bring these matters to this definite conclusion, and therefore propose the memorial, and now that this support is refused I shall have nothing to do with the memorial."

The Boers drew up their memorial, and, as he had promised, Frere enclosed it in a letter written to the Secretary of State, setting out their arguments, which was shown and approved by them before being sent. He also sent the shorthand-writer's report of the meeting, and this too was first shown to the Boer Committee that they might see that it was correct.

The letter was as follows :—

"April 17, 1879.

"I have the honour to forward a report, drawn up from notes by a shorthand-writer, of what passed at a meeting which Colonel Lanyon and myself held with a Committee from the Transvaal at the Boer meeting, near Erasmus Farm, about six miles from this town.

"I have also the honour to forward a memorial, since presented to me by the Committee, for submission to Her Majesty's Government.

"At the particular request of the Committee (a request to which it is evident that they attach great importance) I have promised them to state in my own words, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the arguments they have addressed to me, as I understand them, and which will no doubt receive your earnest consideration.

"They maintain that their independence was unjustly taken from them by the Act of Annexation, an Act which, they alleged, was grounded on incorrect representations of the state of the Transvaal, and of the feebleness of its government.

"They desire that their independence may be freely and unreservedly restored to them.

"They desire nothing more in the shape of concession and they cannot be content with anything less.

"By 'independence' they understand the same entire freedom from all control in choosing their own form of government, and their own administrative machinery, as was guaranteed to them by the Sand River Convention of 1852.

"In making this demand, they claim to represent the wishes of the very great majority of the Boer population of the Transvaal.

"They consider that the Boers now assembled represent the very great majority of that population.

"In proof of this they give me the strongest assurance that, besides those whom I saw there on the occasion of my visit to the camp, and who I may state undoubtedly represented a strong party, there had been from time to time many more, fully five thousand burghers of the land, who they state all cordially agree with their expressed wishes and views, and that such a number would certainly be a decided majority of the burghers of the land, as estimated by the latest official authority. How far this is the case, I have, of course, had no opportunity of judging personally, but there can be no doubt that I may say, as the result of my own observations in the camp and elsewhere, that it certainly is a very strong party that has kept up this movement to the present time. As a proof of their earnestness, I can confirm the fact that they have been in an open camp for four weeks waiting my arrival.

"And looking to the bearing and the temper of the members of the Committee whom I met, who are men of position in the country and respected, and leaders who have, since the earliest establishment of the Republic, taken a prominent part in the government of the country, I think I may say that their representations are worthy of your earnest consideration.

"They maintain that they are voluntarily assembled, and that what the Committee states is the voice, not of delegates or representatives, but of the very great majority of the people.

"They, therefore, pray that Her Majesty's Government, taking these facts as herein represented into consideration, will restore their independence.

"I have endeavoured in the above sentences as correctly as possible to epitomize their statements and view of the case, as explained to me at great length, and I have requested the members of the Committee, named in the margin, to inform me, after the perusal of this letter, whether I have truly described what they said to me.

"They have this day assured me that they are fully satisfied with my summary of their arguments."

The names in the margin are M. W. Pretorius, Chairman, S. J. P. Krüger, J. Maré, J. S. Joubert,* and H. J. Schoeman.

Frere writes from Pretoria to Sir M. Hicks-Beach about the meeting at Erasmus Farm :—

"April 14, 1879.

"They were evidently much disappointed. . . . Our meeting separated with no more definite decision than that they must report to the 'people,' and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done.

"If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, men who deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiable qualities as citizens and subjects. . . .

"The few exceptions are mostly foreign adventurers of various sorts and nations, English, Irish, and Scotch, Jews, Americans, Hollanders, Germans, Belgians, and Portuguese, who though often well educated and naturally able, are rarely men of high character or disinterested aims. They acquire great influence among the less educated Boers, but foster the tendency to suspicion, which, mixed with extraordinary credulity in many things, is a marked feature in the Boer character, and makes them very difficult to manage by any one who does not enjoy their entire confidence.

"They are extremely sensitive to ridicule, and to opprobrious or slanderous imputations, feeling most keenly unjust charges against their race by any in authority. Hence perhaps they are very liable to be deceived by men who, for their own ends, flatter and pretend to sympathize with them.

"Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides. If they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of annexation—that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe it will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will ask it—I have on the other hand been shown the stubbornness of a determination to be

* Not to be confounded with Piet Joubert, who refused to sign.

content with nothing else, for which I was not prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their professed opinions. . . . I feel assured that the majority of the Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national wrong. . . . But what I have seen during the last few days has strengthened my conviction that the real malcontents are far from being a majority of the whole white population, or even of their own class of Boer farmers.

"I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position to assert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to the reign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minority would cease to agitate and would soon cease to feel grievances which a very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental, not the less keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survive the prosperity and good government, with a fair measure of self-government in its train, which are within their reach under British rule.

"Unfortunately till Colonel Lanyon came little had been done to strengthen the hands of the Executive so as to enable it to support the law, and to defy forcible attempts at revolution.

"At the present moment, thanks to Colonel Lanyon's energy and to the well-directed efforts of Colonel Rowlands, it is no longer as easy as it was a few weeks ago for the malcontents to execute their threats of 'entering Pretoria,' 'hauling down the British flag,' 'putting the officials over the border,' and 're-establishing the Republic.'

"But there is an absolute want of power to disperse the meeting should the members proceed to acts of open violence. . . . And meantime the taxes, which ought to have been paid three months ago, are uncollected, and the government of the country is virtually in abeyance or on sufferance, everywhere outside the capital.

"Nor should I omit to point out the proof afforded by the present position of affairs here, that the annexation was almost the only step which could have saved the country from anarchy or foreign domination.

"It is obviously almost impossible, in the present state

of the population of the Transvaal, that so vast a territory should have been governed, as a single state, by any such simple machinery as the Boers could provide from their own ranks. Unless the law were better respected and enforced than could have been the case under such a constitution as the Republic, it seems to me almost a necessity that all power should have fallen into the hands of a few enterprising and educated foreigners. They could hardly have been Englishmen, they might, and possibly would have been extremely hostile to England, and would probably have made anything like peace in South Africa an impossibility for generations to come. I am told that when the Republic collapsed there was not a single man in high office who was a native or a genuine Boer of the Transvaal."

Great as was Frere's anxiety to bring about the breaking up of the camp, he was scrupulously careful not to use a word or an expression which could leave any doubt as to the annexation being irrevocable. But he had the more sympathy with the Boers, and was more patient with their insubordination, because of his conviction, strengthened by personal contact with them since his arrival in their country, that sadly too little progress had been made in the two years since the annexation in providing them with good administration, and giving them the constitutional privileges which, from the promises held out to them, they were entitled to expect, and which it had been his constant and anxious wish to secure for them. He had come to perceive also, more and more plainly, that Shepstone, with all his great courage and ability, and with his unrivalled local information, had made little advance towards establishing firm and settled government; that his reticence, diplomatic subtlety, and habit of procrastination had raised their suspicions instead of winning their confidence, and had made him intensely unpopular with them.

In January Shepstone was in Natal, on his way to England—though his departure was afterwards postponed till May—and Frere, knowing that the Colonial Office would naturally attach considerable weight to the opinion of so experienced an officer, felt it incumbent on him to give the Secretary of State his own impression of Shepstone's administration of the Transvaal. The letter in which he does this is quoted here, as it is the key to the course of events there during the two preceding years.

"February 3, 1879.

"He is a singular type of an Africander Talleyrand, shrewd, observant, silent, self-contained, immobile. Forty years ago he might have been great in Continental diplomacy. Here he has had to be the Native Department of a small Colony, to manage an ever-growing population of Zulu refugees, streaming in singly, without property or means of subsistence, and only begging to be allowed to go to some friendly kraal, and there earn their living under some Chief Headman.

"Had he been well directed and supported, Shepstone had the capacity, if I may judge from a few early papers, to have organized them into some sort of community. But he was quite alone. . . . Hence he was driven, more and more, to trust to his naturally excellent memory, and to shut himself up in an irresponsible isolation, as the only man who knew anything about native affairs.

"Like many of his countrymen, he is inclined to resent inquiry or control, and to treat in a hostile spirit all the information and all the suggestions about his department which do not come from himself. Hence it is not easy to help him, and his reticent habits make him very dangerous in troublous times. During the last year had he been more ready, full, and frank in telling somebody—you, or me, or Bulwer—what had happened with the Boers or Secocoeni, and with the Zulus at their first meeting, we might have escaped many dangers and calamities.

"He knows the Boers well, but has no sort of sympathy with them, and I doubt whether he can ever have their confidence and goodwill. . . . One never feels sure that

one has got his whole and his real opinion and all the information he can give one. . . .

"He has, of course, a vast fund of useful information, if one could get at it; but he is apt to regard it as his own private armoury, and not as belonging to the State. And I always feel, when I think he has gone entirely with me, that he may have said nothing about some fact or opinion which would have entirely altered my view."

On the same subject Frere writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert:—

"March 27, 1879.

"I could not give you a better instance of the difficulties in which Shepstone's reticence lands him and those who trust to him than by referring to what I think I mentioned to you regarding the Natal native levies. Shepstone was at the General's camp two days before Isandhlwana, and told me before I left Pietermaritzburg that he would probably have remained on, and might have been in the camp when it was destroyed but for the strongly expressed feeling of dissatisfaction in the Native Contingent, and their constant reference and appeals to him, which were so disagreeable that he decided not to remain. This is a thing which he ought at once to have mentioned to Chelmsford, but Chelmsford tells me Shepstone gave him no hint of anything of the kind.

