Mobile Terms in the Conceptual Architecture of Michel Foucault's 'Productive Power'

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the conceptual architecture in Michel Foucault's work on Productive Power. I identify five mobile terms in Foucault's work, which move between different power-knowledge configurations. The chosen mobile terms are 'production', 'population', 'prediction', 'the subject', and 'the norm'. The conceptual content of each term changes between different power-knowledge configurations. Prototypical conceptualisations of the mobile terms can be extracted from Foucault's work on Pastoral Power, indicating that Pastoral Power can be described as 'proto-productive power'. Changes in the mobile terms in the move from Pastoral to Disciplinary Power indicate an emerging concern with the generation of productive subjects. Disciplinary Power can be considered the first system of 'productive power proper'. Foucault's archaeological work on the clinic serves as preparation for his genealogy of Biopower, which entails shifts in the mobile terms as the analysis of power-knowledge configurations turns from Discipline to Biopower. Foucault's work on Biopower and Biopolitics, his integration of Discipline into the framework of Biopower, and the changes in the mobile terms accompanying the emergence of Biopower, are explored as the first changes in Foucault's conceptual architecture within 'productive power proper'. In a final step that conjoins Biopolitics and 'Governmentality', a more specific conceptualisation of 'population' comes into the picture. To account for the complexities of 'Governmentality' in Foucault's analysis, this thesis concludes with a three-dimensional model of Governmentality consisting of a 'general' dimension referring to the 'conduct of conduct', a 'specific' dimension referring to governance focused on 'population', and a third dimension (in the form of Neoliberal Governmentality) ushering in new transformations in the mobile terms.

Key Terms

Productive Power, Power-Knowledge, Population, Prediction, The Norm, The Subject, Pastoral Power, Disciplinary Power, Biopower, (Neoliberal) Governmentality

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Introduction

Michel Foucault held a Chair in the 'History of Systems of Thought' at the Collège de France from 1970 to 1984. This chair replaced the chair in 'the History of Philosophical Thought' (Ewald & Fontana, 2020: ix). The latter designation aptly fits the continuously developing content of Foucault's *oeuvre*. Reading Foucault's work, three crucial foci emerge with varying degrees of significance, depending on the era of his writing and the methods applied. Applying the broadest of strokes, one could describe Foucault's work as examining the various ways in which the interactions between language and knowledge change and transform conceptualisations and discourses, and how these changes in knowledge in turn affect the structures, apparatuses, and dynamics of power between subjects and institutions. In this complex network of interrelated systems, Foucault displays important transitions in the history of Western power-knowledge configurations from the introduction of Christian Pastoral power to the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality. His earlier work, described as Historical 'Archaeology' (Gutting, 2005: 32) focuses on developments in language and knowledge, whereas his later work, referred to as Historical 'Genealogy' (Gutting, 2005: 45), explores developments in the relation between knowledge and power.

The three main elements in Foucault's exploration of the history of 'systems of thought' are language, knowledge, and power. This project focuses on these three elements. It investigates his work on productive power, and the significant moves in power-knowledge leading to the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality, through tracking shifts in the conceptual architecture in his work. Of particular significance in tracking these shifts are mobile terms impacting on each other: a change in the conceptualisation of one such mobile term inevitably coincides with changes in the conceptualisation of the others. These mobile terms are 'production', 'the subject', 'population', 'prediction', and 'the norm'.

'Mobile Terms' in a Conceptual Architecture

The method of analysing mobile terms takes its cue from Foucault's archaeological method. In the Foreword to the English edition of *The Order of Things*, Foucault purports to examine moves in the knowledges of nature, grammar, and wealth between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century. He analyses the changes in these fields at the turns by which the study of

general grammar morphed into historical philology, natural history into the analysis of comparative anatomy, and the analysis of wealth into political economy focused on labour and production (Foucault, 1970: xi-xii). He examines the multifarious "combinations of corresponding transformations that characterised the appearance of biology, political economy, philology, a number of human sciences, and a new type of philosophy, at the threshold of the nineteenth century" (Foucault, 1970: xii). Foucault's archaeology analyses epistemic formations and transformations, focusing on "the mobility of epistemological arrangement[s]" (Foucault, 1970: 217). The aim of Foucault's archaeology was to "establish the system of transformations that constitute 'change'" (Foucault, 1972: 173).

Taking its cue from the analysis of epistemic shifts in Foucault's archaeological works, this project approaches the transformations within and between power-knowledge configurations in Foucault's genealogical work through an investigation of mobile signifiers. The aim is to investigate selected terms as they move within and between different power-knowledge configurations, generating combined effects and corresponding transformations. The analysis uncovers what remains implicit in the instantiation of specific terms in a specific power-knowledge configuration.

This project analyses power-knowledge in terms of dynamic interlinked configurations that appear in Foucault's work as broad modes/forms of power. Within these configurations, mobile concepts are formed and informed by a range of multifarious apparatuses that are morphed and modified. In turn, the operations of apparatuses of power are informed by the conceptual content of the mobile terms. I will use capital letters to refer to these configurations; 'Disciplinary Power' or 'Discipline', for example, will be taken to refer to the power-knowledge configuration of Disciplinary Power. This indicates the differentiation of the designations for specific configurations from ordinary language nouns such as 'pastorate' and 'discipline'. The different configurations have to be specifically identified and marked, in order to be able to analyse the ways in which the mobile terms move within and between them.

The mobile terms 'production', 'the subject', 'population', 'prediction', and 'the norm' feature in different power-knowledge configurations, which carry different conceptual meanings depending on the particular configuration in which they feature. By examining the conceptual content of these terms, it is possible to grasp their interrelations and correlations.

Foucault himself does not treat these terms as 'mobile' in the manner that I propose to do. My treatment of the selected terms as mobile deviates from Foucault's own treatment of the specific terms. For Foucault, 'population' as a concept emerges in the eighteenth century (see Chapters Four and Five), and his deployment of the terms reflects its specific historical usage. On the other hand, 'the subject' is treated by Foucault as a transhistorical concept, and tool of analysis, regardless of the concept's historical development.[1] This thesis approaches the mobile terms, including 'population', in a somewhat similar manner to Foucault's own treatment of 'the subject' as a transhistorical tool for analysis. However, it also considers the trans-conceptual qualities of these terms, that make it possible to utilise the terms as tools of analysis for changes within and between the different power-knowledge configurations according to their conceptual transformations.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the conceptual loads within and across different power-knowledge configurations, in the process of their formation and transformation. This does not mean that they regularly lose the entirety of the conceptual content that they signified prior to an epistemic shift. In many cases, as will be made clear, the conceptual content they signify expands to consider knowledges pertaining to conduct, biology, and economics, without necessarily becoming completely divorced from the conceptual content they previously held.

The terms defined here are mobile precisely because they move from one primary conceptual designation to another, in tandem with significant processual changes in knowledge and power. The terms signify different conceptualisations depending on the power-knowledge configuration within which they operate. They possess a level of trans-conceptual mobility, allowing them to feature in different configurations and different power-knowledge dynamics, holding different conceptual content.

The mobile terms were identified as units of analysis because of their inter-relatedness, as well as their significance throughout the history of productive power that Foucault unfolds in his writings. Changes in the conceptual load of one term accompany changes in the others to various degrees. They indicate specific conceptualisations depending on their historical and discursive positioning. Foucault does not deploy these terms as mobile terms in a specific manner. Their mobility is brought to the fore through an analysis of various power-knowledge

[1] See Foucault's account in *The Subject and Power* (2020: 326-348).

configurations. The different terms appear with varying levels of prominence and significance in different historical power-knowledge configurations.

Each chapter turns its focus firstly, on the mobile terms that feature most prominently in a particular power-knowledge configuration. I will analyse the explicit conceptualisations of the most prominent mobile terms, along with the operations of apparatuses, in order to glean the implicit conceptual content of the mobile terms that feature less explicitly or do not feature at all. 'Production' appears in every power-knowledge configuration; the transformations in its conceptual content correspond to transformations in the other chosen terms. In Pastoral Power, 'the subject' attains a central role. The conceptualisation of 'the subject' in Pastoral Power is closely related to the conceptualisations of 'production', 'population', and 'prediction'. Within Discipline, 'the norm' emerges as a significant term (along with 'production'), with a newly conceptualised relation to 'the subject', 'population', and 'prediction'. In Biopower, transformations in the mobile term 'population' become the most prominent, correlated with coextensive transformations in the mobile terms: 'prediction', production', 'the subject', and 'the norm'.

Foucault himself does not always make the different conceptualisations of the mobile terms explicit. This is what this thesis will take up as its challenge and task: to uncover the implicit and explicit conceptual loads of each of the mobile terms relative to the specific power-knowledge configuration in which they are deployed, by investigating Foucault's explicit use of these terms, as well as his analysis of the apparatuses deployed in specific systems of power-knowledge. In doing so, it sets out to provide new understandings of the conceptual loads of the mobile terms within and between power-knowledge configurations, in order to disclose the moves between power-knowledge configurations, their interactions, and their influences upon one another.

In order to discover what can be said to be 'implicit' pertaining to the mobile terms in Foucault's work, I will, firstly, examine the inter-related terms that appear explicitly, and extract what can be said to be implicit by means of the relations between terms. For example, the implicit primary conceptualisation of 'predictability' in Pastoral Power can be uncovered through a careful analysis of Foucault's explicit account of the subject as inevitably, and therefore predictably, predisposed to sin. Secondly, I will analyse Foucault's accounts and arguments pertaining to specific apparatuses within a particular power-knowledge configuration in order to parse out the implicit conceptualisations of specific mobile terms. For example, the primary

conceptualisation of 'prediction' in Pastoral Power can further be extracted by means of an analysis of Foucault's account of the confession and the shepherd-flock relationship.[2]

Because the aim is to analyse specific power knowledge configurations based on both the implicit and the explicit, the conceptual loads of the mobile terms within every power-knowledge configuration presented at the end of each chapter are not what is made available and obvious from reading Foucault. Instead, the analysis provides new understandings of these various power-knowledge configurations, the operations of the apparatuses of power, how power and knowledge interact in every configuration, and the moves within and between these configurations in terms of the primary conceptualisations of the mobile terms.

I will analyse Foucault's descriptions of several important successive moves in Western power-knowledge configurations. This does not imply a linear or teleological sequence of power-knowledge configurations; instead, it indicates the ways in which these configurations overlap and unfold, one within another, corresponding to changes in the operations of apparatuses deployed, and transformations in the conceptual loads of the mobile signifiers.

There are two uses of the term 'productive power'. The first is in reference to an analysis of power as productive rather than repressive (see Foucault, 1976: 92-102).

The second use of 'productive power', which occupies and important place in this thesis, is a historical, archaeological, and genealogical one. This use of 'productive power' locates 'production' epistemically, with the emergence of political economy from the eighteenth century onwards. Within political economy, subjects and populations are directed to be productive, and become the focus of the calculations and predictions of political economy (see Foucault, 1977-1978: 108-109).

In this project, I take up 'productive power' in the second more specific sense - namely in the sense of power-knowledge configurations deploying apparatuses to render subjects productive. By 'productive power', I am referring to those forms of power focusing on cultivating productive subjects. I specifically intend to work with productive power as opposed to sovereign repressive forms of power, which aim to undermine the subject's capacity to act, lest those activities pose risk to the sovereign. Admittedly, for Foucault, power always contains

[2] See Chapter One.

productive elements. Even when the apparatuses appear repressive, power can still be considered productive by virtue of the underlying rationale for the deployment of apparatuses.[3]

However, my analysis expands beyond Foucault's genealogies of productive power in several ways. Firstly, it includes his work on Christian Pastoral Power, which is not commonly included in discussions of productive power. Foucault's work on the Christian pastorate indicates that Pastoral Power exemplifies what I identify as unique 'proto-productive' characteristics, laying the groundwork for the emergence of, what I term, 'productive power proper' in the form of Disciplinary Power. Secondly, this thesis explores Foucault's archaeological work on the clinic and medical knowledge, not commonly associated with his work on productive power. I will argue that Foucault's archaeological work on the clinic provides the foundations for his genealogical work on Biopower and Biopolitics. Furthermore, *The Birth of the Clinic* contains 'placeholder' terms and statements, referring to conceptualisations that were to form part of the conceptual architecture in his later writings on Biopower. The final chapter explores Foucault's work on Governmentality, usually understood as being somewhat removed from his formal genealogical work. The method of analysis deployed in this thesis presents a novel approach to Foucault's work on Governmentality, spanning three specific dimensions relative to his genealogical work on productive power. The first dimension pertains to the entire history of power and knowledge, both repressive and productive, centrally involving the 'conduct of conduct'. The second dimension involves a reworking of his genealogical work on productive power bringing the concept of 'population' into focus. The final dimension involves the continuation of his genealogical work, which moves beyond Biopower towards Neoliberal Governmentality. In this last dimension, the mobile terms acquire a new significance consonant with their deployment in contemporary neoliberalism.

The Mobile Terms: 'Production', 'the Subject', 'Population', 'the Norm', 'Prediction'

Seeing that this project locates itself predominantly in Foucault's work on productive power, the first mobile term to be analysed is that of 'production'. The conceptualisations of 'production' – what production is supposed to accomplish, and what is necessary for a specific kind of production to be achieved – are of crucial importance for understanding the various moves in power-knowledge that Foucault explores, from the introduction of Pastoral Power to

[3] Ragesh (2018: 62) argues that, for Foucault, power is not essentially negative but productive.

his work on Governmentality. Foucault's work explains and demonstrates how changing conceptualisations of 'production' throughout the history of productive power inform, and are informed by, knowledges of the subject and its conduct. Furthermore, different conceptualisations of production inform, and are informed by, the different conceptualisations of the other terms: 'population', 'the subject', 'the norm', and 'prediction'.

The second mobile term, that of 'the subject,' changes with every power-knowledge relation to be analysed here. Different conceptualisations of the subject directly influence the apparatuses deployed in different power-knowledge systems. This thesis traces the conceptual load of the term 'the subject' in its move from a predictably sinful subject of the Catholic flock to a self-policing agent of contemporary Neoliberal Governmentality. The story of power is also the story of the subject. In fact, in *The Subject and Power* (2020: 326), Foucault argues that the objective of his work has been to construct a history of the different modes by which "human beings are made subjects". As this thesis will demonstrate, there is no significant change in any of the power-knowledge configurations that does not correspond to a change in the conceptualisation of 'the subject'. According to Foucault (2020: 331), there are two primary meanings associated with the 'subject'. It either denotes someone subjugated to exterior control or guidance, or an individual's "own identity by conscience" and capacity for "self-knowledge", suggesting a "form of power that subjugates and makes subject to" (Foucault, 2020: 331), respectively. This thesis analyses different power-knowledge configurations to uncover what kind of subject is being produced, and the systems of power-knowledge it is subjected to.[4]

'Population' is a mobile term singled out here for investigation, for several reasons. In his work on Governmentality, Foucault (1977-1978: 110) argues that the emphasis on 'population' in the pastorate laid the foundations for forms of government that correspond to the emergence of productive power. This marks the shift of the term 'population' to a significant concept. As will become clear in this thesis, the conceptual transformations of 'population' significantly contributed to the elaboration of the Biopolitical pole[5] of Biopower.

[4] In the same article, Foucault (2020: 331-332) characterises contemporary power struggles as struggles against forms of subjection, and against the submission of subjectivity.

[5] Foucault (1976: 139) refers to two distinct 'poles' of Biopower emerging in the nineteenth century, the first constituting a system of disciplinary apparatuses focused on the individual bodies, and the second constituting sets of regulations focused on the population as a 'species body'. It is this second 'pole' which I refer to as the 'biopolitical pole' of Biopower.

'The norm', as a mobile term, only emerges with, what I will call, 'productive power proper'[6], along with the understanding that subjects must be imbued with guidelines for conduct, so as to optimise their productive capacities. We first see the norm emerge as an important concept with Disciplinary Power, with its focus on cultivating calculable subjects in closed institutions. It remains important throughout the history of productive power, with each successive power-knowledge system adding layers and nuances to the conceptualisation of the norm and its utility in creating productive and predictable subjects in a population. The norm signifies a set of ideal prescriptions for subjects to strive for (Kelly, 2019: 5), not according to the moral frameworks of Pastoral Power, but according to frameworks of ideal conduct generated by the human sciences. The concept of 'the norm' would contribute to standardisation within the field of statistics.[7]

The mobile term 'prediction' is selected because of its inextricable relation to the mobile terms 'the subject', 'the norm', 'production', and 'prediction' in Foucault's work. Each era of power-knowledge has a unique approach to understanding and achieving predictability, depending on the conceptualisations of the other mobile terms. In Pastoral Power, predictability is conceptualised as an inherent quality of the subject, as opposed to Disciplinary Power and Biopower, where predictability is conceptualised as a state to be instilled in the subject or population to achieve an envisaged outcome.

Defining *Dispositif*

Related to the chosen mobile terms is the concept of 'the apparatus' (*dispositif*). This project is located in Foucault's work on productive power, analysing the apparatuses of productive power. Therefore, it is important to be precise about the meaning and role of 'apparatus' in Foucault's work on productive power. The English word 'apparatus' is a common English translation for Foucault's use of the word *dispositif*. However, this is not the only English translation used. 'Apparatus' (*dispositif*) features in every form of power as the ensemble of means by which systems of power-knowledge cultivate ideal subjects. This thesis explores

[6] By 'productive power proper', I mean those systems of power that are largely geared towards the generation and cultivation of productive subjects, instead of proto-productive systems of power that deploy apparatuses resulting in productive activity on the part of the subjects, without productivity being the primary reason for their deployment.

[7] Kelly (2019: 14-15), however, cautions against equating Foucault's use of 'norm' with the kinds of 'standardisation' deployed to generate averages in industrial processes. Foucault's 'norm' provides a model for "people, movements, and actions" in relation to humans and bodily activities.

Foucault's descriptions of various apparatuses to uncover what they reveal about mobile signifiers in different configurations of power-knowledge.

In *Confessions of the Flesh*, Foucault discusses the development and function of apparatuses of power, which he describes as "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (Foucault, 1980: 194), "supporting and supported by, certain types of knowledge" (Campbell and Sitze, 2013: 11). He refers to the system of relations established between these elements as "*dispositif*", and argues that by the term 'apparatus' (*dispositif*) he understands a "formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need" (1980: 195).

Some English translations use "mechanisms" when referring to *dispositif*. The "mechanisms" Foucault adduces in *The History of Sexuality* (1976), translated by Robert Hurley, recur in *Society Must Be Defended* (1976), but are translated in the latter as "technologies" and "techniques" by David Macey. Callewaert (2017: 29) points out that some translations use "deployment", and are criticised for adding a militaristic context to the term. Other translations use the English term "device" to render the sense of *dispositif.* Bussolini (2010) contests the most popular English translation of *dispositif* as 'apparatus', because the English term occludes the exact etymological connotations inherent in the French term *dispositif*. He points out that the terms *appareil, apparato,* and apparatus have been used synonymously with *dispositif, dispositivo,* and dispositive. In its English translation, the former is too static, compared with the conceptual specificity of the English term 'dispositive', which for Bussolini (2010) is the ideal English translation of Foucault's *dispositif*. Although *appareil* and *apparato* are etymologically much closer to 'apparatus', Bussolini (2010, 85) argues that these terms were used as distinct from *dispositive* and *dispositivo* by Foucault, Agamben, and Deleuze.

While I will use the term 'apparatus' here, I will not alter translated quotes using other English translations for '*dispositif*'. '*Dispositif*' denotes "a specific apparatus geared towards rendering individual subjects and the population productive" (Bussolini 2010: 88),[8] and is instantiated in

[8] According to Bussolini (2010: 88), Foucault's understanding and usage of the term "centrally relates to his concerns with the productivity and positivity of power". Because *dispositif's* primary functions are inextricably connected with the productive nature of power, it becomes clear that the term denotes a specific apparatus geared towards rendering individual subjects and the population productive. However, this does not detract from the heterogeneity of *dispositifs*, as there are a wide variety of different apparatuses functioning in different ways to render the population productive and predictable. Thus, even though the etymological foundations of the term

the conceptualisation of productive power. To mark the specificity of particular *dispositifs* in particular forms of productive power, this thesis will distinguish between repressive apparatuses, productive *dispositifs*, and governmental *appareil*, when appropriate.[9]

Chapter Outline

Chapter One begins by investigating Pastoral Power, as the power-knowledge systems of the Christian pastorate exemplify the earliest examples of prototypically productive apparatuses in Foucault's work. I will argue that Pastoral Power exemplifies a uniquely 'proto-productive' orientation towards managing subjects. The relationship between the pastor and his flock produces an earlier form of what could subsequently be called a calculable subject in Disciplinary Power. This account suggests that a life lived according to fundamental principles grounding the Christian theology of the doctrine of original sin, coupled with a belief in the immortal soul, leads to a cluster of required religious practices encoded in theological knowledge. These proto-productive developments lay the foundations for the emergence of fully productive conceptualisations of the mobile terms 'production', 'the subject', and 'population' within a configuration of Disciplinary Power. The chapter concludes with a summary of the way in which each of the chosen mobile terms form the first steps towards an understanding of the unfolding of the conceptual architecture of Foucault's genealogy of productive power.

The second chapter focuses on the move towards Disciplinary Power, and the functioning of disciplinary apparatuses in closed institutions. I explore disciplinary apparatuses that elucidate critical conceptual transformations in the mobile terms identified. Disciplinary Power is the first appearance of what I call 'productive power proper', where apparatuses are geared towards the cultivation of subjects whose conduct is rendered calculable and productive. Disciplinary

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remain the same, there are numerous different instances of *dispositif*, which only proliferate in orientations and strategies as the focus turns from calculable subject to a predictable population.

[9] Foucault distinguished between *dispositif* and *appareil*. Bussolini (2010: 93) argues that in Foucault's work, *appareil* refers to a smaller subset of state apparatuses restricted in the following ways, in which *dispositif* is not. These apparatuses (*appareils*) originate in the monarchy and the State. This association with monarchical power also pertains to *appareil*, which is linked with Sovereign Power and repressive apparatuses deployed by the sovereign and the sovereign State. Additionally, *appareil* is associated with the state in ways that *dispositif* could not be, because *dispositif* is spread out across all forms of productive apparatuses, including those not intrinsically linked to the State. This point is made in Foucault's discussion of the emergence of *dispositifs,* stating that they function according to technique instead of right, according to normalisation instead of the law, according to control instead of punishment, being exercised at all levels beyond the State and its apparatuses (Bussolini, 2010: 93).

Power functions by instilling a desired norm in individual subjects making up the 'population', primarily conceived of as an aggregation of subjects. The operations of Disciplinary Power are underpinned by the changing knowledges of the human sciences, which contribute to defining and reinforcing the norms through which Disciplinary Power renders individual subjects calculable. Unlike scriptural doctrines, the knowledges of the human sciences can change and transform and are not concerned with procuring eternal spiritual life or canonical-doctrinal status. The chapter concludes with a description of the ways in which the mobile terms function in the production-oriented system of Disciplinary Power. The conceptualisations of the mobile terms differ from their role in forms of Pastoral Power, while laying the foundation for future conceptual transformations implicit and explicit in Foucault's analysis, and for the conceptual emergence of Biopower in particular.

Chapter three focuses on Foucault's account of the development of Western medical knowledge in *The Birth of the Clinic*, and argues that his archaeological work on medical knowledge prepared for his genealogical work on Biopower. Foucault's archaeology of the clinic investigates significant historical moves to which he would later attribute the emergence of Biopower in his genealogical work. *The Birth of the Clinic* contains sections that directly explore the political repercussions of specific developments in medical knowledge, which become the focus of his genealogical work. Uncovering the preparatory function of Foucault's archaeology of the clinic is important for understanding the move from Disciplinary Power to Biopower, and the changes in the conceptual architecture accompanying this move.

Chapter four focuses on the emergence of Biopower as a historic phenomenon in which anatamo-political apparatuses of discipline appear combined with the imposition of large-scale biopolitical regulations on the population conceptualised as a 'species body'. In the context of specific natural scientific knowledges revealing threats to the population that cannot be addressed at the level of the individual, apparatuses of Biopower must be deployed at the level of the 'population' as a 'species body'. These new apparatuses are geared towards establishing a level of population-wide predictability that does not rely on calculable conduct on the part of the individual subject. These changes in knowledge, in turn, relate to transformations and recalibrations of the conceptualisations of the mobile terms, reflected in Foucault's own use of these terms in his work following *Discipline and Punish*. Significant conceptual transformations in the mobile terms would only occur again with the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality.

The final chapter explores Foucault's work on Governmentality, which functions as both a new framework for his genealogical work as well as a continuation of the work done by his genealogies. It turns on the conduct of conduct, presenting a final set of conceptual transformations in the chosen mobile terms. The chapter discusses Thomas Lemke's two-level analysis of 'Governmentality', and responds by proposing a novel alternative three-dimensional model of understanding Governmentality. The model comprises a first 'general' dimension that frames the history of power, including repressive forms of power, through the conduct of conduct; a second 'specific' dimension that is specifically defined by a focus on the productive capacity attributed to the population, shifting the term 'population' from an ordinary language term to a concept; and a final dimension that extends beyond the era of Biopower towards contemporary Neoliberal Governmentality. The chapter discusses the changes in the mobile terms accompanying the historical emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality as described by Foucault, and analyses the ways in which these changes contribute to the operations of power in systems of Neoliberal Governmentality.

Chapter One

Pastoral Power: A Proto-Productive Power

It may appear unorthodox to begin a study on Foucault's work on productive power with Pastoral Power. However, on closer inspection it emerges that systems and apparatuses of Pastoral Power contain elements that undergo a transition to, what I term, 'productive power proper'. By 'productive power proper' I mean specifically forms of power that are primarily geared towards engendering subjects whose conduct generates and ensures production. Through an analysis of the mobile terms 'production', 'population', 'prediction', and 'the subject', I hope to show that elements of Pastoral Power can be understood to be operating in a uniquely 'proto-productive' manner, by which I mean that they do not meet the criteria for 'productive power proper', but contain functions and conceptualisations that can be seen as precursors to 'productive power proper'. The conceptual value attributed to each of the mobile terms in Pastoral Power indicate the unique role played by the Western pastorate in the transition from predominantly repressive power towards power systems focused on production. In historically locating the discourses of Pastoral Power prior to the advent of Disciplinary Power, Foucault charts the emergence of knowledges of 'the subject' that prompted a turn towards productive systems of power. To track these shifts, I will start with the Christian pastorate, where power and knowledge are located in a theological framework— in a period during which the subject and the population come to be understood as possessing inherent productive capacities requiring direction and guidance.

Apparatuses of Pastoral Power function in a unique 'proto-productive' manner: they do not operate with the primary goal of generating productive subjects, but 'productivity' features as a secondary or tertiary goal. Proto-productive apparatuses operate with the ultimate objective of ensuring the salvation of the subject's soul, by both repressing certain forms of conduct that threaten the salvation of the soul and enforcing other forms of productive conduct. 'Proto-productive' apparatuses arise from within the Christian theological framework. Practices described as proto-productive operate with an understanding of subjects as born with a God-given immortal soul and a body with a propensity for sin. Pastoral Power emerges within the context of Sovereign Power, which primarily aimed to repress various forms of conduct. However, Pastoral Power understands that the subject cannot be completely repressed due to its propensity towards sin. In this context, 'power' functions not exclusively to repress, but to guide the productive capacities of subjects, and to meet the ultimate theological goal of Pastoral

Power: to secure the salvation of the immortal soul of every member of the pastor's flock. In this specific theological framework, conceptualisations of the mobile terms 'the subject', 'production', 'population', and 'prediction' begin to feature in ways that form part of the conceptual architecture that I identify in Foucault's work, which would ultimately lead to their conceptualisations in 'productive power proper'.

Apparatuses of Pastoral Power are not primarily aimed at production. Instead, they focus on ensuring salvation for the soul in the afterlife. The productivity of Pastoral Power is limited to producing subjects who conduct themselves in a manner concomitant with the goal of achieving salvation. Apparatuses of Pastoral Power rely on, and result in, productive subjects only to the extent that guiding subjects' conduct ensures their salvation. This is in contrast to contexts described in terms of 'productive power proper', in which production becomes the primary objective of the apparatuses.

Pastoral Power is distinct from 'productive power proper' in the kinds of knowledges underpinning the functioning of its apparatuses. Pastoral knowledges are informed by spiritual teachings pertaining to proper conduct and the avoidance of sin; they are disseminated vertically from the pastor to the subjects in his flock. The pastor has the role of teaching his subjects, and guiding their conduct *away from sin*, so that they can attain eternal life. However, these teachings involve the repression and avoidance of sinful conduct and are not entirely geared towards directing productive activity. The theological 'knowledge' of the Christian pastorate does not function in the same way as the dynamic 'power-knowledge' relations of 'productive power proper' described in Foucault's genealogical work, as it pertains to an established body of knowledge based on doctrinal teachings, instead of a continuously expanding framework of knowledge gathered from the observation of subjects. Instead, pastoral knowledges are founded on established spiritual doctrines and are not primarily gathered and modified based on observational data.

Through an analysis of pastoral apparatuses like the confession and the shepherd-flock relationship, this chapter demonstrates the proto-productive nature of the mobile terms in the system of Christian Pastoral Power. Foucault does not use the mobile terms in every instance where he speaks of Pastoral Power. They are, however, implicit in his work on Pastoral Power. The significance of each mobile term differs between systems of power and historical periods. By virtue of the fact that the pastorate directs the productive, and not altogether repressible, capacities of the subject, the mobile terms 'production' and 'the subject' become prominent in

the pastorate. The term 'population' is implicit in the pastorate in which the Christian collectives appear as 'flock', that is, as a precursor to population. 'Prediction' is the least significant of the mobile terms in the pastorate, and differs significantly from the conceptualisation it would attain in productive forms of power. The primary conceptualisation of 'prediction' in Christian Pastoral Power can only be glean based on its relation to correlative mobile terms and the operations of pastoral apparatuses. 'Prediction' seems to be significant only to the extent that the subject is predisposed to an inevitable and predictable tendency to sin which is accounted for by proto-productive apparatuses like confession.

What is Pastoral Power?

Foucault's most extensive work on Pastoral Power can be found in his work on Governmentality, with mentions of the Christian pastorate interspliced throughout various articles and essays. On the theme of Christianity, Foucault pronounces himself in his earlier work in the form of "scattered remarks" (Carrette, 1999: 2). However, there are some noteworthy sections on the Christian pastorate in his genealogical work, such as his chapter on the 'Repressive Hypothesis' in *The History of Sexuality* vol.1 (1976: 17). The first chapter of this thesis focuses primarily on Foucault's elaborations on Pastoral Power in the *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978) lecture series and other related works. These texts focus specifically on the characteristics of the Western Christian pastorate as a form of governance.

Beside the *Security, Territory, Population* lectures, Foucault's most concise and comprehensive formulation of Pastoral Power can be found in 'The Subject and Power' (2020: 332-333). This essay casts Pastoral Power as a form of power that relies on the deployment of individualising techniques adapted for different kinds of state power. Foucault explains that the contemporary Western state integrates the techniques and apparatuses originating in the Christian pastorate, resulting in the proliferation of new kinds of power relations throughout the West. Foucault identifies four characteristics for Western Christian Pastoral Power: Firstly, its aim is to assure the salvation of the immortal soul. Secondly, it embodies a willingness to sacrifice itself for the life and the salvation of the flock. This distinguishes it from Sovereignty, which demands sacrifice on the part of the subject for the will of the sovereign. Thirdly, it is focused not only on the flock, but on the individual. Finally, it relies on the ability to extract the innermost thoughts of the individual. It is dependent on knowing the exact details of what is happening in the minds and souls of its subjects (Foucault, 2020: 333).

The Pastorate

While Pastoral Power emerged during periods of repressive power, it ushered in knowledges and practices that prepared for productive systems of power. This is borne out by Foucault's discussion of the Western Christian pastorate, which is primarily located in Catholicism. Foucault's most intensive work on Pastoral Power took place in tandem with his focus on 'Governmentality'.

Foucault traces Pastoral Power back to the "ancient oriental societies" of Egypt, Assyria, and Judea (Foucault, 2020: 300). Foucault draws distinction between the Greek and Hebrew gods. Whereas the Greek god was considered territorial and rooted within the walls of the polis and the temple, the Hebrew god is one that marches, displaces, and wanders. It is the tradition of the Hebrew god that Foucault casts as 'pastoral' (Elden, 2016: 96).

The Pastoral power-knowledge configurations that are of interest for purposes of my argument here are those to which he refers in discussing the unfolding of contemporary Christian Pastoral Power, predating the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the time period in which Foucault situates the emergence of Disciplinary Power.

Foucault traces apparatuses of Pastoral Power, such as confession, back to the eleventh century. He argues that the Pastoral Power dynamic remained constant in Western Christian institutions from the fourteenth to the twentieth century (1977-1978: 148). This suggests that Pastoral Power supplemented repressive power and productive power at different points in history. Having refined elements of the Hebraic pastorate into formal institutional power structures (Foucault 1977-1978: 129-130), it could bridge the gap between repressive power and productive power by deploying apparatuses geared towards repression of the subject, as well as apparatuses inculcating productivity in the subject, albeit not for the primary purpose of production. According to Foucault, the fact that Christian Pastoral Power stretches from the fourteenth century to the twentieth century indicates that apparatuses of Christian Pastoral Power contain elements of both repression and of production, and were thus capable of supplementing Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power, and Biopower. If Pastoral Power is said to span periods of repressive and productive power, it presupposes a conceptualisation of the subject directed by both repressive and productive apparatuses.

Pastoral Power supplementing Sovereign Power deployed repressive apparatuses that maintained the authority of the sovereign, with Pastoral Power supplementing Disciplinary Power through deployed apparatuses compatible with its productive goals. In both instances,

the primary goal of Pastoral Power does not coincide with that of the prevailing system of power. However, Pastoral Power can supplement the apparatuses of the prevailing system of power. Despite this feature, Pastoral Power should not be considered a state institution, but a form of power with a specific set of apparatuses supplementing state power to different degrees during different periods. Notable examples of Pastoral Power supplementing the sovereign head of state to different degrees, even to the extent that the Church occupies a position of authority over the King, can be found in George Duby's *The Knight, the Lady, and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France* (1983). The book deals with the dual institutions of Church and State and investigates the ways in which these institutions inflected matrimonial practices of the subjects of Pastoral Power under conditions of sovereign rule.

Duby documents the traditions of royal courtship and marriage between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the scandals that resulted from kings forming relationships with concubines, and the measures taken to address problems presented by children conceived out of wedlock or in relationships disapproved of by the Church. The book highlights the authority of the Church over kings, and the role of church officials, such as bishops, in determining the legitimacy of royal unions. This indicates that the Church held significant power and authority during the Middle Ages, not only in appointing pastors and shepherds to minister to the subjects of kings, but over the kings themselves. Duby's study shows that Western Christian Pastoral Power played a prominent role in periods of repressive Sovereign Power.[10]

Proto-Productive Apparatuses and Confession

Like Duby, Foucault places the emergence of Christian Pastoral Power during times of repressive sovereign rule and extends it into periods of productive power. Pastoral Power played a unique role in supplementing Sovereign Power, but can also be considered 'productive' in a certain sense. In the chapter on the repressive hypothesis and the 'Scientia sexualis' in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (1976: 53-73), Foucault argues that the Christian pastorate introduced monastic practices to transform sexuality and discourse surrounding sex. However, some apparatuses aimed at the repression of deviant conduct also account for the subject's capacity for autonomous deviant conduct.

[10] This short exposition does not nearly capture the extent of Duby's investigations. He provides an account of specific historical forms of courtship and of the Church doctrines regarding sex and marriage.

The apparatus that best demonstrates the proto-productive workings of Pastoral Power is the confession as practiced in Western Catholicism. Not only does the practice of confession demonstrate the germinal understanding of the individual's productive capacities, but it operates with an idea of the subject of the Christian flock as possessing an inevitable, and therefore predictable, propensity for sin. Confessional practices emerged with the Lateran Council in 1215, signalling the

> resulting development of confessional techniques, the declining importance of accusatory procedures in criminal justice, the abandonment of tests of guilt (sworn statements, duels, judgements of God) and the development of methods of interrogation and inquest, the increased participation of royal prosecution of infractions, at the expense of proceedings leading to private settlements, the setting up of tribunals of Inquisition: all this helped to give the confession a central role in the order of civil and religious powers (Foucault, 1976: 58).

