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THE EXPERIENCE OF XENOPHOBIA AMONG INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: THE CASE OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN PRETORIA

by

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ABSTRACT

Xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have negative and positive consequences in the host society respectively. This study offers a detailed examination of how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business. It asks fundamental questions such as; do individual Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia while conducting their business differently from Anglophone or Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria? How does the individual experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal business on sidewalks, differ from those who conduct informal business at street corners, on municipal stalls or in small shops?

The study adopts an interpretivist methodological approach and a case study method to conduct qualitative in-depth interviews with open-ended questions to collect data in order to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans while conducting their business in Pretoria; to determine the type of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business; to establish the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and to understand why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

The study found different ways Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria experience discrimination while conducting their business. For example, the study found how "skipping" Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to buy from local informal traders is an experience of discrimination that is common among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. The study also found that officials of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) would impound the goods belonging to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who have valid trading licences to conduct informal trade in the designated area without any justification or explanation. While local informal traders who conducted informal trade without valid trading permits in the same area were allowed to carry on trading and their goods were not impounded.

The study establishes different types of virtual, verbal, and physical harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced in Pretoria while conducting their business. It also establishes that high school boys; political affiliates, workers

of Tshwane waste management service, football fans; members of “Izikhothane;” “Operation Dudula are among the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

Lastly, the study found secular and nonsecular reasons why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business. For example, this study establishes that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria were attacked while conducting their business because they fail to lend money to South Africans or when they call the police about South Africans who were taking the law into their own hands against them.

KEYWORDS

xenophobia, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, South Africans, discrimination, harassment, perpetrators of xenophobic attacks, informal trade

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACMS	African Centre for Migration and Society
ACO	Aliens Compliance Order
ACCT	Agency of Cultural and Technical Cooperation
AIF	Intergovernmental Agency of Francophonie
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBD	Central Business District
CoJ	City of Johannesburg
CoT	City of Tshwane
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIPC	Companies and Intellectual Property Commission
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EMM	Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
EU	European Union
EUC	European Union Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FNB	First National Bank
GP	Gauteng Province
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	Global Entrepreneurship Monitor

GNI	Gross National Income
GP	Gauteng Province
IHF	International Helsinki Federation for human rights
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPCA	Investment Promotion Centre Act
JMPD	Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIF	Francophone International Organisation
IOM	International Organization of Migration
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAPS	South African Police Service
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
TMPD	Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VFS	Visa Facilitation Service

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Migration is a popular word in the present-day global age because it can affect our 'social worlds;' change societies, and transform economies and nations (Massey et al. 1998:1). Two decades ago, scholars in migration research state that, 'like many birds, but unlike other animals, humans are a migratory species. Indeed, migration is as old as humanity itself' (Massey et al., 1998: 1).

The movement of people from one country to another is rooted in clearly defined historical conditions that point out particular social and economic contexts. The contexts are signposts as to why social sciences have much to offer regarding the movement of people from one country to another, past and present (Massey et al., 1998:3).

The discursive of migration transcends history as it exerts pressure on how the global economy and societies operate. Massey et al., (1998:1) further state, 'the intrinsic variation in terms of the number of people moving from one country to another at different times is an indication that migration remains an ever-increasing phenomenon'.

A lot of theories have been written to explain the reasons why people move from one country to another. For example, some people with financial means as well as educated professionals move with ease temporarily or permanently to various destinations of their choice for health reasons; religious missions, or spiritual quest; to marry, study or pursue personal ambitions including the prominent life-style (Marschall, 2018, 2).

Others move as a response to highly visible dramatic political change - war, conflict - genocide, or the contentious dynamics of forced displacement of refugees, and economic migration of individuals fleeing persecution; natural and 'man-made' disasters; poverty, and lack of economic opportunities (Marschall, 2018:2).

However, even if we are aware of all the theories that explain the reason why people move from one country to another temporarily or permanently, it is important to emphasise that this study is not about theorisation, but the empirical experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, in order to bring new insight into their practical reality. A summary of the key theories of migration is presented in Chapter 2.

The experience of xenophobia among informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the 21st century is very important. This is because of the negative and positive consequences that xenophobia and informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general have in the host country respectively. It appears that xenophobia and the increasing number of informal immigrant entrepreneurs are a result of factors associated with political, social, and economic conditions in the host and country of origin of informal immigrant entrepreneurs.

In the host country, for example, xenophobia, on the one hand, fosters discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs based on the perception that informal immigrant entrepreneurs are "foreigners" (Mashau, 2019; Ngota et al. 2017; Tshishonga, 2015).

Informal immigrant entrepreneurs, on the other hand, "add value through innovation, generate wealth and create additional employment for immigrants and citizens through diverse entrepreneurial activities that involve informal trade along the sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in small shops" (Moyo, 2014:253). This also includes "informal traders who move up and down the streets selling a variety of goods and providing different services to consumers" (Moyo, 2014:253).

Furthermore, "xenophobia in the host country often creates tension in a diplomatic relationship usually between the host country (where informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience discrimination, harassment and attacks) and the country of origin of informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are affected by xenophobia" (Adebisi, 2017:89; Mabera, 2017:31).

The tension between the government of host and the country of origin of informal immigrant entrepreneurs is also felt at the level of interpersonal relationships between citizens of the host country and informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Adebisi, 2017; Mabera, 2017). For example, Vrsanska et al. (2017:170) observe that immigrants in general (including informal immigrant entrepreneurs) who experience xenophobia in the host country often "demonstrate anxiety, depression and suicidal tendencies which makes it difficult for them to lead a normal life in the host country".

According to Pineteh (2018), the attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa take place because of frustrations with the ANC government, competition for resources, joblessness, and poverty. The attacks, therefore, provide occassions for impoverished South Africans to loot shops belonging to informal immigrant entrepreneurs and steal household goods and foodstuffs. In addition, xenophobia perpetrated against informal immigrant entrepreneurs heightens obvious economic barriers towards immigrants as it reduces their

ability to pursue economic opportunities in South Africa for fear of discrimination, harassment, or violent attacks by citizens (Pineteh, 2018).

Tshishonga (2015:165) argues that "the outbreak of xenophobia against African immigrants in general often forces African informal immigrant entrepreneurs including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria to go into hiding". Thus, leaving their informal business unattended. Moyo & Zanker (2022) claim that sometimes African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are unable to go underground are reduced to onlookers as they watch their informal businesses looted and burnt down.

However, there is evidence that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) help to create new business opportunities. As well as diversify existing ones through social networks and the start-up capital that informal immigrant entrepreneurs receive from family members and friends to set up a new informal business or to acquire an existing informal business in cities such as Pretoria (Ngota et al. 2018; Mothibi et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015).

However, it is important to mention that the socioeconomic contribution of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria) is neglected by the government of South Africa. Nshimbi and Moyo, (2018) posit some South African government officials from certain government divisions/departments and officers of the South African Police Service (SAPS) perpetrate discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

Similarly, Tella (2016:143) argues that "not only South African government officials and members of the SAPS perpetrate discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country – even officials from the Metro Police and citizens perpetrate discrimination, harassment and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa."

Dube (2019) argues that the reason why South Africans (government officials, members of the SAPS, Metro Police, and citizens) perpetrate discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is that "… many South Africans do not like foreigners." Contrarily, Tshishonga (2015) argues that not all categories of "foreigners" in South Africa experience discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks. In this regard, Nyamnjoh (2016) for example, contends that foreigners (immigrants) from Europe, North America, Asia, and Oceania do not experience the level of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks that immigrants from across Africa (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) experience in South Africa.

Peberdy (2017) and Tshishonga (2015), therefore, suggest that the reason African immigrants in South Africa, in general, and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria in particular experience discrimination, harassment and violent attacks is because South Africans claim African immigrants in general (including African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) are competing with South Africans over limited resources and socioeconomic opportunities that are available in South Africa.

Consequently, there is a recurrence of violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) in the country (Tshishonga, 2015). An example of vicious attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is an incident that took place in 2008, which left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant informal businesses looted and 213 burnt down (Tirivangasi & Mrubula-Ngwenya, 2022). Similar attacks took place in 2015, 2017 and 2019 (Ogunnoiki & Adeyemi, 2019; Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015).

The fact that South Africans perpetrate discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country is a sign that xenophobia is present across the socioeconomic landscape of South Africa (Peberdy, 2017; Ntshiqa, 2018; Masikane, 2017; Crush, 2015). Scholars such as Moyo and Nshimbi (2018), Peberdy (2017), Ntshiqa (2018), Masikane (2017), and Crush (2015) have confirmed the perpetration of xenophobia against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

It is, therefore, important to conduct studies that seek to examine individual experiences of xenophobia among different categories of immigrants in South Africa, such as Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. Therefore, the discrimination and harassment that are mentioned in this thesis are both those that take place in general and those that occur specifically in favour of South African informal traders.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Various narratives of individual experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, until now, fits in the broader narratives of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general. However, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, may experience discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks while conducting their business.

Certainly, individual experiences of xenophobia among different lingo-cultural categories of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa would differ from one another. The difference may be exacerbated by the fact that Africans, in general, do not speak a homogenous language. African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa originate from African countries where different languages are spoken.

For example, there are African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who come from African countries where English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish remain the official languages spoken by citizens. Such diversity in terms of official languages spoken on the continent has made it possible to group African countries into lingo-cultural groups such as Anglophones, Francophones, or Lusophones.

There is the possibility that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa who come from countries where English is not the official language spoken may experience xenophobia differently from other categories of African immigrants in South Africa who originate from countries where English is one of the official languages spoken. This is because the language spoken in the country of origin of immigrants may promote or inhibit the ease at which informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business in South Africa (Vigouroux, 2018; Skattum, 2018).

It is, therefore, most apparent that individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria would be different from Anglophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. This is in addition to the fact that the business location, suburb, and type of informal business conducted by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria would shape individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs differently while conducting their business.

For example, individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct business along sidewalks and street corners may be

different from those who conduct informal business on a municipal stall and small shops (Dube, 2019; Nkem & Tengeh, 2017; Tella, 2016; Tshishonga, 2015).

It is worth noting that several Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria who conduct informal business along a sidewalk, street corner, municipal stall, and in small shops do so as a last resort because of exclusive labour laws and language barriers, which make it hard for Francophone African immigrants in South Africa to obtain formal employment (Dube, 2019; Nkem & Tengeh, 2017; Tshishonga, 215; Crush et al. 2015); opposed to a few of them who may conduct informal business because they want to explore available informal business opportunities in South Africa to make a profit (Nkem & Tengeh, 2017).

Nonetheless, the desire to make a profit and the need to continue to live in South Africa may also shape the choice of an informal business that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct in Pretoria. This is because informal businesses using municipal stalls and small shops may have a trading licence and rental implication. This means that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs would have to pay rental monthly (Tawodzera & Chikanda, 2016); as opposed to informal business conducted on sidewalks and street corners where there is no monthly rent involved.

Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal business where there is no rent involved may, therefore, experience xenophobia differently from those who conduct informal business where rent is paid monthly. However, for Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria to conduct successful informal business, they must create socioeconomic networks with fellow immigrants from their fatherland, and locals as well (Tshishonga, 2022).

Creating socio-economic networks is important because the formation, operation, and success of the informal business of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs partly depend on how they network with fellow African immigrants and South Africans who remain potential clients to buy goods from them. In addition, creating a socioeconomic network is significant in a situation where there is a high level of informal business competition due to the high level of unemployment in the host country (Crush et al. 2015).

In the context of South Africa, the high level of unemployment among citizens, and the increasing number of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general, have increased the level of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Crush et al. 2018). The reason is because of the local perception that perceives African immigrants in South Africa, in general, as an economic threat to South Africans (Hewitt et al. 2020).

This perception contradicts previous studies that attest that most informal businesses conducted by African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are established through the help of their family members and friends who do not reside in South Africa (Tawodzera & Chikanda, 2016; Northcote & Dodson, 2015) so that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs may have economic activities that generate income for their living expenses in the host country. In addition, even the clientele of some African informal immigrant entrepreneurs is fellow immigrants from homeland who reside in South Africa (Cederberga & Villares-Varela, 2019). Furthermore, the high level of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, is due to obvious biases that perceive African immigrants in general, as criminals (Mpofu & Okunade, 2022; Pineteh, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016).

Olisa and Masango (2019) argue that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are frequently accused of selling illicit drugs in disguise for informal business conducted. Such biases foster the uneasy relationship between African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and locals (Peberdy, 2019; 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015).

Notwithstanding, amidst the uneasy relationship between African immigrants and locals, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs continue to create successful informal businesses around the country (Crush et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015). The success of the informal business of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs has made many South Africans envy them. South Africans often foster discrimination and harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, which frequently spills over to violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to cause bodily harm, looting and burning down of informal businesses belonging to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015).

However, Dube (2019) argues that South Africans perpetrate discrimination and harassment differently toward different groups of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. The reason is that "South Africans prefer certain categories of African immigrants over others" (Dube, 2019:199-200). For example, Dube (2019:199-200) further presents three categories of African immigrants to whom South Africans perpetrate discrimination and harassment the most, notably, African immigrants from Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (Dube, 2019:199-200); as opposed to the three categories of African immigrants to whom they perpetrate discrimination and harassment the least, notably, African immigrants from Mauritius, Angola, and Senegal (Dube, 2019:199-200).

However, Dube (2019:2019:201) did not provide answers as to why South Africans perpetrate discrimination and harassment differently between one group of African immigrants to another but suggests that the country of origin of African immigrants in South Africa determines the level of discrimination and harassment that South Africans perpetrate against them.

The implication of the differential perpetration of discrimination and harassment against certain categories of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, also has severe consequences on individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria who come from different African countries (Lee & Sehoole, 2015). This is because their individual experience of xenophobia may be distinct from each other according to their nationality.

Certainly, there are Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs that South Africans prefer over others. This implies that South Africans would either perpetrate more discrimination and harassment against them or less. This confirms earlier speculation that individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria would differ from individual to individual since Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs come from different African countries; and the fact that the nationality of African immigrants plays a role in the level of discrimination and harassment that they experience in South Africa (Dube, 2019).

Another point to note is the fact that certain municipal agencies in South Africa also perpetrate discrimination and harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in general (Mapitsa, 2018; Tella, 2016). The reason is partly that certain municipal agencies perceive African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as people who are developing an economic sector that ought to be eradicated because of local perception that informal business activities are unlawful (Peberdy, 2017; Madondo, 2017).

Such perception, therefore, ignores the positive contribution that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs bring to the economy of South Africa in terms of job creation for immigrants and South Africans (Ngota et al. 2018; Gastrow, 2018; Tengeh, 2016). It is important to comment further that the attitude of municipal agencies that perpetrate discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs makes it difficult for African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the host country to obtain a trading permit to conduct formal business in the country (Rogerson, 2018; Crush & Skinner, 2017; Vawda, 2017).

Hence, the reason why most African informal immigrant entrepreneurs tend to conduct informal business without a trading permit along sidewalks and street corners, for example, with the help of metal or wooden tables (Jeske, 2016; Masonganye, 2010). Other African

informal immigrant entrepreneurs move up and down the streets selling with or without mobile structures such as bicycles, motorcycles, caravans, or structures that allow them to move their business with ease, to avoid any form of confrontation from South Africans (Peberdy, 2016).

Discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs happen regularly in South African cities (Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). This has propelled Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to choose to conduct informal business mainly in suburbs around Pretoria that they deem safe (Mamabolo, 2015). For example, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs avoid conducting informal business in various townships around Pretoria, where the greater number of South Africa's urban population lives, for fear of being attacked by locals (Myambo, 2020; Mamabolo, 2015).

Hiropoulos (2020) also attests that discrimination, harassment and vicious attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the host country are more frequent in townships than in the suburbs around Pretoria. Mamabolo (2015) claims the prevalence of xenophobia in the townships is because of poverty and unemployment. However, such a point of view contradicts that of Grant and Thompson (2015) who posit that discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are higher in townships than in suburbs around Pretoria because of intense competition between South Africans conducting informal business and their African immigrant counterparts.

Therefore, as a result of the high level of business competition, several scholars confirm that the perpetration of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, in general, mostly target African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their informal businesses (Peberdy, 2019, 2017, 2015; Tshishonga, 2015).

The reason why African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are the target of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks, according to Peberdy (2021) is that South African informal traders often accuse informal immigrant entrepreneurs of not sharing the secret of their informal business success with them, even though such an accusation is contrary to the opinion of Kalitanyi and Visser (2014) who reveal that more than 73% of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa claim they share the secret of their informal business success with locals who work for/with them through skills transfer.

In addition, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs further claim that the only secret of their informal business success is the business skills that they possess and they are willing to transfer such skills to South Africans (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2014), even though African informal

immigrant entrepreneurs maintain the view that South Africans don't believe the secret of their informal business success is the business skills they possess and hard work. That is why South Africans frequently perpetrate discrimination, harassment and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

This is coupled with the fact that South Africans still perceive African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as unwanted or illegal immigrants in the country (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015; Moyo, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 2010; Neocosmos, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2007:13; Peberdy, 2002). Some South Africans even consider it legitimate to violently attack and kill African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and loot or burn down their informal businesses (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015; Akinola, 2014).

This study, therefore, seeks to examine individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal business along sidewalks, street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops; selling fruits, vegetables, foodstuff, clothes, artefacts, traditional attire, curios, African concoctions, etc. (Fransen & de Haas, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Roever & Skinner, 2016). The notion of "experience" in this study applies to the material, social and transactional environment under which Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct informal business in Pretoria (Vygotskij, 2001).

Chinomona & Maziriri (2015) argue that individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are an area of research that remains very understudied. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are made up of individuals from different African countries.

There are more than 25 Francophone African countries (Vigouroux, 2013)[1]. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are among the more than 165 000 African immigrants living in South Africa (United Nations, 2019:24). As a result, individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs may vary widely across the country of origin. There is, however, no exact figure for the number of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the host country (United Nations, 2019:24).

[1]These are African countries that have adopted French (the language of their former colonial master) as their official language (Mazrui, 2004). That is why the population of these countries use French in their daily communication (Bouillon & Morris, 2001:19).

Pineteh & Mulu (2020) however claim one of the growing African immigrant communities in South Africa is composed of Francophones. Even though Chinomona & Maziriri (2015) argue there is a lack of data on the number of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria because the data on African immigrants in the host country, in general, is poor due to weaknesses in national agencies that are responsible for collecting data on Francophone African immigration.

Colette (2005), however, claims that by 2005, there were about 110 000 Francophone African immigrants living in South Africa. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria come from countries such as Algeria, Burundi, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea Conakry, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, and Senegal (Fransen & de Haas, 2019; Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005:1). Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria face language barriers as a result of their lingo-cultural dependence on French which is the official language in their country of origin (Schoar, 2010; Mufwene & Vigouroux, 2008; Léglise & Migge, 2008:1-2; Mazrui, 2004:6; Bouillon & Morris, 2001:19). Arguably, the language barrier may render individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria to differ from the individual experience of xenophobia among African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who do not face a language barrier in South Africa.

The reason is that language is a salient factor when conducting informal business in Pretoria because all business (formal or informal) transactions are mostly conducted in English, which is the business language of South Africa (Van Rooy, 2017; Dippenaar & Peyper, 2011). However, this is not the business language in the country of origin of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are from countries where business transactions are conducted in French.

Therefore, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs may experience xenophobia because they lack proficiency or cannot speak English. This is because "the language can stir up discrimination against non-speakers or speakers who lack proficiency (or are not fluent) in a particular language" (Léglise & Migge, 2008:1-2; Myers-Scotton, 2006:110-20).

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Sharif et al. (2022) argue that a problem statement should address a central issue that establishes a strong rationale or the need to conduct a study, and should indicate why the problem is important. Miles (2016a) describes a problem statement as what would be studied by using data and research to address the research problem. Xenophobia and the increase of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, have become an important socioeconomic phenomenon.

This is because of the conflict between xenophobia and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs trading in the host country (Radipere, 2012:109). Many factors hinder the growth of the informal immigrant business in South Africa. The factors include legal and regulatory policies (Crush et al. 2015), hostile informal business environment (Skinner, 2015), poor market access, inaccessibility to finance (Tengeh & Nkem, 2017), "tax burden, lack of business management skills, lack of proper education, cultural differences, rent, language barriers, crime and xenophobia" (Rogerson, 2016; Fatoki, 2013; Tengeh, 2013; Hunter & Skinner, 2001), amongst other things.

There is a recurrence of violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, like the attacks that occured in 1998 (Tshitereke, 1999) and 2008 that left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant businesses looted, and 213 burnt down (Tirivangasi & Mrubula-Ngwenya, 2022). Similar attacks took place in 2015 (Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2017; Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2019; Ogunnoiki & Adeyemi, 2019; Misago, 2019). The attacks hindered the growth of the informal business belonging to African immigrants (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) in South Africa.

It is acknowledged that all African immigrants in South Africa are susceptible to face discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks. Abdi (2017:14) therefore assert that the "perpetration of discrimination and harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is a characteristic of everyday business life in cities like Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria."

African immigrants in South Africa in general are not accepted by South Africans due to discrimination. This exposes them to various forms of harassment (Peberdy, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015; Foss, 2012). The perpetration of harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria has become intense because the environment in which they conduct informal business, according to Skinner (2014), is hostile towards African immigrants, in general.

This study is only interested in the experience of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. Therefore, the discrimination and harassment that are mentioned in this study are those that occur during the conduct of their business in general, and those that take place specifically in favour of South African informal traders.

It is worth mentioning that members of the SAPS, Metro Police, and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) often raid the informal business location of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs harassing them verbally with the accusation that they (African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) are conducting illegal business. The latter are often threatened with deportation (Misago, 2017).

This is in addition to the fact that even ordinary South Africans often harass African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Tella, 2016; Tshishonga, 2015). Therefore, in line with the research problem point out in this study, the main research question is: How do Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business? Do individual Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria experience xenophobia while conducting their informal business differently from Anglophone or Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs?

How does the individual experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal business along sidewalks differ from those who conduct informal business on street corners, at municipal stalls, or in small shops?

1.4 AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The primary aim of the study is to examine how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business; and why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Hanson (2006) states that the objectives of a research study must define the specific aims of the study. Thomas and Hodges (2010) concur that "the research objectives must indicate the specific issues that the study plans to investigate" in more detail. This study is, therefore, guided by the following research objectives:

- To find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans while conducting their business in Pretoria;

- To determine what type of harassment Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business;
- To establish who perpetrates xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and
- To establish why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the objectives mentioned in (section 1.5) and the research question raised in the statement of the problem (section 1.3), the following research questions arise:

- How are Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs discriminated against while conducting their business in Pretoria?
- What type of harassment do Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience while conducting their business in Pretoria?
- Who perpetrates xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business in Pretoria?
- Why are Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs attacked while conducting their business in Pretoria?

1.7 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY

This study would clarify the over-generalisation of the experience of xenophobia among African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, as it seeks to separate individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria from that of the broader African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

The separation is important because the question of language barriers as a result of the lingo-cultural dependence of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs on French (which is not the business language in South Africa) may add complexity to how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria (Foss, 2012; Léglise & Migge, 2008:1-2; Currie, 2006; Mazrui, 2004:6; Mesthrie & Rajend, 2002).

Individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs would differ from those of Anglophone African informal immigrant

entrepreneurs in Pretoria who do not face language barriers in terms of performing business transactions in English (the business language) of South Africa (Van Rooy, 2017).

Barrett et al., (2022) affirm that speaking English with an accent also presents an occasion for discrimination. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have an accent when they speak English. Through their accent, they can be easily identified as foreigners and discriminated against or harassed.

1.8 CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCIPLINE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Several studies that look at xenophobia and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa mostly focus on the cause, effect, and nature of xenophobia on the one hand (Shahvisi, 2019; Hagensen, 2014; Crush, 2008), and the socioeconomic contributions and challenges African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, face in South Africa, on the other hand (Peberdy, 2019; Ngota et al. 2017; Tshishinga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015; Skinner, 2014). No study has focused on the individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

It is, therefore, the intention of this study to look at individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. This is important because Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria face language barriers (Inaka, 2017; Lekogo, 2008). The findings of this study will make a significant contribution to the discipline of development studies as an interdisciplinary branch of social science (Schuurman, 2000) by providing a comprehensive understanding of individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Not much is written on this category of African immigrants in South Africa. The study will, therefore, provide primary data that will separate individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from those of non-Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

In addition, the study will also provide answers as to why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business. Answers to this question and more regarding this specific group (Francophone) African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria will present a new scientific contribution to the field of development study. This may, therefore, (re-) shape contemporary debates on xenophobia and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

1.9 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

In order to specify the extent of this research, it is important to present and clarify the key concepts that are applied throughout the study. This section is devoted to that effect. The following concepts in this study are, therefore, applied as follows:

1.9.1 Xenophobia

The concept of xenophobia" is derived from the Greek words 'xenos' and 'phobos,' which mean "strange or foreign" and "fear or panic" respectively (Misago et al. 2010; De Master & Le Roy, 2000; Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). The Merriam-Webster online dictionary[2]defines "xenophobia" as "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign". Nyamjoh (2006) captures the definition of "xenophobia" in the context of South Africa by describing it as "as an intense dislike, hatred or fear of others who are foreign". Nyamnjoh (2006), further claims that xenophobia encompasses certain characteristics of mistrust and scepticism about foreigners (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Neocosmos (2008b:83) states that xenophobia in the context of South Africa "is a political discourse and practice lodged within particular ideologies and consciousness that has risen in post-apartheid South Africa permeated by a politics of fear prevalent in both state and society". Bordeau (2010) claims xenophobia is an unreasonable mistrust of outsiders, while a 2009 publication of Centre for Human Rights (CHR), University of Pretoria, claims xenophobia is the manifestation of certain forms of unpleasant behaviours and perceptions against foreigners which is accompanied by hostility, violence, discrimination, and harassment against African immigrants in the case of South Africa (Centre for Human Rights, 2009).

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (2011) attests that xenophobia manifests in South Africa through a demonstrated hatred towards African immigrants in South Africa in general, and is often accompanied by acts of violence which often result in loss of lives and properties, especially the properties of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs.[3]

Harris (2002) suggests that xenophobia in South Africa ought to be rephrased to include acts of physical abuse which usually stem from the "dislike" of strangers. The rephrasing according

[2] The Merriam Webster online dictionary http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/xenophobia (accessed 14 Jan 2013).
[3] African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (2011).

to Harris (2002) is because xenophobia in South Africa broadly describes the negative perceptions that South Africans hold against African immigrants, and the resultant violence perpetrated against them (Harris, 2002).

De Master and Le Roy (2000) claim the negative perceptions held by locals against African immigrants are identifiable because the perceptions provide a very distinct feeling that South Africans demonstrate toward African immigrants (De Master & Le Roy, 2000). Such feeling is often expressed in the form of discrimination, harassment, mistrust and fear, which often lead to violent attacks against African immigrants.

Tshishonga (2015), Akinola (2014), and Adjail and Lazaridis (2013) all claim that xenophobia in South Africa is also expressed through behaviours that reject or demean African immigrants as criminals for the simple fact that they are perceived as foreigners. This study, however, looks at the individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs.

While xenophobia is acknowledged as a form of racism (Tafira, 2015) the study, however, defines xenophobia as all forms of discrimination, harassment, and attacks (with or without the aim of causing bodily harm or injury) perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015).

The study also considers xenophobia to manifest in the form of behaviours that demean Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs on the basis that they are foreigners in South Africa (Tshishonga, 2015; Akinola, 2014; Adjail & Lazaridis, 2013), but for logical alignment of facts, the various ways in which xenophobia manifests would be compressed into discrimination, harassment and violent attacks perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015).

Therefore, whenever this study refers to xenophobia it is referring to acts of discrimination, harassment, and attacks. The reason why this study addresses xenophobia as discrimination, harassment or violent attacks is that acts of xenophobia are often treated as criminal acts in South Africa (Hayem, 2013), maybe because the violent attacks instigated by xenophobia are against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general. The looting and vandalism of businesses belonging to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, according to the South African government, is an act of criminality (Pineteh, 2017).

Furthermore, to attain the desired objectives of this research, the variables of xenophobia (discrimination, harassment, and attacks) are defined accordingly.

1.9.1.1 Discrimination

Discrimination in this study refers to any unfair manner in the way an individual or a group of South Africans treat a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in Pretoria while conducting his/her business on the basis that he/she is a foreigner in South Africa. The study, therefore, considers discrimination as any unfair treatment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the conduct of their business, as well as the unfair treatment against the informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the conduct of their business in general or to favour South African informal traders.

1.9.1.2 Harassment

Harassment in this study refers to any act (whether physical or verbal) that a South African or a group of South Africans perpetrate against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in Pretoria while conducting his/her business that causes a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to be afraid of being harmed or suffering any material loss from the hands of a South African on the basis that a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur is a foreigner.

The study, therefore, considers harassment to be any form of intimidation or aggressive pressure that is perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the conduct of their business with or without the intention of favouring South African informal traders or citizens.

1.9.1.3 Attacks

Attacks in this study refer to any form of behaviour perpetrated by a South African or group of South Africans against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur that involves violence or the use of force to cause or not cause bodily harm toward a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur because he/she is a foreigner. It also includes attacks that occur intending to favour South African informal traders over Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the conduct of their business. Regarding the term "Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur," the following paragraphs describe what a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in this study is. The description commences by looking at the notion of an "immigrant" because, in Pretoria, Francophone African informal entrepreneurs are first and foremost immigrants.

1.9.2 Immigrant

An “immigrant” is a person who lives in a country that is not their country of birth (Wood et al. 2012:105; Nestorowicz, 2011:12). The International Organization of Migration (IOM), (2019) defines an immigrant as “a person who moves from his/her country of origin to another country either temporarily or permanently.” Solomon and Kosaka (2014), Steenkamp (2009), and Laher (2009) all attest that an immigrant is a person who is living in a country he/she is not a citizen.

Dodson (2010) claims an immigrant is a person living in a country that is not his/her country of birth. In this study, the concepts of “immigrant”, “foreign national” “outsider” “stranger” or “foreigner” are applied the same. The study also classifies “naturalised citizens” as immigrants. The study considers persons from other countries who have lived in South Africa for more than one year as immigrants.

1.9.2.1 African Immigrant

According to this study, an African immigrant is a person who leaves an African country to reside in any other country for a period of one or more years (Olupona, 2007). African nationals who were not born in South Africa are considered African immigrants in this study irrespective of residence status.

1.9.2.2 Francophone African Immigrant

A Francophone African immigrant is a person who leaves an African country where French is the official language to another country to settle for more than one year (Neathery-Castro & Rousseau, 2005). This study therefore only considers African immigrants who speak French because they are nationals from Francophone African countries where French is the dominant official language.

1.9.2.3 Francophone African Informal Immigrant Entrepreneur

A Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur is someone who migrates from a Francophone African country to South Africa for more than one year working in the informal sector. The informal sector is the sector of the economy that is not taxed or regulated by government agencies. Chapter 2 elaborates on the definition and conceptualization of the informal sector.

This study, therefore, only looks at Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal trade along sidewalks, street corners, municipal stalls, or small shops around the city of Pretoria (Mackie et al. 2014). Such informal businesses must not be registered with government agencies.

The income of the business must also not be declared to public authorities for tax-related contributions (Antonopoulos & Mitra 2009; Webb et al. 2009; Williams, 2006). However, this study sometimes uses the term "Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs" interchangeably with Francophone African informal immigrant traders. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, according to this study, are different from Francophone African formal immigrant entrepreneurs.

This is because Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct businesses that are not taxed and sometimes without legal business permits. While Francophone African formal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct businesses that are taxed, and with legal trading permits (Skinner, 2014; Tengeh et al. 2011; Fertala, 2006; Fertala, 2006:7; Portes et al. 1989). Therefore, whenever this study refers to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, it is referring to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct business that is not taxed along the following location; sidewalks, street corners, municipal stalls, and in small shops.

1.9.3 Description of business locations

The following business locations are defined as;

1.9.3.1 Sidewalk

A sidewalk is a path along the side of a road that is usually constructed of concrete or asphalt designed for pedestrians (Moretti et al. 2019). However, a sidewalk in this study includes businesses that are also conducted on non-concrete sidewalks.

1.9.3.2 Street Corner

A street corner is a location that lies adjacent to an intersection of two roads (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2001). This study considers street corners to include businesses that are conducted on a spot of a street that is not close to an intersection. If the business takes place away from the sidewalk it is a street corner.

1.9.3.3 Municipal Stall

A municipal stall is a stand, booth, or compartment built by a municipality for the sale of goods such as fruits and vegetables (Mathaulula et al. 2016). This study considers only stalls built by the municipality as municipal stalls. It does not include the stalls that are built by individuals for the purpose of informal trade.

1.9.3.4 Small Shop

A small shop is a small retail business that sells everyday items such as groceries (Androutsopoulos et al. 2021; Basardien et al. 2014). This study considers a small shop as either a stand-alone room or a space that is transformed in a building into a room that can be used for business purposes.

1.9.4 South Africans/Locals

South Africans/locals in this study refer to people of South African ancestry. Both South Africans and Francophone African immigrants are of African ancestry. The difference between them is that Francophone African immigrants come from African nations that use French as the official language, while South Africans are citizens of South Africa by birth (El Bcheraoui et al. 2020; Crush et al. 2005:1). Only South Africans who were born in South Africa are considered locals or nationals or citizens in the study.

1.9.5 Host Country

The host country in this study refers to South Africa where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs currently conduct business (Kirdar, 2012). However, for clarity, Pretoria is the host city but sometimes it is used interchangeably as the host country, migration destination, etc.

1.10 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

This study is made up of seven coherent chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

This chapter presents the introduction and background to the study. It provides the context against which this study is conducted, the rationale, problem statement, aim and objectives of the study, research questions, motivation of the study, and contribution to development studies.

The chapter also introduces and clarifies the key concepts that are used throughout the study. As well as the organization of the study.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

This chapter places this study into a conceptual context. It presents the relationship between Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria and xenophobia. The chapter looks at the reason certain African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are labelled Francophone. It looks at the reason Francophone Africans migrate to South Africa. Before creating a conceptual link between xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

The chapter also traces the migration pattern of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from place of origin to country of destination where they experience discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks while conducting their business in Pretoria.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

This chapter evaluates available literature on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and xenophobia in South Africa. It highlights various knowledge gaps and different points of view in pieces of literature. By looking at what has been done and what is missing. In terms of contributing to the broader literature review on xenophobia and informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. The chapter, therefore, addresses the phenomenon of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and xenophobia in South Africa.

The chapter, therefore, guides us to understand the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. It shows how African immigrants are represented in public discourses that have entrenched discriminatory behaviours against them.

Chapter 4: Study Area: Pretoria

This chapter presents the setting/study area. It presents the economic, legal, social, and political characteristics of Gauteng Province. It presents at Pretoria (now City of Tshwane (CoT)) where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business. It also presents the economic structure of Pretoria; employment status; education levels; key economic sectors; services; the built environment; and the key role players.

It also presents the historical and geographical background of Pretoria; the suburbs where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business; respondents of the study; the demography of Pretoria and Francophone African immigrants in Pretoria's access to housing.

Chapter 5: Research Methodology

This chapter presents the research methodology used in the study. The methodology provides the principles for organising, planning, designing, and conducting the research. The research methodology is critical because its emphasis on methodical ways of providing answers to research questions and solving research problems. The chapter also presents the research paradigm adopted in the study and the research design suitable for the research methodology employed in the study.

It presents the sampling techniques, procedures and size, the research instrument, and the data analysis method, and the ethical statement that guides the procedures and how the data is analysed.

Chapter 6: Data Presentation and Analysis

This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected during the fieldwork and discusses the findings. The chapter responds to the research questions and seeks to achieve the objectives adopted in the first chapter. The main purpose of the study is to analyse the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the study. The chapter is comprised of four sections; The first section is the introduction of the chapter. The second section presents a summary of the findings from the research site. Based on the findings of the study, the third section therefore presents recommendations appropriate in addressing xenophobia-related discrimination, harassment, and violence against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria in general. The final section, therefore, presents the concluding remarks of the study.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Smyth (2004) defines a "conceptual framework" as a research tool that explains the connection between dependent and independent variables. VanderStoep and Johnston (2009:106) claim that a conceptual framework highlights the agenda to be examined, tried, and reviewed in research. Ravitch and Riggan (2017) argue that a conceptual framework presents the logical orientation of everything that forms the underlying thinking, structures, plans, practices, and implementation of a research study.

Several studies have been conducted on xenophobia and informal immigrant enterprises across the globe. The studies consider xenophobia as all forms of discrimination perpetrated against people who are labelled "foreigners" (Akinola, 2018), and informal immigrant entrepreneurs as persons who move from one country to another and operate in the informal sector. Nshimbi and Moyo (2018) describe the informal sector as the part of the economy which is neither taxed nor regulated by government agencies.

Akinola (2018) argues that xenophobia is part of the African story, as the phenomenon takes place in various parts of the continent. In the case of South Africa, it is acknowledged that African immigrants in South Africa are likely to experience xenophobia. Several studies reveal a cause-effect relationship between xenophobia and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Tengeh, 2016; Tirivangasi et al. 2016; Tshishonga, 2015), but none of the studies presents the conceptual relationship between xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

The studies instead integrate the experience of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa with that of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from Anglophone and Lusophone African countries in general. This study, therefore, focuses on the experience of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. The study considers both documented and undocumented Francophone African immigrants who operate in the informal sector as "informal immigrant entrepreneurs" because of the nature of their economic activities. Moyo and Nshimbi (2018) use the theme of informal immigrant traders to refer to African immigrants who operate in the informal economy.

2.1.1 The informal economy

The informal economy is the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are not regulated or protected by the state (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2018). Feige (2005) describes the informal economy as that part of the economy that is made up of transactions that bypass the tax and regulatory system in place. Workers and traders in the informal economy are deprived of benefits and rights that are incorporated in laws and administration regarding commercial licensing, labour contracts, torts, financial credit, and social systems as a result of the unprotected nature of the informal sector.

Notwithstanding, Chen (2016) claims that a large portion of the informal economy is integrated into the formal economy, thereby, contributing to the overall economy of the host or country of origin of immigrants. The informal economy is the environment in which the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs under investigation operate. The Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are people who migrate from various Francophone African countries to South Africa (international migration).

Several theories have been developed to spell out various issues related to international migration. The theories can be placed into two categories; theories that seek to spell out the initiation of international migration and those that spell out the continuation of international migration. It is important to mention that no single theory of migration is coherent. This is because the theories were developed in isolation (Massey et al., 1998; 1993), and are often adopted according to disciplinary boundaries (Massey et al., 1998; 1993, & Schoorl, 1995).

2.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The main theories of international migration are the neoclassical economic: macro and micro theories.

2.2.1 Neoclassical Economics: Macro Theory

This theory is probably the oldest and best-known theory of international migration. The theory was developed initially in order to explain the issues related to international labour migration during the process of economic development (Massey et al., 1993; Todaro, 1976; Harris and Todaro, 1970). The theory contends that international migration, like internal migration is triggered by the variation of labour demand and supply across geographic locations. This means countries that are endowed with high labour in proportion to capital have low market wage rates (Massey et al., 1993; Harris and Todaro, 1970).

While those that are endowed with small labour in proportion to capital have a high market wage rate, the consequence of wage differences between countries often triggers the movement of workers from low-wage countries to those with high wages (Massey et al., 1993). However, as a result of such movement, the supply of labour often falls and wage rises in the country of origin, while the supply of labour often increases and wage falls in the host country (Massey et al., 1993).

In addition, the neoclassical economics: macro theory pays more attention to wage differences and conditions of employment from one country to another (Massey et al., 1993). To this effect, the movement of workers for example, from countries with high labour to those with low labour often represents a shift of investment from capital-rich to capital-poor countries (Massey et al., 1993). It is, therefore, important to emphasise that the movement of capital, in this case, includes human capital (the movement of highly skilled workers from one country to another (Massey et al., 1993).

2.2.2 Neoclassical Economics: Micro Theory

The neoclassical economic: micro theory considers the triggers of international migration as a decision that is made by individuals (Massey et al., 1993; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). The theory argues that individuals decide to migrate because of the expectation that they would experience a positive net return as a result of international migration to a better country (Massey et al., 1993). The expectation of a positive financial outcome of the individual decision to migrate is because individuals critically target high-wage countries when making the decision/choice of migration destination (Massey et al., 1993).

People often choose migration destinations where they believe they would be more productive because of the availability of countless employment opportunities in the migration destination (Massey et al., 1993). Nonetheless, irrespective of the skills of migrants and the possibility of finding employment in the host country, potential international migrants must still have the financial means to cover the costs of migration and the day-to-day living expenses in the host country while searching for employment (Massey et al., 1993).

The process of seeking employment in the host country is coupled with other dynamics such as the need to learn a new language in a host country where the language spoken is different from the language spoken by migrants (Massey et al., 1993), as well as, the need to integrate into the culture of the host country, adapt to a new labour market, and the psychological

implications of "cutting old ties and forging new ones", both in the host and country of origin of migrants (Massey et al., 1993 and Borjas, 1990).

Notwithstanding, in lieu of focusing on a specific theory of international migration the point of view of the international migration systems as discussed by, among others, Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) tries to integrate some key issues raised by various migration theories. This is because the flow of capital and people from one country to another takes place under specific economic, social, political, and demographic conditions across the world (Kritz & Zlotnik, 1992). However, there are newer theories of migration that have been developed as a reaction to the neoclassical theory. These theories were developed as a response to the changing nature of the world such as;

2.2.3 NEW ECONOMICS THEORY OF MIGRATION

The new economics theory of migration was developed in order to confront certain suppositions of neoclassical economic macro and micro theories. The new economics theory, therefore, presents a new opportunity of analysing international migration in consideration of the varied nature of the determinants of migration (Stark, 1991). The theory, therefore, shifted the focal point of migration research from individual to mutual interdependence (Stark, 1991). In this regard, the principal argument is that the decision to engage in international migration is not solely made by isolated individuals, but typically by families or households.

In addition, the decisions of migrants are often affected by a large scope of factors that are influenced by the living conditions in the country of origin of migrants. As such, the decision to migrate is not based on individual reflections, but is determined by the household in order to overcome the risk of household income failure (Massey et al. 1993).

2.2.4 World Systems Theory of Migration

According to Wallerstein (1974), the world system theory connects the determinants of migration to structural change in world markets and views migration as a result of globalisation, the increased interdependence of economies, and the rise of new forms of production (Massey et al. 1993). The growth of export manufacturing and export agriculture that is tied to foreign direct investment from developed economies to less developed ones have provoked disruption in traditional work structures and has deployed a new section of the population into long-distance migration (Massey et al. 1993).

2.2.5 Dual Labour Market Theory of Migration

The dual labour market theory connects migration to structural changes in the economy, but spells out migration dynamics with the demand side (Massey et al., 1993). Piore (1979) claims that the dual labour market theory is divided into two branches; the occupational structure and a dual pattern of economic organisation in advanced economies. Duality, therefore, takes place along the lines of capital-intensive where both skilled and unskilled labour is utilised, and labour-intensive where unskilled labour prevails (Piore, 1979).

The dual labour market theory, therefore, claims that migration is encouraged by conditions of labour demand rather than supply. Typical characteristics of advanced economies in developed countries produce high demand for low-skilled jobs. In this regard, immigration, therefore, becomes a necessary tool in order to fill jobs (Piore, 1979).

2.2.6 Network Theory of Migration

The network theory of migration does not look at the factors that initiate migration (Massey et al. 1993) but rather looks at what perpetuates migration in time and space (Massey et al. 1993). Migrant networks which sometimes develop into institutions help to present a deeper understanding of why migration continues even when the issue of wage difference or recruitment policies no longer exist or are in place (Massey et al., 1993).

The presence of migrant networks (especially networks of migrants from the same ethnic group) in the host country is likely to shape the decisions of migrants during the process of choosing the country of migration destinations (Vertovec, 2002). In addition, the network theory of migrants spells out the rationale behind the uneven nature of international migration flow (Faist, 2000). People easily migrate to destinations where there are individuals that can provide them with necessary support when they arrive.

Notwithstanding, these theories and more have been challenged by new realities of complex migration regimes, lower costs of transport networks, cheaper and rapid communication networks, and high government involvement (Arango, 2000; Massey, 1999). Nonetheless, the researcher is aware of the other theories of migration that are not mentioned in this thesis because the thesis is not theorisation, but the empirical reality of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the conduct of their business in Pretoria. Therefore, this chapter after briefly presenting the theoretical approach to migration, sets out to also present the conceptual relationship between xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. The chapter looks at the reason certain

African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are labelled Francophone. It proceeds to look at the reason Francophone Africans migrate to South Africa before creating a conceptual link between xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. Guba and Lincoln (1994) posit that the conceptual framework must be able to link the concepts used in a study to each other, and Miles and Huberman (1994:440) claim a conceptual framework "lays out the key factors, constructs, or variables, and presumes relationships among them". It is against this backdrop that Figure 2.1 presents a graphic illustration of the conceptual framework of this study.

Figure 2.1: Conception of the general patterns and trends of Francophone African immigration to South Africa.[4]



Figure 2.1: Conception of the general patterns and trends of Francophone African migration to South Africa (Source: Researcher, 2022)

[4] Source: the researcher's proposition

Figure 2.1 presents the conception of the general patterns and trends of Francophone African migration to Pretoria. Pretoria is the administrative capital of the Republic of South Africa (Horn, 2021). It is in the North of the Gauteng Province (Horn, 2021). See section 4.2 for more detailed information on Pretoria.

Notwithstanding, from left to right, the figure reveals that when Francophone African immigrants arrive in South Africa, many of them choose Pretoria as their final destination. This is probably because Pretoria is host to various diplomatic missions which include diplomatic missions of various Francophone African countries (Milusheva, 2012). While in Pretoria, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced discrimination, harassment and violent attacks perpetrated against them while conducting their business (Peberdy, 2019; Skinner, 2017; Crush et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015).

This is accentuated by the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs struggle with the need to be accepted or integrated into the host country. The success of their business partly depends on the way they create networks with South Africans and the extent to which South Africans accept them (Peberdy, 2019; Skinner, 2017; Crush et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015).

In addition, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria face other challenges due to the language barrier because "language is key when seeking acceptance and integration, or when seeking to interact politically, economically and socially" (Chiswick & Houseworth, 2008; Vigouroux, 2008; Cameron 2001:11). The challenge of language barriers is coupled with the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are not able to find formal employment.

Consequently, Francophone African immigrants frequently tend to informal business as a last resort. They either create a new informal business or take over the structure of an old informal business along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in small shops around Pretoria.

The business Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria conduct along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in small shops have exposed them to discrimination and harassment which often led to violent attacks to cause or not cause bodily harm against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses (Nshimbi, 2018; Tshishonga, 2015). The violent attacks against them are often perpetrated by South Africans.

However, during the violent attacks, the informal business of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs is often looted and sometimes burnt down (Nshimbi, 2018; Tshishonga, 2015). The looting and burning down of businesses belonging to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs often leave the informal entrepreneurs without any source of income (economic activity).

Consequently, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are taken back to the initial state of unemployment/joblessness they found themselves in upon arrival in South Africa – a position that compelled them to start their informal trade; thus, creating a sort of vicious cycle.

2.3 CONTEXTUALISATION AND CONCEPTUALISATION OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS AND XENOPHOBIA

Francophone African immigrants originate from African nations where French is the official language (Rose & Wauquier-Gravelines, 2007). There were previously 14 nations in Africa where French is the official language (Le Vine, 2004) but the number increased to over 18 African countries because there are other African countries that adopted French as the official language alongside one other official language like Spanish (Cogneau et al. 2021), for example, the case of Equatorial Guinea which was a previous Spanish colony but now has adopted French as an official language alongside Spanish, thereby joining *"La Francophonie"* ((International Organisation of French-Speaking countries) Smith, 2020).

2.3.1 The Label Francophone

Le Vine (2004) labels countries in Africa where French is used as the official language as Francophone African countries. Clark (2018) describes these countries as Francophone Africa. The reason is that after the second world war, Europe decided to maintain close relations with Africa to establish alliances between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) (Mazrui, 2004:54). However, the relationship between Europe and Africa paved the way for developments such as the Lomé Conventions of 1975[5] (Drieghe, 2020; Moss, 2019).

[5] The Lomé convention was a partnership agreement between European Economic Community (EEC) and former colonies of the EEC member states in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) in 1975. The convention introduced ground-breaking features such as nonreciprocal market access and several mechanisms to stabilise ACP countries' export revenues (Drieghe, 2020).

France, therefore, decided to deepen its relationship with its erstwhile colonies by creating an Intergovernmental Organisation for Cooperation called *L'Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique* (ACCT) - Agency of Cultural and Technical Cooperation in 1970 (Thérien, 1993). The members of this cooperation included a few Asian and European countries (Thérien, 1993). However, following several reforms, the agency for cultural and technical cooperation was transformed into *L'Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie* (AIF) (Intergovernmental Agency of Francophonie) in 1985 (Barraquand, 2004). By 1998, AIF was also transformed into L'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) - Francophone International Organisation (Barraquand, 2004)[6] which Tréan (2006) then coined as "La Francophonie" (people who share French as a common language).

Supposedly, *La Francophonie* was aimed at bringing erstwhile French colonies together. Bouillon and Morris (2001:19), therefore, claim that "Francophone African countries are members of the OIF and that their governments have adopted French as the official language, while their population regularly use French for daily communication."

Notwithstanding, it is imperative to interrogate whether the adoption of French as the official language in certain African countries automatically makes these countries members of La Francophonie, or whether the use of French as the medium of communication in an African country is enough reason to label such a country a Francophone African country.

The interrogation stems from the fact that African countries such as "Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Cape Verde" are members of La Francophonie (Mazrui, 2004:6), "but in these countries Spanish, Arabic and Portuguese are respectively the official languages, and the majority of the population does not use French on daily basis" (Mazrui, 2004:6).

However, Mazrui (2004) submits the reason the listed countries are members of La Francophonie is because of "political, economic and cultural ambitions to expand France and the Francophone community on the continent" (Mazrui, 2004:6). Meanwhile, a country like Algeria which was colonised by France and uses French as one of the official languages is not a member of La Francophonie (Mazrui, 2004:6).

Nonetheless, irrespective of the complexity of membership in La Francophonie (Cogneau et al. 2021). The label Francophone Africa denotes African countries where French is used "as the lingua franca in government offices, judiciaries, legislatures or academia" (Mazrui, 2006:6). Mazrui (2004:6) further claims the label "Francophone Africa" "is enhanced by the degree and the nature of the lingo-cultural dependence of their societies on French."

[6] Community of countries using French as official language (Barraquand, 2004)

Several scholars, therefore, claim the lingo-cultural dependence on French in some African nations is what keeps them continually under the influence of France after independence (Granvaud, 2015; Migani 2008; Pouemi, 2000; Julienne 1988). Kaninya (2020) argues that French is a medium that France uses to transfer its customs and history to new generations of Francophone Africans.

That is why Lekogo (2008) points out in the context of migration that French is prominent among Francophone Africans when they move from one country to another. Garuba (2001:8) attests "the prominence of French is intensified when Francophone Africans migrate to a host country where French is not the official language as French is used as an enabler for in-group solidarity among Francophone African immigrants from diverse backgrounds."

The fact that Francophone African immigrants use French as a shared heritage helps to distinguish their migration experience when they are in an Anglophone host country like South Africa. Therefore, the experience of Francophone African immigrants in the context of migration can be clearly separated from the experience of Anglophone African immigrants in an Anglophone host country (Garuba, 2001:8).

2.3.2 Francophone African Migration

Historically, Francophone African migration was influenced by the type of colonial relationship that exists between Francophone African countries and France (Lekogo, 2006). For example, pre- and post-independence, the mass departure of Francophone Africans to France was sustained by the deep ties between Francophone African countries and France (Lekogo, 2006).

Francophone Africans chose France as their first migration destination outside Africa (Lekogo, 2006). In addition, the choice of France as the first/primary migration destination was informed by "political, economic, linguistic and transportation links between France and its former colonies" (Lekogo, 2006; Mazrui, 2004:6).