"I could multiply such instances . . ."

And in a letter to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, written after leaving Pretoria, he says—

"May 2, 1879.

"Shepstone wrote to tell me that Bulwer and Chelmsford both said they did not wish to detain him in Natal any longer, and I have therefore consented to his going homewards at once, and he will probably arrive soon after you get this. . . .

"His friends here think he wished for retirement and a pension, but he told me in Pietermaritzburg that he felt he could work for some years to come, and had no wish to be shelved. . . . I think he is entitled to the highest pension you can give him, for he has given his life to exceptionally distinguished public services.

"Unless I had seen it, I could not have believed that

in two years things could have drifted into such a mess. They were obviously bad enough when the country was annexed, but nothing save lifelong habits of trusting that 'something would turn up' can explain to my mind the apparent absence of all effort to devise or substitute a better system. . . . When you come to talk to him you find him full of good sense as well as of information, but it never seems to occur to him that he has any duty but to sit still and let things slide.

"It is this absence of constructive or administrative power, which, joined to his apparent want of sympathy with the Boers, will prevent his being of much use to you in devising a constitution for the Transvaal. If you ask him why the Boers, submissive and acquiescent two years ago, are now clamouring for the repeal of the annexation; why the revenue is in some districts two years in arrear; why there is no demand for payment of taxes, and the Landdrosts collect only what is voluntarily paid; why there is little or nothing collected from the natives; no police; no representative organization of any kind; he will doubtless give you many intelligent reasons for the whole machinery of administration being in abeyance, but I shall be surprised if he suggests any means of setting it going again. . . .

"Were I Governor of Natal, Shepstone is a man I should wish to have at hand to refer to for information and advice, which, when you get it out of him, is sure to be sagacious and worth having. He would rule a Zulu community well, after White-Zulu fashion, but would reform and report nothing unasked, and would tolerate no partner in his realm."

Frere remained at Pretoria till the end of April as the guest of Colonel Lanyon. During the first part of this time, the younger and more violent of the Boers in camp were with difficulty restrained by Krüger and the elder men from entering the town and attacking the garrison. There were frequent alarms; and the townspeople had mounted patrols out all night, and erected barricades in different parts of the town, for there were only two hundred infantry and two small Krupp guns,

with twenty-five rounds of ammunition each, to defend it. Frere had more interviews with the Committee on the 16th, 17th, and 23rd. They would not yield anything of their demand for a restoration of their independence, and spoke plainly and somewhat bluntly. Frere courteously, but with equal firmness and emphasis, reiterated that this was out of the question. Nevertheless, the mutual good understanding and cordiality which had sprung up at their first meeting was maintained and increased. What passed was written down—generally verbatim as it was spoken—and made public, and in the course of one conversation Krüger said—

"The people and the Committee have all conceived great respect for your Excellency, because your Excellency is the first high official of Her Majesty who has laid bare the whole truth; and that esteem will not easily be lost, whatever men may say, for the people have seen for themselves in writing what your Excellency has said." *

In the mean time he was mixing freely, as was his wont, with the people of Pretoria and the neighbourhood. He visited them in their houses, and with a companion and interpreter so congenial to himself and so popular with the Boers as Stegmann, he was able to converse freely with them, their wives and their children; and among these people so proud, sensitive, ignorant and suspicious, his natural simplicity, friendliness, and courtesy rapidly gained him their confidence and good will. "As for this Governor of yours," one of them said to Stegmann, "from all I hear he might be a 'regt Dopper.'" †

As to the administration of the Transvaal, Frere wrote, after he had left Pretoria, to Mr. Herbert :—

* C. 2367, p. 150.
† *I.e.* a double Boer, or Boer of the Boers.

"May 16, 1879.

"We have very heavy cases which must come before the Courts in the Transvaal, and I cannot answer for the consequences of having judges and law-officers ill-paid or in debt. The men we have now got are good colonial lawyers, and men of unblemished characters, and I would gladly keep them so. They are highly appreciated, and the remarks I have heard on the subject from old residents showed me how terribly inefficient and how corrupt was the administration of justice under the Republic.

"Do not let any fear of deficient revenue prevent what is right being done for the administration of justice. The collection of the revenue has been even more lax than the administration of justice, and I will answer for Lanyon providing more than Sargeaunt estimated for the receipts into the Treasury. You can have no idea of the extreme laxity of all departments hitherto, and the extreme inefficiency of the administration in every branch. . . ." *

* In an article in the *Nineteenth Century* (February 1881), Frere writes—

"Before leaving [Pretoria] we had arranged the measures which we agreed to recommend to Her Majesty's Government for the future government of the Transvaal. These embraced—

"1. The creation of an Executive Council, in which some of the Boers should have a part as salaried members.

"2. The creation of a temporary Legislative, capable of passing laws immediately necessary to strengthen the administration, and to prepare the way for a representative Volksraad, or House of Assembly.

"3. More efficient organization and better payment of the High Court of Justice.

"4. Some improvement in the position of the worst paid officials.

"5. A careful, scientific examination of the line of the Delagoa Bay Railway.

"6. Administrative reforms, which were much needed, and included the provision of an efficient police force.

"7. The Finances were to be made the special charge of a Financial Commission, with a view to equalize revenue and expenditure.

"8. As regarded representative institutions for the Transvaal, a great mass of materials had been collected, including opinions from the Ministry at the Cape, from the Chief Justice of the Cape, and more especially from Mr. Brand, the popular President of the Orange Free State, who most generously gave all the aid that his experience enabled him to afford, regarding the changes which he thought might suit the wants of the Transvaal. These materials were forwarded to Her

There was at that time telegraphic communication from England only as far as Madeira. Thence it took about a fortnight for a steamer to reach Capetown. From Capetown there was now a telegraph to Pretoria and to Pietermaritzburg. Letters addressed to Frere from England were opened at his desire by Lady Frere, who telegraphed to him in cipher anything of importance in them, so that the substance of them reached him from ten days to a fortnight earlier than the letters themselves.

Up to the middle of April the views of the British Government as to the situation had not reached Capetown. On April 18 a Reuter's telegram made it known throughout South Africa that the Government had, in a despatch to Frere, laid on the table of the House of Commons, censured his action.

Not only had Frere not received the despatch, but no intimation of it had yet reached him. The bad effect of the censure in encouraging all malcontents and enemies of the British Empire throughout South Africa was very great. And as regarded the Transvaal it narrowly escaped being especially fatal, for the message announced that "annexation" was negatived, without expressing that the prohibition referred to Zululand, and not, as might easily have been supposed by the Boers, to the Transvaal.

Frere writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

Majesty's Government, and it was my intention, as soon as the views of the Home Government had been expressed, to have convened a Conference at which the Transvaal remonstrant party would have been adequately represented, with a view to draw up such a Constitution as might satisfy the reasonable desires of the Transvaal people for representative institutions. Mr. Pretorius had intimated his willingness to consider with his colleagues on the Commission my proposal that he should assist as a member of the executive. Hopes were entertained that Mr. Krüger might be willing to take a similar part in the measures which must precede the enactment of a representative Constitution."

"April 18.

"I much fear the effect on the Boers of the discredit the telegram will throw on all I can say or do. I hoped yesterday that Lanyon and I had brought them to the dissolving point, but I shall be anxious to know the effect when the intelligence of the telegram has slowly penetrated into the Boer comprehension."

Happily on this very day, before the purport of the telegram could be published, the camp, to Frere's intense relief, broke up and the malcontents dispersed.

He writes to Lady Frere:—

"Pretoria, April 20, 1879.'

"My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express, when Lanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actually broken up and the Boers dispersing!

"I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded was civil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot I should have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of a dozen Piet Retiefs—or Uys—dying like heroes in the field of battle for their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful I felt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected us through life.

"I was doubly glad that it came through Lanyon, who has so gallantly and truly helped us in all our difficulties. Had he been on my own staff he could not have helped me more loyally and truly. . . .

"Will you tell Mrs. Stegmann and also Sprigg and Mills that I consider our success with the Boers greatly owing to the very efficient help we have had from Stegmann. He is not only so judicious and conciliatory but as bold as a lion—or as Piet Uys himself,—and every now and then in his quiet, humorous way puts a home truth to one of the honest malcontents which makes the good fellow open his eyes and laugh as he sees things, his own pet grievance perhaps, in an entirely new light, till he begins to think that the 'verdompt' English Government is not so bad after all.

"I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow, and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances *for the present*, a phrase which they carefully put into all references to their breaking up,

and which they evidently mean. It was clear to me that it was not the annexation so much as the neglect to fulfil the promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took over the government, that has stirred up the great mass of the Boers and given a handle to agitators."

The telegraphic message announcing the disaster of Isandhlwana had reached England on February 11, three days before Parliament met. Ignorant and unconcerned as most English people were about the affairs of South Africa, the loss of eight hundred British soldiers in a quarrel they knew little or nothing about made a profound impression. Clinging to the tradition that the British soldier is invincible, they refused to believe the simple fact that what had happened was a purely military disaster, for which military men alone were responsible; and, looking about for some one else to blame, fixed upon Frere as the foremost and most responsible non-military man.

It was a tactical opportunity for the Opposition, which they were not slow and not scrupulous in using. A storm of invective was poured upon Frere. He was set down as an unprincipled assailant of native life and property, the leader of colonists who were actuated by foolish or pretended fear of the Zulus, and by desire to rob them of their land and take it for themselves.* The Opposition

* The following extract is from a letter to the *Times*, by Sir Henry Acland :—

"April 7, 1879.

