

CHAPTER SIX

INITIATORS AND INFLUENCERS OF FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE EXTERNAL (NON-DOMESTIC) ENVIRONMENTS

6.1. Introduction

In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, the external environment, in the wider generic sense, includes *transactional* or *communicational* environments such as the bilateral and multilateral types; and it also includes the *geographical* international and regional environments. In the context of the international environment, the concept of the *third state* (see paragraph 6.2.1.4. *infra*), because of the impact its decision makers may have on specific transactional relationships (bilateral and multilateral) within the international *milieu*, may be specially relevant.


In comparison with the more *direct* influences of foreign policy within the domestic or internal geographical environment, it is argued that the external geographical environments serve as crucibles of largely *indirect* or peripheral foreign policy influences. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, peripheral foreign policy initiators and influencers within the external geographical environments of individual states include regional actors or role players. Such foreign policy actors may be specific *third states*, international organisations (a focus of the multilateral environment), individual, organised or institutional entities (also a multilateral focus) within the all-encompassing international environment; and may exert formative influences on the bilateral and multilateral policies of individual states. Their actions and influences help to shape the bilateral environments of individual states, the *communicational* environments in which domestic environments contribute to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The ways in which these actions and influences are dealt with by top decision makers of the domestic and transactional environments are dependent, in part, upon the nature of their leadership. Consequently, the leadership factor, a crucial component of the environmental-

relationships-imperatives linkage model, is also addressed in this chapter. Finally, world view foreign policy matrices in respect of South Africa and the PRC will be developed from salient information already recorded and national characteristics previously identified.

6.2. External environments

As referred to previously, the external environments, two of which are *geographical* and two of which are *communicational* or *transactional*, are external to the domestic environment, which is also the state's internal environment.

Figure 6/1: Representation of the external environments



Source: Original depiction based on the environmental component of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model (Figure 3/2 *supra*)

Figure 6/1 *supra* describes the situation, and also allows for the place of the *third state* (D3), a concept that will be explained further during the course of this chapter. Figure 6/1 *supra* contrasts the domestic environment (D) with those environments,

geographical and transactional (bilateral {B}, regional {R}, multilateral {M} and international {I}), that extend beyond the territorial and national political boundaries of the nation-state. The concept of a *third state* capable of affecting the bilateral relationship between states D1 and D2 is represented by D3. Figure 6/1 *supra* also illustrates the fact that the international environment {I} is all-encompassing, in that any and every foreign policy action that takes place within any of the other environments (domestic {D}, bilateral {B}, regional {R} or multilateral {M}) automatically also takes place within the greater international environment {I}; and, conversely, that any and every foreign policy action, requiring an authoritative decision, that takes place in the international environment also takes place simultaneously in at least two other environments; the domestic and bilateral, domestic and multilateral or domestic and regional.

6.2.1. Geographical external environments

The geographical external environments help to focus on questions of *who*, *where* and *what*? Who is involved (which countries)? What is happening in the region? Where is it happening (which region)? Where the international environment is concerned, there is no dispute about its extent (it covers the globe) and its membership includes every state and every individual and political entity. However, regions are much more difficult to define or identify (Rosenau, 1969: 61-62). Consequently, definitions or descriptions of regions are, for the most part, subjective considerations (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 2), based on factors such as proximity, association or common interests. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, geographical regions that are organised institutionally are treated separately as part of the multilateral communicational external environment.

6.2.1.1. Regional foreign policy influences

South Africa is arguably part of the Southern African region, the African region, the Indian Ocean region, the South Atlantic region, the developing world and the Southern Hemisphere region. In these regions South Africa normally pursues its

foreign policy regional interests through multilateral institutions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (*vide* {1} SA. 2001. *Strategic plan*: 26; {2} DFA. 1998: 40 and 134) within the multilateral environment. During the period of the Mbeki presidency, South Africa has been mooted the idea of forming a *Group of the South*, that would include, among others, strategically important states such as Brazil, Egypt, India and Nigeria (DTI. *Global Economic Strategy*. Undated: 10); and has also actively pursued the related concepts of an African *Renaissance* and *Millennium Africa Plan* (MAP), which have since been supported by other African states in the practical form of the New African Initiative (NAI) (*vide* {1} SA. 2001. *Strategic plan*: 14). Consequently, the African region, Southern Hemisphere and Developing World are the areas most likely to attract South Africa's attention in the realm of regional foreign policy concerns.

The relatively high number of armed conflicts taking place in Africa ({28}WS. 2002: 1-2), as well as ongoing regional problems concerning illegal arms trafficking, illegal immigration, drugs-trafficking, the spread of disease across international boundaries, and cross-border crime (*vide* {2} DFA. 1998: 166-178), have placed additional pressures on African states, including South Africa, to seek diplomatic and foreign policy solutions to these mounting concerns. Despite a stated commitment to a respect for human rights and democracy (*vide* Mills. 2000: 262) South Africa has been relatively silent, in the face of implied contempt for human rights and democracy by some of its Southern African neighbours (*vide* Southall in DFA. 20000619). For example, when Zimbabwe's President allows mobs to attack and kill white Zimbabwean farmers ({18}WS. 2000: 1) South Africa is expected to respond promptly, publicly and unambiguously; first to reassure its own white farmers; and secondly, to reassure the states of the international system that South Africa respects the rule of law, continues to uphold the principles of democratic government, and can be relied upon to consistently demonstrate respect for human rights (*vide* Mills. 2000: 308-309; also {2} DFA. 1998: 156-162). The danger of not responding appropriately may be felt economically when potential investors become disillusioned or nervous about spending their money in a state that seems so easily intimidated by its less

powerful neighbour. The increase in illegal immigration into South Africa (He Wenping. 1996: 6), including illegal Chinese immigrants, through the porous borders of neighbouring states, is an additional regional problem that, in the long term, cannot avoid exerting an impact on South Africa's foreign and domestic policy .

Of course, not all peripheral foreign policy influences emanate from neighbouring or proximate states because not all regions are contiguous; they may also be non-contiguous or dispersed; and whether contiguous or non-contiguous, they may also sometimes include the multilateral environment in the form of the international regional organisation. The non-contiguous region that is of particular importance to South Africa is the region known as the developing world. Many developing states are part of multilateral organisations such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non- Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or the Southern African Development Community. Mention is also often made of South-South cooperation (Mbeki. 1999. *speech* at Gallagher Estate, Midrand, 26 March 1996: 167) or South-North economic disparity (*vide* {2}SA. 1998: Mbeki *speech*) but as many of the world's developing states are in the northern hemisphere these terms tend to distort their messages if "south" is intended to mean "developing", "under-developed" or, merely, "poor". For example, Australia which is geographically part of the "south" has a highly developed "northern" economy (*vide* {14}WS. 2001: 1).

Another non-contiguous "region" or grouping that appears to be of special interest to South Africa is the thus far nameless region encompassing the socialist, communist and revolutionary "friendships" forged between the African National Congress, and some of the governments and revolutionary movements that supported them during the *apartheid* years. This region includes states such as Cuba (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4), Algeria (Mandela. 1997: 355) and the People's Republic of China (*vide* Randall. *Sunday Independent*. 6 August 2000: 4); and actively supportive sub-Saharan African states such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 31), among others.

