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THE CHANGING FOCUS AND PRIORITIES OF POST-COLD WAR CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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By

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To my study leader for his guidance

DEDICATION

To my family for their patience

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

In the context of civilian intelligence, *focus* refers to the types of threats and opportunities that are relevant to national security, while *priorities* refer to the rank order of threats. Priorities, however, may also refer to policy priorities, in which case these will, in fact, largely determine the intelligence focus. The two concepts are, however, at times used interchangeably. Priorities could also precede focus, meaning that priorities could indicate broad areas of attention, and focus more specific aspects of priorities.

It is also difficult to place focus and priorities in only one period, as they frequently span different periods. A priority does not necessarily disappear from one period to another, and the importance of a specific priority may change within different periods. An example of this is terrorism. Before 9/11, terrorism was a focus of the United States (US) intelligence services, although the threat did not warrant terrorism to be the number one priority (Lowenthal, 2006: 233).

An important aspect in determining the focus and priorities of intelligence is the relationship between intelligence agencies and the political leadership. The political leadership must provide clear guidelines and direction to ensure that the intelligence agencies are focused on the right issues and priorities. In a democracy such as the US, the intelligence agencies should not make the final decision about the focus and priorities of their activities. The focus should mainly be influenced by the national security priorities, as approved by the political leadership. The focus and priorities, however, can at times be identified by the agencies, for approval by the political leadership. The legal

mandate of intelligence agencies, furthermore, also provides a broad framework for focus.

The main objective of this study is to discuss and analyse the changes in US civilian intelligence focus and priorities with specific reference to the post-Cold War period. Secondary objectives have as goal to determine what exactly caused these changes, and to establish whether the focus and priorities under discussion are unique to a specific period or whether there is a degree of overlapping. Is there indeed a difference among focus in the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods, or only a change in priorities?

2. LITERATURE SURVEY

Official documents referring to US intelligence focus and priorities include the *US National Intelligence Strategy*, published in 2005, and documents of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the US House of Representatives. Acts that had an influence on the functioning of the intelligence services include the *National Security Act of 1947* and the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*.

Various secondary sources deal with intelligence focus in general. One such book, by Todd (2004), focuses on the “perspectives and aim” of the major intelligence agencies. Although dealing specifically with the post-9/11 period in terms of terrorism, it also provides information on priorities such as economic intelligence that originated during the Cold War period.

The influence of foreign policy on the focus of the US intelligence services should not be underestimated. The book by Lieber (1997) is noteworthy, as he looks at the inward and outward policy trends of the US in terms of foreign policy, and the resulting influence on intelligence priorities. Cameron (2002) specifically looks at the post-Cold War policy of the US and indicates that there will be increasingly challenging environmental concerns in the future. It can be argued that these concerns will be high on the US intelligence

agencies' list of priorities. Hansen (2005: 677-678) states that future priorities would include aspects such as demographic and economic imbalances, acute resource shortages, rapid technological development and proliferation as well as poor governance.

With regard to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) specifically, various sources are available. Richelson (2008) places the CIA in perspective, while Johnson (1989) deals with the CIA in a democratic society. Of particular relevance, in Johnson, is the chapter on the purpose of US intelligence. Blum (1986) provides historic background regarding CIA operations in the Cold War era. From these operations it is possible to deduce the focus and priorities of the CIA in the Cold War era.

Goodman (1995: 3) argues that the existence of the Cold War helped to determine the importance of many targets as these were linked to the conflict between the two (then) superpowers, namely the US and the Soviet Union. Lowenthal (2006), in turn, provides a relevant input in a chapter that discusses post-9/11 intelligence priorities.

The book by Weiner (2007) discusses the CIA under various presidents. Of special importance is the relationship between the CIA and the different administrations. In this regard, Lowenthal (2006: 178) also indicates that the role of the policy maker is important. The longer the policy makers are in power, the higher are their expectations that the intelligence agencies must produce quality information on demand. This is important, as the policy makers might create a situation where the demands on the intelligence agencies to comply with requests become unrealistic. Stevenson (2005: 74) states that in the case of 9/11, it was not only a failure by the intelligence agencies but also other government agencies as well as many levels of administrators, which resulted in the failure of intelligence.

Although various sources are available that refer to priorities, these are not clearly divided into specific periods. Furthermore, it is not clearly indicated what exactly caused or causes the change in focus and priorities. It would

appear that global events and issues, rather than the intelligence agencies or the political leadership, are often responsible for the shift in focus. The study will thus attempt to determine whether the focus and priorities can indeed be divided into definite periods and what role the intelligence agencies play in the shift in focus and priorities.

3. IDENTIFICATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The principal research question addressed by this study is whether there was indeed a clear shift in focus and priorities by civilian intelligence in the US after the end of the Cold War as well as after 9/11?

Secondary questions are:

- Did the US intelligence agencies lead this change in focus and priorities, or did events force them to make such a change?
- What role, if any, did the various administrations play in determining a shift in focus and priorities?

Subsequent to the research questions, the study is based on the following assumptions:

- Although the post-Cold War and post-9/11 priorities changed, the intelligence focus continued to include some of the Cold War period threats.
- The focus and priorities of the US intelligence agencies were largely influenced by events, rather than by changed perceptions.
- The relationship between the various administrations and the intelligence services determines the focus and priorities of intelligence significantly.

The study will focus on the US civilian intelligence agency, namely the CIA, which is the primary US intelligence agency for intelligence analysis, clandestine human intelligence collection and covert action. It has also played

a leading role in the development of technical collection systems (Richelson, 2008:17).

The research will home in on three different periods, namely the Cold War period, the post-Cold War period up to 2001, and the post-9/11 period. In the Cold War period there was a clearly defined main threat (Soviet Communism) that superseded all other priorities. All intelligence activities were related to the competition between the two superpowers. In that period, problem areas, such as the over-reliance on technical collection, could be ignored under the guise of national security. The Cold War legacies still influence intelligence currently (Lowenthal, 2006:230).

The second period, starting at the end of the Cold War, represented a very problematic period for the US intelligence agencies and, indeed, for all intelligence agencies. The clearly defined boundaries of the Cold War were no longer present. The main justification for the existence of US agencies, such as the CIA, had suddenly changed. In that transitional period, the US intelligence agencies did not receive the leadership they needed, and the new role of the intelligence agencies was largely defined by the agencies themselves. Focus and priorities were chosen without clear political direction. That period was effectively a period of survival and reform for the US intelligence agencies.

The third period of this study has as a point of departure the 9/11 attacks on the US. This event had a profound effect on the focus and priorities of the US intelligence agencies, which were researched in the study up to the period ending in 2008.

4. METHODOLOGY

The study is both descriptive and analytical, and a brief comparison of US intelligence priorities and focus in the various periods discussed, are included in the final chapter.

The research was conducted within the scope of the theory of strategic intelligence and threat perception. However, intelligence agencies do not operate in a vacuum and it is necessary to place intelligence in perspective. In reality, many factors influence the functioning and focus of intelligence agencies. The political system, and the manner in which it is applied in a particular state, as well as the mandate of intelligence agencies, are three such factors.

The chapter on theory analyses the concept and purpose of intelligence in order to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of the case study. As part of the analysis, the functions and role of intelligence are also discussed. In this regard Shulsky and Schmitt (2002) and Lowenthal (2006) provided a baseline in discussing the functions and role of intelligence. Relevant primary sources, such as the *US National Security Act of 1947,* and various US National Security Council Directives were utilised to analyse the mandate and focus of US intelligence agencies.

Other primary sources for the study included US Commission Reports, for example, *The 9/11 Commission Report*: publications of the US Senate, for example, *The US: Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate (2007),* and statements by members of the US Congress. Additional primary sources comprised speeches by politicians and directors-general of the relevant agencies, US National Security Council Directives and Presidential Executive Orders.

5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The research is structured as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter outlines the context, research problem, assumptions, methodology and structure of the study.

Chapter 2: The concept of intelligence and national security

This chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which deals with the concept and purpose of intelligence in modern society. The second section discusses the relationship between national security and intelligence focus and priorities, with specific reference to civilian intelligence.

Chapter 3: United States civilian intelligence focus and priorities in the Cold War period

Chapter three provides an historical overview of the US civilian intelligence focus and priorities, and shows that the primary focus and priority was the Soviet Union and its allies. Other focus areas, such as terrorism existed, but were deemed secondary to the perceived Soviet threat, or as an extension of the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. The legal mandate of the CIA is also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 4: United States civilian intelligence focus and priorities in the post-Cold War period up to September 2001

This chapter deals with the difficulties the US intelligence agencies experienced in determining focus and priorities in the post-Cold War period. In particular, the fact is addressed that the various US administrations struggled to provide clear direction to the intelligence agencies. Of importance is the fact that, after the Cold War, no clear-cut enemy existed and this had a crucial

bearing on the various intelligence agencies and, especially, on the CIA. It would appear that, in this period, the main thrust of the CIA was on survival. It attempted to please the various administrations by trying to comply with all requests.

Chapter 5: United States civilian intelligence focus and priorities in the post-9/11 period

The events of 9/11 had a fundamental effect on the priorities and focus of US intelligence agencies. The US-led 'War on terror' became one of the principal drivers of intelligence focus and priorities. Other issues, such as nuclear proliferation also received ever-increasing attention.

Chapter 6: Evaluation

The final chapter comprises a summary as well as an evaluation of the assumptions formulated in the introductory chapter and briefly compares the focus and priorities of civilian intelligence in the US in the different periods.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to address the focus and priorities of civilian intelligence in the US, the first section of chapter two will examine the concept of intelligence, its main functions, and the relationship between intelligence and policy.

The second section of this chapter will deal with the concept of national security and threat perception that underwent certain changes during and especially after the Cold War. These changes need to be spelt out in order to link them to the changing intelligence focus and priorities.

2. THE CONCEPT AND PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

This section deals mainly with aspects that are linked to determining priorities as well as the results of the intelligence process. Of special significance is the relationship between intelligence and policy that has a major influence on determining priorities. Various definitions are also provided in order to describe the purpose of intelligence.

2.1 The Purpose of Intelligence

The term *intelligence* has different meanings at various times. Intelligence may refer to a final product, it may also represent the processes and actions in finalising the product, or it might refer to an organisation such as the CIA (Lowenthal, 2006: 9). Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 2) divide intelligence into three similar fields, namely information, activity, and organisation. Kent (1966:

9) supports these interpretations by stating that intelligence can imply knowledge, an organisation, or an activity.

Intelligence collection is neither responsible for the formulation of objectives, nor the drafting of policies, nor the making of plans nor operational aspects. It is primarily a tool for policy, be it a foreign, defensive or domestic policy. The purpose of intelligence is to see that policy makers are generally well informed (Kent, 1966: 182).

A broad definition of intelligence is provided by Jordan (Jordan et al, 1999: 143)**,** namely that, "intelligence in the simplest sense is the knowledge about events, trends, and personalities that may affect the observer – or the country, institution, or military service for which the observer works – in some immediate or immediately foreseen situation". In a later study Johnson (2007: 1) states that intelligence is produced in the hope of "achieving a deeper understanding of activities at home or ... around the world".

Lowenthal (2006: 2) is of the opinion that intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons, namely "to avoid strategic surprise, to provide long-term expertise, to support the policy process, and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods".

The purpose of intelligence is then to provide accurate and timely warnings to decision makers in governments as far as possible. Its traditional warning function is related to the national security concerns of governments. Intelligence is needed by governments for policy purposes to facilitate their national security interests and deal with threats. (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 1).

2.2 The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence explained as a product of an organisation presents a number of difficulties. However, intelligence as an activity is even more problematic. The processes or activities of intelligence can be defined as "product[s] resulting

from collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all collected information" (Jordan et al, 1999: 143). Lowenthal (2006: 55 - 64) expands on these processes of intelligence by stating that it consists of being able to indicate requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and consumption, as well as feedback.

Johnson (2007: 366) indicates that the process begins with intelligence officials and policy officials planning what information to gather that is related to threats and opportunities. After planning, information is collected, processed and analysed, then produced and disseminated. Johnson (2007: 366), however, also adds that the process will then start all over again. Existing requirements may change and new ones may be added. He emphasises that intelligence is a continuous cyclical process and not a linear task.

Nonetheless, the intelligence process has to begin at some point. In this regard Herman (1996: 285) states that those who use intelligence, the consumers, start the process by indicating the kind of information that is needed. Intelligence capabilities are always limited, so priorities must be set, with some requirements receiving more attention, others less, and others perhaps little or even no consideration (Lowenthal, 2006: 54).

One of the most continuous problems surrounding intelligence is deciding on which particular areas shall serve as priorities. Equally important is deciding on the order of each priority. Senior intelligence managers are expected to translate the needs of the consumers into concrete requirements. These particular needs serve to guide the collectors while obtaining raw data (Herman, 1996: 285).

The next step in the intelligence cycle is the one where analysts have to transform the raw data into a finished product. It is worthwhile to note that a distinction has to be made between intelligence and information. Information is data of which the value cannot be determined immediately; it is the raw, unprocessed data, while intelligence is the product which has been

processed. Intelligence is information collected, organised, or analysed (Simms, 1995: 3). Value has thus been added to the information and intelligence is the result. In this regard Kent (1996: 3) indicates that intelligence is knowledge. Knowledge then refers to processed information, namely intelligence.

During the analysis activity the analysts attempt to envision possible or likely scenarios by analysing the flow of information and providing decision makers with background projections against which to measure current policy and provide action alternatives. The analysts may also suggest action alternatives to policy makers and provide a basis for an informed choice from among them (Jordan et al, 1999: 143).

The distribution process follows the analysis activity. However, it is imperative to note that in practice the distribution activity is not a final step. As indicated, the intelligence cycle is a continuous process. After distribution to the various consumers, feedback will be provided to indicate changing needs and define new requirements (Herman, 1996: 285). Furthermore, it must be stressed that at any given point in the intelligence cycle, needs can change. Input can therefore influence a change in priorities at any time.

2.3 The Scope of Intelligence

This section provides an overview of intelligence with the aim of placing elements of intelligence in perspective that have a bearing on intelligence focus and priorities as well as on products.

2.3.1 Levels of Intelligence

A primary distinction identified is the one between strategic and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence is “knowledge and foreknowledge of the world”. It represents attempts by leaders to understand the risks and gains on a national and/or international level (Johnson, 2007: 1).

Strategic intelligence addresses perceived dangers over a longer period and in broader terms in order to inform policy makers about decisions on general security preparedness. The challenge of strategic warning is to help policy officials decide – without any specific indicators – which of the many general possible threats deserve more attention (Davis, 2007: 173 - 174). For Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 2), strategic warning implies emphasising the changes in the character of a threat.

Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, is much narrower. It refers to the events and conditions relating to specific battlefields or issues (Johnson, 2007: 1). Lowenthal (2006: 250 - 252) provides “dominant battlefield awareness” as an example of tactical intelligence. In this example, all information is available to all commanders at all levels.

Johnson (2007: 1) also distinguishes between global (international) and local (national) intelligence. In the former instance intelligence may focus on dangers and opportunities in foreign countries. In the latter case it focuses on domestic issues. National intelligence must concern itself with threats against the state’s ability to govern or the state’s very existence (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 4). However, in practice the line between international and national intelligence is frequently blurred as internal groups also have links and contacts in the international arena.

