CHAPTER FOUR
BEING-WITH THE (NON)HUMAN:
READING HEIDEGGER

Animals are in possession of themselves;
their soul is in possession of their body.[134]

In the first layer of the study presented over Chapters Two and Three, I contextualised the various ways of looking at the human and nonhuman relation in contemporary society by broadly examining anthropocentrism as well as the theoretical shift to nonhumanism. Throughout Chapters Two and Three, I searched for the importance of the human being amidst the current turn away from human pursuits towards nonhuman entities. I argued that the human remains present and significant in nonhuman thought, showing how animal subjectivity does not necessarily do away with a human way of being. Thus, in the previous chapter, I (following Joanna Zylinska) established that from my point of view human-nonhuman relations consist of a non-anthropocentric human-self living in relation to an animal-self, where human and nonhuman are not collapsible into one another. Furthermore, examining the animal-self from a human perspective, as my reading on Derrida showed, almost always points back to the question of what it means to be human, especially amongst companion species.

Chapters Four, Five and Six, continue the exploration of the human-nonhuman relation by adding another layer of discussion to the human and animal *being-with* one another, or more specifically, the human and dog *being-with* one another. In this layer I ask what exactly it means for human and animal beings to live together or in relation to one another. In other words, I delve deeper into the specific nature of the understanding of the human *being-with* animal, which I have only alluded to in the previous chapters, as I wonder what sort of being this is where human and animal exist with one another. Thus, after *looking at* the human and nonhuman being, I now in turn consider what this specific being *looks like.*

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[134] Georg Wilhelm Hegel (in Merritt 2018).

For my enquiry into the specific being of the human with the nonhuman, I turn to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) as well as Donna Haraway's (2003; 2008) nonhuman theory of companion species. As the focal point of this study, Haraway's companion species provides us with a theoretical understanding of humans *becoming with* their dogs. In turn, Heidegger famously deepens our knowledge of what it means for something to be (and become). By coupling Heidegger with Haraway I hope to form a better understanding of what it means to be human in relation to nonhuman beings, based on the articulation of the human-nonhuman relation in the previous chapter.

Notably, in line with my discussion in Chapter Three, Haraway's notion of *becoming with* companion species is a multispecies approach, which implodes human and nonhuman beings. Comparably, I argue for an unexchangeable human and animal way of being, existing in constant relation to one another. By putting Heidegger in dialogue with Haraway my main aim is to show that Haraway's companion species, despite its insistence on intersubjectivity, can also be read as a valuation of the importance of a non-anthropocentric human being in companionship with an animal being. That is to say, by reading Haraway with Heidegger I rethink Haraway's companion species and the possibility of humans *being-with* nonhumans, without an imploding of subjects. On the whole, in this layer of the study – set out in Chapters Four, Five and Six – Heidegger and Haraway meet in an attempt to provide an in-depth account of the way of being human with animals.

By revisiting Haraway with Heidegger throughout this layer I aim to show how: (1) Heidegger's understanding of the animal being can promote a non-anthropocentric, ecological responsibility by insisting on a difference between the beings of humans and nonhumans; (2) Heidegger's understanding of being and *being-with* human others can be extended into the realm of nonhuman others; (3) Haraway's companion species stresses the human and makes use of specifically human constructs to understand the nonhuman way of being; (4) consequently, Haraway's multispecies idea of *becoming with* shows similarity to Heidegger's *being*, *being-in-the-world* and *being-with*; (5) rooting Haraway's

becoming with in Heidegger's *being-with* prompts a different understanding of the human-dog relation, where both human and dog exist as beings *with* each other without diminishing into another.

My starting point, in this chapter, is a discussion of Heidegger's philosophical development of the notion of being, including his thesis on the animal and nonhuman. In particular I focus on four of Heidegger's seminal texts on being namely, *Being and Time* (1927), *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1938), his later *Letter on 'Humanism'* (1947), as well as the lecture series *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935). Even though I refer to different readings of Heidegger's hypotheses, I mainly associate my reading with recent, more positive interpretations of Heidegger in relation to animal studies, including James (2009), Bailey (2012), Latimer (2013), Schalow (2015), Beinsteiner (2017), Andersson (2017) and Firenze (2017). Thereafter, in Chapter Five, I analyse Haraway's companion species and idea of *becoming with* in *The Companion Species Manifesto* (2003) and its extended version *When Species Meet* (2008). Throughout this analysis of companion species, I demonstrate how Haraway's hybrid human-dog relation is still defined by predominantly human or humanist constructs, such as responsibility and love. In turn, Haraway does not always merge the human and animal into one another, but (at times) highlights their key differences. To remedy this contradiction in Haraway's theory, I then, in Chapter Six, suggest (re)turning Haraway to Heidegger. I show the close proximity between *being-with* and *becoming with* and finally ask, what could interpreting Haraway with Heidegger mean for the understanding of the way of being in a human-dog relation?

4.1 Being with Martin Heidegger

To make sense of what it means to exist in relation to nonhuman subjects, I want to examine in particular the theories of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who is most readily associated with being. The question of being was one of the central topics of Heidegger's life work as he set out to understand "what makes it possible for beings to manifest themselves in their being" (Dreyfus 2002:vii; xiv). In his reflection on the human state of being, Heidegger also famously opposed

traditional philosophical thought, rejecting reasoning of philosophers such as Descartes, Husserl and Sartre by insisting on returning to examining things of everyday human life.[135] In doing so Heidegger rejected certain philosophical oppositional dualisms like the immanent versus the transcendent, subjects versus objects and the conscious versus the unconscious (Dreyfus 1991:6). In other words, Heidegger's enquiry into the idea of being could possibly present a treatise outside of some of the traditional philosophical thought typically associated with anthropocentrism (for example Cartesian dualism discussed in Chapter Two).[136]

In addition, Heidegger's philosophy influenced several leading thinkers in the humanities including Jacques Derrida (Dreyfus 1991:9),[137] while recent intellectual activities that enquire into the nonhuman-human relation and the question of the animal frequently cite his ideas (for instance see Foltz 1993; Dombrowski 1994; Wolfe 2003; Calarco 2004; Schalow 2015 & 2017; Lechte 2017; Beinsteiner 2017; Andersson 2017). Philosophical scholar W.S.K Cameron (2004:34) explains that in much of Heidegger's philosophy the environment plays an essential role in establishing the nature of the human being, which could explain the recent turn towards Heidegger in relation to nonhumanism. In turn, Calarco (2004:30) determines that "any effort to work through the question of the animal … must begin with, and will benefit greatly from, a *thinking* confrontation with Heidegger's analysis of animal life". For these reasons, a Heideggerian approach to the way of being is not only useful, but also necessary,

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[135] For example, in *Letter on 'Humanism'* Heidegger (1998[1947]) contests Sartre's concept of humanism in *Existentialism is a Humanism* (1945) arguing that the essence of humanism is the human being and not existentialism as Sartre suggests. In turn, Heidegger, although a student of Husserl, differs in his approach to the question of being: for Husserl there is a strong correlation between being, phenomena consciousness and subjectivity, while Heidegger in *Being and Time* resists these claims focussing more on a relation to phenomena which reveals a way of being. Moreover, in *Being and Time* and other texts, Heidegger is widely outspoken against Cartesian dualism, resisting the idea that the mind of the human defines all ways of being.
[136] Specifically, in *Letter on 'Humanism'*, Heidegger (1998[1947]) critiques and moves away from anthropocentrism and humanism. Heidegger counters traditional anthropocentric thought, which defines the human in terms of characteristics such as consciousness (Descartes), self-reflection, rationality and personhood (Schalow 2015:64).
[137] In particular, early in his career, Derrida (in Dreyfus 1991:9) mentioned that he doubted he could write anything that had not already been thought of and written by Heidegger. It is only much later in his career that Derrida (1989) goes on to accuse Heidegger's philosophy of anthropocentrism. In addition, other leading thinkers who credit Heidegger for their own philosophical pursuits include, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

within the context of my own argument that examines companion species and what it means to be engaged in a human-nonhuman relation.

Heidegger's theory on being and animal life has been opposed, debated and defended endlessly (Dreyfus 1991:9). The controversies surrounding Heidegger's philosophy stem mainly from the various transitions and phases often found in his philosophical body of work.[138] In his repeated efforts to come to terms with the meaning of human existence, Heidegger for instance, transitions from fundamental ontological enquiries in *Being and Time* to the language of metaphysics in his later work (Crowell 2000:311). Likewise, Heidegger's frequent use of his own philosophical vocabulary and neologisms leaves room for equivocal interpretations (Davis 2010:11). For example, in relation to environmental concerns, Heidegger's philosophy has been interpreted in multidimensional and often contrasting ways (Paul 2017:80). In this regard, it is often tricky to estimate a universal understanding of Heideggerian thought. Said another way, for most existing interpretations of Heidegger's estimation of being a scholarly antithesis exists. To overcome such unsettled intellectual doings, it is helpful to align one's reading of Heidegger with that of specific scholars and particular Heideggerian texts.

In the next section, I mostly draw from four texts by Heidegger, all of which focus on the philosopher's interest in understanding the relation between being and the human being, as well as the relation between being and the nonhuman environment. *Being and Time* (1927) pursues the question of being (and time) addressing what exactly is being, a problem Heidegger inherited from his mentor Edmund Husserl. In the foreword to *Being and Time*, Carman (2008:xv, emphasis in original) explains that in this project Heidegger presents an "understanding of *what* entities are and *that* they are" in which the reader will ask themselves "how we experience and understand ourselves and the world around us, or more

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[138] Heidegger's philosophy has also been placed under much scrutiny after the discovery that Heidegger was closely associated with Nazism (Davis 2010:3). The debates surrounding this matter of his personal life is not considered in this study, since I solely focus on his philosophical work, separate from his political orientations. For further reading on debates surrounding this aspect of the philosopher's life refer to *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Rockmore 1992).

precisely how we experience and understand our *being* and the being of all the things we take *to be*". In this way, Heidegger addresses a fundamental question that had, as the philosopher himself argues, since Plato, long been evaded by other philosophers and leading thinkers. Conversely, philosophers typically inquired into what entities consist of (their properties, characters and features), but not what it means to actually be (Carman 2008:xiv). Thus, with *Being and Time* Heidegger significantly influenced what it means to be human and what it means to think through being human, which surpasses the twentieth century.

Being and Time is entwined with the lecture series *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935).[139] In fact, Heidegger (1935) suggests that the two texts should be read together, since *Introduction to Metaphysics* also opens up the question of what it means to be human. For this reason, I also examine *Introduction to Metaphysics* in relation to *Being and Time*. Heidegger's *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1938) marks a break from his earlier work towards the question of language, truth and history. In this project Heidegger also specifically elaborates extensively on the notion of animal behaviour and the environment. Accordingly, the text forms a critical part of this study. Finally, in his later essay *Letter on 'Humanism'* (1947), Heidegger challenges anthropocentrism, while arguing for the preservation of the human proper. Owing to its estimation on being, as well as its concern with the importance of the human, the nonhuman animal and the environment, I also refer to *Letter on 'Humanism'* in the discussion below.

As mentioned, my reading of Heidegger's fundamental texts is guided by secondary readings such as Davis's *Martin Heidegger Key Concepts* (2010), Dreyfus and Wrathall's (2002) *Heidegger Reimagined*, as well as Dreyfus's earlier *Being-in-the-World* (1991). In turn, as listed above, I also refer to theorists who unpack Heidegger's philosophy of being specifically in relation to the question of the animal being and the environment, since such readings relate to the main theme of my analysis. Below I unpack Heidegger's philosophy in relation to the animal question. I start off by explaining Heidegger's fundamental question of

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[139] Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) is published based on the lecture course held under the same title during the summer semester of 1935 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau.

being and its associated understandings of being-in-the-world, responsibility and care, as well as *being-with*. Thereafter I explore Heidegger's thesis of the animal being as poor-in-the-world and the relation of Heideggerian thought to environmentalism. Finally, I consider the possibility and implication of the Heideggerian *being-with* animals.

4.2 Heidegger's question of being (*Dasein*)

As I have mentioned, Heidegger's primary philosophical concern is to answer the question of being.[140] However, what precisely is meant by this question is at times hard to define. What does Heidegger mean when he probes into the meaning of being? Heidegger (1962[1927]:2) himself explains that this question is difficult to unpack, since the concept of 'being' is also somewhat unclear: "It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it". Heidegger (1962[1927]:2) reasons that it is owing to this self-evident nature of the idea of 'being' that philosophers have typically refrained from delving into the concept itself. In particular, Heidegger (1962[1927:2-3) refers to the efforts of Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle "down to" the more contemporary efforts of Hegel.[141] That is to say, Heidegger feels that in general, western philosophers have traditionally misconstrued the phenomenon of being, by only referring to *what* exists (aspects of being) instead of *how* we exist (what it means to be).

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[140] Heidegger capitalises 'Being' throughout his work. However, in common humanities discourse 'Being' with a capital letter typically refers to an all-encompassing nonhuman form that has a higher power over humans, such as God. To avoid confusion between these two concepts I do not capitalise being, unless quoting Heidegger or directly referring to his own terms, such as *Dasein*.
[141] During a 1924-1925 lecture course Heidegger argues that the original questioning of Plato and Aristotle about the question of being should become the most important philosophical question again. After studying the Greek philosophers Heidegger agrees with their fundamental point of enquiry, yet he argues that their enquiry lacks a particular depth, merely describing characteristics of being (in particular Heidegger refers to Aristotle's *logos*). In turn, in *Being and Time* Heidegger specifically refers to Hegel who, like many philosophers, supposes that being is simple, univocal and unavailable to thought. Heidegger contradicts Hegel (and other similar philosophers) arguing that being is particularly dependent on thought and has specific meaning, especially to the human being (Carman 2013:88-89).

Dreyfus (1991:10) explains Heidegger's question of being as making "sense of our ability to make sense of things". Said in another way, Heidegger attempts to understand how we (as humans) experience and configure our existence in the world. For Heidegger (1962[1927]:26) being is not an entity or something that exists, rather it is what we know of when we think of our being: "it is what we understand in our understanding of being, what we know when we know – however dimly and inarticulately – *what* and *that* entities are" within the doings of everyday life (Carman 2008:xiv, emphasis in original). Thus, Heidegger's main focus is not the relation between phenomena, but rather how it is that the significance of these phenomena and their relations primarily exist (Davis 2010:5). In other words, where we have thus far explored the aspects that make the being of the human different from the nonhuman and their relation to each other (throughout Chapters Two and Three), Heidegger asks a more fundamental question of this relation: what does it mean for human and nonhuman *to be* whatsoever?

To answer the question of being, Heidegger (1962[1927]:27) says "we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being". Therefore, if we wish to understand what it means to exist, we must start with those who consider their existence, those who show awareness of their own being. Heidegger (1962[1927]:27) names such an entity, the being who wonders about their being, "*Dasein*".[142] Heidegger translates *Dasein* as "being-there" and thus describes a reflecting entity that is mindful of their own existence (Heidegger 1962[1927]:27), or as Royle (2018) helpfully describes a "Being that in its Being is concerned about his very Being". Dreyfus (1991:14) explains that the "best way to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to think of our term 'human being,' which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of all

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[142] Notably, Heidegger's question of being enquires into human existence. *Dasein* is therefore used here in relation to the human being (Dreyfus 1991:14). However, Zuckerman (2015:494-495) explains that because of Heidegger's ambiguous language there is no scholarly consensus on "whether *Dasein* is a person, a community, a coping skill, an historical epoch, or an 'event' of some *sui generis* sort; nor have we decided whether our existential responsibilities is for our own personal identities, our culture's way of life, our capacity to understand being at all, or something else entirely". For example, analytical philosopher John Haugeland (2013) interprets *Dasein* to not be a person at all, but a mass term. However, in Dreyfus's (1991:14) reading of *Being and Time* he explains that most commonly, Heidegger indicates that *Dasein* has exclusive human distinctions, such as the use of the pronoun 'I'.

people or to a specific person – a human being".[143] In other words, Heidegger is interested in studying *Dasein's* way of being: "So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:67). In his later work, *Letter on 'Humanism'*, Heidegger (1998[1947]) also describes *Dasein* as a reciprocal response to being, underlying its elicitation to the idea of being, which allows human beings to exist, respond to and cultivate its own being.

Stapleton (2010:44) explains that in mundane terms *Dasein* would typically hold the same denotative meaning as 'self', 'subjectivity' or 'I'. Yet, Heidegger (1962[1927]:27) attentively avoids this simplistic interpretation by stating that *Dasein* is: "[t]his entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being". For Heidegger the connotation attached to *Dasein* surpasses terms such as 'ego', 'soul', 'subjectivity', 'person' and 'self' (Stapleton 2010:44). Therefore, Heidegger's *Dasein* emphasises that his use of 'being' here is more in-depth than how we initially utilised the term 'being' in Chapter Two.[144] Stapleton (2010:44, emphasis in original) defines it as follows:

> For Heidegger, what constitutes the very 'am' of the 'I am' is that being is an issue for it: is a question and a matter about which it cares. This entity that I am understands this implicitly. More radically, it *is* this understanding, or the place where this understanding of being occurs. Hence 'Dasein' means the self *as* the there (*Da*) of being (*Sein*), the place where an understanding of being erupts into being.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger also highlights the core elements of *Dasein*. I briefly mention some of these elements here. Firstly, it is *Dasein* who is the entity trying to make sense of its own being and who always has an awareness of his being (Heidegger 1962[1927]:27). Consequently, "Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself", in that *Dasein* can take a stand on its own way of being (Heidegger 1962[1927]:33). Additionally, for

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[143] Additionally, Heidegger sometimes refers to 'a' *Dasein* indicating interest in an individual human being, while other times he only uses the term *Dasein* to indicate a general human way of being.
[144] In Chapters Two and Three, I used the term 'being' in a general sense to indicate subjectivity or a sense of self.

Heidegger, *Dasein*'s understanding of its being means that it also has a basic awareness for other modes of being (Heidegger 1962[1927]:34). Finally, Heidegger (1962[1927]:35) explains that his enquiry into *Dasein,* in philosophical terms, is something which *Dasein* itself is continually involved in: "Dasein is constantly, in its activities, making sense of itself and everything else. Heidegger, in investigating the question of being, in seeking to understand the understanding of our practices, sees himself as doing thematically what every human being does unawares all the time" (Dreyfus 1991:29).

Furthermore, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, accompanying *Being and Time*, Heidegger (2000[1935]:100) notes that the relation between being and becoming (*Werden*) forms a significant part of the question of being.[145] For Heidegger (2000[1935]:69) becoming means "coming to Being". In this way whatever is becoming is not yet in a state of being (Heidegger 2000[1935]:101). Thus, Heidegger (2000[1935]:216) maintains that becoming is a temporary process towards being and that "Being, in contradistinction to becoming, is enduring". Nevertheless, becoming results in an enduring being and therefore forms a crucial part of the formation of being. In addition, because being is enduring and always-already existing it can also bring about becoming (Heidegger 2000[1935]:210).

4.2.1 Dasein's being as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein)

In relation to *Dasein*, Heidegger (1962[1927]:33) also tells us that "to Dasein, Being in the world is something that belongs essentially" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:33). The essence of *Dasein* is therefore found in its existence, which it is aware of: it *is* there (it endures). Moreover, *Dasein* also belongs to a particular contextual world; it is possessive in its attachment to the world it exists in, in a specific time and place. That is to say, *Dasein* is also here. By being

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[145] In *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger (2000[1935]) specifically looks at four divisions between 'being and becoming', 'being and thinking', 'being and seeming', as well as 'being and ought'. Ultimately, Heidegger (2000[1935]) comes to the conclusion that the four divisions associated with being show us that being is not empty: "Being in contradistinction to becoming, is enduring. Being, in contradistinction to seeming, is the enduring prototype, the always identical. Being, in contradistinction to thinking, is what lies at the basis, the present-at-hand. Being in contradistinction to the ought, is what lies at hand in each case as what ought to be and has not yet been actualized, or already been actualized".

here *and* there *Dasein* considers its own existence within the specificity of the world, but also reflects within itself on its future possibilities of being.

As a result, Heidegger (1962[1927]:34) determines *Dasein* as an entity "being-in-the-world" (*In-der-Welt-Sein*). By being-in-the-world, *Dasein* inhabits a known world; it resides, dwells and belongs within the parameters of the physical world (Hargis 2007:56). Thus, being is a way of engaging or 'doing' in the world. Through Heidegger's placing of being in an immediate and direct world, the meaning of existence becomes closely associated with time. In this way *Dasein* is bound by a contextual and temporal existence, within which it has the ability to determine itself. Hence, *Dasein* is also subjected to a historicity, which it responds to and relates to in the world. Therefore, Heidegger uses being-in-the-world to capture and describe what it means for *Dasein* to exist (Stapleton 2010:44). In describing *Dasein*'s way of being as grounded in a state of being-in-the-world, Heidegger attempts to escape the traditional determining of being as entities with substance, such as the soul or the self, which have come to be understood as a sort-of 'given' entity of being merely to be reflected on instead of understood (Stapleton 2010:44).[146]

Heidegger (1962[1927]:78, emphasis in original) asserts that being-in-the-world is a compound expression, because it is a single notion: "'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary* phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole". Accordingly, when discussing the various dimensions of being-in-the-world, the entirety of the

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[146] Stapleton (2010:45) helpfully uses the analogy of gazing out of a window at a maple tree to understand Heidegger's enquiry into being and how it differs from concepts such as the self. He explains, "What I see is a tree, its branches and red leaves. What I apprehend, more precisely, are not just the leaves and the colour red, but the leaves *being* red. I do not say, for instance, 'leaves red' or 'leaves *and* red', but rather, 'the leaves *are* red … For Heidegger, there is an understanding of being as substance (the being of leaves) and accident (the being of the redness) that accompanies such simple experiences; that guides and structures them in advance (*a priori*) and makes it possible for what I experience to be what it is" (Stapleton 2010:45, emphasis in original). Further on Stapleton (2010:45, emphasis in original) extends this analogy: "While gazing across the garden at the red leaves of the maple, I am at the same time aware that *I am seeing* this … Heidegger claims that all too often the understanding of being that frees objects within the world for their being gets reflected back on the being of the experiencing itself. The 'I' gets taken as a substance, although perhaps of some special sort (ego, mind, *res cogitans*, soul), and the 'seeing' as an activity of this I-thing".

phenomenon should be kept in mind. Heidegger continues discussing *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, by unpacking and identifying such various dimensions in relation to one another and the whole of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger (1962[1927]:78-79) maintains that being-in-the-world is threefold: there is firstly "in-the-world", secondly "being-in [*In-sien*]" and, thirdly, the "who" or entity that is being-in-the-world. The world is that in which and towards what *Dasein*'s being acts in its existence. Notably, this world, for Heidegger (1962[1927]:94), is not a general world understood as the sum total of all objects and relation, but rather the world that belongs specifically to *Dasein*. It describes "what we mean, for example, when talking about the world of an artist, of a person inhabiting a religious world, or of meeting someone who opened up the world of her family to me" (Stapleton 2010:48). As Heidegger (1962[1927]:93) relates, it is "not those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that '*wherein*' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'". It is then being in *this specific* world that allows *Dasein* to experience the world in a certain manner, forming a key part of its existence. Being is therefore always "being *as* understood in a certain manner" (Stapleton 2010:51) based on the world within which *Dasein* finds himself in and to which he has access.

In turn, Heidegger unpacks what is meant by 'being-in'. For him the term indicates more than just the present-at-hand "kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:79). Rather it connotes a sense of dwelling or residing alongside the world that is familiar to *Dasein* (Heidegger 1962[1927]:80). In other words, instead of thinking of the engagement of *Dasein* with the world in a spatial, practical sense, Heidegger employs a further theoretical approach to describing how *Dasein*'s being (or our being's understanding of being) is absorbed into the world. In this sense being-in (the world) is a state of mind, where the mind grabs hold of the physical world:[147] "I

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[147] That is to say, for Heidegger, mind or being is an embodied experience, where mind and body function together, in contrast to Descartes's thinking mind separated from the body.

understand myself *as* being-in a familial or a communal world, but it is my (Dasein's) self-understanding" (Stapelton 2010:53).

Lastly, being-in-the-world also depends on a 'who' that exists in their world, or then "the question of who Dasein is" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:150). For Heidegger (1962[1927]:68, emphasis in original) *Dasein* has a unique kind of being that belongs to it exclusively: "Dasein has *in each case mineness* (*Jemeinigkeit*), one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'". In other words, the so-called 'mineness' of *Dasein*, results in a particular, intimate 'who' (or being experienced as 'I') concerned with its own existence. In this way the being of being human consists of its own particular existence, which belongs to the world.

Heidegger (1962[1927]:68, emphasis in original) further argues that belonging to the world determines *Dasein*'s authenticity:

> As modes of Being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* … are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.

To be authentic denotes being something of your own. *Dasein* holds the potential to be authentic (*eigentlich*), by asking, searching and (notably) *becoming* its own being, because being, in turn, is its own to begin with. Authenticity, for Heidegger (1962[1927]:167), is achieved by becoming aware of one's being and choosing to follow your own potentials and competencies (Sherman 2009:4). In this way, "Dasein authentically understands itself and is able to act in the world accordingly" (Sherman 2009:4). Conversely, if *Dasein* does not engage with its possibilities and reclaim itself in everyday activities it is inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) (Sherman 2009:4). Yet, owing to its being-in-the-world, *Dasein*'s fundamental belonging to the world does not disappear (Stapleton 2010:54). That is to say, no matter how I choose to express my being (authentical or inauthentical) it remains my own existence. Additionally, as the above quote

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indicates, Heidegger (1962[1927]:68) believes that *Dasein* can transfer between states of authenticity and inauthenticity.[148]

To summarise, Heidegger's *Dasein* as being-in-the-world captures the existence of a unique kind of being, who belongs to, has access to and dwells within a particular lifeworld. Within this world, the belonging being can express its existence authentically or inauthentically. Finally, Heidegger (1962[1927]:167) tells us: "If Dasein discovers the world in its own way [*eigens*] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way". Thus, if we understand *Dasein* as characteristically being-in-the-world, we come closer to making sense of the nature of being or what it means to exist.[149]

Dasein's ability to understand the possibilities of its own being-in-the-world is referred to as its "disclosedness" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:167; 384). This understanding (*Verstehen*) of being occurs in a specific state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) and in a present state of falling (*Verfallen*). Heidegger (1962[1927]:220, emphasis in original) explains that the term "does not express any negative evaluation but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part *alongside* the 'world' of its concern".

Additionally, *Dasein* does not fall from somewhere else, but falls from the world that it already exists in – "it has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:220, emphasis in original). Falling is tranquilizing and alienating to *Dasein.* This falling of *Dasein* is an inauthentic everyday way of being made up of the relation between idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity

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[148] Heidegger also identifies an undifferentiated state, which can be shaped into authenticity or; inauthenticity. This state is somewhat more complex and read as ambiguous throughout *Being and Time.*

[149] In addition to being-in-the-world, Heidegger (1962[1927]:276-277) also estimates *Dasein* as being-towards-death. In being-towards-death *Dasein* is always aware of its finitude or possible death. For my purposes here, I do not focus on this aspect of being, however it should be noted that Heidegger estimates the end of being-in-the-world as death.

(Heidegger 1962[1927]:219). Heidegger (1962[1927]:223) states that when being-in-the-world in a falling mode, *Dasein* is alienated and tranquilized and, consequently, gets "entangled" (*Verfängt*) in itself. In my understanding this entanglement differs from a multispecies entanglement, since here *Dasein* does not entangle with others, but rather with itself.[150] Being is therefore, for Heidegger, self-entangling. Moreover, contrary to multispecies' authentic entanglement, Heidegger (1962[1927]:223) maintains that self-entanglement is a plunge towards the inauthenticity of everydayness and thus not an authentic way of being, because it loses sight of its being-in-the-world. Thereupon, *Dasein*'s relation to the self can become characteristically entangled.

4.2.2 Dasein's being as care (Sorge)

In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1962[1927]:237) argues that care (*Sorge*) plays an essential part in the being of *Dasein*. For Heidegger (1962[1927]:237) this care is a state of being, in other words he uses it in a "purely ontologico-existential manner" – that is to say care is not a practical action, but an intuitive understanding that is intrinsic to the very being of existence. The caring state of being is always present in *Dasein*, not just when *Dasein* occurs in relation to a particular activity, being or thing (Heidegger 1962[1927]:238). Scott (2010:60, emphasis in original) explains that in Heideggerian terms care "means the *inevitability* of concern, uncertainty, insecurity, projecting ahead and maintaining all aspects of our human engagements, as well as the desirability of responsibility and dedication".

Therefore Heidegger (1962[1927]:84) contends that *Dasein* relates to the world with concern, or then care. There is a constant care in the understanding of the being of *Dasein* and its being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962[1927]:163). Existence is also a kind of being that exercises concern and care *for others,* through what Heidegger calls "solicitude" (*Fürsorge*), which literally translates as 'caring-for'*.* Being-in-the-world thus also implies caring-for others (Bauer 2001:136).

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[150] In Chapter Three I explained that multispecies studies argue that humans and nonhumans occur in entangled relation with one another, where species exist knotted together in their being and flesh.

In turn, caring for is closely associated with response and therefore also responsibility (Bauer 2001:136). For Heidegger (1962[1927]:83) care is shown by the following examples: "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ..." Thus, the being of *Dasein* is seen or "made visible" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:84) as care, response and taking responsibility within our being. Theorist Andreas Beinsteiner (2017:42) describes Heidegger's formulation of human beings as "places of response-ability" – emphasising *Dasein*'s ability to respond responsibly to other beings. Moreover, Heidegger's care implies a response or "responsible responsiveness" to others (Christensen 2014:30). Through responsible response (caring) Heidegger then further argues that *Dasein* can posit an authentic way of being-in-the-world. That is to say, *Dasein* upholds an authentic way of being only if it cares for and acts responsibly towards other entities (notably all entities, not just other beings) (Dombrowski 1994:27).

4.2.3 Dasein's being as being-with (Mitsein)

But who exactly are these others that we care for? In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1962[1927]:153) points out that in addition to *Dasein* finding itself as being-in-the-world, it also seems to always be in constant relation to other *Dasein(s)*. Consequently, *Dasein* exists as *being-with* or being-with-others (*Mitsein*). By being-with-others our understanding of being is "co-determined" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:153); we measure, compare and come to define our own being in terms of being-with-others. Moreover, we are able to identify and engage with these others as *Dasein(s)* – beings with their own sense of being (Wrathall and Murphy 2013:12). Notably, Heidegger (1962[1927]:154) tells us that these others are not all those entities that exist outside of ourselves. Instead he explains that "[b]y 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me ... They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself – those among who one is too" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:154, emphasis in original). In other words, these others share a (perceived) similar being to ours in that we can identify them as other *Dasein(s)*.

Importantly, *Dasein* still encounters other entities from the parameters of its own world. Although a shared existence, *Dasein* remains the central point of its own being. *Dasein* pursues a self-understanding, but always in relation to others or "they-self". If *Dasein*'s being-with-others prompts it to forgo its individual subjectivity, then Heidegger argues that *Mitsein* results in an inauthentic *Dasein* (Duyndam 2015:58).[151] Nevertheless *Dasein* shares the world by being-with-others. *Being-with* is therefore a key aspect to the whole account of being (Russow 1980:127).

Furthermore, Heidegger (1962[1927]:156-157) explains that *Dasein* can be with others even when they are not currently present: "[e]ven Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world". That is to say, we constantly come to define and make sense of being, in relation to or with others. Note, however, that *being-with* forms part of *Dasein* – the being of our being – and not the human being per se. *Mitsein* implies that beings encounter or respond to others and come to define their existence based on these encounters with these others, yet they do not become inseparable beings. They exist *with* each other, not in a possessive sense but instead alongside or accompanying each other.[152]

Owing to *Dasein*'s temporality, *Mitsein* is also a temporal encounter. *Being-with* means that *Dasein* is responsive to other *Dasein* in their worldly and timely specificity (McMullin 2009:205). As mentioned, Heidegger (1962[1927]:159) also uses the notion of *Mitsein* to question the authenticity and inauthenticity of *Dasein.* In addition to being inauthentic when defining being solely in terms of others, a failure to recognise being in relation to others is also considered to result in inauthentic being. Conversely, a person who acknowledges and

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[151] Interestingly, René Girard draws a parallel between Heidegger's *Mitsein* and his mimetic theory. Mimesis argues that a human's desires are driven by others' desires, therefore both *Mitsein* and mimesis is grounded in a thinking stemming from "they" or the other (Duyndam 2015:60). Even though I recognise the connection between Heidegger and Girard, I am cautious of this comparison, since, on my reading, Girard's mimesis emphasises mimicry or imitation of others, while Heidegger's *Mitsein* is a being together without assimilating into the other focussing on authenticity.

[152] Interestingly, the term 'with' can also connote responsibility, for example we say: 'leave it with me'. In this way our being-with-others also indicates that we act responsibly towards them.

contemplates his being as his own, as being-in-the-world *and* as being-with-others is considered to be authentic (McMullin 2009:206).

According to Heidegger (1962[1927]:162), being-with-others allows us to act empathetically towards them. Our *being-with* other beings, who share similar beings to ours, allows us "understanding [of] the 'psychical life of Others'" (Heidegger 1962[1927]:161). As a result, *being-with* one another occurs understandingly, which Heidegger (1962[1927]:162) "happily designate[s] as '*empathy*'". Here Heidegger's idea of being as care directly correlates to *being-with* empathetically. Since my being consists of care, my recognition of other beings and empathetic understanding of their being, naturally connotes a caring engagement (Agosta 2011:50). It is important to note though, that for Heidegger (1962[1927]:162) the empathetic engagement with others is not a fundamental way of being, rather it is a derivative or consequence of being-with-others: "'Empathy' does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible". Hence, empathy does not come to define our understanding of being, but rather occurs as a direct result of that understanding as care and being-with-others.

Following Heidegger's brief mention of empathy in *Being and Time*, the philosopher later extends his thoughts on shared understanding between beings in his lecture series *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1938). Rather than referring to the term 'empathy', Heidegger (1995[1938]:66-67) introduces the idea of moods or attunements that are shared between beings (Dreyfus 2013:147).[153] Attunements are feelings, which are shown by our way of being. For Heidegger, these attunements are not beings or entities themselves nor are they an experience. Rather attunements are "the way of our being there with one another" (Heidegger 1995[1938]:66) – a way of showing our being in a particular manner. Moreover, Heidegger (1995[1938]:67) tells us that moods

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[153] Notably Dreyfus (2013:146) argues that Heidegger's attunements are an "undermining of the Cartesian subject". By discussing the idea of losing the self, Heidegger rejects Descartes's fundamental idea of a "self-sufficient Subject" (Dreyfus 2013:146), which we encountered in Chapter Two.

determine our being-with-others, affects how we show our own being *to* others, as well as how we experience another's being:

> A human being who – as we say – is in good humour brings a lively atmosphere with them. Do they, in so doing, bring about an emotional experience which is then transmitted to others, in the manner in which infectious germs wander back and forth from one organism to another? We do indeed say that attunement of mood is infectious. Or another human being is with us, someone who through their manner of being makes everything depressing and puts a damper on everything; nobody steps out of their shell. What does this tell us? Attunements are *not side-effects*, but are something which in advance determine our being with one another (Heidegger 1995[1938]:66-67).

Accordingly, *Mitsein* encompasses a sharing of moods as a particular way of being between beings. Dreyfus (2013:151) fittingly refers to this shared understanding as an "absorption" of being-with-others. For Heidegger, our shared moods and attunements is not a projection of our minds or a type of filter through which we see the world, rather it is a way of inhabiting the world differently and letting our entire being line up in a particular way, according to what we attune to. In other words, in Heideggerian terms, beings can absorb the way of being of others, in order to understand the other's thinking about the world and, as a result, care for them.[154]

4.3 Heidegger and the question of nonhuman being

Even though Heidegger is well known for his formulation of what it means to exist, his philosophical enquiry into being relates mostly to the *human* being (as I have indicated). In the few cases where Heidegger has enquired into the being of the nonhuman and question of the animal, his philosophies have triggered a series of noteworthy debates and controversies (Beinsteiner 2017:41). The controversial reception of Heidegger's nonhuman philosophy most likely stems

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[154] Dreyfus (2013:148) notes that, inspired by Heidegger, philosopher Merleau-Ponty furthers Heidegger's idea of shared attunements. Interestingly, Dreyfus (2013:149) himself also extends Heidegger's discussion by showing how scientific evidence of mirror neurons (neurons that mimic actions performed by other individuals) "enable one to give a physiological account of the phenomenon of mutual absorption, that is, cases where one finds one-self directly doing what one sees being done" – as similarly discussed in relation to empathy by multispecies studies.

from the variety of contrasting interpretations of his texts. Much like the question of the animal itself, contextualised in Chapter Two, Heidegger's theory surrounding the animal being is often read as anthropocentric or, inversely, it is considered as anti-anthropocentric and a positive ethical foundation for animal philosophy (Beinsteiner 2017:41).[155]

Perhaps the most well-known critique of Heidegger's animal philosophy is that of Jacques Derrida in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question* (1989) and, as set out in Chapters Two and Three, *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)* (1997). Although Derrida acknowledges Heidegger's influence on his own philosophical work, he contends Heidegger's estimation of the animal being. Derrida (1991[1989]:49) does not specifically accuse Heidegger of anthropocentrism, asserting that Heidegger's analysis "respects a difference of structure while avoiding anthropocentrism". However, it is precisely the lay out of this structure of difference, which Derrida finds problematic. Derrida (1991[1989]:49) argues that the manner in which Heidegger establishes a difference between human and animal creates an even larger abyss between human and animal and reinstalls the idea of an order of being.[156] Based on Derrida's famous critique, several readings of Heidegger's animal philosophy, for example Calarco (2004; 2008), Agamben (2004) and Oliver (2008), follow such a critical interpretation.

