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THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF BORDERLINE CONTROL: A SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY

by

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THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF BORDERLINE CONTROL: A SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY

TABLE OF CONTENTS **PAGE**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Identification of the research theme 1
2. Study objectives 2
3. Literature survey 3
4. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem 4
5. Methodology 6
6. Chapter delineation 6

CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF BORDERLINE CONTROL

1. Introduction 8
2. The concept of borders 8
   - 2.1 The development of borders 9
   - 2.2 Postmodern views on borders 10
   - 2.3 Concepts related to borders and border control 11
     - 2.3.1 Border-related concepts 12
     - 2.3.2 Security concepts related to borders 12
3. Borderline control and the concept of national security 14
   - 3.1 The expanding concept of national security 14
   - 3.2 Sources of threats to national security 15
4. Border-specific threats 16
5. The United States and European Union approaches to borderline control 18
   - 5.1 The United States and borderline control 19
   - 5.2 The European Union and borderline control 22
6. Conclusion 25

CHAPTER 3: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO 1994

1. Introduction 27
2. Characteristics of African and South African land borders 28
   - 2.1 The arbitrary nature of African borders 28
   - 2.2 The South African land borderline 29
3. Threat perception in South Africa prior to 1994 30
   - 3.1 External threat perception 30
   - 3.2 Internal threat perception 31
   - 3.3 The link between threat perception and border control 33
4. The nature of borderline control and protection in pre-1994 South Africa 34
   - 4.1 The South African Defence Force and borderline control 34
   - 4.2 Controlling the movement of people across South African land borders 36
   - 4.3 Curbing illegal firearms through land borderline control 38
5. Specific South African borderline control measures 39
   - 5.1 Physical borderline barriers to enhance control 39
   - 5.2 Role of farmers in borderline control 39
   - 5.3 Borderline control and protection through land allocation 41
6. The homelands policy as an indirect form of borderline control 41
7. Conclusion 43

CHAPTER 4: LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994

1. Introduction 45
2. Constitutional and legislative developments regarding border control 45
3. Regional aspirations and South African border control 47
4. Entities responsible for border control coordination 49

4.1 The Border Affairs Coordinating Committee 49
4.2 The National Interdepartmental Structure and the National Operational Coordinating Mechanism 50
4.3 The Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee 50
4.4 The Border Management Agency 52
5. Roles of the South African National Defence Force and South African Police Service in borderline control 53
5.1 Changing policy dimensions and directives 53
5.2 Role and tasks of the South African National Defence Force in borderline control: 1994 to 2004 55
5.3 Borderline control deployments of the South African National Defence Force: 1994 to 2004 57
5.4 South African National Defence Force involvement following the redeployment of the South African Police Service to borderline control 60
5.5 South African National Defence Force involvement in borderline control since 2010 62
6. Constraints to effective borderline control in post-1994 South Africa 63
6.1 Shortcomings of entities responsible for border control coordination 64
6.2 Practical constraints 65
7. Conclusion 67

CHAPTER 5: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERLINE SITUATION

1. Introduction 69
2. National security in South Africa 70
3. The impact of illegal immigration 71
3.1 The extent of illegal migration to South Africa 71
3.2 Selected official perceptions on the threat of illegal immigration 73

3.3 The link between illegal immigration and crime 75
3.4 Linking attacks on foreigners and illegal immigration 76
4. Land borderline control and disease prevention 79
5. Security concerns along the borderline 80
5.1 Vehicle smuggling across the borderline 81
5.2 Arms, drugs and counterfeit goods smuggling 82
5.3 Human trafficking and people smuggling 86
5.4 The Guma Gumas 88
5.5 Stock theft along the borderline 89
6. Conclusion 92

CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION

1. Introduction 94
2. Summary of text 94
3. Assessing the assumptions of the study 96
4. Conclusion 102

ABSTRACT 105
BIBLIOGRAPHY 107

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Department of Home Affairs deportation figures per country for 1988 ï 1992 37
Table 4.1: Operational statistics of recovered weapons and vehicles by the South African National Defence Force, 1995 to 2000 56
Table 4.2: South African National Defence Force successes in curbing illegal immigration and weapon smuggling between 1996 and 2003 60
Table 5.1: Response of participants to whether the influx of illegal immigrants is good or bad, analysed by educational level 77
Table 5.2: Response of participants to whether the influx of illegal immigrants is good or bad, analysed by race 78

Table 5.3: Response of participants to whether illegal immigrants are welcome in South Africa in general 78
Table 5.4: Illicit firearms recovered during South African National Defence Force operations over the period 2001 to 2005 84
Table 5.5: Illicit firearms recovered during South African Police Service operations over the period 2006 to 2009 84
Table 5.6: Cannabis recovered during South African National Defence Force operations, both along the borderline and in internal operations, over the period 2001 to 2007 86
Table 5.7: Cannabis recovered during South African Police Service borderline operations over the period 2006 to 2009 86
Table 5.8: Livestock recovered as a result of borderline control operations by the South African National Defence Force 91

LIST OF MAPS

Map 3.1: Northern borderline areas of security concern ï The Madimbo corridor and Pafuri River 42
Map 3.2: Territories of self-governance and independent homelands in South Africa before 1994 43
Map 5.1: Primary weapons smuggling routes between South Africa and Mozambique 83

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: The Customs and Border Protection organisational chart 21
Figure 3.1: South African military expenditure as percentage of the total gross domestic product 36
Figure 4.1: Structure of the Regional Joint Task Force North 58
Figure 5.1: Total of overstayed visas in South Africa from 1980 to 2000 72

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian Peopleôs Liberation Army
AU	African Union
BACC	Border Affairs Coordinating Committee
BMA	Border Management Agency
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NIBMS	National Integrated Border Management Strategy
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NIDS	National Interdepartmental Structure
NOCOC	National Operational Coordinating Committee
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PWV	Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SASS	South African Secret Service
TISA	Tobacco Industry of South Africa

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
ZDP	Zimbabwean Documentation Project

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

Globalisation has brought about significant changes to the concepts of sovereignty and borders. Dominated by global trade and increased migration flows, globalisation calls into question various issues related to borderline control. In this era, where states remain involved in the constant search for development, globalisation presents new challenges to national sovereignty and territorial integrity and, consequently, borderline control.

Sovereignty is defined as ñthe exclusive right to exercise, within a specific territory, the functions of a Nation-state and be answerable to no higher authorityò (Boczek, 2005: 117-118). It is the territorial dimension of this definition that links the concepts of borderline control and sovereignty. Following from the definition of sovereignty, the concept implies control over the stateôs territory. However, the demands of globalisation as well as constant calls for the increased freedom of movement of people and goods place pressure on territorial and, specifically, borderline control (Hough, 2009: 2). Threats such as transnational crime, terrorism and the spread of disease also add pressure to borderline control which is already hampered by resource constraints (Van Niekerk, 1995: 1, 4-6). Notably, in the context of instability in sub-Saharan Africa, illegal migration and refugee flows negatively affect the implementation of borderline control.

Given the effects of globalisation, attempts at effective borderline control have seen an array of different approaches. One example of this is the inclusive approach followed by the European Union (EU). This prompted a change in the focus of borderline control towards the external borders of the union, while certain internal borders have been opened to allow free movement (Hough, 2000: 2-4). The case of the United States of America (US) border with Mexico provides a contrasting example. In this case, continuous efforts to increase borderline control, and the control of the movement of people and goods, can be observed (Kruys, 2002: 116-

121). While the example of the EU probably portrays an ideal situation within a regional context, its application in an African context requires careful evaluation owing to vastly different conditions.

According to the Merriam-Webster Law Dictionary (1996), control is defined as ñ[the ability] to exercise restraint or directing influence over; to check; to regulate or to governé ò The development of the ability to ócontrolôborders is a priority as territorial control reflects a basic state function. Borderline control implies the safety of the borderline in terms of the movement of people and goods. Essentially, ócontrolô differs from óprotectionôas the concept of border protection generally refers to the defence of borders and territory by military forces. Borderline control is linked to control at ports of entry and between such ports, but is not necessarily undertaken by the same entities responsible for the actual port-of-entry control.

The change from protection to control also becomes important in view of changes in security thinking following the end of the Cold War. For example, a move away from security analysis based on military threats can be observed, while political, social and economic aspects have gained prominence (Snyder, 1999: 7-8). This view is also noted by Buzan (1991) who places emphasis on the influence of military, political, economic, societal and environmental threats not only to state security, but also to the broader concept of human security. It is therefore imperative to note that threats to security are becoming increasingly non-military in nature. With both state and human security vulnerable to various threats, including terrorism, mass migration, cross-border crime and the spread of disease, the implications of a lack of effective borderline control are apparent.

2. STUDY OBJECTIVES

The primary aim of this study is to analyse the extent and nature of land borderline control as well as threats to land borders in South Africa. Borderline control requires analysis within the broader regional context as do the challenges that this poses to borderline control in South Africa.

Following from the main objectives, the study has a number of secondary objectives:

- Assessing the effect of changed regional circumstances and changing official South African views on borderline control in the post-1994 period in comparison to the pre-1994 period.
- Describing and evaluating the efficiency of current land borderline control in South Africa.
- Identifying some of the main security-related features and threats to land borderlines in South Africa.

3. LITERATURE SURVEY

Numerous sources discuss and conceptualise the concept of borderline control. Walters, *Border/Control* (2006), offers insight into a Social Sciences approach to borders. In his publication *Borders and bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue* (2006), Newman aims to streamline academic thinking on borders. Rumford, in *Theorising Borders* (2006), focuses on specific border types and analyses these within an international perspective. Each of these approaches takes into account the effect of globalisation on borders, thus foregrounding the importance of the impact of globalisation to border control.

In an attempt to apply these theories to the South African context, Lusse, in *The Role of the SANDF in Borderline Protection* (2001), makes reference to South African orientated borderline definitions. Kruys, in *Controlling Land Borders: A Comparison of the United States of America, Germany and South Africa* (2002), also offers a comparative analysis of borderline issues in South Africa.

Other research concerning border control and security in South Africa includes *Border Control in the RSA since 1994: An Assessment* (Acres, 2001), *The Role of the SAPS in South African Border Control Mechanisms* (Beneke, 2001), *The Challenges of Border Security (*Mulatji, 2004) and *South African Borders: How Much Control is Left?* (Hough, 2009). Hennopôs *The Challenge to Control: South Africa's Borders and Borderline* (2001) and Steinbergôs *An Overview of South African Border*

Control: 1994-2004 (2004) both emphasise several changes in border control in the post-1994 period.

As far as primary sources are concerned, several official documents such as the White Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Act (2002) and the Immigrations Act (2002) provide the backdrop for the formulation of South Africaôs approach to borderline control. In addition, *Annual Reports* of the SANDF and South African Police Service (SAPS) are also used to evaluate the implementation of borderline control-related policies. The Auditor-Generalôs report on border control (2008) also presents a general overview of the shortcomings related to borderline control in South Africa. Furthermore, a number of studies have been undertaken on cross-border threats to South Africa. These focus largely on illegal migration and include Solomonôs *Contemplating the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Republic of South Africa* (2000), and Kruysôs *South African Government Policy and Strategy Regarding the Inflow of Migrants and/or Refugees from Zimbabwe* (2007).

In view of the continuing flow especially of Zimbabwean nationals to South Africa, and the uncertainty regarding official policy relating to the control of this influx, there were increasing indications of a collapse in land borderline control since the handing over of this function to the SAPS between 2004 and 2010. Increasing evidence of cross-border crime, as well as related internal problems such as attacks on foreigners, emphasise the importance of effective land borderline control. A more comprehensive study on the security dimensions of land borderline control in South Africa is therefore required.

4. FORMULATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The South African security landscape, both internally and in relation to external security threats, has changed significantly since 1994. The primary research problem is, therefore, whether changes observed in South African land borderline control measures affect security, particularly given the changing regional political and security realities.

The secondary questions that are addressed in the study are as follows:

- Why and in which regard did the South African approaches and policies towards land borderline control change? Considering broader political and ideological changes in the South African policy environment, an analysis of the impact of these changes on policies regarding borderline control is required.
- Are current attempts at land borderline control sufficient and effective? In order to assess the contribution of borderline control to broader security, it is necessary to evaluate its effectiveness.
- What are the current threats to land borderline control in South Africa and what are the broader security implications? In the context of ensuring sovereignty and exercising control over territory, threats to borderline control require constant evaluation.

Following from the research problems as formulated above, the study is based on the following assumptions:

- Distinct changes in the South African approach to borderline control in the pre- and post-1994 era can be observed, mainly concerning changing political priorities.
- In the post-1994 period, borderline control was neglected, which allowed the continued influx of illegal foreigners and increased cross-border crime.
- Ineffective borderline control results in security issues that pose challenges to state security as well as to human security, and hence, to national security.

Significant changes in the South African approach to land borderline control can be observed when the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods are compared. Of specific importance is developments since 2002, which including the handing over of the borderline control responsibility to the SAPS between 2004 and 2010. The main focus of the study is on the period from 1994 up to the end of 2009, with certain references to the period thereafter also included.

5. METHODOLOGY

This study is based on a qualitative research methodology and follows a descriptive and analytical approach. The study also includes a comparative component, briefly evaluating pre- and post-1994 land borderline control in South Africa. South Africa as a case study provides the opportunity to evaluate to what extent policy alterations influence effective borderline control in the context of increasing regional migration flows. The theoretical framework is based on the concepts of sovereignty; approaches to borderline control, and threats to the integrity of land borderlines. Non-military threats such as the illegal movement of people and goods are also emphasised. Increasing pressure to establish the freedom of movement of people and goods in an era of globalisation, relative to security concerns related to borders, is also addressed.

Both primary and secondary sources are used. Primary sources include official South African government policy documents relating to borderline control, as well as government publications dealing with its implementation, including the *South African Police Service's Annual Reports,* the R*eport of the Auditor-General on a Performance Audit of Border Control at the South African Police Service* (2008) and *the South African National Defence Force Annual Reports*. These are supported by analysis of official statements related to borderline control. Secondary sources include *Illegal Aliens in South Africa: Causes and Facilitating Factors* (Hough, 1995); *Free Movement of People across International Borders: Implications for South Africa (*Hough, 2000), and *Controlling Land Borders: A Comparison of the United States of America, Germany and South Africa* (Kruys, 2002).

6. CHAPTER DELINEATION

Chapter One serves as an introduction. It provides the objectives, research problems, methodology and structure of the study. Chapter Two provides a theoretical overview of the concepts related to borderline control. Clarity on concepts such as borderline control, borderline protection and defence, sovereignty and security dimensions related to borders, are included. The expanding concept of borderline control, from an historically securitised view to the current view

encouraging more open borders, is evaluated. Reference is made to cases (for example, the EU) where free movement across international borders exists between certain member states. This is then discussed in contrast to the US where measures to ensure borderline control are continuously implemented.

Chapter Three evaluates the South African approach to land borderline control up to 1994 with the main focus on the period from 1970 to 1994. The regional and domestic situation in South and southern Africa during this period implied that the main security issue relating to borders was that of insurgency. As such, the chapter focuses on aspects such as military deterrence and the prevention of illegal immigration prior to 1994.

In Chapter Four, the focus falls on land borderline control in South Africa since 1994. The guidelines offered by the Constitution of 1993 and 1996 are analysed as well as South African policies as reflected in legislation such as White Papers, and official speeches. The 2003 decision to withdraw the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from the borders and replace it with the SAPS marks a significant development in the approach to borderline control. However, policy adjustments allowing for the redeployment of the SANDF to the function of borderline control after 2009 serve as an indication that both borderline control policy and implementation are in a state of disarray. The establishment of various institutions tasked with the responsibility of overseeing and directing border control between 1994 and 2009 is also subjected to further analysis. Various official and non-official reports on the problem of land borderline control are thus analysed. The impact of regional dynamics, such as the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe and pressures for increased freedom of movement of people on South African land borderline control, are also discussed.

Chapter Five analyses the security implications of the current South African approach to borderline control. This analysis includes the effects of illegal immigration, the increase in refugee flows, the link between poor borderline control and crime, the transfer of communicable diseases and smuggling. Chapter Six provides a summary of the main findings of the study, evaluates the assumptions formulated in the introductory chapter, and draws a number of conclusions.

CHAPTER 2
THE CONCEPT OF BORDERLINE CONTROL

1. INTRODUCTION

Borders should be interpreted as more than a simple division between states. The concept of borders has seen significant development and adjustments according to changes in the international system, and should therefore be viewed within the context of these changes.

Of contemporary importance is the impact of globalisation on borders. Globalisation has resulted in changes in the interpretation of national security, as already noted, and this impacts significantly on border-related security. This stems from the fact that borders and statehood cannot be separated as borders play a crucial role in the security of the state. However, numerous border-specific threats exist that, if ignored, can impact negatively not only on national security, but also on the essence of statehood. The advent of globalisation has seen different interpretations of the importance of border-related security, such as the varying approaches of the US and EU. However, the primary question that remains is based on the extent to which border-related security measures remain relevant in the context of globalisation.

This chapter provides a conceptual framework specifically of land borders. An overview of the concept of borders is provided while the impact of globalisation on borders is analysed. The significance of borders in the context of national security will be evaluated and border-specific threats to security are discussed. Case studies of the US and EU approaches to border-related security are included to provide an overview of some of the modern views on border control.

2. THE CONCEPT OF BORDERS

Borders form a significant component of the definition of the state. Through the historical processes of state formation and with the advent of globalisation, the relevance of the study of borders has increased considerably.

2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF BORDERS

Walters (2006: 193) views the development of borders as part of the creation of the modern state. Originally conceptualised as a frontier, referring to a military front-line, the concept became entrenched in the sixteenth century as ófrontiersô gained permanence in what are today known as borders or boundaries. However, Solomon (1970: 1) indicates that frontiers are a sector of less precision, and that clearly defined borders are essential in the context of the establishment of the modern state. Walters (2006: 193) defines the modern concept of a border as ña continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domainò

A change from the traditional view occurred with the establishment of the Westphalian interpretation of borders, notably through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Certain traits of boundaries can be derived from the Treaty. First, borders reaffirm statehood. States should therefore indicate borders both on maps and physically on the ground. Secondly, in their interaction, states should also reaffirm borders through treaties. Such border agreements should subsequently be incorporated into the laws of the respective countries. Treaties should also include areas where borders did not exist previously, or were poorly indicated, and so borders should be redrawn to form part of the established state-structure (Solomon, 1970: 1-2). It is thus clear that the Westphalian approach places borders at the centre of statehood. It allows for the development of the modern state by delimiting terrain under its authority and clearly distinguishing it from other states regarding sovereignty.

With reference to international law, borders also play an important role in modern statehood. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933: 2) perceives of ña defined territoryò as one of the qualifications for a state to be recognised as a legal ópersonôin terms of international law. Defined territory played a similarly important role in the European Economic Communityôs (EEC) Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committeeôs (EEC, 1992: 182) findings on the prerequisites for statehood. In both these cases, the value that international law attaches to borders is evident. The Montevideo Convention (1933: 3) stipulates that ñ[t]he

territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation, nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly, or for any motive whatever, even temporarilyò The EEC, however, notes that states may adjust their borders not through force, but by agreement (EEC, 1992: 180). As such, borders are essential in the demarcation of the defined territory of a state.

Given its importance, there are numerous stages that constitute border formation. Historically, borders and borderlines were largely formed by natural obstacles such as rivers and mountain ranges. However, four distinct steps in modern border formation can be identified (Jones, 1945, as cited by Dashtseren, 2006: 31-34). First, territory is allotted by means of a political decision. Secondly, ôboundary delimitationô entails the legal process of enacting a boundary line by means of a signed bilateral or multilateral treaty or agreement. Thirdly, ôboundary demarcationô refers to the establishment of the physical borderline by using clear markers such as beacons and border fences. Finally, ôboundary administrationôrefers to a cooperative effort by the governments of neighbouring states to manage the newly established border territories. The administrative process also entails the management of future border-related issues such as shifting borders in the case of river-borders. An example of such administration is the Chamizal Treaty of 1963 signed between the US and Mexico to address territorial disputes caused by the changing course of the Rio Grande (Chamizal Memorial Park, 2009).

2.2 POSTMODERN VIEWS ON BORDERS

The traditional interpretation of the concept of borders has been altered significantly by two recent events. The advent of globalisation, already noted, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, can be identified as having shaped postmodern thinking on the concept of borders (Dashtseren, 2006: 5-6).

At the centre of the criticism of the traditional Westphalian interpretation of borders, is the influence of globalisation. Rumford (2006: 155) notes that the advent of globalisation has brought about a ñworld in motionò that is based on networks transcending conventional borders. Globalisation thus integrated some states to a point where state boundaries become less relevant. This refers to integration and

cooperation not only in the economic sphere, but also in terms of security. Castells, as quoted by Rumford (2006: 155-156), claims that ñthe territorial nation-state is being replaced by a space of flowsò. The EU serves as a prime example of this, where regional borders have now become the borders of concern rather than state borders. Rumford (2006: 155) concludes by noting that ñglobali[s]ation, cosmopolitanism, networked community, mobilities and flowsò have re-shaped the way borders are interpreted.

