place, and the Colonial Kaffirs joined in, our forces were quite inadequate, and our organization so defective, that great disasters must occur before we could be prepared with adequate means for restoring order. I hoped to have met the old chief and to have found him, as I was assured he would be, tired of war and anxious to keep the peace. But he evaded meeting me, believing, as I was told, that he would share his father Hinza's fate. After I left he told the Resident, Colonel Eustace, that he could no longer control his people, and Colonel Eustace having retired to the other side the border, Kreli ordered the Europeans living near him to be conducted safely out of the country.* His people assembled in great numbers and in regular order for war, and attacked the police in British territory, with all the ceremony of formal Kaffir warfare. They, the Kaffirs, had never before had any experience of the modern improvement in weapons, and suffered heavy loss. Commandant Griffiths had thrown up some slight shelter for his men, and their Snider carbines, with the fire from a couple of seven-pounder Armstrongs and some rockets, prevented the swarms of many thousand Galekas from closing with the police, about 250 in number, with 1500 Fingo auxiliaries. Some chiefs of influence were killed and wounded, and a 'witch doctoress,' who had promised to lead to victory the Galeka bands, as she had done before in native wars, was shot at the head of an attacking column.

"The Galekas were greatly depressed by the failure of their attack, but the Colony and the Colonial forces were quite unprepared, and the greatest alarm and confusion prevailed. The frontier police were good material—about a thousand young Englishmen, well armed with Snider carbine and revolver, and tolerably well mounted on hardy ponies, but ill-organized, undisciplined, and with very few capable officers, and very bad field equipment. They were under law, but for other Colonial forces we had only volunteers.

"The obsolete Burgher militia law was quite unworkable, except for 'Commandos' on the old Dutch system of

* As early as August 26, Mr. West Fynn, Colonel Eustace's interpreter, found Kreli and all his chiefs with the "war charm"—a black spot—on their foreheads. This with the Galekas was an invariable sign of an intention to fight. (C. 1961, p. 107.)

volunteer privateering expeditions, when the farmer, having hired out his waggons and oxen to the Government Commissariat at exorbitant rates, set off with his horse and his gun to join his neighbours in lifting Kaffir cattle, and, so long as he could live in free quarters, was in no hurry to finish the war.

"Volunteers, on our English system, had grown up since the panic last year, in spite of ridicule and official rebuffs, but they were unorganized, only partially well-armed, and utterly undisciplined, in the sense of fitness for field work.

"Her Majesty's forces consisted of a single seasoned Battalion (1-24th) under an excellent, steady, sensible Commander, Colonel Glyn, and with very good young officers; and we have since brought up six companies of H.M.'s 88th from Capetown; but they are young Irish soldiers just arrived in the country, admirable for fighting, but unused to the wearing petty work of a Kaffir war.

"Fortunately we have an excellent officer in Commandant Griffith of the Frontier Police. He took charge of his command only a day before he was attacked, but he had been in the force some years ago, knows the country and people thoroughly, and is a cool, determined, prudent man. But we should have been quite adrift had not Sir Arthur Cunynghame hurried down from the Diamond fields and joined us just at the critical moment. . . .

"I insisted on Sir Arthur Cunynghame having the sole command, much against the Colonial grain; but it was our only chance of good, rapid, and united work, and he has done admirably. He made Griffith commandant of all the Police and native levies Transkei, while he put Glyn in command of the Ciskei, where he distributed Her Majesty's troops to the best advantage to prevent a Galeka irruption into the Colony, and to keep down any rising of Colonial Kaffirs, sympathizing with any one who promises to restore the old days of fighting, cattle-lifting, etc. Our object is to localize the outbreak to the territory of the offending tribe; and I must defer any account of the panic among Europeans, which was for some time quite uncontrollable, and of the alarm and excitement among natives, uncertain what was to be done to them or us, and the wonderful series of fortunate coincidences which, thank God, have been in our favour,

and helped us against the effects of long neglect and unwisdom."

By the end of October the whole tribe of Galekas had been driven eastward across the Bashee and Umtata rivers by the Colonial forces, which, at one time, numbered more than 580 armed and mounted police and 990 volunteers. Here Commandant Griffith abandoned pursuit, considering that the tribe, which had lost 700 men and 20 chiefs killed, and 13,000 head of cattle captured, had been sufficiently punished. The war seemed to be at an end, and confidence was being restored. But many days had not passed when, in consequence of a neglect of General Cunynghame's caution to guard the fords of the Bashee, several bodies of Galekas returned and unexpectedly attacked a Colonial detachment, while others slipped past and crossed the Kei into British territory, and there stirred up to rebellion the Gaikas and their chief Sandilli.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"November 21, 1877.

"I was, yesterday morning, making plans for leaving this, in the belief that things were quieting down, and balancing whether I was more wanted at Capetown or Kimberley, when we were startled by the news of a fresh disturbance on the Gaika border. . . .

"That there has been very bad management is clear; but who is to be blamed is not so apparent, nor can we tell for a day or two whether the consequences are likely to be serious. But I find a very serious difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Merriman, as to the mode in which the question is to be treated. He is for carrying matters with a very high hand, in a manner which must bring about a collision with the Gaikas, a result which he avows he would not regret, as enabling us forcibly to break up the present Gaika location, and to deprive Sandilli and the other chiefs of the power hitherto accorded to them by our acts of negligence. I cannot see the legality, necessity, or justice of such violent remedies. After a visit from

some members of the Chamber of Commerce, who came to me in great alarm, Mr. Merriman, the General, and I had a long discussion, and he has since sent me his views in writing. . . .

"I enclose copies of both letters. Mine is less in answer to his letter than to the arguments he founded on his view of the real weakness of the Gaikas, who, he contended, ought to be coerced into submission to all demands, legal or illegal, even if the consequence of insisting on an illegal demand was to raise the whole tribe in insurrection."

Frere's reply to Mr. Merriman here referred to is as follows, and is given nearly entire, as it expresses his view of the right and the wrong of the case as between the Government and the Gaikas and Galekas, as well as his strong sense of the protection and guidance that were justly due to the native races from the Government.

"November 21, 1877.

"Many thanks for your letter. I will try to show my value for it by putting down, as shortly as I can, my view of the Gaika question for you to consider at leisure.

"First, I entirely agree with you as to your estimate of their strength. As a mere military question, I feel sure that by repeating the process followed against Kreli, by summoning burghers and volunteers and arming Fingoes, you could crush the Gaikas more completely, and slaughter more of them in a few weeks, than in Kreli's case.

"But consider the difference of the two cases.

"Kreli, whether a rebel, or a chief entitled to make war, assembled his people with the avowed intention of getting more land, and driving his neighbours, unquestionable British subjects, out of theirs.

"In British territory his forces attacked the Fingoes and the police; killed all they could, and were repulsed with such loss, that their fighting spirit was quite broken, and their utter defeat and conquest of their country followed.

"So far, I think, you and I can justify all we have had any share in.

"But as regards the causes which led to the outbreak before you and I came here, is our Government wholly blameless?

"How did Kreli, a miserable, poverty-stricken exile, when he was allowed to cross the Bashee in 1862, praying to be accepted as a British subject, develop in 1877 into 'King Kreli,' 'Paramount Chief,' discussing ceremonies of coronation with West Fynn and his councillors?

"Can one wonder that, after being allowed successfully to elbow the Tambookies and Bomvanas, he and his people could not see the harm of trying to elbow the Fingoes? How came he to trust trader Crouch more than Colonel Eustace, and to be so incurably suspicious of the good faith and good will of an English Governor, that he dared not trust himself in his camp?

"As I ask myself these and other similar questions, I feel that whilst it would be wicked folly to try more experiments with Kreli as 'an almost independent chief' (whatever that may mean) at the expense of his sixty or eighty thousand people, we are bound to do our best for them by ruling them at least as well as we have ruled the Fingoes.

"The case of Sandilli and the Gaikas is essentially different. They have been for many years our own fellow-subjects.

"We believe they do not like us, and we are sure that many of them are afraid of what we may be going to do to them.

"How shall we attach them to us and gain their confidence?

"I say, by ruling them justly and strictly, but mercifully; not by letting loose volunteers and burghers to carry fire and sword through the country, to inflict on them the terrible punishment which in self-defence we were forced to inflict on Kreli and his people.

"'But they steal our cattle.'

"This is absolutely and entirely our own fault. If we had anything like a tolerable system of police, stock-stealing might be made, in three months, as unprofitable an occupation in Sandilli's location as in Argyllshire. There is no kind of difficulty. Every farmer and trader will be a gainer, and there is no obstacle in the way save the inertness of the farmers themselves and their representatives.

"'But Sandilli's people still speak of him as the paramount chief, ask whether he means peace or war, and

claim a boundary within which the Queen's writ runneth not unless endorsed by Sandilli; where no survey can be made or police posted, as the Gaikas object to such interference with their independence.'

"All this is very wrong and requires correction; but who taught them this mischievous and foolish idea of their position?

"Surely, we, the Government, are as guilty as any one. The 'boundary' is pointed out and insisted upon by the Secretary for Native Affairs. Can we wonder that Sandilli and his people believe in it? Would the poor miserable sot I saw at Kabousie have dreamed of being able to decide on peace or war if we had done our duty to him in the last ten years?

"We send a sot to represent us, and then wonder that the chief is not cured of drunkenness. We replace him by a man who is said to have been sent here because he allowed a petty chief in Kaffraria to call him a liar on the bench; and we wonder Sandilli's people do not respect us more; we give them no adequate establishments, and then wonder that people go to the chief for redress, instead of to the sot or poltroon who represents us.