A link also exists between intelligence and law enforcement. Law enforcement uses intelligence as a tool while civilian intelligence sometimes deals with international crime as the latter traverses more than one country. Examples of international crime include terrorism and narcotics trafficking (Lowenthal, 2006: 236 - 244). The difference between them is apparent in that law enforcement focuses on the punishment of individuals who engage in criminal activities while intelligence mainly provides knowledge regarding an organisation to prevent criminal activities (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 4 - 5).

2.3.2 Intelligence Focus and Products

Shulsky (2002: 52 – 56) distinguishes among four broad collection themes that result in a finished intelligence product. These fields are scientific and technical intelligence, military intelligence, political intelligence, as well as economic and social intelligence. Mandel (1994: 35) also holds that there are four main dimensions to security, namely military, economic, resource/environmental, and political/cultural.

It should be noted that it is difficult to separate these areas into clear distinctive categories. The different dimensions are mostly interconnected or their boundaries are vague. In some instances the data is not always clearly defined. An example of this is the political/cultural dimension where human aspects such as emotion and intent cannot be accurately determined.

The military field remains an important focus of collection, although it is less significant in the post-Cold War period in relation to the other dimensions. One area that has gained ascendancy after the Cold War is the economic dimension. Another area that was also elevated in importance is the resource/environmental dimension (Mandel: 1994: 61 – 75).

Completed intelligence products can be divided into three categories, namely current intelligence, basic intelligence, and intelligence estimates. Current intelligence is concerned with issues involving the present, basic intelligence relates to past issues, while intelligence estimates are concerned with the future (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 57).

Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events. It alerts consumers of near-term consequences and indicates potentially dangerous situations. It can be presented in *ad hoc* memoranda, situation reports, or oral briefings (Hedley, 2007: 214). While a formal priority system might exist, it can be supplemented by the intelligence analyst's own judgment of what is important in order to provide warning intelligence (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 57).

Basic intelligence is concerned with reference data such as biographic, geographic, economic and political information. It can be presented in the form of order-of-battle summaries, in-depth studies, maps and other factual publications (Hedley, 2007: 214). Such reports attempt to provide as full a picture of a given situation as possible.

Intelligence estimates not only describe current situations but also attempt to predict how they are likely to evolve. They provide strategic guidance for developing policies, usually looking a few years ahead and thus it is called “estimate intelligence”. They provide informed assessments and the likelihood of possible outcomes (Hedley, 2007: 214). They can be produced at fixed intervals, in response to specific requirements, or be self-generated (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 61). An intelligence estimate is an educated guess by experts who have carefully studied issues (Johnson, 2007: 2).

2.3.3 Intelligence Failures

The analysing activity, as part of the intelligence cycle, determines the nature of intelligence that will be produced. Although information is processed into intelligence, there is still no guarantee that intelligence will be right all the time. Intelligence can only strive to be right most of the time. Kent (1966: 3) warns that intelligence “is knowledge, not all knowledge, but most”.

Kent (1966: 5 – 6) further indicates that the policy makers or leaders need intelligence that is complete, accurate, as well as delivered on time. If the leadership has such intelligence available, then failure will not be as a result of ignorance. The fact is that although information has been analysed thoroughly and delivered timely, it might still not be useful for a number of reasons.

During wartime intelligence is focused on defeating the enemy on all levels. In peacetime it is much less obvious which foreign nations or circumstances threaten national security and therefore require the attention of a nation’s intelligence agencies (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 3).

Another reason for the failure of intelligence is that intelligence professionals can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is unquestionably true. They might make honest mistakes or simply not have enough relevant information available (Lowenthal, 2006: 7). It might be argued that it is impossible to have all information ready at any given time, as a specific target (e.g. a foreign leader) might not even yet have a particular intention. Another possibility is that intelligence might provide knowledge of the intentions of an opponent, but lack the specific details regarding the how, when and where (Betts, 2002: 58).

The recipient of intelligence must also guard against unrealistic expectations. It can be argued that it is the judgment of political leaders and their understanding of the value and limitations of intelligence that is most crucial (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 141).

It must also be accepted that the world is filled with uncertainties and, as a result, intelligence gaps are inevitable and sometimes result in the failure by intelligence officials to provide timely warning of dangers (Johnson, 2007: 3). Johnson (1991: 59 - 60) further states that every country must endure a gap between what it may need or want to know and what it actually knows or can know. Some information needed is simply too inaccessible. The only certainty is that there will often be unpleasant surprises in the future (Betts, 2002: 58).

2.4 Intelligence and Policy

Intelligence can be collected and produced for any client provided it is targeted, actionable and predicts knowledge (Rathmell, 2002: 88 – 89). The clients can represent any entity such as corporations, fundamentalist religious groups, terrorists, individuals, and governments (Laffin, 1996: 35).

Intelligence is collected for policy makers who should in turn utilise the intelligence in making decisions. Simms (1995: 4) states that “intelligence is best defined as information collected, organized, or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers”. Intelligence and research capabilities are critical in

providing policy makers with an accurate portrait of the world. Policy made without intelligence support, or with inadequate intelligence support, will have a limited chance of success (Jordan et al, 1999: 144).

2.4.1 The Formulation of Intelligence Priorities

The policy maker, to a significant extent, determines the scope, and subsequently the priorities and focus of intelligence. Lowenthal (2006: 2) argues that the policy maker is not a passive recipient of intelligence, but actively influences all its aspects. The policy maker in reality thus shapes the process of determining priorities.

Kent (1966: 182) argues that presented intelligence is of questionable value if the policy maker does not have confidence in the intelligence, or if a lack of cooperation and communication between the intelligence community and the policy makers exist. In this regard Lowenthal (2006: 179 – 181) states that the intelligence community wants to be kept informed about policy directions and preferences. The intelligence community needs guidance on the priorities of the agenda so that its collection and reporting can be as helpful as possible.

According to Pillar (2007: 153) there are two important aspects that determine changes in intelligence programmes and priorities. The first aspect that determines intelligence priorities is that which according to the policy makers encapsulates their greatest interests and concerns.

When the policy makers fail to decide, or fail to convey their priorities to the intelligence community, the latter then either has to continue on the existing (old) path or try to perceive the intention of the policy makers (Lowenthal, 2006: 54 - 57). Treverton (2001: 22) also argues that intelligence about US interests cannot be put on hold while its role is clarified. This implies that intelligence must be actively incorporated in the determination of interests and priorities.

An intelligence service should be sufficiently independent to take the initiative and scan the horizon for potential issues and problems in areas that do not attract the attention of the policy makers. This warning function inevitably involves giving the policy makers information that they have not requested and might not want (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 140). The intelligence product should then not be restricted to the adherence of priorities alone.

The definition of intelligence by Mathur (1996: 327) indicating "[its] ability to update and analyze in accordance with changed and changing circumstances" would seem to support a degree of independence of the intelligence community. It would appear that, although the policy maker has a profound influence in determining priorities, the intelligence community must have at least some freedom in identifying the interests of policy makers. In some instances policy makers expect the intelligence community to anticipate the emergence of new issues (Lowenthal, 2006: 179 - 181).

Intelligence officers would then determine what might affect important national interests, whether or not a current policy maker has given any indication of specific interests. It is this second aspect, where intelligence officers use their judgment, which presents more of a problem in determining priorities.

Although it would appear that there is consensus for intelligence officers to use their discretion, it is unclear exactly how and when to do it. It is this largely unspecified relationship between the policy maker and the presented intelligence that can sometimes lead to problematic situations, especially concerning areas of focus and priorities. In the absence of formal requirements intelligence officers must deduce the priorities from statements, speeches and official documents. The intelligence community must follow the lead of the policy makers but still take care not to be biased towards a particular policy (Pillar, 2007: 153).

Directing attention to subjects currently neglected by policy but that in future may threaten a nation's interests, is in some respects the most important intelligence function. According to Pillar (2007: 154) the judgment of the

intelligence community should guide the work and priorities of policy just as policy interests should inversely guide the work and priorities of the intelligence community.

2.4.2 The Intelligence Product and Policy

In order to guide policy formulation, the intelligence community must be relevant to the policy maker. The value of completed intelligence analysis is not measured solely by its accuracy, but rather by the value it has for decision makers (Marrin, 2007: 199). Intelligence should be so presented to emphasise the particular interests of policy makers in order to supply them with the best and most useful information on topics of interest to them (Handel, 1989: 194).

Russell (2007: 195) states that there are two opposing views concerning the relationship between policy and intelligence. One school of thought wants intelligence to be largely independent of policy makers to avoid analysis being politicised. Boren (1992: 54) also advocates an independent intelligence community. He is of the opinion that if the collection and analysis aspects of intelligence are dominated and overseen by policy makers, there will be a huge temptation for intelligence to serve or sell policy rather than to inform it.

The second contrasting school of thought mentioned by Russell (2007: 195) supports the idea that intelligence analysts have to nurture relationships with policy makers in order to intimately know what they want. Marrin (2007: 199) states that for decision making to be effective, there must be close coordination between intelligence analysts who interpret information and the decision makers who decide what focus areas are to receive the highest priority.

In this regard special care must be taken to ensure that the close relationship between intelligence assessment and policy making does not lead to intelligence becoming politicised (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 151). Intelligence needs to present the facts but can also provide various options for the policy

maker to act upon. However, it is ultimately the responsibility of the policy makers to make the final decision.

The relationship between intelligence and policy makers is thus a key determinant in the role that intelligence will play during a particular administration (Lowenthal, 2006: 177 - 178). As intelligence is needed for policy purposes to facilitate national security, the relationship between policy makers and intelligence will thus also have a major influence on the formulation of a national security policy. In order to determine the exact role of intelligence within national security, both the concept of national security and the link between it and intelligence will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY

The term national security is ambiguous. It changes according to both circumstances and different interpretations. According to Jordan (Jordan et al, 1999: 3) national security is a “marvelously elastic term that has been stretched at times to cover a multitude of different issues and activities”. Security can broadly be defined as the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity (Buzan, 1991: 18). This definition can also have different meanings in specific periods.

3.1 Cold War Views on National Security

The traditional understanding of security concerned the security of the state as it was the state that had to use military force as a defence mechanism against the military force of another state (Mutimer, 1999: 77). Security was mainly thought of in terms of survival and the dominant issues were military threats and situations. It was thus initially more narrowly based and short-term orientated.

Sarkesian (1995: 4) indicates that national security is “the confidence held by the great majority of the nation’s people that the nation has the military capability and effective policy to prevent its adversaries from effectively using force in preventing the nation’s pursuit of its national interests”.

After the Second World War the definition of national security was broadened to include the consideration of non-military factors as tools of statecraft. These non-military factors included economics, politics, psychological aspects, moral aspects, legal issues, and technological improvements (Malik, 1999: 14). Linkages between national security and domestic affairs such as the economy, civil liberties and democratic processes were also made (Snyder, 1999: 6).

Although the understanding of national security changed during the Cold War to include non-military aspects, the main emphasis was predominantly on external and military threats and the conflict between the superpowers (Snyder, 1999: 1). Issues such as the question of alliances, stability, arms control, the possible use of limited wars, the question of deterrence or mutually assured destruction, and strategic balances continued to be deemed important (Snyder, 1999: 6).

It must be emphasised that the Cold War rivalry was never the sole focus of intelligence (Herman, 1996: 346). Other issues such as the situation in the Middle East, the possible nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, and terrorism were also important. Such issues, however, were deemed mainly as secondary to the main conflict between the superpowers.

3.2 Post-Cold War views on National Security

The end of the Cold War brought about a number of changes that influenced security considerations (Miller, 2001: 18). The security situation was no longer bipolar and the world no longer driven by the risk of a world war. A new concept of security was needed in order to address both the military realities as well as the political, economic and social ones (Snyder, 1999: 2).

In that period national security could no longer be considered solely from the point of view of military motivation or political manoeuvring. Economic, cultural, educational and many other developments could have a major influence on national security (Boren, 1992: 61). Military issues such as nuclear strategy, proliferation and weapons of mass destruction were still important, but additional aspects had been added (Snyder, 1999: 2). The result was that military threats declined in relevance because military tools were less useful than before.

This broader definition and changing scope of national security is demonstrated by the inclusion of non-traditional issues such as long-term environmental issues (climate changes), demographic trends (refugees), economic activity (debt and poverty), and strategic resource supply (Job, 1992: 16; Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002: 7).

Also included in the post-Cold War scope of national security are aspects concerning the individual, such as oppression as well as other situations preventing social justice (Booth, 1991: 341). Lowenthal (2006: 246 - 250) includes additional aspects like information operations and health issues.

This broader security definition combines domestic issues with the national security agendas of states. Non-military threats to national wellbeing are now seen as part of the security threats (Snyder, 1999: 7). National security now merges domestic, military and foreign policies' much wider elements of national interests (Herman, 1996: 344). Jordan (Jordan et al, 1999: 3 – 4) states that "foreign policy, international economics and related fields such as the environment and national security are now seen to overlap".

The domestic aspect of national security is especially relevant in Third World countries where domestic issues form an integral part of national security. Due to historical reasons, such as a lack of a homogeneous population, these countries have a weak internal base. Consequently their primary focus is state or nation building (Job, 1992: 12). The management of internal security to

achieve stability in order to ensure state building is thus the main objective. In this regard Ayoob (1992: 65) states that there is a close link between state establishment and security.

The lack of internal cohesion in Third World countries creates a situation where there is no single idea of what national security should entail (Job, 1992: 18). Competing forces in these societies have different notions of what national security should mean. The conflict between these forces creates a situation where the primary threats are internal and often from the government in power, rather than from external threats. Other issues become integral to the definition of security only if they become overtly political and threaten state institutions and security (Ayoob, 1992: 65).

This new concept of national security must be considered in the context of the developing processes in world society. Common problems such as rapid population growth and pollution transcend national boundaries. However, the security challenges most nations face today are not as immediately catastrophic as those in the Cold War era, but they are interconnected (Booth, 1991: 340 - 341).

According to Herman (1996: 359) the significance of intelligence has changed with the end of the Cold War. He is of the opinion that intelligence might even be more important today in the new, expanded concept of national security. During the Cold War era, the role of intelligence was to lessen the risk of a nuclear war, while in modern times intelligence assists governments in the magnitude of important day-to-day tasks, although failure does not necessarily mean total annihilation.

The importance of intelligence in the new concept of security cannot be denied. Its role is to support national security policy and as such forms an integral part of national security. The next section of this chapter will illustrate the role of intelligence in the formulation of a national security policy.

3.3 The Relationship between Intelligence and National Security

The maintenance and promotion of national security should be a primary objective of any government. Intelligence and national security are linked, as intelligence is an instrument used to achieve stability, security and development. Intelligence must assist national security in its narrowest sense of preserving the state from major challenges or disasters (Herman, 1996: 343).

Intelligence agencies are compelled to set priorities based on the national security and foreign policy concerns that are important to the policy makers (Turner, 2006: 72). Threats and vulnerabilities to national security provide the reasons for the central role of intelligence (Herman, 1996: 344). Intelligence must scan the horizons for signs of future trouble and alert the policy maker regarding imminent threats.

Although national security is the ultimate goal of a government, the latter cannot always guarantee success. Intelligence will occasionally fail in providing the necessary warnings regarding threats. This is due to the fact that many threats have two characteristics. Some threats are measurable, e.g. it might be known how long it will take to carry out a specific threat once a decision is taken to do so. However, other threats are not executed, and may indefinitely remain typified as being highly uncertain. There is also no way of determining if they will ever be carried out (Buzan, 1999: 136).