The reason France had deep ties with Francophone African countries was because of the French policy of "assimilation"[7] during colonialism (Müller-Crepon, 2020). The policy paved the way for the mass immigration of Francophone Africans to France (Lekogo, 2006). For example, before 1974, Francophone Africans could enter France only with their "identification document

[7] The policy of assimilation was the official colonial policy of the French administration in Francophone African countries. Assimilation was a strategy to impose French social behavior on Francophone Africans (Diouf, 1998).

and a medical certificate from their country of origin" (Lekogo, 2006; Mazrui, 2004; Hollifield, 1999:62).

By 1975, they were required to enter France with residence and work documents (Lekogo, 2006; Mazrui, 2004; Hollifield, 1999:62). By 1981 and 1985, respectively, Francophone Africans were forced to obtain a residence permit and visa before entering France (Fall, 2003:6-7).

However, besides migrating to France, Francophone Africans maintain a similar attitude when choosing a migration destination within Africa. Their attitude was initially directed toward other Francophone African countries as migration destinations, except for the fact that Francophone Africans recently consider Francophone African countries with stable economies such as Gabon (Lekogo, 2006).

However, to understand why Francophone Africans migrate to South Africa. It is critical to first look at the complexities of African migration before looking at the history of Francophone African migration to France. In order to understand why South Africa is the new migration destination of Francophone Africans, instead of another Francophone African country on the continent.

2.3.3 Complexities in African Migration

The movement of people from one country to another is higher in Africa than in any part of the world. According to (Adepoju, 2007b; Oucho, 2006: 132), the number of Africans moving from one country to another in the continent remains steadfastly on the rise from 9.4 million to 16.3 million between 1960 and 2000. The reason is that Africa does not have a single migration configuration, but a whole range of types at once: between origin, destination, and transit for labour migrants, for flows of undocumented migrants and refugees (Adepoju, 2007b; Oucho, 2006: 132).

The increasing number of Africans moving from one country to another within and out of Africa has created stereotypes that perceive Africa as a continent of mass migration and displacement caused by poverty, violent conflict, and environmental stress (Casale and Posel, 2006; Brooks, 2005: 1159). This is contrary to recent scholarship that provides more micro-evidence indicating that the reason most Africans move from one country to another within and out of Africa is for family reintegration, work, or study (Schoumaker et al., 2015; Bakewell and Jónsson, 2011).

In addition, populist rhetoric also falsely claims that more Africans migrate to Europe and North America than elsewhere in order to escape quagmires of colonial/postcolonial legacies, and the quest for 'greener pastures' (Casale and Posel, 2006: 351; Brooks, 2005: 1159). Such a claim is refuted by recent interview-based studies on contemporary African migration that show that most African migration is not directed toward Europe and North America, but toward other African countries (Schoumaker et al., 2015; Berriane and De Haas, 2012; Bakewell and Jónsson, 2011).

Also, those moving out of Africa not only move to Europe and North America, but to the Gulf countries as well (Bakewell and De Haas, 2007). Furthermore, a study conducted by the Joint Labour Migration Programme for Africa (JLMP) shows that among 31.3 million Africans who live in countries other than their birthplace, more than half of them 18.6 million live in Africa (JLMP, 2015).

Even a recent study by the World Bank (2015b) confirms that the movement of people from one country to another was directed to a limited number of countries in various subregions of Africa; Gabon in Central Africa subregion, Kenya in East Africa, Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa, Libya in North Africa [before the Arab springs of 2011], and South Africa in Southern Africa after the end of Apartheid in 1994 (World Bank, 2015b).

However, in the context of this study, it is also important to explore Francophone African migration to France in order to have a deeper understanding of the history of Francophone African migration and the complexity of alternative migration destinations of Francophone African migrants.

2.3.4 Francophone African Migration to France

Francophone African migration to France was initially determined by factors like "the timing of industrialization and political change" that saw France as a country of immigrants (between 1890 and 1940) (Hollifield, 1994:145, as well as events of the First World War (WWI) that saw the massive recruitment of Francophone Africans as combatants of France, on the other hand (Koller, 2008; Hardach, 1981).

Page and McKinlay (1987) claim about 135 000 Africans from Francophone West African countries were conscripted into the French army during the war. Strachan (2004) argues the number of Africans from Francophone West Africa that were conscripted into the French army was over 200 000 soldiers. Hollifield (1994:145), however, discovers a huge disparity in the

number of Francophone Africans who migrated to France from North Africa and those who migrated from sub-Saharan African countries.

Hollifield (1994:145) argues the disparity is probably due to the geographic proximity of Francophone North Africa and France. As such, proximity helped Francophone North Africans to easily migrate to France than those from sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, by 2002, as can be seen in figures 2.2 and 2.3, there were already a high number of Francophone African immigrants from North Africa such as Algeria, 30 000, Morocco, 25 000, and Tunisia, 5 000, who were living in French cities; as opposed to a smaller number of Francophone African immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa such as Senegal, 4 500, Mali, 4 000 and Côte d'Ivoire, 3 000, who were living in various French cities.

Figure 2.2: Evolution of Francophone North African migrants to France (1994-2002)



Source: http//:www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm

Figure 2.2 shows that between 1994 and 1997, Francophone North African immigrants from Algeria constituted the highest number of Francophone North African immigrants, while between 1998 and 2001, Francophone North African immigrants from Morocco surpassed Algerians and became the highest number of Francophone North African immigrants in France. Also, Francophone North African immigrants from Tunisia constitute the lowest number of Francophone North African immigrants in France.

Figure 2.3: Evolution of some sub-Saharan Francophone African migrants to France (1994-2002).

Evolution of some sub-Saharan Francophone African migrants toFrance, 1994-2002



Source: http//:www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm

Figure 2.3 shows that Francophone sub-Saharan African migrants from Mali constituted the highest number of Francophone sub-Saharan African immigrants in France. By 2002, Francophone sub-Saharan African migrants from Senegal constituted the highest number. However, Granvaud (2015) claims that recently, a substantial population of more than 2.3 million Francophone African immigrants, in general, live in France, while some 23 500 French citizens live in Francophone African countries.

Some scholars argue that Francophone African countries remain a strong support to the economy of France (Granvaud 2015; Lorentz 2001; Lorentz 1997). However, in the last two decades, Francophone African migration to France has experienced a drastic shift, which is because of immigration policy changes in France (De Haas et al. 2015). The policy changes, according to Fassin et al., (2013), are due to events of "the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008".

The crisis increased the level of unemployment among French citizens and the long-term reduction of social benefits in France (Fassin et al. 2013). Cinalli et al. (2021) argue that the financial crisis was compounded by the migration crisis that stretched across the Mediterranean

in 2011 as a result of two dramatic events: the "Arab Springs"[8]and the humanitarian catastrophe it created in North Africa and Syria (Casana & Laugier, 2017; Stepan & Linz, 2013).

These events created new waves of the mass movement to France and other European Union (EU) member states (Staněk, 2017). This is coupled with the rise of security concerns that came with the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in January 2015 in Paris (Castanho Silva, 2018; Duerr, 2015). The attacks increased the level of prejudice against Francophone African immigrants from North Africa two weeks following the attacks (Cohu et al. 2016). The attacks also increased public support for more immigration restrictions within the EU (Cohu et al. 2016). However, before the attacks, Paoli (2017) claims that France was already experiencing an increasing immigration crisis with Francophone African immigrants. This, therefore, led France to tighten its immigration policies further (Paoli, 2017).

Surprisingly, Hall (2008) traces the immigration crisis in France to as far back as the 1980s and 1990s, when France experienced lower rates of growth and higher levels of unemployment. Hall (2008) argues the lower rates of economic growth disappointed many French citizens who had hoped to experience continuous improvements in their standard of living. It is estimated that about 43% of French citizens were unemployed for more than a year right up to the early 2000s (Hall, 2008).

This made France inflict on its immigration policies by looking at policy alternatives (Zolberg, 2001). Freedman (2017) argues that the French policy alternative was excessively harsh in that it ignores the plight of Francophone African immigrants who were sometimes forced to flee their countries because of war, persecution, or natural disaster. The policy alternative, therefore, exposes Francophone African immigrants to increasing exclusion and marginalisation in France.[9]

Moujoud (2018), for example, argues the regularisation of undocumented Francophone African immigrants (so-called "sans-papiers"[10] (without papers)) in France became a serious challenge. Francophone African immigrants who are not documented in France are not allowed to benefit from education and other social services "despite the fact that some of them have been in the country for many years and have been paying taxes" (Moujoud, 2018).

Massey and Taylor (2004:288) mention that the difficult condition of Francophone African immigrants in France progressively increased after the "Schengen Treaty, signed on 19 June

[8] "The Arab Spring" was a popular opposition movement that exploded throughout North Africa and the Middle East (Dixon, 2011).

[9] "Breakdown of foreigners by nationality," INSEE, Retrieved 12 December 2015.

[10] The "sans-papiers" are a heterogeneous group of foreigners in France composed of over-stayers, rejected asylum seekers and undocumented entrants (Lekogo, 2006).

1990, came into effect with the implementation of the Schengen Agreement". Okunade and Ogunnubi (2021) claim that the treaty led to increasing anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe as it allowed for joint action on the repatriation of Francophone African immigrants who do not have proper documentation (Gelatt, 2005).

In the context of France, the level of unemployment among Francophone African immigrants increased drastically (Flahaux, 2017), thus creating anxiety among Francophone African immigrants who could not find formal employment in France to improve their lives (Flahaux, 2017). Consequently, some Francophone African immigrants in France started reflecting on returning to their motherland (Flahaux, 2017).

Simultaneously, Francophone Africans in the country of origin who could not migrate to France due to difficulties in obtaining a Schengen visa started looking at other alternative migration destinations in Africa and elsewhere (Lekogo, 2008; 2006). The quest for alternative migration destinations among Francophone Africans coincided with the fact that "most of Francophone Africa is plagued with socioeconomic challenges such as endemic poverty, unemployment, political instability, the rise of insensitive dictatorship, violent conflicts, nepotism, ethnic divisibility, marginalisation of minority groups, bad governance, and systemic corruption" (Brooks, 2005:1159).

Yates (2012) also attests that systemic corruption and endemic poverty in Francophone African countries are because French companies loot the resources of these countries while leaving them poorer. Lassou et al. (2016) claim that French companies loot Francophone African countries by corrupting the regimes of these countries. Consequently, French companies promote unequal economic growth and a low level of development in Francophone African countries (Karl, 1997). This has compelled Francophone Africans to look for alternative migration destinations to escape "socioeconomic and political" predicaments in the country of origin (Casale & Posel, 2006).

2.3.5 Alternative Migration Destination of Francophone Africans

The quest for alternative migration destinations remains a feature of Francophone African migration after France (the primary immigration destination) implemented more restrictive policies to combat threats related to immigration (Lekogo, 2006). The pressure for alternative migration destinations grew stronger among Francophone Africans as the economies of these countries failed to create employment for the citizens (Médard, 2017).

The pressure to leave the country of origin also grew stronger. Mbaye and Gueye (2018) support the point of view raised by Yates (2012), Lekogo (2008), and Karl (1997) that Francophone African nations are placed among the most corrupt nations on earth with a very high rate of unemployment. Unemployment and corruption in Francophone African countries have created a feeling of disappointment and disillusionment among the citizens.

The citizens are disappointed with the actual political and socioeconomic situation in their countries (Nyamnjoh & Page, 2002), and disillusioned regarding the impossibility of having or creating a decent future in their country of origin (Nyamnjoh & Page, 2002). Benjamin and Mbaye (2020) claim that even the business environment of Francophone African countries is hostile in the sense that the tax rates on income are high in almost all Francophone African countries, as compared to Anglophone African countries. This harms businesses.

Francophone Africans are also not able to conduct trade in their country of origin partly because of the presence of French companies in almost every sector of the economy of these countries. Consequently, Francophone Africans are forced to explore new migration destinations where there is a language barrier such as Great Britain, New Zealand, and recently South Africa post-1994.

2.3.6 Francophone African Migration to South Africa

Francophone Africans increasingly migrate to South Africa post-1994 as a result of "push and pull factors". Landau and Segatti (2009) attest that the rise of Francophone African migration to South Africa is because of the need to seek protection from domestic harassment and violence. McGowan (2003) claims that "coups d'état" were more prevalent in Francophone African countries than in Anglophone countries. According to Rwodzi (2011:18), "push factors that compel Francophone Africans to flee to South Africa are war/conflict, persecution, and natural and human-made disasters."

Among these factors, wars and political instability are the most determinant push factor responsible for the influx of Francophone African migrants into South Africa (Rwodzi, 2011:18; Lekogo, 2008). This is contrary to Marschall's (2018) opinion that the dynamics of poverty, such as a lack of economic opportunities in Francophone African countries, force Francophone Africans to migrate to South Africa in search of better socioeconomic opportunities to improve their living conditions and that of their kind and kith (Marschall, 2018).

Nonetheless, the pull factors that attract Francophone Africans to migrate to South Africa were a chain of events such as "the lifting of restrictions on African urbanisation in the late 1980s", the relatively tranquil political atmosphere after apartheid, and the growing economy of South Africa" (Posel, 2004:277-292; Peberdy, 2001:15-32). However, Landau and Segatti (2009) argue that there are other Francophone Africans who migrate to South Africa "in search of passage to a final destination, typically Europe or North America".

Notwithstanding, the pull factors have increased the number of Francophone Africans who choose South Africa alternative destination or passage to a final destination. Hiropoulos (2017) attests from different data sources that there are about two to three million African immigrants (including Francophones) residing in South Africa.

Previous top migration destinations of African immigrants in South Africa, in general, were Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg (Cox et al. 2004). Pretoria was recently listed as a potential migration destination for Francophone African immigrants because more and more Francophone African immigrants have chosen Pretoria as the migration destination (Cox et al. 2004). However, the increasing number of African immigrants in South Africa (including Francophone African immigrants in Pretoria) has raised concerns in South Africa's legislative circle.

2.3.7 Legislative Concern over African Immigrants in South Africa

Hill (1998) argues that the South African government's response to the influx of African migrants into South Africa post-1994 by signing new immigration legislation to contend the influx. Cousins (1999) claims that the new legislation came with a lot of contention among politicians and scholars. Buthelezi (2001), for example, claims that the legislation is very controversial. That is why the legislation encountered serious criticism from its inception because of its discriminatory nature against African immigrants (Crush et al. 2005; Crush, 2003).

Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180) claims that "post-1994, discriminatory legislation in South Africa was created by the African National Congress (ANC). Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180) adds that "when the ANC government took over power in 1994, it amended the apartheid Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 with the Aliens Control Amendment Act 76 of 1995".

The ANC drafted the amended Act as "a protectionist approach to employment and subsided education which guided the process of selection according to qualifications, thus, amplifying measures against undocumented immigrants" (Kabwe-Segatti, 2006:180). Hence, according to

Muanomoha (2008), undocumented immigrants in South Africa are simply African immigrants (including Francophone African immigrants).

However, to have a clear understanding of the discriminatory amended Immigration Act of 1995 against African immigrants. Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180) presents the case of granting work permits to all categories of immigrants (African, European, Asian) in order to allow immigrants to be eligible to work in the country. Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180) claims that "the ANC government granted 65% of work permits to European immigrants, 12% to North Americans, and only 8% to African immigrants from 12 SADC countries".

Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180), therefore, argues that the disproportion in the provision of work permits to all categories of immigrants in the country is a clear indication of the persistent legacy of discrimination that the ANC government inherited from apartheid.[11]

Crush and Williams (2001:11) also note that "the 1995 Aliens Control Amended Act strongly favoured skilled immigrants from Europe and North America. While perpetrating discrimination against African immigrants." Such discrimination is envisaged by Rugunanan and Smit (2011) who claim that most African immigrants in South Africa possess either secondary or tertiary qualifications. Even though the qualification of African immigrants does not give them the same privilege that European immigrants with such a level of education or qualification enjoy in South Africa.

Notwithstanding, Mwakikagile (2008) claims that the government of South Africa has been drafting immigration policies to admit all sorts of immigrants with sought-after skills. However, Kabwe-Segatti (2006:180) claims that "the fact that the Immigration Act of South Africa is based on a selection in terms of qualification and skills is a clear indication of the discriminatory behaviour of the government which seeks to attract only specific kinds of immigrants that are considered desirable in South Africa while discriminating against immigrants who are considered undesirable because they don't have any sought-after skills". Muanomoha (2008), therefore, affirms it is obvious that undesirable immigrants who do not have sought-after skills in South Africa constitute the majority of African immigrants.

Furthermore, Moyo et al. (2018) posit that African immigrants remain the target of discrimination in South Africa's immigration legislation. Isike and Isike (2012) confirm such a point of view and argue that even when the "Aliens Control Amendment Act 76 of 1995" was replaced by the "Immigration Act No 13 of 2002", the Act still maintained the same tendency to perpetration discrimination in favour of "professional or high-skilled" African

[11] Apartheid was a system of government based on segregation (Maylam, 2017).

immigrants who are allowed to apply for temporary or permanent residency; thereby rendering "unskilled or semi-skilled immigrants", which are made up of the majority of African immigrants, becoming undocumented immigrants (Isike & Isike, 2012; Muanomoha, 2008).

Neveling (2005) attests that the Immigration Act of 2002 contains clauses that are a reminder of the apartheid immigration policies. Apartheid immigration laws were designed to attract white immigrants only, while at the same time, people of African descent were restricted and their movement was strictly controlled within the borders of South Africa (Zuberi & Sibanda, 2004). Neveling (2005) claims that various clauses of the Aartheid Immigration Act of 2002 remain a danger in post-apartheid South Africa which has high intolerance towards African immigrants in the country.

Segatti (2011) argues that the subsequent amended Immigration Act 13 of 2011 is also influenced by immigration policies of the apartheid era. Nkomo (2014) and Orman (2012) posit that post-apartheid immigration policies largely discourage "African migration" to South Africa. That is why even "the 2007 and 2011 immigration policy amendments also fail to introduce policies that facilitate the recruitment of African immigrants into formal employment" (Nkomo, 2014; Nkomo & Munyaradzi, 2014).

As the amendments remain exclusive because they increase mechanisms that continue to perpetrate discrimination against African immigrants in South Africa (Nkomo, 2014). Moyo and Zanker (2020), therefore, conclude by affirming that all the amended Immigration Acts of South Africa still create exclusionary immigration regimes that fail to address the reality of the more than thousands of unskilled or low-skilled African immigrants in the country.

In addition, even skilled and professional African immigrants who seek formal employment are restricted by the requirements of the DHA that have a list of requirements to obtain formal employment in the host country. For example, in order to apply for a job, an immigrant must have a work permit, while to apply for a work permit an immigrant must have a job.[12] Therefore, the requirement for obtaining a job or work permit appears contradictory.

The fact that you need a work permit before you apply for a job and the fact that you need a job before you apply for a work permit is an indirect way of saying African immigrants are not welcome in South Africa. This is the fundamental reason for the high level of unemployment among African immigrants (Hunter & Skinner, 2003).

The high rate of unemployment among African immigrants poses challenges in terms of how African immigrants survive on a day-to-day basis in South Africa (Okyere, 2018). Schierup

[12] http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/types-of-visas

(2017) argues that the need to continue to live in South Africa comes with a lot of uncertainty for African immigrants. Such uncertainty has compelled Francophone African immigrants to frequently tend to informal trade.[13]

Rogerson (1996) claims that "African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are not a new phenomenon in South Africa". They constitute an integral part of African migration to the country (Okyere, 2018). Nonetheless, Francophone African immigrants who conduct informal business in Pretoria experience a "language barrier" because English is the "business language" of South Africa (Foss, 2012; Vinogradov & Elam, 2010:360; L'Eglise & Migge, 2008:1-2; Bouillon & Morris, 2001).

The challenge of a language barrier that Francophone African immigrants face in South Africa is compounded by the fact that years back, the White Paper on immigration legislation called South Africans to report suspected "illegal aliens" (Crush & McDonald, 2001). The "call" became a case of a "witch hunt" against African immigrants including Francophone African immigrants (Crush & McDonald, 2001). Skinner (2014) describes the witch hunt of African immigrants which makes the environment in which African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business hostile to African immigrants.

2.4 CONCEPTUAL LINK BETWEEN FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS AND XENOPHOBIA

African immigrants in general, conduct informal trade in a hostile environment due to discriminatory policies that seek to restrain African immigrants from accessing socioeconomic opportunities in South Africa (Muchineripi et al. 2022; Tengeh, 2013; Kalitanyi &Visser, 2010).

Therefore, Francophone African immigrants have resorted to conducting informal business ranging from the selling of sweets, chips, fruits vegetables and foodstuff to selling items such as traditional outfits, local beauty products, concoctions, electrical appliances, curios, artefacts, and sculptures (Peberdy, 2016) along sidewalks, on street corners and at municipal stalls and in front of small shops (Skinner, 2014).

Several studies have confirmed the rise of African informal immigrant business (including Francophone African informal immigrant business) around major South African cities (Garg & Phayane, 2014; Mthombeni et al. 2014; Fatoki & Patswawairi, 2012; Hikam, 2011; Gebre

[13] Informal trade constitutes "all business activities that are not regulated by the state in an environment where similar activities are regulated" (Castells & Portes, 1989:12).

et al. 2011; Masonganye, 2009; Park & Chen, 2009; Pauw & Petrus, 2003). Most of the business is conducted without trade permits.

The reason is that the business is not regulated by the government in ways that formal business is regulated for tax purposes and employment regulation (Skinner, 2014; Tengeh et al. 2011; Fertala, 2006; Portes et al. 1989). Nshimbi (2018) claims that immigrants who conduct business that is not registered are described as informal immigrant entrepreneurs and such is the case for Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs.

However, irrespective of the business environment that is hostile against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have established successful informal businesses (Tshishonga, 2015). The success of the business of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs has attracted envy against them. This has deepened the uneasy relationship between Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and South Africans which is due to biases in perceiving Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as "undesirable people" in South Africa (Sichone, 2020). South Africans continue to perceive African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as economic threats to them (Pineteh & Mulu, 2020; Mamabolo, 2015; Crush & Ramachandran, 2009) and as a result of this perception, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are limited in terms of where they can conduct business as they conduct informal trade only in certain suburbs around Pretoria.

Besides such limitations, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs sell similar goods that are sold by Shoprite, Checkers and Pick and Pay at a much lower price and higher quality as compared to the latter. However, irrespective of the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs sell their products at affordable prices, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs remain the target of discrimination, harassment, and violent attacks in South Africa (Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015).

Even municipal agencies perpetrate discrimination against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Peberdy, 2017; Crush et al. 2013; Landau, 2011). The reason is that municipal agencies continue to perceive Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as people who are involved in an economic sector that is supposed to be eradicated, because of suspicion that it involves unlawful activities (Peberdy, 2017; Crush et al. 2013; Landau, 2011).

This is coupled with the fact that several pieces of literature have confirmed that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) face discrimination in South African financial and credit institutions (Peberdy,

2017; Crush et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015; Fisher, 2005; Timberg, 2005). Banks and other credit institutions do not allow Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to open accounts without proper documentation to conduct business effectively.

The lack of bank accounts has forced African informal immigrant entrepreneurs operating small shops to sometimes leave the money from their business on the business premises (Mukwarami et al. 2018). The notion that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who operate small shops, leave money at their business premises has also attracted the perpetration of harassment and violent attacks against them. Even the media plays a key role in propagating discriminatory remarks against African immigrants in general, thereby fuelling violent attacks against them (Kariithi et al. 2017).

For example, the media often refer to African immigrants as "illegal immigrants" and portrays African immigrants with a lot of disdain and discriminatory remarks associated with criminality, illegality, being undocumented, drug dealers and human traffickers (Kariithi et al. 2017; Monson & Arian, 2012).

In addition, there is evidence that harassment perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, often precedes inflammatory comments against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their business from politicians and senior government officials (Crush, 2014). The inflammatory comments also inform the drafting of discriminatory immigration policies that diminishes the rights of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria (Crush, 2014).

Even the discrimination that South African government agencies perpetrate against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa often led to increasing harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. It is recorded that ordinary South Africans perpetrate violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, (Moyo et al. 2018; Arias, 2019; Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2017; Crush, 2014).

Even ordinary South Africans who conduct informal trade, such as members of the Greater Gauteng Business Forum, are known to perpetrate harassment and violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general (Arias, 2019; Crush et al. 2015).

Furthermore, the violent attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) are often intending to cause bodily harm and loot or burn down businesses that belong to African informal immigrant

entrepreneurs in various South African cities (Tshishonga, 2015; Peberdy & Rogerson, 2003:80).

An example is the violent attacks again African immigrants that took place in August 1997, following South Africa's first democratic elections that saw African informal immigrant traders, including Francophone African informal immigrant traders, being attacked, and assaulted in various South African cities (Dassah, 2015; Peberdy & Rogerson, 2003:80). A similar example is the violent attacks that took place in 2008, which left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant business looted and 213 burnt down (Johnson & Jacobs, 2012:330), and incidents in 2015, 2017 and 2019 (Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015).

The violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are often accompanied by angry anti-African immigrant expressions such as "Phansi makwerekwere, phansi" (which is translated as "Down foreigners, down") thereby denoting the presence of xenophobia against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Mlambo, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015; Peberdy and Rogerson, 2003:80).

Semantically, "makwerekwere" denotes individuals who speak foreign languages in South Africa, and have little or no mastery of local South African languages, beliefs, and customs (Nyamnjoh, 2016). The use of the word "makwerekwere", therefore, became a form of xenophobia because it is used to set boundaries between "insiders", in this case, locals, and "outsiders", African immigrants in general (Nyamnjoh, 2016).

The reason why the word only applies to African immigrants is that African immigrants are most likely to be mistaken for South Africans due to similarities in phenotype and culture. As a result, "makwerekwere", therefore, serves as a mechanism for detecting and distinguishing African immigrants who are perceived as intruders because they do not originate from South Africa. The word, therefore, embodies the phenomenon that often led to xenophobic attacks (Kelly & Steyn, 2008). The word relegates African immigrants as "undesirable, economic parasites, illegals," among other derogatory terms (Mavengano et al. 2022).

Several scholars such as Dube (2019), Moyo et al. (2018), Nshimbi (2018), Tshishonga (2015), Crush et al. (2015), Moyo (2014), Nyamnjoh (2010), Neocosmos (2008) have also confirmed that the violent attacks against Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria are due to xenophobia.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter presents the link between xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. The chapter traces the migration pattern of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from the country of origin to the host country where they experience discrimination, harassment, and xenophobic attacks while conducting their business in Pretoria

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

According to Collins and Hussey (2014:87), "a literature review is a critical evaluation of the existing body of knowledge on a topic, which guides the researcher and demonstrates the relevant literatures has been located and analysed." Bolderston (2008) attests that a literature review is an examination of published works on specific research areas to find out what is known, the knowledge gap and different points of view (Bolderston, 2008). Rowley and Slack (2004) claim that a literature review elaborates on a variety of publications that exist in a specific research area to make a summary of new knowledge in the field.

According to LeCompte et al. (2003:124), conducting "a literature review is one of the means of demonstrating an author's knowledge about a particular field of study, including vocabulary, theories, key variables and phenomena, and its methods and history." The literature review in this study aims to guide the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

Xenophobia and informal immigrant entrepreneurs are two phenomena that take place across the world (Miller, 2018). The presence of xenophobia across the world is a result of the rise of people who promote the interest of nationals against foreigners in the host country (Miller, 2018). While informal immigrant entrepreneurs exist globally as a result of a combination of push and pull factors of migration and discrimination in the formal labour market of the host country (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018).

Akinola, (2018) argues that the presence of xenophobia in Africa for example, is a result of colonialism which militarised various African societies thereby imposing a violent character upon the state and these societies. Consequently, from Ghana to Nigeria, and Zambia to South Africa, discrimination and harassment have been perpetrated against non-nationals of African descent through accusatory discourses that do not lead to violence against immigrants and the burning of their businesses (Akinola, 2018).

Pineteh (2017) argues that the widespread xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa is because, while post-apartheid South Africa is a prime destination for African migrants, its "economic and psychosocial challenges" have shaped the way South African nationals frame narratives around African migrants from the rest of the continent. These narratives make South Africans distraught because they are coined with "images and metaphors" that portray African

migrants as wicked and threatening, thus, justifying xenophobia perpetrated against African migrants (Pineteh, 2017).

Notwithstanding, the difference in the experience of xenophobia in South Africa and elsewhere in the continent is that Crush and Ramachandran (2014) claim xenophobia in South Africa is extremely violent, as compared to other parts of the continent where it is non-violent (Akinola, 2018). Therefore, it is important to understand the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Before looking at the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, it is important to mention that several scholars have studied and theorised the nature, causes, and consequences of xenophobia that targets African immigrants in South Africa (Delanty and Millward, 2007; Berezin, 2006; Alekseev, 2006; Lucassen, 2005; Cohen, 1994). However, the studies fail to narrow the experience of xenophobia among lingo-cultural collectives or nationalities.

Also, the studies did not compare the experience of xenophobia among African informal immigrant entrepreneurs across various South African cities. In addition, the literature review shows that not all South Africans perpetrate xenophobia against African immigrants. These studies also fail to demonstrate why South Africans who are not xenophobic are unable to quench the xenophobic attacks against African immigrants. In a worst-case scenario, the studies fail to demonstrate the level of restorative justice that is offered to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who lost their businesses as a result of xenophobic violence.

Even scholars who claim that African immigrants in South Africa are attacked because of the local perception that they are stealing jobs that belong to the citizens (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al., 2015; Moyo, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 2010; Neocosmos, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2007: 13; Peberdy, 2002) fail to demonstrate how African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are stealing jobs that belong to South Africans, in order to justify the violent attacks against them and their business. Literature also demonstrates that most of the capital that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs use to start up or invest in an informal business in South Africa is often from family members who work outside the Republic of South Africa.

Notwithstanding, the above studies that have looked at Francophone African immigrants in South Africa include: “The smuggling of La Francophonie”: Francophone Africans in Anglophone Cape Town (South Africa) by Vigouroux, C.B. (2008); Negotiating Linguistic Boundaries: Francophone Immigrant Children’s Experiences as Language Brokers in South Africa by Kemende, Q., and Nomlomo, V. (2019); Francophone transnational students, social exclusion and the challenges of adaptation at a South African University of Technology by

Pineteh, E., and Mulu, T. (2016); Marketing a foreign language: the case of French in South Africa by Margerison, A. (2005); African Immigration to South Africa: francophone migrants of the 1990s by Morris, A., and Bouillon, A. (2001); The 'Amagongogo': Francophone African Immigrants in South Africa by Bouillon, A. (1996).

The studies did not look at the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal entrepreneurs during the conduct of their businesses in Pretoria as a category of analysis. Studies that have looked at the experience of xenophobia in South Africa have often combined the experience of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa with that of Anglophone and Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019; Dube, 2019; Moyo et al. 2018; Peberdy, 2018; Pineteh, 2019; 2017; Tshishonga, 2015).

No study has been able to separate the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria from that of Anglophone and Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. This is critical because of the consequence of xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs across South Africa's socioeconomic landscape.

It is obvious that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who come from the SADC[14] (where South Africa is a member state), such as Francophone African immigrants from the DRC may have a different experience of xenophobia (Mutisi, 2016; Ngoma, 2003) from the experience of other Francophone African immigrants who originate from ECOWAS[15] (Okafor, 2017) or CEMAC (Caceres et al. 2013).[16] This is so partly because African immigrants from the DRC enjoy the 90 days visa-free policy among citizens of SADC (De Jager & Musuva, 2016).

In addition, the experience of xenophobia amongst Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria would be different from that of Anglophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria because Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs face the challenge of a language barrier in Pretoria which is an English-dominant city (Pineteh, 2019, 2017; Lekogo, 2008). It is worth mentioning that the issue of the language barrier is relevant because language barriers during business transactions can cause misunderstandings that may lead to conflict (Khunkitti, 2016; Lang, 1986). Moreover, Gsir

[14] Southern African Development Community (Ngoma, 2003).
[15] Economic Community of West African States (Okafor, 2017).
[16] Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Caceres et al. 2013).

(2017) and Foster (2001) also claim that the language barrier experienced by immigrants in the host country/society may be due to prejudice against them.

However, no study has, therefore, distinguished or compared the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business from that of Anglophone and Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. Additionally, some researchers have documented the experience of xenophobia among African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019; Dube, 2019; Moyo et al. 2018; Peberdy, 2018; Pineteh, 2019; 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

No study in the pieces of literature explored here has also separated the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria from that of Francophone African immigrant non-informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria (Tshishonga, 2015; Nyamnjoh, 2006). Also, no study has been able to link or compare the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria with that of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in other cities like Cape Town, Durban, or Johannesburg. This study will, therefore, cover a gap in the literature review as it seeks to examine how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business.

It is important to conduct more research on Francophone African immigrants as a category of analysis because only a few researchers have attempted to research this category of African immigrants in South Africa, in addition to the fact that a variety of Francophone African immigrant communities and networks exist across South Africa in the form of "political, national associations, and religious organisations."

Francophone African immigrant networks such as national associations and communities such as religious organisations bring together different categories of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in terms of country of origin through French which serves as a "unifier" of a highly diverse Francophone African immigrant community in South Africa (Lekogo 2008; Crush et al. 2005), even though French is spoken within Francophone African immigrant communities in South Africa with local variations in pronunciation and vocabulary (Ball & Marley, 2016).

Given the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, face other socioeconomic challenges such as the difficulty of adapting to a new social environment (Chigeza & Roos, 2012), where high unemployment among African immigrants,

in general, and xenophobia is the order of the day (Nshimbu & Moyo, 2017; Theodore et al. 2017; Mamabolo, 2015; Lekogo, 2008).

Pineteh (2017:1), therefore, argues that South Africa's socioeconomic challenges have influenced the way they perceive African immigrants. However, no study has shown how South Africans discriminately perpetrate xenophobia against African immigrants according to their country of origin, how they perceive Francophone African immigrants in Pretoria separately from Anglophone or Lusophone African immigrants, and how they perpetrate xenophobia against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs according to their country of origin. This point is important because Dube (2019) argues that South Africans perpetrate xenophobia against immigrants in relation to the country of origin of immigrants.

Dube (2019), for example, claims that South Africans perpetrate xenophobia against African immigrants from Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe more than any other category of African immigrants. In addition, other scholars also claim that African immigrants in general, are not easily accepted by locals and often face xenophobia in the form of discrimination, harassment, and xenophobic attacks more frequently than European or North American immigrants in South Africa (Pineteh, 2019; 2017; Crush & Skinner, 2017; Crush et al. 2015; Lekogo, 2008, Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Therefore, to understand individuals' experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business it is important to look at some of the discourses on xenophobia in South Africa. The discourses are important because they guide the way African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are represented across public spaces (Pineteh, 2017); thereby providing an understanding of how xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are also perceived and interpreted across South Africa's socioeconomic and political landscape (Pineteh, 2017; Hagensen, 2014; Hickel, 2014; Palmary, 2002).

Nonetheless, some scholars attest that xenophobia perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general, and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, in particular, is intertwined in the discourse of apartheid segregation in South Africa (Igbokwe, 2021)[17], poverty, inequality and unemployment (Otinkorang, 2020), nationalism (Jakovljevic et al. 2019)[18], and "township politics that arose as a result of political

[17]prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism by an individual, community, or institution against a person or people based on their membership of a particular racial or ethnic group (Igbokwe, 2021).

[18]identification with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations (Jakovljevic et al. 2019).

ideologies and consciousnesses" in post-apartheid South Africa (Marumo et al. 2019; Pineteh, 2017; Gordon, 2015; Neocosmos, 2008).

The ideologies and consciousness have heightened the "politics of fear of African immigrants" that are prevalent in both the state and the general public (Pineteh, 2017; Neocosmos, 2006). The politics of fear blame African immigrants to be the cause of various "societal ills" ranging from cybercrime and online fraud to the spread of HIV/AIDS, and human trafficking (Pineteh, 2017; Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2017; Neocosmos, 2006; Petros et al. 2006), and rising unemployment among South Africans. Vermeulen (2015) argues that the economy of South Africa is confronted with the issue of job creation.

The politics of fear has influenced the behaviour of locals towards African immigrants. That is why there is documented evidence of xenophobia against African immigrants in South Africa (Pineteh, 2019, 2017; Crush & Skinner, 2017; Crush, Chikanda and Skinner, 2015). Despite this, the objectives of the study is to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans while conducting their business in Pretoria; to determine what type of harassment Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business; to establish who perpetrates xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

Furthermore, xenophobia and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are unavoidably intertwined due to antagonism in the formal job market and language barriers confronting Francophone African immigrants in South Africa (Peberdy, 2019; Tengeh et al. 2011; Sahin et al. 2007).

The next section, therefore, explores xenophobia in the context of discrimination against immigrants in South Africa to achieve one of the objectives of the study, which is to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans while conducting their business in Pretoria. In order to do that, it is important to look at xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants in the world.

3.2 XENOPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS IN THE WORLD

Pieces of literature show that citizens of many host countries perpetrate xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants in the host country (Weichselbaumer, 2020; Aldén &

Hammarstedt, 2016; Wrench, 2015; Fuentes, 2006; Munro, 2006; Dillon, 2001; Smith & Edmonston, 1997).

However, the perpetration of discrimination against immigrants in different parts of the world has received increasing attention from social psychologists. For example, the work of Abdelmalek Sayad (1999) has deeply explored the heartbreaking experiences and contradictions of Francophone African migrants from Algeria residing in France. Sayad argues that the displaced existence of Francophone African migrants from Algeria has consequences. One consequence is the result of an "immense collective lie through which immigration reproduces itself" (Sayad, 1999). For example, because of the respect that African migrants have for themselves and family, they often conceal the plight of their day-to-day suffering that is a result of emigration from home by encouraging new departures of family members and friends (Sayad, 1999). Such contradiction is worsened by the absence of migrants' family members and friends, and the fact that migrants are away from their village or country of origin, and at the same time are being caught up with all kinds of inexpiable guilt in the face of exclusion and hostility which expose them to various forms of violent attacks from citizens as they are being perceived as a threat.

Stephan et al. (2005) however, contend that adequate attention has not been given to the psycho-social[19] implication of discrimination against immigrants in host countries (Stephan et al. 2005). It should be noted that towards the end of 2019, a new wave of xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants was seen in different parts of the world as a result of the coronavirus pandemic[20] (Mahase, 2020).

For example, immigrants from China experienced discrimination in several cities across the world because the pandemic originated in Wuhan, China (Human Rights Watch, 2020).[21] Such discrimination prompted the United Nations Secretary-General Mr Antonio Guterres to make the following comments on 8 May 2020: "[…] the pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering".

Mr Guterres further stated that governments should act together to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The comments of Mr Guterres came at a time when some senior government officials in several countries publicly promoted the perpetration of discrimination against immigrants from China through various

[19] The interrelation between social factors and individual thought and behaviour.

[20] Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus (see https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1)

[21] https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide

anti-Chinese remarks concerning the origin of the pandemic (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Political parties in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Greece, France, and Germany took advantage of the pandemic and spread biases against immigrants from China (Human Rights Watch, 2020).[22]

However, before the outbreak of the pandemic, xenophobia and discrimination had long existed in many parts of the world.

3.2.1 Xenophobia and Discrimination against Immigrants in Europe

It was revealed that as far back as 1993, the European Union Commission (EUC) conducted a study among the member states to examine the implication of discrimination against immigrants within the Union (European Union Commission, 1993) and found that discrimination was higher in European countries with large immigrant populations such as Belgium, France, and Austria in comparison to those with small immigrant populations such as Sweden, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain (European Union Commission, 1993).

The issue of discrimination against immigrants within the European Union (EU) raised concerns within the EU because the phenomenon was on the rise (Silove, 1999). There was, therefore, a need to address the issue within the EU (European Union Commission, 1993). Crush (2002) earlier claimed that the perpetration of discrimination against immigrants in the EU was spread through ideas that promote the interest of citizens in the EU.

For example, Figure 3.1 shows the difference in terms of the rising trend of discrimination against non-EU immigrants in EU countries between 2014 and 2018.

[22] https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide

Figure 3.1: Discrimination against non-EU immigrants in the EU between 2014 and 2018



Source: The Economist (2018)

Even though Sweden is missing from the Figure, there was evidence of rising discrimination against immigrants in Sweden as far back as 1999 (Silove, 1999). For example, Swedish citizens between 15 and 16 years of age were caught perpetrating hostility against an immigrant student from Africa (Silove, 1999). In addition, a statistic from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention also confirmed that by 2008, there was a 28% rise in hostilities against immigrants from non-EU countries residing in Sweden (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

In Germany, the presence of discrimination is not new. Germany has a history of discrimination against immigrants as far back as the period between 1928 and 1933 (Hamilton, 2003). For example, as far back as 1939, xenophobia and discrimination were perpetrated against immigrants in Germany during the reign of Adolf Hitler in connection to the wave of "anti-Semitism"[23] in Europe (Bergmann, 1994). Meredith (1996) also attests that there was xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants in Germany.

In Finland, a study conducted by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), shows that more than 10% of the Finnish population perpetrated discrimination against immigrants (IHF Focus, 2001). However, the government of Finland was innovative enough

[23] The hatred and killing of Jews (Voigtländer & Voth, 2015).

to pass an act on the integration of immigrants and reception of Asylum Seekers - 493/1999 in the country (IHF Focus, 2001).

In Russia, immigrants also experienced xenophobia and discrimination[24] (Ekaterina, 2007). For example, more than two decades ago, "human rights groups, scholars, government agencies and media of the Russian Federation" documented evidence of the rise of xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants in Russia (Ekaterina, 2007).

3.2.2 Xenophobia and Discrimination against Immigrants in Asia

In Asia, there were incidents of xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants. For example, in South Korea, immigrants from China suffered discrimination (Song, 2014). In India, immigrants from Pakistan also experienced discrimination (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In Malaysia, the Rohingya immigrants from Myanmar were discriminated against when the government of Malaysia raided and detained them on prejudice that they were spreading the coronavirus (Human Rights Watch, 2020).[25] In China, in April 2020, authorities and landlords in the City of Guangzhou perpetrated xenophobia and discrimination against African immigrants saying that they were responsible for the resurgence of the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19) (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

3.2.3 Xenophobia and Discrimination against Immigrants in North America

In the United States, xenophobia and discrimination are not new phenomena. At the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, there was an upsurge of xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants under the Trump administration (Hussain, 2020).[26] United States citizens perpetrated discrimination against immigrants from China as a result of the coronavirus pandemic (Hussain, 2020). The situation was aggravated when prejudicial remarks against immigrants from China circulated across various social media platforms (Hussain, 2020).

The advent of the coronavirus pandemic increased the level of xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants in the United States. However, before the coronavirus pandemic, the United States government and its citizens have always manifested discriminatory threats against the specific category of immigrants in the country (Garcia-Rios et al. 2019). For example, there

[24] (Marginalised ethnic groups with Russian citizenship such as Caucasians).
[25] https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide
[26] https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-04-22/xenophobia-takes-its-toll-trump-works-curb-immigration

was a rise in discrimination perpetrated against immigrants from Latin America residing in the United States (Garcia-Rios et al. 2019; Fuchs, 1995; Takaki, 1989).

Similarly, more than 3.8 million African immigrants in the United States also experienced discrimination before Donald J. Trump came to power in 2016 (Mosuga, 2020; Huo, 2020; Callister et al. 2019). However, besides the experience of xenophobia and discrimination in Europe and Asia, immigrants also experience xenophobia and discrimination in other parts of Africa besides South Africa.

3.2.4 Xenophobia and Discrimination Against Immigrants in Other Parts of Africa

Xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants are rooted in the broader African society with evidence of discrimination that targets mostly African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in various parts of the continent. However, the issue of discrimination perpetrated against immigrants in other parts of Africa besides South Africa remains understudied. Therefore, more research should be conducted to document the experience of xenophobia and discrimination across 54 African countries.

Nonetheless, the perpetration of discrimination against African immigrants by African citizens in various African countries is a common practice. The most recent episode of discrimination against African immigrants occurred in Ghana in July 2020[27] when African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from Nigeria were discriminated against in various cities of Ghana (Akinola, 2020). The discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants from Nigeria led to the deportation of several informal immigrant entrepreneurs of Nigerian origin who conducted business in Ghana (Akinola, 2020).

Furthermore, besides the discrimination against African immigrants in Ghana (Akinola, 2020) there are other incidents of discrimination against African immigrants in other African countries. For example, in 2009, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) expelled more than 50 000 immigrants from Angola in retaliation to the expulsion of immigrants from DRC residing in Angola (Human Rights Watch, 2012:11).

In 2004 also, following an alleged "coup d'état" in Equatorial Guinea that was led by mercenaries, the government of Equatorial Guinea clamped down on African immigrants in the country (Shirbon, 2004). African immigrants were the target of discrimination, unlawful arrest, unreasonable detention, and unfair deportation (Roberts, 2009:192-193). In addition, government officials of Equatorial Guinea carried out xenophobic propaganda against African

[27] (At the time this thesis was written).

immigrants in the country (Roberts, 2009:192-193). The officials even invited citizens of Equatorial Guinea to be vigilant when dealing with African immigrants because they believed that African immigrants in Equatorial Guinea were stealing the wealth of the country (Roberts, 2009:192-193). Therefore, about 1 000 African immigrants from Cameroon were discriminated against and deported from Equatorial Guinea (Human Rights Watch, 2009:81).

In Côte d'Ivoire in 1995, the government responded to the economic decline of the country under the leadership of President Bédié by spreading discriminatory propaganda in the context of "Ivoirit" (Ivorianity). The propaganda weaved citizenship in Côte d'Ivoire to symbolise access to socioeconomic resources of the country (Wiafe-Amoako, 2015:82-83; Kimou, 2013:18-19). This fuelled discrimination against African immigrants in the country (Wiafe-Amoako, 2015:82-83). Therefore, about 12 000 African immigrants of Burkina Faso origin were discriminated against and expelled from Côte d'Ivoire (Human Rights Watch, 2001:4).

In Nigeria, there were incidences of xenophobia and discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants. For example, the government of Nigeria discriminated against and "expelled more than two million foreigners from the country" as a result of the economic decline that started in the 80s (Aremu, 2013:340). The government justified the expulsion of African immigrants from the country by claiming that "African immigrants were involved in criminal activities" (Aremu, 2013:341). Another wave of discrimination and expulsion of African immigrants in Nigeria took place in 1985 when over 300 000 African immigrants from Ghana were deported from Nigeria (Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011:139-140).

In Gabon in 1978, the late President Omar Bongo took a discriminatory decision to expel African immigrants of Benin origin from Gabon (Henckaerts, 1995:16). The decision to expel them was premised on the alleged attack on President Bongo and the citizens of Gabon by then President Mathieu Kérékou of Benin (Gray, 1998:396). Almost 15 months prior to the expulsion of African immigrants from Benin residing in Gabon, President Kérékou accused certain government officials of Gabon of a failed coup attempt in Benin that sought to oust him from power. President Kérékou urged African leaders to boycott the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU)[28] Summit that was scheduled in Libreville, Gabon in June/July 1977 (Gray, 1998:396). This provoked discrimination against African immigrants from Benin residing in Gabon.

In Uganda as well, the government and citizens perpetrated discrimination against certain categories of immigrants in the country. Immigrants from Asia and Africa for example were

[28] Organization of African Unity (present-day African Union-AU)

discriminated against and expelled from Uganda in the face of the economic downturn in 1972 (Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015:145). A BBC News report (BBC, 1972) confirms the account of Hansen (2000:198) who stated that "immigrants from Britain, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia were ordered to leave Uganda within three months during a wave of discrimination". Immigrants' businesses were also seized by the government and citizens of Uganda (Stokes, 2009:187).

The precedent paragraphs have confirmed that xenophobia and discrimination are present in different parts of the world. However, in the context of this study, what makes the experience of discrimination against African immigrants in South Africa to differ from that of African immigrants in other countries is that the perpetration of discrimination against African immigrants in South Africa is often accompanied by virtual, verbal, and physical harassment which includes xenophobic attacks (Sebola & Tsheola, 2015). Tshishonga (2015) also attests that the perpetration of discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa while conducting their business is accompanied by harassment.

3.2.5 Xenophobia and Discrimination against Immigrants in South Africa

South Africa frequently appears on local and international news due to xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African immigrants (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Lovegrove, 2014; Solomon & Kosaka, 2013). According to Steinhardt (2018), the xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses indicate the day-to-day discrimination that African immigrants in South Africa in general experience.

The discrimination African immigrant informal entrepreneurs, in general, and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience stem from the local perception of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general, as foreigners who do not belong in South Africa (Dube, 2019; Pineteh, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015). Consequently, South Africans perpetrate xenophobia against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs through behaviours that reject, exclude, or demean Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria (Tshishonga, 2015; Akinola, 2014; Adjail & Lazaridis, 2013).

Sebola (2017), however, attests that the perpetration of xenophobia against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa in general (and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria in particular), "is rooted in race, ethnicity, gender, and geographical affiliation in the face of real or imagined scarcity of resources" (Sebola, 2017), or "group affiliation insecurity" (Misago, 2015). Kinge (2016) also argues that certain social

attributes serve as a hotbed for "in-group versus out-group" tendencies, which vis-à-vis intense competition for scarce resources may result in the perpetration of discrimination against "out-group members or outsiders" by "in-group members or insiders".

Several studies have demonstrated that discrimination is an old problem in South Africa because of its history of apartheid-segregation[29] (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Small & Pager, 2020; Pineteh, 2017; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017; Peberdy, 2017; Crush et al. 2015; Tshishonga, 2015). However, what the studies fail to demonstrate is the reason xenophobia is "prevalent in post-apartheid South Africa." When a provision in the Constitution explicitly states that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it" (Pineteh, 2017); and, the fact that irrespective of the discriminatory nature of immigration laws in South Africa, the laws still accorded immigrants the right to belong in South Africa (Pineteh, 2017).

In addition, some studies have attributed the presence of xenophobia to the worsening socioeconomic conditions of the majority of South Africans have failed to demonstrate the reason the magnitude of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants, in general, differs across the socioeconomic landscape in the host country (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Moagi et al. 2018; Abel, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017). Furthermore, the reason some places with the worst socioeconomic conditions in South Africa do not experience xenophobic attacks against African immigrants (Matsinhe, 2016; Kirshner, 2012; Vigneswaran, 2007; Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Furthermore, the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants mostly targets African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses more than African immigrant students, diplomats, or professionals in South Africa. In addition, European or North American immigrants in South Africa do not experience xenophobia (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Moagi et al. 2018; Abel, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017; Matsinhe, 2016; Kirshner, 2012; Vigneswaran, 2007; Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Other interrogations that arose from the literature review on xenophobia in South Africa are issues regarding the fact that poor white and rich black South Africans are not involved in the wave of xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African immigrants (Neocosmos, 2008), and concerns that South Africans who do not approve of violent attacks against African immigrants cannot quench the attacks perpetrated against African immigrant informal entrepreneurs (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017; 2014:2-3). Also, the reason the instigators of xenophobic attacks

[29]Discrimination against individuals because of the colour of their skin or racial or ethnic origin typically in South Africa before 1994 (Small & Pager, 2020).

easily garner enough support from fellow countrymen (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017; 2014:2-3). In other words, xenophobic mobilisation is often received with all readiness amongst fellow South Africans.

Moreover, why is it that South African men tend to be more aggressive toward African immigrants than women (de Haas, 2007), and why is it that xenophobic attacks are not meted out equally to all categories of immigrants in South Africa (Harris, 2001)? Furthermore, why are xenophobic attacks more predominant in townships and informal settlements around Pretoria than in suburbs (Sharp, 2008), and why is the government of South Africa not committed to rooting out xenophobia (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Moagi et al. 2018; Pineteh, 2017; Abel, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017; Matsinhe, 2016).

Arguably, the perpetration of discrimination in South Africa mostly targets African immigrants, in general. One can, therefore, confirm Dube's (2019:199-200) assertion that South Africans perpetrate discrimination differently toward various categories of immigrants in the country. For example, South Africans perpetrate discrimination against African immigrants from Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe more than African immigrants from Botswana, Eswatini and Lesotho (Dube, 2019:199-200).

Dube (2019), however, does not provide a clear answer on why South Africans perpetrate more discrimination against one category of African immigrants than others but (Dube, 2019), suggests that the country of origin of African immigrants has an important bearing on the way African immigrants are treated in South Africa (Dube, 2019:201).