Thus, not only did the practice of confession strengthen Pastoral Power over the subject, it also moved away from apparatuses making external attributions of guilt towards the admission of guilt on the part of the subject him/herself. Christian Pastoral Power understands and works with the subject's productive capacity for action. Interrogation is one of the techniques to extract truth from individuals; the subject's own capacity to act and speak is a condition for its salvation. Truth must be verified by the subject and reinforced by its own words, indicating a change in the understanding of the nature of the human subject emerging with the Western Christian pastorate. Whereas the subject of Sovereign Power was understood as requiring nothing more than the imposition of repressive apparatuses assuring the prosperity of the sovereign, the pastoral subject is understood as an entity with the capacity for authentic speech, activity, and productivity. The subject can no longer be accused and condemned simply through external apparatuses of truth creation but must verify its own guilt in order to be punished, saved, or forgiven. In short, the subject must produce the confirmation of his/her own guilt for this guilt to be recognised as truth. The conceptualisation of the subject as being more than an object of repression finds its expression in the pastoral practice of confession:

> For a long time, the individual was vouched for by the references of others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonwealth (family allegiance, protection); then he was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to pronounce

> concerning himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power. (Foucault, 1976: 58-59)

However, during the period of Pastoral Power supplementing Sovereign Power, confession was often still extracted through the torturous methods that Foucault describes in the opening chapter of *Discipline and Punish* (1975). The deployment of such methods are instances of repressive apparatuses of power reinforcing the imprint of the sovereign's might. Confession is extracted through torture when not offered up willingly. However, the fact that 'truth' is extracted from the subject through torture, instead of being produced through inculcation of conduct, demonstrates the limits of pastoral knowledge in/under repressive sovereign regimes.[11]

One of the most notable aspects of confession – that of producing truth and making that truth productive, is apparent in its capacity to supplement both repressive and productive forms of power. However, regardless of whether the confession is supplementing repressive or productive power, it always indicates a specific power relation between the subject who confesses, and the authority figure being confessed to. Such authority is held by whoever passes judgement, forgives, punishes, or aids in reconciliation (Foucault 1976: 61-62). In the Christian pastorate, this role is ascribed to the pastor. However, because the confession has far exceeded the religious doctrine and knowledge of Christianity, the role of the secular confessor or 'pastor' can be taken up by any authority with similar capacities to pass judgements in different systems of power-knowledge. The important distinction between secular and Christian Pastoral confession is that the goal of the confession in systems where the authority is not a Christian pastor is not the salvation of the immortal soul. The fact that confession could elicit a productive subjective capability in contexts of repression prepared for an understanding of the subject as a productive entity to be directed for the sake of society. The confession provided an epistemic underpinning for the subjective capacities of the individual which could be directed towards productive goals and expanded under 'productive power proper'. As an apparatus of Pastoral Power, the confession was limited to securing the salvation of the immortal soul; in

[11] The practice of supplementing the confession with torture has been prevalent since the Middle Ages, indicating that confession alone was inadequate and out of place in sovereign, repressive power structures:

> When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body. Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins. The most defenseless tenderness and the bloodiest of powers have a similar need of confession. Western man has become a confession animal. (Foucault, 1976: 59)

'productive power proper', it attained multifarious functions, such as inculcating obedience in school children, or fostering a transferential relationship between therapists and patients.

With the emergence of Protestantism, the Counter-Reformation, eighteenth century pedagogy, and nineteenth century medical sciences, confessional practices changed in their function (Foucault, 1976: 63). Confessional practices disseminated to discourses removed and distinct from religious ones. The dynamics of confession expanded from an apparatus geared towards the salvation of the soul to the relationships between parents and children, patients and psychiatrists, students and teachers, among others. In the process, confession was transformed into a productive apparatus capable of supplementing and reinforcing Disciplinary Power, Biopower, and Neoliberal Governmentality.[12] Even though confession historically emerged under conditions of Sovereignty and Pastoral Power, it could be transferred to contexts characterised by productive power to the extent that its religious origins, including its pastoral deployments, were attenuated or obliterated.

The fact that the confession underwent a transition from a primarily repressive to a productive apparatus indicates that it could form part of productive *dispositif* even under conditions of repressive power. This suggests that confession, even under conditions of Sovereign Power, cannot be considered altogether repressive, as it functioned even then with the understanding that the subject must be made to act. For this reason, the confession should be considered 'proto-productive' since it requires a level of subjective activity, even if it is still geared towards salvation and atonement for sin. This is what would link confession to productive power, but without productivity being its primary goal. The individual is enjoined to act, instead of just having its activity repressed.[13]

Confessional practices do not only presuppose a subject endowed with productive capacity; confession can, moreover, function in conjunction with productive apparatuses generating and maintaining subjects for the sake of production. The fact that confession can serve both repressive and productive power equips it for playing an instrumental role in the transition from repressive to productive power, and motivates an understanding of confession as 'proto-

[12] In an interview entitled 'The End of the Monarchy of Sex', Foucault (1989: 214-225) suggests that some contemporary confessional practices pertaining to pornography can even be deployed as ways of speaking truth to power.

[13] In 'The Proper Use of Criminals' (2020: 430), Foucault maintains that all juridical proceedings lead "toward the confession", "from the first interrogation to the final hearing", implying that the practices of confession have remained prevalent in contemporary secular applications of discipline and punishment.

productive'. Even though the pastoral subject can be considered capable of production, productivity is not a primary goal of pastoral apparatuses. Confession can be called 'productive' only to the extent that it deploys the productive capacities of the subject with the aim of securing salvation.

Unlike Sovereign Power, Pastoral Power prioritises the subject, and imbues it with the capacity for activity in need of guidance, for the sake of its soul. Much like the *dispositifs* of Disciplinary Power, the proto-productive apparatuses of Pastoral Power direct the conduct of the subject. However, the primary goal of Catholic Pastoral Power is not productivity. Foucault makes this clear when he describes the Church as

> an institution that claims to govern men in their daily life on the ground of leading them to eternal life in the other world... (1977-1978: 148)

The primary goal of pastoral apparatuses is securing the salvation of the immortal soul.[14] The secondary goal is redirecting subjective activities that endanger the soul. The tertiary goal of Pastoral Power is to produce a subject endowed with agency – geared toward the salvation of the soul through the transformation of, and protection from, actions endangering the soul.

The orientation towards productivity in Pastoral Power plays a role only in the third instance. The form of 'productivity' in Pastoral Power is conceptually distinct from that in Disciplinary Power. Pastoral practices such as confession that demand subjective activity from the flock subject demonstrate a relation to 'the subject' in ways that generate productivity of a certain kind, even if productivity is not the primary goal.

The conduct of the subject of Pastoral Power is to be simultaneously repressed and guided due to the subject's propensity for sin. This conceptualisation of 'the subject' informs the operations of pastoral apparatuses and the relationship between the pastor and the subject. The relationship

[14] Foucault (2004: 7) considers the salvation of the soul to be a crucial element; he traces it back to the reign of Roman emperor Constantine the Great, under whose reign the Roman Christian Empire "had to allow souls to attain salvation". Even though this period predates the emergence of the Christian pastorate of the Middle Ages, it indicates that the pastoral ethos of Christianity has always been inextricability linked to the salvation of the immortal soul. "We should no doubt say, if not with more precision, at least a bit more accurately, that the pastorate begins with a process that is absolutely unique in history and no other example of which is found in the history of any other civilization: the process by which a religion, a religious community, constitutes itself as a Church, that is to say, as an institution that claims to govern men in their daily life on the grounds of leading them to eternal life in the other world, and to do this not only on the scale of a definite group, of a city or a state, but of the whole of humanity. The Church is a religion that thus lays claim to the daily government of men in their real life on the grounds of their salvation and on the scale of humanity, and we have no other example of this in the history of societies." (Foucault 1977-1978: 148)

between the shepherd and the members of the flock-population is the second feature of Pastoral Power that illustrates the 'proto-productive' nature of Pastoral Power.

The Shepherd-Flock Relationship

In the 'proto-productive' system of Christian pastoralism, the 'population', as it would later be conceptualised, appears as a 'flock' of subjects upon whom 'proto-productive' apparatuses are brought to bear. This conceptualisation of a human collective as a 'flock' of sinful subjects informs the relationship between the pastor as 'shepherd' and the collective as 'flock'. This relationship is structured by traditions, rituals, and apparatuses geared towards ensuring the salvation of the soul, through a unilateral transfer of doctrinal knowledge and instruction inculcating submission. The relationship between the shepherd and the flock, and the corresponding apparatuses, presuppose a notion of 'the subject' as predictably predisposed to sin. The relationship fostered between the shepherd and the subject deals with this predictable submission to sin.

By virtue of its subjective capacities for conduct that threaten the soul, the subject in the flock must be continuously kept on the right path by the shepherd. Pre-emptive apparatuses, such as congregation and communion, are to keep the sheep on the right path, while retroactive apparatuses, such as confession, lead sheep back onto the right path when they stray. In understanding sin as an inevitable and inherent in the subject, these apparatuses are prototypically predictive; they operate to mitigate the spiritual consequences of sin.

The conceptualisation of the subject as a predictable sinner for whom the pastor must account, calls for apparatuses to save the sinner in perpetuity. The confession is the ideal apparatus for this, because it simultaneously accounts for the fact that the subject will inevitably stray and relies on that very capacity for autonomy in order to save the subject's soul. The confession must be performed by the subject acting on its own subjective capacity and producing the words that admit guilt. The pastor/shepherd listens and forgives, while relying on subjects' individual capacities to perform certain rituals, in order to finalise the reinstatement of their souls into the kingdom of heaven. Thus, the confession not only embraces the inevitability of subjects' capacity for placing their soul at risk from sin, but deploys this capacity for subjective activity to save their souls, thereby assuring the salvation of both the pastor and the subject. The confession functions with an element of prediction to the extent that it operates with an understanding of the subject as predictably predisposed to sin. These predictable sinful

capacities of the flock-subject were seen as potential threats to its soul and therefore had to be mitigated to ensure its salvation. Furthermore, the activity of the individual flock-subject could threaten the salvation of the pastor, and vice versa, because misconduct on the part of either posed a threat to the salvation of the other.

The conceptualisation of the 'population' as a 'flock' emerges in the language adopted from the Greeks. Foucault (1977-1978: 192-193) argues that the Christian pastorate was orientated towards the conduct of its subjects. He refers to the Greek term *oikonomia psuchōn*, which is loosely translated as an 'economy of souls', to highlight the goal of managing subjects entrusted to apparatuses of Pastoral Power. Whereas the term '*oikonomia*' originally designated the managing of a household, slaves, or clients, Foucault draws attention to the different dimensions that it took on in Christian Pastoral Power. The difference between managing households and children in the Greek city states, and managing souls in the Christian pastorate lies in the expansion of Christianity beyond the household, to include the souls spread across Christian humanity. Apparatuses of the Christian pastorate focus on the conduct of the subject; they emphasise the importance of an economy of subjects, which is one of the primary features of the 'art of governance',[15] and of productive power. Foucault suggests that the governance of conduct was introduced into the West by the Christian pastorate:

> I think the least bad translation for the *oikonomia psuchōn* Gregory Nazianzen spoke about could perhaps be the conduct of souls, and I think that this notion of conduct, with the field it covers, is doubtless one of the fundamental elements introduced into Western society by the Christian pastorate. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 193)

Another significant difference between the Christian pastorate and the system deployed by the Greeks lies in the fact that the former demands absolute subordination of the subject to the shepherd (Foucault 1977-1978: 175-180). The relationship between the shepherd and the subject was an individual one predicated on personal submission to the will of the shepherd, not based on logic or law, but on the sole reason that it is his *will* (Foucault 2020: 309). Foucault identifies three aspects of this subordination specific to the Christian pastorate.

Firstly, the pastor would instruct the subject, seeking to orientate its conduct away from inevitable sin. This inevitability of sin is a constant attribute of the Christian pastoral subject,

[15] See Chapter Five.

to the point of being a predictable feature of the subject. Apparatuses like the constant pastoral instruction, along with confession, imply a conceptualisation of 'prediction' unique to Pastoral Power, inasmuch as these apparatuses deal with an inevitable, and thus predictable, propensity for sin.

The instruction did not centre on the importance of the tasks, but on keeping the subject (pre-) occupied with these tasks, to the exclusion of activities threatening the soul. Thus, even though pastoral instruction functioned proto-productively by making the subject perform activities, the primary goal of these activities, whether they were productive or not, was never productivity itself, but the salvation of the immortal soul and the redirection of activities away from sinful preoccupations. Pastoral instruction was 'proto-productive' to the extent that it resulted in the manifestation of productive action on the part of the subject, without productivity being its primary goal.

Unlike the pastoral relationships of the Greeks, the second characteristic of Christian obedience is that there is no end to the submission. Foucault juxtaposes the Christian pastoral relationship with the relationships of the Greeks, between the likes of the doctor and the patient, or the philosopher and the student. In each case, there would be an end goal to the relationship. The relationship between patient and doctor ends when this healing has been achieved. Likewise, when the desired level of expertise has been achieved, the relationship between student and teacher ends. In these contexts, submission is required for a purpose. By contrast, the Christian pastoral relationship has no immediate earthly goal, and there is no end to the subordination of the subjects to the shepherd. The Christian pastoral relationship demands such absolute submission precisely because the subject's predisposition for sinful activity threatens the goal of salvation—the goal of the Christian pastoral relationship. The only goal of this relationship is to instil a sense of humility in the subject, leading to a renunciation of the pleasures of the flesh (Foucault 1977-1978: 177-178).

The Christian pastorate does not dread inactivity, as the Greeks did, but the specific activities that stem from the flesh. The ideal subject continuously engages with the shepherd, who instructs the subject in ways of combatting this predisposition for sinful activity in perpetuity. The obedience demanded by the Christian pastorate is aimed at redirecting the sinful capacity of the flesh. This is an ongoing process, without an earthly end. By overcoming the weaknesses of the flesh, the relationship between the shepherd and the subject is working toward procuring eternal life. The goals of the Christian pastoral relationships transcend earthly constraints. This

transcendence demonstrates the 'proto-productive' nature of the pastoral relationship. This is one of the aspects that distinguishes it from Disciplinary Power, which is limited to productivity in closed institutions. For Disciplinary Power, death concludes its power over the subject.

The final characteristic differentiating the Christian pastorate from other mentor relationships, according to Foucault, is that of truth (Foucault 1977-1978: 180). The Christian pastor is charged with teaching his subjects through both words and his own conduct. The truth the pastor relays to the flock is limited to doctrinal knowledge. The pastor becomes the purveyor of knowledge about God, the world, and salvation.

There are two additional features in the teaching responsibilities of the Christian pastor, which distinguish them from those of other pedagogical figures (Foucault 1977-1978: 180-181). The first difference lies in the fact that the Christian pastor's teachings are directed at the daily conduct of subjects. The pastor is required to observe the daily life of each subject, instil submission and provide guidance at every level, and to redirect the problematic conduct of the flesh. The second aspect of the Christian pastor's teaching is the orientation towards spiritual direction. The spiritual direction provided by the Christian pastor differs from that provided in Antiquity in the sense that the latter was voluntarily sought out and paid for, and was orientated towards overcoming specific obstacles in an individual's life. The obligatory spiritual direction afforded by the Christian pastorate is not circumstantial, but a permanent feature pertaining to every aspect of the individual's life. It is an ongoing process without end, and is not directed towards achieving self-mastery. Instead, it increases the subordination of the subject to the master who examines and directs (Foucault, 1977-1978: 182).

The pastoral knowledge relationship between the shepherd and the subject individualised the flock subject (Foucault 1977-1978: 183). In addition to producing 'truth', it establishes structures of power, investigation, self-examination, and examination of others. These structures produce and reinforce the submission of the subject's inner truths to the pastor; they function as procedures by which the pastor exercises power over the subject. The pastoral transfer of knowledge and instruction focuses primarily on the individual. Foucault (2020: 309) describes it as a "peculiar type of knowledge between the pastor and each of his sheep". Pastoral power-knowledge requires knowledge of each individual sheep; a theme that predates Christianity, but is amplified in the Christian pastorate. The pastor must know the innermost working of each individual's soul and transfer knowledge and instruction to each individual member of the flock (Foucault, 2020: 310). The Christian pastorate adopts this power-

knowledge relay from Hellenistic conceptualisations of self-mastery and the guiding of conscience, albeit in modified form, so as to maintain and reinforce power over the subject. The subject lets itself be guided "every second", with a sense of being "fatally lost" without such guidance and instruction. The instructions of the pastor are not meant to guide the subject towards effective self-mastery, but to strengthen and reinforce the pastoral power-knowledge relations. Guiding the conscience is a regular and continuous practice; it cannot be limited to situations presenting particular obstacles. Neither is self-examination intended to help the individual achieve self-mastery, but prompts subjects to unveil themselves to the shepherd, and allow him access to the depths of their souls. Pastoral instructions are deployed with the explicit intention of strengthening the unilateral power-knowledge transfer between the shepherd and each individual in his flock.

The guidance afforded by the Shepherd to the subject entails a top-down relay of instructions and knowledge. What is known, or worth knowing, is known by the pastor, and disseminated to the subject. The subject, on the other hand, does not form part of a knowledge-making process. Pastoral knowledge is predicated on established theological premises, which require no additional knowledge-formation or collection. Pastoral knowledge is taught and reinforced from pastor to subject, without any feedback.

Unlike disciplinary closed institutions, monastic institutions do not rely on a cycle of knowledge relay and collection. Only through constant input of pastoral knowledge and submission to pastoral instruction can the subject achieve a level of conduct that ensures the salvation of the soul—not only his own soul, but the soul of the pastor who takes responsibility for him. Pastoral Power utilises the relationship between the shepherd and flock, characterised as one of individual attention; the subject is dependent on the shepherd for guidance (Foucault, 2020: 302-303), which is meted out individually. The relationship between the Christian shepherd and the individual flock member relies on reciprocity and responsibility (Foucault 1977-1978: 168). The primary goal of the pastoral relationship between the shepherd and the subject is to procure salvation for the flock:

> pastoral power is … entirely defined by its beneficence; its only *raison d'être* is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact, the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation (*salut*) of the flock. In this sense we can say that we are assuredly not very far from the objective traditionally fixed for the sovereign, that

> is to say, the salvation of one's country, which must be the *lex suprema* of the exercise of power. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 126)

Although Foucault draws a parallel between the securing of salvation of the individual by the pastorate and the securing of salvation of a country by the sovereign, he makes it clear that the salvation of the pastorate is different due to its focus on the subject. The pastor is the shepherd who puts the individual members of the flock before himself, and ensures that each member is "properly fed". The shepherd-flock relationship is exemplified by care, and the shepherd does everything he can to prevent the suffering of the flock members; he looks for those who run astray, and nurses the sick and injured (Foucault, 1977-1978: 127). Thus, Pastoral Power focuses primarily on the individual subject and its relationship with the pastor.

These individualising elements of the Christian pastorate are indicative of its 'proto-productive' nature. What was later designated as 'population' as a multiplicity[16] of individual subjects had a precursor in the 'flock' of individual subjects in need of individual guidance. Each subject is considered part of a population, prototypically conceptualised as a flock. The pastor is involved in different levels of reciprocal relationships, with both the entire flock and each individual member (Foucault 1977-1978: 168-169). As important as it is for the flock to be saved, it is equally important that each subject is led to salvation.

The extent of the pastor's dedication to the individual highlights a problem that Foucault (1977-1978: 169) calls the "pastoral paradox", referring to the fact that the pastor would simultaneously be required to let go of sheep that pose a threat to the salvation of the entire 'flock', whilst being responsible for their immortal souls. This problem does not exist in secular

[16] Foucault uses 'multiplicity' to refer to the manner in which individuals are organised within Discipline (1977-1978: 12).

> Discipline is of course also exercised on the bodies of individuals, but I have tried to show you how the individual is not the primary datum on which discipline is exercised. Discipline only exists insofar as there is a multiplicity and an end, or an objective or result to be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity. School and military discipline, as well as penal discipline, workshop discipline, worker discipline, are all particular ways of managing and organizing a multiplicity, of fixing its points of implantation, its lateral or horizontal, vertical and pyramidal trajectories, its hierarchy, and so on.

In the fourth lecture of *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974: 75) Foucault argues that regarding systems of closed institutions like schools, workshops, and prisons "we are never dealing with a mass, with a group, or even, to tell the truth, with a multiplicity: we are only ever dealing with individuals." It is for this reason that I deploy the term 'multiplicity' to refer to the population of Disciplinary Power. The 'population' of a closed institution is not conceptualised as a single entity, but as individuals who make up a kind of multiplicity, and the apparatuses of discipline focus primarily on the individual subject who forms part of the multiplicity. The dynamic of disciplinary apparatuses is to engender productivity in every single subject who form part of the multiplicity.

systems of power. Disciplinary Power readily incarcerates those of delinquent conduct, so as to keep the population safe. Biopolitics imposes large-scale regulatory *dispositifs* that put the population, conceptualised as a 'species body', above the individual.[17] These include quarantines and other forms of policing that subordinate the rights and freedoms of the individual to the longevity of the population. However, because the Christian pastorate is concerned with the salvation of the individual immortal soul, the relationship between the shepherd and the flock does not, as a rule, permit the flock to be placed above the individual.

The Christian pastorate made several additions to the dynamic unfolding between the shepherd and flock. These additions resulted in complexities and perplexities which Foucault examines in detail (Foucault, 1977-1978: 169-171). There is, firstly, the issue of "analytical responsibility", referring to the Christian pastor's obligation to account not only for the numerical count of his flock, including the soul of each, but also for the sins of every single member of the flock. The second principle is what Foucault calls "exhaustive and instantaneous transfer", referring to the fact that the merits and faults of each individual flock member are considered by the pastor as his own. The third paradox is that of "sacrificial reversal", referring to the fact that the pastor sacrifices his life to save the lives of his sheep, potentially sacrificing even his soul for the sake of saving the souls of the sheep. [18] The final paradox consists in what Foucault calls "alternate correspondence", referring to the understanding that the merit of the pastor is dependent on the deviations of the flock subjects. If the subjects do not provide obstacles to their own, and thereby the pastor's, salvation, the pastor has no responsibility. The pastor's merit is measured by the obstacles with which he is confronted by his flock.[19]

These four complications encountered in the course of the regimes of the Christian pastorate indicate the co-dependent nature of the relationship between the shepherd and the flock; every action on the part of the shepherd and the subjects affects the salvation of both. Moreover, these additions indicate an understanding of the flock as a kind of prototypical 'population' that is understood as a collective of individual subjects, as in Disciplinary Power[20]. The flock is

[17] See Chapter Four.

[18] The act of taking up the sins of the flock members puts the soul of the pastor at risk of damnation, but he is obligated to be willing to sacrifice his own salvation by doing so.

[19] In his dedication to his flock, the pastor, being human, is required not to hide his imperfections from the flock-subjects, but to allow himself to be repeatedly humbled by his own imperfections. If he were to hide them, the exposure of his faults would potentially result in a scandal that could threaten the entirety of the flock. Thus, both the strengths and the weaknesses of the pastor could prove instrumental in procuring salvation for the flock.

[20] See Chapter Two.

conceptualised as an accumulation of subjects under continuous threat of 'going astray'. These attributions to the 'flock' of the Western pastorate reveal prototypical features of the conceptualisation of the mobile term 'population' as it would come to feature in configurations of 'productive power proper'. The Christian 'flock' is divided into *micro-population*-like parishes. In these parishes, the operations of Pastoral Power take on the individualising features characteristic of the relation between shepherd and each individual member of the flock. In this individualising relationship, 'proto-productive' pastoral apparatuses, like the confession, secure the salvation of the individual soul.

In the pastoral notion of 'population' as a flock, 'population' is not understood as a multiplicity of individual secular subjects in the same manner as would be the case within Disciplinary Power. The pastoral conceptualisation of 'population' is only proto-productive in the sense that the apparatuses of Pastoral Power operate in an individualising capacity, in order to procure the salvation of the individual soul; the individualising apparatuses within a Disciplinary Power configuration, on the other hand, are oriented toward the subject capable of production by virtue of its labour.

The conceptualisation of 'the subject' as a single unit of a collective is carried over from Pastoral Power to Disciplinary Power. However, the subject of Disciplinary Power is conceptualised in secular terms. Because secular productive power, starting with Disciplinary Power, does not concern itself with the salvation of the immortal soul, the co-dependence and threat of mutual spiritual destruction is, for the most part, absent from 'productive power proper'. However, some correlations can be drawn between the unique relationship of dependency between the pastor and the subject and secular practices in closed institutions, especially regarding the achievement of shared institutional goals. Disciplinary closed institutions share institutionally specific productive goals, such as the manufacturing of goods or the education of learners. Whereas the goal of the relationship between teachers and students or between factory managers and workers is to achieve the goal of the institution,[21] the goal of the relationship between the subject and the pastor is a shared desire for salvation. Both the subject of Pastoral Power as well as the pastor have a personal desire to achieve salvation, with the salvation of the pastor being dependent on successfully procuring salvation for the subject. Even though this is not a shared goal in an institutional setting, the pastoral relationship

[21] See Chapter Two.

between the shepherd and the members of the flock demonstrates a prototypical understanding of mutual dependency for a common goal.

The Mobile Terms in Pastoral Power

In the theological framework of Pastoral Power, the subject is inevitably predisposed towards sin. The conceptualisation of 'the subject' as capable of activity that could curb sin and ensure salvation contributed to the emerging Christian pastorate as a uniquely 'proto-productive' configuration of knowledge and power. As mentioned, 'proto-productive power' is distinct from systems of 'productive power proper' to the extent that productivity is not its ultimate goal. 'Proto-productive' apparatuses, such as confession, instruction, and pastoral guidance, elicited and directed the human capacity for productivity, but only to the extent that the resulting activities aided in assuring the salvation of the soul.

The conceptualisation of the mobile term 'production' is evident in the 'proto-productive' nature of Pastoral Power. The 'proto-productive' nature of Pastoral Power manifests itself in the specific ways in which it distinguishes itself from repressive Sovereign Power. For Sovereign Power, the wellbeing of the sovereign and his territory were the primary goals; whereas the subject and the wellbeing of its soul, individually and collectively, are the primary concerns of Pastoral Power.[22] Apparatuses of Pastoral Power are geared towards orientating the conduct of the subject to ensure the salvation of its soul. Apparatuses of the emerging Christian pastorate rely on, and result in, productivity in the subject, without productivity being the primary purpose of these apparatuses. Pastoral Power is 'proto-productive' because it focuses on the subject, understands the subject as having capacities for productive activity, and directs these capacities to achieve its primary goal. However, this primary end is not productivity as in the case of 'productive power proper', but the salvation of the immortal soul of the subject.

The 'subject' of Pastoral Power is both individual and collective. The 'flock' of the Christian pastorate is not conceptualised as possessing qualities that could not also pertain to the conduct of the individual subject and the salvation of the individual soul. This understanding of a human

[22] "[W]e can say that the idea of a pastoral power is the idea of a power exercised in a multiplicity rather than on territory. It is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end. This is therefore a power with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state, or sovereign. Finally, it is a power directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at the higher unity formed by the whole." (Foucault, 1977-1978: 129)

collective paves the way for the concept of 'population' as a focus of power and governance; historically, and in terms of the formation of the conceptual architecture that s the focus of this project, it marks the outlines of Governmentality (Foucault, 1977-1978: 129).[23] However, Foucault makes it clear that the Christian pastorate is not interested in governing State or territory. In fact, both State and territory imply restrictions of Pastoral Power, which aims to procure salvation for every single subject in the whole of humanity.[24]

The accumulation of subjects in Pastoral Power is conceptualised differently from the multiplicities that Disciplinary Power understands as 'population'. The main difference hinges on the fact that disciplinary subjects are conceptualised as having the capability to be rendered productive and calculable by disciplinary apparatuses, whereas individuals in the flock are conceptualised as needing constant guidance from the shepherd to ensure they do not give in to sin.

While Pastoral Power is premised on the 'predictability' of inevitable sin, the pastoral conceptualisation of 'prediction' is left quite vague, and what can be known regarding its conceptualisation is predicted on an analysis of its relation to the conceptualisation of 'the subject', and the functioning of the confession and the shepherd-flock relation. By linking together these elements in Foucault's analysis of the apparatuses of Christian Pastoral Power and its power-knowledge relations, it can provide some content to the notion and the role of 'prediction' in Pastoral Power.

In a Pastoral Power configuration, 'the subject' must be rendered predictable only to the extent that this conceptualisation is aimed at the salvation of the immortal soul. Thus, predictability in Pastoral Power is not equivalent to the predictability at work in Disciplinary Power or Biopolitics; it is a different concept, informed by a completely different set of knowledges. It is not a predictability to be established at the level of the population to accommodate the aleatory biological threats to the population. The predictability we can glean from an analysis of Pastoral Power is also not informed by the scientific knowledges that elucidate these biological threats. Instead, the predictability in Pastoral Power is limited to 'the subject',

[23] See Chapter Five.

[24] In 'Omnes et Singulatim' (2020: 300-325), Foucault points out that the individualising elements of power that had emerged with the pastorate, combined with the centralising tendencies of the modern state, along with certain kinds of police strategies. Foucault argues that the modern state is "simultaneously a factor for individualization, and a totalitarian principle", and that "right from the start, the state is both individualising and totalitarian". (Foucault 2020: 325).

conceptualised as perpetually predisposed to sin threatening the immortal soul, and to the conduct of the subject in response to that threat. The predictability that the pastorate establishes is limited to the conduct of the subject, and the extent to which conduct threatens the immortal soul.

'The subject' is conceptualised as possessing autonomous capacities that must be rendered predictable through its dependence on the pastor, and the pastoral relationship, to ensure its salvation. However, the fact that practices like the confession are performed retroactively, after the individual has already sinned, makes it clear that the Christian Pastoral power-knowledge configuration does not conceptualise 'the subject' as possessing the faculties necessary to be rendered completely calculable.[25] In other words, the subject could not attain its salvation through its conduct; additional interventions would be required to be able to procure its salvation.

The pastor-subject relation on which the Christian pastorate is based is dependent on the conceptualisation of the inept, sinful, subject. The pastoral conceptualisation of 'the subject' proves incompatible with secular Disciplinary Power, which relies on the assumption that the subject can be rendered calculable through normalising apparatuses. Even though the conceptualisation of the subject in Disciplinary Power is, to some extent, inherited from the Christian pastorate, the conceptualisation of the subject that resulted from pastoral knowledge would prove incompatible with the disciplinary conceptualisation of a subject. The conceptualisation of the individual in Disciplinary Power would inherit the understanding of its subjective capacities, but would reject the description of the subject as incapable of self-mastery.

Conclusion

Analysing the systems of Pastoral Power is only the beginning of a project that aims to examine the major moves in Western power-knowledge configurations, as they feature in Foucault's work. This chapter has uncovered the conditions in power-knowledge configurations that have made it possible for 'productive power proper' to emerge. To that end, this chapter has identified 'proto-productive' elements in systems of Pastoral Power; the next chapter will demonstrate how these apparatuses become functional in systems of power that are completely

[25] See Chapter Two.

focused on production. More specifically, chapter two will explore the transformations in the mobile terms that occur with the emergence of Disciplinary Power and the human sciences.

Chapter Two

Disciplinary Power: Productive Power Proper

As opposed to Pastoral Power, which draws its knowledge from spiritual teachings and sets its sights firmly on the preservation of the immortal soul, Disciplinary Power is less encumbered by metaphysical and spiritual doctrines. The gaze of discipline is focused primarily on the subject as primarily an earthly entity, a secular being which must be directed towards secular goals. Heaven is replaced by promotion to a higher rank and prosperity; Hell is replaced by poverty and constraint; and the authority of the pastor is dispersed among a network of trained subjects who become active eyes of the multidirectional gaze of discipline. Unlike Foucault's remarks on Pastoral Power, which appear scattered throughout his work, his conceptualisation of Disciplinary Power emerges in his seminal book *Discipline and Punish* (1975), in which he attenuates the archaeological method he pioneered with his earlier works in favour of a genealogical method inspired by Nietzsche. In deploying his own version of a historical genealogy, Foucault manages to uncover the multifarious relations between knowledge and power. In doing so, he brings to the fore complex networks of interactions that allow for abstract concepts of knowledge to interact with the material realm, and vice-versa. The way in which subjects are produced, and what they produce, features in a complex network of relations that Foucault terms 'power-knowledge'.

Discipline and Punish presents Foucault's most complete investigation of the apparatuses of productive power and the subjects they aim to cultivate,[26] taking the prison and changes in the punitive system from execution to enclosure and rehabilitation as a starting point. In this text, Foucault explores the emergence of closed institutions and the development of productive apparatuses, which establish the conditions for the emergence of new knowledges making up what he calls *human sciences*, encompassing those sciences that pertain to human conduct and behaviour. Foucault's analysis of closed institutions goes beyond the prison, to include military, educational, medical, and industrial institutions (Elden, 2017: 140). By 'closed institutions' I

[26] Apparatuses of Disciplinary Power are geared towards cultivating calculable subjects in closed institutions. The most prominent of these institutions is the prison, and it is no coincidence that Foucault frames his primary work on Disciplinary Power, *Discipline and Punish*, through an investigation of the prison and the changes in the punitive system that accompanied the move from repressive and towards productive power as power designed to enhance productivity. Along with the prison, Foucault identifies other institutions, like schools and factories, as closed institutions where disciplinary apparatuses are deployed to train individuals so as to render them calculable productive subjects.

mean institutions that contain and maintain power-knowledge cycles by deploying specific apparatuses geared towards producing and orientating calculable subjects.[27]

Whereas chapter one focused on the foundations of productive power found in the 'proto-productive' systems of Pastoral Power, this chapter explores Foucault's study of the complex relations between power and knowledge in a configuration of Disciplinary Power, and argues that disciplinary apparatuses (*dispositifs*)[28] focus explicitly on fostering calculable subjects, informed by human science knowledges. I will investigate Foucault's arguments in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) regarding the means by which bodies are rendered docile, normalised, and subject to external examination, in order to argue that his descriptions of these apparatuses reflect significant conceptual transitions in the chosen mobile terms which accompany the emergence of Disciplinary Power. Apparatuses cultivating calculable subjects presuppose conceptual changes in the mobile terms which indicate a move to what I term, 'productive power proper'.

The first set of transformations in the conceptual architecture pertaining to the mobile terms: 'production', 'population', 'the subject', 'prediction', and 'the norm', occurs with the emergence of Disciplinary Power. Foucault's descriptions of disciplinary apparatuses in *Discipline and Punish* show how apparatuses of Disciplinary Power build on the foundations laid by 'proto-productive' Pastoral Power by deploying fully productive primary conceptualisations of the chosen mobile terms. *Discipline and Punish* demonstrates the transition from the 'proto-productive' operations of Pastoral Power to what I call 'productive power proper'. 'Productive power proper' constantly produces new knowledges in closed institutions by means of collecting information regarding human conduct and deploying this knowledge to establish norms.

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[27] Foucault does not attempt to analyse power relations in closed institutions as originating from within the institution; instead, he looks at these institutions as case studies of specific kinds of power relations with the accompanying apparatuses as they occur in institutions, for institutional goals. To demonstrate this, he suggests one should analyse institutions from the perspective of power relations, and not vice versa. For this reason, my investigation focuses on the apparatuses deployed, and works outward towards looking at specific institutions and their commonalities and differences. This is the best way to reveal conceptual changes in the mobile signifiers.

[28] Bussolini (2010) distinguishes between the different translations of *dispositif*, showing that the original term has an etymological origin in positivity (productivity), which excludes those apparatuses that have primarily repressive functions, such as those of sovereignty. Bussolini suggests that Foucault deliberately attempted to distance his usage of *dispositif* from the deployment of terms such as *appareil*, and from the latter's usage in Althusser's formulation *appareils idéologiques de'État* in particular. Agamben's work has demonstrated, he argues, that the two terms are not simply dissimilar semantically, but diametrically opposed. In fact, Agamben states that it is the etymological linkages between *dispositif* and 'positive' that make this most clear; in that sense Foucault's notion of 'productive' power could also be interpreted as 'positive' power.

