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**M-GOVERNANCE FOR COUNTERING POLICE CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA – A  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE PUBLIC COMPLAINT RAPID  
RESPONSE UNIT’S IMPACT ON FEMALE COMPLAINANTS**

By

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This dissertation is dedicated to the students and academics who lost their lives, livelihoods, and loved ones during the COVID-19 pandemic, which heavily impacted the completion of this study and many others of its time.

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## **DECLARATION**

I, **Kristen van de Venter**, declare that this dissertation on “M-governance for Countering Police Corruption in Nigeria – A Phenomenological Study of the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit’s Impact on Female Complainants,” is a result of my own single-handed endeavours and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. The dissertation is being submitted for the degree of Master of Political Sciences in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. It has not previously been submitted for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

Kristen van de Venter

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Pretoria, August 2021

## **ETHICS STATEMENT**

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this dissertation, has obtained, for the research described in this work, the applicable research ethics approval (see Appendix D).

The author declares that she has observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of ethics for researchers and the Policy guidelines for responsible research.

Kristen van de Venter

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Pretoria, August 2021

## ABSTRACT

In 2016, the Nigerian Police Force launched a mobile governance initiative known as the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit (PCRRU) to combat the country's issue with widespread police corruption and brutality. The platform leverages the accessibility and prevalence of mobile phones to make reporting corrupt officers easier for civilians and to streamline the process of investigation. However, the Nigerian population still shows intense distrust of the police, coming to a head in 2020 with the #EndSARS protests. Furthermore, studies have shown that women are disproportionately affected by police corruption and brutality compared to other population groups. This study examines how women have interacted with the PCRRU, and how their perceptions of the PCRRU and the NPF have been influenced in various ways. Additionally, the study compares how women view and perceive the impact of the PCRRU to the actual impact that the platform has had on rates of police corruption in Nigeria. The goal of the study is to understand how m-governance can be used as a tool for improving governance in the hands of the state, as well as how civilians feel about m-governance in its capacity to improve governance, with a specific focus on women as a group that is disproportionately targeted by the state. A phenomenological approach was adopted in this study in order to centre the lived experiences of women, which have been historically underreported. The study uses semi-structured interviews and some relevant quantitative data in its analysis of the PCRRU and its impact. The study finds that, while m-governance can have a notable impact on public perceptions, it cannot precede "real world" political will and engagement with a given issue. In the case of the PCRRU, the impact on public perception and on corruption as a whole has been extant, but negligible. Overall, the impact the platform has had on the lived experiences of women have been limited to isolated cases, rather than a large-scale systemic reform. Based on these findings, the study recommends the adjustment of the PCRRU as a tool to combat corruption, and indeed m-governance strategies as a whole, to rather be a supplement to a wider policy or set of policies, as opposed to a solution on its own. This is especially relevant in other African countries, where the accessibility of mobile technology compared to other forms of communication is quickly making m-governance initiatives a norm.

*Keywords: M-governance, police corruption, police brutality, Nigeria, political phenomenology, governance*

## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3G	Third Generation Cellular Network (a network communication standard for accessing the internet)
4G	Fourth Generation Cellular Network (a network communication standard for accessing the internet)
ADSL	Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
AIG	Assistant Inspector General
AU	African Union
AUDA-NEPAD	African Union Development Agency - New Partnership for Africa's Development
BBM	BlackBerry Messenger
COMPPART	Community Policing Partners
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICT4D	Information and Communication Technology for Development (a Nigerian e-government development plan)
IG	Inspector General
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PC	Personal Computer
PCRRU	Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SMS	Short Message Service
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
Wi-Fi	Wireless Fidelity (see WLAN)
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network

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# CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

## 1.1 Introduction and Context

Nigerian law enforcement has been criticised by various international advocacy groups for extortion, brutality, and extrajudicial executions (Amnesty International, 2002, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2009). According to recent Afrobarometer data, 68% of Nigerians believe that “most” or “all” members of the police force are corrupt (Afrobarometer and Practical Sampling International, 2017). Furthermore, ordinary citizens have heavily criticised the police force, culminating in the 2020 #EndSARS protests (Onwuegbuchulam, 2020).

The #EndSARS protests in 2020 involved mostly young people protesting against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and advocated for its dissolution (Onwuegbuchulam, 2020). SARS had been heavily criticised for excessive use of force and unfair profiling for several years before the #EndSARS movement began (Amnesty International, 2016). #EndSARS was originally a social media movement founded in 2017 in reaction to the SARS unit becoming a danger to society, particularly youth, with multiple reported human rights violations perpetrated by the squad (Onwuegbuchulam, 2020). Following a viral video in which SARS officers allegedly shot an unarmed civilian in October 2020, in-person protests took place, resulting in multiple civilian deaths (*ibid.*). The #EndSARS protests were also notable in the visibility of female protesters leading the movement (Yvonne, 2020). This is an important factor to note, as women are uniquely at risk of suffering at the hands of corrupt police officers (Aborisade and Oni, 2019).

Though data consistently shows that men are more frequently targeted by officers than women, women in Nigeria tend to have less trust in police and are more likely to be sexually harassed and assaulted (Alemika, 2013; Ayodele, 2015; Aborisade and Oni, 2019; Obaji, 2020). However, there are inconsistencies in available data regarding the rates at which women are affected by corruption. Elntib *et al* (2018) show that there are contradictions between studies on how women view the police compared to their male counterparts, with some studies finding that women tend to have more positive views of the police than men, while others found the inverse. This may be accounted for in two ways. First, confidence in the police is heavily influenced by personal encounters with them (Ayodele and Aderinto, 2014; Ayodele, 2015), and as such it is difficult to make generalisations, especially with smaller sample sizes. Second, there is reason to believe that official data regarding the rates at

which women are targeted by police is flawed. There is evidence to suggest that assault cases and victimisation of women involving police officers are going unreported for fear of further retaliation, stigmatisation, and lack of faith in the competency of police (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Alemika, 2013; Aborisade and Obileye, 2017). Furthermore, official accounts of women being detained is contradicted by personal accounts by detainees. For example, SARS officials assert that they do not detain women in SARS facilities, but transfer them to police stations. However, a woman who was allegedly detained at a SARS facility in Awkuzu claimed that she was detained with ten other women, including one who was pregnant. This is substantiated further by a medical doctor who treated six female victims who were tortured at a SARS facility (Amnesty International, 2016). Alemika (2013) also found that official statistics on victimisation tends to be out of date or inaccurate. As such, there is reason to believe that women's perspectives on police corruption in Nigeria are neglected in literature and the consideration of anti-corruption policies.

One of Nigeria's countermeasures against corruption is the mobile governance (m-governance) initiative known as the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit (PCRRU). This study examines how the PCRRU, as a form of m-governance, can alter the perceptions of police corruption for female complainants, as well as how it affects the prevalence of police corruption. Ample research has been done on electronic governance (e-governance) and its use in politics and security – exemplified by journals such as the *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* and the *Journal of E-Governance* – a gap in literature exists with regards to m-governance specifically, which is a small, but rapidly growing field. A study of perceptions of m-governance is thus prudent as an initial look at the viability of such governance strategies in Nigeria, and Africa in general.

The PCRRU is a system intended to allow citizens to report corrupt police activity using a number of available channels in order to draw the attention of police “higher-ups” to specific cases (Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018). The PCRRU supposedly connects complainants to officers dedicated to responding to distress calls. In theory, the investigation should immediately be handed to officers and investigators at the “top echelon” of police, skipping the mid-level “red tape” (Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018: 98). Citizens can make use of phone calls, WhatsApp, SMSes, Twitter, Facebook, e-mails, and Blackberry Messenger (BBM) to submit their reports (Nigeria Police Force, 2017). The goal is to resolve cases of corruption to build trust between the police force and citizens (Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018).

To overcome the obstacles faced by most e-governance initiatives, the PCRRU capitalises on the comparatively high availability, low cost, and usability of mobile phones as opposed to more expensive fixed infrastructure devices, like personal computers, in Nigeria in a shift to m-governance. Nigeria has the most mobile phone subscriptions in Africa (Bailard and Livingston, 2014), and the latest general survey by Afrobarometer found that 84% of Nigerians owned their own mobile phone, with a further 8% having someone else in their household own one (Afrobarometer and Practical Sampling International, 2017). This statistic can be broken down by gender, showing that 77% of women have their own mobile phone, and 13% have someone in their household who owns one (*ibid.*). The PCRRU leverages this accessibility by making report submission methods mobile-friendly.

The PCRRU is thus a system based on online and mobile communication between citizen and state. It is among attempts at introducing e-governance to Nigeria, including election monitoring programmes, telehealth initiatives, and provision of government information online (Fatile, 2012; Ajao and Wielenga, 2017). However, Nigeria faces significant obstacles in implementing e-governance systems, due to a lack of infrastructure, access to information and communication technologies (ICTs), and training on the use of such ICTs among citizens (Fatile, 2012). M-governance is thus, theoretically, a viable avenue through which good governance initiatives can be pursued. Part of the goals of the study is to examine how viable m-governance is in practice and is further elaborated on in a later section in this chapter.

This dissertation argues that m-governance can be a powerful tool for influencing public opinion, but for such an initiative to succeed in influencing perceptions in a positive way, political will and “real world” change must come first. As will be shown through the illustration of lived experiences, the PCRRU can be read as a lesson in negative (or neutral at best) perception influence. A lack of accountability for corrupt officers beyond the act of reporting, which in itself is frequently unfruitful, leaves citizens disenfranchised and diminishes their faith in the PCRRU.

## **1.2 Research Problem**

A research problem is, broadly, a phenomenon or question that requires investigation, a sort of “puzzle” for the researcher to solve (Creswell, 2014). In this case, that “puzzle” is to determine how effective m-governance can be in addressing existing governance issues, such as police corruption. Much research has been done on the use of technology in politics, even with regards to e-governance and security issues. The gap in literature exists in the specific

use of m-governance initiatives, i.e., attempts at improving governance by taking advantage of the accessibility of mobile technology compared to other technologies.

The Nigerian case is especially interesting because of the existing successes of m-governance in the country in election monitoring (Bailard and Livingston, 2014), and the well-documented nature of police corruption. Furthermore, though women have been disproportionately affected by corrupt police officers, there is comparatively little research on their experiences (Aborisade and Oni, 2019). The above circumstances create a clear research problem, namely the impact of m-governance on police corruption in the experiences of women in Nigeria.

### **1.3 Research Question**

A research question is a means of focusing a research problem, specifying what exactly the study aims to find out (Kumar, 2011). In this study, the main research question is the following:

How does m-governance impact police corruption that specifically affects women in Nigeria, through the PCRRU, if at all?

The sub-questions are as follows:

- 1) What are women's perceptions of the NPF?
- 2) How does the use of the PCRRU affect women's perception of the NPF?
- 3) What is the impact of the PCRRU on the rates of police corruption?
- 4) How can m-governance alter perceptions of police corruption, if at all?

### **1.4 Rationale**

In 2020, dissatisfaction with police brutality came to a boiling point, resulting in the #EndSARS protests and the following Lekki Massacre and replacement of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) with the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team (Adebajo, 2020a; Al Jazeera, 2020; BBC News, 2020). There is clearly dissatisfaction with the police force and the government's handling of corrupt officials. This study does not focus on corruption itself or people's experiences at the hands of corrupt police officers, nor is it within the scope of the study to judge the government's overall handling of the situation. However, there is absolutely a need to gauge how people have experienced specific attempts at reforming the NPF – what works, what does not – and this study is aimed at the PCRRU as such an attempt, situated in its broader context of m-governance as a tool for good

governance. This study is therefore significant in its attempt to understand the scope and limitations of m-governance in specific scenarios, including the use of m-governance platforms to combat police corruption. The goals of the study are set out in more detail in the following section.

## **1.5 Research Aim and Objectives**

The research aim and objectives encapsulate the goals that the study will achieve, defining both the main course of action and sub-goals (Kumar, 2011). As mentioned, the study focuses on one particular implementation of m-governance – the PCRRU – and as such its aims do not include an analysis on police corruption in Nigeria and government attempts to combat it as a whole. The full details of what the study does intend to achieve are set out below.

### **Research aim:**

To understand how the PCRRU, as an m-governance initiative, has impacted both the perception of police corruption and the actual levels of police corruption in Nigeria, focusing specifically on the experiences of women.

### **Research objectives:**

- 1) To understand how women feel about and perceive the NPF.
- 2) To determine how women's experiences with the PCRRU impacted their perception of the police force, if at all.
- 3) To establish whether the PCRRU has made an impact on actual levels of police corruption involving female civilians, regardless of perceptions.
- 4) To determine whether m-governance is capable of altering perceived and/or actual levels of police corruption towards women in Nigeria.

## **1.6 Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual and theoretical framework serves to establish a set of working definitions for the two core concepts around which the study revolves, namely police corruption and m-governance. Additionally, this section clarifies how police corruption is inherently a matter of governance and the state, as well as how police corruption and m-governance are linked via the PCRRU. This section is divided into three parts, in which each concept is defined separately, and lastly connected in the final part. In this final part of the conceptual and theoretical framework, the author makes explicit the links between the core concepts, the research phenomenon, and politics as a whole.

### **1.6.1 Police Corruption**

Police corruption is highly variable by country in terms of a legal definition. While all attempts at defining police corruption focus on inappropriate behaviour or abuse of power, it tends to be quite debatable what constitutes such behaviours (Kratcoski, 2002). It is therefore important to explain exactly what is meant by the term “police corruption” in the context of this study to avoid ambiguities. This is done by developing a working definition from two key classifications of what police corruption entails, and then further narrowing it down by applying it to the case study of Nigerian women, supplemented by additional descriptions.

The first typology is the eight discrete types of police corruption by Roebuck and Barker (1973). First, there is “corruption of authority,” in which a member of the police force receives material gain in an unearned and unauthorised manner, by virtue of their occupation, e.g. accepting bribes in any form (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 428). Second, police officers may accept free goods and services in their community, usually from legitimate business owners trying to improve their relationship with the police. This is known as “kickbacks” (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 429). Third is “opportunistic theft,” where police officers take items from crime scenes, arrestees, incapacitated or dead citizens, or confiscated goods (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 430). Fourth, police officers perform “shakedowns,” making use of their knowledge of illicit activities to solicit bribes from the perpetrator in exchange for “looking the other way” (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 30). Fifth, police participate in the “protection of illegal activities,” where police allow and condone lawbreaking. This is usually present in communities with high levels of organised crime or vice-related crime. Members of the police force may be directly involved with crime or may shield organisations from consequences. This also takes the form of “blue laws,” which are informal laws set up by police for their own material gain (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 431). Sixth, there could be “fixing,” in which a police officer agrees to tamper with an investigation in such a way as to prevent prosecution in exchange for material gain. This is generally requested by persons wanting to retain a clean criminal record (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 432). Seventh, officers sometimes buy, sell, and barter duties and benefits, such as vacation days, assignments, and promotions. This is called “internal payoffs” (Roebuck and Barker, 1973). Last, there are “direct criminal activities,” which are crimes committed by police officers, not incited by a third party or supported by the police force (Roebuck and Barker, 1973: 433).

This definition of police corruption is very broad and must be narrowed down. This is done by applying the second core classification, namely the three dimensions of police corruption

proposed by Sayed and Bruce (1998). Firstly, the action must be undertaken for personal or organisational gain (Sayed and Bruce, 1998b). Secondly, the action must make use of police authority or resources in an illegitimate way (*ibid.*). Lastly, the illegitimate activity must be done through the power of the perpetrator's occupation. Thus, it is not police corruption if an officer does something illegal – the action must be achieved through their position in the police force (*ibid.*)

These three dimensions are immediately in conflict with aspects of Roebuck and Barker's typology, notably the exclusion of crimes committed in a private capacity. Thus, these two must be reconciled to create a working definition of police corruption for the purposes of the study.