It is, therefore, important to conduct future research to understand some of the factors that determine the type of discrimination that different categories of informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience while conducting their business in South Africa (Dube, 2019:201), as well as studies that seek to compare the experience of xenophobia amongst African immigrants in terms of country of origin – for example, comparing the experience of xenophobia towards African immigrants from Nigeria and Ghana residing in various South African cities.

Notwithstanding, Akinboade et al. (2017) suggest that the selective perpetration of discrimination against immigrants reflects the discriminatory behaviour of South Africa's Department of Home Affairs. The DHA, for example, provides "temporary or permanent residence permits" to African immigrants with professional or critical skills in the country's quest for critical skills that are essential (Booyens et al. 2020). In the process of granting residence permits to African immigrants with critical skills, the Department of Home Affairs

perpetrates discrimination against semi-skilled and unskilled African immigrants in the country (Amit, 2022; Booyens et al. 2020).

In addition, besides the perpetration of discrimination against semi-skilled and unskilled African immigrants by the DHA, some municipalities also perpetrate discrimination against African immigrants when granting a trading permit to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who apply for a trading permit to conduct business at municipal stalls which are strictly reserved for South Africans only (Gastrow, 2018; Palmary, 2002).

Furthermore, in the context of this study, it is also possible that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct business along sidewalks may have different experiences of discrimination from their counterparts who conduct business on street corners or in small shops. It is also possible that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs may experience discrimination differently because of the nature of the business they conduct or the type of goods they sell in Pretoria.

These complexities and more make this study worth undertaking as lingo-cultural differences alone are not the only form of discrimination experienced by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who speak a different language from the language spoken in South Africa. Their experience of discrimination while conducting their business in Pretoria may differ vis-à-vis other lingo-cultural groups of immigrants such as Anglophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria who are fluent in English, the business language of South Africa (Posel & Zeller, 2016).

However, it is important to conduct future studies that distinguish the type of discrimination that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience as a result of language barriers from the type of discrimination that they experience as a result of the location of their business or the type of goods that they sell in Pretoria.

Several scholars claim that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are victims of discrimination are often perceived as “undesirable persons” who are destabilising the political and socioeconomic structure of South Africa (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Pineteh, 2017; Abel, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017; Matsinhe, 2016; Landau, 2011; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). Such perception increases the level of discrimination that African immigrants, experience in South Africa (Moyo & Osunkunle, 2021; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Mukumbang et al. 2020; Omobowale, et al. 2019).

Nkem and Tengeh (2017) attribute the increasing level of discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa to intense competition between South Africans and African immigrants over the scarce/limited resources in the country. Such intense

competition often led to outright hostility against African immigrants (Crush, 2018; Pineteh, 2017; Dassah, 2015; Palmary & Landau, 2011; Crush, 2003; Hill, 1998). However, the perpetrators of discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs ignore the fact that African immigrants frequently become informal entrepreneurs in South Africa as the only means to survive (Dube, 2019; Nkem & Tengeh, 2017; Crush et al. 2015).

Chinomona and Maziriri (2015) attest that African immigrants frequently become informal entrepreneurs because of discrimination in the formal labour market. Crush and Skinner (2015) claim that African immigrants in South Africa conduct informal business as a strategy for socioeconomic integration in the host society (Crush & Skinner, 2015), and "is a means by which immigrants without education or skills can escape out of poverty" (Kalitanyi & Venter, 2010; Vinogradov & Elam, 2010:360; Serrie, 1998).

Some scholars have also observed that discrimination that African immigrants experience in South Africa is underpinned by the tension that exists between them and their South African counterparts (Mlambo, 2019; Moyo et al. 2018; Ackerman, 2013; Geschiere, 2009; Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; Coenders et al. 2004; Kloosterman et al. 2000). The tension has created so much distrust among African immigrants and locals and the distrust has made the estranged relationship between African immigrants and South Africans even more uncomfortable.

Tshishonga (2015) attests that the estranged and uncomfortable relationship between African immigrants and South Africans is the root cause of xenophobia. Nonetheless, the presence of xenophobia has attracted various theories that seek to explain the phenomenon in South Africa (Crush et al. 2019; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Tafira, 2017; Klotz, 2016; Tella, 2016). Steinberg (2018), for example, argues that xenophobia is a function of the theory of "scapegoating". The theory claims that unemployed and poor South Africans use African immigrants to express their frustration with the declining economic condition of the country.

Moyo et al. (2018) instead believe that the unmet promises to the majority of South Africans post-apartheid have revived a realisation of deprivation which has provoked increasing discontent and indignation among South Africans. South Africans are now more aware of their state of deprivation than before (Moyo et al. 2018). Deprivation has become "an ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish" (Moyo et al. 2018).

Akinola (2018), however, looks at xenophobia in terms of the theory of isolation. The theory claims that majority of South Africans were isolated from the rest of Africa during apartheid. This deprived them of having encounters with other Africans from the continent (Akinola, 2018). Hence, when the borders were opened after the fall of apartheid, many South Africans felt they were under siege by the influx of people they do not know (African immigrants)

(Peberdy, 2018; Crush et al. 2017; Pineteh, 2017; Matsinhe, 2009). Posel (2020), Khatleli (2015) and Adepoju (2003) claim that xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa takes place in the presence of South Africans who lived in exile in different African countries, and South Africans who were not in exile also had encountered African immigrants from Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe who supplied the mines with cheap labour during apartheid (Posel, 2020; Khatleli, 2015; Adepoju, 2003).

Hewitt et al. (2020) and Harris (2002), however, locate xenophobia in South Africa through biocultural theory. The theory looks at visible or perceived differences that distinguish African immigrants from South Africans (Hewitt et al. 2020; Harris, 2002). However, amidst the theories that seek to explain the phenomenon of xenophobia, none could explain why African immigrants from Nigeria, Somalia and Zimbabwe are more discriminated against than other categories of African immigrants in South Africa (Dube, 2019; Lee, 2017; Bello & Tunde, 2017; Fayomi et al. 2015).

These theories could not explain why majority of South Africans continue to construct African immigrants in pejorative ways that justify the perpetration of discrimination against African immigrants (Tirivangasi & Nyahunda, 2020; Tafira, 2017), especially as acts of discrimination constitute a violation of South African laws and an abuse of human rights (Tirivangasi & Nyahunda, 2020; Maseko & Maweni, 2019; Ngozi, 2017). Conversely, amidst various acts of discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa, several studies have demonstrated the positive contributions that African immigrants in South Africa make toward the socioeconomic progress of the country (Batisai & Dzimiri, 2020; Crush & Skinner, 2017; Tawodzera & Chikanda, 2016; Crush et al. 2015).

However, concerning the positive role that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria) play in the socioeconomic progress of South Africa, the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses has raised a series of debates regarding the way African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are represented in various public discourses.

3.3 PUBLIC DISCOURSES ON XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

What African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are represented in public discourses has entrenched discriminatory behaviours towards them (Pineteh, 2017). Section 3.3.1 of this chapter presents some of the ways that the South African government, citizens, media, and

institutions represent African immigrants in the country in ways that reinforce the perpetration of discrimination against African immigrants.

3.3.1 Discourse of Xenophobia and Discrimination: A Construct of the State

Crush (2021), Tella (2016), and Crush and Ramachandran (2016) contend that the South African government denies the presence of xenophobia in the country. For example, the government denies that the May 2008 violent attacks against African immigrants in the country left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant informal businesses looted and 213 burnt down (Tirivangasi & Mrubula-Ngwenya, 2022), and similar attacks that took place in 2015, 2017, and 2019, were not xenophobic (Ogunnoiki & Adeyemi, 2019; Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015). Crush (2021) and Crush and Ramachandran (2016) claim that the government of South Africa refuses to acknowledge the presence of xenophobia in South Africa and tends to shield and vindicate South Africans who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa (Tirivangasi & Rapanyane, 2021).

The government of South Africa claims that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs were acts of criminality (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019; Pineteh, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014) while simultaneously representing African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are mostly the victims of xenophobic attacks as "undocumented foreign nationals" to justify the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019; Pineteh, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

The fact that the government of South Africa continues to refute evidence that suggests that xenophobia was the underlying cause of the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their business heightens the "lukewarm" behaviour of the government in instating measures to prevent the reoccurrence of xenophobic attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Hence, there is no law against xenophobia in South Africa. Tshishonga (2015) argues that besides the lukewarm behaviour of the government of South Africa toward African immigrants in the country it remains adamant in maintaining its discriminatory immigration policies that exclude African immigrants from accessing socioeconomic opportunities in the country. In addition, irrespective of various criticisms from other African governments and the international community regarding the xenophobic attacks against African immigrants, the government continues to downplay the psychosocial impact of xenophobia and discrimination

on African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Some political commentators have also started echoing the view of the government that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country are not a consequence of xenophobia but criminality (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). The political commentators further contend that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are not a sign of large-scale discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Also, some agencies that support the narrative of the government of South Africa conversely claim that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa occur because the government of South Africa has not sufficiently tackled the threat posed by the presence of African immigrants in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Mangu, 2019; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

However, the business of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, provides a service to South African consumers (Moyo, 2015). Consequently, some of the agencies, therefore, advocate for the deportation of all African immigrants in South Africa irrespective of their immigration status because they are a burden to the government of South Africa and its apartheid inheritance (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Pineteh, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Arguably, such discourse misrepresents African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa and reinforces various biases that accelerate the perpetration of discrimination against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Mangu, 2019). In this regard, instead of acknowledging that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are motivated by xenophobia, the issue of xenophobia is diverted to focus on the inability of the government to secure tighter border control and immigration systems that prevent African immigrants from entering South Africa. The assumption is that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs entered South Africa illegally and, therefore, "deserve to be harassed, arrested and deported" (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Mangu, 2019; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016; Sowetan 2 May 2012:12; Daily Sun, 20 May 2008:3). Such discourse has made it possible for African immigrants in general, to continually experience xenophobia and discrimination. However, while it is important to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are discriminated against while conducting their business, further studies on Francophone African informal immigrant

entrepreneurs in Pretoria should be conducted to illuminate more on the positive but unrepresented side of Francophone African immigrants.

Furthermore, the intolerance and unfair treatment of African immigrants is proof that even though the country has moved away from racial discrimination as a result of apartheid discrimination is still prevalent in society (HRW, 2015; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014; Landau, 2011; Nina & de Nicola, 2011; Sharp, 2008; Neocosmos, 2006). Amusan and Mchunu (2017) argue that discrimination in South Africa is formalised in the immigration laws of the Department of Home Affairs.

The reason is to isolate African immigrants in South Africa from accessing the limited resources of the country. This has also made it possible for service provider discrimination against African immigrants in South Africa to become a day-to-day reality (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Ngozi, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015). Notwithstanding this, "South Africa is not the only country in the world with the problem of immigrants and xenophobia" (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:2-3; Roemer et al. 2007). Several studies have shown that specific categories of immigrant experience xenophobia and discrimination from the state, citizens, or institutions (Weichselbaumer, 2020; Aldén & Hammarstedt, 2016; Wrench, 2015).

3.3.2 Brief Historical Context of Xenophobia in South Africa

The presence of xenophobia in South Africa is rooted in the country's history of racial discrimination. Harris (2001:70) asserts that Apartheid segregation in South Africa negatively affected the lives of South Africans of African ancestry in that it instilled the 'xenophobic mind-sets' that is perceived among many South Africans today. Apartheid deprived the majority of South Africans from being exposed to the rest of the continent of Africa. This made most South Africans to be close-minded and suspicious of African immigrants from other parts of the continent.

However, xenophobia in South Africa can be traced as far back as the 1980s, but more recently in the early 1990s and beyond. Solomon (2008:3), and Matzopoulos et al., (2009:1), claim that there were incidents of xenophobia that took place long before the transition into democracy in 1994. An example of such incidents was the March 1990 xenophobic assaults against African immigrants from Mozambique which saw the burning of 300 huts belonging to the immigrants. In addition, in 1993 some South Africans in Cape Town complained that African immigrants from Namibia and Angola had access to land and social services at a time when many South Africans did not have shelters.

The complaint created agitation which resulted in the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants from Namibia and Angola (Solomon, 2008:3; Matzopoulos et al., 2009:1). African immigrants from Namibia and Angola had their properties destroyed and others burnt because they were perceived as foreigners who do not belong in South Africa. Similar agitation erupted in 2008 as a result of complaint that African immigrants are stealing the jobs that belong to South Africans (Johnson & Jacobs, 2012: 330). This led to violent attacks that left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant businesses looted and 213 burnt down (Johnson and Jacobs, 2012: 330).

Since the xenophobic attacks that took place in 2008. There have been a series of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants such as the attacks that took place in 2015, 2017 and 2019 (Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015). The attacks happened because of complaints against African immigrants in South Africa (Peberdy, 2017). However, when the violent attacks do not take place, African immigrants in South Africa are constantly harassed daily.

3.4 HARASSMENT OF IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRANTS' CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Chiu (2020) and Crush (2014) confirm that the harassment of immigrants in the host country is a characteristic of the presence of xenophobia. In the context of South Africa, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, often experience virtual, verbal, and physical harassment while conducting their business. The perpetration of harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is often guided by public and institutional discourses regarding the presence of African immigrants in the host country. Such discourses instigate stereotypes and prejudices that create images in the minds of South Africans to continually perceive African immigrants in the country as "unwanted immigrants" (Moyo et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2018; Isike & Isike, 2012).

However, the harassment of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa often follows a trend which usually entails virtual-to-verbal-to-physical harassment (Jones et al. 2018; Isike & Isike, 2012). Virtual harassment is often perpetrated through various social media or virtual spaces with the help of new technologies[30] (Hoyer et al. 2020).

[30] New technologies are inventions, discoveries, improvements, or innovations that were not previously available (Hoyer et al. 2020).

It is, therefore, important to conduct new studies to examine the conflicting role that new technologies play in the propagation of virtual and verbal harassment against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, while simultaneously assisting them to overcome traditional limitations involved in informal trade by increasing efficiency in business-related transactions. For example, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs with a smartphone may receive messages of harassment through WhatsApp videos, while at the same time, they may use their smartphone to receive or effect payment to wholesalers and mobility service providers such as Uber from where they buy goods or request cars to transport them and their goods. Such business-related activities are performed through bank and Uber apps that are downloaded on smartphones (Thusi & Maduku, 2019; Glöss et al. 2016).

This may, therefore, reduce the cost and time of physically walking into a bank or to an ATM (Automated Teller Machine) to perform business-related transactions (Jegede, 2014). Studies that look at the role of new technologies in the experience of xenophobia, should also focus on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in various cities in South Africa.

Nonetheless, the aim of virtual harassment perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa, in general, is often meant to threaten or scare African immigrants in South Africa to leave the country (Nkrumah, 2018), while the verbal harassment perpetrated against African immigrants is often intended to demean and intimidate African immigrants because South Africans believe that African immigrants constitute a bulk of undocumented persons in the country.

Physical harassment in the form of assault perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa is performed deliberately to inflict bodily harm or injury against them (Tshishonga, 2015). However, when the looting and burning of the businesses that belong to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are involved it is considered xenophobic attacks (Nshimbi, 2019; Peberdy, 2019; Dube, 2019; Pineteh, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush et al. 2015).

Regarding the notion of undocumented persons in South Africa, scholars such as Willie et al. (2016), Madue (2015) and Klaaren and Ramji (2001) claim that South African discriminatory immigration legislation is responsible for producing undocumented immigrants in the country. The latter point of view is also supported by Spel (2020) who argues that South Africa's immigration legislation is designed in a way that African immigrants without critical skills are excluded from accessing legal documentation. This renders many African immigrants undocumented and exposes them to various forms of harassment (Nshimbi, 2018; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018).

Moyo (2018) argues that the "so-called" undocumented African immigrants in South Africa entered the country with legitimate visas but could not renew their visas after they had expired due to an administrative "bottleneck" and discriminatory immigration policies which continually introduced several changes to the administration of visa applications with the sole purpose of increasing visa restrictions against African immigrants in South Africa (Moyo, 2016). This exposes African immigrants to various forms of harassment by South African authorities and ordinary citizens, as opposed to European immigrants who also sometimes overstayed their entry visas but are not harassed in the way African immigrants are harassed in South Africa (Peberdy, 2001).

Jacobsen (2014), however, claims that having official documentation in South Africa does not prevent African immigrants from harassment. Moyo and Nshimbi (2019) also claim that visas sometimes do not protect visa holders from harassment. Studies may, therefore, be conducted to compare the experience of xenophobia among African immigrants in South Africa with visas and those without visas.

Notwithstanding, regarding the forms of harassment that African immigrants experience in South Africa, verbal harassment appears to be the most common form of harassment perpetrated against African immigrants in the country. It is, therefore, important to conduct further studies to understand why verbal harassment is the most common form of harassment perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa and to note that verbal harassment perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa is often accompanied by derogatory terms such as "Amakwerekwere" or "Amagringamba" (van der Merwe, 2019; Baijnath, 2017; Wambugu, 2003).

According to Van der Merwe (2019), "makwerekwere" ("Amakwerekwere" in plural) is only used to harass African immigrants in South Africa. European immigrants in South Africa are never harassed or referred to as "makwerekwere" (Nyamnjoh, 2016; 2006). "makwerekwere" is a pejorative term that captures the negative resentment of South Africans against African immigrants who are sometimes harassed because of suspicion that they have infiltrated post-apartheid South Africa to access various socioeconomic opportunities (Van der Merwe, 2019). The term has become very significant in recent years as African immigration to South Africa has increased drastically (Van der Merwe, 2019).

Nyamnjoh (2016:22) claims that the derogatory use of the term "makwerekwere" is a conscious act to detect and exclude people who do not originally originate from South Africa. Nyamnjoh (2016:22) further claims that the coinage of the term is based on the fact that "to be a South African is an expression of power;" in other words, "to originate from South Africa ceases to

be a mere matter of who settled first, but rather who is powerful enough to dispose of the other with impunity" (Nyamnjoh, 2016:34).

In the same line of thought, Nyamnjoh (2016:17) asserts that "it is, therefore, not enough to carry official documentation and wave the national flag of a given country. One must be seen to belong by "hard-core or bona fide blood-and-umbilical-cord" affiliation with in-group members who stand as ultimate legitimisers of kinships relationship in post-apartheid South Africa" (Nyamnjoh, 2016:17).

The evidence of the precedent point of view is that African immigrants in South Africa who have undergone the process of "naturalisation" to become citizens of South Africa are also sometimes verbally harassed with the term "makwerekwere" (Ngwenya, 2021; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Nyamnjoh, 2016). The implication is that the image of African immigrants that is constructed through the lens of "makwerekwere" according to Zajec (2017:310) is a way to externalise internal oppression by "seeking to make visible the invisible object of fear."

However, the derogatory use of the term "makwerekwere" as a form of harassment against African immigrants in South Africa not only becomes harmful when it shifts from being verbal to physical harassment in the form of assaults (Nyamnjoh, 2016) but also becomes harmful when the circumstances in which the derogatory term is deployed or used are influenced by discourses such as the discourse of "indigeneity" (Nyamnjoh, 2016). This remains a contentiously debated concept in postcolonial Africa (Weaver, 2000).

Notwithstanding, Kennemore and Postero (2021) posit that the discourse of indigeneity is constructed to set boundaries between insiders (South Africans) and outsiders (Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) in the context of this study. Somehow, Vigouroux (2019) has attempted to link the derogatory term "makwerekwere" to the notion of indigeneity by arguing that "makwerekwere" is only used to harass people of African ancestry who do not speak South African home languages. Steenkamp (2009) had earlier mentioned that South Africans harass African immigrants with the term "makwerekwere" because South Africans claim African immigrants speak unintelligible languages.[31] Post and Burling (2017) argue that unintelligible languages are understood to belong to people with distinct origins.

In this regard, Hungwe and Ndofirepi (2022), therefore, claim that African home languages in general demonstrate the origin of Africans. That is why African immigrants speak languages that are not understood by locals because they do not naturally originate from South Africa. It

[31] Languages that are impossible to understand (Selmer, 2006).

is, therefore, important to understand how the question of origin influences the construction and representation of African immigrants in ways that expose them to various forms of harassment in South Africa.

3.4.1 Xenophobia Discourse of Ancestry and Harassment of Immigrants

Mpofu et al. (2021) and Neocosmos (2008) argue that the perceptions that South Africa is not in Africa and that South Africans are not Africans have aggravated the notion that ancestry is how resources, jobs and social services can be accessed post-apartheid. The notion did not exist before 1994 because the discourse of inclusivity dominated the South African public space. For example, before 1994, being a citizen of South Africa was not an issue of ancestry. That is why African immigrants who supplied South African mines with cheap labour did not experience harassment from South Africans the way they are harassed post-1994 (Neocosmos, 2006:83).

Moreover, post-1994, the right to be a citizen of South Africa is dominated by the notion of ancestry (Neocosmos, 2006:83). In this regard, South Africans perceive African immigrants as people who do not originate from South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006:83) and therefore, believe that it is legitimate to harass and even kill African immigrants in South Africa (Moyo, 2014).

In addition, Neocosmos (2006) claims that South African society at large believes that the right to be a citizen of South Africa is because one naturally originates from South Africa.

Peberdy (2009) claims such a notion has promoted immigration and employment policies that continue to exclude African immigrants from the welfare of the country. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001), Landau (2007; 2006; 2005) and Gordon (2011), therefore, argue that the anxiety that South African lawmakers express in exclusive immigration policies portrays South Africa as a state under siege by African immigrants. The latter has encouraged the perpetration of harassment against African immigrants who are continually perceived as socioeconomic threats to locals.

Consequently, African immigrants frequently experience harassment at the hands of ordinary South African citizens, government officials and agents of certain municipalities when accessing or not accessing socioeconomic resources of South Africa. The harassment of African immigrants in South Africa is intensified by the perception that African immigrants do not originate from South Africa and, therefore, must be punished for being on South African soil (Friedman, 2019; Saleh, 2015; Von Lieres, 2015).

When South Africans, therefore, harass African immigrants, they tend to believe that they are rendering services to the government which has failed to deport African immigrants from South Africa (Dinbabo et al. 2018; Miller, 2012). South Africans believe that by harassing African immigrants, they will eventually force African immigrants out of South Africa (Spel, 2020; Isike, 2017).

Mubangizi (2021) and Neocosmos (2006) point out that the perpetration of harassment against African immigrants during the post-apartheid era is because the government and citizens of South Africa completely ignore the positive contribution that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, and Francophone African informal entrepreneurs, in particular, play toward the socioeconomic progress of the country.

Moyo et al. (2018) argue that the South African immigration system treats African immigrants in South Africa unfairly on the basis that they do not originate from South Africa. South Africa is depriving itself of material and immaterial benefits from African immigrant "social networks" in South Africa and elsewhere, which Leyden et al. (2014) claim can bring positive change in South Africa.

Tomaselli (2021) argues that South African officials and ordinary citizens play a role in legitimising the harassment of African immigrants because the perpetrators of harassment against African immigrants are rarely punished as African immigrants are not supposed to be in South Africa (Bbaala & Mate, 2016).

However, according to scholars such as Tomaselli (2021), Beetar (2019), Ndlovu (2014) and Mamdani (1996), the reason why South Africans who harass African immigrants are not punished is that "knowingly or unknowingly" both the government and its citizens believe that people who naturally originate from South Africa are exceptional because there is no African country that can be compared with South Africa in terms of the level of economic development. Consequently, South Africans find it comfortable to harass African immigrants because they believe that African immigrants come from poor African countries (Tomaselli, 2021) and the reason why African immigrants have come to South Africa is to have a better standard of living (Gwatidzo et al. 2016). Such perception is heightened by the notion that the level of economic development in South Africa helps to reduce the level of poverty (Osei & Bentum-Ennin, 2022) even when most African immigrants in South Africa cannot find employment and are also challenged with poverty (Crush et al. 2018).

Therefore, it is important to conduct further research to find out whether the reason why South Africans do not harass European immigrants is that they perceive European immigrants to originate from countries with higher levels of economic development than South Africa. In

addition, the perception that poverty in other parts of Africa has compelled African immigrants to come to South Africa to seek better living conditions has exposed African immigrants to various forms of harassment (Crush & Tawodzera, 2017; Crush & Williams, 2001:1). This is because such perception ignores the fact that thousands of African immigrants migrate to South Africa because of political instability in the host country (Khosa & Kalitanyi, 2015).
Nonetheless, the harassment of African immigrants on the basis that they do not originate from South Africa is also strengthened by the way the media in South Arica misrepresents African immigrants in the country.

3.4.2 Misrepresentation of African immigrants and harassment by the media

The media generally represents African immigrants in ways that seem to suggest that African immigrants should not have migrated to South Africa to begin with (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020, 2018). The media, therefore, construct the presence of African immigrants in South Africa as a problem (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020, 2018; Pineteh, 2017). This ignores the plight of African immigrants who are victims of harassment in South Africa by creating the impression that South Africans are in danger because of the presence of African immigrants in the country (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020).
Pineteh (2017) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2001:646) have amplified the role the media play in the perpetration of harassment against African immigrants by arguing the misrepresentation of African immigrants in South Africa to symbolise evil by the media attracts despicable behaviours toward African immigrants. Moyo and Nshimbi (2020) and Mtwana and Bird (2006), therefore, argue that various stereotypes against African immigrants in South Africa are reflected in the way the print and broadcast media shape the public attitudes of South Africans vis-à-vis African immigrants through emotional media images that depict South Africa as being inundated by undocumented African immigrants.
Even though many African immigrants entered South Africa legitimately, the media still classify all African immigrants as "aliens" – a particularly damaging catch-all phrase that does not distinguish between refugees, who Fine and Bird (2002:20) reported "have lost the protection of their own state and who have a well-founded fear of persecution" trying to obtain official South African government recognition of their status as refugees. From individuals who arrived in South Africa for temporary employment or study purposes, as well as those who have migrated permanently to South Africa or tourists or short-term visitors from Africa, etc.

(Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020). These categories of African immigrants have different reasons why they are in South Africa.

However, media often fails or deliberately refuses to make the distinctions clear, and tends to conflate and confuse the issues to aggravate the living conditions of African immigrants in South Africa (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Mtwana & Bird, 2006). In addition, the media in South Africa often reports events in other parts of Africa in stereotypical ways that focus on disasters, conflicts, wars, and poverty. Such representation has the potential to expand upon discourses that ascribe negative attributes to African immigrants in South Africa (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Mtwana & Bird, 2006). The negative attributes make the harassment of African immigrants legitimate across public spaces in South Africa (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020) as the media continually maintains that South Africa is invaded by undocumented African immigrants.

Notwithstanding, the way the media constructs the presence of African immigrants in South Africa and the effort of the media to justify the perpetration of harassment against African immigrants also suggests possible research gaps. In this regard, the question that needs new insights should be why is it that the media in South Africa largely portrays African immigrants in a negative view. Are African immigrants in South Africa negative? Is the media ignorant of the positive contributions of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs toward the economic progress of South Africa? These questions are important because whether "intentionally or unintentionally, the media has created an atmosphere of moral panic regarding the presence of African immigrants in South Africa" (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Banda & Mawadza, 2015).

One remarkable aspect of the media that contributes to the harassment of African immigrants in South Africa is the over-exaggeration of threat posed by African immigrants in the country (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020) and the fact that the media often estimates the figure of African immigrants (documented or undocumented) to be unreasonably high (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Crush & Peberdy, 2018). Crush and Tevera (2010:4), therefore, argue that the media creates panic in South Africa by inflating the number of African immigrants in the country. Arguably, the media, particularly print media, sustains the point of view that there are too many African immigrants in South Africa (Crush & Peberdy, 2018) and the anxiety to harass African immigrants is provoked by the need to stop or at least limit the influx of African immigrants into South Africa (Crush & Peberdy, 2018).

The media therefore sustains the stereotypes held against African immigrants by contrasting African immigrants from South Africa as "us versus them," "insiders versus outsiders", and "citizens versus undocumented foreigners" to justify the exclusion of African immigrants from accessing socioeconomic resources in the country (Ndinda & Ndhlovu, 2016; Smith,

2011:119). They, therefore, blame the harassment of African immigrants on criminal elements, which exempts South Africans from any wrongdoing against African immigrants (Nshimbi, 2018; Pineteh, 2017).

Crush et al. (2008:8) uphold the view that the media is mishandling the harassment of African immigrants by exonerating South Africans from all forms of harassment against African immigrants. That is why the perpetration of harassment against African immigrants in the country frequently evolves into xenophobic attacks to cause bodily harm or injury towards African immigrants (Jones et al. 2018; Tshishonga, 2015; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Xenophobic attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, for example, often keep African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in fear for their lives and business (Norris & Orchowski, 2019; Jones et al. 2018). Xenophobic attacks are frequent among African immigrants who constitute the most disliked categories of immigrants in South Africa such as African immigrants who originate from Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (Dube, 2019; Crush, 2014). The xenophobic attacks that frequently result from the harassment of African immigrants have now maintained a pattern in South Africa (Tshishonga, 2015).

Lalbahadur (2019) claims that the number of African immigrants who have died, been injured, or displaced as a result of xenophobic attacks is too many to be ignored. For example, Xenowatch (a Xenophobia Monitoring Group) published a report that shows that from 1994 to 2018, there have been approximately 529 xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa. The xenophobic attacks have caused 309 deaths, more than 901 severe injuries, and more than 100 000 internally displaced (Lalbahadur, 2019). Xenowatch has, therefore, partitioned the statistics of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa according to the nine provinces of South Africa.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of xenophobic attacks per province for the period 1994 to 2018.

Province	**Number of incidents**
Gauteng	212 (40.1 %)
Western Cape	111 (21.0%)
KwaZulu-Natal	67 (12.7%)
Limpopo	40 (7.6 %)
Eastern Cape	33 (6.2%)
Mpumalanga	22 (4.2%)

North West	20 (3.8%)
Free State	19 (3.7 %)
Northern Cape	5 (1.0%)
Total	529 (100%)

Source: Xenowatch, www.xenowatch.co.za

Table 3.2 shows that Gauteng Province (GP) has registered the highest number of xenophobic attacks, while the Northern Cape (NC) has registered the least number of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. This implies that African immigrants in Gauteng Province are more exposed to harassment than those in the other eight provinces.

Therefore, the question that should be asked is why Gauteng Province (which is the seat of government and home to diplomatic missions of African countries) has experienced more xenophobic attacks than other provinces (Owusu-Sekyere et al. 2019; Cilliers, 2017; Mabin, 2015). Are the experiences of harassment of African immigrants in GP the same/similar to that of African immigrants in other provinces? Moreover, the literature review does not clearly show the ratio of harassment and xenophobic attacks perpetrated towards African immigrants in various provinces in South Africa.

The literature also does not demonstrate whether the motives of harassment and xenophobic attacks are the same across all provinces where the phenomena take place. This is important to understand because, between 2007 and 2019, the level of threat, attacks, and killings against foreigners (African immigrants) in the context of this study rise and fall irregularly in number (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 shows the level of threats, attacks, and killings of foreigners in South Africa between 2008 and 2019.



Figure 3.3 shows that the level of threats, violent attacks, and killings of foreigners in South Africa was lower in 2015 and 2019 than in 2008. The question that should be posed is why was it higher in 2008 and lower in 2015 and 2019.

Several scholars argue that xenophobic attacks have become a regular feature in many cities in South Africa (Bonga, 2021; Nwobi et al. 2020; Hiropoulos, 2020; Akinola, 2018). This is because according to Crush et al. (2018; 2014), everyday animosity between South Africans and African immigrants frequently spills over into xenophobic attacks that mostly target African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses. The attacks mostly take place in "marginal urban locations of informal settlements, townships and inner-city suburbs of South Africa" (Crush et al. 2018). Further research should, therefore, be conducted to understand why xenophobic attacks mostly take place in these identified locations.

However, the fact that most of the large-scale violence against African immigrants "occurs in marginal urban locations of informal settlements, townships and inner-city suburbs of South Africa" has prompted divisive public reactions over the underlying causes of violence against African immigrants in the country (Crush et al. 2018). The violence against African immigrants in South Africa "took place in May 2008 and left 62 people dead, 342 immigrant businesses looted and 213 burnt down" (Johnson & Jacobs, 2012:330).

However, similar violence against African immigrants took place in 2015, 2017 and 2019 has continued more sporadically until now (Dube, 2019; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015). Due to the sporadic nature of the occurrence of violence against African immigrants in South Africa. There are three dominant public reactions regarding the violence perpetrated against African

immigrants in South Africa, in general: “xenophobia denialism”, “xenophobia minimalism” and “xenophobia realism” (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014).

3.4.3 Perception of Xenophobia in South Africa

Crush (2021), Tella (2016) and Crush and Ramachandran (2014) contend that xenophobia denialism in South Africa is envisaged from the official reaction of the government of South Africa regarding the May 2008 xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa and similar attacks that took place in 2015, 2017 and 2019 (Dube, 2019; Crush et al. 2018; Crush & Tawodzera, 2017; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015).

The government of South Africa continues to deny every claim that suggests that xenophobia is the underlying cause of the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). The government of South Africa, therefore, attributes the deaths, destruction and looting of businesses that belong to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa to the work of criminal elements in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

The reaction has also shaped the official responses of the government of South Africa towards violent attacks (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016) and the government has maintained a “lukewarm” reaction irrespective of multiple criticisms from the African Union and the international community (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). The government continues to consider the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to be acts of criminality (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

In addition, the reaction of the government regarding the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs is “echoed by some researchers and political commentators who argue that only a small group of South Africans” perpetrate violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). Therefore, the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are not signs of large-scale prejudice against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

Xenophobia minimalists react to the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs as a sign of deeper underlying issues that are linked to the history of racial

discrimination in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). In this regard, some minimalist academics and commentators claim that even though there are signs that xenophobia may be present in the broader South African society, it cannot be cited as the cause of the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016), even when there is evidence that the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa follow a pattern of discrimination and harassment before culminating into violence (Ogunnubi & Amao, 2016).

Other minimalists contend that xenophobia is cited as the cause of the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. It means that there is a hostile opposition between "African immigrants and South Africans," which is problematic (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; McDonald & Jacobs, 2005).

Duncan (2011) and Neocosmos (2008) claim that both South Africans and informal immigrant entrepreneurs originating from Asia such as Pakistanis were killed or suffered similar losses during the violent attacks alongside African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Moyo, 2015; Ivier, 2013a; The Star, 19 May 2011:16). However, "the same discussion firmly suggests that it is predominantly African immigrant informal entrepreneurs who were harassed and suffered the most during xenophobic attacks" (Moyo, 2015).

Xenophobia minimalists, therefore, associate the violent attacks against African immigrants with a social crisis that is tied to the unachieved project of reducing inequality by granting more economic access to majority of South Africans who were previously excluded from economic opportunities during the era of apartheid (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Peberdy, 2005). This point of view supports the argument that the consequences of increasing inequality in South Africa after "the democratic transition" is mostly felt in marginal urban locations where most of the violent attacks against African immigrants occur (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Peberdy, 2005).

Crush (2021), Hewitt et al. (2020), and Peberdy and Dinat (2005) claim that to react to the violent attacks against African immigrants by calling it xenophobia is misleading because such a reaction would ignore complex underlying social determinants that trigger the perpetration of violent attacks against African immigrants in South Africa. The violent attacks are, therefore, a reaction of vulnerable South Africans toward vulnerable African immigrants (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Peberdy & Dinat, 2005).

However, xenophobia realists react to the violent attacks against African immigrants in a way that makes sense (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020). A study was conducted by the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) with groups of South Africans and African immigrants across various socioeconomic groups to understand what was behind the violent attacks against African immigrants in South Africa (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2016; Gordon, 2015).

After monitoring the attitudes of South Africans towards African immigrants (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014), the SAMP presented undeniable evidence that animosity against African immigrants is rooted in biases that South Africans hold against Africans (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). The biases according to the study persistently influence the behaviour of South Africans toward African immigrants. South Africans therefore, often let out their frustration regarding the presence of African immigrants through xenophobic attacks (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014).

In addition, regarding the presence of African immigrants, South Africans believe that African immigrants constitute a direct threat to their socioeconomic well-being (Crush, 2021; Hewitt et al. 2020; Prah, 2017 in Crush et al. 2015; Crush, 2014). This is because Akinola (2014) claims that African immigrants compete with locals for the already scarce resources and opportunities in the country – even when African immigrants do not have jobs and have resorted to conducting informal businesses in various cities in South Africa (Crush, 2015).

3.5 IMMIGRANTS' CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Studies that focus on immigrants who conduct business in South Africa are relevant because post-1994 transition to democracy and removal of apartheid restrictions on informal business (Nkambule, 2019; Rogerson, 2003). The number of immigrants who conduct business in South African cities increased drastically (Nkambule, 2019; Rogerson, 2003; Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000; Ihenduru, 1998), irrespective of the high number of immigrants who conduct business in South Africa. Research on the role immigrant entrepreneurs play in the socioeconomic progress of South Africa and their experience of xenophobia is still very limited (Peberdy & Rogerson 2000; Peberdy, 2000; Rogerson, 1997).

This research will, therefore, contribute to the literature review on Francophone African immigrant entrepreneurs and xenophobia. Immigrant entrepreneurs have attracted new interest in research because of the diverse nature of the phenomenon. Over a decade ago, immigrant entrepreneurs were considered a homogeneous phenomenon as it referred to immigrants who

conduct informal business in order to survive in the host country (Verver et al. 2019; Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015; Christopher & Leslie, 2015). However, currently, the phenomenon has become heterogeneous referring to different categories of immigrant entrepreneurs (Arrighetti et al. 2021; Brzozowski & Cucculelli, 2020; Milanesi et al. 2016; Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015; Mitchell, 2015).

The debates on immigrant conduct of business in South Africa must, therefore, consider the conditions under which immigrants conduct formal[32]or informal business.[33] Nonetheless, pieces of literature on immigrants' conduct of business are mostly dominated by immigrants' informal rather than formal business. The reason is partly that in the past, many countries that attracted many immigrants experienced economic downturns (Jetten & Esses, 2018; Van Mol & Valk, 2016; Irastorza & Peña, 2014:35).

The economic downturns created a high level of unemployment due to a lack of job creation in the formal labour market of the host country. As a result, immigrants frequently conduct informal business in the host country to take care of their immediate needs (Muñoz-Mora et al. 2022; Zack & Landau, 2021). In the context of this study, Francophone African immigrants in South Africa face challenges such as difficulty to find employment as a result of discriminatory immigration policies[34] (Brixy et al. 2012; Palmary & Landau, 2011:202; South African Human Rights Council, 2006:32-35).

The policies make it difficult for African immigrants to obtain valid documents in South Africa. Consequently, many African immigrants in South Africa live without valid documents which constrains them from accessing financial resources (Nkem & Tengeh, 2017; Peberdy, 2017; Tshishonga, 2015; Tengeh et al, 2012; Brixy et al. 2012; Fisher, 2005:4). As a result, African immigrants frequently become informal entrepreneurs because "the technical expertise needed to operate as an informal entrepreneur is very minimal" (Peberdy, 2017; Masonganye, 2010; Fisher, 2005:4).

[32] Businesses operating from fixed building structures located on business stands demarcated as such by local government (municipal) town planning regulations (Ligthelm, 2013).

[33] Uunregistered businesses operating as street vendors and in-home businesses established on residential sites often termed 'spaza shops' or 'tuck shops' in the case of South Africa (Ligthelm, 2013).

[34]The policy sometimes contradicts itself in that it states in order to get a job, you need a work permit. In order to get a work permit, you need a job, even though the government of South Africa has amended its immigration and refugee laws: South Africa's Refugee Act of 1998 and South Africa's Immigration Act of 1999 amended in 2017 (Government of South Africa, 2017). The amendment did not resolve the problem of contradiction and discrimination in immigration policies. The 2017 White Paper on immigration and refugee laws only mentions the importance of understanding underlying attitudes toward foreigners without providing any coherent policy to resolve the problem of discriminatory employment policies (Government of South Africa, 2017).

3.5.1 Informal Entrepreneurs and "Informality"

Various discussions on informal entrepreneurs must provide context to the issue of "informality," and how it is perceived in various cities in Africa and South Africa, in particular. This is important because this study is conducted on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

A brief overview of informality would, therefore, guide the phenomenon of informal entrepreneurs which remains an integral part of "urban informality."[35] In addition, the way informal entrepreneurs are perceived and the role they play in the socioeconomic progress of the host country would assist in critically analysing the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Further studies may, therefore, be conducted to examine whether Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are all perceived in a negative light, or whether it is their informal business that is perceived in a negative light, such that they are discriminated against, harassed, and sometimes violently attacked. Additional answers to these queries should come out from the in-depth interviews and an examination of these questions should assist in documenting the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Moreover, regarding the notion of informality, several perspectives have been put forward to explain informality in cities. These include the "dualist, structuralist and legalist" perspectives (Linares, 2018; Bonnet & Venkatesh, 2016). The dualists, on the one hand, view "informality" as "backward and separate from the formal sector" (Dasgupta & Lloyd-Jones, 2018; Linares, 2018; Bonnet & Venkatesh, 2016; Geertz, 1963). Therefore, since informality is separated from the formal sector, it would soon be phased out (Moatasim, 2019; Rogerson, 2017; Crush et al. 2015).

In this regard, Moyo (2017) contend formal authorities in various African cities view informality in urban areas as a problem, a "spatial disorder" or "spatialised deviance", which explains why previously, many governments were passionate to destroy informality in cities to preserve the beauty of cities (Skinner & Haysom, 2017; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). For example, in "Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe," informality in urban spaces is not considered as an integral part of the process of urbanisation but rather something repulsive that must be demolished (Kamete, 2013).

[35] "a state of exception from the formal order of Urbanization" (Roy, 2005:147).

Further studies should, therefore, be conducted to look at the perception of informality in urban areas across Francophone Africa. Furthermore, the assumption that formality is superior to informality creates a negative image regarding the rise of informality in African cities, even when there is evidence that informality makes a significant contribution to many African economies (Average, 2020). In addition, the assumption that formality is superior to informality has made dualists believe that informality in urban spaces operates outside the law (Lindell, 2010).

Consequently, many authorities in Africa that are influenced by the dualist framework look at informality in urban spaces as a phenomenon that must be eliminated rather than improved because it remains an integral part of the broader economy of cities (Moyo et al. 2016). The structuralists, on the other hand, regard "informality as a product of economic crisis or the "informalisation" of the formal economy" (Huang et al. 2020; Aurick et al. 2017; Moyo, 2015). The structuralists claim that informality is established within formality (Portes et al. 1989). This means "formality and informality are connected through a range of complex mechanisms and relationships in a way that allows the formal sector to function through the exploitation of the informal sector" (Portes et al. 1989). According to this understanding, informality plays an important role in the economies of several African cities by supplying low-cost goods and services to consumers, thereby improving their conditions of living (Muhanga, 2020).

The legalists regard informal entrepreneurs as people who decide to escape stringent laws in the formal sector (Dzawanda et al. 2020; Muhanga, 2020; Moyo et al. 2016). De Soto (1989, cited in Young, 2019)), therefore, urges governments to act fast in formalising the informal sector. De Soto (1989) claims this would "reduce the costs of formality and reforming the legal system to provide protections for the property rights, contracts and extracontractual liabilities". The idea of De Soto is connected to the wider idea that "informality is a result of unduly constraining policies that can be resolved through market reforms (1989).

However, the suggestion that "markets are a solution rather than a cause of informality" has inspired a huge number of literatures advocating lesser regulations and less bureaucracy as the best means of reducing the costs to operate a formal business (De Soto, 1989). These aspects are pertinent because they assist this study to understand how informality is perceived across cities.

It is imperative to understand the way informality is perceived across African cities, especially in South African cities, because it would shape our understanding of the phenomenon of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria since informal

entrepreneurs and informality constitute an integral part of formal entrepreneurs and formality across African cities.

In South Africa, informality in cities is viewed as the "second economy" that must be eradicated (Aliber et al. 2006). Consequently, informal entrepreneurs in various South African cities are perceived as people who are destroying the beauty of South African cities because they are dirtying the streets through informal activities (Skinner, 2018), in addition to the fact that informality must be eradicated because it negatively affects formal business in South Africa (Skinner, 2018).

In the case of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, it is believed that they hide behind the informal business to sell illicit drugs to South Africans (Zuma, 2021; Moyo, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). Such a perception ignores the input of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to the economy of South Africa (Tengeh, 2017). It also does not perceive the inextricable link between informality and formality (Cohen, 2010).

It is, therefore, vital that informality in South African cities should not be viewed as a second economy because of the positive support it offers to formal business. For example, the active interaction of informal entrepreneurs with wholesalers who operate formal businesses should be noted as informal entrepreneurs buy goods from wholesalers to resell to the general public and other places that are not easily accessible in cities, thus increasing the output of wholesalers which has a positive impact on the income of their business (Skinner, 2017, Pineteh, 2017; Nshimbi, 2016; Mapadimeng, 2011; Cohen, 2010).

Notwithstanding, the positive contribution of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, the literature review shows that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa frequently experience xenophobic attacks while conducting their business. Section 3.6 is, therefore, set to establish the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

3.6 XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS ON INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS

The literature review shows that "Many South Africans, like the citizens of other countries worldwide, do not like foreigners" (Dube, 2019:191). Previous studies have identified many South Africans or groups of South Africans who perpetrate xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Mantzaris & Ngcamu, 2019; Crush & Ramachandran, 2017, 2014:2-3).

Notwithstanding, it remains unclear what size of the population or number of South Africans perpetrate or approve the xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses in South Africa (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017; 2014:2-3). This point of view is important because the prevalence of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs suggests that a vast majority of the local population supports the xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs.

This is partly because the instigators of xenophobic attacks often swiftly gather enough support from fellow South Africans to mobilise perpetrators of xenophobic attacks to carry on with the attacks (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017; 2014:2-3). Furthermore, existing pieces of literature have attempted to specifically describe some groups of South Africans who are known to have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs. For alignment, the groups would be arranged in sequence of first, second, third, etc.

The first group of South Africans who have been described in the pieces of literature as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs are South Africans who are involved in informal business (Mantzaris & Ngcamu, 2019; Crush & Ramachandran, 2017), especially South African informal entrepreneurs who operate spaza shops and are in direct competition with informal immigrant entrepreneurs who operate spaza shops in low-income neighbourhoods (Mantzaris & Ngcamu, 2019; Gastrow, 2018; Crush & Ramachandran, 2017).

There is a lot of evidence that this group of South Africans have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs to chase informal immigrant entrepreneurs out of certain localities across South African cities (Mantzaris & Ngcamu, 2019; Crush & Ramachandran, 2017), or curtail the economic activities of informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Gastrow, 2018).

The second group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks identified in the pieces of literature are South Africans who are members of certain informal traders' associations including local traders' associations in places like Germiston are noted to have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Crush, 2014; D'haese et al. 2005).

The third group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs are members of the South African Hawkers Associations. This includes local hawkers in Johannesburg's inner city (Zack & Landau, 2021; Arias, 2019; Adepoju, 2003; Peberdy, 2001:25). The members are noted to have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg (Moyo, 2018; Pineteh, 2016).

The fourth group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs are political protesters in provinces such as Gauteng and Mpumalanga who

perpetrated xenophobic attacks on immigrant informal entrepreneurs during protest actions (Arias, 2019; Lancaster, 2018; Crush et al. 2015; Adepoju, 2003; Peberdy, 2001:25).

The fifth group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs are South African residents in certain "informal settlements"[36] that include community members of informal settlements such as Itireleng and Diepsloot near Johannesburg who perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the areas (Crush & Tawodzera, 2017; Amusan & Mchunu, 2017; Monson, 2015; Misago et al. 2010, 2009; Sharp, 2008).

The sixth group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are service delivery protesters in places such as Delmas in Mpumalanga, where after a service-delivery protest, informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their staff were violently attacked and 41 shops belonging to informal immigrants were looted and burnt down (Misago, 2019; Misago et al. 2010, 2009), and Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal where service delivery protesters also perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their business during service delivery protests (Misago, 2019; Tirivangasi & Mugambiwa, 2016; Amisi, 2011).

The seventh group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks identified in pieces of literature are a group of Zulu-speaking South Africans in Alexandria township and some parts of Durban who are also confirmed to have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs and chanting slogans that encourage xenophobic attacks such as: "Phansi A "makwerekwere" Phansi" (the Zulu slogan for "down with foreigners, down") (Moyo et al. 2018; Claassen, 2017; Tella, 2016; Batisai, 2016; Mario Matsinhe, 2011; Tafira, 2011; Nyar, 2010).

The question posed by the pieces of literature is why is it that among the home languages of South Africa, isiZulu is dominantly associated with slogans that perpetrators of xenophobic attacks often chant? Even the perpetration of verbal harassment that often led to xenophobic attacks such as "makwerekwere" is also in isiZulu (Moyo et al. 2018; Claassen, 2017; Tella, 2016; Batisai, 2016; Mario Matsinhe, 2011; Tafira, 2011; Nyar, 2010)? Does this mean that South Africans of Zulu origins constitute the most perpetrators of xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country? Or how convenient is the use of isiZulu in the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs? Do non-

[36] Informal settlements in South Africa are housing areas that are often illegally built on municipal land (Brown-Luthango et al. 2017).

Zulu-speaking South Africans also chant slogans in isiZulu or employ derogatory terms like "makwerekwere" when perpetrating xenophobic attacks or when harassing informal immigrant entrepreneurs is "food for thought."

The eighth group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs identified in the pieces of literature are members of vigilante groups in South Africa (Hunter, 2021; Spencer, 2020; Crush & Tawodzera, 2017; Super, 2017; Bekker, 2015 Botha, 2015; Martin, 2010). One such vigilante group that has been terrorising informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South African cities recently is "Operation Dudula." Members of these vigilante groups have perpetrated xenophobic attacks on informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Pineteh and Masiya, eds. 2022; Boshoff, 2022; Nhemachena et al. 2022). Operation Dudula perpetrated xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs under the pretext of combatting the illicit drug trade and undocumented foreigners in South African communities (Mlambo, 2019; Misago, 2019; Ogunnoiki & Adeyemi, 2019).

The groups of South Africans that have been cited as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs are important when looking at one of the objectives of this study (see section 1.5) which seeks to identify the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. It is, therefore, important to understand whether the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are different from what is cited in the literature review during the fieldwork. Interestingly, many groups of South Africans have been established as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks on African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. The next important question is: Why are informal immigrant entrepreneurs attacked in South Africa?

3.7 THE REASON INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS ARE ATTACKED

There are several reasons why informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked in South Africa. From the pieces of literature, the reasons vary from anger and frustration to inflammatory remarks regarding the presence of immigrants (notably African immigrants) in South African cities (Peberdy, 2019; Crush et al. 2019; Ngota, 2019; Moyo et al. 2018; Nshimbi, 2018; Pineteh, 2017).

South Africans perceive immigrants (particularly African immigrants) to be criminals, or undocumented and unwanted persons (Crush & Peberdy, 2018; Pineteh, 2017; Tagwirei, 2016; Makhada & Roelofse, 2013; Steenkamp, 2009). Nonetheless, to have a better understanding of the reason South Africans attack African immigrants, the accusatory discourse is well-placed

to provide a deeper understanding of the xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

3.7.1 Accusatory discourse of xenophobic Attacks in South Africa

An accusatory discourse of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants is used pre- or post-xenophobic attacks to justify the need to perpetrate xenophobic attacks against immigrants in South Africa in general (Pineteh, 2017). For example, during the wave of xenophobic attacks, South African leaders, media, and ordinary citizens spend more time diffusing content and comments that carry accusatory remarks against immigrants in South Africa, in general.

In the context of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs, a lot of videos circulating on various social media platforms and television contain accusations and images of informal immigrant entrepreneurs selling counterfeit goods in South Africa (Mamokhere & Chauke, 2020; Steenkamp, 2009), and of African immigrants selling illicit drugs to South African children. Sometimes the authenticity of the videos propagating accusatory comments is not properly verified.

The overall accusatory content in various media accuses African immigrants in South Africa of committing all sorts of crimes (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Pineteh, 2017), even when most of the victims of xenophobic attacks are destitute and vulnerable African immigrants with no previous criminal records who are just trying "to make ends meet" in South Africa (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018). The fact that South Africans perceive African immigrants to be committing most of the crimes in the country remains problematic (Clack & Minnaar, 2018). It is, therefore, important to conduct studies on the crime rate in South Africa to understand whether African immigrants commit more crimes in South Africa than South Africans.

