

**THE NECESSITY FOR A SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
TO ENGAGE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)
MEMBER COUNTRIES**

by

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEC	African Economic Community
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation
BNC	Bi-National Commission
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSBMs	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CWS	Continental Warning System
DefCom	Defence Committees
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFR	Defence Foreign Relations
DIA	Defence International Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DMOD	Deputy Minister of Defence
DOD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC	Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee
JCC	Joint Commission on Cooperation
JPCDS	Joint Permanent Commission of Defence and Security
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MOD	Minister of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

MP	Military Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PPDSC	Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PSO	Peace Support Operation
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACU	Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCAT	SADC Administrative Tribunal
SADC-BRIG	SADC Brigade
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADR 2015	South African Defence Review 2015
SAN	South African Navy
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SSF	SADC Standby Force
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i> National (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

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PLAGIARISM STATEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is situated within the context of strategy formulation with collective defence being the end-state, preventive diplomacy being the way to achieve the end-state and defence diplomacy as soft power being the means for the implementation of a South African Defence diplomacy strategy. The interrelatedness of the concepts used in this dissertation was assessed through an examination of scholarship related to conflict resolution and management, the use of the military during peacetime, power relations in IR and strategy formulation. It argues that South Africa's national interests are unavoidably best served by regional stability that is vested in promoting a stable SADC region underpinned, *inter alia*, by constructive defence engagement that is supported by a robust defence diplomacy strategy. The study adopts a qualitative design. The study is a literature-based study that relies on primary data sources that are of an official nature and are available in the public domain.

The dissertation found that based on the operational, foreign and defence policy context, there is a genuine need for South Africa to develop a defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC member countries. The conceptual framework is in line with the policy environments of both South Africa and the SADC, which enable the implementation of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy. The crafting of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy to engage SADC member countries must adopt a multidimensional approach. This includes strategy as Plan, Strategy as Pattern and Strategy as Perspective.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identification of the research theme

Established on 17 August 1992 as the successor to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) admitted South Africa as a member in August 1994. Admission to the organisation was accompanied by high expectations that South Africa would be a leading country and play a pivotal role in driving the SADC forward to become a prominent regional economic community on the African continent. As a regional organisation the SADC is key to the stability and security of South Africa. A stable and secure SADC region implies a stable and secure South Africa and it is against this backdrop that the SADC is viewed by South African policy makers and practitioners as an indispensable strategic partner.

As one of the principal actors in ensuring SADC is stable and secure, the South African Department of Defence (DOD) has played and continues to play an important – if not crucial role. As such, it is contended that the DOD must prioritise defence relations with SADC member states and especially in terms of a specific and nuanced defence diplomacy strategy.

The theme of this study is situated within the context of strategy formulation with collective defence being the end-state, preventive diplomacy being the way to achieve the end-state and defence diplomacy as soft power being the means for the implementation of a South African Defence diplomacy strategy (see figure 1).

1.2 Literature overview

The literature overview provides the underpinnings to satisfy the DOD requirement as stated in the South African Defence Review 2015 (RSA DOD 2015), for a defence diplomacy strategy specifically aimed at SADC (RSA DOD 2015: 7-2). It presents the conceptual framework that focuses on the understanding of key concepts in a conflict and security context

and the importance of a South African defence diplomacy strategy for engaging with the SADC.

1.3 Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework begins with the scrutiny of academic literatures in order to identify and present the concepts that form a critical component of this study. The key concepts will be analysed with regard to their purpose and importance in IR.

1.4 Preventive diplomacy

In order to understand what preventive diplomacy is, Stedman (1995); Özçelik (2006); Ramcharan (2017) and Aderayo (2021) define and describe the concept of preventive diplomacy. Adding to the definition and understanding of what preventive diplomacy is and what it seeks to achieve, Opiyo (2012) and Murati (2018) provide clarity regarding the exact type of action that preventive diplomacy exerts in international relations. Opiyo (2012); Ali and Khalaf (2018) provide insight into who the role players in preventive diplomacy are as well as how preventive diplomacy may be triggered. Stedman (1995); Bercovitch (1996); George (2000); Ali and Khalaf (2018) expand further regarding the exact mechanisms and techniques employed by preventive diplomacy in the management of conflict in international relations. Stedman (1995); Özçelik (2005) and Murati (2018) provide insight on what makes preventive diplomacy a preferred approach to conflict management and resolution in international relations. The ideal and required environment for the effective application of preventive diplomacy is described by Murati (2018); Ali and Khalaf (2018). This section concludes with Aderayo (2021) who describes how preventive diplomacy is featured in Africa's conflict management and prevention architecture.

1.5 Defence diplomacy

This study will make use of the works of academics such as De Carvalho (2016) who distinguish between defence diplomacy and military diplomacy. Subsequent to the clarity provided by Laksmna (2011), De Carvalho (2016), Tan (2016: 592) and Morabety (2017), provide a definition of defence diplomacy that is acceptable for the purpose of this study. Tan (2016: 593) provides further insight on why a state would employ defence diplomacy as part

of its strategy in engaging with other states. Regarding how defence diplomacy can be implemented, Capie (2013); Baldino and Carr (2016) and De Carvalho (2016) provide suggestions on mechanisms that could be employed for the implementation of defence diplomacy. Taylor *et al.* (2014) provide an elaborate account on why defence diplomacy is beneficial to International Relations. Despite the benefits of defence diplomacy, Baldino and Carr (2016) express their concern regarding the misalignment between strategy and defence diplomacy.

1.6 Soft power

Laying the foundation for the concept of soft power, this section begins with Nye (1990) providing a background on the causes of power dynamics amongst states. Rothman (2011: 49); Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015: 24) then provide a definition of power with Ogunnubi, and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) providing a reason for why states would want to exert power in international relations. Fan (2008); Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) then proceed to provide the types of power to which states have access. Nye (2008) summarises the types of power that states have access to into three basic types. The conclusion regarding the concept of power in general is followed by a comprehensive definition of the concept of soft power provided by Nye (1990: 168); Fan (2008: 1) and Nye (2008: 94). Vuving (2009) and Mattern (2007: 98), present their criticisms about soft power based mainly on the concept of “attraction”. Nye (1990), Roselle *et al.* (2014); Solomon (2014); Patalakh (2016); Wang and Lu (2008); Ali and Khalaf (2018), however, provide arguments in favour of soft power based on misconceptions by its critics. Whilst Mattern (2007: 98) and Patalakh (2016) provide advice on what is required to successfully deploy soft power, based on the aims of a state, Lee (2009) categorises soft power into five types.

1.7 Defence diplomacy and soft power

The attempt to illustrate the link between Defence diplomacy and soft power, the section begins with Neag (2014) who illustrates how non-state actors have managed to gain influence in foreign policy making as a result of globalisation. However, Neag (2014) continues to point out that states and non-state actors continue to act in unison through Public diplomacy. Smith (2012: 71) and Neag (2014) outline the circumstances that link Public diplomacy and soft power. Sighting various factors relating to security and the general international relations

environment, Swistek (2012) proposes how Public diplomacy and Defence diplomacy have drifted towards each other and how Defence diplomacy has become a soft power tool. Neag (2014) further advances Defence diplomacy's association with the advancement of foreign policy. Lee (2009); Tan (2016: 593) and Sudarsono *et al.* (2018) directly link defence diplomacy to soft power and advise when and how defence diplomacy is deployed as soft power.

1.8 Collective Security

As the overarching concept in security, this study draws on the definition of the concept of Collective Security as articulated by Jordaan (2017: 164). In line with this study's focus on Collective Defence, Aleksovski *et al.* (2014) explain the link between Collective Security and Collective Defence. Subsequent to providing clarity regarding the concept of Collective Defence and how it is related to Collective Security, Cusack and Stoll (1994) and Bolaji (2010) provide background on the international security dilemma and how interstate relations might be strained. In view of the international state of security affairs, Aleksovski *et al.* (2014) and Jordaan (2017) provide an overview regarding how states may approach the security dilemma in the international system. Gleason (2005), Ebegbulem (2011: 30) and Aleksovski *et al.* (2014), Jordaan (2017: 163) provide the purpose of collective security and a definition of collective security respectively.

With reference to the UN Charter, Arai-Takahashi (2002); Güven and Ribbelink (2016: 57); Tibori-Szabó (2016: 74); Zulkarnain and Hastuti (2020) explain the origins and condition under which states may exercise Self-defence. Zulkarnain and Hastuti (2020) further explain the reason states would be involved in collective-defence arrangements. Brunnée and Toope (2018) and Visser (2020) provide clarity on what motivated the need for states to respond to attacks from non-state actors as well as who or what may activate a state's response in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Criticism of Collective defence based on the behaviour of states within a collective defence arrangement is presented by Kupchan and Kupchan (1995). The most important challenges based on legal technicalities in terms of the use of force and state behaviour is presented by Bothe (2003), Kolb (2004), Kretzmer (2013), Åkermark (2017), Lehto (2018) and Visser (2020).

1.9 Strategy

With the concept of strategy playing a key role in the general theme of this study, Mintzberg (1987), Tanković (2013) and Sudarsono *et al.* (2018) provide the origins of strategy as a term and with regard to its meaning. Mintzberg (1978) further expands on how the term “strategy” should be understood and thus how it should be used. Van Assche *et al.* (2020) provide a generally understood definition of the term strategy. However, this study adopts the definition of the term strategy provided by Mintzberg (1987) who makes use of the five Ps of strategy as a means of providing a comprehensive understanding of not only what strategy is, but also what it aims to achieve. Ravasi *et al.* (2020) and Van Assche *et al.* (2020) provide enlightenment as to why organisations would need or require a strategy. This is further emphasised by Chati *et al.* (2018) who equate strategy with how states relate to each other. Albasoos and Maashani (2020) provide advice on the type of strategy that states can adopt in international relations.

1.10 Operational framework

The operational framework evaluates South Africa’s implementation of Defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2018. It aims to understand and assess South Africa’s Defence diplomacy activities with the SADC and concludes with a description of South Africa’s Defence diplomacy engagements with the SADC.

1.11 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

Given the pivotal role of SADC member states in South Africa’s security, a prime concern is how the country and specifically the DOD should structure its engagement with the defence forces of partner countries. In this respect, Adetiba (2017); Breakfast and Nkosi (2018) point out that towards the end of the 1990s the South African government realised that the socio-political and economic stability of the country is intertwined with the economic and political development of Africa, including the SADC.

In the foreword of the SADR 2015; a strategic planning document of the Ministry of Defence, the Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula explains that its main purpose is to map out the direction that the DOD will take in the next 20 to 30 years (RSA DOD 2015: i). The

Chairperson of the Defence Review Committee, Roelf Meyer expands on this when he says that the SADR 2015 aims to define and expand on the guiding principles that will steer the Defence Force through the next twenty to thirty years (RSA DOD 2015: iii).

Regarding a South African defence diplomacy strategy, and in line with both the Defence Minister's Foreword and supported by the Chairperson of the Defence Review Committee, the South African Defence Review 2015 in its endeavour to provide a strategic framework and guidance to the DOD states that "A defence diplomacy strategy will be developed to address defence bilateral and multilateral priorities" (RSA DOD 2015: 7-2). However, in contrast to this directive and six years after the adoption of the SADR 2015, the DOD's most recent Annual report (2019/2020) confirms that such a strategy has not yet been developed (South Africa 2019: 145).

South Africa's national interests are therefore unavoidably best served by regional stability that is vested in promoting a stable SADC region underpinned, *inter alia*, by constructive defence engagement that is supported by a robust defence diplomacy strategy. While the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been actively engaged with its partners in the SADC since 1994, the SADR 2015 enjoins the Defence Force to develop a multilateral defence diplomacy strategy to "support South Africa's strategic agenda" to maintain strategic bilateral relationships, engagement on international issues related to security, active participation in multilateral security processes, to establish collective security mechanisms and the maintenance of strong representation in international defence and security institutions (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11, 3-2). South Africa's strategic agenda includes the maintenance of strategic bilateral relationships; addressing international security issues; actively participating in multilateral security processes; the establishment of collective security mechanisms and the maintenance of a strong representation in international defence and security institutions (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11). However, the SADR 2015 does not propose an approach to developing such a strategy.

South Africa's dominant position and role in the SADC has been the subject of conjecture. On the one hand the country is expected to play a leading role but on the other in view of its role in the region during the apartheid era, it cannot be seen to have hegemonic aspirations. Similarly, the DOD is also required to follow suit, not only in its force projection but also in its diplomatic engagement with the SADC member states. Given the importance of SADC

member states in South Africa's national security calculus, the research problem is therefore to identify and craft a distinctive defence diplomacy strategy that balances the country's regional defence role with the protection and advancement of its national interests. South Africa's national interests, which are pursued in a coordinated and collaborative manner between all state entities including the SANDF are "national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, the security and continuance of national institutions, the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the South African people, the growth of the economy, and demonstrable good governance" (RSA DOD 2015: 2-26).

1.12 Research question

How must the SA DoD craft a defence diplomacy strategy that is founded on soft power to advance collective security and engage SADC member countries?

1.12.1 Research sub-questions

- 1.12.1.1 What are the most important concepts and principles to consider in the development of a South African Defence diplomacy strategy?
- 1.12.1.2 How does South Africa currently plan its defence diplomatic activities in SADC?
- 1.12.1.3 How does South Africa operationalise its defence diplomacy?

In response to the research question and sub-questions, the research objectives are as follows:

1.12.2 Research objectives

- 1.12.2.1 As a conceptual framework, to assess and contribute to the existing body of literature on defence diplomacy as well as examine the neglected role of strategy in defence diplomacy.
- 1.12.2.2 As a policy framework, to analyse DOD policy and other related government policy and the 2015 Defence Review that contextualise South Africa's defence diplomacy.
- 1.12.2.3 As an operational framework, to analyse how a defence diplomacy was utilised by the DOD between 2003 and 2018.

- 1.12.2.4 As a prescriptive framework, to evaluate the research findings in order to advance recommendations on how the DOD should approach the formulation of a defence diplomacy strategy.

1.13 Research methodology

The researcher intends conducting descriptive-exploratory research concerning the crafting and necessity of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy that focuses on the SADC. The combination of descriptive and exploratory research is beneficial for this study as they complement each other where descriptive research will focus on “how” and “who” questions, whilst exploratory research will play the role of answering the “why” question of the study (Adams *et al.* 2007; Neuman 2014). The methodology begins by creating the conceptual framework by analysing key concepts that contribute to the answering of the research question.

The research design is a literature review. The researcher reviews concepts that are key to the development of defence diplomacy and how they affect a defence diplomacy strategy for engaging SADC member states. Following this, the literature is reviewed that concerns a brief history of SADC, South Africa’s past defence diplomacy engagements with SADC member states and then a future engagement in the form of a strategy as prescribed in the SADR 2015.

For the research method, primary and secondary data sources are utilised. The primary data sources selected are of an official nature and are available in the public domain. This includes documents such as the DOD’s policy documents, annual reports, defence planning instruments, and strategic business plans in order to identify the prominence of SADC in defence diplomacy initiatives from 2003 to 2018. The secondary data sources include books, journal articles, research reports and media reports. These sources will serve the purpose of developing a framework of analysis that seeks to shed light on South Africa’s policies and use of defence diplomacy.

Primary and secondary data sources, mentioned above are analysed descriptively in the sense that the researcher will investigate South Africa’s defence diplomacy when engaging SADC member states since 2003. Based on a descriptive analysis, the researcher thereupon explores the nature and substance of a future DOD defence diplomacy strategy for engaging SADC member states.

The findings will be presented in the form of a pattern or theme that will emerge as a result of the literature analysis of this study. McGregor (2019) describes a theme as a recurring thread or pattern that emanates from the data collected by the researcher. The results presented in this study will therefore seek to provide a collection of ideas from various documents that seek to provide information about DOD defence diplomacy and how it engages with SADC member states.

1.14 Limitations and delimitations

Limitations. This study is limited to SADC member states as an entity. It will not engage with each state individually.