Some of the wealthier countries, political parties and individual leaders appear to have exploited such “friendships” with their South African counterparts by providing funds for party political purposes (Mills. 2000: 274-275), sometimes upon request of the South African leadership on behalf of the ANC (2001: *interview*; *vide* Brummer and Blatt. *Mail & Guardian*. 22-27 March 2002: 4), with the result that South Africa’s foreign policy has effectively been held ransom to the party political interests of the ANC-SACP alliance.

South Africa’s external environment has had a particularly important role in shaping post *apartheid* South Africa; states of the Southern African region gave sanctuary to guerrillas of South Africa’s liberation movements (*vide* SA.1995. *Opening address by President Nelson Mandela*: 5); bilateral relations with many individual states became strained as economic sanctions were imposed against South Africa, such as the economically crippling Congressional Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) legislation introduced against the *apartheid* government by the United States (Suzman. 1993: 274; Mills. 2000: 249); and, of course, states such as the former Soviet Union and Cuba supplied arms, ammunition, military equipment and personnel to fight the South African Defence Force in Southern Africa during the *apartheid* era. The PRC, like the former Soviet Union and some other states, also provided sanctuary and training for ANC and PAC exiles (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 301 and 311-312; WS. 2001).

Dramatic and far-reaching changes in the external environment, such as the decolonisation of Africa, the universal condemnation of race discrimination, the international isolation of South Africa, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the independence of Namibia and the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China, preceded political change in South Africa; such external changes undoubtedly influenced the course of events in South Africa. For example, the termination of Soviet arms supplies to the liberation movements coupled with continuing international sanctions (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 274) against the South African Government created a political stalemate; a situation that could only be resolved by the South African Government and the liberation movements, particularly the African

National Congress and its allies, foregoing the military option for the peaceful option of negotiation (Suzman. 1993: 290).

The People's Republic of China is part of the Greater China Region (which includes Taiwan), the East Asian Region, the Asian Region, the Asia-Pacific Region and the developing world. Clearly the PRC is geographically part of the Northern Hemisphere but in the political, diplomatic and ideological sense it has sought, with notable success, to align itself with the south. Since the communist take-over of the Chinese mainland in 1949 (Ch'en. 1967: 312) the external environment of the PRC has undergone considerable change (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 370-372). The Soviet Union has disappeared; major wars have been fought in Korea and Vietnam; the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not only come into being but has expanded to include some communist states; new states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union have arisen on China's borders; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have since risen to be among the world's most successful economic and financial centres; Hong Kong and Macao have been returned to China by their former colonial rulers; North and South Korea have begun to seek rapprochement; and Western culture, specifically American and British culture, has left its impact on a number of Asian states and territories (*vide* Lam. 1999: 386-387) that are neighbours or near neighbours of the Chinese mainland.

The PRC's main focus in terms of the regions of which it is part, tend to be two-fold (*vide*. Lu. 1997: 155). First there is an over-riding concern for security, which includes opposition to perceived US hegemonic policies (Kim. 1998: 159); and second, there is a dedication to economic issues, aimed at ensuring regional economic stability and maximum benefits for the PRC (Kim. 1998: 171). Nevertheless, security policies have sometimes appeared to dilute the achievements of Beijing's economic policies by encouraging regional political and military instability. For example, William Tow, (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 151) writes of the PRC's sale of arms to third world states such as North Korea and Pakistan.

Security considerations have led the PRC to focus on trying to settle territorial disputes through generally peaceful means, particularly in recent years (*vide* Sun. *China Daily*. 6 July 1998), and to devote considerable attention to ensuring good relations with neighbouring states. There have been exceptions to the peaceful approach, however, as when the PRC has perceived threats to its sovereignty. For example, wars against the Soviet Union and India (De Crespigny. 1992: 261), US forces in Korea, US and Taiwanese forces in defence of Taiwan, and Vietnam; and even the invasion of Tibet (Barnett and Akiner. 1994: 239; *vide* Goldstein. 1994: 92), have all been in defence of Chinese sovereignty. Clashes between PRC and Filipino forces in the South China sea have also been about sovereignty over the Spratley islands, claimed by the PRC and several ASEAN member states (Kim. 1998: 295).

The PRC, within the wider international context, sees itself as a great power (in small letters) by virtue of its long history, its acclaimed culture, its extensive territory, its vast population, its acknowledged leadership within the developing world (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 156 and 317), its diplomatic influence and power as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, its military strength which includes a nuclear arsenal (You. 1999: 85-87), its scientific potential (*vide* You. 1999: 78), and its impressive economic growth and economic potential. Yet it is by no means a Great Power (in capital letters) by the economic or military standards of the United States (*vide* Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 218), Britain or France. Whereas Britain, during the eighties, was able to fight and win a war against Argentina (1982: 1-9), the PRC was unsuccessful in its 1979 three-week war against its neighbour, Vietnam. As De Crespigny (1992: 297) has noted in this regard,

the chief lesson of the ... affray was that China possessed only limited capacity for wielding military force at a distance.

For this reason, perhaps, the People's Republic of China habitually, and deliberately, describes itself as a developing country. In effect, as argued above, the PRC is less than a developed state but is also, arguably, much more than a developing state. It falls somewhere in between, in a category of its own. For convenience, no doubt, the

world appears willing to treat the PRC as a developing country. Consequently, the non-contiguous developing region is of special importance to the PRC because this region offers opportunities for Chinese political, diplomatic, economic and military influence, also in the multilateral context (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 156). A further non-contiguous region, is the Chinese *Diaspora*, numbering more than 50 million people (World Bank. 2000: 40; Roberts. 2000: 279-280), which is to be found throughout the world, not only in Asian states such as Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, but also in Russia, Britain, the United States, Australia and South Africa, among others. The importance that is attached to the overseas Chinese *Diaspora*, by the PRC Government, is evidenced by the existence of an Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that resorts directly under the State Council (Brahm. 1998: *Organisation Chart*). According to Brahm (1998: 151) the office "...coordinates activities involving overseas Chinese around the world ..." State institutions such as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference also devote much attention to maintaining "...extensive expanding friendly contacts with compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and with overseas Chinese..." (PRC. 2001: 9).

6.2.1.2. International foreign policy influences

As one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a special interest in the United Nations. Apart from the Organisation's diplomatic and peace-enhancing role as an arbiter of dispute and facilitator of debate, it is also the multilateral vehicle that gives to China its opportunity to actively, and often conspicuously, participate in the governance of the international environment, with a view to protecting its own broader interests within that environment (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 316-318).

Two important regional organisations, both with a predominantly economic focus, are the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), at which the PRC has observer status, and the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) which has a membership of twenty-one Pacific rim states, including the PRC, United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and Australia. In more recent years, the

Shanghai Five Mechanism, comprising the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has also become a regional grouping of some strategic importance to the PRC (DFA. 20010521).

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is another organisation that is specially important to the PRC, and which it aspires to join as a necessary prerequisite for the envisaged success of its future economic policies. PRC membership of the WTO (Mills. 2000: 347) will also affect Taiwan as the latter also aspires to membership of this organisation but may only join after the PRC becomes a WTO member (Kim. 1998: 257). Hong Kong became a member of the WTO prior to the territory's return to the Chinese mainland in 1997 and will remain a member after the PRC joins the organisation, in accordance with the rights and powers conferred upon Hong Kong SAR by the *Basic Law* (PRC. 1998. *Yearbook 1997/1998*: 157-159).

