

absolutely necessary to compel the submission of the rebel tribes to their lawful ruler."

"I felt proud of my countryman," he writes to Sir G. Clerk (April 17, 1859), "when I saw the thorough confidence and trust which all the Kelat people reposed in him, not excepting the Khan, who, however bluntly Green might speak, seemed always to feel that he had no better or truer friend in the world. I really believe that if Green could stay there a few years, Kelat would become as quiet and prosperous as any part of India."

Frere, in forwarding Major Green's despatch, says :—

"The army had between two and three thousand camels, and other baggage animals in proportion. Beyond the loss of a few which fell over precipices and were dashed to pieces, Major Green assured me that he did not believe that a dozen camels were lost or left behind, though the defiles were worse than any he had ever seen in India or Europe, in the Balkan, the skirts of the Caucasus, or Armenia. A march of equal length in the plains of India would have cost more animals, and our enormous and incalculable losses in the passes of Affghanistan have been almost equalled in later campaigns nearer home. To what is the difference attributable? Major Green is right in attributing it simply to the fact that in the Brahoe force every man understood the animal he used for his baggage, had a personal interest in its preservation, and took care that it was properly fed and not overloaded.

"The carriage of a twelve-pounder brass howitzer eighty miles on the back of a single camel over the worst possible paths, at the rate of fourteen miles a day, is a feat which has been probably rarely attempted, and was certainly never before undertaken as an ordinary job for ordinary hire by a common Brahoe Jutt. No two animals, Major Green assures me, could be less alike in their capacity and power of endurance than the camel in the keeping of his native breeder and the same animal under the charge of a European commissariat conductor, fed with unnatural food, and loaded and tended by a Mahratta horsekeeper.

"I have often ventured to express my opinion that we have enormously overrated the value of the difficult country

to the west of the Indus as a defence to India against any army of Central Asian tribes directed by European intelligence and energy. Major Green has arrived at the same conclusion, of the justice of which the present expedition affords a fresh proof and matter for much serious reflection."

The three guns which had fallen into the hands of the Murrees, when Major Clibborn's force was destroyed at the head of the Nuffoosk Pass, in 1840, had been taken to Kahun, a few miles from the scene of the fight. There Green found one of them, mounted on a bastion of the fort. The carriage of another was found in the fort, and the gun itself at the bottom of a newly made grave in a burial ground outside. One of them had the mark of a sabre cut across the breech—evidence of the close hand-to-hand fight which had raged round them when they were taken. The third gun had been thrown down a precipitous ravine and could not be found. The two recovered guns, twelve-pound brass howitzers, were slung each on a camel and taken eighty miles to Jacobabad.

But at Jacobabad there was no General Jacob to receive them.

When Outram, on hearing of the outbreak of the Mutiny, hastened back to India from Persia with all his European troops, Jacob had remained with the native portion of the force to watch over the carrying out of the treaty. Much as he was wanted in India, he was compelled to yield to the request of the British Minister in Persia that he would remain some time longer, and in September sent Captain Pelly to Bombay to report to Lord Elphinstone. He had been selected for the command of the Central Indian army,* and when at last he was able to leave Persia he

* Apparently at Frere's suggestion. See a letter from Frere to Mansfield of March 9, 1863.

Her Majesty's Government, and if the delegates Krüger and Joubert deal honestly with them, telling them how hopeless is any scheme of undoing the annexation, they will acquiesce, reluctantly, no doubt, at first; but they have many noble qualities and capabilities, and if fairly treated will, I believe, be subjects of whom Her Majesty may be proud. I am quite sure that no people could have done what the trek Boers have done during the past thirty years, without having the materials of a great people among them; but they have hitherto had scant justice done them by either friends or detractors.

"Shepstone's position in the Transvaal is a very difficult one. The Boers do not read Blue-books, but they have long memories, and as the embodiment of Natal native policy, and protector of Cetywayo in his opposition to Boer extension, he had much lee-way to make up. He is now the advocate, very properly, of all Transvaal interests, but this very constantly leads him into positions inconsistent with his former views, when representing the Natal Government, and you will see that I have sometimes had to remind him as well as Natal officials that we are now here on Her Majesty's service, and not on duty exclusively interesting either Natal or Transvaal.

"In a week or two I hope we may be able to give you some certain facts indicating what course the Zulus and Cetywayo are likely to take. At present nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions of the best-informed authorities. The only points on which all seem to agree are that the great majority of the people long for quiet, and for some sort of security for their lives and property; that the King's young regiments believe themselves invincible and will oppose any concession, and that Cetywayo will make none except from fear, for no man has ever yet told me of his doing a single act of justice, mercy, or good aith.

"I hope you will bear in mind that we had fairly taken the wolf by the ears long before we had any reason to suppose that the present was not the most opportune time for taking him in hand. If we had not done so he would certainly have taken us by the hand, or rather by the throat, in a very few months; but certainly for the last twelve months there has been no possibility of receding. The idea that the white races were not invincible, and that

a Kaffir empire like that of Chaka might yet be restored by reverting to Chaka's policy of slaughter and extermination of all enemies, dates further back. It is at least as old as the first acquisition of guns on a great scale by Kaffirs and Zulus after the discovery of the diamond-fields, and the unwise relaxations of restrictions on the gun and powder trade. But certainly for the last two years it has been impossible for us to decline the contest."

It was said then and afterwards that a border raid by savages, the killing of two women, the insult to an official, the violation of the Transvaal frontier, were small matters for which to exact amends under threat of war. It was for no such causes in themselves that the demands were made. These outrages were the latest indications of the temper and disposition of Cetywayo towards the white man, and of the hostile attitude which, since his coronation, and especially during the last two years, had made his growing power a standing menace to the safety of the neighbouring provinces, and a rallying-point for the rebellious and disaffected natives throughout South Africa. The seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on neutral territory and his execution in the ditch of a French fortress is pointed to as one of the most flagrant breaches of international law committed by Napoleon. But it was not revenge for such an act as this ; it was fear of the consequences to Europe of the power and will which dictated it, which made Europe content to be bathed in blood rather than leave Napoleon dominant. The gist and essence of the Ultimatum to Cetywayo—to which the other demands were but corollaries—was the demand for the abolition of the military system which enforced celibacy until the spears were washed, and which made aggressive war sooner or later a necessity for him. As long as the Transvaal was independent this menace had not been directed mainly, much less exclusively, against the British

(the ceremony of firing volleys over the grave being dispensed with), but not a soul who could attend of the thousands living in and around Jacobabad was absent. His own stout soldiers and the wild Belooch borderers were alike unmanned as they carried him to his grave, and none of his older officers could trust themselves to read the Funeral Service, which was read by Captain King.

“The Belooch say that they are glad now that, as his time is come, he did remain among them and is buried there, as his spirit will now be always with them. . . .

“In a will dated a few months back, he left all he possessed to Merewether, as his senior lieutenant.”

Major Green, in his despatch describing the expedition against the Murrees, says :—

“The death of General Jacob added much to the difficulties of the undertaking. For fifteen years he had ruled these people ; his name only was known, feared, and respected as no other ever had been, or ever will be ; the enormous influence he exercised over these barbarians was even unknown to himself, nor could I have believed that any one man could, unseen, exert such influence, unless eighteen months of the most intimate personal acquaintance with all these border tribes, from Mekran to the furthest recesses of the Mari hills, had rendered the fact beyond doubt.”

Thus lived and died at his post in the wilderness, careless of fame or ease, this great soldier genius, whose presence in life, and whose name after death, were a symbol and a message of peace, order, and goodwill from the great Queen in the West to the wild warrior shepherds of her Indian Frontier.

CHAPTER VIII.

RECONSTRUCTION.

Religious teaching in Government schools—Principles of administration—Proportion and organization of native army—Nuggur Parkur—Frere appointed to the Supreme Council at Calcutta—Leaves Sind.

THE destructive force of the Mutiny had shaken to its foundations the whole fabric of English Government in India. Stunned and dazed by the magnitude of the calamity, by the spectacle of a great army suddenly dissolved or in armed mutiny, and bewildered by the chaos of anarchy which, in a vast tract of country, had superseded all law and government, men began to question whether the principles on which they had been working had not been wholly in fault, and were groping in the dark for a truer and juster foundation on which to begin the work of reconstruction.

A great convulsion reveals the hidden strata that underlie the surface; and it was seen that the first question on which all others rest was that of religion. We were a Christian nation, it was truly said, bound as a first duty to be true to our religion. If we were not true to it, God would surely punish us. And in some way or other, doubtless, this very Mutiny had been a punishment, a judgment on us for doing wrong. But how? Wherein had we as a nation and as a Government

gone astray, and been unfaithful to our principles? What attitude ought our countrymen as Christians, and our Government as a Christian Government, to maintain towards the overwhelming multitudes belonging to other religions?

It was at this point that opinions diverged, according to the different conceptions of what Christianity is, and what it inculcates. The Directors' Minute of 1854, on the question of the attitude of Government to Christianity and the native religions, which had received the deliberate approval of men of strong religious feeling in England as well as in India, had been hitherto generally considered as conclusive and final. But it was now challenged as an unworthy concession to expediency. It was urged that faithful allegiance to Christianity involved a condemnation of all other religions as being absolutely and fundamentally false, and to be extirpated by all lawful means.

Those who thought thus, maintained that Government had failed in its duty, and had, doubtless, brought a judgment and a punishment from above, by its slackness in upholding the one true religion and in condemning all others as false; and that the only limit to its efforts to gain converts should be a manifest impossibility, as shown by circumstances. The successful vindication of our authority after the Mutiny should be made, they said, the occasion of a more or less combative and hostile attitude towards other religions; we should henceforward give an official support to Christianity, and enter upon a proselytizing policy in support of it, as far as it was possible to do so without using force or fraud.

