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TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994

BY

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To Riaan and Christo for patience and support,

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To my Father for perseverance and tenacity.

Those who burn the candle late by night are those who walk the peak of life

My mother, 27 December 1938 – 13 November 1983

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CONTENTS

page

INTRODUCTION 1

1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 2
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 3
3. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 4
4. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 4
5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 5

CHAPTER 1

A POST-COLD WAR UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY 7

1. The Concept of National Security 8
1.1 Objectives of National Security 8
1.2 Cold War and Post-Cold War Interpretations of the Concept of National Security 10
1.3 Threats to National Security 12
1.4 National Security of Third World Countries 16
2. Current Views on Terrorism as a Threat to Global and National Security 19
2.1 Views of the United States of America on Terrorism 19
2.2 Global Views on Terrorism 21
3. Conclusion 25
References

CHAPTER 2

TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 30

1. Defining Terrorism 30
2. A Typology of Terrorism 34

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3. The Motives of Terrorism 36
3.1 Religious Terrorism 36
3.2 Ethnic-Nationalist Terrorism 38
3.3 Psychotic Terrorism 38
3.4 Single-Issue Terrorism 39
4. Current Trends in Terrorism 39
4.1 The Indiscriminate Nature of the New Terrorism 40
4.2 The Trend of Super-Terrorism 40
4.3 Fanatical Terrorism 42
4.4 Anonymous Terrorism 42
4.5 The Loose Structure of Terrorism 43
4.6 The Internationalisation of Terrorism 43
5. Causes of Terrorism 44
6. Conclusion 46
References

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT MANIFESTATION OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 51
1. Historical Overview: Terrorism as a Security Threat prior to 1994 52
2. The Manifestation of Terrorism in South Africa after 1994 55
2.1 Violence in the Western Cape 56
2.2 The Right Wing Threat 60
2.3 The Manifestation of International Terrorism in South Africa 62
3. A Classification of Terrorism in the South African Context and Current Trends 64
3.1 A Typology of South African Terrorism 64
3.2 Current Trends in Terrorism in South Africa 66
4. Conclusion 67
References

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CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM 71

1. Official South African Views on National Security 72
2. South African Responses to the Threat of Terrorism 75
2.1 The Legislative Framework 75
2.1.1 Current South African Legislation on Terrorism 76
2.1.2 Brief Historical Background to the *Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act* 77
2.2 South Africa's Adherence to International Conventions 80
3. Official South African Views on Terrorism 82
4. The Significance of Terrorism in South Africa 86
5. Conclusion 88

References

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION 93

1. Summary 93
2. Testing of the Assumptions 99
2.1 The Phenomenon of Terrorism Changed in Extent and Manifestation 99
2.2 Terrorism may still be regarded as a Primary Security Threat in South Africa despite Democratisation and the subsequent new Political Dispensation since 1994 102
3. Conclusion 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY 104

ABSTRACT 113

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INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of the Cold War, national security has, per definition, broadened its focus. The institutionalisation of the post-apartheid era has also brought, together with the broader national security focus, a re-conceptualisation of issues that constitute the security agenda of the current South African dispensation. The concept of security has broadened to include, besides physical threats, also threats that had not been associated with the traditional understanding of security. These threats lie within the sphere of the social, economic, and environmental areas. Developing or emerging countries are also faced with challenges of nation building.

Since the onset of a new political dispensation in South Africa in 1994, the primary challenge of the South African government has been to provide in the need of the citizens, to develop the economy and to restore the social and economic psyche of the nation in ensuring that skewed societies are re-aligned in terms of opportunity, development, education and employment. This demanded that resources had to be allocated according to the most pressing needs during the first term after 1994. These needs were on the developmental terrain. The result of this was that there was a political emphasis on development which influenced the intelligence and security paradigm according to the need for development, rather than only according to the need for physical protection of the state and its citizens.

During the period after democratisation, terrorism as a threat to national security was a debated concept, and it was loosely associated with subversion and sabotage as remnants of an outdated understanding of the security concept. This resulted in the perception that the threat no longer existed in the South African democracy. The concept of terrorism as an ultimate expression of political dissatisfaction, frustration or need, is also not a concept that is readily associated with a liberal democracy, and within the new South African dispensation, the manifestation thereof was almost unthinkable.

Since 11 September 2001, the conceptual thinking on terrorism as a security threat has changed dramatically. South Africa was necessarily also confronted with the global

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threat of terrorism which resulted in a review of South Africa as a possible target for international terrorism and a possible safe haven for terrorist groups. For this reason, South Africa's position on the threat of terrorism, whether domestic or international had to be reviewed.

1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This dissertation argues that, although the manifestation of terrorism in both the international and domestic context altered since the demise of the Cold War, the threat of terror is very prevalent. Although the dimensions of terrorism in South Africa have changed since 1994, as a liberal democratic state it is not necessarily immune from the threat of terror. This was emphasised with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (US). The US is based on democratic principles, yet it has been subjected to a number of terrorist attacks since the end of the Cold War, of which the Twin Tower attacks were the most dramatic. The manifestation of terrorism in the international sphere inevitably has implications for South Africa as well. The international security agenda to a certain degree shapes the agendas of individual states, and the dissertation thus also aims to evaluate the reality of the threat in the domestic context, given the international context.

The main aim of the dissertation is to investigate the relevance of terrorism as a national security threat to South Africa in a changed security environment. In order to determine the importance of the threat, it is essential that national security as a concept should be analysed, as this concept provides the foundation on which the conclusion is based. The changes in the concept of national security necessarily brought a wider range of issues to the security agenda, and it is within this rather wide and holistic array of security issues, that terrorism as a threat needs to be evaluated. Terrorism not only physically threatens, but it also becomes a factor that can impact on, for instance, the economic viability of the state.

Within this changed phenomenon of terrorism the dissertation also aims at providing an overview of these changes in terms of manifestations, trends and extent. The aim is to determine to what extent terrorism has become a global threat to international

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security, as well as to the national security of individual states, and to South Africa specifically. The main period covered for the purposes of the dissertation is 1994 to 2004 - that is the period since the advent of democracy in South Africa, up to the adoption of new anti-terror legislation in 2004.

2. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The broadened concept of national security necessarily implies that more issues have become part of the security agenda of South Africa since 1994. This brought about a perception that the primary security attention is on non-traditional issues, rather than those threats to national security that had been part of the security understanding during the Cold War and the pre-1994 era. A perception developed that previous threats (such as sabotage, subversion and terrorism) made way for issues such as economic development and organised crime.

Not only did the security environment change, but terrorism also changed in manifestation, motivation and trends after the Cold War, contributing to the perception that it was an isolated threat to the post-1994 democracy. However, despite the perception that the threat was no longer an important factor of security, terror has kept on recurring sporadically, especially during the latter part of the 1990s. The strict traditional concept of security and the traditional manifestation of terrorism seem to complement each other, but the manifestation of terror in a post-Cold War era requires objective evaluation and analysis.

Given the broadened understanding of national security, an objective evaluation of terrorism became necessary, focusing on trends, manifestation and characteristics, against the background of a post-Cold War, post-1994 South Africa that is predominantly challenged by issues within the developmental, environmental and social sphere.

In view of the above, the study is based on the following assumptions:

- The phenomenon of terrorism changed in extent and manifestation internationally.

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- Terrorism may still be regarded as a primary security threat in South Africa despite democratisatisation and the subsequent new political dispensation since 1994.

3. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of studies have been undertaken and published to indicate the impact of a changed security paradigm and the subsequent understanding of the phenomenon of terror. Some of these argued that terror changed significantly after the end of the Cold War, while the increasing link between terror and religious extremism was also pointed out clearly. Renewed impetus was given to the debate on the changed phenomenon after 11 September 2001 and authoritative authors published comprehensive reviews on the phenomenon and the impact thereof.

The wide range of valuable publications that are available on the subject of terrorism, include strategic reviews, academic publications, religious popular material as well as historical and chronological reflections on the development of terrorism. There are also authoritative studies on the psychological make-up of terrorists.

Despite the comprehensive range of literature available on the subject of terrorism, none of these placed the phenomenon within the context of national security with specific reference to the South African environment. This gap that currently exists in literature on terrorism, therefore justifies the study of terrorism as a threat to national security in South Africa.

4. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The study begins with an analysis of the concept of national security in a post-Cold War environment as a theoretical framework. A qualitative approach to evaluate the propositions was followed, with evidence from sources and current developments in the security and intelligence domain regarding national security conceptualisation. Both primary and secondary sources were utilised in order to provide an overview of

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the phenomenon of terrorism in the post-Cold War, post-1994 and post-11 September 2001 situation.

The theory of national security argues that security priorities are first and foremost determined according to perceptions and political choices of policymakers, and the study thus evaluates the official responses regarding the threat in order to assess the weight of the threat in terms of the perception of the policymakers. For this evaluation, primary sources were to be consulted. Concurrently, the study also analyses the intensity of the threat through a review of the manifestation of terrorism in global and domestic contexts.

5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter one provides an overview of the concept of national security. The aim of the chapter is to locate terrorism as a security threat within the security agenda of the post-Cold War era. In addition to the explanation that the security agenda of the post-Cold War era has broadened to become more holistic, the chapter also briefly explores the extent to which terrorism is considered as an issue on the international and domestic security agendas.

Chapter two provides an overview of terrorism in terms of the definition and context of the phenomenon, as well as changes in the manifestation of terrorism as an international security concern.

Chapter three aims at analysing terrorism in the South African context, with a brief overview and evaluation of the phenomenon in the pre-1994 period. Changes in the manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa since 1994 are indicated in this chapter and a classification of South African terrorism is provided.

Chapter four focuses on official South African views on national security, and views and responses regarding the threat of terrorism. The chapter also provides a brief overview of international instruments to curb the threat, and South Africa's position in terms of these conventions and resolutions.

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Chapter five consists of an evaluation, including a summary of the text and testing of the assumptions formulated in the introduction.

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CHAPTER ONE

A POST-COLD WAR UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Global changes since the end of the Cold War have brought about a broadened understanding of the concept of national security. The security emphasis has moved away from the more military focus that, to a large extent, directed the attempts of all states to ensure security. The new emphasis since the demise of the bipolarity of the Cold War era is on a broader national security agenda especially in the context of growing democratisation on a global scale. What constitutes the national security agenda of many states in the post-Cold War era, are issues in the socio-environmental sphere rather than military threats, although the latter are still important, both in an intra- and interstate context.

It is within this changed conceptualisation of national security that states have to prioritise their national security issues. The question of assessing threats is a difficult one, especially for developing countries such as South Africa, if it is considered that these threats have to be addressed with limited manpower, limited funds and a high premium on the need for development. Not all security issues can receive equal attention in terms of the national security agenda. Threats to national security are necessarily addressed according to priorities that are determined by factors such as impact, domestic circumstances and political choice.

In order to analyse terrorism within the context of national security, a broadened concept of national security is provided specifically in terms of the different sectors of national security that are part of a revised security understanding. Attention is given to the subjectivity of the criteria often used to determine the security agenda. The nature of Third World security also impacts on the understanding of national security in the post-Cold War era.

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1. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The national security of a state is an interdependent result of the security that is subjectively experienced by the individual on the one hand, and the attempts of a state to safeguard the security of its assets, its norms and its population on the other hand, within a national, as well as a regional and global context. National security can be equated with the capacity of a state to safeguard the individual, groups and the broad population against both physical and socio-economic threats, whether these are systemic or attributed. National security has as its objective the establishment of conditions (political, societal and economic) that will ensure the protection or extension of national values against existing and potential adversaries.[1] A threat to national security may be understood as an array of actions or problems that drastically threaten to erode the quality of life of the citizens of the state and thus force a government to take extraordinary steps or measures outside the established structures to contain the problem.[2]

Traditionally, if a threat or issue is labelled as a security issue, the use of special means to handle the threat is justified, but if the broadened concept of security is used to determine security agenda issues, the exercise becomes more complex, with values, norms, interests and expectations impacting increasingly on the shaping of the security agenda. In practice, the question of when an issue is indeed a national security issue has become even more complicated than what has been understood within a mere broadened understanding of national security. Thus, national security issues in the post-1994 era are not only those that pose existential threats, but also those that exceed beyond national security to the level of national interest.[3] A review of the objectives of national security could assist in the contextualisation of the concept.

1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Security essentially has two foundations. The first is that it has to protect from danger or threat, while the second concerns the safeguarding and promotion of a desirable situation, whatever form this might adopt. It has to preserve a way of life acceptable

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to the people that are represented, and in its broadest sense, provide in basic human needs and ensure social justice and opportunity for all members of the population, and freedom of oppression.[4]

The objectives of national security thus centre on:

- the protection of the constitution of the state;
- sovereignty, territorial integrity and national survival;
- physical protection against external and internal threats, such as terrorism, subversion and sabotage, and the protection of lives and property of the state and all its inhabitants;
- the maintenance of political stability, law and order;
- the maintenance and promotion of national values and interests, as well as political and social value systems;
- the maintenance of a balance between authority and order on the one hand, and the protection of minority and individual rights on the other;
- national development, economic growth and welfare; and
- communal security with other states.[5]

The security of the individual plays a central role in this regard. Individual security is increasingly directing the post-Cold War understanding of national security, with emphasis on human rights, peace and democracy, and social justice. Basic human needs (such as provision of housing, clean water and sanitation, food and shelter) have also become determinants of stability and are as such linked to the concept of national security. This is especially relevant in the developing world. However, not all threats to individual security constitute threats to national security.

Security is a relative and dynamic concept. No state can ever experience complete or absolute security. A measure of uncertainty is always present in the relative security that states experience. The challenge for a developing state is to employ its intelligence capacity according to the relevance of issues that form part of the security situation of the concerned state. The national security paradigm thus constantly fluctuates, which forces a state to focus on certain elements of security to the

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detriment of those that are perceived to be of lesser importance, especially where capacity is limited in terms of human and financial resources.

1.2 COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

National security has traditionally been understood largely within the parameters of especially external military threats. The evaluation of the world in terms of a bipolar East/West configuration during the Cold War shaped the national security concept. It was within these parameters that territorial integrity, stability and order were maintained, primarily by means of military power. Traditionally national security was based on the belief that the national security of a state depended on its ability to counter threats largely through physical and military security. Accordingly, national security had a predominantly physical focus aimed at the protection of the sovereignty of the state against external threats, with the emphasis on those threats that emanated from the state's relationships with other states, rather than internal threats emanating from domestic instability within the state itself.[6]

In congruence with the external focus, the internal threats that were part of the national security paradigm, had its foundation in the strict Communist/anti-Communist conceptualisation of the Cold War era, with the result that internal threats were mainly regarded as terrorism, sabotage, subversion, political violence and espionage. These threats were universally evaluated along the lines of the Cold War and the bipolar superpower syndrome. As a result of the traditional model of national security, the primary objectives of security were national survival, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the stability of the political order. Reference to social issues were regarded only as important in terms of the potential for these to be exploited by adversaries to the detriment of state security, rather than addressing these issues as determinants of domestic stability or as part of an overarching humanitarian objective.

Since 1990 the world has become radically different from what it was at the height of the Cold War. The international arena changed as a result of the crumbling of the East Bloc; the internationalisation and internalisation of values such as democracy and economic growth; the effect of globalisation and immediacy of actions; and a

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growing concern over the survival of the planet. The global security understanding was no longer guided by the fear of West against East and *vice versa*, but rather based on a common understanding of the dynamics of security in all spheres of society, including global society.[7] Socio-economic factors also became yardsticks for security on an international, national and individual level. The strong bipolar character of national security made way for a multilateral security understanding.

The Cold War understanding of national security became outdated primarily in view of the changed nature of the world, but also due to the fact that the strictly military understanding of the concept resulted in the militarisation of the world and an under-emphasis of non-military threats. It led to a misconception that all threats to, and problems of national security, could be countered through military action. Economic and technological progress, societal stability and the maintaining of norms and values are currently more important in determining the national and international stature of states than the level of military expenditure alone. The degree to which a state participates in international trade has to a great extent become a determining factor for its national economic well-being.

Added to the diversification of the issues that constitute the national security agenda of states, individual security has become more important than ever before. The individual (as most basic referent of security) has to an extent become the driving force of security agendas, specifically in developing countries, and it has become increasingly difficult for these states to distinguish between issues that are primarily concerned with the security of the individual, and those that occur on the level of national security.