"Sir Bartle Frere before he left England was, without question, one of the most popular of men. No one was more acceptable wherever he went, and he went everywhere. No one was more beloved by a circle of friends as large as any public man ever had, of every occupation, country, and state of life. It must have struck some of your readers as strange that none hardly of these friends have sent you, in your usual letters, their vote of public and private confidence. The reason is not far to seek. The sudden outbreak of violence which assailed an absent man, in whose province a grave military disaster had occurred, astonished, but did not affect his friends.

were the more ready to attack him, owing to his authorship of the Affghan Frontier Minute, which had been published five months before.

Nor were the Opposition journals the only ones that assailed him. A general election was not far distant. The disaster which had occurred would tell heavily against the Government, and to retrieve it would entail large expenditure and consequent taxation. If the responsibility, or some part of it, could be shifted from the shoulders of

They have full trust in the breadth of his views, the fulness of his capacity, and the sobriety of his judgment. This sentiment of trust is as firmly rooted as affection for his whole character and respect for his busy life. One of the most staid of your weekly contemporaries, immediately the news of Isandhlwana had reached us, spoke of the anxieties of the High Commissioner in South Africa as 'Sir Bartle Frere's amusements;' of 'his paltry method of escaping his obligations;' of his 'being intoxicated by the chatter of Colonial journalists;' of his 'hustling out of sight the mass of his demands;' and then hinted that Cetywayo is 'to be put down' by Sir B. Frere 'in the interests of Sir B. Frere's reputation.' It was certain every friend of Sir B. Frere who knows the brave heart that beats beneath that courteous and gentle nature, and is aware of his deep interest in all native races throughout the world, would keep silence till the nation had, through Parliament, pronounced its verdict. . . ."

It is enough to quote, as a specimen of the volumes of anonymous vituperation that was poured out upon him, the following passage from an article in the *Daily News* of July 8—when there had been time for the first excitement to cool down.

"The enthusiasm which is felt for the High Commissioner is only too easily intelligible. He has allied himself with the worst passions and sinister motives of the colonists—their fear and hate of a savage race, outnumbering their own; their desire for conquest and spoil, for the subjugation of the Zulus, with the view of annexing their territory; and their disposition to sponge on the Empire, to prosecute their own gain at the cost of the mother country. They are to make war with the British taxpayers' money and the British soldiers' blood. Instead of elevating, Sir Bartle Frere has done much to deprave the conscience of the colonists of the Cape, and to poison and contaminate the fountains of what might be a healthy national life in these new communities. He has wrapped up the policy in the phrases of religion and pretences of superior morality, etc."

the Government to Frere's, it would be a gain when the election came.

Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. The leopard does not change his spots. Frere's career of forty-five years was before the world, and however ill-informed the general public might be concerning it, writers for the press, members of Parliament, and others who joined in the hue and cry against him, or listened to it in silence, knew, or could easily have ascertained, that such a charge against him as making unprovoked war against harmless natives from panic or motives of greed, or any other motive, was as inadmissible and as monstrous as would have been a charge of cowardice against Bayard or Chinese Gordon, or of treachery against Pitt or Wellington.

Thus much as to Frere personally.

Upon the general question of his policy and action, it was unfortunate that the matter had to be debated, and public men were led to commit themselves to an opinion, before there was time for a full statement of the facts, which was essential to a right understanding of the case, to be received and published. Notice was given of a hostile motion in both Houses of Parliament, and Ministers had to make up their minds whether to defend Frere or to sacrifice him.

Unfortunately, also, their judgment as to the course of action pursued seems to have been clouded by their keen sense of the ill consequences of the disaster which had happened; for it had occurred most inopportunely, just when critical negotiations were pending at Constantinople and in Egypt, and when a deduction from England's military force at home and in Europe tended to impair her authority in European Councils. The majority of the Cabinet were inclined to recall Frere. Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime Minister, supported him. The result was a

compromise. A despatch was to be sent censuring him, but accompanied by a general expression of continued confidence.

Whether, if Sir M. Hicks-Beach had stood to his guns and had pointed out the plain truth that, up to the second week in October, Frere had been supported and encouraged in his policy, and that it was then too late to change it, the decision of the Cabinet would have been different, can only be conjectured. Instead of forming his own judgment, and standing to it, he seems to have been inclined to invite and accept the opinions of others. It was not till March 13, more than a month after the news had reached him by telegraph, that he took pen in hand to write his views on the subject to Frere.* He had delayed doing so to ascertain what public opinion and what his colleagues in the Cabinet had to say about the matter. He was at length able to announce the decision of the Cabinet, which was that he ought not, without first obtaining the sanction of the British Government, to have insisted on the disbandment of Cetywayo's army, on his receiving a Resident, or on the fulfilment of his promises of better government. For this he would be censured; but he earnestly appealed to him not to take the despatch in the light of a recall, or of such a censure as would justify his resignation.

The part of the despatch containing the censure was as follows :—

"Her Majesty's Government . . . cannot but think that the forces at your disposal were adequate to protect Natal from any serious Zulu inroad, and to provide for any other

* The same hesitation is shown by the despatches. Between February 13, when the Queen's message was sent on first hearing the news, and March 19, when the despatch containing the censure was written, the only despatch on the subject (except formal acknowledgments) was that of March 6, in which there is no suggestion of blame.

emergency that could have arisen during the interval necessary for consulting Her Majesty's Government upon the terms that Cetywayo should be called upon to accept; and they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action, which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used to avoid.

"The communications which had passed between us as to the objects for which the reinforcements were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in dispute with the Zulu King, were such as to render it especially needful that Her Majesty's Government should understand and approve any important step, not already suggested to them, before you were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been afforded to them of considering the time as well as the manner of coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the Zulu King. And though the further correspondence necessary for this purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for the operation of the British troops, and might have afforded to Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.

"Her Majesty's Government do not fail to bear in mind the unusual powers reposed in you, and the corresponding responsibility which attaches to your office, as Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa; and they gladly record their high appreciation of the great experience, ability, and energy which you have brought to bear on the important and difficult task you have undertaken. It is with great regret that they feel constrained to adopt the view which I have expressed of your omission to follow a course which appears to them, for the reasons I have stated, to have been peculiarly incumbent upon you in this instance. They cannot, however, doubt that your future action will be such as to prevent a recurrence of any cause for complaint on this score; and they have no desire to withdraw, in the present crisis of affairs, the

confidence hitherto reposed in you, the continuance of which is now more than ever needed to conduct our difficulties in South Africa to a successful termination." *

The weak and half-hearted attitude of the Government gave an additional impulse to the attacks on Frere. In the debates that followed, though individual members of the Government spoke warmly of his past services; though Lord Carnarvon, now out of office, told the plain truth that no one would have thought of blaming him but for the disaster of Isandhlwana, yet the general effect of the debates in both Houses was condemnatory on one side and apologetic on the other, the Government being supported on a division by less than their normal majority. Lord Elcho almost alone followed the more honourable traditions of the House of Commons by casting aside all party considerations, and defending Frere with vigour as having taken the only course which he rightly could have taken. The neutral part of the Press and public naturally assumed that an officer of the Crown who was so fiercely attacked and so feebly defended must needs be in the wrong.

As between Frere and the Government how did the matter stand?

Two years before, the Government had decided—rightly or wrongly—that confederation under Imperial sovereignty was the best and wisest policy for South Africa. They had gone out of their way to select Frere, a man of Indian, and not of Colonial experience, in view of his known ideas of Imperial policy, to carry it out, and he had accepted the office with reluctance, in obedience to an appeal to his patriotism. Within six months he began to discover, and soon became fully convinced, that there was an insurgent spirit pervading the natives, which it was necessary to put

* C. 2,260, p. 109, March 19, 1879.

down; that in justice to all, and especially to the natives themselves, it should be suppressed speedily and once for all by the direct action of the Imperial power, and not by setting Dutchman against Kaffir, or native against native, in chronic internecine war. He became aware also that this insurgent spirit had its focus and strength in the celibate military organization of Cetywayo, and in the prestige which impunity for the outrages he had committed had gained for him in the native mind. That organization and that evil prestige must be put an end to, if possible by moral pressure, if not possible—and this, Frere declared, was only too probable—by force. Till that was done there could be no permanent peace in South Africa.

All this, for more than a year, Frere had been telling the Colonial Office. It had been said by him, not once or twice; it had been repeated or implied in almost every letter he wrote. And the correspondence shows that as late as October 2, Sir M. Hicks-Beach entirely acquiesced in Frere's action. Then came a sudden change of purpose. The telegraphic message of October 12 gave the first, and that only a slight indication of it. The despatch of October 17 refused the reinforcements and expressed a confident hope that peace might be maintained. Sir M. Hicks-Beach's private letter of November 7 deprecated war on account of troubles in Europe, but it did not reach Frere till December 13, two days after the Zulu envoys had received the Ultimatum. A telegraphic summary of this last letter, sent on by Lady Frere, had indeed reached him on November 30, but even that was a fortnight after notice had been sent to Cetywayo to despatch his envoys to the meeting-place on the Tugela. After all that had occurred, after the demands that had been already made by Sir H. Bulwer, it was far too late to recede without increasing

the risk of war and bloodshed, and to have shown any signs of hesitation or fear at the critical moment would not only have been fatal to any hopes of obtaining a satisfactory settlement with Cetywayo, but would have encouraged the natives throughout South Africa to rise, and also probably have provoked the malcontent Boers into immediate insurrection and civil war.

Writing on December 31,* Sir M. Hicks-Beach, who was then in possession of the substance, though not of the details of the Ultimatum, takes no exception to it, but reserves his opinion. Two days later (January 2, 1879) † the details reached him; but it was not till January 23—a mail having gone in the interval without any letter from him—that he wrote as follows in a despatch, so worded, and with observations so balanced as to leave him the opportunity of saying "I told you so," whatever the event might be.