A working definition is created by retaining Sayed and Bruce's three dimensions as a lens to through which to view Roebuck and Barker's typology and narrowing them down to fit both Sayed and Bruce's dimensions and Nigerian women's experiences.

Firstly, the following activities from Roebuck and Barker's typology will not be adopted because they do not apply to the situation, or are incongruent with Sayed and Bruce's (1998) three dimensions: kickbacks, opportunistic theft, internal benefits, and direct criminal activities in private capacity.

Secondly, activities that are included in this paper's working definition can be narrowed down with some specifics about the research phenomenon. Women are most affected by police corruption involving brutality and abuse of power, through physical and sexual assault (Aborisade and Oni, 2019). This is so entrenched in police culture that it cannot be considered direct criminal activity, but rather corruption of power and protection of illegal activities (Roebuck and Barker, 1973), both of which fall within the three dimensions that are used in this study (Sayed and Bruce, 1998). Victims may also be manipulated into retracting accusations levelled at police, which falls within the realm of "fixing," (Roebuck and Barker, 1973). Furthermore, the NPF is known to solicit bribes and resort to extortion, exploitation, and force in the event of failure to pay the bribe (Guttschuss, 2010). This falls under shakedowns and corruption of authority (Roebuck and Barker, 1973).

The working definition of police corruption for the purposes of this research endeavour thus includes fixing, police brutality, corruption of power, extortion, and shakedowns. All of the above must be in line with the three dimensions set up by Sayed and Bruce (1998). This is further narrowed down to specifically focus on such activities which involve female civilians.

Below, the author continues by setting out a working definition for m-governance, before linking it to both the relevant case and to the definition of police corruption delineated above.

### **1.6.2 M-governance**

M-governance is a lesser-known subset of e-governance that is slowly gaining popularity in both research and real-world implementation (Ingrams, 2015). It focuses particularly on the capabilities of mobile devices such as cellular phones, smartphones, tablets, and other small, highly portable devices, as opposed to ICTs in general (OECD and ITU, 2011). Mobile technology does not require the individual to invest in infrastructure beyond a device, and makes use of wireless networks, such as 3G, to connect devices to cell towers. Cell towers are the main infrastructure needed for mobile technology, and are more affordable for governments and private companies to invest in than wired connections (Dicken, 2015).

In order to understand m-governance, it is necessary to first explain the core purpose of its parent concept, e-governance. A simple definition of e-governance is the use of ICTs and web-based technologies as a means of improving government functions and services. The purpose of e-governance is to improve the relationship between government and civil society (Fatile, 2012). This is done by achieving four main goals:

E-governance should (a) restructure government processes in a way that improves efficiency (Adeyemo, 2011; Fatile, 2012); (b) increase transparency while decreasing corruption, because automation reduces the capacity for human error (Adeyemo, 2011); (c) improve speed, accessibility, convenience, and cost-efficiency of government services through better coordination of the bureaucracy (Adeyemo, 2011; Fatile, 2012); and (d) have a positive effect on the quality of a democracy, by making it easier for citizens to engage politically (Adeyemo, 2011).

In Africa, meeting these goals is challenging, because the continent lacks infrastructure like fibre-optic cabling, and people often do not have access to fixed-line technology like desktop computers (Dicken, 2015). In Nigeria, 73% of people do not personally own a computer, or have someone in their household who does (Afrobarometer and Practical Sampling International, 2017). However, shifting to m-governance changes things.

M-governance inherits all the goals and characteristics of e-governance, but it is optimised for use on mobile devices. Africa has the fastest growing number of mobile phone subscriptions in the world (Dicken, 2015), with Nigeria having the most subscriptions in Africa (Hellström, 2009; Bailard and Livingston, 2014; Dicken, 2015). In Nigeria, 84% of

people personally own mobile phones, with 43% of people having internet access via their phones. Furthermore, 82% of respondents use their mobile phones on a daily basis (Afrobarometer and Practical Sampling International, 2017). It can therefore be argued that m-governance is more viable in Africa than e-governance, due to its superior ease of use and low cost (Hellström, 2009).

The PCRRU can be considered an m-governance initiative because it is an electronic means of engagement, but it is optimised to be as accessible to citizens as possible, focusing on access to mobile phones, but not necessarily access to the internet. Thus, a smart phone is not needed, making it more affordable. The PCRRU can be accessed via online and offline methods, provided the user has reception and airtime (Nigeria Police Force, 2017). In the following section, the author provides more detail on the PCRRU as the key link between the main concepts of the study, and furthermore links the PCRRU, m-governance, and police corruption as matters of the state.

### **1.6.3 Forging Connections**

This study views politics as “the art of government,” in which politics is defined as affairs which concern the state and the duties of the state towards citizens (Heywood, 2019: 36)

Governance falls within this conception of politics, as it refers to the ways in which civil life is organised, and is one of the key functions of government and the state (*ibid.*). M-governance, as defined above, is a method of governance, and therefore falls within the realm of state affairs.

Furthermore, legitimate states by definition have a security mandate to citizens’ lives and their property (Alozie, 2019: 1). This holds true in Nigeria, where its 1999 Constitution enshrines this duty as “the primary purpose of the government,” (Alozie, 2019: 2). A police force is created as part of the fulfilment of this mandate, playing a key role in the maintenance of law and order within a state (*ibid.*). However, when a police force, such as the NPF, no longer operates within the boundaries of the law, it is committing a form of police corruption, which was defined earlier. Thus, police corruption is a matter of the state, and by extension a matter of governance.

Having established that police corruption falls within the realm of governance, the study further narrows its focus by making use of the typology of governance indicators designed by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The IIAG divides governance into four main categories, each with multiple subcategories (see figure 1.1. for the original

subdivision). The four main categories are as follows: “safety and rule of law;” “participation, rights, and inclusion;” “foundations for economic opportunity;” and “human development” (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). The IIAG also recently added a subdivision of its categories that specifically looks at public perceptions of governance in each of the categories, which is useful as a comparison to the original data gathered for this study. Delving further into the subcategories, one can see that police corruption as defined in this study, is covered in “security and rule of law” in Figure 1.1, under various indicators and sub-indicators (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). These are elaborated on in full in Chapter Four when these measures are analysed alongside interview data. It is, however, important to note that the latest corruption and governance data compiled by the IIAG is from 2019, thus not including changes that occurred leading up to the #EndSARS movement and thereafter.

**Figure 1.1:** A summary of the four categories and their respective subcategories as used in the 2020 IIAG Report.



Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2020: 14-15

In short, police corruption, m-governance, and politics as a whole are tied together by the PCRRU, which is an m-governance initiative by the Nigerian state to combat police corruption as a part of its security mandate to its citizens.

## **1.7 Structure of the Study**

Including the introduction, this study is comprised of five chapters, outlined below.

### **Chapter One: Introduction to the Study**

This chapter provides context for the study, as well as an overview of the research problem, research questions, and a rationale for the research. It also details the aims and objectives of the study, and provides a clear conceptual and theoretical framework. The conceptual and theoretical framework provides working definitions and consolidates links between the main concepts.

### **Chapter Two: Literature Review**

A narrative literature review to synthesise the core debates and contributions within the relevant literature, focusing on m-governance and police corruption.

### **Chapter Three: Research Methodology**

Details of the methodology of the study are discussed in this section, including the research design and methods, methodological approach, instruments, sampling, scope, limitations, and ethical considerations. This chapter also includes details regarding problems encountered and how they were resolved and/or averted.

### **Chapter Four: Results and Discussion**

A detailed analysis of data and discussion of findings induced from the processed data. This chapter also includes the core argument of the study.

### **Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations**

This chapter concludes the main argument of the research and provides recommendations for policymakers considering the implementation of similar systems.

## **1.8 Conclusion**

Chapter I has served to introduce the reader to the key concepts informing this study and set out the main goals and questions of this study. The chapter has also introduced the context of police corruption in Nigeria as an endemic, institutional issue, in which women face unique

but underreported challenges, as well as how public dissatisfaction reached a peak with the #EndSARS protests in 2020. The study centres the lived experiences of women in its examination of police corruption – as defined in the conceptual framework in this chapter – through a phenomenological approach. Furthermore, the study examines the implementation of the PCRRU, which is an m-government initiative introduced to counteract police corruption, with the aim of comparing public perceptions of the PCRRU to its actual impact. The study also seeks to determine what sort of implications the PCRRU may have for m-governance as a whole and how it impacts public perceptions. In future chapters, the study will show that the PCRRU has had a minor impact on actual and perceived levels of police corruption since its implementation. It will also affirm previous studies, which are discussed in the literature review, that no m-governance initiative can affect substantial changes without sufficient political will and commitment to “real world” changes.

## CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

A literature review is an overview of relevant and seminal works in a given field, which inform a given study. Literature reviews are used to introduce the reader to a large body of work and to contextualise a new body of work in its broader knowledge base (Kumar, 2011; Onwuegbuzie and Frels, 2016). This chapter is a narrative literature review structured thematically, with each theme (and therefore each section of the review) corresponding to a research objective. Each theme deals with the core debates and most important past findings relating to the subject matter of the theme.

Firstly, this chapter provides a brief historical overview of the NPF, explaining the current state of public perception, specifically from female Nigerians, in terms of behaviour exhibited by police. Secondly, the chapter covers the small amount of research that has been done on the PCRRU as opposed to traditional means of reporting corruption, including efficacy and public perceptions. Lastly, the chapter discusses core debates regarding the implementation of m-governance and its effect on public perceptions, making use of examples of other m-governance initiatives on the African continent and lessons learned from them. The literature review concludes that Nigeria is theoretically in an ideal position for the PCRRU to be effective at influencing women's perceptions, but that low public trust and neglect of women's unique challenges are likely to be major stumbling blocks. Through this, the chapter identifies the data gaps that this dissertation seeks to fill.

### 2.2 Perceptions of the NPF

Nigeria's colonial past introduced a systemic culture of corruption, which is conspicuously present in the country's police force (Carter and Marenin, 1980; Hope, 2018). The NPF was founded during British colonial rule with the explicit role of protecting European colonisers and their property (Jonah and Ityonzughul, 2018; Alozie, 2019). When Nigeria gained independence, police loyalty shifted to those who inherited economic and political power left vacant by British colonists. As such, it is often argued that the main function of the NPF is to defend the status quo (*ibid.*). This runs contrary to the legal function of the NPF set out in the 1999 Constitution and the Nigeria Police Act 2020 (Federation of Nigeria, 2020; Alemika and Chukwuma, no date), which then begs the question: "why is this culture of corruption so persistent?"

Though there are clearly defined parameters regarding the duties of the NPF, it is impossible to argue that the NPF in its current state operates within its own legal parameters. In understanding why this is the case, this dissertation applies a Coxian lens to the situation. The reason for this is threefold: firstly, Cox's view of historicism, in which the context and history of a given phenomenon play a significant role in understanding the present (Mittelman, 1998; Leysens, 2000), is applicable in the case of the NPF, seeing as its culture of corruption can be clearly traced to its colonial origins (Jonah and Ityonzughul, 2018). Secondly, Cox argues that, when illicit or covert actions take place within a state on a large and fairly organised scale, it tends to be in reaction to a status quo of bad governance (Cox and Schechter, 2002, pp. 119–126). While Cox's work here focused on organised crime specifically (*ibid.*), the author would argue that, given that corruption in the NPF necessarily includes illicit actions on an organisational scale for personal gain at the expense of civilians (see Chapter I), it seamlessly fits Cox's description of "the covert world," (Cox and Schechter, 2002, pp. 119–126). Lastly, Cox draws heavily on Marxism in his critique of political economics, and as such shows that exploitation of labourers – police, in this case – necessarily leads to a state of conflict and disorder in some capacity (Mittelman, 1998).

Given that NPF officers are notoriously underpaid and untrained, are afforded little to no safety in their working conditions and tend to have poor living conditions, there is clearly a socio-economic element to their actions (Chinwoku, 2013; Alemika and Chukwuma, no date). Thus, applying the Coxian lens, it becomes clear that there is a top-down structural issue in the way that the state treats and manages law enforcement, as well as an entrenched historical culture, which is contributing to an ongoing, persistent issue. However, Cox's conception of structure and agency posits that structures are created by agents, and similarly can be dismantled by agents (Mittelman, 1998). This would suggest that a top-down solution would be required to solve a top-down problem, although socio-economic context now casts doubt on whether a measure such as the PCRRU could be enough.

Regardless of the structural reasons for the endemic culture of corruption in the NPF, this culture culminated in the 2020 #EndSARS protests and following government backlash. The #EndSARS movement was founded in 2017, partially in protest of the NPF's use of profiling and disproportionate targeting of young people, especially young men. Though #EndSARS was initially focused on the Special Anti-Robbery Squad and the NPF's treatment of youth as a whole, the 2020 protests quickly grew to include other complaints about corruption, brutality, and unfair treatment from the NPF as well (Burke, 2020; Onwuegbuchulam, 2020;

Yvonne, 2020). The dissatisfaction with police corruption and brutality, as well as the inequality in how these issues affect the population, is a well-documented phenomenon evidenced by numerous studies and reports (see, for example Amnesty International, 2002, 2008, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Guttschuss, 2010; Aborisade and Obileye, 2017; Aborisade and Oni, 2019).

According to Alemika (2013), men tend to be targeted by police more frequently than women. The occurrence of criminality among men, and by extension their mistreatment by police, is also more prevalent than among their female counterparts. However, despite men being targeted more frequently than women, women face additional unique forms of victimisation that is not present in reports from male victims (Aborisade and Obileye, 2017; Aborisade and Oni, 2019). Though both sexes face similar forms of physical abuse, intimidation, and deprivation, women are more frequently subject to rape, sexual harassment, and the denial of gender-based needs (Aborisade and Oni, 2019). Female arrestees were also denied arrestee rights such as making a phone call unless they agreed to engaging in sexual acts with officers (*ibid.*).

Though the NPF has been known to commit sexual violence against both sexes as a form of torture, it is more frequently used against women and girls (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Attacks of this nature also take place against female civilians unprompted and outside of the contexts of criminal investigations, where police will make use of their authority and weapons to coerce women and girls and sexually assaulting them (*ibid.*). This is not restricted to male officers; female officers will often be involved in coercion and cover-ups as well. Furthermore, local women's rights organisations, such as Project Alert on Violence Against Women, assert that there is reason to believe that the prevalence of sexual assault committed by police officers is much higher than reported data shows (Project Alert on Violence Against Women, 2000, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2005). This is because the vast majority of cases are not reported due to the risk of stigma and fear of intimidation and retaliation from police (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Amnesty International (2016) found that corruption and brutality extended to SARS, especially in Anambra state. Despite the unit's denial of detaining women, Amnesty International (2016) was able to verify that women were detained, tortured, and denied basic needs at SARS facilities. Human rights abuses committed by SARS officers in Anambra state played a key role in igniting the 2020 #EndSARS protests (Adebajo, 2020b).

Given the well-documented nature of corruption and brutality committed by the NPF and the eruption of protest action against the NPF and specifically its SARS unit in 2020, it is no surprise that the perceptions of police are generally very negative (Amnesty International, 2016; Adebajo, 2020b; Onwuegbuchulam, 2020). Below, Table 2.1 summarises public opinion data on police separated by gender from Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer and NOI Polls, 2020). The data is represented as a percentage, but Afrobarometer notes that these percentages frequently do not add up to 100 perfectly due to the way in which the data has been rounded (Afrobarometer and NOI Polls, 2020).