Delimitations. This study has the following temporal and spatial delimitations:

It is temporally delimited to the period from 2003 to 2018.

It is spatially delimited to the SADC region.

1.15 Research structure

This research report will be structured in a conventional manner and framed by five chapters consisting of an introduction, the conceptual framework, the operational framework, an evaluation and assessment of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC and a concluding chapter on findings and recommendations.

1.15.1 Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter will identify the research theme, provide a literature review, identify and demarcate the research problem and research question, explain the research methodology and indicate the structure of the research.

1.15.2 Chapter 2: The Conceptual Framework.

This chapter will provide the conceptual framework that forms the basis of this study. Focus will be placed on defence diplomacy and how it can contribute to South Africa's engagement with SADC member states in order to advance collective security.

1.15.3 Chapter 3: The policy context of South Africa's defence diplomacy

This chapter will evaluate South Africa's defence diplomacy policy context and analyse the SADR 2015 for recommendations on how South Africa should engage with SADC and how a South African DOD Defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC member states may be developed.

1.15.4 Chapter 4: An evaluation of South Africa's defence diplomacy initiatives with SADC member states from 2003 to 2018

The aim of the chapter is to evaluate the extent to which South Africa uses defence diplomacy to achieve its strategic goals within SADC. The chapter will provide an account of South Africa's defence diplomacy initiatives with SADC and subsequently evaluate how South Africa operationalises defence diplomacy in relation to SADC.

1.15.5 Chapter 5: Evaluation and recommendations.

This chapter serves a purpose that is two-fold. Firstly it will present the findings made during the analysis of South Africa's defence diplomacy in the context of SADC and strategic considerations for a South African defence diplomacy strategy for the SADC in order to assess the extent to which the research questions were answered. Secondly, it makes recommendations on the type of defence diplomacy strategy that South Africa should develop and employ in order to achieve collective security in the SADC Region.

1.16 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to establish clear parameters for the mini dissertation. Having identified the research theme, provided the literature overview, identified and demarcated the

research problem, outlined the research methodology and the structure of the research, attention will henceforth be given to the development of a conceptual framework to describe and explain the key concepts of this study.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

According to Jabareen (2009), the majority of modern social phenomena in research are complex and a large amount of knowledge about them can be found in different disciplines. In this regard, qualitative methods have been found to be adequate tools of enquiry for investigating these modern and sophisticated phenomena (Jabareen 2009). In order to effectively employ qualitative methods of enquiry for this purpose, Rocco and Plakhonik (2009) advise that qualitative methods must be linked to literature or concepts that act to motivate why a particular study is needed (Rocco and Plakhonik 2009). Such literature or concepts must be related to the purpose statement of the study and link the study to existing studies (Rocco and Plakhonik 2009).

The purpose of this chapter is therefore to present and outline this study's conceptual framework. Jabareen (2009: 51) defines a conceptual framework as "a network of interlinked concepts that together provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena". Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the contribution that a South African defence diplomacy strategy can make in the advancement of South Africa's foreign policy in the SADC, the concepts upon which the conceptual framework of this study will be based are preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy, soft power and collective security. According to Jabareen (2009), concepts that constitute the conceptual framework must support each other, clearly express their phenomena and establish a framework-specific philosophy.

In relation to the broader study, Jabareen (2009) asserts that the conceptual framework provides ontological (knowledge of the "way things are," "the nature of reality," "real" existence, and "real" action), epistemological ("how things really are" and "how things really work" in an assumed reality), and methodological (the process of building the conceptual framework and assessing what it can tell us about the "real" world) assumptions. Leshem and Trafford (2017) summarise this very well when they state that a conceptual framework serves to integrate functions between theories that explain the phenomenon under investigation. Rocco and Plakhonik (2009), add that a conceptual framework serves as a support for the study's research

design, method and instruments whilst providing points of reference for the conclusions of a study. Reference is made by means of comparing the findings of the particular study with existing literature and identifying the connected implications (Rocco and Plakhonik 2009; Leshem and Trafford 2017).

2.2 Preventive diplomacy

Stedman (1995); Özçelik (2006); Ramcharan (2017) and Aderayo (2021) describe preventive diplomacy as deliberate actions that are taken at the earliest possible stage in order to prevent and resolve disputes between and within states from becoming violent conflict. Opiyo (2012) and Murati (2018) simply describes preventive diplomacy as diplomatic and political action taken to avoid the escalation of conflict. Stedman (1995) asserts that preventive diplomacy allows actors in IR to monitor, predict, and prevent potential violent confrontations. Preventive diplomacy combines all elements of the peace process and is designed to initiate a process of early conflict detection and resolution (Bercovitch 1996). Bercovitch (1996) and George (2000) assert that preventive diplomacy contributes to conflict management by inhibiting existing conflicts from further escalation and provides a process of prompt and effective response to conflicts. Conflict avoidance and resolution techniques exploited by preventive diplomacy include amongst others mediation, peacekeeping, peace-making, confidence- and trust-building measures, and "Track Two"/ unofficial diplomacy, facilitation, conciliation, adjudication and arbitration (George 2000; Ali Khalaf 2018). Favourable characteristics of preventive diplomacy include its being an inexpensive and almost risk-free alternative to the propagation of deadly conflicts in the international system and being the least complex and the most humane approach to dispute resolution in the international system (Stedman 1995; Özçelik 2005). Preventive diplomacy therefore finds expression in a number of global collective security agreements Murati (2018).

In Africa, regional bodies have also fully embraced preventive diplomacy as a tool of peace making. As agents of peace making, the African Union (AU) for example has established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Warning System (CWS) (Aderayo 2021). From a sub-regional perspective for example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been very active in attempts to resolve disputes before and after they turn violent (Aderayo 2021).

In conclusion, this section provided a clear understanding of preventive diplomacy as both a concept and tool in IR. As a concept, preventive diplomacy provides the foundation from which a DOD defence diplomacy approach can be formulated. As a tool in IR, preventive diplomacy provides an acceptable means of ensuring peace and stability. Therefore, as a globally accepted approach to conflict management and as an important concept of this study, the role of preventive diplomacy in answering the research question becomes that of an overarching concept that informs the approach that a DOD defence diplomacy strategy should adopt.

2.3 Defence diplomacy

This section will define defence diplomacy as a concept and explain how it differs from other forms of diplomacy. Insight into how defence diplomacy may be deployed as well as the objectives that it aims to achieve will also be presented in this section. An in-depth understanding of defence diplomacy in terms of what it is and how it operates is central to answering the research question of this study. A theoretical overview of defence diplomacy will therefore be provided in this section.

Literatures on defence diplomacy interchangeably refers to military diplomacy and defence diplomacy. However, the researcher supports the distinction made between ‘military diplomacy’ and ‘defence diplomacy’ as outlined by De Carvalho (2016). According to De Carvalho (2016: 504), ‘military diplomacy’ is more specific and restricted to military action used in direct diplomacy, for example the use of military attachés. Defence diplomacy does not only involve the armed forces of a state, but also involves the full defence policy spectrum including non-governmental role players within the defence environment (De Carvalho 2016: 504). Expanding on the definition by Morabety (2017) who states that defence diplomacy is “the use of the military in diplomacy as a tool of national foreign policy”, Tan (2016: 592) defines defence diplomacy as “the deliberate application by a nation of its military assets and resources in nonviolent ways and in bilateral or multilateral settings, to attain positive outcomes for its security”. Storey (2012) posits that the fundamental goal of defence diplomacy is to gain political, economic and military influence over another state.

Defence diplomacy can be confused with other concepts under the umbrella of diplomacy mainly because of similarities in the environments that they are employed or events that trigger a specific type of diplomacy in an international relations setting. Du Plessis (2008: 93) notes that such confusion can occur for example when reference is made to military diplomacy, naval diplomacy and gunboat diplomacy. According to Du Plessis (2008), the military-diplomatic nexus is responsible for the possible incorrect contextual use of these terms.

Differentiating the different modes of diplomacy is therefore important in order to ensure purpose and relevance. Although the terms military diplomacy and defence diplomacy can be used interchangeably, their use and meaning can be differentiated based on the literal meaning of the terms defence and military (Du Plessis 2008). In this regard, military diplomacy is differentiated by its exclusion of the wider security concerns, related civilian infrastructure found in defence diplomacy as well as its exclusive relevance to the functional areas of the military and armed forces (Du Plessis 2008). Naval diplomacy and gunboat diplomacy are also differentiated from defence diplomacy. Naval diplomacy is considered to be an adjunct of defence diplomacy and refers to the pursuance of political objectives through the use of naval forces. At the opposite end, gunboat diplomacy is an adjunct of coercive diplomacy as it involves the use or threat of minimal naval force short of war with the intention to either secure advantage, avert loss, engage in an international dispute or deter invading foreign nationals in own territory (Du Plessis 2008). White (2014) further distinguishes defence diplomacy from “strategic” or “security” diplomacy based on the implementation channels used where strategic or security diplomacy encapsulates the full complement of diplomatic efforts that are in place for the promotion or protection of strategic or security interests of a state whereas defence diplomacy makes use of specifically, military channels.

Fetic (2014) further identifies preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy as modes of diplomacy that must be differentiated from defence diplomacy. The relationship between preventive diplomacy and defence diplomacy, which also acts to differentiate the two modes of diplomacy is that preventive diplomacy can be triggered when defence diplomacy has either failed or when it is used to activate “early warning” measures in order to prevent the escalation of conflict. Further, defence diplomacy compliments preventive diplomacy based on its ability reduce tensions and manage crises by involving both uniform and civilian defence personnel in non-coercive ways to ensure that a crisis does not escalate (Taylor (2014). Whilst coercive diplomacy does not refrain from either threatening or actually using force to achieve political

goals, defence diplomacy prepares for the potential of a conflict (Du Plessis 2008 and Fetic 2014).

Depending on a state's strategic goals, Tan (2016: 593) asserts that defence diplomacy can be approached in either a conservative/pragmatic or transformative mode. For the purposes of this study, the conservative/ pragmatic mode will constitute the mode of interest. In the conservative/pragmatic mode, a state employs defence diplomacy for pragmatic end goals such as building interoperability and capacity among allies and partners, building strategic depth with the region, gaining influence in countries where the military is a key actor, better understanding the strategic cultures of other states, building "crisis-proof" bilateral relationships and building the capacity of other states and their militaries in order to contribute effectively to shared tasks (Tan 2016: 593).

Viewed from a broader strategic point of view Sarma (2014); El Morabety (2017); Ram (2018) assert that defence diplomacy is used for the advancement of the foreign policy agenda of a regional power as it allows the regional power to navigate and entrench itself in the intricate whirlpool of regional geopolitics. In agreement with this, Cottey and Forster (2004) assert that defence diplomacy can also be used as a tool for amongst other things building or reinforcing perceptions of common interest with other states. Baldino and Carr (2016); Capie (2013); De Carvalho (2016) suggest that defence diplomacy may be operationalised using a variety of mechanisms, which include high-level strategic security dialogues, military-to-military training exercises, port visits, activities and exchange programmes in education, the integrated use of militaries for the provision of material equipment and aid, engagement in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of an international organisation, the development of technologies and the industrial production of weapons through cooperation and technology agreements.

Defence diplomacy however, has not escaped detractors such as Ford (2014) who warns that defence diplomacy is not the ideal diplomatic tool to be used when engaging with intransigent, unwilling, or insincere partners. Bisley (2014) further notes that defence diplomacy can be made weak by participants who are unable to compromise, and generally lack the will to find mutually acceptable agreements about their many differences. From a financial investment point of view, Leahy (2014) notes that defence diplomacy requires substantial financial investment that is not necessarily matched by a return on investment. Whilst Taylor (2014) points out that the benefits of defence diplomacy are mostly intangible and difficult to quantify,

White (2014) simply downwashes the utility of defence diplomacy as a mere public relations exercise that seeks to soften the aggressive image of the military in the eyes of the public.

In this section, the term defence diplomacy was differentiated from the various types of related forms of diplomacy including military diplomacy. For the purpose of this study, the term defence diplomacy as opposed to military diplomacy was adopted as the term of choice. Although regarded as being different in terms of meaning and purpose, preventive diplomacy and defence diplomacy were found to play a supportive and complimentary role to preventive diplomacy regarding conflict prevention and management. Along with available modes of defence diplomacy, an overview of how defence diplomacy may be operationalised was presented in this section. The conservative/pragmatic mode of defence diplomacy was identified as being the most relevant to this study compared to the transformative mode. In order to provide a balanced view on defence diplomacy, this section was concluded by presenting arguments that seek to highlight the weaknesses of defence diplomacy.

2.4 Soft Power

Rothman (2011: 49) and Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015: 24), define power as being “the ability of one actor to influence the actions of another actor to act in a manner that they would have not acted otherwise”. Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) explain that a state exercises power over another in order to achieve a specific goal or interest in IR. States may opt to use reward power, coercive power, legitimate power and referent or expert power as bases of power in the formulation of power relations with each other (Fan 2008; Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2015). According to Nye (2008), the power bases allow states to exercise either coercive power, which aims to persuade using threats or referent power, which seeks to use attraction as a means of persuasion. Focusing on referent power, Nye (1990) asserts that states may exploit factors such as technology, education and economic growth as sources of their power. Wang and Lu (2008); Ali and Khalaf (2018) classify these factors as being non-traditional, intangible, non-quantifiable and non-material sources of power. The idea of using non-traditional, intangible, non-quantifiable and non-material sources of power laid the foundation for Nye (1990) to introduce the concept of soft power in IR. Nye (1990: 168) defines soft power as “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own”. Expanding on this definition, Fan (2008: 1) defines soft power as being “a country’s ability to influence what another country wants without using

coercive power”. According to Nye (1990); Solomon (2014); Patalakh (2016), soft power contrasts traditional conceptions of power, which assume that power is about the possession of resources such as territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces and political stability. Rather, soft power exploits the more intangible dimensions of power in a political environment that has always been dominated by an openly materialistic power. Central to the utility of soft power is attraction (Patalakh 2016). In relation to soft power, Mattern (2007: 98) defines attraction as the ability to convince others to follow based on the appeal of one’s ideas. In order for soft power to be effective, a state must master the ability to make its ideas and itself attractive to other states of interest (Mattern 2007: 98). In this regard, Roselle, *et al.* (2014) suggest that an attractive culture, values and policies could be exploited as possible means of persuasion and influence in international relations. Depending on a country’s strategic objectives, Lee (2009) identifies five types of soft power:

- Soft power to improve the external security environment by projecting peaceful and attractive images of a country.
- Soft power to mobilise other countries’ support for one’s foreign and security policies by mobilising collective actions among countries and saving on the costs of hard power through the sharing of the burden among coalition partners.
- Soft power to manipulate other countries’ way of thinking and preferences by changing preferences and behaviours of others using ideational resources.
- Soft power to maintain unity of a community of countries by avoiding the use of hard power.
- Soft power to increase approval ratings of a leader or domestic support of a government by invoking patriotism and increasing the domestic popularity of a leader or a government.

This section presented a broad understanding of the concept of power along with an overview of why, when, how and by whom it may be used. Subsequently, the concept of soft power was presented by way of definition and type. Soft power was contrasted from traditional forms of power by presenting the notion of using intangible sources to influence power relations in IR. The ability to influence IR through the exploitation of attraction was presented as an essential element of soft power.

2.5 Defence diplomacy and soft power

As a result of the expanding role of the military attaché and in line with the change in perception of security, the role of defence diplomacy began to transform and expand (Swistek 2012). From being primarily a peace-time tool, defence diplomacy has transformed into becoming a tool for the promotion of modern foreign and security policy (Swistek 2012; Neag 2014). Defence diplomacy has been used as a tool to bring about stability and security by changing the attitudes and perceptions of parties who are in a state of conflict with each other (Swistek 2012). In addition to complementing preventive diplomacy in conflict management, the use of defence diplomacy as a tool of influence is in line with the definition provided by Fan (2008: 1) that soft power “is a country’s ability to influence what another country wants without using coercive power”. As a source of soft power, defence diplomacy exploits amongst others the use of cooperation-, information-, and trust-building programmes, the ability to create understanding, building mutual trust, and influencing other military officials both at junior and senior levels including civilian defence officials (Swistek 2012). The advancement of a country’s national interests without inciting hostility is a key element of defence diplomacy that links it to soft power (Sudarsono *et al.* 2018).

