# The Darker People, Decolonisation and the Making of 'the International': A Theoretical Enquiry

by

Thapelo Tselapedi

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for

the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

International Relations

at the

University of Pretoria

Faculty of Humanities

Supervisor: Prof S Zondi

Co-supervisor: Prof V Thakur

December 2021

**Declaration**

Student Number: 18368124

I, Thapelo Tselapedi, declare that this thesis, *The Darker People, Decolonisation and the Making of 'the International': A Theoretical Enquiry*, is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signed:



Thapelo Tselapedi

Date: 09 December 2021

This thesis is being submitted for examination with my approval.

Signed:



Supervisor: Prof S Zondi

Co-supervisor: Prof V Thakur

## Acknowledgements

This study took several years to complete; it took my time, my effort, and my emotional presence. But it was not possible without several people and moments. The patient and ever-weaving hand of Prof Vale was crucial in the formative years of my PhD. He was careful to cultivate a strong sense of self-confidence, rooted in my ability to think independently. I also must acknowledge both Prof's Siphamandla Zondi and Vineet Thakur, who helped panel beat what was really, and for a long time, a spirited study on the question of black being in 'the international'. Similarly, this was not possible without long conversations with my fellow-traveller, my sister Segomotso Semosa, who helped straighten out my thinking on these questions from the beginning until the end. She is a philosopher in her own right. It goes without saying that the shifts and turns that characterised this study were because of her steadfastness to truth and scholarship. These acknowledgements also go out to the many conversations I had with several people – these being Palesa Nqambaza, Tshepo Madlingozi, Ndumiso Dladla, Lindokuhle Mdabe and Eduard Jordaan. Importantly, I am forever indebted to my father, Oabetswe Johannes Tselapedi. It was he who flamed my fire for truth, for standing for what's just and to always speak out against injustice. In retrospect, it was he who brewed in me the idea that I am black and African first. The rest flows from that. While his transition feels like the ground on which my identity hinges has been stripped from me, I know that he wanted me to continue with this life and cherish its moments. And so, in line with the spirit of Snoop Dogg, I thank me for being able to stay the course. I thank me for believing in myself. I thank me for dedicating time to this project. And I thank me for not sleeping on myself.

**Abstract**

This study is concerned with the constitution of 'the International' and the resistance to it. It contends that international relations (IR) constituted 'the international' through coloniality. This is the fundamental problem of 'the international'. However, resistance against coloniality has largely been premised on western epistemic grounds. For instance, coloniality manifests itself at different historical periods, captured herein as 'regimes of being'. First was the colonial construction, second the liberal construction, and third is the neoliberal construction of 'the International', all of which are resisted based on western epistemic terms. To this extent, coloniality is both continuous and continued. Accordingly, given this cycle, the study contends that the problem of this resistance is that it leaves out the ontological features of coloniality, specifically anti-black racism or the ontological difference. This is what accounts for either the failure or the incorporation of resistance against coloniality. And this is the reason why coloniality has survived throughout different historical periods, albeit in weaker epistemic forms. In other words, coloniality, as a tool of domination, first operates through an ontological frame, and secondly through an epistemic frame. This is because these regimes were made possible through the 'ontological difference' created during the expansion of western Europe. The problem of decolonial thought is that it approaches the ontological via the epistemic. Accordingly, the study uses Africana existential thought to center the ontological in the constitution of 'the international'. This study uses 'being' as the basis of domination/ oppression. It uses the method of conceptual history to show how different 'regimes of beings' were constituted in different historical periods. Therefore, the study blends decolonial theory with African existential thought as the guiding theoretical optic from which this study engages in this discussion.

**Keywords**: Coloniality, the darker people, the International, colonial modernity, regime of being, embodied and ontology.

## Table of Contents

# Chapter 1

# Background and Context

## 1.0 Introduction

Orthodox international relations (IR), which is the predominant field in this study, primarily concerns itself with structural notions of cross-border, transnational and multilateral power relations, mainly through the optic of state sovereignty. In understanding these relations, scholars have written about IR, and its practice, from a range of theoretical and/or methodological approaches which include, but are not limited to, realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism and neoliberalism. These are predominantly materialist in outlook. Fundamentally, they were constructed within/from a western epistemological frame (see Capan, 2017; Hobson, 2012; Shilliam, 2011; Zondi, 2018; etc.). Put differently, they originate from a particular space and context that have erroneously been accorded an international status. Accordingly, the way in which IR has constituted 'the International' has been, and is, exclusionary, preserving being international for what are actually western prisms of thought. By 'the International', this study refers to the ideational or imaginary spaces in which international relations, constituted by both people and states throughout time and space, have been constructed. In *Provincializing Europe*, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) unmasks this epistemic frame as also being parochial. For instance, he demonstrates that, in the capitalist imagination, the Marxist category 'labour' is unable to account for the same in Indian society. This is because, in Indian society, 'labour' includes the "presence and agency of gods or spirits" (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 76). Consequently, the study uses a lower case 'w' to provincialize the west, so as to better situate it within 'the international'. In "IR as Theology, Reading Kant Badly, and the Incapacity of Western Political Theory to Travel very far in Non-Western Contexts", Siba Grovogui (in Creutzfeldt, 2013) reveals this episteme as an ideological posturing in that IR largely represents the interests of the west, including European wars and conquests.

In this study, the argument is that coloniality is the fundamental problem of the modern age (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, 2011; Mignolo, 2001) and so, consequently, is the root cause of the parochial constitution of 'the International'. Accordingly, IR is premised on coloniality. Whilethere is literature on the relationship between colonialism and IR (see Davis, 2020; Thakur, 2017; Davis, & Vale, 2017; Tucker, 2018), coloniality is quite different. According to decolonial theorists,

coloniality is the power structure that replicates itself over historical periods, which sustain relations of domination and exploitation even after colonialism, and in which the Global North occupies superiority with the perpetual 'Othering' of the Global South (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 2011). Mignolo goes further and argues that coloniality is the underbelly of western modernity (2001, p. 22), that is, the darker side of western modernity (see Quijano, in Maldonado-Torres, 2007); something decolonial theorists have categorised ascolonial modernity.

Concerning the coloniality of being, in this study, coloniality is used to theorised from the side of the darker people. Consistent with this undertaking, the decolonial philosopher, Anibal Quijano (in Salgado et al, 2021), argues that coloniality emerged from the formation of hierarchical identities generated by European colonisation, with the European assumed to occupy the top of the hierarchy (in Maldonado- Torres, 2007, p. 244). Accordingly, coloniality was based on a racial pecking order, which later imprinted itself on social practices and political institutions. For others, privileging European history and knowledge, the racialisation of non-Europeans constituted a permanent suspicion of their humanity (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 245), what Maldonado-Torres refers to as a European 'misanthropic scepticism'. Here, Maldonado-Torres accounts for the ontological via the epistemic. This is not surprising because he centers western history by foregrounding the problem of European 'misanthropic scepticism'. He effectively argues that this scepticism is an attitude against the colonised and racialised that marks them out as dispensable (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 246). However, theorising from the side of the darker people, specifically black people, decolonial work would be concerned with re-centring the ontological or securing the ontological independence of black people. In centering the epistemological in the project of decolonisation, decolonial theorists pay insufficient attention to an ontological reality that black people face – this being anti-black racism. Although decolonial approaches have indeed traversed a wide ground on issues such as power, knowledge, gender, nature, spirituality, among other issues, this study focuses on the coloniality of being, and thus uses Africana existential thought to further explore the ontological tenet of coloniality.

This study upholds Quijano's (in Salgado et al, 2021) identification of the formation of hierarchical identities and is consistent with the concept of body-reasoning of the African gender theorist, Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997), which allows the study to unpack the disaggregated nature of coloniality against the different bodies among the darker people. The study discusses this nature in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, as with Quijano (in Salgado et al, 2021), Oyewumi argues that western episteme is anchored in the premise that social relations are biologically determined (1997, p. 4), an indication of

the west's privileging of the visual sense, and of positivism. To understand the origin of the disaggregated nature of coloniality, the study uses the *Valladolid* debates of 1550/1551 as having inaugurated body-reasoning for the darker people. Here, the study demonstrates how Oyewumi's (1997) concept of body-reasoning is ubiquitous within different historical periods. This concept refers to the use of biology as an ideological device not only to organise the social world (Oyewumi, 1997), but to establish domination over non-Europeans. This specifically relates to how ontology, or the body, is used as an instrument of domination. In other words, the hierarchy of the social world established by coloniality demonstrates how the body is used as an instrument of domination. In this context, it follows from Emmanuel Levinas's work (in Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 241), in which "ontology became equal for him to a philosophy of power", complicit with violence. This relationship between ontology and power is also evident in Frantz Fanon's (1963) and later Enrique Dussel's (1996) works on being and the colonial enterprise. For the former, blackness (the embodied) occupies the lowest position in a hierarchical order in which whiteness (the disembodied) stands at the apex of what it means to be human (Fanon, 1963), whereas for the latter, being, within the matrix of western modernity, is understood as a form of domination (Dussel, 1996). However, the study couples Maldonado-Torres's (2007) work with the work of Marimba Ani (1994) to deepen the epistemic components of coloniality. Seen through this lens, coloniality imprints itself on different bodies, spaces and institutions in different ways. Accordingly, the cases of colonial India, colonial Haiti and Mao's China, although each differently located within coloniality, are used to demonstrate the disaggregated nature of coloniality. Together, these constitute the 'colonial difference' (Mignolo, 1999a) that exists between western modernity and the darker people.

Coloniality in IR's constitution of 'the international' has primarily been resisted by the darker people, by which the study refers to 'non-Caucasians'. Although their resistance is evident in continued struggles, which include landmark events such as the Haitian Revolution, which began in 1791, and the Indian Rebellion of 1857, this study focuses on the international dimension of darker people's resistance. Consequently, the study looks at the resistance present in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 1961, the Bandung Conference of 1955, and in the proposal of a New International Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, collectively called the Third World, and later the Global South, of which IBSA and BRICS are representatives. Consequently, given the resistance of the darker people throughout this history, there is a contestation over the constitution of 'the International'. This study later argues that epistemically and ontologically, the darker people have historically sought to build a differently constituted International from IR.

This study examines three historical periods in which different 'regimes of being' are unique to each period. These are the 'colonial construction', the 'liberal construction' and the 'neoliberal construction', all of which are underpinned by coloniality and are premised on western-centred epistemic forms of thinking that are often hostile to non-European world views. Accordingly, what this study refers to as 'regime of being' means historically-specific political orders that shape the parameters of social existence. Therefore, this periodisation of history is unique to this study. For instance, in the colonial construction, from 1492 to the 1940s, the study reads colonial India, colonial Haiti and Mao China through the *Valladolid* debates of 1550/1551 to identify the disaggregated outworking of coloniality. For colonial Haiti, the study specifically demonstrates the natal alienation that characterised the position of black people in the colonial world. 'Natal alienation' refers to a being who belongs to no legitimate social order as he ceases to have any rights to claims of birth, of society and of rights (Patterson, 1982, p. 5). In the liberal construction, from the 1940s to 1990, the study looks at how liberalism, through the intervention of the welfare states of western Europe, the nationalisms of bourgeoning independent states and socialist states, constructed liberal identities, which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Third World project. In the neoliberal construction, beginning with the end of the Cold War, the study argues that a 'veil of ignorance' hides the structural impact of both the state and the market through the optics of neoliberalism, creating an expansive, but ahistorical, notion of being. Therefore, what constitutes these 'regimes of being' shifts between these constructions. 'Shifts' because, while coloniality is historically present throughout these constructions, it has historically specific political orders, each with its own 'regime of being'. These orders create the possibility of incorporating certain non-European bodies/thought systems into coloniality. The outcome is that there is a weakening of coloniality in different historical periods, giving space for the darker people to constitute an alternative International.

Incorporation into coloniality, as this study shows, is evident in the outcome of the battles of the Third World and, more recently, the battles within, and of, the Global South. Using these examples, this study investigates how the Third World and the Global South, assessed against their respective historically specific political orders, have wrestled with coloniality. While it is evident that the Third World failed, using border-thinking (Mignolo, 1999b) as its praxis, it was however able to weaken coloniality by forcing it to shift to the neoliberal epistemic order. The problem here is that, while border-thinking is/was internal to western modernity, it still was able to impose an incoherence on the liberal coordinates of coloniality. To demonstrate this outworking, the study uses the Third World struggles of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New International

Economic Order (NIEO). Because of their exclusive nature, what becomes evident in these shifts is that what strengthens each political order is what also weakens it. So, the stability of each epistemic order is threatened by the cultural prejudices of western-centred epistemology. Accordingly, the same is found in the neoliberal construction, in which the western epistemological frame is central to its constitution. The formation and struggles of IBSA, and later BRICS, as creatures of the Global South demonstrate these prejudices. But it is also out of BRICS, in which this study observes a duality of operation between border-thinking and dewesternisation (Mignolo, 2012) as praxis against the neoliberal epistemic order, that the contestation over the constituting of 'the international' becomes more pronounced.

Given the foregoing, this study has two themes: the first theme is concerned with defining coloniality and demonstrating its operative frame at different historical periods. The second theme is concerned with illuminating a resistance history in which the 'darker people' build, over different historical periods, an international that is inclusive of humanity. In this instance, the resistance of the darker people includes the "imaginaries of its constituents, and the actualized and attainable material and symbolic spaces within it to realize justice, peace, and a sustainable order" (Grovogui, 2013, p. 2), a striving that has eluded IR.

## 1.0 Literature overview

Recent critiques of IR have highlighted its western-centric orientation (Beier, 2005; Grovogui, 2013; Hobson, 2012; Mamdani, 2020; Shilliam, 2011; Zondi, 2018). These critiques have largely focused on both the discipline's theoretical orientation and the west's colonial and imperial efforts as evidence of this western orientation. Dominant IR theories, such as liberalism (see Buchan, 2002) and realism (Henderson, 2015; Vitalis, 2015) at different historical moments, have been used to excuse or justify western colonial and imperial misadventures. Although non-occidental theories such as Marxism and feminism, etc. are accepted as legitimate critiques of 'the international', they are internal to western episteme and, consequently, are "intra-white debates" (Mills, 2008, p. 1383). These conceptions of 'the International all purport to have a universal appeal but speak largely from a particular episteme and impose a social order (see Grosfoguel, 2002; Oyewumi, 1997). And it has been the state, the ontological centrepiece of IR and its constitution of the International, that is used to achieve this social order.

Contrary to the assumption about Westphalia 1648, which ended the Thirty-Year's War, the founding of the nation-state arguably begins in 1492, when the Castilian monarchy forcefully created a homeland for Spanish Christians (see Brunstetter, 2010; Mamdani, 2020). This was done through the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Europe, or their conversion to western culture and religion. This is the same monarchy that went on to create colonies in the Americas. Accordingly, nationalism and colonialism are co-constituents of the state (Mamdani, 2020, p. 2). In other words, the two are central to state formation. However, what Westphalia did was to put an end to the bloodshed created by nationalism and colonialism by agreeing to a common respect for borders and minority groups (Mamdani, 2020, pp. 1-2). The colonial enterprise came to a head at the Berlin Conference of 1885, where European powers sought to demarcate their spheres of control and influence. This did not last as a bulwark against war, however. Three decades later, from 1914 to 1918, these same European powers were again embroiled in war, what was then called World War I. However, contrary to the title, this was not a world war. It was again a war among European powers. Its end in 1919 culminated in the creation of an IR Department at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, in which international peace was to be its disciplinary striving. The difference with the end of World War II in 1945, bringing in the US and Japan (Chomsky, 1993) within the European moral universe, was that it brought about peace among western nations.

Two observations are important given the foregoing history: while peace is premised on intra-European tolerance, state formation is predicated on the trajectory of Euro-American history. In fact, it is on this history that the state is theorised as having, to borrow from Max Weber, the "monopoly of the legitimate use of violence" (Weber, 1964, p. 56). The same argument is made by Youssef Cohen (et al, 1981) and Anthony Giddens (1985). Accordingly, in IR theory, normative and descriptive theorisations of the state pivot on this history. The central assumption underlying these theorisations is that the social and political institutions of the west are regarded as universal goods in a world of plurality, a critique for which E.H. Carr (1964) faulted liberals. And many of these theorisations emanate from a realist position (to use an IR theoretical marker) which emerged in the 1940s, coinciding with decolonisation. Emerging during the war and post-war years, realists fundamentally also operate on specific assumptions about the nature of humans and their drive for power. These include that egocentrism is central to being human, which is why conflict is a never-ending feature of society, but it can be reduced in certain circumstances (Hendrickson, 1997, p. 20). This, they argue, is why anarchy is the best optic through which to understand 'the International'. This optic allows one to understand why states, in a self-help system, are primarily concerned with relative gains in which

their security is premised on their ability to protect themselves against external threats (Krasner, 1992, p. 39). Therefore, states use power (and its instruments) to protect themselves. This prism resonates well with the idea of the traditional Westphalian state system, in which the notion of sovereignty was presented as the concept that facilitates both control over national territory and that tolerates no interference in domestic matters. In its territory, using the Weberian notion, the State is argued to be "an institution that possess a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and the ability to extract tax revenues" (Biersteker, 2005, p. 159). These explanations draw their assumptions from the notion that politics, like society, is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 4). It is this human nature, and its attendant socio-political institutions, that are regarded as universal.

Another major international theory that contributed to 'the International' is liberalism. Also called liberal institutionalism in IR theory, it is premised on the idea that international institutions enable states to cooperate better (Devitt, 2011). So, a common ground among states, which is a function of international institutions, creates the conditions for common values. Accordingly, through global governance, states can also sketch out common goals. And the fashioning of common goals is important in liberal institutionalism because they enable states to cooperate (Devitt, 2011). The problem here is that these common, or shared, goals operate on the basis of asymmetrical histories and societies. That is, one cannot easily discuss shared goals or common values in a situation in which the wealth of one society exists because of the underdevelopment of the other society. Also known as neoliberal institutionalism, it argues that states stand to benefit from cooperation with one another if there is mutual trust in the international system. To the extent that there is an independent governance institution to monitor agreements, there is an incentive to cooperate (Meiser, 2017, p. 24). In turn, this trust results in a general gain for the states system in general. In other words, neoliberal institutionalism is concerned with the general gain for the system (see Meiser, 2017; Powell, 1994). However, the theory is alert to the fact that, even though there is no coherence of interests (Keohane, 2012, p. 126), interests are catalysts for the creation of common institutions, equally implicated in coloniality.

Bar constructivism, it becomes evident that, by being western-centric, IR is premised on materialism. This is the view that all that exists in the world is atoms (Feyerabend, 1963) or matter (see Wolfe, 2015). Since atoms are not visible to the naked eye, and the body is the most visible, it is the body that accounts for the organisation of the social world (Oyewumi, 1997). As the Nigerian gender scholar,

Oyeronke Oyuwumi, argues in this vision, it is assumed that bodies contain social processes such that the embodied are 'irrational' [darker people], carrying with them superstitious traditions, while the bodyless [white people] are 'rational', carrying human's highest values (Oyewumi, 1997). In this way, in western epistemology, somacentricity is central to organising the world (see Ani, 1994). For example, realists argue that, because human nature, defined materially, is power-driven, conflict is a permanent feature of 'the International' (see Hendrickson, 1997; Morgenthau, 1978). Accordingly, 'the International' is theorised as either anarchic or the state as representing the interests of the powerful. Perceived this way, institutions are designed to regulate this nature by curbing its excess. For liberals, however, human nature is predicated on self-interest and individualism (see Levy, 1984). It is why the market or society is theorised as naturally representing private interests, which is why institutions (or the state) are designed in such a way as to check one another as a measure to uphold the common interest. From the foregoing, however, whether liberal or realist, it becomes evident that their theorisations are predicated on body-reasoning.

The emergence and influence of international institutions at the end of the Cold War prompted a rethink of 'the International'. Consequently, constructivism constituted 'the International' from a different point of departure, away from the hard-nosed conception of mainstream theories critiqued above. However, like realism, this theory also emerged during the late period of decolonisation, in which western Europe lost its empire status. There was a need to justify the apparent discovery of poverty in the developing world (Escobar, 1999, p. 382). Consequently, international institutions were created to achieve a common goal such that poverty, which was and is a threat to the established political order, does not reach intolerable levels (Escobar, 1999, p. 382). Implied herein is the pliability of 'the international'. Therefore, while anarchy is structural in constructivism, it is state behaviour that determines 'the International'. So, unlike the foregoing theories, 'the International' is not naturally given, but is malleable (see Onuf 1998; Wendt, 1992). Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 392) posits that state identities and interests are constructed through state relations, such that there is no state existence outside of such relations or processes of interaction. In this sense, 'the International', with its diplomatic institutions and multilateral platforms, is the creation of 'shared interests' and common pursuits. However, this not only masks inequalities or power relations (see Duvallet al., 1999; Epstein, 2017), but it fundamentally de-historicises being, resulting in temporal dislocation. In other words, in the unity of thought within constructivism, the present time is held independently from the past. Only the now, the process, is experienced. This temporal dislocation is a function of the autonomised nature of the western epistemological order. And this ties in neatly with Marimba Ani's

(1994, p. 31) position, much like the present time is held independently from the past in constructivism, the individual in the western frame is removed from *his* environing community, and is conceived as autonomous and independent, that way, they are capable of thinking. Therefore, cognition only becomes possible in difference (Ani, 1994, pp. 105-106).

What is discernible thus far is that these theories form a spectrum. That is, realism, premised on a striving for objectivity through external reality, and constructivism, premised on a negation of external reality, are two opposing truths. Marxism, on the other hand, appears to encapsulate both; that there are objective factors (matter) and there are subjective factors (ideology). And these factors are connected in the Marxian frame. This is so because, in the form of class struggle, material conditions can be changed by human action, and human action, in turn, can be informed by material conditions. However, in these circumstances, there are those who rule over others. Antonio Gramsci, in explaining hegemony, argues that capitalism dominates society through coercive and consensual means (Gramsci, 1971, p. 556). Also, this is how some groups of individuals or states exercise power over other groups. Accordingly, state power is based on their exercise of authority. Robert Cox's adaptation of Gramsci's hegemony is instructive here. He suggests that hegemony is when "a State would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states […] could find compatible with their interests" (in Fusaro, 2010, p. 21). This, for Cox, means a hegemony that is not just an interstate relationship, but that also emerges when social relations in each state are exported and emulated abroad. In turn, these relations, through mutual interests and common ideological positions, create cross-border global classes (Cox, 1981, p. 137). Accordingly, and in agreement with Giovanni Arrighi, a state is hegemonic when "it can credibly claim that the expansion of its power relative to some or even all other States is in the general interest of the subjects of all States" (in Fusaro, 2010, p. 21). In hindsight, then, hegemony is "exercised by social forces or (transnational) classes, not States" (Fusaro, 2010, p. 23), which leads one to the Marxian argument that the state represents class interests (Marx, 1932).

In a predominantly capitalist society, the economy is upheld as an independent institution (see Nicholson, 1987). For example, Nicholson shows that Marx's use of 'production' is ambiguous in that it initially moves from a broad meaning of all activities for basic survival of the species, to a narrow meaning referring to activities within the history of industry and the exchange or creation of objects (1987, p. 18). In this way, industry and exchange are theorised outside of other productive activities. Gendered relations, specifically women's work, is seen as existing outside productive work, as if to

occupy a lower position. To this extent, Marxism is complicit in somacentricity, a belief rooted in Oyewumi's body-reasoning. This is not to evade the reality that Marxism was a key inspiration for Third Worldism and Southern theories like dependency, decolonial thought and other anti-imperialist efforts. If anything, this also indicates that the darker people were also complicit in coloniality. Accordingly, it becomes evident that the modern order rests on a comprehensive worldview (see Ani, 1994; Oyewumi, 1997).

There is some literature concerning the colonial roots of IR (see Davis, 2020; Thakur et al., 2017; Tucker, 2018). This study expands on that. Although the epistemic aspect of coloniality has been thoroughly unpacked (Maldonado-Torres, 2007 Mignolo, 1999a), this study is concerned with its ontological aspect and how it underpins 'the International'. For Anibal Quijano (in Salgado et al, 2021), coloniality means the internationalisation of a social order in which the darker people are biologically inferior, and the lighter people are biologically superior (in Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Importantly, for Quijano, this biological thesis is foundational to colonial modernity. Unlike Maldonado-Torres (2007, p. 245), who re-routes coloniality to an epistemic device, specifically to a scepticism, this study follows on from Quijano's (in Salgado et al, 2021) biological thesis and Oyewumi's (1997, p. 17) idea of body-reasoning, which claims that, in western episteme, a person's biology determines their social position. It is on Oyewumi's (1997) body-reasoning that this study pegs coloniality. That is, given that the body is always in view, and is always present in western thought, coloniality is both epistemic and ontological. However, and this is its limitation, decolonial theorists have a tendency to premise coloniality singularly on an epistemic frame (see Ciccariello-Maher, 2017; Dussel, 1996; Grosfoguel, 2011; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 1999a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Seroto, 2018). As a matter of fact, others argue that epistemology frames ontology (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, p. 135). In this respect, this study is a corrective on coloniality, specifically its ontological aspect.

Decolonial scholars tend to also speak about the coloniality of being. And when they do so, it is usually in the form of claims with insufficient argumentation. For instance, for Sylvia Winter, the coloniality of being concerns the problem of the overrepresentation of the western man as man proper (2003: 260). In other words, humanity is best represented in the image of the western man. Walter Mignolo makes similar claims when he argues that those that self-defined themselves as *humanitas* had invented the non-European (2009:3). Close to some version of the coloniality of being, for Ramon Grosfoguel, in the zone of non-being, the humanity of the colonized is either

questioned or denied (2016: 10). This is because of the God-like status that the Imperial Being assumed (Grosfoguel, 2011: 6). Out of all these interventions, it is Nelson Maldonado-Torress (2007) that, in On the Coloniality of Being, attempts to weave a comprehensive grammar of the coloniality of being. His attempt not only problematically enters the ontological via the epistemic, but it centers European knowledge and history via faulting a European 'misanthropic scepticism' that he argues is responsible for the distinction between those considered human and those considered insufficiently human. The study remedies this problem.

There has been resistance to the foregoing epistemological order. As such, it is instructive to note here that many states in the Third World were initially not recognised as 'nations' and, consequent to that, they were not considered part of the international community. Accordingly, the primary line of contestation during the Cold War was between the East and West (see Berger, 2004). On this point, Oyewumi (1997) reminds us that what it means to be 'human' is predicated on western thought: that humans are 'rational', rights-bearing creatures. To be sure, these notions masked and continue to mask historical injustices that justify the power structure of 'the International', one that is constituted by the logic of difference. While these theories are not exhaustive of the many varied others attempting to understand 'the International', from the perspective of the darker people, these are largely "intra-white" (Mills, 2008, p. 4) debates/struggles for power at the expense of who Vijay Prashad (2007) refers to as the "darker nations". This intra-white dominance constitutes what Mignolo (2002, p. 60) refers to as "a spatial articulation of power". This power, Prashad (2007, p. 68) argues, in unison with Charles Mills, is evidence that the invisible hand in the market is white. Whether it is realism, neo-liberal or constructivist thought, the construction of 'the International' privileges an epistemology that hides the "location of the subject of enunciation" (Grosfoguel, 2011 p. 6). Notions such as the "geopolitics of knowledge" (Grosfoguel, 2002), or what is termed "afro- centric epistemology" (Collins, 1990), and the notion of the "body politics of knowledge" (Fanon, 1967), unmask the locus and locates its subject in space and time. Having located this subject, this study unmasks the struggle the darker people have mounted against coloniality. Much later, the Third World begins to operate at the level that Mignolo (1999, p. 236) argues to be at the "epistemic colonial difference", or in what Jeremy Moses (2007, p. 17) refers to as the "constitutive outside". In other words, in their struggles, the Third World has attempted to operate outside of the western abstract concept referred to as 'humanity', and there is a history to this.

Whereas resistance against coloniality existed in the Haitian revolution of 1791 (Johnson, 2000), and later in the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (Mamdani, 2012), thereby changing colonial techniques of

control (Mamdani, 2012, p. 8), this study focuses on the broader resistance by the darker people, across people and boundaries. Specifically, the study focuses on theresistance of the darker people in the post-1945 world, with the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 1961, and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) of 1977 seen as growing concerted efforts by the darker people to stake their claim on the constitution of 'the International'. These moments represent the so-called Third World. In his book, *The Darker Nations*, from which this thesis draws its title, Vijay Prashad says that the Third World was a project that concerned resolving the problems to which Europe did not have answers (Fanon, in Prashad, 2007, p. 16). This is because, getting out of brutal imperial rule, the darker people sought to enter a world based on equality, democracy, and human solidarity (Segal, 2008, p. 311). Therefore, for Mignolo (2011, 2013), the Third World is where the decolonial horizon begins. For him, decoloniality was a response to both communist and capitalist global designs (Mignolo, 2011, p. xiii), and there is more to both these imaginations. Accordingly, the Third World is the origin of border-thinking (Mignolo, 2013, p. 132).

For Mignolo, the epistemic colonial difference is the point at which the subaltern or the non-westerner is located between retrieving her or his historical authenticity and being lured by the totalising project of western modernity, trapped in a 'double bind', so to speak. It is at this point that Mignolo calls for 'border thinking', where an "appropriation of western philosophy and at the same time a rejection of it is grounded in the colonial difference" (2002, p. 72). Mignolo further says that "the limit of Western philosophy is the border where the colonial difference emerges, making visible the variety of local histories that Western thought, from the right and the left, hid and suppressed" (2002, p. 66). Therefore, border thinking is an epistemological method by which one speaks from the viewpoint of the subaltern or the colonial difference, while appropriating western philosophy. However, the liberal frame foreclosed the outworking of decolonisation. This frame "deployed a regime of government over the Third World" (Escobar, 1995, p. 9), creating "an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and theexercise of power over, the Third World" (Escobar, 1995, p. 9). Accordingly, as with Ramon Grosfoguel (2006, p. 178), the Third World was complicit in coloniality because it reproducedEurocentric thinking. For instance, although Marxism was crucial to Third World activists, Marxism is unable to think of white supremacy as the base (Wilderson, 2003, p. 225) becausethe excluded within Marxist thought are structured by capital. Accordingly, Marxism reproduced Eurocentrism (see Blaney & Tickner, 2017).

Moving to the 'Neoliberal construction of the International', this study looks at how the indebted

developing world eventually came, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, to resist the neoliberal frame and the unipolar division of the world led by the US. This post-1970 period is best exemplified by the conservative leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Ronald Reagan in the US, Helmut Kohl in Germany and Yasuhiro Namason in Japan, all of whom dashed Third World hopes (Toye, 2014, p. 1767). Tying the developing world into the international financial market, these leaders brought these states into debt. In fact, when the Third World called for the worldwide extension of the welfare framework that originated in western Europe (Berger, 2004, p. 24), it was Ronald Reagan who, at the 1981 Cancun Economic summit, said that the US would no longer entertain discussions concerning changes to the global economic architecture, regardless of the discordance it produced (Gilman, 2015, p. 8). This was because the bourgeoning financialization of the world economy, and its subversion of the centrality of the state, appeared to aggravate inequalities in developing societies. The neoliberal frame was based on the principle of the strict use of state budget, cutsin state spending and the disciplining hand of the free market (see Hall, 1988; Harvey, 2005; Jackson, 2014). Consequently, between the 1970s and the 1990s, developing societies faced mounting debt and structural adjustment programmes imposed from outside. There seemed no way out of the crisis of coloniality. However, by 1994, the Zapatista came onto the world stage (Klein, 2019) with their uprising against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This uprising reverberated beyond the Mexican border, creating the possibility of a different imagination (see Olesen, 2004) of 'the International'.

It was not only the Zapatista who were pivotal in the reimagined 'the international'. It was really in the late 1990s, through the WTO protests in the US, that the Global South gained worldwide circulation. According to Siba Grovogui, the Global South was not a rejection of the notion of the Third World; rather, it signified an adjustment or a re-examination of the foundations of the international system, with its differentiated legacies, if not logics, of colonialism (De Sousa Santos, 2016; Grovogui, 2011). For Roberto Dainotto, on the other hand, rather than things in and of themselves, the South or the Global South are orientations (Dainotto, 2017, p. 46). That is, the Global South project is not an ideological straightjacket. Itis bigger than politics. It calls for a world based on solidarity and responsibility (Grovogui, 2011, p. 177). Two state-based creatures to have come out of the politics of the Global South are BRICS (even though included in BRICS is a country not associated with the Global South as a geopolitical bloc: Russia) and IBSA, both of which emphasise solidarity and responsibility as international values (see Conning, 2015; Stuenkel, 2015; Taylor et al., 2013). However, while South-South cooperation is argued to be the cornerstone of the Global South project (see Nel & Taylor, 2013; Stuenkel, 2015), the South cannot exist outside of its relation to the

North (Dainotto, 2017, p. 46). Basically, the South is intrinsically tied to the North, such that it is the South because there exists the North. For others, such as De Sousa Santos (2016), however, the Global South is not a geographical signifier, but a geopolitical one. Accordingly, there is a North in the South, just as much as there is a South in the North (De Sousa Santos, 2016, pp. 18-19). To this end, while it shares many convergences with the Third World, the Global South parts ways with it when it concerns geographical spread.

There are other ways, it seems, in which the Global South parts ways with the Third World, especially when one singles out BRICS. Popular and academic literature on BRICS has swung from critiques that too many "differences outweigh their commonalities" (Stuenkel, 2016b), and therefore there is no need for rigorous analysis, which is a US and EU critique; whereas others argue that the bloc offers no alternative (Proyect, 2015) to the US-led international financial model, or that the bloc is "a challenge to Western economic supremacy" (Desai, 2013). Both critiques emanate from quarters within the Global South. For others, such as Patrick Bond (2013, p. 252), BRICS's sub-imperial ambition not only reinforces Euro- American power, but it replicates it in the respective regions of each country. Mignolo (2017), on the other hand, views BRICS, a creature of the Global South, as the foremost force for dewesternisation. By dewesternisation, Mignolo refers to a state-led project. While it does not question coloniality, it questions the authority of those in control and management of the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, 2018, p. 125). Accordingly, this is not about delinking from coloniality. Instead, dewesternisation is a contestation over the levers of power of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and other international institutions. Accordingly, BRICS brings a different element to the struggle of the Global South. The ability of the latter to coalesce around a common programme, unite their economic power and leverage it for international influence is something the Third World was not able to achieve. This is an important difference between the Global South and the Third World.

### 1.2 Research problem

This study tackles the following two problems. As pointed out earlier, there have been a number of critiques of IR that shed light on its western-centric orientation (Beier, 2005; Grovogui, 2013; Hobson, 2012; Krishna, 2015; Mamdani, 2020; Shilliam, 2011; Zondi, 2018). These critiques have largely focused on how the discipline's theoretical orientation is premised on the west's colonial and imperial efforts as evidence of this western orientation of the discipline. And, while this is important work, there have also been a number of critical interventions in the discipline that shed light on

coloniality within IR (see Blaney & Tickner, 2017; Capan, 2017; Taylor, 2012; Tucker, 2018). However, as with the tendency of decolonial theorists to centre the epistemological within coloniality, critiques that shed light on the connection between coloniality and IR tend to do the same. This is the first problem. The second problem, connected to the first, is that decolonial theorists tend to characterise the problem of coloniality as epistemological firstly, and not both epistemic and ontological (see Ciccariello-Maher, 2017; Dussel, 1996; Grosfoguel, 2002; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 1999; Mignolo & Walsh, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Seroto, 2018). And, when the ontological is acknowledged, it is arrived at from the epistemological (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo & Walsh, 2018).

### 1.3 Research questions

The research questions are as follows:

i) How has coloniality constituted 'the International'?
ii) How do we theorise resistance to coloniality?

### 1.4 Theoretical frame

This study largely follows a decolonial approach to IR. This approach lays bare the hegemonic western frame that envelopes the world, exposing its ontological structure wrapped in the concept 'regimes of being', which is operational at different historical moments. The study contributes to this approach by understanding the shifts, or articulating the regimes of being, that occur at different historical moments in the constitution of 'the International'. These regimes are the colonial, the liberal and the neoliberal construction of 'the International'. Moreover, using Africana existential philosophy, the study is able to deepen the ontological component of coloniality. While black people of African descent are who Lewis Gordan refers to in Africana existential philosophy (2000, p. 6), in this study, the thesis uses this same philosophy to refer to the conditions of black people throughout the world. For instance, the study uses Patterson's (1982) concept of 'natal alienation' to outline the ontological degradation that coloniality imposes on black people throughout the world. Secondly, the study then uses Oyewumi's concept of body-reasoning to understand the disaggregated nature of coloniality. In other words, 'body-reasoning' enables the study to argue that different bodies are treated differently in different regions of the world. This is important because the centrality of

epistemology in the decolonial approach not only masks the ontological degradation of black people, but it tempers the ontological frame brought on by coloniality. For instance, when one looks at decolonial theory on the question of being, being poses an epistemic problem (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo & Walsh, 2018), while in Africana existential theory, being poses an ontological problem (see Madlingozi, 2018; Sithole, 2016; Wilderson, 2003). Certainly, the difference lies in phenomenological disparities between the two. So, bar black people, darker people's ontological degradation is a result of epistemic difference. However, for black people, since the world is by design anti-black (Fanon, 2008; Gordon, 2005;Wilderson, 2014), no epistemic options available in that world will offer them, or validate, their own ontological position. This difference is important, because while darker people are disproportionately situated within western modernity, black people are inside colonial modernity. This schema borrows from Orlando Patterson's (1982) conceptual frame. In the concept of (intrusive form) 'social death', slaves were conceived of as the "enemy within" (Patterson, 1982, p. 41) white society, while other slaves experienced 'social death' (extrusive form) from being insiders who ceased to belong to any community (Patterson, 1982, p. 41). In fact, their non-belonging was a function of their "innate incompetence and of divine disfavor" (Patterson, 1982, p. 41). In this study, the darker people are historically regarded to belong in the intrusive form of social death, while black people historically belong in the extrusive form of social death. So, while the darker people are generally disproportionately situated within western modernity, as the enemy within, black people are adequately (sic) situated within colonial modernity.

