The ‘scorecard’ and ‘kubotereka’ spatial orders: A comparative study of mine housing strategies at Amandelbult (South Africa) and Unki (Zimbabwe) platinum mines

By

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Declaration of authenticity

I Splagchna Ngoni Chikarara declare that this thesis is my original work. I obtained applicable research ethics approval for the research described in this work. Where secondary material has been used (either from a printed source or from the internet) this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance with the University of Pretoria's Code of ethics for researchers and policy guidelines for responsible research.

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Abstract

Spatial orders in mining communities are fiercely contested arenas. In spite of their overall control of housing policies, planning and designs, mining firms are at times aggressively challenged by workers as a collective and as individuals on housing issues. This 'tug of war' involves not only capital and labour but the state and local communities are inevitably drawn in. This study compared the spatial orders of mining settlements at two platinum mines owned by Anglo-American Platinum (AAP). It answered the following research question: What is the rationale behind the housing strategies of AAP in post-apartheid South Africa and in post-independence Zimbabwe? The study employed methodological triangulation. Secondary data from official documents, official websites and newspapers, verbal data from interviews, visual data from photographs and maps as well as data from observation field notes were triangulated.

This study reveals how the South African and Zimbabwean governments play instrumental roles in the unmaking and transformation of historically racialised geographies of mining communities. It further shows how the mining firm concerned seized the initiative to socially engineer spatial orders to their benefit by investing large amounts of money into housing and the development of infrastructure in communities where they operate. Workers, on the other hand, display their agency in many ways as they make meaning of these spaces (see Rogally 2009). In some instances, they have embraced the reconfigured space, and in other cases, they rejected the mining firm's attempts to house them in particular locations. Even in instances where they accepted company-provided housing, they attach different meanings to these spaces from what the company intended. Finally, I introduce the concepts the 'scorecard spatial order' and the 'kubotereka spatial order' to frame the discussion and analysis of the geography of the platinum mining communities in the two mining towns concerned.

Key Words: Space, Spatial order, Platinum mining, Anglo-American Platinum, Mining Charter, Mine housing

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AAC	Anglo-American Corporation
AAP	Anglo-American Platinum
AMCU	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
ANC	African National Congress
BSAC	British South Africa Company
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
FLISP	Finance Linked Individual Subsidy Programme
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions
HOA	Homeownership Allowance
ICU	Industrial Commercial Workers Union
LOA	Living-Out Allowances
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Union
SAV	Single Accommodation Villages
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZFTU	Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions
ZIMASCO	Zimbabwe Mining and Steel Company

ZUMW	Zimbabwe Union of Mineworkers

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1 Introduction: Background and contextualisation

> The emergence of a distinct spatial structure with the rise of capitalism is not a contradiction-free process. In order to overcome spatial barriers and to 'annihilate space with time', spatial structures are created which themselves ultimately act as a barrier to further accumulation. These structures are expressed, of course, in the fixed and immovable form of transport facilities, plant, and other means of production and consumption which cannot be moved without being destroyed (Harvey 2001:247–248)

1.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by furnishing a brief historical background of industrial relations in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. This background spotlights the interrelationships between the three main actors in a capitalist society, namely the state, capital and labour. However, I am aware that a complete detailed account of this history is beyond the scope of this study, and therefore, only key historical moments that bring class struggles into sharp focus are briefly discussed. In doing so, the housing of mineworkers, which is the subject matter of this thesis, is contextualised. Then the problem statement, rationale of the study and the research question that guided this study are articulated. The chapter ends with an outline of the rest of the thesis.

1.2 State power, capital and labour in South Africa

The history of labour and industrial relations in South Africa can be structured into three historical periods, namely the colonial, apartheid, and democratic transition periods. It has been argued that there was no blueprint or a grand plan for segregation and the apartheid system South Africa but that it was the product of complex conflict management strategies and compromises (Posel 1991, 2011). Nevertheless, under colonial rule in South Africa, several labour laws were passed to regulate the employment relationship in

the workplace and beyond[1]. These laws institutionalised a racialised system of exclusion and inclusion in the workplace and beyond. In other words, rights and resources were unevenly distributed along racial lines. Thus, Black workers could not legally negotiate or discuss and redress their grievances with their employers, yet their white counterparts enjoyed the legal right to do so (Jones & Griffiths 1980).

Additionally, white, and coloured people were allowed a qualified franchise vote, which meant that politicians treated them with kid gloves and by and large capitulated to their demands. On the contrary, the state relentlessly repressed any attempts by Black African workers to unionise broadly speaking. The state treated Black people in urban areas as mere 'temporary sojourners' who were only needed for their 'cheap' labour (Jones & Griffiths 1980; Legassick 1975; Lever 1978; Wolpe 1972). This further compromised their already weakened bargaining power.

The colonial and apartheid state also regularly used institutionalised violence to supress the Black population in general and Black workers in particular. This includes, among other things, forcibly incarcerating them in prison-like single-sex regimented barracks known as compounds. Despite the state's use of force and legislation to repress them, Black trade unionism went from strength to strength, albeit in cycles, from the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in the 1920s to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed in the mid-1980s (Byrne, Ulrich & Van der Walt 2017). COSATU was eventually to play a key role in the political changes and negotiations that

[1] Examples include the following:

- The Black Labour Regulations Act, No.15 of 1911, was intended to regulate the recruiting and employment of Black labour.
- The Black (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923, underpinned the principle and practice of tolerating and treating Black people in urban areas as mere 'temporary sojourners' who were only needed for their 'cheap' labour.
- The Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 11 of 1924, which made provision for the prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and employees following the experience of the Rand Rebellion of 1922 when thousands of white workers took to the streets in Johannesburg (see Jones & Griffiths 1980).

culminated in the 1994 democratic transition in South Africa (Bonner 1978; Buhlungu 2010; Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit & Theron 2010; Von Holdt 2005; Webster 1987).

The transition from apartheid has been viewed by South African industrial and economic sociologists as a 'triple transition' that involves three overlapping and contradictory processes, namely political democratisation, economic liberalisation, and the de-racialisation of society (Bezuidenhout 2008:179–180; Webster & Omar 2003:194). To unmake the 'apartheid workplace regime' and redress its legacy, specific policies and statutes were put in place[2]. These efforts have yielded uneven success. There have been significant positive changes in workplace order in post-apartheid South Africa, but some challenges remain (Bezuidenhout 2008; Burger & Jafta 2005; Von Holdt 2003; Webster & Omar 2003).

Since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party in alliance with COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Even though the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and COSATU remain faithful to this alliance, they have at times been critical of the ANC government's economic and social polies. COSATU argues that these policies are pro-business and against workers' interests. At the same time, the government, COSATU and capital cooperate through the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) to set up socio-economic policies and strategies. NEDLAC is a product of labour's struggle to unilaterally limit government's power to introduce policy. It is therefore an important site for labour to contest the implementation of neoliberal economic policies (Gostner & Joffe 2000; Kim & Van der Westhuizen 2015). However, there have been challenges. For example, the ANC-led government side-stepped NEDLAC when they swapped the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for Growth, Employment, and Redistribution as the government's macroeconomic policy framework in 1996. This move irritated COSATU as they felt that Growth, Employment, and Redistribution was generally in favour of

[2]Examples include the Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995; the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997; the Black Economic Empowerment and the subsequent Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, No. 53 of 2003; the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998; the Skills Development Act of 1998; and the Skills Development Levies Act, No. 9 of 1999.

capital over labour. The Mining Charter, starting from 2004, is a biproduct of this corporatist arrangement through NEDLAC. However, industrial unrest and prolonged strike waves between 2012 and 2015 in the platinum mining sector laid bare the ineffectiveness of the corporatist industrial relations system. This became apparent when the South African Police Service used deadly force and killed 34 mineworkers to quell the strikes. From a strategic-relational approach, corporatism, as described above, demonstrates how the state is a condensation of class relations. No single group or class has absolute control over state power (see Jessop 1982 & 2007). Therefore, the post-apartheid state has to 'balance' the interests of all group formations within its territory. The provision of housing for mineworkers is one example where the difficult balancing act between maintaining the conditions necessary for capital accumulation and service delivery, which is key to the state's legitimacy and political consensus, can be observed.

1.3 State power, capital and labour in Zimbabwe

The colonial state using the British South Africa Company (BSAC) as its proxy made policy decisions and enacted laws that were largely favourable to capital and white unionised workers. Institutionalised violence through state apparatus, such as the police and military, were often relied on to force local peasants to become waged labourers in the mines under very exploitative conditions (Hollaway 1997; Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Van Onselen 1976).

Colonial capitalists used many strategies to woo local and foreign African labourers into the mines and used the compounds to repress them and maximise exploitation (Phimister 1993). Business during the colonial era had a direct influence on the state, and therefore, they always got whatever they would request, including a ready supply of cheap labour through the Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission. At the same time, the colonial state relied on the taxes paid by businesses for its own survival (see Arrighi 1970; Hollaway 1997; Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Van Onselen 1976).

During the colonial era, white workers formed their own trade unions, particularly in the mines and railways sectors, to the exclusion of Black workers. There were occasional instances when white unions clashed with employers, but these were few and far in-

between. White unions were, similar to those in colonial South Africa, more interested in fighting for preferential treatment in the workplace over their Black counterparts. This, however, did not stop Black workers from forming their own unions, albeit without similar recognition by the state and capital as white workers' unions were accorded[3] (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014). They organised demonstrations against wages and unfair working conditions but were generally strong armed by the colonial state and capital using the police and the army (Phimister & Raftopoulos 2000). In response, locals would engage in subtle protests. For example, they would write the names of mines on placards along with Shona expressions warning other migrant workers away from mines with cruel bosses and nail them to trees along roads and footpaths leading to those mines. These struggles for Black workers were the bedrock on which the liberation struggle against colonial rule was built (Raftopoulos & Phimister 1997).

Shortly after political independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean state sought close ties with the labour movement (Raftopoulos 2000). The leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) then had very strong ties with the ruling party, and hence, there was hardly any antagonism between labour and the state until the late 1980s. Since then, the labour movement has regularly clashed with the state over macroeconomic policies and the general working and living conditions in the country (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Raftopoulos 2018; Sutcliffe 2013). Consequently, the ZCTU broke formal ties with Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in 1989 and later formed the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Alexander 2000; Van der Walt 1998; Sachikonye & Raftopoulos 2018).

The period after the year 2000 saw the state targeting and supressing the labour movement using both restrictive laws[4] and brutal force through state apparatus like the Central Intelligence Organisation (Mtimtema 2018; Raftopoulos 2018; Sachikonye 2018). In

[3] For example, they formed the ICU, Rhodesia Mine and General Workers Association, Rhodesia Railway Workers Union, The Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association, The Federation of Bulawayo African Workers' union, the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Union and the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014)

[4] For instance, the Political Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, both enacted in 2002.

addition, the state sponsored the formation of another trade union federation in 2000, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), to counter the efforts of the ZCTU. The leadership of the ZFTU was selected from former liberation war veterans (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014). These tactics effectively constrained the labour movement by making it difficult to organise mass trade union meetings and restricting information deemed politically volatile. Weak union leadership, corruption, and factional battles within the ZCTU further blunted labour's force in Zimbabwe. As a result, too many splinter unions have mushroomed and compete to organise an ever-shrinking standard employed labour force (Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Raftopoulos, Kanyenze & Sachikonye 2018; Van der Walt 1998).

It is against this background that this study explored the development of human settlements in a mining town in post-colonial Zimbabwe. On one hand, the labour movement was at its weakest in modern history, and on the other, the state was infamous for putting in place policies that negatively affect foreign investment and good governance. Therefore, the study sought to explore the rationale behind mine housing strategies employed by multinational companies in the country. In addition, it shed light on the nature of the resultant spatial orders and human settlements in these mining communities.

1.4 Spaces of reproduction: Contested spatial orders

Spatial orders in mining communities are fiercely contested arenas. Despite their overall control of housing policies, planning and designs, mining firms are at times aggressively challenged by workers as a collective and as individuals on housing issues. At times workers display their agency through resilience, or in other words, through small, mundane acts or survival strategies. This 'tug of war' involves not only capital and labour but the state and other interested parties are inevitably drawn in[5]. In this, first of its kind study, I compare the spatial orders of mining settlements at two platinum mines owned

[5] There are periods when the interests of two or more parties may align, however, as shown in this study, often these periods of 'peace' do not last long.

by Anglo-American Platinum (AAP). The two mines are in neighbouring countries South Africa and Zimbabwe and are the Amandelbult mine in Northam (Limpopo) and Unki mine in Shurugwi. I introduce two concepts, namely the 'scorecard spatial order' (see section 2.10.1) and the 'kubotereka spatial order' (see section 2.10.2) to frame my discussion and analysis of the geography of platinum mining communities in the aforementioned mining towns.

This study reveals that the post-apartheid South African and the post-colonial Zimbabwean governments play instrumental roles in the unmaking and transformation of historically racialised geographies of mining communities. These spaces of social reproduction were carefully constructed by capital with the aid of colonial and apartheid states to enable the exploitation of mineworkers and to maintain a large supplies of cheap labour for the mines. The main targets were Black mineworkers who were both tricked and forced to work in the mines, living in inhumane conditions in the compounds. I demonstrate how the South African government uses the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) as a monitoring and regulatory tool to ensure transformation in the mining sector and how the Zimbabwean government attempted to do the same through what is known as the ZimAsset policy (Government of Zimbabwe 2013).

However, despite some similarities, the trajectories followed by the two states in question are fundamentally different. For instance, while the South African government encouraged and allowed the collective labour movement to be an active player in the spatial transformation of mining communities, the Zimbabwean government sought to supress the collective voice of workers in general. Thus, while the South African labour movement became to a great extent a force to reckon with for mineworkers, in Zimbabwe the state deliberately weakened the labour movement.

In both cases mining firms have been alert to opportunities where they can seize the initiative to socially engineer spatial orders to their benefit. For this reason, the mining firms have been investing large amounts of money into the housing and development of infrastructure necessary for the delivery of essential social services in communities where they operate. These, however, are not acts of charity; the goal for these firms is to construct spaces of reproduction in ways that further their interests and to find some sort

of a spatial fix. For example, at Unki one's housing location is a factor in determining whether one gets a day or night shift.

Workers, on the other hand, display their agency in many ways as they make meaning of these spaces. In some instances, they have embraced the reconfigured space, and in some cases, they have rejected the mining firm's attempts to house them in particular locations. Even in instances where they accepted company-provided housing, they attach different meanings to these spaces from what the company intended.

1.5 Statement of the problem

In Southern Africa, the housing of mineworkers has historically proved to be a critical and fiercely contested issue (Lange 2003; Van Onselen 1976; Wroger 1987). Profitable mining of low-grade gold ore, for example, would not have been possible without exploiting unskilled Black mineworkers through the compound system (Jeeves & Crush 1995:9–10) and simultaneously guaranteeing different forms of luxury, including housing, for white and senior employees (Moorhead 1995). In addition, literature is awash with studies that have a rather narrow focus on boarding and lodging provisions for unskilled mineworkers in Southern Africa in general. This study contributes to the debates around the housing of mineworkers by taking a holistic approach to mine housing as spaces of social reproduction for unskilled, skilled, and managerial employees. Hence, in addition to boarding and lodging provisions, non-work facilities for and activities of mining communities were taken into consideration across the above-mentioned employee categories. These included access to and the provision of health, leisure, sporting, recreational, educational, religious, drinking, and eating facilities.

The housing of mineworkers inherently attracts interest from several competing parties with seemingly incompatible interests, namely the state, individual mineworkers, organised labour, mining firms, shareholders, and local communities. Hence, this study sheds some light on the processes through which mining firms internally manage and analyse competing 'exogenous' factors and come up with an 'endogenous' housing policy or strategy. I provide a critical analysis of the driving forces behind the changes in housing policies and strategies in the mining industry in general and the platinum mining sector

specifically. To that end, this thesis compares two spatial orders, namely the 'scorecard spatial order' at Amandelbult mine in Limpopo, South Africa, and the 'kubotereka spatial order' at Unki in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe.

1.6 Rationale

The migrant labour system has been pivotal in the establishment and growth of the mining industry in Southern Africa (Allen 1992; Jeeves 1985; Van Onselen 1976; Wilkinson 1998). Invariably, mining houses deployed housing strategies to 'control' and 'discipline' mineworkers with the sole aim of improving productivity while keeping operation costs minimal. Overall, housing in colonial and apartheid Southern African mining communities mirrored the status and rank of the mine employees. While unskilled Black mineworkers were predominantly housed in single-sex, regimented barracks, commonly known as compounds or hostels, white and senior employees lived in family houses in mine villages and nearby suburbs built by the mines. In post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe, mining corporations spend significant amounts of money on family housing for 'all' their employees. In some instances, since the late 1980s, mine management made concerted efforts to 'depopulate' the compounds in a bid to 'stabilise' labour (Crush & James 1991; Lipton 1980). Despite the continuous shifts and rethinking of housing strategies, mine management always want to maintain tight control and oversight of housing arrangements for their employees. Mining companies usually make decisive contributions regarding ownership, planning and designing of housing quarters for mineworkers. Thus, the South African and Zimbabwean states earmarked mine housing as one of the critical tools through which historical social inequalities can be redressed.

Overall, this thesis provides an in-depth sociological analysis of housing strategies with specific reference to the platinum mining sector in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe. It further describes the two spatial orders that emerged in two platinum mining communities located near mining operations owned by AAP, one located in Thabazimbi, South Africa and the other in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe.

1.7 Research question

In post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe, platinum mining firms have been spending large sums of money on housing for their employees and the provision of other social amenities such as clinics, hospitals, schools, roads and sporting and recreational facilities. This represents a significant shift from the housing strategies that were prevalent during the colonial and apartheid eras. This study therefore provides explanations for the research questions below.

1.7.1 Main research question

- What is the rationale behind the housing strategies of AAP in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe?

1.7.2 Secondary research questions

- What roles are played by the state, labour, and capital in the production of spaces of social reproduction in platinum mining communities?
- What is the nature of the resultant spatial orders? How similar or different are they to the old spatial orders under apartheid and colonial regimes?

1.8 Organisation of thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter introduced the study by highlighting the rationale for the study, introducing the theoretical lenses through which I see and approached the subject as well as the research questions that drove this research. In Chapter 2, I delve deeper into the theoretical framework that guided me in this research. David Harvey's notion of space is introduced and explained in relation to this study. This theoretical framework is supplemented by the power relations approach that concretely conceptualises workers' power, as well as the strategic-relational approach state theory that theorises state power as a condensation of class relations (Jessop 2007). I also introduce two analytical tools that I called the 'scorecard spatial order' and the 'kubotereka spatial order'. These two analytical tools, inspired by Harvey's work, served as basic organising concepts for this thesis.

Chapters 3 and 4 critically reviews the literature on-mine housing, and thereby spotlights the power struggles between capital labour and the state in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. In Chapter 3, I trace historically from the colonial, apartheid and current era the housing issue in the South African mining sector. In doing so, the knowledge gap that this study sought to close is carved out. In Chapter 4, the discussion moves from South Africa to look at the same issues in Zimbabwe. A general observation in both chapters is that mining companies were historically reluctant to invest in mine housing, especially for Black mineworkers. As a result, overcrowded mine compounds became a signature feature in mining settlements. However, current literature points to the fact that platinum mining firms are increasingly spending more money on housing for their employees as well as providing social amenities and infrastructure in the communities where their operations are.

In Chapter 5, I outline methodological aspects of this study. I emphasise the triangulation of the data collection techniques that I used. Observation, interviews, photography as well as secondary data were triangulated. This especially fits well with Harvey's absolute, relative and relational notions of space since different data collection techniques offer different angles of looking at these notions of space. In Chapters 6 and 7, I present and analyse my findings. Chapter 6 focuses on the findings from the Amandelbult mine case study and Chapter 7 is dedicated to the Unki mine case study. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by focusing on the theoretical implications of the main findings of this study.

2 Theoretical framework

> Every society—and hence every mode of production … produces a space, its own space … I say each society, but it would be more accurate to say each mode of production, along with its specific relations of production. (Lefebvre 1974:31)

2.1 Introduction

The above quotation perfectly summarises the thinking tools I employed in this thesis. In agreement with Lefebvre's (1974:31) conviction, I take the position that space is socially produced. Hence, there are competing stakeholders locked in a constant struggle for control and influence over the nature and logic of spatial order. This chapter introduces and discusses the theoretical frameworks that guided this study. The labour geography theoretical framework by Henri Lefebvre (1974) and David Harvey (1969, 1973, 2001, 2006), the strategic-relational approach state theory by Bob Jessop (1982), following Nicos Poulantzas (1975), and the power resources approach by Erik Olin Wright (2000) and Beverly Silver (2003) provide the broader analytical tools and lenses through which I approached the subject matter of this thesis. The chapter begins by outlining the key debates and analytical concepts that are at the core of the labour geographies approach. Heeding the calls from critics within this field to both expand and tighten up the theoretical concepts used by labour geographers, the chapter ends by highlighting the theoretical contributions of this study.

2.2 Spatial order and labour power

Thinking in spatial terms requires that one recognises the fact that space is fundamentally social. In other words, people produce space to further or protect their interests. In mining communities, which are the focus of this study, mining firms are key actors in the production of space, but mineworkers should not be viewed as passive occupants or users of these spaces. They are indeed active participants in the making of meanings attached to these spaces. In addition, it is important to note that this is not a two-way power struggle but is rather a three-way tug of war as the state is not a neutral regulator but an actor with

interests. However, the processes of space making in mining communities are peculiar in the sense that the natural landscape or the physical location of the minerals dictates the possibilities of the production of spatial order. For instance, a factory can be relocated at any time if capital feel the need to do so, but a mining operation cannot do this. Therefore, there are inherent contradictions and complexities in the making of spatial order in mining regions. To understand these contradictions and complexities, I relied heavily on the theoretical tools developed by David Harvey (1969, 1973, 2001, 2006) and on labour geography, a sub-field in geography that he inspired.

2.3 Key features of labour geography

Herod (1997) coined the term labour geography, thereby launching a fast-growing field within and outside the discipline of human and economic geography. Labour geographers assume a worker-centric view of the social world. As Castree (2007:853) asserts, for labour geographers "geography matters to workers while workers, conversely, matter to geography". Thus, there is more to geography than mere background. Capital and labour are therefore keenly interested in the shaping, organisation, and production of space. Thus Herod (2001:6) wrote the following:

> The production of space in particular ways are not only important for capital's ability to survive by enabling accumulation and the reproduction of capitalism itself, but also crucial for workers abilities to survive and reproduce themselves.

In addition, labour geographers put significant emphasis on worker agency. Realising that material geographies are actively and socially constructed and reconstructed, labour geographers stress that workers are significant actors or agents in the ordering and reordering of space. Owing to their role in the production of both the essentials for human existence and luxuries, workers play an indispensable role. Thus, labour geographers see workers as active, capable agents. Only when they are subjected to coercion or under slavery conditions do workers have little or no agency (Castree 2007:855).

2.4 Worker agency

Agency is relational, and it can be individual or collective. In other words, worker agency is embedded in social structures such as the state, capital and community. This is "human action that makes a difference to social outcomes" (Bergene, Endresen & Knutsen 2010:6). Thus, geographic concepts such as scale, place and space are intrinsically intertwined with labour agency. In addition, agency reflects the power of individual or collective actors to deal with or act free from the existing structural constraints. Following Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010), labour agency can be seen through at least three forms of actions, namely workers' resilience, reworking, and resistance. Resilience refers to the small mundane acts of getting by or survival strategies dealing with everyday constraints without changing their conditions of existence. Reworking, however, reflects workers' efforts "to materially improve their conditions of existence" (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2010:216). Here workers aim to subvert the prevailing political economy to their own advantage by tilting the scales of power in their favour. Finally, resistance pertains to "direct challenges to capitalist social relations through attempts to regain control of labour time and its use in the sphere of production and social reproduction" (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2010:216).

2.5 Space as a key concept

Geographers view space as a basic organising concept (Harvey 1969:206). However, the word space can be used in multiple contexts with numerous meanings. Thus, it is crucial to theoretically qualify what is represented by the concept space in this study. Harvey (2006:271–275) proposes that space can be understood through what he calls a "tripartite division". First, Harvey states that space can be viewed as 'absolute space'. Absolute space is fixed. It has boundaries, for example, private property, cities, and states. Secondly, Harvey refers to space as relative. He explains that "space is relative in the double sense: that there are multiple geometries from which to choose and that the spatial frame depends crucially upon what it is that is being relativized and by whom" (Harvey 2006:272). Thirdly, space is relational. This entails that it is impossible to understand space without situating it in the processes that define it. In Harvey's (2006:273) own

words, “processes do not occur in space but define their own spatial frame”. Thus, Harvey’s tripartite division shows how space is socially constructed. It can be argued that space is both objective and subjective. Harvey (1973:13) wrote the following about space:

> If we regard space as absolute it becomes a ‘thing in itself’ with an existence independent of matter. It then possesses a structure which we can use to pigeon-hole or to individuate phenomena. The view of relative space proposes that it be understood as a relationship between objects which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other. There is another sense in which space can be viewed as relative and I choose to call this relational space—space regarded … as being contained in objects in the sense that an object can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself relationships to other objects … Further, space is neither absolute, relative, or relational in itself, but it can become one or all simultaneously depending on the circumstances. The problem of the proper conceptualisation of space is resolved through human practice with respect to it.

Following Harvey’s usage of space, this study uses all the three dimensions of space simultaneously or one at a time. Considering the subject matter of this study, mine housing as spaces of social reproduction, it is important to regard space as a contested arena, and thus, its production is fundamentally about power struggle. This is in line with the way labour geographers view space. Labour geographers are more concerned about “how the impact of workers’ actions is conditioned by their position in the geographies of capitalism, their ability to reach across space and in their organizing efforts, and their strategies for matching capital’s (potential) mobility” (Coe & Jordhus-Lier 2010:218).

Gans (2002) provides an equally insightful description of space as a use-centred view of space. Gans (2002:329) argues the following:

> Natural space becomes a social phenomenon, or social space, once people begin to use it, boundaries are put on it and meanings are attached to it … spatial sociologists study how society, i.e., individuals and collectives, transform natural into social space, how they use and exchange it, what social, economic, and other processes and forces come into play in these uses and

> exchanges, and how both kinds of space affect individuals, collectivities, and social processes and forces.

This view of space is well suited to the study of mine housing. It reveals unique dimensions of the complex relationship between public and private space in mining communities. Company housing strategies, state policies and service delivery and the meanings attached to and the use of space by individuals as well as collectives converge in complex ways in mining communities.

2.6 Spatial fix

Harvey (2001) uses the notion of 'spatial fix' to describe many different forms of spatial reorganisation and geographical expansion that serve to temporarily manage capitalism's inherent crisis tendencies owing from its internal contradictions. He wrote the following:

> The accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly geographical affair. Without the possibilities inherent in geographical expansion, spatial reorganization and uneven geographical development, capitalism would long ago have ceased to function as a political economic system. This perpetual turning to 'a spatial fix' to capitalism's internal contradictions (most notably registered as an over accumulation of capital within a particular geographical area) coupled with the uneven insertion of different territories and social formations into the capitalist world market has created a global historical geography of capital accumulation whose character needs to be well understood. (Harvey 2001:369)

Harvey (2001) further noted that capitalism tends to rely heavily on long- term investments in fixed, immobile physical capital to facilitate the mobility of other resources. He explained it as follows:

> Capitalism can open up considerable breathing-space for its own survival through pursuit of the 'spatial fix'... It is rather as if, having sought to annihilate space with time, capitalism buys time for itself out of the space it conquers. So, although we can continue to assert that crises cannot, in the

> long run, be avoided, we have to countenance the possibility that the long run might be very long. (Harvey 2001:338)

This is particularly insightful to help understand the logic behind the large investments made by platinum mining firms in the construction of houses for their employees and fixed infrastructure such as roads, clinics, and schools.

2.7 Labour geography and mine housing

As mentioned earlier, mines are usually sited as a result of geological accidents. In other words, the discovery of minerals in particular places determines the location of mines and eventually mining communities. Thus, the basic assumptions underlining labour geography, that geography matters to workers while workers, conversely, matter to geography, fits naturally to this study (Castree 2007:853). It offers useful lenses to look at mine housing in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe.

Usually, mines are located in areas that would not normally support large populations. Thus, mining capital has historically, in South Africa and other countries, sought to provide housing and build mining communities near and around their mining operations (Allen 1992; Home 2000; Obenauer 1924; Van Onselen 1976; Wroger 1987). However, welfare-mining capital has historically developed or supported the development of mining communities that are stratified along racial and or class lines (Callinicos 1987; Lange 2003; Macmillan 2012). Under the colonial and apartheid regimes in South Africa the class and racial fault lines were endorsed by state policies. Thus, mine housing as spaces of social reproduction were designed to offer different rewards and living conditions along racial and class lines. On one hand, mine management and senior employees (predominantly white) were provided with luxurious houses as well as supporting services such as golf courses, libraries, parks, and schools (Allen 1992; Wroger 1987). On the other hand, ‘low skilled’ mineworkers (predominantly Black) had to share accommodation in inhumanely overcrowded mine compounds and share facilities such as eating and sanitary facilities.

In post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe, mining communities in general and mine housing and supporting services delivery has overall changed for the

better. In principle, workers at all levels have opportunities to access decent housing provided by mining firms. Free-standing houses are available for mineworkers to rent or buy through housing schemes run by mining firms. Conditions in mine compounds have also improved; some compounds were upgraded for family housing (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011:253–254). Yet informal settlements with insanitary conditions continue to grow in and around platinum mines (Rajak 2012). Thus, not all workers benefit from mine housing schemes.

Labour geographers tend to focus on workers' agency and thus frame labour issues as a struggle between two main actors, namely capital and labour. However, this thesis highlights the central role played by two Southern African states, mainly through 'transformative' policies and regulations, in the power struggles between labour and capital over spatial development, particularly in mining communities. This suggests a need to widen the theoretical scope of labour geography beyond labour and capital. I argue that this offers unique insight into understanding the nature and logic of spatial orders that emerged in post-colonial Southern African communities.

2.8 The power resources approach

The power resources approach is used in this study to conceptualise workers' power. This approach was popularised by Erik Olin Wright (2000) and Beverly Silver (2003). According to Wright (2000:962), power is a relational concept and "it can be defined as the capacity of individuals and organisations to realize class interests". Therefore, workers' power partly hinges on their capacity, individually or collectively, to counter the power of capital. In this regard, Wright (2000) conceptualised two sources of workers' bargaining power namely 'associational power', derived from labour's position in the economic system, and 'structural power', which comes from collective political or trade union workers' association. Over the years, the power resources approach has been expanded, and four sources of power were established as 'institutional power' and 'societal power' were added into the labour power matrix (see Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster 2018).

2.8.1 Structural power

Wright (2000:962) and Silver (2003:13) characterise structural power as the power that workers gain simply from their location in the economic system. This can further be differentiated into two subtypes, namely marketplace and workplace bargaining power. The former includes the "possession of scarce skills that are in demand by employers, low levels of general unemployment, and the ability of workers to pull out of the labour market entirely and survive on nonwage sources of income". The latter is gained by workers who are embroiled in "tightly integrated production processes, where a localised work stoppage in a key node can cause disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppage itself" (Silver 2003:13).

2.8.2 Associational power

According to Wright (2000:962), associational power refers to "the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of workers". This includes trade unions and political parties as well as community organisations. Silver (2003:14) adds that "historically, associational power has been embedded in state legal frameworks that guaranteed such things as the right to form trade unions as well as the obligation of employers to bargain collectively with trade unions".

In addition, associational power requires an organisational process to take place and infrastructural resources, organisational efficiency, member participation and internal cohesion within the labour movement (Schmalz et al. 2018:118–119). It can be argued that globalisation has created a vicious circle in which weakening marketplace bargaining power undermines associational power and vice versa (see Standing 2011). In addition, processes such as labour casualisation and outsourcing helped to de-legitimise existing trade union organisations and labour parties in the eyes of many workers by making it increasingly difficult for these organisations to deliver benefits to their members (Bezuidenhout, 2008; Bezuidenhout, Theron & Godfrey 2005; Buhlungu, 2010; Sinwell 2015). Moreover, direct attacks by employers and states on workers' organisations directly undermined workers' associational power (Mutekwe 2019; Silver 2003). However, the history of labour movements shows that when old forms of workers'

bargaining power are undermined, inevitably new forms on a larger and more disruptive scale emerge (Chinguno 2009, 2015; Silver 2003).

2.8.3 Institutional power

Institutional power involves securing and stabilising influence through institutional set-ups. In essence, institutional power is the result of struggles and negotiation processes based on both structural and associational power. Workers can exercise this type of power by referring to their legally fixed rights (Schmalz et al. 2018).

2.8.4 Societal power

This refers to the "the latitudes for action arising from viable cooperation contexts with other social groups and organizations, and society's support for trade union demands" (Schmalz et al. 2018:122). Societal power, as the name suggests, goes beyond the workplace to include agenda-setting, alliances and coalitions with various social and political groups, including workers centres, labour rights advocates groups and members from progressive parties (Webster 1987). At times local unions seek support outside their country in the societal power of allied consumer groups and social movements. Labour activists are often involved in both trade unions and NGOs/social movements and political parties.

Table 2.1 shows the different levels of power and how they function in different levels of society.

Table 2-1 Levels of labour power

	Structural power	**Associational power**	**Institutional power**	**Society power**
Applied in the form of	Disruption of the valorisation of capital	Formation of workers' associations	Referring to legally fixed rights	Interaction with other social actors
At the level of the workplace	Labour unrest Changing jobs	Grassroots works group Works council Shop-steward bodies	Works' constitution	Coalition and discursive power by their very nature transcend boundaries

	Structural power	Associational power	Institutional power	Society power
At the industry wide level	Economic strikes	Trade unions	Collective bargaining autonomy	between the levels
At the level of society	Political strikes	Workers' parties	Constitution law and legislation	

Source: Schmalz et al. (2018:119)

2.9 Class-perspective theories of the state

The state plays a crucial role in regulating the relations between labour and capital; therefore, it is crucial to conceptualise the state. This study drew from Marxian analyses of the state. Many theorists contributed to the class analysis of the state and state power (for example, see Gramsci 1978; Jessop 1982; Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1978). Over the years it became clear among scholars that there is no one-size-fits-all theoretical framework on the state because it is seen as a "nebulous entity" or "not a thing" but a social relation (Miliband 1969:48–50). From a class analysis perspective, state power can be defined as the capacity of a social class to realise its objective interests through the state apparatus (Poulantzas 1978:104). Therefore, state power is capitalist if it creates, maintains or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation and is non-capitalist if it disrupts these conditions (Jessop 1982:221).

However, the state in capitalist societies remain an active site for class struggles. As Miliband (1969:56) observe, the conquest of state power remains incomplete and open to endless contestation giving no single class formation absolute state power. Therefore, the state is best conceptualised like capital "as a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form" (Poulantzas 1978:73). This view of the state, or more precisely, state power as a social relation between people or political forces mediated through the instrumentality of things was further developed by Jessop (1982). His strategic-relational approach to state power guides the analysis of the state role in this thesis.

2.9.1 The state as a social relation and the strategic-relational approach

The state is not an entity with an intrinsic instrumental essence; it is a social relation, the condensation of a class relation (Poulantzas 1975:26). In essence, Jessop's (1982) strategic-relational approach rests on the idea that states are not neutral terrains on which political forces struggle with equal chances to pursue their interests and objectives and with equal chances of realising their goals. Rather, the organisation of state apparatuses, state capacities, and state resources inevitably results in the state favouring some forces, interests, identities, spatiotemporal horizons of action, and projects more than others. The key point is that structures are not equally constraining or enabling for all actors. For example, depending on the balance of political forces, the state may decide to subsidise capital and pay social expenses to achieve political consensus and legitimation (Carnoy 2014).

More precisely, this approach interprets and explains 'state power' (not the state apparatus) as a 'form-determined' condensation of the changing balance of forces in political and politically-relevant struggle. It follows that the exercise and effectiveness of state power is a contingent product of a changing balance of political forces located within and beyond the state and that this balance is conditioned by the specific institutional structures and procedures of the state apparatus as embedded in the wider political system and environing societal relations (Jessop 2008:427–428).

Thus, a strategic-relational analysis is useful when examining how a given state apparatus may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, and some actions over others. It highlights the ways, if any, in which political actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging by engaging in 'strategic-context' analysis when choosing a course of action or policy position (Jessop 2008:428).

2.10 Conceptualisation

In this section I describe and define some conceptual tools that emerged from this study that inform the analysis presented later. The following subsections discuss these tools.

2.10.1 Scorecard spatial order

The Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) plays an instrumental role in the housing reforms in the mining industry in post-apartheid South Africa. All the initiatives and changes that are implemented regarding the housing and living conditions of mineworkers can be traced back to the Mining Charter's scorecard. The Mining Charter, which was first passed by the South African government in 2002 and revised in 2004, stipulate that all mining firms were to provide the government with 5- and 10-year plans, which were supposed to be fully implemented by the end of 2014, for addressing the housing needs of mineworkers. The government would then annually use a scorecard system to evaluate the progress made. Any mining firm that fails to reach the agreed targets would risk losing its mining licence.

In addition to the Mining Charter, the Minister of Minerals and Energy promulgated the Housing and Living Condition Standards in 2009 to further force mining firms to put in place solid plans to provide mineworkers with housing (Government of South Africa 2009). It emphasises building sustainable mining towns. This means that the provision of family housing must be associated with expanded community services and facilities, including education and health care services, recreational facilities, and social wellbeing. In addition, mining firms are obligated to upgrade hostels and convert some of them into family units. Both the Mining Charter and the Housing and Living Condition Standards make it clear that non-compliance will result in a firm losing all mining rights. I argue that this is the main reason why mining giants such as AAP are spending billions of South African Rands on housing their employees. In my view, management is mainly interested in keeping up with targets set in the Mining Charter, and thereby, creating a spatial order rather than empowering and transforming the lives of their Black mineworkers per se.

Hence, I coined the concept 'scorecard spatial order', derived from the above-mentioned management practice of keeping up with the Charter's targets by all means necessary. I use this concept to describe the spatial order that has emerged at the Amandelbult mine complex in Northam, South Africa. It captures how mine management is preoccupied with ticking the boxes, as it were, or scoring points on the Mining Charter's scorecard to avoid losing their mining rights. As a result, proposed solutions, such as giving mining

workers living-out allowances (LOAs), have largely created a much bigger housing crisis with the unprecedented growth of informal settlements in platinum mining communities. Thus, the Mining Charter, a legal tool aimed to fundamentally transform Black mineworkers' lives, has largely been rendered impotent.

2.10.2 Kubotereka spatial order

I draw this concept from one of the most popular physical landscapes in Shurugwi: the Boterekwa pass. The Shona word *boterekwa* literally means a long and meandering course; thus *kubotereka* is to follow a long and meandering course. I use the concept 'kubotereka spatial order' to describe how the physical landscape, the Boterekwa pass, remains a key determinant of the spatial order in this mining region. I further argue that the kubotereka spatial order frames all spheres of social relations for mineworkers at Unki, including the relations between mineworkers and management at Unki.

The snaking Boterekwa pass offers road users the opportunity to view the majestic scenery of the Boterekwa mountains, but at the same time, the steep gradient is dangerous and make first-time travellers nervous. Social relations and the everyday life experiences of mineworkers in Shurugwi mirrors this physical landscape, which is a blend of natural and artificial features that presents them with challenges and opportunities. Unki mine's human resource management also followed the *kubotereka* way of doing things by being deliberately slow to respond to workers and community concerns and unpredictable in their decision making.

To describe the workers' relational space and how they experience and deal with the kubotereka spatial order, I used the concept of a *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking. The Shona expression *kuno kubasa* means 'this is a work location' or simply 'we are here to work'. This is a common expression among mineworkers at Unki mine who live in the townships of Shurugwi and the newly built mine housing in the same town. It sums up their diverging views and attitudes towards the process of space making in Shurugwi. Those who live in dilapidated housing in the townships use this expression in reluctant acceptance of their 'temporary' situation in a town far away from home. Unki employees living in recently built company-owned housing use this expression to remind themselves

that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract and so they need to build their own houses elsewhere. Thus, the *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking means different things to different groups of mineworkers depending on their housing location, which is informed by their perceived worth to the mining firm. It entails either a reluctant acceptance of the status quo or self-caution against false consciousness.

