

Orientalism, Alterity and Social Identity

A historical analysis of the socio-psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of Afrikaner Nationalism, Antisemitism, and Jewish Identity in South Africa in the 1930s to the 1960s.

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Jaunico Van Der Walt

17036268

University of Pretoria

Department of Historical and Heritage Studies

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Supervisor: Professor A. S. Mlambo

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INTRODUCTION

The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is “knowing thyself” as the product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. It is important therefore to make an inventory.

Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*

Man is not a natural species: he is an historical idea.

Simone de Beauvoir on the epistemology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Second Sex*

It could be argued that, broadly speaking, it is the duty of the social sciences to study humanity: its present, its past and the possible configurations of its future; its intra-subjective and intersubjective nuances; and its collective and singular differences based on its geographical and temporal delineation. Why are individuals and groups the way they are? What socio-psychological processes led to them being that way? And what are the processes of interpretation and representation that go into the self-subjectification of humans collectively and individually? How do humans see themselves, and why do different groups see themselves and other groups differently?

These are some of the broad yet crucial questions that make up the social sciences and the humanities, and any institutional study of humanity, collectively or individually, will have to deal, either directly or indirectly, with several of these questions at least.

The present study, thus, will broadly deal with all these questions and not only attempt to answer them in the given case study, but also to show just why these questions are critical and important in the first place. Thus, it is not fundamentally a study of an isolated epoch as a geographic and temporal intersection relevant to a specific people or a multitude of peoples. It will invariably deal with this, or utilise it, but only to elaborate on a specific study that strongly relates to what Michel Foucault called an archaeology of knowledge, where his concern is not to study the constitution or development of a people or a place, but to critically analyse

the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge ... grounds its positivity and thereby manifests its history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility¹

This study is twofold. Its principal objective is to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of the way that identity is constructed throughout the history of humanity. It looks to draw on the empirical and positivist traditions of social psychology to display the nuances of human interaction and psychology, and then to apply these theories that frame and explain them to intricate historical analyses of human history throughout

¹ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Routledge: New York, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

various epochs and geographic spaces. It will then attempt to elaborate on these intricacies through the study of linguistics in the structuralist, deconstructionist and postmodernist traditions, to display how language situates and presupposes all human cognition, interaction, and thus the socio-psychological and cultural configurations of humanity throughout history. The principal aim of this study is thus to provide an understanding of the material manifestations of epistemology and phenomenology through language and culture throughout history; and through this, to construct some moral conception — either through an integrated body of theory or through a body of methodological analysis — of how humanity can conduct itself to allow for a more inclusive, critical and morally and socially egalitarian society, based itself on critical reason, rationality and a cohesive logic that both encapsulates and allows for intercultural and inter-epochal moral and epistemic intricacies. However, this study does not advocate the language of reason and the method of science *per se*; in due course this study will posit how both these are fraught with fallacies and moral predispositions that have legitimated, validated and disseminated reductionism, often through the most violent means of oppression and subjugation — that is largely the object of this study. What this study hopes to accomplish, then, is that set out by Simone de Beauvoir in her magnum opus *The Second Sex* (1949):

The perspective we have adopted is one of existentialist morality. Every subject posits itself as a transcendence concretely, through projects; it accomplishes its freedom only by perpetual surpassing towards other freedoms; there is no other justification for present existence than its expansion towards an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is degradation of existence into 'in-itself, of freedom into facticity; this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil. Every individual concerned with justifying his existence experiences his existence as an indefinite need to transcend himself.²

This study, in terms of what it nominally hopes to accomplish in the academy more generally, is, from a historical perspective, what Merleau-Ponty referred to as a serious reevaluation of the relationship between of *necessity* and *contingency*. Through the case studies to follow, it hopes to illuminate the tragic consequences of conservatism and essentialism as a social medium that has invariably led to the lapse of all segments of humanity, respectively and throughout history, into constant states of moral stasis; and then to show how human development through liberal and progressive initiatives and policies invariably led to societies that were morally inclusive, empathetic and compassionate; the effects of which were social, economic and political development, human rights and better standards of living, scientific progress, and so on.³ Often, the latter — the paths to moral progress and positive social development — were the products of an essentialism that had predispositions just like the former; however, its object was exactly what Beauvoir posits as the ethics of existence — the realisation of the totality of human freedom through social and moral transcendence. If transcendence was not in itself the object of liberalism throughout history, then it was to a limited extent a happy coincidence. However, this study will posit, through the case studies, bodies of theory and methodological analyses to follow, that society should rest on a basis of transcendence instead of stasis;

² S. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, Vintage: London, 2011 (originally published in French in 1949), p. 17.

³ An incredibly useful and important empirical analysis of this point can be found throughout Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* and *Capital and Ideology*, published in 2013 and 2019 respectfully, by Harvard University Press: Massachusetts.

of moral progress that allows for a serious evaluation of the totality of human experience throughout time instead of the devaluation of arbitrarily selected human experiences through reductionist essentialism.

Following from the primary theoretical and methodological objectives of this study — and how it hopes to establish a holistic form of social utility and academic and moral progress — is a critical historical analysis of the socio-psychological and epistemic processes that gave rise to the construction and consolidation of Jewish identity in the South African diaspora before and during apartheid; and how this was in turn affected and influenced by the nationalist Afrikaner identity during the 20th century. Thus, this study entails a critical analysis of the constitution and the construction of Afrikaner identity, and the same-said social-psychosocial processes that influenced and informed the nationalist Afrikaner identity that would go on to envision and operate a highly racialised, discriminatory state that would become the specific diaspora of a large segment of the Jewish nation. This study will entail a historical socio-political analysis of Jews — and, to an extent, the Afrikaner — in South Africa, and how this geographic and temporal intersectionality influenced the “fundamental codes of a culture — those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices.”⁴

Additionally, this study will be a theoretical study of the history of the systems of knowledge, or *epistemes*, which contribute to the constitution and consolidation of identity and the development of the interstices of culture, particularly Jewish culture, based on the specific political and social epoch of a diaspora, in this case the highly radicalised and segregated apartheid state in South Africa from the 1930s to the end of the apartheid era. It will show how processes of self-deliberation of Jewish identity changed and adapted, based on the distinct socio-political epoch of twentieth century South Africa. It will also analyse how deliberation of the Jews all form part of a long tradition of antisemitism as a substrata of Orientalism, defined by Edward W. Said (1978) as a series of Western deliberations of the Orient, particularly the Near Orient, as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in the European Western experience.” Said notes that “The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is ... its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.”⁵ Thus, this study will involve a short yet intricate analysis of the antisemitism throughout history and Afrikaner identity since its inception in colonial South Africa, and how these collectively and reciprocally led to the particular orientation of Jewish identity in the 20th century.

In tandem with the work of Said and Foucault, this study is highly indebted to the work of Antonio Gramsci, particularly his theories of *cultural hegemony* and *critical theory*. This study will show how Foucault’s investigation of “how a culture experiences the propinquity of things, how it establishes the *tabula* of their relationships and the order by which they must be considered” and on what conditions is cultural thought

⁴ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. xxiii.

⁵ E. W. Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin Random House: United Kingdom, pp. 1-2.

“able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence between things, relations that would provide a relation and justification for their words, their classifications, their systems of exchange”⁶ will relate to Gramsci’s theory of civil society and civil culture, and how this functions on transitory systems of submission and cultural domination. One of my arguments will be that these discourses of self-perception and representation of a geographic and temporal collection of cultures and peoples, and the epistemes that inform both their individual and collective constitutions and their development and evolution based in processes of cultural hegemony, are largely set in epistemic spaces of civil culture and institutional spaces of civil society. This will, in turn, be applied to the case study of historic antisemitism and consequently the Jews in South Africa, where it will be shown that the construction of Jewish identity — and its reformulation as a product of its cultural juxtaposition to a specific social and political epoch confined to a specific system of knowledge, or episteme which was itself the effect of a cross-temporal deliberation that took the form of Orientalism — largely takes place in the space of civil society and civil culture, where mainstream deliberations and evolutions of cultural norms, stereotypes and opinions concerning ethnicity, race, class and so forth, are represented, interpreted and reinterpreted, based on the intersubjective and inter-spatial relationship of civil society and political society (also as defined by Gramsci).

The study will invariably interpret these findings through the prism of post-modernist thought, specifically by authors such as Saussure, Derrida, Foucault and Said. An imperative component of this study is invariably that of structural linguistics and deconstruction. The study will give a brief theoretical and historical evaluation of these, and show how language and its most fundamental structural characteristics are seminal to understanding the concept of *alterity*, which underlies all intersubjective and intrasubjective phenomena, and how they manifested themselves concisely and in a strikingly uniform ways through culture throughout human history, and particularly in the case studies employed in this study.

One last theoretical deliberation that is seminal to this study, and complements the poststructuralist and postmodernist theoretical and methodological component rather well, is that of Social Identity Theory (SIT), as developed by Henry Tajfel and John Turner in the 1970s and 1980s. SIT is a sub-discipline of academic Social Psychology that attempts to critically engage with and study the social-psychological processes inherent in intra-group and intergroup identity constitution, construction and consolidation. What are the narratives and discourses that lead to social group formation? What are the influences of ideologies and norms in social group formation? When and how does conflict typically arise in and between social groups as a product of alterity as the phenomenological phenomena underlying intergroup discrimination? Under what circumstances do social group identities either change or reject change? All these questions will be directly or indirectly explored in this study. But a major discovery in the field that is of major importance to the proposed study is that made by Tajfel and Turner, that maximum difference (M.D.) is more important than maximum ingroup profit (M.I.P.) for social identity formation; which means that intergroup discrimination based on various social denominators befitting to the socio-political epoch is a stronger motivator for positive ingroup identity construction and sub-group identity consolidation than is intragroup profit.

⁶ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. xxvi.

METHODOLOGY

Now that the general theory of this study, and how it relates to the case study and the historical subject matter, has been briefly explored and explained, the methodology of the study must be explored as well. The general outline of this study — from its original conception as a loose conglomerate of ideas, theories and interests to the final product that will, hopefully, fulfil an as yet unexplored niche in the general discipline of academic history and other disciplines, such as applied philosophy, political and historical studies, Diaspora studies, Jewish studies, academic social psychology, and so forth — will be explained with reference to this Research Methodology.

The *Research Methodology* of this study is relatively broad for a thesis paper in academic History, and will thus make use of various sources, both qualitative and quantitative; both primary and secondary. Qualitative sources will make up most of this thesis and will be based on research in books and academic journal articles on these subjects, covering both the theory and the history. In addition, this study will rely on firsthand sources in the form of archival material that will include official government correspondence and material, such as minutes of meetings, circulation letters, speeches, agendas, and reports, among other sources. Thus, the study aims to make use of a trove of secondary and primary sources. In addition, the research will make use of quantitative sources, such as statistics concerning the Jewish community in South Africa, which will be sourced largely from books and additional archival material.

However, there are more complicated components to the methodology that this study will employ. While the study is largely for a history market, it is substantially interdisciplinary, encompassing three main academic and scholarly disciplines and sub-disciplines: Historical studies (predominantly Historiography and South African political history), Philosophy (postmodernism and poststructuralism, structuralist/Marxist Dialectic Materialism, Orientalism, and important components of history of philosophy that will complement the intersection of the theoretical application to the historical subject matter) and Social Psychology (Social Identity Theory). The challenge of this applied methodology is to make this study, based on the resources stemming from such a vast array of academic disciplines, clear, concise and relevant.

It ought also to be added that deconstruction, which is itself a seminal concept in postmodernism and poststructuralism that forms a seminal part of the body of theory employed in this thesis study throughout, is used in terms of its theoretical characteristic, but perhaps more importantly, in terms of its methodological scope. It will later be elaborated on that deconstruction was originally constructed and employed by Derrida as a system of methodology that sought to correct and progress the structuralist tradition of textual and linguistic analysis. This is how deconstruction will predominantly be used in this study at large — as a method of deconstructing the language and the history of various constituencies endemic [of] to? this study.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

Why is the whole of the history of humanity littered with war, violence, and discrimination and segregation? Why, even in time of relative, large scale global peace do humans insist on hostility, difference and segregation when the whole of history teaches us that it has never truly been morally profitable from any long-term perspective?⁷ What part of the collective human psyche has made segregation, oppression and discrimination such a universally cross-cultural, transcontinental and cross-temporal issue that humanity struggles to transcend from. This is the larger research problem of this study, and it will make use of the theories of Orientalism, poststructuralism and SIT to analyse a case study from a temporal and geographical moment in human history (which is, as mentioned in the introduction, the study of the Jewish community in the South African diaspora and their collective intersubjective and intergroup political, social and cultural relationship with the [then] politically dominant Afrikaner nation, and the respective histories of both of these through a trimillennial period) to try and answer these larger questions of the history of humanity and its prevailing social-psychological tendencies.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- In light of the above, how were the Jewish people, and Judaism as an abstract idea, discriminated against in the decades leading up to apartheid and during apartheid (if at all) in the late-19th century and throughout the 20th century?
- And following from this, how does this discrimination, and the way it manifested itself in public and private institutions, as well as in the psyches and minds of the Afrikaner people — as well as the Jewish people — form part of the much larger tradition of Orientalism and antisemitism as described by Said?
- What were the social-psychological processes at play between and among various interest groups within both the Afrikaner and Jewish communities, and how did this effect the epistemic and material particularities of identity formation and consolidation within these social and political interest groups?
- And, finally, through an intricate theoretical-historical analysis of these case studies, how can one identify the social and epistemic characteristics that have, throughout the progression of human history

⁷ It should be noted that the author does realise that this statement is most likely anachronistic, in that it projects modern ideas of peace and humanism to historical epochs that were subject to systems of knowledge (which provided the wholesale framework of societal understanding of reality in the general form of religion and culture) prior to and often wholly at odds with the liberal, democratic and humanistic mode of reasoning of our modern day and age that was so influenced by the Enlightenment, Industrial Revolutions, Globalisation and postmodernist thinking. However, it must be understood that this current study is one that applies to an epoch that was itself close to the systems of knowledge and epistemes experienced in our current academic environment, and is, thus, completely relevant. Even studies of ancient, classical and medieval societies that were subject to epistemes completely different to our own will have to be viewed and understood —with a good measure of empathy and open-mindedness, it ought to be added — in a time that is so profoundly influenced by the philosophical and scientific understanding of those from the age of the Enlightenment and the modern and postmodern twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This study is thus conducted with full mindfulness of this fact — that there is some lack of synchronicity between the epistemes of the epoch that makes up the subject of this historical study, and those of the day and age in which this history is studied. The purpose of the theory is to attempt to bridge these epistemic divides.

indefinitely, led to moral and social stasis and logical obscurantism and reductionism that has invariably manifested itself in the forms of arbitrary and violent discrimination, subjugation and oppression? And how can we as humanity, and through this historical study, learn from and correct these trends that are concretely and resolutely epistemic, material, social and deeply psychological, to make society at large a more inclusive, empathetic and egalitarian place.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study must first [make?] an intricate study of the history of antisemitism in Europe. This important for two main reasons. Firstly, it will display how arguments that were used to legitimate antisemitism in South Africa were not novel in any way but were unilaterally part of millennia-long discursive and rhetorical traditions used to legitimate the subjugation and oppression of Jews throughout Europe for what was effectively a trimillennial period. The study will then later display how these discursive and rhetorical traditions were passed down through various epochal periods in European history to culminate in the particular form that antisemitism took in 20th century South Africa. Robert Wistrich's *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*⁸, proved to be an immaculately researched and incredibly informative source for the study of antisemitism, the arguments that upheld it, and the various forms it took until its culmination in Hitler's final solution and the Holocaust in the 20th century. Various other sources and authors will be used to compliment Wistrich's seminal work.

The work of Herman Giliomee has likewise been seminal for the study of the history of Afrikaner identity since the establishment of the Cape Colony in 1652, straight through to formative events to Afrikaner identity, such as the Groot Trek, the Anglo-Boer War, the Union of South Africa and finally the official institutionalisation of Apartheid after 1948. In his official co-edited work *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power*⁹, Giliomee and Adam trace the history of the development of Afrikaner identity and Afrikaner nationalism. This study was seminal for understanding how and why Afrikaner nationalist identity took the particular form it did in the period where far-right, nationalist attitudes which were prevalent among Afrikanerdom in the 20th century, and how these were the main socio-psychosocial cause for intensified antisemitism during the 1930s and the 1940s. The source displays in impressive detail the epistemic and ideological traditions that were formative for Afrikaner nationalist identity, and how these were part of larger socio-psychological traditions that legitimated European antisemitism throughout its history, and thus succinctly displays the uniform effects of alterity across temporal and geographic boundaries, and therefore how it is inhibit of the human condition as is manifested in culture, especially in cultures that unilaterally segregate and discriminate through the use of similar discursive and rhetorical traditions, whether these were intricately linked or not. The historical and sociological work of Giliomee provides the backbone for these analyses, and is thus fundamental for the study at large, especially in how it progresses to the case of both

⁸ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*, Methuen: London, 1991.

⁹ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power*, David Philip, Publisher: South Africa, 1979.

antisemitism in South Africa and the constitution, construction and consolidation of Jewish identity in the country in the 20th century.

Hexham (1980)¹⁰ and Du Toit (1983)¹¹ reiterate these ideas of the origins of Afrikaner identity in the context of the particular episteme of the epoch that will serve as an aid to critically understand Jewish relations with the racial Afrikaner state both before and during apartheid, and specifically how Afrikaner views on Jewry globally and in South Africa might form part of an age-old Orientalist discourse, and their contribution to the history of Afrikaner history and identity were used in the chapter dealing with this subject.

Gustav Saron (1905-1989), Gideon Shimoni and Milton Shain are three of the authors whose prolific work has provided much of the historical subject matter for the latter part of this study. In his chapter in *The Jews in South Africa*,¹² Saron provides a detailed account of the history of South African Jewry concerning its cultural consolidation after the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) and the South African Union of 1910, and the various institutions that were created to head this effort at large scale social and cultural consolidation of this specific segment of the Diaspora. Shimoni also focuses on the representation of the Jewish Community concerning economic, legal and political matters by various organisations, most notable and important of these being the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, which had its genesis in 1903 in the Cape and 1904 in the Transvaal, until it was officially consolidated into a national South African Board in 1912 after the Union,¹³ and still functions as an important representative body today. Saron goes on to explore the importance of this representative body and the consolidation of the Jewish community, and how it adapted to, or was adversely affected by, various political conditions and events at the time. Saron also highlights the origins and development of Zionism during this time and how it was adopted by the Jewish community in the particular social, economic and political conditions in South Africa throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

In his seminal work *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience*,¹⁴ Shimoni traces the origins of Zionism in South Africa, but posits the positive and large scale social and political acceptance and employment of the movement to the existential threat that South Africa's Jewish community experienced at the hand of radical Afrikaner nationalism which, especially at the time leading up to the Second World War, had deep seated sentiment with Nationalist-Socialist ideologies advocated and implemented in Germany by Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party. Shimoni focuses on two very specific groups that were in themselves far right factions of D. F. Malan's *Herenigde Nasionale Party*, being the *Ossewabrandwag*, established by

¹⁰ I. Hexham, 'Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism', *African Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 315, pp. 195-208.

¹¹ A. Du Toit, 'No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 920-952.

¹² G. Saron and L. Hotz, *The Jews in South Africa*, Oxford University Press: London.

¹³ G. Saron, *A Long Road to Unity*, in (ed.) G. Saron and L. Hotz, *The Jews in South Africa*, Oxford University Press: London, p. 227.

¹⁴ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience*, Oxford University Press: Cape Town.

Komendant-General Dr. Hans J. F. J. Van Rensburg; and the *Nuwe Order*, established by Oswald Pirow, who, well before the outbreak of the War, had started advocating a strongly antisemitic, Nationalist-Socialist agenda. Both of these factions represented radicalised racial ideologies and views which had their obvious roots in Nazism (made obvious by the outspoken admiration that these two individuals and their disciples had for Hitler and his movement in Germany at the time), and terminology such as *bloedsuiwerhied* (blood purity).¹⁵ Shimoni noted how the quick adoption of Zionism had its origins in the existential threat that Jews in South Africa faced at the hand of a largely popular Nationalist Afrikaner constituency in the country.

Another author whose work complements Shimoni's study of the progression of radical antisemitism throughout the 1930s and 1940s — and who is today considered one of the main authorities on Jewish history and the history of antisemitism in South Africa — is Milton Shain, whose book *A Perfect Storm: Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948* has served as a critically important study to evaluate the social and political progression of antisemitism towards the period of its radicalisation preceding apartheid in the 1950s to the 1970s. Shain focuses on the progression of another particular faction who was perhaps the most radical and violent of all the institutional proponents of antisemitism in South Africa during the time, being the *Greyshirts*, led by Nazi and socialist radical Louis Weichardt. He notes with particular importance the ideological exchange that was to be found between the Nazi Party and its followers in Germany, and their socialist, radical equivalents in South Africa, that invariably informed and intensified the radicalism by which the country's Jewish community was to be discriminated.¹⁶ Reference will also be made to Shain's earlier work, especially *The roots of antisemitism in South Africa*¹⁷, for additional studies on how antisemitism in the country was both the product of internal and external forces in the period leading up to and following Union.

Another noted work by Shimoni that will be of notable importance to this study is *Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa*, which follows the experience of the South African Jewish community after the National Party's political victory in 1948 and the instillation of apartheid policy during the 1950s and 1960s. He explains that, while the Jews faced an existential threat at the hand of a rather popular and politically influential Nationalist-Socialist, overtly anti-Semitic political and social faction before and during the War (largely due to the fact, says Shimoni, that this faction within the major contending political party at the time maintained this sentiment because it believed that Socialist Germany would win the War, and they would wish to maintain favourable ties with the victors of the War), during the time of the elections, it became obvious that the Allied Forces would emerge victorious from the War, and Nationalist-Socialist ideologies would be highly criticised internationally. Shimoni explains that after the War, the National Party largely abandoned its Nationalist-Socialist rhetoric, and with it its overtly anti-Semitic sentiment, in favour of a highly racialised state that sought to subjugate the majority, black race in South Africa. Since Jews were largely white and had mostly immigrated from Europe (the location of what

¹⁵ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...* pp. 128-130.

¹⁶ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm: Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948*, Jonathan Ball Publishers: Johannesburg, 2015.

¹⁷ M. Shain, *The roots of antisemitism in South Africa*, University Press of Virginia: Virginia, 1994.

was considered the ancestry of the superior race by the apartheid, Afrikaner government and its followers, a view that was supported by the largely Calvinist-Christian rhetoric followed by the government), they would throughout the next several decades stand to benefit from the apartheid state.

Thus, Shimoni's study of the constitution of the South African Jewish community and the development of Zionism in the South African Diaspora directly relates to this study in that it provides thorough and extremely insightful historical material that allows ideas and theories to be formulated of why Jewish identity took the form it did in South Africa, and what social-psychosocial processes led to the particular self-identification and representation of Jews in the South African Diaspora. It explains that much of this identity construction and consolidation took place due to the existential threat that Jews faced (and had emigrated from Eastern Europe for the very purpose of fleeing from) by the hands of antisemitic sentiment rooted in a prevailing Nationalist-Socialist ideology. Thus, the consolidation of the Jews into the white-European class and their odd moral position as beneficiaries of a state that endorsed the very racial discrimination that Jews faced since time immemorial is explained by Shimoni, and will be adapted to these theories, as an act of cultural, moral and physical survival.

In addition to this idea of Afrikaner nationalism and identity being intertwined with epistemic frameworks like Orientalism, the work of Dubow (1992) offers a crucial evaluation of how Afrikaner identity was "deeply encoded with patterns of paternalism and prejudice [and] notions of superiority, exclusivity and hierarchy."¹⁸ This source, thus, makes clear, in a fashion that meticulously ties in to the conception of both Orientalism and the findings of Social Identity Theory, that Afrikaner identity — by virtue of being part of the system of knowledge that was without doubt the foundation of that epistemic depository that legitimated colonialism, imperialism and large-scale racial and ethnic subjugation and oppression all around the globe — had inherent inclinations towards strong collective, cultural alterity that led to antisemitic attitudes leading up to and during the War years.

As mentioned in the introduction section of this research proposal, the other two social science disciplines that this study will employ, and that will make up the bulk of the theoretical component of this thesis, is that of philosophy and social psychology. This study will analyse the history of identity construction of the Jews in South Africa and their relationship with the political and social juxtaposition with Afrikaner identity and the pre-apartheid and apartheid state, as part of a larger Orientalist discourse, as prescribed by Said in his seminal work on Orientalism. Since Said's own work was largely based on previous work by poststructuralist and postmodernist scholars such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (themselves highly dependent on the work of semiologists and structural linguistic scholars such as Ferdinand de Saussure¹⁹), this study, on the philosophical end, will draw strongly from the work of Foucault and Derrida, while in places displaying the intersection of structural linguistics, semiology and philology with academic history. Two seminal works

¹⁸ S. Dubow, 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualisation of 'Race'', *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 209.

¹⁹ F. De Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (ed.) C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, University of Geneva: Switzerland, 1916.

of Foucault that will inform the large chunk of my theoretical approach is that of *Madness and Civilisation*²⁰ and *The Order of Things*²¹, while also making use of his other works. In the former, which was Foucault's first published book, the author undertakes a discourse-historical analysis of the history and development of the field of psychopathology from the end of the Renaissance period to the mid-20th century. The field of psychopathology, important though it is, is of little use to this specific study. What is imperative, however, is what Foucault actually tries to accomplish through his analysis of the history of psychopathology as a case study of how the voices of those subjected and subjugated groups in society all throughout history have been silenced and delegitimised, confined to the margins of what Foucault alludes to as *Reason*. Foucault writes that:

*In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the madman: on the one hand, the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorising a relation only through abstract universality of disease; on the other, the man of madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity.*²²

What is being conveyed in this study, as espoused by Foucault's assessment of the nature of historical and modern psychopathology, is that there are certain social groups and societal constituencies that are deemed as incapable of mentally, biologically or culturally (based on a wide variety of social denominators which changed according to the geographic and a temporal context) fitting into the social and cultural frameworks of a society, itself based on generally mutually agreed-upon norms grounded in a prevailing system of knowledge guarded by established powers of authority through institutions of domination. The marginalised subject of Foucault's study is the clinically insane; in this thesis, it will be a specific people who have, throughout cross-millennial been the subjects of mass discrimination, oppression, religious extermination and genocide — the Jews. In this case study, it will be a story of oppression and discrimination (for a brief period) of the Jews by the Afrikaner, and, thereafter, the reevaluation and reinterpretation of Jewish identity to navigate these *discourses of power*²³ before and during apartheid, in order to maintain a level of societal conformity, while forging a sense of collective exemption from the same strained and skewed moral fibre of the apartheid state that the Jew throughout history has been the subject of (and his/her identity is no doubt in part a product of), but at the time stood to benefit from. Foucault's later work, *The Order of Things*, which largely builds on his former work, will be used to analyse and explain, largely in the realm of abstraction and theory, the "historical *a priori* ... from which it was possible to define the great checkerboard of distinct

²⁰ M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, Routledge: London.

²¹ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Routledge: New York.

²² M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*?, p. xii.

²³ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Random House: United Kingdom, p. 30.

identities established against the confused, undefined, faceless, and, as it were, indifferent background of differences.”²⁴

In relation to the Jews in South Africa, this study will use Foucault’s former work to analyse the history of the Other — what “for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore, to be excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness)²⁵. Thus, how were the Jews in pre-apartheid and early apartheid South Africa deemed as the Other, or the cultural and societal inverse of the politically dominant Afrikaner; and likewise, how, when apartheid seemed to lead to the spontaneous recession of antisemitism, would the Jew navigate his identity and social responsibility through the same processes of cultural exclusion and moral exemption? This study will then use Foucault’s latter work to analyse what is disparate and related in and between social groups and societal constituencies, and what is therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities in order to analyse the history of the Jews and their ‘moral migration’ throughout 20th century South Africa as they navigated what could be interpreted as a fragmentary Jewish identity *vis-a-vis* the discourses of power of the day.

In the case of Said, most of my analysis of Orientalism will come from his main work by the self-said name, *Orientalism*.²⁶ Another useful source that allows this study to navigate the reaches and relevance of Orientalism in Jewish and Diaspora studies is *Orientalism and the Jews* by I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar (2005). In this book, the authors pose the argument that “the western image of the Muslim Orient has been formed and continues to be formed in inextricable conjunction with western perceptions of the Jewish people.”²⁷ This book conceptualises that Judaism and the Jews — much as Said did in *Orientalism* — form part of traditional Western discourses of domination and construction of the Other. These deliberations of the Jews in the Diaspora as part of historic and modern Orientalism will help theoretically position this analysis in the distinct social and political epoch that this study intends to employ.

As for the role of social psychology and social identity theory in this study, it will make use of the work of Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) and John Turner (1947-2011), particularly their theories on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self Categorisation Theory (SCT), both of which were developed as theories that analysed both inter-group and intra-group collective action and behaviour mobilisation, respectively. What is critical to consider about their work is its relation to the concept of alterity, which is one of the key concepts that grounds this research. Social identity is understood as an individual’s self-conceptualisation and self-identification with a group based on his/her group membership. The concept of alterity becomes relevant when analysing ‘social identity’ and ‘social comparison’. Social comparison is how individuals and groups self-identify in

²⁴ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. xxvi.

²⁵ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. xxvi.

²⁶ E. W. Said. *Orientalism*, Penguin Random House: United Kingdom.

²⁷ I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews*, Brandeis University Press: Massachusetts, p. 1.

relation to other individuals or groups. Social comparison is where the process of alterity, or the ‘othering’ of outgroups based on overt group differences, takes place. Collective action and behaviour-mobilisation takes place when individuals within groups or the groups themselves compare their relative group advantages and benefits of group-membership with other groups. Where social mobilisation is not an option, this leads to the consolidation of group identity, where collective social identity within a group is protected when the distinctive characteristics that anchor social identity of the group is maintained — or in certain social circumstances, even constructed — for the sake of the preservation of group identity and the various opportunities and benefits that this group membership yields. These are some of the important findings of Tajfel in SIT, but it was his student, Turner, who, after Tajfel’s death in 1982, went further in developing his theories. Turner’s own theories focused on the importance of intragroup dynamics concerning social identity theory, instead of solely focusing on intergroup dynamics. What is important to note about Turner’s work is that he concludes that the perceived (and constructed) external differences *between groups* are more important and affecting than the perceived similarities *within groups*. It follows, then, that ingroup self-categorisation based on interpersonal similarities is less powerful a motivator for identity construction and consolidation than intergroup differences and discrimination.

A collection of works by Tajfel and Turner that expand on and explain the above-mentioned theories will be used (28). What is important to note in these works is how this concept of alterity, as expanded on through the theoretical and methodological prism of SIT and SCT, can explain the socio-psychological processes that led to the intergroup and intragroup behaviour of both the Afrikaner and the Jew before, during and after apartheid. How was the constitution and general direction of the construction and consolidation of their respective identities influenced by alterity? And what did the political circumstances and particular social denominators at play influence this identity construction and consolidation? And importantly, how can this study of SIT and SCT help complement the analysis of the particular episteme, or system of knowledge, that both the Afrikaner and the Jew found themselves in the specific epoch of this study? One source that will prove indispensable to this study is the *T&T Clarke Handbook to Social Identity in the New Testament*, which is an interdisciplinary study in the fields of academic history, theology and social psychology that attempts to analyse the socio-psychological behaviour in the development and spread of Christianity after the death of Christ through a range of insightful and important chapters by prominent scholars from various fields in the social sciences. This source will be extremely helpful, in that it shares a primary focus with a social denominator that is equally important to this study — religion. This study will show the astounding influence of religion and its institution of domination — the Church, and the Calvinist Reformist Church in — in the constitution, construction and consolidation of identity, and the development of Orientalist discourse that so influenced antisemitism and apartheid in 20th century South Africa. Religion is also a seminal factor that plays into an understanding of the system of knowledge that will be analysed through this

28 H. Tajfel, ‘Interindividual Behavior and Intergroup Behavior’, in *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychologies of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel, Academic: London; H. Tajfel, ‘Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison’, in *Differentiation between Social Groups*, ed. H. Tajfel, European Monographs in Social Psychology, Academic: London; J. C. Turner, ‘Social Categorization and Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group Theory’, in *Advances in Group Process*, ed. E. J. Lawler, JAI Press: CN, 1985; J. C. Turner *et al*, *Rediscovering the Social Group: Self-Categorization Theory*, Blackwell: Oxford.

study, and the production of political myth through religious sentiment that translates into strong Orientalist discourse that can in turn be used to analyse the history of the Jews in South Africa.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Introduction:

This opening chapter will outline broader research objectives of this thesis, as well as the specific research questions that the thesis will attempt to answer. It will outline the historical subject matter, referring to the case studies of South African Jewry and Afrikaner nationalism, and how the theory of Orientalism, poststructuralism and Social Identity Theory will be applied to these historical case studies to answer the research questions and research objectives. This will be an introduction to the theory and methodology, as well as an introduction to the history of the relationship of the Afrikaner and the Jew in South Africa. It will also provide a brief evaluation of the literature used and the way the chapter are structured.

Chapter 1: Historical Symbolism, Rituals of Marginalisation and Discourses of Power in inter-Epochal Representation of Jews and Judaism

This chapter provides a brief yet concise outline of the theory that stands to be used throughout the study. It starts with a brief outline of postmodernism and poststructuralism, referring to the seminal importance of structural linguistics, deconstruction and hauntology, as developed by Saussure and Derrida, for understanding the concept of alterity and how it is inhibit to the human condition — an important point that will be referred back to throughout the remainder of the study. It will then go on to elaborate on the work of Foucault, and how his studies on the history of subjugation and marginalisation can massively illuminate the present study of antisemitism and Jewish identity in 20th century South Africa. The chapter will also provide a brief history and outline of Orientalism, and how antisemitism is a legitimate and important substrata of Orientalism that thoroughly explains the social, political and cultural dimensions of antisemitism and historic Judeophobia, especially as it transcends into the phenomenon of Jewish identity in 20th century South Africa.

Chapter 2: Historic Antisemitism as a sub-discipline of Orientalism, and the historio-discursive proliferation of the Jew as the Other

This chapter will provide a detailed history of antisemitism throughout various epochal periods, from pagan antiquity, the period during and following the proliferation of Christianity and the Catholic Church, the Enlightenment period where social moral constructs were centred around the concept of the sovereign human and the further development of humanism, and into the Third Reich and Hitler's final solution. The chapter will show how antisemitism is not only justifiably, but also importantly, a subsection of Orientalism as defined by Said. Following from this important development, this study will display how modern Orientalism was developed in tandem with the development of philology by thinkers such as Sassy and Renan during the Enlightenment period, and how especially Renan's Aryan-Semite narrative was massively consequential to both Hitler's Final Solution, which would invariably have an impact on the escalation of radical antisemitism in 1930s and 1940s South Africa.

Chapter 3: Afrikaner Nationalism, Afrikaner Identity and the socio-cultural Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa

The third chapter of this thesis will focus on the development of Afrikaner identity since the establishment of the Cape Colony by the Dutch East India company in 1652, and will touch on how various events in the history of South Africa were especially formative for the development of Afrikaner identity, so as to analyse the particular constitution of

Afrikaner social identity in the 20th century, which would be the basis by which this study will evaluate the particular form of the antisemitism in South Africa in the late-19th century to early-20th century South Africa, especially in the period of radical antisemitism in the 1930s and 1940s. It is also in this chapter that SIT will be elaborated on as a general theory that is used to study the structural processes through which social identity is constituted, constructed and consolidated. This SIT will then be applied to the study of Afrikaner history and nationalist social identity throughout the chapter and will explain how the Afrikaner constructed and later consolidated a particular identity, which would itself account for the reasons for the particularly radical antisemitism and Judeophobia in first half of the 20th century.

Chapter 4: Antisemitism in South Africa

This chapter will firmly provide a short history of Jewish migration in South Africa, and the particular forms that Jewish social identity took in South Africa in the early 20th century. This chapter will then provide a concise overview of the specific form that antisemitism took in South Africa since the 1890s, after the Anglo-Boer War, and then especially after the Union in 1910. The chapter will take the socio-cultural and political relationship between the Afrikaner, based on the nationalist Afrikaner identity that was studied in the previous chapter, and the Jew, based on the particular way that the Jew was forced to adapt his social identity relative to the unique political and social atmosphere of South Africa at the time. It will then be explained, through the use of structural linguistics, deconstruction poststructuralism and SIT, why antisemitism took the specific form it did after Union; through this analysis, this chapter will show how antisemitism in South Africa was invariably a result of a long history of discursive and rhetorical antisemitism that was studied in the second chapter of this thesis, and similarly, that antisemitism in South Africa was the product of a traditions of both Orientalism and modern Orientalism, that was inducted by and developed along the lines of Renan's Aryan-Semite narrative. Lastly, this chapter will show how antisemitism escalated into its most radical form in the 1930s and 1940s, and how this was the product of a far right, Nationalist-Socialist Afrikaner social identity that was heavily influenced by the political ideologies of the Nazi party and its intellectual leadership leading up to the War.

Chapter 5: Socio-Psychological and Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Jewish Identity in South Africa

This final chapter of the thesis will firstly provide a short overview of the structure of apartheid from the 1950s to the 1970s, and will provide a detailed socio-psychological analysis of the particularities of South African Jewish social identity relative to the history of antisemitism more generally (as explored in Chapter 2), the Afrikaner nationalist social identity (as studied in Chapter 3), and the Jewish experience of antisemitism and Judeophobia in South Africa from the end of the 19th century throughout the first half of the 20th century, especially in light of the escalated, radical antisemitism of the 1930s and 1940s. This chapter will provide a theoretical reflection on the phenomenon of the overrepresentation of Jews in the white constituencies of the anti-apartheid struggle; it will explore popular Jewish figures in the fight against apartheid, from centrist liberal activists to leftist radicals, and will explain how this overrepresentation of the Jews in the anti-apartheid struggle was invariably a consequence of their historic consciousness.

Conclusion

The conclusion will reflect on the thesis and will explain how the study in its totality met the research objectives and provided an answer to the research problem stated in the introduction. Finally, the conclusion will explain how the study undertaken in this thesis could be expanded and improved in future, and how future studies might benefit the disciplines of academic history, social psychology and philosophy, and society more generally.

Chapter 1: Historical Symbolism, Rituals of Marginalisation and Discourses of Power in inter-Epochal Representation of Jews and Judaism.

Poststructuralism — de Saussure and Derrida, and its methodological legitimacy in the post-structuralist and post-Enlightenment era of textual analysis of history, and historiography, as cultural discourse

The school of poststructuralism as defined and developed by leading formative thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault in the disciplines of philosophy, lexicography and philology, and its growing transdisciplinary development in fields such as International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, History and even Law and Jurisprudence²⁹ offers a critical way in which to understand the “politics of language, interpretation, and representation in the constructions of notions of danger, threat, and identity”³⁰.

Something that ought to be noted about the particularity of the term *poststructuralism* and its specific connotation to the theory and methodology it generally hopes to elucidate, and in turn its use in this specific study, is its conceptual interchangeability and theoretical intersectionality with terms and fields of study such as postmodernism and postmodernity. Despite the potentiality for difference in analytical technique and normative disciplinary goals between these fields of study, there are very important links between them as well.

Postmodernism as a field of study, perhaps more comfortably referred to as an intellectual movement, that generally refers to a mode and direction of analysis born from the idea that it stems from an era or an episteme that is temporally and institutionally beyond or following the era of modernity. It is a system of knowledge with its own theoretical considerations and methodological norms that builds on the academic and epistemic frameworks and profiles of the theories that came before it, most notably engaging with, and seeking to improve upon, the theoretical tradition of structuralism in the disciplines of international relations, sociology, history, anthropology, psychology, economics, philology and particularly linguistics, all of which had their genesis in — or where developed on systems of thought and ideologies — that were prevalent in the Enlightenment period. Thus, poststructuralism and postmodernism are a series of theoretical, methodological and conceptual responses and attempted improvements to the way that those arbiters of the Enlightenment interpreted and represented the world, systems, collective structures and individual institutions around them. This particular study utilises ideas and concepts that form part of the poststructuralist and postmodernist legacy, typically a critical theory that studies the language, rituals and symbolisms of historical and modern cultures, and the seismic historical shifts in their systems of knowledge, or *epistemes*. It is critical to note, however, that poststructuralist thinking itself falls under a very specific system of knowledge developed from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s onward. It thus suffers from its own constraints and intellectual and academic biases and is an epistemic inclination with institutional

²⁹ See the work of V. G. Curran, specifically her article on the use and the legitimation of Deconstruction in the field of Law and Jurisprudence: ‘Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law’, *Boston College Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-52.

³⁰ C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, Routledge: New York, 2010 p. 62.

manifestations that studies the origins of knowledge and identity in the past, in order to make sense of the particular constitution and orientation of knowledge and identity in the present.³¹

The very root of poststructuralist philosophy and its transdisciplinary development lies in the study of language, which is the most primal element of human interpretation and representation of the self and the collective. Two figures who proved to be seminal in the study of language (largely in the Western cultural and civilisational context) in poststructuralist philosophy and philology were Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), the former constructing a body of theory for the structure of language as the basis for meaning and knowledge, and the latter developing a theory of deconstructing language so as to better understand meaning and knowledge more generally. Their theories would prove to be seminal in the understanding of concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘truth’ in social processes of identity construction and consolidation, especially as prescribed by later scholars such as Michele Foucault and Edward W. Said.

In his seminal work *Course in General Linguistics*³² (1916), which was in effect a series of lectures edited into a printed book three years after his death, Saussure lays out the foundation for a critical study of Semiotics, Structural Linguistics and Historical Linguistics. Saussure was a Semanticist in that he tried to analyse the production and construction of meaning through language, and that he devised a basic theory of the structure of language in which to understand how meaning is devised and allocated in both the abstract and the material realms (or to what is sometimes referred to as the production of knowledge), and how this relates to intrasubjective and intersubjective dynamics of individual and social group identity through history. Following from all Saussure’s semiotic and semantic theorisation concerning linguistic structure, was his conceptions of the *sign* (the basic idea of something material or abstract manifested in a complex orientation of sounds and oral gestures known in its totality as language, and objects in that specific language, such as ‘tree’), a *signifier* (the oral gestures and sounds of the words and conceptions that refer to a material or ideational object, such as concrete and abstract nouns, for instance ‘tree’ or ‘love’) and a *signified* (the cognitive processes that lead to the idea of a thing following from the oral gestures and sound referring to that thing); *ergo*, the vowels and consonants that formulate the oral gesture, or word, that is either a concrete or an abstract noun are the *signifiers*, lead to the conceptualisation and idealisation of the idea of the thing, such as tree or love, and its proper function (or form, in Aristotelean terms) that is the *signified*.

However easy it might be to assume that the signified and the signifier’s associative quality is based on the similarity between the oral gestures and the idea or image it brings to mind, Saussure contends that this associative quality is not based on similarity, but on difference. There is no essentialist link between the signifier and the signified, such as the linguistic sound ‘tree’ and the idea of a tree, and the sign which is tree. To Saussure, a tree is not a tree because of any essential quality derived from a tree, but it is a tree because it *is not* something else, like a shrub or a rock; the linguistic value and the exact meaning of a tree lies not in

³¹ C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies ...*, pp. 62-63.

³² F. De Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (ed.) C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, University of Geneva: Switzerland, 1916.

the essentialist qualities of signs in any linguistic structure, but in their “contradistinction to other signs in the linguistic structure.”³³ Thus, the very root of any meaning in any linguistic structure, and its very functionality in any intersubjective environment, is the semantic difference it produces between things. Value and meaning are dependent on difference, and perhaps more importantly, on the production of difference. This phenomenon of difference is central to the conceptualisation of *Alterity*, which is crucial to poststructuralism in general, and to this study in particular. And although Saussure developed the linguistic element of poststructuralism and the conceptualisation of difference, it was Derrida who advanced this linguistic element into a cultural one.

Derrida utilised well-endowed structuralist notions such as hierarchy, class, status and social privilege to conceive of and advance his own notions of linguistic difference and its role in social group constitution and specific cultural orientation. He never critiqued Saussure’s ideas as such but developed them to embody a temporal and cultural relevance. Derrida’s own strand of semantics builds on the notion that meaning is always differing and deferring, in that meaning is not a stable concept, even if certain elements of linguistic structures are stable; meaning is irreverently socially and temporally driven, and the inherent precariousness of meaning is evident in the phenomena of binary opposition in which not language is formulated, but in which meaning is formulated and frequented through language. For every notion, idea and thing that is imbued with a value and a meaning, there is a lexical and linguistic antithesis; such as man/woman, large/small, cause/effect, fast/slow, and so forth. The fact that there are synonyms for most of these notions and ideas is true, but what makes them relevant and saturates them with meaning and particular value is still not the similarities among them, even if they are present, but the difference and contradistinction between them.

But what animates these semantic differences in linguistic structure is not the mere fact of difference in itself, but the fact that difference and appropriate meaning and value due to difference are formulated in a hierarchical fashion; what provides value and meaning to a signified sign is the very fact that it is deemed superior in some fashion that is socially and temporally relevant. Misogyny’s very premise — and the fact of its historical institutionalisation in the form of patriarchy, strong remnants of which still survive to this day — is linguistically, and thus unconsciously in the psyches of millennia of various societies, built on the idea that the signified male is inherently superior and different to the signified female; this idea was then throughout various historical periods rationalised and legitimated through religious myth and pseudoscience, all of which is itself temporally and culturally relative. But to Derrida the fact remains: the value of the signified male is the notion of its superiority to its linguistic and semantic shadow: female. This structural analysis of meanings can be attributed to any sign. But what is furthermore important is not merely the fact of the binary and hierarchical orientation of the allocation of meaning in linguistic structures, but the fact of the necessity of difference in them — the one cannot exist without the other, and that the one cannot be saturated with value without the devaluing of its shadow. Even though historically in many cultures men were thought superior to women, the fabricated notion of male superiority could not exist without the constructed notion of female inferiority. The very existence of value is entirely dependent on the antithesis, the inferior, the evil, the outcast and the marginalised. de Beauvoir developed a strand of theory that was

³³ C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies ...?*, p. 64.

aimed directly at the historical study of sex and gender and its legacy of gender inequality in (then) modern day, 20th century Western society (1908-1986). Beauvoir is to this day considered one of the leading theorists in gender studies, feminism and social justice concerning sexual and gender discrimination. Although her theories are largely limited to gender studies specifically (which is, in terms of the particular case studies employed in this study, of limited consequence), her general theory concerning gender is largely based in the conceptualisation of alterity as the universal cultural norm for the production of truth and knowledge. Thus, Beauvoir's work is highly relevant and extremely important, since, likewise to hers, this study focuses unilaterally on the role of alterity in the construction of identity and culture.³⁴

Beauvoir's work rests on the basis that, in the historic construction of gender and gender roles and the way that they are reflected and practiced in modern-day Western society, it was not merely the fact of the binary differentiation between 'man' and 'woman' based on biological traits and features that roles and opinions of the two sexes throughout history have been constructed, but that they were constructed to fit into a hierarchy of value, based not on their mere differentiation, but on the seemingly absolute and essentialist value of this differentiation. Thus, as with anything, 'man' and 'woman' were conceptually constructed on the basis of alterity. On the phenomenological and larger psychological level, identity is constructed on the basis of difference, but is validated, legitimated and institutionalised on the basis of the differentiation of value attributed to subject and the object of a general discourse. As was noted by Beauvoir herself, Claude Lévi-Strauss himself attributed the seminal importance of alterity to the general production of all culture by stating: "The Passage from the state of Nature to the state of Culture is defined by man's ability to think biological relations as systems of oppositions; duality, alternation, opposition, and symmetry, whether occurring in defined or less clear form, are not so much phenomena to explain as fundamental and immediate givens of social reality."³⁵ It is stated clearly here that the most fundamental basis for the construction of any sort of social order is done through the construction of hierarchies of difference between a collective subject — who constructs the hierarchy — and the object — who is subjected to the hierarchy, and thus to a position of in-autonomy, oppression and social and epistemic dependence. The object is in the most absolute sense made to be the Other, the product of alterity. The object is the social and epistemic dependent of the subject; how it hopes to define and legitimate its absolute and social existence is based on the way it is defined by the subject, within the epistemic and appropriate cultural parameters put in place by this subject. For Beauvoir, this meant

*She is nothing other than what man decides; she is thus called 'the sex' ... for him, she is sex, so she is in the absolute. She determines and differentiates herself in relation to man, and he does not in relation to her; she is the inessential in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the Other.*³⁶

³⁴ See Simone de Beauvoir's seminal work *The Second Sex* for more on her approach towards gender studies, feminism and conceptualisation of alterity. S. de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, Éditions Gallimard: Paris, 1949.

³⁵ See C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, Originally published in 1949. See S. de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex ...*, p. 7.

³⁶ S. de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex ...*, p. 6.

For Beauvoir, it is clear who the perennial Subject and Object is — it is male and female, respectively. For the purposes of this study, it is the Occident and the Orient; the West and the Rest; the ‘European’ and the Jew. Beauvoir’s sentiment and rigid use of alterity as the universal social dynamic of constructing an Other throughout history, irrespective of subcultural particularities, must be kept in mind through the remainder of this study. What is made clear by the work of Derrida, however, is that this alterity is indeed universal because it is essential to the very fundamental and primordial construction of social order and meaning through language, which is itself primordial and absolutely essential to any form of social order and interaction.

The fact of this theory of structural linguistics is historically and sociologically evident in racism in general, and more relevant to this study, in antisemitism. What is evident for the furtherance of this study is thus not ontology — the study of the meaning and value associated with things that socially and culturally animate the perception of what they are — but what Derrida referred to as *hauntology*, or the study of what things are *not*, or the study of “that which is left out or excluded in order for meaning to be secured.” Furthermore, I will use Derrida’s *deconstruction* as a methodological and analytical tool in my critical analysis of antisemitism.³⁷

However, as mentioned previously, poststructuralism, and specifically the notion of deconstruction and its use in the academy and its various disciplines and faculties, has since its inception been heavily disputed and refuted, and has consequently been accused of being overly-reductionist and even nihilistic. Poststructuralism and deconstruction, especially concerning the immense value of these theoretical and methodological bodies to this study, ought not to be taken for granted; if they are to be taken seriously and validated in the present study, they ought to be able to stand up to the various bodies and parties that have scrutinised and attempted to devalue and invalidate them.

Curran (1994) maintains the importance of understanding and situating deconstruction, and poststructuralism more generally, within the historic framework in which it was conceived and developed, and to note the very specific ideological and material circumstances to which it itself attempted to be a coherent response:

Deconstruction ... emanate[s] from anti-totalitarianism ... reflecting [its] historical context ... Jacques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, and Elie Wiesel, chronicler of the holocaust, wrote in France after the Second World War, in the wake of the extermination camps, French collaboration with the Nazis and the gulag of Stalinist Russia.