The humanitarian nature of the post-Cold War era has thus resulted in individual security issues receiving much more national security emphasis than ever before. It is, however, important, as noted previously, that not all threats to individual security are threats to the national security of countries *per se*. The decision of when a security concern becomes part of the national security agenda of a state remains a subjective political exercise and all issues pertaining to the security of the individual cannot merely be regarded as issues of national security. Threats to individual security can only be regarded as threats to national security once they impact on the stability

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and security of the nation and the state. In this regard, Sorenson provides a valuable explanation of the relation between individual and national security: "States constitute the primary nexus when it comes to security for individuals and groups. Even when our primary concern is the security of human beings, states need a significant place in the analysis, because states constitute the single most important macro-structure with consequences for individual security."[8]

The movement towards a new world order and the reality of multilateralism has underlined a growing international economic interdependence and awareness that the world forms an integrated unit. Modern society is vulnerable to threats and dangers to which no military solution exists. These include social problems (such as the increasing population growth, human and economic insecurity caused by poverty); food shortages; health risks; ecological dangers such as pollution; criminal threats; drug smuggling; and international terrorism. This results in the security problems of the modern world being more complex than ever before. Despite multilateralism, arms reduction, the crumbling of the East Bloc, and globalisation, the world is not necessarily a safer place, which was emphasised by the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. Threats of war are still looming. The 'War on Terror' is a global reality. An array of global security problems continues, which are, among others, the sub-national identity of communities in both industrialised and developing countries, resulting in intra-state violence, religious sectarian conflicts, and added to these, global and ecological problems, such as ozone depletion and global warming.[9]

1.3 THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Security is a generic term that has a specific meaning, but it varies in form[10]. This implies that security is the survival in the face of threats, but what constitutes these threats is a combination of objective fact and societal and political perception. Insecurity reflects a combination of the threats to, and vulnerabilities of the state and the individual, which immediately places the appreciation of these on the subjective level, rather than on the level of objective fact. Vulnerabilities are comparatively concrete, and can be related to all levels of the state's existence: the individual, society and the state. A state's vulnerability can be found within all sectors of security, for example in the military sector, the economy and society, but threats are

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more difficult to pinpoint. It is, as stated above, firstly a problem of subjectivity *versus* objectivity. What the individual/state perceives as a threat, might not necessarily be coherent, or have substantiation. Threat and fear are almost synonymous in terms of the security phenomenon. As Buzan explains: "Fear is a volatile political commodity, more so for humans in large groups than for individuals", and questions of fear are not likely to be addressed with rational or scientific actions or policies.[11]

In the attempt of the state to address its vulnerabilities and threats, it is rather difficult to distinguish the more serious threats from trivial ones. Security has to be defined within a specific environment, and not all threats can be defined as national security issues. Buzan explains that national security threats transpire on a continuum of threats that ranges from minor and routine, through serious but routine, to drastic and unprecedented, but the decision to classify issues as national security issues, is a "political choice rather than scientific or objective fact." [12] He also warns that, if the trigger of national security is set too low on the scale, the risk is that it might lead to "paranoia, waste of resources, aggressive policies and serious distortions of the domestic political life".[13] If it is set too high on the scale, the danger is that it might fail to prepare for crises. Weak or emerging states are necessitated by their domestic circumstances to push the qualification for threat to the low end of the political spectrum, thus making the agenda for security rather wide-ranging, despite their limited resources in terms of financial or human capacity. The necessity for weak states to address a rather wide range of threats stems from the issues that cause instability within their fragile security arrangements, with emphasis on individual security.

The question of when a threat becomes a national security issue thus depends on what type of threat it is, and the perception of the concerned state. Even more so, it depends on the intensity with which the threat manifests, with the main factors affecting the intensity of the threat being the "specificity of its identity, the nearness in time and space, the probability of its occurring, the weight of its consequences and whether or not perception of the threat occurring is amplified by historical circumstances."[14] This has the implication that the more intense a threat is perceived

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in terms of the above, the more justifiable it is to deal with the threat as a national security issue.

The problem is, however, that the criteria cannot be measured accurately or objectively, and that they can occur in various arbitrary combinations and complexities, which makes the weighting on the security spectrum a problematic exercise.[15] The issue of national security or insecurity is therefore a complex one. Each state experiences a whole array of specific threats that add up to the insecurity of the concerned state. Within this wide range of security related issues, governments have to balance issues which are to become part of the security agenda, and this, as argued, is to a large degree a political exercise. It is not possible to assess an issue as a "universal" security issue, because there is no universal objective security measure instrument that cuts across ideologies, states or regimes. "Different states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat".[16]

Buzan argues that there are issues that clearly fall within the national security range of states, such as invasions and economic blockades, but there is a broad grey area between "obvious threats" and those issues that fall outside the strict understanding of national security.[17] These issues stretch across the military, political, societal, ecological and economic sectors, and for the purpose of clarity a brief account of each sector follows.

- Military security relies on an interdependence of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states. Military security changed after the end of the Cold War to focus on multilateral security arrangements. The state remains the referent object for this sector of security, even in the multilateral security arrangements of the post-Cold War era. It means that the protection of the territorial integrity of the state is the main issue within this sector, but the application thereof has broadened to include the regional environment.[18]
- The political security agenda concerns itself with the impact of political instability on good governance; the constitutional implication of political activity; and political dynamics that may lead to intrastate conflict. On the political level, threats are thus posed against the "internal legitimacy" of the

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political unit (those issues that define the political state) and those against its external legitimacy (those issues that challenge the state as a sovereign and ideological unit).[19]

- Threats against national security on societal level are mostly intrastate and symptomatic of developing states. There has been much emphasis on the necessity and trend among states of the developing world to concentrate on security issues emanating from this sphere, due to the need of strengthening the nation-state building capacity of the so-called weak or failed state. Societal threats have a dire impact on individual security.[20]
- Economic security concerns access to resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. The national economy is in a certain sense part of the physical base of the state, but it is also connected to the organising ideology and institutional components of the state. [21]
- Ecological and environmental security has been neglected as a security concern during the height of the Cold War and the growing emphasis on this issue is a result of the increased interdependence of states for natural resources. The maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere is essential to support all human enterprise.[22]

National security depends on a balance of these five sectors, and none of these may be regarded as more important than the other. The five sectors cannot be separated or stand in isolation from each other. The sectors are bound together by the security concept to the extent that it demands the treatment thereof as an integrated concept. Any attempt to treat security as if it was confined to any single level, or any single sector, invites serious distortions of understanding. [23] In this regard, Solomon and Cilliers argue that the new security agenda should include factors such as political democracy, human rights, social and economic sustainability in as much as it is dependant on military sustainability.[24]

The determination of the national security agenda of a state is furthermore based on a fusion of threats to, and vulnerabilities of the state. Threats are ambiguous, arbitrary and dynamic and for this reason the setting of the security agenda cannot be an exact

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science. The national security obligation of a state consists of two interwoven parts. It is on the one hand reactive, as it has to defend against threats to its national security, but on the other hand it has to deal with the causes of vulnerabilities, in order to be proactive in strategising to reduce its vulnerability against threats. The broadened security agenda demands a careful consideration of the meaning of security, and an understanding of the range of dynamics that constitute the security agenda of states in a post-Cold War, post-11 September world. There is a danger that all things that gain prominence as national interest issues would simply be added to the security agenda. The sectoral approach however assists in providing an understanding of the different qualities or levels of security that make up the widened security agenda.[25] The broadening of the agenda does not summarily imply that four sectors of security have been added to that of the military sector. It implies that the security of a country is the result of the interplay of various issues, interests, concerns of the people, the society, the state and its policymakers.

1.4 NATIONAL SECURITY OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Third World countries are exceptionally vulnerable in terms of national security in its broader manifestation, as a result of their specific reliance on their physical environment, economic and technological dependence on other states, and their problematic internal situations.[26] Third World states, or so-called weak, developing or emerging states, are unique in terms of their security agendas as a result of the lack of social cohesion and state capacity. This has the effect that the typical Third World state necessarily has to focus its security attempts on internal security issues, aimed at the physical survival of the state.

The real problem of Third World security is a matter of state building - a long-term process with the solution lying in the sphere of social upliftment. Third World regimes are, however, seldom in a position to give both short and long term security issues their due attention on the security agenda, mainly because of a financial predicament, and these regimes have to prioritise to address the most pressing security issues. The rationale for allocating scarce resources to the most immediate needs is a logical one.[27]

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The typical Third World country is challenged with a selection of advantages and expectations of prosperity under conditions of order, but the reality of the environment in which the Third World country operates, dictates its choices. The thrust of national security threats of Third World countries lies within the internal sphere, with external issues occupying a secondary position on the Third World national security agenda. In this regard Buzan remarks that a weakened super-power presence in emerging countries after the end of the Cold War left room for "local security dynamics to take their own shape and operate more on the basis…of local issues", thus emphasising that internal factors are determinants of national security of Third World states in the post-Cold War era.[28]

Third World or weak states can also be characterised by, what Wilkinson calls, "relative deprivation" where perceptions of grievances and injustices are rife. Wilkinson argues that these perceptions can give rise to internal political violence, which in its worst form, can transform into terrorism.[29] According to him, some of the most frequent contributing factors to the perception of relative deprivation, and thus to political polarisation are:

- ethnic conflict, hatred, discrimination and oppression;
- religious and ideological hatred, discrimination and oppression;
- socio-economic relative deprivation;
- stresses and strains of modernisation that accentuate the above;
- perceived political inequalities, infringements of rights, injustice or oppression;
- lack of adequate channels to express dissatisfaction;
- existence of a tradition of violence and popular turbulence;
- the availability of revolutionary leadership equipped with an attractive ideology;
- weakness and ineptness of the government and its forces;
- erosion of confidence in the capacity or intent of the government; and
- deep divisions within the governing elite and leadership groups.

Congruent to the relative deprivation and resultant political and economic polarisation that Wilkinson highlights as basis for the ultimate employment of terrorism, is the

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argument of Job that, in the case of Third World security, the security dilemma metaphor and logic do not hold up to scrutiny[30]. According to Job the Third World state is often occupied by more than one nation with the result that the state's population is not a socially cohesive society. Instead, there can be a variety of communal groups, each contending for its own security and supremacy over the others. Job argues that the regime in power does not necessarily have the support of all communal groups, let alone majority support, because the regime embodies the interest either of a particular ethnic or social sector, or of an economic or military elite that has taken control.[31] In all instances popular legitimacy of the existence and security interests of the regime might be lacking.

Jackson supports this assessment by Job in stating that tribal and religious conflicts, and racial and ethnic problems are part of common human nature to categorise and discriminate, and each communal group tends to contend its own security and supremacy over competitors, which ultimately jeopardises the idea of a socially cohesive society.[32] The domestic insecurity of Third World states frequently manifests in localised political violence. This has become almost endemic to weak or failed states. Localised political violence has an intrinsic potential for civil war.[33]

In addition to these factors of insecurity of Third World countries, the state does not necessarily have the effective institutional capacity to ensure peace and order among the population, and conditions for satisfactory physical existence do not prevail. The sense of threat is thus internally to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state.[34]

The concept of national security is a holistic one that does not remain static over a period of time. This is especially true for weak or developing states. What is currently perceived as a security threat is not necessarily that in a decade's time. The range of military, societal, economical and ecological threats constitutes a dynamic agenda for national security, and national security priorities can shift dramatically in sequence of importance that necessitates the redefining of the concept. Baynham also adds to this broader and more holistic understanding of national security, in highlighting that attacking the sources of conflict and instability should be primary on

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the agenda of policymakers, and even more so for the policymakers of weak, developing or Third World states[35]

Although the threat of terrorism primarily falls within the sphere of political and military security, it is argued that, as a result of the interrelatedness of the various sectors, it is constituted across all the security sectors. It has been present in the strict military traditional understanding of security; it has societal roots; and it links to the organised crime and corruption sphere that forms part of the security environment of states. It is thus understandable that the issue of terror as a security concern needs to be re-evaluated, specifically within the dynamic nature of global and national security in the post-Cold War era.

2. CURRENT VIEWS ON TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO GLOBAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

11 September 2001 brought a dramatic shift in global paradigms on the subject of terrorism. Terrorism became a most visible security reality, and it forced adjustments to security arrangements across the globe. It has been on the security agenda of the international community for at least the past 75 years, with varied priority. This section aims at pointing out how the international view of terrorism developed during the past years.

2.1 VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON TERRORISM

In reviewing international attempts to counter the threat of terrorism, the actions of the US are regarded to be significant, as this country has been the main target of international terrorist activity. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2001 is one of the most noteworthy transformations of the US government since 1947, when its Department of Defence was consolidated. The DHS represents a similar consolidation, both in style and substance. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush decided that 22 previously disparate domestic agencies needed to be consolidated into one department to protect the nation against threats to the homeland. Priorities of the DHS centre on

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the protection of the US against any further attacks (through analysis of threats; guarding of borders; protection of civil infrastructure; and coordination of response in case of emergencies).[36] The broad integration of various structures into one department emphasises the prioritisation of terrorism as a threat to the security of the US.

Former President Bill Clinton however, called upon his government already in 1995 to address the threat of terrorism, which is indicative of the seriousness with which the threat has been regarded by the US, even prior to the Twin Tower attacks. He called for the preparation of legislation to address international crime before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 22 October 1995, focusing on five areas to improve the international capacity to investigate, prevent and punish terrorists and other types of international criminals. Also indicative of the strong stance of the US against the threat of terrorism and terrorist organisations is the signing of two Presidential Decision Directives by President Clinton on 22 May 1998. These directives were aimed at combating terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure.[37] These policies were however not capable of preventing the US embassy bombings in 1998 in East Africa, neither were the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil prevented.

Significant statements that were made by President George W. Bush after the 2001 Twin Tower attacks indicated that the 'War on Terror' was in full swing. He stated that "anybody who houses a terrorist, encourages terrorism will be held accountable" and "it is a different type of battle…a different type of battlefield".[38]

The US 'War on Terror' has an impact on the global perception of terrorism as a security threat. Its strategies underline the urgency with which the threat of terrorism is addressed. It includes the fight against terror abroad, so that the US does not have to fight it on own soil. Another focus of the US 'War on Terror' is to capture known terrorists, and Al-Qaeda and aligned organisations are targeted. The US supports the main emphasis of the UN that democracies need to be strengthened; that terrorists be denied sanctuary in UN member states; and that terrorist financing be curbed. However, despite the acknowledgement of the importance of these strategies to strengthen democracy in order to curb the threat of terrorism, the US emphasises the

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military capacitating of its armed forces with a new input of technologies to equip its military. An amount of US$240 billion has been invested already to do research and development on new military technologies and its plan is to allocate US$270 billion more up to 2009. Additionally the US budget for the transformation of its military might, with the purpose of fighting terrorism, stood at US$16 billion in 2005, while an additional US$78 billion was budgeted for the next four years.[39]

2.2 GLOBAL VIEWS ON TERRORISM

The League of Nations adopted the *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism* in 1937.[40] This convention formed the foundation for the development of the universal instruments against terrorism which were adopted under the auspices of the UN. The adoption of Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001 by the Security Council is indicative of a watershed in the perception on terrorism as a threat to global and national security in the post-Cold War era. The resolution declares that "(A)cts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations", and it calls upon Member States to "become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols" and "to increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols".[41]

Prior to 2001, several international summits were held in an attempt to counter terrorism indicating the point of view of the international community regarding terrorism as a security threat. The Halifax Summit in 1995, the Ottawa Summit in 1995, the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in 1996, and the Paris Ministerial Meeting in 1996, all had the same underlying message: the urgency to counter the threat of terrorism lies in the fanaticism, whether religious, societal or psychological, that echoes through all societies of the world. These summits agreed on trends that manifested with regard to terrorism, namely that many of the fanatic advocates of the groups that pose a terrorist threat to society, are freelancers that take it upon themselves to commit acts of terrorism in the name of their deity. Tracking these perpetrators poses difficulties, because they do not group themselves in closely-knit

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organised groups but on the contrary into loose coalitions granting little opportunity to law enforcement agencies to counter the threat.[42]

At the Halifax Summit (1995), Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, called on Russia to share information regarding terrorism, indicating an expansion of an international coalition to fight terrorism. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit also drew in new role players with the inclusion of all Middle East countries except Iran and Iraq, as well Libya. Increasing cooperation between intelligence agencies of the different countries was pledged to counter terrorism, with one of the methods being the ending of the flow of funds to those individuals and countries that supported terrorism, whether directly or indirectly. These summits are regarded as important indications of the fact that terrorism had indeed been assessed to be a security threat prior to 2001.[43]

Developments within the sphere of the Security Council of the UN are also indicative of the severity of the threat. Apart from the various resolutions and conventions instituted by the Security Council, terrorism has been reaffirmed as a threat at several meetings of the Security Council of the UN since September 2001. A meeting of the Security Council held in January 2003 at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs concluded the following regarding terrorism:[44]

- terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security;
- any act of terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of its motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and is to be unequivocally condemned, especially when it indiscriminately targets or injures civilians;
- there is a serious and growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and therefore a need to strengthen controls on these materials;

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- it has become easier, in an increasingly globalised world, for terrorists to exploit sophisticated technology, communications and resources for their criminal objectives;
- measures to detect and stem the flow of finance and funds for terrorist purposes must urgently be strengthened;
- terrorists must also be prevented from making use of other criminal activities such as transnational organised crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking;
- since terrorists and their supporters exploit instability and intolerance to justify their criminal acts, the Security Council is determined to counter this by contributing to peaceful resolution of disputes and by working to create a climate of mutual tolerance and respect; and
- terrorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the Charter of the UN and international law, by a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all states, international and regional organisations, and by redoubled efforts at the national level.

Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the UN in October 2002 referred to terrorism as a "global threat with global effects; ... its consequences affect every aspect of the UN agenda – from development to peace to human rights and the rule of law … By its very nature, terrorism is an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes".[45] At a meeting of the UN Security Council on 23 January 2003 he stated that terrorism was a menace that required a global response. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, D.C., the world had focused an unprecedented attention on terrorism and on the means of countering it. Despite enhanced attention and more concerted action, the problem requires sustained, long-term action.[46] Anan regards terrorism as a "threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect for human rights, the rule of law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is a threat that has grown more urgent in the last five years."[47]

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From the views expressed by global and national role players, it is clear that a new sense of urgency developed on a global scale after 11 September 2001 and that there is a pressing demand to counter terrorism and UN member states' commitments to the various treaties, conventions and regulations on terrorism increased dramatically: ratification of the key anti-terrorism mechanisms saw an increase of more than fifteen percent from member states in the first year after 11 September 2001.[48] There are currently thirteen international conventions against terrorism. Some of the newer conventions relate, among others, to the suppression of financing of terrorism, while there are also conventions which date back as far as 1972, such as the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft*[49]. Furthermore, the following programmes and agencies were strengthened to address the terrorism concern[50]:

- The International Maritime Organisation, the agency responsible for the suppressing of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency, which recognises that the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material needs to be strengthened in order to protect against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and radio active material.
- The International Civil Aviation Organisation strengthened its in-flight security measures, (This body has enforced security measures, both with regard to aircraft and airports diligently even before 11 September 2001, but it could not prevent the incidents. Since then, security measures at airports have increased dramatically).
- The United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention undertook new strategies to counter terrorism.
- The United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre, which coordinates and monitors the implementation of global counter-terrorism strategies.