Another conceptual tool I use to describe the cautious approach to social relations by mineworkers under the kubotereka spatial order is what I term the *hapaitwe zvekumhanya* attitude. The Shona street lingo expression *hapaitwe zvekumhanya* literally means 'you don't move too fast here', and was adopted by mineworkers to mean 'be cautious, don't be too direct or hasty' when dealing with each other and especially mine management. This cautious attitude became necessary as the trade union movement in general has become weaker in Zimbabwe at a time when unemployment rates have skyrocketed. Thus, mine management hold almost unchallenged leverage when dealing with mineworkers since they have at their disposal a large pool of retrenched mineworkers who are unemployed and desperate to find work.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter introduced and discussed the theoretical lenses I used to analyse the findings of this study. Harvey's conceptualisation of space drove this thesis. His thinking and notions of absolute, relative, and relational space inspired the two concepts of scorecard spatial order and kubotereka spatial order that I introduced. In addition, this chapter also highlighted the need to theorise the role of the state in the production of spatial orders in mining communities. Having put together the theoretical tools for this study, the following chapter reviews the relevant literature for this study focusing on the geographies of mining communities in South Africa.

3 Housing mineworkers in South Africa: A historical review

> If space is produced, if there is a productive process, then we are dealing with history … we may be sure that the forces of production (nature, labour and the organisation of labour, technology and knowledge) and naturally, the relations of production play a part … in the production of space. (Lefebvre 1974:46)

3.1 Introduction

As is alluded to in the quote above, it is crucial to acknowledge space, whether it is absolute, relative, or relational, as a social construct. It is thus imperative to have a historical understanding of how spatial orders in mining communities are created or influenced by relations between labour, capital, and the state and how in turn they shape these relations. In Southern Africa, very few industries bring labour, capital, and the state into a power struggle over spatial development in ways that mining does. Invariably, the geographic locations for mines are a result of geological accidents, and thus, are usually located in places that would not normally support large populations (Macmillan 2012:539). Thus, from site preparation throughout the lifespan of a mine, mining firms continuously must deal with the housing question regarding their employees and at times their families at all levels. This also means that capital in the mining industry does not get to choose where to locate their operations. However, once they are established, they play a key role in the spatial development of the area or region surrounding the mine.

The housing question in the mining industry in Southern Africa is not an entirely new subject. There are several studies and scholarships from various perspectives on this subject (see for example Allen 1992; Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011; Crush & James 1991; Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991; Demissie 1998; Macmillan 2012; Turrell 1984; Van Onselen 1976). With a few exceptions (for example, Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011) these studies, in South Africa in particular, tend to be primarily focused on one

form of housing: the compounds or hostels[6]. Less has been written on the housing of different categories of mine employees such as managerial or supervisory and skilled employees. The focus on compounds also means that the literature's discussion on mine housing issues is limited to Black mine employees and that less is said about the housing of white mine employees. In other words, Black and white mineworkers' housing concerns are generally treated as unrelated matters. Also under-researched is the instrumental role of the state in shaping the geographies of mining communities in the two chosen countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Furthermore, less emphasis has been placed on the impact of mining firms' official housing policies or strategies on the lives on mineworkers and how in turn mineworkers collectively or individually give meaning to these spaces (Rogaly 2009). In addition, very few studies take a holistic approach to mine housing as spaces of the social reproduction of mineworkers. Furthermore, there has been a sharp focus on gold (Crush 1992; James 1992; Moodie 1994; Van Onselen 1976), diamond (Carstens 2001) and coal (Alexander 2004) mining communities, yet until recently less has been written on platinum mining communities (see Alexander 2013; Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015; Capps 2015; Chinguno 2015; Marais 2018; Sinwell 2015). This study contributes to these recent debates and scholarship focusing on platinum mining, particularly in South Africa.

This chapter is divided into two broad parts. The first part discusses mine housing strategies in South Africa prior to the democratic transition in 1994. This part is further divided into two sections, the period from the 1870s to the 1960s and the period from 1970 to 1994. The second part discusses the political economy of mine housing in South Africa after 1994 to date. The implications of factors such as race, employee status, nationality, and type of employment, and mine housing options are discussed.

[6] These were single-sex, regimented barracks

3.2 Housing Black mineworkers in colonial and apartheid South Africa, 1870s-1960s

Right from the onset of diamond mining in Kimberley, Black mineworkers relied on their employers to provide them with temporary boarding and lodging while they maintained a rural home. During the 1870s, Black mineworkers were living on the digger's compounds and part of their wages was paid in the form of food and shelter. At the time, self-employed white diggers, merchants and Black mineworkers lived alongside one another and sometimes shared facilities in the 'open' mining camps (Allen 1992:113, 117; Roberts 1976:70–91; Turrell 1984:75). Thus, workers could enter and exit these spaces as and when they wished. This was similar to the camps built by mining companies in the 1900s in the Congolese copper belt and Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Rubbers 2019).

From these early days of class formation in Southern Africa, the housing question was at the centre of the conflict between mineworkers and their employers (Allen 1992:109). By the mid-1870s, mineworkers successfully fought for a 'board wages' system in place of the employers' provision of food and boarding. As a result, they more than doubled their wages and enhanced their freedom to move around. They could live where they pleased and ate wherever, whenever and whatever they liked, and thus, could negotiate access to social facilities and participate in non-work activities in their own terms. Some of the Black mineworkers remained at the diggers' compounds, others "squatted in the 'native camps' near the main camps while others lived in the townships" (Allen 1992:113–114). In other words, mineworkers were able to exercise their agency in relation to how they experienced the spaces in the workplace and beyond. Hence, using the issue of diamond theft as a smoke screen[7], mine owners pressed toward compounding both Black and white

[7] It is crucial at this juncture to underscore the fact that mine housing strategies were directly tied to operating costs of individual mines. When the price of the minerals was fixed, profits could only be derived from cutting the cost of labour and mine managers by systematically targeted reduced housing costs. Thus, during the open mining period at Kimberley (1871–1884), Black mineworkers lived in open camps but with the onset of underground mining in 1885, which is more labour intensive, and hence costly, they were incarcerated in closed compounds (Turrell 1984:75).

mineworkers in isolated camps and locations around the mines in order to gain more control over their labour (Allen 1992:123).

Closed compounds, modelled on the compounds in the Brazilian diamond mining industry, were thus designed at Kimberley. By 1879, the Brazilian mining companies were using Black slave labour incarcerated in hostels and fed by the mine owners. It was believed that the Brazilian workers were far more productive than the Black mineworkers at Kimberley. Thus, mine owners designed a housing strategy, the closed compound system, that would allow them the "severity and control [over all their employees] implicit in slavery without reintroducing it as a system" (Allen 1992:123; Turrell 1984:67–68). Thus, employers thought that by compounding Black mineworkers they would be able to curtail their agency and control not only their labour but also their social reproduction and life chances.

After a few years of experimenting with prison labour, the De Beers mine management began the initiative to house their employees in closed compounds. This marked the beginning of the collaboration between the colonial state and capital configuring spaces of social reproduction in an attempt to constrain mineworkers' agency. However, both Black and white mine employees were reluctant to enter the closed compounds. In effect they went on strike in 1885 to protest against the closed compound system, but they were defeated. White mine employees managed to escape being incarcerated in closed compounds (I will return to this later). Black mine employees were, without the support of their white counterparts, compounded. A combination of persuasion, cajoling and force was used to get them into the single-sex regimented barracks built by mine owners. By 1888 the closed compound system for Black employees was prevalent through the diamond fields in Kimberley (Allen 1992:125–129). Thus, mine owners looked at this housing strategy as vehicle to provide readily available cheap labour while workers feared losing control over their material conditions of existence (Legassick 1975; Wolpe 1972). As a result, there has always been a tug of war between mine owners and mineworkers with regards to housing. It is important to underscore the role of the predatory colonial state in compounding Black mineworkers as it joined forces with capital to improve its chances of extraction through taxation (see Thies 2007).

The De Beers mine management heralded their closed compound system as a model for social welfare. They often argued that their Black workers were better housed and fed in the closed compounds than those who were not compounded. In addition, they professed that they were providing their workers with free medical care and hospitalisation at the company hospitals, which were usually built adjoining the compounds (Turrell 1984:67–70). This narrative downplayed the fact that these mineworkers were being held against their will in such compounds. It is important to note that, as the findings of this study shows, some mineworkers who have lived in the compounds for many years have now internalised the belief that they are better off living in company-owned accommodation. However, it can be argued that mine management were merely interested in addressing the welfare concerns of their stakeholders. What really mattered to them was designing a spatial system that could make possible tight worker control as well as a constant supply of cheap labour. Their strategy was mainly about producing a spatial order, physical landscape or absolute space, that would help them maximise profits.

Turrell (1984:74) described the life of a Black mineworker at the diamond mines in the 1890s as follows:

> The normal pattern of life for the resident miner was an alteration between mine labour and periods of 'resting' in the locations. Location landlords lived well off miners who rented rooms to recuperate their strength for two to six weeks before returning to the compounds … the oscillation between location and compound kept up the complement of the De Beers workforce.

This means that, essentially, the cost of social reproduction of Black mineworkers was externalised to the locations and the labour-sending rural areas. However, while mine owners agreed on their desire to obtain a regular supply of cheap compliant labour, they did not always agree on what was the best mechanism to get it. For instance, at Kimberley the closed compound system was viewed as the most profitable method, but this was not the case at the goldfields of the Witwatersrand. The issue of theft of minerals by mineworkers did not apply to the gold mining industry as it did to the diamond mining industry as gold could not be easily smuggled out of the mine. Thus, some gold mining firms preferred to establish large locations at or near the mines to avoid paying for the

costs of accommodation for their workers (Allen 1992:237). Despite opposition from the state and local white communities, mine managers allowed the establishment and growth of African locations, which came to be known as ‘tin tows’, at or near their mines before the 1920s. These ‘tin towns’ housed thousands of Black mineworkers in the gold mines of Johannesburg. Represented by the Chamber of Mines, mine managers argued that such rudimentary family housing was critical to attract and retain skilled and experienced Black mineworkers (Jeeves & Crush 1995:4). These developments highlight the following:

a) There has always been a clear link between the housing or accommodation arrangements for mineworkers and the productivity of mining operations;
b) The colonial and apartheid states and capital did not always agree on the general spatial ordering in mining communities; and importantly;
c) Different mining companies, depending on the type of minerals they were mining, had diverging views on the issue of housing.

This resulted in many experiments being tried throughout the colonial and apartheid eras as the state sought spatial regulation and control of patterns of human settlement while capital strove for its spatial fix with the workers at the centre this power struggle. Hence, the ‘tin towns’ that provided family housing for Black mineworkers did not last long. The state and local white communities stepped up their opposition to the creation of permanent Black locations in the vicinity of white suburbs in a bid to uphold the racial and spatial ordering of society under colonial rule. Eventually, after the passage of the Native Labour Regulations Act in 1911, which made mine locations the responsibility of mine management, mines pulled down and discouraged the establishment of new ‘tin towns’. In the end, gold mining firms were left with only one option: Compound Black mineworkers (Allen 1992:237; Jeeves & Crush 1995:5). On the other hand, depending on their rank, white mine employees had various housing options made available directly or indirectly by the mines with the help of the state.

According to Allen (1992:252–253), although the Chamber of Mines did not oppose the colonial state’s policy of segregation, they wanted mining houses to permanently retain some of their skilled Black mineworkers. To that end, mine managers wanted to put in

place a housing strategy that would allow such Black mineworkers to live with their families. The state yielded and granted mine owners permission to build married quarters at a distance from the main town but only a small percentage of Black mineworkers could live there. For example, in 1930 less than 1% of the total Black mineworkers lived in married quarters in the gold mining industry, and this remained mostly unchanged until the 1980s. Turrell (1984:73–74) aptly summed up the situation as follows:

> On the one hand they wanted experienced labourers in their mines. On the other hand, they did not want an organised working class in their town. It was this contradiction that was bridged by the closed compound system.

Thus, family housing for permanent Black workers was more common at Johannesburg's gold mines before the 1920s. Individual mines had up to 15% of their total Black mineworkers living with their families as stabilised labour in married quarters, the 'tin towns' and slum yards away from the mines in 1913 (Jeeves & Crush 1995:4).

It is important to note that under colonial and apartheid rule there was no clearly defined national policy on mine housing. Thus, individual mines used different approaches to address the mine housing question. This opened opportunities for local adaptations and variations in mine housing as a result of negotiations between mine management and external interested parties. For instance, mines located outside the Johannesburg area and those with access to land away from white communities were not compelled to demolish the 'tin towns' at or near their mines. Other mines with access to land established what were known as labour farms where mineworkers and their families could practice subsistence farming. Some of the rural mines provided family housing for Black workers at the mines. At the coal mines in Natal and the Eastern Transvaal, as many as 50% of Black workers were housed in married quarters in the 1930s (Allen 1992:253; Jeeves & Crush 1995:5).

The post-apartheid state has made strides in an attempt to regulate spatial development in mining communities. The main tool the state is using to consolidate mine housing is the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) and its score card, which was first introduced in 2002. However, I argue that the Mining Charter depends largely on mining firms setting their own transformation targets, which results in mining companies

implementing different housing strategies depending on their location and type of minerals they mine.

The approach to mine housing also varied from one country to the other in the Southern African region albeit with the same result. For instance, while the mining houses in South Africa generally housed their Black workers in compounds, except for a small percentage who were settled in married quarters, Rhodesian mine managers used the compound system as a spatial strategy in a slightly different way. In Southern Rhodesia[8], compounds reflected the status and rank of Black mineworkers. Mine managers housed their new recruits and short-term workers in the inner tier with tighter control. As workers became more skilled, paid better and more experienced in their jobs, Rhodesian mine managers allowed them to change their accommodation from the inner compound to the more private, less monitored areas of the compound (Phimister 1988:87; Van Onselen 1976:37, 134).

As suggested earlier, gold mining firms in Johannesburg were initially reluctant to provide accommodation for their Black workers but were ultimately hard-pressed by the state and local white communities to do so. In addition to the state and local communities, local traders were deeply interested in the settlement of the mine housing question. Although they could not stop the compounding of Black mineworkers, these predominantly white local traders and merchants strongly opposed the establishment of closed compounds. They protested that trading with Black mineworkers was crucial for the sustainability of their businesses (Allen 1992:252). In post-apartheid mining towns, local traders and retailers stand to benefit from the spending power of mineworkers.

In 1903, a private commission of compound managers[9] was sent to Kimberly to investigate if it would be advantageous to gold mine owners to imitate the compound system in operation in Kimberley (Turrell 1984:59). As a result, although the design and management systems of compounds at the gold mining firms in Johannesburg were

[8] Now Zimbabwe

[9] Rhodesian mine managers also joined with the Johannesburg gold mine managers in this tour of the diamond mine compounds in Kimberley in search of a solution to the housing question at their mines (Turrell 1984:60).

inspired by the closed compounds in Kimberley, no completely closed compounds were introduced. However, the additional rules that required Black mineworkers to ask for permission every time they wanted to leave the compound and the restrictive pass laws meant that the compounds in Johannesburg operated as closed compounds[10] (Allen 1992:252). This greatly affected the experiences of mineworkers.

The establishment of the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) as a mining giant at the end of the 1940s led to the revival of the family housing question with regard to Black mineworkers. The AAC proposed to provide family housing for up to 10% of its Black mineworkers at the then new gold mines that were to be opened in the Orange Free State. Ironically, the AAC's proposal was strongly opposed by the South African Chamber of Mines[11], even though the Chamber of Mines itself had previously campaigned and lobbied the state to allow mine owners to provide family housing for their skilled Black mineworkers in order to attract and retain them. Citing increased costs, they argued that gold mining would be non-profitable if gold mining firms were required to provide family housing for their Black workers. Thus, the Chamber remained in favour of migrant labour held captive in compounds. Apart from the AAC, no other large mining corporations were willing to house more than 3% of their Black workers in family quarters (Jeeves & Crush 1995:9–10).

Despite the AAC's attempts to move away from relying on migrant African labour caged in single-sex hostels in favour of stabilised Black labour living in family housing, their efforts yielded very little results. Jeeves and Crush (1995:10) observe the following about the AAC housing scheme:

> At several of the new Orange Free State mines AAC undertook a limited experiment to set up small family villages. The corporation built seven villages of between 50 and 150 housing units each for its mines in Orange

[10] Although, there were marked differences between the closed compound system in Kimberley and the housing system that was established at Rhodesian mines, there were some similarities at least in the functions of the compound system in both South Africa and Rhodesia (Turrell 1984:60; Van Onselen 1976:131).

[11] Now the Minerals Council of South Africa

> Free State. By 1953, however, a mere 740 workers were housed in the villages. Family housing was earmarked for a select group of skilled and supervisory workers. The houses were rented to workers and if the employee left the mine or died, his family was evicted.

This demonstrates how mining firms, like capital in general, are seeking a spatial fix. In this instance their operations were fixed and determined by the location of the minerals, and thus, controlling the housing location of mineworkers was regarded as essential to ensure the profitability of their businesses. Notably, even the progressive thinking AAC management reserved family housing for skilled and supervisory workers only. Thus, the housing question was more than a mere issue of providing shelter but an important status symbol, which was appropriated as a key industrial relations strategy. In other words, the type of housing the mineworkers 'qualified' for was tied to their rank and status in the workplace. This housing strategy fragmented and weakened labour as a collective. Furthermore, even though only a small percentage of Black mineworkers qualified to live in married quarters at the mine villages, the apartheid state was not pleased by the fact that this small category was living in close proximity with white mineworkers and the local white communities. Hence, in 1953, the state tried unsuccessfully to have such permanent workers housed in nearby Black townships instead of mine villages (Jeeves & Crush 1995:10).

However, due to the political pressure from the apartheid state, local white communities, the reluctance of most mining firms and the Chamber of Mines to provide family housing, no more than 3% of Black mineworkers were living in married quarters between 1950 and 1975 (Jeeves & Crush 1995:11). With the increased reliance on foreign African labour in the 1950s and 1960s, mine owners were under no pressure to provide family housing, even for their skilled Black employees. In addition, the existence of the 'colour bar' made it possible for mines to treat Black mineworkers as a homogeneous group (see Steinberg 1995).

It is important to reiterate the there was no single and coherent blueprint for apartheid South Africa. As Posel (2011:320) puts it:

> The dogged pursuit of rigid racial boundaries also created sites of porosity, producing a mobile and sometimes unruly dialectic of racial proximity and distance. The commitment to white political supremacy—and with that, the political exclusion of the Black majority—never wavered, yet its conditions remained tenuous, as the apartheid project contained enduring sites of contradiction and tension, and with that, lingering ambivalence and some strategic fluidity.

Therefore, even at the zenith of apartheid state power was resisted and challenged. These contestations were most apparent in the state's policies and legislation that was aimed at controlling the movement and supply of African labour for business, including the issue of housing Black workers in designated 'white only' areas. For instance, there were times when white owners of urban-based manufacturing were pushing for the relaxation of the laws that restricted the movement of Blacks as they sought a more permanent, stabilised Black workforce while the mines preferred cheap migrant labour from the reserves (Posel 1991:153).

Up to this point, the literature shows that the state and capital kept shifting their positions with regards to the housing of Black mineworkers during the colonial and apartheid eras. State regulation was geared towards racial segregation in residential areas while at times mining firms preferred settling their skilled Black mineworkers in areas that were reserved for the white populace. Thus, the state and capital did not always share the same vision, even though they agreed on externalising the cost of social reproduction of Black mineworkers to the individual mineworker and his family left in the labour-sending rural areas. This highlights the complexities and multiple power rationalities that underly spatial engineering in mining communities to date (Rubbers 2019:89). The state, capital and labour keep shifting their strategies and enter alliances with different social actors as each stakeholder pursues their own interests.

3.3 State reforms, new industrial relations, and mine housing, 1970–1990

The two decades that precede the democratic transition in South Africa were marked by significant historical events that shed light on the current changes in mine housing.

General state reforms, a new labour dispensation, and the development of 'career miners' led to changes in the social geography that shaped mine housing in South African mining communities.

The increased mechanisation of mining in the 1960s and 1970s brought with it mixed blessings for mine owners. Technological advancement enabled them to rapidly improve production, but this also made their operations dependent on the availability of skilled labour. Skilled labour is inherently difficult to attract, maintain and retain. However, mechanisation and the resulting dependency on highly skilled labour did not impact gold mining in the same way as it did, for example, coal and diamond mining. Thus, while most diamond and coal mining corporations quickly settled their skilled Black workers in family housing units, gold mining firms were reluctant to provide family housing for their Black workers. For example, some coal mines are said to have moved as much as 75% of their labour force into family housing in the 1970s in a bid to attract and retain skilled Black labour (Crush et al. 1991:167; Crush & James 1991:304–305).

In 1973, hundred thousands of workers downed their tools in Durban. These strikes gave impetus to the development of strong, successful, and militant Black trade unions in South Africa. Although, formed in 1982, the National Union of Mineworkers' (NUM) roots can be traced to the 1973 Durban strikes (James 1992:7). Thus, from 1973 an independent African trade union movement emerged, and as it grew stronger, it forced white capital and the apartheid state to redress, among other things, the housing question in the mining industry.

Sparked by the 1974 plane crash that killed Malawian migrant workers on their way to work in the South African mines, the Malawian government stopped further supply of migrant labour to South Africa. In addition, the Malawian president ordered the withdrawal of over 80 000 Malawian migrants who were working in South African mines. After Mozambique's independence in 1975, the Mozambican government also put a halt on further recruitment of its people to work in South African mines. This left the mining industry hamstrung by labour shortages and with fewer choices but to recruit more expensive local labour (Crush et al. 1991:152; Crush & James 1991:304; Laburn-Peart 1990:70–71;).

One of the mining industry's responses to the resulting labour shortage was to focus on recruiting South African labour that historically shunned mining jobs. In search of stabilised labour, mining firms experimented with urban labour. In the mid-1970s, efforts were made to recruit urban workers from Black townships. This did not prove to be a sustainable solution, mainly because these urbanised Black workers did not stay in mine employment. In other words, the mines failed to retain their urban, non-migrant workers (James 1992:72–73). Thus, from the mid-1970s onward, some large mining firms began to contemplate creating a permanent 'core' stratum of skilled Black mineworkers. In order to minimise the costs of training and retraining, mine owners sought to 'stabilise' their migrant skilled Black workforce by encouraging them to buy and own houses near the mines where they could settle their families (Crush et al. 1991:152; Crush & James 1991:304; Laburn-Peart 1990:70–71).

Eventually, under intense pressure in the aftermath of the wake of the 1973 nationwide strikes, the apartheid state set up two labour commissions in 1977, namely the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions. They were mandated to assess the state of industrial relations in South Africa in search of revised or new forms of control and regulation. The Wiehahn Commission's report, released in 1979, suggested several radical reforms. Its key recommendations were concerned with de-racialising labour relations. As a result of the acceptance and implementation of the Wiehahn Commission's recommendations, a new Labour Relations Act was passed in 1981. Black workers were granted the right to organise and officially register trade unions, opening the way for their participation in collective bargaining (James 1992:5; Webster 1987:176–177).

These reforms should be understood as the gains by Black workers through militant trade unionism and their alliances with local and international social movements. Therefore, at this juncture it is important to briefly summarise the history of Black labour unionism. As suggested earlier, despite the state's use of force and repressive legislation to suppress them, Black African workers remained resilient, drawing from different sources of power. Owing to state repression, Black trade unionism went through cycles. A wave of vibrant unions would arise and after some time fade away or collapse. During the 1920s, the ICU was a formidable Black trade union championing the interests of Black African workers in South Africa. By the early 1930s, the ICU had faded away. The second wave of Black

trade unionism saw the rise of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions in 1941. This union federation lasted only five years before crumbling in 1946. The 1950s saw the rise of yet another wave of Black trade unionism, and the formation of the South African Congress of Trade Union (SACTU) in 1955 in spite of the dominance of the Trade Union Council of South Africa. Buoyed by the political militancy and its links with the ANC, SACTU enjoyed significant successes in its fight for Black African workers' rights. However, it eventually succumbed to repression in the early 1960s when most of its leaders were banned by the apartheid state. A decade of industrial peace followed until the 1973 Durban strikes, which gave impetus to the formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. Careful to avoid SACTU's mistake of forming open alliances with political parties, FOSATU grew rapidly, benefiting from the state reforms, which allowed Black trade unions to be officially registered and recognised by employers. In 1985 FOSATU affiliated trade unions as well as many other 'newly' formed trade unions joined to form the COSATU. COSATU was eventually to play a key role in the political changes and negotiations that culminated in the 1994 democratic transition in South Africa (Bonner 1978; Buhlungu 2010; Godfrey et al. 2010; Webster 1987).

The 1980s saw the establishment and growth of the NUM. Strategically, the NUM turned the compound system to its advantage to organise Black mineworkers. The struggle for control over the compounds eventually forced mine owners to consider depopulating the compounds. In the wake of the growing militancy of mineworkers, changes in mine housing ensued. In 1983, the Chamber of Mines made yet again an interesting U-turn about their stance on family housing for Black mineworkers. This time they pressed the state to abandon any fixed rules on married housing. Thus, when the apartheid state repealed the pass laws in 1986, mining firms got the green light to change their housing strategy for Black mineworkers (Crush et al. 1991:173). Mining firms began upgrading and converting compounds into family housing units. In 1987, some large mining firms in South Africa were determined to move the core of their labour force into owner-occupied housing units at or near the mines (Crush & James 1991:302; Jeeves & Crush 1995:12).

Crush and James (1991:306) describe the tug of war between Black mineworkers and mining capital that pivoted on the compounds as follows:

> During the 1987 Black miners' strike, in particular, the compounds were contested terrain. The union tried to enforce and prolong the strike by controlling the compounds. Management sought to break the strike by trying to regain lost authority. In the politics of class conflict, therefore, compounds began to serve union interests.

Housing and home ownership, therefore, became central to mine owners' strategy to fragment the workforce and weaken labour's collective identity and conscience by co-opting skilled workers (Crush & James 1991:302; Jeeves & Crush 1995:12).

Thus, family housing schemes were used by mine owners in their attempt to divide and fragment Black labour. For example, mine management gave priority to Black team leaders and Black supervisors, who had come under fire in the compounds, to access the new family housing schemes. In other words, family housing was being used as a wedge, further widening "the divisions between Black supervisors and the rank-and-file" (Crush & James 1991:306). This was not an entirely new strategy in the mining industry. Mine management used it successfully when they 'tamed' militant white mineworkers following their strike, with the backing of Black mineworkers, against the dehumanising body searches and compound accommodation at the diamond mines in the 1880s (Allen 1992:128–129; Wroger 1987:174). Mining labour was dealt a blow when mine managers decided to incarcerate Black workers in compounds but white workers, who had mainly supervisory jobs, were settled in family housing in the suburbs. This effectively weakened the working class for white mineworkers became even more reluctant to take sides with Black workers in their struggles for their rights as workers.

By the early 1990s despite the publicity given to the idea of 'depopulating' the compounds, support for family housing delivery to Black mineworkers was uneven in the mining industry. In fact, no mining firm resigned to dismantling the compounds completely. At the time at which ideas about post-Fordism and flexible accumulation were gaining global popularity, mining houses in South Africa were bent on designing a housing strategy that would only allow the select top 10–15%, the core group, of their

labour force to be stabilised (Crush & James 1991:303). Clearly the early 1990s were a critical historical period with regards to the housing of mineworkers at South African mines. Buoyant by the growth of militant trade unions in the country, at the time Black mineworkers were able to launch direct confrontations with capital to the extent of turning a spatial system that was designed to constrain their agency into a recruiting and mobilisation ground for trade unions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although mining firms were forced to consider depopulating the compounds, they did not go as far as destroying them. Thus, the absolute space remained largely unchanged; however, relational space as lived by Black mineworkers was being slowly transformed through the relaxation of movement rules along with attempts to upgrade the compounds.

Just as it were in the 1940s and 1950s, the AAC was again at the forefront of the campaign to provide family housing for a significant segment of their Black workers. The AAC's homeownership scheme aimed to establish or extend Black townships or build new mine villages on mine property for a select group of Black mineworkers. This scheme began in 1986 after a market research survey showed that a considerable number of 'qualifying' Black mineworkers were interested in owning houses and moving their families near their workplaces. The AAC intended to move up to 24 000 Black mineworkers into family housing units. They planned to build up to 16 000 housing units for sale to their Black mineworkers in Thabong, Welkom (Crush 1992:389; Crush et al. 1992:174; Laburn-Peart 1990:72). For several reasons, however, the scheme had limited success.

Crush (1992:397) identifies four main reasons why the AAC's homeownership scheme had only a limited success. He argues that bureaucratic and planning obstacles as the company negotiated with state and local communities slowed down the progress of the scheme in certain areas. In addition to this, Crush observe that most Black mineworkers simply earned too little to afford even the cheapest housing available under this scheme. Thus, the scheme was elitist and only accessible to a select few, namely the skilled and supervisory Black South African workers. This was a disservice to the AAC's public claims that the scheme was open to all their Black employees. Furthermore, this housing scheme was not necessarily popular with Black mineworkers for they opted for relatively cheap rental housing in the squatter camps or backyard shacks in nearby townships (see also, Moodie 1995).

Writing from an urban planning perspective, Laburn-Peart (1990:78–80) offers a slightly different explanation to the limited success of the AAC's scheme. She argues that the corporation overestimated the apartheid state's interest in promoting the 'orderly urbanisation' of Black people at the time. The company hoped that the state would provide infrastructure and services to the new or extended townships. However, the state was reluctant to do so. Laburn-Peart contends further that although the AAC canvassed the opinions of mineworkers through market research before embarking on its homeownership scheme, they neglected, crucially, the direct participation of the target group in the planning of the scheme. In other words, the scheme was planned in a top-down fashion and thus lacked an in-depth understanding of the various housing needs of Black mineworkers. Greater variety in choices of housing tenure, more open communication and education regarding the homeownership scheme were necessary. A 'one-size-fit-all' approach to housing failed to cater for the different housing needs of Black mineworkers. For instance, Laburn-Peart argues that some mineworkers viewed urban housing to integrate themselves into the wider society something that they could only dream about while living in compounds. Others saw housing as a source of supplementary income through sub-letting rooms or informal economic activities. To successfully address the real needs of Black mineworkers, the AAC should have adopted a more flexible approach to family housing delivery. This once again demonstrates the fact that mine management wrongfully treated Black mineworkers as a homogeneous group.

As Lipton (cited in Laburn-Peart, 1990:80) shows, flexible housing delivery was possible. At the time, the Selibe-Phikwe mine management in neighbouring Botswana, were following a more flexible approach to housing delivery. At Selibe-Phikwe mine informal housing was permitted "in addition to the neat rows of company houses with their trim gardens for senior employees, other workers were allowed to erect traditional houses and shacks on a site-and-service basis … nearby" (Laburn-Peart, 1990:80).

The AAC's determination to follow a rigid housing delivery scheme demonstrates the corporation's desire to retain a tight grip on the housing delivery process as well as the urbanisation of its Black employees. When the scheme showed limited viability, the AAC opted to suspend the scheme in 1992 rather than broaden its scope (Crush 1992:398–399).

Up to this point, it is clear that there was no grand plan for mine housing policy in South Africa. Mine owners had to continuously think and rethink, design and redesign their housing strategies in response to external pressures while at the same time furthering their own interests. As suggested earlier, although social science researchers, in particular Jonathan Crush and his associates such as Alan Jeeves, Dunbar Moodie and Wilmot James, have written extensively on mine housing, they are largely silent on the housing question with reference to white and senior mine employees. It is my contention that it is pertinent to take a holistic approach to mine housing that looks at mine housing for all categories of mine employees and to take company housing as spaces of social reproduction. It does not only promise a clearer or more complete picture but also completely different insights.

3.4 Housing white mineworkers in colonial and apartheid South Africa

White mineworkers constituted at least two broad categories, namely British immigrants and Afrikaners. They could also be distinguished according to their skill level and status in the workplace (Callinicos 1987). The housing of white mine employees reflected the above-mentioned distinctions.

In Kimberley, while Black mineworkers were confined in closed compounds in the mid to late 1880s, white mine employees successfully fought against being compounded. They lobbied and gained political support for they constituted a significant part of the white electorate. They also received support from local businesses that dreaded losing customers and thus be squeezed out of business if all mineworkers were locked up in compounds. Thus, mine management were forced not to house white mineworkers in closed compounds. They finally decided to build mine villages or suburbs away from the main town for their white employees. This demonstrates workers' agency, in this case white workers fought successfully "to materially improve their conditions of existence" (Coe & Jordhus-Lier 2010:216). De Beers, for example, built Kenilworth village. Such villages reflected the privileged position of white employees over their Black counterparts. Mine villages for white employees were built with facilities that supported proper social reproduction, with facilities such as gardens, recreation facilities, club

houses, mess halls, kitchens, libraries, billiard rooms, and parks (Allen 1992:128, 129; Wroger 1987:252).

Mine villages were, arguably, the final piece in the puzzle of the compound system. They formed parallel institutions for white employees that enabled mine owners to exert tight control and industrial discipline on their workforce. They would, as with their Black counterparts, albeit under different conditions, be entirely dependent on their employer. While Black mineworkers were isolated from general society by corrugated iron in the compounds, white workers were separated by distance from the rest of Kimberley's inhabitants. However, while compounds were built near mine shafts, white workers' villages were directly linked to the shafts by tram lines to ensure that the mine village dwellers would be at work on time (Wroger 1987:252). Thus, through a clear housing strategy mining capital essentially manipulated and controlled the conditions of existence and the social reproduction of all their employees.

In Johannesburg's gold mines, acute housing shortages coupled with low wages paid to unskilled white workers (predominantly white Afrikaners) forced some of the white mine employees to live in slums in the early 1900s (Lange 2003:89). Ironically, the price, availability and quality of working-class housing were directly affected by the concentration of land ownership in the hands of mining houses and their estate companies (Lange 2003:40). Whereas all Black mineworkers were by law required to live in mine compounds, their white counterparts could choose where they wanted to live. It is important to note that the configuration of absolute space in mining communities at the time enabled white mineworkers' agency and at the same time restricted Black mineworkers' agency and freedom of movement.

The white working-class population, most of which worked in the mines, lived in the inner city and west of it with easy access to their workplaces. Thus, specific areas such as Braamfontein, Belgravia, Fordsburg and Jeppestown became white working-class areas. Suburbs north of the city such as Hillbrow and Parktown were middle- and upper-class areas. Hence, generally, class, occupation and status or position at work played a major role in determining choice of residence and quality of housing and services for white mine employees. In other words, class inequalities were clearly seen in housing for

the white population in Johannesburg. Skilled and managerial white employees who commanded high salaries could afford better housing compared to their unskilled low-paid counterparts (Callinicos 1987:66, 69; Lange 2003:40–65).

As Johannesburg grew to be an economic giant at the turn of the 20th century, backed by its gold mines, more and more skilled white workers immigrated from Britain and sought to settle in South Africa. This in part made housing one of the key policy issues. Some married white miners had to resort to living in the married quarters at mines while some had to squeeze into the small houses in the poor white working-class areas (Callinicos 1987:66; Lange 2003:65). In an attempt to redress housing shortages among the white working-class population, the colonial state sought to secure a living wage for them. For its own white workers, the state resolved to build houses (Lange 2003:89). In addition, the state demolished the slums and resettled the white populace who lived in such areas in more sanitary areas (Callinicos 1987:76–77). Eventually, the state embarked on council housing schemes (Du Plessis 2004:885–891). These developments show how the apartheid state was not only prepared to regulate spatial order in ways that benefited their white electorate but that it was also prepared to carry the cost of social reproduction of white mineworkers and the poor white working class in general.

However, in some instances, the colonial and apartheid states also made it the employer's responsibility to house their employees, and in the process made private companies into somewhat of a state proxy that single-handedly provide services to exclusive mine towns. Large corporations such as Iscor in Newcastle, Sasol in Sasolburg, and De Beers in Kleinzee, for example, developed company towns in which white employees' housing needs were met by their respective employers. The type of housing an employee was allocated reflected their seniority as well as skills level (Carstens 2001; Peens 2012:23–40; Sparks 2012). This preference by the state and capital to develop mining towns where mineworkers were walled off from the rest of society gave rise to enclaves of mineral extraction (Ferguson 2006). Thus, such company housing, including mine housing, for white employees was stratified along class and status fault lines. White employees at the same organisational level were housed together in uniformly designed housing units. The size of housing units and the quality of services provided also reflected class and status. Thus, racialised geographies of mining communities were built on the basis that the

apartheid state and mining capital were willing to shoulder the cost of social reproduction for white mineworkers while at the same externalising the cost of social reproduction for Black mineworkers.

In a nutshell, during apartheid, organised white labour was subordinated and co-opted by the alliance between the state and business. These close ties between the state and the white working class enabled racial Fordism, which is "mass production and mass consumption by and for white South Africans, with an underclass of low-paid Blacks excluded from the benefits of the industrialised economy", including decent housing (Desai & Habib 1997:502).

3.5 The transition to democracy: Mine housing in post-apartheid South Africa

The transition from apartheid has been viewed by South African industrial and economic sociologists as a 'triple transition'. This transition involves three overlapping and contradictory processes, namely political democratisation, economic liberalisation, and the de-racialisation of society (Bezuidenhout 2008:179–180; Webster & Omar 2003:194). To unmake the 'apartheid workplace regime' and redress its legacy, specific policies and statutes were put in place. Examples include the Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997, the Black Economic Empowerment and the subsequent Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, No. 53 of 2003, the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998, the Skills Development Act of 1998 and the Skills Development Levies Act, No. 9 of 1999 (see Webster & Omar 2003). As South Africa negotiated its political transition from apartheid rule to democracy, the housing question was among the central themes of the negotiations. At the time there were several critical factors that affected and influenced the country's national housing policy. Laburn-Peart (1995:36) lists the following as key issues for housing delivery:

- There were acute shortages of housing for non-white populations.
- The availability of land for housing development was a challenge.
- Securing the provision of infrastructure to service the poor working-class settlements was a contentious issue.

- The provision of housing finance and the delivery of housing was also a formidable challenge.

In 1992, the NUM set up a housing commission mandated to develop and pursue a housing policy aimed at dismantling the migrant labour system. The NUM's housing policy emphasised the role of mining firms in enabling migrant mineworkers to have access to housing arrangements of their own choosing. Rather than focusing on family housing schemes that only benefited a select few, mineworkers demanded that mining houses make available a wide range of flexible, low-cost housing options. Unlike in the past when mining firms would make decisions about mineworkers' housing without consulting them, the NUM made it clear that mineworkers must democratically participate in the decision-making process regarding their housing (Moorhead 1995:82–85).

Thus, considering the timing of the political negotiations that culminated in the transition to democracy as well as the legacies of the past regimes regarding the housing question, it was clear that although there would be some changes, the social geographic contours of the past regimes would outlive apartheid. Regarding unskilled Black workers' housing, past government regimes avoided taking the burden and left it entirely to the corporate economy and private industry (Laburn-Peart 1995:37). That needed to be changed. However, as Lalloo (1999:35–36) argues, the national housing policy that emerged out of the negotiations during the transition from apartheid to democracy further entrenched and reinforced racial and economic inequalities.

It is crucial to note that although the South African Constitution makes it the responsibility of the state to ensure adequate housing for all, mineworkers, as represented by the NUM, demand that mining firms take a lion's share of the responsibility. They express genuine fears that if the mining firms are not held responsible to provide family housing for their workers, mineworkers will be worse than before (Huchzermeyer 2001:305; Moorhead 1995:82–83). This ambiguity and contradiction regarding pinpointing the role of the state and capital in workers housing delivery in part delays the delivery of housing for the poor working class. As a result, Marais and Venter (2006:53) observe that more than a decade after the democratic transition, the mining compound

remained the main housing option for mineworkers. Even though large numbers of mineworkers are no longer residing in the hostels, they too do not have adequate housing. Indeed, thousands live in appalling conditions in informal settlements.

Mine management, on the other hand, prefer to shift the cost of housing to individual mineworkers. This is mainly done through the provision of LOAs. Although, mineworkers do not entirely object LOAs, the NUM has long held reservations on this strategy. They argue that since historically mining firms provided housing to their senior white employees, similar provisions should now be extended to all mineworkers (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015:534; Marais & Venter 2006:61). Thus, organised mining labour in post-apartheid South Africa remains committed to the idea that the employer must provide housing not only to unskilled workers but to all their employees.