In the context of globalisation, changes in the interpretation of borders have resulted in an increasing call for borders to be opened. This derives from the fact that, in times of peace, economic imperatives rather than security-related concerns drive border policy (Newman, 2006: 181). However, while globalisation has prompted the opening of borders, events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the increasing threat of international terrorism have again resulted in tighter control in certain parts of the world (Dashtseren, 2006: 54; Newman, 2006: 181).

Finally, it should be noted that historical and contemporary approaches to border control are largely shaped by threat perception (Dashtseren, 2006: 6-7). Border control is therefore structured in a manner relevant to the specific stateôs unique security requirements and threat perception. Thus, despite the advent of globalisation, border control is likely to remain a crucial feature of modern statesô security construct. Furthermore, borders will remain relevant for the maintenance of sound international relations; the promotion of local and national security; the promotion of effective domestic administration, and the effective utilisation of resources (Pratt, 2005).

2.3 CONCEPTS RELATED TO BORDERS AND BORDER CONTROL

Numerous concepts related to land borders have been developed over time. These include generic definitions of border-related concepts, as well as specific definitions dealing with border security.

2.3.1 Border-Related Concepts

International boundaries or borders refer to a borderline constructed along the principles of ólboundary delimitationô This includes mutual respect for the border brought about by peaceful negotiations between states (Dashtseren, 2006: 17). Such borders are normally indicated by a line that establishes or marks the border agreed upon. International borders are the norm in a modern state-system and most international borders conform to this standard. However, peaceful agreements are not always achieved and disagreement over the establishment of borders may exist. Border disputes are defined by Mandel (1980: 427) as ña violent or nonviolent conflict between two primary national antagonists over the demarcation of their shared boundaryò Such cases are particularly relevant where neighbouring states with shared land borders meet. The border dispute between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region serves as a prime example (BBC News, 2008). Conflict itself may result in unique types of borders, such as a temporary international border as a reaction to the settlement of armed conflict or the creation of a ólceasefire-lineô (Dashtseren, 2006: 18). Current attempts to establish temporary borders can be observed in efforts at a negotiated settlement in the conflict involving Israel and Palestine (Benn, 2010).

2.3.2 Security Concepts Related to Borders

With the establishment of borders, their safeguarding forms an integral part of the administration of the border. In the context of maintaining state sovereignty and territorial integrity, various types of border control measures exist.

Border safeguarding refers to ñthe control, regulation and policingò of the land borders of a state (Boshoff, 2001: 41). This includes the maintenance of the stateôs sovereignty by protecting its territory from external attacks or invasion. This is similar to border protection, which is defined by Boshoff (2001: 41) as activities that ñinvolve the protection of the international borders of [a state] against all attacks and actions, including terrorism infiltration and exfiltration, border violations, conventional attacks and any other related operational features which may result from such hostile actionsò It is clear that the role of the military is crucial to border protection.

Border control is the combination of borderline control and the control exercised at designated border posts. In its primary sense, according to the Merriam-Webster Law Dictionary (1996), ócontrolô is defined as ñ[the ability] to exercise restraint or directing influence over; to check; to regulate or to governò Border control relates to the movement of people and goods while legal and other guidelines determine the level of control exercised. Operational border control, as defined in the US National Border Patrol Strategy (USA: Customs and Border Protection Agency, 2005: 3), is ñthe ability to detect, respond, and interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other national security objectivesò

Border-post control includes the control at the actual border posts as a combined effort by relevant state departments (Boshoff, 2001: 41). Such control is executed at formal entry and exit points on state boundaries. The EU utilises the term ólborder crossing pointôand defines this as ñany crossing-point authorised by the competent authorities for the crossing of external bordersò (EU, 2006: 105). The Auditor Generalôs report on border control in South Africa elucidates that such port-of-entry control to include the prevention of transnational crimes, organised crime and illegal migration to the country (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 3). For the purpose of control, the EU uses the term ólborder checksôwhich are defined as ñchecks carried out at border crossing points, to ensure that persons, including their means of transport and the objects in their possession, may be authorised to enter the territory of the Member States or authorised to leave itò(EU, 2006: 106).

Of importance to this study is the concept of land borderline control that refers specifically to control of the border connecting dedicated border control points (Boshoff, 2001: 41). Crucial to enacting such control is the task of border surveillance. The EU conceives of border surveillance as the ñsurveillance of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border crossing points outside the fixed opening hours, in order to prevent persons from circumventing border checksò(EU, 2006: 105).

The development of the concept of borders indicates that it is inseparable from the concept of the state. The era of globalisation not only brought new interpretations of

borders and border-related security, but also of state security. In the post-Cold War era, these changes have resulted in new interpretations of the concept of national security, which pose specific challenges to borderline control.

3. BORDERLINE CONTROL AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Although the concept of state security focuses on borders as an important factor in preventing threats to the state, the broadening of the concepts of security, and national security, has altered this perspective. This implies that it is not only threats to the state that are relevant, but also threats to individual security. In addition, security is no longer primarily a military-orientated concept.

3.1 THE EXPANDING CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The expanding nature of the concept of security is most notable during and after the Cold War era, as already stated. The Cold War attached a specific inter-state connotation to security matters (Buzan, 1991: 368-370). In the traditional view of security, national security is defined in relation to a state's ability to protect its physical territory; its international economic relations; its government and internal political processes, and its borders (Brown, 1983: 4). The inter-state connotation of the Cold War security focuses specifically on protection against aggression from foreign states. During this period, it was the perception of military threats that shaped national security, and the focus remained on ensuring military security. The traditional view of national security thus revolved around the state and the perception of imminent external threat. This notion was further entrenched by Cold War thinking where the external focus often resulted in internal threats to national security being neglected (Hough, 2003: 2).

The post-Cold War era has seen a change in the concept of national security and of the dominant focus placed on external military threats. Societal, economic and ecological threats became increasingly important in maintaining national security (Buzan, 1991: 122-134). Furthermore, it is argued that any significant development that may have an impact on the territorial integrity or political stability of a state may be regarded as a national security threat (Ayoob, 1995: 8). As such, the internal

(intra-state) dimension of national security gained prominence. A further contribution to the expanding nature of national security is the advent of the concept of human security, or individual security. The inclusion of human security can largely be attributed to the irreversible connection between the state and individuals. Threats to individuals arise from pressures specifically on the social, economic and political environments (Buzan, 1991: 37-39). However, not all threats to human security pose national security threats. Poverty, for example, poses a threat to human security while not necessarily to national security (Hough, 2003: 10-12).

3.2 SOURCES OF THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The insecurity of a state can be brought about through a combination of threats and vulnerabilities. Central to the maintenance of national security is the question of threat perception. Although threat perception would differ in strong and weak states, some guidelines exist for national security threats, namely, the type of threat; the intensity of the threat, and the probability of its occurrence within the historic context of the state and its region (Buzan, 1991:112-116).

In the context of national security, five main sources of threat can be identified. First, military threats continue to pose a major threat to national security, despite the advent of globalisation and the expansion of the concept of national security. Military threats remain relevant owing to the fact that they strike at the essence of statehood and affect all spheres of security. Owing to their destructive nature and the involvement of the use of force, military threats are traditionally at the centre of national security concerns. Secondly, political threats also pose a threat to the state as these may impact on the ability to maintain order and stability (Buzan, 1991: 117-118). As such, national security can be perceived as depending on ñpolitical conditions including national policies, political structure, level of national cohesion and [the] level of national consensusò (Mathur, 1996: 307). These political threats can range from insignificant matters such as changes in policy to the complete overthrow of the government. Political threats are particularly relevant in weak states where state capacity is lacking (Job, 1992: 18).

Economic threats also pose a threat to national security as a third category of threat. In the era of globalisation, the economy often presents a more fragile target than the traditional areas of focus of national security. Economic threats have become increasingly important as the state does not necessarily represent the sole or major economic role-player. However, economic imperatives pose a national security threat because they are so closely intertwined with the organisational stability of the state (Buzan, 1991: 125). As with human security, not all economic imperatives pose a national security threat.

Fourthly, societal threats to national security form part of the expanded scope of national security as such threats are mostly intra-state occurrences (Buzan, 1991: 123). Often, the nation-state itself functions as the transgressor as it facilitates the oppression of specific social groupings. Societal threats are closely linked to the lack of human security. Other domestic threats such as crime and health issues can thus be grouped under human security and can therefore be viewed as societal threats to national security.

Environmental threats constitute a fifth source of threat; they pose a physical threat to the state, but have only been included as a national security threat in the post-Cold War period (Buzan, 1991: 131). This follows from the fact that environmental threats can be of such magnitude that they threaten the existence of the state. Environmental threats, such as water scarcity, also have the ability to transcend borders and have the potential to undermine state authority. Water may, for example, serve as the cause of inter-state conflict, thus posing a major risk to national security even according to its pre-Cold War definition (Levy, 1995: 35).

Given the expanding scope of national security, and the inclusion of an array of threats to national security, borders will invariably play an important role in the maintenance of the nation-state.

4. BORDER-SPECIFIC THREATS

The expanding scope of national security and the myriad of threats to national security have impacted on border-specific security features. In addition to the threat

of military invasion, the inclusion of human security has broadened the scope of threats that relate to borders.

Cross-border crime denotes a range of illegal activities that involve the movement of goods and people across borders (Beneke, 2001: 32). The illegal movement of goods includes the smuggling of drugs, marine products (such as abalone), counterfeit products, stolen or hijacked vehicles and mineral resources such as diamonds (Beneke, 2001: 37; Minnaar, 2001: 2). Cross-border crime occupies a unique position in counter-crime initiatives as it always involves two or more states. The role of borders in countering crime and maintaining internal stability is therefore apparent. The establishment of, for example, the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) further highlights the importance attached to cross-border crime. INTERPOL focuses specifically on cross-border crimes and the facilitation of cross-border police cooperation (INTERPOL, 2010).

Perhaps one of the most prominent threats to borders, in the context of national security, is the cross-border smuggling of illegal firearms. The UN (2004: 73) defines illicit firearm smuggling as the ñimport, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize itò The flow of illegal firearms over borders poses a significant threat to national security due to its potentially destructive nature. Firearm smuggling also poses a tangible threat to human security, as firearms are often used in criminal activities and attacks on citizens.

Stock theft from neighbouring states also poses a border-related threat (RSA: Mulder, 2011). Often such theft involves large numbers of livestock, which impacts not only on the economy of the affected state, but also on food security. Human security is thus at risk through the effect on food security and, more directly, the impact on the security of the farming community on the borderline. In addition, the smuggling of wildlife and wildlife products across borders represents a similar threat (INTERPOL, 2010). Linked to the movement of livestock across borders is the threat of the spread of disease. The free movement of livestock often results in the spread of diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease and swine-flu. While the commercial

sales in livestock can also bring about the spread of disease, porous borders simply increase the difficulty in controlling this (Thyer, 2009: 22-24).

Finally, the movement of people across borders, notably illegal migration, poses a border-related threat that has become increasingly problematic given the advent of globalisation and the call for free movement of people. Globally, factors such as poverty; volatile political circumstances; ecological pressures, and the internationalisation of markets across state boundaries cause increased illegal migration (Malatji, 2004: 1). With uncontrolled illegal migration having the potential to disrupt internal stability, this is a threat that requires appropriate control measures. In this regard, porous borders play a major role in facilitating illegal migration. Another dimension of the movement of people across borders is that of human trafficking and the smuggling of people. The UN (2004: 42) defines human trafficking as ñthe recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitationò. The smuggling of people can likewise be with or without the consent of the person being smuggled. These acts thus pose a major cross-border threat, specifically given that the expanded scope of security and national security in particular, now include aspects of human security.

The range of border-specific threats and, specifically, those related to the concept of free movement of people, have resulted in various approaches to border control by different states and/or regions as discussed below.

5. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO BORDERLINE CONTROL

Globalisation has brought about broader international economic interaction and integration, which has significantly escalated the need to facilitate movement of people and goods across international borders. However, in contrast to this need, transnational terrorism has prompted the requirement for increased border control, including borderline control. The need to address both these requirements has

resulted in varying approaches to borderline control, and can best be observed when comparing the US approach to borderline control to that of the EU.

5.1 THE UNITED STATES AND BORDERLINE CONTROL

Borderline control is often prioritised where developed and less-developed countries share a border. In the case of the US, this refers specifically to the US-Mexico border. Cross-border crime, including drug trafficking and illegal migration, is of particular importance to the US along its shared border with Mexico (Kruys, 2002: 116).

The need to put a stop to illegal migration through increased border control in the US is reflected in, for example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (USA, 1996: [cf]). Title one, Section 101, of the IIRIRA (USA: IIRIRA, 1996: 553) notes that ñ[t]he Attorney General in each of fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 shall increase by not less than 1,000 the number of positions for full-time, active-duty border patrol agentsò Also included is a call for increased support personnel to be seconded to border control agencies. The IIRIRA also focuses on borderline control and improving physical security measures along the countryôs borderline. The IIRIRA prioritises the upgrading of fences along the Californian border with Mexico, for which an initial amount of US$ 12,000,000 was allocated. Provision has also been for the state to acquire land where deemed important to ensure increased border control (USA: IIRIRA, 1996: 554).

The US has also passed a number of additional laws to ensure tighter internal control of illegal immigration. These laws include the REAL ID Act, which aims to improve control of the internal means of identification of all citizens by providing federal government guidelines to states for the issuing of identity documents. Under this Act, for example, identity documents such as licences should include the immigration requirements of the cardholder if he or she is not a US citizen (USA: REAL ID Act, 2005(b).

As noted in the IIRIRA, border control plays a central role in attempts to address illegal immigration to the US. The USA Patriot Act, for example, deals with border control measures. This Act allows for increased spending on technology and personnel for the monitoring of the northern US borders. Attention is also given to port-of-entry control to curb illegal migration to the US (USA: USA Patriot Act, 2001: Sections 401-403). The operationalisation of border control is the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security, in which the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency plays the leading role. The CBP also emphasises borderline control, given the fact that its structure includes offices for Field Operations, Border Patrol, Air and Maritime and Intelligence Operations (Figure 1). The organisation focuses on border patrols to ensure safety from terrorism and other cross-border threats (including illegal migration to the US). Furthermore, the CBPôs custom officials are also responsible for the facilitation of the movement of people and trade into the US (USA: Customs and Border Protection, 2010).

While the CBP aims to maintain control of the US borderline, the vast extent of the US-Mexico border has prompted the sporadic utilisation of the US military in addition to borderline protection agencies (Fox News, 2006). Where the US normally refrains from utilising the military for internal roles, it is on a tactical level that the military provides advantages to borderline control operations. This includes night vision equipment, motion sensors, communication apparatus and engineering capabilities in constructing borderline barricades (Kruys, 2002: 119).

Legislation also reflects that the war against terror has impacted on border control in the US. The Homeland Security Act, for example, allows for the establishment of a Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. In an effort at centralisation, the Homeland Security Act also notes that ñ[s]ecuring the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States, including managing and coordinating functions [are] transferred to the Department at ports of entryò (USA: Homeland Security Act, 2002: Title 4, Section 402). The focus thus is once again on tighter control of the movement of people across the borders.

Figure 2.1: The Customs and Border Protection Organisational Chart



Source: USA: Customs and Border Protection. 2010. ñSecuring Americaôs Bordersò Internet: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/ (accessed: 7 May 2010).

Further legislative attempts also demonstrate that efforts at increased border control are constantly ongoing. The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act provides, for example, for the possible construction of border fences on the US-Canada border; an additional 1120km of fences to be constructed along the Mexican border, and increased internal control of illegal immigration. While this Act was never signed into law, it lay the foundation for a number of subsequent debates on border security which indicates a broader legislative initiative to counter illegal migration also through increased border control (USA, 2005(a).

Subsequent developments indicate a continual need for the improvement of borderline control. In October 2006, the US Senate enacted the Secure Fence Act. The aim of this Act is to increase operational control of the borderline. The Act proposes the specific use of technology, including satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors and the use of radars. The Act also prioritises the

development of borderline fencing along the US border with Mexico. In addition, the Act prescribes the assembly of reinforced double layered fencing along priority areas in California, New Mexico and Texas (USA: Secure Fence Act, 2006: Section 3). Political support for the Secure Fence Act continued through the REAL ID Act, already referred to, which stipulates the security fence along the borders as a priority, and that its construction will not be subjected to any other laws. Laws that have been waivered in an attempt to construct the fence, include the National Environmental Policy Act, the Wilderness Act and the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act (Chertoff, 2008).

By April 2010, border fencing was almost complete, with 646 of the 652 miles planned for, finalised (USA: Government Accountability Office, 2010: 11). However, by March 2010, funding for borderline projects focusing on the deployment of new technology was re-evaluated. Consequently, the US$ 50 million originally earmarked for the strengthening of the border perimeter, as stipulated in the Secure Fence Act, was redirected. The decision was made to rather allocate the funds to existing technology, including radios and mobile surveillance equipment (Spencer, 2010).

From the above it is clear that the US continues to improve border control. Although emphasis is placed on the ports of entry, the organisational structure of the CBP agency indicates that a high premium is placed on borderline patrols as well, thus emphasising the significance of borderline control. In addition, the utilisation of the military and military technology further reflects the importance that the US attaches to borderline control. It is also important to note that these attempts continue despite the integrated economies of the US and Mexico.

5.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BORDERLINE CONTROL

The EU conforms to the postmodern concept of borders. This implies that some states become integrated to such an extent that they operate as regional entities rather than individual states (Dashtseren, 2006: 6). What often commences as broad economic cooperation, transcends to economic integration which inevitably raises security sector concerns, including the implications for border control and borderline control.

The EU serves as an example of modern inter-state cooperation on all levels, and this allows for a more integrated regional entity. However, as is clear from the Schengen Agreement of 1985, this form of inter-state cooperation impacts on borders in a number of ways. EU legislation states that ñ[t]he Schengen area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed. The signatory states to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border. Here common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controlsò(EU, 2009).

Under the Schengen Agreement, a total of 26 states form part of the Schengen Area. In terms of border control, the Agreement shifted the focus to the external borders of the Schengen member states. Only three EU member states, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus, maintain independent border controls (EU, 2011). External border control in Western Europe was already a priority between 1983 and 1989, as an estimated one million people migrated to Western Europe during this period. The EU also demonstrates the importance of border control where states with different levels of development meet. For example, prior to 2004, Germany implemented measures to control the external EU border with Poland. To effect such control, the number of border control personnel was increased from 400 to 3,300. A similar trend was observed with the inclusion of other nations in the EU. Poland, for example, vowed to increase border control personnel from 5,300 to 18,000, and agreed to the initial maintenance of German border control mechanisms following its inclusion in the EU (Kruys, 2002: 121-122; Fekete, 2003: 4). Romania undertook to spend ú50 million between 2002 and 2003 on border control in order to meet EU standards. Bulgaria and Hungary also increased border control measures on their borders with Turkey and Ukraine respectively (Fekete, 2003: 4-5).

Stringent conditions exist for acceptance into the EU. Section seven of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) states that ñ[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Unionò While the quest for internal stability is

clear, the importance attached to external border control is also apparent in EU legislation. For example, the European Commissionôs 1997 opinions on the application readiness for inclusion emphasises effective external border control as a prerequisite (Grabbe, 2000: 13). The White Paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union of 1995 and other European agreements require new member states to outline detailed plans for the adoption of EU law and practices. This includes, *inter alia*, the adoption of methods to restrict immigration and increase border control, assuming that they have borders with non-member states (EU, 1995: 9).

To ensure effective border control, numerous measures have been adopted. A regulation of the European Parliament provides for the establishment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams. These teams assist, for a limited period, in border protection methods by providing technical and operational aid on the request of states with external EU borders. Regulation 2007/2004 of the European Parliament established the European External Borders Agency. The function of this body is to ensure an integrated and efficient approach to control of the EUôs external borders. A decision by the European Parliament created the external border fund to be effected during the period 2007 to 2013. Expected resources to be accumulated total ú1,820 million, and the fund would be used in conjunction with the Programme for Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows (EU, 2009).

The EU also employs modern technology to ensure control of its external borders, including preventative measures such as the EU television campaigns in Morocco to discourage migration to the EU. This preventative approach is strengthened by a militarised response. On the southern EU border, for example, these measures include the deployment of naval forces to intercept migrants. The EU has also launched the technologically advanced Surveillance System for the Straits. This includes radar systems, infra-red cameras and advanced video cameras to monitor a 115km area around the Straits of Gibraltar (Fekete, 2003: 8-9).

From the above it is clear that the EU regards border control and, specifically, control along its external borders, as a priority. Through legislation, the EU has shown

political willingness to address the issue of border control. This was then backed by advanced tactical means of enforcing border control. Developments in recent years indicate that border control in the EU remains prioritised. This is demonstrated through, for instance, the EU Parliamentary Communication of 13 February 2008 that notes discussion on the possible formation of the European external border surveillance system. The aim of this system will be to assist member states with external borders to maintain and so decrease illegal immigrant numbers, by stepping up situational awareness of the external borders and increasing the capacity of these states to react. It is thus apparent that external border control remains a priority for the EU (EU, 2009).

Although some similarities can be drawn between the EU and US approach to the concept of border control, the approaches remain largely different. The main difference lies in the EUôs concept of integration that transcends economic integration and includes the free movement of people between member states. In contrast, the US implements much stricter control over the movement of people. In both cases, however, measures to prevent illegal immigration and illegal goods from entering the country, or region, are prioritised.