For black people, to borrow from Frank Wilderson, their situation is because black people "impose a radical incoherence" (2003, p. 225) upon western modernity. It is from this premise that this study deepens coloniality by incorporating black people's struggles, thus situating their history, broadly, within the resistance of the darker people throughout time. However, over time, black people have become enveloped into western modernity, albeit also in a disfigured sense. Therefore, the concept of the 'darker people', used synonymously with Oyewumi's concept of the embodied, then designates a people constituted inside western modernity, but all located in a disfigured way. To this extent, Asians, Africans, Latin Americans, and indigenous people in the developed world, all constituted the darker people, and this study demonstrates the disaggregated nature of coloniality. That means, coloniality has a different effect on different groups of people within the darker people. At the same time,however, this different effect is consistent with Steve Biko's notion of "the totality of white power" (1987, p. 89).

The decolonial approach helps the study to appreciate the meaning of the resistance of the darker people over a longer historical period. Hence, the darker people have been involved in the same

struggle, albeit with different epistemic indices, over different historical periods. Fundamentally, however, these struggles centre on coloniality. Accordingly, following on from the decolonial thinker, Walter Mignolo, the "fundamental difference is indeed [in] the colonial difference" (2002, p. 68). That is, this historical struggle is not against western modernity, but against colonial modernity. Colonial modernity began when the concept of human being or humanity was predicted on the European concept of human (Mignolo, 2009, p. 11) such that black people were at the lower scale of this hierarchy. Ultimately, the concept of colonial modernity conceives a double movement of a modernising vision on the one hand, and a ruinous imagery on the other hand. In this ruinous imagery, what is referred to as the darker people in this study, from which resistance to coloniality emerges, are the people who exist outside the European concept of what it means to be human. Therefore, auto-critiques, or critiques internal to western modernity such as Marxism and liberalism, are "intra-white debates" (Mills, 2008, p. 1383). That is, these debates represent a conversation among those within the European concept of humanity. On the other end, from neo-colonialism, to post- colonialism, to dependency theory and then later decolonial theory, and similarly from the Asian Conference of 1947, the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement of 1961, the darker people have sought not only to critique the various stages of coloniality, but have sought to make their own contribution to 'the International' – not from the perspective of the west but from their own prism. In this manner, the study centres the problem of ontology in colonial modernity. Here, the theoretical contribution of this study is that it blends two theoretical approaches. It synthesises decolonial thought and Africana existential philosophy.

### 1.5 Methodological approach

This study uses a conceptual-history method to formulate the temporal specificity of concepts and how the reconceptualisation of the same concepts, over time, represents a new time (Koselleck and Presner, 2002, pp. 4-5). In this study, such a concept is coloniality and how, through the other concept of 'regime of being', it has temporal specificity at different historical periods. Accordingly, while each 'regime of being' represents a different time, the fact that they are underlined by coloniality means that it is the same time. In this way, coloniality is continuous, this study contends, but in a weakening form. This methodological approach helps the study to understand how darker people's resistance has evolved over different historical periods. So, like Reinhart Koselleck, this study is also an attempt to "write histories in plural" (in Olsen, 2012, p. 213). This is because the study looks at how coloniality has imposed itself in different historical periods, while also looking at

how darker people have constituted their resistance against these periods. Ultimately, this is a qualitative, literature-based study that draws from publicly available documents such as books, journal articles, conference papers and minutes (where publicly available), including newspapers, research reports, etc.

### 1.6 The structure of this study

This study comprises six chapters, which appear in the following sequence:

**Chapter 1** offers an introduction to the subject of the darker people, decolonisation and the making of 'the International'. To this end, it identifies the research phenomenon and research problem, before putting forward the research questions and the proposition of the study. It provides a literature survey, together with the study's theoretical and methodological approach.

**Chapter 2** establishes the conceptual/theoretical frame of the study by discussing how coloniality underpins 'the International'. Focusing on ontology, the first section discusses the emergence of the 'ontological difference', expressed in anti-black racism. In this section, the study discusses two colonial impulses that arose out of the *Valladolid* debates. Accordingly, itwill outline the difference between ontological degradation, as generated by epistemic difference, and ontological degradation, as generated by the anti-black world. In the second section, the study unpacks different IR conceptions of 'the International' to demonstrate how these conceptions are foregrounded by the ontological difference.

**Chapter 3** focuses on the colonial construction of 'the International'. The study uses Oyewumi's concept of body-reasoning to understand the disaggregated nature of coloniality. Accordingly, the section discusses three historical moments. In the first moment, the chapter uses the examples of colonial Haiti to show the ontological component of coloniality, specifically how colonial Haiti was socially ordered, resulting in the construction of anti-black racism, coloniality's persisting ontological feature. In the second moment, the chapter uses colonial India to show how coloniality imposed a gender system, a feature of coloniality whose purpose served to subjugate and oppress. In the third moment, the chapter demonstrates the omnipresence of coloniality, showing that even in lands in which colonialism did not settle for long, coloniality was hegemonic. To this end, it uses China's experience.

**Chapter 4** discusses how the liberal construction of 'the International' constrained the Third

World's struggle for freedom. In the first section, the chapter shows how liberalism constituted a particular 'regime of being'. This is a 'regime of being' constructed on the pretence of diverseidentities (political, economic, social), while concealing its inability to offer black people ontological options outside of coloniality. However, access to these diverse identities, effectively to the cosmology of [western] human rights, made possible the exercise of border-thinking. In the second section, the chapter demonstrates how border-thinking foreclosed the Third World from a comprehensive appreciation of coloniality. In other words, beyond the problem of colonial state, Third World leaders could not see the totality of coloniality. And, in the final section, the chapter discusses how internal competition within the Third World was in large part driven by proximity to western modernity. Accordingly, the chapter conceives of liberalism as a foreclosing device against the unity of the Third World.

**Chapter 5** argues that the failure of the Third World discussed in Chapter 4 made way for the forceful imposition of a shock therapy through the neoliberal construction of 'the International'. In this phase of 'the International', both the state and the individual aretransformed into entities defined by the logic of the market. In other words, the individual, for example, is stripped of their social and historical value and is categorised as a market value. In the first section, the study shows how the dialectic between the developed (North) and the developing (South) world was characterised by an unequal relationship benefiting the former. It argues that this relationship was further impaired by the strengthening of US power, plunging 'the International' under US unilateralism. This section basically describes the open conflict, or frontal attack, directed by the US and the western world on the developing world, designed to install capitalism and its neoliberal variant. In the second section, it argues that neoliberalismnot only attaches, or imposes, commercial value on the darker people and on the white community, but it also reconstitutes them as beings of self-governance stripped of space and history. It draws on Foucault's concept of neoliberal governmentality and Oyewumi's body-reasoning to conclude that the neoliberal free market masks the body-reasoning inherent in coloniality, thus stripping the individual of their social and historical structure. Accordingly, free-market philosophy strips all people of their socio-political context, leading to a wider struggle for freedom.

**Chapter 6** discusses the rebooting of the Third World in the form of the Global South, arguingthat it is a response to the neoliberal construction of 'the International' outlined in Chapter 4. In the first section, several political moments are discussed. First is the Zapatista uprising in Mexico; second are the large protests that challenged the trade rounds of the WTO; third and fourth are the formation and

meaning of IBSA and the formation and meaning of BRICS. All these will be discussed to get a sense of the different impulses making up the Global South. Accordingly, dewesternisation and border-thinking, as praxes against coloniality, are discussed. In the second section, the chapter argues that, while the Global South does contest neoliberalism, as in the case of the Third World it is unable to fully appreciate the ontological component of coloniality. Though the parallel international institutions built by the Global South, a window of opportunity is provided for them to reconfigure coloniality; without a comprehensive appreciation of anti-black racism, the Global South is both transformative andlimited.

**Chapter 7** provides a conclusion to the study by pulling out the thread that runs throughout the chapters, from the beginning to the end. This chapter also discusses the contribution of this study to the existing body of literature and offers recommendations for future studies.

### 1.7 Significance of the study

This study works at the interstices of IR theory and decolonial thought. And there is an existingbody of literature that operates at this juncture. So, this study adds to it. However, this study specifically deepens the ontological understanding of coloniality, expressed in the form of anti-black racism. It does so by reaching out from the toolkit of Africana existential thought. This is significant because the weaknesses detected in decolonial thought, specifically its ontological component, are replicated at the level of a decolonial critique of IR. Accordingly, the study attempts to remedy this problem.

# Chapter 2

# A Sustained Critique of Coloniality

## 2.0 Introduction

With a focus on the ontological component of coloniality, this chapter discusses how coloniality underpins 'the International'. It specifically traces the foundational moments that made this possible. Consequently, the expansion of western Europe is the site of the theorisation of coloniality. The chapter is divided into two sections, with the first section split between two subsections. The first section generally unmasks the ontological component of coloniality. The first subsection unmasks this as far back as the *Valladolid* debates of the 1550s. Here, the *Valladolid* debates demonstrate the logic of the ontological problem as occasioned by epistemic differences. In other words, the ontological problem of Othering is made possible through epistemological differences. In the second subsection, the study demonstrates how the anti-black world functions in such a way that no epistemic options are available to offer black people independent ontological positioning. In other words, anti-black racism is problematically addressed via the adoption of western epistemological frameworks. In the second section, the study unpacks different IR conceptions of 'the International' in order to demonstrate how these conceptions are foregrounded by the ontological difference.

## 2.1 Coloniality

### 2.1.1 Othering

In this section, using the *Valladolid* debates of 1550/1551, the study is concerned with discussing the ontological component of coloniality. A brief historical context of the *Valladolid* debates is important here; the debate occurred at a time when the Spanish empire had expelled both Moors and Jews, later instituting Inquisitions, while simultaneously being involved in the conquest of the Americas (Mamdani, 2020, p. 5). Accordingly, two things are happening here; the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews signals the shaping of nationalism, and the conquest of the Americas signals the shaping up

of colonialism. The *Valladolid* debates concern the latter, specifically how to conceive of the inhabitants of foreign lands. Presented to the 'Council of the Fourteen', the 1550/1551 *Valladolid* debates occurred between Bartome de Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda. The debate centred on the question whether 'war is lawful as a means for spreading Christianity in the Americas?' In this question, there were two corollary questions: centring on the law, the first question was whether war is justified as a means of attracting the Indians (read darker nations) to Christianity. The second, on moral grounds, related to whether the Indians' inferior and barbaric nature in relation to other civilised people justified such a war, according to natural law, as a means of liberating them from such inferiority and barbarism? Interestingly, both Las Casas and Sepúlveda agreed on the matter of the barbaric nature of the Indians, meaning indigenous people of the Americas (Brunstetter, 2010). Though that was the case, there were important differences between the two.

Sepúlveda advanced four contentious claims: While he agreed that the Indians a) were barbaric,he also argued that b) Indian society went against natural law, c) they killed innocent members of their own and were d) unbelievers according to the Christian faith (Hernandez, 2001, p. 99). Sepúlveda argued that, because the Indians refused to accept the natural superiority of the Spaniards, it meant the Biblical proverb applied, namely: "the fool shall be servant to the wise of heart" (Bowden, 2009, p. 136). He therefore argued that war was fitting for their own welfare (Bowden, 2009, p. 136). Sepúlveda, considering the Indians naturally inferior in the presence of the Spanish colonists, considered Indians permanently inferior. In other words, the difference between the Indians and the Spaniards was based on the ontological hierarchy brought by Spanish colonial powers. On this basis, war and violence against Indians was justified because Indians were not rational beings. Furthermore, their irrationality was based on their biological, hence unbridgeable, inferiority. Accordingly, Sepúlveda argued that violence was an important resource for the evangelising efforts of missionaries (Hernandez, 2001, p. 101).

Las Casas, on the other hand, like Sepúlveda, hedged his premise on the barbarity of the Indians. Although Las Casas acknowledged their idolatry and human sacrifices, actionsconsidered sins within the Christian framework, he underscored the Indians' harmonious communities and beautiful languages. He argued that, through persuasive means, they could be made to assimilate Spanish ways of being (Hernandez, 2001, p. 100) and cease to be "culturally different" (Brunstetter, 2010, p. 413). This assimilation through persuasion was possible because the Indians had a conception of a higher being, which, for Las Casas, was one of the essential conditions for the existence of reason. Therefore, persuasion, rather than coercion, was his preferred means for conversion to the Christian

God. It is important to note that difference, predicated on hierarchy, was still present in Las Casas' conceptual frame. And this assured the ever-presence of violence in the relationship between the Indian and the Spanish colonist, including those who were culturally different. This is because "difference is expressed as degeneration" (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 1). So, it is not surprising that Las Casas did not challenge the view that the Indians were inferior and so could not enjoy rights (Brunstetter, 2010, p. 411). Doing so would be to abandon the superiority of the Spanish, including the useof cultural violence.

A more precise manner of conceiving of the foregoing system is through the concept of coloniality. For decolonial theorists such as Nelson Maldonado-Torres, coloniality emerges through colonialism but survives it through patterns of power that define everything from modes of development to intersubjective relations (2007, p. 243). To this extent, it became self-determining. For others, such as Walter Mignolo, the key to coloniality was the Atlantic commercial projects of the 16th century, which kick-started capitalism as a worldwide phenomenon (1999a, p. 21). At one level, this echoes Chancellor Williams' argument that capitalism was central to the making of colonial identities (1974, p. 7). However, by unmasking coloniality as a key logic in the making of racism, Anibal Quijano argues that the struggle between the dominant and the dominated, based on the superior–inferior people binary, developed into a struggle that had biological justifications and structural consequences (in Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 171). Initially, both Maldonado-Torres (2007) and Quijano (in Salgado et al, 2021) argue that "the idea that non-Europeans have a biological structure that is not only different from that of Europeans but also inferior, was imprinted on intersubjective relations and social practices of power" before 1492 (Quijano, in Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 244). The fact that the Pope could declare the Amerindians human (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 244) is evidence of this thinking. However, Maldonado-Torres (2007) parts ways with Quijano (in Salgado et al, 2021) in a way that had a ripple effect among decolonial thinkers. Arguing that, over time, racism exhibits different coordinates, Maldonado-Torres pegs coloniality to an epistemic device, specifically to a scepticism (2007, p. 244). Deeper than racism, he claims, is that the sixteenth century produced an attitude characterised by apermanent suspicion of the other (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 244). This view has become pervasive among decolonial thinkers (see Ciccariello-Maher, 2017; Dussel, 1996; Grosfoguel, 2002; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 1999; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Seroto, 2018). Whilethis study does not disagree with this claim, it emphasises the other side of the coin of coloniality – that it is also ontologically located.

From the foregoing theorisation, the debates demonstrated two impulses inherent in colonialism. For instance, it is evident that colonialism questioned the humanity of the outsider. However, it did so in two ways. On the one hand, the inferiority of the Indians could be overcome by their assimilation into Spanish ways of being (conversion to Christianity). On the other hand, their inferiority was biological, hence unbridgeable. Accordingly, for black people in particular, access to the political universe of western modernity was always in question. While some categories of people among the darker people were incorporated within the moral universe of western modernity, albeit in a disfigured sense, for black people, however, their inferiority was premised on a biological difference, hence an unbridgeable position. Ultimately, these debates were part of the humanist tradition (see Mamdani, 2020). According to Mamdani, this "humanist articulation of rights was a justification of sovereignty" (2020, p. 8), not a critique of it. This relationship between the individual and the state had dire ramifications for the black people and their sovereignty, including their title to land and resources. Colonialism, with its binary logic of 'barbarian' and 'civilised', became definitive social categories in the expansion and projection of European power. Colonisers journeyed through these lands and cultures appropriating, for themselves, the authority to declare who were humans and who were not. In many cases, those who resisted their colonial designations were killed off, while those who accepted were controlled or assimilated. Consequently, in the following subsection, the study turns to anti-black racism.

### 2.1.2 Anti-black racism

In August 1789, the French revolutionaries adopted the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. The Declaration, and its associated revolution, marked an important development in the history of liberalism (Pithouse, 2016, p. 1). Declaring that "all men are created equal' and endowed with an inalienable right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (Blackburn, 1988, p. 111), it struck a universal tone that led the Haitian revolutionaries, between 1791 and 1804, to seek those same rights for themselves. However, what was expressed in universal terms, encapsulated in 'all men', "did not include Indians, Negroes, women and children" (Blackburn, 1988, p. 111). In other words, the repression of the Haitian revolution meant that such rights and freedoms, purporting universalism, were ring- fenced racially (Pithouse, 2016, p. 2). In this section, the study specifically deals with the pernicious racism directed at black people. Accordingly, it deals with the phenomenon of anti-black racism, or what is also referred to as ontological degradation.

Anti-black racism is specifically directed at black people. It is best captured by Patterson's concept of 'natal alienation' (1982 p. 38). In it, Patterson argues that the slave is a 'being' thatbelongs to no legitimate social order as he ceases all rights to claims of birth, of society and ofrights (1985, p. 5). This is a loss of being for black people all over the world. And so the only thing that exists in black people is their bodies. In other words, the biological. On this note, Frantz Fanon echoes these sentiments when he argues that "for the Negro is only biological" (2008, p. 127). This is where the black exists. And so, as Fanon proceeds, he says to be afraidof black people is to fear the biological (2008, p. 127). Given this loss of 'being', or this fixedbiological point, the only recognisable 'being' is that of whiteness. In other words, anti-black racism enables whiteness to be the means through which humanness is exercised (Gordon, 2005, p. 3). This effectively means that black people lack ontological independence.

The logic of coloniality denoted an ontological structure in which Europeans represented human society proper, and the non-European something improper. In many ways, this structure inverted the modes of social organisation around which indigenous societies organised. For instance, the Christianisation of the colonies, which came with its own notion of culture and being, not only stratified those societies (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 128), but it had deleterious effects on native and indigenous people (see Dove, 1995) and their way of life. Accordingly, Frantz Fanon (1963) characterised the 'zone of nonbeing' as where being is either captured or negated. For Patterson, the introduction of black people into coloniality involved introducing them without natality (1982, p. 38). Without any origin, and given their defective humanity, black people were considered not co-present or simultaneous with western modernity (Madlingozi, 2017, p. 127). Javier Sanjinés similarly observes this conflict between "dissimilar spatial- temporal logics" (2013, p. 11). For Frank Wilderson (2003), coloniality involved a structural dynamic between black/human that cannot be reconciled. That is, the conception of black was,*a priori*, non-human, and so could not be transcended. Accordingly, it could not be assimilatedinto western modernity. For these theorists, the grammar of domination of black people is ontologically premised.

Joaneath Spicer says that, as hereditary issues arose following the expulsion of Moors and others, the question of one's pigmentation came up (2012, pp. 36-37). Two dominant strands of thought emerged in debates about one's skin colour. The first, and earlier debate, was aboutwhether it was the climate (environment) that engendered black skin, or whether black skin was hereditary (genetics). The second, and a more enduring strand, is one that demonised black people and canonised white

people. With strong religious overtones at the time, the influential papal theologian, Joannes Annius, published several commentaries on ancient writing. Though they were later discovered as his own forgeries, he had painted a picture of one's blackness as indicative of a curse on a previously white family (Spicer, 2012, p. 39). Unsurprisingly, then, the expulsion of the Moors, catapulting European expansion, ensured that the first slaves into the Americas were from Spain (Spicer, 2012). Accordingly, forgeries or not, Annius's views took hold. This strand constructed historically powerful symbols that gave impetus to metaphors concerning binaries between black and white (Spicer, 2012, p. 39). Splitting the world between dark and light, between evil and good, respectively, these metaphors made European expansion from the 1500s a particularly defining period in the history of 'the international'.

Writing about the early Christian era and the Age of Discovery, Jean Devisse (1989, p. 12) argues that the African had an ape-like nose, "was careless, crafty and ruled by authority", while the European, with his blue eyes and blonde hair, was intelligent and governed by custom(1989, p. 13). In *Racism: A Short History,* George Frederickson argues that evil and death were associated with blackness, while goodness and purity were associated with whiteness (2002, p.26). Europe presented 'Man' in its own self-image (Grovogui, 2011, p. 177). And this is what makes European expansion, alongside the political and economic changes it brought to non- European communities, particularly unique. To be clear, this is because the concept of 'modern' in (western) modernity suggested the need to do away with native cultural traditions and ideas, and rather to converge on positivist thought as a frame from which to understand and operate in the world (Rasmussen, 2017, p. 20). This is consistent with Europe's eventual move away from the Christian worldview to a positivist view of the world. This move merely represented an alternative regime of justification within coloniality. Premised on the idea that reason provides one point of access to objective truth (Rasmussen, 2017, p. 22), this move was, to use Rorty's words, "a sort of holdover from Christianity, a survival of the religious need to have human projects underwritten by a nonhuman authority" (Rorty, in Rasmussen, 2017, p.22). Despite the rise in secularism that occurred during the 18th century, Europeans still felt a deep metaphysical need to believe in an objective moral truth, and Enlightenment thinkers attempted to locate such a truth in human reason, which they believed was the same in all times and places; they insisted that "there is a relation between the ahistorical essence of the human soul and moral truth, a relation which ensures that free and open discussion will produce, one right answer to moral as well as to scientific questions" (Rasmussen, 2017, p. 22). Presumably, it is this belief that enabled colonists to conduct their work with the kind of conviction they carried.

This holdover from Christianity also contained the lingering notion "of a fall from grace, a deviation from the original type" (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 1), hence the need to subdue native or indigenous culture or nature, which represented, in the western imagination, humanity's beastly side. Having inherited these norms from their shared Christian past, what was considered human nature was the chauvinism of eighteenth-century Northern Europe (Rasmussen, 2017, p. 19). The Enlightenment project was, however, not just about being, but about the belief in the good life and the correct political order (Rasmussen, 2017, p. 20), the very story Europe identified itself with (Pagden, 2002, p. 37). This means that characteristics that were thought to be of a rational person were extrapolated to the societal regime, that is, to the organisation of society. And it was these ideas, both at an ontological and epistemological level, that western European ideas, through western colonial conquests, spread throughout the world. Certainly, women and the Other held a different status in colonial society. Both constituted the embodied, that is, the debased side of nature. On the other hand, the disembodied are both male and white, which implies that the anarchical state of nature represents the debased or lowly aspect of western modernity. Reason, a competence of the mind, stood "above the foibles of the flesh" (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 3). As such, a dualism became possible between the mind and the body. This dualism affirmed the perspective that the mind was entrapped by the body. In other words, the mind had to escape the body. Gender studies scholar, Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997), attributes this biological determination thesis to the importance of vision in the western frame. So, while the body is lowly, and must be escaped, the mind exists on a higher plain and is to be celebrated. Marimba Ani aptly captures this when she says that "reason is a higher principle or function of women/man, while appetite is more base" (1994, p. 32). And that they are in fact oppositional to one another. Accordingly, the disembodied or bodylessness becomes a qualification for reason (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 3), a qualification not accessible to the darker people.

Separation and hierarchy not only represented analytical thought, but it reduced all life to matter. As such, materialism also became a central component of coloniality. And this is what Oyewumi (1997) refers to as the body-reasoning inherent in western philosophical thought. Because thought was premised on one being independent of that which one sought to know, in other words, be detached and uninvolved, this paved the way for control (Ani, 1994, p. 31). This is, at first, a self-control that is not manipulated by context and history. Or, at a different level of abstraction, when reason controls emotions. It was these ideas – first argued by Plato, then later taken on by Aristotle – that came to characterise relations of dominance and submission in western culture and its philosophical discourse (Du Bois, in Ani, 1994, p. 35). These relations became possible because those who control their

emotions, the carnal selves, and who do so through reason, must control those who do not have self-control, those who are unable to reason. This thinking was grounded on specific assumptions about territory (nature) and economy, leading colonists to conclude that indigenous people "had no firm moral connections to land that could justify claims to property" (Grovogui, 2011, p. 179). This line of thought is also traceable in western feminists such as Simon de Beauvoir (1949) and Shulamith Firestone (1970), who argue that nature is not necessarily a human value and should be controlled. It has also been argued that the control of nature, with darker people conceived as extensions of nature, was deleterious to darker people the world over. In this vision, darker people lacked the productive nature to reason their way to perceive the collective good (Grovogui, 2011, p. 179). Accordingly, they should be coerced, as the history of colonialism attests, to proper ways of rationality and reason.

For other cultures, the notion of being was intimately involved in their surrounding universe. And, to gain knowledge, meaning was revealed through complex and multidimensional symbols (Ani, 1994, p. 30). In other words, the corporeal body was intimately tied to its surrounding universe. So, the idea of community was expansive. Through Plato's *Republic*, however, the seekers of knowledge were able to separate themselves from that knowledge (Ani, 1994, p. 30). Symbols became exchanged for objects and the creation of the object required a transformation of the universe, no longer experienced, but rather objectified (Ani, 1994, p. 30). In agreement with Arturo Escobar, and congruent with Timothy Mitchell (1998), western thought observed reality from "a position that is invisible and set apart" (Ani, 1995, p. 7). To this end, Achille Mbembe argues that European thought centre's identity on a "relation between similar beings" (2017, p. 1) as opposed to co-belonging or mutual belonging. That is because identity is removed from its environing community of which all humans are part.

It is evident that the nationalism of Spain achieved through the expulsion of the Moors and Jews by the Castile Monarch, and the *Valladolid* debates of 1550 that interrupted the colonial project in the Americas, meant that coloniality was "a mechanism for usurpation of cartography, of space" (Wilderson, 2015, p. 25), while the violence visited upon darker people, culturally and physically, was a procedure for the "usurpation of subjectivity" (Wilderson, 2015, pp. 25). The result was the exportation, and replication, of European society throughout the colonial world, centred on white people at the top of this system. Outside the image of Europe conceived as the home of true government and the home of freedom (Pagden, 2002, p. 37), with colonial subjectivities categorised as either "non-white, non-European and non- human" (Dove, 1995, pp. 4-5), coloniality had a

differentiated influence in colonial societies.

### 2.2 The constitution of 'the International'

This section is concerned with how 'the International' is constituted by coloniality. It discusses how contract theory is a powerful allegory that provides the underlying assumptions for many IR theories. And, given the racial underpinnings of contract theory (see Mills, 1997), we argue that coloniality is the constitutive frame of IR theories. IR is a parochial discipline in that the focus of publications and top-rated journals in the field pivots between Britain and the US (Kowert, Onuf, & Kubalkova, 1998, p. 5). Accordingly, the study endorses Siba Grovogui's (2009) characterisation of 'western scholarship' as appropriate for describing the study of IR. However, the study goes a step further in this chapter. While there are many strands of thought that emerged from western modernity, their central philosophical outlook is coloniality. Following from Ani (1994), coloniality conceives of being as separated from its related universe (community if you prefer) to arrive at objective reality. To know, therefore, is to separate oneself from the known, and the relational universe is no longer to be experienced but to be objectified (Ani, 1994). Such a worldview forms the basis of materialism. What does this all have to do with IR? It is that mainstream IR, including its auto-critique such as Marxism, operates on a worldview from which not only does matter provide the tenets for consciousness, but objectification provides the basis for separation and independence. On the other hand, in theories such as constructivism, there exists a separation, a dislocation of time that informs the superiority of the present time as the time that really matters – this is a function of positivism given how, in constructivism, it is predominantly the present time that shapes human behaviour. And so, how these theories have constructed 'the International' is based on what Mignolo (2002) refers to as the colonial difference.

The Westphalian Treaty of 1648 brought an end to the Eighty Years' War between Spain, the Dutch and the Germans. In IR historiography, this period marked the beginning of western modernity. However, in a compelling revisionist take, Benno Teschke argues that this period marked the peak (and end) of absolutist, dynastic, polities (2003, p. 3). And that an absolutist, dynastic polity changed to a modern, rule-based international order (Teschke, 2003, p. 153). Accordingly, western "modernity (for IR) is essentially associated with the development of the territorial, sovereign state" (Elias & Sutch, 2007, p. 6). Unsurprisingly, Thomas Hobbes used the image of the Leviathan to

define the modern state's sovereign nature (Heywood, 2005, p. 76). Talking about human nature, the metaphor of a Leviathan was meant to show that, while human beings have very many varied interests, it is the head that must decide on what the body ultimately does, consistent with the body-mind dualism present in coloniality.

The development of the modern state ensures several core values. Not in any order of importance, the first is that states were mutually recognised such that each state was prohibited from willy-nilly undermining another's territorial authority. Certainly, this does not preclude the declaration of war if necessary. The second is that each state had authority over their territorial jurisdiction, inclusive of its citizens. Consequently, and this being the third, the state is a political association that is established on sovereign jurisdiction, defined by territorial borders, and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions (Heywood, 2005, pp. 76-77). And so, necessarily, this being the fourth, the state is also an instrument of coercion because it must have the power to enforce its authority. Individually, these values are not exclusive to the state as a political form. However, the study collectively refers to these core values because they are key to the state-centric 'International'. These core values are, however, underpinned by a western philosophical tradition, one such as follows from John Locke's, Jean- Jacques Rousseau's and Thomas Hobbes' ideas, which extend social atomism to 'the International'. In other words, these values are drawn from western normative assumptions about what it means to be human, and these values are underpinned by assumptions that, fundamentally, human beings are self-interested, equal social atoms that together form an aggregate society of self-interested individuals. From this perspective, 'the International' is composed of basic indivisible components: in other words, the state. Consequently, state- centrism became the ontological premise of IR theory (Thakur, 2015). Of course, this personification is said to be only a metaphor, a fictional analogy to explain the state, and therefore the logic of 'the international' (see Wendt, 2004).

Given the foregoing, this personification is not merely a fictional analogy but an accurate representation of the philosophical underpinnings of western thought. From René Descartes (1994) and his dualistic distinction of the immaterial mind from the material body to Thomas Hobbes' (2004) view that humans are mechanical objects 'programmed' to pursue their self- interest. In fact, Hobbes specifically situates the "cause of government empirically in man's nature" (Praeg, 2000, p. 24). The other is John Locke (1689), a prominent figure in Anglo- American political thought, who argued that the state of nature was unstable, so to avoid physical harm, stability and cooperation were pursued in the form of government. Then there is Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), who, in *The Social*

*Contract*, argued that the existential purpose of the state is to govern through the consent of the governed; in other words, through the general will of the population, which provides the source of power. Consistent in these claims is that, akin to being, the state is a self-interested, independent entity. Firstly, these ideas undermined the authority of European monarchies and the church and paved the way for the political revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Secondly, the idea of what it means to be human, and its related epistemological question, is visibly connected to the idea of the state. As such, these theorists were crucial to the development of what Oyewumi calls "body-reasoning" (1997, p. 5) in the western frame. Accordingly, Wendt (2004, p. 290) concedes that this fiction is owed to the physicalism that founded the modern scientific worldview, another feature of coloniality (see Ani, 1994).

To make the point pointedly, Hobbes and Locke froze non-whites in time and assumed that only whites have entered the social contract (Mills, 1997). So-called 'non-whites' are, therefore, still in the state of nature, and cannot decide for themselves. Consequently, for those with a defective humanity, their status in 'the International' is such that they lack many of the foregoing core values. They therefore could either not constitute a state, or could not adequately organise their society, which is still premised on backward values. For example, political philosopher Leonard Praeg makes an important observation concerning contract theory. It is that it assumes the presence of a common linguistic community with shared values (2007, p. 30). Here, Praeg is not only illustrating the limits of contract theory, but he is also demonstrating the spatial location of western modernity and thus its socio-cultural limits. Similarly, Charles Mills (1997) identifies a 'linguistic community with shared values' (kinship bond). Mills argues that this community is characterised by 'global white supremacy' (1997, p. 5), a value system that excluded darker people in the founding moment of [colonial] society (legal contract). In fact, in this value system, since whiteness constitutes property and non- whites do not own themselves, given their inability to appropriate nature (Mills, 1997, p. 96), property is the domain of whites. To this end, Mills refers to contract theory as the 'racial contract'. Accordingly, this contract, in its interaction with disparate people around the world, furthers the 'ontological difference' that differentiates whites from darker people.

The only existence available to darker people was/is either assimilation or re-colonisation. For black people specifically, whiteness was/is the only ontological existence available to them. This accords with Blaney and Inayatullah's observation that, while the state translates differences into sameness, in other words assimilation, 'the International' is considered a site of potential threat (2004, p. 20), which represents the state of nature. In this context, democratic peace theory (see Babst, 1964; Small

& Singer, 1976) represents an argument for the sustenance of coloniality in a different guise. Other alternative conceptualisations of IR, such as Marxism or feminist theory, from which the darker people have attempted to resistcoloniality – be it against capitalism or patriarchy, may have assisted generations of resistance against some of the excesses of coloniality, but they have upheld the 'colonial difference'. Gender (see Oyewumi, 1997) and/or class are not elements that are exogenous to western modernity. The issue is that "race, gender, sexuality and epistemology are an integral, entangled and constitutive part of the broad entangled package called the colonial world- system" (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 20). The problem with alternative conceptions of IR is that theymay provide an escape from separatist struggles, but they cannot do the same from the totalityof coloniality.

Turning this section's attention to mainstream IR theories, such as realism, liberalism, constructivism and Marxism, this study argues that 'the International' is similarly constituted based on coloniality, which is a vision encompassing both epistemic and ontological features. Scholars of IR have developed specific notions of what constitutes 'the International'. Many of these emanate from a realist position (to use an IR theoretical marker) that emerged in the late 1930s and early 1940s, basically in response to the naivety of liberal thinkers (Elias & Sutch, 2007, p. 8). This gained prominence in the US, the mecca of IR study, after WW II. Thisis in large part because war began to feel like a natural feature of 'the international'. In this sense, realism is an attempt to understand the endurance of war (Cox & Campanaro, 2016, p.106). And this endurance rests on the assumption that "states live in a context of anarchy, thatis, in the absence of anyone being in charge internationally" (Antunes & Camisão, 2017, p. 15), a phenomenon reminiscent of the Hobbesian state of nature. Given this nature of 'the International, the state is also considered to be a unitary actor speaking with one voice, especially in times of war. Accordingly, difference within the state is flattened out. In such an environment, therefore, competition among states is the central organising value of 'the international'. And accumulating power is the key objective for states. Accordingly, because of the natural disposition to accumulate power, the state is the key actor in 'the International' (Antunes & Camisão, 2017, p. 15). In his 1919 essay, entitled 'Politics as a Vocation', Max Weber succinctly argues that part of this pursuit flows from the fact that states are considered to hold monopoly over the use of violence (1919, p. 1). Therefore, the state is expected to pursue its national interest, a contest that necessitates a zero-sum game in 'the International' (Heiss & Johnson, 2018, p. 124). These explanations draw their assumptions from the notion that 'the International', like society, is governed by objective laws that are rooted in human nature (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 4). Body-reasoning is evidently present in this frame. And so, just like humans in the 'state of nature', "states are on an inevitable collision course in their quest for power" (Heiss & Johnson, 2018, p. 125). In

this context, much as in coloniality, difference is interpreted as degenerative because those not pursuing power are not theorised aspart of 'the International'.

By the 1970s, during the Cold War, neorealism emerged as a school of thought that constituted 'the International' differently from realism. In trying to move away from assumptions about human nature, it argues that it is the 'structure' of 'the International' that mediates the dynamicsof power. By 'structure', neorealism refers to the preferences of states (see Powell, 1994), which are considered exogenous. However, two assumptions are embedded in the notion of 'structure': the first is that the anarchical system constrains all states, and the second is that anystate action is based on its relative power in this system (Antunes & Camisão, 2017, p. 17). Given this structure, how different is it to the theory of the 'state of nature'? This question gains more currency when neorealism argues that it is the capability of individual states that also determines the structure of 'the international'. Capabilities are not ahistorical, nor are theycreated in the absence of socio-political phenomena. So, much like in the Hobbesian state of nature, with individuals pursuing their self-interests, the capability of the state is demonstrated by its ability to exert its will over others. In this context, neorealism conceals assumptions about human nature in the notions of 'preference' and 'capabilities'. To this extent, it too is underlined by body-reasoning. Also known as structural realism, neorealism emerged after numerous failed attempts by international institutions to level the playing field. Given the unilateralism that prevailed after the 1970s, this failure was underpinned by the power of the United States (US), which overshadowed international institutions such as the United NationsSecurity Council (UNSC) and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) that shaped the internal politics of sovereign states by forcefully imposing free-market systems in many parts of the world. Waltz then argued that, given a state's hegemonic power in 'the International', it is probable that it will recruit states towards interests beneficial to its own (1993, p. 35). Given this context, it is not surprising that neorealism becomes an ideological view of a unipolar world. Accordingly, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz postulated that the presence of a hegemonic power, bringing balance to an anarchical order, can help secure peace (Waltz, 1993,p. 35).

It becomes clear that, within neorealism, international institutions reflect the interests and actions of the powerful (Stein, 2008, p. 210). Therefore, neorealism operates both on hierarchy,since all states are said to pursue power in some form, and on assumptions about human nature. This is similar, yet different, to liberalism. Liberalism not only has a longer history than realism, but it has more variations, such as liberal institutionalism, liberal individualism, and republican liberalism, among many. Here, the study is specifically concerned with how liberalism constituted 'the International'.

To this extent, it will focus on the general tendency of liberalism in IR. This liberalism, which emerged immediately after WW II as a rules-based, democratic order, accompanied by emerging domestic and international institutions, becomesa feature of 'the International'. Accordingly, and this is where it parts ways with (neo)realism and its state-centric focus (Slaughter, 1995, p. 728), the fundamental premise of this theory is that the state reflects the domestic and transnational society in which it is located (Moravcsik,2001, p. 2). State behaviour, rather than capability or the structure of 'the International', is therefore determined by these actors and their interests (see Moravcsik, 2001; Slaughter, 1995).Were one to follow the trajectory of contract theory, then liberalism is a theory that operates ina society in which a social contract is already established. In other words, only free people populate this society. Therefore, in this society, private interests and rational individuals organise to promote and exchange their interests (Moravcsik, 2001, p. 5). According to Oyewumi (1997), rationality is only available to the disembodied (white people) because it is they that have risen above the foibles of the body. Accordingly, in this frame, the body is not visible. That is, the embodied (darker people) only form part of this society once they canrender their body invisible. Accordingly, their only option is to subscribe to the epistemic vision of the disembodied.