"They ought to be taught better and made to respect our law, but is this best done by sending fire and sword into their country, or by sending fit men to rule and teach them?

"I have said I agree with you as to the ease with which the Gaikas could be crushed. But you cannot do it by the same process or machinery as in Kreli's country. The Armed and Mounted Police are pretty well knocked up, and require rest as well as reorganizing. You may get fresh burghers and volunteers in troops, but you will have to proceed according to strict Colonial law, and to answer for all you do to Colonial tribunals, and our acts will have to be judged, not by a grateful public just saved from the horrors of war, but by people horror-struck by tales of starvation from burnt kraals and forest fastnesses, to which in their terror and folly the fugitives betook themselves.

"I would not care for this if my conscience told me that it was done in the execution of duty. But I cannot see any call of duty to the use of force, unless these misgoverned people in their terror should attack us. This I

hope we may prevent, if the troops can be kept in hand; I am sure it could not be prevented if we resort to burghers and volunteers. . . .

"The real evil is the total absence of police—either protective or detective—and of any useful Intelligence Department; and it is quite true that a few dozen Kaffirs, who can steal with impunity and go about the country unchallenged, may do as much harm in Peddie or Albany as an unbroken tribe does in Sandilli's location.

"People in panic do not reason or calculate. If you want to quiet them you must manage to make them feel secure. Here the people seem to have been in a state of chronic panic for years past."

Frere at first believed he had convinced Mr. Merriman; this, however, as will appear, was not the case.

On another point of a similar nature Frere differed from the Attorney-General.

The Gaikas, with whom the war had by that time broken out, were British subjects, and were, therefore, technically rebels. Frere was apprehensive lest, as happened too often during the Indian Mutiny, advantage should be taken of this to kill prisoners without even a trial. On his communicating with Stockenstrom, the Attorney-General, as to the best tribunal for trying such cases, the answer came by telegraph.

"Rebels in arms may be shot without mercy or trial. Investigation at drumhead, suggested by me merely to distinguish between rebels and other enemies, and allow instant execution of former on the field. If there is to be formal trial as proposed and delay [of] execution until Governor's approval obtained, there will not be the summary punishment recognized by law and justified by emergency, but informal trial, subsequently to be ratified by Act of Indemnity."

Frere the same day wrote a Minute repudiating the suggestion, and concluded by saying—

"January 16, 1878.

"The inevitable bloodshed in action is surely more than sufficient for every purpose of example.

"For such rebels as the Gaikas or Islambies, whether captured in action or surrendering, no indiscriminate punishment could in my opinion be justified.

"There may be chiefs and others whose guilt may prove to be of the deepest dye, and I should be the last to interpose any difficulties in punishing the men according to their deserts. But the great mass of the common herd appear to me to be no more deserving indiscriminate slaughter or indiscriminate punishment of any kind than the soldiers of a foreign enemy. It is our duty to disarm and render them harmless, and to teach them that they are not justified by the call of any chief in resisting the authority of Government or in breaking the laws of the Colony; but this is a lesson which we ought to have taught them long ago, and which, I may remark, has yet to be learnt by many of our own people."

The situation by the third week in December had again become serious. Many of the volunteers had returned home, leaving only a few Mounted Police in the Transkei. On the 26th, the communications between King William's Town and the Transkei were cut off, Sandilli, Chief of the Gaikas, having seized and burnt the Draibosch Hotel, on the main road between them. The Gaikas and Galekas being now combined in hostility, a new disposition of troops had become necessary. Hitherto the British force, having no cavalry, and consisting only of a battalion and a half of infantry, had been chiefly occupied in guarding the line of railway, garrisoning the forts and keeping up the communications. But now it was essential to strengthen the force of police in the Transkei, and Colonel Glyn was sent there with some companies of the 24th to take the command.

At the daily councils which Frere had held since arriving at King William's Town, it had needed all his

tact to keep within bounds the feeling of jealousy which the participation of the General in their deliberations excited in the minds of the Ministers. The harmony which prevailed at first had not continued. The prolongation of the war was bringing unpopularity on the Ministers, and they now sought to escape from it by asserting that it was due to the mismanagement of Her Majesty's troops by the General; and, ignoring the fact that they had expressly concurred in Frere's request for reinforcements, and had officially acquiesced in the command of all the troops being placed in the General's hands, they now gave out that they could finish the war with the Colonial forces alone, and unsupported by the Regulars.

Mr. Merriman began to make military appointments, and to give orders without even consulting the Governor or the General. Frere heard by a mere accident from a chance traveller of a movement of Colonial troops having been made, which he knew to be without orders from the General in command.

In a despatch to Lord Carnarvon, he writes—

"February 5, 1878.

"A separate campaign has been commenced on a considerable scale by the Honorable Mr. Merriman, without the previous knowledge and contrary to the advice and warnings of the General commanding the Forces and of the Governor. . . .

"I have gathered, in a vague kind of way, that besides the Queenstown contingent, numbering more than eight hundred men, several bodies each of several hundred men have been set in motion, with what objects and with what orders or results I gather very imperfectly from the fragmentary telegrams reporting details of serious engagements near the junction of the White and Black Kei.

"It is clear that great numbers of the Tambookies have been slaughtered and thousands of cattle captured; that the progress of our troops has been by no means an unchecked success, as they have repeatedly to halt for

reinforcements and supplies; that one result has been to extend considerably the area of disturbance northward among the Tambookies, and another result seriously to cripple the movements of the troops in the Transkei under Colonel Glyn. His native auxiliaries have been withdrawn without his leave or knowledge, and he finds himself without the means of effectually attacking and dispersing large bands of Gaikas who have joined Kreli's warriors in what is understood to be another attempt to carry war into the Colony.

"The persistence of Messrs. Merriman and Molteno in starting this Tambookie campaign, their disregard of all warnings to postpone it, or to carry it on in a carefully concerted manner, so as to ensure success with the least possible bloodshed, their evasion of satisfactory replies to all requests for information, and their avowed determination to let the Governor and military authorities have nothing to say to the conduct of operations which seriously compromise the position of Her Majesty's troops on both sides of the Kei, were among the proximate causes of the present ministerial crisis."

The Ministerial crisis referred to occurred as follows:—

Early in January, Mr. Molteno, having vainly endeavoured to induce Frere to return to Capetown and leave the seat of war, had come himself, at Frere's instance, to King William's Town. Between January 10 and February 1, Frere had no less than ten interviews with him, some of them lasting as much as four hours. Molteno insisted that the Colonial forces should be wholly independent of the Governor or the Commander of the Forces, and repeated this with wearisome iteration. Frere expressed his dissent, and required that at any rate the opinion of the Attorney-General should be taken before such a principle was acted upon. This Mr. Molteno refused to do; and it was evident that it was intended to constitute Mr. Merriman a military dictator independent of the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor. Mr. Merriman began to carry out this plan with a high hand. Every opportunity was taken to put slights on

Her Majesty's troops and their Commander, and to refuse, in the least courteous terms, the most reasonable suggestions for co-operation or assistance or even discussion. Orders not to supply information to the Governor or military authorities had been conveyed, not, perhaps, in direct terms, but in unmistakable hints to all Government officials. On receiving a memorandum from the Governor, in which he stated his objections to this course of action, as being both contrary to reason and illegal, Mr. Molteno observed that "it admitted of but one answer—a tender of his own resignation." Upon this, Frere intimated to him and to those of his colleagues who agreed with him, that their resignations would be accepted. Mr. Molteno thereupon withdrew his proposal to resign. Frere replied that in that case he had no alternative—if Ministers persisted in their illegal course—but to dismiss them; and he dismissed them accordingly.*

It was a bold step for him to take; for a Governor to dismiss on his sole responsibility a ministry which had hitherto possessed, and was supposed to possess still, the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, was an act without precedent in Colonial Constitutional government, and was likely to meet with severe criticism in a newly enfranchised Colony morbidly sensitive to dictation from the representative of the Queen. But to take any other course would have been to surrender the fundamental rights of the Crown, and to assent to what appeared to him gross acts of injustice and aggression on the natives; and he did not hesitate.†

He communicated by telegraph with some of the leading politicians at Capetown. But the difficulty of the situation,

* C. 2097, p. 90.

† See, as to this incident, Todd's "Constitutional Government," in which Frere's action is referred to as entirely constitutional and as establishing a valuable precedent.

the burden and responsibility of the war, and Mr. Molteno's hitherto unbroken majority in the House of Assembly made them shrink from accepting office. Fortunately, there was living on his farm in the midst of the disturbed district, and within a few miles of King William's Town, Mr. Gordon Sprigg, a member of the Legislative Assembly of some distinction, but who had never held office and had not as yet made any great mark. Born of a Puritan family in Essex, he had been familiarized with Parliamentary practice by reporting in the House of Commons, and had emigrated to South Africa while still a young man. He came, at Frere's summons, like Cincinnatus, literally from his farm, leaving his wife, who bravely remained in charge, and was brought away afterwards by a detachment of the Diamond Field Horse, just before the farm was attacked and the cattle carried off by the Kaffirs. After taking a few hours to consider, he undertook to form a Ministry, a task, under the circumstances, requiring no little courage and patriotism.

Frere writes to Mr. Herbert:—

"February 20, 1878.

"We are, as I need not tell you, in an extremely critical state, both here and in the Transvaal. It appears that the very strong measure I was obliged to take in removing Messrs. Molteno and Merriman was not a day too soon. Merriman's insane attempt to ape Gambetta had caused a serious aggravation of the war fever. Years of good management will not repair the evil the war has already done in the Gaika and Tambookie locations by his amateur campaign under civilian soldiers, and we have yet to see whether we shall be able to allay the excitement he has caused in the Waterkloof and its neighbourhood, which in former wars were the strongholds of the enemy, and where his orders to arrest Tini Macomo have already sent Macomo's people into the bush. . . .