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[155] For example, animal activist Matthew Calarco (2004; 2008) places Heidegger in an anthropocentric category. Calarco (2004:18) argues, "Heidegger's thought represents simply another instance (albeit a highly sophisticated one) of the dogmatic anthropocentrism that has characterised much of the Western philosophical tradition". Similarly, theorist Goirgio Agamben (2004) critiques and understands Heideggerian philosophy as "part of the anthropological machine of humanism" (Beinsteiner 2017:48). In turn, theorist Kelly Oliver (2008:103) critiques Heidegger for continuously implying a captivated animal that is "the negative of humanity". Typical theoretical explorations categorising Heidegger as anthropocentric, follow the well-known critique of Jacques Derrida against Heidegger's formulation of the animal being. Comparably, other theorists and scholars maintain that the likes of Calarco, Agamben and Oliver misread Heidegger. They return to Heidegger's animal philosophy to show how his thought can be positive towards the treatment of animals and can be rendered as an anti-anthropocentric worldview. Such positive readings include Llewyn (1991), Dastur (1995), Schalow (2006) and Beinsteiner (2017). For instance, Beinsteiner states: "[T]he critique of Heidegger's position concerning the human-animal relation might actually be counter-productive with regard to the concerns articulated in this critique itself, which frequently is morally charged".

[156] I briefly further explore and refer specifically to Derrida's critique later on in this chapter. For an extensive reading of Heidegger in relation to Derrida refer to Desmond (2010) and Dungey (2001), who helpfully reconstruct the two theorists in relation to one another.

For my purposes here, I do not attempt to settle the debate regarding Heidegger's ethical viewpoint or dismiss Derrida's reading of Heidegger. Instead, I borrow from existing readings of Heidegger's work on animals to set-up an overview of his philosophy of the animal that can be put into dialogue with Haraway's notion of *becoming with* companion species. For the most part, following my contextualisation of the animal question in Chapters Two and Three, I consider and present an anti-anthropocentric reading of Heidegger's animal philosophy that does not dismiss his readings in terms of understanding animal and nonhuman beings. I do so, because in my reading of Haraway with Heidegger, I argue that Heidegger's philosophies can be helpful in coming to terms with what it means to exist in relation to animals and other nonhuman beings.

4.3.1 Heidegger's thesis: the animal as poor in the world

One of the main texts in which Heidegger analyses the being of the animal is *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1938). Notably, Heidegger's analysis of the animal in this specific text is ultimately geared towards clarifying the *human* world. Heidegger's examination of the animal world for the human world highlights the argument made in the previous chapters: the animal question is a fundamentally human enquiry and typically refers back to understanding the human who is asking the question. Nonetheless, Heidegger provides us with a thesis of the state of being of the animal. In this thesis, Heidegger (1995[1938]:185) famously estimates: "[1.] the stone (material object) is *worldless* [*weltlos*]; [2.] the animal is *poor in the world* [*weltarm*]; [3.] man is *world-forming* [*weltbindend*]".

Evidently, at the centre of Heidegger's thesis is the notion of the world or *Welt*. That is to say, how Heidegger defines each being revolves around its relation to the world, while this relation also separates the entities into distinct realms of being. Therefore, "the mode of being of the human as world-forming is both irreducible to the animal's poor-in-world mode of being (representing biological life) and to the worldlessness of the stone (representing inert matter)" (Firenze 2017:135). Yet, the specific 'world' Heidegger refers to here, as we have come to see in our discussion of the Heideggerian being-in-the-world, is a particular

world known to *Dasein* and thus the *human* way of being and the *human*'s access to other beings. Heidegger's measure of world is accordingly the human world, within which *Dasein* dwells in and is familiar. This formulation makes sense if we keep in mind that at length Heidegger is considering the nature of the human being in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, hence he compares the animal's being to the human way of being. Said in another way, in his threefold thesis of the world, Heidegger speaks from a human horizon.

Heidegger's human horizon is important, because it impacts our interpretation of his thesis. Read in isolation, we can easily understand Heidegger's estimation of the three modes of being as hierarchical, arguing that man is more powerful in the world, while the animal is of lesser value (poorer) than man and objects are worthless. However, if Heidegger's horizon is kept in mind, we come to realise that he is not stacking entities in relation to value. In contrast, Heidegger is only explaining how different entities relate to, or partake in, his specific *human* world or then a human way of being – for this is the only world he can speak of with certainty.[157] Theorist Antonino Firenze (2017:136) also points us towards the fact that Heidegger does not intend for his threefold understanding of being to be interpreted as hierarchical. In fact, Firenze explains that Heidegger (1995[1938]:192) estimates it would be a "fundamental error" to understand that "man is the being who unites within himself all the levels of beings".

Following this line of thought, we can rather assert that Heidegger shows how human, animal and physical objects, with regards to their own existence, access the (human) world differently. In other words, as in being-in-the-world, here the world refers to that which the being has access to. Heidegger estimates that human beings form their own world, or as Figal (2010:37) explains: "[w]hat

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[157] In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1962[1927]:75) refers to his approach as "private Interpretation" arguing that life "in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein". Heidegger further emphasises our inability to speak on behalf of animal being in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1988[1927]:191): "On closer consideration we see that, speaking cautiously, since we ourselves are not mere animals, we basically do not have an understanding of the 'world' of the animals. But since we nevertheless live as existents – which itself is a special problem – the possibility is available to us, by going back from what is given to us as existents, to make out reductively what could be given to an animal". In other words, Heidegger argues that the only manner to understand the animal being is to, notably, *reduce* or compare it to the human way of being, since this is what we know.

comes to appear in the course of the 'projection' of the world is not only discovered, but is produced". That is to say, not only do *Daseins* exhibit their own world, but they also generate, create and add to the world through their being. In comparison, Heidegger then estimates that the animal is poor in the (human) world, since it cannot approach the same way of being as the human *Dasein.* Heidegger (1995[1938]:193) explains:

> The animal is poor in the world, it somehow possesses less. But less of what? Less in respect of what is accessible to it, of whatever as an animal it can deal with, of whatever it can be affected by as an animal, of whatever it can relate to as a living being. Less as against more, namely as against the richness of all those relationships that human Dasein has at its disposal.

In other words, Heidegger's use of the word 'less' indicates that the animal experiences a smaller amount of the human *Welt* – that is the world as humans experience or access it together. For Heidegger, the animal therefore does not access, create and partake in the human world in the same way that the human does. An observation which, as Heidegger (1995[1938]:194) himself notes, is quite "evident" and one that echoes what I have also discussed extensively: the human and animal both experience the world differently as distinct living beings. But is Heidegger's lesser and world-forming distinction a question of hierarchy, as so many theorists, including Derrida, have suggested? Heidegger (1995[1938]:194, emphasis added) continues his thesis and discourages an anthropocentric interpretation of his thinking:

> Yet even a little reflection soon renders it questionable whether in fact poverty is necessarily and intrinsically of lesser significance with respect to richness. *The reverse might well be true.* In any case this comparison between man and animal, characterized in terms of world-formation and poverty in world respectively, *allows no evaluative ranking or assessment with completeness or incompleteness in each case with respect to the accessibility of beings*, as soon as we compare the discriminatory capacity of the falcon's eye with that of the human eye or the canine sense of smell with our own, for example. However ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the animal, *such an assessment is deeply questionable*, especially

when we consider that man can sink lower than any
animal.

Thus, on my reading, Heidegger does not wish to use his thesis to rank the completeness or entirety of all beings on earth. On the contrary, Heidegger intends to articulate a distinction between human and animal, where the two beings are complete beings, experiencing their own world, in their own irreducible manner.

Heidegger (1995[1938]:195) further explains that with his use of the word "poverty" he aims to indicate that the animal does not access the world in the same way as human *Dasein* does, but this does not mean that the animal is deprived or lacks a sense of being. Finally, Heidegger (1995[1938]:195) asserts that he cannot describe the animal's way of being like he does the human's (as world-forming), because he cannot speak for the animal or access its being fully. As indicated in the quote above, he finds the methodological reduction of the animal world to the human world problematic. For Heidegger, speaking of the animal holds the methodological risk of understanding the animal in a way specific to human beings. In other words, parallel to my discussion on the formulation of the animal in Chapter Two, Heidegger highlights the danger and complexities of anthropomorphism in the process of describing the animal's way of life.[158] For this reason the animal is 'poor' in the human world, perhaps only because it is deprived of being fully understood or accessed by the human way of being. However, Heidegger (1995[1938]:195) once again emphasises that "in the expressions 'poverty in the world' and 'world-formation' the term 'world' itself

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[158] Notably, Heidegger does not use the specific term 'anthropomorphism', however he does use the term "hominization" (Heiddegger in Beinsteiner 2017:49) which we could interpret as synonymous to the contemporary use of anthropomorphism. Additionally, his discussions on methodologically understanding the animal's own being closely resembles current critique regarding anthropomorphic descriptions (as I laid out in Chapters Two and Three). Both Heidegger and theorists, such as Zylinska (2012), critiquing anthropomorphism do not wish to describe the animal in human terms, because they believe the animal is unique. Beinsteiner (2017:48) provides an analysis of *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* to describe Heidegger's methodological reasoning's close association to the critique against anthropomorphism. In quoting Heidegger, Beinsteiner (2017:48) notes that the philosopher emphasises "that the ways animals relate to other beings are 'infinitely difficult for us to grasp and require a high degree of cautious methodological foresight on our part' (Heidegger)". Furthermore, Beinsteiner (2017:49) reads Heidegger's (in Beinsteiner 2017:49) warning against the "hasty assimilation" of the animal to what the human is as a "purely methodological sense to reflect the danger of anthropomorphizing".

cannot express quantity, sum total, or degree with respect to the accessibility of beings". It is, in other words, only a qualitative distinction, highlighting the difficulties of describing the animal world from a human viewpoint.

Consequently, if we summarise Heidegger's thesis of the 'poor' animal as an estimation that both animal and human are distinct, complete beings who experience the world in irreducible ways and, as a result, the animal world remains only somewhat accessible to the human way of being; then we can, ironically, draw similarities between Heidegger's animal being and Derrida's question of the animal being (discussed in Chapters Two and Three).[159] Both Heidegger and Derrida establish that animals have a complete, responsive being of their own. Furthermore, corresponding to my earlier reading of Derrida's *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)*, Heidegger also hesitates to access and assimilate the animal and human being, acknowledging the irreducible subjective experience outside of human experience.

Finally, both Derrida and Heidegger return the question of the animal being to the being of the human: Derrida does so by asking what his cat's gaze means for his own being, while Heidegger compares the animal way of being to what it means to exist as *Dasein*. In highlighting these similarities between Heidegger and Derrida, we are prompted to also return to and question Derrida's critical reading of Heidegger as anthropocentric. Perhaps the so-called 'abyss' Derrida (1991[1989]:49; 2004[1997]:124) evokes in his critique on Heidegger specifically, is not such a negative, anthropocentric gap, but an opening indicating the kind of accessibility and irreducibility of the animal and human being. An opening, which Derrida, as I understand, in *The Animal That Therefore I Am* also identifies and hesitates to cross over.[160]

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[159] I maintain that the similarities between Derrida and Heidegger's animal philosophy is ironic, because Derrida critiques Heidegger's philosophy yet, on my reading, both philosophers come to similar conclusions regarding the irreducibility and inaccessibility of the animal being.

[160] For a complete unpacking of Derrida's analysis of the question of the animal see my reading of *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)* throughout Chapters Two and Three.

Extending thought on what type of accessibility exists between the animal and human being, Heidegger also helpfully compares both the animal way of being in the human world as well as the human way of forming its world, to the non-living object's manner of relating to the human world. Heidegger (1995[1938]:196) argues that, in comparison to human and animal, the stone is "worldless" in that it "has no world". However, Heidegger makes it clear that the way in which the stone and animal lack (human) world differs significantly. For Heidegger, the animal's being, although different to that of the human, is still able to interact with the world around it. In this way, for Heidegger (1995[1938]:198) the animal being accesses world in some ways and shows awareness of its own environment: "the animal has an environmental world of its own within which it moves". The non-living object or stone, in contrast, does not show any sign of such an interaction or awareness of its surroundings and being, since it does not have any form of life. Thus, Heidegger (1995[1938]:199) comes to the conclusion, that in comparison to the stone, the animal has being and world, albeit a world of its own:

> Even if the animal has access to beings in a different way from ourselves and within more narrowly circumscribed limits, it is still not entirely deprived of world. The animal has world. Thus absolute deprivation of world does not belong to the animal after all.

More precisely, Bejinariu (2018:240) summarises the animal's access to beings as follows: "More like the human and less like the stone, the animal has a certain kind of access to beings: since it always has a certain relation with beings, the world is not totally closed for the animal, but neither is it open in its full [human] meaning".

Once again, Heidegger's threefold thesis proves to not rank beings in order of importance. Instead it seems the philosopher purposefully uses his categorical analysis only to highlight the animal's being and its irreducibility to the human way of being. Heidegger (1995[1938]:199) refers to this as an "intricate entanglement", where the animal simultaneously has world (in terms of its own environment) and does not have world (in terms of not completely accessing the

human world). It is only after Heidegger establishes this twofold signification of animal being that he can delve into the "essence of the animal and its animality" as well as the human way of being in relation to this animal being. As a result, Heidegger makes it clear that his discussion of the animal being stems from a human horizon, from which he can only examine the animal being in terms of observing what it relates to and how it engages with the human world. For Heidegger (1995[1938]:200):

> [I]ts [the animal's] specific manner of being is defined by the fact that it has access of some kind. The question which now concerns us more precisely is this: What does the animal relate to, and what sort of relationship does it have to whatever it seeks as nourishment, seizes as prey, or attacks as hostile.

4.3.2 Accessing the animal being through the 'as if' structure

From the specific outlook described above, Heidegger then further elaborates on what he understands as the specific way of being of the animal. Before doing so, Heidegger considers the methodological validity of explaining the animal being from a human horizon and how exactly the animal world can be accessed, albeit to a certain extent. Heidegger (1995[1938]:202) explains that to understand the animal way of being, one has to transpose oneself into another being. By this Heidegger (1995[1938]:202, emphasis in original) means to go along with another being *as* that being, discovering what and how it is by "directly learning how it is with this being, discovering what it is like to be this being *with* which we are going along *in this way*". Notably, Heidegger emphasises that this transposition is not an actual, 'transspecies-like' vacation of the self to occupy the space of the animal being.[161] Rather it is "one that *merely transpires in thought* … an '*as if*', one in which we *merely act as if* we were the other being" (Heidegger 1995[1938]:202, emphasis in original). Heidegger's suggested transposing is also commonly referred to as the 'as if' structure, since human attempts to think *as if* they were animal (Beinsteiner 2017:41).

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[161] In Chapter Three I describe trans-species relations as a specific type of multispecies relation, where different species share bodily and cognitive abilities.

By imagining the other being's viewpoint, Heidegger also notes that the self cannot be forgotten. Once more, understanding the animal being through transposition is a going-along "with the other being while remaining *other* with respect to it" (Heidegger 1995[1938]:203, emphasis in original). Furthermore, Heidegger (1995[1938]:208) asserts that humans cannot transpose themselves into non-living objects, because they do not show any factual signs of life or accessibility. In turn, Heidegger estimates that the question of transposing into another human's way of being is void, for, as we discovered in the discussion of *Dasein*, being human already implies being-with-others (*Mitsein*), which, in turn, already implies an attunement towards others. In other words, being or going along with other humans, always-already forms a natural part of being human.

Finally, it is only the transposition of the human being into the animal way of being that Heidegger (1995[1938]:204) deems possible, yet limited. Heidegger contends that as humans, we are always aware of being alongside animals. Thus, thinking through the being of the animal forms part of the entirety of *Dasein*: "In our existence as a whole we comport ourselves toward animals ... in such a way that we are already aware of being transposed in a certain sense" (Heidegger 1995[1938]:210). Heidegger (1995[1938]:201, emphasis in original) uses the example of the domestic dog to think through our transposing of animal being:

> We keep domestic pets in the house with us, they *'live' with us.* But we do not live with them if living means: being in an animal kind of way. Yet we *are* with them nonetheless. But this being-with is not an *existing-with*, because a dog does not exist but merely lives. Through this being with animals we enable them to move within our world. We say that the dog is lying underneath the table or is running up the stairs or so on. Yet when we consider the dog itself – does it comport itself toward the table as table, toward the stairs as stairs? ... Nonetheless, it is with us! A going along with ... a transposedness, and yet not.

Hence, for Heidegger, the animal being is one of human transposedness, in which we exist with our animals, transposing (or even intertwining) them into our human world, however remaining conscious of the fact that they do not

experience the world in the same manner that we do.[162] More specifically, even if we transpose ourselves into the animal's experience we remain conscious of the fact that methodologically this is a human interpretation. In other words, it is a way for the human to make sense of the animal world.

Additionally, Heidegger suggests that animals cannot transpose into the human way of being, they cannot contemplate things *as such* (Westling 2012:41).[163] That is to say, the animal is part of our being, but also removed from our being. Our existing with animals differ from the *being-with* of human *Dasein(s)* who share the human world fully.[164] Here again, Heidegger's estimation that the animal (dog) does not exist but merely "lives" and the human exists rather than lives, does not deem the animal of less value than the human. More exactly, Heidegger maintains that the way of being of the human (existence) differs to that of the animal to highlight that "the transposition of man's experience into that of the animal cannot be considered as a methodologically valid way to access the understanding of the animal's animality" (Firenze 2017:138). For Heidegger then the question regarding the being of the animal revolves around how the animal relates to other beings, despite its lack of transposedness – or then our inability to access its transposedness (Andersson 2017:61).

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[162] Heidegger's notion of transposing reminds of the phenomenological methodology applied to address the question of the animal mind, outlined in Chapter Three. For instance, as discussed Jane Goodall attempts to think *as if* animal and imagines herself in the gorilla world to understand and study the animal. Goodall's attempts, as well as that of Bekoff and Smuts, show great similarity to Heidegger's idea of transposing into the animal world. In review of such phenomenological methodologies we are reminded that such accounts still extend from a human horizon, just as Heidegger notes in relation to transposing.

[163] On my reading, Heidegger's estimation that animals cannot transpose into the human being has to be understood in context with his estimation that humans cannot fully access the animal being (even when transposing). Thus, because Heidegger claims that humans cannot truly know whether the animal can think as the human, he does not wish to assume so. Rather he refers to what he can know of the animal through observation of its behaviour.

[164] Dombrowski (1994:28) helpfully accumulates Heidegger's theses to explain the human's 'transposedness' and the animal's reciprocity in the following manner: "Animals are not worldbuilding (*weltbildend*) beings, but they do encircle themselves (*Sichumringen*) with stimuli in ways that make inadequate any behavioristic analysis of them. Their openness to entities nonetheless is not to entities *as* entities, and this is apparently because of their failure to possess language. Rather, their openness is merely for the purpose of the release of drives. Both behaviorism and the theory of evolution treat animals in abstraction from this partial openness, hence Heidegger holds that animals demand of us a specific mode of "transposedness" (*Versetztsein*)".

4.3.3 The animal's world as Umwelt

Subsequently, in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* Heidegger rephrases the animal *world* as the animal *environment* or "*Umwelt*" (in comparison to the human *Welt*).[165] After establishing how the animal world differs from the human world, Heidegger (1995[1938]:261) reverts to expressing the animal's related existence differently, in terms of an environment or *Umwelt* instead of the world, which Heidegger deems to humans.

Following Heidegger's thinking of the animal being, the question of the essence of the animal now relies on how the animal relates to its own environment and other beings within this environment, without accessing the world as human beings do. While Heidegger estimates that human existence is defined by human beings thinking of beings as being as such, he argues that the essence of animal life, in contrast to transposition, relies on relating in terms of behaviour (*Benehmen*) in its environment (Heidegger 1995[1938]:236). For Heidegger this behaviour consists of instincts and drives that are triggered by beings in the animal's environment to which the animal responds. Hence, for the animal other beings are activators (so to speak) – or what Heidegger (1995[1938]:254) calls "disinhibitors" – that evoke responsive behaviour (Andersson 2017:61).

Behaviour based on drives places the animal in relation to other things and beings within the specific context of the animal's environment (note, not the human world). In this way, for Heidegger (1995[1938]:247), the animal is taken up by things [*hingenommen*] or captivated by things [*benommen*]. Animal captivation "characterizes the specific manner of being in which the animal relates itself to something else even while the possibility is withheld from it" and "because of this driven directedness the animal finds itself suspended, as it were, between itself and the environment, even though neither the one nor the other is experienced *as* [human] being" (Heidegger 1995[1938]:247; 248). Accordingly,

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[165] Heidegger (1995[1938]:261) borrows the term '*Umwelt*' from biologist Jacob von Uexküll (1926). Von Uexküll uses the term to describe everything the animal can perceive and can do. It is everything the animal relates to in its environment and that which it can respond to (Firenze 2017:139).

the animal being is that of suspension, or captivation, in its own environment, and not the human world (Andersson 2017:62).

As a result, Heidegger (1995[1938]:249) describes the animal as encircled by a ring of reciprocal instinctual drives, which places the animal in a constant reciprocal relation with beings and stimuli within its environment.[166] In turn, the animal being is always open to respond to the beings and stimuli within its ring, by way of behaviour and drives. Yet, the animal's openness and response can only be prompted into behaviour, if something (another being or stimuli) affects or touches it – the animal's behaviour is reliant on the relatedness and presence of something within the animal's environment (Heidegger 1995[1938]:255). Again, Heidegger emphasises that this different animal way of life that consists of captivated behaviour, does not represent "something inferior or some kind of lower level in comparison to human Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness with which the human world may have nothing to compare".

In addition to Heidegger's full outline of the nonhuman being mainly pursued in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he also addresses the animal to a certain extent in his later work. Commenting on his estimation of the animal as poor in the world, Heidegger (in Schalow 2015:66) asserts in a lecture series (1935-36): "It [the animal as poor in the world] must not be inferred from this that animal has no relation to food, light, air, and other animals. We need only recall how animals play". Markedly, Heidegger here examines the behaviour of the animal when playing and highlights that the animal relates to entities, although we cannot always precisely know what this relation en*tails*. Thus our transposing of the animal into our world, does not mean that the animal does not have a relation with things (or that the human imagines animal relations), instead

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[166] Here, I find the description Heidegger gives to the animal as in a reciprocal relation with other entities quite similar to that which he assigns to *Dasein* as a reciprocal respondent to its own being. The key difference, however, is that *Dasein* responds to its own being, while the animal responds to the stimuli of others in its environment. Although Heidegger does not necessarily deny that the animal can consider his own being reciprocally, he also makes it clear that as humans we cannot access whether or not the animal has a responsiveness to its own being. For this reason, considering its response to others is the closest the philosopher can get to thinking about the essence of the animal.

observing animal behaviour highlights that such a relation does exist as the animal responds (following Heideggerian thought – most likely via drives and instinct) to these things in its own way. Therefore, Heidegger's description of the animal being, in terms of its own behavioural responses in its environment, differs from the description of the animal through the thinking of the human as animal, which can easily border on anthropomorphism if the human horizon is ignored. Although both methodologies help Heidegger think through the precise being of the animal, the latter describes animal being framed by and entwined with *Dasein*, while the former aims to describe the animal being in its own environment, alongside the human. In short, it is my understanding that Heidegger grounds the animal being in both a human being thinking *as* animal and an animal being in response to its own environment.

4.4 Heidegger's philosophy of being (and nonbeing) related to environmentalism

As a result of Heidegger's break with traditional human exceptionalism, most prominently outlined in his *Letter on 'Humanism'* (1947), it would appear that the philosopher's theories could align with scholarly pursuits outside of anthropocentric thought. Heidegger (1998[1947]:252) outright rejects those philosophies and proposed traits typically associated with anthropocentric thought, such as consciousness and Descartes's mind-body dualism. His rejection, ipso facto rejects the thinking that supports the superiority of humans over all other beings. Thus, "Heidegger would implicitly seem to be aligned with the various movements protecting animal welfare" (Schalow 2015:64). However, even though Heidegger's rupture from anthropocentrism is useful to thinking that determines the life of the nonhuman as valuable, it does not completely correlate with nonhumanism or multispecies thought either, because, as we have established, Heidegger does not wish to assimilate human and animal life. Instead, Schalow (2015:65) notes that Heideggerian thought, although anti-anthropocentric, does the inverted to nonhumanism: instead of escalating the value of the animal to that of the human, Heidegger takes away the superiority of man by emphasising a specific place for nature and animal on earth. Moreover, Heidegger demeans the human way of being to an attendant or steward of the

being of others as a dweller in the nature or environment of the earth, that belongs and is accessed by all beings (even if this belonging or accessibility looks different to that of the human's).[167]

More specifically, *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world implies a dwelling on earth, which Heidegger employs in *Letter on 'Humanism'* as a call for humans to exercise stewardship over the earth and to restore "a sense of rootedness over the earth" (Schalow 2015:65). By always and already existing in relation to its immediate environment – which for Heidegger includes nature and animal beings – *Dasein* has an obligation, embodied within its very way of being, to take care of and look after these beings and its environment. For Heidegger, the being of *Dasein* is therefore intrinsically linked to taking care of and acting (or responding) responsibly towards others. Heidegger (1998[1947]:243) argues: "Where else does 'care' tend but in the direction of bringing the human being back to his essence?" Additionally, he also defines responsibility as "a way of becoming 'answerable', that is, as form of reciprocation or responsiveness to the claim of being" (Heidegger in Schalow 2015:65). Therefore, care and responsibility are an inherent response embedded in the human way of being. In this regard Schalow (2015:66, emphasis in original) argues that Heidegger's formulation of being:

> [S]imultaneously grants the openness by which we can exercise care toward *other* creatures and the diversity of nature as such. Our stewardship thereby extends and enhances our capacity for 'caring' in such a way that through encountering and cultivating this otherness we can subordinate our interests in behalf of protecting the interest of animals (and nature) apart from their potential usefulness to us.

In addition, Schalow (2015:66) argues that Heidegger's estimation of *Dasein* as world-forming gives *Dasein* the power to cultivate a shared space on earth where

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[167] Schalow (2015:65) describes Heidegger's theory in relation to nonhumanism as follows: Following Heidegger "we arrive at any appreciation of nature or animals by desposing human beings from their exalted throne (of superiority), rather than by elevating other creatures by ascribing to them 'worth' comparable to our own. Accordingly, any prohibitions against reducing animals to their 'usefulness' depend *not* upon ascribing to them an intrinsic value comparable to persons … but rather, through the humility of yielding a 'place' (*Ort*) for nature (*phys*) … to manifest itself, thereby reserving habitats within which our animal counterparts can live and flourish".

nature and animals can exist and flourish. Heidegger, in his later reasoning, also argues that observing animal behaviour and transposing as animals reveals that we have certain characteristics in common with animals. For example, the ability to reproduce and flourish, suffer and display affection, and thereby discover in nature a dependence on earth. Consequently, by sharing these characteristics with animals – although the experience of such traits can differ essentially between human and animal – we are able to open a space for them to share the planet with us (Schalow 2015:66).

Furthermore, as previously stated, some theorists argue that Heidegger's claim that the animal being is irreducible to the human way of being is a positive manner of thinking about the human-animal relation in terms of ecology. For instance, according to Bruce Foltz (1993:89) noting a distinction between animal being and human being promotes a sense of respect in our treatment of animals, because we acknowledge that we cannot reduce or fully understand their beings. Foltz (1993:89) asserts that "[t]o say simply that people are animals is, I believe, of no necessary help to the animals themselves". Instead Foltz (1993:89), reasons that *not* assimilating animals to humans highlights "respect for the mystery that is at play in life". Following Heidegger, we can deduce that *Dasein* in its very being of care and responsibility can respond to animals by thinking *as* animals from a human perspective and observing their behaviour in their environment to attempt to gain a better understanding of their being. It is exactly because *Dasein* knows it cannot access the animal being in its entirety – or as it does its own – that it is mindful of treating the animal with thoughtful attention. In other words, the respect and even affinity between human and animal is a direct result of their differences, not their similarities.

The deductions drawn from Heidegger's specific unpacking of being in relation to environmentalism and the ethical treatment of animals echoes my conclusions in relation to the animal question in Chapter Two, based on the bioethical reasoning of Joanna Zylinska. Following Zylinska (2012) in Chapter Three, I argued for a non-anthropocentric difference between humans and nonhumans, arguing that both human and nonhuman are beings, whose distinctive beings should be

acknowledged, celebrated and distinguished from one another. Moreover, in relation to Zylinska, I reasoned that the human way of being should always be of importance, since it allows us to recognise and respond to other's actions, respecting their differences. After examining the philosophies of being of Heidegger and the secondary readings thereof in relation to the environment, we come to realise that he estimates a similar way of reasoning, albeit through enquiring into the nature of being: (1) Heidegger argues for a non-anthropocentric understanding of being where; (2) the human and animal way of being are irreducible to one another; (3) Heidegger argues that the different beings of animals and humans allows us to interact with animals from a specific human horizon that we cannot detach from while; (4) the human way of being is, according to Heidegger always-already one of care and responsibility ready to exist alongside and share nature with others.[168]

It is worth briefly mentioning that Heidegger's much later ensuing text, *The Question Concerning Technology* (1962), is also often cited in reference to Heidegger's relevance to environmentalism. For example, Dombrowski (1994), Irwin (2015) and Schalow (2015) mention Heidegger's critique of technology in relation to thinking about environmental relations. In *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger (1977[1962]:1) critically reflects on how technology (*technē*) has developed to such an extent that it also reveals itself as a particular way of being. For Heidegger, technology is not simply a tool, or a system, nor a specific experience or occurrence; it is a process whereby life is revealed and unfolded. Therefore, Heidegger's idea of the human being as world-forming is extended to define technology in that it develops the human world. Thus, technology comes into existence through man's actions and creations. However, technology has come into being to such a dangerous extent that we are now able to state that man comes into being through technology. By focussing on the essence of technology, Heidegger (1977[1962]:7-8) argues that technology not

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[168] Importantly, in Chapters Two and Three, I referred to nonhuman beings, i.e. any being outside of the human including the animal, while Heidegger specifically refers only to the animal being. As mentioned, Heidegger does distinguish between the animal and other non-living entities (for example, the stone). Yet, he also does not clarify whether his use of the term 'animal' also refers to, or how it relates to, other living beings (such as plants).

only reveals reality, but does so in a particular manner: as *Bestand* (standing reserve) technology does not oppose man as mere objects, but exists in anticipation to be used in a challenging and expediting way. Reality, in turn, is revealed through technology as *Gestell* (enframing), which is the essence of modern technology (Heidegger 1977[1962]:8). The enframing technology does exactly what the word indicates: it places everything as a standing reserve in a frame – enclosing reality in its entirety. In this manner technology enframes the world, human existence and all beings. Just as technology is integrated into our lives, so are we integrated into technology.

Irwin (2015:61) uses Heidegger's critique against the extent of technology's impact on the human being to show how technology is largely responsible for the ecological crisis associated with the Anthropocene. He maintains that the technological *Gestell* places nature in *Bestand,* only to ensure technological progress and growth (Irwin 2015:61). Irwin (2015:61) then continues to argue that only Heidegger's philosophy of being can provide some sort of outcome from "'the danger' of technology subsuming all ways of knowing into the potential resource of consumerism, there remains some possibility for thinking and being that might exceed, or at the very least, generate a readiness for those who come after".[169] Similarly, Schalow (2015:66) suggests that Heidegger's critique of technology should be overlaid with his anti-anthropocentric emphasis on the subjectivity of all beings to show the exploitation of the resources of nature. Much like Foltz's use of Heidegger's animal thesis to promote animal welfare above, Schalow suggests that Heidegger's critique against technology and his theses on being is "[t]he directive of an original ethics to cultivate and safeguard the otherness of nature [which] could also lead to rescuing animal life from the grips of the technological drive towards exploitation" (Schalow 2015:66).[170]

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[169] In particular Irwin (2015:61-67) shows how Heidegger's discussions of *Dasein*'s historicity, finitude and being-towards-death (which I do not elaborate on in this chapter) helps us to understand change as a cycle of particular ways of being together. In this sense "the technological *Gestell* that enclose the modern horizon of knowledge" can be enframed as a cycle of being.
[170] I elaborate further on Heidegger's critique against technology as well as the relation between technology, human being and animal being in Chapters Seven and Eight, where I consider the phenomenon of companion species on social media.

4.4.1 The possibility of being-with *animals*

In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* Heidegger makes an important observation regarding his own thesis on the animal being (poor in the world): Heidegger (1995[1938]:264) notes that his concept of animality or animal being is incomplete. The philosopher makes it clear that he does not (and cannot) capture the complete being of the animal, partly, as explained, because of his human horizon, but also because the scientific or zoological research observing the animal's cognitive abilities and the being of animal is continuously developing (Andersson 2017:66). According to Heidegger (1995[1938]:265), as research regarding the animal develops, so too can we extend our understanding of the animal being in his environment as well as further support our thinking *as* animals. Heidegger (1995[1938]:188) makes it clear that science and biology is "subject to change and transformation" and as a result if we place philosophical interpretation parallel to biological and scientific enquiry, philosophical thinking will change accordingly. For Heidegger (1995[1938]:192), at the time of writing *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* the existing research in biology, interpreted philosophically, strongly agreed and supported the thesis of the animal as poor in the world.[171]

Following Heidegger's own admission to his somewhat 'incomplete' thesis on the animal, some theorists accept Heidegger's assent as an invitation to flesh out the philosopher's formulation of animality, in light of contemporary research (Andersson 2017:66).[172] As I have shown in Chapter Three, several scientific observations, such as Gregory Berns's *The Dog Project*, start to scientifically prove the possibility and ways of the animal being – both as similar to the human way of being and irreducible to the human being. With reference to such projects and findings, a scholarly attempt is made to elaborate on the Heideggerian animal in current literature. For my purposes here I refer to some of these theoretical

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[171] In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger (1995[1938]:241) mentions some practical or biological examples to illustrate his thesis, such as studies on honeybees. However, his examples are often the subject of critique. For example, Derrida in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question* (1989) argues that the honeybee example cannot be assimilated to support a theory on animals in general, as Heidegger suggests.

[172] For example, Andersson (2017:67) uses the results of "great ape studies" to show the advance cognition of animals in relation to the Heideggerian animal being.

pursuits, in particular the efforts of Buchanan (2007), James (2009), Bailey (2012) and Andersson (2017), to show how Heidegger's animal being can be expanded. In particular I consider, based on these secondary readings of Heidegger, the potential and affects of a possible *being-with* (*Mitsein*) animals.

Animal rights scholar Christiane Bailey proposes in her paper *Animal Dasein* (2012) that Heidegger's description of *Dasein* closely resembles the being of the animal. Bailey (2012) argues that Heidegger's earlier work, before *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, shows clear signs of the animal being "a being for whom living, being-in-itself, matters" and therefore a "being to which we must attribute, in a formal way, the kind of being which belongs to *Dasein*" (Heidegger in Bailey 2012:6). In short, Bailey (2012) uses examples from Heidegger's work leading up to *Being and Time* to show that Heidegger previously conceived of the animal to have as well as form world, similar to the human *Dasein*. Specifically, Bailey (2012:1) attempts to show how in her reading of Heidegger, the earlier ways of being that Heidegger assigns to *Dasein*, such as perception, disposition, desire, mobility, understanding, circumspection and voice, all manifest in animal life.[173] Finally, Bailey (2012:5) maintains that if we follow this line of thought that she traces in Heidegger's earlier work, *Dasein* is not just a human phenomenon and can also be assigned to animals. Consequently, Bailey (2012:5; 6) presents the idea of an "Animal *Dasein*": "the animal finds itself in the world ... [and] also *how* it finds itself in the world".[174] Thus, for Bailey, the animal shows signs of being aware of its being. Although Bailey does not delve into what exactly constitutes an "Animal *Dasein*", she does suggest that if we acknowledge the possibility of an Animal *Dasein* then animal and human can exist as *being-with* (*Mitsein*) one another.[175] In my understanding, an animal-human

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[173] Bailey's (2012) line of reasoning is clear, however I approach her reading of Heidegger's work with caution, since she does at times refer to Heidegger without clear contextualisation and admittedly only focus on those aspects of Heidegger's *Dasein* that correlates with animal life. In other words, she chooses to ignore places where Heidegger shows how the animal does not correlate with *Dasein* to form the animal being as he estimates in his later work as both 'having and not having' human world.