These extreme views found an ardent exponent in Colonel Herbert Edwardes, whose great ability, distinguished services, and high, unblemished character gave prominence and importance to all that he wrote. He

issued a memorandum on "the elimination of all unchristian principles from the Government of India." Among the "unchristian elements" in our policy, to which he objected, were the exclusion of the Bible and of Christian teaching from Government schools, the endowment of native religions from the revenue, the recognition of caste, the observance of native holidays in the public offices, the administration of Hindu and Mahomedan law, Hindu and Mahomedan processions, and the connection of Government with the opium trade.

Sir John Lawrence had, in theory at least, a good deal of sympathy with Edwardes's views. But his bent was too severely practical to allow him to be led into advocating a course of conduct which, though perhaps logically arising out of his religious theory, was dangerous or impossible in practice. He wrote a long memorandum, expressing agreement on some points with Edwardes, but on the whole combating his views.

Frere differed from both of them. His theory contained nothing with which it was difficult for his practice to harmonize.

First, an instance of his practice.

In March, 1858, a Mahomedan presented a petition to him complaining of an inscription posted up by Mr. Gell, a chaplain, on the wall of the shop of Mr. Matchett, a missionary, in the main bazaar at Hydrabad, and containing, as he stated, a gratuitous insult to all Mahomedans. The placard was sent for, and was found to contain the assertion—for which it proffered a proof—that Mahomet was no true prophet. Frere wrote a civil letter to Mr. Gell, saying that he did not question the truth of the inscription, but objected to it—as he would to a denunciation of the Pope placarded in Limerick, or to abuse of Calvinism in Edinburgh—because it was likely to be understood by

The discontent among the Boers was now so great that it was doubtful what part they would take in the event of war between the British and Zulus. Colonel Evelyn Wood, on December 4, addressed a meeting of them at Utrecht, at which they repeated their grievances, and he so far satisfied them that, after discussion, many of them agreed to serve with him in case of war, on being paid five shillings a day with rations and ammunition.

The second Transvaal deputation to England, Messrs Krüger, P. Joubert, and E. Bok, arrived at Maritzburg on their return, on November 28. Frere had an interview with them and explained to them very fully how they would be able to enjoy perfect freedom and independence as to local matters as a province of the South African Union under the British flag; and that the form of their provincial government would be fully discussed at his intended visit, when he would give them every opportunity of stating their views and wishes. They were very favourably impressed with him personally. Of Krüger Frere entertained a good opinion, and considered that he conducted affairs on the part of the Transvaal with ability and fairness; though he, too, at the time of the annexation, had taken steps privately, as appeared from a letter afterwards found in the Government office, to obtain some post under the British Government.

Frere had written to England, supporting and pressing Lord Chelmsford's demand for reinforcements, on September 10; and again on September 14; and on the 23rd he writes again: "The urgency of supporting Thesiger's request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust there will be no delay." On the 30th of the same month he had written: "The position of affairs is far more critical than I expected. . . . We shall want *all* the troops asked for." And to ensure compliance with Lord Chelmsford's

request, he wrote at the same time privately to Mr. Robert Herbert at the Colonial Office.

“September 30, 1878.

“I have only time to beg you to read, as soon as you can, my official despatch by this mail and to move the Cabinet by all means in your power to send out the reinforcements Thesiger asks for. . . .”

And to Sir M. Hicks-Beach he writes—

“October 27.

“My official despatches will show you that the prospects of peace are fainter than ever. The forbearance of the Lieutenant-Governor has been tried to the utmost by the insolent answers and menacing attitude of the Zulu Chief, and but for the drought which impartially hampers both friend and foe, we should, I think, have had a collision as soon as the Zulus heard of Colonel Rowland's withdrawal from his operations near Lydenburg, which have been watched by Zulus as well as Boers as a test of power.” *

And again on October 28 :—

“I can only repeat my own conviction that the continued preservation of peace depends no longer on what the servants of the British Government here may do or abstain from doing, but simply on the caprice of an ignorant and bloodthirsty despot, with an organized force of at least forty thousand armed men at his absolute command.”

Up to the time of Lord Carnarvon's resignation, Frere's action and policy had been cordially accepted and endorsed by him. So long ago as December 19, 1877, Frere had written to him: “Your object is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This will have to be asserted some day and the assertion will not become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by postponing the trial if we

* Colonel Rowland's expedition against Secocoeni had been frustrated by drought and horse sickness.

conviction that this progress will be interrupted if, abandoning our own principles as we understand and would wish them applied among ourselves, we rely on the temporal power of Government to influence the natives in matters of belief. Disguise it as we may, this is what Government Bible classes come to, and setting aside all practical difficulties and risks of temporal danger, I cannot see how we can, as Christians, defend in India a course which in England we should condemn as ineffectual for the promotion of true religion, even if it were not denounced as impious to attempt it.

On the same subject he writes to Lord Goderich :—

“January 4, 1859.

“If India were converted the gain would be cheaply purchased by the loss of our Empire in India. But I cannot see how we can hope for such a result as a large number of real converts, if we violate the very first principles of Christian toleration. Sir J. Lawrence seems to me to start in error by considering ‘What can we safely *force* the native to submit to?’ instead of ‘What have we, as the power placed over them by God, a right to expect them to submit to?’ It is all very well to say that we know ourselves to be right, and that we cannot be wrong in using our power to enforce our own conscientious convictions. So said the Inquisition and all religious persecutors from the days of Saul of Tarsus down to our own. But there can be no safe rule of guidance for a Christian Government different from that of a Christian individual—to do as we would be done by. And what Colonel Edwardes and Sir J. Lawrence would do is just what we would ourselves resist to the death if attempted on us or our children—not by Hindoos or Moslems, but by a Roman Catholic or Greek autocrat.

“I hold entirely with the principles which guided the late Sir Robert Grant in this matter, and I have in vain sought for some of his minutes and letters on the subject, which have for the past twenty years been our rule on this side of India, and which are very different from what seems to have been the practice elsewhere in India.

“Sir Robert Grant was a far more zealous and efficient promoter of missions than any one I have seen in high office out here, and one of the most popular among natives

of every creed and class—a result I always attributed to the thoroughly Christian and tolerant spirit which shone out in every act and word. . . .

“As regards the points of difference between Sir John Lawrence and Mr. Arnold, I entirely hold with the views of the latter as I gather them from Sir John’s letter. . . .

“If we strictly adhere to our Christian principles, I firmly believe that the glory of bringing India within Christ’s fold may yet be ours ere many more generations have passed away.

“I have written in great haste and amid much interruption, wishing all the time I had been able to enter more fully into this most important subject.”

He writes again to Lord Goderich :—

“January 5, 1859.

“In my hurried letter yesterday . . . I forgot to say what it seems to me it is our duty to do.

“First, as to education. It seems to me an enormous error to lay it down as any part of the duty of any conceivable Government of India, English or Russian, Moslem or Hindoo, in this year 1859, or even in this century, to educate its subjects generally. You have no money, you have no plan, nor are your great parties agreed as to any possible plan for such an undertaking, which no other great Government in the world has ever attempted with success.

“But you can and you ought to assist the people to educate themselves, and as far as they require and will accept your help, so far to the very limited extent allowed by an empty exchequer you are bound as a Government to help them. It has always seemed to me that the Court of Directors, in their despatch on education, sanctioning grants-in-aid, laid down very nearly, if not exactly, the right and only practicable course for our Government in this matter. The policy directed in that despatch was never fairly worked, and I do not think we could now do better than go back to it. Divide the whole sum you can annually spare for the purpose, so much for each province, and let each do its best with the means so allowed, according to the principles laid down in the despatch, with a few rules added to ensure the first grant being made to the most urgent need.

“I believe with Lord Ellenborough that the most urgent need would often be found to exist among the higher classes, and I would not take poverty as the only test of need. I would also let the experiment of Government education in its strictest sense be tried among Bheels, coolies, and other races, where the good effected must be great, and where absolutely no objection to it can be urged. There are hundreds of thousands of such people in India, and when you have really succeeded with them, you can try the more difficult task of educating people who already know what education means, and have their own ideas as to what they want in the way of education.

“With regard to missions, I hold that all that is required from Government is to leave them alone, and I look on any Government enterprise or support as in the last degree mischievous.

“Let the Government of this world keep the peace and do justice and mercy to the best of its power, and rule the people so that peace and plenty may prevail through the land, but let not Government presume to dictate to any of the meanest of its subjects what he shall believe, or, however indirectly, to bribe or coerce him into any particular form of belief. . . .

“I do not mean, however, that Government should be indifferent or idle in matters relating to religion. First let us set our own house in order, and remove the reproach universally and most truly cast against us by all native opponents—‘You spend thousands of pounds to convert one low caste Hindoo, but you do not move a finger to prevent your soldiers and sailors being examples of the grossest vices in every bazaar they frequent. You leave the poor Christians of all classes and creeds wholly uncared for, while a Mahomedan who changes his religion is sure to make his fortune.’ Let us first, by our barrack arrangements and sailors’ homes, make our soldiers and sailors as decent and well-conducted in externals as possible, and give them the same opportunities in the way of pastoral aid as the poor in a well-ordered community in Europe. Let us give similar benefits to the thousands of poor Christians who, as clerks, cooks, and in other capacities, are found in great numbers in every station, and who are now almost universally and totally neglected.

