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MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ASSESSMENT OF PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

by

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I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and other commentators on the diplomatic profession whom I have approached over the past few years for informal discussion on the relevance of diplomatic training. Their frank insights (solicited with the undertaking that they would not be quoted) did much to educate me about the enormous challenges facing diplomats at the cusp of the 21st century. They also, with very few exceptions, confirmed my conjecture that prioritisation of – hence investment in – diplomatic training is of critical importance to Developing World ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice assisted me in obtaining sufficient empirical substance for the research – much needed help in an area of study that is so expansive and often obscured from public scrutiny by formidable government bureaucracies.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP	–	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
AEC	–	African Economic Community
ANC	–	African National Congress (South Africa)
ASEAN	–	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASIU	–	Albert Schweitzer International University
AU	–	African Union
BCE	–	before the common era
CAF	–	China-Africa Forum
CEEC	–	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFP	–	Comparative Foreign Policy
CFR	–	Centre for Foreign Relations (Tanzania)
CFSI	–	Canadian Foreign Service Institute
CNN	–	Cable News Network
CPDS	–	Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, Oxford
CSAS	–	Centre for Southern African Studies (University of the Western Cape)
DA	–	Diplomatic Academy
DAL	–	Diplomatic Academy of London
DFA	–	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFAIT	–	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DHRMD	–	Department of Human Resource Management and Development (Malawi)
DOS	–	Department of State (US)
DPSA	–	Department of Public Service and Administration (South Africa)
DRC	–	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSE	–	*Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung* (German Foundation for International Development)
DSP		Diplomatic Studies Programmes (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva)
EAC	–	East African Community

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EAI	–	European Academy of Informatization
ECA	–	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSOC	–	(United Nations) Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	–	Economic Community of West African States
EU	–	European Union
FCO	–	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDI	–	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD	–	Foundation for Global Dialogue (South Africa)
FSA	–	Foreign Service Academy (Pakistan)
FSI	–	Foreign Service Institute
FSLD	–	Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University)
FSP	–	Foreign Service Programme (Oxford University)
FSTC	–	Foreign Service Training Centre (Turkey)
FSTI	–	Foreign Service Training Institute (Japan)
FTA	–	Free Trade Area
G7	–	Group of Seven (industrialised countries)
G8	–	Group of Eight (G7 plus Russia)
G77	–	Group of 77 (developing countries)
GATT	–	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	–	Gulf Cooperation Council
GEAR	–	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan
GNP	–	Gross National Product
HDI	–	Human Development Index
HEI	–	Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (*Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Genève*)
HIPCs	–	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS	–	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HSRC	–	Human Science Research Council (South Africa)
IBRD	–	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (a.k.a. World Bank)
IBSA	–	India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum

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ICJ	–	International Court of Justice
ICT	–	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	–	International Diplomatic Academy (Switzerland)
IDFR	–	Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (Malaysia)
IDIS	–	Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (University of Nairobi)
IDS	–	Institute of Diplomatic Studies (Saudi Arabia)
IFA	–	Institute of Foreign Affairs (Thailand)
IFANS	–	Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)
IFDT	–	International Forum on Diplomatic Training
IGO	–	Inter-governmental Organisation
IIAP	–	International Institute for Public Administration (France) *(Institut International d'Administration Publique)*
IIR	–	Institute for International Relations (Vietnam)
IIRT	–	Institute of International Relations of the University of the West Indies in Trinidad
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
IOR-ARC	–	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IR	–	International Relations
IRIC	–	International Relations Institute of Cameroon
IS	–	International Studies
ISD	–	Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown University)
ISEN	–	National Foreign Service Institute (Argentina) (*Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación)*
ISRI	–	Higher Institute for International Relations (Mozambique)
ISU	–	International Studies Unit
IT	–	Information Technology
JID	–	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
JMCIS	–	Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies

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		(University of Economics, Prague)
LAIA	–	Latin American Integration Association
LDC	–	Least Developed Country
MDC	–	Management Development Centre
MDGs	–	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	–	Ministry of External Affairs
MEDAC	–	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (University of Malta)
MERCOSUR	–	Southern Cone Common Market (*Mercado Commún del Sur)*
MFA	–	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFR	–	Ministry of Foreign Relations
MFRCA	–	Ministry of Foreign Relations and Church Affairs (Costa Rica)
MGIMO	–	Moscow State Institute for International Relations
MNC	–	Multinational Corporation
MOFAT	–	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (ROK)
MOU	–	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	–	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	–	Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO	–	New International Economic Order
NGO	–	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	–	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	–	Official Development Assistance
OECD	–	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	–	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	–	Pan-Africanist Congress
PISA	–	Program of International Studies in Asia
PMD	–	Prime Minister's Department (Malaysia)
PRC	–	People’s Republic of China
RDA	–	Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs
RIA	–	Regional Integration Arrangement
ROK	–	Republic of Korea (South Korea)

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RSA	–	Republic of South Africa
SACU	–	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	–	Southern African Development Community
SAP	–	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDC	–	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
TBVC	–	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei
TNC	–	Transnational Corporation
UK	–	United Kingdom
UN	–	United Nations
UNCTAD	–	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	–	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	–	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	–	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR	–	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSC	–	United Nations Security Council
US	–	United States (of America)
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development
VDA	–	Diplomatic Academy in Vienna *(Vien Diplomatische Akademie)*
VDI	–	Virtual Diplomacy Initiative (United States Institute of Peace)
VIP	–	Very Important Person
WEF	–	World Economic Forum
WTO	–	World Trade Organisation
ZPCSA	–	Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL COMMENT

The Developing World, however narrowly or broadly defined, comprises the vast majority of members of the global community of states. From an historical perspective its concerted participation in international relations is a relatively recent phenomenon, yet its presence on the world stage has manifestly changed the form and substance of global relations. Key among the institutions that are assimilating the impact of the Developing World is diplomacy – a practice as old as humanity and an institution[1] that remains an essential and central component of global relations. Diplomats[2] from the Developing World thus represent a new polity by means of an ancient vocation; pursuing an unprecedented, collective and revolutionary diplomatic agenda in the global domain through the adopted heritage of a millennia-old, (mostly) extraneous tradition in diplomatic *modus operandi*.

In reality, however, diplomats from the Developing World practice their profession at a compounded disadvantage. As the descriptive adjective in the appellation of their 'world' infers, they engage in global relations on unequal terms: myriad endogenous and exogenous factors complicate their national and international working environment and make it extremely difficult to pursue the international agenda(s) they are entrusted with. The difficulties that emanate from their states' developmental deficit are superimposed on universal diplomatic challenges that have emerged during the past few decades. These challenges, which stem from inordinate political, social and economic changes on a scale never experienced before, have dramatically changed world affairs and confronted the diplomatic profession with the imperative for introspective reevaluation. Duke (2001: 5) observes that even in the rich countries of the developed North, the contemporary challenges posed to diplomats have played up the inadequacy of existing diplomatic performance, prompting efforts to address shortcomings by means of professional diplomatic training.

For the Developing World, this prioritisation of diplomatic training is in a mere

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embryonic[3] stage: the paucity of literary reflection on diplomatic training as a means to strengthen Developing World diplomacy is indicative of its status as an undervalued, neglected area of diplomatic practice. This lacuna has stimulated the research that follows, in which perspectives have been collected and collated from as wide a spectrum as possible of stakeholders in Developing World diplomacy.

This first chapter will introduce the study by identifying and demarcating the research theme, explicating its relevance in terms of the significance, utility and contribution of the investigation; posing and elucidating the research problem; providing an overview of the literary sources; explaining methodological aspects of the study; reflecting on various problems encountered in the course of the research and providing a structural overview of the study. The introduction will also provide motivation for combining within one thesis two very distinct areas of research, namely the diplomacy of development and contemporary diplomatic training.

2. DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

Demarcation of the research theme is necessary in order to delineate the boundaries of the investigation, i.e. to provide scientific focus to the study. The delineation will commence with an identification of the theme, whereupon it will be conceptually situated in the context of the discipline, followed by a demarcation more specifically in terms of geographic scope and time frame.

The theme addresses the challenge of Developing World diplomacy in the 21st century, and the study investigates various perspectives on the role of diplomatic training in meeting this challenge. In the course of developing the theme, the specific imperatives and exigencies of the diplomacy of development will be considered as well as the universal, generic challenges to the profession of diplomacy that have emerged from its recent evolution. In tandem, these considerations present a construct of the formidable contemporary challenges facing Developing World diplomats. The theme will then narrow to a bifocal exposition of diplomatic training: on the one hand, the standards set by international practice in the field and, on the other hand, the reality of existing – and in some cases non-existent – diplomatic training in the Developing World. From this

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juxtaposition, and in light of the aforesaid considerations, an assessment and proposals will be concluded as regards the remedial role of professional training in enhancing the performance of Developing World diplomats.

Positioning the theme in the context of International Relations (IR) requires the separate abstraction of its two main components: Developing World diplomacy and diplomatic training. The common conceptual denominator is diplomacy, and a theoretical perspective on the theme, as provided subsequently, will thus commence by positioning diplomacy within IR and diplomatic theory. As will be discussed, diplomacy comprises[4] a peaceful, reciprocal tool of foreign policy, and is institutionalised to such an extent that it is often mistakenly equated with the latter concept. Foreign policy, which refers to the full spectrum of state involvement across political boundaries and the factors that determine such involvement, manifests within the realm of – and as a function of – international relations.

The location of the central concept of diplomacy within IR theory and practice is thus clear, and attention turns to the concepts that define the two separate components of the theme: Developing World and training. The Developing World denotes a collective of states (some of them failed or nascent and thus not necessarily universally recognised as states) that carries a multiplicity of political and socio-economic labels[5], and which is conceptually juxtaposed *vis-à-vis* the comparatively more developed industrialised nations of the North, referred to as the Developed World. As such, the Developing World is an actor within the international system, hence a unit of analysis.

As concerns the concept of training, the *Oxford Dictionary* (Pollard and Liebeck 1994) defines it generically as the activity of bringing "to a desired standard of efficiency or behaviour etc. by instruction and practice". In the context of diplomacy, this interpretation implies that diplomatic training prepares individuals to become efficient practitioners of diplomacy *via* theoretical as well as practical instruction, i.e. provide them with the appropriate knowledge and skills to master the functions and roles that they will assume in the course of their profession as diplomats[6] (Feltham 1993: 23; Otermi 1992: 30). Diplomatic training, albeit in substance of an interdisciplinary nature (Czech Republic JMCIS 1998), is reflected on within the

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discipline of IR when research is focused on the international political *raison d'être* of its conduct. In this context, therefore, the study investigates diplomatic training not in terms of pedagogic methodology[7], but as an extension of (and commitment to) diplomatic practice, hence an integral part of diplomacy.

Geographical demarcation of the theme is not applicable *per se.* It relates to the theme only inasmuch as the Developing World is geographically conceptualised as a predominantly southern hemispheric zone, as opposed to the more developed northern hemisphere. Diplomatic practice, including training for the profession, is a universal activity and derives relevance from the international environment; it is thus not geographically restricted. Geopolitical units (individual countries and regions) are used only as units of analysis for selected examples in the field.

No demarcated time frame has been applied to the research. An historical overview of the theme is essential because diplomacy is an ancient institution and an evolutionary perspective contextualises the European roots of contemporary international diplomatic practice, including diplomatic training. In this regard relatively greater attention is accorded the 20th century because of, on the one hand, the development of significant challenges to the profession and, on the other hand, the emergence of the Developing World as an international actor. For the purpose of demarcating the research theme, contemporary diplomatic training will be considered as emanating from post-Cold War diplomatic practice. The significance of the title's reference to the 21st century is that the research is ultimately forward looking in its attempt to generate proposals about Developing World diplomatic training as a response to present and (foreseeable) future diplomatic challenges.

3. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH THEME

The relevance of the research theme can be considered from three perspectives: its contribution to IR theory (particularly to the subfield of diplomatic theory), its practical utility and finally its contribution to democratic accountability. The latter consideration is important in the sense that the study originates in South Africa

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(RSA), a newly democratised state where the public has a growing stake in the transparent conduct of state affairs, including diplomacy.

From a theoretical point of view, a major incentive for this study has been the paucity of intellectual reflection within traditional IR theory firstly on the Developing World and secondly on diplomacy, both of which are key concepts within the research theme. These lacunae exist notwithstanding recent intellectual challenges that have rendered reflection on these concepts less peripheral within the discipline. As a social science, IR is a relatively young discipline and its independent academic establishment is as recent as the immediate post-World War One period. Its theoretical development is even more nascent: it only gained momentum after World War Two, notably as a result of American scholarly attention. The resultant limitation in appreciation of "the unique circumstances of other political and bureaucratic systems" (Hocking 1999a: 22) means that contributions to this social science from the rest of the world, and the Developing World in particular, are essential for the intellectual coherence of the discipline.

The research will furthermore endeavour to contribute to the body of diplomatic theory which, as Berridge *et al* (2001: 2) explain, is "reflective in character, permanently indebted to historical reasoning and unfailingly ethical in inspiration". Various commentators have lamented the dearth of diplomatic theory within IR theory, which is ironic in light of the institution's universal and historical importance within global relations (Debrah 1996; Reychler 1996: 10; Sharp 1999: 33). During the post-Cold War era, renewed interest in the study of diplomacy led to the establishment of a number of specialised academic centres, but these centres are almost without exception based in the Developed World. A deficit therefore exists in the academic study of diplomatic practice, including diplomatic training, from a Developing World perspective. This study will therefore attempt to contribute to the effort needed to address this theoretical chasm by focusing not only on diplomatic practice, but doing so from a Developing World perspective.

The research is also an endeavor to enrich diplomatic theory by offering much needed inputs from a host of diplomatic practitioners; in the process contributing to the discourse as regards the continued relevance of career diplomats. It does so by

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identifying the contemporary roles that diplomats need to fulfill and addressing their practical preparation by means of diplomatic training for the execution of these roles, an area within diplomatic theory that is under-researched (Hocking 1999a: 25; Wiseman 1999: 1–2; Wolfe 1997: 3). As Coolsaet (1998: 1) observes: "diplomats and civil servants in the ministries of foreign affairs are also aware of their changing environment. They are confronted daily with new actors, new agenda items and new working methods in a profession which generally evolves only very slowly. Up till now they have not been asked very often about their impressions". The potential advantage and contribution to diplomatic theory is that such practical inputs allow reflection on, as Sharp (1999: 51) observes, not just "how things are supposed to be" but also "how they very often actually are". For a study that addresses diplomatic practice, such pragmatic reflection is absolutely essential in order to arrive at realistic assessments and proposals, particularly from the perspective of Developing States that are confronted by major deficiencies in state capacity.

Participation in international relations by means of diplomacy represents one of the few viable tools of foreign policy accessible to all states, however weak they may be in comparison to other states. To the Developing World, therefore, it offers a crucial mechanism through which to participate in global affairs, if not indeed to secure its actual survival. In this regard, the research theme addresses an exigency within the Developing World, i.e. the lack of skilled diplomats to enhance its interests within what Ahmad (1999: 117) refers to as an "asymmetric and predatory world of nation states". Within this highly competitive environment, the Developing World – *via* various collective diplomatic initiatives such as the Group of 77 (G77) and Non-aligned Movement (NAM) – has positioned itself *vis-à-vis* the Developed World in an increasingly more organised, assertive manner to pursue a very ambitious international agenda. In addition to traditional 'high political' issues, 'low political' developmental causes are increasingly dealt with by diplomats, requiring enhanced skills and expertise that can only be acquired by means of professional training (Commonwealth 1971: 111; Debrah 1996; Hemery 2002: 141). However, whereas the majority of developed foreign ministries recruit candidates from a large academic elite and the in-house training of these individuals amounts to ‘polishing’ rather than shaping, most developing states do not have recourse to such a large

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pool of educated candidates and career-specific training therefore has a relatively more definitive role in the 'making' of their diplomats. This need is acute in cases where foreign ministries need to be transformed or constructed in their entirety, hence new states and states in democratic transition (such as RSA) have a particular interest in international research on the subject. The final proposals of the study are therefore expected to contribute to the growing demand for Developing World capacity in the field of diplomatic training.

A more political consideration for the research is the issue of public interest in democratic accountability. Maintaining a foreign service is costly to any state: the role of its diplomats therefore needs to be assessed on an ongoing basis, in order to determine whether the benefits of their public service justify the expenses incurred by tax-payers. In the case of developing countries, the financial implications are particularly daunting and citizens need to be certain that their foreign ministries effectively pursue their countries' vital interests. If, indeed, the role of Developing World diplomats is indispensable – as this study will argue – their very selection, training and ultimate performance in the field, become a matter of public interest.

From a South African perspective, the public interest in transparent governance has become particularly relevant in light of the country's 1994 transition to democracy, which has widely been acknowledged as a landmark political achievement within the Developing World. The country's new international status has spawned exponential growth in its international relations and a commensurate need for diplomatic capacity. In this regard, the research theme corresponds with stated domestic as well as foreign policy objectives of the RSA government.

On a domestic level, the South African government's agenda is underpinned by its macroeconomic policy, as set out in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR). Ever since the country's democratic transition, the priorities of GEAR have been the most important brief of South African diplomats. They are tasked to lobby the international community to ensure that foreign involvement in South Africa enhances domestic developmental goals such as growth, employment creation and poverty reduction. South Africa's foreign policy objectives are related to these

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domestic imperatives, and are focused on successful implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was founded in October 2001 as an initiative of the African Union (AU). NEPAD represents a new approach within Developing World diplomacy: it foresees a collective effort by African states to stimulate a 'recovery plan' for the continent through growth and development, in partnership with the Developed World. These pivotal priorities clearly call for diplomatic expertise and effective training of the South African diplomats who will be entrusted with their execution.

The imperative for proper training, retraining and development of South African public servants, including diplomats, are emphasised specifically in the South African government's 1997 White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service. Hilliard and Wissink (2002: 5) point out that Section 6 of the White Paper stresses the importance of professional management of human resources, as opposed to a mere perfunctory clerical or administrative approach. Nonetheless, they attribute the low ranking of South Africa in various international competitiveness reports *inter alia* to the fact that many new recruits to the public service "are ill prepared for the daunting challenges facing them ... it is therefore essential that the South African public service should take a fresh look at its public service orientation/induction programmes, its training/retraining techniques, and its management development approaches". They conclude that a "nation that is inadequately prepared to face the challenges of the twenty-first century could find itself globally uncompetitive". Their views are shared by numerous commentators, as will be quoted in the course of the research, who emphasise that South Africa (specifically, and more generally the Developing World) can only gain competitiveness in diplomacy if career diplomats are considered to be potential, and thus trained to become, state assets (Burt and Robison 1998: xii; Debrah 1996; Newsom 1997: 4; Vale 1993: 3).

4. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The following fundamental research question encapsulates the research problem: What role, if any, does diplomatic training play in enabling diplomats from the Developing World to meet the challenges they face at the cusp of the 21st century?

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Five subsidiary research questions have been formulated in order to provide a logical framework for investigation of this question:

a) What are the characteristics of the contemporary diplomatic arena and how do these realities universally impact on the work of diplomats?
b) How does the 'diplomacy of development' manifest itself and what are the implications thereof for diplomatic capacity in the Developing World?
c) On a global scale, to what extent is the targeted recruitment and professional training of diplomats prioritised and what are the salient trends and standards as concerns the method, structure and content of international diplomatic training?
d) Which variables and endemic conditions challenge the status of existing diplomatic training in developing countries?
e) What role can diplomatic training play in building Developing World diplomatic capacity and how should its contribution be facilitated?

In order to address each of the individual subsidiary research questions, a commensurate number of subsidiary propositions have been developed. Substantiation of each of these propositions translates into the objectives of the research:

a) The characteristics of the contemporary diplomatic arena present, on a universal scale, formidable challenges to diplomats, complicating and expanding the profession rather than simplifying or diminishing its practice.
b) The distinct impediments and imperatives of the 'diplomacy of development' impact significantly on the substance and form of Developing World diplomats' professional performance, thereby demanding enhanced diplomatic capacity.
c) On a global scale, career-specific training of diplomats is increasingly prioritised and professionalised as a means to meet contemporary challenges in international relations, hence trends in method, structure and content of diplomatic training reflect a growing convergence of best practice and standards in the field.
d) Specific circumstances within the Developing World, also within particular sub-groups of developing states, hold important challenges for diplomatic training that,

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on the one hand, render its increased prioritisation and professionalisation imperative and, on the other hand, necessitate its customised application.

e) In order to build crucial diplomatic capacity and to advance the diplomacy of development more effectively, developing countries must prioritise and implement diplomatic training that is customised yet reflects international benchmarking in method, structure and content.

Through investigation of a diverse selection of perspectives emanating from theorists as well as practitioners in the field, these subsidiary propositions attempt to provide a composite answer to the fundamental research question. Collectively, they address the main aim of the research, namely to verify the following fundamental research proposition: In the complicated environment of contemporary global relations, and in light of the challenges presented by its developmental deficit, the Developing World is comparatively more dependent on diplomacy to pursue its vital interests and thus need to heed the international exemplar of enhancing diplomats' competitive performance by means of professional, world-class training.

5. LITERATURE SURVEY

The field of Developing World diplomacy is replete with primary sources – *inter alia* press releases, policy documents and speeches by stakeholders in the diplomacy of development – that have proven useful to the study. The Internet sites of individual governments and the multilateral organisations they participate in, as well as the various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are involved in the Developing World, have greatly facilitated access to current data. Notwithstanding the traditional neglect of reflection on Developing World interests within IR theory, secondary sources have also been sufficient, as the last two decades have yielded a surge in reflection on developmental international relations. This widening of the field has been facilitated by the ascendance of post-positivism, which reflects the interests of the Developing World more comprehensively. The result is that many universities now accord independent status to developmental studies, hence encouraging research in this area of the discipline.

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Diplomatic training as a research subject is also very recent to IR but secondary sources, even as regards case studies in the Developed World, are scarce. A notable exception is the landmark 1971 report by the Commonwealth on human resources development of newly established foreign ministries. With very few other exceptions, research on the subject of diplomatic training has been limited to in-house studies undertaken by the foreign ministries of various countries. The post-Cold War sovereignty boom and the attendant need for increased foreign ministry capacity has produced a growth in academic interest in the subject and in response, a number of institutions have positioned themselves to focus on diplomatic studies. As the turn of the millennium approached, a substantial amount of research and publications on the issue of contemporary diplomatic challenges was generated by institutions such as *inter alia* the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies (CPDS) in Oxford, Clingendael in The Hague, the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy in Leicester, and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University. The Internet has also spawned its own 'institutions' in this regard: an example is the host of articles on contemporary diplomatic practice published by the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative (VDI) of the United States Institute of Peace. The assessments as regards diplomatic challenges contained in these literary contributions, often indicate professional diplomatic training as a remedy for enhanced diplomatic performance.

The research has also drawn substantially on the contributions of accomplished international authors on diplomacy, including Langhorne, Sharp, Barston and Berridge, and the recent editorial collections of *inter alia* Hocking, Melissen and Kurbalija. Critical reflection on diplomatic training *per se*, by authors such as Hemery and Newsom, has been invaluable. The relative lack of secondary sources on diplomatic training has necessitated extensive use of primary sources, in particular reports on diplomatic training programmes that had been collected from various diplomatic training centres from across the globe, either directly, *via* Internet sites or the presentations collected *in sito* at the annual meetings of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT).

In the case of South Africa, no known post-graduate research on the subject of Developing World diplomatic training has been done. The only comprehensive and

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scientific study of diplomatic training, as commissioned by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, preceded the country's transition to democracy and was completed during 1990 by the Human Science Research Council's (HSRC) Institute for Educational Research.

6. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Methodologically speaking, the research comprises a study of selected literature – much of it primary – that provides perspectives on contemporary diplomatic training as an integral part of diplomatic practice. As such, the study incorporates aspects of both metatheory and practice, hence displaying elements of a post-metatheoretical approach. As will subsequently be discussed, Constantinou (1996: 17) has proposed that the latter approach, which is a combination of meta-theory and theory-as-practice, be adopted within diplomatic theory to forestall the mutually exclusive notion of theory and practice that commonly prevents metaphysical theorising from being grounded in reality.

The practical approach of the research is evidenced in its emphasis on the formalistic and substantive roles of diplomats that provide the functional *raison d'être* for diplomatic training. As Sharp (1999: 57) contends, "the study of diplomacy, although it may be highly critical of particular individuals or styles, tends to be sympathetic to diplomacy *per se* and to those responsible for handling its predicaments". The proclivity that Sharp identifies applies to this study also, as the author, a practitioner of diplomacy, approaches the subject from a professional and pragmatic perspective that draws heavily on primary sources. These sources, as do many of the secondary sources on the subject, provide an empirical as well as normative perspective on diplomatic training. Not only is the reality of diplomatic training practice examined in its various manifestations, but ideal goals and possibilities are invoked as concerns the imperative for enhanced training of Developing World diplomats. The delineation of thematic boundaries for the purpose of scientific study indicates that the author uses a predominantly positivist approach to the analysis of this particular study in diplomacy, notwithstanding the contextual assimilation of post-positivist and post-empiricist IR critiques of diplomacy and the Developing World. The study's adherence to state-centric

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considerations furthermore ensures that the methodological approach is distinctly rationalist.

The research method of the study displays the following properties: it is qualitative, inductive and analytic. Its qualitative rather than quantitative approach is necessitated by the complex, multi-dimensional environment under investigation and the fact that examination of the research problem requires application of knowledge. The method is inductive in the sense that conclusions are drawn from logically and empirically observed realities, so as to facilitate possible extensions to the existing body of knowledge in the field. The use of empirical data opens up the possibility of additional and external analysis and evaluation of its findings, hence the analytic nature of the study.

No structured interviews were done but additional consultations on the subject of diplomatic training, *inter alia* for the purpose of fact verification and source location, were conducted with a range of stakeholders, including career diplomats, journalists, academics, and representatives of various diplomatic training centres. Case studies *per se* were not done, but the research covered a wide spectrum paradigm of international practice. Empirical data was collected and examples cited from developed as well as developing countries, and as concerns the latter, from well-established foreign ministries as well as relatively new services. The selective elements of a comparative study were included with bifocal intent. The most important reason for the wide perspective on practice in the field is the fact that diplomacy is a universal, international activity, highly institutionalised and regulated by international law. Diplomatic training thus needs to heed an international exemplar in order to prepare individuals to operate in an external environment according to international norms and standards. A secondary consideration is the reality that Developing World diplomats represent much more than individual countries. They pursue the international agenda of a huge diplomatic assemblage, and diplomatic training is therefore instrumental in fomenting a measure of synchronisation of (or at least harmonisation in) the norms and standards of diplomatic practice within the Developing World.

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In summary, it needs to be emphasised that this study is neither a purely critical literary study nor is it an empirical comparison of case studies. Rather, it combines the two distinct approaches precisely because it assesses literature on case studies as obtained from both academic and practical sources. These include, to name but a few, a spectrum of policy documents, curricula, case studies, media interviews and reports, international conference deliberations, diplomatic manuals and academic dissertations. In essence, therefore, the research subject comprises *perspectives* on contemporary diplomatic training.

7. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE COURSE OF THE RESEARCH

The most daunting problem experienced in the course of the research concerns the intellectual scope of the study: the theme, which addresses the concepts of diplomacy, Developing World as well as diplomatic training, has the potential of spawning myriad studies. The challenge has thus been to present wide-ranging research in a succinct manner without forfeiting substance, an imperative that necessitated difficult contractions in every chapter. This challenge has been a metaphor for the practical implications of the study: the interdisciplinary scope of diplomatic training is enormous and the challenge for its designers is to keep it compact and focused without losing substance that could compromise the essential skills and knowledge required by professional diplomats.

A second problem encountered has been the accessibility of primary sources. Although diplomatic training – in terms of national security concerns – is not considered a sensitive area of diplomatic practice, relevant documentation remains largely produced by and intended for internal foreign ministry use. It is therefore not always available for public scrutiny, or if available is often subject to bureaucratic delay. This problem has been acute, particularly because the research, quite literally, has covered diplomatic training centres across the globe.

8. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The current introductory chapter will usher in Chapter 2, which provides a theoretical perspective to the research and places the theme within the context of

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IR and diplomatic theory. Chapter 3 provides an evolutionary perspective on the professionalisation of diplomacy, including the development of career-specific training, and explores the institution's dramatic transformation in method and scope during the 20th century. The challenges that this transformation presents to the diplomatic profession, *inter alia* the exponential expansion of international society, the technological revolution, globalisation, democratisation of the foreign policy process and the 'privatisation' of diplomacy, are examined in order to construct "a broad picture of the world in which diplomats have to operate, before seeing what is left of their traditional roles" as Riordan (2003: 94) observes. Chapter 4 then focuses more specifically on the evolution of the diplomacy of development: the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the distinct, agenda-driven diplomacy of the Developing World *vis-à-vis* the Developed World. Chapter 5 addresses diplomatic training *per se*. Contemporary international practice is examined as a paradigm of trends and standards in the field, including the rationale behind the world-wide increase in prioritisation of training and the structure, method and content of actual training. Chapter 6 discusses the diplomatic training challenge presented by prevailing circumstances in the Developing World, including the specific exigencies that present in the case of new states and states in transition. Chapter 7 assimilates the difficulties facing diplomatic trainees in the Developing World with the afore-going conclusions as regards the universal challenges confronting contemporary diplomats, the imperatives and impediments of the diplomacy of development and the standards set by international practice in the field. In combination, these considerations offer an insight as to the extent of the challenge to Developing World diplomats face as humanity enters the 21st century. The chapter then offers proposals regarding prioritisation and the required method, structure and content of diplomatic training in the Developing World. A proposed curriculum for basic diplomatic training is offered as an addendum. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a concluding evaluation to the research.

9. CONCLUDING COMMENT

As has been noted, traditional IR and diplomatic theory does not provide adequate accommodation for reflection on either the Developing World or diplomacy, notwithstanding their representation of a massive amount of international human

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activity. This vacuity provides a compelling intellectual imperative for a study in Developing World diplomatic training. On a practical level, Newsom's (1997: 4) contention is shared, namely that a sound diplomatic education is required to "produce the skills and insights needed to manage the complexities of modern international relations". The reality that diplomatic training is a neglected, undervalued area of Developing World diplomatic practice belies the obvious and huge diplomatic capacity needs of developing states in the contemporary international arena. This anomaly will subsequently be investigated in order to arrive at a realistic assessment and remedial proposals. The chapter that follows initiates the investigation by providing theoretical foundations for reflection on the research theme.

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[1] Institution, in this context, refers to the officially recognised international practice of diplomacy. The term diplomacy thus implies more than just an activity or process: as Wolfe (1997:14) explains, the practice of diplomacy is an institution precisely because its structures are reproduced by action.

[2] The word 'diplomat' is non-gender specific. The use of masculine personal pronouns throughout this study simply avoids the politically-correct but cumbersome double use of his/her, or the more provocative exclusive use of female personal pronouns.

[3] This actuality has been experienced in the field by the author who has personally undergone as well as facilitated diplomatic training in the course of two decades as a career diplomat from a developing country.

[4] This description reflects a rationalist interpretation; an approach that has been selected by the author.

[5] Korany (1986: 1) observes that "students and scholars interested in the Third World face a series of problems at the outset. First they must face the multiplicity of terms used to describe the same group of countries". For the purpose of this study, conceptual demarcation of the term Developing World and other terms that are synonymously used throughout the study, including the South, Third World, new states and world periphery, is provided in Chapter 2. To avoid stylistic monotony, and importantly also because different commentators that are quoted use different appellations, all these various designations for the Developing World (and, conversely, the terms North, First World, industrialised countries, developed countries) will be used in the course of the study.

[6] As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, the concept diplomat in the context of this study refers to career diplomats and is not inclusive of all foreign ministry staff, notwithstanding the fact that the support services of clerical, technical or administrative staff are essential to the functioning of a foreign ministry as institution.

[7] Some elements of pedagogic methodology will nevertheless be discussed briefly in the context of international standards and trends – and proposals as regards the Developing World's own – methods of diplomatic training.

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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

1. INTRODUCTION

The academic study of diplomacy – hence also of the two related themes that Developing World diplomacy and diplomatic training – is integral to the discipline of International Relations. A contextual location of these themes within IR theory and, by extension, [illegible] provides points of departure for the research problem. It sheds light on the intellectual environment in which diplomacy as an international activity exists and in which the particular diplomatic approach of the Developing World manifests. Importantly, a philosophical framework is provided within which training for diplomats is reflected upon, by examining the evolving theoretical paradigms that affect the professional environment in which they operate.

The chapter commences with a conceptual clarification of the two terms that will be examined and defined [illegible] context of training, namely 'Developing World' and 'diplomacy'. This is followed by an analysis of the theoretical context within which these concepts are accommodated within the literature. The discussion departs from a broad perspective of [illegible] IR perspectives of foreign affairs. The overview of foreign policy and diplomacy – the foreign policy instrument [illegible] the Developing World to advance its interests in the international arena. Finally, the chapter narrows its focus to the theoretical locus of diplomatic training *per se*: the practice of diplomacy, and more specifically the myriad modern functions and roles that diplomats are expected to fulfil and that ultimately provide the *raison d'être* of any specific diplomatic training.

As will be evident, [illegible] the theme [illegible] Developing World or diplomacy within IR theory. Notwithstanding their representation of a massive amount of international human activity, both these concepts have been neglected in mainstream IR literature. This vacuity complicates the research of the theme but also provides the most compelling imperative for a

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study in Developing World diplomacy, in order to contribute to its conceptual coherence.

My career in diplomacy has been much more than the education, privilege and adventure that I had envisaged when I had first decided, as a young woman, to join the profession. I have had the good fortune to be married to one that is also in diplomacy with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to research a subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely the research theme of Developing World diplomacy. Throughout our careers we have been confronted with the issues stemming from our involvement in Developing World diplomacy. These issues have ultimately had a definitive effect on the course of our careers. This is not unique to us as diplomats, who believe, as representatives of their countries, that we have a responsibility to contribute to the challenges of professional diplomacy in the 21st century. The aim of this study is therefore to gain insight into the specific nature of Developing World diplomacy, and the interests of the international diplomacy, respectively from an international and Developing World perspective.

1.1 DEVELOPING WORLD

I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and other commentators on the diplomatic profession who had responded over the past few years to my queries about Developing World diplomacy. Their frank insights (solicited collectively and individually) and their practical, diplomatic and academic perspectives on the issues discussed in this study have contributed immeasurably to my understanding of the complexities and challenges of Developing World diplomacy. The diplomats between the two groups – indeed, the vast majority of foreign diplomats I have encountered over the past few years – have overwhelmingly expressed a strong sense of political solidarity with the less-developed countries, as will be discussed later, to the point of identifying themselves as Developing World diplomats. The literature assisted me in obtaining a sufficient definition of the Developing World for the purposes of this study, but the area of study is characterised by various descriptive labels used when referring to (basically) the same group of states. Clarification of the descriptive terminology will thus be provided, followed by identification of the broad commonalities of developing states.

2.1 Clarifying the descriptive terminology

As indicated in the introduction, there is no consensus in the literature to refer to the group of countries that is juxtaposed with the developed, industrialised, northern-hemispheric 'First World'. The many "elastic labels", as Korany (1986: 2) refers to them, include *inter alia* 'world periphery', 'underdeveloped' countries, 'unmodernised states'; 'pre-modern' and 'modern' (as

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My career in diplomacy has been much more than the legal and adversarial practice I had envisaged when I first decided to study law. It has, however, been a passionate one with the issues with which I have dealt, who are overwhelmingly distributive in nature, have necessitated the use of the full panoply of my legal training. Our legal system from an early stage in my career specifically trains diplomats to think like lawyers and to argue our country's case in international fora, even when the issues are political rather than legal. Thus, I am grateful to my colleagues at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation for their support and encouragement in this endeavour. I am also grateful to my colleagues at the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, for their support and encouragement in this endeavour.

opposed to post-modern) state-centric classification designations: 'Developing World', 'Third World' and 'South'. The latter three terms are not synonyms but their popular interchangeability has led to much confusion and misunderstanding. It should be noted, however, that while certain scholars use a variety of terms to greatly distinguish between, or even exclusively use, a particular term, many scholars use the terms interchangeably. This is also true of the terms 'Developing World' and 'Third World' which are both widely accepted terms for the countries on the periphery of the major economic powers. The term 'South' is the most simplistic and also the least disputed; based as will be discussed on a broad geographical commonality. On the other hand, the most widely accepted terms, 'Third World' and 'Developing World', have various historical connotations which, as will be discussed below, can be misleading. The term 'Third World' was originally coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952 to describe countries that were neither aligned with the capitalist West (the First World) nor the communist East (the Second World).[1] After the Cold War, the term 'Third World' has increasingly become obsolete – even though the notion of a 'Second World' disappeared with the fall of communism, with very few exceptions, countries that were part of the Third World prior to the end of the Cold War remain so today (Eban 1998: 46). Finally, developed countries appear grouped in the UN vocabulary as *Member States of the United Nations, Permanent Members of the Security Council, Western States* or *Western European and Others* (E/1980/97/Rev.1 of 16 May 1980). For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to use the term 'Developing World' to refer to (basically the same group of) states that are peripheral to the major economic powers. The first official use of the term 'developing countries' appeared in the 1951 UN document *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries* (E/1986 of 10 May 1951). For obvious reasons of relevance to my work I have chosen to keep sight of the identificatory purpose of the study, despite my very subjective dislike of the term 'developing' or 'less developed' countries (Korany 1986: 2). However, even the use of the more vague term 'developing' remains problematic as there are clearly various levels of development and different measures used to determine that status. As Eban (1998: 46) notes, these states "vary from the opulence of Kuwait

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With deep gratitude I acknowledge the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Prof Anton du Plessis. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity, whose unstinting dedication to my development as a researcher and writer has been an inspiration to me. I also thank all those who have participated in the interviews that I conducted for the purposes of this study, for sharing their valuable insights with me.

and Saudi Arabia through the Gulf States to Russia and Brazil to the desperate poverty of Haiti and Bangladesh". The huge disparities not only among but also within developing countries are of course a defining characteristic of the range of states that are referred to as the Developing World (Kearney 1986: 3; Mills 1998a: 1).

2.1.2 Specific realities of developing states

Although the collective descriptors used to refer to the Developing World are legion and all attempts to find a universally applicable definition of the term are fraught with difficulty, there are certain features that can be identified that are shared to a greater or lesser extent by all states in the category (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 4; Cammack *et al* 1988: 45; Eban 1998: 46):

a) **Geographical location**: Journalists and other developing states are located in the southern hemisphere and suffer from the disadvantages of social disregard and the tendency of developed countries to ignore their existence (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 4). Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali (1994-99) pledges that the following geographical dimension of the 21st century: Developing World countries are separated from the Developed World countries by the Pacific Ocean, separating the Russian Federation from China (PRC), Developing World Australia and Indonesia, and the Atlantic Ocean separating the United States (US) from countries in South America, Central America and the Caribbean islands. The 'Third' or 'Developing' World thus physically comprises nations that are external to Europe and its cultural enclaves in North America and Australasia (Puchala 1998: 135).

b) **Peripheral position in the global economy**: Rothstein (1995: 39-44) sees the developed countries as the core, explaining the economic disparities between the Developed and Developing Worlds. He explains that the first (core) constitutes the advanced industrialised countries while the second (periphery) constitutes the less developed countries; broadly distinguishable as the Western/First and non-Western/Third World. The diverse states of the Third World include the poorest

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countries of the world, newly industrialising countries, middle-income countries, nations made wealthy because of natural resources and communist and ex-communist states. Most commentators agree that the peripheral status of developing nations is a function of their dependency on the First World, which means that their development is conditional on access to the latter's markets, investment and technology. In the poorest of these states – particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa – the economies are "gravely distorted" and their growth is inversely proportionate to burgeoning population growth (Ayoob 1998: 33).

a) **Low performance on Human Development Index**: Until the immediate post-World War Two era, when large-scale economic poverty forced the introduction of the concept of development into the IR field, economic development was measured in terms of a single indicator, i.e. *per capita* GNP. However, in recent years its measurement has been refined to include additional indicators such as actual purchasing power of the currency, savings rates, the level of investment in production and the distribution of income. In recent years also, several non-economic factors have been included: social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality rate, number of persons per medical doctor, proportion of school-attending children, and percentage of adult literacy (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 8; Kaufman, 1998; Korany 1986: 6). In 1991, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the first time included the Human Development Index (HDI) which combines a number of social and economic indicators, in order to rank countries in its annual Human Development Report. The invention of the HDI was an attempt to measure[2] the real impact of economic development through a small number of carefully selected indicators: the determination of economic developmental status had thus become much more complex, taking into account not only crude increases in production, but also the nature of such production and the level of any social facilities (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 217-218).

b) **Political immaturity/instability**: In addition to their extent of socio-economic well-being, the developmental status of states is determined also by their levels of political maturity and stability. Ayoob (1998: 33) notes that in the political arena, the majority of developing states have in common that their state boundaries, state institutions and governing regimes "are under challenge to significant degrees". In

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My career in diplomacy has been an honour and a privilege and adventure that has been and continues to be. It has, above all, been a passion that I share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to research a subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely diplomatic training. Our concern about the issue stems from our conviction that career-specific training for diplomats holds the key to more professional and ultimately more effective national representatives. These 'foot soldiers', we believe, are indispensable to developing countries such as our own because they have legal and circumstantial occasion to fight for our vital interests in the international arena.

I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and other commentators on the diplomatic profession whom I have approached over the past few years for informal discussion on the relevance of diplomatic training. Their frank insights (solicited with the understanding that they would not be quoted) did much to educate me about the enormous challenges facing diplomacy at the cusp of the 21st century. They also, with very few exceptions, confirmed my conjecture that prioritisation of investment in diplomatic training is of critical importance to developing world ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice assisted me in obtaining sufficient empirical substance for the research – much needed help in an area of study that is so expansive and often obscured from public scrutiny by formidable government bureaucracies.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Prof Anton du Plessis. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity, and his calm but resolute approach to my work forced me to keep sight of the scientific purpose of this study, despite my very subjective disposition *vis-à-vis* the theme.

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this regard, Robert Cooper's [illegible] Organisation explain why the weaker developing states are sometimes referred to as 'pre-modern' states. Cooper [illegible]

[illegible] South Africa (Cassen 1996: 8; [illegible] 2000: 7; Mills 1998: 1) [illegible] international arena.

e) **Psycho-political sense of deprivation**: Developing countries in general share a [illegible]

[illegible] (Cammack *et al* 1988: 42, 45; Kumar 1996: 6)) [illegible] conjecture that prioritisation of – hence investment in – diplomatic training is of critical importance to Developing World ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice assisted me in obtaining sufficient [illegible]

[illegible] greater or lesser extent, the following commonalities: geographical location mostly in the southern hemisphere, economic dependency on the industrialised countries, [illegible]

[illegible] defined as those states, mostly located in the southern hemisphere, that share a sense of historical and present vulnerability *vis-à-vis* the industrialised nations, based on socio-economic and political indicators, and for that reason position themselves as a distinct diplomatic assemblage in the global arena.

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2.2 DIPLOMACY

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My deepest appreciation goes to my supervisor, Professor Kai Kaiser, for his guidance, patience and encouragement throughout the duration of this study. I would also like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at the Department of Political Sciences for their support and interest in my research.

Diplomacy is a distinctive institution of international relations, yet it is surprisingly elusive, even though the literature about it has been a constant feature of the discipline. Watt (1997: 253) says that it is "inherently vague", while Der Derian (1987: 4) refers to the problem as "diplomacy's resistance to full professional explication". Often, diplomacy is simplistically equated with the art of international negotiations, or even more vaguely with the running of diplomatic relations. For example, Professor Kaiser (1999: 475–476) defines it as "the representative function of sovereign states, and their established mode of developing relations, such as the Oxford dictionary does when it describes diplomacy as the management of international affairs" (Pearsall 1999: 405).

The institution of diplomacy follows diplomats, both South African and foreign (often controversial) academics, journalists and other commentators omit the diplomatic profession altogether in their analyses of diplomacy. These widely divergent definitions bear testimony to the relevance of Sir Ernest Satow's (1998: 2) observation that diplomacy is "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states". Thus, in order to arrive at a working definition of diplomacy for the purposes of this study, the following concepts, notions and ideas will be examined: the nature of diplomacy, its various manifestations as an institution of international society, its role as a political instrument of foreign policy and its conceptualisation as an executive function.

2.2.1 Diplomacy as a normative concept

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Professor Kai Kaiser, for his academic counsel and encouragement throughout the duration of this study. I would also like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at the Department of Political Sciences for their support and interest in my research.

Sofer (1988: 207) contends that "diplomatic reform is one of the most established traditions in international society", and his comment bears testimony to the relevance of the subject matter proposed for this study. Yet, the relevance of its normative dimension vis-à-vis the international relations is pervasive in diplomatic theory. In this regard, three assumptions are debated: firstly diplomacy's role as a defining institution within international society; secondly its inherent values that transcend political differences and thirdly its nature as a strictly pacific activity (Bull 1977: 172; Cohen

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1999: 9; Constantinou 1996: 23).

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a) **Structure-giving role within international society**: Berridge *et al.* (2001: 1) call diplomacy a "bulwark against international chaos". As observed above, while perhaps not making such a sweeping claim, we agree that formal diplomacy is one of the institutions that help the world maintain order and stability, both in a symbolic and practical sense (Armstrong 1999: 46; Sofer 1988: 207; Wolfe 1997: 3). [illegible] conviction that career-specific training for diplomats holds the key to more professional and [illegible]

Symbolically speaking, Bull (1977: 166) credits diplomacy with fulfilling "the function of symbolising the existence of the society of states". This structure-giving role within the international system can also be considered from a practical point of view. Keens-Soper (1996: 12–13) refers to diplomatic theory as "the constitutional theory of the states-system" and claims that "foreign policy could not proceed or be intelligible" without its rules of procedure[5] [illegible] Barston (1997: 2) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Sharp's (1999: 50) and Wolfe's (1997: 2) contention [illegible] the constitutive understanding [that states and their relations within] international society. However, Sharp (1999: 44) adds the caveat that at the beginning of the 21st century, the formal diplomatic system can no longer be regarded as the primary institution of international society, because "international relations flow above, below, around, through and in spite of diplomacy". This consideration is particularly germane in the light of the exponential evolution in diplomacy during the past century, which [illegible] scrutiny [illegible] government bureaucracies.

b) **Value-seeking *versus* interest-maximising**: Sharp (1999: 52) points out that the dominant metaphors of contemporary diplomatic discourse [illegible] ideas of [illegible] management of problems and [illegible] construction of order". The debate [illegible] (moral) versus 'effective' (utilitarian) diplomacy. The two concepts denote, *vis-à-vis* the one end of the scale, 'value-seeking' diplomacy with an emphasis on universal human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law, and humanitarian assistance when and where needed. At the other side of the equation is 'interest-maximising' diplomacy, which presupposes that diplomats set out to achieve a set,

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My career in diplomacy has been an enriching and rewarding experience, privilege and adventure that I have been able to be. It has, above all, been a passion – one that I share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to seek out the subject of normative diplomacy as an area of study that is significant for both practitioners and academics alike. Many thanks to my colleagues at the Department of International Relations, University of Pretoria, for their support and encouragement during the writing of this thesis. Special thanks to Prof Anton du Plessis for his academic guidance, insightful comments and his dedication to the study of diplomacy, which fosters a positive, objective, pragmatic approach to issues such as state prestige which are often emotive in the hands of politicians and citizens. In addition, he notes that diplomats are inclined to exert some manipulation even of their own principals, in the sense that they do not just represent their states to the world, but "represent that world back to their

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My current role of diplomatic training and responsibility has been a tool that has enabled me to observe, however, that successful diplomacy of the future will depend largely on developing countries preparing a "subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely diplomacy in the 21st century". Over and above the issue of global values specifically that diplomatic theory is effective national representatives. These 'foot soldiers', we believe, are indispensable to developing countries such as our own because they have a diplomacy as a practical activity. According to Olson (1994: 168) diplomacy "in theory, at least, [seeks] to mitigate and reduce conflicts by means of persuasion, compromise and adjustment". By the same token, Satow considers it a moderating influence on the relations between states, as he stated "the use of force, the principle of international law" (as noted by Qatar 1996: 14). This informal definition, with various academic, journalistic and other publications, with respect to the diplomacy profession in international affairs" (as noted by Qatar 1996: 14). This informal definition, with the relevance of diplomacy is aimed at the insights (solicited and unsolicited) of diplomacy (Sofer 1988: 196) did not be quoted) did much to educate me about the enormous challenges facing diplomats at the cusp of the 21st century. They also, nevertheless, encouraged me to pursue the idea that diplomacy is a dynamic activity, one of critical importance to the maintenance of international peace and security. Berridge (1995: 5) asserts that diplomacy is "the conduct of foreign affairs by negotiation". Barston (1997: 1) points out that the origins of diplomacy are deeply embedded in the history of the expansion of states and has succeeded to be publicly scrutinised by formidable governments and rulers. Langhorne (1995: 239) observes has made diplomacy the "godchild, servant and begetter" of war, in addition to being its alternative and antidote. Thus diplomacy, according to Cohen (1998: 2), is often regarded as the peaceful stage of the international relations of a state, while war is the failure of diplomacy. The interplay between diplomatic activity and violence in my work has become the basis of my research interest in the study, despite seeking overt objectivity in order to keep a distance (1997: 2) from the use of force by governments in their dealings with one another.