6.2.1.3. Other individual and institutional role players

Apart from regional groups and multilateral organisations there are individuals and non-governmental institutional entities that may have an impact upon, and are therefore relevant to, South Africa's foreign policy. For example, former president, Nelson Mandela, still has the ability to influence the direction of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in regard to human rights, as evidenced by his mediating role in Burundi (*Pretoria News*. 27 February, 2001: 12). Archbishop Desmond Tutu also has this ability. There are also significant non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (*vide* Deng and Wang. 1999: 101) that are capable of influencing the direction of a state's domestic and foreign policy.

Among the more obvious non-state actors that may influence foreign policy in the regional (non-multilateral) context are international criminals, terrorists, guerrilla armies, smugglers, poachers and drug-traffickers. Invariably the cross-border or international influence of such individuals and groups is sufficiently negative or threatening to the requirements of good government that effective foreign policy

measures must be employed to negate such influence (*vide South China Morning Post*, 22 April 2000: 5). The regional and international activities of political dissidents, lobbyists, business organisations, human rights activists (*vide* {32}WS. 1998: 1-2), news media journalists and NGOs, among others, can also encourage changes in foreign policy.

On the economic front it is known that the South African government makes regular use of the economic and financial expertise of a group of influential international entrepreneurs, which includes Bill Gates (*vide* Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 101) and George Soros. However, in the context of contemporary South African foreign policy, individuals no longer loom as large as when Nelson Mandela and activists such as Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu (Mandela. 1997: 660) and Peter Hain ({22}WS. 2001: 1), among others, individually and collectively added to the woes of the declining *apartheid* state and forced South Africa's foreign policy makers to focus their attention on finding ways to combat the mounting onslaught of political, diplomatic and social ostracism. Unfortunately, some public policies, such as those intended to deal effectively with the AIDS crisis (which may yet do irreparable damage to the concept of an *African Renaissance*) (*vide* Mills. 2000: 104-105), have also been badly compromised by the unconventional and scientifically disputed views of a few non-governmental individuals (Mbeki. 1999: 99; *vide* {20}WS. 2000: 1).

Possibly the most prominent non-governmental individual associated with the People's Republic of China is the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Lamaists in China, and those in exile in India and elsewhere. His concern for the preservation of the Tibetan culture and freedom of worship for Tibetans in China, and his status as Tibet's "...secular and religious king ..." (Sperling. 1994: 277) has also made him something of a political leader of the Tibetan people. The failure of the South African Government to respond positively to some prominent and internationally influential individuals, such as the Dalai Lama (*Pretoria News*, 10 December 1999: 15), while welcoming other individuals with less impressive qualities or credentials ({31}WS. 1996: 1-3), betrays an absence of consistency that reflects, often negatively, on South African foreign policy.

There are a number of non-government organisations such as Amnesty International, and internationally dispersed groups and communities such as the Chinese *Diaspora*, previously alluded to, and China Democracy activists in exile; and numerous sister socialist and communist parties, that are capable of generating support for, or opposition to, the PRC's foreign policy; and thereby possibly influencing such policy. The activities and status of the *Falun Gong* (*vide* Rademeyer in *Pretoria News*. 27 April 2000) religious sect, as well as the activities of Christians and other religious communities in China, also have the potential to affect PRC foreign policy or PRC relations with other states of the international environment.

6.2.1.4. Influence of third states

In the context of the international environment, the concept of the *third state* (*vide* paragraph 6.1 *supra*), because of the impact its decision makers may have on specific transactional relationships (bilateral and multilateral) within the international *milieu*, is specially relevant. For the purpose of this research, third states (see D3 in figure 6/1 *supra*) are those individual states that together with, or in isolation from, the specific regions or blocs to which they belong, may exert substantial influence on the bilateral relationships of other states, directly or indirectly. The influence of individual third states upon a bilateral relationship between any two states (including South Africa's relationship with the PRC) can be due to bilateral, regional or multilateral actions initiated by them. The Permanent Member states of the United Nations Security Council, in view of their individual military, economic, political and diplomatic influence within the international environment are, effectively, all *third states*.

Since the demise of *apartheid*, third states that may act upon the foreign policy relationships of South Africa are somewhat easier to identify, as the pressures of economic, cultural and diplomatic isolation, and insurrection, are no longer factors for consideration. Now it is more a question of diplomatic influence and pressure, for considerations other than ostracism and rebellion; and states with the ability to effectively exert such diplomatic pressure and influence must arguably include all five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

Third states of particular relevance to South Africa during the *apartheid* years included Britain, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Britain and, subsequently, the United States, were major bases for the organisation and growth of the anti-*apartheid* movement, which sought and successfully achieved the political, diplomatic and economic isolation of South Africa; and the former Soviet Union and its surrogates provided the military training and *materiel* to make war on the *apartheid* state, with somewhat less successful results (Suzman. 1993: 290). However, it is not their contribution to the ending of *apartheid* but their impact on many of South Africa's bilateral relationships with other states that deserves the relative pre-eminence of Britain, the United States and the former Soviet Union as notable *third states*.

Britain's status and position within the Commonwealth in 1960 gave it the power to determine the fate of South Africa in relation to every other Commonwealth state. Britain could arguably have saved South Africa from early isolation but chose not to do so. On the other hand, the United States may have successfully pressured South Africa into abandoning its developing nuclear relationship with Israel (*vide* Mills. 2000: 288). The Soviet Union's contribution was to weaken South Africa's relationship with the United States and particular European States by a combination of direct and surrogate military pressure, emanating from Cuba, the former East Germany and the former Czechoslovakia, among other states (*vide* {29}WS. 2001: 1-2), in the form of weapons, troops, technical experts, trainers and advisors. A consequence of the pressure against South Africa was America's policy of constructive engagement (*vide* Crocker. 1993: 75; *vide* Suzman. 1993: 269). In more recent years, the People's Republic of China also acted as a *third state* to successfully pressure post-*apartheid* South Africa to abandon diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of the PRC (Mills. 2000: 269).

The fact that the PRC is itself a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, and therefore a powerful and influential state in its own right, makes it more difficult for other third states to successfully exert any impact on its current bilateral relationship with South Africa. Therefore, South Africa, *in its relations with the PRC*, appears

relatively immune from third state pressures emanating from other UNSC Permanent Members. Nonetheless, the United States is certainly capable of influencing South Africa's relationship with the PRC. On this point, Paul Kennedy (1987: 535) comments as follows about the relative power of the United States:

*Because it has so much power for good or evil, because it is the linchpin of the western alliance system and the centre of the existing global economy, what it does **or does not do**, is so much more important than what any of the other Powers decides to do (Author's emphasis).*

The PRC is also capable of acting as a third state in terms of South Africa's bilateral relations with other states, including relations with the United States of America. For example, despite an expressed commitment to respect human rights, South Africa did not support the resolution introduced by the United States at the UN Human Rights Commission debate in Geneva, condemning human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China, because South Africa did not wish to compromise its developing relationship with China (*vide* Mills. 2000: 265).

