

STATE AND STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF LIBYA AND SUDAN

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to describe past and present state sponsorship of international terrorism in Africa. Firstly, it commences by exploring the differences between terrorism, international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. Secondly, it details the United States' list of state sponsors of international terrorism and the sanctions that accompany that list. Thirdly, international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism in Africa, during and after the Cold War, are briefly discussed. Fourthly, two case studies regarding the state sponsorship of international terrorism in Africa are presented. The case studies include Libya, a previous state sponsor of international terrorism, and Sudan, currently on the United States' list of state sponsors of international terrorism. The case studies consider the history of these two countries as sponsors of international terrorism; the international community's attempts to prevent their involvement in international terrorism; how Libya succeeded in being taken off the United States' list; and Sudan's efforts to join Libya as a country that is no longer seen as a sponsor of international terrorism.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Governments can, and do, conduct terrorist operations or openly sponsor terrorists to achieve their political ends. The United States (US) State Department, as of February 2008, identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as 'state sponsors of terror'. Before the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, this country was on the list, as was Libya until May 2006. Governments also conduct terrorist activities against their own citizens in the form of secret arrests or widespread killings outside the jurisdiction of the courts of law.

The utilisation of clandestine political violence against foreign enemies by states is not a modern occurrence. One of the earliest known examples of this was Serbia's support of the terrorist organisation, the Black Hand, that was responsible for the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in 1914. Another example was when Italy and Hungary trained, financed and harboured the Croatian *Ustasa*, that participated in the assassination of France's foreign minister Lois Barthou and King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in 1934. These examples, however, could be categorised as 'covert acts of warfare'. The difference between these acts and contemporary state-sponsored terrorism is that contemporary state-sponsored terrorism practises a disparate form of political violence. Whereas the above-mentioned examples were direct acts of warfare, state-sponsored terrorism aims at mounting acts of "covert violence against non-combatants for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of fear and of intimidating a wide audience, so as to advance a social or political agenda". It is this form of state-sponsored violence that has become a new phenomenon in international relations; one that developed in the mid- to late-20th century. The increase in Marxist revolutionary organisations and Palestinian-related terrorist groups, and the emergence of religious-state radicalism in the Middle East can be seen as the primary factors that led to the drastic increase in state-sponsored terrorism in the 20th century.¹⁾

2. TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Terrorism is inevitably about power: the pursuit of power, the attainment of power, and the application of power to achieve political change. Terrorists, present and past, have used violence or, equally significant, the threat of violence in pursuit of a political aim. Whitaker states that terrorism, in the most widely-accepted contemporary usage of the term, is "fundamentally and inherently political". It includes the pursuit of domestic, regional, continental and international political objectives.²⁾

Just as there are different definitions of terrorism, so are there different types of terrorism. These different types have diverse characteristics, causes and outcomes. Experts and critics usually agree on the forms of terrorism found in the modern political environment. Although different labels are sometimes attached, the same typologies are repeatedly found in academic and policy analyses. Martin describes the following types of terrorism practised in the modern global environment:³⁾

- **State Terrorism:** State terrorism is terrorism which comes 'from above'. This is committed by a government against its perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain, or internally against domestic enemies.
- **Dissident Terrorism:** Dissident terrorism is 'from below'. This is committed by non-state movements and groups against governments, ethno-national groups, religious groups, and other perceived enemies.
- **Religious Terrorism:** Religious terrorism is encouraged by the belief that a spiritual power has endorsed, and commanded, the application of terrorist violence for the superior glory of the faith. Examples of terrorist groups invoking religious terrorism are Hezbollah and Hamas.
- **Criminal Terrorism:** Criminal terrorism is motivated solely by

profit. Organised criminal enterprises (such as the Mafia) accumulate profits from criminal activities for personal enhancement. Criminal-political terrorist movements, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, accrue profits from criminal enterprises to sustain their movements.

- **International Terrorism:** International terrorism is terrorism that spills across national borders. Targets are selected because of their value as symbols of international interests, usually for the purpose of political propaganda. Al-Qaeda is an example of such a terrorist organisation, even though it is also driven by religious motives.