2.6 Collective security

Jordaan (2017) asserts that the uncertain pursuance of security by states that are unable to adequately ensure their own security has led to the realisation that they cannot achieve their security goals alone. In reaction to this, states tend to cooperate with each other towards improving their security by not only forming alliances and coalitions, but by also engaging on the rules-based system of collective security (Jordaan 2017: 160).

Aleksovski *et al.* (2014) assert that collective security allows states to combine and pool resources, which allows individual states to reduce their cost of fully providing security. This section will therefore present collective security as a concept that incorporates collective self-defence and collective defence. Therefore, for the purpose of this study and depending on context, the terms collective security, collective self-defence and collective defence will be used interchangeably. This is in line with Jordaan (2017: 164) who asserts that collective security can be perceived as a system that controls and encompasses other forms of security cooperation including collective self-defence and collective defence.

Ebegbulem (2011: 30) defines collective security as “a plan for maintaining peace through an organisation of sovereign states, whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack”. As a term used interchangeably in this study, Jordaan (2017: 163) defines collective defence as “a formal agreement between states to work together in pursuance of their national security goals and focus on enhancing military power and coordinating deployments”. Gleason (2005) explains that collective security alliances are crafted to be self-stabilising agreements among sovereign states who agree to abandon the pursuit of their narrow self-interests in favour of the broader goal of maintaining stability in the international system.

In international relations, collective security agreements are enabled and facilitated by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which maintains that every member of the UN has an inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack (Arai-Takahashi 2002; Aleksovski *et al.* 2014; Güven and Ribbelink 2016: 57; Tibori-Szabó 2016: 74; Zulkarnain and Hastuti 2020). Furthermore, Article 51 empowers states to defend themselves against attack and to use force as a form of self-defence in order to stop and repel an attack against them (Kretzmer 2013).

Collective security finds criticism from Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) who note that in general, some states tend to excessively depend on the assistance provided by other states in a collective defence arrangement. According to Kupchan and Kupchan (1995), the consequence of this is that in the event of a disbandment of a collective defence arrangement, such states end up being exposed and unprepared for direct threats in the event of a war or an attack. Lehto (2018) presents extraterritorial self-defence against non-state actors as a form of criticism. From a legal point of view, Lehto (2018) questions whether collective defence responses triggered by non-state actors who do not have the support of the state from which they launch their attack are justified or not.

2.7 Strategy

Originating from military theory, Mintzberg (1978) confirms that the term strategy continues to be used as a concept that describes the manner in which a nation ensures its security and victory by utilising its armed forces on a large-scale and the employment of long-range planning and development in times of peace and war. In the context of this study and defence diplomacy, Mintzberg (1978) defines strategy by dividing it into five Ps. According to Mintzberg (1987), this approach consolidates strategy into five easy-to-understand dimensions, which include strategy as:

- Plan - The manner in which leaders attempt to set the direction of their organisations by providing them with a predetermined course of action.
- Ploy - Threats and the competition are eliminated using threats, tricks and a number of manoeuvres in order to gain advantage.
- Pattern - Behaviour is emphasised as a key element towards ensuring a successful strategy.
- Position - Organisations are contextually viewed from their position relative to their competitive environments. Their ability to find and protect their positions with the aim of occupying the same position as their competition, avoid it, or subvert it is regarded as critical in strategy.
- Perspective - Strategy expresses the intention and behaviour of a collective. As perspective, strategy focuses on the reflections and actions of the collective in how intentions diffuse through the collective to transform into shared norms and values, and the manner in which patterns of behaviour become deeply ingrained in the group to form what Mintzberg (1987) calls the “organisational mind”.

In addressing the purpose of a strategy or why organisations need strategy, Ravasi *et al.* (2020) assert that organisations engage in strategy formulation as a result of their desire to know and understand what they need to do in order to achieve outcomes that could improve or better their position or situation. Van Assche *et al.* (2020) summarises this desire by describing strategy as a vision towards a long-term future supported by an idea on how to get there. In relation to international relations, Van Assche *et al.* (2020) confirm that strategy is an inherent component in power relations amongst states as it has the capability to predict changes in power relations. Ultimately, the use of power whether it be through coercion, persuasion, or changing of points

of view directly or indirectly is the ultimate outcome of a nation’s strategy in its relations with other states (Van Assche *et al.* 2020). The implication of this is that a DOD defence diplomacy strategy must enable South Africa to use its soft power to influence SADC member countries to support and commit to a collective security agreement.

2.8 Conclusion

In order to formulate this study’s conceptual framework, preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy, soft power and collective security were presented as concepts upon which this study’s conceptual framework will be formulated. The conceptual definitions and overviews provided in this chapter provided insight as to how the concepts may interlink and influence each other towards the development of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy. The conceptual framework presented in this study is therefore summarised graphically in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1: The conceptual framework and how the concepts relate to each other

Figure 1 above graphically summarises the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of the concepts used in this study. Preventive diplomacy is depicted as the starting point “the way” whilst defence diplomacy and soft power are depicted as being “the means” towards a DOD defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC member countries. Occupying the last layer, collective defence is depicted as “the end” or result of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy. Figure 1 also demonstrates the cascading relationship that exists among this study’s concepts where concepts systemically flow from one to the other.

CHAPTER 3

THE POLICY CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FROM 2003 TO 2018

3.1 Introduction

The SADR 2015 prioritises the SADC – as a multilateral institution – as a “firm base for the engagement of the continent ... [and] the consolidation of the security structures and institutions of SADC is thus of paramount importance” (RSA DOD 2015: 7-4). Moreover, the SADR highlights that a defence diplomacy strategy must advance strategic influence by providing the

ability to shape the multilateral security agenda, pursue multilateral security objectives, capacitate multilateral security objectives, capacitate multilateral institutions, develop regional and continental partnerships and direct participation in selected bilateral institutions (RSA DOD 2015: 7-2).

It is in this context that it is noted that the DOD does not have a specific defence diplomacy strategy for engaging countries with SADC membership and given the strategic importance attached to the region, it is contended that attention is given to this shortcoming. In the absence of such a strategy the aim of this chapter is to conduct a primary source literature review to identify literature such as policies and agreements that support and enable the development of a South African defence diplomacy strategy within the South African and SADC foreign policy and governance frameworks.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the term “national interests” by providing a definition and identifying what South Africa's national interests are in the context of international relations. An overview and articulation of South Africa's foreign policy will also be presented to provide a point of reference for South Africa's foreign and defence policy framework.

3.2 Foreign policy context

According to Baylis and Smith (2001: 180), national interests are “that which is signified to be of utmost importance to the state, with survival occupying the top of the list”. The SADR 2015 defines national interest as a “collective concept that defines the aggregate of things that ensure national sovereignty and which guarantee the survival and development of a nation (RSA DOD 2015: 3-3). Developed by state leaders, national interests can be seen as a “sixth sense” that evolves in tandem with a nation’s history, national experience and strategic context and are therefore not static and are subject to periodic change, which is open to interpretations by various sectors of society” (Baylis and Smith 2001: 180; RSA DOD 2015: 3-3).

National interests constitute an essential and indispensable component of state sovereignty (RSA DOD 2015: 3-4). South Africa’s interrelated national interests are therefore articulated as being “national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, the security and continuance of national institutions, the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the South African people, the growth of the economy, and demonstrable good governance (RSA DOD 2015: 2-26). South Africa’s interests are a reflection of the country’s long-term goals, values and aspirations and serve to provide strategic direction to policy makers and provide consistency to the process of policy-making in South Africa (RSA DOD 2015: 3-3). Should the national interests of a state be either threatened or removed, its sovereignty, independence, survival, continuance or its freedom would be highly compromised (RSA DOD 2015: 3-4).

Golstein (1996: 137) defines foreign policy as a collection of strategies that are used by a government to guide it in its actions in international relations. Adopting a similar view, Geldenhuys (2012: 30) defines foreign policy as being “the totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders”. In his definition, Golstein (1996: 137) further explains that the foreign policy of a state articulates the objectives that a state has adopted in pursuit of its relationship with another state or group of states or its approach to a particular situation. Further, the foreign policy also identifies the general means by which the state intends to pursue its identified objectives (Golstein 1996: 137).

Venter (1997) argues that it is an undeniable fact of international relations that when a state considers changing its foreign policy, it would take into consideration its geolocation as a key attribute. In the case of South Africa, recognising the African Continent as constituting

territorial integrity is therefore central to its foreign policy considerations (Venter 1997). Consequently, in the process of considering a new foreign policy during the late 1980s, South Africa confirmed its inextricable attachment to the African Continent and more specifically SADC (Venter 1997). This was the opposite of apartheid South Africa's focus on the distant power blocs of the northern hemisphere (Venter 1997).

Sidiropoulos (2008) argues that with Africa being at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy strongly reveals South Africa's true identity as opposed to a South Africa that once considered itself as an outpost of European civilisation. According to Taylor (2004: 23), post-Apartheid South Africa's foreign policy is therefore based on the strong belief that fair and lasting solutions to the problems of human kind can only be derived through the promotion of democracy. The founding principles of South Africa's foreign policy are therefore the following (Van Wyk 2004):

- A commitment to the promotion of human rights.
- A commitment to the promotion of democracy.
- A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of international relations between nations.
- A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts.
- A commitment to Africa in world affairs.
- A commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent (and globalised) world.

Nathan (2005) explains that although South Africa's foreign policy is intended to advance its domestic interests, its idealist international and emancipatory tendencies embrace an ambitious African and global agenda. Venter (1997: 74) and Van Wyk (2004) describe South African foreign policy as ascribing to the principle of universality, which refers to the unwillingness to discriminate between members of the international community of nations. As result of the universality nature of South Africa's foreign policy, South Africa openly conducts its international relations with other nations, whether they be old enemies or friends and regardless of their domestic policies (Venter 1997: 74; van Wyk 2004). Venter (1997: 79), however, expresses that South Africa's "de-ideologised" foreign policy, which allows it to engage with any state regardless of their domestic policy should not be understood to mean support for such

policies. Regarding relations with the SADC, the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy expresses that South Africa is very mindful of the interdependence of states within the region (RSA DIRCO 2011: 10). In response to this, South Africa's foreign policy advances competition and collaboration as opposed to confrontation and thus commits South Africa to the development of partnerships not only within the SADC, but internationally as well (RSA DIRCO 2011: 10).

3.3 South African soft power

South Africa's emergence as a democracy in 1994 and its subsequent participation in the global arena gave rise to a country that was respected for its commitment to issues of development, the integration of economic development, social development and the protection of the environment as symbiotic and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development, the need for a reformed multilateralism as a possible solution to the global ills of poverty, inequality and under-development (Chiroro 2012). Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) assert that South Africa's post-Apartheid role resulted in a drastic change in the African Continent's power dynamics and leadership equation.

Besada and Tok (2014) agree with this assertion when they state that upon becoming an active participant in international relations, South Africa was strategically positioned as an emerging power both on the African Continent and on the global stage. Regarding soft power, Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) confirm that South Africa's exploitation of its soft power is the main driving factor towards South Africa being considered as the African Continent's hegemonic power. According to Chiroro (2012), South Africa's foundation for soft power is formed by its respect for international laws, norms and institutions, general reliance on multilateralism, willingness to sacrifice short-term national interests in pursuit of collective good and liberal foreign economic policies. Chiroro (2012) further explains that under the leadership of Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe and Zuma, South Africa has done very well over the years to lead the region and fully adopt and exploit its soft power and advocate for a multilateral agenda towards the building of common norms and values not only in Africa but internationally as well. The Mbeki administration in particular advanced South Africa as a champion of an African Renaissance by establishing diplomatic missions in almost all African states, deploying peacekeepers into African conflicts and spearheading institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Smith 2012: 76). In the context of this study, in exploiting its soft

power resources within the SADC, Smith (2012: 76) asserts that South Africa has embarked on a variety of actions such as:

- The provision of the public good of regional stability, through peacekeeping and mediation activities.
- Effective employment of soft power with regard to specific policy issues such as trans-boundary water interaction involving interactions with Lesotho and Namibia over the Orange River.

Despite the positive gains made by South Africa's exploitation of its soft power sources, Smith (2012: 74) warns that there are conditions that threaten the efficacy and relevance of South Africa's soft power. See Table 1 below:

Table 1: Conditions that may jeopardise the gains made by South Africa's soft power

Source of Threat	Impact and Effect
Internal social, political and economic challenges (high levels of crime, unemployment, poverty, poor education and health care).	Tarnishing of South Africa's image.
International actions and decisions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign arms sales to states known for their human rights abuses. • Inability to influence effective political change in Zimbabwe through quiet diplomacy. • Military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. • Decision to deny the Dalai Lama a visa into South Africa to attend a peace conference in 2009 and to attend Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu's birthday celebrations in 2011. • Decision not to support a resolution to end human rights violations in Myanmar, and attempting to block a resolution calling for further sanctions on Iran during South Africa's first term as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives the impression that human rights are being relegated to being insignificant. • South Africa's moral leadership has been contradicted and undermined.

3.4 SADC

Since its establishment in 1992, the SADC has been very progressive in championing regional cooperation and integration (SADAC RISDP 2020: 12). With 16 member states, the SADC has progressively transformed itself from a coordinating conference to becoming an active regional development community (SADAC RISDP 2020: 12). On the agenda for regional integration since 1992, SADC member states have signed a total of 33 protocols, a variety of

declarations, charters and memoranda of understanding relating to a myriad of issues of mutual concern (SADAC RISDP 2020: 12). It is undoubted that the commitments and other initiatives that member states have made to each other have had a positive impact on the lives of SADC citizens (SADAC RISDP 2020: 12). As a community of states and therefore one of the most important building blocks of Africa's integration, the SADC places great importance on ensuring that its policies, strategies, programmes and activities are well synchronised (RISDP 2020: 18). Therefore in coordinating regional peace and security, the SADC is guided by the following key policy documents (SADAC RISDP 2020: 38):

- Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation.
- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, 2010.
- Common SADC Defence and Security Policy.
- Regional Law Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Strategy.
- Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan.
- Regional Disaster Preparedness and Response Strategy.

For the purpose of this study, the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (PPDSC), the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) (2010), the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020 – 2030 and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) (2003) will be examined in order to understand SADC's posture in relation to the conceptual framework presented in this regard. Further, these documents will provide insight on how and to what extent the current SADC policy framework would enable the development and implementation of a South African defence diplomacy strategy:

3.4.1 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation: The aim of implementing the PPDSC is to strengthen and deepen cooperation in the areas of politics, defence, and security in the SADC. The protocol further seeks to encourage member states to advance their effort towards enhanced peace, security, and stability in the region as expressed and confirmed in multiple declarations, treaties, and protocols designed to prevent and manage conflicts in the region. For the purpose of this study, the following sections of the PPDSC are therefore considered to be most relevant and important:

A. Article 2 – The specific objectives of the Organ shall be to (SADAC PPDSC 2001: 7):

- a) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;
- b) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
- c) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
- d) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;
- e) observe, and encourage State Parties to implement, United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;
- f) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- g) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance.

B. Article 3 – In implementing its objectives, the Organ is required to have the following structures amongst others (SADAC PPDSC 2001: 8):

- a) an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), which is comprised of the ministers responsible for foreign affairs from each of the State Parties.
- b) an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which is comprised of the ministers responsible for defence, ministers responsible for public security and ministers responsible for state security from each of the State Parties.

C. Article 11 – In preventing, managing and resolving conflict, the following methods amongst others are prescribed (SADAC PPDSC 2001: 13):

- a) Preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal.
- b) The establishment of an early warning system in order to facilitate timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict.
- c) External military threats to the Region shall be addressed through collective security arrangements to be agreed upon in a Mutual Defence Pact among the State Parties.