In addition, African immigrants who are victims of xenophobic attacks are often accused of hijacking abandoned buildings in South African cities (Hiropoulos, 2020) and taking over RDP houses that belong to South Africans (Reddy, 2012). There are also accusations that African immigrants are living in South Africa without valid documentation even when there is evidence that South African government plays a major role in making African immigrants become undocumented through discriminatory policies (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016), and the backlog that is often experienced in Visa processing which contributes to making African immigrants live without valid documentation (Phathela, 2017).

This coupled with the accusation that informal immigrant entrepreneurs are selling drugs and promoting prostitution is enough reason for the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Asoba et al. 2020), even when there is evidence that South Africans also sell illicit drugs (Cinini & Balgobind, 2019).

Furthermore, there is an accusation that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have taken over business that belongs to South Africans, making the situation worse for African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018; Crush & McCordic, 2017) – even when there is evidence that the informal business of immigrant entrepreneurs also creates jobs for South Africans and increases the profit of South African wholesalers (Crush et al. 2018; Ngota et al. 2017).

The accusatory remarks of some South African leaders also seem to justify the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Hewitt et al. 2020), for example, the accusatory remarks made by President Cyril Ramaphosa during the 2019 election campaign, where he said, "We are going to take back our jobs from foreign nationals", and the inflammatory remarks made by then Minister of Health Dr Zweli Mkhize who said that South Africa's Health Services were under strain because of African immigrants;[37] and that of former Mayor of the City of Johannesburg Mr Herman Mashaba who said that, "the presence of crimes in the City of Johannesburg was as a result of the presence of African immigrants".

These inflammatory statements were breeding grounds for xenophobic attacks against African immigrants. The remarks were also seen as various attempts to justify the reasons why South Africans must perpetrate xenophobic attacks on African immigrants in the country (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Bond, 2020; Jacobs, 2018; Bosch et al. 2018; Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2017). From the latter, it is obvious that the accusatory voices of South African media and political leaders during xenophobic attacks continue to shape the perception of many South Africans and their responses to xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African immigrants (Pineteh, 2017).

3.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter explores various discourses and reactions toward xenophobia and informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa from pieces of literature based on the following research objectives: to find out how informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against while conducting their business; to determine the type of harassment immigrant

[37]https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2174326/government-blamed-for-spate-of-xenophobic-attacks/

informal entrepreneurs experience while conducting their business; to establish the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and to establish why informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked while conducting their business.

From the literature review, it is, therefore, evident that more studies should be conducted on xenophobia and informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. Also, there is a need to separate the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from that of other lingo-cultural groups of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. More studies on the experience of xenophobia in South Africa will shed light on the reason why different groups of African immigrants are discriminated against and harassed in particular ways.

New studies will also shed light on the reason why African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely to be attacked than other categories of African immigrants in South Africa such as students, diplomats, and professionals. In addition to the fact that there is a divergence of opinion regarding the xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa and criminality against them, new studies should be conducted to clearly distinguish attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs that are motivated by xenophobia from those that are motivated by criminality.

Such indicators will help to remove the conflict between criminality and xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, as the literature review shows that some attacks often start with xenophobic undertones and end up in criminality. Others begin as acts of criminality and end up in xenophobic attacks. What is this one thing that is done during the attacks on African immigrants that can be said is xenophobic? And what is this one thing that is done that can be said during an attack against informal immigrant entrepreneurs that is criminal?

CHAPTER 4

THE STUDY AREA: PRETORIA

4.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter examines the individual experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria and presents the setting of the study area. The chapter commences by looking at the general economic, legal, social, and political characteristics of Gauteng Province. It proceeds to look at Pretoria (now City of Tshwane (CoT)) (Horn, 2021), where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business. It looks at (i) the economic structure of Pretoria; (ii) employment status; (iii) education levels; (iv) key economic sectors; (v) services; (vi) the built environment; (vii) and the key role players.

4.1.1 Study Setting: Gauteng Province (GP)

Gauteng Province is the smallest of South Africa's nine provinces in terms of surface area (about 18 178 km^2). However, comprises the largest share of the country's population (Oguttu et al. 2021; Visser et al. 2016; Gauteng Provincial Government, 2014). Gauteng is situated in the central northeastern part of South Africa (Oguttu et al. 2021; Gauteng Provincial Government, 2014). It shares a boundary with "Limpopo to the north, Mpumalanga to the east, Free State to the south, and North West to the west" (Mushongera et al. 2017).

The province originated as a result of the discovery of gold in the late 19th century and the related gold mining projects that followed in the early to mid-20th century (Mushongera et al. 2017). The output of Gauteng's gold mining projects was soaring and it attracted a lot of foreign investment, and skilled and unskilled labour from Africa and across the world (Mushongera et al. 2017).

Therefore, within a century, the province quickly evolved into an urban landscape with a high cultural diversity and a huge socioeconomic disparity (Mushongera et al. 2017). A 2019 mid-year population estimate suggests that Gauteng's population is estimated at 15 176 115 (about 25.82%) of the entire population of South Africa (Oguttu et al. 2021; Stats SA, 2019).

Figure 4.1: Map of South Africa with its nine provinces



Source: (Provincial layout of South Africa)

Figure 4.1 shows the administrative provinces of South Africa. Gauteng is the smallest province in terms of surface area. However, although Gauteng is smaller than the eight other provinces in terms of surface area. It has the largest share of South Africa's population (Mushongera et al. 2017).

Gauteng's population "grew from 12 272 263 in 2011 (Renkin, 2017; Statistics South Africa 2011), to 13 399 724 in 2016 (Renkin, 2017; Statistics South Africa 2016), of which 88.0% of the population are people born in South Africa and 90.4% of the population are South African citizens" (Renkin, 2017; Statistics South Africa, 2016). Internal migration to Gauteng is greater than in any other province in South Africa (Renkin, 2017).

Roughly 54.4% of Gauteng's population was born in the Gauteng region (Renkin, 2017). 59% of the population "live in houses, 18.9% in shacks, 7.2% in apartments, 5.6% in backyard flats and 9.3% live in dwellings described as 'other'" (Renkin, 2017). Gauteng has ten local municipalities, and three of the municipalities constitute the largest metropolitan cities in South Africa in terms of population and economic activities (Renkin, 2017).

The three largest metropolitan cities in Gauteng are "the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) – the financial capital, the City of Tshwane (CoT) – the administrative capital, commonly known as Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) – which is a major industrial hub and home to South Africa's OR Tambo International Airport" (Renkin, 2017; Mushongera et al. 2017).

Figure 4.2: The municipalities of Gauteng Province



Source: (Glester Consulting and Projects, 2019)

Figure 4.2 shows the ten local municipalities of Gauteng of which three (the City of Tshwane, the City of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni) are among the largest metropolitan cities in South Africa (Mushongera et al. 2017). It is estimated that roughly 25.82% of the population of South Africa is spread across the municipalities of Gauteng (Mushongera et al. 2017). About 85% of the 25.82% of the population of Gauteng "is located in the three metropolitan municipalities of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ), the City of Tshwane (CoT), and Ekurhuleni" (Mushongera et al. 2017).

These metropolitan municipalities are predominantly black South Africans (Mushongera et al. 2017). During apartheid, "black South Africans were forced to live in townships where high levels of deprivation are currently found" (Mushongera et al. 2017). However, post-apartheid, Gauteng attracted "a mass of internal migrants" from other provinces of South Africa, and an influx of African migrants from neighbouring countries and other parts of Africa (Mushongera et al. 2017).

4.1.2 Gauteng Economy

The economy of Gauteng is key to the broader South African economy. It is composed of "a variety of industries, communities, and walks of life" (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Many towns

and cities that lie on the periphery of the province share close ties with the province through various infrastructure, movement, and economic networks (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Since 2004, Gauteng provincial government embraced the vision to transform the province into a vibrant economic hub (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

Even though Gauteng is the smallest among all the provinces of South Africa, it is the most densely populated province. Gauteng is home to about 15.2 million inhabitants. Its economy contributed up to 34% of the nation's GDP in recent years (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). The fact that Gauteng contributes a third of South Africa's GDP confirms the province as the "economic heartland" of South Africa (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). However, irrespective of the multiple economic strengths of Gauteng such as infrastructure and access to mineral resources (Hartley & Morrow, 2021), various challenges are hindering the economic growth of Gauteng (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

For example, poverty, rising unemployment, and social exclusion remain persistent in the province (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Hartley and Morrow (2021) claim that these challenges were a result of the legacy of apartheid-era spatial planning which neglected African communities in South Africa (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). However, the South African Reserve Bank (2020) attests that the economy of South Africa, in general, was slow for the past few years, swinging back and forth between 1.3% in 2017, 0.7% in 2018 and around 1.5% in 2019 (South African Reserve Bank, 2020).

Therefore, in line with the "Grow Gauteng Together 2030" strategy, the provincial government of Gauteng is working hard "to create an integrated, socially cohesive, sustainable and economically inclusive province" (Hartley & Morrow, 2021; Geldenhuys, 2021). As a result, the provincial government has pointed out a key element in achieving an economically inclusive province by introducing the "Special Economic Zones" (SEZs), where feasible, to improve manufacturing and increase exports and employment (Hartley & Morrow, 2021; Geldenhuys, 2021).

It is important to note that the backbone of Gauteng's economy is the presence of mining activities, manufacturing, financial and services industries (Hartley & Morrow, 2021; Geldenhuys, 2021). The natural resources from the "Witwatersrand gold ores to coal mining in Emalahleni, to diamond reserves in Cullinan east of Pretoria," have boosted the economy of Gauteng (Hartley & Morrow, 2021; Geldenhuys, 2021).

The minerals have attracted a vibrant manufacturing sector as many individuals and companies sought to establish themselves in the region where they could access key commodities easily (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). The economy of Gauteng is also diverse. Its finance and services

sectors serve as the economic pillars of the province (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Finance and services alone contribute about one-quarter of Gauteng's GDP (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). While manufacturing maintains a strategic position within the economy serving as "the third largest in the province, it contributes 15% of the provincial GDP and employs between 625,000 and 799 000 people" (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

Even large multinational corporations which are present in South Africa have established their headquarters in Gauteng. The reason why Gauteng remains the economic hub of South Africa is due to historic and geographic factors (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Given its geographic position at the centre of South Africa, a significant number of commodities are transported from Gauteng to other provinces (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

Gauteng also serves as "a passage for goods moving to Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the northern reaches of the continent" (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). This is because the road transport network is the predominant means to transport goods and other materials to neighbouring countries (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). In addition, OR Tambo International Airport in Gauteng offers a great transport network (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

4.1.3 Legal, Social and Political Characteristics of Gauteng

4.1.3.1 Legal

During the apartheid era, legal restrictions based on racial segregation were a great obstacle to movement within Gauteng and throughout South Africa (Wolpe, 2006; Crush & McDonald, 2001). The movement of black South Africans and African immigrants, in general, was highly restricted under the apartheid immigration Act (Crush & McDonald, 2001). Black South Africans in rural areas were not allowed to permanently resettle in urban areas (Crush & McDonald, 2001).

Even to visit family members in other provinces or temporarily work there they were required to have a permit from the apartheid government (Crush & McDonald, 2001). It was only before the relaxation of the influx control measures in the mid-1980s that black South Africans were free to move freely from one place to another (Clark & Worger, 2016). Consequently, some of them moved from rural to urban areas (Clark & Worger, 2016). Others moved from agricultural areas to nearby rural towns, and others from smaller towns to intermediate-sized and metropolitan cities (Geyer, 1994).

Throughout that period until now, Gauteng remains the most attractive migration destination for the majority of South Africans and African immigrants (Angelopulo, 2017; Clark &

Worger, 2016; Kok et al. 2003; Oosthuizen & Naidoo, 2004; Todes et al. 2010). For example, between 2001 and 2011, Gauteng received 41% and 45% of immigrants in 2001 and 2011 respectively (Statistics SA, 2005, 2012).

4.1.3.2 Social

Gauteng have the upper hand in terms of skills and access to human capital in South Africa (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). The province boasts the highest rate of adult literacy as compared to all other provinces in South Africa (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). It has the largest number of South Africans with National Senior Certificates, and the second-largest number of South Africans with post-school qualifications. The province also has the largest number of citizens aged between 15 and 24, roughly 2.3 million (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

The numbers are bolstered by large in-flows of internal migrants and African immigrants who are attracted to Gauteng with the hope of finding employment (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). Between 2016 and 2021, Gauteng was expected to experience "a net migration of 1 068 885", the highest of any province in South Africa (Hartley & Morrow, 2021). However, Gauteng is not without problems, although the South African government has made numerous efforts to reduce inequality and address some issues that are related to the historic injustices of the past (Hartley & Morrow, 2021).

There are other persistent social ills in Gauteng, such as the high crime rate, which Garidzirai (2021) claims are a result of the high rate of unemployment in Gauteng. Nonyana and Njuho (2018) claim that South Africa is among the sub-Saharan African countries with the highest rate of unemployment. For example, the unemployment rate among young adults in South Africa remains high until now. High unemployment is one of the country's major socioeconomic challenges.

In 2008 alone, the unemployment rate in South Africa was 33% for young adults between the ages of 15 to 34 (Nonyana & Njuho, 2018). In the first quarter of 2015, it increased to 37% (Graham & Mlatsheni, 2015). It further increased to 38.2% in the first quarter of 2018 (Stats SA, 2019). This implies that more than one in every three young adults in the labour force did not have a job in the first quarter of 2018 (Stats SA, 2018).

The situation of unemployment poses a major threat to South Africa's future economic prosperity (De Jongh et al. 2016; Stats SA, 2015a). Pervaiz et al. (2018) posit that the high rate of unemployment has ushered in an increasing wave of social unrest in the country. The social unrests in Gauteng and other provinces are due to uncertainty and disillusionment among South

Africans who do not have jobs (Mmesi, 2015). Joblessness is cited to have severe effects on South Africans, various communities, "the economy and society at large" (Stats SA, 2015a), and the consequent violent attacks on African immigrants who are often accused of stealing jobs that belong to South Africans (Dube, 2019; Tshishonga, 2015).

Waiganjo (2018) attests that violent attacks against African immigrants have taken place in most parts of Gauteng, where African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are the chief targets of physical brutality (Waiganjo, 2018). African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked for the simple fact that they conduct businesses that offer competition to South Africans (Waiganjo, 2018).

4.1.3.3 Politics

In Gauteng, the legacy of the apartheid aggravated the problem of the influx of African migrants. After the transition into democracy in 1994, major steps were taken to reduce inequality and poverty in South Africa (Lancaster, 2016). However, post-1994, South Africa is confronted with "increasing corruption, the weakening of state institutions by partisan appointments and one-party dominance, and exceptionally high levels of crime" (HRW, 2012). Socioeconomic inequalities and poverty have instead increased with more than half of the population of South Africa living under the poverty line (approximately 20 to 28 million), about a quarter formally unemployed, and a great number of the poor living in townships (Lancaster, 2016). While the democratic transition of South Africa came with promises such as better socioeconomic life for all South Africans, only little has changed for many (Lancaster, 2016).

The failures of the government of South Africa to tackle the problem of rising income inequality and poverty have led many politicians to scapegoat African immigrants whose presence in Gauteng has increased since 1994 (Lancaster, 2016). Hiropoulos (2017b) also attests that South African political leaders and public officials frequently scapegoat African immigrants to distract citizens from the failures of the government.

Hiropoulos, (2018) and Misago, (2017) claim that the failure of the South African government to address obvious challenges of inequality and poverty amidst rising systemic corruption has created political uncertainty in the country, as can be seen in the resignation of Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, because of his role in state capture. However, the "fractured" political climate of South Africa" (Hiropoulos, 2018; Misago, 2017) is exemplified by urban protests, which often turn violent. Some of the protests are informed by populist element that various political groups sought to take advantage of (Hiropoulos, 2018; Misago, 2017). It has

also fostered the scapegoating of African immigrants by South African politicians. Misago (2017) argues that the scapegoating of African immigrants features as a key characteristic of South Africa's conflicted political landscape.

Through the scapegoating of African immigrants, South African public officials tend to reinforce xenophobic attitudes and beliefs. However, the increasing presence of African immigrants in Gauteng is because the country of origin of most of the African immigrants in Gauteng – "Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea Conakry, Libya, Mozambique, Mali, Niger, Somalia" – have or are experiencing political crises that have forced nationals from the countries to move to Gauteng and elsewhere (Hiropoulos, 2018).

Based on the 2011 Census, "around 4.5% of South Africa's population is foreign-born, that is, 2.3 million of the country's 51.7 million inhabitants" (Statistics South Africa, 2012). This represents a 238% increase since the 1996 Census. As of 2011, the highest number of African immigrants in South Africa resides in Gauteng.

Table 4.3 shows the number of documented African immigrants in South Africa by province

Province of Usual Residence	**% SA Citizens**	**% Non-citizens**	**Unspecified**	**Total population**	**Total Non-citizens**
Western Cape	96.0	3.2	0.9	5 650 462	180 815
Eastern Cape	98.4	0.9	0.7	6 437 586	57 938
Northern cape	98.8	0.9	0.4	1 125 306	10 128
Free State	97.8	1.9	0.4	2 663 080	50 599
Kwazulu-Natal	98.1	1.1	0.8	10 113 978	111 253
North West	95.9	3.5	0.5	3 439 700	120 390
Gauteng	91.9	7.1	1.0	1 195 2392	848 620
Mpumalanga	96.8	2.6	0.6	3 983 570	103 573
Limpopo	96.9	2.6	0.5	5 322 134	138 376
Total		**3.2**		**50 688 208**	**1 621 692**

Source: (http://www.statssa.gov.za)

Table 4.3 shows that as of 2011, Gauteng province alone receives the highest number of African immigrants. However, due to the high number of African immigrants in South Africa, the presence of African immigrants is regularly constructed as a crisis by public officials and

the media (Hiropoulos, 2018). It is widely believed among South Africans that African immigrants enter South Africa illegally (Hiropoulos, 2018).

In reality, African migration to South Africa is characterised by highly skilled African immigrants who are documented and unskilled African immigrants who are undocumented (Amit, 2015; Polzer, 2010). About 2 to 3 million immigrants currently live in South Africa (Hiropoulos, 2018). The construction of the presence of African immigrants in South Africa as a crisis has influenced the way African immigrants are received and meted with increasing violence against African immigrants which renders them more vulnerable South Africa (Hiropoulos, 2015; Harris, 2002b).

Since 2008, African immigrants have experienced hostility from ordinary South Africans and public officials (Nyamnjoh, 2010:66). Several civil society organisations, human rights actors and academics observe persistent patterns of crime that target African immigrants around Gauteng (Hiropoulos, 2015), such as the "buyelekhaya" or "go back home" campaign in 1994 in which gangs of South Africans attempted to forcibly evict perceived "illegals" from Alexandra township (Hiropoulos, 2015). Hence, currently, Operation Dudula is chasing away undocumented African immigrants in the country (Mail and Guardian, 2022).[38]

Hiropoulos (2017b) argues that the negative perception regarding the presence of African immigrants in Gauteng has facilitated the enactment of restrictive policy frameworks and unlawful practices by officials which contribute to the marginalisation and exclusion of African immigrants, making them vulnerable to victimisation at a time when anti-African immigrant sentiment is widespread, accompanied by violent attacks against African immigrants (Hiropoulos, 2017b).

However, due to public objection against the xenophobic attacks of 2008 and 2015, xenophobic violence was widely denounced and its legitimacy as a form of expression was questioned (Solomon, 2018; Special Report, 2015). Despite this, concerns about the high number of African immigrants, especially undocumented African immigrants, remain an everyday conversation in townships, thus, reinforcing the belief that African immigrants are taking opportunities that belong to South Africans (Solomon, 2018; Special Report, 2015).

The presence of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in townships around Gauteng has, therefore, fuelled resentment regarding the unfair opportunities that African immigrants enjoy in townships (Solomon, 2018). The resentment of African immigrants getting opportunities

[38] https://mg.co.za/politics/2022-03-28-operation-dudula-vows-to-continue-drive-against-illegal-immigrants-after-leader-gets-bail/

that supposedly should be reserved for South Africans has attracted more violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses in various townships around Gauteng (Solomon, 2019).

Consequently, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs around Gauteng have decided to conduct informal businesses in specific suburbs of Pretoria instead of various townships in Pretoria for fear of violent attacks against them.

4.2 PRETORIA

Pretoria (City of Tshwane) is the political capital of South Africa (Horn, 2021). It is situated north of Gauteng Province (Horn, 2021). Pretoria was founded in 1855 by Marthinus Pretorius and renamed Tshwane in 2000 (Raper, 2008). Pretoria is an important industrial city in Gauteng. The city is famous for heavy industries that include iron and steel casting. Other manufacturing industries incorporate automotive, railroad and machinery (Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005).

The city comprises the headquarters of South Africa Iron and steel Corporation (ISCOR) which manufactures most steel in South Africa. It is the midpoint of the economy. The economy of Pretoria is dominated by several sectors including government companies, motor vehicles and parts manufacturing industries (Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005). While the city attracts formal small, medium, and big businesses it is also a good environment for informal businesses.[39]

As a result, Pretoria has emerged as a treasury for potential job-seekers because of its ever-growing economy (Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005). Pretoria is chosen as the site of this study because of the following reasons: firstly, Pretoria is the capital city and the seat of the executive branch of government. It is home to many diplomatic missions and embassies including those from Francophone African countries which offer a market for informal businesses that trade on goods from the immigrant countries of origin.

There are also many customers from the working class in Pretoria, which is also a good market opportunity (Magidi & Ahmed, 2019). In addition, the presence of diplomatic missions and embassies in Pretoria is one of the reasons why many African immigrants including Francophone African immigrants are attracted to the city (Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005). MudiOkorodudu (2009) asserts that many African immigrants

[39] https://www.pretoria.com/v/economy

present in Pretoria helps African immigrants to easily build profitable business networks with members of their country of origin and African immigrants from different lingo-cultural backgrounds.

Berger (2006) also claims that the huge social networks of African immigrants in Pretoria help them to provide mutual support to each other (Nkem & Tengeh, 2017). Another reason why various suburbs of Pretoria are chosen as the study area is that the suburbs provide a good business environment for African immigrants (Waiganjo, 2018) as they are considered safer and friendlier than the townships around Pretoria (Waiganjo, 2018). There are also clear sidewalks, large spaces at street corners, available municipal stalls and small shops that are suitable for informal immigrant traders (Marais, 2003).

4.2.1 Historical and Geographical Background of Pretoria

Pretoria is located on the well-watered plains in the Apies River valley about 1 300 m above sea level, situated between the Magalies mountain and Bronberg range (City of Tshwane, 2011). The city has long sidewalks which allow for easy pedestrian movement (Jordaan, 1990). Before the end of apartheid in 1994, despite the presence of sidewalks, informal businesses were not allowed in the city of Pretoria (Pienaar, 2006), however, post-1994, new business opportunities have emerged in terms of the rise of informal businesses along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops throughout the city of Pretoria (Labuschagne, 2006; Pienaar, 2006, 2005).

Informal businesses operate side-by-side with formal ones in Pretoria (Pienaar, 2006, 2005). For example, formal retail shops such as Shoprite operate simultaneously with informal immigrant businesses along various sidewalks and street corners (Labuschagne, 2006; Pienaar, 2006, 2005). This was not the case before 1994 (Labuschagne, 2006; Pienaar, 2006, 2005). In addition, the high rate of unemployment in South Africa has forced many South Africans and African immigrants to frequently become informal entrepreneurs as a countermeasure towards unemployment (Labuschagne, 2006; Pienaar, 2006, 2005).

However, some factors affect the informal immigrant trade in Pretoria. Nshimbi and Moyo (2018), for example, argue that South Africa's unwillingness to extend the freedom of movement that it promotes for goods, capital, and services to the movement of people places constraints on the ease with which informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct business in South Africa. Hirsch (2018) also confirms that South Africa's reservation to the free movement of

people in the SADC, for example, is envisaged through various restrictions in the country's immigration regime.

Even though major changes in the immigration regime took place in 2002 through the replacement of apartheid immigration legislation such as the Aliens Control Act of 1991 (Crush et al. 2006), the change remains discriminatory towards African immigrants (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2018). Even when the 2002 Immigration Act was reviewed and amended in 2007 and subsequently in 2014, it did not make it easier for African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Nshimbi et al. 2018).

This is because the Acts were committed to efficiently processing the permits of immigrants. They simultaneously tightened the condition of entry or stay for African immigrants in South Africa (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019). Furthermore, even the bylaws that regulate informal trade forbid trading in a way that obstructs pedestrian traffic (Killander, 2019; Khuzwayo, 2018). Or in front of residential housing "if the occupier" of the building objects to the trading (Khuzwayo, 2018).

The 2005 Tshwane Street Trading Bylaw for example prohibits street trading in all public amenities and within five metres from any intersection (Killander, 2019).[40] Even the provision of the 2014 bylaws on Informal Trade requests that "No person may conduct informal trade on municipal property without a valid permit from the Municipality" (Killander, 2019; Khuzwayo, 2018).

However, not only does the permit cost money but the permit also limits who can conduct informal trade and where informal trade can be conducted (Rogerson, 2018). Crush et al. (eds.) (2015) argue that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are often refused trade permits to conduct informal business because of the need to protect South African informal traders. African informal immigrants who, therefore, conduct business without a valid permit often suffer extortion from the hands of members of SAPS and the Tshwane Metro Police (Rogerson, 2018).

This is because when African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are caught trading without a valid permit. They are compelled to pay a fine for violating municipal bylaws. In the process, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs sometimes lose their business stock because it is usually confiscated by law enforcement officials (Crush et al. 2017). The lack of valid permits often renders African informal immigrant entrepreneurs vulnerable as they are often perceived

[40] City of Tshwane 'Street Trading Bylaws' (16 March 2005) Gauteng Provincial Gazette 105 LAN 550 s 4.1, 4.8

by ordinary South African citizens as “undocumented immigrants” (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016).

The consequence is that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs easily become victims of violent attacks from ordinary South Africans who consider it their right to attack and chase undocumented immigrants out of the country (Crush et al. 2018). During the violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, the livelihoods of the immigrant entrepreneurs are also destroyed (Handmaker et al. 2011). However, irrespective of the reoccurrence of violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, the number of informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria keeps rising (Crush et al. 2018).

The rise is because of factors like the democratic transition in 1994 that lifted the apartheid restrictions which prevented black South Africans from conducting informal business along sidewalks and on street corners of the city (Pienaar, 2006; Altman, 2006). Hence, after 1994, South Africans are allowed to conduct informal trade along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops in Pretoria (Valodia, 2008; Altman, 2006), coupled with the fact that high youth and graduate unemployment in South Africa and the high rate of unemployment among African immigrants has forced them towards informal business (Oluwajodu et al. 2015).

Notwithstanding, the number of South Africans and African immigrants who conduct informal business in Pretoria is not clear. Even though Masonganye (2010)[41] claims that more African immigrants conduct informal business in Pretoria than South Africans. Figure 4.4, for example, presents a pie chart that shows the proportion of informal traders between South Africans and African immigrants (Masonganye, 2010).

Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of informal traders among South Africans and African immigrants

[41]Masonganye, M. 2010. Street trading in Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality: realities and challenges. Urban Landmark. Retrieved from http://www. Urban landmark. org. za/downloads/report_street_trading_jan2010. pdf, date, 6, p.2015.



Source: (Masonganye, 2010)

The pie chart in Figure 4.4 shows that the proportion of South Africans who conduct informal business is 37%, while that of African immigrants including Francophone African immigrants is 67% (Masonganye, 2010). However, to examine the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria the researcher collected data from six specific suburbs of Pretoria, namely Pretoria CBD, Sunnyside, Arcadia, Hatfield, Capital Park and Gezina. The reason why the researcher selected these suburbs is that many African immigrants and South Africans conduct informal trade in these suburbs with ease as compared to townships around Pretoria (Tewolde, 2021).

In addition, most African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria feel safer conducting informal business in the suburbs of Pretoria than in the townships where frequent violent attacks against African immigrants and their businesses take place regularly (Mamabolo, 2015). Figure 4.3 below is a map showing Pretoria and the six suburbs where the data was collected.[42] However, other reasons why the researcher selected these suburbs as the study area would be explained when presenting the individual suburbs.

Figure 4.5 shows the suburbs where the study was conducted

[42]https://www.sa-venues.com/maps/gauteng_pretoria.htm



Source: https://www.sa-venues.com/maps/gauteng_pretoria.htm

4.3 THE SUBURBS WHERE THE STUDY WAS CONDUCTED

Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attracted to various suburbs where the study was conducted because the suburbs offer easy access from the residence of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to their business locations and the markets where they buy the goods that they retail and to the stores where they stock the goods (Ntema, 2016).

Practically, it is easy to access the business location and residence of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs without incurring any transportation costs (Ntema, 2016), except in a situation where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs need to hire a bakkie to transport the goods they buy from the market to their business location or to the rented storeroom where they stock the bulk of their goods, while they retail in small quantities every day (Ntema, 2016).

4.3.1 Pretoria Central Business District (CBD)

Pretoria CBD is the first study area of this study. The area was selected because it is one of the largest suburbs in Pretoria in terms of the number of people interacting in the space each day (Mavodza, 2016). Pretoria CBD has a total population of approximately 741 651 inhabitants (Mavodza, 2016). African immigrants and South Africans perceive Pretoria CBD as a place of trade with many opportunities (Mavodza, 2016).

As a result, African informal immigrant entrepreneurs sometimes move away from areas with declining economic activities to Pretoria CBD (Mavodza, 2016). The researcher was also able to find a heterogeneous sample of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria CBD which encouraged him/her to choose Pretoria CBD to conduct research. Moyo and Nshimbi (2017) also attest that historically, Pretoria CBD is an area that attracts many people.

Moodley (2019) argues that the large number of people interacting in Pretoria CBD also creates a high frequency in terms of pedestrian movement along sidewalks and street corners, in front of municipal stalls and small shops (Moodley, 2019). The high frequency of pedestrian movement, therefore, helps informal businesses along sidewalks and on street corners to thrive (Moodley, 2019). This is because McLagan (2016), argues that many pedestrians in Pretoria CBD often buy their goods from informal entrepreneurs who conduct business along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops.

However, due to high unemployment in Pretoria, the question of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs has become sensitive in Pretoria CBD, thereby attracting violent attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (Mavodza, 2016).

Figure 4.6: Map showing streets of Pretoria CBD

Source: https://www.sa-venues.com/maps/gauteng_pretoria.htm

Figure 4.6 The streets in Pretoria CBD where the study was conducted.

4.3.2 Sunnyside

Sunnyside is one of the oldest suburbs of Pretoria. The suburb is located east of Nelson Mandela Drive (and the Apies River), which is adjacent to Pretoria Central. The suburb is within walking distance from Pretoria CBD and Arcadia. The streets bordering the suburb of Sunnyside are Walter Jameson and Maple Streets to the East, Francis Baard and Park Streets to the north, Nelson Mandela Drive to the west, and Walker Street to the South (Masonganye, 2010).[43] Before 1994, Sunnyside was a suburb of houses and mansions of white South Africans only (Alpaslan 2011:114).

However, after 1994, the suburb has become all-inclusive with the popular Esselen Street accommodating thousands of African informal immigrant traders. Esselen Street was previously named after Ewald Auguste Esselen, the state attorney of South Africa (1894-1895)

[43]Kleijn, Angie. "Toeka se dae: Digter ontsnap in hoë hakke en kappie – en dis nie al nie". *bronberger.co.za*. Bronberger. Retrieved 14 August 2018

but, as of 2012, the street was renamed after Robert Sobukwe.[44] Sunnyside is also closer to Arcadia and Hatfield.

One advantage of conducting informal trade in Sunnyside is its accessibility to the city centre, thus, enabling one to walk to the city centre and other neighbouring suburbs. Sunnyside has an estimated population of 39 282 (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye, 2010). There is also a high number of people interacting in Sunnyside daily (Moodley, 2019). This, therefore, creates a high frequency of pedestrian movement along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls, and in front of small shops which helps informal trade to thrive (Moodley, 2019).

McLagan (2016) argues that many pedestrians buy goods from informal traders. Sunnyside is also attractive because of dynamics such as long trading hours (because some informal businesses in Sunnyside operate until midnight) (Mawadza, 2008).

Figure 4.7: Map of Sunnyside



Source: www.afrigis (Pty) Ltd. Google

4.3.3 Arcadia

Arcadia is located east of Pretoria CBD (Masonganye, 2010). It is bordered to the south by Francis Baard and Park Streets; to the west by Nelson Mandela Drive; to the north by Proes, Belvedere, and Church Streets; and to the east by Hill Street (Masonganye, 2010).[45]Arcadia is renowned for the presence of diplomatic missions and hotels (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye,

[44]Kleijn, Angie. "Toeka se dae:Digter ontsnap in hoë hakke en kappie – en dis nie al nie". *bronberger.co.za*. Bronberger. Retrieved 14 August 2018.

[45] Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa Vol.7

2010). The official residence of the President of the Republic of South Africa – the Union Buildings is situated in Arcadia (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye, 2010).

The central and western parts of Arcadia are characterised by high-rise buildings, high densities, and mixed land use (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye, 2010). On the eastern side, it has mainly one-story dwelling units on single stands, with a high number of embassies (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye, 2010). There is a huge population of African immigrants in Arcadia even though there is no available data on the number of African immigrants in the suburb.

The high number of African immigrants in Arcadia also allows for a high level of interaction among them in Arcadia daily (Moodley, 2019), thereby creating a high frequency of pedestrian movement along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops as well. Which helps informal trade to thrive (Moodley, 2019). Since, McLagan (2016), claims most pedestrians in Pretoria buy goods from informal traders.

Figure 4.8: Map of Arcadia

Source: www.africabz.com

4.3.4 Hatfield

Hatfield is situated east of Pretoria CBD (Moodley, 2019). Hatfield is home to Loftus Versfeld, Hatfield Plaza and Hatfield Square, the University of Pretoria and LC de Villiers sports grounds (Moodley, 2019; Masonganye, 2010). It is also home to the Gautrain station (Moodley, 2019). Hatfield is bordered to the north by Church Street, to the east by Lynnwood Road and the University sports grounds, and the west by Hill Street (Moodley, 2019). The suburb was established in 1905, as a residential suburb, forming the eastern boundary of Pretoria for several decades.

The establishment of the University of Pretoria in 1908 (the then Transvaal University College) contributed to the development of Hatfield, and by the 1980s-90s, the booming retail sector made the area become a prominent commercial centre outside Pretoria CBD. Burnett Street is the busiest street in Hatfield that attracts a lot of informal businesses. A high number of people including a large student population interact in Hatfield daily (Moodley, 2019).

This offers a large market for informal trade as there is a high frequency of pedestrian movement along sidewalks, street corners, municipal stalls and in front of small shops. This helps informal trade to thrive (Moodley, 2019). McLagan (2016) claims that many pedestrians in the city of Pretoria buy goods from informal traders.

Figure 4.9: Map of Hatfield



Source: SA-Venues.com

4.3.5 Capital Park

Capital Park is another old suburb in Pretoria. The suburb lies approximately 4 km north of the historic Church Square, behind the Pretoria National Zoo. The suburb extends from the Apies River to Voortrekker Street. The streets of the suburb are named after a few mayors of Pretoria (for example, Venter Street, Malherbe Street, Van Heerden Street, and Myburg Street). Capital Park was previously a popular suburb and was dominated by Italian and Portuguese communities.

The residents of Capital Park are predominantly Afrikaans-speaking people.[46] There is also a sizeable number of African immigrants in Capital Park (Moodley, 2019). This also creates a

[46] https://www.sa-venues.com/attractionsga/capital-park.php

high frequency of pedestrian movement along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops in Capital Park during the day, which helps informal trade to thrive (Moodley, 2019). McLagan (2016) posts that many pedestrians in the city of Pretoria buy goods from informal traders.

Figure 4.10 Map of Capital Park



Source: www.africabz.com

4.3.6 Gezina

Gezina is an area that is part of the suburb of Rietfontein in Pretoria. Gezina lies between Voortrekker Road and Michael Brink Street close to Rietfontein in the North of Pretoria.[47] There are a lot of African immigrants conducting informal trade in Gezina. This is because there is a high frequency of pedestrian movement along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops during the day (Moodley, 2019), which helps informal businesses to thrive because pedestrians buy goods from informal traders (Moodley, 2019).

McLagan (2016, attests that many pedestrians in Pretoria buy goods from informal traders.

Figure 4.11: Map of Gezina

[47] https://www.sa-venues.com/attractionsga/gezina.php



Source: www.africabz.com

4.4 DEMOGRAPHY OF PRETORIA

Stats SA (2020) claims that South Africa's 2020 mid-year population was estimated to have increased to 59.62 million in 2020.[48] Approximately 51.1% (approximately 30.5 million) of the population was made up of females (Statistics South Africa, 2020); 63% are of working age; and 49% between the ages of 20 and 49 (Masolane, 2019); 8% above 60 years of age; and 5% above 65 years of age (Masolane, 2019).

Pretoria is home to approximately 3.3 million of the 15.5 million inhabitants (26,0%) in Gauteng (Worku, 2022). The annual population growth of Pretoria is 3% (Worku, 2022).

Figure 4.12: Population growth of the City of Tshwane

[48] https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13453.



Source: (Profile of City of Tshwane, 2020)

Figure 4.12 shows that the growth rate of the City of Tshwane has been declining from 3,3% in 2011 to 2,2% in 2019 (Profile of City of Tshwane, 2020). Figure 4.13 also shows the geographic representation of the population of Gauteng.

Figure 4.13: Geographic representation of the population of Gauteng in 2015



Source: IHS Global Insight, 2015

Figure 4.13 shows that "the City of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni accommodate the largest number of Gauteng's population, accounting for approximately 37% and 26% respectively". Tshwane makes up more than 3 million of the total Gauteng population, accounting for approximately 24% of the province's population. Pretoria has a large government sector (community services) which reflects the presence of National, Provincial, and Parastatals (City of Tshwane, 2020; 2017).

The city is the headquarter of many government departments (Masolane, 2019). The departments provide employment opportunities for thousands of people living in the city (Masolane, 2019:12). Pretoria is one of the most diverse cities in the world because of the presence of a huge number of diplomatic missions (Maphosa, 2019), and a large community of immigrants "in pursuit of opportunities in different areas such as employment, academia and business" (Masolane, 2019:12).

There is, however, no official record of the exact number of immigrants, in general, and African immigrants in Pretoria. Statistics South Africa's mid-year population estimates of Pretoria for 2018 state that Pretoria was expected to receive a net immigration rate of 47.5% between 2016 and 2021 (Stats SA, 2018:1), with the highest number of immigrants coming from other parts of Africa (Stats SA, 2018:1).

4.5 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF PRETORIA

4.5.1 Economic

Pretoria is the fourth-largest municipality in South Africa and the second-biggest in Gauteng. In 2017, the city contributed about 28.4% to the economy of Gauteng and accounted for 10% of the Country's economy (City of Tshwane, 2020). The City's key economic sectors are "government, social and personal services, finance and business services, the automotive industry, wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing" (City of Tshwane, 2017).

The city has prioritised the following sectors: "the automotive industry, tourism and related services, agriculture and agro-processing, manufacturing, and knowledge economy (research and development)" (City of Tshwane, 2011). The City of Tshwane's main economic drivers is community services, finance, trade, manufacturing, and transport.

Table 4.14: Economic structure of municipalities in Gauteng

	City of Tshwane	Ekurhuleni	City of Johannesburg	Sedibeng	West Rand	Total
Agriculture	12,300	9,700	14,300	2,560	4,100	42,985
Mining	47,600	8,070	17,000	9,640	4,130	86,381
Manufacturing	119,000	153,000	244,000	43,400	40,500	600,149
Electricity	5,570	6,130	10,600	1,440	1,190	24,925
Construction	81,600	81,200	136,000	15,200	19,100	333,579
Trade	240,000	257,000	438,000	46,300	61,200	1,042,288
Transport	75,100	90,200	130,000	13,200	20,300	328,870
Finance	269,000	289,000	559,000	37,400	55,100	1,209,073
Community services	290,000	225,000	361,000	38,800	48,300	962,857
Households	83,000	79,600	169,000	15,100	16,300	362,872

Source: (Profile of City of Tshwane, 2020)

Table 4.14 shows that the City of Tshwane municipality recorded the highest employment figures in 2017.

4.5.2 Employment

By 2021, the unemployment rate of South Africa increased beyond 32.6%, with more than 7.2 million people of working age unemployed (Statistics South Africa Stats SA, 2021:1). Pretoria remains a city with a vibrant economy even though in 2017, the unemployment rate of the city was more than 24%, whilst half of the population lived below the minimum poverty level (City of Tshwane, 2017).

However, some economic sectors of Pretoria recorded the highest employment figures in 2017, such as the community services sector, with 290 000 employed people or 23.7% of total employment in the metropolitan municipality (Todes & Houghton, 2021; City of Tshwane, 2020). The finance sector also employs about 269 000 people (22.0% of total employment in Pretoria), which is the sector with the second highest contribution to employment in the city (City of Tshwane, 2020).

The electricity sector employs about 5 570 people or 0.5% of total employment in Pretoria whilst the agriculture sector employs 12 300 people or 1.0% of people employed in Pretoria (City of Tshwane, 2020). The two precedent sectors contribute the least in terms of total employment. Pretoria also has significant community services, finance, and transport (City of

Tshwane, 2020). The sector recorded a 30.2% contribution to the city's revenue in 2017 (City of Tshwane, 2020).

In a nutshell, the five main sectors in 2017 with the highest contribution to employment were community services (30.2%), finance (24.9%), trade (13.1%), manufacturing (11.7%) and transport (11.6%) (City of Tshwane, 2020). However, unemployment in Pretoria remains at more than 50% (Statistics South Africa, 2020; Helliwell, et al. 2019). This is partly due to the 2008 world financial crisis (Helliwell, et al. 2019). Many citizens and immigrants who are unemployed in Pretoria tend towards informal trade to earn an income for themselves (Price, 2020).

The exact number of citizens and immigrants who are in the informal sector is unknown. However, the number of people working in the informal sector, in general, was "166 000 or 13.57% of total employment" (City of Tshwane, 2020). Between 2007 and 2017, the number of people working in the informal sector in Pretoria increased from 144 000 to an estimated 166 000 (City of Tshwane, 2020). Informal traders constitute the highest number of people working in the informal sector with "a total of 67 400 or 40.59% of total informal employment" (City of Tshwane, 2020).

This is because people who do not have formal jobs regard the informal sector as a coping strategy (City of Tshwane, 2020). The preferable circumstance would be to have formal employment, but because the formal sector is not growing fast enough to create sufficient employment for citizens and immigrants, the informal economy is leveraged as a mechanism to survive in Tshwane (City of Tshwane, 2020).

Figure 4.15: Formal and informal sector employment in the City of Tshwane 2011–2015



	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Formal sector	871 086	915 088	945 352	979 268	1 002 505
Informal sector	137 300	137 160	141 709	143 020	150 153
Total employment	1 008 387	1 052 248	1 087 061	1 122 288	1 152 657

Source: IHS Global Insight (2015).

Figure 4.15 indicates that employment (in absolute terms) across the formal and informal sectors in the City of Tshwane is steadily on the rise between 2011 to 2015 (Moyo & Gumbo, 2021; IHS Global Insight, 2015). In 2011, the number of workers in Tshwane was "approximately 1 008 387 and has grown to 1 152 657 in 2015 (Moyo & Gumbo, 2021; IHS Global Insight, 2015).

As one would expect, the largest part of this growth can be credited to growth in "formal sector employment," which grew 871 086 in 2011 and has since increased to 1 002 505 in 2015 (Moyo & Gumbo, 2021; IHS Global Insight, 2015). "Informal sector employment," on the other hand, has increased from 137 300 in 2011 to 150 153 in 2015 (Moyo & Gumbo, 2021; IHS Global Insight, 2015).

4.5.3 Education

The City of Tshwane (Pretoria) is the leading metro in Gauteng on education achievement (City of Tshwane, 2020). The metro has seen improvement in several education indicators, such as the rate of literacy and the number of graduates (City of Tshwane, 2020). The number of people without formal education in the city reduced between 2007 and 2017 by an average annual rate of -1.58% (City of Tshwane, 2020). While the number of people "in the "Matric only" category increased from 533 000 to 802 000" (City of Tshwane, 2020).

The number of people with a "Matric and a certificate/diploma" grew by an average annual rate of 4.35% (City of Tshwane, 2020). While the number of people with a matric and a bachelor degree grew by an average annual rate of 6.2% (City of Tshwane, 2020). According to the City of Tshwane 2018/19 Annual Report, "it is estimated that 90% of all research and development in South Africa is conducted in Tshwane by institutions such as ARMSCOR (the Armaments Corporation of South Africa), the Medical Research Council, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the Human Sciences Research Council and educational institutions such as the University of South Africa, the University of Pretoria and the Tshwane University of Technology" (City of Tshwane, 2020; IHS Global Insight, 2015).

"A total of 2.27 million people (91, 02%) in the City of Tshwane were considered functionally literate by 2017 (City of Tshwane, 2020). While 9% (224 000) were considered illiterate" (City of Tshwane, 2020). The number of people who were considered illiterate decreased on average by -1.18% annually from 2007 to 2017 (City of Tshwane, 2020). While the number of functionally literate people increased at a rate of 3.48% annually (City of Tshwane, 2020).

"The City of Tshwane's functional literacy rate of 91.02% in 2017 is higher than that of Gauteng, at 90.83%, which is higher than the national functional literacy rate of 83.69%" (City of Tshwane, 2020).

Figure 4.16: Highest levels of schooling for the population aged 20 years and older in Tshwane, 2015



Source: IHS Global Insight (2015)

Figure 4.16 shows that the City of Tshwane with the highest number of higher education institutions in South Africa (IHS Global Insight, 2015), boasts the highest percentage of the older population with post-matric qualifications "(approximately 23% in 2015) (IHS Global Insight, 2015). In comparison with the national average (approximately 12%), Gauteng (approximately 18%), Johannesburg (approximately 19%) and Ekurhuleni (approximately 15%)" (IHS Global Insight, 2015).

4.5.4 Built Environment

Pretoria (City of Tshwane) has seven administrative regions (Gxumisa, 2020). Each with its distinctive characteristics (Gxumisa, 2020). These regions are a result of the adoption of the city's "Integrated Development Plan" in 2011 (Gxumisa, 2020). Gxumisa (2020), "The plan allowed for the regionalisation of service delivery to decentralise certain operational and

maintenance functions". While strategic planning remained the responsibility of the departments within the city (Gxumisa, 2020).

Figure 4.17 shows the seven administrative regions of the City of Tshwane.



Source: (Gxumisa, 2020)

Figure 4.17 shows the administrative regions of Pretoria. The suburbs that constitute the study area of this study are in region 3 (Gxumisa, 2020). Gxumisa (2020), argues that 75% and 99% of the urban population in several African countries live in "informal settlements". In the case of South Africa, 12% of urban households live in informal housing, with Gauteng having the highest proportion of 20% (Gxumisa, 2020). These informal settlements are often located in "hazard-prone areas" such as "floodplains" and the population in these settlements tends to grow at a high rate (Gxumisa, 2020).

The City of Tshwane "has over the years shown a sprawling developing pattern, especially along the east and south of Pretoria" (Gxumisa, 2020).

Figure 4.18 shows households in Tshwane by type of dwelling between 2011 and 2015.



Source: IHS Global Insight, Regional eXplorer 1029 (2.5w), 2015

Figure 4.18 presents households in Tshwane by type of dwelling. As shown in the figure, "approximately 78 % of the households in Tshwane were occupying formal dwellings in 2011 and this has improved to 79.7 % in 2015 (IHS Global Insight, 2015). Approximately 20.4 % of the households in Tshwane were occupying informal dwellings in 2011 and this has improved to 18.3 % in 2015" (IHS Global Insight, 2015). Traditional and other types of dwelling made up less than 2% in 2015" (IHS Global Insight, 2015).

This is a consequence of the decentralisation of the private sector from the Central Business District (CBD) into suburbs (Gxumisa, 2020). Thereby "creating basic office nodes in the Metro's municipal area" (Gxumisa, 2020). The displacement of the private sector from the CBD was due to poor public transportation in the city, which led to increasing use of private vehicles (Gxumisa, 2020). As the number of private vehicles driving into the city increased, so did congestion as a result of limited parking space available in the CBD (Gxumisa, 2020).

Furthermore, the cost of renting space in the CBD increased more than in the periphery (Badenhorst, 2002). It therefore encouraged businesses to relocate to the east and south of the city where land was cheaper (Badenhorst, 2002). Therefore, Pretoria East as an economic node grew at an accelerated rate compared to the CBD's relative decline (Badenhorst, 2002). This has attracted more development taking place in the eastern part of Pretoria.

The accessibility of cheaper land and vibrant property market in the 70s and 80s encouraged the movement and development in Pretoria east (Badenhorst, 2002). The construction of the

Menlyn Shopping Centre also saw the relocation of retail, office and other businesses from the CBD to areas around the mall (Badenhorst, 2002). Badenhorst (2009) claims that Menlyn has replaced the CBD as a retail centre for people who live in Pretoria East.

However, "the type of development that continues to occur in the east is that of low density which encourages sprawl" (Badenhorst, 2002). According to Badenhorst (2002), Pretoria East has mostly single-detached housing with stands from about 800 m^2 upwards. The cost of "urban sprawl" in the Metro and its associated low densities need urgent attention. However, due to the limitations in the provision of new bulk infrastructure, the use of existing infrastructure must be maximised (Gxumisa, 2020).

However, the number, size, and structure of households in South Africa have changed remarkably post-apartheid (Jhamba & Mmatli 2016). Through a combination of demographic and lifestyle changes (Jhamba & Mmatli 2016). Even the size and composition of households in the City of Tshwane changed remarkably as a result (Roux & Geyer, 2017). According to the City of Tshwane (2020), "the total number of households within the City is 1 136 876, where 16.4% live in informal dwellings".

The Metro's population increased by 63.0% compared to a population increase of 56.7% in Gauteng and 27.6% in South Africa (Liu, 2018; Roux & Geyer, 2017). The number of households more than doubled (+98.5%) growing at approximately 4.7% per annum compared to 4.3% per annum in Gauteng, and 3.2% per annum nationally (Roux and Geyer, 2017).

The number increased by an average of 3,21% in the City of Tshwane between 2006 and 2016 due to high migration into the city (City of Tshwane, 2020). Migration, both "internal and international" has created increasing urbanisation and the proliferation of informal settlements around the city" (Gxumisa, 2020). Whilst "immigration may result in the revitalisation of cities with a declining population, lack of government involvement in the settlement of immigrants may result in the increasing proliferation of informal settlements" (Gxumisa, 2020; Forbes, 2019:97).

This may lead to challenges such as "lack of proper sanitation, crowded conditions and natural and industrial hazards in various cities" (Gxumisa, 2020). "Planned settlement of immigrants is important for integration and social cohesion" (Gxumisa, 2020; Forbes, 2019:97). Whilst there is no doubt that citizens and immigrants contribute to the economic progress of Pretoria (Gxumisa, 2020; Masolane, 2019). It is, however, the failure of the authorities, both local and national, to manage the negative socioeconomic impacts that have created the prevalent anti-immigrant sentiments in South Africa (Masolane, 2019).

According to Thengela (2020), the high level of unemployment in Africa, coupled with forced displacements as a result of conflict and increased immigration restrictions in Europe have resulted in a high influx of African migrants into South Africa (Thengela, 2020; Tati, 2008).

The influx of migrants into Pretoria has serious socioeconomic impacts that often manifest in the form of "uncontrolled and unplanned human settlement in and around Pretoria" (Gxumisa, 2020).

This often result to increasing "informal settlements, illegal labour practices and tensions" which often lead to violent attacks against African immigrants (Masolane, 2019). Gxumisa (2020) posits, "migration results in specific challenges due to differences between immigrants and citizens." The inability of municipalities to respond to the challenge of migration hinders the possibility of poverty alleviation and results in a lack of "integration and social cohesion" (Gxumisa, 2020).