Wilkinson broadens the typology of contemporary terrorism by adding the following types of terrorism:⁴⁾

- **Nationalist terrorist groups:** These groups seek political independence. Their activities can range from the territory they seek to govern, to targets abroad. ETA (Spain) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are examples of nationalist terrorist organisations.
- **Ideological terrorist groups:** The groups intend to impel the entire political, economic and social structures of a state to the extreme right or left. Italy's Red Brigade and Germany's Red Army Fraction (RAF) are examples of former ideological terrorist groups.
- **Single-issue terrorist groups:** These groups do not aim to transform an entire political structure, but only to change an explicit policy or practice within a certain community. Violent animal-rights groups are an example of this type of terrorism.

Wilkinson goes further by describing yet another type of terrorism which increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s, namely ethnic terrorism. He describes how mass terror was used during 'ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts' whereby many civilians were driven from their livelihoods and countries. Ethnic terrorism was used in the past for purposes of 'ethnic cleansing' in countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Kosovo.⁵⁾

The US National Counter-terrorism Centre's (NCTC) *Country*

Reports on Terrorism of 2005 states that Title 22 of the US Code defines the term 'international terrorism' as "terrorism involving citizens, or the territory of, more than one country". It further describes the term 'terrorist group' as "any group practising international terrorism or any group with significant subgroups that practise international terrorism".⁶⁾ The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defined international terrorism in 1976 as an action which is "carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state" and transnational terrorism as an action which is "carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states".⁷⁾ The differences between the 1976 and 2004 definitions are a clear indication of how international terrorism has evolved over the past 30 years.

Defining international terrorism is as intricate a process as defining terrorism. The difference between domestic and international terrorism has also steadily become more difficult to explain. Terrorist movements have often attacked domestic targets in an attempt to gain international support, or for propaganda purposes. Hough suggests some form of categorisation of international terrorism when he classifies it as follows:⁸⁾

- States carrying out international terrorism by using their own resources and agents.
- State-sponsored international terrorism conducted by individuals who are supported by an independent state.
- Independently operating non-state groups or individuals conducting international terrorism.
- International terrorism as part of a broader domestic insurgency.

In the past, terrorism has often been imported into a country or region, at the initiative of a foreign movement which enjoys the support of a sovereign state, with the objective of encouraging the growth of such groups on its own soil. Netanyahu supports this viewpoint by defining international terrorism as the "use of terrorist violence against a given nation by another state, which uses terrorists to fight an alternative war as a substitute for conventional war".⁹⁾ This also explains why international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to

eradicate. The support of a modern state can provide an international terrorist movement with everything that a domestic terrorist movement usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assistance. Wilkinson supports Netanyahu's definition when he refers to 'state-sponsored international terrorism'. Several acts of international terrorism in the past have been used as both domestic and foreign policy tools. State sponsors have used their own resources directly, recruited and controlled terror squads, and have chosen to work through 'client' movements.¹⁰⁾

Wilkinson contends that even though state-sponsored terrorism constitutes only a small part of the entire sphere of international terrorism, it would be 'foolish' for 'communities of law-abiding states' to ignore it. He lists the dangers of state-sponsored terrorism as follows:¹¹⁾

- Where states use terrorism as a primary mode of clandestine warfare there is a risk of interstate conflict escalating from tit-for-tat retaliation to full-scale warfare, as has been seen in the Middle East.
- State-sponsored terrorism is potentially far more lethal and destructive because states can provide levels of firepower, funding, training and intelligence far beyond the scope of substate groups, and they have the inestimable advantage of being able to provide safe-haves and bases for planning and coordination.
- Terrorist groups, such as the IRA and Hezbollah, have been rendered infinitely more dangerous as a direct result of large scale provision of weaponry by state sponsors (Libya and Iran respectively in the case of the IRA and Hezbollah).
- NATO and the G7 states have been deeply divided in their response to state sponsors of terrorism and this weakens solidarity and effectiveness of cooperation against terrorism among the major states.

Since the 1960s the US State Department provides an annual overview of international terrorism, including state sponsors of terrorism. The countries designated as sponsors are subjected to various punitive measures.