Cohen (1999: 4) observes that the mutually exclusive juxtaposition of diplomacy and war is "a peculiarly Western notion not necessarily found in other traditions".

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Post-modernists such as Der Derian (1987: 2-3) have also criticised the normative evaluation of diplomacy by writers who "reinforce if not reify in their writings a *status quo* diplomatic system". This point is of particular importance when examining certain diplomatic phenomena in the Developing World, such as revolutionary diplomacy or the diplomacy of authoritarian regimes, as will be discussed.

2.2.2 Diplomacy as representation

Sharp (1999: 55 and 50) contends that representation is [illegible] international relations and diplomacy in particular", and that "even the [illegible] legal diplomacy is mainly about representation in ways that neither diplomats nor those who study them have yet realised". In an earlier discussion (1998: 61) he warns, however, that diplomatic representation is a "slippery concept" which needs careful analysis.

The common abstract approach to representation has been derived from Modelski (1975: 5–7) in the four categories of symbolic representation, which [illegible] something greater [illegible] identity [illegible] something else; [illegible] representation, which implies [illegible] with primary [illegible] formal representation, [illegible] presupposes [illegible] representative relationship can exist only in [illegible] and substantive representation, which [illegible] in actual [illegible] representative's activities. Of these four categories of representation, the [illegible] are expensive and often obscured from public scrutiny by formidable government bureaucracies.

a) **Symbolic diplomatic representation**: Historically, and until the beginning of the 20th century, it was widely accepted that diplomats represented the person of their sovereign,[6] as opposed to the government or state. [illegible] international law, however, the states [illegible] sovereign [illegible] *vis-à-vis* are therefore deemed the representatives of states rather than of governing elìtes or individual heads of state; hence the Vienna Conventions' use of the terms 'sending state' and 'receiving state' (Kurbalija 1999: 180; Magalhaes 1988: 103; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 566). Hence Bull (1977: 159) makes the

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My career in diplomacy has been much more than the education, privilege and adventure that it has been and continues to be. It has, above all, been a passion – one that I share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to research a subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely diplomatic training. Our concern about the issue stems from our conviction that career-specific training for diplomats holds the key to more professional and ultimately more effective national representation abroad. [illegible] are indispensable to developing countries [illegible] research suggests [illegible] diplomacy is [illegible] national interests in the international arena.

I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and other commentators on the diplomatic profession who shared [illegible] over the past few years during informal discussions on the relevance of diplomatic training. Their frank insights (solicited and otherwise [illegible] undertaking that they would not be quoted) did much to [illegible] enormous challenges facing diplomats at the turn of the 21st century. They also, with very few exceptions, confirmed my conjecture that [illegible] investment in diplomatic training is of critical importance to Developing World ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice [illegible] in obtaining sufficient empirical substance for [illegible] an area of study that is germane to diplomatic theory [illegible] formalistic and [illegible] bureaucracies.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to, and admire the guidance of my supervisor, Prof. Andre du Pisani. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity and his calm but resolute approach to my work forced me to keep sight of the scientific purpose of the study, despite my very subjective disposition [illegible] are there.

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inference that diplomats represent, i.e. the "active elements of the country's political life". This interpretation is valid especially in democracies where diplomacy has been in existence for a long time, and where diplomats are drawn from the elite of society.

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My career in diplomacy has been an adventure that has contributed to my personal and professional share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to research a subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely diplomacy.

Notwithstanding the considerable debate about the state-centrism of most IR approaches and the diplomacy's representational role (whether with pejorative or ultimately more reflective connotations), diplomacy remains a key institution in international relations (Keens-Soper 1996: 6; Sofer 1988: 207; Wight 1977: 21; Watson 1982: 28; Cohen 1996: 25) and Wolfe (1997: 15) maintains that diplomacy is a vital interactive and intersubjective practice taking place between constructed subjects "whose very construction relies on the intercourse and mutual recognition of diplomacy", as contended by these scholars. Diplomacy thus becomes a symbolic and ritualistic process in which states use agents (diplomats) who communicate with each other. This process is dominated by professionals who have spent many years honing their skills (Berridge 1995: 1) and the relevance of diplomacy is thus underscored by the fact that it is the only institution that is present in virtually all states (Berridge 1995: 1). Because of the enormous challenges facing diplomats at the cusp of the 21st century, they also, with very few exceptions, confirm the importance of diplomacy by investing in diplomatic infrastructure in the form of embassies and missions (Watson 1982: 28; Cohen 1996: 25) and Wolfe (1997: 15) maintains that diplomacy is a vital interactive and intersubjective practice taking place between constructed subjects "whose very construction relies on the intercourse and mutual recognition of diplomacy", as contended by these scholars. Diplomacy thus becomes a symbolic and ritualistic process in which states use agents (diplomats) who communicate with each other. This process is dominated by professionals who have spent many years honing their skills (Berridge 1995: 1) and the relevance of diplomacy is thus underscored by the fact that it is the only institution that is present in virtually all states (Berridge 1995: 1). With very few exceptions, the form of diplomacy has been maintained over the years for the purpose of conducting international relations (Armstrong 1998: 55–56; Sofer 1988: 201; Kennan 1996: 13) because the very act of diplomacy has been considered of importance to new states with fragile identities.

5) **Formalistic diplomatic representation**: Shaw (1999: 37) coined the term formalistic diplomatic representation to describe the (traditional) practice of diplomacy as a professional activity that is characterised by a particular type of behaviour, a particular ethos and a particular culture. Shaw (1999: 37) explains the purpose of this study (i.e. diplomacy) as to obtain information contained in official archives. Indeed, formalistic diplomatic representation presupposes that the representative relationship can exist only in as much as certain formal (official) requirements are met and in evidence, i.e. that authority had been granted and responsibility accepted. Furthermore, reciprocal endorsement –

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i.e. formal 'accreditation' by the receiving entity – is required in order for formalistic diplomatic representation to enter into effect (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 1; Keens-Soper in 1996: 6).

Various definitions of diplomacy place formalistic diplomatic representation in a legal context. Dembinski (1988: 4), for example, contends that diplomacy is "the institutional body of specialised organs governed by specific rules and of activities entrusted to them with the aim of establishing, maintaining and developing pacific relations of a state with other subjects of international law". The legal character of formalistic representation confers on diplomats special legal standing that offers, on the one hand, protection of their activities and, on the other hand, the authority to enter into inter-state contracts such as treaties. An important legal requirement of formalistic representation is physical evidence of status: diplomats have historically been required to carry a range of symbolic tokens, both their credentials (letter of appointment/credence) to legitimise their mission and to facilitate international travel – a practice that has evolved into the modern use of diplomatic passports (Berridge *et al.* 2001: 1; Bull 1977: 157; Keens-Soper 1996: 6; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 567).

c) **Substantive diplomatic representation**: Substantive diplomatic representation concerns the actual work that diplomats perform, i.e. activities on behalf of and in the interest of the represented entity – usually a state (Barston 1997: 2; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 567; Mueller 1975: 5–7). This category of diplomatic representation, which is of particular concern in the practice of diplomacy, will be discussed subsequently in terms of the functions and roles of diplomats.

2.2.3 **Diplomacy as a state-centric activity**

In a well-known traditional interpretation of diplomacy, Satow (1979: 3) describes it as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states". In the rationalist tradition, Satow's definition presupposes international relations to be structured around the principle of independence and sovereignty of states, with diplomacy a natural

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My career in diplomacy has been much more than the education, privilege and adventure that it has been and continues to be. It has, above all, been a passion – one that I share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my decision to research a subject of immediate professional experience and interest, namely diplomatic training. Our concern about the issue stems from our conviction that career-specific training for diplomats is the key to more professional and ultimately more effective representation. The 'foot soldiers', we believe, are indispensable to developing countries such as ours, because they have the [illegible] occasion to fight for our vital interests in the international arena.

I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and others whom I approached over the past few years for information and discussions on the relevance of diplomatic training. Their frank insights (shared with the undertaking that they would not be quoted) did much to educate me about the enormous challenges facing diplomats at the cusp of the 21st century. They also, [illegible] confirmed my conviction that investment in diplomatic training is of critical importance to Developing World ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice assisted me to obtain sufficient empirical substance for the research – much needed help in an area of study that is so expansive and often obscured from public scrutiny by the diplomatic governing bureaucracies.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Prof Anton du Plessis. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity, and his calm but resolute approach to my work forced me to keep sight of the scientific purpose of the study, despite my very subjective disposition *vis-à-vis* the theme.

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My thanks to my supervisor, Prof Anton du Plessis. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity, and his contribution to the development of diplomacy as a scientific discipline is immeasurable.

2.4 Diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy

Although diplomacy is a tool of foreign policy, it is distinct from foreign policy. The Institute defines diplomacy as "the means by which countries seek to achieve the ends of their foreign policy by agreement rather than war" (ISD 1997). This definition emphasises diplomacy's rightful but limited place within the larger framework of foreign policy. Before this distinction

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was made, the relationship between diplomacy and foreign policy was – and, indeed, in many cases remains – "complex and often uneasy" (Otte 1998: 16). In diplomacy, the tendency is to use persuasion, negotiation, and compromise as the preferred instruments of foreign policy (Berridge *et al* 2011: 3; Magalhães 1988: 59; Sofaer 1988: 196). The instruments of foreign policy are various and include, for example, the use of force (war), the threat of force (coercive diplomacy), economic sanctions, propaganda, and diplomacy. Diplomacy is described by Berridge *et al* (2011: 1) as "the method by which relations between states and other entities are conducted and managed". On the other hand, personal diplomacy (also known as direct diplomacy) involves direct communication between political leaders who bypass the institutionalised diplomatic channels of their countries. They also, with very few exceptions, have little or no formal training in diplomacy (Bull 1977: 166; Eban 1998: 98; Lee 1977: 5; Otunnu 1992: 24–25). Barston (1997: 106–107) contends that to obtain sufficient advantage from personal diplomacy – such as political leaders are constitutionally empowered to make on behalf of their countries (for example, the granting of concessions) which diplomats are not empowered to do. The practice is also, as will be discussed, ubiquitous in the Developing World

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Prof. Anton du Plessis, Head of the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria. Prof. du Plessis' intellectual input, support and encouragement throughout the study, and especially during the writing-up phase, were indispensable. I am also grateful to Thomas Fitschen for his insightful comments on the draft manuscript, which helped me to clarify my thoughts on the topic. Any remaining shortcomings are entirely my own responsibility.

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or directly attempting to pro[illegible] solution based on a conception of outcomes likely to receive joint or widespread acceptance by the [illegible] experience and interest, namely diplomatic training. Our concern about the issue stems from our conviction that [illegible] 'disinformation' – for the purpose of mass public manipulation of another international actor (Magalhaes 1988: 123). Espionage, as defined by Hamilton and [illegible] becomes involved in the political processes of another with the aim of inducing certain results, favourable to its own interests. This could, for example, [illegible] 1988: 217–218; Riordan 2003: 39).

The coercive instruments of foreign policy include deterrence, which involves the weighing of one state on another by virtue of military power in order to influence its

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notwithstanding fierce debate about the normative nature of the institution, a conceptual demarcation does crystallise into some essential elements that do not vary significantly from one author to another. Bozeman (1985: 177) argues that diplomacy has been and continues to be an international activity, a social institution of international society, a profession and an art. Satow (1922: 1) defines diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states. Nicolson (1963: 30) describes diplomacy as the management of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys, the business or art of the diplomatist. Berridge (1995: 1) defines diplomacy as the conduct of relations between states and other entities with international personality by peaceful means. The essential character of diplomacy, as these definitions suggest, is that it is a process of communication and negotiation through which states and other international actors seek to accommodate their differences and manage their relations, using a wide range of techniques, from propaganda to espionage, but normally employing measures short of war, backed by the possibility of resorting to force if all else fails. Diplomacy is also a profession, with its own practitioners, ethos, culture and rituals. Diplomats are the agents of states and other international actors who are entrusted with the task of representing their principals and promoting their interests in their relations with others. Diplomacy is also a system of institutions and rules governing the relations between states and other international actors. Finally, diplomacy is an art, a skill or expertise that diplomats possess in varying degrees of sophistication.

The structuralist approach, on the other hand, while not universally influential in

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[1] According to Calvert and Calvert (1996: 3) the term 'Third World' was coined by the French demographer Sauvy in 1952, apparently derived from the French expression 'third estate' which denotes the concept of commoners as opposed to aristocracy or clergy.

[2] Calvert and Calvert (1996: 218) note that the most important difference from older measures was to reject the use of "fluctuating and frequently misleading exchange rate conversions in favour of purchasing power parity".

[3] It should be noted that categorisation of South Africa as a developing nation is both contentious and contested. South Africa's status as a middle power renders its developmental 'credentials' somewhat ambiguous, as witnessed in the 1990s by its trade negotiators during complicated negotiations with the EU to ensure the newly democratised country's accession to the Lomé

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[4] Three exceptions are China, Thailand and Iran; also to a certain extent Ethiopia which only came under colonial rule during the 20th century (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 5; Cammack *et al* 1988: 42).

[5] Keens-Soper (1996: 12) differentiates between a diplomatic system and a political system in that the former proclaims no principle of substantive unity – what distinguishes it is the existence of rules of procedure rather than common purpose.

[6] British ambassadors, for example, continue to be called "Ambassadors of her Britannic Majesty" (Magalhaes 1988: 105).

[7] Ironically, spreading propaganda is literally what diplomats do: the word is derived from the Latin *propagare* which means disseminating, diffusing, or spreading (information). It was historically widely used, also by the Catholic Church, and had an innocuous diplomatic application until the end of the 19th century, when totalitarian regimes gave the word a pejorative meaning (Magalhaes 1988: 123).

[8] Clearly, Der Derian's use of the term mediation differs from its interpretation by, for example, Berridge (1995: 17) who regards it as one of the methods of diplomacy and Magalhaes (1988: 11-12) who sees it as a separate tool of foreign policy.

[9] For the purpose of this study, the term will be used synonymously with 'international politics'. Baylis and Smith (1997: 2–3) note that these two concepts are commonly used interchangeably, and that in both cases the terminology is rendered somewhat exclusive by the use of the adjective 'international', which presupposes the primary importance of the nation state. They prefer to use, therefore, the more inclusive concept 'world politics'.

[10] Denoting the activity and subject of study, the lowercase is used to distinguish it from the related academic discipline – International Relations – in that the former is written in lower case and the latter in upper case.

[11] Liberalism is also sometimes equated with idealism, but erroneously so: the latter comprises one of liberalism's sub-schools and believes in the perfectability of human organisation, whereas most liberalists believe only in the improvement thereof.

[12] Hence, traditionalism and modernity were initially seen as mutually exclusive. However, later developments within modernisation theory acknowledged that the two can co-exist: modernisation revisionism is, according to Calvert and Calvert (1996: 81) more sophisticated in its approach but also more pessimistic. It sees modernisation itself as a force for the first breakdown – in order as previously disadvantaged groups are mobilised. Thus temporary disorder must be contained and order restored via institutionalisation.

[13] An important distinction between the two 'neo' approaches is neoliberalism's belief that leaders are concerned with absolute levels of gain, i.e. in cooperation with one another, regardless of what competitors achieve; whereas neorealists maintain that leaders are more interested in their comparative or relative gains by means of competition. Many assumptions are shared by the two approaches, however, such as that states are the most important actors in world politics, and that they are 'utility maximisers', i.e. less concerned with morality than with national interest.

[14] Concept taken by Burton from Hurtig from "The Basis of Civilisation and the Making of World Order" (1996).

[15] It is important to note that dependency theory can be Marxist or neo-Marxist, but also non-Marxist (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 85).

[16] The particular notion of the development of underdevelopment is associated with the work of Frank, who argues that underdevelopment is a process of structural distortion. He claims that the economies of so-called underdeveloped nations are in fact partially developed, but only to the advantage of the industrialised countries (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 83).

[17] The inter-paradigm debate constitutes the third great debate in IR, and evolved during the 1960s and 1970s. The first great IR debate constituted the precepts of realism versus those of liberalism with the second debate focusing more specifically on the differences between traditionalists and behaviouralists.

[18] Riordan (2003: 31) attributes this remark – about Britain – to Lord Palmerton.

[19] Based on the distinction made by John G. Gunnell (1981. Encounters of the third kind: the alienation of theory in American political science. American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 25.)

[20] Constantinou (1996: xii, 53) explains that he uses the ancient Greek term *theoria* because of its complex and holistic denotation of theory as practice. He maintains that the modern term 'theory' has been grammatologically "effaced" because of its either/or distinction from practice, whereas

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[34] During the Cold War, the threat was of a political rather than of a physical nature: espionage was rife and diplomats had to guard against personal manipulation by foreign agents. Over the past decade, however, physical threat to diplomats has assumed a much higher profile as global terrorism takes on new and deadly dimensions. The US in particular has had to fortress its embassies against attack after a spate of bombings, for example the deadly attacks in 1998 on embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

[35] From a practical as well as political perspective, head of state visits are the high point of a diplomat's posting abroad. In recognition hereof, British Ambassadors are knighted after a successful visit of the Queen to their country of accreditation.

[36] 'Beneath one's dignity'

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CHAPTER 3
THE CHALLENGE OF PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a broad overview of the evolution of diplomacy: from its ancient origins through the dramatic impact on the institution of 20th century developments in world affairs, and to its current juncture at which its very survival has become a subject of debate. Diplomacy's changing status and the professionalisation of the institution – its incremental bureaucratisation and legalisation as well as the development of career-specific training – are placed in historical perspective. The evolutionary perspective is essential because it contextualises generational change in the intellectual paradigms that guide diplomatic practice and it elucidates the changing international realities that demand and challenge the contribution of professional diplomats.

The historical overview is supplemented by a discussion of contemporary global developments that have necessitated adaptation in the profession: the changing world order, the growth of personal diplomacy, the technological revolution and expansion of the agenda of diplomacy, the democratisation of diplomacy and the growth of multilateralism. Finally, discussion turns to the most recent and ongoing debate about the profession's relevance; a debate which tends to confuse normative reflection on the institution of diplomacy with efficacy in the attendant profession and its machinery, notably the resident embassy. Notwithstanding the confusion, the criticism of all three levels bears reference to the profession in some or other way because it invariably touches on its *raison d'être*. The issue of the resident ambassador, for example, is important because it is comprehensively legitimised and rationalised by international law (Hocking 1999a: 23; Vella 1998: 11). However, the profession of diplomacy, rather than any other aspect of it, appears to experience the most contemporary rivalry and criticisms will be evaluated in the light of counter-arguments that emphasise the indispensable and perennial value of the profession.

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2. THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF DIPLOMACY

The status of diplomacy as an institution determines the prestige and credibility of professional diplomats and the extent to which they – as opposed to other actors – are employed as agents in the use of diplomacy as a primary instrument of foreign policy. Diplomacy's international standing has, however, during its long history been marked by ebbs and flows and its professionalisation has therefore progressed in intermittent phases. Important stages in its development have been its gradual bureaucratisation which manifested in the institutionalisation of resident ambassadors, establishment of a diplomatic corps and the emergence of foreign ministries; the institutionalisation of a legal framework for the profession, resulting in the codification of diplomatic law; and the development of merit-based recruitment and career-specific training for the profession (Bull 1977: 160; Eban 1998: 29).

2.1 THE EVOLVING STATUS OF THE INSTITUTION

Diplomacy has been present on the international scene throughout the ages but with capricious oscillation in its prestige and utilisation. It has variously been restricted by exclusive, ethnocentric approaches, been used as an instrument of war rather than of peace, been drawn into obfuscated public and private interests and been sidelined in the process of religious or ideological imperialism. It has also, however, not just survived but in fact grown: its systemisation within an evolving sovereign state-system and the development in the early 20th century of so-called 'new' diplomacy paved the way for a greater public stake in diplomacy and the adoption of more universal norms regarding its practice (Babb 1974: 5; Cohen 1999: 11–14; Eban 1998: 33).

2.1.1 **Pre-Modern fluctuations in the status of diplomacy**

The origins of diplomacy coincide with the dawn[1] of human history, when the organisation of people into distinct socio-political groups engendered the need for communication among and on behalf of such groups. Designated individuals intermediated peacefully between groups in response to reciprocal political needs and, as such, conceptual foundations for the contemporary profession were

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established. The rudimentary 'diplomacy' of these primitive societies was intermittent and generated no permanent institutions, yet the representative mandate of emissaries had as a result that they were chosen with considerable discrimination (Dembinski 1988: 1; Holsti 1988: 159; Langhorne 1998: 148; Meerts 1999: 86).

The practice of diplomacy in antiquity is well recorded and a copious, detailed body of literature bears evidence of the nascent profession's expanding role. Greek diplomacy (5th to 2nd century BCE) distinguished itself by producing the earliest evidence of 'open' diplomacy: policy was debated at length in public fora and the arguments to be used by (popularly chosen) ambassadors were therefore democratically determined. The sophistication of the Greek system indicated a need to communicate among equals – a new and important theoretical conjecture that was not evident in pre-antiquity diplomacy (Cohen 1999: 7, 10; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 8–10; Magalhaes 1988: 16, 19).

In Rome, as in Greece[2], ambassadors were a distinguished and honoured group. As discussed elsewhere, Roman diplomacy made an important legal contribution to the practice of diplomacy but, in the opinion[3] of writers such as Cohen (1999: 11) and Eban (1998: 29), remained parochial because of its administrative and normative weaknesses. As was the case in Greece, there were no central institutions in Rome for the conduct of foreign policy or the maintenance of archives, resulting in a lack of continuity. Another restrictive characteristic was the geographical and cultural exclusivity that Shaw (1991: 14) identifies as a "predominant approach of ancient civilisations": in Rome, ambassadors were received only from countries where the *jus legationis* was recognised, thereby excluding subject peoples and colonies. Similarly, Chinese diplomacy during classical antiquity considered external relations to be hierarchical, with its own supremacy a foregone conclusion. Its introspective, intra-cultural nature thus inhibited[4] its scope. Indian diplomacy of the same era was relatively sophisticated with a well-developed institutional framework; guided by clear professional goals. However, its emphasis on espionage, deception and betrayal (as articulated by Kautilya's *Arthashastra*) suggests that diplomacy was employed as a tool of war rather than of peace (Magalhaes 1988: 25).

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During the Middle Ages, as a result of the collapse of the Roman Empire, the international order lost structural definition. The anarchic feudal system inhibited the development of diplomacy because the obfuscation of public and private interests led to equivocal representation of their sources. As a consequence, the practice of diplomacy initially declined and the nascent theory of international law – which later branched into IR theory – did not advance. The diplomatic vacuum left by the fall of Rome was filled by the Roman Catholic Church, whose communications provided the only organic continuation of diplomatic development. For example, the contentious issue of diplomatic precedence was managed by Pope Pius IV who declared in 1564 that the *Ordo Regum Christianorum*[5], which afforded precedence to Christian kings and rulers, would apply to ambassadors too (Burger 1996: 10; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 22; Magalhaes 1988: 27). The dominance of the Church in matters of diplomacy was only diluted by the scientific revolution in Europe and the continent's gradual evolution into sovereign states.

During the final years of the Middle Ages, the use of diplomatic intermediaries once again became common. The Byzantine Empire in particular relied on, as Cohen (1999: 11) puts it, "supple diplomacy rather than costly warfare", securing its long and vulnerable frontiers and ensuring the longevity of the empire. Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 14) observe that the empire's diplomatic activity became a forerunner of the modern system because of "the expansion of its techniques, its immensely long range and its persistence". However, Cohen (1999: 14) adds that Byzantine diplomacy was marked by religious supremacy and ethnocentric notions and thus excluded from its diplomatic "club" vast regions of the world, including "great civilisations in their own right", such as Persia, China and the Ottoman Empire.

2.1.2 **Diplomacy becomes a state-centric activity**

An important change from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age[6] is the fact that, in the words of Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 35) "diplomacy succeeded war as the principal buttress of security". The onset of the Renaissance led to a surge in the profile of diplomacy and by the middle of the 15th century, the institution assumed much more definition, both theoretically and practically. The city-states of

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Renaissance Italy built on the example of the Byzantine Empire by systemising the practice of diplomacy. However, they also have the unfortunate distinction of giving diplomacy a bad reputation, synonymous with intrigue and conspiracy (Babb 1974: 5; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 20).

A watershed in the modern approach to diplomacy occurred when the 30 Years War was concluded in 1648 with the *Treaty of Westphalia*. The establishment of a sovereign state-centric system in Europe meant that diplomacy became preoccupied with the pursuit of national self-interest. This happened within a system that was based on the balance in power among five greater states: Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and Britain – the so-called 'Concert[7] of Europe' or Great Power system. The absence of hegemony led to diplomacy – admittedly aided by espionage – becoming the "principal motor of international relations" (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 79). A new threat to international peace, and hence to diplomacy, developed soon thereafter: the spread of revolutionary ideology, as introduced by the French Revolution. The great powers in Europe now found themselves defending their joint *status quo* and diplomacy became a cooperative mechanism through which to manage the international system. (The goal, nevertheless, was European stability rather than universal equality, as colonialism at that stage was an accepted, undisputed practice). As existing diplomatic methods were insufficient for this purpose, multilateral diplomacy emerged, in the form of the peacetime conference (Eban 1998: 33; Langhorne 1998: 154).

Initially the nation-state concept was not recognised by other parts of the world, especially because the boundaries of nations and states did not coincide as in the case of Europe. China, for example, did not recognise sovereign equality until the 19th century. It disdained sending ambassadors abroad and received envoys from other parts of the world as representatives of barbarians, relegated to a tributary relationship (Berridge 1995: 4; Kissinger 1994: 25). However, with Europe exerting global political dominance the Westphalian system eventually spread world-wide and by the early 18th century, the new state-centric diplomatic system was firmly institutionalised.

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2.1.3 **From *old* to *new* diplomacy**

During the hundred years that followed on the Vienna Congress of 1815, Italian diplomacy gave way to a system of international discourse that Nicolson (1954: 53) dubbed the 'French' system – to be referred to later as *old* diplomacy. The features of this system were the following: the Concert of Europe dominated the international relations of the continent; most European states instituted specialised government departments to manage foreign policy; there was symmetry in the standards of international diplomatic conduct; and diplomatic negotiations were considered confidential and continuous. However, relations among the great European powers were increasingly strained by global developments, especially in the colonies – the nascent Developing World – where fierce imperialist competition raged. The Concert of Europe and with it *old* diplomacy finally collapsed with the advent of World War One (Babb 1974: 4–5; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 89, 95–96; Magalhaes 1988: 63; Otte 1998: 26; Wolfe 1997: 10).

The debate surrounding the causes of World War One created an intellectual crisis in international diplomacy. US President Woodrow Wilson, in particular, shared many of his compatriots' misgivings about European power-politics and so-called Machiavellian diplomacy and held the latter directly responsible for the War. In the first of his famous Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, he insisted on the conduct of "open covenants of peace, openly derived at", i.e. the introduction of transparency in international negotiations (Berridge 1995: 10; Nicolson 1963: 83; Reychler 1996: 1; Wiseman 1999: 7). Sofer (1988: 197) contends that Wilson's views were a globalisation of the American school of liberal thought that intended new diplomacy as "the doctrine that would govern the norms of international behaviour and the nature of the peace conventions". Importantly, for the Developing World[8], Wilson's doctrine of essentially moral diplomacy espoused the notions of universal liberation from servitude, an end to coercive regimes and an international system based on the principle of self-determination (Eban 1998: 36).

To many critics, Wilson's advocacy of open negotiations seemed idealistic and oversimplified. They supported his criticism of secret pacts, but maintained that the process leading up to agreements needed the privacy of secret negotiations.

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Nicolson (1963: 96–100) for example, was wary of the temptation for politicians to publicise diplomatic victories indiscreetly and prematurely in order to affect public sentiment. Nonetheless, the pressure on diplomacy to become more transparent mounted inexorably with the advent of fully-fledged democracies after the War and the concomitant rise in public involvement in the foreign policy making process. Symptomatic of his 'new[9]' diplomacy was a surge in both direct negotiations and 'diplomacy by conference', i.e. multilateralism (Olson 1994: 164; Otte 1998: 14, 23).

2.1.4 **Ideology versus diplomacy in the 20th century**

During the 20th century – particularly its first half – the status of diplomacy was influenced by major ideological developments, which, according to Sofer (1988: 199, 207), had as common denominator a tendency towards revisionism and opposition to the existing world order. The large-scale implementation of socialist/communist revolution and fascist totalitarianism placed enormous pressure on diplomacy, which was either manipulated as a tool of ideology or scorned as capitulation to an opposing ideology. The public image of diplomacy became entangled with propaganda and diplomacy was deemed effective only if backed by palpable force (Berridge 1995: 1; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 240; Holsti 1988: 185).

The ideological suppression of diplomacy climaxed during the Cold War, because its innate zero-sum competition among diplomats fuelled the predominance of realist approaches. This was reinforced by the impotence of international institutions to lower the international political temperature. The ideological bipolarity of the Cold War forced states to choose allegiance and as a corollary, diplomats had to operate within sharply demarcated ideological barriers and rigid strategic concerns. In the process, diplomacy was reduced to a subsidiary instrument of power politics and ideology. The necessary flexibility associated with diplomatic negotiation suffered and not surprisingly, diplomacy lost much of its elegance and refinement. Skills training for the profession also experienced a setback, as ideological training was considered of paramount importance (Holsti 1988: 183–186; Jönsson and Aggestam 1999: 153; Petrovsky 1998: 22, 30; Vella 1998: 12). In reaction against the polarisation of the world, the Third World fortified its voice in

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international politics by advancing an ideological position of its own – that of development.

The profile of diplomacy improved during the late eighties due to the loosening of Cold War restraints and the many new areas of diplomatic focus that became accessible, including areas that allowed smaller states to play a significant role in international affairs (Petrovsky 1998: 22; Sharp 1999: 45; Vale 1993: 18; Vella 1998: 12). However, it did not mark the end of ideological pressure on the profession. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of communism as an ideological force marked the intellectual vindication of liberal capitalism with its accompanying ideas of Jeffersonian democracy and international law, and as many critics claim, a new form of imperialism in its zeal to spread these purported virtues throughout the world. Huntington (1999) calls it the "Davos[10] culture" – what is generally considered the prevailing ideology of Western civilisation. He contends that the West's enormous economic power has amplified these ideas very forcefully, in spite of the fact that the majority of the world's population, in particular the Developing World, actually do not share this culture. In fact the revisionist focus of the ideology of development, which seemed to decline after the failed quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, is experiencing a revival – albeit with a more pragmatic, multidimensional approach – at the turn of the millennium.

2.2 THE BUREAUCRATISATION OF DIPLOMACY

A defining aspect of diplomacy's professionalisation has been its incremental bureaucratisation *via* the establishment of separate and permanent institutions dedicated to the profession. These manifested initially in the 15th century introduction of the resident ambassador, the resulting development of a professional diplomatic corps and the subsequent establishment of separate state bureaucracies for foreign policy execution (Berridge 1995: 8; Sofer 1988: 195).

2.2.1 **Institutionalisation of the resident ambassador**

Building on a trend that began[11] during the Middle Ages, the increase in diplomatic

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activity among the various Italian political units led to the introduction of the resident ambassador in the 15th century. Diplomatic representations thus, for the first time, assumed a permanent character and reflected a consensus that diplomacy had become indispensable to the international system. In addition, the system proved more economical and practical and added to an increasing awareness that diplomacy was most successful when practised continuously (Berridge 1995: 3; Magalhaes 1988: 48; Wolfe 1997: 10–11).

The system gradually spread to the rest[12] of Europe and by the second half of the 17th century became a stable and universal practice, as the resident ambassador assumed the role of "principal operator" in the diplomatic system (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 55). As the sovereign state system spread across the globe, the prestige of the resident ambassador as being the "sole international extrusion of his ruler's power and policy" was increased (Langhorne 1998: 152). In the process, the conduct of diplomacy gradually became the exclusive domain of governments.

2.2.2 **Establishment of a diplomatic corps**

Mattingly (quoted by Magalhaes 1988: 35) identifies "the first signs of something like an organised diplomatic corps, developing a rudimentary sense of professional solidarity" in 15th century Rome. This development was significant: as Berridge (1995: 8) points out, with its own rules of procedure a diplomatic corps represented an emerging sense among diplomats that, notwithstanding their different agendas, they were united by their professional interests. Meerts (1999: 86) adds that this emerging culture facilitated the interaction of diplomats in a "safe manner". This strengthened their position as a collective *vis-à-vis* host governments, and had the further advantage of proving invaluable to networking in the further course of their careers (Babb 1974: 13; Eban 1998: 34).

2.2.3 **Emergence of foreign ministries**

During the Middle Ages the administrative structures of Italian city-states gradually started to discriminate between domestic and foreign policy and to manage the latter in an orderly manner. The Italian initiative was expanded on, and

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professionalised by, 17th century France under Cardinal Richelieu, who identified a new objective in foreign policy namely the necessity to have continuous and coordinated foreign relations within the developing community of secular, sovereign states (Berridge 1995: 8; Eban 1998: 32; Keens-Soper 1996: 9, 11; Neumann 1999: 153). In the process, foreign policy was designated a separate branch of government, resulting in the institutionalisation of foreign ministries with both political and administrative functions (Dembinski 1988: 4; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 2; 71, 73; Hocking 1999b: 3).

As the system of nation states bureaucratised state-to-state relations, the profession of diplomacy became entrenched in the various civil services. The emergence of the modern state and centralised bureaucratic structures in the 19th century resulted in foreign services[13] with regular career patterns and rules governing bureaucratic procedures regarding recruitment, education, remuneration, promotion, retirement and pensions (Armstrong 1999: 44; Berridge 1995: 8; Wolfe 1997: 10–11).

2.3 INSTITUTIONALISATION OF A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROFESSION

The development of a legal framework for diplomacy constitutes a fundamental contribution to the institution's professional status. From one of the earliest expressions of international law, diplomatic law has progressed through millennia of mainly custom and doctrine to becoming, in the 20th century, the most codified branch of international law. It has played a crucial and remarkably uncontroversial role in maintaining diplomatic order in an increasingly complex international system (Bull 1977: 160; Dembinski 1988: 8).

2.3.1 **Pre-Modern roots of diplomatic law**

Rules regulating the various aspects of diplomatic relations constitute some of the earliest expressions of international law. Evidence exists that as far back as 1400 BCE a code of protocol and customary law (known as *Parsu*) existed that defined and regulated the duties of envoys within the Amarna system (*circa* 1400 – 1220

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BCE). This law served as an indispensable diplomatic equaliser among communities that were highly diverse in developmental status, and thus heralded the philosophical foundation of modern diplomatic law (Cohen 1999: 7; Shaw 1991: 462).

During antiquity, the considerable legal heritage of the Roman Empire had a spill-over effect on diplomacy, which was used by the Romans primarily to manage long-distance legal or commercial business within the empire. Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 13–14) remark that this practice left an important functional legacy, i.e. the notion that “the exchanges of ordinary life should occur in a stable and regulated environment”. For example, the inviolability of ambassadors was considered sufficiently fundamental to be part of *jus gentium* (i.e. the endowment of civilised peoples) and its violation was regarded as unusual, even among groups considered to be barbarians (Keens-Soper 1996: 10; Magalhaes 1988: 26; Shaw 1991: 16).

2.3.2 **Modern codification of diplomatic law**

The first systematic examination of a legal diplomatic principle, namely that of the inviolability of envoys, was done in Gentili's 1584 *De Legationibus* and was augmented by Grotius' introduction of the notion of ambassadorial extraterritoriality, a notion which was aimed at buttressing common and long-term interests of states. This fundamental legal debate, however, was limited in scope and did not – when diplomacy evolved towards permanent, resident missions – provide adequate clarification regarding the parameters within which diplomats worked. In particular, it did not address precedence and rank among diplomatic agents – issues that caused increasing conflicts during the 18th century. The diplomatic fall-out prompted the first formal attempt in modern history to codify diplomatic immunities and privileges. The result was the 1815 *Congress of Vienna*, which according to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 84–85) “added to the permanent armoury of diplomatic method a new weapon" which allowed for the sharing of international authority and continuous management of the international system. The consensus that was reached on these aspects of diplomatic law was facilitated by the homogeneity of the international society of the time, the sanction of reciprocity and

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the appreciation of the importance of diplomatic missions as a means of communication, especially in times of crisis (Bull 1977: 35; Dembinski 1988: 8; Holsti 1988: 162–163). However, as Shaw (1991: 37) remarks, the 19th century development of the law of nations was “founded upon Eurocentrism and imbued with the values of Christian, urbanised and expanding Europe" and reflected the subjugation of the host of new states that emerged during the 20th century. Changes to, and greater clarification of, diplomatic law were thus required to accommodate the needs and interests of these states.

Most aspects of diplomatic practice remained regulated by custom and doctrine until a surge in multilateral diplomatic activity during the inter-war period in the 20th century – mainly aimed at outlawing war by getting governments to commit to institution building – gave new impetus to attempts to codify diplomatic law. An important contribution in this regard originated in the Developing World, namely the 1928 *Havana Convention on Diplomatic Agents*, which was adopted by 14 Latin American republics (Dembinski 1988: 8; Holsti 1988: 160). This was a significant attempt by the new states to limit perceived diplomatic impunity of the rising superpowers.

A more universal commitment manifested in research by the League of Nations on the classification of diplomatic agents and their diplomatic prerogatives and immunities. The League’s successor, the UN, inherited the mandate and its efforts produced the three landmark *Vienna Conventions* (1961, 1963 and 1975). These conventions encoded customary diplomatic law into modern international law and – of particular importance to the Developing World – sought to clarify some of the diplomatic rules (such as immunity) that constituted a *de facto* legal system and which were essentially understood within the older states’ system, but ambiguous to the host of new states. The Conventions thus secured adherence to the rules of diplomacy by states that were previously outside the European tradition, in so far as they did not share the history out of which the rules evolved (Berridge 1995: 22; Bull 1977: 171).

The perceived failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War Two stymied enthusiasm for the idealistic liberal principles on which the UN was founded.

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Nevertheless, the international legal evolution that saw the use of force as a means of conducting foreign relations restricted and finally outlawed, gave diplomacy a theoretical monopoly and the end of World War Two precipitated several decades of remarkable progress in the codification of diplomatic law (Kappeler 1998: 40; Ray 1995: 338). In fact, Dembinski (1988: 8) notes that between 1960 and 1980, diplomatic and consular law became “the most codified branch of international law”. Of note is also the fact that since the 1960s, the legal framework for the profession has not been challenged, despite exponential international changes and conflicts among states. It is significant that diplomatic law is perceived by the new states – even those that profess a revolutionary ideology – to be “a gateway to legitimisation and participation in international society”, as Sofer (1988: 201) remarks. The Third World has indeed not just embraced, but in fact made important contributions to contemporary international law, particularly in the areas of global economics and human rights (Henkin 1995: 294; Shaw 1991: 37).

2.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING FOR THE PROFESSION

Professions require very specific skills training and diplomacy is no exception. Hence the development of more objective recruitment criteria and structured, career-specific training for diplomacy has been a defining feature of its slow but incremental professionalisation since the end of the Middle Ages (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 115).

2.4.1 **'De-elitisation' of recruitment for the profession**

For the greater part of history, diplomacy was an elitist occupation, rather than a profession. Until the Modern Age, diplomats were recruited almost exclusively[14] from the ranks of the aristocratic elite. The advantage was social acceptance[15] into the great courts of Europe, where the aristocratic code of honour facilitated diplomatic protocol, and where a collective sense of global cultural and political supremacy prevailed. Diplomacy was thus the domain of a socially homogeneous group of individuals who had shared interests and the inner workings of their "freemasonry", as Nicolson (1954: 75) calls it, were shrouded in secrecy.

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It was not until the French Revolution and the subsequent proclamation of a French Republic in 1848 that any attempt was made to transform diplomacy into a profession based on merit. However, even as public life incrementally democratised in the 19th century, a large percentage of diplomats remained drawn from aristocratic circles and the transformation of the diplomatic services in Europe trailed behind other societal reforms (Armstrong 1999: 45; Enjaldran and Husson 1999: 59–60; Magalhaes 1988: 40; Reychler 1996: 1). Berridge (1995: 13) notes that aristocrats resisted the increasingly democratic control of foreign policy and were contemptuous of trade as a diplomatic issue. However, as diplomatic missions spread around the globe (and further away from the courtly fraternity in Europe) and as the influence of emergent middle classes grew, diplomacy's aristocratic content was diluted. The rising power of the US, with its constitutional prohibition against titles of nobility, also contributed to the global demise of the aristocrat-diplomat (Babb 1974: 7; Crompton 2000d).

The diplomatic profession thus moved out of like-minded, elitist[16] circles into a more heterogeneous, more middle-class environment. Moreover, the changes after World War One that accompanied the 'new' diplomacy increasingly prompted democratic concessions to demographic profiles, redressing racial, gender, caste and other minority biases within foreign services (Wiseman 1999: 9). In Dembinski's (1988: 5) opinion, "diplomats of this new breed may better represent and express more forcefully the real interests and aspirations of their countries than their elders were ever able to do". Democratisation of the profession is, however, not universal. Even though the 20th century witnessed a noticeable shift of emphasis within diplomatic practice from form to substance, diplomats are not yet universally recruited for professional competence rather than personal background. At the beginning of the 21st century large parts of the world remain under non-democratic rule, including sizeable parts of the Developing World, in which recruitment for the profession is dictated by ideological, religious or other arbitrary affiliation (Crompton 2000a; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 105–106; Otermi 1992: 20–21).

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2.4.2 **Origins of diplomatic training**

The earliest evidence of formal diplomatic training dates back to the Middle Ages, when it was initiated by the Venetians. Initial training focused on profiling the ideal[17] ambassador, hence the domination of this theme in diplomatic theory from the 15th to the 18th centuries. This setting of a conjectured standard led to the introduction, in the 15th century, of textbooks for diplomats. Of note during this period is a small treatise by Venetian diplomat Ermolao Barbaro called *De Officio Legati* that detailed the duties of resident ambassadors. Keens-Soper (1996: 1, 5, 9) notes that De Wicquefort's *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions* (1681) became the first functional guide for diplomatic practitioners within the European States system as it emerged from the Congress of Westphalia. However, an earlier publication by Spanish diplomat Juan Antonio de Vera, titled *El Ambajador* (1620) and translated as the 'Perfect Ambassador', remained the preferred textbook of diplomats until the publication in 1716 of De Callières' *De la Manière de négocier avec les Souverains*. The latter quickly became a required textbook of 18th century diplomats, and is still being quoted in diplomatic literature (Babb 1974: 5; Magalhaes 1988: 36–39).

Publications notwithstanding, there were few attempts before the 17th century to inculcate deliberately the advice to diplomats that previously marked diplomatic theory. The rising power of France during the 17th century however induced progress in the machinery of diplomacy and manifested in attempts to train diplomats. Before this change, general practice was that ambassadors made use of private support staff, resulting in a lack of continuity and experience. The resident embassy's growth in infrastructural requirements and the need for experienced personnel and continuous work methods subsequently prompted more and more foreign ministries to supply ambassadors with trained support staff (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 71). As Lauren (1979: 3) notes, De Callières, who "resented the fact that unskilled and untrained people were sent to embassies and entrusted with the conduct of diplomacy", had complained that good diplomats "were rare because there had been 'no discipline or fixed rules' by which 'good citizens destined to become negotiators might instruct themselves in the knowledge necessary for this kind of employment' ". The situation gradually started changing as, from the 18th century, various foreign ministries – notably those of Russia[18], France[19] and

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Prussia[20] – commenced in-house training, mainly by means of having diplomats study the history of treaties and negotiations. Facilitating these studies was access to well-organised archives that were increasingly being assembled by foreign ministries. Another popular method of training was through attachments to missions abroad. However, as Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 78) note, the prevalence of senior appointments from other than diplomatic backgrounds (i.e. political appointments) undermined the efficiency of the system of training. Although diplomacy had become professional, the fact that senior diplomats had not received career-specific training prevented the institution from becoming a fully-fledged profession (also noted by Keens-Soper 1996: 6).

At the beginning of the 20th century diplomats were, as mentioned, still universally selected from small social and intellectual elites and professional requirements were merely, as Kappeler (1998: 39) notes, "an excellent general education, perfect manners and of course full fluency in French". The professionalisation of diplomacy meant that more objective standards had to be applied in the selection of diplomats, and for most states, the norms became academic. However, it took some decades longer before specific schooling in diplomacy evolved into international practice: certain academic fields of study (notably law) were considered sufficient preparation for the profession and graduates merely had to pass an entrance exam to their respective MFAs, if at all. Official diplomatic training only became systemised and ubiquitous during the last two decades of the 20th century (Babb 1974: 4–5, 13; Crompton 2000a; Eban 1998: 34; Otermi 1992: 27).

2.4.3 **Linguistics and the development of diplomatic training**

Classic diplomacy relied almost entirely on linguistic skills and the very experience of travelling to (or living in) foreign places was seen as sufficient opportunity for diplomats to acquire the necessary skills (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 77; Jönsson and Aggestam 1999: 151). The expansion of the profession however necessitated proficiency in more languages. Language instruction was therefore, from the outset, an integral part of diplomatic training, and in some cases constituted it entirely.

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The first bureaucratised attempt to instruct diplomats in languages occurred in the 17th century, when the Habsburg Empire started to train diplomats to speak Turkish – considered essential because of its extended common frontier with the Ottoman Empire. For this purpose, the Austrian envoy in Constantinople directed a special language institute, the *Sprachknaben Institut*. In 1753 the institute was moved to Vienna and renamed the *K.K. Akademie der Orientalischen Sprachen*[21], where it continued to offer instruction in several more languages and commenced a programme of general public service training. This linguistics-dominated training developed into a more broadly based diplomatic training programme by the early 19th century, and evolved into the first fully-fledged diplomatic academy in the world. It is still in existence, making it the oldest diplomatic training centre in the world, and is known since 1964 as the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 77– 78).

Diplomacy is as old as mankind but it was not until the Middle Ages that the role of diplomats assumed permanency and the institution itself more theoretical and practical definition. The Modern Age saw diplomacy attain "institutional density", as Keens-Soper (1996: 9, 11) refers to it, as the nascent profession became increasingly bureaucratised and systemised within a new state-centric world order. The professionalisation of diplomacy coincided with incremental codification of diplomatic law that reflected a growing universal consensus on the norms, standards and relevance of its practice. This consensus has also manifested in the introduction of more objective recruitment criteria and career-specific training of diplomats. The institution came under considerable ideological pressure during the 20th century, but as Sofer (1988: 199) notes, ideology succeeded only in affecting the content and style of diplomacy while “its organisation and proceedings withheld the change”. Diplomacy has indeed not just survived throughout the ages but grown in stature and evolved into a fully-fledged profession.

3. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE PROFESSION

As diplomacy progressed through the 20th century and entered the 21st century, a number of unprecedented global developments have raised questions about the

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continued relevance of the profession. These issues need to be examined because they impact fundamentally on the career-specific training of diplomats. The most salient of these challenges include the enormous changes in world order, notably the exponential growth of international society; the increase in personal, direct diplomacy; technological advances particularly in communications and travel; the massive expansion of the agenda of diplomatic concerns; the 'democratisation' of diplomacy which has seen a host of competing actors becoming involved in areas traditionally considered the exclusive domain of the profession and the rapid and extensive institutionalisation of multilateralism (Barston 1997: 6; Kurbalija 1999: 176–177; Shaw 1991: 762).

3.1 WORLD ORDER IN FLUX

The neatly balanced power relations that marked the Cold War disappeared with its termination and no clear new order is evident as yet in the existing 'asymmetric world'. In Crompton's (2000a) words “the global community is clearly adrift, with nobody obviously in charge”. Two major phenomena of the current world order are globalisation and fragmentation: both phenomena in different ways undermine state sovereignty and hence the monopoly of traditional diplomacy in the international domain. Moreover, the exponential expansion of international society has changed the global political profile with far-reaching implications for diplomacy (Ahmad 1999: 129; Coolsaet 1998: 2; Wiseman 1999: 9).