Globally, there is a strong emphasis on the multi-pronged approach to address terrorism as a security threat. The global position of nations against terrorism focuses on the so-called five "d's" that Anan presented in his keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid on 10 March 2005.[51] The main elements of the strategy cut across all sectors of global security. The strategy entails the discouragement of disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals; to deny terrorists the means to

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carry out their attacks; to deter states from supporting terrorists; to develop state capacity to prevent terrorism; and to defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism. This approach would have more success than a unilateral single sector approach constituted on a strict military level.

The objective and the means of states to counter terrorism vary, but the urgency of addressing terrorism as a security threat is paramount in all the strategies of the majority of member states of the UN. The threat of terrorism has become a significant part of the security agendas of these member states of the UN.

3. CONCLUSION

The understanding of the national security agenda has broadened to include, in addition to military threats, also societal, political, economic and environmental dimensions. The broadening of the concept of security has specific implications for Third World countries, as these countries are challenged by the need to prioritise security issues in terms of limited resources and capabilities.

The national security agendas of states are determined by the political opinion of the policymakers, and the intensity of the perceived threats, based on criteria related to impact and domestic circumstances. Threats to national security are those issues which drastically threaten the quality of life of the citizens of a state as well as state survival and stability, therefore demanding the employment of unusual measures to counter the problem. The national security agenda of a state is not static, but is continuously in flux, guided by global developments as well as internal dynamics, forcing a state to prioritise certain issues above others.

Despite the initial euphoria of the post-Cold War period, terrorism continued to cause instability on an international scale, with lethal attacks for example against the US Embassies in Africa in 1998; the 11 September 2001 attacks; and the Bali bombings in Indonesia in 2002. Although terrorism has always been part of the global security agenda, as is, for example, evident from the various summits on the issue, an urgency to address the threat came to a head after the 11 September 2001 attacks, with the result that it is currently prominently located on the international security agenda.

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The 21st Century phenomenon of terrorism is different from what constituted terrorism during the Cold War. The employment of terrorism during the Cold War was aligned to the ideological foundation of the era along the bipolar East-West (communist/anti-communist) division, and global changes in the security arrangement after the end of this era necessarily brought about a change in the application and manifestation of the phenomenon. With this changed manifestation of terrorism came an initial relocation of the threat to the lower end of the security agenda, as a result of the re-prioritisation of broader security issues. Despite the initial location of terrorism at the lower end of the security continuum, the manifestation of international and domestic terrorism now dictates that it is reaffirmed as a primary security threat.

Aligned with the international appreciation of the threat, the security environment of Third World countries demands that terrorism in all its manifestations be assessed against the criteria for the determination of national security threats. Both domestic and international terrorism may be regarded as a security concern in Third World countries, given the internal dynamics of these states; the prevalence of factors which lead to perceptions of relative deprivation; and the impact of globalisation on all countries in the post-Cold War era.

In order to understand the full consequences of contemporary terrorism, it is necessary that trends which are currently prevalent in terrorism be evaluated. In addition to the discussion of the trends, motives and causes of the new terrorism, the next chapter also provides a typology of the phenomenon, as well as characteristics, which could assist in defining and understanding the concept.

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CHAPTER 2

TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Terrorism is a well-established feature of world politics. It has wide application and its motives and objectives cover various dimensions. It is employed by a variety of groups and movements in search of political and military changes and results which, according to their specific judgement, cannot be achieved through any other means. Many definitions of the concept have been developed over time, but a commonly acceptable one remains elusive. This chapter aims to conceptualise the phenomenon of terrorism within the post-Cold War period. It explains the current manifestations of the phenomenon and its implications for security. The chapter also provides a typology of terrorism, as well as an overview of the underlying causes of the phenomenon.

1. DEFINING TERRORISM

Defining terrorism, especially in view of its diverse character after the end of the Cold War, is an elusive exercise, and the political, military and legal dimensions of the phenomenon add to the difficulty in establishing a universal definition of the concept. Terrorism is a security issue that simultaneously has political (due to the nature thereof and the demands on policy); military (the demands on the defence mechanisms of any concerned country); and legal (it is in essence a criminal act) implications. It is a weapon that has been used by states and sub-state organisations over time. It is not a philosophy, nor a political movement.[1] Terrorism has appeared in many forms over the years and it seems that society is currently faced by not one, but a multitude of forms of terrorism.[2]

Various definitions have been developed to describe the phenomenon of terrorism. The range of definitions is symptomatic of the difficulty of describing the phenomenon, and the current number of definitions of terrorism stands at more than 100.[3] The variety of motives and manifestations of terrorism contributes to the problem of defining terrorism. This diversification of the character of terrorism

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results in the difficulty of developing a comprehensive widely accepted definition. Definitions at times seem to fail to capture the magnitude of the phenomena they are supposed to define, which is the case for definitions of terrorism as well.

Terrorism is often used to define the sub-state application of violence or threat of violence, which intends to instil panic in a society, to weaken or to overthrow incumbents and to bring about social change. It has close ties with guerrilla warfare, can be employed to substitute a war with specific parameters between states, and it has been applied as a strategy in the civil wars of the post-Cold War era. The variety of applications contributes to the difficulty in developing a comprehensive and widely accepted definition.[4]

The US State Department uses the following definition: "Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience".[5] The definition ties closely with that of Combs, which states that: "Terrorism is a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence that is perpetrated on innocent victims before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear for political purposes".[6] Crucial components of this definition of terrorism can be distinguished as follows: It involves an act of violence (or the threat of violence), intimidation, audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims and political motives or goals.[7]

From these definitions some primary elements of the phenomenon are deduced:

- Terrorism is fundamentally a violent act. Violence is endemic to terrorism and the capacity and willingness to commit violence must be present for an act to be considered as an act of terrorism. The perpetrator of terror has a deliberate intention to commit violence. For this reason spontaneous violence that follows from activism, such as sit-ins and protest marches, cannot be considered as terrorism, as the premeditated intention to commit violence is not present. Thus, premeditated violence, the threat of violence and the capacity and willingness to commit violence, is central to terrorist acts.[8]

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- Terrorism creates a mood of intense anxiety that is specifically linked to the nature of the phenomenon. It aims at deliberately attacking innocent persons. Combs states that to "qualify as an appropriate victim of a terrorist today, we need not be tyrants or their sympathizers; we need not be connected to the evils the terrorist perceives; we need not belong to a particular group. We need only be in the wrong place at the wrong time".[9] The seemingly arbitrary and unpredictable nature of terrorism, both in terms of the victims thereof, and the effect of terrorism upon the minds of the individual and the concerned society, adds to the anxiety that is caused by the threat. The use of terror resulting in the creation of extreme fear is inherently part of the phenomenon of terrorism.

- The political objective of terrorism is to influence some government or policy by targeting symbolic victims that serve as instrumental targets of violence. Terrorism may be regarded as a means of communication to voice dissent with political decision-making or the political dispensation, with the implication that the action the terrorist embarks on is illegitimate and inappropriately violent/lethal.[10] Terrorism is, according to Whittaker, fundamentally and inherently a political act. It is violence, or the threat of violence in pursuit of a political aim.[11] Kegley argues that political inspiration is a primary facet of terrorism, which has in essence a political goal of coercing others into doing things they would otherwise not give in to.[12]

The Policy Working Group on Terrorism of the UN also states that "terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere criminality".[13] The Working Group emphasises that, to overcome the problem of defining terrorism, it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology. The shift in meaning of the term; the changes in the way terrorists regard themselves; the modes of behaviour of terrorists over the past decades; and the wide application and manifestation of terrorism, contribute to the difficulty in developing one common definition.[14]

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This argument is amplified by the addition of certain elements to the concept, equating it at times with terms such as guerrilla warfare, revolution and liberation struggle.[15] Terrorism remains a varied threat with a range of causes and objectives. The absence of a widely used definition is apparent in the lack of a commonly used definition in multilateral conventions. These conventions basically list terrorist acts, but do not give a comprehensive generally applicable definition which may be used to objectively identify a terrorist act. In spite of the difficulty of providing a universally acceptable or applicable definition for terrorism, it is the act of terrorism which is condemned unequivocally, regardless of the motive or cause of the application of terrorism.[16]

In the same vein the African Union (AU) provides a rather broad framework to define an act of terrorism: "Terrorist act", according to the AU framework, means:

a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
    (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
    (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
    (iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).[17]

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Wilkinson notes a number of elements of terrorism as essentially characterising the phenomenon. These elements are useful in the development of a more universal definition of terrorism:[18]

- it is premeditated, with the aim of creating a climate of extreme fear;
- it is directed at a wider audience than the immediate victims of violence;
- it involves symbolic and random targets;
- the acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, and thus causes a sense of outrage; and
- it is used in general terms to influence political behaviour.

The analysis of various definitions and elements of terrorism thus points out the following central facets that assist in defining terrorism:

- Terrorism is politically motivated.
- Terrorism essentially involves violence, or as important, the intention to commit violence is present.
- A fundamental cause of the act of terror must be present - if this is not the case, the act may be regarded as merely criminal. The cause is almost always related to the religious, the ideological or political perception of the terrorist.
- The objective of terror is to instil fear.

2. A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM

Contemporary terrorism is a rather broad concept ranging from the social to the legal sphere. Its implication over such a broad range contributes to the perception that terrorism changed significantly over the last decades. The 11 September 2001 attacks projected terrorism into the public, political and security spheres. Subsequently, a number of new assessments of the phenomenon were developed, which in broad terms state that terrorism is a new phenomenon; that it is employed by weak organisations; and that it originates in the Third World.[19] In order to set out more clearly what constitutes terrorism, taking into account its broad implication, range and manifestation, the following typology is presented as a framework according to which various types of terrorism may be categorised in terms of the manifestation of the phenomenon.

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- Domestic versus International Terrorism

Distinctions between domestic and international terrorism are important in an analysis of terrorism. International terrorism refers to incidents involving citizens of more than one state, while domestic terrorism refers to terror within the boundaries of one country, aimed at domestic targets.[20] In the context of globalisation, terrorism has become more international in its manifestation, with the result that additional elements may be added to a definition of international terrorism. It is argued that terrorism becomes international terror when it is directed at foreigners or foreign targets; when it is perpetrated by governments or factions of more than one state; or when it has the objective of influencing the policies of a foreign government.[21]

Although international and domestic terrorism may be conceptually different, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two manifestations of terrorism. This is a result of the international consequences of a terrorist act, as well as media attention on an international level. International terrorism may be classified into three categories: [22]

- International terrorism conducted by autonomous non-state actors.
- State-sponsored international terrorism by persons controlled by a sovereign state.
- International state terrorism perpetrated by a state with the use of its own agents.

- State Terror and State-sponsored Terrorism

Terrorism in the context of the state also distinctly falls into two categories. State terror involves the execution of terrorist acts against citizens of a specific state, which has the aim of instilling fear through violent acts, such as the assassination of political opponents, imprisonment without trial and the torture of opposing citizens. State terror primarily lies within the domestic sphere, in contrast with state-sponsored terrorism, which has international implications. State terrorism can however have an international dimension as well, such as in the case of the murder of dissidents abroad by state agents. State-sponsored terrorism refers to the support of a patron state to a

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terrorist organisation to perpetrate acts of terror against another state.[23] This, by implication, occurs on the international level.

- Revolutionary and Sub-revolutionary Terrorism

Revolutionary terrorism refers to those situations where the threat of or the actual use of violence is aimed at complete revolutionary change and overthrow of the government. Sub-revolutionary terrorism refers to political violence aimed at changing a political system, not necessarily overthrowing it. Revolutionary terrorism includes terrorism as part of a broader insurgency, but not all incidences of terrorism reach the level of insurgency. The insurgencies of the post-Cold War era are mainly fought on the intrastate level by revolutionary groups, militias, mercenaries and paramilitaries.[24]

The development of the typology is primarily based on the area and type of manifestation of the phenomenon, but it is in addition possible to distinguish specific motives in the employment of terrorism. An overview of the motivational forces currently prevalent in the occurrence of terrorism is therefore also provided.

3. THE MOTIVES OF TERRORISM

Cold War terrorism was mainly driven by an ideological motive aligned to the bipolar character of the world, but contemporary terrorism provides evidence that an increasing number of motives are shaping the phenomenon according to the specific value system of the individuals and groups that use terror to achieve their objectives. Although the motives of terrorism have diversified after the end of the Cold War, it may all be linked to an overall political objective.

3.1 RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

Religious terrorism is motivated by fanatical religious beliefs and is related to religion, sects and even the supernatural. One of the most distinguishing features of the changing face of terrorism over the past fifteen years has been the revitalisation and propagation of terrorist groups motivated by religion. In the late 1960s, none of

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the identified terrorist groups could be classified in terms of religion. Currently, the religious motive is an important driving force of the major terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.[25]

Terrorism in terms of the religious association contains a "radically different value system, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality" and a completely different world view.[26] One of the most pressing threats of religious terrorism is the fact that the perpetrators of terrorism in these instances act for no one but themselves and their divinity. For the religious extremist that resorts to terrorism, violence becomes a holy act in itself executed in direct response to some religious demand or imperative. Such terrorist groups are of the opinion that they have a mission to fulfil, and this makes it unlikely that political factors might constrain their acts of violence, as may be the case with more pragmatic and politicised groups.[27]

The lethal nature of religious terrorism lies in the continual search for radical changes in value systems, which can only be achieved by the total destruction of the enemy. In some instances of religious terrorism, the objectives have moved beyond the demand for the establishment of some theocracy. Actions are based on a volatile mixture of subversive, ethnic and religious beliefs.[28] This volatile combination of religion and terrorism is one of the main reasons for the increased lethality of terrorism in its modern manifestation. Religious fanaticism can more easily overthrow psychological barriers to mass murder than the ideological and radical political agenda of previous eras.[29]

Wilkinson states that it is significant that terrorist groups with religious motives have emerged or consolidated after the late 1970s.[30] Prior to this period, the majority of active international terrorist groups had secular goals, with some or other variance on Marxist theory and ideology. After the late 1970s, however, religious fanaticism has dominated the phenomenon, with greater inclination for mass lethality, because a bomber who believes he is carrying out a deed of terrorism for a divine reason, will not necessarily be inhibited by a sense of guilt for innocent victims.[31]

It is important to note that religious terrorism is not only restricted to Islamic groups. Religious motives are dominant in terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah, but terror

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is also used by other religious groups such as Sikh, Hindu and Jewish groups, as well as Christian fundamentalists.[32] The common denominator in all of the religious groups that use terrorism as a means is fundamentalism or radicalism.

3.2 ETHNIC-NATIONALIST TERRORISM

This form of terrorism aims at establishing political self-determination. It has a predominantly political motive, and the term 'political terrorism' is generally used to describe terrorism with political motives and objectives. Wilkinson categorises the perpetrators of this sort of terrorism as 'nationalists'.[33] Ethnic-nationalist terrorism has clear political objectives as its foundation and is in most cases opposed to the political system or ideology of the government of the day. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are examples of terrorist organisations fuelled by political motives.[34] Terrorist motives, which aim at establishing an alternative political order, are regarded to be the result of a fusion of ethnic, ideological, separatist and nationalist ideals.

Ethnic, national or separatist struggles in Central Africa, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India are also examples of this form of terrorism. The use of terror as a weapon in these struggles increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Intrastate conflicts around the world have terror as a common denominator which forms part of the wider array of warfare.[35]

Right wing extremist groups have ethnic nationalist objectives as a basis. Groups with these objectives to the right of the societal and political spectrum include the Ku Klux Klan in the US and neo-Nazi groups in Europe.

3.3 PSYCHOTIC TERRORISM

Psychotic terrorism includes spontaneous and irrational terrorist acts by unbalanced individuals with seemingly political, religious or other objectives, stemming from *inter alia* a search for acknowledgement or public attention. The bombing of the Oklahoma City building by Timothy McVeigh in which 164 people were killed may be regarded to be the result of psychotic terrorism.[36]

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3.4 SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

Single-issue terrorism refers to extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting a specific perceived grievance, usually attributed to governmental action or inaction. The three most prominent forms of single-issue terrorism originate from animal rights groups, environmentalists or anti-abortion pressure groups. The primary objective with single-issue terrorism is not profound social or political change, but rather a widespread change of attitude by the government and the population. It is this facet of single-issue terrorism that contributes to its political nature. Single-issue terrorism can manifest both in the domestic and international sphere.[37]

The concept of terrorism has been mapped out in the previous two sections with the provided typology, as well as the analysis of the motives of terrorism. In the examination of the defining characteristics of post-Cold War terrorism, it is apparent that a review of the current trends will also assist in the conceptualisation of the phenomenon. The current trends are adding to the perception that terrorism of the post-Cold War era is dramatically different from that of the pre-1990s.

4. CURRENT TRENDS IN TERRORISM

The change in the international and domestic political arenas since the end of the Cold War should have ideally brought an end to threats such as terrorism, but it has intensified over the past two decades and has become more pressing after 11 September 2001. This event denotes a dramatic moment in the manifestation of the phenomenon.