**Table 2.1:** Afrobarometer data on police separated by sex

	Male	Female
<b>Question: How much do you trust the police?</b>		
Not at all	49.6	51.3
Just a little	23.3	23.7
Somewhat	16.8	15.4
A lot	8.8	7.3
Refused to answer	0.1	0.1
Do not know	2.4	2.2
<b>Question: How many of the police do you think are involved in corruption?</b>		
None	3.9	5.5
Some	28.4	26.0
Most	35.6	35.5
All	26.3	24.7
Refused to answer	-	0.2
Do not know	5.7	8.1
<b>Question: Can ordinary people in Nigeria report incidents of corruption without fear, or do they risk retaliation or other negative consequences if they speak out?</b>		
Can report without fear	18.8	14.4
Risk retaliation	84.0	83.2
Refused to answer	-	0.1
Do not know	1.2	2.3
<b>Question: How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour for a</b>		

police officer in order to get assistance in the past year?		
Never	3.0	2.2
Once or twice	3.8	3.0
A few times	2.9	1.7
Often	4.0	2.1
Not applicable	86.3	90.9
Do not know	-	0.1
Question: How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour for a police officer when you encountered them in situations like checkpoints, identity checks, or during investigations?		
Never	15.8	13.4
Once or twice	15.4	9.8
A few times	10.3	6.4
Often	13.9	10.9
Not applicable	43.2	58.7
Refused to answer	-	0.1
Do not know	1.3	0.7

**Source:** (Afrobarometer & NOI Polls, 2020)

From this Afrobarometer data, one can gather that public trust of police is very low, and the perceived prevalence of corruption in the NPF is very high, with little difference between the sexes. This affirms past analyses which indicate that differences in public perceptions of police between genders are inconsistent and likely context-specific (Elntib *et al.*, 2018). However, the history and existing reportage on the NPF suggest that general perceptions of the police are overall negative. This study will seek to confirm whether participant views are in line with general views to account for potential contextual differences, before determining whether the PCRRU has had an effect on their perceptions.

### 2.3 Effects of the PCRRU

This section handles the existing literature corresponding to the research objectives which seek to determine the impact of the PCRRU on perceptions and on actual rates of corruption and brutality cases affecting women in Nigeria. These two objectives are grouped together because they form the bulk of the data gap surrounding the PCRRU as an m-governance

initiative and how it impacts women's perceptions, as identified in Chapter I. As such, the existing literature is sparse and centred around shared themes.

The PCRRU itself has not been studied extensively in an academic sense, though there are a few studies on m-governance initiatives and police corruption reportage that briefly touch on the PCRRU. Amusan and Saka (2018), for example, investigated the efforts of the PCRRU as a part of their broader study on issues faced and caused by the NPF in democratic Nigeria. They found that the PCRRU, among other anti-corruption measures deployed by the NPF, had limited success. The NPF's chequered past and low public trust levels posed a major hurdle to the PCRRU achieving more than a few isolated instances of success (Amusan and Saka, 2018).

Odeyemi and Obiyan (2018), in their comprehensive study of the PCRRU as an attempt to improve police-citizen relations in Nigeria, provide most of the extant academic literature on the PCRRU. Their study found that there were constraints to using the PCRRU effectively, including poverty, illiteracy, older age, lack of infrastructure, cost of access, and distrust of police and technology (Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018). This is despite the comparatively low personal cost and infrastructure investment, superior usability, and high mobile phone penetration in Nigeria (Livingston, 2013; Bailard and Livingston, 2014). Furthermore, citizens tended to far prefer more traditional means of interacting with police and reporting corruption, especially in rural areas. Citizens tended to distrust the PCRRU as an extension of poor police-citizen relations (Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018). Thus, the PCRRU saw limited success. Odeyemi and Obiyan (2018) thus argue that for the PCRRU to be more effective at improving police-citizen relations, said relations must first be improved in a more traditional manner. Additionally, poor funding and potential mismanagement of the PCRRU may even deteriorate accountability and police-citizen relations (*ibid.*).

The sparse information on the PCRRU casts a shadow of doubt on the potential of the m-governance initiative to change public perception of the NPF, and indeed for the PCRRU to have an impact on corruption in actuality. However, it is worth pointing out that the doubt cast on the PCRRU is no less dire than public opinion regarding reportage involving the police in general. For example, Ayodele (2015) found that women who were victims of crime were overall unsatisfied with the way in which police handled their reports. This is in line with findings discussed in the previous section regarding the competence of the police in general. Seeing as the PCRRU is a unit of the NPF, rather than an independent body, it is

somewhat predictable that opinions on the PCRRU and the NPF are similar in existing literature.

## **2.4 Effects of M-Governance on Perceptions**

M-governance, as a subtype of e-governance, inherits all the strengths and abilities of e-governance, but with some additional benefits and abilities that can often make it superior to non-mobile e-governance (Hellström, 2009). Its uniquely versatile capabilities could potentially make m-governance an ideal tool for greater state-citizen relations in Africa, but it does come with its own set of challenges as well (Chêne, 2012). While the conceptual framework in Chapter I has already discussed the benefits and challenges of m-governance as a whole, this section of the literature review expands on previous points by reviewing some relevant implementations of m-governance and their effects on public perceptions.

It is important to note that m-governance, and technology in politics as a whole, is not a neutral policy. As with any policy or government initiative, it is open to political manipulation (Bante *et al.*, 2021). In Botswana, e-governance policies were correlated with increased political activeness among citizens and engagement with government (*ibid.*). Similar results regarding improved citizen-state relations with the implementation of specifically m-governance policies came up in studies of populations in the United States of America. Mossey *et al.* (2019), for example, found that m-governance, as opposed to e-governance, successfully bridges the digital divide and increased citizen participation in local government affairs, especially among racial minorities (Mossey, Bromberg and Manoharan, 2019). Furthermore, Yun and Opheim (2012) found that, in general, people with access to the internet tended to be more politically active, and all forms of e-governance, including m-governance improved citizen engagement despite barriers caused by the digital divide. However, they do point out that an improvement in citizen-state relations as a form of “online democracy” is the final stage in a four-step process that tends to occur when governments begin implementing e- and m-governance strategies (Yun and Opheim, 2012). Thus, full acceptance and overall positive perceptions of m-governance is only likely to occur after a long period of development and success (*ibid.*).

Taylor *et al.* (2010) argue that there are even more requirements than practical success of e- and m-governance for citizen perceptions to change (Taylor, Marshall and Amiri, 2010). Before citizens will develop a positive perception of a given initiative, there must first be trust in the government itself and ICTs in general. Both citizens and state must demonstrate a

level of competence in using ICTs effectively for positive perceptions of m-governance to manifest (*ibid.*). Furthermore, m-governance policies should have both actual and perceived relevance as a solution in the location that it is to be used. Though it is important to assess policies and compare them to global standards, policymakers must keep in mind the population that policies are supposed to cater to. M-governance is situational and there is no cookie cutter method (*ibid.*).

The idea of m-governance as a policy that must be tailored to its situation is demonstrated by Livingston (2013). In a study of numerous m-government initiatives on the African continent, it was found that successful implementations of any given attempt – whether top-down (state-driven) or bottom-up (citizen-driven) – required significant citizen buy-in to be successful (Livingston, 2013). Livingston illustrates this with the case of a software known as Ushahidi, which can be deployed and tailored to specific situations, though it is usually used for crisis-mapping. Ushahidi was originally used to monitor election violence in Kenya, where it was an overwhelming success. It was also successfully deployed and implemented to monitor election violence in Nigeria under the name ReclaimNaija (Livingston, 2013; Bailard and Livingston, 2014; Ajao and Wielenga, 2017). However, despite Ushahidi having proven its success in Kenya, a separate initiative in the country that used Ushahidi as its base (known as Hatari and intended to be used to report crime and corruption in Nairobi) was met with limited success due to low citizen engagement. In fact, in a study of over 15 000 deployments of the Ushahidi software, only 500 were successful in the long term (Livingston, 2013).

Nigeria has already demonstrated significant citizen buy-in to m-government initiatives in the success of ReclaimNaija in monitoring its elections, FrontlineSMS in distributing crucial information regarding disasters, violence, and government announcements, CrowdOutAIDS to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, BudgIT to act as an intermediary between citizens and the state regarding matters of the national budget, among others (Livingston, 2013; Piette, 2016). Furthermore, the Nigerian government lists improved and more widespread implementation of e- and m-governance methods in all sectors of government as one of its key future development goals. This is encapsulated in the ITC4D (ICT for Development) plan, which is to aid in Nigeria's achievement of AUDA-NEPAD goals, among other development markers (Adeyemo, 2011).

In summation, m-governance can be used as a tool to manipulate engagement, citizen-state relations, governance, and perceptions of governance. However, how successfully it can be used is highly situational and dependent on citizen buy-in.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Given the substantial citizen buy-in, government commitment, and high mobile penetration in Nigeria, the PCRRU seems to be in a position of guaranteed success. However, one must bear in mind that a previous study indicated some mistrust of the PCRRU by virtue of its relation to the NPF, which has a well-documented history of corruption and brutality. Though distrust of the police and PCRRU by extension does not appear to have consistent gendered differences, there is significant evidence that women face unique challenges compared to men, and some reason to believe that the extent of victimisation of women by police officers is largely under-reported. Thus, there is reason to elevate women's perceptions of the PCRRU, as they are more likely to underreport corruption via traditional means for fear of retaliation. The rest of this dissertation seeks to contribute to the elevation of women's perceptions in m-governance policies, specifically with regards to the PCRRU.

## CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter details the research methodology employed in the study. The chapter begins by discussing the research paradigm that forms the lens through which the study is viewed, namely postpositivism. Following this, the overall design is discussed, along with phenomenology as a methodological approach. After that, the chapter details the research methods, including the scope and delimitation, instruments, data sources, population, and sampling. The chapter then discusses validity and reliability strategies the researcher made use of, followed by the ethical considerations of the study. The chapter concludes with a discussion of limitations of the study and challenges encountered throughout its course.

### 3.2 Research Paradigm

This study is situated within the interpretivist paradigm, in which the idea of a singular, empirically verifiable reality is rejected in favour of a belief in numerous socially constructed realities (Rehman and Alharthi, 2016, p. 55). The implications this paradigm holds for the study are discussed below.

#### 3.2.1 Interpretivism as a research paradigm

Interpretivist research is founded in the belief that realities are actively created by the contexts in which they exist. In terms of ontology, the interpretivist paradigm holds that there can be no universal, unvarying truth, and thus empirical testing of social phenomena is often not applicable (Rehman and Alharthi, 2016, pp. 55–56). Epistemologically, interpretivists believe that reality is subjective, and cannot be interpreted without the interpreter's own context and beliefs affecting the outcome. As such, the positionality of the researcher must always be borne in mind (*ibid.*). Interpretivist methodology demands understanding phenomena through the eyes of those it affects, as opposed to a context-free analysis of phenomena (Rehman and Alharthi, 2016, p. 56). In line with this fundamental assumption, the researcher chose phenomenology as a methodological approach for this study. This decision is discussed further in a following section. Regarding specific methods, interpretivist researchers generate qualitative data and organises it into broad themes through inductive analysis (*ibid.*). Thus, surveys and closed-ended interview questions are usually not applicable to studies in the interpretivist paradigm, which is why this study makes use of open-ended, opinion- and experience-based questions.

Interpretivism has faced heavy criticism for its lack of objectivity and inherent belief in an unverifiable truth. In order to address these valid concerns, interpretivist researchers must employ strategies to ensure validity and reliability of the data (Rehman and Alharthi, 2016, p. 56). The strategies used throughout this study are discussed in a section below.

### **3.3 Research Design**

This study originally intended to make use of an overall qualitative approach, with its major focus on the perceptions and experiences of female Nigerian citizens regarding the NPF and the PCRRU. As such, it took on an emergent design and phenomenological approach in its methods. This design was selected to suit the exploratory nature of the research questions and the study's focus on lived experiences and perceptions of specific populations (Creswell and Poth, 2018). However, in the data collection phase of the dissertation, much quantitative data emerged that was pertinent to the discussion of one of the research sub-questions, and as such, the study made use of some quantitative methods in addition to the main qualitative approach, resulting in a mixed-methods study, as opposed to the originally intended purely qualitative study.

Mixed methods studies involve the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data and integrating them into a cohesive response to research questions (Creswell, 2014). The mixed methods approach is rooted in the assumption that combining qualitative and quantitative data can result in a more complete understanding of the research problem than qualitative or quantitative approaches can have on their own (*ibid.*). This is reflected in the course that this study took, where quantitative data was too relevant to the understanding of the situation to leave out of the discussion. Thus, the overall design of the study moved from an emergent design to an exploratory sequential design (Creswell, 2014).

An exploratory sequential design involves first analysing qualitative data – in this case, semi-structured interviews – and then separately analysing relevant quantitative data, with the goal of gaining a more accurate understanding of the research phenomena (Creswell, 2014).

#### **3.3.1 Phenomenological research**

Phenomenological research intends to determine how participants perceive and experience research phenomena. Phenomenology as a methodology is linked to a rich history of phenomenology as a philosophical movement regarding the nature of consciousness and experience (Usher and Jackson, 2017). Initially, work in the field of phenomenology was purely philosophical, with notable scholars including founder Edmund Husserl, Martin

Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre (*ibid.*). However, phenomenology eventually developed into a methodology rooted in the study of lived experience, and found a particular niche in the study of political phenomena from particular perspectives (Jung, 2016; Usher and Jackson, 2017).

Political phenomenology arose to fill a theoretical gap in political studies between behaviourism and empiricism during the twentieth century in the United States of America (Jung, 2016). However, in more current studies, political phenomenology is used to account for diversity in perceptions and experiences in a globalising, multicultural world (*ibid.*). The main goal of employing a phenomenological methodology in political studies is to challenge the idea of a singular western-centric “truth” by studying the experiences of particular people and how that may differ from what is considered the norm in mainstream political theory (*ibid.*).

In this case, phenomenology is employed to understand the lived experiences of Nigerian women relating to the NPF and the PCRRU. Since political problem-solving is moving increasingly towards mobile and online tools, it is important to pause and understand the perceptions of those who need to use these tools.

### **3.4 Research Methods**

The set of methods that can be used in a given study depends on the paradigm in which the study is situated, as well as the overall research design (Leedy and Ormrod, 2015; Rehman and Alharthi, 2016). This section describes choices made regarding research methods, including decisions about what is and is not included in the data that was collected for the study.

#### **3.4.1 Scope and Delimitation**

The scope and delimitation of a study encapsulates the parameters and boundaries as a result of methodological choices and the boundaries of the research question (Simon and Goes, 2018). The study only covers the use of the PCRRU by adult Nigerian women, specifically when accessed via a mobile device. The research focuses on their experiences with and perceptions of both the NPF and the PCRRU, and how the efficacy of the PCRRU might influence perceptions of the NPF. Furthermore, the study is not focused on m-governance in general, but rather m-governance as a tool in a single sector of governance concerned with security. The study makes use of the typology of governance as a whole, designed by the

Ibrahim Index of African Governance, to narrow its scope, as was discussed earlier in the conceptual framework.

### **3.4.2 Instruments**

The main instrument used in the study was semi-structured interviews with Nigerian women and experts in police reform regarding their experiences with the NPF and the PCRRU. The interview guide (see Appendix B) contained a list of basic topics that had to be touched on, such as how the participant views the NPF and whether they have used the PCRRU, but other than that, the goal is to understand the lived experience and perceptions of participants, rather than to extract specific information (Bryman, 2012). All data from interviews were supplemented with data from secondary sources and apparent statements of fact were cross referenced for accuracy.