Because the People's Republic of China, itself, qualifies as a third state for the purposes of this research, only the other four Permanent Members of the UN Security Council ought to have the potential to shape or affect some of China's own foreign policy decisions or concerns. In reality this would be rare. However, the United States does have this capability (Kim. 1998: 100; *vide* Kennedy. 1987: 535), particularly in the military and economic spheres. For example, in the wake of the Tiananmen incident of 4-5 June 1989 (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 587-589), US-led economic sanctions pushed the PRC into a brief period of isolation, thereby affecting its bilateral relations with many other states (*vide* Roy. 1998: 136). The United States, reportedly (DFA. 20000714), also successfully pressured Israel into cancelling an arrangement to equip PRC-owned Ilyushin-76 aircraft with the advanced *Phalcon* early warning radar system. In addition, the United States has applied consistent and sustained pressure on the PRC in regard to the latter's sale of advanced weapons to

perceived rogue states, including particular Middle Eastern states, with mixed success (Robertson and Shambaugh. 1997: 463-464). It is conceivable, nonetheless, that the close critical attention of this supremely powerful third state, the United States, has discouraged some sales of weapons and weapon technology, to prospective recipients, by the People's Republic of China (Johnston. 1998: 76).

Although the five UN Security Council Permanent Members have all been identified as obvious *third states* for the purposes of this research, in the context of SA foreign policy it is conceivable that states such as India might also qualify as *third states* capable of influencing South Africa's bilateral relations with other states.

6.2.2. Communications and transactions within external environments

The external communicational or transactional environments, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, include the multilateral and bilateral environments. These are the environments in which foreign policy takes place. Of course, the focus in this study is on bilateral and not multilateral foreign policy. Nevertheless, some attention will be paid to the role of multilateral foreign policy in so far as it identifies the major multilateral foreign policy interests of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

6.2.2.1. Multilateral communicational environment

Since the demise of *apartheid*, which was itself a victim of a variety of international pressures, South Africa's diplomatic relationships have expanded and its membership of multilateral organisations within the international system has increased dramatically. Within the context of the multilateral environment, international organisations that are particularly important to South Africa, politically and economically, are the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, the Group of Seventy-seven (G-77), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and, reputedly, the Indian Ocean Rim

Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). It should be kept in mind that multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth (Suzman, 1993: 54 and 264), the Organisation of African Unity and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) (SA, 1995, *Profile 3 95*: 9) gave important support in bringing an end to *apartheid*.

South Africa's commitment to its immediate region and to the African continent has resulted in organisations such as SADC and the OAU becoming specially important vehicles for South Africa's multilateral objectives in Africa (SA, 2001, *Strategic plan 2001/2005*: 26). However, these organisations may also have tended to hobble South Africa's ability to take the lead in foreign policy matters by virtue of their organisational and political emphasis on consensus, solidarity and the concept of *Ubuntu*. Consequently, states such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland, within the SADC context, or Sudan within the OAU context, have drawn no substantial pressure from South Africa that would effectively and publicly distance South Africa from human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, power-abuse and human rights abuses in Namibia (WS, 2001: 1-2), labour abuses in Swaziland (WS, 1996: 1), and religious intolerance and civil war in Sudan (WS, 2001: 1-2). SADC member states initially agreed that governments of member states that changed government through unconstitutional means (e.g. *coups d'etats*) would not be recognised by other member states. However, when such a situation arose in Lesotho, member states, including South Africa, chose the military option (*vide* Mills, 2000: 279; WS, 1998) rather than the more peaceful option of imposing sanctions on the illegal government that had come to power in Lesotho. South Africa and other SADC member states also did not wait for responses from either the OAU or the UN, before resorting to military intervention in Lesotho; and when the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo fell, several African states, including SADC countries, became involved (Mills, 2000: 278-279) in an opportunistic civil war that, at times, resembled imperialist ambitions.

The Commonwealth, of course, has a history of taking strong and effective stands against member states that are found wanting in terms of human rights and good

government. During the *apartheid* years, South Africa voluntarily left the Commonwealth (*vide* Suzman. 1993:54) to avoid expulsion, and suffered under a variety of sanctions measures that included social, economic, strategic and political isolation. Nigeria also had sanctions imposed after the legally elected government was deposed in a military *coup*. More recently, Pakistan and Fiji felt the weight of Commonwealth sanctions after their legally elected governments were deposed in *coups d'état*.

Unlike SADC and the OAU, the Commonwealth is composed of developed industrial states such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and the world's largest democracy, India; all states that can generally be relied upon to take the lead in censuring member states that fall short of Commonwealth ideals that include good government, the rule of law and respect for human rights. South Africa's leaders have demonstrated a capacity to get elected to chair a number of international organisations but, nevertheless, have yet to display consistent and effective individual leadership (*vide* Mills. 2000: 278-280; *vide* {2}Fabricius. *The Star*. 7 July 2000: 15).

After the end of the Cold War some observers expressed doubts about the relevancy of the NAM which South Africa joined soon after the country's first post-*apartheid* elections in 1994. South Africa hosted the NAM in 1998 and, as Chair, has sought to find ways to direct the organisation's energies toward new goals that could best benefit the countries of the developing world which, as Paul Kennedy (1987: 393) noted more than a decade ago, is "... still economically dominated by white men ...". Unlike the United Nations and the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement is an inter-regional organisation with no white leaders. Although the People's Republic of China has observer status at NAM it is not a member. As Robertson and Shambaugh (1997: 407) have noted, "...China's membership policy (toward international organisations) has been its consistent refusal to join Third World organisations ...". This stance indicates the PRC's perception that Third World organisations, including NAM, with their usually wide ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, ideological and political disparities; their mixture of very poor, medium level and wealthier economies; and the often disparate objectives and priorities of their member states,

are probably too unwieldy and unstable to be effective except as potential voting blocs at the United Nations and in other multilateral forums. South Africa, too, appears to recognise some of the weaknesses in NAM, given its lack of success in re-shaping and re-focusing the organisation, hence the proposed formation of a G-South group of developing states (DTI. Undated. *Global Economic Strategy*: 8-10).

Post-apartheid South Africa, like the PRC, has stressed the importance of the United Nations (UN) in dealing particularly with the global impact of war, global peace-keeping needs, and support for the economic development of Africa, a continent that currently hosts the world's twenty-five poorest and least developed states (*vide*{14}. WS. 2001). South Africa has also embarked on a campaign for the restructuring of the United Nations with a view to making the organisation more representative of the interests of the developing world, particularly Africa. In this regard South Africa appears to aspire to a change in the structure of the UN Security Council representation and the closed shop veto powers of the five UN Security Council Permanent Members, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and the PRC; veto powers that were, ironically, originally introduced to reassure a cautious Stalin (Kennedy. 1987: 393). Other possible Permanent Members in an enlarged UN Security Council include Japan and Germany but South Africa and other countries such as Egypt, Nigeria and India all envisage an enlarged UN Security Council that would include developing states such as themselves. South Africa appears to be thinking in terms of a democratic Security Council in which all UN Security Council members will have equal powers. In contrast, the PRC is unlikely to want an enlarged number of UN Security Council Permanent Members ({2}2001. *Interview*), particularly those from the developing world, as such an enlargement would imply equal status with the PRC; and would make consensus more difficult to achieve.

6.2.2.2. Bilateral communicational environment

As has previously been alluded to, the bilateral environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, is the communicational or transactional environment in which foreign policy takes place; the environment

joining two domestic environments that have given rise to, and engaged in, a specific foreign policy linkage.

As reflected in chapters four and five *supra*, foreign policy is formulated and implemented by individuals, acting separately, collectively or collaboratively within an institutional *milieu* that is hierarchical and dynamic; a *milieu* that must constantly respond to external forces and influences with a view to protecting the integrity and stability of the core environment, which is the domestic or internal environment; a *milieu* that relies on effective leadership and decision making to advance the best foreign policy interests of the state.

