that the robbers soon ceased to make attempts on British territory, though still plundering Cutchee.

During the first year, 1847, when there was but one regiment, seven hundred strong, of Sind Horse, on the frontier, the labour was excessive. They had literally to lie down to rest with boots and swords on for many months together. So perfect was their discipline, that though well-planned attempts at surprise were made, never, during the twelve years that Jacob held the frontier, was any outpost of the Sind Horse cut up.* The soldiers, who never took so much as a bundle of forage without paying for it, came to be looked upon and treated as friends by the country folks, and "the moral power of their kindly bearing spread far and wide through the country, and effected what no mere force could have done."

"Meanwhile Major Jacob had discovered that not only the Boordees and Muzzarees, who were always inveterate marauders, but the Belooch settlers in Janadeyra, now British subjects, had been all along systematically carrying on plundering excursions on a considerable scale. . . .

"The horses of these Jekranees and Doombkees had been taken from them a year before by order of Sir C. Napier and sold by auction, but Major Jacob found that the sale had been fictitious, and that the former owners still retained shares in their horses. For it is the custom of the country that a horse, or rather mare (for they ride only the latter), very seldom belongs to one man only, and sometimes the property in one mare is shared between as many as twenty men.

"Thus when these horses were supposed to have been finally disposed of, only certain shares in them had been sold; the animals were kept by various Zemeendars† all over the country, and when any foray from Scinde was agreed upon, the horses were ready for their old masters. The men left Janadeyra by ones and twos, went for their horses and then proceeded to the appointed rendezvous.

* Frere to Lord Elphinstone, October 15, 1858.
† A Zemeendar was a farmer or owner of land.

"After the foray into the hills, or elsewhere, the booty obtained was shared at some place beyond the British boundary, the plunderers dispersed, replaced the horses with the Zemeendars, and returned one by one to their homes.

"The existence of these proceedings had never been suspected until pointed out by Major Jacob, and then at first they were thought impossible, till a party of the Irregular Horse surrounded and surprised a body of the plunderers just returned from the foray.

"Concealment was no longer possible, and Major Jacob now obtained permission to disarm every man in the country not being a government servant, which was at once done.

"At the same time Major Jacob set five hundred of the Jekranees to work, to clear the Noorwal Canal. The men were very awkward at first, but were strong, energetic, cheerful, and good natured; they soon became used to the tools, and were then able to do a better day's work, and of course to earn more pay than the ordinary Sindee labourers. The men seemed proud of this, and the experiment was perfectly successful.

"Soon afterwards the Belooche settlers took to manual labour in their own fields, with spirit and even pride. From that time they were really conquered and reformed. They are now (1854) the most hard-working, industrious, well-behaved, cheerful set of men in all Scinde. Their numbers amount to about two thousand adult males, but for three years past not a man of them has been convicted, or even accused, of any crime whatever, great or small; yet seven or eight years ago they were the terror of the country, murderers and robbers to a man.

"Good roads have been made all over the country, means of irrigation have been multiplied fourfold, and everywhere on the border life and activity with perfect safety exists, where formerly all was desert, solitude, or murderous violence; not an armed man is now seen except the soldiers and police, and person and property are everywhere protected." *

One tribe only, after Jacob had taken command of the frontier, ventured on a marauding expedition in force.

* "Records of Scinde Irregular Horse," vol. ii. pp. 218–220.

At the end of September, 1847, seven hundred Boogtees from the hills entered the plains to plunder. Lieutenant Merewether, Jacob's second in command, and commanding the outpost of Shapoor, started immediately with a hundred and thirty-three troopers in pursuit, and came upon them posted in rough ground, and prepared to sustain his attack. As his squadron moved rapidly along their front to cut them off from the jungle, the Boogtees, thinking he feared to meddle with them, left their vantage ground to attack him. Merewether, instantly changing front to the left, as accurately as if on a parade ground, charged with his troopers and crashed through and through them. For two hours the sharp sword-blades, and with greater effect the carbines of the troopers, did their terrible work; the Boogtees, their formation broken, but shouldering closely together, defended themselves, crouching beneath their shields and cutting with their sharp swords at the bridles of the troopers' horses to render them unmanageable. Brave and unflinching to the last, they refused repeated offers of quarter. At length, when five hundred and sixty of their dead and wounded lay upon the plain, the remnant of a hundred and twenty survivors surrendered, two only out of the whole number escaping to tell the tale of death at their home in the hills.*

It was a terrible lesson to the wild tribes, and no such raid in force was ever again attempted by them. From that time Jacob had to deal with depredators only in small gangs or singly, and could bring them to justice as ordinary highway robbers, acting on their own private account, and reflecting no guilt on the tribe to which they happened to belong. The population within the frontier were prohibited from going about armed, though they might keep their arms at home. All persons crossing the frontier from the

* "Records of Scinde Irregular Horse," vol. i. p. 112.

other side had their arms taken away, for which a receipt was given; and the arms were restored when they went back again. On the intelligence of robbers being seen, the troopers, always in readiness, were slipped upon them like greyhounds from the leash; and they did not stop till they had literally ridden them down. The following account of one of these encounters will give an idea of the spirit which animated them. In December, 1850 (it is Major Jacob who writes)—

"A party of Murree and Boogtee plunderers carried off a number of camels from the jungle, north of Gubbur, near Kundkote. Immediately on the information reaching Kundkote, the officer in command of the detachment there, Jemadar Doorgah Singh, proceeded in pursuit, with a Duffedar* and fifteen men of the Scinde Horse and four of the Belooche guides.

"The Jemadar having found the tracks of the robbers, followed them at a rapid gallop till he came in sight of the marauders, about fifteen in number, who, abandoning the camels, which they had pricked on thus far at speed, continued their flight.

"The Jemadar had now proceeded some thirty miles at a gallop, and at such speed that already seven horses of his party had fallen dead, he having himself ridden two horses to death; but not contented with recovering the stolen camels, he now mounted a third horse, and determined to continue the pursuit; accordingly he kept on with the remains of his party, till he had arrived far within the hills beyond Hyran; the enemy now again appeared, with numbers augmented by a fresh party of horsemen and forty or fifty men on foot, while Jemadar Doorgah Singh had then with him but two suwars of the Scinde Irregular Horse, and one of the Belooche guides, the horses of all the rest having failed long before. The guide entreated the Jemadar to give up the pursuit and return, as the enemy were very numerous, while he had no men with him, and the ground was such that even fresh horses could hardly move among the rocks and ravines. Doorgah Singh replied that if the guide was afraid he might retire;

* A Duffedar is a non-commissioned officer.

but that for himself he should be ashamed to show his face to me [Major Jacob] if, after coming in sight of the robbers, he should retire without killing some of them.

"He then, with his two suwars, and followed by the Belooche guide, went headlong at the enemy. The latter perceiving that their four assailants were entirely unsupported, surrounded them in overwhelming numbers, pulled the Jemadar and his two suwars from their horses and literally cut them in pieces, though not till they had disabled and killed some fifteen of the mountaineers.

"The Belooche guide alone contrived to escape, very severely wounded (as also was his mare), and was with the dismounted men and others of the party who had been left behind by the Jemadar, and with the recovered camels, brought back by parties from the other posts, who had also proceeded in pursuit of the robbers, and who not long after arrived." *

If the Beloochee does not possess, in addition to his courage, the soldierly quality of being susceptible of discipline, he has in a high degree that of chivalry. Round Doorgah Singh's wrist, when his body was recovered, was found tied a red worsted thread. The red thread is a high distinction, conferred, like a posthumous Victoria Cross, for distinguished personal courage. But in bestowing it the Beloochee makes no distinction between friends and enemies, and confers it with generous impartiality on a dead comrade or a fallen foe.

In providing for the pacification of the border population, Frere and Jacob had early recognized that to make the work permanent it was necessary to do more than guard the frontier and overawe the inhabitants of the country immediately contiguous to it. They aimed at making all Beloochistan a peaceful and well-governed country, friendly to English influence. Matters were not promising to begin with. During the progress of the expedition through Beloochistan to Affghanistan in 1838,

* "Records of Scinde Irregular Horse," vol. i. p. 325.

Burnes and Macnaghten had lent a too credulous ear to one Mahomed Hussan, a clever, plausible scoundrel, who by treachery and murder had raised himself to be Wuzzeer, or chief Minister of Mehrab, Khan of Kelat. This man, while secretly stirring up the tribes to attack and plunder the English convoys, and actually sending his own servants to waylay and rob Burnes, persuaded the latter that he was the friend of the English, and that it was the Khan who was guilty of the misdeeds. At the same time he persuaded the Khan that the English were determined on his ruin. So completely were Burnes and Macnaghten deceived by Hussan as to the Khan's doings and intentions, that orders were given to Sir T. Wiltshire's division, on its return from Affghanistan to India, to turn aside from Quetta and attack Kelat. The place was taken by storm in November, 1839, Mehrab Khan was killed, and the town given up to plunder, Mahomed Hussan surrendering to the British. Shah Newaz, a distant cousin of Mehrab, was made Khan in his place. A more unfortunate and unjustifiable act of aggression could scarcely have been committed. Two years later some reparation was made, and under a treaty concluded by Outram, Nusseer, the young son of Mehrab, was restored to his father's principality. But Mahomed Hussan's influence still remained paramount at Kelat. In March, 1851, he paid Jacob a visit of a fortnight at Jacobabad, and by his frank manners and cleverness, imposed upon Jacob as completely as he had deceived Burnes and Macnaghten. It was not till the following year, when he again had an interview with Jacob, that his real object appeared, which was to obtain the countenance of the British Government to his usurpation of the Khanate. When this became clear, Jacob told him in very plain language that he was a traitor and a scoundrel; and the next day he departed.