...

like other modernist movements in literature, painting and music, deconstruction signals the end of the Enlightenment view of human civilization as progressing in tandem with increased scientific discovery. Where the Enlightenment marked the transfer from God to humans of the source of hope for civilization, the cataclysmic events wrought by twentieth-century totalitarianism marked a profound change in the Western intellectual's view of humanity. After

³⁷ For more on Derrida’s work on language, and specifically on writing, and the various concepts he explores, such as the *difference* and *deterrence* of language, *deconstruction*, etc., see J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1967.

*Auschwitz and the gulag, absurdity, barbarity, chaos and regression became part of the perception of human progression; a coherent view of mankind required incorporation of profound incoherence.*³⁸

The origins and the sentiment behind deconstruction, even though it focuses on the analysis and study of the linguistic microcosms of various disciplines, is to deconstruct what is perceived to be ‘true’ and ‘stable’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’, so as to reconstruct — not necessarily to reconstruct truth or meaning, but to reconstruct our very perception of what truth and meaning is, why and how it is infused with value, and the various conditions and consequences of this construction, perception and infusion.

Classically, deconstruction and poststructuralism, and their overwhelmingly critical attitude towards any text that stands to be subjected to their analysis and critique, have been seen as reductionist in the sense that they critique and refute everything indiscriminately, without taking a stance to the affirmative of anything, either textual or contextual. Curran makes a strong case for the misperception of deconstruction, itself a formative subsection within poststructuralism; given its roots in French existentialism as a theoretical answer to the institutional totalitarianism and philosophical essentialism borne and born from the Enlightenment period, poststructuralism is classically (perhaps justifiably) perceived as being a sub-discipline of philosophy, although it is often wrongfully accused of being *only* an expression of philosophical discourse. The casual onlooker in the academy, as well as those who happen to glimpse the phrase deconstruction with its implied poststructuralist association, will most likely assume deconstruction as provisional theory for nihilism and anti-foundationalism. To those who are schooled and trained in the general theoretical and methodological contexts of the social sciences and humanities, deconstruction implies the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault and their respective roots in structuralism and the phenomenology of the French existentialists and their predecessors, most likely thinkers such as René Descartes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre.³⁹ It therefore seems quite natural to assume that deconstruction is a purely philosophical and theoretical enterprise, given its roots in the fields of phenomenology and structuralism (referring specifically to dialectic materialism and the radicalism and revolutionary features implied by the history inspired from such ideologies). But Curran’s contention is that, predominantly, and in the way it features in the work of its arbiter — Derrida — deconstruction is a methodology and ‘interpretive tool’. Its utilitarian function importantly remains its ability to allow the analyser and the interpreter to reach a much deeper, inter-dimensional and perhaps also interdisciplinary understanding of the text involved. Deconstruction’s anti-essentialist tenet allows it to refute the basic existence of only one general truth, answer or exegetical interpretation of a text or body of literature; it crucially shows that truth is deeply contextual and conditional, and that an acceptance of this contextuality and conditionality of knowledge and ‘truth’ should be both the bedrock and the genesis of any analytical endeavour or textual study of any kind. Through this, Curran explains that deconstruction can “enrich textual analysis” and expand “our perceptions

³⁸ V. G. Curran, ‘Deconstruction ...’, p. 2.

³⁹ For more on a foundational study on the exact influences that existentialism had on deconstruction and the field of poststructuralism more generally, see G. Binder, ‘Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie’, *YALE L. J.*, No. 98, 1989, specifically pp. 81-115.

For more on the influence of Hegel and his dialectics and dialectic materialism on Derrida, see M. Rosenfeld, ‘Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism’, *CARDOZO L.*, n.No. 24 1990.

of previously unperceived relationships and levels of signification. In doing so, deconstruction also can promote increased tolerance and effective social and political action.”⁴⁰ To fully understand the theoretical and methodological roots of deconstruction, and to validate it as a methodology of immense value in the academy and to this study, one must fully appreciate the development of deconstruction and poststructuralism from the legacy of structuralism.

As noted, poststructuralism follows from the work done on, and immense influence and acceptance of, the structuralist tradition of thinking in various academic and applied fields in 19th and 20th century thinking. While this brief analysis calls for an appreciation of deconstruction as a methodological tool that helps for the rectification of the totalitarianism that was, to a degree, a consequence of the essentialism of the Enlightenment period and structuralism of the 20th century, any one studying this history should not fail to appreciate the absolute revelation that was embodied by structuralism in the academy more generally, and in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and cultural history more specifically. The focus of this section is on the field of linguistics, and how developments in linguistics and philology affected further major developments in history and historiography, respectively. Thus, the fundamental importance of structuralism, and why it posed such a major development in academia, can be analysed in the seismic shift it offered in the theoretical frameworks and methodological analysis of historical texts.

In the field of linguistics, one specific development was particularly consequential: systematisation. It was indeed the idea of structuralism, that system of (as is descriptive enough by its name) analysis which attempts to add and maintain structure to textual and literary analysis, to analyse text and textuality through the pervading importance of reason and logic — to make linguistics a science, with set formulae for analysis and study that attempts to develop from precepts of speculation to a set system of universal theorisation, akin to the use of equations and universal laws in the natural sciences.⁴¹ As has been elaborated on earlier in this section, the infusion of structure into textual and linguistic analysis had much of its origin in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and his groundbreaking work in semiology and linguistics; however, the pervasion and dissemination of structuralism in various other disciplines in the social sciences can be largely attributed to the work by structural linguist Noam Chomsky and structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009). The former’s study resided around the idea that all human languages had universal communicative grammatical structures that were common among all humans and social subcultures; while surface structures, such as ‘audible linguistics phenomena’, or the intonations of oral cues and verbal gestures and their specific interpretations, might differ among various human collectives, deep structures would invariably stay the same and remain a constant among all human collectives.⁴² Lévi-Strauss similarly

⁴⁰ V. G. Curran, ‘Deconstruction ...’, p. 3.

⁴¹ V. G. Curran, ‘Deconstruction ...’, pp. 7-8.

⁴² For more on work done by Chomsky, see N. Chomsky, *Essays on Form and Interpretation*, Elsevier North-Holland Publishing: Amsterdam, 1977; N. Chomsky, *Language and Mind*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1968; N. Chomsky, ‘Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar’, *Foundations of Language*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1972, pp. 367-382.

believed that there were certain cognitive, social psychological and cultural structures that culminated in certain traits of human behaviour that were truly universal among all humans and human collectives.⁴³

It thus becomes clear that the application of structures to the analysis of texts, human behaviour through history and historical material in general, is intended as an analytical methodology. And in the study of historical material, this methodology allows for the dissection of textual and literary material to an almost microscopic level, truly making the text and the structural climate around its creation the true subject of analytic and near-scientific scrutiny, allowing for the reification of intertextuality. However, despite the analytical rigour and solidity, and perhaps reliability, that structuralism offered to linguistics, philology and the social sciences more generally, it is also this minute scrutiny and obsessive pursuit towards textual specificity and the pursuit of truth in linguistic analysis that stands to be the greatest setback of structuralism — the fact that it uncompromisingly fixates on a singularity, instead of allowing for the possibility of a totality.

And it is exactly these excessive claims made by structuralism, as well as the absolutism that it attempts to imbue in texts through forceful scientific assertion, instead of finding them through painstaking analysis and skilled historic interpretation and study, that poststructuralism and deconstruction attempt to be answers to. Deconstruction is thus not devoid of meaning, and poststructuralism not anti-foundationalist and nihilistic, as is often suggested by its critics. It is a new methodology used to interpret texts so as to strive towards the totality of a cultural and historical context — an episteme — that allows one to understand how processes of thought and action were constructed and invariably changed over time, instead of fixating on one specific possibility — a truth — that defies temporality and ‘anachronises’ context completely.

So, even though structuralism took textual and linguistic analysis “from the purely humanistic to the scientific”, deconstruction is then often accused of being “unscientific and antiscientific”⁴⁴ for its refutation of essentialism and absolute truths. Despite its robust scrutiny of texts and textuality, what deconstruction adds to the ‘omnilateral’ analysis of literature in a very scientific fashion is its intense scrutiny and in-depth study of *all* textual elements, “including a study of textual presences by the evocation of textual absences.”⁴⁵ As was intimated by Merleau-Ponty (1964) commenting on the semiotic theories of de Saussure in linguistic analysis, which was itself immensely foundational to the creation of deconstruction by Derrida, the value of signs (meaning words as concepts and their accompanying intonations) lie not in the inherent meaning of their singular and absolutist constitution, but in their expression “as [a] mark of divergence of meaning between itself and other signs” and “that the terms of language are engendered only by the differences which

⁴³ See C. Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, Basic Books, inc.: New York, 1949. In his work, Lévi-Strauss also refers to and analyses the use of linguistic structures in the search for absolute laws among social human collectives — see listed work, p. 33 for Strauss’s explanation of the role of structural linguistics in the development of structuralism and the prevalence of reason and positivism in the social sciences and anthropology particularly.

⁴⁴ V. G. Curran, ‘Deconstruction ...’, p. 15.

⁴⁵ V. G. Curran, ‘Deconstruction ...’, p. 16.

appear among them.”⁴⁶ Thus, what is truly important for a holistic understanding of a text and the episteme of which it is invariably a product, one must take into account the textual absences — the spaces of silence which are not included in the laudable presences of the texts, but are intentionally subjected to truancy. Thus, the value of signs — as structural linguistics, deconstruction and the foundational tenets of hauntology have told us — are not in the presence of meaning, but in the value of silence, and this silence itself being a signifier of difference.

Thus, deconstruction is not meaningless by nature, and neither is it anti-foundationalist. On the contrary, its primary focus is on the exact value, not only of what is said, but also of what is not said. Deconstruction does exactly what its name suggests — it deconstructs, not only the presences of a text as a representative body of a period or a social collective, but also the absences, and it is exactly these absences that allow for an enlightened view (the irony is, of course, intended) of history and the epistemes that developed them. To finalise this section analysing the importance of deconstruction and the value it has to the study to follow, perhaps Curran said it best when stating that “where structuralism devalorizes the non-textual, deconstruction valorizes the reader's contribution *qua* interpreter in creating the interpretation from the point of departure of the multitude of relations of signification engendered by the text.”⁴⁷

Despite the microscopic intricacies that drove the theoretical and methodological particularity of poststructuralism and deconstruction in the 20th century, it is crucial to remember that the essential sentiment that drove Derrida's theory of the deconstruction of meaning in structural linguistics and the study of hauntology in general, was the need to study those divergent and marginalised voices and sectors throughout history,⁴⁸ their significance lying not in what the voices could or would say, but what they couldn't or were prohibited from saying; the truth was not what was said about them, but the fact of their silence and their silencing. This point provides an ideal intersection from Derrida into Foucault, whose conception of 'regimes of truth' and 'discourses of power' provides almost existential illumination to the role difference and alterity plays in any critical analysis of historical identity, especially that of an identity consequent of suppressed self-determination and subjugated self-expression and self-representation.

Foucault, Regimes of Truth and Discourses of Power

Derrida's hierarchical orientation of language and meaning was used by Foucault (1926-1984) to produce a theory concerning the constitution and construction of norms in the West, and how these practices, and the

⁴⁶ M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, Northwestern University Press: Illinois, 1960, p. 39.

⁴⁷ V. G. Curran, 'Deconstruction ...', p. 17.

⁴⁸ As mentioned, he was a Diasporic Jew who was studying, teaching and writing during, and in the wake of, the very height of antisemitism and the horrors of genocide that culminated, both politically and symbolically, in Auschwitz and the Holocaust more generally. His theory was likely a highly particularised and specialised attempt for him — as part of a race, ethnicity and a social categorisation that was highly scrutinised and marginalised — and for so many others like him, to make sense of his existence and his place in the world in a time when that place was threatened, and any sense of self-consciousness and identity was obscured by a fetishised and vicious moral atmosphere. His work was thus deeply existentially driven.

pattern of their inter-epochal change, were inherently constitutive, and perhaps inhibitory, of Western identity throughout history.

The political and almost explicitly historical character of Foucault's work rests on the idea that the social norms, institutions and conceptualisations of truth that orient Western identity — and any identity, as a matter of fact — is socially constructed. Society is run by certain institutions of domination (to use the Gramscian term, which will be elaborated on in due course) which are any institutions, either public or private, that propagate, enforce and police certain discourses that 'ascertain' a conglomeration of ideas, or a prevailing ideology, as 'true'. This constructed 'truth' becomes the universal standard towards which any normativity concerning action, thought and speech must be directed if a subject is to justify his social position in society at large. These truths are encoded and made manifest by the legislative body of the political unit — whether it be a principality, kingdom, empire or nation state — and assurance of political, economic and social privilege and security in the case of adherence to these social 'truths' ensures that these basic social and moral tenets are accepted as such by the larger membership of the political unit and its constitutive social groups. The widespread acceptance of these ideologies and social participation in the social, political and economic environment inhibited by its moral parameters are known as the prevailing 'discourses' that direct society.

Whereas Saussure and Derrida provided an analysis of the role that language plays in constructing, propagating and legitimating such discourses, Foucault aims to provide an explanation of how "discourse is understood as a series of practices, representations, and interpretations, through which different regimes of truth, for example the boundary between sanity and insanity, are (re)produced."⁴⁹ Individual and collective social identities are, thus, the products of how intrasubjective and intersubjective dynamics are navigated in this discursive context of society, which is itself socially, politically and economically unique. These particular discourses and their inter-epochal orientation and character are formulated by Foucault on the basis of two concepts, namely, 'discourses of power' and 'regimes of truth'. However, these regimes of truth and their discourses of power through institutions of domination exist only on the provision that there are subjugated segments of society that, through whatever social or biological denomination, whether by choice or determination, do not conform to the moral frameworks and social tenets put in place by the regimes of truth. The purveyors of reason — that sentiment that solidifies the truth of the regime and the totality of its power and of its reach — are thus juxtaposed to their moral opposite: the subjugated and the marginalised, that belly of society animated by un-reason; the Other. However,

*reason and un-reason are inextricably involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in relation to each other, in the exchange which separates them ... The [subjugated and marginalised] man ... communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity.*⁵⁰

⁴⁹ C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies ...*, p. 65.

⁵⁰ M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. xii.

As has been shown by the structural linguistics of Saussure and the grammatology of Derrida, and now by the poststructuralist philosophy of Foucault, there is a language that constructs society and animates its particularity, but there is no common language that bridges the abstract gap between reason and unreason, for that is its point and its purpose, the convolution of power and of truth. There is only a silence. A silence constitutive of a suppression that represents the totality of an oppression — not truly (as those arbiters of religion would have us believe) of the evil and the anti-social, not of the apocalyptic and the unnatural, but merely of the nonconformist, and perhaps the anti-conformist, the different and the ‘Other’. Foucault’s objective, and therefore also the objective of this study, is not the analysis of the history of the language of reason by which the dominant class of society came to rule, but the silence by which the subjugated class of society came to rise and rebel. It is an ‘archaeology of that silence’⁵¹ that constituted the condition by which the identity of the oppressed came to form. It is thus a study of alterity.

However, if the very language that constitutes the parameters of our reason and our understanding, the very language which analysis the horizontality of our history and the ‘rational sequence of causes’ by which we make sense of reality and interpret the past as the epistemic foundation for this understanding and analysis, is the very object of our criticism, then it ought to be understood that the language that writes and records history — the linguistic sequentialism and semantic intuition that dominates and inhibits our cognition and its relation to our material and social reality — is, thus, the very embodiment of “the limits rather than the identity of a culture.”⁵² The ultimate objective, then, is not merely the study of what is said about the Jews through (undoubtedly biased) historical analysis, but what is omitted from their Orientalist representations; not only what is said of them, but what is not said of them. The methodological study of language and literature that is deconstruction, and its focus on hauntological analysis — meaning the study of both the presences *and* absences of historical presentation and representation, allows one to analyse the marginalised collectives of society, or a society, from the point of view of their silence. Thus, not a study of a history about them that was undoubtedly written to legitimate their oppression and subjection to various social and political agendas by the ruling classes throughout millennia, but to study a history *of them*, the omitted history, their involuntary silence, that stood to threaten the logic and the reason, the pseudo-ism of the claimed and acclaimed ‘truth’, by which they were historically subjected and ritualistically appropriated for social marginalisation and oppression, and thus the manifestation of privilege and truth.

Orientalism — Theoretical Overview

This section of the chapter provides the intersection for a theory that deals with and specialises in the cultural-colonial relationship between the two larger socio-civilisational groups that concerns the case study of this thesis: Orientalism. Orientalism itself is a wholesale theory that deals with the historical relationship of the West and the East, or the Orient and the Occident, and in extension, with the way that the East has been discriminately observed by the West. Thus, Orientalism deals with how the Orient has been the object of cultural, social and material subjugation for millennia. However, although Orientalism does constitute one of the theoretical methods of analysis that will be employed in this study, the study will focus on one specific

⁵¹ M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. xii.

⁵² M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. xiii.

exegesis of Orientalism literature, being that strand invoked by Edward W. Said in his book *Orientalism* (1978)⁵³, and in extension components from the literary compilation *Orientalism and the Jews* by Kalmar and Penslar (2005).⁵⁴

Said's work focuses on the one hand, on the historical cultural-colonial relationship between the East and the West, but much more specifically on the historical relationship and the development of that relationship deep into the 20th century, between *Islam* and the West. Considering the fact that, as a born Palestinian, the study was close to Said's heart and the configuration of his own personal identity, the scope of Said's Orientalism is very much limited to that of the study of Islam as the Oriental subject of the Occident. However, despite his well-known reservations (although no necessary objections) to the inclusion of the Jew and historical civilisational Jewry in the study of Orientalism⁵⁵ (after all, Said did in his own words say: "Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots"⁵⁶, and constantly makes reference to Semitic as an inter-civilisational collective that invariably includes both Islam and Judaism, both Jews and Muslims), Said's use of a wide array of interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary theoretical and historical subject matter to study the historical subjugation of the Orient by the Occident as a matter of Occidental identity constitution, construction and consolidation is not only very admirable, but without a doubt, extremely useful to the historical study of antisemitism and the construction of Jewish identity, especially Jewish identity in the South African Diaspora. The genealogical and ethnographic-historical particularities and proof to legitimate the study of antisemitism, Judaism and Jews as a valid and extremely important component of Orientalism more generally will be expanded on later in this study, but the work of Kalmar and Penslar and their associates is also hugely important and insightful.

To Said, his book *Orientalism*, referring to the book as the culmination of his theoretical and historical research up to that point in time, was not so much a book about Middle Eastern or even Islamic historio-political relations *per se*, but very much "a book about culture, ideas, history and power"⁵⁷. It is a book exploring the (lopsided) configurations of power between the West and the East, the origins of these power configurations, and very much how these historic discourses of power and their impending subjugation of not only Eastern peoples, but also of Eastern culture, was mutually constitutive. Said's Orientalism is vital, not only because it deals with a culture and a people that is inherent to this study, but because it draws heavily from the semiotic, semantic, linguistic and postmodern and poststructural thought explained previously. This can be seen foremost in Said's definition of Orientalism as

A way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only [geographically] adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilisations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most

⁵³ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...* '.

⁵⁴ I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews ...* '.

⁵⁵ See E. W. Said, 'Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims', *Social Text*, No. 1, 1979, pp. 7-58.

⁵⁶ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...* ', p. xvi.

⁵⁷ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...* ', p. x.

*recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.*⁵⁸

It becomes apparent, then, that the Orient is not a single place or a people, it is not material or physical, but abstract and intellectual, a cultural construction and epistemic composition of the West to legitimate and impose the Occident's self-perceived superiority over a place and an object of both its social interest and scrutiny, as well as its military and political domination. The Orient, as it is perceived and felt, is not something that existed independently from Europe and the West at large, but an idea, a collective unit, which was created for the West. The Western obsession and fascination with (and perhaps keen fear of) the Orient is immediately the consequence of the Orient's difference and foreignness to that of the West. Its languages, its practices, its cosmological views and existential determination were perceived as inverse to the West's general historic identity and moral character. This obsession with difference translated to the solidification of distinction, both ontological and epistemological, between the Orient and the Occident. Said notes that this distinction was the main starting point for those proliferators of literature, poetry, study, science, philosophy, policy and general administration in the Orient, or directly concerning it.

Orientalism is not a static *thing*, but a *discourse*, instantly dynamic and subversive to the actual lived experience, self-perception and consciousness of those subjects of Oriental discourse. Said states that his own conceptualisation and understanding of discourse was greatly influenced by how it was conceived and presented by Foucault. Orientalism is a discourse of power, a framework of understanding and knowledge within the West, formulated not only by language, but by a very specific language with the same hierarchical and binary orientation as purported by Derrida and Saussure. If language is the semiotic and linguistic structure through which value is applied and meaning is engrained based on the universal constant of difference and deference, then it was the language formulating Orientalism that imbued it with meaning based on the perceived and constructed difference between the West and the East. If language is formulated horizontally through binary distinction, and vertically through hierarchical distinction, where a sign (or word, term, concept) is formulated, meant and transported based not on the condition of its inherent constitution, but on the condition of its relative difference to its own binary, to its shadow, to its inverse and its antithesis, then *Orient* meant something only because of its semantic difference and alterity, and its implied and often completely imagined and constructed inferiority, to its own opposite and antithesis: the Occident. It was this 'language of reason' which subjected the Orient as the unreasonable and thus the unnatural; it was this language of reason that became the regime of truth, where what was Oriental was immediately counterintuitive to the processes and institutions formulating, propagating, enforcing and policing 'truth'. It was this discourse that constructed this regime of truth and upheld it. And it is this language of this discourse that is the golden thread, the *invisibilia via*, that was the foundation of "the relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony"⁵⁹ that linked the Orient and the Occident. What made Orientalism so durable was not its effective application, not in culture *per se*, but itself as an effective

⁵⁸ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...* ', pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...* ', p. 7.

and imperative mode of culture, a cultural tool and epistemic utensil for a whole civilisation at large to come to terms with itself and ensure its own self-determination.

This point can be better understood by employing some of the most prominent concepts and theories developed by 20th century Marxist/structuralist scholar Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). Gramsci made the noteworthy distinction between civil society and political society which, even though his ideas were directly applied to the capitalist state, could very well be used to analyse the structural constitution and dynamics of societies throughout history. Political society was that sphere in society that enforced and policed the social norms and moral frameworks of a society through institutions of domination, such as the police and military. Civil society is that sphere of society that shaped the ideologies and beliefs that informed the social conditions of a society through what he referred to as *manufactured consent*. According to Gramsci, culture was to be found in civil society, where what was perceived as truth was based on the general consensus of the bourgeois state, known as hegemony, or *cultural hegemony*.⁶⁰ Cultural hegemony refers to the social phenomena where certain cultural forms and ideas predominate over others, and are used to establish a standard or a system of truth (this can be seen as analytically and theoretically equivalent to Foucault's regimes of truth). Relating this brief analysis of Gramscian theory back to the topic at hand, we can see that Orientalism is without a doubt an example of cultural hegemony in the historical relation of the West with the East. Predominant ideas about Western or Occidental superiority have become a hegemonic insight and, therefore, a massive social predisposition, not because of any actual Western superiority, but because of Occidental representations of the Orient in Europe and the West. Neither was the language and cultural hegemony that constituted Orientalism and shaped and created the Orient the product of any form of Eastern self-perception, self-determination or consent either. Orientalism was not written by Orientals, but by Orientalists. The cultural hegemony, the discourses of power and the language that was and is Orientalism formed

*... a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans against all 'those' non-Europeans ... In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on the flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand ... the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of who's unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections.*⁶¹

These were to be found in both political and civil discourses in Western society. But the acute racial consciousness — or the Westerner's will towards self-actualisation and self-determination that was, and is, based on a very specific and influential consciousness and awareness of race as a social denominator that purports cultural distinction and hierarchical civilisation's positioning — of the Westerner was not conditioned through domination, but through consent. It was not necessarily enforced, but was preached through religious institutions, mythologised by the arts, propagated through popular literature, lent scientific

⁶⁰ A. Heywood, *Politics*, Red Globe Press: United Kingdom, 1997, pp. 100-101.

⁶¹ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, pp. 7-8.

and scholarly legitimacy through careful study in the academy, and taught more or less unilaterally through Western educational institutions; all these efforts and more created an atmosphere of general consent about not only the difference, but the inferiority, of the Orient throughout the Occident. If it is not enforced, then it will come to be assumed, and by its definition, any assumption on the Orient assures that there is in the self-consciousness of any Western individual or social group an Oriental precedent; some culturally engendered notion and knowledge of what the Orient is, on which the legitimation of his own self-perception lies.

The analytic key to this representation of the Orient, and the later study of antisemitism and Diasporic Jewish identity as a collective substratum of Orientalism is, according to Said, the concept of *exteriority*. This concept of exteriority is also crucial in analysing the theoretical phenomena set out by Foucault and Gramsci, particularly those of cultural hegemony, discourses of power and regimes of truth. As noted above, these structuralist and poststructuralist authors have shown how ‘truth’ is a social construct, created for the purposes of social order and ingroup cohesion (itself based primarily on the exclusion and social marginalisation of those who do not consent, submit or conform to this constructed ‘truth’). Exteriority explains that anybody writing, thinking of or speaking about the Orient has to come to terms with their own *strategic location* and *strategic formation*. The former refers to the social position of the propagator of Orientalism to the Orient — where culturally, politically, geographically is the subject in relation to the Orient, and how is this influenced by his own Oriental precedent? The latter refers to how the certain texts and ideas about the Orient gain referential power and representational mass and density in Western culture more generally.⁶² These two concepts explain the exteriority inherent in Orientalism, where the power and scope of what is said about the Orient is not based on any inherent truth about the Orient, but on how the Orient is represented by its cultural inverse — the Occident — to rationalise itself and legitimise its cultural domination, hegemony and physical and epistemic colonialism. The key to exteriority and its components is “to look at ... style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, *not* the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original.”⁶³ It is, thus, the very exclusion, displacement and marginalisation of the Orient — the vivacious insistence of its silence — that saturates the strength, scope and influence of Orientalism. Orientalism is more reflective of the voices and institutions that define it, compound it and distribute it, than it is of the putative object of its crusade.

Since Orientalism as an overarching theory, and the way that it is crucially and usefully interpreted by Said for the purposes of this study, has been expounded on, this section can now divert its attention to applying Orientalism to the case study of antisemitism as a putative subject of Orientalism, and also to the historical question of Jews, Judaism and historic and modern antisemitism in the development of Western culture, and the question of Jews and Judaism in the South African Diaspora more specifically.

However, Kalmar and Penslar (2005) note that the historical study of Jews, Judaism and antisemitism as a larger study of Orientalism adds an additional cultural dimension. For one, Jews and Judaism have, throughout history, been viewed as being much more of an intersectional case, where representations of Jews

⁶² E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*’, p. 20.

⁶³ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*’, p. 21.

as subjects of Western, Christian social deliberation throughout history have been viewed and treated as both Oriental *and* Occidental. As a social scientist more generally, and historians more specifically, there are a number of deliberations and historical factors that might have played into this strange historical and cultural concurrency. An obvious one might be race, since, classically, Jews — even though they are, together with Arabs, genealogically derived from the Semitic cultural grouping dating back thousands of years in the Middle East — at least when viewed in terms of their physical and racial features, have come to resemble the European, and specifically more the Western European, than the Arab has. Fair skin, lighter eye colours and lighter hair have been much less of an anomaly among Jews than they have been among Arabs. But taking race as the prime social denominator for cultural concurrency in historical Orientalist deliberation necessitates a strict and fixed racial consciousness across an almost bimillennial period, of which there is very little evidence, especially when it comes to political and social interactions and cultural interchanges between the West and the near East. Neither can cultural customs and traditions be viewed as the social denominator that explains this concurrency, since Jewish custom must have seemed equally fantastical and foreign to the pagan European in antiquarian periods, and likewise even to the Catholic in times leading up to the rise of Islam in the 9th century and centuries to follow. What this analysis proposes is that there is one very obvious and very dominant social denominator that presupposed Jewish Oriental/Occidental concurrency for almost two millennia: monotheism. For one thing, this is a feature that links Islam to Christianity just as much as it does Judaism; all three religions share Abraham as their religio-mythological patriarch. This implies a common cosmic narrative and existential rhetoric wherein each of these religions independently maintain a strong sense of cultural geocentrism, where both their religion and their faith put them at the very epicentre of their respective moral universes. All three are part of a strange cultural liminality that Derrida, among other contemporaries studying the very same issue, calls the ‘Abrahamic’.⁶⁴ Apart from Abraham, however, Muslim mythology differs markedly from that of either Christianity and Judaism, who both share similar religious devices that mark themselves as cultural tenets laid out throughout the Old Testament, of which Christianity’s is merely corollary of Judaism after the death of Jesus and his assumption as the central figure in the Christian moral cosmos. The concept of Christ, and the grand array of rhetoric devices that follow from his symbolic inception as the centre of the Christian cosmos to shape, consolidate and even centralise at least some form of concurrency among Christian identity, is indeed the central means by which Judaism was culturally delegitimated and persecution and discrimination of the Jews justified throughout two millennia by the Christian church, and various ecclesiastical and hermeneutical traditions during this time. This specific point will be elaborated on in the following historical analysis of antisemitism, but for now, suffice it to say that monotheism was the central link that allowed for the cultural concurrency of the Jews as both Occidental and Oriental in Western representations of Judaism and Jews throughout history. Judaism was, to a much closer degree than Islam, Christianity’s monotheistic Other⁶⁵, and thus much more of an inversive cultural contestant and threat where the realm of Gramsci’s civic culture and its manufactured consent is concerned.

⁶⁴ I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews ...* ‘, p. 5.

⁶⁵ I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews ...* ‘, p. 1.

Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892) are two other important figures who are seminal to understanding the development of racial theory in the 19th and 20th centuries, and specifically the cultural links to Christian and liberal/rational delegitimisation of Jews and Judaism in European society and the resulting forms of ‘modern antisemitism’. Further into the study, the former will be elaborated on less than the latter, but both of these historical figures and their work will be analysed in due course. However, the most basic tenets of their racial theory (predominantly Renan's) and the popularity it gained in the specific social and political context of the epoch in which he lived and wrote, and of which he was undeniably a product, will be considered in the present analytical context for understanding antisemitism, and the Jews and Judaism more generally, as a critically important subject of Orientalism.

It is true that the supernaturalist rhetoric used by the Christian church for a thousand years to rationalise and propagate antisemitism did give way to a liberal-rational one in the time when the state, and the nation-state for that matter, became the prime organising structure of society, and humanism became the moral standard for collective social decision making, from the 17th and 18th centuries onward. It was also at this time when European and later the larger Western differential discourse, for the sake of territorial expansion and industrial development, came to be seen under the guise of *Imperialism* and *colonialism*. However, despite the apparent change of abstraction used to inspire collective action in state affairs, “imperialist rhetoric continued to be accompanied by Christian rhetoric.”⁶⁶ It is important to note that this rhetorical concurrency and intersectionality is one of the main focal points of this present study.

Theoretical application of structural linguistics, poststructuralism and Orientalism to Jewish history, antisemitism and Jewish identity

Following from and directly concerning the theory discussed previously in this study, what is crucial to understand concerning the almost universal symbolic representation of the Jew by what can collectively be referred to as the Occident throughout various epochs and epistemes in history — whether this be Western/Central European/Mediterranean pagan societies during antiquity; the Holy Roman Empire or Catholic Church during pre-medieval, medieval and late-medieval societies; the Reformist Church; the liberal-rational nationalist state in the 18th-20th centuries; or even eventually the pre-apartheid and apartheid South African state — is its symbolic representation, not of isolated difference to that dominant culture, but crucially of its seemingly inherent ‘Otherness’ to the civilisational and cultural authority in society, and many of these particular listed societies.

What makes the Otherness so significant, and so utterly consequential in various historical tides of antisemitism, is not the actual difference between the Jew and the Pagan, or the Jew and the Christian, or the Jew and the enlightened, rational man, or even the Afrikaner; but the inhibited social and cultural similarities and its representation and manifestation of the sordid antithesis of the transcendental constitution of the social identity of the dominant group. As has been proven by the basic structural tenets of human language and linguistic discourse by de Saussure and Derrida, respectively, discourse, rhetoric and narrative, through the basic attribution of meaning through binaries (horizontal attribution of meaning) and hierarchies of value

⁶⁶ I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews ...*, p. 7.

(vertical attribution of meaning) — and the permutation of these structural tenets throughout culture more generally⁶⁷ — the moral framework of a people is defined in the duality of meaning: for every normative virtue, there is an aversive vice; for every sin, there is penance; for every injustice, there is restitution. The very value attributed to the norm in society that is set as an ideological benchmark that defines the moral and social aspirations of any given culture is juxtaposition with a negative value attributed to the opposite of that norm, which is, in any case, defined as an extreme; just as there are certain values that pull members of a social group towards uniformity, there are values that push these members away from the extremity, or that which is perceived as exterior to the social group. But identity, especially collective social identity, is defined just as much by the spaces of exteriority of a culture, as by its plains of interiority. The taboo, the vice, the insane, the evil and the outcast of a culture that animates the character and intersubjective and intrasubjective constitution of a social group also defines its uniformity. Thus, every social group *requires* an ‘Other’ that symbolically manifests the group’s uniformity. Through ritual, the ‘Otherness’ of this outcast is symbolised by what is anterior to the conventionalism of the social group. The outcast and the insane, the inhuman (or perhaps subhuman), is animated by what is perceived as the semantic polar opposite of those values and attributes that dictate the ‘humanity’ and aspirational processes of uniformity in a social group.

Thus, aversion towards Judaism and Jewry was collectively based on the vague cultural similarities of the Jew to that of the pagan/Christian/liberal who marginalised it throughout a trimillennial historic period. Jewish difference and Otherness were not a universal, objective truth, but a subjected condition, a social discourse necessitated for the purposes of group uniformity of the European/Western. In the words of one of the major leaders of the Zionist movement, Max Nordau (1897) at the very turn of the 19th century: “All kinds of vices are falsely attributed to the Jews, because one wishes to convince himself that he has a right to detest them. But the pre-existing sentiment is the detestation of the Jews;” Nordau also conveniently cited a proverb in the same text, stating that ““If you have to drown a dog," says the proverb, "you must first declare him to be mad.””⁶⁸

Because all things that are used as social denominators to rationalise group coherence and uniformity are inherently abstract, one must rationalise the exteriorisation of the Other on the plain of abstraction as well. Meaning, in this case negative meaning, is attributed to certain aspects of Judaism which are themselves conceptual binaries, or shadows, with purportedly and preconceived notions of inferiority, and the Jew is thus confined to a liminal position between acceptance within group membership, and the utter, total conceptualisation of evil, or that which is conceived as the aversive principle of a group. The Jew is conceived of as a figure which inhabits the marginal spaces of a group; he is the guardian of the epistemological and the ontological domain that defines social exclusion. The idea and the image of him cannot be forgotten, it must remain visible and itself coherent, so as that the moral antithesis of what social conformity dictates can retain a face, a body, a voice and a history, even if that voice in predominantly

⁶⁷ As has strongly been evinced by Foucault and Said respectively, not to mention the contribution of various other structuralist and poststructuralist authors, including, but not limited to Marx, Engels, Gramsci, Chomsky, Lévi-Strauss, etc.

⁶⁸ This extract is a text of Max Nordau’s address at the first Zionist Congress on August 27, 1897. Access: <<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/address-by-max-nordau-at-the-first-zionist-congress>>.

animated by a silence, and that history a subjected and largely constructed one. The Jew inhabits and personifies the space of aversion, the absolute edge of reason and what makes membership of a particular social group — whether it be a polytheistic culture; the Church and its people; or the liberal state and its citizens — reasonable. Antisemitism is such a discourse of power, where the Jew is not *found* at the margins of society, but is *cast* there, vilified and subjected to socially anterior notions of Otherness and evil that the Jew does not possess, but which he is given, is indeed chained to, as a social necessity for the sustenance of constructed norms held by that dominant group, culture or society that assures social ingroup cohesion. If fractures are located in the social constitution of a group animated by common transcendental, ideological or material/biological features⁶⁹, then group uniformity through social conformity is not conditioned through intragroup similarity, but through intergroup difference.⁷⁰ The image of the Jew is used to define what the pagan, the Christian and the modern man must not be, in order to correctly animate what he must be — the Jew's absolute moral opposite. He must first look over his shoulder to see the horns of the Devil, in order to be able to know that the image before him is indeed that of his God.

In *Madness and Civilisation*, Foucault (1967) explains this social exteriorisation by referring to the way that the insane, the mentally and spiritually ill of late-medieval society, were used as the image of the Other in order to bear social coherence. The insane animated the consequences of temptation and sin, and their image and cultural quality were used as the marginalising principle that would inspire group uniformity among late-medieval society. An interesting aspect of Foucault's analysis that is extremely helpful in making sense of the semantic discourses that inspire antisemitism during the same period, as well as much earlier and later, is the way that the 'proliferation of meaning' towards certain symbolism and imagery that would come to animate and define the aversive quality of group uniformity, as well as the moral qualities that define and bind the group, makes for a fascinating obscurity of reality. Foucault — keeping in mind preferred religious imagery and symbolism of medieval and late medieval society, where evil is sensorially associated with what is inhuman and unnatural, and often outrightly demonic— notes that

*Things themselves become so burdened with attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form. Meaning is no longer read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for itself. Between the knowledge which animates it and the form into which it is transposed, a gap widens.*⁷¹

He makes this specific claim in relation to the semantic intersectionality of the association of madness and insanity and demonology in late-medieval and early-Renaissance art. One of the pieces Foucault finds particularly interesting is *Triptych of the Temptation of St. Anthony*, otherwise referred to as the *Temptations of St. Anthony*, by painter Hieronymus Bosch (1501). The whole work is animated by the inhuman and supernatural; those figures that bear resemblance to animals and humans are grotesque and beastly, unnatural and a mutation of what is perceived to be normal according to the natural order of God. The collective disfigurement and disorder is accepted as the great 'Platonic metaphor' that illustrates through fetishised

⁶⁹ Collectively and generally referred to as social denominators.

⁷⁰ This is a basic principle discovered through an empirical basis by social-psychologists Henry Tajfel and John Turner during the various studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. The particularities of the theory and the findings will be analysed in the a later chapter in this study.

⁷¹ M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. 16.

imagery the inhumanity and disorder that can result from sin and temptation. Insanity and madness are animated by unnatural behaviour, the opposite of social convention, and this demented representation born of madness illustrates the dangers of a denunciation from social convention; to not conform is considered madness and unnatural, and at odds with the prevailing cosmic order. The marginalisation of the insane in medieval society is a discourse of power that is once again necessitated for the social unification of the group, in this case the Church and its relevant secular institutions. The insane are there to display and ontologically manifest the disorder inherent of a departure from social norms. Madness is seen as the Other, but in its Otherness also the unifying element of a group and a culture. The famous imagery of the gryllos, or the gargoyle, is symbolic of the evil element of the universe, the aversive space. Materially and metaphysically, that signifies and animates the antithesis of social unity and moral purity. It is such an image of a gryllos, that stares St. Anthony in the face, an image born of madness and an artistic objectification of temptation. For Foucault,

it is this figure which fascinates the gaze of the aesthetic — both are prisoners of a kind of mirror interrogation, which remains unanswered in a silence inhabited only by the monstrous swarm that surrounds them. The gryllos no longer recalls man, by its satiric form, to his spiritual vocation forgotten in the folly of desire. It is madness become Temptation; all it embodies of the impossible, the fantastic, the inhuman, all that suggests the unnatural, the writhing of an insane presence on the earth's surface — all this is precisely what gives the gryllos its strange power. The freedom, however frightening, of his dreams, the hallucinations of his madness, have more power of attraction for fifteenth-century man than the desirable reality of the flesh. What then is this fascination which now operates through the images of madness?⁷²

Madness and insanity are themselves proliferations of meaning that personify and culturally define the space and point of social exclusion; it gives a body and an expression to the very attributes, actions and values that are counterintuitive to group identity and counterproductive to group cohesion. History (particularly in the late-medieval ages, but undeniably long before and long after) has shown that Jews and Judaism were culturally and socially subjected to the same semantic attributions as were the mad and the insane in Foucault's analysis of *Temptations* and insanity at the beginning of the Renaissance. A more appropriate rephrasing of Foucault's question to the specific objectives of this study will be: what then is the fascination which now operates through the images of the Jew? A historical study of antisemitism and the particular shape it took 20th century South Africa, and finally its implications for the construction and particular epistemic alignment of Jewish identity in the South African Diaspora, must, therefore, constitute an analysis of the way that the historical marginality of the Jew, his Otherness and associative meaning and imagery as the continual cultural antithesis of the various epochs in which he existed and operated.

As the very constitution of systemic rationalism of particular episteme dictates, the language employed to subject madness to a certain structural interpretation of society was considered and blindly accepted as a Language of Reason. Such a language, and the convention by which such a language was operated, was the lingual and sensual expression of antisemitism as well. It is the ritualisation and exteriorisation by which a subject — the Jew — is semantically disfigured, marginalised and made inhuman and unnatural by

⁷² M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, pp. 17-18.

generations of religio-mythologically inspired stereotypes and pseudoscientific propaganda. The Jew is discarded, yet not forgotten, to the margins of the exterior, so that there may be order in the interior. It is ritual in that it is sacrifice; not a material sacrifice of blood and fire (although this ruthless expression of social solicitude did undoubtedly also have its place in the history of antisemitism), but a cultural sacrifice of value and validation — not a value that permits social inclusion in a social group and validation as sanctification for such and inclusion — but a sacrifice that Others the subject to a liminal space, where it is not part of the social group, but undoubtedly still plays a crucial role in the culture and discourses of power. Antisemitism is an expression of such a liminality. It is a particular trimillennial social ritual that confronts the European and the Christian and the National with what he is not, in order to illuminate to him with what he ought to be. The study of it would thus not be the critique of antisemitism, but a truly critical analysis of the language of reason, as envisioned by Foucault, which elucidated and regulated such rituals of marginalisation, where the social processes of *interiorisation* and exteriorisation of a culture, the social group and its Other, are mutually constitutive and mutually conducive, but where the Other is subject to a system where it communicates through pervasive physical and moral constraint. Inherent in such a constraint is another discourse — not one of sound or of action — but of a silence, writhing against the sanctification of these rituals of marginalisation to which it, and also its autonomy, its sovereignty, and its determination is silenced. These rituals of marginalisation are the tools of the discourses of power that lead to what Gramsci referred to as *Cultural Hegemony*. An “archaeology of that silence”⁷³, of that writhing against this language of reason that justifies the cultural expulsion of determination and social marginalisation of a people, is the object of this study.

M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. xii.

Chapter 2: Historic Antisemitism as a sub-discipline of Orientalism, and the historio-discursive proliferation of the Jew as the Other

Early Antisemitism throughout History

The history of antisemitism, as one might expect of any historical franchise built on a hateful prejudice grounded in obscure cultural and religious myth and social and political stereotypes, is fraught with disjunction and fallacy. Wistrich (1991) notes the semantic and discursive-linguistic problems with the term antisemitism itself. The term had its origins in the late 19th century in Germany, invented by journalist Wilhelm Marr as a term denoting strong opposition and even hatred towards Jews as a people and Judaism as an idea.⁷⁴ It quickly spread to neighbouring states and found strong appeal in many parts of Hungary, France, Austria and Russia. In terms of the spread of this specific movement denoting to this specific term and its specific social and political agenda at the time, it appears to have been rather novel; however, the fact of the easy appeal and sympathy garnered for this movement is telling of a seed of hatred and hostility towards Jews and Judaism that can easily be traced back to ancient, Hellenistic and Classical eras. Although large-scale antisemitism is classically linked to specific events, places and institutions — such as the mass expulsion of Jews from England in 1290⁷⁵; the mass prosecution of Jews during the Spanish Inquisition between 1492 and 1508⁷⁶; the Jewish persecutions in Muscovite Russia⁷⁷; and, of course, the Holocaust during the Second World War — and all of these places and events strong institutional association with Christianity in general and the Catholic Church in particular, the history of large scale anti-Jewish sentiment, and policies and movements borne from this sentiment, stretches much further back towards antiquity and paganism.

The larger problem with the term antisemitism comes from its historically lexicographical and semantic profile. The ‘Semitic’ denotation of the term refers to the historical association with Semites, which is ethnically associated with the Hebrew name ‘Shem’, which was one of the three sons of Noah after the apocalyptic flood in Genesis which was meant to restore humanity. Two important central figures in this Biblio-Historical interpretation of the term are both Ham and Shem, not discounting their brother Japheth.

⁷⁴ For more on the origins the term antisemitism, see M. Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr, the patriarch of Anti-Semitism*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1986.

⁷⁵ See S. A. Singer, ‘The Expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290’, *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 55, No. 2, 1964, pp. 117-136.

⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the Jews during the Spanish Inquisition, I have found the work of Benzion Netanyahu extremely helpful and insightful. See his seminal work *The origins of the Inquisition in fifteenth century Spain*, New York Review Books: New York, 1995.

⁷⁷ G. Vernadsky, ‘The Heresy of the Judaizers and the Policies of Ivan III of Moscow’, *Speculum*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1933, pp. 436-454.

When, in the ninth Chapter in Genesis, Ham brings disgrace to Noah when looked upon drunk and naked, he curses Ham's son Canaan for his father's disgrace⁷⁸. The scripture reads:

[24] And Noah awoke from his wine and knew what his younger son had done unto him.

[25] And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren.

[26] And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant.

[27] God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant.⁷⁹

The curse, often referred to as the Hamitic Curse⁸⁰, entails that Canaan and his descendants be servants unto the descendants of Shem, and by implication Japheth as well. Shem's historical-ethnic designation is that of a group of cognate languages spoken in what is today referred to as the Middle Eastern region, predominantly Hebrew, Arabic, Assyrian, Aramaic, and Babylonian, among others. The vast and intricate profiling of these regions and their respective civilisational categorisations make it clear that they have very little in support of coherent ethnic or racial kinship. Semitic and Semitism, therefore, refers to the historical descendants of the whole region, and not any one of the particular groups in the region.

A link can be drawn to the Jews; one of the children of Shem, whose descendants were to be served by the descendants of Canaan, was Arphaxad, who fathered Salah, who himself fathered Eber, who is genealogically referred to as the eponym of the Hebrew people.⁸¹ Abraham, who is widely considered to be the mythological patriarch of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is of the stock of Eber. But this genealogical link is too vague, and still does not explicitly designate Semitic heritage to the Hebrew nation alone. Thus, the idea and semanticist delegation of Semitic or Semitism to the Jews alone is largely problematic. Wistrich further notes that an extended genealogical and ethnographical study of an ethnic association that historically (although fallaciously) contrasts that of Semitic, referring to 'Aryan' and the way it was itself used in the 20th century, is also problematic. Aryan strictly refers to the Indo-European branch of ethnicity that spoke Sanskrit and invaded Southern Asian regions that would later become India, enslaving its native populations. It therefore had a gross misuse in the 19th and 20th centuries and was juxtapositioned to Semitic ethnicity that was the subject of equal misuse. "Indians and Iranians were 'Aryans' but Germans and North Europeans certainly were *not*, any more than European Jews, who no longer spoke Hebrew, could be meaningfully described as 'Semites'".⁸² The genealogical and ethnographical rift between reality and myth concerning the way 'Semite' and 'Aryan' was used and legitimated by the pseudo-scientific dogmas in the 19th and 20th

⁷⁸ There are long standing historical and theological debates on the reasons and implications for the curse being put on Ham's son and not Ham himself, but these are lost in the various exegesis' of this particular point in scripture by religious and political institutions and authorities to justify a plethora of inhumane acts, policies and franchises.

⁷⁹ The Book of Genesis, Chapter 9, v. 24-27, *NKJV*.

⁸⁰ Which will be explored later in this study, especially in relation to the use of religious and political myth in the hermeneutical rationalisation and theological legitimation of antisemitism and earlier racism in 20th century South Africa and earlier Trekboer society.

⁸¹ S. B. Noegel and B. M. Wheeler, "Shem", in *Historical Dictionary of Prophets in Islam and Judaism*, Scarecrow Press: London, 2002, p. 301.

⁸² R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*, Methuen: London, 1991, p. xvi.

centuries, and its deep-seated semantic roots in anti-Jewish sentiment and hostility throughout history, perfectly displays the power of political and religious myth in stereotyping as a social process of group formation and identity construction and consolidation. History shows us that, often, truth is permitted only when it does not interfere with or threaten privilege.

However, another important feature from this genealogical study is that it provides a solid ethnographic proximation between Islam and Judaism that links them and their historic experiences in the study of Orientalism. Although Orientalism does refer to the study of the Orient and the way that its portrayal as the often inferior ‘Other’ throughout the history of Western civilisation was used to assert Occidental superiority in both the civic and political culture of various epochs in European and Western history, the concept and conceptualisation Orientalism in academia, and especially in the social sciences, is closely related to that specific undertaking of the subject by Edward W. Said in the late 1970s.⁸³ Although Said acknowledges that Orientalism as a subject includes the study of the Western representation and appropriation of the whole East, he does limit his own historical, philological and philosophical analysis to that of the near Orient, particularly the historical depiction and representation of Islam. Studies of the Jewish historical experience, either physically or representationally, due to Said’s exclusion of the Jews in his own study, is not often seen as legitimately falling under the heading of Orientalism *per se*.⁸⁴ However, the above reference to historical ethnographic studies does show that both Islam and Judaism — or to use their historic-civilisation reference, Hebrew and Arab — fall under the larger historic-cognate classification of ‘Semitic’. This ethnographic and genealogical proximity, as well as the historic proximity of the experiences of the Hebrew and the Arab as historical subjects of mass prosecution and intolerance, and pseudo-scientific undertakings for the legitimisation of mass racial oppression and extermination, makes the Jew just as eligible as a subject for the study of Orientalism. Indeed, a Judaeo-Orientalist analysis will be one of the major theoretical components of this study.

Antisemitism is obviously fundamental to any Judaeo-Orientalist analysis of Jewish history, and now that the fallacious philological and semantic nature of the term, and how it is itself a manifestation of the power of political and religious myth in cultural alterity and social identity construction, has been noted, it is worth undertaking a brief analysis of the history of anti-Jewish sentiment and hostility and its various historical manifestations to show how it relates to the present study in pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa.

As mentioned before, antisemitism is most often associated with historic events involving nationalistic governments or the Church. But antisemitism has much deeper historical roots that date back to Graeco-Roman and even Egyptian antiquity. It ought again to be reiterated that the specific term antisemitism denotes a very specific racial prejudice and hate and requires a collective sense of race-consciousness attributed to certain stereotypes made against the Jews as a whole race. One should be careful of anachronistic assumptions when analysing antisemitism during antiquity, when race-consciousness and

⁸³ Referring, of course, to E. W. Said. *Orientalism*, Penguin Random House: United Kingdom, 2019.

⁸⁴ It ought to be noted that there are academic undertakings that do study Jews in light of classical Orientalism, most predominant of these studies is the book by I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews*, Brandeis University Press: Massachusetts. My own study is indebted to this endeavour, and will attempt to expand on it.

alterity were often manifested much differently than in modern history. For this reason, and especially when referring to antiquity, antisemitism might denote civilisational and ethnic prejudice and stereotyping, instead of strictly racial stereotyping as we understand race today.