The transactions and communications that take place in the bilateral environment include all authoritative foreign policy decisions and actions that contribute to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy; and that are coordinated through the Department or Ministry normally entrusted with the foreign affairs portfolio of government. In South Africa the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and in the PRC the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) are responsible for the foreign affairs portfolio. However, as pointed out in Chapter five *supra*, other governmental ministries and departments, such as those responsible for economic and trade affairs, and also the military establishment, as well as other institutions, may also *initiate*, participate in, or *influence* the direction of, the formulation of foreign policy. Sometimes their impact and influence on foreign policy is due to their independent involvement and sometimes their impact is coordinated by the governmental institution responsible for foreign affairs.

6.2.2.3. Leadership and decision making

On the question of decision making and the way in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented by the South African leadership and the leadership of the PRC there appear to be vast, and sometimes surprising, differences in method, style and overall results. Despite the existence in South Africa of sophisticated Western-style democratic institutions of government, a developed legal system and a sophisticated

written Constitution and Bill of Rights (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter two), foreign policy decision making is often *ad hoc*, unfocused, inconsistent, ineffective and unorthodox. Mills (2000: 298) described it as follows:

(South Africa's) ... foreign policy (under President Mandela and Foreign Minister Nzo) was at times weak, vacillating in its principles and lacking both in conceptual clarity and follow-through. There was too little process and too much personality ... (It was) ... a policy which was prone to bow to African sensitivities, eager to pursue party interests, and insufficiently geared to a clear understanding of the needs of both the South African economy and social development beyond just the solicitation of aid. It was, in a sense, rather like the foreign policy of old - royalist and elitist rather than informed by more popular sentiment and process.

The fact that neither of the two foreign ministers appointed since the ANC administration assumed power in 1994 was formally schooled in international foreign policy matters and professional diplomacy, may have contributed to the lack of professional orthodoxy; Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma acknowledged her lack of diplomatic skills during an address to the SA Institute of International Affairs (Chetty. *The Sowetan*, 3 November 1999: 8). Another reason may be ascribed to the fact that the foreign service's most senior civil servant, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, also has no professional diplomatic or foreign policy experience (Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001: 6). A third factor that bears noting is the profusion of ambassadors and other heads of mission that have been sent abroad to serve South Africa as senior diplomatic representatives and who also have had no professional foreign policy or diplomatic experience (Mills. 2000: 293). Normally, a lack of professional experience could be overcome, or at least counteracted, by the close-at-hand presence of professional advisors whose advice on diplomatic and foreign policy matters is at least digested and seriously considered before relevant foreign policy decisions are taken. However, in the light of current affirmative action policies (Chetty. *The Sowetan*, 3 November 1999: 8) that require questions of race

and gender to take precedence over questions of foreign policy and diplomatic experience, there appears to be little opportunity for leaders to benefit from such advice. As Mills (2000: 272) has noted, former Foreign Minister Nzo also perceived DFA as being “too white” and therefore untrustworthy. Consequently, South Africa’s foreign policy appears in some danger of being hobbled by an over-riding concern with race and gender at the expense of the greater diplomatic and national interest (*vide* Myburgh in *Sunday Independent*. 1 April 2001: 7).

Other factors which may hamper and harm South Africa’s ability to project effective foreign policies include a consolidation of power in regard to foreign policy decisions within the Presidency and the practical ineffectiveness and contrasting lack of power accorded to the Foreign Policy Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (*vide* Suttner in Mills. 2000: 276). For example, if the Portfolio Committee was afforded the opportunity to question and approve South Africa’s ambassadorial appointments prior to them taking up their foreign policy and diplomatic responsibilities, it is possible that the President’s selections for appointment would be more suited to the important diplomatic tasks ahead of them (*vide* Mills. 2000: 292). There are reportedly more than a dozen South African heads of mission under internal investigation for unprofessional conduct. DFA has even sought to appoint some heads of mission with questionable qualities of professional judgement, responsibility and honesty (*vide* Mills. 2000: 292; {2}SA. 1999: *Parliamentary media Briefing*).

Where the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry are concerned, the problem arises that where sycophants and party political loyalists serve their leaders as advisors, the only advice given will be supportive of the relevant leader’s own views; and where those views are wrong-headed or based on inadequate information, wrong foreign policy decisions will be taken. In such circumstances, even if the decision is correct in the larger sense, in that it attains the required objective, professional advice, if taken, might well have produced a more cost-effective result. As one journalist has written (Mthombathi. *Financial Mail*, 16 June, 2000: p. 16):

(Mbeki) ... needs much more robust and vigorous debate around

the Cabinet table, and people who will challenge him. That makes for better judgement and, thus, decision-making. Who knows, with more astute minds around him, the Zimbabwe and AIDS controversies, probably the two most embarrassing missteps of his presidency, may have been avoided.

It is due, in part, to the inexperience of South Africa's foreign policy and diplomatic leadership, particularly in the political echelon of power, that the People's Republic of China is consistently able to determine the direction and pace of its foreign policy relationship with South Africa (2001. *Interview*).

By contrast with South Africa's governmental and foreign policy institutions and the approach of South Africa's leaders, the PRC leadership, specifically Deng Xiaoping, showed itself willing to be pragmatic (Yang. 1995: 48) and effective rather than politically and ideologically hidebound (Whyte. 1995: 115). This was not always the case, however, and for some fifteen years, commencing in the early sixties (and encompassing the period of the *cultural revolution*), the PRC foreign service suffered the debilitating effects of policies that valued party loyalty above expertise (*vide* Lu. 1997: 47-52). However, Deng was able to focus on doing what was perceived to be economically, socially and strategically advantageous for the PRC and managed to satisfy the ideologues as well through the ingenious device of re-forming socialism to accommodate Chinese conditions. In this sense he modified ideology to support good policies in preference to introducing poor policies to accommodate ideology. As long ago as 1956, Deng Xiaoping had boldly argued against discrimination involving membership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Whyte: 1995: 114):

The difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of a division of labour within the same class ... The vast majority of our intellectuals have now come over politically to the side of the working class ... what is the point, then, of classifying these social strata into two different categories?

As Whyte (1995: 115) has pointed out, Deng's ideas encapsulated the pragmatic view that the basis for evaluating and advancing individuals should focus on their contributions to society and not on their (ideological) thinking and political virtue.

What is important is how hard you work, how much special training you acquire, whether you introduce useful innovations, and whether you take on extra responsibilities. Later Deng's ideas on this issue were revealed in his less formal but more famous 1961 statement: "White cat, black cat, what does it matter as long as it catches mice?"

From the establishment of the PRC government in 1949, foreign policy was formulated at the highest level of political power. Major foreign policy decisions were made by Mao Zedong (Lu. 1997: 150) but, because of his lack of foreign affairs experience, he relied on the competent and experienced Zhou Enlai to manage and conduct the foreign affairs (Lu. 1997: 150) policies of the PRC. However, the dangers of cultivating too small a resource base of foreign policy expertise, particularly at the higher echelons of foreign policy decision making power, were effectively demonstrated after the incapacity and deaths of both Zhou and Mao because during the subsequent period, April 1976 to 1978 (Lu. 1997: 155),

Beijing's diplomacy lacked clear direction ... Beijing's foreign relations were put on auto pilot with the foreign affairs bureaucracies following ... previously established policy guidelines.

