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Explaining security and insecurity in Africa: the case of Mozambique

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Abstract

This study argues for governance security as the eighth dimension of human security using the case of the insurgency in the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. It aims to contribute toward a non-western understanding of security and insecurity, with a focus on Africa, which has been marginalized in security literature. The study also examines the current governance challenges faced in Mozambique and their impact on human security. The writer propositions that the governance challenges in Mozambique have led to instability of the country with a consequence of increased levels of poverty and insecurity in the country.

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Chapter One – Introduction

1.1 Identification of research theme

The theoretical grounding of security discourse in the last decade can be understood through the “traditional” and more “critical” (non-traditional) approaches to security. The notion of traditional security studies originated in 1945. Traditional security studies refer to work associated with the approach to international relations known as political realism in both classical and structural variants. It is important to note that realist theorists are the most dominant of international relations and global politics. The traditional notion views security from a state-centric perspective and limits its view on security threats to the military. Insecurity is equated with threats to the existence of the referent object which is mostly the state, incorporating government society and territory. The traditionalist approach also addresses threats including the protection of a country’s key national interests in the international arena, the defense of a country against external threats, and the general strengthening of state security. Scholars of traditional security associate security with peace and the avoidance of conflict by military means such as non-offensive defense and policies and deterrence through public law and policy.

However, the international system in the Post-World War II era greatly shifted the understanding of security by significantly broadening it. This was due to an increased realization of significant changes like security challenges faced by states. For many countries, specifically those that are developing, changes in the international security arena meant a cause for alarm not only in external threats but also in internal security issues. A range of approaches, therefore, arose which aimed to challenge the traditionalist approach to security. One of these approaches is the Critical Security

Studies (CSS) approach. Since the late 1980s, the emergence of Critical Security Studies fundamentally provided a criticism of the traditional realist analysis of security specifically its state-centric character. The Critical Security Studies approach expanded on the traditional concept of security and its narrow view of threats (Alberth and Carlsson, 2009). CSS argues for a re-conceptualization of security, that will deepen and broaden the concept to include issues such as poverty, environmental hazards, infectious diseases as well as de-centralised forms of violence, including, terrorism, riots, and insurgencies (Alberth and Carlsson, 2009). In contemporary times, threats deriving from non-traditional sources are a larger threat to humanity, international peace, and security than inter-state war and conflict (Uzodike & Isike, 2009:106). Thus, comprehension of such issues and how they create security vulnerabilities especially for developing states in Africa for example highlight the need for security to be viewed differently and redefined.

The neglect of this non-traditional conception of security in both theory and security governance in an African context has resulted in the marginalisation of African contributions based on African experiences to security theory and practice. Thus, as a theme of interest, this study aims to address this gap by using human security as a framework to understand security and insecurity in Africa using Mozambique as a case study. This study, therefore, argues for governance as the eighth dimension of human security.

1.2 Research Problem

In the security discourse, one of the research problems found in the literature relates to the shortcomings that exist in prominent theoretical debates concerning analytical distinctions within non-traditional conceptions of security, in explaining African security and insecurity. The human security conceptualisation is a critical approach to security that includes a broad variety of issues that not only consists of threats to human beings, but also recreate societal anarchy and insecurity in ways that threaten state (traditional) security. Human Security as a concept emphasizes and reinforces the concepts of human development and human rights . Threats to human security are broader than the traditional realm of security that is centred around the security of the nation-state and the military (Chen, 2004). Accordingly, the “United Nations Development Programme” (UNDP) in its 1994 report outlined human security issues in seven categories, economic, health, environmental, personal, community, food, and political. Food security is simply referring to the access of basic food supply and nourishment. Health security covers various issues such as access to health care and safe water, living in a secure environment, and the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other diseases . Environmental security covers issues such as the prevention of air and water pollution, prevention of natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and droughts . Economic security is centred around the income of the people and the issues relating to the loss of employment, an important contributing factor for public security concerns and political instability . Community security refers to the preservation of cultures and traditions, shared values, and languages. Political security revolves around the protection of the well-being of all people and human rights . Lastly, personal security is related to four types of freedoms that are inherent in every person.

These are freedom of speech, freedom from want and fear, and freedom of religion (UNDP,1994).

It is important to recognize that human security is significant to Africa as it has been placed at the centre of contemporary policy and in the vision of the African Union (Adeyemi-Suenu, 2014:89). The challenge to applying Human Security in the African security context is that it fails to adequately explain security and insecurity in the continent through its seven dimensions alone. It fails to address a critical dimension of security which is a driving factor of these seven dimensions: governance. Governance is an important factor that shapes the levels of stability and peace . Governance is also a critical variable as the nature of governance determines whether the exercise of authority is viewed as legitimate, and this can impact the overall security of the state (Crocker, 2019). While numerous studies have discussed the importance of governance as critical or the missing link in understanding security and insecurity in the African context, not many have attempted to espouse its addition as the eight dimensions of human security. This is the gap this study seeks to contribute to occupying.

1.3 Research Aim and objectives

The main research aim of this study was to explain the importance of governance in understanding security and insecurity in Mozambique. Its specific objectives include:

- Examining the security implications of poor governance on the human security of Mozambicans
- Determining the causes of the human security challenges in Mozambique
- Exploring the efficacy of the mechanisms in place to deal with poor governance in Mozambique

1.4 Research Questions

This research paper aimed to address the following questions:

Main Question: “How does poor governance contribute to insecurity?”

Formulated from the main question, the following sub- questions can be drawn within the context of the case study: Mozambique:

- What are the security implications of poor governance on the human security of Mozambicans?
- What are the causes of the human security challenges in Mozambique?
- What are the current mechanisms in place to deal with poor governance in Mozambique?

1.5 Research Methodology

This study adopted a qualitative approach as the nature of this research was mainly descriptive and theoretical. The study also adopted a qualitative approach because it undertook a desk review of existing data from secondary sources, which included academic journal articles, books, reports, academic internet sources, newspaper articles, and policy documents. Therefore, this study did not require any fieldwork. The

data has been analysed using a qualitative data analysis method of content analysis. Content analysis was adopted in this study because it provided meaningful historical and cultural insights over time through text analysis. This method was also appropriate for this study because it allowed for information to be generated about social groups that are difficult to gain access to. This case study has information about the Islamic insurgents operating in Northern Mozambique and the state of Mozambique as an entity. Content analysis was also useful for this study as it allowed for information to be gathered from a wide range of areas which was analysed in line with the study objectives.

In terms of organization of the paper, the study addresses the relevant conceptual and theoretical frameworks that underpin it in chapter 2. The first part of this chapter conceptualises the non-traditional approach to security while the second part conceptualises and deploys human security as a theoretical framework. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature to highlight the gap that this study filled by adding governance as an eighth dimension of the human security paradigm. The literature review does so by focusing on the evolution of the concept of security, reviewing literature on the post-colonial and human perspectives on security, and ends with an overview of security and insecurity in Mozambique. The study uses human security as a theoretical framework to discuss the socio-economic, political, and governance challenges in Mozambique in chapter 4 with a focus on the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Chapter 5 concludes the study and provides strategies and recommendations for dealing with the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

Chapter Two – Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This chapter provided the conceptual and theoretical foundation for this study. This chapter included an in-depth discussion of key concepts that inform the non-traditional approach to security and human security. The points that were discussed were the nature of security in the Post-Cold War era and a definition of non-traditional security was given.

2.1 Conceptualising the non-traditional approach to security

The emergence of globalisation and the end of the Cold War marked significant changes in the global system and its structure. The main difference in security environments between the Cold War era and the Post-Cold War era was that during the Cold War, political leaders and policy makers were aware of what their vital interests were (Smythe, 2013:8). There was a general comprehension amongst politicians and policymakers that when interests were threatened, they knew the means necessary to succeed in achieving security (Smythe, 2013:8). This was not the case during the Post-Cold War era.

In the early 1990s, a “New World Order” emerged founded on democracy and peaceful coexistence. During this period, however, conflict and violence persistently erupted amongst and within states globally . Rather than continuing a “New World Order”, the international environment was presenting global disorder, characterized by increased chaos within countries that often lead to violence, excessive human suffering, and the collapse of governments . The primary reaction of the West led by the United States was a reaction towards increased international stability by means of “policing” efforts

to promote democracy and efforts of peace around the globe. However, peace and stability were not easy to attain, and as a consequence, various peacekeeping operations were unsuccessful in the early 1990s. Along with the difficulty of maintaining stability within certain countries, it was also difficult to prevent the spread of instability in the Post-Cold war era (Smythe, 2013:8).

Another change in this time was that the membership of the state system shifted. Additionally, the role of the international market economy also became more important. Alongside the international market in global relations, globalisation also created a complex repercussion faced globally. This repercussion is referred to as a global web created by modern information technologies, methods of communication, and transport including transnational and non-state actors (Singh and Nunes, 2016:104).

The end of the Cold War made it feasible for the concept of security to be discussed largely on non-military terms. In addition to states already having to address traditional threats to security, they also had to deal with a wider range of threats (Singh and Nunes, 2016 :104). The concept of non-traditional incorporates threats such as local and international terrorism, intra-state conflict, infectious diseases, the effects of environmental degradation, organised crime networks, and drug cartel and piracy. These security challenges are transcendental thus making states more vulnerable than they were before. Subsequently, these challenges can be assumed to be of great importance as they do pose a significant threat to the future existence of the state (Singh and Nunes, 2016:104).

Thus, a non-traditional security threat or issue can be defined as a threat that is non-militaristic that pose a threat to the social and political integrity of a nation-state and the well-being of its people. These threats can derive from within or across state borders (Singh and Nunes, 2016 :104). These threats have often, since the end of the Cold War, led to more deaths than from interstate war and are a causal factor of intrastate warfare which became a defining feature of the new security environment.

2.2 Conceptualisation of Human Security as a theoretical framework

The human security approach was established in the global “Human Development Report in 1994”. The human security approach primarily argues that challenges to security transcend national defence as well as law and order to incorporate economic, social and political issues that assures a life without fear and danger (Solomon, Gnisci & Wanjiru, 2004:11). The development and liberation of the individual are central to the security agenda in the human security approach (Johns, 2014:1).

In this way, the emphasis of security shifted from the state to the security of human beings. Thus, the referent object of security shifted from the state to the individual (Johns, 2014:1). It is also noteworthy that the state and individuals are not mutually exclusive (Solomon, Gnisci & Wanjiru, 2004:11). In this approach the state exists in co-operation with development agencies, civil society groups and non-governmental organisations as these groups were still viewed as the most active guarantor of this security (Johns, 2014:1).