Neoliberalism, also known as neoliberal institutionalism, argues that, akin to contract theory, states stand to benefit from cooperation with one another if there is mutual trust in 'the International'. Certainly, to the extent that there is a third party to monitor agreements, there is an incentive to cooperate (Meiser, 2017, p. 24). In turn, this trust results in a general gain for states in general. In other words, there is trust in the system. So, instead of relative gains in neorealism, neoliberalism is concerned with gains for the state system (see Meiser, 2017; Powell, 1994). This is because a focus on relative gains, when economic interdependence canensure mutual trust, can lead to protectionism and nationalism (Mastanduno, 1991, p. 76). Andsince neoliberalism prefers a market economy with free trade as key instruments for peace (Lamy, 2001, p. 188), nationalism and protectionism are presented as backward and archaic institutions. This explains why neoliberalism was a bulwark against the Third World. In any case, this is also because neoliberal institutionalism does not subscribe to a coherence of interests (Keohane, 2012, p. 126) in 'the International'. Rather, akin to contract theory, interests are a catalyst for the creation of institutions. The weakness in these institutions, however, is that they are dominated by powerful actors, both domestically and internationally. So, 'interests' does not mean equality of voices or influence. Nevertheless, neoliberal institutionalism also recognises the "dependence of economics on politics" (Keohane, 2012, p.126). This means that a stable and administratively predictable political framework for the arbitration of difference and coexistence is essential for development. Given that 'the international' is also

constituted through this optic, neoliberalism, as with the foregoing IR theories, is underpinned by assumptions embedded in contract theory. This is that cooperation among individuals in the state of nature secures individuals' safety and the 'good life' granted by a society. Similar to neorealism, however, it too conceals assumptions about human nature in claims such as 'interests' and 'relative gains'. This is because these claims are predicated on autonomised subjects, a function of the absence of coherent interests. Akin to liberalism, the embodied are left to subscribe to the epistemic vision of the disembodied.

The emergence and influence of international institutions of the post-Cold War era prompted a rethink of IR theory. Neorealism and neoliberalism, in a sense a resurgence of their classical counterparts, realism and liberalism, emerged in this context as optics through which to understand 'the International'. Constructivism, erupting in IR in the 1980s, when scholars such as Onuf (1989, 2012), Kratochwil (1989) and Wendt (1987, 1999) brought sociological analysis into IR, emerged at a time when the Soviet Union was coming to an end, while 'the International' was entering into a world of unipolarity. Constructivism argues that anarchy is what states determine. It argues that anarchy is not an inherent foundation of 'the International' but is something socially constructed by states. According to Wendt, the interaction of states, creating processes, is what creates state identities and interests (1992, p. 395). In this sense, 'the International', with its diplomatic institutions and multilateral platforms, is the creation of 'shared interests' and common pursuits. However, while processes shape interests, these interests, in turn, shape the material world (Adler, 1997). However, constructivism appears to parochialise 'shared interests', especially given the context of US unilateralism. That is, locally shared interests are considered universal, whereas processes are themselves shaped by historical factors and state capability, a function of coloniality. There is a deeper hidden message at play in constructivism, however. That is that the west no longer requires the analogy of the state of nature and its corollary contract theory. This is because US unilateralism at the end of the Cold War enabled the west to reinvent 'the International'. Accordingly, the issue is how to reconstruct a different world. To this extent, constructivism not only masks historical injustice or power relations (see Duvall et al., 1999; Epstein, 2017), but it fundamentally de- historicises 'the International', resulting in temporal dislocation. In other words, in the unity of thought within constructivism, the present time is cut off from the past. Only the now, the process, is experienced. This temporal dislocation is a function of the autonomised nature of the western order.

Finally, there is the theory of Marxism. Marxism is not a theory about the state, nor was it initially concerned with understanding international relations as such, as is the nature of IR in its conception

of 'the International'. However, several IR theorists have used it to generate a theory of IR. At its most basic, Marxism argues that "the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals" (Marx, 1845). This is the first premise ofthe materialist method. However, this premise stands in stark contrast not only to the theorisation of black people, but their treatment throughout the world and the legacy of humanist thought, which is foundational to colonialism and nationalism (Mamdani, 2020, p. 9). Nevertheless, Marxism argues that human beings are based on the material conditions on which they survive and reproduce their lives (Pal, 2017. p. 43). And material conditions are the result of actions of human beings and their circumstances. Through the intervention of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), Marxism as an IR theory resulted in the development of the 'world systems theory', in which the state system was categorised between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. This system is based on a division of labour in which various sectors of the economy within a given state are dependent on another sector in a different state(Wallerstein, 1974, p. 390). For theorists such as Antonio Gramsci (1971), using the concept of hegemony showed how ideological factors limit or expand people's understanding of capitalism, and therefore their resistance to it. It was left to Robert Cox, who approached power in 'the International' as relations of production that are contingent on both material elements and ideational strength, to anchor these relations, leading to the transformation of the state (Cox & Jacobson, 1974). True to Marxism, relations of production are a fundamental component in the conceptual understanding of 'the International' in all these conceptions. It is a motive force in the transformation of both state and class relations. Given the materialist basis of Marxism, this theory problematically sidesteps the ontological features of coloniality.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, the study elucidated the grammar of coloniality. Given the focus of decolonialthought on the epistemic features of coloniality, the chapter had to focus on the ontological features of coloniality. Accordingly, it argued that coloniality constituted both western epistemic and ontological features, best encapsulated in a concept of body-reasoning. The chapter then unpacked how 'the international' is constituted by coloniality. Surveying dominant IR conceptions of 'the International', the study demonstrated how body-reasoning is the assumptive logic that underpins such conceptions and, importantly, how these conceptualisations circumscribed the practice of international relations.

# Chapter 3

# A Singular Tree: Branches of Colonialism

## 3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the study discusses the colonial construction of 'the International'. This is a historical moment in which coloniality became operative throughout the colonial world. And it operated in its naked, stark form. The chapter specifically shows the disaggregated nature ofcoloniality, all based on different aspects, or a combination, of body-reasoning. The chapter comprises three sections. In the first section, entitled 'Haiti: A Defective Humanity', the studyuses the examples of colonial Haiti to show the ontological domination of black people; specifically, how colonial Haiti was socially ordered, using anti-black racism, which represented coloniality's ontological feature. In the second section, entitled 'India: The Epistemic Question', the study uses colonial India to first show how its relationship with Britishcapital served largely to de-industrialise India. And, as this underdevelopment was carried out,a gender system was imposed, this being coloniality's epistemic feature. This gender system served to subjugate and oppress the Indian population. In the third and final section, entitled 'China: Coloniality Uninterrupted', the study demonstrates the omnipresence of coloniality. That is, even in lands in which colonialism did not settle for long, coloniality was hegemonic. Using the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution' in China, the study shows how early Chinese leaders sought to leap into western modernity, surpassing, in different indexes, some European countries without the burden of a bifurcated society. In other words, without the burden of colonial modernity, coloniality persisted. However, a bifurcation presented itselfpredominantly in class terms in China, where body-reasoning is implicated; class being an epistemological feature of coloniality. These three examples serve to demonstrate the disaggregated nature of coloniality.

In a study of native American history, Mathew Kruer argues that colonisation was inherently destructive because it entailed the decimation of the indigenous population and their cultures to transform the landscape into "another England in America." (2009, p. 15). Basically, European enclaves in the colonial world were created through the genocidal impulse of colonisation, both epistemic (decimation of cultures) and ontological (indigenous people were either killed off or considered partially human for purposes of assimilation). To borrow from Mills (1997, p. 11), the world created by Europe was to establish a system in which the privilege of whites, as a group, was

based on the non-whites' exploitation of their bodies, their resources, their lands, and the denial of their socio-economic prospects, as a group. And this system was, and is, replicated throughout the world. In the following three sections, the chapter focuses on colonial Haiti, colonial India, and then China, to demonstrate how colonialism, though manifestly consistent, expresses itself differently in those parts of the world.

### 3.1 Haiti: A Defective Humanity

Concerning Haiti, its society was constituted differently from Indian colonial society. For instance, Haitian slaves were not native to Haiti. They were mostly drawn from Central Africa, specifically Guinea. This is an important point because it says something about the nature of slavery, which is that Africans were uprooted from their communities and roped into the globalmatrix of power without natality (Patterson, 1982, p. 38). Accordingly, they were brought to work the sugar plantations for the market demands of French society. Called the 'Pearl of the Antilles', Haiti in colonial times was the wealthiest of the colonies in the Americas (Blackburn, 2006; Robinson, 2000), producing sugar, coffee, indigo, and tobacco (Robinson, 2000, p. 145). According to one estimate, on the eve of the French revolution, there existed "393 sugar plantations, 3150 indigo plantations, 789 cotton plantations and 3117 coffee farms" (Aime, in Fennema, 2011, p. 2). And there were roughly 500 000 African slaves. Robinson (2000, p. 145) says, "the slave population was estimated to be between 450,000 and 509,000, the white population, 30,000 and the mulatto population roughly equalling the whites". Not surprisingly, however, Enlightenment thinkers wrote during Haitian colonialism (Buck-Morss, 2009, p. 29),without a sense of irony, that, while the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of theCitizen' was adopted in France (Pithouse, 2016), Haitians were busy slaving away for the upkeep of French society.

The 'Declaration' affirmed that all "men are born and remain free and equal in rights" (in Pithouse, 2016, p. 1), but it did not include black people within the ambit of the French Empire. Many of the slaves were forced to work like animals and housed in animal-like huts with little provisions and fruits (James, 1989, p. 11). Not all darker people were worked like this, however. For instance, among the free mixed race (mulattos), and the slaves, there was a small, privileged group of African slaves, considered upper servants, who disliked their slave counterparts in the fields (James, 1989, p. 19). This social structure was such that, being lighter skinned, some mulattos were educated and

prosperous and either owned slaves for themselves, or were the colonists militias who kept slaves under control (Popkin, 2003). This was the social structure that upheld the political economy of the settler society of then Haiti. In a sense, this structure was premised on proximity to white colonists, then on merit. And for slaves, this meant that laws in favour of slaves invariably violated property laws, unless assisted by the white settler community (James, 1989, p. 22), a similar point to that of Charles Mills when he said whiteness constitutes property (1997, p. 96). In other words, slaves always required the tutelage of their white masters for upward mobility in colonial society. Therefore, among the darker people, 'being' was horizontal for the black people, while it was vertical for the lighter people. The latter group could always try to escape the circumstances of their birth.

Concerning the culture of the Haitians, French missionaries and the Catholic Church confiscated and burned all *Vodou* items (Laguerre, 1973), and these were expressly forbidden in the French colonies. Eventually, these items were legally banned by the colonial authority (Ramsey, 2011). That is, the slave was without a society and without a being for which one could navigate reality. In other words, slaves were without natality. Such definitions of the slave, expressed via the Haitian social structure, made possible the high commercial enterprise that Haiti was to France. It was so brutal that the slave population was not self-reproducing (Robinson, 2000, p. 183). In other words, the damaging social conditions, characterised by the giving of slaves improper food, the abuse of pregnant slaves, widespread disease and high infant mortality rate (Robinson, 2000, p. 183), were degrading. This is because, akin to cattle,it was cheaper to buy than to breed slaves, which serves as evidence that black people were considered bodies only. To this extent, it was evident that Haitians were considered to have a defective humanity. This is further underscored by the lie that the African had no history, no civilisation, no religions and no humanity (see Diop, 1974; James, 2001; Williams, 1974). Undoubtedly, it was evident that "the sphere in which limited freedoms were affirmed was extended, in spatial terms, from England to North America at the same time as it was ring- fenced in racial terms" (Pithouse, 2016, p. 2). The fact of the slave revolts in the colonies attests to this. Cedric Robinson (1983) traces these revolts from the 16$^{th}$ century right through to the mid-twentieth century decolonisation efforts in Africa. Revolts took place in Latin America, in Palmares, in North America, in Jamaica and California, in Africa, etc. However, Haiti became the first slave society to dismantle the slave system and obtain independence from its European master (Robinson, 2000, p. 144). This was close to 150 years before the decolonisation effortsin Africa in the 1950s.

On or around the night of 14 August 1791, two years after the 1789 *Declaration*, a group of enslaved

Africans gathered at Bois Caïman in Saint-Domingue for a religious ceremony (Olukoya, 2008, p. 3). This occurred under the leadership of Dutty Boukman, a Yoruba man who had first been enslaved in Jamaica, originally from Benin. Under Boukman, the strategy was to burn down houses where colonists lived to cause terror and fear among the white settlercommunity. The enslaved Africans had brought with them traditions and beliefs which they adapted to suit their Caribbean environment (Popkin, 2003). *Vodou*, their adaptation of African spirituality, gave them a sense of identity, and a system of thought, to reconstitute their humanity. Summoning the Yoruba deity, Ogun, the god of iron and war (Olukoya, 2008, p. 10),the slaves "slaughtered enslavers, set torches to sugar houses and cane fields, and then marchedby the thousands on Cap-Francais, the seat of colonial rule" (Baptist, 2015). It was a bloody revolt. By some accounts, it was also a 'massacre': beheadings, tortures and killing off of entirefamilies was the order of the day. In essence, it was a cleansing of the land.

It becomes evident that, in Haiti, coloniality was premised on the usurpation of slaves' denial of their being. Specifically, on the manufactured idea that they had a defective humanity. Accordingly, the transformation of their world into that of the whites (racial contract) was accompanied by ontological assumptions germane to European society. And these assumptionsbecame clearer in contract theory. This is why it is incorrect to conceive of slavery and racism as epiphenomenal to capitalism. A reading of Williams (1974) demonstrates that, although capitalism was a significant catalyst in the expansion of western Europe, at its base lay western modernity, specifically whiteness. That the process of primitive accumulation is similar to anti-black racism (ontological doubt) only signifies the centrality of the unity of western vision. Forinstance, "the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production" (Marx, 1867, pp. 874-875), which constituted primitive accumulation, ties in well with Ani's (1994) critique of western episteme in that it separates the knower (producer) from the known (production). And, in the context of anti-black racism, black became an ontological category to exclude Africans from the community of humans. In other words, what Marx conceived of as a wider process is apparent in the ontological difference that marked out black people. Consequently, not only should one avoid understanding primitive accumulation as a prehistory of capital (see Roberts, 2017), it should be appreciated as a historical phenomenon that comesin ebbs and flows. This is because, just as primitive accumulation is instituted whenever the conditions of capitalist accumulation are threatened, racism, as an ontological device for the wholesale usurpation of one's being, is enacted when white supremacy is threatened. This is not about a similarity between primitive accumulation and racism; rather, it is about the logic of a frame that first began by marking black people off as defective, as is the case with Haitians, and then developing an economic system, premised on white nationalism, that would keep black people at the

bottom.

### 3.2 India: The Epistemic Question

Although India represented the "old heathen world which Christianity destroyed" (Mamdani, 2012, p. 10), in western Europe it was dubbed the "Jewel in the Crown" (Johnson, 2003, p. 24)of the British Empire. This is because it was important to Britain's economic power, which was made possible by breaking down the edifice of traditional Indian society (Marx, 1853). What Marx was talking about here is the forceful capitalist manoeuvres of British capital. However, this is only the economic aspect. According to Ashis Nandy, colonialism won not because of military or technological innovation, but through the construction of secular hierarchy's irreconcilable with traditional values (1983, p. 9). One such example of traditional values, according to Nandy, centred on the disintegration of the self-denying asceticism and cerebral of the Brahman, or the abstinence, sexual distance, and self-control of the Indian traditional man (1983, p. 10). In other words, this disintegration was possible because of what Sinha refers to as the tension between the "manly Englishman and the effeminate Bengali" (1995, p. 2). This section is concerned with how colonialism manifested itself in colonial India, specifically how both capitalist manoeuvres and gender-ordering facilitated coloniality.

It is important to first acknowledge that British colonisers found some level of industrialisation in India. In fact, in 1750, India produced about 25% of world industrial output. However, by the middle of the 19th century, it had lost its export and domestic market, and its output droppedto 2% by 1900 (Clingingsmith & Williamson, 2004, p. 1). In a word, India's colonialrelationship with Britain can be characterised as a form of 'de-industrialisation'. For instance, and establishing the centrality of British capital in the Indian economy, the acquisition of *Diwanee* of Bengal by the charter company, the East India Company, in 1765 crowded out European competitors in the Indian market (Khaldun, 2013, p. 7). This made British monopolies key to the Indian economy, especially when it came to the cotton, and generally the manufacturing, industry. However, this did not occur simply through comparative advantage. Protecting Lancashire, a British textile company, this was achieved through the imposition of tariffs and the import of British goods (Johnson, 2003, p. 30), which decimated Indian cotton manufacturers and turned the country into a provider of raw materials (Khaldun, 2013, p. 10). This unfairness, or the use of state power, extended to a "tax on petitions, on food,on houses, on eatables, on ferries" (Khaldun, 2013, p. 19), and a heavy tax on opium. But it was

really, also, the annexation of Oudh, a region in India, which converted the country "into a hotbed of discontent …" (Khaldun, 2013, p. 21). This was the home of the sepoys, a place that birthed what was later referred to as the Indian Rebellion of 1857. These happenings led to the lack of new industries, coupled with limited industrialisation (Charlesworth, 1982, p. 37). The result was the crowding out of Indian participation in the economy.

Also, the impact of British capital in India was such that ownership was most extensive in British hands, if not generally foreign hands (Charlesworth, 1982, p. 44). Added to this anomaly, British investment resulted in specific sectors being disproportionately capitalised, while others were not. Accordingly, this distorted industrial development because it also created regional and sectoral enclaves (Charlesworth, 1982, p. 44). While some level of Indian culture and tradition was kept alive because colonists like Sir William Jones considered ancient Sanskrit texts to be linked to classical Greek and Latin, which gave rise to the notion of Indo- European family languages (Johnson, 2003, p. 26), the demise of the Mughal empire and the British penetration of the Indian manufacturing sector gave rise to India's de-industrialisation (Clingingsmith & Williamson, 2004, p. 2). In fact, the monopoly that British capital held in India, and the resultant crowding out of Indian people from the modern economy, stunted the development potential of post-independence India. All these are essentially underlined by British imperial power, and that it was imperialism that initially incorporated Indians into the world global capitalist circuit. So, what were the colonial features of the relationship between Indian and Britain?

The features of colonialism were made possible by the imperialist penetration of India's productive capacity. However, it was in the socio-political realm that colonialism manifested itself. A distinction was created between public and private domains, with British rule (public) and Hindu polity (private) on different sides of the divide. This had the net effect of making the native not simultaneous with [modern] time. This distinction created a duality between two kinds of laws: culture-free in the west, and culture-bound outside it, and, based on this legal duality, two kinds of societies emerged: progressive and stationary (Mamdani, 2012, p. 20) societies – one disembodied (whites) and the other embodied (Indians). In other words, native people were not simultaneous with [colonial] society (Madlingozi, 2017, p. 123). That is, Indian society was considered backward. However, this was not a matter of making natives stationary. Rather, it was a mechanism for a peaceful transition from a native value system to a colonial value system. So, there existed two different kinds of natives: the indigenous and the civilised (Mamdani, 2012, p. 31), who constituted a continuum in the evolution of western modernity. The issue is that, ultimately, Indians constituted a disfigured position within

westernmodernity.

In colonial India, gender subjectivities were manufactured because of the making of colonial society. In the first instance, in the context of the west, where white males were considered to be more manly, colonised subjects were considered to be feminine (see Gokulsing et al., 2017; Gupta, 2011). Decolonial theorist Maldonado-Torres strikes a similar chord when he argues that the feminisation of colonised men led to them lacking genuine authority (2007, p. 255). Atvariance with local culture and tradition, British notions of gender repudiated Indian notions of community and existence, reshaping the more diffuse and fluid identities in India (Sinha, 1999, p. 448). This is because British gendered norms were interwoven with British imperialism. For instance, the Indian Penal Code, taken straight from the 1860 British penal code, criminalised queer sexuality (Gokulsing et al., 2017, p. 10). Accordingly, the imposition of British gendering served to preserve imperial power (Sinha, 1995, p. 34). And this had a cascading effect on other aspects of Indian life. For one, it had a deleterious effect on Indian national cohesion between the Hindu and the Muslim communities. In other words, the imposition of western forms of masculinity was evident in the struggles between the Muslim and Hindu populations. For instance, the demilitarisation and pacification of the Hindu male body was stripped of its traditional martial activities (Gupta, 2011, p. 445). This manufactured a new, more masculine, identity, centring on isolating certain Hindu myths to create a new history for a 'modern' India. This was part of the process of transformation from native to colonial identity. And this transformation intersects well with Oyewumi's observation of Nigerian colonial society, in which she argues that the masculinisation of society transformed the state into an expression of masculine power (1997, p. 125). The new historical narrative of colonial India had a similar impact on Indian state power.

Given that many Indians saw British rule as largely progressive, many of them considered assimilation to British values their deliverance (Nandy, 1983, p. 7). This is because it tied in with traditional supposed 'Indianess'. That is, British gender values resurrected the Indian ideology of martial races in the concept of statecraft (Nandy, 1983, p. 7). According to JeffreyGreenhunt, martial race theory was predicated on the view that those educated and intelligent were assumed to be cowards, so unfit for state power, while those considered brave, backward,and uneducated were fir for state power (1984, p. 16). Accordingly, the latter were fit for state power because they were considered politically subservient, which ties with the feminisation of Indian men. It is important to take note of the fact that the femininisation of Indian men was not essentially predicated on their sameness to British women, rather, it was premised on theirso-called 'unnaturalness' (Sinha, 1995, p.

41). That is, their lack of (sic) 'proper masculinity' was based on a biological disposition. The reason was that ,in the colonial masculine order, the politically aware and active represented either a perverted or unnatural form of masculinity (Sinha, 1995, p. 2). They could not represent [British] masculinity proper. Furthermore, attached to this biological assumption, which Oyewumi (1997) correctly defines as body- reasoning, is the equating of this supposed 'unnaturalness' or perversion to a lack of moral strength. That is:

In assessing the fitness of native officers, therefore, Anglo-Indians alluded frequently to the various moral deficiencies of character among the 'unmanly' natives. Bengali officers were believed to lack moral courage and to be more prone to falsehood, perjury, sedition, sycophancy, and the blind adherence to social and religious prejudices than any other native race. (Sinha, 1995, p. 42)

Given this persuasion, native officers could not be given any authority over more 'manly' people (Sinha, 1995, p. 41). Two issues are apparent here: i) the imperial project is upheld ii) through hierarchical difference. Accordingly, "the constitutional timidity of the race" (Sinha, 1995, p. 41) was not fit to govern. This cultural shift was not without resistance, however. In fact, faced with hopeless odds, many pre-Gandhian movements sought to overcome the British and redeem Indians' masculinity (Nandy, 1983, p. 8-9). This, coupled with the unequal privileges between Indians and British personnel in colonial India, catalysed the Rebellion of 1857. Although the British won, the losses suffered in the First Afghan War (1838-42), the Sikhs (1845-49) and the Crimean War (1854-56), gave the sepoys the impression that the British, because of their help, were not invincible (Khaludun, 2013, p. 24). And so the Rebellion of 1857 was to be characterised as "a crisis of empire" (Mamdani, 2012, p. 8) that remoulded the colonial enterprise.

### 3.2 China: Coloniality Uninterrupted'

In this section, the study demonstrates the omnipresence of coloniality in that it manifested in lands in which colonialism did not have a firm presence. China has a different [colonial] history from, say, India and Haiti. For instance, China is best characterised as having only become a semi-colony, not a full colony (Aiguo, 2000, p. 16). Bar Hong Kong, which became a British colony in 1842, China was not formally colonised. However, the Qing dynasty, the last dynasty to rule China before it became a republic, was exposed to British capital through the Opium Wars, which forced the dynasty to make concessions to British capital (Wahed, 2016, p. 26). It must be noted that, during this time,

Europeans had already incorporated many countries within the global matrix of capitalist processes (Aiguo, 2000, p. 16), and China was added as another constituent component of these global processes. Accordingly, other European states came in requesting the same trading rights as the British. Nonetheless, these concessions not only enabled a westernised elite to emerge in China, albeit small, but they weakened the sovereignty of China. So, even when the Qing dynasty held prohibitions against private groups/interests (Rankin & Esherick, 1990, p. 9), a move that went against capitalist values, long-distance trade, the introduction of hospitals and schools, and the spread of western values such as bringing an end to the foot binding of Chinese women by missionaries, were catalytic to the transformation of Chinese society (Wahed, 2016, p. 31). Therefore, unlike colonial Haiti, concerning ontological difference, and colonial India, concerning the establishment of two epistemic polities, coloniality in China was established via class differences. Accordingly, as with India, coloniality in China was epistemic. That is, it arose out of attrition with British capitalism, which paved the way for the entry of western values. Accordingly, coloniality became widespread via Marxism, a vision that sought to struggle against capitalism. This was convenient, because Marxism is internal to western modernity.

Two points to say about Marxism. The first is that this study assumes that Marxism does two things: it is a critique of capitalism, while it is also a formulation of its antithesis. That is, the struggle for communism is a struggle against class antagonisms inherent in capitalism. Accordingly, the subject in capitalist society is structured by capital (Wilderson, 2003, p. 225). In this study, however, the subject is structured by coloniality. That is to mean, body-reasoning is the basis on which the western epistemological order rests. However, capital forms part of coloniality. This is because Marxism is complicit in western somacentricity (see Nicholson, 1986; Oyewumi, 1997), it is constitutive of coloniality. Given these interconnections, this section uses the examples of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China to show how then Chinese leaders sought to counter the effects of British values. However, in a struggle against these values, social bifurcation in China presented itself predominantly in class terms. This is because Chinese leaders adopted Marxism as a comprehensive critique of Chinese society. Therefore, the goal was two-fold: to break down traditional social relations (Li, 2001, p. 141) and to centre capitalist production as the singular focus of Chinese modernity; goals which centred the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a motive force in Chinese history. At this point, Chinese elites in the post-Qing dynasty had become westernised. What is meant by ‘westernised’ is that, instead of the traditional “scholar-Office” (Rankin & Esherick, 1990, p. 2) relationship that constituted the authority of the elite in the Qing dynasty, elite authority in the post-Qing dynasty was premised on their proximity to capital. Accordingly, given that the Qing

dynasty, and the one before it, were not a feudal society (see Rowe, 1990; Tiyanu, 2014), which would have meant a class society was existent in China, a post-Qing society was predicated on the introduction of a class system.

The early Qing dynasty exhibited a centralised monarchical, nonhereditary system (Tiyanu, 2015, p. 30). Given the fact that the imperial examination system, which sourced personnel forthe monarchy's bureaucracy, was open to all, it was not a feudal society per se (Tiyanu, 2015,
p. 30). The 'scholar-office' elite, together with the system of counties and prefectures, which was secondary to the former, goes to explain the *fengjian* system that characterised the early Qing dynasty (Tiyanu, 2015, p. 29). In this context, Marx took issue with the tendency to impose European-based concepts such as feudalism and private property on non-Western societies (see Anderson, 1998; Krader, 1974). However, the weakening of the Qing state, which precipitated the devolution of power to local elites, permitted Chinese elites to pursue private interests. Inevitably, together with trading that came with other European powers, a society based on class division emerged. Unsurprisingly, therefore, given that the foregoing historical moments were attempts to undo this division, and in effect build communism, the national struggle was characterised as one between the peasants and the capitalists (middle and upper classes), with the latter viewed as class enemies. To this extent, China orbited itself on the sametrajectory as coloniality. Accordingly, this chapter briefly deals with communist historiography.

Much like India, pre-Marxist China also was characterised as representative of the [sic] Asiaticmodel. For China, however, apart from its highly centralised bureaucratic and political system,it had a system of private property in different historical periods (Melotti, 1977, p. 77). Nonetheless, pre-Marxist China was based on an aristocracy, with a royal dynasty. Social mobility within the Qing dynasty, unlike class categorisation, was based on hereditary titles, education and public office. But the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 was a revolutionary moment in Chinese history. The 1911 moment replaced a strong, centralised monarchy with arepublican state based on secular legitimacy (Dirlik & Prazniak, 2015). Not surprisingly, similar to India, this revolution, said to be inspired by the French revolution, was led by a "Westward-looking urban elite" (Dirlik & Prazniak, 2015, p. 218). This is the same urban elite who cast a post-1911 China through a westernising lens (see Dirlik & Prazniak, 2015; Esherick, 1976; Mengyuan, 2014). And this is due to its leaders, who trained and studied outside China - broadly in Eastern Europe, and specifically in the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese Communist Party began in 1921, Marxist literature among these elites began in 1919 through the New Culture Movement (Ts'ao & Ch'o-Hsuan, 1970), specifically the introduction of

Marxism-Leninism as a consequence of the 1917 Russian revolution two years earlier.

Given the cultural milieu, or intellectual orientation, of the Chinese urban elite who defeated the Qing dynasty in 1911, and later imported and disseminated a Marxist-Leninist vision for China, the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s (1958 to 1961) did not come as a surprise. In it, the Chinese developed Five-year Plans to industrialise and develop their economy. They did this through centralised decision-making with the aim of building communism. These plans were wholly inspired by the then Russian Marxist model because, similar to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not have an advanced or industrialised economy to build from (Palese, 2009, p. 6). Prioritising heavy industry for development, the objective of the programme was for China to catch up with the US and the UK in iron and steel production(Jung & Chen, 2019, p. 61). Accordingly, "in this development anxiety, the 'First World' served as a desire, but the 'Second World' provided the model" (Thakur, 2018, p. 12). In doingso, it was also expected to surpass the economy of the Soviet Russia. Secondly, moving from private small farms to bigger, collectivised farms, communes were central to the Great Leap Forward. It was hoped that these, among other spin-offs, would cater for the market interests of bourgeoning urban nodes. The following characteristics of these communes were the following: "(1) large scale; (2) high degree of public ownership and elimination of privatisation; (3) unity of government and commune, extensive scope and great authority of management; (4) militarised institution, collectivisation of daily life; (5) rationing system that combined the supply system with the wage system (Kuan, in Jung & Chen, 2019, p. 62). In many ways, this programme was more about industrialising rural areas than about developingurban nodes. Unfortunately, all these plans led to the 'Great Famine' that began in 1958 and ended in 1961.

Ultimately, the preponderance of industrialisation and production meant that all other activities that encapsulated the survival of a people and their reproduction were considered not essential. In other words, industry and exchange relationships were the only relationships that mattered (Nicholson, 1987, p. 18). It is not obvious, but the labour of women, then considered to be in the domestic sphere, existed outside of the production process and the industrial effort. Accordingly, in this context, body-reasoning existed. However, not only did these plans not yield the desired industrial objectives in the rural communes, but developmentally it was regressive for both the communist project and for the country. Chairman Mao, admitting as much at the June 1959 Central Committee Meeting of the Communist Party, was self- introspective about the recklessness of the programme (Gao, 2008, p. 126). This programme, as was conceived by the Chinese Communists, was not able to fast-track China's economy to a level of industrial development its leadership sought to achieve.

Even though this effort failed, post-1911 China developed a class system from the old aristocratic class left over fromthe Qing dynasty. This cohort, or class, accumulated wealth. It is important to take stock of thefact that the initial problem for post-1911 China, as envisioned in the Marxist frame of the partycommunists, was that the post-1911 China represented "a trend toward rule by a Westernizing urban elite" (Dirlik & Prazniak, 2015, p. 215). And the Great Leap Forward was one such attempt to reverse this trend. Its failure, however, opened the way for the Cultural Revolution, a much deeper tour into communist theology.

While there are some critics who argue that the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976) was aimed at purging Mao's "dissidents and consolidating his authority" (Jung & Chen, 2019, p. 58), reading Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents of the time it is evident that there was thefear that China was returning to capitalism. Because coloniality emerged endogenously in China, it is important to use the self-writings of Chinese communist leaders. Nevertheless, this is why the CPC initially emphasised the need for a 'cultural' revolution: the purpose was for itto touch "people to the very souls and constitute a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution" (CCP, 1966, p. 1). Consequently, there was a need to change "cultural values and beliefs" (Gao, 2008, p. 7) for the benefit of the industrial effort. For critics such as Weiran Lin,however, in subscribing to the historical trajectory of western modernity, the "cultural revolution was an unsuccessful ideological revolution – an abortive Chinese enlightenment" (1996, p. 3). While there were elements of anti-Chinese tradition in the Cultural Revolution, itwas not a wholesale rejection of the same tradition, given the CCP's stated vision to also preserve aspects of that tradition, such as traditional medicine (Gao, 2008, p. 21). Under the slogan, "fight selfishness, criticize revisionism" (Lin 1996, p. 420), the Chinese people were marshalled, and marshalled themselves, against selfishness and traditional values that hampered their development. Accordingly, solidarity, or an expansive form of kinship, was cultivated in China. However, it must be noted that this was led by a repressive state.

Workers demanded that their bonuses be cancelled, students demanded that the examination system be abolished, and that peasants return private holdings for the benefit of the communes(Lin, 1996, p. 421) were some of the calls that came out of the Cultural Revolution. These weresupported by 'class policies', which benefited historically disadvantaged Chinese, while the class benefits of the elite were limited. And this affected who obtained state jobs, as bias was in favour of the working class and historically disadvantaged families. Even women's rights were widened. The cultivation of this, then emergent, social structure directed human capital to rural upliftment efforts. This work ethic became a key virtue of the working class (Lin, 1996,

p. 118). Consequently, the Cultural Revolution laid the foundations for the development of China in the late 1970s (see Lin, 1996; Li, 2001). Certainly, there are those who disagree with this assessment, including the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) position (see Muhlhahn, 2019). However, the latter is premised on an economic perspective, while the former is underpinned by a cultural perspective to transform social relations, which was the reason for the Cultural Revolution in the first place. Therefore, that there were close to 800 000 businesses in the villages and nearly 90 000 hydroelectric stations in 1979 (Wong, in Gao, 2008, p. 6) speaks more to the change in attitudes towards industrialisation.

Part of the problem, however, is that the Cultural Revolution was also violent. CCP records clearly show that the revolution went against those who sought a capitalist route to China's development, those from the old society, with old habits (CCP, 1966, p. 3). Though many of these acts were not state-sanctioned – in fact Chairman Mao criticised the violence and approved decrees to stamp out detention centres – detention centres were set up, people's homes were raided and some, beaten, were judged to be class enemies (Gao, 2008, p. 17). To this extent, it was the elite who seemed to bear the brunt of the Cultural Revolution. For the working class, however, it seemed to have been their moment to develop. No wonder different people and different classes conveyed different responses to the Cultural Revolution (Gao, 2008, p. 13). Nonetheless, applying across all classes and social groups, the Cultural Revolution victimised many in terms of personal humiliation, physical assaults, arbitrary detention, loss of property and even death (Gao, 2008, p. 8). Given the foregoing brief historical narratives of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, it is apparent that class struggles are a function of the post-1911 China. Marxism emerges on the Chinese political scene among a cohort of educated Chinese who were introduced to it via Eastern Europe and saw it as a frame to imagine a post-Qing China. As such, Marxism, as a manner of perceiving Chinese political and economic reality, emerges from the conceptual womb of western episteme, specifically its immanent variants.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Black people, through the slavery of Haitians, were constructed outside the community of western modernity, but within the society of colonial modernity. That means, since western modernity is premised on white nationalism, and body-reasoning is its *modus operandi*, black people could not find expression inside this humanity. That is, the slaves' colour, or the fact of their blackness, proved

to be an invitation to allocate their social value. Therefore, theexploitation of the slave and their de-culturation constituted their social negation. The theft, or extraction, of Indian wealth to British society could better be explained as an imperial project that resulted in de-industrialisation. However, in the socio-political domain of Indian life, the imposition of a gender order similarly constituted a colonial relationship. So, unlike colonial Haiti, which was premised on the anti-black racism of black people, in colonial India, colonialism was also an epistemic intrusion into how masculinity was to be performed. To this extent, body-reasoning was visible via the association between the lack of masculinity of the Indian body and the lack of moral rectitude, a deviation from the standard (read western man). In this sense, Indians formed part of the community of western modernity, but in a disfigured sense. And China, with its self-imposed coloniality – the adoption of Marxism as a mode of development enveloped China into the linear trajectory of western modernity, but in a similarly disfigured sense as in India. This disfiguration, similar to the logic in western societies, is evident in the exclusion of women's work from the industrial effort of China. Given that the Chinese political party sought to build socialism, first by industrialising, and second by rerouting social values towards class struggles, a bifurcation presented itself predominantly in class terms in China. And the exclusion of the domestic domain in the pursuance of the industrial effort demonstrated the body-reasoning associated with class struggles. Accordingly, the foregoing disaggregation of coloniality represents, as Steve Biko referred to it, the "totality of white power" (1987, p. 89).

In this chapter, the study argued that coloniality had a differential impact in different colonial societies. However, from the foregoing histories, it is evident that colonial Haiti, India and China all represented the embodied. That is, within their different forms of colonialism, body-reasoning was present. Whether it was the anti-black racism of black people, the gender ordering of Indians, or the exclusion of women's work in the industrial effort of Chinese modernity, the body was present. Each society was made up of bodies, therefore. Nonetheless,whether India, Haiti or China, each reinforced a common theme: that coloniality encapsulates both ontological and epistemic features. And this is evident in the different forms of colonialism in each society.

# Chapter 4

# The Third World: An Alternative Narrative of Failure

## 4.0 Introduction

Chapter 3 argued that, at the level of the international system, coloniality manifested itself in disaggregated forms built off body-reasoning. Accordingly, coloniality is a continuing and continuous project in masking the prejudices inherent in the constitution of 'the International'.On this note, this chapter is concerned with how the liberal construction of 'the international' weakened the Third World's struggles for freedom. The chapter argues that, although the ThirdWorld first sought to disrupt coloniality, it later got trapped in liberalism, thus conceding to coloniality. In other words, liberalism effectively dismantled the unity of the Third World. While liberalism has lofty ideals such as universal suffrage, freedom of the press and speech, for the darker people it is underwritten by an underbelly by which the struggles of black peopleare ontologically masked. Therefore, it is a mistake to resuscitate liberalism, as Charles Mills (2017) does. Rather, what is needed is to unmask liberalism as, in essence, a philosophy that masks anti-black racism while emphasising coloniality's epistemic features.

While the struggles within the liberal construction of 'the International' were ultimately about the Third World attempting to disrupt coloniality, simultaneously, but problematically, it was also about darker people striving to be incorporated inside a humanity created by the western order – the same order that black people were not able to enter because of anti-black racism. This epistemic incorporation – juridical and sociological inclusion – gave leaders of the ThirdWorld a false sense of equality with the west and commonality among themselves. However, the latter was not possible given anti-black racism, as black people were not able to access a humanity from which they were excluded since its (colonial) founding. So, the focus on epistemic incorporation, which was accessed via the 'border-thinking' of Third World leaders - essentially a space of rebellion, or the use of double consciousness – is what constrained their ability to dislodge coloniality. In other words, epistemic struggles were fought on the battleground of coloniality.

