



Faculty of Humanities

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THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE  
REGIONAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY IN ADDRESSING  
THE CLIMATE-CONFLICT NEXUS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

by

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
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## ABSTRACT

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The adverse effects of climate change have been widely felt by the Horn of Africa's agro-reliant farmer and pastoralist communities. The increasing competition over scarce natural resources, which both groups depend upon for their livelihood, has culminated in cattle raiding and ongoing conflict, which has compromised regional peace and security in the Horn. The purpose of this study is to determine how effective cooperative regional diplomacy can be in addressing the dual human security threats posed by conflict and climate change in the Horn of Africa. The objective of this study is to explore the feasibility of preventing conflict and building resilience among the region's vulnerable communities through cooperative diplomatic efforts, given the very prevalent and ongoing climate change challenges in the region.

This qualitative desktop case study was conducted using secondary online sources, and an environmental governance analytical framework was applied in evaluating the literature. Despite various initiatives and programmes made possible by climate diplomacy efforts in the Horn, the study found that several factors, including institutional weaknesses, poor leadership, a severe lack of financial and technical resources, and inconsistent stakeholder prioritization of regional goals, have made regional environmental governance initiatives in the Horn less effective. These findings indicate the need for significant improvements and reform in the institutions that carry out environmental governance within the region. In addition, further research on how climate diplomacy tools can be better leveraged to achieve sustainable peace in the region is necessary.

This study maintains that given the cross-border nature of the climate-conflict crisis between farmer and pastoralist groups, there is a need for diplomatic actors in the region, namely IGAD, the EAC and national governments, to recommit to collaboration and strengthening their multilateral partnerships. An all-encompassing solution which addresses the natural resource management, conflict resolution, climate change adaptation and livelihood support needs of the region is feasible in the Horn and can be attained through well-coordinated diplomatic efforts.

**Key words: climate diplomacy, climate-related conflict, Horn of Africa, climate-conflict nexus, pastoralists, farmers, climate change adaptation, conflict resolution, livelihood support.**

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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|          |   |
|----------|---|
| AGN      | African Group of Negotiators  |
| AMCEN    | African Ministerial Conference on the Environment   |
| ARSDRR   | Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction  |
| CAADP    | Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme   |
| CAHOSCC  | Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change                                 |
| CBDFU    | Cross Border Development Facilitation Unit  |
| CEWARN   | Conflict Early Warning and Response Network   |
| CFA      | Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework   |
| EAC      | East African Community  |
| EACCCP   | East African Community Climate Change Policy  |
| FEWS     | Famine Early Warning System   |
| GHACOF   | Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum  |
| HoRN     | Horn of Africa Resilience Network   |
| ICPAC    | IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre   |
| ICPALD   | IGAD Centre For Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development  |
| IDDRSI   | IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative  |
| IGAD     | Intergovernmental Authority on Development  |
| ITC      | IGAD Transhumance Certificate   |
| LEWS     | Livestock Early Warning System  |
| PFS      | Pastoralist Field Schools   |
| PREPARED | Planning for Resilience in East Africa through Policy, Adaptation, Research, and Economic Development |
| RCC      | Regional Climate Centre   |
| RCCF     | EAC Regional Climate Change Fund  |
| RIE      | Regional Implementing Entity  |

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| RPLRP  | Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project      |
| SALW   | small arms and light weapons                          |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| WMO    | World Meteorological Organization                     |

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

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### 1.1. Introduction

The effects of climate change have worsened globally over the past two centuries, and researchers such as Wuebbles & Hayhoe (2002) and Hayhoe et al. (2018), have been preoccupied with studying the political, socioeconomic, and human security impact of the ongoing decline in climate conditions. This study seeks to frame the growing climate change crisis and subsequent conflict in the Horn of Africa as a transboundary issue. The Horn of Africa region is the easternmost part of mainland Africa and includes the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia), the Great Lakes (Kenya, Uganda) and the Nile Valley (Sudan and South Sudan) (ITUC-Africa 2021). This study explores the possibility of the transboundary climate and conflict issue in the Horn of Africa being remedied by cooperative regional diplomatic action in the current era of exploring the potential benefits of multilateralism among developing states (Jaldi 2023: 5).

Climate change has resulted in increased temperatures and disrupted normal climate and rainfall patterns (Adhikar et al. 2015: 112). This has left many parts of the world, including the Horn of Africa, susceptible to drastic changes in climate conditions, increasing the likelihood of food shortages and natural disasters (African Union 2014). The severe climatic effects experienced in the Horn of Africa have resulted in drought, followed by a scarcity of natural resources, including water and pastureland (Freedberg 2022: 3). Consequently, farmers and pastoralists in the region have had to compete for limited resources, leading to tension and violence between these groups (Mkutu 2001: 2). Future projections suggest that climate change is expected to increase the risk of conflict in the eastern region of Africa (Hoch et al. 2002).

In 2018, Amb. Smail Chergui, former African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security (PSD), expressed concern about the escalating regional pastoralist-farmer conflict in the Horn of Africa. In opening a two-day workshop on transhumance conflicts in Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, he stated, "Today, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers on the continent take more lives than terrorism " (African Union 2018).

Restoring peace between pastoralists and farmers in the Horn of Africa will require efforts toward determining and mitigating the conflict risks that exist between the borders of the states in this region – including those triggered by the effects of climate change. Engaging in collaborative regional climate diplomacy to develop cross-border solutions to these climate-conflict issues is imperative not only for advancing the peace agenda on the African continent but also for reinforcing the need for African solutions to African problems (Ali & Vladisch 2016: 610). This study is significant as it highlights the opportunity for collaborative diplomatic engagement within the Horn of Africa region to yield sustainable and feasible solutions to the farmer-pastoralist conflict in the region (Brown et al. 2007: 1146). It is through analysing how the farmer-pastoralist conflict occurring in the Horn of Africa region exemplifies the climate-conflict nexus, that this study problematises how both climate change and conflict threaten the regional security within the Horn and further undermine peace efforts on the continent (von Uexkull 2014: 16).

The study will focus on low-intensity conflict between crop farmers and mobile pastoralists in the Horn of Africa region. Against this backdrop, this research aims to examine how cooperative regional climate diplomacy in the Horn of Africa could provide climate-positive peacebuilding solutions to the conflict crisis between farmers and pastoralists in the region.

## **1.2. Literature Overview**

The following section of the research proposal focuses on the literature overview. It examines contributions made by various scholars in the literature about climate diplomacy, the climate-conflict nexus and climate-related pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The literature suggests that despite varying challenges of policy implementation and harmonization in cooperative regional climate diplomacy efforts, African nations have become more proactive in continental climate diplomacy (Shaw 1975: 672).

A gap in the literature that this paper aims to address is the lack of research on the success of existing regional climate diplomacy mechanisms in the Horn of Africa. Addressing this gap is important given that the study aims to investigate the potential benefits of transboundary climate diplomacy action in the region.

### 1.2.1. *Climate Diplomacy*

Climate diplomacy is a relatively new mode of diplomatic practice that emerged only a little over three decades ago. It involves establishing and managing global climate change frameworks and policies (Elliott 2013: 850). Engaging in climate diplomacy involves two distinct measures, namely mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation measures involve reducing or limiting the human activities that exacerbate climate change while adaptation includes altering behaviours, systems, and conditions to preserve and protect humanity, ecosystems, and the environment from further impacts of climate change (WWF 2024).

The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro was one of the first international meetings where UN member states gathered to engage in climate diplomacy and to discuss the heightened threats of climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty was signed at the summit, and thereafter the Conference of the Parties (COP) climate summits to negotiate efforts towards implementing the UNFCCC followed, with the first one hosted in Berlin in 1995. The most groundbreaking climate diplomacy summits, COP3 in Kyoto in 1997 and COP21 in France in 2015, resulted in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, a legally binding protocol to limit greenhouse gas emissions and the Paris Agreement – a pact to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius (Iberdrola 2023).

African states have been present during the aforementioned milestones in international climate diplomacy, however, Chevallier argues that climate diplomacy within the continent has not made enough progress. To further substantiate this, Chevallier notes that it wasn't until 2022 that the very first continental collective climate response framework for Africa, known as the African Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032) was adopted at the 35th AU Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa (Chevallier 2022).

A similar argument is made in the literature by Eghweree and Imuetinyan (2019) - who maintain that Africa, "appears to be doing very little in making her impact felt in the global climate diplomacy". According to them, although Africa has engaged substantially in international climate change diplomacy, scant progress has been

made in addressing climate change- related issues that are specific to the continent. The climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers is one such example.

The African Union's former Commissioner for Peace and Security stressed the need for the implementation of a "comprehensive continental plan to transform the (pastoralist-farmer) conflict by promoting across border cooperation" (African Union 2018). This is indicative of existing climate diplomacy efforts on the continent; however, no evidence indicates that there is an ongoing process or plan of action in place to proactively address or remedy the issue.

### *1.2.2. The climate-conflict nexus*

First coined in an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report in 2007, the term 'climate-conflict nexus', was used to describe the phenomenon whereby the adverse effects of global warming and climate change such as natural disasters and resource depletion exacerbated existing issues, tensions, and destabilization in communities - triggering the outbreak of conflict (Pachauri & Reisinger 2007). The climate-conflict nexus can be analysed in three dimensions, namely climate change-related environmental degradation and conflict, climate change-related natural resource scarcity and climate change-related migration and conflict (Nordás & Gleditsch 2007: 628).

Scheffran et al. (2012) argue that the degradation of the environment because of climate change threatens the livelihood of a vast majority of people. Issues of food insecurity, a lack of access to clean water, and a decline in the availability of grazing and arable land cause outbreaks of violence in these circumstances as groups grow more protective of and competitive over remaining resources.

As far as the conflict-climate nexus is concerned, some scholars like Gavin (2022: 12) argue that although climate change does not directly cause conflict it exacerbates factors that cause conflict, making conflict scenarios more likely than normal. In this instance, climate change is described as a threat multiplier.

One of the arguments made in the literature is that low human development countries, which are countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) score of below 0.55, are more susceptible to the dual exposure of climate-related degradation and armed

conflict (UNDP 2024). Seven out of eight countries in the Horn of Africa are low human development countries. Furthermore, low human development countries are more vulnerable to the threats posed by the climate-conflict nexus given their heightened levels of conflict fragility and their population's heavy reliance on agriculture and natural resources for survival (Matthew & Hammill 2018: 114).

From the literature, it can be concluded that the farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa is an example of the manifestation of the climate-conflict nexus. The next section will show this by highlighting how climate change has damaged and eroded natural resources that both groups once harmoniously shared, causing tension and conflict between farmers and pastoralists in the region.

### *1.2.3. Climate-related pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the Horn of Africa*

The Horn of Africa has long been a region where farmers and pastoralists co-exist, they have shared natural resources such as pastureland, water, and fresh produce (Percival & Homer-Dixon 1998: 281). Both farmers and pastoralists have benefitted from mutually beneficial exchanges, however, the impact of climate change has disrupted this harmony, with prolonged dry spells, shortages of water and food, scarcity of arable land, desertification, and a decline in the availability of natural resources. Shettima and Tar (2008: 64) argue that competition over scarce resources has been the cause of conflict between farmers and pastoralists as the demand for resources remains constant while the supply decreases due to the declining climate conditions (Ide 2015: 64).

The effects of climate change have rendered the ecological conditions in most of East Africa's arid and semi-arid land unpredictable with erratic rainfall and dry spells. As a result, pastoralists are forced to make spatial adjustments in search of pastureland or better water sources - which leads to them clashing with farmers over territory more frequently. Detges argues that a lack of effective regulations to better manage shared land and natural resources between these groups is the reason for conflict ensuing among pastoralist and farmer communities in the Horn of Africa (Detges 2014: 58).

Bereketeab (2013) makes an argument that similarly references the absence of necessary measures being put in place, stating that pastoralist communities are marginalized by government policies in many countries in the Horn. This in turn has

left them exposed to the harsh effects of climate and environmental conditions with little to no adaptation support from their governments. As a result, the economic marginalization that pastoralists experience has brought this group to resort to violence to address their grievances.

Similarly, Meier et al. (2007) argue that a host of socioeconomic factors aggrieve pastoralists – and these are the factors that contribute to them engaging in conflict. They attribute the outbreak of violence to the effects of unequal resource distribution and the economic dynamics of limited supply and increased demand – not the resource scarcity effects of climate change. It has been suggested earlier in the paper that economic factors are inextricable from the climate debate, especially on a continent like Africa that struggles with poverty and development. Even with these factors in mind, this study focuses primarily on climate-related conflict multipliers as opposed to structural factors given the limitations of the area and scope of study.

### **1.3. Analytical Framework**

The environmental governance analytical framework that has been formulated by the researcher, using existing literature will be applied in this study. The framework comprises five components that make up effective environmental governance. These components must be present in order for environmental governance efforts to meet the necessary objectives of improved resource management, early warning mechanisms as well as climate change adaptation and support. The five components include institutional framework, financial resources, stakeholder cooperation, policies and regulation and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (Malla 2023; Bennett & Satterfield 2018; Kuster et al. 2024).

This framework will be applied in this study to evaluate the efficacy and quality of past and existing environmental governance efforts geared towards addressing the climate-related conflict in the Horn of Africa. The framework will be applied in evaluating the projects, programmes, initiatives, and policies that were made possible through diplomatic engagement between various actors in the region. This evaluation will inform the findings of what the role of cooperative regional climate diplomacy is in addressing the climate-conflict nexus in the Horn going forward – given the identified opportunities and challenges that will emerge from applying the analytical framework.

#### **1.4. Statement of the research problem**

It is demonstrated in the reviewed literature how the adverse effects of climate change are a threat multiplier (Bane 2021). The climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers has compromised regional security and continental peace efforts (Blench 1996: 1). The increased competition over scarce natural resources, which both groups depend upon for their livelihood, has culminated in ongoing conflict, rendering these conflicting parties and surrounding populations more vulnerable. Given the transboundary nature of the farmer-pastoralist conflict and the regional security threat that it poses, the paper seeks to investigate why there is a need for effective cooperative climate diplomacy interventions in the Horn of Africa to cultivate climate-adaptive peace mechanisms and solutions to resource conflicts in the region (GPPAC 2023).

#### **1.5. Research Questions**

The study's central research question is identified as follows:

What is the role of regional cooperative climate governance in remedying farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa?

The sub-questions for this study are:

1. What has the role of climate change been in shaping farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa region?
2. How has regional climate diplomacy been exercised in the past to address the farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa? What have the results of these regional climate diplomacy efforts been?
3. What challenges and/or opportunities does a regionally focused climate diplomacy strategy pose for efforts to remedy the farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa?

## **1.6. Research Aims and Objectives**

This research aims to examine the extent to which cooperative regional diplomacy can effectively address the interlinked human security threats of conflict and climate change in the Horn of Africa. Through analysing the dual threat represented by the climate-conflict nexus, this research aims to assess the possibility of finding diplomatic solutions that will both restore peace between pastoralist and farmer communities and establish effective and accessible climate change adaptation measures for these groups within the Horn of Africa region.

The objectives of this study are identified as follows:

To understand how climate change-related resource scarcity and competition have led to conflict between pastoralists and crop farmers in the Horn of Africa region.

To investigate how implementing regionally established climate-adaptive peace efforts could potentially address the climate change-related conflict occurring between farmer-pastoralist communities more successfully.

To assess the efficacy of regional diplomacy structures in the Horn of Africa in cooperating towards sustainable climate change adaptation measures and the restoration of peace within the region.

## **1.7. Research Methodology**

This study employs a qualitative case study analysis. It will be carried out as a desktop literature study.

A qualitative research design involves collecting data or information, analysing its relevance to the topic alongside existing assumptions, finding various connections or discrepancies in the data, and drawing inferences by contributing a new theory or simply adding to the existing available information (Creswell 2003). This study draws on existing literature and will collect it from various secondary sources, hence its classification as a desktop literature study.

These secondary sources, primarily sourced through the University of Pretoria's online library database, Google and Google Scholar are in the public domain, and include

scientific journal articles, books and book chapters, reports by global organisations, policy documents and official government publications.

According to Yin (1992: 124), a case study analysis is used to make an "exploratory enquiry" or investigation into a phenomenon in a real-life setting. This study lends itself to a case study as the researcher evaluates how cooperative regional climate diplomacy can be exercised to address the real-life occurrence in the Horn of Africa as it pertains to the outbreak of climate change-related conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. A case study is useful in answering the research question at hand which is, '*What is the role of regional cooperative climate governance in remedying farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa?*', as it provides a practical case to which the researcher can apply diplomatic practice theory to analyse how climate diplomacy is practised realistically, providing useful insight on the potential challenges and benefits associated with this practice of diplomacy.