“This is little apparently to ask, but it would require the services of many hundred clergymen—Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Roman Catholic—to enable Government to do its duty in this respect to its own servants.

“I never met any earnest or thoughtful missionary, or religious Christian of any kind who had the means of knowing, who did not allow that Government might by such means effect more than armies of missionaries could, humanly speaking, hope to effect in centuries, as long as the great body of professing Christians in the country are a visible and practical refutation of half the arguments the missionary urges on his native opponent.”

In an undated fragment, Frere writes :—

“I think the note of Principal Ray expresses more clearly and concisely than anything I could write the conclusions at which I have arrived as to the extent to which Government may and ought to comply with the demand that Bible-classes should be permitted in connection with Government schools, viz. that permission should be given to every teacher in a Government school who wishes to teach a *private* class to *volunteers, elsewhere* than in the Government school-room. . . .

“But it is to be observed, first, that this permission is already virtually accorded. At all events, it never, as far as I know, has been, or can be denied to any who choose to assume it. And, secondly, that it does not meet the wishes of those who have taken the most active part in bringing this question forward. . . .

“I trust you will not press on the Government of India, nor authorize if it is proposed to you, any official sanction of the employment of Government teachers in expounding the Bible to their scholars. . . .

“Your Government teachers in this country may be divided into three classes :

1. “A few men to whom any religious-minded Christian who agreed with them on devotional points would gladly entrust the education of his own children. How many are there of this class? And how many of them to whom a moderate but sincere High or Low Churchman, or Presbyterian, or Roman Catholic, would conscientiously give permission to teach religion to their own scholars ?

2. "There is a much larger number of nominal Christians, who do not entirely disbelieve Christ, but who will teach what they are told to teach—much or little Christianity, of any particular complexion which may be ordered—High or Low, Calvinistic or Roman Catholic. Will their teaching do any real good? Just at present, rightly or wrongly, they will believe that it will be for their own good to teach as much as they can with a leaning to Calvinism, and to show as much result as possible in the shape of applicants for further information and missionary teaching.

"What will be the religious results of such men's teaching? What would they be in England or Ireland? What must they be among a people subtle and naturally inclined to dissemble, and who are but too prone to let the end sanctify the means, in advancing their worldly interests?

3. "But the largest class of all are men who do not profess to believe Christianity—some, baptized Christians but sceptics; many more, professed Hindoos, Mahomedans, and other unbaptized unbelievers in Christianity. Can any sincere Christian contemplate the enforced reading and exposition of the Bible to Hindoo and Mahomedan boys, by men of this class, without a shudder? It may be said it is not enforced, but voluntary; but if they know, as they will certainly presume, that their promotion in the department depends on their making a show of teaching, many of them will make such a show, and their misrepresentations, whether honest or dishonest, must do more harm than good. A scoffing, sceptical teaching of the Bible by such men must be many times worse than no teaching at all.

"But take the next case—an honest and competent teaching by a man who believes and is capable of teaching Christianity. Have we any right to make such teaching a part of the system in Government schools?

"It may be said, it is no part of the system, it is simply permitted.

"But I maintain what is expressly permitted and encouraged by the Government is a part of the Government system.

"How would it be in Ireland if a Government with an Orange Lord-Lieutenant were to permit the Protestant

teachers in Government colleges to use their lecture-rooms for religious lectures to their R. C. pupils out of college hours! Would any one believe in the really voluntary character of teaching or learning?"

The rule of the old East India Company was drawing to an end. A Government Bill, assented to in its general principle by the Opposition, had been introduced into Parliament, transferring its possessions and authority to the Crown. The systems and methods of Government in India were in the melting pot, destined to take new forms and shapes, and statesmen and others in England who were likely to have a hand in the work were seeking for information and guidance as to the principles on which the new foundations should be laid. The following letters, written in such intervals as he could snatch in the pressure of his work, give Frere's views and convictions on some of the leading questions involved in the work of reconstruction.

He writes to Lord Goderich :—

“ June 15, 1858.

“ Your questions embrace a wide range. Of the causes of the Mutiny, you will find those which affected the army well set forth in the writings of General John Jacob, and if you do not quote the opinions as *his*, nor make special reference to Bengal, you will find most men of real experience even in the Bengal army agree with him, but such men are fewer than you might suppose, and length of service is no test of experience. We tried to centralize the management of an army dispersed in peace over a country half as large as Europe, the greater part of the army being never seen for years together by any one in real military authority. Our centralization was not by officers, but by departments, and was a purely paper system. We carefully destroyed all individual authority, till it is really no exaggeration to say that, except the adjutant of his regiment and the Adjutant-General of the army, there was no single officer, from the Commander-in-

Chief downwards, whose good or bad opinion was of any consequence to the individual sepoy, in pay, promotion, or anything else affecting his material well-being. For many years past the Bengal army has been practically an army without officers, and but for the innate, tractable character of the material, would have mutinied long ago, as any mercenary army will when they think they have the power to do as they please. The remedy seems to me a most simple one. I do not say easy, for it is impossible to calculate the power of prejudice. Abandon the idea of assimilation to any single pattern. . . . Require personal knowledge and inspection of his charge from every officer, whatever his grade, and you would very soon have an army far better than you have lost. The material you have is the best in India, and you need not go out of India to seek better, for it is excellent. It is our treatment of it which has spoilt it. You would require fewer officers, and could afford to pay them well. Such a system is that advocated by General Jacob. It is the best I have ever seen or heard of in theory or practice. But I do not say it is the only good one, and I would discard the idea of any single system applicable to all India. Every province half as large as France and every army of twenty thousand men ought to be allowed to differ widely in details of system from other provinces and armies. Yet we tried to enforce exact uniformity throughout an army of 150,000 men. Of course such uniformity can, from the nature of things, only be apparent. You must already have seen the mistake of supposing that we can hold India by European troops alone, and you will soon, if I am not mistaken, see the error of all plans for foreign mercenaries—Malay, African, etc. I do not think we have lost the art of governing India mainly by native agency, and you may rest assured you cannot long govern two hundred millions by any other.

“Our mistakes in Civil Government have been of much the same character as those we have made in military affairs, ending in the destruction of all individual and local authority and responsibility. Our form of government must necessarily be despotic; a good, vigorous despotism, in which the risks of tyranny and arbitrary oppression are minimized, is one in which the despot is accessible—that is, when every man sees, knows, and can

appeal to his own despot, to some one who can, if he please, redress his grievance by some act of individual power, in which all affairs of merely local import are managed locally, and where usage or common law rules in most things. Our system has been the reverse of all this, at least in what are called our Regulation Provinces. A native in a distant district can hardly find any man who can do him any good by an act of power. We have enveloped ourselves in rules and regulations till we have left ourselves no power of individual action. We have guarded ourselves against doing evil till we have left no power of doing good. Usage, custom, and common sense go for nothing against a circular or rule of some distant court. Our legislature is away in a corner at Calcutta, composed of a few elderly Government functionaries, inaccessible to public opinion, and necessarily unacquainted with four-fifths of the country for which they legislate. And then we wonder that their laws are not better than the crude edicts, which in former days each province framed for itself. One of the worst consequences of the absence of local legal authority is that unscrupulous men usurp illegal authority, and this is one great cause of the misconduct charged against our native officials. They would be far less tyrannical if they had more legal power and greater responsibility to their immediate superiors.

“Here again the remedy is very simple, though not easy, for it is opposed, not only to existing habits and prejudices, but to all our English ideas of government, though singularly enough not to our habits of business and modes of managing great private and commercial affairs. Centralize by individuals, not by departments. Throughout your whole machine of government, from the head of the village up through heads of districts and provinces, up to the Governor-General, let every official be a real ruler in all things to those below him, and let him be really ruled by the functionary above him. The changes you will have to make will not be really so many as you may imagine. It will be simply a general return to a mode of government once very common and still existent in many provinces. You may have heard of the excellent administration of Nagpore under Sir Richard Jenkins, or of Sattara under Captain Grant Duff. The

great secret of their success was that they were men well selected, and ruled on the plan I have described. . . .

“ I think you might avoid all difficulty about patronage if you will adhere to the Company’s rule, which was to keep jealously in England the right of selecting the raw material for your officials, and leave entirely to the Governments in India the power of selection and promotion after they are once appointed. The former rule excludes broken-down dandies and insolvents, who now so often take refuge in a Government Colonial appointment. The latter prevents much jobbing which can hurt the public service. Provided the lads who go out as future officers or civil servants are not meanly born or basely bred, it is really of very little consequence whether they are selected by Directors or by a Minister. Of course, the better the birth and the breeding, the greater chance of turning out the lad a credit to his country and a blessing to India. But the qualifications you most want are found more or less invariably in all classes above those whose connections and pursuits are really sordid and debasing. It is, as far as India is concerned, a matter of very little moment whether the boy is sent out selected by competitive examination, or as an act of private favour, or in return for votes at an election. But it is of great importance to India that his career in India should depend entirely on the character he makes for himself after he comes out, and that it should not be affected by the home interest of his connections. I think we have made a great mistake in making intellectual power the sole passport to the Civil Service. Our superiority over the natives is less intellectual than moral, and your best Indian rulers, like your best public men everywhere, are not always those who would send in the best papers at an examination for a degree. Of course the higher the intellect and the better the education, the more useful the public servant, if he has the necessary moral qualities also. But what you want in India is a high-spirited, kind-hearted, active-minded, modest, conscientious English youth. And it is really of more moment to the natives that he should be good in the cricket-field and on horseback, popular with servants and the poor, and the champion of bullied fags ; that he should have a mother who taught him to say his prayers, and sisters who helped her to give him love and reverence for womankind and respect for weakness,

than that he should be fit to take a double-first at Oxford.