3.4.2 Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), 2010: The primary objective of SIPO is to express in detail specific activities related to the objectives of the PPDSC, and outlines the strategies for their realisation. In relation to one of this study's concepts – collective defence – the SIPO identifies the successful launching and operationalisation

of the SADC Standby Force as an important milestone and as a commitment of purpose that ensures the region's collective approach to defence and security affairs. Furthermore, amongst other objectives, the SIPO 2010 was approved to guide cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and security. The SIPO also serves as an enabling instrument for the implementation of other regional policies such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (RISDP 2020: 12). SIPO, 2010 identifies strategies and activities that are required in order to achieve the objectives of the PPDS (SADAC SIPO 2010: 21). The strategies identified by SIPO are implemented in four sectors, which include the political, defence, state security, public security and police sectors. For the purpose of this study, however, only strategies relating to the defence and state security sectors will be considered below:

A. THE DEFENCE SECTOR (SADAC SIPO 2010: 35)

1. Objective 2: Promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end.
2. Strategies:
 - a) Harmonise national defence policies to be in line with foreign policy objectives so as to enhance the regional security architecture.
 - b) Establish and operationalise confidence-building measures for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
 - c) Promote interaction among senior officials of the member states security and defence forces through consultation and joint training programmes.
 - d) Conduct activities aimed at enabling coordination in handling conflicts and harmonising policies and strategies.
3. Objective 4: To consider the development of a collective security capacity; and to conclude the 'SADC Mutual Defence Pact' to respond to external military threats.
4. Strategies:
 - a) Operationalise the 'SADC Mutual Defence Pact'.
 - b) Promote and disseminate the Pact within member state institutions.
 - c) Harmonise military doctrines and operational concepts in the region to achieve regional inter-operability.
 - d) Adopt and rehearse operational procedures aimed at achieving the spirit of the Pact.

5. Objective 6: To develop the peace keeping capacity of national defence forces and to coordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.
6. Strategies:
 - a) Develop a regional peace support operational capability based upon individual member state's standby arrangements.
 - b) Consolidate and develop the activities of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre.
 - c) Design and establish a regional peace support operational structure with appropriate means.
7. Objective 7: To enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.
8. Strategies:
 - a) Support the implementation of and contribute to the establishment of operational procedures related to a disaster management mechanism.
 - b) Train national defence forces for effective rapid response in search and rescue missions.
 - c) Conduct joint exercises for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
 - d) Adopt operational emergency procedures that will guide the use of military forces in search and rescue operations.
 - e) Encourage the defence forces of member states to acquire equipment to be used in case of emergency.

B. THE STATE SECURITY SECTOR (SADAC SIPO 2010: 45)

1. Objective 1: To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra- and inter-state conflict.
2. Strategies
 - a) Identify and diffuse threats within the region.
 - b) Exchange intelligence on potential threats undermining the stability of member states.
 - c) Share intelligence on the prevention and combating of terrorism.
 - d) Share intelligence on maritime piracy.
 - e) Exchange intelligence on the observance of human rights.

3. Objective 2: To promote regional coordination and cooperation on security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms.
4. Strategies:
 - a) Collaborate with relevant intelligence institutions.
 - b) Exchange training programmes.
 - c) Share financial and technological resources.
 - d) Hold regional training programmes.
 - e) Hold statutory meetings.
5. Objective 3: To prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra- state conflicts.
6. Strategies:
 - a) Identify early warning signs of inter- and intra-state conflict.
 - b) Monitor regional security situation.
 - c) Collect and disseminate intelligence to assist in conflict resolution processes in the region.
7. Objective 4: To consider the development of a collective security capacity and implement the ‘SADC Mutual Defence Pact’ in order to respond to external military threat.
8. Strategies:
 - a) Promote the exchange of intelligence of mutual interest.
 - b) Disseminate the ‘SADC Mutual Defence Pact’ within state security institutions.

The aforementioned places much emphasis on the need for SADC to act collectively towards ensuring regional security. Whilst the PPDSC provides guidance at a high level on what SADC needs to do in order to ensure regional stability, the SIPO provides the vehicle to implementation in the form implementation strategies. Central to the high-level requirements of the PPDSC and approach to implementation of the SIPO are preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy and collective security. Preventive diplomacy is presented as one of the region’s methods of conflict prevention, management and resolution and defence diplomacy is implied through objectives such as the need to develop the region’s peacekeeping and disaster management capabilities. In addition to explicitly referring to collective security, the aforementioned emphasises the importance of launching and operationalising the SADC Standby Force as a measure of implementing collective security.

3.4.3 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020 – 2030

The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020–2030 is a 10-year strategic plan. It outlines a plan on how SADC can best move towards SADC Vision 2050 on integration and development over a 10- year period from the year 2020 (SADC RISDP 2020: 12 and SADAC RISDP 2020: 13). RISDP, 2020-2030 therefore identifies the following three pillars upon which SADC’s integration and development agenda rests (RISDP 2020: 9):

- Industrial development and market integration.
- Infrastructure development in support of regional integration.
- Social and human Capital Development, anchored in a firm foundation of Peace, Security, and Good Governance.

In order to ensure that pillar number three above remains stable, the RISDP 2020–2030 aims to enhance conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms with an effective early warning system capable of tracking and monitoring political, security, and socio-economic threats (RISDP 2020: 9). The RISDP 2020–2030 calls upon the need to enhance collective defence and security through amongst other approaches the strengthening of the capacity of the SADC Standby Force (SSF). In addition, the RISDP 2020–2030 seeks to achieve amongst others the following strategic objective and key interventions and outcomes (SADAC RISDP 2020: 47):

1. Strategic Objective 1: Enhanced conflict prevention, management, and resolution systems, with early warning systems that are capable of tracking and monitoring political, security, and socio-economic threats.
2. Key Interventions:
 - a) Regional Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Centre established and operationalised.
 - b) Regional measures and strategies to address new, “non-traditional” security threats to the region, including climate-induced migration, environmental hazards, and health pandemics, developed and adopted.
 - c) Capacity of member states increased to observe and monitor indicators of insecurity, including structural factors, triggers and accelerators of conflict, disasters and pandemics.
 - d) Regional rights-based approaches for addressing violent extremism and terrorism developed.

3. Outcome 1: Enhanced early warning systems, leading to timely and targeted monitoring and response to political, security, and socio-economic threats.

3.4.4 SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) - 2003

The SIPO identifies the MDP as a regional commitment towards collective self-defence and the preservation of peace and security in the region and adheres to the principle that an armed attack against one state shall be deemed a threat to regional peace and security (SADAC SIPO 2010: 16). Furthermore, in its preamble, the MDP expresses that its signatories have resolved to unite their efforts towards collective self-defence and the preservation of peace and stability (SADAC MDP 2003: 1).

Whilst Article 2 of the MDP articulates it as being “to operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters”, Article 4 commits SADC member countries to cooperate in defence matters and to facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence-related industries in the following and any other areas of mutual interest (SADAC MDP 2003: 2 and 4):

- a) the training of military personnel in any field of military endeavour and, to that end, they may from time to time hold joint military exercises in one another’s territory;
- b) the exchange of military intelligence and information in all relevant matters subject to any restrictions or otherwise of national security; and joint research, development and production under licence or otherwise of military equipment, including weapons and munitions, and to facilitate the supply of, or the procurement of defence equipment and services among defence-related industries, defence research establishments and their respective armed forces.

Regarding SADC military preparedness, Article 4 of the SADC MDP states that, in order to effectively achieve its objectives, State Parties shall individually and collectively, by means of continuous co-operation and assistance, maintain and develop their individual and collective self-defence capacity to maintain peace, stability and security (SADAC MDP 2003: 3). Article 6 of the MDP provides the following guidelines regarding the coordination and implementation of collective defence and collective action in SADC (SADAC MDP 2002: 3):

1. An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action;
2. Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ;
3. Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.

4. Any such armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations

3.5 South African Defence Policy

In order to appreciate both the historic and foundational underpinnings of South African Defence policy, this section analyses three critical documents that form the corner stones of South Africa's defence policy. Namely the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 and 2015 Defence Reviews. These documents are important in this section as they provide a clear understanding of how South African defence policy has evolved post 1994. Further, as a matter of definition and purpose, this study adopts the definition of defence policy as provided by the 2015 Defence Review:

Defence policy is that body of public policy that a government pronounces as its guidelines for the defence objectives and functions of its armed forces. Defence policy serves to define the defence or military scope of national security, the strategic posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances, and security institutions or mechanisms (both national and international) that govern the utilisation of the Defence Force. The national defence policy further seeks to clearly identify the possible threats to a country's national security and its society, economy, territory and environment, and provides options to government on how the Defence Force should deal with such threats (RSA DOD 2015: 0-6).

3.5.1 The 1996 White Paper on Defence

The May 1996 White Paper on Defence was the first defence policy document to be produced by the South African post -1994 Government of National Unity. After having followed a lengthy process of consulting with parliament and the public, the new South African Department of Defence was able to draft a policy document whose dual purpose was to inform citizens and the international community about South Africa's new defence policy as well as to serve as a confidence-and security-building measure in SADC (RSA DOD 1996: 4). The 1996 White Paper on Defence did not only provide South Africa's new Department of Defence with a defence policy framework based on democratic principles, but it also set the stage for the development of a more detailed Defence Review (RSA DOD 1998: 1-9). In providing guidance as to how Defence policy should be approached, the 1996 White Paper on Defence

expresses the importance of ensuring that Defence policy is aligned with other government policies, especially foreign and national security policy (RSA DOD 1996: 4). As part of South Africa's transformation process, this inevitably ended the role of the SANDF as the dominant security agency (RSA DOD 1996: 4). South Africa's security concerns are now shared among a variety of government departments with parliament being the ultimate custodian (RSA DOD 1996: 4). The Department of Foreign Affairs for example through preventive diplomacy, mediation or arbitration has a role to play in conflict management and resolution (RSA DOD 1996: 19).

3.5.2 The 1998 Defence Review

Two years after the 1996 White Paper on Defence and after comprehensive debates with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, South Africa's first Defence Review was presented to Cabinet and approved by parliament in 1998 (RSA DOD 1998: 1-9). As the second document to articulate South Africa's new defence policy, the 1998 Defence Review concentrated on setting a policy vision for the size, structure, weaponry and funding requirements of the SANDF (RSA DOD 1998: 6-8). These were premised mostly on the primary function of the SANDF (RSA DOD 1998: 6-8).

The secondary functions of the SANDF such as peace support operations and internal deployment in co-operation with the SAPS as proposed by the 1996 White Paper on Defence seemed to have been relegated to a status of less importance, especially where they were seen to be interfering with the primary function of the SANDF (RSA DOD 1998: 6-8). It is within the 1998 Defence Review that South Africa began to truly articulate its defence posture. Based on the prevailing circumstances at the time of the approval of the 1998 Defence Review, it is stated that: "The government does not currently, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It regards the use or threat of military force as a measure of last resort in the face of aggression when non-violent forms of conflict resolution have failed. The emphasis lies on preventing conflict through co-operation with other states, particularly in Southern Africa (RSA DOD 1998: 7-8). This almost cautious approach to the role played by the SANDF in foreign policy can be attributed to South Africa's view that at the time, South Africa was in transition and its focus was mainly on inter-state conflict and trying to ensure

that it did not “rock the boat” by utilising its military instrument for purposes other than self-defence.

3.5.3 The 2015 Defence Review

Whereas the focus of both the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review was on South Africa’s political transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation, due to mounting pressure from South Africa’s strategic environment, it became important that the conclusions made by these two seminal documents be reviewed through consultation (RSA DOD 2015:0-2). The result was therefore the 2015 Defence Review (SADR 2015) (RSA DOD 2015:0-2). In the foreword of the Review, Defence Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula describes the requirement for a second Defence Review as having been brought about by “complex changes in the strategic environment, increasing continental peacekeeping obligations, the need to deepen democracy on the continent and South Africa’s pursuit of national interests” (RSA DOD 2015: i).

As a policy document supported by South Africa’s foreign policy obligations and deriving its mandate from South Africa’s national security construct, national posture and national interests, the 2015 Defence Review seeks to establish the basic principles and tenets that must be converted into a future-orientated, concept-driven, effects-based defence policy and strategy (RSA DOD 2015: 0-6). These principles are expressed as guiding principles that serve to guide the Defence Force over twenty to thirty years into the future (RSA DOD 2015: iii and RSA DOD 2015: iii).

In its approach to providing strategic direction to South Africa’s defence policy, the SADR 2015 adopts a two-pronged approach; firstly it conducts a scan of South Africa’s suit of defence and other national capabilities in order to determine those that can be exploited to achieve South Africa’s strategic outcomes during times of peace, conflict and war and Secondly it articulates a clear and an unambiguous future mission, goals and tasks for Defence (RSA DOD 2015: 0-6). This is especially critical as according to Roelf Meyer (Chairperson of the Review Committee), in addition to providing clear policy on the primary roles of the SANDF, the SADR 2015 also gives direction on the SANDF’s secondary functions (RSA DOD 2015: iii). Along with articulating the ways and means in which the DOD may deliver on South Africa’s national security priorities, the SADR 2015 also makes recommendations on required policies

and strategies (RSA DOD 2015: 0-6). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it is important to also understand South Africa’s defence policy making architecture. This is particularly in view of the fact that national security policy, foreign policy and defence policy are inextricably linked (RSA DOD 2015: 0-5). Accordingly, South African defence policy is located within a national-level within South Africa’s policy hierarchy (RSA DOD 2015: 0-5) (See figure 2 below).




Figure 2: South Africa's policy making hierarchy (SADR 2015: 0-5)

Figure 2 above shows that the SANDF is at the centre of South Africa’s national security policy hierarchy (RSA DOD 2015: 2-25).

In aligning itself with South Africa’s foreign policy, the SADR 2015 recognises the territorial nature of South Africa’s foreign policy by acknowledging the central role that Africa and SADC play in South Africa’s national security and economy. The SADR 2015 acknowledges that both South Africa’s national security and economy rely heavily on the stability, unity and prosperity of SADC and the African continent at large (RSA DOD 2015:iii). In this regard, using a collaborative approach with other African states, South Africa is required to play a leading role within the African continent and SADC in conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and security-sector reform (RSA DOD 2015: iv). This will inevitably require that the DOD position itself to play an active role in international organisations and activities such as the UN, AU and SADC security, democracy and good governance initiatives, as well as the finalisation of specific bilateral partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social and security realms (RSA DOD 2015: iv). To achieve this, the Defence Force will also be required to meaningfully contribute in a manner that complements South Africa’s diplomatic efforts and enhance South Africa’s influence within the broader international spectrum (RSA DOD 2015: v). The SADR 2015 therefore expresses appreciation

for the domestic and regional dimensions of South Africa's national security (RSA DOD 2015: iii).

Regarding relations with the SADC, the 2015 Defence Review is in complete alignment with South Africa's foreign policy by both locating South Africa's national security at the centre of a secure SADC and by calling upon South Africa's Defence policy to be mindful of the role that the SANDF must play in endeavours to promote regional security (RSA DOD 2015: 3-3). Within the auspices of the National Security Council, SADR 2015 therefore commits South Africa to continue applying the following principles and strategies among others in the SADC (RSA DOD 2015: 3-4):

- a) Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence cooperation and the pursuit of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in SADC will be given priority.
- b) The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through nonviolent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body. These diplomatic efforts may include efforts of the SADC Organ, the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council.
- c) The use of force, or the threat of the use of force, against external aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political and other interventions have been exhausted.

Further, the 2015 Defence Review prescribes that South Africa's approach to regional security must focus on the interrelated priorities of the SADC's growth and development, stability and the creation of a just and equitable international system (RSA DOD 2015: 3-10). The DOD must therefore pursue the following interests in the SADC (RSA DOD 2015: 3-10):

- a) Supporting conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.
- b) Strengthening and capacitating institutions of security, democracy and governance in the SADC and the AU.
- c) Strengthening partnerships with like-minded states in the region and on the continent in the political, economic, social and security sectors.