Qualitative case study analyses are often used to analyse how different factors in a study interact and relate, making it relevant in this study as the climate-conflict nexus and subsequent relationship between the effects of climate change and the triggers of conflict between pastoralist and farmer communities in the Horn of Africa are explored (Debout 2016: 57).

#### *1.7.1. Limitations*

The limits to this study include the word limit, time constraints and the inability of the researcher to do fieldwork in the chosen case study region of the Horn of Africa due to the exclusively desktop-based nature of the study.

#### *1.7.2. Ethical considerations and documentation*

This study will follow the University of Pretoria's ethical research guidelines. The study will not employ any research elements or methods that could potentially result in ethical implications on the university's research ethics policy. The study produced will abide by the university's anti-plagiarism policy and the Memorandum of Agreement signed together with the supervisor.

## 1.8 Structure of the research

This study consists of five chapters. The introductory chapter has provided context, briefly, of the case study through a literature overview and has outlined the research questions, objectives and aims of the paper. Furthermore, the chapter stated the research problem and outlined the research methodology and analytical framework that will be applied in the study. In the second chapter of the study, an in-depth review of the literature on climate-related conflict in the Horn and climate diplomacy efforts within the region will be conducted. The analytical framework which will be applied in answering the research questions of this study will also be developed and explained in this second chapter. This chapter will reveal some of the gaps identified in literature that require further research. Chapter three will trace the evolution of the Horn's current ongoing climate-conflict crisis between farmers and pastoralists. This chapter will also shed light on the region's traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution methods. The fourth chapter of this mini dissertation will serve as the analysis and discussion section of the study. In this chapter, the environmental governance analytical framework will be applied to evaluate current regional governance efforts in the Horn. This analysis will evaluate the extent to which climate diplomacy efforts have lent to a sustainable and peaceful solution for the region. Key findings will also be discussed in this chapter. In the concluding chapter of the study, a summary of the study will be provided. Thereafter, recommendations on improvements within regional cooperation between diplomatic actors of the region will be presented. This chapter will also suggest areas for future research on local communities' perception of the success of cross-border climate diplomacy initiatives in the region.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

---

### 2.1. Introduction

The following chapter will serve two purposes, it will provide an analysis of the literature and the ongoing debates on the topic of regional cooperative climate diplomacy in the Horn of Africa as well as an explanation of the analytical framework which will be applied in the study and how it will be operationalised as a tool of analysis to answer the research questions.

The reviewed literature looks briefly both at the history and current state of climate diplomacy in Africa. It deals with the scholarly findings on why there is a lack of action and a comprehensive plan both by governments and regional bodies in the Horn to address the climate-related conflict between farmer and pastoralist groups (Bilate & Zou 2021; Jallow & Craft 2014). The consensus in the literature is that further research is essential, both to better understand the climate-conflict nexus occurring in the region, and why the region needs competent regional institutions and mechanisms that will establish and enforce realistic and impactful solutions (Solomon et. al 2018).

The second half of this chapter will describe the researcher's environmental governance analytical framework and explain how it will be applied as a tool of analysis in the study. First, the concept of environmental governance is broken down and framed as the foundation upon which the environmental governance framework is developed. The use of the framework is further justified in this section, with an in-depth explanation of the relevance of the regional dimension within environmental governance, linking back to why this study is concerned with *regional* cooperative diplomacy in particular.

### 2.2. Literature Review

African states have been known to collaborate on a diplomatic level since as early as the decolonial period of the 1950s (Endeley 2009). Despite Africa as a continent being recognized as an active participant in global climate diplomacy negotiations, there is still an overall absence of visible, ongoing climate diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa aimed specifically at addressing the issue of climate-related farmer-pastoralist

conflict in the region (Gavin 2022: 2). According to the literature, African states' lack of visibility is owed to several issues, ranging from insufficient resources and capacity to weak cooperation and inadequate regional governance efforts. The reviewed literature delves into some of the aforementioned shortcomings. It analyses both continental and Horn of Africa region-specific climate diplomacy efforts towards achieving sustainable peace.

### *2.2.1. The state of climate diplomacy in Africa*

The objective of getting African states involved in combating climate change was first made clear at the OAU Abuja Summit of Heads of State from May - June 1991. At the summit, it was officially acknowledged that African concerns needed to be adequately represented in the upcoming Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, which was the first of its kind, scheduled for the following year, 1992. It was decided that an African 'common position' had to be developed to best represent African climate needs and concerns on the global stage. It was in November 1991 at the Second Regional African Ministerial Conference for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, that the African common position on the African Environment and Development was adopted (Elliott 2004: 56). The publishing of this 'common position' was the first time that all African governments formally addressed the subject of climate change as a collective and this laid the foundation for many of the ideas that would become standard in African climate diplomacy over the next decades (Roger & Belliethathan 2016: 94).

The African climate change negotiation structure comprises a technical tier that reinforces the continent's 'common position', known as the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN), and it is an arm of the African Union (AU). The AGN was established at COP1 in Berlin, Germany in 1995. The arm prepares texts, group positions and strategies for negotiations while maintaining a unified African voice in all climate negotiations. All fifty-four African countries are members of the AGN whose group positions are endorsed and adopted by ministers at COPs. The AGN is the only regional developing country coalition negotiating bloc which has consistently been active and visible in climate negotiations since its establishment (CBFP 2022).

By the AGN's own admission, in order to handle the loss and damage (including conflict) resulting from the climate change consequences on the African continent,

there is an urgent need to enhance support, including financing, technological innovation, and capacity-building for African states. This includes, where necessary, facilitating the establishment and carrying out of new and/or additional strategies and mechanisms, as well as strengthening existing ones (AGN 2018:2). The extent of loss and destruction brought on by the unfavourable effects of climate change on the African continent is a great concern for the AGN. Africa's development efforts are being and will continue to be hampered by these lingering consequences. According to the AGN, even with a wider basis for raising funds towards climate change adaptation, the continent cannot adequately address the expected damages and consequences of climate change using domestic resources (AGN 2018: 2).

### *2.2.2. Hurdles to effective climate diplomacy in the Horn*

#### *2.2.2.1. The role of regional bodies*

Honing more into the Horn of Africa and the state of climate governance institutions specific to the region, one of the most notable regional institutions is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This regional bloc was established in 1986 and was formerly known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) for a decade before being renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in 1996, it was founded to tackle the effects of recurrent severe droughts and other natural disasters that caused widespread famine, environmental degradation, and economic difficulty in the region. All eight states that make up the Horn of Africa region are members of IGAD (IGAD 2024).

According to Bilate & Zou (2021), the regional institutions in the Horn of Africa including IGAD have been ineffective when it comes to regional environmental governance and addressing the crises related to climate change – including conflict – which are plaguing the region (Weldesellassie 2011: 6). As such, it will be up to the IGAD member states to collaborate and establish an institutional framework that is effective and operational, whether that be in the form of a replacement for or improvement of IGAD, reform nonetheless is paramount (Bilate & Zou 2021: 30). This echoes the prior mentioned stance of the AGN when it comes to strengthening or replacing existing mechanisms and strategies aimed at climate governance. A similar sentiment is shared by Ambrosetti et al. (2016) who maintain that regional environmental policies

and strategies that have been put in place or proposed for the Horn of Africa have been unsuccessful because they have lacked organisational collaboration and have been poorly enforced. One can further postulate that the lack of a comprehensive plan or solution to directly address the Horn of Africa's farmer-pastoralist conflict resulting from climate effects is due to the challenges and limitations to climate governance mechanisms as discussed in the literature.

#### *2.2.2.2. The role of governments*

In addition to investigating how regional organisations like IGAD could play a role in remedying crises such as the one playing out currently between farmer and pastoralist communities, an important aspect to consider is the need for capable and reliable governments that will collaborate to lead the process. According to Okot-Okumu (2012), regional political institutions in the Horn of Africa must collaborate across borders to successfully facilitate climate-positive governance. It is only through effective collaboration that they can adequately address the subsequent crisis of conflict resulting from the adverse effects of climate change (Okot-Okumu 2012: 2). Solomon et al. (2018) argue that cooperation among governments could be a challenge in the Horn of Africa given the inadequacies of the governments in the region.

Conversely, Jallow & Craft (2014), claim that government inadequacies aren't the primary problem. According to them, almost all governments have found it challenging to come up with effective and comprehensive regulatory processes and procedures for managing climate change, but governments of least-developed countries (LDCs), often struggle more. It should be noted that seven out of the eight countries that make up the Horn of Africa are classified by the UN as LDCs (UNCTAD 2024). This according to Jallow & Craft (2014) is because of a lack of capacity and resources to engage in climate diplomacy, and subsequently influence climate diplomacy negotiations and decision-making. They propose that a step toward addressing this is strengthening climate diplomacy capacity, action, knowledge, and interest on local and regional levels. They maintain that progress at the local and regional levels will encourage greater ambition and strong national climate change programmes (Jallow & Craft 2014).

### 2.2.2.3. *Geopolitical considerations*

The perception that developing regions of the world demonstrate less urgency in their response to climate change and related crises in comparison to their developed counterparts for purely ideological reasons and nothing else is a myth that according to researchers stems from the widespread notion that climate change is a ‘Western’ issue or a problem for wealthier states (Richler 2020:184; WMO 2020). According to Munge (2023: 9), the perceived lack of participation in climate diplomacy by third-world regions of the world, including Africa is attributed to the North-South divide. When it comes to responding to climate change, developed, and developing nations often respond from a point of differing interests, capacities, priorities, and obligations (Munge 2023: 8). The climate priorities of developing countries differ significantly from those of developed countries, given that climate change is global, but affects various regions very differently.

African nations are faced with a wide variety of issues related to the negative effects of climate change that they have to handle at a given time. The issues fall across, various sectors and differ in impact, these include severe as well as slow-onset natural disasters and many other types in between (AGN 2018: 3). Munge (2023: 7) maintains that as nations engage in climate diplomacy, consideration of historical disadvantage as well as existing disparities should be made. This is to ensure that the expectations of all states to either commit or contribute to the climate discussion prioritize equity. Following from this, it could be postulated that governments like those in the Horn of Africa region might not have a concrete and operational plan of action to tackle the climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers because they wish to ignore the issue, but rather because they have limited capacity and resources as well as a backlog in terms of addressing various other socio-economic challenges including widespread poverty, famine and economic decline (Gavin 2022: 11).

According to the literature, climate research in the Horn of Africa region is under-resourced and thus scarce. There are no solutions because the issues themselves are poorly understood. To have improved conflict prediction and management, there is a serious need for the expansion of knowledge on how climate change acts as a threat multiplier in conflict situations (Gavin 2022: 14; Solomon et al. 2018: 286). An almost identical claim is made by Raleigh & Kniveton (2012) who emphasise that climate-

conflict literature suffers from a scarcity of theoretical links between the two variables—climate change, which is the primary driver, and conflict, which arises as a result. According to them, understanding and thus better managing the farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa requires special consideration of how poor communities like farmers and pastoralists are more inclined to resource-related conflicts specifically because of their economic circumstances (Raleigh & Kniveton 2012: 55).

The economic vulnerabilities of the conflicting communities have remained a concern within the region. The IGAD Centre For Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development recommended opportunities to strengthen pastoralists' adaptive capacity to climate change through the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance. Despite the protocol being adopted in 2021, there is still a long way to go in terms of protecting farmer-pastoralist communities and remedying the root causes of their conflict. More especially has to be done in terms of regulating small arms proliferation and enforcing laws about migration in pursuit of sustenance (ICPALD 2021; Musau 2021: 101). Based on the reviewed literature, in addition to climate change adaptation capacity, it would be amiss to neglect to address the socio-economic challenges faced by farmer and pastoralist groups in strategies towards sustainable peacebuilding and ceasing the conflict (Raleigh & Kniveton 2012: 58; Matthew & Hammill 2018: 114).

Through investigating the answers to the research questions posed in this study, the aim is to make a considerable contribution to climate-conflict literature as well. The Horn of Africa region is in dire need of a comprehensive plan that will dually address climate adaptation imperatives and mitigate the threat posed by climate change as it relates to the outbreak of conflict. The solutions required, must come from, and be upheld by those within the region. The following section of the study will explain the theoretical framework which will be used to analyse the possibility of cooperation within the Horn of Africa region to yield sustainable and practical solutions to farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict.

### **2.3. Analytical Framework**

#### *2.3.1. Environmental governance analytical framework*

Environmental governance refers to the processes, institutions and mechanisms through which society manages and makes decisions about the environment. It

involves various stakeholders including but not limited to governments, businesses, communities, and civil society organizations who, mainly through collaboration, develop and implement environmental policies. Environmental governance is an approach that may be applied to analyse policies across different environmental agendas and is particularly focused on collaborative action and decision-making (Söderström 2017).

The analytical framework that will be used in this study is one that the researcher has formulated, using existing literature. The analytical framework comprises five components required for effective environmental governance procedures. These components must be present for environmental governance to be realized and for it to meet the necessary objectives of improved resource management, early warning mechanisms as well as climate change adaptation and support. The five components used in this framework include stakeholder cooperation, policies and regulation, institutional framework, monitoring, evaluation and learning, and financial resources.

#### ***Institutional framework***

Establishing effective institutions that are responsible for enforcing policies and legislation related to the environment is essential for environmental governance. Governmental environment ministries, regional organizations, regulatory bodies, NGOs, and similar organisations are critical role players when it comes to doing the research, facilitating coordination as well as ensuring compliance as it pertains to policies aimed at protecting and conserving the environment. Having legitimate institutions to hold accountable for environmental governance outcomes (Malla 2023; Kuster et al. 2024:9).

#### ***Financial resources***

Sufficient financing of environmental monitoring and compliance mechanisms, initiatives, research, as well as adaptation and mitigation efforts are crucial when it comes to environmental governance. Financing is a significant component of capacity building where environmental governance is concerned and the mobilization of financial resources for environmentally related projects and initiatives are unfortunately quite scarce in most parts of the developing world. Environmental governance also requires financial resources to equip groups and communities with

the required skills, training as well as infrastructure for capacity building (Malla 2023; Bennett & Satterfield 2018: 7).

### ***Stakeholder cooperation***

Due to the highly involved nature of environmental governance, various stakeholders have to be involved in different decision-making processes. Engaging local communities, indigenous groups, businesses, and corporations as well as NGOs and civil groups ensures that those who stand to be affected by environmental legislation and policy are involved in the process of how these policies and laws are decided upon. The sharing of decision-making responsibilities allows for inclusionary processes and appropriate power-sharing. This inclusive approach ensures that the responsibility to uphold environmental preservation practices is shared across these various stakeholders, promoting transparency while doing so and welcoming differences in opinion and perspective (Malla 2023; Kuster et al. 2024: 6). The inclusion of marginalised and vulnerable groups is of equal importance in the processes and procedures of environmental governance. Environmental challenges often transcend borders, and for this reason, cooperative efforts are a significant part of environmental governance. Effective environmental governance should empower actors at all levels to be able to self-organize, make decisions, act, and participate in information exchange (Bennett & Satterfield 2018: 7; Kuster et al. 2024: 11).

### ***Policies and regulation***

Policy and legislation are at the core of effective environmental governance. Policies that support environmental governance initiatives further lend to the legitimacy of these processes. The existence of policies and laws established by governments at local, national, and international levels pertaining to biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation and adaptation indicates the local and political support for environmental governance. These policies guide environmental decision-making and set clear standards and rules of engagement on various environmental issues against the backdrop of a legal framework (Malla 2023; Bennett & Satterfield 2018: 9).

### ***Monitoring, evaluation, and learning***

Given the implementation of mitigation measures and environmental policies, consistent assessment and monitoring is essential to ensure the effectiveness and

relevance of environmental governance practices. Frequent progress tracking and monitoring provide insight into potential issues and improvements that can be made to guide decision-makers in their efforts and planning when it comes to meeting various environmental goals. Inspections, enforcement procedures and penalties are all examples of compliance mechanisms required to see to it that environmental laws and regulations are adhered to (Kuster et al. 2024: 11; Bennett & Satterfield 2018: 8). It is through monitoring and evaluation that lessons learned, successes and failures are documented to improve processes and make accurate projections. The environmental governance process entails reflection and active updating as well as adjusting where necessary. For this to happen, stakeholders should display a willingness to be flexible and open to new ideas (Malla 2023).

### *2.3.2 Operationalising the environmental governance framework*

The environmental governance analytical framework will be used in the study to evaluate current regional efforts and solutions geared towards remedying the farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict in the Horn. This evaluation will reveal both what has been and remains to be done as it pertains to environmental governance in the Horn of Africa to address the conflict-inducing climate effects. Because this study is concerned primarily with the regional implications of the conflict and climate effects, the environmental governance pursuits will be analysed on a regional level and will therefore be broadly classified as regional environmental governance objectives.