According to philosopher Amartya Sen there are elements that are key to human security as a concept (Sen, 2002). Within the human security concept, a clear focus on the individual livelihoods of humans (in contrast to state-centric security models).

There is also an appreciation of the role of society in contributing to the security of human lives in a constructive manner. This includes a focus on basic human rights and risks to human life (Solomon, Gnisci & Wanjiru, 2004:11).

The 1994 Human Development Report also underpinned two key components, “the freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. These 2 freedoms derived from the preamble of a “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, are a part of the 4 human freedoms that President Franklin Roosevelt notably cited in a 1941 speech that promoted a world founded on freedom of worship, freedom of expression and speech, freedom from fear, and freedom from want (Gomez & Des Gasper, 2012:2).

Central to the human security approach is the notion that humans have the right to live in dignity, free from poverty and misery with fair and equal opportunities to enjoy their rights and to progress their human potential (Gomez & Des Gasper, 2012:2).

Human security is also indivisible. According to Johns , “there is no longer such a thing as humanitarian crises happening in distant countries , especially in an interdependent world where security rests on the framework of stable sovereign entities” (Johns, 2014:3). And where the presence of fragile or failed states, states that sustain internal order by means of many human rights violations, can contribute risks to people globally (Johns, 2014:3).

Thus, human security as a concept places emphasis on the individual as the referent of global security through the inclusion of previously independent challenges such as security and development (Johns, 2014:3). This inclusion allows for the security issues happening in other countries to be considered as global matters. There is an indefinite link between global insecurity and human insecurity (Johns, 2014:3).

Although the definition of human security is a contested one, the most cited definition can be found in the 1994 United Nations Development Human Report (Johns, 2014:1).

The term human security was characterised “a disease that did not spread, an ethnic conflict that did not escalate in violence and a child that did not perish”. The report stated that human security was universal, consisted of interdependent components, is fundamentally people-centred and it is based on preventative measures rather than reactionary ones (UNDP, 1994:22).

Thus, human security can be defined as “safety from prolonged threats such as diseases, food shortages, poverty, famine, and repression as well as protection from abrupt and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (Johns, 2014:1). In this way, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played a vital in broadening the conceptualisation of security.

Both the non-traditional and human security approaches shall be deployed as a theoretical framework to explain security and insecurity in Mozambique. The non-traditional approach to security will be required to explain the security challenges in Mozambique as most of the challenges faced are non-militaristic in nature. The human security paradigm is also useful in explaining insecurity in Mozambique particularly in relation to its 7 dimensions but also more significantly in terms of governance security. Although, political, health, personal, community, political, environmental, and economical factors are dimensions that will be useful in explaining insecurity in Mozambique, the human security paradigm does present a gap in terms of governance as a dimension.

Chapter Three – Literature Review

3.1 The evolution of the concept of security

In literature, security as a concept has always been at the centre of attention in the discipline of international relations (Soltani & Yusoff, 2012). A variety of definitions were laid out for the concept of security, according to different theoretical approaches (Soltani & Yusoff, 2012). The various approaches to security consist of “traditional” and more “critical” approaches to security (Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

Within the traditional school of thought, scholars such as Stephen Waltz and Wolfers’s ideas on the concept of security gained the most popularity among political scientists (Baylis, 2001.) As a starting point for this theoretical review, Wolfers argued that numerous elements including “national characters, preferences, and prejudices shape the overall understanding out of the concept of security” (Wolfers, 1952). But at the centre of the understanding of this security concept is the lack of fear of threat against the values of a nation (Wolfers, 1952). Thus overall, Wolfers conception of security associated with political realism is commonly seen to emphasize the state as the basic referent object of security and war as the main threat to it (Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Liotta, 2002). Thus, the traditional paradigm of security refers to the realist construct of security (Simonyi, 2002:3).

Similarly, Stephen Waltz's perspective on security views is that they are the study of the control, use, and threat of military force (Waltz,1999).This view of security also looks at the various ways the use of force impacts the state, society, and individuals,

exploring the most probable conditions that military force is likely to be utilized and policies that a country implements to prepare, engage, or prevent war (Uzodike & Isike, 2009:105).

Because the traditional security paradigm refers to the realist construct of security, realism within international relations theory deals with macro concerns that are militaristic and political in nature (Simonyi, 2002:6). These issues are placed in a context where both power and security are measured by means of military capabilities as these are the primary forces that were driving the global system. Scholars of traditional security also associate security with peace and conflict prevention by military means such as non-offensive defense through public law and policy and deterrence policies (Uzodike & Isike, 2009:104). Security, from this perspective thus refers to national security. From a traditional realist perspective, “most states entrusted their security to a balance of power for more than forty years” (Simonyi, 2002:6).

According to Wolfers, “national security is synonymous with national interest, which places emphasis on security policy as the policy subordinates any other interests to those of the nation” (Wolfers, 1952). Consequently, stability both the domestic and global systems were grounded on the idea that if the security of the state is preserved, then the security of the of the civilians will also be maintained naturally (Simonyi, 2002:3). For traditionalist security scholars, the state was seen to be secure, “provided that the state could preserve its territorial borders, governing bodies, and structures from threats and attacks to its survival and existence” (Uzodike & Isike, 2009:104).

This traditional approach to security dominated security discourse and practice during the Cold-War era were focused on specific threats concerning the defence of the state (Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2009). Consequently, the global system was considered state centric as the main users and targets of the use force (Simonyi, 2002:3).

However, in the Post-Cold War era particularly in the last ten years of the twentieth century, there was a significant conceptual reconsideration around the idea of what constitutes security (Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2009). This was mainly due to the realisation of shifts in the nature and understanding of security (Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2009). As a response to conventional views of security held in global relations in the Cold War era, which were mainly concerned with state security, critical security studies as a sub-field developed in the discipline of security studies (Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

Critical security studies have occupied a noticeable place within the field of security studies and international relations over the past several decades. While there are dissimilarities that exist in the boundaries of this sub-discipline, key critical security studies authors include Krause & Williams (1996), Booth (2007), Burke (2001), McDonald (2002), Fierke (2007), Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010).

Critical Security Studies are characterized as various shifts away from the state-centric militarism of the traditional approach . These shifts can be summarised as “deepening”, “widening”, or “broadening” of the security agenda (Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Widening refers to the expansion of significant security issues while deepening

refers to the expansion of referent objects of security and insecurity (Rowley & Weldes, 2012:7). Thus, critical security approaches refer to the extension of the referent object of security beyond the state to include various other actors such as institutions, human individuals and even the biosphere (Vaughan-Williams, 2010). For theorists such as Krause and Williams their understanding of critical security studies encompassed a broad range of approaches that incorporated elements from Critical Theory, Marxism, Feminism and Post-structuralism (Krause and Williams, 1997).

Given the changing nature of security, understanding security and insecurity from the conventional perspective of classical realists such as Wolfers and Waltz is at best a poor understanding of contemporary security environments, including the African one where non-traditional vulnerabilities threaten the people and the state (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006:330). Thus, the definition of security from an African perspective would be located within the critical security studies school of thought.

3.2 Post-colonial perspectives on security and human security

The first critical approach that will be discussed is the post-colonial approach relevant for this study as it deals with eurocentrism in security studies. Postcolonialism critiques the inadequacy that security studies derive from its core assumption about world politics from a particular understanding of the European experience (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006:330). The postcolonial approach calls for the involvement of the “marginalized” Global South in the international security arena. This approach aims to reposition disadvantaged or marginalized states in the Global South from passive to more active players in international security (Botchway, 2018:5). Post colonialists

argue that incorporating marginalized countries as active players in global security would effectively deal with Eurocentrism in critical security studies (Botchway, 2018:5).

Thus, postcolonial theorists are key in placing the Global South at the epistemological centre of inquiry and rewriting the narrative. The post colonialist approach to security fundamentally discards that the notion that intellectual inequity into the state of global affairs belongs to west. Postcolonialism also challenges the western historical record on the state of global affairs (Hayes 2017:39). Key postcolonial scholars include Barkawi and Luffey, who explored the theme of Eurocentrism within the field of security studies through multiple empirical case studies. Their findings showed that the erasure of agency amongst states in the Global South privileged discourse by the West (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006:330).

The postcolonial approach is significant for this study because developing nations particularly ones in Africa, have fundamental differences from Eurocentric approaches to security, that were inadequate in explaining security for developing nations . One key difference in security that developing states experience from the West is that states in developing nations are not as legitimate as Western states and that sources of insecurity are more internal than external (Serdar & Mement, 2013:250).

The other critical approach and focal point of this study is Human Security which was introduced to policymakers through the release of the “United Nations Development Report of 1994”. The human security approach challenged the hegemony of the

dominant national security paradigm in both the theory and practice of international relations . Human Security was defined as “the protection from lingering threats such as suppression, poverty, and transmittable disease, and safety from detrimental disruptions in patterns of everyday life that may occur in homes, workplaces or societies. As mentioned earlier, this changed the referent object in security discourse from solely the state to the individual as the state's claim to legitimacy lies in its “responsibility to protect” the individual. Secondly, security threats were no longer viewed only externally to the state but also internally (Shani, 2017:278).

3.3 Governance, Security and insecurity in Mozambique

The Republic of Mozambique is in the Southern African region, along the coast of the Indian Ocean. As shown in Figure 1 below, Mozambique also shares borders with South Africa, Malawi, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Institute for Peace & Security Studies, 2020:2). Mozambique’s location along the coast offers it strategic and geographic importance not only regionally as it provides opportunities for trade to other markets, but also continentally linking Africa to the East. Mozambique is also the seventh poorest country in the world, with an estimated annual gross national of \$1,200 per person (Makonye, 2020:60). After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, a vicious civil war took place from 1977 - 1992 between the government led liberation party (FRELIMO) and Mozambique’s national resistance party (RENAMO). As a result, nearly one million lives were lost and over 5 million displaced. The war ended with both parties signing the 1992 General Peace Accords in Rome leading to a transition in a new democratic era (Institute for Peace & Security Studies, 2020:2)

Figure 1: Map of Mozambique



Source: Cook (2019:2)

After the civil war, Mozambique was viewed as a post conflict success story with nearly two decades of peace and stability. Mozambique has made significant progress on the road to security, peace, economic growth, democratisation, health services, gender equality, education, and Post-Cold War Democratisation. Between the 2004 and 2015, Mozambique experienced steady economic growth of about 8% annually, making it one of the fastest growing economies globally. Mozambique was also forecasted to continue a path that led to an economic growth trajectory (Institute for Peace & Security Studies, 2020:2). While significant changes have taken place in Mozambique in the past few decades, there are still numerous human security and governance shortcomings facing the country, which compromises the security of the state .