“ I have written at intervals a very disjointed letter, and have not touched on half the topics indicated by you, and not even the most momentous question of all: How are we to restore the mutual confidence and good feeling between races now in so many provinces bitterly incensed against each other? It can hardly be done by rule; and our doctrinaire philosophers, who are answerable for half the mischief which has happened, will only make matters worse. But much may be done by personal power and influence, if you trust good men. God forbid I should palliate the atrocities which have been committed so widely throughout the revolted provinces! but the question which occurs to me, and which none of our violent declaimers can answer, is, What so changed the conduct of men, who for so many generations treated us as if we had been tabooed as a sacred rather than as an alien race? It is, I fear, true that we are hated in many a wide province; but why? It is not usual for even the worst of men to hate those who they really believe wish them well.

“ You may say, What are the tests for securing good recruits for the Indian Service? How would I ascertain the moral qualities? I reply that they are generally found in four out of five lads taken from the middle or upper classes at random, and perhaps more generally in lads taken at random than in lads selected for intellectual proficiency. You must not suppose I undervalue intellectual acquirement, but it is a fact that some of our most useless and unpopular men among the natives are the very men whose intellectual powers are of a very superior order, their unpopularity proceeding from their conceit and the ruthless manner in which they follow out a favourite theory when they get the power. You must recollect that our despots here rise by their place in the calendar, not as in Turkey or in France, where a man who would rise to power must, among other things, exert his power of pleasing. You find your doctrinaire philosophers in London ride a hobby to death. But in London they are kept in order by checks and opposition in a thousand forms. Imagine how the same men would ride their hobbies, when invested with despotic power, over a million or two of Indian peasants. It is such men who upset

native tenures, turn native society topsy-turvy, and with the best intentions drive a whole people to mad revolt, when [whereas] General Sleeman, who wrote very indifferent English and had little notion of science, art, or literature, was worshipped simply on account of his kindly nature and the sympathy which the people knew he felt for them."

The Court of Directors issued a despatch, dated November 25, 1857, as to the reorganization of the Indian army, in reference to which a list of questions was framed and sent round to various officials for their replies. The heads of inquiry were classed as—

1. The recruiting and composition of corps.
2. The military code and rules of discipline.
3. Organization, promotion, and rewards.
4. European officers.

Frere answered them fully, and also wrote a letter to Colonel Durand, who was in charge of the inquiry. Several persons having asked for copies of his answers, he had them printed in a pamphlet of a hundred and sixty pages. Sending some copies of this pamphlet to Sir George Clerk, then in England, he says :—

"January 16, 1859.

"I would be very glad to know how far you agree with what I have said. It is quite certain that we cannot keep up our present military expenditure, and I am quite sure that it is not needed, if we would but govern instead of dragooning the people. If you could send us a few of the Malcolms, Metcalfes, and Elphinstones, and come back yourself, I would engage to reduce the military estimates to little more than those of 1838.

"It seems to me utterly impossible that our present system of holding the country with European detachments scattered over it can be persevered in, without the destruction of all discipline, and an aggravation of the feeling of general distrust, which makes Englishmen as well as natives suppose that a detachment of Europeans is necessary at almost every station. . . .

“If we would avoid the necessity which obliged England to cast off her American colonies, we *must* continue to govern our own Indian provinces hereafter, as we have generally done heretofore, through the respect and with the consent of the natives, and to trust for the general maintenance of internal peace to our police. A conviction of our superior military power is one necessary element of real respect ; but such respect derives its greatest strength from a belief in our superior wisdom, justice, and moderation, and is something very different from the simple conviction of our superior brute force, on which it is now so much the fashion to recommend reliance. . . .

“It is, I believe, a fashionable theory that railways, electric telegraphs, and similar appliances render it easier for a Central Government to control its distant subordinates, and safer to exercise that power. So far from this being the case, they seem to me to render it necessary to concede formally greater power to officers at a distance, and to impose heavier responsibilities, because the facility of reference holds out a temptation to refer instead of acting, which did not exist before. On the other hand, the facilities of communication greatly diminish the danger of entrusting despotic powers to men at a distance, owing to the greater publicity which such facilities ensure and the increased ease with which aggrieved parties can seek redress at the hands of the Central Government.

“The English soldier comes of races habituated to self-government, and you can only get good recruits, in large numbers, by letting them see that, however ill-paid and undesirable the service is in some respects, the soldier has still rights of his own. The non-military classes in England would not, with their eyes open, tolerate payment for an army of their own countrymen, ruled on purely despotic principles ; the Articles of War give to the engagement between the soldier and the State some semblance of a voluntary compact. . . .

“Asiatic soldiers, on the other hand, come of races habituated to despotic government, and in the dealings of a State with its servants and subjects, they understand and can appreciate no other. The grant of rights which they can enforce against their Sovereign and employer simply puzzles them, and a Code, like the Articles of War, and Army Regulations, by giving rise to vague notions of

some ill-understood rights, which some unknown authority is apparently suspected of wishing to subvert, creates a vague feeling of suspicion and discontent. Natives much prefer serving under a master whose wishes and temper, once understood, are to them a law and rule of conduct, of which they know the exact provisions and obligations. An Englishman asks, 'What are my rights and duties?' The Asiatic guesses what they will be by the answer to his question, which is always, 'Who is my master?' And with all the intricacies and divided responsibilities of our present system, this is a question to which he can rarely get a clear and decided answer. In some respects his Adjutant or Commanding Officer, the Brigadier or Adjutant-General, the Commander-in-Chief or Governor in Council, are all more or less his masters; but he can never clearly understand the exact relation of each authority to the other, still less can he find the one master whose will to him is law, for he still perceives behind the Government itself some power which prevents the Government from being absolutely despotic.

"That the natives infinitely prefer the individual despotism is clear from the preference they always show for it, when the two forms of subordination are presented to their choice. Service in an Irregular Corps is always preferred to a Regular one; and no one can deal long with natives without finding that they prefer serving a man they know and can trust, and that they will rely on his arbitrary will, rather than get the most binding charter of rights that was ever written on paper by a man whom they do not know.

"In all that General Jacob has written and published on this subject I most fully agree. Rules and laws of some kind there must be, but they should be confined to a definition of 'Who is to be obeyed?' The authority of the immediate commanding officer should be made supreme over all natives who are placed under his orders, to the extent of dismissing them from the service; and he should be held strictly responsible to the commanding officer, up to the commander-in-chief, for the mode in which the authority so given is exercised. But the responsibility should be always retrospective in the shape of praise or blame for what is done, and should never involve the necessity for previous sanction. . . .

"I entirely concur in what has been recorded by many eminent authorities, and especially by General Jacob, as to the absolute necessity, if we would keep India, that we should allow none but educated European gentlemen, in feeling and principles, and, if possible, by birth and station, to have any immediate connection as officers with our native army. . . .

"As far as my observation goes, I should say the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men greatly added to, if it be not essential to, the full influence of good European officers. I cannot see how the legitimate influence of the European officer could be communicated to the men generally without the intervention of the native officers. . . .

"In all the cases—three in number—in Sind, which came under my personal observation, the native officers gave information of the disaffection of their men. In each case the information was given in time to prevent a successful rising. . . . In the Sind Horse, under great and continued temptation, the native officers behaved with exemplary fidelity as well as intelligence. No mutiny took place where they were quartered, but they aided to obtain information of an intended rising of the frontier tribes, and to arrest the ringleaders exactly as European officers with the same opportunities might have done. . . .

"Native officers should be continued very much as at present, but they should be differently treated. The number of European officers with a native corps should be diminished ; they should be all selected men. The work of officers of companies should all be done by the native officers. . . .

"Our best native officers and soldiers do not serve simply for pay, but for distinction, and would not enter at all if debarred promotion to posts of influence and honour.

"Native soldiers are absolutely necessary to the efficiency of a European force, in hot weather, and for services which are better performed by natives than by Europeans. What further proportion of the cheaper and more accessible native element may you add to your army without impairing its efficiency for general military service ?

"Judging from late experience, it is difficult to provide efficiently for all the duties of a large army in the field

during a protracted campaign in India without nearly as many native as European troops. One half may therefore be taken as the minimum proportion which native troops should bear to Europeans, and which it would be desirable to have even if the difference in cost and difficulty of providing Europeans were not greater than that of providing natives. . . . Three to one is about the ratio which I should consider natives should bear to Europeans in order to give us the most efficient army which could be kept up for any given sum. A larger proportion of Europeans would give more than you require of the most costly element in your army ; a smaller one might reduce too low the element which is most formidable in a general action.

“But the proportion would vary in the different arms. In the artillery, the backbone of the army, the advantage of having Europeans, great utility of individual muscular power, and many other reasons, comparatively greater, and the drawbacks fewer than in other arms ; and therefore, in the artillery, Europeans should so far preponderate that there should always be at least sufficient to work every gun ; save in very rare, exceptional cases where (as on the Sind frontier) it is altogether impossible to keep Europeans permanently stationed. In the cavalry the advantages of employing Europeans are at a minimum, and a very small proportion of them will suffice : one of the principal reasons being that European dragoons can never, in this country, dispense with their grass-cutters and other followers who are necessarily on foot, and thus Europeans, as cavalry, lose much of the superior celerity and independence and other natural advantages of cavalry as compared with infantry ; and the advantage of employing the more costly European for such service is much lessened. . . .