3.1.1 **Globalisation and fragmentation**

Globalisation[22], the rapidly increasing movement of people, ideas, goods, services and capital across international boundaries, is not new[23] to the 20th century but it has greatly intensified in recent decades as a result of coinciding phenomena and circumstances. Among these are the end of the bipolar Cold War order, the rapid growth and deregulation of global financial markets since the late 1970s, the massive growth of information, transport and communications technology, the osmosis of corporate activity that perforates and transcends political borders, and the internationalisation of public interest in diplomatic issues (Mills 1998b: 12; Nye 2001: 3; Wolf 2001: 182). The pace and scale of globalisation has been such that it

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has exceeded the capacity of established political and social systems to cope. Mistry (1995: 10) observes that the world for which supranational organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions were designed has changed "beyond recognition" and that these organisations are now "showing signs of age, exhaustion and constitutional weakness". Globalisation has also disturbed significantly the old international consensus that supported the Westphalian system.

The result has been a fragmentation of global power: unprecedented decentralisation has witnessed the international order becoming less structured and polycentric, with regional blocs producing several centres of political gravity. Since the end of World War Two regional institutions have proliferated, linking together geographically and ideologically aligned states and fortifying their global bargaining power, and in the process imposing significantly on the world's diplomatic agenda (Barston 1997: 103; Kurbalija 1999: 176–177; Smith 1998: 101).

3.1.2 **The assault on state sovereignty**

The international interdependence effected by globalisation and fragmentation invariably also erodes the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty. The reduced socio-politico-economic distance between and among states, individuals and companies in practice means that the domestic policies of states are increasingly scrutinised and subjected to international standards, trends and obligations. Many policy-makers in the Developing World, especially 'economic nationalists' like former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, see globalisation as subversive to state sovereignty, not only *vis-à-vis* other governments, but also *vis-à-vis* the market. Their opposition manifests in counter movements towards nationalism, populism, protectionism and 'illiberalism' (Mahathir 1999; Vale 1993: 7). Paradoxically, the counter-strategy of regionalisation also has an erosive effect on sovereignty as RIAs attempt to harmonise the policies and institutions of member states (Duke 2001: 8; Hemery 2002: 141–142; Petrovsky 1998: 24).

Cohen (1999: 2) notes that apart from supranational organisations, trading corporations, NGOs and other trans-national bodies have "revived the medieval

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right of non-sovereign entities to send and receive envoys, conduct negotiations and conclude agreements" and this has caused "erosion of the exclusive functions and prerogatives of the state and the professions that served it". The authority of sovereign states is thus undermined, according to Vale (1993: 15), by "competing and multiple sovereignties, at macro and micro levels of sovereignty". For diplomats, whose representative mandate is legally bound to the concept of state sovereignty, this reality poses a particular challenge, especially in the Developing World where the hard-won battle against colonial subjugation has bred robust nationalisms. Developing states have, however, in many instances weak or collapsed state structures that cannot contain internal conflicts; prompting intervention by multinational institutions and regional and sub-regional organisations (Bull 1977: 246; Crompton 2000a; Kappeler 1998: 41; Langhorne 1998: 158; Sharp 1998: 88). Kurbalija (1999: 174) notes a self-sustaining cycle, as reduced sovereignty then results in the further proliferation of entities such as regional organisations that are expected to bolster state capacity.

The assault on sovereignty has been exacerbated by the universal culture of human rights that was borne of decolonisation and the universal shock about the atrocities of World War Two; hence the 'old consensus' about non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is increasingly being challenged by states and supranational organisations that justify intervention[24] in terms of universal human rights protection (Kurbalija 1999: 173; Shaw 1991: 191–192). In this regard, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (as quoted by Hoagland 1999) juxtaposes what he refers to as "the two concepts of sovereignty", namely state sovereignty *versus* individual sovereignty. The latter, which is enshrined in the charter of the UN and is enhanced, according to Annan, by "a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights" poses a diplomatic challenge especially for diplomats from developing states because of the Developing World's preoccupation with social and economic human rights, i.e. group rights, as opposed to – and often to the exclusion of – individual civil and political rights.

3.1.3 **Expansion of the international society**

Since the end of World War Two, almost a hundred[25] new nation states have come

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into existence differing vastly in type, size and relative power, all competing for political and economic influence. The process of decolonisation, in particular, spawned a host of new states and redrew the world's political map. Dembinski (1988: 5) remarks that "never in history quantitative changes on the international scene were of such magnitude nor did they have comparable consequences for world diplomacy". Not only has the quantity of diplomatic activity increased greatly, but its style, procedures and substance have also been affected by the sheer number and variety of states (Ayoob 1998: 32– 33; Barston 1997: 6; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 3).

Cohen (1999: 10) adds that the post-Cold War era has produced a global system that is marked by the unprecedented situation that almost all states are involved in diplomatic relations with almost all other states. In addition, more and more international organisations have representative missions attached to states or other organisations, manifesting thus as subjects of international law and enjoying diplomatic immunities and privileges. This multidimensional increase in diplomatic activity has greatly intensified competition among diplomats and has amplified the scope of their responsibilities.

3.2 THE GROWTH OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

Throughout the ages, certain countries and individual leaders[26] have shown a predilection for personal diplomacy, to the exclusion of diplomatic intermediation. However, specific circumstances in the past century have precipitated a huge increase in personal international collaborative ventures by political leaders. This has caused a surge in direct diplomacy at head of state or government level and has coincided with a vertical rise in summitry since the 1960s, posing a growing challenge to professional diplomats (Barston 1997: 103, 107; Eban 1998: 92; Holsti 1988: 161; Magalhaes 1988: 48; Reychler 1996: 2).

3.2.1 **Reasons for the surge in direct negotiations**

A pragmatic incentive for increased direct negotiations among leaders during the 20th century has been the huge advances in communications and transport that

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have rendered international interaction instantaneous, cheap and safe. Hence Bull's (1977: 172) contention that the proliferation of 'hot lines' between the heads of a number of important states during the 1960s occurred because traditional diplomatic channels were not providing the rapid, direct communication at the highest levels deemed necessary to avoid potentially cataclysmic conflicts. Moreover, the surge in multilateralism since the end of World War Two has compelled leaders to deal with one another directly in order to reach consensus on issues of vital interest and to lend stature to global and regional alliances.

A domestic imperative for personal diplomacy has been the world-wide spread of democracy. Democratically elected political leaders have a stake in promoting their personal prestige and to honour their constitutional responsibility to constituents by pursuing *inter alia* foreign interests in a visible and assertive manner. The omnipresence of media coverage has made high-level international contacts an attractive means for "quasi-diplomats" to score political points with a domestic audience (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 226). In the Developing World, on the other hand, the domestic imperative has been insecure political systems and inadequate diplomatic bureaucracies, especially in new states, that have made personal diplomacy more effective and thus popular. Leaders of poor states often rely on personal charisma not only to hold on to national power but to make an international impact by means of direct diplomacy (Barston 1997: 106–107, 114; Holsti 1988: 161; Muller 1998: 195; Otermi 1992: 24).

3.2.2 **The growth of summitry**

The dramatic effects of summitry among leaders of the great powers, according to Eban (1998: 92), were played up by World War Two. In the post-war period, the swift expansion of summitry was encouraged by the impact of communications, information and transport technology that made such meetings that much easier to organise and stage. The global processes of democratisation and decolonisation have also had a major impact, as a host of new states and other international actors have demanded visible inclusion in high-level deliberations on global issues (Bull 1977: 166; Dunn 1996: 19). As a result, Barston (1997: 108) notes that the term 'summit' has since the 1970s "lost some of its sense of high occasion and

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special purpose as a venue for decisions of critical importance, becoming a term in diplomatic vocabulary for relatively routine meetings at head of state or government level". Eban (1998: 93) adds that in the process, summits have taken over the symbolic and ceremonial domain of diplomacy. The functional diversification of summitry has been fuelled by the growth of multilateral diplomacy, particularly the expansion of regional and sub-regional diplomacy. The term summit has also been adopted for the increasing incidence of high-profile, *ad hoc* UN conferences, the so-called 'world summits' which since the 1980s have addressed various problems of global importance.

3.3 THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

The past century has witnessed exponential technological advances that, as Vale (1993: 6) remarks, have created an increasingly interdependent 'global village'. Innovations in communications and transport in particular have removed the pre-existing barriers of time and space, affecting in consequence all areas of human activity. The impact on the profession of diplomacy has been profound: while the means and resources available to diplomats to do their jobs have been ameliorated, numerous new issues have encroached on the traditional domain of the profession and it has been challenged in unprecedented ways by the information and media revolution (Magalhaes 1988: 48; Reychler 1996: 2).

3.3.1 **Technology and the domain of diplomacy**

Very few global developments have impacted on the *raison d'être* of diplomacy as severely as the revolution in information technology (IT), as public access to voluminous information has eroded the monopoly that governments had in controlling the distribution of information and specialised expertise. As Kurbalija (1999: 172) notes, this has increased “the capacity of individuals to collect, distribute and manipulate information”, thus challenging diplomacy's traditional role as dominant channel for inter-state communication. In addition, Kurbalija (1999: 174–175) remarks that cyberspace does not acknowledge sovereign borders or correspond to geopolitical restrictions, and adds that there is a “steady shift of power from traditional elements such as control of territorial and physical resources

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towards information as a source of power". The common use of electronic information-handling equipment such as computers and facsimile machines has also introduced security-related problems for diplomats in terms of duplication, hierarchy and authenticity (Kappeler 1998: 44–45).

A further challenge to the profession is the enormous and increasing number of technology-related issues that transcend sovereign boundaries and enlarge the agenda of diplomacy. These include *inter alia* ethical dilemmas encountered by medical science, global environmental concerns, and the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. The latter issue has dramatically raised the stakes of diplomatic negotiations during the latter half of the 20th century and continues to lend weight to or scuttle diplomatic negotiations. The intersection of IT and diplomacy, particularly in the area of international conflict management and resolution, has assumed such prominence that the United States Institute of Peace in 1995 launched the VDI which sponsors global workshops, conferences and symposia to explore the IT-diplomacy relationship (VDI 2004).

Newsom (1989: 33) points out that whereas advances in technology have created certain challenges for professional diplomats, it is the very lack thereof that presents problems for diplomats from the Developing World as they struggle to compete internationally with insufficient technological infrastructure. In a wider sense, the so-called 'digital divide' which adds to the socio-politico-economic schism between North and South has in itself become a fixture on the diplomatic agenda of the South.

3.3.2 **The media revolution**

Over the past few decades, the media has emerged as a powerful phenomenon in world politics, as it provides immediate information from all over the globe to an audience that spans the globe. It has broken the monopoly that governments had on dissemination of information (albeit often with monopolies of its own), thereby impacting on all actors in the foreign policy making process. Its increasing influence has engaged public opinion on a far greater scale than ever before, and has manipulated diplomatic attention by arbitrarily selected media coverage of issues

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(Jönsson and Aggestam 1999: 159; Smith 1998: 98).

Riordan (2003: 5) and Vella (1998: 12) point out the pressure that the media has placed on the profession: whereas in the past diplomacy was marked by prestige and discretion it has now become routinely subject to media intervention and hence public scrutiny and ethical evaluation. As a result, diplomats now receive the kind of exposure traditionally reserved for politicians. The media also often bypasses the diplomatic establishment by carrying state-to-state[27] messages that were traditionally conveyed by diplomats.

For the Developing World, the media revolution has sparked fears of information 'imperialism' by the Developed World, in light of the latter's superior technological resources; however it has also facilitated the increasing use of a public diplomatic offensive in the South's quest to counter marginalisation. On the other hand, the mass media has greatly increased the psycho-social effect of globalisation in that it has, in a frustrating way, *virtually* delivered the world to everybody's doorstep – it has raised awareness and understanding but also stress and despair as the expectations of the poor in Third World countries for higher standards of living and human rights have been fuelled (Deleito 1992: 42–45; Mills 1998b: 15).

3.4 EXPANSION OF THE AGENDA OF DIPLOMACY

Eban (1998: 99) points out an enormous expansion in the functional themes that constitute international relations. This observation applies pre-eminently to the profession of diplomacy and is reflected in the inter-disciplinary nature of contemporary diplomatic studies. An holistic approach to diplomatic subject matter has been necessitated by the globalisation of issues that could previously be handled domestically, and the increasing predominance of economic issues on the diplomatic agenda (Barston 1997: 7; Reychler 1996: 2).

3.4.1 **Globalisation of human concerns**

Ever since the French Revolution sparked increasing attention by the international community to the internal affairs of states, diplomats have had to contend with the

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fact that not only human rights but various other domestic issues are of international concern. Globalisation has greatly increased this reality, as global solutions are required for domestic problems that spill over borders, such as illegal migration, environmental degradation and civil strife. The new and more effective forms of global cooperation that are required illustrate, as Ton (1996) observes, "the need for a variety of new insights and skills that the world of diplomats entails today". Indeed, "complex issues that transcend national boundaries" is one of the reasons identified by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in a 1998 report, as a reason for the necessity to transform traditional US diplomacy (Burt and Robison 1998: x).

The widening of the agenda of diplomacy has given further impetus to the growth of multilateralism and has produced a growing demand for specialisation among diplomats to cover areas such as international finance, agriculture, armaments and environmental issues. On the other hand, it has also facilitated, even demanded, the participation by non-diplomatic experts to back up the work of 'professional generalists' (Armstrong 1999: 45–46; Barston 1997: 5; Kappeler 1998: 41; Kissinger 1994: 24; Meerts 1999: 89).

3.4.2 **From geopolitics to geo-economics**

During the Cold War, reflections on the human race's destiny focused on East-West relations. The demise of the Cold War saw ideological rivalry replaced with economic competition, and the debate about the future of humanity assuming a North-South perspective. At issue is the transformation of an international system that has allowed severe asymmetrical global development: rapid growth within the northern hemisphere in stark contrast to underdevelopment in the southern hemisphere. This has caused a schism between the Developing World's formal equality in terms of international law, and its evident inferiority as concerns socio-economic development. As a result, following the Algiers summit in 1973 on the NIEO, reform of the existing international economic order has become a major bone of contention – and a fixture – on the international diplomatic agenda (Newsom 1989: 30; Sofer 1988: 201; Ton 1996).

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Langhorne and Wallace (1999: 16–17) note that the shifting of the boundary between domestic and international politics during the past few decades has produced “consequent movement in economic regulation and multilateral consultation on economic policies”. A major result has been the establishment of myriad multilateral fora such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the United Nations Conference(s) on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The growing multilateral diplomatic approach to economic issues has been reinforced by two important developments: on the one hand the proliferation of regional economic cooperation and integration arrangements, and on the other hand centralised global economic management (Ahmad 1999: 118; Barston 1997: 4, 108; Camdessus 2000; Shaw 1991: 38; Ton 1996).

For diplomats, the universal change in focus of foreign policy from geopolitics to geo-economics has necessitated a redefinition of their roles in export-driven bilateral relations as well as within the vastly increasing number of trade-based economic organisations at sub-regional, regional and global level. In response, a new diplomatic skill has gained prominence, namely economic diplomacy. It includes complex diplomatic considerations regarding economic relations, and the issue of development assistance that is increasingly dominating relations between industrialised and developing countries (Barston 1997: 165; Dembinski 1988: 6; Duke 2001: 4; Pityana 2000).

3.5 THE DEMOCRATISATION OF DIPLOMACY

Since World War Two, quantitative changes in the community of states and international organisations have precipitated huge growth in global diplomatic representation and thus in the actual number of professional diplomats. This has rendered diplomacy a 'growth-sector': as Reychler (1996: 1) observes, some writers are even speaking in terms of "diplomatic inflation”. The phenomenal growth in the profession has made the institution of diplomacy more diverse and thus representative of global socio-politico-economic realities. Diplomacy's democratisation has also been induced by what Langhorne (1998: 159) identifies

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as the new centres of power that are associated with human activity which are "arranged horizontally across global geography, time zones, and cultures" and that have loosened central, vertical control over human activity by traditional authorities, i.e. governments. The result is that more and more entities are demanding – and providing – inputs in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and hence in diplomacy itself (Dembinski 1988: 5; Kurbalija 1999: 176–177; Rozental 1999: 133).

3.5.1 **Democratisation of the foreign policy process**

Although conflict between foreign ministries and a variety of rival agencies with external concerns has been a continuing feature at least since the late 19th century, real democratisation[28] of the foreign policy decision-making process – in the West, at least – became evident during the 1970s. The "degovernmentalisation of foreign affairs" as Petrovsky (1998: 23) refers to it, occurred as various domestic pressure groups, including the legislative branches of government, other departments and agencies, business and civil groups started to claim a stake in diplomacy and has led to a certain measure of 'domestication' of diplomacy (Cohen 1999: 2; Harris 1999: 27; Kappeler 1998: 41; Neumann 1999: 153; Reychler 1996: 2; Smith 1998: 99). This development has had a dual effect on the jurisdiction of states over foreign policy. Hocking (1999a: 26, 32–33) notes on the one hand a "growing intersection of the state and societal interests" and on the other hand the growing capacity of non-governmental interest groups "to operate alongside governments in the international arena and to challenge their authority".

The competition has not been restricted to the private sector. The traditional state-to-state negotiating role of diplomats has been diminished by the increasing involvement of other state agents, including local and provincial authorities, in international interactions (Cooper 1999: 44; Meerts 1999: 89). By means of example, Clough (1998) cites "the inability of national institutions to serve local and regional needs fully" as one reason why many US[29] cities and states are developing their own foreign economic policies and creating the institutional structures to carry them out. The effect on professional diplomacy has been that diplomats are increasingly in competition with colleagues from other areas of

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government. Meerts (1999: 90) refers to this phenomenon as “inter-civil-servant negotiations”, as diplomats are obliged to confer with such colleagues to harmonise foreign policy strategy.

3.5.2 **Diversification of the culture and style of diplomacy**

Dembinski (1988: 5) makes the point that “in the pluralistic world of today the diplomat often finds himself in a completely new cultural, political and economic environment, where the perceptions of the states and functions of diplomats and of diplomatic missions may be completely different”. The diplomatic corps is becoming more heterogeneous and diplomatic culture – the norms and conventions associated with diplomatic procedures such as *inter alia* the conduct of negotiations and the forms of diplomatic communication – is becoming less universal, with greater varieties in national and regional approaches and more relaxed diplomatic practice (Barston 1997: 27, 103; Cohen 1991: 17; Reychler 1996: 6). Sofer (1988: 200–201) points out a negative result of this dispersion of the formerly universal values of European diplomatic culture and the rejection of elitist Old World codes of conduct: it has rendered consensus on global issues decidedly more elusive.

This diversification of diplomatic culture has also impacted on the linguistic modes of official[30] diplomatic communication. As diplomacy came under the influence of a more fragmented, multilingual and democratic international states system during the past century, and as diplomatic representatives increasingly reflected non-elites, it gradually became an accepted practice for delegates at diplomatic fora to communicate in their own national languages with interpreters at hand. The importance of this change lies in the notion of symbolic equality – a further manifestation of the democratisation of the profession. It is institutionalised in the multiple official[31] languages policy of the UN (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 157).

3.5.3 **Privatisation of diplomacy**

One of the most significant elements of the evolution of diplomatic practice this past century has been the involvement in the field of what Annan (1998) refers to as “an ever more robust global civil society”. There is no common descriptive term in the

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literature for this development: it is *inter alia* referred to as privatisation of diplomacy, para-diplomacy, second track diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy and civilian/citizen diplomacy. The terms all refer to entities other than governments active in the field of diplomacy at the same time, but not necessarily in associative relationships (Cohen 1999: 2; Hocking 1999a: 31–36; Kurbalija 1999: 176–177; Reychler 1996: 9; Vale 1993: 35–36).

As already mentioned, a large share of diplomatic concerns now transcends the traditional domain of the state and can no longer be addressed satisfactorily, if at all, by individual governments. International human concerns increasingly exist on a global, horizontal basis disconnected from the essentially vertical state structure, making it difficult even for supranational organisations to address them sufficiently. Non-official diplomatic dialogue is thus filling the vacuum by operating multi-dimensionally: it creates 'an additional layer of diplomacy' in which non-state actors communicate both with states and associations of states and other non-state actors and *vice versa*[32] (Cohen 1999: 2; Langhorne 1998: 158; Vella 1998: 16; Wiseman 1999: 10).

Petrovsky (1998: 23) identifies NGOs[33] as the most active “intruders” into the domain of diplomacy. The areas they target include human rights and environmental protection, as well as economic, financial and technological concerns. These new diplomatic actors are more flexible and operate more speedily and proactively than governments: they mobilise public opinion around single issues and thereby pressurise governments to act accordingly. Examples are Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines[34]. There are also thousands more, albeit less prominent, organisations that work in tandem to form powerful international networks with the ability to impact significantly on world politics (Cohen 1999: 2; Crompton 2000a; Meerts 1999: 89; Meinardus 1999; Newsom 1989: 41). Annan (1998) describes NGOs as being not only disseminators of public information or providers of services, “but as shapers of public policy”. Annan, as does Vella (1998: 16), contends that NGOs by virtue of their focused and practical role are often operational in the field before the international state community has organised itself into action, rendering them extremely important benefactors in Developing World crises situations.

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3.6 THE PREDOMINANCE OF MULTILATERALISM

Magalhaes (1988: 39) points out that contrary to widely held presumption, multilateral diplomacy was not created in the period following World War One. In fact, as early as 1648 the *Treaty of Westphalia* initiated this new diplomatic method. However, multilateralism only assumed permanence and prominence during the 20th century: Wolf (2001: 184) says that in comparison with the 19th century, which was a world of unilateral and discretionary policy, the late 20th century "has become a world of multilateral and institutionalised policy". The result has been that the bulk of contemporary diplomacy occurs in multilateral fora, or concerns multilateral issues[35] (HSRC 1990: 128; Marshall 1997: 142; Mills 1998b: 11).

3.6.1 **Reasons for the growth of multilateralism**

As is evident from previous discussion, the technological revolution has on a practical level induced speedier and more voluminous interaction of the international community, contributing *inter alia* also to the growth of multilateral diplomatic activity. The intellectual roots of multilateralism, however, lie in liberal attempts to transform a volatile international system: in the aftermath of the unprecedented carnage of World War One, a major diplomatic preoccupation was that of securing world peace. The creation of the League of Nations in 1919 marked the first time in history that a multilateral organisation of permanent and (potentially) universal nature was established. Unfortunately, the League never became universally representative and therefore could not live up to its intrinsic ideals. The horror and scale of World War Two inspired another multilateral attempt to guarantee international peace: the creation of the UN in 1945. With its numerous specialised agencies and almost universal membership, it initiated an unprecedented global hub of diplomacy and, according to Magalhaes (1988: 45), represents the historical zenith of multilateral diplomacy.

The UN's growth and the onset of the Cold War coincided with an explosion[36] in the development of other multilateral institutions that draw states together in cooperative arrangements for economic, security, ideological or various other interests-based reasons (Wolfe 1997: 1–2). This growth has been fuelled by the

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globalisation of human concerns that manifest, as Enjaldran and Husson (1999: 60) note, in the "increasingly intricate web of national and international questions" that can no longer be addressed sufficiently by unilateral or bilateral means. A manifestation of this interconnected diplomatic approach has been the surge in regional diplomacy that has marked the latter part of the 20th century and contributed to the groundswell in multilateralism.

The quantitative increase in the members of international society during the past century also played a major role in the ascent of multilateralism. The process of decolonisation and the subsequent development of a 'Third World', in particular, impacted substantively on the dynamics within this diplomatic method. Multilateral conferences have invoked a sense of fraternity that enhances cooperation, especially sought after within the context of developing state solidarity. Moreover, democratic rules within international organisations such as the UNGA meant that for the first time in history, major international decisions could be decided on a one-state-one-vote[37] basis, affording even the weakest of states a crucial and sought after vote (Berridge 1995: 58; Dembinski 1988: 4, 6–7; Sofer 1988: 201).

Notwithstanding its exponential growth, commentators point out that multilateralism experienced a reflux towards the end of the 20th century – the so-called 'crisis of multilateralism' – because it did not transpire to be a panacea for global problems, as many proponents had hoped. For the Third World, disillusionment has been especially profound because its collective socio-economic status has regressed rather than progressed *vis-à-vis* the industrialised North, in spite of frenetic multilateral activity during the past few decades (Berridge 1995: 178).

3.6.2 **Multilateralism and global management**

Wolfe (1997: 11, 184) comments that since World War Two the most salient aspects of the security and commercial relations among states are organised "not by treaty or other negotiation among the Powers, but through international regimes manifested by agreements reached in international organisations". He explains that just as multinational companies manage private exchange, so global institutions such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank, EU and NAFTA underpin cooperation among

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states, and discipline the international face of national policy. Foreign policy can thus no longer be formulated or executed in isolation: increasingly, instructions to national delegations at multilateral meetings are formulated in consultation or coordination with regional groups or larger multilateral interest groups such as the G77 or NAM (Kaufmann 1998: 14).

The growth in multilateral activity has created a new field of specialisation within the diplomatic profession and has also created the necessity for new types of diplomatic missions, such as permanent missions accredited to international organisations and special *ad hoc* missions and delegations to international organs and conferences. Multilateralism has also created a new genre of international diplomats who are professionals, yet not state-bound, as evidenced by the increasing number of international civil servants[38] working within the framework of autonomous international organisations such as the UN (Coolsaet 1998: 1; Dembinski 1988: 7; Duke 2001: 7; Switzerland DFA 2004).

Moreover, the need to develop representation and negotiation capacities of multilateral entities has boosted the development of new diplomatic methods such as governance diplomacy and associative diplomacy. In this regard, the Developing World, particularly the G77, has made a particular contribution to the evolution of diplomatic practice by means of its modes of achieving consensus amongst its members and its negotiating techniques with other blocs and groups. This has contributed to the emergence of ‘parity diplomacy’, which enables groups of states to achieve accommodation through consensus by dealing with each other on equal terms (Barston 1997: 6, 116; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 198; Kappeler 1998: 40; Leigh-Phippard 1999: 96; Vella 1998: 15).

World order is in flux and so is the field of diplomacy. It has been challenged over the past century by unprecedented changes in the political map of the world, the unravelling of state sovereignty and vast improvements in technology that have abetted the proliferation of personal diplomacy and the omnipresence of media scrutiny (Kurbalija 1999: 176–177; Vale 1993: 7). Diplomacy's agenda has grown exponentially, aided by the globalisation of all human activities, the growing

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predominance of economic concerns and potential mass destruction of the planet – the inevitable corollary of technological advances. The practice of diplomacy, which was traditionally reserved for the executive branch of government and professional diplomats, has become a polylateral activity: a “diffusion of diplomacy”, as Hocking (1999a: 26) points out, has witnessed the development of a multiplicity of actors and channels in the conduct of foreign relations. All of the above-mentioned factors have contributed to the increasingly multilateral character of international diplomacy (Enjaldran and Husson 1999: 60). The question arises whether diplomacy can adjust to these changes and whether professional diplomats can operate effectively in a world where all concepts are being challenged, including that of diplomacy itself.

4. WHITHER THE EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY?

The institution of diplomacy seems to be re-evaluated every time a major transformation in the international system occurs. This happened at the beginning of the 20th century, with the debate about 'new' diplomacy, and is happening again now, post-Cold War, at the turn of the new millennium. According to Hocking (1999a: 23) both state-centric and world society approaches are preoccupied with “newness” or “decline” in the evolution of diplomacy. This derives from the argument that traditional, 'ideal type' diplomacy has been challenged by exogenous and endogenous factors: the former includes developments in information and communication technology and the evolution within (and of relations among) state, society and the international system. These changes interact with endogenous forces that are related to the bureaucratic changes in the functioning of foreign ministries (also discussed by Petrovsky 1998: 21; Reychler 1996: 3; Sharp 1998: 59; Sofer 1988: 195–196).

4.1 HAS PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY BECOME OBSOLETE?

The post-Cold War debate about professional diplomacy can be matched with the various contemporary challenges to the profession, as previously indicated. The major themes of this debate are: the place of diplomacy in a changing world order; the rivalry between the profession and personal diplomacy; the possible

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redundancy of professional diplomacy in light of technological advances; the ability of diplomacy to handle its expanding agenda; and the potential for professional diplomacy to enter into a complementary relationship with 'unofficial' diplomacy.

4.1.1 **Does professional diplomacy have a place in a changing world order?**

The various paradigms of international relations and foreign policy theory have all questioned diplomacy's place in the current, changing world order. The anti-diplomats, as Reychler (1996: 4–5) refers to the idealists, the Marxists and the post-modernists (including significant pressure groups within the Developing World) accuse traditional diplomacy of remaining too elite-minded and not being attentive enough to grass-roots public opinion. In this regard, post-modernists observe that professional diplomacy manipulates concepts such as state sovereignty and national interest to mask hidden elitist interests (Armstrong 1999: 46; Wolfe 1997: 8–10). The Third World, as will be argued, has enlarged this argument to a macro-perspective, positing the exploitative diplomacy of an elitist 'North' versus the grass-roots diplomacy of a marginalised 'South'.

Proponents of a world-society approach maintain that any emphasis on professional diplomacy erroneously reinforces the notion that governments are primary actors in world affairs. They question the significance of diplomacy in a world that is increasingly interdependent and globalised (Hocking 1999a: 23–24; Meerts 1999: 90). Some theorists even consider diplomacy as politically harmful to the international society. Modelski, for example, has argued that "reduction in the role of diplomacy may be a necessary condition for world order" (quoted by Sofer 1988: 196). Some state-centric proponents, on the other hand, find diplomacy an inefficient mechanism to advance national interest, citing *inter alia* the technological revolution (Hocking 1999a: 23). Sofer (1988: 206) adds that politicians often accuse diplomats of espousing a parochial and unrealistic viewpoint on foreign policy, while military leaders in some cases denounce diplomacy as prejudicial to national interest.

In response to these doubts about the significance of (professional) diplomacy, several writers have emphasised the enduring validity of the institution within the

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system of nation states (Hemery 2002: 140; Langhorne 1999; Wiseman 1999: 11). Sofer (1988: 196) contends that “interests, aims and concepts of foreign policy may change, while in diplomacy what usually changes are only the methods of implementation and the repertoire of persuasion”. The resilience of the diplomatic system has in fact been remarkable given the enormous changes of the past century. As Cohen (1999: 14) remarks, “the crowning achievement – indeed vindication – of modern diplomacy was to accommodate the quantum shift, in a single generation, from an international system of about fifty, mostly Western, states to a universal association of 185 [sic] members” (also noted by Wolfe 1997: 1). Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 233) point out the irony in the fact that the very expansion of the states system has tended to inhibit radical change in the conventional mechanisms of diplomacy. Cohen (1999: 14) notes that this phenomenon can be attributed to “the inherent merit and practical indispensability" of diplomacy.

In this regard, Berridge (1995: 1) sees diplomacy’s survival and indeed growth as a function of the circumstances that encouraged, in the first place, its development as "the key institution of the system of states": the balance of power coinciding with a weak international legal regime. Similarly, Bull (1977: 172), who during the Cold War observed a decline in the role of professional diplomacy, nevertheless says that it has not ceased to make “a central contribution to the maintenance of international order”. Sofer (1988: 207) goes as far as claiming that the absence of diplomacy would represent a revolution in international society, inasmuch as it remains the primary apparatus of maintaining stability and significant relations among nations.

Proponents of professional diplomacy also counter the accusation that professional diplomats have been rendered redundant by the effects of globalisation on state sovereignty. They point out that diplomatic relations are, in fact, a condition of globalisation because state representatives are the ones who negotiate and manage the growing network of agreements that facilitate the flow of goods, services and people across sovereign jurisdictions (Cohen 1999: 14; Hocking 1999a: 32; Wiseman 1999: 2, 5; Wolf 2001: 190).

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4.1.2 **Where does personal diplomacy leave the profession?**

Otermi (1992: 25) declares that personal diplomacy has usurped the place of professional diplomats to such an extent during the 20th century that the necessity for the latter has been questioned. However, policy makers that are unschooled in diplomacy risk closure of communication channels that exist between states and which need to be handled, as Bull (1977: 172–173) observes, by "experts in detecting and conveying nuances of international dialogue". Various other commentators have also emphasised the enduring advantage, and in fact necessity, of professional diplomatic intermediation (Lauren 1979: 5).

An important consideration is the nature of diplomatic negotiations. A strategy seldom proceeds with linear progress: the process can be drawn out and could entail temporary setbacks, misunderstandings, bureaucratic delays and strategic ploys. This can render agreement elusive, and most leaders have neither the time nor the political inclination to subject themselves to such a fickle process. In direct negotiations politicians do not have the leeway to be seen as too accommodating, and the process can thus not incubate successfully. It is therefore politically astute to have the hard negotiations done at a less visible and controversial level, i.e. at an intermediate, 'technical' level. As already mentioned, most summits are a mere culmination of successful diplomatic negotiations[39] and in effect increase the work of professional diplomats, not just because of the preparation that is required but also as a result of the follow-up actions that need to be attended to (Crompton 2000c; Nicolson 1963: 100–101; Otermi 1992: 25; Otte 1998: 15).

When professional diplomatic intermediaries are by-passed, the stakes are indeed very high. Meetings either fail or succeed, either way with important and very visible consequences. No set rules of engagement, the fanfare and rivalry of large accompanying delegations and superficiality arising out of haste are other drawbacks. In addition, the excessive 'hospitality' associated with summits can detract from the serious nature of a bilateral agenda, by obliging visibly courteous gratitude. Highly publicised personal meetings also raise public expectations, often to unrealistic levels. A former South African ambassador, Glen Babb (1974: 2),

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observes that "a diplomat is prepared to deal with people he despises, and he removes himself from the hurly burly of national politics. This is not the case for the politician: he looks to the public for support ... consequently, there is always a strong temptation to conceal or deny the fact of failure". In direct negotiations between leaders, personal rapport can become exaggerated, while it constitutes very little of the real essence or durability of the long-term relationship between two states (Eban 1998: 40, 95; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 223; Magalhaes 1988: 55–57; Sofer 1988: 204, 206).

4.1.3 **Has professional diplomacy been made redundant by technology?**

The spectacular contemporary advances of technology in the areas of communications, information and transport have convinced some critics that diplomacy has become technologically redundant. This argument is used specifically as concerns the media revolution. Although greater media exposure of the work of diplomats should have enhanced the appreciation of professional diplomacy, it has instead generated the criticism that media networks have obviated the need for diplomatic intermediaries. Various commentators have refuted this idea because the argument presupposes that diplomats merely relay information (Crompton 2000b; Sharp 1999: 40; Sofer 1988: 196; Vella 1998: 13).

The limitations of relying solely on media reporting, are evident: competition for viewer numbers means that only the most sensationalist stories are covered, and sensationalism often obscures (mundane) facts which might carry long-term implications for a particular state’s interests. Media are also seldom neutral, even when they purport to be: there is always an editorial bias that reflects interest group pressure and manipulation of messages. Another drawback is the competitive nature of the media that makes speed of the essence. This seldom allows time for in-depth analysis (Bull 1977: 174; Hemery 2002: 140; Kurbalija 1999: 182; Sofer 1988: 207; Smith 1998: 101).

With media now omnipresent and information available to anybody with access to a computer, the role of diplomats has indeed expanded rather than diminished. They have to organise, evaluate, verify and authenticate information requisite to the

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formulation and execution of foreign policy. In short, they need to make sense of the barrage of information that reaches governments from a multitude of sources. In fact, rather than compete with the media, a modern diplomatic skill is to use 'media diplomacy[40]' to influence public attitudes and opinions that bear on another government's foreign policy (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 234; Jönsson and Aggestam 1999: 154; Smith 1998: 101)

Most commentators agree that the primary mandate of diplomats has not been changed by technology. Kappeler (1998: 40) emphasises that the profession's duty remains "to establish and maintain personal contacts and relations". Former Filipino ambassador Jose Lino Guererro (1999) agrees: "diplomacy remains an interaction of nations through persons. And the ineffable relations of persons have neither been seized nor grasped nor duplicated by the electronic technology that has become dominant in our day". Cohen (1999: 16) adds that the case for the professional diplomat is strengthened by the resilience of cross-cultural schisms. He says an enduring role for diplomacy is "to work on the boundary between cultures as an interpretative and conjunctive mechanism ... the revolution in communications technology and international transport does not affect this constant, structural feature of relationships between sovereignties". Some commentators also point out that diplomacy has become a much more flexible instrument as a result of technological advances, because diplomats have been freed up to concentrate on the core elements of their work and the advances in technology have actually made it possible to have more diplomatic activity across the globe (Berridge 1995: 180; Kappeler 1998: 40; Wolfe 1997: 28).

4.1.4 **Can professional diplomacy cope with its expanding agenda?**

The massive expansion of the agenda of contemporary diplomacy, in particular the issues that are of a specialised nature such as economics, and science, has prompted many critics to question the ability of 'professional generalists' to cope with this agenda. They argue that there are always other international agents that are willing and better equipped to handle technical issues. In fact, the extensive range of spheres that impact on international relations has in fact made the involvement of non-professionals in the diplomatic process inevitable (Clough 1998;

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Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 217; Sofer 1988: 206).

An area within diplomacy that is regularly subjected to vehement criticism, is the issue of conflict prevention[41]. This area pertains to crises in the Developing World more than anywhere else. According to Reychler (1996: 4, 6–7) inadequate knowledge (by professional diplomats) of conflict-prevention techniques has led to inaccurate prognosis of situations that led to conflict. This, in turn, has seen professional diplomatic efforts being of a reactive rather than a proactive nature. The 1994 genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda and the genocide of Muslims in Srebrenica, Bosnia in 1995, both of which occurred in full view of UN peacekeepers, serve as tragic examples. This ineffectual track-record, according to Reychler, "has diminished the prestige of the diplomatic profession" and has increased parallel diplomacy as a civil response to the perceived limits of traditional diplomacy. Petrovsky (1998: 27–30) counters by arguing that modern diplomacy has a more subtle preventative role, that of ensuring good governance: "its influence on political and economic leaders can channel global changes in an evolutionary, non-violent, democratic rule-based manner". This is only possible because of diplomacy's inherent capacity as an inter-mediating institution.

The proponents of professional diplomacy note that the significance of diplomats lies not in their actual handling of technical issues, but in their management of the process to address such issues – whoever the role players involved. Professional diplomats therefore assume the role of 'specialist-generalists' in the field of diplomacy (Kurbalija 1999: 178). Meerts (1999: 91) says the situation is paradoxical: even though diplomats are losing their monopoly in handling interstate relations, their role is becoming more crucial, as they become more and more specialised as "expert intermediaries". Vella (1998: 13) adds that rather than becoming "an endangered species" professional diplomats have become crucial in helping to "weave the fabric of regional and global political, economic and social cooperation", and to maintain and develop further that cooperation.

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4.1.5 What is the relationship between professional diplomacy and non-state diplomacy?

Various US scholars have, since 1992, argued that the structures and dynamics of world order are changing so rapidly that traditional diplomacy does not conform to the realities of the information age. They make the point that just as there have been revolutions in business and military affairs, so the diplomatic world is about to experience an IT induced revolution: what they term the Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs (RDA). This, they argue, will happen because diplomats are beginning to experience competition from agile non-state actors who are being strengthened by the information revolution (Cooper 2001)

Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2004) predict that diplomats will have to rethink the notion of information and contend with a new emerging realm, the "noosphere", which comprises a global "realm of the mind". The diplomacy that will emerge from this new realm will be based on a new paradigm of 'noopolitik': "an approach to statecraft to be undertaken as much by non-state as by state actors, that emphasises the role of international soft power in expressing ideas, values, norms and ethics through all manner of media". This theory raises a pivotal question, namely the nature of a working relationship, if any, between professional and non-state diplomats. Hocking (1999a: 24) notes that for theorists such as Modelski who regard the state as an obstacle to world order, the development of an alternative diplomacy as managed by NGOs and transnational movements promotes the prospect of an international order that transcends the state system. Indeed, the inroads made by NGOs in the diplomatic arena inevitably raise the probability of rivalry[42] with sovereign governments and question the monopoly of professional diplomats in the field (Cohen 1999: 1–2; Meerts 1999: 89; Riordan 2003: 86–91).

Supporters of the profession note that diplomacy does not cease to be diplomacy because the actors in the field are increasing or because non-professionals contribute to its objectives. Moreover, several commentators have identified the development of a complementary relationship in the field; what was previously discussed as a new method of diplomacy, namely polylateral diplomacy (Langhorne and Wallace 1999: 19; Wiseman 1999: 11). Hocking (1999a: 31–36) uses the term

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"catalytic diplomacy" to describe the growing symbiosis between state and non-state actors within the foreign policy community and notes that there is less and less distinction between 'official' and 'unofficial' diplomacy. An example of the recognition given to the cooperative relationship is the increasing incidence of NGOs not only participating in the foreign policy agenda-setting process, but being included in national delegations to international conferences (Cooper 1999: 48; Harris 1999: 31). Thakur and Lee (2000) refer to these diplomatic joint ventures as "coalitions of the willing" that are formed as temporary alliances in pursuit of agreed international goals. (Vale 1993: 37) adds that these cooperative ventures not only allow for a democratic input in the foreign policy making process, but also serve as a legitimising process for governments.

According to Hocking (1999a: 33), catalytic diplomacy builds on, rather than replaces, more traditional 'official' diplomacy. It manifests strongly in the international pursuits of companies, who may seem a-national but do, in fact, act in support of state functions and needs. He notes that, although their para-diplomacy is most prevalent in areas of 'low' politics and military-security issues remain firmly in the domain of the state, the role of catalytic diplomacy impacts on the latter also, in that it often assumes a preventative function. In recognition of this role, Langhorne (1998: 158) says the UN's active coordinating role in the world of NGOs is an example of how the current diplomatic system can be involved in the management of changes to diplomatic practice, and actually shape such change.

The closer integration of domestic and international environments has enhanced, rather than downplayed, the role of diplomats (Hocking 1999a: 30; Wiseman 1999: 13; Wolfe 1997: 28). As Sofer (1988: 206) notes, "the diplomat is the liaison between the various perspectives, ensuring the primacy of political considerations in relations among nations". This liaison supplies a crucial interpretative linkage that allows for foreign policy strategy to be formulated more comprehensively – for the Third World in particular, where government structures are often weak, a strong partnership with civil society is crucial. Whereas the non-governmental contribution may boast more expertise, the government contribution will add enforcement capacity and legal weight in international agreements. Recognition of this new role of diplomats has given rise to a new area of specialisation known as 'public

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diplomacy'. It recognises the growing role of the public in matters that were traditionally handled exclusively by diplomats, and the attendant demand for transparency and interconnectivity within the domain of traditional diplomacy (Kappeler 1998: 41; Meerts 1999: 90; Mills 1998b: 9; Sharp 1999: 42; Smith 1998: 97, 100, 102). The downside for the profession is that skilled diplomats are becoming more attractive to the private sector or other state agencies, as their skills in handling international relations become more marketable and in demand outside foreign ministries (Perlez 2000).

4.1.6 **Has multilateralism superseded traditional diplomacy?**

A trend that has been evident throughout previous discussion is the rapid and extensive institutionalisation of multilateralism, especially after World War Two, overtaking in quantity the dialogue that characterised bilateral diplomacy until the 20th century. The question arises as to whether the need for specialisation in an increasingly multilateralised environment has meant a downgrading of traditional diplomatic conduct (Ahmad 1999: 118; Kappeler 1998: 40; Vella 1998: 11; Wiseman 1999: 6).

Various commentators contend that, rather than replace traditional diplomacy, multilateralism actually complements and facilitates bilateral diplomacy, which continues to flourish within the new multilateral frameworks. This is especially true for developing states, which often lack capacity to maintain universal resident bilateral relations, and for whom multilateral missions have opened up the possibility of being diplomatically connected to the rest of the world (Berridge 1995: 59; Bull 1977: 159; Marshall 1997: 142; Sofer 1988: 204–205). Coolsaet (1998: 2) offers a reverse perspective in the sense that traditional bilateral diplomacy presents an essential platform for multilateral diplomacy, which often relies on extensive bilateral preparation and follow-up.

Commentators have also pointed out that rather than decline, traditional diplomacy has experienced an enlargement of scope, evident in the proliferation of its methods, as a result of multilateralism. Its role has thus not diminished but the character of its practice has adapted to new imperatives, such as multilateral

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lobbying to ensure parliamentary style bloc-voting. The presence of experts from other state agencies, who work alongside professional diplomats under the same international legal umbrella, has also increased the managerial role of diplomats in the coordination of foreign policy execution (Barston 1997: 6, 116; Bull 1977: 168; Dembinski 1988: 4, 6–7).

4.2 REVISITING THE DEBATE ABOUT THE RESIDENT EMBASSY

The recent criticism of professional diplomacy has inevitably targeted its flagship mechanism, the resident embassy[43], with critics claiming that other agencies are equipped to do the same work as well, if not more efficiently (Bull 1977: 166; Cohen 1999: 1; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 231; Kappeler 1998: 42). Some analysts have even suggested subcontracting[44] the routine functions of diplomatic missions (Reychler 1996: 3; Sharp 1999: 42; Vella 1998: 15). However, proponents point out that the criticism is rooted in ignorance about the actual work that is performed by diplomats and deficient IR reflection on changes in diplomatic roles (Hocking 1999a: 25; Magalhaes 1988: 95–96; Wolfe 1997: 4–5). In this regard, Cohen (1999: 5) notes that although some functions of the resident embassy have eroded over time, new functions have been added. This has prompted some observers to argue for an increase, rather than a reduction, in state resources to be channelled to the institutions of professional diplomacy, such as resident embassies (Perlez 1999)

4.2.1 **Obituaries of the resident ambassador**

Berridge (1995: 32–33) notes five arguments that would have the resident embassy declared redundant: in the first place, the claim that technological advances in travel and communications have obviated the need for resident embassies; secondly the belief that symbolic representation and negotiation are better executed *via* direct contact; thirdly the growth of international organisations and regional integration schemes that have multiplied opportunities for direct international dealing; fourthly the claim that media omnipresence has made redundant information gathering and reporting by diplomats; and lastly the argument that embassies are becoming security hazards in a world where they could be manipulated for ideological or other hostile reasons (arguments supported

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inter alia by Clough 1998 and Riordan 2003: 107–119).

Various commentators add the additional disadvantage of the expenses associated with maintaining, as Modelski refers to it, "an expensive, insecure and cumbersome physical presence in a host country (as discussed by Magalhaes 1988: 88–96). Clough (1998) calls resident missions, in particular consulates, "an expensive anachronism". These criticisms are reflected in the recent world-wide tendency by MFAs to 'rationalise' or 'modernise' diplomatic missions by downscaling the size and/or number of external missions (Langhorne 1998: 147; Kappeler 1998: 42). For poorer nations the argument is particularly germane in light of their lack of financial and human resources capacity: they need to be convinced that their resident embassies are worthy of the expenses they incur.

A more personal attack on the profession is the inference that embassy staff are no longer sufficiently skilled for the *de facto* roles they need to assume. Clough (1998) claims that resident missions are staffed by foreign service officers who do not have appropriate expertise – their mandate simplifies and underestimates the complex web of relations, especially commercial ties, among state as well as non-state actors in the field of international relations. This argument in particular is one that can only be addressed *via* improved diplomatic recruitment and training, and appropriate cooperation among state and non-state representatives.

4.2.2 **Reprieve of the resident ambassador**

Not all commentators are convinced that diplomacy should revert to the pre-16th century practice of using only temporary missions. Instead, they present what Cohen (1999:1–4) calls an evaluation of diplomacy's "irreducible functions, free of fashionable prejudice". Cohen makes the point that a juxtaposition of modern diplomacy with that of other times and places "may help to distinguish the permanent from the transitory, the peripheral from the irreplaceable", and concludes "there is clearly no substitute, then as now, for the permanent diplomatic mission". Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 233) agree and claim that there is no alternative to "that continuity of communication, negotiation, and representation which is the great virtue of the permanent mission". The same authors note that

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even revolutionary and developing states that have consistently and fervently rejected Western values and institutions, “have seemed anxious to maintain their embassies”. Berridge (1995: 1) expands on this argument and says the present global diplomatic system has its origins in the resident mission, which remains the foundation on which the system rests. He identifies three main reasons for this situation: the fact that diplomacy remains transparently essential; the advantages enjoyed by resident ambassadors (by virtue of legal privileges and immunities) in the execution of their functions; and the versatility of the resident embassy.

The debate about resident missions has in fact inspired fresh research on the motivation for their continued existence, and the results invariably evoke the functions of the resident embassy, as accommodated by international law in Article 3 of the 1961 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*:

a) **The function of representation**: States continue to value and protect their sovereignty and in this regard a resident ambassador fulfils a powerful symbolic role. In many cases the establishment, continued existence or closure of an embassy is purely symbolic and intended to send a political message about the nature of bilateral relations (Barston 1997: 19; ISD 1997; Sofer 1988: 207). An ambassador of the Philippines summarised it succinctly: “Like a sacrament, diplomacy’s symbols are often the reality they signify” (Lino Guererro 1999). Berridge (1995: 34–35) adds a more practical dimension to the representative need for resident ambassadors: he notes that political leaders cannot be everywhere at the same time, and therefore need representatives for the continuous execution of symbolic duties. The existence of permanent embassies therefore broadens a state’s representative options and thus its repertoire of non-verbal signals.