[174] Following a recent meme shared on Instagram humorously rethinking *Dasein* as 'dogsein', perhaps, in terms of the specific human-dog relation an animal *Dasein* can also amusingly be phrased as *dogsein*.

[175] Specifically, Bailey (2012:5) maintains that the animal's ability to communicate (by means other than human language) highlights its *Mitsein.*

Mitsein would then imply animals and humans sharing a common being and understanding of that being, inherently showing empathy towards and an ability to affectively attune to the other's being.

In a similar way, Brett Buchanan (2007) argues that Heidegger's formulation of the animal being changes post *Being and Time*. Buchanan (2007:63) notes that in a series of lectures presented by Heidegger in 1925, he maintained that "we miss the essential thing here if we don't see that the animal has a world. In the same way we [Dasein] too are always in a world in such a way that it is disclosed for us". Buchanan (2007:63) explains that Heidegger later retracts this claim that the animal has world like *Dasein*. However, for Buchanan (2007:63) Heidegger's later formulation of the animal being is ambiguous, especially since the philosopher elaborates on the animal being but not animal time. Buchanan (2007) then continues to show that if *Dasein* is constituted by temporality, the animal follows a similar pattern. By tracing three references to animals in *Being and Time*, Buchanan (2007:75) argues that Heidegger's question of the animal should also be examined in terms of temporality. If this is done we might come to realise that the animal and human are similar in that they are specific temporal beings: "the being of the animal is implicated in some 'kind' of time, that animal life is one of duration and longevity but not of being-towards-death, and finally that animals, unlike other things ready-to-hand, are self-producing". In this way, Buchanan (2007) asserts that animal being and human being can be assimilated in their temporal character.

In his discussion on phenomenology and the so-called "problem of animal minds", James (2009:37) examines whether or not, from a multispecies perspective, Heidegger's account of *Mitsein* can be adapted to include our relations with nonhuman others. Especially since the human-nonhuman relation has evolved to such an extent that humans are in a constant state of living in close relation with their animals, both in proximity and as a way of being (James 2009:38). James (2007:40) continues to explore the possibility of a human-animal *Mitsein* by citing Derrida (1991[1989]:57), Simon Glendinning (1998:72), John Caputo

(1993:127) and Charles S. Brown (2007:94).[176] On James's reading these authors all defend the idea of species being-with-others in that they speculate on the possibility of *being-with* (*Mitsein*) animals. Following this reasoning James (2009:41) concludes that "[t]here is no good reason … to suppose that *Mitsein* can only encompass human others".

However, James (2009:42) importantly asserts that even if *being-with* animal is possible, the animal mind or complete way of being remains a mystery. In other words, if we are in constant relations of *being-with* animals, are we not also implying that we can come to understand their minds as we attune to the being of other *Dasein*'s? Why then the constant pursuit to unravel the animal mind? As James (2009:42) remarks "however much ink is spilt in an attempt to demonstrate our being-with them [animals], the hypothesis that animals are minded in this sense of the term remains unproven". Thus for James the idea of animal-human *Mitsein* or even an animal *Dasein*, as Bailey suggests, does not solve the problem of coming to understand and unravel what it means to exist as animal, for although *being-with* animals implies we can understand the animal it does not necessarily ring true. In fact, James (2009:45) continues to warn that a multispecies *Mitsein* (and the broader move towards nonhumanism in general) might potentially eliminate important differences between animal and human or reduce important aspects of animal minds to that of the human beings.[177]

Finally, Tommy Andersson (2017) attempts to further the Heideggerian approach to the question of the animal outside of the realm of ontology, by referring to contemporary scientific studies of animals. Andersson (2017:79) draws on

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[176] Specifically, James (2009:40) explains these authors' contributions to the possibility of an animal-human *Mitsein* as follows: "I am not the first to have considered the possibility of a being-with animals. Following a remark from Derrida (1989: 57), Simon Glendinning speculates on an 'original Mitsein' between humans and animals (1998: 72). Likewise, John D. Caputo chastises Heidegger for having ignored the possibility of 'a kind of Mit-sein … a way to be 'with' animals' (1993: 127), while Charles S. Brown defends the notion of an interspecies 'being-with-others' (2007: 94). All of these writers suggest that we are 'with' animals, in an existential sense …".

[177] Here James's argument supports my argument made in previous chapters, once again following Zylinska. In particular James (2009:45) mentions the example of boa constrictors, where studies have shown that these snakes perceive the world by means of three different integrated consciousnesses. James (2009:45) concludes that it is clear that the mind of the snake and the mind of the human "must be conceived as an entirely private arena and one that for we humans must remain radically unknowable".

various studies, including studies examining great apes and orang-utans, to show that contemporary scientific observations disprove Heidegger's formulation of the animal as poor in the world. For example, Andersson (2017:70) mentions that many animals show a sense of self-awareness when observed during a so-called 'mirror test': some animals are able to recognise, understand and show that they see themselves reflected in a mirror. In this way, animals can possibly have access to their own being and, in Heideggerian terms, the animal self is closely related to the human self. However, Andersson (2017:77-78), like James, suggests that scientific studies confirm an animal being of sorts, but not a being that can be assimilated with the human *Dasein*. Andersson (2017:77) proposes that we speak of animals within "otherworldly worlds" (instead of Heidegger's environment or *Umwelt*), to indicate that each being experiences a shared world from a different horizon. In other words, the human world and animal world are not completely inaccessible to each other, but also not reducible to one another.

Based on my understanding of these various extensions of Heidegger's theory of being, we can synthesise that in contemporary times the animal mind can be examined, understood and explained to a further extent than during that which Heidegger wrote his thesis. It is therefore possible to extend and elaborate on his understanding of the animal being. Yet, scientific research shows (as we have also come to understand in Chapter Three) that the animal being overlaps in part with the human *Dasein*, but also differs in part to the human *Dasein*. As a result, Heidegger's estimation of the irreducibility of the human and animal remains valid. Moreover, the possibility of an animal *Dasein* assimilated with the human *Dasein* resembles nonhumanist efforts to equivocate human and animal. Correspondingly, such notions become problematic and raise questions such as: if we can equivocate humans and animals ontologically, why do we not completely understand the animal mind? Or, if animal *Dasein* is similar to human *Dasein*, then animal *Dasein* is also in its very way of being responsible towards others. Hence, should an animal *Dasein* also be held responsible and accountable for its actions?

What do the various ways of extending Heidegger's animal philosophy tell us? Firstly, Heidegger's animal being as separate from human being should not be

ignored, no matter how we try to extend his theory: it should be kept in mind that Heidegger specifically maintains that the animal and human are both subjects with different worldly horizons, while the animal being is open to be shared and accessed by the human to a certain extent and from a specific human horizon. However, with the extension of Heideggerian theory, the accessibility of the animal horizon is now opening up or *becoming* more accessible.

Within the (more) open space of animal being, the possibility of human and animal *being-with* one another can be explored. But what constitutes the possibility of an animal-human *Mitsein*? From my own reading of Heidegger's formulation of both *Dasein* and *Mitsein*, recall that each *Dasein* holds a particular being, mineness or individuality regardless of its relations. In turn, in their being-with-others *Dasein* does not diminish into another being, instead it retains its own sense of being, while sharing and empathetically or affectively understanding another's way of being. Following this reading of Heidegger's *being-with* we can argue for a *being-with* animals, which encapsulates humans always-already existing in relation to animals. We can also simultaneously uphold Heidegger's formulation of not reducing the animal's own being to that of the human way of being, because even in *Mitsein* individual beings remain aware of their own being or horizon – they exist together yet they do not entangle in a multispecies sense. Consequently, on my reading, a human-animal *being-with* does not necessarily have to imply an animal *Dasein.* The animal can still retain its own being and environment. Moreover, an animal *Mitsein* implies that human and animal can possibly attune and share empathy towards one another, a relationship which we have already encountered in Chapter Three, as dogs show evidence of engaging empathetically with their human beings.

Animal theorist Joanna Latimer (2013:95) provides us with a helpful understanding of human *being-with* animal, in Heideggerian terms. In *Being Alongside: Rethinking Relations Amongst Different Kinds* (2013), Latimer explores the idea of humans and animals *being-with* each other. Latimer (2013:95) maintains that human-animal *Mitsein* is feasible, yet it has to be formulated as a particular form of *Mitsein* that does not collapse the two beings into one hybrid

being or relate to each other as *Dasein* to *Dasein*. It remains a Heideggerian *being-with* that also remains true to Heidegger's thesis of the animal, where animal and human are irreducible. Thus, Latimer's *Mitsein* is an accumulation of both Heidegger's philosophy of human being and animal being. Additionally, by *being-with* animals, humans *and animals* are required to completely attend to, care and engage with one another (Latimer 2013:93). They form, what Latimer calls an "alongsideness", which implies a relation that overcomes dualisms. In other words, by suggesting that animals and humans in their very way of being exist together, alongside one another, we overcome the idea of being formulated in binary opposition to one another. Yet the animal and human way of being remain individual and never synthesise to form a complete, new whole.

Consequently, the idea of humans and animals *being-with* one another appears to be a promising estimation of how exactly humans and animals live together non-anthropocentrically. Admittedly such a discussion requires much more philosophical exploration than what I have only briefly outlined here. For my purposes here, I only suggest the possibility of such a relation to establish that there is a close correlation between thinking of our being-with-other humans and thinking of our being-with-other animals. In turn setting up such a similarity allows me to place Heidegger's philosophy of *being-with* (both with humans and animals) in relation to Haraway's philosophy of companion species, which also thinks through a way of existing with animals.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, as a point of departure into the next layer of my exploration the notion of companion species (namely, understanding the nature of the human-nonhuman and human-dog relation), I explored Heidegger's philosophical enquiry into the notion of being. In particular, I unpacked Heidegger's understanding of being, especially in relation to being and care, responsibility and authenticity. I also focussed on Heidegger's notion of being in relation to others, establishing that being is always-already in relation to other beings. Thereafter, I considered how Heidegger's understanding of the animal being can promote a non-anthropocentric, ecological responsibility by insisting on the

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irreducible beings of human and nonhumans. Ultimately, I showed that Heidegger's understanding of being and *being-with* can be expanded into the realm of nonhuman others.

Accordingly, I presented that we can possibly understand the relation between the human and nonhuman as a *being-with* animals, where humans and animals attend to, care and engage with one another, but do not implode. Reading Heidegger in this way places the idea of *being-with* nonhumans in relation to Haraway's notion of *becoming with* nonhumans. In the following chapter, I unpack Haraway's companion species and the idea of *becoming with* in further de*tail* to eventually read Heidegger in relation to Haraway in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE

***BECOMING WITH* THE (NON)HUMAN:**

READING HARAWAY

> *All knowledge, the totality of all questions*
> *and all answers, is contained in the dog.*[178]

In the preceding chapter, I started to explore the question of what it specifically means for humans to exist with animals and nonhumans, by looking at Martin Heidegger's philosophy of *being-with*. Whilst Heidegger's philosophy of being and its formulation of the animal allows us to think through the specific way of *being-with* the animal, it is necessary to come back to the main theme of this study: the human and dog relation manifesting as companion species. Donna Haraway's (2008) notion of *becoming with* companion species – which I have already briefly outlined in Chapters One and Three of this study – also provides us with an outline of what it means to engage with the being of animals, specifically the dog. That is to say, Haraway, like Heidegger, also provides us with a philosophy of being. However, where Heidegger leads us into a philosophy of being considering the specific, yet different, way of being of animals and humans, Haraway estimates the specific way of being of human-nonhuman, entwined as one inseparable interspecies being. As I described in Chapter Four, Heidegger unpacks the human way of being and the animal way of being. Based on his unpacking, we come to realise that animal and human exist together with each other, engaging with the world and their own way of being together, albeit still as irreducible beings. In turn, Haraway (2003; 2008) sketches what it means to exist in constant hybrid relation with nonhuman others and how these multispecies relations engage with the world around them.

In this chapter, I explore and clarify Haraway's nonhumanist notion of *becoming with* companion species, which she outlines in *The Companion Species Manifesto* (2003) and its extended text *When Species Meet* (2008). Throughout my exploration of anthropocentrism and the turn towards nonhumanism, I have

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[178] Franz Kafka (1971) in Merritt (2018).

already pointed out that, in my view, nonhumanism remains a particularly human endeavour. Hence, in my reading of Haraway I show how, despite Haraway's insistence upon a nonhuman, multispecies reasoning, the idea of *becoming with* companion species remains filled with human constructs and questions. Furthermore, I also indicate where Haraway's idea of *becoming with* shows similarities to Heidegger's philosophy of being human, animal and *Mitsein*. In doing so, I not only untangle Haraway's knot of companion species, but also set up a reading of Haraway *with* Heidegger in Chapter Six – the final section of this layer of the study.

5.1 Becoming with Donna Haraway

On the first pages of Haraway's (2008:3) When Species Meet *the reader is met with two questions: "(1) Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog? and (2) How is 'becoming with' a practice of becoming worldly?". When I encounter these questions, I realise that my own curiosities concerning my furry companions Fudge and Cody, introduced in Chapter Two, echo Haraway's key concerns that guide her study of companion species. Conceivably, following Haraway, my thoughts could be better phrased as: Whom and what do I touch when I touch Cody? How have I become worldly by becoming with Fudge for the past ten years?*

I imagine some of my favourite interactions with Cody and Fudge:

- 🐕 *Every Tuesday, Fudge fetches the newspaper from the gate and whoever is at home to witness his actions responds by praising him, taking the paper and giving him a treat for his efforts. He then proceeds to protect the paper from Cody for the rest of the day to make sure my dad gets it in a readable condition in the evening.*

- 🐕 *During the winter, Cody usually brings a chosen family member his jacket (custom-made to fit a pony, since he is too big for average-sized dog jackets) to keep him warm. Once you have managed to dress him in his pony jacket – which is not the easiest task considering that he is a 60kg dog about as high as the kitchen cupboards and pony jackets do not come with dog instructions – the lucky family member is rewarded with a big dog-kiss and cuddle.*

🐕 *Late afternoons are usually reserved for playtime with Fudge and Cody.
Around four, Fudge collects the toys and Cody fetches the humans (usually
by means of sleeve pulling and barking). There is tugging, throwing and
(some) catching for about 20 minutes (by both humans and dogs), after
which Fudge gets tired, takes all the toys and heads for the pool to indicate
that playtime is over for the day.*

*Are these activities that determine the Heideggerian 'way of being' of our daily
lives, according to Haraway, interactions of becoming with? What precisely does it
mean to 'become with' Fudge and Cody? What is implied ontologically when I
describe the humans and the dogs within our family unit as companion species?*

If we interpret Haraway's driving questions as sequential to one another, we can
argue that the first question describes what happens during the actual event of
when species meet: what happens when I put on Cody's jacket, take the
newspaper from Fudge and play with them every afternoon? More precisely,
what occurs when human and dog touch and interact or *who* do they become
when they interact with the other species? Phrased in Heideggerian terms,
Haraway asks how human-dog interaction affects their existence and allows
them to make sense of their being-in-the-world.

Following this question, Haraway's second question asks us how this specific
interaction allows us, as humans, to live well and get on together with other
beings as well as ourselves. Thus, Haraway's initial question introduces us to the
idea of *becoming with* nonhuman others and the second, probes into what the
meaning of this interaction implies for an ethical existence with others. Notably,
the second question, pertaining to ethics and rights, is a particularly human
concern.[179] In an interview with Nicholas Gane, Haraway (2006:145) explains
her questions more precisely: "When my dog and I touch, where and when are

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[179] As explained in Chapter Three, following Mitchell (in Wolfe 2003) the question of animal
rights and the ethical treatment of animals stem from human concern and the relation between
human and animal rights. These are all concepts that stem from human constructs and
conceptualisation and, as far as we can know, is only advocated for or questioned by human
beings. I also briefly refer to the ethical treatment of animals throughout Part Two of this study.

we? Which worldings and which sorts of temporalities and materialities erupt into this touch, and to what and whom is a response required?". That is to say, when Fudge, Cody and I meet under specific circumstance, what meanings and realities are formed and how do these new behaviours prompt us to respond and reciprocate each other.

Recall that Haraway employs the notion of *becoming with* to explain the entwined relation between humans and nonhumans, from a nonhuman and multispecies perspective. For Haraway (2008:4) humans are always in the process of becoming and we come into being in coalition with nonhuman others, who entwine with our being. Therefore to "be one is always to *become with* many" (Haraway 2008:4). In this way, we can argue that Haraway's interpretation of *becoming with* differs from Heidegger's (2000[1935]:69) becoming (*Werden*), since (as explained in Chapter Four) Heidegger argues that becoming is a process that results in being – in other words it occurs and ends, while Haraway sees becoming as a never-ending process, a particular way of being.

As I have previously pointed out Haraway (2008:4) explains that species we encounter on a micro scale (i.e. bacteria) as well as on a larger scale (i.e. dogs) all entwine with the human being and come to exist within our biological organism. This entanglement is biological (Haraway 2003:8; 2008:4) and also occurs in the metaphysical realm of being – it influences and forms part of our understanding of what it means to exist in the world (Haraway 2008:4). Hence, Haraway's *becoming with* describes the interactions between different species that result in a meaningful "infolding" towards one another, where both species are knotted in their total capacity of being-in-the-world (Jordan 2011:266). Thus, with the notion of *becoming with*, Haraway presents the idea that the very being of humans and nonhumans are constantly entangled in complex relations, to such an extent that their beings are fused together (*becoming with* one another). Species do not just exist alongside or with one another (as Heidegger suggests),

instead, according to Haraway, they are continuously developing and functioning in fusion with one another to form a hybrid way of being.[180]

Consequently, *becoming with* is used to describe what happens when species meet: they come into a new mode of being that is constantly entangled with their human or nonhuman other. Whatmore and Thorne (1998:186) describe the process of *becoming with* companion species as a "relational process" through which subjects are shaped by means of "social bonds, bodily comportments, and life habits that are complicated, but neither originated nor erased". Accordingly, when I put on Cody's jacket, take the newspaper from Fudge, or throw the ball to them – or as Haraway would describe it when I *touch* Fudge and Cody – I intertwine with them both physically, socially and habitually and we co-shape one another into different beings. By *becoming with* we do not mimic or become like our companion species, but we form a new multispecies entanglement together (Weinstein 2004:183). According to Haraway, I am a different being (biologically, psychologically and metaphysically) because of these interactions, I am knotted in an ontological relation with my dogs and in doing so I am *becoming with* my nonhuman others.

Haraway chooses to focus on the specific meeting between human and its so-called "domestic" nonhuman other (dogs), however she notes that there is a multitude of intertwined species *becoming with* one another on earth (Haraway 2008:5). It is not only humans and dogs that *become with* one another, but a multitude of other species, no matter their relation – human and nonhuman, human and human, or nonhuman and nonhuman (Proctor 2017:877). Haraway's orientation towards the infolding of beings means that for her no clear boundaries exist. The lines between the traditional and modern, organic and technological as well as the human and nonhuman are all moulded together (Haraway 2008:8). Her blurred interspecies viewpoint implies, that even though she chooses to examine these "infoldings of the flesh" within figures such as cyborgs and dogs, Haraway (2008:8) does not disregard that other species that

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[180] For this reason, Jordan (2011:266) places Heidegger's *being-with* in direct opposition to Haraway's (2008) *becoming with*. However, as I argue throughout this study, I understand these two terms in relation to one another, showing several similarities.

do not include dogs or technologies, are also constantly infolding towards one another.

The second blurred boundary that Haraway mentions, namely the distinction between the organic and the technological, is particularly noteworthy. Haraway (2008:10) argues that all things that modernists typically included as being "Other to Man" in western culture, including "gods, machines, animals, monsters, creepy crawlies, women, servants and slaves, and noncitizens in general", bring forth a sense of fear and threaten to disrupt all forms of self-entitlement. Perhaps the most unsettling of these is the divide between animals (organic) and machines (technology), which Haraway (2008:10) phrases as the divide between "lapdogs and laptops". Compared to Heidegger's (1977[1962]:8) critical argument that technology enframes everything in standing reserve, in her own attempt to counter human exceptionalism, Haraway (2008:10-11) argues that the lapdogs and the laptops all form part of interspecies dependencies – all entwined in nodes of *becoming with*. In other words, technology also holds a sense of agency and *becomes with* human and nonhuman others, playing an important part in the conversation of *becoming with*. Haraway (2008:12) then refers to the dog as her "co-pilot" – not only referring to the *becoming with* of human and animal, but also adding an additional strand of meaning in this knot of being: *becoming with* human, dog *and technology*.[181]

5.1.1 Philosophical underpinnings of Haraway's becoming with

As discussed in Chapter Three, Haraway's exploration of the multispecies knot of being is informed by a variety of philosophical understandings, including posthumanism, nonhumanism, more-than-humanism and multispecies studies. Moreover, when reading *When Species Meet* (2008), it also becomes clear that Haraway draws and builds her theory on various philosophers, including Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Barbara Smuts and Vincent Despret. Eminently, Haraway omits Heidegger from this list. Although in what follows I only examine the philosophies that Haraway herself specifically refers to, I

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[181] Following both Heidegger and Haraway's formulation of technology, I elaborate on the relation between technology, animal and human in Chapters Seven and Eight.

discuss the direct, irrefutable influence and relation between Heidegger and Haraway in the following chapter.

One of the first philosophical notions that comes to mind when considering *becoming with* is Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's postmodern idea of "becoming animal" in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980),[182] since becoming animal and *becoming with* seem so similar in their syntax. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari's objective with this seminal text, similar to Haraway, is to reconsider the common understanding of what it means to be human, arguing that being is not an unchanging state but a constant flow of *becoming with* others. Resembling Haraway, Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:262) argue that becoming "is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification" rather it is a real state of existence where "[b]ecoming produces nothing other than itself" and therefore species are constantly existing as becoming beings.

At the start of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari define concepts such as assemblages, multiplicity and becomings, which prove helpful to understand Haraway's notion of *becoming with*. Arguing against dualistic thought, they assert that there are no subject and objects in the world, only "assemblages" of different things (Deleuze & Gauttari 1988[1980]:4). According to Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:4-6) an assemblage is a multiplicity, which "has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature" (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:9). An assemblage is thus a unifying knot of elements that make up existence. Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:5) compare these assemblages to rhizome root structures, which means assemblages are characteristically "rhizomatic": it is an entangled network of relations that can take on various forms or 'grow' in different ways and directions. In turn, Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:11) maintain that assemblages are veritable, because

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[182] Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) is considered to be a seminal postmodern philosophical text, where the philosophers present a network of essays or "plateaus" concerning nonhumans anti-anthropocentrically living in multiplicity.

they are always becoming. The philosophers define becoming as follows, with the help of biologist Rémy Chauvin: "the *aparallel evolution* of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other" (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:11, emphasis in original). That is to say becoming is "an exploding of two heterogeneous series" in order to signify something completely new (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:11).

Following Deleuze and Gauttari, we can therefore understand that their becoming opposes Heidegger's *being-with* to a certain extent. Even though both theories argue that two heterogeneous entities come together, Deleuze and Guattari's entities assemble and *explode* into something new whereas Heidegger's beings remain separate alongside each other. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Haraway's *becoming with* also brings together two separate entities, yet for Haraway these two entities *implode* (in contrast to *explode*) into one another to form a hybrid or entangled being, which then exists as a new way of being, or then becoming. In this way Haraway's implosive *becoming with* is a more intimate, inward, joining engagement, while Deleuze and Guattari's exploding becoming is a more violent, joint eruption into a new way of sense-making.[183]

In the specific essay or so-called 'plateau', *1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…* Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980:232) distinguish between three types of animals: the Oedipal animal, the archetype animal and the demonic animal. The 'Oedipal' animal refers to animals with which individuals have an emotional relation, such as pets that are considered as members of a human family. The 'State' animal refers to animals featured in mythologies and spiritual teachings, usually occupying a powerful position. In turn, the 'Demonic' animal occurs as an in between being, between the living and inorganic world (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:240-241; Beaulieu 2011:77).[184]

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[183] It is helpful to think of this distinction not only in terms of a physical entity exploding or imploding, but also in relation to the idea of imploding and exploding digital code. In the digital realm the exploding function *breaks up* code into one array, while the implode function returns elements of code into one array.

[184] Although Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:265) divide animals into these three categories, they argue that any animal can be treated in such a way that it falls under any of the three categories. For example, treating a dog as pet places it as an Oedipal animal, treating the same

It is then the demonic animal that refers to "pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale" which has "affects and powers, involutions that grip every animal in a becoming just as powerful as that of human being with the animal" (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:241). Consequently, the authors employ the third type of 'demonic' animal to continue to consider assemblages and non-hierarchal relations, countering traditional modes of thinking that are visible in the other two animals, such as the Oedipal subject and patrilineage thought.

Finally, Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:300) assert that every becoming, every multiplicity still has its own particular uniqueness or specificity, which the authors refer to as "a thisness" or that Heidegger (1962[1927]:68) would refer to as a definitive being or "mineness". Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, although entities occur as knotted multiplicities, the multiplicities have an individuality of their own. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari (1988[1980]:287) describe the becoming of different individual multiplicities, for instance "becoming-animal", "becoming-woman" or "becoming-vegetable".[185] In particular, the multiplicity encounter of becoming-animal or becoming-dog is described as follows:

> Do not imitate a dog, but make your organism enter into composition with *something else* in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter. (Deleuze & Guattari 1988[1980]:302, emphasis in original).

From my admittedly brief and simplified synopsis of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas regarding multispecies relations and becoming, it appears evident that these

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dog as a mythical character places it as a state animal, while the dog living in a pack of multiplicity is considered to be a demonic animal.

[185] On my reading, when Deleuze and Guattari start to describe becoming in this compound manner, it brings back a certain dualistic reasoning that counters their initial establishing of becoming. When reading these compound becomings we are left to wonder *who* is becoming? Although Deleuze and Guattari directly imply the opposite – it should be read as "a becoming-animal" – the compounds do imply a subject turning into or imitating something else, or a specific organism entering a relation to become another. It thus still easily reads as subject-becoming-animal, which does not relate to a new signification, but rather an assimilation of an already existing entity. Even though I am aware that the authors do not intend their text to be read in this way, I cannot help but wonder whether their formulation remains inadvertently dualistic.

philosophical notions closely relate to Haraway's conceptualisation of *becoming with* and companion species. Williams (2009:52), for example, notes that both Haraway as well as Deleuze and Guattari create a picture of how human subjectivity is shaped by the histories and lineages of the earth. In turn, both sources are critical in understanding and addressing the current global environmental problems related to the Anthropocene (Williams 2009:44). Notably, Weinstein (2004:183) also argues that Haraway's description of the non-imitating fashion of becoming-other in *The Companion Species Manifesto*, is similar to Deleuze and Guattari's (in Weinstein 2004:183) *becoming-animal* that does "not involve imitating a dog, nor an analogy of relations". Interestingly, Despret (2013:37-38) – who Haraway credits for the term *becoming with* – draws on Deleuze and Guattari's notion of assemblages to consider subjectivity, agency and what "makes beings capable of making other beings capable" in *From Secret Agents to Interagency*.[186] Therefore, based on these similarities and their influence on the original notion of *becoming with*, Deleuze and Guattari's theories cannot be ignored and are important to take into consideration when discussing Haraway's companion species.

However, despite the obvious influence and parallels between Haraway and Deleuze and Guattari, Haraway (2008:27) emphasises that she does not wish to relate her ideas to those shared in *A Thousand Plateaus*. For Haraway (2008:27), Deleuze and Guattari present ideas that are seemingly similar to hers and she hoped to see their work as "an ally for the tasks of companion species". Yet she maintains that her *becoming with* cannot align with Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal, since Haraway is critical of the fact that becoming-animal does not deal with the important concrete realities of actual animals (Haraway 2008:27). She criticises "the two writers' scorn for all that is mundane and ordinary and the profound absence of curiosity about or respect for and with actual animals, even as innumerable references to diverse animals are invoked to figure the authors' anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist [*sic*] project" (Haraway 2008:27). Haraway (2008:28) explains that, in her view, Deleuze and Gauttari configure the idea of multiplicity in animal relations to emphasise qualities of

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[186] I elaborate on Despret's concept and impact on Haraway further on in this chapter.

greatness or the sublime, and in doing so, they seem to not only omit, but also dismiss the everyday, earthly, in-the-flesh interactions of animals, especially those that we encounter everyday such as the household cat or dog, in favour of the exceptional.

Williams (2009:52) neatly summarises this difference between Haraway and Deleuze and Guattari as a theoretical deviation where:

> Deleuze and Guattari position themselves as best as they can from the outside … in a position from which they write poetically of deep-time earth histories … Haraway, conversely, situates knowledge from the inside, from the human hearth, and speaks about our meeting … between human and dog, occasionally looking out towards the species that have not shared that history.[187]

Haraway's rejection of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal reveals another important aspect of *becoming with*, which she articulates as "playing in the mud" (Haraway 2008:30). Companion species studies emergent practices, actual happenings within the day-to-day acts of living with others (Haraway 2003:7). As Williams notes above, Haraway considers "vulnerable, on-the-ground" (Haraway 2003:7) and fleshy narratives of human-dog relations. She is not concerned with supreme or extraordinary relations, but rather with the scruffy everyday acts of living, since these are the stories that allow us to know into being and *become with* one another (Haraway 2008:31).

In other words, Haraway *is* interested in my daily four o'clock play sessions with Fudge and Cody. It is these occasions where we – humans and dogs – literally and figuratively play in the mud that allows us to *become with* one another and teach us about our multispecies relations. Therefore *becoming with* is an encounter and an infolding between humans and nonhumans, which occurs

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[187] Interestingly the difference between Haraway and Deleuze and Guattari as noted here, resemble the distinction between Haraway's *becoming with* and Deleuze and Guattari's *becoming* that I noted earlier. Williams argues that Haraway's horizon of interpretation is inward, just as her *becoming with* is an inward implosion. In turn Williams estimates that Deleuze and Guattari speak from an external, outward position, just as their becoming explodes outward into the new.

within the mud of the ordinary multispecies living on earth (Haraway 2008:1).[188] Said differently, Haraway's species are, in a Heideggerian sense, beings-in-the-world or then '*becoming-with*-in-the-world' engaging as *becoming with* in the specific parameters of a real, physical world.

Rather than relate companion species to Deleuze and Guattari, Haraway acknowledges the impact of key philosopher Jacques Derrida's *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)* (1997) on her formulation of multispecies relations. As I already explored extensively, Derrida's (2004[1997]:126) main objective, like Haraway (as well as Deleuze and Guattari), is to rethink the anthropocentric categories "between the human subject, on the one hand, and the nonsubject that is the animal in general, on the other". Derrida's look at the irreducible, subjective animal being can be traced throughout Haraway's dealings with companion species. Haraway (2008:19-22) explains that she draws on the following aspects of Derrida's thoughts:[189]

1) Derrida centres his argument on a real (being-in-the-world) encounter with an everyday companion, his cat, and stresses the fact that his cat is meant as a real physical being and not an allegory.

2) In acknowledging that the animal looks back at the human, Derrida gives the animal the agency to respond. That is to say the cat is also a subject.

3) Derrida does not attempt to anthropomorphise his cat by speaking and thinking for him or making presumptions of what the cat could possibly be thinking.

4) He critiques those that engage with animals solely as mythological or fictional characters or those that refuse to consider that the animal has a point of view.

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[188] Haraway (2008:1; 303) argues that only by studying these ordinary, muddy interactions an *autre-mondialisation* or *alter-globalisation* (informed by Beatriz Preciado's formulation of the term) can be achieved. With these terms Haraway refers to her second point of enquiry – becoming worldly – establishing an untroubled, prosperous and respectful other formulation of the world.

[189] The four key trails of Derrida's thought that Haraway draws on stand in clear contrast to Deleuze and Guattari's becoming animal and helps support Haraway's critique against *A Thousand Plateaus.*

The above-mentioned aspects of Derrida's thoughts fuel Haraway's ideas on companion species. As we have seen Haraway similarly focusses on everyday encounters with nonhuman others, arguing that nonhumans are subjects in the world, and acknowledges that humans cannot 'think' for their companion species (so to speak).[190] In addition, both Derrida and Haraway also counter human exceptionalism in its broadest form.

Despite this immense and evident influence from Derrida, Haraway argues that the philosopher has one shortcoming that sets her thoughts apart from his: "he [Derrida] did not become curious about what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that morning" (Haraway 2008:20). According to Haraway, through his conscious effort to refuse to objectify the animal, Derrida did not consider those that study and interact with animals as mutual subjects, who engage with others as "beings who look back and whose look their own intersects" (Haraway 2008:21). That is to say, Haraway joins the likes of theorists such as Matthew Calarco, whose critique of Derrida I mention earlier. Like Haraway, Calarco asserts that Derrida gave his cat a point of view, but he did not consider how to go about finding out what this view could be.[191] However, as I have suggested, perhaps Derrida did not do so to emphasise the autonomy of the animal and show that any attempt to try and understand what the cat thinks is a fundamentally human endeavour – a critical part of his argument. Yet, in doing so, Haraway (2008:20) reasons that Derrida "missed a possible invitation" to discover a world of positive accounts of researchers working, studying and living in response to animals.

Therefore, what Derrida considered to be an impossible and continuously human question – understanding what his cat's gaze might actually consist of – is for Haraway a very possible question that can be answered by examining those that engage with animals and have come to experience the response of the animal. For Haraway (2008:21) there exists various attempts in contemporary society

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[190] See my discussion of Haraway's notion of *becoming with* in Chapter Three and the initial unpacking of companion species in the introduction to this study.

[191] In addition, Csicsery-Ronay (2010:147) also agrees with Haraway's assessment of Derrida's so-called 'missed opportunity' and argues that Haraway takes Derrida's thoughts as a challenge.

that probe into the question of the animal gaze that do not anthropomorphise the animal and is not fuelled by human pursuits. In particular, she maintains that there exist accounts from certain ethologists, animal behavioural scientists, biologists, philosophical reasoning, popular publishing and a whole world of common people, who engage with animals outside of this human exceptionalism, western canon (Haraway 2008:21). For Haraway, these nonhumanist practitioners can help formulate positive knowledge, which might aid in understanding where the gaze of human and nonhuman meet. Specifically, Haraway (2008:21) mentions anthropologists Gregory Bateson and Barbara Smuts, primatologist Jane Goodall and animal behaviourist Marc Bekoff, as specific examples of those that have "met the gaze of living, diverse animals and in response undone and redone themselves and their sciences".

Since I have already explored Smuts, Goodall and Bekoff's attempts extensively in Chapter Three, I only briefly recall their work here, following Haraway, to show how their nonhuman phenomenological approach impacts her formulation of *becoming with.* As an example of a theorist who responds to animals, somebody "who did learn to look back, as well as to recognize [*sic*] that she was looked at", Haraway (2008:23) relates Barbara Smuts studies on baboon behaviour in Kenya.[192] In her first attempts to study baboons, Smuts would take on a position of neutrality, enter the baboons' territory, keep to herself and observe the baboons as objects. However, she realised that this approach was not working, because the baboons refused to adjust to or become used to her presence. In an effort to speed up the process of habituation, Smuts changed her human behaviour to match that of the baboons' behaviour. She changed her physical cues to *respond* to cues from the baboons and became a subject that the baboons could communicate with. Smuts (as quoted in Haraway 2008:25, emphasis added) relates how she entered into a receptive relation with the baboons:

> By acknowledging a baboon's presence, I expressed
> *respect*, and by *responding* in ways I picked up from
> them, I let the baboons know that my intentions were

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[192] For more on Smuts's baboon study see Haraway (2008:23-26) and *Encounters with animal minds* (Smuts 2001).

benign and that I assumed they likewise meant me no harm. Once this was clearly established in both directions we could *relax* in each other's company.

One of the key aspects of Smuts' research is not only that she responded to the nonhuman baboon behaviour, but the manner in which she responded. As the emphasis in the quotation above indicates, she responded with respect. For Haraway (2008:23) this is one of the key aspects of the practice of *becoming with:* to respond is to respect. It is only by responding with respect to the nonhuman other that both parties can be reshaped and come into worldly beings. Thus, Haraway's *becoming with* is to tie nonhumans and humans together through earthly encounters of regard and respect (Haraway 2008:19). Exactly what this act of respect en*tails* is examined later in this chapter.