The human sciences are primarily concerned with investigating the subject's conduct. In the wake of this new understanding of the subject came significant transformations in the mobile terms identified here: 'production', 'population', 'prediction', and 'the subject'. Moreover, Disciplinary Power ushers in the emergence of a new mobile term – that of 'the norm' - which was hitherto epistemically unavailable due to the moralistic frameworks by which repressive and 'proto-productive' systems of power measured conduct.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault describes the emergence of disciplinary knowledges and apparatuses with regard to the tradition of punishment (1975: 3-131), contrasting traditional repressive sovereign techniques of punishment with the emergence of techniques of punishment centred on enclosure and rehabilitation. By virtue of its capacity for generating and enhancing productivity, the subject within a configuration of Disciplinary Power became conceptualised as possessing inherent utility. Foucault shows how, with the emergence of productive Disciplinary Power, the body of the condemned was no longer understood as the property of the sovereign who brings down his wrath upon it, but became the "property of society" and an "object of a collective and useful appropriation" (1975: 109). These descriptions signal the emergence of 'productive power proper', where apparatuses of power are geared towards orientating subjects towards 'productive' activities thought to benefit society, by virtue of providing labour in closed institutions, and entailing normalisation practices. This conceptualisation of the subject as an entity endowed with a capacity to produce that can be harnessed in the service of social goals contrasts with Foucault's understanding of Sovereign Power, which aimed to repress, and with 'proto-productive' Pastoral Power, which aimed to secure the salvation of the immortal soul utilising productive apparatuses only insofar as such apparatuses serve this outcome.

Disciplinary Power in Time

This chapter focuses on the conceptualisation of discipline as it appears in *Discipline and Punish*, and Foucault's later work in which he relates many of the apparatuses of Disciplinary Power to his anatomo-political schema. Foucault situates the emergence of discipline between the emergence of *dispositifs* aimed at disciplining subjects in closed institutions, and the

emergence of *dispositifs* operating with a conceptualisation of 'population' as a 'species body'.[29]

In *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (1976: 139), Foucault distinguishes between a first and second set of apparatuses that emerged around the seventeenth century to render the population productive and predictable. He merely describes a second set of biopolitical apparatuses as emerging "somewhat later", after the emergence of disciplinary apparatuses. In order to gain a clearer understanding of the historical period that Foucault sets between the emergence of disciplinary *dispositifs* and biopolitical *dispositifs*, I will consider Foucault's (1976: 63) analysis in *Society Must Be Defended* showing that disciplinary apparatuses emerged at the end of the seventeenth century, and proliferated during the eighteenth century. In the same text, he describes apparatuses of regulation emerging during the second half of the eighteenth century, making for a period of approximately half a century between the conceptualisation, in productive power, of 'population' as a multiplicity of subjects, and 'population' as a singular 'species body'. Significantly, the conceptualisation of 'population' as a species body did not render disciplinary *dispositifs* irrelevant, but complemented apparatuses of Disciplinary Power by including apparatuses of regulation addressing problems that went beyond the scope of the individual.

Disciplinary apparatuses were focused on exercising power over bodies with the least amount of effort possible, and were exemplified in systems of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, records, and reports, which Foucault (1976, 63) terms "the disciplinary technology of labour". The subject is reframed as a 'body', and disciplinary apparatuses are brought to bear on subjects understood as essentially biological organisms. The capacities of the subject, harnessed and manipulated by apparatuses of Disciplinary Power, are cast as capacities of the body. The explicit bodily capabilities of the biological subject are cultivated to enhance productivity. Foucault's reframing of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (1976: 139) in terms of Biopower prompts him to refer to these apparatuses as an "*anatomo-politics of the human body"*. He uses the word "*disciplines*" to refer to these apparatuses,

[29] Even though they do not seem to constitute the exact parameters for a Disciplinary Power configuration in 'productive power proper', Foucault (2007: 146) traces the germinal aspects of disciplinary apparatuses back to 'ancient times' and 'the Middle Ages' (naming monasteries and the Roman legionn as example). He articulates that they appeared in in fragmented relations until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

reaffirming the fact that he is indeed speaking about the disciplinary apparatuses that he discussed extensively in his earlier work.[30]

Generating Conditions for Calculable Bodies

An indication of Disciplinary Power as a primarily productive system can be found in Foucault's examination of the training of the subject in closed institutions with the aim of rendering the subject a calculable agent. The interaction of disciplinary apparatuses with subjects entails important conceptual changes in the mobile terms 'production' and 'population', 'predictability' and 'the subject'. Apparatuses of discipline establish the conditions for calculable conduct by applying specific conceptualisations of 'production' and 'population' to maximise productivity in *micro-populations.*[31]

Subjects of Disciplinary Power rendered calculable become what Foucault (1975: 135-169) terms "docile bodies". He argues that disciplinary apparatuses aim at the "control and use of men" (Foucault, 1975: 141). Subjects that can be controlled are made to conduct themselves in line with the productive outcomes of specific institutions. Their productivity contributes to the productivity of the 'micro-population' within the walls of the institution.

Disciplinary apparatuses generate the necessary conditions in which the subject would be rendered calculable, because only such a subject can contribute productively to the population. These apparatuses operate in closed institutions like factories, which contain micro-populations conceptualised as multiplicities of individual subjects that exist in, and contribute to, the outcomes of closed institutions. In turn, closed institutions establish the conditions for the collection and distribution of human science knowledges that define the norm.

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[30] Even though Foucault defines the anatomo-political as focusing on the discipline of the individual body, it would be incorrect to conclude that all Foucault's previous writings on Disciplinary Power can reconceptualised as forming part of the anatomo-political schema. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975: 326-237), Foucault analyses isolation as a form of restitutive punishment, with the goal of instilling in the offender a sense of penitence and remorse. Solitude was thought to lead to reflection, which in turn would evoke remorse. Even though Foucault attempted to reframe his conceptualisation of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power through the lens of the anatomo-political schema, it would be inaccurate to claim that all of the apparatuses of Disciplinary Power can be reconceptualised as anatomo-political, since Foucault described some disciplinary apparatuses as being geared towards the restitution of the psychical and character elements of the subject, and not just the bodily elements. This problem would be overcome with the introduction of the framework of Governmentality, which includes disciplines functioning at a level beyond the body.

[31] By 'micro-populations' I am referring to smaller multiplicities of subjects in closed institutions.

To demonstrate how Disciplinary Power generates the conditions for calculable conduct, we turn to Foucault's (1975: 141-149) explanation of the ordering of subjects in space, and the separation of subjects from one another. Subjects are distributed in space through enclosure and separation of closed institutions from external spaces, by erecting boundaries like walls and gates, as in factories and schools. These boundaries enclose individuals in isolated spaces, separating subjects so enclosed from those outside. Furthermore, there is a partitioning of spaces into individual cells, breaking up the micro-population, and reducing the possibility of counterproductive activities that depend on collective action, such as desertion or protest. Additionally, the 'art of distributions' orders subjects in institutions into hierarchies, and ascribes to each a rank (Foucault, 1975: 141-149).

The next set of apparatuses, which Foucault (1975: 149) categorises as 'The Control of Activities', corresponds to Campbell and Sitze's (2013: 11-13) explication[32] of *dispositif*, as functioning to avert the aleatory risks that humans are predisposed to. Exhaustive appropriation of the subject's time renders its movement in space productive, and overcomes the aleatory nature of human mobility, by assigning movements to individuals scheduled according to temporal and spatial delineations.[33] The control of activities implies a relationship between the position and orientation of bodily gestures,[34] and the position of parts of the body in relation to objects manipulated by it (Foucault, 175: 152-153). Finally, the control of activities exerted by Disciplinary Power monopolises time (Hoffman, 2014: 28), indicating a reluctance to afford subjects in closed institutions a surplus of time to spend on activities that do not contribute to

[32] According to Campbell and Sitze (2013, 11), *dispositifs* represent what Foucault calls "a biological threshold of modernity", which is reached when "the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies". To explicate what Foucault means by this, they suggest that *Biopolitics*, in Foucault's phrasing, involves a sort of "game". In this game, the species itself, as a living entity, is "at play" or "at stake":

> [A] game in which life, which before was one among a number of stakes, begins to drift to another in which life has now become the only stake (Campbell & Sitze, 2013, 12).

In Campbell and Sitze's visualisation (2013, 12), this game is nothing short of placing a bet on the existence of life in a population. It is a bet that functions on the premise that, with all the apparatuses that have been put in place, death is being kept at bay; hence, power can make a calculated bet, investing all its chips in the continuous existence of the population. *Dispositifs*, then, are put in place to swing this probability game between life and death, in favour of the former. This will become more relevant in the next chapter which focuses on Biopower. However, this description still applies to disciplinary *dispositifs*.

[33] "Discipline is, above all, analysis of space; it is individualization through space, the placing of bodies in an individualized space that permits classification and combinations" (Foucault, 2007: 147).

[34] Foucault (175, 152) provides the example of the posture of seated student, and the correct position of their chins, elbows, legs, stomachs, and fingers for optimal handwriting, to demonstrate the control of Disciplinary Power over bodily gestures.

the goals of the closed institution. The subject's time has to be spent productively, and the possibility of engaging in counterproductive activities must be minimised.

Foucault (1975: 156) termed this process of time management the 'Organisation of Geneses'. Constantly directing individuals' conduct generates conditions of calculability - firstly, by segmenting time into periods; secondly, through organising these segments into linear trajectories from simple to complex; thirdly, ending each segment with an examination; and, finally, by assigning exercises to individuals according to rank (Hoffman, 2014: 29). Furthermore, the 'composition of forces' assures calculability by treating individual bodies like mobile elements connected to other individual bodies and to a multiplicity; coordinating the time available to each, combining the capacities of subjects for optimal results, and issuing commands communicated by signs (Foucault, 1975: 162-167).

The move towards productivity as the primary goal of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power demonstrates a change in the conceptualisation of the mobile term 'production' from a tertiary goal of pastoral apparatuses to a primary goal of closed institutions. The *control* that these apparatuses exert on subjects in closed institutions in order to achieve an institutionally-specific outcome entails a transformation in the mobile term 'population' from a flock of souls to a multiplicity of productive subjects trained to achieve a specific outcome. The population is conceptualised as a multiplicity of individual subjects, each of whom is the object of disciplinary apparatuses directing the subjective capacities of the individual, and maximising its productive output in closed institutions with institutionally-specific goals. 'The subject' is reconceptualised in secular terms, as imbued with the capacity to be rendered calculable, if subjected to conditions that direct conduct towards the ideal goals of a given closed institution.

The Norm

To understand why the conceptual transformations of the mobile terms passing from Pastoral Power to Disciplinary Power are indicative of the emergence of 'productive power proper', it would be instructive to examine Foucault's account of apparatuses that cyclically reinforce productivity and norms in subjects (1975: 172-194). The 'norm' itself is a mobile term that emerges in the epistemic framework of secular productive power, where conduct is no longer measured by virtue of its moral worth in reference to a theological framework, but by the normalising standards set by the human sciences, distinguishing between a-normal conduct and normal conduct contributing to the productive goals of closed institutions. The norm functions

as the barometer for conduct, and normal conduct becomes correlative with conduct that is calculable and productive.

The means by which subjects are normalised, and the reasons for their normalisation are integrally related to the mobile term 'prediction' which, in turn, is connected to the conceptualisation of 'production'. The interwoven apparatuses entailed in normalising processes are, on Foucault's account, 'hierarchical observation', 'normalising judgement', and 'the examination'. These processes insert subjects into power-knowledge relations, engendering productive and normalised conduct. The spatial architecture of closed institutions plays a role in hierarchical observation by rendering individual bodies visible and subject to hierarchical observation, resulting in monitoring of conduct. Foucault argues that architecture serves "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold of their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them" (Foucault, 1975: 172). Architecture forms part of a schema that renders bodies constantly visible:

> What makes this visibility perpetual is the implementation of a hierarchical network within the group of individuals who occupy a particular architectural space. (Hoffman 2014: 29)

An example offered by Foucault in the first lecture of *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974: 4-6) is the operation of asylums in the nineteenth century, where visibility is maintained through architecture. The supervision of patients was not restricted to doctors, but extended to supervisors who reported to the doctors, and servants who were subservient to the patients, but likewise reported to doctors. Although this example illustrates a top-down hierarchical transmission of information, Foucault emphasises that the gaze of Disciplinary Power operates multidirectionally across supervisors and supervised alike:

> [A]lthough surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from another: supervisors, perpetually supervised (Foucault, 1975: 176-177).

Disciplinary Power in closed institutions deploys this normalising multidirectional gaze[35] because of its dependence on normalising judgements in order to maintain productivity.

[35]The inconspicuous deployment of the multi-directional gaze is demonstrable in the operations of closed institutions like factories. Employees are not just aware of their own performance, but also of the performance of

Foucault (1975: 177-182) indicates a distinction between the kinds of judgements that are based on law and the ways in which they function in closed institutions. The operations of the multi-directional gaze of normalising judgement in closed institutions are still performed by individuals on other individuals in all directions. According to Foucault, Disciplinary Power analyses individuals, places, times, movements, actions, and operations, so that they can be observed and modified. He describes the multi-directional gaze in terms of a "famous disciplinary, analytical-practical grid" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 56-57). In this multi-directional analytical grid, the individual is observed from all directions, whilst simultaneously observing the individuals around them with the same normalising gaze. Thus, Disciplinary Power appears to exist without a centre, instead permeating the entirety of the institution and society, by virtue of subjects who reinforce the norm and productivity. Unlike Pastoral Power, where the flock subject was under the scrutiny of the pastor who took responsibility for the actions of each individual, Disciplinary Power, by means of the apparatuses deployed, generates conditions where each individual bears responsibility for their own conduct and for those around them.[36]

Disciplinary Power, according to Foucault, classifies characteristics of subjects according to distinct outcomes, and decides the best actions to take to obtain specific results (1977-1978: 57). It makes decisions about workers' suitability for particular tasks, and children's performance results. In a second step, Disciplinary Power links these actions together. Upon this, Discipline institutes processes of correct training and control. Finally, to complete the process, it establishes divisions between those who are not suitable for participation in activities and those who are. Disciplinary normalisation,[37] according to Foucault, aims to establish a specific model for conduct, and aims at getting subjects' movements and actions to conform to

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all the others that operate within the same institution. The interdependence or combinatory individuality created by the apparatuses of Disciplinary Power results in the individual subject's awareness of, and attentiveness to, the performance of the other subjects who form part of the interdependent network of subjects in the institution. Workers are capable of reporting on other individuals who are at the same hierarchical level as they are, or even on those who are higher up in the hierarchy. The gaze exists between the subjects occupying the institution, at every level, in every direction. It is geared towards making individuals responsible for the performance of their peers.

[36] This does not mean that the subject in Disciplinary Power is liberated from apparatuses of surveillance. The subject of Disciplinary Power is trained, and due to conditions of surveillance and scrutiny, is conditioned to take responsibility for its conduct, lest it suffer external retribution. The subject of Discipline is not required to form part of the same kind of continuous, unquestioning relationship of submission and continuous guidance from a shepherd who takes responsibility for its sins (as explained in Chapter One). The subject of Disciplinary Power is conceptualised as possessing a greater capacity for regulating its own conduct than the subject of Pastoral Power.

[37] In the third lecture of *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault uses the term 'normation' to describe normalisation as an apparatus of Disciplinary Power, deploying the norm to construct a "final" division between normal and abnormal. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 57)

this model. 'Normal' becomes a term referring to everyone and everything conforming to this norm (Foucault, 1977-1978: 57).[38]

In *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault's concept of discipline is fixed to the norm. However, the term 'norm' contains context-specific conceptual content, allowing for its deployment as the foundation of disciplinary *dispositifs.* The norm produces a prescriptive model aimed at directing conduct, instead of relying on legalistic restrictions of conduct alone. It is productive precisely because it prescribes what the subject has to do, instead of focusing on what the subject ought not to do, as in the case of Sovereign and Pastoral Power.[39] In Disciplinary Power, conduct is judged by its proximity to the norm. The mobile term 'norm' in Disciplinary Power designates a post-Pastoral apparatus of Disciplinary Power, deployed to train subjects to conduct themselves productively, without appealing to law.[40] The multidirectional gaze deployed by Disciplinary Power is based on parameters of deviation according to the norm. Thus, the multidirectional gaze, and practices resulting from it, can be understood as *dispositifs* of Disciplinary Power, which cannot function without a clearly defined institutional norm. The 'normal' is adduced to prevent, forestall, and minimise deviant conduct. Thus, 'normal' conduct can be understood as conduct in service of the productive outcomes of closed institutions.

The manner in which the norm operates varies from institution to institution, even if the concept of the norm is inseparable from disciplinary institutions. The common thread in apparatuses of productive power lies in the fact that they ensure the preservation, of the particular closed institution, reproducing power relations within closed institutions (Foucault 2020: 343). However, different closed institutions clearly function with institutionally specific outcomes.

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[38] Kelly (2019: 11) argues that 'normation' is simply a neologism performing the same function that 'normalisation' performs in Foucault's earlier work; the latter term is then reserved to refer specifically to norms derived from statistical analysis. 'Normation' would be used in reference to disciplinary normalisation which provides the prescriptive foundations for conduct that can be considered 'normal'. Foucault does not use the term again, and would use 'normalisation' to refer to instances of normation from then onwards. According to Kelly (2019: 11) some scholars have taken up the distinction between the two terms. However, he argues that using them interchangeably is relatively inconsequential. I mention this here, because every instance of 'normalisation' in this chapter refers to the establishment and reinforcement of prescriptive norms for conduct; by the same token, it can be designated as 'normation'.

[39] Kelly (2019: 17) similarly argues, with Foucault, that the norm functions in ways distinct from the law. Where the law devises restrictions telling us what not to do, the norm work positively, by generating prescriptions telling the subject what to do and how to live.

[40] Disciplinary power-knowledge judges according to the norm. But Foucault's concept of the norm is not restricted to legal concepts and practices the norm separates 'the normal' from 'the deviant' based on criteria over and above those of legality (Hoffman 2014: 30).

In some instances, deviancy in subjects in the broader population[41] is seen to necessitate the establishment of closed institutions designed to contain, study, and rehabilitate subjects deviating from the norm. These institutions resemble what Foucault, in an early paper titled *On Other Spaces* (1986: 25), terms "heterotopias of deviation". These closed institutions separate deviant subjects from the broader population. In many of these cases, the deviancy of subjects presents risks to those adhering to norms, and their separation from normal subjects becomes a matter of preservation of the system of Disciplinary Power-Knowledge. Closed institutions functioning in this manner, like the prison or the juvenile detention centre, are designed to lead deviant subjects closer to the norm. The hierarchies established in the institution address particular deviances, and reward conduct adhering to the norm.

The prison is the prime example of closed institutions where subjects not adhering to societal norms are placed to be enclosed or rehabilitated. Prisoners are simultaneously monitored, and encouraged to adhere to institutional norms; they are required to form part of the multi-directional gaze. Prisoners are required to correct their own conduct, and reinforce the norm in others. Through adherence to the institutional norms, and forming part of the multi-directional gaze, the prisoner is rewarded with privileges in the institution, or with release. Prisoners who have been successfully rehabilitated have proven that they are sufficiently normed to return to the broader population without posing a risk to other subjects, and can form part of the multidirectional gaze by adhering to the norm. This kind of subject can be a productive subject by virtue of adhering to societal norms. Endowed with newly restored normalcy, the subject who leaves the prison is ready to enter the factory, and contribute to the productive goals of this institution.

Institutions like factories judge conduct in proximity to the norm, and establish norms in micro-populations of subjects within the institution. However, such institutions are not established to isolate and rehabilitate deviant subjects, but to enclose normalised subjects, in order to deploy their normalised conduct for the sake of productivity. In either the case, that of the prison or that of the factory, productivity is the goal, the norm establishes the productive subject, and only the productive subject is considered normal. It becomes clear that, in discipline, the norm is productivity, and productivity is the norm. The mobile term 'production' becomes closely aligned with the emerging mobile term 'norm', inasmuch as 'normal' conduct is 'productive' conduct, or conduct that does not pose obstacles to production.

[41] i.e., the broader population transcending the closed institution.

Establishing norms results in a conceptualisation of the mobile term 'prediction' distinct from its conceptualisation within the framework of Pastoral Power. Unlike 'prediction' in the pastorate, 'prediction' in discipline is not oriented towards mitigating an inevitable inclination to sin. Instead, the norm sets parameters of conduct which, if properly instilled in 'the subject', renders its conduct calculable, and therefore predictable. The subject's predictability is dependent on the calculability of its conduct, which in turn depends on its proximity to the norm. The calculable subject who conducts itself normally, conducts itself in a manner that is predictable. Subjects in closed institutions rely on one-another's normal conduct in order to realise the common productive goals of the institution, which means that subjects must be able to predict each other's conduct. Normal conduct is expected and can be predicted depending on the efficiency of normalising apparatuses.

Closed institutions could not function if each inmate did not conduct themselves in the ideal normal and predictable manner. The efficiency of the factory is predicated on the normalised, and therefore predictable, conduct of the workers. Deviant, and therefore unpredictable, conduct could prove disastrous for the productive goals of closed institutions. Therefore, each subject is trained to conduct themselves normally and predictably, and to survey and reinforce such conduct vertically and laterally. Subjects in closed institutions are inclined to report and reprimand those who deviate from the norm, because production in closed institutions is dependent on normal and predictable conduct. Apparatuses of discipline, such as the norm and the multi-directional gaze, serve to establish and reinforce normalised and predictable conduct. In closed institutions, productivity is predicated on predictability. 'The subject' is conceptualised as susceptible to normalisation, rendering it calculable, predictable, and productive.

The Examination: Calculable Subjects

To demonstrate how transformations in the mobile terms are indicative of the emergence of 'productive power proper', I wish to investigate the set of apparatuses designated by Foucault in the section (of *Discipline and Punish*) entitled "The examination" (1975: 184-194). There is a fundamental difference between norms and multidirectional normalising judgements on the one hand, and 'the examination' on the other. Unlike normalising judgements instilled in subjects geared towards the orientation of the individual's productive capacities, the examination externally scrutinises and records the conduct of the subject. The subjectivity of

the individual, already guided by normalising judgements, is objectified in order to ensure that the individual's subjectivity remains aligned with the productive outcomes of Disciplinary Power. The examination reinforces external discipline on the individual through the dual deployment of observation and documentation. The examination implements external apparatuses that deter the subject from engaging in activities that stray from the productive goals of Disciplinary Power. The process by which the examination establishes 'the norm' reveals changes in the conceptualisations of the mobile terms 'production', 'prediction', and 'the subject', which set them apart from their conceptualisations in 'proto-productive' Pastoral Power. The deployment of these terms within the framework of 'productive power proper' has shed any link to the primary objective of assuring the salvation of the soul.

The examination reinforces Disciplinary Power by combining hierarchical observation and normalising judgements in a "normalising gaze" (Hoffman 2014: 31). However, unlike the multi-directional gaze of normalising judgements, this gaze becomes operative through external observation, instead of observation between subjects. The examination forms and maintains disciplinary power-knowledge, by keeping records of the conduct and abilities of individual subjects. Foucault defines the examination as a form of surveillance to "qualify, to classify, and to punish" (1975: 184-185). The examination scrutinises individuals according to the norm. Because Disciplinary Power depends on the norm, the examination is pivotal to the extent that it judges subjects as being either within or outside of the acceptable parameters of the norm. Whereas pastoral rituals were predicated on, and compensated for, inevitable sin, the rituals of examination are predicated on the understanding that the subject has a capacity for conduct dependent on various factors, including skills and aptitudes. These factors are in turn subjected to examination to establish the range of predictable conduct that a subject is capable of, and the probability of deviation from the norm.

The examination functions as a set of external measurements of normal conduct; "it manifests the subjection of those perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected" (Foucault 1975: 185). It does so in two different ways. Firstly, it facilitates Disciplinary Power through observation. Moreover, as with the Panopticon, the observer does not need to be visible to the observed subjects. Disciplinary Power is exercised through invisibility, while at the same time imposing visibility on subjects (Foucault 1975: 187). In discipline, "it is the subjects who have to be seen". The visibility of subjects ensures that Disciplinary Power is focused on them. Disciplinary Power requires external control, in the form of observation and examination, in order to ensure that disciplined subjects use their agency according to the productive outcomes

of closed institutions. Thus, the disciplinary subject can be seen as simultaneously a subject of internalised training and normalising judgments, and an object of observation and examination. This dual conceptualisation of the subject as both a recipient and a reinforcer of Disciplinary Power facilitates productive 'normal' conduct on the part of the subject. [42]

Secondly, the examination focuses on documentation that captures and fixes the individual in specific parameters (Foucault (1975: 189), and is accompanied by a system of intense registration and document compilation. Foucault deploys the term "a power of writing" to refer to documentation as an essential part of the apparatuses of discipline.[43] Documentation was used to define aptitudes of individuals, and to indicate the possible use that could be made of these abilities (Foucault 1975: 189). This function of documentation is important for the productive outcomes of Disciplinary Power, as it establishes a body of knowledge regarding subjects; it contributes to identifying their ideal position in the broader population and in specific closed institutions, allowing the ideal deployment of subjects according to their talents and proficiencies.[44]

Foucault (1975: 189-190) attributes the success of normation due to documentation to the deployment of codes[45] and methods of documentation that establish categories, determine

[42] Disciplinary subjects are objectified through observation and examination, maintaining complete control over them. The examination "is the technique by which power, instead of emitting signs of potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification" (Foucault, 1975: 187). It is in this space of domination, according to Foucault (1975, 187), that Disciplinary Power arranges objects. Foucault illustrates this with a discussion of the first military review (1966) by Louis XIV, in which 18,000 soldiers were subjected to the scrutiny of the invisible sovereign, who commanded all their exercises (Foucault, 1975: 188-189).

[43] As an example of documentation in the service of Disciplinary Power, Foucault (1975:189) refers to military documentation to track down deserters through methods of identification and description. A similar kind of documentation was instituted in hospitals to identify patients, keep record of those who have disappeared or died, expel "shammers", follow the evolution and progression of disease, study the effectiveness of treatments, compare cases, and identify epidemics.

[44] Documentation enables an awareness of the habits of the children and their progress in their spirituality and literacy during the time that they are in school. Knowledge collection is initiated as early as possible, to allow for early identification of skills that could be deployed, where they could be deployed, and in what position, to enhance the participation of subjects. It allows for early identification of problems and deviations from norms, so as to employ interventions before these deviations present problems interfering with the productive goals of Disciplinary Power. In other words, documentation elucidates, by means of reports, the individual's proximity to, or distance from, the norm.

[45] "Here the formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality that made it possible to transcribe, by means of homogenisation in the individual features established by the examination: the physical code of signalling, the medical code of symptoms, the educational or military code of conduct or performance. These codes were still very crude, in quality and quantity, but marked a first stage in the 'formalisation' of the individual in power relations" (Foucault, 1975: 189-190).

averages, and specify and reinforce norms.[46] The examination rendered the subject a "case" and an "object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power" (Foucault, 1975: 190-191). This means that individual subjects, when rendered cases by disciplinary apparatuses such as documentation, are both objects of collected knowledge, and subjects engaging with and distributing knowledge. The knowledge collected about subjects is handed back to subjects, in order to influence the trajectory of their conduct, rendering them calculable.

In Foucault's description, the 'case' is an individual subjected to judgement, measurement, and comparison with others. The 'case' is trained, rehabilitated, classified, normalised, and imprisoned if deemed necessary. Uninterrupted writing and documentation of individuals *throughout history* was a privilege accessible to only a few. Documentation provided select few individuals with power and notoriety. The emergence of Disciplinary Power inverted this relation. It lowered the threshold of recordable individuality, and made documentation a means of exercising control over subjects through objectification. Documentation changed from functioning as a testimony of a great individual to operating as a means of rendering the individual an object of control (Foucault 1975: 191-192). It ceased to be an exercise of idealisation, instead becoming a means of objectification and exposure. The direction of the exercise of power changed. Prior to this inversion, the documentation accorded to the individual a position of power and status; disciplinary documentation, by contrast, subjects each individual to perpetual examination and scrutiny within the configuration of Disciplinary Power.[47]

[46] Much like the biological bodies with which they concerned themselves, hospitals were subjected to documentation, most evident in activities such as keeping registers, marking specifications, making transcriptions, and case comparisons, and engaging in exchanges and localisation of data, accountancy of disease, and production of successful medication. The conduct of the subjects in charge of, and working in, the institution was recorded to the same extent as the patients' conduct. Curiously, the institution itself is characterised as a *kind* of subject, and is subjected to many of the same apparatuses of discipline as individual bodies. This does not mean that the institution itself was considered as a 'species body', since the *dispositifs* implemented were the same disciplinary apparatuses as those imposed on individual subjects. The institution can be more accurately described as a single disciplinary entity requiring the same kinds of interventions as the individual subject. Thus, the institution itself can be conceived of as a micro-population that requires disciplinary apparatuses imposed on every individual body in the institution and the institution itself. Importantly, the disciplinary apparatuses imposed on institutions like hospitals were restricted to those objectifying it from the outside—in other words, those forming part of the examination—and those disciplinary apparatuses that manipulate the subjectivity of the individual are not imposed on the institution.

[47] This status links the individual to features, measurements, "gaps", and "marks" characterising the individual as a specific 'case' (Foucault, 1975: 192).

According to Foucault (1975: 192), the examination is at the centre of procedures constituting the individual as both the "effect and object of power', and the "effect and object of knowledge". Examination combines surveillance and normalising judgement, assures the functions of distribution and classification, and the maximum extraction of productive capacity from subjects by generating the conditions for calculability. Assuring calculability by disciplinary *dispositifs* relies simultaneously on an external orientation of the individual, and an orientation toward its internal capacities. The examination produces knowledges that perpetuate the power-knowledge continuum on which Disciplinary Power relies.

'The subject' of Disciplinary Power is rendered calculable, both internally and externally. The knowledge formulated through examination establishes the norms appropriated by the subject. The individual's internalisation of externally established norms renders the subject calculable. Institutional standards and rules relying on the subjectivity of the individual are reinforced externally through documentation and observation. This interplay between the external and internal reinforcement of norms demonstrates the importance of the power-knowledge relationship for maintaining control over and through the subject. Observation and documentation establish parameters of normal conduct to which the subject is required to adhere. This knowledge of the norm is reinforced by the subject in two ways. Firstly, the disciplinary subject deploys its own subjective capacities, informed by external knowledge, to conduct itself according to the norm. Secondly, the subject participates in a network making up a population, where subjects form part of the multi-directional gaze of Disciplinary Power. The subject's position allows it to monitor its own and others' conduct according to the norm, and to identify and report conduct by others that deviate from it.

The normalised conduct of calculable subjects is observed and documented externally, reinforcing the knowledge of the norm that is supplied and reinforced externally to the subject. The power-knowledge cycle is dependent on the external generation of knowledge regarding norms. The conduct of the subject will in turn inform and reinforce the knowledge that will eventually be imposed back on it, maintaining power through knowledge, and maintaining knowledge through power. The subject becomes an agent of disciplinary power-knowledge through the internalisation and reinforcement of the knowledge garnered through the external examination of the subject.

Both components of the examination—observation and documentation—demonstrate 'production' functions as the primary driving force for Disciplinary Power. The external

imposition of normalising measures ensures that the subject is directed in ways that ensure the maximum harnessing of its productive capacity. The strengths and weaknesses of each individual are taken into account, and its potential is maximised by developing strengths, and combatting weaknesses. This process ensures that the subject is positioned where its specific aptitudes are most beneficial, and it can be efficiently productive. The examination demonstrates the fundamental role of the mobile term 'prediction' within the disciplinary system. The external collection of knowledge about the subject aids not only in predicting a subject's aptitudes, but in identifying deviant characteristics and markers which are to be corrected or compensated for. Recording a subject's tendencies to adhere to the norms allows for an estimate regarding the future conduct of the subject, which exemplifies the propensity of Disciplinary Power-Knowledge to establish predictability through calculability. 'The subject' is conceptualised as capable of calculable conduct by means of the external reinforcement and internalisation of 'the norm'. If instilling internalised norms aids in establishing a sense of predictability based on the proximity of the subject's conduct to the norm, then external examination allows for an understanding of the subject's tendency to conduct themselves in accordance with the norm, and therefore predictably. The examination allows for knowledge that enables the prediction of the effectiveness of the normalising process regarding the conduct of the subject.

The Mobile Terms in Disciplinary Power

The mobile terms take on new conceptual meanings with the emergence of Disciplinary Power. All these emerging conceptualisations revolve around the emergent term of 'the norm', which sets the standards for calculable conduct that is productive and predictable. Closed institutions of Disciplinary Power either cultivate normal and calculable conduct among subjects and coordinate the productive capacities of these subjects, or address deviances resulting in diminished productivity of subjects. The link between the terms 'the norm', 'production', 'prediction', and 'the subject' are important in Disciplinary Power, because only predictable conduct by the calculable subject contributing to productivity is considered normal.

'Production', the most important mobile term in discipline, is the primary goals of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power. Productivity is no longer a tertiary element of apparatuses of power, as in Pastoral Power. Like Pastoral Power, Disciplinary Power directs its efforts towards the individual. However, unlike Pastoral Power, apparatuses of Disciplinary Power are not geared

towards securing the salvation of the immortal soul. Instead, they are primarily oriented towards ensuring that subjects are as productive as possible. The mobile term 'production' takes centre stage in Disciplinary Power, especially in closed institutions, where it is the primary goal of institutions and their apparatuses. Apparatuses like the norm and the examination produce subjects that are at once subjects and objects of Disciplinary Power. Closed institutions like factories and schools either produce subjects that are productive, or deploy their productivity as efficiently as possible. Even those closed institutions that are not at first glance dedicated to ensuring productivity, like prisons, correct deviances in subjects that hinder productivity. For this reason, Disciplinary Power can be called the first example of 'productive power proper'.

The mobile term 'population' carries two very specific meanings that are exclusive to the operations of disciplinary power-knowledge. The first is the general broader population of society. This is conceived as a greater multiplicity that expands beyond the parameters of closed institutions. The second context-specific conceptualisation of 'population' refers to 'micro-populations', which are smaller multiplicities in closed institutions. Apparatuses of Disciplinary Power operate between the walls of closed institutions, and the subject, cultivated and reinforced in various institutions, forms part of the population when they move between institutions.[48]

'Population' is reconceptualised from a flock of potentially sinful sheep to a secular multiplicity of potentially productive subjects. Even though discipline, like the pastorate, conceptualises 'population' as an accumulation of subjects, and gears its apparatuses towards these individual subjects, the nature of these subjects is understood differently. Whereases the pastoral flock was conceptualised as a congregation of individuals, each with a soul to be protected from a natural inclination to sin, the disciplinary population is conceptualised as a multiplicity of secular subjects, each possessing the inherent potential for productivity.

'The subject' in Disciplinary Power is conceptualised significantly differently from the subject of Pastoral Power. Discipline, much like the pastorate, is an individualising power focusing primarily on the conduct of individuals. However, the conceptualisation of the subject differs in significant ways. The conceptualisation of 'the subject', which had been based on the knowledges of the Christian pastorate, and was conceived of as a soul inside a body, changes

[48] It should be noted that the conceptualisation of 'population' as a multiplicity of calculable subjects moving between institutions in a society, still does not designate a large number of people characterised by a set of specified criteria as a unit of analysis. The difference is that the general meaning does not conceptualise of this population as constituted of the specific kind of subjects that are the primary focus of disciplinary *dispositif*.

significantly with the emergence of Disciplinary Power. Whereas the subject of the pastorate was seen as a sheep perpetually predisposed to sin, the disciplinary subject is conceptualised as a secular organism that is rendered calculable, if subjected to the right conditions. Because of changing understandings regarding the subject, the disciplinary conceptualisation of 'population' as a multiplicity of individual subjects, becomes distinct from the pastoral congregation of sheep. Even though both conceptualisations of 'population' designate assemblages of individuals, and even though both deploy apparatuses that function primarily on the individual subject, the 'population' of Disciplinary Power is a secular multiplicity, and the role of its apparatuses is cultivating productive subjects. Productivity and calculability are generated by the conditions of closed institutions, where the individual is subjected to various disciplinary apparatuses designed to create docile bodies, and means of training are designed to gear these subjects towards specific goals (Foucault, 1975: 135-194).