“I cannot but think that any attempt to assimilate the Indian armies to each other, beyond those points in which similarity is of practical importance in the field, must hasten the deterioration of the whole body. The course I would in preference most strongly recommend is the direct reverse of assimilation and amalgamation. The unwieldy size of our Bengal Native army was no doubt one element of its ruin, by precluding any officer, but more especially the Commander-in-Chief, with his five years' tenure of office, from gaining even a general know-

ledge of the whole body. It seems to me that our Indian forces should be re-divided into at least four, if not more, armies, so as to admit of a really active Commander-in-Chief gaining a general knowledge of the whole body under his command; and the utmost latitude in organization should be allowed to local authorities within the limits imposed, by a due regard for the finances of the Empire. . . .

“It is doubtless desirable that the rates of pay for similar arms should be, in some respects, similar; yet this must be subject to many local variations. . . . The best military races in India, who will serve for seven rupees in the valley of the Ganges, or at the Nizam’s Hydrabad, will not voluntarily take service in Sind on ten rupees; and the irregular cavalry soldier who finds twenty rupees enough for himself and his horse in one part of India, would starve on thirty rupees in another. . . .

“The diversities of national character in our Indian army are at least as great as among the nations of Europe; and the Oude or Seikh sepoy, the Affreedee and the Goorkha, have each their favourite mode of fighting; and some of them must act to disadvantage, if all are compelled to adopt any one uniform mode of formation.

“It must be borne in mind that the whole army of the Indus is essentially a frontier army, facing, in close proximity, warlike and aggressive nations, who have twice successfully invaded India since we first gained territorial footing on the Continent, and who boast themselves prepared to repeat the attempt whenever it suits them, while they are daily becoming more subject to those military and political influences which affect the great family of European nations. Whatever we may think of its possibility or its chance of success, an invasion of India is a common topic of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and Peshawur, the day-dream of more than one Sovereign Prince, and a subject of more or less thought and reflection to every one who aspires to be a successful soldier. There can be no doubt of the grave results which must follow any advance of our armies beyond our present frontier. But if we would avoid inviting aggression or combinations which may force us to advance in self-defence, we must be better prepared than we have been during the last ten years, and our

frontier army must not only be in numbers sufficient to render attack hopeless, but it must always be ready for the field. If we would preserve peace, every corps and every station west of the Indus should be permanently on a footing prepared for immediate war."

All this time, while statesmen and administrators were planning and reconstructing, the danger was far from being over; there was widespread disorder and demoralization, and hard fighting was going on intermittently all over Northern India. So late as June, 1858, Sir John Lawrence writes to Lord Stanley, that the condition of things was worse than it had yet been since the fall of Delhi, nine months before. The mutineers, defeated and dispersed, had spread themselves over the country, coercing the natives into rebellion as they found opportunity, and accustoming them to a condition of plunder and rapine, while the Europeans became exasperated into an attitude of bitter race-hatred, which too often disinclined them to be just, reasonable, or merciful, or to exercise discrimination between mutineers or murderers, and those who had been coerced into joining their ranks, thus banding together the innocent and the guilty in rebellion. The want of reliable native troops, especially in the hot weather, was greatly felt throughout Bengal, for the Europeans could not act efficiently without their co-operation, and could not move rapidly enough to follow up their successes.

Frere writes:—

"I have just read in the *Lahore Chronicle* of the 18th, an account of proceedings at Allahabad, so circumstantial that one can hardly doubt its general accuracy; but the state of demoralization and disorder it reveals is quite astounding. It is extracted from the *Englishman*, and as the Punjab Government exercises a strict surveillance over the Press, and 'does not allow alarming news to

be disseminated,' one wonders what can be the character of what is suppressed. The men seem to have been guilty of every kind of mutinous and disorderly conduct short of shooting at their officers (they did fire with ball-cartridge into their compounds and over their houses) and plundering the station. Yet it is spoken of as if it were less extraordinary than an election riot, or a collision between marines and dockyard men at Portsmouth.

"It seems to me that however wise and firm the conduct of Government may be in the final settlement of this question, the mischief is done if such conduct go unpunished."

East of Kurrachee, in the south-east corner of Sind, and lying between Rajpootana and the sea, is the district of Nuggur Parkur. Remote, and distant from any important line of communication, it had been hitherto in a backward, unimproved condition, and afforded ample scope for the energies of Tyrwhitt, its Deputy-Collector, the officer who had distinguished himself at the outbreak of the Mutiny by re-establishing the line of communication between the Punjab and Agra. In a letter to Sir George Clerk, Frere describes what was going on there. This description and that of the subsequent outbreak illustrate Frere's administration in a peaceful and in a troubled time.*

"February 1, 1859.

"I have time for a very few lines, but do not like to miss an opportunity of telling you how pleased I have been with these districts which are young Tyrwhitt's charge. It is four years since I was last through them, and he was just setting to work with little to guide him but a good heart, sound sense, and great energy, which he has turned

* In giving the following description, it is not meant to distinguish the administration of Nuggur Parkur as of *exceptional* excellence among districts in Sind managed by such a band of able and laborious workers as Goldsmid, Currey, Ellis, Marston, Ford, Steuart and others, but rather to give an instance of Frere's power of developing qualities in men in whom they had not previously been displayed.

more to road clearing, building, and more especially to canal digging and land settlement than to the present fashionable occupations of hanging and village burning. Not but that he had to use the sword of justice, too, at starting, for the people were wild and half savage, and used to live by cattle lifting nearly as much as by labour, and you may recollect his chase after Ruthensing Soda, a cateran who had rebelled under Sir Charles, been bought off and pensioned, and who shot the first Kardar of Tyrwhitt's who tried to introduce something like security and good government into the desert. But having fairly run Ruthensing down and shown the border thieves that he could ride farther and faster than they could, Tyrwhitt saw that penury and insecurity of life and property were at the root of the evil. I have not yet in the course of this tour seen his desert districts, but he seems to have carried out admirably a plan I sketched for him four years ago for giving the people a light and fixed assessment, just the simple sort of system they have under a good Thakoor of their own, with plenty of wells and tanks where they can be made, work in the camel-police for those who would otherwise steal, and employment and bread for all. The result is that crime has almost disappeared, and he levies a revenue such as the Meers never dreamed of. I can see how well he has managed these Thurr people by the influence he has beyond his own border. He gets all he wants from the Judhpoor and the Jessulmere Durbar with evident good will, and the Thakoors, who are in a state of chronic rebellion against the Maharajah of Jessulmere and who refuse to listen to the Governor-General's agent, write to Tyrwhitt to apologize when they 'by mistake' plunder his people in the Judhpoor territory, and offer to submit all their differences to his arbitration. He is quite altering the appearance of the Sind districts of Meerpoor Proper west of the Thurr, which get no water but from the river. Strong as the language was which I used, to describe our neglect of canals in the early years of our rule, it was short of the truth, and no district had suffered more than these. Meerpoor, when I saw it in 1851, was twenty-five miles within a howling wilderness, and I saw no living soul nor sign of cultivation in a sixteen mile ride from Alyartha Tanda. Now there are fields the whole way, and the people everywhere rejoicing in the abundance of water, the simple

fixed cash assessments, and the absence of meddling and dragooning. . . . There is little, in fact, which might not be found under a very benevolent, just, liberal, and energetic native ruler, and all classes seem equally happy. From old Shere Mohammed down to the old Belooch woman who would come out of her hut with a light for his pipe or a bowl of milk, and to ask the Hoozoor, 'if he could not let her old man have his wheel a rupee or two lower. It was such hard work, and he was an old soldier and not used to labour.' I wish you could see the old Meer. He is by far the finest of the lot, very proud, and as haughty as when he ruled in Meerpoor, but looking ten years younger than when I saw him here, just after his return from Sind four or five years ago, and so evidently pleased with the way Tyrwhitt treats him and his sons and all the old Belooch Sirdars. In all this the Government revenue has not suffered.

"The districts yielded, when made over to Tyrwhitt, 135,000 rupees, and the people were the most wretched, poverty-stricken set to be found in Sind. This year he has collected 450,000 rupees, and I would not wish for a happier and more contented people, nor would it be possible to have less crime. Government sometimes think I have been extravagant in my views of canal works, but do not results like these justify the expenditure even as a fiscal measure? Tyrwhitt has had much unprofitable desert added to his districts since he began, but the main cause of the increase of the revenue is his canal digging and light assessment, and he is far from the limit even now. I fully expect as cultivation extends, the collection will rise to seven lacs. . . ."

Some two months after this letter was written came a rude interruption to the scene of peaceful progress. The contagion of revolt had reached the district. The news came, like a bolt out of the blue, that the telegraph wires had been cut, the officials killed or driven away, and the treasury plundered.

No sufficient cause for the outbreak could be assigned, nor was there any knowing how far it might spread; and, what made it more serious, the insurgents had chosen a

time of year, the beginning of the hot season, when the greater part of the district, the Runn of Cutch, was liable any day to be covered three or four feet deep with water from the summer overflow of the Indus, and the rest of the district was exposed to a fierce heat and drought which made military operations in it by regular troops impracticable.

To Tyrwhitt, much dejected at this unlooked-for disturbance, Frere wrote :—

“ April 22, 1859.