Being at last found out, he became desperate, intrigued with the Murree tribe and assisted them to plunder, and did all that he could to stir up strife. All this Jacob explained to the Khan, who was with difficulty convinced of the truth, so completely had he been hoodwinked by his Wuzzeer. But, being of a good disposition, and not wanting in ability, he roused himself and endeavoured to take the work of Government upon himself. Mahomed Hussan was removed from office and placed in arrest.

To strengthen the Khan's hands, and confirm him in his good intentions, Frere, in February, 1854, at Jacob's particular desire, had an interview with him at Jacobabad; an interview which was a first step in a course of policy of far-reaching importance. A good impression was made on the Khan, and he and his Sirdars returned well pleased from the conference. Henceforward it will be seen that it was Frere's constant endeavour, as the first and most effectual means both of securing peace on the frontier and also of protecting India from hostile influence and possible invasion by more distant powers, to encourage intercourse across the border, and to promote friendly relations with native states outside the frontier and independent, but subject to British influence, and guided as by a silken thread through the personal influence and ascendency of British officers. It was a policy which seldom met with encouragement from the Government of India, and was afterwards abandoned, but he lived to see it accepted and adopted. The Khan was so impoverished that he could not maintain a sufficient force to uphold his authority, and keep the peace between the wild tribes that were supposed to be subject to him. It may have been felt, too, that some reparation, however tardy, was due to him for the way in which his father had been treated. Therefore, Frere and Jacob obtained permission to con-

clude a treaty with him three months later (May 14, 1854), by which the British Government engaged to pay to him, his heirs and successors, an annual subsidy of fifty thousand rupees, in return for which he engaged to enter into no negotiation with other states without the consent of the British Government, to put down robbery in his territories, to limit the duty levied on merchandize passing through his country to six rupees per camel load, and—what was the most important proviso of all—to permit British troops to occupy such positions in his territory as they might find advisable.

This treaty secured and made permanent the friendly relations which for some time past had subsisted with the Khan. Already there was willing extradition by him of robbers taking refuge in Kelat territory. He had an agent residing at Jacobabad, and whenever a robber was believed to have taken refuge across the Kelat border, orders were sent to all village and other authorities to aid the Sind Horse in the pursuit and capture.

Three months after this treaty was made, in August, 1854, Major Jacob reports that—

"The notorious border robber, Sunjur Rind, the last remaining at large, and the most persevering of the outlaws who formerly infested the Scinde frontier, came in three days ago, and surrendered to the Wukkeel of the Khan of Kelat. . . .

"He has, during the last two years, frequently written to me to beg to be allowed to come in and receive pardon for his crimes; but the man's murders, robberies, and crimes generally had been so enormous that I returned no other answer than that I should certainly catch and hang him some day.

"Sunjur then went to Islam Khan, the Boogtee chief, and begged him to intercede with me for him, which he did, receiving the same reply as before, with the addition that if the Boogtees harboured such criminals they would be considered as guilty also.

"The Boogtees then informed Sunjur that if he came to live with them they would send him prisoner to me.

"He then went to the Murrees; but these people, greatly alarmed at our late arrangements with Kelat, and anxious to avoid giving offence, threatened to imprison Sunjur also; whereupon, in despair, the man came in and surrendered as above mentioned.

"The man is of a diabolical nature, and totally irreclaimable; but, as he voluntarily surrendered, I have recommended the Kelat authorities not to execute him, but to keep him prisoner for life." *

And he writes to Frere, September 18, 1854:—

"I am convinced that great and excellent results will ensue from the new arrangements with Kelat; the whole country will, I firmly believe, become well ordered and civilized. The Khan is most earnestly endeavouring to carry out my advice, he now looks after everything himself, and tells everybody that he is now only just beginning to *live*."

Another circumstance arising out of these friendly relations with Kelat, which probably passed unnoticed at the time, but which was, perhaps, the first step in an important course of policy, much debated later on, was the following:—

One evening in February, 1854, Jacob gave an order to one of his Lieutenants, Malcolm Green, to take a Duffedar's party of ten men and set out next morning for Quetta, a march of some two hundred miles, "just to see what the place looked like." Quetta is the last town in Beloochistan on the road from Upper Sind to Candahar, which is the main route between India and Central Asia. It stands on high table land between the Bolan Pass and the Affghan frontier, commanding the approach to the Bolan from the north, in an angle of Beloochistan, which

* "Records of Scinde Irregular Horse," vol. ii p. 189.

runs up into Affghanistan. Thus it is a point of vantage, looking into the latter country both in front and in flank. And it is the nearest place in India to Candahar, from which it is distant less than two hundred miles. These were the days when the Crimean War was impending, and Indian statesmen had seriously to consider the possibility, not of an actual invasion of India by Russian forces, but of Persia or Affghanistan being stirred up by Russian emissaries to give trouble. Both Frere and Jacob had too good an eye for country to be long in perceiving that Quetta was the gate of India on the highway thither from Candahar, and therefore a place of immense political and military importance.

No Englishman, as far as was known, had been there since the end of the Affghan expedition, eleven years before. The English had not, as we have seen, left a sweet savour behind them in that part of the country as they retired through it; and it might have been supposed to be a matter of no little risk for a party of ten soldiers to proceed thither. Such, however, did not prove to be the case. The good name acquired by the Sind Horse among the country folk must have reached even there; for the little party marched quietly and unmolested through the Bolan Pass to the high table land, where they found the pools coated with ice, and, after a short stay at Quetta, returned by way of Kelat, meeting with a friendly reception there from the Khan.

Thus much, then, had been gained already as regards the line of defence of India against an invader from Central Asia, that Beloochistan, the buffer between the two on the north-west, had in these few years been converted, for the time at least, from a hostile into a comparatively friendly country.

Frere, on coming to Sind, had at once set himself to

study, and soon estimated and appreciated Jacob's character and work.

"Jacob is doing more good than any ten men I know," he writes to Outram. To which Outram replied :—

"How gratified I am by your appreciation of John Jacob, who is indeed a wonderful man and an invaluable public servant, and especially well calculated for controlling and taming the wild tribes on our frontier. I only wish he had charge of the entire border from the sea to Attock."

And Frere writes to Lord Falkland :—

"I have sent in a letter regarding the expenditure for this year on the canals in the frontier districts. It will probably occur to you to ask whether the plan has been submitted to Turner and approved by him. And it therefore appears to me that it will be as well to mention beforehand my reasons for not referring Jacob's plans to any one. He and Turner are excellent friends, and have a sincere respect each for the talents of the other, but they work in entirely different ways. Turner, in a cautious, regular manner, observing all forms and regulations of the service, which to Jacob appear only as so many fetters. Turner does not like to act till he is able to record reasons which would show all the reasonable world that he acts rightly. Jacob will not willingly defer acting after he has satisfied himself what is right to be done; and he has an aversion (not, I think, an unreasonable or exaggerated one) to the delay necessary to make assurance doubly sure. Of course if I asked Turner's advice I must take it. If I take it, and call for more elaborate details, plans, estimates, etc., Jacob is, of course, disgusted. With ordinary men, this would, of course, not matter. But Jacob is not an ordinary man, he is a very first-rate engineer, and never fails to succeed in all he undertakes. I hope, therefore, you will not think me inconsistent in exempting his plans from that criticism and supervision to which everything else in the canal department in the province is necessarily subject, and without which any man, less highly qualified than Jacob is, would surely go wrong.

"Perhaps I might have explained my reasons more

briefly by saying that Jacob is quite competent to get on alone, and that he is one of those men who do not get on at all well unless you let them alone."

Jacob fully reciprocated Frere's appreciation and friendship. They were admirably fitted for working together. Jacob's work on the frontier and his great engineering schemes had Frere's constant and active co-operation, and he smoothed their way with the Government by his advocacy and tact. Jacob was inclined to listen to his counsel and accept his suggestions with more deference than he had ever shown to any one else. Frere encouraged him to take his own course, and to hunt his hounds in his own way. Comparatively independent as he was, and possessing, by an unusual combination, which Frere took pains to secure to him, military, civil, and political jurisdiction, so as to be sole master within his own district, there were still, of course, matters as to which he had to obtain the sanction of Government, and to take orders from the military authorities. He needed, for instance, money for his canals and other works of improvement. It chafed him that the assent to his plans for reclaiming the desert should be postponed because a clerk in a Government office at Bombay had found a mistake in the arithmetic of his estimates. Nor was he pleased when a new regulation compelled his lieutenants to pass an examination in a native language, which, for ordinary useful and colloquial purposes, they probably knew better than their examiner. Outside his own special affairs he sometimes wrote letters to the London Press, criticizing and exposing what he considered to be maladministration and mismanagement of the army in India and at home, one of which letters brought down a severe reprimand upon his head. With Frere he corresponded frequently and familiarly, and many of these letters are extant. It seems to have been

a relief to him thus to deliver his soul, knowing that what he wrote would be sure to meet with appreciation and sympathy if not with entire agreement, and that hasty or exaggerated expressions of indignation would go no further, and get him into no trouble. But for this friendship and this convenient safety-valve to his feelings, he might have poured his complaints into a less sympathetic ear, and with inconvenient results; and the threat that he once indulged in of throwing up his commission in disgust, and turning civil engineer, might have been carried out to the irreparable loss of the service. His tone to Frere is not only full of friendliness, but also of unvarying respect and even deference. "*Non omnia possumus omnes;* few men have your concentrativeness and firmness of brain," he says in one letter, which means much from a man who was quite above paying empty compliments to any one, and least of all to a superior.