A further practical consideration is noted by Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD). In its 1997 report on the contemporary relevance of resident missions the ISD warns that it is easy to argue from a First World perspective that advances in communication and transport have made resident embassies obsolete, but the reality is that technological progress is not evenly spread: certain countries may be of strategic importance, yet may not be as "linked to the web" or feature as prominently on international airline routes, as other

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countries that are politically speaking relatively less important. This is particularly true in the case of many developing countries (also noted by Wolfe 1997: 24, 25).

b) **The function of protecting state interests**: The functions that constitute an embassy's mandate, be they political, economic, administrative, consular or purely representative, remain of vital importance to the security[45] of a sovereign state, and cannot be carried out on an *ad hoc* basis by other agencies. However, demands on embassies are increasing as international democratisation leads to civil society taking a much more active role in international relations. Whereas embassies in the distant past primarily dealt with governments, they now deal increasingly with non-governmental clients in the host country regarding everything from human rights advocacy to educational exchanges and arms reduction. In practice much more work is therefore being done by embassies, and across a much wider spectrum than before. In many cases the sheer volume of bilateral exchanges, necessitating consular or technical assistance by embassy personnel, makes the existence of a resident mission imperative. Furthermore, as the relative importance of public opinion grows world-wide, so does the necessity to have trained representatives on the ground to influence the opinion of a host state's public, and to extend a sending state's influence (Barston 1997: 18; ISD 1997; Kappeler 1998: 43).

The ISD argues that the effects of globalisation's perforated borders have, in fact, strengthened the role of the resident embassy. Its 1997 report notes that many problems such as organised crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking, among many other issues that were previously dealt with sufficiently within the context of municipal law, now necessitate very close collaboration among countries. This cooperation often calls for government agents to be stationed in foreign countries. In such cases, embassies are the natural umbrella and enabling environment, protected by international law, under which these officials function. For the Developing World, scarce internal human and financial resources necessitate this international cooperation for the sake of national security and stability. Another point made by the ISD is that the physical diplomatic presence of one state in another state's capital prevents it from being side-lined by the host government and by the other governments represented there, in areas which could potentially yield much advantage. Once again, this advantage bears particular

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relevance for Developing World diplomats who are bidding for international attention.

c) **The function of negotiating**: Dr EM Debrah (1996), a Ghanaian ambassador and Commonwealth consultant on diplomatic training, concurs with Sofer's (1988: 203) insistence that the contemporary increase in summitry has enhanced rather than diminished the role of professional diplomats, because "politicians are no substitute for the accumulative experience of professional diplomats abroad. Agreements concluded between top-ranking statesmen must be maintained, nurtured, and subjected to periodic reassessment". Berridge (1995: 40) adds that important state-to-state messages sometimes specifically need unhurried and discreet handling, so as not to attract undue public attention. In such cases a resident ambassador is in a better position to handle the communication in the course of routine duties, especially when the negotiation process is arduous and requires tenacious persistence. An example is the lobbying efforts launched by Developing World diplomats for (a greater share of) development aid. Berridge (1995: 1) also notes an indirect, multilateral advantage of resident embassies: they have occasion to negotiate with the resident representatives of hostile states on the neutral territory of the host state.

d) **The function of gathering information and reporting thereon**: In spite of the mass availability of global information, certain aspects of information can still only be obtained through traditional diplomatic information gathering procedures, based mainly on human contact. In closed societies, for example, resident embassies have more access to information than do media, partly because of their immunities and privileges. In open societies, the resident ambassador fulfils a different role: rather than collect information, he has to present perspective on a barrage of public information, to analyse and package it for consumption by his own government, "uninhibited" as Sofer (1988: 207) observes, "by considerations of domestic politics and popular rhetoric" (also noted by Cohen 1999: 16; Kurbalija 1999: 183).

e) **The function of promoting friendly bilateral relations**: Debrah (1996) emphatically states that the need for continuity *via* a trusted interlocutor who "is there all the time", is the "real justification for the resident ambassador". The

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promotion of friendly relations requires a professional who can cultivate contacts and network on a continuous basis, and permanent residence provides much needed opportunity to facilitate the rectification of errors and the occasional unintended misunderstandings (Berridge 1995: 35–36; Sofer 1988: 207).

The human element of international relations, which is lost in distance communications, is considered indispensable by all proponents of resident missions. Equally important is the continuity of such personal interaction (Barston 1997: 18; Kappeler 1998: 42; Smith 1998: 113). As Sen (1988: 57) observes: “the role of the man on the spot remains as viable as it was ever before, perhaps not in decision making but in promoting relations on a continuing basis and in preparing the ground work, stage by stage, on which the edifice of friendship and cooperation is to be built”. In the same way that major corporations have representative offices abroad, governments also need representatives who know the situation on the ground and who can interact accordingly, on a continuous basis (ISD 1997).

Important to the Developing World is one of the aspects that Berridge (1995: 50–51) names as part of the resident embassy’s versatility, namely the advantage that embassies of Developed States have to dispense and manage development aid *in loco* in recipient states – an indisputable contributor to closer relations between the two 'worlds'.

4.3 REFORMING THE PROFESSION

The debate about the relevance of diplomacy is not new to the past century, but after World War Two foreign ministries increasingly came under criticism that they wasted resources and were inefficient in the face of more complex and competitive international relations (Harris 1999: 30; Klieman 1999: 98; Langhorne and Wallace 1999: 17; Sofer 1988: 206). In an attempt to counter the spectre of redundancy, and to overcome what Burt and Robison (1998: xii, 53) call "unacceptable performance gaps", MFAs all over the world have during the past two decades responded[46] to contemporary challenges *via* a process of self-imposed transformation, aided by the implementation of more professional standards in diplomatic training (Enjalran and Husson 1999: 70; Rozental 1999: 133).

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4.3.1 **Transformation of foreign ministries**

In order to arrive at concrete proposals to help MFAs adjust to contemporary challenges, various stakeholders have conducted research into – or arranged international conferences[47] to discuss – transformation within the profession (Coolsaet 1998: 1; Hemery 2002: 140). This process has not been without internal resistance: as Crompton (2000a) notes, "in long established professions, there is always stiff opposition to new ideas and techniques". Apart from wider reflection on the conduct of contemporary diplomacy, the following functional aspects of foreign ministries have been subjected to review and reform:

a) **Organisational structure**: Most MFAs have undertaken structural reforms in response to global challenges to the profession, *inter alia* the need for specialised multilateral divisions and functional areas that reflect the new issues on the global diplomatic agenda. Restructuring has affected not only MFA head offices but also the number, location and function of missions abroad. Another increasingly common development is the functional amalgamation of foreign ministries with other ministries that focus on the international environment, *inter alia* those responsible for environmental issues, energy, development assistance and particularly international trade[48] (Coolsaet 1998: 2; Cooper 1999: 44–45; Enjalran and Husson 1999: 68; Harris 1999: 33; Komachi 1999: 103). Barston (1997: 11) notes that for newer states, implementing the appropriate organisational structure for the formulation and implementation of development strategies is of particular concern.

b) **Expenditure**: In response to financial constraints – either as a result of public scrutiny or, in the case of poor states, actual lack of resources – a current trend for MFAs all over the world is to reduce operational costs. A basic step has been the reduction or outsourcing of functions that can be performed by other agencies. Another method has been attenuation of universal diplomatic representation by decreasing the number of non-essential missions abroad, or by downscaling the transferred staff component in missions and extending the use of locally recruited personnel (Coolsaet 1998: 19; Cooper 1999: 52; Harris 1999: 36; Jaques 2003; Langhorne 1999.

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c) **Democratisation and professionalisation of MFA management**: In response to democratic imperatives for transparency and productivity, and in an effort to shed an historical image of societal elitism, MFAs world-wide have professionalised internal management styles and methods. An important trend is to employ management techniques that mirror private sector paradigms of efficient client service delivery. Administrative streamlining has also been utilised not just to make professional diplomacy more cost-effective but to enhance its competitive advantage by means of technological support (Barston 1997: 25–26; Cooper 1999: 42–43, 46; Harris 1999: 30; Jaques 2003; Vale 1993: 2).

d) **Coordination of foreign policy execution**: MFAs are being repositioned to prevent marginalisation in the management of external affairs in light of rivalry within the domestic governmental apparatus and the activity of an increasing number of other foreign policy stakeholders (Ahmad 1999: 129; Vale 1993: 38). This means that MFAs are redefining their role, as "the pyramid of authority is being flattened by the nature of the work to be done" (Langhorne 1999) and moving in the direction of "being a node in the interdependent network which is world politics" (Neumann 1999: 153). What Langhorne (1999) refers to as the "mongrel nature of contemporary foreign policy" thus requires of MFAs to consult intra-governmentally as well as consider (even solicit) the many new and often divergent opinions within the foreign policy community when advising on policy formulation in the process of coordinating coherent national policy responses to regional and global developments. For the Developing World, such coordination assumes a higher priority in light of the imperative to render developmental issues the driving force behind foreign policy (Barston 1997: 11, 26; Coolsaet 1998: 14; Burt and Robison 1998: vi–x; Neumann 1999: 159–163; Rozental 1999: 141).

4.3.2 **Refining diplomatic training**

A prominent element in the transformation of professional diplomacy and MFAs has been the world-wide increase in emphasis on diplomatic training (Cooper 1999: 43; Klieman 1999: 84; Komachi 1999: 109; Rozental 1999: 133, 139). This has been done in order to enable diplomats to fulfil their increasingly complicated functions and roles in light of contemporary challenges to the profession. As Langhorne

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(1999) observes, the questions regarding what diplomats should be trained and retrained to do "are not signs of intellectual or political weakness but accurately reflect the acute difficulties of operating in a transitional situation". Career-specific training has thus become indispensable to avoid what Ton (1996) describes as “teaching the officials of the future to solve the problems of the past”. Various MFAs have, in fact, over the past two decades identified diplomatic training as crucial to capacity building and are working towards private sector[49] standards in terms of investment in staff training (Burt and Robison 1998: xii; Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Meerts 1999: 90; Riordan 2003: 118; Vale 1993: 3).

The disintegration of the communist bloc and the necessity for the many new states at the end of the Cold War to have functional foreign services have added to the groundswell in diplomatic training. By the start of the new millennium there were more than forty formal diplomatic training academies in the world – notwithstanding the growing number of academic institutions and NGOs that offer studies in diplomacy (Canada DFAIT CFSI 2003; FSLD 1993: 2; Galeana 1992: 7; DAL 2003). The number of dedicated diplomatic training centres is increasing as a “growing awareness in the developing countries about the usefulness of training diplomats in their home country” takes place (Meerts 1991: 5). Specific international trends and standards with regard to diplomatic training will be discussed subsequently.

The debate at the end of the 20th century about a possible demise in the relevance of diplomacy has been useful to the profession in the sense that it has generated research, which had been deficient before, on the institution itself. In the process, various theorists have rejected the notion that the profession has become irrelevant to contemporary needs. As Sharp (1999: 42) observes, the argument is negated in practice by the irrefutable fact that professional diplomacy continues to increase in quantity and that it remains in universal demand.

Writers like Coolsaet (1998: 1), Langhorne (1999) and Sofer (1988: 204–205) contend that modern diplomacy remains a principal institution of the international society and that it has not changed in nature, but that mutations in its styles and

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methods reflect the dynamics of the international system. As Hocking (1999a: 23) suggests, the machinery of diplomacy is continuously transformed through “layers of change that build on each other”. The institution itself is thus in ongoing evolution; a process that can be sustained as long as diplomacy displays "a high degree of institutional and conceptual innovation" (Wiseman 1999: 11). This innovation is evidenced in the structural reform that MFAs all over the world are implementing. Even though they no longer hold a monopoly in the conduct of external relations, Otermi (1992: 25) notes that "the tasks that foreign services must cover are wider, more intense and more specialised than they were in classic diplomacy". A crucial response in this regard is the prioritisation of career-specific diplomatic training.

5. CONCLUSION

Diplomacy has always been in a state of evolution[50] but the past century has had a particularly dramatic impact on the institution, exponentially expanding its scope and means and the number of actors involved. Humankind's most violent century prompted an “avalanche of history”, as Feltham (1993: 2) phrases it, causing change at every conceivable level at a tempo that left people bewildered and systems inadequate. Whereas the focus of diplomacy had for centuries been Europe, the 20th century diffused this centre of gravity as dozens of new states entered the international arena. They impacted on every aspect of diplomacy – its demographics, its agenda and its styles and methods.

One constant has been the incremental professionalisation of the institution. If anything, diplomacy has become more institutionalised, more legalised and more exercised than ever before. As Sofer (1988: 208) says, rather than characterising the contemporary era as the decline of diplomacy, it may well become known as the “century of diplomacy”. In the process, diplomacy has become truly globalised, along with all the other areas of human concern. The reality that increasing numbers of international issues now transcend the traditional jurisdiction of states, has added to the creation of supranational organisations and has produced a frenzy of multilateral diplomacy during the second half of the 20th century. In addition, the democratisation of international society and the fact that many issues

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on the diplomatic agenda are of a technical nature have prompted the involvement of a-national and sub-national entities in the international arena, rivalling the traditional monopoly of professional diplomats in the field. The field of diplomacy has, as a result, become much more complex and the profession increasingly subject to public scrutiny, with a symbiotic relationship developing between 'official' and 'unofficial' diplomacy. The role of professional diplomats therefore shifts to facilitation and management of diplomatic processes, a position that is enabled by their legal status as representatives of sovereign states.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the end of the 20th century once again saw a polarised debate around the continued relevance of professional diplomacy. Proponents of the profession acknowledge the problem areas that are targeted, but agree unanimously that the original *raison d'être* of diplomacy remains commanding, even if the primacy of the state has been challenged both in theory and practice. They maintain further that the institution is experiencing "a logical, requisite, historical change ... not a diplomatic revolution, but a continuous process of organic development and adaptation" (Sofer 1988: 205), and that its mechanisms, specifically the resident ambassador, have increased rather than decreased in significance. However, the criticisms of diplomacy and its mechanisms are important because they highlight the areas within the profession that need transformation. As Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 67) note, the "structure and behaviour of the diplomatic machine has always been a response to the needs of the players on the international stage". Continued transformation within professional diplomacy to meet these changing needs is thus of the essence. In addition, pro-active diplomatic training is required to produce the kind of professionals that can counter the risks and seize the opportunities presented by contemporary challenges to diplomacy.

The next chapter will focus on the contemporary division between so-called Developed and Developing 'Worlds', which has had a substantial impact on the global practice of diplomacy and which has spawned a new and distinct, agenda-driven 'diplomacy of development'.

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[1] This estimate is generally supported in the literature, in spite of a lack of recorded information on the subject. Cohen (1999: 3) notes that the first diplomatic document, inscribed on a cuneiform tablet, dates back to about 2500 BCE.
[2] Greek ambassadors were a select group: in fact, the Greek word for envoy or ambassador – *presbeis* (plural) – means 'important person' (Magalhaes 1988: 19).
[3] On the other hand, Magalhaes (1988:24) has remarked that the diplomatic contribution of the Romans was underestimated because of an overemphasis by historians on their alleged preference for warfare.
[4] China's ethnocentric approach, according to Cohen (1999: 11) backfired in its 19th century dealings with European powers.
[5] According to the *Ordo Regum Christianorum*, decreed in 1504 by Pope Julius II, the precedence of monarchs (and hence their ambassadors) was determined by the age of their monarchy. It did not provide a long-term solution and was replaced in 1761 by the *Pacta de Famille* that determined seniority according to the period an ambassador had been accredited to a specific court. This practice, after initial scepticism, eventually spread and evolved into contemporary diplomatic law.
[6] The Modern Age commenced with the onset of the Renaissance in Europe during the latter half of the 15th century (Magalhaes 1988: 27).
[7]The word *concert* denotes states acting in harmony; and after the Napoleonic wars, in alliance: according to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 90) "not just for the achievement of victory, but for the containment of revolution, the maintenance of peace and the re-establishment of ... a general system of public law in Europe".
[8] Sofer (1988: 200) said that the newly formed Soviet Union seemed the most likely candidate to apply the rules of the *new diplomacy*, in terms of the ideology of proletarian rule, but was "soon disillusioned, reverting to traditional methods of diplomacy".
[9] Some commentators do not subscribe to the differentiation between old and new diplomacy. For example, Nicolson (1934:184) includes both concepts in a continuum of change, referring to "a stage in [diplomacy's] long process of adjustment", with the essential principles of diplomacy unaltered. And Sofer (1988: 195) expressed the opinion that the divisive distinction between *old* and *new* diplomacy was "simplistic and inaccurate", inferring revolution when the profession was really undergoing continuity and evolution. According to Magalhaes (1988: 45) the distinction had created intellectual confusion between foreign policy and its instrument (diplomacy) – a lack of distinction that remained, in his opinion, evident in the works of many American theorists.
[10] Venue of the annual WEF meeting that brings together hundreds of government officials, bankers, academics, journalists and politicians from all over the world.
[11] Cohen (1999: 4) points out that, in fact, the first resident ambassadors in recorded history, at the court of Hammurabi, predate the Renaissance by 3000 years.
[12] France took the longest to take to the practice, having shown an historical predilection for personal diplomacy (Barston 1997: 107; Magalhaes 1988: 37).
[13] Armstrong (1999: 44) as well as Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 115) note that the US took longer – well into the 20th century – to devote significant resources to the development of a professional diplomatic service, due to an ingrained distrust of the profession's merit and a belief that diplomats, both American and foreign, did not share the ideals of the American revolution.
[14] In Russia, for example, the diplomatic service remained exclusive in that it officially prohibited entry by a range of socially 'inferior' groups, including Jews (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 90).
[15] The fact that diplomats were expected to have an independent income during their apprenticeship as *attachés,* no doubt helped to sustain the aristocratic profile of diplomacy (Babb 1974: 4; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 100).
[16] In many instances social exclusivity evolved into academic elitism, for example Oxbridge education in the UK and Ivy League education in the US (Babb 1974: 7; Riordan 2003: 16).
[17] Cohen (1999: 11) notes that as far back as the 5th century BCE, Indian and Chinese diplomatic writings (e.g. the *Arthashastra* and *Tso Chuen*) articulated the qualities of ideal emissaries.
[18] As from 1859, Russian candidates had to pass an examination in modern languages, 'diplomatic science' (international law, economics and statistics) and *précis* writing (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 98).
[19] The French Foreign Minister Torcy established the first 'Political Academy' for the training of diplomats in the closing years of Louis XIV's reign (Keens-Soper 1996: 6). Prior to 1877, entry to the French foreign service depended more on patronage than upon academic achievement. After that, all entrants to the French Foreign Service had to pass a qualifying test (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 98).

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[20] Prussia "set great store by the professional expertise of its diplomats" (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 98). According to regulations laid down in 1827, candidates for the diplomatic service had a) to have completed three years at university b) to have passed the two first examinations required by the state civil service and c) to have served eighteen months in provincial government. If, after that, they were selected as diplomats, they had to work for a year as unpaid *attachés* before taking and passing further examinations in modern political history, commerce, law and French.
[21]When Jesuit funding of the Institute could no longer be sustained in 1773, the Institute was deemed sufficiently important to be funded entirely by the state (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995:77).
[22] The derived ideology, *globalism*, can simply be described as the movement towards a border-less world.
[23] Authors such as Kristof (1999: 13–14) and Wolf (2001: 179–181) contend that current globalisation has not yet succeeded in inter-linking the world economy to the extent that it was a century ago; with labour and capital less mobile and people now more restricted by sovereign borders than they were a hundred years ago. Kristof does concede, however, that today's globalisation is essentially different and materially affects more individuals than at any other time in history.
[24] Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, in 1999 ordered a staff report on intervention, effectively to reinterpret the traditional understanding of sovereignty. The theme was forcefully raised in a speech by Annan to the UNGA on 20 September 1999.
[25] Twenty-one of them as a result of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Langhorne and Wallace 1999: 17).
[26] Klieman (1999: 89–91) describes how Israeli diplomacy has over the years been dominated by personal initiatives by leaders such as Shimon Peres; sometimes with recessive impact on the foreign ministry, sometimes boosting its work.
[27] Smith (1998: 100) uses the example of Iran's Khatami who has on occasion deliberately conveyed messages to the US *via* television (CNN) interviews.
[28] A caveat is required: In non-democratic states, as well as states that have nascent democracies, diplomacy is still largely the domain of governments (Newsom 1989: 35). However, the world-wide trend is towards democratisation of the foreign policy-making process.
[29] Eban (1998: 99) notes in the case of the US the additional layer of intervention in diplomacy by national security advisors and personal representatives of the President.
[30] Until the 18th century, the common language of diplomacy was Latin, and all diplomats had to be well versed in the language. The use of a 'dead' language contributed to the exclusivity and opaque image of the profession. French gradually overtook Latin and by the middle of the 18th century had become the unofficial, but universal, diplomatic *lingua franca*. For example, the Congress of Vienna (1815) was conducted in French throughout. However, by 1918 at the Paris Peace Conference, English was granted equal 'rights' and thereafter rapidly became a diplomatic working language, at least partly in reflection of the rising influence of the US as a superpower (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 157).
[31] The official working languages of the UN are Arabic, English, French, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish (Feltham 1993: 68).
[32] For example, Cohen (1999: 2) notes that US law firms negotiate with US state and federal agencies on behalf of foreign governments.
[33] Petrovsky (1998: 23) notes that in Geneva alone, in 1998, there were 1400 NGOs officially registered with the UN.
[34]Successful 'diplomatic' lobbying by this NGO to effect a world-wide campaign to ban anti-personnel land-mines, led to the 1997 *Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines* and earned it the coveted Nobel Peace Prize (Petrovsky 1998: 23).
[35] An HSRC (1990: 128) investigation into diplomatic training in 1990 asserted that even in bilateral missions, much of the work is multilateral in nature – in British embassies up to 75%.
[36] Wolfe (1997: 1–2) notes that the number of international organisations in 1940 were fewer than 70, but in 1992 had grown to more than 1000.
[37] Excluding, of course, the powerful UN Security Council with its controversial composition and veto-mechanism.
[38] Duke (2001: 7) gives the example of the European Commission which, by the end of 1998, had an external service consisting of 111 delegations and 17 offices, considered to be traditional embassies by the 1961 Vienna Convention, and making it the fourth largest 'diplomatic service' in the world.

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[39] Of course, the reverse also occurs. Some rulers get along so well that their personal 'chemistry' – sometimes unexpectedly – fuels and facilitates follow-up diplomatic action to iron out the details of an impromptu agreement.
[40] A relatively recent development in diplomacy has been the emergence of professional diplomats as media personalities (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 234).
[41] The 2003 war on Iraq and preceding diplomatic frenzy may have once again have discredited the role of professional diplomacy as a conflict prevention mechanism.
[42] The failed WTO round in Seattle during November 1999 was a startling reminder of the extent to which NGOs and other representatives of international civil society, in alliance with labour unions, can impede the processes of international diplomacy (Thakur and Lee 2000).
[43] The term 'embassy' is popularly used but is technically not inclusive of the concept in question: 'diplomatic mission' would be more appropriate.
[44] James (2000) gives the example of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a private multinational organisation in Brussels, that employs teams of political analysts – many of them former diplomats, academics or journalists – who provide diplomatic reporting and analysis on areas of potential or actual crisis to supplement the work of Foreign Ministries and embassies, especially those that have fewer resources or limited presence in international capitals. The advantage of an organisation like the ICG lies in its pro-active research, rather than the often re-active work done by individual foreign services.
[45] Berridge (1995: 1) notes as part of the versatility of the resident embassy, the opportunity to intervene politically in the domestic affairs of the receiving state (notwithstanding the Vienna Convention!) or even to pursue hostile acts against state enemies.
[46] Riordan (2003: 9), however, is of the opinion that many MFAs have responded by "burying their heads in the sand".
[47] Some examples are: the January 1993 Workshop on The Changing World and Professional Diplomacy, held jointly by the Centre for Southern African Studies and the International Studies Unit; the 1994 symposium convened by Westminster University and the London Diplomatic Association on the theme 'Are Diplomats Necessary?'; the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy's International Conference on Modern Diplomacy, held in February 1998; and the February 1999 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, held in Washington DC, which deliberated on 'Globalisation and the Future of Diplomacy'.
[48] Notable mergers with ministries responsible for international trade happened in the case of Canada in 1982 and Australia in 1987 (Barston 1997: 15; Cooper 1999: 44–45; Harris 1999: 33) and with that of development aid in Norway in 1990 (Neumann 1999: 157).
[49] A Canadian report on diplomatic training has compared the *per capita* expenditure on Canadian diplomats which is trailing behind that of the private sector, in some cases a mere fraction of what is spent by certain companies, such as IBM, on training of employees (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997).
[50] Der Derian (1987: 3), however, says that the evolution of diplomacy is complete – he says that world society has reached "after a long odyssey the best, final form of diplomacy".

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CHAPTER 4
THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres, which has enkindled the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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professional diplomatic training is both a challenge and an imperative for the large number of states that have taken up diplomacy for development

2. EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

The previous chapters have provided the theoretical framework for understanding the practice of diplomacy in the pursuit of development. It has been argued that political economy theory and the principles of collective identity and solidarity are the theoretical foundations of Developing World diplomacy. The collective sense of identity of these states vis-à-vis the North has grown over the past few decades and has made possible the current phenomenon of development diplomacy.

In order to understand the evolution of the Developing World's collective identity as a distinct diplomatic entity, it is first necessary to understand the historical development of the North-South divide. The emergence of the Developing World, Third World or South found its way into IR terminology only after World War Two, though well before then, primarily as a result of the practices by European powers in the 19th century. The subsequent process of decolonisation and the resultant entry of a host of new States into the international system as a distinct diplomatic entity is also a distinctly post-war phenomenon. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

2.1 EMERGENCE OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Inherent to the concept of the Developing World is the economic inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the development gap between them. It is a collective diplomatic strategy.

The emergence of the Developing World is an extremely complex and multidimensional process, and the unique dynamics that have shaped each of its geographical regions will not be examined in this thesis.

2.1.1 Colonisation and decolonisation

Colonisation of the Developing World resulted from a global socio-economic and political process that started in the 19th century, when industrialisation in Europe and fierce international rivalry for political and economic power led to aggressive imperialism and domination of vast parts of the world (Cammack *et al* 1988: 31, 44–

45). Calvert and Calvert (1996: 5) identify three main effects of colonial rule on subject territories: the establishment of boundaries, the forceful imposition of a political and administrative order and the institutionalisation of centralised, Western administrative systems. Arbitrary borders precluded a shared nation-state history, and forestalled political coherence other than ideology. Previously, political maps of Africa and Latin America were voluntary, and the practice of diplomacy in those areas "knew no frontiers" (Cassese, 1986: 45). Forced administrative orders led to a centralisation of authority and a monopolisation of power, and democratic systems were replaced by dictatorships. The latter part of the 19th century brought to power the ideology of development and the establishment of imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional Euro-American diplomacy. Apart from a brief interval at the beginning of the 19th century, by means of the various types of socio-political colonisation, the Developed World and its resulting intersubjective understandings were forced upon the Developing World. The Developed World's diplomatic strategy up against colonisation. The colonies, in turn, were shocked by the destructive way in which the colonial powers presented themselves with regard to their own identity and ideological dispositions. This contained germs of resistance, which was evidenced by the Developing World's right to self-determination, based on the principle of equality and non-intervention. This paved the way for the emergence of new nationalisms and the development of independent diplomacy, and the eventual decolonisation, or dismantling of the most decisive processes in the evolution of the Developing World's diplomacy (Cassese, 1986: 45). This was addressed by international law (Chamberlain, 1988: 31; Shaw, 1991: 26; Sofaer, 1988: 201).

This chapter commences with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the world of diplomacy in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

The new states of the Third World were generally ill-prepared for independence, as they lacked the necessary diplomatic skills and experience to conduct international relations (Chamberlain, 1988: 31; Shaw, 1991: 26; Sofaer, 1988: 201). Access to and participation in the diplomatic system was initially restricted to those states which met the requirements of statehood as determined by the European powers (Mahbubani, 1999; Mills, 1998: 13; Oxford University Press, 1994: 4). This was achieved by the establishment of diplomatic missions, the practice of which was structured and controlled by the Developed World's diplomatic corps. The new states were thus required to adapt to the rules of diplomacy, with insufficient

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infrastructure and a dire shortage of bureaucratic expertise, many of the new states lacked staff to deal with foreign policy and encountered difficulty in the establishment of extensive diplomatic representation (Malawi 1980; Sofer 1988: 202).

Previous chapters have provided the analytical framework for the practice of diplomacy in the Developing World. Chapter 2 traced the development of diplomacy from its origins in the ancient Near East to the present day, while Chapter 3 focused on the practice of diplomacy in the Developing World. This chapter will build on the analytical framework provided in the previous chapters by focusing on the practice of diplomacy in the Developing World. The chapter will commence with an overview of the historical background to the development of diplomacy in the Developing World, including the impact of the colonial experience on the diplomatic practice of the newly independent states. The chapter will then proceed to discuss the emergence of the Developing World as a distinct diplomatic category, which has enkindled the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behaviour of the Developing World in the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the Developing World and the West. However, in view of the fact that the Developing World is not a homogeneous entity, the chapter will then proceed to discuss the diplomatic practice of the Developing World in terms of its various regional subsystems. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the impact of the Developing World on the establishment of the principles, norms and rules of the international system with the development of North-South diplomacy and the establishment of the major agenda.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1960s the diplomacy of the newly independent states was limited to the establishment of diplomatic missions in the capitals of the major powers (Barston 1973: 210). The majority of the Developing World's states gained independence after the Second World War, and only six had effectively been excluded from traditional diplomacy as part of the British Commonwealth (Barston 1973: 210). Due to the lack of experience in diplomacy, its external affairs often had to be managed by the colonial power (Barston 1973: 210). The result was that the newly independent states were confronted with difficulties in establishing diplomatic representation in the capitals of the major powers (Barston 1973: 210). Due to the lack of experience in diplomacy, its external affairs often had to be managed by the colonial power (Barston 1973: 210). The result was that the newly independent states were confronted with difficulties in establishing diplomatic representation in the capitals of the major powers (Barston 1973: 210).

4.2 Entering the world of diplomacy

The 'world' of the Developing World is constituted by the states that are addressed by the term 'Third World'. However, the term 'Third World' is a misnomer for the Developing World as it does not reflect the diversity of the states that are addressed by the term. The Developing World is not a homogeneous entity, but rather a collection of states that are diverse in terms of their political, economic and social characteristics. The Developing World is not a homogeneous entity, but rather a collection of states that are diverse in terms of their political, economic and social characteristics.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided a theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the socialisation of the Third World's pursuit of development within the International Economic Order, and the resultant marginalisation of the Developing World in the global political economy. This historical perspective, coupled with the fundamental objectives of anti-colonialism and independence which underpinned the Bandung Conference (Section 2.2.1), had led the UNGA, excluded from traditional Euro-centric diplomacy, to adopt a series of resolutions aimed at the NIEO, culminating in the adoption of the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* (CERDS)[4] (Section 3.3.2). CERDS was, however, never implemented and during the remainder of the decade it became clear that there was a fundamental lack of political will on the part of the developed world to address the NIEO's manifestations (Boutros-Ghali 1994: 107; Kaufmann 1998: 11; Puchala 1998: 149). Sofer (1988: 202) notes that apart from their unsuccessful influence on the evolutionary political debate, the practical results of the NIEO were few and far between. It is developed out of the ideological division between the West and the Soviet Union, and the resultant dominance of the Western capitalist ideology, which has shaped the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural differences between Developed and Developing World diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and subsequently maintain – a relative parity with the developed North in the process, the political divide between North and South has also grown, with the Developing World asserting it is being marginalised and exploited through cynical, self-serving policies and actions of the industrialised North (Oats/AEC 1999).

According to Van Wyk (2002), the Developing World's collective diplomacy has addressed issues in the past few decades of the "significantly aggravated relations between the North and South" (Section 2.2.2). This has resulted in a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and subsequently maintain – a relative parity with the developed North in the process, the political divide between North and South has also grown, with the Developing World asserting it is being marginalised and exploited through cynical, self-serving policies and actions of the industrialised North (Oats/AEC 1999).

All these issues bear relevance to the diplomacy of development required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1 INTRODUCTION

Developing countries generally made social and economic progress relative to developed countries between 1945 and 1975. This growth was accompanied by a decline in the proportion (if not the numbers) of Third World populations living in absolute poverty. However, the first oil shock of 1973/74 and the subsequent poor economic performance of developing countries, as the industrialised countries experienced a long period of economic boom, led to a widening gap between the developed and developing worlds, and to the awareness of the vast inequalities between the two 'worlds'. The diplomacy of development is then the diplomacy of the poor countries in their attempts to overcome their disadvantaged position in the international system – a diplomacy that has historically been characterised by a combination of confrontation and cooperation with the developed world in order to achieve its ambitious development agenda.

This chapter will provide the theoretical analysis of the phenomenon that South-South diplomacy is. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the inherent tensions in the Developing World's diplomacy – and its political instability – in many of the relationships with the Developed World in order to achieve its ambitious development agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s the growth of liberal capitalism has increasingly been linked to the concepts of free trade, financial liberalisation, industrial deregulation, privatisation and a diminished role for the state; which have all fuelled the phenomenon of globalisation. Proponents have provided the theoretical underpinning for the practice of free trade as the universal means to the end of wealth creation. In this chapter, the focus is on the phenomenon of development as the diplomacy of development, and the resulting diplomatic effort that has been initiated during the latter part of the 20th century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a large part of the world which, until the 20th century, had not been actively included in traditional diplomacy. It is concerned with the process of globalisation that is fast-tracked by the technological, social-political and economic changes in the world and its impact on the developed and developing countries' foreign policy, which has led to the development of the diplomacy of development. Moreover, from the South's perspective, the process is inherently anarchical and respects no rules, institutions or human rights (ACP 2002; Annan 2000; UNCTAD 2003; and UNGA 2000). Of further concern is that globalisation is not always the best process for the industrialised Developed World, which has led to the Development Round of the WTO in Doha in 2001 (*Africa Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA), 2000). This is followed by discussion of the development plans that set the diplomacy of development from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these on the Washington Consensus between the two worlds. The rise of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is addressed by means of a thematic analysis (PSA DFA 2001; Lee 2002) that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish, and its progress in achieving, a coherent and realistic agenda of globalisation" to produce "results of ethics, equity, inclusion, human security, sustainability and development". The goal is to use all possible multilateral and bilateral avenues to effect the global development policies and measures which will be discussed with their effective participation (Mbeki 1998; Mbeki 2002; UNGA 2000). Some are expected to be between the developing and the

2. THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Globalisation

2.2.1 The concept of globalisation

2.2.2 The divisive role of globalisation

[6] Cardoso 2001: 182).

[7] Thabo Mbeki has established a Consultative Forum with the Business Sector (Lee 2002).

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globalisation is now becoming CHAPTER 4 proponents conceding that an expanding global economy can benefit all, and opponents, rather than simply denouncing the phenomenon, seeking ways to influence its development (INTRODUCTION the opportunities while minimising the risks (Commonwealth 1999; Nye 2001: 3)

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in general terms. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has emerged in the post-Cold War era, particularly in response to the increasing political divide between the developed North and the developing South. This chapter examines the diplomacy of development within the context of the Cold War, as practised by the superpowers and their allies, and the diplomacy of development within the context of the post-Cold War era. It starts with a brief overview of the diplomatic practices of the ancient Chinese (1994: 101) states that Europe "the diplomatic awakening of the rest of the world in the 20th century, [had] effectively been 'exported' to the rest of the world" (Calvert and Calvert 1996 to 2014: 272). the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the developed North has become increasingly typical pessimistic about the South's problems, particularly those of Africa (Nel 1997). Fissures between developed countries on political and economic hegemony, which had characterised the Cold War era, have given way to consensus on the need to address the challenges of the South (such as poverty, underdevelopment and conflict). The South, in turn, has grown tired of political and economic conditionalities imposed by the North. Developing countries have also become more assertive in their diplomatic dealings with the developed world (Saner and Yiu 2003: 84). Diplomatic practices have therefore changed fundamentally in order to reflect the changing nature of international relations. The chapter includes a discussion of the implications that the developed world's preoccupation with its own problems has had on the diplomatic agendas of the Third World countries. The large influx of refugees seeking asylum in the developed countries of the West, which has become a politically sensitive issue in the North, is considered (Adelman 1998: 4). Diplomatic practices, as well as the various aspects of development diplomacy, will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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The '9–11'[9] terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 further contributed to a climate conducive to the growth of Islamophobia, intolerance, xenophobia and racism. The US's renewed preoccupation with national interest has caused an even greater unilateralism in its approach to international security, with accompanying damage to multilateralism, as evidenced by the repeated instances of paralysis in the UN Security Council and the G8 summits (Alger 2002, Lee 2002). The developing world is justifiably concerned that the North's security agenda is being emphasised to the detriment of the South's development agenda. This practice has only manifested solidarity, a key part of the post-colonial diplomacy that has historically characterised the South-South dialogue. For the South to realise its potential in the international system, there is a need to address the lack of solidarity and the weak institutional capacity that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the developed and developing worlds, and a desire to narrow the gap between the two. Development diplomacy is the means by which the South seeks to address this inequality via an equitable North-South dialogue. For this to happen, the South needs to present a united front: as a former South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi (1998), expressed it, South-South solidarity is the key to the success of the South's strategic objective of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of development diplomacy, which is then contrasted with traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of collective diplomacy. Collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the developing world in establishing a more equitable relationship with the developed world in order to realise its potential. An important phenomenon that communication and travel links among developing states often pass through northern facilities *en route*. The continuing priority accorded to All these variables are best understood within a developmental framework, as they relate to the structural constraints of the developing world that maintain it as a developing state as well as many of the considerations that are explored in this chapter. However, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the evolution of development diplomacy.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have considered the evolution of the UN's peacekeeping role, the UN Security Council and the 9/11 events (ACP 2002, Lee, 2002). The developing world is justifiably concerned that the North's security agenda is being emphasised to the detriment of the South's development agenda within this practice has only manifested solidarity, a key part of the post-colonial diplomacy that has historically characterised the South-South dialogue. For the South to realise its potential in the international system, there is a need to address the lack of solidarity and the weak institutional capacity that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the developed and developing worlds, and a desire to narrow the gap between the two. Development diplomacy is the means by which the South seeks to address this inequality via an equitable North-South dialogue. For this to happen, the South needs to present a united front: as a former South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi (1998), expressed it, South-South solidarity is the key to the success of the South's strategic objective of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of development diplomacy, which is then contrasted with traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds.

4.2 The imperative to address the solidarity deficit

Both Alger (1995: 44) and Adebajo (2003: 17) argue that the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of collective diplomacy. Collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the developing world in establishing a more equitable relationship with the developed world in order to realise its potential. An important phenomenon that communication and travel links among developing states often pass through northern facilities *en route*. The continuing priority accorded to All these variables are best understood within a developmental framework, as they relate to the structural constraints of the developing world that maintain it as a developing state as well as many of the considerations that are explored in this chapter. However, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the evolution of development diplomacy.

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the North can dilute crucial South-South solidarity and prevent adequate bargaining weight in negotiations with the North (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 104, 213, 225; Cohen 1991: 26, 33; Mahathir 1999).

1. INTRODUCTION

Without exception, observers agree that the South's developmental challenges [illegible]

[illegible]

developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

2.3.2 South-South institution building

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and [illegible]

[illegible]

agenda, which offers a formidable triangular cooperation pact among three vibrant democracies and economies in the Developing World – all of them active and [illegible]

[illegible] diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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1. INTRODUCTION

On a global scale, the G77 and the NAM are the two most important vehicles for expression of South-South solidarity. The Group of 77 (G77) is a caucus of countries of the South on issues of trade and development that was launched in June 1964 on the conclusion of the first UNCTAD. The G77 has since become the major coordinating forum for developing countries – to the extent that Korany (1986: 30) argues that it provided the Third World's "trade union" – and has established practice of holding caucus groups within the organisational framework of the intergovernmental Group of 24 on International Monetary Affairs (G24) within the IMF. The G77 has greatly increased in size and diversity since its establishment in 1964, and now includes a large number of countries that have little in common with each other, other than their membership of the G77. Although the G77 has been active in the UN system for over 40 years, it has had little success in achieving its objectives, and many scholars have described the G77 as a "talking shop" (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012: 464). Similarly, the NAM has also been criticised for its inability to achieve its objectives, and for its lack of relevance in the post-Cold War era (Acharya, 2009: 1). Despite this criticism, both the G77 and the NAM remain important vehicles for the articulation of the interests of developing countries in the international system.

The G77 and the NAM have their origins in the anti-colonial movements that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in the 20th century, have effectively been the two largest organisations of Third World countries (Berridge & James, 2001: 114). Both groups were established in the 1960s, and have since been dominated by the governments of developing countries (Narlikar, 2003: 1). Both groups have also been criticised for their inability to achieve their objectives, and for their lack of relevance in the post-Cold War era (Acharya, 2009: 1). Despite this criticism, both the G77 and the NAM remain important vehicles for the articulation of the interests of developing countries in the international system.

The chapter commences with a brief overview of the origins and evolution of the G77 and the NAM. The chapter then considers the relationship between the two groups, and the extent to which they have been able to coordinate their activities and define joint strategies. The subsequent 'South Summit', held in Havana during April 2000, officially resolved to strengthen coordination and collaboration between the NAM and G77 in the pursuit of the development and welfare of developing countries. Nevertheless, these attempts have been largely unsuccessful, and the two groups have remained distinct organisations (Dhanjee & Sauvant, 2001: 1). The chapter then considers why the prioritisation of

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1. INTRODUCTION

Latter-day integration schemes in the Developing World have primarily been attempts at addressing political and economic marginalisation within the international community. This continuing quest involves significant diplomatic resources and therefore provides a critical test of the theoretical tenets of Third World diplomacy (Shaw 1991: 762; Soyinka 1988: 231). However, in a broader sense, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomacy that has developed since the latter part of the past century. Its application has been inspired mainly by the developmental needs of Third World countries, particularly Africa where Pan-Africanism[12] has generated the enthusiasm for regional integration in the world's newest developing area (Mytelka 1996: 213; Onwuka 1982: 28). Traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy is the transformation of the OAU into the AU, established in terms of 2001 Constitutive Act,[13] is also motivated by the need for development, as in the case of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which was founded in 1967 in reaction to political and security concerns generated by Cold War conflicts in the region (Acharya 1991: 159). The enduring appeal of the Third World as an identity is evidenced by the distinct diplomatic vocabulary[14] that is followed by nearly all of the Developing World's states, thus underlining the importance of development as a unifying ideology (Mytelka 1996: 213). The practice of development diplomacy, and the impact that it has on the conduct of international relations, is also evident in the ways in which the Developing World's collective diplomacy is directed towards 'North-South' issues, although the Developing World's diplomacy is also addressed by regional initiatives, as is the case with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This analysis of the key issues that constitute the diplomacy of development will therefore be divided into two sections, the first of which will address the imperatives for the Developing World's establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships with the developed North, especially as it relates to the role of diplomacy in the process of consolidating their national identity (Blomqvist 1993: 54).

Although these aspects of development diplomacy are manifestations of ideological cohesion, such as the quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), they will be discussed subsequently with the intention of considering the ideology by which these differences are overcome, as well as the consequences of the pursuit of such

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1. INTRODUCTION

Political systems have provided the dominant, evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy, as has been discussed in this study. This chapter has focused on the phenomenon of the political diplomacy of development cooperation. Within diplomatic practice, the Third World has been identified as part of the past century's legacy of the Cold War (Barston 1997: 4; Bloomfield 1993: 54; Mills 1998: 10), which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is both economic and socio-political in nature. The economic dimension is concerned with the development of Developing World states to enable them to participate in the international economic system on a more equitable basis (Cilliers 1996: 104; Evans 1998; Hyam 2000; Sharp 1998). The socio-political dimension is concerned with the development of Developing World states to enable them to participate in the international political system on a more equitable basis (Cilliers 1996: 104; Evans 1998; Hyam 2000; Sharp 1998). The development of Developing World states to enable them to participate in the international political system on a more equitable basis (Cilliers 1996: 104; Evans 1998; Hyam 2000; Sharp 1998).

The development of Developing World states to enable them to participate in the international political system on a more equitable basis (Cilliers 1996: 104; Evans 1998; Hyam 2000; Sharp 1998). This is followed by a discussion of the nature of first generation diplomacy as developed by the Developing World, which is then contrasted with the second generation diplomacy of development cooperation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC), which is considered by the Developing World (Mistry 1995: 6) as the case of Africa, to be the most ambitious attempt to date to establish a UN initiative, as it is the only one that is directly related to the development of sub-regional economic groupings in order to overcome the disadvantages of small market size. Likewise, the landmark 1991 Abuja Treaty called for continental integration to decrease Africa's disproportionate dependence on foreign aid as part of the self-reliance development approach. However, in spite of the Developing World's determination to achieve these goals by its own methods, it will be discussed subsequently that economic integration considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

1. INTRODUCTION

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[15] Also known as the Group of 77, which is the largest collective diplomacy of the Developing World (Mistry 1995: 6).

[16] The Developing World's determination to achieve these goals by its own methods, however, in spite of the Developing World's behaviour during the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986-1994), as discussed in Chapter 3.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In addition to the political obstacles already, various economic reasons have been offered for the failure of Developing World – Africa in particular – to integrate successfully. Of these reasons the two most pressing are lack of development capacity among members and unequal distribution of the gains of integration[17] (Blomqvist 1993: 65; Odén 1993: 56, 60). However, successful RIAs provide examples of how these challenges can be overcome (for example ASEAN[18], among developed countries (European Union[19]) as well as between developed and developing countries (the latter pair NAFTA[20]). Mills (1998: 3) observes that the literature on development has shifted increasingly from a concern with the international economic environment to a more inward-looking perspective on the role of the state in development. This change in perspective is mirrored in the practice of diplomacy, which has evolved over the past century from a concern with the management of the political relations between developed countries to a much broader agenda that includes the promotion of development as a major diplomatic objective.

This chapter aims to provide a framework for the analysis of the diplomacy of the Developing World. It begins with a discussion of the concept of diplomacy, and the implications of the assumption that diplomacy is a universal institution for the analysis of the diplomacy of the Developing World. The chapter then proceeds to a discussion of the behavioural norms of Developing World diplomacy, and the implications of these norms for the diplomatic relations between the two worlds. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the Developed World in the face of the developing world's most pressing problems.

2. BEHAVIOURAL NORMS OF DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMACY

The behavioural norms[21] of Developing World diplomacy concern the manner in which the various aspects of the diplomatic process – the objectives, methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomacy – are influenced by the unique circumstances of the Developing World. In particular, the discussion focuses on the extent to which the diplomacy of the Developing World is characterised by the adoption of behavioural norms that are expected to bridge the differences in capacity between the participants in

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because of – these divergent approaches to the conduct of their trade. It is important to note that these divergent approaches are generalised trends or peculiar phenomena, rather than congruity, in the diplomatic conduct of developing states. What is clear, however, is that the various approaches are all a function of the circumstances that inform the differentiation between a 'developed' and developing country, and the practical and diplomatic behaviour (Riordan 2003: 101; Sidaway 2000a: 2).

1. INTRODUCTION

In its universal sense, the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical expansion (Bull 1977: 103) and consequent extension of the state diplomatic system, which produced a large part of the world we live in until the 20th century. This effectively has always been an Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core is the dynamics of North-South relations because, as Bull (1995: 135) asserts, Western diplomatic systems have not been sufficiently concerned with the "politics of the gap" between the Developed and Developing Worlds, and the "politics of narrowing the gap" between the two[22]. This difference in style or political culture is determined to a large extent by a state's level of development and its resultant differing perception of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres.

1.1 The role of developmental status

The developmental status of a state has influenced the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the various theorists that contributed to the development of the practice of diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on political interaction between the two worlds. The lack of establishment of a collective diplomacy for the Developing World is addressed by means of a historical analysis of the main issues that contributed to the failure of the Developing World to establish the institutions of post-colonial cooperation, namely poverty, underdevelopment and dependency. Various aspects of these issues are discussed with regard to the role and weight of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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CHAPTER 4
THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters provided theoretical and conceptual perspectives on the practice of diplomacy since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and the practice of diplomacy in the 20th century. In this chapter, the focus is on the diplomacy of the developing countries – a context within which diplomacy is frequently described as the preferred instrument for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, because the latter, by means of diplomacy, becomes "an instrument to achieve domestic goals, driven by the desire to maintain peaceful relations" (Adler-Nissen 2013: 2). In this chapter, the focus is on the diplomacy of the developing countries – a context within which diplomacy is frequently described as the preferred instrument for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, because the latter, by means of diplomacy, becomes "an instrument to achieve domestic goals, driven by the desire to maintain peaceful relations" (Adler-Nissen 2013: 2).