6. CONCLUSION

Borders have developed from being mere obstacles separating social groupings, to an essential part of statehood. Given the importance of the state as the basis of the international community, borders play a crucial role as they serve to demarcate state sovereignty. Borders also have an important role in conventional thinking on national security, as they serve as one of the reference points for external threat perception. The inclusion of human security in the scope of national security has resulted in borders becoming even more relevant as ineffective border control can impact negatively on human security.

It is often argued that globalisation has vastly diminished the relevance of state borders. The Schengen Area, where the majority of EU member states reduced or abolished border controls with other member states, is often held as an example of the diminishing role of borders between countries. However, despite the fact that

border control between specific states has decreased in some instances, the importance of maintaining border control remains apparent, even in the developed regions of the world. The increasing global threat of terrorism has, for example, prompted increased border controls, most notably in the post-9/11 period in the US. Improved border control can also be observed along the EUôs external borders. As such, it should be noted that despite the advent of globalisation, both the US and EU maintain the political will, and practical implementation of measures, to ensure that border control exists.

The next chapter provides an overview of South African land borderline control from 1970 to 1994. This provides the background for the subsequent chapter on current land borderline control.

CHAPTER 3
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO 1994

1. INTRODUCTION

During the period from 1970 to 1994, South Africa was confronted with a number of external security threats. Given the ongoing Angolan conflict and activities of insurgency movements, the need for increased security measures became apparent. Such security measures invariably included the securitisation of the border environment. This resulted in both the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) taking part in border control and protection.

This chapter provides an overview of the physical features and development of South African borders in the broader context of the development of African borders. The evaluation of the pre-1994 South African threat perception provides a framework for the analysis of land borderline control from 1970 to 1994. This should be viewed within the context of ñhostile neighboursòwho surrounded South Africa from the mid-1970s, which had a significant impact on South African threat perception (Steinberg, 2005(a): 2). This analysis includes an evaluation of the institutions and structures involved in land borderline control and protection, as well as practical measures to ensure land borderline control. As South West Africa (now Namibia) was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations in 1920, the Namibian borderline with Angola, Zambia and Botswana does not form part of this analysis. However, reference is made to the role that SADF deployments along the Namibian borderline played in influencing overall borderline control in South Africa. The primary focus will be on the borders of South Africa with Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho and, specifically, Mozambique. Brief reference is also made to border control between South Africa and the former homelands (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda). However, this is only relevant where their external borders were of particular significance to South African land borderline control.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERS

The process of border formation in Africa has largely been shaped by its colonial history. This has many modern-day implications for border disputes, socio-economic development, regional integration and borderline control.

2.1 THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF AFRICAN BORDERS

Although fixed borders are a feature of modern African geography, various different border types can be observed in pre-colonial Africa. First, a frontier of contact existed where different cultural groups lived in cooperation in a common area. Secondly, frontiers of separation referred to zones separating cultural groups, where none of the groups involved claimed authority over the zone in question. Deserts and forests provide examples of such frontiers. Finally, enclaves existed in the case of nomadic groups, with frontiers assuming a more temporary character (Ajala, 1983: 178).

Colonialism changed this African landscape permanently. The Berlin Conference of 1884 played a crucial role in formalising European control of African territories. European borders were superimposed on African territories and divided among the major European role-players. These included Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Belgiumôs King Leopold II and Italy. The majority of Africaôs territories were divided among these states, with only modern-day Ethiopia initially remaining independent (Rosenburg, 2007). As already indicated, these borders were largely based on natural obstacles such as rivers or watersheds, as with the Bangui River between the current Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic. However, approximately 30 per cent of these borders consisted of straight lines, such as those found between Namibia and Botswana (Ajala, 1983: 179).

While these latter borders were artificial in nature, they became permanent features in the post-colonial period. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) played an important role in the maintenance of borders established during the Berlin Conference. At the OAUôs First Ordinary Session in Cairo, in July 1964, member

states reaffirmed their acceptance of borders as proclaimed on the day of independence (Ajala, 1983: 180). The main criticism against the maintenance of such borders is, however, that they cut through traditional cultural divides. This resulted in a number of post-colonial border disputes between states, and also added to the difficulty of managing migration flows (Teshome, 2009: 343-344). Post-colonial attempts at demarcating borders have also led to further disputes. The 1992 dispute between Botswana and Namibia over an island in the Chobe River serves as an example (Saunders, 2004: 93).

2.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERLINE

The origin of current South African borders stems from the unification of South Africa in 1910. In 1909, the Imperial Parliament passed the South Africa Act, which officially unified the self-governing territories of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State into a single state (RSA: South Africa Act, 1909: Section 2). Following World War One, South West Africa was placed under South African administration. This temporarily expanded the South African borderline and lasted until 1990 when South Africa granted independence to what is now known as Namibia (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010). Another temporary change in borders followed as independent homelands were established within South Africa. The newly formed republics of Transkei, Venda, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana changed South Africaôs éexternalô borders from 1976. However, these states were not recognised internationally and were subsequently incorporated into South Africa after 1994 (RSA: SAPS, 2009[b]). The post-1994 period thus saw a return to the borders as established in 1910.

South Africa has a vast land border totalling 4,862km. This includes borders with Botswana (1,840km), Lesotho (909km), Mozambique (491km), Namibia (967km), Swaziland (430km) and Zimbabwe (225km) (Nationmaster, 2010). Natural features play an important role in South African land borderlines. These include the Limpopo River separating South Africa and Zimbabwe and, in part, South Africa and Botswana. The Orange River in turn largely forms the border between South Africa and Namibia (RSA: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2007). Furthermore, the border between South Africa and Lesotho is largely shaped by the Drakensberg

Mountains (Tourism South Africa, 2010). Agricultural farmland can be found along most of South Africaõs borderline, while national parks and private game reserves also occupy large border territories. Two such examples are the Kruger National Park bordering Mozambique and the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park bordering Botswana and Namibia (SANParks, 2010).

This vast nature of South Africaõs land borderline complicated the establishing of effective borderline control. During the pre-1994 period, acts of insurgency, cross-border smuggling, and illegal border crossings, added to the difficulty of controlling the countryõs borders. These threats had a significant impact on the approach to border control.

3. THREAT PERCEPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 1994

South African border control, in the period prior to 1994, was shaped to a large extent by its political demands. Such political demands were, in turn, shaped by the threat perception of the pre-1994 government (Steinberg, 2005(a): 1-2). Both internal and external threat perception have to be examined in order to determine the impact on border control.

3.1 EXTERNAL THREAT PERCEPTION

Prior to 1994, the South African government placed great emphasis on external threat perception. In 1976, Prime Minister Vorster, as cited in Hough and van der Merwe (1988: 47), noted that in the context of the ôSoviet onslaughtõ, the communist aim was to destabilise South Africa by engulfing it in conflict on multiple fronts. This strategy specifically focused on Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Angola. This notion is also reflected in the White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982, which states that ñ[t]he ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA, and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the interests of the USSRò (Garnett, 1989: 4). The Cold War dilemma thus played an important role in shaping South Africaõs pre-1994 external threat perception.

Within the context of the Cold War, the perceived interest of the Soviet Union in the Cape sea route and in South African mineral wealth, as well as the establishment of base facilities in neighbouring states to train terrorists, was noted among the primary pre-1994 national security concerns. While the last mentioned may have presented a more tangible threat, the reality of South Africaôs focus on external threats has been a contentious issue. It has been argued, for example, that neither the US nor the Soviet Union had much interest in South Africa. This became even more apparent as the strategic value of South Africa to these superpowers diminished over time, given the development of superpower *détente* and increasing anti-apartheid sentiment (Garnett, 1989: 4-5). However, the reality of some external threats cannot be dismissed. These threats emanated primarily from the African National Congressôs (ANC) military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and the Pan Africanist Congressôs (PAC) military wing, the Azanian Peopleôs Liberation Army (APLA), which regularly conducted cross-border activities. This included weaponsô smuggling and border crossings with the aim of carrying out terrorist operations in South Africa (RSA: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998).

The external dimension of threat perception decreased in significance as the Angolan war drew to a close in 1990. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent decrease in support it offered to the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) also decreased the extent of external threat perception (Malan in Hough & Du Plessis, 1992: 50). It remains clear, however, that the external dimension of threat perception was closely linked to internal threat perception. In this sense, external threat perception remained a significant part of South African strategic thinking that would shape security policy, including borderline control.

3.2 INTERNAL THREAT PERCEPTION

Despite the realities facing South Africa regarding external threats it was not territorial integrity and/or sovereignty that were at stake during the pre-1994 period. Rather, insurgent activity and incidents of sabotage presented the most tangible internal threats, which required certain domestic security measures. Garnett (1989: 5) notes that resistance movements ñgrouped around the ôfreedom charterô and ôblack consciousnessôpose[d] an infinitely greater threat than any outside pressureò

Furthermore, groups within the ANC, PAC, United Democratic Front (UDF) and the SACP also posed a perceived threat to internal stability (Malan, 1980:10; Hough & Van Der Merwe, 1988: 66). Specialist groups within these organisations, such as the MKôs Solomon Mahlangu Unit and the Dolphin Unit, were specifically tasked to carry out attacks on economic and military targets within the borders of South Africa (RSA: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998).

While the ideologies of the above-mentioned groups did not always correspond, the shared objective was perceived as rendering the state ungovernable (Hough & Van Der Merwe, 1988: 67). Threat perception at the time also included a broader spectrum of threats aimed at undermining the state in several sectors. This included threats to the countryôs political power base and also to the economic power base. It was, however, threats to the social and security power bases that influenced the approach to border control (Malan, 1980: 8-11).

- Threats aimed at the social base were perceived to be aimed at both the white and black communities. The internal role of liberation movements was seen as creating opposition to the apartheid government among its constituency. Examples of such attacks targeting the social base, include the July 1988 bombing of a Wimpy restaurant in Benoni by MK operatives, as well as the July 1993 attack on the St James Church in Cape Town by APLA operatives (RSA: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998; SAPA, 1998).

- Concerning the threat to the security base, external military operations to overthrow the government would have been unlikely at that time, given the military capacity of South Africa. Therefore, a low-intensity internal war focusing on ósoft targetsôwas perceived as the most tangible threat (Malan, 1980: 10). An example of such an attack on the security base was the MK bomb blast in Church Street in Pretoria on 20 May 1983. While many of the victims were civilian bystanders, the primary target was the South African Air Force headquarters (BBC News, 2005).

In the build-up to democratisation, between 1989 and 1994, internal threat perception remained prominent. This becomes clear considering former President

F.W. de Klerkôs statement, as quoted by Hough and Du Plessis (1992: 22-23), that ñ[w]e shall continue to deal with unrest, violence and terrorism with a firm hand [and] strong emphasis will be placed on even more effective law enforcementò. In addition to the threat of insurgent groups operating in the country, internal threats to stability also followed from a number of other factors. These included the general availability of firearms; the existence of private military entities, and mass protests within the country (Hough & Du Plessis, 1992: 26-27). The threat that this posed to internal stability prompted, for example, the regular involvement of the SADF in internal operations in an effort to maintain internal stability. Following the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia in 1990, the SADF became increasingly involved in the maintenance of internal stability by focusing on issues such as riots and terrorism (Malan as cited in Hough & Du Plessis, 1992: 88-89). As can be observed throughout the period between 1970 and 1994, internal threat perception played a significant role in South African security thinking.

3.3 THE LINK BETWEEN THREAT PERCEPTION AND BORDER CONTROL

Threat perception plays a major role in the shaping of border control policies. For example, Israelôs border protection measures along its borders with Syria and Egypt in the 1970s derived from a perception of inevitable military aggression by these countries (Ben-Zvi, 1995: 12). A similar trend can be observed in the US. Rudolph (2003: 606) argues that strict migration policies in the US and other developed countries flow from the post-9/11 perceived ñlinks between migration and military threatò. It can therefore be concluded that while in times of peace the focus is largely on border control, border protection becomes a priority during times of war and instability.

Pre-1994 South Africa saw the combination of internal and external threats influence its general threat perception and responses. However, the two domains were then so interlinked that the distinction between external and internal threat perception became somewhat artificial. Given the scope of infiltration and insurgent activities, specifically on the Angolan border, a highly militarised border protection approach was followed. In addition to the Namibian borderline with Angola, South Africaôs own territory was also vulnerable to infiltration and this prompted similar border protection

measures. Border protection served as a priority owing to ANC and PAC operatives who regularly attempted to cross the border to conduct terrorist operations within South Africa. Many neighbouring states were, in essence, hostile towards the South African government and were willing to host insurgent groups (Hough & Van Der Merwe, 1988: 65). Border protection was therefore essential in a counterinsurgency context. Given South Africaôs highly militarised state security apparatus and the need to act on insurgency, the SADF played a dominant role in both border protection and control. This resulted in the division between borderline protection and borderline control becoming somewhat blurred prior to 1994.

Prior to 1994, South Africa faced numerous internal and external threats to state security. The priority attached to border control in countering these threats is underscored by the heavy involvement of the state security apparatus, notably the SADF, in border protection and control. There was therefore a clear link between threat perception and border control in South Africa which impacted on the implementation of borderline control.

4. THE NATURE OF BORDERLINE CONTROL AND PROTECTION IN PRE-1994 SOUTH AFRICA

Given the importance attached to border control and protection in South African pre-1994 threat perception, it follows naturally that the military and police played the primary roles in securing the countryôs borders. Of prime importance, given the threats posed by cross-border insurgent movements, was control of the movement of people, weapons and goods.

4.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE AND BORDERLINE CONTROL

The SADFôs prominent role in border-related operations started in 1976 (Cilliers, 1994: 22). However, the SADF was, in some instances, active in border protection even before this date, as can be observed in the control of the Madimbo Corridor along the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) and Mozambican borders since 1972 (Whande, 2007: 22). Its role in borderline control and protection was further extended in 1979 during the division of responsibility of internal security operations between the SAP

and the SADF. This division allowed for the SAP to focus on urban operations, while the SADF became responsible for borderline protection and rural operations (RSA: Mortimer, 1997). From this can be deduced that the division of duties served two purposes. First, it allowed for more SAP members to be deployed internally, given increased unrest in black townships throughout South Africa. Secondly, by increasing the SADF presence on the border, counterinsurgency remained prioritised.

The involvement of the SADF in borderline control increased gradually from 1979 onwards with several significant border control operations being launched. In August 1985, the SADF officially took responsibility of border control from the SAP along South Africaôs external borders in the Eastern Transvaal. Under Operation Pebble, this control was extended to other border regions in the Transvaal as well as South Africaôs external borders in northern Natal and the eastern Free State. By July 1986, all borders were allocated to the SADF (RSA: Mortimer, 1997). Although security at ports of entry was primarily the function of the SAP in pre-1994 South Africa, the SADF influence on border control matters extended beyond mere borderline protection along the borderline. The SADF was, for example, used in search operations at various border posts on numerous occasions (Pretorius, 1995: 2). By December 1990, the SADF also assumed the õsearch responsibility at certain border posts from the SAPò (RSA: Mortimer, 1997).

The prominent role of the SADF was further underscored by the deployment of up to 3155 SADF forces for the purpose of border control by May 1990. A further 2576 soldiers were kept on standby for this purpose (RSA: Mortimer, 1997). However, while significant funds and manpower were allocated to SADF border-related operations, borderline control prior to 1994 served as a secondary function of the SADF due to the need for forces for the war in Angola. It also became apparent that maintaining the SADF along the immediate South African borderline would become increasingly difficult given cuts in defence spending in the late 1980s (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: South African Military Expenditure as Percentage of the Total Gross Domestic Product



World Bank. 2010. ñMilitary Expenditure as Percentage of the Total GDPò Internet: http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wbwdi&met=ms_mil_xpnd_gd_zs&idim=coun try:ZAF &dl=en&hl=en&q=south+african+military+spending (accessed: 27 April 2010).

Finally, the SADF was also used in a borderline role to enforce specific political measures. This included, for example, the SADF deployment along the Lesotho border to prevent illegal cross-border trade as part of a broader economic blockade imposed on the Lesotho regime during the early 1980s (UN, 1986). Maintaining a SADF presence in the border areas was common practice during this period. The SADF did, however, play a less prominent role along borders between South Africa and the various homelands. Borderline control between South Africa and the homelands was generally regarded as ineffective with the SAP playing the leading role (Marais, 1992).

4.2 CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ACROSS SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERS

In the context of the threat perception at the time, counterinsurgency was considered the main focus of borderline control and protection before 1994. The SAP was assigned the primary responsibility of controlling the movement of people across the international borders at the points of entry to South Africa. In contrast, the SADFôs main role was that of borderline control and protection, primarily through border patrols. Furthermore, the role of other departments, such as the Department of

Home Affairs, was small in comparison to that of the SAP and SADF. The Department of Home Affairs, for example, was assigned the task of deporting illegal immigrants (Van Niekerk, 1995: 5). Other groups that played a role at ports of entry were the various intelligence agencies (Steinberg, 2005(a): 2). Their involvement was likely to have derived from the focus on counterinsurgency at the time.

Illegal immigration posed a major challenge along the borderline prior to 1994. Owing to the economic and employment opportunities in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) and other areas, people from neighbouring countries crossed the border illegally. The South African Institute of International Affairs placed the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa at 1.2 million by 1989 (Solomon, 2000). By 1994, estimates on this number ranged from 500,000 to two million (Cilliers, 1994: 22). This included an estimated one million illegal foreigners who resided in the PWV area alone. These figures are supported by SAPS estimates at the time that place the figure at up to 3.5 million (Solomon, 2000). Deportations also serve as an indicator of the extent of illegal immigration along specific borderlines (Table 1).

Table 3.1: Department of Home Affairs Deportation Figures per Country for 1988 - 1992

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Mozambique	**33 446**	**38 758**	**42 330**	**47 074**	**61 210**
Lesotho	**4 400**	**4 728**	**3 832**	**4 440**	**6 235**
Swaziland	**1 839**	**1 269**	**1 225**	**1 828**	**2 283**
Botswana	**757**	**843**	**569**	**604**	**458**
Zimbabwe	**3 527**	**5 817**	**5 363**	**7 174**	**12 033**
Deportations	**44 225**	**51 550**	**53 418**	**61 345**	**82 575**

Source: Schutte, D.P.A. Migration: The Status Quo and Prospects for Southern Africa. ISSUP Bulletin 5/93. Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria.

As is clear from these figures, the South African-Mozambican border served as a crossing point for the vast majority of illegal immigrants, specifically after 1975. Prior to 1975, the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) operated on both sides of the South African and Mozambican border. The aim of TEBA was to serve as a formal recruiting agency for labour in South Africa. However, during the existence of TEBA,

and even more so after its closure in 1975, informal recruiters continued to operate along the border and facilitated the illegal movement of people. After the closure of TEBA, the borderline was placed under the control of the military (Whande, 2007: 22).

4.3 CURBING ILLEGAL FIREARMS THROUGH LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL

Borderline control also became increasingly important due to the constant influx of illegal firearms to South Africa. The borders of Mozambique, Swaziland and South-east Zimbabwe were of primary concern as these were the main routes for smuggling illegal firearms to South Africa (Goldstone, 1993). This was mostly due to the availability of weapons as a result of the Mozambican civil war from 1977 to 1992. In the three years preceding 1994, an estimated 40,000 illegal firearms entered South Africa. Curbing the inflow of illegal firearms was also essential in view of the counterinsurgency approach at the time. Illegal firearms were not only used to commit crimes in South Africa, but also had the potential to be used in politically motivated insurgent attacks (Gibson, 1996).

The need for effective border control in South Africa was exacerbated by the general lack of capacity of border control agencies in neighbouring states. The Swazi border police, for example, only confiscated 207 AK-47s and 206 small-calibre weapons between 1991 and 1996 (Gibson, 1996). The lack of trust and assistance from neighbouring statesô border control entities was furthered by a lack of regional political cohesion. The failure of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and the Mozambican government, owing to South African support for RENAMO and Mozambican support to the ANC, increased the distrust between the two countries (Alao, 1994: 74). This resulted in the need for increased South African border control owing to the ongoing threat from insurgency and weaponsô smuggling from neighbouring countries.

In the context of pre-1994 South African threat perception, the need to control the movement of people, weapons and goods across borders, resulted in numerous security challenges. Of particular concern was movement across the border at non-

designated crossing points. Therefore, to address insurgency and other security concerns at the time, specific borderline control measures were implemented.

5. SPECIFIC SOUTH AFRICAN BORDERLINE CONTROL MEASURES

In a comparison of international approaches to borderline control, Kruys (2002: 141) states that ñ[o]ther than control at specific sections of the borders in the late 1970s and 1980s for security reasons, South Africaôs borders have been porous throughout historyò. Some success at effective borderline control was therefore achieved during this period. This can partly be attributed to the implementation of practical borderline control measures and the deployment of the SADF in a borderline control and protection capacity.

5.1 PHYSICAL BORDERLINE BARRIERS TO ENHANCE CONTROL

The creation of a 134,5km electrified fence on the South African borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique served various purposes. This included counterinsurgency; curbing illegal immigration to South Africa, and preventing a spill-over of violence from Mozambiqueôs civil war. A large portion of the fence was therefore situated in the Kruger National Park (Cilliers, 1994: 22). The fence became a highly controversial issue as estimates of casualties resulting from the fence ranged from 89 to 200 over the period August 1986 to August 1989 (Monteiro, 1990).