On the housing front, the post-apartheid government focused on the provision of low-cost housing through the RDP housing programme. Rather than reverse the racial and economic segregation impact of colonial and apartheid housing policy, the new housing policy unintentionally perpetuated racial and economic inequality. Where mass housing projects have been embarked on, it has been done so in a way that does not promote close-knit community life. Facilities for communal activities are few and far apart and where they are provided, they are not well equipped. Seemingly incompatible interests of different stakeholders stand in the way of an effective national housing policy (Lalloo 1999:42; Marais & Venter 2006:53; Wilkinson 1998:226). Although some of the apparatus for significant transformation are in place, decent housing for all remains a utopia. Thus, it can be argued that South Africa has no clear national housing policy that can profoundly dismantle the social and spatial contours of apartheid cities and mining towns. It is against this backdrop that mine housing policy in the platinum mining industry in post-apartheid South Africa is to be understood.

The development and implementation of socio-economic policies, such as housing policy, is both aided and hampered by the nature or form of the post-apartheid state and the way state power is exercised vis-a-vis labour and capital's interests. The ruling ANC is in a formal tripartite alliance with COSATU and the SACP. In addition, the government, labour, and capital work together through the NEDLAC platform to negotiate and develop

socio-economic policies (see Gostner & Joffe 2000; Kim & Van der Westhuizen 2015). Even though the SACP and COSATU remain faithful to this alliance, they have at times been critical of the ANC government's economic and social polies. COSATU argues that these policies are pro-business and against worker interests. This was particularly the case when the ANC-led government side-stepped NEDLAC to replace the RDP for Growth, Employment, and Redistribution as the government's macroeconomic policy framework in 1996. This policy change has been blamed for the increased casualisation of labour and increase in unemployment rates, poverty, and housing shortages. Nevertheless, COSATU continues to play a role in NEDLAC that they view as a product of labour's struggle to limit government's power to unilaterally introduce policy (Gostner & Joffe 2000; Kim & Van der Westhuizen 2015). Judging from the issues highlighted above, it can be concluded that NEDLAC, and by extension corporatism, has failed to forge a comprehensive social pact addressing inequality, poverty, and unemployment in South Africa. These examples prove that states are not neutral terrains on which political forces struggle with equal chances to pursue their interests and objectives and with equal chances of realising their goals (Jessop 1982).

3.6 Housing mineworkers in the time of platinum

The platinum boom that stretched from the mid-1990s to 2009 catapulted the platinum sector to prominence in the post-apartheid South African mining industry. This was aided by the fact that South Africa is the largest producer of platinum, holding 87% of the world's platinum reserves, followed by Zimbabwe. During the boom period, AAP became the single largest producer of platinum, accounting for up to 40% of the global product (Caps 2015:497–500). In addition, during the boom, the platinum sector became the largest employer in the South African mining industry. According to Caps (2015:500), by 2010 there were 24 000 more workers in platinum than in gold. At the same time, Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2015:526) note that the platinum boom attracted thousands of migrant labourers to the platinum belt at the time when there was enormous pressure on mining firms to reduce occupancy in the compounds. This resulted in complex settlements patterns. It is also crucial to note that there are no collective bargaining councils in the platinum sector and that mining firms rely heavily on outsourced workers.

This opens opportunities for competing firms to poach skilled workers from each other as well create massive wage inequalities (see Chinguno 2015; Forrest 2015).

With regards to mine housing policy in post-apartheid South Africa, the state introduced a number of policy interventions in the form of the White Paper on Housing (1994), Breaking New Ground (2004), three versions of the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004, 2002, 2010, 2017), the Guidelines for Social and Labour Plans as required by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act and the Strategy on the Revitalisation of Distressed Mining Towns (see Marais 2018). All three versions of the Mining Charter emphasised upgrading hostels, converting hostels into family houses and homeownership. Despite these government policy interventions, a huge percentage of mineworkers still live in compounds (up to 40%) and informal settlements (also up to 40%), leaving only about 20% in decent housing (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015; Marais 2018:341, Mashayamombe 2018; see also Makaula 2017). The living conditions in informal settlements in mining towns are appalling. Residents end up buying overpriced water in bottles from local entrepreneurs, they have limited or no access to electricity, and have no adequate sanitary services. In addition, violent crime is rampant in these informal settlements with limited policing (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015:534, 542).

A watershed moment in the history of labour, particularly in the platinum sector, was the Marikana massacre. This took place in August 2012 when the South African police shot and killed 34 mineworkers and injured 78 others following a violent confrontation between the police and striking mineworkers at Marikana in Rustenburg (Alexander 2013; Chinguno 2013b, 2015; Twala 2012). This was followed by a historic strike in 2014 that lasted five months and brought operations in the platinum belt to a standstill as mineworkers demanded a living wage (Bowman & Isaacs 2015). These events signified the rejection of the NUM by workers, and the use of deadly force to quell the strike brought into sharp focus the role of the post-apartheid state in ensuring optimum conditions for capital accumulation under the guise of maintaining law and order.

Most of the literature covering the platinum mining sector in South Africa is recent and focused on the Marikana violence and the subsequent 2014 strike waves (see Chinguno

2013a, 2013b). In addition, researchers tend focus on the Rustenburg area. Therefore, this thesis adds to this recent literature by extending the scope of the investigation to Northam, which lies 95 km from Marikana, and comparing what I call the scorecard spatial order at Amandelbult mine in the South African platinum belt to the kubotereka spatial order at Unki mine at the heart of Zimbabwe's Great Dyke.

3.7 Conclusion

Housing strategies by mining firms in South Africa evolved over the years. Mining firms, the state and workers battled for influence or control over the production of space in and around mining towns. During the early years when minerals deposits were discovered, mineworkers in Kimberly lived wherever they chose. They had the freedom to enter and exit the mining communities as and when they wished, which I argue gave them control over their material conditions of existence. At the time, miners or claim owners had limited means to manipulate spatial ordering in general and housing location for mineworkers in particular. However, as time went on, mine owners sought to compound all their workers. As noted in this chapter, only Black mineworkers ended up incarcerated in prison-like compounds while white mineworkers were housed in family housing in mine villages. Hence, from this point on capital's control of spatial development ensured them readily available cheap migrant labour and direct influence on the social reproduction of both white and Black mineworkers (Legassick 1975; Wolpe 1972).

During the 1940s and again in the late 1980s there were half-hearted attempts to provide family housing for Black mineworkers. These attempts were largely unsuccessful because the housing schemes were designed to attract and retain a small percentage of skilled Black mineworkers. In addition, it is thought that these attempts were also aimed at rescuing Black supervisors and team leaders from the threats of violence in the compounds during the late stages of apartheid rule. In addition, a serious lack of political will by the apartheid government to allow Black mineworkers to settle near white communities rendered the family housing schemes impotent. In conclusion, spatial planning and manipulation by the state and capital was critical in determining what housing strategy was adopted. The main concern for mining capital has always been maximising profits while lowering the cost of doing business, especially the cost of

housing Black mineworkers. It is also important to note, I argue, that Black mineworkers are not a homogenous group, and their housing needs and preferences are so diverse that even organised labour cannot fully represent and speak on behalf of all their members with regards to housing options.

Finally, it is clear to see that the colonial and apartheid states were reluctant to shoulder any responsibility for the social reproduction of Black mineworkers. In some instances, however, the state was prepared to share the burden with capital for the social reproduction of white mineworkers. Mining capital, on the other hand, looked for ways to further externalise the cost of social reproduction to individual Black mineworkers and their families. This lack of interest to invest in the social reproduction of Black mineworkers on the part of the state and capital resulted in the infamous labour migrancy system. This system required an enabling spatial order that was pivoted on the construction of compounds to house Black mineworkers without their families. This ensured cheap labour for the mines. At the same time, white mineworkers, and to some extent skilled Black mineworkers, enjoyed the benefits of company-owned family housing furnished with all the services necessary for their social reproduction.

The literature reviewed in this chapter also brings to light some important theoretical insights. To start with, the actions and policies of the colonial and apartheid state reveal the predatory nature of these states. As Thies (2007) posits, a predatory state is an agent that extracts revenue from a group of constituents under its control to ensure its own survival, mainly through taxation. This explains why the colonial and apartheid state treated white mineworkers, capital, and white communities differently. Protecting the interests of these groups enabled the state to extract more from them. In addition, the spatial order that developed in mining communities during and after apartheid largely fits Ferguson's (2006) description of territorial enclaves of mineral extraction. Compounds and mine villages isolated mineworkers from the general society and at times the state even helped to provide security. Most significant is the fact that the state managed to absolve itself from the responsibility to provide services to mineworkers. In company towns that responsibility fell on the shoulders of the mining firms.

The following chapter traces the spatial development of mining communities in Zimbabwe. It reveals the historical similarities and differences of the roles played by the state and capital in shaping the geographies of mining communities in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

4 Housing mineworkers in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe

> The production of space, having attained the conceptual and linguistic level, acts retroactively upon the past, disclosing aspects and moments of it hitherto uncomprehended. The past appears in a different light, and hence the process whereby that past becomes the present also takes on another aspect. (Lefebvre 1974:65)

4.1 Introduction

Spatial analysis of the history of mining communities is important because it provides a rich context to the present or current issues faced by Zimbabwean mineworkers. As Lefebvre (1974) notes, an analytic approach that recognises the role of social forces in the production of space is critical to understand both the past and the present spatial orders. In line with this this, this chapter discusses the history of mine housing in Zimbabwe. The first section discusses housing issues for mineworkers during the colonial era. The second part details the policy changes and responses by mine management and workers regarding mine housing after independence in 1980.

4.2 Housing mineworkers in colonial Zimbabwe

4.2.1 The early years, 1890–1914

Large-scale mining in Zimbabwe dates to the 1890 formal invasion of the then Southern Rhodesia that was organised and financed by Cecil Rhodes. His chartered company BSAC played a key role in the development of the mining industry in colonial Zimbabwe and left a legacy that still remains (Hollaway 1997:28). The BSAC acted as a proxy state, administering mining camps in the country. During the colonial era (and beyond) mining firms in Zimbabwe were determined to make a profit at all costs and only occasionally considered the housing needs of their Black employees in order to improve the output and profitability of their operations. As it became clear that mineral deposits in Zimbabwe were a far cry from what Rhodes hoped for, the mineral policy was largely ad hoc and driven by the desire to take full advantage of whatever was profitable to mine. Until 1903, the BSAC received 50% of the shares in return for making the mineral title available to

mining companies (Hollaway 1997:29). This further pushed miners to radically cut costs by, among other things, refusing to invest in housing for Black mineworkers. Thus, mining played a significant role in the spatial development of colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean towns and cities (Kamete 2012:591).

Black African workers were housed in compounds that were lined with tiers of bunks and accommodation was provided for only half of the Black employees. Mine managers thought that it was unnecessary to have sleeping accommodation for all their Black workers at one time as half would be on night shift while the other half is sleeping. Van Onselen (1976:35) observes that the money that companies invested in accommodation clearly reflected the status and rank of their employees. For example, in 1902 at one of the gold mines, the Black workers' compound building was valued at £582, the European men's single quarters at £1 113, and the mine manager's house at £1 289. Thus, while mine owners were reluctant to invest in housing for Black mineworkers, they were prepared to spend over the top for white workers in general and for mine managers in particular. At Wankie Colliery, the general manager's house was described as a 'palatial residence' set on the most prominent of the low hills overlooking the colliery (Phimister 1992:84).

In Zimbabwean mines the general standard of accommodation never really compared favourably with that provided in South Africa. Van Onselen (1976:34) notes that cost minimising at these mines was not only seen in the capital set aside for building compounds but in how the living conditions of Black mineworkers were governed. During the early years in colonial Zimbabwe, mine owners did not provide accommodation for Black workers in most cases. Hence, newly arrived Black workers would use their time off work to construct rough grass shelters or temporary huts that provided little or no protection from the elements. Unimpressed by the lack of food and housing, many Black mineworkers reportedly left Zimbabwean mines to seek employment in South Africa. From the late 1890s onwards, the larger companies began to invest in the construction of sizeable square wood and iron compounds. In 1899, the Chief Native Commissioner assured Black mineworkers that he had finally convinced mine managers to build compounds. At that time, mine managers were made to believe that compounds would attract and stabilise labour supply. Instead, Black mineworkers

resisted and rejected compound accommodation because it was being used as a mechanism to control the work force and it had no privacy. In addition, workers from different cultural backgrounds were unwilling to share mass accommodation. Thus, between 1903 and 1908 mine and compound managers struggled to have Black workers compounded. At one of the mines a building designed to accommodate 800 workers had a mere 100 occupants in 1905 (Van Onselen 1976:34–35). This demonstrates the mineworkers' agency as they resisted, albeit for a short time, the demands made by capital. It also forced mining capital to rethink certain aspects of their compound designs.

The living conditions of Black mineworkers were much worse at smaller mining companies. According to Van Onselen (1976:36), smaller mining companies claimed that they could not raise the necessary capital to build compounds, and so they struck a deal with mineworkers in which mine managers encouraged workers to build their own housing. Some managers would allow their new workers three or four days free from other duties and provide food rations to groups of four or five new arrivals who would cooperate to build a grass thatched hut. Black mineworkers thus devoted some time and effort to provide themselves and their families with basic accommodation. Even though they had to build their own houses, Black workers preferred the relative privacy and comfort these huts afforded. This arrangement was also popular with mine managers since it cost the mining firm nothing. However, it should be noted that since these huts were built on mine premises, mineworkers who built them did not necessarily have ownership rights.

Mine owners' unwillingness to invest money in buildings for use of Black workers was strikingly reflected in their failure to invest in hospitals and change houses at the mines. One of the gold mining giants spent a meagre £52 on the construction of a hospital to serve thousands of its Black workers and 25 times that amount on a house for the mine manager (Van Onselen 1976:36). At most of the mines there was no hospital at all. Although white workers did not escape entirely unscathed from these stringent cost-cutting practices, the most brutal cuts in direct and indirect expenditure were felt by Black mineworkers. Without a strong bargaining position thanks to the recruitment of indentured *chibaro* workers, they endured significant wage reductions in 1905, 1906 and again in 1907. In addition to the wage reductions, the provision of housing and health

facilities was cut to the bone. Consequently, “tens of thousands of African labourers died from industrially-induced diseases” (Phimister 2003:88). Indeed, the lack of investment in proper housing at the mines led to catastrophic health issues that did not only affect Black mineworkers but also their white counterparts and as such slowed down production at many mines. For instance, Phimister (2003:91) observe that for much of 1900 progress at one of the gold mines was painfully slow because white mineworkers were dying from blackwater fever. Black mineworkers at the same mine endured harsh working and living conditions. As a result, “malaria and dysentery were rife, and the number of desertions approached crisis proportions. With labour scarce, underground work had to be scaled back” (Phimister 2003:91).

With thousands of labourers in the isolated areas where the mines were located, it became a challenge to feed them. The mines in colonial Zimbabwe attempted a few initiatives to provide some of the food required to feed the growing number of Black workers in the compounds at minimum cost to company. Where water was readily available, mine management allowed gardens to be laid out to provide fresh vegetables. Mining companies with large land holdings also owned cattle and would put them out to graze in the vicinity of the mines. On some scattered mines that were well away from railway lines and urban centres, mine owners relied on local African procedures. In effect, before 1912, African peasants are said to have sold large quantities of grain and fresh produce to the mines and by so doing earned sufficient income to avoid having to do wage labour in the mining industry itself. Despite all these initiatives meant to provide nutritiously balanced food for Black mineworkers, between 1896 and 1906 the requirements for official mine rations were extremely modest, “basically 2–3 pounds of maize meal and half an ounce of salt per day” (Van Onselen 1976:42).

4.2.2 The middle years, 1914–1950

According to Hollaway (1997:29), although minerals such as asbestos, chromite, copper, and to some extent platinum from Zimbabwe’s Great Dyke slowly became important exports, gold dominated the middle years of the colonial era. As such, the gold mines tended to set the standard for housing in the industry. The middle years saw marginal improvements in terms of mine housing. However, only in the late 1920s and 1930s could

the largest of the mines boast adequate hospital accommodation for their Black workers (Van Onselen 1976:39). However, these were still acutely understaffed and under-resourced. Overall, there were inadequate health facilities at the mines, and as a result, mine hospitals were not popular among Black mineworkers. They had strong suspicions that anyone who enters there will die. In most cases hospitals doubled as mortuaries, which further made many African men reluctant to go there and share the facilities with corpses. From a mine management perspective, in colonial Zimbabwe, mine hospitals were generally regarded as a refuge for 'loafers', and therefore, the mines did not always provide the patients with food, even of the quality issued in the compound itself (Van Onselen 1976:59).

The conditions faced by Black mineworkers throughout colonial Zimbabwe were typified by what happened at Wankie Colliery, a key coal mine. The so-called 'native' hospital at the mine was not of much help to sick workers. Phimister (1992:69) noted the following:

> Although the existing building had been officially condemned years previously as 'totally inadequate', 'too small and otherwise unsuitable for the daily rate of sicknesses', the construction of a new hospital had been repeatedly subordinated to the imperatives of accumulation …. There was only one doctor, a Dr Sutherland, who was helped by a clerk who dispensed medicine and by ten orderlies who 'were not trained Assistants but the best Natives he could get'. They were, however, responsible for 'a good deal' of the 'actual treatment' of patients. Hospital records were fragmentary and incomplete, and a general air of indifference permeated the place.

No wonder many Black mineworkers resented mine hospitals. They were generally understaffed and became a health hazard rather than an institution where sick mineworkers could be treated and helped to recover. In addition, there were no adequate sanitary facilities and services for Black workers, such as change rooms and refuse collection. Over 2 000 Black mineworkers used an open cement bath tank filled with black coal water. According to Phimister (1992:69), the main compound in which most of them were housed was a major source of infection and disease. The conditions were so bad that visitors to the compound remarked on its filthy state and commented that it was

"neither clean nor sanitary... refuse of all sorts was noticeable" Phimister (1992:69). He further notes the following:

> The influenza pandemic struck the colliery with explosive force. Like most other large Southern Rhodesian mines, Wankie's overcrowded, filthy compound provided optimum conditions for the rapid spread of the disease. Underground labourers, subject to the variations in temperature as they left hot and confined working conditions below ground for the surface where there were no change houses, tended to suffer most from the pandemic. Hundreds of miners drew the appropriate conclusion and fled from the compound into the surrounding countryside (Phimister (1992:76).

In the years that followed, eating houses, which at times were owned by the mining company, were introduced to provide simple meals to Black mineworkers on a cash or credit basis (Van Onselen 1976:45). In addition, white workers had exclusive dining rooms at each boarding house (Phimister 1992:81). Almost every mine had an additional mine store at which workers could purchase food supplies for cash or credit. The mine store constituted a local monopoly and its prices were exorbitant, so Black mineworkers frequently turned to cheaper peasant producers for their food supplies. In the later decades, workers invested time and effort into cultivating gardens of their own to provide fresh vegetables or kept small stock such as goats and pigs. Furthermore, mineworkers also spent their 'leisure time' hunting for game, and the mineworkers owned dogs (up to five dogs) for this. In compounds near rivers mineworkers sought to supplement mine rations by fishing (Van Onselen 1976:45–47). Thus, although Black mineworkers in Zimbabwe lived in compounds during the colonial era, they were granted relative freedom to move in and out the compounds and to engage in fishing or farming activities if management was convinced that they had been completely proletarianised and would not desert. This, however, changed radically in the last phase of colonial rule when a much more stringent approach was adopted to regulate the movement of Black mineworkers.

A common strategy employed by mine managers to retain their Black workers despite these poor working and living conditions was to divide and conquer Black and white workers. A wage colour bar in favour of white workers was instituted and housing was

racially segregated. This helped mine owners oppress both white and Black mineworkers. For example, a strike at Wankie Colliery in 1921 over the right of Black workers to sell beer in the main colliery compound was broken after two days by members of the paramilitary British South Africa Police with the help of a group of armed white mineworkers. At the same time, other white workers were busy underground keeping the mine's essential services operating (Phimister 1992:79).

Despite being protected at work from Black labourers by language barriers and supervisory roles, and differentially housed and paid, white mineworkers did not always get what they wanted. White workers' unions in colonial Zimbabwe suffered many defeats at the hands of mine owners and managers (Bradbury & Worby 1985:149). The fact that white mineworkers relied heavily on the company's housing was often used to break their industrial action at the mines. For example, one mine manager who refused to increase white workers' wages argued that married white miners only paid "an inclusive rental of £1 per month for a three-apartment house with kitchen and bathroom, fuel, electric light and water as well as sanitary service" (Phimister 1992:80). At the same time, board and lodging for single white men cost £8 per month, yet white workers were earning between £30 and £40 per month (Phimister 1992:80, 83). When the white workers went ahead with the strike, they were quickly told that while access to hospital facilities was being withdrawn at once, they could stay in possession of the premises they occupy unless they are otherwise required, and light and water services will be continued if possible (Phimister 1992:84). Thus, there was serious downside to having critical services such as housing and hospitalisation provided for by the company, and hence, tied to their employment. When such critical services were withdrawn, it became very difficult for white mineworkers to continue with their industrial action. Hence such provisions could be used to discipline and keep a tight leash on white mineworkers.

Overall, during the period between 1903 and 1933, the core of the housing complex on large mines was the central square compound. In the earlier years, the compounds were built of wood and iron or stone and later rough-cast local material moulded in dynamite boxes, dubbed 'Kimberly bricks', were commonly used. Set apart from the central complex, and usually sub-divided into tribal divisions, were the huts of the single workers. Beyond this, and again set apart, was a third set of huts that accommodated the

married workers and their families (Van Onselen 1976:37). Thus, the core compound was generally reserved for newly contracted Black workers who mine managers feared would desert. Overcrowding was a basic feature of the inner compound life (Van Onselen 1976:38). However, as they worked longer at the mine, they would be granted the opportunity to move out of the inner compound to the second and third tier with relatively less control and where they could live with their families.



Figure 4.1 The huts compound system before the 1950s in colonial Zimbabwe

Up to this point, the working class in colonial Zimbabwe was divided along racial lines. White workers formed racially exclusive trade unions that to a large degree secured them better working and living conditions compared to Black mineworkers. In addition, the colonial state, using the BSAC as its proxy, made policy decisions that were largely favourable to capital and white unionised workers. Notably, there were occasional instances when white unions clashed with employers, but these were few and far in-between. White unions were, like those in colonial South Africa, more interested in

fighting for preferential treatment in the workplace (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Raftopoulos & Phimister 1997).

4.2.3 The late years, 1950–1980

During this period, close cooperation between mining companies and the agencies of state power was deeply entrenched and maintained in order to recruit Black mineworkers and maintain discipline within the mine compounds. The infamous compound system was further developed to look more like the system at the gold mines in South Africa. It now comprised methods of surveillance and social control like those at the Rand mines. This became a standard feature of mines throughout colonial Zimbabwe. This system was a crucial aspect of a management strategy to minimise labour costs through low wages, the provision of abysmally poor food rations, housing, and health care. At the same time, white workers' interests were not as well represented in colonial Zimbabwe as in South Africa. As a result, white workers were not always in a strong bargaining position (Bradbury & Worby 1985:149).

Overall, the development of the mining settlements conformed to the colonial administration's policy of racial segregation. Under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which divided the country into Black and white areas, all the mines were located on land classified as state land, while the surrounding farming areas were classified as 'white' areas. As a result, Black mineworkers could not own property in these areas. They were only permitted to settle as paid labourers and were expected to leave at the end of their employment service to the mine (Kamete 2012:597).

According to Gaidzanwa (1991:56), social differentiation pervaded most interactions among workers within as well as outside the distinctions of race, class, and ethnicity. She observes that at one of the mines in 1983 there were protests about racism in the allocation of houses. Eventually the mine manager admitted that racial criteria was being used to allocate and distribute houses and pledged to remedy the situation. Even after independence, housing allocations and other entitlements remained controversial and contentious to the point that even mineworkers' wives were getting involved in protests (Gaidzanwa 1991:61).

Up to this point, the decisions and actions of the colonial state as well as its close relationship with mining capital bring into to sharp focus its predatory nature (Thies 2007). Rather than perform a developmental role by building infrastructure and providing services to the populace, including mineworkers, the colonial state was only focused on extraction, despite the low quality of mineral resources in comparison to South African mines. The spatial order that emerged in mining communities under the colonial regime can be aptly described using Ferguson's (2006) 'extractive enclaves' concept. Mineworkers were largely isolated from general society. They relied on the mining firm for food, health care services, housing, security, and other things that would usually be provided by the state or local council.

This, however, did not stop Black workers from forming their own unions, albeit without similar recognition by the state and capital that the white unions were accorded. For example, the ICU and the Rhodesia Mine and General Workers Association organised demonstrations against wages and unfair working conditions but were generally strong armed by the colonial state and capital using policy, the army, and at times, the assistance of unionised white workers (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Phimister & Raftopoulos 2000). These struggles for Black workers were the bedrock on which the liberation struggle against colonial rule was built. Thus, it can be argued that at the peak of colonial rule Black mineworkers in Zimbabwe lacked structural, associational and institutional power but compensated for these by drawing from societal power.

4.3 Housing mineworkers in post-colonial Zimbabwe

Independence from colonial rule was achieved in April 1980. The then incoming government was trying to balance its revolutionary Marxist ideology on one hand and achieving reconciliation on the other. As a result, much of the patterns in the mining sector remained largely unchanged (Hollaway 1997:30). In the period after 1980, mining companies were under pressure from organised labour and the government to improve the working and living conditions of their Black workers. Government policies were framed around the discourse of repaying the historical debt accumulated through the poor working conditions, wages, and general treatment of labour. Thus, mining companies were forced to rethink their strategies to both make profit and demonstrate to the

government that they were prepared and willing to play a part in the construction of a new Zimbabwe. The then new government made it clear that workers were to be treated in a humane fashion and that the crude domination and mistreatment of Black workers would not be tolerated in an independent Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa 1991:50).

During the early 1980s, the Zimbabwean government allowed the mining industry to alter the wage structure in order to increase cash payments rather than make implicit deductions for rations and accommodation. For instance, in 1981, the government permitted mining companies to deduct Z$27 from the wage minimum of Z$85/month for unskilled workers in compensation for housing and other social facilities they claimed to provide. It soon became clear that many of the small mines provided none of these amenities. However, the Chamber of Mines justified the deductions, arguing that the deduction was in line with the generally lower cost of living for mineworkers in comparison to those employed in commerce and industry in towns (Bradbury & Worby 1985:152).

However, the housing question in the mining industry continued to be contentious. Consequently, in 1983 the housing deductions were eliminated, and a base rental rate was agreed upon after lengthy negotiations. Electricity, fuel, and above standard fixtures were charged extra, and deductions were made for older units. Trade unions continued to battle over, among other things, the abolishment of housing rentals (Bradbury & Worby 1985:152, 154). This arrangement remained in place throughout the 1990s. For example, Dansereau (2002:119) observed the following at one of the mines:

> The high-density mine village had 755 houses, varying in size from one to six rooms. A high proportion of houses (78 per cent) were between two and four rooms, and only 21 per cent of houses had all facilities of water, power and internal toilets, while 53 per cent of houses had no facilities at all, with the balance having power only but without running water and internal toilets. Workers in these houses had to use outhouses and outside taps or communal taps and toilets. In many houses, cooking also had to be done outside. Workers at this mine and others complained of overcrowding as the houses were too small for their families, usually estimated at five people, though

> many are now larger as many families are caring for orphaned children of family members struck with HIV/Aids. Because of the relatively small number of better-quality houses, which only become available if a worker leaves, the human resources manager at this mine said that competition is stiff with a criterion of selection based on the workers' grade, years of service, and size of his family. Workers paid little or no rent for the houses at this mine because the houses are older than 20 years. Rents are negotiated through the NEC [National Employment Council] and houses older than 20 years are exempt. Workers still had to pay for electricity and water charges if they had them.

From the above description, it is evident that the plight of Black mineworkers did not end with the transition from colonial rule to independent Zimbabwe. General and basic services, such as the provision of adequate family housing, running water, electricity, and sanitary facilities, were still not up to standard.

According to Dansereau (2002:112), despite the unionisation of Black mineworkers distinctions remained as to wages, education, housing, access to services and mine village amenities. Grades 11 to 13 employees receive many of the same benefits as management because of the high demand for their skills and expertise. This distinction is reminiscent of the old job colour bar, despite the Africanization of the mining sector in Zimbabwe since independence. It is in housing allocation at the mines that these distinctions could still be painfully felt. Race has now been replaced by skill level as a determining factor in housing allocation. At most gold mines, each stratum of workers has its residential zone with distinct types of housing and environmental standards. Describing the housing arrangement at one of the biggest gold mines in post-independence Zimbabwe, Gaidzanwa (1991:55) wrote the following:

> The zones were clearly separated. The low-income, unskilled workers were all Black and were housed in 682 semi-detached houses sited close to the mine to facilitate access to the workplace. Each semi-detached house consisted of a lounge, two bedrooms, a kitchen, inside toilet and shower. All the houses had electricity and running water. Adjacent to this zone was the

> area for middle-income employees. There were 41 houses in this area, all detached. Each house had three bedrooms, a lounge/dining room, spacious fitted kitchen, inside bathroom and toilet with hot and cold running water. The senior employees lived in 43 detached houses with separate bathrooms and toilets, three or four bedrooms, a garage or carport and a bathroom *en suite.* Bachelors in the skilled grades were housed in the single quarters next to the social club patronized by the senior employees. There was some housing under construction to accommodate those employees still living in temporary quarters.

This description holds true across most mines in post-independence Zimbabwe. This is further collaborated by Dansereau's (2002:118) assertion that an important distinction between juniors and seniors is access to and quality of housing. Access to and quality of mine housing mirrors the level of skill and expertise as well as the employee's loyalty to the company, which is measured by the number of years at the mine. It is a common practice to house junior workers in a high-density mine village with varied quality housing, while seniors live in low-density suburbs in higher quality, larger houses. It is crucial to note that the quality of housing is of very poor standards, especially at the gold mines, and that most of it is family housing. However, most gold mines have many one room houses with no facilities meant for single workers, but because of lack of adequate housing, many married Black workers live in these single rooms with their families while they wait for larger accommodation. The quality of housing varies from one mine to another and differs according to the minerals being mined. Five of the six mines that were studied by Dansereau (2002) had constructed a mine village close to the mine, while the sixth chose to build housing in a nearby municipality where they had to ferry workers about 30 km each way (Dansereau 2002:118).

Furthermore, there are social clubs that provide recreational facilities for the employees. Golf courses, tennis courts, squash courts and swimming pools are common at the gold mines. The social clubs are open to all employees in principle, but in reality clubs are stratified according to the income and grades of employees. On one hand, skilled workers tend to patronise the clubs with higher fees and sports such as tennis, golf, and squash. On the other hand, unskilled employees patronise the clubs with lower fees and sports

such as soccer. In addition to the clubs, most mines have a tavern serving clear and opaque beer to the mine residents and many people from the neighbouring rural villages. Other vital service providers such as a post office, police station, petrol station, bank and supermarket are in place. In addition, small traders also sell vegetables, fruits, and other commodities at the mine's business centre. Another constant feature on the mines is primary and secondary schools built to serve the children of the low and middle-income workers and children from the surrounding rural areas. Though the teachers are paid by the government through the Department of Education, they are provided housing by the mining company. However, the children of the higher-income workers generally attend private schools in the major towns with the mines providing their transport to and from school. At one of the mines, two pre-schools are also organised along the lines of parental income, with the one for the higher-income workers' children charging higher fees than the one for the children of the low-income workers (Gaidzanwa 1991:55).

Black mineworkers feel that their working and living conditions in general have significantly improved compared to what they had to endure before independence. For instance, McCulloch (2003) observe that in the early 2000s, in the context of Zimbabwe's crumbling economy and cash-starved public facilities, mineworkers at one of the largest asbestos mines at that time were better off than most Zimbabweans. These miners and their families had access to a well-equipped hospital and well-funded primary schools for their children. They also enjoyed the benefits of sports and recreational facilities built and maintained by the mining company. Above all, the biggest advantage they had was the subsidised housing which over the years drew labourers to this mine. In 1998, low-density houses were rented for $Z2 000 a month on the open market, while the cost to a mine employee for the same property was between $Z40 and $Z65.95. Firewood and coal were also provided by the company at reduced rates. At this mine there were over 2 000 housing units, schools, a hospital, and a golf course (McCulloch 2003:145–148).

However, the sensitivity and contentious nature of house allocation at Zimbabwean mines after independence can be seen in the following example from Gaidzanwa's (1991:61) study:

> One geologist … alleged that, because he was unmarried, the personnel superintendent had actually tried to kick him out of the house that he was entitled to. The geologist was indignant about this because he had voluntarily stayed in the single quarters, despite the fact that in Grade 13 he was entitled to a house regardless of his marital status. He said that the personnel superintendent had not informed him, as a Grade 12 employee of his entitlement to a house. When he then asked for a house, the superintendent would not give him one. The geologist had then gone on to his line manager, who said he had been under the impression that the geologist was quite happy in the single quarters, but then liaised with the mine manager who was responsible for house allocations in the senior grades and the geologist moved into a house the following week.

Thus, seniority at work determines where a worker is housed and although there are clear policies and procedures to be followed when allocating houses, mine managers tend to use favouritism and give preference to their friends or those deemed loyal employees.

In addition, the absence of a central urban planning authority means there has never been any planning control except by the Mining Commissioner and the mining company. Hence, national minimum housing and infrastructural standards have never been applied in the mining towns (Kamete 2012:601). In principle it is the responsibility of town councils to supply water to mining towns, but in practice mining companies are left to care for the treatment of water supplies to their semi-urban communities and to maintain their own sewage treatment ponds (Nyati 2004:26). As a result, the high-density villages at the older mines are in extremely poor shape. They are characterised by poor quality, smaller houses, unpaved roads, and poor, overcrowded schooling facilities. Most of them have a rowdy bar and denuded soccer fields. However, conditions are drastically different in low-density villages where the skilled senior workers are accommodated. These are characterised by large leafy lots, larger houses, with a minimum of six rooms, paved roads, tennis courts, and clubhouses, all with electricity and running water. Their children are provided with transport to the best schools in nearby cities (Dansereau 2002:119–120).

It is important to note that housing quality differs from one mine to the next and better housing stock also means substantially higher rents. Some of the mines have better houses for their unskilled workers with electricity, running water and indoor toilets and paved roads. Another important aspect to note is that all the mines in post-independence Zimbabwe are required to provide mineworkers with family housing, thus at some of the larger mines houses for unskilled workers are four rooms, consisting of two bedrooms, a lounge and kitchen (Dansereau 2002:119–120).

Despite the departure from colonial policies and conditions in mining communities, house and business ownership remain out of reach for many mineworkers. The housing stock at most of the mines belongs to the mining companies, and workers are required to leave it when they lose their job, irrespective of their years of service or place of origin (Dansereau 2002:120). Additionally, business premises, especially stores, that are not operated by the mining companies are generally not owned by the operators but are leased from the mining companies. This was not an immediate cause for concern to most of the residents during the colonial era since 'non-whites' were not allowed to own land in 'white' areas and state land. However, even now in the post-independence era where homeownership has become an integral part of the national housing policy mineworkers are still largely excluded (Kamete 2012:602). This is a source of frustration for mineworkers who cannot afford to buy a house for themselves in the nearby cities, meaning that they always fear becoming destitute should they lose their jobs. The situation can quickly become dire as Dansereau (2002:120–121) observes:

> For "juniors", this means leaving between seven and 21 days after retrenchment, retirement, injury or ill health, or 24 hours if they are fired. They are not allowed to continue living with an offspring at the mine village as the mining company physically moves them from the mine, arguing that the house is too small for more than one family, nor is the salary of one worker sufficient to support other members. Most mines visited have a retirement preparation package starting about one year before their retirement date. It consists essentially in preparing them to leave company housing, encouraging them to make plans for where they will live as without this preparation time, human resources representatives claim that miners say they have nowhere to

> go and ask to be kept on longer. When they do leave, the mine usually provides transportation home if within Zimbabwe or to the border of the country to which they are returning, usually Malawi, Mozambique or Zambia.

Thus, as long as a mineworker is employed, he and his family can live in the mine house, but as soon as he loses his job, they must leave within a short period (Dansereau 2002:121). It is therefore very easy for a once well-housed mineworker and his family to be on the streets the next day. This volatility works in favour of mine owners and managers who can use it to discipline their workers.

Although mining initially gave impetus to urbanisation in Zimbabwe, its decline in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s resulted in urban shrinkage and poverty. As investments into the mining industry dried up, informal settlements sprung up around some of the popular mining towns (Kamete 2012:589, 597). Solid infrastructure that used to characterise these mining towns had fallen into disrepair. The houses, which used to be maintained by the mining companies, are now overcrowded and left without maintenance. The local municipalities were more interested in collecting rentals and other fees payable than service provision. As a result, residents of these mining settlements felt that were not 'genuine' towns. In Shurugwi, Zimbabwe Mining and Steel Company (ZIMASCO) suspended its operations at Peak mine because of diminishing deposits of chrome. The closure of Peak mine came just a few years after the company closed Railway Block, another mine in Shurugwi. The company had built houses for its employees and a hospital, schools, canteens, and social clubs were built in or around the mine complex (De Waal & Nhemachena 2006:11; Makore & Zano 2012:13).

The provision of housing for mineworkers in post-colonial Zimbabwe is best understood in the broader context of industrial relations in this period. Shortly after political independence in 1980, the then new ZANU- PF government decided to take the initiative to create a single trade union federation through the Ministry of Labour. Their efforts resulted in the formation of the ZCTU in 1981. Notably the leadership of the ZCTU then had very strong ties with the ruling party; hence, there was hardly any antagonism between labour and the state until the late 1980s when Morgan Tsvangirai became the

Secretary General of the ZCTU[12]. The labour movement regularly clashed with the state on macroeconomic policies and the general working and living conditions in the country. This culminated with the ZCTU breaking formal ties with ZANU-PF in 1989. The years that followed saw the labour movement support student protests against the state. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank further infuriated labour and more mass protests, stay away, food riots and numerous strikes were staged. These protests by the labour movement culminated in the formation of the MDC political party led by Mr Tsvangirai in 1999 (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Raftopoulos 2000, 2018; Sutcliffe 2013).

The period after 2000 saw the state targeting and supressing the labour movement using both restrictive laws and brutal force. For instance, the ZANU-PF-led government used its majority in parliament to enact repressive pieces of legislation such as the Political Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, both enacted in 2002. These effectively constrained the labour movement by making it difficult to organise mass trade union meetings and restricting information deemed to be politically volatile. The state also resorted to heavy-handed tactics through state apparatus like the Central Intelligence Organisation, button stick wielding riot police officers and the army to quell any dissent from unions or opposition political parties (Mtimtema 2018; Raftopoulos 2018; Sachikonye 2018). In addition, the state sponsored the formation of another trade union federation in 2000, the ZFTU, to counter the efforts of the ZCTU. The leadership of the ZFTU was selected from former liberation war veterans. Rather than challenge the state's policies, the ZFTU negotiated directly with employers, invaded companies and attacked private farms. Weak union leadership, corruption, and factional battles within the ZCTU further weakened labour's force in Zimbabwe. As a result, too many splinter unions mushroomed and compete to organise an ever-shrinking waged

[12] The relationship between Morgan Tsvangirai and ZANU-PF soured despite the fact that he was initially deployed by the party to the ZCTU.

labour force (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Raftopoulos et al. 2018; Van der Walt 1998).

4.4 General housing policy in post-colonial Zimbabwe

According to Magidimisha and Chipungu (2011:482), the approach to housing provision in Zimbabwe is focused on planning, house construction and infrastructure provision to cater for a wide variety of beneficiaries in different income groups. However, informal settlements have never been tolerated. The best known example of the official intolerance towards informal settlements is the massive demolition of unconventional housing during Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. The official position was that the Zimbabwean government does not recognise unconventional housing settlements or romanticise poverty as manifested in the form of informal developments (Magidimisha & Chipungu 2011:483).

Some scholars argue that the stringent policy approach to housing is not fully applied to mining settlements. For instance, Muchadenyika, Chatiza, Nyaunga, and Makaza (2015:11) note that Section 234 of the Mines and Minerals Act gives the Mining Commissioner "who hardly knows anything about planning" the power to approve plans for sewer, wastewater, roads, housing, permanent buildings, recreation, and machinery at the mines. Consequently, over the years national minimum housing and infrastructural standards have not always been applied in mining towns (Kamete 2012:601). Thus, squalid mining compounds are still common in most mining settlements. However, it can also be argued that the general housing policy does cover mining settlements but that the mining companies have been pushing back and side-stepping the requirements. For example, Ericsson and Gibbon (1993:62–63) note that smaller and incoming mining companies in post-independence Zimbabwe had reservations about the government's requirement to build housing and infrastructure to permanent standards when a project may only last a few years.