Cities across South Africa are, however, confronted with the difficulty of addressing the immediate needs of immigrants and responding to the challenges of integration" (Gxumisa, 2020). The fundamental challenge is to strike a balance between addressing the plight of immigrants whilst simultaneously addressing the concerns of citizens regarding the negative impact of migration (Gxumisa, 2020). Often, African immigrants are scapegoated for the failures of local municipalities to deliver quality services to citizens.

Such failure also harms relations between immigrants and citizens, and thwarts every effort to foster integration and social cohesion (Gxumisa, 2020). While migration has an impact on integration and social cohesion, new immigrants do not notably add to the problem (Gxumisa, 2020). Pre-existing socioeconomic deprivation is critical in how locals view their communities. The high level of poverty in various communities is an indicator of lower integration and social cohesion (Gxumisa, 2020).

Such a point of view is supported by findings that demonstrate that "xenophobic attacks are more prevalent in poor areas where there is a lack of socioeconomic opportunities" (Matambo, 2021; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Akinola, 2018). Increased competition between locals and immigrants over scarce resources in communities often results in locals accusing immigrants to be responsible for their poor socioeconomic conditions (Gxumisa, 2020).

Figure 4.19 shows the rate of employment across regions of the City of Tshwane.



Source: (City of Tshwane, 2020)

Figure 4.19 shows that Region 3 where the study was conducted does not have the highest rate of unemployment. This is partly because of the high level of informal business taking place in various suburbs in region 3.

4.6 FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN PRETORIA

The fundamental challenge of African migration to various South African cities is the lack of data that presents the accurate number of African immigrants in various cities. The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) for example, has not succeeded in publishing comprehensive data on the number of African immigrants in South Africa in general (Maseng, 2018). Even the data on the number of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria is difficult to capture because some Francophone African immigrants enter and live in South Africa without documentation (Wotela & Letsiri, 2015).

This poses a serious challenge to know the actual statistics of Francophone African immigrants living in Pretoria or elsewhere. It was estimated that by 2010, about 250 000 Francophone Africans migrated to South Africa (Statistics SA, 2010). Figure 4.20 however, presents an idea of African migration to South Africa which remains on the rise between 1990 and 2017.

Figure 4.20 Trend of African migration to South Africa between 1990 and 2017



Source: International Organization for Migration

Figure 4.20 shows that the number of immigrants living in South Africa since 2000 rose from 1 million to 4 million in 2017 (Maseng, 2018).[49] However, the data does not make a distinction concerning the different categories of immigrants in terms of country or continent of origin. Figure 4.21 which also attempts to show the annual rate of arrival of immigrants to South Africa also does not provide more details regarding various categories of immigrants who arrived in South Africa between 1994 and 20016.

Figure 4.21: Annual rate of immigrants arriving in South Africa between 1994 and 20016

[49] *Business Day*, 25 March 2019. ANC lacks coherent policy for deluge of undocumented migrants.



Source: Community Survey (2016)

Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa states that "everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing (City of Tshwane, 2020).[50] In 2016, "of the Metro's total households of 1 027 413, 694 453 (or 67.59%) had piped water inside the dwelling; 231 258 (22.51%) had piped water inside the yard; and 40 760 (3.97%) households had no formal piped water" (City of Tshwane, 2020). During the Covid-19 pandemic, the City of Tshwane municipality speeded up the provision of temporary water infrastructure to local communities in need, in partnership with the Department of Water and Sanitation and the private sector (City of Tshwane, 2020). The Metro provided 938 mobile and immobile water tanks that supply water to 34 5710 households within 227 informal settlements across the city (City of Tshwane, 2020). These water tanks were provided through coordinated efforts between the CoT, the Department of Water and Sanitation, and private sector donations (City of Tshwane, 2020). Until now, the provision of water to informal settlements through water tankers stands at 438 480 kilolitres (City of Tshwane, 2020).

In comparison with the national and provincial figures, in 2017, the City of Tshwane had 833 818 (81.16%) households that had flush toilets, 25 894 (2.52%) had VIP toilets and 146 439

[50] https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Tshwane-October-2020.pdf

(14.25%) were using pit toilets (City of Tshwane, 2020). Those with pit toilets were mostly in the informal settlements and the rural part of the city (City of Tshwane, 2020). At a regional level, “the region within the city with the highest number of flush toilets was Region 1, with 210 000 or a share of 25.13% of the flush toilets in Tshwane.

The region with the lowest number of flush toilets was Region 5, with 21 100 or 2.53% of total flush toilets in the city” (City of Tshwane, 2020). Looking at the sanitation challenges in Tshwane (the number of households without a hygienic toilet) over time have increased. In 2006, the number of households without a hygienic toilet in the city was 158 000 (City of Tshwane, 2020). It increased annually at a rate of 0.62% to 168 000 in 2016.

Though the city made advances in addressing sanitation challenges in the period between 2009 to 2013, the ongoing increase of households, particularly in informal settlements, as a result of the high in-migration into the region and population growth, has put additional pressure on household infrastructure in the region (City of Tshwane, 2020).

4.7 FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HOUSING

Access to housing is a fundamental human right in South Africa and elsewhere in the world that remains an all-time necessity (Moote, 2022; Martin et al. 2015). Because housing not only provides shelter that is crucial for survival in cases of natural hazards or conflict (Okyere, 2018; Martin et al. 2015). However, the fact that access to housing has a strong impact on health and livelihood options, and shapes whether one feels at home in the city or not (Moote, 2022; Okyere, 2018; Martin et al. 2015). Access to housing is sometimes considered an effective indicator to measure the extent to which poverty has been reduced in the host society (Martin et al. 2015).

In the case of Pretoria, most South Africans live in various townships around the city. Instead of townships, most African immigrants, for fear of being attacked by South Africans, live in various suburbs of Pretoria which offer cheaper housing costs (Martin et al. 2015; Eliseev et al. 2008). However, many people in Pretoria struggle to find decent accommodation due to deprivation (Zukin et al. 2015). Deprivation of shelter that many South Africans experience is due to housing inaccessibility as a result of corruption within South Africa’s housing projects (Manomano et al. 2017).

Corruption adds a constraint to the problem of housing that the country is already facing (Manomano et al. 2017; Ratsatsi, 2010). For example, in 2010, “about 1 910 government officials were arrested over benefiting from the subsidies allocated towards housing

beneficiaries" (Manomano et al. 2017; Ratsatsi, 2010). About 20 housing projects were identified to be lost due to unreliable contracts between contractors and some government officials to the amount of two billion rand (Manomano et al. 2017; Ratsatsi, 2010).

Herrle et al. (2015) mention that the presence of corruption in many housing projects influences the size and space of housing meant for South Africans. Manomano et al. (2017) claim that most "housing projects are one-roomed and very small for privacy and confidentiality, as well as for hygiene". Even the quality of housing material in various cities across the country point to the fact that the houses are usually of poor quality, while the gesture to award housing to South African nationals in need is widely acknowledged in the country (Manomano et al. 2017).

There is also concern about the poor quality of the material used in the construction. The poor material used in housing construction is attributed to the cause of sicknesses such as tuberculosis and other lung infections in housing beneficiaries (Manomano et al. 2017; Majiet, 2013). However, the high demands for housing in South Africa still overwhelm the capacity of various municipalities to provide housing to a high number of South Africans in need (Okyere, 2018; Hirsch, 2005).

In view of the high number of South Africans and African immigrants in need of housing in Pretoria it, therefore, seems as if there is competition between South Africans and African immigrants over limited access to housing in Pretoria. Housing competition has increased the severe housing challenges faced by African immigrants in Pretoria, even though Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa states that "Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing" and the South African Refugees Act (130 of 1998) "guarantees the rights provided in Chapter 2 of the Constitution specifically to refugees" (Okyere, 2018).

However, African immigrants including Francophone African immigrants continue to face significant difficulties in accessing housing in Pretoria.[51] This study establishes that the difficulties of accessing housing that African immigrants in Pretoria face often manifest through discrimination.

Housing discrimination that African immigrants face in the host country is seen in the manner African immigrants under discriminatory immigration laws in South Africa find themselves living and working in specific areas around the city of Pretoria without documentation which, therefore, increases their challenge of not being able to access housing (Markina, 2007).

[51]Kiran Lalloo, "Arenas of Contested Citizenship:Housing Policy in South Africa," Habitat International 23, no. 1 (1998)

Most often, to access housing in Pretoria, one is required to have proof of income or employment (which is always formal employment) as well as South African identification documentation (Markina, 2007). The lack of easy access to housing always makes African immigrants live in overcrowded apartments (De Beer & Smith, 2020). Consequently, African immigrants who live in overcrowded apartments are perceived to be involved in criminal activities (Greenburg & Polzer, 2008). The immigrants are often arrested as a result of suspicion.

4.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a contextual setting of the study area, its historical and geographical background, demographic profile, economic profile, educational profile, access to housing, the built environment, and the key actors of the study. The summary, therefore, shows that the economic activities of Pretoria attracted an influx of internal and international migrants from other parts of Africa (Renkin, 2017).

However, the influx of internal and international migrants has severe socioeconomic consequences. The consequence of the influx often manifests in the form of competition between locals and African immigrants which often results in tensions that lead to violent attacks against African immigrants and their businesses (Masolane, 2019). The situational analysis of Pretoria as the study area, therefore, allows the researcher to establish the most appropriate methodological framework to collect data to understand the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. The next chapter provides the methodological approach used in the study.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters situated this research within a socio-historical context and provided a theoretical foundation for the study. This chapter, therefore, presents the research methodology that is adopted in this study. The research methodology according to Remenyi et al. (1998) is the practical "how" of any given research study. It is more specifically about how a researcher systematically designs a study in order to make sure that the results that address the research aims and objectives are valid and reliable (Remenyi et al. 1998).

For example, how did the researcher go about deciding on what data to collect and what to ignore, from who to collect the data and from who not to, and how to collect the data and analyse it (Remenyi et al. 1998)? In other words, the research methodology provides the principles for organising, planning, designing, and conducting a research study. Radipere (2012) claims research is "a systematic process of collecting, analysing and interpreting data to increase understanding of a particular phenomenon that is being investigated."

The importance of a research methodology is that it emphasises systematic ways of providing answers to research questions (Aden, 2017; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). This chapter, therefore, commences with a brief historical context of xenophobia, and the research paradigm and proceeds to explain the research design suitable for the research methodology employed in the study. The chapter then proceeds to present the sampling techniques and the data collection methods as well as the ethical statement that guides the research procedures and how the data is analysed. In a nutshell, the chapter provides a strong foundation for the next two chapters.

5.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM

A research paradigm is a set of common beliefs and agreements shared between scientists regarding how an issue should be understood and addressed (Dzawanda, 2020; Kuhn, 1970). Lather (1986a:259) attests that "a research paradigm reflects the researcher's beliefs about the world he/she lives in or wants to live in". Other scholars perceive a research paradigm as a human construction that deals with principles "where the researcher is coming from to construct meaning embedded in data" (Omopariola, 2021; Denzin &Lincoln, 2000). The importance of research paradigms is that they provide beliefs and dictate "which researchers in

a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how it should be studied, and how the results of the study should be interpreted."

Several research paradigms have, therefore, been put forward by scholars, but Candy (1989) suggests that all the research paradigms could be placed into three categories, namely; "Positivist, Interpretivist, or Critical paradigms". However, other researchers suggest a fourth paradigm that borrows elements from the three precedent paradigms described as the "pragmatic paradigm" (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003a). However, this study seeks to examine individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

The researcher, therefore, used the interpretivist paradigm as the lens through which individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs can be understood and addressed (Rehman & Alharthi, 2016).

5.2.1 The Interpretivist Paradigm

Interpretivists argue that "the interpretation of the social world following the subjective frame of reference of those being studied is essential" (Rehman & Alharthi, 2016). Therefore, the aim is not merely to narrate or describe the experience of respondents, but also to interpret such experiences in human terms rather than quantification" (Rehman & Alharthi, 2016; Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999:123). The interpretivist paradigm, therefore, emphasises 'rich experiential data,' contrary to the search for "causality" (cause and effect relationship)" (Rehman & Alharthi, 2016).

The interest is not to carefully discover quantifiable measures, but to "synthesise diverging understandings that are illuminated through the combination of different individuals' detailed accounts of a particular issue or event" (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28). Hence, the focus is placed on the subjective accounts of individual experiences in the real world (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28).

The interpretivist paradigm, therefore, enables researchers to understand the subjective world of human experience (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28) as it tries to "get into the head of the subjects being studied", so to speak, and to understand and interpret what the subject is thinking or the meaning he/she is making in a specific context (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28). Hence, every effort of the interpretivist paradigm is determined to comprehend the point of view of the subject that is being studied, rather than the viewpoint of the researcher conducting the study (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28).

The emphasis of the interpretivist paradigm is, therefore, placed on understanding the individual and their interpretation of the world around them (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28). This is because the fundamental precept of the interpretivist paradigm is that reality is socially constructed (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28). The interpretivist paradigm, therefore, validates the point of view that theory does not precede research but follows it so that it is grounded on the data generated by the researcher (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

However, employing the interpretivist paradigm means the data should be collected and analysed in a manner that is consistent with grounded theories (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28). In addition, this study adopted the interpretivist paradigm because it deals with human behaviour which is by its very nature continuously variable, contextual, and subject to multiple interpretations of reality that are not able to reproduce the same results (Mabuto, 2019; Guba 1981).

Notwithstanding, according to Lincoln & Guba, (1985:428), "any research conducted through the interpretivist paradigm exhibits some of the following characteristics: (a) the admission that the social world cannot be understood from the standpoint of an individual; (b) the belief that realities are multiple and socially constructed; (c) the acceptance that there is inevitable interaction between the researcher and his or her research participants; (d) the acceptance that context is vital for knowledge and knowing; (e) the belief that knowledge is created by the findings, can be value-laden and the values need to be made explicit; (f) the need to understand the individual rather than universal laws; (g) the belief that causes and effects are mutually interdependent; and (h) the belief that contextual factors must be taken into consideration in any systematic pursuit of understanding."

Therefore, to understand individuals' experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria the interpretivist paradigm is suitable for the study. This is partly because the interpretivist paradigm assumes that there is no single reality. Therefore, the interpretivist paradigm allows the interpretation of respondents' perceptions in terms of their realities.

In addition, the interpretivist paradigm upholds the view that "knowledge is individually or socially constructed" (Cuthbertson et al. 2019). The paradigm, therefore, allows people to create their reality by the meanings and interpretations they attribute to their experiences (Cuthbertson et al. 2019; Furlong, 2013).

This, therefore, open multiple truths (Furlong, 2013). For example, the quest for answers to questions such as: How are Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs discriminated against while conducting their business in Pretoria? Or what type of harassment

do Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience while conducting their business in Pretoria? makes the interpretivist paradigm to be a suitable paradigm for the study. This is because questions of how and what also inform the type of research design suitable for this study.

There is, therefore, an important relationship that exists between research paradigms, research designs and research methodology. For example, the implication of any research methodology chosen for a specific research paradigm and design often spread into the research questions, participant selection, the data collection instrument, and procedures, as well as the data analysis (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017:26-28).

However, the interpretivist paradigm would ensure that the appropriate research design and methodology are employed to gather and analyse the data (Kerr&Kerr, 2016; Polkinghorne, 1988). The interpretivist paradigm would, therefore, enable the researcher to consider issues like the behavioural aspects of respondents based on their experiences (Sen, 1984). This would help the researcher to describe the reality of participants given the fact that the interpretivist paradigm upholds certain assumptions and beliefs (Remenyi et al. 1998).

The assumptions and beliefs would, therefore, enable the researcher to deal with the context and situation of the research as unique, while taking into consideration the given circumstances associated as well as the respondents involved (Kerr & Kerr, 2016). It would also encourage the researcher to focus on a specific topic and avoid any form of generalisation (Remenyi et al. 1998; Moustakas, 1994).

Furthermore, there are some common qualities that this research study adopts through the interpretivist paradigm which can be summarised as follows:

Firstly, the research is focusing on the whole experience of individuals in terms of the research objectives, rather than considering only a certain part of it.

Secondly, the interpretivist paradigm allows the researcher to explore the depth of the individual experiences through interviews (Makanda, 2016).

Thirdly, human experiences are explored in depth through the adoption of qualitative designs and methodologies.

Fourthly, it enables the usage of the individual experience as a highly important aspect and contribution to support scientific research.

Fifthly, it enables the researcher to further explore in depth throughout individual experiences rather than considering generalised measurements or expectations as given in the positivist paradigm.

Sixthly, individual experiences are largely integrated within subjects and objects leading to valuable findings and insights (Moustakas, 1994).

Based on the qualities that the interpretivist paradigm offers, the researcher, therefore, needs to employ a research design that is more suitable to the interpretivist paradigm (Thanh & Thanh, 2015). In addition, the themes that come up from the interviews are left to the researcher's discretion, to shape and reshape in order to attain a description and interpretation of the phenomenon. This, therefore, allows the researcher to only choose aspects that are considered relevant to answer the research questions under investigation" (Thanh & Thanh, 2015).

The attainment of data in its interpretivist sense means the researcher reads the interviews for what he/she thinks is meant and makes inferences from the data about something outside of the interview interaction itself (Thanh & Thanh, 2015).

5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

Berg (2001) defines a research design as a roadmap/plan that is used when conducting research. De Vos et al. (2004) posit that research design ensures that the pieces of evidence obtained help to answer the research questions. Creswell (2009:3) "advances three types of research designs: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods." This research is a small-scale study of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal businesses around Pretoria.

The intent is to construct an in-depth understanding of their experiences of xenophobia. Given that the number of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria has increased substantially since the end of apartheid in 1994, Pretoria is, therefore, the appropriate location for undertaking this study. The aims and objectives of this study are in line with the research questions that seek to examine how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business and to understand why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked while conducting their business in Pretoria.

The research questions, therefore, require that the lived experiences of the participants are told from their point of view, as they live and interpret them. The use of questions such as "how and why" to achieve the objectives of this study is better understood through descriptive qualitative research design (Creswell & Miller 2003). A descriptive qualitative research design

would, therefore, ensure that the data obtained help to answer the research questions clearly as possible (Aden, 2017; De Vos et al. 2004).

In this case, the researcher approaches the study without any predetermined theory but rather with an open mind to understand individual experiences of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. Creswell and Miller (2003) argue that a qualitative research design is suitable for studies that deal with new topics or topics where theories are limited in the extent to which they can explain the phenomenon.

5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology explains the process employed throughout a research study (Creswell & Miller, 2003; Berg, 2001). Mgogo (2019) and Kothari (2004) claim that the research methodology is a systematic way of solving a research problem. It may be understood as a science to study how research is done in a scientific manner (Mgogo, 2019; Kothari, 2004). The research methodology allows us to study the steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying the research problem along with the logic behind them (Mgogo, 2019) Kothari, 2004).

The key components of the research methodology are the study area, study population, and the sample. This study seeks to examine the individual's experience of xenophobia from the point of view of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, which required an in-depth description of participants' experiences from their perspective. A qualitative approach is, therefore, applied instead of a quantitative approach due to the very nature of the implied assumptions of a quantitative approach, which emphasise quantification, measurability, and replicability.

5.4.1 Qualitative Approach

This study aims to provide a more descriptive understanding of the respondents' lived experiences of xenophobia while conducting their business in Pretoria. A qualitative approach, therefore, seems more appropriate to be adopted in this study. Rahman (2020) and Hoepfl (1997:48) claim that qualitative research is one where the findings are not obtained based on statistical procedures or other forms of quantification.

Donalek and Saldawisch (2007:354) posit that "qualitative research entails a segmented but systematic exploration of human experience that does not concern statistical interpretation but rather the discovery of common emergent themes from an in-depth investigation." The focal

point of the qualitative approach is on “contextual” research and does not champion the discovery of universal “law-like patterns” of peoples’ conduct (as positivists suggest).

The qualitative approach, therefore, seeks to comprehend peoples’ behaviour from the standpoint of those experiencing it (Kelly, 1999:398). A qualitative approach “is value-laden and subjective” (Hoepfl, 1997:60). Researchers who cling to qualitative research argue that “qualitative research could create deeper understanding of social phenomena more than what is achievable through quantitative data collection (Silverman, 2005:32; Babbie et al. 2001:270). This is because there is enough space available for the researcher to probe the complexities that are deeply involved in the meanings people attribute to their social reality.

Several authors affirm that meaning is obtained from an investigation that seeks to understand social events and the way respondents lived them. Interpretive research, therefore, strives to lay hold of respondents' lived experiences from their perspectives.

A qualitative approach is, basically concerned with obtaining meaning and interpretation from respondents’ accounts, suggesting that meaning can be attained through “minimizing the interpersonal distance between the researcher and the participant” (Babbie et al. 2001:270; Barnes, 1992:215; Flick, 2007:2; Shinebourne & Adams, 2007:101; Vishnevsky & Beanlands, 2004:234). Bryman (1988:52) emphasises that “in social sciences, action must be examined from the actors’ perspective and not the researchers.”

The researcher should endeavour “to access the meaning individuals ascribe to their experiences in the social world” (Muller & Glassner, 2004:126), therefore, allowing the exploration of “social phenomena and how they are meaningful in everyday life” (Vishnevsky & Beanlands, 2004:234). The interpersonal attribute of qualitative research, therefore, allows the researcher to study a phenomenon thoroughly, with openness and detail, thereby identifying categories of information that emerge from the data.

This approach is inductive, meaning “it moves from the respondents' perspectives to possible wider themes” (Donalek & Saldwisch, 2004:354; Durrheim, 1999:43). It emphasises exploring various meanings people assign to events in their everyday life, thus appropriate for a study that seeks to enquire into peoples’ experiences. This study seeks to examine how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia while conducting their business in Pretoria.

It is, therefore, vital to get the perspectives of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, and the meanings they attach to their experiences. However, the point is not just to document a descriptive account of their experiences, but to also provide some interpretation. The qualitative approach was, therefore, used due to ‘the ontological, epistemological and

methodological assumptions that guide social inquiry". The respective principles inform us on the "complex nature of reality (ontology), the relationship between the inquirer and the known (epistemology) and how knowledge can be gained from the social world (methodology)" (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:26; Guba & Lincoln, 1998:201).

The ontological assumptions of qualitative research support "a non-statistical, non-measurable and non-abstract nature of the social inquiry" (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:26; Guba & Lincoln, 1998:201). It implies that 'reality is socially constructed by social actors and understood through interaction with these actors" (Schwandt, 1998:223). It suggests that the meaningful components of social reality can be attained through understanding social actors' knowledge, views, interpretations, and experiences of the social world. An interpretivist epistemology, therefore, is more appropriate for the study.

5.4.2 Descriptive Qualitative Case Study

This study adopts a descriptive qualitative case study. This is because "a descriptive qualitative case study is flexible, and the fact that it allows greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction between the researcher and the respondents" (Yin, 2009:69-71), and because "a descriptive qualitative case study provides the researcher with an opportunity to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 2009:69-71). Mayring (2000) states that "a descriptive case study describes the phenomenon in which real life context occurs".

Yin (1984:23) describes a descriptive case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". Creswell (1994) and Yin (1984:15) attest that a research study can adopt exploratory and descriptive research designs in the same study (Creswell, 1994; Yin, 1984:15).

However, since the research questions of this study focus on answering how, what, who and why questions, a descriptive case study would, therefore, help to clearly describe the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. This is because questions that consist of how what, who, and why give contextual detail of human behaviours (Guba & Lincoln, 1989:300).

In addition, a descriptive qualitative case study states facts as it allows respondents to tell their stories in their own words (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). By telling their stories in their own words the respondents can describe their views of the reality of the phenomenon under investigation

(Crabtree & Miller, 1999). This, therefore, assist the researcher to understand the respondents' narrative better (Lather, 1992:87-92), thus, providing rich data for theoretical and practical use (Boeije, 2010:11; Babbie & Mouton, 2001).

This is because a descriptive qualitative case study involves in-depth research on individuals or groups that may lead to a theoretical formulation that may widen the scope of the study of a particular phenomenon.

5.4.3 Population

O'Leary (2010) defines population in research as people who are being studied. Gravetter and Forzano (2012) claim a population sample is a group of people who are selected from a given population to participate in a research study. The research population in this study is Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria who currently conduct informal businesses along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls, and in front of small shops in various suburbs of Pretoria, which constitutes the study area of research (Stangor, 2011).

The researcher had established contacts with more than 100 Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria in a different study that was conducted in July 2019 on Francophone African migrants in Pretoria. The majority of these Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conduct informal trade around Pretoria CBD, Sunnyside, Arcadia, Hatfield, Gezina, and Capital Park.

The researcher, therefore, revisited these Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneurs at their business location and followed up through multiple phone calls to re-establish and maintain contacts. This helped the researcher to make appointments for a physical meeting to explain the intention of this study before booking a further appointment to conduct interviews if the respondents agreed to take part in the study.

5.4.4 Sampling

According to Turner (2020), sampling in research is the selection of a subset of the population of interest in a research study. In most research endeavours, the participation of an entire population of interest is not possible. Therefore, a small group is relied upon for data collection (Turner, 2020). This makes data collection more practical as it allows the data to be collected faster and at a lower cost than when attempting to reach every member of the population (Turner, 2020).

However, considering the nature of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria in terms of the diversity of Francophone African countries and the precarity involved in African migration to South Africa, the focus on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are permanent residents in South Africa would be misleading as far as the aim and objectives of this study are concerned. Despite this, it presents a realistic picture of how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs encounter xenophobia while conducting their business in Pretoria.

The researcher engages Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs beyond residential or immigration status. This is because the researcher intends to rely first and foremost on primary data to deeply understand the phenomenon under investigation as there is limited knowledge on the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria as a category of analysis.

5.4.4.1 Sampling Procedures

This study adopted a non-probability sampling technique to recruit the respondents of the study. Non-probability sampling is a branch of sample techniques that uses non-random ways to select a group of people to take part in a research study (Acharya et al. 2013) and it does not focus on accurately representing all the members of a large population within a smaller sample group of participants (Acharya et al. 2013). As a result, not all members of the population have an equal chance of participating in the study.

The researcher used a non-probability technique because Yin (2003) and Maxwell (1996) attest that non-probability sampling is convenient with descriptive research design which focuses on small samples to have an in-depth understanding of a real-life phenomenon without making statistical inferences concerning the wider population. Morgan and Sklar (2012:72-80) argue that “non-probability sampling is frequently used in research when the study aims to create an in-depth description of the phenomenon under investigation rather than generalising the findings”.

The researcher, therefore, successfully used convenience or purposive non-probability sampling techniques to recruit respondents for the study. Palys (2008:697-698) states purposive sampling is “a selective choice of who to participate in the study”. Babbie and Mouton (2004) posit purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling is “based on the researcher’s personal choice regarding the characteristics of the respondents that are considered by the researcher to have the knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation”.

In other words, in purposive sampling, the subjects are selected owing to some characteristics that they have that are relevant to the study. Through this technique, the researcher, therefore, selects the participants in line with the objectives of the study. Bless et al. (2006:106) claim that "purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling is good because it is used where participants are grouped by preselected criteria relevant to specific research questions".
Given (2008) affirms that to engage in purposive sampling, the researcher sees sampling as a series of strategic choices with whom, where, and how the study can be done. Given (2008) further mentioned that purposive non-probability sampling is also used based on a theoretical saturation of the data, or a point in data collection when new data no longer bring additional insights to the research questions.

5.4.4.2 The Sample Size

The sample size refers to the number of participants involved in a study (Sim et al. 2018). The scope of the sample size of this study is how 30 Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria from as diverse backgrounds and statuses as possible experience xenophobia while conducting their business. According to Creswell (2011:207), "there is no "right" sample size in qualitative research, which generally uses small samples to obtain rich data on various phenomena."
Cohen (2000:12), therefore, argues that "the number of participants in a sample is usually related to saturation, that is the point where there is enough data available to provide "a complete description of the phenomenon under study."

5.4.4.3 Respondents of the Study

Francophone African immigrants who conduct informal business in Pretoria CBD, Sunnyside, Arcadia, Hatfield, Capital Park, and Gezina are the respondents of this study. However, South African officials lack comprehensive data on the number of Francophone African immigrants in South Africa including those who are conducting informal trade along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls, and in front of small shops in Pretoria.
Before the 1996 census, some researchers and analysts relied on samples that were not comprehensive to understand the experience of xenophobia among African immigrants in South Africa, in general (Renkin, 2017; Kok et al. 2003:1). However, in post-apartheid South Africa, several studies that are conducted on the experience of xenophobia among African

informal immigrant entrepreneurs often treat the experience of Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone African immigrants in the same context.

Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs may experience xenophobia differently from Anglophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs due to language barriers in the host country where English is dominant (Kok et al. 2003:1). Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria come from Francophone African countries where French is the dominant language, such as Algeria, Burundi (about 2 000 immigrants as of 2001), Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (about 7 700 immigrants as of 2001), Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal (about 4 500 immigrants as of 2001), Tunisia, Togo and others (Fransen & de Haas, 2019; Schoumaker et al. 2015; Casale & Posel, 2006; Crush et al. 2005:1; Mazrui, 2004:54).[52]

The fact that French is used as a medium of communication in Francophone African countries may shape their experience of xenophobia from that of Anglophone African immigrants who do not experience the same level of the language barrier in Pretoria. Mazrui (2004:6) also argues that the high degree of lingo-cultural dependence on French in Francophone African countries may alter their experience from the experience of other categories of African immigrants. This, according to Garuba (2001:8), is evident in how African immigrants from Francophone African countries are connected through the French language they share.

Despite the huge diversity in Francophone Africa in terms of the number of Francophone African countries (Garuba, 2001:8) it is also important to research the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs' country-specifically. This would allow for a broader comparison of the experience of xenophobia beyond lingo-cultural grouping.

However, the sample size of the study does not claim to answer how all Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general experience xenophobia while conducting their business in Pretoria as this would not be an agent-sensitive question. The researcher, therefore, used purposive non-probability sampling to recruit 30 respondents to participate in the study.

Table 5.1 A description of sample size according to the study area

[52] Francophone African immigrants are nationals from African countries that were former French colonies. The governments of these countries have adopted French as the official language (Bouillon/Morris 2001:19). The use of French as the lingua franca in government, judiciaries, legislatures, or academia labels these countries Francophone. Such categorisation is enhanced by the degree and the nature of the lingo-cultural dependence of their societies on French language (Mazrui, 2004:6).

Study Area	Pretoria CBD	Sunnyside	Arcadia	Hatfield	Capital Park	Gezina
Number of Respondents interviewed per study area/suburb	07	07	06	05	02	03
Type of interview conducted	Face-to-face in-depth interviews	Face-to-face in-depth interviews	Face-to-face in-depth interviews	Face-to-face in-depth interviews	Face-to-face in-depth interviews	Face-to-face in-depth interviews

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

Table 5.1 presents the number of respondents who participated in the study per study area or suburb, and the nature of the interview conducted. Among the 30 respondents, 07 were interviewed in Pretoria CBD, 07 in Sunnyside, 06 in Arcadia, 05 in Hatfield, 02 in Capital Park and 03 in Gezina.

The disparity in terms of the number of respondents per study area is because, during the fieldwork, the researcher observed that there is a high concentration of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria CBD. Capital Park stands out as the suburb with the least concentration of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face.

Table 5.2 (see Appendix G) provides more detail by showing the number of respondents, the nature of informal trade, the number of years conducting informal trade and the suburb where each respondent was interviewed. The table further shows that the least number of years that respondents have been conducting informal trade around Pretoria is two years (specifically respondent No 24 who conducts informal trade along sidewalks in Hatfield), while the highest number of years respondents have been conducting informal trade is 13 years (specifically respondent No 20 who conducts informal business in a small shop in Arcadia).

5.5. RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

A research instrument is a tool that is used in research to obtain, measure, and analyse data from subjects around the research topic (Hernández & Barrera, 2018). This study adopted a qualitative data collection method to collect relevant data that would answer the research questions. The data was collected with the help of a questionnaire with semi-structured in-depth open-ended questions. The interview sessions were recorded and where possible, notes were made.

5.5.1 Questionnaire

A questionnaire is a list of questions or items used to collect data from respondents about their attitudes, experiences, beliefs, or opinions (Hayhow et al. 2002). The questionnaire used in this study had semi-structured open-ended questions which allows for greater flexibility where the interviewer was able to start an interview with a defined question. It then shifted to follow the natural flow of the interview (O'Leary, 2010). The questionnaire guided the researcher to direct the interview in a way that the objectives of the study are achieved (O'Leary, 2010).

Hancock and Algozzine (2006) posit that interviews can be "structured, semi-structured or unstructured". Semi-structured interviews, for example, are well-suited for qualitative case studies (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). This is because conducting a semi-structured interview with open-ended questions with the use of an interview guide enables the researcher to ask predetermined but flexible-worded questions.

In addition to asking predetermined questions, the researcher is allowed to ask follow-up questions to probe the respondent so that he/she goes deeper into the phenomenon and elaborates more on their answers. In this manner, the respondents expressed themselves openly and freely, while defining the phenomenon from their perspectives instead of the perspective of the researcher. The semi-structured questionnaire enabled the researcher to observe and address the contrast that existed in the verbal and non-verbal communication of the respondents to get clarity on their actual thoughts on the given phenomenon (O'Leary, 2010) since this study seeks to understand the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

The questions in terms of the objectives of the study primarily focused on the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the process of buying, selling, or stocking goods or business items, or when using commuter taxis or public transport to go buy, sell, or stock goods or business items or when using financial services to deposit or withdraw money related to informal business transactions.

The semi-structured open-ended questions that the researcher asked the respondents were all in line with the objectives of the study which constitute the themes in the data analysis chapter; Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and discrimination; harassment of immigrants and immigrants' conduct of business; perpetrators of xenophobic attacks and immigrants' conduct of business; why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs

are attacked while conducting their business; (see questionnaire of interview questions in Appendix F).

The questions sought to establish whether Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against in Pretoria while conducting their business, or not. The answers to the questions were obtained through in-depth interviews.

5.5.2 In-depth Interviews

An in-depth interview is an open-ended, discovery-oriented means to gather detailed information about a research topic (Wastiels & Wouters, 2012). The goal of in-depth interviews is to explore in-depth the respondents' points of view, experiences, feelings, and perspectives. In-depth interviews as a means of data collection enabled the researcher to attain rich, personalised information (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).

However, to conduct a successful in-depth interview, the researcher must first identify respondents with deep knowledge related to the phenomenon under investigation. The researcher must also obtain permission to interview the respondents (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). The respondent must not be deceived by the researcher regarding the purpose of the research (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).

In this study, the 30 Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs that were interviewed in various suburbs of Pretoria chose places where they were more comfortable offering information regarding the phenomenon under investigation. Due to the Covid-19 lockdown regulations, the individual respondents selected a place of their choice following the lockdown regulations. The respondents also agreed that the in-depth interviews should be recorded.

However, even though gender is not a criterion for participating in the study, the researcher understands its importance in contemporary studies and proceeded to interview 18 males and 12 females who conduct informal trade in six suburbs in Pretoria. The disparity in terms of the number of males and females in this study is because the researcher relied on purposive sampling (non-probability sampling) where the choice of who to interview was made by the researcher (Palys, 2008).

In other words, purposive sampling involves preselected criteria relevant to the interest of the study. The researcher, therefore, relied on his judgment to select members of the population who have deep knowledge of the subject to participate in the study (Dowla et al. 2020). Moreover, other studies have shown that more males from other African countries are more

likely to immigrate to South Africa than females due to the uncertain and exploitative conditions of African immigration to South Africa (Machinya, 2020; Isike, 2017; Posel, 2006; Dodson, 2001).

However, since this is a case study of purposely sampled respondents, the gender issue should not be taken to represent the immigration patterns to South Africa. The researcher recommends that further research is undertaken to explore the gender profile of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, and how gender affects their economic involvement and experience in informal trade.

All the respondents claim that they have personally experienced xenophobia while conducting their businesses. Most of the respondents were between the age of 25 to 40 years, except for two males and one female who were between 45 and 57 years. However, the study does not consider age, gender, marital status, or duration of living in South Africa, for example, as criteria for participation. It only considers Francophone Africans who were conducting informal business in various suburbs of Pretoria during the fieldwork and have personally experienced xenophobia while conducting their business.

Therefore, the researcher did not consider age, gender, or duration in South Africa in order not to exclude Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs with experience of xenophobia that can help to achieve the objectives of the study. The in-depth-interview were, therefore, conducted by asking a maximum of 40 open-ended questions (10 questions per research objective) with the help of an interview guide (see interview questionnaire in appendix F).

The respondents were given a choice to respond to the questions in either English or French. Lofland and Lofland (1996:183-203) state that "When respondents are given the opportunity to respond in the language of their choice, they evoke responses that are salient". A translator was not needed during the in-depth interviews because the researcher speaks and writes English and French fluently.

However, all the respondents chose to answer the interview questions in English, but in some instances, they would add a few words in French to be more explicit. They individually agreed to participate in the in-depth interviews at their residences because of the fear of contracting Covid-19 outside their residences, and because of various lockdown regulations that dissuade outdoor gatherings. In addition, both the respondents and researcher agreed to always uphold strict Covid-19 regulations in terms of the wearing of face masks and social distancing.

The 30 individual in-depth interviews were successfully conducted during the fieldwork. During the fieldwork, the interviews provided space for a one-to-one discussion, which made

the data more trustworthy and specific. The one-to-one discussions, therefore, "gave the researcher a chance to collect useful data which made the interviews a fulfilling experience for both the respondent and the researcher. It also guaranteed success to a large extent" (White, 2002:33).

Since the respondents answered all the research questions in every single interview. The researcher also frequently asked questions like "how" and "why" to allow respondents to elaborate more on their responses. Each interview lasted a total of 1 hour. All 30 interviews were conducted over three months, from November 2021 to January 2022. The interviews were recorded with an audio tape recorder for the data collected to be transcribed. The data were transcribed and organised into meaningful patterns to provide meaning to information obtained from the respondents (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005:1277-88; Marshall & Rossman, 1999:150).

After transcribing the data, the data were compressed into fewer categories based on explicit rules of coding (Nieuwenhuis, 2016:111). Themes that pattern across the data sets that are important to the description of the phenomenon under investigation, and those that are associated with specific research questions were used. This allowed the researcher to understand the potential issues descriptively (Boyatzis, 1984:4).

Namey et al. (2008:137-161) state that using themes goes beyond counting explicit words and focuses on describing implicit and explicit ideas. The data was then divided into significant analytical units. The researcher familiarised himself with the content by reading it over and over. Once the researcher got the key themes, he proceeded to interpret the data to make sense of the findings. The results of the findings were then analysed and interpreted to fulfil the objectives of the study and answer the research questions, as presented in Chapter 1.

5.6 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD

Marshall and Rossman (1999:150) define data analysis as "a systematic way of organising data, and arranging the data organised into meaningful patterns and categories". The researcher adopted content analysis as suggested by Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1277-1288). Content analysis is defined as "systematic replicable techniques for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding" (Nieuwenhuis, 2016:111).

Themes that are patterns across data sets, which are important to the description of a phenomenon and are associated with a specific research question, are used, thus, given an opportunity to understand the potential issue investigated widely (cf. Boyatzis, 1984:4). Namey

et al. (2008:137-161) posit that "using themes goes beyond counting explicit words and focuses on describing implicit and explicit ideas".

The first step that the researcher took to analyse the data collected was to transcribe the interview recordings verbatim (Terre Blanche et al. 2006). The transcribed data was then read word by word over and over and was divided into significant analytical units. The researcher then familiarised himself with the content by repeatedly reading the text. Once the researcher got all the keywords and themes, he moved into the second step which is to link the themes to the descriptions of the respondents' experiences in line with the research questions (Ritchie & Lewis, 2005).

The third step is to categorise the keywords with the themes to code the themes (Terre Blanche et al. 2006). The fourth step is to review the coded themes and to check if the themes are related to the coded extracts (Terre Blanche et al. 2006). Hencce, the final step is to link the transcriptions to the research questions and existing theories to make sense of the data, after which data would then be organised and interpreted to report the results.

In addition, it is important to note that the analysis and interpretation of the findings of this study are from the instruments and procedures mentioned earlier in this chapter. The researcher, therefore, proceeds to present the data according to the method used, and then the interpretation of the data to answer the research questions (see research questions outlined in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1).

The questions help to get a deep understanding of the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. The research, therefore, proceeds to present an analysis of the data gathered from the in-depth interviews of 30 Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the subsequent chapter.

However, the small-scale nature of the case study is because Creswell (2011:207) argues that qualitative research generally uses small samples to obtain rich data on a phenomenon. The researcher is, therefore, confident that the findings could indicate how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business.

5.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

5.7.1 Validity

The researcher considered four constructs to enhance the validity and reliability of this study. These are credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability. Credibility is the qualitative equivalent of internal validity in research and seeks to ensure that the study measures or tests what is intended (Shenton, 2004). This was enhanced through the proper selection of respondents who are Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct business in any of the five suburbs of Pretoria that constitute the study area. This is to ensure that the researcher gets a true reflection of their experiences.

5.7.2 Reliability

(a) Dependability is the equivalent of reliability which means that if the work were to be repeated in the same context, with the same methods and the same respondents, similar results would be obtained (Shenton, 2004). Dependability was ensured by providing detailed information that describes the experiences of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

(b) Confirmability is to confirm that the researcher was not subjective in reporting the findings; hence, no bias or personal motivation was done to twist the respondents' responses. Therefore, confirmability was achieved through an audit trail (Anney, 2014) where the researcher provided a detailed explanation of the whole process that includes data collection and analysis, up to the final thesis.

(c) Transferability is the demonstration that the results of the findings can be applied to a wider population (Shenton, 2004). Transferability would be enhanced by ensuring a comprehensive description of the data to apply to the general population of the study.

5.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study adhered to the following ethical considerations:

5.8.1 Ethical Clearance

Since this study involved human subjects, there is a need to protect them. According to Orb et al. (2001), the protection of human subjects through the application of appropriate ethical principles is important in any research study. In a qualitative study, ethical considerations have

a particular resonance due to the in-depth nature of the study process (Orb et al. 2001). The study was, therefore, conducted in line with the University of Pretoria's professional research code of ethics.

The researcher submitted an ethics application to the University of Pretoria's Research Ethics Committee. An ethics clearance certificate was obtained with reference number 15402071 (HUM043/0720), amended with reference number 15402071 (HUM043/0720 Line 1) (Amendment) (see Appendices A and B).

5.8.2 Voluntary participation

The respondents were informed that participation in the study was voluntary. This means that under no circumstances did the researcher force anyone to take part in the study. Voluntary participation in a research study entails that the respondents are free to withdraw from taking part in the study at any time and at any stage of the research process (McLaughlin, 2007).

5.8.3 Informed Consent

The researcher provided an informed consent form with detailed information that the respondents can easily understand so that they may choose to take part or not, knowing the risks and benefits associated with being part of the study (see Appendix A). According to Gravetter and Forzano (2012), the principle of informed consent requires the investigator to provide all available information about a study so that an individual can make a rational, informed decision to participate in the study.

The letter of informed consent was, therefore, approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Pretoria, and was presented to the respondents during the interviews in which the respondents' role was explained in detail.

5.8.4 Confidentiality

The researcher kept the respondents' information private by protecting their identity such that the information shared would not be linked to respondents. The information was not divulged to any other person except the supervisor and it was only used for research purposes. Gravetter and Forzano (2012) state that confidentiality is a practice of keeping strictly secret and private information or measurements obtained from an individual during a research study.

5.8.5 Anonymity

The researcher ensured that the information given was not attached to a specific respondent's name; hence, pseudonyms such as Respondent no 1, no 2, and no 3 were used to identify the respondents. This is supported by Strydom and Bezuidenhout (2014) who affirm that "anonymity is the cornerstone of research ethics in that respondents should be offered the opportunity to have their identity hidden in a research report".

The respondents were assured of their anonymity regarding their voluntary participation using pseudonyms and their rights to withdraw at any stage of the study without any prejudice against them (Strydom & Bezuidenhout, 2014).

5.8.6 Reflexivity

In some cases where respondents use a phrase or two in French when responding to the interview questions, the researcher translated the phrase(s) into English. To mitigate the possible loss of deep meanings, back-to-back translation was used. In the case of a withdrawal from the interview, the researcher did a chain referral to retain a cohort of 30 respondents. The respondents were also informed that the study would be available to them in case they needed to review the collected data and the findings.

They were also informed that the data would be stored for 15 years in the University of Pretoria archives. Written permission to conduct interviews with the respondents indicated in the primary data sources was sought from them before the interviews. Where necessary, the researcher explained and clarified in advance to the respondents the objectives of the research, in general, and the interview. The researcher endeavoured to live by his promise to treat all information provided by participants as confidential.

Getting information from Francophone African immigrants from Chad was complicated at first due to the sensitivity of the topic and thus for this reason the researcher had to reassure them that the study was purely for academic purposes. In addition, by my name and background, I will be regarded as a Cameroonian. Cameroon is officially regarded as a Francophone African country because 80% of its population is French-speaking. While residing in Pretoria, I am considered a Francophone African immigrant.

However, care was taken to avoid personal bias. In this regard, the researcher tried to be as neutral and scientific as possible as guided by the ethics of research methodology (Ormston et al., 2014). The researcher also reflected constantly on the objectives of the study and kept

detailed records of the interview (Ormston et al., 2014). This helped the research to be honest when reporting the findings (Ormston et al., 2014).

5.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The principal limitation of this study is the fact that the scope of its scientific claim is limited to a case study based on interviews of 30 respondents that might not cover the diverse nature in terms of the nationality of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, as well as diversity in terms of the nature of the informal business that they conduct. In addition, the two focus group discussions that would comprise 10 and 15 respondents who have taken part in the individual interviews did not take place as planned.

The reason the focus group discussions did not take place is that during the time of data collection from November 2020 to January 2021, the government of South Africa prohibited all forms of gathering under Covid-19 lockdown regulations. This made it impossible for the focus group discussions to be conducted. However, O'Reilly and Parker (2013) point out that in qualitative research, the sufficiency of sample size is measured by the depth of data rather than the sample size. Moser and Korstjens (2018) also argue that in qualitative research the sample size does not matter. The most important criterion is the availability of enough in-depth data. Hennink and Kaiser (2022) supporting the previous point of view, attest that small sample sizes are effective for qualitative research. Despite this, the study does not claim to answer all questions regarding the individual experiences of xenophobia of all Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria as this would not be an agent-sensitive question.

Time constraints also arose for respondents to set out time for the interviews as a result of Covid-19 regulations. To overcome time constraints, the researcher was flexible to avail himself at any time and place chosen by the respondents under alert level 1 when most normal activity resumed with precautions and health guidelines followed at all times.

5.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented a discussion of the research methodology employed throughout the study. The primary aim of the study was defined, that is, to examine the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal businesses in various suburbs of Pretoria. The research question and secondary objectives were pointed out. The qualitative research approach and case study design were discussed in terms of their strengths and relevance to the study.

The purposive sampling technique was used to draw a sample of 30 respondents from the population of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs operating within five suburbs in Pretoria. The method of data collection, that is the in-depth interviews and the thematic method of data analysis, and how these were utilised, was articulated. The chapter also presents how the validity and reliability of the research are ensured. The chapter concludes with the ethical considerations that were considered during the research process.

The next chapter is, therefore, the presentation of the research findings, discussion, and analysis of the findings with the integration of literature that confirms or contests the findings of the study.

CHAPTER 6

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and analyses the data collected during the fieldwork. According to Keller and Trendelenburg (eds.) (2019), data presentation is the process of using textual, tabular, or diagrammatic formats to represent the relationship between two or more data sets. While data analysis, according to Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2003), is the process of cleaning, changing, and processing raw data, and extracting relevant information that helps to answer the research objectives/questions (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2003).

Marshall and Rossman (1995:111) also point out that "in data analysis, the researcher attempts to bring order and meaning to the data collected." The process, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005:201), "involves various efforts to transform raw data from the interviews into 'evidence-based interpretation'". Data analysis, therefore, "entails the search for recurring statements and underlining themes" (Rubin & Rubin, 2005:201).

In addition, "qualitative data analysis does not entail the provision of numeric summaries as would be done in a quantitative study, but the discovery of variations, the construction of meaning and the examination of complexities in the data" (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:202). It is applied through systematic reflection on the complexity of human experiences by reporting social phenomena in the words of those who are being studied. This requires "the application of inductive analysis which involves the discovery of patterns, themes and categories by interacting with the data" (Patton, 2006:453).

However, this study aimed to examine the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. The researcher, therefore, presented the data according to the method and then analyse the data to answer the research questions (see research questions in Chapter 1), therefore, to examine how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, encounter xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their businesses, the research would first present the data and then analyse it. However, before doing that, it is important to have a comprehensive demography of the respondents of the study.

6.2 DEMOGRAPHY OF RESPONDENTS

Table 6.1: Country of origin, Sex, Age, Marital status, Language spoken, Level of education, Immigration status and Monthly income of respondents

Respondent	Country of origin	Sex	Age	Marital status	Language spoken	Level of education	Immigration status	Monthly income earned from informal trade
1	DR Congo	M	44	Married	French and Pende	University Degree	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
2	Côte d'Ivoire	M	37	Married	French and Guéré	Tertiary	Expired study permit	R1000 – R5000
3	Cameroon	F	33	Single	French and Bulu	Secondary	Expired work permit	R1000 – R5000
4	Mali	M	35	In a relationship	French, and Bambara	Secondary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
5	Côte d'Ivoire	F	39	Married	French and Yacouba	Secondary	Expired visitor's visa	R1000 – R5000
6	Cameroon	F	40	Single	French and Fang	Tertiary	Expired Student permit	R1000 – R5000
7	Côte d'Ivoire	M	36	Married	French and Attié	Tertiary	Asylum Seeker	R5000 – R10000
8	DR Congo	F	45	Married	French and Kikongo	Tertiary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
9	Cameroon	F	36	In a relationship	French and Bassa'a	Tertiary	Life partner permit	R1000 – R5000
10	Congo-Brazzaville	M	48	Married	French and Kituba	Secondary	undocumented	R1000 – R5000
11	Cameroon	M	34	Single	French and Mbouda	Tertiary	Study permit	R1000 – R5000
12	DR Congo	F	39	Married	French and Lingala	Secondary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
13	DR Congo	M	40	Married	French and Kikongo	Tertiary	Asylum status	R5000 – R10000
14	Burundi	M	37	Single	French and Kirundi	Tertiary	Expired visitor's visa	R5000 – R10000
15	Burkina Faso	M	29	Single	French and Moore	Tertiary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
16	Senegal	F	38	Married	French and Wolof	Tertiary	General work permit	R5000 – R10000
17	Benin	M	48	Married	French and Fon	Tertiary	Undocumented	R5000 – R10000
18	Togo	F	40	Married	French and Kabiyè	Tertiary	Undocumented	R1000 – R5000

19	Gabon	M	37	Married	French and Fang	Secondary	Study visa	R1000 – R5000
20	Tunisia	M	50	Married	French and Berber	Tertiary	Permanent residence	R1000 – R5000
21	DR Congo	F	28	Single	French and Tshiluba	Secondary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
22	Senegal	M	35	Single	French and Wolof	Secondary	undocumented	R1000 – R5000
23	Burundi	M	42	Divorced	French and Swahili	Secondary	Asylum seeker	R1000 – R5000
24	Congo-Brazzaville	F	30	Single	French and Kongo	Secondary	Study visa	R1000 – R5000
25	Mali	F	50	Widow	French and Bambara	Secondary	Expired business permit	R1000 – R5000
26	Guinea Conakry	M	30	Single	French and Susu	Tertiary	Expired study visa	R1000 – R5000
27	Chad	F	29	Single	French, Arabic and Sara	Tertiary	Expired visitor's visa	R1000 – R5000
28	Chad	M	33	In a relationship	French and Sara	Tertiary	Life partner permit	R1000 – R5000
29	Algeria	M	50	Married	French and Tamazight	Tertiary	Business visa	R5000 – R10000
30	Burundi	M	27	Single	French and Kirundi	Tertiary	undocumented	R5000 – R10000

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

Table 6.1 presents the country of origin, sex, age, marital status, language spoken, level of education, immigration status and monthly income of respondents. The table shows that most of the respondents are asylum seekers. More studies should, therefore, be conducted to understand whether most Francophone African immigrants in South Africa are asylum seekers and if so, why?