National security is concerned with survival in the final instance, but it also incorporates the promotion of a desirable situation in its modern definition. The difficulty exists in determining when these concerns cease to merit the “security” label and become part of everyday life (Buzan, 1991: 19).

Whatever the concept of national security, intelligence must a play a crucial role in it (Mathur, 1996: 327). The reality is that in modern times the focus and priorities are more complex and numerous than before and present greater

challenges to intelligence. Boren (1992: 54) is of the opinion that as the world becomes more multipolar and complex, more intelligence will be needed.

Threats do not remain constant over time, but change according to technological developments as well as developments in states themselves (Buzan, 1991: 138). Information warfare is an example of such a relatively new threat. A national security policy, supported by intelligence, has to continuously deal with ever-changing conditions. This means that policy makers must be able to identify change.

Threats, intelligence and national security are interlinked. The intensity and type of threat identified by intelligence is an important factor in determining when a threat becomes a national security issue. The more intensively a threat manifests itself, the more legitimate the involvement of national security would be as a response (Buzan, 1991: 14).

4. CONCLUSION

It was determined that the purpose of intelligence is to provide policy makers with knowledge to enable them to make better decisions. This purpose of intelligence has not changed over time. The priorities might be different, but the information must still be objective and of value to the policy maker.

For intelligence to produce relevant information the focus and priorities must be clearly established. This is probably the biggest challenge for intelligence. The policy maker is responsible for the guidelines concerning national security priorities. If these guidelines are not clearly communicated, intelligence must be deduced from various sources and this could lead to the misinterpretation of priorities.

However, collected intelligence must also have a degree of autonomy. Intelligence must be investigated or collected according to the established

focus and priorities, cognizant of other issues to provide warnings in that regard if necessary.

Intelligence cannot be accurate all the time. It can also not be expected that all relevant information will always be available. It is therefore not always the fault of intelligence, but rather that of the system that prevents total knowledge at all times. The fact, however, is that intelligence failure has implications for national security.

Intelligence exists to support national security needs. It is clear that the meaning of national security as a concept has changed over time, and the changing perception of what national security entails has definite implications for the focus and priorities of intelligence. Therefore, intelligence cannot be static and must be adapted according to the changing focus and priorities of national security

The focus and priorities of intelligence had to be adapted after the Cold War to support the changing national security concepts and priorities. National security in the post-Cold War became more globally orientated. Common issues such as global warming and international crime had implications for all states. In that regard intelligence cooperation between nations increased from bipolar military issues to virtually all aspects that were of importance to national security.

The following chapters will examine the focus and priorities of the US civilian intelligence in the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and post-9/11 periods respectively. The primary, as well as the secondary focus of each period, will be discussed.

CHAPTER 3

UNITED STATES CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE FOCUS AND PRIORITIES IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence in the Cold War period, chapter three will briefly deal with the main features of the Cold War. Additionally, the National Security Council (NSC) document, *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, will also be discussed as it formed a blueprint for the US national security policy during the Cold War and hence for their intelligence focus and priorities.

A discussion of some legal documents, such as the *US National Security Act of 1947* and various NSC Directives and Presidential Executive Orders, will be included to indicate the legal mandate by which the CIA functioned. The final part of chapter three will address the focus and priorities of the CIA during the Cold War.

2. THE CONCEPT OF COLD WAR

There is some disagreement over the exact dates on which the Cold War started and ended. However, for the purpose of this study it will be regarded as the period from 1947 until 1990. The importance of the Cold War is derived from the fact that it was the major factor in global politics for most of the second half of the twentieth century.

2.1 Dimensions of the Cold War

The Cold War era can be described as a continuing conflict between two superpowers that attempted to establish spheres of influence, created alliances, tried to obtain strategic positions, and competed in all spheres of international relations. This competition ranged from aspects such as economic relationships and technological competition to oceanic resource management (Østerud, 1992: 13).

This period furthermore presented a rivalry between two completely different value systems that included economic, social, and political aspects. It was in essence an ideological conflict. Of major importance during the Cold War were the arms race and the subsequent arms control negotiations (Østerud, 1992: 13). The threat of war, and especially total war between the superpowers, was always present. Cold War terms, such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), formed part of the vocabulary.

The Cold War also involved a geopolitical rivalry in the Third World. This rivalry gained more importance following the decolonisation process and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (Østerud, 1992: 13).

However, the Cold War should not be seen as a period of intense anxiety only. It featured periods of relative calm that were interspersed with periods of high tension. Tensions increased and eased as both sides sought to relieve the high-tension periods. Normal, everyday life continued for most people. Indeed, throughout the Cold War the two rival economic systems coexisted alongside their competing political and military alliances (Spanier and Hook, 1998: 56).

2.2 An Overview of the Cold War

The Cold War dominated the international scene for half a century and it was against this backdrop that aspects of world politics were played out. The Soviet Union and related entities such as the Soviet satellite countries, Third

World allies, and communist parties in some western states, dominated US foreign policy and national security aspects during the Cold War (Lowenthal, 2006: 220). An overview of some of the main events of this period will be provided to give an indication of the extent of the conflict as well as indicate the real concern, namely that the conflict could have escalated into nuclear war.

The blockade of Berlin from June 1948 until May 1949 by the Soviet Union might be regarded as the first major crisis during the Cold War. The West responded to this blockade by initiating an airlift that supplied the city with basic provisions. This airlift continued for eleven months until May 1949 when the blockade was finally lifted by the Soviet Union. During this period both the Soviet Union and the US were careful not to use military force and so avoided an escalation in hostilities that could have resulted in open warfare (Rayner, 1992: 18).

The Korean War of 1950 and 1951 was another major event in the Cold War era. During this period the main opponent of the US was Communist China. China intervened with military force when the US-led forces crossed the 38th parallel that divided North and South Korea. Fears existed at the time, after the Chinese intervention, that the US would use nuclear weapons to obtain a favourable result in the ensuing conflict (Lafeber, 2004: 119 - 121).

The crisis regarding the Suez Canal and the Hungarian uprising occurred in 1956. In that year Britain and France sent an armed force to take possession of the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union threatened to use force in order to stop the armed incursion. The result was that Britain and France withdrew their military force from the Canal area after a lack of support from the US. This led to a division between the US on the one hand and Britain and France on the other (Lafeber, 2004: 193). The Soviet Union made further use of this division to suppress the Hungarian uprising with little opposition from the West.

In August 1961 another major event developed when construction was started on a wall (i.e. the Berlin Wall) that would divide West- and East Germany. The

purpose of this wall was to prevent the flow of people from the communist side to the Western side. Tensions ran high and in October 1961 a military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union loomed imminently. Fortunately both sides refrained from initiating a war (Rayner, 1992: 43 - 44).

Possibly the most dramatic crisis during the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The US determined that the Soviet Union was in the process of constructing ballistic missile launching sites in Cuba. The US then announced a blockade of Cuba in order to prevent any further delivery of missiles. The Soviet Union subsequently decided to terminate the building of launching sites. Both sides were again careful to avoid an escalation that could have led to nuclear war (Lafeber, 2004: 193 – 194).

Other events spanning longer periods also played major roles in the Cold War period. Examples of such events are the Vietnam War and the situation in the Middle East. The Vietnam War was a direct result of the “domino” theory. According to this theory the US had to prevent a communist takeover in Vietnam as it could have led to the spread of communism in other parts of the region (Bell, 2001: 273). The situation in the Middle East also continued throughout the Cold War era as a source of conflict.

A major reason why the Cold War never escalated into a real war was the fact that both sides realised that it should be avoided at all costs. Both the US and Soviet Union further acknowledged that they had to communicate with each other through various means to avoid any misunderstanding. This process of reaching out became known as *détente* (Bell, 2001: 269).

The Cold War finally ended in 1989 when political freedom was achieved in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the same year symbolic freedom was also realised (Sewell, 2002: 137).

3. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY ACTS AND DIRECTIVES IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The primary institution responsible for the implementation of a national security policy in the US was the NSC that was established in 1947. The NSC was a cabinet-level committee that exclusively advised the president on issues of security; the president was, however, not bound by the recommendations. The NSC had to implement each policy irrespective of whether the NSC itself or the president had developed it. The NSC consisted of the president, the vice president, the secretary of defence and the secretary of state. Other officials could be co-opted from time to time (US, 1947).

Given the important role that the NSC played in the Cold War, the NSC directive, *NSC-68*, will be studied to determine its importance as a blueprint for US intelligence during that period. This document, to a great extent, determined the actions of the CIA as it formed the basis for the activities that followed and developed during the Cold War. As such, the document warrants further scrutiny, as it was significantly responsible for determining the focus and priorities for the period.

3.1 National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC-68)

In 1950, *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* was released by the NSC. The paper analysed the ongoing Cold War and courses of action open to the US. It made a case for US political, economic, and military strength in the non-Communist world (US, 1950-b).

Three broad objectives were stated in *NSC-68*. Firstly, the US had to make itself resilient through its values and with the development of its military and economic strength. Secondly, the US had to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the non-Communist world. This successful system would serve to demonstrate the superiority of the US and frustrate the Soviet Union (US, 1950-b).

The third purpose of the successful US policy and actions was to try and influence the perceptions of the general population within the Soviet Union. By influencing the people it was hoped to force changes in the Soviet system itself. The rationalisation was that it would be less costly and more effective if those changes in the Soviet Union occurred as a result of internal pressure rather than through external conflict (US, 1950-b).

From these objectives it was clear that the US intended to increase its own power as a base from which to implement it policies. Secondly, the US aimed to gain a foothold in the rest of the world not aligned to the Soviet Union. The third objective, regarding a change within the Soviet Union, was perhaps the most controversial in the sense that it represented a direct threat to the Soviet Union's internal policies.

The content of the document acknowledged that there were limitations as to how these objectives could be achieved. It also clearly stated that the use of force would be a last resort. It concluded: "… practical and ideological considerations compel the US to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war" (US, 1950-b). This broad statement cleared the way for the active involvement of the intelligence services to engage in virtually any action to combat the might of the Soviet Union.

NSC-68 also discussed the intentions and capabilities of the US. It stated that the "overall policy can be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore affirms the concept of positive participation in the world community" (US, 1950-b).

The overall US policy entailed two subsidiary policies. One was a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community according to the US viewpoint. The other was a policy of containing the Soviet system. Containing in this sense meant to "block further expansion of Soviet power; expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions; induce a loosening of the Kremlin's control and

influence; and in general, foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system" (US, 1950-b).

NSC-68 then finally recommended that the US President direct the NSC to develop and coordinate programmes to ensure that the objectives of the document were achieved (US, 1950-b). Although *NSC-68* did not directly mention intelligence activities, the NSC was responsible for intelligence programmes. The NSC was concerned with broad policy issues affecting the entire range of national security including foreign policy, defence matters, international economic programmes, and internal security as well as intelligence (Breckinridge, 1986: 16). The NSC thus had a crucial role in tasking the US intelligence services.

3.2 The Central Intelligence Agency's Legal Mandate

The CIA was created through the *National Security Act of 1947.* However, various other documents supplemented this Act and formed part of the overall legal mandate of the CIA during the Cold War.

3.2.1 National Security Act of 1947

The main tasks of the CIA were derived from the *National Security Act of 1947* that effectively placed the CIA under the authority of the NSC. The *National Security Act of 1947* accorded the CIA five specific functions, namely to:

- advise the NSC on intelligence activities related to national security,
- make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such activities,
- correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence within the government,
- carry out services for existing agencies that the NSC might decide,

- perform such other functions and duties related to national security as the National Security Council might decide on from time to time (US, 1947).

The last function was the most contentious. The *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949* was enacted to give the CIA specific authority to carry out the duties assigned to it in 1947 under the authority of the NSC. The important role that the NSC had in the operational activities of the CIA can be seen in the wording. The NSC officially sanctioned the use of CIA covert operations with the *NSC-5412/2* of 1955.

3.2.2 National Security Council Directive 5412/2

Paragraph one of this directive states that "the National Security Council, taking cognizance of the activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments, parties and groups dominated by them (international communism), determined that in the interest of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government should be supplemented by covert operations" (US, 1955-b).

The CIA had previously been conducting special operations under NSC instructions, but now the handling of covert operations was officially added. The directive further specifically indicated the purpose of covert operations. It stated that covert operations were designed in order to "create and exploit troublesome problems for international communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc" (US, 1955-b).

Additionally covert operations also attempted to "discredit the prestige and ideology of international communism; counter any threat of a party or individual directly or indirectly responsive to communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world; reduce international communist control over any areas of the world; favoring groups with mutual US interests; and increase

the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to resist international communism" (US, 1955-b).

Documents such as the *National Security Act of 1947* and *NSC-5412/2* were supplemented by other official documents that further expanded or clarified the actions of the CIA. Examples of such documentation are *Executive Order 12063* and *Executive Order 12333.*

3.2.3 Executive Order 12063

Executive Order 12063 was published in 1978 and stated that the CIA should perform all duties as stipulated by the *National Security Act of 1947,* the *Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,* and other laws, regulations, and directives, under the direction of the NSC.

These duties included the production and dissemination of foreign intelligence relating to national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic and sociological intelligence to meet the needs of the president, the NSC, and other components of the US Government. The CIA was also tasked with collecting intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking (US, 1978).

3.2.4 Executive Order 12333

Executive Order 12333 was published in 1981 and corresponds to a large extent with *Executive Order 12063*. It states that some duties of the intelligence community are to collect information and conduct activities to protect against intelligence activities directed against the US, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the US by foreign powers, organisations, persons, and their agents (US, 1981).

The CIA was again specifically tasked to collect foreign intelligence as well as intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking.

Additionally, the Agency was to conduct special operations approved by the US President, conduct services of common concern for the intelligence community as directed by the NSC, and carry out or contract research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices (US, 1981).

These selected laws, directives and Executive Orders all had a bearing on the activities, both on the collection and covert operations of the CIA in the Cold War era. The following section will examine the collection as well as the covert operation priorities of the CIA during the Cold War.

4. COLD WAR FOCUS AND PRIORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The importance of Pearl Harbour demonstrated the need for a central organisation to coordinate the vast amount of intelligence to avoid a similar surprise in future (Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew, 1997: 26). The collection, analysis and dissemination of information were to be the primary mission of the CIA (Johnson, 1989: 16). However, political realities of the time caused the CIA to engage in more activities than simply collecting and analysing information.

In practice the focus and priority of the CIA was twofold. The collection of secret intelligence on the Soviet Union ran parallel to covert operations (Aldrich, 2001: 371).

4.1 Intelligence Collection

From the outset of the Cold War intelligence was intensively focused on the Soviet Union and its sphere of influences (Goodman, 1996: 649). It can be argued that the CIA was established by the US executive whose primary and sometimes sole motivation was to combat the policies of the Soviet Union (Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew, 1997: 25). These priorities of the US executive consequently manifested themselves in the CIA focus. Although other issues

might occasionally, and for a limited duration, have supplanted the Soviet issue, it remained the dominant interest (Lowenthal, 2006: 220).

4.1.1 Intelligence Collection from 1947 to 1959

The predominant question during the Cold War was that of the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies. The CIA sought information on topics regarding the quantity as well as the quality of the Soviet armed forces, the direction of Soviet military research and development, new capabilities the Soviets might be pursuing, the degree to which current and planned capabilities posed a threat to the US and allied interests, and the Soviet military doctrine (Lowenthal, 2006: 222-223). Atomic weapons remained the main priority of intelligence collection (Aldrich, 2001: 371).