4.5 Platinum mining and housing mineworkers

According to Veasey (1997:1361), the platinum potential of the Great Dyke was first noted in 1914, and extensive exploration, which followed Hans Merensky's Bushveld

Complex discovery in South Africa, revealed the great extent of the resource in the 1920s. However, the first recorded platinum mining venture in Zimbabwe was the exploitation of the shallow oxidised main sulphide zone at Wedza between 1926 and 1929. In 1968, Union Carbide explored the Hartley Complex and mined 6 000 tonnes of ore from depths of between 50 and 80 metres and processed 27 tonnes of platinum group metals. Further developments in 1987 saw Delta Gold taking on Union Carbide's lapsed claims (Veasey 1997:1361).

In the early 1990s, platinum group metals in Zimbabwe's Great Dyke were beginning to attract considerable interest from international mining firms. Huge investments were poured into feasibility studies and exploration as well as to reopen and expand closed platinum mines (Ericsson & Gibbon 1993:28). One of the significant initial investments into platinum mining in Zimbabwe was done by BHP/Utah and Delta Gold through its subsidiary Hartley Platinum Mines on the Hartley Complex (Ericsson & Gibbon 1993:29). From the beginning of this project it was clear that platinum mining was about to take centre stage in the industry in Zimbabwe. The Hartley Platinum Project was worth US$206 million in 1990 and was meant to treat 2.2 million tonnes of ore annually to produce 150 000 ounces of platinum group metals and base metals worth about US$100 million (Hollaway 1997:28). At that time it became the largest private sector investment in Zimbabwe since independence (Veasey 1997:1361)

Optimism about profitable platinum mining in Zimbabwe was and remains very high. For example, the Hartley Platinum Mine, which had a projected cash operating margin of US$26 a tonne of ore, was thought to be significantly more profitable than all South African platinum operations. The low cost of operation is largely attributed to relatively shallow mining depths, 100–500 metres, compared to many South African mines that reach depths of 800 metres to 1.5 kilometres. Thus, mining experts were optimistic that the Hartley Platinum Mine would put Zimbabwe in the top rank of platinum producers. As a result, there were other major projects planned for the Hartley Complex and other parts of the Great Dyke (Veasey 1997:1361).

Platinum mining in Zimbabwe has since grown to become one of the largest contributors to the country's GDP. According to Makore and Zano (2012:3), Zimplats' annual

production in 2012 was around 180 000 ounces of platinum and this was ramped up to 270 000 ounces of platinum by 2014. At the same time, Mimosa was producing approximately 100 000 ounces of platinum in 2012. In addition, Amplats' Unki mine was producing 70 000 platinum ounces with the potential to reach 280 000 platinum ounces per annum. The impressive success of platinum mines in Zimbabwe has come with an extra burden as they are expected to carry the flag when it comes to improving the working and living conditions of Black mineworkers as well as infrastructure development in mining communities.

A key development in post-colonial Zimbabwe with a significant impact on mining in Zimbabwe was the passing of the Indigenization and Empowerment Bill, which was served before the parliament in 2007. This led to the Indigenization and Empowerment Act 14 of 2007, which was signed into law in April 2008 (see, Government of Zimbabwe, 2007). This Act stipulated that all foreign owned companies with a share capital above US$500 000 should cede 51% of their shares to Black Zimbabweans. Furthermore, in 2010 the Government of Zimbabwe published regulations for the Indigenization and Empowerment Act to make it effective. Affected companies were given four months to provide specified information to the ministry of Youth Development and Economic Empowerment detailing how they will comply with the Act (Shangahaidonhi & Gundani 2014:128). As a result of this Act, investment by Zimbabwe's top platinum producers, Zimplats, Mimosa and AAC (Unki), was adversely affected by the uncertainty surrounding the future ownership of mining properties (Shangahaidonhi & Gundani 2014:129). While the AAC decided to sell their mining operations in Zimbabwe, they resolved to hold on to the Unki Platinum Project in the face of government pressure to cede a 15–20% stake to locals. Rather than freezing or reducing their investments, Anglo scaled up its promised investment of $92 million to $300 million (Saunders 2008:77).

The Zimbabwean Chamber of Mines has not been in favour of the government's indigenisation policy, arguing that it is scaring away potential investors in the mineral sector. As uncertainty reigned, some mining houses attempted to implement delaying tactics when it came to investing in the industry. All the large mining firms, mostly foreign owned, urged the government to strike a balance between indigenisation and attracting foreign investment in the mining sector (Magure 2012:79). Nevertheless, by

the end of 2012, Unki Platinum Mine, Zimplats and Mimosa had already transferred 10% of their shareholding to local communities through the Community Share Ownership Trusts. In addition to the 10% given to local communities, Zimplats, through its parent company Implats, agreed to give 10% to workers and a further 31% to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (Makore & Zano 2012:11). Furthermore, Zimplats struck a deal with government in 2006 that saw them give away undeveloped ground equalling 36% of its total land claim in return for indigenisation 'credits'. Also included in the deal were infrastructure, including 80 km of road, electricity supply, housing, and the mining community on site (Saunders 2008:78).

Although the political and economic climate in Zimbabwe remains pensive, platinum mining activity within the Great Dyke has resulted in the construction of schools, housing, clinics, roads, and other infrastructure. In addition, platinum mining firms have been instrumental in supporting local entrepreneurship or income generating projects in their surrounding communities (Makore & Zano 2012:7). Platinum mining giants have stepped up their efforts to contribute to the local and national economy. For instance, Mimosa Mining Company commissioned 11 boreholes in Zvishavane and built a mortuary at the town's district hospital and classrooms and toilets at Dadaya Primary School (Makore & Zano 2012:8). In addition, Mimosa built houses for almost all of its more than 2 000 employees under the housing development and homeownership scheme for general workers, supervisors and managers. Beneficiaries of the homeownership scheme own their houses after 10 years of service with the mining company. Furthermore, the mine constructed and tarred a 12 km stretch of road connecting the Zvishavane-Bulawayo road and the road to the mine, which is also used by surrounding communities. It also built a clinic for its workers and their dependants (Makore & Zano 2012:8).

It is important to note that the other platinum mining giants have followed suit. Unki mine refurbished or constructed schools, invested in local community irrigation, made contributions to the local hospital, provided bursaries for promising students to study at the country's School of Mines, invested in power generation, and built a tarred road linking the mine to the main road, among other initiatives. Zimplats's has played a key role in supporting local procurement and constructed the Ngezi-Selous Highway, which has benefited the public, chrome miners, farmers and schools in the area. They also

improved telecommunications infrastructure in Ngezi, which cost the company US$1 million. Zimplats has also spent over US$40 million constructing a company suburb called 'Turf Village' to house mineworkers. In addition, the mine has been supporting water and electricity supplies with infrastructure investments (Makore & Zano 2012:8). These contributions by platinum mining companies have come in handy at a time when the Zimbabwean state and the local government structures have no capacity to deliver vital social services and built critical infrastructure. In other words, the mining companies are performing the functions of the state and local authorities. However, it can also be argued that the building of clinics and housing for employees are mainly meant to improve worker morale, lessen absenteeism, and increase or maintain production at the mines.

It is remarkable that private companies, which are by nature looking to maximise profits for their shareholders, are also involved in activities that are in the public interest, such as building hospitals, roads, boreholes and schools (Murombo 2013:36). On the one hand, despite being required by law to contribute to social infrastructure development, these companies market themselves, even using billboards, as if they are voluntarily contributing to sustainable development (Murombo 2013:38). On the other hand, mineworkers and the community often depend on mining companies for support with critical services such as health, education, housing, transportation, and social activities, such as sporting activities. In addition, local municipalities also rely on the levies paid by mining companies and the infrastructure they develop (Makore & Zano 2012:12).

4.6 Conclusion

From the beginning of large-scale mining in Zimbabwe, housing in general and the housing of Black mineworkers were earmarked by mine managers for cost cutting. Initially Zimbabwean mines provided minimum or no housing for Black workers. This chapter detailed the evolution of the compound system at Zimbabwean mines from the self-built huts to square wood and iron compounds constructed by mining firms. The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that housing options available to mineworkers always went in tandem with the workers' status and rank as well as their perceived loyalty to the company. Ironically, more money and resources were spent to provide housing to

the well remunerated management and senior employees, who probably did not need company assistance, and minimal funds were spent to provide housing for the lowest ranked employees who really needed housing assistance. As a result, many Black mineworkers lost their lives because of poor healthcare facilities and a lack of nutritious food.

It is important at this juncture to reflect on the comparison between the two countries in focus. Doing so reveals important links between the two countries as well as the differences and similarities with regards to mine housing in their mining sectors. As a starting point, it is crucial to note that the development of mining in Zimbabwe began as an offshoot or overspill of the South African mining industry. Thus, mining companies operating in Zimbabwe had been set initially to mine in South Africa. As a result, their housing strategies and policies were similar. It is also important to highlight that in both countries the state played a critical role in dealing the issue of mine housing. For instance, while the South African mining firms initiated the idea of building mine compounds for Black mineworkers, it was the Chief Native Commissioner who took the initiative to convince mine managers to invest in compound construction in Zimbabwe. In South Africa, the state supported and subsidised housing costs for white mineworkers but refused to do the same for Black mineworkers, leaving individual firms to shoulder the cost on their own.

In terms of absolute space, the South African and Zimbabwean mining settlements had a lot in common and continue to share these commonalities. Features such as the mine compounds, mine stores, eating houses, mine hospitals, sports clubs, family housing for white mineworkers, and railway lines defined mining settlements in both countries. However, there were some differences; for example, while the South African compounds were largely closed compounds, in Zimbabwe a layered system was introduced where new recruits were kept in closed compounds but those who had proved their loyalty to the mine were given relative freedom of movement and allowed to build huts for themselves and their families. In terms of relative space, in general mineworkers in Zimbabwe had worse living conditions than their counterparts in South Africa. However, as mentioned earlier, Black mineworkers living compounds in Zimbabwe were given relative freedom of movement and allowed to live with their families on mine properties

while their South African counterparts were not. Overcrowding, poor health facilities, increased control by mine management and concerns about their privacy meant that mine compounds were hated by Black mineworkers in both countries. They expressed their agency by resisting being compounded or deserting whenever they got a chance.

Therefore, while there were limited opportunities to tap into structural, associational, and institutional power resources during the colonial era, Black mineworkers maximised societal power by forming alliances with other social movements, political parties, and international organisations. The trajectories for workers in the post-colonial period differ greatly between the two countries. In South Africa, the trade unions cemented their power and influence after 1994. They have scored significant victories for workers through their alliance with the ANC and their participation in NEDLAC. However, there were instances when the corporatist system of industrial relations failed the workers, such as when the ANC shifted its macroeconomic policy from RDP to Growth, Employment, and Redistribution and the 2012 massacre of striking workers in Marikana. In Zimbabwe, the labour movement has seen its power and influence dwindle since the late 1980s. Repressive legislations and crackdown by the state that targeted and tortured trade union leaders and organisers significantly weakened labour's power.

5 Methodology

> The use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. Objective reality can never be captured. We only know a thing through its representations. Triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation but an alternative to validation (Flick, 2007). The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigour, breadth complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry. (Denzin 2012:82)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines and discusses methodological processes and issues of this study. The first part describes and justifies the use of qualitative methods in this study, and it emphasises the triangulation of data collection methods as it relates to this study. What follows is a meticulous description of how the research was conducted, including a brief discussion of the challenges encountered and the limitations of this research project.

5.2 Qualitative methodology

Qualitative research boasts the ability to "describe life worlds 'from the inside out', from the point of view of the people who participate" (Flick, Von Kardoff & Steinke 2004:3). In other words, qualitative research seeks to gain a deep or thick understanding of the phenomenon under study in its specific setting or context. Thus, a qualitative researcher aims to gain insight into the perceptions of the researched (Alasuutari 2010:141–148; Barnes 1992:115–116). Put differently, qualitative researchers try their best to see and feel as the participants see and feel to understand the nuance. It is thus imperative that the researcher gets a clear as possible understanding of the context and life worlds of their participants.

The value of qualitative research lies in the method's ability to illuminate, to enrich understanding, to explore and to explain in a nuanced fashion the otherwise unknown or covert aspects of social life. Hoepfl (1997:49) highlights that qualitative research relies

on the natural setting as its source of data and that the researcher acts as an instrument for data collection. Hoepfl (1997:49) also adds the following:

> Qualitative research has an interpretive character, aimed at discovering the meaning events have for the individuals who experience them and interpretations of those meanings by the researcher.

Social behaviour and the meanings attached to it are by no means static, and therefore, qualitative research relies on an ongoing flexibility and adaptation at all levels and stages of the research project. Considering the broad focus of this study, that is, the mine housing question in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe, a qualitative approach was both suitable and plausible.

This does not, however, suggest that useful insights on the phenomenon under study cannot also be achieved through a different approach. It is not my intention here to compare qualitative research to quantitative research for such an activity is futile. My position is informed by the idea that these approaches are both useful and can be used simultaneously as in mixed methods research (Bryman 2006:97–113; Weed 2008:13–28). In other words, they can be used to answer different questions in the same study. Thus, in my view, neither of these research traditions is superior to the other in principle. Put differently, these two research traditions are arguably different sides of the same coin, and thus, need not be viewed as competing against each other but as complementary. Hence, choosing to follow a qualitative research approach in this study is both a pragmatic and rational decision. Here the term qualitative research is used in a very broad and general sense. I know there is no *one* qualitative research tradition (Flick 2007:ix). In addition, a qualitative study complemented the theoretical framework that drove this research. Socio-spatial analysis in general and Harvey's analysis of social space are best suited to qualitative research. For instance, the notion of relational space, which is about subjective experience of landscapes, in my opinion is best understood through qualitative research. Furthermore, the aim of the study went beyond the application and testing of Harvey's conceptualisation of space to attempt to add to, modify or expand his theoretical analysis by drawing up concepts from the empirical data obtained.

5.3 Research design

A comparative-case study design was employed in this study. The cases were chosen based on the call by Locke and Thelen (1998) on the need to address the 'problem of equivalence' in comparative research. Thus, two platinum mines owned by the same firm located in neighbouring countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which are in the same geographical, political, and economic region, were selected. Case studies are generally described as in-depth analyses that seek to go beyond the surface to look for meanings and to construct understandings on a small scale when compared to surveys (Knight 2002:41). A case study is an "exploration or in-depth analysis of a *bounded system*" (italics mine; Creswell, in De Vos, Strydom, Fouche, & Delport 2005:272). The emphasis on a 'bounded system' speaks to a bounded 'case'. A case can be geographically, spatially, or theoretically bound. Kumar (2005:113) sums up his discussion of the usefulness of case studies with the following words:

> All data relevant to the case are gathered and organised in terms of the case. It provides an opportunity for the intensive analysis of many specific details often overlooked in other methods. This approach rests on the assumption that the case being studied is typical of cases of a certain type so that, through intensive analysis; generalisations may be made that will be applicable to other cases of the same type.

I am, however, conscious of the fact that the results of a case study are not blindly generalisable (King, Keohane & Verba 1994:45).

5.4 Sampling

Sampling is generally guided by two factors, namely the cost of the study and the demand for precision or accurate knowledge (Brewer & Hunter 2006:80). Thus, the researcher chooses a research site and recruits participants depending on the financial resources available and on whether the sample can arguably provide concrete evidence for certain conclusions.

The choice to focus on AAP mines was influenced by the fact that over the years the company has taken a leading role in providing family housing for Black mineworkers.

Selecting the Amandelbult mine in Northam, South Africa, was both a pragmatic and reflexive decision. Initially, I intended to study AAP mines in Rustenburg but in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre in 2012, many social scientists were flocking into the area to do research. Thus, I decided to look at a mine in a town that was not receiving too much attention at the time to avoid duplicating research efforts. In addition, my contacts from the company were more inclined to help me get access to the Amandelbult mine than the ones in Rustenburg. I also initially wanted to study one mine owned by AAP and compare it to a mine owned by their biggest rival in South Africa, Impala Platinum Mines, but I eventually settled for a comparative study across two countries focusing on the world's biggest platinum producer.

I used two non-probability sampling techniques, namely judgemental or purposive sampling and snowball sampling. According to Brewer and Hunter (2006:93), purposive sampling is a "claim on the part of the researcher that theoretically significant, not necessarily statistically significant, units are selected for study". In this study, two mines owned by the same mining company but located in two different countries in the same geographical, political, and economic region were selected.

Snowball sampling was used to select participants for interviews. This sampling technique requires that the researcher recruits a few initial participants and then ask them to identify or help to recruit other members of the study population. This sampling method is commonly used for studies where the study population members are not readily identifiable or when it is considered unethical to develop a list of the members. In other words, snowball sampling is very useful when gaining access to participants is difficult (Henry 2009:83). This sampling method was therefore both suitable and appropriate for recruiting participants in this study. There is no readily available official register or list of names that specifically captures my target population. This is not to suggest that such records do not exist, but if they do, they are treated as confidential; hence, drawing contact names or details from such official documents was not possible and would have been viewed with suspicion by the participants. It would have also been very difficult to ensure anonymity and hence protect the participants from potential disadvantage or even harm.

Snowball sampling in qualitative research can in itself be a source of knowledge or information. Noy (2008:329) observed that "snow-ball sampling relies on and partakes in the *dynamics of natural and organic social networks*" (italics original). Therefore, much can be learnt about the study population by observing, reflecting on and analysing these dynamics and networks. Given that participants are actively involved in identifying and recruiting participants, power relations between the researcher and the researched need to be 'successfully managed'. Noy (2008:335) wrote the following to highlight the role played by informants in snowball sampling and the power dynamics involved therein:

> Informants who possess social capital and are willing to share it—or to perform and embody—with the researcher are those informants who are members in social networks, who have more friends and acquaintances than others... and they are therefore located centrally.

In other words, informants may 'dictate' the research process by determining who might be contacted next and who is to be left out of the study. This, nonetheless, should not be seen as a weakness of snowballing. In fact, reflecting on and analysing such dynamics enrich one's understanding and result in unique and, for analytical reasons, in-depth and more coherent knowledge. This is also in line with how most qualitative researchers go about their work. As Marshall and Rossman (1995:1–5) argue, in qualitative research, the researcher purposefully avoids controlling the research conditions and focuses on the complexity of situational contexts and interactions as they occur in their everyday natural settings. This is by no means to suggest that the researcher has no influence on what is learnt during the research process. Conversely, the point is that the researcher avoids intentionally creating artificial conditions as is the case in, for example, the experimental method. However, it should be noted that in hindsight following this sampling method resulted in a failure to recruit workers who live in informal settlements in areas surrounding the Amandelbult mine and those living in rural villages near Unki mine. To mitigate this weakness, secondary data was relied on as well as accounts given by trade union officials and local council authorities.

5.5 Data Collection: Triangulation of methods

Social reality is inherently complex and continuously evolving. Thus, it is often difficult to gain a complete understanding of social phenomena using a single method or technique. This is where triangulation, the use of more than one method to research the same phenomenon, comes in handy to social science researchers. It yields unique information and insights that none of the triangulated methods can provide independently (Flick 2004). Triangulation can be applied in several forms in qualitative research. For example, Denzin (cited in Flick 2004:178–181) distinguish between the following four forms of triangulation:

- Triangulation of data: This involves purposefully combining data drawn from different sources, at different times, from different places or from different people. One type of data is used together with another type of data; for example, interview data can be used in tandem with documents or photographs.
- Investigator triangulation: This is when there are more than one observer or interviewer.
- Triangulation of theories: This uses different theoretical approaches side by side to complement each other.
- Methodological triangulation: This can be done in two ways, namely within-method and between-method triangulation. The former involves, for example, the use of different subscales within a questionnaire, and the later refers to combining qualitative and quantitative methods.

This study focused on the triangulation of data. Secondary data from official documents, official websites and newspapers, verbal data from interviews, visual data from photographs and maps and data from observation field notes were triangulated. The aim of data triangulation in this study was to reveal additional knowledge, adding depth and breadth to the analysis, and not necessarily to improve the validity and objectivity of the data (Flick 2004:179). Triangulation involves more than a mere aggregate accumulation of information, and rather involves the interaction of the methods and the resulting data (Hillery 1981:23, 31). Thus, data triangulation was used in this study as a pragmatic strategy that opened the door to a deeper understanding of the mine housing strategies in

post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe. All forms of data and data sets carried the same weight and were of equal importance. They were not 'played off' against each other in search of an objective truth. Rather, these data sets were initially analysed independently to extend the possibilities of discovery. According to Flick (2004:182), "triangulation then relates in practical terms to the results of both analyses and puts them in relation to each other". Triangulation of data fit well with the theoretical framework of this study. Absolute space, which relates to physical landscapes and general topography, is best captured through maps and still photographs, and relational and relative space are better understood through interviews, observations, and secondary documents.

5.5.1 Secondary data analysis: Official documents, official websites and newspapers

Documents in social research provide "mute evidence" because they do not talk back and are usually interpreted without the help of those who created them (Hodder 1998:110). However, despite their 'muteness', documents provide useful data for social researchers. Wolff (2004:284, 288) explains the function of documents, in particular official documents, as follows:

> Function as institutionalised traces, which mean that they may legitimately be used to draw conclusions about the activities, intentions and ideas of their creators or the organizations they represent … documents, even those that, expressly operate as factual reports, should not be reduced to the function of information containers, but should basically be treated and analysed as methodically created communicative features.

Thus, documentary evidence requires sociological debunking. Qualitative researchers therefore take into consideration the social context in which documents were produced. The production and accessibility of documents are wrought by power relations issues. Hence, when analysing documentary evidence, I was mindful of the fact that documents are produced "under curtained material conditions embedded within social and ideological systems" (Hodder 1998:112).

Relevant company officials made available selected official company policy documents relating to mine housing to be used in the study. These were mainly factual documents prepared for the company's officials and shareholders. Thus, permission was granted to use the information contained in these documents without making the documents in full public. Furthermore, some documents were drawn from the company's official website, this included media releases by the mining company, newsletters, reports, and memorandum of understanding signed between the mine and other stakeholders, such as the local government. Secondary data were also discovered in government and municipal official documents, including pieces of legislation related to mine housing and other policy documents and media releases on official websites. In addition, newspaper reports proved to be a rich source of secondary data, especially for the Unki mine in Zimbabwe where I was denied access to official records or reports and from taking photographs in certain residential areas at the mine.

5.5.2 Observation

Observation can be defined as the act of noting a phenomenon in its natural setting without the researcher's interference, often with instruments, and recording it for scientific or other purposes (Adler & Adler 1998:80). Thus, the researcher carefully observes the phenomenon under investigation as it unfolds before them. To gain a deeper understanding and enrich the analysis, the observer records not only visual data but also what they observe through other human faculties.

Furthermore, according to Adler and Adler (1998), the observer goes through several stages that have a significant bearing on the research output. Usually, the first step is to select a setting. In this study, the setting was purposefully selected based on the theoretic assumptions and the research question that drove this study. The next step is to negotiate and gain access. Official clearance from the mining company whose housing strategies were under study was sought and granted before commencing the data gathering process. The initial observations were largely unfocussed, general, and primarily descriptive, but as the process continued, the focus was sharpened, especially when observation took place after interviewing participants. The interviews helped obtain a deeper understanding of the setting, and doing so focused observations on specific elements

relating to the study's research question (Adler & Adler 1998:86–87). It is crucial to restate at this point that this study used observation in conjunction with the other three methods of data collection discussed earlier, enhancing the quality of the data gathered through my observations.

This study's observational data was collected through note taking. The researcher carried and kept with him a notebook during the entire fieldwork. Some notes or keywords were written while in the field, and these were expanded on, developed and gaps filled in from memory immediately after leaving the field. These field notes were kept confidential (Palmer 2010:142). Fieldwork started at the Amandelbult mine in Northam, South Africa, between July and August 2015. The first visit to the area was a general tour to survey the broader location of the mine, including the two towns surrounding it, Northam and Thabazimbi. Most of the observations were carried out during a week-long stay in August 2015 when I was granted access to live at one of the single accommodation villages (SAV) at the mine. Observation at Unki mine took place in July 2016 and June 2017. During the first visit in July 2016, I stayed in one of the townships in Gweru for a week with one of the mineworkers at Unki and was able to travel to and from the mine with the mine staff bus. A second field trip in June 2017 also lasted a week, and this time observations were more focused on the Shurugwi townships and the company housing at Impali on the outskirts of Shurugwi. As suggested earlier, in addition to note taking, interviews were conducted and photographs were taken during these field trips, thereby triangulating these data collection techniques simultaneously.

5.5.3 Visual data: Photography

Photographs produce a unique kind of visual data that can enrich qualitative social science research. Photographic data has inherent dual qualities as they are both objective and subjective. Photographs record the social and physical world "seemingly without interpretation" and at the same time they are profoundly subjective (Harper 2004:231). Nonetheless, photographs can provide descriptive information in a way that no other technique can. Harper (1988:62) posits that even though it is possible to describe many elements of a photograph, "it is not feasible to describe all the elements of a complex image, and it is not easy to describe the spatial relationships among the different elements,

or the gestalt of the image". In this study photographic evidence was particularly useful because of the theoretical approach that drove the investigation and the analysis presented. For example, I argue that photographs capture notions of absolute and relative space more vividly than word descriptions. In this study, pictures of mine compounds, different types of houses, the mine hospital, the roads, railway lines and other physical landscape features that symbolise the kubotereka and scorecard spatial orders were captured and presented as key data sets.

The use of photographic evidence in social sciences is not universally accepted. Visual sociologists in particular struggle to get their work to be regarded just as rigorous as that done through other methods. Prosser (1998:97) discuss the general message in the criticism of photographic evidence as follows:

> Photographs are acceptable only as a means to record data or as illustration and subservient to that of the central narrative; they are unacceptable as a way of 'knowing' because they distort that which they claim to illuminate, and that images being socially created and mediated are skewed by the socio-context of 'making', 'taking' and 'reading'; and summatively images are so complex that analysis is untenable … the implication is that images should play only a minor role, or very occasionally a supporting role (for example a way of collecting and recording data) but only very rarely as evidence or to represent findings in mainstream qualitative research.

It should be pointed out that this criticism can be applied to all research methods in the social sciences, and thus, the strength of visual data lies in the process of gathering it. Just like field notes and other forms of empirical data in social science research, photographs may not provide neutral, unbiased, and objective documentation of the social and material world, "but they can show characteristic attributes of people, objects, and events that often elude even the most skilled wordsmith" (Prosser & Schwartz 1998:116). Thus, when a clear, rigorous, and well thought-out research plan anchored on a research question and a theoretical framework is followed, meaningful visual data can be collected.

Hence, it is important and requires meticulous planning to take theoretically meaningful photographs (Harper 1988:60). In order to take theoretically meaningful photos, I

followed Suchar's (1997) interrogatory principle of documentary photography. This is centred on the following idea of Suchar (1997:34):

> Photography's documentary potential is not inherent in photographs, but rather lies in an interactive process whereby photographs are used as a way of answering or expanding on questions about a particular subject … This process of asking and answering questions—based on field observations or archival research and engaging in a discovery process—is an essential characteristic of the meaning of documentary.

Thus, the research question was pivotal in the selection of shots taken and in the final selection of pictures presented in this study. In addition, pointers were taken from the interviews with participants, official documents, and newspaper reports. Therefore, I began conducting photographic field work with initial working hunches and theories about the subject matter, which allowed me to focus on visual data that I deemed useful to answer the research question.

Furthermore, this helped to make photographs that are 'intellectually denser'. According to Harper (1998:29), the photographic researcher should always be cognizant of the theory that guides the research project. Hence, instead of regarding photographs as truth, they should be taken as "reflections of the photographer's point of view, biases, and knowledge, or lack of knowledge … more fundamentally, all images, despite their relationship to the world are socially and technically constructed" (Harper 1998:29). Therefore, after completing immersive field research driven by theoretical questions set at the outset, the photographic "information must subsequently be organized and presented from a sociological perspective" (Harper 1998:34).

To make sense of visual data in Sociology, it is important to understand both the context in the photograph and the context of the making of the photograph. Becker (1998:88) puts it as follows:

> Photographs get meaning, like all cultural objects, from their context. Even paintings or sculptures, which seem to exist in isolation, hanging on the wall of a museum, get their meaning from a context made up of what has been written about them, either in the label besides them or elsewhere.

In the same vein, Duff (1981:76) argues the following:

> Photography, then, is a mechanical process crucially dependent on a single human decision. The process produces single images which are again, crucially dependent, on the context, in which they are seen. Photographs might appear to be self-evident, but they are more often open, incomplete and ambiguous, and to make sense of them they need to be seen with words or with other images.

This study used photographs retrieved from company brochures and reports on the official website and newspapers together with photographs taken by the researcher. In addition to photographs, maps are also presented as visual data in this research project. Underpinning the use of photographs in this study is the understanding that photographs are socially constructed and thus require sociological interpretation. Photographs, if carefully and creatively used as social science data, may reveal social processes and change in ways that transcends textual descriptions and analyses (Harper 2004:231–233).

I will now outline the process followed to take the photographs and discuss their presentation in this study. The camera can be seen as an extension of the researcher, and so it enables the researcher to record their observations. Therefore, it is important to structure the fieldwork so that photographic evidence can reveal patterns, features or details in a research setting that are not readily apparent in less acute observations of that reality. With this in mind, I sought a field strategy that allowed me to see clear patterns in my photographs, which made it possible and easier to create photographic records that can be used for social analysis. I chose to follow Suchar's (1997:35) suggestion to combine the use of shooting scripts with the procedures of grounded theory, creating categories for the collection, organisation, and analysis of observational data before entering the field. Following this approach, it was crucial to create what Suchar calls 'shooting scripts'. He explains how they can be used as follows:

> Shooting scripts work as guides for photographic and sociological seeing. Not only do they help structure daily field work and photography, but further, provide the flexibility needed for a sociological discovery process that draws from field observations to visually ground abstractive and conceptual

> development. The process of constructing and reconstructing shooting scripts, based on daily field experience, allows for a strategic organization of field photography in order to establish a base of photographic information. From this, analysis, conceptualisation, and further field work can proceed. This, in turn, permits the field worker to become more sensitive to the recognition of patterns and therefore, enhances seeing (Suchar 1997:35).

I used the questions on my interview guide as a shooting script. The series of questions in the interview guide were directly linked to the main research question stated in Section 1.7. This helped to establish the scope and clarity of the constructs developed (Prosser & Schwartz 1998:118). This allowed me to take photographs that are both theoretically relevant and provide answers to my research question.

In addition, working with a shooting script allows the researcher to better manage large amounts of visual data, which is critical in the early stages of data analysis. Prosser and Schwartz (1998:125–126) give the following advice, which I found very useful, with regards to collecting, sorting, and analysing visual data:

> Analysing photographic data in qualitative research, as with textual data, is a series of inductive and formative acts carried out throughout the research process. As with other qualitative research strategies, visual researchers begin the task of analysis in the course of field research so that new inferences can be exploited before the fieldwork ends… Interpretation of any photographic data requires a theoretical framework. A framework aids management of large amounts of (visual) data by providing logic for sorting, organising, indexing and categorisation. The interpretive process begins well before viewing a photograph, and takes place, for example, when decisions are made as to about what and how the photographs are taken … Making sense of photographs is also dependent on what sort of social explanation or intellectual puzzle is to be resolved.

Thus, at the end of each fieldwork day, I created files on a computer with themes contained in the interview that I also used as a shooting script and began to sort pictures according to the aspects of the research question that answer. Viewing previous field work

photographs also alerted me to certain gaps in the data or to new themes that I did not think of initially. At times new locations to photograph were discovered from interviews with research participants. Hence, although focused on the research question and the theoretical framework driving the research, the research design was still flexible enough to include categories that were not pre-set before entering the field. In addition, not all photographs that were taken are included in the final report. Only the photographs the researcher felt best answered the research question were selected.

5.5.4 In-depth interviews

Individual interviews in qualitative research can be said to be "*inter-view[s]* where knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between two people" (Kvale 2007:13). The interviewer and the interviewee influence each other in their conversation. Power dynamics mould and determine the nature of interviews and the knowledge produced therein. For example, the interviewer usually raises a series of questions that interest them and expects the interviewee to respond accordingly. This, however, does not mean the interviewee is powerless; instead, the interviewee as the source of the knowledge that the researcher is looking for arguably possesses agency and power. The interviewee decides what to reveal and what to leave out when talking or answering interview questions. This interviewer-interviewee relationship needs to be sensitively and well managed to obtain quality and useful data (Rubin & Rubin 2005:33–35).

The interviews in this study were modelled on Rubin and Rubin's (2005) responsive interviewing model. They describe the model as follows:

> [The model] emphasises that the interviewer and interviewee are both human beings, not machines, and that they form a relationship during the interview that generates ethical obligations for the interviewer... the goal of the research is to generate depth of understanding, rather than breadth... [and] the design of the research remains flexible throughout the project. (Rubin & Rubin 2005:30)

Thus, the interviewer and the interviewee come into this relationship with their respective values, and their perceptions, feelings, personalities, interests, and experiences shape the

interview process and the inter-subjective knowledge produced thereof. These “two human beings” interact and influence each other’s views, and in so doing they create an inter-subjective reality (Rubin & Rubin 2005:30–32).

Furthermore, the researcher continually reflects on what they are doing to consider their own understandings and reactions. This requires that throughout the data collection process the researcher continuously considers the interviews, reflexively evaluating them. In this way the researcher becomes self-aware and conscious (Rubin & Rubin 2005:30–32).

In this study interviews were conducted with purposefully selected members of the following general categories: Accommodation and housing managers or officials, and mineworkers living in different residential areas. A total of 40 in-depth interviews were conducted, of which 18 were done in South Africa with Amandelbult mine employees and 18 were done in Zimbabwe with Unki mine employees. In addition to the interviews with mineworkers, one trade union official and a local municipal representative were interviewed for each case study. On average the interviews lasted 30 minutes. Informed consent to participate was obtained prior to the interview (see Appendix II for the consent form). Participants could choose to be audiotaped or for the interviewer to take notes during the interview. Out of the 18 participants from Amandelbult, eight agreed to be audiotaped and the other six opted for interview notes without being taped. The two housing managers who were based at AAP’s head offices in Johannesburg were interviewed on two separate occasions (before and after fieldwork at the mine). The follow-up interviews were done to clarify information contained in official documents and issues raised by mineworkers during interviews as well as my observations. Eight participants from Unki mine declined to be audiotaped and thus interview notes were taken. The interviews conducted in 2020 and 2021 were done telephonically because of Covid-19 restrictions and precautions.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows the profiles of the interview participants at Amandelbult mine and Unki mine, respectively.

Table 5-1 Participant profile: Amandelbult mine (South Africa)

Name	Age	Sex	Race	Marital Status	Years at Mine	Job Title	Housing	Interview Date
Thabiso	58	M	Black	Married	28	Team leader	SAV	5/8/2015
Temba	45	M	Black	Married	26	RDO	SAV	5/8/2015
Siphe	55	M	Black	Married	25	Driver	SAV	5/8/2015
Mandla	42	M	Black	Married	15	RDO	SAV	5/8/2015
Tebogo	40	M	Black	Married	12	Surveyor	N/Ext 6	6/8/2015
Rulani	38	M	Black	Married	9	Engineer	N/Ext 6	6/8/2015
Kundani	35	M	Black	Married	10	Engineer	N/Ext 6	6/8/2015
Thsepo	35	M	Black	Married	8	Engineer	N/Ext 6	6/8/2015
Sifiso	46	M	Black	Married	16	Housing manager	Apartment	17/7/2015 and 28/8/2015\
Thabani	50	M	Black	Married	20	Housing manager	Apartment	31/7/2015 and 28/08/2015
Dumisani	45	M	Black	Married	10	SAV manager	Apartment	7/08/2015
Mpho	55	M	Black	Married	15	SAV manager	Apartment	7/08/2015
Lerato	52	M	Black	Married	20	SAV chef	Apartment	7/08/2015
Thato	42	F	Black	Married	12	SAV chef	Apartment	7/08/2015
Kwaito	46	M	Black	Married	22	Engineer	N/Ext6	12/11/2020
Khulani	52	M	Black	Married	19	Technician	N/Ext 6	12/11/2020
Twala	50	M	Black	Married	18	Surveyor	N/Ext 6	15/11/2020
Zwane	39	M	Black	Married	14	Technician	N/Ext 6	15/11/2020
NUM official	45	M	Black	Married	-	-	-	29/12/2020
Thabazimbi Local Municipality Representative	55	M	Black	Married	-	-	-	18/12/2020

Table 5-2 Participant profile: Unki mine (Zimbabwe)

Name	Age	Sex	Race	Marital Status	Years at Mine	Job Title	Housing	Interview Date
Phillip	37	M	Black	Separated	5	Geologist	Gweru Township	22/6/2017

Name	Age	Sex	Race	Marital Status	Years at Mine	Job Title	Housing	Interview Date
Allen	35	M	Black	Single	4	RDO	Impali	23/6/2017
Tendai	45	M	Black	Married	5	Geologist	Impali	23/6/2017
Joe	38	M	Black	Married	5	RDO	Impali	24/6/2017
BaRopa	40	M	Black	Married	3	Geologist	Shurugwi Township	26/6/2017
Salim	37	M	Black	Married	4	Engineer	Gweru Township	22/6/2017
BaLeo	42	M	Black	Married	3	Labourer	Shurugwi Township	26/6/2017
Tichaona	44	M	Black	Married	8	Labourer	Gweru Township	15/11/2020
Nhamo	43	M	Black	Married	7	Labourer	Gweru Township	15/11/2020
Rugare	38	M	Black	Married	8	Labourer	Gweru Township	5/12/2020
Ushe	40	M	Black	Married	8	Labourer	Impali	15/12/2020
Tinaye	37	M	Black	Married	6	Labourer	Impali	15/12/2020
Simon	42	M	Black	Married	12	RDO	Impali	17/12/2020
Kembo	38	M	Black	Married	11	RDO	Impali	17/12/2020
Richard	36	M	Black	Married	9	RDO	Impali	18/12/2020
Mambo	45	M	Black	Married	10	Geologist	Impali	18/12/2020
Sam	43	M	Black	Married	5	Shift supervisor	Impali	26/6/2017
ZUMW Official	40	M	Black	Married	-	-	-	22/12/2020
Shurugwi Town Council Representative	51	M	Black	Married	-	-	-	5/01/2021

I will now outline the steps followed when analysing the interview data. Interview data analysis is "the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to the mass of collected data" (Marshall & Rossman 1995:111). I was searching for general ideas and patterns about the relationship between different categories of data with the aim of building a grounded theory. In this study, just like in any other qualitative research, data analysis began during and continued simultaneously with the data collection process. Once an interview was completed, it was examined to see what can be learnt from it and to identify areas that need to be expounded on. The objective of qualitative data analysis is not to

provide statistical summaries but to "discover variation, portray shades of meaning, and examine complexity" (Rubin & Rubin 2005:202). When all the interviews were completed, the interview recordings were played back and meticulously transcribed and checked, after which the writing up of the data analysis commenced. Interview notes were also included in the analysis.

As suggested above, qualitative data analysis may proceed in different and overlapping stages. Rubin and Rubin (2005:207–208) suggest following these four steps in interview data analysis: Recognition, clarifying and synthesising, coding, and synthesising. *Recognising* is the process of identifying "concepts, themes, events and topical markers" in an interview data set. The next step, *clarifying*, is when the researcher methodically examines the interviews and explicate what is meant by specific concepts and themes. Then, *synthesising* follows as different versions of events are integrated toward understanding the narrative (Rubin & Rubin 2005:207–208). Finding themes in the narratives helps the researcher to sum up the debates and statements made by participants and can be useful in concisely explaining the general patterns emerging from the data set.

In this study, the researcher chose to work with pre-set themes emanating from existing literature in conjunction with those emerging from the raw data. In other words, inductive and deductive methods were used to complement each other. Hence, after printing out all the transcripts, I meticulously worked through them looking for re-occurring words, themes, ideas, opinions, and phrases and highlighted them in different colours. I followed Rubin and Rubin's (2005:204–205) suggestion to create and keep memos that contain notable quotes throughout the research process. These quotes provided important pointers or answers to the research question. Each set of words, themes, ideas, opinions, and phrases were grouped and marked with different shades thereby creating a practical coding system.

The last element of interpretation, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005:208), is the *final synthesis*. At this stage, I combined the concepts identified in earlier steps to suggest how the overall phenomenon under study operates. Therefore, I looked for possible patterns that emerged from the data and followed these patterns to link them. To substantiate some

of my assertions in this thesis, I used exact extracts of quotes from the narratives as recorded in the interview transcripts and notes.