3. THE US LIST OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

As previously stated, there are currently five countries on the US list of states that sponsor international terrorism (see *Table 1*). Their listing took place after the US had identified them as countries that repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The following US sanctions are imposed on the listed countries:¹²⁾

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:
 - Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions;
 - Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts;
 - Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist-listed countries;
 - Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States;
 - Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and
 - Prohibition of Defence Department contracts above \$100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist-list states.

Table 1: Current State Sponsors of Terrorism	
Country	Designation Date
Syria	1979
Cuba	1982
Iran	1984
North Korea	1988
Sudan	1993
Source: US Department of State, 2008. Internet: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm . Accessed: 10 February 2008.	

4. INTERNATIONAL AND STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN AFRICA: PRE- AND POST-1990

In the late 1960s, when international terrorism emerged as an international phenomenon, African states witnessed countless acts of political violence — especially the assassination of leaders — which reflected the primary focus of terrorism on the continent at the time. By the 1980s the continent had, however, also witnessed several acts of international terrorism. Examples of these were the 1976 Entebbe airliner hijacking and the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat.

By 1980, the majority of international terrorist groups, their targets, motivations, and sponsors were well-documented across the globe. The mainstream international terrorist groups were sponsored by two primary groupings, namely the Soviet Union and its allies and Arab states. These countries, in addition to the Soviet Union, included Cuba, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The major international terrorist groups originated primarily in Europe, the Middle East, South America and Asia.¹³⁾ State-sponsored terrorism also played a key role in international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War. Libya — under Gaddafi — was the most notable African state sponsoring international terrorism. During the Cold War, Gaddafi had a record of employing his diplomatic service in the support of any group claiming to be anti-Israeli or anti-American. Several thousand African and Arab volun-

teers were trained with Soviet weapons in training camps across Libya.¹⁴⁾

After the end of the Cold War, many terrorist organisations lost one of their primary means of support, namely the Soviet Union. Wilkinson states that "state support and sponsorship of various client groups and states which had been so active in the 1970s and 1980s" ceased after the ending of the Cold War.¹⁵⁾ This deprived Palestinian terrorist groups of a significant source of money, weapons, and safe havens. German re-unification also ended East Germany's role as an important supplier of money, weapons and sanctuary for terrorists. Aid from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania also dissipated following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Even former Soviet allied states like Syria and Libya, which at times were independent sources of money and weaponry, refrained from overt support of terrorism. This led to terrorist groups seeking new sources and locations in, for example, Africa.¹⁶⁾

During the Cold War, political violence, civil war, guerrilla warfare, revolution, *coup d'états* and terrorism were occurrences that have regularly been associated with Africa. This situation has not improved since the Cold War ended. At the beginning of the 21st century, various forms of violence — be they dormant or active — were affecting several African countries. These countries included Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Uganda and Zimbabwe.¹⁷⁾ International terrorism has also been utilised as a strategic tool in several armed conflicts in some of these countries.

During the post-Cold War period, international terrorist activities in Africa were conducted by primarily two different groups. The first group consists of organisations seeking political independence, or some other domestic political objective. These groups also utilised international terrorism for the purpose of achieving their political and economic objectives. An example of such a group is the Lord's Liberation Army (LRA) in Uganda. The second group consists of those international terrorist movements that form part of a broader global terrorist network. They commit international terrorist acts in Africa, or receive logistical assistance from countries/communities in Africa to enable them to commit such acts elsewhere in the world. The major-

ity of these international terrorist groups are religiously motivated, with the advancement of Islamic beliefs underpinning their objectives.¹⁸⁾

5. STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF LIBYA AND SUDAN

The only two African countries that have been placed on the US State Department's list of state sponsors of international terrorism are Libya and Sudan. Libya has since been taken off the list, but Sudan still finds itself officially classified as a villain, in a world that has 'gone to war' on terrorism. The following section briefly explores the reasons why these countries were placed on the list, and what their current position is regarding the sponsorship of international terrorism.