The terrorism of the 21st century is dynamic, and this dynamic evolving of the motivations, strategies and tactics of the post-Cold War terrorism is evident in the changing nature of its manifestation and its perpetrators.[38] This contributes to the difficulty experienced by governments to counter the threat. Where Cold War terrorism was mainly propaganda for ideological purposes, it has now become a threat

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that aims to inflict as much destruction as possible. The terrorism of the 21st Century has become a "small-group activity, as a component of insurgency and revolutionary warfare, and as an adjunct of the new organised crime."[39]

The post-Cold War terrorism has become indiscriminate and the structure of the leadership is increasingly varied. The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction that receives much attention from counter-terrorism agencies, contributes further to the changed perception of the phenomenon of terrorism.

4.1 THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE NEW TERRORISM

Methods used by current terrorists seem to aim at killing as many people as possible. Terrorism has thus gained an indiscriminate target strategy. This trend was prominent in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which resulted in 301 casualties. The indiscriminate nature of terrorism was dramatically displayed by the 11 September 2001 attacks. Combs's[40] remark that "we need only be at the wrong place at the wrong time" is a relevant description for this trend. Factors that contribute to the trend of indiscriminateness are the higher number of casualties and increased lethality, as terrorists increasingly aim to execute high-impact attacks to draw as much attention as possible. The religious motivation of some terrorist groups also contributes to this trend, as identity of the victims is of no significance in comparison with the sacramental nature of the attacks.

4.2 THE TREND OF SUPER-TERRORISM

Super-terrorism refers to the potential of terrorist groups procuring weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear devices and chemical/biological weapons, with the possibility that they can destroy infrastructure and kill people on a large scale in a single indiscriminate attack.[41] Terrorist organisations of the past depended on conventional weapons, such as machine guns, hand guns and bombs, which limited casualties, because their primary objective was to undermine the opposed system in terms of public confidence rather than causing the indiscriminate death or maiming of a large number of innocent bystanders.

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The trend of super-terrorism is evident in the Tokyo subway attack in 1995 in which Sarin nerve gas was released. The nerve gas resulted in far less casualties than what would have been the case with a conventional attack. In view of this, it is ironic that the Aum Shinrikyo group spent a large amount of money, and employed highly skilled technicians, with limited casualties. The group also failed in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in Tokyo.[42]

Biological and chemical weapons, as well as nuclear weapons, however confront terrorist groups with significant technical challenges. Although sophisticated chemicals might be freely available, the obtaining of large enough quantities and the know-how to develop them into effective weapons in fact lie with nation-states, and not necessarily with small groups. However, terrorist groups can obtain these from states that might covertly support terrorism against, for example, the US. A number of states that the US identified as state sponsors of terrorism allegedly have programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.[43] It is also worth noting that this element has been an important impetus in the 'War on Terror' as fought by the US against Iraq, of which the fight against Al-Qaeda has become a central facet.

Given this, and the potential of additional anti-US (and allies) subversive and corrupt elements within such states, the threat of super-terrorism may become very real. The anthrax scare in the US after the attacks on 11 September 2001 is also evident of the potential threat of the use of biological weapons, as is the arrest of Islamic fundamentalists in London with evidence of highly explosive substances in their possession.[44]

Weapons of mass destruction and the trend of super-terrorism have been foreseen since the demise of the Cold War, with speculations that the lack of control over nuclear weapons; the diaspora of knowledgeable experts after the Cold War; and the relatively free access to information on the world wide web, could assist in the development of biological weapons. Despite the projections of analysts on the potential threat emanating from weapons of mass destruction, it was the utilisation of aircraft as missiles on 11 September 2001 which vividly displayed the trend of super-terrorism.

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4.3 FANATICAL TERRORISM

With the trend of super-terrorism comes the appearance of fanatical terrorism. Traditional terrorist groups had political agendas with the primary objective of being recognised by the government for their opposition on the ideological level, but radical religious thought results in irrational fanaticism. The fanatical nature of the new terrorism can be found in groups with radical religious objectives, such as Al-Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf.[45]

4.4 ANONYMOUS TERRORISM

During the Cold War, terrorist attacks had clear-cut predominantly political, and secondary societal and economic motives and objectives. Responsibility for terror incidents was claimed by specific groups. The stereotypical Cold War terrorist organisations had a well-defined and recognisable command and control apparatus, for example the Japanese Red Army. Members of these terrorist organisations were well-trained in the techniques and tactics of terrorism.[46]

The motives of current terrorist groups are, however, not clearly visible, and structure and membership are diffuse, as are links between terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and groups in the Philippines and Indonesia. The motives and objectives of the modern day terrorist groups are blurred by fanaticism, and the fact that their organisational structure and membership cannot necessarily be pinpointed, complicates the countering of terrorism. Uncertainty over motives and expected attacks results in the almost *ad hoc* nature of these groups. To a certain extent, the element of surprise is exactly what gives the contemporary terrorist an advantage. Additionally attacks are increasingly less likely to be followed by claims of responsibility.[47]

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4.5 THE LOOSE STRUCTURE OF TERRORISM

The shift in terrorist motives has contributed largely to the way some terrorist groups are structured. Because it has its foundation increasingly in religious motives, it does not necessarily have a specific nationalistic, ethnic or ideological agenda. This allows for a loose and less hierarchic organisational structure. The organisational structure of the modern-day terrorist group tends to be a collective of small groups, individuals or amateurs with no central command, but more often than not, with international links to other similarly leaderless groups.[48]

The leaderlessness of the contemporary terrorist organisation allows for increased lethality of actions, due to the fact that minimal constraints are placed on such individuals/groups in terms of identification of a target or the degree of violence to be inflicted. This also contributes to the increasing internationalisation of modern-day terrorism.[49] The loose structure of terrorist networks is also a contributing factor to the difficulty in tracking and penetrating possible terrorist cells.

4.6 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF TERRORISM

Terrorism continuously acquires new resources, and the way in which these resources are applied by terrorist movements contributes to its dynamic nature. Cyber developments facilitate communication among members of terrorist groups in different countries. Technologies such as cellular communication, e-mail, and expanded connectivity are beneficial to terrorist groups that are dispersed across the globe.[50] New means of financial support are also exploited by terrorist groups.[51] Alongside legitimate businesses such as export companies, agricultural schemes and construction operations, Osama bin Laden has also been using the ancient *Hawala* banking system to move financial resources underground across international borders.[52] Governments attempt to counter these through regulations aimed at countering money laundering. Between September 2001 and October 2002, 167 countries blocked terrorist assets. This resulted in the freezing of assets to the value of approximately US$112 million.[53] Terrorist organisations are innovative, and the manner in which they use each other, their links and loopholes in security mechanisms emphasises the internationalisation of the threat. The strength of terrorist

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organisations increasingly lies in their ability to exploit these international dimensions.

The motives, objectives, manifestations and trends of terrorism are diffuse, and there is substantial overlapping between these aspects of the phenomenon. In an attempt to provide clarity on these overlapping aspects, the causes of terrorism are reviewed as an additional factor in the analysis of terrorism.

5. CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Terrorism takes effect when certain prerequisites are present. Cause and motive are regarded to be two central factors that shape human behaviour. The absence of either would theoretically not result in action. It is thus stated that terrorism would theoretically also only occur if or when there are both sufficient cause and motive.

A framework for the analysis of terrorism was developed by Schultz in 1978.[54] His framework classifies terrorism according to three general categories for political action by external or internal agents, with seven additional variables. These categories are revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism and establishment terrorism, with variables which focus on cause, environment, goals, strategy, means, organisation and participation. Shultz's categorisation is useful for most manifestations of the phenomenon. This categorisation includes the typology provided above, and it provides for the motivational force, such as religious or political motives. An aspect or facet of terrorism which is however not sufficiently addressed in Schultz's framework, is the causal factor.

There have to be specific conditions or factors for the manifestation of terror and there has to be specific impetus for the action to take place. According to Crenshaw in Whittaker, a framework for the analysis of terror can centre on preconditions (which refer to situational variables) and precipitators (causal factors).[55]

From the above two approaches follows a triangular setting which could be useful to explain the phenomenon. Each of the angles of the triad is prominent and carries

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equal weight in the understanding of terrorism, and without any one of the angles, the phenomenon cannot exist.

Figure 1: Interrelationship of motive, cause and precipitant in the phenomenon of terrorism



Certain motives and objectives of terrorism as discussed above are regarded as prerequisites for terrorist action, without which the act of terrorism could be equated with ordinary crime. A variety of motives have been identified, ranging from religion, to ethnicity and nationalist objectives, with the overall objective being political.

The causal factor as a prerequisite for terrorism is wide-ranging. Grievances of a specific group which have not been adequately addressed by its government, are examples of the causes of terrorism. This causal factor addresses that which sets the stage for terrorism. It is the precondition that stimulates and directs motivation for violent action. Wilkinson's state of relative deprivation or alienation as a cause for internal political violence is of significance. [56]

This poses the question why individuals or groups might see violent action or terrorism as the only option. What would be the final trigger that 'warrants' in the eyes of the terrorist, the violence that he/she embarks upon? The precipitating factor might be the reaction of a government dealing with protest action, or it might be reluctance or failure of the state or government to address the concerns of a specific population group.

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Shultz's categorisation lies on the motivational and causal angles, while precipitating factors are not addressed. The motivational and causal factors of terrorism are regarded to be largely situational. These situational factors are to a degree predictable. The precipitating factors are the most difficult to project, as these are idiosyncratic and unpredictable. Although it is regarded as an essential angle or corner of the triad, it might only be possible to identify the precipitators after an event of terrorism, thus not giving much opportunity for counter-terrorism activity on this dimension.

6. CONCLUSION

During the height of the Cold War, the threat of terrorism was part of guerrilla warfare, revolutionary tactics and state-sponsored violence. The ideological motivation for terrorist attacks was the determining factor in the decision to embark on terrorism during this period. Contemporary terrorism however has broadened in motive and manifestation and the main trends that denote this diversification are the following:

- Terrorist attacks are no longer only directed against a prominent official or head of state. The range of acceptable victims of terrorism broadened to include so-called soft targets so that frequent attacks occurred during the latter part of the twentieth century on individuals of less significance, but easier to attack.[57]
- State-sponsored terrorism is a continuing feature of terrorism. It has been a tactic of foreign policy of many countries before and during the Cold War, and it remains as such after the demise of the superpower bipolarity of the 1990s. State-sponsored international terrorism remains one of the dire concerns to international security.[58]
- The threat of terrorism has increased with the globalisation of the post-Cold War era. Modern methods of travel result in large numbers of commuters being concentrated in confined areas, posing an opportunity for lethal high-impact acts of terrorism. Modern communication channels contribute to the

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effectiveness of terrorist groups and they also allow for the expansion of the 'audience' that may be reached by one single attack.

Current trends in international and domestic terrorism are indicative of the fact that the threat has global implications. Modern-day terrorism clearly poses a threat to international security, as well as to the national security of individual states. Against this background, the question arises to what extent domestic and international terrorism threatens South Africa's national security. The next chapter focuses on the manifestation of terrorism in South Africa since 1994, not only in relation to the typologies, characteristics and trends of the global phenomenon, but also in view of its historic background.

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CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT MANIFESTATIONS OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

The threat of terrorism in the South African context underwent substantial change after the end of the Cold War, and after 1994 specifically. The general belief amongst South African citizens during the advent of the new democratic dispensation seemed to have been that terrorism was something of the past. The use of terrorism as a means to either bring about political change or to uphold a segregated political dispensation, according to popular belief, no longer had any relevance and the perception was thus that there was no further motive for the use of terrorism.

However, several incidents of violence were experienced in Cape Town during the 1998 to 2000 period, with the familiar undertones of terrorism. Mafia-style activities in the taxi industry displayed the characteristics of terrorism, and the violence within the context of gangsterism was also indicative of the increasing threat of terrorist-type activities within the criminal sphere. Within the radical right, terrorist activities occurred sporadically since 1994, and the latter part of 2002 saw a resurgence of this phenomenon, indicating that the threat within the democratic South African dispensation had not subsided.

Prior to 1994, terrorism as a means to achieve political change in South Africa largely occurred as part of insurgency, while agents of the state also applied tactics associated with terrorism. The South African understanding of terrorism was within the then concept of national security, thus the strict traditional Cold War paradigm, and terrorism was a significant part of this security agenda. However, after 1994, with the onset of South African democracy and the revised view of national security, terrorism initially became a less pressing part of the national security agenda. This was not only the case with South Africa. It was amplified on international level with less initial emphasis on terrorism as a security threat, although there were changes in the trends, typology and characteristics of the threat in a global context that could have

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been regarded as indicative of the increased potential of the threat to destabilise international stability and security.

The aim of Chapter three is to provide a perspective on terrorism in the South African context, with a brief overview and evaluation of the manifestation of the phenomenon prior to 1994. Changes in the manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa since 1994 are also indicated in this chapter and a categorisation of South African terrorism is provided.

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: TERRORISM AS A SECURITY THREAT PRIOR TO 1994

A study of terrorism in the pre-1994 political era poses a specific problem. Terrorism as a security term described an ideology-linked phenomenon that was defined in accordance with narrow interpretations of state security *versus* a quest for liberation. Terms such as 'freedom fighter', 'guerrilla warfare' and 'liberation forces' were equated with terrorism by official South African institutions, while the activities of security forces were in turn seen as state terrorism. A possible solution is to focus on the means employed (and targets affected) which may be equated with terrorism, rather than the motive of the concerned parties, whether from the side of the liberation forces, or from the side of the state or state-supported groups involved in terrorist-type activities.

Considering the sensitivity in the South African context after 1994, it is thus important to emphasise that terrorism is regarded as a form of political violence with terror tactics used as a weapon or method. Terrorism used during the pre-1994 era in South Africa was not a philosophy or political movement *per se*, it was rather the result of the employment of violence that developed and increased since 1976, which culminated in various terrorist-type activities. The 1983 Church Street bombing in Pretoria and the Wimpy Bar bomb in Amanzimtoti are all examples of terrorist-type activities, as are the assassinations of major anti-apartheid role players such as David Webster and Matthews Goniwe. Although no formal or official responsibility for the

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Boipatong massacre was ever claimed, former President Nelson Mandela also cited this as a "strategy of state terrorism".[1]

Any study of pre-1994 violence in South Africa should indicate, as a point of departure, that this era was set within a political ideology based on apartheid; opposition from politically deprived people; and an exploitation of the Cold War era by various forces. An examination of pre-1994 violence and terror, specifically during the height of the anti-apartheid struggle, shows that violence in the South African context was endemic as a way of expressing political views and as a strategy of political action. Terrorism became part of the revolutionary warfare of the opposition forces. It displayed the urgency of the attempts from certain opposition forces to force the government to surrender and to institute a democratic regime. By its own admission, the campaign of the African National Congress (ANC) and its military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) was aimed at the destruction of the political, social and economic structure of South Africa through political subversion and propaganda, and sabotage.[2] At the Morogoro Conference of the ANC in 1969, the organisation adopted the document *Strategies and Tactics of the ANC* in which it was stated that "the riot, the street fight, the outburst of unorganised violence, individual terrorism; these were symptoms of the militant spirit...The winning of our freedom…demands an understanding and an implementation of revolutionary theory and techniques."[3] All of these formed part of the political violence that was employed as a strategy of the liberation forces.

1976 became a watershed year in South African history for a number of reasons. It marked the comprehensive mobilisation of politically and socially deprived people of South Africa with the students' uprising against black education; it forced South Africans to align themselves with either of the political sides; and it introduced an era in which terror, from both anti-apartheid elements and the state security forces was unleashed in the country. A number of South Africans opposing the regime fled the country to neighbouring Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique, as well as to Tanzania, Angola and Libya. In these supporting countries, insurgency training enabled them to clandestinely infiltrate South Africa for political and violent activities.[4]

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During the period 1977 to 1986, 454 incidents of sabotage and armed attacks were reported, which was indicative of the revolutionary armed struggle of the ANC as adopted at the Morogoro Conference.[5] Oil storage tanks at Sasolburg were blazed, the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station was limpet-mined and RPG missiles were launched at the Voortrekkerhoogte military base.[6] All these attacks had one common denominator: it was aimed against military or economic targets, with the argument that it was a military strategy that was employed rather than acts of terrorism.

An important turning point in the strategy employed by the organisations opposed to apartheid prior to the 1990s came with the detonation of a car bomb in Church Street in Pretoria on 20 May 1983. 19 people were killed and more than 200 were injured in the bomb blast, which targeted the building where among others, offices of the South African Air Force were located.[7] In this regard former President Nelson Mandela remarked in his autobiography that "if sabotage did not produce the results we wanted, we were prepared to move on to the next stage: guerrilla warfare and terrorism".[8] The Church Street bomb indicated for many that terrorist-type activities by the liberation forces were also aimed at civilians.

The 'soft target strategy' became increasingly controversial. On the one hand the official point of view carried by the insurgents was that it aimed its attacks on military or state institutions, but in practice it seemed that attacks were also launched against targets where civilians could also be victims. This strategy culminated in the intensification of the armed struggle, which included the placing of limpet mines in shopping malls, cafes and busy streets. The change of strategy that was followed by the ANC after the 1980s indeed had an impact on all South Africans as many innocent civilians became victims of violence.

