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**IMPACTS AND CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL INTEGRATION ON
INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY**

**By
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Declaration

I, Siphumelele Ernest Duma, declare that this thesis entitled “Impacts and Contribution of Developmental Integration on Industrialisation in the Southern African Development Community”, which I hereby submit for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (International Relations) in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria is my own work. It has not been previously submitted for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

Siphumelele Ernest Duma

December 2021

Dedication

To my late mother, Bongiwe Gamede, 1969 – 2005.

I was only eleven when you passed; however, I can still vividly remember all the great expectations you had of me as your only son. I am doing my best to live up to them.

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Abstract

This study examines the impacts and contribution of developmental integration on the regional industrialisation process in SADC, focusing on Botswana and Mauritius from 1992 to 2020. Developmental integration is an approach to regional integration adopted by SADC on its transformation in 1992 to deal with the developmental challenges of the region. The study's objective is to determine whether this initiative has contributed to the increase in the significance of the manufacturing sector in the SADC region. Furthermore, to understand, if so, what accounts for the failure of developmental integration to accelerate the industrialisation process in the SADC region. Textbooks, e-books, articles in scientific journals, government and organisational reports were deployed as data collection methods. The region's economic indicators were examined to measure the significance of the manufacturing sector to the industrial GDP and the total GDP. Despite adopting the mentioned developmental initiative, the collected data suggest that SADC economies are de-industrialising as the manufacturing sector's significance is too little and has also been in decline for years, especially in the specified member states. Lack of coordination between national industrial policies, regional industrialisation and developmental integration objectives impedes the regional industrialisation process. Growth continues to be driven by mining and other natural resource-related activities, with little or no diversification towards the manufacturing sector. The study recommends a synchronisation of national and regional industrialisation strategies. Member states would formulate national industrialisation strategies according to the regional industrialisation agenda. This is precisely because regional initiatives are not of any value if the participating member states do not align their national strategies to them.

Keywords: SADC, Regional Integration, Developmental Integration, Industrialisation, Structural Change, Neo-structuralism, GDP.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDA	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa
AU	African Union
BDC	Botswana Development Corporation
BECI	Botswana Export Credit Insurance and Guarantee Company
BMC	Botswana Meat Commission
DOE	Domestic Oriented Enterprises
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EPI	Export Promotion Industrialisation
EPZ	Export Processing Zones
FAP	Financial Assistance Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLS	Front-Line States
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDDA	Industrial Development Decade for Africa
IDPF	Industrial Development Policy Framework
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
IUMP	Industrial Upgrading and Modernisation Programme

LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MVA	Manufacturing Value Added
NIC	Newly Industrialising Nations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RDF	Regional Development Fund
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs	Small Medium Enterprises
UCLA	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
UJCI	University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

1. Chapter One: Introduction to the Study

1.1. Introduction

Following political independence, integration in pursuit of developmental objectives like industrialisation became a defining feature in Africa and Latin America (Asante, 1997: 06). However, due to the colonial legacy of balkanisation, developing countries were not connected, characterised by narrow individual domestic markets (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992; Briceño Ruiz, 2017). Thus, after independence in the 1950s, they established a link between regional integration and development (Aworawo, 2016; Soderbaum and Brodin, 2016), especially industrialisation. For instance, during the early years of post-independence Africa, collective intervention in the economy appeared to have been put at the centre of the quest for industrialisation. This is evident when judging from the articulations on plans and treaties adopted by the continent during this period. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 1980-2000, serves as a perfect example in this instance. This plan sought to ensure the African continent's self-sufficiency, through the creation of the industrial base in each member state, designed to meet the interest of that country and strengthened by complementary activities at the sub-regional and regional level (Organization of African Unity, 1980: 15).

Furthermore, this is also evident in the Abuja Treaty, seeking to establish the African Economic Community through a gradual integration of the Regional Economic Communities (REC) (OAU, 1991). Thus, industrialisation and economic transformation have been pursued through the developmental integration approach for the most part of post-independence Africa. Through this approach to integration and development, the objective of integration becomes more economical, with major collective interventions in the quest to address the prevailing economic and other development challenges by the participating states (Haarløv, 1997:30).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the continent's RECs, through which it seeks to establish the African Economic Community, as provided in the Abuja Treaty (OAU, 1991). SADC was initially established in 1980, formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). It only became a development community in 1992, after its transformation to deal with development issues of the southern African region (SADC, 1992; Schoeman, 2002). This transformation was noted in the SADC Treaty (1992) as

having resulted from a desire to achieve development, economic growth, and industrialisation, among other objectives. During the first decade of its existence from 1980, SADCC had a political agenda. It was mainly to unite the region against the apartheid South Africa, which had an economic and political destabilisation policy against the southern African region (Patel, 1987). Thus, the SADCC founders sought to achieve economic independence through regional cooperation and development (Schoeman, 2002). This initiative was launched by nine SADC states that had already gained independence by the late 1970s, referred to as the Front-Line States (FLS). These countries included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Lee, 2002: 44). After its transformation in 1992, SADC focused on developmental integration, with industrialisation as one of its key objectives (SADC, 1992).

Having adopted developmental integration on its transformation, SADC has adopted several initiatives in the quest for industrialisation, including the Industrial Upgrading and Modernization Programme of 2009, the Industrial Development Policy Framework of 2012, and the Industrialisation Strategy of 2015. Across all these initiatives, the development and strengthening of the manufacturing industry are underscored. The SADC industrialisation strategy notes that implementation of the industrial policy is primarily undertaken at the national level; and further underscores the significance of forging a compact for the industry made of government, the private sector, civil society, and labour (SADC 2015). It also notes that “the industrial policy must be crafted within the context of a country’s competitive advantage. This requires deliberate and induced interventions to enhance factor accumulation to raise total and factor productivity. This implies the direct or induced shift of resources to more dynamic higher productivity” (SADC 2015).

Against this backdrop, this study examines the impacts and contribution of developmental integration on regional industrialisation in the SADC, with a specific focus on Botswana and Mauritius from 1992 to 2020. This is done against the region’s objective to develop and strengthen the manufacturing industry as the main driver of the economic growth and the only one capable of self-sustaining productivity increases.

As demonstrated in chapter six, despite adopting the mentioned developmental and industrialisation initiatives, data shows that SADC economies have been de-industrialising in the past three decades, since 1990 (SADC, 2020b; World Bank, 2020). This is despite growths

experienced by the region's economies in recent years, especially in the early 2000s (Hillbom, 2008; Chikabwi, Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019; UNCTAD, 2020; UNIDO, 2020d). The focus of most studies concerning the SADC region has been predominantly on economic growth (Rossouw, 2006; Jan Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016; Nizeimana and Nhema, 2016; Byiers, Vanheukelom and Woolfrey, 2018), with no attention to the sectoral composition of GDP.

The growth of most SADC economies, especially in the early 2000s, has been correctly attributed to the commodity prices boom. When the prices and demand shocks kicked in, the economies started to decline (UJCI, 2017; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). Among the fastest-growing economies, China and India had a growing demand for primary commodities leading up to the early 2000s. However, in the mid-2000s, China embarked on a new economic growth path, which saw a decline in its demand for primary commodities (UNECA, 2015; Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018).

In the case of Botswana and Mauritius, for instance, several studies have concluded that these two countries have had miraculous growths in the past years (Cobbe and Samatar, 1999; Subramanian, 2009; Frankel, 2010; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). However, a closer look into their sectoral composition suggests that there has been a limited structural transformation (UNCTAD, 2020; WDI, 2020). With Botswana's growth mainly inspired by the mining sector, specifically diamonds, Mauritius jumped to the service sector without a substantial manufacturing base (Hillbom, 2008; Gore, 2020; UNCTAD, 2020). In Chapter Six, Data Presentation and Analysis, these two cases (Botswana and Mauritius) are dealt with in detail. Thus, this study's investigation of the impacts and contribution of developmental integration on industrialisation pays attention to a shift in the structural composition of the economies under investigation; instead of only observing conciliatory economic growth, as predominantly the case in the existing literature.

1.2. Background of the study

Figure 1-1: SADC Member States Geographical Map



Source: SADC (2020)

In 1991 African leaders made a clarion call to establish the African Economic Community (AEC) through the adoption of the Abuja Treaty. This was set to be achieved through a gradual integration of the regional economic communities (RECs) continental-wide (OAU, 1991). Thus, the treaty called for strengthening the RECs and establishment where they did not exist (Africa Union, Abuja Treaty, 1991: Article 6). As a result, SADC is one of the eight African continent's RECs recognised as building blocks of African integration, as stipulated in the Abuja Treaty (1991). Other RECs are; Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (African Union, 2021).

Most of these RECs were in existence and operating at the time of signing the Abuja treaty; They share common economic transformation and development goals, including poverty eradication (Hailu, 2014). Most importantly, together, they pursue the African Economic Community (OAU, 1991). The rationale for integration in the African continent is based on the realisation that colonisers balkanised the continent for their economic benefit. Thus, the continent wanted to pool their efforts, ideas and resource for common prosperity (Ndikumana, 1999; Kah, 2012; Jiboku, 2017; Monyae and Nganje, 2019; Moyo, 2020b). In the late 1960s, Reginald Green and Ann Seidman (1969), the authors of “Pan Africanism: Unity or Poverty”, contented that it is a well-known fact that the African continent was balkanised into these current smaller economic units; thus, there ought to be a formation of integrated regional bodies consisting of several of these states.

The interest of the colonising powers was to extract raw materials for exportation to feed the industrial machine in Europe. This left the continent’s manufacturing at the small-scale levels, only producing for exports. This meant no industrial infrastructure for the continent, as all else was built to facilitate the shipment of minerals out of the continent (Nzau, 2010). Thus, when combined, they noted, these states would make a more extensive demand base, allowing industries to take advantage of the economies of scale when producing goods and services. The market size argument has been employed to justify RECs to roll back the balkanisation of various parts of the continent, as 35 of 54 African states have populations of less than 15 million people (Statista, 2021).

The year 1992 saw the signing of the SADC Treaty, which transformed the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Several objectives were stated in the treaty for this transformation, including achieving development, industrialisation and economic growth, enhancing the standard of living and the quality of lives of the peoples of southern Africa, and giving the necessary support to the socially disadvantaged (SADC, 1992). However, according to Schoeman (2002), this transformation had more economic driving forces than political security forces characteristic of the establishment of SADCC a little over a decade earlier. In the same vein, Zondi and Mulaudzi (2010) have argued that the reform of the SADCC to SADC sought to overcome the former’s weaknesses which overemphasised political and security considerations over economic and development. This would

see a balancing act between objectives to establish a political community through collective security and the establishment of initiatives that seek to advance development and industrialisation (Zondi and Mulaudzi, 2010).

However, it has also been argued that SADCC's transformation reflected a closing to the era of Cold War proxy wars on the continent, which ended in the early 1990s (Schoeman, 2002; Evans, 2010). Furthermore, there was an anticipated end to the Total Strategy and apartheid state in South Africa and optimism about the potential of regional cooperation and development among the newly liberated states (Evans, 2010). The Total Strategy refers to the then South African Apartheid government policy that sought to destabilise the southern African region under Pieter William Botha, the country's Prime Minister, between 1978 and 1989. This was mainly in the quest to be aggressive towards its neighbours who would try to assist the South African liberation movements (Peters-Berries, 2010).

From its transformation, the policy formulation and implementation in SADC would be expected to be developmental in approach, seeking to industrialise the region and enhance the economic growth and development (Evans, 2010; Faizel Ismail, 2018). This is also emphasised by the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020–2030, which envisages an industrialised region where citizens enjoy sustainable economic well-being (SADC, 2020a). Its three underpinning pillars are industrial development and market integration, infrastructure development in support of regional integration, and social and human capital development. In addition, the SADC RISDP and Vision 2050 further recognise member countries' political and economic diversities and aim to address many production and efficiency barriers arising from the region's underdevelopment (SADC, 2020a).

As also noted by Nyirabu (2004) that, the asymmetric balances characteristic of the Southern African region have to be considered when discussing the region's integration. This is because the member states' varying levels of development have a significant contribution to the way individual countries respond to their regional commitments (Lee, 2003; Nyirabu, 2004; Peters-Berries, 2010). Thus, RISDP identifies several priority areas for regional development, of which industrial development is priority number one (SADC, 2020a). These include a pledge to create a conducive environment through infrastructure development and the acceleration of resource mobilisation to fund the region's industrialisation process (SADC, 2020a).

The literature is consistent on that, as in the rest of the African continent, the imperative of industrialisation in SADC has become more crucial than ever (Faizel Ismail, 2018; Nubong, 2018; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). Adebani (2017:02) has noted that SADC is endowed with abundant natural resources, including minerals; however, they co-exist with poverty. This is primarily a result of the non-industrial background of the region (Adebani, 2017: 03). Therefore, diversifying the regional economies' economic activities and structural composition favouring manufacturing would give a fair chance to address unemployment, poverty, and persistent inequality in the region's member states (Signé and Johnson, 2018). To fast track the industrialisation process, SADC has adopted a wide variety of policy initiatives over the years, such as the Industrial Upgrading and Modernization Programme (IUMP) of 2009, the Industrial Development Policy Framework (IDPF) of 2012, and the Industrialisation Strategy and road map of 2015. Further to that, regional economies seek to diversify their economic activities away from heavy reliance on commodities, as they make them vulnerable to external price and demand shocks (Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014; Page, 2018).

The adoption of the IDPF in 2012 by the SADC's Committee of Ministers was intended for it to serve as the basis for consultations in member states to develop a coherent industrial policy framework and strategies in the region (SADC, 2012). It served as the foundation for the region's imminent industrialisation strategy and road map. The strategy and its roadmap, among other things, seek to enhance SADC economies' productive capacity and competitiveness. The industrialisation strategy also enjoins SADC member states to collectively work towards a developmental macroeconomic framework that prioritises inclusive growth, economic diversification, the enhanced competitiveness of the region, as well as deeper regional integration (SADC, 2015). McCarthy (2014) correctly argued that much as formulating a new industrialisation strategy and the roadmap is desirable and necessary, it is insufficient for the much-needed structural transformation in the SADC region. Successful industrialisation in the 21st century requires the capacity and will to strategically navigate complex and sometimes contradictory processes (Lowitt, 2017).

Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014) have argued that one of the main challenges to SADC's realisation of higher levels of growth and development has been creating an environment that would inspire sustained growth rates. The authors further maintain that the provision of such an

environment would yield sustainable growth and promote economic integration in the region (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014). However, while member states have looked to the successful South-East Asian model, they have failed to capacitate the state to lead economic development (UNCTAD, 2013; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019). Thus, SADC member countries continue to see lower GDP growth rates, derailing the region's industrialisation and economic development objectives (Moyo, 2020a).

According to Evans (2010), the interplay of a set of global, regional, and national factors has worked against the emergence of a competitive industrial base in the SADC region over the past decades. She mostly underscored that the region faultily embraced the neoliberal economic development paradigm on the heels of its transformation over its chosen developmental regional integration. This is as a result of the region's early commitment to the free-market approach, which according to Evans, further perpetuates the existing asymmetries and inequalities in the region (Evans, 2010). However, several authors have argued that the conditionalities for loans by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank forced SADC countries to embrace neoliberal ideals, including trade liberalisation (Schoeman, 2002; Peters-Berries, 2010; Zondi and Mulaudzi, 2010).

1.3. Statement of the Problem

At the centre of the debate on the perpetual differences in manufacturing sector productivity and its growth among nations is the quest to understand what influences manufacturing productivity growth (Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017). In the SADC region, the low manufacturing capacity has been charged as being responsible for the lack of sustained economic growth (Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Nubong, 2018). The SADC region has been characterised by heavy reliance on the export of primary commodities and semi-finished goods. The large shares of GDP in the SADC have been reported to originate mainly from agriculture and mining, the primary production sector (UJCI, 2017; SADC, 2020a). According to Innocent Gore (2020), the share of manufacturing to GDP in the SADC region has not industrialised. This prompts the examination of the developmental integration approach to the industrialisation process in the region. This indicates that the question is not whether SADC should industrialise but which approach to industrialisation would be suitable for the region. It calls for a

systematic examination of the one currently in place; to see its effectiveness since its adoption in 1992.

In a region pursuing developmental integration like SADC, which has put forward various initiatives to drive the industrial process, it is imperative to examine if there is a manifestation of the achievements of developmental integration in regional economies. This is necessitated by the fact that the effectiveness or success of regional strategies is never guaranteed. However, as indicated earlier, the study focuses on only two SADC member states, namely Botswana and Mauritius. This is primarily because these two member states' economies are known to have traditionally relied on primary production for growth and development; this would enable the researcher to determine whether there has been a shift in the structural composition of their economies away from the primary production towards manufacturing. Furthermore, time constraints and the scope of the study would not allow the investigation of all 16 SADC members.

Therefore, the study aims to investigate the impact of developmental integration on the industrialisation processes in the SADC region, with a particular focus on the stated cases, to understand whether it has accelerated this process. Accordingly, the study raises the following questions.

1.4. Research question

What is the impact of the developmental integration approach on industrialisation in the SADC?

Sub-questions

- What is the contribution of developmental integration to manufacturing activities in the SADC region?
- How has developmental integration accelerated the industrialisation process in the SADC region?
- What is the manufacturing industry's contribution to the transformation of economies in the SADC region?

- Why, if so, has developmental integration not accelerated the industrialisation process in the SADC region?

1.5. Objectives of the study

- To examine the effects of developmental integration on the manufacturing industry of the SADC region.
- To investigate the impact of developmental integration on the industrialisation process in the SADC.
- To find out if regional strategies contribute to the increase in the significance of the manufacturing sector in economic output in the SADC region.
- To understand, if so, what accounts for the failure of developmental integration to accelerate the industrialisation process in the SADC region.

1.6. Purpose and justification of the study

There have been a lot of scholarly endeavours on the African continent's lack of industrial development. It has been argued that the only way African countries can start addressing the growing challenges of poverty and unemployment is through the transformation of their economies by way of industrialisation (Page, 2011; Ajakaiye and Page, 2012; Byiers, Karaki and Woolfrey, 2018; Moyo, 2020b). According to Adebani (2017: 02), much of this has been triggered by the co-existence of abundant natural resources with extreme poverty. The search for effective initiatives for industrialisation is ongoing in the SADC. It has been over 25 years since SADC adopted developmental integration in 1992 to industrialise, among other objectives. What has happened during this period in regional industrialisation?

When examining the state of integration and development in the SADC region, several studies do it from the market integration perspective, focusing on the linear approach to integration, and assessing economic growth, indiscriminately. This approach admires economic growth and overlooks the need for structural change and industrialisation, which would be demonstrated by a significant contribution to the GDP by the manufacturing industry. Thus, most studies concerning

the SADC region have been predominantly on economic growth, with no attention to the sectoral composition of GDP. Furthermore, too little is being said about the fact that the region adopted the developmental integration approach on its transformation, for example, as noted by Tsie (1996); Evans (2010); Lowitt (2017); and Zondi (2020).

However, developmental integration's effectiveness and relevance in the region's pursuit of industrialisation need to be examined. Thus, this study contributes to the body of literature by addressing these shortcomings. It is worthwhile conducting a study that seeks to investigate how the current approach to regional integration has been able to drive the industrialisation process; through systematic investigation of its impact on the increase or decrease of manufacturing activities in the region. While also paying sufficient attention to a shift in the sectoral composition of the economies under investigation, instead of only examining conciliatory economic growth, as predominantly the case in the existing literature.

1.7. Definition of Key Concepts

This section deals with the definition of the key concepts of the study. These concepts are developmental integration and industrialisation. They have various definitions in the literature, depending on the author and the context in which they are used. The idea is to show how they are defined in the literature and extrapolate from definitions to indicate what they mean in the context of this study. As an approach to economic transformation by a group of states in a particular region, this study assumes that developmental integration can influence the industrialisation process of the participating member states. This is because it involves collective interventions in various areas to tackle multiple development challenges, including the lack of industrialisation. There are debates and controversies surrounding conceptualising, differentiating, classifying and typifying regional integration and regional cooperation in relation to African integration. However, that is beyond the scope of this thesis as it focuses on developmental integration as an approach to regional integration in the SADC region.

1.7.1. Developmental Integration

In conceptualising developmental integration, it is essential to state that it is an approach to regional integration. The latter has become an important defining feature of the world system in the 21st century (Dent, 2008). This means it would be hard to make an adequate sense of

developmental integration without referring to the concept of regional integration first. Regional integration involves a process of constant and increasing interaction in the economic and political arena among a group of countries, eventually leading to interdependence (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015). According to Peters-Berries (2010: 14), regional integration as a concept promises an increase to the wealth and well-being not just of one, but several member states at a rate higher than when countries pursue these objectives individually. This is because the integrating member states have access to each other's markets and establish mechanisms that maximise the benefits of their interaction (Haarløv, 1997: 15). Moreover, this interaction seeks to “overcome divisions that impede the flow of goods, services, capital, people and ideas” (World Bank Group, 2020).

This way, regional integration appealed to many economists and politicians. Peters-Berries (2010) breaks down the rationale for regional integration into two; the economic and political. The former includes the market size, welfare, development funding and globalisation. While the latter include security, democratic convergence, and putting together what belongs together (Peters-Berries, 2010: 19). The economic objectives of integration, and to some extent the political, are pursued through RECs, as is the case in the African continent. RECs are defined as integrating economic units and nations to reduce policy barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital and labour (Baier *et al.* 2008).

On the other hand, developmental integration is a development-based integration agenda seeking to secure the benefits of regional integration. This includes ensuring that such benefits flow to all member states (UNECA, 2013; Faizel Ismail, 2018; Zondi, 2020). This is because regional integration has mainly benefited richer countries than the poor ones in the developing regions (Yongo-Bure, 2015; Aworawo, 2016). Therefore, developmental integration activities mainly entail several initiatives seeking to close the region's development gap (Dent and Richter, 2013). For example, since the developing regions (countries) have a little productive capacity, the efficiency maximisation of existing capacity is not the focus point. However, the focus is on building a more substantial productive capacity (Lee, 2003: 24); And enhancing the integration of member countries in the regional economy (UNCTAD, 2013).

This makes developmental integration, as a concept, appear more concerned with strengthening the linkages between particular integrational processes and development capacity objectives, as opposed to the regional integration per se. Regional integration per se, according to Dent and

Richter (2013), comprises the passive integration of the economic liberalisation and deregulation policy. Its referral to as passive regional integration is due to its focus on removing intra-trade barriers without paying enough attention to the formation of coordinated technical policy elements among partners (Dent, 2008). What, thus, sets developmental integration apart from regional integration per se is that developmental integration is inherently more focused on the proactive integration processes as these are more naturally aligned to development capacity-building cooperation (Dent and Richter, 2013).

The concept of developmental integration is more often associated with countries at the early stages of their development. Thus, it sanctions more intervention by the respective governments in the economy (Lee, 2002), through industrial policy. As a result, it becomes necessary to develop a productive capacity and enhance competitiveness to integrate domestic businesses into the regional economy and compete globally (UNCTAD, 2013). Industrial policy refers to a conscious attempt by the government of a defined territory to catalyse the development and growth of domestic firms or sectors or to promote structural transformation (Odijie, 2018).

Within the context of this study, this is happening at the regional level and cascade down to the national. This is usually supported by deploying several policy measures, including the suspension of trade with countries considered more experienced (Rodrik, 2008). Given this environment, local firms would see productivity increase, which would enable them to be more competitive (Rodrik, 2008; Andreoni and H.-J. Chang, 2019; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019). The idea becomes the initiation of activities to enhance less developed countries' economic capacity and prospects to strengthen their incorporation into the regional economy (Sloan, 1971).

Developmental integration makes three changes to the integration agenda pertaining to problems created by the market integration, according to Haarløv (1997: 30). These involve the objective of the integration process, the timing and level of interstates binding commitments, and the distribution of costs and benefits (Haarløv, 1997: 32). In terms of the timing and level of interstate binding commitment, as opposed to the market integration approach where binding commitments between the member states of an integration group, and indeed the creation of the supranational institutions come at a later stage, in the developmental integration common rules and regulations are seen as a backbone for furthering the integration among countries. Furthermore, the distribution of costs and benefits ensures that regional integration proceeds are equitably distributed among

member states because integration in the developing regions always risks polarisation. Thus compensatory measures are implemented to eliminate the unequal distribution of gains (Haarløv, 1997: 32).

Developmental integration is frequently used interchangeably with developmental regionalism in the literature; though they have similarities, they also have distinguishing characteristics. Developmental regionalism seeks to promote a gradual and sequenced trade liberalisation through policy actions that aim to build the productive capacities of member states. Its emphasis is on promoting intra-regional trade and integration into the global economy (Dent and Richter, 2013). However, much as it overlaps with developmental integration in the quest to develop member states' productive capacities, they differ in that the state is at the centre of developmental integration. In contrast, developmental regionalism has a region at the centre (Ismail, 2017).

There are several roles that the region can play in the quest for economic transformation. According to Chandra (1992: 93), they include facilitative, regulative and direct production. This study will focus on the facilitative role of the developmental integration approach, which includes financial incentives and marketing assistance. Facilitative measures aim to enable production sectors to maximise productivity (Chandra, 1992; Dent, 2008). These forms of intervention in the context of this study will be understood as measures to foster industrialisation in the SADC region. Thus, in this context, developmental integration means the integration of a group of countries of a particular region to deliberate on measures to collectively overcome their developmental challenges, which include the lack of industrialisation. This is with the understanding that there is a wide variety of cooperation areas by integrating countries in developmental integration; however, the focus of this study is cooperation on industrialisation.

1.7.2. Industrialisation

Different agencies and writers have variously defined the concept of industrialisation. However, these definitions have common points, though not always explicit, like the growth of the manufacturing sector, accompanied by the mechanisation of production specialisation and capital intensiveness (Rao, 1979). According to Simandan (2009), it generally refers to a set of economic and social processes related to discovering more efficient ways to create value. In his general conceptualisation of industrialisation, Simandan (2009) makes a rather very crucial point; that

industrialisation is not an event but rather a process. He states that if a single entrepreneur opens a manufacturing industry in an agricultural region or society, it would be illogical to label that industrialisation. However, suppose a collection of events of this same kind achieves higher significance in the regional economy. In that case, scholars and policymakers are entitled to refer to it as the industrialisation process (Simandan, 2009).

Another crucial fact Simandan (2009) emphasised concerning industrialisation is a distinction between quantitative economic growth and qualitative economic change. While the former refers to an increase in a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the latter refers to the structural change in a given economy. He states that it is inappropriate to refer to it as the industrialisation process if an already industrialised region witnesses the opening of new industrial plants; rather it should be labelled as continuing industrial growth or economic growth. The author insists that the industrialisation concept should strictly refer to the qualitative economic change, which occurs when an agricultural economy becomes to such an extent affected by the opening of new industrial plants; it becomes misleading to continue referring to it as an agrarian economy (Simandan, 2009).

Contrary to Simandan's modern conceptualisation of industrialisation, which also refers to the social processes, historically, it has been chiefly associated with the development experience of the countries in Western Europe and North America (Nzau, 2010). During the 19th and 20th centuries, it mainly referred to the market departure from the subsistence economy towards a more mechanised production system (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009a; Nzau, 2010; Tilly, 2010; Schmitz, 2011). During this period, industrialisation was mainly defined economically, especially the industrial plants carrying out manufacturing activities. Consequently, the country's industrialisation was measured primarily by the percentage of industries engaged in manufacturing (Nzau, 2010). While this study adopted this rather traditional conceptualisation of industrialisation given its objectives, it understands its limitations. As such, it is essential to underscore that it is conscious of other indicators of the industrialisation process (like social-related ones), other than manufacturing and its contribution to a given economy's GDP.

Industrialisation has been understood to be the primary underpinning path to economic development for every economy. This has been the case since the experience of the industrial revolution and later the East Asian growth miracle (Opoku and Yan, 2019). Thus, how fast the developing countries dissociate themselves from poverty has been historically determined by their

ability to diversify their economies and transition to manufacturing, away from agriculture (McMillan, Rodrik and Sepúlveda, 2017). The manufacturing sector is seen as the economy's engine, the main sector driving economic growth. An increase in manufacturing activities output yields higher productivity through the interaction between economic activities (Opoku and Yan, 2019). Therefore, its growth can be identified as a key independent variable in relation to the industrialisation process (Rao, 1979).

The process of industrialisation prompts the establishment of industries and sectors that lead to an improvement in the outcome of the allocation of resources (Moyo, 2016). However, Chandra (1992) has argued that industrial growth in and of itself is insufficient for industrialisation as other sectors could raise their output at a similar rate. He notes that the importance of the manufacturing industry should increase more rapidly than other sectors to signal industrialisation (Chandra, 1992: 4). Thus, in this context, industrialisation means the process of the rise of the manufacturing activities in the SADC region and a significant increase in the share of the manufacturing industry in GDP. The researcher is conscious of the critical voices towards GDP as a measure of growth and development, as is systematically questioned by scholars like Lorenzo Fioramonti (2013) in his book entitled "Gross Domestic Problem". However, in this context, GDP will be used as an indicator to measure trends and significance of the manufacturing sector, as opposed to assuming that its growth means development by default.

1.8. The organisation of the study

Chapter One: Introduction to the study

This chapter introduces the study's research theme, rationale, justification, and background. Then, the chapter states the main question and sub-questions of the thesis, namely, what has been the impact of developmental integration strategy on the SADC region's industrialisation process? How has developmental integration accelerated the industrialisation process in the SADC region? What is the contribution of development integration to manufacturing activities in the SADC region? What is the manufacturing industry's contribution to the transformation of economies in the SADC region? Finally, this chapter justifies why the study of this nature should be undertaken, indicating

that the literature neglected some methodologies in studying the SADC region's integration. Thus, noting that it seeks to fill this gap.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines the study's theoretical framework. Its theory of choice is neo-structuralism. It argues that neo-structuralism is the best theory available in studying the issue of development and industrialisation in the developing countries, not only because it originated from there, but mainly because it has a sophisticated understanding of structural heterogeneity and other issues that continuously impedes the industrialisation and development process in the developing regions. Moreover, it understands that such regions have very specific challenges and that approaches to deal with them would vary from one region to another, as opposed to neoliberalism that assumes the universal applicability of its development and industrialisation assumptions. Effectively, neo-structuralism argues in favour of state intervention in developing countries to deal with these challenges and foster industrialisation. This is primarily because such an undertaking could not be left in the hands of the markets, given their profit motives, argue neo-structuralists.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

Chapter Three, the literature review, deals with the literature on regional and developmental integration in pursuit of industrialisation in the African continent in general, SADC in particular. The idea was to understand arguments surrounding this topic in the body of literature. It demonstrates the debates in relation to an ideal approach to industrialisation and regional development. Thus, theoretical arguments on developmental integration and industrialisation are engaged to lay the context for this study. It is noted that developmental integration is an ideal approach to regional integration in developing regions that seek industrialisation and sustainable development. Furthermore, arguments that justify the significance of industrialisation, especially in the developing regions, are engaged.

Chapter Four: Research Methodology

Chapter four systematically discusses the study's research methodology. It provides a detailed account of the methods deployed by the study to collect, analyse, and interpret data to meet the study's objective. It outlines the researcher's philosophical approach, research design, research methodology, data sources, methods of data analysis as well as limitations of the study. Given that in answering its central question, this study focuses on particular cases within the SADC region, the researcher justifies selecting two specific member states among sixteen.

Chapter Five: SADC's Industrialisation Through Developmental Integration

SADC's industrialisation through developmental integration. This chapter mainly deals with the economic setting of the SADC region and the initiatives that the region has adopted in pursuit of industrialisation. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the nature of the industrialisation initiatives adopted by the African continent in the post-independence era. The literature reveals the dire nature of the continent's economies following the oil prices shock of the early 1970s and how that inspired the continent to intensify its quest for industrialisation to ensure self-sustenance and reliance. The developmental relationship between the then OAU, later AU and the continent's regional economic communities are discussed, as RECs were tasked by the treaty establishing the African Economic Community to pursue developmental objectives at the regional levels. More importantly, the chapter discusses what is responsible for the failure of the post-independence industrialisation in the continent, despite the adoption of several of them. The chapter reveals how the colonial masters denied the African economies any chance at industrialisation, which inspired an inward-looking approach to industrialisation shortly after independence.

Chapter Six: Data Presentation and Analysis

Chapter six mainly provides the data concerning the industrialisation process in the SADC region. As the central chapter of this thesis, this one discusses and analyses data concerning the SADC region's industrialisation process. It presents a case for developmental integration and industrialisation in the SADC region, using two member states, namely Botswana and Mauritius.