Another aspect that I want to emphasise in Smuts' quote is the result of her act of *becoming with* in response and respect. Smuts argues that both baboon and human could relax once a sense of respect was established. That is to say, the exercise of *becoming with* brought about a sense of peace, ease and pleasure. Accordingly, I would argue that *becoming with* is not merely a serious or straining act, but also one that brings enjoyment. In her critique on Derrida, Haraway (2008:22) questions whether or not Derrida would have found a sense of "play" and "joy" if he had responded to his cat's gaze, introducing the possible gleeful nature of companion species.

Following the joy and play included in Haraway's interspecies relations, it is then not surprising that she compares multispecies relations, where human and nonhuman *become with* one another, to the joyful act of dancing. For Haraway (2008:25), humans and nonhumans are joined in a dance of relating.[193] Humans and nonhumans become on-going dancers that are "redone through the patterns they enact" and communicate with one another through the "flow of entangled meaningful bodies in time" (Haraway 2008:25; 26). Even if this dance is not always harmonious – sometimes the partners are mistimed and asynchronous –

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[193] Interestingly, Heidegger's philosophy of being-in-the-world can similarly also be compared to a dance, where the awareness of being goes through the body like a movement: a non-thinking, inherent motion of awareness of being-in-the-world (Ruspoli 2010).

the dance remains in a consistent state of engagement, which means the relation will also constantly be reshaped (Haraway 2008:26). This dance of relation implies that strict human linguistic communication is not necessary to *become with*, since any form of communication creates a continuous loop of response, respect and interspecies relations of *becoming with* (Haraway 2008:26-27). In *The Companion Species Manifesto*, Haraway (2003:62) explains this dance of relation in a more simplified manner:

> The task is to become coherent enough in an incoherent world to engage in a joint dance of being that breeds respect and response in the flesh, in the run, on the course. And then to remember how to live like that at every scale, with all the partners.

It is also worth briefly discussing other theorists that Haraway mentions, values and turns to, to support her ideas on multispecies relations and her critique of Derrida's thoughts. Lynn Margulis and her collaborator Dorian Sagan's body of work on bacteria and micro-organisms aids Haraway in the understanding of how species infold towards one another to form complex entities. They introduce ideas such as "[a]ttraction, merger, fusion, incorporation, co-habitation, recombination", which couple together organisms in a giant web of interaction (Margulis and Sagan as quoted in Haraway 2008:31-32).[194] Haraway (2008:32) explains that it is combinations of organisms that "give meaning to the 'becoming with' of companion species in naturecultures".[195] Thus the various ways of species to come together, whether they are fixed or periodic occurrences, are all ways that humans and nonhumans can practice *becoming with* one another.

In addition, Haraway (2008:32) also refers to Scott Gilbert's (2006) notion of "interspecies epigenesis", which suggests that biological interactions with others

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[194] Symbiogenesis refers to biological process of evolution where cells, organisms, genomes and other microbes, fuse and merge into one another, infolding towards each other to create compound beings in a never-ending process (Haraway 2008:31). In other words, bacteria and microbes evolved and sustain all life on earth by *becoming with* (Lorimer & Davies 2010).

[195] Lorimer and Davies (2010:41) explain that Haraway's exploration highlights intersections between Deleuze's biophilosophy and Margulis and Sagan's symbiogenesis, since "she identifies their shared disavowal of the ontological priority of the individual organism ... [and] explores the emphasis they place on the inventive and promiscuous processes of becoming, differentiation and flourishing".

allow organisms to achieve their full potential, as well as Thelma Rowell's uncommon practices of studying animals. Rowell examines animals by treating them as subjects, *becoming with* them and treating them with "worldly politeness". For Haraway, Rowell's approaches highlight the complexity of species relations and additional ways of *being-with* nonhuman others that she wishes to think through in her own work (Haraway 2008:34; 35). By referring to Margulis, Gilbert and Rowell's body of work, it becomes clear that Haraway argues that *becoming with* companion species brings about fused, complex and merged beings, inseparable from one another. Although, as I will show, this definition does not always reflect in her particular unpacking of what constitutes companion species with reference to muddy, being-in-the-world, examples.

The final scholar Haraway briefly mentions throughout *When Species Meet* that I would argue is key to understanding the notion of *becoming with,* is Belgian philosopher and psychologist Vinciane Despret. Haraway (2008:16; 308n19) mentions in a footnote in her introduction to companion species that she adapts the actual term '*becoming with*' from Despret's article *The Body We Care For: Figures of Anthropo-zoo-genesis* (2004). In this article Despret (2004:130) introduces a "new way of being human" through the idea of anthropo-zoo-genesis. Despret (2004) attempts to theorise how human bodies and nonhuman bodies respond affectively to one another and come to share a common sense of being as they embody each other's interests, minds, habits and even sometimes language. Here Despret's affective response is more extensive than Heidegger's (1995[1938]:66-67) shared attunements between beings. For Despret, being is shared to such an extent that a new being, with new physicality, thought and language comes into existence, whereas Heidegger's shared attunements retains individuality between beings. In other words, Despret notes actual instances where humans and nonhumans exchange aspects of being and come to embody one another to such an extent that they exchange and respond to emotional and affective experiences.[196]

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[196] Haraway (2015:5) describes Despret as a researcher who "thinks-with other beings, human and not". In other words, according to Haraway, Despret practices *becoming with* others as a researcher and does not simply describe this relation as an observation.

Parallel to Haraway (and possibly Heidegger), Despret (2004:115) emphasises the reciprocal nature of these human-nonhuman relations, as she argues that these interactions are more than empathetic and zoomorphic encounters, considering that both parties "induce and are induced, affect and are affected … [b]oth embody each other's mind".[197 & 198] For Despret (2004:131), this is a new kind of "with-ness" and "being with" – perhaps directly extending Heidegger's notion of *being-with* – for humans and nonhumans, where human world and nonhuman world learn to be affected, in body and mind, by one another.

The multispecies similarities between Despret and Haraway are evident and highlight why Haraway chose to reassign the new idea of human *with* nonhuman to her ideas of *becoming with* and companion species. However, by only briefly mentioning Despret, some key aspects of what precisely is meant by the term '*becoming with'* can be overlooked. If this original reference to 'with-ness' is also taken into account to untangle what Haraway's *becoming with* means, we note that embodiment of affects and emotions are critical in such human-nonhuman relations. Despret (2004:114) maintains that for humans and nonhumans to be with one another (in this new manner) requires a bodily exchange of sorts. This co-embodiment does not necessarily occur in a literal, trans-species sense, but through trust and interest from both parties concerning one another, which leads to both bodies being physically and emotionally affected – to such an extent that identities (or beings) are altered (Despret 2004:114).

In a more recent essay, *From Secret Agents to Interagency* (2013), Despret considers the question concerning subject-object agency in human-nonhuman studies. In circular fashion, Despret now adopts and extends Haraway's theories on companion species. She argues that if the human-nonhuman relation is

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[197] Zoomorphic derives from the Greek *zoön* (animal) and *morphë* (shape or form) and can be defined as giving human nonhuman (animal) characteristics or human taking on animal form (Despret 2004:129). Despret argues that *becoming with* implies more than just an imagining of a human taking on an animal form.

[198] Despret (2004:128) emphasises that what she describes as *becoming with* is not empathy, since empathy only focusses on one subject and only highlights an inhabitation of the other, not the relation between two actors. "Empathy allows us to talk about what it is to be (like) the other, but does not raise the question 'what it is to be *with* the other'. Empathy is more like 'filling up oneself' than taking into account the attunement" (Despret 2004:128).

reframed as assemblages that produce agency together in the world, the idea of agency and subject-object relations gain new meaning and companion species now become "one for another and one with another companion-agents" (Despret 2013:29). In her discussion Despret (2013:33) describes the embodied relation between humans and nonhumans that produce an assembled sense of agency as "two beings liberated from pure reproductive motives, and enjoying together an unprecedented, creative, improvised, and queer 'becoming together'". She explains that humans are affected and can affect nonhuman others and vice versa. Moreover, nonhumans and humans are constantly participating and implicated in each other's lives (Despret 2013:35-36). We can therefore equate Despret's 'becoming together' to Haraway's *becoming with* and consequently also arguably add that *becoming with* is closely linked to a sense of mutual agency for companion species. In particular, the agency of *becoming with* or becoming together implies that companion species have the capability to compel each other to do things, provoke, motivate as well as request certain things from one another (Despret 2013:40). Thus, by further enquiring into Despret's original and current use of the term, we can reason that Haraway's relational dance of *becoming with* is not one of impotency or powerlessness but rather "through encounters, conflicts, collaborations, frictions, affinities – a rapport of forces" (Despret 2013:44).

As I have pointed out in Chapter Three, in my view the attempts of Smuts, Goodall and Bekoff – which Haraway finds instrumental to her exploration of *becoming with* – fall under the broader nonhuman approach of a nonhuman phenomenological entwinement, which amounts to a new way of describing the manner of being in the world for both humans and nonhumans. However, as I have also argued earlier, despite these theorists' best efforts their research remains reliant on the account of the human researcher and in relation to the human experience within the animal entanglement. In other words, these theorists, whom Haraway cites, can never solely speak to the animal's experience and lifeworld. For example, Smuts, when behaving as baboon, remained a human attempting to think as baboon, in a similar way to what Heidegger suggests we are able to think *as if* or transpose into animal. Smuts kept her human horizon as

the baboons kept their way of being. This is quite evident in the way both the baboons and Smuts went about their doings as usual, once they were aware of the others being (once again emulating Heidegger).

I find it interesting that Haraway refers to such wavering accounts, in the sense that they do not precisely represent what she establishes in reference to Despret, Gilbert and Margulis. Haraway (2008:23) herself acknowledges that nonhuman projects enquiring into what the animal wants is a "risky project", because it is so complicated to attempt to understand the animal sans human – or as I have argued it is near impossible since we cannot (yet) escape the human horizon. Nevertheless, Haraway (2008:23) basis her notion of *becoming with* companion species on such human-nonhuman entangled projects, mainly because she, following Despret, reasons that in their *becoming with* human and nonhuman are already one whole, new embodied unit of being and therefore there is no need to distinguish between species experiences. However, we are left wondering why Haraway insists on referring to such accounts where a clear human horizon remains identifiable? In other words, on my reading there is an implicit irreducibility between human and nonhuman, even in Haraway's work, which cannot be evaded, regardless of Haraway's insistence that *becoming with* is a joint encounter.

In this way, Haraway's theory, like the work of nonhuman phenomenologists, is somewhat contradictory: Haraway entangles the human-nonhuman to enquire into their being together, which she calls *becoming with*, yet she does so to specifically enquire into the specific being of the dog. Haraway (in Cassidy 2003) tells us that, inspired by Derrida's hesitation and in contrast to his return to the human subject, she "want[s] to know about the dogs" – she specifically states that she wants to understand the specific animal way of being, something she critiques Derrida for not engaging with. But she takes away their individual being by entangling them with humans. That is to say, I cannot help but wonder how a hybrid unit of human-nonhuman signification can also speak for the individual entities in this entanglement, if their individuality ipso facto disappears by *becoming with*?

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Additionally, because Haraway takes such a wide variety of philosophies into account, her hybrid notion of companion species is often opposed by her own thought and observations (for example in the case of reference to Derrida and nonhuman phenomenology). Even though Haraway, parallel to Despret, reasons human and dog exist as a new entity of being altogether, I maintain that we can still clearly trace the human way of being and the animal way of being within the relation. On my reading of Haraway's companion species, human and dog remain irreducible, even in their entanglement of *becoming with*. As a result, I am tempted to read *becoming with* companion species as a Heideggerian *being-with* where both human and dog exist together. To support my reasoning, I highlight how Haraway cannot escape the human, showing clear trails of human thought and constructs throughout her exploration of companion species. I then extend my argument by reading Haraway with Heidegger in Chapter Six.

5.2 Elements of *becoming with*

Thus far in this chapter I have introduced and unpacked Haraway's notion of *becoming with* companion species. As established, *becoming with* describes existence as a constant process of co-shaping and relating to other species (human and nonhuman). *Becoming with* others is thus a knotted ontology of kinship. Based on this understanding, I identify six (knotted) core elements of *becoming with*, which are important to consider when analysing multispecies or more-than-human relations. The elements include: (1) response/respect; (2) historicity; (3) contact zones; (4) play; (5) flourishing; (6) acts of love and; (7) touch.

As explained, *becoming with* nonhuman others is an entangled phenomenon and therefore these elements overlap and converge in multispecies relations. However, it is helpful to identify and discuss these aspects individually, in order to gain a better understanding of companion species as a whole. The various elements are identified based on the above discussion as well as my own reading of Haraway's *The Companion Species Manifesto* and *When Species Meet*. As a result, to avoid repetitiveness, they are only briefly mentioned and considered below. As I have indicated thus far, I question Haraway's hybrid companion

species arguing that, at times, Haraway does not completely infold human and dog, but rather explores their *being-with* one another as indelible individual beings. Throughout my discussion of the core elements of *becoming with* I therefore also highlight how some of these concepts are fundamentally human components and evoke irreducible differences between beings.

5.2.1 Response and respect

Haraway's consideration of Derrida's cat and Smut's baboon-study highlights the importance of response and respect in companion species who are *becoming* worldly *with* one another. She explains: "Species interdependence is the name of the worlding game on earth, and that game must be one of *response and respect*. That is the play of companion species *learning to pay attention*" (Haraway 2008:19, emphasis added). In a similar way to Heidegger, who argues that inherently beings reciprocally respond (to others and their own being) and care for others, she argues that responding to others and showing respect requires an awareness of one another. By identifying our companion species, getting to know them and being curious about them, we are responding to them and, as a result, *becoming with* them.

To be curious about others is to find them "actively interesting" and anticipate interesting and surprising interactions. This is what enables us to "sense and respond" (Haraway [on Despret] 2015:5). Haraway (2015:6, emphasis in original) explains that "[a]sking questions comes to mean both asking what another finds intriguing and also how learning to engage *that* changes everybody in unforeseeable ways". Thus, to respond implies becoming interested and asking questions. Additionally, like Heidegger and Derrida, Haraway argues that humans should also be mindful that nonhuman others have a response of their own, to which we should pay attention. Yet, unlike Heidegger and Derrida, Haraway argues that humans should aim to understand and expect to answer to the nonhuman being. By responding as well as by acknowledging another's (subjective) response, a *becoming with* relation is established.

According to Haraway (2008:76), to respond to others means, "to recognize [*sic*] copresence in relations of use". In other words, to respond acknowledges the subjective presence of another in a beneficial relationship. For Haraway there is a difference between react and response. Although there "is no formula for response" it is "not merely to react with a fixed calculus" (Haraway 2008:77). A reaction is instant, unconscious, driven by a moment and does not necessarily consider others (human or nonhuman). In turn, a response is a considered action, which takes into account the co-presence of others, their ontological existence and their own capacity for response. Haraway (2008:77-78) argues that anthropocentric western philosophers (specifically Haraway [2008:77-78] identifies Kant and Levinas) often argue that only humans can respond, while nonhumans, including animals, simply react. It is exactly this human exceptionalism argument Haraway (2008:295) counters by advocating multispecies response. Following Derrida, Haraway (2008:79; 295) argues that we should focus on distinguishing responses from reactions and acknowledge that animals and nonhuman others also respond. In doing so, we are, in turn, responding. *Becoming with* others therefore implies a ring of response, constantly looping back towards acknowledging one another.

The ring of multispecies response reminds of Heidegger's (1995[1938]:249) encircled animal, which constantly relates to and responds reciprocally with the environmental circuit surrounding it. Notably, however Heidegger's encircled animal allows us as humans to observe the animal respond (or as Haraway would phrase it, 'react') to its environment, sans our human input. In turn, Haraway's circle of response aims to do the opposite by specifically involving the human in the animal's response. Although Haraway's attempt does seem to establish the animal being more equally than Heidegger – whose encircled animal as we have seen is often accused of reducing the animal to instincts and drives – she also brings forth a human horizon to understanding the animal that Heidegger (and Derrida) try to avoid. It is after all the *human* who has to respond to the animal and the *human* who has to attempt to understand the animal being in Haraway's companion species circle.

Furthermore, for Haraway, the circle of response implies acting responsibly in multispecies relations. The ability to respond to others is responsibility, which she prefers to relate as "response-ability" (Haraway 2008:23). Said differently, by responding you are practicing *becoming with* responsibly. Haraway (2008:23) also considers respect another interchangeable aspect of response, since "[t]o respond was to respect". She argues that it is this link that Derrida failed to see in his thinking on nonhuman response: "He came right to the edge of respect, of the move to *respecere,* but he was sidetracked … by his own linked worries about being naked in front of his cat" (Haraway 2008:20). According to Haraway, his lack of concern for *how* his cat responds and his occupation with his own subjectivity highlights a key aspect of Haraway's idea of response. To respond and respect implies enquiry into *another's* response, becoming curious about multispecies and their own responses, which in turn, for Haraway, manifests respect. As per Haraway, Derrida responded to his cat by recognising its own way of being, but if he had enquired into the cat's own response, he would have increased his understanding of nonhuman others and em*barked* on *becoming with* – the act of respect. Hence, *becoming with* is entangled within a circle of response and respect when species meet:

> To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem … [t]o knot companion species together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to enter the world of becoming with, where *who and what we are* is precisely what is at stake (Haraway 2008:19).

Haraway's formulation of respect stands in strong opposition to Heidegger's (1995[1938]:195) assertion that respect for other entities stem from acknowledging difference. Recalling that for Heidegger, the respect and even affinity between human and animal is a direct result of their differences, not their response and curiosity of each other's being. In fact, Heidegger (1962[1927]:178) estimates curiosity as a manner of "inauthentic" being, alongside ambiguity and idle talk. In other words, Heidegger argues that we respect beings by keeping our distance (so to speak), recognising their individual beings and our inability to comprehend them fully. Conversely, Haraway maintains that we respect the animal being by becoming directly involved with

its being, infolding into it and entangling with its existence. Phrased in this manner, I question whether Haraway's entanglement is truly respectful or just another way for the human being to enforce itself onto the being of the animal. After all, does the human curiosity into the animal too often not result in the unethical treatment of the animal, only to satisfy and enlarge our own quest for understanding?[199]

5.2.2 Historicity

Part of responding and *becoming with* companion species also means digging deeper into the enmeshed webs of history of species that become entwined with our own in interspecies relations (Haraway 2008:100). To be entwined in an interspecies relationship connotes inheriting the history of multiple species. A species "historicity" (Haraway 2003:7), "lived history" (Haraway 2008:37), "evolution stories" (Haraway 2003:26) or "inherited histories" (Haraway 2003:7) is increasingly important in companion species relations. Hird (2010:36) notes how Haraway's kinship acknowledges that species have "ontologies-in-themselves" or separate heritages before they encounter one another. It is these heritages and histories, which each subject 'brings to the meeting table' (so to speak) and becomes woven together when species meet.

Haraway (2008:37-38) argues that "looking back" at the histories of our multispecies counterparts allows us to *become with* a nonhuman other, respond to them as well as inherit their histories – their story – as our own. As an example, Haraway introduces the *Tsitsikamma Wolf Sanctuary* in the Eastern Cape, South Africa – a non-profit wildlife organisation providing a refuge for

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[199] Additionally, I wonder whether the animal is reciprocally curious about the human way of being? In this case, I think it is important to note Haraway's specific choice of exploring the human-dog relation as *becoming with* companion species. It is somewhat uncomplicated to argue that the human's curiosity into the dog's existence is reciprocated by the dog, since human and dog live in constant relation to one another and dogs, as I have shown, are naturally and physically inclined towards the human way of life, as a result of domestication. In other words, the human is inherently part of the dog's life. Moreover, several human-dog encounters have indicated how dogs show interest in their human's habits. Thus, in the case of the dog, we do not object to entangling with their lives or to the notion that trying to understand the dog is a sign of respect. However, when thinking of other species, for example elephants, the Heideggerian objective observation of their habits seems unequivocally less intrusive (or more respectful) to try and understand and respect the animals, instead of placing them under stress to attempt to entangle our beings to achieve a shared way of being that does not come naturally to them.

abused and abandoned wolves in South Africa. She provides an evolution story for the wolves and argues, that by becoming aware of and interacting with the story and these companion species, we "live" their histories with them. [200] Haraway (2008:41) explains that inheriting nonhuman histories can be complex, since no evolution story is clear-cut and can be quite a tangled narrative in itself, however the point of delving into such stories is "not to celebrate complexity but to become worldly and to respond". Becoming familiar with nonhuman (past) narratives allows us to respond and respect nonhuman others and increases awareness of the knots of multiplicity in our interspecies beings. It promotes what Haraway calls (2008:38) "*autres-mondialisations*" – becoming worldly or a composed, flourishing and courteous world.

Focussing specifically on dogs as companion species, Haraway (2008:97) also refers to "breed stories", the histories and origins of a specific dog breed, its ancestry and relational ties. Dog owners tend to show a particular interest in their dogs' origin-*tails* (Haraway 2003:26), perhaps inherently driven by their existing companionship. Breed stories include narratives of breed type, breed standard, breed history as well as breed traits and characteristics. In the day-to-day interaction between dog and dog owner, breed histories are also inherited and, more importantly, impact the current relation we have with our companions. Haraway (2008:97) explains: "That's why I have to tell these stories – to tease out the personal and collective response required now, not centuries ago". In addition, how our own histories interact with our companions' histories is also critical. In other words, it is not just nonhuman histories that matter, but also their entanglement with human stories and references. Like Heidegger, Haraway (2006:146) maintains that humans are not ahistorical, or without history and context. For Haraway, they have 'breed stories' of their own, as they are results of relations with living *and* non-living entities as well as the

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[200] For more on the specific history of the *Tsitsikamma Wolf Sanctuary* see Haraway (2008:36-37). In the specific case of this wolf sanctuary, Haraway's arguments do not necessarily ring true. A recent visit to the sanctuary reveals that not much emphasis is placed on the complex history of the wolves in South Africa. In fact, visitors are more intrigued to interact with an actual wolf and very little emphasis is placed on the animal's history. Additionally, the sanctuary is somewhat run down and does not provide a flourishing environment for the animals. That is to say, based on my experience at the sanctuary the animals seem to be objectified zoo-animals and do not present a moment to share a lived history with a nonhuman, as Haraway argues.

environmental epoch and evolutionary history (Haraway 2006:146). Consequently, breed stories teach humans how to cohabitate with their nonhuman companions and establishes a meaningful and layered interspecies relation (Haraway 2008:98).

In reading Haraway's breed stories I suggest that these specific dog histories are essentially human constructs. Breed stories and dog histories, just like history itself, are not told by dogs, but rather constructed by human thought into human narratives that allow us to make sense of existence. In *A Place for Stories: Nature, History and Narrative*, environmental historian William Cronon (1992:1349) explains that historians "configure the events of the past into causal sequences – stories – that order and simplify those events to give them new meanings". Thus, even though history is based on documented events, *humans* construct these events into narratives. Cronon (1992:1349) argues that, as an historian who focusses mainly on the environment and history of nature, he too cannot avoid constructing history into narratives and stories based on scientific records and biological documentation. Cronon admits that "[i]n doing so, we move well beyond nature into the intensely human realm of value". In other words, history, even the history of animals and the environment, is enframed (*Gestell*) – to borrow a term from Heidegger – by human stories. As we have seen throughout Chapters Two and Three, people tell the very history of the dog (from wolf to household pet) in varying ways. For example, in some instances the dog is framed with agency 'domesticating' itself, while in others the dog's evolution is a direct result of human supremacy.[201]

To my thinking, Haraway emulates that breed histories are human constructs as she labels them breed *'stories'* – that is something told by humans themselves.[202] Furthermore, in *When Species Meet*, Haraway dedicates an entire chapter

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[201] For a further explanation of such instances refer to my discussion on domestication in Chapter Two, as well as Alice Robert's *Tamed: Ten Species that Changed Our World* (2017) and Laura Hobgood-Oster's *A Dog's History of the World: Canines and the Domestication of Humans* (2014).
[202] Patton (2010:577) contends that Haraway uses the theme of stories throughout her work on companion species. Indeed, Haraway (2003:17) notes: "Stories are much bigger than ideologies. In that is our hope". Interestingly, Patton (2010:577) also reads Derrida's experience with his cat as a story the philosopher tells to transgress the boundaries of anthropocentrism.

entitled *Cloning mutts, saving tigers* (2008:133-157) to discussing the human manipulation of dogs, including the act of breeding. Here she makes no secret of the fact that breeding is a human, and sometimes anthropocentric, act: "responsible dog breeding is a cottage industry, made up largely of amateur communities and individuals who are not scientific or medical professionals and who breed modest numbers of dogs at considerable cost to themselves over many years and with impressive dedication and passion" (Haraway 2008:139). Thus, Haraway knowingly uses a human construct and human act to explain responsible acts of *becoming with*; her notion of nonhuman companion species paradoxically manifests in fundamentally human behaviour.

Nonetheless, Haraway (2008:105) encourages those bound in kinship to live in response to the histories they encounter of their multispecies others. To *become with* others by engaging with nonhuman others' histories, stories and origins makes multispecies relations a layered, complex and dense phenomenon. More importantly, it becomes a phenomenon where two different species' *unique* histories and horizons are equally important. Although these histories are shared and become enmeshed Haraway urges us to untangle the individual history of each being in the knot of companion species, since historicity gives *becoming with* and companion species context, intricacy and depth, forming a crucial aspect of such relations. Thus, on my reading, by insisting on the separate historicity of the species *becoming with* each other, Haraway conserves a certain degree (or layers) of distinctiveness in her knot of companion species. By delving into the histories of our dogs and their owners "Dogland turns out to be built from *layers* of locals and globals" and helps "shape a worldly consciousness" (Haraway 2003:63; 64, emphasis added). Additionally, Haraway's worldly consciousness and awareness of historicity echoes Heidegger's awareness of being and temporal cognisance.

5.2.3 Contact zones

In *When Species Meet* Haraway explores the phenomenon of interspecies encounters. However, in her formulation of *becoming with* companion species, she also tells us *where* species meet. The actual location or zone where species

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come into contact with each other (both physically and figuratively) forms a particular part of the nodes of those bound in significant otherness. Hinchliffe (2010:34, emphasis in original) explains that companion species also en*tail* aspects of spatiality including matters "as mundane as *where* things happen and as complex as how spaces are made as species meet, and as tricky as trying to think about more than one meeting and more than one companion species". In reference to the spatial aspect or the geography of kinship, Haraway (2008:4) calls the spaces and places where species meet "contact zones".[203] Therefore, contact zones are where and when species encounter, entangle and multiply.

Haraway's use of the term 'contact zones' originates in colonial and postcolonial studies. Linguistic theorist, Mary Louise Pratt, coined the term in her seminal text *Imperial Eyes: Studies in Travel Writing and Transculturation* (1992). Pratt adapts 'contact zones' from 'contact languages', which refers to improvised languages that evolve amongst different speaking native groups continuously communicating with one another. She uses the term to describe these colonial cultural encounters. For Pratt (1991:34) contact zones refer to "social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other". Following Pratt, as well as historian Jim Clifford, Haraway (2008:217) describes contact zones in terms of multispecies relations as the meeting point between different species, where notably all species already exist relationally, with history and with context. In particular, contact zones are where species with historicity respond to one another. It is where response-ability happens. Interestingly, Haraway (2008:217) notes that some of the most applicable examples of contact zones are found in science fiction, with a description that reminds of her own cyborg figure: "in which aliens meet up in bars and redo one another molecule by molecule".[204]

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[203] Contact zones can refer to both spaces (being more figurative, broad and abstract with several connotations and attachments) and places (a very specific and identifiable site), following Michel de Certeau's infamous distinction in *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984) where "space is practiced place" (1984:117).

[204] Therefore, I interpret becoming (or being) cyborg arguably also as a nonhuman-technology contact zone. I discuss Haraway's cyborg figure and its relation to companion species further in Chapter Eight.

Haraway (2008:217) mentions that contact zones also have certain characteristics. For example, she notes that assemblages of biological species typically compose best outside of their comfort zones (Haraway 2008:217). As a result, contact zones of *becoming with* are rarely safe, risk-free spaces and often challenge species to move outside of their immediate circumstances. Furthermore, contact zones are not just spaces where species meet, but also (akin to *becoming with*) where species transform: "contact zones are where the action is, and current interactions change interactions to follow ... [c]ontact zones change the subject – all the subjects – in surprising ways" (Haraway 2008:219). These challenging and transforming spaces are, as a result, also increasingly complex and involve multiple geographies and interactions (Hinchliffe 2010:35). Their complexity reminds us that in unpacking and examining species *becoming with* one another a "complex knot of wheres" also needs to be explored (Hinchliffe 2010:35).

Markedly, Haraway finally also compares the response that takes place between dog and human within the contact zone (here specifically during dog training classes) to the Heideggerian idea of "the open" (*Offen*), arguing that this space requests us to consider: "Here we are, and so what are we to become?" (Haraway 2008:221).[205] In describing the lived experience of being human (*Dasein*), Heidegger (1962[1927]:139) explains that we as humans are able to notice a reality, a space or a "there" of being. In other words, according to Heidegger, "we are open to a reality that is open to us" (Russon & Jacobson 2013:345). The ability to identify and become aware of the so-called 'opening' prompts us to reflect on what it means to 'be there' and what we experience in this space. Or, like I mentioned before, Heidegger (1962[1927]:68) argues that there is "disclosedness" to being in that we are always open to the possibility of being. Additionally in relation to the philosophy of the animal being Heidegger makes it

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[205] Notably, this is the only place throughout her theory of companion species that Haraway refers to Heideggerian thought directly. Additionally, Haraway reconfigures Heidegger's 'openness' (*offen*). According to Metcalf (2008:115), "Heidegger's clearing is opened by the ultimate emptiness or purposelessness of human existence. However, the open that both she [Haraway] and I [Metcalf] require to articulate human-critter entanglements is created by a rich material-discursive apparatus that demands the fullest attention and a double-edged curiosity, not boredom".

clear that the 'as if' structure of being (which allows humans to think *as* animal) occurs in such an open space: "What is meant here by the 'as,' … is … the open of a free space hardly surmised and heeded, in which beings come into play as such, namely as the beings they *are*, into the *play of their being*" (Heidegger as quoted in Beinsteiner 2017:50, emphasis in original).[206] In other words, Haraway and Heidegger's species meet in the same ontological opening.

It is thus this clearing of our awareness of being, that Haraway compares to the space of the contact zone that allows us to articulate companion species. The incorporation of Heidegger's interpretation, which specifically refers to a *human* awareness or openness to all being, in her nonhumanist point of view is interesting and perhaps highlights the role (or authority) of the human in potential contact zones. This role is also emphasised in Pratt's (1991:34) original use of the term often occurring "in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today". Are humans then in control of contact zones? Or are they merely the species asked to answer the ontological questions these zones pose?

Interestingly, Haraway (2008:220-221) acknowledges the authority of the human in certain dog-human contact zones (such as agility training classes): "Agility is a human-designed sport … I would be a liar to claim that agility is a utopia of equality and spontaneous nature … The human decides for the dog what the acceptable criteria of performance will be". However, she maintains that both dog and human respond and meet within these spaces, no matter the power balance: "The human must respond to the authority of the dog's actual performance" (Haraway 2008:221). Nevertheless, on my reading Haraway once again estimates a very distinctive opening for the human in the contact zone, no matter its entanglement.

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[206] Interestingly, here Heidegger uses the idea of playing, which as we will see, Haraway also emphasises in her exploration of companion species.

5.2.4 Play

In *The Companion Species Manifesto*, Haraway (2003:12, emphasis added) explains that the human-dog relationship is filled with various positive and negative acts including "waste, cruelty, indifference, ignorance, and loss … joy, invention, labor, intelligence and *play*". Although she mentions play at the end of the list it becomes one of the most integral parts of *becoming with* other species, since companion species are always "in mortal play" (Haraway 2008:19) with one another. Haraway's play consists of more than just a recreational activity. For her the entire process of dogs and humans *becoming with* one another – of paying attention, responding and adding to their worlds within various contact zones – constitutes play (Haraway 2008:374).

Haraway (2008:232) explains that most dogs inherently know how to play, want to play and usually go to great efforts to find a partner to play with.[207] In turn, (most) humans find various ways to play with their dogs, while others use play as a tool for training practices. She explains that play is an instrument that builds physical, mental and affective connections, teaches players about one another and also provides great amounts of joy (Haraway 2008:232).

However, Haraway emphasises that playing with dogs is not always simple and instinctive for humans. Several humans need to be taught how to play with their furry companions or want to play with dogs as if they were "fantasy children in fur coats or humanoid partners in double tennis" (Haraway 2008:232). Playing with companion species is more complex than projecting typical human-on-human play (a kind of 'anthropo-play') behaviour onto pets. It involves interpreting one another and creating a new way of interacting with one another, learning, responding and respecting. Although humans can teach other humans how to play with dogs in this way, Haraway (2008:232) argues that dogs are

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[207] The scholarly enquiry into the act of play emphasises that play extends far beyond human life and that playing is applicable to both human and animal life, as it allows beings to make sense of existence (Huizinga 1949:i). Dutch historian, Huizinga (1949:i) explains that "[p]lay is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them their playing". Additionally, play is often framed as a transcendent act that surpasses being-in-the-world. I discuss this idea further in the Addendum of this study with reference to Gadamer (1975), Huizinga (1949), Massumi (2014) and Lechte (2017).

probably the best teachers in this regard. During play, it is not human playing with dog or human teaching dog to play like human, but human and dog playing *together*, or even dog leading human in play (Haraway 2008:232). This is the play of companion species that allows them to *become with* one another. Haraway (2008:237) provides an eloquent description of what play means in a multispecies relation, highlighting the act's significance:

> Play is the practice that makes us new, that makes us into something that is neither one nor two, that brings us into the open where purposes and functions are given a rest. Strangers in mindful hominid and candid flesh, we play with each other and become significant others to each other.

It is clear that, for Haraway, play is a critical part of what happens in the contact zone of *becoming with*, as it is one of the key fleshy activities that forms significant otherness.[208]

Notably, Haraway (2008:238) distinguishes between games and play. She makes it clear that games are not play. Play is an open process that is not determined by rules, while games are made-up of rules. For Haraway play – and therefore *becoming with* – cannot occur bounded by rules as well as human language. It is not an innocent act (2008:155), but it is a connotative action with semiotic significance. In other words, play is not always verbatim, neither is it pure, as it occurs in the muddy, fleshy contact zones between species. Accordingly, "[p]lay can occur only among those willing to risk letting go of the literal" (Haraway 2008:239). Instead, play consists of being co-present with another, experiencing together without necessarily having a specific goal or purpose in mind.[209] The co-presence of another brings enjoyment and brings with it potential and new meaning, or as Haraway (2008:240) states "[p]lay proposes". For Haraway, play proposes significant otherness, companionship and *becoming with*.

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[208] Despite Haraway's argument for taking play seriously, some argue that the accent on the playful takes away from the urgency of multispecies relations in the current environmental context and brings a transcendental aspect to her argument. For example, Csicsery-Ronay (2010:143, emphasis added) argues that Haraway's play "down*play*[s] the most urgent political problems posed by the human domination of animals by escaping into a *metaphysical* vision and playful anecdote". I discuss this aspect further in the Addendum accompanying the study.

[209] Here Haraway's definition of play echoes Huizinga (1949) and Gadamer's (1975) sentiments that play is a mode of being in itself.

Similar to Haraway, in *What Animals Teach Us About Politics* (2014), philosopher Brian Massumi aims to "demonstrate that play and creativity are common to human and animals, even in the context of instinctual behaviour" (Lechte 2017:670). Massumi (2014) shows that the politics of play emphasises the fundamental features that are common to all beings – animals and humans alike. According to Massumi (2014:38) play "re-establishes us with our animality".

What stands out in Massumi's discussion of play in comparison to Haraway's multispecies play, is that for Massumi: "In the event of play, animal and human come together without merging into one another" (Lechte 2017:671): "Where the immanent modulation and stylistic deformation overlap – that is to say, in the gesture itself – the arena of combat and that of play enter into a *zone of indiscernibility*, without the difference being erased (Massumi 2014:6, emphasis in original). In other words, although human and animal become tangled together and perhaps equal during play, their differences, or distinctiveness, continuous to be identifiable; their unique being stays intact. Thus if we grasp Haraway's play of *becoming with* in relation to Massumi's politics of play, we can possibly interpret the play of companion species as: a process where human and dog engage together in reciprocal response, yet it does not have to be a nonhuman act that implodes both the being of the human and animal to nothing other than aliveness or 'bare life' (Lechte 2017:672).