In the late eighties, during the era of Deng Xiaoping, it was made crystal clear that the apex of public policy decision making in the PRC resides within the cult of personality; and the individual who holds the supreme leadership position in the echelon of PRC political and military power, including power to formulate foreign policy. As Lu (1997: 8-9) explains,

... in the Chinese political system the ultimate power rests in the hands of a single paramount political leader. Foreign Affairs has always been one of the key areas where the ultimate decision making power is retained by the paramount leader. This paramount leader may or may not be the Chairman or General Secretary of the Party or State President, but most often he controls the military as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

According to Lu Ning (Lu. 1997: 9), “... the paramount leader and leadership nuclear circle wield the ultimate foreign policy decision making power in China as they can veto or ratify decisions made by the Politburo ...” The nuclear circle of power, in the broader sense, is the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with whom “... real foreign policy decision making power rests ...” (Lu. 1997: 9). Usually, the Standing Committee member having the most experience in the field of foreign policy, takes charge of the foreign affairs sector, as Head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), the *Zhongyang Waishi Lingdao Xiaozu* (Lu. 1997: 10).

According to Lu (1997: 11-12), the FALSG, as part of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and, therefore, as an agency of the Communist Party of China,

*... supervises policy implementation and coordination of the foreign affairs sector ... (waishi kou) ... The LSG consists of key members of the Politburo Standing Committee and .. top bureaucrats of government and party foreign affairs agencies ... (and) ... also includes a senior member of the military ... However, this body is **NOT** a standing **institution** and has no permanent staff... The Foreign Affairs LSG ... plays a pivotal role in the decision making process (Author’s emphasis).*

The inclusion of top bureaucrats of government is particularly significant and important because of the expertise, experience and *continuity* that they bring to the PRC public political decision making process, particularly in the realm of foreign

policy. In this regard it is interesting to note that PRC ambassadorial appointments are monitored by the PRC legislature (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*) and that the current PRC ambassador to South Africa is a professional diplomat with a professional knowledge of South Africa and Africa (*vide* {2} 2001. *Interview*). By contrast, neither South Africa's current Ambassador nor his designated successor, who was previously Ambassador to Denmark, are professional diplomats or have the benefit of long-standing expertise concerning the China region ({2} 2001. *Interview*). South Africa appears to have approached the PRC with a view to party-political interests, primarily those of the ANC and SACP, rather than as a destination for the professional promotion of foreign relations with one of the world's most powerful states. Lack of attention to a sustained long-term Mandarin-language training programme for SA diplomats serving in the PRC, the absence of any recognisable attempt to create a permanent and growing diplomatic team of sinologists or China-specialists, and tardiness in opening a Consulate-General in Shanghai, indicate a lack of awareness of China's importance ({3}2002. *Interview*), among SA foreign policy decision makers. The PRC is arguably too important for South Africa to conduct foreign policy in a manner that appears unprofessional and ill-prepared. Where the PRC is concerned, it can obviously be advantageous whenever its professional bureaucrats and ministry officials find themselves negotiating with South Africans who are unfamiliar with the China region and who appear more than willing to allow their Chinese hosts to guide them in their deliberations. The potential pitfalls awaiting some of South Africa's ministers, even when dealing with countries such as the United States, have reportedly been recognised by President Mbeki, himself (Mills. 2000: 284-285). Consequently, when negotiating with China it is essential for South Africa to utilise its available expertise (*vide* Gittings in *South China Sunday Morning Post*. 2 May 1993). As Laurence Brahm suggests ({1}1996: xiii), negotiating in China, without some attempt to acquire knowledge about the way in which the Chinese people approach the strategy of negotiation practice, "... is like walking into a mine-field without a map ..."

South Africa's President Mbeki, like the PRC leadership despite obvious contrasts in constitutional systems of government, has moved to develop his own leadership

nuclear circle (*vide Pretoria News*, 25 January, 2000: 19), in the form of the Presidency which, according to Parsons (1999: 96),

... includes administrative machinery to vet legislation coming from ministers before they have an opportunity to submit it to Cabinet. ... The South African President personally selects those surrounding him. That includes the deputy president (who need not be the party's deputy leader previously elected by the rank-and-file), ministers, senior officials and advisors.

As Mbeki's decision making powers extend to all public policy decisions, they also include decisions about important foreign policy matters, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma (DFA, 20001222: *Christmas Message Speech*), who said:

The President, myself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Minister have spearheaded a series of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities that have had a symbiotic benefit for South Africa, Africa and the developing world.

A crucial point to be kept in mind, however, is that all decision makers need good advice and information upon which to base their decisions (*vide Asiaweek*, 26 June 1998; 50). The quality of the advice will depend on the advisors; but the quality of the information will usually depend on the time available to acquire the necessary information and verify its accuracy. Wrong information or bad advice can lead to bad decisions (*vide the Sprouts in* {1}Rosenau, 1969: 50-51).

6.2.2.4. Contrasting world views: SA and the PRC

As previously alluded to, the non-domestic external environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, comprises the bilateral and multilateral transactional environments; and the regional and international geographical environments. The transactional environments of a state are, in effect, a mirror image of that state's domestically-based world view. For

example, if the PRC leadership's world view perceives the United States or Japan as an enemy, or rival, then the transactional environments will reflect policies, emanating from within the domestic environment, that respond to this perception by seeking to combat the perceived threats posed by those states. PRC opposition to perceived American hegemony and the envisaged American Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system exemplify an important aspect of the PRC world view. Similarly, if South Africa's world view perceives other African states as potential allies, or as having a common enemy or rival, then South Africa's policies, as reflected in the transactional bilateral and multilateral environments, will be tailored accordingly.

As has already been argued, the diplomatic interaction between South Africa and the PRC takes place in the external environments of these states, in the realm of foreign policy. The way in which they relate to one another is determined in large measure by their respective views of the world (their external environments) and their respective places within that world (their respective self-images as well as the way in which, in terms of their own perceptions, the rest of the world regards them; and they regard one another). On the one hand, the PRC is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and is therefore part of that select core group of supreme power within the international and multilateral environments; on the other hand, like South Africa, the PRC regards itself as a developing nation and is treated as such by South Africa and the rest of the world. In truth, however, as has previously been argued, the PRC is more than a developing state (*vide* Philip Snow in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 316). As a member of the elite Security Council Permanent Member states, the PRC is also the only Permanent Member that is neither European nor American; and has no religious base traceable to Judeo-Christian roots.

South Africa and the PRC have shared the experience of *revolutionism*, or what the Chinese may term the struggle for national liberation (He. 1998: 393), albeit from vastly different perspectives. The revolutionary heroes of the PRC were very much leaders and innovators who burst onto the international scene with spectacular and heroic success, and accomplished their revolutionary goals without significant external alliances or assistance. South Africa's ANC and PAC revolutionaries, in

contrast, were remarkably unsuccessful in military terms (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 290), despite an abundance of foreign assistance. Nevertheless, years of close collaboration with revolutionary sponsors in the former USSR and the PRC, as well as other states, have left their impact on South Africa's leaders, and in this sense, both the PRC and South Africa appear to share a revolutionary bond which is more likely to surface during contact at the party political level (*vide* Randall. *The Sunday Independent*. 6 August 2000: 4).