These two SADC member states have been noted in the literature as the region's most successful developmental states. Its idea is to respond to the main question and sub-questions raised by the study. First, what has been the impact of developmental integration strategy on the SADC region's industrialisation process? How has developmental integration accelerated the industrialisation process in the SADC region? Third, what is the contribution of development integration to manufacturing activities in the SADC region? Fourth, what is the manufacturing industry's contribution to the transformation of economies in the SADC region? Why, if so, has developmental integration failed to accelerate the industrialisation process in the SADC region. It is argued that despite the adoption of several initiatives in pursuit of industrialisation in the region, the region still lacks industrialisation, with the manufacturing sector's share of GDP having been in a consistent decline for several years.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Chapter seven concludes the study by doing a thorough recap of what the study intended to do and whether it did achieve its objectives and making recommendations based on the nature of the study's findings and suggestions for future research. It is concluded that the SADC region's developmental integration has not inspired a sustainable industrialisation process, and there is still a long way to go if the region is to achieve this objective. It is noted that member states need to deploy effective resource mobilisation mechanisms and the implementation and follow up mechanism for the region's industrialisation strategies.

1.9. Conclusion

The chapter sought to introduce the study, thereby giving its background, statement of the problem, research question and sub-questions, objectives of the study, as well as the rationale and justification of the study. It was indicated that the SADC's developmental integration agenda has adopted several initiatives to accelerate the region's industrialisation process. Thus, it is the impact of these developmental integration initiatives that the study seeks to examine, given that the effectiveness is never guaranteed. The chapter noted that while several studies usually assess integration from the market integration perspective in the SADC region, mainly looking at

economic growth, and linear integration, it seeks to depart from this trend by examining the impact of developmental integration in the region's industrialisation process, with focus on the sectoral composition and structural composition of the economies under investigation. It is noted that despite the adoption of these initiatives, the industrialisation levels and structural transformation are yet to be realised in the region. The next chapter deals with the theoretical framework of the study, neo-structuralism.

2. Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to outline the theoretical framework of this study, which is neo-structuralism. It is a theory of development economics that sees the poorly diversified production structures and specialisation on primary production as the main sources of developing country's industrialisation and development challenges (Oman and Wignaraja, 1991; Bielschowsky, 2009). Accordingly, they view economic development and industrialisation as involving fundamental changes in economic structures (French-Davis and Torres, 2020). The main structures they deem to require fundamental change include the weight and productivity levels of different economic activities in the overall economy, such as manufacturing, mining, and services (Leiva, 2008). However, neo-structuralism has maintained that industrialisation and economic development do not just come naturally; but could only be achieved through active government intervention as the markets on their own are not capable of initiating this process (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992: 131). Hence, they argue that the state of underdevelopment and lack of industrialisation in the developing regions is not only due to exogenous elements or inadequate policies but also to an intrinsic feature ingrained in the economic structures of these regions (Cimoli and Porcile, 2016).

Thus, it has advocated for the implementation of fiscal, financial, and other reforms for the intensification of the industrialisation process in developing countries (Ocampo, 2014). It notes that at the centre of integration among developing countries is 'development', and developmental integration makes possible not only the harmonisation of rules impacting economic relations; but also the advancement of the industrialisation process (Díaz Müller, 2001; Bárcena and Prado, 2016). As is discussed further in the following sections, this study has adopted the neo-structuralism theory, given the nature of the questions it has raised. Neo-structuralism has been adopted because of its sophisticated understanding of the underlying structural challenges in developing countries due to unfavourable historical, cultural, and economic contexts and because it emanates from the developing world.

The chapter is structured as follows; the second section looks at neo-structuralism, developmental integration, and industrialisation; the subsequent one looks at neo-structuralism on developmental

integration and the manufacturing industry; the fourth one looks at the manufacturing industry and the transformation of regional economies; followed by the chapter conclusion.

2.2. Neo-Structuralism, Developmental Integration, and Industrialisation

Neo-structuralists view industrialisation and development as the structural change that can be achieved through state-guided initiatives, especially concerning infrastructural investments and production development (Martins, 2019). According to neo-structuralists, industrialisation in developing countries is dependent on a series of structures that are obstacles to its attainment. They point to the existence of particularities in developing countries within the context of their productive and institutional structures constituting bottlenecks that impede it (Missio, Jayme and José Luís Oreiro, 2015). These structures, including the manufacturing industry, affect economic development's rhythm and direction (Gala, Rocha and Magacho, 2018).

Neo-structuralists notes that these structures require fundamental transformation, and the state is the only agent they deem capable of igniting this transformation (Cimoli and Porcile, 2016). Chang emphasises this significant role of the state in his book entitled “Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective”, where he points to the historical evidence which depicts that the developed countries made use of a combination of various interventionist policies to fast track the industrialisation process in their early stages (Chang, 2002: 71). These included subsidising manufacturing industries, developing national capacities through research, education, and encouraging the acquisition and learning of foreign technologies (Hakemy, 2017).

When reading on neo-structuralism, one understands that State intervention is not for its sake but to try and enforce development as it can be seen was also the case in the now developed nations during their come-up years. Initiatives like developmental integration are built on neo-structuralist ideas, which understand that industrialisation and development in the developing regions cannot just happen given the unfavourable historical contexts, therefore ought to be initiated by the State (Stephan and Fane Hervey, 2008; Faizel Ismail, 2018). Moreover, within the developmental integration, different developing countries are among themselves at varying levels of development (Nyirabu, 2004; Matambalya, 2015a); thus, there ought to be further arrangements within to make sure that none of them is left behind in the crucial industrialisation process. That's why neo-structuralists argue that the environment in which the producers and consumers operate in a

regional economy is a fundamental responsibility of a developmental integration agenda in the field of economic development and industrialisation (French-Davis, 2016: 118). Thus, this agenda should strive to fully use productive resources and support building new capacities (Baer, 1972; Jonakin, 2007).

In more than one way, neo-structuralism touches on the issues that this study is interested in concerning the industrialisation of the developing regions, like SADC. More so in the sense that this theory understands that the market forces alone cannot enforce this process, but there ought to be deliberate measures by the state to intervene and propel it (Ciarli and Di Maio, 2015; Matambalya, 2015b). It encourages a good working relationship between the public and private sectors to fast-track industrialisation. This theoretical framework captures the circumstance engulfing the SADC region. Not only are economic structures in the region heterogeneous, as well as the varying level of development among the member states, but there are also efforts in the region to help the development of all the member states. The region's industrialisation strategy captures this by explaining the need to industrialise the region. They can no longer rely on primary production because it has diminishing returns and because this form of growth is unsustainable (SADC, 2015)

Neo-structuralism has always understood that the developing economies are characterised by low-value addition production and lower levels of diversification (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992; Storm, 2017a). Thus, as noted in the introduction, it emphasises the need to implement the economy's fiscal, financial, agricultural, and other reforms to intensify industrialisation. Furthermore, re-orient the development styles to prioritise the manufacturing industry (Bielschowsky, 2009). This is with the understanding that the manufacturing industry is the special driver of growth and is superior to growth driven by any other sector, including agriculture, mining and services (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). With their conviction that the developing countries did not possess a reliable market system, with a limited supply of entrepreneurship in addition to these economies requiring significant structural changes and not marginal adjustments, neo-structuralists looked to the state to provide a solution in the developing countries (Meier, 2001; Kormawa and Jerome, 2015; Storm, 2017a).

The process of industrialisation and development is characterised by pervasive market imperfections and failures (Oyeyinka, 2012). This is mainly because the market forces operate not

on the consideration of poverty eradication and other social development issues but profit (Tsie, 1996). Thus, these imperfections and failures that consequently become obstacles to the process of industrialisation and development need to be urgently eliminated (Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018). Therefore, given the significant way in which the use of State power has influenced rates and patterns of industrialisation in the developing world over the years (Kohli, 2004); it cannot just be rolled back based on the presumptive efficiency of the market forces (Bielschowsky, 2009; Fischer, 2015; French-Davis and Torres, 2020).

Making the role of the state even more significant, they argue that its rollback, within this context, would likely lead to the intensification of poverty and other development issues, which are the very problems that the developing countries seek to solve (Leiva, 2008; Fischer, 2015; Cypher, 2018). This is mainly because without industrialisation, it would not be feasible to increase the employment rate, productivity, and income per capita (Leiva, 2008; Bárcena and Prado, 2016; Cypher, 2018). That is to say; they would not be able to reduce the poverty rate as the re-location and diversification of production primarily characterises the development process to higher productivity sectors, like manufacturing, where there are increasing economies of scale, with which poverty reduction is associated (Gala, Rocha and Magacho, 2018). These specific challenges in the developing countries have made neo-structuralist not only concerned about the structural heterogeneity and industrialisation but also to refute the idea of the universal applicability of some economic principles regardless of the nature of the economies concerned (Leiva, 2008; Bárcena and Prado, 2016; Cypher, 2018).

2.3. Neo-structuralism on Developmental Integration and Manufacturing Industry

In their theorisation of development and industrialisation in the developing world, neo-structuralists have underscored that the international division of labour has kept the developing countries as the producers of the primary commodities; while importing the manufactured goods from the developed countries (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012; Fischer, 2015; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019). Thus, industrialisation is understood as going to shift the international division of labour to be more favourable to developing countries. As a result, it is expected to significantly reduce the developing countries' dependency on the production and export of primary commodities (Gehl Sampath, 2014; Mendes *et al.*, 2014; UNECA, 2015; UNCTAD, 2016b).

This is on the basis that as the economy develops, the demand for manufactured goods tends to grow more rapidly than the demand for primary commodities (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012). That is to say, the growth in demand for the developing countries' exports, which are mainly agricultural products, is unlikely to keep up with the growth of the demand of the developing countries for imports, most of which are manufactured goods, from the developed countries (UNIDO, 2018a; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). There is encouragement by this school of thought of trade in manufactured goods, as opposed to the primary production dominating the developing economies.

Thus, the lack of structural transformation results in high growth rates that do not translate into higher employment and a significant reduction in poverty rates. Furthermore, these growth rates are volatile because they are not based on sustainable growth (Lin, 2012; Sai-Wing Ho, 2012; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019). For instance, the literature suggests that from independence, the growth performance of the African countries was similar to those of other regions, until the oil price shock in 1973 (Rodrik, 2009). For this reason, when African countries got independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the dominant approach to developing and industrialising these newly independent economies was then structuralism. It was in the form of import substitution, with the central idea of achieving the structural transformation with the government as a key player in planning and programming (Hailu, 2014; Hosono, 2017).

This school of thought has been encouraging the developing countries to work in regional groupings to develop their industries in broader markets, as the limited size of their markets is one of the obstacles to industrial development (Salazar-Xirinachs, 1993; Briceño Ruiz, 2017). Moreover, they understand that developing a competitive manufacturing sector in the developing countries would be essential to sustainable industrialisation and development while also less vulnerable to external shocks (Fischer, 2015). Thus, neo-structuralism sees integration as an integral part of establishing the manufacturing industry in developing countries.

Neo-structuralists ideas revolve around a view that the existing economic structures of the developing countries are sub-optimal because of the market failures (Cypher, 2018). They highlight systemic factors and structural conditions that undergird the developing countries' regional and national political economies. They argue that these conditions limit developing countries' respective capacities to position themselves in a globally integrated economy (Fischer, 2015; Briceño Ruiz, 2017). In response, the state would intervene as a development player to deal

with such failures and create new opportunities in specified new sectors (Lowitt, 2017). This vertical and coordinated intervention, argues neo-structuralists, is essential to inspire economic growth and development. Without these intervention measures, it would not be easy to achieve higher production systems, investments, and infrastructure integration (SARDC, 2015; Nizeimana and Nhema, 2016; Tshego and McDonald, 2016).

The carefully cultivated and implemented regional integration schemes entail a gradual and sequential liberalisation of trade, together with legislative measures to coordinate investments into regional transport infrastructure, to improve linkages between the states involved and strengthen the production capacity of the member states, and consequently the region (Briceño Ruiz, 2017). Complete comprehension of the secret of dynamic sustained and inclusive growth requires a careful study of the process of how an economy's structure evolves. In the history of economic growth and development, industrialising countries rarely evolved into higher-income status, having not diversified away from resource-based or agricultural into the industry and manufacturing-based economies (Storm, 2017c).

A shift of the developing country's economies away from the traditional agricultural economic activities and into the modern production activities, mainly driven by the manufacturing sector, have always been at the centre of the sustainable productivity gains that characterise economic growth, development and industrialisation (Monga, 2012; Kormawa and Jerome, 2015). The biggest downside of traditional agriculture and other extractive activities is that they generally suffer shortages of water, land, and other resources as they expand. But on the other hand, manufacturing easily benefits from the economies of scale (Lin and Vu, 2014).

2.4. Manufacturing Industry and the Transformation of Regional Economies

At the centre of integration among developing economies is the goal of industrialisation and the promotion of regional productive transformation. Developmental integration strengthens the manufacturing base of regional economies, and new industries become competitive, getting ready to compete in global markets (Salazar-Xirinachs, 1993; Bielschowsky, 2009; Storm, 2017a). Neo structuralists encourage effective integration that would reduce costs while expanding intra-regional industrial exports. Neo-structuralist ideas, from the beginning, have always been informed by an observation that developing economies are characterised by pervasive market failures, and

to correct or avoid this altogether, they vouch for central coordination and allocation of resources, with the state at the helm (Meier, 2001).

For instance, in the aftermath of the second world war, neo-structuralists argued that the state in the developing world was central to overcoming the economic backwardness that prevailed. Noting that it was only through the state playing a major role that industrialisation, which was already being cited as vital for economic development, could be achieved (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992: 134). They questioned the belief that market forces alone could ignite the industrialisation process in the developing world (Bitar, 1988; Önis, 1995; Bielschowsky, 2009). In a 2012 study, Detlef examined the historical evolution of the economies of Great Britain, the United States, Germany and Japan. She found that the level of state intervention in all the mentioned cases went well beyond recommendations by the neo-liberal economic principles of the free markets (Detlef, 2012).

The study concluded that the now industrialised economies did not rely on the free market forces for industrialisation to any extent (Detlef, 2012). The successful developers are now using these policy recommendations of liberalisation to “kick away the ladder” for latecomers (Chang, 2002). With the understanding that development is a process of transforming the economic and social structures in which manufacturing plays the most significant role, neo-structuralists are consistent with the history of development in vouching for an active role by the state (Gala, Rocha and Magacho, 2018). As far as neo-structuralists are concerned, industrialisation requires structural transformation, characterised by a shift in the structural composition of an economy, with the share of the manufacturing activities rising relatively to agricultural activities (Detlef, 2012). This came as neo-structuralists saw the economic specialisation of the developing countries in primary production as a major factor contributing to their economic backwardness (Missio, Jayme and José Luís Oreiro, 2015).

Given its historical importance to the development process, neo-structuralists noted industrialisation to be too important to be left to the markets and private sector initiatives. Instead, it needs a strong sponsorship and directional thrust by the developmental state (Storm, 2017c). Furthermore, neo-structuralists have argued that industrialisation is an increasingly disrupting and conflictive process of, significantly, non-marginal change of creativity (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013; Cypher, 2018). Provided the backwardness nature of economies that has to be overcome in

the developing regions, the extent of this disruption in agricultural structures, together with the number of investments and funds to be deployed; the process of the developing regions' industrialisation needs a deliberate fostering and planning by the State (Storm, 2017a).

For this reason, neo-structuralism has emphasised the structural heterogeneity within various sectors in developing countries. Noting that activities within these sectors vary widely in terms of technological advancement and sophistication, the strength of backward and forward linkages, productivity and scope for accumulative productive increases, the scope for the increasing returns of scale, and other necessary characteristics for growth (Tregenna, 2015). As a result, developing countries face a structural disadvantage in global trade relations. The prices of their mainly primary exports tend to fall relative to those of the developed countries' mainly manufactured exports (Ciarli and Maio, 2013: 38). This decline in the terms of trade of the developing countries tends to widen further the income gap between the poor and rich countries (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012).

Neo-structuralists never believed in the universal applicability of some economic principles, as they noted that the exact role of the state for which they were arguing would differ from country to country and one region to another (Ffrench-Davis and Torres, 2020). First, they have emphasised that the market forces alone had failed to bring about industrialisation and economic development, necessitating state intervention. Secondly, industrialisation and development were to be achieved through a transformation of primarily agricultural economies into industrial and manufacturing ones. And lastly, industrialisation, economic growth and development required an increase in the level of investment in the economy (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992; Wade, 2004, 2014; Cypher, 2018). Thus, maintained that in the developing countries, there may be few, if any agents, other than the state can set up these required vital industries, as risks are often too great and the capital investment too large for local entrepreneurs (Mazzucato, 2015).

The first mover bears much of the innovation costs while the gains from these innovations are ultimately available to everyone (Ciarli and Di Maio, 2015). Moreover, various development projects and initiatives require simultaneous investments to be viable. Therefore, if the independent agents make them, there is little guarantee that they would choose to invest as they always act in their self-interest (Hakemy, 2017). This is especially the case in developing countries with no certainty in returns on investments. Thus, in such a context, the government subsidy could be implemented to offset the first-mover disadvantage (Lin and Monga, 2011), as such problems

create coordination failures. In the same vein, Mazzucato (2015) notes that the state's record in stimulating innovation-led growth is good in eliminating risks of the private sector involved and taking risks that private businesses are not willing to take.

For this reason, neo-structuralists contend that the government should intervene to enhance the market outcomes, as some market failures are so prevalent that they hinder the adoption and development of new industries (Lall, 2004). The main market failures that necessitate the state's intervention are weak and non-existent markets and the economies of scale failures (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2015). And in other instances, there is too little or no capacity to facilitate this process, necessitating an active role by the state in promoting economic performance (Leiva, 2008; Bárcena and Prado, 2016; Cypher, 2018). In tackling these failures, the government is advised by the neo-structuralists to first and foremost resolve the problems associated with the externalities and other coordination problems. They state that this process entails producing goods with the new technologies and reallocating resources to the latest industrial activities from the traditional ones (Cypher, 2018).

Also, as already briefly indicated in the introduction, what sets neo-structuralists apart from the classical economic theories is the former's understanding that there is no one size fits all. They understand that the form of intervention would vary from one developing country to another (Díaz Müller, 2001; Bárcena and Prado, 2016). This is opposed to assuming that there are similar economic and scientific answers to all development problems in every context in the world. Thus, neo-structuralism rejects the idea that economics is a science capable of providing the same solutions for the same issues in each case regardless of the historical, political, and economic context of the countries and regions concerned (Ffrench-Davis and Torres, 2020). Today's developed economies used very few of the industrialisation strategies and policies they recommend to today's developing countries (Chang, 2002; Hakemy, 2017). Chang, (2002) further notes that while history portrays these countries as a perfect manifestation of the workings of the free market, they were the pioneers and frequently the most ardent users of the interventionist policies in the early stages of their industrialisation.

Furthermore, in the post-war era, evidence suggests that rapid growth in the developing world has been increasingly associated with the diversification of products into manufacturing, while slow growth has been associated with low productivity agriculture (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009a;

Bigsten and Söderbom, 2011; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). At the centre of the desire of the strong manufacturing sector is its ability to transform economies by absorbing large numbers of the labour forces, which is hardly the case with the agricultural industry (UNECA and AUC, 2011). However, the recent literature questions the importance of manufacturing in the economy. Much as there was a near consensus in the older literature about manufacturing being the path to economic development, this consensus is unravelling because the service sector accounts for over two-thirds of the GDP in advanced countries (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). Nonetheless, the state in developing regions has a vital role in ensuring that these regions industrialise and secure their desired developmental objectives and catch up with the early industrialisers.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter sought to outline this study's theoretical framework, which focused on neo-structuralism's perception of industrialisation and regional (developmental) integration, more so within the context of the developing countries and regions. As discussed above, neo-structuralists are concerned with the structural heterogeneity in developing countries, making it challenging to attain their industrialisation and development objectives. They are the leading proponents of state intervention to fix these challenges. They argue that the market forces alone cannot bring about the required fundamental structural changes in developing countries. They encourage developing countries to work in regional groupings as the limited size of their markets is one of the obstacles to the industrialisation process. They further note that a negotiated and gradual integration into a commercial relationship is key to economic progress in the developing regions. The state intervention they vouch for would differ from one country to another and from one region to another. As mentioned earlier, they have maintained that as much as they argue for an active role of the state in the industrialisation process, this form of intervention would vary from one country to another as similar historical circumstances do not characterise them. They believe that no economic principles are universally applicable. As mentioned earlier, this sophisticated understanding of the industrialisation process in developing countries by neo-structuralism makes it more relevant within the context of this study.

3. Chapter Three: Literature Review

3.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a systemic review of the literature concerning developmental regional integration as an approach to pursuing industrialisation. The purpose is to position this research in the context of what has gone before and what is currently taking place in the literature. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the debate concerning an ideal approach to regional development, especially in pursuit of industrialisation, is highly contested in the body of literature. Right from the beginning of the 21st century, the literature suggested that there was not much disagreement on what industrialisation is all about, but rather much controversy has been around how industrialisation is to be achieved (Szirmai, 2012; Naude and Szirmai, 2013; Weiss, 2013, 2018; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). Various scholars, development organisations and thinkers have argued that very few nations have achieved sustainable development without industrialisation (Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019); they include Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Thirlwall and Pacheco-López, 2017).

Thus, this chapter seeks to engage with the debates concerning regional developmental integration in pursuit of industrialisation and the proper path to follow in pursuit of this objective, especially in the 21st century. In engaging with the debates, the intention is to identify the gaps and put this study into context. For example, since the industrial revolution in Britain, many countries have made use of various industrialisation trajectories; however, common among these different paths is the central role that is played by the state in these countries' transformation (Chang, 2002; Wade, 2014; Hakemy, 2017).

However, some strands of literature objected to government intervention to accelerate the industrialisation process, arguing for the liberalisation of markets and economies (Baier *et al.*, 2008; Leiva, 2008; Cypher, 2018). While there is consensus among development thinkers and organisations that industrialisation is essential to ensure sustainable growth and development, that is not the case on how to facilitate this process or what the state's role should be. However, what has been pointed out by various scholars and development thinkers is that individual states' efforts in pursuit of industrialisation in the developing countries barely materialise (Zondi and Mulaudzi,

2010; Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012; United Nations ECA, 2016; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017).

The experience of most industrialising countries in the developing world suggests that the shape and form taken by state intervention determine the nature and success of their industrial development (Lall, 2004). Therefore, it has been argued that the debate should move toward what the exact role of the state would be in the industrialisation process, instead of questioning if the state has a role to play at all (Rodrik, 2008, 2009; UNECA and AUC, 2011; Weiss, 2013, 2018; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). The chapter is organised as follows; the second section is on developmental integration and industrialisation; followed by the discussion of the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP as a measure of industrialisation. The fourth one looks at developmental integration and the transformation of regional economies, the subsequent one on developmental states within the context of developmental integration; the sixth one engages with the empirical literature; followed by the conclusion.

3.2. Developmental Integration and the Industrialisation Process

The second half of the 20th century saw a rapidly increasing literature on regional integration. It has been noted by Asante (1997: 17) and several other scholars as a critical aspect of the development strategy, especially in the developing countries and regions (Dent and Richter, 2013; Volz, 2013; Byiers, Karaki and Woolfrey, 2018; AfDB, 2019). This is a perspective shared not only by scholars but also by many policymakers. This can be seen stipulated by article 70 of the treaty that established the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which encourages member states to embrace initiatives and measures seeking to build the infrastructure and designing policies and strategies to industrialise (COMESA, 1993; Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019).

The literature suggests that the growth of regional integration schemes worldwide has been one of the major developments in international relations since the end of the second world war (Schiff and Winters, 2003; Peters-Berries, 2010; Söderbaum, 2013). As was noted by Asante (1997: 2), the post-second world war period came to be understood as the integration era. He states this resulted from the accelerated growth of regional integration initiatives worldwide (Asante, 1997:

3). By 2003, it had become safe to claim that almost every country belonged to a particular regional group, with some belonging to more than one at the same time (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 02). More important to note is that these regional integration initiatives did not necessarily have similar objectives across the spectrum. Some were intended for security purposes, while others were for industrialisation and development. It was dependent on what the integrating and participating members sought to achieve (Peters-Berries, 2010: 05); However, security objectives of regional integration are not the interest of this study; industrialisation and development are.

Developmental integration derives from the concept of the developmental state. It is underpinned by the idea of state intervention in the economy to eliminate market failures and advance the nation's development agenda (Nesadurai, 2003). In this case, by adopting an approach to regional integration to nurture the manufacturing capacity of regional firms to fast track the industrialisation process. According to Zondi and Mulaudzi (2010), this approach assumes the existence of the developmental state at the national level of integrating member states. That is an organised and efficient state that seeks to promote economic growth and development through, among other initiatives, high impact policy measures providing incentives to industry (Leftwich, 1995).

Haarløv (1997: 43) has argued that developmental integration exists because of the shortcomings of the market integration approach. In this approach, he noted that the objective of integration is more economical and social development. The former would involve initiatives that seek to diversify member states' economies. This would be done through cooperation against the lack of industrialisation and other development challenges in participating member states. In relation to the latter, integrating countries would enforce measures that seek to do away with socio-economic issues, like poverty (Asante, 1997; Haarløv, 1997; Zondi, 2020). Haarløv's (1997) conceptualisation of developmental integration draws a stark contrast between the latter and regional economic integration per se, without even mentioning it. While developmental integration also includes, among its objectives, a desire to ensure that integration benefits trickle down to all participating member states and do away with socio-economic issues like poverty, regional economic integration tends to be strictly commercial (Haarløv, 1997). Mainly seeking to maximise the trade of goods and services and sequential integration.

Thus, developmental integration is made by joint policies of economic cooperation, coordination, and integration among developing countries, tailored to fast-track the development process of the

participating member states and the whole region (Stephan and Fane Hervey, 2008; Rekiso, 2017; Zondi, 2020). This is based on the assumption that countries of the same region may be capable of helping one another fast-track their industrialisation process faster than when each country pursue a narrow national agenda (Hansen, 2006; Peters-Berries, 2010; Byiers, Vanheukelom and Woolfrey, 2018). Hartzenberg and Kalenga (2015) have also argued that the rationale for regional integration among the developing countries is deeply rooted in its ability to stimulate a wide range of manufacturing activities across borders. However, the importance of cooperation in areas of common interest was earlier also noted by Balassa (1961). He argued that the larger dose of state intervention in the economy is necessary for developing country groupings than in integration arrangements among developed countries (Balassa, 1961).

The developing countries are known to be lacking when it comes to industrialisation and the necessary capacity for sustainable development. While it is agreed that they need to catch up with the industrialised and newly industrialised economies, it is not agreed upon how best they can achieve this objective. This has seen the emergence of various strands of literature offering different perspectives on how the developing countries ought to pursue this objective. The developmental integration concerning industrialisation would involve the formulation and implementation of the industrial policies by the integrating economies (Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018). Zondi (2020) argued that the only feasible hope for developing countries to industrialise is to go for developmental integration, as nationalistic efforts alone are unlikely to help them develop. This argument is built on the basis that most developing countries were balkanised during the colonial period. As a result, they became smaller economically unviable units after independence.

The debate over the state's role in the industrialisation process remains one of the highly contested issues. Weiss (2013, 2018) points to the intensity of the debate stemming from an “altercation” between the neo-structuralists and the neo-liberal orthodoxy. The former perceives the industrial policy as a means of correcting the limitations of the market (Storm, 2017c; Chang and Andreoni, 2020); while the latter sees it as an impediment to the market forces, which are supposed to be left to function on their own (Siddiqui, 2012; Cypher, 2018). This is a debate over two forms of industrial policy approaches, namely horizontal and vertical. The former refers to an intervention that corrects the market failures that affect the broader economy.

This intervention intends to improve the overall performance of the economy and business environment within which firms operate. In addition, it is said to be market-friendly as it favours the promotion of research and development to improve education and infrastructure, which benefits everyone (White, 1985; Lin and Monga, 2011; Wade, 2014; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). The latter also referred to as the sectoral policies, is the form of intervention aimed explicitly at enhancing particular sectors, whether new or already existing (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012). According to Lin and Monga (2011), following the industrial revolution, the rapid technological innovation saw a dramatic increase in the growth rates accompanied by the transformation of agricultural societies into modern industrial ones. For example, while the main objective of RECs in Africa was to increase intra-regional trade at their establishment, the agenda of advancing the economy through industrialisation gained momentum over the years, mainly due to the low productivity (Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019).

The horizontal approach is favoured by the proponents of neoliberalism. In contrast, the vertical one is preferred by the proponents of neo-structuralism, who argue that the former is too slow and not enough on its own to spear the level of industrialisation needed in the developing countries (Libanio and Moro, 2007; Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012; Siddiqui, 2012; Bárcena and Prado, 2016; Storm, 2017a). In opposition to the state's vertical intervention into the markets, neo-liberals have gone further to contend that too little on record indicates that the state is very good at picking winners. They argue that the government is more likely to pick losers than winners (Detlef, 2012). Moreover, these initiatives require more significant efforts and institutional capacity than the horizontal ones as the government must acquire greater knowledge about the specific industries (Rasiah and Yun, 2009; UNECA, 2015).

The debate in this context revolves around the urgency of industrial policies and industrialisation strategies, which are likely to emerge in the developmental integration agenda. Hence neoliberals argue for an approach to the industrialisation process characterised by trade-liberalisation and economic deregulation, with limited or no government intervention (Lowitt, 2017). As opposed to the government (regional) led approach to industrialisation propelled by the neo-structuralists. However, neoliberalism's market integration approach has been noted to be widening the development gap among regional member states. Countries that lack wide-scale industries are said to get worse off as they find themselves in a position where they are supposed to compete with

partners who are more advanced and industrialised than they are; with no apparent regard for these asymmetries (Baier *et al.*, 2008; Stephan and Fane Herve, 2008; Briceño Ruiz, 2017). Developmental integration comes into effect to address this challenge through cooperation in the drive towards industrialisation (Haarløv, 1997; Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012; Rekiso, 2017).

This study assumes that developmental integration can influence the industrialisation process of the integrating states through the adoption and enforcement of necessary measures. As indicated earlier, the integrating states can play various roles in the industrialisation process, namely facilitative, regulative, and direct production (Chandra, 1992: 15). Even though Chandra (1992) looks at it from the national perspective, it can also be equally relevant when applied at the regional level. He notes that to ensure a smooth path to industrialisation, the region would provide an environment conducive to industrialisation by assuring investment security, providing infrastructure, tax concessions, protection from imports and local competition, subsidies, and negotiating with foreign governments to improve market access for domestic products. In addition to facilitating industrial production, the region also regulates through land use and other rules that are designed to serve the best interest of regional economies (Chandra, 1992: 94). Ensuring security on investment is one of the major challenges facing the developing regions (Nyirabu, 2004; Mijiyawa, 2017). Their inability to ensure this has seen them struggling to secure enough investments to fund their national development plans, including industrialisation.

Storm (2017b) has also argued that no country in the history of industrialisation and development has ever realised this process, not even Britain, without the state intervention, providing the significant directional thrust to diversify the economy and transform the structural composition of the economy. This assertion has been mainly utilised to fight off the claim by neo-liberals that East Asian industrialisation is a perfect manifestation of the free market forces at play. On the contrary, as it has been consistently argued by Wade (2003, 2004, 2014), East Asian success was not entirely a result of the free markets as the neo-liberals most of the time like to remark. But rather a strong developmental state, capacitated to micro-manage the capitalist accumulation process (Wade, 2003, 2004, 2014).

However, according to Lowitt (2017), the industrial policy discourse seems to be drifting away from the orthodox of neoliberal economic development policies. This comes with the recognition of the necessity of state intervention in the economy, particularly in the developing regions.

Moreover, the volatility of the global environment in the 21st century has made it untenable for developing countries to rely predominantly on market forces to bring about the structural changes desired in their economies (Cawthra, 2005; Bielschowsky, 2009; Page, 2018). Even so, industrial policies need to be embraced with a sense of pragmatism, bearing in mind that they are not magic bullets, but their success in catalysing industrial development depends to a large extent on the context and circumstances under which they are implemented (Lowitt, 2017; Chang and Andreoni, 2020; Khanie, 2020).

It is for the contentions above that the assertion that the debate about industrial policy has become stale was dismissed by Szirmai Naude and Alcorta (2013); Fischer (2015); Noman and Stiglitz (2017); Storm (2017a). Contending that new challenges and emerging paradigms have turned industrialisation and industrial policy into one of the most debated issues of the 21st century. It has been pointed out that recent history shows that most of the countries that have built their industrialisation strategies on neoliberal assumptions and principles have struggled to industrialise. Most of those who have achieved prosperity, more so in Asia, deviated from these neoliberal ideals and deployed state interventionist measures (Siddiqui, 2012; Lundvall and Lema, 2014; Hakemy, 2017). This is mainly because neoliberal principles cannot deal with the structural conditions that characterise the developing regions (Tsie, 1996; Bárcena and Prado, 2016; Ffrench-Davis and Torres, 2020).