Once more, Haraway uses a notion familiar to the human world and human way of being to explore companion species. Regardless of play's surpassing and unrestrained nature, it is a process that has shaped human civilisation and remains relevant to several human activities and behaviours in contemporary society. Huizinga (1949:173) asserts that human civilization is "in its earliest phases, played. It does not come from play like a babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises *in* and *as* play, and never leaves it". In other words, although play cannot be instrumentalised and does not belong fully to humans, it remains a very particular way of making sense of being human. We cannot refer to play outside the human experience thereof, since our being arises as play. In this way Haraway's *becoming with* through play implies that we are compelled to pay

attention to the human horizon in a nonhuman relation. After all, according to Haraway (2008:232), human and dog are *co-present* when playing, not one fused present being.

5.2.5 Flourishing

Another key aspect of *becoming with* is the idea, or more specifically, the ethics of flourishing. With the idea of multispecies relations and companion species, Haraway is not only interested in species living together, but also in *how* they live together. For Haraway it is crucial that multispecies relations flourish. Following feminist and ethical theorist Chris Cuomo as well as philosopher and companion trainer Vicki Hearne, Haraway (2008:134) argues that interspecies kinship is not merely about a relief of suffering, but about the thriving, prospering and growth of species (together). The outcome, as well as the ethical goal of companionship and *becoming with* is therefore to ensure flourishing or to live well together (Haraway 2008:134). Similar to Heidegger's (1962[1927]:237) *being-with*, *becoming with* nonhuman others implies and ethics of caring for (*Sorge*) the other (Monguilod 2006:255). Throughout the various relations Haraway explores, she consistently questions the flourishing and well-being of species. For her there is no point to companion species if *both* species are not flourishing.

In *The Companion Species Manifesto* Haraway (2003:41, emphasis in original) notes that her key pursuit is "*companion species flourishing*". For her, flourishing stands in strong contrast to the humanist ideal of relief of suffering. Creating flourishing relationships does not simply imply removing painful relations, where humans treat nonhumans harmfully; instead flourishing focusses on companion happiness (Haraway 2003:52). A happiness that is, according to Haraway, specific to and possible for each nonhuman and human kin. Thus Haraway (2003:53) sees (alongside Hearne and Cuomo) "not only the humans, but also the dogs, as being with species-specific capacity for moral understanding and serious achievement".

Although the idea(l) of multispecies flourishing is clear and perhaps even self-evident in relations of significant otherness subject to the broader turn to nonhumanism, it becomes equivocal in its measurement. Haraway (2008:90) herself questions how to measure flourishing amongst nonhumans as she poses this question to her fellow biologists: "How do good zoologists learn to see when animals are not flourishing?". How can we be sure our dogs are thriving? Tied into the knot of companion species, Haraway refers back to *becoming with*, arguing that caring in a companion species manner, through response-ability, respect and in contact zones, we can learn about our nonhuman counterparts and discover how to prompt flourishing not only for them, but also for ourselves. Even so, the question remains who determines whether or not the dog is flourishing? Echoing the establishment of animal rights – which I previously argued is a fundamental human concept in relation to human rights – the key pursuit of Haraway's companion species can only be measured and be spoken for by the human.

5.2.6 Acts of love

With her concept of companion species Haraway establishes that the relation of interspecies significant otherness is a manifestation of love. Her prominent focus on love is somewhat surprising, since love is such a complex and perhaps less concrete term (so to speak) for a biologist to focus on. Nevertheless, Haraway argues that human-dog relations are not only filled with narratives of evolution, training and breeding, but also with *stories* of love.[210] Throughout *When Species Meet,* we are constantly reminded that kinship and *becoming with* responsibly implies respect, trust and love (Monguilod 2006:255).

By introducing love as a crucial element in companion species relations, Haraway enters an abstract zone. Love is a complicated term to define and is understood differently amongst various cultures, societies and disciplines. Studying the phenomenon of love is also often a point of controversy between science and religion, since scientific evidence of love is often hard to examine and

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[210] Haraway reiterates the word 'stories' – thus narratives that *humans* tell about their loving relations with companion species.

explain. However, recently theorists, including Stephen Post and Jill Neimark (2006) as well as Jay Oord (2010), have become more inclined to take an interdisciplinary approach (much like interspecies studies) to explore love, by incorporating scientific research and humanities' theories, creating a field of study, which Oord (2010:5) describes as a "love, science, and theology symbiosis". Hence, as the research of love takes on an entangled nature, it echoes in Haraway's knotted notion of *becoming with*.

In my opinion, Haraway's emphasis on love in the relation of significant otherness adds an element of transcendence to the otherwise immanent study of earthly relations. Although her conceptualisation of love differs from a spiritual love, it (alongside flourishing) remains a somewhat illusive concept that stems from religious and so-called 'otherworldly' beliefs.[211] For this reason, I suggest that the notion of *becoming with*, although focussing in the actual 'mud' of things, still relates to non-material or metaphysical interactions. The transcendental therefore comes into *play*, to a certain extent, in kinship.[212] To support my argument I refer to Csicsery-Ronay (2010:153):

> Joy and love, Haraway's two most powerful sources of knowledge, are not only emotions; they are for most religions spiritual forces. Despite her frequently stated disdain for religion, Haraway's work increasingly engages spiritual thought and we should not be surprised if the repressed sacred makes a comeback after species meet.

Once again, Haraway's understanding of love in companion species does not correlate to the typical popular understanding of unconditional love. Haraway (2003:34) maintains that love between companion species is "not about unconditional love, but about seeking to inhabit an inter-subjective world that is about meeting the other in all the fleshy detail of mortal relationship". Haraway's love is about commitment and respect, engaging in acts of play, training and

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[211] Haraway's referral to love becomes a point of critique for many, arguing that it is a point of weakness, since it is not a concrete phenomenon (Monguilod 2006:255) and a subjective experience that only those that love dogs might understand (Zylinska 2012:208). In addition, the idea of love is also often labelled as a human phenomenon that is constantly in flux, contradicting Haraway's nonhuman approach (Zylinska 2012:208).

[212] I elaborate on the otherworldly aspect of species kinship in the Addendum of this study.

breeding. It does not indicate affection without limitations. Rather it argues for a response to the *differences* in humans and nonhumans, in order to become coherent through these differences. In this way, *becoming with* is an act of fleshy-love. This love is a result of transforming and re-doing in the contact zone of multispecies relations, of becoming together and co-traveling through the world. It is a bond of trust and *becoming with* between human and nonhuman.

Monguilod (2006:256) explains that Haraway's love implies knowing and acknowledging that the other may never be fully understood, as well as not projecting the self onto the other but rather seeking – with respect – to communicate and connect beyond differences. This love implies acting mindfully, paying attention, constant participation and admitting to not always understanding the other's needs (Haraway 2003:35; 45; 52). Through such a love, respect and trust is established between companion species. Notably, this view of the other, also known as "negative knowledge" originates in theological thought (Monguilod 2006:256) and reminds of the prominent philosophy of love and care of nonhuman philosopher Michel Serres's belief in the power of love. In *The Natural Contrac,t* Serres (1995:50) argues that love has the power to unify species on earth as well as species with the environment: "Love the bond that unites your plot of Earth, the bond that makes kin and stranger resemble each other". Thus, like Serres, Haraway also optimistically suggests that love has a force to bound species together towards a better future (Monguilod 2006:256).

Additionally, Haraway's use of love reminds of Heidegger's ethics of self-limitation demanded by love (Monguilod 2006:256) and Luce Irigaray's *The Way of Love* (2002). Monguilod (2006:256) asserts that Heidegger and Haraway "both regard 'self-limitation' as an ethical practice that love demands. Indeed, in some cases the wellbeing of the other involves 'doing less' or 'doing differently', rather than 'doing more'". [213] In this way, Haraway's formulation of love between companion species challenges her own formulation of responsibility. Here Haraway, more like Heidegger, suggests that love involves doing less, respecting

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[213] Notably, theorist Margaret Toye (2012) also identifies and develops Haraway's theory in relation to Luce Irigaray's notion of sexual difference in *The Way of Love*, which, in turn, is based on Heidegger's philosophy of being.

differences, whereas previously she asserted that responsibility and respect demands curiosity and probing into the being of the other.

In this sense both Heidegger and Haraway's use of love correlates with Luce Irigaray's *The Way of Love* (2002), which explores a wisdom of love and how to love towards the other, not in spite of but because of differences. Notably, Irigaray (2002:xii) states that *The Way of Love* stems prominently from Heidegger's thought and is in constant conversation with Heidegger's philosophy of being and *being-with*. Irigaray (2002:88) suggests, in conversation with Heiddeger, that *being-with* and being-in-the-world requires recognition of differences and individual subjectivities. Thus, for Irigaray both love and respect manifests as a result of differences. In this way, Irigaray (1996:104) suggests that we love *to* the other, where *to* represents a site of non-reduction: "I recognize you signifies that you are different from me, that I cannot identify myself (with) nor master your becoming. I will never be your master. And it's this negative that enables me to go towards you". Haraway's love, in my view, echoes Irigaray and Heidegger and similarly calls for an acknowledgement of differences, of individual subjects when they come together. In other words, here, in the love between companion species, the human being and animal being are equally important.

Reminding of Deleuze and Guattari's (1988[1980]:300) specific ways of becoming (becoming-animal, becoming-woman etc.), Haraway's companion species love also becomes a personal and specific matter. Haraway asserts that the love that emerges between human and nonhuman others pertains only to that specific relation between entities and might differ significantly to the love that is experienced in another species relation. That is to say, the love between human loving cat can differ from the love experienced between human and dog. For this reason, *becoming with* is not a universal love, but one that emerges from human and dog or the self and the specific 'co-existee'. That is to say, there exists a difference between the love that emerges from the entanglements between Fudge and I and Fudge and my mom, for example. Or the love between Haraway and her dog Cayenne might differ from the love experienced between Cody and I.

Nevertheless, most importantly, for Haraway, the love exists, and it exists because we *become with* one another.

With the reference to love, Haraway also introduces the question of whether or not the dog loves the human in return? As I have previously explored, this is a tricky question to answer and, as Haraway (2003:38) herself explains, the love of the dog for the human is usually determined by the human's perception itself – and perhaps also the human's own definition of love. In other words, from our inevitable human horizon, the love of the human-dog relation relies on the perceived human interpretation thereof. Nevertheless, love as such a transcendent and elusive phenomenon is hard to pinpoint as an exclusively human or animal experience. Additionally, as we previously discovered through the neuroscientific studies of Gregory Berns (2017) in *The Dog Project*, dogs show cognitive similarities to the human experience of love and affection. Therefore, love cannot necessarily always be estimated as a solely human experience and the idea that companion species love each other reciprocally could be a very real possibility.

5.2.7 Touch

In multiple discussions, Haraway (2008:263; 36; 37; 202; 105) notes that the actions that occur inside of contact zones revolve around touch. In fact, the idea of touch is prominent throughout *When Species Meet* as it is introduced in the very first driving question behind Haraway's book ("Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog?"). Even the cover illustrations of the book (Figure 8) shows human and dog, touching paw and hand, in an image that reminds of Michelangelo's *The Creation of Adam* (1508-1512) (Figure 9) or its recent technological parodies (Figure 10). Haraway argues that an exchange of touch between companion species allows them to *become with* one another. The action "makes possible" (Haraway 2008:65) the transformation occurring within the contact zone. Touch (both physically and metaphorically – regarding the other) is therefore an exceedingly important aspect of companion species relations and *becoming with* one another.

Figure 8: Cover illustrations of Haraway's *When Species Meet*. (Haraway 2008).

In many ways touch also brings together the various elements of Haraway's kinship, identified thus far: Haraway argues that when companion species touch in contact zones as well as during play, they inherit histories and become entangled, encouraging response, respect, responsibility, love and living well together. As Haraway (2008:36) explains: "Touch, regard, looking back, becoming with – all these make us responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape. In touch and regard, partners willy nilly are in the miscegenous mud that infuses our bodies with all that brought that contact into being. Touch and regard have consequences".

Figure 9: Michelangelo, *The Creation of Adam*, 1508-1512.
Paint and plaster, 2,8m x 5,7m.
Sistine Chapel.
(ItalianRenaissance.org 2015).

Figure 10: Technological parodies as memes of *The Creation of Adam.* (Caldwell 2015).

The Creation of Adam (Michelangelo 1508-1512) is famously known to depict the moment before the finger of God touches Adam. Upon contact it is believed that Adam comes into contact with creation and is shaped, retains life, a soul, love and the divine-human relation (Boyle 1998:2), portraying and highlighting the importance of touch. Yet, the fresco depicts Adam and God's fingers as *nearly* touching or *anticipating* touch (a thought that is interestingly also replicated in its technological parodies). With the slight gap between fingers, Michelangelo arguably expressed the philosophical and religious beliefs of humanism and depicted a tension between the earthly idealism strive towards the sublime transcendent (Boyle 1998:3). In current times Haraway's nonhumanist philosophy is illustrated at the start of *When Species Meet* (2008), in an image of man's hand and dog's paw clearly touching. In comparison to *The Creation of Adam*, Haraway's emphasis on the sense, act and implications of touch – heightened by the fore image – reminds us of the difference between humanism and companion species. In *becoming with*, there is no idealistic strive, yearning or detachment from the nonhuman. Species touch. And through touch they are shaped, they love, and they entangle in companionship. To touch is to *become with*, and in Haraway's worldly human-dog relation touch is inevitable.

Eminently, Heidegger also uses the sensory experience of touch in his animal philosophy. However, unlike Haraway, Heidegger uses touch to express the difference in which different beings access the world. In *The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics* Heidegger (1995[1938]:196) asserts that the basic experience of touching reveals that the thing we are touching is present and with us in the world, as a particular thing and it also reveals our relation to that thing

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(Bejinariu 2018:240).[214] At the same time, Heidegger's touch also then, as we have seen, reveals that beings access the human world differently and that we cannot know the sensation experienced for another being when touched.

Furthermore, Haraway's introduction of touch in the relation of companion species once again resembles Irigaray's philosophy. In *Perhaps Cultivating Touch Can Still Save Us*, Irigaray (2011:139) estimates that touching one another is unifying and simultaneously a way to "discover a living identity of our own". In other words, for Irigaray we come together through touch, but touching also helps us to cultivate our own irreducible identity. In this way, Irigaray's touch differs from Haraway's touch as a manner to join identities into one entangled and always-touching companionship.[215]

In my view Haraway's touching companion species makes sense in its relation to physicality. In Haraway's (2006[1985]:144) *Cyborg Manifesto* she questions: "Why should our bodies end at the skin?" – arguing that technology extends the body as human and machine connect. In similar fashion, when Haraway's companion species physically come into contact, she argues that their bodies become fused together. Yet, in the *Cyborg Manifesto*, Haraway (2006[1985]:117) was able to show the extended cyborg body by means of concrete examples ranging from science fiction to modern medicine.[216] With companion species, the physical manifestation is not as clearly evident in examples.[217] I struggle to think of examples, outside of fiction and trans-species relations, where human and dog physically or biologically touch in such a way that they become one unit. The only instances that come to mind are the act of walking a dog or riding an animal, such as a horse. However, in both these cases we can argue that the act of touch

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[214] With reference to the being of the stone in relation to the human world or *Welt* Heidegger (1995[1938]:197) argues: "It is 'touching' the earth. But what we call 'touching' here is not a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word".

[215] Notably here, as well as in the aforementioned discussion on love, Irigaray refers to human-human relations. For my purposes here I assimilate Irigaray's theories into the realm of the nonhuman to stress my understanding of Haraway's companion species. In the accompanying Addendum to the study I delve further into Irigaray's discussion of animal beings.

[216] For instance, Haraway (2006[1985]:143-144) refers to examples such as disabled people assisted by prosthetics, organism attached to communication devices and even examples in popular culture, such as *Blade Runner.*

[217] In contrast, there are several examples depiction the entwinement of technology and dog, as cyborg-like figures. I examine such examples further in Chapter Eight.

is an anthropocentric binding, motivated by the human controlling the animal – a worrisome deduction in relation to Haraway's anti-anthropocentric theory. As a result, I argue that it is perhaps helpful to configure Haraway's touching species as a manner of *becoming with*, yet a *becoming with* that, following Heidegger and Irigaray, manifests togetherness and not simply an implosion of being.

5.3 Conclusion

Thinking through these elements of *becoming with*, namely response and respect, historicity, contact zones, play, flourishing, love and touch, what is meant by *becoming with* and companion species becomes clearer. Although these aspects can be interrogated individually, they are entangled and occur in relations to one another, therefore they are imbricated and form an assemblage of what it means to co-exist in multispecies relations. Taking the above discussions into account, I (in simplified terms) define *becoming with* as a specific entanglement between two species, who, upon meeting, respond to one another by touching and playing in kinship contact zones. This entanglement allows the companions to share in histories and contexts, and establish a respectful, loving state of being where they live well together.

This chapter also reveals that Haraway's companion species, despite its insistence on exchanging the human for the nonhuman, cannot escape the human as it often times relies on human interpretations (love, flourishing), human constructs (historicity, respect) and a human way of being-with-others (play). The discussion on Haraway's companion species also reveals that, regardless of Haraway's formulation of human and dog as a hybrid being, even by *becoming with* their beings are not always collapsible into one another. In fact, at times Haraway's companion species seems to highlight the different being of human and animal, instead of assimilating their beings. Finally, I also briefly presented instances where Haraway's theory correlates with that of Heidegger, such as through the notion of transposing, touch and dance. In the following chapter, I attempt to address these findings in my reading of Haraway, by rooting Haraway's *becoming with* in Heidegger's *being-with*. In doing so, I hope to present a different understanding of the human-dog relation, where both human

and dog exist as *being-with* each other in companionship, without imploding into another.

CHAPTER SIX

BEING AND *BECOMING WITH* THE (NON)HUMAN:
READING HARAWAY WITH HEIDEGGER

> *The charming relations I have had*
> *with a long succession of dogs result*
> *from their happy spontaneity.*
> *Usually they are quick to discover*
> *that I cannot see or hear.*
> *Truly, as companions, friends, equals in*
> *opportunities of self-expression*
> *they unfold to me the dignity of creation.*[218]

Building on my reading of Heidegger's philosophy of being in Chapter Four and Haraway's notion of *becoming with* companion species in Chapter Five, I now reroute Haraway's companion species via Heidegger's philosophy of *being-with*. In this chapter, I reiterate how Haraway's *becoming with* companion species defends the importance of the human and human experience in multispecies relations. Consequently, I elaborate on how Haraway's hybrid relation between human and dog does not collapse two beings, but rather highlights the importance of their different identities. Thereafter, I summarise the key similarities between Heidegger's philosophy of being and Haraway's companion species that have come to light throughout Chapters Four and Five. Finally, I place Haraway and Heidegger in conversation with one another to suggest that *becoming with* can be read as a Heideggerian *being-with* (*Mitsein*), in order to constitute a particular way of being human with nonhuman animals, or human with dog, in contemporary society.

In Chapter Three we discovered that in a nonhuman perspective "the human is an endangered species" (Seaman 2007:246), since nonhumanism diminishes human and nonhuman into one another. Similarly, Haraway maintains that her theory of companion species infolds human and nonhuman dog into one another, in true multispecies fashion, to form a hybrid and intermittently connected way of being-in-the-world. However, in Chapter Three, I also indicated how the human can remain significant in nonhuman relations and how the human and

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[218] Helen Keller in Filson (2006).

nonhuman should not be reduced to one another, because their unique beings are precisely what makes kinship between the two entities possible. In this chapter, by investigating the specific existence of animal and human – following the same pattern – I argue that Haraway's entwined human-dog relation relies predominantly on a human way of being and human interpretation, as well as a companionship dependant on the dissimilarities of species. Guided, once again, by Joanna Latimer's (2013) and Joanna Zylinska's (2012) critical reading of Haraway's companion species, I therefore point to an understanding of companion species that differs, to a certain extent, from a multispecies or nonhuman point of view.

6.1 Hinting at the human in Haraway's companion species

As I have indicated throughout my discussion of Haraway's notion of human *becoming with* dog in Chapter Five, the notions Haraway employs to explain her concept of companion species – namely love, joy, respect, flourishing, historicity and play – are human constructs. In other words, Haraway's fundamental tropes defining *becoming with* companion species either stem from a human horizon or require a human account and interpretation. Zylinska (2012:208) explains that Haraway's "ethics of companion species – love, respect, happiness, and achievement – have a distinctly human 'feel' to them precisely because it is the human who defines the meaning of these values and their appropriateness for all companion species". Indeed, for Zylinska (2012:208) "[t]here is no escape from the philosophical quandary that even the most committed efforts to give dogs what they want, and not what humans merely want for them, inevitably depend on the human ideas of 'want,' 'satisfaction,' and 'gift'". That is to say, Haraway's exploration of *becoming with* implicitly emphasises the importance of the human in companion species relations and that, once again, we cannot escape the human horizon even when infolding towards nonhuman others.

As much as Haraway (2008:5) clearly advocates for a multispecies "knotted beings" – where human and nonhuman change their ways of being-in-the-world when they come into contact – on my reading she too shows awareness of the tension created by the abiding human horizon in the question of the animal

being. She sets out at the start of *When Species Meet* "asking who 'we' will become when species meet", implying an altered state of being that she explains is "inherit in the flesh" when "human and nonhuman give way to the infoldings of the flesh that powerful figures such as the cyborgs and dogs I know both signify and enact" (Haraway 2008:5; 7-8). Yet, Haraway, at times, also hints at the human capacity at work (somewhat in disguise) in her understanding of the human-dog relation.

For example, in a chapter entitled *Species of Friendship*, Haraway (2008:181-204) presents a series of posts, notes, letters, and journal entries about companion species encounters that she shares via email with colleagues and friends. These notes are distinctly human accounts of witnessed dog relations shared with Haraway's human community. No matter how her accounts attempt to manifest hybrid ways of being, they rely heavily on human interpretation and constructs. For example, in her accounts Haraway often anthropomorphises her dogs: "he [Haraway's dog Roland] was patently happy all day ... he basked in all the attention" (Haraway 2008:184). In addition, she also describes human ideas in relation to dogs, such as celebrating her dog's birthday (Haraway 2008:186) and graduation (Haraway 2008:187).

Moreover, in a particular note (ironically entitled 'Enforcer'), Haraway (2008:191-192) relates how her dog obediently listened to her at the beach as she ordered him to "Leave it, Come, Sit!" – preventing a possible dogfight. Other dog walkers on the beach noted Haraway's obedient dog, however she reveals to her readers that positive reinforcement training with liver cookies was the real secret behind her dog's obedient behaviour. On my reading, this specific story not only reveals a human interpretation of events (how does she know the dog was listening to her or wanted a cookie? Perhaps he just did not wish to engage in a fight?), but also a trace of what I decipher as anthropocentrism. Of course, Haraway would most likely disagree, however the human mastery over dog is evident in this story, as Haraway trained her dog to obey her commands (even if it is on condition of a liver cookie reward) and describes her mastery over her dog, albeit jokingly.

In addition, here Haraway (2008:191) speaks explicitly of her "fellow dog beach humans", perhaps signalling that in some situations with her dog, Haraway too remains inherently human – the human narrating the happiness, love, play, hi*story* and respect occurring when human and dog meet. As Haraway (2003:3, emphasis added) explains at the outset, her *Companion Species Manifesto* is a "*person*al document" in which she "offer[s] dog-eaten props and half-trained arguments to reshape some stories [she] care[s] about a great deal, as a scholar and as a *person* in [her] time and place"– stressing her inevitable human horizon.

Latimer (2013:92) is also critical of this human horizon in Haraway's text:

> In joining in, is the dog Cayenne to some extent becoming more human than dog? Is the infolding we witness here a human concern, a translation of the dog into human interests (competition, agility), particularly those of enhancement: not just then a form of relationality that involves becoming-with but rather a 'becoming better'?

Thus, Latimer is concerned that Haraway may not be articulating a nonhuman perspective after all, and, in turn, might still be following a typical humanist exploration. Latimer's suggestion prompts us to, momentarily, consider again why Haraway is so specifically interested in dogs, when the human-dog relation is typically thought of as anthropocentric.[219] Maybe, Haraway does so precisely because the human-dog connection cannot be denied, it is what makes up the very existence of the dog. Latimer (2013:91) argues that Haraway uses a figure so closely associated with anthropocentrism to emphasise her overthrowing of the singular, exceptional human being (i.e. Haraway can argue that even in a human exceptionalism figure the human is still entangled with nonhumans): "Through the perspective of companion species, Haraway erodes all the divisions that held together the figure of the human as a discrete, sovereign subject". However, it is clear that, despite her best intentions, in (un)doing a perceived anthropocentric relation, traces of the humanist associations of the human-dog relation turn up in

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[219] As noted in Chapter Three, Erica Fudge (2007) points out that Derrida's (1997) specific choice to write about his cat in his philosophy is possibly particularly thought out to emphasise an argument contradicting typical anthropocentric thought. In other words, we have to consider the deliberate choice behind Haraway's focus on dogs – especially since she herself is adamant on pointing to the importance of the dog species.

Haraway's text as she is forced to consider human interactions from an always-already human point of view.

It is also worth mentioning that Jami Weinstein (2004:190), in review of Haraway's manifesto, shows concerns similar to those expressed by Latimer: "Haraway shows her hand by self-consciously acknowledging the extent to which she uncharacteristically anthropomorphizes her dog's behavior".[220] Strikingly, Weinstein compares Haraway's anthropomorphism to Heidegger's animal being: "Perhaps, ironically, she is invoking the Heideggerian caution that there is in fact no way, even for her, to look upon animal being from the perspective of the animal". Finally, Weinstein (2004:190) suggests that if Haraway and Heidegger were to be read together, one could read Haraway's companion species as an acknowledgement of her situated human horizon (or perhaps even her human *Dasein*?).[221]

6.2 Indicating irreducibility in Haraway's companion species

Besides the underlying sense of the human way of being, which appears as a sort-of conscious reminder throughout Haraway's enveloped companion species, Haraway also occasionally suggests that the differences between human and nonhuman being are of key importance to *become with* companion species. In this way it appears as if Haraway, at times, contradicts her own hybrid, interspecies relation. Particularly, there are instances in both *The Companion Species Manifesto* and *When Species Meet*, where Haraway appears to be referring more to a meeting, or then a Heideggerian *being-with*, of two, significantly different beings – human and dog – where both beings remain intact and learn to exist together, not as an entire new fleshy existence but as distinct entities.

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[220] In particular, Weinstein (2004:190) refers to a passage in which Haraway (2003:99-100) describes her female dog interacting with a friend's male dog, where Haraway (2003:99-100) clearly describes the dog from a human viewpoint: "*he is INTERESTED*"; "*here we have pure polymorphous perversity that is so dear to all of us who came of age in the 1960s*"; "*Sure looks like eros to me*"; "*what feminists of [her] generation would call a considerate lover*".

[221] Strikingly, Weinstein (2004:190) argues that Wittgenstein (previously mentioned in relation to human language) echoes the views of Heidegger and Haraway, "underscoring that the distinction between animal and human forms of life present serious obstacles to communication".

For instance, in *The Companion Species Manifesto* Haraway (2003:63) contends that her stories of human-dog love and training aim "to honor the world in its irreducible, personal detail" and that companion species involves communication "across irreducible differences" (Haraway 2003:49). Moreover, in unravelling the term companion species, Haraway (2003:15; 39) also argues, "Species is about defining difference" and that love between companion species should be to learn to "honor difference". In other words, at least throughout *The Companion Species Manifesto*, Haraway is adamant that the difference between the human and dog's way of being remains important.

In *When Species Meet* Haraway continues writing with a tension between hybrid entwinement and honouring difference, since she argues for an overcoming of anthropocentric difference. This tension includes overcoming the difference between that of the human and nonhuman – a knotted *becoming with* of species – and, at the same time, the importance of emphasising distinctions between the human and nonhuman. For instance, Haraway (2008:67; 90) searches for nonhuman discussions "in which specific difference is at least as crucial as continuities and similarities across kinds" and maintains that "multispecies flourishing requires a robust nonanthropomorphic sensibility that is accountable to irreducible difference". Even when describing agility training, where Haraway (2008:175) insists, "[B]oth players make each other up in the flesh", she simultaneously argues how "training with a member of another biological species is so interesting, hard, full of *situated difference*, and moving" (Haraway 2008:213, emphasis added). Moreover, she contends, "Training is, or can be, about difference …" (Haraway 2008:223).

Could Haraway, through these contradictions, be beckoning towards a nonhuman *becoming with* where species meet, but remain irreducible in their differences? It seems likely to infer so, especially when Haraway (2008:240, emphasis added) reminds us that the contact zones of *becoming with* are "[n]ot about reproducing the sacred image of the same, this game is nonmimetic and *full of difference*". Furthermore she leaves the reader at the end of *When Species Meet* with so-called 'parting bites' that exemplifies how, in close proximity to

Heidegger's account of animal and human being, "companion species who cannot and *must not assimilate one another* but who must learn to eat well, or at least well enough that care, respect and *difference* can flourish in the open" (Haraway 2008:287, emphasis added).[222] Yet, we are (curiously) overthrown when Haraway (2008:235) also suggests that *humans* should stop searching for difference among us "and understand that they are in rich and largely uncharted, material–semiotic, flesh-to-flesh, and face-to-face connection with a host of significant others".

As I have outlined in the discussion of Haraway's notion of *becoming with* in Chapter Five, the irreducible human and dog often crop up within the exact aspects that Haraway employs to entwine companion species. For instance, the act of play requires a co-presence of two distinct beings that can respond to each other, while the significance of both beings' unique historicity and context continues within companionship. On my reading, the irreducible human and dog is also present, perhaps more subtly, in other aspects of Haraway's idea of *becoming with*. I argue that Haraway's terminology meant to indicate entwinement often evokes a sense of 'two' or of separate kinds meeting. For example, Haraway (2008) often uses specific terms to describe the entwinement of companion species such as 'a significant otherness'. Yet, embedded within the term 'significant *other*ness' is the idea that difference or an *other* is meaningful and vital in the relation. In other words, when species are significant others, they are really two (other) entities that are significant to each other's separate lives.

Another phrase Haraway (2008:192; 214) often uses to describe human-dog relations is "Dog is my co-pilot". I argue that Haraway's dog as co-pilot also implies a need for two separate beings. In commercial flight, a pilot–co-pilot relation functions, because it involves two people performing *different* duties. Furthermore, to a certain extent, a pilot and co-pilot are hierarchical positions, where the pilot is the first-in-command and holds a higher ranking than the second-in-command co-pilot. Could Haraway's tongue-in-cheek 'dog as co-pilot'

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[222] In particular, Haraway's (2008:285-301) 'parting bites' consist of short examples, where she encounters species companionship, such as her colleague Gary Lease's hunting pursuits, sacramental feasts and animal surrogating.

once again emphasise a sense of human exceptionalism in the companion species relation?[223] Additionally, the very expression of 'companion species' suggests that *two* entities are required to *become with* one another: "There cannot be just one companion species; there have to be at least two to make one. It is in the syntax; it is in the flesh" (Haraway 2003:12). Thus, companion species is inherently two beings, even when knotted together as one.

Perhaps we can now read Haraway's cover image (Figure 8), referred to in Chapter Five, in a different manner. Companion species or *becoming with* occurs when different species meet, touch, play, love, flourish, share histories and respond in contact zones, yet they do not settle into a whole: together they remain, distinct beings. Even in the image where human hand and dog paw touch, we can still clearly identify human and dog, and fathom pulling the two entitles apart again. It is a Heideggerian (1995[1938]:199) "intricate entanglement" relation that can be untangled again, because of the difference between the way of being of the human and dog. After all, they do not become one another, but become *with* one another. It is in this 'withness' that we find a meaningful difference, different experiences of being and an irreducibility of two kinds that make up kinship between human and nonhuman others.

6.3 Reading Haraway *with* Heidegger

Based on the clear human traces and emphasis on irreducible beings in Haraway's companion species, I root my reading of Haraway's *becoming with* companion species in the Heideggerian philosophy of being. As mentioned, Haraway, for the most part, disregards Heidegger's influence on her work,[224] only briefly comparing Heidegger's notion of "the open" to the contact zones of

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[223] Haraway humorously derives 'dog as my co-pilot' from the common car bumper sticker that reads 'God as my co-pilot'. She explains that the saying is also the slogan to the popular dog magazine *Bark* (Haraway 2008:12). I recognise that Haraway uses the slogan ironically, however her formulation amongst her ambiguous human-dog relation does spark my scepticism. Moreover, perhaps the relation between 'God as co-pilot' and the inverse 'dog as co-pilot' also has significance and says something about the importance of the dog in contemporary society.

[224] Rae (2014:505) speculates that Haraway's support for Derrida, Bruno Latour and Giorgio Agamben, leads her to follow their critical readings of Heidegger and overlook the relation between his philosophy and her thinking.

companion species.[225] It is surprising that Haraway overlooks Heidegger's theory, especially considering his close relation to environmentalism and anti-anthropocentric intentions, which we considered previously.[226] In what follows I start to fill this opening by showing that Heidegger's writings not only correlate with Haraway's but also have much to add to multispecies studies, especially regarding being-with-others without assimilating entities. In this regard, I follow theorist Gavin Rae (2014:509) who argues that "making explicit her [Haraway's] assumed, implicit Heideggerian influence will, therefore, allow us to better understand the issues and problems that Haraway's thinking attends to".[227]

In a particular quote, which I have also previously mentioned, we find that Haraway (2008:67) herself searches for a way to discuss nonhuman relations without reducing human to animal: "I am needy for ways to specify these matters in nonhumanist terms in which specific difference is at least as crucial as continuities and similarities across kinds". By joining Heidegger with Haraway, I propose that Heidegger's philosophy of being human and being animal can enhance Haraway in this regard. As my discussion of Heidegger's philosophy in Chapter Four suggests, his seminal texts express an anti-anthropocentric way of being that also defends specific difference. Thus, Heidegger could be a companion or ally in the mud for Haraway to specify the matters of *being* or *becoming with* when species meet.[228]

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[225] Haraway (in Rae 2014:507) admits that she feels more comfortable in "the materialities of instrumentation of organisms in laboratories" than in the readings of philosophers, which is why she prefers to engage with concrete biological studies instead of philosophical texts. Ironically, we have also seen that Heidegger suggests his theories on the animal being can be extended only through such scientific enquiries.

[226] Perhaps, Haraway prefers not to engage with Heidegger, because she follows Derrida's critique against Heidegger's animal being (as I have previously mentioned, Haraway recognises Derrida's influence on her work). Yet, given Heidegger's influence on Derrida – pre-critique – I suggest that Heidegger's influence on Derrida, and Derrida's influence on Haraway's companion species, point to a close relationship between Heidegger and *becoming with* companion species.

[227] Notably, Rae (2014; 2014a) most prominently traces the Heideggerian roots of Haraway's cyborg theory, although he briefly also discusses Haraway's theory of companion species, as well as Heidegger's profound influence on posthuman thought.

[228] Additionally, as we have seen, Heidegger also provides us with a helpful understanding of technology, which can aid in putting the theory of companion species in conversation with technological platforms (or contact zones). I extend Heidegger's relation to Haraway's human *becoming with* dog through technology and on social media in Chapter Seven.

On my reading, Haraway reflects a Heideggerian manner of thinking in several ways.[229] As we have seen, both Heidegger and Haraway attempt to overcome the traditional dualistic thinking of western philosophy.[230] Moreover, both philosophers engage with the question of the meaning of what it is to exist, asking what it means to be human or a dog or human-and-dog together. Rae (2014:525) explains:

> Haraway is attempting to identify the 'essence' or 'dogginess' of dogs (i.e., what makes a dog a dog and not, for example, a cat), by thinking this 'essence' through the dog–human relation. If this is what Haraway is doing … it shares a direct connection to Heidegger's thinking because, as we have seen, his thinking also aims to identify the being of entities, in this case, the being of dogs, which, put more concretely, seeks to answer the question: what is it to say that something is a dog, which, in turn, depends on a prior question: what makes a dog a dog or, put differently, what is the 'dogginess' (read being) of dog?

In other words, Haraway's enquiry into the essence of companion species mirrors Heidegger's enquiry into the essence of being human and the being of the animal. Notably, Haraway maintains that she enquires into human and animal being together in the *same* world, while Heidegger distinguishes between the being of the human and the animal and their different worlds of existence (*Welt* and *Umwelt*) (Rae 2014:525). Nonetheless, both philosophers seem to establish an ontological exploration into the essence of being.