The intelligence community was also expected to collect information on the Soviet Union and its allies, concentrating on:

- likely areas of Soviet probes or expansion,
- the imminence and strength of such probes,
- overall Soviet strength – including military, economic, and social aspects,
- likely Soviet allies or surrogates,
- the strength of the US allies and surrogates,
- signs of relative Soviet strength or weakness (Lowenthal, 2006: 221).

The CIA's intelligence target further included the secret operations of the communist parties' activities, especially in Europe (US, 1951). The focus of CIA operations fell on three aspects of party work, namely, the activities of illegal or underground parties, the mechanism by which these parties were funded, and, in general, the secret activities of such parties (Rositzke, 1977: 87-88).

In the US defence strategy of the early Cold War years, Europe held strategic priority whilst Asia was of secondary interest. Europe was regarded as extremely vital to US security (Spanier and Hook, 1998: 68). However, the importance of Asia was soon established with the focus on China and Korea (US, 1950a).

Although the general order of priorities was Western Europe, Asia, and then Latin America, it became clear in the 1950s that containing communism would require US involvement in other parts of the world too(Leary, 1984: 61). As the scope of the Cold War spread from the Soviet Union outwards to Europe, Asia, and then all over the world, the field within which intelligence had to be collected as well as which operations might be required expanded accordingly (Lowenthal, 2006: 222).

In the mid-fifties American foreign policy became increasingly global. This expanded global policy had an important bearing on the CIA intelligence operations. The growing power and influence of the Soviet Union, the emergence of China on the world scene, the rising tide of revolutionary action, and the increasing power of the left in the Third World as well as in Europe, also became priorities in Washington (Rositzke, 1977: 101).

Areas of instability and regional conflict, particularly where the Soviet Union was involved, led to periodic surges in manpower and resources to match the need for intelligence (Goodman, 1996: 649). Issues such as tensions in the Middle East, crises on the Indian subcontinent, strife in the Indochina states, Cuba's revolutionary programme for Latin America, events in the Congo, Ghana and the Portuguese colonies, the Chinese activity abroad in the early sixties, and *coups* and *countercoups* were all deemed important by the US administration (Rositzke, 1977: 101). As a result the CIA reported on these issues (US, 1954; US, 1955-a and US, 1957).

The overall effect on the CIA's intelligence operations was a steadily increasing focus on current intelligence reporting, on the day-to-day coverage of behind-the-scenes plans and intentions of governments both friendly and

unfriendly, and of the secret forces at work on foreign leaders, executive branch members as well as the legislatures, and the rise of political leaders around the world (Rositzke, 1977: 101). This current intelligence focused on economic and political developments in countries in which the US had considerable interests (US, 1956).

4.1.2 Intelligence Collection in the 1960s

During the sixties the US intelligence community became a global desk in support of the US role as global policeman. Intelligence analysts were required to know what was going on everywhere. They set requirements and priorities that justified the collection of almost any information, e.g. issues such as the situation regarding the Soviet youth even warranted attention (US, 1962).

In the 1960s the image of a single international communist entity began to change as the difference between the Soviet Union and China emerged (US, 1966-a). The Cold War had already manifested itself in Asia. Hong Kong acquired a very important status in gathering human intelligence on the activities of the Chinese Communists (Lombardo, 1990: 64).

By the end of the 1960s the US and Soviet Union had reached almost parity in nuclear armament. The impetus for arms control grew and attempts at greater cultural and economic cooperation began. The result of these shifts in status had an influence on the CIA's focus and priorities which had to be adapted to accommodate these developments in US policy (Leary, 1984: 77).

The CIA was also responsible for reporting on international diplomatic meetings and negotiations relating to the arms control (US, 1966-c). They had to monitor the talks regarding the arms control and the accords themselves (Johnson, 1989: 94). The main functions were to provide assessments as well as collect new intelligence for future meetings (Garthoff, 1999: 1).

The importance of Latin America and, in particular, Africa also increased during the sixties. Prior to 1960 Africa as a topic of collection was included in the European or Middle-Eastern division. Africa was deemed important enough to warrant separate reports (US, 1966-b). Apart from limiting communist advances through propaganda and political action, the CIA's African activities were directed at gaining information on Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea (Karalekas, 1977: 68).

Until 1962 the CIA could only pursue economic analysis on the Soviet bloc, while the US State Department was responsible for the rest of the world. In the mid-1960s economic intelligence acquired an importance of its own. The emergence of independent African nations and the view that the Soviet Union would engage in economic penetration of these governments resulted in more specific requests for information on these countries' economies. The main focus of this new economic tasking was on countries that were perceived to be Soviet targets (Karalekas, 1977: 78 - 79).

In 1967 this economic dimension further developed to include policy-orientated economic intelligence concerning non-Communist countries. The reason was that the growing economic strength of Japan and Western Europe produced a related decline in US competitiveness. The US policy makers needed more information on the free world, as both trading partners and rivals (Karalekas, 1977: 79). Further economic areas, such as the flow of petrodollars and OPEC investment strategies, were added to the CIA brief (Johnson, 1989: 94). Intelligence collection also concentrated in general on scientific activities abroad (Doel and Needell, 1997: 59).

The so-called "hard" military targets of the first decade retained their priority and were regularly reported on (US, 1963). However, as the sixties progressed, more and more "soft' targets were deemed important enough to warrant collection (US, 1967). These included behind-the-scenes political and economic activities in the key capitals of the Third World. In the mid- and late sixties two additional targets joined the list of CIA priorities, namely

international drug trafficking and political terrorism (Rositzke, 1977: 102 - 110).

4.1.3 Intelligence Collection from 1970 to 1989

During the 1970s the primary target of the CIA continued to be the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Other national policy priorities occasionally gained more importance for a relatively short period of time. In this regard events such as the revolution in Iran and the escalating turmoil in Central America captured the attention. In the 1970s an increase in coverage concerning Third World internal targets was also developed (Breckinridge, 1986: 117).

In the mid-1970s a debate on intelligence collection regarding the capabilities versus the intentions of an opponent took place. This occurred mainly as a result of statistical intelligence that was produced. There was a pronounced reliance on technical intelligence reporting because of the closed societies that prevented effective human intelligence collection. Technical intelligence collection and reporting overshadowed human intelligence (US, 1973).

Technical intelligence delivered information such as demographics, size of the Soviet economy, and percentages relating to defence matters. The technical collection also focused mainly on the development of the Soviet weapon systems as well as the scientific and technological advances, especially in the defence industry. The primary target became the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICMB) programme (Garthoff, 1999: 5 and US, 1974). Aligned with the ICBM programme was also the effort to collect intelligence on the space programme (Goodman, 1996: 649). The end result was the realisation that the CIA had a primary responsibility for studies relating to the cost and resource impact of foreign military and space programmes (Karalekas, 1977: 81).

Even when the Soviet target came to command less attention in the 1980s, the existence of communism helped to determine the importance of many

other targets. Countries deemed to be part of the struggle against communism still warranted reporting (US, 1984). This took place as a result of the issues aligned with the Soviet projection of military and political power (Goodman and Berkowitz, 1994: 301).

A list of CIA successes in predictions give an indication as to what they focused on during the Cold War. The list includes the:

- Soviet Sputnik in 1957
- Sino-Soviet split in 1962
- Chinese A-bomb in 1964
- new Soviet strategic weapons systems throughout the period
- Vietnam War developments from 1966 to 1975
- Arab-Israeli War in 1967
- Soviet Antiballistic Missile system in 1968
- India-Pakistan War in 1971
- Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974
- Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1978
- mass exodus from Cuba during 1978
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Johnson, 1989: 94)

4.2 Covert Operations

The Cold War not only encouraged an intelligence-gathering revolution, but also a remarkable expansion in covert operations that sought to change events in the world (Aldrich, 2001: 641). Covert operations may be grouped according to four broad categories, namely propaganda, political action, economic action and paramilitary action (Johnson, 1989: 21).

Secret services accelerated the transformation of the Cold War from a conflict between states into a subversive competition between societies. They did this having acknowledged the importance of and covert funding of political parties, trade unions, student groups, writers, painters, and even orchestras and ballet troupes, in an attempt to triumph in the competition between two different

ways of life (US, 1948). This required the secret services to also focus on their own domestic populations as well as those abroad (Aldrich, 2001: 642).

Although the CIA did not have exclusive jurisdiction over covert operations within the US government, for some three decades it had had the primary role and had been involved in the major programmes as authorised by the *National Security Act of 1947* and *NSC Directive 5412/2.* In the 1950s and 1960s the CIA's covert operational capability dominated the activities of the Agency (Leary, 1984: 76). These actions underlined the CIA's general inclination towards covert operations rather than intelligence gathering during the Cold War (Aldrich, 2001: 294). The covert operations were formal products of the government's foreign policy (Breckinridge, 1986: 214 – 216).

At the first meeting of the NSC in 1947, the CIA was directed to develop a programme of covert operations to meet the emerging expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. Initially, central and eastern Europe were the targets. The immediate priority was to counter the communist parties (US, 1951). Actions included radio broadcasts into these areas, balloons dropping propaganda, and printing materials distributed into the areas (Breckinridge, 1986: 28 – 31). These actions could be classified as propaganda or political operations.

In 1948 the CIA's instructions were broadened to include political and economic warfare and paramilitary activities (Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew, 1997:32). The CIA operation in Guatemala is an example of these broadened instructions concerning economic warfare (US, 1953).

Even prior to 1950 the CIA had begun a small programme to keep resistance alive in mainland China. These efforts gained momentum from the wars in Korea and Indochina (Aldrich, 2001: 294). As a consequence covert operations expanded in the period from 1953 to 1961. Successes were achieved in Iran during 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954 (Johnson, 1989: 19).

In the decade of the 1960s paramilitary operations became the dominant CIA covert activity, surpassing covert psychological and political operations in

budgetary terms. The Kennedy administration initiated paramilitary programmes in Laos, Cuba, and Vietnam (Karalekas, 1977: 67 and US, 1968). Chile presented an example of a covert operation that was used in the 1970s to force a change of government more acceptable to the US (US, 1970). During the 1980s, under the Reagan administration, the doctrine was to aid anti-Soviet guerillas. Afghanistan is an ideal example of this doctrine where from 1985 US weapons were openly supplied to the guerillas. (Bell, 2001: 342 – 343).

Following a shift in the perception of the Soviet threat from military to political, the CIA adjusted its emphasis from paramilitary to covert operations (Leary, 1984: 60). These operations focused on political aspects such as propaganda and played an important role throughout the Cold War to influence international organisations (Karalekas, 1977: 67). The various administrations' reliance on the CIA's covert operations had an important influence in that the Agency realised the significance of covert operations and consequently enhanced the status of such operations (Karalekas, 1977: 82).

5. CONCLUSION

It was established that the Cold War was the major force in world politics for most of the second half of the twentieth century. The conflict and competition between the two superpowers was the main issue of this period. Most others were linked and subordinate to the conflict.

The focus and priorities of the CIA need to be analysed against this background of the Cold War. The various documents discussed provided an indication of the importance that was attached to the Soviet Union. These selected documents showed that the overriding concern for US civilian intelligence was indeed the Soviet Union and its entities.

It was furthermore concluded that the activities of the CIA consisted of two dimensions in particular: it collected intelligence as required but also engaged in covert operations.

From a geographical perspective the intelligence focus originally concentrated on Europe. That soon expanded to Asia, Latin America and Africa to eventually include the rest of the world. From a topical perspective, the priorities of the CIA were linked to arms issues as well as intelligence relating to the Soviet Union. Some issues, such as terrorism, were seen as part of the proxy wars between the superpowers. Occasionally *ad hoc* issues would for a relatively short period take priority.

During the Cold War the narrow emphasis on national security also changed. The original focus on military and political matters soon expanded to include other dimensions such as economic and social issues. These additional dimensions were deemed as part of the conflict between the superpowers.

Another important dimension of intelligence was the concentration on technical data. This must be seen in the context of the Cold War where it was not always possible to obtain information from within a closed society. This reliance on technical intelligence would in a later era severely hamper the effectiveness of intelligence.

The following chapter will deal with the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence in the post-Cold War period until the terror attacks on the US in September 2001. Of importance in this period is that there was no clear-cut enemy. The intelligence services furthermore did not receive proper direction and were intent on survival. After the September 2001 attacks, intelligence once again had a more specific focus, namely terrorism.

CHAPTER 4

UNITED STATES CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE FOCUS AND PRIORITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD UP TO SEPTEMBER 2001

1. INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of discussing the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence after the Cold War chapter four will be divided into two main sections. The first section will examine the problems intelligence experienced in this period. In particular it will emphasise that the main problem in the Post-Cold War period was the uncertainty as to what national security policy should have encompassed.

The second section of chapter four will explore the actual focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence during the post-Cold War period up to 2001. During this period there was no single dominant issue until the terror attacks on the US in 2001. It will be indicated that virtually all the threats were familiar to intelligence. However, none of these achieved the dominance the Soviet threat had during the Cold War.

2. POST-COLD WAR PROBLEMS EXPERIENED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Cold War struggle, with the Soviet Union as the main adversary, gave intelligence an easily understood point of reference. The post-Cold War period offered no such clarity. No one topic could be singled out as the dominant priority in the decade after the Cold War. This can be seen in the budget allocation of the intelligence community which had spent nearly sixty percent

of its resources on the Soviet Union in 1980, but less than twenty percent on the former Soviet Union and related issues in 1993 (Hulnick, 1999: 122).

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, stated that in the post-Cold war period the opportunities and challenges were still unclear and that "there is not yet one dominant enough to define the era on its own terms and give it a name" (US, 1996-b). In the decade after the Cold War, the various US administrations either failed or did not attempt to define US national security interests (Lowenthal, 2006: 232).

2.1 The Relevance of Intelligence in a Changing World

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the role of intelligence and the priorities it concentrated on in support of US policy did not seem entirely clear (Lowenthal, 2006: 232). This was in part due to the fact that a peaceful and prosperous future was envisaged. US President Clinton provided some insight into the opinion at the time. He stated that "some say that we don't need intelligence as much as we used to... that we ought to severely cut the intelligence budget... urge us to scrap the Central Intelligence service" (US, 1995-c).

As a result even the very existence of intelligence agencies was questioned. They were, in some circles, perceived as not being necessary in the changing world. This idea of redundant intelligence services was backed further by the perception that the US had the public and private resources available to generate information for the government (Goodman, 1996: 51).

These available resources included specialised libraries, many dealing with intelligence aspects such as international affairs, foreign policy and national security. There were also numerous think tanks, federally funded research and development centres, and consulting firms producing information that was very similar to the products produced by intelligence agencies. Critics of the intelligence structure further questioned the need of specialised agencies such as the CIA, given the nature of many topics and "line" entities such as

the various military services that produced information (Goodman, 1996: 51 - 53).

One reason for the criticism of the existence of intelligence was the uncertainty prevalent at the time. In the decade after the Cold War there was no overriding ideological challenge or a single geo-strategic confrontation for intelligence to focus on (Goodman, 1996: 47). The realisation existed that the world had changed, but there was also uncertainty as to what exactly the future entailed. In this regard Hilsman (2000: 9) indicated that this “new world” presented the US with a significantly diminished threat, but also with vastly different intelligence problems than had prevailed during the Cold War.

To a certain degree it was easier to indicate what the threat was not, as opposed to what it constituted. It was acknowledged that the world had changed into a multipolar and multidimensional one where a distinction had to be drawn between the conventional threat and the emerging one. Another attempt at defining the new threat stated that “the emerging threat is non-governmental, non-conventional, dynamic and random, non-linear, with no constraints or predictable doctrine, almost impossible to detect in advance, and supported by an unlimited 5th column of criminals and drug addicts” (Steele, 2001: 3 - 4).