As noted by Haarløv (1997: 31) that no fixed rules exist regarding the extent to which integration groups go in their respective intervention in market mechanisms; it is entirely dependent on the objectives of integration. For instance, East Asia is constantly cited in the literature as a successful developmental integration story. However, Dent (2008) has argued that the East Asian growth miracle resulted from a dynamic regional (economic) development, not just individual country efforts. This was strengthened through the reinforcement of regional linkages among the countries of the region. In line with this argument, Moyo (2011) has argued that a major lesson from the East Asian industrialisation experience is that a successful industrialisation strategy critically depends on the existence of a strong developmental integration. With the necessary capacity to formulate and implement appropriate industrial policies and to support the development of industry based on the realities that exist in its own context. In contrast, Hobday (2013: 117) has argued that the Asian lesson-making does not represent anything more than an error in

policymaking and thinking. The author posits that replicating development models can prove problematic for other developing countries in different regions (Hobday, 2013).

This line of argument is supported by scholars who argue that the external operating environment within which countries and regions pursue industrialisation today is so markedly different from the operating environment of the yesteryears. They critically question the Southeast Asian success story's relevance in the current operating environment; while of the view that though there might be valuable lessons that could be learnt, the global operating environment has altered significantly. They emphasise that economic history shows that there has never been a universal path to industrialisation (Wu, 2013; Weiss, 2015). This means any attempt to replicate the model would be unlikely to succeed. They caution that the content of the industrialisation strategies and the tools the late industrialisers use must change and adapt to the current operating conditions with due considerations of their characterising circumstances.

3.3. Manufacturing Industry's Contribution to GDP as a Measure of Industrialisation

The modern world as we know it is the product of industrialisation in many ways. The genesis of industrialisation posits that the industrial revolution created an environment for sustainable productivity growth in Europe and North America (Chandra, 1992). This is said to have resulted in the division of the world economy into rich and poor (Chandra, 1992; Chang, 2002; Hakemy, 2017). Furthermore, this was followed by a catch-up period, with other non-western countries experiencing industrialisation (Rodrik, 2015). To fully understand the concept of industrialisation, one must note the complex nature of its process. It can be examined in various ways; Simandan (2009) speaks of three major ways to determine if a particular economy is undergoing industrialisation. The first one is the comparison of the relative contribution of the manufacturing value added (MVA) to the GDP versus that of the primary sector. The second one compares the workforce employed in the industry versus that of agriculture; and the third one is the observation of the industrial landscape, as industrial activities necessitate a drastic change of the physical landscape, and it is easy to spot.

The selection of a particular measurement depends on what the investigator seeks to find out, as looking at it from one perspective raises different questions and issues from another (Hewitt *et al.*, 1992: 6). The one that is the focal point in the context of this study is the rise and significance of

manufacturing activities in general, in particular, its contribution to the GDP. It is chosen because of its prominence as a credible measure of the industrialisation process and because it is among the major priority areas of the organisation under investigation. Moreover, enforcing industrialisation is one of the long-standing goals enshrined in almost every SADC document (SADC, 1992; SADC, 2014 and SADC, 2015).

MVA is a recognised measure and indicator used by researchers as well as policymakers to assess a country's level of industrialisation. MVA's share in the GDP reflects manufacturing's role in each country's economy and the national development in its entirety (Simandan, 2009; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Mijiyawa, 2017). Since the Second World War, manufacturing has fundamentally changed global production patterns, as it has become so significant in several developing countries (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013; Cantore *et al.*, 2017). Szirmai and Verspagen (2015), in a study entitled, "Manufacturing and economic growth in the developing countries, 1950-2005", have argued that there are no significant examples of economic growth and development in developing regions that have not been driven by manufacturing during this period.

Thus, there are strong theoretical and empirical arguments favouring industrialisation as the primary engine of economic growth and development. Moreover, the ability of the manufacturing industry to transform the economy is strongly supported in the literature, most notably by Kaldor (1966, 1967) with his three growth laws:

The first law states that the growth of GDP is positively related to the growth of manufacturing output, not just because it is a part of GDP but in a fundamental causal sense related to the production characteristics of the manufacturing sector. The second law notes that the growth of labour productivity in manufacturing is positively related to manufacturing output growth because of static and dynamic increasing returns to scale. The third notes that there would be a negative relationship between labour productivity growth in the economy and the rate of employment growth in the non-manufacturing sector. This is because most activities outside the manufacturing industry are subject to diminishing returns, particularly in land-based activities such as agriculture and many service activities (Kaldor, 1966, 1967).

Kaldor (1966); (1967) went on to emphasise the significant nature of these laws to the economic growth of any given economy. The manufacturing sector is capable of creating jobs that offer

higher wages as a result of higher levels of productivity, making its role the most crucial in economic growth and development, especially for countries at relatively low-income levels (Correa and Kanatsouli, 2018). Although manufacturing can satisfy these kinds of increasing demands, it has been widely noted that the share of MVA in GDP in industrialised economies is declining due to the increasing importance of the services sector (Cantore *et al.*, 2017; Martins, 2019). In contrast, though, the share of manufacturing in the GDP in many developing countries has been growing. This is because countries in the early stages of industrialisation tend to rapidly increase their MVA shares in GDP (Correa and Kanatsouli, 2018). It has also been attributed to the relocation of manufacturing production from the industrialised economies to the developing ones (World Economic Forum, 2012).

During the 20th century, industrialisation and sustainable growth were known among the development thinkers and economists to be driven mainly by capital investments and technological advancement (Nzau, 2010). These critical components have always been regarded as vital ingredients that add value to land and labour to build and sustain wealth (Weiss, 2018). Meaning value addition to natural resources and primary commodities is important, and the form of growth on their primary nature is not sustainable (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). Kaldor's (1966) engine of growth hypothesis maintains that manufacturing has higher returns to scale and capital intensity, which is the case for developing countries but not so much in several industrialised countries (Szirmai, 2012).

For the developing countries, the manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for economies of scale, which are less available in the agricultural and services sector (Kaldor, 1966, 1967). For this powerful nature of the manufacturing industry, the OAU, and its successor AU, have proclaimed industrialisation as the major strategy to promote and achieve inclusive growth and development (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). Moreover, the historical records of such growth take-offs in Europe and East Asia suggest a close relationship between industrialisation and sustainable economic growth (Tilly, 2010).

This relationship that inspires sustained growth and development is much stronger for the manufacturing sector than for the services and agricultural sector (Lundvall and Lema, 2014; Martins, 2019). Large industrial industries are associated with economic growth, but fast industrialising countries on average also tend to grow more rapidly than other economies (Kaldor,

1966; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007; Rodrik, 2015). Moreover, countries with their development processes driven by manufacturing are able to rapidly reduce poverty (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015); While the poorest countries are mainly those that failed to industrialise (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). In a study by Cooper and Maddison (2001), it is argued that the modern manufacturing sector has introduced fundamental changes in the global economy and its structure with sustained increases in the growth of labour productivity.

Since the decolonisation period, the rapid economic growth and development in developing countries have been characterised by transferring resources from the traditional sectors to the modern industrial sectors (Rodrik, 2009). For instance, Szirmai and Verspagen (2015) found that the poorest countries have the lowest shares of manufacturing and the highest shares of agriculture commodity production in the GDP. Therefore, a transfer of labour from agriculture, which has lower labour productivity, to manufacturing, which has higher labour productivity, would increase overall productivity (Szirmai, 2012; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015; Bianchi and Labory, 2019). The manufacturing sector has been the essential driver of growth and development in most developing countries since the 1950s, most notably, the East Asian miracle (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992; Jan Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016; Rodrik, 2016b; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019; Hauge, 2020).

Several sources gradually made the manufacturing sector an engine of growth. Firstly, the economies of scale in the presence of an upfront investment, capital deepening facilities, mass production that reduce the cost per unit produced as output increases (Naudé and Szirmai, 2012; Szirmai, 2012). Secondly, the manufacturing sector's strong linkages to other sectors of the economy have proven to be vital. They imply that industry and manufacturing growth effectively creates additional demand and opportunities for other sectors. Thirdly, the manufacturing sector is understood to be the primary source of most technological advancements and innovations. It feeds into growth processes beyond the sector as other parts of the economy take advantage of the newly developed technologies (Naudé and Szirmai, 2012; Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; UNIDO, 2020d).

Manufacturing nurtures growth and development; its increasing share in an economy's GDP inspires an increase across income groups (UNIDO, 2020d). However, for a development process to succeed, these growth rates should be sustained for a prolonged period. For instance, a sustained

catch-up trajectory by the late industrialisers was estimated to require an annual GDP growth rate of over five per cent for two decades (Szirmai, 2012; UNIDO, 2020d). Moreover, the technological transformation has driven much productivity growth during the previous two centuries, and organisational changes originated in the manufacturing sector (Libanio and Moro, 2007; Nagaraj, 2017; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018; Martins, 2019).

Thus, Cantore *et al.* (2017) argued that it would not be an exaggeration to imply that the manufacturing sector has made the modern world as we know it. This sector's activities much more easily lend themselves to mechanisation and processing relative to the other sectors, making it the main source of productivity growth throughout history (Cantore *et al.*, 2017). Because of its ability to produce productive inputs, like machines and chemicals, what happens in the manufacturing sector has been critical in productivity acceleration in other sectors (Naudé and Szirmai, 2012; Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; McMillan *et al.*, 2017). For example, without the departments of the manufacturing industry producing agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers and genetic engineering, there would barely be any increase in agricultural production. For this reason, the manufacturing sector has been widely considered an engine of growth throughout history, more so in the developing regions (Sen, 2016; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018).

Furthermore, the manufacturing sector inspired productivity increases in services like retail and logistics through the production of more efficient transportation and computer types of equipment (Cantore *et al.*, 2017). However, this manufacturing productivity advantage begins to fade in high-income countries when they transition into service sector-driven economies (Dadush, 2015; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017). Conversely, Fforde (2018) has been critical of the overemphasis on the significance of manufacturing. He argues that the structural transformation pattern in the developing regions has shifted from agricultural into services instead of changing from agricultural to manufacturing to services.

However, the manufacturing sector is still significant in developing economies even though the service sector has become the largest in most industrialised countries, as it is heavily dependent on manufacturing itself (Yongo-Bure, 2015). On this basis, Adetula (2004) underscores the significance of noting the distinctive nature of the integration framework in developing countries that is different from that of the developed nations, owing to the socio-economic and political dynamics which have much impact on the process.

3.4. Developmental Integration and the Transformation of Economies

Properly designed and implemented regional industrial policies have an essential role in facilitating diversified manufacturing growth and potentially bringing the desired transformation into reality (Rakner and Tungodden, 2002; Dent and Richter, 2013). What has become a defining characteristic of prosperous regions across the globe is their ability to structurally transform their economies. Changing the structural composition of their outputs; diversifying away from the traditional sector towards manufacturing (Alcorta, 2015; Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). This movement of resources comes with sustainable growth and a rise in incomes, which is why it is mainly countries that can facilitate this movement and industrialise their economies that manage to pull out of poverty (Obinyeluaku, 2015; Opoku and Yan, 2019). Developmental integration, if effectively implanted, could bring about a set of policy measures and initiatives that would provide a sustainable environment for the realisation of industrialisation objectives in the region (Zarenda, 2012).

As underscored by Davies (1994), the developmental integration paradigm is premised on the notion that a different approach to development is required among the developing countries, where underdeveloped production structures and infrastructural deficiencies are responsible for major problems to regional trade. This is why instead of increasing the efficiency of little or non-existent production structures, developmental integration seeks to enhance the productive capacity through improved infrastructure, state loans and subsidy incentives (Stephan and Fane Hervey, 2008). This is so that the competing mature industries, with headquarters in other countries, cannot erode the little productive capacity that some member states have because of the premature removal of the barriers protecting the domestic industries.

Thus, the urgent need for industrialisation and diversification is rooted in the fact that the manufacturing industry substantially impacts the rest of the economy through its backward and forward linkages (Frankenhoff, 1962; Morris and Fessehaie, 2014; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). For instance, Karuri-Sebina *et al.* (2012) refer to the enthusiasm for growth in some African countries at the beginning of the 21st century as false optimism. This is on the basis that it was focused on particular countries and sectors, with the predominant sector being agriculture and natural resources. However, simply natural resources cannot be a country's backbone of industrialisation (Gehl Sampath, 2014). Therefore, direct investments in the manufacturing

industry and the enlarged scope of manufacturing activities with more value-added products are necessary. The only sustainable way to transform the economies is through structural and institutional change across the economic and social spheres. They see the growth that does not reflect on the realities of the people's lives as of no value (Alcorta, 2015; Signé and Johnson, 2018).

Building strong industrial competitiveness to fast track economic development, spearheaded by the manufacturing sector, has been the experience of those countries that industrialised earlier and those who followed during the catch-up period (Hakemy, 2017; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017). Capital goods manufacturing is the industry's highest dynamic sector because of its strongest backwards and forwards linkages to the whole economy. In addition, it provides inputs to various industry sub-sectors and the agricultural and services sectors (Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). Intervention by governments to allocate resources to more productive use, in support of more rapid industrialisation through a focus on manufacturing growth, has been argued to be necessitated by the existence of the market failures to sustain productivity (McCarthy, 2014; Lowitt, 2017; Monyae and Nganje, 2019).

The idea of developmental integration seems to be intrinsically linked with industrialisation, given much of the consensus in the literature about the latter being the pathway to development (Chandra, 1992; Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992; Ajakaiye and Page, 2012). The alignment of the developmental integration to development capacity building cooperation means it is associated with the process of developing initiatives towards the industrialisation process in the developing countries (Nesadurai, 2003). One of the major principles of developmental integration is to ensure that all participating members benefit; none get worse off as a result.

However, McCarthy (2014) is not convinced that collective efforts by governments at a regional level could materialise in various forms of integration arrangements. He argues that, as much as member states may have a similar goal of diversified manufacturing growth, efforts consolidation would be a complex matter given the economic diversity nature of member states. For instance, in 2009, the SADC Industrial Policy draft was vehemently criticised by member states for its lack of consideration for contextual specifications within the region (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015), particularly industrial polarization in favour of South Africa.

McCarthy (2014) further stated that it must be coherent in combining a range of microeconomic interventions in an integrated way. In the same vein, Hartzenberg and Kalenga (2015) have argued that an integration agenda should also focus on microeconomic policies that were traditionally considered the national development policy domain exclusively. However, it remains crucial that to prevail against the challenges of economic transformation; integration initiatives need to be crafted and deployed with a broader development framework, promoting economic diversification and structural change of all the participating member states (UNCTAD, 2013).

It has been noted that while countries have pursued various paths to industrialisation in the past three centuries since the industrial revolution, they have had one thing in common; and that is the central role that industrial policies have played in their transformation (UNECA and AUC, 2011; Hakemy, 2017; Hosono, 2017; Noman and Stiglitz, 2017). Successful industrialisation experiences, according to this argument, were built on the back of industrial policies. This has also been emphasised by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in its 2020 report on “Industrialisation as the Driver of Sustained Prosperity”. It notes that industrial policies were deployed to drive the structural transformation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and recent cases of successful industrialisation. In these cases, there were impactful government interventions to overcome various constraints on industrialisation by channelling long-term finance to firms (UNIDO, 2020).

In the early 1990s, Hewitt, Johnson and Wield (1992: 131) pointed out that industrialisation attempts by other countries, following the breakthrough of Great Britain, had government policies at the centre and the assistance of the financial conglomerates. These measures appeared to be more critical than in the early industrialisation. The required scale of investments was too large to be borne by firms, meaning the self-financing of firms would not work. Thus, together with the financial institutions, the state took over this role by investing directly in industries and transport infrastructure (Szirmai, 2012). This partnership was essential in mobilising resources for investment (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992: 132).

Over the years, development thinkers and scholars have investigated what accounts for the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) success in industrialisation; and they found that the role and capabilities of the state have been a major difference (Panayiotopoulos, 2001; Mazzucato, 2015). For example, Wade (2004) (2014) has consistently pointed this success to the directional thrust

through directive policies and regulations by these regional economies. The author has maintained that the relationship between the state and the private sector provided the necessary precondition for industrialisation. The higher levels of investments, especially in critical industries and the institutional support for policies, enabled an accelerated process of industrialisation in the ASEAN economies (Wade, 2004, 2014; Jan Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016).

While the late industrialisers are advised to take lessons from the early-industrialisers and deploy some of their measures (Lin and Vu, 2014; Nem Singh and Ovidia, 2018), they are warned of the changes in the operating environment. The changing working environment of the 21st century has seen a shift in thinking and implementation of sustainable and effective industrialisation measures and initiatives, changing theoretical assumptions about the advent of industrial policy (Weiss, 2013; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). Thus, an attempt to replicate the East Asian model can only be of limited relevance in the presently changing environment. Though it may be good to take some lessons from models used elsewhere in the world for development, this must be done with caution (Hobday, 2013: 120; Treichel, 2016).

Pollard (1990) argued that “The process of industrialisation should be seen as a single global process of structural change, in which individual countries follow different paths, depending on their entry time into the race.” The high determining role of the timing of industrialisation had earlier been noted by Gerschenkron (1962) when he argued that the role of industrial policy and large financial institutions became increasingly essential to the late-industrialisers compared to the early ones. This emphasises that the point at which an economy pursues industrialisation has the prevailing circumstances and environment determining how to attain it. Development-oriented governments set themselves to eliminate historical obstacles to industrialisation (Naudé and Szirmai, 2012; Szirmai, 2012). McMillan et al. (2017) argued that rapid industrialisation propels economic growth in the early stages of development. Being regarded as the most important engine of economic growth, industrialisation has many transformational policies driven by the state towards developing the industrial sector (Szirmai, 2012; Cantore *et al.*, 2017).

The extent to which the state intervenes in allocating resources through policy initiatives to drive economic development has been the main divergent point among nations in their industrialisation paths (Chang, 2002; Hakemy, 2017). The industrial policy proponents uniformly disagree that government failure is enough reason for the state to refrain from intervening in the economy and

markets. Instead, building on the old market failure arguments, they argue that the markets on their own are not perfect and efficient. Consequently, there is room for governments intervention to advance the industrialisation agenda (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012).

Likewise, Dent (2008) has cited the history of the Greater Mekong Subregion in South East Asian economic cooperation in contextualising developmental integration. In 1992, six countries of this region, including Cambodia, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, embarked on a development sub-regional programme. This programme sought to help identify and implement high-priority sub-regional projects in a wide range of sectors. These include infrastructure with an initial focus on overcoming barriers to physical connectivity within the sub-region (Asian Development Bank, 2018). Major assistance was given by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to ensure the successful management of the programme by providing both advice and finance to member countries (Dent and Richter, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). As Chandra (1992: 94) noted, market incentives, through development banks and favourable investment incentives, are significant measures.

This is accurately captured by Haarløv (1997: 43) when he asserts that a development bank attached to an integration scheme can have a special arrangement allowing for loans with exceptionally favourable conditions to enhance the productive capacity of lesser developed regions or members (Haarløv, 1997: 34). This manifested itself in the case of the East Asian countries' emancipation. Dent (2008) noted that it came with crucial help from the ADB. He further stated that the increasingly important contributions by the ADB to integration in East Asia are a result of its strong developmental characteristics.

This would enable the regional countries to establish integrated self-sustaining economies and deliver to their individual development needs. This case is in line with Yongo-Bure's (2015) argument that integration is not to follow development but rather to precede it, or both integration and development should be pursued simultaneously. The author refutes the idea that each country should begin by solving its problems before integration occurs, noting that it does not make any sense as the lack of capacity is one of the top reasons for the failure of development. Further stating that if individual countries could solve their problems and achieve development by themselves, there would be no argument in favour of integration (Yongo-Bure, 2015).

3.5. Developmental State within the Developmental Integration Context

This section seeks to contextualise the developmental state notion within the developmental integration context that is in pursuit of a variety of the region's development objectives, most importantly industrialisation. UNECA & AUC (2011) defines the developmental state as the "One that can deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and programmes for promoting transformation and growth." It is mainly about government involvement in the economy and society. However, it does not mean a government dominated economy. Instead, it is about finding a good combination between the state and the markets, eliminating market failure and supporting businesses to realise their full potential and contribute to economic growth and development (Wade, 2004; UNECA and AUC, 2011).

This fits within the conceptualisation of developmental integration, as it also seeks to correct the market integration failures (Haarløv, 1997; Lee, 2002); the difference is the scope, with the former being at a national, and the latter at a much broader regional level. Both developmental state and developmental integration notions emphasise the significance of political cooperation from the very outset of the industrialisation efforts. Developmental integration at a regional level expects the execution of objectives through the developmental state at the national level (Zondi, 2020). A developmental state aims to accelerate the economic development that significantly raises the living standard of its citizens, with a focus on structural change and transformation (UNECA and AUC, 2011).

At the auspices of developmental integration, the developmental state guides the development construction that defines the national development objectives and synchronises the social and economic policies to work complementarily (Zondi and Mulaudzi, 2010; Ismail, 2017; Zondi, 2020). The developmental state requires assistance from stronger and more effective developmental coalitions. These primarily consist of groups with a shared developmental vision and can sustain dialogue with political leadership. The leadership has the mandate to define and articulate a country's economic agenda and development vision (Mkandawire, 2010; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018).

This is the idea that SADC elevated to regional level on its transformation from the coordination conference to the development community in 1992 to be known as developmental integration. To achieve this promise of the developmental state, Yongo-Bure (2015) asserts that regional leaders

ought to adopt a developmental state paradigm that takes cognisance of individual country's specific development context, including the functioning of the institutions, as opposed to importing one size fits all models. This is the approach advocated for in the African continent instead of the free market neoliberal approach by the World Bank and IMF. The reason is that there is less evidence for an assumption that lesser or no government intervention inspire more sustainable economic growth and industrialisation both in developed and developing countries (Chang, 2002; Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Hakemy, 2017).

In fact, the notions of developmental integration and developmental state are in line with critical theories of regionalism, which posits that while integration can occur through the operation of market forces, there ought to be explicit political cooperation both before and during the process. This is underscored by the emphasis put by both notions on the state-led rather than market-led integration processes (Stephan and Fane Hervey, 2008). This is a direct opposite to the later political cooperation advocated for by the neoliberal market integration (Cypher, 2018). This is with the understanding that political cooperation gives much-needed strength to achieve the desired objectives (Leftwich, 1995). This is not to say all state-led industrialisation and development objectives succeed; however, hardly any state has ever been successfully transformed through the market mechanisms only (Dassah, 2011). Davies (1994) noted that an integration strategy based on the economic development of member states, more importantly, those who are lesser developed than others, would be in the long-term interest of all concerned. Therefore developmental integration argues for the equitable balance of benefits on integration, particularly towards the less developed partners (Lee, 2003: 24-27).

Lall and Wangwe (1998) have noted as far back as 1998 that effective state-led development policies can oversee the process of economic diversification. Thus, it noted that governments must lead the way and set the initiatives to create an enabling environment for market-based growth that creates jobs. That governments must create an enabling space for businesses remains relevant even today. However, the authors do not underscore the critical role of the private sector in development, as they only suggest the government's firm hand on the wheel. This would hardly work as the drivers of development; particularly industrialisation is the private sector. As vehemently dismissed by the current heterodox view, many authors suggest this should rather be seen as the

strategic collaboration between the private sector and the public sector instead of having it as a top-down approach (Lowitt, 2017).

The significance of such a working relationship has been well articulated by Aryeetey and Moyo (2012), stating that the government should be seen as a facilitating agent, helping individual businesses eliminate coordination and externality issues. The authors argued their case by extrapolating from the East Asian Newly Industrialising Nations (NIC) that the governments of these nations maintained control over the banking sector to make sure that they operated by the national development and industrialisation objectives (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012). Historically, developmental economists have accorded great importance to the role of banks in a given nation's development and industrialisation pursuit, meaning they have been at the centre of economic growth (Weiss, 2015; UNCTAD, 2016a; Griffith-Jones and Cozzi, 2017; Noman and Stiglitz, 2017). What must be learnt from this case is that, in pursuit of industrialisation, governments ought to develop strategic frameworks and mechanisms to avail capital to the private sector (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012).

The most fundamental element of developmental integration in a developing region is that it clearly understands that the integrating countries are at varying stages of development (Haarløv, 1997; Lee, 2002). For this reason, developmental integration includes implementing compensatory and corrective measures, which include a planned regional industrial development, improved conditions for development, and differing reductions on tariffs (Stephan and Fane Hervey, 2008). The urgent need to enhance the productive capacity and redistribute gains by developmental integration further signals its stark contrast to the traditional economic models, namely the role played by the State involvement in the industrialisation process. Unlike conventional approaches, developmental integration sees these factors central to the integration process (Amin, 1999).

As demonstrated in the empirical literature section below, the colonial masters deprived the developing regions such as Africa and Latin America of any form of advanced industrialisation as their interest was only to drain their natural resources and minerals. As a result, at the dawn of independence, there was so much catch up that they had to do (Wong and Yip, 1999; Nzau, 2010; Mezouaghi and El Aynaoui, 2018; Mensah, 2019). With their colonial economies, African countries had no industrial and refining capacity; they boomed with the production and export of crops and minerals, which left them unindustrialised and more vulnerable to the external shocks

(Saha, 1991; Chingono and Nakana, 2009; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017; Noman and Stiglitz, 2017). Moreover, with the European market being dominant, the performance of these crops and consequently the continental economies fluctuated with the European business cycle, inspiring unsustainable growth without development (Hillbom, 2008).

3.6. Empirical literature

It is important to note that most of the literature on regional integration is Eurocentric. However, an emerging group of scholars approaches this phenomenon from the African perspective. They concur that there is a renewed impetus to forge closer economic ties among the African states, clearly understanding the past failures on regional integration (Gibb, 2009). Furthermore, they note that there is an urgent need for an approach to regional integration that would appreciate the continent's specific historical, economic and development challenges; especially given the fact that the continent's history of regional integration is riddled with failures (Nyirabu, 2004; Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007; Jiboku, 2017).

The aftermath of the second world war and the post-independence period saw a series of state-led programmes in the developing regions, such as in Africa and Latin America, in pursuit of industrialisation (Mendes *et al.*, 2014). The acceleration of the state-sponsored industrialisation initiatives in Africa and Latin America during this period needs to be understood within the context of the extractive nature of their inherited colonial economies. In the African context, this was mainly because under the colonial rule and domination; the idea was not to build the industrial capacity, but rather to extract the resources of the continent and export them to the colonising country (Karunaratne, 1980), so was the case in Latin America (Bielschowsky, 2009). Moreover, economies had no connection to each other; the boundaries and smaller domestic markets constrained their growth. Thus, they sought developmental integration to promote the industrialisation process, leading to the establishment of a link between developmental integration and industrialisation (Eder, 2019).

Two industrialisation strategies are known to have been predominantly adopted by developing countries in the post-independence era, namely Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and Export Promotion Industrialisation (EPI) (Chandra, 1992; Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992;

Asante, 1997). The developing countries initially adopted the former, as it promised to substitute imports with domestic production. It was characterised by self-reliance and sufficiency, which they longed for, fresh from the colonial governance. The latter was a direct opposite, as it sought production mainly for the foreign markets (Rasiah and Yun, 2009; Weiss, 2018). It is underpinned by an export-oriented strategy that encourages more specialisation on exporting commodities in which developing countries have a comparative advantage (Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel, 2017; Weiss, 2018). However, there are minimal chances for meaningful industrialisation in the developing regions within this framework due to the lack of complementarity of production structures (Tsie, 1996). The Breton Woods institutions advocated for this approach to industrialisation and development, as they noted it was a better alternative to the ISI (Khan and Khan, 1996; Adewale, 2017; Weiss, 2018).

There is a consensus that it was not in the interest of the colonisers to encourage industrial development in the developing countries because that would shift labour from the agricultural sector and reduce the market for their manufactured goods (Chandra, 1992: 18). Thus, at the dawn of independence, the lack of industrialisation in Africa and Latin America was primarily attributed to the division of labour, which made the colonies nothing more than the suppliers of raw materials (Sugihara, 2019). The attainment of independence in Africa was significant to the continent's attempts to industrialise, given the discouragement and neglect of this process during the colonial era. Having come to understand the importance of industrialisation, especially the manufacturing sector, in meeting the developmental demands of the population, ISI was the first strategy to be deployed (Nzau, 2010; Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014). This ambitious industrialisation model was deployed to see that those previously imported items were targeted for local production (Chandra, 1992:18).

3.6.1. Import Substitution Industrialisation

In the African and Latin American context, ISI is understood as the first industrialisation model, prevalent mainly in the 1950s and 1970s (Baer, 1972; Eder, 2019). This model was widely understood as an inward-looking strategy that encouraged production for domestic consumption (Adewale, 2017). It was regarded as means to higher levels of industrial development (Nzau, 2010). This strategy was encouraged to take effect at the regional level on the basis that countries

at the same level of industrial development may gain significantly. This is because the initial competition from regional partners may not be too difficult to handle (Prebisch, 1950; Eder, 2019).

Chandra (1992) has argued that without an adequate understating of the political and economic evolution, developing countries' current political and economic situation, particularly in Africa, cannot be adequately understood. He notes that contemporary prosperities and failures of the developing countries are rooted in their historical evolution. ISI prevailed as an industrialisation model after the second world war across the developing countries because they longed for self-reliance and sustenance, which they had been deprived of for centuries (Chandra, 1992). Industrialising colonies and raising living standards for its people was not part of the colonial masters' plan (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992). Furthermore, the post-world war consensus posited that the market forces on their own had failed to usher in development and industrialisation, urging the state to effectively seek to advance it (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992). Thus, in the early post-independence era, most African governments launched several development plans and began to implement the import substitution industrialisation strategy.

The ISI industrial policy is underpinned by the assumption that economic development and industrialisation objectives can only be realised by developing local production capacity that can substitute or possibly eliminate imports to reduce leakages (James and Fujita, 1989; Grabowski, 1994; Adewale, 2017). This model was not only seeking to fast track the industrialisation process in the implementing regions, but it also sought to do so in a way that would ensure self-reliance and sufficiency, at least on principle. Furthermore, Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira (2014) have noted that the second driver of ISI in the developing regions was the global economic crisis, which had a highly devastating impact on the primary products that constituted and still constitutes a significant amount of exports in the developing countries. They note that the governments were providing support in this process and made direct investments in several core industries (Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014).

Proponents of this strategy argued that it gave developing countries room to expand their industrial activities, as opposed to the export-oriented approach (to be discussed below) that would involve the dominance of the foreign ownership in the manufacturing sector (Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014). ISI was preferred because it nurtured domestic industries through protectionism employing tariffs, quotas and licensing on overseas goods (Chandra, 1992: 190). The protection

of domestic industries is just one element of this strategy; other measures include the offering of incentives to domestic industries, tax holdings of one to five years, and provision of training to the manufacturing sector (Chandra, 1992: 191). As the local and foreign entrepreneurs took advantage of the government's financial incentives, this saw a rapid increase in industrial production (Chandra, 1992: 193).

According to Wilson Peres (2013: 224), "During the ISI period, industrial policies combined trade protection with investment promotion (both state and foreign investments were supported) and national development banks were the main financing agents." Subsequently, protectionist barriers were erected against competing imports to promote the domestic production of various manufactured goods (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012; Weiss, 2018). This strategy was also supported by providing incentives to foreign investors in the manufacturing industry and investing in energy production and infrastructural building programmes (Ajakaiye and Page, 2012). This is the extent to which the African and Latin American countries were willing to eradicate the colonial legacy, which kept these regional countries disconnected (Eder, 2019).

Critics have argued that ISI led to higher cost industries as smaller domestic markets meant it would be hard to realise the full economies of scale. As a result, specialised goods that needed larger markets for efficient production could not be sustained (Peres and Primi, 2009). In addition, there was an increase in costs due to the lack of viable competition, both locally and internationally. Consequently, businesses did not strive to produce high-quality products at reasonable costs (Mendes *et al.*, 2014). Also, this strategy was seen to have failed to eliminate foreign dependency, which was understood to be its primary target; instead, developing countries continued to import raw materials (Jayanthakumaran, 2014; Mendes *et al.*, 2014; Weiss, 2018). Finally, a heavy state intervention, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOE), is said to have proven to be a major drain of resources (Chandra, 1992: 198). These shortcomings, the desire to yield foreign exchange reserves and the pressure from the international financial agencies, notably the World Bank and the International Monetary fund, led to the adoption of the Export-Oriented Industrialisation (Chandra, 1992).