In reviewing the role of the SANDF within South Africa's foreign policy objectives, the SADR 2015 directs that the SANDF be incrementally used in traditionally non-military roles (RSA DOD 2015: 3-8). Acting in partnership within multilateral structures or through diplomatic

and political efforts, the SANDF will therefore be involved in secondary roles that seek to (RSA DOD 2015: 3-4):

- a) Defuse contentious issues or situations before they give rise to serious dispute or potential for conflict;
- b) Resolve disputes and conflicts that do arise by means of diplomacy, mediation or negotiation; and
- c) Develop and entrench regional and continental collaborative systems and means, including alliances and pacts, to reduce the potential for tension and conflict and to increase the potential for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts that do arise.

Amongst its other secondary functions, the SANDF is required to collaborate with other state intelligence services and constitute South Africa's national anticipation capability (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11). Such a capability must be able to:

- Anticipate future threats and identify any increased instability in the strategic environment (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11).
- Enhance South Africa's strategic intelligence comprehension capability (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11).
- Conduct constant monitoring of risk in South Africa's strategic environment (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11).
- Ensure the timely collection, processing and dissemination of actionable intelligence in order to accurately anticipate and respond appropriately (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11).

The SADR 2015 proposes that in order to support the above capability, South Africa must integrate its diplomatic, military and other efforts in a complementary manner. The DOD must therefore exploit its defence diplomacy efforts to further support South Africa's strategic agenda through (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11 and RSA DOD 2015: 9-10):

- a) maintaining strategic bilateral relationships;
- b) advancing engagement on international security issues;
- c) actively participating in multilateral security processes;
- d) establishing collective security mechanisms; and
- e) ensuring strong representation in international defence and security institutions.

In view of the above, the SADR 2015 acknowledges the requirement for a South African Defence diplomacy strategy and provides guidance on what its focus should be (RSA DOD 2015:7-2 and RSA DOD 2015: 9-10). The SADR 2015 proposes that a DOD defence diplomacy strategy should focus on those national priorities where defence diplomacy

engagements will add the most value (RSA DOD 2015:7-2 and RSA DOD 2015: 9-10). Further, defence diplomacy must also focus on building long-standing relationships with key African states and other strategic partners (RSA DOD 2015: 9-10). Regarding national priorities, the SADR 2015 prescribes that South Africa's defence diplomacy strategy must in general address defence bilateral and multilateral priorities, which include (RSA DOD 2015:7-2):

- a) Pursuing the priorities of government as expressed in its Medium-Term Strategic Framework.
- b) Pursuing the priorities of the Executive Authority responsible for defence.
- c) Deployment of defence personnel into multilateral security institutions.
- d) The pursuit of identified multilateral security objectives.
- e) Concluding instruments on the duties, rights, responsibilities, protection and remuneration of South African forces deployed in international organisations.
- f) Identification of bilateral military assistance to other countries.
- g) Prioritisation of defence attaché deployments.
- h) Multinational military force preparation and force employment in pursuit of common security objectives, such as maritime security, border safeguarding and piracy.
- i) Support and cooperation requirements that may be required from strategic partners to deployed forces.
- j) The requirements of the four combat services and other divisions in terms of force preparation, education, training and force support.
- k) General defence cooperation measures, exchanges of intelligence and protection of defence intellectual property.
- l) National responsibilities assigned to defence, for example: vital interests, hydrography and search and rescue.
- m) Strategic support to defence industry requirements.
- n) Focused defence engagements with strategic partners.

Regarding defence diplomacy engagements with SADC countries, the 2015 Defence Review provides the following guidelines relating to the key features of a South African Defence diplomacy strategy in the areas of multilateral security, regional partnerships and defence industry cooperation where South Africa must be involved. (RSA DOD 2015: 7-3):

- **Multilateral Security:**
 - a) Advance initiatives that seek to consolidate SADC security structures and institutions of SADC and ensure the conclusion of treaties such as the SADC Mutual Defence Pact1; individual bilateral agreements.

- b) Participate in SADC Standby Force activities and establish the SADC Standby Force as a standing multinational force in terms of South Africa's pledges.
- c) Pursue initiatives to create a firm SADC defence and security sector foundation.
- d) Enhance contribution to the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), including the Defence Sub-Committee and its sub-sub-committees and working groups.
- e) Specifically advocate for the migration of the current Planning Element to a functional brigade headquarters capable of conducting regular force preparation, mobilisation of forces when required and execution of command and control over deployed forces. To this end South Africa must:
 - i. Pledge continuous support to the SADC Standby Force.
 - ii. Exchange and train personnel.
 - iii. Offer to permanently supply the Brigade Tactical Headquarters to the SADC Standby Force.
 - iv. Avail South African facilities for the planning and hosting of regional military exercises in pursuit of the SADC Standby Force and other security objectives.
 - v. Establish a strategic relationship between the South African Peace Mission Training Centre in Thaba Tshwane and the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, including the exchange of Directing Staff.
 - vi. Significantly contribute to the establishment of the SADC Logistic Base.
 - vii. Develop mutually compatible SADC doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures.
 - viii. Attach or second subject-matter experts as may be required for periods of shorter duration, examples of potential subjects being doctrine development, maritime security, nuclear and biological defence and military health protection, amongst others.
 - ix. Cooperate with regional defence industries to promote interoperability.
 - x. Advocate the expansion of SADC's Special Forces capability in order to create a "rapid reaction" capability within the regional and sub-regional AU peace, safety and security architecture. To this end:
 - 1) The establishment of a formal Special Forces structure in the Operations Sub-Sub-Committee of the ISDSC.
 - 2) The secondment of Special Forces planners to the SADC Standby Force HQ.
- f) South Africa must actively contribute to the development of the civilian component of the SADC Standby Force, including but not exclusively, within the Planning Element in Gaborone.

- Regional Partnerships (RSA DOD 2015: 7-5):
 - a) Sign and implement international defence agreements to advance regional confidence building.
 - b) Pursue cooperation in the fields of logistics, training and education, intelligence, combined exercises, secondment of personnel, and the development of common doctrine and operational procedures.
 - c) Regarding:
 - Neighbouring States:
 - i. The DOD must pursue specific security arrangements with countries with whom the coordinated cooperation on matters such as defence, state security, immigration, civilian policing, customs and ports of entry is necessary.
 - ii. Specific cooperative operations may take place to counter imminent threats or wider criminality such as poaching, stock-theft, illegal movement of people and goods, as well as maritime security and piracy.

Wider SADC:

- i. The DOD must prioritise bilateral relations within the SADC region through the vigorous and robust pursuit of bilaterally agreed cooperation plans.

Bilateral Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs):

The DOD must advance Defence by the implementation of CSBMs to provide for greater transparency and cooperation on regional and continental military matters in order to contribute towards collective confidence and stability. The following are recommended CSBMs to be pursued:

- i. Defence and security agreements and cooperation mechanisms.
- ii. Intelligence cooperation and exchanges, a (regional) communications network, a “crisis hotline”, and established procedures for dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents.
- iii. Structured annual consultations and exchanges of information on threat perceptions, defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, general defence cooperation, high-level visits and troop deployments.
- iv. Military assistance, exchanges and education and training cooperation.
- v. Combined military exercises and/or on-site observation of military exercises and specified activities.
- vi. Disaster and humanitarian assistance.

- vii. Common procurement of defence systems and common technology programmes.
- viii. Collaboration in the implementation of the AU and SADC Maritime Security Strategies.

Regarding collective security, the SADR 2015 makes the following commitments and proposals:

- South Africa is committed to active participation in multilateral institutions and collective security mechanisms (RSAD DOD 2015: 10-5).
- Defence diplomacy efforts will support South Africa's strategic agenda, extending to amongst others the establishment of collective security mechanisms (RSA DOD 2015: 3-11).
- South Africa will pursue collective action within multilateral organisations to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity (RSA DOD 2015: 3-9).
- South Africa's commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels commits it to continue its involvement in collective defence and security mechanisms on the continent (RSA DOD 2015: 3-9).
- South Africa will be defended and protected in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (RSA DOD 2015: 5-2).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented a definition of the term national interests and clearly outlined what South Africa's national interests are in relation to its foreign policy. The origins and the guiding principles of South Africa's foreign policy, which provide the African continent and SADC as South Africa's foreign policy launch pad, were also presented. In order to understand how the policy frameworks of both SADC and South Africa support this study's conceptual framework, this chapter analysed relevant and specific SADC and South African official policy documents with the aim of understanding what guidance they provide in relation to preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy, soft power and collective security.

Regarding preventive diplomacy, the 1996 White Paper on Defence identifies the Department of Foreign Affairs as having a central role to play in South Africa's use of amongst other approaches preventive diplomacy in conflict management and resolution. Furthermore, Article 11 of the SADC PPDSC identifies among others preventive diplomacy as a mechanism to resolve conflict by peaceful means.

The 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review laid the foundation for South Africa's defence diplomacy when they pronounced that the SANDF has both a primary and a secondary role to play in the security architecture of SADC. The SADR 2015 is, however, the first defence policy document to make an explicit pronouncement on defence diplomacy when it prescribes the need for a South African defence diplomacy strategy. The SADR 2015 calls upon the DOD to exploit its defence diplomacy efforts to further support South Africa's strategic agenda. Although South Africa's soft power is not formalised in policy, the SADR 2015 suggests that South Africa's soft power would be more effective if supported by a "credible military force that is well able to conduct complex operations" (RSA DOD 2015: 3-5). Literature on South African soft power is emphatic on the importance of maintaining the important role played by DIRCO in the development of a coordinated, coherent soft power strategy. This is particularly in view of the central role plaid by South Africa's diplomatic corps in exerting influence through soft power. Whilst Article 2 of the PPDSC prescribes that the SADC consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats, the SADR 2015 commits South Africa to play an active role in the operationalisation of the SADC Standby Brigade, which is the SADC's strategy towards a collective security agreement.

Regarding an established and robust policy foundation, the above confirms the feasibility of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC member countries. Furthermore, it is evident that this study's conceptual framework is in sync with both the SADC and South African strategic trajectory towards a stable region. As with any strategy, the manner in which South Africa structures and implements its defence diplomacy strategy will determine its success.

CHAPTER 4

AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY INITIATIVES WITH SADC MEMBER COUNTRIES FROM 2003 TO 2018

4.1 Introduction

According to Du Plessis (2018), South Africa's strategic contextualisation and linking of defence to foreign policy began in 2007 with the DODs Annual Report of 2007-2008, which reported the DODs emphasis on strategic defence cooperation through defence diplomacy. The DOD five-year Strategic Plan 2015-2020 also emphasises that South Africa's contribution to conflict prevention and resolution hinges on the complementary integration of diplomacy, the military and other efforts (RSA DOD 2015). RSA DOD Strat Plan, 2015-2020 further states that South Africa's Defence diplomacy will focus on strengthening long-standing relationships with strategic African states and partners.

In view of the commitment and importance placed by South Africa on defence diplomacy, this chapter aims to explain how South Africa operationalises its defence diplomacy by evaluating South Africa's implementation of Defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2018. The chapter begins by providing a historic and strategic background on the SADC. SADC is evaluated as both an organisation as well as a geographic location in which South Africa implements its defence diplomacy. South Africa's hegemonic status is then evaluated in order to understand South Africa's standing within SADC as a region. In concluding the chapter, a detailed evaluation of the DODs implementation of defence diplomacy with SADC is conducted. The DODs Defence diplomacy activities within SADC member countries will be outlined in detail.

4.2 Historical and strategic context: South Africa's defence diplomacy in the SADC

According to Yaba and Odubajo (2018), the history of southern Africa is deeply rooted in colonialism and although it shares the same colonial history as the rest of the African Continent, the processes and structures involved in the demise of colonialism did not resemble the same pattern. In addition to normal colonial administration, southern Africa was home to settler colonialism, which was characterised by white supremacy in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). Southern Africa's unique and prolonged colonial transition

gave rise to an ideal platform for South Africa's apartheid regime to flourish (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). This resulted in strained inter-state relations with a sub-region that was divided between apartheid South Africa on one side and an anti-South Africa group of states on the other (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). Since the 1960s, inter-state relations were divisive and conflict was in abundance with South Africa being a militarily and economically dominant state over less powerful majority-ruled states (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). Yaba and Odubajo (2018) assert that the best way to understand southern Africa's security dynamics is to understand South Africa's prominence in the region (Yaba and Odubajo 2018).

In the effort to counter balance apartheid South Africa's drive to forcefully dominate and destabilise the sub-region, the less powerful states adopted a collective security approach, which resulted in a regional security architecture characterised by two sub-regional factions consisting of a South African-led Pax Pretoriana and an informal diplomatic alliance amongst the less powerful states known as the Frontline States (FLS) (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). FLS membership included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). Aeby (2019) asserts that apartheid South Africa's pursuance of an intensified strategy of destabilising African states that hosted liberation movements and encouraging intrastate conflicts around its borders undermined peace and development in the region, leaving its neighbours no option but to organise themselves and adopt a defensive alliance (Aeby 2019).

In 1980 the leaders of the FLS deemed it necessary to transform the FLS into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). The new political configuration significantly reduced apartheid South Africa's tight grip on the region and further weakened its destabilisation tactics (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). This amongst other developments in southern Africa subsequently led to the transformation of the SADCC to SADC (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). The formation of SADC was intended to allow for a more meaningful integration amongst member states, which would further allow member states to consider a wider scope of cooperation including economic, political, military and cultural dimensions of inter-state relationships (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). South Africa joined the SADC in 1994 (Yaba and Odubajo 2018). In total, SADC member states include Angola, Botswana, Congo DR, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (MacLean 1999; Hammerstad 2005; Hentz 2009; Yaba and Odubajo 2018). According to

Luthuli (2020), the SADC Treaty articulates the major objectives of the regional integration in the form of the SADC as being:

- To develop common political values, systems and institutions;
- To promote peace and security; and
- To strengthen and consolidate long-standing historical, social and cultural attractions and links among the peoples of the region.

Mandrup (2008), however, expresses scepticism on the likelihood of achieving the objectives of the SADC Treaty when he draws attention to SADC's historical reality where cooperation on security between SADC member states has been mired by their different views on human rights and democracy. Mandrup (2008) further states that SADC member states have never shared common values, goals and objectives that would provide them with a common sense of belonging. To be effective and implementable, the objectives of the SADC Treaty need to be holistically embraced by all SADC member states. Perhaps, this could bring about the much needed common identity in the form of common values, goals and objectives within the SADC. However, Aeby (2019) notes that post-colonial and post-apartheid SADC is far from this. SADC remains a kaleidoscope of differently reflected values, goals and objectives as depicted in Table 2 below (Aeby 2019):

Table 2: Characteristics of SADC member states

Country	Regime Type	Description
eSwatini	Closed authoritarian regime (an untransformed autocracy).	An absolute monarchy without any intentions towards a democratic transition.
Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe	Electoral authoritarian regimes.	Dictatorship hidden behind a fictitious democracy characterised by regular conflict prone multi-party elections with an uncertain outcome.
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania	Electoral democracies.	Democracy is mostly restricted to the process of periodical elections. Public political participation, however, remains limited.
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Seychelles	Liberal democracies.	Hold regular and credible multi-party elections with procedural certainty. The rule of law, human rights and a culture of constitutionalism are institutionally protected.

With the SADC fully established with systems and structures in place, Aeby (2019) asserts that despite the SADC being the last region on the African Continent to obtain emancipation from colonialism through a long-drawn armed liberation struggle and the fact that this history continues to shape the region's politics and societies, the SADC remains remarkably stable as a region. Despite this general stability, however, Van Schalkwyk (2005), Aeby (2019) and Luthuli (2020) assert that SADC continues to experience a number of violent intrastate conflicts and dormant security risks. In addition to continuing socio-economic grievances that result in social conflicts and undermine human security, Aeby (2019) identifies armed insurgencies, weak institutions, poor governance, democratic deficits and unstable governments as major risks in the SADC.