Vegetation was also used on the border with Mozambique in the form of sisal, which was planted in high density to form a natural barrier which is difficult to breach. However, with elephants still roaming the area during that time, this borderline control measure was only partially effective (Kloppers, 2005: 73).

5.2 THE ROLE OF FARMERS IN BORDERLINE CONTROL

Borderline farmers were seen as an added security measure to enforce borderline control. Their importance is apparent if the Promotion of Density of the Population in Designated Areas Act of 1979 is considered. The aim of this Act was to encourage a flow of the white population to the border areas. By 1986, the borderline designated

under the Act included the entire border of the former Transvaal, as well as the border with Botswana in the Northern Cape. The Act provided for increased financial assistance to farmers willing to remain in these areas. Financial aid included an R8,000 grant to ensure increased security measures on farms, with a specific focus on the first two rows of farms adjacent to an international border (Hugo, 1988: 548-549).

Farmers themselves also pressured the government for additional security measures in border areas. These measures included increased SADF deployments in the border areas; government grants for increased security on farms; the tarring of roads to decrease the probability for landmine attacks, and increased security for school buses operating in border areas. Ex-Rhodesian farmers with experience in bush-war conditions also received incentives to settle in the border regions (Hugo, 1988: 549). Two important facts can be deduced from this. First, these efforts were in line with the counterinsurgency approach of the time. The South African government saw farmers on the borderline as an important asset in its counterinsurgency efforts (Anon, 1986: 2). Secondly, the call for border patrols, the stationing of soldiers on farms, and settlement schemes for ex-Rhodesian farmers with war-condition experience, confirm the militarised nature of South African borderline control at the time.

The establishment of security measures on borderline farms, as well as an interconnected radio network, increased the importance of farmers in borderline control (Hugo, 1988: 551). In the context of counterinsurgency, these farmers were seen as part of the first line of defence. Their importance to the military was also apparent and close relationships were fostered between the SADF and the farming community to enhance borderline security. One such example is the SADFôs territorial force, which was divided into ten regional command areas. The aim of this structure was to obtain localised information on insurgency (Baynham, 1990: 406). Those command areas situated along the borders placed emphasis on cooperation with farming communities and enhancing borderline control.

5.3 BORDERLINE CONTROL AND PROTECTION THROUGH LAND ALLOCATION

The allocation of government controlled land may also have constituted an indirect attempt at borderline control in pre-1994 South Africa. Two clear examples can be noted where ownership of land adjacent to international borders was redistributed to enhance security. First, the Madimbo Corridor, on the South African border with Zimbabwe, was excluded from Vendaôs territory during the formation of the homeland. Highlighting the need for security of this borderline area, the Corridor was placed under SADF control. A second example is the Pafuri Triangle, currently located in the Kruger National Park, between the Pafuri River and the Zimbabwean border (Map 3.1). This territory was key to illegal labour recruiters between 1920 and 1940, with groups of recruiters controlling certain portions by force (Murray, 1995: 373). In 1969, the security advantages of control of the Pafuri Triangle were realised and it was subsequently incorporated into the Kruger Park. After its inclusion in the Kruger Park, game rangers were employed in the area for the dual purpose of protecting the park and apprehending illegal immigrants. The rugged terrain and dangerous animals made it more difficult for illegal immigrants to enter South Africa through the park (Whande, 2007: 23).

The above-mentioned practical measures served to enhance the overall security of the borderline environment. On a strategic level, land allocation further aided borderline control where Black homelands had been established.

6. THE HOMELANDS POLICY AS AN INDIRECT FORM OF BORDERLINE CONTROL

The South African homelands policy prior to 1994 can also be seen as an indirect measure to maintain control in border areas. The structuring of the independent homelands evidenced this as it is clear that South Africa sought to maintain control of its external borders (Map 3.2). Of the four main homelands, namely, Venda, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Transkei, only the last two shared international borders with Botswana and Lesotho respectively. Given the threat of insurgency and illegal immigration, control of the northern borderlines linking South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique was of particular importance.

Map 3.1: Northern Borderline Areas of Security Concern – The Madimbo Corridor and Pafuri River



Whande, W. 2007. Trans-Boundary Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa: Local Historical and Livelihood Realities within the Great Limpopo Trans-Frontier Conservation Area. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape.

As part of South Africaôs borderline control measures, the SADF took control of the Madimbo Corridor (Map 3.1) in 1972, as already stated. Its capacity there was increased significantly in the early 1980s following Zimbabwean independence (Whande, 2007: 22). The erection of an electric fence; regular foot patrols, and the sisal project mentioned earlier provide further evidence of the importance attached to control of these areas. The importance of the Madimbo Corridor is also highlighted in the formation of Venda as an independent homeland. Seven Venda villages were removed to evacuate any human settlements from the corridor, which subsequently had a width ranging from six to ten kilometres (Whande, 2007: 9). It was also argued that the corridor was necessary for controlling the spread of disease carried by Zimbabwean cattle. This border corridor was maintained by the South African government and SADF forces were deployed along the borderline. A South African Air Force base was also constructed in the area to ensure added security. It also

allowed for some aircraft to assist in borderline control through aerial border patrols (Whande, 2007: 23; South African Air Force, 2007).

Bophuthatswana occupied a key strategic position as it bordered on Botswana as well as on South Africa. SADF involvement in the training and operation of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) was significant. It allowed for substantial South African influence over defence structures and planning in the BDF, including its approach to control of the border with Botswana. BDF bases were generally situated close to the Botswana border, such as a base at Mankwe and an operational base at Gopanu. The BDF also had the largest air force of all the independent homelands. Its aircraft included Allouette III helicopters and Pilatus P-68 trainers (Mills & Wood, 1992: 3). It can thus be assumed that this military capacity afforded improved borderline control measures along Bophuthatswanaôs borders with Botswana.

Map 3.2: Territories of Self-governance and Independent Homelands in South Africa before 1994



Source: South African Police Service. 2010. ñOld TBVC States and Self Governing Territoriesò Internet: http://www.saps.gov.za/_images/saps_profile/mtbvc1.gif (accessed: 16 April 2010.

7. CONCLUSION

Prior to 1994, South Africa faced a number of internal and external security threats that necessitated both border control and border protection. With reference to

security, insurgency arguably posed the most significant threat. As a result, the SADF became increasingly involved in borderline control and protection while the SAP was primarily responsible for point-of-entry control. Given the vast extent of the borderline, the deployment of the SADF played an important role in expanding borderline control and borderline surveillance. In addition to serving a counterinsurgency purpose, SADF deployments also served to limit illegal immigration and the flow of illegal firearms accross the country's borderlines.

Prior to 1994, South Africa also made use of a number of additional measures to ensure control of borderline areas. This included the involvement of farmers along the country's borderline and the establishment of physical barriers, including electric fencing. Land allocation, including the creation of Black homelands, was also done in a manner that ensured increased control of the country's border areas. By providing incentives for farmers to settle along the borderline, and through the deployment of SADF forces along sensitive borderline areas, counterinsurgency remained prioritised. Therefore, it is important to note that through the combined SADF and SAP involvement, as well as through political will, South Africa was able to implement relatively effective land borderline control over the period 1970 to 1994. This was achieved despite the country's extensive borders.

The next chapter discusses borderline control in South Africa in the post-1994 era. This includes the policy changes regarding borderline control; the roles of the SAP and SADF in land borderline control, and the impact of regional socio-economic realities on the South African border.

CHAPTER 4

LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994

1. INTRODUCTION

The immediate post-1994 political environment in South Africa resulted in drastic changes to border control. An environment of political openness; the demise of the counterinsurgency approach, and a desire for broader regional integration brought about significant changes in the approach to border control and, consequently, borderline control. However, given the new scope of border control and divergent political approaches to the issue, border control has been marred by uncertainty and inconsistency. Post-1994 South African border control has been characterised by regular changes in legislation and changes in agencies responsible for borderline control coordination and enforcement.

This chapter provides an overview of changes to land borderline control in South Africa after 1994, including legislative changes. Regional aspirations regarding the free movement of people within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are also referred to. This is followed by a broad overview of the various groups responsible for borderline control, and changes in borderline control policy that impacted on the execution of borderline control. Finally, some impediments to effective borderline control in the post-1994 era have been identified.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING BORDER CONTROL

The Interim Constitution of 1993 allocated the responsibility for borderline control to the SAPS. The Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993: Section 218) stipulates that ñsuch functions relating to border control and the import and export of goods may be assigned to the Service [SAPS] by lawò. Similarly, the South African Police Service Act allocates the SAPS the mandate to control illegal entry into South Africa (RSA, 1995(a): Section 13). However, rising crime levels have increasingly burdened the SAPS, resulting in the SANDF maintaining a role in borderline control in conjunction

with the SAPS (Lusse, 2001: 4). This deployment was in accordance with the Interim Constitution of 1993 that allowed for the SANDF to assist the SAPS internally when deemed necessary. The Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993: Section 227) stipulates the role of the SANDF in protecting the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the state as well as "service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own".

In June 1996 the Cabinet formally recommended that the President deploy the SANDF in its internal role in support of the SAPS as provided for by the 1996 Constitution. The recommendation also followed the guidelines of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (RSA: Office of the President, 1996). Such involvement, according to the NCPS, excluded the SANDF from assisting in routine crime prevention. However, it did provide a mandate to the SANDF to be involved in land and sea borderline control, as well as the maintenance of the integrity of South African airspace (Boshoff, 2001: 40). A cooperation agreement between the SAPS and the SANDF was subsequently signed and approved by Cabinet in June 1998. The agreement stated that the SANDF would be tasked with borderline control as a specific function (Lusse, 2001: 2). The Defence Act of 2002 made provision for this role of the SANDF as it provided for the SANDF to "effect national border control" (RSA, 2002(a): Section 18). The SANDF therefore assumed the function of borderline control while port-of-entry control was assigned to the SAPS in conjunction with other role-players.

A major change occurred in 2003 as a decision was taken to withdraw the SANDF from borderline control, mandating full responsibility to the SAPS. This decision was to be implemented over a period of five years from 2004 to 2009, with the first SAPS deployments commencing in 2004 (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 2). However, nearing the completion of the SAPS deployment, Cabinet again reversed the decision and, in 2009, announced the return of the SANDF to enforce borderline control. Deployment of this phase was set to commence on 1 April 2010 (RSA: Radebe, 2010).

Other legislation also placed emphasis on border control and borderline control. The Aliens Control Act of 1991 and the Immigration Act of 2002, which repealed the former, note the importance of borderline control (RSA, 1991; RSA, 2002(b). The preamble of the Immigration Act of 2002, for example, states that ñborder monitoring is strengthened to ensure that the borders of the Republic do not remain porous and illegal immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and deterredò (RSA, 2002(b): 3). The Act also notes the importance of effective port-of-entry control and states that illegal crossing into the country should be detected and punished (RSA, 2002(b): Section 2).

Although legislation prioritised borderline control after 1994, including land borderline control, various changes prevented its successful implementation.

3. REGIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER CONTROL

SADC became an integral part of South Africaôs foreign relations environment in the post-1994 period. SADCôs aim to effect the free movement of people and goods follows from various sources. As early as 1991, the African Economic Community Treaty noted the importance of a common African market to serve as a prelude to the free movement of goods and people (Hough, 2000: 5). This notion continues in the African Union (AU) which, through its Economic Partnership Agreements, aimed to achieve the free movement of people and goods by 2010 in four of the regional economic entities, including SADC (AU, 2010).

In 1995, SADC produced a Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1995). In 1998, SADC presented an Amended Draft Protocol with the main aims stipulated as movement without visas for citizens of member states; residential rights in other member states, and the right to work in another state (Hough, 2000: 11). However, the Draft Protocol, which was again tabled in Gaborone in August 2005, clearly stipulates that the right of entry, residence and work in another state is subject to the laws of the state concerned (SADC, 2005). By 2010, only five member states, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland had ratified the Protocol (Africa Civil

Society Forum, 2010). Such protocols, however, only become enforceable once signed and ratified by at least two-thirds of member states (Hough, 2000: 3).

SADC member states have been cautious on the matter of allowing unhindered free movement, and the relinquishing of state border controls. In 1996, Botswana's President, Ian Khama (then Head of the Botswana Defence Force), noted his concern over SADC initiatives to ensure the free movement of people, as it would be to the detriment of South Africa and Botswana with their regional economic advantages (Hough, 2000: 16). The intended construction of an electrified border fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe in 2007 seems to have underlined this sentiment even in more recent times (Phia, 2007).

The collapse of the Zimbabwean economy in 2008 further complicated the ideals of free movement of people in the region. By the end of 2008, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe reached 94 per cent, causing an outflow of Zimbabweans to other SADC member states, notably South Africa. An estimated three million Zimbabweans left the country to seek employment elsewhere (*Mail and Guardian*, 2010). Indicative of the immediate effect of the exodus to South Africa, is the fact that up to 70,000 Zimbabweans applied for asylum in the first nine months of 2008 (Hough, 2009: 6). Estimates of the total number of Zimbabweans in South Africa, legally and illegally, range from one to five million by the end of 2008. The majority of these immigrants indicated economic reasons for entering the country (Polzer, 2008: 6,7). The extent of illegal migration of Zimbabweans to SADC member states serves to highlight the inability of SADC to effectively control the movement of people.

Other criticisms levelled against the SADC Protocol are based on the inability of some SADC member states to implement effective borderline control and/or port-of-entry control. Dual membership of regional organisations by some SADC member states would present another practical problem for external border control. This includes examples such as the DRC and Angola, both members of SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS, 2010). The regional focus of criticism of the Protocol revolves principally around the expected influx of migrants to the more developed states in the Community. While the Protocol provides for SADC nationals to enter into another SADC state for a limited period without a visa,

it clearly notes that such a visit must be ñin accordance with the laws of the State Party concernedò(SADC, 2005). Hence there was no obligation on member states to allow completely unrestricted free movement of people. Although not directed only towards citizens of SADC states, or to the SADC Protocol, an example of such legislation can be found in the preamble of the South African Immigration Act of 2002 which stipulates the importance of regulating the influx of foreigners (RSA, 2002(b): 3).

Regional aspirations and increased economic imperatives underline the importance of the facilitation of movement of people and goods. This does not, however, imply that borderline control should cease to exist. It is thus essential for effective statutory bodies to oversee and coordinate attempts at borderline control.

4. ENTITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR BORDER CONTROL COORDINATION

Owing to South Africaôs militarised approach to border control prior to 1994, uncertainty regarding oversight and coordination of border control activities characterised the immediate post-1994 period. This invariably affected the coordination of borderline control as cooperation between different entities involved in the borderline environment was becoming increasingly challenging. The following sections attempt to identify the different entities responsible for borderline control coordination after 1994, and highlight some of the challenges faced by these statutory bodies.

4.1 THE BORDER AFFAIRS COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The first attempt at cooperation in the border environment was initiated by the SAPSôs Border Police. In July 1996, the Border Affairs Coordinating Committee (BACC), already mentioned, was established with the aim of bringing about policy consensus among all role-players in the environment (Minnaar, 2003: 24). Although the SANDF and, sporadically, the Border Police, were involved in borderline control, the BACC also addressed matters relating to borderline control (Beneke, 2001: 38). While serving as an initial project aimed at fostering cooperation, the BACC was followed by numerous other endeavours aimed at streamlining border control efforts.

4.2 THE NATIONAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE AND THE NATIONAL OPERATIONAL COORDINATING MECHANISM

Further attempts at fostering interdepartmental cooperation occurred in 1997 and during this year, the National Interdepartmental Structure (NIDS) was formed (Steinberg, 2005(a): 3). The permanent members of NIDS included members of the SAPS, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the South African Secret Service (SASS) and the Department of Home Affairs, all operating under a director from SARS (Minnaar, 2003: 97; Beneke, 2001: 38). Following an agreement on borderline control between the SAPS and SANDF, the SANDF was also invited to become part of NIDS (Minnaar, 2003: 97). The aim of NIDS was to balance the functions of increased movement of people and goods across borders with the curbing of transnational crime (Steinberg, 2005(a): 3).

Although NIDS aimed at a more integrated approach, the overall focus remained on port-of-entry control. Debate within NIDS centred largely on which organisation or department should take responsibility for port-of-entry control, while little mention was made of borderline control (Steinberg, 2005(a): 4). However, some aspects of borderline control were addressed through the coordination of borderline and port-of-entry control functions. This was aided by the launch of the National Operational Coordinating Mechanism (Boshoff, 2001: 43). This Mechanism was established to plan all intelligence operations by the SANDF in conjunction with the SAPS and the Departments of Justice, Welfare and Correctional Services (RSA: National Treasury, 1999). The Executive Heads Committee of NIDS also identified specific focal areas for the SANDF in terms of its borderline control function. NIDS was eventually disbanded in February 2001 to make way for a broader coordination institution (Beneke, 2001: 38).

4.3 THE BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

NIDS was succeeded by the Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC) established in October 2001. The BCOCC aimed at broader interdepartmental cooperation among the main role-players in all the facets of border

control. The BCOCC included the SAPS, SARS, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, the Department of Public Works and the SANDF (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 5).

Borderline control was also emphasised by the BCOCC and, in this regard, the SANDF played an important role (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 28). The importance of borderline control became clear with the establishment of a National Integrated Border Management Strategy (NIBMS) in 2008. The aim of the strategy was to ñexpedite the legitimate movement of cross-border trade and people migration, while deterring, detecting, identifying, preventing and where necessary interdicting illegal or hostile cross-border movementò (RSA: SAPS, 2008[b]).

The need for this strategy accrued from highly uncoordinated interaction between role-players responsible for port-of-entry control and those responsible for borderline control. The NIBMS, for example, identified a lack of surveillance and communications equipment to ensure effective control of the vast borderline (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 14). However, the main concern identified by the NIBMS relating to borderline control was the illegal movement of people across the border. This was seen to be exacerbated by a lack of borderline patrols due to the uncoordinated nature of SAPS and SANDF operations prior to and during the transfer of the borderline control responsibility from the SAPS to the SANDF in 2004 (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 16).

The BCOCC was thus established to address, *inter alia*, the improvement of the technological capabilities of border management bodies in order to enhance border control; to advise on policy matters with regard to integrated border management; to synchronize law-enforcement operations by different organisations involved in border control in an effort to curb illegal activities, and to focus on methods to limit the spread of communicable diseases across the borderline (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 31,34,58).

The main factor affecting the success of the BCOCC remains the fact that it was difficult to ensure the cooperation of all parties involved. This affected coordination between borderline control and control at designated ports of entry. There was, for

example, no legislation enforcing this cooperation and compelling all parties involved to participate in border control coordination (Mohlala, 2011). To rectify this, the NIBMS aimed at creating an Integrated Border Management Act (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 32). From this legislative endeavour, and the continued need for integration, further plans to restructure border management, including borderline control, would follow.

4.4 THE BORDER MANAGEMENT AGENCY

In June 2009, the government indicated its intention to establish a Border Management Agency (BMA). The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development also stated that ñ[t]his agency will improve the security of [the] borders and ports of entry and promote cooperation of security agencies in the region and meanwhile boosting the economic trade relationsò (RSA: Radebe, 2010). It would appear that both borderline control and port-of-entry control were to fall under the management of the BMA.

Some practical challenges have, however, delayed the inception of the BMA. First, should a Border Management Act be promulgated, it would also mean the streamlining of salary scales of different government departments involved in the border environment, including the SANDF, SAPS, SARS and Home Affairs. This may cause disparity within the individual departments involved. Secondly, with such a large number of departments involved, different labour laws in terms of unionisation exist that need to be standardised before any legislation can take effect (Mohlala, 2008).

While the process of establishing the BMA and its legislative imperatives continues, the BCOCC remains the overarching border control entity. The BCOCC thus continues to provide directives on borderline control. Government has also indicated its willingness to attempt to strengthen the BCOCC until the BMA is fully functional (RSA: Cwele, 2010). Indications are that the government aims at a fully operational BMA by 2014. This follows the establishment of a dedicated task team to overview problems with the integration of the BMA (Engelbrecht, 2011).

While structures responsible for the coordination of borderline control have changed considerably since 1994, it has been the SANDF and SAPS that have been responsible for effecting borderline control. However, uncertainties often characterised these deployments.

5. ROLES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE IN BORDERLINE CONTROL

In post-1994 South Africa, two distinct periods of borderline control by the SANDF can be identified. The first period, commenced in 1994 and ended in 2004, during which the SANDF assumed responsibility for borderline control as part of an agreement with the SAPS. Then, renewed SANDF deployments commenced in 2010, following a 2009 Cabinet decision to replace the SAPS on the borderline. The following sections discuss the changing policy directives for borderline control and the subsequent changes in SANDF/SAPS deployments along the borderline.

5.1 CHANGING POLICY DIMENSIONS AND DIRECTIVES

Although its effectiveness is questionable, some attention has been given to improved borderline control in the post-1994 period. Steve Tshwete, a former Minister of Safety and Security, noted, for example, that ñ[t]he illegal alien problem and cross-border crime originates, to some extent, from the border control or the lack thereof [and that] the Department has as one of its priorities the upgrading of this facetò (RSA: Tshwete, 2000: 7). The need to address border control was thus clear to the relevant authorities resulting in a number of policy changes.