5.1 Libya's road to deliverance

Libya's sponsorship of, and involvement in, international terrorism can be illustrated by several examples occurring over a period of almost three decades. Libya was added to the US list of state sponsors of international terrorism in 1979, and the US government stated in 1981 that:¹⁹⁾

The Government of Colonel Gadhafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism. Despite Gadhafi's repeated public pronouncements that he does not support terrorist groups, there has been a clear and consistent pattern of Libyan aid to almost every major international terrorist group, from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Libya's support for terrorism includes financing for terrorist operations, weapons procurement and supply, the use of training camps and Libyan diplomatic facilities abroad as support base for terrorist operations. Libya has trained terrorist from Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

Libyan-supported international terrorism escalated dramatically in

the mid-1980s. The US became a principal target of this terrorist onslaught, which included attacks on diplomatic and military personnel, and on civilian targets, including passenger aircraft. Libya's secret services were credited with supplying intelligence and strategic support which culminated in several significant international terrorist attacks that took place in the 1980s. Libya was the main suspect in the bombing of the Labelle discotheque in Berlin in 1986, which killed two Americans and a Turk, while wounding more than 200 people. The US National Security Agency (NSA) and British and West German intelligence agencies, intercepted incriminating communications between Tripoli and the terrorists involved in the attack. The bombing produced a military response from the Reagan Administration, when the US launched a military strike against Libya on 13 April 1986. This attack, which targeted terrorist training centres and military installations, caused substantial damage to Libya's terrorist infrastructure and resulted in short-term political insecurity in Tripoli. The *Bab al-Aziziyya* compound (Gaddafi's residence, and the headquarters of Libya's terrorism agency) received several direct hits and sustained major damage.²⁰⁾

Two of the most comprehensively documented examples of Gaddafi's sponsorship of international terrorism during the 1980s were the Lockerbie Pan Am disaster of 1988 and UTA 772 disaster of 1989. Pan Am flight 103, *en route* from London to New York, exploded mid-air and crashed into the Scottish village of Lockerbie, 15 miles north of the English border. Along with the 259 people on board, 11 people on the ground were killed. Twelve others were seriously injured.²¹⁾ UTA flight 772 was bound for Paris from Congo on 19 September 1989, when it exploded over the Sahara Desert in southern Niger. All 170 people on board were killed instantly.²²⁾ With growing evidence pointing towards Libya being responsible for the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and France initiated a vigorous campaign to gain international support for sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. The campaign proved successful and, on 11 January 1992, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously passed *Resolution 731 (1992)*, which condemned the bombings and demanded that Libya:²³⁾

— accept responsibility for the attacks;

- hand over for trial two Libyans indicted by the US and Britain for their involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103;
- co-operate in the investigations into the airline attacks by disclosing all related evidence; and
- pay compensatory damages for its role in the bombings.

Libya's failure to comply with the resolution, especially its refusal to hand over the two agents, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, led to the passing of the more punitive *Resolution 748 (1992)* on 31 March 1992. *Resolution 748* imposed a series of sanctions on Libya, including:²⁴⁾

- an aviation embargo prohibiting flights into or out of Libya;
- a ban on all arms sales to Libya; and
- a provision mandating reductions in the size of Libya's diplomatic missions.

Libya continued to ignore *Resolution 731*, failing to hand over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing to the US and the UK. The Security Council passed a final resolution in November 1993 stiffening the sanctions. *Resolution 883 (1993)* tightened the air embargo by prohibiting the sale or acceptance of Libyan Airlines tickets by other carriers; freezing selected Libyan assets abroad; and prohibiting the export to Libya of certain petroleum-related industrial equipment.²⁵⁾ International terrorism activities sponsored by Libya, and resulting fatalities, decreased drastically at the beginning of the 1990s (see *Table 2*). In a quest to have the aforesaid sanctions lifted, Libya took a number of initiatives.²⁶⁾

In 1999 Libya handed over Abdelbassat El-Megrahi and Lamine Khalifa Fhima, the two major suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, both of whom were then tried in a Scottish court. El-Megrahi was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001, while all the charges against Khalifa Fhima were dismissed. The Libyan government agreed to pay compensation to victims of the Lockerbie attack, although it has been reported that the final payment has not yet been made. Payment of compensation for the attack would be structured in three stages.²⁷⁾