South Africa's view of the world, and its place within the international environment, tends to be a projection of its own domestic environment, in which black underdevelopment is viewed as a consequence of white exploitation. For South Africa, the developed industrialised states of the North Atlantic Community (the United States, Canada, the European Union and certain non-EU member states of Western Europe) represent the privileged exploitative and predominantly "white" communities of the international environment (Australia and New Zealand might arguably also be included as part of this category) whereas all other states, including the PRC and South Africa, as part of the developing world or Third World (Kim. 1998: 152), belong to the exploited and predominantly "non-white" members of the international environment. This is not necessarily a *consciously* racist interpretation of the international environment by South Africa's leadership echelon but it is arguably an interpretation born of the racist experience.

Perhaps as a consequence of its own feeling of Chinese cultural superiority, and as a result of China's perceived historically-founded and internationally recognised status within the world, the PRC does not appear (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 312-313) to view the international environment from an ethnic or racial perspective. Instead, the PRC's focus, in line with its ideological base and historical experience, is on economic development and international inequities in this regard. The perception that the PRC does not regard Africa or Africans in racist terms may explain why Pretoria is reluctant to engage Beijing about human rights; because in the absence of racism, as far as South Africa is concerned, there are no human rights issues. As in the case of South Africa, the PRC's view of the international environment and its own

place in the world, is a projection of its domestic history and its domestic experience. Consequently, the developed industrialised states of the international environment still appear as the “cities” of the world whereas the under-developed and developing states of the external geographical environments are perceived as the “rural areas” of the world (De Crespigny. 1992: 260). This is no longer a predominantly military perspective of Mao’s “guerrilla theory of revolution” (De Crespigny. 1992: 260) but appears ever-increasingly to represent the PRC’s economic perspective of itself as a “rural” area that has become a large “town” and that is determined to become one of the world’s great and important “cities”.

With an annual economic growth rate in excess of seven percent, the PRC is developing at an impressive pace. At present the PRC has close to seven hundred cities and its agricultural land is diminishing (CASS.1999: 19-21) as a result of urbanisation, vast irrigation projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and structural readjustments in agriculture. It has been estimated that the PRC will face a shortfall of agricultural land amounting to 150 million *mu*, equivalent to 25 million acres or 10 million hectares (Tung. 1991: 243; Hanks. 1971: 1847), by 2010. This may explain why the PRC is currently exporting its workers and surplus goods to developing states and why it is purchasing vast tracts of agricultural land in some of these states, including South Africa. This view has credence in the light of an article by Yu Guoqing in a Chinese language publication (IWAAS. 2000: 17-24) that set out very clearly some of the achievements and intentions of the PRC Government, with regard to agricultural policies, in its relations with African states. There is clear acknowledgement, for example, that, a “basic characteristic” of economic aid is to make a profit (IWAAS 2000: 17) and that “...economic and political benefits are closely linked...” (IWAAS. 2000: 17). However, the PRC tended to move away from aid-programmes toward programmes of “...mutual benefit and cooperation...” (IWAAS. 2000: 19). For example, there are reportedly (IWAAS. 2000: 20) 23 projects on fishery with 13 African countries, utilising 233 fishing vessels and personnel of nearly 10 000, and producing 300 000 tons of fish and marine resources at a total value of US\$150 million per year. Another project, reportedly (IWAAS. 2000: 20-21) in Zambia, involves the leasing of some 667 hectares of farmland, including 630

hectares of arable land, for a period of 99 years, for the purpose of crop production and the breeding of livestock. All the management personnel are from the PRC. Another farming project, apparently north of Lusaka (IWAAS. 2000:20), concentrates on cattle, pig and poultry farming. The main intent of the PRC's agricultural policies in Africa is directly linked (IWAAS. 2000: 20) to its overall targets for economic development in the 21st Century. As Yu (IWAAS. 2000: 21) has stated,

... the fundamental aim of China's agricultural aid to Africa is to make it serve the medium and long-term purpose of China's economic construction, therefore it should be intended to strive after economic benefit and to put emphasis on long-term strategic tasks. Looking ahead to the 21st Century, China's usable natural resources are getting smaller in size, urging China to depend on the international market. It is known to all that Africa is a treasure house with ample natural resources. China should, on the one hand, make the most of its own resources, and on the other hand, utilise the resources in Africa.

An article in the English-language PRC Government newspaper, *China Daily* reported (Wu. 23-29 April, 2000: 1) that 401 PRC state-owned enterprises had been established in Africa as at the end of June 1999 with a committed investment of US \$671 million. The same article also stated that,

... high profitability awaits Chinese entrepreneurs (who) set up factories, open mines or energy joint ventures, or ... engage in grain production (in Africa).

Although the PRC is aiming to become a developed state, and despite professed continuing commitment to the developing world, the PRC remains focused on its own national interests of security, access to mineral and other natural resources (*vide* Huang. *People's Daily*. 20 February 2001), economic development, unification,

domestic and regional peace and stability, and ensuring for itself an internationally recognised leadership role within the international environment.

As previously alluded to, both South Africa and the PRC are major core states within their respective geographical regions (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 21 and 370-372) and both are members of a variety of multilateral organisations, often separately, sometimes coincidentally. South Africa's focus on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) reflects a commitment to Africa and non-white organisations of the Third World (*vide* Kim. 1998: 153), as does the interest in forming a proposed G-South group of states that could include states such as South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Thailand (DTI. Undated. *Global Economic Strategy*: 8-10). As a strategically important country of the "South" (*vide* {3}2001: *treaties*), Algeria may also be a possible candidate for membership of the proposed G-South. In contrast, South Africa's membership of organisations such as the UN, the Commonwealth and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reflects a more international view of the world, honed more by necessity than by preference, particularly in view of the international influence, and financial and technical contributions toward economic development, that those organisations have made, and can yet make, toward the economic advancement of Africa.

The focus of the PRC is in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC, despite its developing status, is not a member of either NAM or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) although it does have observer status at both organisations. The PRC prefers to remain politically unencumbered and non-aligned or, as stated by Kong Minghui (IWAAS. 1998: 387),

...China does not enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries.

However, the PRC is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) and the Shanghai Five Mechanism (DFA. 20010521), which reflects its abiding interests in, and concerns for, economic and security issues (*vide* Sun in *China Daily*. 6 July 1998). At the global international level, as has been mentioned previously, the PRC is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and, as such, is one of the most powerful and influential states in the world. Consequently, South Africa is at a decided disadvantage in seeking to promote a foreign policy relationship with the PRC on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect.