In turn, as I have shown, even though Haraway considers companion species to be entwined she still refers to their different ways of being, emulating Heidegger to a certain extent. Haraway, like Heidegger, also at times distinguishes between the human world and the dog world, establishing that she (sometimes) believes that human and dog are rooted in different worlds. Haraway often refers to "dogland" (Haraway 2008:59; 95; 107; 125) and "dog worlds" (Haraway

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[229] I have briefly mentioned some of these similarities throughout my discussions in Chapter Five – including the idea of history, temporality and love. I do not elaborate on all the similarities here but refer to those specifically leading into the argument of linking Haraway's *becoming with* to Heidegger's *being-with*.

[230] Specifically, both Haraway and Heidegger challenge the binary logic of Descartes's philosophical legacy (Rae 2014:508).

2008:117; 125; 133) versus "human worlds" (Haraway 2008:56). When she does refer to the meeting of these two worlds, she conjugates them as "dog-human world" (Haraway 2008:128), implying in Heideggerian fashion, that their two worlds come together, but do not necessarily synthesise together.[231] Similarly, Heidegger, as we have discovered previously, also establishes that human and animal can, in part, share world, forming temporal cites resembling human-dog worlds, where human and animal retains its own horizon of being.

In Haraway's enquiry into the being of the human-dog relation she, in a similar manner to Heidegger, establishes that companion species are in a direct, reciprocal and responsive relation to the world. Recall that both Heidegger's human being and animal being responds reciprocally to its distinct (human) world or (animal) environment. Similarly, Haraway (2008:19) estimates that human and dog *becoming with* one another means "to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention". Thus, in my view, Haraway's companion species are Heideggerian beings-in-the-world, whose being is determined by the world they associate with and to which they respond. In particular, Haraway (2008:3) stresses that *becoming with* occurs in the mud of the earth, which not only refers to Haraway's preference for biological relations, but also indicates that companion species are worldly or earthly relations – being-in-the-world.[232]

In this way, parallel to Heidegger, Haraway's *becoming with* implies living with care, concern and responsibility towards others and the world. Although the two theorists differ in their unpacking of *how* to act responsibly – Haraway suggests becoming curious and intimately involved with others, while Heidegger suggests respecting the boundaries between the different horizons of being – they nevertheless establish similar ways of being-in-the-world, especially with others.

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[231] Throughout Haraway's body of work she, like Heidegger, is not afraid of forming neologisms or melting words together to emphasise entwinement. For example, Haraway (2003:12) refers to "natureculture" to highlight that she does not distinguish between nature and culture – for her they exist as one. It is surprising then that Haraway does not speak of doghuman world or humandog world, or even identify a new term for them altogether. I wonder whether she does so intentionally, to keep a certain distance (implied by the conjugated dash) between the two distinct worlds of human and dog.

[232] Interestingly, Haraway (2008:24; 327) quotes both Wolfe (2006:13) and Smuts (2001), who in their direct quotations refer to the Heideggerian being-in-the-world. Curiously, she does not expand on this notion.

It is here at this intersection of being-in-the-world with others – which both Haraway and Heidegger configure in their own way – where I put forward that Haraway's *becoming with* can be understood as a type of Heideggerian *being-with* (*Mitsein*).[233] As I have suggested, Heidegger's notion of human always-already existing with others can be extended into the realm of the nonhuman to delve further into the animal way of being, which Heidegger only partially addresses. Following Bailey (2012), Brown (2007), Buchanan (2007), Caputo (1993), James (2009), Glendinning (1998) and Latimer (2013), such an extension implies that human and animal exists in constant relation, alongside each other, interacting with each other, yet retaining their own sense of self, being and world. Thus, the animal and human in their very way of existing in the world, exist alongside one another, sharing certain aspects of the world, attending to each other, while remaining irreducible towards one another.

My Heideggerian way of thinking seems to closely correlate with what Haraway (at times) argues constitutes her idea of *becoming with*: where companion species exist together in all their complexity and attend to each other, without synthesising into one another. By understanding Haraway's *becoming with* in this Heideggerian manner, we are able to surmount her continuous (and somewhat contradictory) hybrid, collapsible human-dog relation, into a particular state of *being-with*, where human and animal no longer exist as anthropocentric singularities, yet they are also irreducible to one another. Because no matter the extent of entanglement of companion species, in their inherent Heideggerian way of being they remain beings meeting in the contact zones *with* each other's "mineness", without turning into one another.

Furthermore, reading Haraway and Heidegger together allows us to also overcome James's (2009) suggested problem referred to earlier in Chapter Four,

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[233] Even if my reading of Heidegger as influential to Haraway's thinking is rejected, meaning that Heidegger cannot be thought of as a source of Haraway's theory, I have throughout this layer of study explained how Heidegger's theory remains increasingly relevant and important to nonhuman as well as environmental philosophy. In turn, the thinkers that Haraway explicitly refers to throughout her work on companion species, such as Derrida, have also been widely influenced by Heidegger. Therefore, an implicit connection between Heidegger and Haraway persists that will eventually bring the two theorists in conversation with each other.

namely that even by being-with-others the animal mind remains a mystery. Seeing that, if Haraway's *becoming with* can be read as a Heideggerian *Mitsein*, then both Haraway (via Despret) and Heidegger's notion of 'attunement' can now assist us in understanding and accessing the animal way of being, from a human point of being. Heidegger (1995[1938]:67) argues that by being-with-others we are able to attune to another's way of being. In other words, beings can understand and affectively experience a partial absorption of another's being, while simultaneously remaining their individual identities. Equally important, Haraway in rooting her discussion via Despret's idea of *becoming with* nonhuman others, also speaks of species entanglement as an attunement to another's way of being. As I have discussed previously, here Despret refers to a complete absorption of being to form a total new entity, however when interpreting Haraway with Heidegger, we can argue that Haraway's attunements are possibly a sharing of existence, without disintegrating the human and animal way of being. Indeed, Haraway (2008:229, emphasis added), while evoking Despret, still refers to "*nonmimetic* attunement of each to each". Thus, it is not a full simulacrum of being, but an attunement where humans and dogs are both reciprocally affected but remain apart (Haraway 2008:229).

To illustrate, in Chapter Three we discovered that it has been biologically proven that dogs can empathise with their owners by responding to particular moods, emotions or states of the human. In turn, researchers, for example Smuts, Goodall and Bekoff, claim that they can experience a sense of the animal's way of being or world, although they are limited to describing this experience in human terms, from their human point of view. In our daily interactions with dogs we are also often inclined to understand a sense of what our dogs are experiencing, although we possibly enframe (*Gestell*) our understanding in a human manner.[234] Following Heidegger's idea of attunement within a Heideggerian understanding of Haraway's companion species, we can then explain such

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[234] In a recent study by Faragó, Takács, Miklósi and P. Pongrácz (2017) shows that humans have learnt to understand, to a certain extent, their dogs. Participants in the study were able to accurately interpret the inner state of their dogs by listening to their vocal expressions (the inner states of the dogs were also predetermined by cognitive and neural comparison with the human brain). Interestingly, the study also shows that women interpret the animal's inner state more accurately than men.

instances as a particular way of human *being-with* dog or dog *being-with* human, which is characterised by being always-already attuned to each other's inner states. In this way, the dog accesses and understands a part of the human world and vice versa, while each being remains unique in their existence. Furthermore, it highlights that no matter the shared understanding between entities, the understanding is first and foremost preceded by the hermeneutic horizon of each being (human and, as far as we can assume, dog).

Overall then, a Heideggerian reading of Haraway's *becoming with* companion species allows us to resolve the specific way of human living together and meeting with animal as *being-with* (*Mitsein*) and being-in-the-world. In particular this human *being-with* dog can be explained in human terms – since this is the horizon we are always-already confined to – as made up of continuous states of disclosedness or care, concern, responsibility, joy, play and love towards one other. The particular way of human *being-with* animal can also most prominently be observed and celebrated in the contact zones where species meet, touch and attune to the irreducible being of the other. In this way, by *being-with* one another companion species promote a sense of ethical flourishing where we preserve a sense of difference and respect, while at the same time we perform partial affinity in kinship. Contrary to what Haraway occasionally states, companion species do not co-shape the world, but co-shape each other's respective worlds. As a result, companion species do not *become* one another or even *become* something new, they *become* 'beings-with-others'.[235]

6.4 Conclusion

In this layer of my exploration of the human-dog relation, spread out over Chapters Four, Five and Six, I have tried to *sniff out* the specific being of the human and the animal, or human and dog, living together with one another – guided by Donna Haraway's theoretical notion of *becoming with* companion species and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of being and animality. By putting Haraway in conversation with Heidegger, I have suggested that Haraway's

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[235] In *The Open*, a preface to the editorial series *Queering the Non/human*, Michael O'Rourke (2008:xxi) also draws on Heideggerian philosophy to deduce openness to a nonhuman world, which he similarly refers to as "a new sense of being-in-the-world, of *beings*-in-the-world".

becoming with is a kind of Heideggerian *being-with*, where human and animal exist with each other, sharing in each other's being, while remaining irreducible to one another. In this way, the human and dog, as companion species, are each beings of care, concern, responsibility, joy, play and love, always-already engaging with their own world and from their own way of being. Since their way of being is also *with* each other, human and dog share in each other's world, attuning to the other's being, notably still from their own horizons of being. For this reason, any engagement with the animal world, is always enframed by a human understanding. Ultimately, human *being-with* dog determines a flourishing, environmentally conscious and respectful approach to animals and living on earth. In the following chapter I consider how this notion of *being-with* companion species is represented, visualised and embodied in the digital, virtual and technological realm.

PART TWO:

EVERYBODY AND THEIR DOG ONLINE

CHAPTER SEVEN
COMPUTING THE (NON)HUMAN:
COMPANION SPECIES, SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL HUMANITIES

Dogs of Instagram say a hundred delightful things
without actually saying a word...[236]

In Chapter One I introduced the prominence of companion species online with reference to the viral photograph of John Unger and his dog Schoep shared on social media, as well as the popularity of so-called 'dogstagrams' (*#dogstagram*) and the community 'Dogs of Instagram' (*#dogsofinstagram*) shared on the social media platform, Instagram. Through these examples it becomes apparent that the human-dog relation is represented, visualised and embodied in the digital, virtual or technological realm. The importance of technology in the human-nonhuman relation has also occasionally been detected throughout the theoretical exploration in Part One, where I have noted that beyond nonhuman animals, the human-nonhuman relation includes nonhuman digital entities. Following techno-theorist Don Ihde, Haraway (2008:249) affirms that companion species "are bodies in technologies", since both the human and the dog are entwined with technology in the Digital Age. In other words, when species meet in contemporary society, human, dog *and technology* encounter one another. This digital aspect of companion species is the particular part of the human-dog relation I aim to explore further in the following two chapters. In doing so, I want to add a further layer of understanding to the already unpacked relation of *being-with* companion species, wondering how precisely this relation manifests in and entwines with the digital realm?

In this chapter I start my reading of how the human-dog relation entangles with technology, by specifically focussing on the digital encounter of companion species on Instagram (as the phenomenon of the *dogstagram*). Analysing the digital image of the *dogstagram* is my point of departure to examine how *being-with* companion species manifests in a virtual or online realm. My analysis of *dogstagrams* includes a brief contextualisation of the phenomenon and its

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[236] Jessie Wender (2019).

relation to visual culture, technology and companion species. I then analyse *dogstagrams* by means of computational methods in the digital humanities project accompanying my research, discussing digital humanities, my application thereof and theoretical findings.[237]

Based on my analysis, in Chapter Six I explore the human-dog-technology relation further, by taking a closer look at what the human-dog relation in the digital realm, as well as on social media platforms, add to my critical reading of companion species, pursued throughout Part One. Moreover, I wonder as a continuation of Derrida's (2004[1997]:128) question "But as *for* me, who am I (following)?" – *But as for me who am I (following) when I follow dogs online?*[238]

7.1 The *dogstagram*: picturing and digitising the human-dog relation

Picturing or visualising the human-animal relation – specifically the human-dog relation – is an age-old phenomenon, most prominently portrayed through art, photography and cinema. Ever since the first prehistoric paintings on cave walls, man has drawn out its relation with and observations of animals (Aloi 2012:xxi). Notably, even in these early paintings we find representations of canines and wolves (Sutton 2017:92).[239] In other words, since primitive times, humans have used the realm of the visual to express and represent their complex relations and existence with animals and, in particular, also their relations with their dogs. As a result, animals (especially dogs) have featured in a variety of ways throughout the canon of art history, photography and other imagery, such as film.[240]

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[237] Visit the digital humanities project, *Insta-dog*, at http://www.instadogproject.com/ – the reader can follow the project on their desktop alongside the theoretical discussion in this chapter.

[238] I develop this question influenced by Eliza Steinbock's Derridean question in *Catties and T-Selfies* (2017:163): "Who are we (following) when we follow Internet cats?"

[239] For example, Elizabeth Sutton (2017:92-93) specifically explores the cave paintings of Horseshoe Canyon, where "dogs are depicted as part of both human and spirit realms". Interestingly, Aloi (2012:xxi) notes a correlation between Derrida's question of the subjective animal and the cave paintings of animals: "If, as Derrida said, 'The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there,' we can add that art begins there too, as naked we painted the animal on a cave wall. There is something to follow..."

[240] It is not my intention to delve into the vast history or scholarly arguments regarding the relation between art, artists, visual culture and animals. I briefly mention the relation here to contextualise and make apparent the *dogstagram* as digital image. However, as a digital and media scholar, I view the *dogstagram* in relation to technology and the digital sphere more so than in relation to art praxis. Consequently, I do not delve further into the endless theoretical

Evidently, the depiction of animals in the visual realm has shifted alongside our alternating understanding of the human-animal relation and animal subject. That is to say, the visual animal has been subjected to the understanding of the animal as liminal and spiritual in primitive times (Berger 1977:18), subsequently becoming an anthropocentric symbol in medieval and classical art (Pastoureau 2017:10) and finally, in postmodern art, the animal becomes an agent actively involved in the visual image: "The postmodern animal is there in the gallery not as a meaning or a symbol but in all its pressing thingness … it passes itself off as the fact of reality of that which resists both interpretation and mediocrity" (Baker 2000:82).

Echoing the history of the animal and the visual image, the representation of the dog in images has also shifted according to the various viewpoints of the human-dog relation. Said another way: "In all these grand domains of our cultural history, dogs, when experienced and recorded by human beings who are also artists, play essential parts" (Rosenblum1988:10). As humans we have recorded, mirrored, expressed and solidified our relation to dogs throughout history through images, including art and photography.

For instance, in ancient and medieval times, the dog appears as a global symbol alongside humans in mythological images, signifying a variety of ideas from spirituality, divine Beings and fertility to companionship, safety and sinister powers (Rowland 1974:58-61). In turn, in the eighteenth century the dog appears in paintings as companion to the privileged man and symbol of his class or social status, as, for example, the dog is pictured accompanying monarchs during royal hunts (Figure 11). Additionally, we find that dogs are often depicted as symbols of domestication and the overwhelming anthropocentrism of the human centred Age of Enlightenment (Rosenblum 1988:17;20). Moreover, during this time, in various images the dog is used as an icon to represent human experiences ranging from fidelity to human desolation. We also encounter the dog in art as a loyal servant to its human master (Figures 12-13), signifying

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pursuits regarding art and animals. For in-depth readings of the animal in visual culture refer to Rowland (1974), Clark (1977) Aloi (2012), Baker (2000; 2013), Sutton (2017) and Pastoureau (2017).

man's superiority as well as the dog's supposed devotion and selflessness (Rosenblum 1988:67).[241] Finally, in postmodernism, the dog gains a sense of agency in images and prompts humans to respond to the world from the dog's-eye-view, to such an extent that we even encounter the dog itself as art (Figure 14) (Sutton 2017:84).[242]

Figure 11: Alexandre-François Desportes, *Dog watching over game beside rosebush,* 1725. Oil on canvas, 42,8'' x 52''. The Louvre, Paris. (Rosenblum 1988:12).

Figure 12: Jeanne-Elisabeth Chaudet, *An infant sleeping in a crib under the watch of a courageous dog which has just killed an enormous viper*, 1801. Oil on canvas, 44,88'' x 52,75''. Musée des Beaux-Arts, Rochefort-sur-Mer. (Rosenblum 1988:30).

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[241] Such images also remind of the image of the dog at the philosopher's feet, mentioned in Chapter Two, highlighting anthropocentrism.

[242] Here I only mention brief examples of the depiction of dogs throughout history. A full analysis of such images goes beyond the scope of this study. For a comprehensive analysis of the representation of the dog throughout Art History refer to Rosenblum (1988), Hyland and Wilson (2015), as well as Sutton (2017). Additionally, for a comprehensive archive of the canine in art and photography, visit the *Google Arts & Culture* collection accessible in my accompanying digital humanities project and available at https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/m0bt9lr.

Figure 13: Briton Rivière,
Requiescat, 1889.
Oil on canvas, 25'' x 53,75''.
The Forbes Magazine Collection,
New York.

Figure 14: Mike Calway-Fage,
Progression of Regression, 2010.
Taxidermied German Shepherd and
wolf pet, 73'' x 49'' x 42''.
(Sutton 2017:76).

Merritt (2018:8) eloquently summarises the extent and history of the depiction

of dogs in art:

> As the arts elucidate the fine lines and fault lines of our
> lives, they also inform us of the relationship between
> man and dog. Drawn in French caves, entombed in
> Egypt, enshrined in China, dogs have always served art
> as subject and symbol. Early painters such as
> Velàzquez and Titian included dogs in their paintings.
> It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that

the great portrait painters began to express man's love for dogs and at the same time to capture their nobility. Hogarth, Gainsborough and Landseer majestically rendered canine presence in the family of man. The tradition, once started, continues. Today, we see the dogs as an important element in the works of our leading artists, from Picasso to Salle, from Monet to Fischl.

Ensuing the dog in art, picturing the dog through the medium of photography is also a vital manner of representing the human-dog relation. Merritt (2018:8-9) explains that the development and popularity of the camera coincide with the change of thinking surrounding the human-dog relation from anthropocentrism to nonhumanism. That is to say, "both canis familiaris and camera obscura [simultaneously] experienced rapid absorption into the fabric of human life" and, consequently photographs of dogs "speak as much about the history of photography as they do about man's and dog's evolving relationship" (Merritt 2018:8). Currently, taking photos of dogs has become the most prominent manner to capture the human-dog relation. In fact, Merritt (2018:9) notes that, for some, taking photos of dogs is somewhat of an obsessive pursuit – a fixation mirrored in the amount of photos dog owners seem to take from day-to-day. In fact, a 2017 report from Rover.com reveals that 65% of dog owners confess to taking more photos of their dog than their significant other (Varnier 2019).

Following this line of thought, we can explore the depiction of the dog (and other animals) mediated through an endless number of visual examples and mediums. Although it is not my intention to expand on the history of the image of the dog in art and photography further than this brief contextualisation, I argue that what the history of the dog in visual culture emphasises is that humans are inclined to *picture* their experiences and relations with their companion species. Hence, we can learn about the human-dog relation by examining such instances. Furthermore, echoing Derrida's look at his cat in *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)* (1997) and Berger's *Why Look At Animals?* (1977), it is clear that humans *look* at animals, especially dogs. Notably, we are now aware that

this look can occur as an actual encounter with the animal, or as a simulated encounter via a visual image.

In the context of both the Anthropocene and the Digital Age – where technology has developed to such an extent that our lives and our environment are embedded in automation and information – it is well known that the realm of the visual has also transformed into the digital (Mirzoeff 2015:18). Visual culture theorist, Nicholas Mirzoeff (2015:18), explains that "[t]he change at hand is not simply one of quantity but of kind. All the 'images', whether moving or still, that appear in the new archives are variants of digital information. Technically they are not images at all, but rendered results of computation". Accordingly, any image (moving or still) or artwork mediated, shared or looked at on a digital platform is a different entity or medium in its own right:

> In many cases what we can 'see' in the image, we could never see with our own eyes. What we see in the [digital] photograph is a computation, itself created by 'tiling' different images that were further processed to generate colour and contrast. *It is a way to see the world enabled by machines.* (Mirzoeff 2015:18, emphasis added).[243]

Parallel to the evolution of the visual image into the digital era, the specific image of the dog seems also to be computed into its own digital version. The human pursuit of looking at, visualising and taking photos of dogs (and animals in general) is amplified on social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook, which allow us to share (and archive) digital images of our dogs or our human-dog companionship instantaneously. To rephrase Mirzoeff's above explanation of the digital nature of visual culture in terms of companion species: *the popular digital image of the dog is a way to see the human-dog relation enabled by machines.* This means that images of dogs on social media are an example of a Harawayian contact zone where humans, dogs and technology meet. Notably, in this contact zone the image of the human-dog relation once again reflects the

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[243] In particular, Mirzoeff (2015:18) (following digital scholar Wendy Hui Kyong Chun) argues that whenever an image is presented in a digital format it is not simply relayed or reproduced, but also computed by a machine. Additionally, Mirzoeff (2015:18-19) explains that digital images are also easily manipulated, altered and edited, which adds to the image's computational format.

changes in our understanding of our companion species: just as in the case of the popularity of the camera coincides with the intensifying companionship between human and dog; so too the extension of the image of the dog into the digital realm coincides with the current estimation (by theorists such as Haraway 2008) that the human-dog relation is entwined with technological developments.[244]

Sharing digital images of dogs prominently manifests on the social media platform Instagram as people use this specific social media network to share digital representations of their dogs. Instagram is a mobile social application that allows "its users to take pictures, apply different manipulation tools ('filters') to transform the appearance of an image … and share it instantly with the user's friends on the application itself or through other social networking sites such as Facebook, Foursquare, Twitter, etc." (Hochman & Schwartz 2012:6).[245] Founded in 2010, Instagram has grown to have more than 800 million members and more than 52 million images are published on the platform daily (Caple 2019:428). In order for Instagram users to navigate the platform successfully, they require accessibility to a variety of technologies, including Internet connection and a form of hardware that can capture and compute images, such as smartphones with cameras (Tifentale 2014:3).[246]

As a social media platform, Instagram's structure and properties appeals to the so-called 'Kodak culture' of photography, where taking images of daily life and

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[244] In this chapter I focus predominantly on the human-dog relation entwined with technology in the form of the digital image (the *dogstagram*). I elaborate on other ways in which companion species occur entangled with technology in Chapter Eight.

[245] MacDowall and De Souza (2018:3) argue that compared to Twitter and Facebook, Instagram receives relatively little scholarly attention. They maintain that, like Twitter and Facebook, Instagram is a social media platform that shapes a range of social practices and should therefore be a topic of consideration in social media scholarship. By focussing on the specific platform in my study, I hope to continue to address this gap in recent scholarship.

[246] In other words, Instagram is limited to a specific socioeconomic group. Tifentale (2014:12) explains that for "[a] person to be an active Instagrammer anywhere in the world means to fall within a certain income bracket that supports the purchase of a smartphone and monthly expenses related to the network subscription and service fees". Additionally, the average Instagram users are young adults, between the ages of 20 and 30 years (Tifentale 2014:12). Therefore, I remain aware that what is revealed from a study of Instagram images is limited to a specific socioeconomic group and is not necessarily representative of a general population. Incidentally, the socioeconomic group of Instagram consumers correlate with the primary class of human-dog relations Haraway (2008:207) admittedly focusses on in her discussions of companion species, that is a "globalized middle-class". Thus, a discussion of companion species online possibly suits a discussion of Haraway's notion of companion species.

activities, as well as sharing them, have become an increasingly popular habit (MacDowall & De Souza 2018:7).[247] The platform mimics the traditional habit of using a Polaroid or Kodak Brownie camera to photograph everyday doings and sharing these images with friends (via home movies, albums or slideshows) in its digital architecture. For example, Instagram photos are usually posted as square images similar to Polaroid photos and visually uses vintage-inspired filters to remind of analogue photography and super-8 moving image film (MacDowall & De Souza 2018:8).[248] In the digital sphere, Instagram augments the so-called 'Kodak culture', allowing users to share amateur images of everyday activities instantaneously, interactively and rapidly.[249] As a result, the everyday popularity and somewhat nostalgic pursuit of photographing animals and dogs as part of our everyday doings is then also digitised, since people now instantly take and share pictures of their dogs via Instagram on a regular basis.

A typical Instagram post consists of an image (in the form of a photograph, video, cartoon, diagram and so forth) and a caption (which appears below or beside the image). The caption can contain verbal text – usually describing or referring to the image posted – as well as metadata tagging other users, geo-tagging an image to a specific location and/or hashtag (Caple 2019:429; Tifentale 2014:3). Powell (2015:39) explains that hashtags are used to organise and categorise things on social media. Hashtags allow us to search for and discover particularities: "there are millions of conversations, photos and videos being shared on social media – and searching a hashtag allows us to drill down into specific niche subjects, categories and keywords" (Powell 2015:39).

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[247] In other words, Instagram and other similar photographic practices fall under the larger paradigm shift of photography or the so-called "fifth moment of photography" (Cruz & Meyer 2012:219), which is defined by "complete mobility, ubiquity and connection" (Cruz & Meyer 2012:219) (Tifentale 2014).

[248] Interestingly, Patricia Gill (1997) refers to the manner in which digital technologies refer back to the past as 'technostalgia', which re-establishes the human spirit in extremely mechanised doings (MacDowall & De Souza 2018:8). That is to say, in its technical architecture and properties, Instagram deliberately emphasises human qualities and traditions, which could also seep through to the content users post, posing the question: could *dogstagrams* therefore also evoke a sense of nostalgia?

[249] Similar to other social media platforms, Instagram not only allows for a sharing of images and thoughts, but also for reciprocal interaction. Through communicators such as comments, tags and direct messaging users are able to connect with one another via their images, as well as communicate their feelings and emotions by means of software-elements, for example tapping a 'like' button (Bucher & Helmond 2018:2).

In particular, on Instagram hashtags are increasingly important, because users have to search for content and contributors using hashtags as keywords. Using this form of tagging has become a mode of interactivity, establishing connections and having fun (Powell 2015:39). The use of hashtags is so significant on Instagram, that images typically associated with a particular hashtag are labelled accordingly and seemingly become part of global culture. For instance, the hashtag *#selfie* that labels images taken of one's self grew in popularity, owing in part to its use on Instagram, to such an extent that 'the selfie' is now a common term used to refer to such images and the act of taking a photo of the self (Mirzoeff 2015:31). Another example includes the hashtag *#MeToo*, originally used to identify social media posts and Instagram images speaking out against sexual harassment, which also became a worldwide trend currently referred to as the global 'Me Too movement'. On Instagram the hashtags *#dogsofinstagram* and *#dogstagram* are slowly following suit, as images of dogs posted on the social application are casually referred to as *dogstagrams* and the community surrounding the digital network of images is referred to as the *Dogs of Instagram*. In other words, these digital images (consisting of the image, its caption and metadata) are a global phenomenon and network, forming an intricate part of contemporary society and social media culture.

Remarkably, the very first image posted on Instagram by Kevin Systrom (co-founder and former CEO of the popular social network) on 16 July 2010, was an image of a puppy looking up at the camera with the caption "test" (Figure 15) (Evans 2018). In the image, the dog's owner, Kevin – whose foot is also seen in the digital photo – presumably holds the camera, taking the picture.[250] The puppy, now a full-grown Golden Retriever, still often features on Kevin's Instagram feed. Following this initial post of Kevin's dog, in contemporary times dogs have become some of the most popular subjects of shared images on the platform. As mentioned in Chapter One, to-date on Instagram over 69 million images have been shared under the hashtag *#dogstagram* and over 157 million

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[250] I speculate on the meaning of this particular image, as well as the reasoning behind the choice of posting about a dog in the first 'test' image for Instagram, at a later stage in this chapter.

images are accompanied by the hashtag *#dogsofinstagram.*[251] Consequently, dogs remain some of the commonly shared subjects that fill Instagram feeds, alongside food, selfies, friends, quotes, activities and fashion (Hu et al. 2014:596).

Figure 15: The first image posted on Instagram by Kevin Systrom (@kevin), 16 July 2010. Screenshot by the author.[252]

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, *dogstagrams* and the *Dogs of Instagram* have made such an impact in contemporary society that a new social media platform *Barkfeed* has been established, dedicated solely to digital pictures of dogs (Risman 2015). In other words, *Barkfeed* is an Instagram-like feed dedicated solely to images of dogs. Additionally, on Instagram, several canine owners open Instagram accounts dedicated exclusively to their dogs. Posts on these accounts, although run by the human owner, often appear as if shared (and even taken by) the dog. That is to say, followers of such accounts follow the everyday images of the doings of the dog presented as the user, not necessarily the owner. Some of these *Dogs of Instagram* have reached so-called

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[251] As some images are shared on Instagram including both hashtags some of the *dogstagram* and *Dogs of Instagram* images naturally overlap.

[252] Comments and likes are blocked out of screenshots of Instagram posts by the author in order to maintain the privacy of private Instagram users. All Instagram posts featured are obtained from public accounts, publicly available online to any site visitor – not necessarily an Instagram user – and are added as figures captured from a specific web address (available in the study's Sources Consulted) with credit to the account holder, as with any other online source used for academic purposes.

'Instafame' (Marwick 2015) becoming microcelebrities and 'Pet Influencers', who gain follower attention and subsequently earn commercial profits to showcase and post about specific products, brands or services (Duguay 2018:97). Schonfeld (2016:58) asserts that in such cases "[a] single sponsored Instagram post might earn an owner several thousand dollars". Similarly, Loudenback (2018) reports that a dog with more than one million followers can earn up to R230 000 per Instagram post.[253] Thus *dogstagrams* and *Dogs of Instagram* are not only noteworthy digital visualisations of companion species, but also a growing global techno-culture.

7.2 Why do *dogstagrams* matter?

From the above contextualisation, it is clear that *dogstagrams* and digital images of dogs online in general are immensely popular and form part of contemporary society in various ways. Moreover, rooted in the visualisation of the human-dog relation through visual culture, such as art and photography, we can argue that these digital images are a way of *looking* at or representing the human-dog relation mediated by technology in the Digital Age. Thus, *dogstagrams* capture and compute the everyday doings of companion species. Tifentale (2014:13) argues that Instagram is an archive of the human's process of becoming in society. Extending this idea, *dogstagrams* on Instagram can therefore act as a type of archive for the human and dog's process of becoming and *being-with* one another. Consequently, the digital image resonates because it carries with it, intensifies and makes visible the long philosophical history and complex questions surrounding the human-dog relation.

However, recent theoretical pursuits on the digital image, as well as social media platforms, maintains that these technological integrations in society do not only act as amplified archives to accumulate our representations and understandings. Rather, they are also active participants in shaping our relations and interactions. Following W.T.J Mitchell's (1995) iconic question: "What do pictures want?", as well as Mirzoeff's (2015) understanding of an "image-

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[253] The rise of 'Pet Influencers' has grown to such an extent that marketing agencies and managing firms now exists solely dedicated to managing pet Instagram accounts (Loudenback 2018).

dominated network society",[254] Du Preez (2018:17) shows that images "are not only signs of human communication but rather events, encounters and openings for meaning-making". In turn, Joanna Zylinska (2017:59, emphasis in original) explains that "*photography makes philosophy*, full stop – and also, more importantly, that *photography makes worldhood*, rather than just commenting on it". In other words, *dogstagrams* do not just signify the human-dog relation, but also produce new meaning when we engage with them as images. Mirzoeff (2015:66; 68) argues that digital images are "digital conversations" that "convey messages, share information and are designed to sustain conversations".[255] Thus, *dogstagrams* are digital images and conversations, densely packed with information and history and, importantly, also play an active role in shaping how we understand the human-dog relation.[256]

A look back at the first image posted on Instagram (Figure 15) reveals a dog looking at the smart camera (or at his owner holding the device) and, subsequently, also looking at the viewer of the digital image through the Instagram interface. As we look back through our phone screens at the dog, we – like Derrida looking at his cat – meet the gaze of the dog. In doing so, the digital image requires us to consider the dog's possible being. In turn, the viewer also sees a dog lying at his owner's feet, reminding of the dog as historical anthropocentric symbol, waiting with loyalty by its owner's side, looking up in response to his (notably technological) call. Finally, the architecture of Instagram allows human users to interact with this digital version of the dog. We are invited to *touch* the screen (or perhaps the dog) to communicate our appreciation for the post (and perhaps by extension the dog and its owner) and become part of the network of *responding* users who have already done so. Consequently, the digital image resonates because it carries with it, and intensifies, aspects surrounding the human-dog relation, such as the question of

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[254] In *What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images*, Mitchell (1995) discloses the 'pictorial turn' and indicates the agency of images.

[255] Notably both Du Preez (2018) and Mirzoeff (2015) refer to the example of selfies in reference to the agency of the digital image. I apply their thinking to my analysis of *dogstagrams* as digital images.

[256] In other words, much like companion species themselves, *dogstagrams* include a circle of response, evoking response and responding to Instagram users.

the animal mind, touch and response. Additionally, the *dogstagram* opens up a space to create new meanings and new ways of thinking about dogs.

From this brief reading of the first example of a *Dog of Instagram*, it becomes evident that we should not only be asking how *dogstagrams* reflect companion species, but also questioning what do *dogstagrams* do? Or more specifically, what meaning do they add to our current understanding of human-nonhuman relations? To start to answer these complex questions, I *roll over* into the virtual space of the *Dogs of Instagram* by means of digital humanities methodologies.

7.3 *Insta-dog:* computing the computed image

For the purpose of understanding what it is exactly that *dogstagrams* do, or, said differently, what meaning they convey, I explore the digital terrain of these images and their associated networks by em*barking* on a digital humanities project. More specifically, I employ a variety of digital humanities methodologies accumulated in a digital humanities project to analyse *dogstagrams* and *Dogs of Instagram*. As I outline in the introduction to this study, digital humanities is a mode of scholarship that derives from the digital shift in society and occurs as the intersection between digital technology and humanities disciplines (Drucker 2014:9; Burdick et al. 2012:121). Doing digital humanities ranges from using technology to do research, to "the cultural study of digital technologies, their creative possibilities, and their social impact" (Schreibman et al. 2004:17). My digital humanities project, entitled *Insta-dog*,[257] utilises the full spectrum of digital humanities, using computation to analyse and visualise *dogstagrams*, as well as study *dogstagrams* as digital entities to explore their possibilities and influence on the meaning of the human-dog relation. In doing so, I immerse myself as scholar in the digital representations and extensions of the conversation surrounding companion species online.[258]

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[257] To view *Insta-dog* visit www.instadogproject.com

[258] I take my cue from cinema and digital media theorist, Tara McPherson (2009:120), who suggests that the humanity scholar should engage "with the platforms and tools of the digital era" to become a multimodal scholar "imagining what it would be like to immerse yourself in a scholarly argument as you might immerse yourself in a movie or a video game" – or then a social media platform.

My reasons for using digital methodologies to study *dogstagrams* are twofold. Firstly, digital library theorist Bethany Nowviskie (2015:i12) argues that digital humanities can be a helpful approach in addressing the complexities of the Anthropocene. Although the line between using technology to benefit the environment and to destroy the environment is blurry, for Nowviskie (2015:i12), digital humanities should attend to environmental relations to attempt to answer Mirzoeff's (2014) call for "'counter-visuality' to the dominant imagery of the Anthropocene".[259] Thus, in response to Nowviskie's argument and in the framework of the Anthropocene as well as the human-nonhuman relation, my digital humanities project visualises the human-dog relation in a new manner, beyond the current representations in the discourse of visual culture.[260]

Reflecting on digital humanities in relation to environmental relations between the human and nonhuman, I am tempted to rethink digital humanities in relation to the theoretical concepts of Donna Haraway, whose unpacking of the human-nonhuman relation, against the background of the Anthropocene, has formed the basis of my reading of companion species thus far. Even though digital humanities is an insured interdisciplinary field in current academic environments, it is surrounded by contested debates, as theorists struggle to reach a consensus over what precisely constitutes digital humanities. Owing to its interdisciplinary nature, the field has been defined, re-defined, unpacked, re-packed, shaped and reshaped several times in various contexts.[261] I suggest that perhaps Haraway can be helpful in formulating an understanding of digital humanities, since she predominantly focusses on synthesising entities. In other words, perhaps Haraway's theoretical ideas surrounding synthesis can help synthesise the different aspects of digital humanities.

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[259] In Chapter One I outlined Mirzoeff's (2014) argument that the current visuality surrounding the Anthropocene and its associated environmental images require reimagining and scrutiny.

[260] Nowviskie (2015:i12) adds that digital humanities projects have the influence to use software to evoke empathy for the environmental crises. By playing on the affective power of digital images of dogs throughout *Insta-dog*, I hope to also tend to an emotive response, in favour of the environment (or the human-dog relation).

[261] For a full discussion on the various waves of digital humanities and various interpretations thereof, refer to Travis (2015), Liu (2012) Hayles (2011) and Berry (2011a, 2011b).