The chapter starts with an overview of the practice of diplomacy in the developing countries, and explores the impact of the socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the gap, on the diplomatic style of the developing countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the primacy of the Developing World's objectives – and the process to establish and achieve them – as the driving force behind diplomacy, and the relevance of this principle for the diplomatic practice of the developing countries. Although the chapter is mainly descriptive, it will be argued that the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

1.1 Negotiation paradigms

Cohen (1991: 17, 19–33) warns against the assumption that of the practice of diplomacy is universal, and identifies three negotiation paradigms that are indigenised to particular regions. These paradigms are mostly (though not exclusively) associated with the developing countries, and are described as the pre-modern, modern and post-modern paradigms. The pre-modern paradigm is characterised by a personalised style of diplomacy, and the modern paradigm by a bureaucratic style of diplomacy, while the post-modern paradigm is characterised by a diplomacy of networks. The pre-modern paradigm is associated with the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and the modern paradigm with the Soviet Union and the West. The post-modern paradigm is associated with the European Union (EU). The focus is on the pre-modern paradigm, as it is the most relevant to the developing countries.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Emphasis is placed on the provided and affective aspects of the relationship between practice of diplomacy in the Developing World and its progressive evolution and consideration as a distinct style of diplomacy. The latter part of the past century facilitated the rise of many newly independent states such as the G-77, the users of and conducting business with a large part of the world which, under the 20th century, the use of informal diplomatic processes within a more traditional, Euro-centric paradigm of diplomacy (Kissinger 1994: 34-36). Barston (1997: 98) reveals that the latter is politically and economically beyond the but also by political and developing world's diplomatic instruments to avoid development of constitutional approval with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised Exclusive emphasis on states as the key actors within the Developing World's use of as a distinct diplomatic style is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set G-77 diplomacy apart from bilateral and diplomacy, and the initiatives vis-à-vis the Developed World are assessed in two worlds. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Developing World's collective address seeks. There are various analyses of the prevalence of personal diplomacy within the Developing World and its progressive linkage as a critical tool of statecraft with the developed world in order to realise its political legitimacy agenda (Barston 1997: 114; Holsti 1988: 147; Kappeler 1998: 43; Muller 1998: 192 Rozental 1999: 138). However, this style of diplomacy contains the risk of the personalisation of interests, the sovereignty of development and relevance to the institutional methods, structure and conventions of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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3.2.1 **'Big men' cultures**

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1. INTRODUCTION

In weak states, personal power is often stronger than institutional power and such states display a tendency for heads of government/state to personalise the management of external affairs. The practice is reinforced by other states' perceptions that the head of state is the key actor in the process of diplomacy (Eban 1998: 96-97). Deborah (1996) points out that the reluctance with which many African leaders relinquish control over the management of foreign affairs can be traced to the colonial era when the colonial powers deliberately excluded the indigenous peoples from participation in the international system. Thus, as Eban (1998: 97) points out in the case of Malaysia, the "Malay leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, with little or no experience of international affairs, found themselves in the position of having to develop a foreign policy and a diplomatic service almost overnight". Similarly, Ayoob (1995: 107) argues that the leaders of many Third World countries have only recently begun to develop the skills and institutions necessary for the effective conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy.

Personalisation of foreign policy and diplomacy, which has been the trademark of many Third World countries, is also a characteristic of the "strong and iconoclastic political executive". Also, as Eban (1998: 45, 94) points out, many Third World leaders have an overdeveloped view of the significance of their own personal role in the conduct of diplomacy. Indeed, this is a theme that runs throughout the literature on Third World diplomacy (see, for example, Bayissa 1997: 10-11; Cohen 1974: 104; Deborah 1996; Magliveras 1988: 80; Vale 1983: 3).

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The head of state or government may also, for various reasons, simply not trust his country's diplomatic establishment to execute foreign policy according to his own interests especially if officials were trained by former colonial masters or a hostile predecessor regime. They (Afro-Asian leaders in particular) therefore tend to [illegible]

1. INTRODUCTION

[illegible] phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. As such, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world, which until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Eurocentric diplomacy. [illegible]

3.2.3 State weakness

[illegible] that are taken for granted by First World diplomats such as democracy, constitutional political institutions, [illegible]

[illegible] as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, [illegible]

[illegible] terms and conditions in nascent bureaucracies – tend to be obsequious because they fear censorship or dismissal. A related problem is the pervasive practice of [illegible]

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appointment of incompetent and/or political allies in diplomatic posts often damages the state's international image and credibility. Even when diplomats in undemocratic states are appointed by objective standards, their professional integrity is questioned because such governments are suspected of installing[25] party loyalists (Armstrong 1999: 46–47; Eban 1998: 97; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211–212; Heldt 2002: 142; Oduntan 2012: 22–25).

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and empirical perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the diplomacy of development. It starts with a discussion of the concept of development within the context of the Developing World. This is followed by a discussion of the historical evolution of diplomacy from the 20th century, with particular emphasis on the changing nature of diplomatic interaction between the Developing World and the West. The chapter then considers the unique characteristics of Developing World diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. The subsequent discussion of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of the evolution of the regional forums that constitute the third-world level. The independence drive of the 1960s and 1970s, and the current manifestations of this imperative for the Developing World are discussed with particular reference to the role of regional diplomacy in achieving a coherent and effective voice in the international political arena. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. The subsequent discussion of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of the evolution of the regional forums that constitute the third-world level. The independence drive of the 1960s and 1970s, and the current manifestations of this imperative for the Developing World are discussed with particular reference to the role of regional diplomacy in achieving a coherent and effective voice in the international political arena. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds.

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2. THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

Even when diplomats in undemocratic states are appointed by objective standards, their professional integrity is questioned because such governments are suspected of installing[25] party loyalists (Armstrong 1999: 46–47; Eban 1998: 97; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211–212; Heldt 2002: 142; Oduntan 2012: 22–25).

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2.2 Lack of professional diplomatic capacity

Even when diplomats in undemocratic states are appointed by objective standards, their professional integrity is questioned because such governments are suspected of installing[25] party loyalists (Armstrong 1999: 46–47; Eban 1998: 97; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211–212; Heldt 2002: 142; Oduntan 2012: 22–25).

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and the diplomatic manpower required by the panoply of committees, regional groups and coordinating mechanisms (ACP 2002; Hemery 2002: 141–142). Jones and Whittingham (1998: 89) illustrate the problem by noting that only 11 LDCs have a permanent office accredited to the UN in Geneva, while all of the developed countries have a permanent staff of at least 20 people – this despite the fact that Geneva is regarded as the capital city of the practice of diplomacy (Der Derian 2004).

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have traced the evolution of the practice of diplomacy in a broad sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within the practice of diplomacy that has only emerged during the latter part of the 20th century. The increasing attention to development issues in the diplomatic agendas of the developed countries, Euro-centric diplomacy, the position of ACP countries in the world system, and the role of the European Union (EU) in the development of the Lomé Conventions are all factors that contributed to the emergence of the diplomacy of development. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for the Developing World to establish and maintain – in a globalising diplomatic agenda.

3.2.5 Financial constraints

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the Developing World, especially in terms of the diplomatic skills required, as will be discussed subsequently. Important, however, is the cost implications of maintaining an expensive enterprise, of which many considerations are covered by the chapter. A few points in this regard will be made here.

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Limited representation has also led to the closure of consulates in cities in the Developed World such as New York, Geneva and Vienna, where access could be gained to the multilateral facilities of the UN or the Commonwealth (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211-212; Melissen 2002: 142). Even stronger states, such as India, have had to scale down representation abroad as a result of budgetary constraints. Although the post-Cold War era has provided the practice of diplomacy with a universal dimension, the capacity of diplomats to the full range of issues that now form part of their work portfolio has not developed at the same pace. Thus, while the encouragement of several diplomacy, a multilateral diplomatic practice that has existed since the 19th century in one form or another (Berridge 1995: 211-212), has been the most obvious manifestation of this development (also noted by Marshall 1997: 142; Wade 1998: 10), it is not the only one that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional European diplomacy. Of particular importance in this regard has been the increasing use of international organisations and conferences by Developing World states, as a means of overcoming their relative lack of resources and influence within such bodies. This has had a debilitating effect on the development of such states' diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological divide between the less developed countries and the developed world. This is followed by a discussion of the emergence of the Developing World's characteristic style of diplomacy, which has been termed advocacy diplomacy.[28] This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural effects that lack of diplomatic resources has had on Developing World states, and the impact these constraints have had on their ability to conduct diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. The opposite end of the spectrum, the diplomacy of the developed world, is then addressed by means of a discussion of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. This is followed by a discussion of the practical and ideological divide between the less developed countries and the developed world. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the prospects for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

ADVOCACY DIPLOMACY

All three of the above aspects of the diplomacy of developing states to the requirements, structure and conduct of Developing World diplomacy, as will be discussed subsequently, can largely be understood as a direct result of the lack of resources experienced by these states in the post-Cold War era.

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down. This non-violent but highly confrontational style of diplomacy is used by the South to expound its interests by publicly reprimanding the North for its excesses and championing the rights of the South. 'Keeping up the pressure' on the North is a common tactic (Armah 1999: 127–128; Pityana 2000).

CHAPTER 4

THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

3.2.1 Diplomatic verbosity

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the [illegible] (Armah 1999: 119; Nzo 1996; Pityana 1998: 150).

[illegible] involves the extensive use of propaganda (Armstrong 1999: 52).

agenda.

[illegible]

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided in theoretical and evolutionary perspective [illegible] practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the diplomacy of development – a notion within diplomatic practice that, with few exceptions, [illegible] the latter part of the past century, [illegible] imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of the large part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. [illegible] approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the 'Developed' and 'Developing Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed and the industrialised parts of [illegible] agenda. Accordingly, various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

into action our decisions", and Olivier (2002) adds that these "postures rather than policies" have a counter-productive impact on the industrialised world. Ironically though, one of the grievances of the Developing World is that it is often at the receiving end of diplomatic rhetoric. As Kaufmann (1988: 61–62; 1998: 11) points out, recommendations concerning developing countries in intergovernmental organisations are often couched in general terms so as to provide a "built-in escape clause" for the developed countries, particularly where these are to have financial implications or refer to a commitment of aid as a percentage of GNP. Thus, he adds, resolutions of the UNGA [illegible] value. In essence, they have as much value as each member state is willing to accord them." The insidious use of rhetoric has in fact become a keen disadvantage of multilateral diplomacy and has reduced many such forums to expensive 'talk shops' in the eyes of the public (Sofer 1988: 202).

3.2 Mass sentimental diplomacy

As discussed in the previous chapter, public opinion – aided by advances in ICT – is assuming increased prominence in the field of international relations, and [illegible] rather than the governing elite, in order to ensure sympathy with Third World issues, and thereby exert pressure on the concerned governments to change policy accordingly (Mills 1998: 9; [illegible] 2002: 29; Smith 1998: 102).

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3.3.3 ‘**Class action’ diplomacy**

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INTRODUCTION

The decision taken by the UN’s founding fathers to move to majority voting as opposed to the unanimity principle, induced structural changes in the post-1945 diplomatic setting as coalition-like bloc-groupings emerged, notably the various Developing World initiatives such as the G77. The expansion of these respective bodies and the practice of diplomacy in general, has been a major challenge in the conduct of global negotiations in an attempt to reform the international agenda to reflect their own priorities. Within this sense, the collective action has rendered the traditional parts of this past of ‘class actions’ less effective, as the diplomacy developed the codes of parliamentary diplomacy, initiated and propelled their own international legislative agenda to a major part of the world (Barston 1997: 3, 20). Eight Ph.D. theses – seven excluded from the Oxford University Press series – have been written on the subject (Hamilton 1998: 16). Technical-cum-political issues that have been chosen as topics of study, as noted by Jan Knippers Black (1988: 201), were ‘those that could be resolved by a mixture of bargaining and persuasion’. Inside this extensive course of lobbying, termed the ‘Development Dialogue’, the developing countries have continually sought to pursue collective diplomatic goals concerning the ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO) and the ‘Programme of Action’ (POA) – a set of demands that were launched in the mid-1970s. The chapter to come thus provides a more rationalised view of the practical and theoretical divisions between the less developed countries and the industrialised world, as the latter has reacted to the Developing World’s (ineffective) attempts to reform the international economic system. Of interest is also this diplomatic style’s resemblance to methods of municipal law, where lawyers have sought to promote their own vocational behaviour with a view to the practical and ideological divisions between the less developed countries and the industrialised world, as the latter has reacted to the Developing World’s (ineffective) attempts to reform the international economic system. The chapter to come thus provides a more rationalised view of the practical and ideological divisions between the less developed countries and the industrialised world, as the latter has reacted to the Developing World’s (ineffective) attempts to reform the international economic system. This followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic strategies between the two worlds. The substance of the Developing World’s collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the areas of multilateral concern set up with the UN system. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the impasse for the Developing World established with the insufficient leverage obtained by their collective bargaining power. This paved the way for the move to bilateralism in order to realise the ambitions of development. Although the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent decline in the use of UN Security Council veto exertion, has led to a decrease in the importance of the international institutions with a history of bloc-voting (Berridge 1995: 74; Calvert and Calvert 1996: 223; Evans 1998: 43; Sofer 1988: 202), many aspects of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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1. INTRODUCTION

Schwab (2000: 97) and Puchala (1998: 151) observe that, in the latter's words, the inclination to take non-Western radicals less than seriously is founded more often than not in the belief that forces of modernization, Westernisation, global cultural homogenisation, global economic interdependence, cosmopolitanism, the movement of ideas and science and technology are irresistible and that these forces will constitute the future. In fact, a radical approach to international diplomatic practice that has Southern interests (1986: 7) for example pointed out that the influences of revolutionary Third World leaders in diplomacy such as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Toure and Castro – to name but a few – have left an indelible mark on the world of diplomacy. Developing countries have also made significant contributions to the practice of multilateral diplomacy.

3.4 Authoritarian diplomacy

Many Asian, African and Caribbean states veered towards authoritarian rule shortly after independence and have since evolved a variety of one-party (or dominant-party) systems (Barston 1997: 105; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211). Hosti (1988: 184) describes what he terms "radical diplomacy" as an attempt by diplomatic actors to change, in whole or in part, the existing international system. This is followed by a discussion of the ideas and aims underlying the diplomacy of Third World countries. From 1988 to 1997 this effect, and the impact of these countries' diplomatic interaction between the two worlds (e.g. the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the United States and Western Europe) is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute the diplomatic agenda (e.g. North-South relations, the liberalisation of international trade, the environment, etc.). However, as the discussion of the imperatives for the Developing World to establish and to progress in diplomatic–style cooperative relationships with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

A defining feature of authoritarian diplomacy is the fact that diplomats are not (allowed to be) politically neutral vis-à-vis the regime. They are recruited on political basis and expected to make a political commitment to the regime and will be dismissed as soon as they no longer do so (Ahmed 1999: 126; Ehrman 1998: 97). Hence, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided the theoretical and conceptual perspectives in the practice of diplomacy dealing with the Palestinian problem. An important shift has been a shift in emphasis away from traditional government-to-government diplomacy in favour of bottom-up people diplomacy, with part of the establishment of direct links with Islamic groups in other states, both Islamist and pan-Islamic, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from the dominant Eurocentric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the 'developed' and 'developing worlds', juxtaposition seen to be narrowly exclusive to the most accepted definitions of modern diplomatic strategy. The obvious contrasts with the normative assumptions and world-views encapsulated in the 'old diplomacy' in fact reveal an evolutionary movement away from the dichotomy of the ideological division between the 'developed' states and the 'developing' states which has worked towards the creation of a distinctly different foreign policy apparatus – the Development Diplomacy – as an instrument of the Islamic world's engagement with the international system. Berridge (1995: 151) observes that this is "characteristic of the behaviour of many states, particularly developing ones, and apart from Arabs (1990: 47–52) and Barston (1997: 105) there are very few studies of their diplomacy". The aim of this chapter is to address this dichotomy by providing a discussion of the principle of Development Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy which has worked towards the creation of a perceived international society dominated by the developed North in order to realise its own political agenda (Komatina 1986: 7; Magalhaes 1988: 82; Wiseman 1999: 8).

All the various aspects of the diplomacy of development that have been mentioned in the previous chapters, such as the evolution of the diplomatic corps, the role of diplomats, structure and contents of Development Diplomacy, will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. The discussion will be concluded by a brief reflection on the conceptualisation of diplomacy as a

representatives of sovereign states (Anderson 1999: 44–46; Holsti 1988: 183–186). An example is the Libyan Revolutionary Committees' Movement's view of embassies as 'people's bureaux', to be headed by 'revolutionary committees' rather than ambassadors. Also, the Libyan diplomats are trained in revolutionary ideology first and foremost means that they are prohibited from seeking compromise or harmony in international negotiations (Pradhan 2003: 20; Shaw 1991: 464).

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided a theoretical perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon of the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, it is a good deal more than the historical progression and specialisation that have marked the diplomatic thinking of Western countries, which in the 20th century, has effectively excluded from traditional Euro-centric diplomacy. In its core, this approach is informed by a keen awareness of socio-political underpinnings of the diplomatic environment and the ability to adapt to and achieve the overall functional changes between the developed and developing states. It can manifest *inter alia* as acts of terrorism, hostage taking of diplomats, violent destruction of state symbols and the use of diplomatic channels for the deliberate dissemination of state propaganda. Examples are the ideologically motivated offensives, which took place during the Cultural Revolution in China during the 1960s (Barston 1977: 172; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 215–216; Maghroori 1988: 79–84). These are the result of the deep, ideologically motivated mistrust between the two worlds. The existence of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The theoretical (traditional) discussion of the diplomacy of the Developing World is established and its progress is achieved per se and in relation with the developed states. The US is used as the latter's diplomatic agent, describing them as "hostile Third World states with large military forces and nascent weapons of mass destruction capabilities ... bent on sabotaging the pursuit of various aspects of key diplomacy" (Starkey 2000: 1). States such as Cuba, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, (pre-2003) and Libya are grouped in this category and the diplomatic issues addressed subsequently are treated accordingly. This consideration is derived by the position taken by the US, based on the Developing World's rejection of the principles of

[39] Anderson (1999: 44–46) describes the Libyan Revolutionary Committees' Movement's view of embassies as 'people's bureaux', to be headed by 'revolutionary committees' rather than ambassadors.

[30] This is followed by a discussion of the evolution of diplomacy in the Developing World (Section 4.3) and the analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda (Section 4.4). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Developing World's diplomacy for the practice of diplomacy in general (Section 4.5).

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1. INTRODUCTION

Puchala (1998: 150) makes the observation that contemporary First World IR theory has largely failed to provide adequate explanation and evaluation of the significance of, the practice of diplomacy in the Developing World. This chapter, therefore, aims to address this shortcoming by providing an overview of the historical dynamics of North-South diplomacy. The development of diplomatic norms within the Developing World has also greatly influenced the latter part of the past century. Moreover, the Euro-centric world order, developed over the course of the historical progression of international conduct, has excluded the unique perspectives, norms and practices that have marked the diplomacy of the Developing World. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the world was divided into two different worlds. The Developed and Developing Worlds have promoted the widespread use of diplomatic techniques such as personal diplomacy in the Developing World. The latter has also, to a greater or lesser extent, embraced traditional diplomacy, although contemporary practice differs from the classical model in significant ways. The Developing World's foreign policy is aimed at the enhancement of its own interests and takes the form of self-regarding behaviour. This is followed by a discussion of the diplomacy of the Developing World's collective diplomacy and the interaction between the Developed and Developing Worlds through North-South dialogue. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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Whereas the behavioural norms of Developing World diplomacy concerned the form of its practice, its 'agenda' constitutes the substance of its collective international efforts to internationalise a range of development-related objectives (Barston 1997: 4; Henrikson 1995: 20-1; Melakopides 1998a; UNCTAD 2004). As mentioned in chapter 3, the practice of diplomacy is inherently normative in character, and the agenda across the diplomatic spectrum reflects the values and principles that collectively inform diplomatic practice (Berridge 2002: 1; Bull 1977: 307-8; Jönsson & Hall 2005: 127-138). Therefore, the agenda of Developing World diplomacy is developmental in character, with the diplomatic practice of the past half a century reflecting the historical legacy of the Developing World's quest for development. The agenda as set out here reflects a broad consensus between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

4.1 LEVELING THE SOCIO-POLITICAL PLAYING FIELD

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological distinctions between the Developed and Developing Worlds, which has led to the Developing World's collective identity as a distinct diplomatic playing field. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that inform the diplomatic practice of the Developing World, and the subsequent impact on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed in terms of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish—and progress—a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its diplomatic agenda.

4.1.1 International human rights

The Developing World's quest for development—and its relationship with the developed North in order to realise its diplomatic agenda—should ideally be a universal moral imperative. Basic necessities such as education, health and food security should therefore be considered universal human rights (Donnelly 2003: 10-11; Forsythe 2000: 1-2; Mayall 1990: 7-8). All these rights and aspects of development, applicable to the Developing World, are addressed by the United Nations (UN) system, and are therefore also reflected in the diplomatic practice of the Developing World. The UN system has been the primary forum for the articulation of the Developing World's diplomatic agenda since the 1960s, and has provided the Developing World with the institutional framework and procedural rules for its diplomatic practice (Barston 1997: 4; Henrikson 1995: 20-1; Melakopides 1998a; UNCTAD 2004). As mentioned in chapter 3, the practice of diplomacy is inherently normative in character, and the agenda across the diplomatic spectrum reflects the values and principles that collectively inform diplomatic practice (Berridge 2002: 1; Bull 1977: 307-8; Jönsson & Hall 2005: 127-138). Therefore, the agenda of Developing World diplomacy is developmental in character, with the diplomatic practice of the past half a century reflecting the historical legacy of the Developing World's quest for development. The agenda as set out here reflects a broad consensus between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

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In an important move to universalise human rights, the UN in 1948 adopted and proclaimed the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Ironically, at that stage large parts of the Developing World were still under colonial rule and did not have the opportunity to support this milestone. However, active lobbying by Third World representatives eventually led to its adoption by virtue of their majority in the UNGA. The universal declaration became a pervasive force in the struggle of all over the world (Mansell 1998: 3). Subsequently, the UN focused on the elaboration of the declaration as the foundation of human rights law and practice through such instruments as the 1966 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, which came into force in 1976. Nevertheless, in spite of these legal advancements, the Developing World continued to be plagued by poverty, underdevelopment and inequality. In response, the Developing World launched a campaign for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO) in the 1970s (Shaw 1991: 196-199). The NIEO was a collective diplomatic strategy of the Developing World to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

4.1.2 Institutionalising the right to development

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological challenges the Developing World has had to confront in its quest for political and civil rights, which culminated in the adoption of the *Declaration on the Right to Development* in 1986. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural characteristics of the diplomacy of development rights. The traditional diplomacy, extended by the use of these norms, is then contrasted with the new diplomacy of development rights. The latter is characterised by the use of the Developing World's collective diplomatic leverage to advance its development agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implementation of the Right to Development, which describes the measures that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter also deals with a discussion of the impediments to the Developing World's collective diplomacy in the UNGA for the realisation of the *Declaration on the Right to Development*, which describes the measures that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter also deals with a discussion of the impediments to the Developing World's collective diplomacy in the UNGA for the realisation of the right. This right, however, remains controversial and polemic surrounding the issue has repeatedly paralysed North-South negotiations, as happened during the 1993 *World Conference on Human Rights* (Calvert & Calvert 1998: 221; Hevener 1998: 152; Shaw 1991: 189-192).

All these various aspects of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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4.1.3 Quest for sovereignty and self-determination

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The Developing World's legacy of colonial domination has ensured that its quest for sovereignty remains a principal (and principled) concern. In the words of a recent NAM (2002) declaration, the "fundamental and inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination" is essential "to guarantee universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". The NAM, as the Third World grouping such as the G77 have frequently asserted, the diplomacy of development, including the anti-apartheid struggle and the continuing pursuit of sovereignty by Third World political entities such as Palestine and Puerto Rico (NAM 2002), of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world in the 20th century, and effectively external factors such as political, economic or military assistance programmes[34] and the inclination of the weak to resist domination by the strong. Yet, as Donnelly (1998: 124; Fieldhouse 1973: 36; Northedge 1968: 9; Neuchterlein 1978: 150) indicates, sovereignty is applicable between the Third World, because the political and economic dependence of specifically LDCs on the major powers to protect them from internal as well as external challenges, as also significantly devalues the ability to act independently from their benefactors (Dupuis 2002: 124; Hill 1998: 36; Northedge 1968: 9; Neuchterlein 1978: 150).

In this regard, Dos Passos (2002: 124) explains that peripheral states tend to behave differently in the practice of diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on the diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. Through the [lack] of their Developing World's (Bozeman 1992: 42) diplomacy is often addressed by means of like-minded analysis. Authority issues that dominate the diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact of the Developing World's establishment of its progress[35] (achieved by Boulding 1977: 157). This can be explained in the development of its diplomatic institutions and the physical manifestation of diplomacy, such as the opening of embassies. This applies even more so to international organisations, particularly the UN, which is the (1988: 205) platform of the diplomacy of development. Both make the principle of the sovereign equality of states coexist with the absence of parity, with less discussed by the fact that, by the distinct embodiment of a covert by which the latter are expected, in due course, to make it, as they did the

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importance of international diplomatic participation as a (sometimes sole) manifestation of weak states' sovereignty (Armstrong 1996: 56; Barston 1997: 19; Cohen 1999: 14; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 233; Keens-Soper 1996: 7; Wolfe 1997: 13).

4.1.4 Non-intervention versus humanitarian intervention

[illegible]

century, international law no longer accepted arbitrary evaluations of sovereignty [illegible]

[illegible]

interventions has spawned a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention and prompted increasing international interventions[36] in troubled areas such as [illegible]

[illegible]

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Previous chapters have provided a contemporary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the [illegible]

addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for [illegible]

this chapter is expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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Third World countries are alarmed[37] by this development and allege that rich countries display selective compassion about, and willingness to intervene in, humanitarian crises, for example intervening militarily to prevent genocide or destruction in Kosovo or Iraq, but ignoring the countless tragedies unfolding in Africa. Third World mouthpieces such as the NAM (2002) have therefore repeatedly rejected the

[illegible]

inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the development gap between them through a concerted diplomatic strategy.

4.1.5 Eradicating Third World conflicts

[illegible]

World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its

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Schraeder 2002: 97). The arbitrarily[40] demarcated territorial boundaries that are a legacy of colonialism are seen as a root cause because these boundaries

[illegible]

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Previous chapters have provided a theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century.

The Developing World's diplomacy of development consists of historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. Instead, it prescribes a holistic approach, informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental change between them with a coherent diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the growing ideological divisions between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres, which has kindled the Developing World's [illegible] identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two worlds. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperatives of multilateralism that will establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the Developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the [illegible] methods, substance and content of Developing World diplomatic practice, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the [illegible] (in [illegible]) are [illegible] by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make a contribution to the [illegible] of

Rocard 1994: 174). The end of the Cold War released a tide of nationalism as new states in the Third World pursued their repressed self-determination ideals. The result has yet again been a surge in intra-state conflicts which have exasperated the Developed World because of its inability to subdue conflict situations in seemingly weak states. Catastrophic involvement in Somalia and, in some areas in the former Yugoslavia, for example, has made the international community reluctant to participate in peacekeeping in the Third World (Ayoob 1998: 38; Kissinger 1994: 805).

The Developing World is concerned about the perceived reticence of the major powers to peacekeeping, but is also cautious about the manner in which it is conducted and insists that selectivity and double standards in establishing UN peacekeeping operations be avoided. At its core lies an approach that is rather than military or political intervention, to address these conflicts. Many commentators, while not denying that conflicts are exacerbated by internal political and economic mismanagement, agree that underdevelopment, poverty and oppression are root causes of conflict, and that, as the NAM (2002) insists, “democracy, stability, security and peace cannot be consolidated without rectifying the [illegible] international inequalities”. A broad spectrum of preventive measures is therefore proposed, including the promotion of democratic political arrangements [illegible] as human rights, minority rights and broad-based economic development (ACP 2002; Kappeler 1998: 41; Annan 2000).

4.1.6 Democratising global political governance

The Developing World increasingly demands inclusive and participatory processes the Developing World will prevent unilateral actions[41] and policies by wealthy nations. The need to reform supranational structures that currently dominate international politics is therefore a priority. According to former South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo (1997) a chief concern is the “need for a stronger, more flexible, revitalised United Nations, capable of redressing the imbalances of development”. On the one hand, reform is overdue, as its anachronistic Security Council, whose composition and decision-making processes are biased in favour of the developed North. Without permanent representation on the Council, [illegible]

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this powerful body, the Third World maintains that there can be no fair or equitable global governance. Hence, the technical level of UNSC reform makes for contentious multilateral debate about the alternatives, also among Third World states. The conclusion of much needed UN reform is the strengthening of its various agencies and administrative structures so as to allow more civil participation and a greater role by peoples and interest groups (Bava 2003; Cooper 2000a; Field 1998: 13-15; Mandela 1998b; NAM 2002; Nanda 1998: 149-150; Selebi 1998b; Vale 1993: 83).

4.2 LEVELING THE ECONOMIC PLAYING FIELD

Developing countries are convinced that the existing international economic order is inequitable and unfair and that they are denied meaningful integration into the world economy (Dalcong and Ge 1992: 93; NAM 2002). Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir (1999) verbalised this opposition to the North's insidious economic hegemony by saying that it is worse than political overlordship because it is "colonisation by another name". Leveling of the international economic playing field is therefore the most consolidating feature of the South's international agenda, and as Du Plessis (2002: 124) points out, considerations such as structural changes to the capitalist world system and the reduction of dependency relations tend to dominate other foreign policy goals. In this regard, the objective is a continuance of the quest for an NIEO, even though the latter term may not appear in Third World rhetoric anymore (Henkin 1995: 295).

4.2.1 The eradication of poverty

The eradication of structurally entrenched poverty, to which more than a billion people (particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa) remain subjected, is an overriding priority for the Developing World (Annan 2000; NAM 2002; Mills 1998b: 13; UN UNGA 2000). According to Calvert and Calvert (1996: 48), poverty occurs when a country's population is high relative to the resources available to meet basic needs such as clean water, food, sanitation, health facilities, housing and education. Often, the problem is not the actual lack of these resources, but sufficient

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Previous chapters have provided theoretical and historical perspectives on the practice of diplomacy. In this chapter, the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres, which has enkindled the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspectives on the practice of diplomacy in a Cold War sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core, the approach that is informed by an awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the 'Developed' and 'Developing' World, and a commitment to narrow the development divide between the rich and the poor through a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemisphere, which has enkindled the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the basic tenets that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. However, the distinct considerations covered by this chapter are explored in due course, to make it clear why these pose major…

distribution thereof or the capacity of people to purchase it (Cammack *et al* 1988: 276; World Bank 2002: 12). The Developing World contends that its pervasive poverty is exacerbated by the Developed World by means of exploitative global trade and financial relations. Primary among these are the suffocating effects of cooperation with international monetary and financial institutions that coerce impoverished states into implementing SAPs at great social and political cost (Bretton-Gibbon 1994: 104; UN/AEC 1999). Another example is the inability of poor nations to afford remedies, readily available in the Developed World, for humanitarian crises such as famine and disease, for example drugs to treat preventable diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, measles and HIV/AIDS.

The World Bank (2002: 3) makes the optimistic conclusion that 'the next half century offers an opportunity to lower the global patterns of economic growth so as to eliminate poverty' – or as Annan (2000) calls it, to ensure 'freedom from want'. The universal Development Targets for poverty reduction contained in the UN's Millennium Development Goals call for halving the proportion of people who live on less than a dollar per day, compared to 1990, and substantially improving health and education in developing countries by 2015 (UN UNGA 2000).

4.2.2 Debt cancellation

Massive external debt severely impedes economic growth in developing countries, as national resources are diverted to debt servicing instead of domestic development initiatives, while important spheres such as education, health and welfare become impossible to attend to, causing a continuing cycle of underdevelopment. Third World leaders (and many sympathisers in the First World) have therefore launched a moral crusade to reduce the debt burden of their countries. They seek debt reduction – so-called 'debt sustainability' – and increasingly call for a total cancellation of Third World debt (Annan 2000; Calvert and Calvert 1996: 96; UN UNGA 2000; World Bank 2002: 24).

Prior to 1982, multilateral official debt renegotiations were conducted mainly within the framework of the Paris Club[43]. However, the sudden onset of the debt crisis that broke in mid-1982…

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This chapter commences with a general overview of the practical and ideological division between the developed and developing worlds, and the significance of the hemispheric divide which has enkindled the Developing World's identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the dominant norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 'imperative' for the Developing World to establish and achieve a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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problems of management for the international community because no established institutional arrangements could cope with the requirements of debt restructuring or renegotiations. In response, the IMF assumed a coordinating role and in 1996 announced an initiative to benefit the 41 most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Ever since then, developing countries have stepped up their campaign to strengthen and expand the initiative, amongst other things to broaden the eligibility criteria so that more countries can benefit from it (ACP 2002; Barston 1997: 144-150; Calvert and Calvert 1996: 92-95; NAM 2002).

Barston (1997: 148-149) notes that debt-rescheduling negotiations are "some of the most complex and technical in contemporary multilateral diplomacy". Developing World diplomats therefore need to acquire the necessary skills to deal with this critical agenda item.

4.2.3 Decreasing official development assistance

Official development assistance (ODA) became discredited during the 1980s as statistics proved the recipients were not economically viable in spite of it. This led to many economic critics writing off the concept, stressing the developmental significance of trade, rather than aid. Third World leaders are concerned about the consequent decline in assistance to these countries, especially in the area of poverty relief (Dlamini-Zuma 2001; OAU/AEC 1999).

Developing countries are also questioning the quality of existing aid and are calling for an improvement in the focus of ODA. In addition, they object to economic or political 'strings' which come attached to First World 'charity'. In this regard, Calvert and Calvert (1996: 49) claim that aid tends to be directed at higher middle-income countries because they are more likely to be politically useful allies to the donor countries. This and other *mala fide* aid (such as the provision of military in *lieu* of economic aid) merely increases dependency and indebtedness (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 49, 234-235; Commonwealth 2002; Jenkins 1995).

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Many commentators from the industrialised countries agree that aid is a moral imperative and that developed countries should commit to meet the internationally agreed target[44] of 0.7% of their GNP as ODA for developing countries, and to meet the internationally agreed target of 0.15% – 0.20% of their GNP to LDCs (Annan 2000; Kaufmann 1988: 62; Rocard 1994: 177; UNGA 2000; World Bank 2002: 24). The challenge and the motivation to contribute to the practise of development in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomacy that has emerged during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical interaction between international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Developing World, and more specifically between the World Bank (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 99) and the IMF (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 99). The IMF has failed to fulfil its mandate, which comprises the promotion of international monetary cooperation, the facilitation of balanced growth in international trade and the promotion of exchange stability and an orderly overview of the balance of payments. However, the World Bank has succeeded in its responsibilities to the Developing World, which has made this organisation the most powerful development agency in the world (Mihalisko 1988: 15). The analysis of the major issues that constitute a diplomatic agenda, as covered in this chapter, is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on the interaction between the two worlds. This is followed by a discussion of the diplomatic system that is in place in the Developing World to establish, maintain and, if necessary, reform the existing global economic management (IBSA 2003; Calvert and Calvert 1996: 225; NAM 2002; Nye 2001: 3). Negotiations to effect these changes are extremely complex and require the expertise and specialisation of Developing World diplomats.

All these variables are set in the context of the diplomatic methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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4.2.5 **Making international trade more equitable**

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The Developing World believes that international market-capitalism, as dominated by the Washington Consensus, has many adverse side effects that are absorbed by economies at the periphery[45], because the terms of international trade are heavily skewed against the Developing World and do not present the special developmental needs of the latter (Katyal 2003). They claim that the global system is tilted in favour of the developed North and that the 'diplomacy of development' is aimed at correcting this imbalance. In essence, the diplomacy of development consists of the historically particular practices that have traditionally been used by the developing countries (mostly agriculture and textiles) which have market-distorting effects, and which, until the late 20th century, were effectively dominated by the developed North. The Third World approach to international trade is informed by the awareness of its production capacity vis-à-vis the First World, and by the need to redress the inequality between the developed and developing worlds. This inequality means that the benefits of globalisation – job creation, economic growth and development – continue to be elusive to the Third World (IBSA 2003; Calvert and Calvert 1996: 15, 103; Dludlu 2000; Mbeki 2002).

This section commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres, whereby a concerted Developing World's resistance to the establishment of a free trade area, as championed by the developed North, is followed by a discussion of the Developing World's collective diplomacy in the form of the Group of 77 (G77) and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the 1970s. As a result of the Developing World's collective diplomacy, the developed North has come to recognise the importance of developing countries and the provision of assistance in trade-related capacity building in order to facilitate the integration of the Developing World into the global economy (Anyanwu 2000; Mandela – 1998 Report; World Bank 2002: 24). The section concludes with a discussion of the initiatives of the Developing World to establish mutually beneficial trade relations with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

4.2.6 **Securing foreign direct investment**

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the Developing World's quest to secure foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is defined by this chapter as a sufficient degree of control by a parent company of a foreign affiliate to influence substantially its operations, as distinct from portfolio investment, which is the purchase of shares in a company by individuals or institutions for the purpose of receiving a return on their investment, but without the intention of influencing the company's management (Moran 1998: 4). The Developing World requires FDI because it is a source of private capital flows and is therefore important for various reasons. FDI is viewed by this chapter as a key contributor to the economic growth and development of the Developing World, and is also considered to be a non-debt creating source of capital flows, which is particularly important for countries that have a high debt burden[46]. FDI is also

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not happening in a stable, consistent and the volatility of markets has created economic and political crises in developing world economies, as demonstrated by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis (IBSA 2003; Mandela 1998a; OAU/AEC 1998). The demand, therefore, that the international corporations who control investment flows be more responsible and consistent in their actions.

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Previous chapters have provided the conceptual and evolutionary perspective for the practice of diplomacy as it has been applied by the major actors in the international arena, to the extent that they are politically and economically diplomatically active. Third World states during the latter part of the twentieth century,[47] however, have made increasingly less use of diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 230; Wills 1998: 7; Zacarias 1994: 174). From the perspective of Third World states, this is a direct consequence of the inequalities between the Developed and Developing Worlds, and a manifestation of Third World states' relative lack of power in the international system (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 230). Diplomacy, as an individual state's preferred practical and necessary means of interacting with other states, is therefore not always the most appropriate tool with which to pursue its interests in the international arena. This is particularly true in the case of Third World states, which have traditionally been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is founded on a recognition of sovereign equality between states. Diplomacy is therefore the first choice, whatever the issue, and a means of last resort only when other means, such as economic power, have failed to achieve the desired objectives (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 230). Diplomacy is therefore the practical and necessary means of interacting with other states, which has traditionally been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. Finally, there is a clear distinction between the diplomacy of the Developed World states and that of the Third World – one's less developed, and often ad hoc, approach to diplomacy, and FDI being one of these means, provides a clear distinction between the two worlds.

The Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. These issues, which are mainly economic in nature, are dealt with under the following headings: Bridging the technological divide; Trade; Debt; Commodities; and Investment. This is followed by a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the Developed World in order to realise its aspirations for development. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the benefits to be derived from the Developing World's collective diplomacy, as well as the challenges that it faces.

4.2 BRIDGING THE TECHNOLOGICAL DIVIDE

The Developing World's quest for development is largely driven by its desire to benefit from advances in science and technology. A redistribution of these means is therefore considered to be necessary in order to accelerate their own economic and social development.[48] Various aspects of this issue have been addressed previously in the context of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debate, as well as in the Brandt Commission reports (Brandt 1980; 1983; World Bank 2002: 3, 24). Briefly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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Acquisition of information and communications technology (IT or ICT) is of particular interest to the Developing World, because information poverty is adversely affecting its capacity to derive optimum benefits from the globalisation process. This development gap, known as the 'digital divide', also inhibits crucial intra-South connectivity in infrastructural areas and in building stronger financial [illegible]

[illegible] approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between [illegible] ideas and information that drives development". Moreover, for diplomats access to – and [illegible]

[illegible] of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for [illegible]

4.2.3 Sustaining development

[illegible] to be managed responsibly". The subject has been a contentious fixture on the North-South agenda, particularly the fact that the economic dimension of [illegible]

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the debate on development should primarily be people-centred (Commonwealth 1999; Mills 1998b: 14). [illegible] (2000), in fact, has included sustainable development as one of the fundamental human freedoms in his Millennium Report.

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1. INTRODUCTION

[illegible]

[illegible] and Developing 'Worlds', and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

[illegible]

[illegible] development (Kaufmann 1998: 11, 13).

5. TOWARDS A NORTH-SOUTH PARTNERSHIP

All these aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently.

[illegible]

developmental predicament of the South, because the latter's problems – literally or figuratively – tend to threaten the North. The problem of development thus, according to Daicong and Ge (1992: 93) "hinges on North-South relations" and can only be addressed effectively through mutual commitments and new alliances at local, national and global level (Commonwealth 1999; World Bank 2002: 23 and 2003).

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the 20th century. South Africa, the diplomacy of development comprises the historical developments, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic endeavours of a large part of the world which, until the end of the Second World War, had been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. As the diplomacy of development has expanded by North-South relations of socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing Worlds, with its various agencies and organs, it has developed its share of failures and disappointments,[53] it has been indispensable in ensuring that the Third World's concerns are fixtures on the global agenda. This has been facilitated on the one hand by the Third World's practical and ideological division between the leaders of the South's underclass and the industrialised North's elites, which has, however, fractured the Developing World's collective bargaining power as a distinct voice within the UN family of organisations such as UNCTAD, UNIDO, ECOSOC, whose very raison d'être was the diplomacy of development, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of an analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter provides a description of the initiative for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which set the tone for the evolving system of the developed North's response to the South's demands, and the emergence of the Group of 77 as the principal vehicle for the articulation of the Developing World's diplomatic interests. Subsequently, the chapter will describe and analyse the institutionalisation of the diplomacy of development by the UN system, with a focus on UNCTAD as the primary forum for the articulation of the Developing World's diplomatic interests, as well as the establishment and 1995 progression of the organisation's successor, the WTO, which is widely viewed as the institutional embodiment of the North's response to the South's demands. Various aspects of the diplomacy of development, such as the role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the impact of the demise of UNCTAD "has shifted the arena of North-South conflict into the WTO". Effective participation in this forum is therefore absolutely essential to the Developing World's pursuit of development. In the concluding section, the diplomacy of development is considered in relation to the South's diplomatic methods, because of the centrality of diplomatic training, as will be discussed. Subsequently, I examine briefly the distinctive characteristics of the diplomacy of development, which is considered, in this chapter, to be expressed by developing states and the developed nations' responses to

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including two G7 countries, namely Italy and Canada (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 208–209; Commonwealth 2002).

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4.2 INTRODUCTION

As mentioned earlier, associative diplomacy is a fairly new development in the practice of diplomacy where relations between states, the focus of traditional diplomacy, are complemented by relations with other state and non-state groups of the same or different nationality within the diplomatic practice as a diplomatic instrument during the latter part of the 20th century. Examples of this type of diplomacy are the 1975 conclusion of the Lomé Convention between the European Community and 46 developing countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP states), which ushered in a new era of development cooperation (Barston 1997: 115). A more recent example is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), an initiative launched in 1993 to mobilise support for African development efforts. Worldwide, and driven by the government of Japan, the UN, the Global Coalition for Africa and the World Bank. The need for associative diplomacy with the North has also produced the OAU/African Union-sponsored New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The chapter will show that associative diplomacy, forms the core identity of South-South diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy that has evolved from traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural engagements with the diplomacy of developing countries in order to highlight the unique challenges that confront the diplomat of the Developing World in the context of the 21st century. The chapter concludes with a discussion on diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

4.2 ASSOCIATIVE DIPLOMACY

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1. INTRODUCTION

The World Bank (2002: 23) proffers that "much stronger institutions, as well as mutually beneficial partnerships between developing and developed countries to a bold global vision and accord to eliminate poverty and to protect and manage a broader portfolio of assets that will provide the building blocks for future generations" are required to meet the challenges of sustainable development. However, as Stokke (2000: 2) points out, "[a] broad definition of development cooperation would therefore include all efforts by the international community to promote development, irrespective of the channels and instruments used". Active diplomacy is therefore an integral part of the pursuit for development, and the diplomacy of development can be understood within the parameters of the prevailing international order that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from the traditional European diplomatic system.

2. Obtaining a global commitment to development

The need to address the development challenges in the South has been on the international agenda since the 1960s, when the United Nations declared the 1960s as the First United Nations Development Decade (UNDDI). Since then, the UN has declared four more development decades, and has convened a number of conferences on development issues, as well as adopted numerous resolutions and declarations on development (Stokke 2000: 1). Despite the UN's role in development, it was only in the 1970s that the issue of development became a prominent feature on the international agenda. This was largely due to the increasing assertiveness of the developing countries in the UN General Assembly, which led to the adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (Stokke 2000: 1). The NIEO was a collective diplomatic effort by the developing countries to address global economic inequalities and to promote their development. The NIEO was followed by a series of UN conferences on development issues, such as the 1974 World Food Conference (Rome), the 1995 World Social Summit (Copenhagen), the 1995 Women's Conference (Beijing) and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg). In the course of these and other conventions, governments have agreed on such ambitious initiatives to support development as the 1997 UN Agenda for Development, the 1996 HIPC Initiative, the 2001 Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002), the Doha Development Agenda (2001), and the Millennium Development Goals as adopted in September

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1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspectives on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the diplomacy of the Developing World. While all of these perspectives will remain relevant, the Developing World's diplomacy has a unique character, which is largely a product of the historical, political and economic circumstances in which it has developed. Earlier chapters have also indicated that diplomacy, as a mechanism for the management of international relations, has evolved in response to changing international conditions. This chapter will therefore consider the Developing World's diplomacy as an adaptation to the challenges posed by its political and economic circumstances. It will also argue that the Developing World's diplomacy can be understood as a product of the tension between the Developing World's desire to overcome its relative disadvantage and the constraints that inhibit this process. The subsistence of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects for the Developing World to establish – through its diplomacy – a more equitable relationship with the Developed World.

1.1 Background

The 1990s have been characterised by a sense of optimism in international relations. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism and the triumph of liberal democracy and free market economics led to a widespread belief that the world was entering a new era of peace and prosperity. This optimism was reflected in the diplomatic agenda of the 1990s, which was dominated by issues such as democracy, human rights and the environment. The Developing World was also affected by this optimism, and the diplomacy of the 1990s reflected a belief that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new era of development assistance and cooperation (Rothstein 1999: 174; Nye 2001: 3). The promises of ODA, FDI and other assistance by major donors in the Developed World has indeed become conditional on reform in developing countries. On a political level, this entails the establishment of democratic institutions, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and the protection of human rights and the environment. In addition, as will be discussed below, the Developing World's diplomatic initiatives have also been directed towards the establishment of free market economies. Trade liberalisation, privatisation of

improvements in legal instruments, greater investment in infrastructure, the eradication of corruption and good governance and budgetary discipline have all become indispensable to securing the help of the North (Leftwich 2000: 9; Rahad 2003).

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INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have dealt with the development of the practice of diplomacy in the developing world and the ideological pressures that have shaped its character. In this chapter, the focus is on the diplomatic practice itself. The aim is to establish that "the development diplomacy" of the Third World is a distinct diplomatic practice that has come into its own since the 1960s. Although the practice has only manifested itself during the past few decades, its roots can be traced back to the early years of the 20th century, when developing countries were excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is inherently political, however, as it is concerned with the domestic and international socio-political imperatives of the developing world. As the World Bank (2002) points out, the Developing World's demanding trade, migration, development-sharing regimes in industrial countries – to facilitate growth in developing countries – will make great demands on industrial countries' leaders and their sacrifices will be evident to their publics. The ability to mobilise political support for these policies[56] will be a crucial factor in the success of the South's aim to achieve a more equitable world order. Diplomacy has been the tool with which the South has sought to address its concerns in the North, and the impact of these efforts on North-South relations will be discussed in this chapter.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the nature of the Developing World as a diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the North and the South. The second section deals with the practice of development diplomacy itself. It begins with a brief overview of the history of the Developing World's collective diplomacy, and then proceeds to a discussion of the objectives and methods of development diplomacy. The final section deals with the relationship between the developed North and the developing South. It begins with a discussion of the nature of the confrontation that has characterised North-South relations in the past few decades. It then proceeds to a discussion of the recent initiatives to strengthen North-South cooperation, and concludes with a discussion of the prospects for the future of development diplomacy.