On the sub-revolutionary level, a number of terror incidents were perpetrated by extremist right wing groups prior to 1994. These were aimed at individuals and institutions that, in their views, compromised the ideals of the Boer nations. One such organisation was the White Commando, that was linked to a bomb attack in 1980 at the office of Professor Jan Lombard at the University of Pretoria, after he stated that the then Natal province should be governed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, of the *Inkatha*

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Freedom Party (IFP).[9] Terrorism by the right wing was not so much aimed at other population groups but against those "who promote racial integration and black rule".[10]

In hearings before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), (instituted after 1994 to give amnesty to perpetrators of violence and politically-motivated acts during the previous era) terrorist-type activities employed sinisterly by state forces became public. Although political leaders of the pre-1994 period denied knowledge or approval of this type of activities, the fact remains that it was carried out with state resources by members of official statutory bodies in support of the then political dispensation. Those labelled as terrorists, freedom fighters or guerrillas were regarded as the enemy of the state. Some cases heard at the TRC can clearly be categorised as state terrorism. Steele, journalist of *The Observer* remarked in 1997 following the trial of Eugene De Kock, commander of the then security structure responsible for actions against anti-SA government activists, that "the whites-only elections of the apartheid period, a parliamentary system and the… independence of the all-white judiciary masked a secretive and brutal national security apparatus".[11]

After 1994, with the onset of the new political dispensation, an ideological paradigm shift also occurred. The provocation for terrorist-type activities was presumably settled with the democratic election and it could subsequently be argued that terror in South Africa was no longer a threat to security. Despite this, the post-1994 era continued to experience terror that threatened stability and security, thus a review of the main manifestations of terrorism in the new era is presented in the following section.

2. THE MANIFESTATION OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER 1994

Since 1994, a number of incidents perpetrated by individuals claiming to come from the ranks of anti-crime groups, as well as from the right of the political spectrum, indicated that the threat of terrorism in South Africa had not completely subsided with the onset of democracy. According to the South African Law Commission (SALC), more than 400 "criminal" detonations of explosives occurred between 1994 and 2000,

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where railway lines, offices of political parties, power lines, schools, taxi ranks, police stations, post offices, houses, mosques, mine hostels, shebeens, restaurants, and vehicles were targeted. Devices used in these detonations included the more traditional explosives, such as improvised explosive devices (in 42 cases), commercial explosives (61), pipe bombs (117), hand grenades (59), rifle grenades (2), car bombs (4) a landmine, and petrol bombs (16) apart from capped fuses, stun grenades, thunder flashes and ammonium nitrate.[12]

Not all of these detonations were linked to political motives, and some of these may be defined as sabotage or common crime. As an example, the detonations on railway lines formed part of the *modus operandi* of criminal groups to force goods trains to stop due to the damaged rails, in order to raid carriages. In this regard the SALC points out that the threat of criminal acts (such as heists and highway robberies committed in a precise, military type of fashion) may be likened to acts of terrorism in many countries.[13] The KwaZulu-Natal violence of the 1990s, mainly as a result of the tension between supporters of the IFP and the ANC, also led to violent political action. These incidents displayed the character of urban terrorism. The nomenclature could also be applicable to violent acts occurring within the taxi industry, but these acts never displayed any clear political motive, which is argued to be essential for classification of a violent act as terrorism.

In the attempt to evaluate the proposition that terrorism still poses a security threat, the following provides an overview of the manifestation of terrorism in South Africa since 1994.

2.1 VIOLENCE IN THE WESTERN CAPE

Terrorist-type activity in the Western Cape reached a high in the 1998 to 2000 period and the manifestation thereof was attributed to the (initially) anti-crime group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). In order to contextualise the public assumption of the association between PAGAD and terrorist activity, it is necessary to provide a broad historic overview of the organisation, its objectives and activities.

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PAGAD was established in November 1995 in Cape Town as a response to public dissatisfaction regarding unacceptable levels of crime specifically on the Cape Flats. The PAGAD initiative was initially met with countrywide support: communities in Laudium (Pretoria) and Actonville (Benoni) held meetings to add their voices to the PAGAD initiative, and in Port Elizabeth a group with similar objectives was established with the name People Against Drugs And Violence (PADAV). The initial public aim of PAGAD in 1995, to act as a broad front against crime, drew a variety of organisations and citizens from diverse ideological, political and religious backgrounds, with the common objective of eradicating the activities of gangs and drug smugglers that emerged in the Cape Flats area.[14]

PAGAD was initially widely supported by moderate Muslim community leaders, and citizens (mainly but not exclusively) from the Muslim community, but it seemed that QIBLA, a militant pro-Shi'ite fundamentalist force that sought to propagate strict Islamic ideals, saw PAGAD as a vehicle to mobilise the Muslim community to achieve this fundamentalist doctrine.[15] The role of Achmat Cassiem became a common denominator. Cassiem was both leader of QIBLA and member of PAGAD during the height of the spate of terror in the Western Cape. During PAGAD marches Cassiem appeared as a central figure. The marches were also associated with the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), of which Cassiem was a founder member in the mid-1990s. It points to the interwoven relationship which developed between PAGAD, QIBLA and fundamentalist Muslim groups during the height of vigilante action in the Western Cape from 1995 to 1999. A protest march which was held in Athlone in March 1996 indicated the collaboration between PAGAD, the IUC and QIBLA, where some of the marchers were identified as members of QIBLA as well as PAGAD's G-Force, the militant structure of PAGAD.[16]

September 1996 saw a split developing within PAGAD when some PAGAD members moved for the declaration of a *Jihad* against drugs and crime. This caused a split along populist and fundamentalist sentiments, with the result of increasing alienation of moderates within the organisation. The original objective of PAGAD was to combat drugs and crime and the influence of a religious objective led to the radicalisation of the organisation, to the extent that Ali Parker, former PAGAD operational commander stated in September 1996 that PAGAD was controlled by

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QIBLA. Parker was eventually suspended, and the moderates within the PAGAD leadership structure were effectively neutralised by the further suspension of Farouk Jaffer (spokesperson for the Western Cape PAGAD) and Nadthmi Edries, who was the leader of the organisation. After this split, Cassiem became more involved in the activities of PAGAD and the emphasis shifted from vigilantism to a religious quest to establish an Islamic state by way of a revolution. According to the South African Police Service (SAPS), the militant direction of PAGAD at the end of 1996 was the direct result of leadership positions taken up by QIBLA members.[17]

It seems as if PAGAD used its stance against common fears and concerns as a vehicle to promote its ideology. A re-Islamisation took place from grassroots level, with infiltration into all spheres of Western Cape society.[18] On the face of it, this was the strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, where they engaged in vigilantism against alcohol and pornography, with the aim of instituting Islamic law and dress codes.

The overall Islamic message was that the secular state failed to ensure safety and security for all, due to its moral dissoluteness and secularity. PAGAD thrived as a result of the perception of the public, specifically those communities plagued by gang-related criminal activities, that the police and the justice system could not deliver.[19] During this period, PAGAD held a strong view that government was ineffective and that the mandate of the people was to challenge this incompetence.

Parliamentary debate regarding the bombings that plagued the Cape Peninsula stressed that intelligence pointed towards PAGAD as the perpetrators of terror. According to the then Justice Minister Penuell Maduna, 42 cases of urban terror from 1998 to 2000 in the Western Cape involved PAGAD members, and the then Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, indicated that the evidence pointed to PAGAD.[20]

Between July 1996 and December 1997, the covert structures of PAGAD were pointed out as allegedly involved in 222 cases of violence against suspected drug dealers. After May 1998, however, it seems that PAGAD had taken another route with strong reaction against perceived anti-Islamic points of view, and academics and

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clerics that criticised PAGAD became the targets of the organisation. In the same period, the state machinery that investigated PAGAD activities was targeted as the enemy and was subjected to threats and physical attacks. This increased selectivity of targets (such as the assassination of Magistrate Piet Theron, who was presiding in PAGAD trials and SAPS member Bennie Lategan, who investigated the terror attacks in the Western Cape) also points towards an increased reliance on terror as a means to achieve objectives.[21]

Terror had been the main instrument in the Western Cape, and other organisations such as Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) were also linked to the spate of terror incidents in the Western Cape.[22] A significant remark on violence was made by Cassiem in a media interview when he stated that there were three kinds of violence – institutionalised violence used by governments; criminal violence; and revolutionary violence, which had the aim of eradicating the first two forms of violence.[23] Also significant was literature that was found in possession of Said Mhatey, who was arrested in 2000 for his involvement in the PAGAD violence. On his computer hard drive was *The Terrorist Handbook*, while he also had a hand grenade, a pipe bomb and an illegal firearm in his possession.[24]

A number of diffuse factors influenced the perception that a new wave of urban terror commenced with the emergence of PAGAD. During the height of its onslaught on stability in the Western Cape, the perceptions were that it was part of an attempt to start an Islamic revolution; that it aimed at making South Africa ungovernable; that it wanted to intimidate the SAPS and counter SAPS investigations as part of a demonstration against the ineffectiveness of the government; and that it was part of the gangster war on the Cape Flats. The bomb explosions were indiscriminate and civilians were victims of violence, which created panic and lack of trust in the authorities.[25] In the 1997/1998 period, a total of 195 cases of urban violence were linked to PAGAD,[26] while members of PAGAD, specifically Ebrahim Jeneker and Ismail Edwards were sentenced to three life sentences and a 25 year sentence respectively, for their roles in urban terror incidents.[27]

PAGAD never claimed responsibility for the attacks in the Western Cape. Despite the classification of the organisation as an international terrorist organisation by the US

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Department of State (PAGAD was listed together with QIBLA, as an international terrorist organisation in the 2000 *Patterns of Global Terrorism*) the link between PAGAD and terrorism remained elusive. However, it is the remarks made by Cassiem regarding violence; the type of activities launched by members of PAGAD; and the subsequent jail sentences of PAGAD members which placed the activities of PAGAD within the realm of terrorism. At the time of the sentencing of Jeneker, South Africa's new legal tool to deal with terrorism, was still in the developing phase as the *Anti-Terrorism Bill*, but it is significant that he, as a PAGAD member, was sentenced for "multiple urban terror-related charges:" [28]

During the height of its activities, PAGAD members employed terror as a means to promote its stance, whether this stance was against the ineffectiveness of the organs of government to ensure stability and prosecute perpetrators of violence and crime, or whether it was to promote a specific religious objective. It is not PAGAD's identification as a terrorist organisation or the linking of its motives or causes with that of other terrorists groups that is of ultimate importance, but the significance of PAGAD members' activities lies in the willingness to resort to terror as a tactic.

Urban terror has however not been limited to the Western Cape in the last two decades, neither has it been associated only with individuals or organisations with Islamic ideals or causes. Simultaneous with the urban terror in the Western Cape, groups from the right wing embarked on terror and bomb explosions from this spectrum also claimed lives in the late 1990s.

2.2 THE RIGHT WING THREAT

Terrorism as a means to draw attention to a specific cause was used by individuals with ties to the radical right prior to 1994, and this did not subside after 1994. Since 1996, a number of right wing groups that resorted to terror have come to the fore, such as the so-called *Boere Aanvals Troepe* (BAT) in 1996; *Die Volk*, a structure that was allegedly responsible for the weapons theft at the Tempe Military Base in Bloemfontein in 1998; and the so-called *Boeremag* and *Krygers van die Boerevolk* (Warriors of the Boer Nation) that became prominent in 2002.

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The Worcester bombing in 1996 was indicative of the threat of dissatisfied members of radical right wing organisations executing acts of terror. The Worcester trial highlighted the potential of extremist religious beliefs to result in terrorist activity. In December 1996 three right wingers, who claimed to be part of the so-called *Boere Aanvals Troepe*, placed an explosive device in a shopping centre in Worcester resulting in the death of four people, while sixty people sustained injuries.[29]

The significance of the incident lies in the statements the three gave in court. They were staunch members of the Israel Vision (IV), detached individuals that were residing on a farm in the area where they were concentrating on their religious thoughts, which eventually resulted in their action. The three were also involved in the spate of bomb explosions prior to the 1994 elections.[30] It is religious extremism that shaped the ideas and discussions of the individuals involved in the bombing.

In April 2002, three right wingers were arrested for their planning to blow up the Vaal Dam wall. In the trial, the evidence pointed out the role of religious extremism as a motive for their plan. The formation of a religious sect, the New Christian Crusade, with links to the IV, shaped the ideas of the three.[31]

During the last three months of 2002, a number of bomb explosions in Gauteng (Soweto, Bronkhorstspruit and Midrand) and KwaZulu-Natal (Umtamvuna Bridge) occurred, which were significant in indicating the seriousness of the threat of terrorism from the right wing. Responsibility was eventually claimed by the so-called *Boeremag*.[32] Although it was not a widely-known organisation at that stage, it again points towards the continuing potential for terrorism in South Africa. The *Boeremag* codified its national-separatist objectives in a constitution, with emphasis on its religious foundation, thus combining religion with nationalist ethnicity as a motive for the violence, with the purpose of drawing attention to their cause.[33] Another organisation that claimed responsibility for the bomb explosions, identified themselves as the *Krygers van die Boerevolk*,[34] but until terror manifested, none of these groups openly declared its existence, structure and membership.

The rise of the *Boeremag* points to the existence of individuals that are prepared to resort to violence for an ethnic-nationalist cause. The numbers of like-minded

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radicals are unclear, but the fact remains that attacks on carefully selected targets, such as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, key installations, and airports can create havoc.[35] A remark by Vusi Mavimbela, the then Director General of the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) after the bomb explosions is significant. He pointed out that the spate of bomb explosions at the end of 2002 was "more terrorism than a right wing threat…There is no possibility of them succeeding if the intention is the reversal of the political order. But certainly they have the capacity to create havoc and casualties."[36]

Although the *Boeremag* court cases have not been concluded as yet, it is the occurrence of the bomb explosions that signals the threat of terrorism to national security. Whether the motive of the *Boeremag*'s activities is linked to ethnic-religious political ideals; whether it is caused by perceptions of alienation or relative deprivation, or a permutation of these perceptions; or whether the right wing consists of small numbers of radicals, the significance of their activities lies in the willingness to resort to terrorism as a tactic.

2.3 THE MANIFESTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

In addition to the threat of domestic terrorism, South Africa is also not immune to the impact of international terrorism. Globalisation has had an effect on a number of security concerns, and the possibility that South Africa may become a target or theatre of the manifestation of international terrorism exists. It has, for instance, been speculated that a number of security issues add to the attractiveness of African countries for acts of terrorism due to poor border control and large émigré Muslim communities that could provide refuge to international terrorists.[37]

It has also been argued that a variety of factors leads to international terrorist groups targeting third countries for acts of terror instead of targeting the opponent country.[38] The bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 are examples of this tendency. The relative ease of movement through the borders of some developing countries as a result of poor control measures; opportunities posed by the highly publicised international events and conferences that are increasingly held in countries

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such as South Africa; and the activities of some religious movements or non-governmental organisations that align with religious extremist causes, are some of the factors which contribute to the attractiveness of African countries for acts of terror.[39]

The bombing incident at the then Jan Smuts Airport in 1994 displayed the characteristics of international terrorism, as civilians of foreign countries were among the victims of this act of terror. The Planet Hollywood bombing in the Western Cape in which foreigners and South Africans were affected is also an example of international terrorism. South Africa and its citizens are not immune against the threat of international terrorism, neither on own soil, nor in foreign countries. In the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Bali bomb in December 2002, and the bombings in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in 2006, South Africans were victims. Another incident of terrorism, which could have had some international impact, was the attempted placing of a bomb at a Buddhist temple in Bronkhorstspruit by the *Boeremag* in November 2002.

International terrorism incidents in Africa since 1995, coupled with the lack of proper border control and possible support from international terrorist networks, indicate that no African country is immune against acts of international terrorism. The possibility that refuge could be provided to terrorists on the African continent, is illustrated by the example of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who entered South Africa with a forged passport after the US Embassy bombs in East Africa. He applied for refugee status, and was assimilated into the South African Islamic community in the Western Cape.[40] In another illustration of the ease with which terrorism perpetrators could use Africa, and specifically South Africa as a base, is found in the example of Haron Rashid Aswat, who was believed to have coordinated the London bombs in 2005. He was found to have been living in Johannesburg as an ordinary citizen.[41]

The US has repeatedly stated that Al-Qaeda cells are active in Africa.[42] This, together with South Africa's large immigrant population; the accessibility of its identity documents through fraudulent means; its porous borders; and its good communications infrastructure; contributes to the potential to be used as a base for international terrorism.[43] However, in the case of South Africa, it is domestic terror incidents that pose a greater threat than incidents of international terrorism.

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3. A CLASSIFICATION OF TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT AND CURRENT TRENDS

The classification of terrorism used in Chapter 2 is based on motives and manifestations. A review of terrorist activities in South Africa indicates that ideological terrorism in South Africa had been the most common motive of terrorism prior to 1994. As a result of the political dynamics of pre-1994 South Africa, the terrorism of this era also displayed a racial or ethnic character. However, in line with the global trend, motives for terrorism in South Africa seem to have broadened after 1994.

3.1 A TYPOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICAN TERRORISM

Terrorism in South Africa displays a multifaceted nature, which cannot necessarily be placed within the category of one type of terrorism. The fusion of objectives, aims and trends of terrorism in South Africa, does not allow the categorising of a specific group strictly according to type. Organisations that use terror as a means to communicate their demands or objectives, mainly fall within the following spheres, with some degree of overlapping between the different groups and forms of terrorism.