Mozambique has one of the lowest human development indexes in the world (0.437). About more than half of the country's population of 29.5 million live in poverty. Moreover, Mozambique is characterized as a country with appalling socio-economic conditions, land insecurity, high illiteracy rates, youth unemployment particularly in rural provinces, malnutrition, rapid urbanisation and a fragile economy (Adedokun,2017:18). At the heart of these human development challenges is a range of governance challenges which breed political violence and conflict that involve violent extremists, political actors, and organized crime (Cook, 2019:1). For example, Mozambique experienced political violence between 2013 and 2016 from a dispute between the ruling party FRELIMO and the leading opposition. The dispute was because of years of grievances by RENAMO relating to FRELIMO's control of the state (Cook, 2019:1). This led to various armed confrontations between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO forces. In 2019, a final political accord to conclude the conflict and permanent ceasefire was signed. These agreements are yet to be fully implemented and the potential for failure still remains (Cook, 2019:1).

Additionally, the economy in Mozambique has been on the receiving end of a crippling blow with the emergence of a debt scandal in 2016 (European Union Parliament, 2021:1). Between 2013 and 2014, three state companies had reserved a total of 2 billion US dollars in loans which was equivalent to about 13% of Mozambique's GDP (Gross Domestic Product). More than 50% of this debt was not publicized, was in breach of the constitution, and remained unknown even to the parliament (European Union Parliament, 2021:1). Corrupt officials had exhausted large amounts of the funds. This scandal had ramifications for the ruling party. When the fraud was discovered,

donors to Mozambique such as the IMF (“International Monetary Fund”) and the EU (European Union) withheld their direct budget support which accounted for about a third of the government’s budget. Mozambique was not exempt from being impacted by natural disasters, which has also significantly impacted the agricultural production of the country. The agricultural industry is a key sector of the economy particularly in remote areas. The Coronavirus pandemic has further pushed Mozambique’s GDP into a negative slope, at a rate of -0.5 in 2020. Today Mozambique faces a significant amount of debt and severe balance of payment troubles. Due to the economic situation in the country, Mozambique puts all its confidence of economic recovery in the exploitation of recently discovered large gas fields located off the coast of Cabo Delgado.

This brings us to Cabo Delgado which is a critical element of this study. It was one of the provinces that was impacted the most by both the April 2019 Tropical Cyclone Kenneth and the December 2019 - January 2020 floods. The natural disasters damaged the infrastructure and crops, displaced thousands of people and triggered a cholera outbreak in the province which also faced serious food insecurity in 2020 due to the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic (European Union Parliament, 2021:1). Overall, corruption, increasing poverty and inequality, economic decline, natural disasters, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic and the food insecurity are products of inept governance which in themselves also pose new governance challenges for the country. It is important to acknowledge that human development and disaster risk are linked. Rapid urbanisation can amount to increasing amounts concentrations of people in locations prone to natural disasters (Clark,2011:1). The risk increases if more

people and assets are exposed to natural disasters, thus making the ability of a country to improve their risk reduction capacity more difficult (Clark,2011:1). Globally, it is the poor who face the greatest risk from natural hazards as opposed to the rich (Clark,2011:1). This noteworthy as a significant amount of the population in Cabo Delgado are impoverished. Globally approximately 1.3 million people have perished from natural hazards and about 4.4 billion have been impacted by natural hazards. Globally, fewer than 2% of deaths from natural hazards occurred in developed countries (Clark,2011:1).

These are the governance challenges that are at the core of the insurgency in the Cabo Delgado Province which poses serious threats to the peace and security of Mozambique and neighbouring countries (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020).

3.3.1 The Cabo Delgado security threat and governance failure

Cabo Delgado is a province located in the north of Mozambique. The area of Cabo Delgado covers about 77,897 km² of land. Cabo Delgado has an estimated population of about 1,700,000. As shown in Figure 2, the province borders Tanzania, and other Mozambican provinces of Nampula and Niassa. The capital of the Cabo Delgado is the town of Pemba. Along with Pemba, Mocimboa and Montepuez are also other significant cities in this province . The province is also divided into sixteen districts. Some of these districts include Ancuabe, Balama, Chiúre, Ibo, Macomia, Montepuez, Namuno, and Palma (South African Hotels.com, 2021).

Figure 2: Map of the Cabo Delgado Province



Map Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2021)

The Cabo Delgado Province has been considered as neglected as it has been referred to as the

forgotten Cabo. Cabo Delgado is a region where the FRELIMO party mounted its anti-colonial struggle against the Portuguese in the 1960s (Faria, 2021:6). The province has been neglected politically, underdeveloped, and marginalized (Makonye, 2020:60). Not only was Cabo Delgado an area significant for Frelimo during its anti-colonial struggle, it was a province rich in minerals, timber, fisheries, rubies, and tourism (Heywood, 2021). Because of the resource wealth within the Cabo Delgado province, spectators have stated that the province could be an epicentre of development and is wealthy enough to place Mozambique as a middle-income country - if the country's wealth was not being washed away by corruption (Heywood, 2021).

In terms of development measures, Cabo Delgado is ranked as the fourth worst in the world in terms of poverty (Faria, 2021:6). With about 60 % of the population illiterate, the province has the highest illiteracy rate in Mozambique. About 35% of the children having not received an education, only 0.3% were able to access post-secondary

education (Makonye, 2020:60). According to Mozambique's National Statistics Institute, approximately 140,217 children - both boys and girls aged between 10-14 could not read and write in comparison to only 123,838 who could . Disaggregating the literacy data along with age ranges, those between the ages of 15-29 were found to be more illiterate. Also, a gender disaggregation showed that female illiteracy was higher than male as 166,848 males within this age group could read and write compared to 90,313 who could not . On the other hand, for females, 144,9818 could read and write as against the 154,079 who could not read or write (Faria, 2016:6). A significant amount of the youth also remains unemployed in Cabo Delgado, with youth unemployment estimated to surpass 88% (Makonye, 2020:60). Mozambique's National Statistics Institute also showed that approximately 1,739,020 people reside in rural areas while 528,695 live in urban settings (Faria, 2021:6).

Since the year 2017, an Islamist insurgent group has seized on these humans' security vulnerabilities to recruit adherents and caused instability in Cabo Delgado. According to scholars, this deprivation and poverty have caused a plethora of violence. The insurgency can be traced back to 5 October , 2017 when 20 armed members of Ansar al Sunna¹ also known as Al-Shaabab targeted and attacked three police stations: a police post, a police command, and a natural resources and environment station (Vhumbunu, 2021). These raids occurred pre-dawn in the Mocimboa da Praia district within the Cabo Delgado Province. The perpetrators who spoke a variety of languages

¹ Ansar al-Sunna a jihadist group that asserts its affiliation to the ISCAP (Islamic Sate Central Africa Province). It has also been reported that Ansar al-Sunna is founded on Islam, "*Sunnah*" which is an Arabic term referring to legal and traditional customs of the community of Islam (Vhumbunu, 2021). Thus, Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique comprises of Mozambicans from the districts of Mocimba da Praia, Palma and Macomia who also Islamic fundamentalists (Vhumbunu, 2021) Ansar al-Sunna also includes foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia. The insurgent group mainly recruits it's members locally as militias (Vhumbunu, 2021).

including Portuguese, Kiswahili and Kimwani a common language spoken in Cabo Delgado, killed two policemen (Vhumbunu, 2021). The growing effects of the insurgency are quite serious (Estelle & Darden, 2021:3). The group is essentially challenging the Mozambican government's governance and control over Cabo Delgado and liquefied natural gas production that is significant to Mozambique's future economic prospects (Estelle & Darden, 2021:4).

Overview of the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado (2017-2021)

From the years 2017-2020, the situation of violence and conflict in the province of Cabo Delgado has been ongoing. The worsening crisis in Northern Mozambique is a case study for why governance is important and why governance matters. The dominant narrative about Mozambique was about the growth of the economy and the promise of Mozambique's abundance of natural resources and peace dividends. Based on the discussions in the previous section, there were cautionary signs of the corruption and the exclusive nature of the economic growth.

Since the insurgency emerged in 2017, there have been headlines that have highlighted terrorism and the killings of thousands of people. The situation has also turned into a guerrilla war since it emerged (Morier-Genoud, 2020:396). Since insurgents were able to occupy the town of Mocimboa da Praia for 2 days and steal armaments they were only able to flee to the bushes once police reinforcements arrived.

Not only did the insurgency cause a food security crisis but it also caused one of the fastest growing displacement crises globally. The number of internally displaced

people increased sharply over one year . The numbers rose from one hundred and seventy two thousand in April 2020 to over seven hundred and thirty two thousand people by the end of April 2021 (“United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs”, 2021:1). All these occurrences exposed the profound weakness of the Mozambican state (Gavin, 2020). The weakness in the state has been worsened by global criminal networks that have been operational in Mozambique for several years. This exposed the ability of Mozambican officials in exploiting a political culture that enabled powerful government officials to break and evade the law. The secretly hid loans by the Mozambican officials and the debt crisis are examples of this. Overall, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is also characterized by several health emergencies, violence, and displacement. This is particularly concerning as the Mozambican government is experiencing increased pressure on their already limited ability to deliver essential services especially in areas with a high influx of displaced people.

The insurgency is also concerning due to the potential impact it might have on natural gas and oil exploration. According to the terrorism monitor, the emergence of the Ansar al-Sunna in Cabo Delgado could have grave consequences for Mozambique as the province is expected to become central to gas production and other discoveries (Makonye, 2020;66).

It is important to note that the nature of the attacks changed as they first occurred at night - particularly against small villages. This shifted particularly in 2018, they started to target transport on roads, army outposts, and small towns (Morier-Genoud, 2020:396). As the situation entered 2019, the insurgents began to show more confidence in engaging with the Mozambican state security forces. The insurgents

also ambushed transport routes in the coastal districts more (International Crisis Group 2021:11). On 21st February they targeted and confronted separate Anadarko convoys in the Palma district . As a result, a company contractor was killed, and an alarm was sent through the gas industry (International Crisis Group 2021:11). In April 2019, the insurgents invaded a military base in the Mocimboa da Praia district, and reportedly left with a large amount of weaponry. At this point, the province was dealing with the aftereffects of Cyclone Kenneth. Although the cyclone happened the determined insurgents remained consistent in their resistance to the security forces and their attacks. In early June the insurgents were able to defeat an operation in Mocímboa da Praia (International Crisis Group 2021:11). These attacks were prompted by ISIS propaganda channels. The security forces did however initiate counter-attacks that killed about 26 insurgents in the Nangade district. In mid-June, the militants retaliated with the killings of civilians that included more beheadings and attacks on the police in several districts (International Crisis Group 2021:11).