In Chapter Five I outlined Haraway's (2008:4) concept of "contact zones" as spaces where species encounter, entangle and multiply. For Haraway (2008:217), contact zones are meeting points, outside of our comfort zones, where entities meet with historicity, respond to each other and develop new responsible relations. Following Haraway's notion of contact zones, I suggest we think of digital humanities as a contact zone, where humanities scholarship meets digital technologies. Like Haraway's contact zones, digital humanities represents a new manner of doing research, somewhat out of the comfort zone of the typical humanities scholar. Yet, akin to Haraway's contact zones, when the scholar, humanities discourse and technology meet in the zone of digital humanities, a response occurs, resulting in new networks and (hopefully responsible) insights. Equally, just as the entities that meet in Haraway's contact zones have a historicity, each aspect that meets in a digital humanities project carries with it a background, context and discourse. In the contact zone of digital humanities these contexts cannot be forgotten as they meet, exchange and add to their existing findings.

That is to say, we can think of *Insta-dog* as a contact zone, where the following aspects meet: (1) myself as researcher with the historicity of my research and arguments regarding the human-dog relation, as well as my own history with my dogs, Fudge and Cody; (2) the *dogstagram* bearing with it the canon of the visual history of dogs in art and the human-dog relation, as well as the nature of the digital realm of social media platform Instagram and; (3) manual and automated computing methods that have their own distinct way of interpreting digital properties. From these "transdisciplinary encounters" (Travis 2015:928) new understandings and meanings are derived, exchanged, entangled and multiplied.

My second reason for framing the *dogstagram* in the contact zone of digital humanities, stems from my understanding of the nature of images on social media. As explained above, images online, more specifically on Instagram, are more than just visual representations. They are what Caple (2019:429) calls "a modal ensemble" or, according to Tifentale (2015:2) a "networked camera" that is "a curious hybrid, image-making, image-sharing, and image-viewing device".

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Furthermore, as explained, *dogstagrams* as a social media post contains a variety of elements, ranging from metadata to captions and altered images belonging to a wide network of information. It is therefore appropriate to investigate such a digital entity using digital methods that account for the *dogstagram* in its entirety, in comparison to, for instance, only a visual or content analysis that only examines the image. That is to say, digital computation matches the digital nature of the computed image. Tifentale (2014:3) explains: "New image-making and image-sharing technologies demand also radically new ways of looking at these images. Big data require 'big optics,' borrowing Paul Virilio's term from the early 1990s".[262 & 263]

New media theorist Lev Manovich (2001; 2011; 2014),[264] provides helpful guidelines and documentation on how to conduct such a digital humanities project that incorporates a 'big optics' approach. Crucially, Manovich (2011:9) maintains that any computer-assisted examinations of massive cultural data sets require a "distant reading" of computed patters as well as a "close reading" by a human, to make sense of these patterns. Manovich (2011:9) emphasises that "completely automatic analysis of social and cultural data will not produce meaningful results today because computers' ability to understand the content texts, images, video and other media is still limited". For Manovich (2011:9-10), the ideal digital humanities project combines "human ability to understand and interpret … and computers' ability to analyse massive data sets using algorithms we create". Hence, Manovich's ideal application of digital computing methods requires a multi-scale or mixed-methods approach that incorporates a variety of

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[262] In addition, by analysing *dogstagrams* digitally, we also find out more about Instagram as an online image-sharing application and social media users in general (Tifentale 2014:1).

[263] Markedly, Tifentale mentions philosopher Paul Virilio's (1992) notion of "big optics", which he refers to as the technological endeavours and data growth that allows humans to join and see over great distances. Already in 1992 Virilio predicted that technology would alter our way of seeing the world and, as a result, we would have to adjust how we see, or rely on 'big optics' to permit new and "spectacular insights" (Virilio 1992:91). Thus, Tifentale argues using computational methods to understand image-making platforms such as Instagram is a form of using 'big optics' to see the 'bigger picture' (so to speak).

[264] Manovich is the creator of famous digital humanities projects *Selfiecity* (2014) and *Phototrails* (2013) that adopts Culture Analytics as a technique. Manovich's Culture Analytics explores large (big data) image sets to detect various patterns (Hochman & Schwartz 2012:6). I draw from Manovich's available documentation on Cultural Analytic tools in his projects to aid my own digital humanities project.

technologies and, importantly, a human hermeneutical interpretation. I utilise such a multimodal approach to create the digital humanities project, *Insta-dog*.

My mixed method approach includes:[265]

1. An immersion into the digital world of *dogstagrams* by means of a long-term personal learning process, engaging, exploring and experiencing *Dogs of Instagram* in order to gain a particular understanding of the particular phenomenon.

2. Extracting a data set of publicly available *dogstagrams* from Instagram by means of a storage utility and downloader specifically designed to extract and encode public data from the image-sharing platform.

3. Using a pre-trained computer vision API to process a large data set of *dogstagrams* to classify these images into categories and supply analytical information regarding the image, including optical character recognition (OCR), labels and properties.

4. Processing the information supplied from a human horizon, identifying labels significant to the human-dog relation.

5. Visualising the identified labels in various ways using an image processing software and user interface framework in combination with human selection to showcase relevant visualisations and categories of *dogstagrams.*

6. Assembling visualisations, theoretical research, as well as distant and close readings into a complete and impactful platform for viewers to explore.

In what follows, I present the results and findings of the *Insta-dog* platform in conjunction with my own hermeneutical reading of *dogstagrams*. This discussion refers, for the most part, to the multi-scale digital analysis presented in its entirety through the *Insta-dog* digital humanities project. Additionally, I also layer this discussion with my own hermeneutical reading and experience of

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[265] This serves as a brief and fleeting overview of the computing tools and techniques developed and applied in the *Insta-dog* project. For a full discussion refer to detailed documentation available on *Insta-dog* at:
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/79d064_4ca03e39d1774d84b44c29be1d2ec629.pdf

particular *dogstagrams* (described in step one), which also encompasses the critical reading of companion species presented in Part One of this study. In doing so, the ensuing discussion is an entangled computed and hermeneutical contact zone of what *dogstagrams* and the *Dogs of Instagram* reveal.[266]

7.4 Findings: different types of *dogstagrams*

The digital analysis of *dogstagrams* results in various computed tags or labels that provide a preliminary overview, albeit broad, of typical content captured in posts about dogs on Instagram. Thereafter, I process these labels or tags by means of a close (human) reading, where I explore their visualisations, identifying common trends, coherences and patterns that stand out or group together in the assembled plots of *dogstagrams*. Based on these identified patterns, alongside the theoretical reading of companion species and the human-dog relation, I identify seven categories to decipher the digitised dogs on Instagram.[267] These categories include: self-representing *dogstagrams*, anthropomorphic *dogstagrams*, *dogstagrams* as cultural indicators, domestic *dogstagrams*, action and adventure *dogstagrams*, *dogstagrams* of companionship, as well as *dogstagrams* of touch. In what follows, I unpack the identified types of *dogstagrams*.

7.4.1 Self-representing dogstagrams

To say that *dogstagrams* are a means of self-expression, self-representation or self-curatorship is perhaps stating the obvious, because, in its most basic form, social networking has become a means of expressing and representing ourselves virtually to others (Kreiss 2018:16). While the idea of curating the self through (visual) media did not originate in the Digital Age, scholars assert that social

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[266] Throughout the discussion I refer to various examples to illustrate my findings. To facilitate the reader in fully visualising these findings, I present single examples as figures (close reading) in this written component alongside different imageplot visualisations on *Insta-dog* (visit: https://www.instadogproject.com/imageplots). The reader can scroll through each larger visualisation located on *Insta-dog* (distant reading) alongside the specific type of *dogstagram* discussed here. Furthermore, the reader can follow my written argument alongside the broader digital humanities project for a comprehensive accompaniment to this theoretical argument.

[267] Evidently here the digital humanities project and my theoretical exploration of *being-with* companion species accumulates as a true hermeneutical "fusion of horizons" (Gadamer 2004[1975]:305), as the traditional canon of the philosophy of the human, nonhuman, animal and dog meet the realm of the digital and new insights (and questions) arise.

media has intensified, expanded and increased the notion of self-curatorship (Kreiss 2018; Van Dijck 2013; Rettberg 2017; Enli & Thumim 2012). Yet, it seems that the network of the *dogstagram* has proliferated self-curatorship even further, as humans now also use the image of the nonhuman dog to represent and express themselves online.

Tiidenberg and Whelan (2017:141) explore various visual self-representations that are "not-selfies", where people share, tag and view images of animals online (amongst other things) as a practice of self-expression. They argue that the flow of images on social media that are not of the self, still represent "people's experienced, relational, human selves" (Tiidenberg & Whelan 2017:151). In other words, "a picture of not-me is a picture of me", or then in the context of the *dogstagram*: a picture of a dog is a picture of the self (Tiidenberg & Whelan 2017:151). In other words, just as the human enquiry into the animal subject usually reflects back to the human self (Wood 2004:129), so too the digitally curated image of a dog reflects back to the human who posted the image.[268]

For example, in Figures 16 and 17 the account holders use images of their dogs to express their moods after a tough spinning class or long Monday, respectively. Notably, the dogs did not engage in these typically human activities, yet their pictures are used to convey the human account holders' feelings. Tiidenberg and Whelan (2017:152) argue that such images "are heightened in terms of their communicative function precisely because they are 'of' the people that took them or communicate on their behalf, in ways that can be, locally, more profound and direct than self-portraits". That is to say, Tiidenberg and Whelan speculate that these images communicate and connect to other users more effectively than an image of a tired human after a long Monday or a sweaty person post spinning class may have. In this way we use the image of a dog to talk to others and communicate about ourselves with others (Hamada in Wender 2019).

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[268] Here I refer to my discussion in Chapter Two concerning the close relation between thinking about animals and understanding the human self.

Figure 16: Self-representing *dogstagram* expressing human exhaustion after a spinning class (@bernesebelike), 1 August 2018. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 17: Self-representing *dogstagram* expressing the human sentiment of 'Blue Mondays' (@redtheredcocker), 12 August 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Visit www.instadogproject.com/imageplots for more examples

Similarly, Mort (2019:93) maintains that people tend to use their dogs in Instagram posts as extensions or even substitutes of themselves, because it is a 'safer' option. Mort (2019:93) explains that a dog in an image seems more authentic than a person, because posting an image of the self on Instagram (for example a selfie) is often associated with boasting, (elevated) self-confidence or vanity. As a result, viewers might respond more favourably to a post of dog than a post of users themselves, which can result in bonding in lieu of envy (Mort 2019:93). In a similar way, Caple (2019:436) maintains that Instagrammers use

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images of dogs to distance themselves from serious matters, while still expressing their feelings thereof.[269] Perhaps this explanation could explain why Kevin Systrom chose to picture his dog in the first ever image posted to Instagram. As an initial test, Systrom was treading into uncharted waters and did not know what the reception of the post on the new platform would be. Possibly an image of his dog was a safer option – distancing himself from the image, while still conveying a message about himself in a relatable manner.

According to Mort (2019:92-93), the tendency of Instagrammers to think of dogs as more authentic than humans is rooted in the anthropocentric view that dogs lack a sense of self. That is to say, people anthropocentrically perceive dogs as less self-conscious than humans, hence there is a sense of "unselfconsciousness" in images of dogs posted by humans. In this way, *dogstagrams* that are self-expressive once again mimic the human-centred notion that only humans show signs of self-awareness. Equally important, *dogstagrams* of self-representation also highlight how an encounter with the animal being typically makes us question what it means to be human, as I unpacked in Part One of this study.

Referring to the historicity of the visual representations of dogs, we might look back at Romantic artists such as Phillip Otto Runge, Francisco de Goya and William Turner, who, in similar fashion, used dogs in their paintings as allegories to reflect human situations and experiences. Here dogs "permitted humans to project their most heartfelt emotions into an animal kingdom" (Rosenblum 1988:17). For example, in Goya's *A Dog* (1820-1823) we see a dark head of a lone, perhaps sinking, dog looking up at a shadowy presence in a hazy landscape (Figure 18). The abandoned, vanishing dog is interpreted as an expression of the loss of human reason and control, where a stray dog "bear[s] the crushing allegorical weight of an annihilated civilization" (Rosenblum 1988:41). Using dogs as a means of human expression is therefore deeply rooted in our history of *being-with* dogs. With *dogstagrams* this manner of self-curatorship is augmented, instant and occurs on a much larger scale.

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[269] Specifically, Caple (2019:436) refers to examples where Instagrammers use *dogstagrams* to express their political allegiances in a 'softening' manner.

Figure 18: Francisco de Goya, *A Dog*, 1820-23.
Mural transferred to canvas, 53,5" x 32".
The Prado, Madrid.
(Rosenblum 1988:40).

Looking back at some of my own Instagram posts, I realise that I have also used images of Fudge and Cody to express my own moods and experiences. For example, I used a photo of Cody hiding behind pillows to vent about a typical 'blue Monday' experience (Figure 19). Similarly, during a particularly tough day of research, I expressed my frustrations via a sleeping Fudge (Figure 20), who I found stretched out over some reading material. Reflecting on why I used these pictures of my dogs, I am reminded that it probably did stem from an unconscious pursuit to make my situation and feelings seem less self-involved. However, at the same time, these images were taken in moments where I experienced exactly the situations they express – Fudge and Cody's actions at the time just seemed to express my feelings so accurately. Finding Fudge asleep on my research was the perfect picture of my desire to do the same. I see myself behind the camera, self-centredly thinking how my dogs are enacting exactly what I am feeling and then using them to express my own feelings to my fellow Instagrammers in a somewhat humorous manner. In this instance, despite my non-anthropocentric understanding of the animal being, the encounter and act of posting about Fudge and Cody was undoubtably a human reflection back to myself.

Figure 19: The author's own self-representing *dogstagram* featuring Cody (@karlipie),
19 February 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

Figure 20: A previous self-representing *dogstagram* by the author featuring Fudge (@karlipie),
21 January 2016.
Screenshot by the author.

7.4.2 Anthropomorphic dogstagrams

The notion of expressing human experiences through images of dogs on social media reaches a peak when *dogstagrams* no longer just express human sentiments through images of dogs, but actually modify the dogs in the images to mimic humans. A large amount of *dogstagram* content is labelled as dogs dressed in human clothing or performing human activities, such as doing household chores (Figure 21), shopping, working or even getting married (Figure 22).[270] Based on these posts it is clear that anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* are increasingly popular on Instagram.

Figure 21: An anthropomorphic *dogstagram* picturing a dog ironing (@margaret_the_iggy), 25 February 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 22: An anthropomorphic *dogstagram* picturing two dogs getting married, photograph by @aarun_evolution (@barked), 23 April 2019. Screenshot by the author.

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[270] The large variety of *dogstagrams* depicting dogs getting married resonates with the symbol of the dog in folk rituals as a sign of fertility: "The folk ritual of presenting newlyweds with a dog in a cradle in the nineteenth century nursery rhyme of a young lady who took her 'father's greyhound and laid it in a cradle' illustrate a belief in fertility magic, coupled with the idea that canine power can be transferred to humans" (Rowland 1974:60).

In anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* dogs are humanised, since Instagram account holders project human social practices onto their dogs. These images resemble the humanised animal commonly pictured in popular culture, where the animal becomes a signifier of human beings. Reminding of visual examples discussed in Chapter Two, such as Cassius Coolidge's *Dogs Playing Poker* (1903) (Figures 4-5), anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* also literally present the dog in human form.

Notably, in anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* the dogs are not necessarily always an extension of the human account holder, instead they are anthropomorphised to represent habits of people in general or even societal stereotypes – to such an extent that the image and caption often seem to be presented from the humanised dog's point of view, or, said differently, posted as a human-speaking dog. As a result, at times, like Coolidge's *Dogs Playing Poker*, anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* border on satirical, ironically commenting on and drawing attention to aspects of contemporary human society.

For example, Figure 23 is a *dogstagram* featuring two dogs dressed up to resemble parents. The caption reads: "We're not mad honey, just disappointed in you and the life you have chosen for yourself", mimicking a phrase often associated with parenting. More precisely, the dogs are presented to humorously poke fun at the stereotypical idea that the baby boomer generation (the dog-parents) are often disappointed in their millennial children's different life choices, commonly associated with a confrontation and the phrase 'we're not mad, just disappointed' (Brokaw 1998).

Figure 23: A satirical *dogstagram* commenting on parenting styles (@hugoandursula), 9 March 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Similarly, Figure 24 contains images from a multi-image post presenting various dogs with biographies, resembling and mocking stereotypical figures in contemporary society.

Figure 24: Screenshots of a multi-image *dogstagram* mocking societal stereotypes (@doggocom), 30 June 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

Interestingly, upon closer inspection, several anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* pose humanised dogs, dressed up and performing stereotypical images of so-called 'influencers' on Instagram (Figures 25-26). In other words, the images ridicule the human culture and society that creates the microcelebrity on Instagram (Duguay 2018:97), ironically using the platform itself to do so. Perhaps the dogs are used to show, in a tongue-in-cheek manner, how absurd some of the content of Instagram pictures and the culture of so-called 'influencers' have become.

Figure 25: A satirical *dogstagram* commenting on the culture of influencers (@betches), 13 June 2018.
Screenshot by the author.

Figure 26: A satirical *dogstagram* featuring a dog posed as a typical Instagram influencer, originally posted by @wanderlust_samoyed (@mimi_instadogs), 9 April 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Some anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* quite literally emphasise the idea of the anthropomorphic dog by presenting a dressed-up and posed dog, alongside a human dressed in a similar way (Figure 27). Often human and dog are also both dressed in stereotypical fashion. In these anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* the dog becomes a mirror image of the human, turning the contemporary myth that dogs resemble their owners into a visuality. In this instance the *dogstagrams* remind of the opening scene of the Disney film *One Hundred and One Dalmatians*, during which the protagonist Dalmatian, Pongo, looks out onto the street in search of a suitable love interest for his human owner Roger Radcliffe. Pongo sees various dog owners walking their dogs on leashes, all mirroring the looks and character traits of their human counterparts. Simply, in this scene, the viewer learns about (and perhaps even identifies with) the character of the human owner walking the dog, while what we learn about the nature of each dog remains a projection of human ideas and traits. We are entertained by the idea of a dog being human-like as well as the figure of the dog embodying human stereotypes and, as a result, become aware of our own human characteristics and thoughts.

Comparably, anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* featuring a human and their mirror-image dog not only serves as a parody of contemporary society, but also points out human characteristics and thoughts to the human follower. On my reading, the images ironically highlight the *differences* between human and dog, albeit

based on their outer appearances and not inner beings. Although the human and dog are dressed the same, they are simultaneously juxtaposed. The viewer is eminently aware that they are separate and markedly different entities – stressed by the awkward (or even goofy) appearance of the dog in human clothes in comparison to its human counterpart.[271] That is to say, a clearly anthropomorphic *dogstagram* attempting to equalise human and dog, paradoxically accentuates the differences between human and dog.

Figure 27: *Dogstagram* featuring a dog and human dressed similarly (@podarroz_weimaraner), 17 May 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

Visit www.instadogproject.com/imageplots for more examples

Anthropomorphism not only reflects in the pictures and captions of *dogstagrams*, but also in the network of *Dogs of Instagram*. Evident in the usernames of these images, several accounts on Instagram are created and dedicated solely for specific dogs. Users then post on such accounts only about their dogs or 'on behalf of' their dogs. In other words, the very act of imagining and posting as a dog 'Instagrammer' is a manner of projecting the human ability to use social media onto dogs. As mentioned before, some Instagram accounts

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[271] The distinctiveness between human and dog in the mirrored anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* is also emphasised by the tags identified by computer vision for these images. Computed in the digital humanities project, the API identifies a clear 'dog' and 'human' subject in these specific *dogstagrams.*

dedicated specifically to dogs become commercial commodities, since account holders get sponsored to post or advertise products. For example, the account @mollythenewfie regularly advertises products and merchandise for other pet owners. Thus, in these anthropomorphic *dogstagrams*, the dog used to satirise human influencers on Instagram ironically now also becomes the Instagram influencer.

In *When Species Meet*, Haraway (2008:46) comments on the rate at which dogs are commoditised in contemporary society: "We have no shortage of proof that classic rabid commodification is alive and well in consumer-crazy, technoscientifically exuberant dog worlds". Haraway (2008:47) renders the "capitalist technoculture in the early twenty-first century" as the guilty party for turning the dog into an anthropomorphic product. In particular, Haraway (2008:47-52; 53-55) refers to dogs as consumers in the ever-growing pet food industry, pet insurance and dog medical services, as well as dogs as commodities in dog breeding lines, dog cloning, genetic manipulation services and dogs as workers. After the analysis of the anthropomorphic *dogstagram* it is clear that the dog is also commodified "in flesh and in the sign" (Haraway 2008:47) in the technoculture of social media in contemporary society.

With regard to dogs as commodities, Haraway (2008:62) asserts that although the dog as a product is an anthropocentric pursuit (which, for her, calls for concern), in the companion species relation dogs subjected to commodification can simultaneously add value to the technoculture society.[272] In the event of anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* that turn dogs into commodities, perhaps we can argue that they add value by allowing viewers to recognise vices, beliefs and practices of contemporary human society. In turn, the anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* that humanise dogs are significant, because – paradoxically – they also emphasise the irreducible differences between humans and dogs.

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[272] For instance, Haraway (2008:63) explains that dogs 'working' in prisons act as guards, yet they can also add value by acting as therapists and teachers to prisoners.

7.4.3 Dogstagrams *as cultural indicators*

The dog as symbol of (hu)man continues in the digital world of the *Dogs of Instagram*. The analysis of *dogstagrams* reveals that in these digital posts, dogs are also used as cultural indicators or icons: a sign to identify a particular idea, image or event of cultural significance. That is to say, *dogstagrams* not only signify human qualities and experiences, but also associate and fuse with popular events, brands, beliefs or objects. In many ways we can compare these cultural indicating *dogstagrams* to the popular use of dogs in advertising. Mort (2019:92) describes using dogs in advertising as fetish-like behaviour, where the popularity of dogs is associated with a particular kind of status, power and influence. In turn, brands and industries draw on society's fetish with dogs, using dogs in relation to their products to associate their meaning and influential status with their product (Mort 2019:92).

The use of dog as influential symbol seeps through into the realm of *dogstagrams* as we find several dogs inserted into cultural events as well as the latest fashions and crazes. For example, during the worldwide airing of the last season of popular series *Game of Thrones* (Benioff & Weiss 2019), several *dogstagrams* appeared featuring dogs dressed as characters from the series or sitting on the infamous iron throne (Figure 28). Similarly, over Easter and Christmas holidays, *dogstagrams* often feature dogs dressed as the Easter bunny, Santa Clause or reindeer (Figure 29). Several *dogstagrams* also associated dogs with the latest *Avengers: Endgame* (Russo & Russo 2019) film, picturing dogs wearing superhero costumes or chewing on Thor's hammer (Figure 30). Markedly, these images are not sponsored as means of advertising for brands, products or films. Rather, the community of *Dogs of Instagram* respond to cultural events and affiliate dogs with them to point to their significance in society. In other words, *dogstagrams* become indexical of popular culture.

However, *dogstagrams* as cultural indicators are not always popular culture based and can also take a serious tone at times. For example, during the devastating fire outbreak at the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in April 2019, several users took to Instagram to express their sadness and support during the

incident. The *Dogs of Instagram* followed suit, posting pictures of dogs in front of the cathedral (Figure 31) or in Paris, accompanied by sympathetic captions. In another example, Caple (2019:428) shows how Instagrammers use *dogstagrams* to reflect their dissatisfaction with political strategies and endorse political parties during federal elections.[273] In these instances, the dog is not only affiliated with a societal or political event, but also becomes (as well as reaffirms the dog as) a symbol of comfort, support and loyalty. Therefore, the examples of *dogstagrams* as cultural indicators show how the dog can be entangled with events happening in society, indicating important occurrences in cultures and connoting meaning, such as support and loyalty, in relation to such events. In other words, cultural *dogstagrams* are a human pursuit to show the dog responding to its encircled environment and notably human world.

Figure 28: *Dogstagram* featuring a dog dressed as a Game of Thrones character, original post by @bootsythecorgi (@puppystagram), 20 May 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 29: *Dogstagram* featuring a dog dressed as the Easter Bunny, original post by @maplefloral (@dogsofinstagram), 21 April 2019. Screenshot by the author.

[273] Caple (2019:428) specifically refers to a dataset of Instagram posts studied during the 2016 Australian federal election.

Figure 30: *Dogstagram* featuring dogs dressed as *Avengers* characters (@followtheyellowbrickgirl), 11 April 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 31: *Dogstagram* posted in the wake of the Notre-Dame fire, featuring a dog in front of the Cathedral with a sentimental caption (@gatsby_boston_terrier), 16 April 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Visit www.instadogproject.com/imageplots for more examples

7.4.4 *Domestic* dogstagrams

Representing the history of the dog as domesticated animal, several *dogstagrams* also depict the domestication of dogs. Domestic *dogstagrams* show typical processes or activities associated with the training of dogs or dogs obediently living alongside their human owner's way of life. Thus, domestic *dogstagrams* become an ultimate depiction of the human practice of pet keeping, showing domestic customs such as walking dogs (on leash), feeding dogs, dog tricks, dog sleeping habits, dog grooming and dog toys.

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Parallel to the theoretical understanding of domestication as a mutually beneficial relationship that could be coercive and reciprocal (Cassidy 2007:12), these images are not depictions of dominating or cruel behaviour, instead they show engaged processes of domestication, such as walking or training dogs for specific activities. For instance, previously mentioned account @mollythenewfie, often showcases the process to train Newfoundlands in water rescue and drafting (Figures 32-33). In these posts the owner explains that water rescue and pulling are beneficial for Newfoundlands, showcasing how their domestic and breed history includes the capacity and instincts for such activities.

Figure 32: Domestic *dogstagram* of dogs during a drafting practice (@mollythenewfie), 29 October 2017. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 33: Domestic *dogstagram* of Boomer the Newfoundland during a water rescue practice (@mollythenewfie), 17 March 2018. Screenshot by the author.

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In my view, domestic *dogstagrams* remind of popular television series attempting to teach people how to domesticate dogs and train dog behaviour, like National Geographic's *The Dog Whisperer with César Millán* (2004-2012) and CBS's *Lucky Dog* (2013–). The posts about domestication and training dog behaviour can become snapshots or easy-to-follow directions for controlling dog behaviour in a domestic setting, as human owners share their own experiences and directions. Consequently, domestic *dogstagrams* are also anthropocentric; since the posts at times assume to know what dogs want and how to achieve wanted dog behaviour in specific human terms. For instance, in Figure 32 the owner says in the caption to the post that Boomer (the pictured Newfoundland) "started crying and whining just dying to work", however we cannot be sure that this is what the dog was trying to communicate. Perhaps the opposite can also be true: he started crying because he did *not* want to participate in the domesticated behaviour. In this regard, domestic *dogstagrams* also pose a threat to dogs, since viewers and followers of such posts can develop unrealistic expectations for their own dogs – perhaps forcing their dogs to behave in a certain manner or do a certain activity, because 'dogs on Instagram do it'.[274]

In addition to describing domesticated behaviour, domestic *dogstagrams* also depict the dog in a typical homely environment. Dogs pictured on Instagram as a part of a home or household echo how dogs have come to represent the notion of the human idea of home and family in literature and philosophy (Fudge 2007:37-38). The dog as part of the human household is widely represented as a visual theme. Dogs are depicted at the feet of medieval gentlemen, at the table of lavish Victorian banquet's and dogs as pets prominently feature in household portraits, for instance in Diego Velasquez's famous portrait, *Las Meninas* [1656] (Figure 34), a dog is lying on the ground (Clark 1977:50).[275] Similarly, famous family

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[274] Although little evidence exists to support such instances as of yet, as *dogstagrams* grow more and more popular in society, examples might come to light. Mimicking domestic acts depicted in *dogstagrams* perhaps also extend and remind of my own pursuit to take Cody for walks, although he refused to do so (described in Part One of this study). My motivation for walking Cody came from the common domestic notion that dogs 'need to be walked' – perpetuated in the visual realm and also on social media.

[275] In French philosopher Michel Foucault's (1970[1966]:14-15) analysis of the artwork in *The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, he argues that the painting depicts living things in hierarchy, with the dog placed as loyal guardian to the household of Spanish monarchs.

photographs often feature the so-called "family dog" (Merritt 2018:312) (Figure 35), while contemporary advertisements of household products, home appliances and home décor imagery often include dogs (Mort 2019:92) (Figure 36). Thus, the visualised household dog is often described as an object in the household (Rosenblum 1988:10). Building on this widespread theme of the objectified household dog, the domestic *dogstagram* also places the dog as part of the home or the household, as we see dogs on social media sitting on couches, at tables or in Instagram posts about families (Figure 37).

Figure 34: Diego Velasquez, *Las Meninas* or *The Family of Philip IV*, 1656.
Oil on canvas, 316cm x 276cm.
The Prado, Madrid.
(Museo Nacional del Prado 2012:32).

Figure 35: Cecil Stoughton, *JFK and Family*, 1963. (Merritt 2018:364-365).

Figure 36: Magazine cover of *ELLE DECORATION South Africa* featuring a dog as part of the home or interior decor, March 2017.
(Elle Decoration 2017).

Figure 37: Domestic *dogstagram* of home décor featuring a dog (and cat) (@studioseed),
7 September 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

In a particular *dogstagram* account picturing the life of Brim the English Bullmastiff (@brimthemastiff), we can clearly see how *dogstagrams* often depict the dog as part of the household. The majority of the content on the @brimthemastiff account features Brim, in the house, sitting on his 'favourite' couch, in family photos, alongside the household cat or chewing on his favourite 'poof' chewable toys (Figure 38). Scrolling through Brim's Instagram account, it becomes evident that Brim is a key member of his household.

Figure 38: Screenshot of @brimthemastiff profile feed from 27 July to 4 August 2019, showing Brim as part of a family and home.
Screenshot by the author.

In contrast to the anthropocentric understanding of domestic *dogstagrams* picturing dogs as household items, some household dogs (like Brim) seem to be depicted as active participants rather than passive objects. For instance, scrolling through several pictures of Brim seated on his couch, we can anthropocentrically argue that Brim is almost literally 'part of the furniture' (Top left Figure 38), however owing to the somewhat anthropomorphic captions describing what Brim is doing or 'speaking on behalf of Brim', the account presents him with a sense of agency and describes his continuous adventures and actions in the home (Figure 39).[276] For instance, the caption in Figure 39 asks Brim to "chime in on the morning meeting", including him in day-to-day doings. In this manner, owing to the features of the digital platform and digital nature of *dogstargrams*, the visualisation of the domestic dog in the digital realm simultaneously steps away from anthropocentric, objectified depictions: presenting the dog not only as a family companion to the household, but also as an actor *contributing* to the household.

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[276] The notion that the domestication and anthropomorphisms of dogs in *dogstagrams* simultaneously objectifies and gives the animal agency, resonates my understanding of domestication and anthropomorphism in Chapter Two. In my investigation of these two concepts I argued that both terms conjointly exhibit human exceptionalism and animal agency.

Figure 39: Domestic *dogstagram* presenting Brim the dog with a sense of agency
(@brimthemastiff), 8 August 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

Visit www.instadogproject.com/imageplots for more examples

7.4.5 *Action and adventure* dogstagrams

For the most part, the *dogstagrams* identified thus far seem to stem from or embody anthropocentric practices, using the dog as a means of human projection, expression or symbolism, and representing dogs in terms of domestication and anthropomorphisms. Furthermore, the notion that any Instagram post or account involves some form of human agency – since dogs cannot independently post on Instagram – frames the *dogstagram* as a particularly human dominated action. Nevertheless, my analysis of *dogstagrams* reveal that, in some cases, the *Dogs of Instagram* can also connote an anti-anthropocentric perspective and emphasise the being of the dog or the dog's sense of agency.

In contrast to capturing the dog in the human home, several *dogstagrams* capture dogs 'in action' (so to speak) in a natural environment. Pictured against the backdrop of natural landscapes with seemingly no human interference, some *dogstagrams* also attempt to eliminate the human in its imagery and posts.[277] Moreover, it appears as if the dog is on an adventure in a natural setting,

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[277] I use the term 'natural environment' here to refer to natural landscapes, including vegetation, natural resources and natural events. In other words, environments filled with nature and void of human culture. Notably, I am not implying that these environments are the dog's natural habitat, only that they place the dog in an environment without human interference. For this reason, I do not entitle these *dogstagrams* 'natural' but 'adventure' *dogstagrams* – they depict the dog exploring an environment outside of the human realm.

discovering its environment. In other words, these *dogstagrams* emphasise dogs as nonhumans on an adventure in a nonhuman environment, rejecting the material world of commerce, cities and human activities.

We can look back at a long line of imagery depicting the dog in a similar manner, attempting to represent "the pure and honest being" of the dog (Rosenblum 1988:78). In a typical nonhumanist manner, these images take on the gaze of the animal as the human immerses itself into nature and the dog's world (Rosenblum 1988:78).[278] Rosenblum (1988:78) explains that such images often belong to, or show similarities to, the Romantic tradition of depicting people "facing the infinite mysteries and longings evoked by landscape" (Figure 40). However, it is now the dog that faces the nonhuman environment and the human is left to contemplate the landscape from the dog's perspective (Figure 41). Comparably, *dogstagrams* of dogs adventuring in a natural environment tend to place the dog in an untamed setting, gazing out at its surroundings (Figure 42), allowing the viewer to follow and contemplate its irreducible nonhuman gaze.[279] Mort (2019:90) explains: "We feel at once invited into the picture but also excluded, separate from the world the dog and the man have created between them, unable to go to the special places they can reach".

Figure 40: Casper D. Friedrich, *Wanderer above the Sea of Fog*, 1817.
Oil on canvas, 94,8cm x 74,8cm.
Kunsthalie Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.
(Hamburger Kunsthalle 2016).

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[278] For example, also see Franz Marc's *Dog Before the World (Hund Vor der Welt)* (1912).

[279] Interestingly, Romantic paintings of people looking out over empty landscapes are also often read as the colonial gaze of discovery and possession, where the human (typically a white male) looks out over the uninhabited landscape with the notion of controlling, owning or using the land. If *dogstagrams* depict the dog on an adventure also looking out over the landscape could they also be implying that the dog looks out over the land with a sense of power and agency? Perhaps implying that the dog also gains a sense of subjective ownership in the world. At the same time these images can also arguably evoke a sense of the human-centred Enlightenment and colonialisation, discussed in Chapter Two.

Figure 41: William Turner, *Dawn After the Wreck*, 1841. Watercolour with brush, red chalk, rubbing and retinting on white paper, 36,8cm x 25,1cm. Courtauld Institute Galleries, Sir Stephen Courtauld Collection, London. (Rosenblum 1988:42).

Figure 42: Adventure *dogstagram* of a dog looking out over the landscape (@kai_the_snow_dog), 7 September 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Taking a closer look at adventure *dogstagrams,* we find that some of these images not only capture the dog in a natural environment, but also capture the dog-in-motion or in mid-adventure, depicting its movements and actions while exploring nature (Figures 43-45). In other words, the images take the nonhumanist point of view a step further, removing the sense of a human posed picture. So-called 'action-shots' of dogs are intrinsically linked to visual pursuits attempting to capture the dog's movements and motions in action, as seen in Eadweard Muybridge's chronophotography of a dog walking (1887) (Figure 46),[280] Giacomo Balla's Futurist depiction of a dog on a leash (1912) (Figure 47), as well as contemporary dog photographer Christian Vieler's photographs of dogs catching treats (2013–) (Figure 48). However, action *dogstagrams* can be distinguished from these visual pursuits, in that they depict the dog 'in-action' in

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[280] Similarly, see also Ottomar Anschütz photograph of dogs running taken in Lissa, Posen 1997.

a natural setting, without human input, unlike, for instance, Balla's dog walking on a leash alongside a human or Vieler's dogs catching treats thrown by the human photographer.


Figure 43: Adventure *dogstagram* of a dog jumping into a lake (@westymcwesterson), 27 May 2019. Screenshot by the author.


Figure 44: Adventure *dogstagram* of a dog jumping in the air (@pupsonality), 17 June 2019. Screenshot by the author.


Figure 45: Adventure *dogstagram* of a dog chasing sand (@schnoodlesteve), 7 September 2019. Screenshot by the author.

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
Figure 46: Eadweard Muybridge, *Rennende hond (Dread)*, 1887.
Lichtdruk, 484mm x 612mm.
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
(Rijksmuseum 2019).

Figure 47: Giacomo Balla, *Leash in Motion*, 1912.
Oil on canvas, 35" x 43,25".
Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo.
(Rosenblum 1988:81).

Figure 48: Christian Vieler, *Snapshots of dog catching treats*, [sa].
(Vieler-photography 2019).