3.6.2. Export Promotion Industrialisation

Export promotion industrialisation proponents in the literature contend that the import substitution strategy brought about an inward-looking mentality among industrialists; consequently, the lack of competition stunted innovation (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012; Adewale, 2017; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019). With the rise of criticisms levelled against ISI, implementing countries of the African continent and Latin America are said to have opted to review this strategy, which was hastily falling out of favour. It has been noted that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages of sticking with ISI (Chandra, 1992: 98). The 1980 study by Karunaratne involving 45 countries found that countries with high protection showed lower growth rates in contrast to the open economies (Karunaratne, 1980). Countries that had followed more open export-oriented industrialisation strategies, especially in East Asia, appeared to have fared much better than those following ISI. This inspired a shift toward export promotion industrialisation (Chandra, 1992: 100).

Export Promotion Strategy and an outward orientation are traditionally known to have been advocated for by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For example, in its 1987 World Development Report, the World Bank examined the relationship between foreign trade and industrialisation in developing countries. It concluded that trade liberalisation is crucial to foster growth in developing countries (World Bank, 1987). The establishment of this correlation between export expansion and economic growth led to the former to be viewed as an effective strategy for developing countries. The rationale was that exports and trade would enable countries to take advantage of their comparative advantage and enjoy the economies of scale as the smaller domestic markets in many developing countries cannot support bigger industrial plants (Geiger, 1991; Asante, 2000; Wade, 2004; Mijiyawa, 2017).

Export promotion strategy is noted to have had some confusion regarding its definition. It has been stated this is because of the term, which seems to imply a preference for production for the foreign market relative to domestic (Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel, 2017). However, as far as its proponents are concerned, this strategy has neutral assumptions. They assert that the bias for import substitution for domestic markets production should be removed so that the foreign versus domestic production incentives are neutral in nature (Grabowski, 1994; Trindade, 2005; Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel, 2017; Orlenko, 2017). The advocates of ISI maintain that temporary protection of infant industries from international competition is justified (Wa Githinji and Adesida,

2011; Karuri-Sebina *et al.*, 2012b; Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018). However, the export promotion strategy advocates posit that domestic markets are too small to enable firms to achieve optimal scale (World Bank, 1987; Jayanthakumaran, 2014; Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel, 2017). When producing for exportation, firms and industries can achieve higher returns and optimal scale (Grabowski, 1994). Therefore, they argue it is only an outward-oriented industrialisation strategy that can yield economies of scale (Jayanthakumaran, 2014; Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel, 2017).

While the failures of import substitution were becoming apparent in the 1970s in Africa and Latin America, export promotion is said to have been delivering high growth rates in other developing regions, like South East Asia. This hastened the shift toward EPI (Mendes *et al.*, 2014). In the then developing regions like Latin America, where ISI is said to have begun, dependency theorists focused on its failure to create an independent national economy and the absence of the national bourgeoisie to lead the economic development (Weiss, 2002; Lin, 2010). They argued that ISI led to the international corporations taking over most of the dynamic sectors of the economy and to local industrialists being dependent on international capital (Hewitt, Johnson and Wield, 1992). In Latin America, ISI had prioritised the diversification of the production structures, creation of sectors and increasing technological intensity activities in the production (Peres and Primi, 2009: 223).

UNIDO has argued that a favourable external environment characterised by the effective use of policy instruments and a buoyant global demand has benefited the successful economic transformation in the developing countries (UNIDO, 2019). According to Correa and Kanatsouli (2018), growth in the share of manufacturing in GDP and exports of manufactured goods in the developing countries has been mainly driven by the Asian economies, while African countries had stagnating shares, with their economic structures having changed relatively a little. The point being driven across by the authors is that manufacturing exports are an essential driver for developing and emerging industrial economies (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019).

The hallmark of the export-oriented industrialisation strategy was "promotion" in contrast to the "protection" that characterised the import-substituting approach. Promotional measures are meant to subsidise and incentivise industries to overcome multifaceted obstacles that derail their realisation of the economies of scale (James and Fujita, 1989; Trindade, 2005; Olarreaga, Sperlich

and Trachsel, 2017). For example, in the developing regions, these measures may include revamping the credit and financial institutions, improving infrastructure, rewarding external economies conferred on other sectors and providing subsidies for labour training programmes (Panayiotopoulos, 2001).

Chandra (1992) gave a brief account of why developing countries initially adopted ISI instead of producing for exports. As the author argued, there are several reasons for this. The first is that the newly independent countries were acutely aware of the dangers of depending too much on their previous colonisers. Therefore, they wanted to be self-sufficient, which ISI appeared to offer them, and export production would not have worked for them because they could not compete with established producers. However, later, export promotion would be more effective and beneficiary than ISI (Subramanian, 2009; Tandrayen-ragoobur, 2010; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011).

3.7. The Way Forward

While there are studies in the literature that abound in the subject of developmental integration, e.g. Tavares and Tang (2011); Oloruntoba and Tsowou (2019); Gumede (2021); too little is being said about the fact that the SADC region adopted the developmental integration on its transformation. For example, as noted by Tsie (1996); Evans (2010); Lowitt (2017); and Zondi (2020). Furthermore, when examining the state of integration and development in the SADC region, several studies do it from the market integration perspective, focusing on the linear approach to integration, and assessing economic growth, indiscriminately. This approach admires economic growth and overlooks the need for structural change and industrialisation, which would be demonstrated by a significant contribution to the GDP by the manufacturing industry. Thus, most studies concerning the SADC region have been predominantly on economic growth, with no attention to the sectoral composition of their GDP. Therefore, this study contributes to the body of literature by addressing these shortcomings in the literature. It is worthwhile conducting a study that seeks to examine how the current approach to regional integration has been able to drive the industrialisation process; through systematic investigation of its impact on the increase or decrease of manufacturing activities in the region. While also paying sufficient attention to a shift in the sectoral composition of the economies under investigation, as opposed to only examining conciliatory economic growth, as predominantly the case in the existing literature.

The theoretical and empirical arguments cited above suggest that industrialisation remains crucial for the developing nations now, perhaps more than at any other point in history. However, aspiring industrialisers' challenges are also now more daunting than in the past (Naude and Szirmai, 2013; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019). Among other challenges they face is the controversy surrounding some measures in the industrialisation process, like industrial policies. These are measures used by some of the now industrialised economies (Chang, 2002; Lowitt, 2017). The ASEAN model is consistently cited as the biggest development success story in the literature and is often recommended to the developing countries, still at the early stages of industrialisation (Page, 2011; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019).

However, this does not necessarily mean that countries still pursuing industrialisation should take this model precisely as it is and try to apply it in their context. The point is that well established and implemented initiatives are always likely to materialise for the integration member states. As argued by McCarthy (2014), an approach to the industrialisation process must always consider the circumstances surrounding the integrating group. Most importantly, the timing of starting the process, as countries that industrialised several decades ago faced a completely different environment from the one faced by the late-industrialisers of the 21st century (Lowitt, 2017).

There is consensus in the literature about the significant role of industrialisation in the process of an economy's development (McMillan *et al.*, 2017; Signé and Johnson, 2018). The literature has repeatedly proven the positive industrialisation-growth nexus, most notably by Kaldor (1967); Szirmai (2012); and Haraguchi *et al.* (2019). This process in this study is understood as connoting a sustained significance of the manufacturing sector in the region's GDP, ultimately the overall economy. Emphasis has been made that rapidly increasing economic growth is often accompanied by an increasing role of manufacturing in the economy, which makes it be viewed as the special driver of growth, and superior to other sectors (Rodrik, 2009; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Lowitt, 2017; Khanie, 2020).

It also emerges from the literature that the primary driver of the urgent need to industrialise in the developing world is the constant wild fluctuation of agricultural products, which left several economies in the African continent crashing and vulnerable. Furthermore, the prices of the agricultural products have not been able to keep up with the prices of manufactured goods, signalling the deterioration of the terms of trade (Chandra, 1992; Sai-Wing Ho, 2012). The income-

demand elasticity of manufactured products is very high in relation to the agricultural products; as incomes increase, there is no proportionate increase in their consumption, further reducing their long-term developmental potential (Chandra, 1992: 2). As further noted by Chandra (1992: 17), it is well understood that manufacturing cannot replace or serve as an alternative to agricultural development, but rather it is encouraged to complement it. The processing of the agricultural products is manufacturing, and this increases the income of countries as the more processed the commodity is, the higher its value.

The widely criticised Import Substitution Industrialisation Strategy, adopted by developing regions shortly after independence, was not unjustifiable in their contexts. During that period, self-sufficiency and sustenance were the primary concern, following centuries of the colonial yoke that would not be self-reliant and sufficient. Further to that, it is apparent that as much as it is no longer a debatable issue whether the developing countries should industrialise or not, given a strong case that has been built over the years, there are still divisions on approach to take toward the realisation of this objective. This includes a long-standing opposition of the state intervention in the market by the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) against development thinkers and scholars who insist that government intervention is needed. They insist the State is needed, given the huge investments required for the industrialisation to take off. Most of the now industrialised nations had governments playing a decisive role in their industrialisation (Monyae and Nganje, 2019).

The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) conducted a study in 2017 that looked at the factors that contribute to a successful process of industrialisation. It questioned why some countries, more than others, have been prosperous in maintaining a sustained pattern of industrialisation over the last decades? The study reported that atop the list was the policy as a factor that plays a decisive role. It has been noted that the role of policies is crucial in explaining the observed different patterns (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019), for example, in comparing causes of weak manufacturing in Africa to successful cases of East Asia. However, this study observes policy as an output of a particular approach to (development) industrialisation. An approach is understood as a key factor determining the likelihood of industrialisation. As argued by Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri (2017), at the centre of the debate on the perpetual difference in manufacturing

sector productivity and its growth among nations is the quest to understand what influences manufacturing productivity growth.

Given the significance that has been attached to the form of policy directed to industrialisation in the literature, it is worth a while to investigate what has happened during the years of developmental integration in the SADC region in relation to industrialisation. Thus, this study conducts a systematic investigation of the impact of this approach on the industrialisation process in SADC. It is worth noting that the reference to or focus on industrialisation is because of its immediacy in terms of development thinking in the SADC region. There is a wide variety of cooperation areas within the SADC; however, the priorities vary. In each SADC document, there has been an emphasis on the significance of industrialisation as a precursor to other various forms of development (SADC, 1992, 2012, 2015). The literature has widely argued that the only way the African continent, in general, SADC, in particular, can manage to lift its citizenry out of poverty is through industrialisation (Gofhamodimo, 2018; Signé and Johnson, 2018; Moyo, 2020a).

To his end, there is a wide variety of questions that can be raised, but this study seeks to understand whether there has been any transformation in the regional industrialisation state of the SADC since the adoption of the developmental integration. How has this form of integration affected the manufacturing industry's contribution to the GDP? Does manufacturing contribute to the transformation of the SADC economies? These questions will take the study to conclusions concerning the impact of developmental integration on industrialisation in the SADC region. Several studies in the literature have focused on a link between integration and economic growth or a rise in trade numbers. However, this study takes an approach that instead pays attention to the actual transformation as far as the sectoral composition of such economic growth is concerned. In the context of this study, while economic growth is essential, it should also see that the manufacturing sector is of significance relative to other sectors to signal structural transformation and industrialisation.

3.8. Conclusion

This chapter engaged in a wide range of discussions at the centre of this study to demonstrate different perspectives in the body of literature. In the case of industrialisation, it has not just been the definition that has seen various perspectives, but also the methodology. For instance, several

measures that could be deployed to measure the industrialisation process were highlighted. Furthermore, what can be deduced from this chapter is that developmental integration is a form of regional integration that seeks to cater to developing countries, those who lack industrialisation and are in the quest to build their productive capacities. Integrating countries in this strategy are united by a shared understanding that they have similar development challenges and that through integration, they can lift each other instead of individual efforts. As indicated earlier, among such economies, efficiency maximisation is not of concern to them as they mostly have too little industrial base, the idea becomes capacity building. While neo-liberals call for the state to take no significant part in the process of industrialisation and development, neo-structuralists argue that the market forces alone are not capable of enforcing the industrialisation process, necessitating state intervention. Not to eradicate the market forces but rather to help fast track this significant process. That is to say, neoliberal's call for the downsizing of the state's role is problematic within the context of this study, especially given that the literature demonstrates the significant role played by the state intervention in the now industrialised economies since the industrial revolution in Britain.

4. Chapter Four: Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction

Research methodology gives specific procedures used to identify, select, process and analyse information about a topic (Goddard and Melville, 2018). Thus, this chapter seeks to give a detailed account of the methods the researcher used to fulfil the objectives of this study. Amongst other critical things it ironed out are the research paradigm, research design, data sources and analysis methods deployed by the researcher. At the centre of this study is the investigation of what has been the impact of developmental integration on the industrialisation process of SADC as the region's integration and development strategy. As noted by Blaikie (2010: 35), "with research questions in place, one or more research strategies must be adopted, data sources and method of selection must be established and be explicit about how you are going to collect and analyse data." The chapter is structured as follows; the next section deals with the research paradigm of the study, which entails the researcher's philosophical orientation. The third section describes the study's research design; followed by the research methodology. The fifth one deals with data analysis; the subsequent one looks at the limitations of the study; then the conclusion.

4.2. Research Design

A research design entails collecting, analysing, and reporting in research studies (Creswell, 2007). It gives the researcher a clear framework as it guides the study's methods, design, and interpretation basics (Mayring, 2014: 18). It also includes the research paradigm. Creswell (2014: 09) notes that a research paradigm relates to a researcher's philosophical orientation about the world and the nature of the research that a researcher brings to the study. He further notes that these beliefs held by a researcher often determine the choice of the research approach. This is also affirmed by Ryan (2018), who posits that a research paradigm adopted by a researcher determines the design, data collection and analysis of the study. This is so because the research paradigm outlines the beliefs and values of a researcher. Thus, this study adopted the Interpretivism paradigm described and justified below.

4.2.1. Interpretivism

This study adopted the interpretivism philosophical approach. This approach contends that an individual's worldview is of their creation, which means that one can only have a personal experience of the world based on own perception influenced by own preconceptions, beliefs and values (Pryce and Spencer Jill Walsh, 2014). At the centre of this approach is the contention that a researcher is not a neutral and disembodied observer but rather part of society. That “the truth and knowledge are subjective, as they are culturally as well as historically situated on the lived experiences and understanding of them” (Ryan, 2018). This is in direct contrast to a claim by the positivist paradigm that researchers are neutral observers and value more objectivity and proving or disproving hypotheses (Ryan, 2018). What makes interpretivism the best approach for this study is that it underscores that an individual's world perception is not necessarily an absolute truth as it is mainly based on preconceptions. As was demonstrated in the literature review chapter (3), this study rejects the neoliberal assumption that the industrialisation strategies they prescribe are as good in developing countries as they seem to be in developed countries. What works in developed countries may not necessarily work in developing countries.

Several authors have demonstrated that while neoliberalism is responsible for the success in developed countries, it has not been equally effective in other parts of the world (Önis, 1995; Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018; Ovadia and Wolf, 2018). Thus, their claims cannot be understood as the observation of the world as it really is, as claimed by the positivist approach to scientific investigation, but can only be understood as their perception, based on their pre-conceptions (Creswell, 2014: 15). As interpretivism notes, researchers encounter the world already interpreted, and their job is to reveal this according to the meanings already created by humans instead of discovering universal laws. Thus, there can be more than one perspective and interpretation of a phenomenon (Pryce and Spencer Jill Walsh, 2014). As was demonstrated in the theoretical framework chapter (2), interpretivism is in line with the theory adopted by this study. While interpretivism rejects the notion of the ‘universal truth’ and disembodied researcher from the subjects, neo-structuralism rejects theories of development, particularly neoliberalism, that claim universal applicability.

4.2.2. Descriptive Case-study

This study adopted a descriptive case-study design. Described by Yin (2014: 54) as where the researcher develops an in-depth analysis of a case, often a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals. He further notes that case studies are bounded by time and activity, and a researcher collects data using a variety of data collection procedures within a particular period (Yin, 2014). In this context, the program is the implementation of the region's developmental integration approach to development and industrialisation, and the period is between the years 1992 and 2020.

Creswell (2014: 110) has defined a case study as an approach where the researcher investigates a specific case or multiple cases bounded by a particular period. This is primarily done by deploying several data collection methods, including observations, interviews, audio-visual material, documents, reports, case descriptions, and case-based themes (Creswell, 2014). For instance, several programs (a multi-site study) or a single program (a within-site study) may be selected for the study. In addition, types of qualitative case studies are distinguished by the size of the bounded case, such as whether the case involves one individual, several individuals, a group, an entire program, or an activity (Goddard and Melville 2001: 83).

Therefore, the study responded to the questions it raised regarding the implementation of the region's developmental integration strategy on industrialisation through the case study of Botswana and Mauritius. Two countries were chosen among sixteen SADC member states because it would not be feasible to do all sixteen due to time constraints and the scope of the study. Also, singling out two countries helps the study's focus instead of having a wide range of subjects that would be difficult if not impossible to manage. However, it is also important to iron out that this is not a comparative case study. Two countries were chosen to examine the impact of developmental integration on industrialisation in their distinctive settings instead of comparing and contrasting them. These cases are briefly discussed below to justify why they were chosen.

During the mid-1960s, Botswana ranked amongst the least developed nations globally and was one of the poorest countries in Africa. Its per capita GDP hovered around 70 USD (Moyo, 2016). However, Zizhou (2009) has argued that the effective use of the diamonds revenues propelled the country to being one of the world's fastest-growing economies at the time. With a population size of 2,4 million (SADC, 2020b), Botswana is one of the completely landlocked countries in the

SADC. Over 84 per cent of its land is the uninhabited Kalahari Desert, while 80 per cent of its people live along the fertile border. The cultivated land only make up 4 per cent of the whole, and most of the land is used for cattle grazing as cattle is considered the country's source of wealth (Moyo, 2016). At the time of independence in the 1960s, most commentators proclaimed that the country's economic growth and development prospects were grim (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). As of 2020, Manufacturing contributed about 5,2 per cent to the country's total GDP. It has a per capita income of USD 7 837 (SADC, 2020b). It has been argued that Botswana did not inherit anything of substance from the British, unlike various former British colonies, which got some social and physical infrastructure to foster economic growth and development.

Mauritius is the third smallest country in the SADC in terms of the population size of 1,3 million, with a per capita income of USD 11 067 (SADC, 2020b). As of 2020, the manufacturing sector contributes about 10,9 per cent to the country's total GDP. At the dawn of its independence in 1968, Mauritius was a sugar-based monoculture, with most of its arable land devoted to sugar cultivation. Agriculture contributed up to 25 per cent of GDP, while sugar alone accounted for 90 per cent of the total exports (Moyo, 2016). Economic diversification efforts in several countries have emphasised promoting the industrialisation process; this, of course, is premised on the conviction that the latter provides greater potential for long-term sustainable growth than resources-based economies (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). Thus, the Mauritian island was not an exception at the dawn of its independence. It also had its long-standing goals of sustainable economic growth, diversification, job creation, and social welfare associated with industrialisation.

The island's post-colonial governments have pursued similar goals as those of their counterparts within the SADC region, most notably in matters of economic growth and development. They have also undertaken some policies to achieve those goals, a heavily interventionist state involving a myriad of regulations and controls protected import substitution industrialisation (Sandbrook, 2005). To kick off its industrialisation process in the 1960s, the Mauritian government established the national development bank to support the island's industrialisation and economic diversification objectives. The bank would provide subsidised long-term loans to non-sugar industries. This was an era of economic transition, as it can be observed that the government was attempting to reduce the economy's dependence on the traditional agricultural industries, namely sugar, by moving the economy towards the manufacturing sector. The island set up various small

scale industries in food processing, beverages, cosmetics, fertilizer, and footwear to meet the local demand needs (Nath and Madhoo, 2003).

When looking at both Mauritius and Botswana, the fact that they are both traditionally known as economies that were heavily reliant on primary production stands out, making them more relevant for this study than other SADC members. In essence, the researcher will be able to determine if there have been any significant changes in industrialisation over the concerned period. That is to say; the researcher would be able to determine whether there has been a shift from primary production to manufacturing as a result of the region's developmental integration approach from 1992 to 2020. Furthermore, determine whether the manufacturing industry has risen in importance in the GDP, signalling a shift from the primary production.

4.3. Research methodology

The phenomenon of developmental integration that this study seeks to understand its effects is implemented on a large scale, which are sixteen member states of SADC. Therefore, the study intends to develop an in-depth analysis and understand this phenomenon's process in the distinctive cases it was implemented. This led to the adoption of the qualitative research approach, defined by Creswell (2014: 13) as an approach used to explore and understand the meanings individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. Grounded in the interpretive social sciences, this approach tends to be based on subjectivity instead of the quantitative approach's objectivity (Williams and Babbie, 1976).

According to Creswell (2014), this approach involves emerging questions and procedures; data typically collected in the participant's setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes and the researcher interpretations the meaning of the data. The quantitative approach, which is the alternative, would not have helped the researcher to satisfy the objectives of this study given its numeric and objectivity nature. It is well defined by Earl Babbie (2010) as mainly interested in emphasizing objective measurements and the statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis of data collected through polls, questionnaires, and surveys or by manipulating pre-existing statistical data using computational techniques.

Even though this study also presents some numeric and statistical data elements, the qualitative research approach was chosen over the quantitative one because the former would enable the

researcher to explore in detail. For example, to detail the functioning of regional development strategies in the process of industrialisation in the SADC, to understand their impact in strengthening the significance of the manufacturing industry in the region. More importantly, it would enable the researcher to present the findings descriptively and explanatory, in line with the research question and sub-questions. The latter would not enable this as data in its nature is mainly presented in numbers. This makes the qualitative approach more relevant. It gives a deep understanding because it allows the researcher to engage directly with the subjects of the study and make various interpretations. Also, it will enable the researcher to employ multiple data collection methods (Creswell, 2003). However, qualitative research does not presume to represent the broader population because of the small number of participants. It enables researchers to present detailed snapshots of the participants under study (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 1999).

4.3.1. Qualitative Methods

Research methods refer to tools as well as techniques for doing research. They encompass a variety of techniques used for different types of inquiry (Walliman, 2014: 10). According to Norman Blaikie (2010), data collection and analysis are core activities of the research. Data collection entails collecting information from the subjects of interest to the study through the methods identified by the researcher (Walliman, 2014: 63). The researcher initially intended to conduct the interviews in selected clothing and textile industries in Botswana and Mauritius, which did not come to fruition because of the difficulty in getting hold of the respondents due to COVID-19 restrictions. For the better part of 2020, the year in which the researcher had intended to conduct the interviews, many businesses were not operating due to the lockdown regulations.

This made it extremely difficult for the researcher to get hold of the participants through their office telephone numbers provided by these companies on their websites. Therefore, the researcher would have conducted the interviews in three textile and clothing companies in each country. One person in the management position from all the companies. The idea was to identify an individual, at a management level, who could give an account of how the efficiency and productivity levels have evolved in a given period. Furthermore, what modes of production have been introduced as a result of government assistance and how effective have they been. However, as Walliman (2014:

54) underscored, collecting the primary data is not always possible, as getting access to the subject of research may be difficult.

In conducting the interviews, the researcher would focus on the capitals of the identified member states. In the case of Mauritius, it would have been Port Louis, and in the case of Botswana in Gaborone. The purposive (stakeholder) sampling would be adopted. This is defined by Palys (2008) as most useful in evaluation research and policy analysis; it primarily involves the identification of major stakeholders involved in the designing of a programme or the recipients of the services being evaluated. The idea is to find respondents who might have been affected by it. In this context, the researcher is interested in companies that might have been affected by policy programs that came into effect at a particular point. This makes the purposive sampling more relevant as it would enable the researcher to carefully identify companies that have been in operation for a particular period as of relevance to the study. As mentioned above, due to unforeseen circumstances, this study ended up heavily relying on secondary data to answer its questions, meet the objectives and reach conclusions.

4.3.2. Study Population

The phenomenon of study population refers to a group or groups that are of interest to the study. For example, this study investigates the impact of developmental integration on industrialisation in the SADC, an organisation comprised of sixteen member states. However, it is not always entirely possible to study the whole population the researcher is interested in, in which case the researcher takes subjects of the population of interest (Goddard and Melville, 2018: 34). Therefore, as indicated in the previous section Botswana and Mauritius were identified as countries of interest for specified reasons.

Manufacturing can be divided into several quasi-independent sectors (Hewitt *et al.* 1992: 03). For example, the Mauritian main manufacturing industries include food processing, textile and clothing, mining, and transport equipment; In Botswana, main manufacturing industries include diamond processing, food processing, textile and clothing, and mining (Common Wealth Network, 2019). The textile and clothing industry has traditionally dominated the Mauritian manufacturing sector. In the past, the government has undertaken several measures to stimulate additional investments in the manufacturing sectors, including building the export processing zones (DPRU

2002). Also, in Botswana government have taken measures and built industrial sites, as will be demonstrated in chapter six.

Table 4.1. SADC Member States Economic Indicators

	Total Population	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
Congo, Dem. Rep.	84 825 354	42,52	17,90
Comoros	844 866	10,80	7,50
Seychelles	98 013	14,70	7,90
Tanzania	58 636 512	26,28	5,70
Angola	27 497 645	52,90	4,80
Botswana	2 383 184	33,11	6,40
Lesotho	2 209 595	31,90	10,19
Madagascar	26 326 352	18,60	13,80
Malawi	18 860 963	16,34	9,13
Mauritius	1 284 928	21,73	14,73
Mozambique	30 338 988	21,57	10,00
Namibia	2 622 723	31,00	10,57
South Africa	55 866 711	29,15	13,39
Eswatini	1 335 999	39,08	34,66
Zambia	17 772 835	35,31	7,90
Zimbabwe	16 713 345	24,69	10,03

(SADC, 2020)

Table 4.1 above briefly demonstrate the economic setting of the SADC member states through the selected socio-economic indicators, including the total population, industry value-added as the percentage of GDP, and Manufacturing Value Added as the percentage of GDP. The highlighted indicators are significant in measuring industrialisation within the context of this study, as demonstrated in the conceptualisation section in chapter one. When looking at both Botswana and Mauritius, the fact that they are both traditionally known as economies that were heavily reliant on primary production stands out, making them more relevant for this study than other SADC members. In essence, the researcher will be able to determine if there have been any significant changes in industrialisation over the concerned period. That is to say; the researcher would be able to determine whether there has been a shift from primary production to manufacturing as a result

of the region's developmental integration approach from 1992 to 2020. Furthermore, determine whether the manufacturing industry has risen in importance in the GDP.

4.3.3. Data sources

Robert Yin (2014) has noted that the data collection in the case study research is typically extensive, drawing on multiple sources of information such as observations, interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials. For example, Yin recommends six types of information to collect: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2014: 158). Yin further notes that to get to the core of the problem; you need to interview many key officials and review several official documents, explicitly attending to and accounting for the real-world contextual conditions. However, this study relied extensively on the textual and statistical data, classified as secondary data, as explained below.

4.3.3.1. Secondary Sources

Secondary data has been defined by Blaikie (2010) as the primary data that has already been collected by someone else for various reasons, including for official statistics or general information such as government census. Secondary sources that this study used include the government and organisational reports, available to the public domain on the government and organisation's websites, on economic indicators to measure the significance of the manufacturing sector to the industrial GDP and the total GDP. In addition, the progress reports of the SADC industrialisation week for the years 2018, 2019 and 2020 were also employed available on the SADC website. In this annual event, usually hosted by a member state set to assume the chairpersonship of the SADC, the public and private sectors of the region come together for deliberations on measures to industrialise the region. Furthermore, the study used textbooks, e-books, and articles in scientific journals, accessible from the University of Pretoria's library and public libraries.

4.4. Data Analysis

Data analysis in qualitative research consists of preparing and organising the data, whether in textual or imagery form, for analysis. To achieve this, the researcher ought to reduce data into

themes by condensing it and representing the data in Figueres or a discussion (Yin, 2003). However, text analysis and multiple other forms of data pose a difficult task for qualitative investigators. Consequently, the process of deciding how to present and communicate the data in tables and narrative structure is more challenging (Creswell, 2007). In this case, the researcher extracted the statistical data from the SADC, World Bank and UNIDO websites on the world development indicators, books, scientific journal articles and other sources. This data was analysed using the case study or case-oriented analysis and presented in Figueres, Tables and discussion as demonstrated in the data presentation and analysis chapter (six).

The qualitative content analysis was deployed to analyze data. It is defined as the process of categorising the qualitative textual data into similar conceptual categories to identify consistent patterns and relationships between themes (Mayring, 2014: 33). This method is commonly used to analyse a wide range of textual data, including interview transcripts, recorded observations, narratives, responses to open-ended questionnaire items, speeches, and media such as drawings, photographs, and video (Twycross and Shields, 2008). Most importantly, in this study's context, qualitative content analysis is interpretive, involving a close reading of the text with an understanding and recognition that the text is open to subjective interpretation, reflects multiple meanings, and is context-dependent (Klaus, 2020). Mayring (2014: 45) has noted that in the case of the written word, content is often subject related, referring to the aboutness of the text. For example, it applies to the official reports of an organisation; in such an instance, it may identify stated priorities of that particular organisation as well as implicit perspectives. In addition, it is useful to identify the conscious messaging and the unconscious communicated by the text (Mayring, 2014).

Furthermore, the main question and sub-questions that the study intends to answer are evaluative, as indicated by the thesis title 'Impacts of Developmental integration on Industrialisation in SADC.' Therefore, an evaluative approach was also deployed in analysing data to meet the study's objectives. In analysing the textual data, the researcher was mainly interested in the literature that speaks to the implementation of developmental initiatives in the SADC region in pursuit of industrialisation to understand their effectiveness. In analysing the statistical data collected from the World Bank's development indicators, African Development Bank (AfDB), UNIDO and SADC's economic indicators, the researcher observed the structural compositions of GDP in the

countries of interest. Furthermore, the main interest was on the trends concerning the industrial sector, especially manufacturing's share of the total GDP, with an increase in this contribution signalling industrialisation, while a decrease signals de-industrialisation.

As noted in the literature review, there are several measurements one can deploy to measure industrialisation; in most cases, it is entirely dependent on what the researcher seeks to understand. These measures include MVA as a percentage of GDP, the industry as a percentage of GDP, economic out etc. (Simandan, 2009; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; UNIDO, 2019). However, this study adopted MVA contribution to GDP as its primary measure, not only because it defines industrialisation as a process of transforming a traditional agricultural economy to an industrial manufacturing one but also because it is a primary objective of the organisation under study.

Furthermore, this study is mainly interested in the change of the structural make-up of the economy, which would see the manufacturing sector increasing its relative importance in the economy more rapidly than in other sectors. That is to say, an increase in the industrial sector in its entirety is not sufficient for industrialisation, as other sectors may be increasing their output at the same rate or more than manufacturing (Chandra, 1992: 4). Thus, the trends analysed in this context are trends concerning the manufacturing sector's contribution to the industrial output; the contribution and significance of this industry on the identified member states' GDP to determine the pace of the industrialisation process during the cause of the stated period.

The researcher kept a critical attitude through the data collection. According to Walliman (2014: 58), this is an interrogative insertion, which investigates the implications of statements more closely as most statements can be read to have one or two implications; and keep the study focused on what is relevant to its aims and objectives. Furthermore, as Walliman (2014: 130) noted, it is always easier to structure the collected information while the details are still at the top of the researcher's mind; this helps identify the gaps and allow new ideas to develop to challenge your assumptions.

4.5. Limitations of the study

One of the best characteristics of the case-study design is that it enables the researcher to deploy various data collection methods. However, for reasons mentioned earlier, this study could not

deploy some of the methods that the researcher had initially intended to. The study would have significantly benefited from the interviews, as they mainly give a first-hand account of events. For instance, talking to the companies that have been at the receiving end of the government's initiatives to promote manufacturing, consequently, industrialisation would have broadened the perspective of this study. Furthermore, it would have benefited from observing the industrial landscape in the case studies concerned. As was indicated earlier, the industrial landscape is one of the indicators one could deploy to assess the progress of industrialisation. The researcher adopted the case study design because it would allow the study to be bound within a particular period and be specific about a specific subject that is being looked at. In particular, the researcher used the case of only two countries of the sixteen-member states for the practicality of the study purpose. This is with the due realisation that the study of two member states cannot account for sixteen.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter set out to detail the methodologies of this study through which it was conducted. The philosophical assumptions of the researcher were discussed. The research design and the study population were engaged and justified within the context of this study. The chapter explained that examining the industrialisation process in the SADC region would be done with a particular focus on the case of two countries, Botswana and Mauritius. This choice was explained and justified, with the researcher noting the limitations of focusing on two countries in a population of sixteen. The next chapter deals with SADC's industrialisation through developmental integration, giving the economic and physical settings of the region.