Luthuli (2020) is of the opinion that the continuing violent intrastate conflicts in the SADC continue to be one of the region's stumbling blocks towards real integration. In this regard, Aeby (2019) classifies SADC's security risks into three types of contemporary peace and security challenges, which include armed insurgencies, matters of governance and democracy, and socio-economic development. Regarding SADC's ability to resolve intra-state crises and security related issues and the promotion of peace and democratic principles since its formation in 1992, Aeby (2019) is of the view that SADC interventions have been mediocre. For example, although in 1998 the SADC was able to respond decisively to military interference and government instability in Lesotho by sanctioning the deployment of troops, SADC's response to the constitutional crisis in the DRC when President Laurent Kabila's term of office came to an end and failed to timeously hold elections was non-existent (Aeby 2019).

Furthermore, the SADC was unable to respond effectively when Zimbabwe's army interfered in civil politics, which forced President Robert Mugabe to resign (Aeby 2019). According to Aeby (2019), this is a signal of the SADC's inability and unwillingness to be consistent in the enforcement of its democratic founding principles. This further indicates the faltering of SADC's developed peace and security institutions and the desperate need for improved political support for SADC structures, organisational capacity and increase in resources (Aeby 2019).

Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) assert that it is well known that South Africa's approach and view of the international system is heavily influenced by its transition from an oppressive history to a democratic state. This transition according to Landsberg and Kondlo (2007)

influenced South Africa's foreign policy towards what was later described as "quiet and preventive diplomacy" where disputes would preferably be resolved through negotiated settlements. As part of its post-apartheid contribution to the African Continent, South Africa committed itself to the "African Agenda". In its renewed role post 1994, the focus of South Africa's "African Agenda" was on paving the way towards a renewed strategic trajectory in the continent's economy, politics, government and development in general (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007).

In order to secure a leading role in the advancement of this new vision and aspiration, Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) postulate that South Africa needed to position itself in a way that the rest of the continent would understand that without a South Africa, there cannot be a "New Developmental Agenda" for Africa (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). Consequently, South Africa positioned itself to play a pivotal role in the establishment of the African Union (AU) and in negotiating the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). Inevitably, this dictated that South Africa's foreign policy position should be that of a peacemaker, negotiator on and beyond the African Continent (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007; Liebenberg *et al.* 2020).

Mabera (2020) describes this as South Africa combining its profile as an African development partner with its versatile identity of being a champion of the African agenda, a bridge-builder and an emerging middle power Mabera (2020). It is through this that South Africa formulated its African geo-strategic diplomacy not only focusing in Africa, but also including the rest of the world (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). The interpretation of South Africa's geo-strategic diplomacy is that South Africa will strategically apply its diplomatic efforts when engaging with Africa and the rest of the world. Stemming from this, it would therefore be expected that South Africa would also apply and implement its defence diplomacy strategically. This would take place particularly within SADC.

4.3 The operationalisation of South Africa's defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2018

The following section will evaluate South Africa's operationalisation of defence diplomacy in the SADC with a particular focus on the period from the 2003/2004 to 2017/2018 financial years. This period which coincides with South Africa's third, fourth and fifth administrations under Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, is of significance due to it being the period

when defence diplomacy was officially adopted by the DOD and therefore officially reported on by the DOD. The terms of presidential office are also of significance as they represent full terms of office by Defence Commanders in Chief with the mandate to change defence policy that could have an impact on South Africa's defence diplomacy. An evaluation of how South Africa's strategic engagements with SADC member states unfolded during the seventeen-year period will be conducted taking into consideration the various aspects of South Africa's defence diplomacy in the SADC, including the establishment of bilateral defence committees (DefCom) and security consultations, educational exchanges, arms sales, combined exercises, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.

The DOD operationalises its international agreements with other states through its Defence International Affairs (DIA) and Defence Foreign Relations (DFR) Divisions. The DIA was established in 2008 and was tasked with providing the DOD's defence international affairs with strategic direction, the establishment of bilateral and multilateral relations in the field of defence, as well as providing specialist advice and support regarding international legal instruments (RSA DOD 2008: 34). The role of DFR is described as being that of an "advisory role" and of a staff officer function for Chief of the SANDF, Chief of Joint Operations and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for all Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)/SADC high-level activities (RSA DOD 2005: 218). The involvement of the DIA as a strategic advisor - a civilian component of the DOD - further enhances South Africa's defence diplomacy and aligns it with what scholars of defence diplomacy understand it to be.

4.3.1 Cooperation agreements

Cottey and Forster (2004) assert that the main reasons that states engage in defence cooperation or provide other states with military assistance is to offset or discourage current or potential enemies, maintain their areas of influence, support friendly states in their fight against domestic opponents or promote commercial interests that may include the sale of arms or the promotion of general trade relations. Further, according to Cottey and Forster (2004), defence cooperation has transcended from its traditional role of simply supporting the militaries of allies, to being a tool that states employ in their pursuance of wider foreign and security policy goals. In this role, defence cooperation has adopted a three dimensional role, which is that of firstly, being a tool to help build cooperative relationships with former or potential enemies (also known as

strategic engagement), secondly, as a tool to promote democratic civil control of armed forces, and thirdly, as a mechanism to support partner states with the aim of developing their capacity towards contributing to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations (Cottey and Forster 2004).

For South Africa, the signing and implementation of international defence agreements is regarded as a significant contributor towards building confidence about its role and intentions in the region as well as to enhance and operationalise its defence diplomacy (RSA DOD 2007: 206 and RSA DOD 2017: 9). To date, South Africa has signed the following Defence Co-operation Agreements/Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with its SADC neighbours:

- Defence Cooperation Agreement with Zimbabwe in 1995 (RSA DOD 1995).
- Defence Cooperation Agreement with Tanzania in 1999 (RSA DOD 1996).
- Agreement in the field of Defence with Mozambique in 2000 (RSA DOD 2000).
- Protocol on Defence Cooperation with Angola in 2005 (RSA DOD 2013: xi)
- MOU with Tanzania in 2006 (RSA DOD 2006: 21).
- MOU with Zimbabwe in 2006 (RSA DOD 2006: 21).
- Agreement on Defence Training and Technical Cooperation with Botswana in 2007 (RSA DOD 2007: 206).
- Note of Exchange for extension of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation with Lesotho in 2007 (RSA DOD 2007: 206).
- Agreement with Mozambique on the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security in 2007 (RSA DOD 2007: 206).
- Defence Cooperation agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008 (RSA DOD 2008: 181)
- MOU with Malawi in 2009 (RSA DOD 2009: 41).
- Terms of Reference between RSA and Angola in 2011 (RSA DOD 2011: 48)
- Tri-lateral MOU between the RSA, Mozambique and Tanzania on Maritime Security in 2011 (RSA DOD 2011: 48)
- Implementation Arrangements between the SANDF and the Namibian Defence Force concerning Co-operation in the field of Training in 2012 (RSA DOD 2012: 46).
- Defence Cooperation Agreement with Namibia in 2012 (RSA DOD 2012: 46).
- Defence Cooperation Agreement with Zambia in 2015 (RSA DOD 2015).

4.3.2 Representation and exchanges

Storey (2021) asserts that in-country representation plays a vital role in the success of a country's defence diplomacy. Representation is mainly achieved through the deployment of defence attachés stationed at diplomatic missions and thus act as the main point of contact with the host nation's military establishment (Storey 2021). According to Storey, (2021), some of the main responsibilities of a defence attaché include nurturing and expanding bilateral defence cooperation, articulating the country's defence policy, collecting information on political and security affairs, managing security assistance programmes, and making arrangements for escorting visiting delegations (Storey 2021). Since the formalisation of South Africa's defence diplomacy in 2003, according to the DOD's Annual Reports (2003 to 2018), South Africa has been consistent in its deployment of resident and non-resident defence attachés in all SADC member countries (RSA DOD 2003 – 2008).

4.3.3 Visits

According to Pajtinka (2016) defence diplomacy also involves the arrangement and coordination of reciprocal working visits between the representatives of the defence authorities and military units of the sending state in the receiving state. South Africa mainly conducts visits in order build and enhance bilateral international relations and to source knowledge in key areas that facilitate the acquisition of knowledge on how to conduct business that is more economic, effective and efficient (RSA DOD 2005: 219). During the reporting period, South Africa has therefore operationalised its defence diplomacy by undertaking and receiving the following visits:

4.3.3.1 High-level visits

During the period under review, South Africa's Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defence generally embarked on a number of high-level SADC visits whose goals can be broadly categorised as follows:

- To strengthen military relations and cooperation between South Africa and other countries.

- To display goodwill.
- To participate in international forums and Africa's multilateral structures.
- To attend Inter-state Defence and Security Committees.

High-level visits with SADC during the reporting period are summarised in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Incoming and outgoing high-level visits with SADC

Year and Country	Visit Type and Participant/s	Meeting Objective/s
2004 Angola	Outgoing RSA Minister of Defence (MOD)	Courtesy state visit and AU meeting on peace and security (RSA DOD 2004: 47).
2004 DRC	Outgoing MOD	Peace missions and tripartite meeting between the DRC, Belgium and RSA (RSA DOD 2004: 47).
2004 Lesotho	Outgoing MOD	Cleansing ceremony (RSA DOD 2004: 47).
2004 Namibia	Outgoing MOD	South Africa/ Namibia Joint Permanent Commission (JPC) (RSA DOD 2004: 47).
2004 Tanzania	Outgoing MOD	Finalising of the AU non-aggression pact and discussions on the African Standby Force (RSA DOD 2004: 47).
2004 DRC	Outgoing MOD	Visited the RSA contingents in peace missions (RSA DOD 2004: 48).
2004 Lesotho	Outgoing RSA Deputy Minister of Defence (DMOD).	Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (RSA DOD 2004: 48).
2005 DRC	Outgoing MOD	High-level assessment of the situation in the DRC (RSA DOD 2005: 8)
2006 DRC	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On-site assessment of the situation and to consult with the authorities in the DRC (RSA DOD 2006: 20). • Handover ceremony of the Rumangabo Camp to the DRC MOD in terms of Operation Teutonic (RSA DOD 2006: 20).
2006 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	RSA/Zimbabwe Defence Committee meeting (RSA DOD 2006: 20).
2006 DRC	Outgoing DMOD	Leader of RSA Observer Mission for the DRC Elections (RSA DOD 2006: 20).
2007 Angola	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral discussions (RSA DOD 2007: 16).
2007 Lesotho	Outgoing MOD	Meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho on issues relating to the upcoming elections (RSA DOD 2006: 20).
2007 Mozambique	Outgoing DMOD	Hand over equipment to the Defence Force (RSA DOD 2006: 20).
2007 Tanzania	Outgoing MOD	SADC Head of Security meeting (RSA DOD 2007: 16).

Year and Country	Visit Type and Participant/s	Meeting Objective/s
2007 Tanzania	Outgoing DMOD	SADC ISDSC Interstate Defence and Security Council (RSA DOD 2007: 16).
2007 Zambia	Outgoing DMOD	Launch of the SADC Brigade (RSA DOD 2007: 16).
2008 Angola	Incoming DMOD	Goodwill visit by Angola Minister of Defence (RSA DOD 2008: 19).
2008 Angola	Outgoing DMOD	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee of SADC (RSA DOD 2008: 19).
2008 DRC	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DRC/Netherlands/RSA Trilateral Meeting (RSA DOD 2007: 16). • To discuss the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process and the process of reconstruction of certain military bases in the DRC (RSA DOD 2008: 19). • Bi-national meeting to promote relations between the two Armed Forces (RSA DOD 2008: 20). • Handing over of the military base to the DRC MOD (RSA DOD 2008: 19). • Binational Meeting (RSA DOD 2008: 19).
2008 Lesotho	Outgoing MOD	Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister (RSA DOD 2007: 16).
2008 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	To attend the 33 rd Anniversary of the Independence of Mozambique and to hold bilateral discussions on Defence co-operation between the two countries (RSA DOD 2008: 20).
2008 Namibia	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral Meeting on Defence Cooperation (RSA DOD 2008: 20).
2008 Swaziland	Outgoing MOD	To promote relations between the two countries (RSA DOD 2008: 20).
2009 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral Meeting on Defence Cooperation (RSA DOD 2008: 20). • Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security (JPCDS) (RSA DOD 2009: 1).
2009 Swaziland	Outgoing MOD	SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (RSA DOD 2009: 1).
2009 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2009: 1).
2009 Swaziland	Outgoing DMOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (RSA DOD 2009: 1). • SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ (RSA DOD 2009: 1).
2009 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	4th Session of the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS (RSA DOD 2009: 1)
2010 Angola	Outgoing MOD	To find out how the Angolan state has dealt with matters concerning Military Veterans (RSA DOD 2009: 2).
2010 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Meeting (RSA DOD 2010: 12).

Year and Country	Visit Type and Participant/s	Meeting Objective/s
2010 Namibia	Outgoing MOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2010: 12).
2010 Botswana	Outgoing MOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2010: 13).
2010 Botswana	Outgoing DMOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2010: 13).
2010 Mozambique	Outgoing DMOD	SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Meeting (RSA DOD 2010: 13).
2010 Namibia	Outgoing DMOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2010: 13).
2010 Seychelles	Outgoing DMOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2010: 13).
2011 Angola	Outgoing MOD	SADC summit including discussion on piracy issues (RSA DOD 2011: 5)
2011 DRC	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inauguration of the President of DRC (RSA DOD 2011: 4). • Discussion on matters of mutual concern and understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Botswana	Outgoing MOD	Discussion on matters of mutual concern and understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussions on matters of mutual concern and understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 4). • State visit accompanying the President (RSA DOD 2011: 4).
2011 Zambia	Outgoing MOD	State visit (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	JPDS Session (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Angola	Outgoing DMOD	SADC Summit (RSA DOD 2011: 4).
2011 DRC	Outgoing DMOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with counterpart to discuss matters of mutual concern and understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 5). • Meeting with counterpart to discuss matters of mutual understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Mozambique	Outgoing DMOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with counterpart to discuss matters of mutual concern and understanding (RSA DOD 2011: 5). • State Visit (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2011 Zimbabwe	Outgoing DMOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JPCDS Session (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2012 Tanzania	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sign a bilateral MOU (RSA DOD 2011: 4).
2012 Botswana	Outgoing MOD	Accompany the RSA President on State visit (RSA DOD 2012: 4).
2012 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	Operationalisation of the Tripartite MOU on Combined Maritime Patrol (RSA DOD 2012: 4).

Year and Country	Visit Type and Participant/s	Meeting Objective/s
2012 Namibia	Outgoing MOD	12th Session of the Namibia/South Africa Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security (RSA DOD 2012: 5).
2012 Tanzania	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SADC Troika meeting (RSA DOD 2012: 5). • SADC TROIKA meeting of Ministers of Defence (RSA DOD 2012: 5).
2012 Tanzania	Outgoing DMOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signing of a bilateral MOU (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2012 Botswana	Outgoing DMOD	Event to mark 50 years of the formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2012 Tanzania	Outgoing DMOD	OR Tambo Annual Educational tour and memorial lecture (RSA DOD 2011: 5).
2013 Angola	Outgoing MOD	Accompany the RSA President to the Summit of Heads of State (RSA DOD 2012: 5).
2013 DRC	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral meeting on Defence Cooperation matters (RSA DOD 2013: 1).
2013 Malawi	Outgoing MOD	DefCom (RSA DOD 2013: 1).
2013 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral meeting on Defence Cooperation matters (RSA DOD 2013: 1).
2013 Namibia	Outgoing MOD	Inaugural Namibia/RSA Bi-National Commission (RSA DOD 2013: 1).
2013 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	JPCDS (RSA DOD 2013: 2).
2013 Tanzania	Outgoing DMOD	15th meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) on Politics, Defence and Security (RSA DOD 2013: 2).
2014 Angola	Outgoing MOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2nd SADC Ministerial Meeting (RSA DOD 2014: 3). • 3rd ICGLR/SADC Summit (RSA DOD 2014: 3). • Tripartite Mechanism between the RSA, the Republic of Angola and the DRC (RSA DOD 2014: 3).
2014 Zimbabwe	Outgoing MOD	34th Summit of SADC Heads of States and Government (RSA DOD 2014: 3).
2015 DRC	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral engagements (RSA DOD 2015: 20).
2015 Mozambique	Outgoing MOD	Bilateral engagements (RSA DOD 2015: 20).