However, from Table 6.1, among the 30 respondents, 05 originate from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 04 from Cameroon, 03 from Côte d'Ivoire, 03 from Burundi, 02 from Congo Brazzaville, 02 from Chad, 02 from Mali, 02 from Senegal, 01 from Algeria, 01 from Benin, 01 from Burkina Faso, 01 from Gabon, 01 from Guinea Conakry, 01 from Togo, 01 from Tunisia.

The gender distribution of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, in this case, study reflects more male (M) respondents (18) than female (F) respondents (12). Since this is a case study in which the respondents were purposely sampled, the gender distribution should not be taken to represent the migration patterns to South Africa. As a result, further research is

needed to explore the gender profiles of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Notwithstanding, the researcher selected 18 males and 12 females because when engaging with the respondents during the fieldwork, the researcher discovered that more Francophone African males tend to conduct informal trade than females because Francophone African immigrants in South Africa are less likely to be employed than Anglophone African immigrants due to language barriers. Consequently, more male respondents have experienced xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business than their female counterparts. While female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced less physical harassment and assault than their male counterparts.

Since the researcher was, therefore, interested to interview only respondents who have experienced xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business, respondents with deep knowledge of the subject in terms of individual experiences of xenophobia were the sole criterion that influenced the choice of the respondents selected in the study. That is why the interviews show that more male respondents have experienced xenophobia than females.

In addition, the study also shows that all the respondents have experienced xenophobia irrespective of their age.

However, since the aim of conducting informal trade was to earn an income. Age according to Table 6.1, did not determine the monthly income earned. This is because the youngest and oldest respondents (27 and 50 years respectively) were among the highest income earners between R5000 and R10000.

Table 6.1 further shows that 14 respondents among the 30 were married, 11 were single, 03 were in a relationship, 01 was divorced and 01 was a widow. The table shows that Francophone African immigrants who are married tend to do informal business more than those who are single or in a relationship. In addition, marital status also did not determine the level of income earned because the table shows that both respondents who were married and those singles were able to earn a monthly income between R5000 and R10000.

However, in terms of the level of education of the respondents, 01 respondent had a university degree, 18 had completed tertiary education[53] and 11 had completed secondary education before immigrating to South Africa. This is contrary to a study conducted by Legodi and Kansere (2015) who claim that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa lack

[53] Tertiary education refers to formal post-secondary education, including public and private universities, colleagues, technical training institutes, and vocational schools (Bartlett & Ross, 2022; World Bank, 2022).

education and skills. Irrespective of education level, all the respondents have experienced xenophobia.

However, Table 6.1 shows that there were more Francophone African immigrants with tertiary education (18 respondents out of 30) who conducted informal trade than those with secondary education. In addition, the level of education did not determine the level of monthly income earned in informal trade because respondents who have completed tertiary education earned more money (between R5 000 and R10 000) than the respondent with a university degree and those who completed secondary education (between R5 000 and R10 000).

However, it should be noted that the income that respondents with tertiary education earn through informal trade in Pretoria (between R1 000 and R10 000) is more than the income that formally employed civil servants with a similar level of education earn in the country of origin of the respondents. For example, in the DRC and Chad, civil servants with tertiary education earn between USD$109-245, approximately R1 744 to R3 920 (Evans, et al. 2022:10), and USD$100-250, approximately R1 600 to R4 000 per month, respectively (Yorbana, 2017). Some South Africans with tertiary education earn up to R24 000 per month (Ranchhod & Daniels, 2021).

Furthermore, Table 6.1 also shows that the immigration status of respondents did not determine the level of monthly income earned through informal trade. This is because respondents with immigration statuses such as asylum seekers, expired visitor visa, general work permit, undocumented, and business visa are among the highest income earners (between R5 000 and R10 000), while those with permanent residence, valid study visa, South African life partner visa are among the lowest income earners (between R1 000 to R5 000).

Therefore, among the 30 respondents, 23 earned a monthly income between R1 000 and R5 000, while 07 earned an income between R5 000 and R10 000 in informal trade. It is important to mention that conducting informal trade in Pretoria seems more rewarding than conducting informal trade in the respondent's country of origin.

This is because the monthly income for conducting informal trade in the DRC is between USD$27 and USD$36, approximately R432 to R576 (Tsongo, 2021), and USD$67.5 to USD$100, approximately R1 080 to R1 600 in Gabon (Mbaye et al. 2020). Therefore, looking at the monthly income from informal trade between respondents' country of origin and Pretoria, it is worthwhile for respondents to endure xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business.

However, the fact that informal trade is more rewarding in Pretoria than respondents' country of origin is not the principal reason why the respondents conduct informal trade in Pretoria. In

addition, the fact that South Africans may not be aware of the monthly income of the respondents may not show whether the hostility perpetrated against the respondents is motivated by envy. However, one clear thing is that the hostility perpetrated against the respondents is partly a result of pure hatred because the respondents are foreigners.

Notwithstanding, as shown in Table 6.1, the country of origin of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, their gender, age, marital status, educational background, and immigration status did not also determine their experience of xenophobia while conducting their business, but their business location somehow determined the rate at which they experience xenophobia while conducting their business.

Figure 6.2: **Business location of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs**

Source: Researcher's fieldwork interviews in Pretoria in 2022

Figure 6.2 shows that many of the respondents, 12 out of 30 (39.96%), conducted informal trade in front of small shops, followed by 36.63% (11 out of 30 respondents) who conducted informal trade along sidewalks, and 16.65% (05 out of 30 respondents) and 6.66% (02 out of 30 respondents) who conducted informal trade on street corners and at municipal stalls, respectively. Municipal stalls were the least spot where respondents conduct informal business because of the high level of discrimination involved with the issuance of trading permits and allocation of municipal stalls to African immigrants in Pretoria in general.

Only two females out of the 12 female respondents in the study conducted informal trade on municipal stalls, as opposed to zero male respondents out of the 18 who took part in the study. The 18 male respondents avoided conducting informal business on municipal stalls because of the high level of discrimination involved in granting trading permits and allocating the stalls. In addition, the fact that only two female respondents conducted informal business at municipal

stalls could probably be because xenophobia in South Africa mostly targets male African immigrants more than females.

However, the interview questions focused on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs' experiences of xenophobia, discrimination, harassment, perpetrators of xenophobic attacks and why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked while conducting their business in Pretoria. All 30 respondents (100%) attest to having experienced xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business: 19 out of 30 (21.1%) claimed they have experienced discrimination while conducting their business in Pretoria; 20 out of 30 (22.22%) confirmed they have experienced harassment while conducting their business; and 18 out of 30 (19.99%) mentioned they have experienced xenophobic attacks while conducting their business.

The respondents identified various groups of South African citizens who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against them as well as provide some reasons why they believe Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are being attacked while conducting their business. This is explained in the analysis section under the sub-theme of why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked while conducting their business in Pretoria.

Figure 6.3: Percentage of respondents who experience discrimination, harassment, and attacks

Source: Researcher's fieldwork interviews in Pretoria in 2022

Figure 6.3 shows that at the individual level, Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced more harassment (22.22%) than discrimination (21.1%) and attacks (19.99%). In addition, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conducted informal business along sidewalks are more vulnerable to experiencing discrimination, while those who conducted informal business on street corners and at municipal stalls have

experienced more harassment, and those who conducted informal business in front of small shops have experienced more attacks than others.
However, more details regarding respondents' individual experiences of xenophobia would be understood in the data analysis (Section 6.3).

6.3 FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS AND DISCRIMINATION

The testimonies obtained from the fieldwork specifically revealed how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have been discriminated against while conducting their business by members of the Tshwane Metro Police Department (TMPD), members of the South African Police Services (SAPS), officials of City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, government representatives and ordinary South Africans.
However, for logical alignment, the researcher has described how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are discriminated against while conducting their business under specific themes as they appear in the testimonies. For example, out of the 19 (21.1%) Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who testified that they have experienced discrimination while conducting their business in Pretoria (see Figure 6.3 of Chapter 6), 14 of the respondents testified that they had experienced "direct discrimination" from the hands of members of the TMPD and ordinary South Africans.

6.3.1 Direct discrimination

Among the respondents, 14 claimed that they had experienced what they believed was direct discrimination perpetrated against them while conducting their business. The experience of discrimination included members of the TMPD impounding the goods that belong to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs – even when the informal immigrant entrepreneurs had valid trading licences to conduct business within the designated trading area/location.
Despite having valid trading licences and operating in the designated zone, members of the TMPD still arrested and impounded the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs without any justifiable explanation of a violation of the law. It is vital to highlight the fact such acts by the TMPD against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs were a direct act of discrimination because their goods were impounded from designated

trading zones when the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs owned valid trading licences to conduct business in that specific spot.

In addition to the fact that the experience of discrimination was valid because other Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs conducted business in undesignated trading zones and without a trading licence, such as in areas along Pretoria CBD (Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4), who were supposed to be arrested and have their goods impounded. In this case, the alleged acts of discrimination by the TMPD would not be completely accurate because the latter conducted business illegally (without a trading permit and in unauthorised trading zones). Therefore, when the TMPD impounded their goods, they were only administering the law. In this regard, there would have been nothing discriminatory, but in the case of Respondent no 6, one could agree that it was an experience of discrimination because the respondent mentioned the following:

> *[…] when the Metro Police Officers came to seize the goods of people selling on that street corner. […] the Metro Police seized my goods even though I had licence from the municipality to sell there, but did not seize the goods of South Africans who were selling the same things without trading licences. […] The metro police officers gave me no reason why they were seizing my goods after I showed them my permit. […] The fact that they seized my goods alone without any explanation and did not seize the goods of those South Africans who did not have permit to sell there made me to believe that I was directly discriminated […]* **(Respondent no 6, personal interview, Tuesday 16 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

Furthermore, when members of the TMPD, who are responsible to maintain law and order, impounded goods from informal immigrant traders who were lawfully registered and operated from designated trading zones this can be interpreted as discrimination.

Another experience of direct discrimination that emerged from the testimonies was the case of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who believed he had been directly discriminated against because he was requested to pay a higher than usual price that South Africans and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been paying to transport their goods from Evergreen Fresh Market (a wholesaler at Pretoria West) to their business location in Arcadia (see 4.3.3).

However, in a situation where the cost of transportation was negotiated informally between the trader and the driver, it was the responsibility of the driver and the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to have an agreement on the cost of transportation/price. If the driver had demanded a higher transport fare than what South African and other informal

immigrant entrepreneurs paid. The claim of discrimination would not have been validated, but in the case of respondent no 16, one can consider it as an act of discrimination because the respondent was asked to pay a higher than the usual fare because he was not a South African, as he mentioned:

> *[…] While I was still speaking with the bakkie driver, my cousin called me and asked me something in French. When I responded in French and ended the call. The South African bakkie driver asked me, what language was that? I said it was French. […] The bakkie driver then said to me, "you have not said how much you will pay." I said I mentioned that I will pay R500 as usual. He then said to me, "no, R500 is the price for South Africans, you are not a South African so you must pay R900". […] I then replied unfortunately R900 is too much for me, I cannot afford it. […] The bakkie driver then drove off grumbling and left me at Evergreen. I think that was a direct discrimination against me because I know other traders who left Evergreen few minutes ago with more goods than me, but they paid R500. Also, the fact that the bakkie driver told me that the price I must pay was because I am not a South African was discrimination* **(Respondent no 16, personal interview, Tuesday 14 December 2021, Arcadia).**

If the cost of transportation in the case of respondent no 16 was negotiated without the South African bakkie driver informing the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur that the R900 that he was requested to pay was because he was not a South African, the claim of discrimination would have been mere speculation. It was confirmed to be an act of discrimination because the South African bakkie driver mentioned that the Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneur was not from South Africa and drove off at the end (see the testimony of respondent no 16).

Various acts of discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants, in general, on the basis that they do not originate from South Africa have been documented in previous studies (Friedman, 2019; Saleh, 2015; Von Lieres, 2015; Tshishonga, 2015; Akinola, 2014; Adjail & Lazaridis, 2013; Neocosmos, 2006:83). However, what was not documented was the way individual Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experienced discrimination when negotiating to transport their goods from a wholesaler to a business location, as explained in the testimony of respondent no 16.

Moreover, in case the bakkie driver was a non-South African who commented that the R900 price was because the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was not a South African, certainly, this might not have appeared as an act of discrimination perpetrated against the informal immigrant entrepreneur. After all, in terms of power relations, a non-South

African bakkie driver and a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur would have equal power as African immigrants in South Africa.

And also, if the South African bakkie driver who commented the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur did not drive off but changed his mind and transported the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur for the usual R500 price, even after commenting that the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur should pay R900 because he was not a South African, the scenario might not have appeared to the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur as an act of discrimination.

The comment might have appeared as a mere price bargaining strategy that is not discrimination. Or if the South African bakkie driver just requested that the Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneur should pay R900 mentioning that it was the price of non-South Africans, even when he had driven off without accepting R500, this might also not have appeared to be an act of discrimination but rather a disagreement of price bargaining.

Notwithstanding, the testimonies of the respondents also revealed situations where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs claimed to have been discriminated against in a very costly way. This meant that the informal immigrant entrepreneurs lost goods or money in the experience. For example, the actions of officials of the City of Tshwane Municipality and ordinary South Africans seem to suggest that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been discriminated against while conducting their business in a costly way.

6.3.2 Costly discrimination

From the testimonies, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who lost goods or money in any act that they believed was discrimination perpetrated against them were described as costly discrimination. For example, respondent no 11 who conducted informal business at Sunnyside mentioned the following:

> *[…] I have been renting a municipal stall for about two years. […] Last week a South African lady came with six guys who claimed they were working for the City of Tshwane. They greeted me in the home language and I responded in English […] When I could not speak the home language with them, they asked for my passport. But I told them that they were not from home affairs so I would not show them my passport. […] They then said to me the municipal stalls were only reserved for South African citizens. […] Which was not true because I knew foreigners who were also selling on municipal*

stalls but never experienced such incident. […] The officials of City of Tshwane then took away all the goods that I just bought. […] They said, I should tell them who gave me the right to sell on the stall. […] I told them I got the stall from the municipality. I said I have a permit to sell on this stall. But they argued and said I was lying and that my permit was fake because no foreigner was allowed to sell on the stalls. They said the stalls were meant to lift poor South Africans. And refused to look at my permit even when I took it out of my handbag. […] I then begged them to wait a few minutes so that I called a South African friend of mine to come and intervein. But they refused. I lost all my goods. That cost me a lot. It was a bad way to feel discriminated […] ***(*Respondent no 11, personal interview, Saturday 04 December 2021, Sunnyside).**

The claim of discrimination of respondent no 11 had a couple of issues that validated it as an act of discrimination. For example, if other foreigners conducted business at municipal stalls that never had their goods impounded, this would mean that the claim of the officials of the City of Tshwane that foreigners were not allowed to conduct business at municipal stalls was rather a discrimination against respondent no 11 as it would give them no legal right to impound the goods of respondent no 11.

But if it was a policy of the City of Tshwane that the municipal stalls were designated only for South Africans, this would mean that the officials of the City of Tshwane were legally doing their job to ensure that no foreigner conduct business at the stalls. This is because adverts saying "no foreigners allowed" is not a new phenomenon in South Africa (Anjofui, 2018). In addition, the fact that respondent no 11 claimed to have had a business permit from the municipality to conduct trade on that designated spot further validates the claim that the interaction was one of discrimination.

Furthermore, when officials of the City of Tshwane requested the passport of the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur instead of requesting the trading permit that respondent no 11 claimed to have obtained from the City of Tshwane, or requesting both the permit and the passport to check if the name on the trading permit matched that of the passport, this might not have appeared to be an act of discrimination. However, the fact that the officials of the City of Tshwane only asked for the passport and did not ask for the trading permit that was obtained from the municipality suggests that it was an act of discrimination.

This was because, when officials of the City of Tshwane asked for a document that they were not legally allowed to demand (in the case of respondent no 11 his/her passport) and informed the informal immigrant entrepreneur that municipal stalls were reserved only for South Africans heightened the "put South Africans first" discriminatory discourse. This argument

seems to be confirmed by a study of informal immigrant traders conducted in Johannesburg. The study shows that officials from Johannesburg Municipality and JMPD were hostile toward informal immigrant traders even though had the required documentation to apply for trading stalls while officials from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) made the informal immigrant traders feel they were not welcome in South Africa because it was near impossible for them to obtain a business permit (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018:403-404). In addition, the fact that the officials of the City of Tshwane claimed that the trading permit of respondent no 11 was fake without even checking the authenticity of the document validated the claim that it was an act of discrimination.

This is partly because the claim is linked to the accusatory discourse of discrimination where African immigrants in South Africa are accused of many things including fabricating fake permits ((Misago & Landau, 2022; Nhemachena et al. 2022; Maseko, 2022; Pineteh, 2017, Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017) – even when the fake permits were often given to African immigrants by South African officials who are legally mandated to provide permits to immigrants (Chinyakata & Raselekoane, 2021; Alfaro-Velcamp et al. 2017).

Nonetheless, maybe if the officials of the City of Tshwane did not comment that foreigners were not allowed to sell at municipal stalls and requested the trading permit of respondent no 11 instead of his/her passport and later walked away after confirming the trading permit without impounding the goods of respondent no 11, or if the officials had presented any legal document that can be verified from the municipality that stated that foreigners were not allowed to trade on municipal stalls, this might not have appeared to be an act of costly discrimination.

The officials of the City of Tshwane never proved beyond reasonable doubt through official documents to the informal immigrant that they were carrying a legal act as mandated by the municipality. This left respondent no 11 with no choice, other than to claim that it was an experience of costly discrimination especially as the goods were never recovered. Furthermore, when ordinary South Africans take goods from Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs without paying for the goods, they are sending a message of discrimination that the informal immigrant entrepreneurs should not be in South Africa in the first place.

This is significant as the testimonies revealed during the interviews that ordinary South Africans who took the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs without paying, or who confiscated the stocks of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, do not do the same to South African informal business entrepreneurs who conducted business with Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs within the same designated trading area. Such a tendency dismisses claims by the government which

officially denies xenophobia and calls it "acts of criminality" because it is not perpetrated indiscriminately.

South Africans who conduct informal trade alongside Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs do not experience situations whereby ordinary South Africans forcefully take their goods without paying or borrowing. In addition, criminality in South Africa, in general, affects both South Africans and African immigrants indiscriminately (Crush & Tawodzera, 2017).

Furthermore, xenophobic discourse in South Africa seems to prevail in the instance where African immigrants (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria) continue to be perceived by ordinary South Africans as undesirable people in the country (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Pineteh, 2017; Gordon, 2015). Hence, it is considered normal to loot and even destroy businesses that belong to informal African immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (Misago, 2017; Crush, 2014; Everatt, 2011).

However, what validated the claim that the act of taking goods from Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs by ordinary South Africans without paying was an act of discrimination was the fact that in the process of forcefully taking the goods from Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. Ordinary South African who were taking the goods, hurled insults, and discriminatory statements such as; "makwerekwere," "magringamba", "amaGhana", "illegal criminals", and "Nigerians" against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and suggested that the informal immigrant entrepreneurs must leave South Africa with immediate effect.

The suggestion that the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur must leave South Africa with immediate effect reveals that the incident is xenophobic because African immigrants who commit a crime in South Africa are not asked to leave, but are arrested.

In the case of respondent, no 17, the respondent mentioned the following:

> *[…] One day, while I was selling, a group of South Africans about fourteen in number including three ladies came to me and told me that I was not allowed to sell where I was selling. […] I asked them why was I not supposed to sell there because I have been selling on the same spot for more than three years. […] They said to me the owner of the place did not want any foreigner to sell there because foreigners sell drugs. […] I asked them where is the owner so that I go and speak to the person because for more than three years I have been selling on that spot, I never heard of any owner who did not want foreigners to sell there because they sell drug. […] They refused to show me the owner, but instead threatened me not to come to the spot the next day because they*

promised to stab me. "[…] They asked me "why are you here"? while others who also took my goods and refused to pay shouted at me; go home", others said, "go back home and fix your country", and others said "go back home […]" **(Respondent no 17, personal interview, Wednesday, 22 December 2021, Arcadia).**

If the ordinary South Africans who took the goods of the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur without paying did not make such statements, the experience would certainly have been associated with criminality. This is because it would have been void of an experience of xenophobia. This is because the act of taking someone's goods without paying and without their consent is criminal.

However, in the case of respondent no 17, the ordinary South Africans repeatedly shouted at the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur: "Go home!", "Why are you here?", "Go back home and fix your country!", in the process of taking the goods and refusing to pay. The phrases are similar to phrases such as "Go home or die here!" "Go back home and build Africa!" which have been documented to be statements that ordinary South Africans often used when discriminating against African immigrants in South Africa, in general, (Jones et al. 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016; Steenkamp, 2009; Eliseev et al. 2008).

In addition, in December 2022 in Johannesburg City, members of Operation Dudula chased and removed African immigrants including informal traders from an abandoned building forcing them to return to their country of origin.[54] However, even if the ordinary South Africans paid for the goods in the process of shouting at the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to "Go home!", "Why are you here?", "Go back home and fix your country!", this would have still been considered an act of discrimination.

This is because if the informal immigrant entrepreneur has valid documentation and a trade permit to live and conduct informal business in South Africa, statements such as "Go home!", "Why are you here?", "Go back home and fix your country!" would still appear discriminatory. Conversely, even if the informal immigrant entrepreneur does not have valid documentation to live and conduct informal business, the statements would still appear to be discriminatory because there is a legal process to demand that an immigrant leave South Africa. Besides, only the state through the DHA has the power to determine who leaves or stays in South Africa (Hopstock & De Jager, 2011; Landau et al. 2005).

[54] https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-22-inside-joburgs-building-of-darkness-where-migrants-live-in-fear-as-operation-dudula-threats-amplify/

This responsibility is not left in the hands of ordinary citizens. However, it is the responsibility of ordinary citizens to report to authorities if a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur is selling an illicit drug, this would not be an act of discrimination. However, in the case where there was no evidence of wrongdoing, such as the case of respondent no 17, one is left with no choice but to validate the experience as costly discrimination because besides the emotional frustration that comes with the experience, there was a great deal of financial loss as the goods were taken without payment or the hope to be paid on a later date.

6.3.3 Discrimination from accessing equal protection by the police

The finding also revealed that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced discrimination from officials of the South African Police Service and ordinary South Africans. For example, one is reminded of the experience of discrimination by respondent no 10, a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur from Congo-Brazzaville (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6), who went to the police station to report an incident of a violent attack perpetrated against him but was detained instead because he did not have valid documentation at the time, even when he presented a slip from the Visa Facilitation Service (VFS) to show that he had applied for permit renewal and was waiting for the outcome.

The police officers did not listen but instead, the violent attack committed against the Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneur was ignored as the police officer only focused on the fact that the informal immigrant entrepreneur did not have valid documents. The informal immigrant entrepreneur was forced to spend the weekend in police custody while leaving his informal business unattended. The informal immigrant entrepreneur was threatened that the following Monday, he would be taken to the magistrate court and later to the detention and repatriation centre at "Lindela" but was released the following Monday without being taken to the magistrate court and the detention and repatriation centre.

However, it is the mandate of officials of the South African Police Service to detain immigrants without valid documentation in South Africa in terms of the Immigration Act No 13 of 2002 (Hiropoulos, 2017). It is also the mandate of members of the SAPS to investigate all the crimes reported to them irrespective of whether an immigrant is documented or undocumented in South Africa (Eghosa, 2020). No one has the right to commit any crime against anyone because the victim does not have valid documents (Ndinda & Ndhlovu, 2016).

Also, if the police officers acted according to the law, they should have taken the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to the magistrate court where it would be decided

whether he should be taken to the detention and repatriation centre or not. However, the fact that the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was released without being taken to court or the detention and repatriation centre validates the claim that the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur had experienced discrimination from accessing equal protection by the police. The respondent said the following:

> *[…] I was in the shop when two South Africans came to buy an African Fabric popularly known as "Ankara." […] the South Africans had argument with me. They said the fabric was not original. […] I said it was original and I even told them where I bought the fabrics here in South Africa. […] They did not believe me, so I asked them to leave my shop. […] But one that was cursing me that I was selling fake Ankara, turned, and said to me, "who are you to ask me to leave this shop? This shop is on South African soil. You are not even a South Africa he said. He then said show me your passport. The disagreement then escalated into both assaulting me. […] I left my shop immediately and went to the police station to report the matter. […] I was hoping the police would come and look at the CCTV Camera*[55]*footage in the shop to investigate. […] But when I went to the police station, the officer who came to assist asked me to present my identification document. […] I gave him a valid passport with an expired visa in it. […] He looked at my passport and said I was not supposed to still be in South Africa. […] He said we must first deal with the issue of expired permit. […] He called his colleagues and after they discussed, they said to me they would be detaining me because I was illegal in the country. They refused to listen to what I came to report at the station. That is how I found myself sleeping at police custody. Was that not discrimination? I went to report criminals, but was instead threated as a criminal. I think I can boldly say that was discrimination because I was not a South African […]*
>
> **(Respondent no 10, personal interview, Tuesday 30 November 2021, Sunnyside)**

From the testimony of respondent, no 10, one is left to wonder why a South African without an identification document would not be assisted by the police when he/she goes to the police station to report a case of assault. However, the police officers should have first listened to or taken the statement of the informal immigrant entrepreneur or even opened a case on his behalf, even if the informal immigrant entrepreneur was detained afterwards for not having valid documentation, his experience might not have been seen as discrimination against him.

[55] Closed-Circuit Television or Video Surveillance Camara (Troscianko et al. 2004).

Nonetheless, when members of the SAPS are charged with maintaining law and order, and refused to assist the informal immigrant entrepreneur to file a complaint, this can be interpreted as discrimination.

However, even section 10 of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees the right to respect and protect the dignity of all (Constitution of South Africa, 1996). There is documented evidence that members of the SAPS do not provide African immigrants in South Africa the same protection they provide to South Africans (Lamb, 2018; Klaaren & Ramji, 2017; Vahed & Desai, 2013). This validates the claim of respondent no 10 that he experienced discrimination.

6.3.4 Language discrimination

Discrimination as a result of language ineptitude was another form of discrimination that emerged during the testimonies. There were instances where the poor English proficiency of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who was selling cell phone accessories and gadgets was the reason for the perpetration of discrimination against the informal immigrant entrepreneur. This is coupled with the fact that the French accent that he had when he spoke English made him experience discrimination.

Indeed, some South Africans may also have poor proficiency in English and an accent when they speak English. However, as South Africans, it is possible to switch to one of the home languages. However, in the case of the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur, his South African client perpetrated what is described in this section as prejudicial discrimination because the informal immigrant entrepreneur could neither speak good English to express himself nor write in English. Respondent no 2 mentioned:

> *[…] There was a South African guy who came to buy a charger and repair his phone at my shop. […] When I tried to explain the problem that was wrong with his phone. He said he was not understanding what I was saying. […] You know I cannot speak English like South African people! […] The South African client then asked me to write down the problem of the phone on a piece of paper so that he should read and understand what was wrong in his phone. I told him that I cannot write English because I am Francophone. He asked why I did not learn English. I kept quiet, he then said to me, "give me the phone, I am afraid you will not be able to fix it. If you cannot tell me the problem in English, it means you will not be able to repair the phone. I do not want you to take chances with my phone" he said. I told him that I knew how to repair the*

phone. I said that was what I did every day for the past 4 years I have been in that shop in the CBD. I told him that I learned how to repair phone in French. […] He took his phone and went across the street to the shop of some guys from Limpopo who were also selling phone opposite my shop […] **(Respondent no 2, personal interview, Friday 05 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

The testimony of respondent no 2 shows how the lack of proficiency in English of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur can create an unfavourable circumstance that increases the chances of being discriminated against. Perhaps, even if the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was able to explain the problem of the phone in English and the client left, this might not have been validated as an experience of discrimination because the client did not mention anything regarding the origin of the informal immigrant entrepreneur.

However, what is certain in the interaction is that poor proficiency in English coupled with a French accent played a role in the discrimination perpetrated against the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur. This is because the inability to speak a language or poor proficiency in a language creates an environment for the perpetration of discrimination against non-speakers or those who lack proficiency (Ee, 2019; Baugh, 2016; Roberts et al. 2014; Holliday, 2009; Derwing, 2003; Munro, 2003).

That is why in South Africa, in the homeland before the end of apartheid in 1994, African immigrants were called "makwerekwere" (directly translated as "babbler or barbarian") because they could not speak the local language (Sichone, 2008). However, post-Apartheid, the word "makwerekwere" has become "an emotionally charged signifier for African foreign national on which scrutable messages of aversion are written which warrants strip searches, arrests, detentions, deportation, humiliated, tortures, rapes, mugging, killings" et cetera (Matsinhe, 2011:302-3).

Today "makwerekwere" has reinforced cognitive beliefs that have distorted the truth about African immigrants beyond reality. One such belief is the claim that "African immigrants in South Africa are criminals" (Masenya, 2017), whereas the reality is that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, for example, are agents who contribute positively to the economy of South Africa.

Notwithstanding, in the case of respondent no 2, when the informal immigrant entrepreneur said he learned to repair phones in French and unconsciously asserted his "foreignness" in the mind of the South African client who no longer needed to find out about the origin of the informal immigrant entrepreneur such that the perpetration of discrimination might be clear.

Furthermore, respondent no 5, who conducted informal business on a municipal stall in Pretoria CBD, also narrated a different experience of prejudicial discrimination that she encountered while conducting her business. She mentioned the following:

> […] Many *South Africans who came to my stand to buy goods often skipped me to buy from my neighbour who is a South African. […] South Africans would always speak to me first in their home language, when they come to buy. Sometimes I tried to respond in the local language. At other times I asked them to speak in English. […] When I asked them to speak in English, some of them always behaved as if they were angry. […] Immediately when my neighbour saw what was going on. She often interrupted the conversation between me and the client. She always spoke to the client in the home language. […] I usually do not know what she often said. But one thing I observed was that the clients always skip me to buy from her whenever she spoke to them. […] Even clients who had initially given their money to me, often asked me to return their money and they would skip to my neighbour. […] These are clients who sometimes buy and take somethings on credit during the days that my South African neighbour does not come to sell. The same clients would not skip me to buy from other traders who are also not South Africans. […] And also, the same clients who used to speak to me in the home language, would only speak to me English when they want to buy from me when the South African trader is absent. […] I was very disturbed by what was going on so, one day, I asked one of the South African clients who came to buy from me when the South African trader was absent. […] I asked her why was it that she would buy from me only when the South African trader was absent. […] She said, the South African lady told her not to trust what foreigners were selling. And she said, the South Africa lady always looked at her straight in the eyes whenever she came to buy. That was why she only bought from me when the South African lady was absent. To me, this was more than discrimination […]. The client does not even know me, yet she believed what the South African trader had told her and did not buy from me. Even when the time she bought from me when the South African trader was absent nothing bad happened to her.*
>
> **(Respondent no 5, personal interview, Saturday 13 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

The testimony of respondent no 5 shows how skipping respondent no 5 to buy from her South African neighbour was the outcome of prejudice as the South African trader informed fellow South African clients to not trust the goods sold by a foreigner, in that case, respondent no 5. Even when respondent no 5 bought the goods she was retailing from South African wholesalers such as Evergreen. However, the fact that when the South African trader was absent, the same

South African clients bought goods from respondent no 5. The testimony of respondent no 5 validates the fact that skipping respondent no 5 was an act of discrimination because it was grounded on prejudice.

Furthermore, the fact that the same South African clients would buy from respondent no 5 when the South African trader was absent, adds complexity to the experience of discrimination of respondent no 5. The complexity is that there is general distrust between South Africans and African immigrants in South Africa, in general (Addae & Quan-Baffour, 2022; Steenkamp, 2009). However, despite the general distrust, South Africans and African immigrants still interact in informal trade.

However, in the case of respondent no 5, South African clients would buy from her when the South African trader was absent but would not buy from respondent no 5 when the South African trader was present. This is partly because other studies have shown that people often prefer to buy from their fellow countrymen (Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2017; Wang & Li, 2007). Notwithstanding, in the case of respondent no 5, the claim of discrimination remains valid at least for the fact that the South African trader had perpetrated prejudice against respondent no 5.

Knowing that literature has documented some of the prejudices that South Africans hold against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs that foster discrimination against them, such as the accusation that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs sell expired and counterfeit goods (Ngcamu & Mantzaris, 2021). The experience of discrimination of respondent no 5 corroborates the similar experience of respondent no 27 who conducts informal business along the sidewalk in Capital Park. Respondent no 27 mentioned the following:

> *[…] I was selling at my spot one day when a south African guy gave me money to buy bananas and biscuits. As I was putting the bananas and the biscuits in a plastic, there was a security guard standing next to the client and myself. […] The security guard spoke to the client in the home language. […] The client turned to me and said, "the security guard is asking why I am not encouraging South Africans who are selling on the street. […] The security guard then pointed at a South African lady who sells across the street. […] Immediately, the client told me that he does not want to buy again. He asked me to return his money. I gave back his money. I saw him crossing the road to buy from the South African lady. […] I then turned to the security guard and asked him why he told the client not to buy from me. He came towards me and said people in South Africa do not have jobs […] The security guard then asked me, "when are you going home?* **(Respondent no 27, personal interview, Saturday 22 January 2021, Capital Park)**

The testimony of respondent no 27 shows how South Africans perpetrate discrimination against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in order to encourage a fellow South African informal entrepreneur as respondent no 27 claimed. The fact that the security guard asked respondent no 27 when he is going home was an act of discrimination. This is because several studies have documented that questions such as when they are going home that South Africans asked African immigrants are linked to discrimination (Jones et al. 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016; Steenkamp, 2009; Eliseev et al. 2008).

However, if the security guard did not point the South African trader to the client but pointed to another immigrant trader, this would not have appeared to be discrimination. One may instead think the security guard simply disliked the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur. In that case, the question of discrimination would not have been validated. However, the situation where the main reason to buy from the South African lady was that she was a fellow countryman brings in the power dynamic of in-group versus out-groups which often tends to foster discrimination (Feng et al. 2017; Ben-Ner et al. 2009; Garcia et al. 2005).

In addition to the experience of prejudicial discrimination against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business, respondent no 18 stated:

> *[…] I have experienced discrimination many times. But the one that I feared for my life was in 2019, when I went to buy goods from Johannesburg to retail in Pretoria. […] I took the Metrorail train to return to Pretoria because I wanted to avoid spending much money on taxi. […] on my way back, the train had to stop on the way several times. […] I did not know what was happening. I was with another lady from Congo-Brazzaville and two others from the DRC. […] One of the ladies from the DRC was panicking. […] She said to me in French that if she knew she would have used the taxi to return to Pretoria as usual. […] There were South Africans sitting close to me who overheard her speaking to me in French. […] It looked like after she spoke to me, the South Africans sitting closed to me realized that I was not a South African. While the train was going, I heard the South African guys speaking with each other, but did not know what was said. After the train passed the station at Irene, two of the guys came to me and said I should leave the train when it stopped at the next station. […] They said the only reason they do not want to beat me was because I and my co-traders are ladies. […] When the train arrived at the next station which I think was Centurion, I and the other ladies were chased out of the train. […] My bag with the goods was flung out of*

the train. The guy who flung my bag said to me foreigners want to take over South Africa […] **(Respondent no 18, personal interview, Tuesday 30 November 2021, Arcadia)**

The testimony of respondent no 18 validates an experience of discrimination. The testimony shows how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been discriminated against by being chased out of the Metrorail train, as respondent no 18 mentioned. Nonetheless, the fact that the South Africans who chased respondent no 18 and her colleagues identified them as foreigners was a reason to chase them out of the train, even if other foreigners on the train were not chased. The experience of respondent no 18 is validated as an act of discrimination.

Another striking experience of discrimination was that of respondent no 15 who mentioned the following:

> *[…] Where I do business, there were other South African traders that we created a stokvel[56]together. We were about ten of us. […] We contribute out of our business R1000 every after two-weeks (usually on the 15th and 30th of every month). On the list of beneficiaries of the stokvel contribution, I was the 3rd person on the list to receive the money. […] But when it was my turn to receive the money, it was given to a South African. […] So, I went to the leader of the stokvel and asked her why was I not giving the money because I was third on the list. […] The stokvel leader said to me that the other contributors of the stokvel forced her to put my name at the end of the list without my knowledge. […] And when I asked her why did they do that? She said that the other members of the stokvel had suspicions that because I am a foreigner, I can run away with their money to my country. […] Even the stokvel leader who knew me very well contributed in such discrimination against me […] Why would I run away with their money? […] The South African contributors judged me out of character. Is that not enough reason to say that was discrimination? […]* **(Respondent no 15, personal interview, Saturday 18 December 2021, Arcadia)**

The testimony of respondent no 15 further demonstrates how a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in Pretoria was discriminated against because of prejudice that he would run away with the money of South Africans. Maybe if the stokvel leader did not mention that the other members believed that because respondent no 15 is a foreigner he would run away with their money, the situation might have turned out to be simply a case of injustice.

[56] A stokvel is a traditional African model for informal saving and investment (Iwara & Netshandama, 2021).

However, to attach the origin of respondent no 15 to criminal behaviour such as running away with the money of South Africans is a common prejudice that South Africans hold towards African immigrants, in general.

Studies have documented evidence that African immigrants in South Africa are perceived as criminals (Pineteh, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016; Madue, 2015). Such prejudice is often translated into acts of discrimination against African immigrants in South Africa. In the case of respondent, no 15, such an experience is, therefore, validated as discrimination.

In summary, the over-generalisation of the experience of xenophobia among African immigrants in South Africa, in general, remains problematic (Vanyoro, 2019; Marschall, 2017; Crush, 2001). This is because from the testimonies, French, which is not an official language in South Africa, easily exposed the foreignness of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. The role of the French may render the experience of discrimination of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs slightly different from that of Anglophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, for example.

In addition, Marschall (2017) points out that individual experiences of xenophobia generally take place in isolation. Individual experiences can be similar but never the same (Marschall, 2017). The testimonies further revealed that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria experience discrimination spontaneously while conducting their business. The spontaneity is because the testimonies revealed new patterns that show how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are singled out and discriminated against when they speak French, which is not an official language in South Africa.

French makes it easier for South Africans to perpetrate discrimination against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. This is because it is obvious that people who speak French in South Africa are not South Africans as French is not a South African language. The testimonies further revealed the complexities involved in the experience of discrimination perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

The complexities range from the perpetration of discrimination against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who are unable to speak or write through accusations/allegations of incompetency, as revealed in the testimonies. However, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have not only experienced discrimination while conducting their businesses. They have also experienced different forms of harassment.

The testimonies revealed that 22,22% of the respondents confirmed that they have experienced harassment while conducting their business in Pretoria at the hands of South Africans. It is, therefore, important to determine what type of harassment Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experienced in Pretoria while conducting their business to have a complete understanding of the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

6.4 HARASSMENT OF IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRANTS' CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

In the context of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, no study has documented the type of harassment that they have experienced while conducting their business. The testimonies revealed diverse types of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced while conducting their business. Overall, the types of harassment can be classified into the following categories: virtual, verbal, and physical harassment.

Table 6.4 Types of harassment experienced by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria

	Virtual harassment	Verbal harassment	Physical harassment
1	SMS (short message service) containing threats directed at African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in general	abusive or derogatory words	intimidation
2	WhatsApp messages or videos circulating with the content of threats directed against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs	Offensive name-calling; "makwerekwere" / Magringamba"	Threats to inflict harm
3	Online harassments	Insults	Destruction of immigrants' business stock
4	Bullying	Demeaning comments	Physical attacks such as; hitting, kicking, punching, or pushing
5	Voice notes with threats	Accusations	Stereotype

Source: (Researcher's fieldwork in 2022)

Table 6.4 shows that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced virtual, verbal, and physical harassment in Pretoria while conducting their business. The perpetration of these forms of harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant

entrepreneurs takes place at their business locations, on the train and in taxis when they travel to buy, sell, or stock goods.

Nonetheless, the perpetration of verbal and physical harassment in the form of "name-calling", "accusations" and "threats" was the most dominant form of harassment that emerged in the respondents' testimonies, while virtual harassment was often spread via various social media platforms to harass African immigrants in South African in general to leave the country.

In addition, the perpetration of harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs takes place differently along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops. For example, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conducted informal business along sidewalks, street corners and municipal stalls have experienced more verbal and physical harassment than those who conducted informal business in front of small shops.

The testimonies also revealed that the experience of physical harassment is more common among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs with small shops than those who conduct informal trade at municipal stalls.

Nonetheless, not all Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced physical harassment in Pretoria while conducting business. However, according to respondents' testimonies, all 30 respondents (100%) claimed to have individually experienced verbal harassment while conducting their business. Therefore, to understand the type of harassment that individual Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced while conducting their business, it is important to analyse their experiences under virtual, verbal, and physical harassment.

6.4.1 Virtual harassment

Virtual harassment against African immigrants in South Africa, in general, has increasingly become the norm (Dlamini et al. 2022). Some of the virtual harassment sent to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs were not like the regular bullying that takes place on virtual platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and WhatsApp. The virtual harassment directed at Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs often contains a xenophobic undertone.

The testimonies also revealed the type of harassment that members of the Tshwane Metro Police Department (TMPD), City of Tshwane Officials, members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and ordinary South Africans have perpetrated against Francophone African

informal immigrant entrepreneurs. Among the forms of harassment, virtual harassment was the only form of harassment that was perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs by ordinary South Africans.

The other two forms of harassment (verbal and physical harassment) have been perpetrated by members of TMPD, SAPS, City of Tshwane officials and ordinary South Africans. For example, respondent no 30 mentioned the following:

> *[…] I was selling on the sidewalk in front of Rietondale high school in Gezina. […] One day, I received a WhatsApp video from an unknown number when I got home after business hours. The face of the person speaking in the video was not quite clear, even though his voice was clear enough. […] The message in the video was like, "Wena! you are very selfish. […] You are making money but you cannot share. […] You must not come to Rietondale tomorrow. You refused to give us credit. […] We will not allow you to sell at Rietondale again. You must go back to your country. Y You think you are clever. […] If "I you come to Rietondale tomorrow, I will stab you." […] After watching the video, I realized I was the one being harassed in it. I was the very person who refused to give credits to South African who asked for it during lunch break. I also did not know who gave my phone number to the person in the video. The next day I could not go to my business place because I was very afraid, not knowing what would happen.* **(Respondent no 30, personal interview, Saturday 29 January 2022, Gezina)**

There are a couple of things in the testimony of respondent no 30 that show that the respondent was the targeted person in the harassment. The message in the video was different from the general virtual harassment that perpetrators of xenophobic attacks often circulate on various virtual spaces including social media platforms. In the case of respondent, no 30, messages such as "You must not come to Rietondale", We will not allow you to sell again in Rietondale", and "You refused to give us credit" (see respondent no 30) were clear messages that were destined for one specific individual.

In addition, the fact that the speaker in the video said "You must go back to your country" validates the fact that such harassment was linked to xenophobia. Certainly, if the speaker never said in the video "You must go back to your country," this might have sounded probably like a mere threat. However, the fact that the issue of the origin of the respondent was mentioned, it, therefore, validated the experience as xenophobic harassment. This is because it is a common practice among ordinary South Africans to harass African immigrants in South Africa, in general, with statements such as "go back to your country."

Such a statement is considered harassment when it is used by ordinary South Africans who are not mandated to decide the fate of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. Conversely, if such a statement is made by an official of the Department of Home Affairs after the process in situations of deportation of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur, this would not be seen as harassment because the statement goes back to your country and can be used in a situation of repatriation by those whom the state has given the mandate.

Furthermore, besides virtual harassment, verbal harassment was prevalent in the testimonies. The perpetration of verbal harassment against Francophone African informal immigrants was done by officials of TMPD, SAPS, DHA, the City of Tshwane, and ordinary South Africans.

6.4.2 Verbal harassment

The most common form of verbal harassment perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs is the derogatory name-calling "makwerekwere." For example, respondent no 7 mentioned the following:

> *[…] A group of South Africans came to buy goods from me. […] When I turned to take a plastic bag to put the goods, they bought. […] One of the them stretched his hand and stole a packet of cigarette from my market table. […] Fortunately, before he could put the packet of cigarette into his pocket, I had caught him. […] when I took the packet of cigarette from his hand, he immediately started shouting at me calling me "makwerekwere." […] I kept quiet, but they kept harassing and pushing me saying "you must leave this place, this is not your country."* **(Respondent no 7, personal interview, Friday 19 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

The experience of respondent no 7 is described as an incident of xenophobia instead of criminality because a lot of studies claim that when the term "makwerekwere" is associated with statements such as "This is not your country" it is a clear demonstration of xenophobia (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019; Ndhlovu, 2018; Pineteh, 2017). It should be noted that more than 25 of the 30 respondents claimed they have been harassed with the name-calling of "makwerekwere" by South Africans while conducting their business.

Respondent no 9 also mentioned the following:

> *[…] I have experienced harassment a lot of time. […] I am constantly called "makwerekwere" almost every day by people of South Africa. […] One day a South African came to buy goods with incomplete money. […] When I told the South African*

that I would not give the good if the money was not complete, he started harassing me, calling me "makwerekwere." […] On another occasion, another South African who begged me to sell him an item for half the price. […] And I refused also quickly got angry and started insulting me in the home language. I remember, he said to me "you are a kwerekwere, I can take your goods and nothing will happen to me. […] Well, to me South Africans can call me "makwerekwere" a million time, it does not affect me. I know they call me "makwerekwere" because they are frustrated since I did not do as they want. **(Respondent no 9, personal interview, Friday 26 November 2021, Sunnyside)**

The testimony of respondent no 9 further validates how ordinary South Africans harass Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business for failing to accept half the price of an item or for refusing to sell an item for incomplete money. The form of harassment perpetrated by ordinary South African is often associated with the name-calling "makwerekwere." Van der Merwe (2019), Castelyn (2019), Field (2017), and Mlambo (2009) have written on the use of the name-calling "makwerekwere" to perpetrate harassment against African immigrants in South Africa, in general.

However, what the studies fail to demonstrate is how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have reconstructed the meaning of "makwerekwere" away from its derogatory implication as a form of verbal harassment. This is because from the testimonies, when South Africans want to take goods on credit or who want to pay the incomplete price. However, the Francophone African informal immigrant refused. That is when South Africans usually called the informal immigrant entrepreneur "makwerekwere."

As a result, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, therefore, associate the name-calling "makwerekwere" as a mechanism that South Africans used to release their disappointment. This is in other situations, when the same clients succeeded in taking goods on credit or when they buy goods for half the price the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur is never identified as "makwerekwere" or reminded that he/she is a foreigner. The question that may be asked, and applies to many situations is why is it that South Africans often used the name-calling "makwerekwere" only when they are angry or feel frustrated?

Nonetheless, the experience of respondent no 9 corroborates with studies that found that the perpetration of verbal harassment against African immigrants in South Africa, in general, is a result of economic frustration that is transmitted through the local lingo "makwerekwere" (Olofinbiyi, 2022; Hewitt et al. 2020; Akinola, 2018; Dauda et al. 2018; Claassen, 2017).

However, no study has empirically shown whether other lingo-cultural groups of African immigrants in South Africa such as Anglophone or Lusophone African immigrants have been able to reconstruct the derogatory verbal harassment "makwerekwere" used against them, and how they have been reconstructed or what effect it has on them.

In addition, the testimonies also present some contradictory findings on why many pieces of literature claim that African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are most likely to experience verbal harassment from South African men, besides members of the SAPS and the TMPD (Niworu, 2018; Tella, 2016; Mangezvo, 2015; Charman & Piper, 2012; Rutherford, 2011; Oloyede, 2008). The testimonies also revealed other types of harassment that a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur experienced at the hands of a South African woman. For example, respondent no 19, a male Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who operated a small shop in Arcadia, mentioned the following:

> *[…] there was a South African lady who had borrowed goods from my shop. […] It was a regular habit that she would often take goods and paid at the end of the month after she received her salary. […] Before the covid pandemic, she borrowed goods almost every day from bread to bathing soap. […] Sometimes she took things for R30, other times for R40 each day. […] The total amount that she was owing me was R900. […] For some reasons she lost her job from the South African Nursing Council in Arcadia where she worked as the human resource manager as she had told me. […] I did not see her for a long time. […] She also never came to my shop to explain the situation to me. I finally saw her one day after a long time when she came to collect her remaining stationeries from the office. […] I came out of my shop when I saw her, and I asked her for my money. She gave me a false date to pay back the money. […] The date came and passed and I did not hear from her. She was no longer on WhatsApp. Even the number she gave me was no longer going through. So, one day, after about two months, I coincidentally met her on my street and asked her for my money. [..] She got angry and started insulting me. […] She threatened me that she was going to open a case of sexual harassment against me at Sunnyside police station. […] She said to me I should continue to ask her the money, if only I have valid documents. If not, she promised she would get me arrested and deported. […] So, I thought since I cannot speak good English no one would listen to me. She was very serious in what she said. That was the last day I ever asked her for my money.* **(Respondent no 19, personal interview, Wednesday 29 December 2021, Arcadia)**

The testimony of respondent no 19 shows one of the types of harassment that a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur has experienced at the hands of a former South African woman government employee. The testimony shows how a South African woman uses defamation and misuses her citizenship privilege to harass and threaten a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who was simply asking her to pay the debt she owed him. The experience is validated as an experience of verbal harassment because of the choice of words of the South African lady.

She threatened the informal immigrant entrepreneur with a case of harassment against him and reminded the African immigrant that he is a foreigner when she said the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur should ask her for the money if he had valid documents. Such a statement resonates with local perceptions that African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are undocumented immigrants (Pineteh, 2017; Crush et al. 2015; Landau, 2011), which often led to calls for them to be sent back.

Such as the case reported by Soweto Urban in November 2022 where members of Operation Dudula marched from Extreme Park in Diepkloof to Aeroton against foreign nationals working in local areas calling for them to be sent back to their country of origin.[57] And a similar case was reported by News24 where members of the Put South Africa First organisation made headlines in February 2022 for conducting door-to-door campaigns in parts of Gauteng calling for foreign nationals to be sent out of South Africa.[58]

However, the experience of respondent no 19 is not an isolated incidence. Even respondent no 13, a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur from the DRC who conducted informal business on the sidewalk of Esselen Street in Sunnyside, experienced another type of harassment from a South African lady who worked at First National Bank (FNB) at Sunny Park Mall and a member of the SAPS. Respondent no 13 mentioned the following:

> *[…] There was a lady who worked at First National Bank Sunny Park who always buy fruits from me in the morning as she headed for work. […] Sometimes she will just select the fruits without paying. But when she knocked off from work in the afternoon, she always stopped at my business place and pay the money for the things she took during in the morning. […] During that time, I was also having a bank account with FNB. I usually deposited money into the account every day after I finish selling. I will go to the ATM before going home. […] Even when my relatives in the United States*

[57] https://sowetourban.co.za/108303/operation-dudula-creating-a-better-south-africa-for-the-future-generation/
[58]https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/saturday-profile-put-south-africa-firsts-victoria-mamogobo-were-a-peaceful-organisation-20220226

sent me money, I often deposited the money into that account. […] One day, FNB sent me a message requesting me to submit my proof of address. […] When I went to the bank to submit the proof of address. […] I was assisted by the same lady who always take goods from my business and pay after work. She was the one who assisted me at the bank that day. She was a consultant at FNB then. I suppose she saw the money I had in the account. […] After she knocked off from work that same day, she stopped at my business location and requested that she wants to have a word with me. She first paid the money of the goods she took that morning. She then spoke to me and asked if I could borrow her R4000. […] I told her it was business money; I cannot lend her. […] I told her I was saving the money because I wanted to move into a rental shop which is expensive. She said to me, the money in the account was already too much for a rental shop. […] I told her unfortunately, I there was nothing I could do. […] When she left that day, she was not happy, I could see it on her face. […] After about three days, First National Bank sent me another message that I should submit via email all the proof of my source of funds for all confirmed sources of funds in the form of salary, rental income, and proceeds from own business if I want my bank account to remain active. […] There was no way I could provide proof of sources of funding. […] How do I provide proof of sources of funding from the business I do on the sidewalk? Do I need to ask clients to give me invoices when they buy fruits? Does that make any sense? […] Many of the workers of FNB buy fruits from me regularly, if not every day on the street. But they refused to help me. […] I initially thought it was a simple issue I can go to the lady who assisted me the last time to see if she could assist me. When I went to her, she told me, when you are a foreigner, you must be kind to South Africans. She said see what has happened now, there is nothing she can do. I must just provide the proof of sources of the funds and the bank will reopen the account. […] until today, FNB has eaten the money. I do not see that lady anymore. My account remained frozen with my money in the account. I have tried to explain to the bank without any success. […] I cannot speak the type of English that the bank wants to hear so they think I am a criminal […]" I went to the police, the only questions I was asked was how much was the money? And where did I get the money? I remember one police officer once said to me "you are a tsotsi if you do not show how, you get the money, you will go to jail. ***(Respondent no 13, personal interview, Wednesday 29 December 2021, Sunnyside)***

The experience of harassment of respondent no 13 further shows how South Africans misuse their positions as citizens and members of SAPS to perpetrate harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs.