With the arrival of 2020, the insurgents were able to become better prepared, armed, and organised. They were organised according to three separate geographically attack groups in the centre, North and South of Cabo Delgado (International Crisis Group 2021:12). This enabled the insurgents to mount various operations in various zones on state infrastructure and security services. In late, January 2020, when the al-Shabab insurgents initially attacked Mbau in the Mocímboa da Praia district, reportedly upwards of twenty soldiers were killed (International Crisis Group 2021:12). Afterward the town of Bilbiza, in the Quissinga district were also attacked. A few days later, government buildings including a healthcare facility were vandalised. In addition to this, thousands of people fled to the south of Mozambique during erratic cholera

outbreaks (International Crisis Group 2021:12). During this time, it was reported by humanitarian and other sources, that the insurgents who encountered citizens during attacks began demanding that people vacate their homes , threatening to kill them if they did not leave their homes (International Crisis Group 2021:12).

The insurgents then initiated attacks on district capitals as the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic arrived. In March 2020 in the first attack against the Mocímboa da Praia district, they clashed with the security forces, overran a military base, and raised the ISIS flag. They also handed out food to civilians who applauded them during this incident killed (International Crisis Group 2021:12). A day later the al-Shabaab fighters kidnapped a significant amount of women and children.

An entire separate group of insurgents then proceeded to attack the Quissanga town, burnt down the military barracks, destroyed the police headquarters and beheaded the statue of Eduardo Mondlane , the founder of the Frelimo political party. Attacks were also sustained and mounted in early April 2020 on the Muidumbe town also known as Namacande, beheading and shooting down a large number of nearby village residents before fleeing the scene from helicopter gunshots from the Dyck Advisory Group , a private South African military company that provided support to the Mozambican security forces. A vital decision by Maputo to utilize mercenaries did halt al-Shabab's momentum. Even though the momentum was dented, the insurgents were still able to regroup themselves. A couple of days after the insurgents retreated Muidumbe, they invaded the island of Quirimba located in the Ibo district. A health centre, an administrators place of residence and a school were all destroyed. Security forces and forces from the Dyck Advisory group counter attacked in April and May of

2020 and as a result reportedly dozens of Al-Shabab militants were killed . The insurgents still proved to be resilient as they were able to mount yet another daring attack on Macomia town. The militant's stormed into the capital of the district armed with rocket propelled grenades while wearing government army uniforms. Consequently, humanitarian workers and resident left the town. Government security forces attacked the Al-Shabab insurgents days after and once more in the middle of June. Officials reported that many militants were killed. The militants still proved to be resistant and rebounded once again (International Crisis Group 2021:12).

Overall, in 2020, the insurgents were able to overtake district capitals and not only did the recent attacks grow in sophistication and frequency but have also become increasingly brutal (Gavin, 2020), (Morier-Genoud, 2020:396). On the 7th June 2020, insurgents armed with machetes and knives murdered five people in Namaluco village in Qussanga district (Morier-Genoud,2020:396). In a nearby village, days earlier to this incident, the insurgents hacked seven people to death in a nearby village (Morier-Genoud, 2020:396). On 27 May 2020, the insurgents killed 10 more people in two remote villages located in Cabo Delgado, located near the border of Tanzania. Homes were burnt, victims were beheaded, and vehicles were set alight (Morier-Genoud, 2020:396).

Another recent attack occurred in the district of Palma on the 24th March 2021. Following these attacks across the district, approximately 68,000 had to flee their residential homes to move to safer areas ("United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs", 2021:1). At least 30% of people who were displaced in the Northof Mozambique had to flee. Repeated displacements and the destruction of

various livelihoods are occurrences that are very problematic in an area of already scarce resources and can lead the situation of, Cabo Delgado, into a rapidly growing humanitarian crisis (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2021:1).

As of April 2021, the activity of the al-Shabaab insurgents had been relatively muted as the Mozambican government and allies' forces put them under pressure in a continuous "cat and mouse" operation. The Al-Shabaab fighters continued to raid neighbourhoods in Palma, that forced civilians to escape during early May 2021. Many civilians were able to flee the west and northern regions of Cabo Delgado specifically in the Muidumbe, Mueda, and Nangada. However, the insurgents still attacked these areas. The Mozambican security forces were able to overtake some strategic locations specifically Diaca. Diaca is a significant gateway to Mocimboa da Praia which was an area that the insurgents were able to dominate since November 2020.

The remote human security causes of the insurgency

There have been several attempts, theories, and accounts made to pinpoint the origins and root causes of the Islamist insurgency (Vhumbunu, 2021). Like other terrorist groups, the insurgent in Mozambique is not publicly identifiable. The leading argument has been that the insurgency in Mozambique has been remotely prompted by the absence of socio-economic opportunities, poverty and the grievances expressed by young people as a result of persistent and unsettled instability in the country, inequality, decimation, and marginalisation (Vhumbunu, 2021).

When the first attacks occurred in 2017, the economy in Mozambique experienced an economic slowdown. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was at 3.8% in 2016 and

3.7% in 2017 in comparison to an economic growth rate that averaged at about 7.3 % in the past 10 years (Vhumbunu, 2021). With poverty in the country, approximately 46.1% of the populace were living below the poverty line in 2017 (Vhumbunu, 2021). The economic governance of Mozambique also declined, according to the “African Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment”, Mozambique was recorded as having a decreasing score of 3,39 in 2017. This record, which was below the African continent’s average, reflected the ineffective economic institutions and policy (Vhumbunu, 2021). In 2017, 41.7% of the youth in Mozambique were unemployed, and only 29% of the national populace had access to power and energy. Only 20.5% of Mozambican population had access to clean and safe sanitation, approximately 20% of the population were impacted by food insecurity, and 25% of the population were malnourished or were hungry in 2017 (Vhumbunu, 2021).

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is still in its infant stage according to the World Organisation for Peace. Researchers and analysts are still uncovering the origins of the Islamist extremist group . Several factors contribute to the Ansar al-Sunna insurgency in Northern Mozambique (Makonye, 2020:60). It is believed that the insurgency begun when supporters of Kenyan radical cleric, Aboud Rogo, moved to Cabo Delgado and begun preaching their radical ideology from 2013 to 2014, according to one theory (Makonye, 2020:63).

Another theory is that Ansar al Sunna origins lie in an offshoot of the Islamic Council of Mozambique (ICM), which tracks its roots in the early 2000s The ICM established an initiative in Cabo Delgado also referred to Ansaru Sunna who assembled mosques

and delivered other social goods in the region. Although social goods were delivered in the area, Ansar al Sunna was against a secular state and aspired to establish an Islamic state in prospects (Makonye, 2020:63). The World Organisation for Peace states that the insurgent group gradually became radicalised and revolutionised into Ansar al-Sunna . The process of radicalisation of the group in some regions was so violent that members frequently fought with the police, as a result some members were incarcerated (World Organisation for Peace, 2019).

The third theory is that Ansar al-Sunna was established in 2015 by street vendors, who shared economic frustrations and radical Islam beliefs. The validity of this theory is supported by the fact that numerous people in the community of Cabo Delgado were exhausted from not receiving benefits from the economic boom due to the gas exploration in the region (Makonye, 2020:63). Most of the jobs created due to the gas boom were mostly taken by skilled experienced expatriates. Despite the thriving oil and gas industries, Cabo Delgado remains the poorest province of Mozambique, inundated by an unreliable government and its services (World Organisation for Peace, 2019).

Overall there is a sense that the Mozambican government neglects Cabo Delgado, where the prevalent poverty impacts the people especially the youth who do not find the means nor the opportunities to achieve their goals . It can be said that neglect in the province of Cabo Delgado bred grounds for discontent and detachment from the state that created a space for racial preaching (Faria, 2021:6). It is important to note that Northern Mozambique has a Muslim majority, unlike other regions in the country which are predominantly Christian and only about 18% Muslim (European Union

Parliament, 2021:1). The Muslim identifying population in Mozambique adhere and follow the rationally tolerant and peaceful Sufi tradition. Recently, however, religious leaders also referred to as imams from other eastern African countries have radically spread ideas among the marginalized youth in the region. This was achievable through the exploitation of local complaints regarding criminal activity specifically criminal networks, corruption, and marginalisation (European Union Parliament, 2021:1). Thus the province of Cabo Delgado provided a suitable environment for the growth of the insurgent group . Due to its large Muslim population, limited economic development, and high youth unemployment (Makonye, 2020:63).

There is also another theory that underlined both internal and external factors. According to this point of view, Al-Shabaab group argued that the solution to issues such as widespread corruption, unemployment, social inequalities, and political exclusion lie in adherence to the moralistic version of Islam (Faria, 2021:6). This allowed space for Al-Shabab, to persuade people to join the international jihad movement (Faria, 2021:6). According to the Terrorism Monitor, Ansar al-Sunna begun as a religious establishment in Cabo Delgado in 2015 and only gradually became militarized. As mentioned earlier, the earliest members of Ansar al-Sunna were followers of the radical Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed who was killed by gunshot wounds in 2012, possibly by Kenyan authorities in the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa. Mohammed was blacklisted by the United States of America and the United Nations for allegedly supporting Somalia's al-Shabab Militants. After Mohammed's death, the early members of Ansar al-Sunna first settled in Southern Tanzania before entering Mozambique (Makonye, 2020:63).

The national (traditional) security effects of the insurgency

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has also produced effects that threaten the survival of Mozambique as a state. For example, the insurgents have initiated attacks on both civilians and security forces, they have also burnt villages and commit various atrocities, and occupied the port town of Mocimboa da Praia (Zamir, 2021:2). This led to the displacement of approximately 500,000 people with many more also receiving food from the World Food Programme (WFP) (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019:3). Studies have noted that the displacement of people also undermined Mozambique's response to COVID-19 (Estelle & Darden, 2021:4). The conflict has also adopted an inter-religious element, with some sources claiming that Christians and their churches have been definite targets of some attacks (Zamir, 2021:2).