Given the foregoing, this chapter comprises three sections. The first section, entitled 'Liberalism: A Regime of Being', argues that liberalism, a hegemonic vision of the post-war world, constructed being with the pretence of diverse identities (political, economic, social), while concealing its inability to offer black people ontological options outside of coloniality. In other words, in the liberal frame, anti-black racism is hidden. The section then ends off with how access to these diverse identities, effectively to the cosmology of [western] human rights, made possible the exercise of border-thinking. In the second section, entitled 'The Post- Colonial Imagination', the chapter analyses how border-thinking foreclosed the Third World from a comprehensive appreciation of coloniality. In the third section, entitled 'The End of the Third World', the chapter argues that historical moments, such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) project in 1974, were marked by such disunity and disarray that they could not put an end to coloniality. Given the internal competition over the Third World's proximity to western modernity, the study conceives of liberalism as a foreclosing device against the unity of the Third World.

### 4.1 Liberalism: A Regime of Being

In this section, the study focuses on liberalism as a hegemonic vision of the post-colonial world, constructed on the primacy of the individual with the pretence of diverse epistemic identities (political, economic, social), while concealing the essentialising of 'being' (the individual) clothed in western garb. This concealment lies in the "belief that history incorporates a teleology of progress" (Parfitt, 2002, p. 2), that one can perceive a process of evolution towards greater levels of progress predicated on ever-sophisticated forms of freedom (Parfitt, 2002, p. 2). In this way, anti-black racism is concealed. That is, since the fact that the grammar of suffering of black people was predicated on racism, basically ontological degradation, the transition to liberalism meant the marginalisation of the same in liberal discourse. That is, racism was limited to a rights discourse in which, being about colour and not ontological degradation, the allocation of rights and material upliftment sufficed. However, for the darker people, inclusive of black people, liberalism emphasised the [western] epistemic route towards ever-sophisticated forms of freedom and development, which occasioned the performance of Mignolo's (2013) border-thinking, an integrative frame within western modernity for the embodied.

From the preceding chapter, it is evident that there were different modes of colonialism between brown and black bodies, both falling under the rubric of the 'darker people' or the Third World. This is important, because these post-colonial people entered western modernity differently positioned. However, their entry was through the adoption of diverse [western] epistemic identities. For instance, for African Americans, Du Bois conceived of this transition in white society via "double consciousness" (2007, p. 8), by which he meant: this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contemptand pity. One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.

This conceptualisation, though American, can apply to black bodies elsewhere. Writing this in1903, Du Bois was basically prefiguring the transition of black people, once slaves, into white society composed of supposedly free people. However, and not in the same way, both *American*and *Negro* are externally manufactured identities. And so, to apply this thinking to the Third World, this study stretches this notion of two souls. For one, double consciousness was made possible because the Third World's entry into western modernity was predicated on the "western grammar of dignity" (Madlingozi, 2018, p. 49). So, appealing to political jurisprudence of the west not only gave one visibility and recognition (Madlingozi, 2018, p. 49), but gave one access to a world that contained an evolving philosophy of [western] humanrights. Accordingly, the study contends that it is access to this philosophy that border-thinkingis made possible. The study then argues that, in the liberal frame, Du Boisian double consciousness is more accurately characterised by an oscillation between the native (created by coloniality) and the indigenous (the Self). 'The self', here, is an ontological identity that is internally constituted, but is mediated through a liberal discourse (i.e., the native). This is similar to Mignolo's (2013) conceptualisation of border-thinking. This way stretched, the double consciousness of African Americans translates into the border-thinking of the darker people. Therefore, to center, or start with, the ontological means to begin with where the oppressed are.

Before the chapter delves into border-thinking, it is best to begin with the cosmology of [western] human rights, and to show how this cosmology leads to border-thinking. It was in 1947, at a Joint Session of US Congress, that then President Harry Truman delivered a dramaticspeech that sought to galvanise US citizens behind an anti-Communist, liberal democratic, global vision. Dividing the world into the East and the West, Truman argued that, on the one hand, one way of life was

characterised by a majority based on representative government and free institutions, while, on the other hand, the second way of life was characterised by a minority that relied on terror and oppression (Truman, 1947). Two years later, in 1949, President Truman went on to flash out this vision: effectively, he sought to "replicate the world over the features that characterized the advanced societies of the time" (Escobar, 1994, p. 4). This importantly hinged on the adoption of modern western values and education. The speech set the blueprint for the US approach to the developing world. Years later, it was the United Nations (UN), echoing Truman's vision, that stated that "ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate" (UN, in Escobar, 1994, p. 4). This openedthe make for the supposed modern industrial life.

Given the foregoing, liberalism morphed into a distinct post-colonial vision premised on democratic and independent institution-building that was to extend, effectively, to Britain's former colonies. Called liberal institutionalism in IR, it is premised on the idea that international institutions enable states to cooperate better (Devitt, 2011). This institution- building amounts to a democratic governance system that creates the condition for common values in the international system. However, these processes come off the back of the accumulated power of coloniality, in which the west is a hegemonic force in the state system. So, while newly emerging independent countries began to adopt socialism, or some form of nationalism, they adopted some variation of liberalism. For example, immediately after their independence, the Third World cooperated with international institutions such as the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN. Secondly, many Third World states adopted rights forminorities in their own countries. In other words, liberal values provided the means through which the west could impose its self-image on the rest of the developing world. And the US saw itself, starting with the Truman doctrine, as a defender of western civilisation, which it described as a free society based on the dignity and worth of the individual (Kissinger, 1950). In opposing the Soviet Union, its saw itself as the leader of this free world. In this context, the transition to independence did not constitute a thorough break for the darker people. In fact, liberal values adopted by the former colonial states, and their elites, were to act only as a transition to self-rule. To this extent, the advance of liberalism hit at two political projects at the time: the nationalisms of the South, and the socialisms of the East. This hit was important because it framed the contours of both socialism and nationalism in the developing world.

In the liberal frame, unlike realism, force was not necessary for policy formation (Baylis & Smith, 2005). Rather, the fashioning of common goals was central to liberalism. And, in the post-colonial world, doing away with underdevelopment and poverty was a key goal. For instance, in November

1949, armed with Keynesian economic theory, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development went on an expedition in Columbia, with the sole purpose of observing and designing a development programme for the country (Escobar, 1995, p. 24). Suddenly, it was as if the world (read former colonial powers) had discovered poverty in their backyard (as their former colonies). So, international institutions began to focus on the "war on poverty in the Third World" (Escobar, 1995, p. 21) and sought to bring development. And Columbia was one of many instances. However, their form of development, and so their doing away with poverty, was based on establishing power over nature as a form of co-existence and living. In fact, it was said that Columbia's "rich natural resources can be made tremendously productive through the application of modern techniques and efficient practices" (Escobar, 1995, p. 25). Akin to the lone-ranger individual in liberalism's vision, development was predicated on subduing nature. Basically, anything associated with the embodied (black people in particular), or the natural, which represented the debased side of life, had to submit to the alleged superiority of modern techniques.

And this is where liberalism contains the seeds of modernisation theory because, towards black people, liberalism acted illiberally (Jahn, 2013, p. 93) to attain progress in Africa. This is because, conceptually, black people existed outside the social contract. That is, given that liberalism makes every other political system in its own image (Jahn, 2013, p. 117), black people had to conform to the epistemic vision of the disembodied (white society) to conceptually enter western modernity. For instance, the civil rights movement in the US was placated through several legislative acts that enveloped African Americans within the western modernity. It was the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 which all brought African American people within the fold of liberalism. Accordingly, though ontologically not incorporated, black people formed part of the disembodied via juridical incorporation, albeit displacing them politically and economically. In other words, the non-European lived "in the shadow of the Western Self" (Comaroff et al., 2012, p. 115). However, the rest of the darker people became disembodied, albeit in a disfigured sense. In part, this would help explain why the west is central to human rights campaigns throughout the NGO industry, particular in the developing world; this is because the darker people live in their moral universe. The result is that, among the darker people, self-determination was predicated on proximity to whiteness or white supremacy (see Biko, 1987, p. 21). This is arguably the basis of a civil rights discourse. Accordingly, it is why liberal values not only acted as a transition to self-rule among the darker people, but also operated to foreclose the possibility of the unity of the Third World. This is because black people did not have the same standing as, broadly speaking, darker people within western modernity. So any assumption about

Third World unity and, correspondingly, equality with the west is not likelyto hold water. Since there can be no economy without a corresponding society (Amin, 2015, p. 68), and economies in the developing world were either socialist or some variation of nationalism, liberalism became a device on which ideas about human freedoms were shaped and formed (Dove, 1998, p. 5). These freedoms were premised on the capacity to reason (Rawls, 1999), which is quintessential to what it means to be human. And this capacity is based on one first having self-possession (Jahn, 2013, p. 43), a possibility inaccessible to slaves [the embodied]. Accordingly, and consistent with Uday Mehta's view that liberalism is contingent on societieshaving reached a level of maturation (1999, p. 81), the assumptive logic of liberalism rests onthe constitution of already free and equal people who create a society. To this extent, liberalismis predicated on integrating people into a single polity, which is why it is hostile to other political systems. And so, in a post-colonial society, made up of unequal people and people deprived of freedom, the state in the Third World was incorrectly based on the values of the so-called advanced societies. And because of the demand for equality during and after decolonisation, the aim was to reproduce the world based on features that characterised these same societies. Unmistakably, liberalism circumscribed the Third World (embodied) into border-thinking, an integrative frame through which to understand the world.

Walter Mignolo (2012) locates border-thinking as having originated in the idea of the Third World project. However, what are the conceptual origins of this concept? Mignolo's border- thinking was initially derived from Gloria Anzaldúa's (1987) concept, 'borderlands', in her book *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, from which Mignolo develops his concept. For Anzaldúa, the concept borderline is a liminal space in which one exists in multiple culturalspaces because they belong to no singular culture, and the space between the living and the dead is fluid (Anzaldúa, 1987, pp. 194-195). This is a space of hybridity, of the past and the present. Importantly, it is a space occupied by the discarded, the colonially created who must live in the present. Mignolo (2013, p. 137), on the other hand, repurposed 'border-thinking' tomean speaking through conceptual categories of the west but from the positionality of the colonised. Strangely enough, this is similar to Duboisian double consciousness. However, the difference lies in its functionality. Similar to double consciousness, "border-thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the inside" (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006, p. 206). Different from double consciousness, to think decolonially, or to delink from the western epistemological logic, border-thinking is a requisite. However, one must be conscious to coloniality, which is a precondition for performing epistemic disobedience since one has to think through colonial languages. However, border-thinking is not about delinking from the western epistemological frame. In the next section, the study argues that it is in the liberal

frame, because of its seductive cosmology of [western] human rights, that the Third World's border-thinking did not constitute a break, or delinking, from thewestern epistemological order. This regime of being, therefore, circumscribed the being of the first generation of Third World leaders. In their context, they were not conscious of coloniality.

Since black people were not free or equal in the colonial frame, a fact borne out by their ontological degradation, and stripped of their humanity, so too liberalism did not return their humanity. Instead, the transition to the liberal construction of 'the International' meant the visibility of the embodied was only possible via their adoption of the epistemic features of coloniality. This constituted integration without justice (see Biko, 1987, pp. 20-21). Liberalism basically provided the individual with the pretence of diverse epistemic identities – one can bea Marxist or a Republican, for instance. Apart from the assumptive logic of liberalism, this is also evident in the struggles of the Third World, which focused on western-centric ideologies. Consequently, while they were based on a discourse of development that "deployed a regime of government over the Third World" (Escobar, 1995, p. 9), the Third World responded with immanent western critiques, such as Marxism or some nationalist variation, to safeguard their self-rule (sovereignty). This curtailed justice to demands for equality and civil rights discourse. Consequently, decolonising countries adopted modernisation discourse and its culture of development (Burden-Stelly, 2016, pp. 1-2). So, the struggle was not about self-definition, as it should have been for black people, but it was about the disruption of colonial economic interests (Chomsky, 1993, p. 40). Not surprisingly, leaders such as Thomas Sankara and PatriceLumumba, who challenged these colonial interests, were either maligned or marginalised

### 4.2. Post-Colonial Imagination

In this section, the chapter argues that the Third World leaders were trapped in border-thinking, foreclosing them from a comprehensive consciousness of coloniality. Not conscious of the global matrix of power, they consequently were foreclosed from the possibility of performing epistemic disobedience. This section uses the life of the first generation of post-colonial leaders, who defined the contours of the Third World project, to demonstrate how their use of border-thinking**,** though conscious of the problem of the colonial state, foreclosed them from appreciating their position in the global matrix of power.

Although the first Pan African Congress was held in London, in 1900, against racism, the two world

wars were catalytic for the bourgeoning Third World sentiment of equality with the west. The involvement of the darker people in these wars gave natives the impression that, because they fought alongside their white counterparts, back home they would be treated with equality and fairness. And 'back home' is in the west, in western modernity to be precise. The reality was that these natives either experienced racism within colonial society or alienation from their indigenous communities and cultures (Kelley, in Robinson, 2000, p. xiv). In effect, they existed in the borders. It was in this border, or duality, that a nationalist sentiment emerged. A sentiment, the study argues, that readily conceded to importing their ideological positions from the west. In the colonies, the surge of anti-colonial nationalist movements in Latin America, in Asia and in Africa were characterised by these native elites caught between the economic benefits of the metropole, and the socio-political impact of their marginalisation.

The post-colonial years were crucial moments, because they begin with the independence of the British colonies such as India and Pakistan in 1947, Sri Lanka in 1948, Libya in 1951, Malaysia in 1957 and Ghana in 1957, etc. These were the Asian and African states that had strong nationalist currents led by heroes such as Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru in Asia, while in Africa it was Ben Bella and Nelson Mandela (Prashad, 2007, p. xvii) that figured prominently, and at different moments in the anti-colonial struggle. Not to forget Castro of Cuba and Nkrumah of Ghana (Prashad, 2007, p. xvi). All these figures worked towards cohesion among various liberation movements and across social classes to struggle against colonial and imperial forces (Prashad, 2007, p. xvii). However, the contours of the Third World, Prashid reminds us, were in the hands of Nasser, U Nu, Nehru and Sukarno, who readily scolded their colleagues over their association with either the Soviet Union or the US (Prashad, 2007, p. 39). But what were these figures about, really, and in what way did border-thinking circumscribe their outlook.

It is best to start with Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Nehru was born into an affluent and anglicised family in Allahabad and later attended Harrow in England (Nanda, 1998, pp. 1-2). Faithful to his caste, Nehru was a learned person. Born of a successful and shrewd lawyer, he, together with his siblings, were raised in a western tradition (Schottli, 2012, p. 44). In fact, Nehru embodied a fusion between eastern and western cultures in a similarly complicated way in which India sought to catch up with western nations (New York Times, 1964). It is not surprising then that he studied for law at Gray's Inn, London (Schottli, 2012, p. 44). Later in his political life, he became a significant figure in the anti-colonial struggle such that he is remembered as one of the leadings lights of the doctrine of non-alignment, which shaped India's foreign policy and that of other newly independent countries

emerging from colonialism (New York Times, 1964). As a matter of fact, it was Nehru's India that hosted the first conference of independent states in 1947, dubbed the Asian Conference of 1947, "organised at the cusp of India's independence" (Thakur, 2018, p. 3). To Nehru, however, non-alignment meant an approach that was neither pro nor against communism (New York Times, 1964). If anything, bar his scepticism of communism – at least at home – Nehru was interested in friendly relations with all nations. This friendliness had a pragmatism to it, however. For instance, while Nehru was critical of the materialism of American lifestyle, inclusive of military aid, India during his time massively benefited from US financial assistance (New York Times, 1964).

While in Britain, Nehru began reading the Fabian socialism of George Bernard Shaw, and Sidney and Beatrice Webb. And, though influenced by Karl Marx, he rejected Communism. To this end, it is not surprising that Nehru once said, "I have become a queer mixture of East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere," (New York Times, 1964). Reminiscent of Anzaldúa's (1987) concept of 'borderlands', Nehru similarly positions his existence at the border, specifically between the East and the West, but ultimately nowhere. In the final analysis, India's 1950 Constitution eventually found home in the western epistemological order. That is, according to The Times of India, and similarly to South Africa's 1996 Constitution, it was celebrated as the most "elaborate declaration of human rights yet framed by any state" (Singh, 2020). In fact, the then leading constitutional expert, Oxford don Sir Kenneth Wheare, declared it to be "the biggest liberal experiment in democratic government"(Singh, 2020), as if India was in competition with the west itself. Differently positioning himself, on the other hand, was Sukarno (also known as Soekarno) of Indonesia, who was from humble beginnings (Sukarno, in Wejak, 2000, p. 56). He was born in East Java in 1901 (Palmier, 1957, p. 101). Educated at a Dutch elementary school, taking up lessons in French and attending a school largely reserved for children of the Dutch and senior Indonesian officials (Palmier, 1957, pp. 101-102), he received a degree in civil engineering from the Bandung Technical Institute (Shimazu, 2011, p. 12) in 1927. This placed him among a few local Indonesian elites that enjoyed colonial (western) education. Evidently, though "steeped in the Javanese culture" (Palmier, 1957, p. 101), his frame was undoubtedly European.

Informed by the national humiliation of the Dutch and the Japanese, who had invaded Burma, Sukarno "took a decidedly anti-western tone" (Wejak, 2000, p. 56) during his struggle against the Dutch colonisers. Nonetheless, Sukarno birthed the term *Nasakom*, a concept that encapsulated his government's attempt to blend nationalism, religion and communism as a way of fashioning Indonesian national identity, both internally and to external threats such as imperialism and neo-

colonialism (Buduroh & Hanifah, 2020, p. 96). Inevitably, this led to him forming alliances with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), then the largest communist party outside the Soviet bloc (Hindley, 1962, p. 915). Although authoritarian, Sukarno worked with both the military and the communist, and other, formations to advance a progressive-leftist revolution (Hauswedell, 1973, p. 112). Sukarno's persuasion to a Marxist outlook for Indonesian development, predicated on a system of guided democracy, was more a nationalistimpulse to unite all Indonesians. This was an acceptance of the western-centric mode of sovereignty. Accordingly, it was Sukarno's Indonesia that hosted the Bandung Conference of 1955 and, in contrast to the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, it was a "moment in which rich and novel understandings of political community were jettisoned for state sovereignty" (Abraham, in Thakur, 2018, p. 4).

On the African continent was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who was born in September 1909 in Nzima, a typical African village but surrounded by a large lagoon with lots of nature. For his elementary schooling he attended a Roman Catholic mission school (Rooney, 1988, pp. 21-22). This school, its education and its teachers played a formative role in how he viewed black and white relations. For Nkrumah, the school led him on a non-denominational Christian path such that, at some point in his early adult life, he considered joining the Jesuit order (Rooney,1988, p. 26). During his years in academia, he ensured that he read Marxist and western philosophical texts. Matched with his Christian upbringing, he saw no contradiction between them and his Marxist leanings (Rooney, 1988, pp. 22-23). He then latter attended the Government Training College in Achimota, which was to develop the best traditions of European culture (Rooney, 1988, p. 23). In this school, Nkrumah played a role in a drama showin which he, trained as a medical doctor, returned to his village and challenged the traditional healer (Rooney, 1988, p. 24). Even though this was the approach of the school to African traditional customs, for Nkrumah, development was about bringing "African people effectively into the modern world without uprooting them from their tribal background" (Rooney, 1988, p. 31). On the surface, this seems reasonable, but on a cosmological and metaphysical level, this was not possible. For instance, it was evident from the Roman Catholic School's syllabus that black and white relations were predicated on the loss of cultural life of the former. It was therefore naïve to think that the best in African customs and beliefs could coexist alongside the best in Christianity, embodied in a singular individual without contradiction.

In his later political life, much as happened in China, Nkrumah launched the Seven-year Plan, effectively launching his philosophy of scientific socialism. For him, the communitarian history of Africans could easily be wedded to the socialist principles of Marxism, provided these principles

were adapted to African conditions. Rejecting capitalism, Nkrumah believed in a planned economy, common ownership of the means of production, and with political power in the hands of the people (Rooney, 1988, p. 255).

On the other hand was to be found Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who used African custom as a point of reference for socialism. He was born in 1922, in a small village called Butiama (Bjerk,2015, p. 24). Growing up as the son of a chief in a colonial setting, Nyerere had access to racially mixed schools where education was given to these children for free (Bjerk, 2015, p. 24). This enabled him to access western modernity and its cultural values. More so, he was baptised as a Roman Catholic, which is where he got his name Julius from (Bjerk, 2015, p. 25). Again, like Nkrumah, Christianity or its variation seems to have been an important cultural transmitter of western cultural values. In fact, Nyerere attended missionary boarding schools, studied at the elite Makerere University, and later went on to study in Scotland (Bjerk, 2015, pp. 23-24). As with colonial education in many places, the intention was to use bright African students who would mould African society into some version of European society ((Bjerk, 2015, p. 23). However, Nyerere had a different outlook.

Later in his political life, Nyerere looked for a national identity that would form the bedrock of an African identity. He sought to fashion a oneness that could withstand potential dictatorships or divisions that would fashion a national identity, and loyalty, beyond constitutional prescriptions. For this, he developed Ujamma, concisely encapsulated in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Ujamaa encapsulated both familyhood and socialism (Bjerk, 2015, p. 98)as the basis of development. Family, land and citizenship, central to Ujamma, were the basis for African socialism, predicated on the view that socialism is an attitude of the mind (Nyerere, 1968, p. 1). This re-conceptualisation moved socialism away from an epistemic vision to an ontological outlook. Building his thesis on the family as the bedrock of social virtue, the State was its direct extension (Bjerk, 2015, p. 99). Governmental responsibility and social ethics were conceived in this. So, a form of centralised government developed, including the adoptionof a one-party state, that moved towards “effective control over the principal means of production” (Nyerere, 1968, p. 14). And this had implications for land tenure. In this philosophy, freehold was rejected, and leasehold was the accepted land tenure right (Bjerk, 2015, p. 102).

These men were important in fashioning a policy position for the Third World that sought to define self-determination for newly independent countries. However, these western-educated leaders saw themselves as representing the best of their local traditions and the best of Europe (Bjerk, 2015, p.

23). Accordingly, their political and economic systems entailed a combination of both theirs and the west's, if not their synthesis. This balance was not always stable, however. This is why, even when some drew from their cultural traditions, their approaches to development were based on western modes of organisation. While it is evident that this amounted to epistemic disobedience by Third World leaders, what is discernible, however, is them justifying colonial rule as rationale for development under independence (Bjerk, 2015, p. 23). And this is most evident in the leaders' inability to look through "the straitjacket of state sovereignty" (Roy & Zacharia, in Thakur, 2018, p. 4). In other words, instead of a Third World struggle for freedom and liberation, beyond state (read colonial) limits, these leaders sought freedom and liberation within the logic of the state – the adoption of a human rights tradition is indicative of this logic. As a matter of fact, the maturing of these leaders in power, bar India, saw a hardening anti-western position based on an impressionable approval of state sovereignty (Thakur, 2018, p. 18). In this context, the leaders of the Third World project were not conscious of the global matrix of power in which their societies were placed. The struggles against neo- colonialism waged under the rubric of the Third World project did not consider the totalising logic of coloniality, and the positionality of darker people's existence in it – in that, the western epistemological frame rests on subjugating the embodied. And so, the use of western epistemeto restore parity with the west was bound to fail.

### 4.2 The End of the Third World

Since the leaders of the Third World were involved in border-thinking, any multilateral or South-South linkages were bound to fail. Therefore, the Bandung Conference of 1955, the NAM in 1961, and the NIEO in the 1970s, all collapsed because while they sought to determine a middle path out of the east-west binary. However, the west's liberal project of integrating the world into a single global economic vision eventually triumphed over the Third World's border-thinking exercise. This is because liberalism, coloniality's iteration, was hegemonic. And its hegemony was possible because the relationship between the west and the Third World was unequal, with the US, and the west broadly, determining the global set-up. Accordingly, the Third World's competition for proximity to western modernity, which brought disunity and disarray, could not put an end to coloniality. In this section, the study argues that liberalism is best read as a foreclosing device against the unity of the Third World.

The late 1940s were a crucial turning point in world history. The backdrop to this decade is the defeat

of Germany under Adolf Hitler, the end of WW II, the loss of the centrality of western Europe in world affairs and, importantly, the emergence of a bipolar world with the US as leader of the developed world and the USSR as the 'vanguard' of the developing world. In the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), which played an important role in most of the developed world, and later in the developing world, the US dollar constituted the sole currency in world trade and was pegged to all other currencies at a fixed exchange rate (Wolff, 2014, p. 14). This had a damaging effect on the sovereignty of other countries. On the other hand, however, this gave the US both economic and political influence over world markets in extending the reach of capitalism worldwide. In fact, these configurations provided the US with the opportunity to integrate the world according to its interests, if not its image. Accordingly, the post-war economy internationally was built on the back of US imperial interests.

These configurations of power had contradictory spin-offs for the developing world. For instance, the British "suppressed the insurgents in Malaya and Burma, the *Land and Freedom Army*, dubbed the Mau by the British, who then led a peasant nationalist uprising in Kenya in 1952-56 that was ruthlessly crushed while the French crushed an armed struggle for independence in Cameroon" (Jordan & Maharaj , 2018, p. 12). On the other side of the world, the independence of India in 1947 made possible the idea of a decolonised Asia and Africa. In turn, this made possible "the humiliating defeat of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the stunning victory of the Cuban revolution (1953-1959) and of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)" (Maharaj & Jordan, 2018, p. 12), thus emboldening the colonial world. Prashad reminds us that "determined people struck out against colonialism to win their freedom. They demanded political equality on the world level" (2007, p. xvi). However, many of these efforts, given the positionality of the darker people in the hierarchy of the west, did not go as far as dismantling coloniality and its attendant structures. Given the argument in the previous section, this was because they were not conscious of the totality of coloniality. Part of this inability lies in the fact that the leaders of the newly independent states operated off border-thinking as a liberatory praxis through which to define their parity with the west. Given the then recent colonial history, which imposed coloniality, a phenomenon that outlasted colonialism, parity with the west was inevitably going to favour the former colonial powers. It bears reminding that, given the global matrix of power, the white body (disembodied) represented knowledge, while, on the Eurocentric scale, all others represented ignorance (Nzegwu, 2016). Consequently, the Third World's efforts to achieve parity with the west largely constrained their ability to counter coloniality. Steve Biko sums this up cogently:

The integration they talk about is, first of all, artificial in that it is a response to conscious manoeuvre rather than to the dictates of the inner soul. In other words, the people forming the integrated complex have been extracted from various segregated societies with their inbuilt complexes of superiority and inferiority andthese continue to manifest themselves even in the 'non-racial' set-up of the integrated complex. As a result, the integration so achieved is a one-way course, with the whites doing all the talking and the blacks the listening (1987, p. 20)

Biko is used here to expose the global power structure that had been created by coloniality and on which the US sought to integrate the world. The passing of the baton from British colonialism to US imperialism, therefore, was a decisive moment in that the US could continuewhat the British had done, but on a worldwide scale. This scale was carved out by US President Harry Truman: Let's remember that it was President Harry Truman that introduced the word "underdevelopment": the US foresaw that the waves of decolonization in Indonesia in 1945 – followed by India in 1947 – were not going to stop there.In 1949, Truman understood that Asia, Africa and South America were madeup of underdeveloped countries. Thus, the politics of development and modernization became vital in recasting the pre-existing idea of progress, which was a cornerstone of the British Empire's hegemony. The US appointed itself to lead the world toward development and modernization. The first formal step was taken by the US in 1945, with the creation of the Bretton Woods agreement, which was signed by delegates of 44 nation-states (at the time). Bretton Woods was established to regulate the international monetary system. From this agreement emerged the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), which mutated into today's World Bank. Other regional banks were created later, such as the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (Mignolo, 2012).

As part of the package of the Marshall Plan (US financial plain to rebuild Western Europe), the US pressured Britain and France to dismantle their colonial empires so that those countriescould be open to global capital (read US capital). Although once these countries became independent, US policy makers believed that these countries' only purpose was to "provide services for the rich, offering cheap labor, resources, markets, opportunities for investment and (lately) export of pollution (Chomsky, 1993, p. 33). Thus, the only other threat to the US-led order were nationalist regimes that dared to use their national resources to pull themselves out of poverty to the level of sustainable development (Chomsky, 1993, p. 33). What propped up these regimes was their exposition of neo-colonialism. Put differently, what the US considered to be the global spread of capital is what the

Third World considered to be neo-colonialism. Therefore, the US worked to contain these developments. From the perspective of the newly independent states, the so-called Cold War, then, was conceived to be a war against US control over the developing world. For instance, western aid was crucial for Malawian development (Alavi & Shanin, 1983, p. 85). As a result, this constrained the positive neutrality of the Third World. In addition, Cold War calculations and their fortunes and downturns were contingent on the geopolitical benefits to the west, specifically the US, in containing communist or anti- capitalist advances. For example, Singapore, and even much earlier Brazil, benefited massively from the UK and the US, due to its geopolitical position during the Cold War, although the US took the lead on Brazil (see Ngoie, 2019), so these countries were able to avoid the debt pitfalls that befell many in the Third World. In terms of the rest, for many in the developing world, domestic political unrest and the debt problem paved the way for the final nail in the coffin of the Third World project: beginning with Mexico, then later the Latin American economies, these countries were not able to service their debts with American firms, so many defaulted (Sims & Romero, 2013). In the following historical moments, the section demonstrates the unequal relationship between the US-led effort to globalise capitalism and the Third World's defeat. In addition, these examples also show the disunity within the Third World was a result of Third World states competing over their proximity to western modernity.

### 4.2.1 Bandung Conference of 1955

In response to US expansionist ambitions, the Bandung Conference of 1955 was, in its attempt to articulate a middle road between Soviet communism and US imperialism, essentially a triumph for western epistemological hegemony. To understand this precisely, even though the Conference inaugurated the Third World, its announcement was devoid of the anti-colonial rhetoric that characterised much of the resistance against colonialism. So, while the Conference strongly articulated a collective political project against colonialism and imperialism and for self-determination and racial equality, while already laying the foundations for a strategic non-alignment within the vortex of Cold War politics (Weber & Winanti, 2016, p. 1), participants avoided discussion of these on ideological terms. In other words, they had no other choice. Assistance from developed economies became important, even though Third World countries were aware that their underdevelopment was a function of their colonial (extractive) relationship with the west. In addition to this, although countries advocated for a diversification of their export destinations to establishing and centre South-South trade (Kristinsson, 2015, p. 14), South-South trade was not possible, then, without western

involvement. The same is truefor bilateral engagements and trade between developed and developing countries. This is because many of the newly independent states emerged from a low economic base, with low domestic liquidities. As such, these states acknowledged the strategic economic location of the capitalist core and its control of international political and economic processes (Kristinsson, 2015, p. 15). This is also why the prevailing mood at the 1955 Conference was to obtain a middle road between capitalism and socialism.

Crucially, however, this mood affected how the developing world constituted its states. This was partly encapsulated in the debates on 'self-determination' and 'racial equality'. Consistent with liberalism's impulse to create the world in its own image, which border-thinking adopted, these debates were predicated on modernisation theory as the only idea through which to develop (Escobar, 1999, p. 383). In this sense, development was no longer a cultural process, rather, it was a system which consisted of the universal application of technical interventions to lift the poor out of poverty and underdevelopment (Escobar, 1999, p. 384). And since poor people were geographically bound, rights-bearing individuals, modernisation meant the same people were acknowledged once they conceived of themselves as rights bearers in a constitutional order, as cultivated in European history and culture (Escobar, 1999, p. 384). This"metanarrative of development" (Weber & Winanti, 2016, p. 396) is best explained by in the following:

> Importantly, most delegates accepted in one form or another the mainstays of modernist premises of development, and broadly supported the pursuit of 'development as modernisation'—and, more specifically, as conceived in terms of national development (Weber & Winanti, 2016, p. 394)

The implications of this are that, in most instances, the continuation of the colonial practices of domination and rule prevailed in many post-colonial societies. This is because "development aspirations were mired somewhat in the uniformist spirit of 'catch-up', representing anacceptance of the logic of the need to emulate many of the practices of the former colonial powers in the name of development" (cf. Chakrabarty, in Webber and Winanti, 2016, p. 6). Inother words, the visibility of the embodied in the liberal construction of 'the International' occurred through perennial violence and social displacement. This violence is what made theirvisibility possible. In this context, therefore, Bandung did not enable the newly independent states to crystallise the grammar of their suffering: this being coloniality. A critical posture would have meant a self-reflective examination of western conceptual modes of being and development. However, a naive adoption of sovereignty (Thakur,

2018, p. 18) meant that the 1955 Conference had accepted its liberal frame of the state-centric model of organisation, withthe embodied catching up to their disembodied. While a non-state-centric (Pan-Asian) perspective was palpable at the 1947 Conference, it was less so at the 1955 Conference, as it had dissipated into the discourse of 'cooperation', 'mutual interest' and 'multilateral trade': the philosophy of border-thinking. Accordingly, the 1955 Conference was a moment in which epistemic disobedience occurred because the strivings for western modernity were apparent.

### 4.2.2 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 1961

The evolving dialectic between the psychological effect of India's independence in 1947, on the one hand, and the worldwide liberal offensive spearheaded by the Truman doctrine, on the other – anchored by the Cold War logic – was to continue to wreak havoc the world over. For instance, the already dimmed light that was felt at the 1955 Conference had to be narrowed further because, by 1961, in the Belgrade moment, the attempt to recreate the world in the vision of the Third World had dissipated. What was left was for the Third World to seek policy independence within the order created by the west (Prashad, 2007, p. 96). Accordingly, it became apparent that self-determination was the only possible route. Prashad (2007, p. 96) captures this moment well:

> For the Third World, peaceful co-existence would be the main concept for the organization of states in a nuclear world. Because of the overwhelming military power of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as financial capital, and because of the lack of genuine social reconstruction within their own states, most of the Third World leadership would adopt only the *aura of the term* [my emphasis]. Peaceful co-existence allowed the new nations tosqueeze out from under the weight of the bipolar world, but it would not necessarily lead to a reorganization of the states themselves or their own regional aspirations.

This was the historical context in which the NAM convened. And, given that state or regional aspirations contracted or narrowed on the basis of their proximity to the west and the east, NAM organised on the basis of a diverse range of interests and perspectives. Nonetheless, anti-colonial efforts were afoot, and nationalist sentiments were felt across the developing world.

For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa launched its military campaign against the Apartheid regime of the country in 1961; in 1962, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) launched an armed struggle against the Portuguese regime in Guinea-Bissau; the Portuguese *Movimento Popular de Libertação de* Angola (MPLA) in Angola took up arms against the Portuguese; and a year later, the Portuguese *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique began its guerrilla activities. Such was the backdrop to the birth of the NAM. In fact, almost immediately after the Cuban revolutionary moment, the US began covert operations in Cuba. But this was part of the broader liberal offensive against the developing world to place it on the same trajectory as the emerging global economic and political architecture. This moment would help map out the nodal points against which a foreign policy of each state was crafted to follow a path of non-alignment: a policy premised on the struggle against imperialism and for national development (Tassin, 2003, p. 148). In this context, NAM was, in part, the newly independentstates' first response to the Cold War.

The Cold War came with its own tensions in world relations. Third World leaders were concerned with the escalating arms race between the Soviet Union and the US. Further to this, there was the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in which a CIA-sponsored paramilitary group attempted to invade Cuba in April of that year. So Cold War tensions, which also largely included the legitimate fear of nuclear arms use, loomed large over this Conference. Given theheightened international tensions between the west and the Soviet Union, and the machinations by the west to break up the unity of anti-colonial movements, foreign policy projections were used to protect the developing world's socio-economic trajectories. In essence, NAM membership depended on:

> … depended upon an empathy for national liberation movements and a dislike for being drawn into one of the alliances that characterised the Cold War stand-off. In this sense, non-alignment meant the rejection of control by the superpowers of the time and the adoption of a foreign policy stance that implied resistance against East-West pressures and solidarity with Third World interests relating to strategic world political and economic issues (Strydom, 2007, p. 2)

In Mignolo's conceptual framework, this would constitute embryonic attempts to dewesternise. However, this was more aspirational, given that growth, flowing from a low industrial base in Third World countries, required the financial backing of the west, particularly the US.

Remembering that, devoid of any epistemic shifts, "dewesternization means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by western players and institutions" (Mignolo, 2009, p. 3), so non-alignment was always in tension with western power. To provide an example of this:

> As Nasser and Nehru prepared to leave Brijuni, they heard news that the US government had decided to cut its $200 million pledge to finance Egypt's $ 1.3 billion Aswan High Dam. The dam was crucial to Egyptian plans, as the Free Officers hoped that it would help the sluggish Egyptian agriculturalsector (Prashad, 2007, p. 99).

The aspiration for non-alignment came against the cold reality of western power. This is mostevident when Nasser took the decision to accordingly nationalise the Suez Canal. He took this decision in retaliation for the US refusing military aid. But this decision marshalled the west torespond through military aggression. The problem here was that nationalisation was part of thearsenal of socialism, and so contradicted the claimed civilisational values of the west. However,when "the Anglo-French-Israeli force invaded Egypt in retaliation, Tito and Nehru came to Egypt's aid" (Prashad, 2007, p. 100). Such was the period of non-alignment. Over time, however, coupled with the indebtedness among some within the Third World, these factors created differences within the group, creating a rift among Third World countries. This was because, inevitably, Third World countries sought all sorts of strategic relations with various western countries. As a result, subsequent NAM conferences were not always committed to a South-South socio-economic trajectory. And, over the years, splits occurred.