4.1 THE DEVELOPING WORLD AS A DIPLOMATIC ASSEMBLAGE

The Developing World is a diplomatic assemblage that has been constituted by a number of factors. These factors will be discussed in this section, but the basis of the Developing World's diplomatic unity will be discussed first, as it is considered to be the most important factor in the constitution of the Developing World as a diplomatic assemblage. This unity is based on a shared

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2002: 36; Schwab 2002: 97). This bodes well for the South's agenda but needs focussed, dedicated efforts from both sides to realise the potential of North-South "bridging diplomacy", as Barston (1997: 125) refers to it, to achieve a consensual international approach to the world's developmental crisis.

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within the larger practice of the 21st century, that has come to dominate the international diplomatic agenda in the last part of the past century. Although the concept of development has been used in various contexts, it is generally associated with the process of economic advancement of a country, and the term 'developing countries' has become synonymous with the Third World. The diplomacy of development is therefore concerned with that dimension of diplomacy that deals with the relationship between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South. This relationship has been characterised by a dialogue of the deaf, with the developing countries pressing for a restructuring of the international economic system in favour of the South, while the developed countries have been reluctant to accede to these demands. The result has been a stalemate in the North-South dialogue, with little progress being made in bridging the gap between the two worlds. The evolution of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is therefore addressed by means of a thematic analysis, especially since its diplomatic strategy has been directed towards the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact of these diplomatic interactions between the developing world and the developed North in terms of traditional diplomatic practice.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. CONCLUSION

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the diplomacy of development – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has manifested itself during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the "diplomacy of development" concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic activity of a large part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of the socio-political and economic inequality between the Developed and Developing 'Worlds' and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological divide between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres, which first kindled the Developing World's collective identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the Developing World's diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy, and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its international agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

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advantage". In this regard, ironically, the deep divisions between the two 'worlds' have played up the extent to which their destinies are intertwined. The growing and multifaceted challenges of globalisation and changing geopolitics have made it imperative that a North-South partnership be established, in order to secure global peace and security and the establishment of an equitable international economic order.

South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad (1996b) contends that without effective diplomatic participation in global affairs, the Developing World's comparative advantages are of little use – the role of Developing World diplomats is thus instrumental and indispensable. These individuals have the awesome – the huge task of providing sound policy advice – on the developmental challenges of which there are many. Their contribution to breaking the cycle of underdevelopment lies outside of their countries, in the international environment where they need to work ceaselessly to build bridges of cooperation across borders, continents, ideologies and cultures in order to better leverage their comparative advantage. The implication is that their professional preparation, i.e. diplomatic training, is of paramount importance. As the ACP (2002) states, "strengthening relevant institutions through training and research and development, and continuing education of professionals, is a foundation on which all efforts rest". The High-level human resources, more than any other resources, are a key national development asset, and that professional training of the Developing World's representatives ought to be an absolute priority.

The next chapter will introduce the practical aspects of diplomatic training and will compare current trends and standards in international practice. This diplomatic perspective will provide a framework within which the remaining chapters will address, on the one hand, the challenges of diplomatic training in the Developing World and, on the other hand, remedial actions to overcome such obstacles.

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[1] India, for example, had already possessed a quasi-foreign service before its independence in 1947. It had been a member of the League of Nations and it had nationals who gained experience in staffing of missions in neighbouring states and territories. Likewise, Malaysia had been represented in other Commonwealth countries during the final years of colonisation. In the case of Ghana, Ghanaians were included in the governor's 1954 advisory committee on defense and external affairs, which sponsored the selection of diplomatic trainees. In the case of Nigeria the creation of an

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external affairs department four years before its independence in 1960, gave opportunity to Nigerians to work in representative offices abroad (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 210).

[2] The term NIEO was introduced by President Alvarez of Mexico in 1972 at UNCTAD III in Santiago, when his critique of the prevailing terms of trade encapsulated the concerns of most Third World governments.

[3] Not all Third World states are in agreement that official colonialism is over: the administration of Western Sahara by Morocco, for example, is a hotly disputed case.

[4] Calvert and Calvert (1996: 222) note that the main tenets of CERDS were as follows: fair terms of trade for developing countries, a new world currency linked to the price of primary materials and the abolition of IMF conditionality as a requirement for new loans.

[5] Calvert and Calvert (1996: 4, 96, 274) contend that after the oil shocks, Africa may have lost as much as 30 years of development, and for Latin America the 1980s were a "lost decade".

[6] This philosophy builds upon Adam Smith's contention in his classic *The Wealth of Nations* that an "invisible hand" would generate economic welfare from the pursuit of selfish economic interests.

[7] The term "Washington consensus' refers to the IMF, World Bank and major economic powers that agree on fundamental economic policy, *inter alia* financial and trade liberalisation, the necessity for world-wide fiscal discipline, privatisation, and deregulation of markets.

[8] Boutros Ghali (1994: 101) has noted that the Eastern European countries are much more attractive to Western investors because their post-communist political economies are receptive to liberal, market-economy driven initiatives and they have better trained work-forces to assimilate economic assistance.

[9] The attacks on New York and Washington happened on 11 September 2001 and killed more than 3000 people.

[10] An example of cooperative development initiatives in the South is the involvement of China in numerous technical and scientific exchange programmes and other development projects in various LDCs (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 104).

[11] The name is actually a misnomer because the G77 has an expanding membership and by 2004 had 131 members (UN: UNCTAD 2004).

[12] Pan-Africanism, in an ideological sense, represents the ideal to consolidate a continent of which the political map was drawn by colonial powers. Africa has the oldest integration scheme in the Third World, namely the Southern African Customs Union that dates back to the turn of the 20th century. Even in the years prior to independence, wide cooperation arrangements existed, and by 1990 Africa had eight out of a total of seventeen regional integration arrangements world-wide (McCarthy 1996: 210; Odén 1993: 28).

[13] African Heads of State at the Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, on 2 March 2001 unanimously declared the establishment of the African Union.

[14] Mistry (1995: 6) notes that at this stage, nearly all Latin American states are involved in some or other integration arrangement, some of them in more than one. In Africa, the situation is even more complex. Ching'ambo (1992: 24) points out that within ECOWAS, there are some 32 sub-regional organisations, involving the 16 member states in various combinations.

[15] Many of the integration schemes of the Developing World's bolstering intra-regional trade, but during the mid-1970s and the 1980s, a variety of circumstantial impediments (notably the debt-crisis) caused them to unravel. Nearly all Latin American schemes were resuscitated during the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit with new rules and aims, more pragmatism and greater political commitment.

[16] It is in the degree of intra-regional trade – a common measure of successful regional integration – that Africa lags behind the rest of the world. The Economist of 16 September 1995 notes that whereas in the EU 70% of total trade is intra-regional, and in East Asia the percentage is 50%, Sub-Saharan Africa scores a mere 6.3% – way behind even South America's 20%.

[17] CACM, formed in 1960 among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua has often been cited as the most successful ever example of Third World economic integration due to the impressive macro-economic development of its members in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, it collapsed under political strain during the 1980s because the gains from integration were not distributed equally (Blomqvist 1993: 65).

[18] ASEAN remains the only Third World grouping to have industrialised successfully. The exceptionally high – and sustained – growth rates of its members during the 1980s, with limited international indebtedness, have turned the Association into a significant role model within the Developing World (Odén 1993: 56).

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[19] Particularly encouraging has been the fact that four of the EU's members – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – were still classified as developing countries when they entered the (then) Community (as are most of the Eastern European states that joined the EU on 1 May 2004). The pattern of integration was thus asymmetrical, similar to many developing regions that are aspiring to closer integration.

[20] The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) – the largest free trade area in the world – has aroused significant interest in the Developing World, because it is perceived as an unprecedented bonding arrangement between highly developed (US and Canada) and developing (Mexico) states in the same region, with significant advantages for all partners (Mistry 1999: 3).

[21] The term "behavioural norms" is borrowed from Sofer (1988: 201).

[22] The profound role of political culture in the diplomatic confrontation between North and South has prompted Rothgeb (1995: 34) to use the term "parallel universes". Well-known is also Huntington's (1996) hypothesis of a "clash of civilisations", echoed by UNGA Resolution A/56/6 entitled the *Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilisations* (NAM 2002).

[23] Korany (1986: 5) has noted that analysts as from the 1970s switched the focus of their inquiry into the defining characteristics of the Third World from state emptiness to state weakness.

[24] Calvert and Calvert (1996: 208) say that in extreme cases, diplomats may have difficulty in getting their heads of state to attend international summits if such leaders are afraid that they will be deposed while out of the country.

[25] Otermi (1992: 22–25) cites the example of Uruguay's 1973 *coup d'etat* that led to 11 years of dictatorship. Many professional diplomats lost their jobs and were replaced by party loyalists. He adds, however, that even in the midst of such "institutional bankruptcy" there were still individual diplomats who managed to perform their duties with professionalism and aplomb.

[26] Barston (1997: 13) gives the example of Lithuania's MFA, which, with a staff component of only 170 individuals, maintains 28 embassies as well as permanent missions to the UN (NY plus Geneva), EU, Council of Europe and UNESCO, as well as six Consulates-General – all of that in addition to the central machinery of its Head Office, thus maintaining an "as wide on the ground presence as possible".

[27] Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 212–213) give the example of Western Samoa which, after independence, relied on New Zealand for diplomatic services for sixteen years before opening up its first foreign mission in 1976 (a High Commission in Wellington). However, the authors point out that such financial austerity was been rare in the Third World, because the wish to assert political equality has meant that scant attention has been paid to "balancing the costs and benefits of an extensive diplomatic network".

[28] For the duration of the author's posting in the Republic of Korea (1997 to 2001), the Ambassador of the Congo(DRC) was continuing with his diplomatic functions in spite of the fact that he received no remuneration whatsoever from his government. He was financially supported by colleagues from various other African states.

[29] Magalhaes (1988: 82) quotes a textbook on international law from the former Soviet Union which states: "In the Soviet Union ... diplomacy for the first time in the history of mankind wholly serves the interests of the working people, not only of the USSR, but also of all other countries".

[30] Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 215) note that during the Cultural Revolution, China's rulers recalled over forty of the country's ambassadors to Peking and denounced them for having "succumbed to Western decadence".

[31] Recent multilateral focus on this theme resulted in the *World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*, held in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001.

[32] Henkin (1995: 198–202) notes that related claims to further generations of collective human rights include claims to a right to peace (Annan 2000 calls this right "freedom from fear"), the right to a healthful environment and other rights, "seeking the mantle of human rights for political-rhetorical ends".

[33] In recognition of the importance of this theme, the UN proclaimed the 1960s a *Decade of Development*. However, the results were disappointing to many developing countries and the 1970s were proclaimed a second *Decade of Development*. This undertaking was suspended by the first oil shock of 1973.

[34] An editorial in the Mail and Guardian of 27 March 1998 comments that "even when democrats [in African countries] sweep into power, they find their sovereignty undermined by the World Bank and the IMF, and their ability to implement reform indebted and bankrupt states almost non-existent".

[35] However, Sofer (1988: 205) has added that the actual implementation of this principle "would by the great powers to protect, if not promote, their interests".

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Previous chapters have provided theoretical and evolutionary perspective on the practice of diplomacy in a universal sense. In this chapter, the focus narrows to the phenomenon referred to as the 'diplomacy of development' – a mutation within diplomatic practice that has only manifested during the latter part of the past century. In essence, the diplomacy of development concerns the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a large part of the world which, until the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. At its core lies an approach that is informed by an acute awareness of socio-political and economic inequality between the 'Developed' and 'Developing Worlds' and a mandate to narrow the developmental chasm between them with a concerted diplomatic strategy.

The chapter commences with an evolutionary overview of the practical and ideological division between the less developed southern and the industrialised northern hemispheres which has enkindled the Developing World's chosen identity as a distinct diplomatic assemblage. This is followed by a discussion of the behavioural norms that set the diplomacy of development apart from traditional diplomacy and the impact of these norms on diplomatic interaction between the two 'worlds'. The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy is then addressed by means of a thematic analysis of the major issues that constitute its diplomatic agenda. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the imperative for the Developing World to establish – and its progress in achieving – a cooperative relationship with the developed North in order to realise its ambitious diplomatic agenda.

All these various aspects of the diplomacy of development bear relevance to the required methods, structure and content of Developing World diplomatic training, as will be discussed subsequently. Importantly, the distinct considerations as covered by this chapter are expected, in due course, to make it clear why the prioritisation of

[36] Neuman (1998: 7–8) adds that even for the UN, in the past few years intervention rather than nonintervention in the affairs of Third World states has become the rule rather than the exception. She says that to some in the Third World, even the divide between peacekeeping and intervention has grown increasingly "murky".

[37] Some Third World states that had, during the 1960s and 1970s, enthusiastically supported resolutions calling for international sanctions against errant states, now find themselves at the receiving end of such treatment.

[38] Quote from Hoagland's (1999) interview with Kofi Annan.

[39] Annan (2000) says in the last decade intra-state wars have claimed more than five million lives, and displaced many more people.

[40] For example, the 1885 Congress of Berlin where colonial powers partitioned Africa into territorial units.

[41] In the latter regard, professors Daicong and Ge (1992: 92) of the PRC's Foreign Affairs College put it thus: "no country should seek hegemony or try to manipulate international affairs, or pursue power politics according to the law of the jungle".

[42] 1.2 billion people each lives on less than $1 per day, according to the World Bank (2002: 2–3).

[43] The Paris Club, which mainly consists of OECD creditors, dates back to 1956 and is a forum, meeting at the French Treasury, within which countries negotiate the restructuring of official debt (Barston 1997: 145).

[44] ODA target as agreed to during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992

[45] The NAM (2002) notes that Africa's share in global trade accounts for less than 1% of the total volume.

[46] In the case of Africa, the situation is particularly grave. The NAM (2002) notes that FDI flows to Africa still account for a mere 2% of the total FDI flows to developing countries.

[47] Calvert and Calvert (1996: 230) explain the crucial relevance of TNCs to the economies of the Third World: they are responsible for 40% of world trade, 90% of world trade in commodities and 30% of world food production.

[48] For example, the use of technology for disease prevention, agricultural development and energy efficiency.

[49] Delbrück (1992: 44) notes that developing countries rarely invest their territorial sovereignty in an attempt to counter what they experience as an information offensive, and then clash with the developed countries who defend freedom of information at all costs, amounting to guarantees of their economic-technical-information domination.

[50] NAM first raised the issue at its 1976 summit in Colombo. Its calls have been supported by the controversial 1997 UNESCO report (the so-called MacBride report) which highlighted the profound interrelation between the international media and the foreign policy and image of states, and recommended a reduction in the weight of the "media imperialism" of the great powers (Delbrück 1992: 40, 45).

[51] According to Kubálková (1994: 170) "provinces and backwaters in the future will probably not be countries with geographical disadvantages, but are likely to be countries without access to the relevant networks, or countries whose elites are ill-literate. Diplomats, in this context, will have to cope with profound change in geopolitics".

[52] The popular name given to the 1992 UN *Conference on Environment and Development*, held in Rio de Janeiro.

[53] UNCTAD is a case in point. Despite its permanence, many critics in the North assert that it is inefficient in its pursuit of relevance (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 222; Fidler 1998: 34).

[54] According to Business Report (23 October 2000) the G20's relevance is supported by the fact that it represents 87% of the world's economic output and 65% of its population.

[55] The delegation consisted of South Africa's Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as joint chairman of NAM and the Commonwealth; Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria as outgoing chairman of the OAU, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria as chairman of G77 and Thailand's Chuan Leekpai as chairman of UNCTAD.

[56] In 1979 the Brandt Commission in vain proposed a formal redistribution of wealth from the First to the Third World by way of a 'global income tax' (Calvocoressi 1991: 162; Crompton 2000c).

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CHAPTER 5
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND TRENDS IN DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

1. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have highlighted the challenges of diplomacy on the cusp of the 21st century – and, in the case of the Developing World, the ambitious diplomatic agenda superimposed on those challenges. If, as has been concluded, diplomats continue to play a key role in world affairs and their profession is more demanding than ever with more complex functions and roles to assume in an ever more competitive environment, their career-specific training is a fundamental consideration.

Internationally, practice in the area of diplomatic training varies enormously, even within regions that have much in common from a politico-historical perspective. This diversity stems from the fact that the identities of individual states and their national attitudes, priorities and traditions all impact on their approach to the training of national representatives (Duke 2001: 13–14; Marshall 1997: xiv). This is evident from a human resources statement issued by the foreign ministry of New Zealand (MFAT 1996: 24) which proudly names its "core values to preserve – integrity, a sense of national service and New Zealand identity, and a commitment to quality". In the same patriotic vein, a brochure of the (Republic of) Korean diplomatic training institute (ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 4) claims that it is "a birthplace for world-class diplomats". The diplomatic training programmes of foreign services, it seems, are vested with national pride.

Certain practices are nonetheless predominant or increasing and are typically emulated by newly established MFAs services after investigation of 'best practice' training by older diplomatic services. The aspects that are discussed in this chapter, rather than presuming to be an inventory of all variations, represent broad commonalities and trends within diplomatic recruitment and training. An attempt has been made to include practical examples from all over the world so that actual practice in developed as well as less developed MFAs will contribute to an holistic

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picture of the norms that inform contemporary diplomatic training.

The chapter begins by determining the changing priority accorded to diplomatic training by the international community, as evidenced by various critical perspectives on the practice. International standards and trends as concern the critical components of diplomatic training – its method, structure and content – are then discussed: in essence, the 'who, what, where, when, why and how' of diplomatic training. Importantly, reflection on these issues is placed in the context of challenges posed to the profession of diplomacy by global developments during the 20th century, as discussed earlier.

2. INTERNATIONAL PRIORITISATION OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

Diplomacy was historically considered an art rather than a science, and many people still believe, as Hemery (2002: 141) observes, that "as such [it] cannot be distilled in the abstract and taught, like biology". This view persists in many foreign policy communities, both in the Developed and Developing Worlds, but the rapidly manifesting trend among MFAs world-wide is quite the opposite, namely to widen as well as deepen career-specific diplomatic training. This involves, *inter alia*, the formalisation of professional training in recognition of certain distinct advantages; the extension of diplomatic training, to include non-diplomats who are active in the field of diplomacy as well as to foreign diplomats; and the incremental moves towards the international standardisation of training.

2.1 DIPLOMATIC TRAINING AS AN IMPERATIVE

The evolution of diplomacy is in the direction of professionalism and this process is accompanied by the imperative for career-oriented, formal education. MFAs all over the world are recognising the advantages of diplomatic training, not just episodic but continuous, and are formalising and expanding their efforts in this regard.

2.1.1 **From informal to formal training**

As mentioned previously, formal training for the diplomatic profession is a relatively

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new phenomenon. The creation of special institutes or academies for this purpose is, with a few exceptions[1], even more recent to the profession. Most such centres, including the Foreign Service Institute of the US, were founded only after World War Two. Babb (1974: 13) explains that before the 20th century, the closed community of European diplomacy shared "the same breeding and taste", thus rendering diplomatic training extraneous, because "the right *type* of person with the right experience was regarded as filling the bill". Moreover, it had always been assumed that the most important training of a diplomat occurs 'on the job'. In this regard, a Canadian report on diplomatic training admits that many senior diplomats ("quintessentially self-learners") still doubt that special investment in diplomatic training is warranted (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997). Some countries – notably the UK – continue to rely on a rigorous recruitment process that targets and procures an elite of highly educated, experienced applicants who are expected to learn the technicalities of the profession through experience rather than formal training. However, not all MFAs have access to a sufficient pool of highly qualified human resources from which to recruit, particularly not those of the many new (and often poor) states whose requirements for diplomatic representation exceed their human resources capacity. For these states, diplomatic training is imperative in order to add value to recruits who would, under more propitious circumstances, not have been selected for a career in diplomacy (Newsom 1997: 3; Riordan 2003: 16, 118; Sharp 1999: 45).

Notwithstanding pockets of skepticism about the need for formal training, the world-wide trend, also in highly developed states, is in favour of professional training, regardless of the academic qualifications, professional backgrounds or personal profiles of new recruits. The Canadian report mentioned above notes that "the reasons go from the obvious – the need for foreign language training – through to subtler requirements such as maximising benefits promised by large investments in technology and improving and coordinating uniform professional standards around the world". There is clearly a range of reasons for the growth in formal diplomatic training. Most commentators agree that diplomacy's profile has risen since the end of the Cold War and that the scope of 21st century diplomacy has become so vast that there is a real risk of existing diplomatic structures and personnel becoming overburdened (Duke 2001: 5, 14; Enjalran and Husson 1999: 67; Italy MFA *Istituto*

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Diplomatico 1998; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 26; Otermi 1992: 20). Even before the end of the Cold War, during the early 1970s, a Commonwealth (1971: 108) study determined that "the interplay of political, economic and power factors in the world of today is so complex and ever-changing that it is no longer possible for the uninitiated [untrained diplomats] to understand their ramifications or approach questions of foreign policy in a coherent and purposeful manner". Most MFAs have since come to recognize the danger if unprepared individuals are sent abroad to handle vital state matters in an extremely competitive international environment (Perlez 1999; Sharp 1999: 45; Spence 1997: xiii).

A more practical imperative to train diplomats is the lack of career-specific tertiary education in the field of diplomacy (Newsom 1997: 3; Sharp 1999: 45). In the early 1970s, Babb (1974: 13) observed that foreign services could not at a given stage simply recruit 'ready made' diplomats from other sectors of society, in the way a private company could, for example, recruit engineers from other companies or even from other countries. This continuing reality also accounts for, as Spence (1997: xiii) points out, the "plethora of masters' programmes in diplomatic studies and the corresponding rise in scholarly[2] attention" which confirms the need for formal diplomatic training (also noted by IDA 2004 and Oxford University FSP 1994: 45). By and large, though, MFAs still need to take primary responsibility for the training and development of recruits, in order to maintain an accessible pool of appropriately skilled manpower.

Greater investment in formal training has also resulted from the post-Cold War wave of transformation in MFAs all over the world. The quest to attain professional standards has been accompanied by implementation of private sector paradigms and the application of "competency based management" as part of human resources management. The effect on diplomatic training has been the development of more systematic, relevant, proactive and often more demanding programmes to ensure that diplomats are fully prepared for the *de facto* roles they will have to assume in the course of their careers (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Enjalran and Husson 1999: 67; Harris 1999: 31; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 28; Thailand MFA IFA 1998).

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2.1.2 **Advantages of training**

There exists consensus among practitioners in the field that diplomatic training has distinct advantages that an academic background or other professional training cannot yield. These merits are as follows:

a) **Functional capability**: Training supplies personnel with *apropos* knowledge and core diplomatic skills to develop them into experts in the effective execution of foreign policy – to make them, as Hemery (2002: 141) and Marshall (1997: 138) both refer to it, "policy-capable". This is in line with the private sector maxim that personnel training provides competitive advantage. Fitchett (2000) notes as example that the French government has recently become concerned that public service training of its "redoubtable" diplomats is insufficient to meet current international challenges – a concern that implicitly acknowledges the inadequacy of general public administration training in providing diplomats with functional skills (HSRC 1990: 125; US DOS FSI 1998).

b) **Cost-effectiveness**: Training shortens the learning curve of diplomats and allows them to 'hit the ground running' at Head Office and especially when they are posted abroad, thereby saving time and money by ensuring the efficient and speedy attainment of MFA goals. As such, it is a crucial investment by MFAs in their own capacity (Babb 1974: 22; Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; De Borja 1999: 39).

c) ***Esprit d'corps***: Training fosters *esprit d'corps* among diplomats who had trained together by building a common sense of purpose and achievement. It has the added advantage of ensuring that junior diplomats have a networking basis built on rapport with their own colleagues, which is especially necessary in light of the geographical dispersion of any given MFA's personnel (Commonwealth 1971: 116; Duke 2001: 18).

d) **Professionalism**: Training, according to Otermi (1992: 30) is a crucial intervention by MFAs to ensure professionalism within their services. The discipline and efficiency it fosters, in ambience as well as in practice, promotes the confidence MFA personnel have in their own organisation. By the same token, it

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enhances the MFA's professional reputation externally, and as a corollary the image of the country (Commonwealth 1971: 108, Marshall 1997: xiv; Pahad 1996a).

e) **Individual self-esteem**: Training boosts the self-confidence of the individual diplomat, who has to perform within a fiercely competitive peer group of diplomats from all over the world. Without sufficient training, his motivation and focus and ultimately his performance may suffer if he feels 'out of league' *vis-à-vis* his foreign interlocutors (De Borja 1999: 114; Nzo 1996b; Hemery 2002: 143–144).

f) **Uniform standards:** In light of dissimilar educational, cultural and/or professional backgrounds of new recruits, training serves as a professional equaliser, especially in developing countries. This is achieved *via* the provision of uniform and standard concepts and terminology and working methods in the personnel corps of an MFA (Czech Republic MFA 2003; Hemery 2002: 143–144; Vale 1993: 41).

g) **Career-planning**: Specialisation and elective training, particularly language training, allows for career-planning by the individual diplomat, and better human resources planning by MFAs. This includes the identification of special aptitudes among trainees and targeting them for additional specialist training, as well as matching their profiles to specific postings (Commonwealth 1971: 116; Czech Republic MFA 2003).

h) **Institutionalised research**: Diplomatic training cultivates a positive culture of learning and of continuous research into the subject matter, thus contributing to theoretical and practical development in the field of diplomacy. It is indeed common for diplomatic training institutes to publish in-house journals and/or to host conferences on topical issues, or to provide consultancy services in the field of international relations to clients in the public and private sector. In some MFAS, such as that of Spain, the dissertations of diplomatic trainees are available in their internal libraries as part of institutional research collections (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2–4).

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2.1.3 **Training as a continuum**

Burt and Robison (1998: 64) make the point that “the knowledge revolution is too fast paced to expect that the education one brings to the foreign service will be sufficient to serve a generation later”. They introduce a subject which various commentators have identified as an important and universal trend in diplomatic training, namely the notion of training as a continuum – what the French refer to as *education permanente* (Hemery 2002: 141; Ton 1996). Ton (1996) remarks that "we need to resist the tradition of seeing foreign policy training exclusively as the induction of cadets into the diplomatic service. It has to be designed as a continuous process ... training can no longer be an episode in a career". This is especially the case in a government sector where personnel are rotated all over the world. The huge diversity of exposure among diplomats from the same sending state, in addition to fast-paced developments in diplomacy as a profession, necessitate that officials be continuously trained in order to ensure that they continue to perform their functions effectively (Marshall 1997: 147).

Most diplomatic training centres have embraced this philosophy and concur with the view of the Vietnamese MFA's Institute for International Relations (IIR) which states that its aim is "to train and retrain officials" (Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2). Not just knowledge, but diplomatic skills need to be constantly added or upgraded in light of the emerging RDA (Brasil MFR IRBr 2000; Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 26; Reychler 1996: 6; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 3).

2.2 TRAINING OF NON-DIPLOMATS

Although technically falling outside the ambit of diplomatic training, the growing phenomenon of national diplomatic academies training non-diplomats warrants a brief reference. This is because such training illustrates on the one hand the growing profile of diplomatic training centres and on the other hand the interconnectivity between functions that diplomats are trained to fulfil and the complementary role of support staff, family members, colleagues from other departments and international relations specialists in the private sector.

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2.2.1 **Training of administrative and technical staff**

As explained previously, *diplomatic* training pertains to the training of professional (career) diplomats, and does not (generally speaking and specifically for the purpose of this study) include the training of other clerical, technical or administrative staff of MFAs. These providers of essential support services are nonetheless trained by the same diplomatic academies, albeit in separate, tailor-made programmes. They may share attendance of certain generic diplomatic training courses such as protocol and etiquette, cultural studies and foreign languages. Their career development is thus different from diplomats' and if they should want to move laterally within their services from administrative/consular posts to political (diplomatic) posts, most MFAs require that they undergo and successfully complete formal diplomatic training before being eligible to do so. A few countries, such as New Zealand and India[3], encourage joint training for the development of 'crossover' skills, to ensure greater versatility within their services (Enjalran and Husson 1999: 65–67; India MEA FSI 1997; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 27; RSA DFA FSI 2000).

2.2.2 **Training of spouses and families**

Spouses and families who accompany diplomats abroad are regarded as part of a representational 'package', i.e. their conduct, appearance and utterances while abroad reflect on the image of their sending state as much as those of serving diplomats. MFAs have therefore historically provided (limited and often voluntary) training to diplomatic spouses in areas such as foreign languages, cross-cultural adaptation and protocol and etiquette, in preparation for postings abroad (New Zealand MFAT 1996: 27; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10; US DOS FSI 1998).

The 'representational team' motivation for training remains valid, but a more recent consideration has been the unwillingness of skilled diplomats to accept postings where their spouses/partners will be relegated to subordinate positions. In the case of dual-career families, postings can mean interruption, even termination, of spouses' personal careers and can have long-term financial and psychological implications for the family involved (Harris 1999: 31; Hendry 1998: 127–132; Perlez

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2000; Sharp 1999: 56). MFAs have responded to this problem in various ways[4], and some have included formal training in the remedy. Diplomatic spouses and families are increasingly trained in integrated area studies, and are assisted not just to function in a foreign environment, but to be able to maintain careers abroad by pursuing job-opportunities. Yet another approach is to treat spouses as human resources assets of the foreign service and to train them to work in embassies as 'locally recruited personnel' (Israel MFA 1999; Jaques 2003).

2.2.3 **Training provided to other government departments**

Apart from MFAs, other government departments, particularly those responsible for international trade and finance, as well as regional and local government authorities that are involved in international affairs, are increasingly aware that their activities in a globalising world necessitate expertise traditionally associated with diplomacy. The French government, for example, recently found that senior government officials are insufficiently equipped to handle France's international relations, and have therefore announced that their training will be supplemented to compensate (Fitchett 2000). This policy change is in line with a world-wide trend for government officials who are responsible for foreign liaison and particularly those that are seconded to embassies, to be trained by diplomatic training centres. It is of growing necessity as seconded personnel in many cases outnumber career diplomats at embassies: Coolsaet (1998: 17) and Riordan (2003: 26) both observe that in US embassies, officials from the State Department comprise less than half of serving (i.e. transferred from head office) US personnel. Diplomatic training institutes thus increasingly assume responsibility (as noted in its mission statement by the Vietnamese MOFA's IIR 1995:2) for training of all government officials who are mandated to deal with international affairs. Typical curricula for such officials include national foreign policy, negotiation skills, communications skills, protocol and etiquette (Ahmad 1999: 124–125; Russian Federation MFA DA 1998a; Ton 1996).

2.2.4 **Training provided to the private sector**

Some of the larger diplomatic training centres, such as those of Russia and

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Canada, offer training to paying clients outside the public sector. These clients, whether they represent corporations or NGOs, are stake-holders in foreign policy execution and become part of a network in the field that reflects the growing importance of catalytic diplomacy. Their presence in diplomatic training programmes enriches the practical pool of experience that can be drawn on in case studies and raises the profile of training centres both locally and abroad (Ahmad 1999: 124; Canada DFAIT CFSI 2003; Russian Federation MFA DA 1998b).

2.3 TRAINING OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

A relatively new development internationally is the growing number of governments – including of developing countries such as Turkey and Egypt – that are sponsoring and/or hosting the training of foreign diplomats. The training can manifest in various forms: in the first place, it can be done as an integral part of a state's own official diplomatic training. In the case of Chile, for example, the national diplomatic academy has expanded its constituent mandate of training national recruits by offering one-third of the places in its annual training programme to foreign diplomats from as far afield as Malaysia, Egypt, Haiti and Latvia (Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; Commonwealth 1971: 112; Costa Rica MFRCA *Manuel Maria de Peralta* 1998; Turkey MFA FSTC 1998).

Training of foreign diplomats can also be done *via* specially dedicated training programmes, sometimes with independent institutional infrastructure. India's FSI, for example, has an exclusive programme called the Professional Course for Foreign Diplomats which trains foreign diplomats from "friendly countries" (India MEA FSI 1997: Preface). In France, senior foreign diplomats are trained at its *Institut International d'Administration Publique* (IIAP) (France IIAP 1998a and 1998b; RSA DFA 1997). A third form of diplomatic training for foreigners manifests in the presentation of courses *in loco* in other states, for example the lecturers seconded to the South African FSI by the German and Dutch foreign ministries (RSA DFA FSI 1996b; Ton 1996).

A final form of training for foreign diplomats is the facilitation by MFAs of single-issue seminars, workshops and courses, aimed at an audience of mid-career

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foreign diplomats who are (usually) stationed in the capital of the host state. The Japanese Foreign Service Training Institute in 1998 conducted a global survey and found that the majority of MFAs offered such *ad hoc* training. An example is the presentation of an "Introduction to India" course presented by the Indian FSI, to foreign diplomats who are resident in New Delhi (India MEA FSI 1997: 2; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b).

The question arises as to why MFAs would allocate financial resources to the training of foreign diplomats. An historical imperative is the moral obligation on former colonial powers to assist newly independent states. Countries such as Spain, the UK, France and Portugal actively assist the diplomatic training programmes of former colonies, a task that is facilitated by their sharing of a *lingua franca* and a common bureaucratic legacy. Diplomatic training also offers a convenient repository for more generalised ODA, because many developing countries do not have the human or financial resources or infrastructure available to conduct effective diplomatic training. This type of ODA is relatively inexpensive for the donor state, as resources such as study material and lecturers are readily available within their own MFAs (Debrah 1996; Clingendael 1998a: 6; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

A more universal motive for the training of foreign diplomats is the opportunity to spread influence in other states' foreign policy establishments. Diplomatic training directly influences the attitudes and perspectives of trainees *vis-à-vis* the host state, and often converts them into long-term contacts who can nurture mutual goodwill and ensure smooth cooperation and similar standards of operation (France IIAP 1998a). As such, the training of foreign diplomats is a calculated strategy in foreign policy, allowing a host government to impart selected information to a strategically important audience (Bayazakh 1998; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b). In cases where ideology or religion is the mutual foreign policy component between states, the purpose of diplomatic training is ideological synchronization and the strengthening of existing solidarity. An example is the training by Saudi Arabia (MFA IDS 1998) of diplomats from other GCC, Arab and Islamic countries.

Finally, an increasingly common motive for training of foreign diplomats is the

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harmonisation of foreign policy that accompanies regional integration developments, such as within the EU and SADC. In such cases, a country's training of the region's diplomats is a practical manifestation of its commitment to cooperative and integrative regional foreign policy (Duke 2001: 5; Nzo 1996a).

2.4 STANDARDISATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRAINING

Standardisation of diplomatic training is a process that is facilitated by the increasing incidence of international cooperation in the field, as a result of which more resources and information are shared and programmes are amended to reflect international best practice (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; Czech Republic MFA 2003; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

2.4.1 **Bilateral cooperation and exchanges**

Diplomacy requires ongoing international consensus about its rules and practice and it is therefore not surprising that the world-wide growth in formal diplomatic training has coincided with active cooperation and exchanges among stake-holder organisations. This cross-pollination provides opportunities to hosts of diplomatic training to gauge their performance and to improve the quality and relevance of their programmes. In addition, bilateral cooperation agreements between 'sister' institutions allow them to pool resources such as study material and to exchange lecturers; and in some cases students (Debrah 1996; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 3; Ton 1996; Turkey MFA FSTC 1998).

Cooperation is particularly valuable to developing countries, new states and countries in democratic transition, to get on *par* with international standards. MFAs of these states typically study international best practice before they embark on their own national diplomatic training. The rendering of diplomatic training as ODA by developed countries also invariably results in replication of certain practices and hence in incremental standardisation of international training (Czech Republic MFA 2003; Ngwevela 1998; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

Internet facilities and the use of electronic data storage has made it much easier

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and quicker for diplomatic training institutes to access information on the form and content of training, and hence to coordinate (or emulate) activities (Kappeler 1992: 36–37). As the official web-site of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1999) states, the site had been created "with a view to exploring opportunities to expand activities and to seek partners with whom international training would be mutually beneficial". It is becoming commonplace for such web-sites of training institutes to list the other institutes with which they are in collaboration, an action that in itself invites new institutional links and thus wider bilateral interaction (DAL 2003).

2.4.2 **International conferences on diplomatic training**

An increasing awareness of the advantages not only of diplomatic training *per se*, but also of international cooperation in the field, has led to the institutionalisation of global and regional conferences on diplomatic training.

On a global scale, the International Forum on Diplomatic Training[5] (IFDT), which promotes exchange of experiences and new approaches in the field of diplomatic training, is particularly relevant. Since its inauguration in 1973 in Vienna by 12 diplomatic training institutes, its annual meetings have continued and its participants have multiplied: the IFDT (2004) Internet web-site lists 100 diplomatic training centres and institutes of international relations in 79 different countries that are affiliated with it. (see Addendum A). Themes of the annual conferences cover new specialist areas in diplomatic practice such as public diplomacy, challenges and progress within training facilities, new techniques such as distance training, the financing of training, types of programmes that are presented and the gamut of themes that pervade international diplomacy, such as North-South cooperation. Attendance of the meetings impacts on the academic and pedagogic qualifications of lecturers and institutions involved in training and gives rise to growing bilateral cooperation among them (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; IFDT 2004; Galeana 1992: 7; Saudi Arabia MFA IDS 1998; Meerts 1991: 6).

Regionally, diplomatic training conferences have also become institutionalised to increase networking opportunities among diplomatic training centres and to pool

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training resources. Examples are the regular meetings held by the Association of Diplomatic Academies of Latin America, and the European Forum on Diplomatic Training which was established in April 1995 with the specific aim of coordinating diplomatic training for the CEEC (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 1998; Duke 2001: 12).

2.4.3 **International diplomatic training centres**

A relatively new phenomenon in the sphere of diplomatic training is the proliferation of academic centres that offer integrated diplomatic training to students or professional diplomats whose nationalities span the globe. Some examples are the Diplomatic Academy of London (DAL) at the University of Westminster, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (FSLD) at Tufts University in Massachusetts and the International Diplomatic Academy which was established in 1999 as a joint effort by the Albert Schweitzer International University (ASIU) and the European Academy of Informatization (EAI). The latter notes that its founding inspiration lies in the "changes in the framework of international relations in this new century" (IDA 2004). These centres consider their academic and professional contribution enhanced by the diversity of experience that an international body of participants brings to the training programmes; with the added advantage of an international contact network that is maintained by the institution as a result of the integrated training. By the same token, individual participants benefit as much from the interaction with a diverse group of other diplomats as they do from the actual tuition. This new, integrated academic approach to diplomatic training contributes to incremental international standardisation in the field (DAL 2003; FSLD 1993: 2).

Another development is the move towards international organisations conducting diplomatic training for groups of states, with the purpose of building common standards and approaches. European diplomats training together in order to harmonise national positions on external trade policy, is an example (Duke 2001: 17). The generic training and *ad hoc* courses (on economic diplomacy and multilateral skills in particular) offered to international diplomats by organisations such as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the World Bank, also contribute to synthesis of trends and standards in diplomatic

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training (UN UNITAR 2004a).

It is clear from the discussion thus far that diplomatic training is being accorded unprecedented and growing priority within the global diplomatic community. This is evidenced by its evolution from scant, informal practice to increasingly formalised and continuous career-specific training. The practical advantages of diplomatic training, both to the respective MFAs and individual recruits, have become sufficiently compelling to the extent that more and more MFAs are training support staff, spouses, members from other government sectors and even from the private sector, in acknowledgement of the contribution of diplomatic training to successful foreign policy implementation. The latter consideration has also resulted in a new and growing phenomenon – that of governments providing diplomatic training to foreign diplomats. The prioritisation of training is furthermore manifesting in growing international standardisation of training through bilateral cooperation and exchanges, institutionalised international conferences on diplomatic training and the phenomenon of more and more independent, international diplomatic training centres.

3. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The method and structure of diplomatic training are determined by the pressures of prevailing circumstances, the resources available to MFAs, and the degree to which they are willing to commit such resources for training purposes. In practice these elements of diplomatic training vary greatly, even among states of similar developmental stage. Common trends are the professionalisation of the recruitment process, institutionalisation and outsourcing of training, the presentation of training in as experiential a manner possible and the use of training evaluation as a continuous mechanism to adjust training to the changing demands of the profession (Commonwealth 1971:102; Hemery 2002: 141; Marshall 1997: xiv; Sharp 1999: 45).

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3.1 PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

Recruitment of diplomats entails all those actions undertaken by a MFA to persuade a predetermined target group to make their services available in order to meet specified human resources needs in the foreign service. The recruitment process is fundamental to training because it pre-selects certain skills and in some instances – although this trend is diminishing – is seen as sufficiently stringent to obviate the need for training. International procedures for recruitment of diplomats vary enormously and even within an integrated region such as the EU, these differences create "differing assumptions about suitable backgrounds and desirable qualities to be displayed by a diplomat" (Duke 2001: 5; see also Crompton 2000a). The following broad trends are evident in diplomatic recruitment: a move away from demographic elitism, the application of objective recruitment criteria and the use of a variety of checks and balances in selection methods to ensure suitability of candidates. The wide-spread and controversial phenomenon of political appointments to MFAs, is also discussed.

3.1.1 **Merit: the new elite**

In spite of the demise of the 'aristocrat-diplomat', diplomats in many countries still fit an elitist image – whether by virtue of social standing, academic preserve, or political association. Babb's (1974: 9) observation in the 1970s that "the French have not succumbed to the universal cries for the 'diplomat representative of all the people' but have sought uninhibitedly the most talented" remains accurate and, on a universal scale, it seems that MFAs continue to recruit the best calibre of candidates available as a matter of national pride. This meritocratic approach can arguably translate into a new form of elitism (Debrah 1996; Komachi 1999: 109).

The world-wide trend is to 'de-elitise' the social aspects of diplomatic recruitment, coinciding with greater, even exclusive, emphasis on individual merit (Kappeler 1998: 39). In the case of Australia, Harris (1999: 31) notes that this new approach since the early 1980s has required pro-active steps by government to break down the sense of elitism in the foreign service. Klieman (1999: 84) observes that in Israel, the selection process of aspirant diplomats is not as "politicised as in former

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years, when party affiliation and political patronage more often than not determined admission. For all these reasons the close impression remains one of professionalism and dedication among a younger generation of Israeli diplomats on the whole better educated, more highly motivated and innovative than their predecessors". In the same vein, Otermi (1992: 20, 30) notes that the Constitution of Uruguay ensures that career diplomats are selected "with the maximum guarantees of impartiality in competitions in which there is no recognition of 'any other distinction between them other than that of talents and virtues'". The selection stage is therefore crucial in the development of a professional foreign service.

3.1.2 **Enforcement of demographic representativity**

Tradition notwithstanding, recent socio-political developments in international society have led to pressure on the diplomatic profession to be more representative of its public – and to adopt pro-active policies in compliance with this imperative (Cooper 1999: 43; Marshall 1997: 146; Sharp 1999: 56). Many countries, in their quest to shed images of exclusivity, have resorted to legal imperatives in order to ensure that their public service (and thus also foreign service) is demographically representative. This positive discrimination to achieve employment equity, known as affirmative action[6], is specified in respect of ethnicity, gender[7], sexual orientation[8], race, religion, caste, disability or geographical region and is designed to enable specified minorities, previously discriminated against, to achieve their due share in government posts. Some countries, notably the US, Canada, India, Sweden, South Africa and Malaysia, have gone to considerable lengths to ensure that their foreign services are demographically representative. Others, such as the UK, have also recently taken steps to comply with public pressure for equal opportunities in recruitment, career progression and training policies (Babb 1974: 7, 11; Business Day 5 October 2000; Cooper 1999: 43; Crompton 2000a; Komachi 1999: 116; UK FCO 1999; Vale 1993: 34).

Notwithstanding the international trend for diplomatic services to be more demographically representative, the issue of affirmative action is politically sensitive and there exists no international consensus on the enforcement of representativity. A less contentious method of affirmative action is the practice by certain

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governments to allocate study grants in order to 'level the playing field' for members of minority groups thereby allowing them a better opportunity to enter the MFA on merit. New Zealand (MFAT 1996: 25), for example, offers special scholarships to minority groups such as the Maori's, to consider a foreign service career. During their student years they are gradually integrated into foreign service culture *via* social activities, to ensure that they build up a better understanding of the environment they will ultimately work in. After successful completion of their studies, they are included in the short-list of candidates who had been selected for final consideration. After that, the minority members compete on an equal basis, and the principle of merit is not compromised. Likewise in France, which frowns upon 'reverse discrimination' and the allocation of quotas and which favours a natural selection process in terms of recruitment for the foreign service, bursaries are provided for underprivileged groups to pursue appropriate qualifications for a diplomatic career (Babb 1974: 9; Vale 1993: 34).

3.1.3 **Common recruitment criteria**

In most MFAs, certain formal requirements need to be met before the applications of candidates can be considered. The following objective attributes, which typically appear on candidates' *curricula vitae*, are commonly required: citizenship, minimum and maximum age, appropriate academic qualifications, linguistic skills and select specialist skills.

a) **Citizenship**: Before the 19th century, countries recruited diplomats with scant regard for their nationality. Tsarist diplomacy, for example, often used individuals who were not Russian. This situation changed and by the second half of the 19th century, most European states insisted that their diplomats have citizenship. Citizenship has since become a *sine qua non*, and diplomatic law requires that diplomats hold passports of the sovereign state[9] or IGO they represent (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 101; Komachi 1999: 116; *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* 1961: Art. 8).

b) **Age restrictions**: It is common for MFAs to have an age limit for new recruits and the traditional preference is for recruits to join shortly after completion of tertiary

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studies. However, there is a growing tendency to welcome older applicants – in countries where men do conscripted military service (Israel, both Koreas) or where university courses are typically extensive (Germany), this is a practical consideration. In many other services, it is now recognised that post-graduate studies and some life experience such as travelling, peace corps work or equivalent as well as other professional experience will push up entry-level age. Importantly, these individuals will have obtained valuable life skills that will benefit them personally, and enrich the foreign ministry, during a challenging career. The age limit, previously more vigorously implemented and in the mid-twenties for most services, is therefore becoming more flexible, with a tendency for new recruits to be thirty-plus (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Babb 1974: 10).

c) **Academic qualifications**: It is increasingly rare for MFAs – also in the Developing World – not to require at least one university degree (or comparable tertiary qualification) from entry level applicants. Some countries, for example the US, require of candidates to also have a masters degree in a related academic area (Brazil MFR IRBr 2000; Commonwealth 1971: 104–105; Mauritius MFA 1996; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

The most popular academic subjects chosen by students who aspire to a diplomatic career, remain the human sciences – politics, law, philosophy and (increasingly) economics. Until recently, law dominated the academic background of most diplomats, and as a training in precision it is still highly regarded[10]. However, it is now generally accepted that legal expertise plays a relatively small part in the work of a diplomat, especially since matters falling within the jurisdiction of international law are handled by legal specialists within MFAs (Babb 1974: 10–11; Slovenia MFA DA 1998).

The international trend is for more diversified academic backgrounds to be assimilated within foreign ministries. A Commonwealth (1971: 106) report in 1971 noted that many countries had successfully recruited to their diplomatic services graduates in such apparently "irrelevant" subjects as engineering, architecture and medicine. The subject of academic study has thus, in recent years, become less important than the assumption of intellectual discipline instilled by tertiary studies,

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and academic excellence is increasingly seen as a broad, albeit not conclusive, indicator of applicants' ability to grasp evolving concepts (Rozental 1999: 147).

d) **Foreign language proficiency:** Proficiency in foreign languages has traditionally been a major advantage for applicants to foreign services, especially in countries such as Japan and Sweden where the official language(s) is not spoken internationally. Most services require fluent command of an international language as a minimum and some services require proficiency in more than one foreign language, for example Spain which requires applicants to have a command of both English and French in addition to any other spoken languages (Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

Special knowledge of difficult or "small" languages can sometimes help secure entry into MFAs – this was especially the case during the Cold War when a command of say Vietnamese or Hungarian, even Afrikaans, meant better diplomatic access to otherwise inaccessible governments. However, MFAs do not as a rule recruit linguists, or recruit only a small proportion of specialist linguists (as is the case in France) because it is accepted that the career of a diplomat will be so multiform that proficiency in a rare language will be of limited use. In fact, a growing trend is to test applicants for the ability to learn new languages rather than to test their proficiency in particular languages (Babb 1974: 12; Commonwealth 1971: 118; Jaques 2003).

e) **Specialist skills**: MFAs often scout for recruits with specialist skills because, as a Commonwealth (1971: 105) report notes "an increasing awareness of the desirability of broadening the basis of recruitment for the diplomatic service to enable cross-fertilisation" had become evident. As the New Zealand MFA (MFAT 1996: 25, 29) observes, "a noticeable trend in recent years has been our identification of jobs which are limited in duration or which rely on skills not readily available from within the pool of rotational staff. For these positions we have shifted to individual recruitment and appointment as specialists on fixed term contract". The statement continues with the caveat "we expect specialist staff to bring key skills with them and to integrate themselves into our organisation ... it will also be in their and the Ministry's interests that they retain and improve [*via* training] their

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marketable skills". Certain professional experience outside the foreign ministry can be of particular advantage, for example a journalistic background in the case of someone who will specialise in media diplomacy. Parallel recruitment from other sectors of government can also enrich an MFA. Cooper (1999: 45) says that the "aggressive transformation" of the Canadian DFAIT has been accompanied by "an infusion of talent with specialist skills from other areas of government" (also noted by Riordan 2003: 9). This trend has been reinforced specifically by the democratisation of the foreign policy process which has seen a much wider cross-section of states' public sectors involved in the field of diplomacy.