The attacks in Cabo Delgado were targeted at five isolated districts namely Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Nangade, Palma, and Quissanga (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019:3). What is significant about the targeted districts are that they are coastal regions excluding Nangande overlooking the Mozambican channel which is a channel of the Western Indian Ocean that threads between the east of Mozambique and the island nation of Madagascar. Even though Macimboa da Praia is the place of origin of this militant group, most attacks were launched in Macomia. Following this, the violent extremists targeted and attacked the Chitolo village in the Mocimbo da Praia twice in 2018. The first occurred on the 12th of March 2016, one person was killed, 50 houses were burnt down, and goods as well as food were looted. The second attack took place on the 29th of July 2018, one soldier was killed, and unspecified military

equipment was stolen (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019:3). Moreover, the insurgency continued to grow at low-intensity levels until the middle of 2019 (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020). From May to December 2019 the insurgents significantly magnified their frequency and geographical scope of the attacks as they expanded their attacks to cover nine of the sixteen province districts (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020).

The local governance authorities are considered to be lacking in their capabilities in preventing radicalisation and extremism. In response, in 2018 Mozambique passed a counter-terrorism legislation. The Mozambican government subsequently initiated counter-insurgency operations to overthrow the Jihadist insurgents using its military means and also with the help of Russian mercenary groups such as the DAG Group and the Wagner Group . However, it seems that none of the interventions have been effective thus far in stopping the insurgents (Faria ,2021:3). For instance, in 2020, the insurgents unleashed increasingly bold and refined attacks on transport routes and military sites (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020).

The hostility In the Cabo Delgado province poses a threat as it stands to have not only a short-term humanitarian impact on the local population of Mozambique . It is feared that the insurgency may have a destabilising impact on the wider region and may worsen the current violence, which has killed and displaced an estimated amount of 180,000 people (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020). This explains the concerns of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which

recently sent in military forces to support the Mozambican government to contact the hostilities.

It must however be noted that the insurgency threats that Mozambique faces today underlie a central issue that relates directly to the inability of the government to exercise power effectively, in line with the common good essence of the state, to deal with the internal dangers brought by the Al-Shabaab insurgents as well as human security challenges (Faria, 2021:3). Thus, the rapid growth of the Islamic State affiliate Ansar al-Sunna in Northern Mozambique is a frightening trend and poses the most serious threat to peace and security in Mozambique (Estelle & Darden, 2021:3).

The Mozambican government and its response to the insurgency

The government's response may also be worsening the problem in Cabo Delgado. Various human rights organizations have recognized the outrageous abuses committed by security services that were meant to protect civilians but instead further alienated the population (Gavin, 2020). The failure of Mozambican security forces has forced Mozambique to turn to external entities for assistance because the state doesn't have the capacity to deliver basic security services in its borders (Gavin, 2020).

Due to the increased tactical capacity shown by the al-Shabaab insurgents, the Mozambican government did get outmanoeuvred. The government made strategic mistakes and capacity shortfalls. A possible reason as to why these mistakes occurred was that the government was unable to grasp the role that poverty and inequality played in the insurgency (Mlambo, 2021:4). The increased organisation, confidence, and sophistication shown by insurgents were reflected by the increased frequency of

attacks on security forces and civilians, targets on government structures, and civilians (Insecurity Insight, 2021:7). Unfortunately, the increased attacks, the demises of civilians and the failure of the security forces to suppress the violence has brought a sharp focus on Maputo's struggle with recounting and dealing with the intense violence in Cabo Delgado. There is also distrust between civilians and security forces as they did not stop violence brought onto civilians by insurgent attacks in some cases (Mlambo, 2021:4). In addition to this, the security forces also shred their official uniforms to assimilate with civilians to evade combat. These actions provoked criticism.

Nonetheless, the above observations highlighted the lack of trust in the security services, the lack of a coordinated response from the government, as well as the perceptions of the insurgents growing capability (Mlambo,2021:4). It can be said that the rate that insurgency expanded caught the government off guard and they were not able to prepare effectively for it.

SADC and its response to the insurgency in Mozambique

Additionally, Mozambique's neighbouring countries and global partners are very uncomfortable with the situation in Cabo Delgado (Gavin, 2020). The "Southern African Development Community" ("SADC") has voiced their concern but were cautious about involvement rather than the conflict spilling over in other territories. The Southern African Development Community also stated that the conflict in Cabo Delgado endangers their own security and is meanwhile seeking to establish global support to deploy their troops to Mozambique.

SADC comprehends that the situation in Mozambique is a serious threat that risks growing into a full-scale regional challenge. Despite all the observations made, vagueness, ineffectiveness, and the lack of policy coordination toward dealing with the insurgency the regional entity has garnered criticism. Scholars have argued that SADC's failure to intervene should not be surprising as the organisation was not able to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country that has been facing violence for many years . In addition to this viewpoint, SADC is meant to signify the interests of regional states it must, however, respect the principle of “territorial sovereignty of member states” (Mlambo, 2021:4). Regardless of this principle within SADC, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado calls for a well-coordinated policy on a regional scale that calls for joint action and decisive leadership.

Latest Developments in the response to the insurgency

There have been recent developments in the response to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Firstly, the neighbouring country South Africa is sending about 1,495 troops to Cabo Delgado to help Mozambique in its battle with the Islamist Jihadists causing mayhem in the gas rich province. The soldiers that South Africa is sending will form part of a growing multinational force there . President Cyril Ramaphosa did authorise the deployment to aid Mozambique in the fight against acts of violent extremists and terrorism . The mission for the South African force is estimated at three months, from the 15th of July 2021 to the 15th of October 2021. This mission is a part of deal signed in June by the 16 states a part of the “Southern African Development Community” . The estimated cost of the operation is about 984 million rand (about 66 million U.S

dollars). Botswana and Rwanda are other countries that have also sent troops to Mozambique. Rwanda has sent over 1000 troops and Angola has approved the deployment of 20 troops as part of the SADC mission (Africa News, 2021).

SADC has also agreed to the deployment of its Standby force in an attempt to clear out the Islamic militants that have been wreaking havoc in Cabo Delgado for four years. President Nyusi who had been against foreign aid also lauded the military mobilisation by African states (Africa News, 2021). According to President Nyusi, “ the intervention will assist in Mozambique’s mission to restore stability and peace” . The overall force size of the SADC deployment is still unknown (Africa News, 2021).

Another important development is that the European Union (EU) formally established a military operation in Mozambique to assist in training its security forces in battling the insurgents . Portugal, Mozambique’s former colonial ruler is already assisting with training for the Mozambican security forces with the Portuguese military instructors expected to make up half of the European Union mission (Africa News, 2021).

On the 8th of August, 2021 Rwandan Soldiers were able to capture the port held by the insurgents. This was a marker for the end of the first counter-insurgent operations . Although the operation was a success it had a significant cost to Mozambique and its people (Reuters, 2021).

Chapter Four – Human security and governance in Mozambique

From the discussion in chapter 3, The insurgency in Cabo Delgado directly relates to the Mozambican government's inability to efficiently govern and exercise power to effectively tackle the governance challenges and internal threats brought by the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Following this understanding, this chapter will examine in greater detail the current governance challenges faced in Mozambique and their impact on human security from an overview of development since its independence. The chapter looked at socio-economic challenges including poverty, inequality, health, and explored the political challenges that contributed to the socio-economic conditions faced by the people of Mozambique.

4.1 Socio-economic challenges

It has been understood that Mozambique has made various transformations that resulted in some significant but still fragile socio-economic development since the country's independence from Portugal in 1975 (Cruz & Mafambissa, 2020:1). Mozambique was ranked 180th out of 189 in the 'United Nations Human Development Index' in 2019. In Chapter 3 it was also understood that over the past four decades, the Mozambican government has not made the best decisions in the utilization of public funds that have played a vital role in achieving its development goals and aspirations. Public Financial Management (PFM) has also been identified as a factor associated with high economic growth levels for more than two decades, since 1993 . Financial risks had however increased in the mid-2010s, and the debt scandal that

became publicized in 2016 has not helped the financial fortunes of the country. As a result, the economic growth slowed significantly and socio-economic conditions suffered consequently (Cruz & Mafambissa, 2020:1).


4.1.1 Poverty and inequality

In terms of poverty, Mozambique has been able to reduce poverty in various forms in the past fifteen years. Poverty assessments in recent years showed that monetary poverty rates did decrease from 60.3% to 48.4%, and multi-dimensional poverty rates also decreased from 98% to 71%. (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4). Overall, there were remarkable improvements in both urban and rural areas in each province in Mozambique, and in all aspects of human development . These different reductions in poverty were primarily driven by a relatively stable macroeconomic environment that has established high growth rates that resulted in an environment where living standards and incomes increased (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4). Enrolment in schools, access to education, and life expectancy also increased along with decreased maternal and infant mortality rates. Access to basic services such as electricity, sanitation, and water also increased (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4). All these factors were key to driving the reduction of multi-dimensional poverty in Mozambique.

However, from the years 2015-2019, poverty rates have increased particularly in rural areas, because of a crisis generated by decreased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), natural hazards, military attacks in the north and central areas of Mozambique, and the debt scandal incurred by the government between 2013 and 2014 (Daniel, 2020).

According to the 'Ministry of Economy and Finance', from 2015 to 2019, the number of Mozambicans living in extreme poverty has increased by 55% to 60% which amounts to 16.7 to 18.2 million people (Daniel, 2020).

Figure 3: Poverty in Mozambique from 1997-96 to 2014-15




Source: (Daniel, 2020)

Mozambique, as mentioned in chapter 3, remains in the lowest category for the human development index, ranked 180th out of 189 in 2017 lower than countries such as Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. This ranking was informed by the lowest levels of access to education in the world, low gross domestic profit/capital, and high communicable disease burden. High population growth was also a factor that informed the ranking as the strong population growth rates were driven by high fertility rates and increased life expectancy. As a result, the number of people living below the

national poverty line increased from 11 million in 2003 to 12.3 million in 2015 (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4). Moreover, African Development Bank estimated that the contraction of Mozambique’s economy in 2020 resulted in additional 850,000 people moving below the poverty line, which is now 63.7% of the population (Club of Mozambique.com 2021). The African Development also further predicted that economic growth of 2.3% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022, will not be enough to compensate for the 3.4% drop in the gross domestic profit per capita in 2020 (Club of Mozambique.com 2021).

Additionally, it has been expected that the country’s population of 24 million people will reach over 53 million in the next 23 years (See Figure 4 below). This expected population growth will result in pressure on the government to address employment and service delivery. This can be addressed if Mozambique goes on an alternative path of development.

Figure 4: Forecast of extreme poverty in Mozambique (Millions and percent of the population)



Source: (World Bank World Development Indicators, 2019:4).