From the standpoint of Hebrew history, as displayed in the self-representational narratives of Jews and Judaism, it seems that, since the very conception of Judaic and Hebraic ethnography, Jewish identity is constructed in automatic juxtaposition to antisemitism, or anti-Judaism.⁸⁵ The earliest and most relied on accounts of Jewish history is certainly that of the Torah and the rest of the Old Testament in the Bible. The majority of the Old Testament is a narrative device that accounts for the genesis, genealogy and struggle of the Hebrew nation and their self-perceived predisposed cosmic position as God's elect. In this narrative and its mythic rationalisation, antisemitism, or hostile and volatile discrimination against the Hebrew nation throughout history, is coupled with a circular discourse of redemption that manifests and legitimises the Jewish identity and their special covenanted position in the universe. The geocentric staple of Jewish identity is tied to the narrative of antisemitism; without it, Jews could not depend on the redemption narrative to legitimise their meta-historic approach to identity construction and social group cohesion, or the rituals and beliefs that are coupled with it. The Old Testament is fraught with examples of this antisemitic-redemptionist narrative, in either symbolic or literal terms: Jacob, whom God would later rename Israel and whose twelve sons with his first wife Leah would later become patriarchs of the twelve tribes of the Jews, was hated by Esau, whose descendants would become part of the gentiles. In the tale of Esther, the Jewish nation finds itself as an oppressed people by the Persian empire. In the tale, a vision of antisemitism is given when Haman develops a hatred for the Jewish figure of Mordecai when he refused to bow to him as a display of fealty to his monotheistic faith and loyalty to one God. Jewish rejection of the *status quo* and their resultant deistic redemption is the major discursive element of the Bible, and therefore of Jewish identity. However, Hannah Arendt (1968) notes that an evaluation of the meta-historical narrative of antisemitism based on Biblio-historical interpretation has the tendency to substitute history with myth.⁸⁶ While this Biblical narrative is telling and important for an analysis of Jewish identity, one ought to look at material history in order to undergo an extensive and detailed understanding of antisemitism specifically.

Perhaps the earliest account of antisemitism is to be found in the proclamations of the third century B.C. Egyptian priest Manetho, who, according to account of Apion of Alexandria, states that the Jews were a race of lepers who were excommunicated from Egypt in the days of Moses for that specific reason.⁸⁷ This was to be the (recorded) genesis of a plethora of pagan antisemitism proclaiming stereotypes that would be heralded in ages to come, of Jews as godless and gross, sterile, cannibalistic and — perhaps most significantly with reference to the brand of antisemitism experienced since medieval history as franchised by Christian and

⁸⁵ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, pp. 3-5.

⁸⁶ H. Arendt, *Antisemitism: Part One of the Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt Brace & Company: London, 1951, p. 7.

⁸⁷ J. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Towards Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1983, pp. 45-47.

state institutions — “exclusivist, their separatism ... an expression of misanthropy and hatred of the gods”.⁸⁸ This last part would, of course, be reinterpreted as misanthropy towards God, being the monotheistic God of Christianity, and the state and superior race in 20th century totalitarianism. But in antiquity, antisemitism would take hold in various Graeco-Egyptian and Greco-Roman epochal periods, from both before and after the period allotted in history to the death of Christ.

The intersubjective position of the Jews and the calibration of their social relation to the Graeco-Roman and Graeco-Egyptian authorities and populations were, from a cultural-historical perspective, rather paradoxical. One would be hard-pressed to think of a cultural group throughout history that was simultaneously so well-adapted and privileged to and in various cultural epochs on the one hand, and so hated and persecuted on the other. They were written about in both antisemitic and anti-Judaic terms by some of the most prominent of the Hellenistic intelligentsia of the day, including Seneca, Cicero, Juvenal, Cornelius Tacitus and, of course, Flavius Josephus. Stereotypes about Jews, while deeply Orientalist and often politically, culturally and religiously biased, are often vulgar and exaggerated renderings and reimaginings of genuine historical success of Jews in antiquity. This success and genuine periodical tolerance of the Jews in antiquity, however, was coupled with a deep-seated and fairly universal and transcendent cultural orthodoxy and religious conservatism, and Jews refused to culturally associate with Graeco-Roman peoples, and likewise refused to share in their pagan worship and specific social and dietary codes.⁸⁹ While Jews were immensely numerous in the Roman Empire - such as at one point in Hellenistic Alexandria when they constituted around 40 percent of the Alexandrian population — the Jews were often in deep-seated sociopolitical conflict and tension with their neighbours. During the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 A.D.), this socio-political tension had led to the defilement of the Jewish alter and other sacred Jewish texts in Jerusalem, and in 133 A.D., it led to suggestions of the total eradication of the Jews to Antiochus Sidetes.⁹⁰ During the reign of Caligula as Emperor of Rome in 38 A.D., this agenda of Jewish eradication led to popular campaigns of antisemitism against the privilege and power of the Jews in Roman society at the time. This was repeated nearly three decades later in 66 A.D. in Alexandria when popular uprisings were the consequence of equal social rights and religious privileges granted to Jews at the time.⁹¹ It appears that, despite the then-concurrent appeal that Judaism held to the pagan masses of the Graeco-roman public, intelligentsia and higher political echelons, a uniform hatred towards Jewry throughout antiquity is said to mostly have been the product, not of a hatred of the constitution of Jewish cultural identity and Judaism *per se*, but more to the Jews’ “alleged

⁸⁸ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 5.

⁸⁹ There is a great plethora of knowledge on the history of the Jews during antiquity. One of the most prominent scholars in antiquity who compiled a massive detailed and elaborate history of the Jews during the period before and immediately after the death of Christ is the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus; see his 20-part historiographical work *Antiquities of the Jews*, originally written in Greek and first published in 1544; the English translation by W. Whinston in 1737 is one of the most widely used, and in 1987 a new version was published by Hendrickson Publishers: Massachusetts, which can be widely found and used to this day. In addition to Josephus, also see L. H. Feldman, *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian*, Princeton University Press: United States, 1993.

⁹⁰ L. H. Feldman, ‘Antisemitism in the Ancient World’, (ed.) D. Berger, 1995, p. 31.

⁹¹ L. H. Feldman, ‘Antisemitism ...’, pp. 22-23.

intolerance, their missionary zeal, their seditiousness, their credulity and above all their exclusivity.”⁹² It was, thus, this meta-historical, Judaeo-Geocentric narrative through which the Jews viewed themselves as ethnographically elect by their monotheistic God, and their refusal to compromise on any cultural and religious matter on their self-perceived chosen-ness, that was the reason they were periodically hated and persecuted during antiquity.

However, pagan antisemitism during antiquity never gained the aggressive institutional and ‘cosmic-existential’ quality that Christian antisemitism was known for. The very foundation of the Christian message — referring to that ritual and symbolic charge of deicide and spiritual enrichment manifested at the Evangelical event of Pentecost — was based on the notion that the follower of Christ and his message of redemption and mission of evangelisation was the *new elect* of God, and that he had subsumed the cosmic and meta-historical position of the Jew, who was seen as the new heathen and subject of religious conversion under (the newly interpreted) God, as well as cultural and political conversion under the Church. Thus, both the religious and the socio-political antagonism between the Jew and the Christian since the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire was fundamentally more charged and, as would later be seen in the Middle Ages and the 20th century, fundamentally more aggressive and violent.

This subsumption of the Jewish cosmic position and its reinterpretation and reevaluation by the new Christian movement in first century Palestine required a specific narrative that would convince other cultural and civilisational groups to adhere to the evangelisation message and convert to the Christian faith. Jewish-British scholar on Christian and Jewish religion Hyam Maccoby notes the specific discourse used by the Christians and their reinterpretation of the Messianic message in the establishment of a new antisemitism that would, in future, prove to be more influential and more lethal than its pagan predecessor.⁹³

The Christian narrative following the death of the Messiah (who would traditionally come to be known by the name Jesus) was driven by a reinvigorated historical narrative of stark binaries, where in reality the cultural, historical and ethnographical intersectionality was much more complicated. Despite the religio-mystical renderings to his prophetic person by the Catholic Church leading up to and during the Middle Ages, Jesus was a Jewish born individual, from the line of Shem, which made him Semitic, and from the line of Eber (from which the term Hebrew is derived) and his descendant Abraham, which included him to the mythological-genealogical patriarchate of Jews and Muslims, and also from the line of Jacob and his fourth son Judah (from which the term and lineage of Jew is derived). He was, thus, a Jew and was culturally inducted as such in his time. Throughout the New Testaments accounts of his upbringing, Jesus observed and followed Jewish doctrine and ritual, although later in his life, when his full manifestation as the Son of God who performed miracles of healing, prophesying and even supernatural resurrection, he did challenge Hebraic and Jewish ritual by reinterpreting and revitalising orthodox doctrine. However, he observed them to the end, as is seen in the event of the Last Supper, where Jesus is observing Jewish ritual by performing the Pesach (Passover). He was thus a cultural Jew, and although he preached the Gospel of a new Church

⁹² R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 10.

⁹³ H. Maccoby, *The Sacred Executioner: Human Sacrifice and the Legacy of Guilt*, Thames and Hudson: London, 1982.

consisting of both Jew *and* Gentile (an unprecedented suggestion to Jews, especially orthodox Jews, whose cultural and religious identity insists on, and is partly manifested in, their cosmic and spiritual exclusivity), a Gospel he intended to be disseminated throughout the Mediterranean and even the whole world, it is never explicitly stated that he intended for the establishment of a Christian institution that is apart from and largely at odds with Jewish religious institutionalism, as it is known today. Christianity as we know it today was not a given at the time but was completely a social construct set through religious and spiritual discourse to appeal to the Graeco-Roman Mediterranean civilisation following the death of Christ. Thus, the historical person, heritage and circumstances of Jesus is shrouded in Jewishness; so in order to legitimate an institution and a following that would consist not only of non-Jews, but specifically societies that were already — in their most passive rendering — skeptical, if not hostile, towards Jews and Judaism, they would have to separate the immediate connotation between the Messiah (the central figure of the Christian message and movement) from his Jewishness, if cultural and spiritual reliability was to be established in this new movement aimed at traditionally (and so recently and presently) antisemitic societies.

In the narrative taken by the Gospels Matthew, Mark, Luke and John throughout, there enters the protagonist of Jesus, and he is set in a cultural atmosphere out of which emerges two antagonists: the Jew and the Roman. The Gospels were written after the Jewish revolt in 70 A.D. against the Roman occupation of Palestine. Wistrich argues that, partly for political reasons to not antagonise the Roman officials presiding over Palestine at the time, and partly for reasons that the Gospel was meant for a Gentile audience (referring to those that could be classified as being part of the Graeco-Roman, Hellenistic culture, and who already had antisemitic traits and biases), the Jew was devised as the major antagonist.⁹⁴ One can refer to the arguments of Jesus with the Pharisees and various religious and state officials in Palestinian Jewry, but the vilifying of Jews in the Bible is perhaps nowhere more becoming and more consequential than where it appeared preceding Jesus' crucifixion. Following Jesus' surrender to Jewish officials at the Garden of Gethsemane, the High Priest called Jesus blasphemous, tore his clothes and spat in his face.⁹⁵ The following day, the "chief priests and elders" collectively decided to have Jesus killed;⁹⁶ after this, Jesus was taken to trial, where the Roman governor of Palestine, Pontius Pilate, suggested the release of Jesus and the annulment of his sentence, and proposed the sentencing of Barabbas, a true criminal whose crimes were considered and rendered atrocious, and could be proven.⁹⁷ But it was the Jewish lay and elite present at the trial who preferred to kill Jesus for the supposed defilement and fetishisation of sacred Jewish doctrine and scripture. In this scene, which has proven to be immensely sacred and consequential to both the constitution and the legitimation of Christian identity in the two millennia that followed, it was the Jew who was responsible for the death of Jesus, and not the Roman. This sentence of Jewish blasphemy, heresy and spiritual infidelity was enhanced by that individual perhaps most responsible for the dissemination of the Gospel to the Gentile (and the subsequent establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, the See of Rome and various Western and Eastern

⁹⁴ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 10.

⁹⁵ The Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 26, v. 65-68, NKJV.

⁹⁶ The Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 27, v. 1-2, NKJV.

⁹⁷ The Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 27, v. 11-25, NKJV; also The Gospel of John, Chapter 18, v. 28-40, NKJV.

patriarchates, all of which maintained a significant historical role in the instigation of medieval and modern antisemitism and Jewish persecution), the Apostle Paul, who wrote in Thessalonians:

... the Jews, who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets and drove us out, the Jews who are heedless of God's will and enemies of their fellow men, hindering us from speaking to the Gentiles to lead them to salvation. All this time they have been making up the full measure of their guilt, and now retribution has overtaken them for good and all."⁹⁸

Thus, the narratives taken by the Gospels and the Apostles themselves provide a rather antisemitic undertone that would set the cultural intonation for the relationship between Christians and Jews in centuries to come, and would ultimately influence the social-psychological constitution of trekboer and later Afrikaner identity in 20th century South Africa.

This Judeophobia, born from pagan civilisation and reinterpreted and reinvigorated by the original Christian authorities responsible for the institutionalisation of the Church and dissemination of the Gospel, proved to be grounded more in ecclesiastical and exegetical abstraction and political myth than it did in the actual everyday cultural and societal conduct of Jews at the time. The lineage of the theological patriarchs of the Christian faith, from St. Paul to St. Augustine, all succeeded in creating an image of the Jew (it ought again to be added that often this image of the Jew and Judaism more broadly was based in religio-mythological renderings of Judaism that were the product of the Gospels and not actual Jewish culture and societal character at the time) that was perceived to be inherently evil, carnal, materialistic and often demonic; a discourse that was reiterated and propagated by popular literature, theatre and the visual arts throughout the centuries following the death of Christ.⁹⁹ Although the religiously inspired myth of the Jew as a heretic, an infidel and a deicide steadily gained popularity in the centuries following the death of Christ, it culminated when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire around the 4th century E.C., and then again during the negative mythologisation of the Jew during and after the Crusades.¹⁰⁰ One specific and far-reaching stereotype that would at the time and in the centuries to come prove to be just as stereotypically robust, was that of the Jew as a materialistic and greedy money-monger. The myth had, of course, its roots in the discriminatory policies against the Jews during the Middle Ages. Although Jews had enjoyed widespread security and economic, social and political privilege (with certain exceptions, such as in Visigothic Spain)

⁹⁸ 1 Thessalonians, Chapter 2, v. 15-16.

⁹⁹ J. Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and its Relation to Modern Antisemitism*, Jewish Publication Society of North America: New Haven, 1943.

¹⁰⁰ Made famous by the massacres and forced conversions of whole Jewish communities in France at the commencement of the First Crusade, led by the religio-fanatical opinion that, while the Crusade was meant for the occupation of Jerusalem and the expulsion of Muslim rule over the place where Jesus died, the Jews also ought to be considered victims of the Crusade, since they were the ones who were responsible for the death of Jesus in the first place. Famously, since the Council of Clermont in 1096 which called for the Crusade by Pope Urban II, around 10,000 Jews had been massacred within the first six months of the Crusade. These massacres continued until the eventual sacking of Jerusalem in 1099, where Godfrey of Bouillon, who was largely considered to be the ruler of the First Crusade and the ruler of the newly Christian-occupied Jerusalem until his death in 1100, burned the Synagogue of Jerusalem with all the Jews inside. For more seminal research on the subject of the massacre of the Jews during the Crusades, see R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, pp. 22-25; S. Grayzel, *A History of the Jews*, New American Library: New York, 1984, pp. 339-358; and G. Langmuir, *History, Religion and Antisemitism*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1990, pp. 261-265.

from around the sixth century E.C., especially during the rule of Charlemagne as the first Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, ever since the Crusades and the Medieval structural system, the Jews had faced increased suppression in terms of their economic, social and political integration into society. In many parts of Europe, Jews were juridically prohibited from owning and operating property, and from fraternisation with any institution that was in any way formally affiliated with the Christian populace or the church. And concerning the fact that Christians themselves were prohibited from the practice of usury during the Middle Ages, there existed at the time a vacuum in financial customs that were in many ways considered un-virtuous by Christian doctrine. These practices would come to be fulfilled by the Jew, who would (often as a rule due to other restrictions set in place by the Christian authorities) gravitate towards usury and moneylending. Especially concerning their associativity to charging loans with unreasonably high rates of interest (obviously often to Christians) and economic practices that, almost as a rule, lead to a franchise associated with financial indictment, Jews and their overwhelming occupation of the economic underbelly of society quickly became a scorned segment of the Medieval Ages.¹⁰¹ In tandem with the religio-mythological strand of antisemitism in Medieval Europe, there developed the economic stereotypes of the Jew as a moneyhoarder that preyed on the poor and had a special preference for the humiliation and degradation of the Christian,¹⁰² a stereotype that would last centuries and inspire — as we shall see further into this study — antisemitic nationalist policies that would in its own turn lead to mass expulsion, prosecution, persecution and even genocide.

However, in order to truly understand the important link to make between the South African ecclesiastical rationalisation on race and its roots in the Calvinist/Reformist theology and likened religious myth, and its specific relation to Jews and antisemitism in 20th century South Africa, one has to note the fact that the father of the Reformation himself, Martin Luther, was an outspoken anti-Semite who reiterated and reinforced the antisemitism borne in Medieval times and led to the mass oppression and persecution of Jews for centuries to come. At the very start of the Reformation and the ensuing Thirty Years War, when scripture was being printed, reinterpreted and disseminated on a truly mass scale, attitudes towards European Jewry in general under new reformed Christian authority would not change from that previous hatred that was preached by its Catholic counterpart. In fact, group mobilisation in Europe during and after the Reformation would most likely take place against the Jews. Societal legitimation for this course of events can be traced back to the religious rationalisation for anti-Jewish sentiment explored previously. Generating an in-depth study of the historical social-psychological causation of antisemitism and its culmination in South African racial policy is not the exact object of this analysis. Thus far, only a short overview has been provided that serves to illuminate the traces of antisemitism in the past and how this can be viewed as being part of a larger discourse of Orientalism, where the Occident culturally and symbolically utilises the Orient to come to terms

¹⁰¹ R. Chazan, 'Medieval Anti-Semitism', (ed.) D. Berger, *History and Hate: The Dimensions of Antisemitism*, 1997, p. 49.

¹⁰² It ought to be noted that the way that the system worked was that usurers and moneylenders were employed by aristocrats to collect taxes or loans with interest, these aristocrats often being Christian themselves and leaders of the Church and agrarian, Feudal communities. Usurer and moneylending Jews did not necessarily collect money for themselves, but did so as a middleman between the lay and the authorities of the principalities; they were merely hated because they were the faces of the outgoing or the incoming finances, not because they devised the system themselves.

with its own reality, or to project what at certain temporal and geographical points in history could be perceived as existential and cosmological issues on the Orient, based solely on its cultural ‘Otherness’ and stereotypes generated, legitimised and disseminated entirely on this Otherness, and the ensuing negative value connotation to the very franchise of this Otherness.

Thus far, we have argued that, for the purposes of this particular study, as well as for the purposes of philosophical and historical inquiry more generally, a genealogical and ethnographical inquiry into antisemitism approximates it both theoretically and historically into the category of the Orient, thus making it more than eligible for the study of Orientalism. However, there are two seminal points that will link the furtherance of this study on antisemitism and Orientalism with the South African Jewish experience under the Afrikaner. Important to this is the use of race as a social denominator in attitudes on social hierarchy, and attitudes towards Jews and traces of antisemitism based on these fixtures of race and their legitimation through hermeneutical abstraction and religious myth, in South Africa — since the establishment of the Cape Colony all the way through to the Union and apartheid — can be traced back to popular religious myth in the Middle Ages. Important to this brief historical overview are two key points: firstly, the importance of the reconstitution of attitudes towards race and Jews after the Reformation (important because South Africa, referring to the constitution of its social identity and structural layout of its institutions — its Superstructure and resultant Base, if you will — is largely a product of Calvinist theology, a Dutch ecclesiastical strand of the Reformation); and secondly, the importance of the concept of ‘blood purity’, which was an immensely important theme in the Third Reich and pseudoscience behind the popular dispensation and legitimation of the (albeit fallacious) ‘Aryan’ concept and conceptualisations of social hierarchy and the superiority of the *Herrenvolk* (master race) under Nazi Germany. This concept of ‘blood purity’ and ‘natural exclusivity’, especially as it relates to Jews and its Medieval religious roots in antisemitism, stems from 14th and 15th century Spain.

As noted earlier, intolerance towards Jews and Judaism increased dramatically during the time of the First Crusade, and intolerance would continue throughout the remaining two. At this time, popular antisemitic stereotypes — inflamed by a societal zeal that was undoubtedly a consequence of the impending Muslim threat that posed an existential question to the whole of Christianity in Europe — saw a spike, many of these stereotypes to be reiterated and reinvigorated in centuries to come. Among these were the popular Antichrist myth, to be found in the Biblical *Book of Revelation*, where the human arbiter of Satan’s will, according to the Book, come from the stock of those who were responsible for the death of Christ in the first place, and would build a kingdom to rule the world, only to be overcome at the second coming and return of the Lord at the end of days. This apocalyptic fantasy found common use as a ‘prophecy’ referring to and pronouncing Jewish greed, and reimagining Jewish economic and intellectual prosperity as a meta-historical plot to take over the world and exterminate Christianity.¹⁰³ This apocalyptic narrative that centres the Jews as the race of ultimate evil in the very book that supplies Christianity with the means to its very Truth, legitimised the ousting of Jews in communities, not necessarily because it was felt they would bring about the end of the world, but because the Christian lay who were indebted to them as usurers, as well as the Christian elite who

¹⁰³ N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarianism and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995, pp. 91-98.

were jealous of their success and prosperity, would *use* the narrative to get rid of them (that is to say, to eliminate their debts and leave certain institutional positions vacant).¹⁰⁴ One of the other more famous myths was that Jews were responsible for the Black Death. Popular political myth posited that Jews poisoned the wells of towns to exterminate the Christians as part (again) of their larger plot to conquer the world.¹⁰⁵ Breuer notes that, although much of the unrest that led to these accusations were, undoubtedly, due to religious zeal, the jealousy of the Christian elite and the poverty of the lay people were most likely social and economic, rather than spiritual, factors behind the antisemitic narratives that inspired multiple massacres of the Jews during the time of the plague.¹⁰⁶ One ought also not forget the fact of Jewish social, cultural and particularly religious exclusivity that was the reason for hostility towards the Jews in pagan antiquity, just as it was in Medieval Europe. There were many other religious and social myths about Jews that led to popular and, more often than not, volatile antisemitism; however, these two would be the most consequential for Medieval Judeophobia. What inspired these periods of antisemitism and made them truly significant was not only mystical and demonological renderings behind Jewish success and progress — renderings that would come to play a seminal part in 20th century antisemitic propaganda and pseudo-science — but also social and economic conditions. Perhaps most significant of these stereotypes was that of ‘blood purity’, which had its origins in 14th century Spain and would play a seminal role in the construction of social hierarchies of the Third Reich, as well as in pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa.

Although Jews did face persecution in Visigothic Spain before the turn of the first millennium E.C., they enjoyed relative prosperity and security in Medieval Spain, especially at the time of the First and Second Crusade. Despite minor discriminatory legislation, Jews were well integrated and excelled especially at economic and intellectual pursuits, most prominently in the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, at a time when they were being prosecuted and purged in the rest of Europe. Popular religious myth leading to hostile antisemitic sentiment would, however, catch up in the Iberian Peninsula; as mentioned before, despite spiritual fervour behind much of the massacres resulting from the projection of the Jew into apocalyptic fantasies of the Antichrist narrative and the Black Death in Medieval Europe, it was social and economic jealousy and hostility toward Jewish prosperity and religious exclusivism that was ultimately the reason for mass Jewish persecution.¹⁰⁷ The same was the case in Spain. By the end of the 14th century, the condemnation of Judaism and Jewish prosperity in Spain was led by the Archdeacon of Seville, Fernando Martinez, which led to the massacre of 4,000 Jews in Seville and a further 50,000 Jews in other parts of the Kingdom within the same year.¹⁰⁸ Many of the Jews that were not murdered were baptised and were known

¹⁰⁴ M. Breuer, ‘The “Black Death” and Antisemitism’, (ed.) S. Almog & N.H. Reisner, *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, Pergamon: Turkey, 1988.

¹⁰⁵ L. Poliakov, *The History of Antisemitism, Vol. 1*, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2003, pp. 107-122.

¹⁰⁶ M. Breuer, ‘The “Black Death” and Antisemitism ...’, pp. 144-149.

¹⁰⁷ It ought to be noted that the particular source that is seminal to the study of apocalyptic fantasies in Medieval Europe, and was extremely important to this specific study of apocalyptic renderings onto Jews at this time, was N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium ...*. Although the book was shortly cited only in this chapter, it is worth looking at for more information on antisemitism inspired by religious myth and eschatological millenarianism in Europe and the West more generally.

¹⁰⁸ Y. Baer, *History of the Jews in Christian Spain, Vol. 2*, University of Nebraska Press: Nebraska, 1993, pp. 95-99.

as *conversos*.¹⁰⁹ However, many of these *conversos* would only prove to be false converts participating in crypto-Judaism, where they would secretly practice Judaic ritual and religion under the guise of Christian ritual and religion. This led to a new strand of antisemitic sentiment against this new-found *converso* and crypto-Judaic problem, where reasons for the persecution of Jews on grounds other than religion were sourced, in order to exterminate the problem of false-*conversoism* and crypto-Judaism. The result was Spanish racism, “the first of its kind in Europe to be directed against the ‘bad blood’ (*mala sangre*) of the Jews and to become veritably obsessed with the issue of blood purity (*limpieza de sangre*).”¹¹⁰ This Spanish racism was induced in order to hamper ethnic Jewish affiliation with certain institutions and guilds in Christian society, even if these ethnic Jews did prove to be reformed and politically classified as ‘Christian’. However, it was the failure of eliminating false *conversos* and crypto-Judaism that ultimately led to an official decree to exterminate Jews and Judaism from Spain indefinitely, an event known popularly as the Spanish Inquisition. In a wave of religious fervour after the unification of Spain as a consequence of the stamping out of the Muslims after the fall of Grenada, Isabella and Ferdinand instituted a decree led by Castilian High Inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada in 1492 that all Jews ought to be expelled from Spain, on the grounds of popular centuries’ old myths of ritual murder, demonology, profanity of the host, and world dominion, amongst others.¹¹¹

This designation of a whole race as inferior in the social hierarchical configuration of society based on imagined and largely mythic pseudoscientific rationalisation such as the “use of a biological standard”¹¹², would prove to endure much farther into history than seems reasonable, and would form part of future arguments related to concepts such as the *Herrenvolk* in Nazi Germany and *bloedsuiwering* in 1930s far-right political constituencies in pre-apartheid South Africa.

Although 20th century Afrikaner identity, and indeed the nationalist quality of this identity, was in large part a product of Calvinist exegesis, historically, this Calvinist brand of the Reformation has had a record of being more tolerant to the Jews, especially in places such as the Netherlands, France and England, than the strictly antisemitic Lutheran strand of the Reformation was in Germany. However, despite the fact that the Afrikaner was influenced more by the Theology of the ‘Jew-friendly’ strand of reformed Christianity, the German-Lutheran influence is still notable in 20th century South African society. Friedman (1987) also shows the immense influence that Luther and his antisemitism had on Hitler and his pseudoscientific motivations for antisemitic propaganda and the Holocaust. Luther was notably driven by an eschatological, meta-historical vision that saw the impending end of the world as described in the Book of Revelation, and saw the need for a closed, exclusive and protected Christian society, protected from the temptation that will

¹⁰⁹ M. Glatzer, ‘Pablo de Santa Maria and the events of 1391’, (ed.) S. Almog & N.H. Reisner, *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, Pergamon: Turkey, 1988, p. 135.

¹¹⁰ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 36.

¹¹¹ D. Vacandard, ‘La question du meurtre rituelle chez les Juifs’, *Etude de critique et d’histoire religieuse*, Librairie Victor Lecoffre: Paris, 1912, pp. 341-432.

¹¹² J. Friedman, ‘Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Antisemitism’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987, p. 1.

lead Christians astray during the ‘end times’.¹¹³ Not only does one see a continuation of the apocalyptic narrative formerly noted in earlier Medieval Judeophobic reasoning in the preaching and ecclesiology of Luther, but also the narrative enlisted by so many before him that God had broken his covenant with the Jews, and that the Christian had subsumed his cosmic position, and was indeed on the ‘right side of history’. To Luther and his followers, the only acceptable Jew was a baptised one, and one of Luther’s most famed undertakings was that of the conversion of Jews to Christianity.

Shortly following his excommunication from the Papal clergy and mission of establishing a reformed Christian theology based on personal spiritual revelation, Luther, although still overtly racist, does exude a remarkably sympathetic outlook towards the Jew and his historical and cultural predisposition. In one of his 1523 pamphlets that were famously used for the swift dissemination of religious teachings to the Christian lay, titled *Jesus Christ was born a Jew*, Luther writes

*... we in our own turn ought to treat the Jews in a brotherly manner in order that we might convert some of them ... we are but Gentiles, while the Jews are of the lineage of Christ. We are aliens and in-laws; they are blood relatives, cousins and brothers of our Lord.*¹¹⁴

Undoubtedly, Luther must have hoped that his sympathy to their historical and genealogical predisposition would make them less reluctant to convert, but in the years to come, he would be gravely disappointed. The reality was a stark contradiction to what he had hoped, to the point that there was a ‘Judaising’ movement in the 1530s that sought not only to convert reformed Jews back to Judaism, but to covert Christians to Judaism. Twenty years on from his initial sympathy with Jewry, in 1543 Luther published *Concerning the Jews and their Lies*, a pamphlet that viciously attacked Jews and Judaism, calling for the complete destruction of the people and the faith. Luther attacks the Medieval Jewry for “public lying, cursing and blaspheming”, for stealing the money of Christians through usury (again, one may note old stereotypes of the Jew as greedy money-mongers, borne, as is quite plainly displayed in this pamphlet, from Christian jealousy over Jewish economic prosperity), and for laziness and being idle, and unfairly rigging the larger political-economic system in their favour. Luther proposes, quite dramatically, that their synagogues and houses be “set on fire, and whatever does not burn up should be covered or spread over with dirt so that no one may ever be able to see a cinder or stone of it;” Luther likewise calls for the confiscation of their religious scripture, and for the prohibition of their travel and trade.¹¹⁵ He basically proposes the enslavement of Jews as well, where they ought to be forced into manual labour, so as to be forced to earn their place in society.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ H. A. Oberman, *The Roots of Antisemitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation*, Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 1984, p. 117.

¹¹⁴ I. Brandt, (ed.) *Luther's Works, Vol. XLV*, Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 200-201.

¹¹⁵ The restriction of travel of Jews proposed by Luther is remarkably similar to those restrictions on immigration proposed by Nationalist-Socialist factions in South Africa’s Afrikaner political constituencies, such as the *Broederbond*, *Nuwe Orde* and *Greyshirts*. The continuation of this Lutheran antisemitic narrative as a part of Orientalist discourse in pre-apartheid and apartheid politics will be explored further on in the study.

¹¹⁶ All extracts and explanations from Luthers pamphlet from M. Luther, ‘Von den Juden und Ihren Lügen’, *Luthers Reformations-Schriften, Vol. XX*, St. Louis: Concordia, 1880-1910, pp. 1861-2026.

Luther's obsession with the apocalyptic and Christian eschatology made it clear that his antisemitism was still deeply rooted in religious myth and was not informed by pseudoscientific constructions based on biological denominators; however, his ideas would have an immense influence on future pseudoscience, and especially on Spencerian notions of social evolution and social Darwinism. Nevertheless, even though the duality of his reasoning was based more on metaphysical theological abstraction than on science and biology, his intentions were to exterminate the Jews and Judaism, nonetheless. At the turn of the halfway mark for the millennia, Luther's antisemitic narrative, itself a continuation of long-standing, almost nonsensical religious abstractions, was very telling of the societal disposition of Europe at the time. But after the wars that ensued from a politically and religiously fragmented Europe after the Reformation, and since the immensely consequential event at Westphalia in 1648, Europe, more generally, was started on a notably more socially refined path that would eventually culminate in the Enlightenment. One of the effects of the Enlightenment period was a considerably more Humanistic intellectual and political environment across Europe, which itself led to the abolition of religion and the organising of society around collective human determination and autonomy, the effect of which was especially accelerated across Europe's increasingly skeptic intelligentsia. With this decline in religious, mystical and spiritual sentimentality among those that were responsible for the societal superstructure at the time, there came an increased dependency on positivist rhetoric, empirical discourse and its institutional manifestation in the form of the scientific standard. In both the social and the natural sciences, truth was increasingly the consequence of critical processes of evaluation and induction, instead of spiritual fundamentalism and mysticism.

This new 'scientific' atmosphere would seem to be an immense improvement to a dogged, persecuted and oppressed European Jewry. If society would only steer clear of religious myth and towards belief that was grounded in persistent scientific inquiry, there was hope that it might debunk ridiculous theological abstractions fostered by Medieval and Lutheran subcultures that so regularly led to the purge of various Diasporas of the Jewish nation, then it would seem that Jews could integrate well into European society without frequented existential threat. There is perhaps no event that is more revealing of Jewish political and social emancipation than the French Revolution itself. Revolutionaries such as Grégoire, Mirabeau and Robespierre all made similar arguments based on the premise that an essential component of the overthrow of the current, monarchical system of rule was the emancipation of the Jews; if the structural orientation of society was that of rule based on divine elect through the Church, and if the masses wanted a different system of rule based on individual autonomy, self-determination, free will and equal political representation, then the quickest and most effective way to destabilise the current system for reform was to overthrow the institutions of domination that dictated rule, meaning the Church and its spiritual and secular appointees. The most effective way to do this was to unite those who have been for millennia oppressed and subjugated by the superstructural constitution of society, of which the Jews (along with the lay and the poor — the proletariat) were a very large — and influential — constituency. In order to inspire effective and efficient Counter Hegemony, there ought to be an emancipation of the oppressed. This was immortalised in The Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, where the Jews were granted equal civil rights to all those who would form part of the new French Republic where individual self-determination would rule. This, and the larger intellectual and political lead up to it, seemed to champion the freedom of Jews through liberal

rationalism. An extract from Max Nordau (1897) concerning the status of the Jews leading up to and during the French Revolution read:

The philosophy of Rousseau and the encyclopaedists had led to a declaration of human rights. Then this declaration, the strict logic of men of the Great Revolution, deduced Jewish emancipation. They formulated a regular equation: Every man is born with certain rights; the Jews are human beings, consequently the Jews are born to all the rights of man. In this manner the emancipation of the Jews was pronounced, not through a fraternal feeling for the Jews, but because logic demanded it. Popular sentiment rebelled, but the philosophy of the Revolution decreed that principles must be placed higher than sentiments. Allow me an expression which implies no ingratitude. The men of 1792 emancipated us only for the sake of principle.¹¹⁷

However, where there is an opportunity for use, there is always an opportunity for abuse. In the same address, Nordau notes that the emancipation of the Jews during the French revolution was not the result of a society or even a collective national subculture that felt the need for reconciliation and social and political restitution for thousands of years of persecution, subjugation and oppression of the Jewish people, but was simply the result of the liberal-rational logic purported and preferred by the French rationalist intelligentsia of the day. However, the same logic and reason could just as easily be used to delegitimize Jewish emancipation and self-determination — which is what would eventually happen in the form the writings of the French Materialists and English Deists. The thrill of emancipation and strategic value of Jews as a means to overthrow a tyrannical structure proved temporary and did not translate to the value of Jews as a means of sustaining a recently overthrown government. The key to liberal rationalism and humanism was still the fact that spiritual revelation was not a legitimate means to give grounds to any social or political norm, and as far as the new revolutionaries and Enlightenment intellectuals were concerned — particularly the English Deists and the French Materialists — Judaism, and the Jew's interpretation of his own historic and cosmic position (which inherently defined their own social disposition and collective action in the political, cultural and economic spheres of European society), was just as much rooted in mythological interpretations and religious abstraction as those of the Christian monarchies who believed that their right to rule was purely providential, and moreover that this was in any way a legitimate or rational argument.¹¹⁸ This would only serve to reinforce Medieval and antiquarian antisemitic stereotypes; however, now these were a product of liberal rationalist reasoning, and were presumed to be scientific. The Jew was no longer found guilty as the killer of Christ or the servant of the Antichrist but was deemed the arbiter of all monotheistic religion and thus responsible for obstructing crucial and very necessary technological, scientific, philosophical and societal progress; the tone of antisemitism might have been less apocalyptic, but it was by no means less detrimental or damning. Perhaps that most authoritative and influential voice of the Enlightenment period, Voltaire, not only condemned the Jew through a selective reiteration of those pagan stereotypes of being 'inherently corrupt' and 'outright enemies of humanity', but he goes on to justify violent antisemitism and its

¹¹⁷ M. Nordau, First Address of the Zionist Congress: 27 August, 1897, Access: <<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/address-by-max-nordau-at-the-first-zionist-congress>>.

¹¹⁸ S. Ettinger, 'Jews and Judaism as seen by the English Deists of the 18th Century', *Zion*, XXIX, 1964, pp. 182-207.

historical manifestation in massacres and persecution.¹¹⁹ These attitudes and sentiments were shared by Diderot, d'Holbach and even Rousseau. These were not the product of personal prejudices against Jews as a collective cultural or ethnic unit *per se*, but were rather part and parcel of a much larger intellectual and epistemic war that was being fought against theological abstraction and religious fundamentalism and the use of obscurantist arguments and superstition in the rationalisation of institutions of domination in (then) modern European society at large; it was a war against monotheism more generally, Christian belief in particular, and by proxy its Judaic roots. There just happened to be a societal, intellectual and political lineage of vile Judeophobic predisposition to draw supposed 'rational' and 'meaningful' arguments from.

This liberal rationalist strand of antisemitism, developed by the French Materialists and English Deists, was later in the 19th century adopted — together with important theories on historical, political and human development by noted thinkers such as Hegel — by socialist radicals, who blamed the slow development of social conditions to overthrow an inherently corrupt and contradictory capitalist European society on the 'backwardness' of a superstructure still heavily influenced by monotheistic sentiment bridled with obscurantist and superstitious belief, which was itself an antiquarian legacy of Judaism. To many of them, Jews were responsible for the decline of civilisation, and their stubborn cultural and religious exclusivism did not contribute to the social development and revolution envisioned by young socialist radicals, who themselves put an immense value on self-determination and inclusivity — something that was not necessarily a prominent component of the cultural and spiritual tenets of standard Judaic belief and Jewish culture at the time.¹²⁰

The Origins of Oriental alterity and its effects on the Aryan-Semitic discourses and modern, 20th century antisemitism

It was also at roughly this time when philosophical conceptualisations and social manifestations of the superiority of the Aryan race over that of the Semitic one came to surface. This was a particularly influential and consequential development in antisemitism and the Jewish substrata of Orientalism, to which much attention will be given in this present study. Up to this point, it has been shown that Orientalism has a clear and continual presence in any historical evaluation of antisemitism; but the present analysis of antisemitism as a clear discourse of power in the form of Orientalism has been, if anything, a brief summation of the theoretical application of historic events. The reason for this is that the history analysed and described up until now has been far reaching and is intended to provide a meta-narrative of the history of Jews and Judaism and their collective historical subjugation in order to gain a general understanding of their relative collective social identity constitution and processes of identity formation and consolidation, and how this is, if not completely, then at least partly, a product of their historic subjugation to Orientalist discourse. Up until now, this has been sufficient. However, a clear and concise, and perhaps more detailed, evaluation of the

¹¹⁹ Voltaire, 'Letters' and 'Sermon des Cinquantes', *Oeuvres Complètes de Voltaire, Vol. LXII; XXXII*, 1773 & 1785. See also his chapter 'Juifs', in *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, 1878. Also, see his work *Essai sur les Moeurs, ibid., XVII*, pp. 530-534.

¹²⁰ For more on the antisemitism of the socialist radicals and their (albeit selective) influence by Hegel, and importantly their narrative of 'Aryan' superiority, see G. Tridon, *Du Molochisme Juif: Etudes critiques et philosophiques*, Nabu Press: South Carolina, 2012.

literature concerning Occidental/European/Western narratives effecting Jews and their future social and political disposition should be undertaken, especially at the turn of an epoch, or at a stage in history when Western society more generally had a major, if only gradual, shift in epistemic structures, or what Foucault would term an *episteme* or system of knowledge.

As has been noted earlier, structuralism posed a revolutionary development in the field of linguistics and in any discipline where historic and textual analysis is concerned. Structuralism essentially allowed linguistics to become a science, dominated by (what was perhaps at least attempting to be) a pervading systematised empirical rhetoric to textual analysis and theorisation around language, attempting to discover a universal structure of language made clear through the use of a universal system of linguistic analysis. The seismic shift that this methodological and theoretical development posed for the field of linguistics and textual analysis can be equated to the development of the field of philology, and especially the field of Oriental studies and its keen focus on linguistic and textual dissection and study. What the revelation that structuralist systematisation posed for literary study and linguistics, the creation and development of the field of philology posed for the general study of history, and Oriental studies more specifically.

The first of these figures that transformed the fields of not only linguistics and Oriental studies¹²¹, but also of history and historiography more generally, was Silvestre de Sacy. Sacy was a truly transformational figure in the fields of pedagogy (specialising in Oriental studies) and linguistic analysis. From a young age, he became a designated specialist in the fields of Middle Eastern languages, specifically Arabic and Hebrew, for which his immensely prolific translations and linguistic and etymological interpretations were most well known, and would, indeed, in the near future become most influential. In time (and during the reign of Napoleon), Sacy became a professor at the *Collège de France*, and became the director of the *langues orientales vivantes*, which he had joined as a specialist in Arabic in 1769 before the Revolution. In 1805, he was appointed a resident Orientalist at the French Foreign Ministry, and in 1822, Sacy became the first president of the *Société asiatique*.

All these positions and accomplishments, and all the work of specialist translation of predominantly Arabic texts, led not only to Sacy's immense importance in his own day, but to his incredible influence in Oriental studies, and the pedagogic proliferation of Oriental studies and Orientalist discourse, for future scholars in the field and social sciences more broadly. Said notes that "in Sacy's work, for the first time in Europe since the Council of Vienne, there was a self-conscious methodological principle at work as a coeval with scholarly discipline."¹²² Sacy's self-sustained rhetoric was, summarised and generalised, a revisionist one, where through his prolific translation and in-depth interpretation, he offers, not so much *the* Orient, but *his* Orient, to both the students of the near East, and policy makers and executors working in or with the Orient.

¹²¹ And would set the tone for the Aryan-Semitic discourse that would be used centuries later for the legitimation of antisemitism that would lead to one of the most atrocious and outrageous events of ethnic cleansing in history, and would likewise predominate in the collective memories of Jews in the South African Diaspora as they attempted to navigate and justify their position in a locus of racist discourse and segregationist state building that would become the apartheid state.

¹²² E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 124.

In his work is contained not only a massive body of translated texts, but a general methodology and body of theory that allows the student of the Orient to know it systematically and according to a structuralised method of analysis. Some of his work that proved particularly important to become a summation of his spectacularly cumulative efforts as a scholar, and perhaps more importantly, the methodological application of his theory to historical texts, were his *Principes de grammaire* (1799), *Chresomathie arabe* (1806-1827), *à l'usage des élèves de l'École spéciale* (1825), and various other minor works on Arabic history, geography and onomastics that, put together, entailed a completely novel and groundbreaking understanding of the Orient and its history.

However, despite the seemingly insurmountable and truly awesome body of historic and theoretical work that Sacy had throughout decades accumulated and produced, what is of particular interest in his work to this specific study — and in this section analysing modern antisemitism and its epistemic remnants in 20th century South Africa — is *how* his work, both theoretically and methodologically, and through painstaking detail and fanatical scholarly dedication, interpreted the Orient as a cultural and civilisational Other, and how these basic sentiments constituting a methodical and systematic alterity were reproduced and appropriated in decades to come, especially in political bodies and circles that would use these sentiments and (however appropriately adjusted) theory to legitimate mass racial segregation, persecution and ethnic extermination.

With however much effort and zeal Sacy defended the basic historical and linguistic constitution of historic Arabic (and Oriental) literature, his attitude towards Oriental literature more generally (as is clearly evinced in how he talked about Arabic poetry more specifically)¹²³ was that it was only useful, or even sensible, if it was first ‘treated’ and ‘interpreted’ properly by an Orientalist scholar. Thus, regardless of those epistemic frameworks and standards under which it was produced, any Oriental literature had to be properly transformed by what was interpreted to be the ‘correct’ and ‘right’, and perhaps it would be acceptable to insert the terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’, cultural (meaning Western) frameworks and scholarly standards. It is perhaps an underestimation of the interpretive power of anyone reading this to call it an implication, but the implication of this is clear — that for anything Oriental to have any value to Europe on either a scholarly or an executive level, it has to be *subjected* to European standards of ‘reason’ and ‘correctness’. Or to use an appropriate analogy: if the fisherman wants to catch a fish, it is not enough that he should cast his net into the infinitely deep waters of the ocean — in order for the fish to be of any value or use as either food, bait or otherwise, it ought to be treated — skinned, gutted, flavoured, portioned and eventually cooked. In much the same way, the Orientalist must cast his scholarly net into the dizzying deeps of Oriental history and culture, but it is not enough to merely accumulate obscure, fragile and (speaking in solely utilitarian terms) outdated texts and artefacts; it must first be treated — translated, prepared, interpreted, preserved, presented, and then eventually used, in order for it to be of any use to those who utilise it — referring primarily to the Occident. Although this might seem vaguely reasonable, Sacy also did not attribute much of this reasoning to purely temporal and cultural differences either — he stated quite explicitly that Oriental literature on its own does

¹²³ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 128.

not contain enough “taste and critical spirit” to justify its publication and public presentation on its own without the intermission of a skilled Orientalist.¹²⁴

And Sacy’s work did just this — they proved to supplement the objective structure of the Orient extremely effectively and efficiently with the subjective structure of the Orientalist, which is the basic representation of the Orient by the Orientalist, based on the language, structures of reason and systems of rationality that are purely, and quite uncompromisingly, Western. It is not so much that there was any lack of ‘truth’ in the Orient itself and its own isolated history and systems and phases of development, but that ‘truth’ is itself a constructed condition, in that it can only be so, can only be true, if it complies with (or is often coerced into) a Western system of knowledge or structure of interpretation that is concretely Western. Orientalist was thus made truth because it was subjected to the condition of Western regimes of truth and discourses of power. In the words of Said: “The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist’s rationality; its principles become his.”¹²⁵

One can clearly see how Orientalism more generally — but particularly modern Orientalism as it was developed by Sacy at the end of the 18th and start of the 19th centuries — fits remarkably well into the structural discourse of Saussure and deconstructural discourse of Derrida respectively. For all his remarkable and respectable work on the development and constitution of intercultural and inter-civilisational grammar and grammatical structures (referring specifically to his earlier work before the Napoleonic era), Sacy’s work — referring to his body of theory and his methodological analysis of language, texts and textuality — is the very epitome of those most basic tenets and principles of Saussure’s structural linguistics. The collective sentiment behind Sacy’s awesome body of textual translations and interpretations is truly that of difference. He never attempted to provide solidarity between civilisations with such a vast epistemic and cultural divide (despite the interconnectedness of their histories), but attempted to understand them on the basic condition of the totality of their difference, epistemically and ontologically speaking, so as to subjugate and dominate them, in their own time through the practical application of his painstaking analysis and interpretation of Oriental history and historical material for matters of state, and for the future through his theoretical and methodological application for matters of societal and academic domination (a fact cleverly disguised under the guise of development and enlightenment). What Sacy did, whether this was his foremost or secondary intentions, or merely a consequence of his ambition, was establish the framework, the intellectual scaffolding, for a system by which those who happened to be socially different than and societally Other to Europe could be evaluated, analysed and studied — and then through the use of a language and a system of understanding and common social consensus — condemned to an inferior position. What gave Sacy’s work, and truly his legacy in the European academy and the development of the social sciences more generally, such seductive power and influence, was that it justified the civilisational (and this would in due time come to be interpreted as racial, intellectual and perhaps natural and biological) superiority, which was the condition by which material and epistemic domination could and would be justified. In Saussurean terms, it was Sacy’s justification of difference based on the application and universal interpretation of signs to fit into

¹²⁴ Sacy’s exact words were: *pour mériter d’être publiés autrement que par extrait*, which meant that Oriental literature could only justifiably be published in extracts. S. De Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe: Vol. 1*, Biblio Verlag: Osnabrück, 1973, p. viii.

¹²⁵ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 128.

Western intellectual and cultural norms, and, thus, the solidification of difference according to that one system which cognitively and socially predestines the possibility of our interpretive power, which allowed Orientalism to become so rigid and indented in modern institutions of domination and consent. In Derridean terms, it was the language of Sacy, and its clearly binary character (horizontal value attribution), as well as hierarchical classification of signs — words and concepts (vertical value attribution) — that would be used in the mainstream social and political discourse of his time and future time, which allowed Orientalism to develop into the beast it has become today. Although his work — and here is meant the specific work that is attributed to *his* original thought and application — was still largely abstract and based in ideas, methods and theories that lacked any serious institutional grounding, Sacy did develop the language of horizontal distinction, vertical classification and eventual moral subjugation — to use the words of Foucault, the *language of reason* — that would later be interpreted, appropriated and developed by scholars to come.

Although his main and most important work focused almost exclusively on Arabic language, texts and historical material, his work was seminal in the development of the very collective social sentiment and attitude in Europe that saw the Other — in this case the Eastern European, the Oriental, of which the Jew and larger Judaic cultural classification has always been a [seminal] part — as just similar enough to be noticed, considered, and perhaps even respected, but necessarily different enough to be cautioned and condemned to a position by which they could be controlled so as to allow and retain European political superiority at the time. It was the language of Silvestre de Sacy, his language of reason, which shaped and sculpted the discourse of power that would become modern Orientalism.