Regional environmental governance is a form of environmental governance whereby the responsibilities of performing environmental governance duties and tasks are taken on by actors within a region including but not limited to neighbouring governments, regional organisations and bodies, businesses, and civil society groups. A shift away from traditional political institutions and toward the establishment of new, horizontal, dialogue-oriented modalities of governance is becoming increasingly characteristic of transborder regional environmental governance (Klinke 2011: 57).

The region is both a practical and convenient sphere to practice climate diplomacy (Conca 2012: 129). The worldwide effects of climate change are far too complex to be addressed by a single environmental governance structure or institution (Ivanova 2007: 9). In addition to the fact that the responsibility of finding climate solutions should be shared, regions that experience the same natural disasters or climate phenomena

are best informed and situated to address the transboundary effects of climate change that they collectively experience. This cooperation in environmental governance efforts results in solutions that are appropriate and feasible for that region and its people (Gruby 2017: 16). Overall, this framework will assist in assessing whether regional mechanisms and structures in the Horn of Africa can carry out the appropriate environmental governance procedures to establish sustainable solutions to the farmer-pastoralist conflict.

The study starts from the assumption that effective regional environmental governance is an important tool in reinforcing the implementation of climate diplomacy policies and agreements. How regional climate diplomacy could reinforce climate diplomacy and the subsequent solutions to the climate-conflict nexus in the Horn will be analysed through the three dimensions of agency, thematic focus, and territoriality. The analytical framework will be used to attain the aim of this study by answering the research questions.

#### **2.4. Conclusion**

This chapter has contextualised the conflict-climate nexus playing out in the Horn of Africa region by demonstrating the current state of literature as it pertains to the region's climate-conflict crisis, what factors have contributed to the ongoing issues as well as the current state of readiness to tackle the issue by regional bodies and governments alike. In addition, the chapter outlined the parameters of analysis as per the environmental governance framework which will be applied henceforth in the study.

The following chapter will be an analysis of the historical context and background of the conflict-climate nexus in the Horn of Africa region. This chapter will investigate the challenges to regional cooperative environmental governance in the region, as well as factors escalating the conflict. The chapter will provide a better understanding of what needs to be improved or reformed going forward towards the goal of achieving sustainable and climate-positive peace between farmer-pastoralist groups in East Africa.

## **CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND FARMER-PASTORALIST CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

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### **3.1. Introduction**

The effects of climate change have rendered the ecological conditions in most of East Africa's arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) unpredictable with erratic rainfall and dry spells. As a result, pastoralists are forced to make spatial adjustments in search of pastureland and better water sources. It is in their movements that they engage in violent clashes with farmers over territory and resources. This study frames climate change as a threat multiplier. Although climate change does not directly cause conflict, it accelerates, intensifies, and triggers conflict and conflict risk between farmers and pastoralists in the region of the Horn (Busby 2007:6).

The following chapter will provide context on the history of farmer-pastoralist relations in the Horn as well as the circumstances exacerbating the current climate-related conflict between these groups. The purpose of the chapter is to contextualize climate-related conflict between farmers and pastoralists in the Horn. The chapter will discuss various factors that are contributing to the extent of climate-related violence between farmers and pastoralists within the region. These factors include resource competition, governance inadequacies and the growing access to illicit weapons within the region.

### **3.2. History of farmer-pastoralist relations**

#### *3.2.1. Longstanding fluctuant and inconsistent peace*

The Horn of Africa has long been a region where farmers and pastoralists have shared natural resources including pastureland, water, and fresh produce (Percival & Homer-Dixon 1998: 281). The Horn of Africa is home to the largest population of pastoralists worldwide. The Horn is also the most conflicted region in Africa (Bereketeab 2013: 3). Somalia and Ethiopia are ranked third and fifth respectively, for the highest global population of pastoralists. A third of the population of Djibouti are pastoralists and Sudan has the largest number of pastoralists worldwide (Mkutu 2001: 9). At the

borders of South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Kenya, there is a conflict belt that runs from east to west across the Horn of Africa. There are three pastoral conflict clusters in this belt, namely —Karamoja, which is present along the Kenya – South Sudan – Uganda border, the Moyale cluster which can be found on the Ethiopia – Kenya border, and Mandora who are along the Ethiopia – Kenya – Somalia border (Ayana et al. 2016: 608).

Farmers and pastoralists in the Horn of Africa have co-existed in the region since pre-colonial times. It does not come as a surprise that farmers and pastoralists continue to engage in conflict seeing as the relationship between these groups has a long history of fluctuating between rivalry, cooperation, and conflict, spanning over periods. Cattle raiding accounts for most conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. Raiding is the act of one group, most often pastoralists, violently seizing livestock from another, in this instance, farmers. Livestock raiding has long been a part of the pastoralist culture in the Horn of Africa. The raiding of rivals used to be a traditional strategy for expanding access to new water sources, grazing pastures, and—most importantly—a way to improve social status by obtaining cattle from defeated enemies. In addition to acquiring riches, raids served as a tool for reducing famine and poverty for pastoralists (Oba 1992: 20). Pastoralists were known to violently dominate farmers' means of production and pastoral areas were often converted to agricultural land (Seddon & Sumberg 1997). It was in the mid-1970s, post-independence that this controlled and customary activity took more of a violent form with the infiltration of modern arms and weaponry into the region (Greiner 2013: 219). But overall, farmers and pastoralists are described as having always had “dynamic and responsive” interactions with each other (Hussein 1998: 76).

Adjustment and movement have been typical of both communities for centuries, from economic adjustments and moves towards commercialization or adjustments in response to changes in nature such as new diseases affecting their livestock. These groups have also adjusted to changes in the environment that affect temperature and weather patterns and moved accordingly (Scott 1984: 51). Farmers and pastoralists were known to collaborate and thus benefit from mutually beneficial exchanges, however, the consequences of climate change, including prolonged dry spells, shortages of water and food, scarcity of arable land, desertification, and a decline in

the availability of natural resources has disrupted this harmony (Seddon & Sumberg 1997).

Before the 1980s, pastoralists were known to migrate away from areas where there was heightened competition over natural resources to avoid conflict with farmers. Historically, pastoralists have always been regarded as trespassers on the land of farmers and are thus the group that is more likely to migrate if and when a threat of conflict arises. In current times, however, pastoralists are seen getting into confrontations more often with farmers and initiating conflict rather than avoiding it (Leff 2009: 191). Regional cooperative diplomatic intervention efforts could be pivotal in investigating and remedying this perceived pattern of conflict instigation.

Under colonial rule during the 1940s, Turkana pastoralist movements were controlled by a grazing policy within the Kenyan district. The objective of the policy was to limit cattle raiding as a response to drastic ecological changes at the time. The grazing policy was accompanied by a water development plan, which was supposed to provide additional water supplies to relieve the pressure on the frequently used permanent water points in the district (Oba 1992:13).

Following Kenya's independence in 1963, there was no attempt to continue the grazing schemes. The country's new government wanted to separate the colonial suppression of the indigenous population associated with grazing control and restrictions from their new reign. Therefore, they loosened the colonial restrictions that had previously been in place to regulate the movement of people and livestock, across borders within the region. A new system replaced the colonial system, allowing pastoral communities to form their own agreements with one another on the sharing of water sources or pastures. According to Oba (1992), this unrestricted mobility across borders throughout the Horn was the cause for tensions to grow between pastoral and farmer groups and subsequent raids and counterraids that started to occur and have continued to occur until today.

During the drought of 1992 in Northern Kenya multiple conflicts occurred in the Horn of Africa between pastoralists and farmers. One such conflict was between the rivalling Pokot and Turkana communities of northwest Kenya. Other conflicts played out between north-central Kenyan Samburu pastoralists and the Somalis, as well as

between the Rendille pastoralists from the Eastern Province of Kenya and Ariaal pastoralists from northern Kenya. Similarly, in Ethiopia, Somalis and people of the Oromo tribe engaged in conflict with Ethiopian farmers (Fratkin & McCabe 1999:7; Schlee & Shongolo 1995: 10; Devine 2021).

This section on farmer-pastoralist conflict history has demonstrated that conflict between these groups is somewhat common, and perhaps expected. This study maintains that the growing adverse effects of climate change have rendered conflict between these groups more frequent and violent. Despite there being an accepted 'rivalry' between these communities, there is something to be said about the impact that a relatively recent exacerbating factor such as climate change has had on the nature of conflict breaking out between pastoralists and farmers. Given the history of conflict between these groups, as recently as COP26 in 2021, the recurring issue of climate change exacerbating tensions in the Horn between farmers and pastoralists to the point of conflict was on the global agenda (SPARC 2021). The crisis continues to persist and evolve; therefore, this study maintains that a diplomatic solution, that adequately prioritizes climate change adaptation, is required alongside a peacebuilding strategy.

In the following section, the paper will discuss the traditional forms of diplomacy and conflict resolution that have been practised in the Horn to address farmer-pastoralist conflict. There are aspects of the traditional conflict resolution approach to tackling the Horn's challenge of climate-related conflict that can be drawn upon in modern-day diplomatic efforts to remedy the crisis. The following section will demonstrate that dialogue and adaptation measures have been explored within the region and that the foundation for diplomatic engagement exists but needs to be reinforced by government and regional support for an effective and sustainable solution to the ongoing dual climate-conflict challenge to be realized. It is through understanding past systems and mechanisms that we can theorise on the best solutions for the future.

### *3.2.2. Traditional conflict resolution structures and mechanisms*

As far as local customary institutions are concerned, negotiation, mediation and arbitration procedures have always existed in instances where competition over natural resources has caused conflict in semi-arid regions of Africa (Hussein 1998:

81). Within these customary institutions, authority is bestowed upon elders who best understand the local history and how different communities co-exist. These figures often include traditional leaders and are entrusted to facilitate and mediate negotiations between parties who are disputing access to, or control of various natural resources. If and when necessary, local natural resource dispute issues are escalated to formal authorities and institutions to be dealt with by the judicial system (Hussein 1998: 78).

Customary structures have always been thought of as ideal for conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. Pastoralist communities have been known to consult elders for dispute resolution since pre-colonial times. Elders are considered the custodians of natural resources. A council of elders is almost always involved when it comes to traditional peaceful resolutions of farmer and pastoralist disputes. This is accomplished through dialogue, carrying out rituals, and agreeing to share resources including grazing land and water. The customary conflict resolution process might also entail symbolic gestures including the exchange of cattle or produce as an indication of a peace offering once conflict parties have made amends. The availability of pasture and water has been an important aspect in the peace agreements between East African communities, additionally, establishing a win-win scenario has always been the basis of such agreements (Pkeyla et al. 2004: vi). These councils of elders are often made up by or work alongside neighbourhood leaders, older women in the community and members from different age groups who act as representatives (Waphuka et al. 2022: 97).

The Karamoja region of Uganda is home to a significant population of pastoralist communities. In Karamoja, conflict has always been remedied by elders, who made up the customary authority. Cattle raids were approved by the local elders according to customary procedures. Elders established regulations for raiding, and breaking the regulations had consequences ranging from fines, imprisonment, or even death. Elders were important in maintaining communal harmony, identifying local offenders, providing information, reprimanding misbehaving children, settling conflicts, and brokering peace (Toolit 2015; Wennström 2024: 11).

An example of a traditional community-based conflict resolution structure in the Horn is the Samburu District Peace Committee found in Kenya. The traditional techniques

of conflict management in Northern Kenya are mostly shaped by the elders of the pastoralist communities living there. The elders' position of power within their communities allows them to effectively preserve the community's harmonious relationships and way of life. The elders' status in society is the source of their power. This is why pastoralists view traditional conflict resolution techniques as legitimate. The elders are well-connected and often have control over resources, marriages and relationships across generations, ethnic groups, and tribes (SND 2024).

Agreements on resource use have existed between pastoral and farmer communities since the pre-colonial era. For example, in the past, the Kenyan Turkana pastoral community split their rights to water and pasture, expecting access in return from other pastoralists if and when climate and ecological conditions changed drastically. These agreements accommodated neighbouring pastoral communities of Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia as well (Oba 1992: 14). Despite agreements in place, disputes continued to arise as they naturally do in spaces where various groups are gathered and share access to resources. The disputes continued to be addressed according to traditional, communal principles of co-existing and sharing.

Furthermore, traditional solutions to resource competition and conflict between pastoralists and farmers have tended to be very practical and always hinge upon cooperative practices between the groups. These solutions include setting up reciprocal grazing agreements, adjusting the geographic bounds of livestock movement, selling and slaughtering livestock during periods of extreme scarcity and climate variability and forming grazing associations for improved movement regulation (Schilling et al. 2011: 16). Unfortunately, many community agreements established by these traditional institutions governing access to and sharing of resources between the conflicting parties have been drawn up but not shared far enough, or simply not abided by (Huser & Kirkbride 2006: 8). This is indicative of one of the limitations of small, community-based peace mechanisms – their reach is not very far. This does not allow for all pastoral and farmer groups within the region to be governed under the same agreement and therefore cooperate to uphold the conditions of the agreement.

The historical background, motivation, and operational mechanisms of conflict resolution institutions in developing nations are often interpreted as either being formal statutory laws or informal customary norms (Péclard et al. 2009:24). Pitting

"traditional" informal institutions with strong social and cultural embeddedness against "modern" formal structures is something Cleaver (2001) cautions against. Similarly, Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) contend that it is more appropriate to recognize these institutions as continuously evolving norms and standards influenced by various factors, rather than in terms of binary opposition. Flintan et al. (2013) postulate that the disintegration of traditional conflict resolution and similar institutions with the progression of time has contributed to the current state of prolonged conflict and lack of adaptability and resilience by farmers and pastoralists. Hussein (1998) however, queries whether traditional and customary conflict resolution institutions are still able to resolve the farmer-pastoralist disputes of the current day, or whether a completely new approach is necessary. This is due to the limited capacity of these institutions as well as the understanding that the nature and complexity of conflicts continue to advance, perhaps far beyond what these institutions are fit to handle.

Despite being eroded and undermined over time; traditional conflict resolution structures remain essential platforms for intercommunal conflict resolution within the region (Schilling et al. 2011: 19). These platforms are inclusive, appeal to conflicting parties' sense of community and create the opportunity for dialogue to take place while representing the positive difference that diplomatic solutions can make.

This study argues that there remains a role to be played by traditional diplomacy and dispute resolution structures when it comes to remedying community conflicts within the Horn of Africa. Still, these structures alone are not sufficient to adequately address the entirety and magnitude of the problem. Clans and spiritual leaders have had a significant role in mediating the disputes that arise between these groups. Local and regional governments, however, still have a different and much bigger responsibility and role to play when it comes to regional environmental governance and coming up with a sustainable solution to the issue occurring in the Horn. Traditional institutions cannot shield people from violence, but they still play a crucial role in encouraging negotiation and appealing to the communal values and customs in bringing conflicting parties to the table to speak about better resource management to lessen, if not eliminate, the negative impacts of conflict (Eriksen & Lind 2009: 831). State institutions remain crucial in supporting already existing platforms of diplomatic engagement within the Horn because, unlike most traditional institutions, they have the resources,

authority as well as the capacity to provide protection from violence, enact adaptation policy and oversee effective change through governance.

Given the complexities and various factors contributing to farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict in the Horn, the governments of this region bear most of the responsibility to formulate and carry out solutions that put both peace and climate change adaptation at the fore. In the following section, the study delves further into additional complexities associated with the farmer-pastoralist conflict exacerbated by the effects of climate change in the Horn and introduces potential solutions that could be pursued through regional environmental governance.

### **3.3. Factors escalating climate-related farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn**

For pastoralist groups who rely on agriculture and environmental resources to survive, the benefits of engaging in violence to attain resources rendered scarce by the effects of climate change, often outweigh the costs of not doing so (O'Loughlin et al. 2012: 18346). The following section of this paper discusses three main factors that contribute to the prolonged conflict between farmers and pastoralists in the Horn, namely small arms proliferation, resource competition and governance inadequacies. The purpose of this section is to identify the threat multipliers in the conflict situation between farmers and pastoralists and to understand the appropriate regional environmental governance responses required to remedy the entirety of the issue.

#### *3.3.1. Small arms proliferation*

The Horn of Africa is unfortunately quite prone to violent conflict, from small-scale low-intensity conflicts to large-scale civil wars. In addition to climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers, examples of ongoing conflict in the Horn include the al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia, militia and religious extremism in Kenya, and civil wars in Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia (ACLED 2024). Researchers have found that as military-style automatic weapons became increasingly common throughout the East African region, the levels of violence and conflict patterns amongst pastoralists, which were formerly carefully controlled and socially managed, have worsened (Krause 2007: i). The frequent occurrence of armed conflict in the Horn creates the opportunity for weapons to circulate within the region, and as a result farmers and pastoralists

easily gain access to this weaponry, which they use in violent confrontations between each other.