5.6 Ethical considerations

Social researchers always struggle to clear their studies of *all* ethical questions. This qualitative study is no exception; however, careful steps were taken to ensure that this study was ethical. To start with, participation in this study was voluntary. Informed consent was obtained prior to participation. Participants were given consent forms, and they were asked to read them and sign them if they agreed to take part in the study. The participants' right to privacy and confidentiality were guaranteed and maintained. To protect these rights, participants were given pseudonyms, and only the pseudonyms are used in this thesis. In addition, prior consent and permission was sought and granted by the company whose housing strategies were under study. Furthermore, interview participants were fully informed that they were free to withdraw at any time during interviews should they wish to. The researcher also informed the participants that they were free to ask anything they would like to know about the study, and they were given the option to choose to be audiotaped or to allow the researcher to take interview notes. All the information obtained from audiotaped interviews with participants was accurately transcribed and interview notes were carefully taken. Caution was exercised not to misrepresent the views of the participants in the thesis. In addition, excerpts or quotes from the interviews were not taken out of the interview context.

5.7 Reflexivity

As a researcher I am cognizant of the fact that my own values, perceptions, emotions, and personality affected my research in obvious and very subtle ways. To demonstrate the validity and reliability of the data collected in this study, I turned to ‘self-disclosing’. This study depended on ongoing negotiations and interactions with research participants, gate keepers and official documents. Without a doubt the findings and the decisions that I made during the study as well as my interpretations and explanations of these were influenced and shaped by my own cultural, social, gender and personal attributes. In actual reality, “all writing is positioned within a stance” (Creswell 2007:179).

Consequently, I meticulously described as openly as possible all the steps and processes that were followed during this study.

5.7.1 Challenges in the field

Mineworkers at Amandelbult speak several different local languages and are not fluent in English. This presented me with one of the biggest hurdles in the field as I am not fluent in any of their mother tongues. Initially I attempted to have the interviews in English, but I soon realised that mineworkers living in SAVs were reluctant to speak to me. Hence, I had to turn to one of the housing managers[13], who was assigned to me as a point of contact or gatekeeper by the mining company, to assist me as interpreter for four interviews. This decision solved the language problem but opened a different challenge. Most of the participants felt comfortable with the interpreter, but some were reserved when it came to sensitive matters as when they felt that management is not doing enough to improve their living conditions. For instance, one participant only opened up after the interpreter had excused himself to use the toilet. He whispered to me in his poor English to complain about the management's reluctance to provide family units in the compounds and to extend services such as healthcare to their families. At the same time, some mineworkers were very outspoken and pointedly blamed the management for the poor services they receive, such as poor food quality. They complained about the fact that technicians who lived in nearby single quarters were getting better food than they get in the SAVs. These participants took the opportunity to take out all their frustrations on my interpreter who was in their view the face of management.

[13] This manager was not their direct line manager; rather he is based at the company's head office in Johannesburg. Therefore, he did not have daily contact with these workers and would not easily remember who they were among hundreds of SAV dwellers.

6 The scorecard spatial order: Housing platinum miners at Amandelbult

> ‘Change life!’ ‘Change society!’ These precepts mean nothing without the production of an appropriate space … So long as everyday life remains in thrall to abstract space, with its very concrete constraints; so long as the only improvements to occur are technical improvements of detail (for example, the frequency and speed of transportation, or relatively better amenities); so long, in short, as the only connection between work spaces, leisure spaces and living spaces is supplied by the agencies of political power and by their mechanisms of control—so long must the project of ‘changing life’ remain no more than a political rallying-cry to be taken up or abandoned according to the mood of the moment. (Lefebvre 1974:59–60)

6.1 Introduction

The Amandelbult mining complex is located between Northam and Thabazimbi towns and falls under the Thabazimbi municipality in the South-Western part of the Limpopo province. Figures 6.1–6.4 shows the mine’s location in relation to Johannesburg, Pretoria, Northam and Rustenburg. As AAP’s housing policy continues to evolve, a complex and multi-layered approach to mine employee housing is developing. While AAP is committed to providing housing for all its employees, the Paterson system (see Table 6-1 below for a breakdown of this system) is relied on to determine which employees qualify for different housing schemes. As a result, the mineworkers have access to different types of accommodation, that is different size houses and plots, in different geographic places in relation to the mine’s location. These differences impact mineworkers’ access to essential services such as schools, clinics, clean water supply, sewage and waste collection and management, and electricity supply. Thus, to a greater extent, status and level of seniority as determined by the Paterson scale inform where workers live and the quality of their living conditions.

Table 6-1: Paterson job grading system

Decision-making band	Job grades	Sub grades
F Policy formulating (Top management)	Higher F – Coordinating - 11	F5
	Lower F - Policy formulating - 10	F4
E Programming (Senior management)	Higher E - Coordinating - 9	E5 E4
	Lower E – Programming - 8	E3 E2 E1
D Interpreting (Middle management)	Higher D - Coordinating - 7	D5 D4
	Lower D – Interpreting - 6	D3 D2 D1
C Routine (Skilled workers and supervisory management)	Higher C – Coordinating - 5	C5 C4
	Lower C – Routine - 4	C3 C2 C1
B Automatic (Semi-skilled workers)	Higher B – Coordinating - 3	B5 B4
	Lower B – Automatic - 2	B3 B2 B1
		A3

Source: Rooyen (2005).

This chapter presents the findings of the Amandelbult case study and describes AAP's housing schemes and their impact on mineworkers lives. The analysis that I present here is driven by a spatial analytical approach based on Harvey's (2006) notions of absolute, relative, and relational space.



Figure 6.1 Map showing the distance between Amandelbult mine and Johannesburg



Figure 6.3 Map showing the distance between Amandelbult mine and Rustenburg



Figure 6.2 Map showing the distance between Amandelbult mine and Pretoria



Figure 6.4 Map showing the distance between Amandelbult mine and Northam

Source: Google maps

6.2 Anglo-American Platinum's housing strategy

AAP's housing strategy is based on two approaches, namely employee-owned accommodation and company-owned accommodation. Prior to 1994, company-owned accommodation was the main answer to the housing question with regards to platinum mineworkers. Post-1994 there has been a gradual shift from prioritising company-owned accommodation towards empowering mineworkers to own houses. It is important to underline the fact that the employer, in this case AAP, plays a pivotal role by either providing company-owned accommodation or enabling employees to buy their own houses.

6.2.1 Company-owned accommodation

AAP provides accommodation for its employees through three schemes. The first is referred to as strategic housing. According to AAP (2015a), in 2014 the mining firm owned a total of 5 889 houses and a further 5 800 strategic housing units were planned for the next five years. These houses are categorised (AAP, 2011) per size as follows:

- The first tier houses (T1) are four bedrooms and two bathrooms on 180 m^2 or 200 m^2 plots. These are meant for D3–E3 Paterson band employees.
- The second tier houses (T2) are three bedrooms and two bathrooms on 150 m^2 plots. These are meant for C3–D2 Paterson band employees.
- The third tier houses (T3) are three bedrooms and two bathrooms on 130 m^2 plots. B4–D1 Paterson band employees qualify for these houses.
- The fourth tier houses (T4) are two bedrooms and one bathroom on 70 m^2 plots. The A–D1 Paterson band employees qualify for these houses.

Applications for strategic housing are treated primarily on job category or skills and on a first-come-first-serve basis. Despite AAP's drive to reduce employee dependence on this housing scheme by encouraging employees to take up home ownership, the company intend to continue with this scheme.

The second type of company-owned accommodation is married and single quarters. There are a total of 500 housing units of this nature in nine such facilities throughout the

company, of which three are located at the Amandelbult mine. Employees qualify for this housing provision in terms of a selection criterion based on a combination of job level and years of service. The employees who live in married and single quarters forfeit other housing benefits (AAP, 2015a).

The third type of company-owned accommodation is SAVs. A total of 13 SAVs exist throughout the organisation. From 2003 to 2007, AAP refurbished its hostels or compounds and converted them into single-sex accommodation villages. Employees reside in SAVs free of charge and are not entitled to a LOA. The primary difference in allocation between single quarters and SAVs is job level. All levels of employees qualify to live in SAVs, but only skilled technicians can be accommodated in single quarters (AAP, 2015a).

6.2.2 Employee-owned accommodation

According to AAP (2014a), the Employer Assisted Housing Scheme is the most popular housing solution among AAP employees. The Employer Assisted Housing Scheme is meant to do the following:

a) Promote home ownership among all employees; and
b) Help employees to secure home loans so that they can build their own residential properties that are closer to the mines.

There are three initiatives that AAP is using that falls under the broader Employer Assisted Housing Scheme. The first one is the Homeownership Allowance (HOA). This allowance is seen as an incentive to encourage homeownership for all AAP's permanent employees in operators and supervisory units across the organisation. A total of 8 734 employees were receiving HOA by 2014. The minimum rate of the allowance was R2 945 per month and the maximum was R5 590 per month per employee (AAP, 2015a). This allowance enables AAP employees to service their mortgage loans with commercial banks. The company bought residential land in well located areas next to its mining operations in established towns to ensure that their employees are integrated into established communities and towns with all amenities in place. As a rule, the radius of the location should not be more than 100 km from the employees' place of work to benefit

from the company's housing schemes. To finance these projects, AAP set aside R1.4 billion for 20 000 stands, and a further R900 million was set aside to be spent on subsidies spread over 10 years from 2008. Thus, the total cost in investment for the company, including social and economic amenities, which include schools and clinics, was over R2.5 billion. This was meant to benefit 120 000 people (AAP, 2015a).

The company also installed bulk services on the purchased portions of land from its budget. Then, qualifying employees were encouraged and assisted to apply for a grant through the Finance Linked Individual Subsidy Programme (FLISP) housing subsidies from the Department of Human Settlement in their respective provinces (AAP, 2014a, 2015a). Thus, this is a partnership between the mining firm and the state to provide affordable housing to mineworkers. AAP then facilitates the building of the top structure with the assistance of a construction company on behalf of its employees on order. At this stage, the construction company enlists the services of a commercial bank so that mine employees can get home loans for the top structure. Qualifying employees who succeed with the acquisition of a home loan from a commercial bank are provided with a HOA by AAP. The FLISP reduces qualifying employees' debt to the bank by almost 20%, which goes a long way to help Black mineworkers with the repayment of a mortgage bond on their houses (AAP, 2015a).

According to AAP (2015b), the housing business model of AAP is based on the premise that employees should own houses and lessen their reliance and dependency on company-provided accommodation both on-mine and off-mine. Therefore, the company actively promotes homeownership among its employees. Homeownership represents a significant transformation of mineworkers' living conditions, particularly because most of AAP employees benefiting from the company's homeownership programme are first-time homeowners. As they get integrated into the broader community near their workplaces, HOA beneficiaries get easy access to basic amenities, including education and health facilities, safe drinking water, waste management, sports facilities, parks, banks, and shopping malls.

The second scheme is the Housing Bond Subsidy Scheme. This subsidy is open to all permanent employees and is designed to encourage homeownership. Through this

scheme, the company subsidises the interest rate on the mortgage loan so that the employee bears only the first 6%, which could be adjusted by the company from time to time. In 2014, about 1 000 employees were receiving this subsidy. AAP intended to phase out this scheme in favour of the HOA (AAP 2015a).

The third scheme is the Housing Rental Subsidy Scheme, also referred to as the LOA. The Housing Rental Subsidy Scheme is paid to qualifying employees to assist with rental accommodation in the operators and supervisory bargaining units (A–D1 Paterson band) across the organisation. From July 2014, the subsidy amounted to R 1 945 per month. About 26 000 employees were receiving this subsidy at an annual cost of R420 million. The subsidy has come under criticism from the government for its contribution to the growth of informal settlements around mining operations. Despite AAP's plans to phase this scheme out and replace it with an affordable housing benefit scheme, it continues to be part a part of the company's housing strategy (AAP 2014b). Nevertheless, the company has continued to invest community development. For instance, in 2018, a total of R609 million was spent on social labour plans, social investments and payments to community trusts and community dividends (AAP, 2018).

6.3 Single accommodation villages at Amandelbult

> When you enter the hostel you would not say it was a place where people live. You would think it was a place for pigs … The hard stone floors are cold in winter. The rooms have no ceilings. They are hot in summer … I have worked hard for 20 years but have nothing in my hands. The wealth we have created has been stolen by the bosses. They and their families are rich, but we have to live in hostels while our families suffer (Makhoba 1984:3)

The description above depicts the conditions that were prevalent in mine compounds during apartheid. At Amandelbult, these old compound structures were renovated and remodelled into SAVs (Figures 6.11–6.12). The conditions in the SAVs have been improved significantly compared to the conditions in the compounds during apartheid. By 2015, the three SAVs at Amandelbult mine, called Mlanje, Tumela and Dishaba, had less residents per room. These former compounds or hostels were upgraded into shared

apartments (Figure 6.6). About 3–4 persons share a three or four bedroom flat. Thus, each worker has their own room and own bed, and they share a living room, a toilet and a bathroom. This represents a significant transformation considering that during apartheid up to 20 mineworkers were accommodated in the same space. This move has gone a long way to restore the dignity of mineworkers. Their privacy is enhanced by the fact that each room has a fitted door and each occupant is given their own set of keys. Inside the room are metal lockers where the workers keep their own possessions such as clothes and other smaller items (Figure 6.7). The windows of these rooms are also fitted with curtains to ensure privacy. At Mlanje and Tumela, the walls had recently been painted and the floor tiles had just been replaced. Each flat is now fitted with a geyser, which provides running hot water for bathing (Figure 6.13). Very good hygiene standards have been set in the SAVs. The toilets are fitted with clean toilet seats and a handwash basin with hot- and cold-water taps (Figures 6.8–6.10). The toilet cubicles are kept clean and were recently renovated and refurbished. Furthermore, SAV residents are provided with free and reliable electricity supply.



Figure 6.5 Satellite map showing the Amandelbult mine complex. The area shown contains the mine offices, the training centre, the mine hospital, SAVs, company-owned houses and the golf club (Source: Google Earth)

Figure 6.6 Converted hostel that is now a flat apartment

Figure 6.7 Metal lockers and a single bed

Figure 6.8 Mlanje SAV: Toilet and basin with hot- and cold-water taps

Figure 6.9 Bathroom: Shower, fitted curtain and handwash basin

Figure 6.10 Urinary at Tumela

Figure 6.11 Life inside Tumela SAV with tower light

Figure 6.12 Mlanje SAV exterior view

The rooms have a small table and chair where occupants can sit and enjoy a late-night snack, study or read. The shared living rooms have larger round tables with three or four chairs where the occupants of the flat can come together and pass time. An interesting observation is that on top of these large tables the mulabalaba game is drawn and many workers can be seen playing the game during their leisure time (Figure 6.25). In addition to playing the mulabalaba game, loud music can be heard playing throughout the facilities from very early in the morning till late at night. In addition to radio, TV antennas can be seen on the roofs of some of the flats. This indicates that workers living in these SAVs have unprecedented choices of entertainment. They can stay connected with the rest of the world by listening to radio and watching TV. The workers who live in these SAVs appreciate the improvements that have been made. This is what some of them said:

> I have seen the compounds go through significant transformation. When I came here in 2001, we used to be 18–20 in one room, we had no privacy; now each one has their own room. (Mandla; 5/8/2015)

> The rules have changed over the years. Now we have access to TV, there are TV sets in the dining room, and the beer hall so we can watch sports, news, and movies sometimes. It is also allowed to install DSTV or a normal antenna and watch TV in your room. Almost everyone here has a radio; you can play music or listen to the news. During the days of apartheid, us, Blacks could never dream of having these luxuries. (Thabiso; 5/8/2015)

It is striking to note that some SAV dwellers that have been living in the compounds for decades opt to oscillate between the SAVs and the informal settlements near the mine. This is reminiscent of what was happening in the 1900s in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand when mine owners encouraged the establishment of large locations, or what came to be known as ‘tin towns’, near the mines. As a result, Black mineworkers ‘rested’ in these shanty towns for two to six weeks before returning to the compounds (see Allen 1992:237; Jeeves & Crush 1995:4; Turrell 1984:74). The subtle difference here is that now the mineworkers make a conscious decision to stay in the SAV at a cost to the mine but also move their families to stay, albeit temporarily, in the nearby informal settlements. Thus, they can spend some time with their families and move back to the

SAVs. They further hold the view that was first promulgated and heralded by the De Beers management during the colonial era that they are better fed and housed in the upgraded compounds than they are outside. Here is an example:

> Some were quick to leave the compounds when management began offering the living-out allowance, only to find that life is much harder out there. They struggle to save any money, buying your own food is costly, also there are water problems in the informal settlements, let alone the lack of service delivery. That's why I chose to stay here. I have lived in this compound since 1989, and I have seen all the changes over the years. Right now it's the best place for me. My wife comes from time to time. I built her a place in the informal settlement nearby, so when she comes here she stays there and I spend the nights there when she is around. When she goes back home, I then move back in the compound. (Siphe; 5/8/2015)

However, some participants were quick to make the point that although there have been some positive changes in the SAVs, there are still remnants of the past that they want the mine to do away with. Below are some issues that they raised:

> We get time to visit anyone who lives outside the SAV, weekends, especially months end we are free to do that…. There is a problem though, I want to tell you the truth now, when my wife was sick, they only gave her seven days to come here and receive treatment, only seven days! The seven days is not enough, because I wanted her to be here so that I could monitor her recovery, to see if the medication prescribed by the doctors is really helping. How can I do that in just seven days? They only give seven days to a visitor, that's the main problem here [SAV]. We wish that can be changed; they can give us at least one month or one and a half months. (Mandla; 5/8/2015)

Figure 6.13 Each flat has a geyser installed for hot water

Figure 6.14 Tumela's containers for extra accommodation

Workers living in SAVs are provided by the mine with three meals a day, breakfast, lunch and dinner. Efforts are being made to provide them with nutritiously balanced meals. Within each SAV facility there are large dining halls that can accommodate the large numbers of workers. Workers have a choice to either eat their meals in the dining room or to take their food to their rooms. Basic utensils and metal plates are made available for

the workers to use. Dining halls are fitted with tables and chairs and large TV screens where the diners can watch news or sports (Figure 6.18). During the time I stayed at the mine for field work, I observed the storage rooms where food supplies are kept and the way the meals are prepared and served to the occupants of the SAV. I also enjoyed the meals at the Mlanje SAV where I was hosted. The meals were nutritiously balanced and served in large quantities (Figure 6.15–6.16). The occupants of the Mlanje SAV had positive comments about the food and I could see how happy and excited they were in the dining hall as they enjoyed their meals. However, some of the occupants at Tumela SAV expressed their dislike for the food that they were getting. Although the food itself is nutritious, they complained that it was not well cooked. One of the occupants went as far as complaining that the cooking standards were poor compared to what is provided for the workers who live in the single quarters. This is what one of the participants had to say:

> We have a dining hall where we get three meals a day. The problem is that the food is not nice. We have been complaining about the food, but nothing is changing. It's not about the food itself; the problem is how they cook it; It is not tasty (Temba: 5/8/2015).

The chefs who prepare the meals for SAV residents have a different view of the food. They believe that the food quality has improved over the years and are aware that mass cooked food will not taste the same as small-scale cooked food. When the SAV manager at Tumelo was taking me through a tour of the kitchen and pantry, the chef and kitchen staff were uneasy to see me (Figure 6.17). When I later had an opportunity to interview the chef, she told me that she was concerned that I was a health inspector who had arrived unannounced. However, she was confident that the food they prepare is of good standard. She claimed the following:

> We cook for a lot of people, and they all have short window period to come to the dining hall and eat their meals. As you can see, these men do very difficult manual work, so they eat a lot [laughing]. We try our best to change the menu and methods of cooking, and we are pleased with the results … Of course, it is impossible to please everyone all the time, so sometimes maybe

> a few of them are not happy and they complain. We can only try to remain professional and improve the next meal. It's the nature of our work. (Thato; 5/8/2015)

At Mlanje SAV, the dining hall is located next to the main entrance. Thus, it is the first building you see upon entering the SAV, and the chefs are proud of the food they cook.

Figure 6.15 Pap and fish for lunch (large servings)

Figure 6.16 Mineworkers' favourite drink, which is nutritious

Figure 6.17 Rice ready to serve in the kitchen



Figure 6.18 The dining hall just before lunch at Tumela SAV. It's a large dining hall and has decent dining tables and chairs. It also shows the large TV screen on the wall.

The workers living in the SAVs play key roles as consumers. For instance, near the SAVs there are clothing stores that sell trendy clothing. Popular clothing brands such as Adidas, Lee, Levi's, Nike, Soviet and Puma are sold in these shops for exorbitant prices (Figure 6.27). Each SAV has a large drinking hall. In and around the drinking hall are numerous seats and tables to accommodate as many patrons as possible (Figures 6.21, 6.23). The drinking hall is also fitted with large TV screens to entertain patrons (Figure 6.22). These drinking halls are busiest at night and during weekends. Inside the drinking halls are billiards tables and other video game equipment where workers can pay to play (Figures 6.19–6.20). Another striking feature of the SAVs is that there are designated barbeque areas, thus workers can buy meat and braai inside the SAVs (Figure 6.24).

Figure 6.19 Billiards in the drinking hall for SAV dwellers for recreation

Figure 6.20 TV and other games for the entertainment of SAV dwellers

Figure 6.21 Entertainment area

Figure 6.22 Clean- shed for Tumela SAV residents to sit and watch TV together.

Figure 6.23 Extra seating areas around the drinking hall

Figure 6.24 Thatched gazebo where SAV dwellers can braai if they can buy their own meat

Figure 6.25 Shared sitting room for three with a Mulabalaba game on the table

The interview excerpt below reveals how mineworkers living in these SAVs struggle to maintain a healthy work-life balance even though the mining company has made

provisions for recreational facilities (see Rogally 2009). The back-breaking physical labour they do as well as the long working hours leaves them extremely tired and with no time to enjoy meaningful recreation.

> We have a soccer field here, but I personally don't play. I am too old for that. The work we do is very tiring. For leisure I prefer to come here and play mulabalaba. We can play till late no problem. (Mandla; 5/8/2015)

When it comes to education and training, there are Adult Basic Education centres inside the SAVs. At Mlanje SAV, for example, there are two classrooms equipped with tables, chairs and books provided by the mine for use by SAV dwellers (Figures 6.32–6.33). Apart from the Adult Basic Education, the mine has a central training centre where workers receive further job-related training (Figures 6.30–6.31). There is also a hospital at the mine (Figures 6.28–6.29).

Although, the interiors of the former compounds have been remodelled to enhance the living conditions of mineworkers, the exterior features and structures remain as they were during apartheid. Despite relative freedom of movement, the perimeters surrounding the SAVs are fenced (Figure 6.26), and they all have single access points that are constantly watched and controlled by security officers. In addition, the occupants of SAVs are separated from their families. Some of the occupants complain about not being with families.

Figure 6.26 Fenced-in SAV dwellers

Figure 6.27 Mine stores selling designer clothing

The mine also provides other social facilities for its employees. For instance, this is what some of the participants had to say about the health and training facilities at the mine:

> Yes, we have a mine hospital here. There are no problems. We get medical aid cover from the company, and the only problem is that we cannot get our families here for treatment when they are sick. They live in rural areas with no access to good medical facilities. (Mandla; 5/8/2015)

> We have ABET [Adult Basic Education and Training] here. Those who didn't finish their schooling are given the opportunity to do so. But I think I am too old to go back to school …. (Temba; 5/8/2015)

In view of the above, it is hard to deny the fact that the mining firm in question has responded positively to the call by the post-apartheid state as well as organised labour to contribute meaningfully to social development and the empowerment of Black mineworkers.

Figure 6.28 Main entrance to the mine hospital

Figure 6.29 Sign showing the direction of the mine hospital

Figure 6.30 Workers leaving the training centre

Figure 6.31 Sign showing the direction of the mine's training centre



Figure 6.32 Adult Education Centre designed to improve literacy among mineworkers, the majority of whom did not finish schooling

Figure 6.33 Adult Basic Education and Training classroom and extra desks for Mlanje SAV dwellers

A close look at **Error! Reference source not found.** reveals the words 'Mlanje Hostel Adult Education Centre'. This is an interesting observation. In official documents, the mine management is at pains to emphasise that these are no longer hostels but SAVs. That shift or name change is symbolically important and supposedly demonstrates a clear disjuncture from the now infamous compound system and a move towards suitable accommodation for Black mineworkers in particular. Yet there are still many reminders of this painful past within these SAVs. This invokes the following supposition by Lefebvre (1974:88):

> The principle of the interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces has one very helpful result, for it means that each fragment of space subjected to analysis masks not just one social relationship but a host of them that analysis can potentially disclose.

Thus, the absolute space that colonial and apartheid capital designed and created to advance its accumulation is still serving similar purposes for capital in post-apartheid South Africa. There is also a church (Figure 6.34), security and police services and a post office (Figure 6.35) near the mine. These social services were recurring themes in the interviews with mineworkers living in SAVs. For instance, some of the participants had this to say:

> There is a big church on the other side, people go there, but they do not have my church nearby, so I don't go to church. (Siphe; 5/8/2015)

> No, there is no crime here. No, nothing, the only time there is disorder and chaos is if there is strike going on. Sometimes we must force the management to listen to us you know.... (Thabiso; 5/8/2015)

Figure 6.34 One church building that is open to all mine employees living in company-owned housing near the mine

Figure 6.35 The Post Office at Mlanje SAV

At this juncture, it is important to highlight the fact that the compound, which is symbolic of the mining spatial order during the colonial and apartheid era, has survived to date. Even though there have been refurbishments, the numbers of occupants have been reduced and the infamous control system was abolished, the new SAVs stand as relics from a previous spatial order. However, in comparison to what was experienced by Black

mineworkers during the previous oppressive regimes the new developments are a welcome sign of progress. In terms of absolute space, there are marked changes from the previous spatial order, for example, the walls and floors of the SAVs have been painted, workers' rooms have been installed with curtains, there are shared living rooms, and there are also clean and dignified toilets and dining rooms. These changes go a long way to improve the living conditions of Black mineworkers. Nevertheless, there are still complaints from SAV occupants about being separated from their families. Although these facilities are SAVs, all the participants in this study who live in SAVs are married and thus separated from their families.

The following section looks at another feature of the scorecard spatial order that survived from the old spatial order under apartheid, the single and married quarters.

6.4 Single and married quarters Amandelbult

At Amandelbult mine, AAP provides its single technicians and middle management with neat free-standing flats built on the mine premises (Figure 6.36). Access to this area is tightly controlled with boom gates and security officers always on duty. Almost all the single quarters have satellite dishes installed, which is an indication of the affluence of those who occupy them. They are also fitted with solar panels to provide back-up power in case of power cuts. The mine also provide workers who live in single quarters with three meals a day. They have their own kitchen and dining hall fitted with modern features.

Figure 6.36 Single quarters for technicians (cars, satellite TV, solar power for back up)

Figure 6.37 Single quarters with a private power substation independent from unreliable municipal power supply

In addition to the single quarters there are two locations where the mine built family houses for its employees. These villages were built during apartheid and are located very close to the mine shafts (Figure 6.43). One of them, called Rithabile village, was originally meant for select skilled Black mineworkers (Figures 6.38–6.41). It is important to note that it is located close to one of the SAVs (Mlanje), which accommodated thousands of compounded Black miners during apartheid. Thus, during apartheid there was geographic separation of skilled workers by race. Rithabile village was also built with its own sports and leisure facilities as well as a large church building that stands right at the entrance to the village. Post-apartheid race is no longer the determining factor when housing is allocated, but it is important to note that the spatial separation of the two villages is still intact and enabled by the physical architecture designed during apartheid.

Figure 6.38 Rithabile village: Family housing formerly reserved for skilled Black mineworkers only, separated from both the SAVs and family housing for white mineworkers.

Figure 6.39 Rithabile village flats in Nkatau Street

Figure 6.40 Rithabile village: The executive cars indicate the status and rank of the employees who are allocated these houses

Figure 6.41 Rithabile village has large houses surrounded by beautiful vegetation

Figure 6.42 Secondary school that benefits from Amplats

The other married quarters village that was built for white workers is located near the single quarters described above, which were also built for white workers. It's important to note again that race is no longer used to allocate houses at the mine, but these family houses are designated for senior management officials (Figure 6.44). The house designs and services in these areas are at par with what you would find in upmarket suburbs anywhere in the country. The houses in this village and the single quarters were planned in such a way that the occupants could share several facilities provided for them by the mining company (Figure 6.46–6.49). For example, there are commonly shared sports fields. These include a football pitch, a golf course, a swimming pool, tennis courts and a netball facility. A luxuriant, thatched, state-of-the art recreational centre is also available and senior mine employees and their families can exclusively enjoy a gym facility, change rooms and restaurant facilities here. In addition, there are playgrounds for children that are fitted with swings and other play equipment (Figure 6.45).

Figure 6.43 Company-owned family housing right next to the mine shaft

Figure 6.44 Big houses that reflect employees' seniority and status

Figure 6.45 Playgrounds for the children of employees living in company-owned family houses near the mine. This is not far away from the SAVs where thousands of men live without their families.

Figure 6.46 Multi-facility sports club that includes a tennis courts, gym, golf course and a swimming pool

Figure 6.47 An exclusive club for senior employees who live in the company-owned family houses and single quarters

Figure 6.48 A restaurant adjacent to the sports club

Figure 6.49 Golf course

At this point it is evident that mineworkers who live in company-owned housing do not have the same services at their disposal. To compare, those who live in married and single quarters fare much better that their counterparts living in SAVs. During apartheid, these facilities were reserved for white workers only and later for skilled Black mineworkers. Post-apartheid class or rank at work has become the fault line. It is disquieting to note that while highly ranked mineworkers are provided with huge luxurious houses, state-of-the-art sports clubs, including a golf course, playgrounds for their children and free transport for their children to go to school and back, SAV dwellers are separated from their families. Furthermore, geographically these married and single quarters are literally a stone's throw away from the SAVs. Another interesting observation from an absolute space point of view is that these married and single quarters are also fenced off and there is a security check point at the entrance to ensure that only residents and approved guests can enter these premises. Thus, in essence these facilities can be compared to gated communities in upmarket suburbs.

The following section looks at new housing schemes designed to break away from the old spatial order by building houses for mineworkers in already existing communities. This is a key feature of the scorecard spatial order.

6.5 Community integrated family housing

Recipients of the HOA purchase houses with the assistance of AAP in well-established communities. One such location was recently built in Northam, just over 10 km from the Amandelbult mine. This project consists of 310 housing units in a prime location in the town among existing houses. Northam Extension 6 houses are in a strategic area (Figures 6.50–6.53). For instance, it is connected to the major road network in the city, which makes it easy for workers to drive to and from their workplace. In addition, there are facilities, such as private doctor's rooms, schools, and shopping malls close by. However, at the onset of the project there was no basic infrastructure in the area. Consequently, the Thabazimbi municipality was reluctant to grant AAP permission to build houses. Their main concern was that the oxidation ponds used for sewage had reached maximum capacity. Thus, adding more houses would have resulted in an environmental and health catastrophe for the residents of Northam. Thus, AAP had to initiate the process of

conducting a feasibility study, which cost AAP R2.5 million, to determine the need to build a sanitation plant for the entire Northam community. Once the feasibility study was done, the Thabazimbi municipality, AAP and other stakeholders secured the funding to build a new Northam Wastewater Treatment Plant. Thereafter, AAP was granted permission to build houses in Northam Extension 6. According to AAP (2014c), further contributions by AAP to this project were as follows:

- R2.5 million to connect Breaking New Ground (houses in Northam Extension 11) to the sewage pipeline that goes to the oxidation ponds
- R0.5 million to the development of the Thabazimbi municipality housing sector plan (renewable annually)
- R9.3 million for the acquisition of the 310 stands
- R21.3 million for the installation of services for the 310 housing units
- R8 million towards the building of an intersection and entrance road into Northam Extension 6 for the benefit of the entire community
- R23 million towards the construction of the Northam Wastewater Treatment Plant

Figure 6.50 Northam Extension 6 houses

Figure 6.51 Entrance to the recently built family houses in Northam Extension 6. The compulsory PPE sign is still hanging on the main gate

Figure 6.52 Aerial view of the Northam houses under construction

Figure 6.53 Unoccupied house at Northam Extension 6

The housing project at Northam Extension 6 is equipped with all the necessary basic services such as a good road network, running water and electricity (Figure 6.54). While showing me around their houses with a sense of pride, participants said the following:

> We have running water and electricity. We pay the bills at the end of the months. I can't ask for more than that. (Tebogo; 6/8/2015)

> Look, I can't complain. We have everything we need here. All the services are provided, i.e. running water, electricity, and a safe place to raise my young children. This is our first ever home that we own. I was tired of renting, helping others to pay their own mortgages. (Kwaito; 12/11/2020)

Interestingly, during the protracted strike in 2014–2015 some of the beneficiaries of this housing scheme refused to pay their bills. They argued that the company should pay their water and electricity bills. In essence they were demanding that they get the same treatment as their counterparts who live in company-owned houses. One of the human resource managers responsible for housing had this to say as he was requesting that we reschedule our appointment for a meeting:

> I have to run. I am driving to Northam. You see these people … I and the company went out of our way to help them buy houses. Most of them would not have been able to raise enough money on their own to buy a house. Now they have houses but are refusing to pay for the utilities. I have to go there and fix this mess. They want everything to be done for them. (Sifiso; 17/7/2015)

Figure 6.54 Neat rows of houses with electricity installed and tarred roads in good condition

The houses in Northam Extension 6 were equipped with all the basic social infrastructure and services, including, tarred roads, electricity, sewerage and rubbish collection (Figure 6.55–6.56). However, the occupants and owners of these houses were concerned about the long-term environmental impact of the oxidation ponds that were installed. Concerned residents said the following in an interview:

> The only problem is the sewerage. We can flush for now, but more work still needs to be done around that. Management said this year they will finalise the negotiations with the municipality; negotiations are at an advanced stage. (Tebogo; 6/8/2015)

> Initially, we had a challenge with waste treatment in the area. I almost thought we were dupped by the company and were sold property in an area not suitable for human settlement. Now everything is sorted, and we are happy

> with our house. The municipality and the company had to work together to increase the capacity of the waste management plant. (Zwane; 15/11/2020)

This was confirmed by a senior human resources manager responsible for housing who told me the following:

> To be honest, that's the only issue we have here. The location is the best we could get for them, but there is this minor issue with the sewerage system. It's really beyond what the company is responsible for, but we have pledged and set aside significant amounts of money for the problem to be fixed. (Thabani; 28/8/2015)

In addition to the completed 310 housing units in Northam Extension 6, there are other active and planned housing projects that will benefit AAP's employees at the Amandelbult mining complex. The planned projects are as follows:

- 188 houses in Northam Extension 8
- 2 675 houses in Northam Extensions 12 and 13

The following projects are already active or under construction:

- 680 houses in Northam Extension 17
- 89 houses in Thabazimbi Extensions 18 and 22 (AAP, 2014c).

Clearly AAP has ambitious plans to transform Black mineworkers' living conditions through homeownership schemes. However, as will be shown later, there are challenges along the way.

Figure 6.55 Street view inside the Northam housing project

Figure 6.56 Mineworkers' children playing in the streets of Northam Extension 6

It is interesting to note that there is already a strong sense of community developing even though the project was only completed recently. Some of the participants had this to say about the neighbourhood:

> I like my neighbours. This one [pointing to the house to the left] is a Xhosa, and I know all my immediate neighbours … If I am having a barbeque, I just play my music, not too high, I know I have neighbours and I can also invite them to come and eat with us or they can also invite us for their barbeque. (Rulani; 6/8/2015)

> We try to encourage unity as a community here. We have so many things in common. We are all first-time homeowners here, so it is important to share information, especially on how to manage the mortgage and so on. We all work for the same company as well and generally everyone wants this place to remain clean and crime free. These days though we keep in touch mainly though WhatsApp, as you know this Covid-19 pandemic makes it impossible to gather in groups, but basically we all know one another here. (Khulani; 12/11/2020)

Figure 6.57 Northam shopping mall and an open market

Figure 6.58 Some of the national and international retail shops in Northam

The location of the Northam Extension 6 houses is also strategic with regards to access to spaces of consumption. There is a shopping mall adjacent to this housing project and this is appreciated by the mineworkers and their families who have moved into these houses (Figures 6.57–6.59). Some of the participants had this to say:

> There is a big shopping mall just across the road here. All the shops that you get in a big city are here and the banks to. So we have everything nearby. Those people who were critical of the company for building these houses here now regret that they missed an opportunity to own a house in a prime location. Everything is here, and it is a good place to raise my family. (Kundani; 6/8/2015)

> Having everything nearby is very helpful, especially now with Covid-19. You can avoid travelling long distances and crowded metropolitan cities like Pretoria and Johannesburg. Those are really the hot spots for Covid. We have had very few cases here, and I think the company has been proactive and take the disease seriously, but also it is easier to shelter in place here. (Twala; 15/11/2020)

Figure 6.59 Banking services and more retail shops in Northam in close proximity to the Northam Extension 6 housing project

Participants were also happy to have fast-food outlets and restaurants nearby (Figure 6.60). One participant stated the following:

> There are restaurants and fast-food outlets in town, so it's not a problem. We have KFC, Wimpy and McDonalds around here. So, my family and I don't really miss living in a big city …. (Tebogo; 6/8/2015)

Figure 6.60 KFC and other popular fast-food outlets are located near the Northam Extension 6 houses

Figure 6.61 Public transportation by road: Public transport is readily available in Northam, linking this small mining town to other major towns in the country like Polokwane, Rustenburg, Pretoria and Johannesburg.

Other important social facilities available include educational and religious facilities. This is what some of the participants had to say about these:

> There is a primary school nearby, just 4 km away in town. My kids get to learn together with the other children in this community, which will help them to settle in and feel that they belong here. (Tebogo; 6/8/2015)

> There is a church nearby, on the way out. The community here is very religious. If you come here at the weekend, the church will be teeming with people and praise and worship music can be heard from here …. (Tshepo; 6/8/2015)

In addition, interviewees were satisfied with the levels of security in this community. One of them put it this way:

> No crime complaints since I moved here, I have never heard anyone complaining—no gumba gumbas [illegal vendors]—we have peace of mind here. When you talk to the people who have been in this mining industry long enough you understand that we are living a dream right now. People used to live like pigs while slaving at the mines in the past. But now we have homes that we own … I am grateful for that. (Tebogo; 6/8/2015)

The homeownership schemes are to be commended. It shows that real transformation of the lives of Black mineworkers is possible. According to Lefebvre (1974:59–60; quote cited at the beginning of this chapter), transformation or changing society is only possible when an appropriate space has been produced. Hence to transform from spatial order in mining settlements require that both the state and capital be committed to provide the necessary resources to construct or produce a new spatial order. In this regard, it is crucial to acknowledge that in the project described above, the mining company has been working together with the state to build family houses for mineworkers that have the potential to transform their lives for the better. Huge amounts of money have been invested into this project. However, it is important to note that this transformation is still slow paced in the mining sector in general. At Amandelbult it is clear that only a small percentage of Black mineworkers are provided with or can afford family housing, compared to thousands who live in SAVs and informal settlements. This criticism has

always been levelled against the mining industry with regards to finding equitable solutions to the housing question for Black mineworkers (see Allen 1992:237; Jeeves & Crush 1995:4).

The next section deals with another critical feature of the scorecard spatial order, perhaps one that was unintended.

6.6 Living-out allowances and informal settlements

> I work here in Boksburg but my spirit is in Mahlabathini. My spirit is there because I come from there and my father was born there (Mandlenkosi Makhoba 1984).

This excerpt reveals one of the reasons Black mineworkers are reluctant to buy a house in the mining towns where they work. A strong spiritual connection with their rural roots still plays a major role when deciding where to build or buy a house. Many mineworkers who receive a LOA from AAP choose to reside in the informal settlements mushrooming in and around the Amandelbult mine complex. According to the Thabazimbi Local Municipality (2011), there are at least five informal settlements, namely Schilpadnest, also known as Smash Block, Jabulani, Donkerpoort, Thabazimbi and Regorogile. Schilpadnest is located very close to Amandelbult. The Thabazimbi Local Municipality (2011) describe it as "reaching alarming proportions as no formal infrastructure service are in place". The Thabazimbi municipality together with other stakeholders have failed in their attempts to resettle the occupants of Schilpadnest or to formalise the area for residential purposes. Jabulani informal settlement also has no infrastructure services, but the Thabazimbi municipality supplies water by truck. Donkerpoort is in Thabazimbi on a part of the farm Donkerpoort on entering Thabazimbi. The Thabazimbi informal settlement is close to a stormwater channel running from the Regorogile River, which poses a danger during floods in the rain season. Regorogile informal settlement is located in Regorogile Extension 3 and on parts of the Rosseauspoort and Apiesdoorn farms. Some workers still live in the rural areas near Amandelbult, such as Sentrum.

