

---

# Stoic against the City

*Louise Mabile*  
*University of Pretoria*

---

## Abstract

*In these decadent times, it is tempting to turn to Stoicism for alternative inspiration. It is misleading, however, to think that Stoicism possess a genuinely political dimension; in fact it is inimical to politics as understood in the classical sense. Drawing on Hannah Arendt and Friedrich Nietzsche, it is shown that Stoicism could be as anti-polis as the rest of the metaphysical tradition.*

Stoicism presents itself as a healthy, robust alternative whenever and wherever the battle against decadence is fought. Admittedly, this happens but rarely, especially in our age, but in a world awash with corruption and the politics of sentiment, the temptation to romanticize the apparently *honest*, pitiless Stoics as the last defenders of public-spiritedness is always there. Friedrich Nietzsche for one is often taken as a latter-day Teutonic Stoic. Drawing on the anti-metaphysical Nietzsche, however, I set out to prove that Stoicism, with its particular brand of pre-Christian 'interiority' and latent Platonic cosmology, can be seen as a symptom of decadence in its own right, and that the Stoics, for all their virtues, contributed to the demise of the vibrant political life in their own particular way. For this reason, Nietzsche was at once their greatest admirer and fiercest critic. He had a well-established habit of denouncing those who had most influenced him. This is more than the mere desire to cover up intellectual debts; according to Nietzsche's mouthpiece Zarathustra, one repays one's teachers badly if one were merely to *follow* them: what cannot be made into one's own has to be remolded or rejected. And if Nietzsche chooses to keep to the Stoic art of self-concealment and self-sufficiency – perhaps precisely *because* he chooses to keep to this art – Nietzsche rejects Stoic metaphysics.<sup>1</sup>

By referring to his philosophy as *eine Lebenskunst*,<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche explicitly associates himself with the Stoic tradition. And there is clearly Stoic inspiration behind his extolling of the virtues of self-command and self-mastery and his contempt for pity. Among his first scholarly publications – still useful today – are three studies of Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Philosophers*, one of the major sources for what we know about Stoic philosophy today. The works of Seneca and Epictetus count among the most

heavily read in Nietzsche's library. He agreed with some of the most decisive tenets of Stoic philosophy; like Epictetus, he stresses that ideas have very real effects on life, and that they must not be tested simply according to their truth content, but according to what they *achieve*. In his *Discourses*, Epictetus submits one idea after the other to the test of whether they aid or distract from the art of self-mastery:

If indeed one has to be deceived into learning that the things external and independent of our free choice none concern us, I, for my part, should content to a deception which would result in me living thereafter serenely and without turmoil....<sup>3</sup>

Likewise, for Nietzsche, philosophy is not simply a question of theoretical 'truth':

The falseness of a judgment is not necessarily an objection to a judgment. [...] The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving.<sup>4</sup>

As much as he valued honesty, Nietzsche does not extol the Stoic version of honesty as the most life-preserving quality that the Stoics contributed to the Western heritage. What passes under 'honesty' is more often than not a mask for dishonesty or cowardice, and on an epistemological level, simplification. Quite the contrary, he exalts their only truly political art, the art of self-concealment. In a remarkable passage from *The Gay Science* 359, which is *A Genealogy of Morals* in abbreviated form, Nietzsche, writing about "morality's most dangerous and insidious advocates", says:

What do you suppose he finds necessary, absolutely necessary, to give himself in his own eyes the appearance of superiority over more spiritual people and to attain the pleasure of an *accomplished revenge* at least in his imagination? Always morality, you can bet on that. Always big moral words. Always the rub-a-dub of justice, wisdom, holiness, virtue. Always the Stoicism of gesture (how well Stoicism conceals what one lacks!).

The greatest pity, according to Nietzsche, is that the Stoics did not appreciate this tactic of self-concealment enough. The Stoics, like Socrates, *took themselves too seriously*. For the donning of a mask, the presentation of the self in a particular *style*, was not limited to the Stoics themselves, but extended to the nature according to whose laws they were trying to live. Unlike the tragedians, who emphasized the incomprehensibility of the world, the Stoics maintained a faith in a decipherable natural order. Zeno the Phoenician, for example, at the birth of the Stoic tradition, already exhibits impatience at metaphysical subtleties. However, like the poststructuralist anti-metaphysicians of our own age, he slips back into metaphysics with his insistence upon the 'solidity' of everything from material objects to concepts like God and justice.