### **3.4.3 Data Sources**

The study makes use of a combination of primary and secondary sources, as was briefly touched on in the previous section. Below, detail is provided regarding the nature of both primary and secondary sources used.

#### *3.4.3.1 Primary Sources*

The study made use of two types of primary sources, namely expert opinions and the lived experiences of civilian women. Both sets of data were collected via semi-structured interviews, as explained above.

#### *3.4.3.2 Secondary Sources*

This study used a number of secondary sources, including published journal articles, books, news articles, certain webpages (such as the home pages of organisations relevant to the study), reports, surveys, and some unpublished works.

### **3.4.4 Population**

The sample was selected from adult female Nigerian citizens who have had experience with the NPF and the PCRRU. Women were selected as the target population for two main reasons. Firstly, women are particularly at risk of falling victim to police corruption and violence, and secondly, women are more likely to be silenced after reporting their experiences with the police (Aborisade and Oni, 2019). However, the population had to be extended to accommodate some male interviewees due to limitations discussed in section 3.8.

### 3.4.5 Sampling

In this study, the sample refers to the interviewees selected from the population of Nigerian women, as described above. In order to conduct interviews, the study makes use of purposive sampling in the form of snowball sampling. In this sampling method, a handful of cases are selected as a start, with each participant interviewed directing the researcher in the direction of other pertinent participants (Bryman, 2012). The initial cases were selected via the opportunistic sampling method, in which the researcher capitalised on their access to certain cases and participants (*ibid.*). The starting point for recruitment of interviewees was the Community Policing Partners (COMPPART) Foundation – a Nigerian nongovernmental organisation (NGO) that works on reforming justice and security systems through a number of projects (COMPPART Foundation, 2019), as well as a Nigerian #EndSARS activist based in South Africa with whom the researcher was familiar. Participants were recruited via online communication platforms, due to the constraints resulting from the global COVID-19 pandemic.

During the data collection phase, a total of five interviewees were recruited and interviewed. Due to the limited time and sheer adversity of recruiting and interviewing people in a fully online manner, two male participants were selected in addition to the three female interviewees. These men were chosen for their unique perspectives as an interesting juxtaposition to themes that came up in interviews with women. The limitations leading to the decision to include male participants and settle for a much smaller number of interviews than originally anticipated are discussed in more depth later in this chapter. In table 3.1, a demographic summary of participants is presented, along with motivation for the selection of three interviewees as experts on police corruption in Nigeria.

**Table 3.1** Demographic summary of interview participants

	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4	Respondent 5
Sex	Male	Female	Female	Male	Female
Age range	26-35	26-35	18-25	36-45	26-35
Highest Education	Bachelor's Degree	Bachelor's Degree	Master's Degree	Bachelor's Degree	Master's Degree
Owens a mobile phone	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mobile phone	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

able to connect to internet					
Reliable access to the internet	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sometimes/ patchy access	Sometimes/ patchy access
Reliable cellular signal (phone calls, SMSs)	Yes	Sometimes/ patchy access	Yes	Sometimes/ patchy access	Yes
Used the PCRRU	Yes	Yes	Familiar through work	Familiar through work	No
Personal encounter with corrupt police	Yes	Yes	Yes	Familiar through work	No
Experience regarding relevant topics	N/A	#EndSARS activist leader	#EndSARS activist and political analyst	COMPPART Foundation	Journalist
State	Lagos	Anambra	Kwara (temporarily residing in South Africa)	Akwa Ibom	Lagos

**Source:** Personal Interviews

### 3.5 Data Analysis

Data analysis in a mixed-methods study refers to interpretation of both numerical and non-numerical data in order to discover meaning, patterns, and relationships in the data (Babbie, 2007). Due to the density of information that emerges from semi-structured interviews, the data needed to be narrowed down, reducing it to the most important and relevant parts only (Creswell, 2014). This was done following an adapted version of the qualitative analysis and interpretation process proposed by Creswell (2014), outlined below:

Firstly, raw interview data was transcribed and organised. Secondly, the organised data underwent a manual coding process, in which the researcher extracted the main themes emerging from the data, which formed the core of the findings. Lastly, the coded data was interpreted by applying the research questions and objectives to the data (Creswell, 2014).

In addition to the abovementioned parsing of interview data, secondary data, including some numerical datasets, was reviewed and narrowed down for relevance in a similar manner to the process described above. Small subsets from larger datasets were extracted and portrayed in simplified tables to show only the most relevant secondary data.

### **3.6 Validity and Reliability**

Validity strategies included five different approaches: firstly, data from interviews were triangulated with data from secondary sources found in prominent literature to ensure that themes and findings are justified (Creswell, 2014). Secondly, the researcher clarified possible biases which may have influenced interpretation of the findings (*ibid.*). Thirdly, discrepant data will also be presented in order to create a richer account of the findings, making it more reflective of the actual experiences of participants (*ibid.*). Fourthly, the researcher made use of member checking, by confirming with participants whether they feel they have been accurately represented and contacting some for follow-up interviews as needed (*ibid.*). Lastly, the researcher did not use the same sample for qualitative and quantitative datasets. Qualitative data was gathered from personal interviews, while quantitative data was drawn from secondary sources. This separation of qualitative and quantitative datasets is particularly important with an exploratory-sequential design to prevent duplication and biased results (*ibid.*).

Reliability strategies included the following checks: firstly, the researcher documented procedures of the study as it progressed, in order to ensure consistency in the approaches (Creswell, 2014). Secondly, the researcher guarded against “drifting” of codes, in which definitions shift over time, by frequently checking progress against the original definitions, questions, and objectives (*ibid.*). Lastly, transcripts were checked and compared to original recordings to ensure that no obvious mistakes were made. Excerpts used in the dissertation itself were also checked against transcripts and the recordings. The same care was taken in comparing numerical tables to their original sources to ensure accuracy (*ibid.*).

### 3.7 Ethical Considerations

This section outlines the steps that were taken to ensure protections and compliance with ethical standards during the study. As the data was reliant on interviews, some of which were with vulnerable persons, it was important to ensure protections for all interviewees. Full ethical approval was obtained prior to commencing any interview research.

#### 3.7.1. Participant Protections

All interviewees were afforded the following protections:

1. **Confidentiality** – Information provided by participants was provided in strict confidence to the researcher and will not be disclosed in any identifying manner to third parties (Creswell, 2014)
2. **Anonymity** – Participants' identities are known only to the researcher and will not be made public (*ibid.*).
3. **Informed consent** – All participants had to sign an informed consent form (see Appendix A) and were given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the study. All participants were made fully aware of what the information they provided would be used for prior to their interviews (*ibid.*).
4. **Voluntary participation** – Participants would under no circumstances be coerced into participating in interviews or forced to answer questions that they are not comfortable with. Furthermore, participants were allowed to retract their consent at any point with no repercussions (*ibid.*).
5. **Counselling services** – Considering the fact that many persons would need to recount potentially traumatic events, the researcher had a list of free counselling services available to participants based in both South Africa and Nigeria, which participants could be referred to if the need arose.

#### 3.7.2 Risks and Benefits to Participants

The researcher foresaw no risks to interviewees, other than being asked to respond to potentially uncomfortable questions or being identified. Both of these possible risks were addressed by the protections listed above.

Interviewees did not receive any direct benefits for their participation and did not receive any rewards. They were, however, made aware that their contribution may be useful in advising future policy, and as such there may be an indirect, communal benefit.

### **3.8 Limitations and Challenges Encountered**

Fieldwork for this study was severely constrained by the COVID-19 pandemic. Originally, research was to take place in Nigeria, through contacts at NGOs working in police reform. Unfortunately, restrictions on international travel and a global halt of many sectors, including university shutdowns, resulted in much less time for fieldwork, a substantial delay in research, and a much harder limit on sample size. All interviews had to take place via Skype, which of course demanded all participants have stable access to internet. This severely limited the scope and diversity of persons who could be interviewed, as persons without capable devices and/or reliable internet access could not be recruited or interviewed. Furthermore, poor connectivity and prohibitive costs resulted in a far smaller sample than initially anticipated. As such, generalisation of the experiences collected and analysed during the study is not recommended. This is especially true considering the vast size of Nigeria and the impact of cultural differences on police aggression and perceptions thereof (Personal Interview, 3 March 2021, Online). However, the window of insight that was gained from the small sample is valuable enough on its own to warrant consideration in the implementation or proposal of similar m-governance policies.

### **3.9 Conclusion**

This chapter has detailed the methodology used in the study and all ethical considerations and issues encountered during the data collection process. This chapter also detailed specific data sources, instruments, and procedures that were followed throughout the course of the study. Furthermore, the chapter has delimited the scope and limits of the study, with special regard to the impact of international restrictions due to COVID-19 on the study.

## **CHAPTER IV: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The following chapter details the findings of the study from unstructured interviews and analysis of existing research and statistics. The chapter includes an inductive, phenomenological analysis on recurring themes from interviews and what it means for m-governance, both in terms of the PCRRU and what can be learned from its implementation in future scenarios. It also contains a brief discussion of governance and corruption indicators and reports on police corruption rates from the Nigerian government with regards to the PCRRU. The discussion of results takes place in four parts, corresponding to each of the four research objectives, concluding with a final synthesised argument responding to the overarching research question. This chapter also explains the core argument of this dissertation, that m-governance on its own cannot affect substantial change. Rather, demonstrable political will and “real world” results must precede any given m-governance initiative for significant positive results to be achieved.

### **4.2 Women’s Perceptions and Sentiments towards the NPF**

This section demonstrates the perception that women have towards the NPF as opposed to their male counterparts. Understanding the basic sentiments women have toward the NPF is key to the phenomenological approach and explaining the lived experiences of women in their interactions with the NPF and the influence of the PCRRU on their experiences. In this line of questioning, participants were asked about the ways in which they viewed the NPF and how they thought that compared to their peers. Male and female participants were asked slightly different questions, as it was important to centre the female experience, rather than the male experience for this study. Female participants were asked how they thought their views compared to those of fellow women, and how they thought their and fellow women’s perceptions differed from those of their male counterparts. Male participants were asked whether they thought that there was difference in perceptions of the NPF between men and women in general. From this set of questions, two key themes arose.

Firstly, women overwhelmingly showed distrust and overall negativity towards the NPF. All three women who were interviewed states that they do not trust the police and go out of their way to avoid interactions with police officers. In a particular case, an interviewee judged the police force to be deliberately malicious towards civilians. “The police force in Nigeria is highly incompetent,” she states, “and also very, very wicked. They have no regard for human

rights ... they do not care. They are bullies. ... There are so many things that they could do, but they don't do it and they are comfortable not doing it. Instead, they are more inclined to hurt people.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

This idea was echoed in a more sympathetic light by a male interviewee who works in proximity with the police:

“The police ... are also ignorant of even the laws that they are supposed to enforce. ... How many Nigerian police [officers] have the 1999 Constitution, personal copy? And even if they do, do they have the time to sit down and read? Even if they do read, do they understand the content, the wording, the spirit and letter of the laws and the people that these laws are talking about? Because even when you talk about fundamental human rights, the police will look at it from the angle of antagonism, rather than see that even he or she is also entitled to those rights.” (Personal Interview, 3 March 2021, Online).

This interviewee, in his work with police officers, believed that the antagonistic attitude of police towards civilians was not born of malice, but one born of ignorance and improper training. The notion of improper training for officers came up in several interviews and is also strongly supported by literature. Afon and Badiora (2016) argue that attempts at police reform thus far have been mostly an attempt at garnering positive press, while not addressing the core issue of poor morale, lack of funding, unprofessionalism, and lack of adequate training in line with the law and human rights. Alemika and Chukwuma (no date) corroborate this and add that poor remuneration, lack of manpower, supplies and equipment – which places police in more dangerous situations due to the possibility of being outnumbered – as well as improper working conditions for officers cause further tension between police and the public. Police are presented with a duty that they are never given a clear legal understanding of and are faced with logistical barriers that prevent them from operating within the confines of the law in a manner that is safe for them (Alemika and Chukwuma, no date). This is exacerbated by poor policymaking, high level embezzlement of public funding, and inadequate recruitment policies (Amnesty International, 2002; Chinwoku, 2013; Owen, 2014). Thus, the interviewee’s argument here is consistent with findings from previous studies on the contentious relationship between the police and the public.

Secondly, both male and female participants thought that both men and women had similar negative feelings toward the police but believed that the sources of their distrust were

different. Interviewees thought that women were more afraid of sexual harassment and assault, while men were more afraid of wrongful arrest based on profiling. This difference in fear can be accounted for by looking at past studies, news articles, and human rights investigations on police corruption in Nigeria. According to Adebajo (2020b) and Amnesty International (2002, 2016), men are more likely to be profiled and targeted by police, especially the SARS unit, both as a result of inhumane crime prevention policy and a culture of corruption endemic to the NPF. Men are also more likely to be unfairly detained and tortured than women (Aborisade and Obileye, 2017). Thus, male respondents' fears correspond to what more commonly affects men in terms of police corruption and brutality. Women, however, are more likely to be targets of rape and sexual harassment (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Aborisade and Oni, 2019), which is consistent with what female respondents to this study said they were afraid of.

This study has thus confirmed an overall negative perception of police, with particular distrust, negativity, fear, and avoidance in women. An interviewee summarises the core findings in this regard in the following statement: "The difference is that for women, we are scared of being killed ... for a man who's also scared of being killed ... if he has the money, he is more likely to ... get out of it. For a woman, your money would not save you from being violated. You'll still get raped. Maybe your money will save you from being killed." (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

### **4.3 Women's Experiences with PCRRU and Impacts on Perceptions**

Questions in this category aimed to determine two main things. Firstly, how people felt about the PCRRU in general; and secondly, whether any interaction they may have had personally or heard of from another source altered the way they felt about the NPF. This line of questioning yielded three key notes regarding engagement with the PCRRU and perceived efficacy thereof.

Firstly, participants had different levels of personal engagement with the PCRRU. Out of the three women, only one had personally used the PCRRU, while the other two were familiar with how it worked and knew of various cases involving the PCRRU. Both men were familiar with the PCRRU, one through personal use of the platform and one through professional work in police reform and community policing. Thus, all participants had some degree of knowledge about the PCRRU. However, one must note that this data is likely skewed due to the limits on recruitment of interviewees as discussed in Chapter III. All

interviewees were people with access to the internet and a high level of education, and demonstrated some degree of knowledge on the functioning of the Nigerian justice system. Some interviewees were recruited specifically because of their involvement in police reform, either through journalism, NGOs, or activism (refer back to Chapter III for a breakdown of respondents and their experience on the topic of police corruption). One interviewee indicated that, in his experience working in police reform and community policing, the average person has very limited knowledge regarding their rights, the functionality of the NPF, and what to do when they encounter a corrupt officer. Interestingly, neither of the participants who had personally used the PCRRU indicated reporting the issue to the PCRRU as their first course of action. Furthermore, some interviewees stated outright that they would not consider reporting a case of police corruption to the PCRRU due to lack of trust and perceived lack of results.

Secondly, positive perceptions of and experiences with the PCRRU are the exception, not the rule. Out of the two interviewees who had direct encounters with the PCRRU, one had a positive experience, while the other had a negative experience. However, even the participant who had a positive experience with the PCRRU acknowledged that his experience was in the minority. Below, the two narratives of direct contact with the PCRRU are discussed and supported with additional commentary from other interviewees and secondary sources. Note that the below sections use the word “experience” and not “perception.” This is because, despite opposing experiences, neither interviewee reported a significant change in their perceptions of the PCRRU or the NPF.