Policy changes relating to borderline control have been significantly influenced by South Africaôs changing threat perception in the post-1994 period. This became apparent as Cabinet spokesperson, Themba Maseko, claimed in 2009 that ñ[t]he (Thabo Mbeki administration) decided that the SANDF, for instance, donôt have arresting powers and, secondly, the deployment of the Defence Force in the past was essentially meant to deal with the coming in of trained members of the liberation movements and that is why the SANDF was deployed in the pastò (Engelbrecht, 2009[b]). Changes in the countryôs threat perception also resulted in the restructuring

of the security sector which, in turn, influenced borderline control. One such example was the closure of all Commando units (Boshoff, 2009).

Further changes to the security sector also derived from the Defence Review of 1998. This Review stated, for example, that "government regards the on-going deployment of the SANDF in an internal policing capacity as undesirable… [and that] the SANDF is currently employed in cooperation with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and in border protection against non-military threats… [but] ideally the SANDF should be deployed in the former role only in the most exceptional circumstances…" (RSA: South African Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 1). While this did not have an immediate effect on SANDF deployments along the borderline, it did, however, become clear that the eventual aims were to reduce SANDF involvement, which largely focused on counterinsurgency prior to 1994, and to increase SAPS involvement. As these aims were translated into policy, they resulted in the replacement of SANDF deployments with SAPS deployments along the land borderline.

As stated previously, Cabinet took the decision, in 2003, to return the responsibility for borderline control to the SAPS. The Department of Defence stated in the SANDF Annual Report (RSA: SANDF, 2005: xvi) that this was the case as "the SANDF continued to support the SA Police Service with crime-prevention operations and borderline patrols… [but that the] Police Service [was] growing in its ability to deal with crime and therefore the support needed by the SANDF in this regard has steadily declined…". The SAPS could thus, it was argued, increase its focus on borderline control to relieve the SANDF from this internal deployment. Furthermore, pressure was also mounting on SANDF borderline deployments, as the SANDF was involved in a number of international peacekeeping missions that required large troop contributions (Engelbrecht, 2009[c]).

The Cabinet decision in October 2009 to return the SANDF to the borderline with effect from April 2010 marked yet another turning point in South Africa's borderline control policy (RSA: Radebe, 2010). This reversed the 2003 decision to allocate all borderline duties to the SAPS, as already stated. The reason for this change, it was argued, was that the SANDF is more capable of dealing effectively with cross-border

crime and organised crime along the borderline than the SAPS (Maseko as cited in Engelbrecht, 2009[c]). Cabinet consequently called for a phased approach to redeploy the SANDF on the borderline. This policy change came after widespread criticism of the SAPSôs attempt at borderline control, including a report on border control by the Auditor General finding borderline control to be highly inadequate (RSA: Auditor General, 2008). Similarly, the Department of Community Safety, Security and Liaison of the Mpumalanga Provincial Government, issued a statement noting that it would like ñto appreciate the national Cabinetôs decisioné of reconsidering bringing back the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to our bordersò (RSA: Mpumalanga Provincial Government, 2009).

5.2 ROLE AND TASKS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE IN BORDERLINE CONTROL: 1994 TO 2004

The Defence Review notes that ñSANDF employment should be concentrated in rural and border areas since these coincide with the military's conventional theatre of operationsò (RSA: South African Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 6). Specific tasks of the SANDF on the borderline included attempts at controlling the illegal cross-border movement of people and goods in areas other than designated ports of entry. This included, specifically, the smuggling of small arms and drugs as well as attempts to curb illegal immigration (RSA: South African Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 4). During temporary detention of detainees, the SANDF assumed the responsibility of providing them with medical services and food. The SANDF also retained the responsibility for the transportation of these detainees (Boshoff, 2001: 42).

While the focus remained on the primary tasks of curbing illegal immigration, the SANDF also remained involved in other activities on the borderline. The SANDF was involved in the detection of stolen vehicles and weapons on the borderline, as well as the recovery of livestock stolen from South African farms (Heinecken, 2002: 75). Its importance is, for example, reflected in SANDF successes in the recovery of stolen vehicles and weapons during its deployment as noted in SANDF Annual Reports (RSA: SANDF, 2003: 139) (Table 4.1). The South African Air Force also played a role in borderline control. Aside from providing air support to landward

forces deployed along the border, the Air Force also provided radar coverage of the borderline areas. This served the dual purpose of detecting the entry of undocumented aircraft and directing own air operations (RSA: South African Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 8).

Table 4.1: Operational Statistics of Recovered Weapons and Vehicles by the South African National Defence Force, 1995 to 2000

Years	Weapons	Vehicles
1995 ï 2000	**338**	**5709**

Source: Boshoff, H.J. 2001. ñThe Role of the SANDF in South African Border Control Mechanismsò in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C. and McClean, A. (eds.). The Challenge to Control: South Africaôs Borders and Borderline. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Furthermore, the SANDF employed specialised equipment suitable for land borderline control. This included the use of borderline sensors and surveillance equipment, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles and night-sight equipment, as already mentioned. Long-distance televisions and the SONOP, a visual monitoring device that allows for viewing of images from remotely placed cameras at a central point, also allowed for observation of a wider area. In addition, the SANDF deployed listening posts on the borderline to intercept radio transmissions (Boshoff, 2001: 42).

During land borderline control deployments, the SANDF also assisted the SAPS in the arrest of criminals involved in cross-border crimes, and the initial handling of borderline crime scenes. Boshoff (2001: 42) notes that the SANDF acted in conjunction with the SAPS to arrest suspected criminals where the basis for such an arrest existed and, thereafter, handed suspects over to the SAPS for criminal prosecution. Similarly, illegal goods obtained in borderline areas by the SANDF had to be handed over to the SAPS. Finally, crime-scene assistance by the SANDF involved the cordoning-off of crime scenes and the recording of evidence for criminal investigation.

5.3 BORDERLINE CONTROL DEPLOYMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: 1994 TO 2004

Following the directive of the Interim Constitution of 1993 which, as already stated, allocated borderline control to the SAPS, the deployment figures of the SANDF steadily decreased. From 1994 to June 1996 the SAPS was involved in borderline control based on the agreement between the SAPS and SANDF on shared borderline control under the NCPS (RSA: Office of the President, 1996). However, despite dwindling numbers, the SANDF still maintained a dominant presence on the borderline (Hennop, 2001: 1). In 1993/1994, 3,752 soldiers were deployed for borderline control, which then decreased to only 13 companies (approximately 2,000 soldiers) during 1994/1995 (RSA, 1995(c): 67). A turnaround occurred in the 1995/1996 period following a decision to again task the SANDF as the main role-player in borderline control. This followed largely as a result of rising crime levels which placed increasing domestic pressure on the SAPS. The agreement resulted in an increase in the number of SANDF contingents on the borderline in an attempt to allow the SAPS to focus more directly on rising crime (Lusse, 2001: 2). Over the 1995/1996 period the deployment figure increased to 23 companies (RSA: SANDF, 1996: 81).

The SANDF categorised its priorities for the land borderline in an attempt to direct its deployments. The borders connecting South Africa with Zimbabwe and Mozambique were accorded Priority One status. Priority Two was the borders connecting South Africa with Swaziland and Lesotho, while Priority Three referred to control of the borders between South Africa and Botswana and Namibia. SANDF deployments were limited to Priority One and Two areas (Boshoff, 2001: 43). The SANDF also used a filter system to assure the security of the borderline and adjacent areas. Filter One referred to the borderline itself, where soldiers were posted at substations every 10km along the border fence. From these positions motorised and foot patrols were conducted. During this period, an electric fence was still in place, which served as a force multiplier in Filter One. Filter Two referred to a 10km zone from the borderline. The focus of the SANDF in Filter Two areas fell on urban centres, roads and bus stops within 10km of the border. Filter Three referred to a 30-km zone adjacent to Filter Two, as well as any other area of military responsibility related to borderline

control. While control of Filter One depended largely on the conducting of regular patrols, Filters Two and Three were of concern in the curbing of the illegal movement of people and goods. Patrols in these areas were executed by conducting raids on pick-up points for illegal immigrants and the illegal movement of goods (Hennop, 2001: 2-3).

The SANDF deployments along South Africaôs northern and eastern borders functioned under the control of the Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) North (Figure 4.1). These borderline areas constituted an important part of broader land borderline control. However, this was hampered by decreasing SANDF numbers along the countryôs borders. By 2001, only four companies were being deployed by the RJTF North, managed from Messina, Nelspruit and Ermelo respectively. All borderline operations were directed from the RJTF headquarters in Pietersburg (now Polokwane) (Hennop, 2001: 2).

Figure 4.1: Structure of the Regional Joint Task Force North



Source: Hennop, E. 2001. ñSANDF Control of the Northern and Eastern Border Areas of South Africaò ISS Paper 52. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

SANDF deployments were also present along the borderlines linking KwaZulu-Natal with Mozambique and Swaziland. Hennop and Mclean (2001: 79), however, note, during interviews with borderline control officials, that a SANDF section of only 20 soldiers was responsible for patrolling the borderline between the Kosi Bay port of entry and the sea. These interviews also revealed that another SANDF section of only 12 soldiers was responsible for patrolling the rest of the Mozambican border up

to where it joins the Swaziland border. SANDF patrols in this area excluded patrols in the Ndumo Game Reserve and the Tembe Elephant Park. By 2003, SANDF deployments along these borders declined rapidly and, on average, only seven infantry companies were deployed along the South African borderline (RSA: SANDF, 2003: 136).

The SANDF was also deployed along the Lesotho borderline, categorised as a Priority Two borderline (Boshoff, 2001: 43). Patrolling of the 450km borderline only started in the 1970s as the relationship between South Africa and Lesotho deteriorated owing to the fact that Lesotho joined the Frontline States opposing South Africa (Steinberg, 2005: 2). The Lesotho borderline control operations were directed from the regional headquarters in Bloemfontein and then directed to the operational headquarters in Ladybrandt (Crush 2002: 48). SANDF deployments on the Lesotho border focused specifically on stock theft and illegal grazing. However, this deployment decreased dramatically and, by the end of 2002, only one company (approximately 150 soldiers) was responsible for patrolling the entire Lesotho borderline (Steinberg, 2005(b): 2). Furthermore, the deployment along the Lesotho border was concentrated largely on the Eastern Cape (Transkei) border with Lesotho (RSA: SANDF, 2003: 136).

During the period between 1994 and 2004, the SANDFôs presence on the borderline was primarily directed at the curbing of illegal immigration and illegal firearm smuggling. In this sense, the SANDF deployment achieved a number of successes (Table 4.2). These successes were achieved despite drastically decreasing numbers of soldiers deployed for the purpose of borderline control.

Table 4.2: South African National Defence Force Successes in Curbing Illegal Immigration and Weapon Smuggling between 1996 and 2003

Focus area	1996	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003
Illegal Immigrants detained	**18 048**	**n/a**	**46 864**	**59 547**	**74 253**	**47 440**	**57 774**
Weapons confiscated	**37**	**71**	**2 738**	**3 906**	**4 437**	**4 411**	**1 877**
SANDF companies deployed on borderline	**23**	**26**	**23**	**n/a**	**13**	**12**	**7**

Source: RSA: SANDF. 1996 ï 2003. SANDF Annual Reports. Pretoria: Government Printers. These figures may, in some cases, represent a combination of SANDF borderline successes as well as figures from internal operations in support of the SAPS.

5.4 SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE INVOLVEMENT FOLLOWING THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE TO BORDERLINE CONTROL

Following the already mentioned 2003 Cabinet decision relating to the SAPS taking over borderline control, SANDF involvement on the borders decreased from 2004 when the SAPS officially commenced their deployment. To implement this, an entry and exit strategy was conceptualised according to which SANDF units withdrew as soon as SAPS units were in place to assume the responsibility of a designated borderline area. The entry and exit strategy also included the handing over of borderline equipment to the SAPS. The Cabinet decision set the date for complete rotation at 2009 (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 6).

During the initial phases of the SAPS deployment, between 2004 and 2005, numerous borderline control bases were taken over by the SAPS. Others, specifically along the Lesotho and Zimbabwe borders, were still administered jointly by the SAPS and SANDF. This transition period was used by the SAPS to structure border control mechanisms and train the required personnel. The SAPS also constructed 13 additional bases in 2005 for the purpose of borderline control, spread along the borders of Northern Cape, North West, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal

(RSA: SAPS, 2006: 78). The assumption of the borderline control responsibility by the SAPS also brought about structural changes. The SAPS Annual Report of 2004/2005 (RSA: SAPS, 2005: 78) notes that ñ[a]s from 1 May 2005 the Protection and Security Services Division will be responsible for all matters relating to ports of entry security, while the Operational Response Services Division will be responsible for Borderline Control. The current subprogramme: Border Police, will therefore change to Borderline Security, while an additional subprogramme: Ports of Entry, has already been createdé ò

The number of SANDF soldiers involved in borderline control stood at 11 companies in the financial years 2002/2003 to 2004/2005, and continued to decline from then onwards (RSA: SANDF, 2003: 35; RSA: SANDF, 2005: 72). By 2008, the SAPS had assumed control of all borderline control posts along the Mozambican and Swaziland borders in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, except for the Komatipoort borderline district. Only 504 SANDF soldiers were deployed on average for the purpose of borderline control along the KwaZulu-Natal border with Mozambique and the Limpopo provincial border with Zimbabwe, as these areas were still administered jointly by the SAPS and SANDF. However, the Auditor Generalôs report on the status of borderline control noted that by July 2007, the SAPS had only deployed 283 members along the borderline compared to a structure that allows for the deployment of 970 personnel (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 9). The number of SAPS forces deployed along the borders were subsequently increased to 648 in 2008. During the financial year 2007/2008, the SAPS also commenced with borderline control training for members prior to their deployment (RSA: SAPS, 2008(a): 105-106).

It should be noted, however, that the commencement of deployment of the SAPS in 2004 occurred against the background of large scale reductions in personnel. In 1994, the SAPS had 143,800 members after the integration of the SAP and Homeland Police Units. By December 2001, this number had decreased to 120,640, of which only 100,114 were police officers and detectives (Schönteich, 2002: 6). During the 2008/2009 financial year, the SAPS invested more funds in its borderline capabilities, including the purchase of suitable borderline patrol vehicles and borderline patrol equipment such as night-vision binoculars. Increased mounted

capabilities, specifically along the mountainous Lesotho border, also became a priority (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 94).

By 31 March 2009, the transfer process between the SAPS and SANDF was completed as the SAPS assumed control of operational bases along the Zimbabwean border (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 94). However, the SANDF maintained its presence on the Zimbabwean borderline, along with the SAPS, under Operation INTEXO which was only set to terminate in March 2010 (RSA: SANDF, 2010: 80). By July 2009 only one infantry company was operating from Musina along a stretch of 55km of the border (RSA: SANDF, 2010: 23). This limited deployment was in response to a request by the SAPS for the SANDF to maintain a presence until after the FIFA World Cup ended (Engelbrecht, 2009[a]). As such, the SANDF maintained a presence on the Zimbabwean border even after the SAPS was expected to assume full responsibility of the entire borderline by 2009. During the SAPSõs assumption of borderline control, criticism of the state of borderline control grew rapidly (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 10). This laid the foundation for a Cabinet decision to replace the SAPS by returning the SANDF to the borderline with effect from 1 April 2010, as noted earlier (RSA: SANDF, 2010: xvi).

5.5 SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE INVOLVEMENT IN BORDERLINE CONTROL SINCE 2010

As part of the decision to redeploy the SANDF on the borders in 2010, a phased return to the borders was proposed. This return was to commence along the Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders. Phase One started with the deployment of four SANDF companies on 12 April 2010, following initial training (SAPA, 2010). This phase also included the deployment of two engineering platoons, to ensure the maintenance and repair of the border fence. Phase Two included the deployment of a further four infantry companies along the northern borderlines with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Phase Three envisioned a total of 11 infantry companies, while Phase Four aimed at increasing this to 14 companies. Phases Three and Four were aimed at deployments along the Swaziland and Lesotho borders as well (RSA: SANDF, 2010: 143; Engelbrecht, 2010[b]).

The guidelines for renewed SANDF deployments were in accordance with those of earlier deployments. The primary aim was to ensure the monitoring of the border fence and to provide reaction capabilities through mobile patrols (SAPA, 2010). The strategy was, however, to adopt a more integrated approach than previously employed by the SAPS. The Chief of the SANDFôs Joint Operations Division, Lieutenant General Themba Matanzima, and the Chief Director for Operations, Rear Admiral Philip Schöultz, stated that ñthe military will re-introduce foot- and standing patrols, observation and listening posts, vehicle control points, reaction force and follow up operations (to include the extended border area) and depth operations (road blocks to a depth of 20km to the rear of the borderline in conjunction with the SAPS) in addition to intelligence operations to collect information on illegal cross-border activitiesò(Engelbrecht, 2010[a]).

In the light of the above statement, it would seem that the planning of new deployments heeded the call by the Auditor General that borderline control should be intelligence-driven (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 3). This notion of intelligence-driven operations was also reflected in the leading role that the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), the National Joint Operations Centre and other Intelligence structures played in borderline control. The interaction between the Defence Intelligence structures and the above-mentioned entities also indicated a more integrated approach to borderline control (RSA: SANDF, 2010: 71).

Given the regular changes in borderline responsibilities between the SAPS and SANDF in post-1994 South Africa, it is clear that continuity in borderline control is lacking. Numerous problems have thus arisen as a result.

6. CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE BORDERLINE CONTROL IN POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICA

Borderline control in the post-1994 era has been negatively affected by a combination of ineffective coordination; the discontinuity of entities involved, and physical borderline constraints. The following sections expand on these factors.

6.1 SHORTCOMINGS OF ENTITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR BORDER CONTROL COORDINATION

Although a clear need for coordination of border control measures existed, the lack of cooperation among departments involved in this often contributed to a lack of success. The first attempt to establish cooperation, under the BACC, set the tone for disunity as it was dominated by the Border Police (Minnaar, 2003: 24). The effectiveness of the BACC was affected by the fact that other organisations and departments, such as Customs, also established parallel bodies for coordination. As such, the BACC and other coordination measures at the time were ñpiecemealò at best (Steinberg, 2005(a): 3). Similarly, NIDS had little impact on borderline control owing to the fact that it focused rather on coordinating port-of-entry control. This included technological and infrastructure improvements, as well as the re-classification of all ports of entry, while little mention was made of improving borderline control (Minnaar, 2003: 28-29).

The BCOCCs approach to borderline control has also been subject to criticism. The Auditor Generalôs report on the status of borderline (RSA: Auditor General Report, 2008: 5) notes ñ[a] lack of proper holistic oversight and control over the strategic planning processé [that] increased the risk of operational inefficiency and ineffectivenessò. The report also states that both the strategic plan on borderline control and the divisional policy on borderline operations were no more than draft policies (RSA: Auditor General Report, 2008: 6). The fact that senior decision makers were absent from the BCOCC added to a lack of effective decision-making (Steinberg, 2005(a): 5). In addition, the BCOCC was guilty of not providing proper oversight or supervision to facilitate a timely and effective transfer of borderline control between the SANDF and SAPS, as directed by Cabinet, in 2003 (RSA: Auditor General Report, 2008: 12). This could also be ascribed to the decrease in focus on borderline control, while port-of-entry control gained prominence. Perhaps the clearest indication of this was noted by Steinberg (2005(a): 6), who states that ñ[i]n 1994, border control was a defensive security functioné [but] by 2004, it had become, above all else, a mechanism of trade facilitationò.

In general, the lack of effective coordination of borderline control can be attributed to the lack of an intelligence-driven approach which severely curbed its effectiveness. This refers to crime intelligence specific to the borderline itself as well as cooperation with borderline intelligence structures from neighbouring states (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 11).

6.2 PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS

Numerous practical difficulties, both as a result of mismanagement and environmental imperatives, have added to ineffective borderline control in South Africa. The extent of South Africaôs 4,862km land borderline makes it difficult to control. A minimum of 28 infantry companies and at least seven aircraft are required for adequate borderline control (Lusse, 2001: 5). This has not been achieved in the post-1994 era which saw the highest number of infantry companies deployed at 26 in 1997 (RSA: SANDF, 1997: 23). This number decreased rapidly thereafter, notably following the 2003 decision to transfer the borderline control responsibility from the SANDF to the SAPS, as already stated. Managing this extensive borderline is also complicated by the fact that land borderlines often cut through traditional tribal lines, as is the case, specifically, with the South African border with Lesotho (Steinberg, 2005(b): 1).

Other practical difficulties also reduced the efficiency of land borderline control, including the border fence itself. In many instances, the border fence does not deter illegal immigration. In other cases, border fences have been removed completely or have not been erected, while rivers or dams serve as porous border demarcation lines (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 9). In this regard, a group of farmers on the South African border with Lesotho stated, in 2010, that ñborder infrastructure and security has disintegrated to such an extent that it has become almost impossible for farmers to continue farmingò (*Sunday Express*, 2010). The disabling of the electric border fence along the South African borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe has further increased the need for patrols in these areas. During its operational period, as stated previously, the electrified fence (and other initiatives such as the sisal project) served as a force multiplier in land borderline control (Lusse, 2001: 5).