However, it was in the person of Ernst Renan that the subject — and thus the language of reason and the discourse of power and general regime of truth that constituted its being and allowed for its use and widespread proliferation and legitimation — had become official and had gained the character of an institutional culture. “Renan derives from Orientalism’s second generation: it was his task to solidify the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematise its insights, and to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions.”¹²⁶

Renan was, indeed, the figure in the 19th century that was responsible for two specific, yet extremely important, developments concerning not only the cultural institutionalisation of Orientalism, but also concerning the evolution of modern antisemitism and the ‘Judaisation’ of Orientalism and widespread Orientalist discourse in 19th and 20th century Europe (and subsequently beyond Europe, as this study shall explore later). Firstly, starting with his first major (and perhaps one of his most important) works, titled *History of the People of Israel* (1855), where he placed the Jew as an individual and a social collective, and Judaism as a major ideological component of the overall intercultural composition of 19th century European society; and secondly, Renan was responsible, together with his crucial role in the development of the field of philology, for making Orientalism, and specifically Judaic Orientalism (or what Derrida referred to as the Abrahamic, encompassing the cultural intersectionality between Islam and Judaism, which will be used as an interpretive referential tool on its own to navigate the relevance of Judaism, Jews and antisemitism in

¹²⁶ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 130.

modern Orientalism) a matter of empirical inquiry and positivist rationalisation — effectively constructing it into a ‘science’. This study shall look at the latter of these two influences first, to see how his ambitions within linguistic analysis as a continuation of the work and legacy of Sacy, influenced the specific cultural and racial consciousness that predominated not only in his later work, but certainly how his work was very selectively used and appropriated for the legitimisation of various radical and nationalist political agendas in the 20th century. The historic figure of Renan, in both his own time and the periods after him, should be seen as a “cultural and intellectual praxis”¹²⁷, where, even to modern scholars and biographers, his racial views and lived experiences based on his political and social figure in his own time is obscure and somewhat contingent to specific exegesis of his work and epistemic and social context. He entered Orientalism through philology, and it is exactly the extremely technical and analytical quality of this field — especially with its hyper-focused character to linguistic and etymological analysis — that made him such an arbiter of the Orientalism of his time. But what made him such a force and allowed him to imbue the field with a novelty previously unknown, was the extreme scope of his work.¹²⁸

Said’s analysis of philology as a field of study, and its particular relation to the binary and hierarchical linguistic structures of literature and textual analysis as explained by Derrida (and touched upon earlier in this study), can be compounded in his words: “Philology problematizes — itself, its practitioner, the present. It embodies a peculiar condition of being modern and European, since neither of those two categories has true meaning without being related to an earlier alien culture and time.”¹²⁹ Thus, it is clear that the very constitution of philology as a field of study is rooted in the collective Western intellectual and institutional pursuit of European (and later Western) self-identity, self-consciousness and self-determination through the allocation of difference between it and the Other, and the use of linguistic analysis and historical inquiry for the condemnation of the Other — in this case the Oriental, or in the parlance of Renan, the Semite, as opposed to the Westerner, the European or the Indo-European — to a cultural, and later material and political, position of inferiority. It is perhaps this very feature of philology that sees itself as an institutionalised version of the sentiment and character of the work of Sacy, following from the previous analysis of him and his work. And it is this very character of philology — its acclaim and reliance on discourses of difference and marginalisation — that predisposes it to scrutiny in any deconstructionist study, including this one. But it is perhaps in the words of Renan himself, in his own inquiry into the field of philology and its application to European discourses of identity constitution and construction, that the true character and agenda of philology — and perhaps more telling of *his* philology — is seen most clearly.

¹²⁷ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*’, p. 130.

¹²⁸ Foucault notes this point in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language*, Routledge: United Kingdom, 1972, pp. 70-130.

¹²⁹ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*’, p. 132.

In *L'Avenir de la science* (1948)¹³⁰, Renan makes clear that the very condition and constitution of ‘modern thinking’ — in other words of the episteme or system of knowledge, with all its social conditions and cultural and political predispositions — was the product of philology and philological inquiry. He drives this point passionately by saying that “rationalism, criticism, liberalism, were founded on the same day as philology” and that “the founders of modern mind are philologists.”¹³¹ Thus, philology’s purpose is to be a driver of modern culture — and to make sense of modern culture and modernity more generally through intensely thorough analysis of history and historical material — and therefore a culture based on the principles of ‘rationalism, criticism and liberalism’, and in furtherance, a culture that is intent on driving out arbitrary supernaturalism and analytic reductionism, and upholding societal development through positivist and scientific inquiry through linguistic and larger historical analysis. And it is perhaps this point that is telling of the cultural and social paradox that the figure of Renan embodied: his racial views on Semitic culture and history through the epistemic and institutional paradigm of philology does not seem to depend on any explicit view of cultural or civilisational inferiority, but is dependent on the idea that the cosmic and ideological framework that animates Semitic culture and its larger social constitution more generally — encapsulated in the concept of *monotheism* and the cultural and social conservatism that is consequent of it — is inhibiting of the very rationalism, criticism and liberalism that he, and modern culture, was aspiring to, and was furthermore impeding on the social progress that ought to be the natural result of history and humanity. Renan’s objective of developing historical and social study through linguistic and historiographic analysis was made clear by himself in what he wrote in his above-mentioned work:

*To do philosophy is to know things; following Cuvier’s nice phrase, philosophy is ‘instructing the world in theory’ [inverted commas added]. Like Kant I believe that every purely speculative demonstration has no more validity than a mathematical demonstration, and can teach us nothing about existing reality. Philology is the exact science of mental objects.*¹³²

Renan’s notion of philology was that, despite its object of study, it could be applied to existing reality, and — true to the positivism that was so clearly the epistemic ideal it tried to uphold — that its efficacy could be proven. It was a means to an end, but both the means and the end had to be rational, reasonable, and applicable to lived reality, and since many of his early treatise, Renan’s accomplishments within and through the framework and agenda of philology were most impressive.

¹³⁰ The piece was written in 1848 (seven years before the publication of his most famous work that launched the direction of his career as a public intellectual), but was only published for the first time in 1890. It is perhaps very telling that Renan’s attitude towards the technical and larger ideological character of the field in which he worked — not so much in terms of how it worked, but very much in terms of why it was constituted and practiced in the way it was, especially concerning the social and cultural context in which it was developed — was only made clear after his accelerated fame for his racial views and work on analysing the civilisational difference that was the product of natural endowment between the Orient and the Occident, or the Semite and the Indo-European. Perhaps people preferred to be selective in what they draw from his work and his own life. However much he was the product of a spirit that put rational inquiry and epistemic rationality above social and intellectual mediocrity and political conservatism, constituencies of his audiences would use it to preserve and rationalise exactly that — conservatism and the perpetuation of ignorance for personal gain and the legitimization of various political and cultural agendas.

¹³¹ E. Renan, *L'Avenir de la science: Pensées de 1848, 4th edition*, Calmann-Lévy: Paris, 1890, p. 141.

¹³² E. Renan, *L'Avenir de la science ...*’, p. 149.

As has been mentioned earlier, the turn of the episteme commonly known as the Enlightenment period was characterised by the rejection of supernaturalism and the pursuit of rationalism and reason; this has been evident in the roots of structuralist thinking seen in the work of Hegel and Heidegger (of course not discounting the immense contribution of various other thinkers who are associated with the same period), and later in the work of the late 19th century and early 20th century thinkers. The intelligentsia of the era strove to think of and compartmentalise the world into systems and structures that could be proven, and were liberal instead of conservative. History was interpreted and presented around humanity, and the sovereign human individual, and no longer the obscure notions of divinity that had previously dominated interpretations of history and reality, and therefore the orientation of societal conduct throughout history, as can so clearly be seen by the brief evaluation of antisemitism up to this point in history provided above.

Clearly, then, philology and Renan's work in the field of philology, was a project towards this larger societal aspiration towards modernity and development. Thus, the era of philology (and also the era in which modern Orientalism was developed by means of this philology) that was started and developed by the work of Silvestre de Sacy, attempted, through painstaking attention to detail and thorough historical investigation and inspection, to prove that language — that most basic and most essential element of human cognition, communication and social cohesion — was not a singular development born from unnatural divinity, but was socially constructed out of pure natural (and perhaps social) necessity. Foucault (1966) speaks of the discovery of language, which does not indicate the point in the very distant past when order was conceived out of arbitrary oral cues and gestures, but is the point in time when humanity came to become conscious of, and seriously and systematically, analyse language as the bases for the understanding and organisation of the “matrix of all relations”, and that the serious (and at the time, loosely institutional and professional) analysis of language “forms ... a thin surface film for knowledge.”¹³³ This new tradition of empirical analysis of humanity — its history and its interpretive means and representative power of itself and its history, referring to its language — is expressed by Foucault as

*The adjacencies it expresses, the elementary identities it circumscribes and whose repetition it shows, the resemblances it dissolves by displaying them, the constants it makes it possible to scan — these are nothing more than the effects of certain syntheses, or structures, or systems, which reside far beyond all the divisions that can be ordered on the basis of the visible.*¹³⁴

The essence of this was that “the discovery of language was therefore a secular event that displaced a religious conception of how God delivered language to man in Eden” and that — through this new consciousness and analysis of the origins of language, and therefore the origins of all knowledge and order, and the means for the construction and constitution of any sort of social structure or system, as well as the scrutiny of divinity and supernaturalist ‘anti-rationalism’ — “a new historical conception, in short, was needed, since Christianity seemed unable to survive the empirical evidence that reduced the divine status of

¹³³ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. 273.

¹³⁴ M. Foucault, *The Order of Things ...*, p. 273.

its major text.”¹³⁵ The result was the replacing of what Said refers to as the ‘Edenic fallacy’ with the idea of protolanguage, referring specifically to Semitic and Indo-European origins of language and therefore culture, something that Sacy had greatly contributed to. But it was this ‘second generation’ referred to previously, and of which Renan was a seminal proponent, that was intent on focusing on the historical nexus between the Orient and the Occident through the study of Semitic and Indo-European languages that would functionally put the East and the West in a strategical historic and cultural relationship with one another.

Although there were various other notable scholars whose work was essential for the development of a specific Oriental consciousness, including Edgar Quinet’s seminal work on the origin of all religion as a strategic cultural relation between what can be summarily be referred to as the Orient and the Occident¹³⁶, it was Renan who contributed most to his field of study and to society at large: in displaying the origins of modern civilisation through the Semite (Oriental) and the Indo-European (Occidental), and the strategic relational disposition between the two throughout history. It was taken that the society that he both wrote from and wrote for was the cultural and, structurally speaking, the social descendancy of the Indo-European, then his aim was to analyse the cultural and socio-historical intricacies of the Semite, and to show how the Semites had indeed contributed to modern civilisation (which was of course implied to be European/Western civilisation). However, Renan did this empirically and systematically, and without using philology-as-science as an interpretive tool to legitimate supernaturalist predispositions contained in scripture and culture, but to use science, in the form of philology, to scrutinise arbitrary and foundation-less assertions of humanity and history that were the legacy of religion more generally. This he did through the formulation of an intricate systematisation of comparative study that put the Semite and the Indo-European in a strategic historic position that provided a foundation for their specific social, cultural and political relations in modern times. However, despite his suave confidence in his propagation of rationalism and positivism as the ultimate virtue of historic analysis opposed to arbitrary and outdated supernaturalism that was widely accepted by the intelligentsia of the time to be the vice of modernity, and his intricate and thorough focus of the relational makeup of the Semite and the Indo-European as his subject of analysis in order to develop a holistic understanding of humanity and its history, Renan did display an outstanding, and perhaps an outstandingly unchecked, bias when it came to his racial consciousness that would structure a future discourse of power based on his formulated racial theory through his binary Semite/Aryan racial-civilisational rhetoric.

This was definitely the case since the publishing of his *magnum opus* on Semitic studies *History of the People of Israel* 1855, where Renan offered an intricate study of the history of the Semites and their culture and civilisational origins (which genealogically includes the history of both the Arabs and the Hebrews more

¹³⁵ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*’, pp. 135, 136.

¹³⁶ E. Quinet, *Le Génie des religions*, Nabu Press: South Carolina, 2012.

predominantly, but most of the work done by Renan was on the Jews specifically¹³⁷) through a painstaking study of their linguistic structures and how this contributed to the collective constitution of their social and cultural being. Although there are times when Renan espouses much respect, and even admiration, for the Jews as a historic and modern people, the value of his work, and that most important sentiment that was the cause and the effect of his study — his science, one may add — was the fact and the effect of the cultural, ethnic and civilisational difference *between* the Semites and the Aryans. One must always remember that Renan's study, and all his studies to follow, were deeply comparative at heart, and the most prominent (even if this prominence was imbued with a subtlety that was only too apparent through his overbearing sentimentality) tone was that of difference, and correcting and sustaining the difference between the Aryan and the Semite. One easily sees the same binary and hierarchical Derridean structures and strictures in the language used by Renan as one sees in the language used by Sacy (as well as many of the most outrightly racist purporters of antisemitism and racial segregation of their time), even if this language was meant to provide a theoretical and methodological systematised analysis of the phenomena of language itself. Said notes this fact by stating that it “should by no means be lost on us that Semitic was for Renan's ego the symbol of European (and consequently his) dominion over the Orient and over his own era.”¹³⁸

As has been stated by his own self-evaluation of the field of philology and his place in it, the ends of its (and his) analysis was the construction of a modern world, a modern culture, and thus a modern humanity that constituted and conducted itself around the principles of *rationalism*, *reason* and *liberalism*. And this meant the rejection of the redundancy and reductionism of supernaturalism in all its forms, whether epistemic or material. However, since the very principles that the field and its arbiters and supporters were very much a construction, and merely a reflection, of a society that required the acceptance, institutionalisation, enforcing and policing of norms that would be conducive to social ingroup cohesion, it would then logically follow that any fields of study built on these norms are themselves constructed on the condition that the ends of the field of study and the institutions that uphold and enforce it should then also be conducive to the same ingroup cohesion that the principles and norms purportedly seek to uphold. Thus, the language of the field, in this case philology, upholds a hegemony that becomes the basic preconditions for inclusion into a culture — or in the parlance of Gramsci, cultural hegemony. However, Derridian hauntology states that the constitution and ‘truth’ of a discourse and a culture is only conducive of the absence of its Other from that language, and of its difference to that Other. Thus, for Renan to justify the existence and the proximation of a culture and

¹³⁷ It can thus be deduced, as many scholars surely have, that Semite is a reference to the Hebraic culture — referred to as Jews as a people and Judaism as the faith that predisposes and necessitates ingroup membership and cohesion into the Jewish or Hebraic culture — only because this early and influential work of Renan focused specifically on the influence of Hebrew as a language — and therefore the cultural basis for the structural and systemic nexus of order established within the larger ‘racial’ and ethnic classification of the Jews and Judaism and their frameworks and norms for ingroup membership — and therefore the Jews and the very constitution and consolidation of such larger Jewish ingroup identity.

The trouble with this was, of course, that in the social discourses and political rhetoric of the 20th century, when modern antisemitism culminated in the atrocities of genocide of the European Jews, the term Semite was attached to a specific ethnicity and culture (even though it actually referred to a larger cognate classification of a historic people with similar linguistic structures and relational qualities), and was easily and quickly rendered semantic association with and cultural embodiment to everything that was to be despised by the European.

¹³⁸ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 141.

people that are conducive of very specific values and norms, then a cultural Other is required in order to justify what the *new* culture ought not to be. This was the scheme of Renan, to justify the existence of a culture and a discourse (however abstract) by delegitimizing its discursive and cultural antithesis — its Other. It makes perfect sense, then, that Renan’s focus on the contribution of the Semites to (‘modern’) culture was based on the fact that they were “rabid monotheists who produced no mythology, no art, no commerce, no civilisation; their consciousness is a narrow and rigid one”¹³⁹; in his own words, Renan stated the culmination of the Semite and his history as “une combinaison inférieure de la nature humaine (an inferior combination of human nature).”¹⁴⁰ Thus, it is easy to see how Renan himself, as well as his work on the structure and history of linguistics and linguistic development, is a discourse of power, a subtle statement of Occidental (Indo-European/Aryan) superiority, and a creation of a people and a culture whose purpose it is to inhibit the frameworks of understanding of such a people — the Semites, taken in his time and after to mean the Jews and Judaism — to a physical and epistemic plane of inferiority, subjection and submission, which would in the right political and social circumstances come to take radical forms of oppression, persecution and genocide. So although the Semites (referring now to the Jews and the Arab — all people under the cognitive classification of linguistic structures and the various cultural similarities they feature) had a physical and social existence — temporally, culturally and geographically — what gave them meaning and influence, what made them a discursive feature in the European and Western discourse towards historical self-actualisation, was the way that they were represented by the European, and in this case by Renan, for the European.

Now, it has been made clear in the study how European discourses of power, regimes of truth and cultural hegemonies were constructed at the turn of the episteme known as the Enlightenment period, and the influence of the field of study known as philology had on new Orientalism — and the very specific yet very influential role of Orientalism had as a major element in these discourses of power, regimes of truth and cultural hegemonies as a major constructed reality — and how all this culminated into creating epistemic and material conditions in which the reconstituting, reconstruction and reconsolidating of identities could flourish.

However, it ought also to be noted that any cultural interaction with the Jews in either the antiquarian, early Christian or medieval Christian Era before the transitional Enlightenment period was also a case of Orientalism. It was invariably a case, wherever and whenever it was, where a social group with established social norms and values that were necessitated for ingroup cohesion — taking the form of rituals, customs, religions, worldviews, language, stereotypes, and so forth — had to come to terms with their existence, and external factors that had an influence on their collective social-psychological and material existence. If these external factors — usually other social groups with their own social norms and values — were different than the original group, it would pose a threat to the social cohesion of the original group. The exemplification of difference between social groups, and the framing of this exemplification in hierarchical terms¹⁴¹ where one

¹³⁹ E. W. Said, *Orientalism ...*, p. 142.

¹⁴⁰ E. Renan, *Histoire générale ...*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁴¹ Referring back to the Derridean strand of linguistics, where language is universally constructed in binary and hierarchical terms.

group and their beliefs are cast as inferior, due to it being definitively ulterior, has always been a way for any group to justify their own values and norms, and thus the constitution and orientation of their collective existence to that of the Other. This is what I have earlier referred to as rituals of marginalisation. But these measures, these rituals of marginalisation, are often purely discursive; the material threat of diversion and diversification of norms and values will continue in the physical domain. What history has taught us is that, time and again, social groups use these discursive elements — one can refer to them collectively as rhetoric, and thus the various material manifestations of this rhetoric — to justify either the conversion, expulsion or extermination of the threat to the social group. It has been shown that before the Enlightenment, this was accomplished by the Church through persecution, forced conversion, expulsion and dispossession, or in its most radical form, genocide, rationalised and legitimised on the basis of the ‘ulteriority’ and the difference of religion. During and after the Enlightenment, and in the time when Sacy and Renan worked and developed both philology and modern Orientalism, it was the fact of religion, and the predomination of monotheism more specifically, that was seen as the threat to the *new* norms and values of the *new* and *modern* culture, where terms of ingroup cohesion and social group membership was being radically reconstituted, reconstructed and reconsolidated. Now, it was the fact of religion and no longer the difference in religion that became the basic terms by which justification of collective difference and rituals of marginalisation throughout Europe were constituted. In the time to come shortly after Sacy and Renan and their Enlightenment contemporaries had worked, the antisemitism took a new form.

After, and largely due to, the racial theories of Renan, antisemitism was being defined and practised around the cultural arrogance and religious exclusivism of the Semite; Renan also devised that the historic detestation of the Jews in general (and the cultural root of their dislike) was largely due to this exclusivist fanaticism.¹⁴² It was also Renan’s comparative history and philosophy, devised together with Christian narrative, that, in contrast to the Semites, the Indo-European ‘Aryans’ were the most advanced of all of human civilisations.¹⁴³ In his case, Renan really did refer to the proper Aryan ethnographic classification, but his work was selectively used, together with that of Hegel’s conceptions on historical dialectics (while conveniently ignoring important aspects of Hegel’s appraisal of Semitic cultural contributions) by movements such as the French socialist Blanquists; from Renan the Blanquists adopted the singular notion that Aryans were inherently superior to Semites, but used the term ‘Aryan’ fallaciously to refer to the Graeco-Roman civilisational grouping (which surely had certain ethnographic links with the true Indo-European Aryan race, but was genealogically independent from them). However, the (albeit incorrect) use of the Aryan classification served their purposes well in reference to Hegel’s dialectic notion of history — infused with empirical, materialist philosophical conceptualisations that were an immediate heritage of their French intellectual atmosphere — to justify their call for the overthrow of the current capitalist system and establishment of a socialist (if not referred to more correctly as an anti-capitalist) state. However, their intellectual legacy would persist in the form of the binary and hierarchal structured narrative between the Aryan and the Semite, where normative gestures by thinkers such as Gustave Tridon (1884) would entail the

¹⁴² E. Renan, *History of the People of Israel, Vol. 1*, Chapman and Hall: London, 2018.

¹⁴³ E. Renan, *Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques*, Paris, originally published in 1863.

inherent superiority of Aryans and the inherent inferiority of Semites.¹⁴⁴ The persistence of the Blanquist legacy could be noted in increased antisemitism that was sentimentally spectral of pagan arguments in antiquarian times past, but was based in the prevailing arguments made by the French left of the day, perceived to be ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’, due to its epistemological antithesis from the obscurantist reasoning of Medieval Christianity and pagan polytheism. Authors that reiterated such arguments were Albert Regnard and Benoît Malon,¹⁴⁵ and particularly Edouard Drumont (1889), who praised the Blanquists for their courage in calling out the true inferior nature of the Semite and ‘refer to the Aryan race and to proclaim that race’s superiority.’¹⁴⁶

It was this blatant accelerated use of the Aryan-Semite binary, and especially its use not only in West-Central European intelligentsia, but in the literature frequented by socialist radicals and revolutionaries more generally, that led to its large-scale use in 20th century German socialism. Indeed, German strands of this argument would appear in the very late 19th century, infusing it with the Dialectics of Hegel and more blatantly with the Dialectic Materialism and scientific socialism of Karl Marx. Marx’s critique of Judaism and Jews in West-Central Europe was, like so many of his colleagues, part of a larger critique on monotheistic religion and its being an impediment to societal development in the middle-to-late 19th century. To Marx, the societal value of Judaism, as with all religion, was devoid of any supernatural quality or legitimacy, but used superstitious and obscurantist reasoning to legitimate a certain interpretation of reality that itself spoke of Jewish ethnic predestination and superiority and was, thus, exclusivist to anything and anyone who was not Jewish. Marx saw Judaism as being principally ahistorical, a-societal and showing utter contempt for liberal-rationalist conceptualisations of man as an end in himself.¹⁴⁷ In fact, Marx’s interpretation of Judaism, despite the mythological symbolism and religious didacticism, was that it was inherently a religion and ethnic-social classification centred on money and exchange (a clear reinvigoration of medieval stereotypes of Jews and their medieval roots as usurers and moneylenders). Marx writes that money is “the jealous God of Israel before which no other God may stand ... the God of the Jews has been secularised and become the God of the world. Exchange is the true God of the Jew. His God is nothing more than illusory exchange.”¹⁴⁸ This absolute link drawn between the Jew and the capitalist system by Marx led to his belief that antisemitism was inherent to social emancipation from capitalism, from “the empirical essence of Judaism — buying and selling, and its presuppositions.”¹⁴⁹

There is no doubt that Marx’s utter disdain of Jews and Judaism was both a product of his personal psychology and his immediate political environment. Born into a Jewish family that converted to Lutheranism when he was six years old, and having grown up poor in a political and financial environment

¹⁴⁴ G. Tridon, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 36.

¹⁴⁶ E. Drumont, *La Fin d’un Monde*, Paris, originally published in 1889, p. 185.

¹⁴⁷ K. Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, *Early Writings*, London, 1844.

¹⁴⁸ K. Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question ...’, p. 238.

¹⁴⁹ K. Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question ...’, p. 237.

highly influenced by the mythologised Rothschild family and their illustrious economic power and pull over multiple European governments, Marx was no stranger to the antisemitic hate in his Christian-proletariat upbringing and radical-revolutionary academic environment.¹⁵⁰ Although Marx never embodied such radical and hostile antisemitism as to the point where he supported the extermination of Jews from Western society, he held on faithfully to the view that the Jews were the absolute personification of the modern corrupt and contradictory capitalist system by (perhaps a bit paradoxically) recycling old antisemitic stereotypes embodied by the very monotheistic Christian bourgeois that he sought to overthrow. These abstract symbolic ties between the Jew and the capitalist system would come to be used by Hitler in support of his final solution.

Ironically, it can be argued that, given the particular social and political conditions of central Europe at the time of the rise of National Socialism, the Jews and their seismic economic success through liberal, capitalist structural procedure was the very reason for the violent mass antisemitism that took root in the new revolutionary atmosphere of the late-19th to early-20th centuries. As in times of old, Jewish success and prosperity in economic affairs (though at a much larger scale than in medieval times), and bourgeois jealousy of this success, was the social and political context that upheld antisemitism at the time; however, the ‘rational’ links drawn between the image of the Jew and the image of money, and the corrupt capitalist system that upheld it, by revolutionary leaders such as Marx and the materialists and deists that came before him, provided a new flair and sense of legitimacy to antisemitic proceedings.

At this time, a unique process of nationalism took hold in central-Europe, in countries such as Austria and Germany, with a fragile national identity and weak democratic institutions. Both the uneducated proletariat and the educated elite rebelled against ‘capitalism’ and ‘democracy’, and the liberal-rational ideology that upheld it, with thinkers such as Friedrich Rühs and Jakob Fries claiming it to be alien and un-German; a sense of national identity would have to be unique and, importantly, different from the rest of Europe in that it ought to unite the *Volksausplünderer* (German people), instead of divide it as was happening in England and France. It would have to be socialist (of which there was a convenient class of both aspiring and established intelligentsia and atmosphere of political activity to draw from, much of it in Europe), the antithesis of capitalism, and thus the racial and ethnic antithesis of the Jew. This antisemitic narrative, now with a racial as well as a political character, would be used as a creed to unify a politically divided people against the Jew, the very personification and arbiter of the social and economic system that Germany would seek to be unified from.¹⁵¹ This sense of antisemitism as the key to both the emancipation and the unification of the German nation had, due to the character of the legendary composer Richard Wagner, assumed a very influential arm in the artistic and larger cultural sphere of German society as well. Wagner’s vision of Judaism was that ‘evil thing’ responsible for the decline of modern civilisation and artistic expression.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ R. S. Wistrich, *Revolutionary Jews from Marx to Trotsky*, Harrap: London, 1976.

¹⁵¹ E. Sterling, *Judenhass: Die Anfänge der politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815-1850)*, Europäische Verlagsanst: Hamburg, 1969.

¹⁵² O. D. Kulka, ‘Richard Wagner und die Anfänge des modernen Antisemitismus’, *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, Vol. 4, 1961, pp. 281-300.

Wagner's expression of the Jews was that they embodied the "evil conscience of our modern civilisation," and that the Jew was essentially the "plastic demon of the decline of mankind."¹⁵³ And where Marx fell short of that most extreme arm of radical antisemitism that called for the complete extermination of Jews and Judaism from Central European society, this was very much Wagner's vision of the ideal German society: one free from any physical or cultural trace of Jews or Judaism. In a letter to Ludwig II of Bavaria, Wagner writes "I hold the Jewish race to be the born enemy of pure humanity and everything noble in it. It is certain that it is running us Germans to the ground."¹⁵⁴ It was this fanatical antisemitism of Wagner specifically that perhaps contributed to the views and later political agendas of Hitler more than Marx, Fauerbach or any of the other German, French or English enlightenment intellectuals ever could. Wagner's antisemitic literature certainly shaped the thinking of noted English anti-Semite and Social Darwinist Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who was one of Hitler's favourite antisemitic intellectuals, and certainly one of those he drew ample inspiration from in the formulation of his own brand of antisemitism.¹⁵⁵

Adolf Hitler was himself a Catholic-born Austrian who was very much, and quite unashamedly, a product of both the late-medieval Catholic-Christian liturgy, ecclesiology and theology and its superstitious and mythological strand of antisemitism that held the narrative that the Jews were the embodiment of supernatural evil and the very conspirators of Satan; as well as the National-Socialist revolutionary intelligentsia of late-19th century and early-20th century Central Europe. Wistrich (1991) states that "without the irrational beliefs inculcated by centuries of Christian dogma — reinforced by xenophobic, nationalist and Germanic racial mythology — Hitler's antisemitism and the echo which it found throughout Europe would have been inconceivable."¹⁵⁶ Hitler was the exact embodiment of the very worst and the most irrational of all antiquarian-pagan, Christian/religious-mythological, liberal-rationalist/pseudoscientific, and Nationalist-Socialist antisemitism evaluated and analysed in this study thus far. He was the personified mutation of all ideological-historical characteristics responsible for the persecution, massacre and genocide of Jews for millennia. As early as the beginning of the 1920s, Hitler publicly refers to the Jews as "racial tuberculosis", subhuman, vermin and derived from the very essence of the Devil. He goes on to state that the only hope that both Germany and mankind have of civilisational survival was the complete extermination and eradication of the Jews.¹⁵⁷ Hitler talked of public hangings of Jews that he would initiate in the case of his leadership, and that he would not stop until Germany is rid of its very last Jew.¹⁵⁸ Hitler certainly retained the apocalyptic outlook of his Catholic antisemitic ancestry and upbringing, and portrayed himself publicly as a messianic

¹⁵³ R. Wagner, *Das Judenthum in der Musik*, Leipzig, 1850, pp. 10-12.

¹⁵⁴ R. Wagner, *Letter to Ludwig II*, 1881, quoted in J. Katz, *The Darker Side of Genius: Richard Wagner's Antisemitism*, Brandeis University Press: Massachusetts, 1986, p. 115.

¹⁵⁵ See M. Woodroffe, 'Racial Theories of History and Politics: the Example of Houston Stewart Chamberlain', (ed.) in P. Kennedy and A. Nicholls, *Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany Before 1914*, St. Anthony's College: Oxford, 1981, pp. 143-153.

¹⁵⁶ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 67.

¹⁵⁷ From his speech 'Warum Sind wir Antisemitin? Rede auf einer NSDAP Versammlung', in (eds.) E. Jäckel and A. Kuhn, *Hitler: Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 1905-1924*, Stuttgart : Deutsche Verlags Anstalt: Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 176-177.

¹⁵⁸ J. Toland, *Adolf Hitler*, Anchor: New York, 1976, p. 157.

figure come to save mankind from the Jews. In 1926, Hitler declared in Munich that “the task which Christ began but did not finish, I will complete.”¹⁵⁹ Hitler likewise wrote in *Mein Kampf* that “in defending myself against the Jews I am acting for the Lord.”¹⁶⁰ In continuation of his self-perceived mission of righting the wrongs of history through the extermination of all Jews, Hitler even damned Martin Luther for translating the Bible into German, because this led to the *Verjudung* (Judaisation) of the German people.¹⁶¹ In his eyes, the Jews were perceived as the epitome of the anti-natural and of disease; and in the build-up to the War, “this mystical, biological and naturalistic racism was later to be used to sanction final measures against *all* Jews, whatever their social background, beliefs or political convictions.”¹⁶²

Despite the public exploitation of religious myths and apocalyptic narratives of the Jew as the conspirator of Satan and the bodily and cultural manifestation of the antichrist for political ends, all rooted in medieval Christian mythology and eschatology, there was a strong element of Christophobia in the Nazi party lines. Monotheism more generally, and certainly Christianity in particular, was branded as an elaborate Judaic farce introduced to the ancient world, and had infiltrated the great Graeco-Roman civilisational nexus when Christianity became the predominant religion of the Roman empire around 400 E.C., and especially in the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire in 800 E.C. Most damning of this ideological and social legacies of Christianity was the notion that all believers (under the rise of liberal-rationalism, ‘believer’ would be translated to ‘humans’ in general, regardless of class or creed) were equal; to the principle thinker of the Nazi movement, Alfred Rosenberg, these Christian sentiments of equality, compassion and love were a poisonous and effeminate parasitical pretense of the biological and spiritual essence of German honour, virility and independent superiority.¹⁶³ It thus becomes quite clear that, despite the use and reuse of religious mythology to induce a sense of racial superiority in the German public, antisemitic propaganda and antisemitic policies were based on conceptualisations around nationalism, clear German national identity and strong loyalty to the Weimar Republic. Irrational pseudoscience was then used to legitimise this national German identity to the German/Aryan citizen and his national sanctity through mystical and obscurantist abstractions of the bond of race and soil, the link of German blood and meta-historical renderings of German destiny, and especially of the racial totality of the *Herrenvolk*.¹⁶⁴

All of this was done to ensure the correspondence and the loyalty of the German Churches and bourgeois institutions in boycotting Jewish businesses and organisations, and legitimating segregationist legislation that would essentially create separate ‘living spaces’ for German and other East-Central European Jews, therefore

¹⁵⁹ R. S. Wistrich, *Hitler’s Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy*, St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1985, p. 139.

¹⁶⁰ A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1998, p. 65.

¹⁶¹ D. Eckardt, *Der Bolschevismus von Moses bis Lenin: Zwiegespräch zwischen Adolf Hitler un mir*, Munich, 2018, pp. 35-36.

¹⁶² R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 68.

¹⁶³ See A. Rosenberg, *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1930. Also see R. S. Wistrich, *Hitler’s Apocalypse ...*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁶⁴ E. Fackenheim, *The Jewish Return into History: Reflections in the Age of Auschwitz and a New Jerusalem*, Schocken Books: New York, 1978, p. 76.

prohibiting the social, cultural and racial contamination of the Aryan race. Another important linkage between the Weimar case study and that of the immediate pre-apartheid and apartheid political situation, is the political link made between the Jews and Communism. The fact that Jews constituted much of the top leadership of the 1918 and 1919 revolutions in Berlin and Munich made it possible for the Radical Right to construct a reality for a disoriented, traumatised and humiliated post-War German public that Jewish participation in these revolutions was a sign of Jewish political subversion, which itself was an elaborate plot of the Jews for world domination and undermining of German racial and national superiority.¹⁶⁵ The existing pseudoscientific narrative of Jewish racial inferiority and its subsequent ideological and national alienation from rightful German-Aryan citizenship was exacerbated by linkages drawn between the German radical right and the recent revolutions in Russia its subsequent ‘Bolshevisation’, and this Jewish participation and leadership in the 1918 and 1919 revolutions; the German public, and especially the German lay and working class, was fed stories of these recent Berlin and Munich revolutions being part of the Russian communist revolution, and thus part of a larger scheme of Jewish global hegemony.¹⁶⁶ The fact that the father of the Russian Revolutions in 1917 and subsequent commander of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky, was a Russian-Jew born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, made these linkages between communist revolutions in the East and Jewish participation in revolutionary attempts in Germany seem more organic. Thus, the linkage between Jews and Communism, and, consequently, the link between prevailing anti-Communist rhetoric and antisemitic propaganda, seemed all the more natural.

These pseudoscientific, racial-mythological and political discourses of Jewish racial inferiority and Jewish plots of world domination and subversion of the German nation and Weimar Republic manifested in current communist revolutions around the world, were themselves part of early radical-right attempts at political and socially alienating German Jews on an institutional level;¹⁶⁷ all of which led to the pogrom of 1938 — known as Kristallnacht, or Night of Broken Glass — and the legitimization of subsequent ‘Jewish living spaces’, or extermination camps set up for the purposes of the eradication of European Jewry; the most infamous culmination of all this being the historic event of the Holocaust. All of this was to be part of Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’, and Wistrich writes that

*It was this intensely ideological, mystical and deeply irrational character of Hitler’s antisemitism, linked to his exceptional political skills and the total power which he exercised as the head of a highly developed military and industrial state, which made the Holocaust possible. In his eschatological world-view, itself a monstrous mutation born out of centuries of Christian diabolicising of the Jews, the ‘final solution of the Jewish question’ was indeed the key to world history, to the future of Germany, of European civilisation and of the white, Aryan race ... In its fanatical intransigence this testament represented the apocalyptic nemesis of a bimillennial disease that had been raging intermittently in the heart of Christendom.*¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ J. Z. Müller, ‘Communism, Anti-Semitism and the Jews’, *Commentary*, 1988, pp. 30-33.

¹⁶⁶ A. Hillgruber, ‘Die “Endlösung” und das Deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des Rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus’, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: München, 1972, p. 51.

¹⁶⁷ See R. Bytwerk, *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 39/40, 1976, pp. 41-46. Here Bytwerk elaborates on Hitler’s agenda to encourage the German public to boycott Jewish businesses and institutions.

¹⁶⁸ R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism ...*, p. 77.

Although the extremities of such fanatical antisemitism in the Weimar would never be repeated on any significant scale in South Africa, much of this ‘intensely ideological, mystical and deeply irrational’ antisemitic attitudes that were held by ‘bimillennial’ antiquarian civilisations, the medieval Christian Church, Martin Luther and much of religious Germany, Enlightenment revolutionaries and ideologues, and finally by Hitler and his fanatical, secular-fundamentalist contemporaries, would later resurface in pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa. And although, not-counting selective extremes in the 1930s and 1940s, this fanatical antisemitism would not affect the Jews as intensely in the South African context as it did in the German one, it would affect the country’s black population in ways that resembles the Jewish bimillennial experience. Like the Jews in Antiquarian, pre-Medieval, Medieval and post-Medieval times, South African black populations faced intense ideological, religio-mythological and pseudoscientific racism that was manifested by a racially segregated state, and that resulted in such extremities as massacre, such as that witnessed at Sharpeville in 1960.

Much of the ideological idiosyncrasies between Antiquarian, pre-Medieval, Medieval, Enlightenment and 20th century Central-European antisemitism and 20th century South African antisemitism and racism will be explored in the next chapter, and the subsequent Jewish societal and cultural responses to the particular ideological and political-structural epoch of 20th century, apartheid South Africa. How did the South African Jew respond to this long history of the antisemitic arm of Orientalism? Would he/she serve to propagate this Orientalism for the sake of cultural and political assimilation into apartheid South Africa — to form part of the privileged bourgeois middle-class? Or would the Jewish community, or at least certain members within it, fight for the freedom and liberal-rationalism that had assured their own societal and cultural survival and development during their own historic persecution?

CHAPTER 3: Afrikaner Nationalism, Afrikaner Identity and the socio-cultural Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa

By the 1930s, constant ideological and cultural friction between the Jews and the Afrikaner, if not always explicit and physical, then certainly cultural and social, would lead to a period that gave rise to large-scale attitudes of antisemitism among the nationalist Afrikaner constituency in post-Union South Africa, which infiltrated both the civil and the political institutions of the country. During the time of Adolf Hitler's ascension as a popular radical political figure in Germany, and especially during the time leading up to and during the Second World War, there was a clear divide in political attitudes among Afrikaner constituencies in South Africa's political scene.

The National Party, led by J.B.M. Hertzog, which was first elected to power in 1924 and represented the rights and interests of the Afrikaner people, especially in the time following the Union in 1910, was at the time a staple of Afrikaner nationality and identity. The National Party was the ruling party from 1924 to 1934, when it merged with the South African Party led by former Boer General Jan Smuts to form the United Party. Smuts, together with General Louis Botha (also a former Boer General during the Anglo-Boer War) was at the time already a controversial figure to the larger Afrikaner demographic due to his avid support of the British Empire and South Africa's place in the British Commonwealth. Hertzog's National Party and its merging with the South African Party to form the United South African National Party — or United Party for short — was a notoriously controversial decision and caused what, decades later, would be extremely consequential splits among Afrikaner political interest groups. This split, amongst other things, led to the creation of the D. F. Malan-led *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* in 1934. It was within this party, and specific factions amongst its members, that strong Nationalist-Socialist attitudes and ideologies directly linked to that of Nazism could be found. A strong ideological accomplice to this philosophy espoused and endorsed by those within this hard right Afrikaner leadership was antisemitism. This conglomerate of Nationalist-Socialist ideas took root among Afrikanerdom after the election of the United Party, and especially after the United Party's decision in 1939 that South Africa would jointly side with the British and Allied Forces in the Second World War against Germany (which resulted in Hertzog leaving the party, arguing that, after the humiliating defeat of the Afrikaner by the British during the Anglo Boer War, it would not bode well for the unification of Afrikaner identity and Afrikaner nationalism more generally to join forces with the Empire, who not so long ago slaughtered and displaced so many of its people, many among these women and children). With almost uniform consensus, Afrikaner nationalists were against South Africa joining the war, in an effort to avoid alliance with its most recent enemy. This domestic hate of the British and refusal to join their cause “rendered the Afrikaner national movement more receptive to Nazi German influence than ever, for it began to seem as if the shortest path to a restored Afrikaner republic lay in the prospect of an understanding with a victorious Germany.”¹⁶⁹ Thus, in the strategic atmosphere that the Great War provided, a refusal by the Afrikaner nationalist to side with the British meant that the only alternative was to side with Nazi Germany. And indeed, by the time leading up to the War, and especially right after Hitler's declaration of War in 1939 and Germany's occupation of the Netherlands and France through their impressive military

¹⁶⁹ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience*, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, 1980, p. 128.

strategy *blitzkrieg*, it did seem as though Nazi Germany might emerge the victors of the War. For all intents and purposes, siding with what was perceived to be the victor of the War was a smart strategic decision, despite the obvious moral implications in this specific case.

What ought then to be understood about the political and social atmosphere of South Africa's social and political spheres in the time leading up to and during the 1930s and 1940s — specifically the constitution of Afrikaner nationalist identity, its relation to the larger South African Jewish community, how this changed after the National Party won the elections in 1948, and, inevitably, how the ensuing period of apartheid and the radical institutionalisation of racist and segregationist laws — is how the South African Jewish community related to it by constructing and consolidating a communal identity that remained true to the most basic tenets of Judaic culture and Jewish social values, yet likewise allowed them to adapt to the highly racialised and radical moral (if not amoral) atmosphere of the apartheid state. In order to gain this immensely fragile understanding and larger context of the intercultural intricacies of the Afrikaner and the Jew, and how they related to one another on a socio-institutional, socio-psychological and epistemic level — and how these were crucially part of an effectively trimillennial legacy of inter-ethnic and inter-civilisation domination based on, respectively, predominantly religious and racial social denominators (what made the South African case so immensely interesting in that it contained both highly religious and highly racial components, and that importantly these would prove to be extremely consequential) the proceeding two chapters will respectively be dealing with the issue in two parts.

This chapter will provide a brief history of Afrikaner nationalism since the establishment of the Cape Colony by the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) in the mid-17th century and will explain how crucial social processes of alterity were to the constitution, construction and consolidation of Afrikaner identity up until the South African Union in 1910. It will explain how dependent the Afrikaner nationalist was on a prolific racial conscience for identity construction and nation building, and will, furthermore, show how this racial consciousness was merely the product of the same phenomenon of the epistemic and physical manifestations and legitimations of difference (especially in its Derridean binary and hierarchical formations) — and ensuing social processes of social and political domination — that have been evaluated in the previous chapter analysing the history of antisemitism and its theoretical and epistemic relation to modern Orientalism. The chapter will then turn to the period immediately preceding and following Union, and will analyse the rise of radical antisemitism in the country.

However, the novelty and power of this study in general lies in its ability to amalgamate interdisciplinary theory with historical research, and particularly, this study aims towards the theoretical and methodological fusion of philosophy and social psychology with history and historiography. For this to be done, a very brief outline of Social Identity Theory will be provided, and will then be applied to the historical case study in this chapter, as well as all the chapters to follow.

Social Identity Theory: A Brief Outline

In order to grasp the scope of the physical and epistemic, and especially the socio-psychological (which in this case, at least in how it relates to the theory used in this study, will represent the intersection between the

physical and the epistemic) complexity of the Afrikaner, one ought to understand the cultural and political development of the Afrikaner — or the Boer, as he was formerly known — since the colonisation of the Cape and South Africa by the establishment of the Cape Colony in 1652, and the unique application of political and religious myth in the formation of the larger Afrikaner identity.

With its affixed emphasis on certain seemingly timeless cultural traditions and the celebration of significant historical landmarks that seemed seminal to the constitution of Afrikaner identity, anyone who lived in apartheid and pre-apartheid/post-Union South Africa, either as a subject or a beneficiary of its segregationist policies, could easily be mistaken in thinking that the identity of the ruling social and political class was stable and perennially fixed. But as in all cases of identity, it was socially constructed, adjusted and consolidated to “fit historical circumstances and social contexts.”¹⁷⁰ However, the theoretical and methodological model that will be used for this chapter — together with those that were used in the previous ones, referring primarily to the theoretical work of Saussure, Derrida, Foucault, Gramsci and Said — is Social Identity Theory (SIT). A brief introduction of its history and most important features will be given, but its value is in how it can complement historical analysis. Certain features of SIT will be familiar to the reader, since they have been alluded to in earlier chapters — however, the wider margins of the theoretical body and field will be selectively scavenged and utilised in the manner and formation in which it was developed in the disciplinary field of social psychology, and the sub-field of social identity theory more specifically. When SIT is used in the analysis of the case study of the history of the Afrikaner, it will be consolidated with Saussurean structural linguistics, Derridean deconstruction, Gramscian structuralism and Foucault’s poststructuralism in order to devise a holistic method of analysis and understanding of the development of Afrikaner nationalist identity, and in later chapters, of Afrikaner antisemitism and South African Jewish identity.

Social Identity Theory was a body of theory that was developed by Social Psychologist Henry Tajfel in the 1970s to analyse, through positivist methodological analysis and empirical means (which were the methodological confines of the general field of academic psychology at the time) why identity was constituted collectively, and what certain social features were dominant between people that made them think and behave in certain ways that proved to be constant, on both a temporal and subcultural level. In short, Tajfel attempted to distinguish order between people, and then how this order was constituted, and effectively how and why it changed over time, although often changing in a strikingly uniform manner.¹⁷¹ This order was, thus, constituted as Social Identity. Tajfel (1978) explains social identity loosely as a subject’s self-identification with, and self-actualisation and self-determination within the normative frameworks of, a social group. One of the most basic features of an individual human subject is a sense of

¹⁷⁰ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power*, David Philip, Publisher: South Africa, 1979, p. 83.

¹⁷¹ It ought to be noted that the body of theory developed by Tajfel and his contemporaries, most notably one of his Doctoral students John Turner, will not be dealt with here in great detail. Only some of its most important features will be presented. For a more elaborate analysis and outline of SIT (and later SCT), see one of the other postgraduate works of the author of this thesis study: J. Van Der Walt, *Identity, Alterity and Conflict in the First Crusade and the ‘War on Terror’*, (unpublished) University of Pretoria: South Africa, 2020, pp. 13-16.

belonging¹⁷², and this collective social instinct of belonging leads to the establishment of a social group, where certain conditions for group membership — usually taking the form of social norms and values, and developing into complex moral frameworks and world views, such as religions and ideologies, over time — are established, and adherence to these conditions assures membership within a group. The proclivities of the conditions for group membership can be either internal or external — meaning they can be dependent on behaviour that is reflective of a certain worldview or moral framework within a group, or they can be dependent on certain biological features shared by members of a social group, as well as environmental conditions that the group happens to find themselves in. Despite this, membership of a social group necessitates the adherence to the conditions of group membership.¹⁷³ However, generally speaking, the formations of various groups, and conditions set out by various groups, are relative to time and place, and what SIT focuses on is how social groups, once the conditions for membership and a general social contract has been established, react towards one another: referred to in the field as ‘intergroup behaviour’.

Now, Tajfel explains the establishment of conditions for group memberships as being constituted around three general social psychological components: a *cognitive* component, an *evaluative* component, and an *emotional* component. The *cognitive* component merely outlines a subject’s conscious awareness that he belongs to a social group, based on the fact that his behaviour is accepted as being conducive to social cohesion and the benefits he reaps within the group. The *evaluative* component outlines the negative or positive value the subject attaches to his membership of a social group, following from his cognitive recognition of such a membership and the benefits and satisfaction he attains from this membership, while the *emotional* component recognises the sets of emotions (such as anger, fear, dislike, sympathy, hatred, compassion, and so forth) that is formed following from the evaluative component. What is important to recognise of the latter two components, is that they are not only applicable to a subject’s conscious sense of his own group membership, but also to his conscious recognition of other subjects’ membership within other social groups;¹⁷⁴ both these features are equally important in any evaluation of intergroup behaviour. What is particularly important for the application of these three social psychological components is that (especially

¹⁷² Darwinian theory teaches us that, as with all of the animal kingdom, humanity, and humans individually, are first and foremost predisposed to survive biologically, and to procreate in an attempt to survive indefinitely. The most efficient way of doing this is to do it collectively, where various subjects come together to establish a collective basis for the sustenance of themselves and their species. Where two or more humans are involved in a set of interchangeable dynamics of behaviour that is mutually beneficial and reciprocal, a social group is formed. The basis of understanding for such a mutually beneficial group dynamic is called a social contract, whereby certain conditions are adhered to to establish a collective system of trust whereby mutual benefit can be sustained. In philosophy, the general concept for this is a *social contract*. A sense of belonging is an essential biologically driven emotional need to survive, and thus to accommodate a social contract in order to survive, or belong.

Social contractarianism is a subject that has been expounded on immensely, but its development rests on Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For more context on the material and epistemic foundations of social contractarianism, and how it directly relates to this study, especially in how it speaks to SIT and the complexities of its cultural, economic and political foundations, see *Discours sur l’oeconomie politique* (1755) and *The Social Contract & Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1765) by J. Rousseau; *Leviathan: Or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (1651) and *elements of law, natural and politic* (1650) by Thomas Hobbes.

¹⁷³ Tajfel expounds on this significantly in his work: H. Tajfel, ‘Interindividual Behavior and Intergroup Behavior’, in *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychologies of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel, Academic: London, 1978.

¹⁷⁴ H. Tajfel, ‘Interindividual Behavior ...’, p. 27.

when applicable to *intergroup* dynamics instead of *intragroup* dynamics) they are not based on the actual constitution of another group and their own social group dynamics (referring to the social norms and moral values, including their actions and motivations) in any objective sense, but purely on the subjective evaluation, interpretation and ingroup representation of the opposing outgroup by the initial ingroup.¹⁷⁵

When there are basic or radical differences in the makeup and social infrastructure of another group, the original group — cognizant of the epistemic and ideological nature that precludes the behaviour that make up the conditions of their own group — will naturally feel threatened (referring to the threat that opposing norms and values pose to the legitimacy, or the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of the outlooks, motivations and behaviours of the initial group), and apply a negative value to the outgroup, its members and the values and norms they hold, and, therefore, garner hostile emotions and resultant motivations for behaviour and action towards the opposing social group. Within the parlance used within the study thus far, it should only seem natural that one refers to the opposing social group as the Other. In the case where the differences between social groups are especially apparent and garner the potential for radical action to the point where the very survival of one group or the other is threatened, and where social mobility (defined as the ability to move between groups, especially in cases where the positive dimensions initially attributed to membership within a certain group is no longer realised by the individual member¹⁷⁶) — something Tajfel refers to as the ‘intergroup extreme’ — is impossible, “members of an ingroup would (a) show more uniformity in their behaviour towards members of outgroups, and (b) tend to ignore individual differences between outgroup members and treat them as undifferentiated items in a unified social category.”¹⁷⁷ This whole process is referred to in SIT as ‘social comparison’, which is particularly relevant in any study where alterity is involved, such as the present one. However, concerning these findings made by Tajfel, there is a feature following from social categorisation and social comparison that proved a constant in all empirical research conducted by Tajfel and one of his most prominent Doctoral students and contemporaries, John Turner: that predominantly, *intergroup difference* is a much stronger driver for social identity construction and subgroup identity consolidation than *intragroup similarity*.¹⁷⁸

This strongly reflects what has been displayed in various theoretical fields used in this study thus far, and has, likewise, been proven by the application of these theoretical fields to various historic case studies, whether they be studies of general trends inherent in certain cultures throughout millennia, or whether it be the study of the work of a single author or school of thinkers: humanity makes sense of itself and its reality on either an individual or a collective level, and assigns value and meaning to it — whether this reality is purely lingual and cognitive, or whether it relates to the larger social dynamics and cultural and political dimensions of various temporal spaces— through *difference*. Thus, it has been proven in social psychology that intergroup discrimination based on overt social group difference has often been preferable to intergroup

¹⁷⁵ H. Tajfel, ‘Interindividual Behavior and’, p. 43.