- Ethnic and ideological terrorism

In the South African context, this form of terrorism is still dominating. Claims of the so-called *Boeremag* and *Krygers van die Boerevolk* that their acts of sabotage were the result of dissatisfaction with the South African government, and that they were prepared for more deeds of terror to be employed for the purpose of self-determination, are indicative of the objective of these acts of terror, based on race and ethnicity. The issues which are stated to be at the basis of the dissatisfaction of the *Boeremag* and the *Krygers van die Boerevolk*, are issues that lie on the political terrain, such as the perceived lack of the South African government to effectively attend to farm attacks; the perceived tolerance of the South African government with the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe; and the fear within the South African farming

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communities that the trend of farm seizures seen in Zimbabwe, will occur in South Africa as well.[44]

Although the 2002 Soweto bombings and threats of terror fall within the category of ethnic-nationalist terrorism, terror emanating from the radical right also falls in the sphere of religious terrorism, as a result of its emphasis on the divinity of a calling to ensure that the chosen people obtain self-determination.[45] The motivational force for these groups is a combination of visions of a white state and religious thought. Although Wilkinson[46] warns that "it would be wise to avoid exaggerating the religious aspects of many of these groups" as there is a strong political/ideological agenda present in their activities. It is the fusion of political thought with religious and ethnic motives that compounds the threat of terror from the extreme right.

- Religious terrorism

As stated above, terror from the radical right does not necessarily only fall within the ethnic-nationalist sphere, but it is a fusion of radical ideology, ethnicity and extreme religious dogma. Religion has always played a central role in right wing activities. Perceptions of white supremacy have been, to a large degree, the reason for the existence of the right wing, not only in South Africa, but also in groups such as the Phineas Priesthood in the US.[47] In South Africa, religious thinking is further fuelled by predictions of 'Siener' van Rensburg, a charismatic seer who predicated the resurgence of white rule in South Africa.[48] The IV religion plays a central role in the propagation that white Afrikaners are supreme, and it is taught by the IV that they are the direct descendants of biblical Israel.[49] In the case of the Vaal Dam group, religious thought was the dominant factor, while the primary motive of the *Boeremag* was the result of a fusion of their religious and ethnic/racial value systems.

In the same manner that right wing groups are driven by, *inter alia*, their religious beliefs, extremist followers of the Muslim faith in the Western Cape saw acts of terrorism as justified in a secular society. The similarities between radical right wing groups and the radicalism of international groups such as Al-Qaeda lie in their perceptions of supremacy and religious elitism.

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3.2 CURRENT TRENDS IN TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

As far as the manifestation of terrorism in South Africa is concerned, the following trends have emerged since 1994.

There is little evidence of any specific structure or hierarchy within groups such as PAGAD and the *Boeremag*. In none of the radical right wing organisations associated with terror over the past years, indications could be found of specific lines of command and control, and widespread speculation on possible cell structures within the radical right wing circles could also not be substantiated so far. With regard to PAGAD, there is uncertainty regarding leadership structures and links between various associated organisations, such as QIBLA. Speculation on possible cell structures within PAGAD is also indicative of the uncertainty regarding the structural layout. A fitting description for PAGAD emphasises this uncertainty: "a completely new type of terrorism – terrorism for its own sake and which remains nameless".[50] It is this unpredictability in terms of structure and leadership combined with a religious and political motive, which contributes to the potential for violence and terrorism. PAGAD never claimed responsibility for terror in the Western Cape, nor did it publicise any leadership structure. At any rate, since the arrest of some of the key figures, it has been relatively dormant.

Another global trend in terrorism is the indiscriminate nature of acts of terror. An analysis of incidents of terror in South Africa since 1994 also substantiates this trend, and the Planet Hollywood bomb and the Worcester bomb are examples. Plastic and commercial explosives, as well as fabricated devices such as pipe bombs and agricultural chemicals, such as fertiliser bombs, have been used.[51]

The main targets of terrorism in South Africa have included businesses, such as the Planet Hollywood restaurant at the Waterfront in Cape Town; government officials and buildings, such as police, police stations, judges and courts of law; and infrastructure such as railway lines and bridges. Both civilians and government officials were potential victims.

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As far as the claiming of responsibility is concerned, there has been a tendency to less frequently claim responsibility for attacks. The *Boeremag* at first did not claim responsibility. This tendency was also evident during the spate of terror in the Western Cape, where PAGAD was reluctant to claim responsibility.[52]

International terrorism currently displays the trend of religious and ethnic motives rather than the ideological motives of the Cold War era. This is also the case in South Africa in the manifestation of domestic terror. Domestic terrorism seems to be the result of a fusion of primarily religious motives on the one hand, and ethnic-nationalist objectives on the other.

4. CONCLUSION

Following the advent of the post-1994 political dispensation in South Africa, the perception arose that terrorism and political violence were something of the past. Various indications that terrorism is still a pressing concern have, however, come to the fore since 1994, such as the Worcester bomb; various cases of urban terror in the Western Cape; and the Soweto and other bombs at the end of 2002. All these incidents point towards the fact that the phenomenon of terrorism in South Africa is still an important security issue. In addition to domestic terror, South Africa is also not immune to the threat of international terrorism.

Motives and objectives of domestic terrorism in the South African context relate to religious and ethnic-nationalist factors, while it seems that in some cases, criminal motives also have an impact on the manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. The necessary prerequisite in terms of an overall political motive is thus largely present in the South African context.

The other prerequisite, the causal factor, is also present. This indicates the potential for contentious groups to resort to terrorism. Groups that had employed terror since 1994 claimed that their discontent with the South African dispensation was the cause for their actions. In the case of PAGAD the claims were that the government failed to effectively combat crime, while the *Boeremag's* alleged decision to resort to terror

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stemmed from a deep dissatisfaction with the government's perceived inability to address issues such as farm murders and discrimination against whites, in the form of affirmative action, land reform and transformation.

An overview of the manifestations, trends and categories of terrorism in the South African context indicates that it continues to be a threat. Chapter 1 argues that the nature of a threat is an essential factor in determining its priority on the security agenda, but political choice is also important in determining security agendas of states. The next chapter provides a synopsis of South African views on national security and its response to terrorism, focusing on the legal framework; statements of political leaders and government officials; and South Africa's position in terms of conventions and resolutions on terrorism in order to measure the significance accorded to this threat.

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CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

Since 11 September 2001, there has been an increased focus on the threat of terrorism and numerous debates on countering the threat took place. One of the primary arguments has been the fact that security budgets and resources since the end of the Cold War had to be scrutinised to find a balance between the perceived threat and other pressing expenditures of modern democracies. After the end of the Cold War, major budget constraints in terms of agent operations and clandestine activity were witnessed in, among others, the US. In this regard, Goodman remarked that post-Cold War American priorities would demand a reallocation of government resources which might result in a reduction of the national security budget by at least ten to twenty per cent over the period after the Cold War.[1]

The same trend followed after 1994 in South Africa where the more pressing demands on a limited budget resulted in fewer resources for intelligence and security forces and increased expenditure on reconstruction and development projects, which corresponds with the argument of a broader security concept as explained in the first chapter. The national security dilemma for the post-Cold War state, as set out in Chapter 1, thus also applied to South Africa after 1994. The challenge for the South African policymakers has subsequently been to allocate resources to those pressing needs that are of developmental nature, amidst the reality that threats to the security of the state and to society, such as terrorism, also demand adequate resource allocation. Parliamentary debates over the past years regarding the budgets of the NIA and the South African Secret Service (SASS) have been indicative of the changed perception of the security threat against the country.

Chapter four provides an overview of the official views of the South African government on national security in general, and on terrorism specifically, against the background of the international appreciation of the terrorist threat, as well as the increasing realisation of the extent of the threat in the African context. Official

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attempts to address the threat are discussed and analysed in this chapter, as well as legislative initiatives to address terrorism with specific emphasis on the *Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities,(POCDATARA) Act*, and South Africa's support for international conventions on terrorism. It provides an overview of political and diplomatic responses to the threat of terrorism, while it also attempts to point out the consequences of terrorism in South Africa, with the ultimate aim of indicating whether terrorism is regarded as a national security threat to South Africa.

1. OFFICIAL SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Official South African views on national security are based on a broad understanding of the concept of national security, congruent with the broad definition of security as freedom from fear and freedom from want. The framework that governs national security is set out in the *Constitution of South Africa*, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), the *White Paper on Defence* (1996) and the *White Paper on Intelligence* (1994). The *White Paper on Intelligence* explains meticulously that national security entails "quality of life, the practise of democracy and the promotion of an internal and international climate of peace and stability".[2] There is a direct relationship, according to the *White Paper on Intelligence*, between national security and peace, stability, development and progress, thus underlining the official stance that

- security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon and incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues; and
- the objectives of security go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social life.

One of the more significant pronouncements on what is understood as national security is found in the *Intelligence Programme for 2000*, issued by the Ministry of Intelligence Services.[3] According to this programme, intelligence has to provide

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support to the government's domestic and international initiatives, thus indicating that the broadened understanding of national security shapes the functions of intelligence. In his budget speech of 2005, the Minister for Intelligence Services stated that the threats of the 21st century, "where more than one in every six human beings, live on less than a dollar a day - encapsulate the inextricable link between development and security. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop as there can be no security without development and no development without security."[4] On another occasion, Kasrils pronounced that the intelligence focus is on a well-informed and secure South Africa, with a government that is enabled to carry out its programme of development to provide a better life and opportunity for all its people.[5]

The South African policymakers see national security threats in the post-1994 era as posing new challenges, for which a new approach is required. Kasrils stated that there is relentless pressure on resources such as energy, water, minerals, fertile land and food, leading to increased competition and potential for conflict. According to him, it affects everyone, especially a new and diverse nation like South Africa, "with a range of domestic challenges and wide international responsibilities, including our obligations within our region and our commitment to the African renaissance"[6]. From the above it is evident that national security is viewed as a holistic and wide concept, closely linked with the national interest of South Africa, and not only with security issues that lie within the ambit of the strict military or traditional sphere of national security.

The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) embarked on a review of the national security strategy that steers intelligence priorities; shapes the official view of national security; and ultimately, guides the operationalisation of national security priorities within the business plans of the intelligence and security stakeholder departments. In the first workshop on the national security doctrine, Kasrils defined national security as "freedom from fear and want". He further explained that "security affects the daily lives of each and every South African, especially if we keep in mind that 'to be secure' actually means to be free from danger, threat or uncertainty, and all common human needs".[7] The opening address during the second National Security Conference held in May 2005, emphasised that

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national security is no longer only defined within the realm of states, but it is rather sensitive to the needs of the individual and the region. The NICOC Coordinator, Barry Gilder, stated at this occasion that the concept of national security includes "an obligation on the state" to provide a facilitating environment for equality; individual participation in a democracy; and adherence to human rights.[8]

Since 1994, the list of intelligence priorities has been indicative of the wider interpretation of national security by the South African government. Among those priorities have been organised crime, corruption, gangsterism, border security and taxi violence.[9] Terrorism has also been a recurring priority on the national security agenda and the 2000 priorities specifically included destabilising "the constitutional order, subversion, sabotage and terrorism, and in particular urban terrorism".[10] The wide range of intelligence priorities for the year 2000 is an example of the political preference of the policymakers of which issues should be on the security agenda.

The challenge, according to Kasrils[11], however remains that the national security concept is still driven by the continued presence of 'hard' security matters, that of international terrorism, organised crime, weapons smuggling and weapons of mass destruction, border issues, drug trafficking, and people smuggling, whilst the security understanding of the South African government is informed by a holistic perspective of a broadened national security concept.

Chapter one of the dissertation states that the national security agenda is ultimately also determined by the political opinion of the policymakers. The official South African views on what constitutes a national security threat are clear from the statements provided above, but it does not suffice in assessing the seriousness with which the South African government views the threat of terrorism. The following section provides the South African responses to the threat in order to evaluate the weight accorded to terrorism as a national security threat by the South African government.

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2. SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

An analysis of the official South African response to the threat of terrorism is aimed at assessing the seriousness with which the threat of terrorism is viewed. In assessing this, three aspects are taken into account. This section reviews the legislative framework; the adherence of South Africa to international conventions; and the official views of the South African government regarding the terrorism threat.

2.1 THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

South Africa has a broad range of security legislation that addresses aspects of the threat of terrorism. Acts such as the *Prevention of Organised Crime Act*, 1998, (Act 121 of 1998) and the *Financial Intelligence Centre Act*, 2001, (Act 38 of 2001) which were promulgated during 1998 and 2001, make provision for the prosecution of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist financing in broad terms. However, the South African legislative framework lacked one single act that could address the threat of terrorism, mainly because the threat of terrorism changed after 1994. Prior to 1994, the threat of terrorism was addressed by the then South African government within the milieu of the Cold War. Changes in the phenomenon of terrorism, as well as international requirements, demanded that additional aspects had to be considered for effective legislation against the threat, and in this regard the SALC emphatically states that "effective legislation to combat terrorism is one of the available tools governments can use in fighting terrorism". [12]

Work on the *Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act*, 2004, (Act 33 of 2004) *(POCDATARA*) had the intention to bring South African legislation for combating terrorism in line with international conventions dealing with terrorism. Defects in legislation on terrorism included a lack of provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction; the definition of a terrorism offence was too narrow; and the financing of terrorism had to be addressed in one separate consolidated piece of legislation. This was the intention with the development of the *POCDATARA Act* over which much debate was provoked.[13]

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In order to contextualise the legislative framework, an overview of legislation which has addressed the threat of terrorism, will be provided, followed by a synopsis of the development of the *POCDATARA Act*. A brief reference to the public reaction regarding the adoption of the Act is included in the discussion.

2.1.1 CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION ON TERRORISM

The *Anti-Terrorism Bill* had its inception during the period of the Western Cape terror attacks which came to a head in the 1996 to 1999 period, perpetrated by (originally) anti-crime groups influenced by fundamentalists with extremist Islamic objectives. The initial purpose of the Bill was to replace anti-terror legislation which originated before 1994. The 11 September 2001 incidents in the US made the process of promulgating the Bill more urgent than ever before.[14]

The drafting of the *Anti-Terrorism Bill* did not take place in isolation from the existing legislative framework that deals with the threat of terrorism, and debate on the Bill also addressed the current framework. In order to place this into perspective, an inventory of the South African legislative apparatus which addresses terrorism is included. Schönteich provides a breakdown of security legislation that previously aimed at addressing criminal activities related to terrorism. He differentiates the legislative apparatus as follows:[15]

- Laws seeking to protect the internal security of South Africa, such as the *Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Act*, 1991, (Act 138 of 1991).
- Legislation that has the purpose of permitting the State to restrict gatherings and public demonstrations, with a State of Emergency which, according to the *Constitution*, may be declared when the "life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster, or other public emergency" in order to restore peace and order.[16]

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- Legislation that allowed state institutions to gather information on terrorist organisations and criminal syndicates, such as the *Criminal Procedure Act*, 1977, (Act 51 of 1977).
- Legislation against the supporters of terrorist groups and their sources of money, criminal gang and organised criminal groups. (*Prevention of Organised Crime Act* and the *Financial Intelligence Centre Act*).

Additional to the above are the following:

- *Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act*, 1998, (Act 15 of 1998), which prohibits military-related services, any attempt, encouragement or solicitation to render such service to a party in an armed conflict in foreign countries (excluding humanitarian or civilian activities with the aim of relieving the plight of civilians).
- *Explosives Act*, amended by Act 83 of 1997, which regulates the manufacture, storage, transport, importation, exportation or use of explosives.[17]

The above legislative framework was however not sufficient to bring South Africa's anti-terrorism legislation in line with international conventions and resolutions relating to the threat of terrorism. The acts did not make adequate provision to address the manifestation of international terrorism (the *Internal Security Act* for instance defined only domestic terrorism, which would be inadequate in an era of internationalisation of security threats) nor for criminalising of financial support for terrorist groups. The new act to counter terrorism, the *POCDATARA Act*, provides a collective legislative framework to address the threat of terrorism, both in domestic and international terms.[18]

2.1.2 BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT

Initial attempts to draft anti-terrorism legislation originated during the period of terror in the Western Cape, and comments of the late Minister of Safety and Security, Steve

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Tshwete, were indicative of the urgency with which the legislation was perceived by the South African government. Ministers Tshwete and Penuell Maduna, former Minister of Justice, argued that the lack of a specific tailor-made statutory framework against terrorism resulted in South Africa becoming a safe-haven for terrorists.[19]

The first request for the review and rationalisation of South Africa's security legislation in 1995 by Tshwete to the SALC gained renewed impetus as a result of the Western Cape terror of the late 1990s. An initial document drafted by the SAPS on the proposed Bill was submitted to the SALC in October 1999. After this submission, additional research, comment and discussion resulted in the publication of the draft bill for general information and comment by the public in mid-2000. The events of 11 September 2001 prompted not only the US, but the whole world to audit its available measures to counter terrorism. Resolution 1373 of the Security Council of the UN, as adopted on 28 September 2001 placed countries under pressure to institute counter-terrorism legislation.[20]

In this regard, Tshwete remarked that "we have offered our support to the Americans in the global fight against terrorism and the fact that we do not yet have an anti-terrorism law has put us under pressure".[21] This was underlined by Maduna's remarks that South Africa would make the necessary contribution to combat terrorist attacks such as those of 11 September 2001; that the government believed that everyone who participated in the attacks should be punished; and that South Africa was part of UN deliberations to find an agreed definition of what constituted terrorism.[22]

The Deputy Director General in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Minty, also stressed that UN Resolution 1373 implied that every country should comply with the counter-terrorism resolution.[23] South Africa's response in developing a new act to counter terrorism, is significant of the urgency with which the threat was perceived from a legislative point of view. This was in adherence to a statement of the UN that terrorism as a global threat challenges countries to protect their citizens, as "terrorism transcends national boundaries and…no region or country remains immune."[24]

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Public debate during the drafting and redrafting of the *Anti-Terrorism Bill* was however notoriously controversial. Opinions ranged from concern about the interrogation measures stipulated in the proposals, to the period of detention of suspects with emphasis on human rights[25]. Strong reaction also emanated from Islamic organisations, which regarded the proposals as part of the global agenda to stigmatise Muslims as potential terrorists.[26] Among the concerns of Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and the Human Rights Commission were:

- that the subject of the Bill was too vague and could lead to abuse of power in the interpretation and application of the legislation;[27]
- that South Africa had a wide range of laws to deal with crime and terror (an opinion which was shared by, among others, the South African Human Rights Commission)[28]; and
- that the Bill was draconian.[29]

The title of the *Anti-Terrorism Bill* was also questioned, and the eventual change of the proposed name to the *POCDATARA Bill* is indicative of the debate that ensued in the public domain. The *POCDATARA Bill* was tabled in the National Assembly in December 2003, and was adopted by the Assembly. On 27 February 2004, it was approved by the National Council of Provinces. Yet it was again amended after the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) voiced dissatisfaction on the broad scope of the definition of terrorism, stating that it had implications for legitimate labour action or similar activity[30], before it was ultimately assented to on 4 February 2005, and published in the Government Gazette of 11 February 2005.