"Mr. Sprigg has had to organize everything *de novo*, with such aid as the General and his department can give

him, which he very thankfully accepts. Merriman made a great parade of his Commandant-General of Colonial Forces, who was to supersede the General and his large staff and military department, and Griffith had been sent out, without being allowed to communicate with the General or Governor, to the Tambookie location near Queenstown. Of course we supposed he had some kind of instructions and something in the shape of Staff. But he appears to have neither. He was simply a screen, and Merriman managed all the various bodies of volunteers who were marching independently of each other about the country, cattle-lifting, shooting Kaffirs, and burning kraals, by his telegrams. . . .

"You must not suppose that I think for a moment it is the Governor's function to have anything to say to the selection of his Ministers under a responsible Government. I should have left the Parliament to deal with the old ones had it not become a struggle for existence. There was really no alternative, but to give over the country to two or three months of unchecked Kaffir Civil War, or to make a stand in defence of the constitution.

"But I have no desire to act as the Constitutional Colonial Patriot. Mr. Sprigg may do that, and it is really very patriotic in him to take office in the face of such difficulties. I shall confine myself to the very prosaic office of having asserted an important prerogative of the Crown."

Meantime, in the Transkei, and where the regular troops were acting, matters were improving. On December 29 and 30, Major Moore, with forty young recruits of the Connaught Rangers and thirty police, repulsed the attacks of large numbers of the enemy, and reopened the communications. More Burghers, Irregular Horse and native levies took the field. And in February and March H.M.'s 90th Regiment, 2nd battalion 24th, and a battery of artillery arrived from England. On February 7, a combined attack of the Gaikas and Galekas was made near the Quintana mountain, on a force commanded by Captain Upcher, which, though small, was fortunately complete in all arms, well posted, and

thoroughly well handled. Kreli was in the field with his witch-doctor and his sons, and Sandilli, a weak man, with little personal love of fighting. Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"February 17, 1878.

"They seemed to have had great hopes of crushing Upcher by enveloping his position, and then of raising the Colony. They came on in four divisions very steadily, and in the days of Brown Bess would certainly have closed, and being eight or ten to one would possibly have overwhelmed our people.

"They held on after several shells had burst among their advanced masses, but they could not live under the fire of the Martini-Henry. The 24th are old, steady shots, and every bullet told, and when they broke, Carrington's Horse followed them up and made the success more decided than in any former action.

"It has been in many respects a very instructive action; not only as regards the vastly increased power in our improved weapons and organization, but as showing the Kaffir persistence in the new tactics of attacking us in the open in masses. At present this is their fatal error, but it might not be so if they had a few renegade foreigners as drill-masters; and we find many indications that they may ere long possess themselves of all such desiderata, cannon and artillerymen included."

And to the Duke of Cambridge he writes—

"February 20, 1878.

"From the very first the Royal troops, though consisting but of a single battalion, without cavalry or artillery, were the backbone of everything, the one force on which we could rely, and whilst H.M.'s 1-24th held the line of railway and the towns, the volunteer forces were able to go forward. As the rebellion spread and the 88th and 90th came up with artillery, the best part of the severe fighting has been by Her Majesty's troops. . . . The General will have told your Royal Highness what good reason we have had to be thoroughly satisfied in every way with Colonel Glyn and his regiment the 1-24th. . . . As to the feeling of the Colony being adverse to

Her Majesty's army, it is, I believe, here as elsewhere, one of the most popular of our institutions; but for party and selfish personal objects, it suited the late Ministry of the Colony to get up a cry against 'imperial domination and military despotism, etc.' The attempt, however, signally failed. . . ."

The hilly region comprised in the disturbed district was extensive, the mountain summits being "sometimes higher than the Grampians," steep, and clothed with almost impenetrable bush of hard, thorny wood, "worse than any but the densest bamboo jungle." General Thesiger, who had just succeeded Sir Arthur Cunynghame as Commander-in-Chief, had but two thousand British Regulars.* And most of the volunteers, whose time had expired, had returned to their homes, so that operations had to be suspended during three weeks of April. But the mountain and forest paths were now known, and at important points there were loyal natives, or German settlers. The insurgents were becoming discouraged; matters were looking brighter, and Frere was so well satisfied with Thesiger's management that after seven months' sojourn in barracks at King William's Town he was able to return to Capetown. Towards the end of April offensive operations were vigorously and successfully resumed. Sandilli was not long after killed by a stray shot, Tini Macomo was taken prisoner, and Kreli became a fugitive. On June 29 an amnesty was proclaimed to all who would lay down their arms, though the spirit of unrest which pervaded the natives throughout South Africa at this time prevented the Transkei from being brought to a settled condition till some time afterwards.

Frere had formed a favourable opinion of the capacity of the Kaffirs, and considered them to be, as compared

* In the war of 1851–3, which lasted nearly three years, Sir George Cathcart had had thirteen thousand troops.

with the martial races of India, easily governed and susceptible of rapid and permanent civilization. The "School Kaffirs," as they were called, that is, those who, under the teaching of the missionaries, had adopted, subject to occasional relapses, European dress and habits, had as a rule remained loyal throughout the war, those of them especially, generally a small minority, who had become Christians. There was one remarkable exception in the case of Umhala, a cousin of Sandilli, an able, well-educated man, who held the office of interpreter in the Court of the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate of King William's Town.

This man's conduct had been suspicious, and after the war he was tried for sedition. For the prosecution his diary was produced, a strange jumble of fierce ejaculations and devout wishes for the success of the rebels; but no overt act of rebellion was proved against him, and he was acquitted. The Bishop of Grahamstown applied to Frere on his behalf that he might be reinstated in his office. To this letter Frere replied, going minutely into all the details of the case, and pointing out how, notwithstanding his acquittal, he was disqualified for holding an office under Government. He concludes as follows:—

"September 23, 1879.

"You can explain to him that it is his utter apparent oblivion of any sense of duty to our symbol of sovereignty, to the Crown, or its Colonial representative, to the Colonial Government, or to the Constitution as by law established, that cuts him off from my sympathy and disables me from suggesting to my Ministers his re-employment in any of the many positions for which he is otherwise, by nature and education, so well fitted. I can sympathize with Tell or Hofer, with a Chouan chief or with Hector McIvor; they had belief in violated rights and other causes of discontent and excuses for rising against the Government as it existed, and they believed they could set up a better; but I have no more sympathy with a Fenian than with a

French Communist, and least of all with an educated and intellectual man, who, under pretence of improving the world, attempts to upset the Government as it is, and to bring back chaos. . . .

"In Umhala's case I did my best before he left the Government service to induce Mr. Brownlee to deport him out of harm's way. Mr. Brownlee, I believe, gave him every facility to go, short of deportation like a child. I can see great room for pitying Umhala's weakness which prevented his going, but while he is unrepentant and evinces no contrition for his false step, and for his infidelity to Government, even though it went no further than feeling, I cannot see any good ground for his re-employment.

"Umhala's case seems to me to illustrate one serious but little-noticed defect in much of our teaching in this country where natives are concerned. I allude to any direct teaching of the duty of obedience to the law. Among ourselves such teaching would be usually quite superfluous. The duty is indirectly taught in our families and among our schoolfellows, better than it could be possibly learnt in any formal lesson, and is thus more perfectly learnt and realized among the most law-abiding nation in Christendom.

"But the Kaffir has no such advantages, and the consequence is that controversies and arguments, which with us can never shake the foundation of civil allegiance, have for them a significance quite different from what they have for us. The Queen and the Constitution have no more ardent and loyal supporters than are to be found among our controversialists, reformers, and anti-reformers of all classes and creeds, but the Kaffir who has learnt the whole duty of Christian man, with the exception of that law of civil obedience to constituted authority which his teacher had never occasion to learn, may naturally translate much of the argument into assegais and red ochre, and be dangerously perverted from obedience to laws which really hold society together.

"It seems to me that in most of the native schools I have seen, there was some room for direct teaching of Christian duties, of civil obedience to law, which in our home schools have been little needed for many generations."

To Sir M. Hicks-Beach he writes—

"June 1, 1878.

"Here, as in India in the early days of native education through the English language, the higher the English education received by a native the greater are his trials. The educated men of his own nation are too few to form a society for him. He can rarely find as his wife a woman sufficiently educated to understand him. He has new wants, wishes, and aspirations, and little prospect of gratifying them. . . .

"Very little has been done hitherto to make use of this new element of educated natives otherwise than as teachers, and very partially in commerce. The attempts to turn it to account in the public service have been very few, and have not, as a rule, been judicious.

"There is nothing like a native branch of the Civil Service, such as is so useful in India. There is a great want of clerks and interpreters in the English offices, but I know of no native employed as a Government servant in any office of trust or responsibility except as interpreter. Chiefs have been allowed greater power, both within and without the Colony, but it is by right of birth as chiefs, not as Government servants. I cannot find a single instance of an educated native being employed to do any Government work which required a good education, such as magisterial or revenue duty, simply because he was fit for it, and because Government ordered and empowered him to do it on European and not on Kaffir principles.

"When anything of the kind is proposed, it strikes even the best friends of the natives, as unpractical, if not an impossibility, though probably nothing would do so much to abolish the evil influences of tribal chiefship; and few things seem to me easier.