4.3.4 Capacity building

Cotter and Forster (2004) assert that post the Cold War Western countries with the most capacity have become reluctant and uncommitted to deploying troops for risky humanitarian assistance in foreign countries. This is most pronounced when there are no immediate national interests to be realised (Cotter and Forster 2004). This approach by Western countries has thus

placed a lot of pressure on non-Western countries and regional organisations to fill the void and commit to international peacekeeping (Cottey and Forster 2004). As a result, regional and sub-regional organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU) are compelled to accept peacekeeping as their responsibility by taking the necessary steps to develop capacity within their domains and to embark on peacekeeping operations (Cottey and Forster 2004). In addition to the rest of the African continent, South Africa is expected to play an important role in peacekeeping. The existence and effectiveness of the SADC Standby Brigade remains one of South Africa's most important contributions to peace and stability in the SADC.

Cottey and Forster (2004) state that support in the development of peacekeeping capabilities through defence diplomacy is not new and is an important shift in the manner in which military cooperation and assistance is conducted by states. Storey (2012) suggests that capacity building can be achieved through training, study visits and the convening of joint working groups in order to exchange views and share information among relevant law enforcement agencies. Through capacity building, Baldino (2016) postulates that partner nations are enabled to monitor their environments against specific threats. In its endeavour to contribute to capacity building for peacekeeping in the SADC, South Africa has therefore embarked on the following activities during the reporting period (See Table 4 below):

Table 4: South Africa's contribution to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in SADC

Year and Country	Activity
2004 DRC	Deployment of troops under the UN and AU operations (MONUC III) (RSA DOD 2004: 34).
2004 SADC	SANDF active involvement in the establishment of the African Standby Force, resulting in the SADC Brigade (RSA DOD 2004: 34).
2004 Mozambique	Military logistical assistance to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to assist the Government of Mozambique with its elections (RSA DOD 2004: 34).
2004 Madagascar	Disaster relief in support of the DFA (RSA DOD 2004: 74).
2006 Mozambique	Humanitarian assistance in the Zambezi valley as a result of cyclones and torrential rain (RSA DOD 2006: 47).
2006 Tanzania	Exercise BLUE RUVUMA: A humanitarian relief exercise based on a flood disaster scenario (RSA DOD 2006: 47).
2007 Mozambique	Support during a flooding disaster and provision of technical assistance following an ammunition depot disaster (RSA DO 2007: 89).
2008 DRC	Specialist Advisory Team on a capacity building mission in Security Sector Reform targeted at the DRC Defence Force (RSA DOD 2008: 49)

Year and Country	Activity
2010 Mozambique	Operation COPPER: The deployment of the frigate SAS MENDI on an anti-piracy patrol in the Mozambique Channel (RSA DOD 2010: 73).
2011 DRC	Military Police (MP) members deployed as part of the peace support operations (PSOs) (RSA DOD 2011: 95).
2011 Mozambique	MP members providing support to an anti-piracy operation (RSA DOD 2011: 95).
2011 Tanzania	A search and rescue operation in which a ferry sank near island of Pemba (RSA DOD 2011: 27).
2011 Mozambique	Support operation to combat piracy on the African East Coast (RSA DOD 2011: 27).
2011 Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Exercise BLUE CLUSTER: exercise to enhance SADC's capability to manage humanitarian assistance tasks and disaster relief operations (RSA DOD 2011: 75).
2012 Mozambique	Counter piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel (RSA DOD 2012: 22).
2013 Angola	Exercise BLUE ZAMBEZI: A Multinational Humanitarian Relief Exercise (RSA DOD 2013: 66).
2014 Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to the Mozambican Government to curb piracy in the Mozambique Channel (RSA DOD 2014: 82). • Flood relief support in the Mocubu district (RSA DOD 2014: 82).
2015 Botswana	Ex BLUE ZAMBEZI: A humanitarian aid Ex aimed at achieving readiness for humanitarian aid operations and related supporting operations (RSA DOD 2015: 72).

4.3.5 Education and training

The SANDF presented various courses to the militaries of neighbouring SADC member states. The courses which varied in duration from one year to only a few weeks focused on the following areas:

- Senior Courses/ flagship courses of the SANDF (RSA DOD 2008: 181):
 - i. Executive National Security Programme.
 - ii. Joint Senior Command and Staff Course.
- SANDF functional courses (training in Initial Supply Support, Procurement, Military Music Bandmasters, Biological Safety Isolation, Artillery Battery Commanders, Hydrographical, and Military Integrated Environmental Management).
- Force preparation exercises and training courses.

- Artillery training.

The following education and training related courses were presented by the DOD during the period in review (See Table 5 below):

Table 5: DOD courses presented to SADC countries

Year and Country	Course
2003- Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe	Executive National Security Programme (RSA DOD 2003: 55).
2003- Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania	Joint Senior Command and Staff Course (RSA DOD 2003: 55).
2003- Zambia	Junior Staff Course (RSA DOD 2003: 72).
2003- Lesotho	SAMHS health courses (RSA DOD 2003: 97).
2003- Mozambique	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Damage Control Part 1 Course (RSA DOD 2004: 115).
2004- Namibia	Military Training for Ratings Part 1 (RSA DOD 2004: 115).
2004- Namibia	Military Training for Officers Part 1 (RSA DOD 2004: 115).
2004- Namibia	Junior Staff and Warfare Course (RSA DOD 2004: 115).
2004- Namibia	Survey Recorder Course (RSA DOD 2004: 115).
2005- DRC, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.	Naval Co-ordination and Guidance for Shipping Course (RSA DOD 2004: 114).
2006- Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Combating of HIV & AIDS through Spiritual and Ethical Conduct (CHATSEC) programme (RSA DO 2006: 35).
2007- Tanzania	Foreign Intelligence Course (RSA DOD 2007: 155).
2008- DRC and Namibia	Undisclosed learning opportunities (RSA DOD 2008: 103).
2010- Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Annual Protection Course for African States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention on behalf of the SA Council for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (RSA DOD 2010: 77).
2011- Lesotho and Zimbabwe	Courses in combat casualty care and Joint Operational Medical Management System and health care of chemical, biological and radiological casualties (RSA DOD 2011: 84).
2012- Namibia	Military Mass Casualty Disaster Medicine Course (RSA DOD 2012: 86).
2012- Mozambique	Advanced Motorcycle Riders Course (RSA DOD 2012: 96).

4.3.6 Participation in military exercises

In its 2013 Annual Report, the DOD identified that operational cooperation is the backbone of military bilateral and multilateral cooperation when engaging with other countries (RSA DOD 2013: 113). It further recognised that operational cooperation enhances operational

interoperability, whilst allowing for the transfer of knowledge (RSA DOD 2013: 113). Generally, the SANDF conducts planned external exercises in order to ensure amongst others that it remains compliant with its international obligation to support stability in the SADC (RSA DOD 2013: 113). Blaxland (2014) asserts that bilateral military exercises can be used to reinforce mutual understanding and enhanced interoperability for a variety of contingencies such as air, land, maritime and Special Forces exercises. These have the potential to provide opportunities that maintain channels of communication allowing for the benchmarking of capabilities in case of need (Blaxland 2014). Since South Africa's official adoption of Defence diplomacy in 2003, the following military exercises have been conducted either bilaterally or multilaterally with the SADC (See Table 6 below):

Table 6: South African military exercises with the SADC from 2003 to 2018

Year and Exercise	Country	Description and Aim
2004 AIRBORNE AFRICA	Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho.	A parachute skills competition to test paratrooper related skills (RSA DOD 2004: 16).
2004 NICUSY	Mozambique and Botswana.	Re-affirming peace support capabilities and focused on actions during deployments in peace support operations (RSA DOD 2004: 16).
2005 THOKGAMO	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.	AU peace enforcement exercise to determine SADC preparedness regarding regional stability. In collaboration with the French, develop SADC peacekeeping capability (RSA DOD 2005: 108).
2006 BLUE RUVUMA	Tanzania	A humanitarian relief exercise based on a simulated flood disaster scenario (RSA DOD 2006: 50).
2007 INTER OP EAST & WEST	Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola	Naval exercise to build trust, capacity and capability in SADC navies (RSA DOD 2007: 99).
2008 GOLFINHO	Angola, Botswana and Mozambique.	Map exercise (RSA DOD 2008: 81).
2008 TEUTONIC	DRC	To assist the DRC Armed Forces with integration and training Map exercise (RSA DOD 2008: 71).
2009 GOLFINHO	Angola, DRC and Mozambique	To ensure that the South African Navy (SAN) remains abreast of world standards and to enhance maritime relations and interoperability with other SADC navies (RSA DOD 2009: 42 and 85).
2010 FAIRWAY BUOY	Namibia	A CPX to implement the necessary procedures for the guiding of ships in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans (RSA DOD 2010: 59).
2011 GOOD HOPE V	Mozambique	Sharing of anti-piracy expertise (RSA DOD 2011: 70).

Year and Exercise	Country	Description and Aim
2011 INTEROP EAST	Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.	A Maritime Patrol, interdiction and Diving Exercise (RSA DOD 2011: 79).
2011 GOOD TIDINGS	Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia, (Namibia and Mozambique participated as observers).	A maritime interdiction exercise (RSA DOD 2011: 79).
2011 BLUE CLUSTER	Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi	To enhance SADC's capability to manage humanitarian assistance tasks and disaster relief operations (RSA DOD 2011: 101).
2013 BLUE ZAMBEZI	Angola	A Humanitarian Relief Exercise (RSA DOD 2013: 66).
2015 BLUE ZAMBEZI	Botswana	A humanitarian aid Relief Exercise aimed at achieving readiness for humanitarian aid operations and related supporting operations (RSA DOD 2015: 82).

The above clearly indicates the DOD's commitment to engaging with its closest neighbours in activities targeted at capacity building, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, general and mutual skills development. As part of Defence diplomacy, these activities are targeted at enhancing good relations and mutual military-military understanding and confidence building with former enemies.

4.3.7 Bilateral and multilateral meetings

According to Blake (2016), there are different categories of bilateral meetings that are chaired based on the level and seniority of the chairmanship. Blake (2016) asserts that in order of seniority (from the highest to lowest), South Africa engages in Bi-National Commissions (BNCs), Joint Commissions on Cooperation (JCC), Joint Permanent Commissions on Defence and Security (JPCDS) and Defence Committees (DefComs). The BNC is co-chaired by the Presidents of the two countries and is attended by government Ministers (including the DOD) and other relevant senior officials (Blake 2016). The JCC is co-chaired by the Ministers of

International Relations/ Foreign Affairs of the two countries involved in the bilateral and attended by Ministers of government departments (including the DOD) and relevant senior officials (Blake 2016). The JPCDS is co-chaired by the Ministers of Defence of the two countries engaged in the bilateral meeting and is attended by Departmental officials. Lastly, the DefCom is co-chaired by the Secretaries for Defence of the two countries engaging in the bilateral meeting and is attended by senior departmental officials including Defence Industry representatives (Blake 2016).

Since 2003, South Africa has participated and coordinated regular BNCs, JCCs, KPCDs, DefComs and Inter-State Defence and Security Committees (ISDSCs) in compliance with its obligatory defence international agreements with SADC Member States (RSA DOD 2010: 50). In addition to compliance with international agreements, South Africa engaged in bilateral meetings in order to further its defence interests and promote government's diplomatic agenda to forge strong ties with countries that share South Africa's interests (RSA DOD 2002: 40; RSA DOD 2008: 34). South Africa continues to participate in both bilateral and multilateral meetings as it views these forums as being crucial to enhancing multilateralism, cooperation and interoperability within the SADC (RSA DOD 2007: 207). During the review period, South Africa participated in the following SADC Bilateral and Multilateral meetings (See Table 7 below):

Table 7: South Africa's participation in SADC bilateral and multilateral meetings

Year and Country	Nature and Type of Meeting
2004- Botswana	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Lesotho	Bilateral - Joint Bilateral Coordinating Commission (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Namibia	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - Defence Liaison Forum (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Summit (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Peace & Security Conference (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Organ (Troika meeting) (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2004- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Chiefs of Defence Troika meeting (RSA DOD 2004: 36).
2005- Botswana	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2005: 217)
2005- DRC	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2005: 216).
2005- Lesotho	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2005: 216).
2005- Mozambique	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2005: 216).
2005- Namibia	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2005: 216).
2005- Zambia	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2005: 216).
2005- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - Defence Liaison Forum (RSA DOD 2005: 216).

Year and Country	Nature and Type of Meeting
2005- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Summit (RSA DOD 2005: 219).
2005- All SADC States	Multilateral - Meeting in Support of the SADC Executive Secretariat (RSA DOD 2005: 219).
2005- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Handing and taking over of Organ Chair meeting (RSA DOD 2005: 219).
2005- Entire SADC	Multilateral - African Standby Force (SADC) (RSA DOD 2005: 219).
2006- Botswana	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2006: 162).
2006- Lesotho	Bilateral - Inaugural DefCom (RSA DOD 2006: 162).
2006- Mozambique	Bilateral - Joint DefCom (RSA DOD 2006: 162).
2006- Zambia	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2006: 162).
2006- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2006: 162).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Defence Intelligence Standing Committee (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC meeting of the Operations Sub-Sub Committee (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Spiritual and Moral Support Conference (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - 11th Standing Aviation Committee (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Ceremonial Parade for the Inauguration of SADC BRIG (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Summit Statutory Meeting (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Standing Maritime Committee (SMC) (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2007- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Defence Intelligence Standing Committee meeting to write the SADC Estimate (RSA DOD 2007: 207).
2008- Botswana	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- DRC	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- Lesotho	Bilateral - Joint Permanent Commission meeting (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- Mozambique	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- Namibia	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- Zambia	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Telecommunications and Information (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Systems workgroup (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Special Defence Intelligence Standing Committee (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Operational Sub-Committee (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Meeting (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Logistics Workgroup (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Summit (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - 14th Annual SADC Standing Maritime Committee (RSA DOD 2008: 180).
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC Extraordinary Summit (RSA DOD 2008: 180)
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Military Health Conference (RSA DOD 2008: 181).

Year and Country	Nature and Type of Meeting
2008- Entire SADC	Multilateral - Standing Aviation Committee (RSA DOD 2008: 181).
2009- DRC	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2009: 118).
2009- Malawi	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2009: 118).
2009- Mozambique	Bilateral - Inaugural DefCom (RSA DOD 2009: 118).
2009- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Structures (RSA DOD 2009: 117).
2010- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC structures (RSA DOD 2010: 128).
2011- DRC	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Botswana	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Malawi	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Mozambique	Bilateral - Joint Bi-lateral Commission for Co-operation (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Tanzania	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2011- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC/ISDSC Structures Meetings (RSA DOD 2011: 100).
2012- Angola	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2012: 102).
2012- Botswana	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2012: 102).
2012- DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2012: 102). • Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2012: 103).
2012- Lesotho	Bilateral - Operational Border Liaison Forum (RSA DOD 2012: 102).
2012- Mozambique	Bilateral - Operational Border Liaison Forum (RSA DOD 2012: 102-103).
2012- Namibia	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2012: 103).
2012- Zimbabwe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral - Operational Border Liaison Forum (RSA DOD 2012: 102). • Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2012: 103).
2012- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC Structures (RSA DOD 2012: 103).
2013- Angola	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Botswana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral - JPCDS (RSAD DOD 2013: 112). • Bilateral - DefCom Midterm Review (RSA DOD 2013: 112). • Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- DRC	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Lesotho	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral - Joint Bilateral Coordinating Commission (RSA DOD 2013: 112). • Bilateral - Border Liaison Meeting (RSAD DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Malawi	Bilateral - DefCom (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Mozambique	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Namibia	Bilateral - Inaugural BNC (RSAD DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - JPCDS (RSA DOD 2013: 112).
2013- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDSC (RSA DOD 2013: 111).
2014- Botswana	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2014: 140).
2014- DRC	Bilateral - JCC on Defence (RSA DOD, 2014: 140).
2014- Zimbabwe	Bilateral - Bilateral Meeting (RSA DOD 2014: 140).
2014- Entire SADC	Multilateral - SADC/ISDSC Structures Meetings (RSA DOD 2014: 140).
2015- DRC	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2015: 20).
2015- Mozambique	Bilateral - BNC (RSA DOD 2015: 20).
2015- Entire SADC	Multilateral - ISDC (RSA DOD 2015: 72).

