Vryheid van spraak en die “etiese aktiwiteit van denke”

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dc.contributor.author Van Marle, Karin
dc.date.accessioned 2009-06-22T12:12:28Z
dc.date.available 2009-06-22T12:12:28Z
dc.date.issued 2009-03
dc.description.abstract In this article, following the work of Hannah Arendt, the author argues that thought should be placed at the centre of the reflection on freedom of speech. For Arendt thinking is a necessary condition for the existence of an active political sphere and democratic politics. The absence of thought on the other hand is central to totalitarianism. Arendt, reflecting on the trial of Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichman, noted how the absence of any activity of thinking and the rigid following of rules and clichés resulted in evil – what she calls the banality of evil. The author focuses on the limits of liberal legal approaches to respond adequately to the issue of freedom of expression, mainly because of the absence of thought and the preference for predictable applications of rules and interpretations of rights in these approaches. Firstly, the author exposes the law’s preoccupation with fairness, legitimacy, functionalism and economic benefi t to the detriment of ethical thought and justice. Thereafter, the author recalls the argument by Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld related to the indeterminacy of rights, as discussed by Joseph Singer. Hohfeld made a radical intervention in traditional liberal legal assumptions by formulating the category of no-right, thereby exposing the situations in which an individual, although she suffered damage, will have no recourse in law. In the context of freedom of speech the category of no-right and the reality of damage without recourse in law can play out in many ways – someone could suffer damage because of speech without recourse to law or someone’s right to speech could be infringed without recourse to law. Thirdly, Jacgues Derrida’s deconstructive notion of justice as aporia is discussed to link up with the urgency of thought and judgement in the face of instrumental rule-following. Finally the author considers the application of Derrida’s notion of auto-immunity/ self-destruction to the law and particularly to the right to freedom of expression. If the legal right to freedom of speech has the tendency to self destruct each attempt to protect one kind of speech would always already also have destructed and prevented that same speech. The author argues that thought should guide the allowance and limitation of freedom of speech and not a predictable application of rules, dogma and jargon. She concludes with reference to an application of Arendt’s insistence on the link between the activity of thinking and democratic politics within the context of the politics that surrounded the proposed legislation on same sex marriages, citing in this regard Jaco Barnard’s recent work, which persuasively shows how thoughtless behaviour allowed moments of a totalitarian politics. en_US
dc.description.abstract In hierdie artikel argumenteer die skrywer in navolging van Hannah Arendt dat denke sentraal moet wees in besinning oor vryheid van spraak. Denke is vir Arendt onlosmaaklik gekoppel aan ’n aktiewe politieke sfeer en demokratiese politiek. Die afwesigheid van denke daarteenoor staan sentraal tot totalitarisme. Die skrywer fokus op die beperktheid van liberale regsbenaderings om bevredigend vryheid van spraak te hanteer. Eerstens word die bemoeienis van die reg met billikheid, legitimiteit, funksionalisme en ekonomiese wins in plaas van met etiese denke en geregtigheid uitgewys. Daarna word Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld se argument oor die onbepaalbaarheid van regte soos uiteengesit deur Joseph Singer bespreek. Derdens word Jacques Derrida se dekonstruktiewe siening van geregtigheid as aporia voorgehou. Laastens pas die skrywer Derrida se siening van outo-immuniteit/selfvernietiging toe op die reg en spesifi ek vryheid van spraak. Die skrywer voer aan dat denke – en nie resepmatige toepassing van geykte reëls, dogma of jargon nie – bepalend moet wees in regulering van vryheid van spraak. Sy sluit af met verwysing na Jaco Barnard se toepassing van Arendt se aandrang op die verband tussen denke en demokratiese politiek op die aanvaarding van wetgewing oor eendersgeslagtelike huwelike in Suid-Afrika, wat oortuigend aantoon hoe gedagtelose optrede totalitêre politiek toelaat.
dc.identifier.citation Van Marle, K 2009, 'Vryheid van spraak en die “etiese aktiwiteit van denke”', Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 32-42. [http://www.journals.co.za/ej/ejour_akgees.html] en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0041-4751
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2263/10487
dc.language.iso Afrikaans en_US
dc.publisher Suid Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap & Kuns en_US
dc.rights Suid Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap & Kuns en_US
dc.subject Hannah Arendt en_US
dc.subject Jaco Barnard en_US
dc.subject Jacques Derrida en_US
dc.subject Wesley Newcombe Hohfeldt en_US
dc.subject Indeterminacy of rights en_US
dc.subject Freedom of speech en_US
dc.subject Njabulo Ndebele en_US
dc.subject Joseph Singer en_US
dc.subject Totalitarianism en_US
dc.subject Totalitarisme en_US
dc.title Vryheid van spraak en die “etiese aktiwiteit van denke” en_US
dc.title.alternative Freedom of speech and the "ethical activity of thinking" en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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