Jacob's chief and constantly recurring complaint was that the Punjab authorities, in their dealings with the border tribes, followed a system which was the very opposite of his, and that thus his work of pacification was hindered and counteracted.*

* On this subject Sir George Clerk some years afterwards, when Governor of Bombay, writes to Frere at Calcutta :—

"June 26, 1861.

"I often ask myself, how is it that among items of extravagant expenditure in the Punjab, you have that constantly recurring unlimited one arising from the forays of our troops over the border? I know something of the tribes all along, and no one can say that Afreedees, Yosufzarees, and such up there, are a bit worse or more wild than Murrees, Brahooes and Belooches down here. But here, as you know, that is, on the frontier under the mountains, not a mouse stirs without Merewether's permission—and aloft, in the midst of the fastnesses of the wild tribes, I fancy there is now no fighting without Green's sanction. Hence it seems to me that before long it may fall to this Government to undertake to save you three-quarters of a

In an official despatch to Frere, he says :—

"February 27, 1854.

"Much good must, it seems to me, be accomplished among these wild but not unintelligent people, by our resolutely setting our faces against all private war whatever, whether against our friends or enemies.

"It seems right that I should bring to your notice that very great evil is caused by the contrary practice close to us in the Punjab districts. Muzzarees, Boogtees, etc., have been there permitted or even encouraged to *retaliate* on the hill plunderers, a proceeding fraught with terrible and increasing ill consequences.

"The principle of totally putting a stop to private warfare on this frontier, where it once existed to such terrible extent, having been attended with such excellent effects, it seems matter of regret that it should not be acted on in the districts in such close contact with us as that part of the Punjab, south of Mittenhote, where the same tribes exist on both sides of the border in both provinces; and the people and even the families being the same, the influence of proceedings in one district must be more or less felt in the other."

For writing this despatch Jacob was severely taken to task by the Government. Frere warmly took up his defence. "Major Jacob," he says,

"shared my own doubts as to whether the members of the Punjab Government were aware of the extent to which the system of permitting or encouraging our own subjects to retaliate on the border plunderers was carried, or of the manner in which it worked. . . .

"Had I imagined that his remarks implied any criticism on a policy adopted or approved by the Supreme Government in a neighbouring province, I should consider myself more culpable for forwarding than Major Jacob for writing them. . . .

million per annum, which is now wasted in cockering up the so-called 'Punjab System.'"

Sir George Clerk's testimony on this question is the more valuable, inasmuch as he was in the Bengal service, and had held office in the North-West Provinces.

"I will only further express a hope that Major Jacob may be relieved from any of the displeasure of the Supreme Government, or that if his explanation be not deemed perfectly satisfactory, I may be permitted to bear my fair share of the blame for forwarding remarks which are considered open to such serious censure."

In the mean time a "Punjab Report" had been printed and published, which had gone out of its way to disparage the work done by the Sind Horse in comparison with the labours of other frontier troops. This was too much for Jacob. He wrote an official despatch to Frere, complaining of the "Punjab Report" as being "founded on imperfect information, incorrect in fact, and unjust as to conclusion," and claiming "the protection of the head of the province" [*i.e.* the Commissioner in Sind] "from these injurious remarks." He then, at Frere's request, wrote and sent in a memorandum describing and contrasting the two systems. The gist of his description of the Sind system is as follows: Entirely offensive measures on the part of the troops; no defensive works allowed, existing ones destroyed or abandoned. No distinction made between British subjects and others in cases of robbery and murder. The plea of blood-feud or retaliation considered as an aggravation rather than as a mitigation of guilt, inasmuch as it implies malice aforethought. No private person allowed to bear arms without leave. Predatory tribes considered as mere criminal, disreputable persons as long as they persist in their misdeeds, with whom it is disgraceful for respectable persons to have any dealings. Every soldier employed, on the other hand, to have the feeling instilled into him that he was altogether of a superior nature to the robber, whom he was to consider not as an enemy but as a malefactor. Perfect information to be obtained of all movements or intended

movements of plundering tribes. Strict justice, and an endeavour to excite men's better natures.

Another essential feature in the Sind frontier system was that all authority, civil, political, and military, was concentrated in the Frontier Commandant, who was thus enabled to act on the instant, as circumstances might require, without consulting any one. In a memorandum written for Lord Northbrook in 1876, Frere thus describes the difference in this respect between the two systems :—

"In Sind the Frontier Commandant commanded all troops on the frontier, whether local or belonging to the regular army. In his military capacity he was responsible to no one but the Commander-in-Chief and Government. He was also sole Political Agent, and superintendent of police, chief magistrate, judge, and engineer, fiscal officer, and canal officer of a strip of territory of various width from ten to fifty miles on the frontier of Cutchee. He had assistants to aid him in the several departments, but he had no superior except the Commissioner, who ruled the whole province, through whom he corresponded with Government.

"In the Punjab there has always been much greater division of power and responsibility. The civil and military officials are kept separate and independent, the nearest authority common to both being in some cases the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, but more often the Viceroy. The military authority again is divided. The troops of the regular army are under one Brigadier, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. The Punjab troops holding all outposts are under a separate Brigadier, only partially responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. The engineers for public works are in four divisions, the police in two, all independent of each other and of the Commissioners."

Upon other points of difference the memorandum states that :—

"In Sind it was a cardinal rule to attempt no disintegration of the Khan of Kelat's sovereignty, whether

nominal or real, over the Belooch tribes, but rather by every means in our power to uphold his authority. Chiefs, or complaints against chiefs, were referred to the Khan. Every effort was made to enable or induce the Khan to give redress when needed, and to keep his people in order. . . .

"The Punjab policy was 'divide et impera;' deal separately with each tribe and each section of a tribe; avoid, as far as possible, recognizing any authority of the Amir of Cabul over the frontier tribes—keep them as buffers between him and our frontiers. . . ."

In Sind the Commandant was charged to use his troops for the protection of life and property, not only in our own territory, but in that of our ally "within our reach." This phrase was defined in a military sense. He was to allow nothing to go unnoticed within reach of our outposts if the evil threatened to involve our people. Active interference beyond the frontier by using our troops was, however, only permitted in case of overt acts of outrage by armed men, such as no local police could cope with, cattle lifting by armed bands, and the like. Prisoners made in this case were handed over to the Khan for disposal.

In the Punjab the troops were on no account to cross the frontier without express instructions from Government; and we were to hold ourselves absolutely irresponsible for the good or bad conduct of the tribes over the frontier as long as they did not cross it.

In Sind, in following an enemy across the border the ordinary rules of civilized warfare were to be strictly observed: unresisting or unarmed men were to be protected; no plunder was permitted, or wanton destruction of houses, trees, crops, or other property. The actual culprits, not the culprits' clansmen, were punished.

In the Punjab, when an expedition across the border was sanctioned, the object was to strike terror. For some

years prisoners were rarely taken, and quarter rarely given to armed men. Houses, trees, crops, etc., were destroyed. The fault of the individual was visited on the tribe.

In January, 1855, Frere wrote to Sir John Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, begging him to reconsider his policy of permitting British subjects on the frontier, not in the service of Government, to bear arms without a license. After recapitulating the facts, he says :—

"I trust you will not think me intrusive in thus stating the results of the system in this province. . . . The system has been now enforced for some years under such a variety of circumstances and agencies, that there can, I think, be little doubt of its practical effect: it is observed along the whole frontier, from Mekran, round by Kelat, the Punjab, and Rajpootana, to Guzerat and Cutch; and unless Guzerat, where an opposite system has been in force, be much changed within the last few years, the good effect of the prohibition to carry arms is nowhere more marked than in contrast with one of the oldest provinces of our Presidency.

"I trust you will further excuse my pointing out that the Punjab officers on the frontier above Kusmore hardly appear to recognize the fact that the Boogtee country adjoining the British territory is part of the territory of the Khan of Kelat. Any separate treating with inferior chiefs must of course tend to weaken the authority of the sovereign; and I need not point out that this must in time weaken our hold on the country, and diminish our means of obtaining redress when we wish to obtain it through his Highness." *

This remonstrance seems to have produced some effect and to have brought about orders for a partial disarmament on the Punjab border. But neither Sir John Lawrence nor any other of the high functionaries in India seems to have recognized and appreciated the fact that Jacob's genius and persistence, supported and encouraged by Frere, had in their own province solved a problem which

* "Records of Scinde Irregular Horse," vol. ii. p. 244.

Englishmen, not only in India, but in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere, had hitherto failed to solve—the problem how to contrive that contact between the civilized race and the predatory or savage tribes should bring about not hatred, bloodshed, and extermination, but peace, civilization, and mutual benefit.

A saying is attributed to a late Roman Catholic divine, speaking at a time when Italy was making her first struggles for a share in the civilization of nineteenth century Europe, that it would be a better deed to save the soul of the meanest Neapolitan beggar than to cover Italy with railways from end to end. If anything could make it clear that the antithesis is a false and misleading one, a glance at the condition, physical and moral, of the people of Sind at this time would surely do so. Frere held as strongly as any man could that to "save souls," in any real sense, is the first and paramount duty, the highest and best ambition conceivable. No man was less likely to fall into the error of supposing that godliness, virtue, and happiness are coincident and co-extensive with civilization and physical comfort. But he knew and saw and realized, as we at home cannot realize, that a large proportion of the population of India, and an immense majority of the people of Sind at the time of his going there, had till recently been living in mere slavery, oppressed, robbed, and ill-treated by careless or brutal tyrants; that they were, not occasionally, but habitually, in want of sufficient food; that they were sunk in the grossest and vilest superstition; and that these and other kindred miseries made them, as starved, wronged, tortured men inevitably will be, murderers, infanticides, thieves, and liars. He knew that before their souls could rise from such sins as these, the heavy load must be lightened which crushed

their bodies, and made escape from sheer wretchedness the one absorbing object of their lives.