The mobile term 'prediction' no longer relates to inevitable sin but becomes the aim of the norm and of the multidirectional gaze. Pastoral Power guided the conduct of the subject only to the extent that this would establish deterrents against and protections from sin, but Discipline generates predictability through engendering calculability in each subject.

The adjective 'normal' is not exclusive to the description of Disciplinary Power. However, the context-specific conceptualisation of the 'norm' pertaining to Disciplinary Power refers to a very specific apparatus informed by knowledges pertaining to human conduct. The norm constructs a barometer for appropriate and productive conduct on the part of the subject. Productive power deploys the norm and normalisation as a non-juridical apparatus to render the disciplinary subject calculable. Through normalisation and normation the subject is to become a productive and calculable agent in both the broader population and the micro-population of the closed institution, without having to invoke laws which set restrictions on human conduct.

The effectivity of the predictability instilled by normalising apparatuses is measured externally through apparatuses of examination, establishing records of the subject's tendency to comply with the norm. Predictability is of paramount importance for Disciplinary Power, albeit restricted to the conduct of individuals—a focus that changes with the emergence of Biopower.

The Road to Biopower

External examination and adjustment of individual subjectivity through normalising judgements sets necessary conditions for the calculability of individual conduct by which it is directed towards activity contributing to the overall productivity and predictability of the population as a multiplicity of individual subjects. Disciplinary apparatuses are geared towards individual subjects, whether it is the guiding of the individual's subjectivity, or the objectification of the subject. In both cases, these apparatuses are geared exclusively towards cultivating productive subjects in a 'population' conceptualised as a multiplicity of individual subjects. None of the disciplinary apparatuses are geared towards the functioning of 'population' as *species body*, as it would be conceptualised in Biopower.

Yet, apparatuses of Disciplinary Power, much like certain pastoral apparatuses, are carried over into future power-knowledge couplings – specifically those operative in Neoliberal Governmentality. In his book *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood* (1996), Nikolas Rose discusses the individualising effects of the "psy"-industries[49] in cultivating the ideal neoliberal, self-policing subject.[50] According to Rose (1996: 11-13), the knowledges produced by psy-disciplines, and the power structures in which they participate, establish and reinforce structures of Governmentality where individuals regulate themselves and each other. The contemporary psy-disciplines cultivate self-policing subjects imbued with a calculability of conduct, indicating that apparatuses brought to bear on the subject as a singular entity in a multiplicity remain an integral aspect the Neoliberal Governmentality power-knowledge configuration.

Foucault's own analysis of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power in *Discipline and Punish* works with an understanding of 'population' as a multiplicity, which is apparent in his descriptions of apparatuses geared towards cultivating disciplinary subjects. He investigates normalising judgements, hierarchies, and the examination as geared towards the individual subject, with an understanding that the population, or micro-populations in institutions, will be rendered productive and predictable by cultivating calculable subjects. However, by the time he turned to Biopower, Foucault's understanding of 'population' changed significantly. Whereas his

[49] Those industries that are identified by the prefix 'psy' are not strictly speaking only those with a prefix 'psy', such as psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis (Rose, 1996: 11).

[50] In fact, Rose's (1996: 4-5) considers these industries as 'individualising': they cultivate a turning inward to an "internal universe" where the self must distinguish between normal and abnormal, in order to regulate conduct that fosters appropriate expression, self-love, and the capacity to be worthy of love from others.

description of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power in *Discipline and Punish* was primarily informed by the specific disciplinary apparatuses on which he focused at that stage, his later work features problems specific to the population as a 'species body' irreducible to (the) individual subject(s). The change in Foucault's understanding of 'population' may be due to several factors, including his realisation that problems such as public health, mortality, natality, and endemics were specific to the population as a 'species body'. However, disciplinary apparatuses geared towards the individual subject persist in Biopower; Foucault's analysis of these apparatuses was not negated by the realisation of the role of apparatuses of productive power functioning at the level of the population as a species body. Instead, Foucault's turn to Biopower allowed him to reframe the apparatuses of Disciplinary Power discussed in *Discipline and Punish*. He reframed apparatuses of Disciplinary Power as part of an 'anatomo-political' schema of the individual subject, which itself formed part of the operations of Biopower, alongside a second pole – that of a "Biopolitics" of the population as a 'species body' (Foucault, 1976: 139).[51]

Foucault's move in drawing the disciplinary apparatuses described in *Discipline and Punish* into the framework of Biopower is ingenious, because it incorporates his previous analysis of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power into his developing thought without contradicting the central tenets of *Discipline and Punish.* Foucault reframed his descriptions of disciplinary apparatuses of power to take account of changes in the conceptualisation of the mobile term 'population', along with the emergence of regulatory apparatuses. Regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics complement the already established apparatuses of Disciplinary Power in addressing problems that disciplinary apparatuses alone are not capable of addressing. Furthermore, Foucault establishes a period of about half a century between the emergence of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power and the subsequent addition of apparatuses of regulation. This allows for a reading of *Discipline and Punish* in the development of Foucault's *oeuvre*: in this book, apparatuses of Disciplinary Power appear as a singular pole of productive power preceding the deployment of regulatory apparatuses of the population as a species body. Foucault's reframing of apparatuses of Disciplinary Power as the first anatomo-political pole of Biopower, allows for *Discipline and Punish* to remain consistent with the change entailed in his turn to Biopower. Foucault managed to integrate aspects of his earlier writings in which 'population' was conceptualised as a multiplicity of individuals, into his work on Biopower, with its conceptual

[51] This argument is substantiated by Mark Kelly (2019: 16), who argues that Biopolitics is built on the existing foundations of *disciplines* and *anatomo-politics* which predate Biopolitics.

transition of 'population' from multiplicity to species body.[52] As Stuart Elden (2016: 41) notes, Foucault recasts Discipline and Biopower as "two conjoined modes of the functioning of power/knowledge".

The periods and examples that Foucault investigates in *Discipline and Punish* predate the emergence of medical and human sciences concerned with problems specific to the population as a species body. Essentially, the apparatuses of Disciplinary Power explicated by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* are set in the period between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, prior to the emergence of regulatory apparatuses in the second half of the eighteenth century. In the process of writing *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault's research may have yet had to present him with examples of apparatuses of productive power focusing on problems specific to the species body, which could not be addressed by normalising the conduct of the subject. Based on this consideration, it would appear that his work on apparatuses of Disciplinary Power in *Discipline and Punish* was limited by the scope of his investigation, which did not yet allow for an understanding of 'population' as anything more than a multiplicity of individual subjects. It was only during his later work that Foucault, informed by his investigation of systems, apparatuses, and predominantly natural sciences concerned with problems specific to the population as a species body, displayed a conceptualisation of 'population' as consisting of something more than a multiplicity of individuals.

Conclusion

Disciplinary Power is marked by significant changes in systems of power-knowledge, from systems of 'proto-productive power' to 'productive power proper', as demonstrated by the significant conceptual transformations of the chosen mobile terms reflected in Foucault's

[52] By reframing apparatuses of Disciplinary Power, like normalising judgements and the examination, as parts of the anatomo-political pole of Biopower, Foucault can include these apparatuses in his later descriptions of *dispositifs*, in 'Confessions of the Flesh' (1980)—as cultivating productivity and longevity in the population, by decreasing the possibilities of death and increasing the possibilities of life, and by indicating that disciplinary apparatuses have the same directives of longevity and productivity as regulatory apparatuses, but with an understanding of 'population' as a multiplicity that limits these apparatuses to the disciplining of the individual subject. Even though Foucault's later descriptions of the functioning of *dispositifs* are framed in accordance with a conceptualisation of 'population' as a 'species body', his integration of disciplinary apparatuses into his work on Biopower allows for an understanding of disciplinary apparatuses that function with the same directives of cultivating a productive population which is at minimal risk of death. These apparatuses do so at the level of the individual subject, whilst regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics act at the level of the population as a 'species body'. The goals of disciplinary apparatuses are the same as the goals of regulatory apparatuses, but disciplinary apparatuses function with an understanding of a population as a multiplicity of individual subjects.

genealogy. The apparatuses of Disciplinary Power built on the 'proto-productive' foundation laid by Pastoral Power, to give rise to the first incarnation of 'productive power proper'. However, these shifts represent only one set of changes in the mobile terms. In fact, significant changes in the natural sciences, especially those pertaining to the medical field, resulted in another set of conceptual transformations of these terms. 'Population', which had already changed from the flock of the pastorate to the accumulation of individual disciplined subjects in closed institutions, changes again due to significant changes in knowledges of biological sciences like epidemiology predicated on a singular species body. Along with the changes in knowledges newly configured in Biopower came the necessary reconceptualisation of 'population' beyond subjects in enclosure, as a singular body moving in the open territory of the State. This reconceptualisation of 'population' also transforms the way in which productive apparatuses achieve 'production' in the species body. These changes result in a very different conceptualisation of 'prediction': the primary goal of regulatory apparatuses of Biopower is to render the entire species body predictable by mitigating those elements that pose a biological risk of large-scale death in the population. These changes are reflected in Foucault's work on Biopower. However, Foucault's focus on biomedical systems of knowledge predates his genealogical work, and can already be found in his archaeological work on medical and clinical knowledge. In chapter three, I explore how Foucault's archaeological work of medical knowledge prepares for his genealogy of Biopower, by examining the changes in medical knowledge which underpin the emergence of Biopower, and the accompanying changes in the mobile terms. In doing so, I will argue that Foucault's archaeology of the clinic provides the foundations for the move from Disciplinary Power to Biopower.

Chapter Three

From Archaeology to Genealogy: The Road to Biopower

Foucault's archaeological work pertaining to medical knowledge provides a valuable bedrock for his work on the power-knowledge relations that emerged due to the problems presented by epidemics. A reading of *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967) presents parallels between Foucault's archaeological and genealogical work regarding the changes in medical knowledge and practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Moreover, it presents a deeper understanding of the shifts in Foucault's own methodological approach, and how this shift influenced his analysis of clinical and medical practice. Analysing the shifts and transformations in medical knowledge is invaluable in understanding the epistemic moves resulting in the move from Disciplinary Power to Biopower, and the changes in the conceptual architecture that accompanied this move. The groundwork for 'the road to Biopower' is laid by the work Foucault does in *The Birth of the Clinic* regarding the epistemic moves in the field of medicine.

In order to glean the extent to which Foucault's archaeology of the clinic can be said to pave the road to Biopower, this chapter analyses *The Birth of the Clinic* in a similar manner as it engages with his genealogical work. I examine both the rare instances in *The Birth of the Clinic* where Foucault makes overt and explicit references to the operations of power and the political, as well as the various implicit references to power or other components that would feature more prominently in his genealogical explorations. I will return to the various relevant text regularly, and examine specific instance in the *Birth of the Clinic* that prepare for the genealogy of Biopower, and the correlative transformations in the mobile terms either explicitly or implicitly.

By deploying this strategy, this chapter argues that *The Birth of the Clinic* prepares for Foucault's genealogical work in several distinct ways. Firstly, by discussing epistemological changes in the same historical timeline that Foucault would later continue to explore in his genealogies, with the additional dimension of power. This is most evident in the changes in knowledges regarding epidemics, and the ways in which these would come to re-situate the role of the hospital. *The Birth of the Clinic* explores the epistemic foundations for both anatomo-political disciplines and biopolitical regulations. Secondly, Foucault attributes the 'opening of corpses' to social/political conditions that allow for practices of pathological anatomy. Corpses could only be 'opened up' after structural agreements were made. Foucault's acknowledgement of how *ideological* positions regarding appropriate medical practice affected the proliferation of medical knowledge indicates an understanding of the relation between

structures of power and epistemology, which would become crucial for understanding the power-knowledge couplings that feature in his genealogical work. Thirdly, Foucault's conceptualisation of the 'medical gaze' establishes a relation between a subject and an object, which is crucial to power relations in his genealogical work. Finally, *The Birth of the Clinic* contains passages that elaborate changes in medical knowledge and their political implications for the role of medicine and the doctor in society, which coincide with his later genealogical writings on medicine and its relation to power and knowledge. These sections overtly discuss the kinds of power relations that are the primary focus of Foucault's genealogical work.

The Mobile Terms in the Archaeology of the Clinic

The analysis conducted in this chapter reveals aspects regarding the relation between Foucault's archaeological work on medical knowledge, and his genealogical work on productive medical power-knowledge, where the latter functions as a continued exploration of the former, with the added dimension of power relations. Foucault's discussion on the emergence of epidemics focuses on the ways knowledges affect a population, and the measures taken to mitigate the effects of epidemics. In the section titled 'A Political Consciousness', Foucault references activity that could best be described as 'political' and motivated by 'the state'. Both instances showcase an explicit consideration of power-relations.

Similar to discussions on power, the mobile terms in *The Birth of the Clinic* function/appear differently from the way in which they feature in Foucault's later work. The archaeology of the clinic reflects changes in knowledge that would be reframed by Foucault. Although certain aspects of the conceptual architecture do not feature overtly in *The Birth of the Clinic*, the epistemological shifts that are discussed in *The Birth of the Clinic* run parallel to, and prepare for, the moves Foucault would later characterise in the conceptual architecture found in his genealogical work, to the point that precursors to the concepts that make up the conceptual architecture of productive power feature in Foucault's archaeology of the clinic. The mobile terms play a pivotal role not only in reframing the changing knowledge systems, but also in the shift from an archaeological to a genealogical method in Foucault's investigations. Foucault's *The Birth of the Clinic* paves the way for the conceptual architecture that this thesis argues can be found his genealogical work.

'Archaeology' and 'Genealogy'

Before investigating the different, and correlative, aspects of the archaeological and genealogical methods in the historiography of medicine, it is important to understand the difference between Foucault's two distinct approaches. Foucault characterised his early work as historical archaeology, different and distinct from other methods of historical analysis. Foucault's archaeological method is linked to the notion that language is a source of thought *in its own right*, instead of merely an instrument for conveying thought (see Gutting (2005: 32), moreover, language provides certain parameters of thought and knowledge. Thus, the limitations of language can prove to be significant obstacles to the progress of knowledge, to the point where it would be 'unthinkable' that the spherical Earth is just one among many celestial bodies that orbit the sun. If certain terms do not exist in language, knowledge is left outside of the realm of thought.

Gutting (2005: 36) compares Foucault's archaeology with Noam Chomsky's linguistics, which tries to uncover the 'deep structure' of language (see Chomsky: 2009). However, unlike Chomsky, Foucault is not interested in semantics or syntactics, but in the actual "material content" of what is said and thought. *The Birth of the Clinic* chronicles the developments in medical-scientific knowledges since the seventeenth century, by exploring the changes in language and thought that brought about changes in the parameters of conceptualising disease, nosology, epidemics, medical practice, observation, the value of cadavers, and the political aspects of medicine.

Foucault's genealogical method introduces a new aspect to the analysis. Beginning with *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault's investigation includes changes in power relations in tandem with changes in knowledge investigated in his archaeologies. Gutting (2005: 45) points out that *Discipline and Punish*, the first genealogy in Foucault's definition of it, is not just concerned with the language and thought that inform our thinking about the world, but with the power that functions to enact the changes in our thinking onto the world. Foucault refers to this method as a 'history of the present': it analyses the historical processes correlating with the institutional relations of power in the present. Its primary objective is not simply to understand the past, but to critique power structures in the present, by understanding the conditions of their emergence (Gutting, 2005: 50).

With the introduction of the genealogical method, Foucault deploys the hyphenated term 'power-knowledge', indicating a complex set of relations between epistemic events in

knowledge and the co-implicated power relations. Threads common to all of the works that Foucault characterised as genealogies include the focus on power, the material world, the force relations of specific knowledges, and the apparatuses deployed to direct the individual subject and the population. As the previous chapters have shown, both the subject and the population, are understood differently in different power-knowledge configurations. Foucault's later genealogical works focus on 'the body', and document the effects that different developments in religious, ethical, behavioural, and scientific knowledge had on the material world that included, the physical body of the subject.[53]

Archaeology as a "Moving Force" for Genealogy

According to Thomas Flynn (2005: 29), Foucault had intended to include the power-knowledge relations of his genealogies in his earlier archaeological work, albeit in an implicit manner:

> These approaches do not exclude each other. Rather, like successive waves breaking on the sand, each is discovered after the fact to have been an implicit interest of the earlier one, for which it served as a moving force. Thus, Foucault insists that the question of power relations, which characterizes his genealogies, was what his archaeologies were really all about… (Flynn 2005: 29)

Flynn (2005: 29) maintains that Foucault did not conceive of archaeology and genealogy as mutually exclusive methods, and that the emphasis on power relations in Foucault's genealogies was implicit in his archaeologies, which function as "moving forces" for Foucault's genealogical work (Flynn 2005: 29). Elden (2016:30) argues that genealogy was never intended to replace archaeology, but rather a to supplement it. In a 1983 interview Foucault clarifies the intertwined nature of archaeology and genealogy when stating that archaeology "indicates the field which I deal with in order to make a genealogy" (Elden, 2016: 174). There is no genealogy without archaeology. As Brad Elliot Stone (2004: 80) remarks, there can be no analysis of power relations, until there is an analysis of the knowledges and discourses produced and perpetuated in these power relations.

[53] In the opening lecture of the *Society Must be Defended* series, Foucault (1975-1976: 11) provides a description of the differences between archaeology and genealogy "in a nutshell": archaeology is "the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities", whereas genealogy is "the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, bring into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them."

Taking the above quote into account, we can analyse *The Birth of the Clinic* in order to uncover the implicit power relations at work in, for instance, 'A Political Consciousness' (1967: 22-36), where he outlines the manner in which doctors would make prescriptions regarding feeding, dressing, and conducting oneself to avoid illness. *The Birth of the Clinic* does indeed outline the epistemic and conceptual transformations that facilitated the emergence of Biopower, and the changes in the clinic as an institution of power-knowledge (Foucault, 1976: 284)

The focus of the medical knowledge that Foucault discusses in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967: 4-18) entails a localisation of illness in the body, (a) specific part(s) of the body, and its relation to other bodies. This knowledge, emerging in the eighteenth century, stood in contrast to the knowledge of medicine of the classical age (Flynn, 2005: 33); changes in clinical practice were largely due to the epistemic shifts that generated this new knowledge.

> After the epistemic break (a concept that Foucault adopts from the philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard), attention focused on the surface of the lesion, the site of the disease; clinicians were now interested in "geography" rather than history; their question was no longer the essentialist "What is wrong with you?", but the nominalistic "Where does it hurt?" (Flynn, 2005: 33)

Foucault (1967: xviii-xix) argues that an "essential mutation in medical knowledge" appeared in the eighteenth century, bringing about:

> a new outline of the perceptible and statable: a new distribution of the discrete elements of corporal space (for example, the isolation of *tissue*—a functional, two dimensional area—in contrast with the functioning mass of the organ, constituting the paradox of an 'internal surface') a reorganization of the elements that make up the pathological phenomenon (a grammar of signs has replaced a botany of symptoms), a definition of the linear series of morbid events (as opposed to the table of nosological species), a welding of the disease onto the organism (the disappearance of the general morbid entities that grouped symptoms together in a single logical figure, and their replacement by a local status that situates the being of the disease with its causes and effects in a three-dimensional space). (Foucault, 1967: xviii)

Foucault attributes the emergence of the clinic as a historical fact to these different reorganisations, and argues that the new structure of the clinic is indicated by the "minute but decisive" change from the question "What is the matter with you?", with which the dialogue

between doctor and patient began in the eighteenth century, to the question of "Where does it hurt?" (Foucault, 1967: xviii). He argues that the relationship between signifier and signified is thereafter redistributed:

> between the symptoms that signify and the disease that is signified, between the description and what is described, between the event and what it prognosticates, between the lesion and the pain that it indicates, etc. (Foucault, 1967: xviii)

Foucault (1967: xviii) explicates the perspective through which the symptoms of disease are being identified as an epistemic reorientation towards the body, as the body had become the location of disease, and disease had become localised to the body, or parts of the body. This reorientation runs parallel to the epistemic changes that Foucault attributes to anatomo-politics.

The knowledges Foucault speaks of in *The Birth of the Clinic* are not explicitly focused on the question of the productive capacities of the body, but focus on the body as a site of shifts in knowledge of disease and illness. The knowledges concerning the anatomo-political component of Biopower, as described by Foucault (1976: 139), are implicated in the epistemic shifts outlined in *The Birth of the Clinic*. However, if we give credibility to Flynn's argument that Foucault's archaeologies function as 'moving forces' for his genealogies, it can be argued that Foucault's genealogical work on Biopower expands on the groundwork of his archaeology of the clinic, in the same manner as his genealogical work in *Security, Territory, Population* expands on the groundwork of his archaeological analyses in *The Order of Things* (Elden, 2016: 94)[54] or his work in *Discipline and Punish* expands on the work done in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Rouse, 2006: 96-97) by adding the dimensions of power and politics.

The Localisation of the Medical Gaze, and the Opening of Corpses

In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault outlines the epistemic shifts creating the conditions for the emergence of anatomo-politics. In the section on dissecting cadavers, entitled 'Open Up a few Corpses' (Foucault, 1967: 124-146), Foucault explores the emergent realisation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that anatomical and medical knowledge about the functioning of the human organism could be gained by investigating cadavers, and the turn in

[54] Elden (2016: 40) makes a similar argument pertaining to *The order of Things* and *Society Must Be Defended*: "In *The Order of Things*, a decade previously, Foucault had aimed to show how general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth became linguistics, biology and political economy: in *'Society Must Be Defended'* there is a politicizing of this argument."

the medical gaze towards the body, specific regions of it, the measuring of frequencies between disease types, and the relation between pathological anatomy and comparative anatomy. *The Birth of the Clinic* explores the history of medical knowledge, in part, by exploring this gaze of the medical practitioner upon the phenomenon of disease, as it manifests in the body of the individual. In the first sentence of the preface to *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault (1967: ix) writes that the book is "about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze".

Foucault tracks the historical and epistemological shifts that establish the parameters of this gaze with regards to what it focuses on, what it is informed by, what it is supposed to uncover, and how the practitioner is supposed to interact with the object of medical investigation and treatment. For the most part, the gaze is simultaneously directed by an understanding of the nature of disease; it is directed towards the physical manifestations on the body where it is localised, the commonalities between various manifestations of disease across different cases, and the symptomatic repercussions of the manifestation of disease on the body over time. The gaze designates a relation between the observer and the observed, where the observer is the subject and the observed is the object of the investigation. The way the subject of disease is conceptualised through the gaze changes with epistemic developments in the field of medicine.

Foucault understands that there needed to be changes in the clinic itself, which would create the conditions for the opening of corpses and the resulting epistemic developments. He (1967: 126-129) describes the processes by which the original works on morbid anatomy by the likes of Morgagni were accepted and developed by new physicians such as Bichat, to establish a new consensus for the purpose of the medical gaze, what it is to discover, and how it is supposed to incorporate tissue structures and organs into the expanding medical knowledge of disease. The reconciliations and developments in the entity of the clinic itself, and the understanding of morbid anatomy as "*ordinal*" and localised (Foucault, 1967: 130), aided in the re-establishment of a consensus regarding morbid anatomy. It becomes clear that the nineteenth century emergence (or re-emergence) of pathological anatomy and physiology, was due to developments in the clinical structure itself. This indicates an understanding in Foucault's thinking that there needed to be structural changes in order for certain knowledges to emerge and proliferate. Changes in the clinical structure itself represent changes in structures of power that would be necessary for the developments in knowledge. The link between clinical knowledge and anatomy could only be formed after structural changes that allowed for the reconciliation between knowledge of anatomy and established clinical knowledge (Foucault,

1967: 126). Here Foucault alludes to the relationship between power (in the structures on the clinic) and knowledge (in the expansion of clinical knowledge by means of pathological anatomy), which would become a key component of his genealogical work.

Foucault's analysis of the changes of the material conditions and epistemic moves in *The Birth of the Clinic* indicates that Foucault understood that material conditions were intrinsically involved in epistemic formations and transformations. Changes in power relations, and in different knowledges, were inextricably linked and correlative. Changes in one part of the coupling would make for re-arrangements in the other, much like changes in the structures and attitudes of the clinic would transform medical knowledges to reflect the significance of pathological anatomy and what is discovered by means of investigating cadavers. In correlating material conditions with epistemological configurations, Foucault's *The Birth of the Clinic* prepares for his genealogical work, which would be primarily focused on an investigation of the historical relations between developments of power and knowledge.

After the discovery (or 'rediscovery') in the nineteenth century of the significance of cadavers in expanding the understanding of disease and its anatomical and physiological causes, the focus of the medical gaze, which was traditionally "foreign to the investigation of mute, intemporal bodies, causes and locales", turned towards the bodily origins of illness and disease, in addition to focusing on its 'frequencies, manifestations, and chronologies" (Foucault, 1967: 126). This epistemic shift is correlative to the emergence of the anatomo-political pole of Biopower, where the focus of power turned towards the individual body, its health, and its capabilities. In *The Birth of the Clinic,* Foucault does not use the term 'anatomo-politics' because the term denotes power relations that result from epistemic developments including morbid anatomical knowledge, which are not the focus of the text. However, his discussion of the opening of corpses, and the shifts in the medical gaze, explain some of the epistemic foundations for what he would later call 'anatomo-politics', referring to apparatuses focused on the "body as a machine" and on the "optimisation of its capabilities" (Foucault, 1976: 139).

The period in which Foucault situates epistemic changes in the medical gaze fall into the temporal range of the emergence of productive power. Shifts in the medical gaze in the eighteenth century consider the dimension of productivity of individuals and the population. The focus on the body contributed to understandings of its optimal functioning and the factors threatening it, opening the way for a calculated utilisation of the productive capacities of the body.

It could be argued that the relational nature of the gaze, or the relations cultivated between doctor and patient by the concept of the gaze, allude to a kind of power relation that exists between the observer and the observed. To some extent, the relations cultivated by the gaze can result in a certain kind of power relation between the doctor, who is a knower and observer, and the sick individual, who is the object of knowledge collection and (re)enforcement. However, the establishment of a productive power relation is not presented as the primary goal of the medical gaze.[55] Instead, in *The Birth of the Clinic*, the gaze is geared toward gathering data about disease, and generating knowledge regarding the nature of illness. In fact, the objectified individual could be considered a conduit for the goal of data collection, instead of the primary object of investigation. What is being explored is disease, how it works, and how it affects the body over time, how different cases compare, and how it is spread. Investigating the diseased body of the individual is a necessary procedure in order to learn about illness, instead of exercising any form of authority over the sick body itself. As the 'Open Up a Few Corpses' section of *The Birth of the Clinic* shows, the exploration of disease and ailment did not even require life on the part of the body; the dead body offered a new dimension of exploring disease that was, for some time until that point, beyond the perception of the medical gaze:

> The medical gaze must therefore travel along a path that had not so far been open to it: vertically from the symptomatic surface to the tissual surface; in depth, plunging from the manifest to the hidden; and in both directions, as it must continuously travel if one wishes to define them, from one end to the other, the network of essential necessities. The medical gaze … was directed upon the two-dimensional areas of tissues and symptoms, must, in order to reconcile them, itself move along a third dimension. In this way, anatomo-clinical range will be defined. (Foucault 1967: 136)

Foucault describes how the introduction of corpses into the exploratory space of medical research transformed the investigation to the point where the body itself, as opposed to disease

[55] Foucault (1967:84-85) describes how medical knowledge was extracted from the labouring classes through surgery. Due to the reciprocal relationship established between the rich doctor and the poor patient, "there emerges for the rich man the utility of offering help to the hospitalised poor: by paying for them to be treated, he is, by the same token, making possible a greater knowledge of the illnesses with which he himself may be affected; what is benevolence towards the poor its transformed into knowledge that is applicable to the rich." (Foucault, 1967: 84). Even though there exists a kind of power relation between the rich doctor and the poor patient, the primary goal of the entire enterprise remains the expansion of medical knowledge pertaining to illness.

as an external affliction, becomes the object of investigation. However, this move in focus was notably due to the absence of life from the body, and it was the dead body that became the first primary object of the medical gaze:

> Disease is no longer a bundle of characters disseminated here and there over the surface of the body and linked together by statistically observable concomitances and successions; it is a set of forms and deformations, figures, and accidents, and of displaced, destroyed, or modified elements bound together in sequence according to a geography that can be followed step by step. It is no longer a pathological species inserting itself into the body wherever possible; it is the body itself that has become ill. (Foucault 1967: 136)

The subject-object relation in the medical gaze was a unilateral process, with a clearly defined investigator observing and acting upon a clearly defined object of the relation. However, it would be a mistake to think that Foucault conceptualised its dynamic as a power relation. The inextricable link between power and life is made clear by Foucault in *Society Must Be Defended* (1976: 62) when he contrasts Sovereign Power's authority to "put to death" or to "let live" with the choice between having to "make live or let die". Foucault frames the power of the sovereign to kill as a kind of "right" over life and death, and therefore a right to kill. The emergence of productive power, in contrast, is framed as a reorganisation of this right over life and death into a right to life predicated on the productive capacities of the individual subject and the population, to the extent that *dispositifs* are deployed to foster life and that such life can be harnessed by power for purposes of production. Life as a condition for power to become operative is crucial for Foucault (1976: 68); he argues, conversely, that death "is outside the power relationship", and is "beyond the reach of power". Power needs life to become operative, it "has no control over death", and therefore sustains itself by fostering life.

Campbell and Sitze's (2013: 11) description of *dispositifs* frames productive apparatuses as primarily geared towards the exercise of power focused on fostering life. They argue that the concept of *dispositif* "serves as a bridge between life and politics", and that the transition from 'law' to 'norm', which took place with the emergence of Discipline, was indicative of the emergence of *dispositifs* explicitly and specifically geared towards the preservation of life. Furthermore, the biopolitical conceptualisation of *dispositif* was almost completely transfixed on life and death, to the point where the primary goal of *dispositifs* was to act on the "wager" placed by power, on life over death, in order to maintain the objects of power, which is the life

of all those under it. *Dispositifs* exist to keep death "at bay" for life (and by proxy, productivity) to continue with minimal risk of immediate death. This wager can function both regarding the calculable life of the productive individual and the life of the entire population:

> In this sense, knowing the story of how life and politics come together means asking how it has come to be that collective life has assumed the form of a massive bet—a deadly serious game of chance in which the population is at once the central player and the main prize, at once the subject of politics and the objective of politics itself (Campbell & Sitze, 2013: 12).

Foucault frames both Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics through this relation between life and death. Whereas Sovereign Power was power over life and death, Productive Power is power of life. While the spectacle of the scaffold, with which Foucault opens *Discipline and Punish* (1975: 32-65), was geared towards the power extracted from the sovereign's right to kill, the *dispositifs* of productive power are organised by the capacity to sustain and control the direction of life. Foucault's genealogies make it clear that life is the most valuable basis of power, whether it is by putting to death or fostering life. If the subject-object relation of the medical gaze can exist in the absence of life, it would appear that, for Foucault, the medical gaze was not intended to be an apparatus of power. However, the body remained an object of this relation, even in the absence of life, to an ever-increasing extent. The body is indeed an object of the gaze, and an object of knowledge. The body of the patient and the clinician in *The Birth of the Clinic* cannot be said to generate the power relations that Foucault thematises in his later work. However, the subject-object relation itself recurs in his later work, with the added dimension of life, which brings the relation into the space of power-knowledge.

In *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974: 2) Foucault integrates his concept of the medical gaze, originating in *The Birth of the Clinic* into his genealogical method. He argues that, in the nineteenth century asylum, the conditions for the generation of the validity and objectivity of the medical gaze, which constitute medical knowledge, exist in a relationship with order and the distribution of individuals in time and space. The exact conditions for the medical gaze to produce medical knowledge are not possible without discipline. Here Foucault finally integrates the relationship of knowledge collection of the medical gaze into power relations, not by arguing that the medical gaze is a power relation, but by arguing that it is dependent on power relations.

Foucault's arguments regarding the medical gaze in *The Birth of the Clinic* can be said to prepare for the conceptualisation of Biopower in three ways. Firstly, the changes in the medical gaze, specifically pertaining to pathological anatomy, are coextensive with the emergence of the anatomo-political pole of Biopower in both period of emergence and epistemological focus. Secondly, the understanding that certain material conditions in the institution of the clinic were responsible for the (re)emergence of pathological anatomy and the resulting epistemic developments prepares for Foucault's conceptualisation of the power-knowledge coupling, which is the focus of his genealogical work. Finally, the relation between the object of the medical gaze and the subject who gazes, indicates a kind of relation that would come to feature centrally in Foucault's genealogical work, to be understood with the added dimension of power as 'power relations'.[56]

The archaeology of the clinic and the genealogy of Biopower are two sides of the same coin, with the former focusing on the epistemic shifts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the latter focusing on the ways in which productive power used the new emergent knowledges in order to direct the forces of individual subjects and the population.

Power in the Archaeology

It is in the essay on 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' that Foucault introduces the dimension of power into his discussion regarding developments in medical knowledge. To the extent that it relies on epistemic moves Foucault explored in his archaeology, this essay indicates that the archaeology in *The Birth of the Clinic* functions as a 'moving force' for explaining the changes affecting the hospital with the emerging knowledges of 'population' as a 'species body'. The essay also explores changes in medical knowledge discussed in *The Birth of the Clinic,* and discusses the power-relational consequences of these changes. 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' explores the epistemic configurations emerging in the eighteenth century, with changes in the role of the doctor and the organisation of the hospital. These changes impact on power relations pertaining to managing and protecting the population as a primary object of intervention. Foucault reflects on this shift through the concept of 'noso-

[56] The only time when Foucault does, indeed, link medical knowledge to life in his archaeology of medicine, is when he discusses the politicisation of medical knowledge, and how it would come to dictate life. Therefore, Foucault invokes the inseparable link of knowledge to life only in the few instances that are meant to signal a deliberate relation to the realm of physical power and politics.

politics', which functions as a conceptual precursor to what he would call 'Biopolitics'. The specific change in Foucault's work pertaining to shifts that resulted in his turn to Biopower and Biopolitics will be discussed in the next chapter.

The emerging knowledges of the illness localised in the body in *The Birth of the Clinic*, and the knowledges of 'population' in 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century', can be understood as earlier writings on the successive emergences of the anatomo-political and the biopolitical aspects of Biopower, as described by Foucault in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (1976: 139) and *Society Must Be Defended* (1976: 66-67). In 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century', Foucault (2020: 101) argues:

> The challenge to the hospital institution in the eighteenth century can be understood on the basis of these three major phenomena: the emergence of "population", with its bio-medical variables of longevity and health; the organization of the narrowly parental family as a relay in a process in the process of medicalization for which it acts both as the permanent source and the ultimate instrument; and the interlacing of medical and administrative instances on organizing the control of collective hygiene.

In this quote, Foucault adds an element to his historical analysis of medical-epistemological changes, namely that of 'population' as species body. This new element in the order of knowledge dislodged the hospital as an institution of Disciplinary Power. The changes in the organisation of the hospital can be seen as response to the emergence of Biopolitics, and the medical knowledges that bolster it by analysing the population as a species body predisposed to disease.

The second chapter of *The Birth of the Clinic,* entitled 'A Political Consciousness' (1967: 22-36), contains an extensive discussion on the epistemic changes brought about by the emergence of epidemics in the eighteenth century, including the impact of these epistemic changes on the medical gaze and the role of the doctor. 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' explores the impact of emergent knowledges pertaining to the population on the hospital and on power relations related to medical knowledge, such as including the inoculation of children to prevent widespread epidemics (2020: 98), and the control of urban spaces to impose regulations of public hygiene on the population (2020: 99). Foucault (2020: 101) attributes these changes to the emergence of knowledges regarding 'population', and the changes in medical knowledge and practice in the eighteenth century. In *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1,

Foucault attributes the emergence of Biopolitics to the same knowledge formations, particularly to those knowledges pertaining to the population. Thus, the knowledges that contributed to the changes pertaining to the hospital and medical practices in 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' are the same changes that resulted in the emergence of the biopolitical pole of Biopower.