The Act provides a general definition of terrorism, and additionally specifies certain acts of terror. The *POCDATARA Act* recognises that South Africa's territory should be protected against a situation where it can become a stage for the "planning, organisation, or execution of terrorist acts or the initiation or participation in any form of terrorist attacks".[31] It provides for the combating of terrorism in all its consequences and forms, and not only for South Africa becoming a target of terrorism. Its enactment will also facilitate the role of South Africa as a participant in the international counter-terrorism effort, and the position of South Africa in support of international conventions against terrorism is strengthened by the Act.

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2.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

The purpose of international conventions to counter terrorism is to guarantee that responses and prosecution of terrorists are compatible among modern democracies. No country subscribing to these conventions should become a safe-haven for terrorists.

The importance of South Africa adhering to the various conventions is linked to its vision to be a democratic role player in the international arena. In attaining its vision, South Africa has to abide by conventions and regulations in the international arena seeking to enhance common security. Opposition to the international counter-terrorism response would ultimately harm the long-term position of South Africa and would reverse the progress that has been made in ensuring a positive international image of the country. In this regard, President Thabo Mbeki remarked on 10 November 2001 at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly that:

> There can be no doubt but that the peoples of the world have to unite in action to defeat terrorism. There can be no hesitation among any of us in the resolve to work together to ensure that those responsible for the heinous actions of September 11 are brought to justice….
>
> Where we might have used the concept of a global village loosely in the past, on September 11 terrorism taught us the abiding lesson that we do indeed belong to a global village….All must act to promote the safety and security of one and all on the basis of a shared responsibility born of a shared danger. Accordingly, we have no choice but to get together in the village square to agree on the threat that confronts us all...To guarantee world peace and security in the light of the threat posed by terrorism requires that this organisation, the UN, must discharge its responsibility to

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unite the peoples of the world to adopt an International Convention against Terrorism.[32]

South Africa has ratified the following major multilateral international conventions and protocols on counter-terrorism:[33]

- *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft*. South Africa acceded to this convention 26 May 1972.
- *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.* South Africa ratified the convention on 30 May 1972.
- *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.* South Africa ratified the convention on 30 May 1972.
- *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents*. South Africa acceded to the convention on 23 September 2003.
- *The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages*. South Africa acceded to the convention on 23 September 2003.
- *The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*. South Africa signed the convention, but it has not yet been ratified.
- *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.* South Africa acceded to the protocol on 21 September 1998.
- *The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation*. South Africa acceded to the convention on 8 July 2005
- *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.* South Africa acceded to the protocol on 8 July 2005.
- *The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection*. South Africa acceded to the convention on 1 December 1999.
- *The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings*. The convention was ratified by South Africa on 1 May 2003.

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- *The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*. South Africa ratified the convention on 1 May 2003.
- *The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* has not yet entered into force and is thus also not signed, nor ratified by South Africa.

Of the total of thirteen conventions and protocols, South Africa acceded to or ratified eleven. *The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* has been signed, and is yet to be ratified or acceded to. The *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* is awaiting finalisation by UN stakeholders.

Additional to this, South Africa has also ratified the *Algiers Convention of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, which was agreed to at the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in July 1999 in Algiers.[34] This Convention seeks to give impetus to the African contribution to the international fight against terrorism. South Africa subscribes to the *Constitutive Act* of the African Union (AU), in which the AU in 2002 declares as one of its principles, the demand for "respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities."[35] The *Algiers Convention*, to which South Africa and other members of the AU are signatories, is in line with this principle. The *AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* came into force during December 2002 after the 15th country, Ghana, ratified the Convention. At an inter-governmental meeting on terrorism, in Algiers during September 2002 (in which South Africa also participated), it was decided that a Protocol to the AU Convention, establishing a follow-up mechanism, should be formulated to counter terrorism.[36]

3. OFFICIAL SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS ON TERRORISM

After 1996, the number of terror attacks in the Western Cape took on such proportions that normal policing and intelligence-gathering operations no longer sufficed to curb the threat of terrorism and this forced the approval of the official policy on terrorism

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and the management of incidents of terrorism by Cabinet on 4 March 1998. According to this policy, the South African government was committed to uphold the rule of law; to defend and uphold the freedom and security of all its citizens; to acknowledge and respect its obligations to the international community in this regard; and never to resort to any form of general and indiscriminate repression. The South African government, according to this policy, is obliged to condemn all acts of terror, to take all lawful measures to prevent acts of terrorism and to bring to justice those who are guilty of or involved in acts of terror; to protect foreign citizens against acts of terror in South Africa; and in the event of an act of terror in a foreign country and involving a South African citizen, to cooperate with the host country to resolve the matter. The policy furthermore stresses that South Africa shall not make any concession to terrorists; shall not allow its territory to be used in any way for terrorist planning or activity; shall cooperate with the international community to prevent and combat acts of terrorism; shall use all appropriate measures to combat terrorism; and shall support its citizens who are victims of terrorist activity.[37]

After the 11 September 2001 attacks the South African Government issued a statement, which is an indication of the seriousness with which South Africa perceives the threat. The statement condemns terrorism and states the following:[38]

- Attacks against civilians cannot be justified.
- South Africa will co-operate with all efforts to bring the attackers to book.
- South Africa recognises the right of the US Government to track down the culprits.
- Acts of vengeance based on colour, creed or language cannot be justified.
- The world should unite in the fight against terrorism.
- Terrorists should be isolated through international cooperation in building an equitable world order.
- South African intelligence and security forces will share intelligence with its US counterpart where concrete information is available.

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- South Africa will participate in regional and other multilateral organisations, such as the UN in discussions on the course of world action against the phenomenon of terrorism.

With this as the basis of South Africa's point of view pertaining to the threat, the fact that terrorism has become a pressing security threat is underlined by the emphasis that was placed on the threat of terrorism and the financial implications thereof in the budget speeches, parliamentary debates and public statements of a number of Cabinet Ministers.

In his address to the South African Institute for International Affairs on 18 April 2002, Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued that the manifestation of globalisation had a profound impact on the global economy and international relations, emphasising that South Africa cannot stand aloof from what was happening in the international arena.[39] He stressed that the threat of terrorism had to be countered through multilateralism within the international context, implying that the South African government appreciates the importance of its participation in the international attempts to counter the threat of terrorism. Pahad reiterated condemnation by the South African government of the 11 September 2001 attacks. As a consequence of the attack of 11 September 2001, Pahad stressed that South Africa was part of the Global Coalition against Terrorism.[40] He stressed that South Africa recognises that terrorism is indeed a national and international threat, which impacts on international relations. This view, according to Pahad, was echoed by the Secretary General of the UN, when he said in the UN General Assembly, that none of the challenges which faced the world on 10 September 2001 had become less urgent. These challenges centre on the eradication of poverty and pandemic diseases; ensuring sustainable development; combating the negative consequences of globalisation; preventing global warming; containing the threat against the Middle East peace process; eradication of racism, xenophobia and other intolerances; and combating organised crime.[41]

In a parliamentary media briefing on 13 February 2002, the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota emphasised that South Africa condemned terrorism without any equivocation. He stressed that attacks against civilians were unacceptable to the

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South African government, and these acts could not be justified in terms of faith, language or colour. He also stressed that South Africa was united with the world in the fight against terrorism, with recognition of the fact that the root causes of the phenomenon should be addressed. Over the medium term, this involves, according to Lekota, global concerted efforts to resolve conflict in all parts of the world, including the search for lasting peace in the Middle East, but it also includes joint commitment throughout the world to eradicate poverty. He also emphasised that South Africa is part of the international action against terrorism, through its multilateral relations with the UN, the AU and the SADC.[42]

In the June 2002 budget speech of the Minister of Intelligence Services, Lindiwe Sisulu explained that the conventional threats of the Cold War, which could be detected by conventional intelligence capacity, are being replaced by new emerging threats which are asymmetric, arising from unconventional sources, and "wield influence and act disproportionate to their actual strength and capabilities."[43] She also remarked that, as the world shrinks, the security concerns of countries beyond the borders of South Africa become the security problems of South Africa as well. The terrorism that was visited upon the US is the same terrorism that affected Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. South Africa has to take this greater problem into account in terms of its security agenda.

In its *Public Annual Report* 2002/2003, the NIA notes that growing trends of "national and international incidents of terrorism have necessitated that this area of interest be given prominence in the work of NIA"[44], thus implying that the threat of terrorism is a national security threat. In this regard, Sisulu stated that "South Africa 'abhorred' terrorism and had introduced legislation in parliament to deal with the scourge in accordance with internationally accepted definitions of terrorism and in line with the UN Security Council resolution passed after September 11."[45] The stance of the Intelligence Ministry on the threat of domestic terrorism as posed by extremist and fundamentalist groups was clearly stated in a media briefing by Sisulu: "The government thinks that the right wing *Boeremag* and Muslim fundamentalists in People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) remain a threat to South Africa's security - and the country's intelligence services are keeping a close watch on these organisations."[46] In the 2003/2004 Annual Report of the NIA, it states that it "has put

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structural mechanisms in place in order to avert any acts of terror. Although it has a domestic intelligence focus, its counter-terrorism focus, in respect of potential threats to national security, takes into consideration both domestic and international terrorism".[47] As such the NIA's focus on counter-terrorism, as a priority area of intelligence interest, is also reflected in its interaction and cooperation with foreign counterparts in respect of intelligence sharing and skills development.

Charles Nqakula, South African Minister of Safety and Security, highlighted in his budget speech of 2003/2004 that the *Anti-terrorism Bill* had the purpose of ratifying the international conventions on the combating of terrorism.[48]

These statements underline the seriousness with which the threat of terrorism is viewed, and as such give an indication of the how the threat is ranked on the national security agenda of South Africa.

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Since 1994 South Africa has experienced two different manifestations of terror. Incidents of urban terror occurred in the Western Cape, which was the result of a conglomeration of vigilante action in reaction to the perceived inability of the security services to control criminal elements; fundamentalist religious objectives of some of the followers of the Islamic faith; and individual role players that exploited the mood of the residents of the Cape Flats in their reaction to drug smuggling and gangsterism which were perceived to be out of control. This was however not the first experience in South Africa of terrorism after its democratisation: the Worcester bomb in 1996 was the result of right wing attempts to draw attention to a cause that would later again come to the fore with the Soweto bombs in 2002 and the subsequent arrest of members of the so-called *Boeremag*.

Terrorism in South Africa is of a sporadic nature, and this facet echoes the global manifestation of the threat. The sporadic occurrence of terrorism in South Africa may be regarded as one of the characteristics which contribute to the elusiveness of terrorist groups, adding to the difficulty experienced by security forces to contain the threat.

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The effect of terrorism is experienced in a number of areas: it has a psychological impact on the psyche of a nation; it affects the economy of countries; it creates the perception that the situation is out of control; and ultimately impacts on the global perception regarding stability in a country. Additional to this, it marginalises countries that experience terrorism and it polarises communities. A meeting of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Ministers underlined the implications of terrorism: the loss of innocent lives; the maiming of innocent civilians; and massive destruction to social and economic infrastructure.[49] Acts of terrorism not only threaten individual security of innocent individuals but also threaten the security of the nation state and the world community.

South Africa has also been affected as far as tourism is concerned, and travel warnings of specifically the US and the United Kingdom (UK) include the threat of terrorism. The US warned in 2003 in the context of terrorism, that as far as South Africa was concerned, the "possibility of violence, including threats against American interests, should not be discounted, particularly in times of heightened world tension."[50] The UK warned in the same year, that although there was no recent history of global terrorism in South Africa and the South African Government had strengthened its counter-terrorism policy, there was nevertheless a risk to British nationals and visible British institutions and organisations in South Africa from global terrorism. On the threat of domestic terrorism, the UK mentioned as part of its travel warning that domestic groups in South Africa detonated small explosive devices, although tourists were not targeted.[51] Prior to the event of the World Cricket Cup in South Africa in 2003, Australia also issued a travel warning to its citizens to exercise caution, particularly in commercial and public areas known to be frequented by foreigners.[52] A similar travel warning was also issued by the Israeli government to its citizens not to travel to South Africa.[53] This was followed by the closure of the Israeli embassy in Pretoria and the private complaints of Israeli embassy officials about a pro-Palestinian protest march by Qibla in Cape Town in early December 2002, during which young children wore mock suicide bombs and posters calling for the death of Americans and Israelis were displayed.[54]

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5. CONCLUSION

Various statements by South African government officials and Cabinet Ministers highlight the importance of South Africa's attempts to address terrorism as a threat, not only to individual security, but to all aspects of national security. The responsibility of the South African government to counter terrorism is twofold. It has an internal responsibility to counter domestic terrorism. On the other hand, the South African government's counter-terrorism strategy has implications for multilateral cooperation, which may ensure that South Africa maintains its position as an important role player in counter-terrorism, and economic and political initiatives within the African continent.

South Africa's status in the global war on terrorism is promoted by its support of the various UN resolutions and international conventions on terrorism, and the finalisation of the *POCDATARA Act* was an essential element in aligning South Africa with global counter-terrorism demands. The Act eventually positioned South Africa to effectively address the threat of terrorism within the domestic environment.

The threat of terrorism cannot be addressed in isolation. It is a threat that is compounded by fundamentalism, relative deprivation, a lack of economic growth and societal instability. Countries need to address the threat in a holistic manner, as it relates to all aspects of national security. The success of counter-terrorism initiatives depends on the ability of a country to create a safe and secure state on both the international and domestic level in order to ensure a level of economic confidence to promote development. South Africa plays a prominent role in the African context to institute effective measures against terrorism.

Terrorism is regarded as an important aspect of the security agenda of South Africa due to the multifaceted effect of the threat: it has an effect on the psyche of a nation and it poses a threat to individual and national security. It impacts on the international confidence of the country and thus affects investor confidence and economic development. The various initiatives to counter terrorism by the South African government; the importance afforded to align South Africa with global protocols on

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terrorism; and statements by various officials, are indicative of the prominence of the threat on the security agenda of South Africa. The various statements quoted in this chapter point out that the threat is perceived as a priority on the South African security agenda. This is in view of, among others, the impact of the threat of terrorism on stability; the potential marginalisation of both South Africa and Africa should terrorism not be addressed; the economic impact thereof; and the effect of terrorism on individual security.

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CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION

The broadening of the concept of national security to include a wide spectrum of societal, economic, political and development issues took place with the democratisation of the South African political dispensation in 1994. South Africa as a developing country in its transformation as a democracy had to deal with issues of reconstruction and development as an important aspect of its national agenda to promote peace and stability. It is within this broadened focus on security, that physical threats to the security of the individual and the state were perceived with lesser urgency. State resources were channelled to reconstruction and development, as these presented the most prominent needs of the immediate post-1994 era. The result of this was that terrorism was to an extent perceived as a remnant of the Cold War rather than an issue that warranted security attention from a liberal democratic state.

Threats to national security are addressed according to priority that is determined by its importance in terms of impact, domestic circumstances and political choice. This chapter points out that terrorism has regained its status on the security agenda. It also evaluates terrorism as a threat in accordance with the criteria for national security threats.

1. SUMMARY

The concept of national security has broadened over the past ten years to a holistic understanding of all determinants of security. It focuses on individual security more than ever before. It is in constant flux, with the determination of security priorities according to political choice, global demand and domestic circumstances. Since the demise of the Cold War developmental issues have become the driving force behind security agendas of developing states. In the period directly after the end of the Cold War, the security emphasis in developed countries was, among others, on organised

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crime as a security threat in the re-understanding of national security. Contrary to the paradigm of the traditional security agendas of the Cold War, the security of the individual, developmental demands and national interest, played an increasingly important role in the determination of security agendas, especially in the case of the developing state. So strong was this emphasis that terrorism as a threat to national security in a global context was on the periphery of security agendas of most developing and developed countries.

The dissertation explains the concept of national security as a point of departure to evaluate terrorism and its trends, and the South African experience and official viewpoints regarding the threat are evaluated in order to test the assumptions formulated in the Introduction.

The dissertation is based on the understanding that national security is an interdependent concept which is subjectively experienced by the individual on the one hand, and the attempts of a state to safeguard the security of its assets, its norms and its population on the other hand, often within a regional security arrangement as well as part of the broader global arrangement.