And if the British officer and the native trooper and the Civil Judge brought peace and security to the weak, and converted the murderer and robber into a harmless and industrious peasant; if the engineer and his workmen cleansed foul cities, and poured water over arid plains, turning a desert into a garden, bringing health to the fever-stricken and food to the hungry; if, where shifting sands had been washed to and fro by the shallow tide, great ships now sailed proudly in, bearing from across the "black water" the wealth, the civilization, the morality, for good or bad, of Western Europe, till half-savage men, by thousands, turned their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks;—if this was done, and if Frere's was the guiding mind and faithful spirit which prompted and directed and achieved it, then it is claimed for him and for his memory, and for the noble band of fellow-workers whom he loved so well, that in the work of "saving souls"—if, indeed, it be permitted to speak of this as in any sense a work for man to aid in—theirs was not a worse but the more excellent part.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MUTINY.

On sick leave to England—Returns to Sind—Is met by news of outbreak of Mutiny—His prompt action—Despatches troops to Punjab—Lieutenant G. B. Tyrwhitt—The camel-dawk—Native newspapers—The treaty with Dost Mahomed—Question of abandoning Peshawur—Outbreaks at Hyderabad, Kurrachee, and Shikarpur.

ABOUT a year and a half after his wife and family had gone home, Frere's health failed. He was obliged to take sick leave, and sailed for England early in 1856.

Jacob was left Acting-Commissioner in Sind, as Frere had requested, during his absence; but in April, 1857, he was given the command of the Cavalry in the Persian expedition, and Barrow Ellis took his place.

Frere remained in England nearly a year. Sind and its wants were constantly in his mind all the time. He was sending out designs and plans to Colonel Turner for bridges, taking measures for the improvement of the breed of sheep in Upper Sind, urging the India Directors to push on the works for the Sind Railway, speaking at the Sind Railway meeting, and so on. He was invited to a quarterly dinner of the India Directors—one of the last ever held—and treated as one who had earned distinction.

It was in this year that he took a lease of Wressil Lodge, which he afterwards bought, a house looking over

Wimbledon Common, which henceforth became his home in England for the rest of his life. After spending the summer chiefly in visiting friends and relations in different parts of the country, he settled there in the autumn with his family, taking to live with them his wife's two unmarried sisters.

Those six autumn and winter months still live in the memory of those of his children who were old enough to remember them, as a time of blissful companionship with him. There were the games in the snow, the first play (*Midsummer Night's Dream*), the toys brought from London, the books—generally not children's books, but such as would be valued in after-years—always well-bound. And there were the first lessons in drawing—a great point with him in his children's education—and the legends and fairy stories, which he expanded so as to extend them over many days in the telling; and there were the more serious talks. He never talked *down* to a child, yet was always on the happiest and easiest terms even with the youngest. Though always occupied, he was never in a hurry. The old nurse recalls his putting up some Raphael engravings, which he had given the children, with hammer and nails on the morning he was starting to return to India, as quietly as if he had nothing else to do or to think of.

In March, 1857, he set out on his return, leaving Mrs. Frere and his family in England, and reached Bombay early in May. Taking with him his brother-in-law, Mr. John Arthur, of the Bombay Civil Service, who was to act as his Revenue Assistant during the absence of Mr. Shaw Stewart, who was away on leave in England and did not rejoin him till some months afterwards, he left Bombay for Kurrachee, and landed there on May 18, after a dangerous and protracted passage, owing to the ill-manned, leaky, and unwholesomely dirty condition

of the vessel, the effects of which he felt for some time afterwards.

On his way from the landing-place to Government House he was met by a trooper with a note from Mr. Gibbs, his Judicial Assistant, enclosing a letter just received by Mr. Neville Warren, the Sind Railway Company's engineer, from Mr. Brunton, the Chief Engineer of the Punjab railway. It was dated Lahore, May 13, and ran as follows :—

"We are in a fearful state of anxiety here. At Delhi the whole of the Indian troops are in mutiny; they have killed every Christian in the place; at other places the troops show the same dissatisfaction and are turning out. Here there is expected a rumpus. At this moment all the troops are turned out for parade at Mean Meer, and it is intended to disarm the native troops. We have only seven hundred English and a few artillery.—Ten o'clock. All arms are out of the hands of the natives. They were taken by surprise, and left them, after having piled arms, at the order 'right about,' seeing at sixty yards the 81st Regiment loaded with ball, and ten guns pointing towards them loaded with grape. All men are to meet at Sir John Lawrence's office with all the arms they can muster. We are afraid what we may hear from Umritsur, where they have no English troops."

For five months past there had been indications of the coming storm in Bengal. There had been gross insubordination in several regiments, and disturbances about the greased cartridges. But mutinies of single regiments had occurred not infrequently before in India, without leading to serious results, and few men, especially in the Bengal presidency where they occurred, considered these manifestations of disaffection as having deeper roots than in mere local and passing grievances.

Frere saw matters in a different light. He knew something of the condition of the Bengal army. He had fore-

seen great danger from the policy of annexation and centralization which Lord Dalhousie had promoted. Ten years before, as we have seen, he had apprehended the possibility of grave consequences from the annexation of Sattara. He had doubted the justice and wisdom of the annexation of Sind. Still less did he approve of the high-handed proceedings in respect of Cashmere, of the Emperor of Delhi, of the Ranee of Jhansi, of the ex-Peishwa. Attaching great importance to dealing tenderly and in a conservative spirit with native customs and institutions, he saw grave danger in the hard uniformity and indifference to local feeling, of which the land-system of the North-West Provinces and the harsh treatment and degradation of the native landed aristocracy of the Punjab were instances; nor did he share the prevalent belief in the contented disposition of the natives as a result of such government.

What he thought on these matters may be gathered from the following extracts from some letters written in 1865 to Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Kaye, criticizing his "Sepoy War":—

"August 20, 1865.

"In your account of the Indian estimate of Lord Dalhousie, you have, I think, been led into the very natural mistake of accepting the estimate formed of him in the Bengal Presidency for the estimate of all India. You have correctly described him as he appeared to the great majority of leaders of opinion in the civil and military services of the vast Bengal Presidency, from Peshawur to Singapoor; but a very different opinion of him prevailed throughout the other half of India, including the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, where every justice was done to his vast ability as an administrator, but where there was a very extensive and profound distrust of him as a statesman. . . . His farewell Minute was admired, in what you will perhaps call these benighted regions, rather for its magnificent composition than for any other quality as a State Paper. There was a very widespread feeling that

all was not so smooth as it seemed outside in 1856, and the explosion of '57 did not affect men in Madras and Bombay with the same surprise which you have so graphically described in Bengal." *

And again :—

"July 22, 1865.

"When you say that there is no blame to be recorded against the Governor-General for the conduct of his final dispute with Napier, do you not take rather a limited and official view of their differences? No doubt, technically and officially the Governor-General was right and the Commander-in-Chief wrong—there could be no question as to which the Ministry at home was bound to support —but will not history blame the statesman who refused to be warned by such a soldier as Napier?—who, as far as we can judge, shut his eyes to the danger Napier had clearly pointed out, and was content to entrust the task from which Napier retired to such incompetent hands as ——, and who left the empire which he had governed for so many years with the sincere conviction, as testified in his

* Sir James Outram, then in command of the expedition to Persia, had written thence, on April 27, to Lord Elphinstone : "The mutinous spirit so extensively displayed in the Bengal army is a very serious matter, and is the consequence of the faulty system of its organization, so different from that of Bombay, where such insubordination is scarcely possible; for with us the intermediate tie between the European officers and the men—*i.e.* the native officers—is a loyal, efficient body, selected for their superior ability, and gratefully attached to their officers in consequence. Their superior ability naturally exercises a wholesome influence over the men, among whom no mutinous spirit could be engendered without their knowledge, and the exertion of their influence to counteract it, whereas the seniority system of the Bengal army supplies neither able nor influential native officers—old imbeciles merely, possessing no control over the men, and owing no gratitude to their officers, or to the Government, for a position which is merely the result of seniority in the service.

"I pointed this out to Lord Dalhousie once, who told me he had seriously considered the matter, and had consulted some of the highest officers of the Bengal army, who, one and all, deprecated any attempt to change the system, as a dangerous innovation. Whatever the danger, it should be incurred, the change being gradually introduced; for as at present constituted, the Bengal army never can be depended on." ("Life of Outram," by Sir F. Goldsmid, vol. vi. p. 5.)

famous parting Minute, that the dangers against which Napier, Jacob, and Henry Lawrence had been warning him had no existence? . . .

And again:—

"July 30.

"John Jacob went to the root of the matter in his published criticisms, and left the rulers of India no room to say that the truth had not been preached to them. . . . Lord Dalhousie's censure of John Jacob's published criticisms was a model in its way, quite sufficient to annihilate an ordinary man, but in proportion to its official effectiveness is the damage it must inflict on the reputation for statesmanship of him who could thus devote his skill to muzzle his watch-dogs."