Political decisions also affected borderline control. One of the main events impacting on borderline control was the removal of the Commandos who played an important role in rear-area protection (Du Toit, 1997: 7). Although Commandos were not actively deployed for the purpose of borderline control, their disbanding resulted in the removal of a valuable intelligence-driven network in rural areas, which included borderline areas. Similarly, all SANDF reserve force members (a total of nine platoons) were systematically withdrawn from the borderline by the end of 2009 (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 5). A lack of directives on borderline control protocol exacerbated the problem. SANDF members were, for example, often under constraint to act as SAPS approval was required, resulting in delays in the arresting of illegal immigrants. The morale of borderline control personnel was also adversely affected by the ineffectiveness of the deportation system. As a result, corruption became a problem, with SANDF forces deployed along the borderline often being offered bribes by criminal organisations and illegal immigrants (Heinecken, 2002: 75-76).

As already stated, financial constraints also hampered borderline control, most notably due to cuts in the Defence Budget that shrunk from almost three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1994 to just 1.36 per cent of GDP in 2008 (World Bank, 2010). This reduction made it increasingly difficult for the SANDF to effectively maintain its secondary roles, including borderline control. A practical example would be the withdrawal of motorcycle platoons from the borderline environment in 2000 owing to financial shortages. The motorcycle platoons served as an efficient force multiplier (Hennop, 2001: 3). With the SAPS re-assuming the borderline control function in 2004, financial allocations also decreased. For example, the SAPS budget for borderline functions stood at R178,433,000 for the financial year 2008/2009. (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 165). This indicates a decline, as R183,469,000 was allocated to border policing in the financial year 2005/2006 (RSA: SAPS, 2006: 147). In its 2009/2010 budget, the SAPS allocated R155,035,000 more to VIP protection than to the borderline control function (Engelbrecht, 2009[b]).

Following the SAPS assumption of borderline control in 2004, practical problems experienced during the previous SANDF deployments only seemed to have been exacerbated. As mentioned, borderline control under the SAPS lacked specific

communications facilities, as well as reconnaissance and surveillance equipment (RSA: BCOCC, 2008: 12). This correlates with the findings of the Auditor General that the SAPS lacked operational effectiveness due to a shortage of available equipment. It was also indicated that the SANDF did not hand over all relevant equipment for borderline control as initially agreed to. Aside from limited equipment, the SAPS also faced immense human resources deficiencies which can directly be related to mismanagement. For example, the Auditor General noted that in 2008, the SAPS was 71 per cent understaffed on South African land borderlines. Such deficiencies were further exacerbated by the lack of borderline-specific training for members of the security forces involved in this environment prior to the (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 9-12). Only during the financial year 2007 to 2008, did the SAPS commence with borderline-specific training for members prior to their deployment (RSA: SAPS, 2008(a): 106).

7. CONCLUSION

Changing domestic and regional circumstances in the post-1994 period impacted on the South African borderline control situation. However, this gave rise to a number of problems. A lack of continuity in the entities responsible for coordinating borderline control seems to have impacted on its effectiveness. In addition, the lack of clear policy directives has rendered these entities ineffective which, in turn, has translated to ineffective guidance on borderline control operations. Often, those responsible for control were also guilty of neglecting borderline control in favour of port-of-entry control.

Owing to changes in policy, the constant alternation of SANDF and SAPS deployments between 1994 and 2010 further decreased borderline control effectiveness. Prior to 1994, the SADF was the dominant role-player in borderline control and it developed expertise in managing its borderline control function. Removing the SANDF from this environment in the post-1994 period resulted in loss of expertise and a lack of continuity. In conjunction with the abolition of the Commandos, this added to a further disintegration of a well established borderline control network. Intelligence-driven borderline operations also decreased significantly in the post-1994 era. In addition, the border-related experience of the

SAPS prior to 1994 was primarily focused on port-of-entry control, and its introduction to the broader borderline control resulted in a further loss of borderline control capacity. Demonstrating a lack of expertise, inadequate equipment, limited personnel and poor policy directives, the SAPSõs efforts at borderline control were largely unsuccessful.

As regional and continental instability remained, South Africa became an increasingly attractive destination for illegal migrants and crime syndicates in the post-1994 era. The policy turnaround that saw the return of the SANDF to borderline operations in 2009, and the plans to establish the BMA are perhaps the best indications that drastic measures were needed to repair the breakdown of borderline control. However, years of neglect and eschewed policy directives have already had some security implications for South Africa.

The next chapter provides an overview of the security implications of the current South African approach to borderline control. The security implications relating to illegal immigration are discussed, including the link between illegal immigration and crime as well as the phenomenon of attacks on foreigners in South Africa. Various forms of cross-border crime are analysed, including weapons smuggling; stock theft; borderline criminal gangs, and vehicle smuggling. Finally, the link between ineffective borderline control and the spread of disease is also discussed.

CHAPTER 5
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LAND BORDERLINE SITUATION

1. INTRODUCTION

From the preceding chapter it is clear that a number of deficiencies characterised South African borderline control in the post-1994 period. While borderline control legislation was in place, the official bodies responsible for coordinating control were largely ineffective, resulting in a lack of proper land borderline control. Furthermore, they often prioritised port-of-entry control over borderline control. In conjunction with these factors, the systematic withdrawal of the SANDF between 2004 to 2010, resulted in the land borderline becoming largely unpatrolled. This contributed to a physical deterioration of borderline infrastructure, including borderline fences. The inadequate deployment of the SAPS along the borderline did little to prevent a subsequent surge in borderline-related crime. Apart from the increased problem of crime, regional realities, such as the already mentioned economic crisis in Zimbabwe in 2008, and numerous ongoing conflicts on the African continent, combined to bring about push factors for migration to South Africa. Given these problems, the need for effective borderline control should have been foreseen. However, the poor response to borderline requirements only served to exacerbate the security implications for South Africa.

This chapter evaluates the most salient security implications for South Africa as a result of ineffective land borderline control. First, a broad overview of the official perceptions of national security in South Africa will be provided to serve as a framework for assessing both external and internal security threats. Then, the impact of illegal immigration on security in South Africa is discussed, assessing the links between migration, crime and the occurrence of violence against foreigners. The role of the land borderline in controlling the spread of disease is also analysed. Finally, numerous security threats along the physical borderline are of importance. These include the smuggling of arms, goods and drugs; violent robberies along the

borderline; vehicle smuggling across the borderline; stock theft, and the issue of human smuggling and trafficking.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The development and expansion of the concept of national security in South Africa has followed international trends, as discussed in Chapter Two, and moved beyond a predominantly military threat perception. This was reflected in, for example, the White Paper on Defence, which notes the inclusion of socio-economic and political matters as national security threats by stating that "the greatest threats to the South African people are socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence" (RSA: White Paper on Defence, 1996: 4). Similarly, the White Paper on Intelligence notes that "[n]ational security objectives should encompass the basic principles and core values associated with a better quality of life, freedom, social justice, prosperity and development" (RSA, 1995(b): 4). In the immediate post-1994 era, the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was, for example, viewed as an integral part of ensuring broader national security as it focuses on developmental and societal issues rather than military threats.

It is therefore clear that official South African policy with regard to national security, in the post-1994 era, encompassed the concept of 'human security'. With this change in focus, a two-pronged approach to national security was set out in the White Paper on Defence. First, in international terms, national security would mean the assurance of "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" and the promotion of regional security". Secondly, it would focus on advancing democracy, addressing rising crime levels, ensuring social justice within the scope of maintained economic growth, and maintaining a politically stable state (RSA: White Paper on Defence, 1996: 6)

As South Africa sought broader regional and global integration in the post-1994 era, the challenge was to bring about integration without undermining national security. In

this sense, illegal immigration presents one of the most salient issues that could potentially impact on national security.

3. THE IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Not all illegal immigration to South Africa is the result of poor borderline control. However, this remains an important factor that should not be overlooked. The following sections examine the extent of illegal migration to South Africa. Some official views on illegal immigration, as well as the main security implications of illegal immigration for South Africa, including crime and attacks on foreigners, are also analysed.

3.1 THE EXTENT OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

Prior to 1994 already, economic opportunities in South Africa caused the country to become a popular migration destination, specifically to migrant workers from neighbouring countries. Moreover, regional realities such as conflicts, drought and poor socio-economic conditions served as further ñpush factorsò that increased migration (Schutte, 1993: 4). Owing to these regional realities, an increase in illegal immigration to South Africa could be observed by the early 1990s. In 1989, the South African Institute of International Affairs estimated that up to 1,2 million illegal immigrants resided in South Africa (Solomon, 2000: 2). These figures are supported by statistics indicating that the annual number of repatriations increased from 44,225 in 1988 to 96,515 in 1993 (Maharaj & Rajkumar, 1997: 257).

The post-1994 period is characterised by increased uncertainty about the exact number of illegal immigrants in South Africa. However, it is clear that numbers rose significantly after 1994. This can be deduced from the increase in people who overstayed their visa time limit in South Africa (Figure 5.1). During 1990, approximately 50,000 people overstayed their official visa time limit in South Africa, compared to 300,000 in 1995. This figure increased to 900,000 by the end of the century (RSA: The State of South Africaôs Population Report, 2000: 16). While estimates regarding illegal immigrants in South Africa remain speculative, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) estimates the number of illegal

foreigners to have been at between 2.5 and 4.1 million by 1998. However, a former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, had already placed it at between 2.5 and 5 million in 1997 (Solomon, 2000: 2).

Figure 5.1: Total of Overstayed Visas in South Africa from 1980 to 2000



Source: RSA: 2000. The State of South Africaôs Population Report. Pretoria: Government Printers.

The post-2000 period saw a significant addition to these figures due to increased political instability in Zimbabwe. Deportation numbers from South Africa increased from approximately 150,000 in 2001, to well over 200,000 by 2005 (RSA: Auditor General, 2007: 3). This trend has continued as a combination of figures from ports of entry in 2006 reveals that 245,294 people were deported during that year, of which 127,097 were from Zimbabwe (Kruys, 2007: 4). By 2007, deportation figures on the Zimbabwean border were estimated to reach up to 17,000 in some months (Kruys, 2007: 4, 5). Illegal immigration, specifically by Zimbabwean citizens, reached such high levels that the South African government introduced a special dispensation for Zimbabwean citizens illegally in the country in 2010. Through the Zimbabwean Documentation Project (ZDP), Zimbabwean citizens who were in the country illegally, or had overstayed their visa limit, could register for a renewable permit which would allow them to remain in the country. The programme closed on 31 December 2010 and a total of 275,762 applications, including 6,243 amnesty applications, were received. In addition, the Department of Home affairs indicated its

intention to implement further such registration processes to address the high number of illegal migrants from other neighbouring countries. (RSA: Mamabolo, 2011).

An estimated three to six million ñundocumentedò foreigners were also mentioned in the SAPS Annual Report of 2008/2009 (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 9). In late 2009, the Minister of Home Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, indicated that estimating the number of illegal immigrants in the country was "difficult" (SAPA, 2009). The implication of these figures, amongst others, is that ineffective borderline control is one of the factors contributing to the increasing number of illegal immigrants entering South Africa.

Despite uncertainty regarding the exact number of illegal immigrants in South Africa, it is clear that illegal immigration has become increasingly prominent in recent years. The following section provides an overview of selected official perceptions regarding illegal immigrants in South Africa.

3.2 SELECTED OFFICIAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE THREAT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Illegal immigration has, on numerous occasions, been identified as a significant problem facing post-1994 South Africa. As early as 1996, a former minister of Home Affairs, Mangusuthu Buthelezi, noted that ñthe influx of illegal immigrants [poses] a threat to the RDP and the prosperity of citizensò (RSA: Buthelezi, 1996). Buthelezi thus called on continued efforts by the central government, in cooperation with neighbouring countries, to limit the influx of illegal migrants.

In 1997, Buthelezi further alluded to both the advantages and disadvantages of immigration. In terms of advantages, he noted that ñ[t]he Department realises that a properly managed immigration programme can be of great economic, social and cultural benefit to the country. The [departmentôs] policy is therefore aimed at allowing entry only to those persons who can contribute substantially towards the needs of the country in the form of personal skills or investments leading to industrial expansion and job creation for the local population.ò He did, however, reiterate the negative effects of illegal immigration by stating that ñwith an illegal alien population

estimated at between 2,5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens. With unemployment running at above 34 per cent and millions of illegals making a living in South Africa, it can be postulated that if all the illegal aliens were removed, the unemployment problem will be closer to a solutionò(RSA: Buthelezi, 1997).

Illegal immigration remained a priority as the then Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, in 2004, reiterated the Department of Home Affairsô commitment to increase security at the ports of entry. It was further noted that the department aimed at focusing on cooperation with other departments to address the issue of illegal immigration (RSA: Mapisa-Nqakula, 2004). This was underscored by the establishment of the departmentôs National Immigration Branch, which was assigned the specific task of facilitating arrival and departures at ports of entry with the aim of decreasing illegal entries (Ndou, 2005). The threat posed by illegal immigration remains an ongoing concern, as is also clear from more recent official statements. In 2011, the Minister of Housing, Tokyo Sexwale, stated that the presence of illegal immigrants brings about unnaturally high levels of population growth which complicates the provision of housing (RSA: Sexwale, 2011).

Despite official statements often pointing to the threats of illegal immigration, they have, on some occasions, also pointed to its unmanageable nature. In 2007, former President, Thabo Mbeki, stated with regard to the influx of illegal immigrants that ñI personally think that it's something we have to live with...it's difficult; you can't put a Great Wall of China between South Africa and Zimbabwe to stop people walking across" (RSA: Mbeki, 2007). This notion was also reflected in what seems to be a different view emerging in 2008, changing from efforts to curb illegal immigration towards the facilitation of migration. This was captured by Mapisa-Nqakula as she stated that ñ[t]he worst would be...to go back to the past where we had electric fences meant to restrict people [and that] tighter border controls would actually encourage illegal migration" (RSA: Mapisa-Nqakula, 2008).

Given that illegal immigration has increased drastically since 1994, the increase in illegal immigrants has often been associated with other security threats, including South Africaôs high crime rate.

3.3 THE LINK BETWEEN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND CRIME

South Africa has one of the highest crime rates in the world. The murder rate, calculated to be 34,1 for every 100,000 citizens in 2009/2010, places South Africa among the highest homicide rates in the world. Furthermore, 2,121,887 serious cases of crime were reported in South Africa during 2009/2010. Property-related crime and contact crimes constituted 26,1 and 31,9 per cent of this figure respectively (RSA: SAPS, 2010: 1-3). Although no specific statistics are kept in this regard, it has become clear that illegal immigrants are increasingly involved in crime in South Africa, thus contributing to insecurity. Statistics from the Department of Correctional Services confirm this notion as they indicate that 8,580 foreign nationals, both legal foreigners and illegal immigrants, were imprisoned in South Africa by August 2010, of which 4,868 had been sentenced (RSA: Department of Correctional Services, 2010).

Solomon (2000) notes that police documentation claims the involvement of illegal immigrants in a number of crimes, including ñdiamond smuggling, small arms proliferation, narco-trafficking, car-hijacking, taxi violence, burglaries, stock theft and involvement in political massacresò. Media reports on the matter endorse the notion that foreigners are involved in a wide array of crimes in South Africa. The following serve as selected examples during 2010, although it is not always clear whether the foreigners involved are illegal or not or, indeed, whether it is only foreigners and not also local citizens who are involved. Reports state:

- On 14 May 2010, two Zimbabwean nationals were arrested in Johannesburg for possession of 2,500 kilograms of commercial explosives. These types of explosives are regularly used in ATM bombings (News24, 2010[c]).
- On 25 June 2010, a public demonstration took place in Johannesburg against foreigners, notably Zimbabweans and Nigerians, who purchased RDP houses for as little as R10,000 (News24, 2010[d]).

- On 25 August 2010, six Zimbabwean nationals and a South African national appeared in court on charges related to copper theft (News24, 2010[a]).
- On 28 April 2010, two Mozambican men were arrested in connection with an assault on a domestic worker and a one-year-old baby in Johannesburg. A third suspect was believed to have fled to Mozambique (News24, 2010[b]).

The involvement of illegal immigrants in crime also affects crime statistics. The SAPS Annual Report of 2008/2009 (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 9) notes that ñcrime ratios may be inflated by 10 [to] 20 [per cent] - particularly if it is kept in mind that most of the estimated [three to six] million immigrants may belong to the economically active age group as well as the high crime risk age group. The murder ratio may therefore actually have been 27,3 per 100,000 and not 34,1 per 100,000é ò Figures of the Department of Correctional Services are in line with this statement, as it notes that more than 75 per cent of foreign nationals, including illegal immigrants, incarcerated in South Africa were involved in economic and aggressive crimes (RSA: Department of Correctional Services, 2010). Furthermore, a study on the profiling of house robbers in South Africa revealed that an estimated 17 per cent of such criminals were foreign nationals (Zinn, 2008). Given the fact that South Africa recorded 256,577 house robberies in 2009/2010, this figure becomes quite significant (RSA: SAPS, 2010: 4).

In addition to the threat of crime, increasing numbers of illegal immigrants have also resulted in growing tensions between local communities and foreign nationals, further impacting on domestic security.

3.4 LINKING ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

As a result of the high number of illegal immigrants in South Africa, even prior to 1994, attacks on foreigners have a long history in the country. A number of examples of attacks on foreigners throughout South Africa during this period include attacks on Mozambicans in Hlaphekani, near Giyani, in 1990 and clashes between local residents and illegal Namibian immigrants in Hout Bay in 1994 (Solomon, 2000). However, the most significant series of attacks on foreigners in the post-1994 period commenced on 11 May 2008 in the township of Alexandra in Gauteng. An

estimated 62 people were killed and 670 injured as the attacks subsequently spread around the country. Furthermore, reports claim that up to 100,000 people were displaced. These events have been seen by some as evidence of an ever increasing anti-foreigner sentiment in South Africa (Landau, 2008: 1).

South Africans also seem to have high levels of dissatisfaction with illegal immigrants in the country. A 1997 survey revealed that, regardless of race and educational level, most South Africans believed the influx of illegal immigrants to be highly problematic (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). In this survey, 73,6 per cent of participants indicated that illegal immigrants were either ôunwelcomeô or ôvery unwelcomeô in South Africa (Table 5.3) (Solomon, 2000).

Table 5.1: Response of Participants to Whether the Influx of Illegal Immigrants is Good or Bad, Analysed by Educational Level.

Educational Levels (Percentage)	Good	Bad	Neither	Uncertain
Higher than Gr. 12	**8**	**81**	**9**	**2**
Grade 12	**12**	**72**	**12**	**4**
Grade 8 -11	**18**	**64**	**12**	**6**
Grade 7 and lower	**18**	**58**	**18**	**6**
No schooling	**15**	**59**	**14**	**12**

Solomon, H. 2000. ñContemplating the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Republic of South Africaò Unit for African Studies Working Paper. Pretoria: Centre for International Political Studies.

The attacks during 2008 occurred in the context of global food and fuel price increases. Violence aimed at foreigners mostly occurs in poorer communities where an increase in the cost of food and fuel has the greatest impact (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Perceptions regarding service delivery have also contributed to the violence, as frustration over a lack of access to basic services, such as government housing and adequate medical facilities, were directed towards foreigners. Similarly, South Africans also perceived foreign nationals employed in the country as a cause of high unemployment among the South African citizens. Furthermore, local political manoeuvring contributed to the violence, and community leaders were often found to be involved in the attacks on foreigners to gain political and/or economic influence in

their communities (Maina *et al*, 2011: 3-4). Therefore, worsening socio-economic conditions; general frustration over service delivery; personal political ambitions, and existing perceptions on the role of foreigners in exacerbating the plight of the poor, served as a catalyst for the violence (CNN, 2008).

Table 5.2: Response of Participants to Whether the Influx of Illegal Immigrants is Good or Bad, Analysed by Race.

Race (Percentage)	Good	Bad	Neither	Uncertain
Blacks	**21**	**56**	**15**	**7**
Asians	**14**	**65**	**18**	**3**
Coloureds	**5**	**77**	**9**	**9**
Whites	**1**	**93**	**5**	**1**

Solomon, H. 2000. ñContemplating the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Republic of South Africaò Unit for African Studies Working Paper. Pretoria: Centre for International Political Studies.

Table 5.3: Response of participants to Whether Illegal Immigrants are Welcome in South Africa in General.

Respondents (Percentage)	Very Welcome	Welcome	Neither	Unwelcome	Very Unwelcome	Don't Know
Respondents	**3.2**	**12.7**	**7**	**35.8**	**37.8**	**3.6**

Solomon, H. 2000. ñContemplating the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Republic of South Africaò Unit for African Studies Working Paper. Pretoria: Centre for International Political Studies.

Following renewed attacks on foreigners in the Western Cape in 2010, a former ANC provincial chief whip, Max Ozinsky, noted that "it is clear that perpetrators of xenophobic violence do not usually distinguish between those legally in the country and those notò (in Makinana, 2010). However, given the large numbers of illegal immigrants in South Africa, a significant number of those attacked were believed to be illegal immigrants. It is therefore clear that poor borderline control has played a role in these attacks, as it has contributed to the extent of illegal immigration to South Africa. In this context, the South African Institute of Race Relations summarise the causes of the attacks on foreigners as a combination of government failures with regard to ñinstitut[ing] listed crime, inadequate border control, unemployment, education and corruptionò(*Mail and Guardian*, 2008).

While the borderline serves as a physical barrier to illegal immigration, it has a number of other purposes as well, as already discussed. Disease spilling over borders can have serious consequences for the economy, as well as for human and food security, and this is discussed in more detail in the next section.