#### **4.3.1 A positive experience**

Respondent 1, a male interviewee, described having multiple encounters with corrupt police officers. Following a particular encounter in which ₦10 000 was extorted from him, Respondent 1 took to Twitter to speak out about his experience and was contacted by a representative of the PCRRU, resulting in his case being successfully resolved. Respondent 1’s case drew attention on both social and news media, which he believes may have contributed to the successful resolution thereof.

“I saw my Twitter DM; I saw their message,” Respondent 1 explained. “They even sent another message as a follow up message the next day that they’ve been trying to reach me, that they wanted to know what happened, that they needed to open a call with me ... Then they called me almost immediately and we had a

discussion, they asked for the narration of what happened. I explained everything to the customer representative that was talking to me, which happened to be a police officer. After the discussion, he just transferred my case immediately to ... the respective state that was involved ... They attended to me immediately. ... The commissioner of state police ... called and they listened to me, and immediately they told me ... they've really apprehended these guys, that they are going to deal with them .... So that is what they said that day, then they said they were going to refund my money, that they just needed to confirm if the story was true or not and said I should send my details. You can deduce, I did. And in less than, I think, 30 minutes ... they sent the money back.” (Personal Interview, 6 April 2021, Online).

When asked whether Respondent 1 believed that the PCRRU made a positive impact overall, not just in his own case, he said the following:

“I will say no. ... This is part of a business or a system or a public entity that tends to always want to give or do a sort of window dressing on every matter. ... So, I feel like whatever it is that has been done, yes, it's a good improvement. ... But ... it still looks like more of a window dressing to me. ... Maybe the action that was taken was just something that was taken publicly. And just after that, nothing happened again. ... We've seen over time ... that they just come to the public to do a cover up, sort of. And after doing the cover up, they end up saying things like, ‘Well, we've been able to cover for you, don't go and mess up again.’ ... Sometimes it feels like whatever happens or whatever was corrected, was corrected because it came to the public and they needed to do it, making ... it seems like they needed to make good those damages that have been caused in the eye of the public, and after they've done that, they just move on with the normal system ... What you begin to hear, too, is that these guys don't just do these jobs for themselves. They have put out a return to their top officials. So, it's a top-down problem. ... I feel like the fact that they even try to do that is, sort of, progress.” (Personal Interview, 6 April, Online).

Respondent 1's view of the police reacting only as a way to save face is not unique. The NPF and its anti-corruption strategies have been accused of being “window dressing” rather than a true commitment to change in other studies of police corruption as well (Afon and Badiora,

2016). Furthermore, another respondent unknowingly referenced Respondent 1's case in her own interview, stating that: "I know of a particular case ... it went viral on social media, on Twitter, and the person was asked to make a complaint through the complaints unit, and he did. And then he got his money back ... But the police officers are still there ... nothing has been done to them." (Personal Interview, 28 April 2021, Online). However, as Respondent 2's case in the following section will show, the use of social media and specific engagement with m-governance (as opposed to walking into a police station to report corruption in person) is not necessarily what led to the successful handling of Respondent 1's case.

In summary, Respondent 1 felt that, despite his positive experience and a general improvement of his views on the NPF, it was simply not enough. In his view, the overall issue is not one of ineffective means to report corruption, but of an endemic, top-down culture of corruption. His scepticism is validated by cases such as Respondent 2's, which is discussed in the next section.

#### **4.3.2 A negative experience**

Respondent 2 is a female interviewee who was involved in activism during the #EndSARS protests and a high-profile case of police brutality that received national media attention. Following the disappearance of her brother and reports of his death at the hands of police, Respondent 2 made multiple attempts to find more information about what happened to her brother and get some form of justice for him. One such attempt included contacting the PCRRU, which unfortunately made no impact.

"At first, I wrote on Twitter about ... what happened with my brother [being] arrested in 2012, November, and since then, we've not seen him. ... the police are telling us that he's dead. ... I wanted justice. I wanted to know why he had to die because in Nigeria, the Constitution ... is clear about how to treat alleged criminals. If my brother was really guilty of the crime, he deserved his day in court, and should have been taken to court where he would ... get his defence and say his own part of the things. But he wasn't given any of these options and he was murdered in cold blood." (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

As in Respondent 1's case, Respondent 2 was contacted by the PCRRU following her appeals on social media. However, Respondent 2's case remains unresolved.

"They gave me a code," she explained, "which I was supposed to use to track the complaint. ... They didn't tell me how I'm supposed to use this code. ... I've been

to the ... police force headquarters to get answers. Like, how am I supposed to use this code? I've also tweeted at them. I've written letters to them, with the code in. ... And, up until now, nothing. So, I just know that the compliant response, the code, ... it's just a show-off to say we are doing something, but they are not doing anything. Because I'm not the only person they have given a code, and nothing came out of it. When you complain online, they will come ask you to make a proper complaint and you do, they give you a code, a tracking code and ... they don't let you know how to use it. And you never get any reply from them. No matter how much you message them, tweet at them, write letters to them, nothing comes out of it.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

In addition to contacting the PCRRU, Respondent 2 has also led protests during #EndSARS, made appeals to the Ministry of Justice and the House of Representatives, contacted the National Human Rights Commission and the Inspector General of Police, and opened a civil case against the NPF with the help of a civil rights attorney.

Elaborating on her experience using the PCRRU, Respondent 2 has the following to say:

“Using it ... grounded my belief that these guys are incompetent, and they do not care. ... When they gave me the code, I won't lie, I had this feeling that, ‘wow, so this might actually be it. This might work.’ ... They now know. They are interested. But then a week later, nothing. Two weeks later, nothing. I started losing hope again. And at some point, I asked myself: ‘Why are you losing hope? Why did you even ever have hope at all that it was going to work? It was obvious that these people don't care. It was obvious.’ It was just me, ... getting my hopes all turned up because I got the code. ... It was a bad experience for me because I really thought that that was going to work.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

Respondent 2's disappointment is echoed by other participants, who further add to the idea of the PCRRU as an exercise in showmanship: “Most of the time this whole complaint just serves as like showmanship,” argued one female participant. “[They] just want to show the citizens that ... this particular agency exists and ... tell them ‘Your complaint has been received,’ but like nothing gets done, like the actual complaint doesn't get addressed. ... I think that's one of the reasons why I'm not really motivated to use the channel.” (Personal Interview, 17 February 2021, Online). Another woman justifies her scepticism, saying that:

“People say that their complaints go unheard or there's no viable solution. There's no accountability.” (Personal Interview, 28 April 2021, Online).

Here one can see that the m-governance aspect of the PCRRU is not what accounts for cases being handled successfully. Both Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 had their cases go viral on Twitter, but only one of them had their case resolved. Furthermore, Respondent 2 took additional steps that did not rely on m-governance mechanisms like the PCRRU and the viral nature of her Tweet, yet her case has still not been resolved. Respondent 2's case is more complex than Respondent 1's, which may account for some of the delay in its resolution. However, given the additional measures taken by Respondent 2 and the amount of elapsed time since the case was first reported via traditional channels, this author will not argue that complexity is the only factor at play in this case. It is more likely that the PCRRU or the NPF itself lack either the capacity or will to resolve certain cases.

The NPF does have demonstrably low capacity to successfully investigate and solve criminal cases, as has been shown by numerous studies. The NPF lacks funding, recruits, training, and equipment to perform its duties effectively and within the confines of the law (Amnesty International, 2002; Alemika, 2013; Chinwoku, 2013). Furthermore, as the PCRRU is a division of the NPF rather than an independent body, there is little reason to believe it is fully exempt from the culture of corruption that permeates the NPF – and indeed most governmental institutions in Nigeria (Carter and Marenin, 1980; Hope, 2018). The NPF has also demonstrated a consistent lack of political will to make necessary structural amendments to clamp down on corrupt officers, with their anti-corruption strategies being accused of being mere showmanship (Afon and Badiora, 2016; Amusan and Saka, 2018).

These factors also contribute to a general lack of faith in the NPF that is reflected in the willingness of people to make use of the PCRRU or contact the police at all in the first place (Ayodele and Aderinto, 2014; Ayodele, 2015). Participants in this study pointed out that, as it is a case of “police investigating the police,” given the low levels of trust in the NPF, there is little reason for them to trust the PCRRU. “Feels a bit dodgy that one of your officers or a couple of your officers are accused of something, and it's ... their colleagues that are doing the investigation. ... It feels biased to me. I feel like it can be rigged,” explains one participant (Personal Interview, 28 April 2021, Online). Another one adds to this by elaborating more on the idea of public trust in the police: “I think ... they've not really created that ground for the citizens to trust them. And coming from how ... how the citizens

feel about the police, it would be like 90% negative and people don't trust them. So, the question would then be, why should I trust in public complaints section of this same police?" (Personal Interview, 17 February 2021, Online).

Thus, all participants, including those who had not personally had a positive experience with the PCRRU view it as mostly showmanship with little impact behind it. Participants unilaterally agreed that, despite a few good outcomes and some progress made, the system does not encourage trust or improve relations between the NPF and citizens. These views culminate in the third and final theme emerging from this part of interviews, which showed that the influence of the PCRRU on overall perceptions of the police is minor. It would be inaccurate to call the influence negligible, but the fact that the influence did not have a major impact for any of the participants is a very important finding. In this lies the crux of the result of the study: no m-governance initiative can preclude political will. This is elaborated on in detail later in this chapter.

It should now be clear that the PCRRU on its own, without substantial police reform, has little positive impact on the perceptions of citizens toward the NPF. Interviewees would not seek out the PCRRU as a first course of action, and generally have a sense of mistrust towards it. At best, the PCRRU was described as adding "a little bit of positivity," and at worst as a public disappointment. "At the inception of the police public complaint unit, we were all excited, a new thing, new way of doing things," one woman recounted. "But it doesn't work now .... Well, we are thoroughly disappointed. ... Now we are even more angry because this taxpayers' money that is being used to pay these people for not doing anything." (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

#### **4.4 Actual Impact of the PCRRU on Corruption**

The previous sections showed that there is an overall negative perception towards both the NPF and the PCRRU, with the PCRRU having made little difference in improving perceptions of the NPF, if not actively worsening views. This section seeks to compare the perceived impact of the PCRRU to its actual impact. The goal of looking into the actual impact of the PCRRU on police corruption as well as the perceived impact is to confirm whether the PCRRU is as ineffective as it is perceived to be, or if it is a case of poor publicity. Or, had views of the PCRRU been positive, whether it could have been a case of good publicity with little basis in reality. These concerns are addressed in two ways. First, corruption statistics over the years since the PCRRU has been implemented are analysed,

along with other sources looking into its efficacy. This is compared to official reports from the PCRRU on the unit's performance. Secondly, responses on this matter from interviewees with experience in police reform and Nigerian government are discussed.

#### **4.4.1 Analysis of Efficacy Data**

As explained in the introductory chapter, the main statistical metric for police corruption in Nigeria is the IAG, which combines various sources and metrics into a unified report (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). This, in conjunction with several human rights reports and articles, is used as a general basis for trends in police corruption since the inception of the PCRRU. This section also utilises official reports from the PCRRU as a comparison.

Below there are three tables that contain IAG scores out of 100.0 (with 100.0 being the best and 0.0 being the worst) for Nigeria in increasing detail from 2016 to 2019, when the most recent IAG data was gathered. Each table presents the score Nigeria received for a specific measure in each year from 2016, when the PCRRU was first implemented. The tables also show an overarching trend in the given time period.

Table 4.1 gives a very broad overview of the scores Nigeria received in the most recent IAG report. The table firstly presents the overall governance score, which is an average combined score across all the categories that are assessed (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). This has been in a slight downward trajectory, but that is far too broad to mean much on its own (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020, 2021c). Thus, Table 4.1 narrows overall governance down by 'zooming in' on security and rule of law as a category. This has also been in a downward trajectory since 2016. Narrowing down even further, the table then shows the four subcategories within the main category of security and rule of law. The first subcategory is 'security and safety,' which deals with the physical safety of civilians from conflict, crime, and forced displacement (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021c). The second is 'rule of law and justice,' which assesses the quality of the judiciary and law enforcement, especially in terms of treatment of defendants and equality before the law (*ibid*). Third is 'accountability and transparency,' which evaluates the extent to which there are adequate checks and balances against government power and access to information (*ibid*). Last is 'anti-corruption,' which looks at the pervasiveness of corruption and the presence and efficacy of countermeasures (*ibid*). All of these are in decline, though some markedly more than others (*ibid*). At a broad surface level, it would appear that there have been no significant positive changes in governance, and particularly that which is relevant to law enforcement and corruption.

**Table 4.1:** A broad overview of IIAG scores for Nigeria from 2016 to 2019

Measure↓	2016	2017	2018	2019	Trend
Overall Governance	48.4	46.7	46.6	45.5	-2.9
Security and Rule of Law (Overall)	48.7	44.9	46.0	44.3	-4.4
Security and Safety	56.5	48.9	50.3	51.1	-5.4
Rule of Law and Justice	55.1	51.0	52.0	47.0	-8.1
Accountability and Transparency	50.6	50.1	51.4	49.5	-1.1
Anti-Corruption	32.7	29.4	30.5	29.5	-3.2

**Source:** (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021c).

However, as Table 4.2 shows, the picture is more nuanced than it appears at a glance. This table delves into the relevant indicators within the subcategories mentioned above and reveals that despite an overall decline in good governance in terms of security, there have been strong improvements in key areas. Table 4.2 is not a comprehensive list of all indicators in each category, but rather seven specifically selected indicators that are most relevant to the PCRRU and police corruption. The first indicator is ‘absence of violence against civilians,’ which looks at any violence or violent events involving civilians (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021b). Second, ‘judicial processes’ evaluates the extent to which justice is accessible and afforded to defendants without undue delays or mistreatment (*ibid.*). Third, ‘law enforcement’ assesses the reliability of police and the extent to which they can be held liable for misconduct (*ibid.*). Fourth, ‘institutional checks and balances’ deals with the extent to which public office holders, including police, are held responsible for abuse of power (*ibid.*). Fifth, ‘civic checks and balances’ accounts for the ability of citizens to report and complain about situations, including the extent to which government cooperates with civil society

(*ibid.*). Sixth, ‘anti-corruption mechanisms’ examines the presence and effectiveness of policy and institutions that deter and investigate corruption (*ibid.*). Last, ‘absence of corruption in the public sector’ assesses the extent to which illegal diversions of funds and bribery takes place among public sector employees, including but not limited to police (*ibid.*).

One can see that many of these indicators show a downward trend, but, significantly, civic checks and balances, anti-corruption mechanisms, and absence of corruption in the public sector are on an upward trajectory. This shows that, despite declining quality of state-level judicial processes and a general uptick in violence against civilians, there is definitely some improvement in terms of corruption and the extent to which citizens can engage with the state.

**Table 4.2:** IIAG scored by subcategory and indicator.

Measure↓	2016	2017	2018	2019	Trend
Security and Safety					
Absence of Violence against Civilians	30.8	14.1	18.8	17.9	-12.9
Rule of Law and Justice					
Judicial Processes	43.1	43.7	45.6	42.9	-0.2
Law Enforcement	39.9	39.7	37.7	34.9	-5.0
Accountability and Transparency					
Institutional Checks and Balances	63.2	62.9	58.5	55.3	-7.9
Civic Checks and Balances	59.8	61.1	63.0	61.4	+1.6
Anti-Corruption					
Anti-	36.9	39.3	47.6	47.6	+10.7

Corruption Mechanisms					
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector	28.0	31.8	31.8	29.8	+1.8

**Source:** (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021b).

Narrowing the data down even further, Table 4.3 shows sub-indicators picked from within the indicators shown above. This is the smallest level into which IIAG scores can be broken down. As was done with the selection of indicators above, not all sub-indicators are displayed here due to deviation from the scope of the study or irrelevant content.