5. Chapter Five: SADC's Industrialisation Through Developmental Integration.

5.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the industrialisation initiatives that SADC has adopted since its transformation in 1992 under developmental integration. It further provides the physical and economic characteristics of the SADC region, in particular those of the selected member states, which are Botswana and Mauritius. These two SADC member states have been noted in the literature as the region's most successful developmental states (Owusu and Ismail Samatar, 1997; Hwedi, 2001; Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Moyo, 2016). In this chapter, there will be a referral to the notion of the 'developmental state.' As was discussed in the literature review chapter, developmental integration and developmental state are two complementary development approaches. The participating member states implement developmental regional integration initiatives at the national level. Therefore, there should be a developmental state at the national level for these initiatives to take effect. This is well put by Zondi (2020) when he notes that developmental integration assumes there already exists a capable developmental state at the national level of the integrating member states ready to carry out the objectives of the developmental integration agenda.

However, before homing into the SADC region, then the selected member states, this chapter begins by discussing the initiatives at a continental level giving a background of the initiatives that gave birth to the regional economic communities. It would be difficult to speak of SADC's developmental integration agenda without speaking of the initiatives like the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja treaty, by which RECs are inspired. As already mentioned, the study is on the SADC region's quest for industrialisation. However, the subregional industrialisation and development initiatives are inextricably linked to the continent's. This necessitates a look at the continent's initiatives, under the auspices of the then OAU, later AU, that sought to industrialise the continent using the continent's regional groupings, formally known as the RECs.

Conscious industrialisation policies in African countries, like in most developing countries, began in the post-World War 2 period (Grabowski, 1994; Nzau, 2010). This came to be because prior to that point, the international division of labour dictated that the colonies would have to stay underdeveloped for the industrialisation of the colonisers (Jalloh and Abass, 2014; Mendes *et al.*,

2014). Since most Western countries were industrial while developing countries specialised in primary and agricultural production primary producers, economic growth and development came to be identified with industrialisation (Frankenhoff, 1962). As a result, the prices of agricultural and primary products consistently declined relative to manufacturing and industrial products. Moreover, exports prices of primary and agrarian products were unstable, with their value depreciating over time (Sai-Wing Ho, 2012; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019).

Furthermore, prices for primary products were stagnant, but they were also easily replaceable with synthetics. Hence primary products export-led growth was to be substituted with industrialisation (Frankenhoff, 1962; UNECA and AUC, 2011; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). In response to these issues, the African continent elected to deploy collective efforts in the quest for industrialisation, some of which will be briefly in this chapter.

The chapter is organised as follows; the next section deals with the industrialisation initiatives that have been adopted at the African continental level. The third section looks at SADC's industrialisation through developmental integration, which briefly discusses the evolution of this concept as an approach to the region's integration. The subsequent one discusses the SADC region's industrialisation initiatives that have been adopted since its transformation in 1992. The fifth section discusses the financing of industrialisation in the region; followed by examining the Government-Private sector collaboration in pursuit of industrialisation in the SADC region. The chapter then gives the economic and industrialisation background of the study's two cases, namely Botswana and Mauritius; followed by the chapter conclusion.

5.2. Africa's Initiatives in the quest for Industrialisation

An examination of the conceptualisation of developmental integration suggests that the economic transformation has been pursued through the developmental integration approach for the most part of post-independence Africa. Though it may not have been declared, it is evident in the articulations and stipulations in treaties and plans adopted at this time, like the Monrovia Declaration and the Lagos Plan of Action (OAU, 1980a; Adedeji, 1984). Governments of the independent states of the African continent noted with concern that they could not provide most of the basic needs for the citizenry as these countries lacked sustainable growth and development

(Nzau, 2010). With industrialisation being understood as the source of modern growth and development, they quickly realised that to be able to provide employment and uplift the citizens out of poverty; there was an urgent need to industrialise (Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014). Shortly after independence, it dawned to the majority of leaders of the African continent that if there was to be industrialisation, there existed a need to work collectively (Moyo, 2011). Thus, the lack of industrialisation and diversification in the continent began to see a rise in rhetorical commitments by leaders at both regional and continental levels. Consequently, several initiatives were adopted by the continent to foster the industrialisation process, which are discussed in this section.

These are discussed to demonstrate the developmental nature of the continent's earlier initiatives and to lay a significant background for the context of the pursuit of industrialisation in the SADC. The purpose is to demonstrate how far back the continent's industrialisation attempts dates and, more importantly, to put SADC's developmental integration into context. This will demonstrate that the pursuit of industrialisation in the SADC is not an isolated process but rather a part of a broader continental mandate. In reviewing these initiatives, the focus is on plans established for industrial development and industrialisation in the continent. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 1980-2000 will be the first to be looked at, followed by the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) of 1991, then the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA).

According to Asante (1997: 10), the initial efforts at regional integration in the African continent began as aspects of the pan-African movement, which sought to unite the continental economies in the fight against imperialist forces and neo-colonial domination. Shortly after, regional integration was also recognised as the necessary precursor to the long-term sustainable development of the continental economies. Asante (1997) noted that the resolution by the newly independent African states to establish regional entities to promote regional economic integration was considered the most significant development in the 1980s decade. He has argued that regional integration should be regarded as an approach to economic development rather than an isolated process of trade arrangements in the developing world. Moreover, this integration process should begin with and be sustained by the government (Asante, 1997: 37). This necessitates the coordination of national development strategies with regional plans.

5.2.1. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

The formal adoption of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos in 1980 by African leaders was the culmination of long talks emanating from the late 1970s with the adoption of the Monrovia declaration. It has been noted that the African leaders launched an attack on the inherited colonial and neo-colonial economic policy (Sekgoma, 2001). The idea was to search for an alternative strategy to the colonial economic establishment perpetuated by the then recently independent African states (Adedeji, 1984). Within the framework of this 1977 declaration, the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos identified African development priorities in six major economic and social sectors, which included industrial development (Adedeji, 1984; Aly, 1994: 78). The LPA and Final Act of Lagos, as designed jointly by the politically independent African states, constituted a charter for the continent's development for 1980-2000 (OAU, ECA and UNIDO, 1997).

It is well established in the literature that even though the manufacturing sector performance of the African countries was nowhere near being satisfactory, it fared much better in the first ten to fifteen years after independence (Lall and Wangwe, 1998; Lall, 2004). And it continued to receive prominence in almost all continental countries (Adedeji, 1984; Owusu and Ismail Samatar, 1997; Lall and Wangwe, 1998; Lall, 2004; Nzau, 2010). However, a series of external shocks hit many African countries in the early 1970s, crippling various economies (Haarløv, 1997; Teal, 2002; Zondi and Mulaudzi, 2010). The continent then sought relief from the international financial institutions and other international bodies as the economic situation in the continent was getting dire.

Consequently, in what has been referred to as a response to the continent's plea for help and the LPA, the World Bank published a report entitled "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action" in 1981; commonly known as The Berg report (Berg *et al.*, 1981). The report noted that the African continent's state-driven industrialisation and development strategies had resulted in over protection of industry and bias against the agricultural sector, which exacerbated the economic crisis. It pointed to a significance of an agricultural-based and export-oriented-industrialisation strategy for the continental economies, that the pace of industrialisation should not be forced (Berg *et al.*, 1981).

It further advised the African countries to pursue their comparative advantage by improving the production of their exports products (Berg *et al.*, 1981), which contradict what the African leaders

had in mind. The Berg report appeared to have been encouraging the African countries to continue exporting the primary products (Nzau, 2010). Most African governments vehemently opposed these recommendations. They were convinced that such a trajectory would not help but exacerbate their economic challenges, leaving the continental economies in a perpetual state of dependency, thereby drawing back its industrialisation (Adedeji, 1984; Ndayi, 2011). It has been argued that the Berge report, in many ways, was an anti-thesis to the LPA. While the plan underscored the need for the continent's self-reliance and self-sustaining development, based on effective integrated and dynamic national, sub-regional and regional markets, the report's agenda emphasized the external market and the continuation of the inherited colonial export-oriented market (Adedeji, 1984; Nzau, 2010).

In emphasising the economic crises the continent was facing, the opening line of the second chapter, which addresses Industry in the LPA, notes that after twenty years following the attainment of political independence by most African countries, the continent was to enter the 1980-90 decade in a state of under-development (OAU, 1980). However, with the adoption of the LPA in 1980, member states were optimistic that through the individual and collective efforts, the last two decades of the 20th century would see the continent breaking through in economic and social development. The LPA addresses thirteen critical issues, including industry, which its authors argue to be essential to the continent's industrialisation and development. However, they are not all going to be mentioned here (see OAU, 1980), as this study is mainly interested in one of these issues: industry.

The LPA noted that member states were acutely aware of their handicap and determined to take all the necessary measures to lift their respective countries out of underdevelopment. They vowed to promote their economic and social development individually and collectively (OAU, 1982). It was understood that industrial development would depend on various factors at the national level, namely, the design of a national industrial policy which would lay down the priorities, targets, institutional and financial resources required. This would call for the creation of financial institutions which would offer such terms and conditions as to promote accelerated industrial development (OAU, 1980a). Adedeji (1984) noted that continental strategies and policy formulations could only be adopted and implemented if governments and policymakers perceive

a need for change. Thus, member states were urged to prioritise industrialisation in their development plans.

From the LPA emerged the idea of the “industrial decade”. This meant a ten-year period devoted to translating the goals and objectives of the LPA into programmes and projects (UNIDO, 2020a). This then gave birth to the concept of an Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA) (OAU, ECA and UNIDO, 1997). The period 1980-90 was then declared the Industrial Development Decade for Africa by the member States to achieve a greater share of the world industrial production (OAU, 1980b). The 1980 LPA was explicit about the importance of creating and implementing an initiative for the collective industrialisation of Africa. This would happen by creating the industrial base, strengthened by complementary activities at the regional level, to meet the integrating country’s needs (OAU, 1980b). This way, the first IDDA was launched to industrialise the continent in the quest to attain self-reliance and self-sustenance as underscored by the LPA.

The literature suggests that the decade of the 1980s was a disastrous one as far as the continent’s quest for industrialisation was concerned. By the end of the decade, the continent is said to have been poorer than when it began (Lall, Wangwea and Wangwe, 1998; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1998; Lall, 2000, 2004; Mkandawire, 2010). Different scholars have given various accounts of why the first industrial decade did not materialise. The lack of the implementation mechanism, national buy-in and funds are the main issues that have been identified to be at the core of this failure. However, Moyo (2011) argues that on top of the lack of the implementation mechanism was the lack of coordination mechanism. This failure resulted in talks that led to the second IDDA between 1993-2002 (UNIDO, 2016a). However, the basic goals had not changed much from the first one; the idea continued to be that of ending the continent’s dependency on the industrialised countries by promoting the continent’s energies of growth, wealth creation and industrialisation (OAU, ECA and UNIDO, 1997).

However, the second IDDA differed from the first in its approach. While the first one was created, designed, and centralised by the OAU together with the development partners, including UNIDO, and approved at a higher level by the continent’s conference of ministers of industry; the second one was prepared at national levels of member states (Ajakaiye, Drazen and Karugia, 2008). Its preparation at the national and sub-regional level took into account the realities and priorities of

each member state (OAU, ECA and UNIDO, 1997; UNIDO, 2016a, 2020a). Each member state had to use the local experts to frame a national programme by carefully studying and considering the national development challenges. The OAU, with the development partners, provided the member states with a framework and guidelines. This was to emphasize that the basic objectives of the first decade remained valid (OAU, ECA and UNIDO, 1997). However, this decade was also not a success; its failure was attributed to the dwindling commodity prices during the 1990s (Nzau, 2010; Matambalya, 2015a; UNIDO, 2020a).

As of 2021, the IDDA programme has come in three phases, with the third one is currently underway for 2016-2025 (UNIDO, 2020a; African Union, 2021). Just like the first and second one, the third seeks to reduce the dependency of African countries on the industrialised world, focusing on the rehabilitation of the existing industries and improving the performance of public sector enterprises (UNIDO, 2020a). What is understood in the IDDA 3, more than in both the first and the second one, is that industrial policy and development must be crafted to fit the specific contexts to be successful. However, while the responsibility for industrial development rests primarily with national governments, regional integration has an essential role in lifting the various binding constraints to industrialization (UN General Assembly, 2016; UNIDO, 2016a; African Union, 2021).

According to Adedeji (1984), the LPA and its self-reliance and sustenance strategy were crucial in many ways. Firstly, it was a signal of awareness among the continental countries of severe socio-economic challenges, like underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality. Secondly, it was evidential of the continental leaders' recognition of an urgent need to coordinate economic and development at a regional level (D'SA, 1983; Adedeji, 1984; Sekgoma, 2001). Finally, a key component of the LPA's programme for Africa's socio-economic transformation through the principles of self-reliance and self-sustenance was the need to achieve industrialisation by integrating the various national industrial structures into a common continental economy. That is the main principle of the developmental integration approach. However, it did not yield the results of industrialisation and development for which it was established (Opoku and Yan, 2019),

5.2.2. The Abuja Treaty

Signed in Abuja on the 3rd of June 1991 by fifty-one (51) heads of state and government, the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community had as its primary objective the promotion of economic, social, and cultural development in the continent as a significant step towards the industrial development (OAU, 1991). However, the treaty was only to come into effect three years later, after securing the pre-requisite number of ratifications. Having come into effect in May 1994, it emphasised regional integration as a vehicle for promoting self-reliance and self-sustained development (Mukisa and Thompson, 1995; Nzau, 2010; Ricks, 2016). In formulating this treaty, leaders of the African continent identified several impediments to the industrialisation and development of the continent, which at the same time seriously jeopardized the future of its people (Ricks, 2016).

Thus, the treaty prioritized the development of regional production structures supported by efficient infrastructure (OAU, 1991). Moreover, it encouraged member states to prioritise coordinating and harmonize their economic and social policies within and between the sub-regional communities (Nyirabu, 2004). Therefore, the primary aim of the Abuja Treaty was to promote regional integration by harmonizing member states' industrial policies in the quest for industrialisation. Moreover, to create a solid basis for this process, promote collective self-reliance, modernize the priority sectors, establish joint industrial development projects at the regional level, and create African multinational enterprises in priority industrial sub-sectors (OAU, 1991; African Union, 2021).

The continent's sub-regional groupings, known as RECs, would later be understood as the vital building blocks for achieving industrialisation and development, which was inconceivable through individual efforts (Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019). RECs have been argued to work better when comprised of a larger number of member countries. This is on the basis that a large number of states would provide sufficient markets to ensure economies of scale in production (Yongo-Bure, 2015; Ricks, 2016). This further strengthens the notion of self-reliance, vouched for by both the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty, to engage in the strategy of collective self-reliance and sufficiency through the promotion of economic interdependence (Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019).

The signing of the Treaty at the then OAU's twenty-seventh (27th) summit by member states established the timetable toward creating the AEC by 2028 (OAU, 1991). This was understood as the clarion call for gradual integration of the African continent toward the major objective of the AEC (Abuja Treaty 1991). Like in the LPA, this was based on the Pan-African vision, mobilising for the collective self-reliance and sufficiency for the economic transformation of the continent (Ricks, 2016). Critical to note is that the signing of this treaty was not an isolated event but rather was a culmination of decades of integration attempts by an independent state of the African continent.

It was built on the LPA's self-reliance and sustenance principle. This is precisely because the LPA had already declared a strong desire for the African Economic Community to increase economic self-reliance and promote self-sustained development (Asante, 1997: 101). The Treaty inspired the launch and revamped numerous regional and sub-regional initiatives across the continent (Julian Kitipov, 2012; Yongo-Bure, 2015). This was the same period that saw SADCC being transformed into SADC to attain a higher level of integration to help member states address their problems of national development, notably, industrialisation as part of the broader continental agenda.

Article 48 of the Abuja treaty underscores that to promote the industrial development of member states and integrate their economies, they had had to strengthen the community's industrial base to foster self-sustained and self-reliant development (OAU, 1991). It called for the promotion of joint industrial development projects at the regional community level (OAU, 1991; Jalloh and Abass, 2014; Kormawa and Jerome, 2015). Subsequently, Article 49 further highlighted that to create a solid basis for industrialisation and promote collective self-reliance, member states had to ensure the development of various industries (OAU, 1991). Based on the long-standing idea among African leaders that socio-economic integration is essential to continental transformation and development (Nshimbi, 2018); the Abuja Treaty prioritised the development of regional production structures. With appropriate supportive infrastructure and the coordination, harmonisation of economic and social policies within and between sub-regional communities (OAU, 1991; Nzau, 2010; Ricks, 2016).

The treaty provided that the community would be achieved gradually in six stages, over a period not exceeding thirty-four (34) years from the treaty's entry into force (OAU, 1991). The first stage would focus on strengthening the RECs that already existed at the time of the treaty's adoption and

their establishment where they did not exist. In the second stage, the treaty noted there ought to be a “prepared and adopted study to determine the timetable for the gradual removal of tariffs barriers to regional and intra-community trade and the gradual harmonisation of customs duties in relation to third states.” (OAU, 1991). The third stage noted that each REC should establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) through the observance of the timetable for the gradual removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to intra-community trade. Stage four is coordinating and harmonising tariff and non-tariff systems among various RECs to establish a customs union by adopting a common external tariff at the continental level. The fifth stage is the establishment of an African common market through the adoption of a common policy in several areas such as industry. The final stage is the consolidation and strengthening of the common market structure through the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services. This would also include the integration of all sectors, namely economic, political, social and cultural (OAU, 1991).

In a critical review of the treaty, Mukisa and Thompson (1995) contended that, while it represented a crucial and much-needed step forward in the quest to alleviate the continent’s economic problems; by downplaying the significance of political integration in the continent, the treaty fails to meet the requirements for the attainment of its objectives. Moreover, the authors posit that so much is dependent on political integration to the extent that a strategy that overlooks that factor is bound to be of limited utility to proponents of economic development in the continent (Mukisa and Thompson, 1995). This critique was inspired by the fact that the treaty does not say much about political integration. Instead, it is mentioned in passing at the later stages of economic integration (Mukisa and Thompson, 1995; Sanders, Dzinesa and Nagar, 2012).

5.2.3. Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa

In 2008 leaders of the African continent adopted yet another ambitious plan in the quest for the industrialisation of the continent, the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA). This happened at the January 2008 summit, dedicated to “the industrialisation of Africa”, as was suggested by the theme. During this summit, AIDA was adopted and embraced by all of the continent’s participating heads of state and government (African Union, 2008). The aim, notes AIDA, is to mobilize financial and non-financial resources and increase Africa’s economic competitiveness (African Union, 2008; Matambalya, 2015a; Moyo, 2017). Like all of the

continent's industrialisation and development initiatives that preceded it, AIDA underscores the importance of manufacturing and industry for attaining higher standards of living and inclusive economic growth and development (Gehl Sampath, 2014). The commission of the African Union was then directed to operationalise this initiative in collaboration with UNIDO, UNECA and other development partners.

21st century Africa is recognized as a highly diverse continent in its economic, social, and political structures (Chingono and Nakana, 2009). However, its countries share common characteristics and similar challenges (Gehl Sampath, 2014); like the lower levels of social-economic development and lack of industrialisation. That the continent lacks industrialisation is a fact that has been proven by several studies that came before this one (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009a; Page, 2011; Ajakaiye and Page, 2012; Matambalya, 2015b). The interest in this study is to understand the impact of SADC's developmental integration in the region's quest for industrialisation as part of the continental mandate. Thus, AIDA is one of the most recent initiatives that seek to put the continent on a sustainable industrial development trajectory (Matambalya, 2015: 57). This way, it stresses the significance of industrialisation for economic transformation while also acknowledging the continent's industrial development challenge.

It has been widely argued that despite the adoption of all these initiatives in pursuit of industrialisation in the SADC region, they have barely materialised (Nzau, 2010; Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012; Wolf and Christina WoLF, 2016). This is because the continent has made very few industrial products that matter for its growth since the 1970s (UNIDO, 2020a). However, John Page (2011b) has, to some degree, attributed this to the lack of investment in the continent. Noting that the difference in industrial development between the African continent and other developing countries can be traced back to differences in the investment climate. He mentions three critical areas that he argued constraints industrialisation in the continent, focusing on which investments should focus: infrastructure, skills, and regional integration.

Furthermore, the 2021 paper by Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin (2021) notes that the underdevelopment in firm-level productivity in Africa results from the lack of finance and infrastructure. Thus, suggesting that action must be taken in these two areas to ensure competitiveness and the continent's industrialisation. Matambalya (2015: 179) has argued that the development of diverse infrastructural capacities has greatly aided industrialisation throughout

history. Implying that in the absence of the supporting infrastructure, the expansion of the economy spurred by industrialisation cannot happen. However, the lack of financial resources remains a significant obstacle to African countries, which derail the industrialisation process. To finance this process, they need to mobilize sufficient resources for public investments, crucial to industrial development, including infrastructural upgrading and technological advancements (Opoku and Yan, 2019).

UNIDO (2018) also noted that many small firms in the African continent struggle to secure finances. Noting that these firms face demand and supply-side effects in access to finance. At the same time, the main problem on the supply side entails the lack of depth in the financial system. It is characterized by the few operators that mainly focus on large scale firms as they consider the Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) high risk and administratively costly (UNIDO, 2018a). Further to limited financial options, especially for the SMEs, a lack of technological advancement and capabilities to inspire innovation and develop new industries is also a significant obstacle. As a result, the continent's technological capabilities in production have been deemed inadequate, which continuously reduces the continent's competitiveness (UNIDO, 2020e).

This is evident with the continent's relatively lower share of MVA compared to developed countries and other developing regions. It is also evident with the relatively small contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP (World Bank, 2020). Even though the African continent's manufacturing may have been on the rise shortly after independence, said to have been triggered by the protectionist policies, by the mid-1980s, external shocks, including oil prices, the decrease of the commodity prices, saw a major decline in the continental industrial output (Lowitt, 2017). The limited success of the post-independence initiatives has propelled enduring debates concerning industrialisation paths in the continent. Making it one of the most contentious subjects in the continent's development (Evans, 2010).

According to Lall and Wangwe (1998), the industrial performance in Sub-Saharan Africa had been very poor, with the growth of manufacturing value-added over 1980-93 only at 3 per cent per annum. In the same vein, Page (2011) has noted, during 1975 and 2005, the size and diversity of the industry in the African continent dropped drastically. In essence, the continent has been missing relative to regional and global manufacturing. For example, the continent's share of global manufacturing declined from around 3 per cent in 1970 to less than 2 per cent in 2013 (Zamfir,

2016). Moreover, by 2006 the continent's MVA had declined to about 10 per cent, exactly where it was in the mid-1960s (Matambalya, 2015b). This is even though rapid growth in the developing countries since the 1960s was strongly associated with structural change, resources being transferred from traditional sectors to more modern industrial sectors (Rodrik, 2009).

Looking at these earlier conclusions and comparing them to the more recent ones, it becomes clear that the earlier verdict still holds in the continent's industrialisation process. Moyo (2020b) has emphasised that Africa's industrialisation in general; Sub-Saharan Africa in particular over the past decades, has been a disappointment. She noted that most countries continue to preside over undiversified economies, with the too minor or non-existent industrial base; and zero structural transformation. Looking back at the history of African industrialisation, the author noted that the average manufacturing value-added per capita was lower in real terms in most countries in 1982 than it was in the 1960s.

However, it is also noted that one of the objectives of the colonial policy was to hinder industrialisation and monopolise the manufactured goods markets. Consequently, the African countries entered the 1950s with a low or non-industrial base and had to build from the bottom (Salazar-Xirinachs, Nübler and Kozul-Wright, 2014; Rekiso, 2017). As a result, African countries had a primary exportation economy in the wake of independence. The dynamism of its development depended on the central countries' demand for their export commodities (Mukisa and Thompson, 1995; Asante, 1997a; Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014; Weiss, 2018). Thus, in a 2011 report on the "State and Africa's Development Challenges," UNECA, in collaboration with the African Union Commission, maintained that the state in the African continent has a distinctively crucial role to play in alleviating the growing and emerging development challenges. It further noted that diversifying the continent's exports and production constitute a significant element of transformation (UNECA and AUC, 2011). However, the state's leadership and vision are essential to design and pursue policies to move the continent away from its heavy reliance on primary commodity production and exports (UNECA and AUC, 2011).

5.3. SADC: Industrialisation Through Developmental Integration

Article 5 of the SADC Treaty clearly outlines the transformation's aims and objectives. These include the achievement of development and sustainable economic growth through

industrialisation, poverty alleviation, the enhancement of the people's standard of living, to mention a few (SADC, 1992: 5). Furthermore, the treaty notes that to achieve these objectives, the region would have to, among other things:

a) harmonize political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states; b) encourage the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region and to participate fully in the implementation of the programs and projects of SADC; c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization of requisite resources for the implementation of programs and operations of SADC and its Institutions (SADC, 1992: 6).

With these aims and objectives and proclamations in the SADC treaty, the policy formulation and implementation in SADC needed to be developmental in approach, seeking to industrialise the region and enhance economic growth and development. Diversifying economic activities and strengthening the manufacturing capacity is vital to eliminate higher poverty levels, unemployment and inequality in the regional economies (Nizeimana and Nhema, 2016; Signé and Johnson, 2018; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). This would largely be based on the greater complementarity between national and regional policies. In all this, industrial policy has an important role to play so that industrialisation is responsive to the yearnings of the region, especially in the promotion of inclusive and transformative growth. This should strive for the commitment to develop the productive capacity of member states (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009b; Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012; Andreoni and Gregory, 2013).

As Langa and Nkhonjera (2018) emphasised, linkages with the extractive sector can be strengthened by developing the manufacturing capabilities within the capital equipment sector within the region; to ensure strong complementarity between the mining construction and the rail infrastructure and agriculture. However, most SADC regional economies have smaller domestic markets, which struggle to support the establishment of capital goods industries (Moyo, 2020). Therefore, unless established on a regional basis, such industries would be underutilised in most fragmented SADC countries (Siddiqui, 2012; Gofhamodimo, 2018; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019).

The literature is consistent on that, as in the rest of the African continent, the imperative of industrialisation in SADC has become more crucial than ever (Gehl Sampath, 2014; Hailu, 2014; Matambalya, 2015a; Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019; Moyo, 2020b). Thus, SADC embraced

developmental integration to ensure none of its members is left behind in pursuit of industrialisation (SADC RISDP, 2003; Mureverwi, 2016). SADC's adoption of developmental integration had specific main objectives; they include the industrialisation of regional economies to inspire sustainable growth and enhance living standards and quality of life for the region's citizenry (SADC, 1992, 2015; Evans, 2010; Zondi, 2020). At the heart of propelling the industrialisation process is growing the significance of the manufacturing sector in the GDP (Simandan, 2009), as explained in the literature review chapter.

5.4. SADC's Industrialisation Initiatives

Thus, there have been several initiatives by member states in the SADC region that have been developed with the sole purpose of fast-tracking the industrialisation process. Some of them have been adopted at the continental level and are implemented by the continent's eight RECs (Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu, 2019). This section will deal with three industrialisation initiatives that have been adopted by the SADC region, namely, the Industrial Upgrading and Modernization Programme of 2009, the Industrial Development Policy Framework of 2012, and the Industrialisation Strategy of 2015.

5.4.1.1. Industrial Upgrading and Modernization Programme

In 2009, the SADC Council of Ministers on Trade and Industry adopted the SADC Industrial Upgrading and Modernisation Programme (IUMP) to fast track capacity building in the local industries (SADC, 2018). UNIDO established this industrialisation and development programme to assist the developing countries with economic growth and facilitate their regional integration and economies in transition through capacity building of local manufacturing industries for structural transformation and economic diversification (SADC, 2018; Moyo, 2020a; UNIDO, 2020c). SADC has stated that it is developed for individual countries through an interactive process between UNIDO and national authorities (SADC, 2018).

Recognising that most of its member states are at the low level of industrial development, SADC noted that this programme provides an integrated approach that encompasses promoting

diversification of the manufacturing sector and improving regulatory frameworks and the business environment (SADC, 2018; UNIDO, 2020c). Therefore, SADC members were encouraged to use the IUMP as the framework to establish their national upgrading and modernisation programme to catalyse the enhancement of the existing industrial capacity (SADC, 2018). This programme is premised on the fact that successful industrial development is driven by multiple factors that must be tackled concurrently (UNIDO, 2020c). Thus, the region identified nine strategic sectors for upgrading and modernisation interventions, including agro-food processing, textiles and machinery and equipment, to mention a few (see SADC, 2018: 5).

These sectors were identified in collaboration with UNIDO, which researched sectors that could serve as catalysts for the region's industrialisation process (Mbuta, 2011; SADC, 2018; UNIDO, 2020c). This initiative served as the beginning of a series of intervention measures intended to enhance factor accumulation and raise productivity in the region (McCarthy, 2014). Member states were required to develop their national IUMPs and implement them; these had to be in line with the regional IUMP, which provides the basis for the sector-specific industrialisation approach (SARDC, 2017).

5.4.1.2. Industrial Development Policy Framework

The adoption of the Industrial Development Policy Framework (IDPF) in 2012 by the SADC's Committee of Ministers was intended to serve as the basis for consultations in member states to develop a coherent industrial policy framework and strategies in the region (SADC, 2012). It served as the foundation for the region's imminent industrialisation strategy and road map. The foundation of the IDPF, according to SADC (2014), is the IUMP. IDPF spelt out cooperation areas at the regional level to build a diversified and globally competitive industrial base that would significantly contribute to sustainable growth and promote industrialisation. In the framework's establishment, SADC (2014) noted that "It provides a reference point and will guide the coordination of complex complementary policies, activities and processes which will form part of the regional industrial development framework."

The region's industrialisation aspirations are communicated through it. While it recognises that the formulation and implementation of the industrial policy is essentially a national prerogative, it

encourages the formulation and implementation of national industrial policies by member states to stimulate and enhance their productive capacities. This is because the industrial policy remains a legitimate development instrument (SADC, 2012). Also emphasised in the UNIDO 2011 report is that as much the industrial policy is a national prerogative, an approach that takes cognisance of the importance of the collective effort through regional integration is essential; this is mainly due to the existing economic diversities and regional imbalances (UNIDO, 2011).

The framework seeks to leverage and build on SADC's mutually beneficial opportunities and address the common challenge of industrialisation by developing strategies and activities coordinated at a regional level (SADC, 2012). The IDPF indicates that it recognises there is no one size fits all model for regional industrialisation and development. However, it was crafted to amalgamate various policy measures and interventions that influence the industrial structure and performance within diverse contexts at national and regional levels (SADC, 2012).

There are three elements that the IDPF mainly emphasises these are; the urgency to boost competitiveness in the industrial sector; to promote industrial linkages; and the develop regional value chains (SADC, 2012). A comprehensive mechanism emphasising intervention areas with regional linkages, like improving the competitiveness for the industrial sector and promoting competitive regional value chains to build a diversified regional industry, has been argued for by Zarenda (2012). This is essential because the IDPF underscored the importance of an efficient and regionally integrated infrastructure in support of the regional industrialisation process, most importantly in the provision of intermediate input into manufacturing (SADC, 2012).

The SADC's IDPF further notes that all the developing countries that have been able to move away from a low-income status and eradicate poverty, especially in Asia, have looked to the manufacturing sector as the main source and engine of development (SADC, 2012). What it recognises as a challenge for the region is dissuading from an economic growth and development path built on the consumption and exports of primary commodities to a more sustainable developmental path based on industrialisation (SADC, 2012). McCarthy (2014) observed that the interest that is revealed by the region in an industrial development policy framework reflects the urgency put to intervention measures to support the rapid manufacturing sector growth as a driver of sustainable growth and industrialisation.

5.4.1.3. SADC Industrialisation Strategy

Adopted in 2015, the primary orientation of the strategy is the necessity for industrialisation in the SADC region. It notes that industrialisation should be seen as a long-term process of structural transformation of the entire region (SADC, 2015). This is on the basis that, it argues, SADC economies can no longer rely on rich resources for industrialisation and modernisation in the 21st century. Thus, it seeks to propel significant structural transformation in the context of deeper regional integration, targeting higher levels of growth (SADC, 2015). The strategy requires governments the private sector to work in concert to drive the industrialisation agenda (SADC, 2015). This strategy is anchored on three pillars: industrialisation as the champion of economic and technological transformation, Competitiveness as an active process to move from comparative advantage to competitive advantage and regional integration and geography as the context for industrial development and economic prosperity (SADC, 2015: 3).