"None of the objections I have heard stated appear to me of any force. It can hardly be said that educated natives, carefully selected and trained, are unfit for the duties or responsibilities of deciding the ordinary police or magisterial duties of a Kaffir kraal, when we allow uneducated natives, not selected and not trained, but simply because they are chiefs, to exercise, almost unchecked, absolute power over the lives and fortunes of hundreds and thousands of their fellow-tribesmen.

"It seems to me that a time has arrived for altering a state of things so anomalous. I think a beginning might be made by organizing a service, which, without being exclusively native, should give opportunities for the employment of natives in the public service and for advancing them when found worthy.

"I would limit its sphere for the present to the Kaffrarian province Transkei."

Just as he was emerging successfully from the crisis in February, the news had reached Frere that Lord Carnarvon had resigned office. It was a great blow to him; and the event proved that it was a great misfortune for South Africa. Lord Carnarvon was not a great statesman. He was deficient in knowledge and perception of men and events, and made not a few mistakes. In speech and writing he was apt to be prolix and tedious. But he was an honourable, single-minded man, with a high standard of duty and a clear, consistent purpose in public life. He worked hard and did his best for the Colonies, over whose affairs he presided with no ulterior purpose of selfish or party advantage. Frere and he were in entire harmony as to South African policy. In striving to bring about federation, they had an object before them, very difficult of attainment, and impossible for any Governor to effect, unless he were loyally supported by the Colonial Office and the Government at home.

The Eastern Question was then in a critical stage, and unfortunately it happened that on the question of sending the British fleet to the Bosphorus at a particular time, Lord Carnarvon differed from the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet. It was apparently a difference not so much of principle as of mode of action and expediency, on a matter outside his own department, and as to which his share of responsibility would have been comparatively small. But with his deficient sense of proportion, he failed to see that, having

initiated a great and bold course of policy in South Africa, he was under a specially strong obligation to remain at the helm himself in order to uphold those whom he had selected to carry it out, and that in abandoning office at a critical time he deprived Frere of a support which was essential to his success. His resignation was the first blow to the prospect of federation and of a consistent policy in South Africa. From that time forward to the end of Frere's life, whichever party was in power, the policy of the Colonial Office and of the British Government came to be inspired less and less by a consistent purpose in the interests of South Africa and the Empire, and was more and more swayed by the desire of conciliating at any price parliamentary adherents or opponents, however ignorant or careless these might be of the facts or rights of the case.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"February 17, 1878.

"Reuter's telegram, saying that you had left the Ministry, has, without any figure of speech, utterly taken the heart out of me. I try to frame all kinds of theories by which you are again at the helm in the Colonial Office till South African confederation is carried, or at soonest till my share in the work is finished, for I feel my interest in the work, and my hopes of carrying it through, sadly diminished by the possibility of your leaving the post which has so identified your name with the fortunes of South Africa. It is peculiarly trying to us just now, when there seems at last a prospect of a break in the clouds. . . .

"If you have really left the Colonial Office, it adds another, and the strongest of all reasons for my wishing to follow you, and to rest after forty-four years of continuous service with very little holiday."

Lord Carnarvon was succeeded at the Colonial Office by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.

The successful termination of the war had smoothed the way of the new Ministry in meeting the Legislature.

Frere writes to the Hon. Cecil Ashley:—

"July 14, 1878.

"When Parliament met, the ex-Ministers in the House and their friends in the newspapers were loud in demanding all the papers and correspondence regarding their dismissal. I left Mr. Sprigg at full liberty to produce what he liked, and the first batch staggered the friends of the ex-Ministers; and after another batch or two 'Argus' gave them up, and they have literally not had a single advocate in any leading or respectable paper in the Colony, or elsewhere in South Africa.

"Merriman brought forward a motion condemning me for their dismissal. He subsequently changed it to a condemnation of poor Sir A. Cunynghame, but after a long debate he was defeated by a larger majority than Molteno could ever boast of.

"Sprigg then brought forward his defence measures—a disarming Act, reforms of Police, Burghers, and Volunteers, and a paid Yeomanry Bill—and they were carried with little alteration beyond what improved them.

"Then came their financial statement, the first full and plain and honest account the House had had for some years. This made a very favourable impression; and then taxing-bills, to increase some of the custom duties and to impose a house-tax and an excise duty, were all well received. There has been a great fight over the excise, but I think it will be carried.

"Finally, Sprigg proposed a vote of thanks to Thesiger and all his forces, including, in his speech proposing it, some very handsome words to Cunynghame. Mr. Molteno, as leader of the Opposition, seconded it. It was carried unanimously; and the presentation of the address to the General and Commodore in person, with all their officers, and all the rank and fashion of Capetown in the galleries, was, I am told, a sight worth seeing—though the Governor, for 'Constitutional reasons,' could not be present."

This was the last session of the first Cape Legislative Assembly. The new elections, which by custom extended

over several months, were about to take place, and the Sprigg Ministry, to Frere's great satisfaction, in their programme promised a hearty support to the policy of Confederation.

Mr. Sprigg continued to be Colonial Secretary during the remainder of Frere's stay at the Cape. From first to last they worked together in complete harmony.

The atmosphere of a Constitutional Government by Ministers responsible to a Parliament, was to Frere, notwithstanding his Indian official training and experience, much more congenial than that of a despotic or Crown Government; and his decision, absence of reserve, and tenderness for local susceptibilities, gave him great influence and authority. Mr. Sprigg reciprocated his confidence and regarded him with the warmest feelings of esteem and respect; and in his administration combined, to an extent seldom attained by the chief of a Colonial Ministry, devotion to the interests of the Colony with an equally jealous care for the honour and integrity of the Empire.

Frere was anxious that the services of the Colonists who had distinguished themselves in the late war should not pass without recognition by the British Government. His reiterated requests on their behalf having been but partially and tardily responded to, he writes some months later to Mr. Herbert:—

"January 12, 1879.

"I wish you could impress on Sir Michael the evils of delay in conferring any honours on the Colonial Forces. It is now many months since I adopted the very unusual course of sending officially a request from my Ministers that I would move Her Majesty's Government to recognize the services of Frost and Brabant. They fully deserved the compliment for services in the field, but I should have left that to the General had I not seen the great political

importance of honouring the men who had come forward earliest and most effectually to support the gallant little English farmer, who left his 'laager' on the rebel frontier to help me when the Molteno-Merriman conspiracy to humble Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and through him the English Government, was so nearly successful. Had it not been for Mr. Sprigg, the Gaika rebellion would have been still smouldering on, with its crop of reprisals and massacres, and the inevitable Royal Commissions of Inquiry and party debates in Parliament, with no result to compensate for increased colonial irritation and misgovernment. . . ."

CHAPTER XIX.

THE ZULU WAR.

Native combination — The Zulus — Cetywayo's installation — Slaughter of girls—Daily victims—Frere goes to Natal—The disputed territory—Cetywayo's threatening attitude—The Ultimatum—Reinforcements asked for—Confidence of British Staff Officers—Isandhlwana—Panic—Piet Uys—Frere's journey to the Transvaal—The Boer Camp—The Memorial—Shepstone as an administrator—The Camp breaks up—Censure of Frere—His unpopularity in England and popularity at the Cape.

THE events in the midst of which Frere had been living at King William's Town, and the intelligence and reports of magistrates that came to him from all quarters, had proved to him that the Galeka and Gaika risings, the war with Secocoeni, and all the recent outbreaks of the natives were not isolated or accidental occurrences, but the result of a general conviction that the English power could be overthrown, which, like the spirit which was abroad in India at the time of the Mutiny, pervaded the natives everywhere.

He writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert:—

"March 18, 1878.

"I do not think I ever expressed to you my conviction which has been gradually and unwillingly growing that Shepstone and others of experience in the country, were right as to the existence of a wish among the great chiefs to make this war a general and simultaneous rising of Kaffirdom against white civilization.

"I did not at first believe it, owing to the obvious selfishness and fondness for isolation which characterizes the feelings and actions of all chiefs, great and small, and

prevents effectual and continuous combination of any kind for any common purpose.

"But the conviction has been forced on me by a hundred little bits of evidence from different quarters, that though they are incapable of combination and compact in our fashion of leagues and treaties for a common object, there was a widespread feeling among them, from Secocoeni to Sandilli, that the time was come for them all to join to resist the flood of new ideas and ways which threatened to sweep away the idle, sensuous elysium of Kaffirdom, such as Gaika and Chaka and Dingaan fought for and enjoyed; that they too had got guns and could shoot as well or better than the white man, and had, besides, numbers and valour on their side; that all they wanted was union and discipline, etc.

"This sort of talk seems to have been the staple, of late, of the endless embassies which are always passing between the chiefs great and small, and employment in which is the favourite amusement of elderly Kaffir gentlemen who are getting too old for hunting or fighting.

"They are sent in twos or threes, rarely alone (for who would trust a single Councillor by himself?), with several attachés on every imaginable occasion, and it is a science to guess, from the rank of the Councillor sent to meet the envoys, from the fatness of the beast killed in their honour, from the comfort of the hut assigned for lodging, from the position of the mat on which the chief seats them in audience, and from the tones of the grunts he utters, as they very slowly and with many pauses deliver their message—what he thinks of it much more than from what he may say, which is rarely to the point, but rather some clever parry or fence with the address, if the subject be delicate or difficult—so that many envoys come and go without the Chief committing himself. Thus a mission comes from the Zulus to the Pondos about a marriage, and in the course of an audience the Zulu envoy observes that Cetywayo's English cow (Shepstone) had neglected her own calf (the Zulus) and was giving milk to a strange calf (the Transvaal Boers). And according to the tone or emphasis of the Pondo Chief's grunts on hearing this news, he will go on and develop his views or drop the subject.