"I regret that the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would have been involved in consulting Her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be required to accept, before those terms were actually presented to the Zulu King.

"In making these observations, however, I do not desire to question the propriety of the policy which you have adopted in the face of a difficult and complicated condition of affairs. . . . I sincerely trust that the policy you have adopted may be as successful as the very careful consideration which you have given to it deserves, and that if military operations should become necessary, the arrangements which you have reported may secure that they should be brought to an early and decisive termination, with the result of finally relieving Her Majesty's subjects in Natal and the Transvaal from the danger to which they are exposed." ‡

* C. 2222, p. 115. † Ibid., p. 197. ‡ Ibid., p. 298.

In ordinary circumstances Frere would have resigned his office on receiving the despatch. His task had been arduous enough hitherto, in all conscience; how could he hope to accomplish it when discredited by the censure of the British Government? But the same Secretary of State who censured him in a published despatch had begged him for the sake of the public service not to resign. And a still stronger and more earnest and cogent appeal—and this time a manly, generous, and straightforward one—had been made to his patriotism by a higher personage.

The despatch, too, reached him at Pretoria, at the moment when the prevention of an outbreak of the Boers might, and probably did depend on his individual personal influence.

Though the weight of uninformed public opinion in England was bearing heavily against him, the post brought him letter after letter from those who had knowledge more or less complete of the true bearings of the situation, and from old friends who knew him too well to believe that either his perception of what was right or his policy could have been in fault, begging him for his own and for the country's sake to remain.

Lord Carnarvon wrote (March 27)—

"I cannot allow the mail to go without a few lines to repeat my earnest hope that you will consider well before you resign your office. I readily understand the difficulties in which you are now placed; I do not hesitate to say that I think you have much of which you may complain; but I greatly fear that your resignation of office at this juncture would involve grave embarrassment—perhaps even disaster. . . ."

Lord Granville was heard to say, "I hope to God Sir Bartle won't take huff and resign!" *

* Mr. Albert Grey to Sir B. Frere, March 27, 1879.

Colonel Yule wrote—

February 11.

"What can I say at such a time but that I rejoice, with most honest men, that England's trust is in such hands as yours. . . . In all that you have done there, though there is much that there is not time to learn to understand properly, I go with you heartily in faith where knowledge does not extend, as I go heartily in the spirit of those papers of yours which were published here about Affghanistan politics, heartily and with pride in our old and kind friend."

"March 4.

"Would not old Jacob have gloried in your work and been delighted to see it?" writes Sir W. Merewether.

Sir Robert Morier, who was well acquainted with the situation, and had been lately engaged in negotiating with Portugal for a railway from the Transvaal to Delagoa Bay, writes (March 27, 1879), denouncing in strong and indignant words the "cowardly and brutal" attacks made on him in and out of Parliament, and "the cowardly manner in which Government has given in to them." He goes on to say—

". . . I have been fighting your battles *à outrance, per fas et nefas*, for the last week, and find, of course, that most respectable people agree with me, but have not *le courage de leurs opinions.* What I mainly write for is to tell you that in my opinion, carefully thought over, both from your point of view and that of the country, the really high-souled patriotic course for you to follow is *not* to resign but to hold on till you have finished your work.

"I have only to add that this view has the more weight as coming from me that I have always been against the annexation of the Transvaal and the policy it represented, but what I said at the time and repeat now, was, that *if* we annexed, we *necessarily* had to do two things—demilitarize the Zulu armed polity, and acquire the right of way to the sea. . . ."

An old friend, an officer highly distinguished in India, wrote :—

"March 27.

"I really have been half out of my senses during the last ten days or a fortnight, with rage at the disgraceful treatment you have received in this country. . . . I suppose privately the cowards have written you a letter begging and praying of you not to resign. Why did they not do that publicly, and if they disliked your policy, say so privately? The fear now is that you will resign, and of course it would serve the Government and the country right if you were to resign. Then what a fix you would put them in! I believe, my dear Sir Bartle, anybody but you would resign, but you are so far more good and patriotic than anybody else I know, that I shall not be surprised to hear you treat the Government with your unequalled Christian generosity and remain at your post."

Mr. Gordon Sprigg's appeal, though expressed in more measured language, yielded to none of them in its urgency.

"April 24.

"If you were now to retire, the consequences to South Africa would be simply disastrous. . . . I hope you will not come to a decision adverse to the wishes of nearly every man in Africa without giving me an opportunity of discussing with you the whole question. . . . In my representative character as First Minister of the leading Colony of South Africa, and on behalf of its inhabitants whose opinion has been expressed through public meetings in every important town, I do urge you not to think for a moment of giving way to public opinion in England on a question which no man who has never been in Africa is competent to understand."

What could he do but yield and consent to toil on to the end, with an additional burden of difficulty laid upon him by this pitiful despatch, and all that it boded as to want of support in the future—doing a strange double service to the Government as its scapegoat and as its chosen officer!

In reply to Sir M. Hicks-Beach's letter of March 13, and before receiving the despatch containing the censure, Frere wrote—

"April 25, 1879.

"Since receiving your letter I have read a good deal of what the English press has said on the subject of the Zulu War. I was not surprised at the party bitterness of the *Daily News*. It was too good an opportunity of trying to inculpate the Government to let slip. Nor was I unprepared for the natural party vexation of the *Standard*, and many others on the Government side, who could only see an unexpected aggravation of Budget difficulties, and who would gladly throw the blame on a distant proconsul, too far off to be heard till the S. P. Q. R. had decided; but I confess to some surprise that men, with some pretensions to statesmanship, and to a judicial frame of mind, such as Lord Blachford, for instance, should have forgotten that no ship-captain can well, without the gift of prophecy, write his reasons for being caught in a hurricane before it begins to blow; and that whilst he is, as we are now, labouring to save the ship from foundering, it is no time to put him on his defence for being dismasted. He has enough to do to keep his log, and must wait for calmer weather to report why he was caught in the storm, and to justify his seamanship after it overtook him.

"Some of the evidence of the urgent necessity for immediate action was not before the public, and was probably not before Her Majesty's Government when you wrote, *e.g.* my despatch of November 8, which I do not find in any Blue-book,* and which certainly indicated little hope of a peaceful solution; but much of the evidence of such necessity was certainly not before you . . . including the evidence of Boer discontent—which weighed greatly with me in convincing me that any delay in acting would incur (involve) dangers far greater than those of a Zulu war.

"I do not mean merely the risk of an invasion of Natal. As to the probabilities of such an invasion, you had Bishop Colenso, the *Cape Argus*, and some Natal officials, against my opinion, supported by nine-tenths of all Colonial and native experience, and you might have

* It was not published till July, 1879. (C. 2367, p. 107.)

reasonably doubted whether Colenso and Saul Solomon might not be right and all the rest of us wrong.

"But there could be no doubt as to the state of Boer feeling, of which at the time you had little evidence before you. I felt, however, quite certain that, even if I could postpone for a few weeks or even months the inevitable Zulu War, it would be impossible to avoid a Boer rebellion. You will, I think, agree with me when you read my recent despatches about the Transvaal, and reflect how much the danger we have so narrowly escaped here would have been aggravated had the malcontent Boers been able to point to Piet Uys and his gallant band, driven from their homes to make them over to Zulus.

"Some act of violence the Boers would certainly have committed—hauled down the flag, stopped the mails, put the administrator over the border, or done some other of the many acts of rebellion they have threatened ever since they knew we were fighting their inevitable enemies, the Zulus. We must have moved some of our troops from Natal to support law and order here, and some bloodshed would have been the inevitable result.

"What would the Zulus have done? Observed a strict armed neutrality? I doubt if all Cetywayo's power could have enabled him to observe it. His young men would certainly have washed their spears in some white man's blood, whether Dutch or English would matter little to them. If Dutch, as is more probable, the Orange Free State would have been drawn in, and the Boer rebellion might have extended to Cape Colony, the ill-blood and lifelong race hatred certainly would. Such Zulu allies would have been far worse for us than a Zulu inroad into Natal, and how should I have answered you for incurring such a misfortune, and shirking the responsibility of bringing Cetywayo at once to an account?

"In fact, it seems to me a simple choice between doing what I did—risking a Zulu war at once, or incurring the risk of still worse—a Zulu war a few months later, preceded by a Boer rebellion.

"You must not think I was insensible to your difficulties in Turkey and Asia. I doubt whether you felt them more acutely than I did; but you must remember they were not present in their late aggravated form, till we had gone too far in Zulu affairs to recede with honour

or even with safety. You will remember that Bulwer's very proper demand for the surrender of Sirayo's sons was made in August last; there was no drawing back with any safety after that.

"Had things gone wrong in Turkey or Affghanistan you would not have thanked me for putting off war, when it involved both war and rebellion while you were in the midst of a European war.

"The 'full explanations,' which your telegram says 'should have been exchanged,' would have involved four or five months' delay, at the least. I feel quite sure we could not have kept the peace here so long. You are not yet convinced of this, but you will be, I think, when you have all the evidence before you; and you will see that we have, in fact, fallen on a time of national excitement and revolution when events will not wait for our convenience, and we can only meet dangers as they arise.

"But I will keep what I have further to say on this point till I get your despatch.

"As to its effect on me personally, I cannot, of course, tell till I receive it, how it may affect my position here, any expression of want of confidence might paralyze all my power for good. But you may rely on one thing, that I will think first of the public service, and of what is due to Her Majesty's Government and the country, before I give a thought to what is merely personal.