Prashad argues that, among the NAM states, five produced more than 80% of the block's total industrial output (2007, p. 215): Brazil, South Korea, India, Mexico, and Argentina. And this translated into political power within some states in the Third World. These states (others notably include India, Singapore, the East Asian 'Tigers', and Brazil), because of Cold War geopolitical benefits, played a crucial role in the derailment of the Third World agenda (Prashad, 2007, p. 215). However, while it is significant that no African country is present in this list, this was also a consequence of political and economic events between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. For instance, at the end of the first UN conference on development, held in 1964, the G77 pledged themselves to "a new world order" (Toye, 2014, p. 1762). To be precise, this new world order was predicated on the developing world reclaiming its sovereignty. However, the west, particularly the US, sought ways and strategies to contain theburgeoning communist regimes and movements, given

their striving for economic sovereignty. And so, for the US to advance a worldwide capitalist mode of development, there was a need to develop a counter-strategy. This was evident in the 1950 NSC document. Accordingly, Benedict Anderson (1998, pp. 3-7) argues the following:

> In every important country of South-East Asia, with the exception of Indonesia, there were major, sustained Communist insurrections, and Indonesia, in the early Sixties, had the largest legal Communist Party in the world outside the socialist bloc. The notorious domino theory was invented specifically for South-East Asia. To shore up the line of teetering dominoes, Washington made every effort to create loyal, capitalistically prosperous, authoritarian and anti-Communist regimes – typically, but not invariably, dominated by the military. Each disaster only encouraged Washington to putmore muscle and money behind its remaining political allies. No world region received more aid.

No wonder then that Singapore, and states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), were strategic partners in US efforts to contain socialism in South East Asia. Whilethey were part of the broad non-alignment constellation, their relationship with both the Britishand US made them allies against communist frontrunners, such as Cuba and China. For instance, British bases in Singapore and US military procurements for Vietnam contributed 20% and 15%, respectively, to Singapore's national income (Ngoei, 2017a). It is these investments that shielded the country from underdevelopment, although buttressed by market-based domestic policies. To this extent, Singapore benefited from Cold War machinations because it exploited the transnational conflict that ensued from it (Ngoei, 2017a). However, it was not the only country to do so. In fact, many non-aligned states retained military relations with the west or, more appropriately, with any one of the powerful Cold War powers. Richard Nixon's triangular diplomacy organised Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore into forging military and economic relations with the US, thus serving served as a bulwark against Chinese and Soviet expansion in the region (Ngoei, 2017b,p. 904). However, many of these countries were still very much tilted to the Soviet Union and China. Not surprisingly, it was at the 1983 New Delhi NAM Conference that Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, argued that the choice was no longer about allegiance to either capitalism or communism. The choice was rather about what constituted the national interest (Prashad, 2017, p. 211). The national interest argument provided space for 'elite' countries within the Third World bloc to loosen their fidelity to the notion of non- alignment. This was crucial because non-alignment as a project of the Third World had alreadybeen weakened.

Nonetheless, the geopolitical benefits for Singapore and others were not always simply a matter of betraying political imperatives such as non-alignment. For instance, in the NAM leadership, with the transition from Fidel Castro to Indira Gandhi, the world was going through a turbulent time: proxy wars had engulfed the decade in economic stagnation, on the one hand, and so holding a pro-Soviet line was difficult to sustain given the generational shifts that were also occurring in the Third World, on the other hand. Certainly, this is not to imply or mean that a pro-Soviet line was tantamount to a non-alignment strategy; on the contrary, non-alignment was a matter of a state straddling the two without institutional affiliations – especially because there was a fallout between the Soviet Union and China. Capitalism also fell into a severe crisis in the early to mid-1970s, and the 1955 anti-Imperialist and left-leaning generation was, in the same period, replaced by a growing class that emerged high off the heels of import substitution programmes (Prashad, 2007, p. 211). The latter development was crucial because of the growing appetite for offshore markets. Prashad notes that this generation "wanted the accoutrement of advanced industrial capitalism without a sense of the historical process that makes this possible" (2007, p. 258). Of course, this had a devasting impact on the Third World and its plans, then, for de-westernisation; this is because, politically, the Third World, especially at the moment of the NIEO, at which embryonic forms of de-westernisation emerged, could not delink from the instructions of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Mignolo, 2012). But while this was the case, not only was there a wide gulf between the two leading lights in the Third World, viz. Cuba and the Soviet Union, which were embroiled in a major debt crisis and were internally weak, respectively, they were not able to provide an alternative (Prashad, 2007, p. 210) vision of a Euro-American capitalist mode of development.

### 4.2.3 New International Economic Order of 1973/1974

The 1973/1974 New International Economic Order (NIEO), basically a set of proposals for international governance that would direct more of the benefits of globalisation toward developing countries (Gilman, 2015, p. 1), was proposed by the Third World. These proposals coincided with the move away from territorial, or direct, colonialism to neo-colonialism, and with the transition from the liberal to the neoliberal construction of 'the International'. The timespan for this was from the 1940s to the late 1970s. In 1965, Nkrumah was writing about territorial colonialism being as "everywhere on the retreat" (p. 3), when decolonisation was reaching maturation. However, during

this dispensation, the developed world attempted to maintain pre-World War II colonial economic systems, if not at least to continue to profit fromtheir former colonies. And the maintenance of these systems meant that newly independent states effectively kept intact the structure of their colonial political economies. That is, Euro- American capital and their investments were used to exploit the developing world. To halt this exploitation, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) advocated in the 1960s for a more protectionist stance or import-substitution for developing countries. The problem was the nature and form of the economic relationship between the developed North and developing South, which favoured the continued development of the North and the underdevelopment of the developing South.

Neo-colonialism argues that, while a country appears independent, with all the outward snares of sovereignty, its integration with the world financial system means its policy is arbitrated from outside (Nkrumah, 1965, p. 3). Apart from articulating the growing power of western financial capital, which is used to advance parochial interests, hence increasing inequality, Nkrumah developed his thesis from Lenin's conception of imperialism. Lenin's conception was concerned with the concentration of capital and how political and economic elites developed interlocking interests in the metropoles (Lenin, 2008). Furthermore, and most importantly, it is concerned with how profits derived from the colonies provided the working class in the metropoles with concessions, fostering 'national pride' and national chauvinism. This was different in the colonies, however. Concerning social relations, political and economic elites' interests are usually in conflict with one another and, where they interlock, it is out of rent-seeking and through corruption. From the perspective of the developing South, therefore, it is important to characterise this moment as neo-colonialism. So, while the US benefited froma reconstructed western Europe, it could only benefit from an underdeveloped developing South, at least in so far as the latter's markets reflected the interests of the US, specifically, andwestern Europe, broadly.

In *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney (1983) demonstrates that the unequal relationship between Europe and Africa is historically structured. Specifically, while Africa was undeveloped, it was not underdeveloped. In fact, there is a direct correlation between the development of Europe and the underdevelopment of Africa (Rodney, 1983, p. 135). This is also evident in the case of colonial India. Accordingly, development and underdevelopment are caused by the same historical process: European imperialism. These historical developments set the stage for a different posture in the developing countries. And the UNCTAD, serving as a technical centre, and the G77, serving as a point of cohesion, are the main platform on which developing countries could

advance a cohesive political economy agenda on international platforms. Further to this, as anti-imperialist rhetoric gained traction, and emerging comprador classes in the newly independent societies also lent their support to their national leaders. This contributed to the swing in focusing on "the need to break economicties with the Western countries with which the country had been linked in the colonial era andestablish new economic relationship with other nations" (Tassin, 2003, p. 149). These new economic relations with other nations signalled the birth of South-South relations, to the extent that, just over a decade after NAM's formation, and after subsequent NAM conferences, the United Nations (UN) had to contend with proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) from these newly independent states. In some ways, this signalled a move towards de-westernisation, which would only come to fruition in the late 1990s and gain momentum in the early 2000s. In this context, border-thinking was being overtaken by de-westernisation.

The establishment of the G77 group of developing countries in the United Nations occurred in June 1964, at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. But it was in 1973 that the G77 called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would better serve the needs and interests of thedeveloping world (Kristinsson, 2015, p. 14). In one way, this was a critique of the enduring, unequal nature of the international political economy, and the difficulty of catching up with the developed North within the structural constraints of international capitalism (Weber & Winanti, 2016, p. 10). This prevailing situation was such that the global order perpetuated and intensified the system of dominance and exploitation between the centre and the periphery (Magdoff, 2003, p. 109). The issue was no longer territory as a wealth-creating resource. Instead, competition for market shares in the world economy (Strange, 1995, p. 55) was the new game. Accordingly, neo-colonialism was just as effective, and exploitative, as colonialism. Consequently, to deal with the neo-colonial and dependency features of the international political economy, the following was recommended:

At the core of the NIEO's agenda was a series of interrelated proposals for reforms to the structure, governance, and norms of the global economy designed to improve the relative position of the so-called developing states. In particular, the NIEO Declaration called for: (a) an absolute right of states to control the extraction and marketing of their domestic natural resources; (b) the establishment and recognition of state managed resource cartels to stabilize (and raise) commodity prices; (c) the regulation of transnational corporations; (d) no-strings-attached technology transfers from north to south; (e) the granting of preferential (nonreciprocal) trade preferences to countries in the south; and (f) the forgiveness of certain debts that states in the south owed to the north. Together, all these

proposals amounted to an assertion of the 'economic sovereignty' of postcolonial states. (Gilman, 2015, p. 3)

While the foregoing proposals failed with the oil and debt crises from the 1970s, two issues areclear: Firstly, NIEO did not call for doing away with the western developmental model. Instead,it called for the worldwide extension of the welfare framework that existed in western Europe(Berger, 2004, p. 24). Secondly, and as a result, NIEO uncritically accepted the state-centric mode of socio-political organisation. This certainly is not to take away the fact that how the west responded to the debt problems of the 1970s also played a role in blocking the aspirations of the developing countries. However, by the 1980s, the NIEO was replaced by discussions concerning the Washington consensus, structural adjustment programmes and the 'end of history' thesis (Gilman, 2015, p. 1). This was also made possible by the Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal pact that killed off ideas about welfare and any sort of state intervention. In fact, it was Ronald Reagan who, at the 1981 Cancun Economic Summit, said that the US would no longer entertain discussions concerning changes to the global economic architecture, regardlessof the discordance it produced (Gilman, 2015, p. 8). In a very real sense, this was the end of the liberal construction of 'the international', which heralded the hegemony of neoliberalism.

### 4.3 Conclusion

In this section, the study argued that the Third World leaders were trapped in border-thinking, specifically the hegemonic, integrative frame of liberalism, which had the effect of limiting theability of Third World leaders to be conscious of the global matrix of power, or the totality of coloniality. The study uses the life of the first generation of post-colonial leaders, who definedthe contours of the Third World project, to demonstrate how their use of border-thinking**,** although conscious of the problem of the colonial state, was blind to the totality of white power. Accordingly, border-thinking accomplished two things: First, it concealed the ontological degradation that coloniality exercised over black people, which circumscribed racism to a rights discourse; and secondly, it had the net effect of dividing the Third World bloc. This is why the struggle for equality within the Third World bloc proved futile. This is because, whileit was assured juridically, equality within the Third World, and with the west, ultimately was not an established political fact. Accordingly, the Third World was marked out by disunity and disarray, such that it could not put an end to coloniality. Given the internal competition regarding the Third World's proximity to western modernity, this chapter

conceived ofliberalism as a foreclosing device against the unity of the Third World.

# Chapter 5

# The Emergence of Neoliberalism

## 5.0 Introduction

The Third World, caught in the trappings of border-thinking, was in a state of fracture in the 1970s. Non-alignment was difficult to sustain in the face of the US policy of containment. While some within the Third World project sought aid and assistance from the developed world, others found friendship in the Second World, i.e., the Soviet Union. This fracture was to prove untenable for the developing world when indebtedness hit the Third World, particularly Latin American and African countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while thedeveloped world was enveloped in a recession in the mid-1970s (Hall, 1988, p. 22). But it was in this fracture that a new form of international socio-economic organisation emerged. The US, having consolidated an international institutional framework together with the UK, foregrounded neoliberalism as a global policy outlook. To be precise, Frederich von Hayek wrote – much earlier, in 1947 – about neoliberalism as an institutional framework in the contextof the Cold War to defend liberal society (Peters, 2012, p. 134). The purpose was to strengthenthe practice of a 'free' society by strengthening its principles (Peters, 2012, p. 134). In this sense, the imposition of neoliberalism was to safeguard liberalism. The difference here is that liberalism came with a welfare or state-centred economy, while neoliberalism came with a market-centred economy. Accordingly, it was as if the spread of socialism and the bourgeoningof nationalisms in the non-western world threatened the central values of western civilisation. Therefore, the foregrounding of neoliberalism by the US and the UK in the 1970s and 1980s was, to the Third World, a reconfiguration of the relations of domination (Coronil, 2000, p. 352) in the world economy.

This reconfiguration, emerging in the wake of the collapse of the Third World project in the 1970s, was institutionalised by the decisions of Margaret Thatcher, then UK Prime Minister, and Ronald Reagan, then US President in the 1980s. The former became Prime Minister in 1979. Her administration unleashed neoliberalism, a set of economic policies adopted in most jurisdictions around the world (Gaunt, 2013), which had brutal consequences for the developing world. Like Thatcher, Reagan he introduced a political economy premised on market principles (Morgan, 2008, p. 101). Between the 1980s and early 1990s, the combined leadership of Thatcher and Reagan

worked to reshape the governments of the western world, while standing steadfastly against socialism (Thornburgh, 2013). This move replaced individuals with welfare rights with individuals with consumer rights, as the goal of neoliberalswas to free people from state welfare (Peters, 2012, p. 135), as if to deny state responsibility for the poor (capitalism) and black people (anti-black racism). Consequently, neoliberalism reconfigured social relations, opening up new points of contention and new social identities. Helmut Kohl of Germany, and Yasuhiro Namason of Japan, were also key figures in spreading the virtues of the emergent neoliberal vision. And, for a while, this was the edifice that buttressed Euro-American power around the world.

This chapter demonstrates the worldwide imposition of neoliberalism as a crucial cog in the constitution of 'the International', and also the reframing of coloniality. It does so in two ways.First, it outlines the imposition of neoliberalism as a global conceptual outlook, and then it identifies its philosophical underpinnings. In other words, concerning the latter, it draws attention to its epistemic structure, and how that affected the non-western world. It then shows how neoliberalism frames 'being', or ontology, among the darker people. Accordingly, the chapter comprises two sections. In the first section, the study describes the open conflict, or frontal attack, directed by the US and the western world on the developing world, which was designed to install capitalism and its neoliberal variant. In the second section, it argues that neoliberalism not only attaches, or imposes, commercial value on the darker people and on the white community, but it also reconstitutes them as beings of self-governance stripped of space and history. Accordingly, free-market philosophy strips all people of their socio-political context, leading to a wider struggle for freedom. However, in reality, this does not mean the same for all darker bodies. While the darker people have broadly been incorporated into western modernity during this phase of 'the international' in some form or another, for black people, however, the structural legacy of coloniality has a different influence on their being.

### 5.1 The Imposition of the 'Free Market'

The evolving dialectic between the developed North and the developing South was argued earlier to be characterised by an unequal relationship that benefited the former. Deepening this inequity, the west applied frontal attacks not only to reconfigure the relationship between capitalism and democracy, but to use international financial institutions as vessels for this reconfiguration. It was not so much the transition of power from the UK to the US, which tookplace decisively in the aftermath of WW II, but it was Cold War tensions that generated a variety of political systems across the non-

western world in which this reconfiguration took place. Added to this, the control of money and credit (read welfare states) in the decades until the early 1970s ensured that money would not be disruptive to people's lives (Strange, 1997, p. xx). This stability or management of money enabled the Third World to determine whatever modes of development it wished to pursue. However, the decolonisation process had a negative effect on the UK's economy. Its economic positioning in the world economy weakened, callinginto question its domestic economic structure (Gough, 1980, p. 10). By the early 1970s, the oil crisis had begun, further affecting the already ailing UK, and other western, economies. The combination of the oil crisis, and the structural deficiencies of the UK economy occasioned by decolonisation, increased unemployment, and eventually led to economic stagnation (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 111), which befell many in the developed world. The Keynesian strategyof buying one's way out of the crisis was unsuccessful, and it became clear that the growth rates of yesteryear were not to be seen again, unless some structural reform occurred (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 111). Because this had a systemic effect on the developed world, it alsoled to the crisis of debt and the scarcity of fluidity in the Third World. In this context, althoughthe 1970s was a decisive moment for the worldwide spread of capitalism or the imposition of western interests, this can be gleaned from the immediate decolonisation transitions.

Two issues became evident during the recession: Keynesian economics no longer held sway, and the economic right came into vogue. Being central players in the British Conservative Party, the economic right sought to dismantle welfare philosophy and introduce cuts in public expenditure and tight money management (Hall, 1988, p. 28). It assumed monopoly over ideasto extricate the world economy from the crisis (Hall, 1988, p. 40). But, in the UK, it was still taboo to undo the welfare model, let alone drift towards a market-centred economy. To sway public and private sentiment, ideological work was crucial. This ideological work targeted twoideas: the post-war consensus of the interventionist state, and the 'problem' of statism (Yergin& Stanislaw, 2002, p. 79). This was done by exposing the intrinsic contradictions of the welfare state (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 81). When Margaret Thatcher took state power in 1979, although being Conservative Party leader since 1975, and the worldwide recession was in fullswing (Hall, 1988, p. 22), she was part of a group in the party that transitioned from Keynes to Hayek, the latter associated with monetarism (Clarke, 1999, p. 303). Monetarism is the state control of the money supply, through adjusting interest rates, thereby allowing the market to correct itself (Tamny, 2013). So, much like Ronald Reagan later on, Thatcher wanted the market to play a central role in economic growth. Although Reagan adopted a similar monetarist position, backed up by durable security capabilities to enforce US will on other countries, Thatcher's ideological machinery was potent. For Thatcher, a return to the traditional values of the

family was important in how a new economy was to be conceived (Hall, 1988, p.71). In fact, it was her close political friend, both in the party and in government, Keith Joseph,who publicly spoke about new values such as 'initiative', 'enterprise' and 'entrepreneurship' (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 75).

For Thatcher, it was about reconfiguring society; privatisation would create a "capital-owning democracy" (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 97) in which ordinary people would have a share or a stake in society, and from which their future generations would benefit (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 97). Given regular elections and their associated short-term embedded interests, a state-centric approach to development was unpredictable. So, placing assets in the hands of citizens created, as the theorisation went, a durable stability unhindered by the vagaries of the state. Accordingly, the intellectual alibi of the Thatcher centre was the monetarist doctrine predicated on tight money management, budget cuts and the distributive ability of the free market (Hall, 1988, p. 28). But this was not easy to sell to the British people.And, for a moment, given the weakened stature of British power in the world, Thatcher's holdon power, in her first tenure, seemed shaky. Then the Falklands war happened in 1982. Thatcher's response to it signalled, both in the country and abroad, that the UK was not a country in retreat (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 94). Reclaiming those colonial lands, and defeating the Argentines, who, by the way, had legitimate rights to those islands, provided Thatcher and her political and intellectual centre the executive authority to privatise the commanding heights of the economy (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 99). This secured her a second term, and that term saw a shift in gear towards this new political economy. There was privatisation in housing and education, increased charges on health and housing, a weakening of unions, encouragement of work incentives and the strengthening of law and order (Gough, 1980, p. 8).

It was evident that evoking metaphors like 'family' and 'capital-owning democracy' in the unveiling of neoliberalism, beneath "economic interests" (Vidal, 1999) lay moral questions. Accordingly, economic considerations always flowed from moral questions. In other words, as the narrative goes, an open economy and a free market were the best way to constitute a strong,integrated society (Hall, 1988, p. 28). In this sense, liberalism, a philosophy associated with progress and civilisation, paved the way for neoliberalism in many other parts of the world. Many countries, especially those in Asia, adopted privatisation, or market-led development. Ofcourse, unsolicited advice always came in from their former colonial powers about how moderneconomies, and particularly states, are to be structured (see Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, pp. 168- 176). And, certainly, countries such as Singapore were shielded from the advances of the SovietUnion. Also, the debates concerning 'Socialism with Chinese

Characteristics' in China in the 1980s centred on creating a market economy (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 193). The same went for India, whereby it sold off state assets, cut subsidies for domestic products and reduced tariffs (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 222). In Latin America, Bolivia reduced the state budget, restructured the public sector, slashed tariffs, and removed price controls (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 233).

Notwithstanding their influence, the British could not secure western interests (neoliberalism) across the world in the way they did in the pre-war period, so it was left to the US to steer the world economy to this new trajectory. This was not difficult, as the US sang from a similar hymn sheet to the UK. For Reagan, corporate tax cuts and fiscal expansion were central to this turnaround (see Morgan, 2008, p. 114; Troy, 2005, p. 65), including decreasing regulation. The issue concerned how to return to a growth trajectory, and it was thought that this could be guaranteed by supply-side economics. Supply-side economics is a macroeconomic theory that assumes that tax cuts, deregulation and free trade can boost economic growth. In ideological terms, this means that, bar the fiscal expansion, the turn to supply-side economics entails a turn to Hayekian economics; that is, "a return to sustainable production – production purged of boom-era distortions caused by easy money" (Selgin, 2011). This effectively meant leaving markets to markets. The implication was that incorrect market decisions should meet their fate - and that is to go bust without state financial support.

Ronald Reagan's occupancy of the White House meant that the market was to be freed from big government (Morgan, 2008, p. 114). To be precise, the US not only reorganised western societies along neoliberal lines to prop up their civilisation claim, but they used frontal attacks on emergent statist consensus in the non-western world to impose a free market ideology. And this is where the US's diplomatic approach was a lot more aggressive than that of the UK. For instance, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was, among other issues, to avoid the decline of US export trade through multilateralism (Chomsky, 1993, p. 106). It also was meant to secure hefty amounts of US investment for Europe and elsewhere (Chomsky, 1993, p. 107). As the façade of the golden age of state power faded (i.e., Keynes), "aid to Israel, Egypt and Turkey was motivated by their role in maintaining US dominance of the Middle East, with its enormous oil energy reserves" (Chomsky, 1993, p. 107). It was evident that the idea of a 'free' market was free to the extent that the economy was enabled, not only to roam around unhindered by democratic constraints, but to secure US international interests. In another deviation from free market theory, the Reagan administration instituted protectionist measures regarding failing banks and industries (Chomsky, 1993, p. 106). Undoubtedly to prop up

US corporate power, which was becoming transnational because of the Marshall Plan, US industries such as high- tech, agribusiness, biotechnology and other strategic industries were protected by the Pentagonand other state agencies such as NASA (Chomsky, 1993, p. 106).

Since territorial claims were no longer the game in town, the burning issue at the time was to open up foreign markets for capitalist enterprises. This was primarily to avert the ruin of US export trade (Chomsky, 1993, p. 106). But also, importantly, money from the Marshall Plan was used by US private companies to make direct investments in Europe, thus creating the basis for modern transnational corporations (TNCs) (Chomsky, 1993, p. 107). Undoubtedly, the US sought to contain communist elements that partly arose because of the colonisation anddecolonisation processes. The US policy of containment, dubbed the NSC 68 document of September 1950, was the most comprehensive rearmament programme undertaken by the US during the Cold War (Heuser, 1991, p. 17). Not only did this policy lead to the US-Vietnam War in November 1955, the US played sheriff around the world to expand its economic interests while containing communist programmes. For instance, the coup against the leftist social government of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected leader of Chile, was supportedby US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2006, p. 147). A similar case is evident in Egypt (see Joya, 2011, p. 367), where economic liberalisation was accompanied by authoritarianism.

The NSC 68 document focused, among other things, on strengthening US military capability, including that of its allies, in the face of increased Soviet capabilities (Drew, 1996, p. 15). Although the objectives of the NSC 68 document were primarily to bolster Euro-American military capability, the issue fundamentally concerned ideological differences (Drew, 1996, p.16), and so, inadvertently on the part of Euro-American policy makers, capitalism acquired doctrinal status; in other words, in opposition to communism, it regarded capitalism as the best form of political and economic organisation. The US saw itself as the representative of western civilisation, while the Soviet Union was considered its antithesis. This had far-reaching consequences in the context of rebuilding western Europe and the newly independent countries. It was not only then US President Dwight Eisenhower who expressed his fear of a “domino theory” (Stur, 2017) – that, if a single country in Southeast Asia went communist, the entire region would fall to communism, but it was his successors who thought the same. Certainly, the US-Vietnam War (1 Nov 1955 to 30 Apr 1975) was not only concerned with communist containment. Factors such as the Cold War and US credibility (Stur, 2017) were, in the eyes ofits allies, central to its longevity. However, this war “drained America’s resources, made world currency speculation rampant and the 1970s saw the biggest deficit thus far in US history”

(Rothman, 2016). The background to this is that, for the US to maintain this frontal attack on communism, it kept printing money. So much so that, by the late 1960s, the printing of money far exceeded its gold reserves.

US frontal attacks also occurred in Africa. These included, with the help of Belgium, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. This is because he was viewed as pro-communist or was viewed through the lens of Cuba's Castro (see Gerard & Kuklick, 2015, p. 58; Singh, 2016; 10-11). Then there was the 1965 overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah was decidedly a Marxist and sought to impose some variation of socialism in Ghana (see Quaidoo, 2010; Telepneva, 2019). The other was also US support for the FNLA and Unita in Angola to oppose the MPLA during the mid- to late-1970s. This opposition was based on the characterisation of the Angolan political situation as between communist and non-communist (Houser, 1975). For the US, however, its support for FNLA and Unita was based on protecting western interests and securing organisations and people amenable to that (Tvedten, 1989, p. 3). Evidently, all these instances were essentially about containing Soviet influence, curbing nationalism and securing western interests.

Similarly, the 1979 Iran hostage crisis at the US Embassy was a blow for the US as a world leader. The Iranian students wanted the US government to return the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza, a man who openly abhorred traditionalism (Maloney, 2019), to stand trial for his crimes (Cumming-Bruce, 2019). Unfortunately for the US, Reza was crucial to "America's security architecture for protecting Western interests across the region" (Maloney, 2019). Not surprisingly, the US refused to return him to Iran. And then a war of attrition began between Iran and the US. For one, the US struggled to muster UN Security Council support to collectively restrain Iran and its students, who held US embassy employees as hostages. Secondly, with few governments willing to cut off oil imports from Iran, several countries joined the Soviet Union and China by normalising and extending economic ties with Iran to offset US sanctions (Hewitt & Nephew, 2019). These events, the study argues, had a debilitating effect on US structural power around the world.

In effect, these western machinations were complicit in the collapse of the post-war international economic governance architecture (UN, 2017, p. 50). For instance, the first of these decisions occurred in August 1971. It was the year in which the US completely severed ties with the gold standard in foreign markets (UN, 2017, p. 53). Of course, 1971 was also the year in which, serving as a blueprint for corporate capture of US democracy, the Powel Memorandum was sent to the US Chamber of Commerce for consideration. Nonetheless, because the US began printing more dollars

than it had in gold because of the transition to a paper-based system, all currencies pegged to the dollar became fiat. A differently structured financial system had to be built. By 1973, many countries settled for a 'floating' system, and then later for a different category of exchange rates called 'free falling' (UN, 2017, p. 54). On the other hand, and compounded by low national savings (Morgan, 2008, p. 110), this also meant that the US had to depend on the extensive foreign usage of the dollar. This was handsomely rewarded, because the IMF and the World bank were already dollar denominated. But of course, while petrodollars ensured the demand for dollars beyond US shores, fluctuations in real oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s harmed the developed world (Strange, 1997, p. 15). The Soviet Union was not exempt from this because, by around 1975, it had entered economic stagnation. By the 1980s, its grain imports pushed its debt levels to unprecedented heights.

For the most part, much of the developed world was experiencing "declining growth, rising unemployment and high rates of inflation" (UN, 2017, p. 54), much of which could have been avoided had the dollar not been severed from the gold standard. Given the accelerated mobility of capital as a result of the severing of ties with the gold standard, paving the way for a wider mandate for the IMF, this ushered in an era of finance capital, which had a ripple effect across international financial institutions. The printing of money after this severance facilitated the increase in interest rates, pushing up the cost of oil, which hit Third World countries particularly hard (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 8). As this happened, it became evident that the Keynesian economics of roughly 40 years prior, unable to counter stagflation of the 1970s and 1980s, was discredited (Morgan, 2008, p. 114). States were unable to shoulder welfare models. In fact, the socialism of the East, the nationalisms of Africa and the welfare models of Europe were in tatters. In sum, the 1971 decision to move from a gold-dollar system to a paper-based system, to widen fiscal freedom to keep up with the war in Vietnam, exacerbated three factorsthat led to a weakened global financial system (see Amin, 2015, p. 64). These were unstable floating rates systems, volatile interest rates and fluctuating oil prices. Consequently, and articulating this in political terms, the age of Hayek was effectively replaced by the age of Keynes. Nonetheless, the changed mandate of international financial institutions caused the Third World, better encapsulated by NIEO at the time, to buckle under the pressure of debt. Bythe 1980s, beginning with Mexico, an oil-rich country, defaulted on $80 billion in public-sector debt in 1982. Forty countries joined Mexico in arrears, and a year later another twenty seven had to restructure their massive debt. The total debt in the bruised nations was $500 billion, which at the time threatened the financial stability of the world market (given that much of this debt was owed to commercial banks) (Prashad, 2007, p. 217).

Mexico served as a signal to the rest of the developed world that the developing world was under the pressure of debt, including Africa, which also was embroiled in a debt crisis. On this note, Marx reminds us that the expansion of the stock market enabled speculative finance to create a new elite that had an interest in the indebtedness of any state (Marx, in Davanzati & Patalano, 2017, p. 53). So, there will always be someone, or some institution, that benefits from this indebtedness. And, in the eyes of the Third World, therefore, this had the effect of weakening the state, especially concerning 'hot money'. Importantly, it snuffed out thepossibility for a complete transformation of post-colonial societies, which dashed hopes for a sovereign public policy space. As the Third World pushed for the NIEO in the 1970s, western interests used this financial crisis to halt global structural reform and reconfigure a global political economy in their favour. For instance, Toye remarks that US representative Richard Gardner argued that the developed world should not be subject to majority votes because they transacted two-thirds of world trade (2014, p. 1761). Of course, this trade was largely internal to Euro-American power. However, it was evident that economic muscle was to proveimportant for political battles.

As the 1980s set in, with structural reforms demanded by the Bretton Woods Institutions, a market-led economy was sold off through force and consent as an alternative to indebted welfare societies (Strange, 1997, p. xi). With the welfare state kicked off the international stage,Hayek economics took centre stage. Repackaged as the Washington Consensus, it endorsed, amongst many, the privatisation of state enterprises, financial liberalisation and market-determined interest rates (Williamson, 2005, p. 196). However, as this mantra was institutionalised through influential actors and institutions, the different responses to Third World debt "broke up the tri-continental alliance" (Toye, 2014, p. 1767). By the time the developed world faced their own crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, via stagnation, the differences between Asia on the one hand, and Africa and Latin America on the other hand, had worsened. That Africa and Latin America were in the same position, and Asia as the leading bloc within the Third World, speaks directly to the disaggregated nature of coloniality.Manifesting itself in economic terms, while UK and US investments in Southeast Asia were a result of strategic interventions, in other words to curb communism, Latin American debts were pegged to US banks while Africa's debt was fastened to international financial institutions. Consequently, Africa and Latin America followed disparate debt solutions, with the former taking debt from public financial institutions and the latter to private banks (Toye, 2014, p. 1767). On the other side of the world, acute in Britain and the US, the developed world faced a crisis of stagflation, which saw a decline in private (national) savings and a competitive international political economy (Morgan, 2008, p. 102).

Added to that, the oil embargo and oil price hike of 1973 "that occurred later that year in the wake of the Arab–Israeli war exacerbated already serious problems" (Harvey, 2005, p. 148). For the world economy, it was this combination of factors that led to the changing of the mandate of the Bretton Woods Institutions:

In the 1970s, the IMF shifted its three-decades-old mission from the provision of short-term credit to countries with current account deficits (lender of the last resort) to the use of its crucial finances as a weapon to demand structural economic changes mainly in the bruised nations. In other words, the new IMF eroded the institutions of state sovereignty fought for by the global institutions of the Third World (UNCTAD and NAM). (Prashad, 2007, p. 222). And US and UK investments, giving way to economic development within the *Asian Tigers*, shifted the balance of power within the Third World grouping. By the time the IMF changed track, the economic trajectories of the Third World were disaggregated between the three continents – Asia, Africa and Latin America, with Asia's growth and developmental trajectory widely surpassing that of both Africa and Latin America. The collapse of Keynesianism and the restructuring of the Bretton Woods Institutions both signalled the centrality of the free market in the state system. This free-market ideology was to continue well after the end of the Cold War. However, it needs remembering that this ideology was in fact an attack on the developing world. For instance, in a confidential memo on global warming by the World Bank in June 1992, leaked to the *Economist*, it argued that the export of the dirty industries to the Third World should be encouraged by the Bank (Chomsky, 1993, p. 107). It said that economic 'rationality' dictated that, for the Third World to hold back on its ill-advised developmental plans, the west should export pollution there and, in that way, the Third World would be preoccupied with protecting its citizens from environmental disaster (Chomsky, 1993, p. 107). It becomes clear here that 'rationality' is used in the service of western imperial interests. On the whole, this constitutes a frontal attack on the developing world. In sum, the misadventures of the developed world, primarily US interests, saw, in credit and money, allies in their foreign policy objectives in the developing world.

### 5.2 Neoliberal Regime: The Epistemic Frame

In this section, the study is concerned with neoliberalism's ontological underpinnings. It draws attention specifically to its epistemic structure, and how that structure structures being, not only in the non-western world, but also in the western world. Unlike liberalism, however, neoliberalism imposes a commercial value on the disembodied and the embodied alike. But it also reconstitutes them as

forms of self-governance stripped of space or history. All of this is possible because of the supposed 'self-regulating' market in neoliberal society. Accordingly, the proposition here is that the free market, said to be the quintessential capitalist institution that judiciously distributes rights, goods and services (Slobodian, 2018, p. 173), maintains the "Western preoccupation with biology" (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 8). That is, body-reasoning is inherent in the idea of the free market. Based on a "primitive form of individualism" (Peters, 2012, p. 136), neoliberalism conceals the structural legacy of coloniality. Instead, the lone individual in the neoliberal universe only has their agency through which to experience reality. However, for black people, the structural legacy of coloniality continues to have a differentialimpact on their being.

In *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi (1944) discusses the depoliticisation of the economy by arguing against the separation of the market from society. He argues that social relations form part of the logic of the market (Polanyi, 1944, p. 60). In *States and Markets*, this position is reiterated by Susan Strange (1994) when she argued that markets are constructed bypolitical decisions. She further says that there is a relationship between the political system of states and the economic system of markets, but that the best way to understand this relationshipis through the concept of structural power (Strange, 1994, pp. 24-25). By structural power, Strange means the power to shape the framework within which economic, political and socialrelations are conducted (1994, p. 25). Accordingly, what Strange does is to expose the façade of neoliberalism's 'free-market' philosophy. For instance, free markets were conceived as autonomous entities standing outside the influence of society, with its biases concerning gender, racial and class discrimination. But this autonomous characterisation, instead ofavoiding the influence of society, serves to silence social and cultural phenomena. In fact, Hayek, Friedman, and Hutt, key figures who theorised about neoliberalism, were concerned about the need to insulate the bourgeoning economic order from the demands of justice (Slobodian, 2018, p. 22) in Southern Africa, for example. In this context, the Rawlsian (1971) 'veil of ignorance' is imposed within the neoliberal frame. And it is imposed not out of fairness, but to conceal historical wrongs.

This disconnect between society and the economy is also evident in the support for Augusto Pinochet's Chile. Given his neoliberal reforms, the US supported the Chilean dictator (Hinds, 2016). This is an instance of neoliberals in bed with illiberal states (Slobodian, 2018, p. 22). Elsewhere, speaking of Southern Africa during the Cold War years, Wilhelm Röpke, a neoliberal theoretician, argued that universal suffrage in South Africa would be tantamount tonational suicide (Slobodian, 2018, p. 153). Therefore, this was not an isolated idea within neoliberal circles. In fact, neoliberals

such as Milton Friedman, John Davenport, and Shenfield himself, were against universal suffrage in Southern Africa (Slobodian, 2018, p. 151). This is the same Friedman who was responsible for the disastrous Chicago boys' training programme that taught people like Rolf Lüders, who was responsible for the Chilean economy under the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (Davies, 2019). Röpke, however, took it a step further. He believed that a defence of the world economy meant a defence of western christianity and Caucasian principles (Slobodian, 2018, p. 22). Invariably, this translates into white supremacy. The point is, neoliberalism was concerned with the construction of an extra- economic framework to sustain capitalism (Slobodian, 2018, p. 16) and liberal society. Evidently, the existence of certain bodies in the free market is testament to the presence of body-reasoning within neoliberal thought. That the preservation of economic freedom may mean curbing political freedom (Slobodian, 2018, p. 151), it comes as no surprise that David Harvey (2005) calls neo-liberalism a creative destruction. He says it is a totalising project that must necessarily move in a two-step process: through "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2005, p. 156). Expressed in a different way, it gives as much as it takes. So, while it dispossesses from others (evictions, lack of health care, etc.), it accumulates for some (venture capitalists, owners of the means of production, corporate power, etc.). And the dispossession of the one amounts to the accumulation of the other. Therefore, there will always be someone, or some people, who benefit from crises.

That the syllable *neo* in fact spoke more to the type of legal-institutional regime to reconstitute a differently articulated state (Slobodian, 2018, p. 6) affirms Foucault's (2008) description of 'neoliberal governmentality'. This refers to the merger of public and private power to co- govern society. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault (2008) makes observations about a bourgeoning economic model, which he referred to as 'neoliberal governmentality'. He argues that neoliberalism is a theory primarily predicated on a "art of government" (Foucault, 2008, p. 131). In other words, it requires a rationality that pertains to a sophisticated and shifting balance of management techniques, between coercion and consent, that is exercised on the governed. Therefore, for Foucault, neoliberalism is the projection of the general principles of the market on the state and repackaged as an art of government. Drawing from this analysis, this section focuses on how neoliberalism constituted its subjects; that is, no longer forming part of an exchange relationship with labour, the neoliberal subject is "an entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (Foucault, 2008, p. 226).

In this sense, the subject becomes both capital and labour, with self-ownership as the defining characteristic. Accordingly, besides liberalism's basic tenet that individuals may do what they like

provided they do not harm others (Tucker, 1994, p. 14), neoliberals subscribe to an expansive definition of property. It is not just your body that you own, it is also your talents: consequently, property is characterised by its mobility. As such, one can enter a contract with anyone or any institution, at any time. Put differently put, fixed assets such as land and housesno longer hold as high value as they did under the liberal construction of 'the international' as do the subject under the neoliberal frame. This is important specifically for black people amongthe darker people. For one, a theory stemming from self-ownership and the protection of individual liberty is incapable of racism, since, as Ayn Rand (1964, p. 120), postulated, racismis conceived as a crude form of collectivism. But the problem here is that self-ownership, andits attendant self-interested, self-governing attributes, are assumed to be de-linked from any social or historical phenomenon. So, in this neoliberal frame, the self-governing person denies, or is denied, the interdependence that constitutes their humanity, thus consolidating historical and sociological detachment.