"In this childish kind of way, though they may never form any treaty or league in our fashion, they may arrange

a good deal of combined action. Their weakness is, whatever they do is always out of time—too early or too late. Thus there can be little doubt that Kreli relied on sympathy and help from many chiefs besides those who have sided with him, and he is said now to tell his people that he will wait till after the mealie harvest when the Pondos and Cetywayo will send him help. But he precipitated the outbreak in August, before his allies had screwed themselves up to the fighting point. Sandilli, on the other hand, was too late, and others, who certainly received messages to sound them, and did not, like some of the smaller Gaika chiefs and Siwani and Kama, report the overtures to us at the time, are still wavering, and will, I hope, keep quiet, if Kreli and Sandilli are effectually put down.

"This kind of thing is evidently going on along the Transvaal frontier. If Shepstone is able to give Secocoeni a decided check, it will tell on the Zulus and keep them quiet for a time; but you must not expect peace on that border till the chiefs have satisfied themselves who is master. When once they have learnt that lesson it must be our own fault if they forget it; for unless they are very unlike their cousins here, they are more easily governed than most Indian nations, but they must be *governed*, not neglected and left to follow their own devices. They are very teachable, and can be made to take all the cost and much of the labour of their own government, but the impulse and the standards of right and wrong must be European."

By far the most powerful of the native tribes in South Africa were the Zulus, and it was to them and to their King Cetywayo that the others looked as their leaders and champions in the contest.*

The Zulu power had been built up by Chaka, a fugitive chief, who early in the century visited Capetown, and there, watching the British soldiers exercise, discerned and

* "Yes, you have beaten us," said an old Galeka warrior to a native magistrate—"you have beaten us well, but there," said he, pointing eastward, "there are the Ama Zulu warriors! Can you beat them? They say not! Go and try. Don't trouble any more about us, but beat *them*, and we shall be quiet enough."—"A Sketch of the Kaffir and Zulu Wars," by Captain Hallam Parr, p. 101.

appreciated the power conferred by strict discipline and drill. With great ability he set to work to utilize his knowledge. Raising an army, small at first, he increased it, as a snowball is increased, by forcing every vigorous, able-bodied man, without distinction of friend or foe, into the ranks, sparing a certain proportion of the women, but killing every one else, man, woman, or child, over the whole face of the country, who would not add, directly or indirectly, to its fighting power. An estimate put the number of victims in the wars of his reign (1813–1828) at a million.

Chaka was killed and succeeded by Dingaan his brother, a savage of the same type. It was in his reign that the Boers, trekking over the Drakensberg, first came in contact with the Zulus, and, entering Natal, found it almost depopulated by them. Dingaan received the Boer deputation and its leader Retief with apparent friendliness, entered into an agreement with them for the cession of land, gave them hospitality, and in the midst of the feast fell upon and slew the whole number, seventy, and thirty servants, in cold blood. The Zulus then made an attack on the unsuspecting Boer families in the waggons and killed all whom they found, six hundred men, women, and children. The Dutch survivors were, however, strong enough to avenge the massacre. They killed Dingaan and three thousand of his warriors in fight, and set up his brother Panda as King in his stead; and the Zulu power was for a time cowed and ceased to be aggressive. Panda's reign of twenty-eight years was, compared with that of his predecessors, peaceful. As he got old, his two sons Umbelazi and Cetywayo contended for the succession, and in 1856 a fierce battle took place between them and their respective followers, in which Cetywayo was victorious, and Umbelazi defeated and killed.

In 1861, the Natal Government, thinking it desirable that a fixed succession in Zululand should be established and recognized, sent Shepstone, at Panda's request, to perform the ceremony of Cetywayo's installation as heir-apparent. At the last moment Cetywayo's pride revolted at receiving nomination at the hands of a white man, and he came to the meeting with the intention of killing Shepstone, who found himself surrounded by a mob of excited, yelling savages, and for two hours thought every moment would be his last. An eloquent address by old Panda on the duties of hospitality, and Shepstone's perfect coolness and courage saved his life. Instead of killing him, the Zulus declared that as the nominator of their future King, he must hold the rank of a King himself, and from that time forward Cetywayo addressed him as his "father Somtseu," and he became a power in the land.

Twelve years later, in 1873, the message came that Panda was dead, and with it a request that Shepstone, as Cetywayo's "father," would come and install him on the throne. Twice was the request refused by the Government of Natal, but on its being pressed a third time, consent was given on the express condition of Cetywayo making certain promises for the better government of his country; and Shepstone proceeded to Zululand and proclaimed Cetywayo with due ceremony. On this occasion Shepstone, by his presence and influence, prevented the human slaughter taking place which was a customary part of the ceremonial; and he went on to proclaim, as the result of a consultation with the King and his Council, and with much emphasis, that henceforth indiscriminate shedding of blood should cease in the land; that no man should be killed till after fair trial, or without the King's leave; and that for minor offences loss of property should be substituted for the death penalty. Cetywayo further promised, though

unwillingly, that the European missionaries then, resident in the land should remain unmolested, as in Panda's time.

In spite of these apparent advances in the direction of friendship, it was soon evident that Cetywayo meant to imitate the example of Chaka and of Dingaan rather than that of his father Panda. He kept his promise as regards the missionaries so far as their own personal safety was concerned, but their converts were in several cases and on various pretexts killed, in one instance under the very eyes of the missionary and his wife, so that their occupation being gone, they were finally constrained to leave the country, two only remaining up to the end of 1878. The old military system of Chaka was revived with stringency. A Zulu who had not "washed his spear," that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. The unmarried men and the unmarried women were formed into separate regiments and classes; and a regiment or class of either might reach middle age, failing an opportunity of fighting, without being allowed to marry. Peace under Panda had been of such unwonted duration that a grievance had thus arisen.

In September, 1876, came a story of massacre startling even in Zulu annals. A number of girls had without leave married men of corresponding age, instead of the men of an older regiment for whom they were destined. Large numbers of girls and others connected with them were in consequence ruthlessly slaughtered in cold blood and their bodies exposed on the public ways; and when the parents of some of them buried the corpses, they too were killed.*

There was little disposition on the part of the Natal

* Sir H. Bulwer to Lord Carnarvon, October 13, 1876. (C. 1748, p. 198–9.)

Government to criticize the internal affairs of the Zulus, but this outrage was too monstrous to be passed over; and Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, sent a message to Cetywayo to remonstrate with him for this breach of his coronation promises.

The Zulus are adepts in the arts and devices of diplomacy, and on subsequent occasions Cetywayo was careful to excuse his conduct, and to mask his designs under specious professions of friendliness; but on this occasion he was candid enough. Instead of denying or excusing the outrages, he replied:—

"Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone I would not kill? Did he tell the white people I made such an arrangement? Because if he did he has deceived them. I do kill. But do not consider that I have done anything yet in the way of killing. Why do the white people start at nothing? I have not yet begun; I have yet to kill; it is the custom of our nation and I shall not depart from it.* Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about his laws? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, and so throw the large kraal which I govern into the water. My people will not listen unless they are killed; and while wishing to be friends with the English, I do not agree to give my people over to be governed by laws sent to me by them. Have I not asked the English to allow me to wash my spears since the death of my father Umpandi, and they have kept playing with me all this time, treating me like a child? Go back and tell the English that I shall now act on my own account, and if they wish me to agree to their laws I shall leave and become a wanderer; but before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted. Go back and tell the white men this, and let them hear it well.

* The same savage propensity was shown in the treatment of animals. Oxen would be torn in pieces alive by men as a trial of strength. When a war with white men was impending, a black ox and a white ox would be skinned alive, and it was held to be an omen of success for the black or white race according as the black or white ox survived the operation longest.

The Governor of Natal and I are equal; he is Governor of Natal and I am Governor here." *

This was plain speaking. Writing to Lord Carnarvon with reference to this message, Sir H. Bulwer says—

"November 2, 1876.

"The reply of Cetywayo to the message which I sent him is an outward expression of the present temper of the King. Incited by the young men of the nation, urged on by his own desire to distinguish himself and to wash the assegais of his people, which has not been done since his father's death, and elated at the result of the conflict between the Government of the Transvaal and Secocoeni, he has for some time past evinced a great desire for war. It is evident, if the information which has reached me is correct, and there is no reason to doubt its correctness, that he has not only been preparing for war, but that he has been sounding the way with a view to a combination of the native races against the white men. Whether that combination has been effected, or whether it can be effected, we are not in a position yet to form an opinion, but that messages have been passing on the subject between Cetywayo and other native chiefs there can be little doubt.

"In the present message Cetywayo throws off any concealment of his intention to wash his spears, and repudiates the moral influence which this Government has exercised with him since his father's death, and especially since his formal recognition and installation as King of the Zulus by Sir T. Shepstone, and which he was only too ready to accept and be guided by so long as the support of this Government was found necessary for the maintenance of his power and even for the safety of his person." †

This was five months before Frere's arrival as Governor and before the annexation of the Transvaal. That event altered our relations with the Zulus greatly for the worse. Regarding the Boers as his natural and hereditary enemies, Cetywayo had courted the friendship of the

* C. 165, p. 216. † C. 1748, p. 215.

British and of his "father Somtseu" as a protection against them in case of need. Unfortunately there had been too much disposition on the part of the Natal Government to accept this position, and to regard the Zulus and the Boers as dangerous neighbours who could be played off against each other. The Boers were now British subjects, and such a policy was no longer possible.

"The fact is," writes Frere to General Ponsonby, "that while the Boer Republic was a rival and semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus as one might a tame wolf who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly, and now that both flocks belong to us we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf's ravages."