The weapons that have come to be used in climate-related confrontations between pastoralists and farmers originate from official weapons stockpiles that are not well monitored and secured. The weapons are also attained from areas experiencing ongoing civil wars including Sudan and Northern Uganda. Non-state armed groups who have constant access to global arms markets and have commodified weaponry pose a significant challenge to peacekeeping efforts in the Horn seeing as they sell these weapons to pastoralists from across borders. As such, the continued infiltration of these arms into the region undoubtedly worsens the violence among pastoralists and farmers (Krause 2007: i). The use of these automatic and semi-automatic weapons in farmer-pastoralist conflicts escalates the severity of climate-related conflict between the groups and further complicates conflict resolution and disarmament efforts (African Union 2024). The human security threat that the circulation of these arms across borders within the region poses, justifies the urgent need for diplomatic intervention both from regional bodies and governments in the Horn, given that the issue affects people within all their nations.

The 1990s marked the introduction of more automatic weaponry including AK-47 rifles into the region, gradually replacing traditional weapons which were used in cattle rustling attacks (Gray 2000: 409). With this came the emergence of a market for stolen livestock and a new form of organized crime. Hendrickson et al. (1998) owe the proliferation of arms into pastoral communities, and subsequent violence against farmers, to the shift from traditional 'redistributive raiding' to 'predatory raiding'. The now normalized use of arms in farmer-pastoralist conflicts has altered both the gravity and repercussions of the violence between these groups.

In many pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa, including Uganda's Karamoja region, the 'gun age' has eroded the traditional governance system and reshaped the dynamics of conflict with significant changes in the scope, scale, and intensity of violent confrontations between groups (Toolit 2015). Guns have rendered communal conflicts far too violent and dangerous for traditional governance systems to intervene to the same extent as previously. According to Omolo (2010), the escalation of conflict between farmers and pastoralists reflects a breakdown in customary control.

The availability of weapons has increased the number of casualties from cattle raids, which has complicated the management and resolution of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. The use of modern weapons in these conflicts has also deepened tensions between the communities and have established longer-lasting hostility (Wennström 2024: 4). Wider access to and use of semi-automatic weapons has also increased overall insecurity within communities in the Horn (Omolo 2010: 88) (Mkutu 2001). Deleuze and Parnet best describe this mobile and violent lifestyle of pastoralists in their 2007 paper with the following quote, “flee, but while fleeing, pick up a weapon” (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 179)

Both the acquisition and use of weapons in farmer-pastoralist conflict have worsened the threat that the ongoing conflict poses. The role of regional environmental governance intervention goes beyond calling for the silencing of guns in this instance. Due to the transboundary nature of the conflict, states within the region have a responsibility to cease the distribution and use of illicit weapons in these attacks - given the national security risk that the circulation of these weapons poses. The lack of an existing, explicit plan to address the issue of illegally attained weapons in farmer-pastoralist conflict remains an issue for the region’s governments to address through diplomatic engagement.

### *3.3.2. Competition over scarce land and natural resources*

According to Molina (2017), natural resource management is one of the most sensitive issues currently facing the Horn, and an issue that can only be solved by the actors within the region (Molina 2017: 20). Resource competition is neither a new concept nor is it exclusive to pastoralists and farmers in the Horn, however, periods of stress – including drought and famine, exacerbate the risk of conflict ensuing because of resource competition (Omolo 2010: 88) (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6).

When it comes to the discussion of raiding and warfare in Africa's dry and semi-arid regions, many blame resource constraints and climate change for interethnic conflict (Scheffran et al. 2012: 870). A combination of drastic climatic changes and inefficient resource management pushes pastoral communities to incite violence against farmers in the form of cattle raids. According to raid data gathered from the area between 2006 and 2009 by IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN),

Pokot pastoralists, found in Kenya and Uganda, were responsible for 59% of all raids, followed by the South Sudanese Toposa who conducted 11% of all raids and the Dasenach from Ethiopia and Kenya who carried out 9% (Schilling et al. 2011: 14). The persistent challenge of resource scarcity and competition has led to violent conflict over the acquisition of these natural resources. The occurrence of cattle raids in multiple countries within the Horn highlights the cross-border aspect of the crisis and the subsequent need for a cooperative effort for all parties in the region to commit to resolving the conflict incidences.

Competition over scarce resources has existed for as long as groups have depended on naturally occurring resources to maintain their livelihoods. Resource competition is normal, and often anticipated, but conflict because of resource competition is not (Hussein 1998). When conflict ensues due to competition over scarce natural resources, a common reason is human movement in response to degrading environmental conditions caused by the intense effects of climate change.

A significant concern in the case of the Horn of Africa is that growing competition for resources has increased the level of conflict in the region between farmers and pastoralists, while the speed of climate change adaptation measures and solutions has remained stagnant. Managing the existing competition between pastoralists and farmers for natural resources is imperative. The literature above, as well as the lived experiences of people in the Horn, suggest that the most effective solution to the ongoing climate-related conflict should be threefold. It should address the aspect of diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution, it should encompass means to predict and respond better to climate variability and it should offer support to the livelihoods of the agro-reliant farmer and pastoralist communities of the Horn so that these communities do not have to resort to conflict.

According to a 2016 UNDP study on the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), the initiatives and activities that have been the most effective in regions like the Horn typically take a cross-border approach. In addition, these initiatives incorporate and expand upon traditional institutions and practices, strike a balance between income generation and the needs of community members, implement peacebuilding, and reinforce already-existing mechanisms (Molina 2017: 20). Abrahams argues that despite understanding that climate is a threat multiplier in

conflict scenarios between pastoralists and farmers in the Horn, policymakers still find it challenging to implement policies and programmes that directly respond to the crisis within the region. He argues that understanding the threat multiplier discourse in climate-conflict scenarios does not translate into the ability to conceptualize, develop, or implement sustainable policies that address the climate conflict nexus (Abrahams 2020: 1).

### *3.3.3. Limited governance and state reach*

Persistent farmer-pastoralist violence indicates that existing policies and regulations in the region pertaining to climate change adaptation support, conflict early warning and resolution are not sufficiently tailored to address the concerns and needs of these communities (Seddon & Sumberg 1997).

Agro-reliant communities' ability to adapt to the extremes of climate change is influenced by several factors, including poverty, the extent of governmental support or lack thereof, the accessibility to economic opportunities, as well as the state of social cohesion between communities. These are all challenges currently faced by the pastoral population of the Horn (Omolo 2010: 83). The sustainable and diplomatic response that this study calls for in response to the ongoing conflict within the region, requires leaders within the Horn to address these underlying socioeconomic factors and related systemic shortcomings to resolve the conflict between farmers and pastoralists holistically.

Farmers and pastoralists have seemingly found it challenging to adapt to the climatic changes in their region and how drastic weather patterns are jeopardizing their livelihoods (Omolo 2010: 89). In their 2011 paper, Schilling et al. (2011) postulate that farmer-pastoralist conflict and the violence involved in cattle raiding for purposes of livestock replenishing in times of drought is in itself a form of climate change adaptation. As such, they call for alternative, sustainable, and most importantly, peaceful, adaptation options for these groups within the Horn region (Schilling et al. 2011: 16). In the past two decades, pastoralists, have pursued alternative means of generating income and sustaining their livelihoods to depend less on the weather and environmental factors. The continued occurrence of cattle raids and violent confrontations between pastoralists and farmers indicate that despite their efforts to

adapt and pursue alternatives, the threat posed by climate change on their livelihoods remains significant and far from alleviated. This begs the question of what governments are doing to support and assist these communities as they fight against each other in their struggle to adapt to climate change.

State governments often fail to reach pastoralist groups who occupy and move between remote areas. However, their distance from typical areas of government reach should not make the lack of government support acceptable. Due to the absence of governance in pastoralist areas, they have been dubbed ungoverned spaces (Raleigh 2010: 72).

Ungoverned spaces are territories outside of the domain of a government's authority. Individuals living inside the borders of a sovereign state but not under its authority are thus inhabitants of ungoverned spaces. Most ungoverned spaces are that way due to the state neglecting these locations and their inhabitants by failing to provide services and governance to them, opting rather to pursue other interests while deliberately isolating the ungoverned spaces (Groh 2006: v). Areas where pastoral communities are found are often characterised as ungoverned spaces, this further explains why conflicts in these regions are not promptly and effectively dealt with, and why the grievances of these communities including the adverse effects of climate change on their livelihoods, persist.

Between 2006 and 2009 close to 300 raids had been conducted by pastoralists in the Horn of Africa region. Of these raids, only 8.2% of animals stolen in the process were recovered, and the authorities only intervened in 13.4% of the raids (Schilling et al. 2011: 13). This low percentage of livestock recovery and law enforcement intervention demonstrates a lack of government involvement in issues relating to cattle raiding and by extension, conflict among farmers and pastoralists due to their geographic marginalization. This lends to the claim that pastoral areas are ungoverned spaces and therefore more prone to this form of violence continuing with little to no recourse (Wennström 2024: 12).

According to Mwaura (2005), pastoral regions' marginal geographic position and experience of insufficient state penetration are frequently linked to conflict. Pastoralists are viewed as being on the periphery of society, state institutions and politics in

addition to being geographically remote. There is a lengthy history of social, economic, and political marginalization experienced by pastoralist communities in East Africa. With governments in this region often neglecting to promote livestock industries for pastoralists to participate in and insufficiently regulating pastoralist areas, this further fuels the grievances and motivations for violence amongst these communities (Waphuka et al. 2022: 99; Behnke 2008: 46). Pastoralist communities in these isolated border regions continue to have a limited and unfavourable perception of the state due to a lack of state presence and interaction. Generally, the state plays a weak role in providing services to pastoral communities in two areas: security and livelihood support (Mwaura 2005).

The exercise of effective environmental governance within the Horn of Africa in response to the current climate-related conflict will have to encompass improved local capacity to support these communities in adapting to climate change. Marginalized groups such as pastoralist communities continue to be vulnerable because, typically, they cannot participate in or influence the processes and decisions that determine the adaptation options available to them (Eriksen & Lind 2009: 818). The perceived neglect of and bias against pastoralist communities will need to be eradicated for this group to be adequately supported and involved in dialogue and decision-making on adaptation strategies and peacebuilding within their region.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

This chapter has further contextualized the farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict in the Horn. It has identified the basic inadequacies of the state's administrative, resource management, and conflict resolution mechanisms concerning preventing and reducing scarcity-induced conflicts in the region. Pastoralism is a lifestyle known to adapt well to the severities of climate change and as a result, has thrived in several regions of the Horn for centuries. Even so, the unregulated and widespread availability of small arms, inadequate governance, socioeconomic challenges, and frequent droughts have progressively outpaced pastoralist's ability to adapt (Schilling et al. 2011: 1). This chapter has demonstrated how violence over access to resources in this instance is a product of self-governing to sustain livelihoods in ungoverned spaces (Raleigh 2010: 70; von Uexkull 2012: 447). According to Slentz, the outplay of violence is a crucial communication mechanism that signals shifts and changes to come within

weak and inadequate systems (Slentz 2021:23). This study aims to uncover the opportunities for regional cooperative climate diplomacy in the region, particularly as it pertains to the policy and structural shifts and changes necessary within the region.

The following chapter will feature the discussion and findings section of the study, whereby an environmental governance analytical framework will be applied to evaluate the opportunities and challenges for successful regional cooperative climate diplomacy.

## CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSING THE FEASIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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### 4.1. Introduction

By way of answering the third and final research sub-question of the study, the following chapter will assess the opportunities and challenges to regional cooperative diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region. The discussion in this chapter is aimed at highlighting the feasibility of remedying farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn through environmental governance. Using an environmental governance analytical framework, the chapter will analyze the progress of cooperative environmental governance in the Horn. In the first three chapters of the study, two of the three research sub-question questions were answered, namely, ‘What is the nature and history of farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa region?’, and ‘What have previous conflict resolution and climate adaptation efforts aimed at farmer and pastoralist communities looked like in the Horn of Africa?’. The objective of this chapter is to answer the third and final sub-research question and in doing so, further lend to the study’s overall aim of understanding the role of regional cooperative environmental governance in remedying farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn.

In this chapter, the solutions that have been identified as necessary to remedy climate-related conflict in the Horn between farmers and pastoralists will be stated and explained. Following this, the environmental governance framework will be applied to evaluate the progress that has been made in the Horn in achieving the outlined solutions. Thereafter, a discussion on the key findings about the challenges and opportunities to regional environmental governance and the climate-conflict nexus in the Horn will follow.

### 4.2. Categorized solutions to the climate-related conflict in the Horn

The complexity of the climate-conflict case in the Horn of Africa necessitates a solution that adequately addresses the entirety of the problem. In addition to engaging in climate diplomacy, leaders in the region will have to demonstrate that they prioritize

supporting farmer and pastoralist communities in adapting to climate change. Following reviews of the literature and discussions about the history of conflict, resource competition and conflict resolution within the region, the appropriate solutions to the climate-conflict case are summed up into three broad categories (See section 3.2). These categories include diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, climate change adaptation and farmer and pastoralist livelihood support. The following section will detail what these solutions entail as well as the positive difference they are expected to make within the region.

#### 4.2.1. Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms

The Horn is a region with already existing platforms of dialogue, conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement. The region and its ethnic groups have seen resource competition conflicts come and go and have managed to agree on peaceful solutions before. Therefore, this should guide efforts towards cooperative efforts within the region as far as reducing conflict incidence between farmers and pastoralists altogether (Omolo 2010: 91; Toolit 2015). In addition to engaging in dialogue, diplomatic engagements by regional actors make it possible for tangible solutions regarding land sharing as well as resource management to be established. The conflict between farmers and pastoralists often transcends borders, and to restore peaceful relations among the actors within the region, it is of concern to the entire Horn to respond to the ongoing crisis appropriately. Drastic climatic changes have disrupted social relationships and harmony between communities in the Horn and considering that there used to be traditional ways that this issue was addressed previously, future peace negotiations need to remain community-centred and considerate, to a significant extent, of customary diplomacy (Huser & Kirkbride 2006: 8; Omolo 2010: 93).

An additional aspect of conflict cessation involves addressing the national security threat posed by the movement of arms across the borders of the region. The cross-border element of small arms proliferation in this conflict should be a concern that all governments in the region commit to collectively rectifying and better managing for the benefit of their individual states as well as the Horn altogether (Schilling et al. 2011: 19). Diplomacy will be vital in the management of small arms proliferation as it allows for the facilitation of dialogue, peacebuilding, as well as disarmament initiatives aimed

at curbing arms proliferation in the entire region. Diplomacy fosters cooperation among states, and particularly in the Horn, it could be useful in enabling collaborative efforts aimed at the implementation of arms control agreements and establishment of stricter arms trade regulations (Mkutu 2001). The common goals of regional security and stability are shared by all the citizens and leaders within the Horn. Diplomatic engagement on the issue provides opportunities for actors to agree on a way forward that adequately prioritizes the security of the entire region and contributes to long-term sustainable peace between farmers and pastoralists.

#### 4.2.2. Climate change adaptation

Both inhabitants of the Horn and environmental scientists have identified a need for better weather prediction in the region, more particularly when it comes to weather extremes like droughts. Second to this, Omolo (2010) has suggested the establishment of a drought-coordinating agency to best ensure that governments within the region are offering support to pastoralists and farmers before during and after droughts according to the needs of the respective groups. Better climate change early warning and prediction response mechanisms are needed within the region as well, seeing as a significant portion of the population relies on the land and naturally occurring resources to survive. Geographically, most countries in the Horn are subject to similar weather patterns, and consequently similar climate change impacts. It is for this reason that regional interventions remain a priority, as the experiences of these communities do not occur in isolation. Being better prepared for floods or droughts significantly reduces the risk of scarcity-fuelled violent confrontations.

#### 4.2.3. Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support

Climate change adaptation in the case of pastoralists and farmers in the Horn of Africa entails, to a large extent, capacity building. Most pastoralists are finding it more and more difficult to cover production input costs and keep their livestock alive and healthy during drought (Flintan et al. 2013: 2). A solution to this is that farmers and pastoralists should receive adequate and appropriate adaptation support in the form of viable farming, cultivation, or resource alternatives as well as assistance and support on how to best distribute and share scarce natural resources (Eriksen & Lind 2009: 826). This can be in the form of education or through programmes that gradually introduce these

groups to diverse livelihood options and sources of income to sustain them during periods of drought (Omolo 2010: 99).