6.3. Proposed world view foreign policy matrices: SA and the PRC

The purpose of a matrix is to provide origin or form (Hanks. 1971: 978). It may also act as a selection system (Hanks. 1971: 978). The envisaged matrices of the respective world views of South Africa and the People's Republic of China are therefore also intended to give origin or form to the respective foreign policies of these states through careful selection of factors that may enhance understanding of what drives their individual foreign policies; and may also serve to elucidate in what manner world view considerations are linked to foreign policy events and excitations in the external environments of states. Such matrices would also encapsulate useful summaries of what has thus far been explored. A basic foreign policy matrix would be divided in terms of the five (domestic plus four external) environments and would be expected to accommodate the four types of leadership or decision making relationships and the most relevant imperatives. By constructing a matrix that reflects as far as possible the salient aspects of a state's foreign policy imperatives, its main foreign policy decision makers, and the distinction between its perceived domestic, regional, bilateral and multilateral priorities, as well as an indication of its world view sensitivities and concerns, it is possible to discern the most advantageous way to approach South Africa's foreign policy relations with the PRC. Based on the research carried out thus far, a world view foreign policy matrix focusing on the three geographical environments, selected imperatives and crucial leadership relationships in respect of the People's Republic of China, would reflect the following data:

Figure 6/2 : PRC world view foreign policy matrix utilising geographical environments

PRC World View Foreign Policy Matrix		
Geographical environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
DOMESTIC i. supremacy of CCP ii. economic reform iii. PLA modernisation iv. civil stability v. re-unification vi. Chinese socialism	i. governmental institutional a) Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo b) Central Military Commission ii. governmental individual a) Jiang Zemin b) CCP Standing Committee members	i. historical a) strong central government b) cycles of unification and disintegration ii. strategic iii. economic iv. social
REGIONAL i. security ii. peace iii. stability iv. PRC pre-eminence v. border states vi. Asia-Pacific vii. developing world viii. Confucian region	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a) and (b) above b) other regional governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a) and (b) above b) other regional leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) foreign press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) regional activists/commentators	i. historical a) invasion/colonialism/war b) past greatness/regional dominance ii. strategic a) territorial disputes b) fear of US hegemony iii. social (cultural) a) middle kingdom perception
INTERNATIONAL i. globalisation concerns ii. multi-polarity versus uni-polar world order iii. communal rights iv. quest for recognition v. progress in science and technology vi Chinese Diaspora vii Chinese exiles viii non-alignment ix Chinese cultural primacy x middle kingdom	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a) and (b) above b) other governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a) and (b) above b) other foreign leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) foreign press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) foreign activists/commentators b) Dalai Lama c) Chinese political dissidents in exile	i. economic a) developmental ii. strategic a) world order security iii. moral a) civilisational legitimacy iv. legal a) dependability v. historical a) historical inevitability vi. Social vii. political a) national interest viii. Science & technology

The PRC data compilation in respect of the bilateral and multilateral transactional environments is a continuation of the matrix depicted in figure 6/2, but for reasons of space and convenience is reflected hereunder in a separate matrix as figure 6/3.

Figure 6/3 : PRC world view foreign policy matrix utilising transactional environments

PRC World View Foreign Policy Matrix (continued)		
Transactional environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
BILATERAL i. PRC-South Africa	i. governmental institutional a) as per <i>International</i> above b) State Council c) MOFA/MOFTEC/MOD ii. governmental individual a) as per <i>International</i> above b) advisors c) MOFA/MOFTEC/MOD ministers/senior personnel iii. non-governmental institutional (peripheral role) a) as per <i>International</i> above iv. non-governmental individual (peripheral role) a) as per <i>International</i> above	i. historical /legal/moral a) five principles of peaceful coexistence ii. scientific & technological/strategic a) access to technology and energy/strategic resources iii. economic a) trade/FDI and economic development iv. social/legal/economic a) access to new employment opportunities, agricultural resources and markets b) <i>Guangxi/</i> connections c) focus on bilateral agreements v. political/strategic/historical a) isolation of Taiwan b) defence of sovereignty
MULTILATERAL i. UNSC P/Member ii. WTO aspirant member iii APEC member iv. NAM observer v. Shanghai five member vi. ASEAN observer vii China-Africa Conference convenor	i. governmental institutional a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above b) International institutions ii. governmental individual a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above iii. non-governmental Institutional; and iv. non-governmental individual a) both as per <i>Bilateral</i> above	i. political/strategic/historical a) security b) leadership/prestige/respect ii. economic/social a) development b) <i>Guangxi/</i> connections c) modernisation needs iii. historical/strategic a) isolation of Taiwan

The foreign policy matrices in respect of South Africa are depicted by figures 6/4 and 6/5 *infra*.

Figure 6/4 : SA world view foreign policy matrix utilising geographical environments

SA World View Foreign Policy Matrix		
Geographical environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
DOMESTIC i. preoccupation with race ii. black empowerment iii. economic development iv. centralisation of political power v. crime problem vi. AIDS problem	i. governmental institutional a) ANC/SACP/COSATU b) The Presidency c) Cabinet d) parliament e) judiciary ii. governmental individual a) Thabo Mbeki and advisors iii. non-governmental institutional a) opposition parties/press/NGOs b) private business sector iv. non-governmental individual a) Nelson Mandela b) Desmond Tutu c) activists/commentators	i. historical/economic/legal a) <i>apartheid</i> /racism/slavery b) colonialism/ <i>revolutionism</i> c) democratisation ii. scientific & technological/economic/strategic a) economic under-development b) security concerns iii moral/legal/social/historical/political a) human rights concerns b) racial representativeness
REGIONAL i. African commonality ii. collective security iii. common enemies iv. African region v. developing world vi. South-South region vii. Indian Ocean rim viii. G-8 of the South	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other regional governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other regional leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) regional press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) regional activists/commentators	i. historical/social/economic a) racism/slavery b) colonialism/ <i>revolutionism</i> ii. strategic a) regional multilateral approach iii. social a) <i>ubuntu</i> / poverty/disease iv. Political/economic/social a) regional dominance b) economic exploitation
INTERNATIONAL i. African marginalisation ii. access to developmental resources (continued on next page)	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other governments (continued on next page)	i. economic a) developmental (continued on next page)

SA World View Foreign Policy Matrix (<i>Figure 6.5</i> continued)		
Transactional environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
MULTILATERAL	i. governmental institutional	i. political/strategic/social/economic/historical/moral
i. SADC	a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above	a) security
ii. OAU	b) international institutions	b) wealth creation
iii. Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)	ii. governmental individual	c) African recognition
iv. Commonwealth	a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above	d) consensus politics
v. NAM	iii. non-governmental	e) peace and stability
vi. UN	institutional; and	ii. political/economic
vii. Third World causes	iv. non-governmental individual	a) African empowerment
viii. collective decision-making	a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above	iii. strategic/political
ix. relative anonymity		a) UN re-structuring
x. resentment of the success of developed states		b) opposition to American unilateralism
xi. WTO		iv. scientific & technological/legal

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the peripheral influences on foreign policy, more specifically the foreign policies of South Africa (SA) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), within the external geographical and communicational environments. It has sought to identify the major regional interests and concerns of SA and the PRC and has identified some of the individuals and institutional entities within the wider international system that may conceivably influence the foreign policies of these states. The concept, characteristics and role of the *third state* have also been articulated and explained in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. The roles of the transactional and communicational environments, the bilateral and multilateral environments, have been more clearly articulated and explained in terms of their peripheral influence and impact on foreign policy; and the leadership characteristics that motivate foreign policy decision making in SA and the

PRC, and find expression in the bilateral and multilateral environments, have also been explored.

Finally, this chapter has sought to explain and articulate the role of world view foreign policy matrices that, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, may reflect, as far as possible, those factors that conceivably affect the formulation and implementation of a state's foreign policy, including the foreign policy decision making acumen of its leaders. Only a few of the more fundamental factors, influences and imperatives that may affect the foreign policies of these states have been included and are not intended or assumed to be a comprehensive list encompassing all possibilities. However, they are considered sufficient for the purpose of this policy analysis and may also serve as a guide for further, more comprehensive, research not only on the subject of South African-Chinese foreign relations but also in the field of foreign policy analysis in general. It now remains, in the next chapter of this research paper, to begin the task of discerning, from among a range of alternatives, the most advantageous way to serve the best interests of South Africa's bilateral foreign policy relationship with the PRC.