Akin to Romantic landscape paintings, perhaps it can be argued that adventure *dogstagrams* evoke a sense of the transcending sublime for the viewer, creating an aesthetic of awe, thrill and danger reaching beyond the self when confronting nature.[281] In *#NeverLeaveTheDogBehind*, theorist Helen Mort (2019) discusses

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[281] Here, I refer to the discourse of the sublime originally outlined by philosopher Edmund Burke in *A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful* (1990[1757]),

the phenomenon of Instagram photos of dogs accompanying their human owners on hikes or adventures, pictured in extreme outdoor environments, typically also accompanied by the hashtag *#neverleavethedogbehind.* In these adventure *dogstagrams*, dogs are captured during extreme outdoor activities, picturing dogs on top of mountains or climbing to seemingly dangerous heights, pursuing the sublime and an unimaginable world alongside its owner (Figure 49). Tromble (2019:7) argues that the billions of animal videos on the Internet is "an echo of a lost sublime – the long aeons when we were primarily companions or competitors to the species that co-evolved with us". Following Tromble, perhaps adventure *dogstagrams* therefore represent the human's pursuit (or return) towards a sense of the sublime, albeit this time through the safe distance of the image and gaze of their wandering dog – a nonhuman that might bring them closer to an encounter with the wildness of the nonhuman environment.[282]


Figure 49: Adventure *dogstagram* of a dog climbing to dangerous heights (@keepingfinn), 8 January 2019. Screenshot by the author.

often identified in Romantic landscapes as an overwhelming experience, causing extreme emotions such as awe, thrill, terror or fear, most commonly encountered in nature. As an aesthetic category, the sublime is an experience that causes confusion or discomfort, collapsing distinctions between what is known and what is unknown or unimaginable. In this eighteenth century outline, the sublime is experienced at a distance, with the subject far from the actual event (Du Preez 2018:746). In contemporary society, the sublime is manifested as the pursuit of extremes where "sublime encounters are also increasingly immersive, requiring the distance between subject and object to shrink to millimetres and nanoseconds" (Du Preez 2018:747).

[282] In turn, as digital images, adventure *dogstagrams* can also reflect a sense of the digital sublime. First identified by Mosco (2005), the digital sublime refers to the possibility of the technological and digital realm to transform everyday life into the quality of greatness that is the sublime. In other words, as digital posts, adventure *dogstagrams* extend a certain sublime beauty to society.

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7.4.6 Dogstagrams *of companionship*

The digital analysis of *dogstagrams* reveals that a large number of images include two different subjects or two different species. Upon closer inspection, it seems some of the two-subject *dogstagrams* comprise of a human and a dog, or a dog and another animal. Reading the photographs' captions, it is evident that *dogstagrams* attempt to capture companionship or friendship between two subjects. In this manner, the *dogstagrams* tell stories of dogs living in kinship with other dogs, species or humans. They become types of "stories that matter" (Haraway 2003:3) in the world we live in, which Haraway (2003:4) argues are key to understanding and examining companion species. That is, *dogstagrams* can be considered as a way of telling stories about species relations and *being-with* companion species. Hence, in some instances, *dogstagrams* form part of what Haraway (2003:17) calls "doggish scribblings", where the "[l]essons have to be inextricably part of the story" – teaching other Instagrammers about the relation between species or how to be with others.

To illustrate, I refer to a few examples of companionship stories told through *dogstagrams.* A notable *Dogs of Instagram* companionship follows Cricket, a Golden Retriever, and his companion Larry the Tortoise (Figure 50). In their Instagram posts their owner describes their relation and histories. For example, in a video of Cricket meeting Larry for the first time the caption reads:

> This is where it all began. We rescued Larry the Tortoise and brought him home to live with us. Frightened and uneasy he would not come near any of us in those first few days... until he met Cricket. Cricket sensed that he hadn't had a good life up until now. So Cricket sat with him all day and looked after him until eventually they became best friends. Cricket would wait patiently until Larry would catch up (as seen in this video. And Larry would follow Cricket everywhere. Today Larry is a different tortoise since meeting his best friend and they are inseparable! (From @fozcook Instagram account, posted on 26 July 2019).

Similar to Cricket and Larry, some *dogstagrams* show dogs interacting with other species as their kin, ranging from ducks (Figure 51) and cats, to cheetahs.[283] In particular, such *dogstagrams* capturing perhaps somewhat unlikely friendships, teach us about co-habiting with others. In most of these stories it is evident that two different, irreducible species exist in relation to each other, sharing in each other's world as well as showing signs of a Heideggerian care (*Sorge*) and a Harawayian play, love and response when engaging with each other.

Figure 50: Friendship *dogstagram* of Cricket and Larry (@fozzcook), 12 June 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Figure 51: Friendship *dogstagram* of a Golden Retriever and a duck, (@puppies.media), 5 June 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Although there are several *dogstagrams* of humans and dogs that, somewhat superficially, express a bond or connection between human and dog (often anthropomorphically referred to in captions as 'best friends'), others exist that conscientiously attest to and reflect a companionship where human and dog live with one another, recognise each other as a co-presence and co-shape each

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[283] Cheetahs are somewhat anxious animals, especially when living in a rescue environment. Often rehabilitation units put them together with dogs to help calm them down. The dogs and cheetahs often develop a close relation, depicted in Instagram posts.

other's world. For example, on the account @wafflenugget, account holder Kate Speer posts about her life with Waffle, her psychiatric service dog. Kate (2019) calls herself a 'digital storyteller' and, as a result, her Instagram posts become stories of her relation with her dog Waffle. Followers witness how Waffle supports Kate, responds to her and aids her in going about her everyday life (Figure 52). We also see how Kate engages with, responds to and cares for Waffle and allows him to explore the environment in his own way. On my reading, the account is a digital story of a companionship where human and dog exist in relation, to such an extent that they become beings-with-others, engaging with the world as separate entities and also *being-with* one another by playing, responding and learning from one another. As Kate (2019) perfectly describes, they are a human-dog team, teaching each other their ways.[284]


Figure 52: *Dogstagram* of companionship and support between Kate Speer and psychiatric service dog Waffle (@wafflenugget), 30 August 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

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Another example of a digital story of human-dog companionship can be found on the account @keepingfinn. Finn is a rescue dog from Puerto Rico traveling with his owner Henry through the United States. Their Instagram posts resemble adventure *dogstagrams*, as Henry and Finn capture and share images of their hikes and adventures across the country (Figure 49). However, @keepingfinn also demonstrates the bond of companionship that exists between human and

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[284] Kate and Waffle's companionship has spread beyond the platform of Instagram as they become advocates for service dogs, mental health, as well as the importance of the human-dog relation. For more on their story visit http://www.katespeer.com.

dog. The account follows the relation that developed between Finn and Henry since his adoption. As a result, followers see how Henry and Finn learn from each other. In captions, Henry describes them as 'a bonded pair', 'co-pilots', 'co-workers' and 'wingmen' as we see them play together and respond to each other, embodying the human-dog companionship of *being-with* described in Part One of the study. In a particular post (Figure 53), Henry describes his life before he met Finn and how much he has changed since travelling with his dog. The caption of the image reads:

> Me now (with Finn) vs me before Finn. The contrast between the two is funny to me. The old Henry looks uncomfortable standing there, picture is poor quality, etc (should we go on? Please no). The new Henry with Finn stands taller, happier, more confident, plus a much higher quality picture. It's a funny comparison and example of how much Finn has changed my life. (From @keepingfinn Instagram account, posted on 14 January 2019).

In this *dogstagram* it is evident that Finn's being has co-shaped Henry's existence, changing how he experiences life (notably for the better). In turn, Henry has co-shaped Finn's life rescuing him from dire circumstances in Puerto Rico. Therefore, *Dogs of Instagram*, like @keepingfin and @wafflenugget, can also tell digital stories of human and dog *being-with* each other in companionship.[285]


Figure 53: Multi-image *dogstagram* of companionship capturing the difference of life for Henry with and without Finn (@keepingfinn), 14 January 2019. Screenshot by the author.

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[285] Another similar account depicting digital stories of companionship is @bonosurfdog, which tells the story of Bono the Labrador and his owner who travel the world and surf together. Notably, both @keepingfinn and @bronosurfdog tell digital stories of *being-with* by means of traveling, which might be an interesting theme to explore in further research.

7.4.7 Dogstagrams *of touch: the 'boop'*

As discussed, Haraway (2008:263) argues that touch is a significant aspect of the human-dog relation that occurs in the contact zones of companion species relations. In turn, Heidegger (1995[1938]:196) also uses the sense of touch to identify the different ways in which different beings relate to the world. Notably, the digital analysis of *dogstagrams* signals that a specific genre of *dogstagrams* also play on the notion of touch. In these *dogstagrams* the smartphone becomes a nonhuman contact zone representing touch between human and dog, as well as urging users to 'touch' the dogs pictured in a post by means of double tapping the screen (a feature on Instagram that allows users to 'like' posts).[286]

On the one hand (or paw), certain *dogstagrams* capture a specific moment of touch between human and dog. *Dogstagrams* of touch portray the moment of engagement between human and dog, in similar fashion to the cover image of Haraway's *When Species Meet* (Figure 8) and its predecessor, Michelangelo's *The Creation of Adam* (Figure 9), previously mentioned in Chapter Five. *Dogstagrams* showing touch between human and dog often picture the dog's paw touching the human's hand (Figure 54), analogously to the images discussed in Chapter Five. In addition, some *dogstagrams* show dogs in the moment of reaching out to 'give paw' or 'high five' (Figure 55), indicating a common act of touch between human and dog as well as creating the sense that the dog in the image is reaching out, beyond the screen, to touch the human viewer.


Figure 54: *Dogstagram* of touch featuring a dog touching a human hand (@ellisberankova_photography), 19 August 2019. Screenshot by the author.

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[286] Interestingly, the layout of a webpage or platform is often referred to as a 'skin', reaffirming the sense of haptic communication or kinaesthetic communication through digital devices.

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Figure 55: *Dogstagram* of touch
where a dog reaches to touch
the camera and, by extension,
the viewer (@thedogist),
19 July 2019.
Screenshot by the author.

The *dogstagrams* capturing the touch between human and dog evoke Haraway's (2008:36) notion that touch creates a sense of response, respect and (be)coming towards each other. In addition, *dogstagrams* of touch can also represent Heidegger's (1995[1938]:196) notion of touch, which aims to show that beings access the world differently and that humans can never fully know the sensation experienced by another being when touched. As a result, *dogstagrams* of touch simultaneously represent humans *being-with* dogs, as well as the distinct beings of human and dog.

A close analysis of a particular example of a *dogstagram* of touch (Figure 56) manifests a direct play on *The Creation of Adam* with the caption "the creation of #boop". Moreover, the specific image also (visually and literally) points toward *dogstagrams* of touch that are becoming increasingly popular on Instagram, referred to as a 'boop' and usually accompanied by the same hashtag. According to the popular press Urban Dictionary (2016), a 'boop' is the act of "affectionately poking someone on the nose, often accompanied by the saying 'Boop!'". The slang dictionary also adds that a 'boop' is particularly used to refer to the playful tap of a dog's nose, or when dogs bump each other's noses as a way of greeting or playfulness (Urban Dictionary 2016).

On Instagram, *dogstagrams* mirror 'boops', by posting a close-up picture of a dog's nose (Figure 57) with a caption directing the viewer to 'boop' the dog.

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'Boops' have grown so popular on Instagram – perhaps owing to the engagement the digital images require – that an entire community, *Boop My Nose*, has developed, inviting owners to submit 'boop' images of dogs (and other animals).[287] The idea behind the posts are that a follower double-taps the dog's nose (as a 'boop') and, consequently, likes the picture (Boop My Nose 2019). In other words, 'boop' *dogstagrams* are invitations for fellow Instagrammers to 'touch' the digital dogs on Instagram, notably in an affectionate or playful manner, while engaging with a post by liking it.

Figure 56: *Dogstagram* of touch captioned as 'The creation of #boop' (@hugoandursula), 17 June 2019. Screenshot by the author.


Figure 57: A typical 'boop' *dogstagram* inviting the viewer to touch the dog's nose through the screen (@boopmynose), 29 August 2019. Screenshot by the author.

Visit www.instadogproject.com/imageplots for more examples

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[287] The Instagram platform's algorithm generates viewership towards posts receiving increased or intense amounts of engagement (via likes and comments) (McNely 2012). Since 'boop' images encourage viewers to like the image via touch, they generate a lot of interaction, fuelling the Instagram algorithm to gain even more engagement.

Daniel Palmer (in Hinton & Hjorth 2013: 133) argues that smartphone technology and photography on software applications create an experience of "embodied visual intimacy" between touch and the image. Palmer (in Hinton & Hjorth 2013:133) explains that the smartphone "held in the palm of the hand, reintroduces a visual intimacy to screen culture that is missing from the larger monitor screen". In other words, touching the dog through the screen is an intimate act that extends the visual software to also include the sensory experience of touch. Therefore, I argue that 'boop' *dogstagrams* are manifestations of touching companion species in an online realm. By 'booping' a *dogstagram* we are responding and engaging with the digital representation of dogs on Instagram in a playful manner. Said differently, 'boops' encourage us to touch dogs, mediated by the technology of the smartphone.

Furthermore, haptic communication mediated by technology (for example through touchscreens and feedback technology) shows potential of establishing a sense of connectedness, communicating simple ideas and reducing stress (Haans & IJsslsteijn 2006:149). Although a technological touch – or a double-tap – can hardly imitate the affects of physical or bodily touch, it does have the potential to create its own sense of connection, communication and comfort for the viewer. In this way, the act of 'booping' a dog's nose on Instagram not only represents, but can also result in, a positive and joyful experience that reminds, to a certain extent, of the perceived connection formed when human and dog touch in the flesh.

<p style="text-align:center">🐾 🐾 🐾</p>

To summarise, a distant and close analysis of *dogstagrams* on Instagram sorts the digital network of dogs on Instagram into various categories, which show how the different aspects, views and historicity of the human-dog relation (ranging from anthropomorphism to nonhuman companionship) is visualised in the Digital Age and extends into the realm of technology. Although I have discussed the types of *dogstagrams* separately, for the sake of clarity, they exist – much like my unfolding of the human-dog relation in this study – in layers,

overlapping and entangling together, since "images mash together different kinds of cultural materials" (Tromble 2019:6). In turn, it is evident that *dogstagrams* also unfold and build on ideas of the disparate world (or then 'cultural material') of dogs in visual culture, routed in a visual history of art, photography, film and many more. I have tried to point out some of the visual roots of *dogstagrams* throughout the discussion, albeit somewhat clumsily since it is not the main focus of my analysis, which I rather approach from a digital culture perspective.

By approaching the *dogstagram* from a digital humanities perspective, what comes to the fore is not necessarily the *Dogs of Instagram*'s traces in art history, but more so the possibilities or affordances of embedding the human-dog relation in the digital realm. In other words, based on the digital analysis of *dogstagrams*, we not only see what *content* the digital images portray about companion species, but also what they *do, facilitate or add* to the understanding of the human-dog relation. In what follows, I briefly unfold some of these affordances of *Dogs on Instagram* further*.*

7.5 Findings: affordances of *dogstagrams*

In *The Affordances of Social Media Platforms*, theorists Tania Bucher and Anne Helmond (2018:18) frame social media platforms, like Instagram, as an environment, comparable to a terrestrial (or natural) environment with paths, cliffs, barriers, water and so on. Bucher and Helmond (2018:18) argue that just as a natural environment affords various ways of existing relative to animals, so social media platforms "constitute a form of environment too, composed of pathways and features in their own right" that afford ways of existing for human beings (Bucher & Helmond 2018:19). Accordingly, social media platforms become resources (or then affordances) that create meanings and meaningfulness; their features are "endowed with different meanings, feelings, imaginings and expectations" (Bucher & Helmond 2018:2) that result in perceptions, attitudes, expectations and experiences for users.

Bucher and Helmond's explanation of the social media environment is particularly apt in the case of *Dogs on Instagram*, since the human-dog relation is widely dependent on their interaction with the environment in which the human and dog encounter and interact with one another, as we have seen throughout the study. Framing social media as a digital *environment* therefore makes sense in terms of animal studies, since the human-dog relation now interact with and encounter a terrestrial environment *as well as* a digital environment. Said differently, in Heideggerian (1977[1962]:6) terms, the *Welt* of companion species is now also placed in a state of *Bestand* (standing reserve) by the *Gestell* (enframing) of Instagram. In other words, picturing the human-dog relation on Instagram is also an instrument that reveals possibilities and actions for companion species.

Following Bucher and Helmond, I further discuss my digital analysis of *dogstagrams*, by thinking through some of the affordances of *Dogs on Instagram*, namely how *dogstagrams* can be a playground of *being-with* companion species, how *dogstagrams* form and shape communities, as well as how *dogstagrams* can promote affective responses and ethical practices.

7.5.1 Dogstagrams *as a playground of* being-with

By now, *dogstagrams* of companionship and *dogstagrams* of touch have already indicated that the relation between human and dog – as a relation of *being-with* each other, while remaining irreducible to each other – is also represented on and mediated by Instagram. Alongside representing companion species relations as a way of *being-with*, I suggest that the human action of taking and sharing *dogstagrams* online is also a particular way of *being-with* dogs or then being-in-the-world with dogs.

When dog owners, Instagrammers and photographers are asked *why* they take photos of their dogs and share them online, they often explain that the act of taking the image provides a sense of joy (Vieler in Almond 2018), establishes trust between human and dog (Nordeman in Wender 2019) and is a way of documenting our relations and memories with our dogs, creating a kind of

"visual diary" or archive (Saxon 2018). Instagram photographer Elias Friedman (photographer behind the popular Instagram account @thedogist) argues that taking photos of dogs for Instagram "capture a moment between him and the dog" and relies on a connection between human and dog that other Instagram users can also connect to (TIME 2018).[288]

Friedman's description of how to take Instagram photos of dogs in a recent video for *TIME Magazine's* online platform, mirrors a human-dog relation of *being-with*. Friedman (TIME 2018) acknowledges that he and the dog are different beings and he treats the dog as such when taking photos (for example, he emphasises using patience and not forcing the dog to behave in a certain way for the camera). In addition, he plays with the dogs while taking photos and engages in their world by "getting on their level" (TIME 2018). He also asserts that once he and the dog relax around each other, he is able to take the best photos (TIME 2018).[289] In other words, human and dog are encountering one another at ease and with care. In the process of capturing an image, Friedman responds to the dog and the dog responds to him in turn. Moreover, he argues that he approaches dogs with sensitivity, love and care (TIME 2018). Thus, I argue that Friedman's approach to *dogstagrams* reflect a *being-with* encounter where photographer and dog meet, once again, sharing in each other's world by playing, showing care and concern, without imploding their beings.

Understanding *dogstagrams* as a way of *being-with* is however not always evident in every Instagrammer's approach to taking and posting pictures of their dogs.[290] Therefore, it can seem to be a somewhat idealistic reading of *Dogs of Instagram* in general. Perhaps a more feasible understanding can stem from understanding the social media platform that mediates the images, instead of the

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[288] Interestingly, Friedman also says that while taking photos he feels "spiritually aligned" with dogs (National Geographic 2017), relating to the possible otherworldly interpretation of the human-dog relation discussed in the Addendum of the study.
[289] Here Friedman directly echoes Barbara Smuts's approach to studying baboons discussed in Chapter Five. Notably, Smuts also indicated that both researcher and animal subject relaxed in each other's presence.
[290] In some cases, people use conditional behaviour, domestication training methods, physical force and even violent treatment to take the desired photos of dogs (Baker 2013:3). I elaborate on this subject in Chapter Eight.

actual act of taking *dogstagrams*. In this regard, social media scholar, Zizi Papacharissi (2018:2), conceptualises social media as a way of playing in contemporary society. Papacharissi (2018:2) argues that like social media,

> Play also possesses an infrastructure that reflects, reproduces, and sometimes, albeit not often enough, reinvents geopolitical, sociocultural, and economic hierarchies. Play always has been that way: a wanted distraction that pays off in ways public and private, personal and commercial ... and all types of playgrounds, material and imagined, adult and non-adult that have emerged and are yet to come.

Thereby she eloquently states that: "Technology is the playing ground of the [A]nthropocene" (Papacharissi 2018:2).[291]

In the case of *dogstagrams,* we can therefore apply Papacharissi's argument and contend: Instagram is the playing ground of companion species. In this way, *dogstagrams* are a way for humans and dogs to *play*, a notable aspect of companion species encounters as indicated by Haraway (2008:240), as well as of *being-with* companion species as set out in the second layer of this study. More specifically, Haraway (2008:240) estimates that play proposes companionship, engagement and co-presence. In turn, I indicated that play between human and dog is a reciprocal process of engagement, or then a process of being-with-others. Accordingly, *dogstagrams* as online play forms part of the process of *being-with* companion species. That means taking and sharing *dogstagrams* results in engagement, co-presence, companionship and reciprocation between humans and dogs.

7.5.2 Dogs of Instagram *as a virtual and real community*

The above formulation brings forward an additional affordance of *dogstagrams*: if social media platforms are the playground of the Anthropocene, it is also a contact zone of interactions, encounters and, importantly, connections. According to Papacharissi (2018:2), social media as a mode of play "provides the

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[291] Interestingly, Sokol (2014), in a review of Lev Manovich's big data digital humanities project *Selfiecity*, remarks that such a digital humanities platform is "both an academic and *highly playful* way to engage with a topic". Suggesting that perhaps play can also be thought of as a significant part of a technological analysis in the humanities.

stage for hybrid modalities of expression and connection, linking the individual, separately or simultaneously, with multiple audiences". In essence, on social media, communities form and connections are established (Papacharissi 2018:3). Perhaps, stemming from one of the well-known original incentives behind the conceptualisation of social media (to establish connection), technology's ability to connect people is a key point of analysis in contemporary society as well as scholarly endeavours (Van Dijck 2012:141).[292]

José van Dijck (2012:142) explains that technologies are spaces of connection and communication. Moreover, they are not impartial spaces, but are engineered and constructed to shape connections, link individuals and create communities in society (Van Dijck 2012:142). The inherent architecture and algorithms of social media platforms are therefore geared towards creating an experience of connection and communities (Papacharissi 2018:3). In other words, engaging with and sharing *dogstagrams* on social media is always-already geared towards producing connectivity and community.

Interestingly, in *Copresence as 'Being With'* (Zhao & Elesh 2008) as well as *A Snapshot of Social Media: Camera Phone Practices* (Hjorth & Hendry 2015), it is suggested that online connectivity establishes a Heideggerian sense of being-with-others that "reinforce[s] shared emotional experience across time and place" (Hjorth & Hendry 2015:12). Referring to Heidegger's notion of *Mitsein* (*being-with*), Zhao and Elesh (2008:570) argue that social media allows for a co-presence of *being-with* beyond the constraints of physical place, where people can reciprocally relate to one another. Following Zhao and Elesh, as well as Hjorth and Hendry, we can derive that Instagram, as a social media platform, and *Dogs of Instagram,* as a social media network, also establishes a relation of being-with-other humans and dogs.

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[292] See, for example, Kollock and Smith (1999), Wellman (1999), Newman (2006) Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), Van Dijck (2012; 2013), Hinton and Hjorth (2013), as well as Paparachissi (2018), who discuss the notion of communities and connections via virtual communities and social networks. On the other hand, some scholars, for instance Turkle (2011), Nowland et al. (2018) and Hillis et al. (2015) also investigate how social networks can lead to disconnection, detachment and dehumanisation.

By means of a digital analysis of the geolocation metadata of selected *dogstagrams*, I have visualised the landscape or "complex knot of wheres" (Hinchliffe 2010:35) of *Dogs of Instagram* on *Insta-dog*.[293] Mapping *dogstagrams* in such a way, attempts to make visible the tangled contact zones of companion species and shows that these digital images do not just point towards themselves, but also "point directly outside, looking for connections, relations, patterns with other images in a collection" (Hochman 2014:2). The map of *dogstagrams* animates a digital network of dogs on Instagram, indicating pathways, patterns and connections based on the data surrounding each post. Hochman (2014:3) explains that data relations, such as those derived from *dogstagrams* that I visualise on *Insta-dog*, are "imagined data communities that only potentially and relationally exist" but also mirror aspects of corporeal life in time and place. That means, the inherent engineering of *dogstagrams* posted on Instagram (for instance their tags, locations and metadata) already maps out a sense of community and connection among this digital network of images on social media.

In addition to being a data-driven community of images, *dogstagrams* and *Dogs of Instagram* seem to also articulate a community beyond data and metadata. Users regularly posting *dogstagrams* form part of a community of Instagrammers that are grouped together beyond the use of a hashtag. *Dogs of Instagram* not only share a hashtag, but also form connections, show support, engage with one another and care for one another. In other words, they form an online community, as Paparachisi (2018) and Van Dijck (2012) suggest, that are co-present and sharing their world with others: an online community of *Mitsein* (Zhao & Elesh 2008:570).

Mapping the multi-geographies of *dogstagrams* also shows how companion species posting to Instagram form part of a circle of response. As outlined, both Heidegger (1938) and Haraway (2008) picture the animal in a ring of response, in relation to its environment. Similarly, the *Dogs of Instagram* community can also be pictured as a circle of response between companion species on social

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[293] To visit the map animation visit: www.instadogproject.com/community-grids

media. Yet, as I noted in Chapter Five, it is the *human* who has to respond to the animal and the *human* who has to attempt to understand the animal in Haraway's companion species circle. In other words, the community of *dogstagrams* once again poses the question: who is in control of the contact zones of companion species? In this case, however, it is not only the human who has agency to respond in the contact zone, but also the nonhuman agent of technology that plays a role in connecting the *Dogs of Instagram.*

The online community of *dogstagrams* is directly disclosed on various online platforms that have developed from the community surrounding *dogstagrams* and *Dogs of Instagram*. For example, *Dogsof* is a platform extension of the account @dogsofinstagram that brings together "a community of almost 4 million dog lovers and photographers, capturing and celebrating moments spent with man's (and woman's) best friend" (Dogsof 2017). *Dogsof* shares stories of dogs via *dogstagrams* on Instagram and promotes awareness about dog adoption and welfare, while connecting dog owners across the globe. Similarly, *The Dogist* and *Boop My Nose* platforms, previously mentioned in this chapter, also connect companion species and their owners and establish meaningful connections.[294] The virtual community of *Dogs of Instagram* is, therefore, built on a shared sense of community that involves a ring of responsive communication, interaction, meaningful connections and sustained engagements. Instagrammer, Lorien Wilcocks (in Sonnekus 2017), who runs an Instagram account for her dog Cali, confirms that she has formed "wonderful connections online, since the community of companion species on Instagram is increasingly supportive".

Notably, the community of *Dogs of Instagram* does not only manifest online or in a virtual realm, but also generates offline connections and communities. Several dog communities on Instagram have occasional 'meetups', where owners and dogs meet one another face-to-face (or perhaps nose-to-nose). As a result, *dogstagrams* generate an online sense of community, but also promote actual offline connections and meetings for both humans and dogs (Serafinelli

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[294] View the online communities of *The Dogist*, *Boop My Nose* and *Dogsof* by following the indicated links on *Insta-dog.*

2017:20). For instance, on the Instagram account @mollythenewfie, the owner often shares the positive experiences she and her dogs have had by meeting up with other Newfoundlands on Instagram – specifically emphasising how new friendships have formed and that the dogs enjoyed meeting each other.[295]

For the most part, the above-mentioned discussion reveals that theorists maintain that online communities (and their offline extensions) form as a result of the architecture of social media platforms (Van Dijck 2012), metadata relations (Hochman 2014) as well as an online co-presence (Zhao & Elesh 2008). In particular, Serafinelli (2017:21) asserts that the content of Instagram posts is not important to create social connections and interactions, and that it is simply the act of photography, posting and using the social media platform that drives the connections it creates. At the same time, in the case of *Dogs of Instagram*, I argue that the content of the images – dogs – are significant and perhaps instrumental in creating these communities. Cultural critic Amanda Hess (in Wender 2019) argues that "[d]ogs mediate so many social interactions" and that establishing connections by showing interest in other's companion species is a widely known phenomenon.[296] That is to say, in the case of communities surrounding *dogstagrams,* the focus on dogs specifically plays an important role, since humans have long relied on their companion species to instigate social response, connection and interaction (Beck 2015). Thus, the fact that *dogtstagrams* are predominantly posts *about dogs* plays as an important role as the digital platform itself in establishing relationships and communities.

[295] Another recent example of how the virtual community of *Dogs of Instagram* extends into face-to-face relations is the immersive pop-up installation *Human's Best Friend* (see link on *Insta-dog* platform)*. Human's Best Friend* is a shareable experience for humans and dogs in a technicolour environment that is based on taking pictures of and with your dog for social media. It is also a platform that advocates dog adoption and creates awareness around companion species. The installation space brings the community of *Dogs of Instagram* full circle, since it is based on the phenomenon and popularity of *dogstagrams*, extends the phenomenon into an offline realm and encourages social meetings as well as experiences with dogs and other people, and finally results in, once again, taking photos and sharing these experiences on Instagram with others.

[296] Companion species as human connectors or social mediators is a long-studied phenomenon by psychologists, sociologists and veterinary practitioners (Guéguen & Ciccotti 2008; Robins et al. 1991; Hunt et al. 1992). Based on such studies, Beck (2015) notes: "People's canine companions make for good icebreakers, and can overcome the barriers humans put between themselves and strangers". The phenomenon is often also depicted in popular culture, for example in the films *One Hundred and One Dalmatians* and *Must Love Dogs* (Goldberg 2015). In turn, a recent smartphone application entitled *Meet My Dog* allows users to connect with other dog owners in their local area, encouraging owners and dogs to establish friendships.

7.5.3 Dogs of Instagram *as response-ability*

Another possible affordance of *dogstagrams* is their ability to generate response. As discussed, Haraway (2008:97) emphasises that response and responsibility (or response-ability) are key aspects of companion species relations. In particular, Haraway (2008:97) contends that it is vital to tell stories of companion species relations in order to evoke a response and create awareness in contemporary society. *Dogstagrams,* in their own right, also foster a sense of response. Specifically, as digital stories of companion species, they create awareness surrounding the ethical treatment of, and notably *human* responsibility towards, dogs.

Cultural theorist Eliza Steinbock (2017:63) reasons that part of the appeal of pictures of animals online is based on the sentimental response it creates in users. Steinbock (2017:63) argues that the sentimental response is the result of "mass culture's longstanding affair with cute objects colliding with access to contemporary user-generated digital media". According to Steinbock (2017:64) images with a "cuteness" aesthetic (as is often the case with images of dogs, puppies, cats and kittens) evoke an affective response of sentimentality, joy, delight and endearment. Accordingly, *dogstagrams* have an emotive affect on viewers.

Steinbock's observations are mirrored in recent studies explaining how looking at images of animals can evoke positive psychological responses. For example, Japanese researcher Hiroshi Nittono (2012) argues that looking at cute pictures, such as pictures of puppies online, improves people's moods and also increases their productivity "as the result of a narrowed attentional focus induced by the cuteness-triggered positive emotion that is associated with approach motivation and the tendency toward systematic processing". Additionally, psychologist Stanley Coren (2016) suggests that looking at dogs produces positive emotional changes in people, while researchers at Florida State University show how looking at cute pictures of animals (such as *dogstagrams*) can have a positive affect on relationships with significant others (McNulty et al. 2017:1031). In other words, looking at *dogstagrams* can result in positive emotional responses.

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Adding to the mix of the affective responses of *dogstagrams*, Steinbock (2017:63) mentions that the cuteness response also "recursively loops into the banality of violence". Here Steinbock refers to images that are cute, but also inappropriate with regards to enforcing animals to become a visual spectacle (of, for instance, anthropomorphism) for the sake of a cute response. For example, a recent trend in *dogstagrams* shows dogs sitting with their heads against a wall with captions claiming the dogs are feeling 'guilty' about unruly behaviour. Closer inspection reveals that dogs often sit with their heads against walls when they are anxious, scared or have severe neural damage. Such behaviour requires immediate medical intervention (Waglabs 2019). That means that these *dogstagrams* result either from the cruel treatment of dogs or, said differently, allow dogs to suffer for the sake of a social media post. Steinbock (2017:63) argues that the play between violence and cuteness highlights the tension between response and responsibility when looking at images online.[297]

Luckily, *dogtstagrams* can also bring awareness of responsible behaviour and the ethical treatment of animals. For example, some of the images of dogs engaging in 'head pressing' are often flagged by Instagram and other users as abusive, resulting in an investigation being launched against the account holder. Instagram as a platform has also made changes to the network's architecture to fight animal abuse, promote animal welfare and discourage harmful behaviour towards animals for the sake of social media. Changes include notifications and information of animal abuse that pop up when searching for, or posting images related to, flagged hashtags (for example #animalselfie or #exoticanimalforsale), censoring and removing posts displaying or supporting harmful behaviour towards animals, as well as allowing users to report posts that do not treat animals fairly (Daly 2017).[298]

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[297] Interestingly, Steinbock (2017:63) also notes that a sentimental response to cuteness can border on violence, since viewers, for instance, feel that they can squeeze the animal to death because it is so cute.

[298] These changes to Instagram's platform come after several investigations into the growing industry of wildlife tourism that often abuse animals specifically for tourism, which is widely motivated by photo opportunities for social media (Daly 2017).

Furthermore, *dogstagrams* teach people about the ethical treatment of companion species, posting content that informs and educates people on animal welfare and possible harmful behaviour towards animals (Daly 2017). *Dogstagrams* are also, at times, beneficial to rescue dogs and promoting dog adoption, since the reach of dogs in need of care and loving owners is much greater (Schonfeld 2016). In turn, *dogstagrams* also change the way in which dog adoption agencies approach sharing images of dogs available for adoption, playing on the sentimental response images of dogs can create in viewers. The popularity of images of dogs online have resulted in placing more dogs in loving homes and have led to more community engagement, more volunteers and more donations (Chapman 2018). As Chapman (2018) reports: "It's now more common than ever for someone to discover an adoptable dog via their Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook feeds", as a result, dogs "have infiltrated not only our shared [I]nternet lexicon, but seemingly, our collective consciousness. We love faving them. And social media is upending the way we rescue them". Thus, *dogstagrams* can also promote a responsible response to dogs.[299]

After analysing *dogstagrams* via image recognition computation, I suggest – as a brief afterthought – that perhaps Instagram can also combine such techniques to identify and respond to irresponsible *dogstagrams.* More specifically, equivalent to my digital humanities computation of *dogstagrams*, the Instagram platform can also employ an API to sort through online images of dogs. In addition, the API can be engineered to identify visual cues based on behavioural distress signs in dogs – for example lowered ears, pulled in tail, shaking, whining or even 'head pressing'. The API can therefore automatically flag *dogstagrams* where humans could possibly be causing dogs distress. Following up on the marked posts, Instagram's ethical committees can launch an investigation to address the issue (as they would, for example, in the case of cyberbullying).

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[299] In this way, perhaps *dogstagrams* can act as a kind of "countervisuality" that Mirzoeff (2014:230) calls for in the context of the Anthropocene (as explained in Chapter One and earlier in this chapter) since the digital images intervene on behalf of animals and aids nonhumans.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined how the human-dog relation and my reading of *being-with* companion species extends into the online realm of *dogstagrams* and *Dogs of Instagram*. By computing and digitally analysing a data set including thousands of *dogstagrams* on Instagram through the digital humanities project accompanying this study, *Insta-dog*, I have provided both distant and close readings of the variety of digital images representing the human-dog relation on the social media platform, Instagram. The mixed-method approach to analysing the digital stories of companion species on Instagram revealed that various types of *dogstagrams* exist, capturing both an anthropocentric and nonhumanist viewpoint of the human-dog relation and question of the animal being. For example, domestic and anthropomorphic *dogstagrams* are clear anthropocentric pursuits to capture and project human ideas onto the dog. Alternatively, *dogstagrams* of companionship and touch exemplify aspects of an anti-anthropocentric relation of humans *being-with* dogs.

What became clear from this discussion and in the contact zone of the digital humanities project *Insta-dog*, is that the human-dog relation is not only represented or expressed in the online playground of Instagram, but that companion species relations are also *actively practiced* on Instagram. In other words, *dogstagrams* add an additional layer of meaning to companion species in contemporary society and becomes a way of *being-with* dogs. *Dogstagrams* become active (nonhuman) agencies and actors contributing to our companion species relations, especially because they evoke a sense of touch, play, affective response and responsibility between Instagrammers, viewers and dogs.

Computing and hermeneutically interpreting the digital versions of companion species on social media also show the complexities of these digital images and highlight the influence of nonhuman technology on companion species relations. In the following chapter I explore the infolding of nonhuman technology and companion species further by working through various case studies of human-dog relations enframed, in a Heideggerian sense, by technology – including the cyberspace version of the dog in *dogstagrams*.