"I need not tell you that I came here for no personal object of my own, and, had I consulted only my own ease and welfare, I should have returned in six months. But I was honoured with a charge to stand on sentry for other purposes than my own personal benefit; and whilst my strength lasts, I will not desert my post till Her Majesty's Government either relieves or removes me."

Three weeks later, after receiving the despatch, he writes to Mr. Herbert:—

"May 16.

"I had hoped to have answered the Secretary of State's two despatches regarding the war and settlement of Zululand, but it is quite impossible, harassed and overworked as one is on such a journey, when forty miles of progress

in a mule waggon as completely absorbs the energies of the day as if one were rowing in a cross sea.

"I can quite understand its being necessary to write such despatches for parliamentary purposes. How they can be expected to do anything but trip up and fetter an officer placed as I am, is to me inexplicable, and this I will in due time explain officially.

"What my personal feeling is I am sure I need not tell you; nor need I assure you that it will never interfere with the discharge of my duty. I shall never forget your kind and intelligent sympathy, nor all the generous things which Lord Carnarvon, Lord Salisbury, Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Cranbrook said in the debates.

"But my course must depend on the degree in which I find that the censure or faint praise of official despatches may interfere with my power to do my duty, and of that I can scarcely judge till I get to the Cape."

His detailed answer to the Secretary of State's despatches was not sent till more than a month afterwards (June 30). It is a long paper, covering thirteen pages of the Blue-book,* too long for indifferent people in England to read through; and it came too late to influence members of Parliament, journalists, and others, who had long before taken their line. It was an answer not merely to the censure of the Government, but to attacks from other quarters. Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in acknowledging it, expressed his annoyance that it should have been written at all, as he presumed that Frere would wish it to be published. He did not see why Frere should take notice of attacks; and as for the war, all African wars had been unpopular, and this was especially so, and it would have been better not to raise a fresh storm by justifying it. It does not seem to have occurred to him that it was because the Government had not adequately defended him that Frere had to defend himself; nor did he seem to be aware that, to Frere at any rate, the important point

* C. 2454, p. 129.

was not whether the war was popular, but whether it could be proved to have been necessary and right.

Frere answered as follows :—

"September 22, 1879.

"I can assure you that I am by no means, as you suppose, unaware of the state of public feeling in England regarding the Zulu War, nor of the unanimity of all parties in England regarding it. No one can realize more keenly than I do its unpopularity, or regret it more sincerely as a costly but necessary evil.

"I cannot, however, but feel that the more the facts are looked into and sifted, the more clear it will be that the war was inevitable and righteous—forced on us by Cetywayo, begun by him and not by us, and that it could not possibly have been postponed without the certainty of greater evils—to wit, a repetition of bloody Zulu inroads into British territory, and a simultaneous Boer rebellion in the Transvaal.

"Few, as you say, will now be found to agree with me in this view. Few, I fear, in this generation.

"But unless my countrymen are much changed, they will some day do me justice. I shall not leave a name to be permanently dishonoured. Meantime many thousand colonists and hundreds of thousands of native subjects will feel secure in the Queen's dominions, who could not sleep in safety before the war.

"Your warning is a kind one. 'Why raise a fresh storm by replying to the Opposition?' Simply because, finding no complete and formal reply had been made to them, I wished to place one on record.

"No fresh storm can be more desolating in its effects on me than that which has passed over me, and apparently wrecked for the time such repute as I had, as a prudent, just, and loyal public servant. If a fresh storm will in any way embarrass the Queen's Government, then, indeed, I shall regret it, and I will gladly, as long as my present relations continue, at all times bow to the exercise of your discretion in reserving as much of my despatches as you think proper from publication till such time as they can be published without inconvenience to Her Majesty's Service.

"You will pardon me if I find it difficult to take your

view in thinking that the attacks on me are not harder to bear than those on Her Majesty's Government.

"*You* can reply at once, whether in Parliament or in the press. Your Governor cannot hear of an attack on him for three weeks, and cannot make any reply till the attack has long passed out of public recollection. Hence the necessity to him of effectual defence at home.

"Of course I cannot expect you to take the same view as I do in this matter, and if you think that all has been done that public opinion and the necessity for carrying on the Queen's Government allowed to be done with a view to my defence, I bow in this, as in all questions of the kind, to the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

"I am very glad to be assured by you that what I endeavoured to do has really met with your approval and that of Her Majesty's Government, for I must confess that though open censure had been confined to one or two points—no communication public or private that I have received this year had led me to feel myself warmly supported or approved in my attempts to carry out the instructions laid down for me by Her Majesty's Government in appointing me to this Government. As long, however, as they do not meet with the open disapproval of yourself and the Cabinet, my actions shall be guided as they have ever been, by the sole desire to uphold to the utmost of my power the authority and influence of Her Majesty's Government in these Colonies; and to endeavour conscientiously to discharge the duties you have intrusted to me."

The following is from a letter to Mr. Albert Grey, written in the following year:—

"June 28, 1880.

"Not only did Cetywayo's own people say 'Here is Chaka come back,' but he himself, as a 'Zulu of Zulus,' claimed to be Chaka, and have a right to all Chaka's dominions, including, emphatically, Natal, as his right, though he disclaimed any present intention of insisting on his full rights.

"Consider the impression this made on his people and on ours. Among Zulus the war party was in the ascendant. All the younger men were clamorous to 'wash their

spears' in blood, which must be the blood of British subjects or allies.

"They clamoured to be led to war, and long before the Transvaal was annexed or any of the later excuses for the war with us given, Cetywayo had distinctly told our agent Mr. Fynney in a confidential conversation officially reported at the time, that he could not restrain the young war party.

"Our people in Natal fully understood this danger. From the time Wolseley first went to Natal in 1875 till the war broke out in 1879, no one ever doubted that war would ensue, though a small party (Colenso, etc.) argued that it would be our fault. With this small exception the idea that war was ultimately avoidable has been entirely an afterthought since the war, as far as Natal is concerned. I doubt whether a single despatch of Wolseley's in 1875, or of any official or public writer in the press up to 1879, could be quoted which does not prove the almost universal conviction that war was inevitable—sooner or later. . . .

"I hold that we must accept facts as we find them, that the English, Dutch and other white races are here, in temperate South Africa rooted by a residence of nearly two hundred and fifty years, growing and dominating weaker and less civilized and cohesive races. The Kaffirs, the finest and strongest of these native races, seem to have arrived here from tropical Africa about the same time that the white man landed on the Southern Coast. Since early in this century the two races have come in collision. Experience of these wars and their results shows that while the white races are the stronger of the two, the Kaffir once vanquished is as capable of accepting European civilization, of living under it, and of assimilating with his conquerors, as the races conquered by our ancestors when they broke into Northern Europe. Here in the Cape Colony and in that only, black and white live on equal terms, are under the same laws and enjoy the same liberties and franchises, under a system of complete self-government.

"There is nothing in the law to prevent a black man from being Prime Minister of the Colony. This healthy constitution I would wish to extend over other colonies and territories—Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State,

and outlying native territories like Basutoland, Transkei, etc., in all of which the native races are under exceptional laws and generally governed as an inferior race.

"If these are sound aims then I maintain that the discretion allowed me 'was wisely used.' Cetywayo had repaired and reconstructed a vast machine, quite able, if well directed, to have overwhelmed such weakly settlements as Natal or Transvaal, unless they had the support of British troops.

"He prepared and commenced war against us, not we against him, and he was crushed. . . .

"But there are other aims favoured by disciples of Colenso who regard the Zulus as the 'coming race' of South Africa, who are about to absorb and assimilate the white man and dominate wherever the two races come into contact.* If this is a sound view, my action was

* This statement of Colenso's views concerning Cetywayo, the Zulus, and their destiny may seem exaggerated, but it is more than borne out by the following passage from Miss North's "Recollections of a Happy Life," vol. ii. p. 279 :—

"We came in sight of Bishopstowe, with its many-gabled house and gum trees, like an oasis in the desert. It stood on the top of a small hill, and every tree there was planted by Dr. Colenso. Under the verandah, covered with creepers, he stood to receive me, giving me his arm with as much courtesy as if I had been a princess. It seemed quite a dream of old days to meet such a gentleman again, and difficult to understand how one so genial and gentle could have made himself so hated by the majority of the country. His conversation was delightful; but he gave me the impression of being both weak and vain, and very susceptible to flattery. His two elder daughters seemed to manage him. They were perfectly devoted to him and to Zuluism! which governed everything. The dear natives were incapable of harm, the whites incapable of good. They would, I believe, have heard cheerfully that all the whites had been 'eaten up' and Cetywayo proclaimed King of Natal. His portrait was all over the house, and they mentioned him in a hushed voice, as a kind of holy martyr, and had hardly a good word to say for any white man, except Colonel Durnford, whose life poor Frances wrote. . . . I was taken to see the printing-press, which was continually contradicting every fact stated by the Government or officials, who in their turn contradicted every fact published by it. Messengers were continually arriving with fresh lies (I believe) from the 'King,' over which the Bishop and his daughters passed all their time. It would have driven me mad to have stayed long in such a strained atmosphere."

worse than a failure, it was a crime. If by leaving the Zulus alone they can evolve civilization and liberty from among themselves—if they can live alongside the white race in Natal and Transvaal without coming into a struggle for supremacy, then the course we have taken during these last three years, as during the preceding fifty, has been wrong.

"But I have always regarded that view as a mischievous dream, the folly of which is proved by history everywhere, but especially by four thousand years of negro existence without one single step of spontaneous advance throughout this vast continent, every step out of their general animal existence being clearly traceable to some external impulse or impression."