This indicates an overlap, both in time and epistemic configuration, between the emergence of epidemiology as presented in *The Birth of the Clinic*, and the changes in power-knowledge relations described in 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century', figuring conjointly in the emergence of Biopolitics. *The Birth of the Clinic* functions as a moving force for Foucault's genealogical work on the emergence of the biopolitical pole of Biopower, to the extent that it describes the epistemic emergence of medical knowledges pertaining to epidemics as transmissible, contagious, and having the potential to infect large numbers of people (Foucault, 1967: 23-25). The changes that Foucault discusses in *The Birth of the Clinic* regarding knowledges of epidemics become crucial to understanding the knowledges in the eighteenth century that elucidated the importance of a focus on the 'population' as a species body in Biopolitics. The conceptual transformations of the mobile term 'population' between Discipline and Biopower are prepared for in Foucault's discussion on epidemiology in *The Birth of the Clinic.*

Power in *The Birth of the Clinic*

Foucault indicates the method of investigation pursued in this book with the subtitle of *The Birth of the Clinic – An Archaeology of Medical Perception.* Even though the archaeological method is not directly focused on power, there are specific instances in *The Birth of the Clinic* where Foucault invokes the power of the state, the police, and other agencies and institutions and the knowledges germane to them. In these passages, Foucault does not take account of the kinds of knowledges that he would relate to power in his later work, but discusses the manifestations of power correlative to medical knowledges. He provides some examples in the chapter entitled 'A Political Consciousness'. Here he discusses the impact of certain changes in knowledge pertaining to medicine and doctors on the power over the physical bodies and living conditions of both doctors and patients (Foucault, 1967: 25-34). In discussing developments regarding the knowledges of epidemics and contagions in the eighteenth century, Foucault maintains that the interventions required to address epidemics necessitated the

exercise of power over individuals, and the imposition of regulations on industry and individual conduct:

> … [the] experience [of dealing with epidemics in the eighteenth century] could achieve full significance only if it was supplemented by constant, constricting intervention. A medicine of epidemics could exist only if supplemented by a police: to supervise the location of mines and cemeteries, to get as many corpses as possible cremated instead of buried, to control the sale of bread, wine, and meat, to supervise the running of abattoirs and dye works, and to prohibit unhealthy housing; after a detailed study of the whole country, a set of health regulations would have to be drawn up that would be read 'at service or mass, every Sunday and holy day, and which would explain how one should feed and dress oneself, how to avoid illness, and how to prevent or cure prevailing diseases: 'The precepts would become like prayers that even the most ignorant, even children, would learn to recite' (Foucault, 1967: 25-26).

Here Foucault's argument does not only include the exercise of power to deal with the problems of epidemics; he makes it clear that exercise of power is necessitated by the new epidemiological knowledges emerging in the eighteenth century. Even though Foucault does not use the term 'power' and has yet to conceptualise his power-knowledge coupling, he describes in detail specific developments that he would later frame by the power-knowledge relation. Foucault analyses those changes, not only in historical chronology, but also in terms of the kinds of measures taken to address epidemics. These measures are similar to those referred to as 'regulatory' *dispositifs* or "regulatory controls" (as Foucault calls them in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (1976: 139)). Measures geared towards 'avoiding illness' and 'preventing diseases' rely on apparatuses deployed by medical doctors, to cultivate conditions in which the population would be simultaneously productive and predictable.

To the extent that the archaeology of the clinic attempts to tell parts of the same story that is the focus of the genealogy of Biopower, albeit limited by the methodology, the work done in the former lays the groundwork for the latter. The exact epistemic changes and details outlined in *The Birth of the Clinic* are never discussed with this level of care again in Foucault's genealogical work. In *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (139-140), Foucault makes references to knowledges and apparatuses pertaining to "public health" and "medicine"; however, the specifics of these changes are not discussed with the same level of detail as in his archaeological

work. This suggests that Foucault's later work relies on his previous work, and takes knowledge of its content for granted. The knowledge configurations that gave rise to Biopolitics are mooted in *The Birth of the Clinic* to the extent that repeating them becomes unnecessary in his later work.

Foucault's genealogical work on Biopower and medicine is thus, to an extent, dependent on his archaeological work on medical knowledge. The fact that the genealogy assumes what has already been explored in *The Birth of the Clinic* allows it to investigate the power-knowledge configurations in the emergence of Biopolitics, without being vague or incomplete. Biopower, investigated through a genealogical method, can be seen to supplement the archaeological exposition of the clinic. A comprehensive account of the developments in medical knowledge implicated in the emergence of Biopolitics, and apparatuses mobilised in the process of these changes, can be gleaned only from the genealogy of Biopower. The concomitant transformations in the mobile terms within and between Disciplinary Power and Biopower can only be uncovered through an analysis of Foucault's genealogical work. However, the epistemic changes that accompany and influence these transformations are dealt with in great detail in *The Birth of the Clinic.* Therefore, the road to Biopower, and the correlative transformations in the mobile terms, is paved by Foucault's archaeology of the clinic.

Two 'Myths' of Disease: the 'Destinies of States'

A further overt reference to power in *The Birth of the Clinic* appears when Foucault explains the emergence of two different misconceptions, the first regarding the organisation and powers of the medical profession; and the second the disappearance of disease and the possibility of restoring health immediately both prior to, and after, the French revolution. The first focuses on the emergence of a nationalised medical industry, where posts of doctors would be organised like the clergy and offer free medical services. The second myth speculates about improvements in health conditions to the point of the eventual disappearance of disease due to corrective and supervisory interventions. According to this myth, the eighteenth-century resurgence of disease, and the economic divide between the rich and the poor, politicised the role of the doctor, who became responsible for partaking in the struggle against bad governance resulting in the perpetuation of inequality and disparity in the dispersion of illness (Foucault, 1967: 31-33):

> The first task of the doctor is therefore political: the struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad government. Man will be totally and definitively cured only if he is first liberated: 'Who, then, should denounce tyrants to mankind if not the doctors, who make man their full study, and who, each day, in the homes of poor and rich, among ordinary citizens and among the highest in the land, in cottage and mansion, contemplate the human miseries that have no other origin but tyranny and slavery?' (Foucault, 1967: 33).

By discussing the eighteenth-century idea that doctors should play a political role, and are to combat bad government, Foucault introduces the role of the doctor, along with medical knowledge, into the realm of power relations. By the nineteenth century, doctors had become more than collectors and holders of knowledge. They had become agents enmeshed in power relations, who needed to exercise the power afforded to them by knowledges - not only of medicine, but medical knowledge combined with knowledge of economics, history, and government. Thus, the transformations in medical knowledge at this time did not happen in a vacuum, but formed part of a complex relation of different knowledges which, in their combinatory form, were shaped by and shaped power relations of the time.

Foucault's discussion of both myths indicates that he was not simply concerned with epidemiology alone, but with the power structures and forms of governance that formed the contexts of epidemiology in the eighteenth century. Both myths involve speculation regarding the kinds of governance that would guide the *practice* of medicine, and the mandate of the doctor in a network of power relations.

Foucault (1967: 31) argues that the doctor's entrance into the social realm coincided with requests for "statistical supervision of health based registrations of births and deaths". Furthermore, Foucault (1967: 34) notes that the values of the doctor as a political agent played an important role in linking the practice and knowledge of medicine to the "destinies of states" in a positive light. The knowledge of medicine had successfully infiltrated the sphere of power. Foucault's descriptions of the reach of medical power, moving into spheres of life cycle rituals and public recreation activities, bear striking resemblance to the kinds of disciplines that he would come to call anatomo-politics in his later work. One of the most remarkable resemblances between the anatomo-political apparatuses of the genealogies, and the discussions of the powers of positive health interventions in *The Birth of the Clinic* can be found in the following passage that reads:

> Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing ills and of knowledge that they require; it will also embrace a knowledge of *healthy man*, that is, a study of *non-sick man* and a definition of the *model man*. In the ordering of human existence it assumes a normative posture, which authorises it not only to distribute advice as the healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral relations of the individual and of the society in which he lives (Foucault, 1967: 34).

Medical knowledge became inextricably linked to life itself. It became embedded in power relations to the extent of becoming an exerting authority on everyday practices and interactions and thereby assuming a normative role (see Foucault 1967: 34). In the eighteenth century, medicine shifted its focus from the investigation of the illness and its origin, location, and progression to the conduct to be enforced on the public in order to mitigate the spread of illness. Gaining knowledge of epidemics meant that medicine had to do more than explore and investigate; it needed to set acceptable limits of physical and moral conduct to stop the spread of communicable diseases. Jointly with the state, and with the doctor as an agent of the state, medical knowledge could dictate rules and standards ensuring a healthier population of healthy individuals capable of engaging in productive labour.

Foucault's argument that the doctor would become a political and social agent corresponds to several of his later works, which are usually classified as part of or tangential to his genealogies. In his 1974 lecture entitled 'The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine', Foucault discusses the way the medical doctor would become a social agent tasked with assigning the acceptable parameters of conduct. He argues that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century medicine began to produce social systems predicated on laws which would, by the twentieth century, have developed into the construction of social systems governed by norms. Medicine attained this capacity for social prescription from its concern with those aspects of life that are not linked to disease; thus, the general prescriptions of health became prescriptions for everyday conduct. Since the eighteenth century, this trend has rendered medicine, as 'health science', "social" rather than "clinical" (Foucault 2004: 13). In Foucault's genealogical terms, medicine comes to normatively define the 'model man'.

In 'The Birth of Social Medicine' Foucault distinguished between different kinds of socialised medicine developing in Europe during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The first of these he refers to as 'state medicine'(*Staatsmedizin*), developing specifically in

Germany (Prussia) in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, which itself appeared paradoxical to the development of the doctor's role as a social and political agent in France and England. In Germany, the state would need to be completely involved, and in control of, medical practice and data collection, which meant that doctors and hospitals would function primarily as state-agents and state-institutions respectively. The new medical policies in the paradigm of necessary state control of the field and practice of medicine would allow for state analysis and awareness of the predictability and productive capabilities of the population in ways not achieved up until that point.

The policies of Prussian state medicine were, firstly, that there would be a rigorous system of data collection on a regional and state level from doctors and hospitals to gain awareness of epidemic and endemic phenomena that could threaten the strength of the population, and by proxy the state. Secondly, medicine, medical practice, knowledge, and qualifications would be standardised. This standardisation would bleed into other state apparatuses. According to Foucault (2020: 140) "The doctor was the first standardized individual in Germany", characterising medicine at the time. Thirdly, and partly to ensure such standardisation, there would be an administrative organisation to oversee the activities of doctors. The standardised way doctors would collect data, administrate tests, and issue directives on epidemic diseases were predicated on the "subordination of medical practice to a higher authority" (Foucault 2020: 141). Finally, there would be medical officers who would be given authority of medical practice in certain regions based on their medical knowledge. Foucault (2020: 141) argues that the combination of these policies, in practice, resulted in what would be called "state medicine"[57], which would not emerge in the rest of Europe until the introduction of the Beveridge Plan in twentieth-century England (Foucault, 2020: 138). It is the "smallness of states" in eighteenth-century Germany compared to the large states of France and England that Foucault (2020: 38) argues allowed for the emergence of robust statised medicine.

Social medicine in the rest of eighteenth-century Europe would develop differently. Foucault (2020: 142) uses the term 'urban medicine' to describe the development of social medicine in eighteenth-century France due to the expansion of urban structures. The emergence of urbanised medicine was prompted by anxieties resulting from the city's transformation into a hub of economic activity on both a national and international level. The fact that the city

[57] Foucault notes that this German statised medicine would be followed by the much less state-oriented 'modern medicine', and calls its emergence "paradoxical" to the state-medicine that came before. He also notes that there were other systems of 'social medicine' that emerged at the same time, in other parts of Europe, that were not as statised. The remainder of the lecture is dedicated to those forms.

became a marketplace, and a place of production elucidated the necessity of "homogenous and coherent mechanisms of regulation" (Foucault, 2020: 145). A second reason for urban control was the political turmoil between the rich and the poor, due to price hikes or wage cuts, which would prompt the poorer classes to pillage silos, markets, and granaries in revolt. Additionally, the fact that people existed in close proximity to each other provided the necessary conditions for epidemics, and the increase in urban population created problems regarding finding burial space for the poor. Foucault (2020: 144-145) argues that addressing these factors resulted in the deployment of a quarantine plan that represented "the political-medical ideal of a good sanitary organisation of eighteenth-century cities" (Foucault, 2020: 145). According to Foucault (2020: 146), the quarantine model and regulations regarding public hygiene, demonstrated the political power of medicine to subject sick people to military inspection.

French urban medicine of the eighteenth century showcases the extent to which the doctor had become a social and political agent, where medicine was granted social authority in cities to generate prescriptions for dealing with the pressing anxieties experienced due to urbanisation. Medical knowledges/practitioners were given political authority to dictate the actions and movements of subjects, and to impose restrictions on them where necessary.

Foucault (2004: 13) attributes four characteristics to eighteenth century socialised medicine. The first of these is that the medical authority is not limited to medical knowledge, but can make prescriptions regarding towns, districts, and institutions. This is the aspect of social medicine that led to specifically German (Prussian) state medicine. The second characteristic of socialised medicine was the emergence of medical intervention in fields such as water, sewage, and construction, which had very little to do with disease. The third was the introduction of the hospital as a site of "collective medicalisation". Foucault claims that the hospital, prior to the eighteenth century, was merely a commune where poor sick people came to die, and not an institution of effective treatment and cure. Finally, the eighteenth century signalled the emergence of medical administrative tools for data collection, in particular for the collection and analysis of statistical data.

The doctor's role as a social agent, following the emergence of epidemiological concerns specified in *The Birth of the Clinic*, corresponds to Foucault's discussion on the emergence of statistical analysis in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1. With the emergence of Biopolitics, "statistical assessments" aimed at the entire "social body" were needed in order to act on the population in a way similar to the way in which disciplinary "controls" acted on the individual

body (Foucault: 1976: 145-146). The role of statistical analysis as a science of prediction, as Malthus understood it, envisaged an apparatus for prediction that could be used to make estimates regarding the 'structure' of society. The Malthusian conceptualisation considers statistical measurement ideally applied over centuries, in order to construct data regarding the tendency of a society to multiply and flourish. In *An Essay on the Principle of Population, As It Affects the Future Improvement of Society* (1826) he writes:

> A satisfactory history of this kind [of knowing when periods of scarcity and prosperity take place], of one people and of one period, would require the constant and minute attention of many observing minds in local and general remarks on the state of the lower classes of society, and the causes that influenced it; and, to draw accurate inferences upon this subject, a succession of such historians for some centuries would be necessary. This branch of statistical knowledge has, of late years, been attended to in some countries, and we may promise ourselves a clearer insight into the internal structure of human society from the progress of these inquiries. (Malthus, 1826: 19-20).

Statistical measurement is designed to produce data allowing for predictive verdicts about the population. The epidemics and public health concerns detailed by Foucault in *The History of Sexuality* vol.1 heightened the significance of statistics. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault links the emergence of the doctor as a social agent to the same epidemiological knowledges and needs for statistical, which he would later argue gave rise to Biopolitics. It was the statistical knowledges related to epidemiology that allowed for the doctor's entry into the realm of power, and gave medical practitioners the authority to set norms and parameters for human conduct. By connecting the doctor's entrance into the social sphere with epidemiology and statistics, Foucault also lays the groundwork for the emergence of the need for statistics as a measure to ensure predictability in the population in the power-knowledge configuration of Biopower. Therefore, *The Birth of the Clinic* lays the groundwork for the conceptual transformations in 'population' and 'prediction' from Discipline to Biopower, by foreshadowing the changes in knowledge that would accompany these conceptual transformations.

Foucault's genealogical work echoes and builds upon the foundation he laid in *The Birth of the Clinic* regarding the doctor's role as a social practitioner, and the expansion of medical knowledge into the social sphere. Medical knowledge went from being a specific

connaissance[58] with a primarily exploratory prerogative to an apparatus for exercising political/social power. Medical knowledges in the eighteenth and nineteenth century pertaining to public health, disease, and epidemics developed into being the epistemic foundation for *dispositifs* geared towards ensuring healthy conduct on the part of the subject, along with those *dispositifs* geared towards large-scale action enforcing rules and standards of health that permeate throughout society and the population. This emergence of *dispositif* informed by knowledge of medicine, to a significant degree, parallels the emergent knowledges that resulted in the "subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" which ushered in "an era of 'biopower'" (Foucault, 1976: 140).

Health and the Norm: From the Medical to the Social

The relation between the normal and the pathological is addressed with nuance in Foucault's archaeological work, whereas in his genealogical work he mostly deals with the distinction between the normal and the pathological. In epistemically locating nineteenth-century medicine's preoccupation with generating prescriptions based on normality in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967: 35), Foucault mentions the work of Claude Bernard. For Bernard there existed no definitive dichotomy between the normal and the pathological:

> Common sense shows that if we are thoroughly acquainted with a physiological phenomenon, we should be in a position to account for all the disturbances to which it is susceptible in the pathological state: Physiology and pathology are intermingled and are essentially one and the same thing. (in Canguilhem, 1991: 67)

Foucault's mentor Canguilhem sought to ground the contrast between the normal and the pathological in "the structure of the living things themselves" (Canguilhem, 1988: 141), and conceptualised the pathological "not [as] the absence of a biological norm: it is another norm but one which is, comparatively speaking, pushed aside by life" (Canguilhem, 1991: 144). Foucault retains Canguilhem's understanding whereby in the nineteenth century "norms of life

[58] Foucault uses this term to refer to the "formal knowledge of an established discipline", as opposed to *savoir*, which refers to general knowledge that is dispersed throughout a specific "historical social formation" (Lemert & Gillan, 1982: 133).

and death became positive as life came to be defined by death, and health by pathology" (Kistner, 2002: 256).[59]

Foucault's later work does not seem to convey the same nuanced understanding of the bipolarity between the normal and the pathological; nor does he define 'the normal' and its relation to what is commonly understood as 'abnormal'/'a-normal', or what is more critically understood as 'anomalous'; the conceptual status of these terms is not elaborated upon. In 'The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine', Foucault argues that twentieth century doctors are in the process of "inventing a society, not of law, but of norm", and that society is governed by "the perpetual distinction between normal and abnormal" (Foucault, 2004: 13). However, Foucault's original assertion in *The Birth of the Clinic* that the *science of man* appeared as an extension of the *science of life*, with both being medically and biologically based, through transference of concepts that "opened up a field that was divided up according to the principles of the normal and the pathological" does not imply a dichotomy between opposite poles of normal and pathological. A link between Foucault's argument in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967: 35-36) and his genealogical work can be made out in the correlation between the emergence of Biopower and the emergence of concepts and standards of normality from which deviation can be measured.

The anatomo-political pole of Biopower, and its specifically disciplinary aspects, come into play in *The Birth of the Clinic* in Foucault's notion of 'normative posture' (1967: 34). Foucault here refers to the authority of medical knowledge to define normed practice pertaining to conduct on the part of subjects. The norms defined by medicine are no longer purely based on a distinction between the healthy body and the diseased body. Medical knowledge comes to inform the conduct of subjects, by linking normality to those activities and practices that avoid disease, and by linking a-normality to those practices that could result in the contracting or spreading of disease. The diseased body changes from attesting to a purely biological deficit to indicating conduct incurring disease.

According to Foucault (1967: 35), this newfound focus on normality emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Foucault argues that during the eighteenth-century medical knowledge was still primarily focused on "health" as opposed to normality. Medical knowledge was less concerned with the normal functioning of the organism than with the qualities that were lost to disease, and were to be restored by medicine. However, medicine of the nineteenth

[59] See *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967: 144-146, 154, 158)

century became more preoccupied with normality than with health. Medical knowledges gained the authority to prescribe interventions "in relation to standards of functioning and organic structure" (Foucault, 1967: 35). To this end, medical knowledge did not only investigate the structures of the body and disease, but came to define the parameters for normal functioning of the human organism. It was in the nineteenth century that medicine moved away from being a purely investigatory enterprise to one which sets the standards for physical health, and activities affecting the health of the individual and of society:

> Eighteenth century medicine freed itself from the scientific and therapeutic stagnation in which it had been mired beginning in the medieval period. From this moment on, medicine began to consider fields other than ill people and became interested in aspects other than diseases, changing from being essentially clinical to being social. (Foucault, 2004: 13)

In Foucault's account, norms of health rooted in medicine and biology were taken over into the human sciences. The movement of medical knowledge into the realm of power relations set tracks for the human sciences and their turn to conduct. The introduction of health norms into the field of power facilitated the restructuring of the continuum between the normal and the pathological by those sciences fundamentally preoccupied with human conduct.

By linking health to conduct, the human sciences could generate prescriptions beyond the reach of medical knowledge. Theories of human nature did not require a biological foundation for their entry into the sphere of power. Whereas medical knowledge would be based on biological foundations, clinical reasoning and the human sciences were not constrained by empirical research in arriving at norms of conduct. Whereas medical knowledge had to operate with a logic of ordering conduct in favour of increasing physical health and the continuation of biological life, the human sciences could abstract from the very idea of life to the point of stipulating norms of conduct on its own merits, with varying degrees of appeal to the threat of biological harm. The human sciences appropriated the structural relation between the normal and pathological 'life', turning it into a bipolarity:

> When one spoke of the life of groups and societies, of the life of the race, or even the 'psychological life', one did not think first of the internal structure of the *organised being*, but of the *medical bipolarity of the normal and the pathological*. Consciousness exists because it can be altered, mimed, diverted, from its course, paralysed; societies live because there are sick, declining societies and healthy,

> expanding ones; the race is a living being that one can see degenerating; and civilisations, whose deaths have so often been remarked on, are also, therefore, living beings. (Foucault, 1967: 35)

Here Foucault argues that it is exactly the capacity of medical knowledge for establishing norms which was adopted by the human sciences, which measured *life* not on a biological level, but on the level of conduct. The normalisation of conduct allowed for the actions of the subject to be seen as deviations from what is considered normal. Moreover, it allowed for a society itself to be judged 'healthy' or 'sick' from a human science perspective.

The emergence of human science prescribing conduct is elaborated by Foucault's (2004: 14-15) argument that certain types of demedicalised sciences emerged only when medical fields such as psychiatry started moving its focus beyond disease. He refers to the human science discipline of psychoanalysis which emerged with an attempt to demedicalise psychiatry, treating conditions like hysteria and neurosis as psychopathologies rather than psychiatric illnesses. In cases like this, the human sciences inherited medicine's capacity for stipulating a norm without being constrained by medical-conceptual limitations. The human sciences could establish the norm for the sake of the norm.

By referencing the role of the doctor in generating prescriptive norms, as well as the fact that the human sciences appropriated the concept of the norm in order to generate prescriptions, *The Birth of the Clinic* sets the stage for Foucault's later genealogical analyses of practices of instilling prescriptive norms in Discipline and Biopower. Foucault's brief discussion on the generation of prescriptive norms by doctors and within the *sciences of man*, prepares for his extensive examinations of the generation and reinforcement of prescriptive norms in his genealogical work, albeit with modified understandings of the *bipolarity* that he mentions in *The Birth of the Clinic*. What is evident is a germinal formulation of the concept of the prescriptive norm as it pertains to the conduct of the subject, which would become a primary component of his genealogical work. Although it is impossible to glean anything substantial regarding the conceptual transformation of the mobile term 'the norm' from Foucault's brief mention of it, an analysis of *The Birth of the Clinic* reveals the foundations for what would become an important component in Foucault's genealogical work pertaining to norms.

The 'Science of Life' and the 'Science of Man'

There is, however, one key aspect of Foucault's discussion in this part of *The Birth of the Clinic*, which is more difficult to reconcile with his later work. He speculates that "the science of man" appeared as an extension of "the science of life" due to the appropriation of the normal-pathological distinction (Foucault, 1967: 36). This implies that Foucault understood the medical sciences as predating and inspiring the "sciences of man" or human sciences, which seems to contradict the idea that it was the emergence of the biological sciences that, after the human sciences, resulted in the emergence of Biopolitics. What remains is the central tenet that certain developments in the fields of biology and medicine gave rise to Biopower, and the Biopolitical focus on the population as a species body necessitating predictability. It is factually correct that *nosological* practices/*the art* of healing the body predate many of those fields that are considered 'human sciences', and it is correct to argue that certain manners of thinking developing in the medical sciences could be seen as expanding into the human sciences, especially those that make up what Nikolas Rose (1996) argues are grouped together by the shared prefix "psy" or psy-sciences.[60] The knowledges resulting in Biopolitics did not arise out of a vacuum, but from existing medical-biological knowledge and medical-social practice. It was the epistemic developments and discoveries regarding risks to the population that prompted the emergence of Biopower and Biopolitics.

'Race' as a Forerunner for 'Population' as a 'Species Body'

The way Foucault (1967: 35) uses 'race' and 'society' in *The Birth of the Clinic* should be noted for its resemblance to what he would later refer to as 'population'. His reference to a race as a singular living being indicates a notion that would only become a unit of analysis with his move to Biopolitics. What precipitates this move is an understanding of the population as a singular object that is more than just a multiplicity of individual subjects. Given that this conceptualisation of a 'race' as a singular entity is limited to a single sentence, this notion was in a germinal stage at best. The idea of a large group of human subjects as a singular entity would only re-emerge once Foucault had elaborated the genealogical method, and had established the framework of power-knowledge, productivity, and population that ran as a thread through his later work. Thus, 'race' as a single object stands as precursor to Foucault's

[60] See previous chapter.

later understanding of a 'population' as an object of power. Foucault's use of 'race' as a single object is a precursor to the transformations undergone by 'population' as a mobile term to a singular 'species body'.

This is not to say that Foucault's analysis in *The Birth of the Clinic* is indistinguishable from his genealogical work. In *The Birth of the Clinic* (1967: 35), he applies this idea of a race as a single entity more to the extrapolation from a framework pertaining to normality and pathology of medical science by the human sciences than to the emergence of medical knowledges that required interventions to be imposed on the population as a singular entity, as would be the case for the emergence of 'Biopolitics'. However, even in his genealogical work, Foucault does point to human sciences like demography as sets of knowledges focusing on the population as a single entity, or a 'species body'. Therefore, some of the knowledges referred to here, focusing on a singular 'race', can be said to be of a piece with knowledges that contributed to the emergence of the conceptualisation of the population as a holistic object of power. *The Birth of the Clinic* gestures towards an understanding that knowledges emerging somewhere between the eighteenth and nineteenth century were focused on the conceptualisation of a biological-social collective understood as a single entity, instead of as a multiplicity of individual human subjects. This is the understanding that would come to be designated as 'population' in the framework of Biopolitics.

In his genealogical work, Foucault would use the term 'race' with much more specificity and nuance, in a manner that would distinguish it from the concept of 'population' as a species body. In Society Must be Defended' (2013: 74-77) Foucault explicates the concepts of race and racism in relation to the state and the population. He argues that the concept of 'race' allows for distinctions to be made within a population predicated on perceptions of superiority and inferiority. Accordingly, the concept of race prompts distinctions between the worth of the lives of subjects belonging to different races (Foucault, 2013: 74).

Discussing the Mobile Terms

The mobile terms thematised in this thesis do not appear in the archaeology of the clinic in the same manner as they do in Foucault's genealogical work. The best way to locate them is through a deep reading of Foucault's archaeology and by tracking their elements in his archaeological work. My analysis of *The Birth of the Clinic* has come up with many implicit and explicit references to power.

Many of the specific medical measures that Foucault refers to in *The Birth of the Clinic* run parallel to those regulatory apparatuses that would later be couched in his genealogical work as being geared towards assuring 'predictability' and 'productivity' in the 'population'. The moment the doctor becomes a political agent, his goals become the maintenance and perpetuation of a productive population. Foucault makes this clear when he reframes the same epistemic developments through the lens of Biopower using the mobile terms.

In *The Birth of the Clinic*, there are specific instances where conceptual content appears that approximates that of the later conceptualisations of the selected mobile terms, albeit linked to different signifiers. Thus, these early versions prepare for the emergence of the conceptual architecture, inasmuch as they provide proto-typical 'placeholders' for future mobile terms. In the case of 'race', as used in *The Birth of the Clinic*, the word is understood as a kind of 'species body' or singular entity that should be understood as a single biological organism. In this sense, Foucault's use of the word 'race' in certain parts of *The Birth of the Clinic* functions as a prototypical conceptual placeholder for his use of 'population' when discussing Biopower in his genealogical work. This is not to say that it is an exact substitution, as there are methodological and linguistic limitations to the extent to which Foucault could conceptualise biopolitical power-knowledge relations in his archaeological explorations. These differences would not have allowed for the notion of 'race' in the archaeology to be specified and defined to the wide extent that 'population' is instated in his work on Biopower. However, there exists enough conceptual overlap to recognise 'race' as discussed in *The Birth of the Clinic* as an element of biopolitical 'population'.

Conclusion

The archaeology of the clinic displays parallels in historical developments ascribed to Biopower and Biopolitics, albeit in a different linguistic and methodological framework. The transformations in the conceptualisations of the mobile terms: 'population', 'productivity', and 'prediction', that accompanied the emergence of Biopower can be understood only by analysing the move from Disciplinary Power to Biopower. In its analysis of the changing structure of the medical gaze, of the reorganisation of the hospital and the clinic, of the changing parameters of medical knowledge and practice, and of the combination of medical knowledge and social mandates, *The Birth of the Clinic* lays the groundwork for Foucault's genealogical work on the emergence of Biopower. This chapter has argued the significance of

Foucault's archaeological work on medical knowledge for the genealogy of Biopower. The next chapter is devoted to the shift from Disciplinary Power to Biopower, and the transformations in the conceptualisations of the mobile terms, specifically 'population' and 'prediction', that are coextensive with this shift.

Chapter Four

Biopower: From Individuals to a Species Body

Foucault's genealogical work on Disciplinary Power allowed for exploring the multifarious power-knowledge relations emerging out of the field of medicine. Foucault investigates the ways medical and biological sciences interacted with power relations from the eighteenth century onward and unpacks the ways these knowledges related to the emergence of *dispositifs* directed at addressing risks pertaining to the entire population as a 'species body'. In his work on Biopower, Foucault conceptualizes 'population' as a "collective or social body" (Curtis, 2002: 507), which is different from his conceptualization of the term in his earlier work on Disciplinary Power.[61] 'Population' in Biopower becomes an object for the collection of statistical information pertaining to regularities in rates of birth, death, and marriage (Curtis, 2002: 509). 'The norm', although primarily geared towards generating prescriptions related to individuals in Foucault's work, comes to include the elements of gathering descriptive data that allows for collection of averages, which may be used to generate prescriptions based on statistical data in the configuration of Biopower (See Footnote 86). The articulation of power through statistical knowledge pertaining to the population as a 'species body' allowed for the analysis of risks pertaining to sanitation, mortality, and natality rates (Foucault, 1976: 139). Biopower operates by means of two sets of apparatuses. Firstly, Biopower deploys anatomo-political 'disciplines' to address risks pertaining to individual bodies making up the species body and, secondly, it deploys biopolitical 'regulations' to address risks pertaining to the population as a singular 'species body' (Foucault, 1976: 139).[1] The "discovery" of 'population' is attributed to the emergence of Biopolitics and 'anatomo-politics', referring to the realization that the individual subject forms part of a biological species (Curtis, 2002: 519). Foucault (1976: 141) argues that Biopower was indispensable to the development of capitalism, because it provided a controlled supply of healthy bodies for participation in the "machinery of production". Biopower also allowed adjustment of 'population' to economic processes. Productive labour was to be ensured through maintaining a healthy population from which capable bodies could be chosen. Each individual was understood as a biological organism forming part of a *gestalt* species body susceptible to unique biological risks demanding the deployment of unique regulatory apparatuses, in order to render the population productive (see Curtis, 2002: 519). Regulatory apparatuses, such as incitement or curbing of birth rates

[61] See Chapter Two.

(Foucault 1976, 146), would supplement disciplinary apparatuses, such as the spatial partitioning between sick and healthy individuals (Foucault, 1975: 195-200), in order to address biological risks pertaining to individual bodies, as well as risks to the overall species body.

The emergence of the conceptualisation of 'population' as a species body accompanied a larger set of conceptual transformations in between Discipline and Biopower. Foucault's use of power went through several transformations in its later versions, and far exceeded the scope of Disciplinary Power. He turned to power structures posing problems that could not be addressed at the level of the individual subject in a closed institution.[62] The articulation of 'Biopower' and 'Biopolitics'[63] marks a radical shift in the conceptual architecture, which features transformations in the conceptual content of the mobile term 'population' and a new and specific kind of 'predictability'. The introduction of the concept and framework of Biopolitics is based on the knowledges pertaining to the scientific analysis of the entire population, including studies of endemics, demography, and public health. The shift from a primary focus on conduct towards problems pertaining to the entire population is evident in Foucault's *oeuvre*, as his focus turns to risk factors presenting a danger to the population as a 'species body' defined according to geographical delimitations of territory.

In a system of Biopower, the mobile terms 'production', 'population', 'the subject', and 'prediction' are transformed again, without, however, discounting their previous conceptualisations. Instead, the conceptual changes of the mobile terms from classical Disciplinary Power to Biopower build on their valence in Disciplinary Power, without discarding any of the conceptual content they were imbued with in that power-knowledge configuration. Foucault chose to work his previous analysis of power in *Discipline and Punish* into the schema of Biopower under the new moniker of 'anatomo-politics'. The transition of the mobile terms expands the conceptual scope that they occupied in Disciplinary Power to include the epistemic developments ushered in by problems pertaining to the population as a species body.

[62]'Biopower' is the subject of much of Foucault scholarship. It has impacted the redefinition of the psychiatric subject (Kirshner, 2010: 92-103), as well as the reconstruction of Foucault's war model within the scope of the politics of life and death (Karkens, 2010: 122-13).

[63] 'Biopolitics' refers to a specific ensemble of apparatuses within Biopower, which focus on the population as a singular species body. Biopolitics functions in tandem with 'anatamo-politics', which focus on disciplining the individual body. (Foucault, 1976: 139-140). See also, Chapter Two of this thesis.

Biopower focuses on those biological aspects that put the individual and the entire species body at risk of death or extinction. In this framework, the terms 'production' and 'the subject' retain their previous meanings, but are reframed in a larger system that focuses on 'population' as a species body. 'Production' remains a primary goal of Biopower, addressed through different interventions such as avoiding biological risks like disease and starvation, which could render subjects unproductive. The conceptualisation of 'the subject' is similar to that in Disciplinary Power, with the added dimension of its biological aspects and its place in a singular species body. 'Population' and 'prediction' gain new relevance, corresponding to the knowledges that inform the systems and apparatuses of Biopower. 'Population' becomes a primary focus of biopolitical apparatuses of power, and establishing methods of 'prediction' at the level of the population becomes a primary function of many of these apparatuses. Finally, 'the norm', as it pertains to conduct, is conceptualised similarly to the way in which it is conceptualised in Disciplinary Power, but is no longer considered to be the primary means by which productivity and predictability are achieved. Foucault's use of the term 'norm' most prominently related to generating prescriptions for conduct (Kelly, 2019: 14-15). The statistical tools deployed by the natural sciences expanded on the norm by instating it as a standard of measurement in the form of a mean average.[64] The conceptual content of the mobile terms 'the subject', 'production', and 'the norm' within the system of Disciplinary Power is retained with the emergence of Biopower. This conceptual content forms part of the anatomo-political aspect of Biopower. The conceptual transitions occurring with the emergence of Biopower act as additions to existing conceptualisations by adding new dimensions to the mobile terms.