At first Cetywayo was puzzled what to make of the new situation. Shepstone, instead of being his "father Somtseu," was now chief of the Boers.

"Probably," writes Sir H. Bulwer (July 19, 1877), "he has no wish to try conclusions with the English unnecessarily, but his temper of mind is such that he is quite prepared to fight, not merely to defend himself and his authority as an independent King, but to fight on the slightest provocation, regardless of all consequences." *

In May, 1877, the missionaries—Norwegian, Swedish, Hanoverian, and English—sent a memorial to Sir H. Bulwer, saying that the number of people killed annually since Cetywayo's coronation, instead of being less, was greater than ever.

"The chief work of the King and his Izinduna *every day* is inquiring into or originating witchcraft cases, too many of which end in one or more persons being killed." †

* C. 1961, p. 35.

† "Smelling out," *i.e.* conviction of being a witch, was a sort of established legal fiction which generally preceded the killing of any one whose life or property the chief wanted to take. The motive was generally malice or plunder, not *bonâ fide* superstition.

"No sun," it was said, "rises or sets without its victim in Zululand." The Christian converts were especially selected for murder; their protection as such was, however, a matter in which the British Government rightly declined to interfere.*

In June Cetywayo asked Mr. Fynney, the Border Agent at Stanger, who was then at the King's kraal at Ulundi, to get leave for him from Shepstone to make a raid, only "one small swoop" to wash his assegais, intending to attack the Swazi. This being refused, Mr. Bell, a Commissioner for Native Affairs near the Swazi border, reported that Cetywayo's messengers had brought word to the Swazi

* "I request that you will cause the missionaries to understand distinctly that Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake to compel the King to permit the maintenance of mission stations in Zululand, and that it is desirable for them (if they cannot live there in peace) to retire for the present from the country."—Lord Carnarvon to Sir H. Bulwer, August 31, 1877. C. 1961, p. 60. Subsequently there was a despatch from Sir M. Hicks-Beach to the same effect.

There is an entry in Frere's private diary (Nov. 12) of what was told him of the Zulus by Bishop Schreuder, a Norwegian missionary.

"Bishop Schreuder's account of Zulus. Chaka was a really great man, cruel and unscrupulous, but with many great qualities. Dingaan was simply a beast on two legs. Panda was a weaker and less able man, but kindly and really grateful, a very rare quality among Zulus. He used to kill sometimes, but never wantonly or continuously.

"No doubt Cetywayo has greatly increased killing of late. Bishop Schreuder knows of many cases; but in general no one knows more than that the man has disappeared. It is not safe to talk, inquire, nor to tell tales. Cetywayo is an able man, but for cold, selfish pride, cruelty, and untruthfulness, worse than any of his predecessors. He has a curious want of gratitude, and will never acknowledge the slightest obligation to any one.

"Chaka never ordered torture. He always ordered the execution of men by instant death. Cetywayo of late has, Bishop Schreuder knows, ordered a man's lips to be cut off for biting another, and a man's arms and legs to be cut off, after which he lived three days."

Bishop Schreuder's mission-station was at Entumeni, in Zululand. He had lived many years in the country, was well acquainted with Cetywayo, and frequently saw him. He remained there to the last, after nearly all the other missionaries had gone.

King's kraal "that he wished the Amaswazi to enter into an alliance with him against the white man, as they would then be able to attack the white man from two sides, and that he wished to begin at once," with threats in case of non-compliance.

Shepstone wrote (December 1, 1877) to Frere:—

"It is said that Cetywayo is being advised from Natal, and it is commonly reported in Zululand that his adviser is Bishop Colenso. Indeed, Cetywayo all but said so. If this be so, I am afraid there is no chance of a peaceful solution of the question, for Cetywayo will put a very different construction on the Bishop's words to what the Bishop intends."

And again—

"December 7, 1877.

"The Zulus do not believe that Kreli is in the least getting the worst in his conflict with you, and pretend to have heard from sources of their own that he has always been successful in every encounter with your forces. Such reports are doubtless circulated to keep up the excitement of the war-party, and to stimulate the feelings of all in the direction of a struggle with us. Everything seems to me to show that this difficulty is a preconcerted matter, and that Cetywayo really believes in his power to overcome us all without much difficulty. . . . One thing is quite certain, that if we are forced into hostilities we cannot stop short of breaking down the Zulu power, which, after all, is the root and real strength of all native difficulties in South Africa."

And a week later he writes—

"December 15, 1877.

"My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I am satisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is to show that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state of great apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontier districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstrom to hold themselves in readiness should I find it necessary to call upon them for active service." *

* That Lord Carnarvon was at this time alive to the imminent

The immediate danger of collision between the Boers and the Zulus at this time arose from a long-standing dispute as to a belt of territory on the border, occupied by Boer farmers and claimed by them as having been sold to them by the Zulus, but which the Zulus asserted had only been let to the Boers to graze cattle on, for a limited time, and which they now wanted restored. Shepstone had a conference with the Zulu Prime Minister

danger to be apprehended from Cetywayo as the chief leader and instigator of rebellion, and was prepared to face a war with him, is shown by the following despatch to Frere, dated January 24, 1878 (C. 2000, p. 94) :—

"It seems certain that the Zulu King has derived from his messengers the unfortunate idea that the Kaffirs are able to cope with the Colony on more than equal terms, and this belief has, as was inevitable, produced a very threatening change in his language and conduct towards the Transvaal Government. It is only too probable that a savage chief, such as Cetywayo, supported by a powerful army, already excited by the recent successes of a neighbouring tribe over the late Government of the Transvaal, may now become fired with the idea of victory over Her Majesty's forces, and that a deliberate attempt upon Her Majesty's territories may ensue. Should this unfortunately happen, you must understand that at whatever sacrifice it is imperatively necessary that Her Majesty's forces in Natal and the Transvaal must be reinforced by the immediate despatch of the military and naval contingents now operating in the Cape, or such portion of them as may be required. This is necessary not only for the safety of the Transvaal, for the defence of which Her Majesty's Government are immediately concerned, but also in the interest of the Cape, since a defeat of the Zulu King would act more powerfully than any other means in disheartening the native races of South Africa."

See also, on this point, his speech in the debate in the House of Lords, March 26, 1879, in which he says :—

"When I resigned the seals of office in January, 1878, the position of affairs was as precarious as possibly could be, and nothing but necessity at home compelled the authorities to hold their hands. . . . On August 12 Sir H. Bulwer says : 'There has been for the last eight or nine months a danger of collision with the Zulus at any moment.' And in November, 1878, he writes, 'The system of Government in the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement seems hopeless. We should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetywayo."'

and Indunas on the Blood River on October 18, 1877; and was "surprised and puzzled" at the "self-asserting, aggressive, and defiant spirit" in which he was met by them.* Ultimately it was agreed that the disputed territory should be the subject of a formal arbitration; but the Zulus, too impatient to wait, had attacked and burnt several of the farm houses, and seized or burnt the crops, and built a military kraal on the disputed territory, the Boers and their families having to fly for their lives.

Shepstone writes—

"December 25, 1877.

"The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief which Cetywayo's conduct has caused."

And again (April 30, 1878)—

"I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetywayo. He receives directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal."

Thus, during the anxious months spent at King William's Town in the midst of the Transkei war and troubles, there had been coming to Frere from the Zulu border frequent tidings of threatening danger, of plunder and violence, of government without the strength to make its authority respected, of the dark shadow of an impending native war more formidable than any which had preceded it.

A Commission had been appointed by Sir H. Bulwer in February, 1878, to report on the Boundary Question between the Zulus and the Boers, consisting of Mr. Gallwey,

* C. 2079, p. 54.

Attorney-General of Natal, Mr. J. W. Shepstone, a brother of Sir Theophilus, acting Secretary for Native Affairs, and Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E. They held their sittings at Rorke's Drift, which is near the south-west end of the disputed territory; but they do not seem to have personally visited or examined the country in question. The Boers produced written documents, as evidence in support of their case. Written agreements as between civilized men and savages, few of whom can read or write, are always open to suspicion, but it was a questionable act summarily to reject them all, as the Commissioners did.

Their Report was produced in July. It was greatly in favour of the Zulus. Frere, as High Commissioner, had to make the final award.

As long as the Gaika and Galeka outbreaks were the chief causes of anxiety, Frere, as has been related, was detained near the seat of danger, at King William's Town. When that passed he had to return to Capetown. In September he was at last free to go elsewhere. Colonel Lanyon, the Administrator of Griqualand West, was anxious that he should go to Kimberley, the capital of that province. Colonel Lanyon had written in May, from a place on the Orange River, that for a hundred and fifty miles of his march thither from Kimberley he had found the country deserted and all the farmers in laager, "the attitude of the natives being insolent, and cattle-stealing, accompanied by acts of violence, not uncommon." In Pondoland there was apprehension of trouble with the natives. In the Transvaal discontent was on the increase among the Boers; and Secocoeni, who had successfully defied the Boer levies, and was closely allied with Cetywayo, was ready to break out again. There was the disputed territory award to make, and there were Cetywayo's unwashed spears like

a thunder cloud on the frontier. Everywhere the outlook was stormy; yet everywhere those in charge were disposed to let matters drift rather than incur the responsibility of taking, or even of recommending decisive action. Frere was, for once, in doubt and perplexity to decide where his presence was most needed and whither to go. But just then came a letter from Sir M. Hicks-Beach which directed him to go first to Natal to settle matters there.