A representative from the local municipality explained the challenges they face this way:

> The demand for housing far exceeds available resources, especially serviced land, suitable for human settlements. We also face challenges with uncontrolled illegal business activities, lack of land management and disposal mechanisms, growing informal settlements, unresolved land claims and various land use transgressions. This makes our task very difficult, but we are not folding our hands. We have developed a multidimensional housing strategy to tackle this. There [is] also a shortage of staff in critical positions such as town planning and civil and building expertise. (Thabazimbi Local Municipality representative; 18/12/2020)

However, the local municipality is not tackling this daunting challenge on its own. They receive support from other provincial and national government departments, as the representative explained:

> We have support from other government departments as well. For example, CoGHSTA [the Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs] has been supportive by making funds available for infrastructure installation. This will assist in addressing some of infrastructure challenges that we are faced with in some of our settlements. The Department of Public Works donated erven 1 221 and 1 370 to the municipality to cater for middle-income households, we are waiting for transfer process of these erven. This I believe will help relieve some of the pressure of housing demand since we have many mineworkers who technically do not qualify for RDP houses [they earn more than R3 500]. We still need more land need to address the housing backlog. (Thabazimbi Local Municipality Representative; 18/12/2020)

During a research trip to Thabazimbi's townships and informal settlements at the height of the longest strike in the platinum sector in 2015, it was striking to observe many donkey-drawn carts crisscrossing the dirty roads delivering precious drinking water to residents. Figures 6.62–6.64 show how the situation looked at the time.

Figure 6.62 Thabazimbi informal settlement (Source: Getty images)

Figure 6.63 Many mineworkers who take the LOAs end up in the informal settlement with no basic services such as running water and proper toilets (Source: Getty images)

Figure 6.64 Fetching water to sell to mineworkers dwelling in the informal settlements using donkey-drawn carts (Source: Getty images)

In its plan of action document titled 'NUM: 10-year plan 2010–2020', the NUM was very concerned with the poor living conditions of mineworkers. It noted the following:

> By 2009 more than 65% of mineworkers were still staying in single-sex hostels. These hostels symbolize the legacy of apartheid and the migrant labour system. This is despite the introduction of the Mining Charter in 2002 which stipulated that by 2007 50% of hostels should be converted to Family Units (NUM 2010).

Despite taking part in drafting the Mining Charter, the NUM still felt that mining companies were finding loopholes in the system and deliberately slowed down progress. It was also critical of the state's role in ensuring that its members had access to affordable housing. The union's position was that the government should take an 'active interest', without necessarily wholly owning in the housing sector. The document added the following:

> The mining industry has done very little to change the situation and the following is the current situation:
>
> - slow conversion of hostels into family units
> - non-availability of land
> - total shifting of housing responsibility to government by companies
> - mushrooming of informal settlement around mines
> - pleading of poverty by mining houses
> - development of housing projects for rental instead of purchasing
> - members do not qualify for housing bonds or fall out of the threshold of government subsidy (NUM 2010).

Clearly some of the barriers to the provision of affordable housing identified by the NUM are complex and require different societal stakeholders to work together to resolve them. Unavailability of suitable land for housing and the fact that most mineworkers in the platinum sector do not qualify for RDP housing and yet at the same time cannot afford to buy houses without government or company subsidies further compound the issue. An NUM official had the following to say about the issue in an interview:

> Generally, from the NUM's point of view, what we are saying is that there is lot more that can be done by both the mining industry and the government. We have been stressing the need for multiple housing solutions for our people for a long time. It is not right to see so many of our members living in squalor conditions, especially now during this Covid-19 pandemic. We are losing too many mineworkers to this disease, and if look at it, it boils down to their living conditions. Some of them live in areas where there is no running water or proper toilets so the level of hygiene there is not up to standard. Of course, we are not saying nothing has been done because if you look in the past our people were living like rats, 30–40 people in one room. We have successfully fought against that and our people have now a level decency they deserve in the compounds. But we are saying the progress is too slow and we have heard too many excuses. Often, we are told that there is no land to build houses, but the mines own a lot of land and the local municipality also has land or at least the power to force those who are not releasing land that is not in use to do so. That is what frustrates the workers, and you see some of them start informal settlements right next to the mine, on land owned by the mine. We do not encourage that, but it is a form of silent protest. As a union we remain committed to finding a solution through dialogue with all the relevant stake holders. (NUM official; 29/12/2020)

The rapid growth of informal settlements near mining operations is not an entirely new phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, this was the case in the early 1900s at the gold mines of the Witwatersrand when mine management actively encouraged the establishment of large locations for Black mineworkers, which came to be known as 'tin towns', at or near the mines (see Allen 1992:237; Jeeves & Crush 1995:4; Turrell 1984:74). However, what is significant about this current rise in informal settlements near the mines is that most of the people living in these settlements are mineworkers who have moved out of the compounds. Lowering the number of compound occupants is a positive move; however, if workers are moving from compounds to live in squalid conditions in informal settlements, then the problem is not solved. The problem is further compounded by the

shift towards more subcontracted workers who are more likely to end up dwelling in these informal settlements (see Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011; Rajak 2012).

According to the Thabazimbi Local Municipality (2020:132), despite putting in place an elaborate housing strategy backed by the mining firms, the municipality is faced with a shortage of suitable land to accommodate the growth of human settlements. A preliminary analysis revealed that the available municipal land will not be enough to accommodate the current backlog and future housing demand in the medium to long term. Consequently, the council mandated the municipal management to start a municipal land audit and possibly acquisition land for housing.

Land shortage is a real constraint for the municipality. For example, despite receiving funding from the Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs for the 2016/2017 financial year to build 300 low-cost housing units, as of 2020, Thabazimbi Municipality had no land to build on. In total, the municipality reported a housing backlog of 3 500. Of these, the unavailability of land negatively affected 2 079 low-income households and 1 500 middle-income households from getting subsidies from the Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs housing scheme (Thabazimbi Local Municipality 2020:132).

6.7 Transforming mineworkers lives through housing schemes

Arguably, AAP has been at the forefront of contributing towards the creation of vibrant and sustainable human settlements. In recent years, the mine has put forth efforts to build new houses for workers away from the mining operation. Since 2008, the company 'resolved' to assist its employees by facilitating the building of 20 000 housing units in a 10-year period. On 13 November 2008, AAP signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Department of Housing to facilitate a public-private partnership to deliver housing and integrated human settlements. The following targets were set and agreed upon by both parties;

1) To build 12 000 housing units in the North-West Province; and
2) To build 8 000 housing in Limpopo Province.

The National Department of Housing made the following key undertakings:

1) Agree that Anglo Platinum Limited would pilot the employer assisted housing programme based on the potential projects mentioned above;
2) Facilitate meetings between financial institutions and other sectors, including the construction sector, to ensure affordable housing products for the beneficiaries; and
3) Support and facilitate the fast tracking and relief of bottleneck(s) to delivery with Anglo Platinum Limited and other parties.

On the other hand, Anglo Platinum Limited undertook to do the following;

1) Identify all suitable land for housing currently in the ownership of Anglo Platinum Limited and undertake appraisal of such proposals in Northam and Rustenburg;
2) Negotiate secondary funding from banks/agents for the construction and delivery of the housing programme;
3) Design and develop financial models that allow transfer of housing units to the beneficiaries; and
4) Project manage the complete process of housing delivery.

According to AAP (2014c), on 17 April 2009, AAP handed over purchased land for the construction of 1 000 housing units as part of the Serelang Integrated Human Settlement in Rustenburg. This was a historic milestone for the partnership between government and mining firms to provide affordable housing to thousands mineworkers. The plan known as Breaking New Ground is aimed at eradicating informal settlements in and around mining towns. According to the Platinum Weekly (2009), the housing department spent R128.2 million and completed 3 200 Breaking New Ground housing units in the area, and Anglo Platinum Limited contributed R23 million towards bulk infrastructure for the project. This was done before the publication of the Housing and Living Condition Standards by the Minister of Minerals and Energy mentioned earlier (Government of South Africa 2009).

On 4 March 2013, AAP and the Limpopo Provincial Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlements and Traditional Affairs signed a memorandum of understanding on a partnership to implement FLISP (Limpopo Provincial Government & Anglo Platinum 2013). The memorandum acknowledges that section 26(1) of the South

African Constitution (1996) provides that everyone has the right to adequate housing. Although FLISP was approved in 2005, there has been several operational and institutional impediments to its implementation. Thus, the purpose of this agreement was to improve cooperation between AAP and the Limpopo provincial government in the development of housing and integrated sustainable human settlement through FLISP. The responsibilities of AAP are stated as the following:

1) Initiate and manage programmes aimed at encouraging and promoting increased engagement of the banking sector;
2) Initiate partnerships with government to facilitate a partnership within the human settlements sector for development of integrated sustainable human settlement;
3) Provide innovative and affordable housing solutions to the low-income housing market; and
4) Facilitate housing finance accessible for lower- to middle-income households in South Africa.

To enable the Limpopo provincial government to monitor the progress of this programme, it was also agreed that AAP would report on a quarterly basis to the provincial department on the implementation of FLISP and provide a reconciliation report on disbursements of the funds to lenders.

These efforts are noticed and appreciated by the local municipality. The Thabazimbi Local Municipality's representative put it this way:

> We regard the mining companies in our municipal area as key partners. They all play important roles, especially with the development of sustainable human settlements. For example, AAP built houses in Northam for their employees and also contributed funds to build the new Northam Wastewater Treatment Plant. They have some of best healthcare facilities in the municipality, there are three mine hospitals, and contribute towards building and funding schools among other things. (Thabazimbi Local Municipality Representative; 18/12/2020)

AAP had planned to construct 1 329 houses in the Limpopo province for the financial year 2013–2014 but only 500 were built and handed over to qualifying employees (AAP

2014a). These included 310 housing units in Northam Extension 6, and the rest were built in Thabazimbi Extension 18 and 22. There were a few temporary and long-term factors that hampered the completion of the projects. The instability caused by the five-month strike in 2014 had an impact on all the housing projects. There were also issues with regards to trade union rivalry, and turf wars had huge consequences on housing delivery during 2014 (see Chinguno 2015; Sinwell 2015). As a result, all major commercial banks were reluctant to advance home loans to mineworkers after the protracted strike. In addition, most locations where mines located the housing projects are faced with huge backlogs and lack of basic infrastructure.

Some challenges, however, are much more difficult to solve and more long term in nature. For instance, the mine employees in the lower category of salary ranges are not credit worthy and consequently it is difficult for them to be granted mortgage loans. Additionally, most mine employees lack financial literacy and have not yet learnt to understand the mortgage loans process. Another challenge is that most of the mineworkers, especially the older generation, have a secondary home in rural villages in major labour-sending provinces such as the Eastern Cape, and are thus reluctant to relocate to urban areas near the mines. They prefer to rent a decent housing unit rather than pursue homeownership. However, the younger generation of mineworkers is very mobile and keen to relocate closer to the workplace and buy their own houses (AAP, (2014a).

The mining communities in general also benefit from the bulk infrastructure investments made by AAP. For example, in Northam Extension 6, AAP funded the expansion and construction of the entrance road, which improved the safety of the community, especially the school children in the community. The company also benefits from these housing projects. For instance, providing decent and sustainable housing to their employees helps the company retain skilled workers. Partnering with the government to deliver affordable housing enhances the company's image with the state. There is also a tax benefit that accrues to the company for the investment made in the bulk infrastructure.

Notwithstanding the fact that AAP is a profit driven global firm, their housing initiatives in the platinum mining industry are bringing tangible benefits to their employees and the

communities where their mining operations are located. At the Amandelbult mine, many of the employees are first-time homeowners; they have never owned a decent house and really appreciate this phenomenal change in their lives. These housing projects enhance employees' wellbeing and improve family co-existence. In addition, owing to the location of the houses, the project promotes harmony by integrating employees into the broader community of the country. Their projects, such as the one in Northam Extension 6, provide employees and their families with easy access to all amenities, including educational and health facilities. The family housing projects also create wealth for the employees and their families since they become property owners. Some of the employees are assisted by the company's Group Housing Team to apply and are granted the government FLISP housing grants, which serves as a down payment and reduces employees' exposure and debt to the banks.

The communities where the new family housing projects are being constructed benefit immensely from these projects. For instance, the general Northam and Thabazimbi community benefits because the infrastructure in their areas was improved substantially. The municipality also benefits because the local infrastructure got uplifted to acceptable standards by the mining company at huge financial cost. There is also an increase in the municipality revenue from the new houses in the area in terms of consumption of water, lights, rates, and taxes. Furthermore, during construction there is also a hype of economic activity that result in new jobs being created and opportunities for skills development and supplier development. In some cases, AAP's Group Housing Unit partners with Corporate Affairs (Limpopo Provincial Government & Anglo Platinum 2013) so that the latter can consider the provision of schools, clinics, crèches, and community halls (AAP, 2014c). For example, Corporate Affairs built a community hall in Seraleng, and the hall has since been handed over to Rustenburg municipality. In Northam Extension 6, Corporate Affairs expanded and funded the entrance road. This project improved the safety of the community, especially the kids in this community.

When it comes to providing decent housing for mineworkers, AAP has been the flag bearers in the South African mining industry. Their contributions are widely recognised by provincial and national government. This can be seen from the number awards their housing projects have won. For example, in 2013 both the Serelang (North-West) and

Northam (Limpopo) employees' housing projects were awarded the South African government's Govan Mbeki Human Settlements Awards. These awards are in recognition of excellence, best practice, and healthy competition among industry practitioners. In addition, the Northam housing project also received the National Human Settlement Minister's Award as the best Each-One-Settle-One project in the country in 2013. Furthermore, in 2012 and 2013, the Serelang housing project won the Best FLISP project in the Govan Mbeki Human Settlement Award in the North-West province. Finally, from 2012 to 2014 the Northam housing project was each year awarded the Limpopo Provincial Minister's Merit Award for the Best FLISP project in the province (AAP, 2014c).

6.8 The making of the scorecard spatial order

The Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004), first passed by the South African government in 2002, is the main driver of policy change regarding the housing and living conditions of mineworkers. The Charter was established to create a mining industry that reflects the promise of a non-racial South Africa. It serves as a legislative imperative that promotes homeownership and abolishes the ill-conceived apartheid hostel system and all its legacies. Table 6.1 is an extract from the scorecard for the broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter for the South African mining industry.

Table 6-2 Extract from the scorecard for the broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter for South African the mining industry

Description	5 Year Target		10 Year Target
Human resource development			
Has the company offered every employee the opportunity to be functionally literate and numerate by the year 2005 and are employees being trained?	Yes	No	
Mine community and rural development			
Has the company co-operated in the formulation of integrated development plans and is the company co-operating with government in the implementation of these plans for communities where mining takes place and for major labour-sending areas? Has there been effort on the side of the company to engage the local mine community and major labour-sending communities? (Companies will be required to cite a pattern of consultation, indicate money expenditures and show a plan).	Yes	No	
Housing and living conditions			

Description	5 Year Target		10 Year Target
For company-provided housing has the mine, in consultation with the stakeholders established measures for improving the standard of housing, including the upgrading of the hostels, conversion of hostels to family units and promoted homeownership options for mine employees? Companies will be required to indicate what they have done to improve housing and show a plan to progress the issue over time and is implementing the plan?	Yes	No	
For company-provided nutrition has the mine established measures for improving the nutrition of mine employees? Companies will be required to indicate what they have done to improve nutrition and show a plan to progress the issue over time and is implementing the plan?	Yes	No	

Source: Adapted from the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004)

Table 6.1 shows the targets set by the South African government for mining companies that are relevant to the housing question under investigation in this study. I argue that the Mining Charter's (Government of South Africa 2004) scorecard is the instrument that guides mining companies and the state when it comes to transforming the spaces of social reproduction in mining communities. Essentially, all the initiatives discussed in this case study can be traced back to the Mining Charter's scorecard. Therefore, it is used as a blueprint for what I call the scorecard spatial order in platinum mining communities.

Furthermore, the promulgation of the Housing and Living Condition Standards by the Minister of Minerals and Energy on 29 April 2009 played a central role in forcing mining firms to rethink and put in place tangible plans to provide mineworkers with decent housing (Government of South Africa, 2009). Some of the stipulations made by the Government of South African (2009) were as follows:

- Current and future housing developments must be coordinated with the structure of mining towns and settlement;
- The provision of family housing should be associated with expanded community services and facilities, including education, health care services and social wellbeing;
- Employer shall establish measures for upgrading of hostels and conversion of hostels to family units;

- Mining companies in consultation with other stakeholders shall assist financially and facilitate the acquisition of land within proximity of the mine and plan their housing needs in support of compact, integrated, and mixed land use environment;
- Housing development needs to address social facilities and adequate space to accommodate recreational facilities and other needs;
- Housing provided by the employer shall be redeveloped or build to have access to electricity, facilities for hot water supply and running water, basic fixtures and fittings in rental stock and access to ablution facilities;
- In establishing measures to improve the standard of housing, the mining company shall be required to indicate what it has done to improve housing and show a plan to progress the issue over time and the implementation plan thereof;
- In order to implement and enforce measures contained in this standard document, the employer shall submit an annual report of compliance of the provision of this standard to the Minister;
- The compliance to the principles embodied in this standard document shall have a significant bearing on the granting of all mining rights; and
- Non-compliance with the Housing and Living Conditions Standards will render the entity to be in breach with the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, No. 28 of 2002, and subjected to section 47 of the Act.

An important tool of the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) is the 'scorecard' which was designed for companies to self-report to the government on how they are meeting certain transformation targets. While the spirit of the scorecard is positive, in practice there are serious loopholes that mining firms are exploiting to sidestep the regulation. In addition, the state seems to use this tool to abdicate its responsibility of providing services to its citizens. Effectively mining firms are left to provide housing, electricity, water and at times construct roads and wastewater treatment plants to their workers and the surrounding communities. On the other hand, taking advantage of the LOA mine management at Amandelbult can tick the box of reducing the population in SAVs but at the same also externalising the cost of social reproduction to the individual mineworker. The workers' response has largely been seeking

accommodation in informal settlements around the mines and at times these settlements are built on land owned by the mines.

Apart from the legal obligations imposed on mining firms, AAP stands to benefit in several ways from its employee housing projects. Firstly, the projects help with retaining skilled employees as those who benefit from these schemes are more likely to become loyal to AAP. This in turn, at least in principle, creates a productive workforce. Secondly, the projects are done in partnership with the three tiers of government, and this greatly enhances the company's image with these key stakeholders. Finally, there is also a tax benefit that accrues to the company for the investment made in the bulk infrastructure.

6.9 Conclusion

Although much has changed with regards to the housing of Black mineworkers in post-apartheid South Africa, it is important to note that transformation is snail-paced and many of the issues from the past are persisting or have taken on new forms. For instance, during apartheid, AAC management reserved family housing for skilled and supervisory Black mineworkers only and that has not changed much. In other words, the type of housing the mineworkers qualify for is still tied to their rank and status in the workplace (see Jeeves & Crush 1995). This reduces the housing question to an issue about status symbols, which could be appropriated as a key industrial relations strategy rather than a matter of addressing a basic human rights issue. As a result of this largely top-down approach to housing by mine management, house ownership schemes are still not necessarily popular with most Black mineworkers, who often opt to stay in informal settlements while building their own houses in their hometowns far away from the mines.

Significantly, some key physical features of the apartheid spatial order remain in place notwithstanding some internal make overs. These include the old compound structures that have now been refurbished and converted into SAVs. The high rising fences around the compounds and the overall designs of the external structures of these old facilities remain intact. Thus, from an absolute space point of view the main features that define the geography of mining communities have not changed much. However, there has been significant transformation from a relational space viewpoint. The rules that restricted the

movement of Black mineworkers were scrapped and the internal refurbishments done in the SAVs restore the dignity of SAV dwellers. In addition, SAV dwellers enjoy nutritious meals, improved sanitary services, good health care facilities, recreation facilities, and have access to the internet, radio, and TV services, which all improve their living conditions.

Segregated married and single quarters are another feature of the apartheid spatial order that is yet to be fully transformed. The high fences and tight security check points ensure that SAV residents do not get access to these luxuriant houses and services attached to them. Thus, the scorecard spatial order near the mines is still cast in an apartheid frame. Racial segregation is no longer company policy, but rank and status of employees are still used to spatially segregate the labour force. On the relative level of space, SAV residents and workers living in informal settlements envy the quality of housing and services that are provided to those who live in the married and single quarters. For instance, SAV residents who were not satisfied with the quality of their meals often compared their meals to those served at the single quarters' dining hall. In addition, SAV residents were keenly aware of the fact that while their families are living far away from them, mostly in poor rural areas, those living in married quarters were living with their families and the company provides them with transportation to school, state-of-the-art healthcare facilities and other social amenities.

Another fundamental facet of the new scorecard spatial order relates to the Employer Assisted Housing Scheme. Using this initiative, AAP is investing huge sums of money to assist its employees to own houses in already developed communities in towns near their operations. At absolute space level, these newly built houses have a minimum of two bedrooms and a maximum of four on plots that are up to 200 m^2. Within the residential area where these houses were built in Northam Extension 6, there are neat, tarred roads and short fences were installed, primarily to demarcate boundaries for each house. On a relational space level, the mineworkers who live here have a strong sense of community. Some participants in this study revealed how they live together, looking out for one another and at times enjoying a braai together. The sense of community and togetherness can also be seen on the streets where children of these mineworkers converge to play together. Residents in this newly built housing project were largely excited to live here

and to own a house for the first time in their lives, and they also reported very low levels of crime. This is an indication of the transformative potential these spaces of social reproduction have if well planned and carefully managed.

However, it can also be argued that there have been half-hearted attempts to provide family housing to Black mineworkers. Firstly, to date only a small percentage of Black mineworkers have family housing, and they are mainly skilled or supervisory workers. Secondly, it is important to note that AAC had over the years experimented with providing family housing for its Black mineworkers but there has been limited progress. These attempts started in the 1940s and 1950s, and due to pressure from the state and white communities the schemes were discontinued. Then in the late 1980s AAC publicly declared its desire to provide family housing to its Black employees (Crush et al. 1991; Laburn-Peart 1990); however, more than 30 years later many of its Black workers at Amandelbult live in SAVs and informal settlements. Given the large sums of money that have been spent on different housing projects and schemes in recent years, these noticeable changes can be traced back to the passing of an aggressive Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) in 2002. In fact, one of the managers said "we did not want to be caught with our pants down" with reference to the possibility of having fallen short of the targets set out in the Mining Charter.

An unplanned feature of the scorecard spatial order is the spiralling informal settlements near the Amandelbult mine. The residents in these informal settlements are largely mineworkers who have accepted a small LOA to move out of SAVs as the mine management sought to depopulate the compounds. In absolute space terms, these informal settlements have rudimentary houses or shacks. There is no proper infrastructure or sanitary amenities. Notably some of the shacks were erected on land that is owned by the mining company. This, I argue, is symbolic of workers' agency as they refuse to stay in SAVs or enrol in the homeownership schemes or rent an apartment in the nearby town. Rather, they have chosen to stay in informal settlements near the mine, thereby disrupting mining capital's plans with regards to land use in these areas. In other words, these workers are seeking their own spatial fix (Herod 1997). On relational space level, these mineworkers are living in crime infested areas; muggings, stabbings and even gun violence are rife in these informal settlements. Life is made even more difficult by the

fact that there are no sanitary amenities, making the area a health hazard. There is also a shortage of clean drinking water and so mineworkers are forced to buy tap water from water-selling merchants. The local municipality is now forced to formalise some of these informal settlements by providing basic infrastructure and constructing RDP houses.

As demonstrated by photographic evidence presented in this chapter, it is clear to see that much effort has gone into upgrading hostels into SAVs. The rooms are no longer overcrowded and human dignity and privacy has been restored. However, it is important to note that there has been no commitment or intention to demolish these old structures and start afresh. Therefore, the general spatial ordering that was designed during apartheid prevails today. While during the colonial and apartheid eras the geographic location of compounds in relation to that of white mineworkers' villages served to reinforce racial segregation, in post-apartheid South Africa it serves to reinforce class segregation, even though there is no official policy in support of it. This is an unintentional consequence of failing to demolish compounds and fundamentally transform the geographic layout at the mine. Importantly, SAV dwellers are still fenced in and can only enter or exit the SAVs through one gate that is constantly guarded and monitored.

In the following chapter, I shift my attention from Amandelbult mine to Unki mine in Zimbabwe.

7 The kubotereka spatial order: Housing mineworkers at Unki

> Even the powerful myth of nature is being transformed into a mere fiction, a negative utopia: nature is now seen as merely the raw material out of which the productive forces of a variety of social systems have forged their particular spaces. (Lefebvre 1974:31)

7.1 Introduction

The quote above perfectively describes the processes at play in the making of the kubotereka spatial order. This chapter demonstrates that the physical geographic landscape, the realm of absolute space, in this mining town has been used as the foundation of a particular spatial order. Unki mine is located at the heart of Zimbabwe's Midlands province. This underground platinum mine is 17 km from Shurugwi town, which is located 350 km south of Harare. It is also close to three major cities: Bulawayo, which is 220 km south-west, Masvingo, which lies 99 km to the south-east, and Gweru, which is just 32 km to the north (Figure 7.1). Shurugwi itself is a mining town that was established by the BSAC and the Willoughby's Consolidated Company in 1899[14]. It has a population size of just over 17 000 people. The larger Shurugwi district is known for gold, chrome, and platinum mining. Before Unki mines commenced operations in 2011, ZIMASCO was the largest and employer in Shurugwi. However, in 2014 ZIMASCO closed its mining operations, leaving Unki as the most lucrative employer in this small mining town (Phiri, 2015).

[14] Online history of Shurugwi

Figure 7.1 Map of Zimbabwe showing major cities and small towns (Source: www.mapsofworld.com)

Unki mines employs around 1 600 workers. These workers reside in different residential areas scattered around the Midlands province and beyond. General labourers who are recruited from nearby rural villages live in their rural home steads. There is also a 'mine camp', built in very close proximity to the mine shaft where some of some of the operational managers and contract workers live. In addition, some workers live with their families in the nearby townships in Shurugwi and others live in the townships in Gweru. Furthermore, Unki has undertaken to build 940 houses for its employees at Impali farm, 5 km south-west of Shurugwi. Of the planned 940 houses 350, were already occupied in July 2017. Senior management commute between Shurugwi and Harare on a weekly basis. From Monday to Thursday, they reside in the mine 'camp' and on Friday afternoon they drive back to Harare to spend the weekend with their families.

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of this study, focusing on Unki mine in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe. It reports how the mine is managing its housing strategy and by doing so socially engineering the spatial arrangement of this mining town and beyond.

Interview excerpts are used to illustrate how the spatial ordering of the town is impacting the everyday lives of mineworkers. I draw this concept from one of the most popular physical landscapes in Shurugwi: the Boterekwa pass. The Shona word *boterekwa* literally means a long and meandering course, thus *kubotereka* is to follow a long and meandering course. I use the concept kubotereka spatial order to describe how the physical landscape, the Boterekwa pass, remains a key determinant of the spatial order in this mining region. I further argue that the kubotereka spatial order frames all spheres of social relations for mineworkers at Unki, including the relations between mineworkers and management. The first aspect of the kubotereka spatial order that I discuss is the rural villages that surround Unki mine and provide much needed general labourers.

7.2 Unki mine and the rural village workforce

Unki mine is located in a rural area and is thus surrounded by rural villages of peasant farmers. Some of the mine's unskilled labour is drawn from these villages. Despite the mine's active participation in community projects, the relationship between Unki mine and the surrounding rural villages is contentious, at best. For instance, on 6 February 2014, the mine eventually gave in to pressure from a "self-styled, unofficial pressure group" to sign a deal that would ensure that 75% of general labourers would be sourced exclusively from Shurugwi (Mugugunyeki 2014). This came after the Midlands Provincial Administration chaired a meeting between the villagers' representatives and Unki mine management. As a result, a community engagement forum was established to assist in recruiting labour, which included the Unki management, local chiefs and members of the Shurugwi-Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust (Mugugunyeki 2014). Thus, a significant portion of mine's general labourers live in villages with no services such as running water, electricity, easy access to health facilities and schools (Figures 7.2–7.4). It is important to note that the labour related matter was resolved by a provincial political officer and not a trade union representative or a labour court. This fact will be useful in the analysis that I present later.

Figure 7.2 Rural village near Unki mine: Main suppliers of general labourers at Unki mines

Figure 7.3 General labourers from local villages live in poorly constructed houses or grass thatched huts

Figure 7.4 Huts in rural villages without electricity and running water, far from health and educational facilities

In absolute spatial terms, the villages' close proximity to the mine means that most of these labourers simply walk to work and do not require housing or transportation from the mining company. Thus, it is surprising that mine management had to be pressured to give them first preference when recruiting entry-level labourers. On the surface it seems that employing labourers from these villages would reduce the burden of providing housing and transportation for workers. However, these villagers are not fully proletarianised. They continue to practise subsistence farming, making it difficult for management to exercise full control over them, and this can potentially impact negatively

on production. It is important to highlight at this juncture that although these village workers live in poorly constructed houses without services such as running water and electricity, there are no informal settlements or shanty towns near the mine as is the case at Amandelbult mine. The next feature of the kubotereka spatial order is what is popularly known as the ‘camp’ among the Unki workforce.

7.3 The mine ‘camp’

Located adjacent to Unki’s plant is what is famously known as the ‘camp’ by the mineworkers. Within this camp is the mine manager’s house. It is a four-bedroomed house with a kitchen, lounge, toilet, and bathroom. It is designed as a family house that can comfortably accommodate a family of four. In addition to the mine manager’s house, there are 16 houses reserved for top management personnel. Furthermore, there are 16 ‘containers’ or one room cabins for temporary personnel. Interestingly, these senior managers do not live with their families in the camp. Most of their families live in Harare and Gweru. Those with families in Gweru drive to and from work every day. Those whose families live in Harare drive home for weekends on Fridays and return on Mondays each week. They thus live in the camp between Monday and Thursday. As it stands, the houses in the camp are not being fully utilised. They are family houses but most of the time they are occupied by one person. This is mostly because Shurugwi is a very small town without many services that are available in the bigger cities like Harare, so senior management are reluctant to move and settle their families in Shurugwi. There are, however, plans to build luxurious houses for senior management nearer to the mine.

Figure 7.5 Unki mine plant (Source: https://www.angloamerican.com/)

Figure 7.6 Satellite view showing Unki mine and the camp (Source: Adapted from Google Earth)

Thus, while mine management has plans to build larger houses for senior employees, the camp in the mean time provides them with a temporal spatial fix. It's location very close to the mine is ideal for the management and to supervise production at the mine around the clock.

The next feature of the kubotereka spatial order is the townships in the Shurugwi and Gweru where significant numbers of Unki mineworkers live.

7.4 Shurugwi and Gweru Townships

Some of the mineworkers at Unki mine live in rundown townships in Shurugwi. These townships are overcrowded and lack most basic services expected in an urban area (Huni, 2015; Shoko, 2015). It is not uncommon for three to four families with children to share a three bedroomed house in Makusha, one of the oldest and most popular township in Shurugwi (Figure 7.7). The roads in the townships were once tar but have been neglected over the decades and have now turned to dusty, gravel roads. The houses are also dilapidated and provide minimum protection from the elements, and most houses have leaking roofs. Conditions in Gweru's townships are much better than those in Shurugwi. The houses in Gweru townships are generally in good structural condition and well spaced, providing space for residents to plant vegetable gardens.

Figure 7.7 Life in Makusha (Shurugwi), a vegetable street vendor, a busy bar, cars driving on dirty roads and children going to school

This is what some of the participants had to say about where they live with their families:

> This is my house [pointing to the dilapited house]. I live here with my wife and two kids, both are girls. We share the house with two other families. We use one bedroom and the kitchen. My monthly rent is now $80 … we are here to work. What can we do? At least I can support my family. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

> I live here but this is my parent's house. At least I don't get to pay rent, but I am responsible for the bills. (Phillip; 22/6/2017)

Although BaRopa refers to the house as his, he doesn't own it. These houses were formerly owned by the mining company ZIMASCO and are now owned by the local municipality. The cash strapped municipality relies heavily on the rates paid by these residents, despite the lack of service delivery and overcrowding in the area (Figure 7.8; see Makore & Zano 2012).

Figure 7.8 Dilapidated houses and roads in Makusha, Shurugwi Township

Participants who live in these townships lamented the lack of service delivery. For example, some of the participants said the following about rubbish collection and pollution in the area:

> Because there are no roads here, municipal vehicles that are supposed to come and collect rubbish no longer come this far, so we have to carry our rubbish and dump closer to the nearest road where they pass and collect. The situation

> is not ideal. Some households just dump their rubbish in front of the house, making the whole place an environmental hazard. This is not an ideal place to live, but we came here to work and support our families. (BaRopa 26/6/2017)
>
> I come from a big city in Chitungwiza, but I could only find work here. What can we do here? As long as I have a roof over my head. But this township is dirty and overcrowded. I have been placed on a waiting list for housing, but at the mine nothing is straight forward, everything happens at a slow pace. You can't make demands to management; they will just find a reason to fire you. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

These conditions are reminiscent of those that prevailed in the compounds for Black mineworkers during the colonial era when many lost their lives after contacting diseases such as dysentery and malaria. As Phimister (2003:88) put it, "tens of thousands of African labourers died from industrially-induced diseases". What is striking though is the fact that in this case these townships are not directly under the oversight of Unki mine, rather they are under the jurisdiction of the local municipality. In the streets of this township, mineworkers commonly use the expression *hapaitwe zvekumhanya*, which literally means 'you don't move too fast here'. But it was adopted by mineworkers to mean 'be cautious, don't be too direct or hasty' when dealing with mine management. This cautious attitude arises from and is compounded by the fact that the trade union movement has become weaker in Zimbabwe at a time when unemployment rates have skyrocketed (see Mutekwe 2019). Thus, mine management hold almost unchallenged leverage when dealing with mineworkers since they have at their disposal a large pool of retrenched mineworkers who are unemployed and desperate to find work, so much so that they are willing to pay bribes for jobs (see Bulawayo24 News, 2012; Machaya 2013). In addition, although there is running water for these communities, it is not necessarily safe for drinking. This is what some participants had to say:

> We have access to running water, but as you know, it's a problem in the whole country: The water is not necessarily safe for drinking. So sometimes we boil the water before drinking, but again you can't do that all the time. So we are

> at risk with water borne diseases. There are not too many options we have to work for our families. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)
>
> I have been placed on the waiting list for company housing, but you know the mine managers here, everything happens at a slow pace. Some even say you need to bribe them or befriend them in order to be allocated a house. You never know. They don't communicate openly with us, and if you go and ask them or demand a house, they will just find a way to fire you …. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)
>
> Electricity and water are not a perennial problem. The company pays for electricity and water is pumped and piped to mining villages or compounds at no extra cost. Trade unions continuously engage the mining companies' "gold" over better accommodation. Yet these companies argue the economic environment is not viable to allow erection of better houses. We admit the task is bit challenging, but we are geared to take the bull by its horns in a bid to have workers' accommodation crisis addressed. (Zimbabwe Union of Mineworkers [ZUMW] Deputy General Secretary; 22 December 2020)

Figure 7.9 and 7.10 show dilapidated houses and at the same time it shows the satellite dishes on the rooftops. Such satellite dishes remain a key symbol of status in the country, and it indicates that some of the households who live here earn enough income to sustain a relatively comfortable lifestyle, yet they live in overcrowded and decaying buildings. It is interesting to note that most of these participants use the Shona expression *kuno kubasa*, which means 'this is a work location' or simply 'we are here to work'. It sums up their subjective experiences of and attitudes towards the process of space making in Shurugwi. It signifies reluctant acceptance of their 'temporary' situation, living in dilapidated housing in a town far away from home as they have no other avenues to find work.

Figure 7.9 Houses in overcrowded Shurugwi townships

Figure 7.10 Arial view of Makusha township houses

At this juncture, it is important to underline that there are very basic infrastructure and facilities available to mineworkers living in these townships, such as schools, a hosipital, running water and electricity. However, these are inadequate and have been allowed to crumble without the necessary maintanence. In addition, these townships are built near the towncenter, which gives them easy access to some retail shops and other services such

as public transport, linking them to the mine and other major towns such as Gweru, Masvingo and Harare. This is what one particpant had to say about the road transport network in the area:

> Public transport is available we are connected with the nearby towns, any time you can travel. If I want to go to Gweru, Masvingo, Bulawayo or Harare, it's easy to go. Harare is a matter of a few hours. If I leave early in the morning, I will be back in the evening. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

While mineworkers who live in the Impali houses built by Unki mine have a private power grid installed by the mine, those living in Shurugwi townships rely on the local municipal power supply that is generally unreliable. One interviewee said the following:

> Power supply is improving now that it's pre-paid. We hardly experience power cuts these days, but before it was a nightmare. We literally lived in the dark and cooked on fire. Those who were selling firewood made a killing by overcharging us. They knew we didn't have the time to go and fetch firewood ourselves. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

Hence, these mineworkers' experiences of the spatial order in this mining town are informed by and compared to their lived experiences and what they have observed in other cities in the country. In addition, these mineworkers are in constant communication with other platinum mineworkers at nearby mines, thus they are always comparing their living conditions to others in the same industry. Among Unki's employees there is no doubt that the living conditions of those living in the townships are far worse than those experienced by mineworkers that are housed by the mining company at its Impali housing project; all the mineworkers are aware of this. This further fragment the workers and the distinction itself serves to discipline both sets of workers. Those allocated housing fear losing the right to live there, and so they work very hard and do not question their working conditions, while those placed on the waiting list exert themselves too and do not want to be seen by management as troublemakers for that will jeopardise their chances of being allocated a house.

In addition to living in dilapidated houses, those who live in Shurugwi townships have to make do with the maladminstered and poorly resourced public healthcare system. This is what some of the participants had to say:

> Government hospital and municipal clinic are a walking distance away; however, they are understaffed and under-resourced. They only give pain killers. If you want proper health care, you have to travel to Gweru. Here they can watch you die. Now it's going to be better because the mine has finished building a clinic for mineworkers at Impali. I am yet to go there so I don't know the quality of their service. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

> I go to the public clinics and hospital here in Gweru. The mine provides medical aid but I haven't really got sick and needed to use. (Phillip; 22/6/2017)

Although there are communal or municipal recreational facilities for use by the public in the townships, mineworkers rarely use them because of the long hours and hard work they do, which leaves them either too tired or with no time for such activities. Participants had the following to say about these facilities:

> Yes, [pauses] there are municipal facilities that are open to all community members, especially those who like soccer. They can go and play or watch the local teams play … It's not far. One can walk there. But the thing is when you are working the way that we do, you simply don't have the time or strength to go and run around. If I am not working, I take the time to rest or spend time with my family. At the weekend I just go and drink one or two beers with my friends. That's it [laughs]. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

> The mine management encourages us to play team sports as team bonding exercises. Here in Gweru there are no facilities built by the mine for this, but they run a few sporting teams … There are municipal facilities nearby in the township, but I rarely make use of them since I have no time and I am always tired after work. (Salim; 22/6/2017)

Township dwellers are actively involved in the community's affairs. The following comments reflect how they feel about their communities:

> Here we live like in the village. The life here is communal. Everyone knows everyone, and I like that. Sometimes we meet as a community to discuss issues such as crime, which is becoming worse these days. We also talk about development issues. Here if the community does not stand up and fix our streets/roads, no one will come and do it, and I also take part in that. *Tisu vanhu vacho* [we are the people who own this area]. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

> I am well known in the community, and I think I am respected by most members of the community as one of the few 'young men' with a decent job … In fact many people often stop me in the streets to ask if there are any job openings at the mine, and if he could assist someone to get hired … I am not into politics. (Phillip; 22/6/2017)

As these comments suggests, those who live in the townships have a strong sense of belonging and enjoy the communal lifestyle lead here. However, they often express their envy for those living in the newly built company houses. For example, one of them told me the following:

> I don't know why I missed out on these new houses … It hurts me. That is where all the development in this town is. Even those working at Mimmosa know about these houses. They too are jealous. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

Education plays a key role in determining the life chances as well as the general social reproduction of these mineworkers. There are primary and secondary schools that were built by ZIMASCO but are now under the oversight of the local municipality (Nyaya, 2016). Some of the participants had this to say about educational facilities in the township:

> Yes, we have schools, pre-schools everything. The primary and secondary schools were built by ZIMASCO. Now since ZIMASCO went down, the municipality is running the schools. My first daughter goes to the primary school nearby. The fees are not too bad. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

> Education facilities are available. Almost each section of this township has its public primary schools. There are fewer secondary schools, but the nearest is not far from here, and they are affordable. (Salim; 22/6/2017)

As noted in these interview excerpts, the fees for basic education are affordable even though there are fears that the standards might fall following the closure of ZIMASCO (see Nyaya 2016). Another important aspect of social reproduction is practising religion and belief systems. There are religious facilities in the townships and people are free to choose their belief systems and practice their faith. The participants had the following to say:

> I am a very religious person. Every Saturday if I am not working, I take my family to church. There are many churches around so it's about what you believe in. People are free to choose where they want to go and worship. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

> Yes! There is a church down the street. I grew up in the church. I used to go there with my mother, but these days I hardly find time to go there. (Phillip; 22/6/2017)

It is interesting to note that the work-life imbalance because of the long working hours and the long travelling to and from work was impacting Vakoma Phillip's religious activities. Owing to the communal lifestyle in these townships and the relatively small population size, crime is low in the area. Petty theft and public fights are the most common crimes, and murder and gun violence are largely unheard of. One participant told me the following:

> It is safe, I think. We don't have too many murders or things like that, only burglaries from time and fighting between rival small-scale miners. Those are our main issues. As a small town, we basically rely on the community to protect each other and fight crime. We have a very small police station that sometimes don't have a single police vehicle, so the response is usually to slow. (BaRopa; 26/6/201)

Figure 7.11 A busy day in the CBD in Shurugwi

As noted earlier, Shurugwi is a very small mining town. As such, there are certain services that are not available in the town. For instance, there are no banking halls or ATMs, and the CBD is made up of one street with shops on both sides (Figures 7.11, 7.12, 7.14). There is only one traffic light in the town (Figure 7.16). This is what some of the participants had to say about these spaces of consumption in the town:

> That is a thorny issue here. This town is so small, and there are no quality shops here. So, you have to travel to Gweru, Masvingo or Bulawayo if you want to do proper shopping, especially for clothes. (BaLeo; 26/6/2017)

> There are a few shops in town where we can buy our food items. Eating out is not a common thing here, but men like to go and drink and have *gochi* (barbeques). You should have come at night time, this place kicks into life at night. Miners here, especially *makorokoza* [small-scale gold miners] like to party with their beers and women. So night time is party time here. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

There is a tavern in the area, not far away from here. I have stopped drinking these days. When I started working, I used to spend all my money on booze. Now I am trying to be a responsible father [laughs]. (Salim; 22/6/2017)

Figure 7.12 Main street in Shurugwi CBD. Shurugwi Town Council workers are resurfacing a section of the main street damaged by trucks and heavy machinery from the mine.