Adjusting to something as unpredictable as climate change requires government support to affected communities, especially pastoralists in this instance. This support can be in the form of livestock insurance for instances of significant livestock loss and poor health resulting from the effects of climate change (Schilling et al. 2011: 18). Pastoralists depend on the land to make a living, therefore supporting these groups and minimizing their distress and desperation during climate-related shocks could include integrating pastoralism into markets to ensure that pastoralists continue to enjoy income security during these crises. The consequences of pastoral marginalisation and poverty are widespread and have impacted many farming communities across the Horn. As such effective solutions that address pastoralist's grievances are necessary to restore security and peace not only within individual states but across the region.

#### **4.3. Operationalizing the environmental governance framework of analysis**

In the following section of the chapter, the environmental governance analytical framework will be applied to evaluate what has been and what remains to be done to remedy the ongoing farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict in the Horn. To do this, the quality and efficacy of existing environmental governance interventions, structures, and efforts within the region that align with the abovementioned solutions will be evaluated according to the five components of the environmental governance analytical framework. This analysis will evaluate the state of diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, climate change adaptation and farmer and pastoralist livelihood support in the Horn according to the components of environmental governance, namely institutional framework, financial resources, stakeholder cooperation, policies and regulation, monitoring, evaluation, and learning.

The analysis will be conducted this way to draw informed conclusions about the efficacy of environmental governance efforts when it comes to directly responding to the identified needs of the region and the conflicting parties. With the solutions in mind, the evaluation aims to demonstrate the successes and shortcomings of current

environmental governance in the region, to inform the improvements and alternatives required when it comes to the implementation of the solutions.

#### 4.3.1. Institutional framework

There are a few key institutions in the Horn that have been developed to handle environmental governance issues in addition to other regional challenges. The institutional structures identified as being equipped to effectively address specific environmental governance issues in the Horn include the African Union as well as the two regional blocs of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). These regional bodies are mandated to coordinate efforts in ensuring the effective enforcement of environmental policies (Malla 2023). Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda have dual membership in IGAD and the EAC, henceforth reference made to the EAC will be directly relevant only to the three states that are also a part of the Horn and subsequently, IGAD. The AU, IGAD and EAC have been credited for being successful in environmental governance only to a limited degree. The question of how improvements in the function, design, and operations within these institutions, could enhance their impact in the areas of conflict resolution, natural resource management, climate change adaptation and pastoralist livelihood support in the Horn remains (Brewer & Stern 2005: 41). The following section will analyse how leadership shortcomings as well as disconnects and flaws in the functioning of IGAD and the EAC have adversely impacted the efficacy of these institutions' environmental governance efforts in the Horn.

##### *Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms*

The IGAD-Cross Border Development Facilitation Unit (CBDFU) was established in 2018 with the aim to promote and improve cross-border cooperation within the Karamoja Cluster. CBDFU is IGAD's representative on the ground. The specific areas of cooperation that the unit focuses on include institutional support and coordination, policy dialogue, capacity development, resilience strengthening as well as conflict prevention and peacebuilding particularly in the rural and remote areas of the region (IGAD 2021). This project has played a crucial role in the creation of cross-border resource-sharing frameworks that have since been embedded in IGAD's regional

security and development policies- indicating long-term impact (Otuoma 2022: 92). Kefale and Arsano (2020) found that the design of the CBDFU has promoted diplomacy at the grassroots level, which has been complementary to formal interstate diplomatic efforts. This has been achieved through improved local governance and conflict resolution mechanisms among pastoralists in areas like the Kenya-Ethiopia border, instilling trust between these communities and reducing conflict incidence (Kefale & Arsano 2020: 112). The success of the CBDFU is attributed to how effective the programme has been at carrying out its function of providing cross-border regional coordination support among IGAD states. The programme has carried out its mandate of overseeing regional collaboration by bringing together grassroots and formal diplomacy in a complementary way - drawing on the benefits that both can contribute to conflict resolution in the Horn.

Despite these successes in promoting a bottom-up approach to diplomacy, a few issues persist. One of the challenges experienced when it comes to the CBDFU is the ineffective coordination between national governments and the regional framework of IGAD. While the CBDFU advocates for regional projects, national governments occasionally give priority to their national agendas and plans, which may conflict with or detract from regional goals. This results in a misalignment between national policies and IGAD initiatives and these breakdowns in cohesion have impeded the implementation of CBDFU cross-border regional agreements (Mekonnen 2019: 41; CEWARN 2022: 41). Furthermore, IGAD member states have often demonstrated inconsistent commitment to CBDFU initiatives, and this has weakened and disrupted the diplomatic endeavours within IGAD that are geared towards various conflict prevention and resource management plans and strategies (Holmquist & Rock 2023: 6). The national priorities of individual nations should not hamper collaborative efforts for the entire region - these issues indicate that there is a lack of common understanding among IGAD member states regarding their responsibilities within CBDFU. Flaws in institutional functions such as this cannot go unresolved for too long, given the significant role that these actors play in actioning real change and impact in the region. If IGAD members cannot find common ground and carry out their mandates, critical decisions for the region are delayed and solutions to the problems faced by communities like farmers and pastoralists only persist and worsen.

### *Climate change adaptation*

Between 2012-2018 an initiative in partnership with the East African Community (EAC) and Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) to improve the management of transboundary water resources and support climate change adaptation and resilience within the region was established. The Planning for Resilience in East Africa through Policy, Adaptation, Research, and Economic Development (PREPARED) project improved the EAC and LVBC's institutional ability to recognize, plan for, and address a broad range of climate change challenges related to water, sanitation and biodiversity conservation. The project facilitated the EAC's Secretariat acquisition of Regional Implementing Entity (RIE) certification for the operationalization of the EAC's Regional Climate Change Fund (RCCF). This accreditation was essential in ensuring that the EAC qualified to receive financing from the Global Adaptation Fund (GlobalWaters.org 2022). As an RIE, the EAC Secretariat enhanced its ability to coordinate climate change adaptation efforts across the region, including collaboration with other regional bodies including IGAD, allowing for better policy harmonization across East African countries, particularly concerning climate-resilient agriculture and water resource management (Onencan & van de Walle 2022: 127).

With RIE certification, this meant that the EAC could channel funds toward climate-resilient infrastructure projects in the Horn of Africa. This included the development of flood control measures, drought management infrastructure, and climate-resilient transport systems, which were critical in mitigating the impacts of extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change (Kamau & Mutugi 2022: 64). The RCCF financed the construction of small-scale irrigation systems and water storage facilities in drought-prone areas of northern Kenya and Uganda. This infrastructure helped pastoralists and farmers better cope with prolonged dry spells, reducing competition for dwindling resources and improving food security in these regions. The RCCF supported numerous locally driven projects, such as the promotion of agroforestry, sustainable rangeland management, and alternative livelihoods for pastoralist communities in Kenya and Uganda. By targeting local communities with direct adaptation support, the fund helped to build resilience at the grassroots level, reducing vulnerability to climate shocks like droughts and floods, which are frequent in the Horn of Africa (Igumba 2021:102). It is through these positive impacts that the importance

of climate funding for developing countries is highlighted. The Horn is a region that is known to struggle with the effects of climate change, with a population who are poor and agro-reliant. The EAC's diplomatic engagement and participation in this project underscored the benefits of multilateralism and partnered efforts towards realizing various climate change adaptation goals.

The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) framework of action was developed by IGAD member states in 2011 following a period of devastating droughts in the Horn of Africa. The framework was designed to strengthen the capacity of the Horn's nations to handle natural disasters and to build resilience among the region's communities to handle future disaster occurrences. IDDRSI aimed to address the vulnerabilities of pastoralists and other agro-reliant groups who relied heavily on the environment and its resources to survive (IGAD 2019; FAO 2019: 53). Regional cooperation among IGAD member states was pivotal to the successful operationalisation of IDDRSI, and all member states were expected to make a collective effort towards improving water and land management, sustainable land use and overall promotion of resilience during recurring drought. In the Karamoja Cluster—the cross-border region between Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia—joint efforts to manage grazing lands and water sources were made, resulting in a notable difference in reducing resource conflicts (UNDP 2024: 17).

While the work of IDDRSI in addressing the root causes of vulnerability as well as highlighting the importance of collaborating to solve climate change issues has been significant, its overall impact on reducing natural resource conflicts in the Horn of Africa has been limited (Ospina & De Nys 2022:11). This is mainly due to, poor institutional integration between national and regional bodies, weak coordination, and a lack of capacity for implementing regional initiatives. The lack of collective action from IGAD member states is attributed to member states' national interests often superseding regional priorities, leading to inconsistent application of IDDRSI policies (GWPEA 2015). Failures in the IDDRSI are attributed to an absence of cohesion within IGAD, this is cause for concern considering that this study aims to highlight why cooperation and cohesion are vital in ensuring effective and sustainable solutions for the Horn's challenges.

Like IGAD, the EAC has often been characterised as lacking a cooperative nature as well, with member states often disagreeing and neglecting to engage in dialogue to resolve their disagreements. This absence of cooperation and friendly diplomatic relations can be understood to have contributed to the failures in the effective implementation of the East African Community Climate Change Policy (EACCCP) (Urbanus 2020: 11; Viljoen 2013: 138). Overall, this policy seems to only scratch the surface in addressing the complexities associated with the adverse effects of climate change but does not address the subsequent concerns of displacement and food insecurity that already vulnerable groups – pastoralists in particular- are facing in the region. This is due in part to flaws in the policy design as well as a lack of coordination between the EAC’s climate policy framework and local governance institutions. Mulwa (2017) attributes these institutional failures to ineffective top-down approaches that neglect to integrate ground-level realities into regional climate adaptation strategies, resulting in inadequate responses to pastoralists’ food security and displacement challenges (Mulwa 2017: 6).

A pattern of lack of cooperation within regional bodies and institutions in the Horn seems to be common. According to Tsega (2016), a hindrance to more effective regional climate diplomacy in Africa is the fragmentation within the continent's most prominent bodies that deal with climate issues (Tsega 2016: 7). These bodies include the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), established by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). Institutional framework challenges are the cause of the fragmentation, which manifests in the form of overlapping mandates, unclear roles, and weak coordination mechanisms. Both bodies aim to represent Africa in climate negotiations but often operate in silos, resulting in fragmented policy-making and reduced influence regionally and continentally (Jegade & Masoga 2016: 11).

#### *Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support*

The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) was established in 2003 as an African Union flagship initiative as part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to reduce food insecurity on the continent through enhanced agricultural support (African Union 2003). Given the vast

population of agro-reliant communities and industries in the Horn, the CAADP was expected to be pivotal in addressing many of the region's challenges especially those associated with climate change and how it had impacted pastoralism. The CAADP's focus has largely been on agriculture and food security, with less emphasis on pastoralism - a critical livelihood in the Horn of Africa. While the programme promotes sustainable land use, it has not sufficiently addressed the mobility needs and resource-sharing systems crucial for pastoralists. Despite the CAADP's focus on climate-smart agriculture contributing positively to resilience-building in some areas, those measures have not been sufficiently widespread to fully alleviate resource conflicts (Benin 2016:19). According to Nori and Davies (2007), pastoral concerns and livelihood challenges are often marginalized in agricultural policies, and therefore a programme like CAADP held the potential to correct this by paying explicit attention to addressing the unique challenge of pastoralists, however, the programme did not do so (Nori & Davies 2007:17). Through its emphasis on national and regional modern agricultural development, the CAADP has tended to significantly overlook the specific needs and rights of pastoralist communities, who continue to face displacement while struggling to attain resources to survive off. This has only served to further marginalise this group and has not minimized their incentive to engage in conflict by any significant margin (Hagmann & Péclard 2010: 556; Molina 2017: 21).

A more pastoral-focused approach was taken between 2015 and 2021, when the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan respective ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries collaborated under the lead of IGAD in organizing the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP). The project was complemented by funding from the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan governments. The project's goals were to increase the resilience of pastoral and agro pastoral communities in cross-border drought-prone areas of the Horn against shocks. Additionally, the project aimed to improve the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan government's capacity to act quickly and decisively in response to crises including droughts and natural resource conflicts. The project implemented pastoral risk management to enhance drought preparedness and response both at national and regional levels and improved access to intra-regional livestock markets. The project also reduced the time lapse between early warning information and response within the region, trained pastoralists on livestock value chains and demonstrated an overall prioritization of enhancing the livelihoods of

pastoralists in the Horn. On many different fronts, especially pastoral livelihood support, the project was considered a success. The regional aspect of the RPLRP remained key and although the project was without fault, it demonstrated a positive shift towards state response to pastoral needs and vulnerabilities (Wakjira 2021; IGAD 2019).

The existence of regional bodies and organisations committed to addressing the issues that arise from climate change in Africa is essential, but only in so far as these bodies effectively contribute to solving Africa's climate-related challenges. The trans boundary nature of the climate-related conflict in the Horn necessitates a regional solution and if there are setbacks in the functions of the institutions entrusted to remedy the region's challenges, this suggests that no solutions could ever be effectively implemented. Gesora and Mulinge (2022: 56) argue that what is missing in climate diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is leadership, capable negotiators, and policy implementation. The institutional framework weaknesses discussed in this section underscore this.

#### 4.3.2. Financial resources

Economic factors remain inextricable from the climate change adaptation and resilience discussion especially where it pertains to developing states who have limited resources to adequately tackle the challenges of climate change. Tsega (2016) argues that one of the most significant constraints African states encounter in their climate adaptation implementation is the lack of financial capacity, and the Horn is no exception (Tsega 2016: 5). The following section will discuss the financial aspect as part of environmental governance plans to combat the Horn's ongoing climate-related conflict crisis. Given the magnitude of the ongoing challenge, there is an overall lack of financial and technical resources being allocated towards solving the crisis and related issues. This section will evaluate the impact of funding constraints and discuss whose responsibility it is to ensure that regional budgets better accommodate conflict resolution, climate adaptation and pastoralist livelihood support plans in the Horn.

#### *Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms*

The African Group of Negotiator's (AGN) bargaining power in climate diplomacy continues to grow. This growth accelerated after COP12 in Nairobi in 2006, when

African states played a significant role in setting the conference's agenda, mainly through climate finance negotiations (Roger & Belliethathan 2016: 93). Financing climate adaptation remains a concern in Africa. Ethiopia and Somalia, two of the Horn of Africa's most vocal supporters of the Loss and Damage Fund's establishment, were among the attendees of COP27 in 2022. Together, alongside other least developed countries, they put compensation for climate change related loss at the fore of the COP27 agenda. Somalia represented the diplomatic interests of the region best by using the ongoing drought crisis that is affecting millions of its citizens as a practical illustration of how climate change is intensifying disputes over limited natural resources including land pasture and water (FESTU 2022). Advocating for the Loss and Damage Fund, demonstrated the proactiveness of nations in the Horn when it comes to climate diplomacy negotiations and advancing regional interests (UNFCCC 2022). As of 2024 the Loss and Damage Fund is in the inception stages and has not been fully operationalised, as such, countries in the Horn of Africa have not yet seen substantial financial benefits from the fund. In the meantime, the Horn of Africa continues to rely on other climate finance mechanisms and humanitarian aid to address its pressing climate challenges.

### *Climate change adaptation*

To harmonise climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts in the East African region, EAC Heads of State adopted the East African Community Climate Change Policy (EACCCP) in 2009 (EAC 2011.). The policy aimed to address climate change effects that were adversely impacting the region's socioeconomic development. A cooperative approach to combating climate change and its consequences as part of this policy included supporting vulnerable communities and sectors in their adaptation strategies as well as mainstreaming climate change into national as well as regional development plans. Among issues of weak governance and weak policy enforcement, inadequate funding was especially a hindrance to the success of the EACCCP (Ampaire et al. 2017:86). The policy's implementation relied heavily on capacity building, mainly in the form of financing and technological transfers (Laibuni et al. 2019: 22)

Due to a lack of proper financing, national and local governments in East Africa encountered various restrictions when it came to technical expertise and capacity-

building efforts. The implementation of adaptation projects within the EACCCP geared towards agriculture, water management, and disaster preparedness have all been hampered by financial constraints. The goals of this policy could not be fully realized because the EACCCP's objectives were significantly underfinanced. The challenges of financing experienced with the EACCCP demonstrated that agricultural sectors do not receive sufficient funding from national governments across the region (Mulwa 2017: 7- 9).

In addition to the institutional framework challenges which delayed the implementation of the IDDRSI project, limited funding was especially an issue when it came to coordinating cross-border initiatives within the project. Financial constraints have caused project delays, significant scale-backs as well as the cancellation of a few initiatives within the project. Initially the project set out to establish climate-resilient infrastructure projects including water harvesting and irrigation systems, but these plans were not fully realised due to a lack of financial resources (Hurford et al. 2017: 18). Because the IDDRSI was heavily dependent on external funding sources, regional ownership and autonomy over the project implementation was rather limited. In addition, this dependency led to a lot of uncertainty when it came to the availability and acquisition of funds for the project (Ackerl et al. 2023: 185; Wakjira 2018: 18). This has all compromised the quality, project sustainability and overall effectiveness of the IDDRSI in better equipping and preparing farmer and pastoralist communities for adverse climate conditions (Lung et al. 2021: 24).