The notion that 'nature' or *physis* encompasses everything, including things, phenomena and events that might seem 'supernatural' according to other worldviews, remained the basis for Stoic physics throughout the tradition, though later thinkers allowed for more complex distinctions within that framework. According to Diogenes Laertes, the Stoics offered two divisions of their physics, the one 'specific', the other 'generic'. In the specific division the Stoics distinguished between five categories: bodies, principles, elements, gods and 'limits, place and void'. In the generic framework, they distinguished between the world or *kosmos*, the elements and the search for causes (*aitiologikos topos*).<sup>5</sup> Paradoxically, this latter framework is more concrete and closer to what we would today call 'physics': the *kosmos* – the organized whole or *holon* with its rules of organization or *diakosmêsis* is its main object of study. The 'specific' way of looking at the cosmos operates at a more theoretical level. At this level particularly, the paradoxes in Stoic materialism manifest themselves. For one, the Stoics distinguish between the 'whole' (*holon*), and the 'all' (*pan*), the 'all' being the sum of the 'whole', i.e. the sum of the *kosmos* and the infinite void that surrounds it. Given the belief in the unity and cohesion of the world, this distinction proves problematic, and is only partially solved by the positing of an extra-cosmic void with its eternal cycles and contractions. Contradictions like these make Epictetus's picture of nature as a rational *kosmos* designed with a particular *telos* in mind extremely problematic, and likewise his corresponding notion of the self as a rational will that is able to comprehend the cosmos and master itself by suspending all impulses that supposedly interfere with the natural order. The opposition of Self and World, a metaphysical curse that was to plague philosophy until deep into the twentieth century and still continues to do so in analytical circles, is solved by emphasizing the rational soul's 'deeper unity' with the underlying justice and unity of nature.

It is this rationality and supposed unity that Nietzsche undermines. He sees a strong Platonic shadow (*sic*) hanging over Epictetus's repeated appeals to a teleology discoverable in nature. Nietzsche dismisses this myth, the most important of what he calls the Judeo/Christian philosophical prejudices, as 'anti-worldly', and 'dishonest'. As a point of departure, he throws down a hermeneutical gauntlet to the Stoic tradition: what is it that the Stoic *understands* by 'nature'? Nature is far too measureless, or rather, the gap between the human *mêtron* and that of nature is too large to allow for practical ethical guidance. From the human perspective nature is wasteful and indifferent, not lawless certainly, but simply operating on a scale far beyond immediate human concerns and comprehension. The Stoics display their own unique version of *hubris* by desiring to live according to Nature: a part – for humans are but a part of nature – cannot hope to live by the standard of the whole. Nietzsche cuts them down to size:

“According to nature” you want to *live*? Oh you noble Stoics, what deceptive words these are! Imagine a being like Nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time: imagine indifference itself as power – how *could* you live according to this indifference? [...]

In truth, the matter is altogether different: while you pretend rapturously to read the canon of law into nature, you want something opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to impose your morality, your ideal on nature [...] You demand that she herself be nature ‘according to the Stoa’ and you would like all existence to exist only after your own image – as an immense external glorification and generalization of Stoicism.<sup>6</sup>

Thus for Nietzsche the Stoic attempt to decipher the fundamental laws of nature so that humans can learn to live accordance with them is yet another unsuccessful philosophical attempt to deal with pain. From Plato’s idea of the ideal regime that frees man from the pain of longing after earthly goods whose possession can never be absolutely guaranteed, and the Christian escape from lack and pain in the afterlife, to Marx’s prophecy of the socialist revolution through which the entire history of human suffering will finally be reconciled, suffering has been posed as a problem to which philosophy, and politics, must offer some kind of solution – or at least some kind of *meaning*. For as Nietzsche reminds us, ‘The meaninglessness of suffering, *not* suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind thus far’.<sup>7</sup> And the Stoics did not deal with this problem as well as they thought they did. Nicolas Berdyaev writes,

Stoicism is the doctrine of self-salvation and the doctrine of ‘peace’ or ‘apathy’. Stoic morality testifies to a very high level reached by man’s moral consciousness, but in the last resort, it is a decadent and pessimistic morality of despair, which sees no meaning in life, it is inspired by the fear of suffering. One must lose sensitiveness to suffering and become indifferent – that is the only way out.