Inequality in Mozambique is also high with a widening gap between the haves and the have nots, the rich and poor, urban, and rural. The inequality is especially evident in the southern, central, and northern provinces which remain the most populated and impoverished parts of the country (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4). The Gini-coefficient also rose from 0.47 in 2008/9 to 0.56 in 2014/15 which placed Mozambique among one of the most unequal countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Embassy of Sweden in Maputo, 2019:4).

Impact of COVID-19 and the insurgency in Cabo Delgado on poverty and inequality

The onset of the Coronavirus caused a halt in Mozambique's good economic performance. The real gross domestic product was estimated at 0.5% in 2020, which was the first decline in 28 years, after a 2.2% growth rate in 2019 (Club of Mozambique.com 2021). Other measures that negatively impacted the economy were a 3% reduction in economic activity along with a reduction in the turnover of companies by 20% (Daniel, 2020). Employment rates also reduced by 7.8%, particularly for people in tourism (21.9%) and industrial (12.4%) sectors (Daniel, 2020). The main drivers of the decreased growth levels were slowdowns in transport, tourism, construction, and a decrease in demand for commodities exports (Club of Mozambique.com 2021). Economic activity was also indefinitely impacted by the escalating conflict in Cabo Delgado, which as discussed in chapter 3 has displaced over 250,000 people and resulted in thousands of people being killed. Although significant progress has been made with poverty reduction in the last two decades, the

Coronavirus pandemic jeopardises the progress achieved, pushing more Mozambican people into poverty.

In conclusion of this discussion, it is important to recognize the explanatory factors that influenced the phenomenon of poverty as a human security issue in Mozambique. The factors that significantly impacted poverty reduction were regional and geographical differences, high inequality, and an exclusive instead of an inclusive economic development sequence or pattern (Eggar, Salvucci & Tarp, 2020:1). Other factors include increased violence against civilians in Northern Mozambique, a clear drop in commodity prices, a continuous series of severe weather disasters, the hidden debt scandal, and weak international demand due to the economic crises. Many of these factors were governance related and resulted in an economic slowdown in Mozambique, that in turn suggests a strong impact on poverty in the country (Eggar, Salvucci & Tarp, 2020:1). Along with this, the emergence of the global COVID-19 pandemic added further challenges. Thus, the absence of good governance in the case of Mozambique did impact the security of many Mozambicans considering poverty as a human security issue.


4.1.2 Health security challenges

Mozambique's war-stricken history has affected the prevalent human security challenges in the country today. This includes the healthcare system whereby the Mozambican health infrastructure has been drastically damaged . Generally, it appears that health statistics for developing states such as Mozambique did not show any noteworthy progress toward achieving the Millennium Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 have not shown any movement towards achieving the Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs) either. The main obstacles identified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) toward achieving these development goals include limits to system and staffing, insufficient resource monitoring systems, and the lack of a multi-sectorial approach to achieve desired health outcomes (Human Rank Index, 2015:30).

Additionally, the violence in Northern Mozambique does not aid in regard to improving health in the country. When violence erupts in a country, global aid agencies often suspend activity. Health workers are rarely evacuated by local employers. Doctors and other healthcare workers who originate outside the area where the violence occurs leave on their own account. Nurses, health assistants, community health workers, doctors, and pharmacists are also among the many civilians harmed by the ongoing violence in Northern Mozambique. Along with the harm to healthcare workers, healthcare facilities have also been destroyed, which had devastating consequences on access to health care (Insecurity Insight, 2020:1).

Figure 5: Illustration of context on attacks on health care in Mozambique in 2020 (Shown in the proportion of incidents in that particular category)Source: Insecurity Insight (2020:1).



There have been increasing attacks on health care from three attacks in 2019 to fourteen in 2020. , and several of these incidents have been documented. For example, healthcare facilities have been set alight, damaged, or vandalised, one

health worker and three other people were killed in these occurrences (Insecurity Insight, 2020:2).

These incidents frequently occurred in the Cabo Delgado Province but were also reported in other provinces in the country including Manica, Sofala and Maputo provinces. The main perpetrators of the damage to health care facilities were the armed insurgent groups. The high number of attacks on health care facilities in Cabo Delgado occurred when wide attacks and raids on civilians and villages took place. Perpetrated by the Islamist militant group specifically when they increased their activity in the region (Insecurity Insight, 2020:2).

In some instances, either health care facilities or health workers were sole targets. An example of this scenario is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) team working on HIV/AIDS relief getting ambushed and attacked in the Manica province by suspected militants of the RENAMO political party, who rejected the peace deal signed in August 2019 between the FRELIMO government and the opposition RENAMO. As a result of the ambush, three staff members of the NGO were injured (Insecurity Insight, 2020:2).

Another incident involved a female health worker, her body was found near her residential area revealing that she had been sexually assaulted and killed in the Maputo Province. An ambulance traveling to Cabo Delgado was ambushed by armed perpetrators. There have also been incidents, particularly on two occasions where money, medicine, mobile phones belonging to both healthcare workers and patients were stolen from health care facilities by armed groups who stormed out and burned the health facilities down (Insecurity Insight, 2020:2).

The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on public health and government response

The ongoing Coronavirus pandemic had a destabilizing impact on health, societies, and economies around the world and different governments have responded to it in different ways. Mozambique announced its first state of emergency on the 1st of April 2020, which was extended to a full 90-days allowable by the Constitution. Along with the mandating of school closures, the state of emergency also imposed very tight restrictions on public transport, workplaces, markets, leisure, and religious services. Models from the Imperial College of London were widely utilized by many governments to inform their responses to COVID-19. In the case of Mozambique, it was predicted, in the worst-case scenario, that it would cause about 65,000 deaths and 190,000 hospitalizations should the government fail to respond adequately.

There has been external assistance in helping Mozambique deal with the Coronavirus pandemic. For example, UNICEF did support with a response to the health situation along with other health cluster partners (UNICEF, 2021:3). It focused on the management and prevention of childhood illnesses such as COVID-19, malaria, acute watery diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, and measles in Cabo Delgado Province, Manica, and Sofala. UNICEF is also involved in joint assessment missions to Ancuabe, Chiure, and Montepuez districts of Cabo Delgado (UNICEF, 2021:3).

As of April 2021, the number of Coronavirus cases declined due to preventative measures issued by the Mozambican government. In Cabo Delgado, in April 2021 only 49 new cases and one fatality were reported. UNICEF also contributed to the control of the pandemic by supporting the rollout of the Coronavirus AstraZeneca

vaccine supported by the COVAX initiative . Vaccination for integrated development plans in Cabo Delgado was also planned for the second phase of the development plan (UNICEF, 2021:3). All vaccines under the COVAX initiative that were planned to be provided for Mozambique were delivered, the second batch was distributed in July 2021. Due to the improvements in the control over the Coronavirus, Mozambique downgraded the alert level on 16 April 2021, which allowed for the opening of facilities and services including religious services. However, there are restrictions on the number of participants that are allowed to partake in these activities.

UNICEF also sustained integrated mobile brigades in Cabo Delgado and supported service delivery in health care facilities (UNICEF, 2021:3). A strategy that has been utilized by UNICEF involved eight community health workers who were able to flee from conflict zones. They arrived in the Chiúre and Montepuez districts and were used to increase access to health services in Cabo Delgado. It is also worth noting that along with the response to the coronavirus UNICEF is also making efforts with partners to mobilize 3,000 mosquito nets for integrated development plans, while an additional 35,000 mosquito nets will be procured to meet the demand for malaria prevention (UNICEF, 2021:3).

Overall, the coronavirus outbreak not only impacted the Mozambican economy by its impact on the labour force and supply of labour to the economy, the sharp increase in the number of people who were falling ill or in extreme cases dying lead to increased pressure on the health systems in Mozambique . The pressure on healthcare system for the Coronavirus may have secondary impacts in the ability of health care workers in assisting patients with other common disease in Mozambique such as malaria,

hepatitis A, hepatitis B, cholera, yellow fever, HIV/AIDS, TB, typhoid, and rabies . The most vulnerable group of people including persons with disabilities may suffer most from the lack of support and attention from health care services (United Nations in Mozambique, 2020:12).

In conclusion of this section, it is important to acknowledge the impact of the insurgency in Mozambique on its health security. The violence from to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado harmed the public health conditions in the province, and in Mozambique generally. Civilians including health care providers were negatively affected. This worsened access to health care in Cabo Delgado and Mozambique. This is an indicator of the need to address the violence in Cabo Delgado stemming from the devastating consequences on healthcare which has been worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the Mozambican government coupled with external support from bodies such as the UNICEF were able to cope with the challenges and controlled the number of cases by management and preventative measures that were adopted.

4.2 Political and Governance Challenges

To discuss the political and governance challenges in Mozambique, it is important to briefly understand what constitutes the concepts of governance itself and what the term “good governance’ entails as it serves as a basis for understanding governance security and its importance to human security.

Governance simply refers to the process of making decisions by which the decision is either implemented or not (“United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia

and Pacific”, n.d:1). Governance can be utilized in various contexts including nationally, locally, and internationally. Both formal and informal actors can be involved in the decision-making process . Actors of governance include the government, non-governmental organisations, research facilities, civil societies, and religious facilities . The concept of good governance consists of 8 key components. Good governance is accountable, allows for participation, is transparent, responsive, consensus oriented, effective and efficient, follows the rule of law, is equitable and inclusive. Good governance ensures that corruption is minimal and that that the views of marginalized groups are accounted for in the decision-making process (“United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific”, n.d:1). Good governance also responds to the current and future needs of the society.

After Mozambique’s long and brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 that killed over a million people, the country experienced close to twenty years of political stability. At the peak of the boom in the commodity from 2002 to 2012 Mozambique was one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with the annual gross domestic product reaching 6.7% from 2006 and 2017 . As discussed in the previous chapters the reason for fuelling optimism for Mozambique’s growth and economic development were natural resources such as titanium deposits, coal, offshore natural gas, and rubies . However, this path of development took a turn when armed conflict resurfaced from 2012 to 2016. This significantly impacted the optimism in Mozambique. As a result of the 5-year armed conflict 446 conflict events were reported and consequently resulted in 272 battle-related deaths and 107 civilian mortalities according to the Armed Conflict

& Event Data Project . These reported events surpassed the 251 conflict events that were reported for the 15-year period from 1997 to 2011 . The surge in conflict resulted in 11,500 refugees fleeing into neighbouring countries deaths and twelve civilian deaths. Along with the remerged conflict from 2012 to 2016, Mozambique experienced declines in commodity prices and widespread financial mismanagement by the administration at the time. Along with the structural challenges such as high levels of unemployment, poverty, and other poor human development indicators. All these factors dwindled the prospects for development in Mozambique (Flitz, 2018:4).