Biopolitics: The Second 'Pole' of Biopower

According to Foucault, a second set of apparatuses emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, which was different from disciplinary *dispositifs*, but did not exclude them. These apparatuses integrated and modified the *dispositifs* of Discipline, and embedded themselves in the system of Biopower (Foucault, 1976: 63). The new techniques operated on a different level and a larger scale, making use of different instruments. They did not apply strictly to individual

[64] Mark Kelly (2019: 14-15) argues that Foucault's own use of the mobile term 'the norm' and normalisation, although open to a certain level of conceptual additions, is not altogether equivalent to industrial or statistical standardisation models.

bodies, but biological living beings as part of a 'species body' (Foucault, 1976: 64).[65] These apparatuses focus on the regulation of an entire population as a species body, and on all the processes that affect it. They function as a seizure of power over the population as a species. It is this turn that came about in the eighteenth century that Foucault calls a "Biopolitics" of the human race[66] as a species body (Foucault, 1976: 64).[67]

The Biopolitics[68] of the human species, according to Foucault, was focused on birth rates, mortality rates, the ratio of births to death, and longevity, among other population problematics. These processes, along with the political problems that they presented, became "*biopolitics*' first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control" (Foucault, 1976: 64). It was during this latter half of the eighteenth century that demography emerged as a science geared towards the statistical analysis of these problems, and it was this period in which serious attempts were made to exercise control over the birth rate (Foucault 1976: 64). Foucault suggests that it is during this period that compulsory birth control measures were introduced.

Foucault points out that Biopolitics was also geared towards the analysis and control of mortality, in addition to the new focus on fertility. The problem of mortality was no longer restricted to epidemics as had been the case since the Middle Ages but was also extended to "endemics". 'Endemics' refers to "the form, nature, extension, duration, and intensity of the illness prevalent in a population" (Foucault, 1976: 64-65).[69] Endemics affect the population at

[65] Foucault (1976: 64) distinguishes between techniques of discipline on individual bodies, and apparatuses of regulation focused on the larger population as a species: "To be more specific, I would say that discipline tries to rule a multiplicity to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if needed be, punished. And that the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on."

[66] Although Foucault's use of 'race' in 'Society Must be Defended (1976) cannot be equated to the concept of a 'species body', he does designate a singular entity when referring to 'human race'.

[67] See also Bruce Curtis (2002: 506).

[68]The concepts of 'Biopolitics' and 'Biopower' should not be used interchangeably. Biopower pertains to the strategies of production on the biological components of the subject (better understood here as bodies), and the biological problems at the level of the population. Biopower should be seen as the culmination of institutions of Disciplinary Power focused on anatomical components, as an anatomo-politics, and Biopolitics focused on the regulation of biological problems at the level of the population. Both were invoked to effectively manage "life" and the productivity of the population. Foucault (1976: 139-140) locates the anatomo-political disciplinary *dispositifs* of power, and Biopolitical regulatory apparatuses of power, in the "classical period".

[69] About endemic illnesses, Foucault (1976: 55) says: "These were illnesses that were difficult to eradicate and that were not regarded as epidemics that caused more frequent deaths, but as permanent factors which—and that is how they were dealt with—sapped the population's strength, shortened the working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive."

multiple levels, including its economic stability, the availability of capable bodies for the work force, the rate of production, and public health. According to Foucault (1976: 65), endemics made death something permanent which did not "swoop" into life but rather slips into it. This conceptualisation of death as a permanent threat to life explains why regulatory procedures were required to optimise life and circumscribe the possibilities of death.[70]

The implementation of biopolitical apparatuses became pressing whenever endemics threatened the continuous and prosperous existence of the population. Foucault (1976: 65) describes death brought about by endemics as something that "gnaws at", "diminishes", and "weakens" life. The threat that this poses to the population sets up the need for apparatuses focused on public health, hygiene, and medicine that widen the gap between life and death for the population, and help assure a "strong, healthy, society" (Decoteau, 2013: 104).[71]

The Concepts of Population and Populousness

The concept of 'population' appears in Foucault's work from roughly 1970 to 1982. Curtis (2002: 508) argues that the term 'population' in Foucault's work refers to different concepts. Foucault mentions 'populousness' in discussions of the function of policing and of mercantilism, designating units of government containing a number of entities within a specific territory. The concept of 'populousness' allows for forward planning and prediction, however, it remains centred on hierarchical differentiation between groups linked by "a common abstract essence", such as clergy, knights, and peasants (Curtis, 2002: 508). Foucault's use of the word 'population' to refer to 'populousness' is most evident in his description of mercantilist and physiocratic apparatuses to deal with grain scarcity among peasant classes (Foucault, 1977-

[70] This corresponds to Campbell and Sitze's (2013: 12) description of Biopolitical *dispositif* as operating in favour of life in a game of life and death: "Knowledge of biopolitics entails risky propositions: death's slight withdrawal for living opens up the space for a knowledge of life that is irreducibly probabilistic in form, such that understanding life's enmeshments with politics always involves some roll of the dice about the future of both life and politics. In this sense, knowing the story of how life and politics come together means asking how it has come to be that collective life has assumed the form of a massive bet—a deadly serious game of chance in which the population is at once *the central player* and *the main prize*, at once *the subject of politics* and *the object of politics itself*". In their analysis McHoul and Grace (2002: 62) argue that for Foucault "Political strategies within our society revolve around the question of 'life': the demands for basic needs, for the realisation of potentials, for the annihilation of scarcity and the concomitant demand for complete fulfilment and plenitude."

[71] Foucault elaborates: "These are the phenomena that begin to be taken into account at the end of the eighteenth century, and they result in the development of a medicine whose main function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coordinate medical care, centralize information, and normalize knowledge. And which also takes the form of campaigns to teach hygiene and medicalize the population." (1976: 65)

1978: 30-40); used in this context, the term refers to the distinction between different groups, and the relation of certain groups to others. The concept of 'Population', on the other hand, entails establishing equivalences among subjects, allowing it to function as an object of statistical knowledge (Curtis, 2002: 509). Whereas 'populousness' allows for analysing a social body and its relative categories for specific policy initiatives such as the regulation of resource consumption by a certain group, 'population' allows for the organisation and reorganisation of the social body on a molecular level (Curtis, 2002: 509). The concept of 'population' allows for the deployment of apparatuses focused on the population as a singular entity as well as apparatuses focused on the individual subject, regardless of social group. The proper use of the concept 'population' is evident in Foucault's work on training and taking record of individual subjects in *Discipline and Punish* (1975), as the apparatuses deployed by Disciplinary Power do not distinguish between groups in the manner designated by 'populousness'. Foucault's work on Biopower in *Society Must Be Defended* (1976) and *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1* (1976) also exemplifies the use of the concept of 'population' as a social body without appeal to the distinctions implied by 'populousness'.

Changes in 'Population' and 'Predictability' in Foucault's Work

The mobile term 'population' had much more limited conceptual content in Foucault's earlier genealogical work, especially in his discussions on Disciplinary Power before his turn to Biopolitics. In the lecture 1974 Lecture at the Institute of Social Medicine in Rio de Janeiro, "The Incorporation of the Hospital into Modern Technology", Foucault points out that the practice of writing and documentation in hospitals in the late eighteenth century allowed for comparisons of medical records across hospitals, which constituted a knowledge of illness in the population as a whole.

> Through the same system of disciplined hospital space, one can observe a great number of individuals. The records obtained daily, when compared among hospitals and in diverse regions, permit the study of pathological phenomena common to the whole population. Thanks to hospital technology, the individual and the population present themselves at the same time as objects of knowledge and medical intervention. The redistribution of those two medicines will be a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. The medicine that is formed in the course

> of the eighteenth century is simultaneously a medicine of the individual and the population. (Foucault, 2007: 151)

Here, Foucault makes a distinction between the individual and the population, and casts eighteenth-century medical knowledge as something that pertains to the individual subject and the population as two different entities. However, Foucault's account in this lecture is still limited to Discipline. Although he refers to the population as an additional concern to the individual, he does not elaborate what problems are specific to population. Instead, all the measures articulated here by Foucault are directed towards the individual subject. This indicates an understanding of 'population' as a multiplicity of individual subjects, reflected in his work on Disciplinary Power, particularly *Discipline and Punish* (1975).[72]

Foucault's description of the examination in *Discipline and Punish*—as a way to not only track the development of individuals, but also to establish collective categories and trends within a population—indicates a conceptualisation of 'population' as a multiplicity of individuals. He maintained that increases in the population understood as an "accumulation of men" were restricted to the operations of Disciplinary Power, and that the production of delinquency in the prison facilitated "the perpetual surveillance of the population". It could be due to Foucault's understanding of a population as an accumulation of subjects when writing *Discipline and Punish* that his understanding of Disciplinary Power treats the population as secondary, where the population is a focus of power-knowledge only insofar as it is an accumulation of individuals subjected to apparatuses of Disciplinary Power.

Hoffman (2014: 96-97) references Foucault's Collège de France lectures presented between 1974 and 1975 under the title *Les Anormaux* (translated into English as 'Abnormal'). Here Foucault returned to his distinction between the models used to deal with individuals for plague and leprosy, but with a noteworthy modification. The exclusion of lepers is said to serve the purpose of purifying the community by means of excluding the impurities associated with leprosy. The plague, and quarantine of the inhabitants of plague-stricken areas, is on the other hand said to serve the purpose of constituting a healthy population. The novelty of the latter measure, according to Hoffman (2014: 97), lies in the fact that Foucault describes quarantine

[72] Foucault's use of the word 'population' during his lecture at The State University of Rio de Janeiro, did not signify 'population' in any sense different from its role in the disciplinary *dispositif*. Marcelo Hoffman (2014: 96) argues that 'population' delineates "a constituted element in the exercise of power first and foremost concerned with the production of subjected individuals", as it is understood in Disciplinary Power. 'Subjected' is used here in the sense of being subjected *to* productive apparatuses.

as a measure of securing a "healthy population". It indicates a noteworthy modification of Foucault's previous emphasis on the "disciplinary society" as the 'dream' of models dealing with illness on a large scale. However, in the second lecture (of 15 January 1975) of the course 'population' still receives only peripheral treatment, with the health of the population still being treated as a secondary effect of Disciplinary Power rather than being the primary focus of a *dispositif*.

Foucault's conceptualisation of 'population' continues to show changes in his 1974 Lecture entitled 'The Birth of Social Medicine', where he explores epistemic developments in the field of medicine in the eighteenth century, and the power structures implicated in these developments. In discussing the emergence of 'urban medicine' in eighteenth century France, Foucault explores the anxieties felt regarding the spread of contagious diseases within the parameters of the city as "a place of production", which necessitated "homogenous and coherent mechanisms of regulation" (Foucault, 2020: 143). Foucault adduces the term "regulation" to describe the mechanisms deployed to deal with emergent health concerns in cities. These concerns are strikingly similar to the concerns that he would later identify as the impetus for the emergence of Biopower as both anatomo-politics and Biopolitics:

> So there arose what could be called an urban fear, a fear of the city, a very characteristic uneasiness: a fear of the workshops and factories being constructed, the crowding together of the population, the excessive height of the buildings, the urban epidemics, the rumours that invaded the city; a fear of the sinks and pits on which were constructed houses that threatened to collapse at any moment (Foucault, 2020: 144).

Prominent among these concerns are the problems associated with epidemics and the crowding together of the population. By virtue of forcing members of the population into proximity with one another, the city presented risks in terms of the biological vulnerability to disease and epidemics, posed not only to a single life, but to the life of all the individuals making up a population. In fact, it is inferred that even the closed institutions of discipline presented a threat to some extent. The close partitioning of the spaces in closed institutions could generate epicentres of contagion in the case of incidence of disease. A single subject could pose a risk to the entire micro-population that makes up the workforce and anyone in contact with them. At this point, Foucault's focus is still directed primarily to the risks that sick individuals pose to other individuals who together make up the population. He does not frame the population as

a single entity; instead, it is the risks posed by the proximity of individuals to other individuals that command his attention.

The risk of proximity called for measures to address the phenomena that "caused the population of the city to experience such intense anxiety" (Foucault, 2020: 144). However, in discussing the measures taken to address this anxiety, Foucault focuses on apparatuses addressing individual conduct. Even the idea of quarantine, which is oriented towards the entire population, is framed in the context of individual discipline. There would be an emergency plan in order to deal with an epidemic, which included mandates for people to stay home and each individual to remain in their own room, the city to be divided into sectors to each of which there would be an inspector assigned to patrol the streets, reports to be written by district monitors, and daily inspections of every house in order to ensure that the occupants were still in place and in good health. In Foucault's account, these measures were still predicated on the conduct of the individual. Subjects had to stay home, remain in their room, comply with daily checks, and be partitioned off from others, if they got sick. What this shows is that in 1974, even when confronted with problems threatening the species body, Foucault could not frame problems of the species body outside of his disciplinary framework.[73]

In another lecture delivered in October 1974 (first published in 1976) at the Institute of Social Medicine, Biomedical Centre of the State University of Rio de Janeiro entitled 'The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine', Foucault discusses changes in medical knowledges and practices from the eighteenth century onwards. In the lecture, he argues that the proliferation of practices diverging from those that are strictly medical to include "every aspect of life" (as discussed in the previous chapter) resulted in an epistemic expansion beyond problems that affect individuals to those that affect "the entire human race" (Foucault: 2004: 11). Here Foucault uses "race" in the same sense in which it features in his archaeological work on medicine, as a singular entity that can itself be a singular focus of knowledge. Additionally, he highlights knowledges that impelled doctors and biologists to progress from the individual to "the level of life itself and its fundamental events". Foucault's use of the term "life" resembles his biopolitical understanding of *dispositif* as geared towards maximising the chances of life. Here, Foucault does not refer to "a" life, as it would be inherent in a living

[73] Note the similarity between these measures, and the measures that Foucault discusses regarding dealing with contagions in the plague town in *Discipline and Punish* (1975: 195-200). In both cases, Foucault discusses biopolitical problems and *dispositifs* approximating biopolitical regulation, but falls short of a holistic description, due to his conceptualisation of 'population' being limited to a multiplicity of individual subjects.

individual body, but "life itself" as a concept that transcends the individual. The use of the term "life" demonstrates an understanding of "life" as a problematic pertaining to "the human race" as a single entity. However, Foucault does not as yet use the word 'population'[74] to designate this entity, and neither does he discuss it in the rest of the lecture. During this period, Foucault casts the hospital in a similar light as the prison, specifically taking note of the architecture, surveillance and special organisation of and within the hospital institution. In an interview that later appeared as the preface to the 1977 French edition of Jeremey Bentham's *Panopticon*, Foucault remarks that the hospital required specific knowledges about contagions and ventilation "at the same time to divide space and keep it open, assuring a surveillance which is both global and individualizing, carefully separating apart the individuals to survey" (Elden, 2017: 180). Here, Foucault exemplifies and understanding of the importance effects of contagions to be observed beyond the individual, yet he ultimately draws his analysis back to the surveillance and separation of individual subjects.

Foucault started to demonstrate a different, and in some respects a more comprehensive, understanding of 'population' in his 1976 (2020) essay entitled 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' where he adduces the term "noso-politics" to designate a politics of disease. He points out that during the eighteenth century the population became the primary focus of noso-politics, which he defines as "the problem of the health of all as a priority for all, the state of health of a population as a general objective of policy" (Foucault, 2020: 92). Noso-politics thus is conceptualised as a form of power that is primarily focused on the population. Foucault attributes this new focus to the ensemble of apparatuses that he had termed 'police', which appears to be his first conceptualisation of a collective ensemble of apparatuses geared towards control of the population.[75] Policing served not only to ensure a sustainable labour force at the level of the individual, but to integrate the growing population into the institutions to which they would contribute their labour. Thus, the population became an object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, and modification. The population needed to be controlled and sustained to ensure its continuous existence. The primary risk to the population became understood as a set of problems related to physical health. Foucault's notion of noso-politics

[74] Foucault (2004: 12) does use the term "general population" in the conventional sense, to refer to (what appears to be) the multiplicity that consists of individual 'patients', technicians, and doctors.

[75] Hoffman (2014: 97) argues that Foucault described police "less as a single apparatus engaged in the supervision of the fine details of individual behaviour for the sake of public order than as an 'ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the condition of preservation of health in general".

entails the idea that the assemblage of apparatuses referred to as 'police' was primarily geared towards rendering the population more sustainable, manageable, and predictable. 'Policing' in this sense contains an explicitly predictive function. This suggests that Foucault's new-found conceptualisation of 'population', understood as more than simply a multiplicity of individuals, reflects an understanding of the population as being vulnerable to risks that require interventions geared towards establishing an element of predictability in the population. Predictability established through policing would circumvent the possibility of death in large numbers within the population, by moving the population away from aleatory conditions that risk extinction.

According to Hoffman (2014: 97), it was in the course of Foucault's discussion of noso-politics that 'population' appeared for the first time, showcasing a conceptualisation of a singular body consisting of "biological traits" still to be rendered docile and useful rather than an aggregate of individuals. This conceptualisation of 'population' would require *dispositif* transcending the individual and the closed institution. If the population were to be conceptualised as a body of biological traits instead of an aggregation of bodies, then new forms of *dispositif* would have to be identified that could make the population the primary focus, rather than a secondary object on which the effects of disciplinary apparatuses are felt.[76]

Foucault's first attempt to delineate apparatuses of power that needed to apply to a population in non-disciplinary terms came in the final lecture of *Society Must Be Defended*; however, his new discussion did not make a single mention of noso-politics. Here, Foucault turns to the term 'Biopolitics' without any apparent explanation for the abandonment of the term 'noso-politics' in its favour. Even more interesting is the fact that the term 'noso-politics' appeared in an essay published in the same year that the final lecture of 'Society Must Be Defended' was being delivered. According to Hoffman (2014: 98) the most probable explanation for this shift is that Foucault thought the term noso-politics, as a politics of disease, too narrow to encapsulate the scope of power primarily focused on the entire population. Threats to a population do of course entail more than mere threats of disease. For this reason, Foucault made it clear that Biopolitics concerned not merely the prevention of disease, but the mitigation, if not elimination, of risks that jeopardise the life of a population (Hoffman, 2014: 98).

[76] Foucault (1976: 170) highlights the need for such apparatuses: "The biological traits of a population become relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes necessary to organise around them an apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but the constant increase in their utility."

Foucault echoed the distinction between apparatuses directed at individual bodies and apparatuses directed at the population as a single entity in a 1976 Lecture at the University of Bahia entitled 'The Stiches of Power'. In this lecture, Foucault argues that the 'discovery' of 'population' is what separated monarchical power from forms of power that succeeded it. He defines 'population' as "not simply a group of human beings", but "living beings" ruled by biological laws, and who are predisposed to risks of age, death, birth, and health (Curtis, 2002, 518-519). The discovery of population is for Foucault the conceptualisation of 'population' as a biological species. This discovery is conditioned upon the knowledges of biological sciences pertaining to public health, disease, mortality, and natality. Foucault's description of the 'discovery' of population parallels the emergence of his conceptualisation of Biopower.

A New Predictability: Overcoming the Limits of the Disciplinary *Dispositifs*

Foucault's discussion of Biopolitics in *The History of Sexuality volume 1* (1976) marks a departure from the configuration of power specified for disciplinary procedures and institutions that had been the central focus of his work in *Discipline and Punish* (1975). This departure is based on the introduction of clear distinctions between disciplinary apparatuses and the regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics. Biopolitics can be distinguished from Disciplinary Power by its concern for the population as more than a multiplicity of individual subjects. Accentuating this distinction is the conceptualisation of 'population' as a body possessing its own specificity comprising all kinds of biological processes and events described as "unpredictable", "aleatory", and "random" (Hoffman, 2014: 98). One of the primary functions of *dispositifs* is to improve or optimise the population's continued existence by manipulating variables interacting with risks impinging on it both from outside and from within a population:

> The general character of these events necessitated the deployment of instruments distinct from disciplinary instruments. If disciplinary power ought to *train* individual bodies to constitute them as docile and productive forces, biopolitics sought to *regularise* aleatory events within the population for the sake of defending its life and maximising its forces. "Regularisation" denoted a control of aleatory events that established a balance within the life of a population (Hoffman 2014: 98).

The reconceptualisation of 'population' as species body gave rise to the notion of the regulatory function of *dispositifs* which, according to Foucault, emerged in the eighteenth century after the predominance of a disciplinary *dispositif*. However, this reconceptualisation only becomes apparent in Foucault's own *oeuvre* in the course of his lectures entitled (in English translation) 'Society Must Be Defended'. The function of *dispositifs* to swing the forces of life and death in favour of the former could arise only with the conceptualisation of the population as a species body susceptible to a myriad of aleatory risks threatening its continuous existence. As the statement by Hoffman quoted above suggests, Foucault's conceptualisation of the disciplinary *dispositif* was primarily focused on training individual subjects to render them calculable and productive, so that they could be inserted into socially and economically productive processes and institutions. However, the impact of disciplinary *dispositifs* on individual subjects turned out to be unable to address aleatory events that rendered the continuous existence of the population unpredictable. The emergence of scientific knowledges regarding endemics and other aleatory forces, gave rise to *dispositifs* going beyond the training of individual subjects. Addressing anxieties about the population's unpredictability, these *dispositifs* were aimed at preventing death on a large scale, and creating optimal conditions for the continuous existence of the population. Thus, the regulatory function of the *dispositif* emerged for the purpose of rendering an entire population predictable in the face of aleatory events that threatened predictability.

Foucault's understanding of regulatory apparatuses is that they "must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations with this general population and its aleatory field" (1976: 246).[77] Thus, regulatory *dispositifs* are geared toward predictability. This is not to say that disciplinary *dispositifs* do not address problems presented by unpredictability. Disciplinary Power can be shown to have the capacity to anticipate and pre-empt aleatory events: "disciplinary power always tends to intervene beforehand, before the act itself if possible" (Hoffman 2014: 99). The primary difference between disciplinary and regulatory anticipation lies in the fact that Disciplinary

[77] Hoffman echoes Foucault in saying that this new regulatory technology functioned, not by training individual bodies, but by establishing an equilibrium, through predictability, that protects the whole of the population: "Concretely, Foucault contended that regularisation involved the anticipation, if not prediction, of aleatory events through "forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures", and that these mechanisms provided the basis for interventions in the biological processes of the population to modify them in accordance with the goal of equilibrium." (Hoffman, 2014: 98-99)

Power is concerned with anticipating the conduct of individuals, and trains subjects to conduct themselves calculably (rather than acting on overall variables rendering the population unpredictable). A disciplinary *dispositif* is geared toward pre-emptive action (as described in *Discipline and Punish*); in that sense, it is anticipatory rather than predictive. In a disciplinary *dispositif* the aleatory events to be forestalled were reduced to the potentially deviant actions of the individual subject. The predictive function of disciplinary *dispositifs* was not made explicit because the problems addressed by disciplinary *dispositifs* demand strategies to mould the subject into something calculable. On the other hand, the problems specific to the level of 'population', which are the primary preoccupation of regulatory *dispositifs*, demand prediction beyond curbing deviant conduct in individual subjects. Thus, it would be fair to say that 'prediction', although present at some level in many disciplinary *dispositifs*, is not their primary function, because the problems addressed by disciplinary *dispositifs* do not necessitate prediction on the same scale of the species body.

Another distinction between the anticipatory capacity of disciplinary *dispositifs* and the predictive objectives of Biopolitical *dispositifs* lies in the kinds of knowledges informing Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics, respectively. Disciplinary Power cultivates calculable subjects through the human science knowledges pertaining to conduct. Institutions of disciplinary power-knowledge are sites of knowledge collection and generation, where knowledges about the conduct of individuals are collected, documented, and imposed back on subjects to maintain norms that further the productive goals of Disciplinary Power. Systems of Disciplinary Power harness knowledges concerning human conduct. For this reason, Foucault focuses his discussion of Disciplinary Power on institutions orientated towards gathering and utilising knowledges about conduct. Knowledges accumulated in the prison provide insight into the conduct, the motivation, and the success of rehabilitating the prisoner. Likewise, the knowledges accumulated about students in the confines of the school ground provided insights into the conduct of individual learners at study and at play, their aptitude for different kinds of activity, their disposition to deviant conduct, and the effectiveness of different disciplinary *dispositifs* in correcting the deviant conduct. Each closed institution that Foucault discusses in *Discipline and Punish* is orientated towards the collection, documentation, and deployment of knowledge about the subject's conduct. The predictive function of disciplinary power-knowledge was limited to cultivating calculable subjects that conduct themselves according to established norms.

Biopolitics, on the other hand, is not preoccupied with knowledge about conduct. In fact, the knowledges that Biopolitics concerns itself with are based on scientific data about medicine, disease, agriculture, mortality, and natality. None of these fields of knowledge are concerned with the specificities of individual conduct, but focus on collecting data about factors threatening the continuous existence of the population instead. Natural scientific knowledges are not collected to establish a norm, nor are they meant to influence conduct by reference to the norm. On the contrary, although the movement of bodies impacts on the epidemiological spread of diseases, the scientific understanding of disease itself is set in relation to a threat to the population as a species body. In Biopolitics, the population is understood to be a passive object devoid of the subjective capacities for self-discipline or self-orientation. Rendering the population predictable as a single species body is not limited to analysing and directing of conduct.

What is more, the knowledge collected by Biopolitics cannot be instilled back into the subject with the same kind of efficiency and effectiveness as the knowledge collected by Disciplinary Power. This is not to say that biopolitical knowledges do not contain aspects pertaining to conduct, but rather that the appeal to subjectivity is recognised to be inadequate to the task of addressing problems particular to the population as a 'species body'. For example, problems of epidemic or endemic proportions entail medical knowledge about the nature of specific pathogens, how they spread, the rate at which they spread, the risk of mortality, the physical parameters pertaining to the location of pathogens, the possibility of a cure, the timeframe in which a cure can be successfully administered, and the resources available in a specific area to manufacture and safely administer the cure. Concerns with regards to conduct pertaining to these problems of epidemics or endemics are limited to the movement of subjects infected or at risk of infection, the conduct of individuals contributing to the limitation or increase in spreading the disease, the motivation of the subject to inquire about the possibility of infection, the subject's awareness of symptoms and contagiousness, and the subject's tendency to restructure its conduct so as not to contract or spread the disease.

Disciplinary *dispositifs* only contribute to the solution of problems like epidemics by addressing aspects of the problem reducible to the conduct of the individual. Announcements can be broadcast warning subjects about the disease, informing them of the rate of infection, and acquainting them with symptoms and risk factors. Subjects can be advised to seek aid and advice at their nearest clinic or medical centre if they suspect that they or someone they

encountered might be infected, and the calculable subject will adhere to these recommendations. But the possibility of confining and rehabilitating subjects not adhering to such norms remains limited. In the open territory that is the physical space in which the population exists, subjects with varying degrees of capacity for the adherence to norms move and act. Were even the smallest number of subjects not to adhere to the norm, they would risk becoming vectors. [78]

Epidemics and endemics must be considered within an open territory instead of closed institutions; they pose a risk at the level of a species body existing across an entire defined territorial space instead of an accumulation of subjects confined to a closed institution. Depending on the possibility of inoculation, the single subject could potentially (re)introduce the pathogen into a multiplicity of subjects who adhered to the norms designed to control the spread of the disease, thus harbouring the potential for large-scale death. The potential for unpredictable conduct on the part of a single subject thus carries the risk of death for the species body.

However, not every form of deviant conduct on the part of the subject can be attributed to deliberate resistance, defiance, or wilful counter-conduct; rather, it is a case of the factors pertaining to the subject's adherence to norms becoming too multifarious and unpredictable when considered in terms of an open territory. Biopolitical *dispositifs* must externally impose restrictions to establish predictability in the population, not through any appeal to the calculability of conduct, but through imposing laws and policies on the population as a single entity.

These measures include legally restricting travel, banning or limiting products tainted with pathogens, imposing quarantine, evacuating areas where the disease is prevalent, and examining individuals at checkpoints to ascertain whether or not they are infected. In the most extreme of these cases, these procedures can be enforced through emergency measures with the help of military and law enforcement officials, in a manner not dissimilar to the implementation of martial law. The subjectivity of the individual is negated and overridden, to circumvent the possibility that it could stand in the way of the predictability that Biopolitics

[78] Biopolitical territory only defines the geographical limits of the species body, and is not to be confused with sovereign territory, which is conceptualised as a kingdom to be governed. Whereas the sovereign in the Machiavellian tradition governs a territory, Biopolitics governs the entity conceptualised as a species body, which exists within the scope of a defined territory. Foucault's description of the Machiavellian school of thought, and its primary focus on territory, is explored in the next chapter.

requires to ensure the continuation of productivity in the population. Thus, biopolitical *dispositifs* are directed towards the establishment of predictability not through the manipulation of individual conduct, but through overriding the possibility of deviant conduct by imposing measures that establish predictability. Biopolitical *dispositifs* negate the very subjectivity that Disciplinary Power relies on. Individual conduct in the biopolitical schema could be considered a potential threat to predictability. Whereas the conduct of the subject considered within the framework of Disciplinary Power orientates the subject towards predictable conduct, the conduct of the individual subject proves to be a potential threat to predictability considered within the framework of Biopolitics (that is, beyond the restrictions of closed institutions).

The Game of Life and Death: The Importance of a Predictable Population

The conceptualisation of the mobile term 'population' as a 'species body' does not indicate that this body has any capacity for subjectively orientated conduct, but rather that it is without a mind of its own. The species body within the scope of Biopolitics is conceptualised as a living, breathing body, without the mental capacity for subjective self-direction; instead, it needs to be monitored, cleaned, and protected for it to remain alive. The certainty and optimum of life can never be achieved.

The aleatory risks presented to the population imply that Biopolitics can never manage to generate absolute predictability with regard to the population. However, the function of biopolitical *dispositifs,* as laid out by Campbell and Sitze (2013), is not to generate the certainty of life, but to impose corrective measures to increase and optimise the statistical possibility of life. Foucault laid out specific interventions to indicate what exactly Biopolitics and regulatory *dispositifs* had to consider: lowering mortality rates, increasing life expectancy, and stimulating birth rates (see Hoffman, 2014: 99). These imperatives are geared towards the aleatory events that threaten the life of the population, and are based on scientific knowledges that cannot be reduced to individual conduct. Even though conduct does prove to be a potential component in stimulating birth and reducing premature mortality, the causes of problems pertaining to the health and longevity of a population cannot be reduced to individual conduct alone. Thus, the interventions addressing these problems cannot appeal to conduct alone.

However, these new forms of control were not absolutely disconnected from Disciplinary Power, and points of articulation between Biopolitics and Disciplinary Power remain. Such

points are described by Foucault especially in 'Society Must be Defended' and *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1. Disciplinary *dispositifs* are incorporated into Foucault's schema of Biopower as 'anatomo-politics' deployed in tandem with regulatory *dispositifs* of Biopolitics in what Foucault termed the era of 'Biopower'. Hoffman describes these two sets of *dispositifs* as opposite poles of Biopower or "control over life spanning from the fine details of the individual body to the gross details of the population body" (2014: 99). For Foucault:

> These two mechanisms—one disciplinary and the other regulatory—do not exist at the same level. Which means of course that they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other (1976: 246).

Foucault did not convey any sense that the aleatory events impacting on the population provided a basis for the population to participate in the regulation of its own processes. The 'population' of Biopolitics appeared as an inert, passive object in the statistical calculations and manipulations of processes of birth, death, and other biological processes (Hoffman, 2014: 100).

However, Foucault's later work does include an understanding of the population as possessing a level of subjectivity. His conceptualisation of 'population' changed from being a purely passive object on which regulatory apparatuses were enacted on to a 'subject-object'[79] with the capacity to self-regulate without the need for imposing overt external interventions. This led him to abandon the preoccupation with Biopolitics in favour of the framework of Governmentality.[80]

Foucault's understanding of 'population' as a primary object of intervention invoking the predictive capacities of its *dispositifs*, so conceptualised in 'Society Must Be Defended' and *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1, did not imbue the population with subjective capacities for self-regulation. On the contrary, 'population' was for Foucault at this stage of his work conceptualised as a biological object distinct from, and irreducible to, an accumulation of

[79] See Chapter Five.

[80] To be explored in the next chapter. It is only later with *Security, Territory, and Population* (1977-1978) that Foucault started making more drastic changes to his conceptualisation of 'population'. The course was meant to uncover how political sovereignty in the West became preoccupied with the details of life and the population. He identified the governance of human beings in the broad sense of the 'conduct of conduct' with the exercise of Pastoral Power in pre-Christian societies, especially in Hebraic societies, rather than in Greek societies. Hebraic societies were first and foremost in his view preoccupied with the guiding of conduct of individuals. During this course, Foucault develops the idea of 'security' to reconcile his new conceptualisation of 'population' as possessing a natural capacity for self-regulation. Chapter five discusses this final development in Foucault's conceptual attributions to the word 'population'.

bodies, and devoid of any capacity for self-regulation. This understanding of 'population' as being devoid of subjectivity highlights the urgency and importance of predictability, as the population could not be disciplined into self-governance. The population as a passive object could not be instilled with the capacities for self-regulation or productivity, because it could not reinforce any of the powers imposed on it, or the knowledge generated from it. Furthermore, the population could not actively contribute to the power-knowledge relation, because it was conceptualised as not being endowed with subjectivity that could be manipulated, nor with the capacity to autonomously work towards its own self-preservation.

Additionally, the conceptualisation of 'population' in relation to 'life' differs dramatically between Discipline and Biopower. The crucial difference between Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics is that the former cultivates subjects that autonomously engage in conduct directed towards achieving productivity and avoiding death, whereas the latter imposes external regulatory controls upon the population. To the extent that the population within a biopolitical configuration is conceptualised as a completely passive object without a mind or a soul that could be directed towards self-preservation, regulatory *dispositifs* act completely externally without any attempts at harnessing subjectivity. The population cannot take actions to defer death and to reinforce the possibility of a continuous productive existence; to move towards life and away from death.

According to Foucault (1976: 138), the preoccupation with death precedes the rise of productive power. Under the regime of Sovereign Power, death was the way one sovereign was supplanted by another. Productive power, by contrast, is power over life, whether it pertains to the life of the individual subject as in Disciplinary Power, or to the life of the population as a 'species body' as in Biopolitics. All forms of productive power are geared towards the avoidance of death and the enhancement of life and production; however, *dispositifs* change in accordance with the aim towards which productive power is geared. Productive power must be directed towards life and away from death, because death is the antithesis of production. For this reason, Foucault (1976: 138) understands death to be the limit of power, because power cannot harness production at and from the point of death. The dead body has no subjective capacities to be harnessed by Disciplinary Power; it is a passive object from which the specific kinds of knowledges that are important to Disciplinary Power can no longer be extracted, whilst being incapable of reproducing knowledges or of actively contributing to the disciplinary power-knowledge relation. Likewise, to the extent that the population is an object of life that

must be sustained, biopolitical power must impose on a passive population *dispositifs* of external control to avoid death. Biopolitics, as a component of productive power, is power over the 'species body' only insofar as this body is alive. If there is no notion of a pulsating 'species body', there can be no knowledge harnessed from it, and there can be no external power over it.

One indication of changes in the conceptualisation of 'population' from a multiplicity to a 'species body' can be found in the changing roles of the closed institution between Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics. While Foucault's conceptualisation of complete and austere institutions, and the elaborate descriptions he provides of the disciplinary training of individual subjects, explains the power-knowledge relations in these institutions, the function of these institutions becomes significantly compromised by biopolitical knowledge that cannot be reduced to individual conduct. Disciplinary institutions effectively contribute to the disciplining of individual subjects, the generation of knowledge pertaining to conduct, the utilisation of conduct to perpetuate the norm, and the effective construction of calculable subjects corresponding to disciplinary power-knowledge. The knowledge of subjective conduct and the power pertaining to the exercise of conduct was paramount to the function of disciplinary institutions.[81]

Closed institutions are however limited by the knowledge they collect, as well as by their physical parameters. Even though the discursive components of the institutions engender calculable conduct in the population, the institution itself could not envelop the population. The population as a 'species body' could not always be restricted by institutions, orientated, as they are, towards the individual subject. The population could not be rendered predictable by means of the manipulation of subjective conduct in closed institutions. Moreover, even though closed institutions like the clinic were able to produce knowledge pertaining to the population, such as epidemiological knowledge, and scientific knowledge pertaining to health, mortality, and natality, they could not address these problems beyond an appeal to the subjective conduct of patients and staff. Thus, the clinic could treat ailments of individual subjects, and provide them with knowledge that was meant to result in calculable conduct on the part of the subject; however, the clinic itself was still limited to the treatment of individual subjects. The conduct

[81] The capacity of the prison to ensure the continuation of life in the population was limited to the correctional methods pertaining to the conduct of the prisoners. Likewise, the effectiveness of the school in ensuring the predictable, continuous, existence of the population was limited to the power-knowledge relation between teachers and students. These institutions were geared towards the implementation of disciplinary *dispositifs* based off of knowledge and manipulation of conduct.

of these subjects beyond the confines of the clinic could not be effectively determined by the clinic, and the conduct of the individual outside of the clinic still posed a threat to the population that could not be addressed by the clinic. In this way, the clinic proved to be unique among, and distinct from, complete and austere institutions of training, because it was never completely orientated towards the collection and production of knowledge that pertained to conduct alone. With the understanding that disease spreads organically in a population, the clinic came to concern itself with the population as a 'species body' much earlier than other closed institutions.[82] However, the clinic was not capable of comprehensively addressing the problems that were registered in the course of its own knowledge collection and production.