¹⁷⁶ P. F. Esler, ‘An Outline of Social Identity Theory’, in J. B. Tucker and C. A. Baker (eds.), *T&T Clarke Hand- book to Social Identity in the New Testament*, Bloomsbury: London, 2014, p. 20.

¹⁷⁷ P. F. Esler, ‘An Outline of Social ...’, p. 18.

¹⁷⁸ J. C. Turner et al, *Rediscovering the Social Group: Self-Categorization Theory*, Blackwell: Oxford, 1987, p. 51.

consolidation; our evaluation of history — and further analysis of the South African case study — will prove this as well. It is thus on the basis of differentiation, and the binary and hierarchical features of this general differentiation that seems to be inherent to the human condition, that people, either individually or collectively, think, speak and act, and thus make and interpret history. These fundamental yet seismically consequential conclusions drawn from the discipline of social psychology¹⁷⁹ — and reiterated in the disciplines of philosophy, linguistics, philology and history, as well as sociology and anthropology — will be applied to the case study of the historical development of Afrikaner nationalism, and its specific constitution and proclivity towards antisemitism in the years leading up to apartheid.

The History and Development of Afrikaner Identity from the 17th to the 20th century

It has been established that in order for any form of social group identity to exist, there needs, in turn, to exist some form of group mobilisation; SIT has taught us that group mobilisation, through various social processes noted above, takes place in the case of intergroup difference, and thus requires an Other from which to garner motivation to act collectively. Thus, for group mobilisation, there is required some sort of social denominator that differentiates the ingroup from the outgroup — whether this be race, caste, ethnicity, a system of cosmic belief and moral framework (summarily understood as religion or ideology) or some common political association and affiliation — among which potential members of a social group can make out threads of similarities that lead to material or spiritual gain within the group, but likewise differentiates itself from a collective Other. These potential gains ought to be enticing enough that existing individual class disparities are collectively suspended so as to mobilise around these specific social denominators that are socially decided to be categorically linked to material and spiritual profit. In the sub-discipline of SIT, John Turner (contemporary and Doctoral student of Tajfel) developed his own strand in the field called Self Categorisation Theory (SCT).¹⁸⁰

One of the basic tenets of SCT is the differentiation between three dimensions of social identity: *Subordinate identity*, *Social Ingroup identity* (which will be referred to as subgroup identity further into the study), and *Superordinate identity*. The first is a subject's personal, individual identity which is based on larger intrasubjective dynamics (generally dealt with in the field of phenomenology in the discipline of philosophy) as well as intersubjective dynamics. The second is the subject's self-identification with a social group, and his assimilation into, and membership of, this group through behaviour that coincides with the norms and values that are considered conditional to group membership within this group. An important feature of subgroup identity is that a subject can belong to various social subgroups simultaneously and have various social roles that he is compelled to conform to under various conditions, without necessarily compromising his position and membership within any one of those various social subgroups. And finally, superordinate identity is the larger identity that a person belongs to that prescribes the meta-characteristics of the society

¹⁷⁹ This study will also utilise other conclusions and concepts from SIT, but they will be respectively addressed further into this chapter.

¹⁸⁰ SCT generally deals with the establishment of intragroup processes of social identity, which are the dynamics of identity construction *within* groups, and the resultant fluctuation of identity recategorisation — or identity consolidation — between different dimensions of social identity.

that he lives in; it is the one identity to which all of the subject's other identities (his subordinate and subgroup identity) must adhere, and they are encapsulated and inhibited by the meta-norms and meta-values that are conditional for membership into the superordinate identity.¹⁸¹

Capozza and Brown (2000) comment on certain features of group mobilisation within the methodological and theoretical frameworks of SIT. They note that, insofar as basic social group formation and identity construction are social processes that are primitive in scope¹⁸², the social processes that are more relevant for study of historical societies with complex economic, cultural and political dimensions are those of social *recategorisation* and subgroup identity *consolidation*. In noting the fluidity and dynamism of identity as a social phenomenon among humans more generally (and a phenomenon whose fluidity and dynamism is exponentially accelerated in the complex cultural, economic and political atmosphere of colonial to apartheid South Africa), Capozza and Brown state that the dynamics of social identity can be better understood by analysing intergroup activity as “redrawing group boundaries so that those who were once classified as outgroupers can be regarded as fellow ingroupers with[in] a larger superordinate category.”¹⁸³ The case study that follows will, thus, be framed within the conceptualisation of social identity in 17th to 20th century society as following from social recategorisation and subgroup identity consolidation of already existing subgroups into larger superordinate social groups.

South African sociologist and Afrikaner historian Hermann Giliomee (1979) notes, concerning the constitution of identity in the social and political context of the Colonial Cape and later South Africa in general, that “ethnic identification occurs most strongly where a collection of individuals come to consider themselves communally deprived and believe that mobilisation as a group would improve their position or where persons seek to protect the privileges they share with others against those who do not have them or whom they are exploiting collectively.”¹⁸⁴ Any social group, whether described as ethnic, political, cultural or religious, requires leaders that will recognise or create social circumstances that are favourable in persuading that said social group to act towards attaining a sense of social cohesion and worth through gaining a sense of a constructed superiority, that might likewise lead to various forms of social and political profit.

When the Cape Colony was established in 1652, the broader ethnic categories that could be located in the area, and that were naturally directly influenced by economic, social and political activity conducted by the VOC in the area, were European immigrants, slaves brought over by the colonial authorities, and indigenous ethnicities such as the Khoisan, ‘Bushmen’ and various other minor indigenous ethnicities to be found in the area at the time. The majority of the European settlers were either of German, English, French and especially

¹⁸¹ C. A. Baker, ‘A Narrative Identity Model for Biblical Interpretation: The Role of Memory and Narrative in Social Identity Formation,’ in (ed.) J. B. Tucker and C. A. Baker, *T&T Clarke Handbook to Social Identity in the New Testament*, Bloomsbury: London, 2014, pp. 106-109.

¹⁸² See foot note earlier in chapter noting the most primitive conceptualisations of the social contract.

¹⁸³ D. Capozza and R. Brown, (eds.) *Social Identity Process: Trends in Theory and Research*, Sage: London, 2000, p. xiv.

¹⁸⁴ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 83.

Dutch descent, and beyond their ethnic links, two important threads that ran throughout their cultural heritage was that of their common race as white, and their Protestant/Christian dogmatic affiliation. This racial and religious similarities were at the time the social denominators that solidified the superordinate identity under which, in various cases of dealing with an Other (in this case meaning any social group whose members were not white, and whose cosmic outlook and motivation for collective and individual action was not Christian), subordinate identities could and would be suspended for the sake of social cohesion and mutual ingroup profit of those who enjoy membership and benefit within the larger superordinate identity.¹⁸⁵

A need for peaceful coexistence and communal senses of profit and belonging made the consolidation of minor ethnic and individual differences among the scattered European descendants relatively easy. Cultural similarities, such as ideas about race and similar cosmic beliefs, reinforced one another and provided the said social conditions that were at once favourable to large scale social mobilisation; thus, the conditions, at least among the Europeans in colonial South Africa, were favourable towards social mobility. Thus, and largely due to these ethnic and cultural commonalities, there quickly existed a common class in the larger social hierarchy of Cape society. If one would view the social denominators allocated to the various classes in 17th and 18th century Cape society, one would most definitely notice obvious racial disparities and material inequalities, but it would be anachronistic and perhaps ignorant to assume that Europeans in that specific epoch were racially conscious in the sense that we conceptualise race and race relations today.

It could be argued that, although racial disparity and inequality was undoubtedly a consequence of social processes of group mobilisation at the time, it was not necessarily the object of social processes of group mobilisation. Europe was subject to a particular system of knowledge, or *episteme*, in the 17th to 19th centuries, and communal attitudes of its immigrants in the Cape were shaped by cultural and scientific advances that were the products of the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, both of which put immense value on certain conceptions of space and time and the science and philosophy that supported and proved it in the fields of architecture, physics, chemistry, astronomy, war, and so on. If this system of knowledge could lead to the material and social domination of other social groups and civilisations that were not as ‘advanced’ as the European colonisers (as the term was perhaps restrictively conceptualised within the European epistemic heritage, moral frameworks and ethical standards of that day), then it would logically follow that Europeans would believe themselves to maintain civilisational superiority. The races of these ‘Other’ civilisations were merely social denominators that were used as some physical trait of dominated social groups to allocate cultural class distinction in order to legitimate certain frameworks and restrictions for social mobility among the natives, and related material and social privilege among the white Europeans. Cultural constructs such as beauty, intelligence, sophistication, and so on, were strictly European constructs, but (as Saussurean and Derridean linguistics and semantics have taught us) the value of a sign — a concept — and its material manifestation and relation to other things, is entirely dependent on its perceived difference to something else that does not share the same physical or epistemic traits as the original sign or thing. If something — whether it be an idea or something physical — is a European construct —

¹⁸⁵ In this case the superordinate identity could be referred to as European — a superordinate identity which seemed fragile at the time, and whose boundaries would soon be redrawn in the progression of South African history leading up to the 20th century.

conceptualised, conceived of, 'discovered', created, used and valued in Europe — then it means that it reflects the basic cultural outlook and moral framework of those that self-identify with the superordinate identity of 'European'. In order to validate the existence and value of the things, epistemically or physically, that reflect and define the European identity, it must be proven to be 'true' and superior to anything that diverges from or is significantly different from it.

In Europe, the physical trait of 'whiteness' is a common denominator of those members that conform to the meta-norms and values that are conditional to membership of the European superordinate identity, and it seems to stand to reason that whiteness itself precludes, and justifies, such membership; this consciousness of a physical trait is coincidentally shared by the members of the ingroup is the cognitive component of the social identity constitution in SIT. However, for this feature that seems to preclude membership from a social group to have any true meaning and value, there must also be an evaluative component, meaning that a positive value must be attributed to the feature that precludes membership of an ingroup. It is here where an immensely valuable intersectionality between the work of Saussure and Derrida and SIT can be noted, and it is in this evaluative component where alterity seems to come into play. Saussurean structural linguistics states that meaning and value of a sign — a concept, of which 'white' and its conceptual attribution in the physical dimension through the manifestation of a certain pigment of the skin is one that is highly relevant to the European superordinate identity — cannot be attributed based on the fact of its constitution (which seems so be contingent anyway), but on the fact of its difference to something that cannot be conceptually associated with that same sign. The simple fact of meaning and value is applied based on this difference, which is still part of the cognitive component, but the meaning and value is relative and contingent, and Derridean linguistics states that signs, and their value and meaning, are attributed horizontally and vertically, meaning their attribution has a binary and a hierarchical orientation. For 'white' as a racial attribution to have any true meaning and value, and if this meaning and value should be what stimulates social ingroup cohesion and social group mobilisation, then its binary character necessitates that it ought to compare and compete with another similar biological features with different characteristics; and that hierarchically it ought to prove that it is superior to that similar feature with a different characteristic. Otherwise, if white is not superior, why should a member of a group stimulated by and constituted around the condition of such a racial attribution remain in the group if his membership within the group based on the fact of his skin colour is not as profitable as it would be if he were in another group associated with and necessitated by another skin colour?

Thus, in order to prove that membership to a certain group that is precluded by race is, indeed, profitable, and therefore to sustain ingroup cohesion and intragroup stability, it ought to be observed that the condition of this group membership — meaning being white — is superior to that similar feature which is different. In the social setting of the early VOC colonisers of the Cape colony, this would obviously be the slaves and indigenous populations that were clearly racially differentiated from the white European colonisers. This will, thus, be the evaluative component, where meaning and value, and, therefore, positive meaning and value, is associated to membership of an ingroup conditioned by race, and negative meaning and value is attributed to membership of an outgroup conditioned by a different race. What follows from the evaluative component of group membership is the emotional component, where a whole range of negative emotions are

felt due to the perceived or constructed difference and inferiority of those members of the outgroup, and a whole range of positive emotions are felt due to the membership of an ingroup (and the conditions of this membership, race being one of the important ones in this case). Thus, in this racial atmosphere, people and communities were not vilified, subjugated and oppressed because they were black, but merely because they were not European, and they were not European because they were not white. Essentially, their peril came from their difference, regardless of how arbitrary and redundant this difference may seem.

However, what ought also to be understood in relation to a point made a bit earlier, is that these social processes were not a sudden fact of social existence, but were exactly that — a *process* and a *discourse*. An acute racial consciousness takes time to rationalise and conceptualise, and once it is conceptualised, it must be proliferated before it is made manifest through legislation and general social and political behaviour. But these initial processes of conceptualisation and rationalisation of race, both intersubjectively and intrasubjectively, are built around rhetorics, narratives and general discourses that are culturally and civilisationally inherited. Thus, an acute racial consciousness as a precursor for large-scale group mobilisation, social recategorisation and subgroup consolidation was not fully formed in the Cape Colony by the time of its initial establishment in 1652. The following section will look at how this racial consciousness was firstly part of a Western, European and Occidental discursive legacy that conceived antisemitism as well, and likewise developed and changed over time, and especially how some of these large scale changes in the legitimations for social group mobilisation and social identity construction and consolidation were indicative of the shift in episteme that saw the creation of the liberal, rational and critical atmosphere in Europe (conceptualised around terms such as Enlightenment and Humanism), that also saw the creation and development of modern Orientalism. What will be noted is the epistemic and material similarities between the social processes that resulted in both the Holocaust and the particular orientation of Jewish identity in the South African Diaspora. But what is crucial is that it be understood that the social processes explained through the body of theory above are the conceptual framework within which the following historical analysis is framed.

It can make sense to frame the social processes in Cape society at the time in terms of class, with class being interpreted as various subsection of society with a proclivity towards categorising difference through culturally engendered biological and ideological features along which social identities and social group memberships are constructed in the form of dominance hierarchies. Indeed, from a legislative standpoint, the VOC distinguished between four basic social classes. These were (1.) members who served the company on any official capacity; (2.) ‘free burghers’, who were members who enjoyed the full scale of political, economic and social freedoms under the legislative frameworks of the Colony — this meant that they were eligible to purchase certain goods and property, as well as to vote; (3.) slaves, who were themselves imported from the East and other areas in Africa; and (4.) ‘aliens’, referring to those indigenous inhabitants such as the Khoi Khoi and ‘Bushmen’. Although the first two social categories enjoyed widespread social privilege and autonomy, it ought to be noted how there was, strictly speaking, no categorical distinction made on the basis of race or European ethnicity at the time¹⁸⁶, but legal distinctions within society were made on the basis

¹⁸⁶ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 86.

through which various members of society could serve the furtherance and development of the colony. When it came to official political and legal discourse, there was not such a sense of race consciousness as it was understood in 20th century South Africa. However, due to the semantic allocation of meaning and value to certain social and civilisational groups based on basic cultural traits such as economic, political and military development and sophistication, certain races were invariably excluded from certain social privileges based on the argument of them being culturally inferior. Here one sees the evaluative component in social group mobilisation, where race as a feature or social denominator precluding group membership is differentiated, and those races that are not European (do not fulfil conditions under which membership into the superordinate European identity and ensuing subordinate identities are necessitated) are conceptualised and rationalised as being inferior, based solely on their difference, of which one difference is race, but is also associated with other cultural features which are also different to European social identity. Linguistic simplicity and a lack of technical development and sophistication were assertively used as both rhetorical devices and physical reasons to conceptualise and rationalise a narrative of inferiority which were based entirely on European teleological standards and conceptualisations of the progression of time and place as history.

Thus, the Company almost exclusively hired those with white skins and of European descent; and although free-burghership was often given to persons of colour, these were very rare occurrences. Also, although there did exist senses of class distinction between the Company servants and the free burghers, mutual requirement between the two classes (Company servants required the burghers for the agricultural development and policing of the peripheral territories of the Colony, and burghers required social and legal privileges to fulfil these requirements) led to an unofficial, reciprocal social contract that subsumed official differences in status (subgroup identities) to create a larger ruling class conditioned by similarities of whiteness and European-ness (for the cohesion and stability of the larger superordinate European — and Christian — identity).¹⁸⁷

Two very important components to note concerning the development of what was to become Afrikaner identity is the importance of the church as a religious institution and personal and collective affiliation with the Protestant faith (especially the Reformed/Calvinist denomination); and the socio-economic structure of the *trekboere* as egalitarian. The peculiar nature of the Cape economy — referring to the lack of local industry and therefore occupational opportunity for European immigrants — meant that, outside of the capital, farming was the only occupation that most colonists could find. Most of the agricultural practices in the Cape were those of wine and wheat production, and later that of large-scale livestock farming. However, soon overproduction and a lack of labour opportunities for a large demographic swath of the Cape periphery's white residents led to a continual migration into the country's interior. Those adventurers who migrated into the interior were referred to as *trekboere* (migrant farmers).¹⁸⁸ Giliomee notes that, among the *trekboere*, “the interplay of weak government control and the continuing availability of land produced a

¹⁸⁷ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, pp. 86-87.

¹⁸⁸ See L. Guelke, ‘Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657-1780’, (ed.) H. Giliomee & R. Elphick, *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820*, Longman: London, 1979.

socially mobile white group who accepted their fundamental equality as Europeans.”¹⁸⁹ W. S. Van Ryneveld (1831) likewise notes that “among the true inhabitants of this colony there is no real distinction of ranks among the white population.”¹⁹⁰ Thus, the trekboere’s social order of the day was highly influenced by this egalitarian social element, in that there was very little class distinction among those that were considered European; which also meant that, while no European was considered superior in the prevailing social hierarchy over another (by virtue of their ethnic similarity), anyone who was not European was almost automatically considered inferior (due to their ethnic difference). This was telling of the stable social identity among the Cape’s white population, and the general lack of large-scale social fracture within the superordinate identity was telling of how stable the racial and ethnic class discourses of the time were.

Another extremely important social and cultural component that would only serve to enhance the Boer’s sense of cultural superiority was that of his Christian religion. The Christian religion was very much seen as an important social indicator of civilisational quality and sophistication; if one was a heathen, then one was seen as uncivilised and uncultured, and automatically cast as the Other, and thus counterintuitive to the social cohesion of the European social identity. The church as an institution was also involved in the education of the European youth, not only on religious matters, but in basic literacy and the corresponding interpretation of the Bible and other literature as well. Thus, basic literacy and Baptism (as an inductive ritual into the Christian society and therefore the higher echelons of the trekboer social hierarchy) were seen as seminal symbolic rituals in which membership in social groups, and larger social group mobilisation, was expressed.

However, even though one can clearly see that the Afrikaner’s ancestors, at the very outset of the development of their specific cultural identity in the new environment and social and political challenges it offered, did not view race-consciousness in quite the same way as one would in the political climate of 20th century South Africa, and that discourses of power were expressed along ethnic and occupational lines and were largely based on religious association and affiliation, it so happened that racial categorisation and subjugation did fit into the cultural and ethnic strata of 18th and 19th century South Africa. However, what is certain is that racialism had its share of the role to play in the social stratification of frontier society. What is worth looking into, for the purposes of this specific study, is the role that political myth and religious myth played in the construction of Afrikaner identity, and its own role centuries later in the construction of Jewish identity in the South African diaspora.

As mentioned earlier, the importance of the Calvinist faith to the identity of the original Dutch settlers of the Cape Colony, and the later 20th century Afrikaner *volk*, was largely linked to their consciousness of civilisational and social hierarchy and the racial categorisations within these hierarchies. From the very start of the 18th century, there existed a very specific religious consciousness that linked non-whites, and especially the black native population, to the ancestry of Ham, the cursed son of Noah, himself the chosen of God to re-inhabit and repopulate the Earth after the apocalyptic flood of the Book of Genesis. In the Bible, Noah cursed Ham’s son Canaan and his descendants for Ham’s disgrace of his father’s nakedness and

¹⁸⁹ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 89.

¹⁹⁰ W. S. Van Ryneveld, ‘Schets van den Staat der Kolonie in 1805’, *Het Nederduits Zuid-Afrikaansch Tydschrift*, 8, 1938, p. 124.

drunkenness. The actual subject and intention of this curse and its various interpretations by the three major monotheistic religions and their various respective denominations have been debated for centuries. Earlier Jewish and Rabbinical interpretations of the curse may have used the curse to rationalise the subjugation of the Canaanites (the ancestry of Ham's son, Canaan) to the Israelites (the direct descendants of Shem, son of Noah). However, later Christian interpretations of the curse — particularly the interpretations made by the Calvinist-Christian *trekboere* in the frontier of the Cape colony in the early 18th century — infer that the curse was made to black people, who were believed by this specific denomination to be the descendants of Ham.¹⁹¹ Sarna (1981) notes that one of the Jewish interpretations of the curse might have been to justify the Israelite occupation of Canaan, seeing as Canaan was cursed and the Israelites were God's chosen people, and that the curse specifically was a curse of subordination to the sons of Shem.¹⁹² This narrative was most probably reinterpreted by the *trekboere* to legitimate the occupation of the frontier and the former lands of the non-white and black indigenous inhabitants, and was most likely interpreted to justify racial subjugation, oppression and slavery; that the seemingly uncivilised nature (according to European standards of civilisation and their very obvious links to Christian consciousness) and subjected inferiority of the indigenous population was part of the Curse of Canaan, and that these indigenous races were the descendants of Canaan.¹⁹³

This is an example of the use of narrative and general discourses of power in the conceptualisation of a racial consciousness that is used to legitimise and actualise group mobilisation and social identity formation. The objective accuracy of the Hamitic curse is irrelevant, but what matters is the power it carries (since it coincides excellently with the existential perspective and religious consciousness of the white European, and the *trekboer* subgroup identity more specifically) to manifest differentiation (in the Saussurean sense, and relating to the cognitive component of social identity), rationalise inferiority (in the Derridean sense of binary and hierarchical association of signification, and relating to the evaluative component of social identity) and legitimise rituals of marginalisation (relating to the emotional component of social identity¹⁹⁴)¹⁹⁵, so as to ensure social ingroup cohesion and effective group mobilisation. The evaluative component of social identity is strengthened through such discourses, narratives and intense rhetoric, and through this, the emotional component is radicalised and effectively engendered in a culture, and would only become more manifest through eventual cultural ritual and political legislation.

¹⁹¹ See H. Giliomee & R. Elphick, 'The Structure of European Domination at the Cape ...', *ibid*.

¹⁹² N. Sarna, 'The Anticipatory Use of Information as a Literary Feature of the Genesis Narratives', (ed.) F. R. Elliott, *The Creation of Sacred Literature: Composition and Redaction of the Biblical Text*, University of California Press: United States, 1981.

¹⁹³ See the work of D. N. Goldenberg, *The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Princeton University Press: United States, 2003.

¹⁹⁴ And also relating to the work of Gramsci, especially that of Cultural Hegemony, and also Foucault's regimes of truth. Effectively, the establishment of the Hamitic curse, as ridiculous as it might seem now, established and culturally engendered a sense of superiority that strengthened social group cohesion. It also effectively Othered and vilified those who were previously socially excluded and oppressed on what might have at the time been interpreted as arbitrary grounds, on cosmic grounds. It made hierarchical and binary configurations of racial discourse religious and existential, and thus deeply necessary to the *trekboere*. It made racism not only socially profitable and beneficial, and thus preferable, but it made it deeply essential — a necessity of faith.

¹⁹⁵ The same of which were observed in earlier chapters in studying the history of antisemitism.

This Biblical interpretation and its establishment of religious and political myth in 18th century trekboer society was, of course, a product of the political and social circumstances of the day. All members of the trekboer community had some form of formal education and were, if only to a fairly limited extent, literate. Partly due to the uncultivated nature of the landscape, and partly due to the steady expansion of agricultural practices, there was always a demand for manual labour, and the most unskilled labour would be passed down to indigenous populations. In the urban centres and towns of the colony, where society was more ‘established’ and authority undisputed and centralised in local government, racial prejudice was more predominant and social hierarchies could be enforced and policed. On the frontier, however, social interactions were, to say the least, unbridled, and local government was almost non-existent; “colonists without the means to use coercion effectively would have to attract local labour” which led to a social atmosphere where “there was an uncertainty of status: whites were not all masters; nonwhites were not all servants.”¹⁹⁶ Giliomee continues to note that it was only after the frontiers had ‘closed’, meaning they were domesticated and had become established towns, were nonwhites seen as inferior, and a rigid caste-like system developed. Only when there were challenges to the racial structure of the social hierarchy of *trekboer* society did racial thinking and large-scale racial discrimination evolve from being the exception to being the norm.¹⁹⁷ This largely came at a time during the end of the 1700s and the start of the 1800s when a growing number of the Khoi Khoi and the slaves refused to submit under European racial hegemony. This major challenge to the prevailing (and constructed) social structure of society forced the trekboer masters to formulate an ideology that would allow them to legitimise the sustenance of the current social system and their place within it — their very identity and the benefits it afforded them — without having to compromise any of the power they wielded and the socio-political and socioeconomic benefits it entailed. It was at this time when the political myth that the *trekboere* maintained a special place in society, and the religious myth of the *trekboere* as a chosen people, elected by divine predestination, could be seen to take prominent place in the socio-psychological processes and motivations of the Boer volk, with both these myths falling into the ecclesiological framework of the Calvinist/Reformist/Christian hermeneutical tradition. Although there were secular motivations for justifying the racial superiority of the whites as well (among these were arguments relating to narratives of natural selection), it was the belief that the Christian faith was the sacred right of the European and the Boer, and that black slaves and indigenous Khoi Khoi populations were heathens by birth (a strong remnant of the Hamitic myth touched on earlier), that predominated the racial ideology of Boer society at the start of the 19th century. This strong religious sentiment of the Boer overplayed the basic narrative of the Old Testament, and denoted the Black populations as the direct descendants of Canaan, and thus the racially denoted spiritual afflicted by the Hamitic Curse; in addition, the Afrikaner overplayed their own cosmic position as those benefiting from the same superiority given by Noah to his son Shem.¹⁹⁸ This mytho-geneological component to the cultural construction of *trekboer* identity added to the sense of pride that the European descendent felt in belonging to a particular social collective of such (albeit imagined) geocentric importance; any policy that would affect the *trekboer* and his/her social position, and further

¹⁹⁶ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 92.

¹⁹⁷ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 93.

¹⁹⁸ F. A. Van Jaarsveld, *Lewende Verlede*, Afrikaanse Pers: Johannesburg, 1961, pp. 228-258.

contradict his/her cosmic position, would inevitably spark a form of social as well as psychological descent — it would be both counterintuitive and highly contradictory to the social identity which precludes the Boer's existence and his conscience. It would be easier to run from a social system that contradicts and threatens the very cultural and religio-mythological tenets of one's social group, than to confront the possibility of a fallacious existential foundation used to legitimate a certain societal formation, in this case along racial and ethnic lines.

The Great Trek, which would later become the very pinnacle of Afrikaner identity formation and national pride in the 20th century, was invariably a form of collective social descent sparked by such an existential contradiction to the Boer and the basic cultural and religio-mythological tenets of his social identity. It was predominantly caused by the legislation of the British in the Cape Colony (the Cape Colony was transferred to the Crown at the very start of the 19th century), known effectively as ordinance number 50 of 1828 and further legislation leading to the emancipation of slaves a decade later. While this legislation legally abolished the division of political and social privileges between the indigenous peoples, the slaves and the Europeans, the actual racialised nature of Cape society did not change dramatically. However, perhaps due to the Boer's affinity with his particular exegesis of scripture and its rationalisation and legitimisation of racial divides in the social hierarchy and religious mythology in trekboer society, the racial and ethnic equalisation which was the automatic consequence of the Colonial legislation was perhaps a bit too traumatic for the Boers, and ultimately led to their flight from the new 'heretic' and disorderly Colonial society. Gustav S. Preller (1920) noted the words of Anna E. Steenkamp, a popular figure in *trekboer* society and whose journals are popularly used as representative of the *trekboer* mentality during the Great Trek, as well as the Pietism that animated the socio-psychological profiles of Boers and their descendants in the 20th century. In relation to explaining the reason for the Great Trek, she writes that the legislation leading to slave emancipation was interpreted by the Boer *volk* as officially denoting "their equalisation with the Christians, in conflict with the laws of God and the natural division of descent and faith, so that it became unbearable for any decent Christian to submit to such a burden; we therefore preferred to move in order to be able to better uphold our faith and the Gospel in an unadulterated form."¹⁹⁹ This is but one example among many that illustrates the way that the Calvinist/Reformist exegesis influenced the identity, social cohesion and politics of the *trekboer*, and led to the particular social identity formation that would animate the post-Union, pre-apartheid and eventual apartheid state. Afrikaner identity, and the specific consequences it (referring to both the actual structural orientation of the state, as well as the ideological tenets drawn on to legitimate its highly racialised character) held for the Jew in South Africa, and the particular way his/her own socio-psychological identity formed in relation to a state that supported the same racialism legitimated by the same arguments as those that led to the trilmillennial persecution and massacre of his own ancestors.

Although the *trekboer* underwent various social and political phases to retain his/her independence as well as (and perhaps precisely animated by) his/her cosmic position and societal importance notionally rooted in his/her European descendancy, what is striking is how *trekboer* society seemed to extricate itself from Europe and its cultural and political obligations to its continental descendancy. The cause of this was mostly the fact

¹⁹⁹ G. S. Preller, *Voortrekkermense*, Nasionale Pers: Cape Town, 1920, p. 4.

that the economic and political activities of the Colony were conducted in such a manner as to develop the urban areas and the economic fruition of the Company, instead of the specific social developments and needs of the burghers themselves. Towards the end of the 18th century, it became quite clear that the burghers and frontiersmen saw themselves not as citizens of the Netherlands or even the colony, but as natives of the southern (and increasingly eastern) portion of the continent.²⁰⁰

This hints to major fractures in the European superordinate identity which had up to this point seemed so stable, and this brought along major processes of social group recategorisation and subgroup identity consolidation. This harkened a period necessitating a reestablishment of the most basic tenets that necessitated social identity and membership of a specific social group; the very boundaries of identification would have to be redrawn, and the meaning and value assigned to physical and epistemic features that precluded social identity and social group membership would have to be reconsidered. The constitution and processes of differentiation would take on a new character. And it is in this period that the superordinate identity under which all other subgroup identities must align themselves will have to be reestablished. The restructuring of this identity, as will be explained further on into this study, was made on the grounds of four basic features: race, ethnicity and, perhaps most importantly, language and religion.

Superordinate identity was still predominated by the necessity of whiteness, which meant that European heritage was still a basic condition for inclusion into the larger social group which would later become the Afrikaner *volk*, but the Afrikaners required another feature to differentiate themselves from a new enemy whose policy had driven them from the Cape Colony in the first place: the British, who were also white, and who were also European. This differentiation and social recategorisation would depend on the Calvinist ecclesiological and hermeneutical tradition which it inherited from its *trekboer* forebears; but it would also eventually culminate in the development of, and later official institutionalisation, of Afrikaans as the official language of the Afrikaner *volk* and South African state.

The political orientation of the Colony made it clear that the burghers, whose needs were not met or even considered by the Colony, were to fend for themselves; from a political, economic and social standpoint, the burgher and the Boer would be responsible for their own development. This disenfranchisement with the Colony, abstract renderings of locality and nativity, and loyalty to an imagined spacial belonging and thus social and political entitlement rooted in this imagined belonging, was evident in those pioneers of the eastern frontier such as Marthinus Prinsloo, who referred to himself and the *trekboere* who colonised the frontier as “true natives of our true fatherland.”²⁰¹ This sense of imagined ethnicity and belonging to a social and political collective apart from those who deemed themselves distinctly European, is said to be the source of the term and concept of ‘Afrikaner’. Franken (1928) notes that the term itself in reference to a white was first used in 1707 by Hendrik Bibault, who exclaimed when he was being flogged by a landdrost that “I am

²⁰⁰ C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte*, Van Schaik: Pretoria, 1929, pp. 194-196.

²⁰¹ H. Giliomee, *Die Kaap Tjydens Die Eerste Britse Bewind*, Hollandsch Afrikaansche Uitgevers Maatschappij: Cape Town, 1971, p. 28.

an Afrikaner, even if the landdrost flogged me to death ... I will not be silent.”²⁰² The context of the exclamation insinuates that his reference to his person as an *Afrikaner* was used to imply some sort of injustice to his ‘inherent’ right based on his ‘nativity’ to the region. The use of the term Afrikaner in reference to whites grew steadily during the 18th century and particularly into the 19th century. Sometimes the term was used to refer to various segments and individuals of the country’s black population, which meant that the term was not as racialised, and that it might only have implied the nativity of an individual or a group to the southern region of the African continent; however, in these infrequent cases, it was the nativity of the individual of the group that was stressed, which still highlights the ethnic uniformity of the burghers and *trekboere* against the Europeans in the Cape, first under the Company, and finally after 1806 under the British Empire; and towards a (if at times disputed) coherent national consciousness in the 19th century.²⁰³

Roughly at the same time as the emancipatory policies that inspired the Great Trek, British Colonial authorities worked hard towards the Anglicisation of Cape society by pressuring various Afrikaner institutions to replace their largely Calvinist/Reformist traditions and customs with English cultural and social values.²⁰⁴ While some segments of the Afrikaner *volk* did resolve to Anglicise, or otherwise to compromise cultural exclusivity for the purposes of peaceful intercultural assimilation, there was a large disenfranchised and disaffected Afrikaner constituency that grew resentful towards the British’s self-imposed cultural and civilisational superiority, and opted to oppose this Anglicisation franchise through Afrikaner group formation by strongly emphasising the ethnic pride and inherent nativity (as well as cultural and supposed cosmic importance) of the Afrikaner (which was clearly inherited from the *trekboere* who came before them), as well as his cultural and social values and institutions. This national consciousness was emphasised through stressing the common cultural and social features of those proud Afrikaners who opposed British social and political influence. Among these were language, which was of vital importance, as the continued use of Dutch was used as a predominant common social trait that would set the Afrikaner apart from the Brit in both public and private life; but the traditions and the customs that would influence Afrikaner ethnic and later ‘national’ identity would be strongly rooted in Calvinist ecclesiology. Indeed, although English was being spoken all the more in public and economic institutions nearing the end of the 19th century, it was insisted by the cultural authorities of the Afrikaner society that Dutch remain the official language of the Dutch Reformed Church, which was without a doubt the most prominent and influential institution in Afrikaner society. Thus, language and religion, and the cultural synthesis between the two, were indisputable elements of Afrikaner ethnicity and national identity.²⁰⁵

Another crucial element to Afrikaner national consciousness was the class stratification of society among racial and ethnic lines, and specifically with the European/white social groups and its members forming part

²⁰² J. L. M. Franken, ‘Hendrik Bibault of Die Opkoms van ’n Volk’, *Die Huisgenoot*, September 21, 1928.

²⁰³ For more on the development and nature of the concept of Afrikaner and its historical application, see H. Giliomee, *Die Kaap ...*, Ph.D.: University of Stellenbosch; D. J. Kotzé, *Positive Nasionalisme*, Tafelberg: Cape Town; C. De Jong, *Reizen na de Kaap de Goede Hoop, 1791-1797*, 1968, Tafelberg: Cape Town.

²⁰⁴ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 98.

²⁰⁵ J. Du P. Scholtz, *Die Afrikaner En Sy Taal, 1806-1875*, Nasou Beperk: South Africa, 1900, pp. 112-130.

of the higher echelons of the social class hierarchies of Afrikaner society. This sense of racial and civilisational superiority was elemental to the national identity of the Afrikaner.

It is important to note that the former elements of Afrikaner national identity, being language and religion, were perhaps more formative and crucial than the latter racial and ethnic ones. Racial and ethnic stratification, and social and political rights based on this social-hierarchical positioning, put the Afrikaner and the Brit on an even societal position; however, although slavery and the black and Khoi Khoi racial subjugation to low-wage and largely unskilled labour in earlier burgher society served to develop a racial consciousness and superiority complex among the later Afrikaner, it was the inevitable clash with British imperialism after the occupation and colonisation of the eastern frontier by the *trekboer* that stimulated a sense of cultural belonging, not as a white inhabitant in juxtaposition to black inhabitants of a particular region, but as an Afrikaner, with a very specific cultural consciousness animated by language and driven by specific religious tenets, in juxtaposition to another cultural group who, while racially similar and socially equal, was culturally different.²⁰⁶ We can thus again witness the strong processes of differentiation (and thus importance of alterity) in the construction and consolidation of social identity at this point in history.

Giliomee states that the “annexation of Basutoland (1868), the Diamond Fields (1871), and the Transvaal (1877) led Afrikaners throughout South Africa into the awareness that they were a spiritual entity — people sharing the same interests, language, faith, and destiny.”²⁰⁷ Although there was a sense of unity among the Afrikaners in the 19th century, there was still the issue of who exactly was to be considered an Afrikaner — what social denominators would determine who would benefit from an Afrikaner state in the future? Many of the cultural and political authorities were split on the subject. First President of the Transvaal Paul Kruger believed that any man or woman who was white and spoke Dutch or Afrikaans should be considered an Afrikaner, and, thus, a beneficiary of the future Afrikaner state. There were those of the more metropolitan pool, such as Boer General Piet Joubert, who believed that social stratification of Afrikanerdom should be more inclusive and should include those white South Africans that spoke English. The radicals of the Afrikaner constituency, such as Schalk Burger (who served as the Chairman of the Volksraad in the late 19th century) believed that an Afrikaner should be a native or immigrated inhabitant of the Transvaal; even those that originate from the Cape or the Free State, regardless of whether they perceived themselves as Afrikaners, and regardless of their language or race, should not be provided with the social and political benefits reserved for Transvaal Afrikaners.²⁰⁸ However, the development of the Afrikaner argument eventually settled on one predominant feature that was simultaneously exhaustively legitimated by the Calvinist ecclesiastical narrative and geocentric quality of cultural and ethnic cosmic superiority it denoted: that the Afrikaner was increasingly defined as a social and cultural group in opposition to the English, and that the Afrikaner was “God’s people”, and that only the Afrikaner and Dutch were ‘chosen’ and

²⁰⁶ See F. A. Van Jaarsveld, *Die Ontwaking van die Afrikaanse Nasionale Bewussyn, 1868-1881*, Voortrekkerpers: Johannesburg, 1959.

²⁰⁷ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, p. 100.

²⁰⁸ C. T. Gordon, *The Growth of the Boer Opposition to Kruger, 1890-1895*, Oxford: Cape Town, 1970, p. 10.

‘predestined’ to join this socio-cultural group.²⁰⁹ Kruger had stated that ‘God’s People’ (the Afrikaner) were being persecuted and threatened by the ‘Beast’ (the British).²¹⁰ Boer General Jan Smuts (1939) — future president of the state after the Union of 1910 — stated that the Afrikaner, along with his liberty and his sacred cultural and religious values, was threatened and insulted by the British, but wrote that Afrikanerdom would prevail indefinitely one day.²¹¹

The ultimate culmination of Afrikaner national identity based in alterity against the British came in 1898 at the start of the Anglo-Boer War, and the resulting defeat and national humiliation of the Boer Republics. Although many believed that the defeat of the Boer Republics would mean the eradication of Afrikaner national identity and its integration with Anglican political and social identity, there were those leaders of the Boer Republics, foremost amongst them being President Marthinus Steyn, who believed that a traumatic event among the Afrikaner nation was needed in order for a new, more robust Afrikaner identity to take root in a new South Africa.²¹² This was the stage of Afrikaner social group development at the very start of the 20th century, after the Anglo Boer War and before the Union in 1910, when South Africa was announced an independent nation. Despite its new beginnings, Afrikaner identity, and the truly national character it took after the declaration of South Africa’s political independence in 1910, was greatly influenced by the racial, Calvinist-ecclesiological/theological and socio-cultural rhetoric formulated throughout nearly four centuries, since the occupation of the Cape, the development of the burgher-class in the South African frontier that lay the foundations for what was to become the Boer republic, and the *trekboere* that settled the eastern frontier of South Africa in an attempt to establish both political as well as cultural independence from their European forebears and colonial and cultural nemesis. In order to understand the segregationist policies and Nationalist character of the Afrikaner that followed the Union, one ought to understand its history, as has briefly been done up to this point. And in order to understand the relationship between the Afrikaner and the Jew, and how Jewish identity was formulated in a South African ‘Diaspora’ politically ruled by the Afrikaner and his nationalist and Calvinist tenets, one ought to understand the relationship between the Afrikaner and the ‘Brit’, and the development of this relationship throughout the 20th century, after the political compromise of the Union.

Afrikaner Identity in the 20th Century

The Union of South Africa in 1910 saw somewhat of a divergence in the social and political spheres of the larger Afrikaner constituency. The Union was initially introduced as a political compromise between the Boer Republics and the English Empire in South Africa, in order to bestow upon the Afrikaners the independence they had sought and fought for centuries, while still maintaining South Africa as part of the British Empire and allowing its English population to reap social and political benefits in the country, and likewise allowing the Empire to reap economic and political benefits in the future, without having to do so

²⁰⁹ J. A. Coetzee, *Politieke Groeperinge in die Wording van die Afrikanernasie*, Voortrekkerpers: Johannesburg, 1941, pp. 247-256.

²¹⁰ F. A. Van Jaarsveld, *Lewende Verlede ...*, pp. 201-207.

²¹¹ J. C. Smuts, *N Eeu van Onreg*, Nasionale Pers: Cape Town, 1939, pp. 1-3, 57.

²¹² J. J. Oberholzer and M. C. E. Van Schoor, *President Steyn aan die Woord*, Sacum: Bloemfontein, 1953, pp. 15-16.

through another ludicrously expensive war. Peace, mutual constitution and mutual social, political and economic profit was the aim of the Union. However, regardless of the official political agenda of the Union, this compromise, on both a political and a socio-cultural level, was interpreted differently among the Afrikaner *volk*.

There were those who, despite minor sub-group allegiances, were invested in deemphasising sentimentality with the ethnic and cultural exclusivity of the Calvinist rhetoric in certain ultra-conservative Afrikaner circles and opted instead towards inter-cultural cooperation and a sense of cultural, social and political homogeneity. They accepted themselves as members of the commonwealth and understood that the future of a prosperous South Africa was vested in liberal cosmopolitanism, instead of radical, nationalist separatism. This liberal sentiment can be displayed in various statements in the media and governmental and academic circles. Most notable among these were former Boer generals Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, both of whom saw no practical sense in the cultural and political separation between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans. Mulder and Cruywagen (1964) noted that Botha himself sought to “create from all present elements a nationality; whoever had chosen South Africa as a home should regard themselves as children of one family and be known as South Africans.”²¹³ Among the more radical of the liberal-cosmopolitan Afrikaners was Dr. Niemeyer, who declared “we are all Britishers alike now. We have all accepted the British, and the majority of us ... wish to form one nation with you, the glory of the British Empire.”²¹⁴

However, this total acceptance of Anglican cultural and British political preeminence was a bitter pill to swallow for those who still remembered loved ones and fellow kin who suffered and died due to the vicious scorched earth policies and concentration camps under the tenure of Lord Herbert Kitchener as commander of the British Forces in South Africa little more than a decade prior. Among these Afrikaner nationalists who not only apposed but, in many ways, openly detested British influence in South Africa due to the historical injustices committed against the Afrikaner people during the War were General J. B. M. Hertzog and Dr. D. F. Malan (who would later become the President of South Africa in 1948 as leader of the very National Party that would introduce apartheid). Hertzog, while accepting (perhaps resentfully) South Africa’s place in the commonwealth, claimed that it was essential that South Africa avoid cultural assimilation into the British Empire, and that a distinct and ‘national’ Afrikaner identity be maintained and developed in the future. His premise for stressing the differentiated character of the Afrikaner identity to that of the British was that the Afrikaner held a very significant place in the civilisational development of South Africa, due to the development of the frontier by the *trekboere* centuries earlier — South Africa is as it is due to the historic efforts of the Afrikaner’s ancestors, and they ought to maintain the differentiating cultural quality in commemoration, as well as in continuation, of this long line of Afrikaners who worked towards the vision of a truly sovereign nation. This intercultural assimilation in the spirit of supposed social amelioration would be sacrilegious towards the collective Afrikaner spirit that strove towards national unity against the Brit during

²¹³ C. P. Mulder and W. A. Cruywagen, *Die Eerste Skof van die Nasionale Party in Transvaal, 1914-1964*, Voortrekkerpers: Johannesburg, 1964, p. 13.

²¹⁴ S. Patterson, *The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation*, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1957, p. 97.

the First and the Anglo Boer War.²¹⁵ Hertzog's ideas and national sentiment were reiterated in the work of Dr. D. F. Malan, but while Hertzog appealed to the political and social logic behind Afrikaner national pride and unity, Malan's position in the clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church predisposed him towards transcendental rationalisations towards Afrikaner nationalism and collective Afrikaner identity. Found in his work — and in his appeal towards the unification of the Afrikaner *volk* as an attempted social recategorisation and the consolidation of various subgroup identities under a new reimagined and reconstructed superordinate identity that would harken a new social group, membership of which would necessitate the acceptance of social norms and values that were *strictly* Afrikaner and Christian — are the same abstract, religio-mythological rhetoric that animated *trekboere* society in the 18th and 19th centuries, where the Afrikaner is seen as the supernaturally elected subject of divine predestination, who was born/chosen to assume the superior socio-political position in society.²¹⁶ Malan upheld the narrative (put in place by so many before him) that Afrikaner unity and national identity was supported and upheld by God, apparent in a statement in 1915 where he said: "Ask the nation to lose itself in some other existing or as-yet non-existent nation, and it will answer: by God's Honour, Never."²¹⁷ This narrative would, of course, be used to condone political, social and economic decisions that would allow for Afrikaner political superiority and privilege throughout the 20th century, and would likewise be used to validate the persecution and oppression of those members of the broader South African society that did not possess the social features, both physiological and cultural (which at this point in the development of the Afrikaner identity was based on a fundamentally concise and definitive racial consciousness that would animate and structure the social, political and material divides between various social groups in the country) that was conditional to membership of the dominant social group and assimilation into their social identity, that would in turn afford them basic societal benefits.

Hertzog and Malan's proposed policies, that strongly reflected the ambitions of a great many of the Afrikaner nationalists, were that of the separate cultural and social development of the Afrikaner (Perhaps equally importantly, to control the state's resources so as to ensure welfare, education and jobs for poor Afrikaners) to both that of the country's black population, as well as to that of the country's English population. Racial separate development was supported by both, although on different grounds. Again, Hertzog rationalised racial separate development through appealing to more politically charged (albeit no less racist) civilisational rhetoric, where he argued that blacks should not populate the social and political spaces of the whites because they were civilisationally inferior to the Europeans, and needed time to develop their cultures so as to properly transition into the position that the Europeans held in the existing social and political hierarchy of the country.²¹⁸ Malan supported and legitimated racial development through appealing to those same metaphysical, religio-mythological qualities used to rationalise Afrikaner cultural and social superiority,

²¹⁵ C. M. Van Den Heever, *Generaal J. B. M. Hertzog*, A. P. B.: Johannesburg, 1946, pp. 301-311.

²¹⁶ A. H. Marais, 'Die Politieke Uitwerking van die Verhouding van die Afrikaanssprekende tot die Engelsprekende, 1910-1915, *Ph.D. Dissertation, University of the Orange Free State*, p. 588.

²¹⁷ D. F. Malan, *Glo in U Volk: Dr. D. F. Malan as Redenaar, 1908-1954*, (ed.) S. W. Pienaar, Tafelberg: Cape Town, 1946, p. 16.

²¹⁸ P. J. Nienaber (ed.), *Gedenkboek Generaal J. B. M. Hertzog*, A. P. B.: Johannesburg, 1965, pp. 233-243.

appealing to narratives such as the Hamitic curse and divine predestination to justify the inferiority of the country's blacks, and their consequent systemic oppression.

Another feature — other than the supernaturalist, religio-mythological, civilisational one enacted by the exclusivist, geocentric character of the new Afrikaner nationalist identity — that was crucial to the rationalisation and legitimation of the separate development between the Afrikaner and the English, was that both Malan and Hertzog vigorously appealed to the creation and edification of Afrikaans as a language inherent to the Afrikaner culture that would support the cultural and psychological unification of the Afrikaner as a new social group in a politically and culturally fractured environment. Malan (1908) proclaimed:

*Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, let it become the vehicle for our culture, our history, our national ideals, and you will also raise the people who speak it ... The Afrikaans Language Movement is nothing less than an awakening of our nation to self-awareness and to the vocation of adopting a more worthy position in world civilisation.*²¹⁹

Amidst Afrikaner unrest in years following the Union, and after the creation of the National Party in 1914, the policies and political franchise of President Botha came under frequented attack due its liberal and cosmopolitan agenda that was seen as the collective subjection of the Afrikaner to Anglican social and cultural values. The National Party was built on the premise that if the assimilation of the Afrikaner into the cultural and social developmental sphere of the British was to continue, then it would mean the stifling of the Afrikaner nation and its cultural identity; and that only by developing separately from the Brit can the Afrikaner hope to maintain his national character and inherently special and superior civilisational and cosmic position in South Africa.²²⁰

This rhetoric supporting the separate development of the Afrikaner towards the creation of a strong national identity had much of its context in the economic reality facing the Afrikaner at the time. Since the Union and the assimilation of the Afrikaner into the commonwealth, South Africa underwent a period of intense industrialisation that saw the large-scale migration of Afrikaners (who had traditionally, as explained earlier in this section, come from agriculturally based segments of society and the national-economy, descriptive of their proud ritualistic-cultural self-interpretation as *Boere*, or farmers in English) to the country's rapidly growing urban areas. Van Jaarsveld (1973) notes that shortly after the Anglo Boer War, urban centres in South Africa only housed 10 percent of the country's population; following the Union, it was around 29 percent; and by 1926, that number had skyrocketed to 41 percent.²²¹ Most of these migrants came from the Afrikaner constituency of society; however, many of the Afrikaners who did participate in this mass urbanisation were largely unskilled and uneducated (or otherwise their education and skills were constricted to agriculturalism, and not the urban and industrial economy). For all the rhetoric that espoused Afrikaner

²¹⁹ Malan, *Glo in U Volk ...*, p. 175.

²²⁰ H. Adam & H. Giliomee, *The rise and crisis of Afrikaner Power ...*, pp. 106-107.

²²¹ F. A. Van Jaarsveld, *Stedelikke Geskiedenis as Navorsingsveld vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Historikus*, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit: Johannesburg, 1973, p. 16.

cosmic and civilisational superiority, many of the Afrikaners who came to live and work in the cities could only find arduous and unskilled labour little better than that held by the black population, and certainly much lower than that held by the majority of the English workforce. What was apparent in the post-Union South African economy was the vast income-gap between the Afrikaner and the Brit. Thus, the social unification and strong collective cultural identification with *Afrikanerism* (and thus political parties and other civil and economic institutions that supported the cause of the Afrikaner and represented his interests in parliament) was essential for the economic and political development of the Afrikaner *vis-a-vis* the Brit, and also for the cultural development of the Afrikaner as a cultural constituency apart from (yet still self-perceived as being superior to) the Brit. This strong ethnic and religious association to *Afrikanerism* and its perceived self-superiority was made controversial seeing the interracial intersectionality among the class hierarchy in society. White Afrikaners were expected to maintain a standard of living appropriate to European civilisational superiority, as maintained by the wealthy and middle-class English, yet they were doing the same work as equally-unskilled black members of the economy.²²² Thus, the development of the Afrikaner as part of the racially divided class system in society maintained by the Brit was essential to politically, socially and economically manifest the perceived racial superiority of Afrikaner.