The strategy and its roadmap, amongst other things, seek to strengthen the productive capacity and competitiveness of the regional economies (SADC, 2015). It also enjoins SADC member states to collectively work towards a developmental macroeconomic framework that prioritises inclusive growth, economic diversification, the enhanced competitiveness of the region, as well as deeper regional integration (SADC, 2015; SARDC, 2015). However, as McCarthy (2014) argued, formulating the new industrialisation strategy and the roadmap is desirable and necessary. However, it is insufficient for the much-needed structural transformation in the SADC region. Successful industrialisation in the 21st century requires the capacity and the will to strategically navigate complex and sometimes contradictory processes (Lowitt, 2017).

UJCI (2017) has argued in a policy brief that this industrialisation strategy signals a renewed commitment to the regional-industrialisation process in the SADC. It is as a result of the realisation that whether the region succeeds in its quest for sustainable industrialisation in an increasingly volatile and rapidly changing economic environment; is entirely dependent on its ability and willingness to mobilise and increase value-addition to its abundant resources (UJCI, 2017). As also emphasised by Monyae and Nganje (2019), is that SADC's new industrialisation strategy has all the hallmarks of a comprehensive and well-thought-out industrial policy consistent with the changing times. However, a well-articulated industrial policy alone cannot remedy the region's industrialisation and economic development challenge. This blueprint must be translated into

action to bring about the desired industrial and socio-economic change (Monyae and Nganje, 2019) .

Furthermore, UJCI (2017) argues that the success of this industrialisation strategy would highly depend on the extent to which its implementation by the member states embraces certain imperatives. Firstly, industrialisation needs to be reconceptualised, so the thinking and policymaking shift from the conventional narrow focus on manufacturing and maximise the productive linkages across economic sectors. It further notes that due consideration should always be given to that the SADC region's effort to industrialise takes place in a dramatically changing global context, flowing from the capitalist system. Thus, this necessitates an inward-looking approach to regional industrialisation that maximises ownership and policy space and allows for strategic engagement with the outside world (UJCI, 2017). However, expanding the productive capacities and infrastructure that underpin the industrialisation process requires financial commitments to support the process (UNCTAD, 2016a).

Thus, its success is dependent on the forging of a solid developmental relationship consisting of the government, the private sector and other development partners. It is to be done through deliberate and induced interventions to enhance factor accumulation to substantially raise total factor productivity (SADC, 2015; SARDC, 2019). That is to say; there ought to be a direct shift of resources to dynamic higher productivity use. This is further so as the strategy acknowledges that the SADC region's economies can no longer rely on their rich resources or low-cost labour as their platform for industrialisation (SADC, 2015). Two quantitative goals of the strategy are first to double the region's share of the MVA in GDP by 2030 to 30 per cent and 40 per cent by 2050. To achieve a major socio-economic transformation at the national and regional levels (SADC, 2015).

The region's industrialisation strategy signals that SADC is redirecting its focus to the objectives the heads of state had agreed upon on the SADC's transformation in 1992, under developmental integration. These range from fast-tracking the process of industrialisation to poverty eradication (SADC, 2015; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). In the years following this agreement, the region seemed to have lost sight of these ambitious objectives. Instead, as noted by Lowitt (2017); Monyae and Nganje (2019), they primarily focused on the liberalisation of trade through the elimination of trade barriers at the expense of creating the productive capacity in the region. This

was seen as after just four years of the SADC's transformation; member states had started negotiating and signing the trade protocol, which came into effect in 2001, with the region expected to be a free trade zone by 2008 (Lee, 2003).

The strategy indicates that the region is moving away from the linear approach to regional development and integration. It had expected the region to be using a single currency (achieved in 2018) by now, having achieved a Customs Union in 2010, Common Market in 2015, and a Monetary Union in 2016 (SADC, 1996). None of these objectives has been met by the region yet, mainly because of capacity constraints (Tshego and McDonald, 2016; Byiers, Vanheukelom and Woolfrey, 2018; Odijie, 2018). The region neglected to focus on a strategy that would focus as much on building the region's capacity as to the elimination of the trade barriers (UNCTAD, 2013). They neglected to form a broader development framework, promoting the region's sectoral recomposition, economic diversification and structural transformation, thereby enhancing the member state's productive capacities (Moyo, 2017; Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018).

The region's industrialisation strategy is a true reflection of neo-structuralist ideas. It notes that the region comprises economies at varying levels of development, meaning the transformation targets higher levels of growth and deeper structural change. It recognises that, much as the strategy was adopted at the regional institutional level, its implementation is at the national levels of the member states, characterised by different historical, political, and economic contexts (SADC, 2015).

5.5. Financing Industrialisation in the SADC

There are several issues to which industrialisation challenges in the African continent in general, the SADC region in particular, are attributed. The lack of financing often comes up as one of these challenges (African Development Bank Group, 2017). In fact, the region's industrialisation strategy and roadmap noted an urgent need to develop an innovative way to finance the industrialisation process in the region as inadequate financing is among the biggest challenges to the region's industrialisation process (SADC, 2015). From the private sector perspective, it has been argued that investments in infrastructure for the industrialisation process are big tickets, long-term commitments with fixed locations, fixed revenues and structures that require substantial

financial buy-in from all parties and stakeholders (Baloyi and Zengeni, 2015). More so, in the regional industrialisation process, infrastructure is of paramount importance, as several studies have shown that regional transport infrastructure is one of the biggest obstacles to fast-tracking the industrialisation process in the region (Baloyi and Zengeni, 2015; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019).

The financial sector is essential in developing the private sector, consequently industrialisation, particularly regarding the efficient capital and financial markets and the banking system (African Development Bank Group, 2017). Together with the appropriate institutional and macroeconomic environment, capital investment is essential and a critical issue for small business sector growth (Noman and Stiglitz, 2017: 13). However, in several countries in the African continent, the lack and shortage of investment derail long-term growth prospects (Noman and Stiglitz, 2017: 33). Therefore, this underlines the urgent need to encourage domestic and foreign investment and accelerate the development of local capital markets (Matambalya, 2015b; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). To meet these challenges, countries in the continent need to reform their financial sector to be more responsive to industrial development (Volz, 2013; African Development Bank Group, 2017; Griffith-Jones and Cozzi, 2017; Noman and Stiglitz, 2017).

Foreign Direct Investments and domestic investment have often been looked to provide investment, especially in small businesses; however, this does not happen at times (Naudé, Szirmai and Lavopa, 2013). The industrialisation process requires small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs) to achieve economies of scale to reap competitiveness benefits as part of a larger drive towards diversification (UNECA, 2020). However, as noted, SMMEs are often undercapitalized as capital banks are reluctant to grant them loans (Matambalya, 2015b; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). The private commercial funders tend to focus more on short term financing and not on the long term financing spectrum required by the SMMEs (Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin, 2021).

This was noted by Melamid and Lewis (1954) that the private sector might be reluctant to invest, especially in regions like Africa, which they might deem to not provide any certainty for the returns on their investments. The authors indicate that the government has a credible case to lead the way in establishing industries using its resources. They argue that the idea would be to show that industries could operate successfully, expecting that the government can withdraw from the industry once the pioneering stage is over (Melamid and Lewis, 1954a; Matambalya, 2015a; Weiss, 2018). Finances become a cause for concern because the industrialisation process is known

to require long term financing, which would usually come from the private sector, while the public sector ensures a suitable business environment (Kormawa and Jerome, 2015). This is because it is easier to effectively promote long-term investments in countries or areas with an investment-friendly and enabling environment (Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019).

Within the SADC region, it has been noted that the financing for industrial development should target SMMEs, as they have been proven to be key drivers of industrialisation and structural transformation around the world (SADC, 2015; Noman and Stiglitz, 2017; Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin, 2021). That is to say, the support for this sector is a critically important strategy for the SADC member states. While innovative and willing to contribute to industrial development, this sector faces major financial constraints (Noman and Stiglitz, 2017). The SADC industrialisation-strategy underscored that the possibility of industrialisation is nonexistent without higher investment in infrastructure, upgrading and diversifying the capital stock, and the provision of technological skills necessary in the modern industrial sector (SADC, 2015). The strategy notes this while also acknowledging that the current investment and savings levels to propel industrialisation and structural transformation in the region are nowhere close to where they are supposed to be (SADC, 2015). Which was to say, something needed to be done urgently to aid the region's industrialisation process.

In 2017, the SADC Regional Development Fund (RDF) was operationalised to support the region's industrialisation plan. The mandate of this initiative is stipulated in the SADC Treaty Article 26A (SADC, 1992: 18). The fund's purpose is to create a regional financing mechanism to aid industrialisation and sustainable economic growth and development in the region (SADC, 1992; Wentworth *et al.*, 2018). Its primary purposes have been noted as follows; infrastructure development, industrial development, integration and economic adjustment and social development (SADC, 1992). It is funded mainly through the mobilisation of resources from member states, development partners and the private sector. However, like many regional integration initiatives in the SADC, the success of this fund is dependent on the member states' ability and willingness to replenish it to support its aims and objectives (Griffith-Jones and Cozzi, 2017; Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019).

5.6. Government-Private Sector Collaboration in Pursuit of Industrialisation

The quest for industrialisation in the SADC has seen a ground-breaking institutionalisation of the private and public sector cooperation in pursuit of this objective. The formalisation of the collaboration between the SADC member states and the region's businesses marked a crucial point in the quest for industrialisation (SADC, 2015). The establishment of the Southern African Development Community Business Council sought to strengthen the private sector engagement in pursuit of the industrialisation agenda in the SADC region (NBF, 2018). The lack of direct involvement of the private sector in the industrialisation and development conversation has been noted as being a barrier to the success of this agenda (UNECA and AUC, 2011; Mazzucato, 2015; Signé and Johnson, 2018; SARDC, 2019; UNCTAD, 2020). Thus, initiatives like the SADC Industrialisation Week provide a formal platform dedicated to the engagement between the member states and the private sector (SARDC, 2019). Up until the adoption of the Industrialisation Strategy in 2015, SADC had not given an official platform for engagement with the private sector; hence we refer to the initiative as ground-breaking in the region's context.

The SADC (2015) industrialisation strategy extensively discusses the roles of the state and the private sector to foster this process in the region. It notes that government has a crucial role in this process, which is to create an enabling policy and regulatory environment for businesses, emphasising the binding constraints of infrastructure, skills development, and financing. It further contends that the multi-faceted challenges of industrialisation in the 21st century require a strong alliance between the government and the private sector (SADC, 2015). That is to say; the government has to facilitate the establishment and growth of firms and industries.

Thus, the strategy assigns specific complementary roles to the state and the private sector. In addition to creating an enabling environment for industrial development and facilitating the financing of the industrial projects, the state is employed to sponsor measures that seek to strengthen the institutional capacity for industry and trade (SADC, 2015: 32). The private sector is mandated to be involved in implementing the industrialisation strategy and help the state eliminate obstacles they encounter while doing business in their day-to-day operation. Furthermore, the private sector is urged to implement capacity building programmes in collaboration with the State to enhance entrepreneurial and managerial skills (SADC, 2015: 33).

From the above-stipulated roles of both the state and the private sector, it can be deduced that there is a deep desire to make this working relationship productive and achieve the common objective of industrialising the region. The 2019 Southern African Economic Outlook by the African Development Bank noted that the private sector is critical for industrialisation, growth, and employment. It contributes up to 70 per cent to the region's GDP (AfDB, 2019). The report posits that governments should involve the private sector in infrastructure planning and ownership regarding industrialisation. Furthermore, it notes that the public-private partnerships should come together to make often larger and complex infrastructure investments, which are critical to integration and deepening the industrialisation process (AfDB, 2019).

The private sector is the essential driver of an economy's growth; moreover, this sector creates employment and provide goods and services (Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019). They are the key drivers of innovation across sectors. They also stand to benefit more from aligning their activities to the national agenda for development and integrating sustainability in their corporate strategies and operations (UNIDO, 2016b). It has been argued that the quality nature of the relationship between the state and the private sector created a necessary precondition for the rapid industrialisation in East Asia (Leftwich, 1995; Wade, 2014; Panayiotopoulos, 2017). The state plays an active role in the economy and works with the private sector to provide an enabling environment to pursue development objectives, is known as the developmental state (Ovadia and Wolf, 2018).

The major challenge that the SADC economies have faced has been creating an environment that would enable the attainment of high and sustainable rates of equitable economic growth (Nizeimana and Nhema, 2016; Byiers, Vanheukelom and Woolfrey, 2018; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). Which, if achieved, would promote the region's integration which benefits all the parties involved (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014). With most SADC member states still experiencing low GDP growth rates, the region's economic development has become increasingly uneven, derailing economic development and the region's integration process (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014; AfDB, 2019; SADC, 2020b). Since 2008, the region's GDP growth rate has been in decline from 6.8 per cent in 2007 to 4.5 per cent in 2012 and 2.1 per cent in 2018; with the lowest growth rate in 2009 of 0.2 per cent (SADC Selected Indicators, 2018; SADC, 2020b).

As noted on numerous occasions above, developmental integration in the SADC was adopted so that member states would collectively pursue their industrialisation and development objectives without leaving any member behind. Also, as already mentioned earlier, developmental integration assumes it is building on the developmental state at the national level. The ultimate goal of the developmental state is to accelerate sustainable economic development with a focus on structural transformation (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). However, in the African continent in general, SADC in particular, fostering manufacturing development to achieve a broad-based economic development, has been marginalised over the past years (Sen, 2016; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). Thus, industrialising the economic activities and developing manufacturing capacity in the region enhances options for addressing rising poverty, unemployment, and inequality in many SADC countries (Signé and Johnson, 2018).

5.7. Developmental (State) Integration and SADC's Pursuit of Industrialisation: Botswana and Mauritius

It is worth reiterating that the quest for collective self-reliance is not new in the African continent in general, SADC in particular; it has been advanced in various forms since the beginning of decolonisation in the continent (Ajakaiye and Page, 2012; Matambalya, 2015b; Ismail, 2017). The increasing deterioration of the vulnerable African economies in the post-independence era from the 1970s as well as the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s led to the intensification of the calls for regional integration (Haarløv, 1997; Teal, 2002; Zondi and Mulaudzi, 2010; Romano and Traù, 2017). It then led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos in 1980, culminating in signing the Abuja Treaty, as explained earlier in this chapter. It was also argued shortly after independence by the proponents of integration that small African states were not economically viable by themselves; as a result, various efforts at development and industrialisation were to be taken to a broader continental level (Nzau, 2010; Matambalya, 2015a; Yirga Shumuye, 2015).

Developmental integration that SADC adopted to fast track the process of industrialisation in the region presumes the existence of a developmental state at the national level (Zondi, 2020). Within the context of integration, these two appear to be inextricably linked to each other, given that developmental integration is a broadened version of the developmental state at a regional level.

This study has repeatedly noted that SADC is entirely reliant on its member states to put into effect developmental integration initiatives for the realisation of the grouping's objectives. And that is literal. Given the nature of the region's integration, there is not much that can be done at the region's institutional level if one of the member states does not implement at the national level what was agreed upon (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015; SADC, 2015; Moyo, 2016; Odijie, 2018).

The main aim of the SADC's developmental integration is to reduce and eventually eliminate the region's pervasive development and economic challenges, focusing on the high and sustained growth rates through economic diversification and transformation (Tsie, 1996; SADC, 2015; Mureverwi, 2016). However, since free-market forces alone cannot drive the economic transformation, the developmental state must play a role in the resource allocation and efficient coordination of crucial economic activities (UNECA and AUC, 2011).

5.7.1. **Botswana**

At the time of independence in the mid-1960s, Botswana was mang of the world's least developing countries, and one of the poorest countries in Africa, with its per capita GDP hovering around 70 USD (Moyo, 2016). However, Zizhou (2009) has argued that the effective use of the diamonds' revenues contributed immensely to the country's fastest-growth relative to other global economies. With a population size of 2,4 million (SADC, 2020b), Botswana is one of the completely landlocked countries in the SADC. Over 84 per cent of its land is the uninhabited Kalahari Desert, while 80 per cent of its people live along the fertile border. Only 4 per cent of the country's land is cultivated, and most of the land is used for cattle grazing as cattle is considered the nation's primary wealth (Leftwich, 1996; Sekwati, 2011; Moyo, 2017; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). At the time of independence, most commentators concluded that the country's economic growth prospects were dismal (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). As of 2020, Manufacturing contributed about 5,2 per cent to the country's total GDP. It has a per capita income of USD 7 837 (SADC, 2020b). It has been argued that Botswana did not inherit anything of substance from the British, unlike various former British colonies, which got some social and physical infrastructure to foster economic growth and development (Hillbom, 2008; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018).

Despite the conclusions of the country's doomed growth prospects by development commentators and adverse challenges, the leadership that took power at independence was determined to develop and pursue policies aimed at economic growth. This was to be done by formulating interventionist policies, with the state playing a pivotal role in the development and industrialisation process (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). Thus, several development plans and initiatives have been adopted and implemented to promote industrialisation and enhance the productive manufacturing capacity broad-based in Botswana. In addition, these plans have prioritised diversification of the economy away from over-reliance on diamonds production into manufacturing (Hillbom, 2008, 2012; Yirga Shumuye, 2015; McMillan *et al.*, 2017).

At the time of independence, the country's only manufacturing enterprise was the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) (Taylor, 2002), and the traditional economic activity was cattle rearing with modern sectors non-existent (Yirga Shumuye, 2015). The average growth in the manufacturing sector during the 1990s was reported to be around 3.8 per cent. This had grown over the years, as at independence, Botswana's manufacturing was almost entirely meat products, which had dropped to 15 per cent by the 1990s (Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019). Demonstrating a commitment to a stronger manufacturing sector, two major government organisations were established to assist in establishing manufacturing and industrial enterprises. They are, Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) LTD and Botswana Export Credit Insurance and Guarantee Company (BECI) LTD. They invest in selected industries that include manufacturing textiles and garments, jewellery, and glass (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009b).

Established in 1970 and 100 per cent owned by the government, BDC is the country's main agency for commercial and industrial development. It has been mandated to assist local and foreign investors in establishing and developing commercially viable businesses in Botswana across all sectors, apart from large-scale mining (BDC, 2021). Given that this initiative targets local businesses and foreign, it is abundantly clear that the idea is to foster diversification away from mining. BECI was established in 1996, and BDC entirely owns it. Its primary mandate at the establishment was to assist in developing non-traditional exports by diversifying products and markets (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009b).

For decades since discovering diamonds in 1967, Botswana has demonstrated heavy reliance on diamonds for its growth. They have accounted for over 40 per cent of the country's output for

several decades (Hillbom, 2008; Sekwati, 2011). This is primarily because of the dominance of the economy by mining which is responsible for over 50 per cent of the public revenues, and diamonds alone are responsible for over 73 per cent of the merchandise exports (Sekwati, 2011; Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018; BDC, 2021). However, the challenge that has faced Botswana over the years has been expanding the manufacturing industry's limited size. Thus, the government has intended to diversify away from mining towards processing the local raw material.

5.7.2. Mauritius

Mauritius is the third smallest country in the SADC region in terms of population size, inhabiting 1,3 million people, with a per capita income of USD 11 067 (SADC Selected Indicators, 2018). As of 2020, the manufacturing sector contributed about 10,7 per cent to the country's total GDP (SADC, 2020b). At the dawn of its independence in 1968, Mauritius was a sugar-based monoculture, with most of its arable land devoted to sugar cultivation. Agriculture contributed up to 25 per cent to GDP, while sugar alone accounted for up to 90 per cent of the total exports (Subramanian, 2009; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Moyo, 2016; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017). At independence, the country's economic stagnation was characterised by low growth rates, at 0.7 per cent, and a growing number of unemployed people (Nath and Madhoo, 2003).

Consequently, the island's post-colonial governments have pursued similar goals as those of their counterparts within the SADC region, most importantly in matters of economic growth and development (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Moyo, 2016; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017). It has been noted that the successive post-independence governments have managed to take advantage of the country's political stability, colonial preferential trading status and a skilled workforce (Sandbrook, 2005; UNCTAD, 2020). Efforts to diversify and industrialise the Mauritian economy involved interventionist policies to achieve these goals (Sandbrook, 2005; Moyo, 2016; UNCTAD, 2020).

To kick off its industrialisation process in the 1960s, the Mauritian government established the national development bank to support the island's industrialisation and economic diversification

objectives. The bank would provide subsidised long-term loans to non-sugar industries (Subramanian and Roy, 2001; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Moyo, 2016). This was an era of economic transition, as it can be observed that the government was attempting to reduce the economy's dependency on the traditional agricultural industries, namely sugar, by diversifying toward the manufacturing sector. As a result, several small scale industries in food processing, beverages, cosmetics, fertilizer, footwear were set up to meet the local needs (Nath and Madhoo, 2003).

Initially, the island deployed the imports substitution strategy to pursue its national objectives; however, it is said to have later realised that it did not possess sufficient characteristics of an internally oriented process of industrialisation, development, and diversification (Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011; Saylor, 2012). The country's obstacles included the labour supply, capital, and a bigger market to support the industrialisation process (Meisenhelder, 1997). Following the unsuccessful attempt at industrialisation through ISI, the island substituted it with a more export-oriented approach (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011). This model took the form and shape of the East Asian industrialisation, which is noted to have been characterised by export orientation and the state playing a central role in this process by using its resources to offer incentives to attract domestic and foreign investment (Hillbom, 2008; Frankel, 2010; Yirga Shumuye, 2015). This model inspired the establishment of the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in the country, a programme whose success they carefully studied in the East Asian economies, especially Taiwan (Hauge, 2020).

The EPZ Act was passed in 1970; it intended to provide incentives to manufacturers that produced for the foreign markets. It was not restricted to one location on the island but somewhat was scattered all over (Chan Sun C.A, Chittoo and Sukon, 2016). The government invested immensely in the required infrastructure to set up EPZs and keep them running (Zafar, 2011). Along with the development of the EPZs, Mauritius continuously pursued the modernisation of its sugar industry and diversification into tourism and offshore services. These developments sought to convert a monocrop (sugarcane) economy into a newly industrialising one to quell the island's growth rate and unemployment problems (Meisenhelder, 1997; Frankel, 2010; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011). Furthermore, local sugar money was transferred into the clothing industry, eliminating dependence on foreign capital (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011). Unlike the purely market-

oriented neoliberal approach advocated by the Bretton woods institutions, the Mauritian quest for industrialisation has been built on the state's regulation of the Foreign Direct Investment import and export taxes (Subramanian and Roy, 2001; Subramanian, 2009; Frankel, 2010).

As an initiative that was crafted and subsidised by the government, the EPZ programme grew drastically during the mid-1980s. About 600 textile concentrated firms were employing over 90 000 people by the early 90s, almost one-third of the country's workforce (Meisenhelder, 1997). During this period, textiles and garments accounted for about 63 per cent of the island's exports and about 15 per cent of the GDP (Russell, 2014; Chan Sun C.A, Chittoo and Sukon, 2016). It has been argued that the newly industrialising countries demonstrate and offer good models of development based on the free market; conversely, the experience of Mauritius points to the significance of the state. In this case, economic growth has resulted from calculated state intervention instead of the unfettered marketplace (Meisenhelder, 1997; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Saylor, 2012). Through the adoption of policies that sought to open the economy, by adopting a mixed strategy of import substitution in combination with the incentives for exports through the EPZ programme, other sectors of the economy were enabled to flourish, as the economy was the monoculture. These include industrial, tourism and financial sectors (Fauzel, 2016).

Moreover, the EPZ programme encouraged investments by foreign businesses and to take advantage of the island's cheap, skilled and well-educated labour (AfDB *et al.*, 2012; Chan Sun C.A, Chittoo and Sukon, 2016). Many firms were exempted from paying tariffs on imported machinery and inputs, tax concessions on profits, exemption from import or export duties and the national labour code provision of tax holidays and the maintenance of full ownership of facilities (Nath and Madhoo, 2003; Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011). It is said that during the mid-1980s, the Mauritian EPZ programme spearheaded a decade of the pursuit of industrialisation and economic diversification, following the rise in sugar prices and production (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Chan Sun C.A, Chittoo and Sukon, 2016). This came as a result of the realisation of vulnerability posed by the monoculture, thus embarked on industrialisation and diversification. With the government in charge of the island's development agenda, this led to a decision to attract the foreign investors through incentives that induced duty-free imports, untaxed operations as well

as cheap but well-educated labour (Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Chan Sun C.A, Chittoo and Sukon, 2016; Adewale, 2017).

Just like in Botswana, the government of Mauritius deployed the indigenization policy both in the state sector and major investments in other programmes, including the EPZ and human development, to build its productive capacity (UNECA and AUC, 2011; UNCTAD, 2020). The country's leadership has clearly articulated the developmental vision and the economic agenda for the country. This demonstrates a commitment to transform and diversify the country's economic structure to fast track the industrialisation process (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Moyo, 2016; UNCTAD, 2020). This strategy accelerated the country's economic growth, while the government was also trying to diversify into tourism and off-shore services (Fauzel, 2016).

Before its repeal, the Mauritian EPZ Act regulated the Export Oriented Enterprise (EOE). According to Statistics Mauritius, this subsector had 239 enterprises at the end of 2019. However, they produced a relatively narrow range of products, dominated by clothing and textiles, accounting for up to 65 per cent of the total export (Statistics Mauritius, 2020). The country's Domestic Oriented Enterprises (DOE) are said to be more diversified than the EOE in their production. However, as of 2020, they only accounted for a tiny 8 per cent of GDP and employed just over 19 000 people (Statistics Mauritius, 2020; UNIDO, 2020e). According to a 2020 report published by UNCTAD in collaboration with the Mauritian government, the country's manufacturing sector comprises 810 larger establishments that each employ over ten people. Also, there are about 13 000 small businesses that employ a relatively smaller number of people, less than ten each (UNCTAD, 2020).

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter set out to discuss initiatives that have been adopted in the quest for industrialisation in the SADC region. While doing so, it gave a context for the region's pursuit of industrialisation through developmental integration. This was done by discussing the African continental initiatives that inspire the RECs. Furthermore, in giving the continent's history of a collective pursuit of industrialisation, this chapter demonstrated the relationship between the continental initiatives and RECs like SADC. As noted, RECs are pursuing the AEC; thus, SADC's pursuit of industrialisation is not an isolated event but part of a bigger continental objective. It is clear from the discussions

that in the post-independence era, African economies were under-developed and lacked industrialisation. The colonial arrangement had the continent only producing primary commodities for exportation.

Consequently, this international division of labour left most of the continent's economies un-industrialised and were reliant on imports for manufactured goods. As a result, these economies found themselves exceedingly dependent upon primary commodities for economic growth and development at independence. However, they soon realised that such a form of growth and development is not sustainable. It exposed them to external demand and prices shocks, and they came together to form initiatives to pursue sustainable growth paths. The chapter also discussed the issue of financing industrialisation in the SADC region and the importance of the public-private sector collaboration in pursuit of this objective. Most importantly, the cases of the study were introduced by giving their physical and economic settings, Botswana and Mauritius, whose industrialisation processes for the period 1992-2020 are examined in Chapter 6.

6. Chapter Six: Data Presentation and Analysis

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents data and analysis in response to the question at the centre of the study; and sub-questions. The main question it tackles is what has been the impact of developmental integration strategy on the SADC region's industrialisation process? Further questions it seeks to respond to are How has developmental integration accelerated the industrialisation process in the SADC region? What is the contribution of developmental integration to manufacturing activities in the SADC region? What is the manufacturing industry's contribution to the transformation of economies in the SADC region? Why, if so, has SADC's developmental integration failed to hasten the industrialisation process? As indicated in the methodology chapter (5), this mainly entails assessing the trends of the contribution and significance of the manufacturing sector to the GDP and the industrial output relative to other sectors. When drawing comparisons in the size of the manufacturing sector of various countries and regions, development economists generally focus on two indicators; which are, the share of manufacturing value-added in GDP, which indicates the size of industrial production in relation to the total production of the economy; and MVA per capita, which indicates the size of the industrial output of a country or region in question, in relation to its population (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017).

However, this study is mainly interested in changes in the structural make-up of the economy, which would see the manufacturing sector rapidly increasing its significance in the economy more than other sectors. That is to say, an increase in the industrial sector in its entirety is not sufficient for industrialisation, as other sectors may be increasing their output at the same rate or more than manufacturing (Chandra, 1992: 4). Thus, the trends to be analysed in this context will be concerning the manufacturing sector's contribution to the industrial output; the contribution and significance of this industry on the identified member states' GDP to determine the pace of the industrialisation process during the cause of the stated period.

This is investigated against the developmental integration's objectives set by the SADC member states. Hillbom (2008) noted that a policy's success is judged against its objectives. Even though developmental integration is an approach to regional integration and development, not a policy, this is equally relevant because it inspires policies adopted by the integrating member states at the

regional and national levels. As noted in the methodology chapter, the selected economic indicators are used within the context of the two SADC member states to understand the trends shortly before and after the introduction of developmental integration in the region. The data the researcher has gathered dates to the year 1990. Therefore, even though this study is mainly interested in the period 1992-2020, the selected indicators, especially concerning the manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP, will be traced from 1990 to 2020.

As the collected data will show, the chapter argues that SADC's developmental integration has not significantly impacted the strengthening of the region's manufacturing sector, consequently, the regional industrialisation process. This is partly because of a lack of policy coordination by member states, as they seem to be pulling towards different directions, which impedes regional industrialisation. Thus, the region's initiatives have no discernable impact on member states' manufacturing activities. Evidently, between 1992 and 2020, SADC member states could not transform and diversify their economies, to ensure sustainable growth and development through industrialisation. As much as the two SADC member states studied in this context have had significant growths since independence, as noted in the literature, they have not done well as far as the region's developmental integration objectives are concerned. This is because the share of the manufacturing sector in their economies has been in decline, signalling de-industrialisation. It is concluded that there is still a long way to go if the significance of the manufacturing sector in the SADC economies is to improve, including enforcing the resources mobilisation mechanism and synchronisation of regional and national industrialisation plans and strategies.

The chapter is structured as follows; the second section deals with developmental integration and industrialisation in the SADC region. While this section provides MVA as a share of GDP for all SADC member states, the attention is on the presentation and analysis of data on the study cases, Botswana and Mauritius. The third section looks at the manufacturing industry and the transformation of SADC economies. The subsequent one reflects on 25 years of developmental integration in the SADC region in pursuit of industrialisation, followed by a discussion and analysis of obstacles to the region's industrialisation process, then the conclusion.

6.2. Developmental Integration and the Industrialisation Process in the SADC Region

An integrated approach to industrialisation in developing regions may encourage investments, which would then enable firms to engage in a competitive production in larger markets (Byiers, Karaki and Woolfrey, 2018). An example was made earlier of how the Asian Development Bank upscaled its investments into the integrating economies in Southeast Asia. Many SADC countries sought to build the state capacity through the indigenisation policies in the state bureaucracy, including investments in training and human capacity building programmes. Economic development was a major thrust of economic governance, of which industrialisation was the primary objective goal (Evans, 2010; UNECA and AUC, 2011; Monyae and Nganje, 2019; Moyo, 2020b). However, the evidence suggests that SADC is de-industrialising; this is depicted by a gradual decline of the manufacturing sector's contribution to member states' GDP. This means there is a drift away from the common objective of fast-tracking the industrialisation process across the region, as underscored in SADC's initiatives (SADC, 2012, 2015; UNIDO, 2020c).

While there has been great emphasis on the significance of the diversification of the traditional colonial economies, which do not inspire a strong and significant industrial base; the structural composition of regional economies has not changed much since 1992, and very few have diversified (SADC Selected Indicators, 2018; African Development Bank, 2020; WDI, 2020). The evidence further demonstrates that even those member states diversifying have been deindustrialising over the years (Khanie, 2020). This is seen as the manufacturing significance in their economies has been declining gradually (World Bank, 2020). At the core of sustainable economic development, notes Langa and Nkhonjera (2018), are diversification and industrialisation processes based on linkages towards more sophisticated higher productivity, higher value-added products within a sector and moving towards higher productivity sectors. This has not yet been observed within the SADC region.

Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 below depict SADC's Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) share of GDP from 1990 to 2019 at the country-specific and regional levels. This data was obtained from the world bank's development indicators database. As can be seen, very few member states have seen growth in their MVA share of GDP. It was a slight one for those who have experienced growth, except for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC grew by 10,1 per cent, from 9,91 per cent in 2000 to 20,01 per cent in 2019 (WDI, 2020). Also, Lesotho has been consistently growing

over the years, from 9,52 per cent in 1990 to 15,95 per cent in 2019. Impressively, Eswatini has maintained a high MVA share in its GDP over the years, though there was a slight decline from 31,42 per cent in 1990 to 29,39 in 2019 (World Bank, 2020).