To the extent that they relied on the training of doctors and patients, the *dispositifs* of the clinic still functioned within the parameters of Disciplinary Power. Although the clinic would go beyond an appeal to conduct in prescribing and administering treatments, such as emergency interventions, surgeries, and medication regimens, these interventions were still restricted to the institution. However, to the extent that *dispositifs* orientated towards the gearing of conduct were still deployed at the level of the individual subject, they could not effectively deal with the problems presented by the knowledges of the clinic pertaining to epidemiology. In the clinic, it is the individual subject that is examined, operated on, and medicated, and it is the individual subject that is educated, informed, and instructed on conduct preserving health. In a system of classical Disciplinary Power, the clinic was in the anomalous position of producing knowledge not completely limited to individual conduct, but being incapable of addressing any concerns pertaining to the population at a level beyond the individual subject.[83] It can be argued that this problem came to be partially addressed with the instantiation of the doctor as social agent.[84]

The other complete and austere institutions were primarily concerned with the production and collection of knowledge pertaining to the conduct of the individual. These processes have been discussed at length in Chapter Two. What is important to note about them is the fact that their

[82] The concern for the 'species body' arose with epidemiology. However, as noted in the previous chapter, medical knowledge focused on investigations not pertaining to conduct; certain aspects of empirical medical investigation would bleed into the human sciences when it came to establishing norms based not only on physiological functioning, but on conduct.

[83] The knowledges cultivated in the hospital and the clinic in the eighteenth century did lay the foundation for a focus on population as an object of investigation and intervention (Curtis, 2002: 514-515). However, the spatial limits of the institution disallowed intervention on a population-wide scale.

[84] See Chapter Three.

knowledge practices were restricted to conduct. These closed institutions were not just restricted in, and by, the function and orientation of disciplinary *dispositifs*, but by the knowledge that was being collected and reproduced in the power-knowledge relations of the institution. Prisons and schools were orientated towards the collection and production of knowledge that did not pertain to the population as a 'species body', but were geared largely towards individual conduct instead. The application of disciplinary *dispositifs* was limited to and by the parameters of the institution, which simultaneously produced the knowledge that informed the deployment of disciplinary *dispositifs*, and utilised *dispositifs* to manipulate conduct to align it with the norm. The manipulation of conduct by disciplinary *dispositifs* in closed institutions was limited to the physical parameters of the institution. The subject not contained within those parameters was not being subjected to disciplinary *dispositifs*.[85]

The Mobile Terms in Biopower

The mobile terms identified at the outset undergo significant transformations with the emergence of the knowledges centred around the regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics. However, these developments do not discard the conceptual content of the key terms associated with the emergence of Discipline. Instead, they are elaborated to take in new epistemic developments in the natural sciences. These conceptual expansions make it possible for the mobile terms to remain within the parameters of 'productive power proper' whilst taking on additional conceptual values unique to Biopower. It is at this distinctive point in the conceptual architecture that it becomes possible to understand problems like epidemics and endemics, and the need for regulatory apparatuses.

'The subject' is no longer conceptualised primarily as a potentially calculable individual, but first and foremost as a biological entity forming part of a species body, susceptible to a myriad of aleatory biological risk factors. The possibility of even marginally deviant conduct can put the entire population at risk for epidemics or endemics. Thus, reliance on the subject's calculability is insufficient to address these risk factors.

[85] Closed institutions like schools and prisons were rendered inept at addressing the problems specific to the population due to the fact that disciplinary knowledge did not pertain to the entire 'species body', and the impossibility of disciplinary *dispositifs* to generate predictability in the population due to the limits of disciplinary knowledge. The inadequacy of disciplinary *dispositifs* in addressing problems not pertaining to conduct, and the physical restrictions of closed institutions, also restricted their capacity to address problems affecting the entire species body.

'The norm' retains its conceptual content as a barometer for the measurement of conduct. However, unlike disciplinary apparatuses, regulatory apparatuses do not rely on cultivating calculable conduct in subjects according to established norms. Unlike disciplinary society, systems of Biopower supplement established disciplinary apparatuses with regulatory apparatuses to achieve the desired levels of production and prediction, because problems pertaining specifically to the population as a 'species body' cannot be addressed purely through reliance on calculable conduct of individual subjects. The introduction of statistical methods allowed for a conceptualisation of 'the norm' based on averages within data sets. However, statistics merely describe trends and patterns, and do not prescribe acceptable parameters of conduct in the way that 'the norm' as an apparatus of Disciplinary Power does.[86]

Maintaining a productive population remains a primary objective of Biopower and Biopolitics. The development of new knowledges in the human and physical sciences regarding mortality, natality, public health, and epidemiology entailed changes in the understanding of the kinds of conditions that make maximum productivity possible. These knowledges introduced the idea that production is dependent on an overall level of health in a population (among other factors). 'Production' could no longer be assured by appealing to the subjective capacities of the individual, because the risks posed by factors such as epidemics could threaten not only the productive capacity of the individual, but that of the entire population. These risks could not be comprehensively addressed by means of any of the disciplinary apparatuses discussed in chapter two. They required a new set of apparatuses, which Foucault labels 'regulatory'. By supplementing disciplinary apparatuses with regulatory apparatuses that function explicitly at the level of the population as a species body, production can be maximised and assured with a greater degree of certainty.

The mobile term 'population' extends beyond the sense of a multiplicity of individual subjects to pertain to a singular, but passive, species body. Once again, this is not to say that Biopower disregards the individuals making up a population, nor does it mean that apparatuses geared towards these individuals are dispensed with. On the contrary, they combine to form what

[86] Mark Kelly (2019: 14-15) cautions against equating Foucault's understanding of the norm with industrial standardisation, as Foucault's term is explicitly geared towards "providing an optimal model in relation to 'people, movements, and actions'". This indicates that, although the mobile term "the norm" has been imbued with conceptual content related to the description of statistical trends, Foucault's own use of the term remains closely related to the prescription of human conduct. In *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978: 63), Foucault argues that the 'normal' evinced in statistical analysis allows for a 'norm' to be deduced from a statistical mean average. The statistical norm becomes fixed and only plays an operational role, implying that the norm of statistics is merely a description. However, Foucault remains open to the possibility that a prescriptive norm might be derived from the descriptive 'norm' of statistical data.

Foucault calls the 'anatomo-political' dimension of Biopower. The new developments in the natural sciences addressing epidemics, public health, nutrition, mortality, and similar population-specific problems all contribute to the conceptual transformation of 'population', from designating a multiplicity of subjects to designating a singular 'species body' predisposed to problems and risks that cannot be addressed completely through an appeal to individual subjectivity. For this reason, apparatuses of regulation became prominent. To the extent that apparatuses of regulation did not consider the possibility that the population could regulate itself, the species body was considered passive. Foucault's conceptualisation of Neoliberal Governmentality operates with the understanding that 'population' has an inherent capacity for self-regulation. The mobile term 'population' would be reconceptualised accordingly within the framework of Neoliberal Governmentality to be discussed in the next chapter. Changes in Foucault's conceptualisation of 'population' within Neoliberal Governmentality would result in concomitant changes in other mobile terms: 'predictability', 'the subject', and 'production'. Chapter five explores Foucault's theory of Governmentality, and discusses the changes in relevant mobile terms that accompany the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality.

Conclusion

Foucault's turn to Biopower and the emergence of a regulatory *dispositif* is indicative of a radical shift in the conceptual architecture. The mobile term 'population' transforms with changes in the targets of interventions from a multiplicity of individual subjects to a species body. This transformation meant that *dispositifs* had to attain additional functions that were not present in the classical conceptualisation of Disciplinary Power or Biopower. Discipline is informed by knowledges of human conduct, and restricted by a focus on conduct in closed institutions. The emergence of natural and human sciences pertaining to the species body necessitated the imposition of *dispositifs* on the 'species body' delineated by the parameters of territory. The next chapter explores Foucault's concept of Governmentality and the transformations in the mobile terms that accompany the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality. I will investigate the extent to which his genealogical work can be successfully reframed and reformulated in the framework of Governmentality as the 'conduct of conduct'.

Chapter Five

Governmentality: The Conduct of Conduct

Subsequent to his work on Biopower, Foucault's thought developed in the direction of a study of what he would call 'Governmentality'. Acts of government always featured in Foucault's work on power-knowledge, but they take centre stage in his analysis in the course of the lecture series entitled *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978). In *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-1979), Foucault broke new ground by reworking his entire genealogical project, placing it within the framework of the 'conduct of conduct'. If Pastoral Power is a point of departure for Foucault's timeline of Western power-knowledge, then Governmentality functions as both a reworking of his entire genealogy, and chronological successor to his genealogical timeline. Thomas Lemke (2013: 38-41) proposes a novel distinction between Governmentality in the 'broad sense' designating all governance as a conduct of conduct, and a 'specific sense' referring to government focused on 'population'. Instead of Lemke's proposed dual-factor reading of Governmentality, this chapter proposes to analyse Governmentality in three dimensions, each enveloping the dimension superseding it temporally. Each successive dimension of Governmentality is prefigured by the previous dimension, and yet distinguishes itself from the preceding one by adding new and specific parameters to an understanding of government as 'conduct of conduct'.

The Three-Dimensional Model of Governmentality, and the Role of the Mobile Terms

The three-dimensional model of Governmentality that I would like to develop here consists, firstly, of a 'general' dimension, referring to an umbrella framework through which to view the entire history of governance from sovereign government over territory to contemporary Neoliberal Governmentality. [87] Secondly, it consists of a 'specific' dimension which refers to

[87] Foucault omits the 'neo' from most of his lectures published under the title of in *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978); however, he introduces it in the lectures on *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-1979) during the following year. Most contemporary Governmentality studies focus on Neoliberal Governmentality which can be seen as an expanded version of classical liberal Governmentality. A simple distinction between classical liberal Governmentality and Neoliberal Governmentality would have it that Neo-liberal Governmentality expands on the liberal focus on, and apparatuses geared towards, the economy by applying principles of liberal economics to other aspects of life. Neoliberalism is concerned with 'human capital', including skills, labour, and social status: "… the neo-liberals say that labor was in principle part of economic analysis, but the way in which classical economic analysis was conducted was incapable of dealing with this element. … … [neoliberals] are led to study the way in which human capital is formed and accumulated, and this enables them to apply economic analyses to completely new fields and domains" (Foucault, 1978-1979: 227). An easy distinction between classical liberal Governmentality, and the emergence of neo-liberal governmentality, can be found in Benda Hofmeyr's 'The

all forms of government focusing on 'population', regardless of their specific conceptualisations. The 'specific' dimension of Governmentality emerges with the Christian pastorate, and consists primarily of proto-productive and productive approaches to government. The new third dimension emerges with neoliberal Governmentality, and functions with a conceptualisation of 'population' as a subject-object capable of self-regulation. This form of Governmentality functions with apparatuses of security, and frequently works with the notion of 'natural' phenomena in the population such as agriculture, economics, and the desire of the individual to prosper, to maintain predictability. Thus, each dimension of Governmentality relates to the conceptual architecture in different and specific ways. The first, 'general', dimension contains all the conceptualisations of the mobile terms, because it includes both repressive and productive forms of government. The second, 'specific', dimension encompasses the emergence of productive and proto-productive power. The third dimension, that of Neoliberal Governmentality, is characterised by new conceptualisations of the key terms - 'population' understood as a subject-object, 'production' beholden to the capacity for self-regulation on the part of the population, and 'prediction' relying on the 'natural', internal processes of the population to render it predictable.

This chapter will start by examining what Foucault understood the verbs 'to conduct' and 'to govern' to entail. I will consider Lemke's dual-factor reading of 'Governmentality', and explain why it is lacking in complexity. I will offer a three-dimensional model of 'Governmentality', in which the third dimension refers to Neoliberal Governmentality as logically following from the second, 'specific' dimension; and I will analyse the attendant transformations of specific mobile terms.

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culture and subjectivity of neo-liberal Governmentality' (2011: 20). Accordingly, neo-liberal Governmentality expands on liberal attitudes toward, and apparatuses of control of, the economy, by applying techniques to subject the political sphere, and every other aspect of contemporary existence, to the economic rationality of liberal Governmentality. In short, it is the expansion of liberal economic rationale, into the sphere of the subject, its conduct, public health, the population, etc. Hofmeyr concurs with David Harvey (2005: 3) who argues that neoliberalism "values market exchange as 'an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action". Jason Read writes that in neoliberalism:

> Everything for which human beings attempt to realize their ends, from marriage, to crime, to expenditures on children, can be understood "economically" according to a particular calculation of cost for benefit. Secondly, this entails a massive redefinition of "labor" and the "worker." (Read, 2009: 5).

'Government' and 'Conduct'

Before discussing Governmentality, we have to unpack Foucault's understanding of what it means 'to govern'. He points out that "to govern", prior to the sixteenth century, was understood in a myriad of different non-political ways (1977-1978: 122). The meanings of acts of governing included "movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity". Thus, 'to govern' does not refer to the governing of a state, a territory, or a political structure. Instead, governance pertains to "people, individuals, or groups" (1977-1978: 122).[88]

What remains constant in the act of governing is its focus on directing conduct. The verb 'to conduct' shares certain features with the verb 'to govern' (Foucault 2020: 341). To 'conduct', Foucault suggests, could refer to the act of leading others or "a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities". For Foucault, power itself is the 'conduct of conduct' and a management of different possibilities of/for conduct. Foucault develops his interpretation of what it means 'to govern' along the lines of two prongs. The first prong consists of the conduct of the self; and the second prong consists of the act of conducting the activities of others. Accordingly, power is understood as the 'conduct of conduct', as the management of the possibilities of the conduct of others, thereby conducting their conduct. In the same passage of 'The Subject and Power', Foucault describes the exercise of power as a kind of 'government', not necessarily implying state policy, action, or intervention. Foucault's discussion of the word 'government' here retains the sense of the etymology of the verb 'to govern'. Notably, 'to govern' can be understood as limiting, structuring, and delineating the possibilities of the fields of possible action of others. Governance is thus placed within the framework of power relations, not requiring state intervention. However, the proliferation of state actions has drawn many contemporary power relations under state control (Foucault: 2020: 345). It is with the proliferation of state controls, Foucault argues, that contemporary power relations have become increasingly "governmentalized". However, he notes that in linking the state to government, one should employ the 'restricted' definition of government, in the sense of an imposition of control by the state over the population and individuals. It is this more 'restricted' contemporary understanding of government as linked to state action that informs most, but not all, of

[88] Foucault (1977-1978: 122-123) argues that the understanding of governance pertaining to people cannot be traced back to the Greeks, who did not seem to think of governance in this way. Instead, Foucault argues that the idea of governance pertaining exclusively to people emerged in the Mediterranean East, including Egypt, Assyria, and Mesopotamia.

Foucault's uses of the term in his discussions of contemporary state and Neoliberal Governmentality.

Lemke's Two-Pronged Governmentality

The argument for a three-dimensional approach to Governmentality is both inspired by, and responding to, Thomas Lemke's dual-factor understanding of Foucault's 'Governmentality'. In Lemke's explication, 'Governmentality' stands both as a general 'broad' term for governance, and a 'specific' term focused on 'population'. According to Lemke (2012: 3), Foucault's conceptualisation of Governmentality provided a guideline for reframing his "genealogies of power" with reference to the 'general' kind of Governmentality. In the 'broad sense' "'governmentality' denotes power relations in general" (Lemke, 2013: 38). Comparing Foucault's work on Governmentality to his earlier genealogical work, it becomes apparent that Governmentality does indeed provide a framework for his genealogical timeline. This reframing is restricted to the 'general' understanding of Governmentality, though the 'specific' definition implies a focus on population, excluding sovereign governance over territory.

Foucault's own remarks on Governmentality are not entirely clear. It seems that Foucault uses the term as a general umbrella term for all forms of power geared towards the 'conduct of conduct', whilst simultaneously implying a succession from earlier to later forms of power and a preoccupation with 'population'. Therefore, it appears that Governmentality is instated as a new framework for his genealogical work on power while at the same time forming part of it.

Lemke (2013: 38) suggests that Foucault had a dual-factorial understanding of Governmentality, to be broadly delineated as a "broad sense" on the one hand and a "more specific sense" on the other. The broad definition of Governmentality refers to "governing" as a "conduct of conduct", and "designates rationalities and technologies that seek to guide human beings". 'Broad sense' Governmentality refers to "power relations in general", serving as an analytical grid for analysing power relations.

With the 'general' understanding of Governmentality, it is possible to include forms of power relations not explicitly preoccupied with population. In this 'broad' definition of Governmentality we can include apparatuses of power not geared specifically towards generating and maintaining productivity in a population (either as a multiplicity or as a 'species body'). Repressive regimes of power governing over territory, such as the juridico-legal power

of the sovereign and related forms of power operating with prohibitions can still be viewed as forms of power governing conduct through negating and repressing undesirable activity, instead of orienting activities towards a productive goal. Forms of proto-productive Pastoral Power, too, can be considered forms of Governmentality, because they were based on power relations between the shepherd and the flock, and the conduct of the individual subject, through both repressive apparatuses and productive *dispositifs*. Pastoral Power exemplified the 'conduct of conduct' not exclusive to either repression or production. The 'broad sense' of Governmentality thus includes the forms of power that Foucault discusses in his genealogical work. In this 'broad sense', Governmentality is not limited to Foucault's genealogical work on productive power, but functions as a new framework for reviewing his previous work on power, both repressive and productive.

The second 'specific sense' of Governmentality, according to Lemke, refers to:

> a quite distinct form of power. It stands for a historical process closely connected to the emergence of the modern state, the political figure of "population", and the constitution of the economy as a specific domain of reality. This process is characterized by the "pre-eminence over all other types of power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we can call 'government'. (Lemke, 2013: 38)

In the 'specific sense', "Foucault seems to endorse the idea of continuous shifts or a historical succession of sovereignty, discipline, and government" (Lemke 2013: 38-39). In this second sense of Governmentality, the term functions as more than an umbrella term for all forms of power. The focus on this second sense of Governmentality led many theorists to assume that repression and discipline under contemporary Neoliberal government are archaic and outmoded (Lemke, 2013: 39-40). An understanding of configurations of power in historical succession, from Christian Pastoral Power to Neoliberal Governmentality, would have to take account of the changes in apparatuses over time. Epistemic shifts resulting in the emergence of new apparatuses of power do not signal the complete obsolescence of the apparatuses deployed before. Apparatuses of power tend to get transferred to the new *episteme*, where they feature in auxiliary or supplementary capacities. Anatomo-political components of disciplinary apparatuses find deployment in Biopower and Biopolitics. Similarly, religious institutions do not disappear with the advent of Discipline; they contribute to the latter in rendering subjects calculable.

Foucault constructs a type of "triangle" consisting of the vertices of sovereignty, discipline, and government. Successive formations do not imply one vertex replacing the other; rather, the different forms of power and their respective apparatuses overlap and supplement each successive system. The primary focus of this 'triangle' is "population", and its primary apparatuses are apparatuses of 'security' (Foucault, 2020: 219). Governmentality does not rely exclusively on apparatuses of security, or even on productive apparatuses, but deploys a range of apparatuses, including repressive ones. Foucault uses the term *appareil* to refer to strictly governmental or state apparatuses that potentially function repressively (Bussolini, 201: 93). Governmental *appareils* are not limited to production, but can retain certain repressive elements, when such elements are required to govern the population.

Lemke maintains that apparatuses of government are not limited to production:

> Studies of governmentality tend to emphasize the "productive" side of power at the expense of investigation of the "repressive" and authoritarian mechanisms. Such works often ignore or underestimate the role of violent and "irrational" forms of politics, e.g. the mobilization of fear or seemingly "uneconomic" populist discourses. (Lemke, 2013: 40)

Lemke refers to the repressive, fear-mongering apparatuses installed in the aftermath of the September Eleven attacks as examples of contemporary Governmentality deploying repressive apparatuses. Repressive apparatuses have sometimes mistakenly been thought to have been rendered obsolete by subsequent productive forms of power.[89] Repressive apparatuses are deployed to different extents in different forms of power that are encompassed by both the 'general' and 'specific' senses of Governmentality.

The two senses of 'Governmentality' outlined by Lemke can, indeed, be identified in Foucault's later work. The 'broad sense' serves as Foucault's umbrella term for all forms of power discussed throughout his genealogical work. Under this umbrella, we can include forms of power governing over territory rather than population.

The 'specific sense' of Governmentality that pivots on the concept of 'population', on the other hand excludes Sovereign Power insofar as many forms of repressive Sovereign Power predate

[89] Lemke's argument implies that contemporary examples of governmental *appareil* are indeed sometimes intent on repression rather than production, in ways that have mistakenly been characterised as 'uneconomic'.

the concern with 'population' in a specific sense. Foucault instates 'Governmentality' to refer to three different concepts/structures/formations (Gertenbach 2012: 100). In the first of these,

> Foucault takes governmentality to refer to a certain *historical* constellation at the beginning of modernity, as it pertains to the form of the state. Here, he uses the term in contrast to the model of sovereignty on the one hand, and that of discipline on the other - concepts with which Foucault himself worked extensively and which, at least in the case of discipline, he had previously accepted as descriptions of modernity. (Gertenbach: 2012: 110; trans.)

Gertenbach's description matches Lemke's understanding of Governmentality in the 'specific sense', by situating its emergence with the modern state, with the emergence of Disciplinary Power. This second, 'specific' sense of Governmentality, apart from its focus on 'population', implies a succession, positioning Governmentality chronologically after Sovereignty and Discipline. In this scheme, Sovereign Power qualifies as Governmentality in the 'broad sense' but not in the 'specific sense'. To the extent that Lemke's 'specific' sense of 'Governmentality' stands at the end of a successive series, it no longer functions as an umbrella term for Foucault's genealogical work, but forms part of it.

Foucault's Concept of Governmentality

According to Lemke (2012: 3) the term 'Governmentality' is a neologism derived from the French term *gouvernemental*, meaning "concerning government"; the term was in use prior to Foucault's first mention of it. Foucault (1977-1978: 108-109) takes 'Governmentality' to refer to the specific ensemble of state-orientated knowledges and power relations, and the apparatuses focused on 'population' for the sake of any given form of the state, at any given period in history. This description largely fits with Lemke's 'specific' definition of Governmentality, because it implies an explicit orientation towards governing with an understanding of 'population'.

Foucault specifies 'Governmentality' as ensembles of state apparatuses that have a 'population' as their primary focus, confirming his sense of a 'specific' notion of 'Governmentality'. Given the timeline Foucault sketches, the specific conceptual content of 'population' is not covered by the 'specific' definition of Governmentality. Rather, Governmentality includes a notion of 'population', either as a flock, a multiplicity of individual subjects, or as a 'species body'.

Governmentality understood as "governing of conduct" emerged with the pastorate (Foucault, 1977-1978: 197).[90] 'Population', understood in relation to the governing and the governed, however, is always the focus of 'specific' Governmentality, even as the modalities of governing 'population' may differ.

The previous chapters have shown conceptual changes in the course of the emergence of new knowledges. None of the emerging knowledges inflecting the understanding of 'population' either affirm or negate Governmentality. Even though Foucault makes it clear that 'population' is the focus of Governmentality, it does not appear that any specific conceptualisation of 'population' is necessary for Governmentality. Instead, all that is required is that 'population' is a key focus of Governmentality. Thus, while Governmentality is focused on 'population', it is not limited to apparatuses of production or repression, and neither does it require any specific conceptualisation of 'population'. Conceptualisations of 'population' as a flock, a multiplicity, or a 'species body', all fall into the parameters that Foucault sets for 'Governmentality'.

Foucault's description of Governmentality (1977-1978: 109) encapsulates historical forms of governance in the West since the Middle Ages, to the extent that these forms of governing are geared towards a population. It seems that Foucault is indeed limiting Governmentality to a focus on 'population', and to forms of power with a primarily productive component. This suggests that Foucault did, indeed, intend to distinguish a 'specific' kind of Governmentality which is focused explicitly on 'population'. He does not however explicitly imply that Governmentality stands at the end of a historical succession of different forms of power; nor does he place 'Governmentality' in a pre-eminent position vis-à-vis its supposed historical antecedents, Sovereignty and Discipline, as Lemke would have it. In locating the origins of thought on Governmentality as far back as the Middle Ages, Foucault makes it clear that he includes in his notion of 'Governmentality' other forms of power appearing throughout the timeline of Western power-knowledge configurations, which accords with Lemke's 'general' Governmentality. In doing so, he implicitly disputes the idea that 'specific' Governmentality succeeds earlier forms of productive power. In fact, Foucault's notion of Governmentality focused on 'population' includes Pastoral, Disciplinary, and Biopower, rather than implying that Governmentality succeeds the latter; in fact, he argues that Governmentality emerged in/with Pastoral Power (1977-1978: 197). Pastoral Power, Disciplinary Power, and Biopower fit into the schema of Governmentality (both the 'general' and 'specific' dimensions), inasmuch

[90] See Stuart Elden's detailed account of the emergence of the governing of people in *Foucault's Last Decade* (2016: 95-100).

as their apparatuses are geared towards the governing of people forming part of a population. This would imply that a 'specific' Governmentality focused on 'population' includes Pastoral, Disciplinary, and Biopower, instead of succeeding them.

Even though Foucault does imply a chronological sequence in the three vertices of the triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, the 'specific' definition of Governmentality does not automatically imply that this form of power succeeds the previous ones. Two of the three sides of Foucault's triangle all share a focus on 'population'. Foucault does not imply that Governmentality based on 'population' succeeds Discipline, but that 'Governmentality' includes Discipline.

Governmentality as Three-Dimensional

However, there are grounds for arguing for a third dimension of Governmentality that follows logically from Biopower with the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality. Thus, fanning out from Lemke's two-dimensional model, I will lay out a third dimension of Governmentality that is incompatible with the 'broad' understanding of Governmentality insofar as the third dimension does not include the forms of power preceding the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality and apparatuses of security. To recall, the first dimension is the 'general' dimension indicating the understanding of 'Governmentality' as 'conduct of conduct'. The second, 'specific' dimension applies only to forms of governance geared towards a population, rather than territory. The third dimension I will propose here applies to liberal and Neoliberal Governmentality, emerging with the understanding of 'population' as a subject-object, and employing apparatuses of security. Neither the first nor second dimensions should be understood as emerging in chronological succession to the forms of power discussed in Foucault's genealogies, but the third dimension follows on from where Foucault's genealogical analysis left off.

The third dimension of Governmentality arises from an analysis of the focus on the government of 'men and things', which heralds the emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality. The governing of 'men and things' undergoes transformation in the conceptualisation of 'population'. According to Foucault, the preoccupation with 'population' emerged as a response to the Machiavellian ethic of sovereignty primarily involving governance over territory. Foucault juxtaposes the Machiavellian conceptualisation of a sovereign state governing territory (Foucault, 1977-1978: 92-96) with the discursive resistance presented by

the anti-Machiavellian "art of governance" of La Perrière and Frederick the Great (Foucault, 1977-1978: 94-101). The art of governance was conceptualised as a governance of "men and things", laying the foundations for political economy. Governance over territory, which Foucault attributes to Sovereign Power, historically precedes the emergence of Governmentality orientated towards a 'population'.[91] The rise of the art of governance, and the conceptualisation of people and things as subjects/objects of governance in 'political economy', indicate a realisation that the imposition of sovereign law over state territory proved ineffective.[92]

In giving content to the concept of 'political economy' and to the 'art of governance' as governing conduct, Foucault's work moves toward an understanding of government focused on population. Foucault's use of the terms 'men and things' (or at least the term 'men') indicates a notion of 'population' as a multiplicity of subjects. His idea that conduct must be governed implies that the subject possesses a capacity for conduct that must be individually directed.[93] However, this is not the only form of Governmentality. The 'art of governance' is related to the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality. The rise of discourses on the art of governance coincides with emergence of the concept of 'population' as integral to the well-being of the state.

This argument for a 'specific' dimension linked to the concept of population is substantiated by Foucault's argument (1977-1978: 110) that Governmentality was "born" from "the archaic model of the Christian pastorate", and that it could only have acquired its "present dimensions" due to a set of specific instruments, "the formation of which is exactly contemporaneous with the art of government, and which is called, in the old, seventeenth-and eighteenth-century sense of the word, police". Here Foucault makes it clear that 'specific' Governmentality is made possible by the apparatuses resulting from the art of governance, which had already considered 'population' in terms of 'men and things'. This is the reason why the understanding of governance prior to the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, while falling within

[91] The resulting "state of government" is no longer "essentially defined by its territoriality, but the surface it occupies, but by a mass: the mass of population, with its volume, its density, with the territory that it covers, to be sure, but only in a sense as one of its components" (Foucault, 1977-78: 221).

[92] Prior the emergence of 'Governmentality' in Foucault's work, in the second of his *Society Must Be Defended* lecture series, he identifies sovereignty as a form of power exercised over "land" and the produce of "land", rather than over "bodies" (Foucault, 1975-1976: 36). This indicates that prior to his work on Governmentality, Foucault understood Sovereign Power to be directed towards geographical territory, rather than the population or the subject.

the parameters of 'general' Governmentality, cannot coincide with the 'specific' understanding of Governmentality that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Foucault makes it clear that Governmentality is directed at the population (1977-1978: 108) in line with the 'specific' dimension of 'Governmentality'. Thus, the governmentalisation that took place during the period between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that is, preceding the emergence of the art of governance and Disciplinary Power, should be seen as a form of governance lacking the characteristics attributed to Governmentality in the 'specific' dimension – though it still falls under the 'general' description of Governmentality.

Considering that Foucault (1977-1978: 108-109) calls Governmentality the "process, or rather, the result of the process, by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 'governmentalized'", the conditions for Governmentality emerged before the discourses surrounding 'population' in the eighteenth century. Therefore, Governmentality cannot be seen as synonymous with the art of governance or the particular conceptualisation of 'population' emerging with Discipline: Governmentality, according to Foucault, emerged from processes occurring several centuries prior to the art of governance. This would confirm that Governmentality, in the 'general' dimension did not emerge with the art of governance, but overlaps with sovereign forms of power governing over territory. The discourses on the 'art of governance' and their emphasis on governing 'population' can, on the other hand, be seen as aspects of the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality. The art of governance emerged with, and resulted in, the knowledges and apparatuses that define the 'specific' form of Governmentality elaborated by Foucault (1977-1978: 108-109) for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Forms of governance not geared towards people or population should not be conflated with the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality, but fall under the 'general' dimension of Governmentality.

It was through the emergence of the problems pertaining specifically to 'population' that the art of governance transitioned from the constraints of sovereign repressive law (Foucault, 1977-1978: 103-105) towards governance that aims to instil productivity in the population. This shift was brought about, in part, by statistics focused on problems of 'population' (Foucault, 1977-1978: 104). Foucault attributes elaborations of discourses of the art of governance, itself falling within the parameters of what could be considered Governmentality, to the emergence of statistics, which he had previously related to the emergence of Biopolitics.

The similarities in Foucault's arguments pertaining to the focus on 'population' and the advent of statistics between his genealogical work and his work on Governmentality indicate an intention to explain many of the shifts explored in his earlier work in terms of Governmentality. Foucault's description of the knowledges orientating Governmentality towards problems pertaining specifically to the population (1977-1978: 103-105) is strikingly similar to the knowledges that resulted in the emergence of Biopolitics, and the move from Disciplinary Power to Biopower (Foucault, 1976: 139-145; Foucault, 1976: 64-65). The art of governance came into its own with "the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, which was linked to the abundance of money, which was itself linked in turn to the expansion of agricultural production…" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 103-104). Furthermore, "problems of population" "released" the 'art of governance' along with discourses surrounding diseases as endemics and statistics as a discipline transcending administration.[94]

Foucault reframes the movements from Sovereignty to Disciplinary Power to Biopower in terms of Governmentality and the emergence of the art of governance. This reframing omits some of the details in his previous descriptions: it does not account for the time gap between the emergence of Discipline as an anatomo-politics, and the emergence of Biopolitics, but compresses these two moments into a single shift away from Sovereignty. However, Foucault had by this stage already provided a detailed genealogical account of these shifts in his previous work; it stands to reason that his reframing of the knowledges of population-specific risks, as they pertained to the framework of Governmentality, did not require a repeated account of the epistemic shifts from Sovereignty to Biopower.[95] In the same way that Foucault's genealogy of Biopower assumes knowledge of the archaeology of the clinic, so does his history of Governmentality assume knowledge of his genealogical work.

The "release" of the 'art of governance' corresponds to Foucault's description of statistical knowledges as they shape the forms of productive power concerned with population as a 'species body'. My argument is not that Foucault's description of the 'art of governance' and

[94] "Statistics, which had hitherto functioned within administrative frameworks, and so in terms of functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents. Statistics also shows that the population also involves specific, aggregate effects and that these phenomena are irreducible to those of the family: major epidemics, endemic expansion, the spiral of labour and wealth. Statistics [further] shows that, through its movements, its customs, and its activity, population has specific economic effects. Statistics enables the specific phenomena of population to be quantified and thereby reveals that this specificity is irreducible [to the] small framework of the family." (Foucault 1977-1978: 104)

[95] Statistics is an apparatus of state power, as both *dispositif* and *appareil*. Foucault clarifies that 'statistics' means "the science of state" (2020: 212).

the preoccupation with 'population' is an exact rewriting of his genealogical work. Rather, it is that Foucault's notion of government focused on 'population' reconceptualises the shifts from Sovereignty to Discipline to Biopower highlighted in his genealogies of power within the framework of Governmentality. Furthermore, the shift from governance according to territory to governance according to population coincides with the emergence of the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality. The emergence of 'specific' Governmentality corresponds to the move from repressive forms of Sovereign Power to productive power. The symmetry in these twin emergences is evident in Foucault's argument that:

> population will appear above all as the final end of government. What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health. And the instruments that government will use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region of activity. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 105)

Here we see that the government emerging from the 'art of governance' is purely focused on harnessing and maintaining productive subjects, without any reference to repression. This does not mean that apparatuses of repression disappeared altogether, but that the primary power-knowledge relations of the 'art of governance' were orientated towards reinforcing productivity. Productive incentives are aimed at an increase of wealth. The specifically biopolitical nature of this shift is evident in the promotion of longevity in the population, the preoccupation with wealth, and the stimulation of birth rates. The techniques mentioned by Foucault, both those acting directly and those acting indirectly, do not pertain only to the individual, but to the entire population.

Foucault's articulation of the emergence of the 'art of governance' and the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality is closely related to his study of the knowledges[96] of Biopolitics. He is reframing the shifts from repressive to productive power that were the focus of his genealogical

[96] Foucault's work on the emergence of knowledges in this new framework did not do away with the power-knowledge coupling. He attributes the developing knowledges regarding 'population', such as concerns for health and longevity, to the emergence of state knowledge regarding 'political economy', focused on the multiple relations between population, health, territory, and wealth. "The constitution of knowledge [*savoir*] of government is absolutely inseparable from that of a knowledge of all the processes related to population" (Foucault, 2020: 217).

work in the terms of Governmentality. It is thereby possible to read Foucault's genealogical work in line with 'general' Governmentality, and to see the emergence of the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality in tandem with the emergence of productive power.[97]

Neoliberal Governmentality as the Third Dimension

Foucault's work on Governmentality includes his investigations of liberal and Neoliberal Governmentality, representative of, what I argue is, the third dimension of Governmentality. This dimension refers to the mode of governing that emerged after Sovereignty and Discipline. In Neoliberal Governmentality we find a final shift in the conceptual architecture indicated by the mobile terms. The most dramatic conceptual transformation can be found in the conceptualisation of 'population' from a purely passive 'species body' to a subject-object capable of self-regulation.