Figure 7.13 The rail network was established by the BSAC for the mining industry (Source: www.chronicle.co.zw)



Figure 7.14 Shurugwi shopping centre. Only a few shops along the main street. Night clubs and bars dominate the shopping centre

Figure 7.15 Locomotives remain the main means of transporting goods and raw materials for the mines (www.chronicle.co.zw)

Figure 7.16 Shurugwi Town Council office building and the only traffic lights in the town (Source: http://stc.org.zw/)

Unki mine is located at the heart of Zimbabwe, giving it access to several transport options for both its employees and the transportation of goods, raw materials, and equipment. This can be done through rail or road transportation. However, poor roads and rough terrain make life difficult for workers who must travel to and from work each day. The railway line has been critical for the development and sustenance of mining in this town. In Harvey's conceptual terms, it provides capital with an escape or a spatial fix since mining depends largely on fixed, immobile capital and mineral resources, and rail, and road transportation help with moving mines' output for exportation.

The final aspect of the kubotereka spatial order is what I refer to as a company suburb. This is a housing project that is wholly sponsored by Unki mine and meant exclusively for its employees. It is not necessarily an orthodox company town but has some of the features of a company town.

7.5 A company suburb: Impali houses

In 2013, Unki bought 1 407 stands at Impali source farm from the Shurugwi town council to build houses for its employees. A total of 1 200 stands were quickly serviced or installed with bulk services (see Makoshore 2014). The company's goal was to commission 200 houses at the end of 2013 for occupation. Unki management set aside US$8 million for the housing project with the plan to build 3 500 housing units for the fast-growing workforce. The Impali housing project was designed to be a self-sustaining

company suburb. The plan was for the company to provide all the essential infrastructure and services to this exclusive residential area. This included constructing the more than 5 km long entrance road connecting the Impali farm and the Gweru-Shurugwi highway (Figure 7.17). In addition to the main road, other smaller roads were developed throughout the Impali plot. The mine also invested heavily in a 33 kV substation to guarantee power supply to the housing project. Water is supplied from the 2 012 mega litre Impali source dam, and infrastructure is in place to augment the water supply from the nearby Gwenoro dam (Figure 7.18). Sewer and reticulation systems were installed. Furthermore, a school, clinic and shopping centre would be built to serve the mineworkers dwelling in these houses as well as the local community (see Chadenga 2013; Makoshore 2014; The Source 2014a; Southern Eye 2014). Such investments into the construction of roads and a power substation are significant, especially considering that most local municipalities are struggling to keep the lights on for their residents and the condition of most public roads in Zimbabwe is appalling (see Makore & Zano 2012).

From the labour movement's point of view, platinum mines in Zimbabwe have become standard bearers when it comes to their housing strategies. The Deputy General Secretary of ZUMW had the following to say about the general housing of mineworkers in post-colonial Zimbabwe:

> Housing strategies in post-colonial Zimbabwe resemble the colonial era both in strategy and housing serve for a few mines that came into being of late, notably the platinum mines. Platinum Mines have established locations where their employees stay. Transport is logically in place to ferry labour to and from workplaces timeously. Their labour stays far from mining sites, but they [platinum mines] do not feel the pinch that distance brings. Platinum Mines have built modern houses for their employees. In that sense platinum mines are a cut above all the other mines since they have erected standardised accommodation. This is backed up with homeownership schemes maturing upon attaining ten years of continuous engagement with the company. A worker can acquire home ownership even without having served for ten years if his termination of employment is because of medical grounds. (ZUMW Deputy General Secretary; 22 December 2020)

Figure 7.17 New road (The Link) which connects the Impali houses with the Shurugwi-Gweru high way

Figure 7.18 The 33 kV substation installed by Unki mine to supply power to their Impali houses

The houses were designed to reflect the employees' ranks. The suburb is divided by the main road into two distinct zones. On one side are the houses for shift bosses and artisans (Figures 7.19–7.21). Their houses are spacious and detached. They are three bedroom houses with a kitchen, lounge, and toilet as well as a car port for two cars. The difference usually goes beyond the size of houses to include other services and facilities such as recreational facilities and schools. The senior employees tend to monopolise access to

golf courses, tennis courts and swimming pools while low-ranked employees tend to dominate sports such as soccer (see Gaidzanwa 1991). The practice of residentially segregating mineworkers' houses according to rank and status is reminiscent of the racial segregation during the colonial era. The subtle difference is that class has replaced race as the decisive factor. Interestingly, this practice is regarded as a norm in mining communities in Zimbabwe as well as in South Africa. Gaidzanwa (1991:61) reports incidences when this logic was being challenged at one gold mine in the early 1980s; however, this strategy is common practice to date.

Figure 7.19 Houses for shift bosses and artisans

Figure 7.20 Three bedroomed houses for shift bosses and artisans and their families

Figure 7.21 Detached spacious houses for shift bosses and artisans surrounded by natural vegetation

Figure 7.22 Three bedroom duplexes for entry-level underground mineworkers and their families

On the other side are the houses for low-ranked employees. These are double storey duplex flats (Figures 7.22–7.26). They are built in such a way that two families live in the same building.

There is a sense of pride and satisfaction on the part of those employees who have benefited from Unki's housing scheme. This is what some of the interviewees had to say about living in the Impali houses:

> I am very happy to live here in this house. It is three bedroomed. That's enough for me and my family. I can't complain if you see the houses here in Shurugwi and even in Gweru. We have the best houses. Everyone is talking about these houses. (Tendai; 23/6/2017)
>
> We only pay the electricity and water bills; no rent. The houses are owned by the mine, so we know it's nice when you are here, but I have to buy or build my own house somewhere because one day if I am out work, we won't have a house. (Joe; 24/6/2017)
>
> There were many of us who wanted to get into these houses, but not everyone was allocated a house. It is an issue that caused many people to be upset because some who were still new at the mine got a house, yet some had been here longer but were not allocated a house. Also, some houses were not completed and there is a rumour that the manager misappropriated some of

> the funds. So those who did not get houses were bitter about it. (Allen; 23/6/2017)
>
> Sometimes it is easy to find something to complain about, but we are thankful to have jobs and these houses, especially now with this Covid. Many lost their jobs, but the mining sector is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. I also think having proper housing has allowed the mine to remain operational with minimum Covid related stoppages. (Simon; 17/12/2020)

It is interesting to note that Unki employees living in recently built company-owned housing use the expression *kuno kubasa* to remind themselves that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract and so they need to build their own houses elsewhere. Thus, the *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking means different things to different groups of mineworkers, depending on their housing location, which is informed by their perceived worth to the mining firm. As noted earlier, it entails a reluctant acceptance of the status quo for those living in dilapidated housing in the townships of Shurugwi, and as shown here, a self-caution against false consciousness for those living in company-owned housing.

In addition, not everyone who lives in these company houses is entirely happy with the idea of paying for their utility bills. Here are some examples of discontentment expressed during the interviews:

> I grew up in mine compound. My father used to work at a gold mine. So, I know that in the past mineworkers were not paying for their bills in mining areas, but nowadays mining companies have separated that and are now saying the employees should pay their own bills directly to the council or ZESA. So, for us the new generation of mineworkers that is a problem because according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement for the mining sector, an employee is not supposed to pay for services or bills when the accommodation is in mine site. So, to avoid paying our energy and water bills, they are building accommodation away from mine site in a council (municipal) owned area. (Tinaye; 15/12/2020)

> They [trade unions] only intervened when we [mineworkers] went on strike, when we had a dispute over the payment of water and electricity bills. The company was saying its employees who should pay whilst according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement it is the company's responsibility. We initially won the case when the labour court ruled in our favour, and the company appealed at high court, and it went to Supreme Court, where the judgement came in favour of the company. Then the matter went back for arbitration. That is when the workers went on strike. Only then, did the union got really involved, but still we lost as some of the worker leadership lost their jobs as a result of the strike. I know many mineworkers who now believe that the union was bribed, and from that day they do not have a voice over the company, and we are now paying bills. (Rugare; 15/12/2020)

Some of the participants were keenly aware of the stratification along levels of seniority and skill with regards to housing available to mineworkers and the strict rules of conduct within the Impali residences. Some of the participants had this to say:

> They have provided us with company houses, but we are not equals. The size of the house you get is necessarily according to size of your family, rather it depends on your grade or level at work. So, they may give two rooms to low employees that is general hands. Then three rooms to operators, four rooms to semi-skilled supervisors and 4 or 6 to the so-called skilled workers with critical skills from the view of the employer, e.g. artisans, overseer miners and all other skilled mining personnel. (Ushe;15/12/2020)

> We have strict rules here as well, noise making is one of those things that can get you in trouble. You can even get a written warning. We work different shifts, so others need to rest as well. Now with Covid-19 there are also strict about who can live in the company houses: Only the employee and immediate family members. (Richard; 18/12/2020)

Figure 7.23 Duplexes showing the car port and satellite dishes

Figure 7.24 Duplexes showing solar powered geysers

Figure 7.25 Duplexes: Family housing for entry-level mineworkers

Figure 7.26 Impacting mineworkers lives: Most households here have at least one car

The construction of these houses for low-ranked employees clearly represents significant progress from the colonial practice of cutting costs by providing inadequate and poorly constructed housing to Black mineworkers. As noted earlier, during the colonial era, mine management would radically cut costs by refusing to invest in housing for Black mineworkers (Kamete 2012; Phimister 1992; Van Onselen 1976). It is also important to note that even though Unki mine operations began at a time when the Zimbabwean economy was in dire straits and platinum prices were fluctuating, the mine resolved to build proper housing for all levels of employers rather than construct hostels or compounds. This proves that it is possible for platinum mining firms to do away with hostels and remain profitable. One trade union official commented the following:

> As a trade union, we appreciate the modern-day accommodation provided by these platinum mines, the transport to ferry employees to and from work, the homeownership scheme, the water, and undisturbed electricity supply. However, the homeownership scheme has one grey area that needs amendment. The clause in the homeownership scheme where the employer demands that should one decide to sell the house after attaining ownership, the sole buyer has to be the employer [the mining company]. We feel this attached string should be removed. The situation is dire in the gold sector where employees are accorded accommodation in line of grades and seniority. However, these houses are beyond their time. Some have become dilapidated or are in a near state of collapse, requiring complete demolition. These out of time houses are safety hazard to employees with yawning gaps. Maintenance and refurbishment move at snail's pace, especially with the current economic meltdown. Ownerships is not in existence. Therefore, the retired or dismissed employees end up destitute, with no food over their heads upon leaving employment. Most end up relocating to rural areas where land is still affordable and where buildings [houses] are not strictly monitored. Often, they built pole and dagga grass thatched huts or houses. The most vulnerable ones end up forcing themselves to stay with relatives who remain in employment. (ZUMW Deputy General Secretary; 22 December 2020)

The above excerpt shows that the trade union is content with the housing provided by platinum mining companies. However, some of the interviewed mineworkers were very critical of the role of trade unions in the sector. Some of them had this to say about trade unions:

> Well, what can I say about the role that trade unions have played to ensure that housing and health facilities are provided … it is something else, aah. I can say yes, they have played a role, but it is like they are not proactive on the housing issue. They only focus on salary negotiations. (Nhamo; 15/11/2020)

> Yes, I belong to a trade union, but you know here, you trade cautiously. If become outspoken, they don't think twice about terminating your contract, So it is about picking up the right kind of battles. (Kembo; 17/12/2020)

Figure 7.27 Health and education facilities specifically built for mineworkers

Significant investment has gone into providing top class health and educational facilities for the beneficiaries of Unki's housing project (Figures 7.27–7.28). The following interview excerpts sum up the general feelings of those who live at Impali housing:

> As Unki employees we have access to the best healthcare available in the province, and many people wish they were in the same position, As you know, healthcare in this country is very expensive. Since we [employees] and our families have medical aid cover paid for by the mine, we can use either the mine's clinic or other private surgeries and pharmacies from other medical providers. The company has a trauma centre and an occupational health centre for Covid-19 tests and medicals. To kerb the spread of Covid-19, all employees are regularly screened and tested. If you attend a funeral or a wedding, then you go on self-quarantine for 14 days. This has helped. We have had very few cases and work has continued even during the hard lockdown. (Tichaona; 15/11/2020)

We have a clinic here with state-of-the-art equipment, and so there is no problem there. It's owned by the mine so we get first priority, but local residents can also use it. (Tendai; 23/6/2017)

Generally, health facilities are accessible for mining employees. With small mines having mine clinics staffed by state registered nurses who refer patients to district hospitals where there are doctors. Big mines have clinics and mine hospitals. The health facilities are mostly adequately equipped. When the prescription is not in stock, the patients procure medicines, and they are refunded upon producing receipts of payment. With the Covid-19 pandemic, most mines are on high alert and cooperative in implementing the WHO recommendations to arrest the effect of the pandemic among employees. Issuance of face masks, social distance observance and testing for Covid-19 remain observed As a trade union, we engage the mining sector to observe the WHO recommended guidelines. We offer face masks and sanitisers to our members and encourage them to adhere to the guidelines. We have WhatsApp groups where such information is disseminated. For now, we have put aside mass meetings and only send information on social media and other electronic forms of communication. More than often, pay impromptu visits to assess whether the guidelines are being followed and make recommendations. (ZUMW Deputy General Secretary; 22 December 2020)

Figure 7.28 Impali primary school

> We have a state-of-the-art primary school here. It was built for our children, but local residents can also bring their children. This year we are paying $80 per term. For us [employees] the mine allows us to pay the school fees in instalments and that is very helpful. (Joe; 24/6/2017)

> Our children go to one of the best primary schools in the country. They have all the equipment they need, including a fully functioning computer lab as well as some of the best teachers in the province. We are happy with that! (Tendai; 23/6/2017)

In addition to the school and clinic, which are appreciated by the residents of the Impali housing project, there are plans to build more facilities. Participants discussed these plans as follows:

> There are plans to build a club house for sports, but at the moment only the school has some sports field here. (Allen; 23/6/2017)

> There are plans to build huge shopping mall here, but at the moment we have to go all the way to Gweru for shopping. We don't have even a bank or ATMs in Shurugwi, so it's bit of a problem. (Joe; 24/6/2017)

> I don't get it sometimes, if you go around this area, you can see that only a small number of houses have been completed. We know that Anglo had allocated enough money to build houses for all the workers here, but somehow some of the houses are still not completed and the builders already left the site. You wonder then, what happened to the funds for this project. Some of our fellow workers still travel all the way from Gweru to work and back. It's too much. But here you don't complain otherwise you are gone. (Sam; 26/6/2017)

Figure 7.29 Incomplete houses at Impali due to a bitter dispute between Unki mine and the construction companies

Figure 7.30 Construction companies downed their tools over ‘exploitative’ contracts with Unki

Once again, the *hapaitwe zvekumhanya* attitude comes to the fore here. The contentious issue of house allocation and the incomplete project without proper explanation by management to workers are matters, in principle, that the workers should challenge and demand answers for. However, mine management hold almost unchallenged leverage when dealing mineworkers since they have at their disposal a large pool of retrenched mineworkers who are unemployed and desperate to find work.

Workers’ position is also weakened by the fact that the trade union movement is fragmented and weaker, especially those organising in mining sector. For instance, Zenda

(2017) noted that disgruntled mineworkers were in the process of setting up a splinter union called the Progressive Mining and Allied Industries Workers Union of Zimbabwe in addition to the four registered unions in the sector already. In addition, the labour movement in Zimbabwe had been under state repression for over a decade (see Mutekwe 2019). A report by an ILO (2009: vii–viii) commission of inquiry made the following observations and conclusions:

> There was systematic, and even systemic, violation of the Conventions in the country. It saw a clear pattern of arrests, detentions, violence and torture of trade union leaders and members by the security forces coinciding with Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) nationwide events, indicating some centralised direction to the security forces to take such action and a clear pattern of control over ZCTU trade union gatherings through the application of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). It noted the systematic targeting of ZCTU officials and members, particularly in rural areas, involving significant violence and anti-union discrimination in employment, in what appeared to be a calculated attempt to intimidate and threaten ZCTU members. It also noted the routine use of the police and army against strikes, widespread interference in trade union affairs and the failure to guarantee judicial independence and the rule of law, resulting in a situation of impunity for those perpetrating atrocities.

Thus, the environment in Zimbabwe makes it very difficult for mineworkers to claim their rights and make demands through strikes. Indeed, all the participants in this study declined to reveal whether they were members of a trade union.

In 2014, Unki was in the process of building 940 housing units. These were expected to be ready for occupation by July of that year (The Chronicle 2013). At the same time the mine intended to hand over infrastructure worth US$35 million to the Shurugwi town council. Workers would live in these houses as long as they are employed by the mine, but the houses would remain Unki property. However, the first phase comprising 200 houses was only completed in 2016. The revised target was then to have 350 houses completed and be officially commissioned for occupation in June 2016. That once again

did not materialise. The houses were only completed and ready for occupation in November 2016. At that point, the mine had spent US$120 million on the housing project. In addition, a double storey primary school with 16 classrooms fitted with furniture was completed and ready to start enrolling students. Unki had also spent US$22 million on community social investment around Shurugwi and Gweru in several community developmental projects.

Considering the above developments and the outcome of this housing project, it is difficult to disagree with the following conclusion of Lefebvre's (1974:56):

> All the same there is no getting around the fact that the bourgeoisie still has the initiative in its struggle for (and in) space. Abstract space works in a highly complex way. It has something of a dialogue about it, in that it implies a tacit agreement, a non-aggression pact, a contract as it were, of non-violence. It imposes reciprocity and a communality of use.

Notwithstanding the fact that Unki employees living in company-owned houses at Impali exercise their agency and are aware that they do not have title deeds for the houses they live in, capital, as Lefebvre suggests, has taken the initiative by creating a spatial order that promotes its interests. In addition, Harvey (2001:338) writes the following:

> Capitalism can open up considerable breathing-space for its own survival through pursuit of the 'spatial fix', particularly when combined with temporal displacements... It is rather as if, having sought to annihilate space with time, capitalism buys time for itself out of the space it conquers.

Thus, Unki's investments into long-term physical and social structures, such as the housing stock described above along with the construction of important infrastructure such as roads, schools, clinics, power substations and water pipes, are part of its search for a spatial fix. In the following section, I demonstrate the importance of road infrastructure and Unki's staff bus arrangement to the functioning of the kubotereka spatial order. I argue that this gives the mining company a much needed spatial fix.

7.6 Boterekwa and Unki's spatial fix: Daily commuting to and from work

The average day in the life of Vakoma Phillip, a 37 year old geologist employed by Unki mine, starts around 02:00 in the morning some 67 km away from the mine in Mkoba township in Gweru. His phone's alarm rings and he jumps out of bed to go outside and start a fire to boil his bathing water. It is June, and Gweru is well known for its bitterly cold winter seasons. The water takes between 20–30 minutes to boil, and then he goes in to bath, while boiling more water for tea. After bathing and changing, it's around 02:40, and he quickly makes tea and drink it while standing in the kitchen. After drinking his tea, he grabs his back-pack and walks out of the house at about 02:45. As he walks out of the house, it's dark outside as there are no street lights. We walk down a dirty road. While walking, Vakoma Phillip whistles to signal to his co-worker who lives in the same street that its time to go. Soon, he joins us as we walk briskly to the bus station. At 03:00, we arrive at the bus stop, and at exactly 03:05 the mine staff bus arrives and we board the bus. We are not the first ones on the bus; this is the second pick-up point. As the bus drives around picking up more workers in Gweru, almost everyone is sleeping in their seats. It will be at least two hours on the road before we reach the mine at 05:00 am. His shift starts at 06:00 and is supposed to end at 13:00, but this week management has set very high production targets so he will be working until 16:00. During the morning and at lunch, the company provides the workers with bread or buns and mahewu (nutritous energy drink). By 16:30 Vakoma Phillip exits the mine plant to wait for the bus back home. The bus only leaves the mine at 17:10. On the bus going home, there is exitement that was missing in the morning. Everyone has a smart phone that they are either browsing the internet with or using social media on to communicate while they debate an upcoming local football cup final between fierce rival Zimbabwe Premier League soccer teams (Highlanders and Dynamos). Another two hours pass before Vakoma Phillip is dropped off at Mkoba, Gweru, at 19:15, and it's already dark. As he slugishly walks home, he meets an elderly women who knows him well, and she begs him to help her grandson who recently finished school to find a job at the mine. He promises her that he would let her know when the mine is hiring. It is 20:00 when he finally gets home. His mother and siblings have already eaten their supper, so he eats alone and watches the TV briefly

before going to bed (Observation; 23/06/2017). He will repeat the cycle again tomorrow and on most days after.

Apart from the general labourers drawn from surrounding villages and those living in the mine camp, the rest of the mine's labour force travels significant distances to and from work on a daily basis. A significant number of mineworkers still live in townships in Gweru. These workers travel up to 67 km to work, which takes on average one hour and 15 minutes one way by car, but the mine staff bus takes two hours (Figure 7.33). Thus if they are on the day shift, they get up as early as 02:00 am to catch the mine staff bus, which departs at 03:05 and only arrives at the mine around 05:05, and start work at 06:00. The last staff bus fom Gweru departs at 04:00, and those who catch this bus would have to be up between 03:00 and 03:30, and at times do not get home until 19:00 or 20:00. Thus, put together they travel a 134 km round trip and spend on average of four hours each day travelling between work and home. Although the mining company provides them with 'free' transport to and from work, too much time is spent travelling between work and home, upseting the work-life balance for these workers.



Figure 7.31 Map showing the distance between one of townships in Shurugwi (Makusha Township) and Unki mine



Figure 7.32 Satellite view of Shurugwi township and Unki mine (rocky terrain and landscape)



Figure 7.33 Map showing the distance between Gweru townships and Unki mines



Figure 7.34 Map showing the distance between Impali mine houses and Unki mine

It is important to note that before the completion of the Impali housing project at the end of 2016, most of the employees who are now allocated houses at Impali lived in Gweru. They travelled this long distance daily. Even after the completion of the Impali housing project there is still a significant number of Unki workers who either rejected the move to Impali or were not allocated a house. Those who live in Shurugwi townships, though closer to the mine, still travel about 27 km to work (Figures 7.31–7.32). That is about

54 km, or one and half hours round trip, each day. In addition, those living in the company houses at Impali also travel about 32 km one way (64 km round trip) to and from work, spending significant amount of time on the road each day (Figure 7.34). Even though many of these mineworkers own their own cars, they continue to rely on the mine's staff buses to ferry them to and from work. This arrangement is not without its problems. For instance, on 23 February 2014, four employees were killed and 68 others were injured when the mine's staff bus ferrying them home after a night shift plunged into a river (Figure 7.35; The Source 2014b). Often when I asked participants whether the transport arrangement by the mine management was beneficial for them, those who know of this accident were quick to remind me how risky the trip is. This is what some of the participants had to say about the daily travel to and from work:

> It's a distance [27 km] from here to work, and the road we use is very dangerous, but there is nothing we can do about that. I use the mine bus to and from work. It takes about 35–45 minutes. The main problem is having to drive through Boterekwa twice every day … My wife wories about that every day. (BaRopa; 26/6/2017)

> The main problem with my situation right now is that I travel far to go to work [about 65.5 km, 2 hours by bus] … Transport is provided by the mining company, but I have to get up early, at 02:00am, every day … I actually prefer to take a cold shower in the summer. You know electricity is too expensive. And I believe that a cold shower helps me to avoid fatigue. So I walk about 20 minutes to the bus stop and the bus picks me up at 03:05. The journey usually takes longer since the bus has to stop from time to time picking up more workers; we get to the mine between just after 05:00 am. (Phillip; 22/6/2017)

> The travelling from Gweru each morning is killing us, you know. Even the bus drivers sometimes they are so tired, and our lives are in their hands, especially driving through the Boterekwa pass. It may be fun for a tourist who comes here once, but doing it every day is dangerous. In 2014, the mine bus was involved in an accident, and I lost a close friend and another one is now

> wheelchair bound. It is traumatising just thinking it; could have been me. (Salim; 22/6/2017)

Boterekwa pass is a meandering road with many blind spots built on rolling mountains. The snaking road offers road users the opportunity to view the majestic scenary of the Boterekwa mountains, but the steep gradient is dangerous and make first-time travellers nervous (Figures 7.36–7.37). The Boterekwa is feared with good reason; many have perished in car accidents on this pass. Thus the fear of travelling to and from work on a daily basis is well founded. Drawing from the challenges and opportunities offered by the Boterekwa pass, I have coined and conceptualised what I call the kubotereka spatial order concept, which aptly describes the absolute space in which Unki mineworkers live. They are employed by the employer of choice in a town, where the majority of the population are jobless, many among them having lost their jobs after ZIMASCO closed down. At the same time, they are fearful of losing their jobs and are thus open to exploitation, working long hours and travelling long distances to and from work. Those who have been given houses by the mine are expected to be exemplary in terms of discipline, work ethic and loyalty to the company.

Figure 7.35 Unki staff bus plunged into a river in 2014, killing four and injuring 68 mineworkers (Source: http://source.co.zw/2014/02/four-unki-mine-employees-die-in-bus-accident/)

Figure 7.36 Boterekwa pass, infamous for fatal road accidents

Figure 7.37 Unki's employees travel through Boterekwa twice daily

7.7 The making of the Kubotereka spatial order

The Great Dyke where Unki mine is located is a seam of ore-bearing rock that goes from the north to the south of Zimbabwe. It spans a total length of 550 km, has a maximum width of 11 km and contains diverse mineral resources, including the platinum group metals, gold, nickel, copper, and chrome. Some of the biggest mining companies that operate in the Dyke are Zimplats, Mimosa Mine, ZIMASCO and Falcon Gold (Makore & Zano 2012:1). It is very difficult for mining firms to retain skilled workers since rival companies operate within relatively short distances from each other, which results in fierce direct competition for the same pool of expertise (Figure 7.38–7.39). For instance, when I first visited at Unki in June 2016, I was a given a car ride by a geologist who told me that she had just tendered her resignation at Unki to take up employment at Ngezi Platinum Mine, owned by Zimplats, the largest platinum producer in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, most of the senior management at Unki were formerly employed by ZIMASCO. There is no doubt that mine management across the Dyke are acutely aware of the potential role of housing provision to attract and retain all levels of mineworkers, especially with the advent of social networking, which helps mineworkers stay up to date with developments at rival mines.

Figure 7.38 Map showing the distance between Ngezi Platinum Mine and Unki mine (Source: Adapted from Google Earth)



Figure 7.39 Map showing the distance between Unki mine and one of its closest rival platinum mining company, Mimosa Mining Company (Source: Adapted from Google Earth)

Housing policy is further complicated by the unavoidable competition with bigger cities. Shurugwi's (Midlands Province) centrality and hence connectivity with major towns in the country may be an advantage when it comes to moving equipment and other materials, including the mine's produce, but it makes it very difficult to attract top management and other skilled artisans to move their families from major cities such as Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Gweru to live in Shurugwi (Figures 7.40–7.43).



Figure 7.40 Map showing the distance between Unki and Masvingo (Source: Google Maps)



Figure 7.41 Map showing the distance between Unki and Gweru (Source: Google Maps)



Figure 7.42 Map showing the distance between Unki and Harare (Source: Google Maps)



Figure 7.43 Map showing the distance between Unki and Bulawayo (Source: Google maps)

In addition, aggressive policy reforms have added impetus for mining firms such as Unki to spent significant amounts of money on infrastructural development and housing for their employees. Notable is the infamous Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), which was launched by the government in 2013 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). This policy earmarked the mining sector as the sector with the potential to become the pillar for economic growth through value addition and

beneficiation. Despite remonstrations by the Chamber of Mines that the policy was scaring investors away, platinum mining firms, who were open targets of ZimAsset, had to take action to appease the government. The labour movement continue to cry foul of the government policies and labour laws. The following interview excerpts reveal the immensity of this problem:

> The political climate continues to impact negatively on trade unions in the mining sector. Politicians always denounce trade unions' deemed as anti-ZANU-PF government. They often denounce these while advocating for mining employees to subscribe to trade unions which are pro-government. This creates an unequal recruitment ground as some members fear to be associated with trade unions deemed anti-government by the legislature. This political climate has reared its ugly head in the mining sectors where the legislature introduced a 51% indigenous ownership. Most mining firms have closed, while those that have remained on board, induced retrenchments and/or down sized. The union continues to mobilise labour to embrace trade unions membership despite the discouraging political and legislation power. This is done through campaigns and awareness. (ZUMW Deputy General Secretary; 22 December 2020)

> I know our union tries to fight for our rights, but the odds are always stacked against us. The employer can exploit us, setting unrealistic production targets, although the pay is great. I must admit … but I still feel the union has been rendered toothless by ZANU-PF. We cannot freely gather and discuss our grievances with the union leadership because they accuse us that all we want is to force a regime change because we are affiliated with ZCTU, and therefore politically we are MDC supporters. (Mambo; 18/12/2020)

The ZimAsset followed yet another aggressive transformation policy called the Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 (Government of Zimbabwe. 2010). This policy provided that local mining communities must receive shares in the mining firms operating in their territory. As a result of this policy, the Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust was established at Unki mine. Furthermore, subsection 2(k) of section

403 of the Mines and Minerals Act, Chapter 21:5 stipulate that mining firms are required to ensure the proper feeding and housing of their labourers. Thus, mining firms in general, and platinum mining firms in particular, are under the spotlight with regard to the living conditions of their employees and empowering local communities.

While mining firms generally feel aggrieved by the macroeconomic framework, they continue to have cordial working relationships with local government authorities at municipal level. A municipal representative of the Shurugwi Town Council had this to say about their partnership with Unki mine:

> What we appreciate the most about Unki is their interest and significant investments in the growth and development Shurugwi and the surrounding areas. They have made so many contributions to infrastructural development, including road construction and maintenance, building schools and health facilities, and building houses; the best houses you can find in Shurugwi. When the government called for businesses to support our fight against Covid-19, Unki were among the first to step forward and support these efforts. They assisted Shurugwi District Hospital with PPEs, medical equipment, among other things. Recently, we have jointly embarked on a project to install streetlights in Shurugwi CBD and townships, which will help to reduce petty crimes such as muggings at night and keep our people safe. (Shurugwi Town Council Representative; 5/01/2021)

Even though there is good cooperation between the mine and the local government, at times their interests clash. The following is an example of such cases:

> We know how the long-term future and viability of this town is inseparable from mining. Our land is endowed with many precious metals. Therefore, there is mutual understanding and shared goals between the council and the mine. We have so many private-public partnership projects that are ongoing. Of course, they are a profit-oriented company, and we are a public entity focused on service delivery for all the residents of Shurugwi, so there may be some misunderstandings now and then. For example, we had a disagreement over a number of stands and the subdivision bought by Unki mines, which

> from our point of view we do not have jurisdiction but the courts and the arbitrator dealing with the matter ordered the STC [Shurugwi Town Council; local authority] to grant ownership of the disputed land to Unki mine. (Shurugwi Town Council Representative; 5/01/2021)

This demonstrates how the state, through the local municipality in this case, continues to engage in what Jessop (2008:428) refers to as a 'strategic-context' analysis as they choose a course of action. The local municipality here is eager to work with the mining firm in matters that help the municipality deliver service delivery to its residents, boosting their legitimacy with rate payers.

7.8 Conclusion

The kubotereka spatial order consists of five geographic nodes, namely the rural villages near the mine, the camp adjacent to the mine plant, Shurugwi townships, Gweru townships and the Impali housing project. In terms of absolute space, the rural villages are primarily made up of grass thatched huts and some rudimentary brick houses. However, there are no proper roads, toilets, schools, and health facilities. Importantly though, they remain in control of their homestead land and continue to practice subsistence farming. At the 'camp', which is strategically located adjacent to the mine plant, there is a mix of spacious houses for senior managerial employees and their families as well as makeshift houses in the form of metal cabins meant for short-term contract workers with technical expertise. In addition, the camp has a high perimeter fence, and there is one entrance or exit gate which is tightly monitored by security officers and a complex alarm system helps secure this perimeter fence.

As noted earlier, many of the workers at Unki live in townships in nearby Shurugwi town and further away in Gweru. Those in Shurugwi townships live in overcrowded communities, and the actual houses are old and dilapidated. In addition, there are dirty roads and uncollected refuse piles up on street corners, making it a health and environmental risk. Gweru townships offer better living conditions for mineworkers and their families; there is no overcrowding and there are better houses and roads. However, the recently built Impali houses just outside of Shurugwi are the best housing stock in this

town and beyond. These company-owned houses have become a marketing point in the whole of Shurugwi as the authorities were trying to reinvigorate the town's economy. There are no high walls or fences surrounding this housing project. Only short fences for boundary marking purposes were installed.

In terms of relative space, the rural and township dwellers have the worst living conditions, especially compared with those in the newly built company-owned houses. The workers who did not get allocated a house are fully aware of the conditions enjoyed by those who now live in the company-owned houses and envy them. At the same time, those who got allocated houses expressed awareness of their vulnerability because they do not have ownership of the houses. They are mindful of the fact that their stay in these houses will only last as long as their employment contract, and most of them were looking to purchase or build their own houses. In addition, Unki workers were in constant communication through social media with fellow mineworkers at nearby mines and are thus aware of the living conditions being offered by rival mines. As a result, rival mines poach skilled and managerial workers from each other.

In terms of relational space, township dwellers, though living in some overcrowded and dilapidated houses, still enjoy a deep sense of belonging in their communities. They also reported that they enjoy the communal living in the townships, which result in very low crime rates. Those living in the newly built houses at Impali also reported a strong sense of belonging. Mineworkers' children roam and play in the streets. Their wives can also be seen chatting to one another through the fences as they work their backyard gardens. The satellite dishes and cars parked at almost all the houses show that these mineworkers are living a life that most Zimbabweans can only dream of. It is also interesting to note that workers who live in company-owned housing do not work the same shift as those who live in Gweru and Shurugwi townships. Those from the townships start work at 06:00 and those from the mine housing work either the afternoon shift from 13:00 or the night shift from 19:00.

One of the key findings of this study relates to what is missing from the spatial ordering at Unki in comparison to the Amandelbult complex case study. At Unki there is no informal settlement near the mine or compound accommodation. Instead, the company

built houses for its employees, including those at entry level, and there are plans to build more houses. However, these are not merely acts of charity. The investments into the housing project, building schools, roads, clinics, and power substations are hallmarks of what Harvey describes as the inherent tensions between the fixity and mobility of capital for which capital needs a spatial fix. Jessop (2006:148) explains it as follows:

> Capital has to build a fixed space (or "landscape") necessary for its own functioning at a certain point in its history only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital invested therein) at a later point in order to make way for a new "spatial fix" (openings for fresh accumulation in new spaces and territories).

In this case, Unki employees are right to remain sceptical and actively look for opportunities to build their own houses. They are aware that living in the company-owned houses can end abruptly should the mine close or should they lose their jobs. The staff bus arrangement is also instrumental in the mining company's search for a spatial fix. It allows the company to transport their workers to and from work and relieve them of the pressure to provide housing for their entire workforce.

While labour geographers tend to focus on the power struggle between capital and labour, this case study reveals that the state, through its regulatory frameworks, plays a key role in this tug of war. In Zimbabwe, the ZimAsset policy (Government of Zimbabwe 2010) and in South Africa the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) are instruments used by the states to create a blueprint for transformation and development in mining communities.

The following chapter presents a summary of the main findings of this study and their conceptual implications as well as empirical contributions to debates on labour geography.

8 Conclusions

> The initial basis or foundation of social space is nature, natural or physical space. Upon this basis are superimposed, in ways that transform, supplant or even threaten to destroy it, successive stratified and tangled networks which, though always material in form, nevertheless have an existence beyond their materiality: paths, roads, railways, telephone links, and so on. Theory has shown that no space disappears completely or is utterly abolished in the course of the process of social development- not even the natural place where that process began (Lefebvre 1974:402–403).

8.1 Introduction

Natural or physical space described by Lefebvre above or absolute space as Harvey calls it plays a more critical role in the mining sector than it does in most economic sectors. This is largely because mineral deposits are buried in this kind of space in locations that cannot be predetermined by capital, labour or the state. Thus, natural or physical topology of mineral rich locations determine the nature of social space that can be produced in these areas. However, as this study demonstrated, capital, labour and the state are locked in an endless three-way power struggle over the production of spaces of social reproduction in mining communities. It also demonstrated the enduring nature of space in general and absolute space. For instance, the compounds or SAVs and the married and single quarters for skilled mineworker are still at the core of the scorecard spatial order at Amandelbult despite being from an infamous apartheid spatial order. At Unki, the Boterekwa mountains continue to determine spatial development in this area despite the construction of a road that connects the mine and the nearby town of Shurugwi. In addition, the railway line and basic housing infrastructure built by the BSAC during the colonial era are still in place and central to the spatial development of this small mining town.

Zimbabwe and South Africa are neighbouring countries in the same economic and geographical region. They thus share a common history in terms of the development of mining and the subsequent housing strategies employed by mining firms to deal with the

pertinent housing question in the industry. Historically, a common feature of the geographies of mining towns in Zimbabwe and South Africa was the compound system, which was specifically designed to maximise the exploitation of Black mineworkers. In both countries, Black mineworkers were coerced and cajoled into compounds. There were varying degrees of openness, depending on the location of the mine as well as the minerals being mined. For instance, in South Africa the diamond mines were in favour of completely closed compounds whereas gold and coal mines built and ran partially closed compounds. In Zimbabwe, the core of the housing complex on large mines was the central square compound, built for new forced recruits (chibaro labourers), which was encircled by two layers of huts for single and married mineworkers with their families (Van Onselen 1976). However, as they worked at the mine longer, they would be granted the opportunity to move out of the inner compound to the second and third tier with relatively less control and where they could live with their families. In addition, Black and white mineworkers were housed in racially segregated locations. Black mineworkers were compounded in overcrowded single-sex compounds, separated from their families, and white mineworkers lived mainly in family housing units with health, educational and recreational facilities provided to them by the mining firm.