He left Capetown accordingly by steamer for Durban, arriving there September 23, and went on to Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, where he was received and remained as the guest of Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor. With him went Mr. William Littleton, his private secretary; Colonel Forestier Walker, acting military secretary (in the absence on sick leave of Captain Hallam Parr, who rejoined him in November); Lieutenant Coghill, 24th Regiment, his acting aide-de-camp; and also the Rev. George Stegmann, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, a man of high character intelligence, and attainments, who acted as his Dutch interpreter and secretary, and was of the greatest use to him, especially during his subsequent visit to the Transvaal, for he was justly held in high estimation by the Dutch, both for his own merits and also on account of his father's former services as peacemaker and mediator in the Transvaal.

Natal was a Crown Colony. The Legislature—as altered and settled by a law passed under the auspices of Sir Garnet Wolseley, when he was acting as Administrator of Natal for five months in 1875—consisted of five executive, eight nominee, and fifteen elected members. The Government, not being dependent on a majority of the Legislature, was subjected to little criticism, and underwent little change in its composition and traditions. The Colony

had been till lately isolated from any other, and there had been little thought of concerted action with the Cape.

With the exception of Major Mitchell,* the Colonial Secretary, Frere found no one from whom he could get much help. Most of the local officials had strong prejudices against the Transvaal Boers, against Dutchmen in general against the Cape Colony, its ways and its ministers, against advocates of responsible government, military men, and all non-officials and outsiders.

He writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"December 8, 1878.

"Altogether I find the difficulties in the way of harmonious working for the good of Her Majesty's service not less than they were this time last year in the Cape Colony. It of course makes an immense difference that Sir Henry Bulwer is a thorough gentleman in every feeling and almost fanatically just and loyal."

And to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

"January 12, 1879.

"No country farmer, with a bunch of gold seals dangling from his watch-pocket and a well-filled purse and pocket-book equally manifest under the broad-cloth of his garments, dozing among thieves in a Whitechapel 'boozing den,' had ever a greater or more undeserved escape than this Colony has had from its Zulu neighbours.

"I was puzzled at first why the Zulus had let it alone so long, but I found that they had been thoroughly beaten when the Boers, taking Panda's side, set him on the throne, *vice* his brother Dingaan, defeated and killed in 1840. The Boers were aggressive, the English were not, and were well inclined to help the Zulus against the Boers.

"I have been shocked to find how very close to the wind the predecessors of the present Government here have sailed in supporting the Zulus, against Boer aggression. Mr. John Dunn, still a salaried official of this Government, thinking himself bound to explain his own share in supplying rifles to the Zulus, in consequence of the revelations in a late trial of a Durban gun-runner, avows that he did so with the knowledge if not the consent and at the

* Now Sir Charles Mitchell, Governor of the Straits Settlements.

suggestion of [naming a high colonial official] in Natal. —— denies this and shows the untruth of much that Dunn says, but there can be no doubt that Natal sympathy was strongly with the Zulus as against the Boers, and what is worse, is so still. I cannot tell you what uphill work it is contending, one day with some crotchet or difficulty raised by Colenso, another with every form of selfish and narrow-minded difficulty. 'Natal has nothing to do with the Transvaal or Imperial interests in South Africa; everything of this kind ought to be the care of the Home Government,' etc.

"The Boers are well aware of this. . . . I had no idea till I came here how entirely the colonists were kept from any share in or knowledge of many of the most important branches of administration, notably of all that relates to native affairs. . . ."

In continuation of this letter, he writes again a few days later:—

"There is a strongly marked separation between the official governing class and the colonists, mainly, I think, due to the form of Constitution, though increased by the separation of the main body and head-quarters of the officials from Durban, the busy mercantile centre and port of the Colony.

"This capital is an accident, and not a peculiarly happy one. When Durban was an English port, Pietermaritzburg was the largest of the Dutch laagers and became the capital, and has so continued ever since. But it has no special convenience of situation, and almost any other pretty little country town between the sea and Drakensberg would have equal claims, as far as natural advantages go.

"It is in a hollow a thousand feet below the surrounding country, not accessible without going over the rim of the basin, hotter consequently, and less healthy than the country fifteen miles away. Take away the Government offices and people and the small military detachment, and nothing will remain but a very small country town. I only mention this as a reason why the Government officials are so completely apart from either farmers or merchants, and not with any idea of changing the capital.

"The capital, however, would do well enough if they had a better Constitution. I need not describe it, for you know the hybrid affair which here, as at Kimberley, lets in just enough of independence to checkmate the best of despots, but not enough to make the independents feel responsible for any part of the mischief they may do.

"The strange thing is that not one of the officials I have yet met, sees, or if he sees, likes to acknowledge the obvious reason of the failure of the Constitution to give reasonable satisfaction to any one. All admit it was bad and unworkable when Sir Garnet Wolseley came here, and is worse now. I have seen no one who thinks it possible to go on with it, as it is, after the term of its trial is over one or two years hence. Few men even of the most determined officials hint at the possibility of a change in the direction of more absolute autocracy. All reasonable practical men scout such an idea. But many say in a kind of despair 'they fear the Colony is not fit for responsible Government.' This, I believe, is a great mistake.

"I have not seen as much of the non-officials here as I should like, but I feel quite confident that you have here all the elements of a good responsible Government, if you exclude those subjects which the South African Act reserves to the Union, or to Her Majesty's Government.

"But whatever is done, you will have to change the present system of managing native affairs.

"I have not time to-day to describe the many absurdities of the present system. It could only have endured with a man like Sir Theophilus Shepstone at its head, silent, self-asserting, determined to oppose all innovation and division of his authority, and very skilful in that sort of diplomacy which defers decisions and evades difficulties by postponing action. . . .

"Save a superannuated old clerk, there is no establishment here, but native messengers and a most absurd and mischievous [Native] High Court. Some of the native agents and magistrates are fairly good, but they are few and far between, and there is no progress or improvement [among the natives] except from the indirect effect of peace and protection, and from the labours of some of the missionaries.

"The system has only been kept going by the vicinity of Zululand. Most of the natives are Zulus, refugees from Zulu misgovernment, and as long as the peace and protection they enjoy here is contrasted with the oppressions of Cetywayo they are happy and content, and the bad subjects go over to him; but when the state of things over the border is improved, the present system of leaving everything to manage itself in native locations will no longer be safe or possible, and people here are fifty years behind the Cape in their notions how to deal with such materials. . . ."

The award as to the disputed territory was engaging Frere's earnest attention. The Report of the Commissioners in favour of the title of the Zulus he thought one-sided and unfair to the Boers. Subsequent inquiry strengthened this conviction. He ascertained—what the Commissioner had failed to discover—that on the territory in question there were no less than seventy-five farms* occupied by Boer farmers, with the homesteads they had built on them, besides twenty farms now unoccupied. Amongst civilized nations, when territory is ceded by one to another—as when Savoy and Nice were ceded to France, and Alsace and Lorraine to Germany,—private rights of property are, as a matter of course, respected. But with savage races it is otherwise. The seventy-five homesteads, with all they contained, would be burnt or swept away as soon as they came under Zulu dominion, unless special provision were made for their protection.

Before delivering his award, he consulted, as was his wont, all those best qualified to give him information.† The observations of Shepstone, the Administrator of the Transvaal on the Report, did not reach him till November.

* A "farm" amongst the Boers generally contains about six thousand acres.

† He had also to wait for the observations of the Secretary of State, to whom he had sent a copy of the Report.

Shepstone was greatly dissatisfied with it. "The fact that it is adverse," he writes, "is difficulty enough, but the worst part of it is its insulting tone and the cynical language towards the Transvaal people which pervades it from beginning to end, and the effect on the latter of its publication will be most unfortunate."

Though disapproving of it, Frere felt bound to accept the terms of the Report, as a judge with certain limitations accepts the verdict of a jury whether he agrees with it or not. But it was evident that to do so without some safeguards would not only seriously and, as he thought, justly incense the Boers, and greatly aggravate their discontent with the British Government, in which Dutch feeling at the Cape would support them, but it would also probably lead to hostilities between them and the Zulus. He therefore in his award introduced a stipulation that, when the territory occupied by the Boers was handed over to the Zulus, the Boer farmers should either be compensated, if they left their farms, or protected in their occupation of them, if they elected to remain and become Zulu subjects; and that a British Resident with Cetywayo should be specially charged with this duty.*

Meantime Cetywayo's attitude was becoming more and more threatening.

About the 24th of July one of the wives of Sirayo, a Zulu chief of importance, fled from Zululand across the Tugela into Natal for protection. Being in a wounded

* Zulus settled within the Transvaal border were to be similarly compensated or protected. Information subsequently acquired increased Frere's objections to the conclusions of the Report. He writes to Sir Garnet Wolseley (September 15, 1879): "As to the Boundary award, you are quite right. It was an unjust verdict, but it came from a jury chosen by ourselves, though not my own selection, and I did not see my way to directing a fresh trial. Had I known then as much as I do now of its history, I would not even under such circumstances have given effect to it."

condition she was taken to a kraal of the Natal native police, twelve miles from the frontier. Two days afterwards a force of Zulus, led by two sons of Sirayo, and consisting of twenty or thirty horsemen and forty or fifty on foot, all fully armed with guns or assegais, crossed the river, and proceeding to the police-kraal and threatening the few police there with violence if they resisted, carried off the woman to Zulu territory, singing their war-songs as they went, and there killed her. Another of Sirayo's wives, who had also about the same time taken refuge in Natal, was carried off by another armed Zulu party, led by two other sons of Sirayo. Her front teeth were dashed out, she was dragged along the ground by a rope, "as if she had been an old hide," for some five hundred yards, placed across the backs of two horses till the river was recrossed, and then killed like the other.*

Sir H. Bulwer at once requested that the leaders in these outrages should be surrendered for trial in Natal, and a fortnight later repeated his demand. Cetywayo's reply was to excuse the outrages as a boyish freak, and to offer a sum of money (£50) as a solatium for the violation of British territory. This was, of course, refused. Cetywayo then said he would lay the matter before his Council, but nothing came of it.