Given the foregoing, because individual freedom is what constitutes government (Lorenzini, 2018, p. 158) and market forces, there is less reliance on the external or the political structure. That is, the welfare project is no longer sufficient as a condition for freedom, since the individual already possesses both the functions of government and the market. Consequently, there is no need for socio-historical phenomena to act as a constraint to individual agency. Thisis because political freedom and economic freedom are mutually reinforcing (Friedman, 1962, p. 16) under this frame. Milton Friedman (1962) effectively argues that certain combinations of economic and political arrangements give effect to individual freedom. For him, individualfreedom is best secured when democracy and capitalism reinforce one another. In fact,capitalism is a precondition for political freedom (Friedman, 1962, p. 17). Although this resonates with Polanyi's (1944) critique of the disarticulated relationship between the market and society, in the neoliberal configuration this articulation "freed capital from democratic restraints" (DuRand, 2018). To accommodate democracy, however, capitalism subsumed accountability within the notion of the free market. Hence, one only had to be accountable to the logic of the free market, making commercial value the social organising principle of society. In this context, the concept of freedom ought to be viewed within the evolving forms of domination and control of the disembodied – specifically black people.

Given the interlocking nature of neoliberalism in the foregoing accounts, the neoliberal subject is exceptionally governable for some (Lorenzini, 2018, p. 155). Although this neoliberal phase of 'the International', as with liberalism, conceals anti-black racism, the disembodied are expendable, provided they are able to "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" (Robbins, 2014, p. 248). Failure to

do so is a result of individual responsibility. And so, accordingly, such individuals expose themselves to the vagaries of the market: racism and sexism, etc. In this context, both the state and the free market, as co-creators of values (Mazzucato, 2011) are conceived as institutions devoid of body-reasoning. This is to mean; the state and the market have no discriminatory attributes. Accordingly, not only are they blind to social phenomena such as racism and sexism, but they have no responsibility to issues such as social justice. Slobodian demonstrated this by showing how key figures, such as Hayek, Friedman, and Hutt, argued that the bourgeoning economic order (neoliberalism) needs to be insulated from the demands of justice (2018, p. 22). Inevitably, given their legitimate claims to both historical and social justice, it was the darker people, specifically black people, around the world who would bear the brunt of the implications of this insulation of neoliberalism from claims of justice. Black Lives Matter (BLM), a movement of black people in the US that became a rallying call for "Blacks' struggle for human acknowledgment" (Lebron, 2017, p. xiii), underlines the problem of anti-racism in the neoliberal phase of 'the International' (Clayton, 2018, p. 449). As such, removing this 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1971) with which neoliberalism endows both the market and the state must be the starting point in the fight against coloniality.

### 5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the worldwide imposition of neoliberalism. It did so in two ways. First, it outlined the imposition of neoliberalism as a global outlook, and secondly, it identified its ontological underpinnings. The first section described the open conflict, or frontal attack, directed by the US and the western world on the developing world, designed to install neoliberalism. However, this was done to safeguard liberal values. The difference here is that liberalism came with a welfare, or state-centred, economy, while neoliberalism came with a market-centred economy. And, although the latter criticised the former, the aim was supposedly to shield liberal values from being eroded by communist or nationalist political orders. In this context, although the 1970s was a decisive moment in the worldwide spread of neoliberalism or the imposition of western interests, this was made possible because of the then decolonisation transitions occurring in the Third World. In the second section, the chapter pointed out the presence of body-reasoning in the notion of the free market, which was concealed by neoliberalism. In fact, it demonstrated that the free market is conceptually dependent on a 'veil of ignorance', stripping neoliberal persons of their history and socio- political context, thereby making the disembodied expendable. That is, if the disembodied do

not subscribe to the neoliberal frame, they are likely to be ensnared by the vicissitudes of the market, the blame for which can be apportioned to their own individual responsibility. As such,issues such as racism and sexism, and even social justice, are concealed in the neoliberal frame.

# Chapter 6

# The Making of the Global South: The Third World Rebooted?

## 6.0 Introduction

The neoliberal order of the 1970s to 1980s continues unabated. This is despite the lessons from the failures of the Structural Adjustment Program's (SAP's) of the 1980s and 1990s, both those imposed on states and those that states converted to voluntarily. Nevertheless, several events occurred in the developing world. In January 1994, "the eruption of the Zapatistas, in Chiapas in Mexico, who launched their uprising symbolically on the day NAFTA came into effect" (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 13), dimmed the light of neoliberalism as a solution to the world's problems. Also, the East Asian crisis of 1997 crystallised this dimming within the Third Worldcommunity. In the 1990s, then deputy President Thabo Mbeki (of South Africa) wrote a formal memo to key leaders in the developing world, asking them to coalesce around a "G7 of the South" (Husar, 2016, p. 1) to counter the influence of the G7 of the North. It did not receive much attention, but it was a significant move in anti-neoliberal struggles. In the developed world, the 1999 Seattle protests, saw no fewer than 40 000 protestors gathering in Washington DC in the US against globalisation. As these events unfolded, Wallerstein observed that similarsetbacks in Brazil and Russia dampened the pristine light that neoliberalism presented (2006, p. 13). This period also coincided with the major protests that took place in Seattle in 1999 against the decisions of the WTO. However, these did not weaken neoliberalism, but opened up political contestation over its control.

This chapter demonstrates that, in effect, the 1990s witnessed the solidarity of the developing world on issues affecting them directly. For instance, the formation of India, Brazil and South Africa, uniformly called IBSA, in 2003, was an important emergence of the developing world'scohesion at an international level. In 2006, IBSA was bolstered by the formation of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), which was later joined by South Africa in 2010 to make it BRICS. BRICS is effectively a forum for cooperation among regional hegemons that seek to reform the structure and content of 'the International'. These formations not only ignited solidarity among the darker nations, forcing the developing world to again reflect collectively on the question of power, but they opened up allies for them in the developed world. In this context, the darker people, whom the neoliberal frame

imprisoned through the 'veil of ignorance', appear to bust out of their prison and widen the scope of their struggle for freedom. However, this bust was essentially the opening of alternative political and juridical space outside and within the political architecture of the Bretton Woods System. Accordingly, in this chapter, the study first asks whether these events mean the rebooting of the Third World project. By the Third World project, this study refers to the replacing of the East-West tussle (Cold War) with the North-South struggle that is underlined by continuing global inequality and underdevelopment for the benefit of former colonial powers. Importantly, however, the Third World project did not address the ontological divide wrought by coloniality, which dehumanised black people. Given the fact that the darker people, in general, accepted the hegemony of the western epistemological frame, anti-black racism stands to hinder the unity of the Global South. So, if the Global South means a rebooting of the Third World, then there is no more comprehensive understanding of coloniality as that which operates on the basis of body-reasoning.

This chapter begins with the 1990s. Marked out by the concept of the Global South, this era was a response to the neoliberal frame. According to Siba Grovogui, this was not a rejection of the Third World project; rather, it signified an adjustment or a re-examination of the foundations of the international system, with its differentiated legacies, if not logics, of colonialism (2011, p. 175). To this extent, the chapter defines the contours of the Global South. The study then asks the second question, about whether the Global South shows signs of unhinging coloniality. By 'unhinging', the study refers to whether it can address anti-black racism. Consequently, bar the Introduction, this chapter comprises two sections; the first, entitled 'Epistemic Disobedience', concerns the 1990s, in which anti-neoliberal mobilisations registered themselves. This section also shows the continuities between the Third World and the Global South concerning the use of border-thinking. Accordingly, it first looks at the 1994, Mexico-based Zapatista mobilisation against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and then at the WTO talks against the machinations of the west in the WTO, which paved the way for the emergence of institutions such as IBSA and BRICS. It is from these mobilisations, or intellectual currents, that the section then draws out the conceptual tenets of the Global South, as different from the case in the Third World. In the second section, entitled 'The Global South: The Question of Coloniality?', the section attempts to settle two issues: the first briefly reconstructs the conceptual coordinates of the Global South, concluding that there is evidence of political contestation over the management of neoliberalism. The second issue looks at the Global South response to the ontological coordinates of neoliberalism. Specifically, it tries to see whether it can unhinge anti-black racism. The chapter concludes that, although the Global South contains different intellectual currents, BRICS – its most influential current - is not positioned to fully

appreciate the mechanics of coloniality.

### 6.1 Epistemic Disobedience

This section is divided into four subsections. The first discusses the 1994 Zapatista mobilisationagainst NAFTA that catapulted the organisation into international stardom. The second discusses the meaning and influence of the protests at the Seattle (1999) WTO meeting. The third and fourth sections look at the emergence of IBSA and BRICS, respectively, and their position with regard to the neoliberal construction of the 'the International'. Concerning the latter, there is BRICS's 'within and without' approach on the one hand, which is similar to the border-thinking of the Third World, and then there is IBSA's inward-looking, or naval-gazing,approach, which is unpacked in the section. Ultimately, this section argues that these formations are creatures of the Global South and, as such, express its different impulses. Accordingly, this section draws out the conceptual tenets of the Global South.

#### 6.1.1 Zapatista and NAFTA

Emerging from the debt crisis of the 1980s, Mexico imposed a liberalisation programme to rebuild its economy. This programme reorientated Mexican society from a state-centric to a free-market society (Stahler-Sholk, 2007, p. 49). This transition involved breaking the back of the social compact that was built in Mexico in the 1930s:

> Like leaders of other countries faced with the burden of massive debt restructuring,Salinas de Gortari and the Mexican government embraced the course imposed by the International Monetary Fund and most favoured by foreign debt holders: continued structural adjustment and neoliberal reform. Breaking the social pact with peasants, workers, and Mexican business that the government had forged after the Revolution, especially in the 1930s, the ruling party began eliminating social programs, privatizing state industries, removing price controls, and courting international investment. The government dropped price guarantees for agricultural products and phased out credits for rural producers. These measures were applauded by many; but exacted a deep toll on

> Mexico's poor, especially the ruralpoor who had been the traditional backbone of support for the government (Collier& Quaratiello, 2005, p. 159)

This neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican economy not only broke this social compact, leaving citizens to fend for themselves in the free market, but also opened them up to foreign competition. For the Maya Indians, located in Chiapas in Southern Mexico, the privatisation of communal land was tantamount to the destruction of their livelihoods, the basis of their existence (Cleaver, 1998, p. 625). These Indians made up the majority of Mexico's indigenouspopulation, most of whom worked in the agricultural sector, and were the most vulnerable to this neoliberal restructuring. Under the banner of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which joined the US, Mexico and Canada under a common trade regime, the neoliberal programme was correctly viewed as an attack on the welfare of Mexican citizens. It is under these conditions that the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) emerged. Onthe day that the NAFTA was launched, the Zapatista, at a time when armed guerrilla struggle was no longer considered a means for political change, came out with ski masks, rifles and all sorts of weapons, along with home-made army uniforms, and seized towns in central and eastern Chiapas while proclaiming a revolution (Collier & Quaratiello, 2005, p. 1). Armed guerrilla tactics had been phased out at the end of the liberal phase of 'the International' because of its integrationist ethos. However, the images of armed Zapatistas interrupted this ethos. Attacking the Rancho Nuevo army base and freeing prisoners from a nearby prison (Collier &Quaratiello, 2005, p. 2), they declared the Salinas regime an illegal dictatorship.

Although the Zapatista movement sought autonomy in Mexican society, not against it (Cleaver, 1998, p. 626), it underlined social cleavages such as rights for ethnic minorities, gender rights (Collier & Quaratiello, 2005, p. 160) and the problem of racism. It was as if the Zapatista movement broke out of the 'veil of ignorance' that constituted the darker people in the neoliberal frame, concealing the ontological difference created by western modernity. This is because the Zapatista also organised on the basis of their historical subjugation and exploitation(Collier & Quaratiello, 2005, p. 54), breaking out of the ahistorical then-emerging market- centred society. Highlighting the predicament of their injustice, the Zapatista brought attention "to the faceless of Mexico's development" (Popke, 2004, p. 309). By 'faceless', not only to signal the multitudes of the poor left out in development, but also to signal the presence of the embodied, which is the darker people. In an ironic twist, this is also why movement members and leaders donned face masks. The face masks served as a critique of the way in which western modernity had denied them their subject position (Popke, 2004, p. 309), a function of the neoliberal order. However, the free market is not blind to social and historical cleavages. Instead,

as one Zapatista leader put it, Subcomandante Marcos pointed out that they cover their crime with neoliberalism, which represents misery and death "for the original people of color of these lands" (2001, p. 83). Marcos goes further and argues that the lie of neoliberalism "wasso deep and so broad, we ended up mistaking it for truth" (Marcos, 1992, p. 259), thereby normalising their poverty. To face the truth they need to reclaim their face, in other words, theirhistory. It bears reminding that, in the transition to the liberal construction of 'the International', the embodied were transformed into the disembodied to fit into liberal society. But it soon became evident that juridical inclusion did not mean sociological inclusion. And the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a white supremacist group responsible for lynching black people in the US, is evidence of the civic sphere carrying on what in the juridical sphere discontinued. Similarly, the juridical defeat of apartheid South Africa did not stem anti-black attacks in post-1994 SouthAfrica.

While the guerrilla warfare of 1994 was met with state repression, the movement eventually was able to take 300 000 hectares of land in Chiapas, Lacandon Rainforest (Ryan, 2011, p. 6). This land fell under the control of the Zapatista, who self-governed the area without state involvement. As you enter the area, there is a sign that reads, "Here the people govern, and thegovernment obeys!" (Ryan, 2011, p. 6). What is important about this sign is that the Zapatista embrace an "anti-leader" (Rosset, in Collier & Quaratiello, 2005, p. viii) ideology that rejects a hierarchical form of authority. In fact, the sign is consistent with the Zapatista slogan that says, "to lead by obeying" (Ryan, 2011, p. 9). Accordingly, the movement reasserted communal decision-making, and so social institutions within civil society are called to remake society to be responsible to the needs of those marginalised and exploited (Rosset, in Collier & Quaratiello, 2005, p. viii). And these marginalised are not poor merely because of market forces, but are so largely because of colonialism. So, the Zapatista emphasised the importanceof indigenous rights. This is an important incursion against the neoliberal construction of an ahistorical subject in which the free market is alleged to do away with structural cleavages such as racism and cultural chauvinism, for example.

The Zapatista movement extensively resisted neoliberalism in other ways too. For instance, Zapatista villages resisted the construction of an airport in San Salvador Atenco and a golf course in Tepoztlan, both of which required their displacement (Stahler-Sholk, 2007, p. 48). One of the immediate ways in which the movement justified their resistance against these activities was that they were autonomous from the state. However, their autonomy was based on positioning themselves as Mexican citizens and as indigenous ethnic people (Stahler-Sholk,2007, p. 51). This is the basis of

their recognition of the state of Mexico. And, consistent with their slogan 'to lead by obeying', the state took their authority from the people. In other words, the state is legitimate to the extent that it derives its authority from the consensus of ordinary people. And, because people organise their lives differently, 'to lead by doing' is to live in "a world in which many worlds fit" (Olesen, 2004: 262), as another Zapatista slogan goes. This slogan de-centres the neoliberal hegemonic vision that took root in the 1980s. Since the state houses many different kinds of people, with different existential concerns, policy and development has to be able to cater to as many of them as possible.

### 6.1.2 The WTO Rounds

Referred to as the 'Battle of Seattle', December 1999 was a difficult month for the WTO and the trade rounds that ensued in Washington DC. Later there were rallies, riots and marches in at least 20 countries (Vidal, 1999), all against the WTO and its undemocratic practices, with the US and the west attempting to impose their trade preferences on the rest of the developing world. Human rights and development groups, both from the developing and developed world, came together to condemn the way the US powered through issues such as agricultural subsidies (Vidal, 1999) – issues that largely affect the developing world. The WTO is a direct product of post-war efforts to coordinate and focus on world trade. Prior to 1995, it was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Nonetheless, the international body is tasked with opening up the economies of the developing world and guaranteeing the intellectual property of the developed world (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 88). However, this was based on the economic interests of the west. That is, the developing world was expected to open up based on the interests of the west. And the WTO was to be the institutional home for that bargaining. Inevitably, the relationship between the two worlds would always have its conflictual side. Accordingly, one scholar explained the protests as follows:

> Two broad areas that led to this dissatisfaction were: firstly, policy differences and secondly, the inadequacies of the WTO procedures. Irreconcilable policy differences among the major participants were the primary reason for the failed talks. Members of WTO could not agree on wording to guide the negotiating on export subsidies. More importantly, negotiators remained far apart on how to deal with non-agricultural [and agricultural] topics. Several issues – such as the lack of market access, concessions for textiles, and concerns over the United States favouring WTO enforcement of labour

> standards – placed the United States in opposition to developing countries. (McClenahen, 1999)

Unsurprisingly, the 1999 WTO Seattle trade round eventually collapsed (Vidal, 1999). Developing countries refused to play by the rules of the west. But protests ensued over the next few years. And these protests raised concerns about the WTO's fixation with the liberalisation of world trade (Baldwin, 2006, p. 677). Dissatisfied, the developing world formed the World Social Forum (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 13) in January 2001. The World Social Forum (WSF), akin to the yearly Davos meetings of global neoliberalism since the 1980s (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 13), became a meeting ground for all sorts of activists and leftists around the world. The WSF and the NGOs, including religious groups that constituted them, were at the forefront of many demonstrations (Hardt & Negri, 1994, p. 278). This is because many of these groups represented people who lived in dire poverty, and many at the cusp of starvation (Hardt & Negri, 1994, p. 278). This was a horrific indictment of the process of globalisation, especially when driven by private market players with little democratic control.

Observing the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s, Strange (1997, p. 2) argued that the international financial system resembled a gambling hall, where speculators in one part of a country had a systemic effect on the international financial system. Very few individuals, even with the development of technology and its facilitation of information, have the power to affect a systemic impact on the international financial system. In other words, the ability to determine the regime, rules, and the agenda of this system, and to determine its system of play, limited individual persons from determining their lives. Strange referred to this as 'casino capitalism', in which it was evident to many that the US and the west held too much power over the international system. This was the fundamental issue that divided the developing South from the developed North because this leverage foreclosed the former from democratic control over the international financial system. So, after the fierce Seattle protests of 1999, the US and the west had to rethink their strategy (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 13).

For many in the civic movement, and for the people they represented, this was about life, and how to sustain it. That is, while domestic and international institutions played power games, or advanced self-serving interests, at issue was how these institutions constrained the freedoms of the majority of people. So, there was a need to acknowledge the ecosystem of the political, the economic, the legal and the cultural in the international system as having a real-life effect on the ability of the majority to

live a fuller life. For instance, the problems of air pollution, radioactivity and water pollution in one country can be, and likely are, the problems of another country; so, there is a need to also acknowledge that we all share in the common resources of this planet (Hardt & Negri, 1994, p. 282). And that feminist, anti-racist and/or indigenous struggles are biopolitical in that the hegemonic structures in the political, economic and legal sphere structure them too (Hardt & Negri, 1994, p. 282). The biopolitical refers to how social and political power determine the sustenance and reproduction of life. And so the mode of development, as it manifests in the Global South, has to appreciate these intersections. For example, the construction of the Sardar Sarovar in India, a World Bank project (Hardt & Negri,2004, p. 282), which began in the 1980s, was stalled in 1995 over issues of social displacement. In other words, for the Save the Narmada Movement (Narmada Bachao Andolan), which protested its construction, one aspect of development cannot produce underdevelopment for people.

What the Seattle protests did do was to underline the inequality in the North-South divide. Significantly, given that these protests were largely driven by American anarchists and radicals, and spread throughout the developed world, the notion of the Global South was not as geographically constrained as the Third World. Even earlier, Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclaireargued that, while the South created a thin layer of society well integrated with the North, the North generates its own South (1996, p. 531). So, the idea of the Global North and the Global South cuts across state and regional boundaries. To account for this, others (see Comaroff et al., 2021, p. 121) regard the Global North as evolving towards the Global South. That is, because the South is the North's experiment, the North ends up looking like the South. Although using the discipline of IR as a unit of analysis, this same argument is advanced elsewhere (see Thakur & Vale, 2020). For instance, Thakur and Vale argue that the formation of South Africa in 1910 was central to the foundational conceptual coordinates of the IR discipline (2020, p. 25). In other words, the South was the laboratory in which the North soughtto settle the question of a multiracial polity. Nonetheless, however one accounts for the Northand South cutting across state and regional boundaries, the Seattle protests made it evident that the international political economy had a real-life effect on the lives of ordinary people everywhere.

Two years later, the Doha Round began. It was launched in late 2001 in Doha, Qatar, in the wake of the 11 September 2001, or 9/11, attacks. But by June 2006, five years after its launch, the Doha Round collapsed because of continued disagreement between the Global North and the Global South over agricultural subsidies and the failure to remove restrictions on imports of apparel and textiles to

developed countries (Baldwin, 2006, p. 684), the very issues that accentuated inequality between the North and South. While the North, specifically the US, provided protectionist measures for its farmers, refusing to liberalise the agricultural industry, the west pushed for the liberalisation of domestic markets in the South. What was interesting about the Doha Round, and specifically concerning the agricultural sector, was that new alliances formed. For instance, the Cairns Group, which includes Australia, a developed country, and Argentina, a developing country, lobbied for tariff reductions in agricultural goods and the scrapping of domestic subsidies provided to farmers in the developed world (Subedi, 2003, p. 430). Similarly, at the WTO talks in Cancun in September 2003, the US government continued the protection of their domestic agricultural subsidies, undercutting farmers in the South, while wanting the latter to discuss the Singapore issues – these included discussions on investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation(Columbia Solidarity Campaign, 2003); in other words, non-developmental issues. This is of course duplicitous dealing on the part of the west. Even though the Trade Justice Movement, aUK-based movement made up of 40 development, environment and trade union organisations representing millions, protested the inclusion of the Singapore issues (Columbia Solidarity Campaign, 2003), there was generally a split between the Global North and the Global South at Cancun. However, aside from the North-South split, states such as India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) were significant players at Cancun, especially with regard to their influence in developing states.

### 6.1.3 The IBSA Moment

The US, under George W Bush Junior, launched its war effort against Afghanistan in October2001 in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York. With insufficient evidence, the US accused the Middle East-based Islamic terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, of being behind the attacks. The resultant War on Terror, marking a change towards a "realist and unilateralist" (Johnson et al., in Ward, 2006, p. 79) US foreign policy, reverted to racist and prejudiced forms of engagement. The installation of democracy through military invasions (Ward, 2006, p. 81) appeared to be the bourgeoning US foreign policy objective. The US called the invasion Operation Enduring Freedom, the aim of which was to ensure that the country was no longer used a launchpad for terrorist attacks (Zucchino, 2021). This was not only a US war, however. NATO, as allies to the US, joined in. One must bear in mind that there was strong international opposition to the Taliban regime (Corten, 2012, p. 22). The oil reserves in the Middle East were also highly sought after. Significantly, however, the US did not get specific approval from the UNSC for the Afghanistan War (Thorp & Smith, 2010, p.

3). Accordingly, this subsection argues that, for many in the Global South, and given the still fresh memories of the Doha Trade Round, global governance needed to be overhauled. However, this was 2001.

As South-South trade was growing, at the 13th Conference of Heads of State or Governments of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Kuala Lumpur, in February 2003, the Global South stressed the need to revitalise the NAM and issued a clarion call for world peace. This call was made in the context of an emerging US war with Iraq. Accordingly, the threat of a war between the west and Iraq loomed large over the Conference (Billington, 2003, p. 55). As such, the Conference upheld and reaffirmed the role of international institutions as bodies tasked to provide global governance. However, weeks prior to the 2003 Cancun Trade Round, a month after NAM's call for peace, the US unilaterally invaded Iraq, disregarding international law. The US War on Terror was fought in the Middle East, a region replete with oil deposits. However, it was this disregard for international law that strengthened South-South relations and bolstered the South's demand to strengthen global governance. This was possible because, with the US involved in two wars in the Middle East region, US influence and power weakened (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 17). The diplomatic adventurism of US unilateralism expressed in the unjustified wars in the Middle East to secure commercial resources, its disregard for international law – posing a threat to global democracy, and the worsening North-South divide, were important coordinates of the formation of IBSA. This is because the Global South, through NAM, and specifically the countries making up IBSA, for a while articulated the need to democratise institutions tasked with global governance.

A meeting between then South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma, and her Brazilian counterpart, Minister Celso Amorim, in January 2003 took place to discuss the possibility of a Southern block. Noting the late-1990s formal memo written by former President Mbeki to key leaders in the developing world to coalesce around a "G7 of the South" (Husar, 2016, p. 1) to counter the influence of the G7, Minister Amorim thought a simpler version of the 'G7 of the South' could be considered between India, South Africa and Brazil. Consistent with the formal memo from the 1990s, Minister Dlamini-Zuma suggested that China also form part of the group (Dr Ntsaluba, personal communication, 15 June 2020). But, with the fresh history of the military junta in Brazil, it was considered ill-advisable to include a country with little democratic credentials (Dr Ntsaluba, personal communication, 15 June 2020). These credentials set the tone and orientation of IBSA:

> Established in June 2003, the IBSA Dialogue Forum brings together three large democracies and major economies from three different continents i.e., Asia, Africa and South America, facing similar developmental challenges. India, Brazil and South Africa represents three developing, pluralistic, multicultural, multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious nations. The three countries share a common vision that democracy and development is interlinked, mutually reinforcing and is essential for achieving sustainable peace and stability. (Mishra, 2018)

Fortunately, Brazilian President Lula de Silva was elected in January 2003. In June of the sameyear, at the G8 Summit in France, he joined forces with India's Prime Minister at the time, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and South Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki, to discuss a trilateral relationship that was formalised in the signing of the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003. This document mentions the three countries as being democratic in character, and as developing countries withthe ability to act on a global scale (IBSA Declaration, 2003). The inclusion of Brazil, India andSouth Africa in the 2003 G8 Summit outreach provided the impetus for these countries to seek more representation at the negotiating table. They are former colonies that had become key Global South actors, given their democratic credentials and their emergent economies (Giugliano, 2011, p. 227). They also became active champions of South-South cooperation and had consistent messaging about changing North-South relations and the need to reform global governance. For instance, IBSA called for the removal of trade-distorting or protectionist policies and for the reformation of the multilateral trade system (IBSA Declaration, 2003). Accordingly, the three leaders were inspired by the spirit of Bandung and the Third World campaign for global reform and were key voices in Bandung's legacy institutions such as NAMand the G77. Accordingly, it was difficult for the G8 to ignore them on the international scene.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, IBSA's praxis appeared to centre on amplifying the voice of the developing world. At the meeting of the first Leaders' Summit in 2006, IBSA sought "a fair and equitable global order" (IBSA, 2006). However, this order was predicated on their ability to strengthen the voice of the developing world and to contribute to global decisions, a far cry from NIEO's call for a reconfigured global order. As a result, IBSA sought representation within the global order. This ties in with their individual aspirations to become permanent members of the UNSC (Mishra, 2018). For instance, the US was not averse to SouthAfrica's inclusion in the UNSC, given its liberal constitutional frame. However, the issue wasthat South Africa's political culture enabled it to be close to China (Dr Ntsaluba, personal communication, 15 June 2020).

Nevertheless, the new world order that IBSA spoke about appears to have meant equal status with the developed North. Draper et al. (in Stuenkel, 2015, p. 18) points this out and traces its emergence from the 1955 Bandung Conference. As it was then, multilateralism and the principle of 'non-indifference' continues to be an important pillar for equity in international relations (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 18). So, to this extent, IBSA appears to be a trilateral instrument to prop up multilateralism. Accordingly, its aspirations were as follows:

> The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India gave special consideration to the importance of respecting the rule of International Law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace and security. They reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the legal instruments to which Brazil, India and South Africa are parties. (IBSA Declaration, 2003)

The foregoing appears to be premised on the assumption that the marginalisation and exploitation of the Global South is based on the flouting of international law. And this is consistent with IBSA's desire for better representation at all levels of global governance, by which it meant the reconfiguration or reformation of global governance. However, South-South cooperation or trade is another important pillar of the Global South project (see Nel & Taylor, 2013; Stuenkel, 2015). And this is so because the South needs to develop first to be able to be on an equal footing with the North. It is a matter of the South catching up to the North. To this end, IBSA appears to be underpinned by assumptions embedded in western modernity – that development is linear. Accordingly, IBSA is largely a grouping of like-minded countries centring their programme on South-South cooperation, democracy and development, and unswerving to an agenda of an inclusive sustainable developmental path of which its constituent members would form part (IBSA, 2018). The predicates of their democracy and development, however, are based on a "liberal consensus" (Husar, 2016, p. 186). That is, liberal institutionalism is the cornerstone of IBSA's approach to a multilateral trading system, partly because it thought that it could secure cooperation through this, and as such use international intuitions as a bulwark against the mistreatment of the Global South.

Given the foregoing, it is important to note that IBSA was operating in a particular historical context: one was globalisation, which, in the NAM meetings, was characterised as having both negative and positive benefits. Accordingly, the section on the WTO meetings is illustrative of the dual impact of

globalisation. Two is the unilateralism of the US through the legally suspectwars against Afghanistan and Iraq, specifically, and the structural power that the west exercised over international institutions. These contexts are interrelated to the extent that the mode of globalisation, currently predicated on neoliberalism, is a function of the hegemonic power of the west. Consequently, the US, using its structural power in institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, continued with their historical frontal attack on alternative systems to neoliberalism. As a result, the US exercised a long-standing, disproportionate influence over the development discourse in international financial institutions. For the rest of the developing world, it seems to be open to multiple processes of development, including IBSA. For instance, Kurtz-Phelan's (2013) assessment is significant:

> IBSA's more important work may in fact lie in more prosaic interactions— the efforts at promoting economic integration, the mid-level technical working groups, the small-scale trilateral cooperation, and the networks of academics, entrepreneurs and civil-society leaders that gather under IBSA's people-to-people initiatives. India has sent officials to Brazil to study the success of Bolsa Familia as it looks to build its own system of conditional cash transfers. Brazil, in turn, has looked at South African policy toward wealthy taxpayers.

The foregoing implies that, in some respects, IBSA also incorporates a counter-modernity. That is, it is willing to tap into the strength of its histories and appreciate cultural differences that arise between the members for the purposes of learning and policy convergence. This gives the bloc flexibility from a market-centred development discourse (Giugliano, 2011, p. 227). And this is important because, while states might be limited by the prevailing international balance of power, people-to-people interactions do not necessarily come with the same kind of limitations. And this is one way to displace the hegemonic development discourse. However, this does not appear to be a dominant impulse within IBSA. For instance, the IBSA Fund, established in 2004 and housed in the United Nations (UN), exists to alleviate hunger and poverty in the Global South. However, because the Fund's investments do not come with conditionalities, which is a welcome reprieve given the history of western aid, it does not temper the management of projects. For example, the delivery of safe drinking water in Cabo Verde, water, and not the infrastructure managing it, is generally regarded as private property in Cape Verde (Bosa, 2015, p. 2652), even though Cape Verde's Constitution recognises water as the state's property and the people's collective heritage (Bosa, 2015, p. 2641). This is because IBSA considers the state the central authority on issues of national development, which is a condition for its funding; thus, projects are aligned with national priorities (IBSA, 2006). To this

extent, IBSA does not seek to displace the hegemony of the west's developmental discourse. Given this critique, and using Mignolo's (2012) conceptualisation, IBSA does not involve itself in disputing the political management of international institutions. This involves, on the one hand, i) not questioning the capitalist economy (Mignolo, 2013), while on the other hand, ii) "political decisions are multipolar, no longer unipolar" (Mignolo, 2013). The second point means they seek representation within these international institutions, while the first point means they do not contest the neoliberal logic. Ultimately, the darker people are left in their 'veil of ignorance'.

### 6.1.4 The BRICS Moment

There are several origin narratives concerning the political moments that led to the formation of BRICS. The first is the two reports published by Goldman Sachs in 2001 and 2003, in which the investment company predicted, respectively, that the growth of China, specifically, but BRICs countries generally, will have a global impact (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 1). In the 2003 report, the investment company predicted that the BRICs countries would be larger, in dollar terms, than the wealthy G6 of the Global North (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 3). The difference between these two reports is that the 2001 report only had economic indicators and not political considerations (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 1). To this end, the 2001 report did not gain wide circulation beyond the investment community. In several ways, the international climate was changing when the October 2003 report was published. The momentum that began at the 1999 WTO Seattle protest and the developmental trade rounds that ensued thereafter, united the Global South. Accordingly, for the first time in history the poor countries of the world had told the rich they weren't playing the First World's game. For the first time, Africa was united. 'No one combs our hair in our absence,' said a furious Ugandan, as the talks lurched towards collapse. (Vidal, 1999).

As the preceding sections have argued, the Global South unity demonstrated at the Seattle Trade Round was repeated at the Doha (2001) and again at the Cancun (2003) WTO Rounds, which collapsed because of a lack of consensus on development issues between the North and the South. In several ways, this split was reminiscent of the Cold War period. Secondly, in October 2003, seven months after the US invaded Iraq – a move that subverted international law, the 2003 Goldman Sachs report attracted the world's attention. This is not surprising, given the already polarised atmosphere brought about by the US and its allies in the moments after the 9/11 attacks in the US. In a powerful way, the September 11, 2001, attacks brought home to the west the reality that it was not

immune to terrorist attacks, shattering people of the US and the west's perceptions of their invulnerable security (Silver, 2011, p. 427). Predicatedon US exceptionalism and moral strength, this must have hit specifically hard at the US's perception of its sovereignty.

It was this perception that also came to divide the world. At George Bush's national address toa joint session of the US Congress, the president declared, "Every nation, in every region, nowhas a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, in Domkeet al, 2004, p. 234). Diplomatically, a new kind of adventurism had been inaugurated in the post-1989 world. It was this "adventurism" (Acharya, in Stuenkel, 2015, p. 3) of the US that followed in the form of the Iraq war of 2003 that underlined the weakness of the international political system. In this context, the Goldman Sachs 2003 report, moving beyond investment circles, came to prominence within political circles. Reading the deepening possibility of a multipolar world, in the later report, Goldman Sachs wrote that the growth of BRICs would surpass that of the 2003 prediction (Stuenkel, 2014, p. 100). This was already in a polarised environment between the North and South (allied with the East) and exacerbated by a prevailing anxiety that flowed directly from the US's binary vision of the war (Domke et al., 2004). This is the 'War on Terror' discourse, a discourse reminiscent of the colonial period and a discourse responsible for promoting civilisational categories of who belongs and who does not belong. By binary, the study refers to a discourse of 'us and them'.

In the 'War on Terror' rhetoric of George Bush's presidency, which "focused on this antagonistic theme of a destined nation combating a deviant enemy" (Lee, 2017, p. 3) and of "a dichotomous discourse of savagery versus civilisation [sic]" (Smith, in Lee, 2017, p. 3), Brazil, Russia, India and China were holding high-level meetings about the possibility of a BRICs bloc. By the time the BRICs' leaders met for the first time for an official BRIC Summit, in 2009, the general international media routinely referred to the BRICs without an explanatory addendum. It is in this context that in 2010, Goldman Sachs called the first ten years of the twenty-first century the BRICS Decade (Stuenkel, 2014, p. 100). The combination of the west's intransigency at the WTO Rounds, the Goldman Sachs reports,the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, and the "with us or against us" discourse (Bush, in Lee, 2017, p. 4), all of which consolidated Global South unity, created the conditions for a BRICs bloc. Accordingly, the emergence of BRIC, and later BRICS, weakenedthis binary discourse, creating a window of opportunity to reimagine a different world, free from colonial strangleholds.

Early debates on BRICS suggested that the bloc was an anti-west front that would struggle with

cohesion, given the conflicting interests of its member states. The view was premised on the proposition that they had more differences amongst them than commonalities (Hurrel, 2006; Sharma, 2012; Stuenkel, 2016b). Given the longevity of the group, however, now entering its second decade, debates on BRICS have become multilayered. For instance, one suggests that member states harbour regional sub-imperialist ambitions (Bond and Garcia, 2015). This means that BRICS states seek to extend their power and influence in their respective regions, but through their recognition of global hegemons such as the west. Another view argues that the bloc is a challenge to western economic supremacy (Desai, 2013) in that it seeks to displace the authority and position of the west in global politics. Accordingly, this argument says that the block is "a challenge to Western economic supremacy" (Desai, 2013). However, others argue that BRICS is unlikely to take over global politics because "the West continues to command the key resources for domination" (Beausang, 2012, p. 138). Consequently, others argue that the bloc offers no alternative (Proyect, 2015) to the US-led international financial model, which is a critique from some quarters within the Global South.

Indeed, while all or some of these critiques might have some validity, they operate based on the anxiety and fears of Euro-American power: demonstrating not only self-serving critiques but upholding western modernity as the only barometer for politics and development. That is, sensing the weakening of coloniality, there is angst concerning the post-western world. This is because, while it the realm of international economy that defined BRICS's initial internationalagenda, the block centres the 'political'. This means it seeks to create multiple centres of power. For instance, in 2013, the BRICS bloc instructed their finance ministers and Central Bank governors to establish a New Development Bank (NDB), while on the other hand also movingtowards the creation of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to supplement existing international financial infrastructure, specifically for emerging economies and developing countries. With no political conditions, the example of the BRICS CRA pegged to the IMF (Panitch, 2015, p. 66) is an example of the bloc's 'within and without' approach. In other words, it is the block's aim to create multiple centres of power; however, as it stands, it does not have sufficient autonomy to go it alone. That is why it operates within BWIs while workingwithout through its own facilities, such as the NDB. Nonetheless, these instruments are crucial for other countries to acquire financing beyond the Bretton Woods Institutions.