The only sub-indicator under ‘security and safety’ displayed here is the ‘absence of government violence against civilians.’ This involves any acts of violence committed by government forces against civilians and political violence, including acts committed by law enforcement (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). This has seen a steep increase since 2016, with Nigeria being among the most regressed countries in the last five years. Nigeria’s deterioration in terms of violence against civilians was showing signs of slowing (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020), but recent developments regarding police brutality, #EndSARS and the events at the Lekki Tollgate in 2020 will likely influence future analysis of government violence against civilians (Adebajo, 2020a). Thus, from a police brutality standpoint, any possible decline that may have occurred since the implementation of the PCRRU is likely minor.

In terms of ‘judicial processes,’ there are two relevant sub-indicators: ‘due and fair process,’ and ‘enforcement of justice.’ ‘Due and fair process’ refers to the extent to which legal rights are afforded to people accused of crimes and the treatment of those detained (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). This is a particularly important measure, as abuse of detainees is one of the most frequent accusations levelled against the NPF (Amnesty International, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2009; Guttschuss, 2010; Adebajo, 2020b; Obaji, 2020). ‘Enforcement of justice’ refers to the extent to which criminal and civil justice tends to be served, i.e., whether cases are resolved in a manner in line with the law (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). Both of these sub-indicators show some decline, but are currently declining little enough to be

characterised as “warning signs” for possible more alarming deterioration (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020, 2021a). However, from the standpoint of this study, the presence of warning signs despite the implementation of the PCRRU to counteract police brutality and corruption shows that the impact of the PCRRU on the incidence rate of these issues is likely not significant.

Proceeding in the ‘rule of law’ subcategory, the next important indicator is ‘law enforcement.’ This contains the key sub-indicator that deals with police specifically. This sub-indicator measures the reliability of the police and the functionality of mechanisms for holding officers accountable for misconduct (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). Interestingly, the highest score Nigeria has ever received on this indicator was in 2016, but unfortunately the score has steeply declined since then. It will likely continue to decline in light of recent protests, which some have referred to as a result of a “final straw” situation (Burke, 2020; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). Considering the decline in reliability of police, the PCRRU does not appear to have made a significant improvement in this respect either.

The next two sub-indicators are both in the sub-category of ‘accountability and transparency,’ and deal with institutional checks and balances, and civic checks and balances, respectively. First is ‘presence of sanctions for misconduct and abuse of office,’ which has shown no change since 2016. This sub-indicator assesses the extent to which state employees are held accountable for their actions if they engage in corrupt and illegal activities (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). The overall score shows that institutional checks and balances are declining, but it is interesting that this sub-indicator is remaining unchanged. It may be reflective of interviewees consistently mentioning the idea that effective reportage does not necessarily imply effective justice. Second is ‘complaint mechanisms and petitions,’ which assesses the extent to which citizens can effectively engage with government via channels like the PCRRU (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). This sub-indicator shows a clear increase, and this may be partially due to the addition of several platforms through which citizens can engage with government, including, but not limited to the PCRRU, such as ReclaimNaija and telemedicine providers (Ukaoha and Egbokhare, 2012; Bailard and Livingston, 2014). Without further comprehensive investigation into each possible factor that could have contributed to the improvement in civil checks and balances, it is not possible to definitively state to what extent the PCRRU influenced this sub-indicator, but that is outside the scope of the study. It is, however, possible to conclude that, at least to some extent, the existence of a mechanism such as the PCRRU had a role to play in improving civil checks and balances.

Regarding ‘anti-corruption,’ there are four notable sub-indicators. First is ‘anti-corruption policy,’ which examines the extent to which government successfully controls corruption through various policy-based means, such as codes of conduct, transparent procurement methods, accountability, access to information, et cetera. This also includes the extent to which governments prosecute corrupt officials (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). Nigeria has implemented multiple anti-corruption measures and policies in recent years, many of which make use of m- and e-governance, and the PCRRU is only one of them (Fatile, 2012). Thus, as was shown above, it is not within the scope of the study to judge how influential the PCRRU was in the upward trajectory in anti-corruption policy, but it can certainly be included as a contributing factor.

Second is ‘anti-corruption bodies.’ This refers to the functionality and proactivity of state bodies that deter and investigate corruption, including timely resolution of citizen allegations of corruption (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). The PCRRU is an example of a body that receives citizen complaints and theoretically proactively seeks out and resolves cases of alleged corruption, but the score remaining unchanged since 2016 makes it difficult to infer what sort of impact the PCRRU may have made. In theory, it could have made a big positive impact that was cancelled out by more negative events, or vice versa. It could have made no impact at all, for that matter. However, based on interview data, the PCRRU for the most part seems unreliable and quite variable in its efficacy, so while a definitive statement cannot (and should not) be made, it seems unlikely that it was particularly impactful in this regard.

Third is ‘anti-corruption investigation,’ which deals with the extent to which corrupt officials can be investigated without undue influence over investigators and the extent to which allegations of corruption are followed up by investigations (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). This score has shown improvement since 2016, which the PCRRU may have influenced, but it is also important to note a concern brought up by interviewees regarding this matter. Several interviewees indicated that they did not trust investigations when they do take place because of perceived fear of police and the fact that the PCRRU is a part of the police itself, not a separate body. Bearing these views in mind, it’s likely that the PCRRU had a part in the improvement, but probably not a particularly influential one.

Last is the ‘absence of public sector bribery,’ which refers to the prevalence of bribery among state employees, including police officers, and the extent to which they use their positions of power for private gain (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a). Prevalence of bribery in the public

sector briefly improved, but then declined again, resulting in an overall decline (*ibid.*). Bribery is a core element of corruption (Roebuck and Barker, 1973; Sayed and Bruce, 1998b, 1998a) and is the most common forms of police corruption brought up in interviews and anecdotal evidence. Bribery is pervasive in the Nigerian public sector (Hope, 2018), and this sub-indicator deals with more than just police engaging in bribery. It is not within the scope of this study to delve into the extent to which bribery involving police influenced this score's fluctuation. As such, it isn't possible to make a clear judgement on the influence of the PCRRU on the incidence of bribery. However, combining this score with evidence from interviews shows that police bribery is still prevalent. The PCRRU has shown the ability to make reparations in at least one case, but there is little to suggest it has made a long-term impact on the incidence rate of police soliciting and accepting bribes.

**Table 4.3:** IIAG scores by indicator and sub-indicator.

Measure↓	2016	2017	2018	2019	Trend
Security and Safety: Absence of Violence against Civilians					
Absence of Government Violence Against Civilians	48.4	28.3	37.6	35.8	-12.6
Rule of Law and Justice: Judicial Processes					
Due and Fair Process	33.4	33.4	34.7	29.2	-4.2
Enforcement of Justice	45.6	47.8	49.0	43.5	-2.1
Rule of Law and Justice: Law Enforcement					
Police Services	63.0	62.6	49.0	48.5	-14.5
Accountability and Transparency: Institutional Checks and Balances					
Sanctions for Misconduct and Abuse of Office	42.9	42.9	42.9	42.9	0.0

Accountability and Transparency: Civic Checks and Balances					
Complaint Mechanisms and Petitions	63.9	66.4	69.9	68.6	+4.7
Anti-Corruption: Anti-Corruption Mechanisms					
Anti-Corruption Policy	35.7	42.9	42.9	42.9	+7.2
Anti-Corruption Bodies	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	0.0
Anti-Corruption Investigation	25.0	25.0	50.0	50.0	+25.0
Anti-Corruption: Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector					
Absence of Public Sector Bribery	32.8	38.3	37.8	32.2	-0.6

**Source:** (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021a)

Data from the IIAG suggest that the PCRRU may have made some impact on dismantling the “culture of corruption,” (Hope, 2018) and acceptance thereof. However, in terms of incidence rates of police engaging in corruption in the first place, there seems to be little to no positive change.

It is difficult to gauge to what extent the PCRRU may have influenced the scores discussed above. This is made especially tenuous by how sparse reports from the PCRRU are regarding its own performance. However, the few available reports from the PCRRU suggest that the unit has seen a general upswing in usage and tends to resolve cases more often than not. Table 4.4 below shows reported usage and resolution statistics from the PCRRU itself.

**Table 4.4:** Summary of PCRRU Reports

Total complaints received	Resolved/closed cases	False/unrelated cases	Pending cases	Resolved cases %	False cases %	Pending cases %
2016 Fourth Quarter (Q4) Report: October – December 2016						
822	636	156	30	77.37	18.98	3.65
2017 First Quarter (Q1) Report: January – March 2017						
498	355	65	78	71.29	13.05	15.66
2017 Second Quarter (Q2) Report: April – June 2017						
657	589	19	49	89.65	2.89	7.46
2017 Fourth Quarter (Q4) Report: October – December 2017						
604	484	25	95	80.13	4.14	15.73
2018 First Half-Year Report: January – June 2018						
884	750	10	124	84.84	1.13	14.03
2019 Annual Report: January – December 2019						
2161	1621	216	324	75.01	10.00	14.99

**Sources:** (Idris and Shongunle, 2017b, 2017c, 2017c, 2017a, 2018b, 2018a; Adamu and Basiran, 2020).

The table above demonstrates two things. Firstly, the PCRRU does not receive many complaints in a given year. This may either be a case of inconsistent record keeping – a valid concern considering the infrequency and tardiness of official reports – or of low engagement with the platform to begin with. Low engagement is a distinct possibility given the distrust of the platform and general unwillingness to engage with police (Ayodele and Aderinto, 2014; Ayodele, 2015; Odeyemi and Obiyan, 2018). The author would argue that low engagement in this case is not a flaw of the PCRRU or m-governance in this particular case, as Nigeria has already seen significant public buy-in to other m-governance systems (Ukaoha and Egbokhare, 2012; Livingston, 2013; Bailard and Livingston, 2014). The NPF also invested in public education and broadcasting to increase awareness and citizen buy-in, so low utilisation is not necessarily due to poor awareness (Livingston, 2013; Idris and Shongunle, 2017a). Secondly, according to this data, the majority of cases are either resolved or unrelated to the functions of the PCRRU. This is inconsistent with the views of interviewees, the majority of

whom thought that most cases reported to the PCRRU go unresolved, if they are responded to at all.

The NPF's account of the PCRRU's performance is inconsistent with public opinion, making it difficult to corroborate the impact of the PCRRU on actual rates of corruption. However, assuming the data in the official records are both correct and complete, one can see that rates of corruption are not decreasing, though the PCRRU is managing to resolve most cases. There is thus a lack of accountability and repercussions for offending officers, and as such the PCRRU is not impacting the incidence of corruption, but rather making reparations. This is consistent with accusations made by other studies and interviewees that the PCRRU, much like other anti-corruption strategies employed by the NPF in the past, is an attempt at public relations management, rather than an attempt at actual reform (Afon and Badiora, 2016).

#### **4.4.2 Discussion of Interview Data**

Two women and one man who were interviewed had significant experience in matters regarding police corruption in Nigeria. Each of them was asked if they believed that the PCRRU had made an impact on the prevalence of police corruption, specifically with regards to cases involving female victims, and their views are presented in this section.

The male interviewee, who has experience working in police reform and community policing (Respondent 4), had the following view:

“I will say yes, I will say no. I will say yes in some areas and no in some areas, this is because there are different cultural sensibilities in Nigeria. ... And within the Nigerian police organisation itself, there are some gender discriminatory practises which are supposed to be expunged from the police regulation ... So automatically there is this assumption that nobody is a woman in the police force ... If you are a woman and you want to get married, you need to seek the consent of your commissioner of police before you get married. To me as a person that is discriminatory because the male folks don't ask the consent of the commissioner before they get married. So that's discriminatory. ... [These are] structural defects, which does not encourage the reduction of gender discriminatory practices. Like until recently, a woman wasn't allowed to take a suspect on bail at the police station by virtue of the fact that she's a woman, and that's wrong. It's especially provided in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria under Chapter Four that every citizen of Nigeria has right not to be discriminated upon

on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation. ... So long as this thing is happening within the police organisation, I doubt [there will be improvement] because you can only give somebody what you have. So, if the police itself does not have [these] internal democratic structures whereby everybody are being treated equally before the law, it is seriously impossible for them to replicate such to the community they are supposed to serve.” (Personal Interview, 3 March 2021, Online).

The first female interviewee, an activist leader during the #EndSARS protests (Respondent 2), spoke on behalf of women and said this:

“Five years ago, or so, I think we ... believed that we are insulated from these things. That the most that can happen to us is like get arrested and you can't bail yourself as a woman. A man has to bail you. ... It was just that at first and then it started getting worse. It started getting more bold, what with the raping, extortion and all. It started getting worse. I think with the ... growth of technology and young people having access to more money and all that stuff and then also women empowerment where women now have the belief that ... they are equal. They started ... clamping down on us harder. We didn't do anything necessarily bad; we just knew how to assert our rights now. Insisting that a woman should actually be able to bail people if that be the case. And then with a lot of female lawyers taking up very important positions in human rights advocacy, I thought that they [the police] felt insulted got more harsh on women. And so, in the last five years, ... the plight of women got worse than it was before.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

The second female interviewee (Respondent 3), an activist and political scientist, echoed the idea of “window dressing” that was brought up by Respondent 1 and other interviewees when asked her opinion on this. “I think that the situation is still the same,” she said. “It's just the level of covering up has improved. Because that's what happened in the last month, you wouldn't know the situation was that bad until people came out to start telling their story. And [I thought] really? In the same country that I've been living ... all my life, these things were happening?” (Personal Interview, 17 February 2021, Online).

These three viewpoints taken together reflect deep structural issues within the police force that have not improved since 2016. None of the interviewees believed that corruption was

improving overall, and (as will be seen in more depth later in this chapter) none of the interviewees believed that any improvements could be attributed to the PCRRU.

Combining the findings from experienced interviewees and some quantitative data on corruption in law enforcement, this section concludes that any impact that the PCRRU may have had on corruption rates are not noticeable in overall cases of corruption involving women. It appears that positive impacts that the PCRRU has made are thus far mostly on an individual, rather than systemic scale.

#### **4.5 Effect of M-Governance on Public Perceptions**

The sub-question dealt with in this section is concerned with moving away from the PCRRU specifically and moving towards a more “big picture” understanding of the impact that m-governance initiative can have on perceptions. In order to answer this question, interviewees were asked if they thought that any effective and reliable means of reporting corrupt officers or engaging with the state on this matter, perhaps through a better platform than the PCRRU, would make a difference in the prevalence of police corruption. Participants were also asked to explain what they thought would improve the way they and their communities felt about police.

Regarding the question on effective reportage and engagement, participants universally viewed a platform like the PCRRU as only a small part of a solution. “I think reporting is part of the solution,” explained one woman, “but a couple of things have to be ticked off first because like if you're reporting corrupt police officers and nothing has changed within the police system, then I don't really see how that's effective, because essentially nothing's going to happen. So, I think for reporting to be effective, first off there needs to be an overhaul of the entire police system.” (Personal Interview, 28 April 2021, Online). Another woman expands on this by saying that “it's one thing for there to be channels of reporting, it's one thing for you to have access to these channels of reporting, it's another thing for the errant officers to be brought to book.” (Personal Interview, 17 February 2021, Online).