- US\$4 billion to be paid after the lifting of UN sanctions;
- US\$4 billion after the lifting of US sanctions; and
- US\$2 billion when the US removes Libya from its list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Year	Casualties	Year	Casualties
1981	2 deaths	1991	0
1982	0	1992	0
1983	0	1993	1 kidnapping/ execution
1984	6 deaths, 30 injured	1994	0
1985	80 deaths, 100 injured	1995	0
1986	50 deaths, 381 injured	1996	0
	Pre-airstrike: 3 deaths, 229 injured Post-attack: 47 deaths, 151 injured		
1987	12 deaths 52 injured	1997	0
1988	270 deaths	1998	0
1989	171 deaths	1999	0
1990	0	2000	0

Source: Collins, S, "Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya)", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol 27, 2004, p 6.

UN sanctions were finally lifted on 12 September 2003. The US and France, however, refrained from lifting sanctions. Libya also allowed nuclear inspectors access to its nuclear facilities, after this had been denied for a long time. The country reaffirmed its commitment to the twelve international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols to which it is a signatory.²⁸⁾ Libya was removed from the US list of states that sponsors terrorism on 30 June 2006 after the US and the UK had negotiated a settlement regarding the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, and after Libya officially renounced terrorism. In April 2007 the US State Department stated that:²⁹⁾

[A]s a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD pro-

grams, the United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.

It must be noted that the Libyan government initially agreed to a compensation deal with the relatives of the 170 victims of the UTA 772 bombing of 1989. This compensation deal has, however, been blocked by the Libyan government due to several issues that (according to Libyan authorities) had to be resolved between the Libyan and French governments. It was reported in January 2008 that a US District Court Judge ordered the Libyan government and six of its intelligence officials to pay more than US\$6 billion to the families of the seven Americans killed in the UTA 772 bombing.³⁰⁾ This is yet another example of the costly ramifications for any country sponsoring international terrorism.

5.2 Sudan and sponsorship of international terrorism

Following Libya's removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, the only remaining African country on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism is Sudan.

5.2.1 Background

Sudan was added to the US State Department's list of state sponsors of international terrorism in August 1993. The State Department declared in 1994 that:³¹⁾

[D]espite several warnings to cease supporting radical extremists, the Sudanese Government continued to harbor international terrorist groups in Sudan. Though the National Islamic Front (NIF), which dominates the Sudanese Government, Sudan maintained a disturbing relationship with a wide range of Islamic extremists. This list includes the ANO, the Palestinian HAMAS, the PIJ, the Lebanese Hizballah, and Egypt's al Gama'at al-Islamiyya. Sudan's ties to Iran, the leading state-sponsor of terrorism, continued to cause concern during the past year. Sudan served as a convenient transit point, meeting site, and safe-

haven for the Iranian-backed extremist groups.

Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir launched a military *coup d'état* in Sudan on 30 June 1989, which ended the rule of a three-year-old democratically-elected government led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party. The new regime committed itself tenaciously to turning Sudan into a fully Islamic state.³²⁾ Ironically, a central figure in the development of radical Islamic ideologies in Sudan throughout much of this period was al-Mahdi's brother-in-law, Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi. Al-Turabi was a former Dean of the School of Law at the University of Khartoum, and had been Secretary General of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) since 1964.³³⁾

One of the primary reasons for the US classification of Sudan as a state sponsor of international terrorism, was the fact that al-Qaida's leadership was based in Sudan and was directly involved with the politics and economics of the country. The late 1980s and 1990s saw al-Qaida's Osama bin Laden develop a strong political and economic platform in Sudan which he effectively utilised for the purpose of achieving his objectives. An example of this was the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings. In 1989, Bin Laden established a holding company in Khartoum, called Wadi al-aqiq and had dealings with the Al Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, which in turn had ties with al-Turabi and the *Ikhwan* through one of the bank's founders, Mutasim Abd Al-Rahim. In 1990 Bin Laden reportedly began to buy property in Sudan. In the same year he and his entourage left Afghanistan for Sudan. On his arrival, a lavish reception was organised in his honour by al-Turabi in Khartoum. At this time, Bin Laden was reported as having made a US\$5 million donation to al-Turabi and the NIF. Bin Laden then also married a relative of al-Turabi and in 1996 married the daughter of a Taliban leader. Bin Laden effectively used these marriages to develop and cement political relationships. At the time he was also allowed to import materials into Sudan duty-free.³⁴⁾