Given the immediate concern of the 2008 financial crisis, it was as if changes in world financewas BRICS's original agenda. However, reading through BRICS's first ten declarations, one gets a sense that the bloc was concerned with the political and economic stability of global governance. Seemingly attributing the 2008 global financial crisis to the international economic architecture, the

bloc called for "a restructuring of the World War II-era global financial system and an eventual end to the long reign of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency" at its 2011 BRICS Summit in China, three years after the global financial crisis (Richburg, 2011). While the 2011 declaration was a strike against US power, at the 2012 Summit BRICS showed itself to be open to deliberative and cooperative engagement on the way it read problems concerning world stability. At the 2012 BRICS Summit, the bloc declared that it is "a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43% of the world's population, for the promotion of peace, security, and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world" (BRICS, 2012). Evidently, BRICS was interested in global issues and specifically sought to promote a multipolar and interdependent world system.

Another instance of BRICS's 'within and without' approach, also reflecting its appetite for cooperation, was that it used its meetings to prepare for the G20 meetings (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 15). For instance, the Summit of the G20 leaders was later held in Pittsburgh in the US, on 24 and 25 September 2009, three months after the BRICS 2009 Summit. And so, as the first BRICSummit called for better international coordination of food security via multilateral and bilateral interventions, the Pittsburgh Summit called for "globally coordinated action" (G20 Research Group, 2009) on issues such as climate change and food security. This influence appears to be a key praxis of the BRICS bloc. Importantly, one needs to note that the founding 2009 BRIC declaration recognised the pivotal role played by the G20 against the 2008 financial crisis (BRIC, 2009). On this score, it is important to remember that the G20 displaced the role that the G8 played in its objective to stabilise the global economy, an exercise possible via the walk-out of South Africa, India, Brazil, China and a number of other Southern and Northern countries from the G8 Plus. In this context, BRICS's recognition of the G20 as an important platform for the pursuit of a stable global financial system connects with the Third World's earlier attempts to build an equitable global order.

Equally, while BRICS promoted the United Nations as the primary body handling global security and threats on the one hand, it lamented its slow pace of transformation on the other. And transformation here speaks to the issue of "who is making the decisions regarding the politics of development" (Mignolo, 2012). This is an issue that is then connected to the worrying prevalence of "imbalances in global economic development" (BRIC, 2010). No wonder part of the demands of BRICS has been that the World Bank should move from being an institution that mediates North-South cooperation to one that approaches these states as equal partners concerning development, as in that way it can move away from the donor-recipient model (BRICS, 2012). This not only

appreciates the complexity of the international political economy, but also centralises the need for collaboration and cooperation on an equitable basis. And that is only possible among equal partners, a demand NIEO also advocated in the 1970s. Accordingly, BRICS seeks to be a force for change and for the reform of international institutions (BRICS, 2014). As such, it positions itself as a catalyst for building amore just and equitable global order.

Akin to representing or speaking for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs), the bloc is in support of "a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States" (BRIC, 2010). However, this support is not essentially concerned about carving out an alternative international political and economic trajectory, as Mignolo (2012) points out, or at least initially. This support is concerned with identifying and implementing amicable ways of opening up multiple centres of power, through and outside the Bretton Woods Institutions. The creation of multiple centres of power tends to unmask the politicised nature of post-war, seemingly neutral, bureaucratic logic. Accordingly, BRICS's, much like IBSA's, emphasis on the rule of law (international law) and multilateralism hits at US unilateralism. With BRICS, however, its struggle for equality with the west is predicated on reconfigured power relations, not merely insertion into the capitalist demand and supply chain, as is alluded to by the sub-imperialist critique (Bond and Garcia, 2015, p. 18). This is akey departure from IBSA because, while both work with BWIs, BRICS, using its financial power and political influence, creates multiple centres of power though initiatives such as the NDB. This has the potential to break up the veil hanging over the darker people, in other words, their incorporation into the strata of the disembodied. Since black people were not ontologically incorporated, which displaced them economically and politically, and were incorporated only juridically, alternative sites of power outside the purview of the west have the potential to restore them politically and economically – a form of dewesternisation for the darker people. Even if the existing institutional features of the NDB share similarities to western-centred international financial institutions (see Morozkina, 2015; NDB, 2014), what is crucial here is self-governance in *toto*: in other words, self-governance at all strategic levels (economic, legal and political). This does not displace neoliberalism, however. It leaves it intact, with competition over its control and management.

For BRICS, sustainable development in infrastructure and renewables is key, including maintaining environmental integrity and equitable benefits (NDB General Strategy, 2017, p. 6) for emerging

economies. Alongside green interventions as part of BRICS's 'sustainabledevelopment' or "inclusive development packages, under the sub-theme Agriculture, the BRICdiscussed family farming" (BRIC, 2010) as a way towards food production and food security. So, while there are attempts to move towards an alternative developmental model, there are a lot of similarities with the western financial institutions in terms of how the work is done, even when these investments open up space for technical assistance between Southern states. Therefore, it is not surprising that the CRA is pegged to the World Bank. It is part and parcel of the 'within and without' BRICS approach; this is its ability, depending on its interests at the time, to form and run international institutions independent of the Bretton Woods Institutions, while simultaneously propping up the latter. Additional to this, all NDP loans from 2019 are disbursed based on the currency denomination of the country requesting it (Dr Ntsaluba, personal communication, 15 June 2020). This is crucial, because it provides coherency – both institutionally and at the level of a worldwide vision – to the public articulations BRICS has made over the years. What is clear is that BRICS – not as individual states, but as a bloc – demonstrates the need to strengthen regulatory bodies to better coordinate and manage the international political economy. Unmistakably, this takes away the traditional brokering role of the west to decide singularly on the trajectory of international development. Ultimately, "what is brought into question is who is making the decisions regarding the politics of development …" (Mignolo, 2012).

The foregoing is what Mignolo (2012) refers to as delinking. He defines it as not "delinking from a type of economy, but from the instructions of the World Bank, the IMF and related institutions" (Mignolo, 2012). In other words, delinking is not a matter of operating outside the regime of the Bretton Woods Institutions, which is what Marxian thinker Samir Amin (1987) had in mind. For Amin, creating alternative sites of power is defined as economic rationality based on the law of value, but independent of the capitalist value characteristic of the west (1987, p. 435). Accordingly, and in line with Mignolo (2012), the creation of the NDB and the CRA are instances of the use of political control over economic decisions, albeit still linked to a 'type' of an economy. This ties in with BRICS's stated objective to do away with the 'donor-recipient dichotomy', which manifests itself in the North-South divide. However, this does not resolve the ontological divide concealed by liberalism.

### 6.2 The Global South: The Question of coloniality

In the foregoing section, the chapter drew out different intellectual currents, or impulses, making up the Global South. These are the Zapatista movement against NAFTA, which clearly was against neoliberal restructuring in Mexico. The second is the WTO Trade Rounds that were based on development, which saw some common ground emerge between sections of theNorth and the South but went bust on the back of agricultural subsidies in the west. The third is the emergence of IBSA, which self-identified with the western epistemological order but sought to curb its excesses. The fourth, and final, is the emergence of BRICS, which, while rhetorically against the neoliberal project, sought only to contest the authority of the west overneoliberalism. These all make up the intellectual currents within the Global South. They are not exhaustive, especially given the many NGOs and community-based organisations that have mobilised against neoliberal adjustments throughout the world, but they make up the dominant currents within the Global South. Accordingly, the Global South is a creature of neoliberal restructuring. That is, it is a response to the latter.

One important aspect of the Global South is that the North-South dichotomy that characterised the Third World collapsed, enabling the Global South to escape the narrow divisions of class and geographical location, contesting the homogenisation of societies and cultures implicit in the notion of the Third World (Dados & Connell, 2012, p. 12). Consequently, “the South was a concentration of conflicts and contradictions which were not, however, peculiar to the [Global] South” (Dainotto, 2017, p. 49). Therefore, De Sousa Santos (2016) and others (see Jean and John Comaroff (2012), and Mahler (2017), argue that the Global South also exists inthe Global North:

> The Global South is not a geographical concept, even though the great majority of its populations live in countries of the Southern hemisphere. TheSouth is rather a metaphor for the human suffering caused by capitalism andcolonialism on the global level, as well as for the resistance to overcoming or minimising such suffering. It is, therefore, an anti-capitalist, anti- colonialist, anti-patriarchal, and anti-imperialist South. It is a South that alsoexists in the geographic North (Europe and North America), in the form of excluded, silenced and marginalised populations, such as undocumented immigrants, the unemployed, ethnic or religious minorities, and victims of sexism, homophobia, racism and islamophobia. (De Sousa Santos, 2016, p.18-19)

In the forgoing quote, Santos demonstrates the none-state character of the Global South. To further underline this character, Dainotto argues that the South "is here what we have to assumeas the pole of a relation – and what cannot exist, in itself, outside of that relation" (2017, p. 46).In other words, that the South relation exists in its relation to its Northern, wealthy counterpart,which now co-exists with it in a single geographical space because of Globalisation. However,Dainotto also argues that the South signifies the limits of the North; that is, that the South represents the contradictions of the North that can no longer be hidden (2017, p. 49). In this context, the Global South is an attempt to overcome fragmentation (Garland, in Dainotto, 2017, p. 43), to resist difference (or marginalisation, if one prefers). This is resistance to the differenceof the past and the 'veil of ignorance' of the present – the neoliberal citizen is without social and historical context. As such, the Global South appears to be a bifocal critique of the Euro- American vision of the world.

The 'inclusive and interdependent' values of the Global South not only weaken, but provide a counter-current, if not alternative, to the segregated/binary thinking of the western epistemological order. Specifically, the process of ending international dependency (delinking)from the legacies of the BWIs, as well as ending the reign of the US dollar so that global trade occurs through multiple currencies, signals a process of dewesternisation. Dewesternisation refers to the process of a state consolidating its economy without following the instructions ofthe west (Mignolo, 2012). Observing a binary impulse in critiques against BRICS, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that "multipolarity is not a recipe for competition and chaos in international relations, as some of our critics say" (Lavrov, 2019). Here, the Ministerwas emphasising 'inclusivity' and 'interdependency'. These re-centres the state as a "continuous whole-ness rather than independent fragments of reality" (Ramose, 2005, p. 35). So, state relations, instead of being characterised by independence and exclusivity, are said tobe determined by people-to-people relations. It therefore is not the borders or the effective force over a territory that constitutes a state, it is the people, and their development, that constitute a state. In this sense, the Global South represents the harbinger of "… being as one-ness and an indivisible wholeness" (Ramose, 2005, p. 36). However, the inability of the Global South to unmask the ontological degradation of black being is a threat to this unity. In other words, its inability to confront anti-black racism threatens its own values.

While the Global South advances the Third World struggle, it is plagued by the sameweaknesses of the latter: that is the inability to confront anti-black racism. And this isimportant, given the ontological foundation of coloniality. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) campaign, which began in the

US among African Americans and spread to many parts of the globe, is an attempt to unmask this ontological degradation. Without this unmasking, the epistemic struggle against neoliberalism would only mean that the darker people sink deeper into the contradictions of the western epistemological order. For instance, the Global South calls for a "world based on responsibility toward self and others" (Grovogui, 2011, p. 177), existing alongside the ontological doubt of black being, thereby upholding the body-reasoninginherent in coloniality. This is important, because humans are not only rational, autonomous beings, but are also interconnected communities with responsibilities to share in the world. So consistent with this premise, therefore, the Global South struggle ought, to borrow from FrankWilderson (2015, p. 25), ultimately be a struggle against the "usurpation of subjectivity", withits invented hierarchical binary identities such as 'women', 'black', 'poor' and 'heterosexuality' imposed on indigenous populations, mostly black people, by coloniality. These differences continue unabated. Driving this point differently, and writing in 1881, Karl Marx argued that "the profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation layunveiled, turning from its home where it assumed respectable forms, to the colonies, where it went naked" (Marx, in Merlotti, 1972, p. 115). Eighty years later, in setting his gaze on the colonies, Frantz Fanon makes this very same observation when he said that "the zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settler" (Fanon, 1963, p. 38).It is this difference that needs to be overcome within the Global South.

### 6.3 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that the 1990s witnessed the solidarity of the developing world on issues affecting them directly. The Zapatista and its 1994 moment and the WTO developmental rounds demonstrated how the machinations of the west opened space for Global South institutions to raise questions about the distribution of power concerning the international political economy. Similarly, the formation of India, Brazil and South Africa, uniformly calledIBSA, in 2003, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) in 2006, was an important emergence of the developing world's cohesion at an international level. Although the two blocks shared similar origin narratives, the former was marked out by its liberal

institutional ambitions and the latter by laying the foundation for dewesternisation. It was from these moments that the chapter drew out the conceptual tenets of the Global South.

In the second section, the study characterised the Global South, mainly through its BRICS variant, as in part a struggle for dewesternisation. In other words, there is an impulse to create parallel institutions for a fairer, equitable world order. However, IBSA and BRICS not only ignited solidarity among the darker nations, forcing the developing world to reflect collectively on the question of power, but they opened up allies for them in the developed world, making the concept of the Global South able to exist beyond geographical differences. Significantly, the incorporation of these allies transforms the darker people into the embodied. In that way, the Global South is also defined by the demands of the poor and marginalised in the Global North, a function of capitalism. However, the darker people, whom the neoliberal frame imprisoned through the 'veil of ignorance', appeared to have escaped from their prison. This escape was essentially the opening of alternative political and juridical spaces, both outside and within the political architecture of the Bretton Woods System. However, this escape is not a matter of the Global South addressing the ontological divide wrought by coloniality. To this end, the Global South project suffers the same limitation of the Third World; it is unable to unmask the ontological features of coloniality or confront anti-black racism.

# Chapter 7 A Conclusion

## 7.0 The argument

This study has tackled two arguments. The first argument is that international relations (IR) are acknowledged as both parochial and ideological. This is the problem of both 'the International' and the IR discipline. Accordingly, the proposition herein is that IR, and how it has constituted 'the International', forms part of the problem of coloniality. Little in the literature delves into the coloniality of IR, let alone how IR constituted 'the International' on such terms. However, there is resistance to this constitution, both in the discipline and in 'the international'. But this resistance is not without its limitations. Given the foregoing, there were two research questions. The first asked how coloniality constituted 'the International', and the second asked how we theorise resistance to coloniality. This study addressed these questions throughout the chapters. However, on the question of coloniality, there is a further problem within decolonial thought. The problem, and this constitutes the second argument, is that decolonial theory incorrectly characterises the problem of western modernity as foundationally epistemological, and not ontological. This problem is a function of privileging western knowledge and history. Instead, this study begins with how the darker people, specifically black people, were impacted by coloniality. And that impact, characterized as anti-black racism, necessitates that the ontological is foregrounded. This is because one cannot perceive the world without a perception of who one is. In other words, the problem of anti-black racism, which directly talks to the ontological difference, or ontological degradation, that forms part of western modernity is masked in layers within the western epistemological frame. This is what accounts for the resilience of coloniality in different historical periods. In this final chapter, however, the study summarises the thesis.

## 7.1 The conceptual frame

In Chapter 2, in contrast to decolonial theorists, the chapter centres coloniality on both ontological and epistemological grounds. However, it emphasises its ontological component, showing how it is foundational to coloniality. It demonstrates how this ontological component, with anti-black racism as its most resilient component, has had a pervasive effect throughout so-called 'modern society', creating what the study refers to as 'regimes of being' at different historical moments. To this extent, the study differentiates coloniality in terms of three 'regimes of being': first is the colonial

construction of 'the International', the second is the liberal construction of 'the International', and the third is the neoliberal construction of 'the International'. In other words, each of these historical moments served to construct being on epistemic and ontological grounds, premised on body-reasoning. These historical moments tiein with the first question of this study, about how coloniality constituted 'the International'. For instance, during the colonial construction of coloniality, body-reasoning was formative of western modernity, creating white [supremacy] nationalism on the one hand, and the darker people on the other hand. In the liberal construction of 'the International', body-reasoning became the cultural glue that differently incorporated the darker people into the moral universe of western modernity. In the neoliberal construction of 'the International', coloniality then de- historicises the individual, imposing a 'veil of ignorance' over them. It then re-establishes the individual as a measure of market value devoid of any structural impediments to theirdevelopment.

Accordingly, not only was body-reasoning formative of [colonial] society, but it was also instrumental in determining who belonged and who did not belong and, in both instances, in what way. Therefore, the state, IR's ontological centrepiece, is replete with theorisations that split humanity between the dominant and the dominated. For instance, in different historical contexts where the state is constituted differently to address the needs of its citizens, it merely proves to be an exercise in shifting the parameters of coloniality. Accordingly, the study argues that coloniality is a self-determining device to capture, negate and define darker people's being. To this end, coloniality both continues and is continued.

The second problem is that decolonial theorists (see Ciccariello-Maher, 2017; Dussel, 1996; Grosfoguel, 2002; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 1999; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Seroto, 2018) incorrectly characterise the problem of colonial modernity as epistemological, and not as first ontological and second epistemic. The study uses Africana existential theory to make up for decolonialists weaknesses (Ani, 1994; Oyewumi,1997; Patterson, 1982; Wilderson, 2003). The problem here is that one cannot perceive of the world without a perception of who one is. Accordingly, who one is, is foundational to how one perceives the world. This problemis addressed in the resistance of the darker people against coloniality. For instance, within this resistance, the study demonstrates that, in 'the International', through the struggles of the ThirdWorld and now the Global South, there was an attempt to remake international relations as a people-centred enterprise. And this ties in with the second question of the study, being how does one theorise resistance against coloniality? To this end, the answer lies in the striving of the Global South to create a site, or space, for a common humanity. And this first requires thatsociety be constituted of people, and specifically people of equal value. To achieve this, the reconstitution of black people's ontological value, or their

"indigenous life-worlds" (Madlingozi, 2018, p. 50), is the first step given the disaggregated nature of coloniality among the darker people. This was evident in the Haitian struggles for freedom and independence, inthe independence struggles of the Third World, and in the Civil Rights movement in the US. The issue, however, is that these struggles were based on the western epistemological order. Therefore, the struggle for black people's ontological value failed in all those instances. In fact, black people were incorporated into western modernity once they rejected their own life-worlds and accepted the western epistemological order. And this broadly applied to darker people on different scales. Accordingly, darker people kept succumbing to the seductive trappings of the teleology of the western epistemological order. This was evident in their struggles for socialism, their struggle for nationalism or state-centric identities, and their struggle for equality within western modernity (i.e., the struggle for human rights). These struggles effectively eschewed the ontological problem, the constituent solution for creating a common humanity.

Theoretically, the study uses being, or ontology, interchangeably as the basis of western domination/oppression. Or, alternatively, as the basis of the western epistemological order. It is why the study argues that the western order rests on body-reasoning. While it focuses on black being-in-the-world, which is where the ontological problem exists, the study also uses the concept of the 'darker people' as a conceptual hanger to demonstrate the disaggregated nature of coloniality. On the other hand, the study uses the method of conceptual history to show how different 'regimes of being' existed at different historical periods. This enables the study to illuminate the different 'regimes of being' at each historical moment. That is, while eschewing the ontological problem, these historical periods demonstrate how different epistemic frames within each period sustained coloniality. To this end, the study used decolonial theory as the guiding theoretical optic from which it engaged in this entire discussion, although the study modifies this theory by making ontology central to decolonial thought. Accordingly, the study is a comprehensive engagement between IR history and theory, decolonial thought and Africana existential philosophy.

### 7.2 Chapter outline

Chapter 1 offered an introduction to the subject of the darker people, decolonisation and the making of 'the International'. To this end, it identified the research phenomenon and researchproblem, before putting forward the research questions and the proposition of the study. It provides a literature survey, together with the study's theoretical and methodological approach.

Chapter 2 established the conceptual/theoretical frame of the study by discussing how coloniality

underpins 'the International'. Focusing on ontology, the first section discusses the emergence of the 'ontological difference', expressed in anti-black racism. In this section, the study discusses two colonial impulses that arose out of the *Valladolid* debates. Accordingly, it outlines the difference between ontological degradation, as generated by epistemic difference, and ontological degradation, as generated by the anti-black world. In the second section, the study unpacks different IR conceptions of 'the International' to demonstrate how these conceptions are foregrounded by the ontological difference.

Chapter 3 focused on the colonial construction of 'the International'. The study used Oyewumi's concept of body-reasoning to understand the disaggregated nature of coloniality. Accordingly, the section discusses three historical moments. In the first moment, the chapter uses the example of colonial Haiti to show the ontological component of coloniality, specifically how colonial Haiti was socially ordered, resulting in the construction of anti-black racism – the persisting ontological feature of coloniality. In the second moment, the chapter uses colonial India to show how coloniality imposed a gender system – a feature of coloniality that serves to subjugate and oppress. In the third moment, the chapter demonstrates the omnipresence of coloniality, showing that even in lands in which colonialism did not settle for long, coloniality was hegemonic. To this end, it used China's experience.

Chapter 4 discussed how the liberal construction of 'the International' constrained the Third World's struggle for freedom. In the first section, the chapter shows how liberalism constituted a particular 'regime of being'. This is a 'regime of being' constructed on the pretence of diverse identities (political, economic, social), while concealing its inability to offer black people ontological options outside of coloniality. However, access to these diverse identities, effectively to the cosmology of [western] human rights, made possible the exercise of border-thinking. In the second section, the chapter demonstrates how border-thinking foreclosed the Third World from a comprehensive appreciation of coloniality. And, in the final section, the chapter discusses how internal competition within the Third World was in large part driven by proximity to western modernity. Accordingly, the chapter conceives of liberalism as a foreclosing device against the unity of the Third World.

Chapter 5 argued that the failure of the Third World, as discussed in Chapter 4, made way for the forceful imposition of shock therapy through the neoliberal construction of 'the International'. In this phase of 'the International', both the state and the individual are transformed into entities defined by the logic of the market. In other words, the individual, for example, is stripped of their social and

historical value and is categorised as a market value. In the first section, the study shows how the dialectic between the developed (North) and the developing (South) world was characterised by an unequal relationship benefiting the former. It argued that this relationship was further impaired by the strengthening of US power, plunging 'the International' under US unilateralism. This section basically describes the open conflict, or frontal attack, directed by the US and the western world on the developing world, designed to install capitalism and its neoliberal variant. In the second section, it argues that neoliberalismnot only attaches, or imposes, commercial value on the darker people and on the white community, but it also reconstitutes them as beings of self-governance stripped of space and history. Drawing on Foucault's concept of neoliberal governmentality and Oyewumi's body-reasoning, it concludes that the neoliberal free market masks the body-reasoning inherent in coloniality, thus stripping the individual of their social and historical structure. Accordingly, the free-market philosophy strips all people of their socio-political context, leading to a wider struggle for freedom.

Chapter 6 discussed the rebooting of the Third World in the form of the Global South, arguing that it is a response to the neoliberal construction of 'the International' outlined in Chapter 4. In the first section, several political moments are discussed. First was the Zapatista uprising in Mexico; second were the large protests that challenged the trade rounds of the WTO; third and fourth were the formation and meaning of IBSA and the formation and meaning of BRICS respectively. All these were discussed to get a sense of the different impulses making up the Global South. Accordingly, dewesternisation and border-thinking were discussed as praxes against coloniality. In the second section, the chapter argues that, while the Global South does contest neoliberalism, as does the Third World, it is unable to fully appreciate the ontological component of coloniality. Although the parallel international institutions built by the Global South provide a window of opportunity for them to reconfigure coloniality, the Global South is both transformative and limited without a comprehensive appreciation of anti-black racism.

Chapter 7 has provided a conclusion to the study by pulling out the threads that run throughout the chapters, from beginning to end. This chapter discusses the contribution of this study to the existing body of literature and offers recommendations for future studies.

**Recommendations**

Overall, coloniality constituted 'the International' via a western frame that masks the ontological difference that is foundational to it. Be it through the colonial, liberal or neoliberal phases of 'the International', the inability to address anti-black racism will be the undoing of any solidarity project among the darker people. And so, resistance to coloniality will be plagued by this inability. Be it the border-thinking under the liberal phase of 'the International', or dewesternisation under the neoliberal phase of 'the International', the inability to address anti- black racism will mean that coloniality persists. Any further studies on this question need to investigate how black people, specifically, can restore their ontology outside of the western frame.

**Contribution of the study**

This study operates at the interstices of IR theory and decolonial thought. It contributes to the existing body of knowledge by rethinking IR and how it views 'the International' during a period when there are growing calls for the decolonisation of the discipline and practice of IR. It does so by redrawing the conceptual contours of IR. For instance, the study provides IR with a longer history, going back to the 1490's. Secondly, it also demonstrates the parochial nature of the discipline, and its associated practice, especially in relation to how it is entangled with the logic of coloniality and a 'regime of being' that produces Othering, anti-black racism and epistemicide throughout different historical periods. Finally, the study attempts to displace the state as the ontological centrepiece of IR and centre the notion of a shared humanity among disparate people. In decolonial theory, the study also displaces the primacy of epistemology and its related conceptual instruments such as border-thinking. Instead, it centres ontology as a central motif in the titanic struggle against coloniality. This is significant, because the weaknesses detected in decolonial thought, specifically its ontological component, are replicated at the level of a decolonial critique of IR. Nevertheless, epistemic interventions become epiphenomenal to the question of ontology. In this way, the state emerges visibly as an instrument that splits humanity between those who belong and those who do not belong.

# References

Aiguo, L. (2000). *China and the global economy since 1840*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Abbattista, G (2011) European encounters in the Age of Expansion. Accessed 2 August 2015: http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/backgrounds/european-encounters/guido-abbattista-european-encounters-in-the-age-of-expansion

Abid, M and Abid, Q.I (2009) July Revolution and the Reorientation of Egypt's Foreign Policy. J.R.S.P., 46(2). Accessed 4 April 2019: https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Myanmar-s- forgotten-hero

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. *European Journal of International Relations, 3*(3), 319-363.

Adler, E (2005) Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates in Handbook of International Relations. Carlsnaes, W, Risse, T and Simmons, B.A (eds). 2nd Edition. SAGE.

Africa Recovery (2000) South Summit hits global economic gap. Africa Recovery, 14(2). Accessed 20 July 2017: http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/subjindx/142g77.htm

Alavi, H., & Shanin, T. (1983). *Introduction to the sociology of "developing societies"*. London: Macmillan.

Alexander, L (2011) A Pact with the Devil: The United States and the Fate of Modern Haiti. Accessed 15 June 2017: http://origins.osu.edu/article/pact-devil-united-states-and-fate- modern-haiti

Amadeo, K (2017) GATT: Purpose, History, Pros, Cons: The First Global Trade Agreement Saved Us from the Depression. Accessed 12 July 2017: https://www.thebalance.com/gatt- purpose-history-pros-cons-3305578

Amadiume, I (1997) Re-Inventing Africa: Matriarchy, Religion and Culture. Zed Books:London & New York.

Amin, S. (1987). A note on the concept of delinking. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 10*(3),435-444.

Amin, S. (2015). Long road to socialism. In W. Soyinka, S. Amin, B. H. Selassie, M. G Mugo,& T. Mkandawire (Eds.), *Reimagining Pan-Africanism* (pp. 55-112). Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: Mkuki Na Nyota.

Anderson, B. (1998). From miracle to crash. *London Review of Books*, *20*(8). Accessed 18 January 2020: https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n08/benedict-anderson/from-miracle-to- crash

Ani, M. (1994). *Yurugu: An African-centred critique of European cultural thought and behaviour*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Antunes, S. & Camisão, I. (2017). Realism. In S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, & C. Scheinpflug Eds.), *International relations theory* (pp. 15-21). Bristol, England: E-International Relations Publishing.

Anzaldúa, G. (1987). *Borderlands/La Frontera: The new Mestiza*. San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books.

Ashworth, L.M (2017) How Should We Approach the History of International Thought? *in* The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought (eds Schmidt, B.C and Guilhot, N). Springer: Switzerland.

Babich, D (2017) So, Who is Against Free Trade? Not BRICS+ for sure. Accessed 20 August2018: https://sputniknews.com/columnists/201707241055820347-who-is-against-free-trade-not-brics/

Bakare-Yusuf (2013) Yoruba's don't do gender: A critical review of Oyeronke Oyewumi in The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses. Accessed in May 2017: file:///C:/Users/s1800010/Downloads/BAKERE_YUSUF.pdf

Baldwin, R. E. (2006). Failure of the WTO ministerial conference at Cancun: Reasons and remedies. *The World Economy, 29*(6) 677-696. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00815.x/abstract (accessed 20 June 2017).

Biko, S. (1987) I write what I like. *Heinemann*

Baptist, E. E. (2015, August 6). The bittersweet victory at Saint-Domingue. *Slate*. http://www.slate.com/articles/life/history/2015/08/the_most_successful_slave_rebellion_in_history_created_an_independent_haiti.html (accessed 20 June 2016).

Basic Documents of the XXII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Durban, South Africa. 2 – 3 September 1998. Accessed 18 July 2019: http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Summit_Summary/1998_12th_Summit_Summary.pdf

Bassey, O (2007) What Is Africana Critical Theory or Black Existential Philosophy? Journalof Black Studies 37(6), 914-935.

Baylis, J., & Smith, S. (2005). *The globalization of world politics: An introduction tointernational relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beier, M. J. (2005). *International relations in uncommon places: Indigeneity, cosmology, andthe limits of international theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bell, D (1960) The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. TheFree Press: Glencoe.

Bello, W (2018) Globalization and Deglobalization: A Retrospective. Paper presented at the Economics Department of the University of Gothenburg Conference. Accessed 10 March

2020: https://www.scribd.com/document/407686348/Deglobalization-and-and-Globalization-A-retrospective-by-Walden-Bello

Bhabha, K. Homi (2005) The Location of Culture. Routledge: London

Bhutto, Z.A (1969) Myth of Independence.: Oxford University Press: New York

Biersteker, T.J. (2005). State, sovereignty, and territory. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of international relations* (2nd ed., pp. 157-176). London: SAGE.

Billington, M. (2003). Non-aligned movement revives a voice for the Third World. *Executive Intelligence Review, 30*(9), 54-55. https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2003/eirv30n09-20030307/eirv30n09-20030307.pdf

Bjerk, P. (2015). *Building a peaceful nation: Julius Nyerere and the establishment ofsovereignty in Tanzania, 1960-1964*. New York: University of Rochester Press.

Boldizzoni, F (2020) Foretelling the End of Capitalism: Intellectual Misadventures Since KarlMarx. Harvard University Press: US.

Bosa, M.S. (2015). Water institutions and management in Cape Verde. *Water, 7*, 2641-2655. https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/7/6/2641/pdf (accessed 15 May 2021).

Bowden, B. (2009). *The empire of civilization: The evolution of an imperial idea*. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.

BRIC. (2009). *Joint statement, First BRIC Summit – Russia Declaration*. Accessed 18 June2018: https://brics2021.gov.in/BRICSDocuments/2009/Yekaterinburg-Declaration-2009.pdf

BRIC. (2010). *Joint statement, Second BRIC Summit – Brasilia Declaration*. Accessed 20 June2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2011. Third BRICS Summit – Sanya Declaration. Accessed 20 June2018:

http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html

BRICS. (2012). Joint statement, Fourth BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration. Accessed 23 June2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2013. Fifth BRICS Summit – eThekwini Declaration. Accessed 25June 2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html

BRICS (2014). Joint statement, Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration. Accessed 26June 2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2015. Seventh BRICS Summit – Ufa Declaration. Accessed 26 June2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2016. Eighth BRICS Summit – Goa Declaration. Accessed 2 July2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-goa.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2017. Ninth BRICS Summit – Xiamen Declaration. Accessed 2 July2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html

BRICS Joint Statement, 2018. Tenth BRICS Summit – Johannesburg Declaration. Accessed 3July 2018: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html

BRICS Project Summary, 2016. Accessed 20 August 2018: https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/country-summary-disclosure_-Eskom-South-Africa.pdf

Briggs, R (1996) Witches and Neighbours: The Social and Cultural Context of European Witchcraft. Harper Collins: London

Broussard, B (2012) The Catholic Spirit of Christopher Columbus. Accessed 22 April 2017: http://www.tfp.org/the-catholic-spirit-of-christopher-columbus/

Brunstetter, D. R. (2010). Sepúlveda, las casas, and the other: Exploring the tension betweenmoral universalism and alterity. *The Review of Politics, 72*(3), 409-435.

Buchan, B. (2002). Explaining war and peace: Kant and liberal IR theory. *Alternatives: Global,Local and Political, 27*(4), 407-428.

Blackburn, R. (1988). The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848. *VERSO*. London. NewYork.

Bond, P. (2013). Sub-imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African 'deputysheriff' duty within BRICS. Third World Quarterly. 34(2), 251-270.

Blackburn, R. (2006). Haiti, Slavery, and the age of the Democratic Revolution. *Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture*. 63(4), 643-674.

Buck-Morss, S. (2009). Hegel and Haiti and Universal History. *University of Pittsburgh Press*,US.

Buduroh, M., & Hanifah, S. (2020). The Nasakom ideology in the short stories of Varia Magazine. In *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 453*. Proceedings of the International University Symposium on Humanities and Arts.

Burden-Stelly, C. (2016). The modern capitalist state and the black challenge: Culturalism and the elision of political economy. Unpublished dissertation. Berkeley: University of California. BurdenStelly_berkeley_0028E_15992. Merritt ID: ark:/13030/m5pz9xps. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gs4b7z3

Burke, T (2013) Olufemi Taiwo, How Colonialism Pre-empted Modernity in Africa. Accessed 13 November 2015: https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/olufemi_taiwo_how_colonialism_preempted_modernitbook4you.org_.pdf

Cabral, A (1970) National Liberation and Culture. Accessed in May 2017: http://www.blackpast.org/1970-amilcar-cabral-national-liberation-and-culture

Cardoso, F.H and Faletto, E (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America. In AlaviH., Shanin T. (eds) Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies. Palgrave: London.

Chabal, P (1981) The Social and Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral: A Reassessment. The Journal of modern African Studies. Cambridge University Press. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar. 1981), pp. 31-56

Chakrabarty, D. (2000). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Chakrabarty, D. (2005) Legacies of Bandung: Decolonisation and the Politics of Culture. Economic and Political Weekly, 40 (46), 4812–4818.

Charlesworth, N. (1982). *British rule and the Indian economy, 1800–1914*. London: Macmillan Education.

Chase-Dunn, C and Hall, T.D. (1993). Comparing World Systems: Concepts and Working Hypotheses. Social Forces. The University of North Carolina Press. June 1993, 71(4), 851-886

Chengu, G. (2014). Before Columbus: How Africans Brought Civilization to America. Accessed 25 August 2015: http://www.globalresearch.ca/before-columbus-how-africans- brought-civilization-to-america/5407584

Chomsky, N. (1993). *Year 501: The conquest continues*. London: Verso.

Cleaver, H. M. (1998). The Zapatista effect: The internet and the rise of an alternative political fabric. *Journal of International Affairs, 51*(2), 621-640.

Clingingsmith, D., & Williamson, J. G. (2004). India's de-industrialization under British rule: New ideas, new evidence. NBER Working Papers No. 10586, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.

Cohen, J.B (2014) Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc: Cheltenham, UK. Northampton, MA.

Collier, G. A. & Quaratiello, E. L. (2005). *Basta: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Contee, C.G. (1972). Du Bois, the NAACP, and the Pan African Congress of 1919. The Journal of Negro History. The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Association for the Study of African American Life and History. 57(1)

Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) (2006) India-Brazil-South Africa: The Southern Trade Powerhouse Makes its Debut. Accessed 3 August 2017: http://www.coha.org/india- brazil-south-africa-the-southern-trade-powerhouse-makes-its-debut/

Cox, M, Ikenberry, G.J and Inoguchi, T (2000) American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Cox, R., & Jacobson, H. (1974). *The anatomy of influence. Decision making in international organization*. New Haven: Yale University Printers.

Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders. Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium*. 10(2), 126-155.

Cox, R. (1996). Approaches to World Order. *Cambridge University Press*. Cambridge. Craven, M (2015) Between law and history: The berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logicof free trade. London Review of International Law, 3(1), 31 – 59.

Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2017). *Decolonizing dialects*. Durham and London: Duke UniversityPress Books.

Creutzfeldt, B (2013) 'Theory Talk #57: Siba Grovogui on IR as Theology, Reading Kant Badly, and the Incapacity of Western Political Theory to Travel very far in Non-Western Contexts', Theory Talks, Accessed 12 July 2015: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168715/Theory%20Talk57_Grovogui.pdf

Dados, N., & Connell, R. (2012). The global south. *Contexts*, *11*(1), 12-13. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1536504212436479

Dainotto, R. (2017). South by chance: Southern questions on the global south. *The Global South, 11*(2), 39-53.

Davanzati, G. F., & Patalano, R. (2017). Marx on public debt: Fiscal expropriation and capital reproduction. *International Journal of Political Economy, 46*(1), 50-64.

Davies, R. (2019, November 13). Why is inequality booming in Chile? Blame the Chicago Boys. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/13/why-is- inequality-booming-in-chile-blame-the-chicago-boys (accessed 13 March 2021).

De Beauvoir, S. (1949). *The second sex*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Dennis, R.M (1995) Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race. The Journal of Negro Education. 64(3)

Desai, R. (2013, April 2). The Brics are building a challenge to western economic supremacy. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/02/brics-challenge- western-supremacy (accessed 15 February 2018).

Descartes, R. (1994). *Discourse on method*. London: Everyman Paperbacks.

De Sousa Santos, B. (2016) Epistemologies of the South and the future. *From the EuropeanSouth 1*, 17-29. http://www.boaventuradesousasantos.pt/media/Epistemologies%20of%20the%20south%20and%20the%20future_Poscolonialitalia_2016.pdf (accessed 5 May 2018).

Devisse, J. (1989). The image of the black in Western art. In From the Early Christian Era to the Age of Discovery. Volume 2, Part 2. Harvard University Press.

Devitt, R. (2011) Liberal institutionalism: An alternative IR theory or just maintaining the status quo? *E-International Relations*. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal- institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/ (accessed 31 January 2019).

Dewey, J. (2008). Democracy and Education. Wilder Publications: Radford.

Dillion, J (2012) Plato and Rawls on the Parameters of a Just Society. Platoniciennes, 9 | 2012,105-113. Accessed 2 February 2017: https://journals.openedition.org/etudesplatoniciennes/273

Diop, C. A. (1974). The African origin of civilization. New York and Westport: Lawrence Hilland Co.

DIRCO (2006) Non-Aligned Movement: History and Present Status. Accessed 4 July 2017: http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/nam.htm

Dove, N. (1995). An African-centred critique of Marx's logic. *The Western Journal of Black Studies, 19*(4), 260.