#### *Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support*

The European Union-funded EU Emergency Trust Fund Cross-Border Programme which spanned across the borders of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia was launched in 2016. Diplomatic relationships and engagements between the EU, IGAD, national governments and local actors were central to the design, funding, and implementation of the programme. The objective of trust fund programme was to foster resilience among pastoral communities along the Karamoja cluster, the Mandera Triangle, and the Borana pastoral belt. Additional priorities of the programme included expanding economic and employment opportunities for pastoral communities in addition to reducing their irregular migration and subsequent involvement in climate-related conflicts (Altai Consulting 2021:15). Upwards of two hundred million euros

have been invested in agricultural productivity, improving livestock production, and building infrastructure such as water boreholes and dams to ensure reliable access to water during dry seasons in the region. These financial investments have proved critical for sustaining livestock in the drought-prone areas of the Horn.

The EUTF Cross-Border Programme was a financial instrument that was more adaptive than structured, and responded to the context and needs in the Horn as and when they arose. In addition to fostering deeper cross-border cooperation, the EUTF Cross-Border Programme improved pastoralists' resilience to environmental shocks, especially drought. An example of this was through the introduction of mobile veterinary clinics which helped reduce livestock mortality, a critical factor in securing livelihoods in these regions. As a means to expand market access opportunities for pastoralist communities, the programme offered skills training and business development in these communities, especially targeted at the youth (Raty & Shilhav 2020 :8). A persistent obstacle of the EUTF Cross-Border Programme was the restricted ability of local administrations to maintain the outcomes of the initiative. Sustaining the infrastructure and services that were made possible by the programme's funding requires governance and administrative capacities that many of the region's local governments do not have (Kipp 2018:24). Although diplomatic engagements between the EU, IGAD, and regional governments were essential to securing the necessary funding and cooperation to implement the cross-border programme, the external dependence and lack of local ownership of the project presented significant limitations to its success.

Climate change adaptation is undoubtedly an expensive process. For a region like the Horn, it is also a process that is ongoing and will continue to require an appropriate response. This section demonstrated a pattern where the costs of the regional crisis significantly outweigh what the various actors in the Horn can afford. Given both the magnitude of the region's climate-related conflict crisis and how long it has been occurring, a criticism of a lack of appropriate and sufficient national and local budget allocations toward remedying the crisis could follow. There is a lack of confidence that the Horn will manage the financing of the various proposed solutions to its crises. Furthermore, it could be concluded that a lack of urgency in prioritizing and meeting the financial demands of the regional problem is due to a variety of shortcomings in

governance and in engaging diplomatically and leveraging multilateral partnerships with various actors across all sectors to secure funding.

#### 4.3.3. Stakeholder cooperation

Over the past two decades, more non-state actors have become involved in climate diplomacy and related policymaking processes. New platforms including the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) have played an integral part in paving the way for non-state actors to be recognized and incorporated into the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Hsu et al. 2015: 502). The stakeholders involved in the climate diplomacy and regional environmental governance engagements of this case study include the governments and respective ministries of foreign affairs, environment, and natural resources of IGAD and specified EAC member states. Additional stakeholders include local peacekeeping NGOs and civil organisations, traditional leaders as well as farmer and pastoralist groups.

Because regional environmental governance, encompasses debate and collaboration between various groups, this emergent form of governance is legitimate and effective (Klinke 2011:57). The following section will discuss how inconsistent prioritisation, differing interests, disagreements, and occasional lack of cooperation between stakeholders has prevented the realization of practical and actionable solutions for the region in many cases. Although there has been value in collaborative climate diplomacy engagements among the above-mentioned stakeholders, the involvement of diverse actors in the process has also posed as a challenge in terms of achieving and maintaining cohesion.

#### *Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms*

Initiated in 2014, PEACE III was a five-year initiative aimed at improving the horizontal and vertical ties within and between local, national, and regional conflict management actors to promote stability in the Horn of Africa. By concentrating on and tackling the many drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa along the Kenyan border straddling the

Somalian, Ethiopian, South Sudanese, and Ugandan borders as well, PEACE III expands on the success of PEACE II and PEACE I, two earlier conflict resolution projects (USAID 2016:7). During the initiative's duration, fewer violent conflicts occurred in the region thanks to the establishment of peace committees that enhanced cooperation between pastoralist groups along the Kenya-Somalia border. The engagements between the groups included the revitalization of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms including negotiated grazing corridors, which allowed pastoralist communities to share scarce resources without resorting to conflict. These horizontal connections were made possible by inclusive diplomatic engagement between actors, and their establishment played a crucial role in easing tensions and preventing violent conflict incidences in the region (Pkalya et al. 2020: 102).

PEACE III provided local conflict data to the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and created communication pathways between local peace committees and national policymakers, allowing local conflicts to be addressed through broader governmental policies. By strengthening the institutional capacity for regional conflict management and utilizing regional diplomacy to defuse possible conflicts, PEACE III improved IGAD's ability to intervene proactively in resource disputes and encouraged more efficient resource administration (Nyamwera et al 2021: 47). The source of the PEACE III project was cooperative and inclusive engagement among stakeholders.

The implementation of joint resource management agreements was one of the most successful components of PEACE III. These agreements, negotiated through cross-border peace committees and supported by local and national governments, created a clearly defined grazing corridor. Despite the prior success of the project stemming from effective cooperation between stakeholders, the implementation of the joint resource management agreements into national frameworks was impeded by a few stakeholder engagement challenges. The Ethiopian and Somali national governments had a few reservations about PEACE III and refused to be cooperative (Mahmoud 2019: 238). The individual national development agendas of Ethiopia and Somalia occasionally conflicted with the objectives of the PEACE III initiative. Both governments, have a history of border clashes and sovereignty concerns and were concerned that the PEACE III project's campaign for cross-border collaboration on

resource management would undermine their respective national security objectives (Adegehe 2009: 7; USAID 2017).

Despite PEACE III facilitating ties between local players and national authorities, it could not be effectively enforced due to a lack of cooperation among leaders (Wanjala & Otieno 2021: 96). Even with the necessary financial resources and support, member states failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to successfully operationalise the conflict prevention measures that were reached by various actors through the assistance of the PEACE III initiative. This project was a prime example of why a sustainable solution to the crisis in the Horn requires regional actors to take the lead and always show initiative. External donors can always show support and lend their resources but actioning the change relies on regional leaders and when administrative failures like the abovementioned occur, it brings us to question how truly committed leaders in the Horn are to setting their individual interest aside and committing to collaboration to see the issue in the region being resolved.

Another example of stakeholder cooperation in the region involved cross-border diplomatic negotiations between the neighbouring states of Kenya and Uganda. Following a consultative meeting in the community of Turkana in November of 2022 between Ugandan and Kenyan leaders, farmers, and pastoralists as well as NGOs working on peace within the region, Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni signed an MOU. The MOU permitted Kenyan pastoralists to cross the Ugandan borders for cattle grazing, given that they crossed the border without carrying weapons. This exercise of diplomacy was done to maintain good relations between the neighbouring states and address the growing concerns about the use of illegal weapons in cattle raids and related crimes within the region. As significant as this was on paper, unfortunately, neither the Kenyan nor the Ugandan pastoralists and farmers who were in attendance felt that the meeting was effective in mediating the persisting issues between the groups. Many expressed that a resolution was decided by their leaders on their behalf before they were allowed to express their grievances and propose their solutions (Jeremiah et al. 2024: 28).

This outcome, as unfortunate as it was, serves as a reminder that authorities and senior institutional representatives cannot make decisions alone and that their agreements can only really be effective if the affected parties agree to cooperate.

There seems to be a gap between prescriptive solutions from governments and actionable solutions that communities would prefer. Even though the authority lies higher up, consulting the affected groups can never be a lost cause- and perhaps more consultation with farmers, pastoralists and their affected communities is required before officials sign agreements amongst one another. More of a bottom-up approach in these diplomatic engagements is necessary, and it is only with a clear understanding of the issue from farmers and pastoralists themselves that viable solutions can be enacted. This can only occur if these groups are engaged thoroughly and frequently.

The Cross Border Development Facilitation Unit (CBDFU) works alongside IGAD's Specialized Institutions particularly to ensure cooperation and the success of cross-border initiatives (IGAD 2021). The CBDFU integrates these regional tools into its mediation efforts, linking local-level conflict resolution with broader regional strategies for conflict prevention and management. NGOs are often at the forefront of implementing CBDFU's policies on the ground. They work in tandem with the CBDFU to conduct peacebuilding workshops, provide humanitarian aid, and mediate disputes at the local level. Women, as primary caregivers and providers of water and food security in rural agro-reliant communities, are critical in peace-building efforts. The CBDFU has worked to elevate the role of women in decision-making spaces, particularly in discussions related to land use and resource management, where they have a vested interest. Second to this, by virtue of their vulnerability, during violent clashes between pastoralists and farmers, women are seriously often harmed. The spillover effects of these conflicts significantly impact the lives of women and therefore they should be adequately represented and included in peace discussions and operations (Maseno 2020: 101.; Wanyonyi 2018: 34; Mieth 2012:70). The work of the CBDFU has reflected an understanding of the delicate diplomatic approach required to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are equally paid consideration.

An additional marginal group in society that the CBDFU works to include in their work is the youth. Youth, who make up the largest proportion of the population in conflict-affected areas of the Horn, are frequently involved in violent clashes due to a lack of economic opportunities. Young people who seek to earn a living and support their families join pastoralist groups and move across borders where they often also

become involved in the negative conflict associated with pastoralism (Toolit 2015). The CBDFU partners with local governments and NGOs to provide alternative livelihoods for young people, thereby reducing their involvement in farmer-pastoralist conflicts. By including civil society actors, the CBDFU ensures that its interventions are rooted in the realities of those directly affected by conflicts. The CBDFU's bottom-up approach in integrating various actors, including traditional leaders, builds trust amongst them while acknowledging the authority and influence that these actors have on their communities. The CBDFU's encouragement of stakeholder cooperation underscores the importance engaging in diplomacy across various levels and empowering communities to take the lead in negotiations and discussions regarding issues that impact their lives (Toolit 2015).

In March of 2024, Kenyan residents participated in a community-led effort towards peacebuilding. The historically conflicting Turkana and Samburu populations of Kenya joined together to address the long-standing problems of banditry and cattle raiding, which had been sparking violence between farmers and pastoralists belonging to the respective tribes. Local leaders and community elders led the peace initiative, which involved hosting a peace demonstration from Ngaremara town to Serolipi. During this journey, these communities shared the message of peace and reconciliation. The initiative included various groups within society, including women, the elderly, and Morans—who are most often involved in the raids. This cooperation of various stakeholders indicated the collective concern about climate-related conflict occurring among these communities (SND 2024).

The leaders of both communities have played crucial roles in encouraging dialogue and mutual respect as an alternative to conflict, signalling significant progress towards restoring peace and cooperation between Kenya's conflicting pastoralist and farmer communities. Recognizing that rivalry for resources and small arms proliferation are among the primary causes of violence, after negotiating and engaging in dialogue, the communities have pledged to collaborate to resolve these fundamental problems. These committees seek to deepen their diplomatic efforts and create procedures for amicably settling conflicts between the Turkana and Samburu farmers and pastoralists. There are existing peacebuilding initiatives that committees have

established, and they would like to maintain the momentum towards achieving peace (SND 2024).

### *Climate change adaptation*

The Horn of Africa Resilience Network (HoRN) is a multi-stakeholder project operating from 2019-2024 with the aim to increase the Horn of Africa's communities' ability to adapt to climatic shocks. It focuses on the socioeconomic well-being of the region's vulnerable communities especially those who are agro-reliant, such as pastoralists and farmers, through integrating climate change adaptation measures with development goals. The Network's strategy combines collaborative efforts between regional organizations like IGAD, local communities and leaders, foreign donors as well as national governments. The HoRN facilitates regional diplomacy on climate-related concerns providing national governments, pastoralists, and various funders with a forum to coordinate efforts on cross-border challenges including drought and natural resource management. The HoRN aims to enhance evidence-based learning and reinforce cross-border and regional collaboration to better inform regional climate change adaptation and resilience at all levels. To better manage natural disasters, the HoRN collaborates with various actors across Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia as well as South Sudan. The project's learning, sharing and exchange component between various actors at multiple levels encourages solutions that combine indigenous and local approaches with the support of various actors from outside of the region, pledging support and resources towards the realisation of these solutions (USAID 2022).

Through community-based initiatives, the HoRN makes sure that agro-reliant communities are included in the Network's climate adaptation initiatives. The HoRN places an emphasis on indigenous knowledge systems, ensuring that climate resilience and adaptation strategies are informed by local needs and traditions. Through direct interaction with farmers and pastoralists, the HoRN promotes local ownership of initiatives meant to enhance resource management and agricultural productivity, given the region's climate condition. In its resilience-building approaches, the HoRN places a strong emphasis on acknowledging and incorporating indigenous knowledge. Examples of this include the application of community-led disaster preparedness initiatives and the use of traditional drought early warning systems in

the initiatives of the HoRN. But occasionally, pastoralist communities have opposed some of the climate change strategies the Network has advocated, especially when such strategies contradict their customary land-use practices (Tye & Suarez 2021). This accommodative approach ensures local ownership of the initiatives, increasing the likelihood of their prolonged relevance and sustainability in local communities. This has led to more locally accepted and effective solutions to resource conflicts and more appropriate interventions that are tailored to local needs (Molla 2022: 132).

The HoRN still faces constraints regarding expanding their efforts across the entire region. Local capacity for climate adaptation remains limited and despite the HoRN's efforts to strengthen the capacity through technical support and training, this remains a challenge given how vast the region is and how diverse local settings are (ACBF 2023: 13; Heady & Kennedy 2012: 9). The most significant obstacle that the HoRN has encountered is stakeholder fragmentation. The network's overall influence has been weakened by a combination of several actors with competing interests duplicating efforts or misallocating resources (Kioko & Ouya 2023). The collaboration of diverse stakeholders was intended to strengthen the Network, but instead it has corroded it to an extent, resulting in more challenges than positive results. It is not very clear whether a single group of actors are entirely to blame for the failure of the Networks collaboration - however it is a concern to find that the cooperative element of cooperative regional climate diplomacy is a common challenge.

#### *Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support*

The Pastoralist Field Schools (PFS) programme was initiated in the Horn of Africa in 2006 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO). The conceptualization and funding of the programme was a result of diplomatic collaboration between the UN and governments of neighbouring states of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The programme was a community-driven learning initiative that empowered pastoralists in the region whose vulnerability was exacerbated by climate change, through training them on how to combine indigenous knowledge with modern practices (FAO 2017). On the ground, community members were trained to facilitate various activities and practices in field schools, where groups of pastoral women, men and youth were taught about more sustainable land and resource uses (Duveskog 2012: 4). The initiative focused on building the adaptive capacity of pastoralist

communities in the face of climate change, droughts, and natural resource conflicts through peer learning and communal cohesion. The PFS model fostered social learning and in doing so, promoted collective action and conflict resolution within pastoralist communities. The success of this approach was in its participatory nature, which ensured that the initiative was tailored to the specific needs and challenges of pastoralists in the region (Wane & Kazungu 2020: 645). This programme has empowered pastoralists through knowledge, allowing them to take the lead in decision-making regarding livestock management, sustainable grazing, and disease control (Duveskog: 2012: 4).

Despite its success, there were a few challenges encountered over the course of the programme. Pastoralists were highly sceptical of international organisations and government representatives, given that they were not used to interacting with these groups often. It was a challenge to build trust between the various actors and pastoralists, and as such a few components of the programme did not run as smoothly. There was also an initial resistance to the modern ideas and techniques that FAO was proposing to local communities through the programme. Pastoralists were not always willing to compromise or forgo their traditional methods to accommodate ‘foreign’ ideas (Catley et al. 2013: 24).

All things considered, the PFS programme was an example of regional diplomatic collaboration, resulting in an initiative which equipped pastoralists with a wider range of knowledge and skills to continue sustaining their livelihoods through non-violent means. The PFS has demonstrated the benefits of collaboration toward a common goal of strengthening pastoralist climate resilience. The prioritization of community engagement and participation in the abovementioned programme is important for building resilience among pastoralists and empowering them to be proactive agents in processes that have to do with improving their circumstances and lives. A significant component of solutions originating from within the region hinges on citizens being receptive and taking the lead such that they can claim ownership of the success of such work in their communities.