Such was the fear of provoking hostilities that Sir H. Bulwer raised an objection to sending another British Regiment to Natal during that month, in accordance with orders from home to strengthen the garrison, lest it should increase the alarm on the border. And for the same reason he requested Lord Chelmsford to abstain from sending troops by the direct road to Utrecht, which passed near the border, though at that time the additional thirty-five

* C. 2220, pp. 124, 194, and 265.

miles involved in using the more circuitous road was, on account of the drought, specially inconvenient.

In September, the Swazi chief Umbelini, living in Zululand, was, with the connivance, if not under the express orders of Cetywayo, making raids into the Transvaal, not only into the disputed territory, but into the country close to the Lüneberg settlement north of the Pongolo, killing men, women, and children in a kraal of friendly natives. So threatening was the prospect that Rudolph, the Landdrost of Utrecht, wrote to Mr. J. W. Shepstone (acting Secretary for Native Affairs), that unless the Lüneberg settlers were at once reassured by the presence of a force, they would trek, and that their example would be followed by all the Boers living under the mountain, and by most of the friendly natives. Frere at once wrote to Colonel Evelyn Wood, who was at Utrecht.

"October 7, 1878.

"The German settlers at Lüneberg have received notice to quit, in Cetywayo's name, from the Commandant of the military kraal. Let Mr. Rudolph know that we have no intention of allowing any one to meddle with the Lunebergers."

Colonel Wood, accordingly, on his own responsibility,* and at some risk of dangerously weakening the force at Utrecht, promptly sent two companies of the 90th Regiment to Lüneberg, which had the desired effect.

In October, Rudolph wrote word that a Zulu war-doctor had been going to all the chief Zulu kraals, using charms and medicines with which he doctored the warriors to make them invulnerable, a ceremony so important "that no one would presume to perform it without the positive order of the King, nor until war had been determined on by Cetywayo." Royal hunts on a large scale were being

* "Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn Wood," p. 72.

organized by the Zulus near the border,* where there was little game, but which might afford an excuse for crossing it, according to Zulu custom, a recognized mode of beginning or declaring war.

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach from Pietermaritzburg :—

"September 30, 1878.

"Since we landed a week ago at Durban, I have been so hard at work gathering information and putting it into condensed shape for you, that I can do little more than refer you to my despatch for the grounds of my conviction that the state of things here is far more serious than I had supposed possible. The people here seem slumbering on a volcano, and I much fear you will not be able to send out the reinforcements we have asked for in time to prevent an explosion. . . .

"The Zulus are now quite out of hand, and the maintenance of peace depends on their forbearance.

"These views will, no doubt, appear extreme to most people here, but you will judge for yourself when the facts are before you. I speak with a deep sense of responsibility for what I say, when I assure you that the peace of South Africa for many years to come seems to me to depend on your taking steps to put a final end to Zulu pretensions to dictate to Her Majesty's Government what they may or may not do to protect Her Majesty's Colonies in South Africa, and that unless you settle with the Zulus, you will find it difficult, if not impossible, to govern the Transvaal without a considerable standing force of Her Majesty's troops.

"Nothing can be more hospitable than Sir Henry Bulwer, and nothing more cordial and frank than our relations, both public and private. I found his opinions differed widely from mine on many points. On some I think I have succeeded in bringing him round to my views,

* "Report received from border agent at Lower Tugela of a force consisting of two large Zulu regiments being close to Tugela, ostensibly for purpose of hunting. We have sent instructions to resident magistrates to warn our chiefs along the border, and to take steps for defending their districts against a possible attack or raid."—Sir H. Bulwer to Frere, September 12, 1878. C. 2220, p. 266.

on others I hope to do so, when he recognizes as practically as he does in theory, that the other Colonies are not separate or rival 'nations,' as it seems the fashion in Natal to consider them. Sir Henry is himself a thoroughly patriotic English gentleman, but he has never had to do much with military affairs, and many things which are burnt into one after a few years' dealing with natives in India have to be explained to him, and he is not facile in altering opinions once formed."

Frere, as usual, says the best he can of his colleagues. But it is evident that he was not supported, and not furnished with information, as he had a right to expect, by the Natal Government. It was the obvious duty of that Government, threatening as had been the attitude of the Zulus for some time past, to have obtained full and reliable information concerning the chiefs, the military strength, the disposition of the various regiments, and still more as to the geographical features of Zululand, the practicable roads, the water-supply, the fords, the distances, etc. No such information had been collected, though it could have been easily obtained by means of the Natal Zulus, who, being indistinguishable from their fellow-tribesmen and relations over the border, could pass to and fro without question. Frere and Lord Chelmsford, therefore, had to gather their information about the country as best they could, chiefly from missionaries, who, except the gun-runners, were almost the only white men who knew the interior of Zululand, and from the Natal magistrates living near the border.

All that he could learn, tended to confirm and intensify his previously formed conviction as to the extent and imminence of the danger to be apprehended. He therefore prepared to utilize the occasion of announcing to Cetywayo the terms of the Boundary award, in order to make such demands upon him, as regarded reparation for the past and security for the future, as would test the

sincerity of his peaceful professions and his willingness to put an end to the essentially aggressive and threatening features of the Zulu military system, and thus once for all, either peaceably or by stress of arms, to rid South Africa of the long-standing menace to its tranquillity and union.

Throughout South Africa there were few who did not recognize the existence and magnitude of the danger; it was only as to whether it was imminent or remote that there was much difference of opinion.

Bishop Colenso was almost the only man of note who, with a small following, undertook to defend Cetywayo's attitude and conduct. It was always Frere's habit to seek out those who most differed from him, and by listening patiently to all they had to say, to check and test his own opinions. He had much talk and afterwards a lengthy correspondence with Colenso, which the latter printed and circulated—not at the Cape or in Natal, where it would have been promptly criticized—but in England, where the facts were little known. Frere gradually came to see that Colenso's opinion concerning Cetywayo was of little real value, as, after having once become prepossessed in his favour, he had got into the habit of accepting, without discrimination, all that was alleged to his credit, and rejecting everything that told against him.

Although those who agreed with Colenso were very few, yet in Natal, more than elsewhere in South Africa, there was, in spite of the constant sense of insecurity, a disposition to ignore the danger, an idea that somehow or other it could still be averted by playing off the Boers against the Zulus. Many of the Natalians could not understand how the cousins and kinsmen of the Zulu "boys," who, often employed by them as male nurses, were wheeling their children about in perambulators, could

have been moulded by Cetywayo's military system into a pack of wolves. For very few of them had ever been in Zululand, or knew anything of the Zulus in their own country. They were for the most part comparatively recent settlers; only a few older men, mostly Dutchmen, recollected, or had themselves witnessed, the slaughter of the six hundred men, women, and children, the victims of Dingaan's treachery, and recognized in the acts which were now being done, and the words which were being spoken across the Tugela, signs that what had happened in 1838 might any day happen again.

The experienced officials, such as the Shepstones and Brownlee, the former Native Minister of the Cape Colony, took much the same view of the situation as Frere. But when it came to taking a definite course, those who should have aided him were for the most part unwilling to commit themselves to anything; they balanced arguments, discussed alternative courses, and were for temporizing and postponing. The whole burden of deciding what action to take lay upon Frere's shoulders.

At last, however, the Award as to the Disputed Territory was drawn up, and at the same time a second document, containing the demands to be made on Cetywayo in respect of the outrages which had been committed, and also the other conditions to be insisted on. The whole case was set forth at length. In substance what was demanded was as follows:

The verdict of the Boundary Commissioners upon the Disputed Territory was accepted unaltered, but the private rights of those who were settled on it were to be secured, either by way of compensation, if they elected to leave, or by protection being accorded to them if they remained. A demand was made for the surrender, within twenty days, for trial by a Natal Court, of the two sons and the

brother of Sirayo, who had carried off and killed the refugee women; with a fine of five hundred cattle for the delay in compliance with the two former demands. Another fine of a hundred cattle was demanded for an offence committed on two Englishmen who were molested while surveying British territory. The existing military system was to be reformed, and all men allowed to marry as they came to man's estate; and while the universal obligation to serve in war was not interfered with, the regiments were not to be called up without permission of the great Council of the Zulu Nation assembled, and the consent of the British Government. In order that all these provisions should be carried out, a British Resident in Zululand, or on its immediate border, would be appointed, who would be "the eyes, ears, and mouth" of the British Governor towards the Zulu King and the great Council of the nation. The missionaries who had settled in the country were to be left unmolested, as in Panda's time. A period of thirty days was allowed for an answer to these demands.

This document, though called the words of the High Commissioner, bore the signature of Sir Henry Bulwer, as Lieutenant-Governor of Natal; for though Frere, as High Commissioner, had jurisdiction over all matters outside the boundary of that Colony, he had no jurisdiction within Natal itself. The minutes and despatches of the two show that though they differed in some minor details, they were in substantial agreement as to the facts and aspect of the case.* Sir H. Bulwer, the end of whose term of office

* In a Minute of November 29, 1878, Sir H. Bulwer writes :—

"In requiring the abolition of the Zulu military system as it is, the High Commissioner strikes at the root of all that is most vicious and most dangerous in the Zulu country.

"Nothing but the eventual complete abolition of that system will, I think, suffice, though the effectual attainment of this object will