In other words, the Stoics also succumb to the ascetic impulse.

*Stoicism’s* calculated endurance is a symptom of injured strength; one measures out one’s inactivity to tip the scales against pain – a lack of heroism that always struggles against (and does not simply suffer) one who freely seeks out pain.<sup>8</sup>

In the most basic sense of the word, asceticism enshrines the life of self-denial as the highest form of human flourishing. Under the auspice of the ascetic ideal, human beings seek to become ‘whole’ or ‘complete’ through complex processes of self-laceration and self-vivisection. Meaning is infused

into life through ever increasingly violent orgies of self-inflicted pain. Although most humans are unlikely to succeed in their quest for completion, their immersion in ascetic disciplines will at least succeed in distracting them, albeit temporarily, from their irredeemably fragmented condition. Unlike animals, human beings derive their sense of vitality, or in Nietzschean terms, their sense of *power*, indirectly, even derivatively, as a consequence of their self-imposed ascetic disciplines. Animals rely pre-reflectively upon their natural endowments such as instincts, but *Homo sapiens* is defined by the violent distortion of its natural instincts. This original distortion or wounding is what Nietzsche calls *bad conscience*. Paradoxically, precisely this bad conscience is the inspiration of man's greatest achievements. For guilty men are interesting; we owe our Dostoyevskys to our neuroses. As Nietzsche puts it, 'All instincts that do not discharge themselves turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was called his *soul*'.<sup>9</sup> In order to unleash the creative potential of this original wound, man must learn to fashion contexts of interpretation which allow men to sublimate their suffering.

It is the failure to do this that drives men to reject the world and flee inward into a reflexive, atomistic 'soul' at the expense of the vibrant, public self of pre-Socratic antiquity. While Nietzsche does not offer a genealogical analysis of the Stoic will in particular, it is easy enough to recognize it as spiritually *reactive* move of the weak against the strong, which constitutes the second movement in Nietzsche's genealogy, the moral period. Instead of aristocratic *acting* (see below), the Stoics prefer an inner distancing from events that promotes indifference to events.

I believe we do not understand Stoicism for what it really is. Its essential feature as an attitude of the soul – which is what it originally was before taken over by philosophy – is its comportment towards pain and representations of the unpleasant: an intensification of a certain heaviness and weariness to the highest degree in order to weaken the experience of pain. Its basic motifs are *paralysis and coldness*, hence a form of anaesthesia (*sic*). The principle aim is to eliminate any inclination to excitement, continually to lessen the things that might offer excitement, to awaken distaste for and to belittle any form of stimulation, to hate excitement as an enemy, to hate the passions themselves as if they were a form of disease or something entirely unworthy, for they are the hallmark of every despicable and painful manifestation of suffering. *In summa: turning oneself into stone* against suffering and in the future conferring all worthy names of divine-like virtues upon a statue. What significance can be attached to embracing a statue in wintertime if one has become entirely deadened against the cold? What significance can be attached to one statue embracing another? If a Stoic attains the character he seeks – *for most part he already possesses this character and therefore chooses this philosophy* – the loss of feeling reached is the result of the pressure of a *tourniquet*. I am very antipathetic to this line of thought. It undervalues the

value of pain (it is as necessary and useful as pleasure), the value of stimulation and suffering. It is finally compelled to say: everything that happens is acceptable to me, nothing is to be different. There are no needs that triumphs, because it has killed the passion for needs. All of this is expressed in religious terms as a complete acceptance of God's actions (for example, Epictetus)<sup>10</sup>

Throughout his career Nietzsche was pre-occupied with the problem as to why cultures lose their creativity and spiritedness and this is why the problem of decadence 'preoccupied [him] more profoundly than any other problem'.<sup>11</sup> Without this periodic trust in life, no culture can flourish, and so the assignment of value is a necessary condition for life itself. When we succeed in creating values that are potent and rich enough, we are able to endure suffering without succumbing to asceticism. For Nietzsche the noblest rationale for existence was one rooted in a triumphant Yes! To existence, a glorification of life. Such a rationale would be noble not only because it affirmed life *as it is*, without recourse to some utopian ideal, but also because it would admit to – and celebrate – the utter meaninglessness of life. The Stoics, by contrast, opted for anesthetics: they developed a philosophy that allowed them to refrain from participating in the messy world of politics, and focused on the cultivation of the self instead.