The debt scandal was a significant event as it was very impactful and had far reaching consequences for Mozambique. The scandal prompted criminal prosecutions both locally and in the United States of America . Due to the criminal prosecutions, donor governments suspended their aid to Mozambique, and this undermined the credibility of the Mozambican state . The scandal also placed Mozambique in a debt crisis, which reduced the ability of the government to access credit financing needed to assist in funding development and administrative operations of the government . The scandal was also seen as a major contributing factor to the post 2015 slump in economic growth which was relatively stable before that . While the growth rate expanded the economy, and contributed to the reduced levels of extreme poverty, the majority of Mozambicans have still remained poor regardless of improvements of some socio-economic indicators (Cook, 2019:1).

Additionally, it is important to understand that the Mozambican government's inability to deal with deep-rooted issues such as poverty and inequality, as these are both drivers that fuel the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. At the core of the conflict in Northern

Mozambique is indeed a governance challenge that includes allegations deep-rooted corruption within the ruling FRELIMO party (Cilliers et al, 2021). From increasing amounts of violence to economic mismanagement and democratic backsliding, corruption underlines the central reason why many of Mozambique's challenges remain persistent.

Corruption in Mozambique is a systematic problem, as the country is poorly ranked on various corruption indices. In 2018, The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators gave Mozambique a score of negative 0.8% which placed the Mozambique at the bottom 25% internationally . Additionally, in the 2019 Corruptions Perceptions Index, Mozambique only scored 26 out of 100 ranking it 146th out 180 compared to other countries such as Iran and Honduras . Also, in 2020 the Ibrahim Index of African Governance gave Mozambique an anti-corruption score of 34.1 out of 100 . This placed the country 29th out of 54 African countries. Concerning transparency and accountability Mozambique scored 34.8 out of 100. This placed it 31st out of 54 African states . Almost half of the Mozambican respondents at the 2019 "Global Corruption Barometer" believed that the government of Mozambique was not effective in dealing with corruption (Bak, 2020). The prevailing corruption in Mozambique reflects a serious governance challenge especially relating to depleted public funds. Funds that could have been used for public and social welfare in the country such as education and healthcare. Corruption is a factor thus that contributed to the service delivery challenges in the country.

Mozambique's poor rankings on the fragility indices show a strong relation to those measuring corruption and governance. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation

Development released a report in 2020, that ranked Mozambique as the 25th most fragile state globally. State fragility is mainly driven by security and environmental pressures. These rankings reaffirm the need for the re-establishing of transparent and accountable governance to rebuild social contracts in the country.

The weakness of the Mozambican state has also worsened due to the global criminal networks and a political culture that enables influential government officials to break and evade the law. Along with corruption, ruby smuggling, crime and heroin trade that has become associated with the Mozambican state. All these factors have made the Mozambican state less capable of addressing governance and service delivery challenges and less trustworthy (Gavin, 2020).

Due to the prevalence of neglect by the Mozambican government in Cabo Delgado, where poverty impacts the people, primarily the youth who are not able to find opportunities to achieve their desired goals . This scenario can easily breed feelings of detachment and discontent with the state in Mozambique. Along with this, fragile state structures of governance and inefficient public institutions, poverty, and corruption are factors that reflect the inability of the government to transform Cabo Delgado's abundance of natural resources into regional economic opportunity that could improve the lives of the Mozambicans . Thus, poor governance and the absence of the state have antagonised the local Mozambicans and left behind a security vacuum (Faria, 2021:6).

Mozambique's fragility as a country translates to the trouble the state will have in preparing a well-synchronized response to the insurgency. The development, alliance, and the ability of Al-Shabaab to mount attacks in the region were primarily driven by

various factors (Mlambo, 2021:3). According to the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa, the al-Shabab insurgency is taking advantage of the severe poverty and inequality in Cabo Delgado. This line of argument shows that lack of governance can impact human security negatively. In the case of Cabo Delgado, this proved to be valid when considering the health and socio-economic dimensions of human security. Although Cabo Delgado is one of the wealthiest regions in the country, the resources were not being used to develop the country, instead they are exploited by multinationals.

The shortcomings and regional implications of SADC's response to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado

The SADC region has an estimated population of 345 million people that are characterised by growing poverty and inequality rates, the expansion of the insurgency would have a devastating socio-economic impact on the SADC region (Heywood, 2020). Since the insurgency emerged in Northern Mozambique, "SADC" has delivered several statements criticizing the insurgents, calling for de-escalation and the necessity to uphold the territorial integrity of Mozambique (Mlambo, 2021:4). The effective policy to support these condemnations is however yet to be seen.

Although SADC seems to understand how complex and serious the situation has been, it has been unable to provide efficient support to Mozambique. However, some scholars have stated that SADC cannot be liable for the absence of a response because the officials of the Mozambican government have stated that the insurgency is under control and that the country does not necessitate any foreign aid. While the terrorism in the region could have very serious implications, the inability of the regional

states to act also shows that there is a greater challenge within the regional entity which in turn reflects SADC's inability to effectively coordinate dealing with the insurgency in Mozambique (Mlambo, 2021:4).

SADC's inability to synchronize the process of dealing with the insurgents in Mozambique cannot be observed in isolation. The absence of leadership in dealing with these matters makes it complicated to observe SADCs response to the insurgency from both a diplomatic perspective and a policy perspective taking SADCs political indecisiveness into account (Mlambo, 2021:4). The indecisions may ensure that the stabilisation of Mozambique is a failure and would thus have widespread consequences for the region (Makaredzi, 2020). It is also important to mention there is a lack of coordination between the forces of SADC and various other forces playing a role in the region. An example of this would be Rwanda's intervention in Mozambique which soon after the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron's to the Rwandan capital Kigali . Some speculators have put forward that Rwanda, which was funded by France, has only stepped in to protect French interests, particularly the French company Total's gas facilities located in the province of Cabo Delgado. There is also evidence of the French directly supporting Rwanda's military campaign Kigali. France has also participated in very important high-level dialogues with Rwanda and South Africa regarding the conflict months before their intervention in Mozambique Kigali (The Chronicles, 2021). This proposes a close coordination between France, South Africa, and Rwanda reflecting the French interests at stake in Kigali (The Chronicles, 2021). This also reflects complex governance and management challenges that further complicates the observation of SADCs response to the insurgency from both a policy perspective and a diplomatic perspective.

Mixed leadership signals from President Nyusi's response to the Insurgency

Mozambique's President Nyusi has been anxious about what is happening in Mozambique. Critics of President Nyusi state that he wants to keep snooping eyes out of Cabo Delgado because it is an area for unlawful activity including drug trafficking that benefits elites. His followers on the other hand emphasised that Nyusi is just being cautious about the kind of intervention he is going to allow. His supporters emphasized that he is cautious of a strong presence of foreign troops that could become tough to control and could end up being a complex and hazardous situation (International Crisis Group 2021:12). President Nyusi was indeed opposed to foreign aid and he lauded any military mobilization (Africa News, 2021). The Mozambican government did state that the insurgency was under control and did not require assistance from SADC (Mlambo, 2021:4). This signalled that the insurgency was not a problem. However, President Nyusi has also officially declared the insurgency as "a potential threat to national security and acknowledged that the country's security forces are struggling to deal with the increasing insurgency" (Africa News, 2021). This was evident during "UK-Africa Summit" in January 2020 where he asked for external aid in dealing with the insurgency. The disruptions of gas exploration and concerns surrounding the spread of the violence to nearby countries pressured president Nyusi to accept foreign help to address the ongoing violence in Cabo Delgado. These mixed signals from President Nyusi in his response to the insurgency reflects both poor governance and governance insecurity. This further worsens human insecurity and traditional security in the SADC region. While the Mozambican government was indecisive the insurgents were able to establish their ground which in turn worsened insecurity in Mozambique

In conclusion of this discussion, it is evident that the fragility in Mozambique has been apparent for years, it can be understood that the Al-Shabab insurgents were driven by deep-rooted injustices against a state that they viewed as delivering little for them despite the growth of key resource deposits. The political and governance challenges that faced the Mozambican state such as corruption, the debt scandal, declines in commodity prices together with the structural challenges, as outcomes of poor governance including high levels of unemployment, poverty, and other poor human development conditions facing the Mozambican nation to further emphasise that the threat of the radical Islamist insurgency is far too big to the Mozambican state's legitimacy. Especially the inequality and poverty, reasons that have been highlighted as drivers of the violence. Perhaps if the global community had paid more attention and pushed harder a decade ago to support the civil society actors who called for attention to the deep-rooted issues, Mozambique in the present-day may have demonstrated more resilience to the issues faced. If the Mozambican government fails to address the insurgency the insurrection could spread further. This threatens the national stability of the Mozambican state just as it is fulfilling a peace deal with the country's main opposition RENAMO and heading into the national elections in 2024. The situation could also aggravate the instability on the East African coast. The Mozambican government's use of security services fails to consider the role of socio-economic exclusion in Cabo Delgado that is fuelling the insurgency. Thus, addressing grievances facing the nation should be a top priority for the government in Mozambique. Additionally, the Mozambican government should also focus on addressing the long called for socio-economic grievances - not solely for the need to dismantle the insurgency. Although there have been rising debates surrounding religion and the role

it has in the insurgency in a pursuit to comprehend the drivers of Al-Shaabab in Mozambique. It should be emphasized that religious beliefs are not always the sole reason for insurgencies but sometimes individuals simply turn to violence due to the absence of access to basic services. Cabo Delgado's wealth in mineral resources coupled with the marginalism also entails that Northern Mozambique is at risk of becoming a regional centre of extremism based on Islam. It is certainly a security threat that requires a well-synchronised response before it spreads in the rest of SADC. The poor rankings on multiple corruption indices reaffirm the need for the reestablishment of transparent and accountable governance to rebuild a social contract in the country. Finally, as we have seen in the case of Mozambique governance is a crucial element of realizing human security. It should not be assumed but included as the 8th dimension of human security. In this light, this study would define governance security as accountable, transparent, responsive, inclusive, equitable, following the rule of law, effective, efficient, consensus orientated, and efficient.