2.2 Intelligence Adaptation to a New Situation

This lack of a clear threat posed a severe problem for policy makers and the intelligence officials. The threat, and as a consequence the requirements, were uncertain or subject to rapid shifts (Hulnick, 1999: 105). The problem was that US intelligence had to be able to respond quickly to the needs of policy makers, no matter what the subject. However, in order to respond effectively, intelligence needed well-documented threats, as reliable intelligence capabilities could not be developed overnight (Goodman, 1996: 47).

Within this uncertain environment intelligence had to adapt and make changes to comply with those new world threats. The legacy of the Cold War collection system, designed to track a large political-military structure, had to change as it proved extremely difficult to collect intelligence on much smaller entities (Lowenthal, 2006: 234). The visible signature, for example, of a priority such as terrorism was much smaller than that of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, intelligence had to deal with entirely new phenomena and organisations. More information also had to be shared with new clients such as the United Nations (UN) during peacekeeping operations. Another new phenomenon was the massive growth of the open source market. A good deal of information that the US government needed came from open sources. Even the remaining authoritarian regimes had an increasing difficulty in keeping information suppressed (Goodman, 1996: 40).

Goodman (1996: 38) stated that the post-Cold War global environment of a "new world order" had affected every phase of the intelligence process, namely, priority setting, information gathering, data processing, analysis, drafting and disseminating reports. Intelligence clearly had to adapt to the changing circumstances.

The growth of consumers of intelligence proved especially troublesome for the CIA that faced additional clients with more requests, as the threat perceptions were no longer as narrowly focused. In this regard DCI Deutch stated that "the contact and awareness of consumers' needs must be extended to all levels" of intelligence (US, 1995-a). The greatly expanded role of Congress in foreign affairs and the national security policy also brought considerable pressure on the CIA for more extensive collection and analysis (Goodman, 1996: 39).

The scarcity of resources was another problem intelligence services had to contend with in the absence of the Soviet threat and the resulting new thinking. For the first time in history US intelligence was faced with strong challenges about what it should focus on, for whom, at what cost, and the

inevitable compromise of US democratic values and procedures that the pursuit entailed (Goodman, 1996: 40).

US President Clinton stated with specific reference to funds that “we have to rethink what we collect... we must be selective... we can’t possibly have in a world with so many diverse threats and tight budgets the resources to collect everything...” (US, 1995-c). The limited funds made it difficult for US intelligence requirements to pass the scrutiny of the budget makers, who were themselves unsure as to what constituted threats.

In this post-Cold War era, intelligence was further used to help combat transnational threats by using a combination of counterintelligence and law enforcement techniques, as well as covert action (Hulnick, 1999: 105 - 106). Whereas intelligence largely alerted policy makers to issues they had to deal with during the Cold War, it was no longer a passive observer, for it had become part of the measures used to counter some of the problems.

Deutch supported this new approach by intelligence in stating that it was time to establish a fresh style and a new division of responsibilities between civilian intelligence and law enforcement agencies that realistically reflected the pattern of international activity (US, 1995-a). In essence better cooperation between the two entities was envisaged. Provision was then made in the *Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act* for better cooperation between civilian intelligence and the US law enforcement agencies in order to combat the growing transnational threats (US, 1996-a).

2.3 Uncertainty of Political Leadership

Intelligence as a service industry means to serve the government of the day, but in order to do so, clear guidance from the policy makers is needed. In this post-Cold War period uncertainty existed on many levels as to the exact role of intelligence. However, this was not only a case of intelligence alone demanding leadership. Perceptions also existed both with the public and

members of Congress that intelligence had lost its focus after the Cold War and needed better guidance and direction from policy makers (US, 1997-b).

The new threats resulted in policy makers as well as the intelligence environment often finding these issues more difficult to analyse and deal with than the previous Soviet issues. On many of the new priorities, such as environmental issues, there was no clear course of action and sometimes no foreign governments to influence. This frequently led to frustration on the part of the policy makers, as they needed intelligence to take action (Lowenthal, 2006: 233 - 234).

The absence of a clear national security policy in the period after the Cold War made it difficult for intelligence to be produced which met its own and the policy makers' expectations. Although intelligence officials did have a broad understanding of the policy makers' preferences and immediate interests most of the time, it did not provide the basis for making a coherent set of plans (Lowenthal, 2006: 252). US President Clinton accentuated the importance of a clear policy by stating "you need and deserve clear priorities from me and our national security team" (US, 1995-c).

The broader question that faced the intelligence domain was what types of information the US government needed about the general environment and range of situations that could pose grave threats to US national security (Goodman, 1996: 37). In the absence of formulated clear threats by government intelligence collection had to primarily home in on what constituted threats.

As a result Congress frequently accused the intelligence environments of looking for a threat on every occasion. On the other hand, Congress also warned them not to remain fixated on old threats (Treverton, 1996: 99). Intelligence was clearly in a precarious situation.

The fact is that the mission of intelligence did not change after the Cold War. It remained the collection and analysis of information in support of the policy

makers. Only US intelligence targets and priorities changed (Lowenthal, 2006: 233). President Bush reiterated that the familiar Cold War security policy was affected by developments that had barely been imagined a year previously, yet the goals and interests remained the same (US, 1990).

Since the end of the Cold War a myth was propagated that US intelligence had failed to monitor the non-Soviet topics and was ill-prepared to deal with transnational issues that had become the new national security threats. That was only partially correct. Although the Soviet Union was the major focus point during the Cold War, intelligence resources were focused on other targets as well. Given the wide range of US interests abroad and Americans, who lived, worked or travelled overseas, intelligence collection focused on country as well as transnational issues (Hulnick, 1999: 105). The intelligence environment, however, was ill-prepared to deal with the new importance of some older threats.

The problems experienced by intelligence institutions in the post-Cold war had a direct bearing on their activities, especially in determining focus and priorities. The following section will deal with the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence in the post-Cold War period until September 2001.

3. POST-COLD WAR FOCUS AND PRIORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNTIL SEPTEMBER 2001

A number of official documents represented the focus and priorities of the CIA during the post-Cold War period and until 2001. These documents included the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, documents of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a speech by President Clinton, and various statements by different DCIs of the CIA. These documents were selected as they together represent most of the focus and priorities of the CIA covered in chapter four.

3.1 National Security Strategy of the United States

The foundations of the *National Security Strategy of the United States* for the 1990s were based on four main objectives or interests. These were:

- the survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure,
- a healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavours at home and abroad,
- a stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions, and
- healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations (US, 1990).

The document acknowledged that these broad objectives were shaped by the totality of the international and domestic environment that was changing dramatically. Some trends, regional issues, as well as the agenda of the US expanded on the foundations and from them some areas of concern that existed can be deduced.

3.1.1 Focus Areas for the United States

Economic matters were regarded as of major importance. There was a realisation that the world economy would be more competitive and that there would be a shifting balance of economic power. The belief was postulated that the US national power rested on the strength of the economy and its continuous growth. The US economic growth was linked to economic development elsewhere, especially in areas where development could not keep pace with population growth and increasing debt. That could have led to unrest and instability in areas that were suppliers of energy sources as reliable supplies of energy sources were deemed as essential to economic growth (US, 1990).

Regional issues were also a priority. In this regard the situations in the Middle East and Asia were of special concern. Specifically mentioned were Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Libya, Syria, North Korea and China. The situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was also of real concern to the US. The fear existed that fundamental political and economic changes could lead to new sources of instability (US, 1990).

Third World conflicts were also regarded as a continuous threat to US interests. In this regard the proliferation of weapons, especially biological, chemical, and nuclear armament was a real concern. Poverty, injustice, racial and ethnic tensions, as well as religious fanaticism were other concerns regarding the Third World. The spread of refugees was a further worrying factor. In addition to the financial burden on some countries, there was concern that that phenomenon could fuel hatred that could in turn lead to more conflict, eventually involving the US (US, 1990).

Transnational issues were raised as well as the fact that international traffic in illicit drugs constituted a major threat to the US national security. Low-intensity conflicts, such as terrorism, subversion, and insurgency were also regarded as threats to US security (US, 1990).

3.1.2 Specific Intelligence Programmes

It was stated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* that these areas of concern posed a major challenge to the intelligence assets and programmes of the US. Some specific focus areas were mentioned that followed from the areas of concern.

It was acknowledged as critical that the US government be well informed of events and intentions around the world, especially in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In this new period, intelligence also had to focus on new issues that were aligned to existing ones. Within the Communist world, for example, economic questions had taken on new importance. Economic forces

were regarded as the impetus for many changes that had taken place and were a valuable gauge of real change (US, 1990).

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other military technologies had raised the risk for conflict and crisis. Proliferation issues were directly linked to regional conflicts that continued in many areas. US intelligence had to monitor such developments in order to provide policy makers with the information needed to protect American interests (US, 1990).

The twin threats of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking also posed high priority, but non-traditional, intelligence requirements. Intelligence orientations had furthermore to be adapted to focus on broader global economic and trade issues and to be more aware of subjects such as foreign trade policies, economic trends, and foreign debt (US, 1990).

The document additionally indicated that hostile intelligence efforts were likely to increase as barriers to contact came down. Counterintelligence thus remained a priority. Importantly, US intelligence was sensitised to provide warning of new dangers and new developments even as the requirements grew in number and complexity (US, 1990).

3.2 Special Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence

The special report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, dated January 1995, did not specifically concentrate on the focus and priorities of the US intelligence agencies. The report focused on the intelligence-related activities of the Committee during the previous year. However, from the content of the report some information about the focus areas and priorities of intelligence can be deduced.

Arms control remained one of the major focus areas of intelligence. The various arms control treaties with the Russian Federation were the main priority. Intelligence was needed to verify that parties to the treaties complied with them. It was stated that “monitoring such illicit behavior will be the single

most challenging task for … US monitoring". With regard to the *Open Skies Treaty*, the Committee sought and obtained from the intelligence community "an assessment of the likely information gains and losses resulting from the treaty" (US, 1995-b).

Concerning the *Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC)*, the Committee on Intelligence reviewed numerous documents, including a "*National Intelligence Estimate*" on US monitoring capabilities. The Committee further continued its on-going review of the "Intelligence Community's assessment of the threat of global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons" (US, 1995-b).

Another area of review by the Committee on Intelligence was counterterrorism. The Committee held various hearings to examine the capabilities of the intelligence community to monitor and deter the activities of international and domestic terrorist organisations (US, 1995-b).

The Committee report also held a hearing in 1994 on the *Current and Projected National Threats to the US*. In this regard the DCI, James Woolsey, had to testify and discuss the threat to the US as posed by the former Soviet Union, China, the Middle East, North Korea, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Transnational threats such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, and illegal drugs, were also discussed (US, 1995-b).

Economic intelligence was another major priority. Topics such as the *North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)* and its impact upon US-Mexico relations, the pace of Mexico's economic reform, and narcotics trafficking, were important. In this regard the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Economics had to provide the necessary information (US, 1995-b).

Covert action remained an intelligence priority. In this regard the report stated that covert action represented a small and shrinking fraction of the intelligence budget. However, the Committee devoted a substantial amount of oversight to consider new activities initiated by the President. The Committee also ensured

that there remained sufficient funds for the CIA's covert action capability to respond to short-notice requirements (US, 1995-b).

The report further highlighted the serious problem of the growth of organised Russian crime after the Cold War, both within Russia and elsewhere. The Committee had to ensure that the US intelligence response to that threat was adequate. Linked to transnational crime was the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement. The Committee also attempted to ensure that the coordination between intelligence and law enforcement was conducted according to regulations (US, 1995-b).

Concerning the relatively new field of environmental issues, the Committee had worked with the Intelligence Community on efforts to use intelligence assets and data. In August 1994, the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology testified in this regard (US, 1995-b).

With regard to the foreign intelligence threat, six topics were mentioned in the report as focus areas. These were Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Cuba, North Korea, as well as the sharing of information. The latter was specifically concerned with sharing information with the UN during peacekeeping operations and inspections (US, 1995-b).

Focus areas and priorities were not only determined from official documents. Various statements and speeches by other role players, both outside and within the intelligence environment itself, assisted in determining focus and priorities in the post-Cold War period.

3.3 Views of President Clinton on Intelligence Focus and Priorities

During July 1995 the then President Clinton delivered a speech at the CIA where he stated that he had earlier set out areas in a presidential directive, on which the CIA must "focus on... priorities that will remain under constant review, but are still clear enough..." These focus areas as mentioned by Clinton were the following:

- the need for prompt and thorough intelligence for the military during operations,
- political, economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the US,
- intelligence about specific transnational threats to the US security, such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, illicit trade practices and environmental issues of great gravity (US, 1995-c).

Clinton further emphasised the need for both technological and human intelligence. He stated unequivocally that one could not decide between one or the other. The US needed both to obtain the complete picture (US, 1995-c).

3.4 Views of DCI Deutch on the Future of Intelligence

In September 1995 Deutch delivered a speech at the CIA where he stated that the US faced a “multitude of challenges”. The challenges mentioned by him were as follows:

- the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction,
- the activities of hostile countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea,
- the growing threat of international crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking,
- the necessity for maintaining the economic security of the US (US, 1995-a).

Deutch also warned that intelligence had to focus on longer-term developments. In this regard he specifically mentioned the role of China in relation to political and economic developments in Asia. He further stated that

the Russian struggle towards democracy needed monitoring as well (US, 1995-a).

In February 1996 Deutch provided a threat assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He started the assessment by stating that much was uncertain and named the following:

- the stability of many regions of the world threatened by ethnic turmoil and humanitarian crises,
- the development of two great powers, Russia and China, that needed to be monitored,
- the threat to peace represented by rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, specifically the attempts of those nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
- the threat to the world community from those who dealt in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs, and crime, and
- the vulnerability of the US to economic shocks due to the interdependence of the world economy (US, 1996-b).

Deutch continued and expanded on the uncertainties by listing threats that intelligence specifically focused on. In that regard he mentioned the possibility of conflict between countries such as Pakistan and India as well as between Greece and Turkey. Other countries and regions such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and the Middle East also needed monitoring. The situation in Bosnia, the possibility of instability in Cuba and violence in Haiti, and the economic problems in Mexico were also deemed important priorities. Africa and Latin America, with specific reference to narcotics trafficking and illegal immigrants, were also highlighted (US, 1996-b).

Transnational threats that were identified included the proliferation of WMD, all types of terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, and threats to economic security. Additionally newer focus areas such as information

security and environmental issues were also mentioned as threats (US, 1996-b).

3.5 Views of DCI Tenet on Current and Projected Threats

In February 1997 DCI George Tenet provided the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with a threat assessment. He indicated that the situation at the time was more complex as opposed to the Cold War era and that at least five critical aspects had been identified. Those five major areas were:

- the continued transformation of Russia and the evolution in China, as well as the role each played beyond their borders, those states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, whose hostile policies could have undermined regional stability,
- transnational issues that included terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international drug trafficking, the growth of international organised crime, and threats to US information systems,
- regional hotspots, such as the Middle East, the South Asian subcontinent, Bosnia, and the Aegean, that carried a high potential for conflict, and
- human misery and suffering, ethnic and civil conflict, forced migration, refugee flows, diseases and starvation (US, 1997-b).