3.1.4 **Methods of selection**

A combination of selection methods such as personal interviews, psychological tests and examinations are commonly used by MFAs to short-list applicants who qualify according to the before-mentioned criteria.

a) **Personal interviews**: Unless recruits are political appointees, most MFAs require that applicants undergo a personal interview – i.e. assessment of the intellectual and personal attributes of applicants by a carefully chosen board[11], commission or department. The extensive personal profile that is desired in a diplomat, is clearly something that cannot be determined from a paper selection. Often candidates with impressive work and academic records fail during these interviews because their personal presentation and communication skills are unimpressive (Commonwealth 1971: 106; Klieman 1999: 84; Vale 1993: 35).

b) **Psychological and aptitude tests**: As previously discussed, the ideal personal profile of diplomats is fairly universal in its desirability and the traditional demand for talented candidates that are of sound mind, psychological resilience and scrupulous background, has not changed. The growing importance of industrial psychology in the context of human resources management has spawned a battery of standardised tests – including psychometric tests and security clearances – that are used world-wide to test psychological stability and aptitude. As Babb (1974: 1) expresses it, these tests determine "the capacity of the applicant to handle the discipline required of him for the rest of his life". Some MFAs, such as that of

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Norway, place particular emphasis on psychological tests, but MFAs almost universally use these methods (when available) at least as a supplementary tool to screen candidates (Czech Republic MFA 2003; Debrah 1996; Jaques 2003).

c) **Examinations**: Some MFAs subject applicants to a competitive written and/or oral examination, usually involving essays to be written on subjects such as economics and politics. The requirement is sometimes met by candidates passing a standard public service examination, as is the case in France, Spain and ROK (Crompton 2000a; Enjalran and Husson 1999: 64; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998). In other cases, MFAs use customised competitive examinations for aspirant diplomatic trainees, such as are used by Israel, the Philippines and Uruguay (De Borja 1999: 10, 56; Klieman 1999: 84; Otermi 1992: 25). The *Foreign Service Examination* of the US DOS' FSI (1998) is an example of such an entry-test.

3.1.5 **Political appointees**

The diplomatic profession is unique in the sense that it constitutes a career in which experience and *savoir-faire* are essential for success, yet at the apex of a diplomat's career – the final achievement of becoming an ambassador – the position can be allocated to a person who has not spent a single day in the public service (Sofer 1988:206). This phenomenon, in which normal recruitment criteria are bypassed and personnel are appointed by prerogative of a state's governing executive, is known as political appointment.

This controversial and arbitrary system of recruitment is fairly common in developed and developing countries alike: in the US, Singapore and most of Latin America, for example, up to a third of ambassadors are political appointees. Europe is progressing in the opposite direction with many countries (for example Denmark, Austria and Belgium) not allowing political appointees to serve as ambassadors. In the latter regard the reasoning is that the position is essentially a public service and should be done by people who are trained for it, have the necessary related experience and, above all, are beholden to no interest groups other than the general public (Barston 1997: 105; Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; Leifer 1998;

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Otermi 1992: 25; Riordan 2003: 23; Vale 1993: 38, 43).

On a personal level, professional diplomats object to the practice because their career advancement is restricted by political appointments. As Babb (1974: 8) points out, the egalitarian approach of the US in selecting its career diplomats is negated by its system of political patronage, against which its purported pool of "outstanding talent" cannot hope to compete. The problem also pertains to other senior appointments within foreign ministries. Klieman (1999: 76, 91) describes as "disturbing" the fact that the majority of Israeli foreign ministers have had no diplomatic background, but were selected by virtue of political, military and personal connections. This practice, he says, has not over the years served well "the ministry, its interests, talents, collective experience and diplomatic perspective" (Similar observations made about ambassadorial appointments, by Crompton 2000b; Perlez 1999; Riordan 2003: 21; Vale 1993: 43).

Seen from another perspective, there is general agreement that political appointees can be MFA assets when candidates are recruited for exceptional skills, rather than political affiliation. In this regard, Komachi (1999: 109) quotes the 1991 Sechima Report that addressed shortcomings in the Japanese foreign service. It recommended that "in appointing ambassadors, efforts should be made to recruit the best available human resources, including those from other ministries, as well as from the private sector". Sofer (1988: 206) points out that the necessity for expertise in an extensive range of spheres – economics, science, political and military – has made the participation of 'non-professionals' in the diplomatic process "somewhat inevitable". Vale (1993: 43) mentions, for example, that many non-career diplomats appointed to head of mission positions in the US foreign service are in fact not political appointees – they are selected for their technical expertise in various disciplines that are relevant to foreign policy objectives.

3.2 HOSTS AND SOURCES OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The hosts of diplomatic training are the institutions that offer the instruction, whereas the sources are the experts who present training and the material that is used for instruction. These elements, in combination with the configuration of

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training, comprise the structure of diplomatic training.

3.2.1 **Hosts of training**

Diplomatic training can be facilitated by various host structures: MFA affiliated diplomatic training centres, university affiliated schools of foreign service, NGO type IR institutes, and IGO affiliated international training centres. In addition, some countries accommodate diplomatic training within general public service training (Meerts 1991: 6). Depending on the state resources of individual countries and their differing levels of civil organisation, any one or combination of the various hosts can be used to accommodate diplomatic training.

a) **MFA affiliated diplomatic training centres**: These are institutes or centres that are created and funded by MFAs, either as an integral part of them or as semi-autonomous units which are known as institutes or academies. In the former case, training divisions are integral parts of the respective foreign ministries' human resources divisions – some examples are the UK, Israel and New Zealand. Examples of the latter are the diplomatic training institutes/academies of South Africa and Estonia. In some cases these institutes/academies evolve into fully autonomous units, such as for example Austria's *Diplomatische Akademie*, and the diplomatic academies of Russia and Venezuela. Their MFA affiliation, however, continues to determine their mandate and personnel structure: core staff members are mainly seconded from the parent MFA, and usually headed by a director with ambassadorial rank (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 1998; Jimenez 1998; Klieman 1999: 84).

b) **Schools of foreign service**: These are departments of universities that provide undergraduate and/or post-graduate training in diplomacy, which prepare students for a career in their country's foreign service. Examples are: the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University[12] and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, both in the US; the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies in the UK; the School of Foreign Service at the National University of Mongolia; and, in Africa, the diplomatic training institutes at the Universities of Yaoundé and Nairobi**.** These schools are typically accessible to national and foreign students alike and receive

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funding from a variety of sources, both private and public (Bayazakh 1998; IDIS 2004; Kenya MFA 2004; Meerts 1991: 6; MGIMO 1998; Sharp 1999: 45).

c) **Institutes of International Relations**: These institutes are fully autonomous organisations that exist apart from MFAs, but have a mandate to train diplomats for, and are often subsidised by, governments. As such, diplomatic training is outsourced to the private sector. An example is the Clingendael institute in The Hague that receives half of its revenue[13] from the Netherlands' MFA and its Ministry of Defense (Clingendael 2004; Ton 1996). However, Duke (2001: 5) notes that "diplomatic training continues to be regarded in many countries as a national preserve" with some countries, such as France and Italy, more reluctant than others, for example Germany and the Netherlands, to outsource diplomatic training to NGOs.

d) **International training centres affiliated to IGOs**: Some IGOs have units that specialise in the training of member states' diplomats, who may be sponsored privately, by the organisation or by their own governments. UNITAR, which has a UN mandate to provide training and research advice *in loco* to national diplomatic training institutes, is an example. Diplomats can also attend its courses at UNITAR offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Vienna and New York and are awarded course certificates for full attendance (Meerts 1991:6; UN UNITAR 2004a).

e) **Public service training facilities**: Although not a provider of diplomatic training in the strict sense of the word, the generic training offered by public service training institutes in some countries is considered specialised enough to cater for diplomatic trainees also. French diplomats, for example, do not attend a diplomatic academy: as civil servants, they are trained at the *École Nationale D'Administration* in Paris, where all potential members of the senior echelons of the public service – traditionally considered a special elite in the country – spend three years before rotating among business and government (Enjalran and Husson 1999: 64; Meerts 1991: 6).

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3.2.2 **Sources of instruction**

Some of the larger diplomatic academies, for example that of Russia, employ permanent lecturers[14] to teach specific subjects. However, most other diplomatic training centres are not as well endowed with human resources and in small centres such as the Estonian School of Diplomacy, staff merely function as coordinators and administrators of *ad hoc* instruction (Estonia MFA ESD 1998; Russian Federation MFA DA 1998a). Even for large training centres it is common practice to use a wide range of external instructors and obtain study material from both public and private institutions, thus mirroring the enormous scope of diplomatic training curricula.

The most obvious – and least expensive – source of instruction for any diplomatic training centre emanates from the parent MFA: its manuals, policy documents, institutional memory and experienced staff, both serving and retired, who can lecture on diplomatic practice. In addition, practitioners in the various areas of study are drawn *inter alia* from other government departments, academia, NGOs, political parties and parliament, business, foreign embassies based in the country, and the media. These lecturers either work on a contract basis or participate as guest speakers or panelists in classroom discussions (Canada DFAIT CFSI 2003; India MEA FSI 1998: 1; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998). As the Italian MFA's *Istituto Diplomatico* (1998) notes, its training packages are "diversified and easily adaptable to new demands and growing needs". The *ad hoc* approach to sources of instruction thus allows for flexibility and the wide spectrum of inputs into a given diplomatic training programme provides diversity and stimulation.

3.3 TIMING AND CONFIGURATION OF TRAINING

Diplomatic training can take place either before or after entry into a foreign ministry. If training forms part of the recruitment short-listing process, for example in Austria, admission to the MFA is conditional on successful completion of diplomatic training. Candidates therefore do not perform actual work at the ministry before being trained. In Brazil and Uruguay trainees work as apprentices in the MFA but need to pass their final training evaluation before being confirmed in their posts. Many

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countries, such as Kenya, require of trainees to pass diplomatic training successfully before being eligible for posting abroad (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Brasil MFR IRBr 2000; Kenya MFA 2004; Otermi 1992: 30).

An alternative practice is that candidates are recruited and commence working in a MFA without training. In such cases, training may in due course be required[15] (either full-time as in Spain or part-time as in Belgium) for the purposes of promotion or placement abroad. Where training is staggered and/or elective, trainees or their supervisors can determine the pace of learning and do modules on a need-to-know basis. Meerts (1991: 7) observes that such part-time training programmes "tend to resemble terms of 'probation': the trainees do their work at the ministry and follow some lessons now and then, visit other ministries and are, in effect, part-time 'students'". The advantages are discretional utility of scarce manpower resources, and the opportunity for trainees to combine experience with progressive formal instruction so that they can better appreciate the value of their training. Nevertheless, there are definite disadvantages also, notably disruption to work continuity and the incidence of junior staff training and promotion proceeding arbitrarily (Commonwealth 1971: 116; Duke 2001: 13; Hemery 2002: 141). Pahad (1996b) notes that these considerations in 1994 prompted the South African MFA, after international research on the subject, to switch from a part-time to a full-time diplomatic training programme.

Formal diplomatic training programmes are indeed more often presented on an uninterrupted schedule and can range in duration from a few weeks (UK) to several months (nine months in the case of Spain and Tanzania) to as long[16] as two years (Germany, Indonesia). One year of full time study (as evidenced for example in Uruguay, India and Italy) appears to be the world-wide norm. Full-time courses are considered to be less disruptive to students and supervisors alike, to be more pedagogically sound and to enhance *esprit de corps* among participants (Brazil MFR IRBr 2000; Duke 2001: 13; Hemery 2002: 141; Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Otermi 1992: 30; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996).

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3.4 DIPLOMATIC TRAINING METHODOLOGIES

The method of diplomatic training concerns the manner in which instruction is imparted to trainees. This can entail formal instruction in a class-room setting, including experiential group exercises such as simulation and case studies, or exposure in the field *via* head office work, mission work or short field trips. Additional training methods include study exchanges and a new method facilitated by ITC advances, namely distance training.

3.4.1 **Training techniques in a class-room setting**

Diplomatic training in a class-room setting traditionally involves formal lectures, with or without audio-visual presentation, which are followed by question and answer sessions. In addition, panel-discussions and debates which are guided by practitioners in the relevant area have traditionally allowed trainees to engage in reflective conversation from which they can extract and exchange perspectives.

Theoretical subjects are still mostly presented in formal lectures, but the international trend is to use interactive educational methods ('active learning') rather than passive teaching whenever possible (Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 136). As Ton (1996) recounts, "[The Netherlands] foreign ministry has asked us to cut the time devoted to lecturing, and increase exercises in, for instance, preparing a *démarche*, in effective political reporting or writing a policy brief". Experiential class-room techniques such as case studies and simulation (role-playing exercises) engage the trainee directly and personally and concentrate on the practical application of his theoretical diplomatic studies in complex decision-making situations (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; Commonwealth 1971: 129; France IIAP 1998b; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10). The HSRC's (1990: 129) contention that "effective and validated games and simulations lead to greater understanding of internal dynamics of the countries and clarify various options, pressure points and warning signs" remains valid. The great advantage, of course, is that trainees can experiment in these exercises without fear of real consequences (CPDS 1998b; Hemery 2002: 142).

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3.4.2 **Experiential training in the field**

Experiential training in the field of diplomatic practice can involve actual work at head office or in a mission abroad, or a study excursion to a relevant domestic or international sector.

a) **Head office 'on the job' training**: Many MFAs define the work that junior diplomats do at head office as a probationary stage in official training. In the cases of ROK, Tunisia and Argentina, for example, formal training ranging from a few months to a year is followed by a year-long apprenticeship in various parts of the foreign ministry, and sometimes at other public and private agencies. In the case of Brazil, part-time training over a period of two years is combined with apprentice work in different units of the MFA (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; Brazil MFR IRBr 2000; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10–11; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

The Commonwealth (1971: 124) notes the advantage of 'on the job' diplomatic training, in that one or more supervisors can act as mentors and teach and evaluate trainees on an ongoing basis. As Marshall (1997: xvii) remarks: "in no field of professional endeavour can learning from others be more important than in diplomacy. Example and encouragement are at the core of diplomatic effectiveness". The *ad hoc* attendance of seminars and conferences that is part of head office work, also constitute important in-service training that enhances trainees' understanding of international developments and enable their cultivation of contacts with colleagues and experts from other countries (Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998).

b) **Actual mission work**: Some services include in their formal diplomatic training a period of probation in a mission abroad. In Turkey, junior diplomats round off their training with a three-week sojourn at a Turkish mission abroad. Brazilian junior diplomats do the same, in their case spending three months at Brazilian missions in South America and Mexico, where they work in the political, economic, commercial, cultural and consular departments. Likewise, two years of formal training in Israel are followed by one year at an Israeli mission, which is considered part of training and during which trainees are evaluated for performance in the field (Brazil MFR

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IRBr 2000; Klieman 1999: 84; Turkey MFA FCTC 1998).

c) **Field trips**: Many diplomatic training programmes include domestic or regional study tours so that trainees can meet with practitioners and observe practice in institutions that impact on their country's foreign policy (Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Duke 2001: 13; FSLD 1993: 8). Domestic tours are designed to sensitise diplomats to areas that attract international attention, such as developmental projects and areas where investment incentives are launched. In Israel[17], for example, diplomatic trainees are expected to spend time on a kibbutz in order to develop an understanding of grass-roots issues in their own country (Rafael 1997). Regional study tours are also a feature of many training programmes: diplomatic trainees in European countries typically visit neighbouring states and the institutions of NATO and the EU. In Jordan, the diplomatic training programme includes a visit to Egypt to meet with a range of governmental and private organisations (Jordan JID 1998b).

3.4.3 **Study exchanges**

Study exchanges as an integral part of diplomatic training programmes are increasingly common, as standardisation in the field increases regionally as well as globally, and as ODA packages include diplomatic training opportunities. The Austrian *Diplomatische Akademie* (2003), for example, sends trainees to complete summer courses at "comparable institutions" abroad, such as the French *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* or the Spanish *Escuela Diplomática*.

3.4.4 **Distance training**

Diplomatic distance training was pioneered by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta (MEDAC), which developed a programme (called *DiploEdu*) similar in form and application to the *Joint Academic Network* which was established for communications between academics in the UK in the 1980s. The method can be considered the electronic version of a telephone conference: participants communicate *via* personal computers that are linked by modem to a central server through which a dedicated study channel is created.

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Baldi (1998: 257) notes practical advantages of the programme (the so-called Internet Relay Chat system): it can be accessed *via* ordinary e-mail connections; the study happens in real time, i.e. immediate responses are obtained; it allows for immediate transfer of electronic files, eliminating a waiting period for study material in the regular mail and it provides a measure of supervision in the 'virtual classroom' as well as student-to-student and student-to-instructor communication. The Canadian CFSI has adopted a similar method but is using existing foreign ministry communications systems with specially designed software, thereby creating a 'virtual campus" that each of their 157 foreign missions can access *via* a dedicated server (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997: Director-General's Overview; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 141).

Kurbalija and Baldi (2000: 147) mention that DiploEdu has had surprisingly positive results in the teaching of practical skills such as negotiations, in light of the original assumption that only knowledge-based education could be imparted *via* on-line learning. This makes the programme of added relevance to MFAs: the latter are particularly well suited to distance training because of geographically dispersed staff, which makes it cumbersome and expensive for them to attend sporadic training at head office. Distance training also has the potential to facilitate international cooperation in the field of diplomatic training and opens up important possibilities – especially for developing countries – to participate in courses that are presented elsewhere (Duke 2001: 1; Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Smith 1998: 113).

3.5 EVALUATION OF TRAINING

The evaluation of diplomatic training can be viewed from two perspectives: firstly, the direct evaluation of a specific training course to determine whether students had mastered the knowledge and/or skills that were imparted; and secondly the indirect evaluation of training by MFA clients and the organisation itself, in terms of service delivery.

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3.5.1 **Direct evaluation of training**

The usual evaluation methods employed during and immediately after diplomatic training focus more on the performance of the individual diplomat than on the relevance of the content, structures and method of training itself. Evaluation of individual performance includes written as well as oral assessments. Written assessment, which demonstrates analytical ability, insight and skills in formulation is done by means of examinations, assignments based on simulations of real life situations that diplomats need to handle and independent research on relevant subjects. Oral assessment, on the other hand, is useful in that it sheds light on the interviewee's maturity, presentation skills, general knowledge, political insight and speech ability, particularly his ability to formulate and communicate arguments. This type of assessment is done by means of prepared and unprepared speeches, simulated media interviews and wide-ranging, multi-disciplinary interviews by panels of experts. Additional evaluation methods include the allocation of weight by course presenters and other class members to the participation of individual trainees in group activities (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Babb 1974: 20; Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Costa Rica MFRCA *Manuel Maria de Peralta* 1998; FSLD 1993: 5; Jimenez 1998).

3.5.2 **Indirect evaluation of training**

Indirect evaluation of diplomatic training is arguably of more importance because it involves continuous assessment of the returns of training, through client feedback of the quality, effectiveness and appropriateness of the services that are rendered by diplomats. It is a long-term process, because, as Babb (1974: 20) argues, it is only after service in the field that diplomats (and their clients) begin to understand the benefits of – or gaps in – the training they had received. Performance-in-the-field-based evaluation of training is also relevant to the techniques used throughout the careers of diplomats to appraise their suitability for promotions and postings (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Jaques 2003). The New Zealand foreign ministry (MFAT 1996: 29) makes the point that good training is often expensive and that it is therefore essential to assess the results of training in order to make the most of it. The point is thus that it is not just trainees who need to be evaluated, but training

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itself that needs to be continuously adjusted and improved, because the aim of training, according to the Commonwealth (1971: 110, 129) "can and will change" at various stages in the development of a MFA (also noted by Marshall 1997: xvi).

International trends in the method and structure of diplomatic training reflect the latter's increasing prioritisation and formalisation, as previously discussed. The recruitment process, which can be considered the gate-keeper process for diplomatic training, is likewise becoming (with the exception of the ongoing phenomenon of political appointments in various developed and developing countries) more professional in the sense of objective and merit-based selection criteria, and more democratic in its growing and deliberate reflection of demographic realities.

The hosts of diplomatic training are also globally diversifying and increasing: within MFAs, dedicated diplomatic training centres range from human resources training divisions to semi or fully autonomous diplomatic institutes/academies. The diplomatic training mandate of these traditional hosts is being complemented, and in some cases rivaled or replaced, by rapidly increasing numbers of private diplomatic training institutions: schools of foreign service at academic institutions and NGO institutes of international relations. An additional phenomenon is the diplomatic training mandate given by member states to IGO affiliated training centres. These various hosts of training tend to use a diverse range of sources for diplomatic training, with in-house expertise and institutional memory of MFAs still being the most important, but with an increasing diversity of subjects and instructors to mirror the challenges that face diplomacy at the beginning of the 21st century.

Timing and configuration of training differ from country to country, but the general trend seems to be towards a full-time, year-long course, either preceding or following acceptance into a given MFA, with career advancement conditional on successful completion of diplomatic training. The methodologies used during training are increasingly experiential and interactive, as opposed to formal and

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classroom-bound. Evaluation of training also reflects a more holistic and functional approach in that the emphasis of evaluation is shifting towards service delivery, i.e. evaluation not just of trainee performance during formal courses, but of the indirect manifestation thereof through MFA service delivery.

The various trends in the structure and method of diplomatic training are indicative of incremental and universal professionalisation of the process to select and prepare diplomats for their careers. As will subsequently discussed, these trends are mirrored also in the content of training.

4. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN THE CONTENT OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The content of diplomatic training concerns the curricula that are typically used in training courses world-wide. It can broadly be divided into knowledge based education (theory) and skills based education (practice). The combined range is very large, reflecting the scope of work in diplomacy which Hemery (2002: 141–142) describes as "impossibly broad", and which Spence (1997: xii) says transforms the modern diplomat into "something of a polymath". The official diplomatic training programme for junior diplomats which forms the core of any diplomatic training centre's activities, is augmented in most countries by language training and supplementary in-service training on a continuous, *ad hoc* basis.

4.1 DETERMINATION OF CONTENT

In determination of curricula content, two factors are usually considered in addition to the actual selection of subject matter: on the one hand the balance between theoretical and practical subjects, and on the other hand the broadening (generalisation) as opposed to deepening (specialisation) of subject focus.

4.1.1 **Balance between theory and practice**

Diplomatic training programmes usually combine theoretical (knowledge based) instruction with practical (skills based) instruction. Babb (1974: 15) refers to it as a

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balance between "functional and background training" – with each dimension providing perspective on the other.

The relative weight of the two dimensions varies greatly among diplomatic training programmes, and determination thereof can be contentious (Vale 1993: 46). Sharp (1999: 46) questions whether diplomatic trainees are taught theoretical perspectives because it will (as it should) inform their professional practice, or simply because "it is a part of their professional make-up 'to be informed' in these areas in much the same way as they need to know about wine, opera and art". He says it is usually the latter, because in diplomacy, as in most other professions, "theory remains remote until it requires life through subsequent practical experience". Hence, while the need for diplomats to have an interdisciplinary background is not in dispute, the objective of diplomatic training programmes is increasingly to match professional courses with specific job requirements by means of skills training. The demands of various disciplines that are drawn on are therefore not paramount, but rather the demands emanating from diplomats' functional mandate. The application of knowledge is thus more important than the mere acquisition thereof (ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10; US DOS FSI 1998). Hemery (2002: 141) concludes that training should be less concerned with what diplomats know than with what they do, and how they can be helped to do it more effectively.

4.1.2 **Specialisation and generalisation**

MFAs are universally faced with the question of whether to widen the spectrum of diplomatic training to produce generalists, or to deepen it in order to develop specialists in geographical areas, languages or functional sectors (Barston 1997: 27; Crompton 2000d; Duke 2001: 18). Diplomats have traditionally been considered 'professional generalists' or 'specialist generalists', and it is exactly their role in coordinating foreign policy execution across a broad spectrum that has perpetuated their relevance in international relations, regardless of the proliferation of experts in the field (Babb 1974: 15, 18; Commonwealth 1971: 108; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 232–233; Meerts 1999: 89; Otermi 1992: 31).

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Notwithstanding this role and the international trend for embassies to outsource certain functions or to co-opt seconded specialists from other ministries, MFAs are nevertheless prone to specialisation[18]. There are various reasons for this phenomenon. Often diplomats acquire incidental specialised knowledge for example when they work in countries where certain issues dominate the political and social agenda – be it linguistic rivalry in Canada, reunification in Germany or oil-politics in Nigeria. Such temporary specialisation requires *ad hoc* self-study at most and is not reflected in diplomatic training *per se*. Formal training is, however, necessary when diplomats are prepared for specialist roles such as trade negotiators, or for postings to complex countries like China where it is imperative for (effective) foreign diplomats to specialise in the culture, language and politico-economic system. The growth of multilateralism has also increased the demand for specialists because they need to work with single-issue committees on long-term programmes such as nuclear disarmament. Likewise, the growth of economic diplomacy has prompted countries like Japan to actively encourage specialisation among its diplomats in this area (Babb 1974: 20; Barston 1997: 13; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 220; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 24).

For the individual diplomat, specialisation is often attractive because it allows career planning and it affords him a certain expert status within the foreign ministry. However, specialisation is not always a personal choice: the former East-bloc countries treated all geographical areas of the world as specialisations: diplomats were allocated specific foreign language(s) to study and were obliged to concentrate on one country or region for the duration of their career. Specialisation is also not always an option: the training of diplomats is ultimately determined by the needs and priorities and resources of each state, and many smaller countries find that they simply cannot afford to allocate or train specialists. On the other hand many developed countries, for example Denmark and France, specifically try to avoid excessive specialisation in their foreign services by making available training and in-service refresher courses in various areas to encourage greater versatility among staff (Enjalran and Husson 1999: 65–67; Harris 1999: 31; Otermi 1992: 31; Vale 1993: 38).

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4.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The theoretical basis of diplomatic studies can broadly be divided into international and national studies. In both areas, a given state's foreign policy priorities will to a large degree determine the selection of issues to be studied and the priority afforded to each.

4.2.1 **International studies**

Traditionally, the systems and methods of thought contained in the disciplines[19] of international law, international politics/relations and international economics, comprise the most universally applied academic preparation for a career in diplomacy. IR in particular guides the parameters of international studies within the context of diplomatic training. It provides an historical, theoretical and institutional overview of the dynamics of the international system and embraces a large spectrum of study areas that are intrinsic to diplomatic practice, such as foreign policy analysis, diplomatic theory, multilateral systems and international security (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; FSLD 1993: 15; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

The definitive concept of an international legal order renders international law an integral part of international studies. Legal texts underwrite many diplomatic processes such as the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, and knowledge of the framework and ground rules within which regulated international relations are conducted, is essential. It also educates the diplomat about his professional parameters – his privileges, obligations and limitations – within the confines of international law. Some or all of the following specific areas are typically presented by diplomatic training programmes: sources of international law, diplomatic law, public international law, pacific settlement of disputes, humanitarian law and human rights. Some services even include constitutional law and other aspects of law that impact on domestic politics (Kaufmann 1988: 143; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

International economics, particularly trade and finance, has always been relevant

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but is growing rapidly in importance to diplomatic training as the balance of diplomatic efforts shifts to economic concerns. The international financial architecture and the structure and dynamics of the international trading system, micro and macroeconomics, analysis of statistics, the study of multinational companies, are all typically part of the academic course and are increasingly combined with the practical skills taught in economic diplomacy. To diplomatic trainees from industrialised and developing countries alike, regional integration, North-South relations and developmental economics are of increasing importance as these issues dominate the agenda of international organisations and set the terms of associative diplomacy (Barston 1997: 26–27; Marshall 1997: 141).

A recent trend in theoretical diplomatic training is to present holistic, integrated, interdisciplinary studies, in which the above-mentioned disciplines overlap and expand. The frequently used term 'political economy' exemplifies this interconnectivity (JMCIS: 1998; Kaufmann 1998: 3). An example of an interdisciplinary approach is integrated 'area studies' as presented in the US (US DOS FSI 1998) which prepares candidates for the national and regional context in which they will work. Area studies, which are typically combined with language studies, focus on values and norms of specific regions and include aspects of politics, regional relations, sociology, history and culture. Another interdisciplinary approach to international studies is the study of global 'issues'. The phenomena that are studied are those that impact on international relations and on the work of diplomats, and include *inter alia* globalisation, regionalisation, democracy, human rights, peace, the environment, international terrorism, humanitarian intervention, energy, and hunger (US DOS FSI 1998).

4.2.2 **National studies**

Debrah (1996) explains that “diplomatic training is not another academic training. It is a professional training for a purpose and with a bias; to enable the participants to promote ... the national interest at home and abroad”. Diplomats are indeed traditionally – and continue to be – required to have a thorough understanding of their country's foreign policy agenda, which is primarily based on national interests. National foreign policy analysis therefore constitutes a major part of their training

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curricula, accompanied by broad knowledge of the domestic realities that inform that policy: their country's history, political system, bureaucratic processes, ideology and value-system and economic and social challenges (Meerts 1991: 17). The Indian foreign ministry asserts that, indeed, the very focus of its diplomatic training programme is "India – its history, culture, geopolitics, natural and human resources, security, economic goals and foreign policy priorities". The reason is that "it is important for Indian diplomats to know India thoroughly before they can represent the nation's interests abroad" (India MEA FSI 1998: Preface). As discussed previously, MFA diplomatic training programmes are vested with national pride and the prioritisation of national studies play a key role in this regard.

4.3 PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY

The practical content of diplomatic training curricula consists mainly of training in skills that are considered essential to the efficient performance of diplomatic functions. These subjects, which can broadly be divided into basic, specialised and auxiliary diplomatic skills, all have a component of theory but are approached from a practical perspective to ensure that diplomats are *au fait* with the many *de facto* roles they are expected to assume in the course of their careers (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998).

4.3.1 **Basic diplomatic skills**

Basic diplomatic skills are the skills historically associated with the profession of diplomacy. They comprise communication, negotiation, representation and protocol and etiquette.

4.3.1.1 Communication skills: Effective communication – still considered the most important and basic tool of a diplomat – is required on all levels of the profession, whether in contact with national authorities, inter or intradepartmental deliberation, dialogue with own or foreign public and official communications with the authorities of a host state. Traditionally, communication skills (including the command of foreign languages) were prerequisites for entry to MFAs and were not taught formally. These skills were augmented with instruction in *pro forma* written formats

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– in-house communications such as report writing and minutes of meetings and official interstate correspondence such as *notes verbales*, a*ides memoires* and d*émarches* (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Feltham 1993: 32–35; Marshall 1997: 154–164; Turkey MFA FCTC 1998).

While written formats continue to be essential knowledge in diplomatic practice, the instruction of broader communication skills has not only become ubiquitous but has evolved into a growth industry among specialist companies, which are often contracted by diplomatic training centres. The skills that are taught cover a spectrum of contexts: verbal and non-verbal, written and oral, formal and informal, interpersonal and intra- and intercultural communications. Specific courses such as public speaking and effective writing are often included and made available to serving diplomats as mid-career enrichment courses.

A new trend, pioneered by the US and emulated by MFAs in states such as Canada and the Czech Republic**,** is to approach communication skills from an holistic perspective, as an integral part of language training and area studies (US DOS FSI 1998; Canada DFAIT CFSI 1999; Lehmannova 1998). US programmes "promote democratic and culturally pluralistic values while enabling each student to develop understanding and skills in overcoming barriers arising from language, attitudinal, non-verbal and ethnocentric variations in human communication styles" (HSRC 1990: 126). The emphasis thus is on effective communication, to make diplomats as Bull (1977: 173) phrases it, "specialists in precise and accurate communication".

4.3.1.2 Negotiation skills: Bull (1977: 174) makes the observation that the diplomatic profession "is a repository of specialist skills and techniques in the business of negotiation". Indeed, negotiation is traditionally and legally recognised as a primary function of diplomacy, and related skills are ubiquitously taught in international diplomatic training programmes. Much international research has gone into the effective teaching of negotiating techniques, and some diplomatic training centres, such as the Netherlands' Clingendael, have become specialised 'exporters' thereof. Procedural aspects of negotiation that are taught include *inter alia* preparation for the process, information gathering on opponent's – and

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determination of own – negotiating strategy and tactics, definition of objectives, interests analysis for all the parties to the process, understanding of the nature and elements of the persuasion process, setting of agendas, and troubleshooting (Berridge 1995: 119; Meerts 1999: 92).

Diplomatic training curricula typically include a basic course in negotiation skills. This area of practical diplomacy has, however, grown to such an extent that many MFAs now offer specialist courses in multilateral negotiations, trade and aid negotiations and conflict management. These areas, as will be discussed subsequently, are also increasingly covered by supplementary, *ad hoc* diplomatic training provided to mid-career diplomats.

4.3.1.3 Protocol and etiquette: Since antiquity, knowledge of protocol[20] (the official form of procedure and etiquette in the handling of state affairs) and etiquette (the guidelines for courteous behaviour between and among individuals) has been intrinsic to the conduct of diplomacy. The historical maze of intricate prescriptions has been greatly reduced in contemporary diplomacy, but retention of a basic framework for official communication and conduct is still considered essential to codify ceremonial activity, i.e. to guide the form as opposed to the substance of governmental relations. It also, importantly, symbolises the fundamental sovereign equality of states, as recognised in international law. Because protocol and etiquette set certain behavioural parameters and take away the individual burden of having to accord status[21] to contacts, knowledge thereof allows a diplomat to avoid embarrassment and inadvertent offence, and to concentrate on the task at hand (Holsti 1988: 162–163).

Protocol and etiquette comprise one of the oldest and least controversial aspects of diplomatic training, and is universally included in diplomatic training programmes (even though MFAs typically have specialised divisions dealing with protocol). It is also one of the generic courses taught to other public and private sector clients who deal in international relations (RSA DFA FSI 2000; Burger 1996: 9).

4.3.1.4 Representational skills: During the twentieth century, diplomacy as a profession became much less socially exclusive, with more emphasis than ever on

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substance as opposed to form. The latter, however, remains important. Diplomats are official representatives of states and their appearance, conduct and utterances at all times reflect on that status (Eban 1998: 101; Ngwevela 1998). Representational duties were not historically deemed to demand any special skills, other than knowledge of etiquette, but the situation is changing as more and more states enter the competitive world of international relations, and diplomats from very diverse backgrounds vie for the attention of governments, publics and business. Most diplomatic training programmes therefore teach diplomats how to represent their states in such a manner as to make maximum positive impact: aspects such as personal appearance, entertaining, decoration of chanceries and diplomatic residences and stylish presentation of functions such as national day receptions (Burger 1996: 44–57; India MEA FSI 1998).

4.3.2 **Specialised diplomatic skills required by contemporary diplomatic practice**

The exponential changes brought on by economic and socio-political changes in the past few decades have resulted in areas of practical diplomacy developing into specialised skills that are now routinely taught in diplomatic training programmes. These include information handling, skills in public, economic and multilateral diplomacy, and consular skills.

4.3.2.1 Information handling: Information, the intellectual freight of diplomats, has traditionally been scarce and obtaining data relevant to state interests, a major preoccupation of the profession. As Bull (1977: 174) observes, "the professional diplomatist is uniquely skilled in gathering a particular kind of information that is essential to the conduct of international relations". The barrage of information at the beginning of the 21st century has made the management thereof more complex and specialised, and appropriate training is necessary to ensure that diplomats handle information in the most advantageous manner possible. Diplomatic training programmes increasingly include courses in which trainees are taught not just the purpose, methods and parameters of information gathering and dissemination, but also the verification, analysis, evaluation and even the presentation of such information. In addition, they are sensitised to the pitfalls of information handling,

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such as human error, propaganda and planted information, hype and sensationalism (Barston 1997: 22; Czech Republic MFA 2003; Rozental 1999: 144).

4.3.2.2 Public diplomatic skills: The world-wide 'democratisation' of diplomacy and the public demand for greater accountability and transparency in governments has resulted in what the Argentine MFA's ISEN (1998) calls "a rapidly expanding discipline", namely public diplomacy. As the diplomatic training institute of Brazil (Brasil MFR IRBr 2000) asserts, "this notion of public diplomacy ... is the main source of renewal and, at the same time, of legitimacy of our diplomatic career". This new form of diplomacy involves a growing interface of professional diplomats with the publics of their own and host states, in an attempt to influence or understand policy decisions within the context of bilateral relations (Harris 1999: 31; Hocking 1999: 26; Kappeler 1998: 41; Klieman 1999: 97; Komachi 1999: 114; Smith 1998: 95–97).

Burt and Robison (1998: 53) say the magnitude of change in the international system and the gaps in diplomatic performance argue for the development of a collaborative relationship with the public, so that “embassies must not become the monasteries of the 21st century". Diplomatic training programmes increasingly reflect this new priority and are instructing diplomats in pro-active public liaison techniques such as marketing and networking. In this regard, Fitchett (2000) reports that the French foreign ministry has recently decided to train its diplomats in "the new tools of international influence, often described as soft power", so as to interact more effectively with their own civil society, as is done in the US and UK. This new trend has also affected diplomats attached to IGOs: Kofi Annan (1998) announced in 1998 that all training for UN staff, done by the United Nations Staff College, would henceforth include a component dedicated to cooperation with civil society.

Public diplomacy encompasses *inter alia* the specialised areas of cultural diplomacy and media diplomacy. Of the two, cultural diplomacy has traditionally received the least attention (Cooper 1999: 46). In recognition of this gap in training, the Canadian CFSI (1997) has since 1996 taken on "responsibility for inter-cultural

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effectiveness training. This includes training and information (written, computer-based, audio-visual) that promotes people's ability to work effectively in other cultures". Some centres have recently started to specialise in the subject, for example the *Edward R Morrow Center of Public Diplomacy* within the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy which is dedicated to studying the psycho-socio-cultural characteristics of foreign[22] nations (HSRC 1990: 124; Lehmannova 1998).

Media diplomacy – pro-active interaction with media in pursuit of diplomatic objectives – acknowledges the enormous and growing influence of the media in the shaping of international public opinion. Most MFAs (and large, well-staffed missions) have specialised units that conduct media liaison and/or contract private firms to conduct media campaigns. In recognition of the role of the media in the field of diplomacy, general media studies have traditionally been included in diplomatic studies, including theoretical perspectives on the historical and changing role of the media and its sociological, political and economic impact on society, as well as its legal underpinnings (issues such as defamation). What is becoming more common in diplomatic training programmes is the instruction of pro-active 'handling' of the media: trainees are instructed in identifying target audiences and securing media coverage to reach them, preparation of press releases, letters to editors, preparation of supplements, *savoir faire* in radio/TV/print media interviews, liaison with journalists, and sensitivities regarding press arrangements during official visits (Barston 1997: 22; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 234; Kappeler 1998: 42).

4.3.2.3 Economic diplomatic skills: Economic concerns dominate the foreign policy agenda of most countries in the world. This fact is evidenced *inter alia* by the agenda of the Developing World, the international phenomenon of MFAs amalgamating with economic ministries, and the trend within MFAs to establish internal functional divisions that deal exclusively with the international economic dimensions of foreign policy. The result has been the rapid development of economic diplomacy, a new area of diplomatic practice that requires of diplomats the application of appropriate skills in order to advance their countries' economic interests in the face of massive international competition. These skills include export and investment promotion, commercial negotiations, international marketing,

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trade-dispute settlement, the promotion of joint ventures, participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, and assessment and management of commercial risks. It also, importantly, involves all aspects regarding ODA for diplomats of donor as well as recipient countries (Barston 1997: 13, 15, 26; Czech Republic MFA 2003; Duke 2001: 4; India MEA FSI 1998: 67; Ton 1996).

Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 220) note that in the case of the UK, as early as the 1960s two separate government reports, namely Plowden (1964) and Duncan (1969), both emphasised the need for British diplomats to be trained in economic diplomacy. Subsequent economic events with a global impact on diplomacy, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s and the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, have confirmed the gist of the British reports and have prompted more and more MFAs to invest in economic diplomatic training. As Lee (1998) points out, Asian MFAs found out during the financial crisis that their diplomats were poorly equipped to understand issues such as investment and export environments, the implications of debt management, structural adjustment, labour market flexibility and risk analysis. Also, importantly, it became evident that they needed more specialised training in the conduct of economic negotiations with entities such as the IMF, foreign banks and even domestic actors.

In recognition of their deficiencies regarding tuition in economic diplomacy, many MFAs – in developing as well as developed countries – are sending officials for training courses that are presented by international organisations such as UNITAR and the *Economic Development Institute* of the World Bank, on subjects such as the legal aspects of debt management and structural adjustment. Diplomatic training centres are also increasingly including economic diplomatic skills in their curricula.

4.3.2.4 Multilateral diplomatic skills: As in the case of economic diplomatic skills, multilateral diplomatic skills are a fairly recent addition to diplomatic training curricula, although the theory of multilateralism has been taught as part of IR studies for much longer. The exponential rise in multilateral diplomacy since the end of World War Two has dramatically impacted on contemporary diplomacy, and for diplomats involved in RIA diplomacy (such as those working within the EU) or

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Developing World diplomats who for various reasons work mainly in multilateral fora, the skills involved in multilateral diplomacy are essential professional tools. The coaching of multilateral diplomatic skills is a good example of the holistic, interdisciplinary approach that diplomatic training requires, because this area of diplomatic practice overlaps substantially not only with the theory of multilateralism, but also with the skills required by economic diplomacy, negotiation, communication and conflict management (DSP HEI 2004).

Multilateral diplomatic participation demand that diplomats have thorough knowledge of the processes, structure, *modus operandi* and legal framework of multilateralism in order to become *au fait* with a host of operational skills. These include *inter alia* drafting of resolutions, conducting multilateral negotiations and constructing and mobilising political coalitions (Barston 1997: 6; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 198; Muller 1998: 198; RSA DFA FSI 2000). The rise in conference diplomacy and parliamentary style diplomacy within IGOs – where the conclusion of international treaties and conventions is at stake – has meant that multilateral negotiation skills, as a specialist variation on traditional negotiation skills, are increasingly called for. It is indeed critically important for Developed and Developing World diplomats alike to make the most of their given circumstances *via* negotiation in multilateral fora and to package international agreements in such a way as to extract maximum advantage for their sending states (or alliances of states) (Berridge 1995: 161–173; Kaufmann 1988: 1–11; Saudi Arabia MFA IDS 1998; Ton 1996).

4.3.2.5 Conflict management skills: Conflict management is a diplomatic skill that in some international curricula is treated as an integral part of negotiation skills. (Conflict in this case is understood to be interstate or intrastate, as opposed to interpersonal of which the management would form part of either communication skills or management skills). The increasing international preoccupation with global peace and security and human rights, has necessitated diplomatic specialisation in preventative or remedial actions regarding socio-economic and political conflicts that have an international impact. This important new area of diplomatic practice requires training in aspects such as early warning systems, preventative diplomacy, conflict management, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace-building and

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peacekeeping (Hemery 2002: 142; Jaques 2003; RSA DFA FSI 2000).

4.3.2.6 Consular skills: Consular duties concern the functions that officials perform abroad in the routine line of civil service, i.e. bureaucratic assistance such as notary and civil registry services rendered to own nationals, and the issuance of visas to, and assistance with immigration of, foreign nationals. Consular duties are exercised within a strict and prescriptive legal framework and thus require functional knowledge of both domestic and international law especially in matters concerning *inter alia* citizenship, refugee affairs and asylum. Most foreign services, such as that of South Africa, employ specialist administrative personnel or (in larger missions) seconded officials from the ministries of internal affairs to perform these functions. Notwithstanding this specialisation, diplomats need to understand the scope of consular activities and the impact of its underlying policy on bilateral relations, particularly when career diplomats are tasked with consular duties in addition to their political work, as is the case in India's foreign service (Holsti 1988: 166; India MEA FSI 1997; RSA DFA FSI 2000; Simpson 1983: 14; Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).

Consular and diplomatic functions have historically been treated as mutually exclusive – in fact, consular work was deemed of 'inferior' priority in terms of foreign policy objectives. This perception is starting to change, as more and more MFAs are including upgraded consular assistance in public diplomacy campaigns as part of national 'image building' strategies. The changing perspective is reflected in the increasingly common tuition of consular skills as part of diplomatic training programmes (Jaques 2003; Riordan 2003: 16).

4.3.3 **Essential auxiliary skills**

Auxiliary diplomatic skills do not in essence concern diplomacy but are nevertheless essential for the effective functioning of diplomats, both at head office and in missions abroad. These skills include historically important intellectual skills, and new, technical skills such as management.

4.3.3.1 Intellectual skills: Intellectual skills, considered by many commentators as

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core skills of diplomats, concern such abilities as analysis, critical judgement, listening and observing skills, assimilation, decision-making and problem-solving. Traditionally it was assumed that diplomats had to possess these qualities naturally in order to fit the profile of the 'ideal diplomat'. However, the corporate world has since World War Two successfully demonstrated the possibility – and advantages – of improving employees' intellectual skills *via* formal training. Practical exercises in intellectual discipline, such as memory training and speed-reading, have in turn assisted the cultivation of competitive functional skills. Diplomatic training hosts all over the world are beginning to pick up on this trend – as Hemery (2002: 142) says, to prioritise it as the "heart of any programme of education for diplomats, helping them to sharpen their focus, to use their antennae, to think laterally and see the possibilities of new connections" – and are thus formalising instruction in intellectual skills as part of diplomatic training (Babb 1974: 19; Commonwealth 1971: 109; Eban 1998: 102).

4.3.3.2 Management skills: Managerial styles vary greatly among cultures and associated skills were traditionally considered to develop naturally *via* work experience. For these reasons, the global application of management principles and the formal instruction thereof is a relatively recent development in corporate practice. MFAs have been slower to follow suit but the trend is spreading (Coolsaet 1998: 18; Marshall 1997: 146). Less tradition-bound 'new-world' states such as Canada and Australia have lead international practice in this regard by applying scientific management theory and making the relevant instruction a compulsory and integral part of diplomatic training. A new practice in this regard, as used by the South African DFA, is to precede management courses with so-called Management Development Centres (MDCs), where certain generic management skills are measured and areas identified where officials require individual development (Barston 1997: 25–26; Pahad 1995).

Langhorne (1999) notes that managerial skills on all seniority levels have become much more important in light of the trend for diplomats to operate as coordinators within horisontalised structures – both domestic and international – rather than within the strict, vertical command structures of old. Modern management training therefore targets all levels of diplomats, including entry-level trainees. Trainees are

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taught not only the traditional elements of management such as delegation and supervision of personnel, but also stress time and work-load management and the planning and coordination of events such as conferences, exhibitions, meetings and official visits. Education in managerial skills also increasingly encompasses areas that were traditionally the preserve of specialised administrators within foreign services, such as financial management and project management – areas that are of particular concern in the execution of economic diplomacy. Diplomats' effective mastering of these skills greatly contributes towards the professional functioning of MFAs and enhances the latter's international competitive advantage (Cooper 1999: 45; Hemery 2002: 143; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 28).

4.4 SUPPLEMENTARY DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

Supplementary in-service diplomatic training concerns a growing trend in MFAs to provide diplomats with additional professional development – what Duke (2001: 13) refers to as "top-up" training. With the exception of induction training, which usually occurs before any other training takes place, supplementary training builds on basic diplomatic training and can manifest as post-specific, mid-posting or post-posting training, other *ad hoc* mid-career training and the training of heads of mission.

4.4.1 **Induction programmes**

Most foreign services have compulsory in-house induction (or 'orientation') programmes that are intended to give new recruits a broad but functional framework of the parameters within which they are to work. These courses last from a few days only to as long as nine weeks (US DOS FSI 1998). (In some cases, the induction programme is considered substantial enough to stand in for formal diplomatic training, although this trend is in decline) Induction programmes typically introduce new MFA members to the structure and functions of the foreign ministry, the facilities and working methods of head office, particularly the format of internal communications and practical ITC skills. The latter in particular is rapidly gaining importance in diplomatic training programmes because it facilitates information handling and public diplomacy and is instrumental in distance training. Induction training also usually includes personnel issues such as conditions of

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service and the MFAs code of conduct (Enjalran and Husson 1999: 67; India MEA FSI 1997: 75; Kappeler 1998: 45– 46; RSA DFA FSI 1999).