This study focused on the housing strategies of one platinum mining firm with operations in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. It answered the following research question: What is the rationale behind the housing strategies of AAP in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe? The findings revealed that there are both continuities and discontinuities with regards to housing strategies employed by AAP in both countries. In general, there are commonalities between the mining communities in these two countries. These similarities primarily stem from the fact that it is mostly the same mining firm operating in both countries. However, there are some important differences as well. This chapter presents a summary of the key findings of the two case studies and their empirical and conceptual implications or contributions to the current debates in labour geography as well as studies on mining and human settlements.

8.2 The scorecard spatial order

As stated earlier (Chapter 6), the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) continues to play an instrumental role in the housing reforms in the mining industry. Indeed, all the initiatives and changes that are implemented regarding housing and living conditions of mineworkers can be traced back to the Mining Charter's scorecard, hence the concept 'scorecard spatial order'. The Mining Charter, which was first passed by the South African government in 2002 and revised in 2004, 2010 and 2018, stipulate that all mining firms must provide the government with 5- and 10-year plans, which were supposed to be fully implemented by the end of 2014, for addressing the housing needs for mineworkers. The government would then use these plans to evaluate the progress made annually. Those firms who failed to reach the agreed targets risked losing their mining licences. On housing and living conditions of mineworkers, the Mining Charter requires mining firms to answer the following question:

> For company-provided housing has the mine, in consultation with stakeholders established measures for improving the standard of housing, including the upgrading of the hostels, conversion of hostels to family units and promoted homeownership options for mine employees? Companies will be required to indicate what they have done to improve housing and show a plan to progress the issue overtime and is implementing the plan (Government of South Africa 2004).

In addition, the promulgation of the Housing and Living Condition Standards by the Minister of Minerals and Energy in 2009 further forced mining firms to put in place solid plans to provide mineworkers with housing (see Government of South Africa 2009). It emphasised building sustainable mining towns. This meant going beyond merely providing accommodation for their workers. Rather, the provision of family housing was to be associated with expanded community services and facilities, including education, health care services, recreational facilities, and social wellbeing. In addition, mining firms were obligated to upgrade hostels and convert some of them into family units. To satisfy the set standards, housing provided by the mining firms was required to have access to electricity, facilities for hot water supply and running water, basic fixtures and fittings in

rental stock and access to ablution facilities. This, I argue, is the main reason why mining giants such as AAP are spending billions of Rands on housing their employees.

Both the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) and the Housing and Living Condition Standards make it clear that non-compliance will result in a firm losing all mining rights since this would render the entity to be in breach of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, No. 28 of 2002, and subjected to section 47 of the Act. This subsection gives the Minister of Minerals and Energy the powers to "cancel or suspend any reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right, mining permit, retention permit or holders of old order rights or previous owner of works". It is important to understand the form of the South African state and how it wields its power. As was suggested earlier, although the ANC, in alliance with the SACP and COSATU, rose to power in 1994 and has been the governing party since then, it does not have absolute control over state power. Capital, including multinational mining firms, which was instrumental in the creation of the apartheid's spatial order (see Posel 1991), continue to exercise significant influence on policy formulation through their participation in NEDLAC (Gostner & Joffe 2000; Kim & Van der Westhuizen 2015). This 'condensation of class relations' (Poulantzas 1975:26) is manifest in the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act's powers being tempered by the fact that mining firms must voluntarily set their own targets and self-report their progress. Thus, in my view, management is mainly interested in keeping up with targets set in the Mining Charter, thereby creating the scorecard spatial order, rather than empowering and transforming the lives of their Black mineworkers.

However, this is not to suggest that there has been no significant progress with regards to the housing of Black mineworkers in post-apartheid South Africa, especially in the platinum belt. By 2015, the three SAVs at the Amandelbult mine, namely Mlanje, Tumela and Dishaba, had reduced numbers of residents to one person per room. These former compounds or hostels were upgraded into many shared flat apartments. About 3–4 persons now share a three or four roomed flat. Thus, each worker has their own room and own bed, and they share a living room, a toilet and bathroom. This has transformed the living conditions of Black mineworkers, considering that during apartheid up to 20 mineworkers were inhumanely squashed in the same space. Upgraded SAVs are restoring

the dignity of Black mineworkers. Some of the improvements include the installation of geysers to provide hot water in the SAVs and there are clean toilets and bathrooms. SAVs also have recreational and entertainment services, such as a drinking hall, billiards, large TV screens, barbeque gazebos, and mulabalaba. With regards to health facilities, there is a fully functional mine hospital located very close to one of the SAVs.

SAV dwellers are also provided with three meals a day. These are nutritiously balanced meals, but they are not very popular; SAV dwellers complained about the food being poorly cooked. In addition, there are facilities for adult education programmes and training facilities aimed at improving the literacy of mineworkers. In my view, the most promising aspect of the scorecard spatial order, which still needs further development, is the attempt to transform hostels into single and family housing units. Since hostels were a key spatial feature used mostly to exert control over Black mineworkers and to effect maximum exploitation of these workers, a complete dismantling of the compound system would be a fundamental prerequisite to their economic emancipation and empowerment. Unfortunately, despite these upgrades and the provision of social services, which were available to white workers only during apartheid, the exterior design and architecture remain intact. The high security fences and single, guarded entrance or exit have remained, and I argue that this is impeding the complete transformation of the spatial order at the Amandelbult mine.

In view of the challenges mentioned above, I argue that rather than completely dismantling the compound system along with the physical structures that made it possible, what has transpired is a mere reconfiguration of the spatial order. Physical structures such as the high fences and constantly monitored gates continue to ensure that, for example, SAV dwellers do not have access to single quarters and family housing areas despite being in the same geographic space and within a walking distance from each other. They live in two different worlds, separated by barbed wires, high fences, and countless security check points. This ensures that certain social services and facilities provided by the mining firm, such as playgrounds for children, tennis courts, a swimming pool, restaurants and the golf club, remain out of reach to Black mineworkers dwelling in SAVs. Crucially, the SAV dwellers continue to live without their families and their families have no access to the medical facilities at the mine, while the families of those

in family housing units do. Thus, the spatial reconfiguration taking place in the mining industry creates conditions for social reproduction that are fundamentally different for different categories of mineworkers, depending on their perceived worth to the company. Racial segregation, which was the logic behind the spatial order at the mine during apartheid, has been successfully replaced by a new logic, class segregation.

Full transformation of mine housing and living standards of many Black mineworkers, I argue, is being hindered by management's obsession with ticking boxes on the Mining Charter's (Government of South Africa 2004) scorecard and avoiding penalties or losing their mining licences. This single-minded determination by mine management not to lag on the targets set in the Mining Charter was made clear to me when one of the human resources managers responsible for housing at the mine explained why the mine was spending large sums of money building houses for mineworkers, stating that "we didn't want to be caught with our pants down". This aptly describes mine management's approach to mine housing: It is centred on avoiding state penalties or losing mining licences rather than a commitment to the spatial restructuring of mining communities. Therefore, I argue that the logic behind the creation of the compound system in the mining industry has partially been challenged but needs to be completely overhauled and turned on its head. The Mining Charter itself, which has been instrumental in driving changes in the living conditions of mineworkers, is slowly being reduced into a 'game of numbers' and an exercise in 'ticking boxes'. This is illustrated by the fact that many of the mineworkers who accepted the management's offer of a monthly LOA as a part of their plan to depopulate the compounds, thereby reducing the occupancy ratio to one person per room, have now moved to live in nearby informal settlements. Hence, mine management can tick the box on the Mining Charter scorecard requiring them to lower the occupancy ratio to one person per room in SAVs, but this does not mean that the lives of those who left have been improved. Instead, another housing crisis is created that may be more difficult to resolve.

In addition to upgrading hostels, AAP embarked on a programme to encourage home ownership among 'all' its employees. One such project consisting of 310 housing units in a prime location of the town among other existing houses is in Northam Extension 6 (see Chapter 6). This is just over 10 km from the Amandelbult mine. It is connected to

the major road network in the city, which makes it easy for workers to drive to and from their workplace. In addition, there are facilities such as private doctor's rooms, schools, and shopping malls in proximity. As noted earlier, AAP spent more than R 65 million on this project alone.

However, there are still some challenges to be overcome to ensure adequate housing for *all* mineworkers. For instance, while the younger and educated generation of mineworkers is very mobile and are keen to relocate closer to the workplace and buy own houses in strategic locations such as the Northam Extension 6 houses, many mineworkers who receive a LOA choose to reside in informal settlements that are mushrooming in and around the Amandelbult mine complex. Some of these informal settlements are located on land that belongs to the mine. Hence, it can be argued that workers are displaying their agency by subverting and resisting the reconfigured spatial order designed from the top without their full consent. Instead of using their LOA to rent apartments in nearby towns, a move that would completely fragment them and push them out of sight of mine management, they opt to remain closer to the mine and in the process disrupt the intended spatial order. This is further compounded by the fact that most of the mineworkers, especially the older generation, have a secondary home in rural villages in major labour-sending provinces such as the Eastern Cape, and are thus reluctant to relocate to urban areas near the mines. They prefer to stay in SAVs or live in informal settlements rather than pursue home ownership. The result, intended or unintended, is that the mine's homeownership scheme has become an elitist project. However, it can be argued that the poor Black mineworkers are resisting AAP's attempt to spatially reconfigure the Amandelbult mining community in general and not just its homeownership scheme.

The failure of this homeownership scheme to attract many of the mineworkers brings to mind another failed attempt by AAP to foster home ownership among Black mineworkers in the late 1980s. They then overestimated Black mineworkers' interest in owning houses and moving their families near their workplaces. Their intention was to move up to 24 000 Black mineworkers into family housing units Thabong, Welkom. The scheme was elitist and only accessible to a select few; the skilled and supervisory Black South African workers. Furthermore, the scheme was not necessarily popular with Black mineworkers, who opted for relatively cheap rental housing in the squatter camps (informal settlements)

or backyard shacks in nearby townships. Driven from the top by management, the scheme lacked an in-depth understanding of the various housing needs of Black mineworkers (Crush et al. 1991; Laburn-Peart, 1990).

In addition, it should be noted that the challenges currently facing the NUM because of direct competition with a rival union the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) make it difficult to get the workers' collective voice on the issue of housing. The instances where mineworkers build informal settlements on private land owned by the mining company are of great significance to the understanding of relational space at the Amandelbult mining complex. Just as the mining company used to invade the private space (absolute space) of compounded mineworkers, it can be argued that by building informal settlements on land privately owned by the mining company, mineworkers are now returning the favour.

8.3 The kubotereka spatial order

As noted in Chapter 7, the kubotereka spatial order consists of five geographic nodes, namely the rural villages near the mine, the camp adjacent to the mine plant, Shurugwi townships, Gweru townships and the Impali housing project. One of the interesting findings at Unki mine was that the mine uses surrounding rural villages as the main source for its general labourers. What is striking about this arrangement is that an unofficial, self-styled lobby group forced mine management to prioritise local villagers to fill general labourers' jobs at the mine. Even though mine management was reluctant to enter this arrangement, these villagers do not require the company's assistance to build houses near the mine. The main concerns they have are with regards to their need for better schools, hospitals, clinics, running water and proper toilets in the villages.

The fact that mine management gave in to pressure from a community lobby group but would respond with a heavy-handed approach to demands by organised labour, as was the case when the management refused to pay some of the construction workers contracted to build houses for mineworkers, illustrates the notion of kubotereka. In addition, the fact that the dispute with this local community was settled after mediation facilitated by provincial political officers rather than labour representatives or a labour

court shows mine management's preparedness to sidestep organised labour. This incident also demonstrates the state's influence on labour issues, especially at the time of ZimAsset. Hence, although labour's institutional and associational power has been weakened, workers were able to draw on societal power to influence decisions made by capital (see Brookes 2013; Schmalz et al. 2018). In addition, the state, through a provincial officer, had to selectively choose who to privilege by "engaging in 'strategic-context' analysis when choosing a course of action" (Jessop 1982:428). In this case, a state that had a strong support base in rural areas and struggled to win over organised labour strategically chose to side with rural villagers.

Some of the mineworkers at Unki live in Shurugwi and Gweru Townships. Houses in Shurugwi townships are dilapidated and rubbish is not regularly collected, making the townships a health and environmental hazard. In addition, there are very poor roads in the townships in Shurugwi and the houses are overcrowded. They manage to endure their adverse living conditions by tapping into their *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking. Relational space or the subjective experiences for the workers who live in Gweru townships are largely influenced by the long-distance travel to and from work on top of long hours of hard work, which often mean no time or energy for recreation. The average day for these mineworkers when they are on a day shift begins as early as 02:00 in the morning as they wake up to boil bathing water and get ready to catch the first bus, which starts off from Gweru at 03:05. They only arrive at the mine at 05:05 and prepare to start work at 06:00. This greatly affects their work-life balance. They must also make do with poorly resourced health and educational facilities.

In addition, the mineworkers at Unki experience the kubotereka spatial order in relation to what they have experienced or observed in other cities such as Gweru, Masvingo, Bulawayo and Harare. This further explains why the *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking is prevalent among mineworkers in this town. This is also in line with the observation made by Kamete (2012:601) that most Zimbabweans living in small mining towns do not view these mining settlements as 'genuine' or 'real' towns.

In contrast, the 350 workers who live at Impali housing project have access to some of the best facilities and living conditions, arguably in the whole province. The mine spent

over US$170 million building the houses as well as putting in place the necessary infrastructure and services, including the construction of a road, a 33 kV substation, a primary school, and a clinic. The houses, however, differ in size and location, reflecting the occupants' seniority and position. This is similar to what other researchers observed at other mines in the country (see Dansereau 2002; Gaidzanwa 1991). As stated earlier, this practice of residentially segregating mineworkers' houses according to rank and status is reminiscent of the racial segregation during the colonial era. The subtle difference is that class has replaced race as the decisive factor.

Another interesting finding was that senior management at Unki commute between Shurugwi and Harare on a weekly basis. They spend their working days in Shurugwi and the weekends in Harare with their families. Their families are reluctant to move and settle in a small town with limited services. This also explains the low trust levels between mineworkers and senior management as they are seen as being out of touch with the everyday experiences of the workers.

Significantly, there are no informal settlements or compounds near Unki mine as was the case at the Amanelbult mine. Therefore, with the exception of the village labour force and a few employees living in the mine camp, the rest of the mine's labour force travel long distances to and from work on a daily basis. A significant number of mineworkers still live in townships in Gweru. These workers travel up to 67 km to work, which should take on average one hour and 15 minutes one way by car, but takes two hours on the mine staff buses. Put together, they travel a 134 km round trip and spend on average four hours each day travelling between work and home. Although the mining company provides them with 'free' transport to and from work, too much time is spent on travelling between work and home, upseting the work-life balance for these workers. Those who live in Shurugwi townships, though closer to the mine, still travel about 27 km to work. In addition, those living in the company houses at Impali also travel about 32 km one way (64 km round trip) to and from work, spending a significant amount of time on the road each day. Even though many of these mineworkers own cars, they continue to rely on the mine's staff buses to ferry them to and from work through dangerous terrain with very poor roads.

Thus, as I stated before, the Boterekwa pass is a central geographic feature in the spatial order at Unki and beyond, including the mining town of Shurugwi. This is the foundation on which the kubotereka spatial order, which permeates all levels of social relations in this mining region, is built. Mining jobs are just like the snaking road that runs through the Boterekwa mountains that offers road users the opportunity to view the majestic scenery but at the same time put them in danger. I draw this concept from one of the most popular physical landscapes in Shurugwi: The Boterekwa pass. The Shona word *Boterekwa* literally means a long and meandering course, thus *kubotereka* is to follow a long and meandering course. I use the concept kubotereka spatial order to describe how the relations between mineworkers and management at Unki follows a meandering pattern and how the actual physical Boterekwa pass remains a key determinant of the spatial order in this mining region. I further argue that the kubotereka spatial order permiates all spheres of social relations for mineworkers at Unki. Social relations and the everyday life experiences of mineworkers in Shurugwi mirrors this physical landscape, which is a blend of natural and artificial features that presents challenges and opportunities. Unki mine's human resource management also followed the *kubotereka* way of doing things by being deliberately slow to respond to workers' and community concerns and unpredictable in their decision making. The kubotereka spatial order is manifest in the following ways in this mining community:

- Mineworkers are hired to do hard, dangerous work underground, yet they are expected to travel long distances to and from work each day. Even though this has adverse effects on their social and family lives, they are afraid to demand family housing closer to the mine.
- When mine management eventually decided to build houses for employees, the project was mismanaged to the extent that it took longer to complete than was expected and to date there are incomplete houses, yet a significant number of mine employees continue to travel long distances to and from work.
- The *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking, which I draw from the common Shona expression among mineworkers at Unki mine meaning 'this is a work location' or simply 'we are here to work', sums up their diverging views and attitudes towards the process of space making in Shurugwi. Those who live in dilapidated housing

in the townships use this expression in reluctant acceptance of their 'temporary' situation in a town far away from home. Unki employees living in recently built company-owned housing use this expression to remind themselves that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract and so they need to build their own houses elsewhere. Thus, the *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking means different things to different groups of mineworkers, depending on their housing location, which is informed by their perceived worth to the mining firm. It entails either a reluctant acceptance of the status quo or self-caution against false consciousness.

- The *hapaitwe zvekumhanya* attitude is also drawn from a Shona street lingo expression that literally means 'you don't move too fast here' but was adopted by mineworkers to mean 'be cautious, don't be too direct or hasty' when dealing with each other and especially mine management. I use this concept to describe mineworkers' cautious and patient approach to dealing with mine management with regards to housing and other work-related issues. This is further compounded by the fact that the trade union movement in general has become weaker in Zimbabwe at a time when unemployment rates have skyrocketed. Thus, mine management hold almost unchallenged leverage when dealing mineworkers since they have at their disposal a large pool of retrenched mineworkers who are unemployed and desperate to find work.
- As a result, Unki employees consider themselves the lucky ones who are employed by the employer of choice in a town where much of the population are jobless, many among them having lost their jobs after ZIMASCO closed operations. Thus, they are fearful of losing their jobs and this leaves them open to exploitation, such as working long hours and travelling long distances to and from work. Those who have been given houses by the mine are expected be exemplary in terms of discipline, work ethic and loyalty to the company.

Table 8.1 sums up the key finding of the two case studies, Amandelbult mine and Unki mine.

Table 8-1: Summary of key findings of the two case studies

Amandelbult mine complex, Northam, South Africa	Unki mine, Shurugwi, Zimbabwe
Employee-owned family housing integrated in established communities is provided through homeownership schemes. Workers getting LOAs leave hostel accommodation to live in informal settlements near the mine Significant number of workers live in SAVs without their families There is company-owned family housing for middle management and artisans in geographically strategic locations close to the mine with access to social amenities and facilities that are unavailable to SAV dwellers. The Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2002, 2004), the Housing and Living Condition Standards (2009) and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, No. 28 of 2002 gave impetus to the changes in mine housing strategies.	No homeownership schemes sponsored by the mining firm. Company-owned housing was recently built for all employees, including entry-level employees. This has reduced the time and distance travelled by these workers to work by half. There is no compound or informal settlements near the mine. Unskilled labourers are mainly drawn from surrounding rural villages. Villagers had a self-styled lobby group force mine management to prioritise them for general labourers. Some of the workers live in overcrowded and dilapidated housing in the nearby townships. Some of workers travel over 64 km one way to work (about 1hr and 15 minutes' drive). Dangerous terrain and poor roads make driving to and from work a risk for many miners. The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (2013) and the Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 (Government of Zimbabwe. 2010) were critical tools used by the state to force mining firms to improve the living conditions of their employees as well as develop the local mining communities.

8.4 Conceptual implications

This thesis introduced insightful theoretical concepts, namely the scorecard spatial order and the kubotereka spatial order. The study revealed that the struggle between labour and capital takes place within the spatial frameworks that were drawn initially by the state through regulatory policies. At Amandelbult, South Africa, the Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) is used by the state as a regulatory tool. This enables the South African state to abdicate its responsibility for providing housing and other social services to mining communities. With the state withdrawing from playing its role, the mining companies have to shoulder the financial costs. As a result, mining firms are further abdicating social reproduction to individual mineworkers and their families. It is important not to overstate the role of the state in formulating the Mining Charter since organised labour in South Africa participates in policy formulation through the NEDLAC. Nonetheless, the findings of this study show that at Amandelbult, the mining firm had

become a state proxy, providing crucial infrastructure and social services in this mining community. While Harvey's conceptual tools were helpful to describe the nature of the human settlements in this mining town, they fall short of conceptualising labour's response and explaining the role of the state.

Therefore, reading Harvey and Lefebvre in conjunction with the power resources approach and the strategic-relational approach (Jessop 2007) helps to paint a complete analytical picture. South African mineworkers in the platinum sector were able to draw from all four sources of power, namely structural, associational, institutional and societal power (see Schmalz et al. 2018; Silver 2003; Wright 2000). South Africa is the world's number one platinum producer, and this boosts platinum mineworkers' structural power. Their strategic position is further reinforced by the fact that platinum mines are not foot loose because mining capital cannot simply close shop and relocate. This explains why they could stage the longest strike in the country's history in 2014, which lasted for five months (Bowman & Isaacs 2015; Chinguno 2015). Despite the rivalry between the NUM and AMCU, South African mineworkers still enjoy significant associational power and hence have successfully negotiated for a living wage in the sector. Their institutional and societal power bases are also relatively strong. Workers' rights are legally protected by laws such as the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Through COSATU they enjoy an influential alliance with the ruling party, which ensures that their interests are represented when the government formulates socio-economic policies.

The strategic-relational approach to the state theory helps to explain some of the policy decisions and actions of the state. As was stated earlier, the ANC has been the ruling party in alliance with COSATU and the SACP since 1994. This alliance puts labour in a strategic position to influence the country's policies, although they have not always got what they wanted. In addition, the government, COSATU and South African capital work together through NEDLAC to formulate socio-economic policies (Gostner & Joffe 2000; Kim & Van der Westhuizen 2015). The Mining Charter (Government of South Africa 2004) is a biproduct of this corporatist arrangement through NEDLAC. However, industrial unrest and prolonged strike waves between 2012 and 2015 in the platinum mining sector laid bare the ineffectiveness of the corporatist industrial relations system.

This proves that no single group or class has absolute control over state power (see Jessop 1982). Therefore, the post-apartheid state must strategically 'balance' the interests of all group formations within its territory. This demonstrates how states are not neutral terrains on which political forces struggle with equal chances to pursue their interests and objectives and with equal chances of realising their goals.

In terms of the local municipal government, capital's interests are well represented within the Thabazimbi Local Municipality. Mining firms are regarded as partners by the municipality and they also contribute significantly to infrastructure development by investing millions of Rands. As Jessop (1982:221) puts it, state power is capitalist if it creates, maintains, or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation and is non-capitalist if it disrupts these conditions. It can be argued, therefore, that the post-apartheid South African state is capitalist as much as it promotes neoliberal policies. However, the conquest of state power remains incomplete and open to endless contestation, giving no single class formation absolute state power (Miliband 1969:56). This explains why there are continuities and discontinuities between the apartheid and post-apartheid social and spatial orders.

The relations between the state, labour and capital are even more complicated in post-colonial Zimbabwe. In the early 1980s, the then new ZANU-PF government spearheaded the formation of a single trade union federation the ZCTU. There were strong ties between ZCTU's leadership and the ruling party. However, this did not last long. The ZCTU broke formal ties with ZANU-PF in 1989. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, a neoliberal policy framework, in the early 1990s was the start of the economic downward spiral and the effects are still being felt today (Raftopoulos 2000, 2018). In recent years, the Zimbabwean government under the Mugabe regime introduced the ZimAsset policy, which compelled multinational companies such as Unki mine to invest heavily in local community development. This included building houses for its workforce as well as building schools, clinics, roads, and power substations.

From the year 2000 onwards, the relationship between the state and labour broke down. The state used restrictive laws and brutal force to suppress labour. State apparatus like the Central Intelligence Organisation, riot police and the army targeted vocal trade

unionists and opposition political parties (Mtimtema 2018; Raftopoulos 2018; Sachikonye 2018). In addition, the state sponsored the formation of another trade union federation in 2000, the ZFTU, to counter the efforts of the ZCTU. As a result, too many splinter unions compete to organise in the same sector (Bhebe & Mahapa 2014; Phimister & Pilossof 2017; Raftopoulos et al. 2018; Van der Walt 1998). Hence, in Zimbabwe labour has very limited structural, associational, and institutional power. However, they continue to draw on societal power as they join forces with local and international social movements, community organisations and political parties. For example, trade unions that organise in the mining sector continue to participate in global organisations such as IndustriAll, which is a global union that challenges the power of multinational companies and negotiates with them on a global level (IndustriALL, 2019).

In both case studies the mining company faces a real risk of losing its mining licence for failure to comply. In addition, it is important to note that while the post-apartheid South African government has encouraged a vibrant labour movement, in Zimbabwe, the opposite happened. The Zimbabwean government deliberately suppressed and weakened the labour movement without necessarily taking sides with capital.

Table 8-2: Summary of key findings and conceptual implications

	Amandelbult (South Africa)	**Unki (Zimbabwe)**
State's spatial regulation	Scorecard is used to abdicate responsibility of social reproduction to mining firms. Mining Charter: The collective labour movement is given a say. Mining firms become somewhat of a state proxy.	Iron fist control and regulation through ZimAsset. Companies face losing mining licences if they do not comply. Labour regulations weaken the labour movement.
Company spatial fix	Company housing strategy boils down to ticking boxes and scoring scorecard points. The LOA leads to the unprecedented growth of informal settlements near mines. Transportation arrangements.	A mixed strategy, including recruiting labourers from surrounding rural villages. Some workers are settled in a well-built company suburb. Others live in nearby, rundown township houses. Some still travel long distances from Gweru.
Worker agency	Workers show subtle resilience by accepting the LOA but	Workers living in dilapidated housing in the townships reluctantly accept their

	Amandelbult (South Africa)	Unki (Zimbabwe)
	moving into informal settlements. Move into new houses but refuse to pay electricity and water bills. Direct confrontation: Marikana, and long strike (5 months) in 2015.	'temporary' situation in a town far away from home. Employees living in recently built company-owned housing expressed their awareness that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract or when the mine closes and so they are actively looking to build their own houses elsewhere.

Building new housing projects that require huge financial investments on the part of the mining firm in both case studies should be seen as capital's attempt to find a spatial fix. Capitalists tend to invest in fixed, immobile capital to facilitate the mobility of other capitals (See Harvey 2001; Jessop 2006). This search for a spatial fix is further enabled by investments in road construction, building schools and health facilities as well as other social amenities that take many years to return their value to circulation. Hence, capital seeks to buy itself more time. Furthermore, the housing strategy at Amandelbult was driven by mine management's determination to tick the relevant boxes and score points on the Mining Charter's scorecard (Government of South Africa 2004). On the other hand, mineworkers who accepted the LOA to leave the mine compounds have moved into informal settlements near the mine. Their living conditions have worsened since there are no basic services such as toilets and clean drinking water. At Unki, the mine continues to rely heavily on the staff bus arrangement ferrying workers from as far as Gweru townships some 67 km away.

While capital has made the initial moves when it comes to mineworkers' housing, labour also exercised collective and individual agency. For example, at Amandelbult, workers have in recent years been involved in direct confrontations with capital. In 2012 and 2014–2015, violent strikes engulfed the whole platinum belt in South Africa as workers demanded a living wage. The demand for a living wage clearly reflected their plight and discontentment with their living conditions, including the housing provisions. However, many workers accepted the LOA but settled in informal settlements near the mine rather than use the money to rent apartments in the nearby town as was intended by mine management. Another example of subtle resilience by mineworkers was when those who

were assisted by the company to buy houses were refusing to pay electricity and water bills, arguing that the mine should pay for them as it does for those living in company-owned accommodation. At Unki mine those who live in dilapidated housing in the townships reluctantly accept their 'temporary' situation in a town far away from home. On the other hand, Unki employees living in recently built company-owned housing expressed their awareness that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract or when the mine closes, and so they were actively looking to build their own houses elsewhere.

8.4.1 The scorecard spatial order and Harvey's notion of space

In terms of absolute space, presented mainly in the form of still photographs in this study, the scorecard spatial order is characterised by a mixture of different types of housing and other social amenities for mineworkers. Prominent physical features at and near the mine include the SAVs, the single and married quarters, the mine hospital, sports and recreation facilities such as the golf course, mine stores, Adult Basic Education and Training classrooms, and high security fences around the SAVs. In addition, shacks and newly built family housing in already existing communities within a 20 km radius from the mine are other defining features of the scorecard spatial order.

In terms of relative space, it is crucial to note that the mine's housing strategy creates winners and losers among the workers. Housing directly reflects workers' status and perceived worth to the company, thereby dividing them along class lines. The single and married quarters as well as the newly built family housing in Northam Extension 6 are the best housing stock for mineworkers at Amandelbult. The housing scheme at Northam Extension 6 won awards from local and provincial government and is thus regarded as a model housing scheme for other mining firms to imitate. However, it is important to note that only a small fraction of the total labour force at Amandelbult live in these houses. The majority continue to live in SAVs and informal settlements near the mine and are envious of those who have been assisted by the company to have better living conditions.

In terms of relational space, which is space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols by inhabitants and users, the picture is complex. As Harvey (2006) puts it,

"the relational notion of space- time implies the idea of internal relations; external influences get internalised in specific processes or things through time". In relation to the Amandelbult mine, the older mineworkers who live in the SAVs were contented with the upgrades that the mining firm had done to their hostels. They appreciated the reduction in population density at the SAVs and the attempts to normalise living in the hostels. They, however, expressed frustration with the quality of food they get as well as the fact that they are not allowed to bring their families to live with them. Nonetheless, they did not consider living in the informal settlements as a viable option. Contrary to this view, many younger mineworkers who once lived in the hostels accepted the LOA offered by the company and moved into informal settlements near the mine. There are also mixed views among the mineworkers who benefited from the homeownership scheme initiated by AAP. Some are of the view that the mining company should provide them with free water and electricity as it does for those who live in company-owned accommodation. At the same time, the majority are happy to own a house for the first time in their lives and that the houses are in a prime location in Northam.

8.4.2 The kubotereka spatial order and Harvey's notion of space

The kubotereka spatial order is characterised and shaped by different physical landmarks, both natural and manmade, when compared to the scorecard spatial order. For instance, there are no compounds or hostels at Unki, but the mine relies on rural village labour force for manual entry-level jobs. There is also a mine camp near the mine, which has large houses for senior employees as well as makeshift cabins meant for temporary contract skilled workers. The topography makes it difficult to build housing near the mine so newly built company-owned houses are still far from the mining operation. In addition, workers travel as far as Gweru townships each day to work. Hence, the staff bus transport arrangement is the key to the functionality of this spatial order, and by extension, the Boterekwa pass influences whatever developmental plans the mine and the state may decide to put in place.

From the mineworkers' perspective, the newly built family houses at Impali are the best housing stock in the town and beyond. In addition to the appealing physicality of the houses, the fact that mine employees living in these houses do not pay rent but only pay

their water and electricity bills makes this the best housing option for mineworkers. Nevertheless, some mineworkers still live in dilapidated houses in similar conditions to the informal settlements at Amandelbult. It is also interesting to note that Unki mineworkers are aware of what other platinum mines are offering in terms of housing and want to get the same or better. Furthermore, it can be deduced that the Zimbabwean state expect platinum and diamond mines to measure up to very high housing standards compared to other players in other minerals such as coal and gold.

In terms of relational space, Unki mineworkers' experiences are different depending on where they live in relation to their place of work. For the workers who live in Gweru townships, their experiences are largely influenced by the long-distance travel to and from work, in addition to the long hours of hard work, which often mean no time or energy for recreation. Even though this has adverse effects on their social and family lives, they are afraid to demand family housing closer to the mine. The *kuno kubasa* mode of thinking sums up their diverging views and attitudes towards the process of space making in Shurugwi. Those who live in dilapidated housing in the townships seem to reluctantly accept their 'temporary' situation. On the other hand, those living in recently built company-owned housing are keenly aware that they only have usufruct rights to these houses that can be terminated at the end of their employment contract and so they need to build their own houses elsewhere. In addition, the experiences of mineworkers at Unki are characterised by the *hapaitwe zvekumhanya* attitude. Everything happens slowly and with caution. This is especially evident in the mineworkers' approach to dealing with mine management with regards to housing and other work-related issues. Despite numerous complaints about the management style at Unki, workers do not collectively confront management about their concerns.

Table 8-3: shows the spatial analysis of the scorecard and kubotereka spatial orders

	Scorecard spatial order	**Kubotereka spatial order**
Absolute space (maps and still photographs of housing settlements in mining towns)	Compounds (SAVs) remain a key feature of the housing landscape. New employee-owned family houses built in already existing communities.	No compounds, but rural village labour force and the mine camp. Topography makes it difficult to build housing near the mine. New houses are still far from the mining operation.

	Scorecard spatial order	Kubotereka spatial order
	Growing informal settlements near the mines.	Workers travel as far as from Gweru each day. Staff bus transport is key.
Relative space (Processes do not occur *in* space but define their own spatial frame; hence, the concept of space is embedded in or internal to process)	Housing mix divides workers: Housing directly reflects workers' status and perceived worth to the company. Newly built houses are the best housing stock in the town. Housing scheme wins awards. Old company-owned housing is considered better than SAVs and living in informal settlements.	Newly built houses are the best housing stock in the town and beyond. Some mineworkers still live in dilapidated houses in similar conditions to the informal settlements in SA. Workers are aware of what other platinum mines are offering. Platinum mines are expected to measure up to very high housing standards compared to mines, such as coal and gold.
Relational space (space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, which are inhabitants and users)	Experiences differ: A complicated relationship or view of different housing options. The older mineworkers living in the SAVs are contented with the upgrades the mining firm had done to their hostels. Younger mineworkers who once lived in the hostels accepted a LOA offered by the company and moved into informal settlements near the mine.	*Kuno kubasa* mode of thinking: Diverging views and attitudes towards the process of space making in Shurugwi depending on their housing location, which is informed by their perceived worth to the mining firm. There is a reluctant acceptance of the status quo by employees living in dilapidated house in Shurugwi townships, and those who live in recently built company-owned house self-caution themselves against false consciousness; they are actively looking to build their own houses elsewhere.

Harvey's notion of space is useful to outline the overall processes through which capital structures the social and economic development of landscapes. This study, through the infusion of class-perspective theories of the state and the power resources approach in labour geography, spotlighted historic and context specific issues that challenge the limits of David Harvey's conceptual tools. The study focused on the issue of housing strategies employed by a multinational company in a post-colonial context in which the states are concerned with both gaining and maintaining legitimacy by dismantling the colonial spatial order but at the same time maintaining optimum conditions for capital accumulation and economic development. Analytical insight from Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop's conceptualisation of state power shed light on labour geography's

conceptual blind spot: The role of the state in the struggle between labour and capital. The case studies discussed in this thesis show how the state is constantly engaging in strategic-context analysis when choosing a policy position or course of action. For example, in South Africa, the ruling party is in a formal alliance with the country's largest trade union federation and the SACP, but at the same time, through NEDLAC, capital is given a platform to make contributions when major economic policies are discussed. This condensation of class relations explains why there are loopholes inherent in policy instruments such as the Mining Charter that are being exploited by capital. On the other hand, the power relations approach showed how workers draw on different power resources as they engage in their own strategic analysis of the balance of changing political forces in specific contexts. For example, mineworkers in Zimbabwe rely mostly on societal power as they make alliances with community organisations, global trade unions and political parties as they deal with an oppressive political regime.

On a conclusive note, I restate that the nature and logic of the scorecard spatial order and the kubotereka spatial order, as I described in this thesis, emerge from the continuities and discontinuities of the past spatial orders. The making of these spatial orders proves Harvey's and Lefebvre's contention that space is socially produced. In this case, the state, labour, and capital keep jostling for decisive influence on the nature and logic of spatial orders in mining communities. However, each stakeholder is only interested in furthering their own interests, and thus, this power struggle will continue perpetually.

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Appendix I: Interview Guide

Interview #

Spaces of social reproduction: mine housing strategies and platinum mining communities in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe.

Biographic information:

Gender

Nationality

Race

Age

Marriage status

Family responsibility

Language(s)

Number of years at the mine

Type of employment

Job title

Accommodation arrangement(s):

Type of accommodation

Distance from the mine

Homeownership/rental arrangement

Health facilities:

What health facilities are available to you? How far are the facilities from your residency? Can you afford the health services offered?

Leisure/recreation/sporting facilities:

Are there any leisure/recreation/sporting facilities accessible to you?

How far are the facilities from your residency? How often do you use such facilities?

Social or community activities/public space:

What social or community engagement activities do you participate in?

How well do you fit in your community? Do you feel as an integral member of the community? Do you attend and participate in any community meetings?

Education/training facilities:

Are there any education/training facilities available to you in this community?

How often do you use them? If you have children or other dependents, do they have access to these facilities? Are the facilities affordable?

Religious facilities:

Are there any religious facilities available to you in this community? How often do you visit them?

Eating and drinking facilities:

How would you describe your experience of the eating drinking facilities available to you?

Are you satisfied? What changes if any would you suggest, and why?

Shopping centres/ spaces of consumption:

Where do you do your shopping? How often do you shop, is the shopping easily reachable from your residence?

Sanitation- toilets, rubbish collection, pollution:

Is your residential area sanitary? How often is rubbish collected?

Are you affected by noise, dust, polluted water from the mine's activities?

Services- electricity (energy), water, transport:

Do you receive adequate services such as water, electricity and transport?

Are the services affordable for you?

Security- crime and policing:

Is your community safe? What measures are put in place to stop or reduce crime?

Appendix II: Consent Form

Department of Sociology

Faculty of Humanities

Splagchna Chikarara (04374878)

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Cell: 074 829 5833

Participation in the study: Spaces of social reproduction: mine housing strategies and platinum mining communities in post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe.

My name is Splagchna Chikarara. I am a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria. I am conducting a research study on mine housing policies and how they impact on the lives mine employees and the overall mining communities.
As part of this study, I would like to interview you. All the information will be kept confidential. In writing up the information, I will use a pseudonym when I refer to specific interviewees.

The data will be stored in the Department of Sociology's research archive for 15 years in accordance with the University of Pretoria's research policy. Only my supervisor and I will have access to the data.

The outcomes of the research are to be written up in my Doctoral Thesis. I may also want to publish the findings in a scholarly journal or as a book or book chapter in a field-specific publication. I plan to present my findings to participating organisations, as well as to my colleagues at the University of Pretoria and at academic conferences.

The details of my research supervisor follow below. You may contact me or him at any time should you have further queries:

Professor Andries Bezuidenhout

Department of Sociology

Faculty of Humanities

University of Pretoria

Pretoria 0002

Tel: +27 12 420 2330

Fax: +27 12 420 2873

Email: andries.bezuidenhout@up.ac.za

Participant's agreement: Participation

I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary. I understand the intent and purpose of this research. If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, I may do so freely.

I have the right to review, comment on, and/or withdraw information prior to the Doctoral Thesis' submission. The data gathered in this study are confidential with respect to my personal identity unless I specify otherwise. I understand if I say anything that I believe may incriminate myself, the interviewer will immediately rewind the tape and record over the potentially incriminating information. The interviewer will then ask me if I would like to continue the interview.

If I have any questions about this study, I am free to contact the student researcher or his supervisor (contact information given above). I have been offered a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own reference. I have read the above form and, with the understanding that I can withdraw at any time and for whatever reason, I consent to participate in today's interview.

I am aware the data will be used in a Doctoral Thesis that will be publicly available at the Main Library at the University of Pretoria, and that the information contained in it may be used in academic publications and presentations. I understand that the data will be securely stored in the Department of Sociology for 15 years.

_____ _____

Participant's signature Date

_____

Interviewer's signature

Participant's agreement: Recording

I am aware that the interview will be recorded. I understand the intent and purpose of the recording for transcription purposes. If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the recording, I may do so freely.

_____ _____

Participant's signature Date

_____

Interviewer's signature

Appendix III: Letter from editor

WORDPLAY EDITING
Copy Editor and Proofreader
Email: karien.hurter@gmail.com
Tel: 071 104 9484
Website: http://wordplayediting.net/

30 January 2022

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is to confirm that *The 'scorecard' and 'kubotereka' spatial orders: A comparative study of mine housing strategies at Amandelbult (South Africa) and Unki (Zimbabwe) platinum mines* by Splagchna Ngoni Chikarara was edited by a professional language practitioner. It requires further work by the author in response to my suggested edits. I cannot be held responsible for what the author does from this point onward.

Regards,

Karien Hurter