“ You must not let this affair vex you. It was not in your power to have prevented it, and I know you will set matters to rights quicker than any one else would under such circumstances ; so make your mind easy on that score. It seems to me one of those things which God sometimes sends to bring us to our senses, when we are beginning to be very self-confident and to forget our dependence on Him, and we shall all be better for the lesson. I had begun to feel over-secure, but rely on it the thought of blaming you never entered my head. Now there are a few things you must remember. 1st. There are no fresh Tyrwhitts in store to serve out when the original one is worn to rags—so please take care of him ; don't expose him more than you can help, nor put him to do work which others can do as well, or which will bear delay. This is frightfully hot weather in your part of the world, and no mortal man can stand the work you try to do, so do please try to take things a little quietly. 2nd. If we hear matters are not settled at once I will send you a larger force. We could send troops very quickly by Mandavie Bhaaj, but you could get them still more quickly from Deesa. There is a troop of horse artillery now about leaving Deesa, which ought to be available. I have told the brigadier you are likely to call on him. 3rd. I have ordered Pirie to go on to take command of the Hyderabad police with Johnstone. You will find him an excellent ally, if anything is to be done. 4th. If the people take to the Sardra valley, be very careful how you manage the assault ; an attack at either end of the defile would be a very desperate undertaking if they are

determined to defend themselves to the last, and you would have to go very cautiously to avoid ambushades. There are paths to the tops of the hills from the walls of the defile, and if you once crowned them, the people below must surrender or be destroyed; probably the best way would be, if you had men enough, to close the two openings—that towards Casbe, as well as that towards Nuggur—and then send parties over the hills, and not to attempt an advance at either end till you know that the heights are in possession of your men. Water would be your chief difficulty, as I fear there is none in the hill outside the gorge. But I trust you will not be obliged to use force. The greater part of the insurgents must be blind followers of some few knaves, and no good can be gained by destroying them. You may rely on any promise of pardon you may make being observed, and no one will ever say you have been too lenient. Any leaders or instigators of the multitude must, of course, take the consequence of their misdeeds; but this I leave entirely to you, and I hope you will take special care to let them all know, whether they submit or resist, that any women and children of even the very worst of them will be taken care of and sent to their own relations in safety. Otherwise, unless assured of good treatment for their families, we may have them slaying their women Rajpoot fashion, before they are attacked, to prevent their falling into our hands. All petty prisoners you can try and sentence at once, but the leaders and capital offenders had better be committed for trial by Downe. The Bengal Acts for summary jurisdiction in such cases do not extend to Sind. For all but the leaders, and for those who were merely lukewarm and disaffected, but not actively criminal, a few years at Kurrachee would be a good punishment. They will go back with sounder ideas of our power and their own importance than they have now.

“I have full trust in your judgment and humanity as well as in your zeal and courage, and you may rely on my supporting you to the utmost. The fact that all the suspected leaders are Sodas looks as if there were some grievance of the class of which we have as yet heard nothing. But if any one can find it out I know you will. God be with you and guide you.”

In order to put down the outbreak with as little delay

and as little resistance as possible, Frere caused three columns, comprising troops of all three arms, to advance simultaneously, one from Hyderabad, a second from Deesa, and a third from Kurrachee, sent by sea to Mandavie. The command was given to Colonel Evans, by whose prompt and judicious action the town of Nuggur was recaptured and the insurgents dispersed or taken. Frere was able to report the complete success of the operations and the suppression of disturbances more than two hundred miles from the camp whence the force marched, before time enough had elapsed for an answer to be received from the Bombay Government to his report of the outbreak.

Some of the officers employed under Colonel Evans had come from outside Sind, and were therefore unacquainted with Frere's manner of dealing with insurgents. He therefore writes to Colonel Evans :—

“ May 4, 1859.

“ It may be well to impress on all officers with you that you are not dealing with mutineers but with rebels, or it may be with foreign enemies, but either as rebels or enemies entitled to a fair trial. You will be best able to judge whether any departure from the ordinary forms of procedure is necessary ; but unless the necessity is very urgent, I should strongly recommend your making over all prisoners to Captain Lambert, with instructions to try and dispose of them in the usual way. But in any case every officer under you should understand that he is not at liberty to hang any one he may think deserving, as some of them seem inclined to do.”

He writes again to Colonel Evans :—

“ May 15.

“ Always supposing that Akhajee was not a leader or instigator, and did not approve of what had been done, I should be inclined to let him off cheaply. Born before the Talpoors got Sind and when the Ranas were really independent robber chieftains, reared as a Desert Thakoor

who looked on a raid to Cutch or Guzerat as his natural, rightful mode of subsistence, he had the sense to submit from the first to Roberts, and has since honestly done his best to reconcile the old and new order of things. In a sudden disturbance like this, if he speedily separates himself from the leaders and gives in, I would not be very extreme to mark whether he attended the rebel Rana's Durbar, provided he told his old masters he was a fool, and had made a mistake in rising. It is hardly in human nature for an old servant like him to do more, and we should be well off if all did as much. Tyrwhitt and his people will be very naturally angry with him for not doing more, but till we have some evidence of an organized plot and conspiracy, I should not condemn the old man for not telling us."

To Lord Elphinstone he writes, May 5 :—

"I fear there can be no doubt that the people of Parkur had substantial grounds of complaint, but, as far as can be seen from such of their statements as have reached me, not more than falls to the lot of people in every remote district, and is usually treasured up till they get an opportunity to complain. Such an opportunity they knew they would have had in a few weeks more or less, when Lieutenant Tyrwhitt came among them ; and any very pressing grievance would, no doubt, have led to some of them starting for his camp, or to Bhooj, or to Kurrachee, to complain. But the events of the last two years had unsettled their minds, and they no doubt intended to repeat the experiment they tried under the Meers, when they shot an obnoxious Kardar.

"The true remedy is, I am sure, to bring the district out of its present isolation, and enable us to get at the people and the people at us, better than they can do at present."

Sir John Lawrence, worn out with his great and arduous labours, was at length able, at the end of February, 1859, to leave his post in the Punjab to his successor and to start for England. His way lay down the Indus through Sind, and Frere expected him to go to Kurrachee, where

he and Lady Frere were preparing to receive him with due honour. He met him accordingly in Upper Sind, and travelled two days in his company down the river. But Lawrence was too weary and ill, and too anxious to get home, to pause in his journey or go out of his way, and so went straight from the mouth of the Indus to Bombay, without going to Kurrachee.

Referring to what he had seen of him during these two days, Frere says, writing to Lord Elphinstone :—

“ March 10, 1859.

“ You will have seen Sir John Lawrence and heard all and much more than I could have told you of what I heard from him. My general impression was that his difficulties, from the paralysis of the action of a Supreme Government and of the military system generally, were far greater than I had imagined, and that the present condition of everything to the North and North-West was, and is still, far worse and still more demoralized than I had believed possible. I used to think it a great mistake that Sind had not been united to the Punjab and placed under the direct control of the Supreme Government, but what I heard from Sir John has quite altered my opinion, and I fancy that with [in spite of] all the advantages of being appendages of Calcutta, your dominions are half a century in advance of either the North-West or the Punjab.”

Frere had never re-visited England except once on sick leave, and now that the great danger is over, his thoughts turn homeward.

“ March 30.

“ I have seen the revenue here rise from twenty-three to forty-three lacs in eight years,” he writes to Lord Elphinstone. “ And if your Lordship stays in India as long as I hope you will, you may certainly see the revenue of Sind three-quarters of a crore, and perhaps more. . . . I am not likely to see it, for I earned my pension last month, and now ride at single anchor.”

And to Mr. H. Danby Seymour he writes :—

“ March 17.

“The first instalment of Mr. Walker's plan for improving the harbour of Kurrachee has been sanctioned, and is to be put in hand at once, and it will be wanted to accommodate the rapidly increasing trade. Here are some of the figures. The value of the whole seaborne trade was, in 1853-4, 88,51,000 rupees; in 1857-8, 215,92,000, being an increase of some thirty-six per cent. per annum. It will this year be probably two and three-quarter millions, which is close on the value of the whole trade of Madras, and the stream is only beginning to flow. The first square-rigged sailing ship entered the harbour in 1851: there were fourteen in 1852-53; fifty-seven in 1857-58; and there will be at least seventy-five this year, twenty-seven of which will have taken full cargoes for Europe. This is exclusive of Government transports. I think these facts are a sufficient answer to those who call me a visionary, and who talk of my reckless expenditure, or proposed expenditure, of public money.”

His services during the Mutiny in India were comparatively little known to the general public in England; for the very reason which was strongest evidence of his high merit, namely, that while a fierce struggle was raging on its borders, his own province was almost undisturbed, and nothing of such startling interest as to attract general notice had occurred in it. But by Lord Elphinstone and at the India Office at home, the importance of the work he had done, not only in keeping his own province quiet and in guarding his frontier, but in doing this while at the same time sending nearly all his European troops to Delhi, to the Punjab, and to the Deccan, was fully appreciated.*

* Mr. (now Sir Richard) Temple, secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, writes to the secretary of the Bombay Government, extracting a paragraph from a letter to the secretary to the Government of India, which runs as follows:—

“ May 28, 1858.

“The Chief Commissioner (Sir John Lawrence) could not allow his notice of the officers who have distinguished themselves to be

On each of the two occasions—in January, 1858, and in April, 1859—when the thanks of Parliament were given to the Civil Service and the army in India, his name was specially mentioned; and on the second occasion he received the honour of a Knight Commandership of the Bath.

To Major Merewether, in response to his congratulations, he writes :—

“ May 27, 1859.

“ Many thanks for your kind letter, which only expresses what I knew you would feel. But you do not feel what I do very strongly, that but for you and the Sind Horse, if any of us had lived to get honours, they would have been for the reconquest of the country, not for its preservation in peace and for helping those beyond our border. One of the few points in which I did not agree with our dear friend Jacob was in rating—I trust not too highly—such rewards as among honourable objects of ambition. But I shall ever regard mine as a trust given, not to me personally, but as the head and representative of many noble and brave men who all did their duty so gloriously.