4. LAND BORDERLINE CONTROL AND DISEASE PREVENTION

The land borderline does not only serve as a barrier to illegal migration, but also plays an important role in limiting the spread of disease. Schutte (1993: 8) notes that ñ[d]iseases such as yellow fever, cholera, AIDS and other subtropical diseases have endangered the health of South African citizensò Furthermore, the South African government, in its Ten Year Review, notes the spread of communicable disease as one of a number of new security threats facing the country amid changing national security perspectives (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 94).

A clear example of the role of borderline control in disease control was the outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe in 2008, and the effect of this on South Africa. In August 2008, the deterioration of sanitation infrastructure in Zimbabwean cities coincided with the advent of the rainy season, which caused the outbreak of cholera. The disease quickly spread to rural areas in Zimbabwe, including the provinces bordering South Africa (BBC News, 2009[a]). On 15 November 2008 a former South African Minister of Health, Barbara Hogan, noted that the first case of cholera had been detected in Musina and, on 24 November 2008, the first deaths resulting from cholera were reported in the Limpopo Province. Dealing with ñirregular immigrantsò was one of the areas identified for immediate action in response to the outbreak in correspondence between the Department of Health and the Department of Home Affairs (RSA: Hogan, 2008). These ñirregular immigrantsò referred to thousands of people who attempted to cross the border to South Africa to receive medical treatment (Doctors Without Borders, 2009[a]). The spread of the disease in South Africa resulted in 59 deaths, while a further 12,000 cases were confirmed (AFP, 2009). The total cost incurred by the Limpopo provincial health department amounted to R39.5 million (Mafobelo, 2012). While South Africa had, in this case, failed to use borderline control effectively to prevent the spread of the disease,

border control has been used for this purpose elsewhere in southern Africa. The closure of the Angolan border with the DRC to prevent the spread of the Ebola virus serves as an example (Hough, 2009: 4).

Land borderline control also plays an important role in limiting the spread of disease by animals. An example is the 500km-long border fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe. In 2003, the Botswana government undertook the construction of the fence to limit the spread of foot-and-mouth disease from Zimbabwe (BBC News, 2009[b]). Similarly, agricultural entities in South Africa, including AgriSA, have indicated South Africaôs lack of borderline control as a direct cause of the spread of foot-and-mouth disease to the country (Martin, 2011). The Milk Producers Organisation of South Africa specifically pointed to the border situation between South Africa and Zimbabwe where movement of cattle across the dilapidated border fence was a common occurrence (Zvomuya, 2010). The Auditor General raised similar concerns about the border fence that is, in some instances, completely absent (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 10). The spread of disease not only carries risks associated with the disease itself, but also has a negative impact on the export of livestock and meat to foreign markets (Martin, 2011: sp]). Thus, aside from health concerns, the financial implications caused by the cross-border spread of disease can be severe.

In addition to the health and financial implications of the spread of disease across borders, there are a number of other concerns impacting on the immediate land borderline environment.

5. SECURITY CONCERNS ALONG THE LAND BORDERLINE

The porous nature of South Africaôs land borders means that the borderline environment itself is a security concern. While cross-border crimes did occur before 1994, these crimes have increased in the post-1994 period, including vehicle smuggling, arms, drugs and the smuggling of counterfeit goods; stock theft, and human smuggling and human trafficking. Armed robberies of illegal immigrants along the borderline further increase insecurity in these areas.

5.1 VEHICLE SMUGGLING ACROSS THE BORDERLINE

As far back as the 1980s, the SAP identified the smuggling of vehicles across the border as a major concern (Geldenhuys, 2007). INTERPOL statistics claimed that 96 to 98 per cent of all illegal vehicles sold in the SADC region originated from South Africa, and that an estimated 50 per cent of vehicles stolen in South Africa were smuggled out of the country (Irish, 2005: 1). Operation Morogoro, a regional joint police initiative across a number of SADC member countries in 2005, found 663 stolen/hijacked South African vehicles in Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi (RSA: SAPS, 2006: 83).

The borderline between South Africa and Mozambique in the Komatipoort and Kosi Bay areas has been identified as providing popular transit points for stolen vehicles. This has largely been attributed to the assistance that local communities offer to smuggling syndicates, as well as to the nature of the terrain, which makes it easier to conceal such activities. Similarly, the dilapidated condition of the border fence in this sector by late 2009 also facilitated this form of smuggling (News24, 2010[g]). In contrast, smuggling across the borderline with Zimbabwe only occurred sporadically. This could generally be ascribed to the comparatively higher quality of border fencing along this sector and geographic features such as the Limpopo River that inhibits smuggling (Irish, 2005: 2-3).

SAPS statistics only began to differentiate between vehicles recovered at ports of entry and those recovered in borderline operations in 2006/2007, following the establishment of the sub-programme, Borderline Security, in 2005. The SAPS Annual Report of 2006/2007 notes that 208 stolen vehicles were recovered along the borderline. The same number of vehicles were also recovered in 2007/2008, while the number increased to 530 during 2008/2009 (RSA: SAPS, 2008(a): 82; RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 70). While increased SAPS deployments may have resulted in the higher success rate in recovering stolen vehicles along the borderline in 2009, it is evident that cross-border vehicle smuggling presents an ongoing security challenge to South Africa.

Cross-border vehicle smuggling often takes place in conjunction with a number of other cross-border crimes such as the smuggling of arms, drugs and counterfeit goods.

5.2 ARMS, DRUGS AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS SMUGGLING

Arms smuggling along the South African borderline has been of major concern both before and after 1994, especially given the porous nature of the country's borders. This has allowed for a flow of arms from neighbouring countries, and the use of these weapons for criminal and other purposes within South Africa, as noted previously, which impacts negatively on domestic security.

Although the South African borderline with Zimbabwe is not a traditional arms smuggling route, the borders linking South Africa with Mozambique and Swaziland were of particular interest to borderline control and arms smuggling in the immediate post-1994 period (Hennop, 2001: 5). These borderlines have also remained problematic in terms of arms smuggling even in recent times (Nkala, 2012). This is due to the fact that arms were widely available following the end of the civil war in Mozambique (Namburete, 1999: 30). This section of the borderline was also regularly used by ANC operatives to smuggle arms into South Africa prior to 1994. Inkhata Freedom Party operatives also used routes along the borderline with Mozambique and Swaziland to obtain arms for use in internal political conflicts. Prior to 1994, the South African government also used routes along this borderline to smuggle arms to Mozambique in support of Renamo (Kloppers, 2005: 140). Following a decrease in political violence after 1994, arms smuggling along this borderline decreased steadily. This specific sector of the South African borderline did, however, remain a priority in countering arms smuggling to the country even after 1994 (Hennop & McLean, 2001: 74).

A field study in 2000 by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), in conjunction with the SAPS, confirms the important link between arms smuggling and borderline control. The study notes the relevance of borderline control in preventing arms smuggling *vis-à-vis* an approach that focuses largely on port-of-entry control. It was found that a mere one per cent of all seizures of illegal arms were made at the border posts. The

study also confirm that the borderlines between South Africa and Mozambique remained the most common route for arms smuggling (Hennop, 2000). By 2000, eight years after the end of the Mozambican civil war, an estimated 67 smuggling points across this part of the border remained in use (Map 5.1) (Hennop, 2001: 6). The smuggling of weapons along the Mozambique-South Africa border remains a problem as is evident in recent related arrests and the increasing use of firearms for poaching in the Kruger National Park (Nkala, 2012).

Map 5.1: Primary Weapons Smuggling Routes between South Africa and Mozambique.



Source: Hennop, E. 2000. ñSouth Africaôs Porous Borders: A Haven for Arms Smugglersò Nedbank ISS Crime Index 4(3). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Both the Defence Review of 1998 (RSA: South African Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 4) and the Defence Act of 2002 (RSA, 2002(a): Section 20) note the SANDFôs role in the seizure of illicit weapons when deployed in a borderline control capacity. The SANDF achieved noteworthy successes in its seizure of illicit weapons during its support operations to the SAPS and in its deployment in a borderline control capacity. There has, however, been a major decrease in SANDF seizures of illicit weapons since 2002/2003 which coincided with the commencement of the withdrawal of the SANDF from borderline control (Table 5.4). The SANDF did continue to seize illicit firearms after its withdrawal commenced in 2004, because a number of units maintained a presence along the borders as part of the decommissioning phase. Furthermore, the decrease in arms seizures after 1994 has also partly been ascribed to a general decrease in arms smuggling since 2000 as internal, rather than external smuggling, seemed to have increased (Hennop, 2001: 8). SAPS statistics on borderline-specific seizures of illicit weapons, following its increased involvement in borderline control after 2004, reflect relatively low numbers (Table 5.5).

Table 5.4: Illicit Firearms Recovered During South African National Defence Force Operations over the Period 2001 to 2005.

Financial Year	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005
Firearms retrieved by the SANDF	**4 411**	**1 877**	**2 451**	**1 379**

Source: RSA: SANDF. 2002 ï 2005. SANDF Annual Reports. Pretoria: Government Printers. These figures indicate illicit firearms recovered in all SANDF operations, including borderline control.

Table 5.5: Illicit Firearms Recovered During South African Police Service Operations over the Period 2006 to 2009.

Financial Year	2006/ 2007	2007/ 2008	2008/ 2009
Firearms retrieved by the SAPS	**83**	**162**	**265**

Source: RSA: SANDF. 2006 ï 2009. SANDF Annual Reports. Pretoria: Government Printers. SAPS statistics on borderline-specific seizures only commenced in 2006/2007.

The cross-border smuggling of counterfeit goods facilitated by the porous nature of the South African borderline poses another threat to security. The illegal smuggling of cigarettes along the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa appears to be one of the most significant borderline smuggling industries with regard to counterfeit goods. The Tobacco Industry of South Africa (TISA) estimates the proportion of illegal cigarettes as part of the total cigarette market at more than 20 per cent. A large proportion of this smuggling takes place across the borderline in places other than the ports of entry. The implications of such smuggling are not only financial, in terms of lost revenue, but also the undermining of the industry and health directives on the manufacturing of cigarettes (TISA, 2011).

Drug smuggling across the South African borderline is of major concern, as it not only floods the South African market with drugs, but also results in South Africa becoming a major drug export centre to other countries. Of specific concern is the smuggling of cannabis from Lesotho, where it is produced, to South Africa (Madzima, 2008). Two specific smuggling operations from Lesotho have been identified. The first focuses on smuggling cannabis across the borderline to Ficksburg and Bloemfontein for the South African market. The second route uses the south western Lesotho borderline for export to Durban, from where it is likely to be smuggled to other international destinations (Laniel, 1998). The mountainous terrain of Lesotho makes it very difficult for law enforcement personnel to reach areas where cannabis is cultivated. The smuggling process across the borderline then involves the use of animals following a trail across the borderline to South Africa. Often, animals are trained and can follow trails unaccompanied, making it difficult to arrest those involved in the smuggling process. Four-wheel drive vehicles are also used for such smuggling purposes (Madzima, 2008). The security threat of drug smuggling along the Lesotho borderline is aggravated by the fact that it is often linked to other forms of borderline-related crime, including the smuggling of livestock and stolen vehicles (Laniel, 1998).

The SANDF has had continued success in the confiscation of cannabis along the borderline. However, as was the case with counterfeit goods and stock theft, the SANDFõs successes decreased from 2004 onwards in view of SAPS deployments along the borderline. The SANDF did, nevertheless, maintain a presence along

some sections of the borderline after 2004 as part of the handing over process, and therefore continued to gather statistics on drug seizures until 2007 (Table 5.6). The SAPS managed to confiscate larger quantities of cannabis in its borderline operations between 2007 and 2009 (Table 5.7).

In addition to arms, drug and counterfeit goods smuggling, human trafficking and people smuggling, as noted earlier, pose further challenges related to cross-border crime. These are often exacerbated by ineffective borderline control measures.

Table 5.6: Cannabis Recovered during South African National Defence Force Operations, both along the Borderline and in Internal Operations, over the Period 2001 to 2007.

Financial Year	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007
Cannabis seized (Kilogram)	**175 914**	**87 968**	**70450**	**52 992**	**42 179**	**15676**

Source: RSA: SANDF. 2002 ï 2007. SANDF Annual Reports. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Table 5.7: Cannabis Recovered during South African Police Service Borderline Operations over the Period 2006 to 2009.

Financial Year	2006/ 2007	2007/ 2008	2008/ 2009
Cannabis seized (Kilogram)	**30 046**	**119 535**	**174 270**

Source: RSA: SAPS. 2006 ï 2009. Annual Reports of the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service. Pretoria: Government Printers. Note that SAPS statistics on borderline-specific seizures only commenced in 2006/2007.

5.3 HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND PEOPLE SMUGGLING

The porous nature of the South African borderline also gave rise to other forms of smuggling, including the smuggling of people. The UN defines migrant smuggling under the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants as ñ[t]he procurement, in order

to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent residentò (UN, 2000). The smuggling of migrants, or people smuggling, differs from the more coercive phenomenon of human trafficking which is defined by the UN as ñrecruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring or receiving a person through a use of force, coercion or other means, for the purpose of exploiting themò (UN, 2000). South Africa has relied on its existing legislation to deal with these phenomena and only in 2010 proposed specific legislation to deal with human trafficking. The Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill (Number 7 of 2010) was introduced aiming ñto provide for an offence of trafficking in persons and other offences associated with trafficking in persons; to prevent and combat the trafficking in persons within or across the borders of the Republicò (RSA: Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, 2010: 3). By November 2012, almost three years after the initial Bill was tabled, it was not yet passed into law (RSA: Parliament of South Africa, 2012)

South Africa serves both as a destination and transit point for people smuggling and human trafficking. People smuggling to South Africa is, however, more common and includes the smuggling of children and other labourers to South Africa for farm and/or domestic work as well as the trafficking of young women from predominantly African countries to South Africa for sexual exploitation (Laczko & Gozdziak, 2005: 76). South Africa is also used as a popular transit point for trafficking and smuggling people to other Western countries, such as the US, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) (Malatji, 2004: 3). Neighbouring countries often serve as a recruitment area for smuggling and trafficking to South Africa. Given the porous nature of the borderline, smuggling from neighbouring countries for employment on farms along the borderline is commonplace. Human Rights Watch points to the fact that the minimum wage for employment is often disregarded, making the use of illegal foreigners for agricultural and other labour purposes even more attractive (SouthAfrica.info, 2006).

A number of countries have shown concern regarding the apparent increase in people smuggling from South Africa in recent years. The US and UK have raised specific concern regarding terrorist groups that may be involved in smuggling to and

from South Africa, as well as the use of the country as a transit point to Europe and the US. In 2009, the UK imposed visa requirements for all South African nationals travelling to the UK. This restriction followed concerns that forged South African passports are easily obtained and could be used by terrorist groups for transit (*Mail and Guardian*, 2009). Porous borders, corrupt officials in the Department of Home Affairs and easily forgeable travel documents thus combine to create ideal circumstances for South Africa to be used as a transit point.

An extensive report on human trafficking by the HSRC affirms the connection between people smuggling/trafficking and land borderline control in South Africa. The report notes that ñSouth Africaôs extensive land borders, which are largely unpatrolledòare an enabling factor in people smuggling and trafficking (HSRC, 2010: viii). This notion is also included in the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, committing the state to ñborder controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect trafficking in personsò (RSA: Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, 2010: Article 11). However, the HSRC report notes that a number of factors, including ineffective borderline control and corrupt state officials in border areas, undermine these attempts, and make South Africa a popular destination for smuggling syndicates (HSRC, 2010: 15).

In addition to the high rate of people smuggling across the South African borderline, there are criminal groups who have also entered the borderline regions to take advantage of illegal immigrants being smuggled to South Africa.

5.4 THE GUMA GUMAS

As highlighted earlier, the porous nature of South Africaôs land borderline and a myriad of push and pull factors have given rise to an increase in illegal immigration to the country. This phenomenon has created opportunities for criminal gangs to operate along the borderline and to target the large number of people crossing the borders in places other than the designated points of entry. These criminal groups are commonly known as the *Guma Gumas* (roughly translated from Shona as ó obtaining something without effortô) and are particularly active along the South Africa-Zimbabwe border (Times Live, 2008; OôToole, 2003).

These groups are extremely familiar with the illegal crossing points along the borderline. They often pose as smuggling agents offering to assist migrants to cross safely into South Africa for a minimal fee. At crossing points along the borderline they await groups of illegal immigrants and proceed to assault and rob them of their possessions (Times Live, 2008). While the *Guma Gumas* are generally not heavily armed, they carry spears, screwdrivers and machetes to overpower their victims (OõToole, 2003). Rape is also common as both women and men who attempt to cross into South Africa are often raped by the *Guma Gumas* before they are robbed (Doctors Without Borders, 2010). The fact that such migrants are generally in the country illegally means that many of these cases are never reported to the police (Doctors Without Borders, 2009[b]).

While SANDF patrols along the borderline often come across victims, this usually occurs after victims have been abandoned in the borderline area (OõToole, 2003). It can therefore be concluded that the absence of effective borderline control has created a security vacuum in which violent crime thrives. Increased measures to limit illegal immigration would thus reduce the impetus for criminal groups to act as smuggling agents in the borderline area.

5.5 STOCK THEFT ALONG THE BORDERLINE

Stock theft has been an ongoing concern in most South African provinces, prompting a number of government initiatives to limit its impact. These include legislation such as the Animal Identification Act of 2002 as well as the Stock Theft Act of 1959 and various amendments to the latter. Other practical measures include the launch of the SAPSõ Stock Theft Unit and the establishment of a National Stock Theft Forum. However, an agricultural union, AgriSA, notes that while stock theft is common in all provinces in South Africa, it is of much greater concern in provinces that share borders with neighbouring countries (AgriSA, 2011). This raises further concern given that of the 30 per cent of arable land in South Africa, a large portion is located along international borders (Martin, 2011). Ongoing stock theft presents a number of economic and security concerns, including the loss of food security, to South Africa. A briefing by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (RSA, 2010[a])

captured this predicament in 2010 by stating that stock theft ñaffected food security [and] the livestock industry and forced the closure of farmsò

Most notably, AgriSA states that stock theft along the South African borderline had intensified in the 1990s and had become more organised and often more violent by then (AgriSA, 2011). The magnitude of the problem, specifically along the Lesotho borderline with the eastern Free State, prompted farmers in the area to seek a court ruling on the issue of borderline control in 2009. In 2010, the court ruled that it was the urgent responsibility of government to rebuild a 130km border fence along this stretch of the borderline (Martin, 2011). The border fence itself is an important counter-measure, as stock theft on the Lesotho border occurred from both the Lesotho and South African sides (Dzimba & Matooane, 2005: 32). Similar situations regarding stock theft can be observed along the shared borders between South Africa and Zimbabwe and South Africa and Mozambique. In these cases, poor borderline control allowed a number of stock theft syndicates to operate, often taking livestock from Zimbabwean farms, moving them across the border, and selling them in South Africa and Mozambique (News24, 2010[e]). While adequate fencing along the borderlines would have a more limited impact on, for example, illegal immigrant flows, it will have a far more significant impact on stock theft as it limits the opportunity for moving large herds.

The deployment of the SANDF to counter stock theft was another crucial factor in the search for effective land borderline control. Farmers in the eastern Free State claimed that in areas of SANDF deployment along the border with Lesotho, prior to the SAPS assuming the role, notable achievements were made. This included a reduction in cross-border crime, decreased stock theft and the regular arrests of perpetrators (Martin, 2011). As the replacement of the SANDF borderline deployments commenced in 2004, the SAPS did implement additional measures to curb stock theft. This included the acquisition of four-wheel drive vehicles; night-sight equipment; communications equipment, and the use of horses along the borderline to improve reaction times in responding to stock theft (RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 94). SAPS borderline control did, however, remain limited in capacity. During the 2008/2009 financial year, for example, only four four-wheel drive vehicles were acquired. This seems disproportionate to the threat of sustained high levels of stock

theft. The announcement that the SANDF would return to borderline control duties in 2010 was widely welcomed in agricultural circles (News24, 2010[f]).

SANDF successes in curbing stock theft along the borderline were evident, as can be deduced from figures made available in annual reports (Table 5.8). The SANDF continued its publication of stock theft statistics along the borderline until 2005/2006. Despite the decline in SANDF forces deployed along the borderline after 2004, several units remained involved in borderline control as part of the phasing-out programme, specifically along the Lesotho borderline notorious for stock theft. SAPS statistics, following the assumption of the borderline control function in 2004, did not indicate whether stock theft had occurred on the borderline or elsewhere.

Table 5.8: Livestock Recovered as a Result of Borderline Control Operations by the South African National Defence Force.

Financial Year	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006
Livestock Recovered	**3 175**	**1 751**	**3 360**	**3 908**	**1 692**

Source: RSA: SANDF. 2002 ï 2006. SANDF Annual Reports. Pretoria: Government Printers.