For Foucault, Neoliberal Governmentality entails the end of the tensions between the market and government on which Keynes had still based the call for government intervention in the market, and the beginning of conditions where governments sought to accommodate the market by ensuring the conditions for the functioning of the market (Gertenbach, 2012: 121; trans.): Lars Gertenbach interprets the reconfigured relation between government and economy underlying Foucault's concept of Neoliberal Governmentality as follows:

> [T]he economy is no longer an instrument in the service of society, but society is supposed to obey the imperatives of the economy. Even economic growth is no longer considered a means in the sense of the specifically modern promise of increasing individual and collective autonomy, but becomes an end in itself, to which social institutions and individual aspirations have to subordinate themselves. (Gertenbach, 2012: 122; trans.)

The new relationship between governance and the market requires a transformation in the way 'population' ought to be understood and governed. Foucault's concept of Neoliberal

[97]These similarities are echoed by Lemke (2014: 13-15): the integration of Biopower into the framework of governance facilitated an expansion of Foucault's focus on power and knowledge beyond purely biological parameters. The concept of Biopolitics itself, according to Lemke, is replaced in Foucault's work by the government of 'men and things'. The latter accounts for the "interrelatedness and entanglements of men and things, the natural and the artificial, the physical and the moral" (Lemke, 2014: 14). This substitution of a more nuanced understanding of Biopolitics as the art of governance indicates that the framework of Governmentality functions as a reworking of Foucault's previous reflections on Biopower.

Governmentality entails a shift in his understanding of 'population': population is no longer a passive object of regulation. With the introduction of apparatuses of security (Foucault 1977-1978: 1-49), theoretically and historically-politically, 'population' attains a level of subjectivity that distinguishes it from its previous role as a passive object of Biopolitics and regulation (Foucault 1977-1978: 11).[98] Foucault distinguishes between biopolitical regulation and apparatuses of security: the latter are not imposed on a passive 'population', but allow for a self-cancellation of negative effects in 'population' through the population's own capacity to regulate itself (Foucault, 1977-1978: 66).

There are indications that Foucault himself was wrestling with the potentially active capacity of a population prior to his turn towards Governmentality and apparatuses of security. Hoffman (2014: 100) argues that there were two indicators, prior to the lectures on *Security, Territory, Population*, of a change in Foucault's own understanding of 'population' from a passive object to a 'subject-object' with the capacity for self-regulation. The first was a lecture delivered at the University of Bahia in November of 1976 entitled 'The Meshes of Power'. In this lecture, Foucault states that population is not a mere group of humans "but living beings, traversed, commanded, ruled by processes and biological laws". This definition indicates that the population itself, not just the individual subjects in the population, is/are ruled and commanded by a set of biological laws, implying that the population must possess some capacity for activity that cannot be reduced to that of the individual subject. If the population has a capacity for some level of activity, it can no longer be conceptualised as a passive object of biopolitical regulatory apparatuses, but must be understood as being endowed with a capacity of internal regulation that is not entirely dependent on the imposition of external regulations.

A second indicator that Foucault started to conceptualise 'population' as more than a passive object can be found in his distinction between 'population' and 'people' in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1:

> One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labour capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceive that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people",

[98] This point is also highlighted in Marcelo Hoffman's (2014: 101-106) argument that Foucault's apparatuses of security are geared towards the 'population', and account for the population's capacity for self-regulation.

> but with a "population", with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation. (Foucault, 1976: 25)

This quote makes 'population' the explicit focus of government, and attributes to it a specific category of variables irreducible to the conduct of individual subjects. Many of these same variables would later involve factors indicating more than passivity on the part of the population, including factors pertaining to diet and habitation. Factors like diet, space, and scarcity eventually lead Foucault to the realisation that the population possesses a 'natural' capacity for self-regulation, challenging the necessity of regulatory apparatuses.

The realisation that the population is endowed with 'natural' capacities for self-regulation takes full effect in Foucault's thinking with the *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978) lectures, where he starts conceptualising government as the 'conduct of conduct' and shows an explicit change in his conceptualisation of 'population'. Hoffman (2014: 102) notes that Biopolitics ceased to occupy a prominent place, making way for a much more nuanced analysis of governance corresponding to 'population'. Foucault identifies two interrelated techniques of power focused on 'population'. The first one is 'police', correlative to *raison d'état* (reason of state) Governmentality, and the second one 'security', correlative to liberal Governmentality. Whereas police[99] was geared towards imposing rules and laws on the population (Foucault, 2020: 416) to increase wealth and longevity, security spurred the population on to regulate itself without imposing external regulatory apparatuses. To the extent that the regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics are said to entail a form of regulation akin to 'policing', Foucault's work on Biopolitics was trapped in a kind of "police reasoning" (Hoffman 2014: 102). The biopolitical model failed to consider the internal capacity for self-regulation inherent in a population. This reflects a change in Foucault's own conceptualisation of 'population' from a purely passive object to a 'subject-object' which can simultaneously be an object of regulation, and a subject that regulates itself independently. The conceptualisation of 'population' as a subject-object entails both an object of apparatuses of power, and a subject which is expected to conduct itself correctly (Lemke 2014: 9). It is with the understanding of the population as a subject-object that Foucault introduces the idea/concept of apparatuses of 'security'.

[99] Foucault (2020: 403-417) describes 'reason of state' and police elaborated by Turquet de Mayerne, De Lamare, and Von Justi as apparatuses designed to act on all facets of the lives of individuals and of the state, with the purpose of strengthening state power and enhancing resources.

Foucault's use of the term 'security' in this instance differs from his earlier deployment of the term. 'Security' used synonymously with 'regulation', as it appears in the last lecture of *Society Must Be Defended* (1976), implies that 'security' pertained primarily to the biological existence of the population as a passive object. However, Foucault's use of the term 'security' changes in *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978). Security apparatuses, as Foucault conceptualised them in *Security, Territory, Population*, ensured the longevity of a population by focusing on the internal processes influencing the population, rather than imposing preventive regulatory apparatuses.[100] Apparatuses of security take into account the internal processes of self-regulation, which, according to Foucault, are 'natural' to the population, bearing in mind the political economy of 'men and things'.

The idea of a 'natural' set of phenomena inherent in the population arises within the economic doctrine of the Physiocrats, specifically Francois Quesnay's article 'Hommes' (written in 1756 and published in 1888).[101]

> Now with the physiocrats and, more generally, with the eighteenth century economists, I think the population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as a collection of subject wills who must obey the sovereign's will through the intermediary of regulations, laws, edicts, and so on. It will be considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 70)

Foucault uses the term "naturalness" to refer to the accumulation of processes in a population that the Physiocrats considered natural. The "naturalness" of population, firstly, refers to the realisation that 'population' encompasses/designates more than just the sum of individuals that occupy a specific territory, and that it is subject to variables and internal processes such as climate, taxes, economics, marriage rituals, customs, and means of subsistence (Foucault, 1977-1978: 70-71). These variables render ineffective or impossible any sovereign decree that aims to impose regulations upon the population. "If one says to a population 'do this,' there is not only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do

[100] "These mechanisms do not tend to a nullification of phenomena in the form of prohibition, 'you will not do this', nor even, 'this will not happen', but in the form of a progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves." (Foucault 1977-1978: 66)

[101] The article was originally intended for publication in Diderot's and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* Vol. VIII, but in 1759, governmental permission for the publication was withdrawn. The article was published in 1888 by August Oncken as part of Quesnay's '*Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques'* (Sakato, 1971: 21).

it" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 71). The population is imbued with 'natural' phenomena; that does not put it outside of the purview of governance, but changes the approach to the way it is to be governed. This is where the physiocratic approach to scarcity becomes relevant, taking into consideration, as it does, the variables inherent in the population in relation to the available resources.

> [A]bove all, if one wants to encourage population, or achieve the right relationship between the population and the state's resources and possibilities, then one must act on a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate behaviour, fecundity, and desire to reproduce… In any case, it is possible to act effectively on the population through the interplay of all these remote factors. So you can see that a completely different technique is emerging that is not getting subjects to obey the sovereign's will, but having a hold on things that seem far removed from the population, but which, through calculation, analysis, and reflection, one knows can really have an effect on it. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 71-72)

Secondly, the 'naturalness' of the population indicates that the actions of individuals in a population cannot be altogether predicted, but that the population as a whole contains the internal attribute of 'desire' for the satisfaction of the subject's self-interest, which guides the conduct of individuals. If government were to allow for this desire to guide the conduct of individuals, within the constraints of the other restrictions and conditions in a population, the result will be of benefit to the overall population (Foucault, 1977-1978, 72-73).

> The production of the collective interest through the play of desire is what distinguishes both the naturalness of population and the possible artificiality of the means one adopts to manage it. This is important because you can see that with this idea of a management of populations on the basis of the naturalness of their desire, and of the spontaneous production of the collective interest by desire, we have something that is completely the opposite of the old ethical-juridical conception of government and the exercise of sovereignty. (Foucault, 1977-1978, 73)

Unlike modes of government that impose restrictions and regulations on the population, apparatuses of security guide the 'natural processes' in the population, including the desires of the individual, in order to guarantee a level of predictability relative to this 'naturalness'.

According to physiocratic doctrine, desire (which Foucault refers to as the individual's pursuit of its own interests) must be guided and encouraged so that this desire can "produce its necessary beneficial effects*" to the population* (Foucault, 1977-1978: 73, Italics mine).

Finally, "naturalness" refers to the fact that the population is dependent on a variety of "modifiable variables", that is, irregularities such as chance, individual conduct, or accidents. However, with the introduction of mortality tables in the late seventeenth century, these variables would come to be considered regular, inasmuch as mortality rates between men and women, the city and the countryside, and children and adults, appear "regular". The population is revealed to be "a set of elements in which we can note constants and regularities even in accidents, in which we can identify the universal of desire regularly producing the benefit of all, and with regard to which we can identify a number of modifiable variables on which it depends" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 74).[102]

The concept of "naturalness" is integral to governance through security apparatuses attending the political economy of 'men and things'. The understanding of political economy as 'men and things' facilitates the conceptualisation of the population as a subject-object:

> [W]hen it became possible not only to introduce population into the field of economic theory, but also into economic practice, when it became possible to introduce into the analysis of wealth this new subject, this new subject-object, with its demographic aspects, but also with the aspect of the specific role of producers and consumers, owners and non-owners, those who create profit and those who take it, when the entry of this subject-object, of population, became possible within the analysis of wealth, with all its disruptive effects in the field of economic reflection and practice, then I think the result was that one ceased analyzing wealth and a new domain of knowledge, political economy, was opened up. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 76-77)

[102] The constants and regularities of natural cycles inherent in the population, as conceptualised by the physiocrats, bear some similarity with the oscillation between "progressive" periods of prosperity and "retrograde" periods of hardship noted by Malthus (1826: 19-23). Malthus observed that the population is subject to inherent cycles that can be predicted through statistics. However, it should be noted that the Malthusian project, in an attempt to establish predictability in the population, would recommend both individual discipline and the imposition of regulatory measures not dissimilar to what Foucault would (in *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1) conceptualise as regulatory apparatuses.

The focus on political economy of 'men and things' is evinced in the physiocratic doctrine of Quesnay, who consistently argued that "real economic government was government that concerned itself with the population" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 77).[103] The doctrine of the Physiocrats represents a new approach to government predicated on the 'natural' phenomena said to be occurring within the population. The 'natural' phenomena in a population signify benefits accrued through free trade and the desires of self-interest on the part of the subject (Hoffman, 2014: 105).

> [T]he entry of a "nature" into the field of techniques of power, of a nature that is not something on which, above which, or against which the sovereign must impose just laws. There is not nature and then, above nature and against it, the sovereign and the relationship of obedience that is owed to him. We have a population whose nature is such that the sovereign must deploy reflected procedures of government within this nature, with the help of it, and with regard to it. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 75)

Apparatuses of security are geared towards allowing a population to regulate itself. Instead of imposing external regulatory apparatuses, apparatuses of security guide processes inherent in the population for the population to regulate itself.[104] The conceptualisation of a population that includes 'natural' phenomena changes the understanding of security apparatuses: the latter would have to take account of and work with the 'natural' events occurring in a population, to the advantage of the population. While regulatory apparatuses operate on the population as a 'species body' by *controlling* the population and its inherent aleatory risk factors through the imposition of external regulations, apparatuses of security focus on 'natural' phenomena as a

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[103] At a later stage, Foucault adds civil society as a domain of this "naturalness" as opposed to the artificial governance by police (Foucault, 1977-1978: 349). Civil society, for Foucault, occupied a space between the artificiality (in the sense that it breaks with previous cosmological and theological frameworks of government) of police politics, and the naturalness of a population: "Society as a specific field of naturalness peculiar to man, and which will be called civil society, emerges as the vis-à-vis of the state. What is civil society if not, precisely, something that cannot be thought of as simply the product and result of the state? But neither is it something like man's natural existence. Civil society is what governmental thought, the new form of Governmentality born in the eighteenth century, reveals as the necessary correlate of the state" (Foucault, 1977-1978: 349-350). Civil society, in this historical-political elaboration, is not altogether 'natural', nor all together 'artificial', but a form of consociation endowed with the capacity to self-regulate. Civil society relies on the 'natural' processes of the population to ensure a higher level of predictability in society. On the other hand, this 'naturalness' is contingent on security; but security in this sense functions without imposing the kinds of regulations that characterise a police state.

[104] Hoffman (2014: 104) argues that Foucault's conceptualisation of 'population' in *Security, Territory, Population* expanded from an initial focus on phenomena such as epidemics and public health to include phenomena that are not strictly linked to biology, such as economics, which had significant implications for his articulation of the "workings and modality of power appropriate for population".

means to achieve predictability, rather than imposing regulations on the population with the aim of curbing aleatory events.

Security and the Mobile Terms

Foucault's descriptions of apparatuses of security indicate a final shift in the mobile terms, especially in the terms 'population' and 'predictability'. The new strategy of relying on self-regulation results from a new way of ensuring 'predictability'. Unlike regulatory apparatuses, security apparatuses operate with a conceptualisation of the population as capable of achieving predictability without the constant intrusive imposition of external regulation. The mobile term 'prediction' attains new salience with the understanding that the population can be relied upon to regulate itself.

The notion that 'population' is endowed with subjectivity also has implications for the understanding of the relationship between the State and the population. The State could no longer be seen to act in a sovereign capacity by imposing regulatory apparatuses that do not attribute *agency* to the population. The imposition of regulatory strategies was not effective in dealing with the variables of population, like climate, law, and monetary flow in a manner that could promise to ensure prosperity and predictability (Hoffman, 2014: 104).[105] Neoliberal Governmentality generates predictability by allowing the subject's individual desire to contribute to the overall good of the population. A component of the conceptualisation of the subject guided by its desires in Neoliberal Governmentality can be found in Foucault's account of the self-interested and entrepreneurial aspects of *homo oeconomicus* in *The Birth of Biopolitics*:

> Homo œconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is true to the extent that, in practice, the stake in all neo-liberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo œconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo œconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his

[105] Foucault (1977-1978: 71): "If one says to the population "do this", there is not only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it. If we restrict ourselves to the sovereign-subject relationship, the limit of the law is the subject's disobedience; it is the "no" with which the subject opposes the sovereign."

> own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings. (Foucault, 1978-1979: 226)

The conceptualisation of the subject of neoliberalism can be seen as imbued with the entrepreneurial capacities of *homo oeconomicus*. Neoliberal Governmentality functions with the understanding that political economy[106], focused on 'men and things', depends on 'the subject' deploying its skills and desires in a manner that supports the 'naturalness' of the 'population'. 'The subject' can be understood as entrepreneurial[107] by virtue of its self-directedness and desires (to work towards its own self-interest), and its participation in civil society.[108] The conduct of the subject of Neoliberal Governmentality can be said to be rendered calculable to the extent that the subject follows its desires in line with what is permissible in society. Whereas the conduct of the subject of Discipline was rendered calculable to the extent that it conforms to the norm,[109] the conduct of the neoliberal subject is rendered calculable by its self-directedness and desire to achieve its own self-interest.

The understanding of a 'naturalness' of the population linked to the self-directedness of the subject opens up a new kind of predictability in the population. The neoliberal 'population' is conceptualised as having its own predictability contingent on overall economic processes, and

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[106]Foucault unpacks the various understandings of political economy: "The very ambiguities of the term "political economy," and of its meaning at this time, indicate what was basically at issue in all this, since you know that between 1750 and 1810–1820 the expression "political economy" oscillates between two semantic poles. Sometimes this expression aims at a particular strict and limited analysis of the production and circulation of wealth. (Foucault, 1978-1979: 13). The "first political economy was, of course, that of the physiocrats", who understood that "political power must be power without external limitation. 'Political economy' analyses governmental practice according to the effects of these practices. "Political economy revealed the existence of phenomena, processes, and regularities that necessarily occur as a result of intelligible mechanisms. These intelligible and necessary mechanisms may, of course, be impeded by the practices of some forms of governmentality. They may be impeded, jammed, or obscured, but they cannot be avoided, and it will not be possible to suspend them totally and definitively. In any case, they will force a reappraisal of governmental practice. In other words, political economy does not discover natural rights that exist prior to the exercise of governmentality; it discovers a certain naturalness specific to the practice of government itself. The objects of governmental action have a specific nature. There is a nature specific to this governmental action itself and this is what political economy will study." (1978-1979: 15)

[107] This conceptualisation of the subject in Neoliberalism is echoed by David Harvey:

> Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. (Harvey, 2005: 2).

[108] It is the interplay between the self-interest of the neoliberal subject, and its capitalisation by neoliberal economics, that is taken up by contemporary Governmentality studies, notably by Andrew Barry, Nikolas Rose, and Thomas Osborne (1996).

[109] See Chapter Two.

the subjects governed by desire and self-interest that stimulate the natural processes in the population. To this effect, each individual within the population must be free to pursue their self-interests. If the 'natural' phenomena in a population are guided, and if subjects are allowed to follow their desires within the framework of political economy, the population is rendered predictable.

The 'natural' processes of the population must be allowed to unfold without external imposition of regulations, in order for predictions to be made based upon 'naturalness'. Neoliberal Governmentality, in relying on the population's 'naturalness', must allow the population a level of freedom previously inhibited by the regulatory apparatuses of Biopolitics. Within the new conceptualisation of 'population', security apparatuses guide the 'natural' processes inherent in 'population', with the understanding that the best form of governance affords the subject and the population a degree of freedom.[110] This includes the freedom of refusal – which would incur unfreedom:

> The people comprise those who conduct themselves in relation to the management of the population, at the level of population, as if they were not part of the population as a collective subject-object, as if they put themselves outside of it, and consequently the people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system. (Foucault, 1977-1978: 43-44)

The freedom afforded by security depended on the 'natural' processes of the population. Groups in the population utilising their freedom in a manner presenting problems to the predictable 'natural' processes of the population would no longer be seen as part of the population. Thus, subjects who would revolt, rebel, or whose conduct would pose a potential threat to the predictability understood to arise from the population's 'naturalness' would no longer be afforded freedom. They would be reduced to 'people' who are no longer part of the population or its capacity for self-regulation. They would be considered a threat.

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[110] "An apparatus of security, in any case the one I have spoken about, cannot operate well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense [the word] acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things. I think it is this freedom of circulation, in the broad sense of the term it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses of security." (Foucault 1977-1978: 48-49)

Except for these subjects, the population under Neoliberal Governmentality is awarded a level of freedom exceeding the freedoms afforded by Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics, precisely because the 'naturalness' understood to be resulting from this freedom is what Neoliberal Governmentality requires to maintain a level of predictability in the population.

The concept of apparatuses of security forms the final vertex in the triad of productive apparatuses –disciplinary apparatuses—regulatory apparatuses—security apparatuses. Disciplinary apparatuses focus on the conduct of the individual subject by utilising its own subjective capacities, along with external constraints, to cultivate calculable subjects. Apparatuses of Biopolitics impose regulations on a population considered a passive object predisposed to a multitude of aleatory risks, to generate predictability with respect to the population. Security apparatuses, finally, operate with the understanding of the population's 'naturalness' allowing for a level of self-regulation. Guiding this 'naturalness' is the best way for Neoliberal Governmentality to ensure predictability in the population. 'Predictability', therefore, undergoes a conceptual transformation with the emergence of neoliberal apparatuses of security; in this case, it is understood to be generated through the 'natural' phenomena of the population.

The transformations in the mobile terms that can be gleaned through an analysis of Foucault's work on Neoliberal Governmentality can be summarised as follows. The mobile term 'production' retains its meaning as the primary goal of 'productive power'. The term 'production' does, however, become re-conceptualised to the extent that it is achieved by means different from those serving Biopower. In Neoliberal Governmentality, 'production' is achieved by means of stimulating the capacity of the population to regulate itself. The mobile term 'the subject' undergoes a conceptual transformation to the extent that it becomes calculable to a near-absolute degree in Neoliberal Governmentality. The subject, like the population, is conceptualised as capable of self-policing and self-regulation in the pursuit of its desires and its entrepreneurial self-interest. Regulatory apparatuses and repressive apparatuses are still deployed in Neoliberal Governmentality in the face of risk factors that cannot be addressed by relying on the 'naturalness' of a population. 'Population' changes conceptually from being a passive 'species body' without any capacity for self-regulation, to being a subject-object imbued with a set of processes that facilitate self-regulation in the face of events considered harmful to the population. 'The norm' is similar to its previous conceptualisations in Disciplinary Power and Biopower, but with the added specification that adherence to norms

renders the subject entrepreneurial and self-policing. Subjects police themselves according to the norms pertaining to self-interestedness within Neoliberal Governmentality. Finally, the mobile term 'prediction' changes to the extent that prediction is achieved primarily by guaranteeing the optimal functioning of 'natural' processes in a population. The conceptualisation of the population as a subject-object results in a different understanding of what is required to render a population predictable. Instead of assuring predictability by imposing regulations, as in Biopolitics, predictability is achieved by relying on 'natural' processes by which the population supposedly regulates itself.

Conclusion

My argument for a three-dimensional model of Governmentality is dependent on the conceptual analysis of this thesis. It is only by analysing Governmentality according to the conceptual transformation in the mobile terms within and between power-knowledge configurations, that the need for a three-dimensional model of Governmentality becomes apparent. It is only in this three-dimensional model that the changes in the mobile terms can be situated properly within Foucault's work on Governmentality. A three-dimensional approach to analysing Foucault's concept of 'Governmentality' elucidates the moves of the key terms in the conceptual architecture sketched out in this thesis. The 'general' dimension of Governmentality reframes Foucault's previous work on power in terms of the conduct of conduct. In this 'general' dimension, none of the mobile terms attain specific conceptual content, because the 'general' dimension includes both repressive and productive forms of power. The 'general' dimension of Governmentality contains all the different modes of power and governance that constitute Foucault's timeline of Western power-knowledge. The second 'specific' dimension of Governmentality emerges with the Christian pastorate, and focuses on the population. This second dimension develops from within the 'general' dimension, but the focus on population is what sets it apart from earlier forms of governance that are not centred on population. However, there is no specific conceptualisation of 'population' that is unique to the 'specific' dimension of Governmentality. The 'specific' dimension of Governmentality emerges with Pastoral Power, and continues into Neoliberal Governmentality; it encompasses forms of Governmentality falling in the parameters of proto-productive and productive power. It thus includes the various conceptualisations of 'population' from the pastoral flock to the neoliberal subject-object. The 'specific' dimension of Governmentality signals the emergence

of productive power. The third dimension of Governmentality emerges with the application of apparatuses of security in liberal and Neoliberal Governmentality. Within the third dimension we find unique conceptualisations of the mobile terms specific to Neoliberal Governmentality. 'Population' becomes conceptualised as a subject-object capable of certain levels of self-regulation independent of the implementation of external regulatory apparatuses. 'The subject' becomes conceptualised as capable of being guided by its self-interest, which will result in adherence to the norms of Neoliberal Governmentality'. 'Prediction' in the population is generated by guiding the subject's self-interest, as well as by guaranteeing the effective functioning of the 'natural' processes inherent in a population as a 'subject-object'. 'Production' becomes conceptualised as guaranteed by the 'natural' processes of a population, and 'the norm' is defined by the parameters of neoliberalism, which guides the self-interested subject to self-police its conduct in order to achieve its goals within Neoliberal Governmentality.

Conclusion

The conceptual architecture analysed in this thesis focuses on terms which become mobile, moving within and between power-knowledge configurations, while simultaneously delineating the relations between different modes of power.

The relations between power and knowledge are dynamic, and never static. For Foucault, "[t]he 'distributions of power' and the 'appropriations of knowledge' never represent only instantaneous slices"; "[r]elations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are 'matrices of transformations'" (Foucault, 1976: 99). Power and knowledge continuously change in conjunction with one another.

This thesis examined the relationship between power and knowledge, as it changes between different power-knowledge configurations. It analysed changes in the chosen mobile terms in relation to power-knowledge in terms of these dynamic, changing, interacting configurations. These configurations are located in the different modes of productive power-knowledge that I have identified in Foucault's genealogical work: Pastoral Power, Disciplinary Power, Biopower, and Neoliberal Governmentality. This thesis has argued that there are changes in power-knowledge configurations, not only *between* different modes of power, but *within* them. These changes become manifest through analysing the mobility of the operative terms 'production', 'population', 'prediction', 'the subject, and 'the norm'. The changes *between* modes of power can only be fully grasped through the mobility of the operative terms.

The conceptualisations of the operative terms are analysed first in the manner in which they *explicitly* feature in Foucault's work on specific power-knowledge configurations. In a further step, the implicit conceptualisations of these terms are gauged by examining Foucault's account of the functioning of particular apparatuses within a specific power-knowledge configuration—how these conceptualisations are 'brought into play' in the fields of power and politics.

The mobility of the selected terms lies in their ability to do specific conceptual work within and across different power-knowledge configurations, changing in their conceptual content, while retaining traces of their primary conceptualisations in other/previous power-knowledge relations. These terms take on conceptual *loads* dependent on the modes of power and knowledge in which they are deployed. In doing so, they become of crucial importance for operations of power in which they are deployed, and contribute to the functioning of apparatuses of power – the particular apparatuses deployed, the ends to which they are implemented, and the focus of their deployment.

Mobile terms form part of the internal structure of specific power-knowledge configurations and move beyond them to new structures when new forms of power-knowledge arise. For example, 'Population' acquires additional conceptual content between the emergence of Discipline and Biopower, transforming the apparatuses from exemplifying primarily disciplinary functions to a combination of disciplinary and regulatory functions. The term 'population' is significant for both Discipline and Biopower, but the conceptual content transforms the weight of the term 'population' and its interaction with other terms and concepts, the particular cast it gives to operations and apparatuses of power, and its position in the particular power-knowledge configuration.

The specific structures unique to different power-knowledge configurations require careful work of unearthing. In some instances, such as Discipline, the structures are clearly outlined and grouped together in focused works. *Discipline and Punish* provides the bulk of this picture, and selected interviews and lectures aid in elaborating on specific components of Discipline. In the case of Pastoral Power, an analytical reader is charged with navigating Foucault's entire corpus, in order to reconstruct how it operates; how, where and when it emerges; and how it contributes to an understanding of the history of productive power. The historical positioning of Pastoral Power allows for a reconstruction of the conceptual transformations that accompany the move from Pastoral Power to Discipline. Situating Pastoral Power prior to the emergence of Discipline reveals the proto-productive nature of apparatuses of Pastoral Power; it shows how apparatuses arise and transform with changes in the conceptualisations of 'the subject', 'production,' and 'population'.

Changes in the conceptualisations of mobile terms pivotal to the conceptual architecture in Foucault's work are apparent on two different levels. The first level refers to the changes in the primary conceptual content of specific terms between different power-knowledge configurations. The second level refers to the changes explicit in Foucault's own deployment of a term. In the specific instance of 'population', for instance, there is a change from Foucault's use of the term to refer to a multiplicity of individual subjects to an understanding of it as a 'species body' vulnerable to risk factors that cannot be addressed by/through the deployment of disciplinary apparatuses directed at the individual subject. The shift in Foucault's own use of the term 'population' reflects the change in the conceptualisation of 'population' between Discipline and Biopower.

The picture of a specific power-knowledge configuration extracted from Foucault's work on Pastoral Power can be substantiated by examining supplementary texts. Chapter One references the work of George Duby to support the picture of Pastoral Power present in Foucault's work. Duby's presentation of the relation between royalty and the clergy supports and supplements the argument that Pastoral Power could supplement sovereignty. Duby's work illustrates the extent of the reach of the shepherd-flock relation, wherein kings were not exempt from the authority of the Christian pastoral shepherd. The use of many such supplementary writings is not strictly necessary, because Foucault will often support his arguments with robust references to writings on (and from within) a given power-knowledge configuration. However, in certain cases using such sources can help gain a clearer picture of the operations within a specific power-knowledge configuration, and can offer support for the presentation of the structure of a specific power-knowledge configuration found in Foucault's work.

Analysing Foucault's conceptual architecture requires more than simply analysing the manner in which specific terms are deployed in his discussion of a particular power-knowledge configuration. Mobile terms feature both implicitly and explicitly in Foucault's work. In certain cases, such as the conceptualisation of 'prediction' in Pastoral Power and of 'population' in Disciplinary Power, the conceptual loads of the relative terms had to be extracted from Foucault's arguments and descriptions of the operations of power. In other instances, such as 'population' in Biopower and 'the norm' in Disciplinary Power, Foucault is explicit in spelling out his understanding of these terms relative to a specific power-knowledge configuration. The conceptual loads of mobile terms become clear from their semantic and discursive contexts, their interactions with other terms and concepts, and their roles in specific configurations of power-knowledge. Yet it is not a matter of working with only the explicit use of terms; what also needs to come into purview are the implicit assumptions about their conceptualisation, which inform their interactions with other terms and apparatuses. The challenge is to compare the implicit meaning of a specific term with the explicit use of the term in other texts. How does the implicit understanding of Foucault's use of the term 'population' in his work on Disciplinary Power relate to his explicit deployment of the term in his work on Biopower? What shifts are apparent? How do the shifts in the other mobile terms interact with those pertaining to the term 'population'? It is only by disinterring the implicit along with the explicit, that the structures of a specific power-knowledge configuration can be laid bare.

Once the structures relative to specific power-knowledge configurations are extracted, it becomes possible to compare the moves and changes in the conceptual loads of mobile terms

between different power-knowledge configurations. Only once the structures are clarified, can one analyse the moves from one power-knowledge configuration to the other. Only by uncovering the structures of Pastoral Power, and comparing them with the structures of Discipline, will it be possible to identify those components of Pastoral Power that can be said to be 'proto-productive'. It is only by understanding the conceptualisation of 'the subject' as an individual member of the flock, that one can see how this conceptualisation leads to the secular individual subject forming part of a multiplicity in Disciplinary Power.[111] Only through an understanding the conceptualisation of 'population' as a passive 'species body', does it become possible to juxtapose it with 'population' as a 'subject-object' within the structure of Neoliberal Governmentality.

By extracting and sketching out the internal structures and relations of each power-knowledge configuration, and analysing the moves in the mobile terms, it becomes possible to discern the conceptual architecture in Foucault's work on power-knowledge in general. The conceptual architecture in Foucault's work is one of moves, shifts, changes, and transformations. The mobility of the specific terms identified in this thesis allows for an analysis of the shifts in the primary conceptual content of these terms, which accompany the emergence of new apparatuses of power and new frameworks of knowledge.

The manner in which the specific power-knowledge configurations are presented at the end of each chapter, through the mobile terms, cannot be said to be exactly what Foucault intended, since the conceptual content of specific terms is examined through what is implicit in Foucault's accounts of different modes of power-knowledge. The presentation of the different mobile terms within power-knowledge configurations goes beyond what is explicitly stated by Foucault, and brings to the fore new understandings of the terms and their interrelations in different power-knowledge configurations. Tracing the mobility of the terms within power-knowledge configurations allows for new understandings of their transformations between power-knowledge configurations.

The method of analysis, as well as the tracing of the transformations in the mobile terms within and between power-knowledge configurations can contribute to the analysis of power-knowledge beyond the scope of this thesis.

[111] See Chapters One and Two.

In an interview published as 'From Torture to Cellblock', Foucault remarks that he considers all his books to be "little tool boxes" that may be deployed to "disqualify or break up the systems of power" (Foucault, 1996: 149). Likewise, this thesis has set out to provide an analytical toolbox for the analysis of operations of power and the conjunctive formations and reformations in knowledge. By sketching out the details of the different power-knowledge configurations from Pastoral Power to Neoliberal Governmentality, this thesis presents an approach to analysing moves and changes in power, knowledge, and politics, as these moves and changes continue to unfold.

I will provide one brief example couched in the events surrounding the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Chomsky and Waterstone (2021: 340) criticise the urgency of the 'reopening of the economy' in the face of lockdown measures "no matter the risks to the population" in the United States during the year 2020. There were significant social movements from groups who combatted lockdowns and stay-at-home orders, predicated on "financial insecurity, boredom, impatience, and distrust of government" (Chomsky & Waterstone, 2021: 343). Ironically, politicians in several US states encouraged these movements, and some even took to lifting lockdown restrictions before the necessary safeguards were put in place (Chomsky & Waterstone, 2021: 343).

Taking into account the method of analysis applied in this thesis, it becomes evident that the conflict described by Chomsky and Waterstone is one of diverging conceptualisations of 'population'. The appeal for an imposition of lockdown procedures to circumvent risks to the population is a biopolitical one. More specifically, it is reliant on a conceptualisation of 'population' as a species body that has to be protected from the aleatory risks presented by SARS-CoV-2. To this end, mandatory lockdown measures operate in the same way as the regulatory apparatuses of Biopower, by imposing large-scale restrictions without appeal to the calculability of the individual subject. The threat posed by reliance on individual discipline is considered too great. The conceptual content of 'population' as a species body becomes primary the moment a significant biopolitical threat to the species body emerges.

Moreover, SARS-CoV-2 presents threats to the 'predictability' of the population in a manner that cannot be completely addressed through the implementation of security apparatuses, especially since security apparatuses (in the form of 'safeguards' and response measures like medical centres and facilities to treat and contain the virus) were, at the time, not in place. In the absence of the necessary security apparatuses that would have been able to allow the

population to self-regulate with minimal interference, regulatory restrictions became imperative.

However, the Neoliberal conceptualisation of 'the subject' as a self-policing, self-determining, entrepreneurial entity stands in opposition to the imposition of large-scale regulatory apparatuses. The Neoliberal subject has been engendered to be entrepreneurial and self-policing, and thus would oppose regulatory apparatuses that appear to restrict its capacity to pursue its own self-interests. Outside of the threat of a pandemic, this impetus to be entrepreneurial and self-policing would be the ideal state for subjects within Neoliberal Governmentality. However, the insistence on self-determination by the Neoliberal subject remerges as a significant risk to the 'population' as a species body, when faced with a biopolitical threat such as SARS-CoV-2.

What is laid bare by deploying the methodological and analytical toolbox presented in this thesis, is that the conflict arising during the pandemic is due, in part, to conflicting conceptualisations of 'population' and 'the subject'; one traced back to the emergence of Biopolitics, and the other firmly located in contemporary Neoliberal Governmentality. There is an incompatibility with the Neoliberal conceptualisation of 'the subject' and the deployment of regulatory apparatuses that impose large-scale restrictions on the 'population' as a species body. The Neoliberal subject reacts to regulatory apparatuses with 'impatience' and 'distrust' and prioritises its own 'boredom', because that is what it has been engendered to do.

The re-emergence of the primary conceptualisation of 'population' as a species body demonstrates that the conceptual content of mobile terms is not lost as they move between power-knowledge configurations. However, the conflict surrounding lockdown measures elucidates the incompatibility of specific primary conceptualisations of the mobile terms within a particular power-knowledge configuration, and the conflict presented by (re)introducing specific regulatory apparatuses that are inconsistent with primary conceptualisations of 'the subject' and 'population' in a configuration of Neoliberal Governmentality.

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