The testimonies of respondents no 13 and 19 show how South African women use their gender (as females) and work position to harass Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria; contrary to most South African men who perpetrate verbal harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs through name-calling such as "makwerekwere" that often led to violence or "extreme violence, as conceptualised by Crush and Ramachandran (2014) when describing South Africa's form of xenophobia.

A prominent finding on the female gender is the possibility that the female gender is xenophobic too but seems to be subtle in the way it expresses xenophobia contrary to the male gender. For example, South African women who harass male Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs verbally do not often use the word "makwerekwere." They use other words to harass male Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs verbally. For example, in the case of respondent no 13, statements such as "[…] When you are a foreigner you must be kind to South Africans" is a form of intimidation which is verbal harassment in nature (see the testimony of respondent no 13).

However, the experience of harassment of respondents, no 13 and 19 is only possible because the broader South African society understands the rights of African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are not respected. That is why African immigrants in South Africa are harassed daily (Pineteh, 2017; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017), partly because they also cannot access or afford the cost of legal services in South Africa (White & Rispel, 2021 Schockaert et al. 2020).

The subtlety in the testimony of respondent no 13 can also be linked to the indirect way in which members of the SAPS do not use the term "makwerekwere" often when harassing African immigrants in South Africa, but would often verbally harass African immigrants with derogatory terms such as "tsotsi" when in fact they are being xenophobic. "Tsotsi" is South African lingo that is generally understood to denote "young urban male criminal" (Hurst, 2009).

The term is also associated with gangs (Le Roux, 2004). The fact that a member of the SAPS harassed the informal immigrant entrepreneur with the term "tsotsi" validates the experience of xenophobic harassment. This is because such harassment is rooted in xenophobic biases that perceived African immigrants in South Africa as criminals (Pineteh, 2017, Nshimbi, 2018). Even without conducting any form of investigation, the alleged member of the SAPS told respondent no 13 that if he could not provide proof of sources of funds, he was a "tsotsi". Even

when the SAPS understood the nature of the business of the informal immigrant entrepreneur, the behaviour of the member of the SAPS also supports the local perception that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa hide behind informal trade to sell drugs (Zuma, 2021; Pineteh, 2017; Charman & Piper, 2012).

Furthermore, the testimonies also revealed that female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are sexually harassed by South African men while conducting their business. Such an experience of harassment has not been given proper attention in the literature review. Respondent no 24, for example, narrated her experience of verbal harassment that she experienced at the hands of ordinary South African men and officials of the City of Tshwane. Respondent no 24 stated the following:

> *[…] What South African men wants from me is only sex. […] There was a South African guy who always come to buy fruits and vegetables from me. Every time he comes, he always asks me for sex, promising that he would help me get permanent resident permit as if I do not have valid documents. There was no single day that he comes to buy without inviting me to his place. […] No matter how many times I told him I was not interested he kept bothering me. He said he was free to have sex with me because I am a foreign woman in South Africa […] Even one official from City of Tshwane who claimed he was sent to check whether people who were selling on municipal stalls where the same people in the municipal record. […] requested sexual favour from me in exchange of helping me to get the best spot to conduct business. I believe the two individuals were harassing sexually […]* (**Respondent no 24, personal interview, Saturday, January 15, 2022, Hatfield)**

The testimony of respondent no 24 validates sexual harassment as another form of verbal harassment that a female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur has experienced while conducting her business in Pretoria. It is a fact that female African informal entrepreneurs suffer a lot of sexual harassment, not only in South Africa but across the continent.

However, what validates the experience of harassment of a female Francophone African informal trader in Pretoria as xenophobia is the fact that the basis of the sexual harassment was because the respondent was a foreign woman in South Africa (see the testimony of respondent no 24), and, to be in a position of power such as in the case of the official from the City of Tshwane. Hence, to use one's position to lure a female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to have sex with you in exchange for a better business location is harassment. This is because requesting sexual favours when performing the duties that officials

of the City of Tshwane are mandated to perform is harassment. Furthermore, besides the perpetration of verbal harassment against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, the testimonies also revealed situations where verbal harassment sometimes tends to be physical harassment.

6.4.3 Physical harassment

There are several circumstances as revealed from the testimonies that verbal harassment of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs often led to physical harassment in the form of assaults. For example, respondent no 12 mentioned the following:

> *[…] Another African immigrant lady who also sell with me gave me money to buy stock for her from Marabastad. After I bought my stuff and hers, I hired a bakkie to take me back to Sunnyside. […] The lady who gave me money sells just a robot away from me. The street that the bakkie driver took was supposed to stop at her business location first before getting to my market place because we were supposed to drive past her before getting to my business location. […] So, when we got to her business spot, I asked the driver to stop so that I offloaded her stuff. […] When the driver stopped, he said to me, he was going to offload everything at once. He said I should decide whether the goods should be offloaded at the lady's business location or at my business location. […] While we were still talking, the driver started speaking to me in the home language. I only knew he was very angry when he started calling me "makwerekwere." I then told the driver he also is "makwerekwere." I said again to him, we are all "makwerekwere" because we all came to Pretoria from somewhere. […] The driver then opened his bakkie door by force and came out of the bakkie and grabbed me on my neck. […] it became very physical until two Metro police officers who were passing stopped at the scene to resolve the issue as a crowd of people that had gathered were blocking part of the road. […] The bakkie driver had scattered our goods all on the road as he angrily offloaded everything. The two Metro police officers also started throwing our goods away from the road. […] When I told one of the officers that please do not throw the boxes on the ground like that, the soft fruits inside would get damage. He told me that he does not care. He said to me, "you must go and do this shit in your country." Even when he was witnessing what was going on, he threatened to impound the goods if I do not take them out of the street immediately." […] I told him he cannot impound my goods because I have permit to do business on that street. The official then pushed me*

on the pavement saying I should clear the road. (**Respondent no 12, personal interview, Tuesday 7 December 2021, Sunnyside)**

The testimony of respondent no 12 validates the claim that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced physical harassment while conducting their business. Respondent no 12 was physically harassed by both the South African bakkie driver and the official of the TMPD. The reason is that the bakkie driver used the derogatory name-calling of "makwerekwere" against the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur. Even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur also told the bakkie driver that he was also a "makwerekwere."

The testimony revealed that the bakkie driver became more violent to confirm the depth of the psychological discomfort that South Africans understand they are perpetrating against African immigrants in South Africa when they harassed them as "makwerekwere." In addition, the fact that the officials of the TMPD told the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs "You must go and do this shit in your country" and pushed the informal immigrant entrepreneur on the pavement in the pretence that the informal immigrant entrepreneur was blocking the road was a strong validation of verbal harassment that tends to be physical (see the testimony of respondent no 12).

To tell the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur to "Go and do this shit in your country" appears to be a forceful way of chasing the informal immigrant entrepreneur away from South Africa without following due process. This can be validated as harassment because the office of the TMPD does not have the legal right or mandate to determine who leaves or stays in South Africa. Should the determination of who leaves or who stays in South Africa fall under his jurisdiction?

This might not have appeared to be harassment, especially in the case where the informal immigrant entrepreneur is acting without valid permits. However, in the case of respondent no 12, he had a valid trade permit to conduct business there. Also, the testimony of respondent no 26 shows a situation where verbal harassment quickly tends to become physical harassment. Respondent no 26, for example, mentioned the following:

[…] Before I came down to Capital Park, I was selling close to Steve Biko Hospital. My business was making enough money to cover my bills. […] Many South Africans told me in my face that I was selling drugs. I did not know that they were not happy because I was selling on that spot and they saw that people were buying my stuff a lot. […] Last Tuesday morning, a guy came to buy chips. I knew he did not pay me, but he lied that he gave me R50 immediately he came to my business. […] I said that was a lie

because I only had coins, there was no R50 note with me at that time. […] He said I have hidden the money because I am a foreigner and am capable of anything. […] He insulted me that I was trying to rob him. He insisted that I must give him change […] But I refused because I never received any money from him. […] He never even checked his pockets again to see if he made a mistake, but started insulting me "makwerekwere," go home, what are you doing in South Africa. He started to slap and scratch me. I had bruises all over my right hand because he was dragging my money bag and I was refusing to let go of the bag […] (**Respondent no 26, personal interview, Friday 21 January 2022, Capital Park)**

The experience of physical harassment of respondent no 26 suggests the complex relationship between criminality and xenophobia in South Africa. The client lied to have given R50 for a packet of chips. The client did not even try to check inside his pockets to confirm whether he was mistaken but rather started harassing respondent no 26 calling him "makwerekwere" and physically assaulting the informal immigrant entrepreneur. Such an act is validated as a form of xenophobia-related harassment because the client said respondent no 26 was trying to rob him and that respondent no 26 should go home, and what is respondent no 26 doing in South Africa?

Such statements are associated with various forms of verbal harassment that often led to physical assaults that South Africans perpetrate against African immigrants in South Africa, in general (Oni & Okunade, 2018; Masenya, 2017; Fayomi et al. 2015; Crush, 2014).

Moreover, the testimonies also revealed that in other cases, the perpetration of verbal harassment and physical assaults against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business go beyond slapping, punching, kicking, or vandalising the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. It involves demeaning behaviours towards Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs at the hands of ordinary South Africans.

For example, respondent no 22 mentioned the following:

[…] It is no longer safe doing business in South Africa. At the same time, I must survive. To survive I must go out and do something. […] I have been harassed and physically assaulted in my business place. […] South Africans have spat on me, insulted me, they have chased me from where I was selling before. […] But I still go out despite all the harassment. […] Even the police harassed me sometimes. They do that because they know that I am a foreigner. […] Sometimes, when they come to buy, they want me to give them things for free. If I do not give them, they asked of my passport. […] They

told me they will arrest me. At other times they would scatter my stuff claiming that they are looking for illicit cigarettes and drugs. […] They even pushed me one day when I tried to stop them from scattering my stuff. I have been called "makwerekwere" countless number of times. […] Most of the time people who called me "makwerekwere" are South Africans who are not happy with the price you give to them. […] They fight me because of the price I decide to sell my goods. It seems as they always want to take my things for free. Even those who borrow things from me do not want to pay me back because I am a foreigner. I once asked my money from a South African guy who borrowed stuff from me. […] It got so tensed that he threatened to call the cops on me claiming I was living illegally in South Africa. He spat on me and on the goods, I was selling" he said, I was shit. (**Respondent no 22, personal interview, Sunday 9 January 2022, Hatfield)**

The testimony of respondent no 22 shows other forms of physical harassment that Francophone African informal entrepreneurs have experienced while conducting their business. Respondent no 22, for example, was harassed with the derogatory name-calling of "makwerekwere". At the same time, the South African client spat on the informal immigrant entrepreneur and her goods while threatening to call the police on the informal immigrant entrepreneur because of the perception that the informal immigrant entrepreneur was living in South Africa illegally.

Spitting on respondent no 22 is a unique form of physical harassment that emerged from the testimonies. It seems like it is an act of harassment that is perpetrated only on vulnerable Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. There is no record of such type of physical harassment in the literature review that is perpetrated against other categories of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs such as students, professionals, or diplomats. In terms of the case of respondent no 22, a question that can be asked is: Do South Africans perpetrate specific types of physical harassment against certain Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs based on the perception that informal immigrant entrepreneurs have no rights in South Africa?

This question is important because existing pieces of literature on the type of harassment perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business have not established whether specific Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria attract a specific type of harassment while conducting business. Do ordinary South Africans frequently spit on people?

Furthermore, another type of physical harassment that was revealed in the testimonies is harassment in the guise of community policing. Respondent no 6, for example, mentioned the following:

> *[…] In December of 2018, a group of South Africans came to Pretoria CBD claiming they were doing community policing. Some of them claimed that they were government employees and law enforcement officials. They said they were looking for counterfeits and drugs. […] They never showed me any kind of professional identity card. […] When they came to my business place, they asked me for my permit. […] I did not know whether they were asking for business permit or resident permit. So, I asked them what department they were coming from. […] One of them said they were coming from dti*[59]*[…] I said to them why did not you come with at least a law enforcement officer. They said they were law enforcement officers. […] One of them said, "we are the law ourselves" […] I immediately realized they may be crooks because of the answers they were given me. […] When they realized I have discovered who they were, three of them started hitting me. They were hitting me and saying in home language "makwerekwere" give us your papers we want to see them. […] It was other foreigners who came to rescue me and the whole scenario turned to a fight. […] I had to escape for my life. I only went back to collect my things after the police came. But the guys we nowhere to be seen" […]* (**Respondent no 6, personal interview, Thursday 16 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

It is common in South Africa to see situations where ordinary South Africans who are not delegated by law harass and ask African immigrants to present their identification documents. The experience of respondent no 6 further confirms the vulnerability of African immigrants in South Africa. In the case of respondent, no 6, South Africans harassed the informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the name of conducting community policing.

In addition, even members of Operation Dudula, which several reporters and analysts have criticised for taking the law into their own hands, were reported by *The Daily Maverick* newspaper on 1 September 2022 for harassing African immigrants outside the Kalafong Provincial Tertiary Hospital in Tshwane, shouting at immigrant patients and employees through a loudspeaker saying they do not want "makwerekwere" (foreigners).[60]

[59] DTI is an abbreviation for the Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa (Mhaka & Jeke, 2018).
[60] https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-09-01-operation-dudula-harasses-immigrants-outside-kalafong-hospital/

Nonetheless, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced virtual, verbal, and physical harassment while conducting their business. Most of the studies that look at the experience of xenophobia mostly focus on the xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, (Akinola, 2017; Langa & Kiguwa, 2016; Bekker, 2015 Mamabolo, 2015). Previous studies have not provided much on the experience of virtual, verbal, and physical harassment perpetrated against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs) in Pretoria while conducting their business.

However, the studies that look at virtual, verbal, and physical harassment are of significance because the testimonies of this study have shown the dominance of verbal harassment such as "makwerekwere" which has become the most popular form of verbal harassment used by the majority of ordinary South Africans to harass African immigrants in South African, in general. However, the studies failed to show how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who have been victims of the derogatory name-calling of "makwerekwere" have become so desensitised toward "makwerekwere" as verbal harassment. This is partly because Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been overexposed to the term as many of the respondents testified that they get called "makwerekwere" at least once or twice a day for the length of time they have been conducting informal business.

Also, some of the respondents claim they often make jokes with the word "makwerekwere." They often call each other "makwerekwere" which has helped them to no longer to feel angry or threatened by the verbal harassment "makwerekwere." While Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are desensitised to "makwerekwere," they have also become less sensitive to the suffering of ordinary South Africans.

For example, respondent no 26 mentioned the following:

> *[…] When I first came to South Africa. Any time I was called "makwerekwere," I would be so scared that I would sometimes run for my life. But over time, I have learned from experience that only South Africans who are angry call me "makwerekwere." […] This is usually when they want to borrow something and I refuse. […] I think they use the word only when they are angry because the same people who called me "makwerekwere," do not call me that when they are not angry […] I have also learned to call myself "makwerekwere" before they call me. Sometimes I even introduce myself as "makwerekwere." I no longer feel angry or threatened when they then called me "makwerekwere." […] Sometimes, I just call myself "makwerekwere" just to inform my clients that I cannot give them credit because as "makwerekwere" I need to look*

for money to go back home. (**Respondent no 26, personal interview, Friday 26 January 2022, Capital Park)**

In addition, respondent no 7 also mentioned that he has become desensitised to the term "makwerekwere." According to respondent no 7, the term "makwerekwere" is a statement of frustration, as was apparent in the respondent's testimony:

> *[…] Previously, when South Africans called me "makwerekwere," I felt like death was coming. It triggered panic inside of me because during the xenophobic attacks, the most word you hear on TV was "makwerekwere" when South Africans are describing foreigners. I never heard that foreigners are doing anything good in South Africa. […] At my market place, most South Africans who called me "makwerekwere" did so out of frustration. […] Sometimes, when South Africans want me to sell something at a lesser price and I refused. That is the time I am called "makwerekwere." […] Today, "makwerekwere" does not mean anything to me because I have seen that South Africans who called me "makwerekwere." only do that when they are frustrated because I did not let them have their way. […] Know longer feel the anxiety I use to feel before I realized that they use "makwerekwere" to ease their frustration […]* (**Respondent no 7, personal interview, Friday 19 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

The testimonies also revealed that some of the respondents believe that the term "makwerekwere" is used by South Africans as a licence to attack or steal from informal immigrant entrepreneurs. For example, respondent no 30 mentioned the following:

> *[…] I pay much attention immediately a South African call me "makwerekwere." […] The reason I pay much attention is that, the first year when I started conducting informal business. Most times that South Africans called me "makwerekwere," they would grab my things and run away. […] Now, I do not care they can call me "makwerekwere" a thousand time it does not scare me. […] Instead, I become more attentive and ready to defend my goods because they only called me that when they want to bring disorder in my business location. […] Sometimes, when they come to my market place in groups, they do not call me "makwerekwere"* […] But immediately they try to steal and I catch them red handed, they switch quickly and start harassing me in the home language calling me "makwerekwere." […] A lot of time when this happening they physically attacked me. **(Respondent no 30, personal interview, Saturday 29 January 2022, Gezina)**

From the testimonies, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria claimed that the verbal harassment "makwerekwere" is mostly used to harass them in situations where South Africans feel dissatisfied or disappointed with the informal immigrant entrepreneurs. Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have, therefore, listed some of the circumstances where South Africans harass them with the term "makwerekwere" such as when South Africans unsuccessfully bargain for a lower price when they do not have money to buy goods and want to take goods on credit, or when they want something to be given to them for free.

Such a claim, however, contradicts previous studies such as that by Kelly and Steyn (2008) who claim that "makwerekwere" embodies a phenomenon that often leads to xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, in general. However, the testimonies further revealed some criminal tendencies that are associated with the use of "makwerekwere" to harass Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

However, the link between "makwerekwere," physical harassment in the form of assaults and criminality against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business has not been well established in previous studies. This is because of the complexity that is involved in physical harassment and violence against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

6.4.4 Complexity between violence and harassment against immigrants

The testimonies revealed a complex relationship between physical harassment and violence. While physical harassment may involve efforts to inflict bodily harm and injury or other forms of unwelcome physical proximity, violence sometimes involves more than efforts to inflict bodily harm or injury. There is evidence from the testimonies that some people who supposedly experience physical harassment that involved violence perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs were incidences of "attempted murder" rather than physical harassment or violence.

This is because the law requires that an incident be proven beyond reasonable doubt that there was an "intent to kill" before it can be validated as a case of attempted murder (Keiter, 2003). There is evidence from the interviews that some incidence of physical harassment and violence perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs was to murder the informal immigrant entrepreneur.

In the case of African immigrants in South Africa, in general, Charman and Piper (2012) have written about the case of attempted murder of African immigrants. However, attempted murder remains a crime in South Africa (Breetzke, 2010). In the case of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, the crime of attempted murder of the informal immigrant entrepreneurs is weakened because it is described within the context of xenophobia which vindicates South Africans from any form of legal consequences even when the South Africans had the intention of killing the informal immigrant entrepreneur.

For example, respondent no 13 mentioned the following:

> *[…] Before I moved to Sunnyside, I was selling at the Prinsloo taxi rank in Pretoria CBD. I did not know that foreigners are not allowed to sell in taxi ranks. […] One faithful morning, while I was selling, a group of six South Africans came to me and asked me who allowed me to sell in the taxi rank. They said, I should not sell there again. So, I asked them why? They said foreigners are not allowed to sell there. I then commented to say, but foreigners are allowed to use the taxi? One of them said to me why are you asking question? Foreigners are not allowed to sell in the taxi rank that is it. I then suggested to the guy that, why do not he put a notice that foreigners are not allowed to sell at the taxi ranks. […] The guys got very angry and two of them said to me they were going to confiscate my goods. They started physical assaulting me until one of them pull out a knife and started stabbing. I used my hands to defend the stabbing. […] I was stabbed twelve times. […] While they were stabbing me, I heard people shouting but I was unconscious. I only regained consciousness when I woke up Florence Ribeiro clinic at Sammy Marks just opposite the taxi rank. I do not know who took me there. Since that incidence, I never went back to that place. […] I nearly died. That was more than harassment. They guys wanted to kill me. They said it. Even when one of them took out the knife, his friends shouted stab him, another said kill him. Another said to me we will kill you today you kwerekwere. You do not respect us […]*

(Respondent no 13, personal interview, Friday 10 December 2021, Sunnyside)

The experience of respondent no 13 cannot be considered mere physical harassment or violence perpetrated against the informal immigrant entrepreneur. The experience was an act of attempted murder. Especially as the intent of the assailant was made known when they told the informal immigrant entrepreneur that they will kill him. There are also similar experiences of this nature that involve other African immigrants who were stabbed by South African men to scare the informal immigrant away from his stall (Viljoen & Wentzel, 2000). Hence, the case

of Emmanuel Sithole-a cigarette and sweet vendor from Mozambique selling in Alexandra who was stabbed to death in April 2015 (Mutanda, 2017).

Even though the murderer of Emmanuel Sithole was sent to jail, it appears that there are only a few instances where the perpetrator was arrested and jailed. In most cases, the perpetrators of physical harassment and violence are never arrested. Only in cases of murder on a few occasions is the murderer arrested and prosecuted, while cases of attempted murder are given attention among South Africans and the assailants are arrested and prosecuted.

None of the cases of attempted murder against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs has ever gone to court, even when it involves the looting and burning down of businesses belonging to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Pineteh, 2018; Crush & Tawodzera, 2017; Crush & Ramachandran, 2015; Tshishonga, 2015; Mamabolo, 2015). There are hardly any consequences for the perpetrators.

Therefore, to understand the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business it is important to establish the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against them while conducting their business. However, it is indisputable that ordinary South Africans as well as law enforcement officials are physically violent and attack and even, kill foreigners. For example, the case of a Mozambican street vendor, Emmanuel Sithole, was stabbed and killed by four South Africans in the township of Alexandria (Kaziboni, 2022), and Mido Marcia, another Mozambican taxi driver, who was handcuffed to the back of a South African Police Service (SAPS) van and dragged on a tarred road in Daveyton and finally died in police custody several hours later (Faull, 2017; Crush, 2014). This reality is more than harassment – it is extreme violence.

6.5 PERPETRATORS OF XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS AND IMMIGRANTS' CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

South Africa continues to be plagued with regular incidents of xenophobic attacks and discrimination perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa, in general. Even though the government of South Africa launched the National Action Plan for the Combat of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP) in 2019 there are still widespread incidents of xenophobic harassment and hostility perpetrated against African immigrants by mobs of ordinary South Africans and government and law enforcement officials.

African immigrants are frequently verbally and physically harassed by ordinary South Africans for originating from other African countries. The physical harassment of African immigrants in South Africa usually takes the form of assaults which frequently become xenophobic attacks to cause bodily harm or injury.

South African law enforcement officials have always responded to xenophobic attacks with indifference or often provided inadequate support to prevent xenophobic attacks perpetrated against African immigrants in South Africa, in general. The government of South Africa and law enforcement officials have failed to ensure that victims of xenophobic attacks receive justice. Instead, the government has acted in discriminatory and abusive ways against African immigrants during xenophobic attacks against them, while vindicating South Africans who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against African immigrants.

However, amidst various attempts to identify the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, no study has documented the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. This section of the study, therefore, sets out to identify the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

The testimonies revealed that 18 out of the 30 respondents (19,99%) confirmed that they have experienced xenophobic attacks from different groups of South Africans.

6.5.1 South African Youth as Perpetrators of Xenophobic Attacks

There is rising concern regarding the involvement of young South Africans in violence. For example, respondent no 18 who sells sweets, chips, and other items at a street corner in Arcadia, mentioned the following:

> *[…] The people who attacked me were high school boys from Pretoria Technical High School in Arcadia […] Some of the boys know me because they always buy chips, cigarettes, and other items from where I sell in the morning and after school. […] Some of the boys often want to borrow cigarettes from me, but I refused and I often tell them that I cannot borrow anything to anyone because where I am buying the things I sell, I do not get things on credit. […] Unfortunately, it looks like this did not sit well with them. […] So, two or three months ago, while I was busy selling, one of the boys who attacked me took a packet of chips. […] I was sitting on a chair, so I got up and held his hand to take the packet of chips. […] He then screamed towards his friends who*

had already crossed the robot. […] His friends came back in group […] They were calling me "makwerekwere." The only one among the boys who spoke in English said, "is it only for a packet of chips that you want to break his arm?" The others did not waste anytime but started throwing stones and other objects at me calling me "makwerekwere." They were more than 7 boys against me alone. […] There were some people working inside the church opposite the school. They were the ones who started shouting at the boys asking them not to hurt me and to stop attacking me. **(Respondent no 18, personal interview, Tuesday 30 November 2021, Arcadia)**

The testimony of respondent no 18 shows that xenophobic attacks are ingrained in South African society. This is because xenophobic attacks are perpetrated by ordinary South Africans across different walks of life, including young people who never experienced racial discrimination under apartheid but are somehow affected by the legacy of apartheid. Pillay (2008) claims that post-apartheid South Africa is disintegrated by the high level of violence affecting various communities. Kaminer et al. (2013) claim that it is with such a high level of violence that young people are raised in South Africa.

In addition, a study conducted by Jefthas and Artz (2007) to examine youth violence in South Africa claims that many South Africans perceived violence as an acceptable means of resolving conflicts. This has encouraged the use of violence across various sectors of society. Hence, respondent no 18 was attacked because he was seen holding the arm of the student who wanted to steal a packet of chips from him. However, what validated the incident of respondent no 18 to be a xenophobic attack was the fact that the perpetrators of the attack identified him as "makwerekwere".

"Makwerekwere" was used to discard the fact that a student stole for respondent no 18 and to approve the attack on respondent no 18. Beetar (2019) claims that African immigrants in South Africa have been relegated to a zone of death. The fact that one is an African immigrant in South Africa is enough reason to be killed.

In addition, still around Arcadia, respondent no 16 who sold fruits, vegetables, biscuits, and chips also testified the following:

[…] I was attacked by a group of young supporters of Orlando Pirate after a match between Orlando Pirates and Mamelodi Sundown football club at Loftus Versfeld stadium. […] On the day of the attack, I decided to sell until 6pm because there was a football match. […] After the match, supporters sometimes get hungry […] and will buy things to eat or drink from me. I thought the day will turn out the same as always. […] So, I bought lots of can drinks and filled in the cooler box. […] After the match

ended, Mamelodi Sundown beat Orlando Pirates 4-1. […] Some supporters who were putting in t-shirts of Orlando Pirates stopped at my business to buy cigarettes, cold drinks, and other items. […] I honestly do not know what went wrong. One of the supporters took a banana for R3. He peeled the banana and ate half of it. […] Then came to me and said the banana was rotten. […] I then asked him to take another banana while I was busy trying to sell to the other supporters who were standing in front of me. The same supporter came back again complaining that the second banana was also rotten. […] I then realized in my mind that other people have been buying bananas throughout the day but no one had said to me the banana was rotten. So, I then told the guy that, I cannot give him another banana because I have already lost the profit the banana. […] When I said that to him, he became very aggressive. He was speaking to his friends and was also talking about "makwerekwere." When I heard "makwerekwere," I knew everything was not going to be easy. He said to his friends while pointing at me, "this guy is full of shit." […] One of his friends also said to me, "why are your cigarettes expensive?" […] I said my cigarettes were not expensive. […] I told him that I was only earning 40 cents per cigarette. […] The guys became very angry. […] I wish I was understanding their home language. All they were saying that I could hear was "makwerekwere." […] One of the guys then pushed me from behind and I fell on the items that I was selling, while three others hit me with the vuvuzelas they were holding […] While they were hitting me, some people were crossing the road towards the incidents […] Some passer-by asked me to run that they can kill me like a joke […] That is how I escaped and they took everything including the cooler box.

***(*Respondent no 16, personal interview, Monday 20 December 2021, Arcadia)**

The looting of businesses belonging to informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. In the case of respondent, no 16, when he was able to escape the xenophobic attacks, all his goods were looted. However, what validated the experience of respondent no 16 as a xenophobic attack was the fact that the informal immigrant entrepreneur was called "makwerekwere."

Maybe if the perpetrators did not call the informal immigrant entrepreneur "makwerekwere," the incident would have appeared differently because sometimes, football supporters (in this case supporters of Orlando Pirates) often channel the anger of defeat into violence against supporters of the team that won. Archetti and Romero (2004) attest to the fact that violence has always existed in football. It is most likely perpetrated by supporters of the team that loses.

But in the case of respondent no 16, why was the respondent attacked? This brings us to the issue where African immigrants are blamed for the failures and mistakes of South Africans. Even though the informal immigrant entrepreneur was not the cause of the Orlando Pirates losing the match, the informal immigrant entrepreneur was assaulted.

6.5.2 Political affiliates as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks

Furthermore, xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have also been perpetrated by members of political parties in South Africa. Often, even if the term "makwerekwere" is not employed during xenophobic attacks, it is a habit that ordinary South Africans always try to establish the origin of African immigrants to determine the level of attacks perpetrated against them; to confirm the argument of Dube (2019) that South Africans perpetrate different level of xenophobia towards different categories of immigrants in the country.

For example, before respondent no 1 who conducted informal trade in Pretoria CBD was attacked, he was asked if he was a Nigerian as the respondent mentioned the following:

> *[…] I was attacked by members of the Economic Freedom Fighters who were returning from the National Day of Action march at the Union Building. […] The attackers were putting on the EFF red t-shirts with the logo on it. […] Some of them had the EFF red beret on. […] While they were passing in front of my shop, one of them spoke to me in the home language while waving his hand at me at the same time. […] I waved back at him without saying a word. […] They then walk a few metres but turned back and came to my shop. […] They started pretending as if they wanted to buy things […] They started asking the prices of almost everything. […] I kept giving them the price until one of them asked if I was from Nigeria? I said, no I am from DRC. He then asked me again "how long have you been living in South Africa?" […] Even before I responded, another one asked me, "why did you come to South Africa?" […] I then decided not to respond to them. […] They were talking and laughing in the home language and I knew they were speaking about me because they we calling the word "makwerekwere" […] I then asked them why they were asking me all those questions? One of them said to me, "you know our people are suffering neh"! […] I responded yes, my brother, I know, even me, I am also suffering. […] They then said, they were from the EFF". They said, they are fighting while foreigners are taking over all the place. They asked me to give them money so that they can leave. I told them that I have not sold anything that day. I*

told them I had on R40 in my pocket. They said if that is the case, they would search my shop and if they find any money, they would take it. […] I told them that they should not search my shop the things I am selling are for people from the DRC. […] When I realized, they were determined to search the shop, I then took my phone and tried to dial the 10111 to call the police for help. […] That was when I one of them slapped me on the face and hit me multiple times on the neck and in the stomach. […] I was not able to call the police, but as it was a busy street people come as they heard the noise in my shop, that is when they left **(Respondent no 1, personal interview, Tuesday 2 November 2021, Pretoria CBD)**

In addition, South Africans use economic deprivation as a licence to perpetrate xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, even when they understand that African immigrants in South Africa face a lot of constraints in accessing economic opportunities. Often the financial capital that they invested in their business is mostly obtained through the support of friends and relatives (kith and kin).

However, the testimony of respondent no 1 is similar to that of respondent no 12 who was also attacked by members of the Economic Freedom Fighters. The respondent mentioned the following:

[…] I was attacked by some members of the EFF at Sunnyside on the 7th of June, 2020. I will never forget that day because it was the saddest day of my life since I came to South Africa. […]. They were returning from a protest at the US Embassy in Pretoria for whatever reason that I do not know. When they came to my marketplace, they asked what I was selling so told them. […] They also asked for the prices, so I gave them. They did not seem to be happy with the price I gave them. […] They said to me that my stuffs were expensive. […] Then one of the guys took a banana and ate. I told them that the price of a banana was R3. […] But he behaved as if he did not hear. […] They kept speaking in their home language. After that, one of them who first picked a banana gave me R5. […] And the other who ate two bananas said the R5 was for all the bananas they had eaten since they cannot eat the foreign food that I was selling. […] I told them that the 4 bananas were R12. […] When the 7 of them were leaving, I held the hand of the one who did not pay. […] I said please pay me for the two bananas you ate. […] One of his friends took out money to pay me, but he told the friend not to pay, so the friend put back the money in his pocket. […] I then stood in front of him to block him from exiting. […] That is when one of them said, "this guy is irritating we need to teach him a lesson" while referring to me. […] That was when five of them started hitting at

me while the others went outside to wait for them. But before my other brothers from DRC could arrived the scene to help me, they had left […] (**Respondent no 12, personal interview, Tuesday 7 December 2021, Sunnyside)**

The testimony of respondent no 12 further revealed the complexity of power relations between South Africans and African immigrants. The fact that perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against African immigrants are not punished has increased the perception that African immigrants in South Africa have no right to live or conduct business in the country. From the testimony, one is left with the impression that South Africans think the informal immigrant entrepreneurs do not have any right to tell them how much they should pay for their goods. Hence, in the case of respondent no 12, the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks, even after they were informed of the price, decided to offer what they wish to offer until the situation became violent. Such a scenario makes one ask questions such as to what extent do groups of South Africans premeditate the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against African informal immigrant entrepreneurs?

Nonetheless, what validated the experience of respondent no 12 as xenophobic attacks was the fact that in one way or the other, the foreignness of the respondent was established when the perpetrators claimed they could not eat the foreign food that the respondent was selling. Such a statement has deeper implications because what makes food foreign? The respondent, for example, sells rice which is a common staple food across many communities in the world. What then makes rice to be foreign?

In addition, there are other known examples of political affiliates and their xenophobic attitudes/actions that have been documented. ActionSA, for example, under the leadership of Herman Mashaba, was harshly criticised for their xenophobic action and views on tackling "illegal foreign nationals" in the City of Johannesburg, as reported by *The Daily Maverick* newspaper.[61]Gayton McKenzie, leader of the Patriotic Alliance, was also criticised for his xenophobic utterances when he promised to deport foreigners during the launch of the party manifesto during the 2021 elections in Eldorado Park, Johannesburg, as reported by News24.[62]

[61] https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-05-action-sas-herman-mashaba-unapologetic-about-stance-on-foreigners-and-driven-to-wear-joburgs-mayoral-chain-again/

[62]https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/elections-2021-patriotic-alliance-targets-illegal-foreigners-at-manifesto-launch-20211009

6.5.3 Direct and indirect perpetrators of xenophobic attacks

The testimonies revealed that there are different roles South Africans play in the perpetration of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the country. For example, there are South Africans who play the role of direct perpetrators and others who act as indirect perpetrators. For example, in the testimony of respondent no 17 who identified the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against him as workers of the City of Tshwane Pikitup service (direct perpetrators),[63] the respondent mentioned the following:

> *[…] There was a time when workers of pikitup were protesting in Pretoria. The workers had scattered dirt all over the streets. […] I went to the usual place that I displayed my curio items. I always sell them close to a mobile kitchen of a South African lady, and another elderly South African who sell fruits and vegetables. […] Before I got to my business place, the South African lady who runs a mobile kitchen had swept the dirt that was scattered all over the place. […] While I was selling, 6 South African men came to the place we were selling. […] They spoke to the elder South African man who sells fruits. Then they came to me. One of the men greeted me in the home language. […] I responded in English am fine thanks and you? […] They spoke to each other and I heard the word "makwerekwere." […] They then said, they were working for the waste management service at City of Tshwane. […] They asked me why did I sweep that place because they and other workers were the ones who spread dirt all over the place. […] I said, I did not sweep anything. I arrived when the place was already swept. I said I was not sure if the lady who owns the mobile kitchen was the one who swept the place since she was selling food stuff. […] I added, I only sell curio stuff so I can sell even on top of dirt. […] They were not satisfied. They kept speaking in the home language mentioning the word "makwerekwere." […] The leader of the group then said to me they would take my goods to the City of Tshwane. I told them that they can asked the old man selling fruits I came after he and the lady selling food had arrived. They did not listen. […] Three of them started packing my stuff into the bags that I carried the goods with. They did not pack the stuff of the old man or the lady. […] So, I said to them why are they collecting only my stuff. One of them said to me, "you talk too much." That is when they started attacking me. […] They asked me to follow them, but someone who often buy from me, said I should not follow them that they can kill*

[63] Pikitup is the waste management utility service in South Africa (Samson, 2020).

me. […] Besides my body was painful after they had hit me with the object, they were holding.

(Respondent no 17, personal interview, Wednesday 22 December 2021, Arcadia)

The testimony of respondent no 17 also confirms the uneasy relationship between South Africans and African immigrants. From the testimony, it would have been normal for the workers of the City of Tshwane waste management services to bring together the three informal traders to establish who swept the dirt away. However, they did not do that. Instead, they made up their mind to punish respondent no 17 for an act that he did not do, and then attacked him. The fact that no one asked the name of respondent no 17, yet his assailants spoke in the home language mentioning the word "makwerekwere" was proof that the attack was a xenophobic attack. There is nothing African immigrants can do to please South Africans. African immigrants are always seen as liars (Koenane, 2018). The South African lady who swept the place should have been sensitive enough to own up to the fact that she was the one who swept the place or the old man should have called out the lady who swept the place. Yet both (indirect perpetrators) kept quiet even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur was wrongfully attacked with objects.

Such behaviour shows the mindset of the majority of South Africans who consider it normal to attack and even kill African immigrants to get rid of them in South Africa (Spel, 2020). Respondent no 22 also identified the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against him as South Africans who were dressed like "Izikhothane".[64] The respondent mentioned the following:

[…] I was at my shop selling when almost eight boys entered my shop to look at the clothes I was selling. […] Two of them were putting on similar clothes like the ones I was selling. Some of the clothes were typically clothes that member of izikhothane like to put on. […] While I was attending to the ones looking at the clothes, the counter where I had displayed some of the perfumes I was selling was opened. […] In the cause of my interaction with the clients, one of them asked me where I am coming from. I said I come from Senegal. […] Another one said, "where is Senegal?" […] I responded Senegal is far. […] One of them who was looking at the clothes then bought a colourful brown and black tracksuit that I sold for R300. […] While they were leaving the shop, I then realized that two bottles of perfumes were missing from the counter. […] I quickly stopped them and said, two bottles of perfumes were missing. […] That was when they

[64] Izikhothane is an urban youth subcultural phenomenon in South African townships that involve the display of stylish clothes (Memela, 2018; Mchunu, 2017).

said I have accused them. The one who bought the tracksuit said, I should refund him that he was no longer buying the tracksuit anymore. […] They threatened me with words such as; "we are going to send you home in a dead bag. […] They became violent and attacked. Two private security guys in Hatfield came to the scene. […] When they came, one of the security guys said to me, why did I accuse them? […] The other security guy said, he would have to search their bag. They did not accept but he used force to search it and found the bottles of perfumes inside their bag. That was when they said to me, "we will come back for you kwerekwere […] **(Respondent no 22, personal interview, Sunday 9 January 2022, Hatfield)**

The testimony of respondent no 22 further revealed the complex nature between criminality and xenophobic attacks against Francophone African immigrant entrepreneurs. The members of "izikhothane" who were the direct perpetrators of xenophobic attacks posed a criminal act which in the end reconstructed the criminal incident to become xenophobic when they threatened with the words, we will come back for you "kwerekwere" (see the testimony of respondent no 22).

In addition, when the members of "izikhothane" claim that they do not know where Senegal is it confirms studies that claim that South Africans do not know much about other parts of Africa as a result of isolation during apartheid (Akinola, 2018; Crush et al. 2015; Matsinhe, 2009). However, the question that should be asked is why is it that even after apartheid young South Africans still do not know about other parts of Africa? Is it that curricula in South African schools do not teach about other parts of Africa?

Notwithstanding, the experience of respondent no 22 can be validated as a xenophobic attack because his origin was established by the perpetrators. Hence, when the private security agents arrived at the scene, even without searching for the members of "izikhothane" who stole the perfumes, one private security agent (as an indirect perpetrator) brought the integrity of the informal immigrant entrepreneur into question by asking the informal immigrant entrepreneur why he was accusing the members of "izikhothane." Even when the perfumes were discovered from the latter, the private security agents did not apologise to the informal immigrant entrepreneur.

6.5.4 Disgruntled workers

While the 2019 "National Action Plan to combat Xenophobia, Racism and Discrimination" was an important step towards recognising and addressing abuses related to xenophobia and

ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable, not much has been achieved in terms of addressing the issue. Both direct and indirect perpetrators of xenophobic attacks are still not held accountable.

For example, respondent no 19 who was attacked by individuals who were part of a group of mine workers protesting outside the Union Buildings in Pretoria mentioned the following:

> *[…] I did not know that most foreigners did not open their shops the day I was attacked. […] I had barely opened my shop when a group of men who were protesting at the Union Building crossed the road to my shop. […] There was a South African lady who was selling pap and steak in the yard where I run my business. […] The group of guys were speaking the home language to the lady who sold food. I thought they were placing their orders. […] The lady told them that she was renting the space where she sold pap and steak from me. […] Suddenly, the guys entered my shop and said, "why did you open this shop when we are busy protesting at the Union Building?" […] I told them that I did not know it was a protest. I said, it is fine, let me close the shop. […] One of them said, who owns the building that I was in? I said it was a former ambassador of Chad that I was renting only the space for the shop. […] He asked me where was the caretaker of the building, I said I do not know. He said because they were going to burn down the building. I then responded it is a residential building. While I was answering them, I was also trying to close the door but one of them blocked the door with his leg. […] He then accused me that I hit his leg with the door. That is how they attacked, assaulted me, and vandalized the whole shop. […] They said, I must respect South Africans. I must not open the shop when South Africans are protesting because it is a provocation […]* **(Respondent no 19, personal interview, Wednesday 29 December 2021, Arcadia)**

The experience of respondent no 19 highlights some issues that should be interrogated. One of the issues is enquiring if there is a law in South Africa that says shops belonging to informal immigrant entrepreneurs should not be opened when South Africans are protesting. Besides, the perpetrators claim that the shop of respondent no 19 should not have been opened because it was a provocation to South Africans. They did not explain how the opening of the shop was a provocation to South Africans.

This is because the protestors were mine workers and they cannot claim to be speaking on behalf of all South Africans across different walks of life. Also, the fact that the South African lady who sold pap and steak was exempted from being vandalised, validates the experience of respondent no 19 as a xenophobic attack. This is because it seems as if respondent no 19 was

singled out. In addition, the fact that the building where respondent no 19 conducted informal business belonged to an African immigrant diplomat, may have angered the perpetrators the more.

Hence, the immediate response after establishing ownership of the building was the threat to burn down the building. The question one should, therefore, ask is what was the link between the shop that was vandalised and the intent to burn down the building? This same question can be asked regarding the looting of business that belongs to African immigrants in South Africa during the wave of xenophobic attacks.

For example, if African immigrant informal entrepreneurs are attacked because they are not South Africans, do the goods that they buy from South African retailers also become foreign? Why are the informal businesses of immigrant entrepreneurs mostly targeted during xenophobic attacks? In the case of respondent, no 19, are the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks xenophobes or protesters? How does opening the shop for informal immigrants provoke South African protesters? These questions and more need to be answered by future research studies.

6.5.5 Officials of SAPS, TMPD, and Department of Community Safety and Xenophobic Attacks

Some officials of the SAPS, TMPD, and Gauteng Department of Community Safety have perpetrated xenophobic attacks against African immigrants in South Africa. For example, officers of the SAPS and TMPD often used to search for counterfeit goods and drugs as a cover-up to raid informal businesses that belong to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. During the raid, sometimes, officers often beat up African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in the process. There is also evidence that some officers of SAPS and TMPD often confiscated the goods that belonged to informal immigrant entrepreneurs unjustly, and resold the goods later (Gastrow, 2018; Manjokoto & Ranga, 2017; Vigneswaran, 2013).

This is similar to the experience of respondent no 28 who mentioned the following:

> *[…] There was mix patrol of the SAPS and TMPD in Gezina immediately after the lockdowns were over. The officers who were leading the patrol said it was alleged that counterfeit goods from Zimbabwe had been circulation in South Africa during the lockdowns. […] The officers came to my shop and requested my identification papers. When I gave it to them, they said they would like to search my shop. I said they can get inside and search. […] While they were searching, one of the officers of SAPS said to me "where do you keep the drugs"? I responded to him I do not sell drugs. […] Another*

officer stretched his hand and took a plastic bag that had close to thirty packets of cigarettes inside. The was the stock I just bought few days ago. […] The officer asked me where I bought the cigarettes? I said I bought it from Shoprite. […] He then took the packets of cigarette and said to me he was going to the police van to scan them to see if he I bought them from Shoprite. I told him there was no need to scan the packets because I had slip that I received after buying the cigarettes. […] I showed him the slip, but he refused to look at. […] He went to the police van and dropped the cigarettes there. […] When he came back to the shop to continue searching, the police van drove off. Some of the TMPD officers also left. […] I then told the police officer that I will close the shop and go with him so that I can collect the cigarettes that was left in the van. The officer said to me that, he would bring the cigarettes. I told him I was not sure he would bring back the cigarettes. That it was good I follow him and get it back myself. […] The officer then got angry and said I was obstructing him. The cigarettes were under investigation. I then asked him to give me a document that says the cigarettes were under investigation so that I can keep it for my reference. […] That is when he stepped on my toes and started assaulting me. […] He said to me I do not have respect for police officers. He asked the TMPD officers to confiscate the goods I had put on the table outside my shop. […] I tried to stop the TMPD officers but the situation was instead escalated to a point where three of them started assaulting me. […] They took out Jambok from the van of TMPD and hit me with. One of SAPS then said to me he would ensure that I was deported […] **Respondent no 28, personal interview, Saturday 11 December 2021, Gezina)**

The testimony of respondent no 28 can be validated as an experience of xenophobic attacks for a couple of reasons. The patrol team did not present any formal search order before searching. This left one in doubt about whether the exercise was legal or not. Hence, one needs to interrogate whether South African informal entrepreneurs and other informal immigrant entrepreneurs around Gezina were subjected to such an exercise. In addition, the fact that the informal immigrant entrepreneur was asked by one of the police officers where he was keeping the drugs was inappropriate because it sounded as if the policers officers operated out of prejudice.

The police officer should have searched and then presented a report on whether drugs or counterfeit goods were found. Also, why did the police van drive off with the packet of cigarettes of the informal trader in it? And why did the SAPS officer refuse to look at the slip/receipt that that informal immigrant entrepreneur presented to him to confirm where the

cigarettes were purchased? Such refusal not only adds obscurity to the entire search process but further questions the legality of the exercise, especially at the point where the informal immigrant entrepreneurs were threatened with deportation and assaulted by officials of TMPD. These are seemingly individuals who know the law and were supposed to execute the law. If the informal immigrant entrepreneur was guilty of any wrongdoing, why was he not arrested and prosecuted? Why did the officers resort to attacking the informal immigrant entrepreneurs? They would surely not have behaved the same way if they were before a South African informal immigrant entrepreneur. Therefore, the way they manhandled respondent no 28 validates the fact that the officers were perpetrators of xenophobic attacks.

Lastly, respondent no 13 mentioned the following:

> *[…] In 2019, I was attacked by individuals from the Gauteng department of community safety who came to Sunnyside to combat issues that threatened the safety of the community. […] The individuals had no document to show that they came from Gauteng department of community safety. […] They were many of them. I remember two of them came to where I was selling and asked me for to present a trading permit. […] I told them that I have been selling on the sidewalk for more than 7 years and that was the first time I was being asked to present a trading permit. […] They said, they would call the metro police to come and collect my stuff. […] I then noticed that the other foreigners who were selling were not asked to present their permit. I then asked them why did they not asked trading permit from the South Africans and those from Lesotho were also selling closed to me. […] One of the officials responded that South Africans are home, why must they have a permit? He further asked me where do I want South Africans to go and sell? […] When I then realized that they were being very serious. I started to pack the things I was selling inside the boxes quickly. […] They quickly stopped me. I then asked them to issue me fine. They said, they are not the metro police to issue such ticket. I then said, if they are not the metro police why are they asking me things that the metro police should be asking? […] The exchange between myself and them became intense. I then decided to try and pick a few expensive stuffs that I had bought before the arrival of the metro police. […] That was when they attacked and assaulted me. […] Some of them used word like kwerekwere. […] They asked me if I thought South African was a country without law. They said I should go home and do as I wish. They attacked me until the metro police came. […] When the metro police came, the officers' notices that spot I was occupying to trade was the veranda of a hair dressing salon. So, they said, if the owners of the hair dressing salon do not complain,*

they it was my right to sell on the spot. The metro police showed the officials of community safety, the space on the sidewalk that belonged to building and the space that belonged to the public. They said, I was occupying the space of the building and only the building has the right to evict me. As if that was not all, some of the members of the Gauteng community safety said, they must check my stuff if I sell drugs. That is when they started opening my boxes, scattering the fruits on the pavement. They said to me they will show me that this is South Africa […] **(Respondent no 13, personal interview, Friday 10 December 2021, Sunnyside)**

The testimony of respondent no 13 shows that the respondent was singled out among South African and Lesotho informal immigrant entrepreneurs. The question that must be asked is why the African immigrant from Lesotho did not experience similar treatment to the Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneur? Is it because the country of origin of African immigrants in South Africa influences the behaviour of South African towards different categories of African immigrants, as Dube (2019) has argued.

Even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur was vindicated of no wrongdoing by the officials of the TMPD, the South African officials of the Gauteng Department of Community Safety still abused their power by searching the boxes of fruits of the informal immigrant entrepreneur without even apologising for assaulting an innocent person before the Metro Police officers arrived.

When they called the informal immigrant entrepreneur "kwerekwere" and promised to show him that he was in South Africa, it could be an idiom that means South Africa is a place where African immigrants do not have a voice/say and are subjected to xenophobic attacks. This validates the experience of respondent no 13 that those officials were perpetrators of xenophobic attacks.

More especially, as the officials were not mandated to search for drugs without the police. Nonetheless, while the previous section has established the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business, it is important to understand the reason why Francophone informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

6.6 THE REASONS FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS ARE ATTACKED

During a hybrid National Assembly Plenary Question and Answer Session that took place in Cape Town on 27 August 2020. President Cyril Ramaphosa appeared before the National Assembly to answer questions presented for oral reply. A question was asked by Honorable Thandiswa Marawu- a member of parliament of the African Transformation Movement (ATM) regarding what steps President Cyril Ramaphosa would take to ensure that trading in the informal sector was reserved only for South Africans and to instruct the government to review work permits, revoking all permits issued for work that South Africans could do.

In his response, President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that "the unemployment crisis in our country has been dramatically deepened by the economic effects of the global coronavirus pandemic. We are, therefore, called upon to use every means at our disposal to rebuild our economy, protect existing jobs and create new jobs. This means, among other things, that we need to look at the issues of migration, employment, and economic activity. As we do so, we should avoid the populist temptation to blame our unemployment crisis on foreign nationals working in our country, either legally or illegally […]."[65]

However, despite Ramaphosa's plea, there remains a widespread myth that African immigrants including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are responsible for 'social ills' such as; "crime, bringing disease, and "stealing" jobs, services, and resources" that belong to South Africans. Thus, rendering South Africans in poverty (Crush and Ramachandran, 2016). Since the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 until now, poverty is often used to justify the perpetration of violence against African immigrants, especially African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. Even poor South Africans who often attack informal immigrant entrepreneurs do not attack each other with similar ferocity (Crush and Ramachandran, 2016). In addition to the fact that some poor areas in South Africa do not experience violence against immigrants (Crush and Ramachandran, 2016).