Dussel, E. (1996). *The underside of modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the philosophy of liberation*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Doyle, M.W (1986) Liberalism and World Politics. The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 151-1169.

Drew, S. N. (1996). *NSC-68: Forging the strategy of containment*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press Publications.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (2007). *The souls of black folk*. City? Oxford University Press.

DuRand, C. (2018). The death of neoliberalism is an opportunity to birth a new system. *TruthOut.* https://truthout.org/articles/the-death-of-neoliberalism-is-an-opportunity-to-birth-a- new-system/ (accessed 2 July 2019).

Ediagbonya, M (2015) A study of the Portuguese-Benin Trade Relations: Ughoton as a BeninPort (1485 -1506). International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies. 2(2).

Eghbal, M., 2008. BRIC economies withstand global financial crisis. Euromonitor International. Accessed on 19 July 2018: https://blog.euromonitor.com/2008/11/bric- economies-withstand-global-financial-crisis.html

eNCA, 2016. Eskom gets R2,6bn loan from Brics-supported bank. Accessed 21 August 2018: https://www.enca.com/money/eskom-gets-r26-billion-brics-bank-renewable-energy

Engerman, S.L (2003) Collective Degradation: Slavery and the Construction of Race. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at Yale University. Accessed 15 July 2015: http://www.yale.edu/glc/events/race/Engerman.pdf

Erickson, D (2001) Philosophy and Theory. Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism.Accessed 15 October 2018: https://www.academia.edu/605837/Philosophy_and_Theory

Escobar, A. (1999). The invention of development. *Current History, 98*(631), 382-386.

Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development: The Making and unmaking of the ThirdWorld. Princeton University Press. Princeton. New Jersey.

Eun, Y-S (2018) Beyond 'the West/Non-West Divide' in IR: How to Ensure Dialogue asMutual Learning. The Chinese Journal of International Politics: 11(4), 435-449.

Fanon, F. (1963). The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, F (1964). Toward the African Revolution. Grove Press: New York.Fanon, F (2008). Black Skin White Masks. Pluto Press. London.

Fennema, M. (2011). *Toussaint Louverture: Black Jacobin or African leader*. https://www.qracao.com/docs/Toussaint%20Louverture%20-%20Meindert%20Fennema.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018).

Ferreira, M. F. (2017). International Relations Theory in International Relations Theory (eds McGlinchey, S and Walters, R and Scheipflug, C). E-International Relations Publishing.

Firestone, S. (1970). *The dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution*. London: TheWomen's Press.

Foucault, M. (2008). *The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79* (edited by M. Senellart). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Frank, A.G (1972) 'The Development of Underdevelopment' in James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale Johnson, eds., Dependence and Underdevelopment. Anchor Books:Garden City.

Freeman, J (2015) Myanmar's Forgotten Hero. Accessed 20 March 2019: https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Myanmar-s-forgotten-hero

Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Fukuyama, F (1992) The End of History and The Last Man. Free Press: New York.

G20 Research Group. (2009). *G20 leaders statement: The Pittsburgh Summit.* http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html (accessed 15 June 2018).

Gao, M. (2008). *The battle for China's past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution*. London: PlutoPress.

Gordan, L. (2000) Existentia Africana. Routledge. New York. London.

Garcia, A and Bond, P (2015) BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique. Pluto Press: London. Gaunt, J.

(2013, April 8). Thatcherism: The radical ideology that became the global norm. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-thatcher-economy-idUSBRE9370WM20130408 (accessed 15 February 2021).

George, S. (1999) A short History of Neo-Liberalism: Twenty Year of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change. Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a

Globalising World. Accessed 9 October 2016:
http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/econ101/neoliberalismhist

Gerard, E., & Kuklick, B. (2015). Death in the Congo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.

Giddens, A. (1985). The nation-state and violence: Volume two of contemporary critique of historical materialism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gilman, N. (2015). The new international economic order: A reintroduction. *Humanity.An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 6*(1), 1-16.

Giugliano, R. G. (2011). Space and development: A non-hegemonic view. *Revista Ciencia and Tropico*. *35*(1), 209-232.

Godelmann, I.R (2014) The Zapatista Movement: The Fight for Indigenous Rights in Mexico. Australian Institute of International Affairs.
Accessed 15 June 2020: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/news-item/the-zapatista-movement-the-fight-for-indigenous-rights-in-mexico/

Gordon, L. R. (2005). Through the zone of nonbeing: A reading of *Black Skin, White Masks* in celebration of Fanon's eightieth birthday. *The C.L.R. James Journal, 11*(1), 1-43. https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/sites/globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/files/file-attachments/v1d3_LGordon.pdf (accessed 12 April 2018).

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Grosfoguel, R. (2011). Decolonizing post-colonial studies and paradigms of political- economy: Transmodernity, decolonial thinking, and global coloniality. *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1*(1). doi:10.5070/T411000004

Grosfoguel, R. (2002). Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System. *Research Foundation of State University of New York*. 25(3), 203-224.

Grosfoguel, R. (2006). World-Systems Analysis in the Context of Transmodernity, Border Thinking, and Global Coloniality. *Research Foundation of State University of New York*. 29(2), 167-187.

Grovogui, S. (2011). A Revolution nonetheless: The global south in international relations. *TheGlobal South, 5*(1), 175-190.

Grovogui, S. (2009). Counterpoints and the Imaginaries Behind Them. *International Political Sociology*. 3(3), 327-350.

Grovogui, S.N (2001) Come to Africa: A Hermeneutics of Race in international Theory. Sage Publications. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 26(4), 425-448.

Hagen, P. L (2005). Theory Building in Academic Advising. NACADA Journal, 25(2), 3-8.

Hall, S. (1988). *The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left*. London & New York: Verso.

Hanke, L (1959) Aristotle and the American Indian. Indiana University Press: Bloomington and London

Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. London: Oxford University Press.

Hauswedell, P. C. (1973). Sukarno: Radical or conservative? Indonesian politics 1964-5. *Indonesia, 15*, 109-143.

Hayek, F.A (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Heidhues, F and Obare, G (2011) Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programs and their Effects in Africa. *Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture*. 50(1), 55-64

Heinrich, M. (2004) An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital. MonthlyReview Press: New York.

Heiss, A., & Johnson, T. (2018). Liberal institutionalism. In T. G. Weiss & R. Wilkinson (Eds.), *International organization and global governance* (2nd ed., pp. 123-134). London: Routledge.

Hendrickson, D. C. (1997). In defense of realism: A commentary on *Just and Unjust Wars*.*Ethics and International Affairs, 11*, 19-53.

Hernandez, B. L. (2001). *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda controversy: 1550-1551*. https://history.sfsu.edu/sites/default/files/images/2001_Bonar%20Ludwig%20Hernandez.pdf (accessed 6 June 2017).

Heuser, B. (1991). NSC 68 and the Soviet threat: A new perspective on Western threat perception and policy making. *Review of International Studies, 17*(1), 17-40.

Heywood, A. (2005). *Political theory*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hinerfeld, O (2013) The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. *PDXSScholar*. Portland State University.USA.

Hobbes, T. (2004). *Leviathan: Or the matter, form, and power of a commonwealthecclesiastical and civil*. Bel Air, CA: 1873 Press.

Holland, J (2006) A Brief history of Misogyny: The World's Oldest Prejudice. Robinson: London.

Houser, G. M. (1975, December 14). Communism and the war in Angola. *New York Times*. https://projects.kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/210-808-10015/AAACOAGMH12-75opt.pdf (accessed 20 April 2021).

Husar, J. (2016). *Framing foreign policy in India, Brazil and South Africa: On the like-mindedness of the IBSA states*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Hunter, M (2004) Rethinking Epistemology, Methodology, and Racism: Or, is WhiteSociology Really Dead? Race and Society: Vol 5, Issue 2. Pp 119-138.

IBSA. (2006). *IBSA fund: Programme guidelines*. https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/BRB/IBSA%20Fund%20%20Programme%20Guidelines%20%20Revision%208%20-%20FINAL.pdf (Accessed 17 May 2021).

IBSA. (2018). *About IBSA*. http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/ (accessed 16 November 2019).

Ikenberry, G.J (2009) Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition. International Studies 46 (1-2), 203-219. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600213

Jackson, B. (2014). The think-tank archipelago: Thatcherism and neoliberalism. In H. Schulz-Forberg & N. Olsen (Eds.), *Re-inventing Western civilisation: Transnational reconstructions of liberalism in Europe in the twentieth century* (pp. 189-212). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.

Jaeger, A. J., Dunstan, S., Thornton,C., Rockenback, A. B., Gayles, J. G., & Haley, K. J., (2013). Put Theory into Practice. About Campus: Enriching the Student Learning Experience. 17(6), 11-15. https://doi.org/10.1002/abc.21100

Jahn, B. (2013). *Liberal internationalism: Theory, history and practice*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

James, C. L. R. (1989). *The black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (2nd ed). New York: Vintage Books.

James, G. (2001). *Stolen legacy: Greek philosophy is stolen Egyptian philosophy*. https://www.jpanafrican.org/ebooks/eBook%20Stolen%20Legacy.pdf

Jinping, X.I (2017) Full Text of President Xi's Remarks at Plenary Session of BRICS Xiamen Summit. Accessed 20 October 2020:

http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/BRICS2017/t1490182.htm

Johnson, R. (2003). *British imperialism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jones, D.S (2012) Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics. Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford.

Jordan, P., & Maharaj, M. (2018). South Africa and the turn to armed resistance. *South African Historical Journal, 70*(1), 11-26.

Jung, H. S., & Chen, J. L. (2019). Causes, consequences, and impact of the Great Leap Forwardin China. *Asian Culture and History, 11*(2), 58-65. http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ach/article/view/0/40128 (Accessed 9 March 2020).

Kant, E (2016) Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch. Project Gutenberg. Accessed 5 March2017: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm

Koselleck, R and Presner, T. (2002). The Practice of Conceptual History. *Standford UniversityPress.* Standford, California.

Kanungo, A.K (2009) China's Process of Accession to WTO: Obstacles and Challenges. Forum for Research in Empirical International Trade. Accessed 15 July 2017: http://www.freit.org/WorkingPapers/Papers/TradePolicyMultilateral/FREIT510.pdf

Kelley, R.D.G (2017) What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism? Accessed here: 23 November 2019: http://bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson- mean-racial-capitalism

Kennedy, D (2013) Indirect Rule and Its Legacy in Africa. Book review of Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012. Accessed 13 December 2020: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=38337

Keohane, R.O. (2012). Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism. *International Relations*.26(2),

125-138.

Khaldun, T. (2013). The great rebellion. In P. C. Joshi (Ed.), *Rebellion 1857*. New Delhi: National Book Trust.

Kissinger, H. A. (1950). *A report to the National Security Council*. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.pdf?v=2699956db534c1821edefa61b8c13ffe (accessed 17 May 2020).

Kissinger, H. A. (1964) A World Restored: Europe After Napoleon. Grosset & Dunlap: NewYork:

Knutsen, T.L (1992) A History of International Relations Theory. Manchester UniversityPress: Manchester and New York.

Kortright, C (2003) Colonization and Identity. Accessed 05 December 2015: http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/chris-kortright-colonization-and-identity.pdf

Kose, M.A. and Akin, C (2007) Changing Nature of North-South Linkages: Stylized Facts and Explanations. IMF Working Paper: WP/07/280.

Kowert, P., Onuf, N., & Kubalkova, V. (1998). *International relations in a constructed world*. London: M.E. Sharpe.

Krasner, S.D. (1992). Realism, imperialism, and democracy: A response to Gilbert. *Political Theory, 20*(1), 38-52.

Kristinsson, P. (2015). The spectre of Bandung: China, the Global South, and the end of colonial trade patterns. Unpublished Master's paper. Lund, Sweden: Lund University, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies.

Kruer, M. (2009). Red Albion: Genocide and English colonialism, 1622-1646. Unpublished MA thesis. Eugene, OR: University of Oregon.

Kumar, A (1992) Marx and Engels on India. The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53,No. 4 (Oct. - Dec. 1992), Pp. 493-504.

Kurtz-Phelan, D. (2013, April 22). What is IBSA anyway? *Americas Quarterly*. http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/what-ibsa-anyway (accessed 3 August 2017).

Lamy, S.L. (2001). *Contemporary mainstream approaches: Neo-realism and neo-liberalismin the globalisation of world politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lapon, G (2011) What do we mean by exploitation? Accessed 12 December 2018: https://socialistworker.org/2011/09/28/what-do-we-mean-exploitation

Lavrov, S. (2019, November 13). BRICS a strategic partnership for global stability, shared security and innovative growth. *IOL*. https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/brics-a-strategic- partnership-for-global-stability-shared-security-and-innovative-growth-37128188 (accessed20 January 2020).

Lawson, S (2003) International Relations: Short Introduction. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Lenin, V. (2008). *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: A popular outline*. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ (accessed 16 July 2016).

Lenin, V (1917) The State and Revolution: Class Society and the State. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 381-492. Accessed 20 June 2017: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch01.htm#s1

Letelier, O (1976) The Chicago Boys in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll. The Nation.August 28, 1976. Accessed 14 January 2017: http://www.ditext.com/letelier/chicago.html

Leysens, A (2008) The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Fugitive or Guru? Palgrave MacMillan: UK.

Locke, J. (1689). *An essay concerning the true original, extent and end of civil government*. London: Awnsham Churchill.

Locke, J (1995) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Prometheus Books: London.

Laguerre, M. (1973). The place of voodoo in the social structure of Haiti. *Caribbean Quarterly,19*(3), 36-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/00086495.1973.11829161

Levy, M. B. (1984). Liberalism, self-interest, & social choice theory: A reply to Kalleberg & Preston. *Polity*, *17*(2), 378-385.

Lorenzini, D. (2018). Governmentality, subjectivity, and the neoliberal form of life. *Journalfor Cultural Research*, *22*(2), 154-166.

Lugones, M (2010) Toward a Decolonial Feminism. Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Hypatia,Vol. 25, No. 4 (FALL 2010), pp. 742-759.

Lugones, M (2010) Toward a Decolonial Feminism. Wiley Online Library. AccessedNovember 2017: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01137.x

Maclean, F (1957) The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito. Harper Brothers Publishers, New York.

MacMillan, M (2009) Rebuilding the World After the Second World War. The Guardian. Accessed 15 June 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/11/second-world-war-rebuilding

Madlingozi, T. (2017). Social justice in a time of neo-apartheid constitutionalism: Critiquing the anti-black economy of recognition, incorporation and distribution. *Stellenbosch Law Review, 28*(1), 123-147.

Madlingozi, T. (2018) Mayibuye iAfrica? Disjunctive inclusions and black strivings forconstitution and belonging in South Africa. Unpublished PhD dissertation. London: Birkbeck, University of London, School of Law.

Mafeje, A (1978) Science, Ideology and Development: Three Essays on development Theory. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: Uppsala.

Magubane, Zine (2016) American Sociology's Racial Ontology: Remembering Slavery, Deconstructing Modernity, and Charting the Future of Global Historical Sociology. Cultural Sociology. Vol. 10(3) 369–384.

Maldonado-Torres, N. (2007). On the coloniality of being: Contributions to the development of a concept. *Journal of Cultural Studies*, *21*(2-3), 240-270. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502380601162548 (accessed date August 2016).

Mamdani, M. (2012). *Define and rule: Native as political identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mamdani, M. (2020). *Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

March 2019: https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-long-history-of-racism-is-coming-back-to-haunt-it-82199

Magdoff, H. (2003). *Imperialism without colonies*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Marcos, S. (2001). The word and the silence. In J. P. de León (Ed.), *Our word is our weapon: Selected writings* (pp. 83-85). New York. Seven Stories Press.

Marriot, M (2018) When the Irish Weren't White. Accessed 20 February 2019: https://www.theroot.com/when-the-irish-weren-t-white-1793358754

Marsh, H (2019) Venezuela's long history of racism is coming back to haunt it. Accessed 04

Martin, L.L. and Keohane, R.O (1995) The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security. Vol. 20, No. 1.

Martin, R., 2017. The Ancient Khemetic Principle That Connects Lucipher, Imhotep, andJesus. Accessed June 2016: http://khemeticcenteredliving.com/lucifer-imhotep-jesus-2/

Marx, K (1844) Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Accessed 15 July 2016: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Critique_of_Hegels_Philosophy_of_Right.pdf

Marx, K (1844) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844: Profit of Capital.Accessed 5 March 2020: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/capital.htm

Marx, K. (1853). *The British rule in India*. Herald Tribune. New York

Mazrui, A.A., 2008. The Politics of War and the Culture of Violence: North-South Essays by Ali A. Mazrui (eds) by Seifudein Adem and Abdul S. Bemath. Trenton NJ and Asmara. AfricaWorld Press.

Mbeki, T. (2004) Approaches to Poverty Eradication and Economic Development III: TheTruth & the Asian Miracle. Volume 4, No. 43. Accessed 23 March 2017: http://www.anc.org.za/docs/anctoday/2004/at43.htm#art1

Mbembe, A. (2017). *Critique of black reason*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. McBride and

Lee, (2007) Neo-Liberalism, State Power and Global Governance. Springer.Mehta, U. (1999).

*Liberalism and the Empire*. London: The University of Chicago Press.

Meiser, J.W (2017). Liberalism. In (eds. McGlinchey, S, Scheinpflug, C, Walters, R. *International Relations Theory*. 22-27.

Melotti, U. (1977). *Marx and the Third World*. London: The MacMillan Press.

Mignolo, W. (1999a). Coloniality at large: The Western Hemisphere in the colonial horizon of modernity. *CR: The New Centennial Review, 1*(2), 19-54.

Mignolo, W. (1999b). I am where I think: Epistemology and the colonial difference. *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 8*(2), 235-245.

Mignolo, W. (2002). The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. *The South Atlantic Quarterly, 101*(1), 57-96.

Mignolo, W. (2009). Epistemic disobedience, independent thought and de-colonial freedom. *Theory, Culture & Society, 26*(7-8), 1-23.

Mignolo, W. (2011). *The darker side of modernity: Global futures, decolonial options*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Mignolo, W. (2012). *Delinking, decoloniality & dewesternization: Interview with Walter Mignolo (Part II)*. https://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/05/02/delinking-decoloniality- dewesternization-interview-with-walter-mignolo-part-ii/ (accessed 15 April 2016).

Mignolo, W. (2013) Geopolitics of sensing and knowing: On (de)coloniality, border thinking,and epistemic disobedience. *Confero*, 1(1), 129–150.

Mignolo, W (2014) The North of the South and the West of the East: A Provocation to the Question. Ibraaz Essays. Accessed 20 July 2017: http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/108

Mignolo, W. (2017). Interview with Walter D. Mignolo. In M. Woons, & S. Weier (Eds.), *Critical epistemologies of global politics* (pp. 11-25). Bristol, England: E-International Relations Publishing. https://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Critical- Epistemologies-of-Global-Politics-E-IR.pdf

Mignolo, W., & Tlostanova, M. (2006). Theorizing from the borders: Shifting to geo and body-politics of knowledge. *European Journal of Social Theory, 9*(2), 205-221.

Mignolo, W., & Walsh, C. (2018). *On decoloniality: Concepts/analytics/praxis*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Miller, E.F. (2010) Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty: An Account of its Argument. The Institute of Economic Affairs. Profile Books Limited: London.

Mills, C. (2008). Racial liberalism. *PMLA*, 123(5), 1380-1397.

Mills, C. (1997). The Racial Contract. *Cornell University Press*. Ithaca and London.

Mishra, A. (2018, June 20). IBSA and South-South cooperation: An appraisal. *Observer Research Foundation*. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ibsa-and-south-south- cooperation-an-appraisal/ (accessed 21 October 2019).

Moravscik, A. (2001). Liberal international relations theory: A social scientific assessment. WCFIA Working Paper 01-02, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge MA.

Morgan, I. (2008). Reaganomics and its legacy. In C. Hudson, & G. Davies (Eds.), *Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, policies, legacies* (pp. 101-118). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Morgenthau, H, J. (1978). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Mustacich, A (2013) Imperialism, the Cold War, and the Contradictions of Decolonization. Accessed 31 October 2016: http://www.globalresearch.ca/imperialism-the-cold-war-and-the- contradictions-of-decolonization/5334692

Nandy, A. (1983). *The intimate enemy: Land and recovery of self under colonialism*. London:Oxford University Press.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2013). *Empire, global coloniality and African subjectivity*. New Yorkand Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Nel, P. & Taylor, I. (2013). Bugger thy neighbour? IBSA and South-South solidarity. *ThirdWorld Quarterly, 34*(6), 1091-1110.

Newman, B., nd. Theories of international Political Economy. Accessed 12 August 2018: http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/IPETheory.365.htm

New York Times. (1964, May 28). Nehru, 'a queer mixture of East and West,' led the struggle for a modern India. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/28/archives/nehru-a-queer-mixture-of- east-and-west-led-the-struggle-for-a.html (accessed 28 March 2019).

Ngoei, W.-Q. (2017a, March 28). Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore bloomed in the shadow of the Cold War: Singapore's rise can't be separated from the context of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. *The Diplomat*. https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/lee-kuan-yews-singapore-bloomed-in- the-shadow-of-the-cold-war/ (accessed 3 June 2019).

Ngoei, W. Q. (2017b). A wide anticommunist arc: Britain, ASEAN, and Nixon's triangular diplomacy. *Diplomatic History*, *41*(5), 903-932.

Ngoie, W.Q. (2019). *Arc of containment: Britain, the United States, and anticommunism in Southeast Asia*. London: Cornell University Press.

Nougayrede, N (2015) Vladimir Putin is rewriting cold war history. *The Guardian*. Accessed 2 May 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/05/vladimir-putin-yalta- ukraine-crimea-historical-narrative

Nyerere, J. (1968). *Ujamma: Essays on socialism*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.

O'Connor, T (2018) U.S. Has Spent Six Trillion Dollars on Wars that Killed Half a MillionPeople Since 9/11, Report says. Accessed 22 October 2019: https://www.newsweek.com/us-spent-six-trillion-wars-killed-half-million-1215588?fbclid=IwAR1xnBIICUQxAYsxKbiUoPq3CyKzzxItwlHccXBmfTJDIheEV8qkLhwATcA

OECD, (2012) Trade Related South-South Co-Operation: China. Policy Dialogue on AID forTrade. COM/DCD/TAD (2012) 3 Accessed 1 August 2017: https://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/South-South_China.pdf

Olsen, N. (2012). *History in the plural: An introduction to the work of Reinhart Koselleck*.New York: Berghahn Books.

Omeje, K., nd. Conflicts in West Africa. Accessed 08 July 2018: http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sorting_out_the_mess_conflicts_west_africa_k_omeje.pdf

Ordonez, G, Estrada-Villalta, S and Adams, G (2018) The Modernity/Coloniality of Being: Hegemonic Psychology as Intercultural Relations. Science Direct. Accessed in May 2018: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176716303777

Oyewumi, O. (1997). *The invention of women: Making an African sense of Western gender discourses*. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press.

Olesen, T. (2004). Globalising the Zapatistas: From Third World Solidarity to GlobalSolidarity? *Third World Quarterly*. 25(1), 255-267

Padilioni, J (2013) What Can Hayek Teach Us About Race? Bleeding Heart Libertarians:Free Markets and Social Justice. Accessed 14 January 2016: http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/11/what_can_hayek_teach_about_race/

Pagden, A. (2002). *The idea of Europe: From antiquity to the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Page, M.E (1987) Introduction: Black Men in a White Men's War in Africa and the First WorldWar (ed Page, M.E.). St. Martin's Press: 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, USA.

Patterson, O. (1982). Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study. *Harvard UniversityPress*. London, England.

Palmier, L. H. (1957). Sukarno, the nationalist. *Pacific Affairs*, *30*(2), 101-119.

Panitch, L. (2015). *BRICS, the G20 and the American empire in BRICS: An anti-capitalist critique*. London: Pluto Press.

Pehe, J (1998) Connections between Domestic and Foreign Policy. Institute of International Relations, NGO. Accessed 14 November 2018: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23615812.pdf

Peters, M.A. (2012). Neoliberalism, education and the crisis of Western capitalism. *Policy Futures in Education, 10*(2), 134-141.

Pithouse, R. (2016). Haiti, Mbeki and contemporary imperialism. *Latin American Report,31*(2), 1-18.

Polanyi, K. (1944). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time* Boston: Beacon Press.

Popke, E. J. (2004). The face of the other: Zapatismo, responsibility and the ethics ofdeconstruction. *Social & Cultural Geography, 5*(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649360410001690277

Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist-neoliberal debate. *International Organization, 48*(2), 313-344.

Praeg, L. (2007). *The geometry of violence. Africa, Girard, modernity*. Stellenbosch: SUNPress.

Prashad, V. J. (2007). *A people's history of the Third World: The darker nations*. New York & London: The New Press.

Prashad, V (2012) World on a Slope. Critical Sociology. SAGE.

Prince, C (2002) The Historical Context of Arabic Translation, Learning, and The Libraries of Medieval Andalusia, Library History, 18(2), 73-87: https://doi.org/10.1179/lib.2002.18.2.73

Proyect, L. (2015, September 18). Thick as BRICS: An illusory alternative to neoliberalism. *Counterpunch*. https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/18/thick-as-brics-an-illusory-alternative-to-neoliberalism/ (accessed date May 2018).

Puchala, D, J (2003) Theory and History in International Relations. Routledge: New York and London.

Quaidoo, E. (2010). The United States and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Unpublished Master's thesis. Hays, KS: Fort Hays State University, FHSU Scholars Repository.

Ramsey, K. (2011). *The spirits and the law: Vodou and power in Haiti*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rand, A. (1964). *The virtue of selfishness*. ?Place?: Signet.

Rankin, M. B., & Esherick, J. W. (1990). *Chinese local elites and patterns of dominance*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Rasmussen, D. C. (2017). Contemporary political theory as an anti-enlightenment project. (pp.1-45). Accessed 18 July 2020: https://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Rasmussen_PPW.pdf

Rawls, J. (1999). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Roberts, W.C. (2017). What was primitive accumulation? Reconstructing the origin of a critical concept. *European Journal of Political Theory, 19*(4), 532-552. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885117735961

Rodney, W. (1983). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.

Rothman, L. (2016). The U.S. Dollar Hasn't Been Linked to Gold for 45 Years. Here'sWhy. *TIME*. Accessed 5 August 2019: https://time.com/4444172/gold-standard-history/

Rooney, D. (1988). *Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and tragedy*. Accra, Ghana: Sub-SaharanPublishers.

Rowe, W.T. (1990). Success Stories: Lineage and Elite Status in Hanyang County. In (eds Esherick, J.W, Rankin, M.B) Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance. University ofCalifornia Press. Los Angeles.

Rousseau, J. J. (1762). *On the social contract*. Paris: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Ryan, R. (2011). Zapatista spring: Anatomy of a rebel water project and the lessons of international solidarity. Oakland: AK Press.

Sanjinés, J. C. (2013). Embers of the past: Essays in times of decolonization. Durham, NC:Duke University Press.

Saran, S., Singh, A.K. and Sharan, V (2013) BRICS: A long-term vision for BRICS. Observer Research Foundation: New Delhi.

Scheler, M (1915) Ressentiment. Translated by Louis A. Coser. Accessed 8 March 2018: https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf

Schottli, J. (2012). *Vision and strategy in Indian politics: Jawaharlal Nehru's policy choicesand the designing of political institutions*. London & New York: Routledge.

Salgado, J.G.G, Garcia-Bravo, M.H and Benzi, D. (2021). Two decades of Anibal Quijano's Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America. *Contexto Internacional*, 43(1), 199- 222.

Scott, R.A (2010) Life in the Middle Ages *in* Miracle Cures: Saints, Pilgrimage, and the Healing Powers of Belief. University of California Press: California.

Seroto, J. (2018). Dynamics of decoloniality in South Africa: A critique of the history of Swiss mission education for indigenous people. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae, 44*(3). http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/2412-4265/3268

Sharova, V, Trufanova, E and Yakovleva, A (2013) Philosophy: Theory and Practice. Russian Academy of Sciences. Institute of Philosophy: Moscow.

Shimazu, N. (2011). Diplomacy as theatre: Recasting the Bandung Conference of 1955 as cultural history. Working Paper Series No. 164, National University of Singapore, Asia Research Institute.

Silver, R.C. (2011). An introduction to "9/11: Ten years later". *American Psychologist,* 66(6),427-428. https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-66-6-427.pdf (accessed 24 June 2018).

Singh, A. (2016). Foreign role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. *International Journalof Research in Humanities and Social Studies, 3*(5), 10-16.

Singh, K. H (2015) Isolationism: A perspective on political developments in Myanmar.Manipur University. Thesis. Accessed on 13 April 2019: https://sg.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/39975

Sinha, M. (1995). *Colonial masculinity: The manly Englishman and the effeminate Bengali inthe late nineteenth century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Slaughter, A. M. (1995). Liberal international relations theory and international economic law. *American University International Law Review, 10*(2), 717-743. Smith, A (2003) The Wealth of

Nations. Bantam Classics: New York.

Smith, K and Mandrup, T (2015) South Africa's Diplomacy of Ubuntu in Conning, C.D, Mandrup, T, Odgaard, L (eds) The BRICS and Coexistence: An alternative vision of World Order. Routledge: New York.

Smith, N (2014) The Dark Side of Globalization: Why Seattle's 1999 Protesters Were Right. Accessed 1 July 2017: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/the-dark-side- of-globalization-why-seattles-1999-protesters-were-right/282831/

Spicer, J. (2012). European perceptions of blackness as reflected in the visual arts. In J. Spicer(Ed.), *Revealing the African presence in Renaissance Europe* (pp. 35-61). Baltimore, MD: Walters Art Museum.

Strange, S. (1970). International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect. Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 46(2), 304 – 315.

Strange, S. (1994). *States and markets*. London & New York: Continuum.Strange, S. (1995). The

defective state. *Daedalus*, *124*(2), 55-74.

Strange, S. (1997). *Casino capitalism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Stuenkel, O. (2015a). *India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum (IBSA): The rise of the globalSouth?* New York: Routledge.

Stuenkel, O. (2015b). *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*. Lexington Books. New York. London.

Stuenkel, O. (2014). Emerging Powers and Status: The Case of the First BRICs Summit. *Asian Perspective*. 38(1), 89-109.

Stuenkel, O. (2016a). *Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Stuenkel, O. (2016b, December 5). Why the west struggles to understand the BRICS. E-*International Relations*. http://www.e-ir.info/2016/12/05/why-the-west-struggles-to- understand-the-brics/ (accessed 15 October 2017).

Stur, H. (2017, April 28). Why the United States went to war in Vietnam. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/04/united-states-went-war-vietnam/ (accessed 24 June 2019).

Taiwo, O (2010) How Colonialism Pre-empted Modernity in Africa. Bloomington. Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indiana.

Tiyanu, F. (2014). Society of Imperial Power: Reinterpreting China's 'Feudal Society'. Journal of Chinese Humanities. Vol 1, 25-50.

Taylor, C., 1999. Two Theories of Modernity *in* Alternative Modernities, ed. Gaonkar, Dilip. Duke University Press. USA.

Taylor, I, Lee, D and Williams, P.D (2006) The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy. Palgrave MacMillan: New York.

Telepneva, N. (2019). Saving Ghana's revolution: The demise of Kwame Nkrumah and the evolution of Soviet policy in Africa, 1966–1972. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *20*(4), 4-25. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00838

Teschke, B. (2003). *The myth of 1648: Class, geopolitics and the making of moderninternational relations*. London: Verso.

Thakur, V., 2014. The International in/and South Africa. Concept Paper.
The Times, (2004) The Comeback man. Accessed 6 January 2017: http://www.economist.com/node/2478223

Thakur, V. (2015) Africa and the theoretical peace in IR. *International Political Sociology*. 9,213-229.

Thakur, V and Vale, P. (2020). South Africa, Race and the Making of International Relations.Roman and Littlefield. London. New York.

Thakur, V. (2018). An Asian drama: The Asian Relations Conference, 1947. *The InternationalHistory Review*, *41*(3), 673-695.

Thakur, V., Davis, A. E., & Vale, P. (2017). Imperial mission, 'scientific' method: An alternative account of the origins of IR. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *46*(1), 3-23.

Thompson, A. (2007). Scientific racism: The justification of slavery and segregated educationin America. Accessed March 12, 2017: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2183/09217323dc1ab838d4684db4223facc9cde5.pdf

Thornburgh, D. (2013, April 8). Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan remade conservatismandthe west. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-ronald-reagan (accessed 22 March 2021).

Thorp, A., & Smith, B. (2010, February 26). The legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan. *House of Commons Library*. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research- briefings/sn05340/ (accessed 17 May 2021).

Tremlott, G (2017) The Moor's Last Stand and Blood and Faith review – The Expulsion of Muslims from Spain. The Guardian. Accessed 2 May 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jun/15/moors-last-stand-blood-and-faith-spain- muslims

Toye, J. (2014). Assessing the G77: 50 years after UNCTAD and 40 years after the NIEO. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(10), 1759-1774. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.971589

Toye, J and Toye, R (2003) The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis.History of Political Economy. Duke University Press: USA.

Tamny, J. (2013, April 7). Monetarism and Keynesianism: Identical sides of the same adolescent coin. *Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2013/04/07/monetarism- and-keynesianism-identical-adolescent-sides-of-the-same-coin/?sh=4086975244dc (accessed15 March 2021).

Truman, H. (1947). Speech at Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947. https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=81 (accessed 23 August 2020).

Tucker, D. F. B. (1994). *Essay on liberalism: Looking left and right*. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 51. Dordrecht: Springer.

Tvedten, I. (1989). *The war in Angola: Internal conditions for peace and recovery*. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Issue 7. Uppsala, Sweden. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:290226/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 15 March 2021).

UNCTAD (2000) Bangkok Declaration: Global Dialogue and Dynamic Engagement. TD/387.18 February 2000. Accessed 31 July 2017: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ux_td387.en.pdf

Vale, P and Thakur, V (2015) Out in the dark: Knowledge, Power and IPE in Southern Africa. Contexto Internacional: Rio de Janeiro, vol. 37, no 3, September/December 2015, p. 1011-1040.

Vazquez, R (2012) Towards a Decolonial Critique of Modernity: *Buen Vivir*, Relationality and the Task of Listening. Capital, Poverty, Development, Denktraditionen im Dialog: Studien zur Befreiung und interkulturalität, Vol 33, Wissenschaftsverlag Mainz: Aachen 2012.

Vidal, J. (1999, December 5). Real battle for Seattle. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/05/wto.globalisation (accessed 1 July 2017).

Vitalis, R. (2013). The midnight ride of Kwame Nkrumah and other fables of Bandung (Bandoong). *Humanity Journal: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 4*(2), 261-288. https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2013.0018

Von Hayek, F. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Wahed, M. S. (2016). The impact of colonialism on 19th and early 20th century China. *Cambridge Journal of China Studies, 11*(2), 24-33.

Wallerstein, E. (2006). The curve of American power. *New Left Review, NLR 40*, 1-20.

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The modern world system: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century*. New York: Academic Press.

Ward, B.M. (2006). The shift in United States foreign policy in the Middle East since 1989. Unpublished MA thesis. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida. Scholar Commons.

Weber, M. (1919). *Politics as a vocation*. Munich: Duncker & Humboldt. http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/foundation/documents/03Weber1918.pdf (accessed 22 February2017).

Weber, H and Winanti, P. (2016) The Bandung Spirit and solidarist internationalism. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 70(4), 391-406

Weber, M. (1964). *The theory of social and economic organization*. Glencoe, IL: The Falcon'sWing Press.

WEF (2019) BRICS' New Development Bank Turns Four: what has it achieved? Accessed 20 January 2020: https://europeansting.com/2019/09/24/brics-new-development-bank-turns- four-what-has-it-achieved/

Wehler, H (1970) Bismarck's Imperialism 1862-1890. The Past and Present Society, Oxford University Press: London.

Weiner, L (1922) Africa and the Discovery of America. Innes and Sons 129-135 N. TwelfthSt: Philadelphia, PA.

Wendt, A. (2004). The state as person in international theory. *Review of International Studies,30*(2), 289-316. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210504006084

Wendt, A. (1992) Anarch is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, Vol. 46(2) 391-425

Wilderson, F. (2003). Gramsci's black Marx: Whither the slave in civil society? *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 9*(2), 225-240.

Wilderson, F. (2015). Blacks and the master/slave relation. In *Afro-Pessimism: An introduction* (pp. 15-30). Minneapolis, MN: racked & dispatched. https://rackedanddispatched.noblogs.org/ (accessed 15 January 2018).

Williams, C. (1974). *The destruction of black civilization: Great issues of a race from 4500 B.C. to 2000 A.D*. Chicago: Third World Press.

Win, A, A (1995) Obituaries: U Nu. Accessed 4 April 2019: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituaries-u-nu-1573985.html

Wiredu, K (1992) Formulating modern Thought in African Languages: Some Theoretical Considerations *in* V.Y. Mudimbe (ed) The Surreptitious Speech. Presence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness, 1947-1987. University of Chicago Press: Chicago

Williamson, J. (2005). The strange history of the Washington Consensus. *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 27*(2), 195-206.

Wolfe, P (2006) Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of The Native. Routledge: Taylor andFrancis Group. Journal of Genocide Research, Vol 8(4). Pp 387 – 409.

Wolfe, C.T. (2015) Materialism: A Historico-Phoilosophical Introduction. Springer BriefSeries. Accessed 19 October 2019: https://hps.master.univ-paris-diderot.fr/sites/hps.master.univ-paris-diderot.fr/files/Wolfe%3DMATERIALISM_Introduction_2015_0.pdf

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Declaration. Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 8 September 2001. Accessed 01 August 2017: http://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf

United Nations. (2017). The end of the Golden Age, the debt crisis and development setbacks. In World Economic and Social Survey (WESS). https://www.un-ilibrary.org/economic-and- social-development/world-economic-and-social-survey-2017_fc354ffb-en (accessed 20 June 2019).

Yergin, D., & Stanislaw, J. (2002). *The commanding heights: The battle for the world economy*. New York & London: Simon and Schuster.

Zick, T (2014) Statehood as the New Being: The Discovery of Fundamental 'States' Rights'. William & Mary Law Review. Vol. 46(1)

Zucchino, D. (2021, October 7). The war in Afghanistan: How it started and how it is ending. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/article/afghanistan-war-us.html (accessed 17 May 2021).