While in England Frere was being censured and vilified, in South Africa an overwhelming majority of the colonists, of whatever race or origin, were declaring, in unmistakable terms, that he had gained their warmest approbation and admiration.

The first note was sounded (March 24) at Capetown, at a public meeting, called to protest against the gross misrepresentations of the *Argus* newspaper of the state of public opinion at the Cape. The *Argus* was Saul Solomon's paper. The editor was one McLoughlin, an Irishman, formerly a private soldier, who had got into some trouble, for which he had been suspended from the Capetown City Club; afterwards some evidence which he gave at a trial was so strongly animadverted upon by the judge, that there was a question of his indictment for perjury, so that Solomon, to his regret, for he was a clever man, had to drop him. Solomon was an influential politician, who had at first professed to be friendly to the Government; but for some personal reason he changed his ground, and the *Argus* became the organ of an incongruous minority, comprehending the Opposition led by Mr. Merriman, Bishop Colenso, the Aborigines Protection

Society, and the Dutch Afrikander party, who agreed only in wishing to oust Mr. Sprigg's Ministry and thwart his and Frere's policy.

The meeting was the largest and most enthusiastic known at Capetown since the days of the anti-convict agitation. An attempt by Solomon and his friends to move an amendment failed utterly, and resolutions of enthusiastic approbation of Frere's action were carried by acclamation.

The note thus sounded was taken up wherever British rule extended in South Africa. From town after town and village after village kept pouring in addresses and resolutions, in different forms, and mixed up with different local questions, but almost without exception * agreeing in enthusiastic commendation of him as the one man who had grasped the many threads of the South African tangle, and was handling them so as to promise a solution, in accordance with the interests of all the many and various races which inhabited it.

"In the opinion of this meeting," one of them (from Cradock) runs, "his Excellency Sir Bartle Frere is one of the best Governors, if not the best Governor, this Colony has ever had, and the disasters which have taken place since he has held office, are not due to any fault of his, but to a shameful mismanagement of public affairs before he came to the Colony, and the state of chaos and utter confusion in which he had the misfortune to find everything on his arrival; and this meeting is therefore of opinion that the thanks of every loyal colonist is [are] due to his Excellency for the Herculean efforts he has since made under the most trying circumstances to South Africa. . . ." †

Another, from Kimberley, says—

"Your Excellency may rely upon our assurance that

* There is *one*, in a contrary sense, amongst them all.

† C. 2367, p. 28.

you have had our entire sympathy and confidence, that at no time have we doubted your ultimate success, and that our only anxiety has been lest your powers of physical endurance and health might give way under the terrible pressure of work and responsibility which has been forced upon you.

"It has been a source of much pain to us that your Excellency's policy and proceedings should have been so misunderstood and misrepresented. The people in this country know that the Zulu War was unavoidable; and the time, we hope, is not far distant when the wisdom of your Excellency's native policy and action will be as fully recognized and appreciated by the whole British nation as it is by the colonists of South Africa." *

At Pretoria, in the heart of the Transvaal, within a week of the breaking-up of the camp which had been threatening its safety, a public meeting was held (April 24), which resolved that—

"This meeting reprobates most strongly the action of a certain section of the English and Colonial Press for censuring, without sufficient knowledge of local affairs, the policy and conduct of Sir B. Frere; and it desires not only to express its sympathy with Sir B. Frere and its confidence in his policy, but also to go so far as to congratulate most heartily Her Majesty the Queen, the Home Government, and ourselves, on possessing such a true, considerate, and faithful servant as his Excellency the High Commissioner." †

A public dinner also was given to Frere at Pretoria, at which his health was drunk with the greatest enthusiasm; there was a public holiday, and other rejoicings.

Frere was intending to go to Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State to visit President Brand, with whom he was on cordial terms, and with whom he wished to talk over his plans for the Transvaal; but instructions came from Sir M. Hicks-Beach to proceed without unnecessary delay to Capetown. He therefore left Pretoria on May 1,

* C. 2454, p. 57 † C. 2454, p. 56.

travelling as before in the spider. He was welcomed everywhere with the utmost cordiality and enthusiasm. At Potchefstrom there was a public dinner and a reception. On approaching Bloemhof he was met by a large cavalcade and escorted into the township, where a triumphal arch had been erected, and an address was presented.

Thus far he was in the Transvaal. At Kimberley he had to be sworn in as Governor of Griqualand West. Fifteen thousand people, it was estimated, turned out to meet and welcome him. There were triumphal arches, a torch-light procession, the Kimberley mine was lit up with coloured fire, there was a banquet, and an address of sympathy and congratulation. From thence to Capetown his journey was like a triumphal progress, the population at each place he passed through receiving him in flag-decorated streets, with escorts, triumphal arches, illuminations, addresses, and banquets. At Worcester, where he reached the railway, Lady Frere met him, and there was a banquet at which Mr. Gordon Sprigg was also present. At Paarl, which is the head-quarters of the Dutch Afrikander league, and where some of the most influential Dutch families live, a like reception was given him. Finally at Capetown, where, if anywhere, his policy was likely to find opponents among those who regarded it from a provincial and western point of view, the inhabitants of all classes and sections and of whatever origin gave themselves up to according him a reception such as had never been surpassed in Capetown.

In England complimentary local receptions and addresses to men in high office or of exalted rank do not ordinarily carry much meaning. Party tactics and organization, love of notoriety, or a sense of favours to come from the personage to be honoured account for a large proportion of such manifestations. But the demonstration on this

occasion can be explained by none of these causes. There was no party organization to stimulate it. It was too general to confer notoriety on any of its promoters, and Frere had not personally the power, even if he had had the will, to requite compliments. And what made it the more remarkable was that there was no special victory or success or event of any kind to celebrate. The war still dragged on without, as yet, any decisive success, though it was now some time since the reinforcements from England had arrived; and a deep shade of gloom had just been thrown over the Colony by the death of the young Prince Napoleon.

Some of the English newspapers were not ashamed to revive the old calumny which had done shameful duty eighteen years before during the Maori War in New Zealand, and to suggest that colonists *like* wars with the natives, because they bring British troops who spend money in the Colony, and that they are ready to do honour to those who advocate a war policy. The allegation is as senseless as it is false.* Colonists, whose native

* "All classes are very sore at the persistent slanders of the English Press, and of many who ought to know better in England, as well as here, who assert that the Cape Colony finds any profit in the Zulu War or approves of it because it is profitable to them. It would be quite as true to attribute English approval of a war in Turkey to interested motives."—Sir B. Frere to Mr. R. W. Herbert, August 19, 1879.

The Committee of the Aborigines Protection Society took upon itself to write a letter to the Mayor of Pietermaritzburg expressing regret that the citizens should have passed resolutions approving the Zulu War, and saying that they had hoped that they would have supported the cause of peace and justice, and expressed their sympathy with the course taken by their "noble bishop." The reply of the Mayor (Mr. Francis) is a complete and a dignified one. After pointing out the chief errors in the letter, and stating concisely the main facts of the case, he goes on to say :—

"As to the unworthy misstatement in the memorial you enclose to me—that the Zulu War is no doubt popular in the South African

wars are fought in their midst, or on their borders, whose families may be slaughtered, whose farms may be harried, and who may lose the savings of a life's labour by a night's raid, who have no glory, no plunder, no advantage to gain by it, however successful, have their minds opened by the stern teaching of experience to the miseries of war far more than the average Englishman who takes his ease at home, without risk of life or limb or property, and whose acquaintance with the realities of warfare is confined to what he reads of it in his daily paper.

Colonies, because the colonists are not required to bear the heavy burdens which it will entail—I fearlessly assert, as regards the Colony of Natal, which, though approving of war, if necessary, had no more to do in causing it than the inhabitants of the Diamond Fields; that the burdens Natal has borne and is bearing are heavy in the extreme, almost unbearable; that she finds her trade and industrial pursuits dislocated and paralyzed; that the expenses of living have enormously increased over the whole Colony; and that in proportion to her means and population, she has already lost more than the Mother Country, while those who have principally and largely benefited are a few contractors and transport riders. . . .

"It is because the colonists of Natal are staunch friends of peace and justice that they have supported the policy of Sir Bartle Frere and approved of his meeting the war that was forced upon him, as they well know that in no other way can peace and justice be made secure in South Africa.

"The colonists of Natal have no sympathy, as a body, with the course taken by their 'noble bishop.' I suppose by this expression you mean bishop Colenso; because though most willing to admit his many amiable qualities, they altogether doubt the soundness of his judgment, and his ability to see and weigh both sides of the question. In their opinion he has merely the mind of a keen partisan or an able advocate. In this opinion I coincide, and although he is my bishop, I am convinced that he never has and never will lead public opinion in this Colony, in consequence of a pretentious self-sufficiency which throws aside facts and experience in favour of ingenious but unfounded theories."

CHAPTER XX.

SUPERSESSION AND RECALL.

The High Commissionership divided—Sir Garnet Wolseley—Ulundi—Cetywayo a prisoner—Basutoland and Pondoland—The Zulu Kinglets—Missionaries—Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Transvaal—Secocoeni taken—Special correspondents—Colonial defence—Sir George Colley succeeds Sir Garnet Wolseley—Dutch feeling—The Midlothian speeches—Mr. Gladstone in office—South African policy unchanged—The Aborigines Protection Society—The Basuto disarmament—Confederation postponed—Attacks on Frere—The "Unity of the Party"—Frere's salary—His recall—General indignation—Loyalty of Colonists.

IF the British Government still placed confidence in Frere, as it professed to do, it took a strange method of showing it.