In 1992 Sudan started issuing large numbers of passports to al-Qaida associates and operatives. Bin Laden was given huge land rights across Sudan and at the time he owned the most profitable businesses in the country. His business interests included construction, manufacturing, currency trading, importing and exporting, and agricultural enterprises. Profits from these businesses were dis-

tributed amongst local al-Qaida cells to enable them to become self-sufficient, self-reliant terrorist entities in the countries within which they operated. In 1993 evidence emerged which directly linked Bin Laden's al-Qaida to the bombing of the World Trade Centre. In the same year Bin Laden was appointed al-Turabi's General Secretary in the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) General Assembly. Between 1994 and 1995 Hezbollah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and al-Qaida, collaborated under the auspices of the PIAC General Assembly. By 1996 Sudan's political and economic relationship with Bin Laden had deteriorated. In 1996 Sudan's President Bashir offered the extradition of Bin Laden to Saudi authorities, to be passed on to the US. This was primarily due to negotiations between the Sudanese government and the CIA in the US. Bashir was in turn aiming to improve his country's relationship with Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden, as expected, returned to Afghanistan in May 1996. Sudan increased its efforts in 1996 to improve relations with its neighbours. Political turmoil, however, struck Sudan at the end of the 1990s when the Sudanese Parliament was disbanded in 1998 and a national emergency was declared. Al-Turabi's influence diminished greatly during this period and he was arrested in 2001. He was re-arrested in 2004 for an alleged *coup* plot against the al-Bashir government.³⁵⁾

The UN Security Council adopted two resolutions pertaining to Sudan's support of international terrorism in Africa during the 1990s. The first was *Resolution 1044 (1996)*. This resolution called upon Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects wanted in connection with the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt.³⁶⁾ The second was *Resolution 1054 (1996)* which called on countries to adopt sanctions against the Sudanese government in consequence of its non-compliance with *Resolution 1044 (1996)*.³⁷⁾ The Security Council's management of the incident was interrupted by US air strikes on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, mistakenly thought to be producing chemical weapons for terrorist use. As stated previously, Sudan shortly thereafter expelled al-Qaida's Osama bin Laden. After requests by the OAU, Egypt and Ethiopia, sanctions were finally lifted by *Resolution 1372 (2001)*.³⁸⁾

5.2.2 Contemporary US views

The 'global war on terror' has ironically seen the US develop a closer

relationship with the ruling Islamists of Sudan. Since Osama bin Laden's departure from Sudan, the country has seen its Islamist movement split into two groups, which has resulted in Sudan experiencing ongoing armed conflict over the last couple of years. The development of a relationship between the US and Sudan can be seen as ironic since, in the 1990s, the US rejected every proposal offered by the Sudanese government to co-operate on counter-terrorism issues, including an offer to extradite Osama bin Laden to the US for prosecution. The Sudanese government's willingness to provide intelligence on al-Qaida has resulted in the country receiving a certain level of immunity from accountability for the violence in Darfur. The US even went so far as to release large numbers of Sudanese prisoners from Guantanamo Bay.³⁹⁾ The ever-improving relationship between the US and Sudan was illustrated in 2007 when the US State Department stated that the "Sudanese government was a strong partner in the War on Terror and aggressively pursued terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan".⁴⁰⁾