Most member states have experienced a drastic decline in the share of MVA over the years. Most notably, the Zambian MVA declined from 31,86 per cent in 1990 to 7,77 per cent in 2019. Zimbabwe from 20,48 per cent in 1990 to 10,59 per cent in 2018 and Mauritius from 20,65 per cent in 1990 to 11,03 per cent in 2019. Zambia had a 24,09 per cent decline, Zimbabwe 9,89 per cent and Mauritius 9,62 per cent. The data suggests that most SADC member states had a better MVA in the early 90s than in the 2010s. The region has not been doing well in terms of increasing the significance of the manufacturing sector to the GDP, which would propel industrialisation. As demonstrated by Figure 6.1, the constant decline that has been characteristic of the region's MVA share of GDP between 1990 and 2018 is telling of the state of industrialisation. MVA at the regional level has declined from 20,51 per cent in 1990 to 10,97 per cent in 2018 (AfDB Socio-Economic Database, 2019).


Some countries have performed better than others in the stated period. These statistics demonstrate extreme levels of de-industrialisation in the SADC region and that member states are pulling in different directions. There is no uniformity; the contrasts are too sharp for an integrating region. This points to a lack of policy coordination at the regional level; member states commit to regional initiatives on principle without acting on them (Monyae and Nganje, 2019; Zondi, 2020). Any sign of prospect for sustained growth in any of the region's member states is entirely dependent on their economies' degree of structural transformation. Thus, industrialisation, spearheaded by the manufacturing sector, is vital for their economies (Khanie, 2020). The region will have to increase the significance of the manufacturing sector in their GDP to at least 25 per cent to significantly transform the state of industrialisation in the region and the economic status of the citizenry (AfDB, 2019).

Table 6.1: SADC's Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP)

	1990	2000	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
South Africa	21,61	17,47	12,00	11,72	11,60	12,05	12,02	12,03	12,01	11,76	11,78
Botswana	4,77	5,63	5,79	5,94	5,82	5,31	5,78	5,19	5,12	5,15	5,25
Mauritius	20,65	19,75	13,87	13,65	13,91	13,59	13,04	12,40	11,80	11,34	11,03
Mozambique	..	13,00	9,81	8,65	8,19	8,03	8,19	8,48	8,20	8,81	..
Angola	..	2,89	4,17	4,40	4,83	4,76	5,69	6,75	6,58	6,06	..
Zambia	31,86	9,45	7,52	7,08	6,02	6,82	7,52	7,69	8,13	7,77	..
Zimbabwe	20,48	13,39	9,17	14,04	12,92	12,59	11,89	11,60	11,02	10,59	..
Congo, Dem. Rep.	..	9,91	15,36	15,36	15,39	15,55	17,13	18,26	19,49	18,50	20,01
Eswatini	31,42	33,86	31,69	31,02	29,64	30,65	31,60	31,03	29,51	28,85	29,39
Lesotho	9,52	13,62	12,57	11,23	10,69	11,96	15,05	16,31	15,05	16,25	15,95
Malawi	16,65	11,62	10,07	9,25	9,56	9,55	9,60	9,52	9,37	..	..
Namibia	10,41	9,96	13,65	12,19	10,36	9,76	11,38	11,69	11,92	12,02	11,74
Seychelles	10,10	19,21	7,31	8,43	7,22	6,50	5,98	5,75	5,93	6,75	6,18
Tanzania	8,48	9,86	9,55	9,44	9,11	9,12	7,86	7,81	7,66	..	..
Madagascar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators, 2020

Figure 6-1: SADC Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP)



Source: AFDB Socio-Economic Database (2019)

There is an absence of coherence between national industrial policies, regional industrialisation framework and developmental integration objectives, which impedes regional industrialisation in the SADC region (Vickers and Motsamai, 2011; Monyae and Nganje, 2019; Habiyaemye, 2020; Zondi, 2020). Therefore, member states need to periodically review their national industrialisation strategies to ensure they align with the region's industrialisation agenda (Mkwizu, 2021). This is because regional industrialisation is dependent on the commitments by individual country policies and implementation.

The evidence shown does not suggest that the region's economies have not been growing over the years since the adoption of this ambitious regional approach to development and integration; some have been growing. This was so especially in the first decade of the 21st century when the demand for the primary commodities was rising, not just the European market on which they have historically relied, but also across Asia, especially China (UNECA, 2015; Rodrik, 2016a; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). This then inspired some economic growth in the region with the diversification of the primary commodities markets (Monyae and Nganje, 2019).

Even though most of SADC economies had not diversified, most of them showed impressive growth in the first decade of the 21st century because of the market diversification, no longer

reliant on Europe for its primary products with the increasing Chinese and Indian demand (UJCI, 2017; Monyae and Nganje, 2019). However, the question remained on the sustainability nature of this kind of growth. Its unsustainability nature is the very reason they came together under developmental integration to diversify their economies and industrialise (SADC, 2015). However, despite experiencing those periodic growths, this has not been sustainable long enough to improve the standard of living of the individual countries' citizenry, which is the goal (Subramanian, 2009; Moyo, 2016, 2017, 2020b).

For this reason, Prebisch, notes Sai-Wing Ho (2012), argued for the absolute necessity to establish and strengthen trade in industrial exports; that exports of manufactures ought to be the natural complement of the industrialisation of the developing economies. This is why, probably more than anything, he strongly argued for the importance of an indigenous technological density to avoid the shocking and detrimental effects of the commodity declining terms of trade (Frankenhoff, 1962; Sai-Wing Ho, 2012). Rodrik (2016) has also observed that Sub-Saharan Africa has rapidly grown during the 2000s decade, but a curious feature of this growth was that it was accompanied by little structural transformation towards non-traditional tradable. This serves as one of the primary motivations for regional (developmental) integration. As convincingly argued by Shinyekwa, Lakuma and Munu (2019), African RECs are as vital building blocks for continental economic integration as they are for its industrialisation. They further note that RECs are essential and instrumental for the effective implementation, financing, evaluation, and monitoring of the industrialisation programmes.


6.2.1. Botswana

While it is true that Botswana experienced impressive growth after its independence, its GDP growth had been dominated by agriculture and mining (Hillbom, 2012). As noted earlier, this is the precedence the country's government sought to overcome when it embarked on state-driven industrialisation and diversification initiatives (Sekwati, 2011; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). Figure 6.2 below shows the annual percentage of GDP growth rate of Botswana from 1990 to 2020. As can be observed, in 1990, Botswana grew by 6,7 per cent, which fell to 1,9 per cent ten years later in 2000. In 2011, the economy grew by 6 per cent, and 11,4 per cent in 2013. However,

in 2015, Botswana experienced a negative growth rate of -1,6 per cent and 2,9 per cent in 2019 (World Bank, 2020).

The data demonstrate that the country has not experienced consistent economic growth over thirty years. The country's growth rates have been in decline since 1990, except in 2013 when it rose to 11, 4 per cent, and has been declining since. Even experiencing negative growth rates in 2015 and 2020, respectively. These inconsistencies in the country's growth are consistent with arguments in the literature that an economy reliant on primary commodities is unsustainable (Rodrik, 2016b; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). Botswana's economy is one of those in the SADC region that were adversely affected by the global economic crisis of 2009. This crisis affected almost every single economy in the world; thus, the SADC region was no exception (Ndayi, 2011; Sekwati, 2012). The crisis's impact on a given economy depended on its integration into the global economic system and diversification levels. Thus, with Botswana's economy dominated by primary commodities, especially the mining sector's diamonds, there were adverse effects following the crisis after a decline in demand for this output (ECA, 2009).

Figure 6-2: GDP Growth (%) Botswana




World Bank (2020)

Furthermore, Figure 6.3 below demonstrates the role played by the industrial sector in Botswana's economy. It shows the industrial sector's share as a percentage of the total GDP from 1990 to 2020. The data suggests that the industry's contribution to Botswana's GDP in 2020 was at the lowest in thirty years at 25 per cent (World Bank, 2020). Even though it is not an extremely bad contribution by this sector, the cause for concern is that it has been in a consistent decline since 1990, as can be observed in Figure 6.3 below. This is an instance that a country trying to diversify its economy away from unsustainable growth forms would want to avoid.

The country's government has had to encourage this diversification as its reliance on mineral production, and revenues had left it vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The world recession of 1981-82 demonstrated this to the country's government (Valentine, 2000; Moyo, 2016, 2017). Thus, mineral revenues would be used to facilitate overall economic development and diversify the economy away from dependence on mineral rents, as diamonds contributed up to 45 per cent of the country's GDP and about 80 per cent of the export earnings in the 1980s (Hillbom, 2008).

Figure 6-3: Industry (Including Construction) % of GDP Botswana



World Bank (2020)

Given that diversification is expensive and riskier (Sekwati, 2011), Valentine (2000) argued that Botswana's indigenous population was geared towards minimising risks for protection against

adverse climate conditions. Thus, convincing the population to abandon the low-risk traditional production towards non-traditional sustainable output would be no small task and require innovative effort. Furthermore, besides the lack of diversification within the country's economy, another challenge that emerged was the economy's excessive reliance on foreign investments (Kapunda, 2017; Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019).

This meant the benefit of the economic growth would accrue primarily to the foreign-owned firms; thus, something had to be done regarding the lack of citizen participation in non-agricultural productive activities (Botswana Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1995; Khanie, 2020). Therefore, in 1982, the government of Botswana introduced the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) to encourage the citizen ownership of enterprises as most of them appeared to have been foreign-owned (Valentine, 2000). It would channel the financial assistance in the form of grants to new productive businesses within the manufacturing sector to facilitate rapid industrialisation; and assist in diversifying the economy away from reliance on large scale mining (Valentine, 2000; Khanie, 2020).

At the introduction of the FAP programme, Botswana's economy was still entirely dependent on mining and agriculture. Thus, the government made heavy investments in the 1980s towards industrial development to boost the manufacturing sector which was dwarfed by mining and agriculture (Owusu and Ismail Samatar, 1997). As a result, the FAP programme saw the establishment of diamond polishing and jewellery manufacturing companies that involved local entrepreneurs, supported through loans, infrastructure, and skills training (Botswana Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1995; Moyo, 2016). This came to fruition as a result of the government's negotiation with De Beers. This multinational company has mined Diamonds for decades in Botswana, insisting that the company should assist in creating the local diamond polishing sectors that would involve many locals (Valentine, 2000; Sekwati, 2012; Moyo, 2016).

On top of the FAP programme, in 1984, the country adopted its first industrial development policy from 1984 to 1998, intending to enhance economic diversification, poverty and unemployment eradication. Moreover, it sought to strengthen private sector development by producing for the domestic market (Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018; Khanie, 2020). This policy became the country's underlying premise of industrial policy and subsequent industrial development plans (Sekwati, 2011). Even though the FAP programme was abolished in 2000 (World Bank, 2012), its

adoption had portrayed the state as the entrepreneurial agent engaging in the institutional building to foster the country's growth and development (Taylor, 2002).


It demonstrated the change in the country's government development attitude, intending to move away from traditional sectors by incentivising investments in non-traditional sectors. The focus was on enhancing the manufacturing sector's productive capacity and non-traditional agriculture (Valentine, 2000; Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019). This is to say Botswana has defied the orthodox view that African countries could not enhance their industrial development through interventionist initiatives. Owusu and Samatar (1997) postulated that Botswana's state-governed industrialisation strategy supports the research on the east Asian miracle, which concluded that state intervention is of critical importance in a nation's industrial transformation.

According to the World Bank (1987) report on "Barriers to Adjustment and Growth in the World Economy, Industrialisation and Foreign Trade", Botswana experienced an annual growth rate average of 14.3 per cent and 12 per cent between 1980 and 1985. Its manufacturing sector grew by 12.5 per cent on average between 1966 and 1980 (Saha, 1991). In 1998, the country adopted its second industrial development policy for the 1998-2012 period. It contained a new guiding principle for the country's approach to industrial development (Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). This policy has marked a shift from the import-substituting strategy to a more neoliberal approach to encourage the establishment of highly productive and competitive export industries (Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019). The third one, 2014-2028, is still focused on export-led growth by strategically using the country's readily established resources (Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019).

Figure 6.4 below depicts the manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP for Botswana from the year 1990 to 2020. As can be observed, Botswana has been up and down in its MVA growth curve since 1990, reaching the highest in 2012 at 5,9 per cent (World Bank, 2020). Botswana's MVA has averaged 5.3 per cent in the past 30 years, which is not a good MVA share of GDP if the country is to achieve sustainable industrialisation. Even though the country's MVA has not necessarily been in a consistent decline in the stated period, it has remained marginal as it has never reached even 10 per cent (World Bank, 2020). These data demonstrate how insignificant the manufacturing sector has been in Botswana's economy in the past thirty years. The earlier discussed industrialisation and diversification initiatives aim to increase these figures, as the

manufacturing sector is the source of sustainable growth (Alcorta, 2015; Rodrik, 2015; Sen, 2016; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017).

Figure 6-4: MVA (% of GDP) Botswana




World Bank (2020)

While Botswana's manufacturing sector has not been doing well over the past decades, its service sector has been growing since 1990. As demonstrated by Figure 6.5 below, the services sector has been doing much better than the manufacturing sector, demonstrated in Figure 6.4 above. Their manufacturing value-added contribution to GDP has never reached 10 per cent from 1990 to 2020, while their service sector has never gone below 30 per cent in the same period; instead, it has been growing consistently. In 2020, the country's service share to GDP reached the highest since 1990, at 63 per cent, dwarfing the MVA by far, which sat at 5,4 per cent in the same year, having been at a constant decline since 2015 (World Bank, 2020). This growth defies the orthodox view, which states that a country would progress to the manufacturing economy from a traditional agricultural economy, then later services (Wells and Thirlwall, 2003; Rodrik, 2016a; Su and Yao, 2017).

However, the Botswana government still prioritises the development of measures to inspire the significance of this important sector in the history of growth and development. In collaboration with various national institutions, the government has made tax and customs incentives available

to attract foreign investors and encourage export activities (Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Chikabwi, Chidoko and Mudzingiri, 2017; Common Wealth Network, 2019).

Figure 6-5: Services (% of GDP) Botswana



World Bank (2020)

The government introduced several incentives to support this diversification strategy, like rebates on import duties. These included the industrial rebate concession; “this exemption from customs duties benefits the import of raw materials used for products either local or external markets in the textiles, food and beverages sector” (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009a). General rebates customs duty: this exemption exclusively targets raw material imports for manufacturers destined for foreign markets. Duty credit certificate facility; this rebate is product specific; it is only applied to yarns and other clothing accessories (Marti and Ssenkubuge, 2009b).

Historical development shows that diversification is not an easy adventure, especially the implementation of structural change and transformation measures (Yaïche and Asia, 2019). Moreover, the poor link between the sectors of the economy for resource-dependent nations like Botswana generally exacerbates their economic challenges (Khanie, 2020). Plenty of natural resources and mineral reserves, such as diamonds or cattle, do not mean success in and of themselves and further do not explain Botswana’s developmental record. However, how these

natural resources are utilised to create the nation's wealth determines the fate of the country's growth trajectory (Taylor, 2002; Morris and Fessehaie, 2014; Matambalya, 2015a; McMillan *et al.*, 2017; Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). Nevertheless, economies ought to be diversified, as it has been argued that natural resources often have undesirable effects. So Fauzel (2016) puts it, "for every Botswana, a diamond-rich and prosperous state; there is at least one Congo, a mineral-rich and failed state". It has also been widely recognised in the literature by several scholars that to be successful, a structural transformation and industrialisation plan require a stronger political commitment that will seek to align these objectives with public policies and substantial financial resources (Rodrik, McMillan and Sepúlveda, 2016; Cilliers, 2018; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019).

Hillbom (2008), but also Sekwati (2011); and Moyo (2016) have noted the necessity to distinguish between growth and development. Contending that Botswana's significant economic advance makes a clear case of growth without development. They continue, while there are commendable advances that have been achieved since independence, these need to go hand in hand with technological advancement and innovation, productivity increases and most importantly, a significant rise in the standard of living of the country's citizenry. For countries with economies highly dependent on resources, including Botswana, diversification is not optional; it is a must; given the experience of the 2008 global economic crisis, which demonstrated the high vulnerability of such economies to external shocks as a result of the commodity price fluctuations (Sekwati, 2012; Rodrik, 2016a).

6.2.2. **Mauritius**

The structural transformation and diversification efforts in many countries emphasised the promotion of the industrialisation process; this, of course, was and continues to be based on the conviction that the latter is the primary engine of long-term sustainable growth as opposed to resources-based economies (Sekwati, 2012; Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019). Thus, the Mauritian island was not an exception at the dawn of its independence. It also had its long-term objectives to realise sustainable economic growth and diversify away from the sugar-based economy to industrial manufacturing associated with industrialisation. As has been shown in the literature that

rapid industrial growth facilitates the attainment of national objectives (Andreoni and Chang, 2016; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Khanie, 2020).

Thus, policies were formulated to open the island's economy, adopting a mixed hybrid import substitution approach, and incentivise exports through the EPZ programme (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011). While the Mauritian economy was based on agriculture at independence, it has diversified from the primary production, however, not towards the manufacturing sector but to the services sector, as the island's economy is primarily driven by the financial and retail sectors (Fauzel, 2016; UNCTAD, 2020). Therefore, in the country's quest for diversification, their EPZ program did not only encourage and incentivised exportation but also encouraged the foreign firms to invest in the country take advantage of the cheap and well-educated labour (Greig, Turner and D'Arcy, 2011; Chan Sun C.A, Chittooo and Sukon, 2016).


Figure 6.6 below demonstrates the Mauritian GDP's annual growth rate from 1990 to 2020. In 1990, the country's economy grew by 7.1 per cent; this increased to 8.1 per cent ten years later in 2000. Since then, it has been on a steady decline, as the Mauritian economy's annual growth rate has never grown beyond 5 per cent. In 2020, the economy took the worst hit in 30 years, with a negative growth of -14,8 per cent (World Bank, 2020). A UNCTAD 2020 report on the Mauritian economy, entitled "Industrial Policy and Strategic Plan for Mauritius: 2020-2025", noted that:

The outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic has created significant disruption for the Mauritian manufacturing and broader industrial sector. The pandemic will profoundly impact the Mauritian economy, and the Mauritian manufacturing industry is not expected to be spared from the unfolding crisis. Because of confinement, order losses, and other supply chain disruptions, production stoppages will take a severe toll on the sector. As a result, production is likely to decline significantly throughout the crisis. The clothing and textiles sector, which accounts for the bulk of Mauritius' export revenue, has experienced a drastic and protracted decrease in orders due to the closure of major global retail brands and a crisis in global consumer confidence that has impacted consumption discretionary goods (UNCTAD, 2020).

The clothing and textile industry has represented a significant portion of the Mauritian manufacturing industry for a long time. According to Mezouaghi and El Aynaoui (2018), by the

end of the 1990s, the clothing and textile industry alone represented 12 per cent of the island's GDP. However, at the beginning of the 2010s, it represented about 5 per cent. The authors further posited that the EPZ programme was initially aimed at aiding the textile and clothing producers to explore the global markets, as this industry constituted over 50 per cent of the EPZ companies and 80 of the workforce at the beginning of the 1990s (Mezouaghi and El Aynaoui, 2018).

Figure 6-6: GDP Growth (Annual %) Mauritius




(World Bank, 2020)

Figure 6.7 below demonstrates the industrial sector's contribution to the Mauritian GDP between 1990 and 2020. The data depicts a consistent decline in the significance of industry in the country's GDP. As can be observed, the highest contribution in this period was back in 1990, sitting at 27,8 per cent, and the lowest was in 2020 at 16,7 per cent (World Bank, 2020). As explained earlier, a significant decline over a prolonged period of the role played by the industrial sector, especially manufacturing, in a country's GDP signals deindustrialisation (Rodrik, 2015; Romano and Traù, 2017). This is going against the country's objectives as it seeks the direct opposite, which is a significant role of the industrial sector in the economy. As noted by UNCTAD in its report, the evidence suggests that the industrial sector, including manufacturing, can grow dynamically and support the continued Mauritian development; however, as things stand, the essential ingredients

that are at the centre of a strong and dynamic industrial sector appear to be missing (UNCTAD, 2020).

Figure 6-7: Industry (Including Construction) % of GDP, Mauritius




World Bank (2020)

As shown in Figure 6.8 below, just like the country's overall industrial sector, the MVA percentage contribution to the Mauritian GDP has consistently declined since 1990. In 2020, the country saw the lowest contribution to GDP by the manufacturing sector in 30 years, which sat at 10.7 per cent (World Bank, 2020). While on the other hand, Figure 6.9 demonstrate the contribution of the services sector to the country's GDP for the same period. The data shows that while the manufacturing industry has been in decline for thirty years, the service sector's significance has been consistently growing. In 2020, this sector contributed up to 68 per cent to the country's GDP, the highest contribution in thirty years, as the lowest was back in 1990, sitting at 46 per cent (World Bank, 2020).

This has been referred to in the literature as an unusual pattern of growth by various scholars and commentators; as the orthodox pattern of growth gradually moves from the traditional sector to manufacturing then ultimately services (Wells and Thirlwall, 2003; McMillan *et al.*, 2017;


Fessehaie and Rustomjee, 2018). It can be seen that since 2000, the service sector has been responsible for over 60 per cent of Mauritius' GDP. Furthermore, it has been growing every year since, up to 68 per cent in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Even though Mauritius struggled to strengthen the manufacturing sector to the economy, the services sector has been consistently growing over the past three decades.

Figure 6-8: MVA (% of GDP) Mauritius



World Bank (2020)

Figure 6-9: Services (% of GDP) Mauritius



World Bank (2020)

The Mauritian government appear to have noted the declining role of the manufacturing sector in the country's economy. This was demonstrated when the government's "Vision of revitalising the manufacturing sector" through industrial policy development was fully endorsed at the industry stakeholder workshop, which took place on the 2nd of February 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020). This initiative is in collaboration with the country's private sector to uncover obstacles to the manufacturing restructuring and work on measures to remove them. This strategic collaboration is encouraged by the SADC industrialisation strategy, urging member states to establish a good working relationship with the private sector (SADC, 2015). In Mauritius, the public-private sector seems to enjoy a good relationship in a conducive business environment. Both parties are committed to furthering the industrial development agenda and cooperate to give effect to the mutually beneficial outcome (Statistics Mauritius, 2020; UNCTAD, 2020).

While the growth that Mauritius has managed to pull off since independence deserves applause, it should also be noted that so much work still needs to be done to secure a sustainable form of growth. The island's manufacturing sector has been struggling over the years, and its decline should be a cause for concern (UNCTAD, 2020). Thus, as further indicated by UNCTAD (2020),

rebuilding and strengthening the country's manufacturing sector is essential for advancing the scale and capabilities of the sector.

The services sector has driven the recent growth of Mauritius; this includes the financial and retail sectors (UNCTAD, 2020). However, as crucial as the role of the service sector in the manufacturing sector may be, according to UNCTAD (2013), developing and strengthening the manufacturing sector remains more crucial as it is a leading high productivity sector. This should be worry-some, not only because the manufacturing sector drives productivity growth across all sectors in low-income economies, especially those with less than USD 15 000 per capita incomes (UNCTAD, 2020; UNIDO, 2020d). But also because it is key to employment creation and value (UNIDO, 2018b; Yaïche and Asia, 2019).

6.3. Manufacturing Industry and the Transformation of SADC Economies

The shift towards the developmental integration in the SADC was, and continues to be, motivated by the desire and need to transform the region's economies and propel socio-economic development (SADC RISDP, 2003). The industrialisation has been one of the region's objectives. It has been consistently argued to be the consistent delivery of sustainable economic growth and development that the SADC region needs to meet its objectives (SADC, 2015). The SADC has amongst its main objectives poverty eradication, which its key requirements are job creation, sustainable livelihoods, food security and skills development, which are associated with industrialisation (UNIDO, 2016b). SADC member states have placed industrialisation at the core of the region's developmental integration approach in recognition of this reality. As a transformative process, industrialisation shapes countries' economic structures and impacts their social and institutional fabric like eradicating poverty, infrastructural-upgrading, and broader economic development (UNIDO, 2020d).

The objective was that industrialisation would guide the developing countries to economic prosperity and self-sustained growth (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017). The developing countries, most of which were colonised by the developed countries, were deprived of any form of development, particularly industrialisation. Karunaratne (1980) argued that colonisers could not let their colonies develop industries as they had made them the producers of primary products. In turn, they would

manufacture and export the final products back to the developing countries, which were the initial source (Alpha Diallo, 2016). Even though industrialisation was identified as the necessary precursor to economic transformation in the African continent shortly after independence (Evans, 2010; Monyae and Nganje, 2019), it has recently become the priority in the SADC region in pursuit of its goals of sustainable economic growth and development.

Thus, SADC's regional industrial development efforts have always been clear about the state driving the industrialisation initiatives, which is the essence of developmental integration. This would involve deliberate and orchestrated measures to induce this process (SADC, 1992, 2015, 2018; Mureverwi, 2016). As has been correctly noted by Chandra (1992: 97), there is no path of development planning that has been widely endorsed and adopted like industrialisation in developing countries; As most governments have committed to a certain degree of this process. The author made this point precisely because, following the second world war, developing countries have constantly pursued industrialisation to overcome their challenges of poverty and underdevelopment (Ndayi, 2011). It was seen as going to emancipate the developing countries from the colonial economies that primarily exported raw materials to the developed countries of the core, only to import manufactured goods at a later stage (Karunaratne, 1980).

For instance, the manufacturing industry share was smaller for several regional economies in 2016 than in 1981, at about 10 per cent of GDP (Helmut, 2017). What has mostly accounted for these unsuccessful attempts is that majority of the countries in the continent started from a very low level of industrial base or nothing, which constantly hampers their ability to roll out the process effectively (Lowitt, 2017). The 2018 African Economic Outlook has also argued that the attainment of structural transformation and economic independence depends on how serious the industrialisation process is taken in the continent (*African Economic Outlook*, 2018). Moreover, the economic systems that most continental economies preside over are unsustainable; thus, they need to diversify away from traditional economic activities (Odijie, 2018).

In the SADC region since the 1990s, the manufacturing industry has been outperformed by the service sector, contributing an average of 50 per cent to the region's GDP and consistently growing. For example, the 1990-94 period saw the service sector contributing 50.39 per cent compared to the manufacturing industry's 32.1 per cent. Between 2010 and 2014, the service sector

contributed an average of 51.1 per cent, manufacturing about 34 per cent (Correa and Kanatsouli, 2018; World Bank, 2020).

In 2015 the services sector contributed up to 54 per cent to the GDP, while manufacturing did 30 per cent (Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015). This explains why the process of industrialisation in the region has been stagnant. In the historical linear development process, from the agricultural background, the next phase is expected to be the manufacturing sector, then followed by the services sector (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017). However, the region seems not to have followed this process, as it skipped the industry, particularly manufacturing, and proceeded to the services sector. However, this is argued to be harmful to the region as it jumped the most significant stages of development, including technological advancement, policy experimentation, and learning (Beegle *et al.*, 2016; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). Although it is undeniable that the services sector has a pivotal role in the region's manufacturing industry and agricultural development (Unctad, 2016); Enhancing the manufacturing sector capacity is more important. This is because it is a leading high-productivity sector with the ability to absorb high numbers of moderately skilled workforce and grow faster (Africa Growth Initiative, 2016).

The evidence demonstrates these disparities between these two sectors. For example, Figures 6.10 and 6.11 below depict the annual growth rates of the MVA and the service sector for Botswana and Mauritius, respectively, from 1990 to 2019. Inconsistencies have characterised both countries' growth since the early 90s. In 1990, Botswana's MVA grew by 3.3 per cent, while in 2000, it experienced negative growth of -1,07 per cent, which is not a good improvement in over ten years. However, in the 2001 to 2011 decade, they seem to have improved, which rose to 11,3 per cent. This was an improvement, even though it was still not enough in the grand scheme of things. From then to 2019, this has declined from 6,5 per cent in 2013 to 2,8 per cent in 2019.

On the other hand, Mauritius has also had its ups and downs over the same period. While seem to have been consistent over the 1990 to 2000 decade, with 7,7 per cent growth and 7,5 per cent, respectively, there was a sharp decline to 0,74 per cent growth in 2011; 2,6 per cent in 2012. And 4,7 per cent in 2013 is the highest over the last ten years as it has since dropped from 1,7 per cent in 2014 to 0,6 per cent in 2019.


Figure 6-10: Manufacturing, Value Added (Annual Growth %) Botswana & Mauritius



Source: World Bank, 2020

Depicted by figure 6.11 is a big difference between the annual growth of the manufacturing value-added and the service sector of these two SADC member states. Botswana's service sector saw an 8,5 per cent growth in 1990; however, it experienced negative growth of -1,2 per cent, which increased to 8,8 per cent in 2011, 10,5 per cent in 2013 and 4,4 per cent in 2019. On the other hand, Mauritius' service sector grew consistently over the 1990-2000 decade, with 6 per cent in 1990 to 9 per cent in 2000. However, this annual growth declined from 5,3 per cent in 2011 to 4,4 per cent in 2013 and 3,3 per cent in 2019 (World Bank, 2020). There also have been inconsistencies in the growth of the service sector. However, they are not as bad as that of the manufacturing sector. This further indicates that the service sector is more consistent and sustainable than the manufacturing sector in these economies.


Figure 6-11: Services (Annual Growth %) Botswana & Mauritius



Source: World Bank, 2020


The sectoral composition of GDP depicting a huge leap to the services sector is depicted below by Figures 6.12 (Botswana) and 6.13 (Mauritius), from 2000 to 2019. As demonstrated, the decline in the agricultural sector in these two economies has not seen a rise in the industrial sector, especially manufacturing, but instead has seen a rise in the services sector. The service sector does not even seem contested by other sectors in these two economies; it is massively significant in their GDPs; while the manufacturing sector does not seem to be a factor in comparison (African Development Bank, 2020). This is the basis for the services sector argument by several scholars who believe that the manufacturing sector is no longer the driver of economic growth and sustainable development. This role has been moving towards services for several decades. They argue that the services sector is increasingly promoting economic development and reducing poverty (Tandrayen-ragoobur, 2010; Andreoni and Gregory, 2013; Su and Yao, 2017; Fforde, 2018).

Figure 6-12: Sectoral Composition of GDP (%) Botswana



Source: African Development Bank (2020)

Figure 6-13: Sectoral Composition of GDP (%) Mauritius



Source: African Development Bank (2020)

Sustainable industrialisation is about building a stronger industrial base, spearheaded by expanding the manufacturing sector; this is suggested by the empirical evidence from the early and late industrialisers (Chang, 2002; Mazzucato, 2015). The SADC region's logic for developmental

integration approach to regional-industrialisation relates to regional fragmentation, with small markets and limited scope for the economies of scale (Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015; Gofhamodimo, 2018). Moreover, the SADC industrialisation strategy underscores the difficulties relating to the design of a plan due to the varying economic structures, endowments and sizes (SADC, 2015).

This is worth mentioning because, while Botswana and Mauritius have endorsed all of the region's industrialisation initiatives, from the IUMP to the industrialisation-strategy, there don't seem to be a synchronization of these regional plans with their national development plans. In examining their national development and industrialisation initiatives, it is evident that regional initiatives are not prioritised. For instance, SADC's Industrial Upgrading and Modernisation Programme (IUMP), adopted in 2009 to be implemented at the national level by member states. They were all urged to create their national IUMPs, and select a combination of their priority sectors based on national priorities, endowments and funding (SADC, 2018). Over ten years later, Botswana and Mauritius are among member states yet to implement this initiative (Mkwizu, 2021). Regional policies have been argued to have some traction in an instance where they align with the objectives of the national leadership. Thus if the national governments see no incentives, they might not implement, and there is not much that the region can do to push members to act (Byiers, Karaki and Woolfrey, 2018). As has been noted by Hartzenberg and Kalenga (2015), the varying degrees of national priorities, development and industrialisation in the SADC make the harmonisation of industrialisation policies a challenging task. In which case, discerning the impact of these initiatives on member states' levels of industrialisation becomes difficult.

6.4. Over 25 Years of Developmental Integration's Quest for Industrialisation in SADC

It has been over twenty-five years since the beginning of a formal institutionalisation of developmental regional integration within the Southern African Development Community, with the regional leaders having recognised the significance of industrialisation as a precursor for socio-economic development. After such a long period, it is essential to measure the impact of this approach as it promised a great deal of a transformation at its adoption in 1992. Thus, the progress, achievements, challenges have to be examined to offer possible solutions. It has been noted in the

literature that SADC countries experienced relatively high rates of GDP growth at the beginning of the 21st century (Dadush, 2015; Habiyaremye, 2020).