Chapter Five – Conclusion, Strategies, and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

As noted in Chapter 3 after a critical discussion of the human security impacts of the insurgency and the lack of governance, the importance of governance and the role that it plays in human security should be further emphasized. Security can be regarded as a precondition for development in a state. In the case of Mozambique, governance issues such as corruption, criminal activity within the government, and the lack of transparency have had very far-reaching consequences for Mozambique. The debt scandal reflected these consequences as it was seen as a major contributing factor for the slowdown post 2015. The slump in economic growth thus impacted employability and poverty reduction in the country. The prevalence of socio-economic issues such as poverty and inequality in combination with corruption and the lack of transparency, entrenched within the ruling FRELIMO party, were all drivers of instability and conflict in the case of Mozambique. Values such as accountability, transparency and public participation are a preconditional requirement for good governance in a country. The Mozambican government must importantly understand that the neglect of such values has resulted in insecurity. Due to the importance of the role of governance in security, it should be included as the eighth dimension of human security.

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is indeed complex and multidimensional as it has taken different approaches through time. There is an inequality aspect, poverty aspect, and a religious aspect. Although all three of these dimensions remotely caused the

instability in the Cabo Delgado region and contributed toward concerns surrounding the spread of the terrorism threat in the Southern African region, the common factor tying them together is governance. Given its centrality to achieving the 7 dimensions of human security, governance security is critical and should form part of the human security dimensions. It is necessary for the government of Mozambique to start prioritising human (people) security over the state and regime security and focus on the human security vulnerabilities that underpin the insurgency, and other similar threats to the survival of the state. Government should realise these and draw the link between human security and state/regime security as when citizens of a state are secured from human needs, they are more likely to support and protect the state from any kind of attack both from within and outside it.

At the regional level, as a region that has not experienced much terrorism before, SADC does seem to understand the urgency to assist Mozambique and they are serious about concerns over the conflict spilling over into the region. SADC seems to be exerting serious efforts to prevent a spillover. These efforts are necessary to establish social cohesion and stability in Mozambique. Porous borders in the SADC region and the lack of reliable intelligence services will make it difficult for the region to deal with the insurgency in the case where it moves beyond Mozambique's borders.

If SADC fails to contribute toward a viable solution to the insurgency, the regional organisation will risk outlining itself as a weak institution and this may present new challenges for the region.

5.2 Strategies and Recommendations

Strategies to address the insurgency

As indicated in the conclusion, a people-centric rather than a security-centric strategy will be required to deal with the insurgency to stabilise Cabo Delgado and Mozambique as a whole. The strategy will have to incorporate security, social, religious, political, humanitarian, and economic dimensions of the insurgency. For the government to attain this, a central governing body is necessary to establish an inter-agency approach to deliver a unified national response. For security to be restored the Mozambican government needs to develop a thorough intelligence plan that details all funding needed, local supporters and collaborators, sources for arms, and external linkages. Mozambique should also establish effective policing, twenty-four-hour intelligence, and operation centres in Cabo Delgado along with persistent land, air, and sea surveillance systems for monitoring.

Funding is urgently needed for the humanitarian response in Cabo Delgado. The response is greatly underfunded, as only 10 percent of the amount needed was received. The top-recorded donor in 2021 according to the financial tracking service is the “United Nation’s Central Emergency Response Fund” with about 5 million U.S. dollars allocated to the Palma crisis as a rapid response. An additional 5 million U.S. dollars were also funded from the Under-Funded Emergencies window. Despite efforts from donors to step up, additional funding is necessary to ensure that response scale up to the swiftly rising needs. Without immediate additional funding, humanitarian collaborators will be obliged to make very difficult choices, and significant amounts of people may not receive the help they need to survive as a result.

The importance of humanitarian assistance should also be emphasized. In 2021 alone, humanitarians have been able to reach and provide for over 700,00 people with

life-saving aid and protection. The humanitarian response in Cabo Delgado however is still insufficient for the extreme needs. This is mainly due to underfunding along with no capacity increase, insecurity, and challenges to access. Safe and free access for humanitarians as well as fast issuing of visas and customs clearance to ensure that humanitarians can reduce suffering and ultimately save lives.

Protecting citizens and ending the violence is of utmost importance. If the violence cannot be controlled, the crisis in Northern Mozambique will make the task of humanitarian organisations increasingly difficult. Further emphasizing the need for urgent action to deal with drivers of the insurgency. The participation of civil society, especially amongst the youth and humanitarian organisations in conflict resolution can also be beneficial as the Mozambican government could gain meaningful insight on how to deal with the insurgency.

Thus, both a coherent counterterrorist strategy and regional assistance will be needed, otherwise, the odds stacked against the Mozambican security forces might prevail. Overall, it is also wiser for Mozambique and its collaborators to approach a response to the insurgency by combining military operations with efforts to address the local root causes of the insurgency.

Recommendations to address socio-economic issues in Mozambique

A long-lasting solution to the violence and the insurgency in Cabo Delgado cannot solely rely on the military force. Based on the strategic understanding that emerged from the findings of this study, the following policy focus is recommended:

- The government needs to address the grievances faced by the population that are part of the complex motivations for the extreme violence. The Mozambican government needs to invest extensively in Cabo Delgado. Investments in infrastructure including roads, transportation, bridges, and telecommunications can result in increased trade within the population. This will also allow Cabo Delgado to integrate with the rest of the country.
- It has been recommended by SADCs technical team that the establishment of a Regional Coordination Mechanism and a Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre are necessary developments for the northern province in Mozambique. Intelligence sharing is also essential among SADC members, along with other states with a marine presence in the Mozambique Channel. The Mozambican security forces need to patrol and secure the coastline. Mozambique should also make use of valuable technological devices such as drones and mobile phone surveillance but Mozambique should essentially place human intelligence as an immediate priority. Human intelligence is beneficial as it provides a continuous supply of important information on new people entering villages and towns, local developments, and possible exterior threats. Intelligence is necessary as well for understanding the context so that security and development can be achieved.
- The high illiteracy rates in Cabo Delgado also need to be addressed as high illiteracy rates reproduce and endure both political and social exclusion. Consequently, political, and social exclusion results in significant amounts of unemployed and unemployable young people. Extensive investments in education are needed in Cabo Delgado to guarantee that young people acquire

the skills needed especially in industries that contribute to the economy such as the booming extractives industry.

- Diversification of the economy is required. Cabo Delgado's wealth in natural resources places the province in a position where it risks dependence on natural resource extraction. This is problematic as it may result in economic growth without creation of jobs and therefore can expose Cabo Delgado to the volatility of commodity prices in the global market. The diversification of the economy as soon as possible especially before the dependence of natural resources and exports occur is therefore required. For example, if Cabo Delgado develops an agricultural sector, it could increase the capacity of employment and feed more people.

The Mozambican government must develop a human rights-centred approach for the government's methods of land tenure transfer from local communities to mining entities in Cabo Delgado and across the country. Often the government's methods of transferring the rights to land use from resident communities the human rights of the residents are not considered. These proceedings do not give prior, free, or informed consent of the local communities. The cultural, economic, and social factors:

- are seldom considered.
- Mozambique should also work toward inclusive economic growth - this can be done with public policies for the eradication of poverty. Inclusive poverty eradication can be attained with a policy that expands access to basic services including electricity, education, sanitation, access to labor and health.
- Due to Mozambique's history with natural disasters, developing insurance

markets to reduce the risks related to natural disasters is also suggested. These efforts can lead to generating more inclusive growth, establishing financial buffers for the reduction of poverty in Mozambique, that would also build resilience. The informal sector is also vital to attaining broad-based progress in the enhancement of welfare over the next 10 years. Inclusive growth is key to achieving social and economic development in the next few decades.

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6. Appendixes

Appendix 1 : Anti-plagiarism form

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
PLAGIARISM POLICY AGREEMENT

The University of Pretoria places great emphasis upon integrity and ethical conduct in the preparation of all written work submitted for academic evaluation.

While academic staff teaches you about referencing techniques and how to avoid plagiarism, you too have a responsibility in this regard. If you are of any stage uncertain as to what is required, you should speak to your lecturer before any written work is submitted.

You are guilty of plagiarism if you copy something from another author's work (eg a book, an article or a website) without acknowledging the source and pass it off as your own. In effect you are stealing something that belongs to someone else. This is not only the case when you copy work word-for-word (verbatim), but also when you submit someone else's work in a slightly altered form (paraphrase) or use a line of argument without acknowledging it. You are not allowed to use work previously produced by another student. You are also not allowed to let anybody copy your work with the intention of passing it off as their work.

Students who commit plagiarism will not be given any credit for plagiarised work. The matter may also be referred to the Disciplinary Committee (Students) for a ruling. Plagiarism is regarded as a serious contravention of the University's rules and can lead to expulsion from the University.

The declaration which follows must accompany all written work submitted while you are a student of the University of Pretoria. No written work will be accepted unless the declaration has been completed and attached.


Full names of candidate: Gerson Jesus Mendes


Student number: 16050119

Date: 01/10/2021

Declaration

I, _____ understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

SIGNATURE OF CANDIDATE: 

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: 

This document must be signed and submitted to the Head, Student Administration within two months of registering for the research component of the programme.

Appendix 2 : Declaration of Originality

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This document must be signed and submitted with every
essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation and/or thesis.


Full names of student: gerson Jesus Mendes

Student number: 16050119

Declaration

1. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.
2. I declare that this dissertation (essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation, thesis, etc) is my own original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.
3. I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in as my own.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of posing it off as his or her own work.

SIGNATURE OF STUDENT



SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR



Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance Form



Faculty of Humanities

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomothe



21 April 2021

Dear Mr GJ Mendes

Project Title: Explaining security and insecurity in Africa: the case of Mozambique
Researcher: Mr GJ Mendes
Supervisor(s): Prof CA Isike
Department: Political Sciences
Reference number: 16050119 (HUM010/0221)
Degree: Masters

Thank you for the application that was submitted for ethical consideration.

The Research Ethics Committee notes that this is a literature-based study and no human subjects are involved.

The application has been approved on 25 March 2021 with the assumption that the document(s) are in the public domain. Data collection may therefore commence, along these guidelines.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. However, should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, a new research proposal and application for ethical clearance will have to be submitted for approval.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

Prof Innocent Pikirayi
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomothe

Research Ethics Committee Members: Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Mr A Basso; Dr A-M de Beer; Dr A dos Santos; Ms NT Goolbsy; Andrew; Dr P Joubert; Dr E Johnson; Prof D Maree; Mr A Mohamed; Dr I Mooko; Dr C Ruiters; Prof D Bredius; Prof M Soke; Prof E Tshabalala; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tshabe; Ms D Mokoena