Thus, we can see the ideological as well as the material strain between the Afrikaner, keen on establishing his cultural identity as independent and unique (as he has been taught for centuries he is), and the Brit, claiming his place in South Africa as a victor of a ruthless war, and benefiting from such a social and political (which often translated into an economic) predisposition. While a racial consciousness that has been developed for centuries made it clear that the Afrikaner as a European and a white was superior to the black on culturally given racial-civilisational/class-hierarchical/transcendental-religious grounds, the Afrikaner had to state and manifest his claim of *cultural* superiority and political and social preeminence by navigating his relationship with the British, who were historically perceived as the Afrikaner's political and cultural nemesis.

The relationship between the Afrikaner and the Jew in South Africa was, thus, massively influenced by the fact that much of the established Jewry in South Africa was derived from the Anglo-Jewish population who immigrated to the country in the late 19th centuries, and who would represent the interests of the unestablished and alienated Litvak, Yiddish-speaking Jewish population who immigrated at the start of the 20th century through organisations and cultural and political bodies such as the South African Zionist Federation (SAZF) and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD). The historically strained relationship between the Afrikaner and the Brit was transferred in the political interactions and cultural exchanges that the Afrikaner had with the pro-English, liberal and cosmopolitan Jews (who would collectively, on a representative level, come to inhabit the centrist spheres of South African political society), who, in decades to come, would prove to be remarkably resilient and prosperous, especially in South Africa's economic sphere.

What is very important to note, and what the following section seeks to analyse from both a historical as well as a theoretical perspective, is how the cultural exchanges, political interactions and very obvious ideological

²²² J. Lever, 'White Strategies in a Divided Society: The Development of South African Labour Policy', *Unpublished*, P. 3.

delineations from a fundamentally social and cultural level between the Afrikaner and the Jew, led to a period of intensified antisemitism in South Africa during the 1930s and the 1940s. Additionally, the following section will show how the antisemitism in South Africa during this period — while never materialising as intensely as it did in certain periods of history or especially Europe earlier in the same century — was conceptualised and rationalised around the same arguments to legitimate racial subjugation, oppression and extermination during the early Christian to Medieval years — where intergroup comparison and resultant senses of social superiority were grounded on supernaturalist, religio-mythological beliefs — as well as those liberal-rational humanist arguments that were indicative of the change of the episteme in the 18th century, and that ultimately led to the development of modern Orientalism. What makes antisemitism in this period in South Africa so interesting, and perhaps so complex (and was perhaps the reason for its relatively quick decline and eventual political and social pacification), is the fact that it embodied arguments borne from two systems of knowledge in history that seemed antithetical, but were amalgamated, nonetheless. The effect of this would be a particular socio-psychological disposition in the South African Jewish community during the period of social [re]categorisation? and social identity consolidation after the period of intensified antisemitism leading up to apartheid.

CHAPTER 4: Antisemitism in South Africa

A short history of the Jews in South Africa, and the subtle roots of antisemitism

The foundation of the Jewish community was the consequence of the immigration of British Jews to South Africa during the first half of the 19th century, and the establishment of the first synagogue in Cape Town in 1841. This was the start of the institutional establishment of Jewish culture, which was followed by the establishment of a series of Zionist societies and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in 1912, which was modelled on the organisation of the same name in London. Collectively, these Zionist societies and Jewish institutional bodies represented the political, economic and social needs of the South African Jewish population to secure the wellbeing and fair consolidation of the Jews into South African society.²²³ From their inception into the South African population and their steady induction into the country's social, economic and political society, South African Jews possessed one crucial feature that greatly determined their socioeconomic prospects, especially after the Union and during apartheid: the Jews were largely considered ethnically European and racially white, which in the social hierarchical norms of the time assured their induction into the dominant political, social and economic class in South Africa.²²⁴

Apart from the minor similarities that South African Jews and their cultural adaptation had with those of other diasporas — being that, by virtue of their immediate ethnicity, they were assumed to be European and white and benefited politically and socially accordingly — South African Jewry was starkly different to that of other Diasporas leading up to and after the War. One such overwhelming feature that set them apart, and was thanks to their Litvak²²⁵ cultural heritage, was their strict, orthodox religiosity and cultural conservatism. Although there was some acculturation between the Anglo and Litvak Jewry, Lithuanian descendants observed Jewish religious lifestyles and principles without too much cultural amalgamation with the English and Afrikaner (largely Reformist-Christian) cultural and religious traditions.²²⁶ Although the observation of some of the Jewish traditions, such as Sabbath, was hindered due to difficulties in adapting to the demands of the socioeconomic environment in South Africa, the “distinctive consequence of the Litvak predominance in South African Jewry was the highly self-affirmative ethnicity that characterized the community.”²²⁷ But one feature of the Litvak descendant of the majority of South African Jewry was its strong emotional and cultural bond to Zionism. Mendelsohn (1993) notes that nowhere was Zionism more socially and institutionally entrenched than in interwar-period Lithuania.²²⁸ Thus, Litvak Jews that were trained in the religious traditions were also taught the importance of Zionism, a feature of their identity that would follow these Litvak immigrants to the southern tip of South Africa. This was expressed in the fact that one of the first

²²³ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, p. 3.

²²⁴ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, p. 3.

²²⁵ The term *Litvak* refers to a Jew that is descendent from Lithuania or the surrounding region, most notably those Eastern European regions heavily characterised by Russian acculturation.

²²⁶ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 4.

²²⁷ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 4.

²²⁸ E. Mendelsohn, *On Modern Jewish Politics*, Oxford University Press: New York, 1993, pp. 42–44.

Jewish institutions following the arrival of many of the Litvak immigrants in the country was the South African Zionist Federation (SAZF), founded in 1898. Thus, the majority of the South African Jews, referring to those of Litvak descent, had by the 1930s and 1940s a very unique, orthodox identity. But the major question of this thesis is not so much that of Jewish identity and its geo-temporal perseverance, but that of its dynamic quality under certain social and intercultural atmospheres, specifically in terms of its incorporation into the host society.

Those that were either the immigrants or direct descendants of immigrants of the Litvak Jews into South Africa were mainly from the peasant class, and too preoccupied with fitting into the socioeconomic stratification of South African society by making a living and learning new languages to apply too much attention and (very limited) resources to cater to the country's segregated and oppressed black majority.²²⁹ And regardless, it has been established that the Litvak Jews did not acculturate as quickly as its American counterpart did, and South African Litvak Jewry tended to see to the needs of its own people before those of its neighbours. Feldman (1956), himself part of the immigrant generation of Litvak Jewry, notes that "Immediately upon their [immigrant Jews] arrival they were, thanks to their white skins, taken into the ruling section of the population. . . . One accepted the privileges 'with both hands' and one allowed oneself to be served by the Africans just as all other whites did."²³⁰

However, despite their immediate European descendancy, Jews had an element of foreignness about them that would become a prevailing feature in Afrikaner nationalist antisemitic rhetoric in the build up to the 1930s, and especially in the period of fervent antisemitism throughout the 1930s and 1940s. There were two elements to this: the first has been noted above, in that many of the Jews, especially the majority Litvak Jews, did not assimilate into the larger religious rhetoric of the leading political and social constituency of the European demographic of the country; this is itself reflective of a long historical tradition of Jewish cultural exclusivity that has been noted in earlier chapters. The second was that many of the Jews had a social, political and economic proclivity towards the English sector and its liberal/cosmopolitan ideological predisposition, and would thus be viewed by the larger Afrikaner demographic, especially those of the far right that espoused a strong nationalist sentiment — and whose social conduct was thus greatly informed and motivated by the supernaturalist, fundamentalist rhetoric towards geocentric socio-strategic importance and greater cultural and national independence studied in the previous chapter — as foreign conspirators of their historic and cultural nemesis. The nationalists would come to use this social predisposition to adapt old and generate new narratives that would justify hostility towards the larger Jewish community in order to either legitimate existing norms, values and ideologies that allowed for social ingroup cohesion; or otherwise to allow for social recategorisation and consolidation of social subgroup identities that would create a new social system in the country that would benefit Afrikaners excessively. Another feature of the Jewish community that would serve to engender social and economic circumstances that would alienate it even further from the Afrikaner political constituencies and the *volk* more generally, was the fact that the vast

²²⁹ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...?*, p. 6.

²³⁰ L. Feldman, *Yidden in Johannesburg*, Yiddish Cultural Federation, Pacific Press: South Africa, 1937, pp. 243–244.

majority of the Jews were settled in the urban areas. Since very early after the Union, there were more than ten times as many Jews in the urban sectors of South Africa as in the rural sectors (42,487 to 4,280 in 1930).²³¹ Jewish predominance in towns and cities, and the relative commercial and economic success of a great many of these urban Jews (the majority of which were part of the Anglo Jewish community), would come to be used against them in key political moments throughout the 20th century.

Ambivalence towards the Jews and Jewish immigration from the side of the Afrikaner had already become evident even before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, when, in objection to a certain clause in the proposed *Grondwet* (Constitution) of the New Boer Republics by then-president Paul Kruger that allowed for the legalisation of social, political and economic disabilities (such as being unable to participate in affairs in any of these spheres without the full range of social rights afforded to those that would come to be classified as Afrikaners) on any member of the Republics to not be a Protestant, Rabbi Joseph Hertz led a campaign that called for the exclusion of such a clause. Although this clause was by no means specifically antisemitic by nature, it obviously had a major implication on the larger South African Jewish community, as the clause meant that any person that was not Protestant could not stand for public office, and could not be inducted into state-sponsored and led educational institutions, and furthermore that any institution that was not purportedly Protestant, was not eligible for state subsidies.²³² In the end, when the draft Bill for the Constitution was submitted to the *Volksraad* (National Assembly) on 13 July 1899, it was apparent to everybody present that the clause had been omitted by president Kruger. However, even though the clause was not aimed at the Jews specifically, it became apparent in the ensuing debate that there was much vacillation towards the Afrikaner's opinion of Jews particularly. One member of the *Raad* notes vehemently that, if this immigration continued, the *volk* would find itself "governed by all those persons who were banished from their own land."²³³ This was very reflective of the growing "*Uitlander* agitation" among the larger Afrikaner constituencies.²³⁴

One point that is interesting to note at this specific point in South Africa's history leading up to the Anglo-Boer War, was the difference in opinion between the rural and the urban Jewish constituencies in South Africa, which would be especially consequential for their collective fate in the 1930s and 1940s. As has been noted in the previous chapter, the new social identity of the Afrikaner was rooted in its Calvinistic hermeneutical tradition, from which followed the political myth — that was collectively used to recategorise and consolidate a new Afrikaner social identity — that the Afrikaner was God's new chosen people, likened to the Jew as his old chosen people in the Old Testament, and that the Groot Trek was the Afrikaner's exodus from moral bondage and enslavement from an oppressive system, likened to the Hebrew exodus out of Egypt.²³⁵ What is curious to behold at this point is the Orientalist discourse inherent, not only in the way that

²³¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 31.01.1930.

²³² *House of Assembly Debates*, 10.02.1930, cols. 558 ff.

²³³ *Friend*, 31.01.1930.

²³⁴ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 62.

²³⁵ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 64.

the Jew was represented among the Afrikaner *volk*, but how the Jew, and a subtext of its history that was historically and narratively so immensely formative to his identity, was culturally reinterpreted in order to validate a specific narrative that established both the social, political and transcendental/cosmic preeminence of the Afrikaner, and his right to independence. Through the proliferation of this narrative²³⁶ through written and spoken language, it became clear that on the basis of culture and communal self-representation the Afrikaner saw the Jew as his cultural Other and civilisational contestant, as is the case with all European Oriental discourse. However, despite the fact that the Jew was seen as a familiar figure in the same discursive historical context through which the Afrikaner strove for self-determination and a cohesive and sovereign social identity, the need for positive ingroup reinforcement would soon take its place in the construction of concrete social difference between the Afrikaner and the Jew, by the Afrikaner, through the use of narrative and rhetoric that would establish the Afrikaner as culturally and civilisationally superior. This is evidently reflective of the Orientalism underpinning the relationship between the Afrikaner and the Jew, where the Jew is noticed, but through rituals of marginalisation is disposed of to the margins of Afrikaner society, only to be referred to and utilised where the difference (and inherent inferiority) of the Jew relative to the Afrikaner is relevant. The Afrikaner did truly see himself as a cultural successor of the Jew, thus allowing himself to become prejudiced to the same religio-mythological discourses that could be found in antisemitism for more than a millennium.

This was evident in the stark contrast between how the Jew was treated and represented in the rural *vis-a-vis* the urban sectors of South Africa during the time leading up to the Anglo-Boer War. In the words of Nehemia Dov Hoffmann, founder of the Jewish Press in South Africa,

*Generally the farmers of South Africa respect the Jew greatly and exalt him above all nations under the sun. The Jews are esteemed and admired; they are referred to as 'the chosen people', 'the most treasured of all people' ... The viper of anti-Semitism has not laid its poisonous eggs in this land .. for they and their sons and daughters are very fond of our brethren.*²³⁷

This is in reference to attitudes of rural Afrikaners in the late 19th century to mostly Eastern European Jews who were most represented in the rural communities²³⁸; they were seen favourably not only because they held an esteemed position in the Biblical cosmic nexus of which the Afrikaner was so fond, but also perhaps because they posed no immediate threat to the economic, social and political standing of the Afrikaner in South African rural society. However, this was not reflective of the mood of whites towards Jews in the urban areas, and since it had been established that rural Jewry made up less than a tenth of the overall Jewish population in the country leading up to the Anglo-Boer War, the general consensus among Afrikanerdom was that of a hostility towards the Jew.

²³⁶ Once again subject to the same structural linguistics and Derridean hauntological analysis.

²³⁷ *Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa*, Pro Ecclesia Press: Stellenbosch, 1932.

²³⁸ One such example is of Esrael Lazarus, an incredibly successful Jewish farmer of Litvak descent, who was referred to as the 'Mealie King'. Generally, Jews were very well assimilated into South African rural society, often referred to as the *Boerejode*. See M. J. Murray, 'Factories in the Fields: Capitalist Farming in the Bethal District', c. 1910-1950', in (ed.) A. Jeeves and J. Crush, *White Farms, Black Labour: The State and Agrarian Change in Southern Africa, 1910-1950*, University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1997.

An interesting thing to note on this subject is that — despite the fact that South African Jewry was for the most part politically sympathetic towards the liberal attitudes espoused by the British, and that in the 1890s the majority of the urban Jews were made of Anglo-Jews — antisemitism in urban South Africa came from the British. One J. H. Munnik (1894), a government employee, said of Jewish businessmen in the South African mines that they “have not the slightest sense of decency and morality in them and a more depraved race never existed.”²³⁹ Likewise, an extract from the *Johannesburg Times*, there is stated of Russian Jews:

*To the ordinary members of the public he represents the apparition of a slovenly, unkept and generally unwashed edition, in various members, of the Wandering Jew. As a sort of commercial shield he carries a basket of eggs on his right arm while holding his money tightly clenched in his sinister hand ... If some restraint is not imposed upon the operations of these unwashed peregrinators it will be necessary to consider some legislative means for the isolation of the species.*²⁴⁰

Antisemitism at this time was much more prolific among the English than the Afrikaner, even after the Anglo-Boer War, and it becomes apparent that the antisemitic language and sentiment that would become well versed in the Afrikaner far right closer to the 1930s would be strategic re-adaptations of the British antisemitic propaganda nearing the end of the 19th century. It was only when the Jews were starting to be noted for their prolific economic success after the Union — at exactly the same period when the poor white problem started to emerge and become a political campaign by the Afrikaner nationalists led by Hertzog and Malan in the 1920s — when antisemitism started to peep its ugly head among the Afrikaner nation. But as for the antisemitism among the English, it was apparent that the specific imagery, symbolism and general sentiment behind the stereotypes of Jews that made for the swift acculturation of antisemitism was very reflective of that antisemitism that could be found in Europe all throughout the 19th century.

Despite the radical absurdity of the social myths peddled by far right groups in the 19th century concerning the heretical, masonic and satanic character that attributed to Judaism and Jewish culture more generally, the antisemitic stereotype that has seemed to be the most robust, and perhaps the most burdensome, is that of the Jew as the arbiter epitome? of Capitalism, and thus the invisible hand behind a secret world order that controls every economic and political interest on the planet. As mentioned in a former chapter analysing the history of antisemitism, the stereotype had its roots in the immense scope of the Rothschild banking enterprise throughout Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the massive influence it exerted on policy in various European nations and Empires. But the peddling of such antisemitism linking the Jews with overall economic dominance can clearly be seen to have had its influence in South Africa.

The standard arguments in Europe since the 19th century that proliferated the narrative espousing Jewish hegemony over the larger European economy was the legacy of French Blanquism, and discursively formed part of a strong undercurrent that would culminate in a revolutionary attack on capitalism by socialism. Jews

²³⁹ M. De Saxe, (ed.) *The South African Jewish Yearbook*, South African Jewish Historical Society: Johannesburg, 1929, p. 41.

²⁴⁰ *Carnegie Commission ...*, pp. 115-116.

were blamed for Capitalism, and the common Socialist rhetoric (which was the standard dogmatic brand preferred by the nationalists) was that if Capitalism was to be overthrown, then the persecution and expulsion of Jews and Judaism was central to the larger revolutionary process. Despite the fact that the arguments made by the Blanquists and later socialists was indicative of a larger undertone vilifying and devaluing the legacy and influence of monotheism more generally (an argument that would be left redundant in a South Africa dominated by an Afrikaner political constituency extraordinarily vested in conservative Christianity), the national-socialism that would blossom nearing and into the 1930s would find much use for such an anti-Capitalist narrative, as well as its associative character to large-scale Judeophobia.

It should be noted that any analysis of English antisemitism in the Cape Colony between 1890 and 1910 was not the product of a revolutionary atmosphere espousing socialism, but of a mere peddling of stereotypes to incite hatred towards Jews who, in the urban sectors of the Colony, had become quite prolific in the economy, and posed strong competition towards English businesses and to a British monopoly in the Cape economy more generally. It would fare well for English businessmen if Jewish businesses would suffer due to general discontent based on Jewish ethnicity and stereotypes more generally. An extract from a letter by Zvi Meier Katz to *Hamelitz* newspaper in 1898 read

*With justice we may conclude that the anti-Semitism which has found a nest for itself in the English newspapers of the Transvaal more than those of the rest of South Africa, results from the intense competition between the Jews befriended by the burger citizens, and the enterprising and clever Englishmen.*²⁴¹

However, the motivation for this antisemitism was transparent, and could (and would) be easily blown over in the time leading up to the Anglo-Boer War. For instance, in an extract from *The Jewish Chronicle* in 1898, in a segment titled ‘Anglo-Jewish Association Report’, while commenting on correspondence and influence of Jewish organisations, the report reads: “and wherever it exerted its influence, it has been backed by the power and prestige of Great Britain.”²⁴² It goes to show then that, for the most part, Jews sided with the British on almost all matters of policy. And despite minor exceptions in selected media outlets at the time, there is much evidence to suggest that antisemitism nearing the end of the 19th century was not an immense occurrence in South Africa. For instance, in the same *The Jewish Chronicle* article of 1898, antisemitism is commented on in various parts of the world, including Algiers and Galicia²⁴³, but nowhere in the whole of the *Chronicler* of that year is there any mention of excessive antisemitism in South Africa. By looking at an extract from a *Chronicler* article from 1899 that reads

²⁴¹ In G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 67. However, for more on the antisemitism in the Cape Colony during and directly after the Anglo-Boer War, see M. Shain, *The Jewish Population and Politics in the Cape Colony 1898-1910*, unpublished M. A. Dissertation, University of South Africa: South Africa, 1987.

²⁴² *The Jewish Chronicle*, 01.07.1898.

²⁴³ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 15.07.1898.

*It is regrettable to note that there are a few Jews — fortunately very few — who have joined the Boer forces and gone to protect the frontiers of the Transvaal. They are people who do no credit to our race and religion ... How Jews have any right other than to uphold the cause of England in these matters passes my comprehension.*²⁴⁴

It can be noted that, despite the (continued) presence of English antisemitism in South Africa, the fact of it was a mere phase, and the only real danger it posed was that of it providing body and voice to the much more radical Jewish hate that could be seen three decades later among the Afrikaner nationalists.

During the Anglo-Boer War itself, there did prove to be some measure of support for the Boer from Jews, but as mentioned before, the Jews who sympathised with the Boer and fought for his cause against the Empire were almost predominantly from the *Litvak* Jewish descendants, and far more Jews fought on the side of the British. In the end, it did well for the South African Jewish community that the British had won. The British High Commissioner, Lord Milner, with the newfound control of the Transvaal region, immediately removed all the previous civil and political disabilities instilled discrimination imposed by the former Transvaal Boer government (as mentioned earlier in this chapter), and reprimanded all forms of discrimination against the Jew, stating that “the principles which I have indicated are part of a long-settled policy universal throughout the Empire, from which no British government would think of departing.”²⁴⁵ Following this public statement, Milner’s attendance at the inaugural session of the *Jewish Board of Deputies* in 1903 provided great weight to both the overall validity of the representative body, as well as its support by the British Empire more generally. Touching on both his presence at the inauguration and his remarks in support of the South African Jewish Community, the *Chronicler* commented

*His Excellency has once more shown his complete sympathy with our race and perhaps our peculiarities. The High Commissioner’s attitude on Jewish questions, be they political, racial, or moral, has, on several occasions, been commented on by your representative and described as being one of absolute fairness, just statesmanship, and completely in accordance with well-known British traditions.*²⁴⁶

Milner is further in the article recorded as having said in his speech

*This great community has its own religion; it has its own race traditions and race loyalty. There is absolutely nothing incompatible in this with the most thorough-going British patriotism. All of us who come from the Old Country have known many Jews, clinging with intense devotion to their own race and religion, are as patriotic and as public-spirited citizens as you can find anywhere in the world.*²⁴⁷

This crucially afforded a guarantee for Jews that their civil, economic and political rights would be both afforded and respected by the British after the war, and similarly after the Union. The reality of this is

²⁴⁴ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 03.11.1899.

²⁴⁵ G. Saron, ‘Jewish Immigration, 1880-1913’, (ed.) G. Saron and L. Hotz, *The Jews in South Africa: A History*, Oxford University Press: London, 1955, p. 91.

²⁴⁶ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 08.28.1903.

²⁴⁷ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 08.28.1903.

reflected in the fact that between 1902 and 1910, there was an immense growth in Jewish representation in official governmental offices, almost all of them favouring the centrist, cosmopolitan stance espoused by the British liberal ideological tradition, particularly the Labour Party.²⁴⁸ In the first Union Parliament of 1910, there were five Jews elected, being Emile Nathan, Morris Alexander, Lionel Phillips, Sir. David Harris and C. P. Robinson.²⁴⁹

Following the Union, there seemed to be a measured temperament of conciliation between the Afrikaner and English political constituencies. Shimoni notes that, after the increased centrist pattern evident in the political stratification of post-Union South Africa, Jewish sympathies with Afrikaner affiliated organisations and parties grew as well. This essentially led to the establishment of the South African National Party, which in the build up to its establishment, was agreed would jointly be led by J. C. Smuts, L. Botha and J. B. M. Hertzog. The agenda behind the establishment of this party could easily be summarised in the words of Smuts himself when he said that the “whole meaning of Union in South Africa was: we are going to create a nation — a nation that will be of a composite character, including Dutch, German, English and Jew, and whatever White nationality seeks refuge in this land.”²⁵⁰ This liberal and cosmopolitan outlook would come to nominally provide much relief for the South African Jewish Community. However, Hertzog purportedly had reservations concerning the exact agenda of the new Party, and insisted that the Afrikaner’s cultural interests be better represented. This was reflective of a larger Afrikaner concern at the time that the increased Anglicisation of South Africa after the war would result in the slow erosion of the independent spirit of Afrikaner national identity that had been forefront in the mind of every Afrikaner only a decade earlier. The net result was a breakaway between Botha and Smuts and Hertzog, and in 1914, Hertzog established a nominally exclusively Afrikaner Party existent of strong (and often radical) republican-nationalist sentiments that would culminate into the hyper-exclusivist, far right faction of the Purified National Party apparent in the 1930s.²⁵¹

Although Smuts lost the 1920 national election to the Nationalists, he thereafter promptly absorbed the Unionists and a segment of the Independents into his South African Party, and after calling for a general reelection in 1921, won the election and sported a 22-seat majority in Parliament. The sudden surge in Jewish support for the South African party after the split of the National Party in 1914 meant that a large part of Smut's 1921 victory was due to the Jewish support he had garnered. Concerning the reelection in 1921, the *Chronicler* notes that “We have hitherto taken up the attitude that the Jew *qua* Jew is not entitled to be dragged into any particular political enclosure, but the question which is to be decided is one of more than ordinary political movement.”²⁵² Also in the *Chronicler* — apart from vigorously scrutinising the exclusivist and nationalist policies of the National Party — there were various segments substantiating the immense

²⁴⁸ In G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 70.

²⁴⁹ S. A. Rochlin, *Political Notebook*, 1902-1910.

²⁵⁰ W. K. Hancock, *Smuts. I, The Sanguine Years 1870-1919*, Cambridge University Press: London, 1963, p. 361.

²⁵¹ For more on Hertzog’s political character and the establishment of the National Party, see C. M. Van Den Heever, *General J. B. M. Hertzog*, *ibid*.

²⁵² *The Jewish Chronicle*, 04.02.1921.

debt of the Jews to Smuts and the particular alignment of his policies, specifically noting the fact that he had been one of the original members who participated in the drafting of the Balfour Declaration of 1917.²⁵³ Benzion Hersch, one of the most influential Zionists in South Africa, advocated the support for Smuts and his Party by stating that it was the Jew's foremost interest in any Diaspora he found himself in to assure the equality of the rights of the Jew in the Constitution of that nation.²⁵⁴ In the prominent Jewish Newspaper *Der Afrikaner*, Chaim Weizmann praised Smuts for playing such an immense role in the hopes and the ambitions of the Zionist movement.²⁵⁵ However, despite the general welfare of the Jews under the new reigning centrist, liberal government of the early 1920s, this was also the time when a suggestive undercurrent of antisemitism started to take hold in the new nation — an antisemitism that had its subtle roots in the attitudes of a growing niche of the nationalist-inclined Afrikaner constituency after Union.

One particular avenue of policy that seemed to leech itself onto the Union, and perhaps one of the principal ones which potentially threatened the integration of the Jew into the Union, was that of immigration. Not only was the Union dominated by those of the White/European race, which implied the exclusion of anyone who did not fall under that particular category, but there were ongoing debates of how to exclude anyone who was deemed as undesirable, even if white and by any margin of the definition, European, in the fledgling nation. The Union was a reference to the political and social amalgamation between the British and the Afrikaner, and although Milner's assurance of Jewish civil and political rights under new British government at the time was a temporary relief for the South African Jewish community, this surety did not seem to translate well after the Union when Afrikaner nationalism started to gain traction in the country's political scene. The English and Afrikaner core groups would invariably strive towards political hegemony after the Union, each to see their respective vision of a new South Africa realised. The Jews, while officially being recognised as white and European, were seen to pose a threat to this political hegemony by various constituencies of the two core groups, since the majority of them ('they' referring to Jewish immigrants, and in other words persons who could not speak the native language of the Union and thus participate sufficiently in society to such an extent that they may be considered beneficial and conducive to nation building) were strictly speaking neither English or Afrikaans.

Just after the Union in 1911, legislation that was aimed at strictly preventing Indian immigration into South Africa inadvertently had the effect of stifling Jewish immigration into the Union as well. This was protested by the Jewish Board of Deputies, particularly by Cape Town Jewish editor David Goldblatt, and newly appointed Parliament member Alexander Morris; by the former for being arbitrary and negligible²⁵⁶; and the latter proposing that the bases by which eligibility for immigration would be decided, which was at the time a language proficiency test, should make Yiddish (which had very recently been made an official European

²⁵³ *The Jewish Chronicle*, 11.02.1921.

²⁵⁴ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 74.

²⁵⁵ *Der Afrikaner*, 21.01.1921.

²⁵⁶ D. Goldblatt, *The New Immigration Act: Some Criticisms*, Jewish Advocate Office: Cape Town.

language in the Union) an official language by which an applicant's eligibility should be measured.²⁵⁷ These terms were conceded to in 1913, and the final document that was passed by Parliament was the Immigrants Regulation Act, No. 22. This was perceived as a great success for the South African Jewish community, and a testament to the fact of the integration of the Jews in South African society and the official recognition of their cultural and social institutions. But for the most part, the scope of Jewish politics was nominally restricted to intra-White politics at this time. The concern of the Jewish representative bodies and political representatives were, thus, with Jewish integration into the dominant class of the Union, and with assuring that no potentiality for antisemitic discrimination would arise and threaten the Jew's place in the South African Diaspora. For all those official parties involved, it would seem that this larger initiative would translate into the fight of the Jewish community against a constant onslaught of immigration policy, which by the 1930s, was becoming increasingly and explicitly aimed at the Jews as a collective social and political unit.

Two events that started this subtle onslaught against Jewish inclusion and immigration into South Africa predominantly by the Nationalists could be said to have been the 1924 national elections and the Rand Rebellion. By a savvy reorientation of political affiliations related to the Rand Rebellion in 1922, Hertzog managed to form an election pact with the Labour Party in a brief period of disgruntlement with Smuts and his South African Party, and consequently managed to emerge the victor in the 1924 national elections. It was at this point when the Nationalists were the dominant political constituency in South Africa, and there was an atmosphere of relative disgruntlement for Smuts and the South African party, when Afrikaner nationalism gained traction and started to become increasingly entrenched in the South African political scene.²⁵⁸ It was also around the time following the Rand Rebellion when the leadership of the various major Jewish representative bodies became shockingly aware of a subversive narrative that had done its rounds among the White constituency of the Transvaal that it was 'Bolshevist Jews' who were behind the Rebellion. The majority of Jewish immigrants at this time were Russian and East European Jews, and they had well-noted involvement in the radical wing of South Africa's Labour politics, including bouts with the newly established South African Communist Party, which was founded in 1921. The association's made between some Jews and their socialist sympathies led to a larger suspicion, reflected in a police report from 1922 following the Rebellion, that the Bolshevik agitators arrived in South Africa as Russian Jewish immigrants.²⁵⁹ This led to a bout of intense media coverage blaming the Jews for revolt and social descent in the country (and all the deaths associated with the event), the referring to the country's Jewry (and especially those of Litvak and further Baltic stock) as Anarchists.²⁶⁰ The consequence of this was that there was a special enactment of clause 4(1)(a) of the 1913 Immigration Law, allowing the exclusion of any immigration application on 'economic grounds'. The idea, however fabricated, that Jewish immigrants were communists and a threat to the social fabric of the South African Union was enough to legitimate the prohibition of Jewish immigrants into the country. And although the Jews did up not this point enjoy their civil rights which

²⁵⁷ E. Alexander, *Morris Alexander*, Juta: Johannesburg, 1953, pp. 66, 67.

²⁵⁸ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 86.

²⁵⁹ B. D., *Report of Executive*, August 1921 to May 1923, p. 13.

²⁶⁰ See *Cape Times*, 18.03.1922.

entrenched their position in South African society as equals of both the British and the Afrikaner, there was a clause in administrative matters for entering immigrants in 1913 that explicitly distinguished between European and Hebrews.²⁶¹ Although this had no effect on the differentiation of civil and political rights of Jews at the time, it did distinguish them when the clause in the Immigration Act made it near impossible to gain entry into South Africa if you were a Jewish immigrant at the time.

This was a concise attempt by the government of the time to stifle public dissatisfaction due to the Rebellion and garner sympathy from a disgruntled public, and more importantly, from the constituencies whose votes they would want to retain in the upcoming elections (which, as we know, would ironically, but perhaps not surprisingly, be lost to Hertzog and the Nationalists).²⁶² This Bolshevik myth was, however, a major threat to social and political welfare of the whole of the South African Jewish community, as well as imposing unnecessary and unfair hardships on incoming immigrants who had left their European homes due to similar injustices of discrimination and social, economic and political intolerance; this narrative and its accompanying legislation was consequently fought tirelessly by the Jewish Board of Deputies, and in turn by Morris Alexander in Parliament.²⁶³

However, despite the fact that the Jews did face a measure of discrimination on these legislative grounds, it did become apparent that their vote in elections were of some consequence. One instance where this becomes was obvious was in various instances before elections in the 1920s. Leading up to the 1924 elections, the government placed a six-month suspension on the clause used to mitigate Jewish immigration into the country, in hopes of garnering sympathy and accumulating much needed votes. Even from the side of the Nationalist Party, outspoken sympathies towards the Jew and their cause for social integration without any discrimination had become a well-versed campaign strategy since 1920. The particular initiator of this spectacle was Tielman Roos, who was known as an ardent opponent of antisemitism, and issued various public statements condemning any sort of discrimination against Jews “by reason of their religious faith or on account of their country or race of origin.”²⁶⁴ In addition, he issued statements in the Jewish press appealing for the essential similarities between the Afrikaner and the Jew, skilfully weaving into his arguments religious rhetoric that appealed to the well-known supernaturalist component that was the key to the tightly knit fabric of Jewish culture, saying that the Afrikaner and the Jew were both in principle the same since they both strived for cultural independence and national self-determination, and that the Jewish nation was throughout history the cultural exemplar of the very Nationalist mission that the Afrikaner — and therefore the National Party — would strive towards. The narrative was, thus, one of an appeal towards kinship, and not one of separatism.²⁶⁵ There is little evidence to indicate that the Jews were swayed much by

²⁶¹ Part of the Passenger Declaration of Form D.I.10 of the Immigration Department, question 5(b), following question 5(a), which was a declaration of Nationality.

²⁶² See E. Bradlow, ‘Immigration into the Union 1910-1948: Policies and Attitudes’, Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Cape Town: Cape Town, where she cited a letter by then Minister of the Interior Patrick Duncan to one Lady Selborne (20.04.1922), pp. 204-205.

²⁶³ See B. D., *Minute Book, Special Meeting of Executive Council*, 20.03.1922.

²⁶⁴ S. A. Rochlin, ‘The Jews and the Early Nationalists’, *Jewish Times*, 04.02.1949.

²⁶⁵ See *Jewish Chronicle*, 05.03.1920.

these expressions from the Nationalists; what little evidence there is of Jewish contributions to the outcome of the 1924 elections was that the Labour Party, who would form the electoral alliance with the National Party, had Jewish sympathisers. There were exceptions, for there was evidence that in the Fordsburg constituency, most of the Jewish votes went to Nationalist candidate J. S. Pretorius instead of the Jewish SAP candidate Sir. Harry Graumann, who had released a public statement in the *Chronicler* after his defeat stating his regrets that many of those who voted against him were his ‘coreligionists’.²⁶⁶

However, Jewish suspicions of the Nationalists would be somewhat misplaced for the remainder of the 1920s. It seemed as though the National Party, after its victory of 1924, would keep true to their former promises of safeguarding the Jewish community and their rightful place in South Africa. The new Minister of the Interior, D. F. Malan, would hold fast his Party’s former pledge by stating that he had no intention of retracting his Party’s former decision that the clause of Section 4 of the Immigrants Regulations Act of 1913 was not at all applicable to European immigrants. Consequently, and most probably much to the relief of the South African Jewish community at the time, Jewish immigration figures rose since the Nationalists took power in 1924, and leading up to the 1929 elections, there was much need of Jewish support for the Nationalist Party, as was evident in the fact that Morris Alexander — political champion of the Jews and unofficially their representative in Parliament — strongly suggested the Jews to vote in the favour of the Nationalists, who had proven to be supporters of the Jewish causes of immigration and naturalisation. Regardless of these relatively minor political reorientations present in the 1920s, the vast majority of Jewish support remained on the side of the South African Party, who still retained an element of strong political dominance, despite the setbacks of the events of 1922. However, the turn of the decade posed an immense watershed period for the Jews and their social constitution in South Africa.

The rise of antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948

The rise of radical antisemitism in South Africa came in the form of the 1930 Quota Act. Leading up to this point, it is important to note the political tenacity of the National Party, and as a crucial side note, the role of one particular figure — Oswald Pirow — in what was to become hostile antisemitic sentiment in the country.

Despite the reputation that the National Party had built for itself concerning its apparent support for Jewish immigration and Jewish welfare in the country, nearing the 1929 national elections, the Nationalists had near-unilateral agreement that something definitive had to be done about the growing influx of Eastern European Jews into the country. At the National Party’s Orange Free State congress, it was decided that a quota upon Jewish immigration was the best proposed option to deal with the problem.²⁶⁷ Some of this had leaked to the country’s Jewish leadership, and to mitigate the issue, the Nationalist leaders dispatched one of their rising stars — Oswald Pirow — to attempt and assuage a particular Jewish constituency in Bethal that the National Party had no plans of prohibiting Jewish immigration if they were to be voted to power. Oswald Pirow, a talented orator and tenacious politician, would be the replacement for Tielman Roos as Minister of Justice under a new pact government. Pirow did much to assure the Jews in Bethal that the Roos-policy of

²⁶⁶ *Jewish Chronicler*, 20.06.1924.

²⁶⁷ *Cape Times*, 21.10.1929.

opposition to antisemitism and support for Jewish integration would remain intact, and that it was indeed the South African Party which was the enemy of the Jews. And indeed, for the most part the Jews did seem to be aware that Jewish immigration did not seem to be under any particular threat for the time being. An extract from the *South African Jewish Chronicle* read: “We have no doubt that Pirow’s assurance will set at rest the minds of many Jews who were becoming anxious lest propaganda and agitation should drive the Government to discriminate against their race.”²⁶⁸

But Pirow’s efforts were of no avail for two reasons — firstly, because the South African Party had won the Bethal by-election; and secondly, because on 29 January 1930, Minister of the Interior, D. F. Malan introduced to the nation the Quota Act, which greatly prohibited Jewish immigration on the basis that it allowed only 50 immigrants per year from a list of ‘quota’ countries (which not-so-coincidentally included a large host of Baltic states that were the centres of Eastern European Jewish emigration). As much of a shock as this might have come to many Jews, the policy was not wholly controversial. The English would be satisfied with the Bill because stunted immigration would allow for less competition with Jews in the economic sector. And the Afrikaners — referring to those who were in support of the nationalist sentiments espoused by the ruling Party — were in near unilateral support of the Bill, since it solved a cultural agitation which had been brooding since the Groot Trek.

As has been explained in the previous chapter, there has been an exponentially conflated religiously inspired race-consciousness in South Africa, which was the very same race consciousness which jolted the *trekboere* into migration into the interior in the early 19th century. This race discourse was fixated on the idea of *bloedsuiwering* (blood purity) — no doubt a discourse sourced from the Spanish racism in the late-14th and early-15th centuries, where Jews were expelled and massacred on the basis of *mala sangre*, where Jewish (actually referring to Oriental, including Muslims in this particular context) blood was seen as inferior, evil and to be expelled — if not destroyed — by Christian authorities, for the purpose of creating an enclosed Christian society built on a primary principle of *limpieza de sangre*, or blood purity.²⁶⁹ While actual evidence is lacking that fundamentalist discourses of *bloedsuiwering* and *limpieza de sangre* are directly linked, it is clear that the rhetoric of not allowing inbreeding between two race-classes and its legitimation through supernaturalist, Christian rhetoric has its genesis in the time of the Spanish Inquisition, and is wholly motivated by religio-mythological, early Orientalist superstitions that those of Oriental (or non-Occidental) genes are naturally inferior to those Occidental genes they seek to protect — a narrative that is all too familiar to anyone accustomed to South African white supremacy. The discourse at the time took the form of fears of miscegenation, and was prevalent among eugenicists and white supremacists, who were famously over-represented in the Nationalist party.²⁷⁰ It ought also to be noted that this particular fear of miscegenation and the contamination of ‘superior’ genes with that of ‘inferior’ genes based on arbitrary and obscurantist

²⁶⁸ S. A. *Jewish Chronicle*, 24.01.1930.

²⁶⁹ See chapter on the history of antisemitism prior for more history and sources on the matter.

²⁷⁰ For more on this, see S. Dubow, ‘Race, Civilisation and Culture: The Elaboration of Segregationist Discourse in the Inter-war years, In (ed.) S. Marks and S. Trapido, *The Politics of Class, Race and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa*, Longman: London, 1987.

rationalisations of race and ethnicity reflects the binary and hierarchical characterisation of the language of Orientalism examined earlier.

The immense influence of the Aryan-Semite rhetoric of Ernst Renan, and its ensuing discourse of domination that led to the logic and reason behind antisemitism in 1930s and 1940s Germany, is clearly reflected in the eugenics and *bloedsuiwering* dogmas among the white supremacists in the Afrikaner nationalist constituency. Although this specific fear of miscegenation and its supposed consequence of moral degeneracy was aimed primarily at indigenous Africans, the same sentiment can also be seen to have crept into rhetoric on immigration policy, which would have no doubt been seminal (if subtle) in the eventual Quota Act observed above. An example of this is an article written in the *Star* newspaper in 1925, when it was reflected that immigration of Eastern European individuals would be counterproductive to the effort of the nationalists to preserve Afrikaner cultural hegemony in the country, and that it would be far more productive and intuitive to allow for and promote the immigration of Nordic immigrants.²⁷¹ In the light of agitation concerning the Jewish question that have been noted in social phenomena such as the unfounded rumours that the Rand Revolt was the fault of Bolshevik Jews as seen above, there is little cause for doubt that sentiments expressed concerning anti-immigration was aimed at the Jews, and more specifically, at cultural and racial preservation of Afrikaners against Jews. But the binary and hierarchical classification of races and the effects it might have on the cultural and natural superiority of any one specific social group, and the institutionalised and regulated character it obviously possessed in order to promote social cohesion through social recategorisation, is obviously endemic to that ‘scientific’ Aryan-Semitic discourse of Renan observed in previous chapters, and that Afrikaner nationalism reflects extremely strong remnants of Orientalism concerning its relation with and navigation of the Jewish question. It should thus be clear that the theory used in this study thus far illuminates the universal characteristics of various subcultures that are the effect of social phenomena that seem to be inherent to all human interaction based on the primal structural constitution of language. It was after this moment in South African history that one would observe a sudden spike in social and institutional antisemitism throughout the country. The Quota Act would thus prove to be quite consequential in the cultural history of the country, and would see the radicalisation of social recategorisation and subgroup identity consolidation in the social-identitarian nexus of the country, not only among the Afrikaner — and especially the far-right movement of the Afrikaner nationalists — but also among the Jews in South Africa, which will be dealt with further into the study.

As has been observed, there was never a shortage of outright antisemitism or general Judeophobia in the country, but what seems a definitive fact, however, is that by 1930 there was an obvious upsurge in the scope and the intensity of antisemitism. There are several events that state this case quite clearly. One definitive case is that of the vandalism of a synagogue in Brandfort in 1930.²⁷² In an article commenting on Union Day celebrations of the same year, the changing mood in the inclusion of Jews into the new post-Union South Africa is noted with apt dismay:

²⁷¹ *The Star*, 17.10.1925.

²⁷² *Cape Times*, 24.02.1930.

The significance of Union Day for the Jew in his more personal relations, is somewhat less glorious. With the nurturing of the national consciousness of South Africa, there has arisen an anti-Jewish feeling that was unknown, or, at any rate, unnoticed, before. We well remember the days before 1910, when the Dutch-speaking people of the farms and the villages were on the friendliest terms with the Jews; when we were to some extent regarded as 'die uitverkorende volk'²⁷³ ... It was perhaps inevitable that, with the growth of national feeling, these sentiments should change.²⁷⁴

In another instance of the same year, the *S.A. Jewish Chronicle* notes the attack of one Marais of Maraisburg at The Annual Congress of the Nationalist Party, held at Somerset East, on South African Party representative of the Ladysmith Division in the Cape Provincial Council (and well-known Jew) Joel Mann, recorded in the *Cape Argus*, as saying

Mr. Marais, of Maraisburg, referring to the Ladysmith Provincial result, said that it was due to the fact of the successful was strong financially in the district. They should prevent Uitlanders from working the original Afrikaner population out of their property in an insidious manner. Effective propaganda in that direction should be made in the press and elsewhere.²⁷⁵

Perhaps most insidious was the circulation of highly superstitious and completely unfounded conspiracies to be found in antisemitic literature sold at bookstores in Cape Town; one particular piece mentioned to the Board was the Protocol of the Elders of Zion, which suggested that the “Jews were plotting to destroy the Christian world.”²⁷⁶ These ridiculous notions harken back to the apocalyptic sentiments expressed in the antisemitism of the Middle Ages analysed in a previous chapter, where the existential fears of Christians concerning the fate of the universe and Christianity is triggered through rumours espousing that that which is culturally Other (and perceived to fall conveniently outside the parameters of truth and moral correctness constructed by the original social group) poses a threat to the very social and moral fabric of the particular ingroup, thus legitimating (if not on a political-institutional level, then at least on a moral level) the expulsion of the outgroup and their norms and values from the social, and geographic, setting in which the original ingroup has laid claim.

By using SIT, one can easily see that, concerning the socio-psychological processes present in this historical setting, that the 1930s was a time when leaders of recategorisation attempts of the Afrikaner social group downplayed ethnic, racial and even national similarities between them and the Other in question — the Jews more generally — and overemphasised social differences between them and the Other in order to redraw social boundaries so as to recast and reanimate the hierarchical configuration of the larger superordinate identity, which is to say, South Africa as a nation. And in studying this history, it becomes very clear these leaders of recategorisation attempts were Malan and Louw in the centrist section of the Afrikaner political

²⁷³ This likewise reflects the sentiments observed by Afrikaners earlier in this chapter of their general mood towards Jews in the 1890s.

²⁷⁴ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 30.05.1930.

²⁷⁵ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 10.10.1930.

²⁷⁶ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm: Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948*, Jonathan Bill Publishers: Cape Town, 2015, p. 21. For the actual report on the circulation of the literature, see South African Jewish Board of Deputies, *Executive Committee Minutes*, 19.05.1930.

spectrum, and as will be elaborated on later, figures such as Hans van Rensburg, Oswald Pirow and Louis Weichardt on the far right. Such ridiculous apocalyptic notions might represent the extremes of the arsenal of narratives that were used to legitimate antisemitism so as to create social conditions of alterity, which in turn made the redrawing of social boundaries for social recategorisation possible, but it is often the case that the extremes represent the limited yet very real condition of the general constitution of a shared sentiment among a group. People entertained and believed ridiculous notions of social differentiation because they had a shared sentiment and were present within larger discursive conditions that animated a collective psyche that would and could believe be believed, because it presupposed social privilege and the sustenance of an existing social hierarchy of dominance. In hauntological terms, the visible and apparent racism and hostility of a group towards another is indicative of the invisible and silent fears of the invalidity and inconsequentiality of group membership, and the beliefs that animate the behaviour that predetermines this membership, of a group that is itself validated by a self-perceived moral or cosmic superiority.

The more moderate Malan himself did not entertain or endorse any of the most outlandish conspiracies present in the extremities of Afrikaner nationalism, but he did share certain racial reservations that were aimed expressly at the Jews. In popular Afrikaner news outlet *Die Burger* (1931), Malan blamed the Jews for backing the independent Willem Petrus Steenkamp in a political initiative to sabotage the electoral and executive success of the National Party in the northwestern Cape Province as a way to get revenge for the Quota Act. Demographic figures and actual evidence do not back any of these accusations, but regardless, it is clear that Malan was intent on Othering the Jewish community and casting them as a threat to the Afrikaner and the *volk* in general. While appearing to be temperate concerning the issue, certainly absolving himself from any accusation of antisemitism by time after time stating that his concerns of Jews in the country were demographic and economic, and not racial in any way, he did still state that “it is easy to rouse a feeling of hate towards the Jews in this country.”

And the climate concerning the issue of the Jewish question did appear to remain moderate and temperate for the remainder of the year. However, this general reserved optimism would melt into despondency a year later — especially after the effects of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the ensuing global depression, coupled with one of the worst drought’s the country had faced since its European occupation — when the National Party was forced to follow the example of the Empire and take South Africa off of the gold standard, a decision crucially influenced by the resurgence of former Minister of Justice, and notorious friend to the Jews, Tielman Roos into the country’s political scene in December 1932. This event was rather significant for two reasons that would again see the reissuing of old antisemitic tropes and stereotypes prevalent in 19th century Europe. On the one hand, the Jew had already had a reputation of economic fruition success in the country — whatever the actual accuracy of such generalised allegations, Jews were thought to be after economic hegemony through international conspiratorial fiscal practices. The Jew’s general political association with the British, and Britain’s original decision to abandon the gold standard, made it a plausible and at least logical assumption that the Jew’s conspired with the former occupiers of the Colony and historical oppressors and cultural contestants of the Afrikaner for control over the country by manipulating the international economy so as to weaken the National Party, and therefore the Afrikaner. Shain notes an

already-existing, deep-seated antipathy of the Afrikaner towards the international financial system²⁷⁷, and concerning the established climate of anti-British sentiment, as well as the growing climate of antisemitic sentiment, such a decision — especially in light of the raging poor white problem still championed as a cause by the National Party, and the fact that the British were still overwhelmingly dominant economically — this gave much cause to cast the figure of the ‘money-mongering’ Jew to the forefront of national news about the economy, and could be used as a considerably forceful means of political opportunism. An anti-capitalist sentiment in the country would only provide deeper means for the development of antisemitism, a link that has deep roots in European intelligentsia in the 19th century, as has been observed in detail in a previous chapter, by thinkers such as Karl Marx, among many others.

In any case, the economic crisis would create a political one, where disaffected and disenfranchised members of Afrikaner society would turn against the new (imperial and capitalistically sympathetic) pact-government proposed by Smuts and Hertzog; the anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism of the day would provide means for a reorientation of South Africa’s political system, and the radicalised atmosphere and desperation for conditions that would foster the needs and cultural interests of the Afrikaner, and the Afrikaner alone, would be taken by Malan in creating a new party that held above all the republican, nationalist, *völkisch* sentiment increasingly prevalent among the Afrikaner *volk*. What made this changing political atmosphere exponentially more alarming was the fact that it was at this specific moment in history that marked Hitler’s radical ascendancy to power in Germany.

It is appropriate to provide an overview of the specific ideological climate in South Africa at the time, so as to understand the social and social-psychological conditions that not only made antisemitism possible, but also preferable among those of the far-right constituency of the country.