From the official documents selected numerous focus areas and priorities could be determined. According to the documentation it would appear that no clear distinction had been made between focus areas and priorities. Furthermore, terms such as “challenges” and “threats” were also frequently used. The following section will provide a brief analysis of the focus areas and priorities in the post-Cold War period in order to place them in context.

4. AN ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE FOCUS AND PRIORITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD UNTIL 2001

Most of the topics identified from the various official documents represented, had been focus areas for intelligence before the Cold War ended. Economics, terrorism, narcotics, proliferation and regional stability were all addressed during the Cold War. Only health and ecological issues could have been classified as somewhat new (Lowenthal, 2006: 234).

Preventing proliferation, for example, had been a long-standing goal of US policy. Within some areas a shift in priorities had taken place. During the Cold War the proliferation emphasis was on nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union. Chemical and biological weapons gained greater dominance after the Cold War. The possibility of possible “loose nukes” after the collapse of the Soviet Union also gained prominence. The likelihood of a possible nuclear war between Pakistan and India further created this shift away from the original emphasis on the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons (Lowenthal, 2006: 239).

Numerous issues jostled for top priority after the Cold War until 2001. These included aspects such as international economics, proliferation of WMD, narcotics, crime, terrorism, ecological and health issues, and a variety of regional ones. The main regional issues were the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Africa and North Korea. Anyone of these could be the most important for some period of time, but none of them maintained the dominance that the Soviet Union once had (Lowenthal, 2006: 233).

According to Goodman (1996: 48 - 49) those new post-Cold War threats posed a much more serious problem to the US national security than the behaviour of some nations. Some of the threats to US policies and values as mentioned by Goodman were transnational terrorist and criminal forces, currency speculators, drug dealers, as well as ethnic, tribal and religious leaders seeking to achieve regional and even global aims.

Due to the host of new threats, the focus on the behaviour of nation states played a decreasing role. (Goodman, 1996: 48 - 49) This did not mean that the importance of the behaviour of nation states ceased to exist. Although Russia, as the dominant country following the break up of the Soviet Union was no longer regarded as a serious military threat, it still had that capability and as such continued to be an intelligence priority (Hilsman, 2000: 10). There was also a continuous need for gathering information in “denied areas” such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Goodman, 1996: 56).

Regional issues gained prominence in the post-Cold War era. In this regard the possibility of violence in Eastern Europe needed monitoring. The fear existed that violence might escalate and drawn the US into a conflict situation (Hilsman, 2000: 11). The Middle East also remained high on the priority list. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the possibility of its escalation had always been present. The rising expectations from the Third World were another important focus. It was feared that violence might have undermined political stability in many countries and regions (Anderson, 1990: 3).

One aspect that gained much prominence after the Cold War was the economic field. Initially it was thought that intelligence could assist in identifying opportunities for advancing US interests and support US trade negotiators. US competitiveness would then have benefited from intelligence. Additionally intelligence had to guard against foreign economic and industrial espionage and identify threats to US companies from unfair trading practices (Lowenthal, 2006: 244) and (Goodman, 1996: 61).

On the broader economic front intelligence also had to forecast major international economic shifts (Lowenthal, 2006: 244). It had to provide policy makers with analytical support on world economic trends, key international trade issues, information on former Soviet countries’ economic reform programmes, information on the circumvention of UN sanctions, and assess how some governments violated the rules of international trade (Goodman, 1996: 62).

Other aspects of economics on which intelligence had an impact related to the balance of trade, foreign acquisition of defence industries, and trends towards multinational corporations (Anderson, 1990: 3). It was acknowledged by policy makers that intelligence rivalry with other capitalist powers would grow and that free trade might suffer setbacks in the process. They even thought that a competitor might be perceived as an enemy (Burman, 1991: 188). The danger was that that possible economic conflict could have escalated into racism, as might possibly have happened between the US and Japan.

Two relatively new focus areas, namely health and the environment, were identified. In 1996 DCI Deutch stated that “intelligence has an important role to play in our efforts” to deal with environmental issues (US, 1996-b). Health has gained prominence as a result of AIDS and the outbreak of deadly diseases such as Ebola and avian influenza. The intelligence task was largely one of tracking patterns of infection (Lowenthal, 2006: 246).

The main intelligence tasks in the environmental sphere were to identify and track major threats and identify states whose policies might be harmful to the environment (Lowenthal, 2006: 247). These actions included issues such as monitoring ozone depletion, tropical deforestation, climate change, dumping of hazardous material in oceans, water scarcity, and food shortages (Goodman, 1996: 55 - 56). An additional important aspect was to monitor environmental depletion, especially the diminished mineral wealth and US dependence on some critical materials (Anderson, 1990: 3).

Intelligence also had to deal with other relatively new focus areas. Information operations dealt with computer technology, both the capability to wage war and protect the US systems in the event of an attack. Intelligence support to military operations was also regarded as very important. Since the end of the Cold War peace keeping operations have expanded rapidly and intelligence has had to provide adequate information (Lowenthal, 2006: 248).

4. CONCLUSION

The decade after the Cold War was a period of great uncertainty for intelligence. At the time the general feeling, of a peaceful and prosperous future in the making created difficulties for US intelligence. The very existence and future needs of intelligence agencies were questioned.

With the demise of the principal threat, namely the Soviet Union, and the existence of intelligence threatened, the latter was required to focus on numerous existing threats as well as some new ones. In the absence of clear political leadership and guidance, intelligence had the *de facto* responsibility of deciding on focus and priorities. This led to further criticism as intelligence was accused of creating threats to justify expenditure. Intelligence activities were further hampered by the apparent lack of a clear distinction between focus areas and priorities. Numerous role players, ranging from the executive to intelligence officials, used these terms loosely on occasions.

Although the principal role players realised the magnitude of the new threats, the lack of a clearly defined national security policy and strategy hampered the effectiveness of intelligence. No single dominant threat was identified that intelligence could focus on. The various threats jostled for importance throughout the period. As a result, intelligence attempted to respond to all the requests by the various administrations and an in-depth focus on particular issues was lacking. Intelligence was in a sense involved in a struggle for survival and attempting to justify its existence.

Table 1 attempts to place the intelligence priorities as determined from the Cold War period until the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US in context. It must be stressed that although certain priorities have been placed in a designated square, they are in fact to a high degree interwoven. Energy supply for example, can also be placed under transnational threats. Similarly, economic espionage may fall under economic issues.

Table 1: US Intelligence Focus and Priorities in the post-Cold War period until 9/11

Main Focus Area	**Specific Areas of Concern**
Economic Issues	Increasing debt, population growth, political stability, trade policies, and energy supply were all important.
Arms Control	Proliferation in general, and specifically WMD, was the main priority.
Counterintelligence	The hostile intentions of foreign countries, especially with regard to economic espionage were a priority.
Transnational Threats	Organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, subversion, cyber security, and environmental issues were the main priorities.
Support of the Military	Needed in times of conflict and certain covert operations.
Better Cooperation with Law Enforcement	Specifically with regard to drug trafficking and other organised crime.

The following chapter will examine the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence in the period after the September 2001 terror attacks until the end of 2008. The terror attacks were a catalytic event for US intelligence. Once again the US intelligence agencies, as in the Cold War, had a clear and dominant enemy, namely terrorism. The only difference was that after September 2001 the dominant threat was not a state, but a transnational movement.

CHAPTER 5

UNITED STATES CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE FOCUS AND PRIORITIES IN THE POST-9/11 PERIOD

1. INTRODUCTION

In discussing the focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence after the 9/11-terrorist attacks, the impact of the attacks will first be placed in perspective in this chapter. The first section will indicate how these attacks affected US national strategy and foreign policy, which in turn influenced intelligence focus and priorities.

The next section will highlight specific elements of the national security strategy of the US that had a direct influence on the intelligence focus and priorities. The subsequent section will then address the intelligence focus that flows from the national security requirements on a national level. The fourth section will specifically look at the focus and priorities of the CIA during the post-9/11 period until the end of 2008, while the fifth will provide a brief analysis of US intelligence focus and priorities in the post-9/11 period.

2. IMPACT OF THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US played a key role in US politics and in determining intelligence focus and priorities (Eckersley, 2009: 92). Countering terrorism has become the top national security priority for the US and will probably continue to be so in the short-to-medium term. In this regard US officials have emphasised that the campaign against terrorism will be prolonged (Walt, 2001: 57).

It can be argued that for years to come the war on terrorism will be the defining paradigm in the struggle for global order (Cox and Stokes, 2008: 406). This is mainly so because terrorism is perceived to be more salient, more immediate, more controllable, and evokes a greater emotional response from Americans than other threats, such as the risks posed by climate change. It is also most likely that the US attitude towards other priorities, such as climate change, is not likely to shift dramatically in the absence of a major and vivid incident (Eckersley, 2009: 92).

Challenges in the post-9/11 era have generally become transnational rather than international (US, 2004-b: 362). Globalisation and the resulting "smaller world" have ensured that the US has interests all over the world. The country has had to pay attention to all sources responsible for global instability, since any significant change in them bodes a potential threat to US interests. In some instances US national security was equated to global security, as market expansion and access to resources were essential to the US economy and the wellbeing of its citizens (Gurtov, 2006: 13).

A national strategy as well as a national effort was required by the US to counter threats. The long-term success of such a strategy demanded the use of all elements of national power, namely diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defence (US, 2004-b: 363 - 364).

Gutman (2008: 257) states that a political strategy to counter threats must be supported by power. Offensive action is necessary to support US diplomacy. Diplomacy that is not backed up by a credible threat is just as impotent as the use of force without a clear diplomatic purpose. It is then important that any strategy should be well balanced (US, 2004-b: 363). A response to a potential problem should be powerful but not overbearing. In this regard Hirsh (2002: 41 - 42) states that the world must be ensured that the US is benign, but not soft. Consequently a new assertiveness became apparent in US foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 (Hirsh, 2002: 19).

This new assertiveness according to Cogan (2004: 315) could be seen in the 2002 national strategy of the US that advanced the doctrine of pre-emption. Cogan called it an “offensive hunt” strategy. The strategy entailed actively seeking out threats such as terrorism and using methods that were not the norm prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Cogan, 2004: 316).

The manifested assertiveness in US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks had a direct bearing on the activities of its intelligence agencies. The aggressive foreign policy was closely linked to action by the military. The latter needed proactive intelligence and a close relationship with intelligence agencies was necessary. Furthermore, US intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, were also expected to act aggressively against terrorist targets. However, the limited military capability of US intelligence agencies to engage in covert actions made direct cooperation with the military imperative (Cogan, 2004: 317).

A further dimension of this assertiveness was that the support of allies in countering terrorism had become crucial. As intelligence would provide the necessary data for prevention and pre-emptive attacks and the more cooperation the US could obtain from allies in the intelligence and policing spheres the less unilateral action was needed. The 9/11 terrorist attacks proved to be the driving force to enhance existing intelligence capabilities and build a complete intelligence picture (Posen, 2001: 46 - 57).

Intelligence formed a crucial part of the new assertiveness in US foreign policy, both in obtaining information and in taking direct action. The following section will deal with the US national security strategy in the post-9/11 period until 2008 to determine the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Specific attention is given to the impact of these attacks on the focus and priorities of US intelligence.

3. US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AFTER 9/11

Two national security strategy documents, namely *The National Security Strategy of the US 2002,* and *The National Security Strategy of the US 2006,* will be analysed in order to determine if the strategy changed during the post-9/11 era, and how it influenced intelligence focus and priorities.

3.1 US National Security Strategy of 2002

In the 2002 national strategy it was stated that the first and fundamental commitment of the government of the US was to defend the nation against its enemies. It was emphasised that the task was far more complex and the threats more elusive in the modern world than ever before. The importance of intelligence in the national security strategy was thus acknowledged throughout the document (US, 2002-c).

The 2002 national strategy specifically stated that the US should use every tool, including intelligence, in its arsenal to combat the new elusive threats. It was stated that intelligence, and the manner in which it should be used, was the first line of defence against terrorists, hostile states and other dangers (US, 2002-c).

The national strategy of 2002 further acknowledged that the US realised the importance of building a better and more integrated intelligence capability to keep pace with the nature of the threats and provide timely, accurate information on threats wherever they might emerge. Using this intelligence, the US would strike before any emerging threats were fully formed or reached its borders (US, 2002-c).

Terrorism and WMD were specifically mentioned as threats. The 2002 national strategy stated that the combination of radicalism and technology presented the major threat to the US. Linked to this threat was the proliferation of WMD that presented another major concern for US security (US, 2002-c).

The 2002 national strategy further stated that the country would actively work to extend the benefits of freedom and democracy across the world. The US realised that weak states could pose a great threat to its national interests. The combination of weak institutions, poverty and corruption could make states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels. The US would also continue to reduce the spread and impact of transnational dangers such as HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases (US, 2002-c).

An overview of the US national strategy of 2002 provides some focus areas that were intended to support its goals of a peaceful and prosperous world, namely:

- defeating terrorism,
- preventing the spread of WMD,
- defusing regional conflicts,
- promoting democracy,
- promoting human dignity,
- ensuring free trade and economic growth,
- developing cooperative action with other role players,
- transforming US national security institutions to meet twenty-first century challenges (US, 2002-c).

The next section will review the 2006 national strategy in order to determine any changes from the 2002 strategy, and whether it resulted in a change of intelligence focus and priorities.

3.2 US National Security Strategy of 2006

The 2006 national strategy stated that the US was at war, and that two inseparable priorities, namely combating terrorism and promoting freedom, had guided its policy from even before 2002. Furthermore, the country's national security was founded on two pillars, namely promoting freedom,

justice and human dignity, and confronting the challenges of the modern era. The 2006 national strategy then indicated some of the challenges that extended across borders as pandemic diseases, proliferation of WMD, terrorism, human trafficking and natural disasters (US, 2006).

The 2006 national security focus was to a very large extent the same as that of 2002. The only difference was that in 2006 an additional focus area was added, namely the opportunities and challenges of globalisation. The 2006 national security strategy also provided more detailed information regarding the threats (US, 2006).

Ending tyranny across the world was regarded as a major focus area in order to ensure US security. In this regard North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma and Zimbabwe were named as countries that were suffering under tyranny. Ending tyrannies was an area of focus as they threatened freedom in the world. Some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threatened the US's immediate security interests as well (US, 2006).

Specific countries or areas named under regional conflicts that demanded attention were Darfur, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Uganda, the Ethiopian/Eritrean situation, and Nepal. Some success areas in the period 2002 until 2006 were listed as Sudan, Liberia, the Gaza Strip, the Indian/Pakistani relationship, Indonesia, and Northern Ireland (US, 2006).

With regard to WMD, Libya was highlighted as a country where success had been achieved in preventing the proliferation of WMD. Focus areas that still demanded attention concerning WMD were named as Iran, North Korea, terrorists attempting to acquire such weapons, the protection of weapons materials, and the rapid advances in technology that provided new opportunities for the illegal acquisition of such weapons (US, 2006).

As mentioned before, globalisation created new challenges. Some of the challenges listed were the prevention of the spread of pandemic diseases

such as HIV/AIDS and avian influenza. Illicit trade in all forms and environmental destruction were also termed as focus areas for US security interests. Two countries, namely Russia and China, were specifically discussed. Those countries, due to their respective and unique locations, strengths and internal situations demanded US attention (US, 2006).