In contrast, one female interviewee did believe that effective reporting mechanisms would make a difference, despite having little faith in the PCRRU.

“I think it will make a difference,” she argued. “A whole lot of difference. Let me explain. [NPF officers are] scared of accountability. The Nigerian police, they are all humans, and they know that if I can comfortably complain about the way they

treat me, the people that have gotten lucky enough to ... access higher officers and complain about the way they are treated by the lower officers of the Nigerian police. It has shown that they are scared of that. If I can call ... the IG or AIG to complain about the way the police is treating me, they would settle, because they knew that their jobs might be on the line, there might be disciplinary action.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

A male interviewee explained that mechanisms like the PCRRU are only a part of the solution by linking it to the second question regarding what true change would require. Throughout his interview, the participant lauded the new Police Act of 2020, believing strongly that changes enacted into law by it would result in the type of structural change that is necessary for an improvement in police corruption.

“Before now, [the PCRRU] was more or less like a programme sponsored or supported by the British Council in Nigeria. So, you know, when you are running a donor driven programme, the donor dictates the pace, and the programme dies with the funding. But the beautiful thing now about Nigeria is that with the emergence of the Police Act 2020, the police complaint response unit has been fully codified into the new Police Act under Section 131. ... So, you now see that the complaint response unit now is no longer a programme, it is now a unit. It is an internalised organisational structure of the police force.” (Personal Interview, 3 March 2021, Online).

All other participants thought that the solution was in deep structural reform. One woman explained that perceptions could only be changed “if we see good police, if we see a police reform happening, like actually police being retrained and taught the right way to act. ... We see them actually doing this, training them, teaching them how to treat people with respect, understanding basic human rights and respecting it. I think that it would change our perception. And that's what we've been asking for during the #EndSARS campaign. ... I think that if they are ... trained properly on the right way to act and there is a punishment for them if they do not act the right way. I think it would go a long way to change our perception. A punishment ... that is enforced. It's not like saying this will happen and it never does happen. If we see it being enforced, then ... we would have more confidence in the police.” (Personal Interview, 4 March 2021, Online).

This is in line with the findings of Wolfsfeld *et al* (2013) in their study of social media use during the Arab Spring. In their study, they determined that despite the important role of social media during the Arab Spring, “politics comes first,” (Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer, 2013, p. 115). Wolfsfeld *et al* discussed and confirmed two theoretical principles: firstly, the political environment in which social media is used, must be understood before one can understand the impact of any ICT-based engagement (Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer, 2013) Thus, there is no simple correlation between social media penetration and political engagement. This dissertation finds that this principle extends beyond social media to top-down m-governance initiatives as well. This shows that perceptions of any m-governance initiative cannot be analysed in a political vacuum. Any finding that a study should have regarding perceptions of m-governance would be meaningless outside of the political context in which an m-governance initiative has been (or will be) implemented.

The second principle discussed by Wolfsfeld *et al* (2013) argues that changes in a ‘real world’ political environment precedes any changes in a virtual political environment. Again, the principle extends to m-governance. All interviewees unilaterally agreed that their perception of the PCRRU (and by extension the NPF) as well as their willingness to engage with the PCRRU, would only improve once substantial ‘real world’ political change has been noticeably implemented. One interviewee encapsulated this notion in the following statement:

“There needs to be accountability, ... if you're caught doing something ... as a police officer, something wrong, breaking the law, you should be held accountable. You should ... face the law. ... I think until people really see that that is happening continuously without bias, they wouldn't want to report. I'm not encouraged to report unless I actually know for sure the report is going to make a difference, that there's going to be accountability on the part of the police. ... Of course, it's going to help, but there just needs to be a lot of things in place first before we can actually get there.” (Personal Interview, 28 April 2021, Online).

In short, while m-governance can have an impact on perceptions and contribute to political change, it cannot supersede practical political change, and nor can it be isolated from its context. Any given m-governance initiative would perform differently depending on the political climate in which it is meant to function. In a political environment in which change

is actively being driven, an m-governance initiative to support change would perform differently than if it were implemented in a politically stagnant environment.

## **4.6 Conclusion**

Chapter IV presented and discussed the findings from interview data and secondary sources, answering the four research sub-questions. The study has confirmed four main findings that lead up to the answer to the overarching research question. First, women tend to have an overall negative view towards the NPF which is distinct from negative views that men have. While men tend to fear profiling, wrongful detention, and torture, women tend to fear sexual harassment and abuse. This is in line with what previous studies have found regarding how men and women tend to be affected by police.

Second, though the PCRRU has had a mixed impact, its impact on perceptions overall has been supportive of existing perceptions of police. Interviewees overwhelmingly felt that the PCRRU was not enough to address the structural causes of corruption and had little faith in the platform.

Third, the PCRRU has had a minimal impact on the prevalence of corruption perpetrated against women, and thus confirms that scepticism of the efficacy of the PCRRU is warranted. Official government data on the PCRRU is sparse and inconsistent with public perceptions of the PCRRU. The study finds that the PCRRU's lack of noticeable success is likely not one of poor implementation of m-governance, but rather that the Nigerian government has not demonstrated commitment to the necessary structural reforms to win public trust in the platform.

Fourth, no m-governance initiative can extend beyond the borders of its political environment and can only enhance and supplement existing political will. M-governance cannot achieve much as a standalone initiative, and requires investments of demonstrable political will, "real world" reforms, and public buy-in.

Combining all four findings leads to the answer to the main research question: M-governance has had an impact on police corruption that affects women in Nigeria through the PCRRU, but because there is a lack of structural reform in the NPF to back up any positive impacts the PCRRU can have on its own, the impact has been minor. Despite isolated instances of the PCRRU making a difference, it cannot do more than that in an environment that lacks the underlying political will to drive deeper change.

## **CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter concludes the dissertation and provides a summary of the main findings that came up during the course of the study. Firstly, this chapter provides a brief synopsis of each of the preceding chapters. Secondly, it highlights the most important emerging issues. Lastly, the chapter provides recommendations for policy adjustments to future and existing m-governance initiatives, and well as recommendations for further study.

The main goal of this dissertation was to investigate how m-governance in Nigeria can impact police corruption and public perceptions, with specific reference to the case of the PCRRU and its effect on women's perceptions of the NPF. This was done using a phenomenological approach to semi-structured interviews, in combination with analysis of existing datasets and studies. Through the course of investigations, the study found that the PCRRU has seen limited success, most likely due to existing lack of public trust in the NPF and negligible long-term results. As such, the PCRRU has had a limited effect on perceptions. This was despite the proven ability of m-governance as a whole to influence political views and citizen-state relations, even within Nigeria itself. Thus, it is necessary for "real life" positive changes to take place through traditional means before mobile solutions can take full effect.

### **5.2 The Impact of the PCRRU as a form of M-Governance on Nigerian Women's Perceptions of the NPF**

This dissertation was composed of five chapters, including this concluding chapter. Chapter I aimed to introduce the context of the NPF's corruption and women's unique challenges in that regard. Chapter I also introduced m-governance as a lesser-studied subdivision of e-governance and demonstrated its utility in an African, and particularly Nigerian setting. Furthermore, the introductory chapter contained the conceptual framework within which the study operated, providing working definitions for police corruption and m-governance, and situating the study in the conception of "politics as the art of government."

Chapter I was supported by the narrative literature review in Chapter II, which provided a thematic exploration of existing research relevant to the research questions. Firstly, the literature review examined the historical context of the NPF and how that impacts the culture of corruption that is still pervasive today. The prevalence of corruption in the NPF poses

unique challenges to women, and there is reason to believe that rates of victimisation of women by police is underreported, thus further justifying the need for a focus on women's lived experiences regarding means of reporting corruption and victimisation. Secondly, the chapter examined the sparse existing literature on the PCRRU, and found that its success has been minor, though not necessarily so minor as to be declared a failure, as public distrust of the PCRRU in other studies was on par with public trust with the NPF as a whole. Lastly, Chapter II examined past and existing implementations of m-governance and literature regarding its influence on public opinion and citizen-state relations. Previous studies indicated that m-governance in general is a powerful governance tool that can be used to alter public perceptions and engagement in politics, but that policies needed to be highly tailored to the political milieu within which they will be implemented, as lack of citizen buy-in may result in policies failing. Furthermore, though Nigeria was found to be ideal for the implementation of m-governance policies in many ways, the connection between the NPF and the PCRRU may have degraded public trust in the initiative.

Chapter III delineated the methodological approach used throughout the dissertation, including ethical precautions and limitations of the study. This chapter indicated that recruitment of participants for interviews was severely limited by travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in a small, non-generalisable sample size. Furthermore, the sample was biased in the sense that limitations on recruitment meant that only literate persons with internet access could be interviewed. Thus, diverse data on usability and accessibility was severely lacking. Chapter III also explained that the study was situated within an interpretivist paradigm and used a phenomenological research design. Political phenomenology was employed to account for diverse lived experiences in an ever-globalising world. This design was chosen to because m-governance and online tools in general have the potential to drift away from their target user base and towards a more global standard, thus alienating the intended users. As women are already underreporting their experiences, it was important to shift the focus.

Chapter IV formed the bulk of the dissertation, with data from semi-structured interviews and analysis of the IIAG dataset relating to police corruption being presented to answer the research questions. Firstly, Chapter IV presented primary data from interviews which illustrated that women tended to have similar levels of distrust of the NPF compared to their male counterparts, but their mistrust came from different sources of fear, likely due to the different ways in which men and women are targeted and victimised by corrupt police

officers. Female respondents tended to fear sexual assault and sexual harassment, and thought that this fear was not common among men. Rather, they thought that men feared profiling and physical violence. This was affirmed by male respondents who agreed that women tended to face gender-based violence from police, as opposed to men who were more commonly faced with threats and physical violence.

Secondly, Chapter IV showed that the PCRRU had a minor, but non-zero effect on women's perceptions. Again, drawing from interviews, the chapter juxtaposed the positive experience of a male respondent who reported his case to the PCRRU to that of a female respondent who did the same, but had a negative experience. Though the male respondent said that his view of the PCRRU and the NPF had improved, he did not believe any deep systemic change had taken place and that the PCRRU alone was not enough. The female respondent, however, said that the PCRRU had changed her view of the PCRRU and the NPF, but for the worse. According to her, the poor response from the PCRRU deepened her distrust of the NPF and made her less likely to report instances of police corruption. However, she did believe that, were the PCRRU more functional than it is at present, it would make a distinct difference in her views of the NPF. Other interviewees, who had not had direct experiences with the PCRRU, tended to echo the idea that, although they were aware of successful resolutions of cases reported to the PCRRU, they did not fully trust it and felt that its status as a part of the NPF rather than an independent body made it less trustworthy. Thus, the PCRRU did have an influence on women's perceptions, but unfortunately the influence thus far has been minor and not necessarily positive.

Thirdly, the chapter presented IIAG data from 2019 on the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. At the time of writing, this was the most recent dataset, though it is important to note that it does not take into account changes made by the Police Act 2020 or the #EndSARS protests, as these events occurred after the data collection period. This was compared to data from the PCRRU's own efficacy reports. These sets of data showed that the PCRRU has made an impact on corruption, or at least the reportage of corruption, but not in a substantial and definitive way. Thus, Chapter IV concluded that whatever effect the PCRRU may have had on actual incident rates of police corruption has been negligible. This was affirmed by interviews with participants who had extensive experience in police reform either through their work, education, or activism. These participants did not have consistent viewpoints regarding whether incidence rates of corruption involving female victims has declined since

the implementation of the PCRRU, but they did agree that positive changes made by the PCRRU have overall been on an individual scale, rather than a systemic one.

Lastly, Chapter IV showed that, based on the perceptions of female interviewees in combination with existing literature, m-governance is capable of changing public perceptions. However, any given m-governance initiative cannot supersede “real world” political changes. Thus, systemic reform of the NPF must take place before or in conjunction with the implementation of the PCRRU for public opinion to change in a more substantial and more positive way.

Thus, the crux of the dissertation is that m-governance certainly has the power to influence public perceptions in the right political climate. However, the PCRRU specifically has had a minimal effect on actual rates of corruption and the negative perceptions of the NPF among women. Looking at the lived experiences of women who were interviewed as opposed to those of male interviewees, women still face unique challenges when encountering and reporting corrupt officers, which the PCRRU has done little to ameliorate.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

This dissertation indicated at the outset that the end goal of the study was to amplify the lived experiences of women in their unique challenges when facing corrupt officers and reporting such officers. This was done by focusing particularly on the case of Nigerian women and the PCRRU as an m-governance initiative to curb police corruption. The study found that the PCRRU has been largely ineffective in affecting women’s experiences and corruption on a societal level, though there have been instances of success. This is despite Nigeria being an ideal space for the implementation of m-governance initiatives and the general capacity for m-governance to have a strong political influence. Thus, the PCRRU itself has failed in some ways that are relevant to people affected by m-governance policies, policymakers, and researchers. However, the study has also found that m-governance is a policy tool with the power to influence public perceptions despite the shortcomings of individual policies and initiatives, which provides some valuable insight into the political potential of m-governance. In light of these findings, this study makes the following recommendations:

With regards to women’s perceptions of the NPF and the PCRRU, this dissertation recommends (i) that the Nigerian government commits to and demonstrates structural reforms within the NPF, paying special attention to proper training and refocusing officers as a force *for* citizens, not against them; and (ii) that the PCRRU should be separated from the

NPF and form an independent investigative body, as this study has found that the problem lies not with m-governance, but with the lack of demonstrable reform within the NPF. The success of m-governance initiatives is contingent upon public trust in the government and ICT (Taylor, Marshall and Amiri, 2010). Thus, for the PCRRU or any m-governance initiative to successfully address the problems they are meant to resolve, there must first be some degree of public faith in the solution. This can be illustrated by a past implementation of m-governance in Nigeria, ReclaimNaija, which required substantial campaigning and “real world” input for citizens to engage with it and thus for it to successfully fulfil its purpose (Livingston, 2013). Thus, for the PCRRU to succeed in improving public perceptions of the NPF, especially among women who are particularly distrustful, the government must first show notable commitment to systemic reforms within the NPF.

The PCRRU’s minor impact on perceptions was linked strongly to the lack of structural reform in the NPF itself and poor public trust, so with regards to this objective of the study, the author recommends refocusing the PCRRU as a small part of a larger set of policies to reform the NPF, rather than a single solution. For the PCRRU specifically to succeed, the onus is on the government to demonstrate reform.

Regarding the ability of m-governance as a whole to influence perceptions, the study found that m-governance can be powerful tool to influence public perceptions even when the intended goals of a given initiative have largely failed. As such, this study recommends that further research must be done on the extent and limits of the abilities of mobile technologies in political applications.

Furthermore, m-government initiatives must be tailored to their political environment (Taylor, Marshall and Amiri, 2010). Nigeria has shown previous success in this regard, but due to the limited sample size of this study, it is difficult to determine whether the PCRRU may be partially suffering due to lack of usability and access. At least one interviewee explicitly believed that the PCRRU was ineffective, especially among older people, illiterate people, and those in rural areas (Personal Interview, 3 March 2021, Online). It is therefore necessary for (i) policymakers to ensure that m-governance initiatives and accessible in practice, not just in theory; and (ii) for future research on the PCRRU to specifically study accessibility and influence in older, rural, and illiterate populations.