Radical nationalism and radical antisemitism: the radicalisation of Rituals of Marginalisation

It has now been explained that there has indeed been an increasingly radical and fundamentalist campaign to form and develop a new Afrikaner social identity, its formative principles and features of social differentiation being based expressly on language and ecclesiastical and hermeneutical tradition. What ought now to be analysed is how this political and cultural campaign, especially concerning the general rhetoric and specific narratives that conceptualised and validated it, that gave it drive and scope, was also that which created a social and cultural atmosphere ripe for the inculcation and proliferation of radical antisemitism.

There is an important element of ideological interchange between the Afrikaner and the Eastern and Central European subcontinent that bore its mark on the very character of radical antisemitism in the early 1930s South Africa. This interchange can be traced in how an exponentially growing global antisemitism was monitored by the Jewish leadership and press in the country, noting especially how this new international wave of antisemitism and anti-Jewish sentiment fed into the social and political atmosphere of South Africa,

²⁷⁷ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 28.

and gradually animated the collective psyche (to various degrees, but definitively nonetheless) of the Afrikaner *volk*. Throughout the early 1930s, various Jewish publications throughout South Africa noted a definitive upsurge in antisemitism across the globe, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, which was steadily forming an obvious pattern of cross-national and subcontinental fraternisation against Judaism more generally, seemingly unilaterally threatening the welfare and cultural subsistence of Jews across two continents.

In January 1930, the *S. A. Jewish Chronicle* mentioned in an article analysing antisemitism in Romania the words of then-retiring President of the United Roumanian Jews of America, Mr. Bennet E. Siegelstein, where, concerning the severity of the situation, said “Anti-Semitism ... is general throughout the country”²⁷⁸, and likewise noted recent violent anti-Jewish outbreaks in the country. In another article of the same day, antisemitism in Hungary — at the hand of one Admiral Horthy, the leader of the Fascist Government in the country — was noted, and how “fascist students are by violence preventing Jews attending the universities.”²⁷⁹ In addition to the case in Hungary, there existed an odd occurrence of national forced conversions of Jews towards Christianity if they were to seek employment within the state, which harkens back almost half a millennium to the phenomenon of *conversos* during the Spanish Inquisition, where Jews were forced to convert to Christianity in order to retain their material subsistence within Spain; the failure of which led to the *mala sangre* and *limpieza de sangre* narratives that themselves — as discussed above — also had their transcultural equivalents in both Central Europe and South Africa during this time.

In another article of the same journal one week later, exposing a vein of antisemitic rhetoric that stretches back to the late-Middle Ages as well,²⁸⁰ the controversies of one Professor Alexandru C. Cuza, an academic, cult leader and founder of the Roumanian anti-Semitic Movement and Christian Student’s Federation, is noted with grave concern by the South African Jewish Press. Cuza is said to have proclaimed himself the thirteenth apostle and the only true teacher of the ‘real’ Gospel and claimed that antisemitism is a movement ordained by God, and in truth and destiny equivalent to Evangelism. Cuza’s stated mission was the “extermination of the Jewish peril”, and in articles written by himself, he stated that Judaism was “criminal and perverse”, “the Satanic religion of hatred”, and that the Jewish-authored Old Testament was “all inspired by the Devil”, and stated that Jesus had himself said that the Jews were in spiritual fraternisation with the Devil.²⁸¹ This specific event harkens back to the apocalyptic narrative of Jews being associated, both symbolically and spiritually, with the Antichrist, and were themselves responsible for all evil in the world, and were arbiters of the end of the world and the death of Christianity — narratives carried by tropes endorsed by such spiritual inquisitors and leaders as Tomás de Torquemada and Martin Luther.²⁸² Evidence shows that such supernaturalist conspiracy gained little traction, but the fact is that they are representative (as

²⁷⁸ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 13.01.1930.

²⁷⁹ *ibid.*

²⁸⁰ See chapter on the history on antisemitism for more.

²⁸¹ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 07.02.1930.

²⁸² See chapter on the history on antisemitism for more.

mentioned earlier) of larger seismic shifts in the social conditions across Europe, based in deep-seated hatred that itself had its roots in discourses of alterity for thousands of years.

Apart from reporting on radical events that are products of obscurantist, religio-mythological discourses very familiar to the whole of global Jewry, the Jewish press and leadership in South Africa likewise noted the political and systemic shifts that effected, not so much the cultural-symbolic image of the Jew in European society, but the very material subsistence of Jews across the continent — those events that would ultimately motivate cases of mass integration into South Africa. One of the earliest scares expressed by the Jewish press of potential disaster in Germany was that of 7 February 1930, when the election of Deputy Frick to the dual portfolio of Minister of the Interior and of Education is reported on. Frick was a well know radical anti-Semite, and member of the Hitlerist party, himself having been arrested in 1923 for his involvement in the attempted *coup d'etat* by the Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch.²⁸³ The news of his influence in German parliamentary business made him a natural source of much distress for the security of the whole of the German Jewish community. Five months later, the same newspaper would again report on the doings of Minister Frick, and his successful proposal to establish the Chair of Race-ology — “the cult of Germanic race purity or anti-Semitic pseudo-scientific teaching of Jewish inferiority”, at the renowned University of Jena by the Thuringian Government. This departmental component would make the study — and through this any assertions claimed by any such study — scientifically sound, and thus ‘legitimate’ for grounding policy that would inevitably lead to the extermination of German and Eastern European Jewry.²⁸⁴ Almost a year after this, the *S.A. Jewish Chronicle* reported on violent attacks on Jews in the Jewish district of Rue du Temple in Paris, where Jewish youth were violently attacked by fanatical anti-Semites in broad daylight.²⁸⁵

There are a plethora of examples of antisemitism reported from around the world by the Jewish press that can be drawn from, but these few examples analysed above, and how they clearly relate directly to the general body of theory applied throughout this study, should give a sufficient scope of how the growth of European antisemitism was viewed by South African Jewry, and likewise how the influx of antisemitic sentiment *from* Europe into South Africa affected the socio-political climate of the country in the early 1930s. In May 1933, a segment was written in *The Zionist Record* of ‘The Growing Menace of Anti-Semitism’ in South Africa, deploring the antisemitic rhetoric expressed in *Die Vaderland*, a leading Afrikaner newspaper in the Transvaal province, but more forcefully in *Die Deutsche-Afrika Post*, a Johannesburg newspaper printed in German, “full of Hitlerite and anti-Jewish prejudice.” It likewise noted the distribution of dodgers and circulars throughout provinces dominated politically by an Afrikaner demographic, with headlines reading: ‘To Abolish War, Deport All Jews’, ‘The League of Nations is a plot for world control by Jews’, ‘The gold standard is the greatest Jewish fraud of all’, and so forth. These circulations reflect a growing, and increasingly bold and arrogant, antisemitic atmosphere among a growing constituency of

²⁸³ *ibid.*

²⁸⁴ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 13.06.1930.

This news truly reflected the vast cope and consequence of the work of Renan, and particularly his Aryan-Semite narrative, not only on an abstract-intellectual level, but on a physical and institutional level as well. Modern Orientalist discourse was thus of almost existential consequence — and detriment — to European Jewry in general.

²⁸⁵ *S. A. Jewish Chronicle*, 22.05.1931.

whites in South Africa, predominantly Afrikaners; but they also reflect the old tropes and stereotypes borne from obscurantist rhetoric from Medieval to 19th century, of Jews as a collective race intent on dominating the international political economy through hegemonic global financial practices. This is reflected in an extract from a titled “The Jew and the Farmer” that read

*The Jew is hostile to the farmer. He may cajole the farmer and fawn upon him, but all the while he is working to ruin him. Why ...? Because farmers constitute a class that stands between Jewry and the completion of Communist “world-dominion” (such as the Jew has already achieved in Russia).*²⁸⁶

These obviously reflected old narratives clearly bent on triggering common fears among fanatical, fundamentalist, nationalistic and often lower-class Afrikaners. The segment is concluded with a warning for Jews in South Africa:

*it behoves Jews in this country not to ensconce themselves too comfortably in the belief that all is well here. The hydra-head of anti-Semitism is beginning to show its fangs in South Africa. It is useless to adopt an ostrich-like attitude. It is time that we become aware of the evil so as to meet it with full vigour and courage.*²⁸⁷

The antisemitism at this time becomes strikingly apparent, but even more apparent than the steady development of a racial and definitively Orientalist consciousness against Jews, was the sudden escalation of the hard right in South Africa, and the fundamentalist, obscurantist and pseudo-scientific rationalisations of their particular strand of Orientalist discourse against the country’s Jewry.

But it was the movement led by Louis Weichardt that was perhaps the most telling of the far-right, explicitly antisemitic section of Afrikanerdom. While the ‘Greyshirts’ shared the anti-parliamentarian, National-Socialist sentiment and political agenda of the Brandwag and the Nuwe Orde, it is antisemitism was not a mere implication of its politico-ideological alignment, as it appeared to be with the other two, but was the actual source of its doctrinal inspiration. On 26 October 1933, an uncharacteristically large and raucous turnout at the *Koffiehuis* — a venue close to the Parliament buildings, and ad-hoc, unofficial Afrikaner gathering for informal discussion and gossip of issues that affect the Afrikaner — was made stage by the thirty-nine year old Louis Weichardt, and was the unofficial announcement ceremony of the South African Christian National Socialist Movement, or the ‘Greyshirts’.²⁸⁸ Weichardt’s first order of business in his impassioned speech was that fact that the Jews were the root of most of the political, social and economic problems experienced by both the Afrikaner and the English in South Africa. “Is there any sane man in the world that does not believe that Hitler would not have risen to power had not that great nation been trampled on by a certain race that will have to be brought to book.”²⁸⁹ Weichardt continued to cite ridiculously fabricated figures concerning the Jews’ role and influence in the South African economy, and how it

²⁸⁶ *The Zionist Record*, 19.05.1933.

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸⁸ The whole of Weichardt’s speech is recorded in *Die Burger*, 27.10.1933.

²⁸⁹ *ibid.*

adversely impacted especially the welfare of the Afrikaner. Next, Weichardt called out the Democratic-Parliamentarian system used in South Africa for being the source of Jewish prosperity and domination over much of the English and Afrikaner *volk*. He stated that he was against violence and persecution, but definitely pro-expulsion.

*What objection can the Chosen Race have if I recommend a policy by which they would be happily settled in their own country? What, I ask you, is wrong in that we want to assist them in that direction? Healthy nationalism is nothing else but National-Socialism. But a minority in this country has got the power in its hands by means of the Press and is dragging you down to your knees.*²⁹⁰

The meeting concluded with members shouting racial slurs and cultural stereotypes such as ‘Peruvians’, ‘international gangsters’, ‘scoundrels’, ‘rogues’, just to name a few; some of those present even gave the Nazi salute.²⁹¹ Before we continue with the historical analysis of the development and consequence of Nazi and Hitlerian sentiment and propaganda against South African Jewry, it is, for the particular purposes of this study, worth dissecting the semantic and socio-psychological implications of the language and narrative employed by Weichardt.

The whole of Weichardt’s monologue was constructed around the binary and hierarchical differentiation of signs, as proposed by the universal construct of language and semantics by Derridean linguistics. In conveying the importance of his message, and in laying bare the epistemic parameters under which his message is to be understood, he constructs his account in binary fashion, speaking of the intersubjective dynamics between two principal groups: The Jew and the white European. The historic irony in this is apparent. As previously mentioned, in 1903 Lord Milner, then High Commissioner of the Cape after the end of the Anglo-Boer War, made it clear that all Jews were seen — and legislatively treated — as members and descendants of the white, European ethnic race, despite *cultural* differences. They were incorporated within the social parameters of South Africa’s white, European race, and all the social benefits this insured. But after the Union, and especially in the charged political atmosphere of the early 1930s, social group recategorisation and subgroup identity consolidation necessitated that the social boundaries be redrawn to construct a new social identity — a strictly Afrikaner identity, under which Afrikaner’s would benefit on all social, political and economic fronts. However, in order for this process to take full effect — and since it has been established that all language and meaning is conveyed on the premise of the differentiation of signs, and that language is the basis for all forms of social order and group orientation — the particular language employed by the leaders of recategorisation attempts — Weichardt, in terms of this study — constructed the Jew as the Other, and the moral shadow-construct of the Afrikaner. Legitimising ingroup membership through a constructed sense of superiority necessitates the existence, epistemically and ontologically, symbolically and physically, of something that is systemically similar on social terms (so that its existence seems familiar enough), but different on moral ones (so that its inferiority can be justified). For the larger white superordinate identity in South Africa, this differentiation was cast in the most basic racial terms. Skin pigment was presumed to be an indicator of intellectual and cultural sophistication, and thus an indicator of

²⁹⁰ *ibid.*

²⁹¹ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, pp. 33-35.

social worth on pre-legitimated moral grounds; but for the Afrikaner, a legitimate sense of superiority *within* the larger social classification of white and European descendancy, the point of differentiation was made to be based on a more refined racial consciousness; not on arbitrary grounds of skin pigment alone, but on well theorised and studied grounds (recall Renan) of cultural development and behaviour (and the seeming hierarchical value essentialised on these preconceived normative notions of culture) in larger historical-civilisational interchanges between the Occident and the Orient. The Jew, as both a cultural image and an ethnic classification, was subjected to rituals of marginalisation — from propaganda to social and political rallies — where the idea of him provided the constitution for both the presence of his image, and yet the absence of his determination. To recall Foucault, at this point in history, the Afrikaner (at least discursively) and the Jew (symbolically) “are inextricably involved: inseparable at the moment where they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in relation to each other, in the exchange which separates them.”²⁹²

As we have seen, where existing facts for the legitimisation of differentiation and marginalisation do not suffice, narratives will be distorted and fabricated so as to provide grounds where the Othering of a people will seem beneficial to the reconstitution of a particular subgroup. Weichardt’s whole rhetoric was premised on a language of reason — a language of binary distinction and hierarchical classification — where the legitimisation of norms and values, and societal-structural orientations, is necessitated by a figure — an image — whose social and cultural constitution embodies the antithesis of the animation of the Afrikaner as an individual, and the Afrikaner nation as a collective. Proof of this is that throughout Weichardt’s speech, he often refers to the ‘other’. In reference to cases of illicit financial activity in the mining sector (one needs hardly to mention the predictability of the nature of this assertion), he states: ‘the culprits are our people, but the ring leaders are the other’. In reflecting on this event, Shain (2015) states it most concisely: “the crowd needed little reminding of who the other were.”²⁹³ The assumption of the identity of a subject of a narrative and a discourse based solely on the damningly negative features associated with a social group — not because they are true in any way in which they are stated, but because they are necessary for the social objectives of social recategorisation and cohesion — is quite telling of the contingent, superfluous and arbitrary nature of social reality and any representation of any unit within a social reality. The irony of the matter is that — and this is evident in the case being studied — discourses of truth are constituted more around the necessity of opinion and action than they are on any conception of ‘truth’; the actual integrity of truth is irrelevant — the necessity of its status application is what drives history.

The collective use of SIT, structural linguistics and post structural historical evaluation provides quite a vivid estimation of how Jewishness — as an idea and as a people — was constituted in the social nexus of 1930s South Africa. And the implications of Weichardt’s speech were damning. Despite its resonance with various sections of the national psyche among the *volk*, not all parties in South Africa were so welcoming to his political agenda. In reporting on Weichardt’s speech, the *Cape Times* said

²⁹² M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation ...*, p. xii.

²⁹³ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 34.

Much of the language employed last night by Mr. Weichardt at the Koffiehuis meeting, is an abominable abuse of the rights of free speech in South Africa. It is clownishly calculated to make appeal to the most inferior intellects, and it seeks to re-establish in this country, which has just succeeded in outgrowing a very destructive racialism of old standing a new type of racialism which is nothing more or less than the Aryanism of Hitler, and it undoubtedly deriving its impetus and its propaganda from Nazi sources in Germany — A certain number of Nazi fanatics in this country — some of them hailing from Germany and under the spell of Hitlerism — are conducting a very pestilent form of racial incitement against the Jewish citizens of South Africa in the collective sense as well as against individuals.²⁹⁴

Despite the backlash caused by Weichardt, merely a day after his speech at the Koffiehuis, there were pro-Nazi public events and mass distributions of leaflets with popular Nazi slogans; the chairman of the meeting even called for the killing of Jews.²⁹⁵ Throughout the country, Afrikaner farmers were being bombarded with constant accusations that the Jews were responsible for all their hardships and communal problems.²⁹⁶ These are some of the events that concisely capture the political right and their influence on the Jews in South Africa.

To the mind of the critical student of history and politics, the rationalisation for such fundamentalist fanaticism might be hard to comprehend; that was probably the case in its own time as well, but the hard right of the day garnered formidable social traction. The proposed fusion between Hertzog and Smuts due to the economic and social complications posed by the 1929 Wall Street Crash and global depression — and especially the ensuing poor white problem that followed in South Africa — at the 1934 general elections saw the disaffection and disassociation of the right-section of the nationalist faction of the National Party, especially D. F. Malan and Eric Louw, and later in 1934, Malan established the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party), the name of which insinuates enough of what it tried to achieve in the larger Afrikaner constituency during and after the 1934 national elections. Where Weichardt's radicalism might have experienced controversy in the case of clear factionalism present in the National Party and the political and social atmosphere of the early 1930s, in the industriously radical and fanatical character of the Purified National Party, it found a home. In addition to adding kindle to the flame of the general distrust of the Afrikaner — especially the low to low-middle class Afrikaner — based on conspirational stereotypes of Jewish world domination and secretive, financial practices that led to international Jewish world hegemony, the Greyshirts also fanned religious conspiracies of the Jews having an agenda to bring about the end of Christianity — which triggered one of the most essential cultural tenets of the Afrikaner *volk*.²⁹⁷ This was reciprocated in a speech by an especially radical leader in the ranks of the Greyshirts — Raymond Kirch Rudman — given to small towns whose population constituted mainly white farmers, stating that

While we are squabbling Comrades, Ikey is rubbing his dirty greasy hands, and we are paying the price in blood and tears ... Every Jew is a skunk. There is not a good Jew. They are all evil and filthy. Every mother must warn her sons of the fate which is his by the hands of Zion and send her husband and sons out to fight this evil. I urge you, Comrades,

²⁹⁴ *The Cape Times*, 27.10.1933.

²⁹⁵ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 38.

²⁹⁶ *The Zionist Record*, 03.11.1933.

²⁹⁷ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 48.

*forget your animosity, and British, Boer and German, come out together as one man and fight Judaism until we have strangled the snake and it lies dead at our feet. This is a religious fight. The fight for Christianity.*²⁹⁸

Apart from the obviously abhorrent hostility apparent in this narrative rooted in arguments which have absolutely no empirical grounding whatsoever, an analysis through the theoretical prism of SIT lays clear Rudman's social and political intentions. His intention is clearly that of social group recategorisation and subgroup identity reconsolidation, where the leader of the social recategorisation attempt breaks down previous social group boundaries of European ethnicity and racial whiteness, and employs and promotes new social denominators to establish a new superordinate identity that cements the (Renanean) Aryan-Semite narrative as the ideological basis for rationalising identity reconstitution and consolidation; an old narrative seen throughout history in many (and often apposing) contexts. The binary character of this antisemitic language is constructed around Aryanism vs. Semitism — this is the basis for horizontal differentiation — but that which serves the function of establishing the apparent superiority of the Afrikaner and inferiority of the Jew is the supernaturalist-religious one — a narrative that has been around for more than a millennia, and certainly one that has been at the forefront of the social consciousness of the Afrikaner since the early 18th century. That which was at one point the source of cultural admiration for the Afrikaner of the Jew — that of being juxtapositioned to the Jew within the Biblical-supernaturalist cosmic framework of the larger social consciousness of the *volk* — had in the 1930s become the point of not only socio-cultural and socio-political differentiation, but of moral differentiation and separation.

An interesting feature that uniquely earmarked the South African National Party (or SANP, the party that Weichardt had established after fusion as a politico-institutional presence in the country, with the Greyshirts functioning as its operative branch) was its accentuation of the Aryan-Semite narrative by its constant insistence that “the Dutch and English [are] branches of ‘the same Aryan race’”²⁹⁹, and that there should be no distinction between them due to their Aryan heritage, the obvious implication of this being that the commonality is based in their Occidentalism; and the hauntological implication being that what keeps them together should be a strong mutual disassociation with the Semite, or in effect, the Orient, rooted in a religiously inspired narrative of cultural and cosmic superiority.

Thus, antisemitism in the 1930s and 1940s, when it was both at its most intense and its most vulgar stage in South African history, was the effect of a fundamentalist Afrikaner nationalism that found powerful political expression, as well as profound social traction, in a number of factions within Afrikanerdom. Apart from those radical movements influenced and led by Weichardt himself, some of the most pronounced among those of the far right of the country's political scene, most prominently the *Ossewa Brandwag*, led by second Kommandant-General Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg, previous Administrator of the Free State; and the *Nuwe Orde*, led by Oswald Pirow.

²⁹⁸ M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 49.

²⁹⁹ Cited from M. Shain, *A Perfect Storm ...*, p. 57.

For his part, van Rensburg, having met Hitler in person on a visit to Germany, made no secret of his admiration for the Nationalist-Socialist system. The political ideology espoused by the *Ossewa Brandwag* was unmistakably influenced by the German Nationalist-Socialist system, with differing details such as sympathy with the Calvinist theology espoused by the Dutch Reformed Church, but “it’s conception of ‘nation’ bore the unmistakable marks of German National-Socialism, as was evident in such terminology as *bloedsuiwering* [blood purity], *die bonde van die bloed* [the bonds of blood], and *bloed en bodem* [blood and soil]”.³⁰⁰ A copy of the organisation’s Draft Constitution was released in 1941, and in it was encoded the ideological and bureaucratic frameworks upon which a ‘Christian National Republic’ would be built. Apart from making Afrikaans the official language of the state and providing the state president with near dictatorial power, the Draft Constitution stated that citizenship will be accorded only to whites who have the will and capacity to advance the nation and everything it stood for, which, if not explicitly stated, provided legislative means for the state to exclude Jews, a fact that would and should have been quite apparent concerning their socialist sympathies at a time when socialism was so unanimously associated with Jewish extradition and extermination in the very continent that the Afrikaner volk derived their ideological and religious tenets, and thus the very foundations of their particular social identity, from.³⁰¹

It appears the *Brandwag* did not come up with the contents of this Draft Constitution on its own, but that it was, in time, developed jointly with other organisations and political factions, especially (among others) Malan’s *Herenigde Nasionale Party*, even though the latter never adopted it in any official way. Additionally, the *Brandwag* rejected the parliamentary system completely, and openly supported the right of the government to use violence as an adequate means to obtain its objectives, whereas the *Herenigde Nasionale Party* contained itself to a party-system.³⁰² Regardless of whether the symbolism, ideology and policies of the *Brandwag* seemed harsh, aggressive and downright violent, it undoubtedly held massive appeal to the majority of Afrikaners, with a membership of 300,000 by the first half of 1941.³⁰³ However, in policy and ideology, the *Brandwag* embodied everything that was aggravating to the Jews, both historically and politically. Even though the *Brandwag* was not as openly and violently antagonistic as the *Greyshirts*, there was no doubt that the model of the Christian-Nationalist nation-state that the *Brandwag* promoted — and their stark apposition to the British influence and continued societal acculturation at this time — would not provide Jews with full citizenship, especially not concerning one of its most immediate political objectives of ‘eliminating nationally-harmful and liberal attitudes’, which, with their political and ideological sympathy with the British, was aimed expressly at South African Jewry.

The journal of the *Brandwag*, aptly named *Die Ossewa Brandwag*, was permeated with explicit and unabashed antisemitic language, stereotypes and slogans, warning its members of the money-grabbing,

³⁰⁰ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 128.

³⁰¹ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 129.

³⁰² H. Van Rensburg, *Their Paths Crossed Mine — Memoirs*, S.A. Central News Agency, 1956.

³⁰³ D. F. Malan, *House of Assembly Debates*, vol. 41, 4.2.1941, col. 2196.

‘British-Jewish-Masonic’ imperialist and capitalist.³⁰⁴ It became clear, with its expressed ideology, explicit sympathy for German Nationalist-Socialism and its political agenda of modelling the South African state on the core tenets of such a German structure that the political organisation and social movement that was the Ossewa Brandwag posed a major risk to the South African Jewish identity and the wellbeing of Jews in this particular segment of the Diaspora.

In 1940, a pamphlet titled *Die Nuwe Orde van Suid-Afrika*, written by one Oswald Pirow, outlined the political and social principles that was proposed to be the ideological standards to which an Afrikaner nationalist government ought to aspire. It became the manifesto of the political organisation to be known as *Die Nuwe Orde*, another faction organisation of the Heringde Nasionale Party, that strove for an anti-democratic, nationalistic government led by the Afrikaner people.³⁰⁵ The origins of the Nuwe Orde was somewhat enigmatic, especially considering the fact that in the 1920s its head, Pirow, was associated with the much more moderate Hertzog instead of the semi-radical leftist Malan, himself replacing Tielman Roos as the Minister of Justice after the 1929 elections; in addition, various sources at the time implied that he had good relations with the Jews, noting specifically his speech at the Bethal by-election in 1929 elaborated on earlier. Although he always espoused an admiration for Nazi Germany and their leaders, he did not reveal any notable antisemitic sentiment until the very start of the War much later in 1939, when he suddenly proclaimed himself a supporter of radical Socialism and antisemitic agendas. Furthermore, Shimoni notes that “Pirow’s New Order became the most intellectual and sophisticated of all the pro-National-Socialist movements in South Africa.”³⁰⁶ What essentially underlay the character of the New Order was the fundamental belief that, regardless of who the victors of the War were, the age of liberal-democracy, imperialist-capitalism was over, and the future of governance the globe over would take some form of the National-Socialism adopted by nations like Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal, but adjusted and reappropriated to the specific national and cultural character of its people. In the vision provided by Pirow and his New Order associates, South Africa’s future government could allow no racial and cultural integration between its White and Black citizens; all ties with the British Empire ought to be completely severed; and the nation must be Christian (meaning Calvinist-Reformist, hermeneutically and ecclesiastically speaking) in character. Thus, liberal attitudes towards race, political government, and religion — meaning anything that was by will or virtue of character un-Christian — had to be uprooted and eliminated.³⁰⁷ It ought to be noted that despite his clear ideology and its antisemitic implications, Pirow’s own style of antisemitism was not so radical and completely dehumanising as that of Hitler and the *Third Reich* that it stood a chance of leading to genocide, but contained itself to immigration policy. Essentially, Jews would either be ‘repatriated’ (if they had entered the county after 1914); older Jews would be assimilated into the

³⁰⁴ E.g., *Ossewa Brandwag*, 24.2.1943.

³⁰⁵ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...?*, p. 130.

³⁰⁶ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...?*, p. 130.

³⁰⁷ O. Pirow, *Nuwe Orde vir Suid Afrika*, Christelike Republikeinse Suid Afrikaanse Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Studiekring: Pretoria, 1940, p. 39.

population with second-class citizenship; and finally, a small constituency of Jews who had assimilate themselves as Afrikaners would attain full citizenship.³⁰⁸

This shows the idiosyncratic character among the larger factional strata of Afrikaner nationalism. What ought to be remembered, then, is that they were characterised in the 1930s by the fact that all three of them were highly associated with the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party. It would seem that, after the fusion government of 1934 between Hertzog and Smuts, Malan's party constituted the biggest hope that Afrikaner nationalists might have had of claiming the majority seats in parliament and being legitimately represented and privileged in all spheres of South African society. Additionally, leading up to and during the start of the Second World War, Malan and his political conspirators also believed that their best bet at leading a nationalist state that would hold a claim to the novel, socialist world order that seemed to be looming in the wake of Hitler's immense military success at the very start of the War, was of adopting the same political tenets as the Nazi regime that led the global crusade against democracy and capitalism (and, of course, Jews).

Thus, it can be seen that — due to Germany's overwhelming progress in the War in Europe, as well as significant pressure from within in the form of the Ossewa Brandwag, the New Order and the Greyshirts and SANP — the Herenigde Nasionale Party toyed exhaustively with ideas of Nationalist-Socialism framed by a Calvinist-Christian Afrikaner ideological rhetoric. What was surprising, then, was the divergent route that the Herenigde Nasionale Party took in the 1940s, despite these external and domestic pressures. Into the 1940s, the Herenigde Nasionale Party remained devoted to the parliamentary electoral system and gradually moved away from ideological affiliation with the Nationalist-Socialist, anti-parliamentarian leanings of the Ossewa Brandwag and the New Order. In fact, Pirow's radical anti-democratic lead and the Ossewa Brandwag's massively growing membership posed a significant threat to electoral infrastructure of the Herenigde Nasionale Party. Essentially, disenfranchisement with the United Party after its decision to join the war on the side of the allies in 1939 provided a rare opportunity to unite *Afrikanerdom* under a single objective that was the newly consolidated superordinate identity that was the object of political discourse of the Afrikaner nationalists since Union — to overthrow the ruling political faction that sided with the former enemy of the Afrikaner people by using the existing parliamentary political system. However, the aggressive anti-parliamentarianism of the Brandwag and New Order (as factions within the Herenigde Nasionale Party) seriously endangered any progress that Malan and the party's leadership stood to accomplish to unite *Afrikanerdom* in South Africa to rule over the country in a fashion that suited the Afrikaner's needs. Malan and his party leadership settled for a campaign against these two political factions that mainly entailed branding them as arbiters of 'foreign ideologies' and supporters of 'dictatorship'.³⁰⁹ It could be assumed that the Herenigde Nasionale Party's movement away from the ideas of Nationalist-Socialism that it had formerly experimented with was due to the fact that popular opinion would most likely not remain favourable to such an authoritarian system in the long run; what could also have played a major determining factor was the fact

³⁰⁸ *Nuwe Orde Correspondence Course*, Lecture No. 14, 'The Jewish Question' (mimeographed); cf. *Die Nuwe Orde*, 4.10.1945; 5.9.1946.

³⁰⁹ M. Roberts & A. E. G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition, 1939-1945: an essay in contemporary history*, Longmans: London, 1947 p. 125.

that Germany's role in the War had by 1942/43 radically diminished; if Malan and Strydom wished to maintain the strategy of creating favourable ties with the victors of the War through a common ideological foundation, then a newly instated government headed by Afrikaner party would have to remain favourable to a parliamentary democracy. Thus, these fundamentalist, radical nationalist factions in Afrikanerdom gradually lost influences, and Afrikaner nationalism regained and maintained its largely 'rational', democratic character.

However, despite this change of direction concerning its political ideology, the Herenigde Nasionale Party remained largely antisemitic, especially with respect to its policies determining qualification for citizenship. In the party's Programme of Principles, Programme of Action and Constitution adopted in 1941, contained under the heading of Immigration and the Jewish Question, sub-clauses c.) and e.) reads:

c) *In view of South Africa's specific problems, the party recommends the immediate cessation of all further immigration of Jews and further of all elements which cannot be assimilated by the South African nation or which are a hindrance or dangerous to society.*

...

e) *The Party wishes to take all possible steps to fit South Africa's own original White population elements for earning a living in every sphere and to protect them against unfair competition.*³¹⁰

It was, thus, apparent that the Herenigde Nasionale Party was increasingly discriminatory against Jews for what can only be described as petty reasons founded on age-old discriminatory stereotypes. As the 1940s continued, Malan's party grew increasingly public and aggressive in its antisemitic sentiment, especially in its public statements and speeches. Its fight for supremacy in the Afrikaner nationalist constituency against Pirow and the Brandwag meant that the Jewish question was something that Malan and the *Herenigde* leadership had to fight against to show its faithful commitment to Afrikaner unity and development under a new government and its fight for total Afrikaner independence from the British Empire.

Intelligence from the American diplomatic offices in Europe, distributed out of the European executive offices in Paris in 1938, notes that in the period leading up to the Alien's Act of 1937, an estimate of 4,500 Jews had immigrated from Germany to South Africa. After the Alien's Act Bill, this immigration was considerably stunted; to such a degree that since the Bill went into effect, only 682 applications for immigration into South Africa out of 2,282 were granted by the Immigrant's Selection Board in Pretoria from all over Europe, including Germany. The only applicants that were accepted were those who either had familial relations who were Jewish and had already acquired citizenship in South Africa, or those that were deemed to have the potential to be swiftly assimilated into the South African economy.³¹¹ However, in official documentation from the HIAS-JCA Emigration Association (HICEM), in listing South Africa as one of the most important and most prominent destinations of Jewish Emigration in the years leading up to the War, notes that some of the conditions for emigration were:

³¹⁰ B.D., *Report of Exec. June 1940 to July 1942*, p. 7.

³¹¹ From *A Survey of Oversea Countries Into Which Jews From Germany Have Immigrated During The Last Five Years*, American Joint Distribution Committee: European Executive Offices, Paris, 1938, p.20.

- c) is not likely to be harmful to the welfare of the Union; and
d) does not and is not likely to pursue an occupation, in which, in the opinion of the Board, a sufficient number of persons is already engaged in the Union to meet the requirements of the inhabitants of the Union;³¹²

This was most likely linked directly to the proliferation of certain economic and political conditions within South Africa at the time. In an extract from a document contained in the SAJBD archives, Saron notes that this specific condition for immigration to South Africa was most likely related to the growing poor white issue that was becoming more and more apparent since the radical industrialisation and consequent urbanisation since the Union and was furthermore exacerbated after the Global Depression of 1929 — which had a horrific effect on the economy of the Afrikaner led South Africa. The National Party that had been in power from 1924, led by J. B. M. Hertzog, had driven to ameliorate the poor white problem of their dominant political constituency, so it would follow that the government would most likely be hostile to any condition (especially if it was foreign) that would pose a threat of increasing the poor white in the country. This was the basis for the debate of whether immigrants were creating opportunities for the country and its inhabitants, or whether they were depriving its inhabitants of said opportunities, especially in a time when there was so much social and political fracture in a country that was in such a fragile economic state. This view was only exacerbated by local racist and anti-Alien rhetoric related to the Jews and their prevalence for economic hegemony in the Afrikaner nationalist constituency, especially by the political right, and their historically friendly relations with the British and sympathy for British liberalism. These stereotypes were encapsulated in what was referred to as the *Joods-Brits geldmag* narratives, fanning antisemitic propaganda and domestic hostility towards the idea of Jewish immigration, reflected well within the conditions provided for immigration into the country above.³¹³ Thus, it is easy to observe the effects of antisemitism, and its political and economic roots, even before the period where it became a radical issue that would threaten the survival of many Jews in the country. Thus, one can easily observe that antisemitism was a lingering and robust social and political feature of South Africa. However, in the years leading up to 1948, this antisemitic climate seemed to wane, and antisemitism, while still present in South African society, grew gradually less prominent.

At this point, a further analysis of antisemitism in South Africa leading up to apartheid — as analysed within the methodological and theoretical parameters thus used — might come across as repetitive, and, thus, run the risk of seeming redundant. There were fluctuations in antisemitism, and to a larger degree, antisemitism did not become the norm in South African society, although it always loomed as a great danger in the collective psyche of the South African Jew.

The aim of this chapter was to study the occurrences of antisemitism in South Africa leading up to apartheid, and to display, through interdisciplinary theoretical study, the socio-psychological processes present in the collective Afrikaner psyche *vis-a-vis* the issue of Jewish upward mobility, as well as the Jew's cultural and

³¹² HIAS-JCA Emigration Association (HICEM), *Survey of Present Conditions and Outlooks for Jewish Emigration in the Most Important Immigration Countries*, 1938, p. 38.

³¹³ G. Saron, *Immigration Controversies of the Thirties: The Historical Context*, 1955, pp. 1-2.

economic influence in the country before and after Union, and how Afrikaners factionally responded to this Jewish question. It was shown that the basic socio-psychological processes present in the program of Afrikaner nationalism since the end of the 19th century and start of the 20th century was that of basic social recategorisation, where social group boundaries were redrawn to consolidate specific subgroup identities under a new superordinate identity that — at least normatively — would predetermine the status quo of South African society. This chapter also argued that the narratives and discourses employed to construct such a superordinate identity were definitively those used throughout Western continental-domestic and colonial history to justify regimes of truth and discourses of power that would allow for cultural hegemony and political domination, and thus epistemic acculturation, of the Other. In this case, the larger Western psyche was animated by the cultural and sub-cultural particularities of the Afrikaner *volk*, and the Other was that image and cultural symbol that has for a trimillennial period been subjected to a group of people displaying various linguistic, etymological, genealogical, cultural and religious patterns — sometimes the main discursive presence in the collective psyche of the West was the Jew, other times the Semite, and yet at other times the Oriental; however, it was always — even in the most liberal, forgiving and inclusive social and political climate — the Other. What is of concern for the next chapter of this study, is how the identity of the Other was itself constituted in a social and political environment dominated by such apparent hostile racial alterity.

CHAPTER 5: Socio-Psychological and Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Jewish Identity in South Africa in the early decades of Apartheid

The cultural, political and social orientation of Jewish identity *vis-a-vis* Afrikaner Nationalism and Apartheid.

Concerning this period of the 1930s and the early war years that saw the radical escalation of antisemitism among various (and often prominent) constituencies of the Afrikaner nation, the biggest concern of Jews in South Africa was not whether they would be prosecuted and ousted, but whether they could, as individuals, individual constituencies and collectively as a people be peacefully and efficiently assimilated within an apartheid state that discriminated, prosecuted and ousted a whole race based almost completely on supernaturalistic and morally redundant narratives that have been the bane of the Jew for around a trimillennial period. Could their collective social conscience deal with the seismic shift in the strategic position of cultural appropriation and subjugation, where previously they were the oppressed and now they appeared to be culturally and racially eligible to be the oppressors, or at least the benefactors of an oppressive state?

However, in order to understand the particular social constitution of Jewish identity during apartheid, and in specific relation to Afrikaner nationalist identity institutionalised by apartheid legislation, one ought to understand what made apartheid unique as an ideology of racial discrimination and political and cultural domination. Shimoni (2003) notes that

*White supremacy, racial discrimination, and social separation of the races were rooted also in British colonial policies and in the practice of English-speaking South Africans. The innovatory thrust of the new Afrikaner nationalist government lay not in the invention of the system but rather in its ideological rationalisation, its reinforced legislative institutionalisation, and the implementation of massive social engineering to fortify it against the winds of change in Africa.*³¹⁴

Although, to truly understand the legitimisation of apartheid as an ideology, and furthermore its rationalisation as a cultural discourse by political and religious myth grounded in very specific cosmic-cultural beliefs of the Afrikaner people, one ought to understand the context of apartheid as a political framework in the larger African continent — and its own continental position in the political and ideological tides of the impending Cold War.

Apartheid can be identified through its social, cultural and political dimensions, all of which are definitively intersectional, especially as they relate to the identity of the Afrikaner and the retaliatory identity of the Jew. Keeping in mind the crude racist rationale that underlay the political finesse with which apartheid was pursued, apartheid was essentially a political retaliation to the perceived danger of black domination in an increasingly liberated and institutionally decolonised African continent. It comprised larger societal and particular institutional racial segregation with the intention of minimising and largely discouraging the miscegenation and fraternisation of whites with indigenous and Oriental races (Oriental legislation was

³¹⁴ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 18.

aimed primarily at Indians, but, as the previous chapter has aptly shown, Jews were also implicated in traditionally Orientalist narratives). Generally speaking, apartheid took two forms that dominated its temporal and political framework; firstly, apartheid was focused on the territorial separation and ‘separate development’ of South Africa’s races, executed under its formal title of the Group Areas Act of 1950, which allocated certain areas within the confines of South Africa’s borders to individual ethnic groups. Increasingly stringent legislation was introduced to “systematise the division of the population into rigid statutory racial categories”³¹⁵, and allocate these racial categories to specific geographical confines that were in themselves regulated by the government. The Pass Laws Act of 1952 made it illegal for persons of colour to enter into the white-dominated areas without a pass and certain other requirements relating to labour, which, if violated, was a severely punishable offence. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 and the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 regulated what people of colour could be taught in educational institutions and withheld the teaching of subjects and skills required for certain jobs that people of colour were legally ineligible for anyway; the latter educational act required that separate universities be built for people of colour, all of which were stringently controlled and regulated by the government.

The second form that apartheid took was an increasingly intensified legislative and executive retaliation to the increased upsurge of opposition to the racial legislation of apartheid and its impending inequity and suffering among the Blacks, Indians and Coloureds of South Africa’s population. Formal opposition to both political and social racial discrimination in South Africa long predated apartheid after 1948. The intensification of racialism and segregation in South Africa after the National Party’s accession to power did, however, make it more pertinent, and in many cases much more violent. Formal opposition to the apartheid regime was embodied by various political parties, liberal and racially progressive organisations and various political and social campaigns meant to openly disrupt and oppose the institutional operation and ideological legitimisation of apartheid. Most pertinent of these oppositional bodies was the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress and the Congress of Democrats; other important bodies that caused fractures in the social and political security of the racial state were the South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Party Congress. White supporters of the opposition to apartheid were few, but well represented in the English and especially the Jewish communities. On the whole, there were two orientations of oppositional politics — those that sought to reform the state by eliminating racial segregation and apartheid, and those that sought to overthrow the entire socioeconomic system; the former was often the centrist, progressive and liberal benefactors of the struggle, and the latter were the leftist radicals, predominantly those using the communist doctrine to support their reasons for opposing the apartheid state. The second form of apartheid was in response to this opposition; although oppositional tactics and events were often passive and non-violent, it still stood to threaten the security and legitimacy of the racial tenets of the state and the larger apartheid society.

To this, the government responded with increasingly repressive legislative and policing measures to oust dissent; the pinnacle of which was the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act. The legislation had its roots in the larger political context of the Cold War and the increased threat that communism held for the South

³¹⁵ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 19.

African state and larger Southern African subcontinent, but its intentions were beyond the suppression of communism alone. It sought to pursue and expel “any doctrine or scheme ... which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change ... by means which include the promotion of disturbance or disorder.”³¹⁶ As explained above, one of the larger proponents of opposition to apartheid was communist ideology and its specific Marxist reasoning relating to the particular socioeconomic orientation of the state that ran on racial subjugation and suppression, but one of the normative proponents of communist ideology was racial equality. This specific element in communist ideology was likewise held by other more centrist, progressive and liberal activists who had little-to-no affiliation with communism, but nonetheless made them eligible for prosecution under the Suppression of Communism Act. The Act allowed any person or organisation that held any such liberal views to be banned; in publications, expressing such views as was named in the Act, or even quoting a banned person, was a punishable offence. In 1963, legislation was passed that allowed the police to detain any person for up to 90 days without trial if this person was suspected of any political offence contained in the Communist Act.

One can thus see how the two forms of apartheid — legislation meant to entrench the self-preservation of whites in the country through political domination and separate development based on racial segregation, and the increasingly radical crackdown on any form of opposition or dissent — would constrict the actions of the Jewish community, in terms of retaining their social respectability and political legitimacy when it came to the construction of an identity that would allow for peaceful coexistence in South Africa; as well as the retaining of specific cultural traits, while also upholding the moral fibre and social justice that Jews themselves have historically advocated in the name of self-societal and cultural preservation.

What becomes fairly evident concerning the way that apartheid was structured, and with respect to the first form of apartheid as explained above, is that the South African government was largely preoccupied with the question of people of colour and separate development to give too much attention to the ‘Jewish question’ concerning previous antisemitic attitudes held by the far right inside the *Herenigde* National Party. But it is only in retrospect that one can appreciate the alternative course of political action that the National Party adopted after its 1948 electoral victory.

At the time, the Jewish community, and particularly the Jewish Board of Deputies, shared an immense concern for the community's welfare and prospects of peaceful integration, coexistence and dignity. However, to the surprise of many, a real and major threat to this never took place; instead, Malan's new position as leader of the country gradually led to a course of increased peaceful coexistence between the Jewish and Afrikaner communities.³¹⁷ Much of the intraparty contention over the Jewish question was between Malan and Eric Louw, who had at the time reasserted his party's antisemitic agenda.³¹⁸ Louw had written to Malan shortly before the national elections, making clear his clear objections to Malan's new direction on the Jewish question. Louw avowedly thought that sympathy with and favour towards the Jewish

³¹⁶ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 20.

³¹⁷ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, pp. 21-22.

³¹⁸ See Eric Louw's letter to the *Cape Times*, 15 October 1947.

community in South Africa would mean the repudiation of the party's standing policy regarding the country's Jewry; additionally, he thought that sympathy with them and their cause would completely compromise the support of the Greyshirts, who were a valuable political asset to the National Party in the upcoming elections.³¹⁹ But interviews with national publications and representative delegations of the Jewish community confirmed that, apart from the immigration questions, Malan sympathised with South African Jewry and their Zionist cause.³²⁰ This might be due to the fact that — as mentioned in the previous chapter — Malan was becoming increasingly disaffected and disassociated with the radical right of Afrikanerdom, as was evinced in his vilification and condemnation of the *Ossewa Brandwag* and their anti-parliamentarian, National-Socialist agenda. Shortly after Malan's inauguration in 1948, the leadership of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies — consisting of Bernard A. Ettliger, Gustav Saron and Simon Kuper, which were, consecutively, the president, chairman and general secretary of the Board of Deputies — requested an interview with Malan to ascertain his exact position towards the country's Jewish question. Notwithstanding his disappointing reaction towards the question of Jewish immigration, Malan eased their disquiet by confirming his favour of South African Jewry and his commitment to ousting antisemitism in his party and the country alike.³²¹

The larger social consequences of these actions on the construction of Jewish identity during the exponential escalation of apartheid will be viewed in time. What is worth studying now, however, is that Jewish identity was constituted and consolidated against a racially discriminatory South African system even before the Union.

Despite general conformity to the social hierarchy of white South African society, South African Jews also stood out in that they were, relative to their ethnic percentage in the white population, some of the most fervent resisters of the racially discriminatory social system that so much of their community were complicit in, even before the Union of South Africa. Between 1906 and 1914, during the campaign undertaken against racism against Indians in South Africa by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, called *satyagraha*, a doctrine preaching active non-violent resistance, some of Gandhi's closest and most trusting associates were white Jews, namely Henry Polak, Hermann Kallenbach and Sonia Schlesin, a Litvak born Jew who unwaveringly worked as Gandhi's secretary throughout his time in South Africa.³²² These figures were representative of the discourse that challenged that of the growing public controversy that Jews were actively complicit in the system of overt racial discrimination in South Africa, and therefore actively complicit in something — referring to systemic racism, where people are individually or collectively persecuted by virtue of their skin colour or ethnicity — that Jews themselves had suffered from on a wholly ethnic scale for more than three thousand years.

³¹⁹ P. F. Van der Schyff, *Eric Louw in die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948*, D.Litt. dissertation, Potchefstroom University, 1974, pp. 694-701.

³²⁰ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, pp. 23-26.

³²¹ Report of Interview with the Prime Minister, 1 July 1948, Board of Deputies, Public Relations Files.

³²² Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, trans. V. G. Desai, Stanford Academic Reprints, 1954, pp. 177, 180, 247.

However, although Jewish representation in the struggle against a racially discriminatory state was not necessarily an anomaly — they were very well represented indeed — the majority of the Jews in South Africa were indeed complicit in the larger social and political structure that embedded racism in both civil and political culture throughout the country. Even the SAJBD, who championed the struggle against antisemitism, especially on matters of immigration policy, were surprisingly silent on the issue of racial discrimination and segregation against native peoples in the country. This was quite obvious in 1924, when Jan Smuts submitted the Class Areas Bill to Parliament, which made it illegal for persons of colour other than the indigenous population to enter certain areas that were effectively commercial and residential centres for whites exclusively, without a pass. Although this Bill was drafted specifically with the country's Indian residents in mind, a particular point in the Bill that proved to be quite disconcerting to the SAJBD was 'persons other than natives having racial characteristics in common'; although South African Jews — whether from Eastern or Western Europe — were generally perceived, in both the social and political spheres of the country, to be European and white, Jewish leaders knew that such a generalisation could easily be used against them — especially under the intellectual auspices of Orientalist narrative, since both Jews and Indians did indeed have certain characteristics in common, in that they were both, historically and genealogically, Orientals. Such potential for future antisemitism would not be allowed, and sure enough, the Bill, which had no intention to be used against the Jews anyway, *was* promptly amended to exclude any class of peoples who came from (even if fairly recent) European stock.³²³ Although this in itself boded well for a general sense of solidarity between the Jews and the (mainly Afrikaner led) government at the time, the fact that the Jewish leaders themselves did not in any official capacity blink an eye at the morally heinous policies proposed by the state — policies that should have been all too familiar to any Jew who possessed an inkling of knowledge of the atrocities their forebears had faced throughout European history — was telling of the general attitude of the Jews concerning their assured societal predisposition *vis-a-vis* an oppressed class of native peoples at the time. It was not the belief in or behaviour on any essentialist system or discourse of racial inferiority, but the complicity in a system functioning on such beliefs, which made a segment of Jewish society before and during apartheid particularly nefarious.

But despite this, Jewish history in South Africa was largely animated by an attitude, and often a life, of dissent by those particularly ardent and fervent members of the especially progressive substratum of South African whites. There are various Jewish individuals who are representative of the strong disagreement with which racial segregation in pre-apartheid South Africa was met by many a Jew. One such individual who is perhaps very well-known is Henry Polak. A year after coming to South Africa, Polak met Gandhi, and soon became the spiritual leader's closest confidant and ally and joined the press outlet through which Gandhi would come to distribute the message of his peaceful dissent concerning racial segregation in the country. In 1913, Polak was imprisoned, together with Gandhi, for their practice of *Satyagraha*. In 1916, after remaining in the country as Gandhi's lieutenant and informant concerning the progress of the affairs of Indians, Polak returned to England with his wife, stating as his motivation that "our children should not be brought up in an atmosphere of race and colour prejudice."³²⁴ Polak was indeed one of the Jews whose personal convictions

³²³ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, pp. 79-80.

³²⁴ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa ...*, *ibid.*

concerning racial equality and race prejudice were particularly strong, and during the years of his activism, it became clear that these convictions were definitively inspired by his particular social and historical consciousness as a Jew: “This was the Jewish problem all over again ... If the Jew does not stand up eminently for ethical principles, what *raison-d’être* has he in the scheme of things ... for which purpose is his the Chosen Race?”³²⁵ On various occasions, Polak noted that the arguments made to discredit Jews and Jewish societal inclusion and integration in Europe throughout history was strikingly similar to the arguments made against the Indians in South Africa; any level of cultural and historical consciousness, pride and honour should compel a Jew to stand up for a system of ethics and code of conduct that condemned and ousted the scourge by which his ancestors had suffered for millennia.³²⁶ Upon reflecting on the similarities between the discrimination of people of colour in South Africa and Jews in czarist Russia, Shimoni noted that “either in ignorance or by design, Jews have lent themselves to, or at least not openly dissociated themselves from, racial persecution.”³²⁷

Another close Jewish contemporary of Gandhi of Lithuanian descendant was German born Herman Kallenbach, who became a successful architect in South Africa with known tastes in material extravagance, but, upon meeting Gandhi, gave up that lifestyle for one of material abstinence. Together with Polak, he was arrested in 1913 for his participation in *Satyagraha*. However, Kallenbach had his reservations over the total passivity preached by the spiritual leader. Indeed, in the 1930s, Kallenbach’s contention was that Hitler and his foreign forces should be stopped by all means, even if these included violence.³²⁸ Another ardent Jew who championed the struggle against racial segregation of the Indians and the coloureds, and one that should be well known by now, was liberal parliamentarian Morris Alexander. And to the critical, socially progressive and anti-racial discourses espoused by Polak, Kallenbach and Alexander (who are only few among a plethora of other Jews whose progressive contributions are of no less importance), there was a socialist equivalent among the South African Jewish constituency as well.