There are ample opportunities for bottom-up diplomatic engagement in the Horn. The hope is that various stakeholders are not merely involved for the sake of having diverse groups at negotiating tables, but that their inputs are given serious consideration and

acted upon. The cooperative aspect within regional climate diplomacy is meant to strengthen conflict resolution, climate adaptation and pastoral support efforts - with multiple actors exchanging best practices and contributing to solutions that affect the interests of all parties. Unfortunately, collaboration is not highly prioritised in the Horn, and this has impeded the success of initiatives on the ground. This section has demonstrated that there is an urgent need to improve the management and alignment of the varying interests of stakeholders in the Horn.

#### 4.3.4. Policies and regulation

The development of peace agreements, land and water sharing pacts and related policies does not automatically equate to the effective implementation and enforcement of these policies. Ayana et. al. (2016) argue that a significant reduction in the presence of operational and effective peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa has allowed farmer-pastoralist conflict in the region to escalate (Ayana et.al 2016: 605). African treaties pertaining to the shared or transboundary use of natural resources, particularly water, are founded on the assumption that these resources' quantity and quality will remain unchanged over time. Due to their "static" character, many of the existing water agreements lack the appropriate procedures to address climatic crises and encourage fair and sustainable collaboration and shared use of water resources (Sala et al. 2014:317).

The following section will highlight and discuss the apparent disconnect between policy formulation and implementation in the Horn by evaluating existing regulations and the lack thereof. The objective is to better understand why plans in the region are rarely carried out as initially intended. The weaknesses in policymaking will be highlighted as well to better understand the kind of improvements required.

#### *Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms*

The Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) is a proposed permanent legal treaty aimed at establishing an equitable and inclusive system for the management and allocation of the Nile River's water resources. The legal framework is designed to facilitate collaboration and dialogue pertaining to improved water management which promotes conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation (Cooley et al. 2009: 19; Sala et al. 2014: 318). Once ratified, a Nile River Basin Commission that

will act as a permanent governing body responsible for managing the shared Nile resources, mediating disputes, and overseeing water-related projects among the Nile Basin countries will be established to enact the CFA (Nile Basin Initiative 2024). This treaty would affect six of the eight countries in the Horn as it explicitly addresses equitable water sharing, which has critical implications for water security in the Horn of Africa, especially for pastoralist communities who rely on the Nile's tributaries during droughts (Conway 2017: 638; Mekonnen 2010:16). By promoting more equitable distribution, the CFA could ensure that water-scarce regions, where pastoralists rely on seasonal rivers including Ethiopia and Kenya, receive a fair share of water for their livestock and agricultural needs (Nicol 2018: 646). Link et al. (2012) argue that the Nile Basin Initiative will be pivotal in pioneering conflict prevention policies in the Nile River basin which account wholly for climate-related triggers of conflict (Link et al 2012:36). Despite there being previous disagreements among member states in the region regarding the CFA, as of July 2024, the agreement was still subject to ratification (Salman 2024). The prior lack of cooperation regarding this resource-sharing agreement strained regional relations and demonstrated the difficulties that often come with negotiations and managing varying interests, however, there is much positivity about the prospects of the CFA.

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was adopted in 2004 by eleven states, six of which are Horn of Africa states. The objectives of the policy are threefold. To combat and eradicate the illicit trafficking, manufacturing as well as possession of SALW within the sub-region, to facilitate coordination within the sub-region between governments, regional bodies, and civilians to prevent and combat the spread of illicit SALW and lastly to enforce laws that encourage accountability and the effective control of arms proliferation in the sub-region (RECSA 2004). The Great Lakes and Horn of Africa nations realized that no one state could address illicit arms proliferation on its own, and this conclusion gave rise to the Nairobi Protocol. Civil society organisations together with diplomatic representatives from nations within the region participated in the negotiations that led to the approval of the Nairobi Protocol. The objective of these engagements was to promote information exchanges on arms trafficking, to coordinate national laws, strengthen cross-border collaboration between law enforcement in the region (Adeniyi 2017: 27). States were

able to coordinate their efforts geared towards arms control through regional cooperative diplomacy, enhancing their combined capacity to combat the proliferation of SALW. Both IGAD and the EAC were significant in promoting communication between the member states and the success of the Nairobi Protocol depended on both regional bodies to a great extent (Mkutu 2007: 56).

The inability of member nations to adequately enforce the Nairobi Protocol's requirements has been one of the biggest obstacles to its successful implementation. The region's nations, particularly weaker governments like South Sudan and Somalia, often encounter resource limitations, ineffective law enforcement, and have porous borders which enable the continued flow of illegal arms into their countries. A combination of a lack of appropriate border control infrastructure in addition to underfunded and poorly trained law enforcement departments have made it difficult to implement the Nairobi Protocol and the various associated regulations effectively (UN 2021). Because many of these nations lack strong legal systems, even in cases where illicit arms traffickers are caught, they are rarely punished. The Nairobi Protocol's efficacy is significantly compromised by these institutional shortcomings, as they prevent nations from effectively operationalizing the legal frameworks established under the accord (Dye 2009:8). This is unfortunate as it hinders the protocol from adequately enforcing the necessary regulations to discourage the use of weapons in farmer-pastoralist clashes in the region.

Locals and community members have been vital in leading inter-communal conflict prevention and resolution in the Horn. Peace meetings and processes have been held by community members, resulting in the signing of peace accords between various pastoralist groups. This includes the Lokiriama Peace Accord signed between the Kenyan Turkana and Ugandan Matheniko elders in 1973 (Welty et al. 2019:69). As recently as 2021, following diplomatic negotiations, the elders of the Pokot and Turkana communities signed a border peace pact, committing to unite and maintain peace within the region (Chai 2021). As of July 2024, in efforts to strengthen their peace agreement, the Pokot and Turkana have begun engaging in negotiations regarding traditional methods of compensating farmers and community members who have been victims of pastoral banditry in the past by way of post-conflict recovery and rebuilding (Turkana County Government 2024). The continuity in their efforts is

indicative that the communities are committed to maintaining peace between the groups. Furthermore, the continued existence of traditionally rooted solutions in the region further lends to the goal of ensuring that locals are at the fore of the decisions being taken and are active in leading local peace objectives and conflict resolution.

### *Climate change adaptation*

There are no documented collaborative regional policies or laws that are dedicated solely to regulating climate change adaptation across the borders of the Horn. Policies of this kind exist at national level in a few countries of the Horn, including Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya - but these are unilateral efforts and are not because of cooperative regional climate diplomacy. The apparent lack of cross-border policy response to climate adaptation needs in the Horn suggests that there is an inadequate prioritization of reducing climate-related triggers of conflict between farmers and pastoralists among regional bodies and government ministries. Climate change grievances play a key role in the ongoing conflict between pastoralists and farmers. Given the projected trajectory of global warming and related environmental ills, it can be expected that the consequences of climate change will continue to be felt by populations in the Horn for years to come. The lack of policy and regulation to address this issue garners concern for the future of effective, well-rounded conflict prevention in the case of climate-related conflict, given that there is no current indication of proactive efforts towards ensuring regulations exist.

### *Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support*

In 2010 the African Union adopted the Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa (PFPA) as part of their strategy to support and improve pastoralist livelihoods and by extension Africa's agricultural economy. The policy was developed to better understand and adequately address the unique challenges and vulnerabilities faced by pastoralists continentally including their exposure to climate change, their involvement in resource conflicts as well as their societal and structural marginalization (Majok 2017:58). The existence of the PFPA encourages governments like those in the Horn, particularly where climate change and resource competition endanger the

lives of many pastoralists, to develop and enact policies that consider the needs of pastoralists and promote sustainable pastoralism (Tache 2017:8).

Securing pastoralist land tenure rights and addressing the historical exclusion of this group by communal grazing land arrangements was part of the PFPA's objective, particularly in the Horn. The policy further highlights the need to improve service delivery and the availability of infrastructure to pastoralist communities in the Horn (Fratkin 2020: 112) Despite the call for better governance structures and legal frameworks that protect pastoralists' rights, the PFPA has not addressed the power imbalances between pastoralists, and government authorities or the factors impeding states from providing services to this group.

In 2021, the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD) enacted the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance to promote controlled and safe cross-border movements for pastoralists. The Protocol mandates that IGAD member states must legally acknowledge and permit the seasonal, free, and safe cross-border movement of cattle and pastoralists in search of pasture and water. This is to support the survival of pastoral communities by offering them a climate change adaptation option within the region, while enforcing strict rules to prevent conflict from ensuing (IGAD 2020). The Protocol dictates that pastoralists who intend to travel across borders into neighbouring countries in search of water and pasture may do so, but under very specific regulations, and only if they abide by various rules. The Protocol outlines that pastoralists are free to enter neighbouring countries with their livestock to gain access to water and pasture, if they only use the transhumance corridors which are designated migratory routes outlined by the host country. Furthermore, according to the Protocol, only pastoralists with valid IGAD Transhumance Certificates clearly indicating their identity, borders to be crossed, itinerary and livestock ownership are permitted to move between regional borders. In addition, pastoralists are not permitted to cross borders with firearms. Failure to abide by the regulations outlined in the protocol leaves transgressors subject to the legal ramifications of the country concerned, with punishments ranging from penalties and livestock confiscation to arrest (IGAD 2020)

The IGAD Protocol has had mixed success. It is credited for allowing pastoralists official recognition and protection for their practice of transhumance to maintain their

livelihoods and establishing a legal framework that standardizes procedures pertaining to the movement of livestock across borders. Furthermore, the recent slight decline in conflict incidences between farmers and pastoralists in Kenya and Ethiopia is said to be a direct result of the Protocol (De Haan et al. 2016: 23; Hyman et al. 2020: 44). However, inadequate funding, ill-trained border control officials, and limited state presence at borders often compromises local and national law enforcement mechanisms designed to execute the Protocol. Despite the rules of the protocol, in many nations in the Horn where borders are inadequately guarded and monitored, illegal pastoral and livestock migrations persist unimpeded. There is generally minimal governmental presence in pastoralist regions, and border control officials frequently lack the capacity, facilities, and training necessary to properly implement the IGAD Transhumance Protocol (ICPALD 2021). While this policy is in place to regulate transhumance, it is not uniformly implemented throughout the region and this inconsistency in law enforcement allows for conflicts to persist.

Overall, there are very few comprehensive, policies that address the specific needs of pastoralists in conflict-prone areas and are aimed at building their resilience to climate change (Korf & Hagmann 2022: 355). This indicates a lack of diplomatic collaboration and initiative as it pertains to written and enforced laws about the protection of pastoralist communities. According to Elliot (2013), one of the main obstacles to successful cooperative climate diplomacy is following through with implementation. Cooperation is no longer a means to an end, and diplomatic success is now determined more by words agreed upon in writing than by effectively implementing measures geared towards adapting to the effects of climate change (Elliot 2013: 850). This challenge continues to persist in the Horn and should be corrected, to ensure effective policies, govern the region and its people. Given the existing narrative that pastoralist spaces are ungoverned and on the peripheries of law enforcement and state intervention, the absence of pastoralist considerations being written into legislature further isolates this group.

#### 4.3.5. Monitoring, evaluation, and learning

Environmental governance in its nature, must be responsive to be effective. According to Bennett and Satterfield (2018), constant evaluation and reflection are crucial during the process to allow for opportunities to adapt and adjust to various contexts and

conditions (Bennett & Satterfield 2018: 4). Pastoralist-farmer climate-related conflicts are not new to the region, therefore it can be assumed that multiple peace and adaptation interventions have been explored and implemented over the decades. It is through monitoring, evaluation and learning that mechanisms which have worked can be retained and those that have not can be replaced or improved. In the following section, the paper will evaluate how despite the establishment of monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms to improve environmental governance in the Horn, their efficacy is hampered by a fundamental lack of capacity when it comes to implementation as well as challenges of accessibility and inclusion when it comes to engaging local communities. The aim is to understand the areas of improvement when it comes to applying early warning data to actionable conflict resolution and climate change adaptation in the Horn region.

#### *Diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms*

Climate outlook forums were first developed by the World Meteorological Organization Climate to better predict and control climatic changes. These forums have promoted cooperation and collaboration within regions, and the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF) has built climate response capacity in the Horn of Africa and illustrated the advantages of exchanging knowledge and experience about climate change by providing seasonal climate outlook information for the next rainy season (UNECA 2020: 2). In the context of shared climate vulnerabilities, the GHACOF serves as a diplomatic forum for promoting regional cooperation within the Horn. Cross-border cooperation is necessary to address the region's complex climate change challenges and the GHACOF has played a key role in promoting early warning systems, intergovernmental collaboration, and strategies for managing the threats associated with climate change, including conflict prevention. The climate response negotiations that take place between countries during GHACOF meetings exemplifies the diplomatic component of the forum (Segele 2018). Furthermore, the GHACOF has contributed to the development of diplomatic capacity in the Horn through engaging climate specialists and policymakers on matters regarding resource management as well as climate adaptation plans for the region. The GHACOF has facilitated diplomatic relationships between the scientific community, decision-makers, and peace activists (GRoW 2024).

Given the prevalence of climate-related conflicts in the region, the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF) has always prioritised placing conflict early warning and response systems (CEWARN) on the agenda at events and meetings hosted by regional climate centres (UNECA 2020:10). Several challenges hinder the GHACOF from reaching its full potential in the region. For example, the forum generates reliable seasonal prediction data, but there hasn't always been consistency in turning these projections into national policy that can be implemented. Many governments in the Horn of Africa struggle to integrate climate forecasts into actionable plans and policies for climate adaptation and conflict prevention, especially countries in the region who have very limited resources (Owiti 2020; Gudoshava 2024: 13). Additionally, local actors are frequently left out of decision-making processes, given that the GHACOF mainly operates at the regional and national levels. This makes it difficult for local actors to own and execute the GHACOF's climate adaptation strategies. Because of its limited interaction with local actors, GHACOF's climate outlooks lack local context and may not always translate into relevant or culturally suitable strategies, especially in areas where pastoralist groups and farmers have long-standing tensions (Rigby et al. 2023: 188; Hansen 2020).

### *Climate change adaptation*

The IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), previously known as the Drought Monitoring Center – Nairobi (DCMN) was established by IGAD Heads of State and Governments in 2003. In 2014 the ICPAC became a World Meteorological Organization (WMO) accredited Regional Climate Centre (RCC) responsible for providing climate services including cross-border early risk warning and climate hazard tracking to eleven East African countries (ICPAC 2021). The centre's hazard watch includes the tracking of drastic climate conditions including drought and heavy rainfall risks, to create resilience within this region which is highly vulnerable to the drastic and adverse effects of climate change. The ICPAC has played a key role in training national meteorological agencies, local governments, and community organizations in climate data interpretation and use. This capacity-building component ensures that climate information reaches the most vulnerable communities and that they are equipped with the knowledge to implement adaptive strategies. ICPAC's early warning systems (EWS) have become a cornerstone in disaster risk reduction,

allowing pastoralist communities to take anticipatory actions against climate extremes such as prolonged droughts and flash floods (Opiyo et al. 2015).

Because the ICPAC provides accurate, localized user-friendly climate data, both farmers and pastoralists can receive tailored information on drought conditions and climate hazards, helping them to adjust their migration routes and access emergency support before disaster strikes (Opiyo et al. 2015). Furthermore, the ICPAC's support for regional policies and cross-border cooperation reflects the growing recognition of the transboundary nature of pastoralism and climate adaptation, which in turn drives the imperative for regions to cooperate in solving the challenge (PFE et al 2010: 29). Limited infrastructure and difficulty reaching pastoral populations has hindered the full-scale success and implementation of the ICPAC (Gemedda et al. 2023: 3). This obstacle is directly linked to pastoralists being on the periphery, in ungoverned spaces. The inability to reach the targeted groups with adaptation solutions due to structural barriers raises an important question regarding the preparedness of leaders in the Horn to fully commit to inclusive environmental governance that caters to the needs of all, and not only a select few.

While the ICPAC has made great strides in providing crucial climate data to nations in the Horn, the extent of its success in improving monitoring, evaluation and learning in the Horn is debatable (Omondi et al 2014: 1268). The initial obstacle is that in certain Horn of Africa nations, inadequate infrastructure, institutional weaknesses, and poor coordination impede the implementation of the data supplied by ICPAC at local and national levels. These challenges can be seen in countries like Somalia and South Sudan where capacity constraints have impeded the integration of early warning data into effective conflict prevention responses. Additionally, the top-down approach of the ICPAC when it comes to resource allocation and data sharing excludes local communities, particularly pastoralists, from the decision-making processes. Because the process is inaccessible to this group, they do not feel part of it, and therefore lack a sense of ownership over it. This subsequently weakens the ICPAC's impact especially in ungoverned spaces occupied by pastoralist communities (PAJCA 2019).