## **5.4 Conclusion**

This study confirmed and demonstrated the need for m-governance initiatives to be tailored to their political environments and for there to be notable “real world” dedication to and investment in systemic change. The PCRRU has seen limited success in altering women’s perceptions of the NPF. This is largely due to its connection to the NPF, which has shown no sign of the necessary structural reform that is required for the PCRRU to have a more pronounced effect on women’s perceptions. As such, the study proposes building systemic reforms through more traditional means before expecting more widespread success of m-governance initiatives.

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# APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS



## Informed Consent

You are being asked to take part in a research study in partial fulfilment of the degree MA Political Sciences. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully. Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you need more information.

### Title of Study

M-Governance for Countering Police Corruption in Nigeria – A Phenomenological Study of the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit's Impact on Female Complainants

### Principal Investigator:

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University of Pretoria

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+27 (0)82 092 3365

### 1. Purpose and Background

Kristen van de Venter is conducting research on the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit (PCRRU) in Nigeria and its impact on women who have used it to report police corruption. The purpose of your participation in this research is to help the researcher gain an understanding of women's experiences with the PCRRU. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your affiliation with a relevant non-governmental organisation in Nigeria, or because of your personal experiences with Nigerian law enforcement.

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Faculty of Humanities  
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe  
Lefapha la Bomotho



## 2. Procedures

Should you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview with the principal investigator. This interview will involve answering questions regarding the organisation you are affiliated with, your experiences with the Nigerian police force, and your experiences with the PCRRU. Many questions will be vague, because it is important to hear your personal views without leading you into saying certain things. Note that you may also be asked about other people who may be interested in being interviewed at your organisation. The interview will likely take place over a video conference call due to international travel restrictions because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

## 3. Risks

The researcher foresees no major risks to participants, though some questions may be uncomfortable to answer for some participants. You may retract your consent at any time if you do not wish to continue. Your responses will be recorded to ensure that there are no misunderstandings in the data. The researcher may reach out to you later to confirm or clarify something you have said. The researcher may refer you to counselling, should you require or request it.

## 4. Confidentiality

The records of this study will be treated as confidential. Individuals will not be identified by name in the published study. Recordings of interviews will be kept by the principal researcher, and only accessed by the researcher, for up to fifteen years, upon which it may be deleted. Data and recordings will be stored electronically and will be password protected. Participants have the right to access their data.



## 5. Benefits

There is no direct benefit to individual participants in this study. The anticipated benefit of your participation of this study is to understand how effective the PCRRU is at combating corruption, based on how women have perceived it. This understanding may be used as a baseline for new, similar systems to learn from past successes and failures.

## 6. Voluntary Participation

Your decision whether or not to participate in this study is voluntary and will not affect your relationship with the researcher or the University of Pretoria. If you choose to participate in this study, you can withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time without prejudice.

## 7. Questions

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the principal investigator at any time, using the contact details on this form. Please ask any questions before consenting.

## Consent

Your signature below indicates that you have decided to participate in the study after reading all of the information above and you understand the information in this form, have had any questions answered and have received a copy of this form for you to keep.


Participant signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX B: CONSENT FROM THE COMPPART FOUNDATION



## APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE

### Interview Details

Date of interaction	DD/MM/YYYY
Time/duration of interview	HH:MM – HH:MM

### Section I: Demographic Information

1. What is your age?	18 – 25 years	
	26 – 35 years	
	36 – 45 years	
	46 – 55 years	
	56 – 65 years	
	65+ years	

2. What is your sex?	Female		Male		Other	
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3. Where (in Nigeria) are you from?

4. What is your home language?	Hausa	
	Igbo	
	Yoruba	
	Fula	
	English	
	Other	
	If other, please specify:	

5. What is your religion?	Muslim	
	Christian	

	African Traditional Faith	
	None/Not Applicable	
	Other	
	If other, please specify:	

6. What is your highest level of education?	High school	
	Higher certificate	
	Diploma	
	Bachelor's Degree	
	Master's Degree	
	Doctorate Degree	
	Other	
	If other, please specify:	

7. What is your current occupation?

8. What is your usual annual income?	≤ ₺299 999	
	₺300 000 - ₺599 999	
	₺600 000 - ₺1 109 999	
	₺1 110 000 - ₺1 599 999	
	₺1 600 000 - ₺3 199 999	
	≥ ₺3 200 000	

9. Do you own a mobile phone?	Yes		No			
9(a). If yes, is your phone able to connect to the internet? If no, please proceed to <b>question 10.</b>	Yes		No			

9(b). If yes, do you ever use your phone's ability to access the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
9(c). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
9(d). Do you have reliable access to the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
9(e). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
9(f). Do you have reliable cellular signal in your area?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
9(g). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
9(h). If yes, do you make use of the signal for making phone calls, sending SMSs, etc.?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
9(i). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						

Answer the following set of questions only if you responded *no* to **question 9**.

10. Do you own any other communication device, such as a laptop or tablet?	Yes		No			
10(a). If <i>yes</i> , please specify. If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 11</b> .						
10(b). Is your device able to connect to the internet?	Yes		No			
10(c). If <i>yes</i> , do you ever make use of your device to connect to the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
10(d). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate						
10(e). Is your device able to use cellular signal for phone calls and SMSs?	Yes		No			
10(f). If <i>yes</i> , do you make use of its ability to do so?	Yes		No		Sometimes	

10(g). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
10(h). Do you have reliable access to the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
10(i). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
10(j). Do you have reliable cellular signal in your area?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
10(k). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						

Answer the following set of questions only if you responded *no* to **question 10**.

11. Do you have <i>reliable</i> access to a communications device of any kind via a person or institution you are affiliated with?	Yes		No			
11(a). If <i>yes</i> , please specify. If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>Section II</b> .						
11(b). Are you able to use the device for personal purposes?	Yes		No			
11(c). Is your activity on this device private?	Yes		No			
11(d). Is the device able to connect to the internet?	Yes		No			
11(e). If <i>yes</i> , do you ever make use of your device to connect to the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
11(f). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate						
11(g). Is your device able to use cellular signal for phone calls and SMSs?	Yes		No			
11(h). If <i>yes</i> , do you make use of its ability to do so?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
11(i). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						

11(j). Do you have reliable access to the internet?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
11(k). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						
11(l). Do you have reliable cellular signal in your area?	Yes		No		Sometimes	
11(m). If <i>sometimes</i> , please elaborate.						

## Section II: Perceptions and feelings regarding the NPF

1. What is your personal perception of the NPF?	Positive		Negative	
1(a). Please elaborate as much as possible.				

2. How do Nigerian women perceive the NPF?	Positive		Negative		Unsure			
2(a). Please elaborate as much as possible.								
2(b). How does this compare to how Nigerian men view the NPF?	More positive		More negative		Same		Unsure	
2(c). Please elaborate as much as possible.								

3. Have you ever had a direct encounter with an NPF officer in their professional capacity?	Yes		No	
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3(a). If <i>yes</i> , were you asked to pay a bribe, perform favours, or otherwise coerced in any way? If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 4</b> .	Yes		No	
3(b). Please elaborate as much as possible.				
3(c). Do you think you were targeted for a specific reason?	Yes		No	
3(d). Please elaborate as much as possible.				
3(e). Do you think the NPF targets people for specific reasons?	Yes		No	
3(f). Who do you think the NPF tends to target? Please state why you think that.				
3(g). Did you report the incident?	Yes		No	
3(h). Why or why not? Please provide as much detail as possible.				
3(i). If <i>no</i> , did you take any other action? E.g., speak to a journalist or politician, attend a protest, etc.	Yes		No	
3(j). Why or why not? Please provide as much detail as possible.				
3(k). Did this encounter change your perception of the NPF at all?	Yes		No	
3(l). Please elaborate as much as possible.				


Answer the following set of questions *only* if you responded *no* to **question 3**. If you responded *yes*, proceed to Section III.

4. Do you know of anyone who has had a direct encounter with an NPF officer in their professional capacity?	Yes		No		
4(a). If <i>yes</i> , were they asked to pay a bribe, perform favours, or coerced during the encounter? If <i>no</i> , please proceed to Section III.	Yes		No		
4(b). If <i>yes</i> , please describe the incident. If <i>no</i> , please proceed to Section III.					
4(c). Were they targeted for a specific reason?	Yes		No		Unsure
4(d). Why do you (or they) think this? If <i>yes</i> , please state the reason. (Ignore if <i>unsure</i> .)					
4(e). Do you think the NPF targets people for specific reasons?	Yes		No		Unsure
4(f). In your view, who do they tend to target? Please state why you think that.					
4(g). Did the person in question report the incident?	Yes		No		Unsure
4(h). Why or why not? Please provide as much detail as possible. (Ignore if <i>unsure</i> ).					

4(i). If <i>no</i> , did they take any other action? E.g., asked somebody to act on their behalf, attend a protest, speak to a journalist or politician, etc.						Yes		No		Unsure	
4(j). Why or why not? Please provide as much detail as possible. (Ignore if <i>unsure</i> ).											
4(k). Did hearing about this change your perception of the NPF at all?						Yes		No			
4(l). Why or why not? Please elaborate as much as possible.											
4(m). Are you willing and/or able to refer me to the person who experienced this first-hand? (Especially if they are a woman).						Yes		No			
4(n). Contact details if <i>yes</i> :											

### Section III: Women's Experiences with and Perceptions of the PCRRU

1. Do you know anything about the PCRRU?						Yes		No	
1(a). Do you know what the PCRRU does?						Yes		No	
1(b). If <i>yes</i> , please explain in your own words (ignore if <i>no</i> ).									
1(c). Do you know how to access the PCRRU?						Yes		No	

1(d). If <i>yes</i> , please explain in your own words (ignore if <i>no</i> ).				
1(e). Do you know how the PCRRU works? E.g., what happens to reports once they have been sent etc.	Yes		No	
1(f). If <i>yes</i> , please explain in your own words (ignore if <i>no</i> ).				

2. Have you ever personally used the PCRRU in any way?	Yes		No	
2(a). If <i>yes</i> , please describe your experience in as much detail as possible. Then proceed to <b>question 2(d)</b> . If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 2(b)</b> .				
2(b). Is there a specific reason you have never used the PCRRU?	Yes		No	
2(c). If <i>yes</i> , please explain in as much detail as possible.				
2(d). Do you know of somebody else who has used the PCRRU?	Yes		No	
2(e). If <i>yes</i> , please describe what you heard in as much detail as possible. If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 3</b> .				
2(f). Are you willing and/or able to refer me to the person	Yes		No	

who experienced this first-hand?				
Contact details if yes:				

Please answer the following set of questions *only* if you are not aware of the PCRRU *or* if you have neither used it yourself nor heard of anyone who has. The interviewer will provide you with an overview of the PCRRU, so that data can still be gathered on your initial impressions.

3. Until today, your knowledge of the PCRRU was very limited. Based on your initial impressions, do you think that the PCRRU is likely to be effective and accessible?	Yes		No	
3(a). Please explain why you think this in as much detail as possible.				
3(b). Would you ever consider personally using the PCRRU and/or recommending it to somebody else?	Yes		No	
3(c). Please explain why or why not in as much detail as possible.				

Answer the following set of questions *only* if you have had a personal experience with the PCRRU or have heard of somebody who has used it.

4. Did your experience with the PCRRU (or hearing the story of someone who has) change your perception of the PCRRU?	Yes, improved		Yes, worsened		No, remained the same	
4(a). If <i>yes</i> , what changed your perception? Please be as detailed and specific as possible. If						

there are multiple factors, please list them all.						
4(b). What would have led to a better outcome for you? I.e., what would have resulted in a positive change in your perception?						
4(c). Did your perception of the PCRRU affect your perception of the NPF in any way?		Yes, improved		No, worsened		No, remained the same
4(d). Please elaborate as much as possible.						

### Section IV: Impact of the PCRRU on Police Corruption

This section will mostly involve desk research looking at corruption and reportage statistics, however there are some questions for participants who have thus far demonstrated knowledge and/or have some sort of expertise on the topic (e.g., NGO leaders). Thus, most interviewees will skip this section entirely.

1. Have the levels of police corruption and/or police brutality changed in recent years? Specifically with regards to cases involving female victims.		Yes, levels have increased		Yes, levels have decreased		No notable change
1(a). If yes, what, in your opinion, caused this change? Please list all notable factors.						
1(b). In your opinion, would better and/or more accessible		Yes		No		

channels for reporting corrupt officers improve rates of corruption and brutality?				
1(c). Why or why not? Please be as specific and detailed as possible.				
1(d). Has the PCRRU made any notable impact on levels of police corruption, specifically against women?	Yes		No	
1(e). Why or why not? Please be as specific and detailed as possible.				

## Section V: Capability of M-Governance to alter public perceptions

This section will largely require synthesis of public opinion with desk research and facts obtained from experts. However, there are questions specifically for experts and for civilians regarding this section, outlined below.

### Set One: Experts only

1. In your experience with the NPF and/or your work in police reform/activism, have you noticed any changes in public perceptions of the NPF?	Yes		No	
1(a). If <i>yes</i> , please describe the changes in as much detail as possible. If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 1(c)</b> .				
1(b). What, in your opinion, caused these changes in public perception?				
1(c). Do you think that a platform/initiative, such as the	Yes		No	

PCRRU, is likely to influence perceptions of the NPF based on its relative success or failure? Either your own perception or those of the communities you work with.				
1(d). Why or why not? Please elaborate as much as possible.				
1(e). What, in your opinion, would it take to substantially reform the NPF and regain public trust/a positive public perception?				
1(f). Are you willing and/or able to refer me to another expert, member of your organisation, or any other person who may be able to provide valuable insights into the topic?	Yes		No	
Contact details if <i>yes</i> :				

**Set Two: Civilians only**

2. Based on your own experiences in your personal life and your community, do you think that public perceptions of the NPF have changed over time?	Yes		No	
2(a). If <i>yes</i> , how have perceptions changed, in your view? If <i>no</i> , please proceed to <b>question 2(c)</b> .				
2(b). If <i>yes</i> , what do you think may have sparked these changes?				

2(c). Do you think that effective and accessible means of reporting corrupt officers is likely to succeed in reducing police corruption and brutality (specifically against women)?	Yes		No	
2(d). Why or why not? Please elaborate as much as possible.				
2(e). In your opinion, what would it take for you and your community to have a more positive perception of law enforcement?				
2(f). Are you willing and/or able to refer me to any other person who may be able to provide valuable insights into the topic?	Yes		No	
Contact details if yes:				

# APPENDIX D: ETHICAL APPROVAL



**Faculty of Humanities**  
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe  
Lefapha la Bomotheo



19 November 2020

Dear Miss K van de Venter

**Project Title:** M-Governance for Countering Police Corruption in Nigeria – A Phenomenological Study of the Public Complaint Rapid Response Unit's Impact on Female Complainants  
**Researcher:** Miss K van de Venter  
**Supervisor(s):** Dr CC Nshimbi  
**Department:** Political Sciences  
**Reference number:** 16064039 (HUM006/0620)  
**Degree:** Masters

I have pleasure in informing you that the above application was **approved** by the Research Ethics Committee on 19 November 2020. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

**Prof Innocent Pikirayi**  
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics  
Faculty of Humanities  
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA  
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe  
Lefapha la Bomotheo

**Research Ethics Committee Members:** Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris, Mr A Sizos, Dr A-M de Beer, Dr A dos Santos, Ms KT Govinder, Andrew, Dr P Gutuza, Dr E Johnson, Prof D Maree, Mr A Mohamed, Dr I Noome, Dr C Buttergill, Prof D Reyburn, Prof M Soper, Prof E Tshedi, Prof V Thebe, Ms B Tsebe, Ms D Mokalapa