One specific figure who stood out among the socialist ranks of revolutionary Jews in South Africa was Yeshaya Israelstam, a Lithuanian-born Jew who briefly settled in America in his middle teenager years, and emigrated to South Africa in 1900 at the age of thirty. It was in the U.S. where Israelstam developed his passion for Jewish socialism and his tastes for economic and political revolution. It was in South Africa that Israelstam was the founder of the Yiddish Speaking Group, a branch of the South African International Socialist League, the original institutional predecessor to the Communist Party of South Africa.³²⁹ The structuralist roots of socialist theory meant that Israelstam was inclined to see the world through the prism of class and hierarchy, in terms of the domination of the bourgeois and the subjugation and struggle of the proletariat, and that any sort of discrimination based on differentiation among social denominators — such as

³²⁵ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa ...*, p. 146.

³²⁶ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 82.

³²⁷ Cited from G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 83.

³²⁸ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 84.

³²⁹ For more on Yeshaya Israelstam, see L. Feldman, *Yidden in Johannesburg ...*, *ibid.*

race or ethnicity — was undoubtedly the consequence of the hyper-competitive nature of a self-degenerative and contradictory capitalist system. He thus believed that any discrimination rationalised and legitimated on racial grounds was inherently unjust and amoral, and that the Jew's main contribution to revolution was the structural liberation of the oppressed proletariat, of which the indigenous, coloured and Indian races were the principal objects. Israelstam rationalised the moral framework of this revolutionary struggle and the unification of the proletariat, regardless of race or ethnicity, based on the idea that the Jew's historical consciousness compelled him to do so, since “they should know that they themselves belonged to a persecuted race.”³³⁰ This larger socialist ideological sentiment was shared by the *Poalei Zion*, who likewise championed a discourse of the unification of the struggle of the South African proletariat across racial lines. The patterns of this Jewish socialism in the decade following Union can be determined — those members of a proposed revolution were often of the uneducated, lower to lower-middle class, Yiddish-speaking constituencies. Thus, it is clear that there was evidence of an acute social consciousness among a collective of Jews that was collectively sourced from common historical experiences of subjugation, oppression and persecution. Even before the period of intensified and radical antisemitism, Jews were aware of the moral paradox that they found themselves in — as a class of socially and ethnically hybrid-Europeans who were the benefactors (at least in terms of race) of a state that was becoming increasingly racially differentiated in its political and civil cultures, legitimised through discourses of power based on narratives of race that were not-so-long-ago being used to persecute the Jews themselves, and was indeed being used at that time to persecute Jews on the very continent from which they gained their superior status.

It can, thus, be shown that, from a SIT and deconstructionist analytical vantage point, some Jews' refused to draw new lines of social recategorisation attempts based on a hierarchical discourse of racial superiority and inferiority. Subgroup identity consolidation was not based on either obscurantist/supernaturalist or pseudoscientific arguments of racial superiority rooted in ideas of predestination or natural attribution, but was based in moral arguments of social justice, where discourses of the 'equal rights of man'³³¹ predetermined the socio-psychological responses of liberal-revolutionary Jews to a system that they felt threatened these rights that grounded the moral framework by which membership in a certain social collective was predetermined, even more so if such a system (in this case a segregationist state and government, where segregation was itself predetermined by arguments of social differentiation, and differentiation was predetermined by race as a primary social denominator) was upheld on ideological tenets that weren't deemed to be rational or moral in any way.

However, despite the presence of such a collective social consciousness, the fact does seem to remain that, among the larger Jewish constituency in South Africa, these Jews did seem to remain in the minority at the

³³⁰ Cited from G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 84.

³³¹ Arguments invariably borne from the Enlightenment, through the work of thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau, in which individuals adequately versed in socialist ideology — which also has much of its origin in Enlightenment philosophy — would have been aware of. Perhaps most notable of these is Locke's arguments made in his *Second Treatise of Government* (1689), where he argued that there are certain natural rights that individuals possess that make them equal; famously, these rights were claimed to be “life, liberty and property.” Socialism, which is itself commonly a direct ideological descendance from thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, advocated unilaterally for these basic liberties among members of a society, and how the overthrow of capitalism might bring about such unilateral social equality and justice among classes.

time. The evidence shows that, despite the revolutionary segments of its population, Jews themselves (at least in the decade following Union) still retained a strong sense of racial prejudice, whatever their political inclinations towards or against the dominant Afrikaner government were. Generally speaking, the Jew's awareness of the indigenous population of South Africa was still framed in binary and hierarchical terms, where the Jew differentiated between himself and the country's native population based on a clear racial and cultural consciousness, and legitimated his superiority in this strategic positioning of social differentiation based on arguments that indigenous (black) South Africans were inferior because they did not maintain and uphold the cultural and civilisational norms and values espoused by (and unilaterally informed and predetermined by) European/Western social group membership. They thought they were inferior, merely because they were different. Evidence of this is ample. In 1896, a letter from one M. D. Hersch to the Hebrew Press agency *Hatzfira* notes the cultural differences between the indigenous and Jewish peoples in the country, and concludes that "they're way of life is almost like that of the apes, and like the first man, Adam, they wonder about naked and are not ashamed."³³² Jewish immigrants before and after the Union became accustomed to rituals of marginalisation through racial appropriation, and predispositions concerning the perceived racial inferiority of the indigenous population and natural inclination towards and role of servitude became the norm.³³³ Interestingly, the Jewish opinions towards Asiatics, predominantly the Indian population, were equally as biased and contemptible.³³⁴ An interesting point to note, and one that has much effect on the racial appropriation and racism among the Afrikaner constituency later in the century, was the fact that the word *kaffir*, which was used as a slanderous term meant to imply the racial inferiority of the country's indigenous blacks, had its origins in Semitic etymology,³³⁵ where the word — originally Arabic, but with Yiddish linguistic pejorative adaptations — originally meant nonbeliever, infidel or heretic.³³⁶ As anyone familiar with mainstream Afrikaner culture might well know, the word was reissued as a slanderous term among the Afrikaner *volk*, and was a favourite of the country's political right.

This racism among the majority of South African Jewry would continue to predominate in the 1920s. As has been expounded on in the previous chapter, the election pact between the National Party and the Labour Party that allowed for their victories in the 1924 and 1929 general elections — and concerning the political bias that many Jews displayed towards Labour movements — gave various individual Jews much traction in the country's political arena. Although the Jewish political elite at the time did champion a strand of social justice that was highly liberal and centrist, and based on the intercultural and social unification of South African society, it must be added that the Labour politics in the 1920s was still characteristically being conducted within a strict racial framework, where the only ones who were represented by the Party were

³³² *Hatzfira*, 16, 1896, *Letter from M. D. Hersch*.

³³³ L. Feldman, *Yidden in Johannesburg ...*, pp. 241-246.

³³⁴ For more on the expression of racial prejudice of the early 20th century South African Jewish immigrant community through linguistic analysis, see M. P. Grossman, *A Study of the Trends and Tendencies of Hebrew and Yiddish Writing in South Africa since their beginnings in the early nineties of the last century to 1930*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 1973.

³³⁵ This time the term 'Semite' is meant to properly denote the whole of the near Eastern ethnographic classification, meaning both Arabic and Hebraic descendants.

³³⁶ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, pp. 85-86.

whites. It was only its (radical revolutionary) cousin — the Communist Party, established in March 1922 — that fully advocated a completely colour-blind and non-racial society. But the Communist Party struggled to gain the political capital of Labour, and its activities at the time were mainly confined to the margins of the country's political scene, where it dealt mainly with the affairs of Trade Unions and parliamentary agitation.³³⁷ The importance of the Communist Party would, however, be displayed in full force later in the century.

Two other Jewish figures who proved to be exceptionally prominent and influential in the political scene of the 1920s and early-1930s were Gabriele Weinstock and Morris Kentridge. The former was a left-of-centre politician who, due to his prominence in the printing industry, became extremely influential in Labour winning the majority in the Transvaal Provincial Council at the 1914 Provincial Elections. For 25 years, he headed publishing of *Foreword*, the news outlet that was extremely influential for the South African Labour movement following Union. He was one of the founding members of the International Socialist League, but Creswell's (then-leader of the Labour Party and initiator of Labour's election pact with Hertzog during the 1924 general elections) decision for pact — and its obvious implications for the snowballing of Afrikaner nationalism, which was a step back from the political universalism and democratic socialism espoused by the Labour movement — urged him to make a strong political stance against the pact, and thus against Afrikaner nationalist hegemony. Kentridge, one of the initial advocates and leaders of the country's Zionist movement, joined Labour in 1912, and after a short bout in Parliament in 1914, rejoined his seat as one of the representatives of Labour after the 1924 electoral pact. Unlike Weinstock, Kentridge approved of pact because he thought that — concerning the political (and growing nationalist) climate of the 1920s, it was a worthwhile compromise that would allow for real legislative change in the country. Leading up to 1920, Kentridge enjoyed relative success in municipal affairs as town councillor in 1917 in Johannesburg and was one of the leaders of the 1922 worker's strike that inevitably led to the Rand Revolt. However, in the early 1930s, Kentridge too became disaffected with Labour, and in 1932 joined Smut's South African Party.³³⁸ While these two figures are again representative of the influence and attitudes of Jews in the centrist part of the country's political spectrum, one ought to note the immense influence of Jews in the political left and radical component of the country's Labour movement, where they were very well represented. Jewish individuals of note in the far left of the Labour movement are Ben Weinbren, a Latvian born Jew who was a prominent figure in the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions of 1928, and who likewise served as an eminent executive on the Trade Union Council from 1924 to 1954. Another prominent Jewish figure was Emile Sachs, a Lithuanian born Jew who was a founding member of the Young Communist League in 1922, prominent member of the International Socialist League and General-Secretary of the Transvaal Garment Workers Union, where he experienced immense success in improving the working conditions of those

³³⁷ For more information on the Communist Party and its nascent role in early South African Politics, see H. J. & R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*, Penguin: London, 1969.

³³⁸ For more information on both Weinstock and Kentridge, see Ivan I. Walker and B. Weinbren, *2 000 Casualties: A History of the South African Labour Movement*, S. A. Trade Union Council: Johannesburg, 1961, pp. 320; 323; South African Jewish Board of Deputies, *Biography Files: Gabriel Weinstock*; M. Kentridge, *I Recall*, The Free Press: Johannesburg, 1959.

labourers in the country's garment trade. Until 1931, he was also a member of the South African Communist Party.³³⁹

Thus, in the decades following Union, and leading into the period of radical antisemitism (discussed in the previous chapter) that would have a monumental effect on the constitution and orientation of South African Jewish identity onwards, there was a specific amalgamation of racial ideology and sympathies among the country's Jewry; some prominent Jews espoused liberal, progressive policies, but only within particular racial-political frameworks, and thus only to the effect of the Jews and their particular intersubjective relation relative to the larger racial and ethnic substrata among South African whites. Other Jews endorsed a political system where race as a social denominator had very little influence on the structural saturation of the larger social nexus of the country. These were both constitutive of the general social condition of Jews as benefactors of the racial state in South Africa. Moral introspection and reflection among the country's Jewry based on their specific historical consciousness, while present among various members and groups within the larger community, was not necessitated due to external factors. However, the 1930s and 1940s would see these conditions fulfilled.

Jewish Identity in growing Racial Adversity

One very important consequence of increased antisemitism in South Africa was the growth of importance and support (largely out of sheer necessity) of an organisation that represented the struggle and social hardships of the South African Jewish community. Before the 1930s it was the Zionist Federation that enjoyed most of the Jewish support in South Africa. But where the Zionist Federation specialised in the representing the movement of the Jews to their prophesied homeland in Palestine, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies — whom had up to that point received relatively little support and funding — represented the domestic concerns of South Africa's Jewish population; thus, with an upsurge in antisemitism in South Africa, the SAJBD's role grew in importance.³⁴⁰ Shimoni notes that:

*The counter-activity undertaken by the Jewish Board of Deputies in these years may be divided into three main categories. First, pressing for anti-defamation legislation and litigating, wherever possible, against anti-Semitic acts. Second, monitoring anti-Jewish propaganda and refuting it 'by exposing its source and objectives and by keeping the true facts before the public'. Third, active promotion of better relations between the Jewish community and the other sections of the white population.*³⁴¹

Two of the major points that the Board constantly found itself fighting against that greatly stoked the fires of antisemitism in the 1930s and 1940s were those of immigration and the accusation that Jewish economic

³³⁹ South African Jewish Board of Deputies, *Biography Files: Ben Weinbren*; South African Jewish Board of Deputies, *Biography Files: Solly Sachs*; G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, pp. 88-89.

³⁴⁰ *The South African Jewish Board of Deputies — The Story of Fifty Years 1903-1953*. Reprinted from *Jewish Affairs*, the monthly journal of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, under the Lippmann Archive, June 1953.

³⁴¹ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 146.

activity in South Africa hampered the prospective economic development of the Afrikaner. Ever since the Union, Afrikaner political constituencies were rallied behind the plight of the ‘poor white’, and of standing together as a nation in the name of working together towards economic development. The damning accusation made of Jews and economic domination is a stereotype that stretches more than a millennium, and was at the time fanned by the global legacy of the Rothschild family. Ever since the 11th century, incriminating links in Europe between Jews were based on their role as bookkeepers, thriving merchants and store owners, and tax collectors, money lenders and usurers. This legacy of Jews linked to the historic hardship of much of the Afrikaner, and the antipathies that the Afrikaner already possessed towards the global financial system, was thus an easy point around which to construct a communal conscience that would rally support for a nationalist economic and political agenda, at the expense of South African Jewry. There was, of course, no real sound basis for these claims, as much research done at the time proves that the poor White-ism receded steadily throughout the 1930s and 1940s,³⁴² and that, indeed, Jewish economic activity had the direct consequence of improving employment that actually alleviated the poor White problem, instead of enhancing it.³⁴³

However, on the whole, and especially relevant to the Board’s constant contention that it was not a political body but a civil-representative body, the Board’s main focus was in enlightening the South African political and social spheres concerning the country’s Jews, as they believed “that ignorance is the most fruitful bed for the breeding of antisemitism; and that the most effective weapons for fighting the forces of darkness are truth and enlightenment.”³⁴⁴ Thus, stereotypes concerning Jewish immigration and economic affairs were political myths used to legitimise certain legislation that would be [incumbent towards]? Afrikaner nationalism. Enlightening the public would disprove much of the antisemitism that was used by the radical right Afrikaner leadership to vilify the country’s Jewry, and would ultimately help Jews to consolidate their material and psychological existence in the country. To this end, the Board acted on the revelation that in order to enlighten the country against nationalist/socialist and antisemitic demagoguery, it had to support the liberal forces in South Africa; these liberal forces would not only be those that effected the political elite that directly influenced policy, but those in whose hands the political election of 1948 rested — the general white population of the country. If the United Party, who was the Jewish Community’s best chance of seamless integration, was to win the general elections in the 1940s, then the voters had to be convinced that Malan’s brand of radical nationalism was by no means in the general interest of the nation.

One of the ventures of the Jewish Board of Deputies was the endorsement of popular literature that opposed “pro-Nazi and racist manifestations in South Africa.”³⁴⁵ One of these magazines was called *Forum*, which endorsed the most progressive liberal ideals of the day, and was regularly written in (and later directed) by the formerly-mentioned pro-Jewish Jan Hofmeyr. This liberal narrative of public enlightenment was nowhere

³⁴² M. W. Wilson & L. Thompson, (eds.) *The Oxford History of South Africa, II*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1971, p. 142.

³⁴³ J. L. Gray, *The Jew in the Economic Life of South Africa*, Palala Press, 2018.

³⁴⁴ *Jewish Board of Deputies, Report of Exec. May 1935 to May 1937*, p. 27.

³⁴⁵ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...?*, p. 153.

made clearer than in the Nine Point Programme of combating antisemitism, proposed in the Board's 14th Congress in May 1945, of which the first three points read:

1. *The fight against anti-Semitism is part of the defence of democracy and of freedom; and only if the larger victory is won is their hope of eliminating (or mitigating) anti-Semitism.*
2. *The Board's efforts at promoting better Jewish-gentile relationships are part, and in furtherance, of wider efforts to promote inter-racial and inter-faith goodwill.*
3. *Racialism (of all varieties) thrives on poverty and economic hardship. Jews must therefore range themselves behind efforts aimed at improving existing social and economic conditions.*³⁴⁶

These words make obvious the intent of the Jewish community to educate, liberate and enlighten the public to the cause of democracy, that would invariably help the integration of their own community; but the activism of the Board and its associates went further than Jewish interests. In the 1940s, the Board took more frequent and deliberate stances against the *Herenigde* Nasionale Party, the *Nuwe Orde* and the *Ossewa Brandwag*, by endorsing and including extracts in its *Jewish Affairs* journal from liberal publications such as *Common Sense* and *Forum* that openly criticised the National Party's doctrine of *apartheid*, calling it a 'policy of domination'.³⁴⁷ Antithetically to this criticism of radical Afrikaner nationalist policies, *Jewish Affairs* endorsed the United Party and referred to their policies as 'open-minded' and 'understanding' to the interests and cultural and social realities of the native peoples (which impacted the cross-cultural, largely racially liminal position of the Jewish population).³⁴⁸

Therefore, even though there were, even before, but principally after, Union, cases of a Jewish consciousness that advocated for completely inter-ethnic and interracial integration (and these sympathies were wholly motivated by a historic consciousness of Jewish oppression of subjugation), the majority of Jewish sympathies were towards centrist politics that represented the community's best hopes of peaceful integration. However much the Jewish leaders and press might have endorsed the liberal outlook of the United Party leading up to 1948 — even in regard to their progressive (although this is only relative to the intense racism of the National Party) views of the natives, these major Jewish representative bodies only channeled their liberal aspirations in race-encapsulated political and communal endeavours, and only inasmuch as it added to the potential of the liberation of their own people, regardless of the struggle and suffering of the South African black majority. However, this was not in any way conditional of the fact that the Jews had any hostile attitudes or intentions towards the country's indigenous black — as well as subjugated Asiatic — population; but the vagueness, and frankly arbitrariness, of the language employed in official public statements are interesting to observe.

Something that seems to saturate the whole of Jewish opinion expressed in mainstream Jewish press and through the larger Jewish representative bodies concerning the racialised nature of the South African state is

³⁴⁶ *Jewish Board of Deputies, Report of Exec.*, August 1942 to May 1945, p. 18.

³⁴⁷ G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism ...*, p. 154.

³⁴⁸ P. Lewsen, 'Apartheid — A Nostalgic Dream', *Jewish Affairs*, Jewish Board of Deputies: South Africa, 1948.

the fact that, in one vein, a statement would advocate total democracy among the whole of the South African population, irrespective of race; and in the next vein, a statement would undercut this progressive, liberal sentiment by stating that, due to the racial intricacies in the current structural alignment of South African society, the case and rights of Europeans and non-Europeans are not the same, and that their situation ought to be treated differently. In one breath, through public discourse and universalist narrative, social group boundaries are redrawn so that race and ethnicity are not social denominators that ought to predetermine membership of a novel progressive, cosmopolitan superordinate identity; no differentiation is necessitated on grounds of race. However, in a next breath, there is a definitive racial and ethnic differentiation cast on the socio-strategic position (European) Jew and the non-European, which itself implied a differentiated approach to their broader societal condition in the country. This can be seen in a press-piece released in *Jewish Affairs* of the month June 1945, an addition which dealt almost exclusively with the reconstruction of the Jewish community directly after the end of the War that same year. This particular piece was written by Gustav Saron, then General-Secretary of the SAJBD, on *The Jew in the South African Scene*. In explaining his Nine-Point Programme (first stated at the Board's 14th Congress, as seen above), Saron first writes:

The major premise is this: that the fight against anti-Semitism can only be conducted in the wider context of the struggle for democracy, for the strengthening of goodwill, cooperation and mutual respect between all sections of the population ... Democracy is indivisible: if we wish to protect our own rights, we must be zealous of the rights of others.

Following in the very next sentence, however, Saron continues

We should not, however, over-simplify the situation. The causes of tension and conflict in this multi-racial South Africa are very complex. It is a mistake to believe that all racial problems here can be treated on the same level. Antagonisms between Englishman and Afrikaner where it exists, is different in type from the prejudice of Gentile against Jew and different again from the tension between European and non-European ... when one is dealing with so delicate and so difficult a subject as the social Colour-Bar.³⁴⁹

The general tone of this statement (and many like it) is not one of hostility, or even of apathy, but of sympathy towards the cause and the struggle of the South African 'bantu' nations; however, the language employed does betray a distinct binary differentiation on ethnic and racial grounds; however, this specific extract, and the specific language employed within it, betrays the fact that the true differentiation is not based on race or ethnicity (even if these words are employed or implied regularly), but on the socio-strategic position of the Jew as a privileged social unit in the larger social nexus of South Africa multicultural populace, *vis-a-vis* the 'non-European' who is an unprivileged, oppressed subjugated unit. One can clearly see a hierarchical character to this discourse of differentiation. The differentiation is not as stark, not as hostile, not as violent as the Jew's white contemporaries, but it is nonetheless present. Thus, a structural linguistic study of this extract from Saron alludes to a universal socio-psychological condition made clear by SIT, deconstruction and poststructuralism — and it alludes to two very important things.

³⁴⁹ G. Saron, 'The Jew in the South African Scene: A Discussion of the Board's Public Relations Work', *Jewish Affairs*, June, 1945, pp. 9-10.

Firstly, the Jew was implicit and complicit in a regime of truth — not a truth that he necessarily held personally, or advocated either publicly or privately, but a truth that he benefited from nonetheless — and a discourse of power — not in that it is a power that is policed, strenuously advocated or coerced by the Jewish leadership, press or community in general, but it is a power that is nonetheless held, and very reluctantly relinquished. Secondly, this extract from Saron makes it plain that, despite the sympathy, empathy and liberal attitude espoused in the particular rhetoric of Saron as a major representative of the general South African Jewish population, through his binary and hierarchical differentiation between the ‘European and the non-European’, he implicated himself in a ritual of marginalisation that might be different in character, but is definitely similar in structure, to that which was being used against the Jews through European history, and specifically in both Europe and South Africa only a decade earlier. As the Jews were cast to the margins of society throughout history due to truly arbitrary physical and ideational denominators and stereotypes, the Jew now, in his position of social privilege and potential for communal social benefit in post-War South Africa (while simultaneously condemning this very same superstructural orientation), cast the non-European to the margins of society — keeping him in sight as a discursive object to display his fealty and support of a moral system that satisfied his historical consciousness, yet keeping him at arm’s length through equally arbitrary social differentiation, so as to satisfy and maintain a privileged socio-strategic position. It ought to be noted that, in the case of the larger South African Jewish community, the discrete (and perhaps subconscious) sustenance of such discourses and such a cultural hegemony is not despicable, since it, generally speaking, might have been unintentional. It is a conglomerate of socio-psychological processes that is merely indicative of the condition; of humanity’s necessity for social validation as a component of his search for existential meaning.

Jews and Apartheid

As was mentioned earlier, the (often violent) antisemitism that had characterised the *Herenigde* Nasionale Party in the 1930s and early-1940s had receded, and Malan’s policies towards the Jewish community grew increasingly more passive, despite his general reluctance to reform immigration legislation. But the post-War euphoria — and, after the defeat of the Nazis and their hyper-nationalist/socialist alliances, the general certainty that National-Socialism was not the proper recourse for a new South Africa in an increasingly liberal and cosmopolitan world order — meant that Jews came to feel increasingly secure in the new political state of affairs. The threat to their communal and cultural well-being was disappearing, and they were regaining their political and civil privilege, even after the Jewish-supported United Party had been defeated in the 1948 general elections by the National Party.

Concerning the fact that the general threat to Jews was disappearing, some might have expected that the necessity of Jewish communal self-preservation in the light of radical antisemitism would have also disappeared, and the Jews — with special reference to their particular historic consciousness of persecution and genocide (much of which was now in very recent memory) discussed earlier — would have championed much more progressive views and policies that would have advocated for the racial equality of whites, blacks, coloureds and Asiatics, and a system of social justice that would abolish racial segregation indefinitely. But the data shows that this is not the case. Even though the newly branded National Party enjoyed political dominance, the United Party was still a strong opponent in Parliament. Jews, as they had

done after Union and during the 1930s and 1940s, gravitated towards the centre of the political spectrum, with periodic occurrences of Jewish deviation to left-of-centre, especially after the emergence of the Progressive Party in 1959. But the United Party still enjoyed the vast majority of Jewish electoral support, in both municipal and national elections, and the vast majority of Jewish politicians who were elected into power between the period of 1948 and 1970 stood for the United Party, with, again, a fair few being elected into the political echelons of the Progressive Party in the 1960s.³⁵⁰ However, even though the United Party still retained a general liberal rhetoric that preached social justice and equality, and particularly equality of opportunity for all whites in South African society, it was by no means any less intent on relinquishing the social, economic and political hegemony of whites in the country. While the language employed by the National Party espoused a crude racial dogmatism that explicitly stated the superiority of white Europeans, the United Party employed a language that was more subtle, yet no less prejudiced. The statements made by de Villiers Graaff, a prominent member of the United Party in the 1960s, betrayed the subtle racial bias of his Party. Concerning the question of the race-relationships between the Europeans and the non-Europeans (the whites and the blacks) in South Africa (especially concerning a grand array of defamatory racial policies that were being legislated and executed at this specific point in South African history), Graaff stated that racial segregation would be “based on common sense and tolerance rather than ideological orthodoxy”, and likewise made statement such as “white leadership with justice”, and “enlightened leadership and guidance of the white group in the interest of all races.”³⁵¹

However, the more liberal Progressive Party, which had also enjoyed a stream of Jewish representation and electoral support in the 1960s, advocated a nonracial state, and proposed a wide array of policies that would slowly eliminate racial segregation in the country. Among these propositions were calls for the elimination of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, as well as the Immorality Act. In addition, the Progressive Party promised to repeal all pass laws and influx control laws. The general sentiment behind this larger political agenda was that the party believed that intersubjective aspects of society — such as marriage, sexual relations, freedom of movement, equal right to economic opportunity, and so forth — should not be controlled by laws, but should be left to a person’s own determination and preference. Although this was a massive leap from the socio-racial conservatism of the National and United parties, the Progressives did betray some racial prejudice in the fine print of its political agenda; perhaps most influential — and most telling — of these were the fact that they advocated for the qualified franchise, and not the universal franchise, which would have the effect of whites retaining political and economic dominance in the country.³⁵² Shimoni notes the possibility of truth in the sentiment of the Jewish constituencies in the country, that the majority of them “spoke like Progressives, voted for the United Party, and hoped that the National Party would remain in power.”³⁵³

³⁵⁰ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, pp. 56-57.

³⁵¹ ‘The United Party’s Policy of Race Federation’, (ed.) N. J. Rhodie, *South African Dialogue*, McGraw Hill: Johannesburg, 1972, pp. 211-226.

³⁵² H. Suzman, ‘The Progressive Party’s Programme for a Multi-Racial South Africa’, *ibid.*, 1984, pp. 228-244.

³⁵³ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 58.

Despite the lingering racialism in much of the country's social and political scene, one general thing to note is the direction in which the progressive left of South Africa's political spectrum was moving, and importantly, how well represented Jews were in this constituency. Truly, it is in this strata of individuals, those that were unilaterally opposed to apartheid and the basic social tenets by which it was upheld. There is a plethora of individuals who stand out in this radical oppositional scene.

One such Jewish politician, Helen Suzman, who stands out all the more due to the fact that she not only challenged mainstream racial norms through her radical persona, but gender norms in a traditionally patriarchal society. Suzman stood out in the political echelons of the centrist/left-of-centre in that her opposition to apartheid and institutionalised racial discrimination was replete and total. Upon joining parliament through her representation of the United Party in 1953, she would go on to be a light of radical liberalism and humanism for thirty-six years, until her retirement in 1989. Although Suzman started her parliamentary career in the United Party, she soon realised that her party was too passive concerning the race question to pose any real threat to the National Party's absolute resoluteness for the unilateral institutional engendering of white supremacy, and in 1959, she was one of the United Party members who split from the party ranks to form the Progressive Party, where she was one of the prime exemplars of liberal integrity and valour, stubbornly opposing every single segregationist measure that the apartheid regime tabled. During her time in office, Suzman had to endure not only racist fundamentalism as a liberal, but also frequent bouts of antisemitic and misogynistic attacks on her person as a Jewish woman.³⁵⁴ The culmination of her work and advocacy was the new Republic of 1994, where a state based on racial equality for which she had fought all her life was finally realised.

But regardless of how well represented Jews were in the centre/left of South Africa's political scene, their representation dwindled in comparison to that of Jewish representation in the far left, especially in extra-parliamentary opposition. Even though the Communist Party was banned in 1950, and the country saw the hostile and violent suppression of communism — and everything that was associated with communism — the 1950s to 1970s were [tainted]? with the names of Jews who were associated with communism, radical leftism and political dissent of the apartheid state. Perhaps the most famous example of this was the Treason Trial of 1956, which lasted nearly five years until the end of the first quarter of 1961. The trial started as a crackdown on some of the most well-known suspects of political treason and conspiracy of insurrection. There were 156 suspects on trial, twenty-three of whom were white, and half of those were Jews, all of whom were at one stage or another officially associated with radical leftism and communism. Those Jews on trial were Yetta Barenblatt, Hymie Barsel, Lionel (Rusty) Bernstein, Leon Levy, Norman Levy, Sydney Shall, Joe Slovo, Ruth Slovo, Sonia Bunting, Lionel Forman, Isaac Horvitch, Ben Turok, Jacqueline Arenstein, and Ronald Press.³⁵⁵ In addition to those Jews who were on trial, Jews made up a big chunk of the defendant's legal counsel as well. Most prominent figures defending those accused of insurrection were Norman Rosenberg, Israel Maisels and Sydney Kentridge (the son of the legendary Jewish United Party parliamentarian, Morris Kentridge, who is mentioned earlier in this chapter). Ironically, the state prosecutor

³⁵⁴ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...?*, p. 60.

³⁵⁵ D. Y. Saks, 'The Jewish Accused in the South African Treason Trial', *Jewish Affairs* Vol. 52, no.1, 1997, pp. 43–47.

was Oswald Pirow, former member of the National Party who was seminal in the Quota Act of 1930, as well as self-professed anti-Semite, Nazi-sympathiser and leader of the socialist, anti-parliamentarian Nuwe Orde organisation throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Ideologically, the trial was an epic battle between obscurantist, fundamentalist white supremacy in the one corner, and progressive, humanist, liberal universalism in the other. Even at the famous arrests made at Lilliesleaf farm in Rivonia in 1963, all five white dissenters who were arrested with prominent revolutionaries — most notably Ahmed Kathrada and Walter Sisulu — were Jews. Arthur Goldreich, Lionel Bernstein, Hilliard Festenstein, Denis Goldberg, and Bob Hepple, together with Harold Wolpe (was intercepted later on) were tried at the Rivonia trials, together with Nelson Mandela, for High Treason. And in the decades to come, Jewish names would continue to saturate the radical opposition to apartheid.

It would seem, then, that if one is to truly understand how Jewish identity was constructed and consolidated in the particular social and political context of the South African Diaspora, then one ought to at least account for the social phenomena that Jews were overrepresented in the sectors of radical resistance to a state whose institutional orientation was rooted in nationalist dogma that held social differentiation and segregation as some of its main ideational pillars.

Jewish Radicalism and its epistemic roots in Orientalism

It should at the offset again be noted that there was a distinct differentiation between various Jewish constituencies in South Africa when looking at how they viewed their own Jewish identity, or how they navigated their social and political existence based on their Jewishness as either a predetermining factor for social and political behaviour, or as a social and ethnic feature that had no or little influence on a Jewish individual's social and political consciousness. These can, generally speaking, be divided into two categories; firstly, regardless of major Jewish representation in far-left politics and communist causes, the vast majority of Jews were, if not supporters of, then conspirators of white supremacy and the social mechanics involved in advancing it. It is true that Jews were extremely well represented in the centrist and left-of-centre political scene, and that, on average, they were far more liberal than the majority of other whites in the country. This has often been attributed by many social theorists as a remnant of their cultural and religious consciousness, especially based on values such as *tzedakah*, a concept meaning charity but implying a universal Jewish principle of social justice. When studying the religious tenets of Judaism, the heroes and protagonists of Hebrew canon have often been the oppressed and the ousted, the de-rooted and the marginalised. One need only to think of Egyptian Jews leading up to the Exodus; David after being pursued by a jealous Saul; the Persian Jews in the time of Haman.³⁵⁶ Judaism and Hebrew-ism is a collective communal character, a culture, born from struggle and adversity. It would only seem logical that the Jew's religious character would compel him to empathise with those who found themselves in the same marginalised strategic position in which the values of Judaism are phenomenologically rooted. This religious account for Jewish liberalism, especially in the case of South Africa, seems to be reflected in the sociological census of Immanuel Suttner. Suttner gathered an immense amount of sociological and anthropological material based on vast amounts of interviews with Jews who had participated in the struggle against

³⁵⁶ Respectively, The Book of Exodus, *NKJV*; The First Book of Samuel, Chapter 24, *NKJV*; The Book of Esther, *NKJV*.

apartheid, as either centrist liberals or leftist radicals. His conclusions, summarily, were that the socio-psychological basis for Jewish activism was that: “the aspect of Jewish tradition they link up to is the tradition of non-conformism, rebuke and solidarity with the underdog.”³⁵⁷ This seems to track with the theory that Jewish religiosity and cultural conservatism, whether conscious or unconscious, has been at the basis of Jewish activism. However, even though this might add to a holistic explanation of Jewish activism as a major character of one component of collective Jewish identity in South Africa, these religious and cultural-historical explanations do not account for the passive complicity of most Jews in the apartheid system.

The historical experience of Jews has time and again concluded that the more inclusive, tolerant and liberal the society they live in, the more communal security and social assimilation they would experience. The general historical experience has been that intolerance of any form has often been directed at Jews, and when it was not explicitly aimed at Jews or Judaism, its larger societal structure ended up affecting them adversely anyway. However, in South Africa, and especially since the National Party’s victory in 1948, the Jewish community, now seen as white and European, and thus qualifying for full social and political status with all its intended privileges, experienced a social peace and prosperity that has seldom been the case for millennia.

*Because the Jews in South Africa were part and parcel of the privileged white minority, their welfare was unmistakably dependent on conformity with the white consensus ... to challenge the very foundations of the white consensus, which liberally allowed equal opportunities and rights for all whites but denied them to nonwhites, was perceived by most Jews—including many who deplored apartheid—as courting a clear and present danger.*³⁵⁸

In the words of Medding (1981), the primary concern for Jews has always been the interest and security of the community at large, and although Jews were in general more liberal, liberalism has never been an end in itself, especially if it threatened Jewish interests and social security. The majority of South African Jews have always aimed “to achieve a maximum degree of stability and security, irrespective of the nature of the regime.”³⁵⁹ Generally speaking, those more orthodox segments of the South African Jewish community were those that were more complicit in the apartheid system; and many of the Jewish radicals shamelessly and openly identified as atheists. As for these radicals, there seems to be an interesting socio-psychological interchange when analysing the constitution and consolidation of their identity as opposed to the more orthodox, more cultural and more centrist Jewish constituencies.

The majority of Jewish radical activists sympathised with, endorsed or fought for communism, a cause whose ideological tenets preached a dogmatic universalism that saw social justice and universal equality as the primary political, social and economic cause. Subcultural identities — and in this case subordinate identities — were irrelevant when considering the larger societal causes of the far-left movement. Thus,

³⁵⁷ I. Suttner, (ed.) *Cutting through the Mountain: Interviews with South African Jewish Activists*, Viking: London, 1997, p. 620.

³⁵⁸ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 76.

³⁵⁹ P. Medding, “Toward a General Theory of Jewish Political Interest and Behavior in the Contemporary World,” (ed.) Daniel J. Elazar, *Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses*, Turtledove Publishing: Ramat Gan, 1981, p. 321.

inclusion in the social groups and political sects that held belief and behaviour that espoused communist ideology as the primary prerequisite for ingroup membership under the normative superordinate identity that communism aspired to, required a denunciation of subgroup identities, including a Jew's cultural and religious identity.

In the *Jewish Quarterly* of 1993, well known Jewish activist Albie Sachs said that his role in the insurrection of the apartheid state apparatus was not preconditioned by his historical and cultural consciousness as a Jew: "I did not feel in my bones that the central and dominating feature of my existence was my Jewishness."³⁶⁰ There are, however, cases that diverge from that of Sachs'. Another famous radical activist, Pauline Podbrey, stated that her Jewish identity was the core feature that evoked her role as a radical activist and a communist; "I've always felt very conscious of being Jewish, and that my Communist sympathies had their roots in Jewish ethics and Jewish morality." She added that "I think that by not aligning yourself with the oppressed you are betraying the Jewish tradition."³⁶¹ Another avid communist radical Jew, Baruch Hirson, while stating that he was neither a religious nor a cultural Jew, notes that

*The ethnic origin and classlessness, the studentship and professionalism, the political awareness and the presence in prison were not entirely disconnected, at least in my case, from being born a Jew. It was a Jewishness that denied many of its attributes, but there was a residue, harking back to some past that helped mark out the trajectory along which I journeyed.*³⁶²

It becomes interesting to see how the radical, humanist proclivities of many of the leftist Jews in South Africa was indeed linked to their Jewishness — to some, it was an acute awareness of their cultural and moral Jewish heritage, but for the majority, who claimed to have absolutely no self-consciousness with Jewish morality, religion or culture, the only link between their radical social personas and their Jewish heritage was a vague thread that linked their current social identity as a minority with the oppression and subjugation of their forebears, and framed this historic consciousness in terms of their social marginality and a suppression of complete social self-determination. This historical consciousness of Jews and their self-identification as a marginalised social group struggling for social self-determination is not new; it has been observed throughout history in various Diasporas; but it does seem to have a unique element in the case of South Africa. Such radical insurgency born from a historical consciousness of prosecution, oppression and subjugation would seem reasonable in the case of Jewish occupation of a social system that was explicitly aimed against them as a unique social collective, as might have well been the case in much of Europe and Russia in the 20th century. But in South Africa, Jews have enjoyed the full range of political and civil rights and liberties, and were [implied]? as benefactors in the social structure that upheld white supremacy, even during the period of heightened antisemitism in the 1930s and 1940s; collective action based on a historical consciousness was not necessitated for social and ethnic survival. Shimoni notes that

³⁶⁰ A. Sachs, 'Being the Same and Being Different', *The Jewish Quarterly* Vol. 40, no. 1, 1993, p 13.

³⁶¹ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain ...*, pp. 60, 70.

³⁶² B. Hirson, *Revolutions in my Life*, University of Witwatersrand Press: Johannesburg, 1995, p. 97.

*even there, the segmented social structure of white society and the long shadow of Afrikaner nationalist antisemitism rendered Jews outsiders to a degree sufficient to generate in many of them alienation from the established order, conventions, and ideological norms of society. This facilitated the adoption of counternormative attitudes and ideologies by a disproportionate number of Jews relative to other whites.*³⁶³

It is here that we might observe the role and tradition of Orientalism, and antisemitism as a sub-disciplinary arm of Orientalism, in the adoption of these attitudes by Jews.

As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, Orientalism can be studied through using structural linguistic analysis (Saussurean) and deconstructive analysis (Derridean). Orientalist discourse, as we have analysed in the chapter dealing with the history of antisemitism and Orientalism, is always constructed in a binary and a hierarchical fashion. As was explained in the first chapter, this is due to the fact that a discourse is a temporal and social conveyance of meaning and value to any intersubjective reality through the process of language, and that the very transmittance of any sort of meaning and value through language (or any other medium, for that matter) is done through the differentiation between signs; due to this, language itself is fundamentally dependent on the process of differentiation, and is thus constructed in a binary and a hierarchical fashion, where not only horizontal differentiation takes place, but also vertical differentiation, where abstract classes of superiority and inferiority are conferred. The keepers of a regime of truth, and the authorities presiding over a discourse of power, subjugate — both ontologically through military occupation, colonisation and politics, and epistemically through ideology and culture — the Other — its social contestant — to a position of social inferiority. Orientalism, old and new, has been this long historic process, where the existing parties in this historic discourse were the Orient and the Occident, where Orientalism was the discourse constructed, policed and enforced by Orientalists, so as to ensure both ontological and epistemological Occidental superiority and Oriental inferiority. This study has argued thus far that Orientalism refers just as much to historic discourses of power implicating Jews, as those implicating Muslims or Arabs. Thus, antisemitism is a valid subdivision of Orientalism.

So far, this study has sufficiently explained how Jews were implicated in Orientalist discourses, referring specifically to the work of Ernst Renan, and his Semitic studies. Renan's linguistic and historic-cultural analysis of Semites (where he focused mainly on the study of Hebraic monotheism and civilisation) focused on the Semite-Aryan differentiation, where, perhaps subtly and masked in language filled with humanistic and scientific sentiment, the Semite was resolutely cast as civilisationally inferior to that of the Indo-European, or Aryan. It was this specific Aryan-Semite narrative that has been proven to have influenced the atrocious antisemitism of Nazi Germany — invariably leading to the Holocaust — which itself was highly influential to the socialist-nationalist dogmas that engendered antisemitic rhetoric among much of the Afrikaner *volk* in the 1930s and 1940s.

But it is this fundamental element of horizontal and vertical differentiation based in the very core tenets of linguistic structure that underpins any narrative, rhetoric and discourse — and in the case of this study, the very narrative, discourse and rhetoric that upheld Orientalism, modern Orientalism, antisemitism, and 20th

³⁶³ G. Shimoni, *Community and Conscience ...*, p. 78.

century South African antisemitism — that might account for the controversial orientation of the social identity of most of the Jewish radicals, despite the fact that they did not strongly identify with the core cultural, moral or religious norms and values of Judaism. The link that many of the Jewish radicals had with a past, that identitarian element that was a remnant of a historical Jewishness that underpinned their collective assumption that they were not only different, but that they were deemed inferior, in any social system in which they functioned, despite the fact that the social system assured them the full range of civil and political benefits and liberties that they had scarcely ever been afforded at any point in their history. It was this engendered sense of differentiation, of Otherness that was a product of a [multi-cross]? temporal discourse of alterity, inhibit in any collective social interaction and cultural exchange that they had had throughout millennia with Europe, that could (at least in part) explain the radical temperament and hyper-humanism of a certain substratum of Jews in South Africa during an extended period of racial segregation, whether or not the Jews were on any social or political level adversely impacted by this racial segregation. In essence, it was this duality, this tradition of differentiation that seems [to be inhibit of]?? and presupposed by the human condition — and in essence the way that it effected the Jews in violently adverse ways throughout the whole of their collective, global history — that is the object of this study.

Conclusion

Although the study is an interdisciplinary one — focusing on the main academic disciplines of philosophy, social psychology and academic history and historiography, but drawing from a vast amount of disciplines throughout the academic scope of the social sciences and the humanities — and deals with several bodies of theory and a specific set of academic vocabularies that have been accused of being reductionist, anti-foundationalist and generally abstract, and with little consequence to the actual world and lived experiences of people in general, the intended value of this study is the practical application of its findings and its conclusions in the modern day and for future generations. Regardless of whether any of the progress made by humanity — in the name of liberalism, human rights and egalitarianism — was nothing more than a teleological meta-narrative that, in a Foucauldian sense, is not progress, but merely a massive transition of the priorities and values that humanity transferred onto the moral subjects of historical discourse more generally (which is to say humanity, itself), humans, while facing the same challenges that they have done throughout the totality of their history — whether these challenges are inherent to the human condition, or whether they are derived from natural circumstances partially or wholly in the control of humanity — are much better equipped to face them and solve them, and have invariably led to a world where (generally speaking) human welfare, dignity and meaningfulness is not only the principle aim, but also the underlying condition, of much of what our species has to offer in the modern day and age. However, despite these successes made in the name of humanity, there still lingers the ridiculous remnants of a virus that is hate and violence that can be unilaterally traced throughout the history of our species. In summary the effects have been needless human suffering on a truly inconceivable scale, in terms of how long it has lasted and in terms of how many it has affected. These have taken the forms of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, religious fundamentalism and entitlement, just to name a few; there are doubtlessly many more, all of which are heinous and none of which are excusable. It is my opinion that it is the duty of every human to progress himself/herself, his/her community, and humanity in general towards a world where these above-mentioned hosts of human suffering are, if not eradicated, then at least actively mitigated. Every person ought to have a moral conscience that is based on the effects of their actions and the ideologies, social norms and societal values that they either actively endorse and thus underly the motivations behind their behaviour, or that they allow to exist and thrive among their fellow humans. This thesis study is the product of my moral conscience, and my effort to live up to my responsibility to try and transcend humanity — especially that geographical and subcultural constituency of humanity that I grew up in — from a state that incubates these arbiters of human suffering, to a state that allows for true human flourishing and wellbeing, towards a world of inclusion and true meaningfulness.

What this thesis has thus done was to study and *expose*, through a rather vast historical and theoretical scope, the social conditions in which the discriminatory atmosphere behind the kind of human suffering that humans are the cause of, and so often refuse, either due to negligence or through active participation, to be the solution to, is allowed to thrive. The conclusion is that the underlying condition of humanity is alterity; and alterity — unchecked — leads to segregation and discrimination, social conditions in which human sovereignty, freedom and a right towards self-determination is utterly refused and neglected. This thesis is a proposed solution

— a means towards an alterity which *is* checked, dissected, analysed, and hopefully understood in such way in which its toxic consequences can be avoided.

The particular arbiter of human suffering — the particular type of segregation and discrimination, of unchecked alterity — that is studied here is racism, and its specific form that is the effect of a particular type of Orientalism: antisemitism; and additionally (and to the effect of the broader scope of my thesis) how those that were the intended victims of such discrimination, reacted in a social and political environment that endorsed it, to the tragic consequence of others.

This study started with the explanation of the theory to be employed throughout its entirety. It first looked at the school of poststructuralism — or as it is interchangeable referred to at certain points: postmodernism — looking specifically at the structural linguistics of Saussure and the deconstruction of Derrida. Through this brief analysis, it explains the basic structural tenets of language and semantics, and how everything is dependent on alterity, which is the arbitrary or necessary differentiation between various social groups for the purposes of social security and cohesion. The first chapter then continues in giving a brief analysis of the work of Foucault to display how the effects of these — and their culmination in alterity — can be seen in the cultural more generally, and how these relate both to the intrasubjective and intersubjective components of humanity. The chapter then both expands and focuses this theoretical study of alterity to Said's Orientalism, to show how large-scale alterity has manifested itself in the historical relationship between the East and West, particularly the Near East and West, or the Occident and the Orient, or otherwise the Middle East and Europe. What Said displays with great efficacy is the truly lopsided nature of the power-relationship between these two civilisational factions, and how they have been characterised by both the epistemic and ontological oppression of the East by the West. The chapter then ends by briefly demonstrating how this phenomenon of alterity has historically and culturally impacted, and still is impacting, the Jew.

The study then moves on to a brief, yet concise, analysis of the history of antisemitism throughout various epochs in history, and by using the theories explained prior, displayed in detail how antisemitism was always the effect of alterity, and was always fuelled by superstition and social myths grounded in reductionist essentialism, fundamentalist obscurantism and pseudoscience. The chapter also looked at the link between antisemitism and Orientalism, by showing how one of the most consequential antisemitic narratives — the Aryan-Semite narrative — was constructed and disseminated, and was ultimately used to rationalise and legitimate the antisemitism in 20th century Germany by Hitler and the Nazis, which would invariably have a massive impact on the form and the scope of radical antisemitism in South Africa at around the same period in the 20th century.

Since South Africa is the historic-geographic location of the case study, and the Afrikaner the historic-cultural constituency responsible for the radical antisemitism in 20th century South Africa, the study then turned to a historical and theoretical analysis of the history of Afrikaner social identity, and particularly Afrikaner nationalist identity, which was the responsible for the hard right factionalism which endorsed in the segregation and discrimination of the Jews in the country in the 1930s and 1940s. It is also at this point in which the study explained one of its extremely important theoretical component — SIT. It gave a brief

overview of its history, and used it as a theoretical prism through which to view the genesis and the development of the Afrikaner identity into the 20th century.

The study then turned its attention to the history of antisemitism in South Africa, and how it was invariably a product of narratives that have been used to legitimate and rationalise antisemitism — often to the effect of the segregation, displacement and murder of Jews on a horrifically mass scale — throughout history. It reflects on the unique cultural and social relationship between the Jew and the Afrikaner, and how alterity manifested itself as a continuation of a discursive legacy of Orientalism, both old and new, and an enactment of the racial and Orientalist fanaticism that was to be found in Hitlerite Germany, and was the lead-up to the most atrocious War in human history.

The study then finally moves its attention to how, in the wake of such segregationist, discriminatory fanaticism that could be found in the hard right Afrikanerdom towards the Jew — and in the greater stratum of Afrikanerdom towards the country's native and Asiatic population more generally, which manifested itself in the form of white supremacy and the atrocious racial legacy that is apartheid — the Jewish population in South Africa navigated its collective identity *vis-a-vis* a state whose racial policies reflected that by which its ancestry had collectively suffered for millennia. The findings were that, in general, the Jews' historic consciousness allowed for — and according to the accounts of many Jews themselves, compelled them — towards a moral identity in which they would stand for the moral transcendence of South African society from a state based on moral stasis that acted as an incubator for needless and arbitrary human suffering, towards a society where human well-being and meaningfulness, and individual autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination were the prime drivers of collective action and state policy.

In many ways, this thesis is a continuation of those liberal, progressive and radical Jews who offered up their own security and privilege to fight for a morality that would heed and check alterity, and therefore needless human suffering. This thesis is an attempt to provide an exploration of, and an explanation for, the scope and the particular character of the injustice which still haunts humanity today. It is a dot, a mere speck, in the totality of the work that has been done by so many to right the wrongs of history.

I argued that interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological analysis could be complementary, and not conflicting; the author believes that this study was successfully displayed how the empirical and positivist strengths of social psychology, the abstract and phenomenological considerations of philosophy and postmodernism, and the in-depth and detailed study of historical material [by history and historiography] did not serve to reduce the capacity, scope and influence of any one of these fields respectively, but served to complement and enhance one another, successfully filling in the 'blind spots' that any one of the studies might have had on their own. Philosophy lent much interpretive power to the historical and experimental material from history and psychology; history gave temporal and cultural substance to the phenomenological and logical considerations of philosophy, and likewise provided psychology with much-needed cross-temporal and intercultural context to illuminate the truly intricate nature of intersubjective interactions between humans, either individually or collectively; and psychology provided certain measures of probability to the extremely subjective nature of historical studies, historiography and philosophy.

Interdisciplinary collaborations into future studies in the social sciences could only serve to enhance the field and illuminate this complicated matter that is humanity.

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