#### *Farmer and pastoralist livelihood support*

Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) and Livestock Early Warning Systems (LEWS) have both been integral in sustaining the lives of pastoralists as well as their livestock. FEWS provide crucial data on food security and drought conditions, facilitating early interventions that prevent famines and reduce the risk of conflict. LEWS, offer critical insights into livestock and rangeland health, enabling pastoralists to manage their herds more effectively, access markets, and adapt to climate change. FEWS offers early detection of famine risks by monitoring rainfall, vegetation, and food prices. This early warning allows pastoralist communities, governments, and humanitarian organizations to take preventative measures, such as pre-emptively relocating livestock, storing food, or seeking alternative livelihoods (Akerkar et al. 2020: 7; Quansah et al. 2010: 28). This preparedness has significantly reduced the vulnerability of pastoralists to shocks through proactive, well-coordinated early intervention and timely response. LEWS use satellite imagery, ground surveys, and local reporting to assess the availability of pasture and water for livestock, as well as the health of herds. In doing so, these systems have provided early warnings of drought, disease outbreaks, and other threats to livestock assets, which are essential to pastoralist livelihoods (Matere et al. 2020: 3).

The rate of livestock loss during periods of drought has decreased because of LEWS as pastoralists have become informed on when to destock or sell livestock before drought conditions worsen (Bedelian 2024: 4). Together, these systems have enhanced resilience, reduced vulnerability, and promoted sustainable livelihoods among pastoralists. In addition, by directly assisting these communities with ways to mitigate and manage the loss and devastation to their livelihoods in times of climate disaster, these systems have decreased pastoralists' motivation to raid cattle and start conflicts over resources. The preventative nature of these systems puts pastoralist communities in positions where scarcity and famine do not drive them to violence as a means of adaptation. Instead, it builds their resilience and capacity to cope with the effects of climate change.

A similar mechanism that has improved pastoralist communities' preparedness for climate threats is the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ARSDRR) strategic framework. The Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ARSDRR) framework that was adopted in 2004 by the African Union has been vital

in providing an accessible and coherent approach to disaster risk reduction in the Horn. The ARSDRR has led to the improvement of data and information sharing in the Horn of Africa through enhancing the collection and dissemination of disaster-related data to inform decision-making (African Union 2004). This has allowed pastoralists to be well informed ahead of time about measures they need to take in anticipation of dry spells or occasional floods, including travelling to different areas to avoid being impacted by climate disasters. This preventative action is significant in the long run when it comes to pastoralists and their livelihoods. Given the recorded positive impacts of this framework, its overall implementation in the affected regions of the Horn has been slow and uneven, due to resource and capacity constraints faced by various countries. This has made the integration of the framework into national and local policies near impossible, thus compromising the efficacy of the ARSDRR altogether (Mulugeta 2017: 8; Hill 2019:20).

While the ARSDRR concentrates on long-term resilience development, policy advocacy, and enhancing institutional capacity to decrease disaster risks and impacts, FEWS and LEWS are reactive, real-time early warning systems. The ARSDRR has a more calculated and policy-focused effect on pastoralists livelihood support, seeking to incorporate disaster risk reduction into national and local planning strategies (Hellmuth et al. 2007: 89). Both forms of immediate and long-term monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are necessary and relevant within the region but because pastoralist areas in the Horn of Africa are often remote and have limited infrastructure, poor data coverage and budget limitations have rendered data dissemination for FEWS, LEWS and the ARSDRR a challenge (Okowa 2018: 26). The highly technical work involved in data-related work also tends to exclude pastoralists, and this lack of buy-in only makes it harder for these interventions to be adopted and sustained in these communities (Hassan et al. 2024: 6).

Monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms can only be useful in the Horn in so far as they can be applied to yield practical solutions for the communities in the region. If early warning data is collected and provided to national and local governments, but not adequately used, analysed, or applied in resource management and conflict prevention frameworks - then there is no real difference that the data makes. The concern with this is that these mechanisms have the potential to drastically improve

livestock loss, conflict prevention, and manage climate risks, and are therefore highly relevant despite not being applied correctly in the Horn. Monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms can be highly technical, and if the data and information collected is not disseminated to groups like pastoralists and farmers in ways that are tailored for their understanding, this can easily discourage them from showing interest and feeling included in these processes. This is the current challenge in the Horn. Therefore, prioritising these groups and making information accessible to them is vital in ensuring that monitoring, evaluation, and learning is effective in the region.

#### **4.4. Findings**

In 2013, IGAD identified two main challenges to enforcing long-term, practical responses to the negative consequences of climate change in the region. These included the lack of implementation of effective mitigation policies and programs for climate change, in addition to insufficient systems for early warning and prediction of climate change and response mechanisms (IGAD 2013: 18). Evidently, implementation and follow-through remain a significant hindrance to the efficacy of existing policies. Learning to adapt to the effects of climate change is an ongoing and highly involved process that seemingly requires more effort, capacity, and resources than what IGAD and EAC member states and their respective ministries can provide. This is due to a combination of capacity constraints, lack of leadership or disagreement between stakeholders on how various policies should be actioned. Regardless, it seems a waste to have agreements and treaties on paper that make no real difference on the ground and in the lives of afflicted communities in the Horn.

Although international partnerships have made a significant difference through financing projects geared towards climate change adaptation, peace operations as well farmers and pastoralist support, the lack of capacity within the region to initiate and financially support local projects is a matter of concern. Oftentimes internationally funded programs are limited contractually, and despite the positive impact that they might have, once these contracts lapse, some communities are left struggling to continue to maintain the project. Local and regional initiatives have a higher likelihood of sustainability and long-term implementation given that they would be a product of local efforts and consistent monitoring and improvement. The Horn has experienced decades of severe climate effects, natural resource conflicts and pastoral group

vulnerabilities yet these concerns still do not receive the appropriate budget allocations from governments within the region. This points to a weakness in governance as it pertains to allocating funds to the region's most pressing concerns and prioritizing solutions that originate from within the Horn.

Despite the significant progress many programmes and initiatives have made in engaging stakeholders and putting their objectives on paper whether concerning diplomacy, climate change adaptation or even pastoralist livelihood support – it seems there are not enough solutions that address the issue wholly and consider all three aspects of the solution. There isn't a single initiative that originates from within the region that adequately speaks to cooperation and diplomacy, early warning, resource management and disaster risk reduction while simultaneously addressing the structural marginalization fuelling competition among pastoralists. Perhaps a solution of this kind is not plausible, and various projects and policies spearheaded by different stakeholders are the only way to realistically tackle the ongoing crisis in the Horn. If that is the case, however, it begs the question of why the multiple, diverse abovementioned ideas and projects have failed to put an end to the crisis. Natural resources continue to be depleted and harsh climate conditions have rendered them highly scarce. The scarcity of resources continues to trigger violence among pastoralist groups, particularly in areas where governance is weak, and communities feel excluded from resource management decisions. Unfortunately, the rate of adaptation is insufficient compared to the rate of resource depletion and competition in the Horn. Even with existing initiatives focused on the areas of diplomacy, community engagement, pastoral livelihood support, environmental governance and climate change adaptation, there seems to be a lack of coordination in ensuring impactful work and sustainable results.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed at length the role of cooperative regional climate diplomacy when it comes to addressing the region's ongoing climate-related conflict through the practice of environmental governance. The chapter applied an environmental governance analytical framework to evaluate past and existing solutions to the region's climate-conflict nexus, and in doing so, highlighted the challenges and opportunities for cooperative regional climate diplomacy in the Horn.

In discussing where the region currently stands in terms of achieving sustainable peace between farmers and pastoralists, the chapter found that a combination of broader policy enforcement, capacity, governance, and funding challenges must be dealt with first. Effective environmental governance has the potential to significantly improve sustainability and planning for the future of the Horn and its communities. The environmental governance framework for long-term development which prioritizes expansion while minimizing harm to the environment speaks directly to the growth imperatives of a region like the Horn. Significant improvements in the areas of responsible resource management, community engagement, resource allocation, capacity building and leadership are necessary to preserve the delicate balance between human needs and ecological sustainability within the region (Malla 2023). The progress and efforts directed towards remedying the crisis in the region, although existent, lack in significant impact. Despite the Horn not having reached the goal of full proof cooperative, climate-conscious peace in the region, we can reflect on the opportunities that lie ahead. In the next and final chapter, the study will put forward recommendations and conclude on how the climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers can be better dealt with going forward to achieve long-term sustainable peace in the region.

## CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

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### 5.1. Summary

This study proceeded from the assumption that due to the cross-border nature of the climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers in the Horn, the most appropriate response to the crisis would be collaborative diplomatic engagement across various levels within the region.

After preliminary reviewing the literature on the climate-conflict nexus affecting farmer and pastoralist groups in the Horn of Africa, this study identified that African nations were becoming increasingly more proactive in climate diplomacy engagements both continentally and internationally. However, there remains a lack of documentation regarding the progress, failures and successes of regional conflict resolution and climate change adaptation/resilience projects and initiatives that have come about because of climate diplomacy engagements in the Horn. Following more of an in-depth review of the multi-disciplinary literature, the study found that existing environmental governance institutions in the Horn need to undergo reform to achieve organizational collaboration and policy enforcement. This literature review pointed to national and local governance inadequacies in the region, indicating a need for increased commitment to cross-border collaboration towards minimizing conflict triggers and climate threats. Furthermore, the review underscored the need for an improved approach by these actors when it comes to addressing the socio-economic grievances of pastoral communities as a means towards conflict prevention.

The study's third chapter contextualized the history of the climate-conflict nexus between farmers and pastoralists in the Horn and explored the benefits of drawing on previous conflict resolution and climate adaptation efforts to inform diplomatic intervention in the region. The chapter found that several aggravating factors including small weapons and light arms proliferation, competition between farmers and pastoralists over scarce natural resources and limited state reach were contributing to the escalation of the region's crisis. In discussing the various components contributing to the overall state of farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict in the Horn, the chapter concluded by proposing that the region required a threefold solution to best address farmer-pastoralist climate-related conflict. The solution would have to encompass diplomatic conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms, climate change adaptation and pastoralist livelihood support. With an understanding not only of the crisis but also the required solutions, the study aimed to present a more structured discussion and analysis of whether the current environmental governance initiatives and mechanisms are relevant and will suffice in addressing the Horn's challenges.

This was followed by the fourth chapter which included an extensive discussion on the feasibility of effective regional environmental governance in the Horn of Africa. This analysis was done according to an analytical framework which was developed within the study. The framework was designed to evaluate the state and quality of environmental governance in the Horn as far as effectively actioning the three identified solutions to the region's climate-conflict crisis. The five components of the framework include institutional framework, stakeholder engagement, financial resources, policies, and regulation as well as monitoring, evaluation, and learning. The subsequent analysis of the chapter demonstrated that the efficacy of regional environmental governance efforts in the Horn have been hampered by a combination of institutional flaws, leadership shortcomings, a significant lack of financial and technical resources, and inconsistent prioritization of regional goals among stakeholders. This lack of cooperation has hindered the implementation of various conflict resolution, climate change resilience and pastoralist livelihood support policies and practical solutions. Policies geared towards minimizing the crisis in the region are seldom followed through and enforced, and this results in multiple projects and initiatives failing to meet their objectives. Despite the establishment of monitoring,

evaluation, and learning mechanisms, the efficacy of these efforts is hindered by a lack of capacity and challenges in accessibility and inclusion for local communities.

Together, what these chapters illustrate is that climate diplomacy has been vital in advancing solutions to the region's climate-related issues and there remains a need for continued environmental governance efforts in the Horn. However, the reality is that past and present environmental governance mechanisms and initiatives in the region have been effective only to a limited extent. This indicates that there is a serious need to reform and redesign the institutions responsible for enforcing the solutions that speak directly to natural resource management, conflict resolution and pastoralist livelihood support in the Horn.

## **5.2. Recommendations**

Current policy and similar responses in the region primarily address and prioritise either conflict prevention or climate change adaptation, but very rarely their nexus. There is a need for improved synergy between conflict prevention and climate change adaptation solutions in the Horn. Conflict prevention and resolution interventions should account for the climate change triggers of conflict in their approach and climate change interventions should prioritise solutions that lend to reducing conflict incidences between farmers and pastoralists. Currently, the issues are being addressed in isolation, and this is a contributing factor to the lack of follow-through and effective enforcement experienced in the region when it comes to policy and regulation.

There is much room for improvement when it comes to climate change adaptation and resilience support for farmers and pastoralists in the Horn. With increased capacity to appropriately apply early warning data, regional actors, including pastoralists and farmers, can respond quicker and more effectively to conflict, famine, and climate disaster threats. The roll out of adaptation support in the farming and agricultural sectors of the region could include encouraging the planting of more drought-resilient crops or limiting herd sizes to decrease vulnerability in times of climate disasters. Programmes like Pastoralist Field Schools (PFS) are an example of a channel that could be used for this roll out. More adaptation measures that incorporate community-

led learning with climate change adaptation would streamline the region's resilience-building plans and are therefore needed in the Horn.

Enhancing cross-border resource management in the region will be pivotal in decreasing climate-related conflict between pastoralists and farmers. The effects of climate change will worsen before they improve. Proactive efforts like the IGAD Transhumance Protocol geared towards regulating natural resource use and access as well as migration across the borders of the Horn have the potential to significantly reduce competition and thus conflict among farmers and pastoralists. The region requires an increased commitment by regional bodies, policymakers, and law enforcement to properly apply this cross-border Protocol and similar measures in the region. Better regulation of access to water sources and pasture during periods of drought, flooding and other climate disasters in designated and controlled areas will undoubtedly lessen the incentive for pastoralists and farmers to engage in conflict related to scarce resources.

The success of climate diplomacy efforts in the Horn is contingent on the extent to which regional actors are willing to prioritise issues that transcend borders, including farmer-pastoralist conflict. There is a need for improved cross-border collaboration among regional bodies and national governments for the region to yield the benefits of collective action in the case of conflict prevention, resolution, climate change adaptation and the support of pastoral communities. IGAD member states have the platform to engage at a diplomatic level and plan for the future of the region's peace and sustainability. Part of this could include establishing a regional fund that is dedicated to addressing various persisting infrastructure, human capacity and technical shortcomings that impeded the efficacy and implementation of the region's solutions.

More consistent and intentional inclusion of local actors in diplomatic engagements and negotiations as it pertains to the crisis in the Horn will be essential in ensuring that the solutions for the region are relevant and sustainable. This includes making the necessary adjustments in instances of data capturing and sharing, such that the information is understandable by and accessible to pastoralists and farmers – to inform their decision and promote their use of the region's early warning mechanisms. Increased policing and state visibility by national and local governments in pastoral

communities are necessary to combat concerns such as SALW proliferation in the region. Increased visibility of state representatives could also play a significant role in familiarizing pastoralists with their governments and the resources that they provide, such that they are more willing to engage and show up when governments propose meetings and negotiations with them.

There are very few recent studies on regional environmental governance and how it is made possible by climate diplomacy platforms and actors within the Horn of Africa. Unbiased reporting and documentation of the projects, initiatives and policies geared towards remedying the region's conflict prevention, climate change adaptation and pastoralist livelihood support are hard to obtain, especially in instances where international donors and organizations are involved. This renders it challenging to keep consistent track of the project's progress as well as to fully understand the challenges and areas of improvement of the projects. More independent, academic enquiry into this field is necessary. There is also a need for more fieldwork to be conducted in the region. Particularly to formulate studies focused on hearing from people on the ground such as pastoralists and farmers regarding their perceptions of the efficacy of various initiatives and programmes, as well as to gain an understanding of the extent to which they feel prioritised and involved in discussions and proposed solutions that stand to affect their lives.

### **5.3. Conclusion**

In answering the study's main research question, one can conclude that the role of regional cooperative climate diplomacy in remedying farmer-pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa is through the facilitation of environmental governance efforts aimed at engaging relevant actors to collaborate on informing the appropriate solutions to the crisis.

Despite the peacebuilding and climate resilience progress that has been made in the Horn because of involved diplomatic engagements, there are substantial remaining challenges to improving environmental governance in the region. Various policies, initiatives and projects geared towards resolving the issue have come and gone, but progress, enforcement, and implementation, more especially at the regional and national levels have been slow and inadequate. The study has shown that climate

diplomacy is necessary to drive the development and human security goals within the Horn and that stakeholders have serious issues to tackle on their agenda when it comes to mitigating climate-related conflict in the region. Environmental governance has a pivotal role to play in remedying the conflict, human security, and climate threats in the Horn as well – but to do so it must be conducted by committed actors who have the necessary leadership competence, funding, capacity, and functional institutional frameworks to do so. The overwhelming hindrances to effective regional governance in the Horn require a re-commitment to collaborative diplomatic action by national governments, IGAD and the EAC which will yield long-term sustainable peace across the region's borders.

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