It can be argued that the 2002 and 2006 national security strategies do not differ in essence. The 2006 national security strategy is to a large extent a continuation of the 2002 national security strategy. The two noticeable differences are the added detail in the latter strategy and the formal recognition of globalisation as a focus area. The next section will examine the focus and priorities that US intelligence derived from the national security strategies.

4. US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOCUS AND PRIORITIES

The first *National Intelligence Strategy* was published in 2005 and has its origins in the 9/11 terrorists attacks and the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* of 2002. According to the Director National Intelligence (DNI), John D Negroponte, US intelligence had the obligation to serve as the first line of defence and promote the spread of freedom, human rights, economic growth, financial stability and the rule of law. Additionally, intelligence could and should be used to aid diplomacy, influence actors and ensure victory when a conflict manifested (US, 2005-a).

4.1. National Intelligence Strategy

Five strategic objectives were identified in the *National Intelligence Strategy*. From the document it would appear that no distinction is made between the terms *priorities* and *objectives*. Indeed, it is stated that the national intelligence strategy is a statement of “our priorities”. Nevertheless, the objectives listed are as follows:

- defeating terrorism,
- preventing and countering the spread of WMD,
- bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful democratic states,
- anticipating developments of strategic concern and identifying opportunities,
- developing innovative ways to penetrate difficult targets (US, 2005-a).

It was additionally acknowledged that intelligence had to support diplomacy and the military in the event of intervention or conflict. To support policy makers in general, intelligence had to have access to expertise on “every region, transnational issues, and every threat to the American people” (US, 2005-a).

The objectives encompassed in the national intelligence strategy were stated in broad terms. The importance of intelligence, however, in supporting the national security strategy was clearly discernible. More detailed information concerning the US intelligence focus and priorities, and especially regarding the CIA, was contained in the annual report of the US intelligence community.

4.2. Annual Intelligence Community Report

The *Annual Intelligence Report* of 2006 indicated that a significant share of the intelligence community’s efforts was spent on supporting the military on the ground. In particular, Afghanistan and Iraq “will continue to require a substantial share” of the intelligence effort (US, 2007-b).

In combating terrorism the CIA, in particular, was singled out to recruit assets in the human collection sphere. Collection in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq took a substantial share in resources and efforts. In combating proliferation the CIA was named as “a leader in efforts to create new sources, collection platforms, and sensors” (US, 2007-b).

Bolstering the democracy was another area of importance to the intelligence community and, in particular, to the CIA. The latter played “a lead role in coordinating such exchanges”. Liaison between the CIA and external experts in building new democracies and stabilising transitioning ones took place regularly. In gaining access to hard targets, the CIA took the lead role in managing programmes in that regard (US, 2007-b).

In combating terrorism and WMD, many resources were utilised. However, intelligence still needed to devote significant attention to potential or emerging threats of strategic consequences. In that regard the shifting of resources to concentrate on sudden issues such as Lebanon and Darfur were mentioned. In anticipating developments the CIA “remains a leader in conducting strategic analysis, in particular studying issues of concern in the Muslim world such as Sharia, Islamic economic ideas, and financial support for terrorism” (US, 2007-b).

A transnational issue, namely the threat of avian influenza, was highlighted as an unconventional one that the intelligence community had to monitor. Several agencies, including the CIA, “contributed substantially to the larger effort” (US, 2007-b).

From the national intelligence strategy and the annual intelligence report that were discussed, it became evident that the general areas of concern for intelligence greatly corresponded with those of the national security strategy. The following section will examine the focus and priorities of the CIA in greater detail.

5. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOCUS AND PRIORITIES

The focus and priorities of US intelligence and, in particular the CIA, in the post-9/11 period can be deduced form various official documents and speeches made by high-ranking intelligence officials.

5.1 Views of DCI Tenet Regarding Worldwide Threats

DCI Tenet presented some documents of note concerning the intelligence focus. Two of these, both describing the threats in the world and dated 2002 and 2003 respectively, will be discussed.

5.1.1 Converging Dangers in the World in 2002

In March 2002 DCI Tenet presented a paper explaining the threats to the US before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Given the fact that that presentation took place just after 9/11, terrorism clearly took prominence. The first part of the document dealt with topics such as terrorism, the Muslim world and its links to terrorism, as well as proliferation issues (US, 2002-b).

Tenet pointed out the links between terrorism and related issues such as WMD and the social, political and economic tensions across the world. He stated that the convergence of those threats had forced the US to expand its focus to other areas as well. Those included countries such as Somalia where the absence of a national government created an environment favourable for terrorist groups; Indonesia, where political instability and ethnic tensions prevented economic recovery and fuelled Islamic extremism; and Columbia, where insurgents used drug trafficking money to combat the government. The conditions that allowed terrorism to take root were mentioned as having virtually the same threat to US national security as terrorism itself (US, 2002-b).

Under terrorism various groups, such as al-Qaeda, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and HAMAS were mentioned. The possibility of groups such as these in acquiring WMD was seen as a real threat. Additionally, the possibility of cyber warfare by terrorists was also deemed a threat. State sponsored terrorism was another area of concern, and countries such as Iran and Iraq were specifically mentioned as supporting terrorist groups (US, 2002-b).

The second main topic of the 2002 paper was listed as the “Muslim world”. That subsection dealt with the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. The unique relationship between India and Pakistan and the situation between Israel and the Palestinians were also regarded as issues that warranted attention (US, 2002-b).

The third topic, namely proliferation, discussed WMD and the delivery systems of such missiles. Countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan were mentioned as being of concern to the US regarding WMD (US, 2002-b).

The 2002 presentation also concentrated on specific countries or areas of concern to US national security. The countries that were regarded as priorities that needed closer scrutiny were Russia, China and North Korea. The emphasis was on their respective internal situations and the fear that they could have a negative impact outside their borders (US, 2002-b).

Other regions of unease included Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans. In Latin America the possibility of internal unrest in Venezuela, Argentina and Columbia was the primary concern. In sub-Saharan Africa economic failure and the resulting violence were the major concerns. In that regard Somalia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe and Liberia were mentioned, while in the Balkans the possibility of conflict in Bosnia and Macedonia was regarded as significant (US, 2002-b).

5.1.2 Evolving Dangers in the World in 2003

In February 2003, DCI Tenet provided a briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the evolving dangers in a complex world. Terrorism was still viewed as a priority and together with related subjects such as WMD remained the primary focus. Some countries were named that were experiencing terrorist activities, or providing a safe haven for terrorists, or assisting terrorist groups. Those countries included Columbia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. The situation in Iraq was further

analysed regarding links with terrorist organisations and proliferation issues (US, 2003).

Proliferation continued to be a theme of major importance to the US intelligence agencies. Specific countries linked to proliferation were again named. They were North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, India and Pakistan. In the document Libya's interests in WMD were added as of concern to US security (US, 2003).

The internal situations in China, Russia and Iran were deemed as needing closer scrutiny while the continuing tension and potential for conflict between India and Pakistan was again emphasised as being worrisome. The difficulties experienced in Afghanistan were added as additional issues (US, 2003).

Globalisation as a phenomenon was named as a key issue that could present a transnational threat. In that regard the implications for countries that could not deal with the changing circumstances, combined with the possible backlash of the population, were regarded as being problematic. The fear existed that instability might grow. HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, were also deemed as threats (US, 2003).

The refugee problem in the world and the resulting strain on the need for aid was yet another problematic area to the US intelligence agencies. Sub-Saharan Africa was specifically mentioned, as well as the security situations in Colombia, Venezuela and in the Balkans (US, 2003).

5.2 Views of DCI Goss on Global Intelligence Challenges

In March 2005, DCI Porter J Goss presented a threat assessment to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He indicated that the CIA would concentrate its efforts on the challenges that were most pressing. The efforts were being directed towards defeating terrorism, protecting the homeland, preventing the proliferation of WMD, combating drug trafficking, and fostering stability, freedom and peace in the troubled regions of the world (US, 2005-b).

As regards the terrorist threat, al-Qaeda remained the main priority, although other groups, such as Hezbollah, were also mentioned. Specific geographical areas of concern relating to terrorism were Pakistan, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe. Latin America and parts of Africa were viewed as areas where terrorist incidents might occur at any time, while Iraq and Afghanistan were singled out as areas of major concern (US, 2005-b).

Proliferation again continued to be a foremost theme for US intelligence. In that regard Libya was deemed a lesser threat than had been the case previously after having renounced its WMD programme. North Korea and Iran, however, remained high on the priority list. The developments in China and Russia also warranted continuous monitoring. With regard to China, special attention was given to the build-up of weapons and the possibility of conflict with Taiwan. In Russia, the likelihood of increasing instability, secession problems and the vulnerability of the WMD posed substantive dilemmas (US, 2005-b).

Goss also indicated other potential areas of concern that needed close scrutiny. The Middle East and especially the Palestinian problem remained priorities. In Africa, Nigeria, Sudan and the Horn of Africa warranted special attention. In Latin America, Venezuela, Columbia, Haiti and Cuba were the main target areas. In Southeast Asia Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were regarded as the foremost areas of concern (US, 2005-b).

5.3 Views of DCI Hayden on CIA Focus Areas

In January 2007, DCI Michael V Hayden discussed some challenges that the CIA faced with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Terrorism and proliferation continued to be the principal focus areas. Hayden stated that “we focus on North Korea and Iran” whose WMD programmes threatened regional balances, US interests, and international arms control mechanisms. The CIA also focused on the WMD and missile programmes of Russia and China, which were large enough to jeopardise US survival in a possible conflict

situation. Additionally, the CIA was searching for signs that could indicate whether other states or non-state actors were taking steps to acquire such technology. The CIA was also attempting to determine whether new technological developments might lead to increased access in the sphere of WMD in the future (US, 2007-d).

In Iraq and Afghanistan the CIA concentrated on terrorism and issues regarding the reconstruction of those nations. The activities of countries such as Iran and Syria, who were perceived to oppose the coalition goals, were also monitored (US, 2007-d).

Global economic aspects were additional focus areas. The rise of countries such as China and India and the emergence of new economic centres were monitored. The problems of failing states and the scarcity of natural resources, in particular energy sources, were further focus areas (US, 2007-d).

5.4 Views of Deputy Director Finger on Global Security

In July 2007 the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Thomas Finger, presented a global security assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He testified that terrorism continued to be the “pre-eminent challenge” to the intelligence community. The role of countries such as Iran and Syria, that were perceived to be supporting terrorism, was mentioned. The specific situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were highlighted as particularly challenging areas (US, 2007-c).

Globalisation and the corresponding interaction between different fields were aspects that required intelligence coverage. The link between terrorism and proliferation as well as between terrorism and drug trafficking had also become areas of concern. Iran and North Korea were specifically named as problem states with regard to proliferation issues (US, 2007-c).

A number of other countries that were under scrutiny were discussed. Those included Syria with its ties with terrorism, the Palestinian territories, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico, and India. Two countries that warranted special attention were, yet again, China and Russia. Those two countries were given priority status due to their respective military strengths, links to proliferation, relationships with neighbouring states as well as economic development (US, 2007-c).

Finally, energy security and the resulting competition was a further worrisome area. Energy security and development were “rapidly becoming an increasing priority” for the US (US, 2007-c). The following section will provide a brief analysis of the focus areas and priorities in the post-9/11 period in order to place it in context.

6. AN ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE FOCUS AND PRIORITIES AFTER 2001

Most of the issues identified from the various official documents presented in chapter 5 were also focus areas for US intelligence in the Cold War period, as well as in the post-Cold War period until 9/11. One major focus area that had become the focal point for US intelligence was terrorism. That development in turn had catapulted a number of existing and new national security threats onto the growing intelligence priority list (Turner, 2006: 155).

The prevention of proliferation of WMD was an example of such a threat of which the importance had increased. The emphasis of intelligence on WMD was to provide the government with information on nuclear issues and with special reference to terrorist groups (Perkovich and Acton, 2008: 59).

A further noticeable feature in the post-9/11 period was the acknowledgment that links existed between various priorities that could be ascribed to increased permeable political boundaries, declining relevance of distance, and the growing capacity of non-state role players as a result of globalisation

(Mansbach, 2004: 20). Turner (2006: 153) also affirmed that state-specific threats had become overlain with sub-state political concerns, such as ethnic rivalries, religious extremism and rising nationalism.

The various transnational threats that continued to be focus areas served as examples of the interlinking threats. Criminal activities often played a supporting role in many traditional international security problems such as in financing terrorism or illicit arms trafficking. In weaker states such activities could also contribute to domestic instability or state failure (Smith, 2010: 179 - 181).

Terrorism is another example of a transnational threat that was linked to a range of other issues such as WMD, failed states and energy resources. The US economy and its links to other issues of importance were also acknowledged by the US national security focus. The need to find reliable suppliers of energy was especially important to the US as one of the world's largest consumers (Umbach, 2010: 202). Fears existed that terrorism could pose a threat to the safety and security of energy sources and energy infrastructure, which were regarded as of major strategic value (Umbach, 2010: 203 - 204).

Some relatively newer priorities, such as the information sphere, had also gained importance. It was linked to possible terrorist actions against critical infrastructure that could have devastating consequences for the US economy and the national security (Clark and Levin, 2009: 2).

Democratic state building was an important component of US national interests (Rice, 2008: 3). By promoting democracy in the world, the US intended to attempt to prevent failed states that were associated with instability, terrorist activities and a magnitude of social problems. Direct threats included the movement of combatants to neighbouring countries, while indirect threats concerned secondary aspects such as the additional financial burden on some governments in providing assistance to refugees (Lecher and Milne, 2005: 25 - 32).

Supporting the military on both a tactical as well as a strategic level also gained more prominence in the US government in the post-9/11 period and resulted in an increased involvement of intelligence in military matters (Kolisnek, 2006: 61). The support was twofold: both in war and in peacekeeping operations. Intelligence assisted in providing information for planning purposes and in determining the effectiveness of a campaign, especially in peacekeeping (Cammaert, 2006: xix).

Finally, US intelligence still confronted state-specific threats as had been the case during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; however, as lesser priorities (Rice, 2008: 3 – 12).

7. CONCLUSION

The 9/11 terrorist attacks had major implications for the US in general, and especially for US intelligence. The period after the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a renewed recognition of the importance of intelligence. The attacks also provided a new sense of urgency to intelligence when compared to the previous decade. The uncertainty of that decade was no longer an issue as intelligence once again had a single dominant priority to focus on, namely terrorism.

That did not mean that other focus areas and priorities had disappeared. It was simply a case of terrorism being regarded as the most immediate threat. Linked to terrorism was the other major focus area of the period, namely countering the proliferation of WMD. A recurring priority throughout the post-9/11 period was the importance attached to the expansion of democracy. It can be argued that the idea was to prevent states from failing and the consequent dangers that could result from such failed states.

Transnational threats also received more prominence during the post-9/11 period. Those threats, such as drug trafficking, diseases and threats linked to

the environment attracted more attention as a result of increased globalisation. However, the “older” priorities had remained to a large extent. An example was the dominant priority of the Cold War era, namely the Soviet Union, which remained a priority, albeit in the new form of Russia.

CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The main focus of this study was to discuss and analyse the changes in US civilian intelligence focus and priorities in the post-Cold War period. The study attempted to explore what caused those changes and whether priorities are unique to a specific period or whether there is a degree of overlapping.

This chapter will summarise the contents of the study, and compare the intelligence focus and priorities in the various time periods. An evaluation of the assumptions formulated in the introduction follows the summary. Finally, some conclusions will be presented, based on the main findings of the study.