“ There was no part of Lord Stanley’s speech which I read with half the pleasure I derived from what he said of our dear friend.”

Some time early in the summer of 1859, Frere heard incidentally that Lord Stanley, on Lord Canning’s recommendation, was about to appoint him a Member of the Supreme Council at Calcutta. Owing to a change of

closed without mention being made of the great obligations under which he lies to Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sind. From first to last, from the commencement of the Mutiny to the final triumph, that officer has rendered assistance to the Punjab administration, just as if he had been one of its own Commissioners. It was owing to his indefatigable exertions that the 1st Bombay Fusiliers arrived at Mooltan so soon as they did. He despatched the 1st and then the 2nd Belooch Battalion from Sind to succour the Punjab. The Chief Commissioner believes that probably there is no civil officer in India who, for eminent exertions, deserves better of his Government than Mr. H. B. E. Frere.”

Ministry in June, Lord Stanley being succeeded at the India Office by Sir Charles Wood, nothing was for some time definitely settled. Subsequently Sir Charles Wood wrote to Lord Canning that he intended to make the appointment. Still there was some uncertainty owing to the number of retirements and of places which had to be filled up. It was not till the beginning of September that he received a letter from Sir Charles Wood to say that next day he was going to nominate him.

Lord Elphinstone was very unwilling to lose Frere from Sind. He afterwards told Lady Frere that he and Lord Canning had been fighting over which should have him, "but Canning, you see, has got his way."

Towards the end of September he got a letter from Lord Canning, telling him that his appointment had been received, and wishing him to go to Calcutta as soon as he could.

In a letter to Lord Elphinstone, he says—

"October 9.

"I am writing among many interruptions consequent on our departure, rather sooner than was expected. I need not tell you how very mixed is one's feeling on such an occasion. But I think my wife's feeling is nearly unmitigated regret at leaving so many kind friends and a place where we felt of some use, and going some thousand miles farther from our children, but I hope it will not at any rate retard our chance of ultimately rejoining them."

Writing to Sir Charles Wood a month later, in the interests of his successor, whoever he might be, he says—

"November 11, 1859.

"I have urged on Lord Elphinstone as strongly as I could the impolicy of reducing the salaries of the Commissioners in Sind, and I believe he fully agrees with me. Owing to the position of the place it is, as I found by experience, quite impossible for the chief civil officer and

representative of Government to do his duty, either to Government or Society, and to save out of the salary heretofore allowed—as he might and ought to do out of a very much inferior appointment here in Bombay. . . .

“I am convinced there is no worse economy than underpaying your officers in charge of frontier and insulated provinces like Sind. It is a serious financial mistake to pay any of the superior officers of Government so low as to make it difficult to save a decent competence before they are quite worn out, and for a warden of the marches to have to consider whether a guest more or less will make a serious difference in his household expenditure, may make the difference between success or failure in important public affairs. One of the most sagacious men in India once said to me, speaking of Sir William Macnaughten’s avoidance of society, ‘I often used to think a few dozen of champagne might have averted the Cabool disaster,’ and what constitutional shyness did for Sir William, is often done by parsimonious living in our Indian stations. We have little expression of public opinion, hardly any originating with the better-informed class of public servants, and the man in high official position who shuts himself out from hearing what his English fellow-servants say and think in society is sure, sooner or later, to go wrong. I think I could trace some of the worst and most dangerous blunders of late years to the recluse habits of some of our leading men, who ought to have known every pulsation of feeling among Europeans as well as natives; and whatever may be said of the old lavish style of Indian expenditure, it certainly left our officers no excuse for a parsimony which Mountstuart Elphinstone, Malcolm, or Metcalfe would have held incompatible with successful administration. I would not have inflicted this dissertation on you, but having left Sind I feel free to speak on a subject which I am satisfied is of vital importance to my successor, and it may make all the difference between his taking a pride and pleasure in his work, and his being anxious to quit it as a very laborious and ill-paid office, which I am convinced it will be if the threatened reduction in the salary is carried out.”

When it was known at Kurrachee that Sir Bartle was to leave Sind, a public meeting was held, to propose

the presentation of an address, expressive of public feeling on his approaching departure. All races and classes joined in expressing their love and respect for his character and their sense of the benefits which under his wise and fostering rule of nearly nine years had been conferred on the province. The address was signed by more than five thousand persons in Kurrachee, and by as many more from other parts of Sind.

In replying, Frere disclaimed any originality in his principles and methods, which were those of Mountstuart Elphinstone and Malcolm, of Outram, Pottinger, and Clerk, and after paying a warm tribute to Napier and Jacob, he said :—

“In the other branches of administration to which you specially allude, if I have been successful it has been by exposing to the utmost of my power the centralizing fashion which has of late years been so common, and which I have always considered to be one great cause of our late disasters.

“I believe you have not exaggerated what has been done in many of the departments which you specify, but I feel convinced that however earnestly and ably I might have laboured, the results would have been comparatively insignificant had I acted on any other principle than that of giving to every workman the freest scope and best aid I could, to do in his own way that work which God put into his heart to attempt; it is this which, in almost every district, has enabled our officers, with very limited means, to crowd into a few years such a vast amount of improvement in roads, canals, railways, steamers, and other results and marks of civilization.

“I have endeavoured to pursue the same policy in all matters affecting commerce, regarding Government interference and Government imposts as in themselves serious evils, and believing it to be the appropriate function of Government simply to protect all men in the enjoyment of their rights and possessions as long as they do not interfere with the rights or possessions of others, and to remove all obstacles, natural or artificial, to such enjoy-

ment ; it has been my study not to develop commerce and industry, but to leave commerce and industry free to develop themselves."

Independently of the above, an address was presented to Frere by the native community of Kurrachee. After enumerating the benefits Sind had received from his rule, it says :—

" Perhaps you cannot at present fully know the extent to which your good qualities, your knowledge of the secret of gaining the hearts of the natives of India, and of governing them by the sole power of justice and love, have endeared you to the people of this province, and made you popular alike among all classes of the country, natives as well as Europeans, countrymen as well as foreigners. But had your route lain through the province, instead of by sea, we are sure you would have found every step of your way crowded by a sorrowing populace. From the aristocracy of the land down to the humblest fisherman, every soul would have deserted their pleasure and their daily labour, and flocked round you to give vent to the outpourings of their hearts. You would have met with none but weeping and sorrowing faces on the sudden parting with their deservedly beloved and revered ruler. But you are saved such an affecting scene. We, however, are sure that you will yet hear of their grief on learning that their benefactor, whose ever-smiling face annually brightened every villager's homestead with a visit from Kurrachee up to Kusmore, and from Thur up to the remotest corner of the Hill regions, has suddenly left them, with but a slender hope of ever seeing him again. . . .

" We would say in conclusion, that if Her Majesty's Government want to select from among the Indian statesmen one who possesses the key of the secret of touching and winning the hearts of men of different creeds and castes of which the native society of this country is composed, by the power of love and not of fear, they should look to you, and to you alone. You have appreciated and illustrated the ' Power of Love ' to its fullest extent in your administration of this province. There are volumes in those three words, and your rule here has proved that

you had thoroughly mastered them, feeling as you do that 'we have all of us one human heart.'"

Frere, in his reply, alludes to the immunity from disturbance which Sind had enjoyed during the past two troubled years, ascribing, mainly to the loyalty of the inhabitants and the efficiency of the police, the fact—

"That we went about our ordinary avocations in peace and quietness, and that though attempts were repeatedly made in different places to excite insurrection, no public office was ever closed for a single day, our ordinary commercial dealings were never interrupted, and no community was kept for more than a part of a single night out of their beds, in consequence of any of the abortive attempts at insurrection."

On the morning of one of the last days of October, Sir Bartle and Lady Frere left Government House for the last time. There was not a man in the length and breadth of Sind, it was said, to whom his face or voice was not familiar; and all Kurrachee, European and native, had turned out to line the road by which he was to pass to the harbour. The soft October sun shone upon crowded ranks of people in every variety of bright-coloured costume, on intent faces, and on a forest of outstretched hands, seeking in simple Eastern fashion to touch if it were only a fold of the coat of him who, during ten years of peace and plenty, such as they had never known before, had been their ruler and their friend. Through the native town the train moved at foot's pace to the Napier Mole of the harbour—the first passenger-train that had gone that way. Here some mishap occurred at the facing-points—a truck went off the rails—and carriages had to be procured to take them the remaining mile and a half to the head of the pier, which was decorated for the occasion. A boat was waiting to row them to the steamer, into which Frere,

with difficulty releasing himself from his friends, was the last to enter. The strains of "God save the Queen," the boom of fifteen guns from the fort, and the cheers of the crowd of comrades and of friends, in whose moved faces and moistened eyes congratulation struggled vainly with regret, carried to him across the widening water a last farewell from Sind.

CHAPTER IX.

CALCUTTA.

Settles at Calcutta—Mr. Mackinnon—Indian finance—Mr. James Wilson—Income-tax—Sir C. Trevelyan—Death of Wilson—Sir Robert Napier—Military Finance Commission—The Arms Bill—Constitution of Legislative Council.

THE vessel that took Sir Bartle and Lady Frere from Kurrachee was the *Feroze*, belonging to the Indian navy. One of those petty local outbreaks, which were still happening from time to time—sparks fanned into flame by the pervading spirit of unrest—had recently occurred at a place on the coast of Kattywar, some two hundred miles south-east of Kurrachee, and the insurgent Waghers had occupied a small fort at Dwarka, which was being invested by some troops. The ammunition running short, a fresh supply had been sent for, which the *Feroze* had taken on board to leave on her way down the coast. She reached Dwarka and landed the boxes of ammunition at the very time that a bombardment from the sea and an assault by land of the fort was going on, which Sir Bartle and Lady Frere were able to watch from the deck of the vessel, the shots from the fort occasionally passing through the rigging or striking the water near. After taking in several wounded men, the *Feroze* proceeded on her way to Bombay.