The then Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Pieter Mulder, estimated that during the 2008/2009 financial year alone, stock theft accounted for the loss of 34,000 cattle, 60,000 sheep and 28,000 goats, with an estimated cumulative value of R366 million (RSA: Mulder, 2011). As such, the department noted in its Strategic Plan for 2010/2011 that ñassistance will be provided for farmers to address the serious problem of stock theftò (RSA: Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2010(b): 3). Furthermore, borderline control was needed as farmers along international borders not only face problems of stock theft, but threats to their personal safety as well. AgriSA notes that problems along the borderline included attacks on farmers and their employees, vehicle theft, illegal grazing and drug smuggling (Martin, 2010). It is therefore clear that borderline control is necessary to curb the substantial financial and food security losses attributed to stock theft. The call by farming communities for the redeployment of the SANDF on

the land borderline is perhaps the clearest indication of the need for adequate borderline control to curb stock theft.

6. CONCLUSION

While illegal immigration to South Africa occurred both prior to and after 1994, this has been exacerbated by a number of regional realities in the post-1994 period. With estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa ranging up to 5 million people, a number of related security threats have been identified. South African government officials have often referred to the negative impact of the large number of illegal immigrants on the developmental goals and socio-economic resources of the country. Illegal immigration has also proven to aggravate the already high crime levels in the country, with a significant number of foreigners found to be involved in crime. In addition to the perception that illegal immigrants raise crime levels, a number of issues relating to socio-economic development have resulted in an anti-foreigner sentiment in recent years. This sentiment, combined with large numbers of illegal immigrants, has resulted in an increase of attacks on foreigners in South Africa, especially in the post-1994 period. The expanded scope of the national security problem and illegal immigration, on the scale recorded in South Africa, therefore pose a threat to security and can, to a certain extent, be attributed to the poor state of land borderline control in the country.

The neglect of borderline control creates opportunities for criminal elements to take advantage of the countryøs penetrable borders. The smuggling of counterfeit goods and stock theft, for example, impacts negatively on South Africaøs economy and decreases the ability to maintain food security. Similarly, poor borderline control results in the spread of disease from neighbouring countries to South Africa, as has occurred on a number of occasions in the post-1994 period. The smuggling of stolen vehicles and other goods also contributes to ongoing crime in South Africa as the porous borders allow criminal groups the opportunity to export these goods. People smuggling and human trafficking to and from South Africa are also facilitated by poor borderline control, as this allows syndicates to operate more easily in the country. A lack of thorough patrolling of the borderline, along with the influx of illegal

immigrants, creates the opportunity for criminal groups to operate along the borderlines.

The above-mentioned security threats clearly indicate the requirement for increased borderline control. Despite the SANDFôs return to borderline control in 2010, it is likely to take long to undo the damage to security caused by inadequate borderline control by the SAPS. It is also clear that borderline control alone is not the only mechanism to address security threats, but that it has to be coordinated with other measures to create a more secure environment.

CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a summary of the study; an evaluation of the assumptions regarding land borderline control in South Africa formulated in Chapter One, and some recommendations related to more effective land borderline control.

2. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

Chapter One set out the study objectives and the research theme as well as providing a literature review. The research methodology followed in the study was presented and a number of assumptions were formulated.

Chapter Two introduced a number of views on the development of borders. This overview was followed by an evaluation of the changes in the postmodern interpretation of borders through the advent of globalisation and important security-related events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The chapter also focused on the link between borderline control and the expanding scope of national security, including aspects of human security. An outline of border-specific threats, such as cross-border crime and illegal migration, was also provided. The latter part of the chapter analysed the approach of the US and EU to borderline control comparatively.

Pre-1994 threat perception in South Africa was largely based on national security concerns emanating from the ongoing Cold War; the conflict in Angola, and the threat of insurgency. Chapter Three analysed borderline control prior to 1994 within this context. The chapter commenced by evaluating the nature and extent of the South African land borderline. The countryôs pre-1994 external and internal threat perceptions were then compared in terms of their impact on borderline control. Particular attention was also given to the impact of insurgency on South Africaôs approach to borderline control. Given the ongoing insurgency in the country prior to

1994, the need to curb illegal weapon flows into South Africa was also analysed. In addition, attention was given to the primary role that the SADF played in carrying out borderline control.

Chapter Four discussed and analysed borderline control in South Africa in the post-1994 period amid South Africaôs aspirations for broader regional and international interaction following the 1994 elections. The chapter assessed how renewed regional integration impacted on border control policies. Changes in these policies and institutions responsible for borderline control coordination were also evaluated. Furthermore, the decision by Cabinet in 2003 to allocate borderline control responsibilities to the SAPS, rather than the SANDF, and the impact this had on the effectiveness of borderline control, were analysed. This is followed by a chronological overview of the SANDF and subsequent SAPS involvement in borderline control, before this function was once again assumed by the SANDF in 2010. The chapter concluded with a synopsis of some practical constraints to effective borderline control in the post-1994 period, including dilapidated borderline infrastructure; the dissolving of the Commandos, and a lack of human resources.

Chapter Five discussed certain security implications resulting from South Africaôs post-1994 approach to borderline control. These security implications were evaluated within the expanded scope of national security. First, illegal immigration as a result of ineffective borderline control was discussed, including the extent of illegal immigration to South Africa after 1994 and the governmentôs response to increasing numbers of illegal immigrants. Security implications associated with increasing numbers of illegal immigrants were also evaluated. The role of borderline control in preventing the spread of disease was then discussed, specifically in the light of a number of disease outbreaks in neighbouring countries in recent years. Furthermore, land borderline specific crime, including the smuggling of vehicles, firearms, drugs, counterfeit goods and human smuggling, was assessed in the context of changes in South Africaôs borderline control approach after 1994. Stock theft along the borderline and the presence of criminal groups operating specifically in borderline regions were also highlighted as security concerns.

3. ASSESSING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

The following assumptions were formulated for assessment in this study:

- Distinct changes in the South African approach to borderline control in the pre- and post-1994 era can be observed, mainly concerning changing political priorities.
- In the post-1994 period, borderline control was neglected, which allowed the continued influx of illegal foreigners and increased cross-border crime.
- Ineffective borderline control results in security issues that pose challenges to state security as well as to human security, and hence, to national security.

3.1 DISTINCT CHANGES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO BORDERLINE CONTROL IN THE PRE- AND POST-1994 ERA CAN BE OBSERVED, MAINLY CONCERNING CHANGING POLITICAL PRIORITIES.

Significant changes to borderline control, both practically and in terms of policy, occurred in South Africa prior to and after 1994. Prior to 1994, borderline control was largely a militarised function based on South Africaôs external threat perception. However, South Africaôs external and internal threat perception remained interwoven, as can be observed in the concept of a ñtotal onslaughtò on the country (Malan, 1980: 3). Given the focus on external security threats, and the fact that ANC and PAC operatives maintained a presence in neighbouring countries, borderline control was prioritised in South African security policy. The importance attached to borderline control in counterinsurgency prior to 1994 can be observed in, for example, the deployment of up to 28 SADF companies and a number of intelligence agencies for the purpose of borderline control by 1994 (Hennop, 2001; Steinberg, 2005(a): 2).

The first signs of changing political priorities came with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Angolan war in 1990. South African threat perception and the approach to national security consequently shifted to focus more on internal security concerns. The change in emphasis to increasingly encompass aspects of human security is reflected, among other documents, in the White Paper on Defence

and the White Paper on Intelligence. The emphasis on external security threats was also reduced through the establishment of broader regional interaction and improved relationships between South Africa and neighbouring countries. This resulted in a reduction of the number of SANDF companies deployed along the borderline from 28 in 1994, to 7 by 2003 (Hennop, 2001; RSA: SANDF, 2003: 135). Changes in political priorities are also reflected in budgetary constraints on the SANDF in the post-1994 period, compared to funding allocated prior to 1994 (World Bank, 2010). The political decision to direct funds away from the SANDF in the post-1994 period therefore impacted on its ability to carry out large-scale borderline control operations. Furthermore, the apparent demilitarisation of the borderline can be observed in the declining role of the SANDF within institutions responsible for border control coordination. While the SANDF played a leading role in coordinating border control prior to 1994, changing political directives limited its influence after 1994. This is reflected, for example, in the establishment of NIDS in 1997, under a director from SARS (Minnaar, 2003: 97).

The Cabinet decision to transfer the responsibility of borderline control from the SANDF to the SAPS reflects a major turnaround strategy, and resulted in the further decline of SANDF influence in the borderline environment. Implementation of this decision only commenced in 2004, and borderline control responsibility was consequently transferred from the SANDF to the SAPS during a phased handover between 2004 and 2009. However, the SAPSõs execution of borderline control could not compare to that which was achieved by the SANDF, specifically with reference to human resources made available for the function (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 6). This provided the foundation for a Cabinet decision to replace the SAPS borderline function and return the SANDF to the borderline from April 2010 (RSA: SANDF, 2010: xvi). The decision to transfer the borderline control responsibility back to the SANDF does suggest a renewed focus on more effective borderline control.

Changes in political priorities in South Africa came about primarily as a result of a change in the focus on external security threats to internal threats. The emphasis on internal security in the post-1994 period, in addition to improved relations with neighbouring countries, thus prompted a revision of South Africaõs approach to borderline control. This change in political priorities moved the focus away from a

defensive borderline control approach and sought to limit the internal role of the SANDF, also in land borderline control operations. In this sense, distinct changes in the approach to land borderline control in the pre- and post-1994 era, at least up to 2010, can be observed. This relates specifically to the role of the security forces in border control. The assumption that changes in the approach to borderline control were based on changing political priorities can therefore be verified.

3.2 IN THE POST-1994 PERIOD, BORDERLINE CONTROL WAS NEGLECTED, WHICH ALLOWED THE CONTINUED INFLUX OF ILLEGAL FOREIGNERS AND INCREASED CROSS-BORDER CRIME.

As noted previously, the post-1994 period in South Africa has been characterised by political changes that sought to align state policies with a reduced emphasis on external threats. This resulted in the neglect of borderline control in a number of ways. First, the considerable reduction of SANDF deployments for the purpose of borderline control between 1997 and 2010 impacted significantly on its effectiveness. For example, by 2001, only 30 SANDF soldiers were deployed at any given time for borderline control along the KwaZulu-Natal border with Mozambique (Hennop & Mclean, 2001: 79). Similarly, by 2002, only one SANDF company (approximately 150 soldiers) was deployed along South Africaôs border with Lesotho (Steinberg, 2005(b): 2). The SANDFôs ability to conduct adequate borderline control was further curtailed by the reduction in the budget of the Department of Defence in the post-1994 period (World Bank, 2010: [sp[).

Secondly, the decision to allocate the land borderline control responsibility to the SAPS from 2004 also reduced borderline control capacity. This was reflected in the 2008 Report of the Auditor-General on a Performance Audit of Border Control at the South African Police Service that found the SAPSôs execution of borderline control highly inadequate. The SANDF, with an history of involvement in borderline control, developed a specialised capacity to deal with the requirements of land borderline control in a South African context. The introduction of the SAPS not only resulted in a lack of sufficient personnel at the borderline, but also in a loss of skills regarding borderline control (RSA: Auditor General, 2008: 8). The 2009 Cabinet decision to return the SANDF to the borderline from 2010 provides further evidence of the extent

of ineffectiveness of the SAPSômanagement of borderline control. Thirdly, this study noted regular changes in the entities responsible for border control coordination. In the post-1994 period, a number of official groups were established, including the BACC, NIDS and the BCOCC. These bodies were responsible for facilitating interdepartmental cooperation regarding border control, including matters related to borderline control (Steinberg, 2005(a): 5). However, the regular restructuring of these institutions often resulted in a lack of interdepartmental cooperation. (Mohlala, 2011).

The need for effective borderline control to combat illegal immigration is clearly stipulated in South African legislation. This includes the preamble of the Immigration Act (RSA, 2002(b): 3), which stipulates that ñborder monitoring is strengthened to ensure that the borders of the Republic do not remain porous and illegal immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and deterredò A number of statements by state officials further emphasise the increasing security threat related to illegal immigration. A former Home Affairs Minister noted, for example, that ñthe influx of illegal immigrants [poses] a threat to the RDP and the prosperity of citizensò (RSA: Buthelezi, 1996). However, despite an official focus prioritising illegal immigration and borderline control, a significant increase in the number of illegal immigrants has been recorded in the post-1994 period. By 1998, the HSRC estimated the number of illegal immigrants to be between 2.5 and 4.1 million, while SAPS reports put the number at between three and six million by 2008 (Solomon, 2000: 2; RSA: SAPS, 2009(a): 9). Given these figures, it is clear that while official views have identified illegal immigration as a threat, the implementation of measures to counter this, most notably that of borderline control, has been less successful.

Crime statistics also indicate a significant threat of crime along the South African borderline. The smuggling of arms, drugs and counterfeit goods as well as people and stock theft has been identified as a major problem affecting the borderline environment. Statistics indicate that, for example, at least 10,118 illegal firearms were retrieved through SANDF operations, including borderline control, between 2001 and 2005 (The SANDF maintained some presence along certain borders until 2010, despite the borderline control responsibility being allocated to the SAPS in 2003). Similarly, 444,909 kilograms of cannabis were confiscated between 2001 and 2007 (RSA, SANDF Annual Reports 2002 ï 2007). Stock theft was also identified as

a major concern along the borderline with the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries estimating that, in 2008/2009 alone, 34,000 cattle, 60,000 sheep and 28,000 goats were stolen in the country, including at the borderline (RSA: Mulder, 2011).

The declining role of the SANDF in internal security, along with budgetary constraints and changes in the units responsible for border control coordination, reflect the general neglect of borderline control in the post-1994 period. Although there were numerous push and pull factors stimulating increased migration to South Africa, the reduction in security force deployments along the land borderline created circumstances conducive to the mass influx of illegal immigrants. The steady increase in cross-border crime after 1994 further indicates inadequate levels of security deployments in the borderline regions. The assumption that borderline control was neglected after 1994, contributing to increased illegal immigration and cross-border crime, can thus be verified.

3.3 INEFFECTIVE BORDERLINE CONTROL RESULTS IN SECURITY ISSUES THAT POSE CHALLENGES TO STATE SECURITY AS WELL AS TO HUMAN SECURITY, AND HENCE, TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

In addition to an increase in cross-border crime and the influx of illegal immigrants to South Africa after 1994, ineffective borderline control also contributed to a number of internal security threats. First, a combination of illegal immigration, a rising intolerance of illegal immigrants, and a number of other socio-economic issues contributed to the increase in attacks on foreigners in South Africa. The South African Institute of Race Relations summarised this by noting that attacks on foreigners in South Africa came as a combination of government failures in dealing with ñcrime, inadequate border control, unemployment, education and corruptionò (*Mail and Guardian*, 2008). Secondly, it was found that illegal immigrants are a factor in South Africaôs high crime rate. Although no specific SAPS statistics are kept in this regard, incarceration statistics showed that 8,580 foreign nationals, both legal and illegal, were imprisoned in South Africa by 2010, while further studies found foreign nationals to be involved in up to 17 per cent of house robberies in the country (RSA: Department of Correctional Services, 2010; Zinn, 2008).

This study also focused on the economic impact that ineffective borderline control had on South Africa. The increase in illegal immigration was shown to place an additional strain on public sector resources. This was confirmed by a former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi (RSA: Buthelezi, 1997), as he noted that ñwith an illegal alien population estimated at between 2,5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliensò. Stock theft along the borderline was also identified as having a significant economic impact on the country. While not all stock theft occurs along the borders, the study found stock theft along the borderline, specifically the South African border with Lesotho, to be significant. The economic impact of stock theft is reflected in a statement by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries who noted that, during the 2008/2009 financial year alone, stock theft worth R366 million occurred in South Africa (RSA: Mulder, 2011).

Furthermore, the spread of disease across South Africaôs borders has had both an economic and physical impact. For example, the lack of borderline control along with increased illegal immigration from Zimbabwe was one of the major issues contributing to the spread of cholera to South Africa in 2008 (RSA: Hogan, 2008). The Limpopo Provincial Health Department confirmed that the outbreak of cholera in the province resulted in costs of R39.5 million (Mafobelo, 2012). In addition, the physical security implications of the spread of disease to South Africa is reflected in the South African governmentôs Ten Year Review, which notes the spread of disease as one of a number of new security threats facing the country as part of changing national security perspectives (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 94).

Both the White Paper on Defence and the White Paper on Intelligence state that national security objectives in South Africa should include developmental issues, social justice, and socio-economic problems. As such, human security has become central to South African national security thinking. Threats to human security include features such as the threat of hunger, disease and repression as well as sudden and hurtful disruptions of life (UNDP, 1994: 23). The economic and physical threats to security identified in the study can be found to have impacted on human security. Of

particular significance are the role of ineffective borderline control in the spread of disease and the security implications that ineffective borderline control may have on borderline communities. It can further be argued that illegal immigration adds to the countryøs socio-economic problems.

However, although several factors that impact on security have been identified, these may not necessarily impact on national security. There are specific criteria that need to be met for security threats to translate into national security threats. These include, *inter alia*, threats to a nationøs physical integrity and territory; threats to the stateøs ability to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world; threats to a stateøs nature, institutions and governance, as well as threats to a stateøs internal stability (Brown, 1983: 4; Buzan, 1991: 122-134). Despite the fact that human security became central to South African national security thinking, the threats to the state and society brought about by ineffective borderline control are not yet of such a magnitude to imply direct and serious threats to national security. These threats have not, for example, affected South Africaøs physical integrity, territory or governance. The assumption that ineffective land borderline control poses challenges to national security can therefore only partly be verified.

4. CONCLUSION

The link between ineffective borderline control and the security implications it holds for South Africa is clear. Given the changing nature of national security in the post-1994 environment, South Africa requires clear policy directives on border control, including aspects pertaining to land borderline control. The execution of borderline control has often been the cause of its ineffectiveness since 1994, so it is important that policies provide for its effective implementation. In order to achieve this, it is crucial to define the roles of official entities involved in borderline control, especially with regard to the role of the security forces.

The following recommendations are presented:

- The rapid development and implementation of the BMA is essential in ensuring effective borderline control. The BMA should work towards increased

interdepartmental cooperation on border control measures and borderline control, as part of border control, should be prioritised. Security forces, particularly the SANDF, should play a leading role in directing the BMA regarding borderline control.

- The need exists for the development of policies specific to borderline control operations. Border control in post-1994 South Africa has largely been guided by policies that emphasise border port-of-entry control, often at the expense of borderline control. In the context of the 2009 decision to return the SANDF to a borderline control function, it is recommended that the SANDF be afforded a more prominent role in advising policy decisions, specifically those related to borderline control. In addition, other security institutions such as the SAPS and the Department of State Security can play a secondary role in borderline control policy decisions. This would allow for the development of intelligence-driven borderline operations.

- Although a decision was made to redeploy the SANDF to the borderline control function in 2010, this function requires more rapid implementation and expansion. Given the extent of the South African borderline, large numbers of troops are required to effectively control the borderline. In addition, more advanced borderline surveillance technology should be introduced as a measure to save on the cost of large troop deployments. Effective borderline control operations also require the SANDF to constantly review the personnel deployed in this function in order to avoid corrupt practices along the borderline. The SANDF will be required to review borderline deployments *vis-à-vis* external deployments to ensure that appropriate funding, resources and equipment are allocated to borderline control operations.

- The development of an adequate borderline control infrastructure is essential. Borderline fences are easily breached and, in some instances, are completely non-existent. This is not only important for controlling illegal immigration, but borderline infrastructure should also curtail the movement of animals across the border in an attempt to prevent the spread of disease. The use of motion

detectors along the borderline serves as an example of enhancing borderline control through effective infrastructure development.

- The abolition of the Commando system negatively affected the intelligence network in the borderline environment. In an attempt to revive this capability, closer relations within the security sector involved in the borderline environment, including the SAPS and SANDF, and local communities and farmers in the borderline regions should be prioritised. Not only can this add to intelligence-driven borderline operations, but it also has the potential to increase the security of communities and farmers in these areas.

ABSTRACT

Topic: The Security Dimensions of Borderline Control: A South African Case Study

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The primary aim of this study is to analyse the nature and extent of land borderline control as well as threats to land borders in South Africa. The study also aims to evaluate the efficiency of land borderline control and the security implications of the approach to borderline control in the post-1994 period. The argument is based on the following assumptions:

- Distinct changes in the South African approach to borderline control in the pre- and post-1994 era can be observed, mainly concerning changing political priorities.

- In the post-1994 period, borderline control was neglected, which allowed the continued influx of illegal foreigners and increased cross-border crime.

- Ineffective borderline control results in security issues that pose challenges to state security as well as to human security, and hence, to national security.

The study found that borderline control played a crucial role in the pre-1994 period given South Africaûs predominantly external threat perception and other security threats at the time. Changes in political priorities after 1994 resulted in the reduction of security forces deployed for the purpose of borderline control. Changing the borderline control responsibility from the SANDF to the SAPS, and then back again to the SANDF, as well as regular changes in the institutions responsible for border control coordination, further contributed to a general neglect of land borderline control.

Ineffective borderline control, in conjunction with other regional push and pull factors, resulted in increasing levels of illegal immigration to South Africa after 1994. The absence of adequate borderline control also led to in an increase in cross-border crime, including vehicle theft and the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and counterfeit goods, as well as the smuggling of people and stock theft. Although these factors have impacted negatively on security in South Africa, it was found that national security as yet remained largely unaffected given the limited impact of these security threats on the physical integrity, territory or governance of the country.

Key Terminology:

Arms smuggling
Border control
Borderline
Border post
Border protection
Cross-border crime
Illegal immigration
Land borderline control
National security
Port of entry
Stock theft
Vehicle smuggling

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