4.4 Assessment of the operational context of South Africa's defence diplomacy from 2003 to 2018

As a result of its apartheid history and subsequent attainment of democracy in 1994, South Africa took on a reconciliatory and diplomatic approach to conducting its relations with SADC member states. Post-apartheid South Africa preferred to use dialogue as a conflict resolution mechanism. It is therefore not surprising that South Africa firstly endeavoured to engage its neighbours through the signing of a variety of defence-related cooperation agreements accompanied by the exchange of defence attachés. As initial gestures, these served to quickly relay South Africa's good intentions regarding its quest for peace and stability within the region. The high-level visits combined with a participation in bilateral and multilateral engagements further strengthened South Africa's drive to build confidence and confirm its commitment to the collective.

It is probably for this reason that South Africa seems to be committed to the goal of the establishment of an African Standby Force and SADC Brigade as forms of collective security. Participation in peacekeeping exercises and humanitarian assistance through defence diplomacy is further evidence of both confidence building within the region as well as South Africa's efforts to ensure that its neighbours are capacitated to ensure their own internal security against terrorism and any other internal threats. Maritime exercises and anti-piracy operations serve a dual purpose of ensuring the security of South Africa's coast lines as well as capacitating neighbours in their fight against piracy and ensuring their own security. The use of these engagements in a non-threatening manner through preventive and defence diplomacy serves as a force multiplier for the indirect safe-guarding of South Africa's interests both inland and at sea. South Africa's defence diplomacy initiatives in the SADC are summarised in Table 8 below:

Table 8: Summary of South Africa's defence diplomacy engagements with SADC member states

	Cooperation agreements	Representation and exchanges (Reciprocated)	High-level visits (Outgoing)	Capacity building	Education and training	Participation in military exercises	Bilateral meetings
Angola	2	Yes	8	2	None	6	2
Botswana	1	Yes	5	2	3	6	8
Comoros	None	No	None	None	None	None	None
DRC	1	No	10	3	2	2	8

	Cooperation agreements	Representation and exchanges (Reciprocated)	High-level visits (Outgoing)	Capacity building	Education and training	Participation in military exercises	Bilateral meetings
Eswatini	None	No	3	None	None	1	None
Lesotho	1	No	4	None	2	3	6
Madagascar	None	No	None	1	None	None	None
Malawi	1	Yes	1	1	4	3	3
Mauritius	None	No	None	None	None	None	None
Mozambique	3	No	10	9	2	8	8
Namibia	2	Yes	6	1	8	5	5
Seychelles	None	No	1	None	None	None	None
Tanzania	3	Yes	7	3	4	7	1
Zambia	3	Yes	2	1	3	4	3
Zimbabwe	2	Yes	7	1	5	4	7

Except for an isolated humanitarian relief engagement in 2004 with Madagascar and the attendance of a Regional Ministerial Conference by the Minister of Defence hosted by the Seychelles in 2010, South Africa did not have any defence diplomacy engagements with any of the SADC's island nations – Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles - during the reporting period. The major influencing factor resulting in non-engagement could be that South Africa does not share the same security concerns as the SADC's island nations. This is evidenced by the non-existence of cooperation agreements between South Africa and the island nations. The signing of cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding with other SADC members states of interest with the exception of eSwatini clearly formed the foundation of South Africa's defence diplomacy during the reporting period. The non-existence of a defence cooperation agreement between South Africa and eSwatini could be influenced by the fact that the two countries have two different systems of government, eSwatini is a monarchy while South Africa is a democracy. Although not reciprocated by all SADC member states, as part of servicing its defence diplomatic agreements, South Africa was consistent in its deployment of Defence Attachés in countries with which it has defence agreements. The commitment to deploy of Defence Attachés in all SADC member states of interest serves two purposes for South Africa. The first is mainly geared towards building confidence about South Africa's commitment to a united SADC whilst the second serves to ensure the accurate communication of South Africa's position on defence and security.

This is complemented very well by the many high-level visits and bilateral meetings with various SADC member states during the reporting period. Countries such as the DRC and Mozambique with the highest number of High-level visits and above average number of

bilateral meetings during the reporting period for example are a clear indication of South Africa's commitment to ensuring security within the region. With the exception of eSwatini and Lesotho, South Africa had a minimum of five and a maximum of seven high-level visits to its immediate neighbours (Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe). Although there is a defence cooperation agreement between South Africa and Lesotho, the less than five High-level visits could be influenced by post-apartheid political tensions between the two countries as outlined earlier due to amongst others Operation BOLEAS in 1998. In addition to its confidence building measures with SADC member states, South Africa's defence diplomacy involved capacity building, education and training and various military exercises. Although South Africa was engaged in activities that encourage the interaction between defence forces with other SADC member states of interest, Mozambique remained the only country with which South Africa had the highest number of combined capacity building, education and training and military exercises during the reporting period. The focus on Mozambique could have been mainly motivated by the fact that it is not only an immediate neighbour, but it is also a country that is plagued by the highest number of natural disasters and off-shore criminal activities in the form of piracy in the Mozambican Channel. Piracy and terrorism pose a very big threat not only to South Africa's security, but also to its economy.

4.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to firstly provide a historical background on the SADC to evaluate and understand the political environment in which the DOD is expected to implement its Defence diplomacy. Whilst the second aim was to evaluate South Africa's hegemonic status in the SADC to assess the extent to which South Africa's is an accepted leader in SADC, the third aim was to evaluate the DOD's bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy efforts with the SADC. Three findings were made. Firstly, the prolonged violent colonial history of Southern Africa was instrumental in the formation and behaviour of present day SADC member states.

The SADC's liberation struggle history and the resulting lack of trust amongst its member states has strongly influenced the manner in which they relate to each other politically. Secondly, whilst South Africa's leadership role in SADC is reflected by its hegemonic status, it is clear that not all member states accept South Africa as a hegemon. Thirdly, although the DOD only considered defence diplomacy in a strategic context in 2007, implementation of

defence diplomacy-related activities were already underway in 2003. The DOD implemented defence diplomacy through the signing of cooperation agreements, representation and exchanges, high-level visits, capacity building, education and training, participation in military exercises and participation in bilateral and multilateral meetings.

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this study was to conduct a strategic analysis of available literature that supports the development of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy for engaging with SADC member countries as a requirement proposed by the 2015 Defence Review. The research problem prompting this analysis is the need to identify and craft a distinctive defence diplomacy strategy that balances South Africa's regional defence role with the protection and advancement of its national interests. In response to the underlying study, the research question relates to how a SA DoD defence diplomacy strategy that is founded on soft power to advance collective security and engage SADC member countries may be crafted. In response to the research question, this study therefore seeks to propose how the DOD should structure its engagement with the defence forces of partner countries using a defence diplomacy strategy.

5.2 Summary

The study was structured around five chapters. Chapter One focused on the introduction to the study while Chapter Two provided the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter Three and Four were committed to presenting South Africa as a case. Chapter Five, as a final chapter therefore serves to present the conclusion of the study and advance recommendations concerning South Africa's defence diplomacy strategy.

In order to introduce the study and provide context, the source and context of the study was indicated through the identification of the research theme. Furthermore, in Chapter One, the literature overview was conducted as a means of justifying the study; research questions were posed in order to identify and demarcate the research problem; with reference to research design and the approach to the method of study, the research methodology was presented and concluded with an outline of the structure of the research.

Utilising a more focused approach to the literature review, the aim of Chapter Two was to provide clarity regarding the conceptual framework of the study to use it as a guide for analysis. Essentially, Chapter Two served to explain the conceptual underpinnings of a defence diplomacy strategy by presenting the concepts of preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy, soft power, defence diplomacy as soft power, collective security and strategy and how they may be applicable to South Africa. The result was the development of a conceptual framework that serves to guide the development of an SADC- specific DOD defence diplomacy strategy.

Based on the evaluation of literature related to mainly primary sources that articulated official South African views on foreign policy, defence policy, defence diplomacy and DOD planning, the aims of Chapters Three and Four were to provide South Africa's operational context of Defence diplomacy in the SADC from 2003 to 2018 and to also provide a future policy-related perspective of South African defence diplomacy. From a policy point of view, an analysis of the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (2010), the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020 – 2030 and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003), South African foreign policy, South African soft power, the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review and the 2015 Defence Review was conducted whilst from an operational point of view, an evaluation of how and to what extent South Africa implemented defence diplomacy with SADC member states was conducted in Chapter Three and Four.

5.3 Key findings and evaluation

Regarding the conceptual framework, which establishes the important concepts and principles to be considered in the development of a South African defence diplomacy strategy, the following findings are made:

- Preventive diplomacy:

Preventive diplomacy is a universally accepted and efficient tool for conflict management in international relations. For preventive diplomacy to be effective regardless of how it is implemented, whether institutionalised or not, the creation of an enabling environment is crucial. It is important that such an environment includes trust amongst role players as well as the presence of monitoring mechanisms to ensure the early activation of preventive diplomacy measures. In its defence policy as articulated

by the SADR 2015, it is important to note that the DOD places very high importance on the development of early warning mechanisms within SADC. It is also encouraging to note that the SADC as a regional organisation also identifies preventive diplomacy as one of its key approaches to conflict management within the region.

- Defence diplomacy:

Although defence diplomacy is an internationally recognised approach to the use of the military for building relations amongst states during times of peace it is important to note that in its policy and strategy documents as analysed in this study, the SADC seems to have steered away from using the term. Rather, reference is made to specific activities that are related to defence diplomacy. In its introduction for example, the SIPO reminds SADC member states about their shared past and how they have cooperated with each in a variety of defence areas that include the exchange of information, visits, the sharing of training institutions, the carrying out of joint exercises, and availing support to one other during emergencies and in times of political challenge. All these are activities that can be classified as falling under defence diplomacy. It can be speculated that this approach is deliberate in order to avoid confusion in an attempt to be more specific and direct. In the SADR 2015, it is important to note that the DOD has indeed embraced defence diplomacy as an important tool to be used in building relations with not only the SADC, but with the international community as well. The SADR 2015 provides clear policy guidance by firstly defining defence diplomacy as a concept. Secondly by explaining how defence diplomacy can be deployed as a tool within the SANDF.

- Soft Power:

Although public diplomacy is the main channel used by states to both develop and gain soft power in other states, other forms of diplomacy are available for the same purpose. Amongst those is defence diplomacy. This shows that sources of power that are traditionally considered to be sources of hard power can also be used as a means to create soft power. South Africa's role in SADC as an economic power in the region is an example of the use of a hard power source to achieve soft power in international relations. Instead of using its economic power as a "stick" in the region, South Africa pursues region-wide economic gains. In return, South Africa gains the respect and admiration of its fellow member states. The latter can thus be exploited by South Africa to influence regional economic development.

- Defence diplomacy and soft power:

With the understanding that soft power is the ability to use attraction to influence other states to do what they would not otherwise, the military can be used as a source of attraction through Defence diplomacy. The two main sources that make a military attractive, especially in the case of South Africa and the history within the SADC is the absence of violence and the positive contribution that the military makes in the society in which it is deployed through Defence diplomacy. Rescue missions conducted by the military during natural and man-made disasters are classic examples of Defence diplomacy as a source of soft power. In this regard, the military is used to enhance the image of the deploying country. Through Defence diplomacy, the military doctrine amongst other aspects of the target country can thus be influenced.

- Collective security:

Collective action in the attempt to maintain peace and stability is an important security aspect in international relations particularly since provision has been made for self-defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Collective security enjoys prominence within the SADC's strategic and planning documents. This is evidenced by SADC's expression to have a SADC Standby Brigade to execute the potential requirement for regional Collective defence against armed attacks. Although the issues of vagueness and the potential abuse of the need for self-defence contribute significant challenges to collective defence, the legal technicalities relating to the use of force against armed attacks remains the biggest challenge faced by collective defence arrangements.

- Strategy:

As a concept, strategy remains very diverse in terms of its definition, purpose and use. It assumes different meanings based mainly on context and purpose. From a military theory point of view, it is intriguing to note that strategy describes the manner in which a nation ensures its security and victory by utilising its forces on a large-scale and the employment of long-range planning and development, both in times of peace and war. This is indeed in line with the concept of defence diplomacy and the expression by the 2015 Defence Review for long-term planning in the form of a DOD defence diplomacy strategy.

Regarding the policy framework, it is found that the development and implementation of a DOD Defence diplomacy strategy to engage with SADC is not only fully supported by both South Africa's foreign and DOD policy frameworks, it is also supported by the

SADCs strategic and policy frameworks. By articulating the concepts presented in this study, both the state and regional policy frameworks lay a solid foundation for the development of a DOD Defence diplomacy strategy that will be recognised by both formulators and implementers.

Regarding the operational framework, the finding is that the DOD has been very active in implementing its Defence diplomacy during the reporting period. This is despite the lack of a clear Defence diplomacy strategy aimed at not only SADC, but the international community as well. However, based on the high number of meetings held in the SADC as well as the majority of training exercises that were conducted, it is clear that engagements with the SADC were given high priority.

5.4 Recommendations

Recommendations post this study include both the operational and policy contextual dynamics of South Africa's defence diplomacy to strengthen the SADR 2015 by proposing points of focus for future research. Therefore, based on the above research findings, the following recommendations are made regarding how the SA DOD must craft a defence diplomacy strategy that is founded on soft power to advance collective security for engaging SADC member countries:

Regarding the operational context, recommendations are made as follows:

- With soft power derived from its economic superiority and other non-tangible sources within the region, the DOD must place emphasis on participating in those defence diplomacy activities that will allow the DOD to enhance the image of the SANDF repeatedly and over short periods, resulting in the building of attraction on the part of member countries. In addition to rescue missions, acts of goodwill and the exchange of Defence Attachés, the DOD must place priority on training exercises, exchange training courses and general exchange visits.
- Multilateral defence diplomacy remains an important platform for engagement and cooperation. South Africa must place additional emphasis on using its soft power to influence discussions that advance the expedited establishment of the SADC Standby Brigade.

Regarding the policy context, the following recommendations are made:

- Due to the strategic nature of SADC, policy must provide clear direction and guidance on how defence diplomacy should be employed in order to specifically engage with SADC member states. This entails providing an identifiable defence diplomacy strategy for the SADC.
- DOD defence diplomacy strategy should take the combined dimensions of Strategy as Plan, Strategy as Pattern and Strategy as Perspective.
- DOD planning both in financial and human resources terms must complement the defence diplomacy strategy whose implementation must be monitored, measured and annually reviewed.

Regarding future research on how the DOD must craft a defence diplomacy strategy that is founded on soft power to advance collective security, the following is recommended:

- Theoretical research to develop greater understanding on whether defence diplomacy may in itself be considered a strategy or whether the development of a specific defence diplomacy strategy remains a credible requirement.
- Applied research to further the implementation of defence diplomacy proposals in the SADC as stipulated in the 2015 Defence Review. Specifically, the level to which trust is built within SADC as a result of defence diplomacy should be measured.

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