As for the heads of the Bengal native army—

"Poor John Jacob," he wrote, two years after this time (August 7, 1859) and after Jacob's death, to Mr. G. T. Clark, "who knew them well, had long before pointed out the utter rottenness of their whole system, and the want of discipline, manliness, and truth, which characterized all our dealings with the Bengal native army. He had been vilified in every possible way for his pains, officially silenced by Lord Dalhousie and the Calcutta philosophers, so far as it is possible to gag such a man, and few, but those who knew him personally, thoroughly believed him. Still there were many of his intimate friends besides myself who saw he spoke only the truth, and were prepared for the worst."

"Is it not strange," Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone three weeks after the outbreak (June 7, 1857), "that a man like Sir John Lawrence should believe the new cartridges were the real *cause* of the outbreak, or anything more than the *occasion* for the outbreak of a feeling caused by a long period of mismanagement?" *

* It is a significant commentary on the belief that the greased cartridges were the prime and sole cause of the Mutiny that Captain Macauley, during his campaign in Rajpootana in command of a Belooch regiment in July, 1858, found some of the greased cartridges in the possession of, and being used by the rebels. He says: "In one of the houses which had been occupied by the rebels, I found,

Thus it was that the report of the outbreak, of which there had been no sort of anticipation when he left Bombay, found Frere more prepared to credit it and to realize its full import, than perhaps any other leading man at that time in India. And his frame of mind was such that when, within a few minutes of his landing, after a year's absence, he received Mr. Brunton's letter, he did not, as most men would have done in such circumstances—seeing that it did not come from Meerut or Delhi, and that the worst part of the intelligence it contained was second-hand—doubt its accuracy, or wait for confirmation of it, or account the disturbance as a local matter, nine hundred miles off, which did not concern him and his government in Sind;

amongst other things, three of the identical cartridges, the issue of which was made the plea for mutinying; others of these were also found by some of the 1st Bombay Light Cavalry (Lancers), who brought them to Lieutenant Stack, their troop officer; and on the line of march next afternoon this officer, showing them to me, asked me i I knew to what regiment they belonged. On telling him they were the greased cartridges, he gave them to the Soobedar of his troop, a Brahmin, who not only took and carefully examined them, but put one in his cap-pouch to show in the lines to the men of his troop."

Colonel Malleson, in his "History of the Indian Mutiny" (vol. iii. p. 470), thus sums up the question: "After an exhaustive argument, Sir J. Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the Mutiny was due to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cartridges only. The public applauded a result so beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension; . . . with them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the Mutiny of the Indian army. . . . Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chupatties had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts. . . .

"The real cause of the Mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words—bad faith. It was bad faith to our Sepoys, which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was our policy of annexation; of refusing to Hindu chiefs the permission to adopt—with them a necessary religious rite; of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sagar and Narbadd territory, and in Bandahhand; and our breaches of customs, more sacred to the natives than laws, which roused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule."

but as he read the letter, he comprehended at a glance the full gravity of the situation, and took action without an hour's delay—action for the rescue of India, as in extremity of peril, not merely for the protection of his own province.

Having sent on the letter by an express to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, he forwarded a copy of it, by the same steamer which had just brought him to Kurrachee, to Outram and Jacob on the shores of the Persian Gulf, where they had just brought the Persian expedition to a successful end, writing at the same time to urge upon them the need of bringing back the troops to India as fast as possible. Another copy he sent to Captain Raikes, the Acting Political Agent in Kutch, the nearest native state on the south-east border of Sind, who had charge of the postal lines of communication there, telling him to do everything necessary at whatever cost to keep them open, and that he (Frere) would be responsible.

To Jacob he wrote :—

"May 18, 1857.

"I was greeted on my arrival here to-day by the news contained in the enclosed.

"It is of very grave import—and as regards Lahore can hardly be much exaggerated. I send it for your own and Outram's perusal, as this fulfilment of what you have so often and so long ago predicted would one day occur, may materially affect his plans as to sending back Europeans to India. All here well. I am thoroughly knocked up by nearly five days of the filthiest and worst-manned steamer ever provided for me. Take care to have her well cleaned ere you send any sick by her, else they will be stifled in their beds by the smell."

To Outram he wrote the next day—official intelligence of the outbreak having in the mean time reached him :—

"May 19, 1857.

"The enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Macleod, the Financial Commissioner in the Punjab, will show you that the report of the state of affairs there, as given in Mr. Brunton's letter, of which I sent Jacob a copy yesterday, was by no means exaggerated. I daily expect a call [for help] from Sind. You know how limited our means are at present, and you will see from the enclosed that every man who can be spared from the Persian Gulf will find enough to do in the North-West before the year is out. If you have an opportunity of sending me a letter direct, will you let me know if there is any chance of your sending any, and what men, back to Kurrachee. Of the river steamers, which are the article in which we are just now most deficient, there is little chance of your being able to spare any till the monsoon is over, but you will be able to judge of this better than we can. I have no time for congratulations on your many successes, nor to say how much I wish you were out of the heat and malaria in Persia and among us again in India, where, verily, we can just now ill spare men like you and your General of Cavalry. God keep you both."

Outram received Frere's first letter and enclosure at Bagdad, and forwarded it at once to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, with a request that he would move the Porte to allow regiments from Malta to pass through Egypt. He hoped that his letter would reach Constantinople before the regular overland mail, and that in any case no time would be lost in sending out reinforcements overland, if possible.* Lord

* Frere to Sir J. Lawrence, June 29, 1857. Mrs. Frere, moved by his letters to do so and in deepest anxiety, kept urging Sir George Clerk, then at the Board of Control, to press the sending of troops overland. At last, but not till September, she got a note from him to say, "Your persistency has conquered: a detachment of troops is to go overland. They are to start in plain clothes, and have their muskets packed in boxes." About two hundred men of the 57th Regiment were sent from Malta through Egypt; the plain clothes were to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of the French. Frere attached great importance to troops being sent overland, however few

Stratford de Redcliffe did obtain the Porte's permission, which, had it been acted upon at once, would have enabled reinforcements to reach India in August, at latest.

Perceiving the peril in which the Punjab was placed, and that the position of the mutineers at Delhi and the stress of danger elsewhere would probably prevent any reinforcements being sent thither from Bengal and Calcutta, he, within a couple of hours of landing, sought an interview with the General commanding the troops in Sind, and urged him at once to send some European soldiers up the Indus to Mooltan, to reinforce Sir John Lawrence and to secure the safety of that station, so important as being the key of the communication of the Punjab with Sind; for he foresaw that not only would no European troops be able to be spared from Bengal, but also that the Indus valley would become the only channel of communication between the Punjab and the rest of India by which assistance could be sent, and without which it would be absolutely isolated. His conjecture was soon confirmed. On June 3rd Lord Canning telegraphed to Sir John Lawrence, in answer to his application for reinforcements: "I can give you no assistance with Europeans in the Punjab. You are better off for Europeans than any other part of India, and you must do your best with what you have got."

Owing to the drain for the Persian war the number of troops in Sind, frontier-province as it was, was already much smaller than usual. Sir Charles Napier used to require a force of fourteen thousand there, about one-third of them Europeans. There were now in the province four

in number; not only because every man was urgently needed, but because of the effect on the native mind of the evidence that troops *could* be so sent, and at such short notice. Had more troops been sent that way, and sooner, it would, he thought, have made a great difference.

Bombay native infantry regiments, a Belooch battalion, and two batteries of Native Artillery, one at Shikarpore, the other at Hyderabad, and on the frontier at Jacobabad one regiment (eight hundred sabres) of Sind Horse, and the 6th Irregular Bengal Cavalry (five hundred and fifty sabres). Of European soldiers there were in all Sind only the 1st European Fusiliers and the depot of the 2nd Europeans (about three hundred strong).

It was a grave matter at such a time to diminish a force already too weak, and the General commanding in Sind at first was inclined to hesitate. But Frere, taking all responsibility upon himself, prevailed on him to comply with his request, and arrange to send off at once to Mooltan the Belooch battalion and a wing of the 1st European Fusiliers. In so doing he anticipated a request from Lord Elphinstone, which arrived a few days later, that he would do this. The Beloochees, who were already on their way to Hyderabad, at once marched on to Roree, to be transported the rest of the way by steamer up the Indus. On the 25th two steamers came down the river to Kurrachee, on which the detachment of five hundred and fifty men of the 1st Europeans were to be embarked. It had been intended to send six hundred and fifty men, but this would have entailed overcrowding on board, which in the fierce summer heat of Upper Sind, through which they would pass, would have probably caused sickness and loss of life.

It was a grievous disappointment and annoyance to Frere, on his return to Sind, to find that the Indus flotilla, on the importance and efficient maintenance of which he had so repeatedly and emphatically insisted, was now, in the hour of trial, not immediately or fully available. The materials of four fine large steamers and four river-flats had been sent out from England to Sind in the previous

November or December, and everything ought to have been ready to put them together there. The builder, Mr. Laird, had protested against their being put together anywhere but on or near the river where they were to be used, because, when built at Bombay, the steamers had always been strained and injured, and on two occasions were lost on their way up; and the Court of Directors, accordingly, had ordered that thenceforth they should be put together in Sind. Nevertheless the Bombay dockyard authorities insisted on their being taken to Bombay instead of straight to Kurrachee; and up to April nothing was done. Jacob (Frere writes, September 2, 1857) "thought the whole flotilla contrary to the laws of nature, and was for abolishing it root and branch, so he took no interest in the matter, which is one of the few points in which I do not agree with him." When Barrow Ellis succeeded Jacob as Acting Commissioner, he found the steamers, which had been at last sent on with no workmen to put them together, in sections, rusting on the beach, and at once set to work with such men as he had, and asked for a six months' sanction for the employment of the additional artificers that were required. Thus when Frere arrived on May 18 the new vessels were hardly begun to be put together, and the only really serviceable old vessels were with the Persian expedition on the Euphrates.