National security operates on two foundations: it has to protect from danger or threat, and it has to safeguard and promote a desirable way of life. As a relative concept, it is in constant flux, forcing a state to concentrate on certain elements of security at the expense of others, especially when capacity and resources are limited. The determination of national security issues for the agenda of a liberal democracy which has to ensure economic development and upliftment, can be challenging. Not only does it have to attend to internal developmental and domestic security issues, but states increasingly have to include global security issues on their security agendas as well.

More emphasis is currently placed on individual security than ever before, with emphasis on human rights, peace and democracy, social justice and the provision of basic human needs. These have become determinants of stability and are as such linked to the concept of national security, especially in developing states.

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The question of when a threat becomes a national security threat is subsequently addressed. The determination of issues for the security agenda depends on:

- the type of threat;
- the perception of the government; and
- the intensity of the threat.

The intensity of a security threat is determined by:

- the specificity of its identity;
- the nearness in time and space;
- the probability of it occurring;
- the weight of its consequences; and
- whether or not the perception of the threat occurring is amplified by historical circumstances.

This has the implication that the more intense a threat is perceived in terms of the above, the more appropriate and legitimate it is to deal with the threat as a national security issue. The decision to classify issues as national security issues is to a large extent, however, a political choice rather than a scientific or objective fact.

In Chapter two, a conceptual framework of terrorism is provided, with the focus on definition, typology, features of and trends in the phenomenon, within the broader post-Cold War concept of national security.

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Defining terrorism is a controversial issue. Not only is "one man's terrorist the other's freedom fighter" but it has such an array of applications, concepts, manifestations and interpretations, that definitions of the phenomenon in general are unsatisfactory. A sound definition of terrorism should include a number of facets:

- the political motivation of terror is central;
- terrorism essentially involves violence, or as important, threats and intention to commit violence; and
- the objective of terror is to instil fear.

Contemporary terrorism is not synonymous with political violence *per se* but it is rather a broad concept ranging from the social to the legal sphere. As a result of the broad range of manifestations of the phenomenon, the perception has developed that post-Cold War terrorism is markedly different from what is was during the height of the Cold War. This chapter not only evaluates this perception but it attempts to categorise the phenomenon. It distinguishes between international and domestic terrorism; state-sponsored terror and non-state terror; and revolutionary and sub-revolutionary terrorism. The chapter also points out that the motive for terror has broadened to include religious, ethnic and nationalist objectives with the overarching prominence of a political motive in the perpetration of terror.

The current trends in terrorism are also reviewed. Post-Cold War terrorism is increasingly indiscriminate and fanatical; it is to a large degree anonymous, as its structure and membership are clandestine and diffuse; the structure of current terrorist organisations is rather loose; and there is a measure of leaderlessness, which results in minimal constraints on the groups in terms of target identification or degree of violence to be used.

A need for the development of a framework for the analysis of terrorism flows from the difficulty of defining the concept. The changes in the manifestation, the emerging

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trends and the motives of the perpetrators become confusing aspects that need to be clarified in a specific framework.

Certain prerequisites or elements should be present to give rise to an act of terrorism. There must be specific conditions or factors for the manifestation of terror and there must be specific impetus for the action to take place. A triangular setting was provided in Chapter two, which could be used to explain the phenomenon. Each of the components of the triad is prominent and carries equal weight in the understanding of terrorism, and without any one of the components, the phenomenon cannot exist.

Specific motives and objectives of terrorism are prerequisites for terrorist action, without which the act of terror could be equated with ordinary crime. The causal factor stimulates and directs motivation for terror. The precipitant is the final trigger that 'warrants' in the eyes of the terrorist, the violence that is embarked upon.

Chapter three focuses on terror in the South African context, with an overview of pre-1994 terror set in the paradigm of the Cold War as background. The main emphasis is on post-1994 incidents of terror in an attempt to evaluate it as a security threat to South Africa. Various indications that terrorism is still a pressing security issue have become clear since the onset of democracy, all pointing to the fact that terrorism in South Africa is still prominent on the security agenda.

A number of factors contributes to the prominence of terrorism on the South African security agenda as a threat with an international dimension. Given inadequate border control; the number of foreign embassies and diplomatic ties with various countries; the high profile sporting events and international conventions held in the country; and cultural and religious groups in the country that could be used by international groups to perpetrate terrorist attacks, South Africa has to ensure that international terrorism is addressed in terms of its security agenda.

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Incidents of domestic terrorism however dominate the manifestation of terror in South Africa. In this regard a more detailed or comprehensive triangular model is presented:

Figure 2: The interrelationship between factors in the manifestation of terrorism



Chapter four provides the South African perspective on the concept of national security, which is founded in a broadened understanding of national security, emphasising that there is a direct relationship between national security and peace, stability, development and progress. This view of national security underlines the official government stance that the objectives of security are to contribute to democracy, sustainable economic development and social wellbeing. The chapter also reviews the official South African response to the threat of terrorism in relation to the understanding of national security.

The international response to terrorism indicates a certain urgency to institute counter-terrorism initiatives within the domestic and international arena. This is also the case in the South African security environment, while there is simultaneously much

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emphasis on the countering of the threat in a continental context. Various statements that highlight the importance of South Africa's attempts to address terrorism as a threat not only to individual security, but also to all aspects of national security, are included in the chapter. The responsibility of the South African government to counter terrorism has implications for multilateral cooperation on the issue of counter-terrorism, which can ensure that South Africa maintains its position as an important role player in counter-terrorism initiatives within the African continent as well as in the international arena.

The threat of terrorism cannot be addressed in isolation. It has to be addressed in a holistic sense, as it relates to all aspects of national security. The various initiatives of the South African government to counter terrorism; the attempts to align South Africa with global protocols on terrorism; and statements by various officials, are indicative of the prominence of the threat on the security agenda of South Africa.

2. TESTING OF THE ASSUMPTIONS

Two assumptions are stated in the Introduction:

- The phenomenon of terrorism changed in extent and manifestation internationally.
- Terrorism may still be regarded as a primary security threat in South Africa despite democratisation and the subsequent new political dispensation since 1994.

2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM CHANGED IN EXTENT AND MANIFESTATION

During the height of the Cold War, the threat of terrorism was part and parcel of guerrilla warfare, revolutionary tactics and state-sponsored violence. Prior to the end of the Cold War and prior to the onset of democracy in South Africa, terrorism was mainly employed as part of the ideological conflict of the Cold War. The ideological

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motivation of terrorist attacks was the determining factor in the manifestation of the threat of terrorism during the Cold War. Much of the terrorism employed during the Cold War had its foundations in the East *versus* West super-power conflict.

After the end of the Cold War, the threat of international terrorism was perceived to have been largely addressed. During the 1990s there were indications that the threat subsided, as international terrorist action was at its lowest point during this period. 1992 specifically was the year in which the lowest number of international incidents of terrorism was recorded in seventeen years.

In evaluating the current state of security in a global context, it is clear that terrorism occupies a primary part of the global security agenda. The 11 September 2001 incident was a turning point in the assessment of terrorism as a factor in the post-Cold War security understanding, and was the impetus for further anti-terrorism initiatives on international level. However, prior to 2001, there were already indications of changes in the phenomenon. Several attacks on foreign embassies in Africa indicated the increasingly indiscriminate nature of contemporary terrorism. At the end of the 1990s, changes in the manifestation of the phenomenon became apparent, which peaked with the 11 September 2001 attacks. The following trends denote the changes in terrorism as a security threat:

- There is a diversification of the range of acts employed by terrorist groups.
- The motives of terrorist actors cover a broad range. Criminal, ethnic and religious motives are now also shaping the acts of terrorism, while the Cold War terrorism had its foundation largely in ideology.
- Terrorist attacks are increasingly indiscriminate.
- The structure of the leadership of terrorist groups is varied, mostly unidentified. Terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army had clear leadership hierarchies, but the new terrorism seldom has overtly known hierarchies.
- Terrorism of the beginning of the 21st Century is fanatic and anonymous.

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The phenomenon furthermore changed in application and extent as a result of globalisation. Modern travel allows for large numbers of commuters concentrated in confined areas, with opportunity for ruthless groups to ensure maximum impact with terror attacks. Modern communication channels facilitate media coverage of acts of terror to the broad global audience. Modern terrorism is also aided by cyber technology and communication among members of terror groups is immediate and clandestine.

These changes in the phenomenon have been replicated in the domestic South African situation and 1994 is regarded as a watershed year. Prior to 1994, terrorism was included as part of insurgency, set within the traditional understanding of the security paradigm of the Cold War. The trends which have been identified in an analysis of post-1994 terrorism in South Africa are as follows:

- There is little evidence of specific structure within groups that employ terror. Terror attacks in the Western Cape attributed to PAGAD during the 1998 to 2000 period were rather *ad hoc*, which is characterised by a lack of clear leadership accountability for the acts.
- Uncertainty regarding support is another international trend that is amplified in the domestic situation. Regarding both PAGAD and the right wing's so-called *Boeremag*, there is no clarity on the levels of support, and the general assessment is that small fringe groups are responsible for the contemporary occurrence of terror in the domestic context.
- The increasingly indiscriminate nature of terrorism is also present in the South African situation. The Planet Hollywood incident is indicative of this trend. Although the *Boeremag'* s bombs in Soweto had one indirect casualty and no loss of life occurred during the other acts of terror, the evidence obtained in later arrests, indicated that there were plans for an attack at a soccer match, for example.
- Ideology and race are no longer the only motivational factor of terrorism, but the motive for terror in South Africa has diversified to include religious fanaticism.

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The terrorism of the post-1994 dispensation has increased in manifestation and extent, with a diversification of motives. However, it is mainly the trends identified regarding post-Cold War terror that contribute to the changed character of the threat. The assumption could thus be verified.

2.2 TERRORISM MAY STILL BE REGARDED AS A PRIMARY SECURITY THREAT IN SOUTH AFRICA DESPITE DEMOCRATISATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT NEW POLITICAL DISPENSATION SINCE 1994

The changed character of the threat of terrorism in South Africa demands a renewed evaluation of the threat as a security concern. The threat has to be evaluated against the criteria that are used to determine the security agenda of the state. Chapter one provides a post-Cold War, post-1994 conceptual framework of national security. The South African national security agenda now includes issues ranging from economic areas of interest, political dynamics, societal stability, organised crime and corruption, border security and terrorism as part of the domestic intelligence agenda.

The following criteria are used in determining the priority given to an issue that poses a threat to security:

- It depends in the first instance on the perception and political choice of the policymakers. The emphasis given to the threat in budget speeches, the reaction of the South African government and the President of South Africa specifically after 11 September 2001, are clear indications of the political perception on the issue of terrorism. It confirms that terrorism warrants special attention on the security agenda of South Africa. The NIA, as the vehicle of civilian intelligence, regards terrorism as so important that it has been allocated specific attention as an area of operational attention in the allocation of resources since 2003.
- It depends on the intensity of the threat. The intensity of the threat is determined by the specificity of its identity; its nearness in time and space; the probability of its occurrence; the weight of its consequences and whether or not the occurrence of the threat is amplified by historical circumstances.

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- South Africa's experience of terrorism since 1994 has largely been on the domestic level. The terror in the Western Cape and the terror of the *Boeremag* emphasised the reality of the threat in terms of its nearness in time and space.
- The probability of the threat of terrorism occurring was also emphasised by the Western Cape terror attacks and that of the *Boeremag* in 2002. The probability of the threat on domestic level is beyond debate. It has happened and it can occur again. The motive and causal factors in the triangular model remain, although the precipitating factors may vary. In terms of international terrorism incidents in South Africa, the probability of its occurrence is amplified by *inter alia*, poor border control, the number of international events held on a regular basis, and the possibility of the alignment and support of domestic groups loyal to fundamentalist extremist international terrorist groups.

From the above it is clear that the assumption that terrorism may still be regarded as a primary security threat in South Africa after 1994 could also be verified.

3. CONCLUSION

The first responsibility of the South African government is the protection of its own citizens. However, equally important is the responsibility to participate in regional and global initiatives against terrorism. The multilateral approach of governments will ensure a joint effort in addressing the threat, making sure that no terrorist organisation can readily obtain state support for its activities. Terrorism has truly become transnational. The effect of a terror attack in a specific country is not limited to that country, especially if it is an incident of international terrorism or wide-ranging domestic terror. Terror affects global stability in all sectors of security.

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ABSTRACT

TOPIC:	TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994
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After the end of the Cold War the paradigm of national security broadened to include additional sectors of security which were not previously associated with the narrow concept of security. This changed paradigm extended to South Africa as well, and it became evident after 1994 that national security in South Africa was a holistic concept. The emphasis of national security was, in addition to sectors such as military and political security, also on economic and environmental security. In the post-Cold War paradigm of national security, terrorism was initially viewed as a secondary issue, and resources were rather allocated to secure development and reconstruction.

However, there have been dynamics in the South African context that demanded the re-evaluation of terrorism as a security threat. The international manifestation of terrorism amplified the need for a reassessment of the threat of terrorism.

It is in this context that this study was undertaken. The objective of this dissertation is to assess the significance of terrorism as a threat to national security in South Africa since 1994. It takes into consideration developments over a period of mainly ten years. The study ascertains whether the terrorism of the post-Cold War era changed in manifestation and extent, and, taking into account a new concept of terrorism, whether it could still be regarded as a primary security threat in South Africa.

The dissertation provides a perspective on the theory of national security, with specific reference to the challenges of the developing state. It indicates that the

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concept broadened to include additional aspects of security that were not previously associated with the traditional paradigm of national security.

Resources are scarce, and all issues of national security cannot be afforded equal prominence, and consequently, issues for security attention need to be prioritised. The criteria used to determine what constitutes the security agenda, centre on the type and intensity of the specific threat and the perception of policy makers regarding the threat. These criteria are used in the study to evaluate terrorism as a security threat in South Africa after 1994.

The dissertation points out that the threat of terrorism has diversified markedly since the end of the Cold War. It provides a categorisation of the new terrorism, and current trends in the global context. Incidents of domestic terrorism occurred in South Africa prior to and after 1994, which are reviewed to determine the type and intensity of the threat of terrorism for South Africa. No country is however immune to international terrorism, and the impact of international terrorism is thus also assessed in the dissertation.

The official policy and policy pronouncements of the South African government and adherence to international conventions and protocols on terrorism are analysed to determine the official South African appreciation of the threat of terrorism.

Given the combination of the nature of terrorism as a security threat; the intensity of the threat in the South African context; and the perception of the South African government of the urgency of the threat of terrorism, it is concluded that terrorism has become a threat to national security in South Africa after 1994.

Key Terms: Domestic Terrorism; International Terrorism; National Security; Priority Setting; Security Agenda; Security Threat; Terrorism; Third World Security.

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OPSOMMING

ONDERWERP:	TERRORISME AS 'N BEDREIGING VIR NASIONALE VEILIGHEID IN SUID-AFRIKA SEDERT 1994
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Die einde van die Koue Oorlog het meegebring dat die konteks van nasionale veiligheid verander het. Fokusareas wat tradisioneel nie met nasionale veiligheid geassosieer was nie, het na die Koue Oorlog deel uitgemaak van die nasionale veiligheidsagenda, en 'n holistiese konsep van nasionale veiligheid het dus ontwikkel. Dit het wêreldwyd die streng tradisionele paradigma van nasionale veiligheid in heroënskou geplaas. Die verbreding van die konsep het veral op ontwikkelende state geïmpakteer, en dus ook op Suid-Afrika. Na die Koue Oorlog het die klem van nasionale veiligheid in Suid-Afrika op sektore soos die ekonomie en omgewing geval, bykomend tot die militêre en politieke veiligheidsagenda van die vorige era. Direk na die einde van die Koue Oorlog, was daar 'n persepsie dat terrorisme as 'n bedreiging sekondêr gestaan het teenoor die belang wat die beleidmakers geheg het aan die uitdagings van ontwikkeling en heropbou as primêre fokusareas van die na-1994 politieke bestel.

Suid-Afrika het nie die hulpbronne om alle fokusareas of agendapunte van nasionale veiligheid aan te spreek nie, en moet dus noodgedwonge prioriteite hieruit bepaal. Die kriteria wat gebruik word om nasionale veiligheidskwessies te prioritiseer, berus grotendeels op die aard van die bedreiging; die intensiteit daarvan; en die persepsie van die beleidmakers oor die spesifieke kwessie(s). Hierdie kriteria is gebruik om terrorisme as 'n nasionale veiligheidsbedreiging vir Suid-Afrika na 1994 te evalueer.

Die studie ondersoek die na-Koue Oorlogse en na-11 September 2001 manifestering en omvang van terreur, in die lig van die veranderinge in die konsep, om die impak

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daarvan op nasionale veiligheid in Suid-Afrika te bepaal. Die analise van terrorisme as ‘n bedreiging word aangebied binne die raamwerk van huidige tendense en die internasionale manifestering daarvan. Daar het dan nog voorvalle van terreur in Suid-Afrika plaasgevind sedert 1994.

Die amptelike beleid en uitsprake van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering is beduidend van die erns waarmee terrorisme as ‘n bedreiging bejeën word. Verder is die wyse waarop die regering gehoor gee aan internasionale protokolle en konvensies, ook ’n aanduiding van die erns om terrorisme te bekamp.

Die studie dui aan dat terrorisme in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks sedert 1994 steeds ‘n bedreiging vir nasionale veiligheid is. Die evaluering is gegrond op die aard van die verskynsel; die intensiteit van die bedreiging; en die persepsie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering oor die erns van terreur as ‘n bedreiging.

Sleutelterme: Binnelandse Terreur; Derde Wêreld Veiligheid; Internasionale Terreur; Nasionale Veiligheid; Prioritisering van Veiligheidskwessies; Veiligheidsagenda; Veiligheidsbedreiging; Terrorisme.

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