Without the Christian concepts of guilt and sin, the Stoics opt for aloofness and a purity that is immune to the taint of worldly events. The central Stoic distinction between what is mine and under rational control, and not mine and may require endurance, reduces the self to a one-dimensional phenomenon and lays the groundwork for what was to become the modern subject. The self's attitude, its inner composure, reflects its power as individual. From this perspective, action in the world does not constitute an important part of the individual's identity. I 'am' not so much what I do, but what my rational attitude is towards 'my' actions.

The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt sees this condition of *worldlessness* as the definition of the kind of human being that developed after the fall of the Roman republic. Her understanding of the concept 'world' can best be explained by referring to the pre-Socratic Greeks. An adversarial distinction between the public and private formed the essence of ancient Greek, as opposed to Hellenistic, political life. The *polis* was not a conglomerate of households, but a distinctly *public* domain that stood in an adversarial relationship to the *oikos*, or household. This is what the tragic Greeks understood as *world*; the term did not refer to nature, but to the common space that developed between public interlocutors, or *actors* upon the public stage. In her chapter on action in *The Human Condition*, Arendt cites the etymological link between the word *drama* and the Greek word *dran*, to *act*.<sup>12</sup> Shakespeare had it wrong. All the world is not a stage; rather the stage comprises a very specific place that derives its specificity from

being different from the rest of the world. This was the space in which politics happened. Hannah Arendt writes, 'According to Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is not only different, but stands in direct opposition to that organization whose centre is the home and the family'.<sup>13</sup> The world of this second organization is the world of laboring man, or *animal laborans*. It is not for nothing that the word 'labor' refers both to the activities that man have to perform in order to live, such as taking and transforming products from nature, and to the process of childbirth. Both involve biological necessity, which was for the Greeks the dark, unworthy world of women and slaves.

While labor conforms to the unceasing natural rhythms of growth and decay, a second activity, on the verge between public and private, divided these two spaces. This was *work*, which offered a limited degree of mastership over the world and a measure of stability 'over nature's ceaseless flux'.<sup>14</sup> Work is artificial; by surrounding himself with a large number of fabricated goods, man is able to create a world if not exactly immortal, at any rate less mortal than himself. In other words, labor allows man to survive, but the products of work survive man. The typical representatives of *Homo faber* are the artist, the lawgiver and the architect. They are the erectors of walls, literally and figuratively, that separate the human world from nature. Without them, there would be no space for the unfolding of the drama that is human life. One of their chief functions was to keep the shambolic world of 'nature' from intruding upon the truly *human* activity of engaging in public speech. That the Stoics denied this distinction, and even more, elevated the gory, chaotic world of nature as a standard to live by, meant that they too, succumbed to Platonic decadence.

The public sphere, the domain of free speech, is a world for those who want to *act*; it is a world for those who wish to dazzle with wit and the command of language without the need to show who they *really* are. By entering the web of public human relations, an agent or citizen is able to 'disclose himself', not *reveal* himself. Through acting and speaking, a unique human being discloses her individuality, herself as *sui generis*. Arendt puts this particularly tellingly:

In acting and speaking men show *who* they are, reveal actively their unique identities and thus make their appearance in the human world... This disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' a person is – his qualities, gifts, talents and shortcomings, which he may display or hide – is implicit in everything a person says or does... Without the disclosure of the person in the act, action loses its specific character and becomes one form of achievement among others.<sup>15</sup>

For Arendt, and the tragic Greeks, to act is, above all, to *begin* or take initiative, with all the unpredictability and unexpectedness that this implies.

The freedom that flows from action is a freedom both from natural necessity and from the limiting category of 'free' will, a tragic freedom that is distinctly opposed to the Stoic version of freedom as self-sufficiency. This form of freedom, *sovereignty*, is illusory, since by seeking an uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, the agent is removed from the 'spontaneous beginning of the new' that is involved in real freedom's tie with the necessary.