2. SUMMARY

To attain the purpose of the study, use was made of description, analysis and comparison as research methods. The theory chapter (chapter 2) provided a conceptual framework for the rest of the study. It was divided into two sections, the first of which dealt with the concept of intelligence. Aspects such as the purpose of intelligence, various intelligence products, different levels of intelligence and the relationship between intelligence and policy were discussed. The second section of chapter 2 examined the relationship between national security and intelligence. That section also sought to explain the changing views on national security that had a direct influence on intelligence focus and priorities.

Chapter 3 presented an historical overview of US intelligence focus and priorities in the Cold War period. The Cold War was significant as it dominated

the international scene for half a century, and the primary US intelligence focus and priority was the Soviet Union and its allies. Other focus areas were regarded as extensions of the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. Various documents that underpinned the legal mandate for US intelligence focus and priorities were discussed in that chapter. In that regard special emphasis was placed on *NSC-68*, which had influenced the focus and priorities of US intelligence during the Cold War.

Chapter 4 dealt with the period immediately after the Cold War up to the 9/11-terrorist attacks in the US. That period could be regarded as a transitional phase in the sense that US intelligence focus and priorities were not always clear. Finding a defined role for intelligence in the absence of a clear-cut enemy proved to be problematic. The uncertainty as to what exactly warranted focus and priorities according to the national security policy and strategy also hampered the effectiveness of intelligence. Changes in priorities often occurred as both intelligence environments and government struggled to determine focus areas and priorities.

Chapter 5 examined the post-9/11 era where intelligence once again focused on a dominant enemy, namely terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks had had a major influence on US national security strategy, which in turn determined intelligence focus and priorities. During that period it became evident that very few priorities could be seen in isolation and that a degree of overlapping often occurred; an example being the main priority of the period, namely terrorism, which had definite links with other priorities, such as drug trafficking and organised crime.

3. A COMPARISON BETWEEN UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE FOCUS IN THE POST-COLD WAR AND THE POST-9/11 PERIODS

The Cold War struggle dominated US intelligence and virtually all issues were regarded as being extensions of the struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies. As a result the US intelligence focus after the Cold War was initially

impeded by a lack of a clear enemy as well as by the nature of the Cold War itself. Due to the absence of clear intelligence priorities, a number of issues jostled for position, but no one issue achieved the dominance that the Soviet Union had previously held. In contrast, US intelligence had gained an undeniably top priority after 9/11. All other priorities, although important, had become secondary to the threat and struggle against terrorism.

The nature of the Cold War had had an influence on the intelligence focus in both periods, albeit more so in the immediate post-Cold War period. US intelligence was designed primarily to combat the Soviet threat, and experienced difficulties in changing its focus to new targets in the post-Cold War. Additional to that problem was the lack of clear guidelines or direction by the policy makers, which further plagued US intelligence in defining its role in the post-Cold War period.

In the post-9/11 period US intelligence also experienced problems. It still endured the legacy of the Cold War. Intelligence inadequacies, most notably the faulty analysis concerning WMD in Iraq, were pointed out as a result of intelligence orientations not having fully adapted from those of the Cold War mindset.

Table 2 will attempt to place the focus areas in the post-Cold War as well as the post-9/11 periods in perspective. During both those periods it was extremely difficult to place a focus area into a single category as the different focus areas were extensively interlinked. Terrorism, for example, was linked to energy issues as well as weapons proliferation.

Table 2: Comparison between US Intelligence Focus in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods

Post-Cold War Focus Areas	Post-9/11 Focus Areas
Economic Issues such as increasing debt, population growth, political stability,	Combating **Terrorism** on all levels; also supporting the military in the struggle

trade policies and energy supply were all important.	against terrorism.
Arms Control with emphasis on proliferation in general.	**Spreading Democracy** to prevent social problems such as refugee movements and ensuring human dignity. Also supporting the military in peacekeeping operations.
Counterintelligence in preventing the hostile intentions of foreign countries, especially with regard to economic espionage was a priority.	**Combating Proliferation** with emphasis on WMD.
Transnational Threats including organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, subversion, cyber security and environmental issues were the main issues	**Transnational Threats** such as organised crime, drug trafficking and environmental issues.
Support of the Military in times of conflict, certain covert operations and peacekeeping.	**Economic Issues** with emphasis on energy problems. Also the threat of cyber attacks on the economic infrastructure.
Better **Cooperation with Law Enforcement** specifically with regard to drug trafficking and other organised crime.	

The focus and priorities of US intelligence in the post-Cold War period were varied and included a range of issues. Although Cold War issues continued to be focus areas, the difference was that an issue, such as terrorism, was regarded as an independent focus area in the post-Cold War period, and not as an extension of the struggle against the Soviet Union as had been the case during the Cold War.

In the post-9/11 period intelligence also continued to focus on certain Cold War era issues. Of note in that period was that, similarly to the situation during the Cold War, various issues were once again linked to the dominant question

of the time, namely terrorism. In that regard a concern such as drug trafficking was frequently linked to terrorism, whose perpetrators sought to acquire funds through drug trafficking.

In both the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods, older issues were supplemented by new or relatively new focus areas. In the case of the post-Cold War period, health and the environment could have been regarded as new. After 9/11, cyber and communications-related issues were added to the existing focus areas. However, some of those areas, such as transnational threats, overlapped in the different time periods that were discussed. In other instances there were subtle shifts in the importance attached to a focus area, for example, the emphasis placed on preventing the proliferation of WMD changed in the different periods. In the post-Cold War period the accent was mainly on preventing rogue states from obtaining weapons, while in the post-9/11 period the emphasis was on preventing non-state actors from obtaining weapons.

In both the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods, transnational threats increasingly gained importance. In the post-Cold War period those threats, such as drug trafficking, were regarded by some as even more serious than the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. In the post-9/11 period the importance of transnational threats was further highlighted mainly as a result of globalisation. The difference between the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods is that in the post-9/11 period more importance was attached to the interdependence of the world. The approach in the post-9/11 period was more holistic and links between the various issues were acknowledged.

4. TESTING OF ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions formulated in chapter one related to the inclusion of Cold War period threats in the post-Cold War era, the influencing of intelligence focus by events rather than perceptions, and the role of the US administration in determining intelligence focus and priorities.

4.1 Cold War Threats Continued to be Relevant in the Post-Cold War Era

Assumption: “Although the post-Cold War and post-9/11 priorities changed, the intelligence focus continued to include some of the Cold War period threats”.

Although the Soviet Union dominated US intelligence focus and priorities during the Cold War, intelligence resources were focused on other targets as well. From an intelligence perspective, all areas of society were regarded as important in the struggle against the Soviet Union. That was as a result of the interpretation of *NSC-68,* which stated that the “American system” must flourish by “means short of war” (US, 1950-b). All issues, including economic and social ones, were viewed as an extension of the struggle against the Soviet Union.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, intelligence collection continued to focus on issues that had previously been linked to the Soviet Union. Terrorism, for example, was regarded as an extension of super power politics during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period terrorism increasingly became seen as a separate, independent issue. However, the intelligence environment was ill-prepared to deal with the new importance of some older threats.

The new threats resulted in policy makers, as well as the intelligence environment often finding those issues more difficult to analyse and deal with than the previous Soviet-related matters. On many of the new priorities, such as environmental issues, there was uncertainty over the course of action that needed to be followed (Lowenthal, 2006: 233 - 234).

What changed were the priorities accorded within a specific focus area. During the Cold War the military capability of states was one of the main focus areas of US intelligence. In the post-Cold War period, military issues such as

the nuclear strategy, proliferation and WMD were still important, but the emphasis had also moved to non-state actors and their potential use of WMD.

The same changes in emphasis were also noticeable in other focus areas. Whereas the focus on economies was linked to the growth and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Cold War era, it became an independent one in the post-Cold War period. Under the economics spotlight, various aspects, such as energy resources, illegal trade practices and market acquisitions were analysed.

The assumption formulated above can therefore be verified.

4.2 Events, Rather than Perceptions, Determined US Intelligence Focus and Priorities

Assumption: “The focus and priorities of the US intelligence agencies were to a great extent influenced by events, rather than by changed perceptions”.

Two events that had a major impact on US intelligence focus and priorities were the end of the Cold War and the 9/11-terror attacks in the US. Both those events led to a change in US intelligence focus and priorities. At the end of the Cold War it became apparent that intelligence had failed to provide any prior indications of this happening, resulting in a surprising unfolding of events. Furthermore, the intelligence environment was to such a degree unprepared for the event that it grappled to determine its role in the subsequent years.

The intelligence milieu was also confronted with budget constraints and struggled to adapt in the changing world. For the first time in history, US intelligence was confronted with strong challenges over what it should focus on, as well as an increase in clients. It also had many new clients such as the increasing role of Congress in foreign affairs and the national security policy (Goodman, 1996: 39). In the absence of guidance by the executive branch through a clear national security policy, the intelligence domain focused on

broad global issues. Threats and requirements were uncertain or subject to rapid shifts (Hulnick, 1999: 105). The intelligence world tended to respond in a reactive manner as global incidents occurred.

The 9/11-terror attacks presented yet another example of intelligence again failing to provide sufficient and timely warning. It was not ready to deal comprehensively with the new threats after the Cold War. The legacy of the Cold War collection system designed to track a large political-military structure failed in that novel environment as newer focus areas demanded that intelligence adapt quickly. However, the 9/11 attacks restored the importance of intelligence to a significant degree, and it was once again a leading component in the new struggle against terrorism.

In this post-Cold War period, and especially in the period immediately after the Cold War, uncertainty existed on many levels as to the exact role of intelligence. Perceptions existed both with the public and the policy makers that the intelligence domain had lost its focus after the Cold War and needed better guidance and direction from policy makers (US, 1997-b).

Intelligence also experienced the uncertainty and DCI Deutch stated that in the post-Cold War period the challenges and opportunities were still unclear (US, 1996: b). It would then appear that on many levels uncertainty existed regarding the role of intelligence and that events assisted in the intelligence focus.

The assumption formulated above can therefore also be verified.

4.3 The Relationship between Intelligence and the Various Administrations Influenced Intelligence Focus and Priorities

Assumption: “The relationship between the various administrations and the intelligence services determines the focus and priorities of intelligence to a great extent”.

Policy makers are not passive recipients of intelligence, but actively influence all its aspects. The policy maker is thus a key determinant in the process of establishing the focus and priorities of intelligence.

The Cold War provides an example of how intelligence related to the various administrations during that period. The national security policy of the US government throughout the Cold War was clear: the main focus was the Soviet Union and its allies as originally contained in *NSC-68*, which served as a clear blueprint for US intelligence during the Cold War (US, 1950-b). To a large extent that document determined the focus and priorities of the CIA, as it formed the basis of the actions that followed and developed during the Cold War.

The period after the ending of the Cold War provides exactly the opposite view of how intelligence activities are influenced by a relationship between an administration (policy makers) and intelligence. The absence of a clear national security policy in the period after the Cold War made it difficult for the intelligence environment to function properly and to meet its own as well as the policy makers' expectations.

However, the US government acknowledged the importance of a clear policy. US President Clinton specifically said that intelligence "need[s] and deserve[s]" clear policies (US, 1995-c). Although intelligence officials had a broad understanding of the policy makers' preferences and immediate interests for most of the time, it did not provide a sufficiently substantial basis for clear intelligence focus and priorities.

In the absence of a clear focus of the Soviet Union as the principal enemy, intelligence attempted to redefine its role in relation to the various administrations. US intelligence had to be capable of responding quickly to policy makers' needs, no matter what the subject. However, in order to effectively respond, intelligence needed well documented threats (clear threats), as reliable intelligence capabilities cannot be developed overnight (Goodman, 1996: 47).

In some respects the intelligence focus after the 9/11-terror attacks on the US resembled, the same as that exhibited during the Cold War with one dominant issue in both instances. It was once again accentuated that if an administration has clear policy goals, intelligence focus and priorities will also be more aligned. In the post-9/11 period US intelligence had had that unambiguous focus. Documents such as the *National Intelligence Strategy* and various speeches by high-ranking intelligence officials clearly stated the focus areas and priorities (US, 2005-a).

The assumption formulated above can therefore too be verified.

5. CONCLUSION

Intelligence focus refers to the types of threats and opportunities relevant to intelligence, while priorities refer to the rank order of threats. Priorities may also refer to policy priorities, which will in fact largely determine the intelligence focus. Priorities could also precede focus, meaning that priorities could indicate broad areas of attention, and focus more specific aspects of priorities. However, the study determined that the concepts, “focus” and “priorities”, together with other concepts such as “issues” and “threats”, are also often used interchangeably.

Intelligence focus and priorities are established by interaction between policy makers and intelligence. The political leadership must provide clear guidelines and direction for intelligence to act upon. The focus and priorities, however, can at times be identified by the intelligence agencies for approval by the political leadership. In the absence of formal requirements, intelligence must deduce the priorities from statements, speeches and official documents. The legal mandate of intelligence agencies also provides a broad framework for focus.

The intelligence environment must have a degree of independence in order to scan the horizons for signs of future problems and provide the policy makers with timely warning regarding threats. The intelligence product should clearly then not be restricted to the adherence to priorities alone.

Intelligence and national security are closely linked as intelligence agencies are compelled to set priorities based on the national security and foreign policy concerns that are important to the policy makers. The end of the Cold War brought about a change in the interpretation of national security. A new concept of security was needed in order to address both the military realities as well as the political, economic and social realities.

From the study it was determined that relatively few “new” issues had developed since the Cold War. Most of the so-called newer issues, such as cyber-related threats are newer forms of communication security that have changed according to technological developments. Only a few issues such as environmental aspects can be classified as new priorities. Intelligence focus has in fact become broader, but in many instances what are termed new threats are in fact just new priorities accorded to older threats.

The majority of issues that were focused on after the Cold War were obviously also focus areas during the Cold War. In the period after the Cold War a shift in emphasis occurred with regard to those focus areas of which WMD serves as an example. In the Cold War period US intelligence focused on the Soviet Union and a possible future conflict in that regard. In the post-Cold War period, WMD was an independent focus area, with special attention given to non-state actors.

ABSTRACT

Topic: The Changing Focus and Priorities of Post-Cold War Civilian Intelligence in the United States of America
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The aim of the study is to determine if any changes in US civilian intelligence focus and priorities occurred in the periods between the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and post-9/11 respectively. In order to do so, the study provides a conceptual framework of intelligence, with specific reference to the role of the policy maker, and the relationship between intelligence and policy.

The conceptual framework establishes that the policy maker has a critical role to play in determining intelligence focus and priorities, but also acknowledges that intelligence should have a degree of independence. The importance of a national security policy and strategy in establishing intelligence focus and priorities, as well as the different interpretations of national security in modern times, is also discussed.

The study further establishes the intelligence focus and priorities of US civilian intelligence in the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 periods. Although the emphasis of the study is on the post-Cold War period, the Cold War era is discussed, as it was the major factor in global politics for most of the second half of the twentieth century, and served as a point of reference for the subsequent periods.

The study found that no fundamental changes had occurred in intelligence focus and priorities between the different periods. In fact, the research established that relatively few “new” issues have developed since the Cold War and that a shift in emphasis mainly occurred. As a result the study, acknowledges that intelligence focus is not unique to a specific period, but

tends to overlap. Additionally, it determines that intelligence focus and priorities are extensively influenced by events.

Key Terminologies

Cold War	Intelligence threats
Intelligence	National security
Intelligence process	Policy maker
Intelligence focus	9/11 terrorist attacks
Intelligence priorities	

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