On May 28 he writes to Lord Elphinstone from Kurrachee—

"I went to see the first detachment of the Fusiliers on board the *Nimrod* and *Jhelum* this morning. They were to start at 11 a.m., and the *Satellite*, with a hundred and thirty more, will, I hope, be off to-morrow, making but three hundred and thirty in all, I am sorry to say, instead of five hundred and fifty, as I anticipated; but almost at the last moment the General changed his mind about the flats, wished to leave them behind, and said

that if they went it would be five days before the detachment could start. Captain Daniell * agreed with me that it would have been better to have sent the flats, but as it was quite clear that if I urged the point there would be several days' delay, and I thought that three hundred and thirty men at once were better than five hundred and fifty a week or ten days later, I let him arrange in his own way. He had applied for the services of Captain Dansey, who was employed in the Civil Department, and I acceded the more willingly, because Captain Dansey has the reputation of being a very zealous and energetic officer, and I thought that the command of the first detachment might require some judgment and decision, should anything unusual occur at Mooltan or on the way up, and I suggested to him to leave the arrangements as much as possible to Captain Dansey. He thought 'it would be entirely a military operation.' I willingly consented, anxious only to get the men off; and he then got alarmed at the responsibility—said it was 'a very delicate operation, partly military and partly political,' and sent Captain Dansey over to me for 'instructions,' to return to him for 'final instructions.' I said I could give none but to get up to Bukkur as fast as he could, and there look out for orders from Sir John Lawrence or his nearest representative, and to take care of himself and steamers.

"As I make a point of troubling the General as little as possible with official letters, the correspondence which is forwarded to-day to Government will give but a very faint idea of the trouble of getting off these two hundred men, and but for his changes of plans they might have been off on Tuesday morning at latest.

"I suggested to him to ask for Field Establishment and Field Batta for the Beloochees, and for riding-camels, to help them on with as little fatigue as possible. This he has done, and I have sanctioned the Establishment and camels as necessary to speedy and easy marching in anticipation of your lordship's approval.

"The Fusiliers seemed very comfortable and in the highest spirits.

"The Beloochees were to leave Hyderabad to-day; Colonel Farquhar says they are highly flattered at being employed."

* Of the Indus Flotilla.

On June 5, he writes—

"The Europeans continue to go off very slowly. On every occasion several days elapse after the steamers are reported ready, before the men are on board."

And on June 14—

"The two first steamers with two hundred men under Captain Dansey passed the Bukkur Rapids in safety on the 10th. This was a great load off my mind, for, owing to the mistake of the Flotilla officer at Mooltan in sending down the steamer which Captain Daniell meant to keep above the Pass and the delays in embarking here, it was quite possible they might have found the Rapids at Bukkur impassable; but the river fortunately fell suddenly for two or three days, and by great exertion the steamers were warped through. I hope they will be at Mooltan by the 17th. The Beloochees will be at Sukkur by the 21st, and I have asked the General to give Colonel Farquhar discretionary power to halt there or push on according to the state of affairs on the Frontier and at Shikarpoor. I purpose to continue the upward movement of the Fusiliers as fast as we can. The *Conqueror* is in such bad order that I ordered Captain Daniell to let her land forty men whom the *Satellite* could not take at Hyderabad, and then return here, when, after repairs, she will be able to run between this and Hyderabad, and save some time in the upward transport of the rest of the regiment when we are able to get the other steamers. We could get the *Indus*, capable of carrying a whole regiment, ready in a few weeks, if Sir H. Leeke would only send us up a few riveters. By the two last steamers he sent up a score of engineer apprentices, a class of men of which but two or three were required and who knew nothing of riveting, and only one or two riveters—the sort of workmen he knows we want most urgently. I am told any number might be got if he promoted good second-class men to first-class and so on. His conduct at a moment like this really seems to me unpardonable. Captain Daniell is doing the greater part of the work with men taught up here, but it takes a long while to teach a man."

Again, on the following day, he writes—

"Sir H. Leeke writes to order Captain Daniell down to give evidence before the Supreme Court, but this would be nearly tantamount to stopping all that is doing in the Flotilla, and I have therefore been obliged to interpose and direct him to remain at his post. Sir Henry also ordered him to send down the *Victoria* directly the *Lady Canning* arrived; but the latter arrived in such a state that it will be many days ere it will be safe to let her tow in vessels; and with so many transports expected, it would be most dangerous to part with the *Victoria*, and I have therefore been compelled to order her to remain. I trust your Lordship will approve of all this. It would save infinite trouble if Sir H. would send orders through the Commissioner. At a time like this he can never tell what is happening so many hundred miles off."

Again, June 26—

"I have written officially strongly recommending a piece of decentralization (or I suppose one ought to say centrifugalization), without which I am confident the Indus Flotilla must remain in its present wretchedly inefficient state. Your Lordship must think me afflicted with a monomania on the subject, but I assure you the cases regarding which I trouble you form but a very small portion of what I hear, but am unable to bring forward. I am quite hopeless of ever seeing matters mend unless the Flotilla be put under the direct control of the Government, and the Commander-in-Chief (of Indian Navy) allowed to interfere no more than he does with a steamer for the China Station.

"I would not wish for better officers than Captains Ethersey and Daniell, but I have seen matters get gradually worse ever since Admiral Lushington left, and I can only attribute it to that constant interference which, I can assure your Lordship, I have never seen exercised *in any single instance* save to the detriment of the public service. I could not have remained silent so long but that I was deterred by a feeling that, notwithstanding the warm interest your Lordship and Lord Falkland took in the matter and the support you always gave me, any plan for improving our river Flotilla or Marine met with an amount

of cold water at Bombay, quite sufficient to drown a landsman like myself.

"But I could stand it no longer when I saw what our countrymen did and are doing up country,—heard their applications for help, and remembered that with a disposable force and excellent troops eager for employment, and a navigable river, and all the elements of a powerful steam Flotilla, we are sending tributes of two hundred men at a time in steamers which ought not to be allowed to run, to help men who are marching twenty-five miles a day, for weeks together, in a Punjab May and June."

Frere, at this critical time, in his correspondence with Lord Elphinstone, speaks with plainness and sometimes even with severity of some of the officials with whom he had to work. It was no time for standing on ceremony. Ever since he first came to Sind, he had had frequently to contend with the obstructiveness or supineness of some of the Bombay departments; and though he eventually succeeded in getting most of his plans for the development of the country sanctioned, yet it was at the cost of long delay in carrying them out, the evil consequences of which were now becoming sufficiently apparent. In the hour of extreme peril, official obstructiveness and a pedantic adherence to hard and fast regulations, persisted in in the face of unprecedented circumstances and new dangers occurring from day to day, could hardly fail to be fatal to the very existence of the Empire.

Fortunately his chief, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, though of quiet, retiring disposition, was a man of great sagacity, ability, and strength of will, whose high merit, not fully recognized by the Press or the Public in England, was well known to the Home Government, by whom he had been nominated as Lord Canning's successor in case of any accident befalling him. Lord Elphinstone fully appreciated Frere's powers and merits and the value

of having him as "the guardian of his left flank," and again and again interposed authoritatively in his favour in his contests with various departments. Throughout this period Frere was in almost daily correspondence with him on all that was passing around them, and was encouraged by the assurance that he would receive from him unfailing sympathy and support.

Ever since he had been Commissioner in Sind, he had been enforcing the paramount geographical importance of Kurrachee as the natural harbour, and of Sind and the Indus valley as the natural channel of communication between North Western India and England. And now that Bengal was in revolt, cutting off all direct communication between the North-West Provinces and Calcutta, Kurrachee had inevitably become the mouth, and the Indus valley the throat, through which alone the Punjab could be reinforced with troops and fed with supplies, or could even speak with Calcutta or England. Clearly therefore Lower Sind was the true base of operations, and should have had a vigorous general officer, with ample powers to act on his own responsibility, or with sufficient force of character to act independently of orders as the changing necessities of the hour demanded. It was folly to suppose that there could be prompt and vigorous action if orders—often, when they came, conflicting orders—were to be awaited from Bombay, five hundred miles distant, and from which the post sometimes did not arrive for five days together.

Frere, in a letter to Mr. G. T. Clark, written two years afterwards, describes the General commanding in Sind as—

"August 7, 1859.

"A fine specimen of a gentlemanly and well-educated Light Cavalry officer, a perfect picture on horseback, and excellent at the head of his regiment, but not more fond

of innovation than the Senior U.S. Club generally are, and not so young as he was twenty-three years before, when I found him at Poona, Colonel of the 4th Dragoons. However, a braver old gentleman never drew a sabre, and nothing could be better than the spirit with which he agreed to all the suggestions for diminishing his already weak force when the want of men elsewhere was urgent."

But the General had not the ability or elasticity to enable him to cope with an emergency which transcended all experience. When he should have been directing and acting, he was waiting for instructions or seeking advice; and Frere found himself, against his own inclinations, suggesting, advising, remonstrating, and practically directing the disposition and movement of troops, and concerting measures of detail for the safety of Sind and the succour of threatened places outside it, as though he were himself the Commander of the troops. Needless to say, this was done with the utmost tact, delicacy, and consideration, and the two men were from first to last on cordial and intimate terms. But the fact remained that it was to Frere that all turned for instructions and protection, as the one strong and prescient man in the province who knew his own mind, was prepared for all emergencies, and held the threads of Government, military as well as civil, in his own hands.