These high growth rates have been correctly attributed to the commodity boom periods, between 2002-2007 and 2009-2013, as the growth subsided when the external demand and price shocks kicked in (UNECA and AUC, 2011; Ciarli and Di Maio, 2015; Moyo, 2020b). As a result, the SADC economies remain among the less industrialised in the world (Zondi, 2020). The neostructuralist theorists would explain this from the post-colonial moment perspective, arguing that all SADC member states were colonised. Thus, colonial powers shaped their development and growth trajectory (Oman and Wignaraja, 1991; Ndayi, 2011).

The colonial years' unequal power relations between the advanced core countries and the least-industrialised of the periphery led to the international division of labour that, to this day, see countries like those in SADC dominated by commodity production and exports (Ovadia and Wolf, 2018; Page, 2018; UNIDO, 2020d). Various scholars have widely criticised this pattern in the literature (Rekiso, 2017; Martins, 2019; Moyo, 2020b). However, in the post-independence era, this continuous lack of industrialisation in the SADC region has also been attributed to the widening gap between adopting and implementing regional-industrialisation initiatives. As noted in the previous section, the main initiatives devised for the industrial development in the region hardly got off the ground, despite the consensus on the significance of industrialisation to sustainable economic growth and development (Monyae and Nganje, 2019).

Various scholars in the literature have tried to make sense of the performance of Sub-Saharan economies in general, SADC in particular, regardless of the regional integration initiatives that have been adopted over the years since independence. It is consistently noted that most developing countries produced similar products at the early stages of manufacturing and could effectively trade with each other (Hakemy, 2017; Odijie, 2018). Moreover, developed countries insistently imposed tariffs on manufactured products from the developing economies (Odijie, 2018). Finally, however, developing countries resolved to promote regional economic integration to pool their markets. Still, while participating member states of these integration schemes could see the benefits of collective efforts, they could find common ground on equitable sharing of these potential benefits. These partnering countries were at varying levels of industrialisation; as a result,

each of them was too focused on the national development agenda (Yongo-Bure, 2015; Su and Yao, 2017; Odijie, 2018).

Within the SADC, growth has primarily been championed by mining and other natural resources-related activities, with little or no structural transformation to enhance the manufacturing sector. For instance, as demonstrated earlier, manufacturing value-added as a share of GDP has not only been too little but also declined drastically over the past decades, from 17,4 per cent in 1990 to 10,9 per cent in 2019 (SADC, 2020b). This is true, especially for Botswana, whose economy has been predominantly carried by diamonds since their discovery in the 1960s (Sekwati, 2011; Common Wealth Network, 2019). In fact, this commodity dependency was noted by the African Development Bank as constraining Botswana's development aspirations (AfDB, 2019). This is despite Botswana being referred to as an exemplar of success and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa. This frequently cited success of Botswana should be understood as one of pre-modern growth, argued Hillbom (2008), as it is not accompanied by structural transformation and development. Even though the country has seen the so-called 'miraculous' growth over the past decades since its independence, it still lacks sustainable industrialisation (Yirga Shumuye, 2015; Moyo, 2017). This is because it is yet to experience the modern form of growth, characterised by structural change in production patterns (Hillbom, 2012; Rodrik, 2016a; Andreoni and H. J. Chang, 2019).

What is demonstrated by evidence in the case of Botswana and Mauritius is that after twenty-five years of the formal institutionalisation of the regional efforts to industrialise the SADC region and inspire sustainable economic growth and development, this has not quite been achieved. Various scholars have weighed in on the region's developmental integration agenda, most notably Lowitt (2017); Monyae & Nganje, (2019); Zondi (2020). They concur that the global ascendancy of the neoliberal political and economic order led to the region's uncritical embrace, which then saw the prioritisation of trade and economic liberalisation.

This was at the expense of the developmental integration agenda to which the region had subscribed, putting industrialisation and economic diversity on top. This is true in many respects, but most notably, the prioritisation of Trade and Economic Liberalisation in the RISDP on its establishment at the turn of the century, while industrialisation was given the back seat (SADC RISDP, 2003). However, the adoption of the industrialisation strategy (SADC, 2015) and the

revised version of RISDP, 2020-2030 (SADC, 2020a); suggests that there is a reprioritisation of the region's developmental agenda, with the industrialisation of the region's economies as the number one priority and not their liberalisation.

Zondi (2020) correctly argued that in the SADC region, not enough was done to demonstrate that it was well understood what the notion of developmental integration meant and that the member states fully embraced it. He argues this because member states simply resumed functioning as usual, with no attempts to initiate measures that would increase efficiency levels and catalyse economic development (Zondi, 2020). He further indicates that the region's developmental integration had several preconceptions regarding its realisation conditions. First, it assumed the region had a developmental agenda to carry out the objectives; states were already organised and positioned to propel their economic development through effective policy interventions to incentivise industry (Zondi, 2020).

The significance of industrialisation has been noted by the United Nations, as it has added to its Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). SDG 9 refers to industry, innovations, and infrastructure; Noting that it is essential to build a resilient infrastructure capable of promoting sustainable development and industrialisation (UN, 2020). Building the resilient infrastructure is crucial because the realisation of SDG9 depends on the expansion of the manufacturing sector's productive capacity and effective linkages across the economic sectors, which cannot happen with a debilitating infrastructure (UNIDO, 2018b). Thus, the member states under developmental integration in the SADC region have a crucial role in this industrialisation process; there must be action. The region needs the opposite of most of what it experienced in the past. For example, some of the region's member states looked up to the South East Asian state model without taking action to strengthen the ability of the state to take charge of the economic development (Zondi, 2020).

The mid-term review of the RISDP back in 2014 did indicate that it has fallen very short of its ambitious objectives (SADC, 2014). The region seems to have realised that there was a dissuasion from the initial aims and objectives. Its revision (RISDP) and the subsequent adoption of the regional industrialisation strategy demonstrated that there is no alternative to industrialisation if there is to be sustained growth and development. The mentioned growth that the southern African economies have experienced, especially around the early 2000s, has been inspired by the

commodity markets. However, the changing global economic environment indicates that economies cannot be sustained that way (Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017; Signé and Johnson, 2018; Opoku and Yan, 2019).

The commodity-dependent countries in the SADC region, mainly Botswana, have been viewed from the stability and growth perspective, not from structural change and development (Monyae and Njanje, 2019). As a result, the growth story of the African continent in general, Southern African in particular, misses structural change, notes Page (2011), arguing that the rapid growth between 1995 and 2005 that is widely cited in the literature, lacks evidence of having been accompanied by significant changes in structural variables.

The precursor to the region's poverty eradication and employment opportunities creation will be the fundamental changes to the region's economic structures through industrialisation. Where the region's patterns of economic production and exchange that predominantly rely on the extractive and agricultural sector will have to yield to a more diversified economic development model that transfers the factors of production from low to higher productivity (Tandrayen-ragoobur, 2010; Beegle *et al.*, 2016; United Nations ECA, 2016; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2017). Indeed, on principle, the SADC region's developmental integration approach is mainly interested in the sustained and comprehensive efforts that seek to achieve significant improvement in the region's state of development and ensure the well-being of the people. It recognises that growth is insufficient if it is not accompanied by improving the people's standard of living; this is further reiterated by the region's industrialisation strategy (SADC, 2015).

However, SADC economies, suggest evidence, still have a long way to go in their economies' diversification and industrialisation processes. The East Asian growth trajectory indicates that the government has a vital role in facilitating the economic structural transformation (Dent, 2008; Dent and Richter, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). This experience further demonstrates that the government has to closely monitor the implementation of the industrial policy (Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019). This was confirmed when the Asian Development Bank funded the regional industrialisation projects (Dent and Richter, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013). The form taken by the industrial policy depends on the intended objectives, what institutional capacity the implementing region has, and the context in which these initiatives are implemented (Dent, 2013). That is to say, the formidable challenge of economic diversification requires concerted effort and the agency of

the state (Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018). The sectoral composition of Botswana and Mauritius' GDP, demonstrated by evidence, suggests the need for economic diversification, which will see the country's structural composition of the economy shift towards manufacturing (AfDB, 2019).

Beyond the East Asian case, the literature also noted that in many countries where market mechanisms are not providing adequate finance for industrialisation, governments had created complementary and specialised financial institutions to provide the much needed industrial finance (Goga, Bosiu and Bell, 2019). Development banks have played critical roles in aiding industrialisation, including providing complimentary capital to under-served sectors, new venture support, and the provision of countercyclical funding during economic downturns (Mazzucato, 2015). To promote industrialisation, the manufacturing industries need financial support, as it is recognised that this sector is highly unlikely to experience decreasing returns to scale as opposed to land-based activities, which are subject to the fixed supply of land and different qualities (Wells and Thirlwall, 2003; Ciarli and Maio, 2013; Ciarli and Di Maio, 2015; Opoku and Yan, 2019).

Sulser *et al.* (2015) have provided two paths that can finance the industrialisation process in developing regions like SADC. First, they underscore the accumulation of domestic resources and industrial partnerships. They note that even though several developing countries, like the SADC region, are endowed with several natural resources; however, they perpetually utilize them in their raw form, with no strategy to add value to these resources (Kormawa and Jerome, 2015). In the history of industrialisation and economic development; it has been proven that none of the countries with natural resources has been able to transform this “inherited wealth” into “created wealth” without building a highly capacitated manufacturing industry (Melamid and Lewis, 1954b; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015; Rodrik, 2016a; Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018; Haraguchi *et al.*, 2019; UNIDO, 2020b). As a result of exploiting natural resources in their raw form, most of these countries barely yield any returns in the form of equitable growth and development. Thus, the accumulated income from natural resources could be used to finance industrialization (Langa and Nkhonjera, 2018).

The second source of financing industrialisation that the authors highlight is through partnership for industrialisation. This entails a strategic partnership between the countries pursuing industrialisation (Kormawa and Jerome, 2015). More importantly, the financial shortage for small

and medium business development has been detrimental to the value addition process. Government investments in industrial development to support value addition has proven successful in some developing regions, like East Asia (Dent and Richter, 2013). Furthermore, there has been advocacy for the regional and domestic funding mechanism. Where applied, this is normally done through properly structured incentives. In some instances, governments employ domestic financial institutions to find long-term capital investments of industrialisation initiatives (Kormawa and Jerome, 2015).

Some developing countries that accumulated massive revenues during the commodity price and market boom, like Botswana, should deploy these financial resources to enhance the manufacturing sector and capacitate their SMEs (Matambalya, 2015b; Guadagno, 2016). At the centre of this initiative would be the Ministers of industry and finance, as they are an integral part of the industrial policy formulation process. However, the authors warn of the downside of giving such an expensive project to people who may not have sufficient experience to execute it. Instead, they recommend the public-private partnership by either engaging the private management for a management fee or inviting the private capital in a joint venture, which can draw on management expertise of the private sector (Melamid and Lewis, 1954a). Development banks and other major funders have historically been quick to provide support for these regional schemes because they have been understood as making financial sense. According to Peters-Berries (2010: 15), this is because regional integration projects involve the realisation of cross-border projects, including railways and roads. These kinds of projects cannot be realised at the national level.

As indicated earlier, one of the grave mistakes committed by the SADC economies was to focus on eliminating trade barriers and spent less time developing productive capacities, especially in the manufacturing and agro-related industries. Much as removing barriers for free trade is essential; it should be balanced with fostering entrepreneurship to address the supply-side constraints, which becomes a predicament to the private sector's production efficiency (Evans, 2010; UNCTAD, 2013; Lowitt, 2017). A strong and dynamic private sector is essential to inspire sustainable longer-term growth in the SADC region. Though this has been recognised, the region's private sector remains limited by numerous obstacles, including financial, high cost of doing business and infrastructure bottlenecks (Kormawa and Jerome, 2015; Beegle *et al.*, 2016).

This was recognised by Tsie (1996) when he argued that the neoliberal market integration approach to industrialisation, which encourages the developing countries to specialise in commodities in which they have a comparative advantage, would be of no greater usefulness within the SADC region. In concurring with the neo-structuralists ideas, he noted that this framework offers no industrialisation path for the SADC region; this is primarily because the region's production structures are not complementary (Tsie, 1996). This would expose most of the region's countries to remain the producers and exporters of primary products, necessitating careful state intervention to initiate policies that better position the regional economies (Tsie, 1996; Matambalya, 2015a; Ricks, 2016). Thus, what is required in the region is the redesign of the state to have a developmental vision to forge close relationships with the private sector and other market forces to promote developmental integration agenda. That is to say, the state should play a leading role in developing and strengthening the private sector because, without a formidable private sector, industrial development and sustainable growth can barely be attained (Tsie, 1996).

On principle, SADC member states understood from the beginning that funding the region's industrialisation process could potentially pose a challenge. For this reason, the SADC treaty made a provision for the establishment of a Regional Development Fund to assist with development financing. Furthermore, the regional programmes and projects would require substantial financial resources to get off the ground. Thus, Article 25 (1) of the treaty notes that "SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own and other resources required for the implementation of its programmes and projects. ; (2) SADC shall create such institutions as may be necessary for the effective mobilisation and efficient application of the resources for the regional development." (SADC, 1992).

Article 26 then provides that "The fund of SADC shall consist of contribution of member states, income from SADC enterprises and receipts from regional and non-regional sources." (SADC, 1992). However, as clear as these provisions are, it was not until over twenty years later, in 2017, that member states operationalised this initiative. Now, this delay in the operationalisation of such a significant financing mechanism for the industrialisation of a low-income region; together with the prioritisation of the elimination of trade barriers at the expense of the industrial and manufacturing capacity building in pursuit of industrialisation, makes one wonder how well understood was the concept of developmental integration when member states subscribed to it.

Furthermore, how serious the developmental integration was taken as a concept, and the achievement of the region's aims and objectives.

6.5. Obstacles to Industrialisation in SADC

As noted above, there are ambitious initiatives that the SADC region has adopted to fast track the industrialisation process; these are the Industrialisation Upgrading and Modernisation Programme, Industrial Development Policy Framework, and the Industrialisation Strategy. A strong commitment to implementing these strategies by the member states, complemented by the ground-breaking Public-Private sector collaboration (which has been widely and correctly praised by the commentators), would give room for optimism regarding the region's eventual industrialisation. These have been admired by various commentators, development organisations and scholars. However, they maintain that a plan on paper, no matter how good it is, does not solve any challenge until implemented. Thus, these initiatives have been widely argued by a considerable number of scholars to have failed to enforce the industrialisation and development agenda, for which they were instituted within the SADC region (Jan Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016; Nizeimana and Nhema, 2016; Moyo, 2020a; Zondi, 2020; Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin, 2021).

Since the early 1990s, the Manufacturing Value Added share as the percentage of GDP in the region has been declining steeply. The data suggests that most of the SADC member states were better off in the early 90s in terms of MVA's contribution to GDP than they have been lately, in the 2010s. There has not been much improvement as a result of the acceleration of these initiatives, as the significance of the manufacturing industry in the region's economy has been in decline since the 1980s (Gehl Sampath, 2014; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015; Ricks, 2016; UNIDO, 2020d).

Over and above, there are innumerable challenges that have been obstacles to the SADC's progress towards industrialisation. These challenges left the region's economies highly dependent on primary production. Theresa Moyo (2017) noted that productivity in the SADC region's manufacturing is far lower than in developed countries. The region's dependence on primary production over the years has not helped with industrialisation and sustainable economic growth and development. In fact, it has exposed them to external demand shocks, which has often crashed

the economies of most resources revenue dependent countries (Moyo, 2017). It was noted by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) that African countries have economies that specialise in a remarkably narrow range of production activities, while countries that have diversified production have higher income per capita.

While some authors have viewed several industrialisation initiatives as a positive sign, demonstrating the level of commitment to this process, Matambalya (2015: 183) blames the proliferation of these initiatives, arguing that they tend to overlap without any clear mechanism to relate them to each other. Thus, this would further mean there is no clear focus of efforts and resources to promote industrialisation within the region. Another issue that the author attributes the failure of industrialisation attempts to in the SADC region is the general nature of these schemes; noting that while the challenges facing regional economies are similar in general, in detail, they tend to differ from one country to another. This is the phenomenon that the generic nature of regional industrial initiatives fails to capture (Matambalya, 2015b).

The absence of an implementation and follow-up mechanism is another detrimental shortcoming to the SADC region's industrialisation process. The management instrument's lack often leads to the initiatives' haphazard implementation, as many were forgotten shortly after being adopted (Matambalya, 2015b; Moyo, 2016, 2020b). This is because there is a gaping hole between resolutions reached and implementation at the national level in the quest for industrialisation. As a result, the record of the implementation of regional industrialisation initiatives is far from satisfactory. Also, apart from the lack of implementation mechanisms, the adoption of unrealistic timeframes to reach specific targets, as well as the absence of institutional architecture charged with monitoring the implementation of these programmes, is equally responsible for failures (Matambalya, 2015a; Byiers, Karaki and Woolfrey, 2018; Monyae and Nganje, 2019).

The failure to mobilise and deploy financial and non-financial resources to implement programmes has also hampered the success of these initiatives. Thus, the proliferation of schemes also means that the little available resources are spread across, thereby becoming ineffective (Mkwizu, Monametsi and Swai, 2019). Furthermore, it has been argued that low income and pervasive poverty rates demonstrate the weak production structures of the regional economies; Many of which have poorly developed infrastructure, weak institutions and political instability (Hailu, 2014; Moyo, 2020a; UNCTAD, 2020). Provided that several economies in the SADC region are

heavily reliant on agricultural products as the main economic activity and a source of income, disturbances that characterise political instability and conflict impede efficient agricultural production. Consequently, political instability and war destroy the physical and human resources and cause disorders that inflate the cost of doing business (Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019; Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin, 2021).

Furthermore, the creation of a competitive industrial sector has been hindered by poor infrastructure, including but not limited to transport and communication. This results in higher production and transaction costs (Bathla, D'Souza and Joshi, 2019; Minstat, Markely and Saint Martin, 2021). Therefore, investing in infrastructure would provide an efficient and enabling environment for industrialisation within the region. In addition, SADC member states need to make use of their natural resources to develop and strengthen capacity in industrial development (UNIDO, 2020d). Therefore, infrastructure development must be prioritised at both national and regional levels to fight off these obstacles to the regional industrialisation process.

6.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, several initiatives have been adopted in the SADC to propel the industrialisation process to enhance the living standard of the people of the region. These are the objectives of all the SADC's regional economies. However, adopting an initiative is one thing; implementation is quite another. Development models employed by Botswana and Mauritius are in line with the region's developmental integration directives; they seek to develop their national industrial development and ensure diversification. However, it would be illogical to attribute their so-called growth successes to the region's developmental integration, given that by the late 1980s, they were already said to be fast-growing economies. However, while the SADC's developmental integration seeks to increase the significance of manufacturing to the region's economy in the quest to inspire long-term sustainable growth, evidence from the mentioned member states suggests the opposite has been the truth. There has been deindustrialisation within the region, shown by a constant decline in the significance of the manufacturing sector in the economy, while the developmental approach seeks the direct opposite.

The manufacturing sector is not only insignificant in the region's economies, but it is gradually declining, as can be seen in both the case of Botswana and Mauritius. It is also important to note that these countries are understood to be the most successful in the region with their 'tremendous growth'. Of the two, Mauritius is the most diversified (into the services sector) as it is no longer as reliant on its primary commodity of sugar. At the same time, Botswana is still heavily dependent upon diamond mining; the economy is not as diversified as desired. Saying Mauritius is diversified is not to say it has achieved the highest level of industrialisation, but rather to say it is in a much better position in comparison. There is still so much work to be done; these countries cannot be de-industrialising while people's lives have not yet been transformed. Growth without development is of no effect within the context of developmental integration, as indicated earlier. Thus, economic independence and transformation in the SADC region cannot be attained unless industrialisation is taken seriously.

7. Chapter Seven: Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

This study set out to investigate the impact of developmental integration on the industrialisation process in the SADC region since its transformation in 1992. Since the dawn of independence, the African continent has pursued industrialisation as the continental economies felt the need to diversify the colonial commodity-based economies. They understood that their commodities could not inspire sustainable growth and development, but they could achieve this through industrialisation. While the continental economies experienced some economic growth and development shortly after independence, it soon came down crashing as the commodity prices boom inspired it. Thus, when the price shock kicked in the 1970s, economies declined (Lall and Wangwe, 1998). This experience motivated this undertaking as the continental economies shared similar development challenges, inspired by their lack of industrialisation. These initiatives were advocating for the continent's self-sufficiency and substance. They did not only look within for assistance but also looked to the international financial institutions.

This study was guided by the following research objectives upon which the summary of findings is structured and discussed; To examine the effect of developmental integration on the manufacturing industry of the SADC region; to investigate the impact of developmental integration on the industrialisation process in the SADC; to find out if regional strategies contribute to the increase in the significance of the manufacturing sector in the economic output of the SADC region; to understand, if so, what accounts for the failure of developmental integration to accelerate the industrialisation process in the SADC region.

7.2. Key findings

This thesis has investigated the impact of developmental integration in the industrialisation process of SADC, with a focus on two SADC member states, namely Botswana and Mauritius. As indicated in chapter one, the notion of developmental integration in the context of this study refers to a developmental-based integration agenda that seek to maximise regional integration benefits. More importantly, this includes establishing channels to ensure that all member states benefit; none of them worsens as a result. This notion is more often associated with countries at the early stages

of their development, characteristic of the SADC region. Thus, it sanctions more intervention by the respective governments in the economy, as the SADC region collectively pursues industrialisation. This saw the adoption of various initiatives that sought to fast track this process in the region, including the industrial upgrading and modernisation programme, the industrial development policy framework, and the industrialisation strategy. Thus, this section seeks to summarise the key findings from this investigation.

7.2.1. Developmental integration and the industrialisation process in the SADC region

As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the idea of integration for continental industrialisation in Africa is not new; however, it has not brought about favourable results. More so, during the academic and policymaking battle regarding formulation and deployment of industrial policies in the 1980s to the early 2000s (Nzau, 2010). At the centre of integration among the SADC economies are goals of industrialisation and development. The SADC economies have limited production capacities; thus, developmental integration sought to help build the state capacity through the indigenisation policy in the investments. However, as noted in the analysis, there is an absence of coherence and a lack of coordination between national industrial policies, regional industrialisation, and developmental integration objectives, which impedes the region's regional industrialisation process.

These persistent disparities point to the fact that member states are pulling in different directions. Growth continues to be dominated by mining and other primary resource-related activities, with little or no structural transformation away from these primary activities into the manufacturing sector. Botswana's economy, for instance, as noted, has continued to rely on diamonds predominantly. Despite this, the country has been termed an exemplar of success and prosperity, not just in SADC alone but in the African continent. However, this needs to be understood within the context of pre-modern growth as it is not accompanied by structural transformation and sustainable industrialisation. On the contrary, growth should be characterised by structural change in the growth patterns to be considered sustainable. Furthermore, Mauritius is diversifying towards the service sector and not manufacturing as a sector that drives industrialisation.

7.2.2. Manufacturing industry and the transformation of the SADC economies

The manufacturing sector is an engine of growth that offers countries at the early stages of their development opportunities for economies of scale, which are less available in other sectors (Rodrik, 1966). Moreover, this sector nurtures growth and development, as its growth in a country's GDP sees an increase across income groups in a long-term perspective. For this reason, very few countries in history have been able to develop and transform their economies without diversification towards this sector. Hence, the interest of this study is on the increase in the significance of the manufacturing sector to the economies of SADC since the adoption of developmental integration by the region.

This would have entailed a shift in the structure of the region's economies, as it is well known that most developing countries have historically been agricultural societies. That is to say, the positive impact of this strategy would have transpired through the evidential shift in the contribution of various sectors into the economies, which is mainly referred to as structural change or structural transformation in the literature. Changing the makeup of the regional economies towards industrialisation has always been the primary goal of the SADC countries. This is because they had and still completely comprehend the unsustainability nature of the economies that are not diversified and reliant on primary products.

However, this study found that this vital sector has been gradually declining for the SADC region's member states for the period under investigation, 1992 to 2020. Failure to diversify has kept various economies in the region reliant on primary commodities for their economic growth. This does not help diversification and transformation, given the fact that it makes them vulnerable to external demand and price shocks. Thus, this form of growth is not sustainable. For example, while some of the SADC region's economies experienced growth in the early 2000s as a result of the increase in demand for the primary commodities, they soon declined when the demand for their products started to decline. Botswana is one of the SADC member states adversely affected by prices and demand shocks of the early 2000s and the 2008 economic crisis due to an undiversified (towards manufacturing) economy. Thus, it emerges that if there is to be sustainable growth, there ought to be a fundamental transformation in the sectoral composition of SADC member states' GDPs, away from the traditional sectors to the modern industrial one, spearheaded by manufacturing.

7.2.3. Regional strategies and the acceleration of manufacturing activities in the SADC region

It emerges that not enough was done in the SADC region to demonstrate that it was understood what the notion of developmental integration meant and was embraced by all member states. Instead of paying attention to the development of productive capacities of the member states in manufacturing, a lot of resources and time was spent on eliminating trade barriers. This was one of the main missteps in the execution of regional strategies and the acceleration of manufacturing activities. Making regional integration mainly about the trade arrangements, as Tsie (1996) mentioned, is one of the mistakes that SADC committed during the early days of its transformation. Despite adopting a developmental form of integration, member states' attention was swept by eliminating the tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

Further to that, when the region adopted the initial RISDP in 2003, the developmental integration ideals took a back seat despite being mentioned repeatedly in the document. In its articulation of a fifteen-year plan as a blueprint for the region's integration, it envisaged a sequential (linear) process to regional integration. It starts with adopting a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2008, Customs Union in 2010, Common Market by 2015, Monetary Union by 2016 and the Economic Union with a single currency by 2018. That is to say, at its adoption, the SADC region's form of developmental integration took the World Bank's market-driven development as its starting point, which would explain the region's obsession with the premature liberalisation of the economies. This was the case until the 2015 revision of the RISDP, which had liberalisation as the top priority instead of integrated efforts to industrialise the region. As a result, the region skipped the most urgent task of developmental integration, of deliberately creating the developmental state in the region to ensure effective intervention in the regional economy to promote balanced regional development. While some member states like Botswana and Mauritius had long-running programmes that sought to fast track the industrialisation process in the region, it was not uniformly done across member states, consequently derailing the region's developmental agenda.

7.2.4. Obstacles to the industrialisation process in the SADC region

The industrialisation process has proven to be no easy process, not least in a developing region like SADC. During the organisation's transformation and the signing of the declaration treaty in

1992, the member states envisioned facing several challenges in their collective pursuit of regional industrialisation and development. One of such challenges would be the financing of these objectives. However, while member states did make a provision for establishing the regional development fund, which would assist member states in need with the financial resources, this idea was not operationalised until over twenty-two years later, in 2017. This is while the notion of developmental integration is very clear about the significance of such mechanisms among the developing countries that seek collective development and industrialisation if none of them is to be left behind. This indicates that the main challenge to the realisation of the region's objectives, among others, is the lack of a will to implement the region's strategies as opposed to the actual failure of these initiatives.

This study found that the failure to create this mechanism has set up the region for failure in mobilising and deploying financial and other resources to implement the regional industrialisation initiatives. The proliferation of these initiatives has proven to be a major challenge as they tend to overlap with one another with no clear mechanism to synchronise them, while there is also a lack of implementation by member states. This takes the focus away from a single clearly defined objective and stretches the region's available limited financial resources. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure has also added to the challenges, resulting in high production and transaction costs.

7.3. Recommendations

Based on the study's main findings, and the view that the SADC region still have a long way to go in its pursuit of a sustainable form of growth, as outlined in chapter six, the following recommendations are made:

a) Resources Mobilisation

Devising strategies that seek to advance regional industrialisation is important; however, implementing such programs is even more important. Furthermore, the implementation of these programs needs resources, financial and non-financial. Thus, the region needs to re-enforce its resource mobilisation mechanism, especially the financial resources. The lack of financial resources was found to be one of the major obstacles in the region's quest for industrialisation.

Thus, the region should strive to attract investment, which they currently lack. Initiatives like SADC's Regional Development Fund would be of great value to the region if adequately replenished. There should also be a focused channel of the available resources; member states should focus on a limited number of initiatives that they seek to operationalise and focus on instead of splitting scarce resources across multiple overlapping initiatives. That would not only help spare financial and other resources; it would show progress in the region's pursuit of industrialisation.

b) Synchronisation of the national and regional industrialisation strategies

The adoption of national industrialisation and development plans that conflict with regional industrialisation plans is counterproductive to the region's developmental integration objectives. The national industrialisation strategies of the SADC member states are diverse and lack coordination with member states in pursuit of varying national development objectives. As they all seek to promote economic diversification at the national level, they tend to deploy some measures that hinder the region's developmental integration objectives. Thus, the synchronisation of national and regional industrialisation strategies becomes vital to deter such counterproductive instances. Member states need to formulate their strategies in consultation with the regional industrialisation agenda. This is precisely because the regional initiatives are not of any value if the participating member states do not align their national strategies.

c) Implementation of regional strategies

While the adoption of several industrialisation strategies may be viewed as indicating a desire for economic transformation and diversification away from the primary production by member states, if they are not implemented, they are not of much significance. One observation that was made is that in some instances, it is not that there has been a policy or strategy failure, but the problem is the operationalisation of these initiatives. A case in point is the Regional Development Fund. While the region's declaration treaty provided for the resource mobilisation mechanism, member states never took it upon themselves to hasten its operationalisation to gather resources to finance the regional industrialisation programs and assist the member states short in financial resources. As a result, it was only operationalised over two decades later, in 2017. Thus, it is vital for member

states to encourage the implementation and operationalisation of the organisation's strategies, which would give them a chance of succeeding and help them with a fair assessment of how they are doing in pursuit of their collective objectives.

d) Implementation and follow up mechanism

One of the main challenges facing the SADC region is the implementation of regional initiatives and strategies. Thus, instead of only devising and adopting strategies at the regional level and hoping that the participating member states would integrate them in their national development and industrialisation plans, these strategies should be accompanied by legally enforceable regional implementation and follow up mechanisms. These should establish the time frames by which member states are expected to reach particular milestones. In that way, it would not be difficult for member states to trace their progress in the pursuit of significant objectives such as the industrialisation of the region. This is significant specifically because the success of regional initiatives lies with their implementation at the national level by member states. Without their implementation, it would be difficult to assess their effectiveness.

7.3.1. Suggestions for future research

The impact of developmental integration on the SADC region's industrialisation process needs to be studied at full scale, including all member states and deploying several measurement indicators. Including but not limited to the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP, urbanisation, observation of the industrialisation landscape, and the industrial sector's significance to the regional economies. While this study did not have time and scope to cover all the mentioned angles, further investigation could be conducted in that context. In addition, a further conceptual and theoretical examination of developmental integration is needed to broaden its understanding in the body of literature and the implementing regions that pursue development objectives through this form of regional integration.

Further studies also need to explore how can the SADC region pursue industrialisation while effectively ensuring the protection of the environment at the same time. For example, living in the climate change era, it has become of paramount importance to ensure sustainable energy use to

mitigate the devastating impact of climate change. This is especially so given that its challenges are felt more by the developing regions, like the African continent in general, SADC in particular. Thus, a study that would set out to look at this would benefit the academic literature and industrialisation policymaking.

7.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the significance of developing a stronger manufacturing sector to ensure sustainable industrialisation in the SADC region cannot be stressed enough. This has been demonstrated by the critical voices in the literature who are in favour of industrialisation as the driver of sustainable growth and manufacturing's role in stimulating economic growth and development. Furthermore, the evidence provided in this study points to the significance of this sector. However, economies in the SADC region are de-industrialising; this was demonstrated by evidence, with a consistent depreciation in the significance of the manufacturing sector in these economies. This has been partly because not enough has been done to diversify the region's economies. Furthermore, it is not clear how well was the concept of developmental integration understood by the member states at its adoption as the region's approach to dealing with the developmental challenges. Much as SADC member states share some development challenges, some member states are more developed than others. Thus, for some, eliminating the tariffs and non-tariff barriers would mean the wipe-out of infant industries they were trying to build and further derail their manufacturing base.

As SADC member states, Botswana and Mauritius have adopted several ambitious initiatives to industrialise and diversify their economies. However, as was demonstrated by evidence, the manufacturing sector does not have the required dominance in their economies to inspire sustainable industrialisation. That is to say, understandably, the SADC region's quest for industrialisation may have been derailed by the financial and other challenges. However, some of these challenges were self-inflicted. Thus, even though there is still a long way to go, there is hope that the region will realise its industrialisation objectives, as spelt out in the industrialisation-strategy. However, that can only happen if the participating member states implement the initiatives. Hence, there should be an effective mobilisation of resources, synchronisation of the

national and regional industrialisation strategies, and a follow-up mechanism on the implementation of these initiatives.

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