Therefore, poverty is the cause of the violence against immigrants in South Africa. Why is it that only African immigrants are singled out for deadly assault, but European immigrants for example, are not (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Crush and Ramachandran, 2016)? Even when Misago (2019); Peberdy (2018); Nshimbi and Moyo (2018); Pineteh (2017); claim that African immigrant informal entrepreneurs, for example, contribute significantly to the formal

[65] https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-signals-watershed-transparency-and-accountability-public

retail and wholesale sector in South Africa. African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses are attacked for varied reasons. Operation Dudula for example attacked informal immigrant shop owners on the 8th of March, 2022 in Alexandra township in Johannesburg accusing them of taking job opportunities meant for South Africans as reported by EWN (eyewitness news).[66]

There is also the assertion that amidst the high competition between informal immigrant entrepreneurs and local/South African informal traders, informal immigrant entrepreneurs sell goods at cheaper prices than local informal traders for various reasons and, therefore, undercut and take away business from locals (Mukwarami et al. 2018). This has raised questions among South Africans such as; where do foreign shop owners get the goods, they at cheaper prices? South Africans have, therefore, resorted to believing that the goods that informal immigrant traders sell are fake or counterfeit goods (Mofokeng, 2018). Even when Masibane et al. (2020) claim some foreign shop owners use the 'price discount' approach to gain a competitive advantage in informal trade. Nonetheless, the assertion that informal immigrant entrepreneurs are selling counterfeit goods has attracted violent attacks against them and their businesses. For example, The Citizen newspaper reported on the 22 of June 2022 that foreign shops in Yeoville market were burnt down 3 days after shop owners received threats from Operation Dudula.[67]Nonetheless, the testimonies in the subsequent paragraphs from Section 6.6.1 would establish the reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

6.6.1 Failure to Act as a Lender to South Africans

Among the reasons why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business. The failure to act as a lender to South Africans appears to be a potential reason why the informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been attacked in Pretoria. Such reason is not documented in previous studies that look at the reason why African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, are attacked. For example, respondent no 18 mentioned the following:

> *[…] I was attacked by South African guys who wanted to borrow cigarettes from me. I often refused and told them that I cannot lend anything to them because where I was buying the goods. […] No one has ever given me goods on credit. […] So, two or three*

[66] https://ewn.co.za/2022/03/08/migrant-shop-owners-close-shop-for-second-day-amid-dudula-movement-removals

[67] https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/crime/police-looking-suspects-responsible-yeoville-market-fire/

months ago, while I was busy selling, one of the guys who attacked me took a packet of chips. […] I was sitting on a chair, so I got up and held his hand to take the packet of chips. […] He said to me, he would take credit by force. I told him that would never happen. […]" While I was struggling to take the packet of chips from his hand, he called his friends and that was how I was attacked by them as they called me "stinky "makwerekwere." […] **(Respondent no 18, personal interview, Tuesday 30 November 2021, Arcadia).**

From the testimony of respondent, no 18, South Africans attacked Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who refuse to lend goods to them. Even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur informs the attackers that where he buys goods, the wholesaler does not give him goods on credit. To politely decline the request. However, that meant nothing to the attackers who claimed he would take goods on credit by force. Thus, showing again how South Africans abuse their privilege as citizens when interacting with African immigrants. Even when the attackers called the informal immigrant entrepreneur "stinky makwerekwere" shows their disgust for African immigrants who are believed to be trespassers.

In addition, respondent no 23 has had a similar experience to that of respondent no 18. In the testimonies, respondent no 23 mentioned the following:

[…] A South African guy who sells close to where I am selling, asked me to lend him R1500 so that he can add his business stocks because he was just coming from a funeral in Limpopo where he spent all the money he had been saving […] I told him I do not have money to lend to him because the little money I had, I wanted to add my own stocks. […] I then left to the market to buy new stocks […] When I returned with a bakkie, while the goods were being offloaded and the bakkie guy was about to leave. […] A group of guys who had dirty clothes on came and were opening the boxes without my permission. […] I told them not to open the stuff because I was not selling them yet. […] They said who am I to tell them what to do or what not to do? They said I was not a South African so, I had no right to tell them what to do. They became violent as they were insulting me in the home language and English calling me kwerekwere and physically attacking me. I was scared that they might harm me. So, I let them do what they wanted to do […] Then, one of them said to me, you are taking our jobs, but when we ask you for small money you cannot give us" […] I think he did not say this intentionally. That is how I knew someone was behind it […] The boys damaged some of the fruits and left" When I returned to my business place, I narrated the incident to the South African guy who asked me to borrow him money and I could not […] They

*guy laughed, and said to me that was a serious warning. Those guys might come back for me. That I might have offended someone […] (**Respondent no 23, personal interview, Tuesday 11 January 2022, Hatfield)***

The testimony of respondent no 23 also shows how a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was attacked because he refused to lend R1 500 to his South African informal business counterpart. As mentioned earlier in (section 6.4) the experienced harassment and physical attacks perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria. This has made the informal immigrant entrepreneur insensitive toward the plight of South Africans who have genuine concerns. There is, therefore, evidence that the attackers were sent by the South African informal trader because not only the attackers mentioned that […] when we ask you for small money you cannot give us (see the testimony of respondent no 23). The South African informal entrepreneur also confessed without empathy that the incident was a serious warning against the informal immigrant entrepreneur and even went as far as threatening the informal immigrant entrepreneur that the attackers would come back for the informal immigrant entrepreneur. So that the informal immigrant entrepreneur should conduct business in constant fear as is the case of many African immigrants in South Africa who live their day-to-day life in constant fear of being attacked by South Africans.

The assertion that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs such as Somalis have been attacked by their South African counterparts because they sell goods at cheaper prices than the locals for various reasons and, therefore, undercut and take away business from locals is evident

However, even the testimony of respondent no 23, seems to contradict previous studies that claimed that African informal immigrant entrepreneurs (especially from Somalia) are attacked by South African informal entrepreneurs because they do not share their "business secret" with them (Peberdy, 2021; Tshishonga, 2015). In the case of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs, the issue of business secrets did not appear in the testimonies. However, the fact that they refused to lend money or goods to South Africans was the reason for them to be attacked.

6.6.2 Calling the police on South Africans

Another reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business is when they try to involve the police in a

confrontation between them and South Africans. Respondent no 1 for example mentioned the following:

> *[…] When the South Africans were determined to search my shop, I then took my phone to dial 10111 to call the police for help since I did not know what would happen next. That was when one of them grabbed my phone and saw the number of the police station on it. […] He told his friends that I was calling the police. […] They then because angry and said to me, who are you to call the police on us? They then started slapping me on the face and hitting me multiple times on the neck and on the stomach. […] They called me "makwerekwere" and said I should go to the police station and open a case […]* **(Respondent no 1, personal interview, Tuesday 2 November 2021, Pretoria CBD**

Many South Africans do not take it lightly when informal immigrant entrepreneurs call the police on them. In the case of respondent, no 1, the assailants never attacked the respondent until they realized he had called the police on them. Part of the reason why South Africans do not take it lightly is because of the perception that African immigrants in South Africa in general do not have any rights. Therefore, calling the police on them seems like the informal immigrant entrepreneur was challenging their position of privilege as "bona fide" citizens.

Respondent no 12 also mentioned the following in her testimony:

> *[…] Some South Africans came to my shop claiming they were looking for illegal immigrants. They asked for my passport. I told them my passport was not with me. That I left it at home. […] They said I should walk with my passport everywhere I go. […] I told them I did not know about that. I asked them where are they from? They said they were from Home Affairs City of Tshwane. […] I realized that there was no department called Home Affairs City of Tshwane. I told them that Home Affairs and City of Tshwane are two different offices. I said only officials of Home Affairs or the Police are allowed to request for my passport in this case. […] I then said I am calling the police to come and resolve the matter. […] I took my phone to call the police, that was when the physically attacked me and said, they will make sure I go back to my country […]* (**Respondent no 12, personal interview, Tuesday 7 December 2021, Sunnyside).**

The testimony of respondent no 12 also confirms the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked for seeking assistance from the police. The informal immigrant was also attacked when he tried to call the police. In the case of the testimony of respondent no 12. The reason the respondent was attacked might be because the South Africans might not have acted purely on xenophobic motives. This is because when the assailants said

they were coming from the Department of Home Affairs City of Tshwane. There was a clear indication that they sounded like criminal elements because there is no such office as the home affairs city of Tshwane. Home affairs offices are distinguished by the street they operate from. For example, the Department of Home Affairs Byrun Place, Sophie de Bruyn Street.
However, even though such an experience may appear to have criminality in it. The fact that the assailants told the respondent that they would make sure the respondent return home, brought in the aspect of xenophobia which is prevalent among South Africans across all walks of life including criminals.

6.6.3 Unofficial law enforcers

South Africans continue to feel betrayed by the government and law enforcement agents. Many believe that the reason why African immigrants are still in South Africa is because of corrupt home affairs officials and police officers. To this effect, many South Africans have resorted to taking the laws into their hands when it comes to dealing with particularly African immigrants in the country.
Ordinary South Africans feel it is their responsibility to punish African immigrants who commit crimes or are suspected of conducting illegal activities in the country. In this regard, Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria claimed that they have been attacked because ordinary South Africans have taken the laws into their hands to decide who stays in South Africa and who must leave the country. Such actions do not consider the role of established law enforcement authorities in the country. For example, respondent no 16 mentioned the following:

> *[…] Three ladies and a guy came to where I was selling. […] One of the ladies said, she sent her son to buy mangoes. But she realized that I took the money and gave her son rotten mangoes […] I said to her the mangoes were not rotten. I even showed her a couple of mangoes and explained to her that the mangoes were the same. I said that was how all the mangoes I sold were. I then asked her, where are the mangoes? With the hope that I may change them to the one she wants. […] She said, she threw the mangoes in the dustbin. […] I then said to her, how then do I know whether the mangoes were rotten? Another lady that came with her stepped in and said to me, "so you have come to South Africa to tell us that we are liars, right? […] While she reached out to grab my money, I pushed her away from my counter to grab my money bag. […] The*

situation then escalated and all of them attacked me and scattered the stuff I was selling […] **(Respondent no 16, personal interview, Monday 20 December 2021, Arcadia).**

Increasingly, South Africans resort to taking the laws into their hands when they are dealing with Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. The testimony of respondent no 16 shows how South Africans attacked the informal immigrant entrepreneur because they believe that they have the freedom to administer justice in a confrontation between them and the informal immigrant entrepreneur. However, if there was an issue of wrongdoing on the part of the informal immigrant entrepreneur. They should have reported the matter to the police station which is an established legal institution to deal with such matters.

The assailants (South Africans) rather decided to punish the informal immigrants themselves. Even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur requested that she be willing to change the goods (mangoes in this testimony). Why was it difficult for the South Africans to bring the mangoes so that the informal immigrant entrepreneur can see it for himself? Even when the informal immigrant entrepreneur was still negotiating to change the mangoes, what was the correlation between the mangoes and the money bag of the informal immigrant that one of the ladies wanted to grab? Such a scenario further demonstrates the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked because some South Africans believe it is their right to enforce the law vis-à-vis the informal immigrant entrepreneur. This is rooted in the perception that African immigrants in South Africa have no rights.

The reason why respondent no 11 was attacked, is similar to that of respondent no 16. For example, respondent no 11 mentioned the following:

[…] I was attacked by street waste pickers in Sunnyside. […] Three of them had collected the metal table that I displayed chips and other things to sell. […] I went after them before they could go too far with my metal table. […] When I met them, I held the table. They started insulted me "makwerekwere" […] One of them used a long rusted objected to attack me. He stabbed me on my left thumb, but I used my hand to block it. It scratched me a little bit, and blood was coming out. […] I however succeeded in recovering the metal table. They said, they would remove me from where I do business. I told them to come and remove me but they never came […] **(Respondent no 11, personal interview, Saturday 04 December 2021, Sunnyside).**

The testimony of respondent no 11 further shows how South Africans often take the laws into their hands when dealing with African immigrants. The assailant of respondent no 11 promised to remove the informal immigrant entrepreneurs from his business location even when they know they do not have the authority to do so. They took the metal table of the informal

immigrant entrepreneur and stabbed the finger of the informal immigrant entrepreneur. This highlights the fact that South Africans believe it is normal to attack and even kill African immigrants in South Africa. Even News24 on 29 April 2022 published a report accusing former City of Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba and his ActionSA party of taking the laws into his hands under the title: Herman Mashaba/Foreign nationals: The new F-word that needs proper discourse. Where Herman Mashaba was accused of masterminding xenophobic violence in South Africa through his populist stand on "illegal immigration."[68]

6.6.4 Nonsecular dimensions

Furthermore, some respondents claimed that the reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business is associated with serious spiritual issues. Respondent no 1, for example, mentioned the following:

> *"[…] I believe life is spiritual. […] South Africans attacked me because they have shared a lot of blood during apartheid. […] Like the bible says when the blood of a man touches the earth it cries for vengeance. The blood of Abel touches the ground it cried. Can't you see the kind of anger that the youths of South Africa have? I have been attacked several times for no good reasons […] The last time I was attacked was because two guys asked me where I was from and I said I was from Arcadia. They said, no they mean what country I was from. I then kept quiet. It resulted in them attacking and destroying my goods. There must be spiritual forces manipulating them because how do you attack me because I refused to answer your question? […]"* **(Respondent no 1, personal interview, Tuesday 2 November 2021, Pretoria CBD).**

Respondent no 1 did not see any valid reason why he was attacked by the two South African guys. The respondent said the fact that he kept quiet and they attacked him must be that there has been some sort of spiritual manipulation that made the guys attack him. The reason respondent no 1 gave as a possible cause of the attack is not documented in the pieces of literature on Francophone African immigrants in South Africa. However, the question of spiritual dimensions appeared twice in the testimonies. Respondent no 26 also mentioned the following:

> *"[…] There was a security guard from hlanganani protection services who was working at Bismillah supermarket opposite the spar around Capital Park. […] He*

[68]https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/analysis-who-is-behind-south-africas-xenophobic-nationalism-20220429

*crossed the road with his colleague and told me he was going out for lunch. He said to me I should give him chicken feet that he would when he returns from lunch […] I told him to take the number of chicken feet that he was asking. […] But instead of the chicken feet, he added wings and gizzard for about R30. […] His colleagues also took chicken feet for R15 and R10 respectively. […] Around about 6pm before I left, I went to them to ask for my money because it was time to go back home. […] The one that I asked for my money said what am I harassing him for peanuts? […] If it was peanut, why didn't you pay when you took the stuff? He got angrier and said, I was asking him money when nobody was asking me to pay rent where I roast chicken and sell. […] He called the two other security guards and asked them to take my stuff and locked in the in the store. […] They pulled my stuff one side and I pulled it the other side. […] it then resulted to three of the security guards to start assaulting me. What can I say about such behaviour? They first guy was very angry as if demons were controlling him. If it was not Satan, how would they eat my chicken feet and refused to pay me. Not only that and assaulted me as well? It must be the work of the devil […]" (***Respondent no 26, personal interview, Friday 21 January 2022, Capital Park).**

From the testimony of respondent, no 26. The respondent could not understand how security guards would borrow braai chicken from him to pay on their return from lunch. However, after eating the chicken, they refused to pay him and got so angry as if demons were controlling the first security guard that he asked for his money. Nonetheless, the fact that the security guards told the informal immigrant entrepreneur that he was not paying rent where he conducted his informal business seems to be the reason why they did not want to pay the informal immigrant entrepreneur.

However, refusing to pay the informal immigrant entrepreneur and not assaulting him was one thing. However, to refuse to pay the informal immigrant entrepreneur and assault him was something the informal immigrant entrepreneur concluded was the work of Satan. Thus, emphasising the non-secular dimension of the reasons why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

6.7 BRIEF ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

The respondents' testimonies reveal how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against while conducting their business in Pretoria (see section 6.3); the type of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs

experience in Pretoria while conducting their business (see section 6.4); the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business (see section 6.5); and the reasons Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business (see section 6.6). This is in response to the objectives of the study (see section 1.5).

However, while Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, in particular, (and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general) continue to be portrayed as "unwanted or undesirable immigrants," it is argued that any attempt to contend the presence of xenophobia in South Africa would not be meaningful. This is because the misrepresentation of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, through various accusatory discourses that portray African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa as criminals or undocumented immigrants cannot coexist with the South African National Action Plan (NAP) to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.[69]

Therefore, objective, and positive representation of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general, can assist the government of South Africa through its NAP to contend with the rise of xenophobia in the country. It is, therefore, obvious that either the objective and positive representation of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, and the successful fight against xenophobia in South Africa, or the continual negative and subjective representation of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa fuel xenophobia.

It is also certain that the rampant harassment of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa (including Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria) provides fertile ground for xenophobic attacks as it engenders animosity between South Africans and African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, in general. However, if African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their contribution to the socioeconomic landscape of South Africa are objectively and positively represented, it can contribute to the NAP to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.

This is because the objective and positive representation of the contribution of African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to the socio-economic landscape of South Africa would greatly encourage tolerance and acceptance toward African immigrants in South Africa, in general. If African immigrants in South Africa, in general, are accepted and integrated into the host

[69] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/national-action-plan.pdf

society, the post-1994 tension that arises as a result of the influx of African migrants into South Africa would become minimal. Even the negative debates on the presence of African immigrants in South Africa would no longer dominate the social, political, and economic platforms in South Africa.

In addition, the acceptance of African immigrants in South Africa, in general, would have a positive influence on the stringent anti-immigrant laws that the government of South Africa has enforced to shield South Africans from the socioeconomic threat that South Africans assume is posed by African immigrants. Until now, the anti-immigration laws in South Africa mostly target African immigrants. As opposed to European or Asian immigrants in South Africa.

The consequences of anti-immigration laws have often promoted negative perceptions of African immigrants. African immigrants in South Africa are increasingly perceived as people who are not valuable members of the host society. The presence of African immigrants in South Africa is perceived and represented as a threat to the well-being of South Africans. This often creates anxiety among South Africans which often led to the perpetration of xenophobic attacks on African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and their businesses; specifically, to cause bodily harm and injury and the looting and burn down of businesses and properties belonging to African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa; even to the extent of killing African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.

6.8 CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, Chapter 6 shows that the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria goes beyond what is documented in previous studies. Chapter 7, therefore, presents the conclusion of the findings of this study and the various recommendations in consideration of the objectives of the study.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In line with the objectives of the study (see Chapter 1), this study has established the link between Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and xenophobia (see Chapter 2). The data were collected in six suburbs in Pretoria (see Chapter 4). Through the research methodology and process adopted in the study, the data was collected to understand how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business (see Chapter 5). The data was then presented and analysed accordingly (see Chapter 6).

The analysis revealed new ways that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced discrimination while conducting their business. It also revealed the types of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced in Pretoria while conducting their business and established new categories of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business. New perspectives were revealed concerning why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked while conducting their business in Pretoria. The findings in Chapter 3 go beyond what previous studies have established. This study, therefore, fills gaps in existing pieces of literature as it seeks to address the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business.

Therefore, based on the findings, Chapter 7 is devoted to showing the missing pieces concerning how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are discriminated against while conducting their business; the type of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business; and the reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business. Answering these questions would mean that the objectives of this study, which are discussed in the summary of the findings, have been achieved.

7.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

This chapter continues to address the objectives made in the first chapter. For that reason, this section of the chapter carries forward the investigation of the study and pursues further the questions raised in Chapter 1 by revisiting the discussion on the analysis in Chapter 6.

7.2.1 Discrimination while conducting business

Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are discriminated against by South Africans in different ways while conducting their business. The most common ways Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against while conducting their business is through South African home languages.

Besides the use of South African indigenous languages to perpetrate discrimination against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, it was also revealed that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who lack proficiency in "spoken English" were discriminated against while conducting their business.

The testimonies revealed instances where a "lack of proficiency" in spoken English was the reason for the perpetration of discrimination against informal immigrant entrepreneurs. The lack of English proficiency was a result of a lack of formal skills in English and a "French accent" when the informal entrepreneur spoke English to the South African.

In addition, the inability of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs to communicate in a local South African home language makes South Africans "skip" them in a discriminatory move to buy from a fellow South African who communicates to the client in a South African home language (see Chapter 6).

Direct discrimination is another form of discrimination that emerged from the data concerning what Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced while conducting their business in Pretoria. The experience of direct discrimination included members of the TMPD impounding the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs with valid trading licences to conduct informal trade in the designated trading area/location where their goods were impounded without any justification or explanation. However, fellow South Africans who conducted informal trade beside them without a valid trading licence were allowed to carry on trading and their goods were not impounded (see Chapter 6).

On other occasions, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans in a costly way (costly discrimination). This involves circumstances where Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct trade in designated trading zones with a valid trading permit have their goods seized and never returned. The informal immigrant traders were also not given any reason as to why the goods were not returned and no fine was levied on the informal trade as is the case concerning the violation of rules governing informal trade around the city of Pretoria.

Another way in which Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced discrimination while conducting their business is when they seek protection from members of the SAPS against South Africans who assaulted them. A Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur with an expired visa on a valid passport was discriminated against by the police and was called "tsotsi" and was threatened with imprisonment.

7.2.2 Varieties of Harassment against Immigrants

Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced different types of harassment in Pretoria while conducting their business. The harassment of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs often takes the form of virtual, verbal, or physical harassment in the form of assault while conducting their business.

Virtual harassment often constitutes text messages through SMS or video messages with an undertone of "xenophobic threat" sent through WhatsApp directed at individual Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs when they refuse to provide items on credit to South Africans.

Verbal harassment was another type of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced in Pretoria while conducting their business. The most common form of verbal harassment perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs is the derogatory name-calling of "makwerekwere." This is often accompanied by phrases such as "illegal foreigner" or "go back home."

Physical harassment that often led to assaults of varied nature is another type of harassment that was revealed in the testimonies that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have experienced while conducting their business. For example, spitting on a female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur and her goods was a unique experience of physical harassment that had been experienced by a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur, as revealed in the testimonies.

Notwithstanding, overall, the findings reveal that female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced less physical harassment and assault than their male counterparts in Pretoria while conducting their business.

7.2.3 Category of Perpetrators of Xenophobic Attacks

The testimonies revealed a specific group of South Africans who have perpetrated xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs such as high school boys who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur on a street corner in Arcadia because the informal trader refused to give them goods on credit while frequently using the word "makwerekwere" as they attacked the informal trader.

Political affiliates are another group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business in Pretoria. This group constitutes members of political parties such as the EFF who do not uphold the values of the party's "open borders" that is promoted by the leadership of the party have attacked a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur because he refused to give them a reason why he immigrated to South Africa. The informal immigrant entrepreneur was referred to as a "makwerekwere" or "Nigerian" even when the Francophone African informal entrepreneur was not originally from Nigeria.

Another group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs was a group of disgruntled workers such as waste management (Pikitup) and mine workers who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs accusing the entrepreneurs of sweeping dirt that they had littered on the street during a protest action and for opening the shop during protest action that involved mine workers respectively. The informal immigrant entrepreneurs were called "makwerekwere" during the attacks.

Football fans from football clubs such as Orlando Pirates were identified as another group of South Africans who have perpetrated xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business. The fans attacked a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who was trying to sell to them and accused the informal trader of selling goods that were very expensive while frequently using the word "makwerekwere" during the attack.

Members of “Izikhothane” were also identified as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who tried to enquire about missing goods from his shop less than two minutes before they left his shop. While the goods were unlawfully found in their possession, they violently attacked the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur while calling him “makwerekwere” as they injured him.

Another group of perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs was individuals who claimed they were members of “operation dudula.” The assailants violently attacked a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur and his wife in their shop when they could not find what they claim was an “illegal drug.” The victims were called “illegal foreigners" in the process even when they had valid permits during the time of the attack.

Lastly, officials of SAPS, TMPD, and the Gauteng Department of Community Safety on a joint raid for counterfeit goods were identified as perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in Pretoria while conducting his business. This group of individuals raided the shop of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur without entering the shops of South Africans who sold similar goods in the same designated area.

They confiscated cigarettes that the Francophone African informal trader bought from Shoprite and refused to give back the goods even after he brought all the receipts to prove that the goods were not counterfeit because they were bought from Shoprite. The Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was attacked in what is described as a xenophobic attack because the members of SAPS and others told him as a foreigner, he has no right in South Africa. They falsely accused the informal trader of obstructing the ends of justice and assaulted him.

7.2.4 Reasons Informal Immigrant Entrepreneurs are Attacked

The testimonies revealed different reasons why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business. The testimonies revealed that failure to lend money to South Africans was a potential reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria have been attacked while conducting their business, such as the case of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who refused to lend money to a South African informal trader who returned from a funeral and needed money to stock goods.

Also, when a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur calls the police about South Africans who were taking the law into their own hands by unlawfully demanding that the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs should present his/her documents so that they should verify if the informal immigrant trader was legal in South Africa. After calling the police to come and intervene, the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur was violently attacked while the assailants called him "makwerekwere." The assailants informed the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur that as a foreigner he had no right to call the police for assistance.

Another reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have been attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business is when South Africans who impersonate themselves as law enforcement officials are discovered and exposed as impostors by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs. This was the case of a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who was confronted by South Africans who wanted to enter his shop to check for "illegal drugs."

When the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur asked for identification documents, they told him that they worked for "Home Affairs City of Tshwane." The Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs told them that there was no office called Home Affairs City of Tshwane. When the informal trader asked for the street address of the office, they worked for they got violent and attacked him calling him "makwerekwere" and ordering him to go back to his country.

A non-secular reason was given as one of the causes of the attack against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. One of the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who believe that "life is spiritual" claims the attack that he suffered at the hands of South Africans is attributed to the fact that South Africans have spilled a lot of blood during apartheid. Hence, from a biblical standpoint, the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur mentioned that the Bible states that "when the blood of a man touches the earth it cries for vengeance." That is why South Africans attacked him; not just because after he borrowed goods from them and asked them to pay the debt at the time, they told him to come and collect his money.

It was also revealed from respondent testimonies that, during a business transaction between a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur and a South African, sometimes a misunderstanding between the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur and a South African often led to the informal immigrant entrepreneur being attacked. Like the case

of the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur who was attacked because a South African lady accused him of selling rotten mangos to her son.

When the informal immigrant entrepreneur requested her to return the rotten mangos so that he could exchange them. The lady said she had thrown the mangoes away and accused the Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur of insinuating that she was lying which was not the intention of the informal entrepreneur. This resulted in a group of South Africans assaulting the informal immigrant entrepreneur calling him "makwerekwere" and demanding he presents his visa, while forcefully taking his goods and leaving him with bruises all over his body.

Since the respondent testimonies have shown how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against in Pretoria while conducting their business; the type of harassment they have experienced while conducting their business; the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against them while conducting their business; and the reasons why they are attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business. The researcher, therefore, proceeds to make certain recommendations in terms of strategies to address the subject matter and suggestions for future studies.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

In line with the objectives of this study (see section 1.5). The researcher, therefore, suggests the following recommendations;

7.3.1 Strategies to combat xenophobia in South Africa

The following strategies should be combined with the government of South Africa's National Action Plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.

7.3.1.1 Education and awareness campaigns

Education remains one of the vehicles to transmit knowledge or foster skills and character traits. It can also be used to develop understanding, rationality, kindness, and honesty.

7.3.1.2 Inclusive extramural activities in schools

Given the testimonies that revealed that high school boys have perpetrated xenophobic attacks against a Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur in Pretoria while conducting his business, South African schools should invest more resources and time to educate learners

and train teachers and administrators on how to enact culturally relevant and inclusive practices to eliminate the perpetration of xenophobia by South African learners. This can be done through school policies, statements, guidelines, or codes that reject all forms of xenophobic discrimination, harassment, and attacks against immigrants in South Africa.

South African schools should also create extramural activities where African immigrants in South Africa are invited to interact with South African learners to tell their stories. In addition, South African schools can start organising learner exchange programmes with learners from other African countries to bring/expose South African learners and learners from other African countries together. This might help to demystify certain myths in South Africa about immigrants from African countries.

7.3.1.3 Initiate respectful conversation among company employees

South African companies can initiate xenophobia awareness programmes by hosting productive and respectful discussions, forming employee resource groups, and training on preventing discrimination, harassment, and attacks on African immigrants in the country. This can be done by creating channels where employees feel safe speaking up about xenophobia-related issues. In addition, building a stronger, healthier, and better workplace culture is also dependent on having a solid set of core values that are integrated into every policy, decision, and process. Companies can, therefore, include combatting xenophobia in their employee training programmes or retreat where African immigrants can be invited to tell their stories to increase empathy among employees through exposure and education.

7.3.1.4 Political Party Schools

Political parties in South Africa should embrace the idea of a "political party school" where party members are properly trained in combatting xenophobia and other related forms of discrimination in South Africa. Political party schools should encourage party affiliates to refrain from engaging in xenophobia and related intolerance. Party affiliates who are found guilty of perpetrating xenophobia should be named and shamed publicly.

7.3.1.5 Government Officials and Human Rights Promotion

In line with the adoption of the National Action Plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance in South Africa.[70] The government of South Africa should

[70] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/national-action-plan.pdf

invest more resources to empower its officials to promote and protect the human rights of everyone in South Africa, including African immigrants.

The government can initiate a partnership between government departments and centres for human rights such as the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria to train government officials on issues of human rights such as xenophobia which is a human rights abuse. Further actions can include the collection of data regarding xenophobia and other related issues to improve xenophobia intervention mechanisms. As well as the prosecution of xenophobia perpetrators.

7.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future studies on the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs or immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, should be conducted on a horizontal and vertical level. For example, horizontally, studies should be conducted to compare or contrast the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from North African countries such as Algeria to the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from sub-Saharan African countries such as Gabon.

On a vertical level, studies should be conducted to document the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from countries such as Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic (CAR). Future studies should also be conducted to contrast and compare the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from SADC member state such as the DRC who can enter South Africa without a visa[71]from other Francophone African countries who required a visa to enter South Africa.

Other studies should also be conducted to separately document the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African students in South African tertiary institutions in Pretoria, from professionals and diplomats working in Pretoria. Future studies on Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria should also be conducted to separate the form and type of discrimination and harassment (respectively) that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who conduct informal trade along sidewalks, on street corners, at municipal stalls and in front of small shops experience while conducting their business. This

[71] http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/exempt-countries

could also be extended to compare the experience of Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in other cities in South Africa.

Other studies should be conducted to look at the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs from individual Francophone African countries to avoid generalising the experience of xenophobia of all Francophone African immigrant informal entrepreneurs in South Africa because individual Francophone African countries have bilateral relations with South Africa which can give certain advantage to their citizens in South Africa, thereby altering their experience of xenophobia from other Francophone African countries without such privilege.

Furthermore, the use of the derogatory term "makwerekwere" appears to be the easiest indicator that the respondents of the study considered to affirmatively qualify any virtual, verbal, physical or violent act perpetrated against them as xenophobia. That is why the use of the term "makwerekwere" appears in almost all the testimonies of the respondents who confirmed that they have experienced xenophobia in South Africa.

It is, therefore, clear in the testimonies that whenever the respondents were described as "makwerekwere," they immediately linked such experience to an act of xenophobia. Future research should, therefore, try and investigate if there are other indicators of xenophobia perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs besides the derogatory term "makwerekwere," "amaGhana" or "magringamba." In other words, how can an act of xenophobia be identified without the use of derogatory terms like "makwerekwere," "amaGhana" or "magringamba"?

Such investigation is important because certain acts of xenophobia go unnoticed because derogatory words like "makwerekwere" are not used. In addition, future studies should also find out whether Francophone African informal entrepreneurs in certain suburbs in Pretoria experience specific forms of discrimination and harassment that are different from those in other suburbs. Hence, whether they experience specific forms of discrimination, harassment, and attacks as a result of the specific goods that they buy and retail in Pretoria. Other studies should also find out if Anglophone and Lusophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are also attacked for the same reasons that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked in Pretoria while conducting their business.

Furthermore, no study has documented the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during the process of procuring goods from South African wholesalers. Future studies should, therefore, be conducted to specifically document the experience of xenophobia of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs

during the process of buying goods from South African wholesalers. This is important because none of the respondents revealed any incident of discrimination, harassment, or attacks between Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and South African wholesalers or their staff in shops where they buy goods they retail.

Future studies would, therefore, provide more insights that would expand on the strategies to combat xenophobia against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria that are suggested in this study. In addition, a comparative study should be conducted to compare the experience of xenophobia among informal and formal African immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. In order to understand whether immigration status or economic sector exposes African immigrants to xenophobia.

Another comparative study should be conducted to compare the experience of xenophobia among Francophone African immigrants in a French-speaking African country such as Côte d'Ivoire and an English-speaking African country such as South Africa. The reason is that Francophone African immigrants such as Senegalese, Malians, and Burkinabès experience xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire more than their Anglophone counterparts from Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia. Such a study would provide more insight into xenophobia based on language, not economics. Also, such a study would prove a deeper understanding in terms of how xenophobia manifests in spaces where there is no language barrier in terms of the business language used, as opposed to spaces where there is a language barrier such as South Africa.

7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The primary objectives of this study were to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against by South Africans while conducting their business in Pretoria; to determine what type of harassment Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business; to establish who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and to understand why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

The study found different ways Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria experience discrimination while conducting their business. For example, according to the findings of the study, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against because of their inability to speak South African home languages and their lack of proficiency when they speak English with a French accent. South Africans would

speak to Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in their home language. When they respond in English, they will then "skip" them to buy from fellow South Africans who communicate with them in a South African home language.

Sometimes, officials of the TMPD would impound the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who have valid trading licences to conduct informal trade in the designated trading area where their goods were impounded without any justification or explanation. While South Africans who conducted informal trade without a valid trading permit in the same space were allowed to carry on trading and their goods were not impounded.

In other circumstances in the case where officials of TMPD seize the goods of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs and South African informal entrepreneurs who conduct trade in designated trading zones, the goods of South African informal traders were returned while those of Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs were never returned and the Francophone African informal immigrant trader was not given any explanation as to why his goods were not returned and the law that he had violated to get his goods seized in the first place.

On other occasions, Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience discrimination while conducting their business when they seek protection from members of the SAPS against South Africans who assaulted them in their shops. When they go to the police station they are ignored and instead called "tsotsi" and are threatened with jail or deportation because they have expired visas on valid passports even when they show proof from VFS that they have applied for visa renewal.

Regarding the type of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced in Pretoria while conducting their business, the study found the following: Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have experienced virtual, verbal, and physical harassment in the form of assault while conducting their business. Virtual harassment, for example, constitutes text messages through SMS or WhatsApp videos with an undertone of "xenophobic threat" that was directed at Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs informing them they would be killed if they are found conducting business in a specific spot because they refused to give credit to South Africans. Verbal harassment was also experienced by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria while conducting their business. The dominant form of verbal harassment perpetrated against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria was the derogatory name-calling "makwerekwere" which was often accompanied by phrases such as "illegal criminals," "go back home," "Nigerians" even when the informal immigrant traders are not from Nigeria.

The study also found that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have become so desensitised toward the term "makwerekwere" because they have been overexposed to the term. Over time, they feel less anxious when the term "makwerekwere" is employed against them because they have realized that it is mostly used against them by South Africans who are unable to pay for the goods they sell. However, irrespective of the fact that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs have felt less anxious when the term "makwerekwere" is employed, they have become more and more desensitised to the plight of poor South Africans.

Physical harassment that often led to assault such as "spitting" on a female Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneur and her goods was a unique experience of physical harassment that was found in the testimonies. In addition, the study also found a subtle type of "harassment" that was uniquely perpetrated by female South Africans who use their positions in banks to harass male Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs who refused to lend them money.

Furthermore, regarding the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, while conducting their business, the study found that high school boys; political affiliates (members of a political party such as the EFF); workers of Tshwane waste management service Pikitup; mine workers; football fans; "street waste pickers"; members of "Izikhothane"; "Operation Dudula"; and official of SAPS, TMPD and Gauteng Department of Community Safety were the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria.

Concerning the reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business, the study found that when Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria fail to lend money to South Africans, they were attacked; when they call the police about South Africans who were taking the law into their own hands against them, or when they call the police to come and intervene in a disagreement between them and South Africans, they were attacked.

Another reason is when South Africans who impersonate themselves as law enforcement officials were discovered and exposed as impostors by Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs they were attacked; and, when Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs asked for identification documents from South Africans who claimed to be representing the departments of Home Affairs or the City of Tshwane, they were attacked.

In addition, the study found that misunderstanding between South Africans and Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs during a business transaction was another reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria were attacked while conducting their business. Lastly, spiritual reasons also emerged as a reason why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria were attacked while conducting their business.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Faculty of Humanities
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Humanities 100
Since 1919

08 October 2020

Dear Mr G Atabongwoung

Project Title:	EXPERIENCE OF XENOPHOBIA AMONG IMMIGRANT INFORMAL ENTREPRENEURS IN PRETORIA: THE CASE OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS
Researcher:	Mr G Atabongwoung
Supervisor(s):	Dr CC Nshimbi
Department:	Anthropology and Archaeology
Reference number:	15402071 (HUM043/0720)
Degree:	Doctoral

I have pleasure in informing you that the above application was **approved** by the Research Ethics Committee on 08 October 2020. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

Prof Innocent Pikirayi
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Research Ethics Committee Members: Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Mr A Bizos; Dr A-M de Beer; Dr A dos Santos; Ms KT Govinder Andrew; Dr P Gutura; Dr E Johnson; Prof D Maree; Mr A Mohamed; Dr I Noomé; Dr C Puttergill; Prof D Reyburn; Prof M Soer; Prof E Taljard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa

APPENDIX B: AMENDED ETHICAL CLEARANCE

Faculty of Humanities
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

2 March 2022

Dear Mr G Atabongwoung,

Project Title:	Experience of Xenophobia among immigrant informal entrepreneurs in Pretoria: The case of Francophone African immigrants
Researcher:	Mr G Atabongwoung
Supervisor(s):	Dr CC Nshimbi
Department:	Anthropology, Archaeology and Development Studies
Reference number:	15402071 (HUM043/0720 Line 1) (Amendment)
Degree:	Doctoral

Thank you for the application to amend the existing protocol that was previously approved by the Committee.

The revised / additional documents were reviewed and **approved** on 02 March 2022 along these guidelines, further data collection may therefore commence (where necessary).

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the amended proposal. Should your actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

Prof Karen Harris
Chair: Research Ethics Committee
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: tracey.andrew@up.ac.za

APPENDIX C: LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT

Pretoria, 0002 Republic of South Africa http://www.up.ac.za
Tel 012-420-2323
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Development Studies
Date: 2020-08-31

Letter of Informed Consent

I Gallous Asong Atabongwoung, Student Number u15402071, am currently enrolled for Doctoral study in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Pretoria. I am doing a thesis entitled: **The Experience of Xenophobia among Immigrant Informal Entrepreneurs: The Case of Francophone African Immigrants in Pretoria.** For this study, I need to conduct field research which will take the form of open-ended interviews with individuals with first-hand knowledge of issues relevant to my thesis. This will form part of my primary research as oral evidence and will comply with the accepted standards within the discipline of Development Studies at the University of Pretoria. I hereby wish to obtain permission to interview individuals. Each interview would take 1-2 hours at any place chosen by the respondents. Individual input will be acknowledged according to the footnoting system prescribed by the Department of Development Studies. If specifically requested, respondents may request to remain anonymous. The interviews will be recorded with a tape recorder and will be stored in electronic format for 15 years in compliance with the policy of the University Faculty of Humanities. This material may also be used for another research by the candidate. Participation is entirely voluntary and respondents may choose to withdraw from the interview at any stage. I also request permission to use the data for possible research in future.

Yours sincerely,

I _____ agree to participate by responding to interview questions in the Doctoral research project of Gallous Asong Atabongwoung, Student Number u15402071, from the University of Pretoria. I have read this letter of introduction and agree that my information may be acknowledged according to the prescribed Departmental footnote reference system.

	I give permission for my name to be used in this research.
	I wish to remain anonymous in this research.

Signed _____ Date _____

APPENDIX D: FRENCH TRANSLATION OF LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT

Lettre de consentement éclairé

Moi Monsieur Gallous Asong Atabongwoung, étudiant numéro u15402071, je suis actuellement inscrit au doctorat au Département des études du développement de l'Université de Pretoria. Je fais une thèse intitulée « L'expérience de la xénophobie parmi les entrepreneurs informels immigrés : le cas des immigrés africains francophones à Pretoria ». Pour les besoins de cette étude, je dois mener des recherches sur le terrain qui prendront la forme d'entretiens ouverts et de 2 groupes de discussion avec des personnes ayant une connaissance de première main des questions pertinentes à ma thèse. Cela fera partie de ma recherche principale en tant que preuve orale et sera conforme aux normes acceptées dans la discipline des études du développement à l'Université de Pretoria. Je souhaite par la présente obtenir la permission d'interroger des personnes. Chaque entretien et discussion de groupe de discussion durerait 1 à 2 heures à n'importe quel endroit choisi par les répondants. Les contributions individuelles seront reconnues conformément au système de notes de bas de page prescrit par le Département des études sur le développement. Sur demande expresse, les répondants peuvent demander à rester anonymes. Les entretiens seront enregistrés avec un magnétophone et seront conservés sous format électronique pendant une période de 15 ans conformément à la politique de la Faculté des sciences humaines de l'Université. Ce matériel peut également être utilisé pour une autre recherche par le candidat. La participation est entièrement volontaire et les répondants peuvent choisir de se retirer de l'entrevue à tout moment. Je demande également l'autorisation d'utiliser les données pour d'éventuelles recherches à l'avenir.

Cordialement,

Je _____ (le soussigné) accepte de participer en répondant aux questions d'entrevue dans le projet de recherche doctorale de M. Gallous Asong Atabongwoung, numéro d'étudiant u15402071 de l'Université de Pretoria. J'ai lu cette lettre d'introduction et j'accepte que mes renseignements puissent être reconnus conformément au système de référence de notes de bas de page ministériel prescrit.

	J'autorise l'utilisation de mon nom dans cette recherche.
	Je souhaite rester anonyme dans cette recherche.

Signé _____ Date _____

APPENDIX E: CASE STUDY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Based on the non–probability sampling technique of respondents for in-depth interviews, the respondents will be accessed, after which, the researcher/interviewer will read this case study interview protocoal aloud to the respondent/interviewee and the respondent will add his/her signatures afterwards.

Good day. Thank you for accepting my request to answer questions. My name is Gallous Asong Atabongwoung. I am a PhD candidate from University of Pretoria. I am conducting a research study entitled: **The Experience of Xenophobia among Informal Immigrant Entrepreneurs: The Case of Francophone African Immigrants in Pretoria.** The main research question is: How do Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience xenophobia in Pretoria while conducting their business? For the next 1-2 hours and I will ask you questions to find out how Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against in Pretoria while conducting their business; to determine what type of harassment Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business; to establish who perpetrate xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs while conducting their business; and to establish why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria are attacked while conducting their business.

If any question is difficult for you to answer, you have the right to withdraw or skip any issues that you do not want to discuss. When and where necessary, I will translate our discussions. In doing so, your active participation in giving ideas, commenting, and engaging is essential for the completion of this research. Your participation is voluntary and you reserve the right to withdraw from the same, should you so wish. However, for a successful and effective progress of this interview, we need to set ground rules. All information shared here is confidential. When you are explaining events or people, you must not mention their name(s). This is because of the need to protect and maintain confidentiality in this transaction. I will use each other's first names during the session, but no names will be used in any of the reports I will produce using the information you are going to share with me. No one will be able to link your name back to what you said. Try to speak up so that you are heard and I do not miss any of your comments. Please feel free to speak openly.

There are no right or wrong answers. With your permission, I would like to record our session because I do not want to miss any of your comments. Having a chance to discuss with you is a unique experience and opportunity, and consequently, want to make sure I represent your opinions and thoughts accurately and correctly. I assure you that these recordings and all notes taken will only be used for my research purposes. The information will be kept in a safe and secure place so that no one will access it. If you think of any questions, feel free to ask. With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this session and to keep in confidence information that could identify specific participants and/or the information they provided.

Name: _____
Signature: _____
Date: _____

APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Pretoria, 0002 Republic of South Africa
http://www.up.ac.za
Tel: 012-420-2323
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Ancient Languages and Cultures
Humanities Building,
Date: 2020-08-30

1. QUESTIONNAIRE

A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Age

10 – 20 years 20 – 30 years 30 – 40 years 40 – 50 years 50+

Sex

Female Male

Trading Permit

Yes No

Educational Level

Primary Secondary Tertiary Never attended any

Start-up Capital

R500 – R1000 R1000 – R10,000 R10,000 – R20,000 R20,000 – R30,000 R30,000+

Monthly Income

R1000 – R5000 R5000 – R10,000 R10,000 – 20,000 R20,000 – R30,000 R30,000+

Additional Information

Nationality Residential Area Business Location

Language spoken

	English	French	Zulu	Afrikaans
0-No proficiency				
1-Fluent				
2- Intermediate				
3-Basic				

2. SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A. How Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are discriminated against in Pretoria while conducting their businesses

i. What goods do you sell?

ii. How do South Africans behave towards you while you are selling, buying, transporting, or stocking your goods?

iii. Have you ever been discriminated against by South Africans while you are selling, buying, transporting, or stocking your goods? Yes/No (if yes);

iv. How have South Africans discriminated against you while you are selling?

v. How have South Africans discriminated against you while you are buying goods to sell?

vi. How have South Africans discriminated against you while you are using any means of transport to go and buy or to transport the goods you buy to your business location or self-storage?

vii. How have South Africans discriminated against you while stocking or collecting goods from self-storage?

viii. Has South Africans discriminated against you while depositing or withdrawing money related to your business in a bank or ATM? If yes, how?

ix. Has South Africans discriminated against you while going to or coming from your business location? If yes, how?

x. How have you been discriminated against by South Africans while doing business in Pretoria?

B. Types of harassment that Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs experience in Pretoria while conducting their business

i. Has South Africans harassed you while conducting your business? If yes;

ii. What type of harassment did you experience while selling your goods?

iii. What type of harassment did you experience while buying goods to sell?

iv. What type of harassment did you experience while transporting, stocking, or collecting your goods from a self-storage?

v. What type of harassment did you experience while depositing or withdrawing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?

vi. Could you describe the type of harassment that you experienced while selling your goods?

vii. Could you describe the type of harassment that you experienced while buying goods to sell?

viii. Could you describe the harassment that you experienced while transporting, stocking, or collecting your goods from a self-storage?

ix. Could you describe the harassment that you experienced while depositing or withdrawing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?

x. What type of harassment have you experienced while conducting your business in Pretoria?

C. Perpetrators of xenophobic attacks against Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs in Pretoria, while conducting their businesses

i. Have you ever experienced xenophobic attacks while conducting your business in Pretoria? If yes,

ii. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while selling your goods?

iii. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while buying the goods you sell?

iv. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while transporting your goods to your business location/self-storage?

v. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while stocking your goods in self-storage?

vi. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while collecting your goods from self-storage?

vii. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while depositing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?

viii. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while withdrawing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?

ix. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while going to conduct your business?

x. Who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against you while returning home from conducting your business?

D. Why Francophone African informal immigrant entrepreneurs are attacked in Pretoria while conducting their businesses

i. Have you ever been attacked in Pretoria while conducting your business? If yes;
ii. Why were you attacked while selling your goods?
iii. Why were you attacked while buying the goods you sell?
iv. Why were you attacked while transporting your goods to a business location/self-storage?
v. Why were you attacked while stocking your goods in a self-storage?
vi. Why were you attacked while collecting your goods from a self-storage?
vii. While were you attacked while depositing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?
viii. Why were you attacked while withdrawing money related to your business in a bank or ATM?
ix. Why were you attacked while going to conduct your business?
x. Why were you attacked while returning from your business?

APPENDIX G: TABLE SHOWING RESPONDENTS, PLACE OF INTERVIEW, NUMBER OF YEARS CONDUCTING INFORMAL TRADE AND NATURE OF INFORMAL TRADE

Respondents	Place of interview	Number of years conducting informal trade	Nature of informal trade
Respondent no 1	Pretoria CBD	7 years	Small shop selling food stuff from DR Congo
Respondent no 2	Pretoria CBD	8 years	Small shop selling cell phone accessories and phone repairs
Respondent no 3	Pretoria CBD	5 years	Sidewalk selling fruits and vegetables
Respondent no 4	Pretoria CBD	4 years	Small shop selling necessities
Respondent no 5	Pretoria CBD	6 years	Municipal stall selling dry fish, fruits, and vegetables
Respondent no 6	Pretoria CBD	9 years	Street corner selling Fruits, Vegetables, and patching clothes
Respondent no 7	Pretoria CBD	6 years	Sidewalk selling fruits and Vegetables
Respondent no 8	Sunnyside	7 years	Sidewalk selling fat cakes, sweets, and chips
Respondent no 9	Sunnyside	4 years	Small shop selling African fabrics and hair piece
Respondent no 10	Sunnyside	10 years	Small shop selling African fabrics
Respondent no 11	Sunnyside	3 years	Sidewalk selling simbas, sweets, airtime
Respondent no 12	Sunnyside	5 years	Street corner selling foodstuff and traditional attires from DR Congo
Respondent no 13	Sunnyside	9 years	Sidewalk selling household items, necklaces, sunglasses, wristwatches
Respondent no 14	Sunnyside	6 years	Street corner selling traditional African concoction called “Jedi” and doing haircut
Respondent no 15	Arcadia	4 years	Small shop selling African attires and curio
Respondent no 16	Arcadia	6 years	Street corner selling fruits and Vegetables
Respondent no 17	Arcadia	7 years	Sidewalk selling curio items and hair products
Respondent no 18	Arcadia	8 years	Street corner selling chips and sweets
Respondent no 19	Arcadia	5 years	Small shop selling clothes

Respondent 20	no	Arcadia	13 years	Small shop selling food
Respondent 21	no	Hatfield	4 years	Municipal stall selling fruits and vegetables
Respondent 22	no	Hatfield	4 years	Small shop selling clothes and perfumes
Respondent 23	no	Hatfield	8 years	Small shop selling Cameroonian food and traditional dresses
Respondent 24	no	Hatfield	2 years	Sidewalk selling fruits and vegetables
Respondent 25	no	Hatfield	11 years	Sidewalk selling curio products and cosmetic items
Respondent 26	no	Capital Park	4 years	Sidewalk selling roasted chicken and foodstuff
Respondent 27	no	Capital Park	3 years	Sidewalk selling fruits and vegetables
Respondent 28	no	Gezina	3 years	Small shop selling bread and consumable items
Respondent 29	no	Gezina	8 years	Small shop selling bread, cigarettes, and food
Respondent 30	no	Gezina	4 years	Sidewalk selling artwork and curio

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

APPENDIX H: UNIVERSITY PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

Full names	Gallous Asong Atabongwoung
Student number	u15402071
Topic of work	The Experience of Xenophobia among Informal Immigrant Entrepreneurs: The Case of Francophone African Immigrants in Pretoria

Declaration

1. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.
2. I declare that this thesis is my original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, the internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged and referenced following the requirements as stated in the University's plagiarism prevention policy.
3. I have not used another student's past written work to hand in as my own.
4. I have not allowed and will not allow anyone to copy my work to pass it off as his or her work.

Signature 

APPENDIX I: DECLARATION OF PROFESSIONAL EDIT

Van Schalkwyk Editorial Services

Email: arayofhope1@gmail.com

LinkedIn profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ar%C3%A9-van-schalkwyk-0214202a/

14/02/2023

DECLARATION OF PROFESSIONAL EDIT

THE EXPERIENCE OF XENOPHOBIA AMONG INFORMAL IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: THE CASE OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN PRETORIA

by

GALLOUS ASONG ATABONGWOUNG

I declare that I have edited this thesis. My involvement was restricted to language usage and spelling, completeness and consistency, reference style, and formatting of headings, captions and tables of contents. I did no structural rewriting of the content and did not influence the academic content in any way.

Mr Aré van Schalkwyk

BA (Languages)

Accredited service provider of the University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch University,

the University of Johannesburg, Unisa and other institutions