A week after he had returned to Capetown there came (June 14) a telegraphic message, of the purport of which he had had no previous hint or warning, that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on his way out to supersede Lord Chelmsford in the command of the army, and Sir H. Bulwer as Governor of Natal, and also that he was "for the time" to replace Frere as High Commissioner of the Transvaal, Natal, and all the adjoining eastern portion of South Africa.

The command had been first offered to Lord Napier of Magdala; but he, when he found that his acceptance of it involved a curtailment of Frere's authority, chivalrously

declined to supersede an old friend, in whose character, judgment, and ability he had, by long experience, learnt to repose such confidence.*

The want of cordial agreement which prevailed between Lord Chelmsford and Sir H. Bulwer, more particularly as to the system of raising, organizing, and employing the native levies, made it expedient that, in order to bring the war to a conclusion, a change should be made, and that the offices of General-in-Command and Lieutenant-Governor of Natal should be held by the same person. But the High Commissioner had nothing to do with the conduct of the war. To deprive Frere of his authority as regarded Natal, Zululand, the Transvaal—the Transvaal, which almost by his single hand and voice he had just saved from civil war—and expressly to direct Colonel Lanyon to cease to correspond with him, was to discredit a public servant before all the world at the crisis of his work.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, indeed, assured him that no slight was intended, that the pushing forward of confederation, which was the great end in view, required Frere's constant presence and advocacy at Capetown, and would suffer by his having to attend to affairs in Zululand, the Transvaal, and elsewhere.† But this was entirely an error. The Cape Ministry needed no persuasion. Confederation was a leading feature in their programme; they had a large majority in the Legislative Assembly, and they were well supported in the country. What was wanting to bring

* A year later (July, 1880) Lord Napier writes—

"You will hardly know how near I was joining you at one time. I however, felt and said it was impossible that I could in any way take away any part of his authority from one with whom my ties of friendship were so strong as with yourself."

Would that he had accepted! Had Frere had such a coadjutor how different might have been the future of South Africa!

† Sir M. Hicks-Beach to Sir B. Frere, May 28, 1879. C. 2318, p. 84.

about confederation was confidence, founded on the permanent pacification and settlement of Zululand, the Transvaal, the Transkei, Pondoland, Basutoland, West Griqualand, and the border generally. How could there be confidence any longer? There was no doubt what Frere had meant to do. By many a weary journey he had made himself personally known throughout South Africa. His aims and intentions were never concealed, never changed. In confederating under his superintendence all men knew what they were doing. But in obedience to clamour against him in England he was to be superseded. Was his policy to be changed, and how? To tell Frere to effect confederation while discrediting him and depriving him of half his authority, was to bid him weave a web, the threads of which were taken from him and put under another man's control.

Nor was this all. To divide into two the High Commissionership, the authority by which the sovereignty of the Crown and the Mother Country is exercised, was obviously a step in the direction, not of union and confederation, but of separation and disintegration. Thus, to take a single instance, there was a marked difference between the native policy of the Cape and that of Natal; the former was much in advance of the latter, where the natives, being in overwhelming numbers, had been left for the most part untaught and unimproved. This divergence, which Frere sought to get rid of, would now be likely to increase.*

Still he felt it to be his duty not to resign.

"I have no wish" (he writes, June 23, to Mr. R. W.

* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, C. 2374, p. 144. The difference was fully appreciated by the natives. Compare the speeches of the Basuto chiefs at their interview with Mr. Gordon Sprigg in December 1879. C. 2482, pp. 488-509.

Herbert) "to follow the dictates of Her Majesty's Opposition, of the *Daily News*, or of those who would wish ill to all South Africa save Cetywayo and his Zulus. So I shall not consult my own feelings after being made a shuttlecock for party purposes. I hope to see South Africa out of the first Act, at least of her present difficulties, before thinking of rest for myself; but it is very weary work."

And in another letter to him, he says—

"June 27, 1879.

"As regards the new departure—the substitution of one man (Wolseley) for three (Chelmsford, Bulwer, and Lanyon) —I fully concur in the wisdom of the arrangement which concentrates supreme authority, civil as well as military, in one hand, instead of dividing it among three. I regret, indeed, for Chelmsford's sake, it was not done earlier. . . .

"As for the mode in which Wolseley's appointment affects me, I need not say anything to you, for you see, I have no doubt, as clearly as I do, that an apparent slap in the face such as would satisfy Dilke and Sir R. Peel cannot easily be administered without the recipient feeling it. . . . It is impossible to give half the High Commissioner's duties and responsibilities to Wolseley without what remains to me being lessened.

"There were, it seems to me, many ways in which what was needful might have been done without casting any slur upon me; but I do not care to dwell on this, the personal aspect of the question, for I really care less for it than for the effect the supersession—whether partial or complete, whether temporary or permanent—must have on the question of confederation and on the future peace and prosperity of South Africa.

"For *immediate* peace on a basis to ensure security to Natal, I have little fear. Government would not, I trust, order, nor is Wolseley the man willing to make 'peace at any price,' and whenever he makes peace I have little doubt that he will, before making it, create in the Zulu mind a strong conviction that they have been well beaten.

"But how about the future settlement of Zululand, so

that the country may be *kept* in peace? How about Natal itself, with the swarming tribes of natives? and the Transvaal?

"I have the highest opinion of Wolseley, whom I have known for years; but I doubt whether he has the requisite patience, or has ever thought much of the principles on which the future administration and constitutions of such countries must be framed. His attempt at a Constitution for Natal* has been a deplorable failure. He is so shrewd and sensible, as well as clever, that with good advisers he might do well; but where are such men to be got? . . . Without a thoroughly sound settlement of all these questions, confederation is out of the question.

"There was only one expression in your letter (I might almost say in *any* letter you ever wrote me) which I regret. You say that you hope I will not surrender the work of confederation, and that 'to become the first Governor-General is the fit coping' of all my work.

"I can assure you no hopes of that kind are among the inducements to me to remain out here. I hope, before I go, to see an end of this Zulu War, and some real progress towards an Africa Pacificata, meantime to put on record some of the things I have learned, and which, I fear, people in England do not yet know, which may help to make this country more united, more prosperous, and more useful to England as an honoured division of the British Empire. This done—and it will not, I hope, take long to do it, or at least fairly to start it—I will leave my task to be completed by men who can work more in accordance with party views and traditions, and ask Her Majesty's Government to let me have some rest after forty-five years of almost incessant labour in the public service. There is no position out here they could offer me at all comparable to that I had the honour to hold after the mutiny in India, more than twenty years ago. I shall never lose my interest in Africa, and may, perhaps, yet do her good service before I die. But I am not made of cast iron, either body or soul, and it is wearing work always up-hill against the collar. A puppy dog in Bond Street or Fleet Street is bigger and stronger than any elephant in Africa, and I may do more real good 'havering' to members, or writing answers at the 'Athenæum' to

* In 1875. See p. 237.

such genial critics as Morley and Blachford, than by writing despatches here, which, except yourself and a very few others, no one reads for any purpose but to frame indictments."

The prospects of confederation were made still worse by a despatch* from Sir M. Hicks-Beach on the subject, which arrived a week later (July 6). This document evinced a strange ignorance of the situation. It was tacitly assumed that it was the Cape Parliament that was stopping the way, and it was suggested that "general proposals for the establishment of a South African Union or Confederation" should "be submitted to the Cape Parliament," which "might assume the form of resolutions" affirming the expediency of establishing a union, and suggesting such a definite form of Parliamentary Constitution as would secure a fair share of representation to each of the several members.

Abstract resolutions such as these were exactly what the cautious Cape people were afraid of, because they could not foresee what effect they might have in practice. And in the present case they were especially unwelcome to the Ministry and to the colonists generally, because they contained suggestions which were at once recognized as having been inspired by Mr. John Paterson, a politician of some note but small following, and a more than doubtful supporter of the Ministry, who had lately been in England.

It was the old story. The Secretary of State was ready to listen to the advice of any one rather than the High Commissioner, the Queen's representative.†

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

* June 12, 1879. C. 2454, p. 50.
† Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, August 28, 1879.

"July 12, 1879.

"As regards confederation, I much fear your action and the two despatches on the subject, which I received last week, have had an effect the reverse of what you intended.

"You tried, no doubt, to avoid anything like coercion or threatening. But colonists are very sensitive, and their backs had already been put up by very similar arguments and proposals having been put before them by Mr. Paterson, with the assurance that if they were not accepted willingly, they would be forced on all the Colonies concerned. When, therefore, the same plans were recognized in your despatch, even confederationists took alarm, and neither I nor Mr. Sprigg are able to satisfy some of his staunchest supporters that their fears are groundless. They believe that Wolseley has secret instructions to confederate the Transvaal and Natal forcibly, and the almost universal feeling here is to wait till they can see what is done in Natal and Zululand and Transvaal, before they commit themselves.