Freedom was made possible in the *polis* precisely by the acceptance, and sublimation of necessity in the form of fate, that backbone of tragic drama. For it is only where necessity is accepted as part of life that real spontaneous initiation can happen. Tragedy provides the best example; tragic action happens *between* the grand framework that fate sketches for the single individual, and the action that the single actor initiates. Thus Antigone knows beforehand the power that she opposes and the consequences of subverting Kreon's authority, but she nevertheless proceeds with an action that genuinely breaks open something that was not visible before in the world; her deed 'suddenly and unexpectedly disturbs the peaceful organization and movement of the ethical world'.<sup>16</sup> *Antigone* is the tragedy in which the *hypertragic* theme of irretrievable loss manifests itself. For Antigone there is no redemptive Colonus.

Tragic characters are so compelling because they are not subjects in the modernist sense of the word, but *narratives*. This is why, in Gadamerian terms, a truly tragic text (which goes beyond the dramatic *genre* of tragedy) can never be exhausted. That is to say, what Arendt calls the 'who', the character's genuine uniqueness, only appears to the spectator or reader, and never to the character him- or herself. Arendt draws on the classical notion of the *daimon* in order to explain:

It is more than likely that the 'who' which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remain hidden from the person himself, like the *daimon* in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.<sup>17</sup>

The Platonist, and Stoic, by contrast, are unable to wrench freedom from fate; they have to be *protected* from it. Rather than creating a risky *world*, the Stoics posited a kindly *nature*, which is *everywhere*. The tragic *daimon* becomes more concrete, and begins to resemble the Christian guardian angel.

Moreover, where the tragic Greeks valued friendship and disinterested relations, the Stoics elevated the intimate sphere of family to the highest order. The anti-political act *par excellence*! On earth, Epictetus believed, we are prisoners and in an earthly body. Marcus Aurelius's answer to this is that, since Zeus could not give the body freedom, he gave each man a spark of his own divinity. Since we all share a common father, '[w]e should

not say that "I am an Athenian", or "I am a Roman", but "I am a citizen of the universe". If you were a kinsman of Caesar, you would feel safe; how much more should you feel safe in being a kinsman of God'?<sup>18</sup>

This is of course a hope that goes back to Plato. All his dialogues betray a certain unease with the volatility of *polis* life, and the hope of finding a final solid truth that would render the idle speculation in the *agora* superfluous. But it was the condemnation of Socrates that made Plato despair of *polis* life (sentence construction). That Athens could condemn her noblest citizen to the hemlock was enough to let Plato turn his back upon the capriciousness of the public stage, and look for redemption from the human condition in the serenity of the eternal Ideas. Plato tried his best to create an anti-tragic figure in his fictional Socrates: rationally self-sufficient, impervious to events and sealed off from adversity. This did not mean that horrific events could not befall the good or just man, but rather that these events could not deprive him of his self-possession. In the *Symposium*, Socrates stands for hours motionless in the snow, apparently impervious to the cold and discomfort; in this text at least, he is an *honorary* Stoic. The tragic birth of philosophy engendered an almost two thousand year quest to escape the contingent. Stoicism is but one installment.

In contrast to this, the tragic hero experiences tragic learning as a radical divestiture, leaving him in a state of radical exposure to the greater contingent reality that surrounds him, as well as to the merciless gaze of the spectator and the endless analysis of the reader.

The Stoics, by contrast, took virtue out of the *polis* and equated it with living 'according to nature and right reason'. This ideal is, as we have seen, highly individualistic and universalistic; it is an ethical ideal of personal cultivation abstracted and divorced from the requirements of particular communities.

Stoicism in general is an inquiry into what is fitting for *man*, not what is the appropriate behavior for an Athenian or even a Hellene. Hence Cicero translates the Greek term *kathēkon* as *officium* or 'duty', introducing a legalistic term into ethics. Like Aristotle, Cicero conceives of virtue as a disposition in the soul of an individual, and sees it more as a matter of proper motive than a question of effective conduct. This means that the attainment of virtue is possible for anyone regardless of external circumstances. Like Socrates, Cicero sees the virtuous man as immune to tragedy.