Whether it was owing to his finding himself in this position, or only to the natural bent of his mind to soldiering and strategy, he found time so early as June 6, and long before the Mutiny had developed to its full extent, to write a long and elaborate minute on the military position of India with reference to the Mutiny. Treating the Bengal army as practically gone, he assumed that a regular campaign would be necessary for the reconquest of Bengal and the North-West, and indicated the bases of operations where troops should be concentrated and the lines by

which they should advance. He urged that in the quiet parts of India, instead of waiting inactive, listening to, and perhaps being demoralized by the news of disasters in Bengal, the troops should be organized with a view to commencing the campaign as soon as the summer heats were over. Urging the impossibility of ultimately relying on English soldiers alone for holding the country, he recommended the raising of additional companies to increase some of the native regiments ; and he pointed out in detail the essential difference between the regulations of the Bengal, and those of the Bombay army, which had contributed to produce such different results. It was a remarkable document, which said in plain language that which required to be said, and what no soldier in authority could be found to say.

It will be remembered that at the outbreak of the Mutiny in May there was no European artillery in the province. At Kurrachee there were a few guns, but not a single gunner or waggon. On the return of the Artillery from Persia Frere had sent it all away to other parts of India, except one troop of Horse Artillery, which remained at Kurrachee. He now suggested taking about ninety volunteers from the depot of the 2nd European Regiment to be trained as artillerymen to form a battery. This plan was taken in hand and carried out by Colonel Hutt with spirit, and in a short time an efficient battery was in course of being formed. On August 15, Frere had to represent that the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay had peremptorily ordered these artillery volunteers out of the province without so much as informing him of the order, and leaving the General no discretion His remonstrance produced the desired effect, and a strong letter was written by the Bombay Government to the Adjutant-General insisting that the Commissioner should

be allowed a discretionary power to suspend orders for the withdrawal of troops from Sind.

Another matter of vital importance that occupied his attention as soon as he heard of the interruption of direct communication between the Punjab and Calcutta, was the opening of a line of communication, shorter than the way by Kurrachee and Bombay, the only one now remaining open. He found that it would be best to re-open the route *viâ* Oomercote, Joudpur, and Nusserabad to Agra, which, before the annexation of the Punjab, was the usual line of postal communication between Sind and Calcutta, but which had been discontinued for the last five or six years. He also determined to endeavour to connect this route at Joudpur with a branch to Bhawalpur and Mooltan, so as to obviate the necessity of Punjab letters passing through Sind, and to give them a shorter line of communication with Agra and Calcutta. It was no easy matter; there was the desert to cross and it was the hot season of the year; but there was an officer holding a command in that part of Sind whence the dawk would have to start to cross the desert, who, he knew, would do it if any one could.*

Lieutenant George Booth Tyrwhitt, of the 5th Bombay Light Infantry, was one of those men whose redundant animal spirits and superabundant energy are apt in quiet times and in civilized society to bring them into trouble oftener than to lead them to success, and are only appreciated in times of danger and distress. As a boy he had run away to sea and served as a common sailor, and when afterwards he obtained a commission in the Bombay army, and subsequently was given the appointment of Deputy Collector of Mirpur and Oomercote on the eastern district of Sind next the Great Desert, he still retained his sailor-like appearance and frank boyish manner, wearing

* Frere to Lord Elphinstone, June 19, 1857.

rings in his ears, and ever ready for an adventure or a practical joke.* A favourite, and always on cordial and intimate terms with the natives in his district, he knew exactly where and from whom to purchase camels and all that he needed, with the least possible delay. On June 19, a month after his arrival at Kurrachee, Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone that in spite of the great heat and every other obstacle opposed to Europeans travelling at that season of the year, Tyrwhitt, assisted by two inspectors, had by great local influence been enabled to carry the line through to Balmeer, "and the line is complete, I hope, ere this, to Joudpur." On receipt of the news that the Mutiny had broken out at Nusseerabad, and that Ajmere was threatened, instructions were given by Frere to connect the line with Deesa, as an additional security. Letters went from Balmeer to Hyderabad at the rate of eight miles an hour, which for desert travelling was very good.

This line remained open throughout the Mutiny year, and to estimate its value and the time saved in the transmission of intelligence between the Punjab and the seat of Government at Calcutta, it is only necessary to remember that but for its existence, a despatch from Mooltan or Peshawur to Calcutta would have had to go the whole way round by Lower Sind and Bombay.

This was only one among many of Tyrwhitt's achievements. Later on, at the cost of great labour and personal risk, he succeeded in bringing away a number of ladies and sick officers from Joudpur to Sind, across the great desert, in the hottest season of the year, and through a

* On one occasion he telegraphed from Hyderabad to several of his friends at Kurrachee, about a hundred miles distant, "Poor Tyrwhitt dead; come at once." Some of them went and found him prepared, not to be buried, but to entertain them at dinner. He had merely worded the invitation in the way best calculated to secure their attendance.

very disturbed part of Rajputana, when all other routes were closed by the insurgents.

The Indus flotilla, as has been shown, was in May hardly sufficient for the task of carrying even a few soldiers up the river from Kurrachee to Mooltan. In June and July troops were arriving from the Persian Gulf, and more were expected. Every available steamer would be wanted for conveying them; the ordnance and other stores could not be taken in addition, and already they were beginning to accumulate at Kurrachee, which threatened to become a second Balaklava. Of English rifle-bullets alone there were forty-five tons awaiting transmission, and about thirty-five tons of other stores; while in the Punjab, hospital supplies and clothing were greatly needed, and such was the scarcity of ammunition there that the conduct and success of the siege of Delhi was being seriously endangered by it.

The only other available means of transport was by camels—a very tedious process, occupying from five to six weeks, according to circumstances. It occurred to Frere that the time required for the journey might be reduced to less than a fortnight by the establishment of a camel-dawk, so that it might be performed continuously by relays of camels, without stoppages. The organization and management of the camel-train was entrusted to Colonel Hutt, a most energetic officer, whose intimate knowledge of the Belooch and Brahoe tribes enabled him to collect some of the chiefs together, and conclude a contract with one of them, Morad Khan, a respectable Pathan of Kurrachee, for the supply of camels. They began with about five hundred, and a dawk was laid at intervals of twenty-five or thirty miles, with about twenty camels at each stage, which were soon increased to sixty. Each camel was to carry a load of three hundred and twenty pounds,

making at first a despatch of about three tons of stores at intervals of three days. The camels would return at leisure, grazing as they went, so as to be ready to start fresh on getting back to their stations. The time occupied in the journey of five hundred miles seldom exceeded ten days. The camels were also available for use in carrying soldiers in detachments of forty at a time, though they were only once so used, viz. in conveying the 7th Dragoon Guards to Hyderabad. The train was so successful and so much needed that in a few months the number of camels at work was increased to nearly ten thousand, by which large supplies were sent up to assist the siege of Delhi.

So honestly and well did the camel owners and drivers do their work, that though there was only their word for the performance of their contract, not the value of a bale-lashing was ever lost. "On one occasion a barrel of ammunition," writes Sir George Hutt, "was missing, and for a long time could not be traced; at last, as the river fell, it was found in the mud. A Brahoe immediately started on a camel, and never stopped till he brought it to me at Kurrachee. He rushed into my tent at a very early hour: 'There is your barrel!' he exclaimed, and he almost threw it on my bed."

On July 26 Frere received a letter from Lord Elphinstone, desiring him to send to Bombay for service in the Deccan a wing of the 2nd European Regiment, if it could possibly be spared. This would leave, besides ninety recruits and the same number transferred to the artillery, only a hundred and thirty-nine effective European bayonets for the whole of Sind!

He did not hesitate. He wrote to Sir J. Lawrence the same day, and remarking that "when troops were needed in the citadel the outworks must get on as best they can with reduced numbers," he says:—

"I had rather have sent it (the wing of the 2nd Europeans) to *you* for many reasons, of which I will only mention the selfish one that they would have passed through the province, and before they were all out we might have hoped for the news, at least, of overland reinforcements. However, I cannot say they cannot be spared, though a weak wing of a sickly regiment is a small force of Europeans for this whole province; but we are quiet, and I hope may continue so; and when every part of the Empire is so pressed, we must take our share of the risks, and if any danger arises, meet it as best we may." *

Of the tranquillity and absence of disaffection amongst the country population of Sind he felt assured. Better governed and more prosperous beyond all comparison than they had ever been before, they had no violated traditions, no unwelcome administrative innovations to complain of, and had every reason to be contented. As to the population of the towns, it was difficult to tell what their disposition was.

"July 22, 1857.

"Of course, in the most contented Mohamedan population," he writes to Lord Elphinstone, "a fanatical outbreak is never impossible, but I see no reason to apprehend one here. . . . Moreover, the Mohamedans here, both Beloochees and Sindees, are a manly race, far superior to the town population in the Deccan and Guzerat. . . . Information was given me that Sher Mohamed, the ex-Ameer of Meerpoor (Sir C. Napier's 'Lion'), and another old chief had been sounded as to what they would do if the Mutiny extended to Bombay. They replied that no Belooch had any objection to a good stand-up fight, but the deeds of the

* The wing of the second Europeans landed near Goa, two companies strong, about a hundred men, twice as many as Lord Elphinstone had ventured to hope could be spared him. They marched up over the Ghat to Poona, and reinforcing General Le Grand Jacob's force at Kolapore, enabled him to check and finally to suppress the insurrection there. In a letter of a disaffected native, subsequently intercepted, the writer stated that he had stationed himself so as to count all the soldiers as they passed, and that he had counted *two thousand!*

mutineers were worse than those of traitors. To murder women and children was the act of the sinners of Sodom and Gomorrah."