"I do not think you have realized that a peremptory tone, which would be quite justifiable where nothing had been done towards Union, was not required here in the Cape Colony, where the present Ministry and Parliament were quite in accord with you, and had been steadily working for a year and a half past in your direction. Nothing more was needed than that Government should express approval and bid them go on; but they were pulled up in mid career, when they were carrying out your own principles in Kaffraria. Their supporters now ask them, 'What has been disapproved by the Secretary of State?' 'Is it your Kaffrarian policy?'* 'Or Sir B. Frere's proposals for Natal?' 'Or is peace at any price

* "In reply to our request for certain powers to deal with Galekaland and other portions of Kaffraria, you told us you would consider the matter as a part of the confederation question. You might as well have said 'at the Greek Kalends' or 'during the discussion on the Berlin Treaty.' Poor Mr. Sprigg was in despair, for the settlement of Galekaland, etc., was to be one of the results of his year's work, and everything like settlement must be deferred, to the imminent risk of adding to the incentives to a Kaffir rising, and unsettling everything on the eastern frontier. I could not help him, for I really could not imagine what the Secretary of State was driving at. . . ." (Frere to Mr. R. W. Herbert, June 27, 1879.)

to be made with Zululand?' 'Or is the Transvaal to be given up?' My Ministers can only say they have no reason to believe in any such change of policy; but this will not satisfy their supporters in the face of definite assertions of the Opposition, and the obvious disapproval expressed by your treatment of me; and their supporters say, 'We must wait to see what is done in Natal, Zululand, and Transvaal before we take any steps towards confederation.'"

Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Capetown on June 28. From that time forward Frere ceased to have any share in the affairs of the Transvaal, Natal, or Zululand. Frere received him cordially, and gave him all the information and assistance in his power, "talking all day and half the night" to him. He went on without delay to Natal; but before he could reach the seat of war and assume the command of the army in the field, the battle of Ulundi had (July 5) been fought and won by Lord Chelmsford. The fighting was now at an end. The Zulus confessed themselves beaten, and did not again attempt resistance.

Cetywayo was taken prisoner on August 28, and was afterwards sent to Capetown, and had rooms given to him in the Castle, where the quarters of the General and Staff officers were.

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach:—

"October 20, 1879.

"I told Captain Poole, R.A., who has the immediate charge of him, to treat him exactly, as far as difference of customs admitted, as he would any European officer of rank who might be in his charge as prisoner of war, and I think you may trust Captain Poole to do so. . . . He had begged to have a suit of English clothes. He is very particular about what he gets, and seems well pleased with all that Poole has given him. . . . In all these things, if you can imagine an extremely shrewd, wily, sensual man, with many of the habits, tastes, and ideas of a very vicious, childish lad, who had never mixed with any but flatterers and inferiors, and had hardly ever known what

it was to be crossed in his will without taking ample vengeance, you will have as good an idea as I can give of him. Long habit of uncontradicted command gives great dignity to his general manner, and takes in casual observers with the belief that he is a very superior being; but you will look in vain for kingly attributes, as we understand them, apart from those associated with superior force and cunning."

Had Sir Garnet Wolseley been sent out immediately after the news of Isandhlwana, it is probable he might, by combining the authority of General of the Army and of Governor of Natal, and by his great military ability and energy, have brought the war to a speedier conclusion. But as matters were, nothing could have been more ill-timed and unfortunate than his appointment.

A keen and ambitious soldier, he had come out in the expectation of making a brilliant finish to a chequered and tedious campaign. Arriving too late for this, he had before him the work of making a settlement of Zululand and of arranging the government of the Transvaal, tasks for which he had not the requisite aptitude, experience, or inclination. Under the altered circumstances he was the square peg in the round hole; and of this he seems to have been conscious, for his letters, one after another, express his impatience to get the business over and go home. "The sooner I can complete my work, the sooner I can 'clear out' so as to leave the coast clear for your arduous task of confederation," he writes to Frere (July 29), quite unaware, apparently, that the feasibility of Frere's arduous task depended greatly upon the quality and stability of the settlements which he himself had to make.*

* He never could understand this, and always assumed that the cart was to go before the horse. He writes to Frere from the Transvaal (November 11): "I wish you could carry out confederation quickly, as that might calm the sullen anger of these Dutchmen."

The evil consequences of the division of the High Commissionership might have been minimized had Sir Garnet Wolseley been willing to keep Frere informed if not to consult him at each important step that he took. But so far from this, he omitted to give him any information as to what he proposed to do, sent his despatches home without allowing them to pass through Frere's hands, and left him when the most important arrangements were pending to get his earliest information from the newspapers.

On the subject of confederation, Frere writes again to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

"August 28, 1879.

"Union, after the fashion indicated in the South African Act of last year, is so much to the advantage of all concerned, that nothing but party tactics and party perversity can long delay its acceptance by a great majority of thoughtful colonists. But they cannot be dragooned into it, nor made to accept it by 'Imperial pressure,' as Paterson would call it, for they are at least as obstinate and self-willed as the stock they come from, whether Dutch, English, Scotch, or Irish.

"By careful explanation, perseverance, and some 'give and take,' we may induce all to agree to any really useful measure. To be useful or acceptable it must include the grant of some form of self-government, either immediate, or immediately prospective, to all members of the Union. We were on the fair road to this when my supersession by Wolseley threw us all back. It is always difficult to revert to the exact *status quo ante*. To weaken the influence of your Governor and his Ministers here, when those Ministers are thoroughly loyal and English in feeling, is simply playing into the hands of Messrs. Colenso, Saul Solomon, and Merriman—the bitter anti-English opposition here and in Natal.

"They are sedulously courting the Dutch party, and swaying the loyal Dutch (a great majority of the Cape Dutchmen) to swell the already considerable minority who are disloyal to the English Crown here and in Transvaal, and who would prefer a Holland (*i.e.* remember a *German*) Government or Protectorate in the Transvaal to an English

one, and a Republic here to a Dominion under the British Crown.

"If the special correspondents are right as to Wolseley's plans for Zululand (of which I know nothing from him) his settlement of Zululand is not likely to mend matters. You may with the greatest ease so rule Zululand that the Zulus shall pay their share of the cost of the war and be a strength and not a weakness to Natal and the Transvaal. To leave them to themselves, with no restraint but 'moral suasion' from Residents carefully instructed that the Zulus are to be left to rule themselves after their own will and fashion, is simply to invite a repetition of the history of Cetywayo and Kreli—who in ten or fifteen years built up a strong military power out of the remnants of a defeated and dispersed tribe.

"This is not avoiding increase of responsibilities. It is merely inviting their increase by turning your back and shutting your eyes whilst they are growing.

"All colonists know this well—and except crotchetty philanthropists and political partisans, all acknowledge it—and if they see us so acting, none will feel secure nor consent to confederate, except with some strong military power on which they can depend for help in time of need.

"We are meantime drifting into very awkward relations with these Colonies. What you are now doing seems to me uncomfortably like what was done more than a century ago, when we drove the American Colonies into war and forcible separation.

"From the Treaty of Paris in 1763, to the end of the War of Independence in 1783, it took twenty years for the quarrel to arise, culminate, and be fought out in separation. We do things faster nowadays. The whole history of causes of difference—the character of the disputes between the British Government and the States, and the mode in which they were carried on were, *mutatis mutandis*, very like the storm now brewing here. . . .

"I wish you to be warned in time, and having warned you I have done my duty. If you think I am an alarmist, I wish you would refer to Lord Salisbury or Lord Halifax, or others who have known me long, and can judge whether I am wont to be deluded or deterred by phantom fears."

Unfortunately this was by no means the only instance in which Frere failed to receive the consideration and support he naturally looked for.

The news of the disaster of Isandhlwana, exaggerated by Cetywayo's emissaries, had spread among the natives all over South Africa. The British army had been represented as totally destroyed, and the British race as no longer able to hold its own. Even amongst the Boers the same idea, though to a less extent, prevailed. The spectacle of a couple of regiments marching through Basutoland, Pondoland, Tembuland, and the Transvaal, would have tended to dispel the delusion immediately and effectually, as nothing else would; and the expense would have been the merest trifle compared with the moral effect produced, and the trouble and bloodshed in future years that might have been saved. But Sir Garnet Wolseley would not listen to Frere's suggestions that this should be done. The one thing to be aimed at, it seemed, according to his instructions, was the saving of present expense; the future must take care of itself.

In Basutoland a chief named Morosí had been encouraged by the early troubles of the Zulu War to raise a rebellion, which extended over nearly one-fifth of the province. He had entrenched himself with his robber-band in a strong hill-fort in the heart of the country, and there he was being blockaded by the Colonial troops, yeomanry and volunteers. Frere asked Sir Garnet Wolseley for the assistance of two or three hundred British Infantry to finish the business at once, but he refused them. The Colonial troops did at last (November 20) take the fortress unassisted, but at a much greater expenditure of men and money than had the help asked for been granted.

Pondoland, the country between the Transkei and

Natal, was in a very disturbed condition. Mrs. Jenkins, the missionary's widow, had proved to be an inadequate guardian and mentor to the Chief Umquikela. The latter had refused to give up for trial a gang of murderers who had fled to his territory just before the Transkei War began, had allowed a well-armed contingent of Pondos to join the Griqua rebels, and had listened to overtures from Cetywayo. There had been differences between Umquikela and his neighbours, which had led to frontier fights, murders, and wholesale plunder of cattle. The powers of the Government there and in Galekaland, Tembuland, and Bombanaland, were vague and undefined, and it was essential that they should be duly considered and authoritatively laid down. The Government wished to take the telegraph across a narrow strip of Umquikela's territory; he objected "as if he had been the Emperor of Germany," and the Government gave way and took it a long way round. "Any troublesome trader or missionary might any day bring into our Colonial courts the right of our best and most humane officials to do what they have been doing for many years past," Frere writes, "and there is a small party of renegade white men who for their own purposes wish to keep the country to themselves and helped to oppose everything the Government did to quiet and open up the country." *

It was obviously necessary that this state of things should be inquired into on the spot by a competent and experienced officer. Frere could not spare any of his staff and had no one whom he could send. He therefore applied to Sir Garnet Wolseley to assist him by placing at his disposal for this purpose one of the many trustworthy officers who had come out for special service with the army, and were then being sent home on the ground

* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, October 7, 1879.