Justice is the most attainable of all the cardinal virtues for the Stoics. Because justice for the Stoics refers to relations among people as members of the *cosmopolis* rather than the *polis*, of human society in general rather than relations among citizens of an elite city like Athens, the Stoics tend to define justice according to standard formulae of their day, general enough to express a rule that was thought to be in accordance with nature. Cicero

repeats the standard definition, according to which justice is 'to render to each his own'; this can include all kinds of valid claims, including family ties or societal position. This obviously lends itself to a legalistic interpretation according to which a person's legal rights are defined as that which is his *own* under law. Cicero mentions a number of examples familiar to the modern reader: respecting the distinction between common and private property, not harming others, contributing to the common welfare and assisting in the punishment of transgressors.<sup>19</sup>

It is, however, precisely by defining justice in such universalistic terms that it becomes unattainable, and philosophy sets itself up to be disappointed *ad infinitum*. For justice can only be realized in specific terms, under specific circumstances and according to specific rules under particular circumstances. Stoicism thus exhibits the oldest philosophical *arrogance*: the insistence upon reading its own particular ideals into 'nature' and thereby forcing nature to appear in the framework provided for her. It is an old story.

In your pride you want to dictate your morality, your ideal to nature, incorporate them into nature, of all things; you demand that nature be 'according to the Stoics', you would like to make all existence exist in according to your own image alone – for the great and unending glorification and universalization of Stoicism! With your love of truth, you force yourself to stare so long, so constantly, so hypnotically at nature that you see it *falsely*, that is stoically, and you become incapable of seeing it otherwise. And then out of some unfathomable arrogance you conceive the lunatic hope that *because* you know how to tyrannize yourself (Stoicism is self-tyranny), nature too can be tyrannized: for isn't the Stoic a *part* of nature?<sup>20</sup>

Stoicism indicates a withdrawal from the world and so we can say the Stoics begin to exhibit decadence. Not only that, however. From the passage cited above it is easy to see an early mindset of the colonizer: the world is to be encountered upon the terms set by Stoicism, or not at all. What Nietzsche calls 'negation' or decadence is shorthand for a refusal to meet the world as plurality, becoming, contradiction, and illusion. This negation regards this world and everything in it as worthless. If the world is not to be encountered in the mode chosen by the rational subject, it is rather not to be encountered at all! Taking this assertion as its point of departure, nihilism invents a 'true' world, one with all the attributes that worldly life does not have: stability, unity, happiness, goodness and, importantly for our purpose, 'truth'. The division of the two worlds, a feat first undertaken by Plato, is the nihilistic act *par excellence*. All metaphysical values, and indeed all categories of intelligibility, implicitly contain a will to negate and slander life.

---

1. It should be pointed out at this stage that, although Nietzsche drew upon the Stoic idea of natural cycles for his doctrine of eternal recurrence, his understanding is definitely

more historical and even spiritual in nature than the more materialist Stoic doctrine.

2. See for example *The Gay Science* section 290.
3. Epictetus. *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian: Books I-II*. Cambridge: (Mass.) Harvard University Press, 1998, p.35.
4. Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 4.
5. Brunschwick J. 'Stoic Metaphysics' in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*. Edited by Brad Inwood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 207.
6. Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9. From: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: The Modern Library, 2000.
7. Nietzsche, F. *The Genealogy of Morals*, third essay, section 28. From: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: The Modern Library, 2000, p. 598. Hereafter *GM*.
8. KSA 9, 12[140, 141], 600.
9. Nietzsche, F, *ibid*, *GM* II, section 16.
10. KSA 9, 15 [55], 652-653.
11. Nietzsche, F. *Kritische Studiaausgabe in 15 Bände*. Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1980, Band 3, p.371.
12. Arendt, H, *The Human Condition*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956, p. 188. Hereafter *HC*.
13. Arendt, H, *HC*, p. 185.
14. Arendt, H, *HC*, p. 152.
15. Arendt, H. *HC*, p. 182.
16. Hegel, G.W.F. *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 171.
17. Arendt, *HC*, p. 179 -180.
18. Quoted by Bertrand Russell in *The History of Western Philosophy*. London: Unwin University Books, 1961.
19. Cicero. *De Officiis*. I.20, chapter 7.
20. Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 9.