The Police, the best legacy Frere had received from Napier, were thoroughly efficient and trustworthy, and were well able to cope with any criminal outbreak that might occur. At his suggestion two regiments, called Beloochees, though in fact the men were nearly all Sindees, were being raised and trained to act as an auxiliary and semi-military force of Police. Applications to be enrolled in it were numerous, and the service seemed likely to be popular.*

The Bombay native regiments, Frere felt confident, were at the outbreak of the Mutiny faithful and reliable, and as yet untainted with disaffection. A few days after his return a petition had been presented to him, signed by a clergyman and nineteen others, stating that they had been given to understand that the native troops there were ripe for revolt, and asking that they might have arms served out to them for defence. He replied, assuring them that the troops were loyal and that there was no present danger —he himself having no guard to his house except the usual Sepoy sentry;—and the petitioners were satisfied with his assurances. He "abstained from calling for volunteers or appointing places of rendezvous or refuge, from a conviction that, situated as we are at this station, such measures only embarrass the military and promote panic without affording much real security."

He writes to Lord Elphinstone:—

"September 26, 1857.

"The station stretches in an irregular area of four or five miles, along the whole extent of which the dwellings

* Mr. Frere to Lord Elphinstone, August 22, 1857.

of European inhabitants are scattered, seldom at any great distance from the bazaars.

"Very early in the present crisis I found that many of the places, such as the jail, the police lines, etc., which I should have considered most secure, were regarded with indefinite terror by the alarmists. It was out of the question to provide European guards to separate places of refuge for persons at a distance from the small force of Europeans in the barracks, and no single spot would answer the requirements of all parts of the station. No one could say from what quarter they apprehended disturbance, and it seemed to me that the general safety, in case of any disturbance, required that the small European force should give as few detachments and guards as possible, and should be kept compact and free to move rapidly in any direction, and prepared to sweep the wide straight roads of the camp, where unarmed persons rushing to distant places of refuge would only impede the action of troops, and perhaps meet their own destruction.

"So as regards volunteer guards, almost every man here has business to attend to during the day, and a family to take care of at night. To arm, drill, and employ such men in guarding the camp would, as a general rule, only take them from their regular work, promote panic, and hamper the military with ill-disciplined allies, who, in the event of their services being really required at any particular point, would find themselves drawn by even stronger calls to stay at home and defend a helpless household.

"In reply, therefore, to numerous applications on this subject, I have generally advised applicants to keep in their own houses, and calm, by reason, religion, and example, the fears of their own families, to provide such arms as they could use, and in case of disturbance to defend their houses till the aid which could not be long in coming should arrive."

"Here all is very quiet," he writes on August 29, "though there is a vague alarm about the Mohurrum; and it is dangerous to go near the houses of Parsees and English clerks, I hear, after dark, for the inmates are armed to the teeth, and apt to explode like a box of rockets. The Bohras have made arrangements to flee to the houses of European sergeants in camp in case of alarm. It does not look like intended rebellion on their part.

The common people about the bazaar, if anything, more than usually civil and good-humoured."

Amongst the alarmists were some of the English newspaper editors. The false statements that got into the newspapers did so much harm that Frere expostulated with them, and warned them of the mischief they were doing. They had frightened not only the public, but each other, and at last came and asked Frere what could be done for safety. He replied in his usual way that he did not share their fears, but if they felt insecure, he had a bungalow at Kimaree, where he thought they would be perfectly safe, which he would be glad to put at their disposal.

On the question of the Native press, which at this time of extreme peril and excitement was a very difficult one, Frere writes as follows to Lord Elphinstone, June 10:—

"I have the honour to enclose a memorandum with which Mr. Gibbs, Assistant Commissioner, has favoured me, of a conversation with Shet Naomul, a native merchant of Kurrachee, for many years favourably known to Government on account of his great intelligence, his extensive influence and connections throughout the countries of our western frontier, and his tried attachment to the British Government.

"His opinions on the subject of the Native press seem to me deserving of attention, backed as they are by extracts from an Hindustani paper published at Madras, which show how mischievous the articles in native newspapers often are, and how widely they circulate.

"The extracts and translations by Major Goldsmid* will enable your lordship in Council to form a judgment on this point.

"No. 1 seems clearly meant to produce an impression that the Government had attempted to defile their Sepoys by flour mixed with hogs' bones, though the insinuation is very cautiously worded.

* Frere had all Sind native newspapers read, and the principal articles translated by Major Goldsmid.

"No. 2 is a very mischievous perversion of an Indian debate in Parliament, which in quieter times might be amusing.

"No. 3 is perhaps the most important, as it is evidence of the effort which has for some time past been made to place the Shah of Persia in the position, as regards Mahomedans in general, formerly held by the Sultan of Turkey. Your lordship is aware that some of the most influential learned Mahomedans in India are Sheeahs, and that the liberal measures lately adopted by the Sultan, and his manifest reliance on the aid of Christian Powers, have been triumphantly appealed to by the Sheeahs as proofs of the Sultan's heterodoxy. . . .

"It is the ignorance of the authors and readers of such articles which really gives them their dangerous character, as well as forms the difficulty in dealing with them, for it is not easy to prevent or punish the publication, in a native newspaper, of what may be a verbatim translation of a very harmless criticism in an English publication.

"A poem in a Persian paper was lately brought to my notice as of very mischievous tendency, and as it described the signs preceding the Day of Judgment in language strikingly applicable to the present time and place, it was doubtless calculated to unsettle and excite men's minds, and prepare them for some sudden disturbance, but it read so like a free translation of a sermon by a popular English preacher on the same subject, as to render it rather puzzling to know what to do with it.

"I believe the best plan would be to have all periodical productions of the Native press regularly read by trustworthy persons, with instructions to bring to notice any objectionable passages, whereupon any measures which might appear necessary might be taken regarding them. At any time like the present, when productions like those enclosed would be calculated to do real harm, the ordinary courts would punish anything treasonable with exemplary severity, and public opinion would fully bear them out in so doing.

"I have taken measures which will, I hope, prevent the publication of any mischievous articles in this province."

On the same subject he writes to Sir John Lawrence a month later (July 9):—

"I fear the Press Law will hamper the Governor-General as much as ——'s appointment, and that he will, ere long, have reason to regret that he consented to either. A Calcutta jury would have hanged a Persian editor on very slight evidence of seditious purpose, and till the old law had been enforced and found insufficient, it seems a mistake to enact new ones calculated, as this Press Act is, to rouse a nest of hornets just at the time it was most necessary that the acts of Government should have every support from the public here and at home. Private letters and gossiping idlers spread more false and mischievous reports than the newspapers, as far as my observation goes. Your system of telling the exact truth through the Press, on all that it concerns the public to know, seems to me the true plan of preventing needless alarm. As the Act is now law, I mention my opinion in confidence to you."

On July 16 Frere addressed the following circular letter to the district officers, enclosing a proclamation which they were empowered to publish or withhold, at their discretion, according to the circumstances:—

"It has been suggested to me on various occasions to issue some proclamation or public notice relative to the mutinies in the Bengal army. I have hitherto abstained from complying with such suggestions, from a conviction that notifications often do more harm than good, by unsettling people's minds and creating a panic.

"As, however, it appears certain that emissaries have been despatched in this direction with a view to disturb the public peace, and that alarming rumours have been put in circulation in various parts of the province, I have drawn up a proclamation, of which an English translation is enclosed.

"Where the people know little and care less for what has occurred, any public notification on the subject would be not only superfluous but mischievous, by creating alarm. But where exaggerated reports have been current, or where emissaries are likely to appear, the proclamation may do good, by showing the people that Government is aware of the danger and prepared to meet it.

"Much more can be done by district officers in their personal intercourse with the natives than by any pro-

clamation. A plain statement of the real facts of the case will generally prove less alarming than the native reports in circulation ; and almost every one you converse with will be able to call to mind instances within his knowledge, when the danger which threatened our rule was much greater, and was nevertheless met by the British Government with signal success.

"Probably few natives really doubt the sincere intention of the British Government to rule them for their own good and to secure them perfect toleration and the fruits of their own labour. It may not, however, be amiss occasionally to remind Jagheerdars that they hold their estates on service tenure, and that no service is more imperative than that of assisting Government to check disaffection and apprehend traitors."

In reading these cheerful and confident letters in deprecation of undue alarm, one needs to be reminded that they were written in the four terrible summer months when the Mutiny was spreading almost unchecked ; when some, even of the most stout-hearted, doubted if the English power would prove strong enough to crush it ; when calamities more and greater than often occur in a generation were crowded into a few months ; when defeat might involve the slaughter, not of armed men only, but of women and children ; and when the danger was not in front or at a distance, but all around, and rumbling as it were beneath the very ground men stood on. As the intermittent weekly or daily express brought its story of bloodshed and horror, its tale of slain comrades and relations, the wonder is, not that there was here and there mistaken and exaggerated alarm or shaken confidence, but that men's nerves and physical and mental powers stood the strain so well.

Frere by his own demeanour was setting an example well calculated to inspire confidence and dispel panic. He carried on as nearly as he could the ordinary routine of daily life, but he had not even time, such was the pressure,