In addition to intelligence sharing, the US is also keen to protect the peace agreement, the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA) signed in January 2005, that aims to end the North-South civil war in Sudan and release vast new reserves of oil onto the market. The peace agreement gives autonomy to the Southern rebels for six years. After this period a referendum on independence is planned. A separate conflict, however, broke out in 2003 in the Western region of Darfur. This conflict caused an estimated 200 000 to 400 000 deaths and displaced nearly two million people. The political violence in Sudan in 2005 and 2006 highlights the increase in fatalities in Sudan resulting from terrorist activities between 2005 and 2006 (see *Table 3*). The country witnessed 157 fatalities resulting from terrorist activities in 2005. This number increased by 356 percent to 716 fatalities the following year; a clear indication that political violence increased in Sudan over this period. By the end of 2006, peace-keeping troops were still struggling to stop or stabilise the violence in several regions across Sudan. The violence also impacted negatively on the stability of Eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. Large numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Chad, have also entered Sudan. The provision of humanitarian assistance to these affected population groups and

regions has been made difficult due to armed conflict in these regions, a poor transport infrastructure in Sudan, and inadequate government support.⁴¹⁾

Table 3: Countries with the Highest Number of Terrorism Fatalities in 2005 and 2006			
2005		2006	
Country	Fatalities	Country	Fatalities
1. Iraq	8 262	1. Iraq	13 340
2. India	1 361	2. India	1 256
3. Colombia	813	3. Afghanistan	1 042
4. Afghanistan	684	4. Sudan	716
5. Thailand	498	5. Sri Lanka	627
6. Nepal	485	6. Colombia	533
7. Pakistan	338	7. Thailand	520
8. Russia	238	8. Chad	518
9. Sudan	157	9. Pakistan	387
10. Democratic Republic of the Congo	154	10. Phillipines	291

Source: National Counter-terrorism Centre, *Reports on Terrorist Incidents 2006, 2007*, pp 24-25. Internet: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/>. Access: 10 February 2008.

In response to the Sudanese government's continued involvement in the increasing violence in Darfur, US President George Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. The sanctions froze assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned companies owned or controlled by the Sudanese government. In response to the ongoing violence in Sudan, the UN Security Council adopted *Resolution 1769 (2007)* on 31 July 2007. The resolution calls for the creation of a joint 26 000 strong UN/African Union (UNAMID) force to keep the peace in Sudan, replacing the 7 000-member African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).⁴²⁾ After rejecting a first draft, which included the threat of sanctions, Sudan agreed to accept a second resolution which did not include sanction threats.

The ongoing political violence in Sudan and the Sudanese government's active support of certain revolutionary groups (who

have utilised international terrorism tactics in the past) are the primary reasons for Sudan remaining on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. The US commitment to end the genocide in Darfur and to promote a lasting political settlement was illustrated in December 2007 when President Bush named Richard S Williamson as Special Envoy to Sudan. The US president highlighted the US's concern in ending the violence in Sudan when he stated in January 2008 that:⁴³⁾

I am deeply troubled that innocent civilians continue to fall victim to the scourge of government- and rebel-led attacks in Darfur. I remain firmly committed to the rapid deployment of an effective peacekeeping force coupled with serious political dialogue between the parties to help end the crisis and the suffering of the innocent people of Darfur.

Terrorist activities will never cease in Sudan until peace has been achieved within the country's borders. Revolutionary groups from Sudan and neighbouring countries will continue to use terrorism as a political tool to achieve their objectives. The assistance Sudan has provided to the US in its 'war on terror' seems to indicate that Sudan will, at some stage, be removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. This will, however, not occur until the Sudanese government has restored stability, peace and legitimacy to its political, military and law-enforcement structures.

6. CONCLUSION

Libya's sponsorship of international terrorism and the international community's measures to isolate Libya's terrorist activities present a significant case study on the application of military force and unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, to counter state sponsorship of international terrorism. Libya's case proved that multilateral economic sanctions were more effective at reducing state sponsorship of international terrorism than either military force or unilateral sanctions. The case of Sudan has also shown that multilateral sanctions (applied against the country since 1996) have had an impact on the country's sponsorship of international terrorism and on its attempts to be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Sudanese government's most recent actions regarding terrorism

and the sponsorship thereof have followed a pattern similar to those taken by Libya before the country's removal from the US list.⁴⁴⁾

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