There they were detained for more than three weeks,

waiting for their vessel to go on to Calcutta. The delay gave him the opportunity of intercourse with Lord Elphinstone, and of making himself acquainted with the opinions of leading men at Bombay. Thence they went on to Galle, then the port of junction where the mail steamers from Suez, Calcutta, Bombay, China, and Australia met, and where they had a few days to wait. In a long letter to one of his daughters at home, he describes the beauties and antiquities and interesting features of Galle, a place so familiar to travellers in those days—the spider canoes, or catamarans, used as surf-boats for landing passengers from the steamers in the roadstead, made out of a hollowed tree, and balanced, so as to be incapable of upsetting, by a beam floating on the water attached to it by stiff rods six or eight feet long; the costume of the Cingalese men, a black silk jacket and petticoat, and with hair drawn back into a knot at the back of the head, “like a respectable Portuguese of Bombay masquerading as a woman;” the old Dutch gateway; the Court House, with a cock and the date 1603 over it; the narrow streets, where two carriages could not pass; and the well-known road to Wakwallah, a few miles inland, the perfection of tropical scenery. The letter is interspersed with spirited illustrations, and five different kinds of palms are noted and each accurately sketched—

“ Besides scores of other trees, of which I could recognize but few, but all most luxuriant, and with a greater variety of form and foliage than in any Indian scenery I know. As we ascended we had the most lovely peeps down the sides of the hill—sometimes into little dells—quite overshadowed by the thick trees, with neat little cottages under them, swarming with children. At other times we got more distant views of the hills in the interior, or of the seashore and bay, with its deep blue sea and white breakers. At the top we found a very neat bungalow, as

we should call it in India, a house with only a ground floor—wide verandahs projecting far out, so as to throw as much shade as possible without excluding the breeze—rooms floored with real Dutch tiles, and furnished with old Dutch carved ebony couches, chairs, or cabinets, elaborate enough to drive a carved furniture-fancier crazy, and a pretty garden in terraces round all, between the house and the edge of the hill, with beautiful peeps of distant scenery beyond.

“For the first time in my life I saw India as it appeared to my imagination thirty years ago, and I again implicitly believed in the scenery of ‘Paul and Virginia’ and the ‘Indian Cottage,’ after a quarter of a century of scepticism and disappointment.”

They spent three days at Guindy, near Madras, as the guests of Sir Charles Trevelyan the Governor, and reached Calcutta December 21.

Frere writes to Lord Ripon :—

“December 21.

“We have been here but a few days, only time enough to see that the city is far more metropolitan in appearance than either Madras or Bombay, and the European population far larger and more varied; but I am sadly disappointed in the natives, though what I have seen of them explains much which was before inexplicable in the conduct of Europeans during the Mutiny and their sentiments since. I think it a very serious evil that so large and influential a section of the rulers of India should obtain their first, often their only knowledge of the natives of India from a race which seems to me both physically and mentally inferior to any of the more civilized races of Northern and Western India. On this account, and for many other reasons, I am glad that Mr. Wilson has gone up to join the Governor-General's camp, and will get as far as Lahore before he turns his face in this direction.”

At Calcutta he took a house, No. 31, Chowringhee Road, in a fine range of buildings facing the Maidan Park, or Plain, the Hyde Park of Calcutta, outside the city. Here he would be seen at sunrise riding “Beejapore,” a fine

Arab he had taken from Satara to Sind, and brought on to Calcutta, over the fine galloping ground, or round the race-course, or in the shady roads of the suburbs on the two sides of the Maidan facing the country. The day would be spent in his study or in attending the Executive or Legislative Council ; and late in the afternoon, if not too busy, he would be out riding or driving again. The evenings he rarely had to himself. 'Work after nightfall in an Indian climate is fatal to health, and to be avoided if possible ; and he entered freely into society.

He was the first Bombay civilian who had ever been appointed to the Supreme Council ; hitherto its members had always been taken from the Bengal service, and the Calcutta civilians were not at first inclined to be cordial towards a stranger from another Presidency ; but his tact, kindness, and courtesy, his readiness to mix in general society and make himself acquainted with current opinion, and the liberality with which he maintained the high standard of Indian hospitality, soon overcame prejudice and made him generally popular.

Nor was his hospitality confined to the official world. At Calcutta, more than at Bombay, and than elsewhere in India, the Civil servants had hitherto been socially a class apart, having little intercourse with non-official Europeans, and none at all with natives. But Sir Bartle and Lady Frere had a welcome for all classes and races, and tact to offer it in such a way as to offend no prejudices. Lady Frere visited the native ladies, as she had been accustomed to do in Sind, in Satara, and formerly in Bombay ; and the native merchants, and native princes and rajahs who came to Calcutta were often entertained at their house. Friends would look in, uninvited, to breakfast ; and once a week Frere had a public breakfast to which any person who wished to see him on any business could come. Any

one arriving from England or from some other part of India, any one who had information or experience to impart, or a cause to advocate—artists, missionaries, soldiers, merchants, men of science, and above all, travellers—found in him an attentive and sympathetic listener. The non-official Europeans, whose only way of making their wants and grievances known had hitherto been by articles in the Press—often virulent and abusive in proportion to their powerlessness to produce any effect—found Frere always ready to give them a courteous and attentive hearing.

It was thus that about two years after this time he first met Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Mackinnon, who became for the rest of his life one of his warmest friends.

Mackinnon had gone out to India from Glasgow a few years previously, a young man, and with slender means, to take up a business in partnership with a friend who had preceded him to India. After a time they had come to own two steamers of six hundred tons each, trading from Calcutta to Burmah; more steamers were acquired, and the concern became the "Burmah Steam Navigation Company." Mackinnon had larger schemes in view, for which he needed a Government subsidy; but Calcutta officials in those days were not very accessible to the outside mercantile world, and it was not till early in 1862, shortly before Frere left Calcutta, that a friend took him to one of Frere's semi-public breakfasts, and he was able to get a hearing from some one who could help him. He proposed, if a subsidy were granted to him, to establish a line of coasting steamers, calling at all ports of the coast from Calcutta round to Kurrachee. Frere, with his quick eye for a man of mettle, gave him and his proposal a cordial reception. "You are the man I have been looking for for years," he said to him; and he took him to Lord Canning, who gave favourable attention to his scheme. But the consent of the Bombay

Government was also necessary, and this Mackinnon was unable to obtain till Frere went to Bombay as Governor in April, 1863. There he was the first person with whom Frere had an interview after being sworn in, and the result was that the subsidy was soon after granted. The "Burmah Steam Navigation Company" became the "British India Company;" and in time the steamers extended their trips to the Persian Gulf, to the East African Coast, to England, and to Australia. When Frere's mission went to Zanzibar in 1872-3, Mackinnon maintained for several months, with great advantage to the Mission, and at a great expense to himself, a fortnightly postal service to Zanzibar. The British India Company has now a fleet of eighty-eight steamers, some of them of from four to six thousand tons. In case of need it could, and would, at a week's notice, collect steamers enough at Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay to convey thirty thousand troops to any port required—an addition to the defensive strength of the Empire which it is difficult to adequately estimate. This great company took its first impulse—so said Sir William Mackinnon—from the encouragement given by Frere to a young and unknown man at his breakfast-table in Chowringhee Road.

The office to which Frere had been appointed was Member of the Supreme Council of India, that is, of the Cabinet of the Governor-General.

The question of finance, of how to make both ends meet, was the absorbing problem of the day. From 1853-4 to 1856-7 there had been a deficit every year. Then came the Mutiny, when, in the struggle for existence, the expenditure was uncontrolled and lavish. The deficit for 1857-8 was eight millions sterling; that for 1858-9, fourteen millions; and the estimated deficit for 1859-60 was upwards of ten millions. Unless matters

could be mended, bankruptcy must follow, or India would have to be retained at such a cost to the mother-country as she could hardly be expected to submit to. Comparatively little increase could be made to taxation; for India is, or was then, a country of few rich men and many poor. If the balance of income and expenditure was to be restored, it must be mainly by a reduction of expenditure.

In February, 1859, nearly a year before he went to Calcutta, Frere had written to Mr. H. Danby Seymour:—

“My few spare minutes have been given to answering Colonel Durand's questions on the re-organization of the army, of which I ordered a copy to be sent to you. They were mostly written in July and August, but every week since has convinced me more strongly of the fact that the question is essentially a financial one, and that unless it is so viewed and disposed of, we shall lose India, not from any incapacity to hold it, but from finding it too costly and troublesome a possession to be worth keeping. You or men who know India are not likely to think so, but numbers of the tax-paying classes would, if they found Indian deficiencies disturbing the Stock Exchange. Out here there seems no one connected with the Supreme Government who has any definite plan of finance, and from Lord Dalhousie's conversion of the Five per cents. to the present moment nothing could be more unworthy of a great Government than the haphazard way in which we have drifted in finance. . . .

“It is the total apparent want of plan and method, of any defined object, the general trusting to what may turn up, and the sort of demoralization consequent thereon, that are, to my mind, symptoms of evil omen, even now when every one is saying that our troubles are over. (We) are, in some respects, less likely to govern India as we ought than before our late terrible lesson.”

On the threshold of any financial reform was the impossibility of obtaining reliable information as to what the