The New Zealand foreign ministry (MFAT 1996: 26–27) explains the objectives of induction training as "fundamental to ensuring all staff are able to be effective as early as possible after joining the Ministry and to making sure our corporate goals and values are understood and accepted". It adds that induction has the further advantage of making staff more efficient when posted abroad because they understand better how their head office operates.

4.4.2 **Post-specific training**

For diplomats who have been assigned to a mission abroad it is essential to have knowledge of the demands of the post to be occupied in the particular mission as well as the living and working conditions in the host country. Wolfe (1997: 17) explains that a diplomat's quest to influence policy makers in the capital of the US "depends on a sophisticated understanding of how decisions are made in Washington, a subject outside the bounds of international theory. The same would be true of any capital". A foreign diplomat based in Washington DC, for example, would therefore operate in quite another 'world' as a colleague from the same sending state who, for argument's sake, is posted to Ulan Bator.

However, much more than an understanding of the governing elite in a host country is required. 21st century diplomacy engages civil society as much as officialdom and diplomats therefore need to have an holistic comprehension of the environment in which they will be working. For this reason, many MFAs arrange tailor-made, post-specific courses – what the Americans refer to as cultural "immersion" courses, presented as part of area studies. The training allows the individual diplomat to 'hit the ground running', i.e. to minimise acclimatising time and to maximise efficiency in a new environment. Included in these courses is information on political systems, history, geography, cultural[23], ethnic, religious and other sensitivities, foreign policy (including relations with own country), social patterns, traditions and customs. Also, an important aspect is practical information about the country – legal issues and day-to-day necessities such as driving, banking and

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shopping (HSRC 1990: 124; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10; US DOS FSI 1998).

The size of the actual mission where a diplomat will be based, also impacts on the content of a post-specific course. The smaller the mission, the wider the range of functions there is to be performed by individual personnel. Budget streamlining and simultaneous expansion of diplomatic representation have in fact prompted many foreign services to open so-called micro-missions, staffed by a single diplomat with support from locally recruited staff. Single-officer assignments are obviously demanding and require special, broader training for the diplomats concerned. On the other hand, larger missions often have more specialists, both among seconded personnel and diplomats working there, thus decreasing the scope of responsibilities of diplomatic staff (Riordan 2003: 29).

4.4.3 **Mid-posting and post-posting training**

Many MFAs offer special training to diplomats who are mid-way through a posting abroad, or who have just been transferred home after such a posting. The reason is that diplomats who are immersed in a foreign culture and political setting may need updating on their own country's internal developments and external relations, in order to operate at maximum efficiency. In Japan, for example, senior officials who are stationed abroad receive "special orientation on domestic affairs" during their home leave, i.e. "lectures on current events – political, economic and social movements in Japan and overseas" (Japan MFA FSTI 1998a: 3). This type of orientation also allows officials opportunity to cultivate contacts and build on existing networks in their own country, *via* direct contact.

By the same token, training is offered to diplomats who return to head office after a few years abroad. A debriefing course can help returning diplomats cope with unexpected culture shock in their own country and practical considerations such as cost of living, new labour legislation, and changes in medical or educational structures. It can also introduce diplomats to system changes at head office. This type of training is universally useful, but is especially relevant in countries that are undergoing political transformation (De Borja 1999: 105; Otermi 1992: 32).

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4.4.4 **Mid-career training**

As a function of the world-wide emphasis on continuous training, more and more countries are recognising the need for renewal within diplomatic careers and offer formal training courses, either voluntary or compulsory, for mid-career diplomats, i.e. diplomats with about 10 to 15 years experience (Babb 1974: 15; Enjalran and Husson 1999: 67; Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998). As a statement from New Zealand's foreign ministry explains, "we see it as important that staff who have spent a long time in the Ministry get opportunities to pick up new perspectives and skills. We are after all an organisation that deals with information and ideas and we have to put in a conscious effort to maintain our intellectual capital" (New Zealand MFAT 1996: 29).

The courses presented to mid-career diplomats typically focus on management skills, but may also include the upgrading of certain skills, or introduction of new skills such as computer literacy. Diplomatic training courses may also reflect new priorities in a state's foreign policy in areas such as peacekeeping, trade negotiations, international election observation and regional integration (Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 1998; Commonwealth 1971: 127; Jordan JID 1998b).

A variation on formal diplomatic training for mid-career diplomats is the offering of opportunities for them to take study leave or sabbaticals. This option demands from MFAs a measure of flexibility in human resources management and a commitment to long-term training investments. The US has, for example, for the past four decades had a 'Diplomat in Residence Programme' which gives senior MFA personnel the opportunity to spend a year-long sabbatical at a university campus in the US. The individual diplomat is consequently exposed to new and enriching academic experiences, whereas the academic institution can draw on the practical expertise of the diplomat to complement its theoretical study of international relations (Japan MFA FSTI 1998a; New Zealand MFAT 1996; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 3; US DOS FSI 1998).

An innovative new trend that originates in the US and UK is to second diplomats outside the foreign ministry to private firms or other government ministries, for short

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spells. Langhorne (1999) refers to this as a "revolving-door policy", which spreads the sense that foreign policy is "at least to some degree a cooperative enterprise, based on inclusivity and accessibility". This cross-fertilisation enriches MFAs and ensures more versatility among its human resources (Babb 1974: 21; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 27).

4.4.5 **Heads of mission training**

Heads of mission training consists of short courses that are specially designed for diplomats who have been appointed as ambassadors or heads of secondary missions such as consulates. These courses – which are typically combined with post-specific training – are usually compact and voluntary because MFAs depart from the assumption that such individuals already have the skills that are required of effective diplomats and that they need only limited instruction in a few areas such as financial planning, legal issues and the protocol that applies to their status.

Nevertheless, Barston (1997: 27) notes that ambassadors need training so as better to understand the specific interests they are to represent while abroad, their links to the foreign business community in the host state and to be alerted to the adequacy of traditional reporting methods; all in all to understand the "increasingly conflicting tasks the modern ambassador has to undertake". In line with Barston's comment, the trend internationally is thus for such courses to be made compulsory, even for political appointees (Russian Federation MFA DA 1998a; ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998b: 9).

4.5 LANGUAGE TRAINING

Language proficiency is universally considered an indispensable diplomatic skill (Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Japan MFA FSTI 1998a: 2–3; New Zealand MFAT 1996: 27). As the HSRC (1990: 131) notes: "foreign language expertise is required to ensure more reliable capacities to communicate with the countries' allies, analyse the behaviour of potential adversaries, and earn the trust and sympathies of the uncommitted". All MFAs are therefore concerned with recruiting personnel who have foreign language skills or alternatively investing in language

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training, in spite of the fact that such training is typically expensive and time-consuming (Commonwealth 1971: 117).

Diplomatic language instruction can be done in any one or combination of various ways. Certain countries invest heavily in an internal foreign ministry language training capacity: cases in point are the US FSI and the Canadian CFSI, both of which offer instruction in more than 40 foreign languages (Canada DFAIT CFSI 2003; US DOS FSI 1998). The second option is independent, sponsored study at language institutes or universities, either full-time or part-time. A third option is a study-placement in a foreign country, sometimes but not necessarily combined with attachment to a mission (ROK MOFAT IFANS 1998a: 10–11). Finally, diplomats who assume postings abroad are often sponsored by their respective foreign ministries to learn a local language in due course of the posting (as done by the South African DFA[24]).

As concerns the choice of foreign language instruction, French remains a popular choice on account of its historical status as a diplomatic *lingua franca*. Its prominence is, however, diminishing as English increasingly dominates international commerce, science, ITC and multilateral communiqués. This is reflected in the fact that many MFAs of non-Anglophone countries such as (Republic of) Korea have opted to conduct their diplomatic training entirely in English. Indeed, in the former East Bloc countries, rest of Asia, Africa and the Americas, even in Europe, it is becoming rare to find a diplomat who is not conversant in English (Austria *Diplomatische Akademie* 2003; Bayazakh 1998; De Borja 1999: 15; Italy MFA *Istituto Diplomatico* 1998; Lee 1998; Turkey MFA FCTC 1998).

The popularity of certain languages does, however, present a problem to MFAs in the sense that there is an oversupply of popular language speakers as opposed to an under-supply of difficult or isolated language speakers, who may be required in certain foreign policy priority areas (such as, for example, Arabic speakers in the US foreign service). The acquisition of proficiency by an individual diplomat can lead to specialisation and have a definitive impact on his career path, hence the careful consideration of personal investment in a specific language. MFAs therefore

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tend to offer special incentives or – in the case of more autocratic states, such as the former East-bloc countries – to simply direct diplomats to study particular languages.

The content of diplomatic training universally seems to be expanding in scope, reflecting the enormous socio-economic and political changes of the past century and their challenges to the diplomatic profession. A major trend is the move towards a more interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach, combining theoretical perspectives with practical skills training to prepare diplomats for the many *de facto* roles they will have to assume in the course of their careers. The basic, traditional diplomatic skills namely communication, negotiation, representation and protocol and etiquette (and, to a large extent, intellectual ability) were historically not *taught* but *sought*: suitable candidates for the diplomatic profession were assumed to possess these skills by virtue of personal aptitude and social status. These skills are, however, increasingly the subject of formal tuition. Also on the increase is tuition in new skills demanded by the *de facto* contemporary roles of diplomats: information handling and skills in public, economic and multilateral diplomacy as well as consular work. The latter, as so many other areas of diplomatic practice, reflect the influence of democratisation of diplomacy and the crucial impact of an own and foreign public's opinion. An auxiliary and new diplomatic skill that originates in the corporate world is management, of which the tuition has become commonplace in diplomatic training programmes both at basic and advanced levels of training.

As earlier discussed, the world-wide prioritisation of diplomatic training manifests also in this professional education being seen as a continuum, hence the host of supplementary training offered to diplomats in addition to basic diplomatic training: MFA induction programmes and post-specific, mid-posting, post- posting and *ad hoc* mid career training, as well as an increasing tendency to provide formal training to heads of mission regardless of their personal accomplishments. An area with less evidence of universal trends, is language training: historically and universally considered as fundamental to diplomatic prowess, linguistic ability remains a crucial

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diplomatic skill, but not all diplomatic training centres invest in the training of a variety of foreign languages. Yet again, the IT revolution has made its mark on diplomatic practice, as the predominant use of English in electronic communications has rendered it the new *lingua franca* of international relations – a fact that is reflected in the increasing use of English as medium of diplomatic training world-wide.

5. CONCLUSION

The practice of diplomacy – historically considered an innate art rather than an acquirable science – has been transformed in the course of the past century, *inter alia* by means of the professionalisation of diplomatic training. The practical advantages of training have become sufficiently compelling to create a global trend towards the widening as well as deepening of career-specific training. Greater investment in diplomatic training has created new opportunities for MFAs to implement aspects of foreign policy *via* the training of their own diplomats, non-diplomatic support networks, private sector clients of diplomacy and even foreign diplomats. The increasing world-wide demand for diplomatic training has resulted in the multiplication of the hosts of training to include non-traditional private and multinational host institutions that; making the outsourcing of diplomatic training more common and acceptable. The growth in world-wide diplomatic training has caused unprecedented international cooperation among stake-holders in the field as a result of which more resources and information are shared and programmes are amended to reflect international best practice – a trend that is contributing to global standardisation of diplomatic training.

As discussed earlier, the required abilities of MFAs' primary human resources, namely their diplomats, comprise personal qualities as well as appropriate knowledge and skills. The first of these elements is addressed *via* targeted recruitment for the profession. Traditionally, elitist recruitment obviated the need for training, but the process is increasingly being seen as a functional and egalitarian pre-selection that provides a fundamental base from whence formal training can proceed to produce effective diplomats who are representative of their publics.

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In practice, both the recruitment and training of diplomats are marked by considerable variations in structure and method; also among states of similar developmental stage. These differences reflect national cultures, attitudes and priorities, and are decisively influenced by the pressures of prevailing circumstances, the resources available to MFAs, and the degree to which the latter are willing to commit such resources for training purposes. A best practice trend seems to be that MFAs are increasingly making diplomatic career advancement conditional on successful completion of available training. Training itself is configured in multiform packages but the general inclination as regards basic diplomatic training is towards a full-time, year-long course, incorporating experiential training methodologies. Evaluation of training is also gaining functional prominence in that its emphasis is shifting towards service delivery in the framework of foreign policy objectives, demanding assessment not just of trainee performance during formal courses, but of the indirect manifestation thereof in terms of MFA efficiency ad productivity.

Broad international agreement exists on the knowledge (theory) and skills (practice) that professional diplomats should acquire, i.e. on the content (curricula) of diplomatic training programmes. The combined range is very large, reflecting the scope of diverse issues that 21st century diplomats need to deal with on a routine basis in bilateral and multilateral fora. A major trend is the move towards a more interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach, combining theoretical perspectives with practical skills training to prepare diplomats for the many *de facto* roles they will have to assume in the course of their careers. The basic, traditional diplomatic skills are thus complemented by new specialised and technical skills that result from the demands of the RDA. The world-wide prioritisation of diplomatic training manifests also in this professional education being seen as a continuum, hence the host of supplementary training offered to diplomats in addition to basic diplomatic training.

The aspects that have been discussed in this chapter represent broad commonalities and global trends within diplomatic recruitment and training that set the norms of best practice in the field. For newly established MFAs and the poorer, weakly-capacitated MFAs of developing countries, these examples are of crucial

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importance in the development of their own diplomatic training capacity because they have (for a variety of reasons that will subsequently be discussed) a relatively greater stake in producing effective diplomats. The practical reality is, however, inversely proportionate to their needs, in the sense that many of these services have inadequate diplomatic training at their disposal. The next chapter will examine this phenomenon in light of the many challenges that face diplomatic training in the Developing World.

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[1] The diplomatic academy of the former USSR, for example, dates back to 1934. The oldest diplomatic academy in the world, the *Diplomatische Akademie* in Vienna, dates back more than 200 years.

[2] The CPDS (1998b) is of the opinion that the rapid growth of academic diplomatic studies is a parallel development that benefits courses of professional diplomatic training through the availability of richer resource materials, especially of cases.

[3] In the case of India, no differentiation is made between the training of administrative and political officials

[4] Various countries have introduced measures to compensate spouses for sacrificing careers: pensions, unpaid leave from institutions that they had worked for, sabbaticals, bilateral agreements to allow them to work in host countries, employment within embassies, and special allowances – however, in many cases spouses are not accommodated at all. The author has personal experience of the latter.

[5] The IFDT was, until 1996, known as the 'Annual Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations'.

[6] Vale (1993: 32–34) explains that the term 'affirmative action' originates in the US where it is used to denote the official effort to reconcile representativity and professionalism. It involves a series of techniques and actions and plans that can be brought into effect to create professionalism, to bring an amalgamation of the service among people who were not professional in the strict sense of the term.

[7] Diplomacy, like most other areas of international relations, used to be the exclusive domain of men. Discriminatory rules against the employment of women were universal until the middle of the 20th century. Whereas historically women's intellectual and mental aptitude for the profession had been questioned, the second half of the 20th century saw the debate evolving into more practical considerations. Their physical safety, their perceived primary care-giving responsibilities to husbands and children and their temporary, sometimes frequent absence from offices due to childbirth, were all seen as dictating against a career in the foreign service. When women were eventually slowly 'allowed in' to (Western) foreign services, they were limited in their career development – they were initially only assigned to administrative or secretarial or research positions, and hence subordinate, positions (Babb 1974: 11; Vale 1993: 34). In most other areas of the world, the female face of diplomacy took even longer to develop. In South Africa, for example, (unmarried only) female diplomats were allowed to take up postings abroad for the first time in 1968 (Babb 1974: 11). In many undemocratic parts of the world, discrimination against female diplomats continues. Until very recently, female diplomats – even in democracies – had to choose between marriage and a career, the assumption having been that male spouses would/should not sacrifice a career to accompany female diplomats abroad. The feminist revolution and the universal awareness of human rights have however changed the genderderd face of diplomacy and more and more female diplomats are reaching the highest echelons of the profession. However, there is still a vast discrepancy between the number of male and female diplomats in the world, even in societies where women have equal rights (Babb 1974: 11; Kappeler 1998: 39; Klieman 1999: 84; Marshall 1997: 147; Vale 1993: 34).

[8] The human rights revolution has also facilitated recruitment to foreign services of individuals with same-sex orientation. Traditionally, acknowledged homosexuality was a universal taboo in foreign services. This situation is changing and more and more democracies, for example Canada, South Africa and Australia, are recruiting MFA candidates regardless of sexual orientation, and acknowledging the partners of homosexual diplomats as *de facto* spouses (Author's own experience

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of interaction with diplomats from Australia, Canada and colleagues in South African DFA, also information as received on 5 October 1999 from the Canadian Ambassador to the ROK, Arthur Perron, who had previously been the head of Canadian MFA personnel management.

[9]Ordinarily it is required that spouses of diplomats also be (or become) citizens of the same country. In fact, some countries do not allow their diplomats to marry non-citizens, or special permission at a political level is required. Komachi (1999: 116) notes that in the case of Japan, as part of recent modernisation, the foreign ministry has abolished the nationality clause which forced foreign spouses of Japanese diplomats to take Japanese nationality.

[10] In Germany in the past, law graduates were exempted from much of the diplomatic training programme required from other candidates (Babb 1974: 10–11).

[11] Vale (1993: 35) cites the functional approach of Norway's foreign ministry, where "recruits are interviewed by a panel representing trade unions, the employer's federation, the universities etc. These are the users of the foreign services and it is agreed that they should have a say in the kind of people who will serve them".

[12] The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University proudly notes that by 1993, it had nine alumni serving as US ambassadors and a hundred that had served as ambassadors since the beginning of the programme (FSLD 1993: 2)

[13] The other half of Clingendael's revenue is generated by its activities, *inter alia* courses, seminars, workshops on international negotiations and research projects (Clingendael 2004).

[14] In 1998, the Russian Diplomatic Academy was staffed by 200 people, among whom were 52 professors and doctors of sciences and 86 senior lecturers (Russian Federation MFA DA 1998a).

[15] In practice this means that some officials proceed with their careers without ever undergoing formal diplomatic training, for example in South Africa (Author's personal observation during career in South African DFA).

[16] Meerts (1991: 7) adds that in exceptional cases like Iran and Vietnam, diplomatic training can last "many more years". In the case of the former USSR, diplomatic training lasted five years, before a small elite of specialists was sent abroad (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 219).

[17] Israeli Ambassador Gideon Rafael recalled a conversation he had with Prime Minister Nehru of India, in 1961. Nehru asked him how Israel with a population two hundred times smaller than India's managed to find so many suitable candidates for ambassadorial positions. The Israeli replied: "quite a few of Israel's Ambassadors had graduated from Kibbutzim rather than from Diplomatic Academies ... the man behind the plough was familiar with the ways of modern rural economy, understood to get along with his Arab neighbours and to negotiate loans with hard-headed bankers and thick-skinned bureaucrats and was at least as good Ambassadorial material timber as the diplomat reared in the precincts of academic exclusivity" (Rafael 1997).

[18]In fact, many commentators regard diplomacy as a specialisation *per se* (Costa Rica MFRCA *Manuel Maria de Peralta* 1998)

[19] These disciplines usually contain elements of, or are supplemented by, the other human sciences such as history, sociology and philosophy.

[20] In a different sense, the term protocol can also refer to an international treaty that is complementary to a main treaty, eg the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. (Switzerland DFA 2004)

[21] An example is the official Order of Precedence, determined by governments, according to which the Chief of Protocol affords people the necessary recognition at official ceremonies and functions.

[22] The US Foreign Service excludes liaison with its domestic public from the notion of public diplomacy (Smith 1998: 96).

[23] For a long time it was assumed that cultural studies were not necessary when diplomats from one anglophone country were posted to another. This presumption of similarity in culture has proven to be incorrect and anglophone foreign ministries are increasingly sensitising their diplomats to cultural differences in other anglophone countries.

[24] Author's personal experience during diplomatic posting in ROK, 1997– 2001.

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CHAPTER 6
THE CHALLENGE OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

1. INTRODUCTION

Diplomatic training practice in the Developing World ranges from its total absence in certain states, to the presentation of sophisticated training by renowned[1] diplomatic academies in other states. This diversity means that the assessment of diplomatic training in the Developing World amounts to a sweeping generalisation. However, a broad distinction can be made between the training requirements of developing countries as opposed to those of developed countries, whom a Commonwealth (1971: 103) report found "have accumulated experience of the conduct of foreign affairs over a long period and generally have a higher level of education from which to draw their diplomatic officers, as well as more sophisticated institutions and methods for their training". Considered in addition to the universally recognised advantages of diplomatic training, as discussed in the previous chapter, certain conditions thus render diplomatic training in the Developing World a relatively greater imperative. These conditions vary according to the scope and nature of challenges that face various categories of developing nations such as new states and states in transition.

The impact of these variables is examined in the context of the Developing World's collective international agenda and the impediments to diplomatic training that are widely experienced within ministries of foreign affairs. Finally, the contribution of the international community to diplomatic training is discussed – its scope and benefits but also its limitations in addressing the needs of diplomatic training in the Developing World.

2. THE IMPERATIVE OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Certain factors pertain specifically to the Developing World and render diplomatic training not just important, but crucial. These considerations depart from the fact

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that diplomacy is an international activity and that its practitioners are obliged to adhere to and operate within universal standards and norms, regardless of national resources. For Developing World diplomats, the myriad challenges to contemporary diplomacy are compounded by their states' competitive disadvantages and the fragile sovereignty that so many of the latter contend with. In addition, diplomats from developing nations carry the responsibility of representing the diplomatic agenda of an entire 'world'.

2.1 COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC ARENA

Diplomats need training in order to become 'world class' professionals because diplomacy, per definition, is practiced internationally and as such subscribes to international norms and legal principles. This practical consideration prompts the recruitment of diplomats according to a universally desirable profile and their subsequent training in preparation for participation in a global 'culture' of diplomatic practice. The huge discrepancy between rich and poor states in terms of MFA capacity enlarges the individual responsibility of diplomats from the latter category and places a relatively higher premium on their training.

2.1.1 **The universal profile of diplomats**

The profile of the 'ideal diplomat', as previously discussed, is universal in its desirability, regardless of the developmental status of a diplomat's sending state. Notwithstanding many other changes to the profession, this traditional profile – "the academic and intellectual attainment as well as the refinement and decorum of the diplomat", as Debrah (1996) expresses it – has not been altered in any substantive way. In fact, as Hemery (2002: 141) points out, the corpus of required skills and qualities of diplomats has, as a result of globalisation and the information revolution, only become more universal in its desirability. Certain core requirements are thus universally sought when diplomats are recruited, and this base is expanded on by career-specific training in a body of knowledge and skills on which general consensus exists (New Zealand MFAT 1996: 24).

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2.1.2 **Embrace of conventional diplomacy**

Notwithstanding the Developing World's rhetorical rejection of its colonial legacy and Western-centric tutelage, the conduct of its diplomacy is firmly rooted in the conventional norms and practices of the European state-system that remain at the basis of global diplomatic practice (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 209). Sofer (1988: 202) observes that, for new states, the reinforcement of conventional diplomatic norms is important because "their chances of being harmed from international anarchy are greater than those of the established states". In practice, the rules of diplomacy have bestowed on new states validation of their sovereignty with accompanying international advantages, such as equality of privilege, access to interstate fora and recourse to international law. Rather than repeal, the new states have thus sought reform of diplomatic rules within the framework of existing diplomatic institutions. Even those new states that profess a revolutionary ideology have tended to accept[2] the rules of traditional diplomacy and have – rather ironically, as Sofer (1998: 201) points out – espoused its formal, ceremonial and traditional roles. Soviet diplomats, for example, were (and their successors still are) highly trained, among other skills in diplomatic etiquette, and have been known to be punctilious in its application. Armstrong (1999: 55–56) remarks that whatever reservations these states may have had about the operational norms and conventions of diplomacy, in most cases they have found it hard to conduct their formal relations by other means.

The practical espousal by the Developing World of conventional diplomacy has confirmed the need for a corps of professionals with conventional diplomatic skills in areas such as negotiation, communication and protocol, in order to 'play the international game'. As Ahmad (1999: 128) observes about Malaysia's MFA (*Wisma Putra*): "the role of traditional diplomacy is still important in securing support and agreement for Malaysia's ideas and initiatives, an area of activity no other agency can come close to in terms of results. For all the more initiatives and a more complex world, it is still the number of missions abroad, staffed by the *Wisma Putra* officials, that can help to realise Malaysia's external interests. This indicates that the *Wisma Putra* officer is still the man or woman at the front line defending or promoting Malaysia's national interests, and not therefore playing a diminished role

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in the changed international circumstances". Seen from this perspective, training for the diplomatic profession is a *sine qua non*, and of increasing necessity for any state wishing to make an international impact by means of diplomacy.

2.1.3 **Lack of foreign policy comparative advantage**

Many Developing World states deal with the reality that the weight of their national bargaining power is inversely proportionate to the size of their foreign policy agenda. The fact that their countries lack comparative advantage in alternative foreign policy tools such as military or economic power means that they have a disproportionately high interest in successful diplomacy to advance their interests in the global community (Debrah 1996; Pahad 1996b).

In this regard, Ahmad (1999: 118) observes that a country's 'developing' status brings into question its command of resources to implement foreign policy objectives. He says "without a resort to force, it might be argued that Malaysia's ability to perform its foreign policy goals would depend more on the quality of its diplomats". Debrah (1996) echoes this sentiment when he declares “if diplomacy is our [developing countries’] first line of defense, it is imperative that we invest heavily and deeply in the training of our diplomats”. For less developed countries, diplomatic training is thus a crucial remedial action to address their lack of international comparative advantage.

2.1.4 **Insufficient diplomatic capacity**

The Developing World's competitive role in the international arena is made vastly more difficult by insufficient capacity to conduct diplomacy. The problem originates at MFA head offices that are often inadequately capacitated and significantly under-resourced in terms of manpower (Dlamini Zuma 2002). Ahmad (1999:118) comments on the many vacancies in Malaysia's foreign ministry and says "its most pressing need at this juncture, indeed, is to find persons with the correct aptitude, training, skills and inclination to fill [the vacancies]". Indeed, all over the Developing World diplomats find that they literally have to do 'more with less', i.e. that they have to perform with far fewer resources than their peers in developed states.

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Lack of foreign ministry capacity manifests most obviously in the quantitative establishment of missions abroad, which often translates into limited or localised representation. Barston (1997: 19) gives the example of Jamaica which in 1997 had only eleven embassies in addition to its four multilateral missions, leaving it with "no significant diplomatic representation in the Far East, South-East Asia, much of Africa or the Middle-East". Many other LDCs have to make do with even fewer external missions. Less visible but equally significant is the attenuated capacity of missions even where they do exist. Smaller countries simply cannot afford to maintain large missions – in this regard, the HSRC (1990: 123) observes that "in all too many cases [in small states] the economic and political officer, i.e. the consul, and the administrative officer are embodied in a single person. In addition, this diplomat with multiple functions may also serve as military *attaché*, press officer, intelligence station chief, student advisor, and trade representative for the country of his appointment". The result is disproportionate pressure on staff to tend to the full spectrum of functional and/or geographic responsibilities – including, often, simultaneous accreditation[3] to many other countries (Botswana DFA 1996; Commonwealth 1971: 111; Marshall 1997: 142).

Of equal concern is the disadvantage that developing countries have in *ad hoc* international negotiations in light of their "differential[4] capacity to that of the industrialised countries ... because they lack the human resources to sustain difficult and sophisticated trade negotiations with the powerful developed countries" (Jones and Whittingham 1998: 88–89). As previously mentioned, less developed states cannot always spare the appropriate technocrats from domestic ministries to participate in international delegations, leaving diplomats ill-equipped to deal satisfactorily with the technical aspects of negotiations. Exacerbating the dilemma is the common lack of 'quick-response' telecommunications link-ups to technical experts in their sending states. Their resultant under-representation in multilateral fora risks, as Hemery (2002: 142) points out, turning them into "a mere object of negotiation" and prevents them from participating as equal partners (also noted by Barston 1997: 18, 28).

Diplomats from developing countries are clearly outnumbered in a hugely competitive environment, and this fact renders individual diplomats' personal

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contribution to the attainment of their countries' foreign policy simultaneously more difficult and more essential. This is where training comes into play – it can build capacity by 'adding value' to available human resources. Hemery (2002: 142) says "by understanding properly the dimensions and dynamics of the game and knowing how to manipulate the levers of power, diplomats from poor countries can serve as important multipliers of influence and defenders of national interest in otherwise vulnerable circumstances". Nzo (1996b) emphasises the necessity of training as a confidence building mechanism "so that our diplomats can hold their own in the fierce diplomatic battlefield" in the face of competition that he calls "ruthless at times". The necessity to make individual diplomats more assertive and effective is therefore clear, and this can only be achieved by means of substantial yet broad-based diplomatic training, with intensified emphasis on areas such as negotiations and intellectual skills.

2.2 MEETING 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES TO THE PROFESSION

The universal challenges that diplomats face at the beginning of the new millennium, as discussed, have for diplomats from the South been superimposed on developmental disadvantages, thus intensifying the overall impact. This has forced them, as Rozental (1999: 133) puts it, to keep up with "dizzying and often contradictory events" in "a vastly more complex international environment than ever before", and having to adapt "quickly to new challenges and opportunities – often with little or no additional resources". Many of these concerns are reflected by the Developing World's international agenda, but its MFAs have also had to face up to the reality that the problem needs to be addressed internally: new approaches to the study and teaching of international relations have become necessary, not least so in the preparation of their diplomats (Ahmad 1999: 124; India MEA FSI 1997: Preface; MGIMO 1998).

2.2.1 **Globalisation**

The evolving post-Cold War order has radically reshaped international relations, with new challenges as well as new areas of cooperation emerging in the field of diplomacy. The 'global village' that the world has become has made the Developing

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World more vulnerable to international events, obliging diplomats to keep abreast of an ever-enlarging spectrum of issues, especially negative international developments, and alerting their governments to possible remedial or preventative action. This has played up the necessity for diplomatic training in areas such as global issue studies and preventative diplomacy.

On the positive side, globalisation has also multiplied the opportunities and methods for international cooperation, which diplomats, more than any other public servants, are tasked to facilitate. Their skill development in areas such as public and multilateral diplomacy is therefore very important (Business Day 3 February 1999; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Pahad 1996a). The Malaysian diplomatic training institute notes that globalisation is such a dynamic phenomenon that it has forced the re-designing of diplomatic training programmes (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998). It affects not only the curriculum content of diplomats but also its target group, drawing in non-diplomats and officials from other government sectors as part of a more interconnected foreign policy community. It also necessitates the continuous research in the field of diplomatic practice that is increasingly institutionalised in diplomatic training centres.

2.2.2 **The digital divide**

According to the Mozambican MFA's Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI 1996) the revolution in communication and transportation technologies has "profoundly affected those institutions that educate and train diplomats to be international practitioners". This is because diplomats from less developed states acutely experience the professional impact of their countries' lagging technological capability, i.e. the so-called 'digital divide' between North and South. Dlamini Zuma (2002) says "in this knowledge-based era where information is a strategic resource, [an inadequate level of ICT infrastructure] represents a potentially crippling limitation". This draw-back compels diplomats from developing countries, as in so many other instances, to accomplish 'more with less'.

One of the implications of advances in modern technology is the increased speed with which diplomatic intermediation needs to be accomplished (Debrah 1996). This

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has required of diplomatic training to be even more focused on competitive skills in areas such as reporting, negotiation and networking, intellectual skills and also to include, specifically, training in the use of IT resources.

In terms of content of work, Deleito (1992: 42) adds that diplomats from smaller states are confronted by the "media imperialism" of larger states. This poses a huge diplomatic challenge to Developing World diplomats as regards the competition for attention and desired reaction by foreign as well as domestic publics. It also makes intensified training in the handling of information and expertise in media and public diplomacy an imperative. Moreover, narrowing the digital divide comprises an important foreign policy agenda item for diplomats of Third World countries, motivating them to seek investment and/or development aid in the relevant sectors and necessitating sound knowledge of all the underlying issues (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998).

2.2.3 **The predominance of geo-economics**

The international shift from geopolitics to geo-economics has left no state untouched, and for Developing World diplomats the mandate is often a matter of national survival. A more equitable international economic system remains at the basis of the Developing World's collective agenda and much of its diplomatic activity is geared towards achieving that, including its myriad efforts to maximise economic influence by means of regional integration schemes.

The challenge is made vastly more difficult by the fact that diplomats from the South have to compete with highly skilled diplomats from all over the world who relentlessly pursue different economic agendas. Their diplomatic efforts can therefore hardly be limited to the simple pursuit of development aid: they need to sustain, secure and expand international market share and secure the best possible terms for their countries' products in highly sophisticated and competitive markets. In addition, they also need to vie for dwindling natural resources, secure preferential investment and aid terms, and in general attract more international involvement in targeted development of their countries' resources (FSLD 1993: 3; Pahad 1996a; Vale 1993: 20).

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However, as Barston (1997: 13, 28) points out, many Developing World diplomats find themselves ill-equipped to handle the international economic aspects of foreign policy, due to traditional political emphasis or lack of human resources. He explains that foreign ministries, which have generally lacked expertise in these areas, have found it difficult to accommodate and coordinate international economic policy in line with the international trend for MFAs to do so, and adds that the issue is more complex for newer states because development policy to a large extent becomes inseparable from foreign and national security policy. The dire need for diplomatic training in economic diplomacy with the implied expertise in negotiation skills and bilateral as well as multilateral diplomatic skills is thus a self-evident imperative.

2.2.4 **Increase of role players in foreign policy community**

The host of new actors in the field of diplomacy, many of them non-governmental, has prompted MFAs all over the world to redefine their relationships with own and foreign publics and the wider foreign policy 'community' in every state. Rozental (1999: 146) explains that in the case of Mexico, the greatest change in diplomatic practice has been that the relationship between the "foreign policy establishment" and the numerous NGOs that have emerged in Mexico during the 1990s has changed from adversarial to cooperative. "Where originally the ministry was deeply suspicious of NGOs – often seen as external *agents provocateur* – it now has a daily working relationship with the principal groups dealing with human rights, the environment, narcotics and women's issues, among others ... a case in point is the preparatory process that takes place prior to major international summit meetings ... NGO representatives now join governmental delegations and participate fully in the drafting of position papers and conference documents". For developing countries that struggle to summon the necessary resources in execution of foreign policy, such a united national front in pursuit of a developmental agenda is important. This means that diplomats need specific training in managerial, communication and negotiation skills and expertise in public diplomacy in order to coordinate foreign policy execution, and the sharing of scarce resources, among a wide spectrum of foreign policy stake-holders.

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2.2.5 **The rise in multilateralism**

Barston (1997: 3, 5) notes that the rapid growth in the volume of diplomatic activity over the past few decades has largely been as a result of the expansion of multilateral and regional diplomacy, and points out that much of it has been "economic or resource related". As previously discussed, multilateralism has opened up important possibilities for the Developing World to make global diplomatic impact and for individual countries to conduct bilateral relations with countries in whose capitals they are not represented (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 200). However, it has also presented its diplomats with formidable challenges that need to be addressed *via* diplomatic training. Among these is the necessity for specialisation in technical areas and the need to master new diplomatic techniques such as lobbying and conference diplomacy.

Multilateral activity in the context of regionalism has spawned a particularly voluminous diplomatic output and has severely taxed the under-capacitated MFAs of developing countries. It has also, even in developed countries, demanded the augmentation, even redesign, of diplomatic training programmes to enable diplomats to deal with integration arrangements and the management of foreign and domestic policy harmonisation (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 199). In this regard, instruction in management skills, in addition to traditional negotiation and communication skills, has become a necessity.

2.3 REPRESENTING MORE THAN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

The performance demands on Developing World diplomats – intimidating enough if national circumstances are taken into account – are multiplied by the South's collective developmental agenda. Diplomats, in the daily execution of their duties, need to heed the foreign policy interests of various sub-regions, regions and indeed the accumulated interests of the Developing World's diplomatic alliance. As Pityana (2000) remarks about South African diplomacy, issues often present that "are not crucial to South Africa *per se*, but are of compelling concern for many other African countries". Thus South African diplomats need to also champion those causes

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because "we owe it to the continent and our future generations to do our best to seek a better deal for Africa [in all international fora]" (also noted by Pahad 1996b).

Various developing countries have made it clear that they serve the wider interests of the South, particularly leader states such as Mexico, South Africa and Malaysia that have engaged in high profile diplomacy in their chosen roles as spokesmen for the South. The impact on the MFAs of these countries has been significant as they progressed from mainly reactive diplomatic activity to the proactive execution of foreign policy objectives. Without exception such states have upgraded their diplomatic training to prepare their diplomats for a more demanding, global role (Ahmad 1999: 117; Rozental 1999: 138; Selebi 1998b).

For diplomats from these leader states as well as from the rest of the Developing World, diplomatic training provides the capacity to "weave the fabric of regional and global political, economic and social cooperation", as Vella (1998: 16) observes. He adds that "once that fabric is created it is even more important to maintain it and to develop it further". This implies that continuous diplomatic training, in addition to basic training, has become a functional necessity in order for developing MFAs to fulfil their wider regional and global roles with optimal efficiency.

2.4 PROTECTING FRAGILE NATIONAL IDENTITIES

Whatever their multilateral commitments, Developing World diplomats remain first and foremost the representatives of national states, with the duty to promote those states' interests as well as image in the international arena (Coolsaet 1998: 21; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 198). In this regard, Ahmad (1999: 117–118) remarks that Malaysia's *Wisma Putra* continues to retain "its custodian role as upholder of the national interest in the regional and international contexts, ever mindful of the parameters of Malaysia's position". This obligation is particularly important in light of the fact that state sovereignty in the Third World is a treasured but often fragile commodity.

The role of diplomats in upholding and protecting state sovereignty stems from their representative function. Sharp (1999: 54) explains that this status allows them to

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confirm their sending state's identity. He gives the example of the USSR's collapse and the fact that many former Soviet diplomats, rather than simply switching allegiance to the new sovereign republics, "sought to keep the USSR as an international actor until, as they hoped, internal affairs had been clarified". The reason they could successfully do so was their impeccable professionalism, inculcated by intensive diplomatic training. Likewise, in other developing countries, professional diplomatic training, particularly in national studies, protocol and international law, ensures that diplomats are able to fulfil their representative function to full national advantage.

For the Developing World diplomatic participation in international relations is not really a choice, it's a matter of survival. However, as it struggles to cope with the universal challenges of 21st century diplomacy, it deals with severe developmental impediments to its capacity to compete. Its over-stretched diplomats, who need to protect fragile national sovereignties in addition to pursuing the interests of a wider international alliance, can be given competitive, even comparative, advantage *via* professional training. This consideration makes diplomatic training for Developing World countries an absolute imperative.

3. IMPEDIMENTS TO DIPLOMATIC TRAINING WITHIN DEVELOPING WORLD MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Diplomats (especially) from the poorer developing states face a number of obstacles, both material and attitudinal, to acquiring the professional competencies that will enable them to perform effectively in rapidly changing international affairs (Hemery 2002: 141). These impediments include the organisational immaturity of foreign ministries and lack of financial and human resources to sustain proper training as well as actual paucity of training infrastructure.

3.1 ORGANISATIONAL IMMATURITY OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In large parts of the Developing World state bureaucracies are weak and civil

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servants are treated as disposable rather than as valuable assets. In such states MFAs are hamstrung by what Debrah (1996) refers to as a “blind spot” governments seem to have regarding the pivotal means by which their foreign policy agendas are promoted in the international arena. As a result, MFAs lack organisational maturity, influence and legitimacy, and this status is reflected in the low priority accorded to diplomatic training (Commonwealth 1971: 102; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 210–211).

3.1.1 **Lack of foreign ministry status**

Barston (1997: 11) notes that attempts to improve the coordination and direction of foreign policy in the Third World have in the main involved building up agencies under the direct control of – or attached institutionally to – the office of the head of government or state. This has been the case even in newly industrialised countries such as Malaysia and (Republic of) Korea. Rozental (1999: 141) gives the example of Mexican President Echeverría who "created a parallel foreign policy team within his own office to supervise – and often contradict – the foreign ministry, which he basically mistrusted". The absence of an autonomous MFA, or its sidelining in favour of extended personal diplomacy by the head of state, diminishes the influence and standing of a foreign ministry and casts doubts about its distinctive contribution.

Ahmad (1999: 119–120) describes this phenomenon in the case of Malaysia, where the foreign ministry was relegated to a subordinate position when Prime Minister Mahathir assumed power in 1981 and summarily centralised foreign policy in his own office. "*Wisma Putra* initially resisted the shift in locus but gradually took on the role of willing partner (detractors might want to use the term 'able sycophant') in pursuit of what has been [Mahathir's] 'high-profile' diplomacy". Ahmad (1999: 126) adds that the sidelining of *Wisma Putra* manifested unambiguously in the establishment of a diplomatic training school attached to the Prime Minister's office, with *Wisma Putra* officers working there only on secondment.

Even when the reverse happens and foreign policy units evolve into separate

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foreign ministries, as in the cases of Swaziland and Tanzania, centrally controlled foreign policy and the prevalence of personal diplomacy prevent such ministries from taking on meaningful stature, and reduce the profile of existing or nascent diplomatic training. When the governing regime is tainted with authoritarianism, MFAs suffer a further blow to their legitimacy and independent actors, be they foreign or domestic, may desist from rendering assistance in respect of official diplomatic training (Hemery 2002: 144; Swaziland MFA 1996; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996; Vale 1993: 47).

3.1.2 **Deficient training policy**

In 'immature' MFAs, training is often at the bottom of priorities in terms of structural accommodation. The Mauritian MFA (1996) for example notes that it has "no set annual intake of recruits and no plan for diplomatic training". The reason, at least in part, originates in culture. Hemery (2002: 141) explains that "in conservative societies with traditional management structures and vertical hierarchies[5] the role of the superior as exemplar is crucial. The task of the young is to observe and emulate. This approach is an effective means of transmitting core values and traditional approaches to the job; it is not so strong on innovation and adaptation to change" (also noted by Selebi 1998b). The latter ability is indispensable in light of the constant evolution of international diplomatic practice.

Several Developing World MFAs maintain that on-the-job experience suffices to train diplomats for their work and that official diplomatic training is therefore not a priority. Hemery (2002: 141) explains that MFA recruits, who usually come from universities, are already "part of a tiny elite at the apex of developing societies. And as many typically will have studied law or international relations there is often a supposition that they already know all they need to know, and that the rest is best learned on the job" (also noted by Ahmad 1999: 126; Commonwealth 1971: 104–105; Botswana DFA 1996; Lesotho MFA 1996). Avoidance of elitism, in some cases is used as justification for lack of training: a Malawian government spokesman recounts that in Malawi's MFA "no minimal entry qualifications and subsequent training requirements have been laid down and no deliberate training needs and resources assessment done to establish a training intervention plan"

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because of "a fear in certain circles for creating an elite group" (Malawi DHRMD 1996). In more powerful developing states, on the other hand, diplomatic training is often a subject "on which commentators have been silent", as Barratt and Vale (1998) criticise. They remark about South African diplomatic training that it "is an area in which, unfortunately, we seem to be falling further and further behind" – sharp criticism of a country which is assuming a leadership role in the diplomacy of the Developing World.

More and more MFAs are, however, realising the negative effects of their neglect in the area of diplomatic training. The same Malawian government representative quoted above, admits that in spite of training interventions, most of which are sponsored by donor countries, 'it is evident that Malawi's approach to the training of diplomats has been more sporadic and selective, and as a result the impact in meeting changing realities in the world has been minimal" (Malawi DHRMD 1996). And Swaziland, after more than two decades of independence "realised that diplomacy is a professional task for which skills, training and dedication are needed for it to operate successfully". Hence, in 1991 its MFA approved a new recruitment and training policy which clarified – in line with international practice – the objective of developing a corps of skilled professional diplomats with a clear understanding of their wide-ranging responsibilities (Swaziland MFA 1996).

3.2 FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Hemery (2002: 141) comments wryly that there are "at least two species of diplomats – those from rich countries and those from poor. This is not to suggest a simple qualitative distinction between them ... on balance though, the poorer the country the less likely it is that money will be spared on educating its diplomats". MFAs often bear the brunt of states' economic pruning and are usually among the first ministries to be affected by shrinking budgets because, as Hemery (2002: 141) reminds us, for governments "there are few votes in foreign affairs". Marshall (1997: 140) adds that the problem stems from a perception of diplomacy as an "expensive as well as esoteric" business. Budgetary austerity within MFAs, in turn, is typically applied first to low-priority areas, of which training is an unfortunate example (Jaques 2003; Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998).

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It seems an obvious observation that poorer states would have fewer financial resources at their disposal to expend on diplomatic training. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is relatively more expensive to train a small intake of recruits, as in the case of small foreign services. Botswana, for example, has an annual intake of only five new diplomatic trainees – by far too few students to warrant the financial implications of a dedicated training programme (Botswana DFA 1996; Commonwealth 1971: 117; Mauritius MFA 1996). In this regard the HSRC (1990: 123) observes that "the majority of Third World countries ... cannot fund and operate Foreign Service Institutes or their equivalents" and therefore depend on their public education systems for the recruitment and training of their staff. Even when generalised civil service training is provided by a state, its MFA competes against a host of domestic ministries for training priority, due to limited funds. In the case of Botswana the Directorate of Public Service Management handles recruitment and training for the whole government, but "training is rather provided for engineers than for diplomats" – the MFA is thus not deemed a priority area in terms of skills training (Botswana DFA 1996).

In the final analysis, insufficient financing of diplomatic training reflects MFA priorities as much as it does actual lack of financial resources. The problem thus manifests in the degree to which resources, domestic as well as aid allotments, are used by MFAs for training purposes (Marshall 1997: 140).

3.3 LACK OF HUMAN RESOURCES

As discussed previously, Developing World diplomats struggle with insufficient representation in permanent and *ad hoc* diplomatic fora because of paucity in human resources. This problem is carried through to the area of diplomatic training, which ironically needs to be part of the remedy. Sufficient recruitment for MFAs in developing countries is difficult, however, because the tertiary education base is small, and the process is confounded by the low incentives of government service. This also leads to attrition as candidates who had undergone diplomatic training often seek 'greener pastures' in the private sector. Moreover, limited human resources within MFAs impact on training in the sense that there is insufficient

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manpower reserve to sustain the absence of officials who are undergoing training (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 225; De Borja 1999: 39–41).

3.3.1 **Recruitment impediments**

According to a Commonwealth (1971: 102–103) report, the nature of a state's diplomatic training is influenced by the availability of suitable sources from which diplomats are recruited and the number of available recruits. In this regard, Third Word states frequently have few available training facilities within their own borders and very limited output of their own educational institutions. This is in stark contrast to the First World, where the recruitment process typically pares down hundreds of suitably qualified candidates to an adequately sized group selected for diplomatic training.

In many cases the size of the recruitment pool is not the problem, but rather the lack of interest by suitable candidates in a diplomatic career, for reasons that include remuneration and conditions of service. Argentina's diplomatic academy, for example, states that its greatest difficulty is the small number of applicants for the yearly admission exams, "in spite of the glamour generally attributed to the diplomatic career". It notes that a preliminary analysis of the reasons points to growing private sector employment opportunities, as a result of Argentina's recent economic reforms, which, it notes, have generated a "phenomenal demand for new talent". It adds this factor to the inefficient image of the state which "until very recently has made public office unattractive and dramatically lessened its popularity and prestige" (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998). The problem of insufficient candidate interest is by no means unique to the Developing World, but has more damaging implications for the latter in light of foreign services' paucity of human resources (Barston 1997: 13; Mauritius MFA 1996).

A further problem with adequate recruitment is the political or social elitism that often inhibits professional staffing, i.e. recruitment and training, of developing country MFAs (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211). Developing countries without employment equity reflected in legislation or political culture typically recruit predominantly from exclusive groups based on gender, race or other social

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considerations. The result, naturally, is a waste of human resource potential. This problem manifests particular in the propensity for developing states to appoint party-politically affiliated individuals to diplomatic posts. In this regard, Business Day (3 February 1999) warns that the number of political appointees to the South African DFA poses "a problem if the goal is to create a foreign service staffed by an increasing number of professional diplomats". In the same vein, Ahmad (1999: 121) observes that Malaysia's *Wisma Putra* is so exclusive and elitist that it deals with personnel shortages rather than recruit more widely. In fact, political appointments are not in essence problematic, but the professionalism of MFAs is diluted when political appointees are indiscriminately deployed without any training for diplomatic practice.

3.3.2 **Lack of human resources reserve**

Three decades ago, Babb (1974: 21–22) already noted that larger, better-endowed MFAs had a manpower 'reserve' (some 10% in the UK and US) which allowed them to draw in personnel for training without forfeiting normal productivity. He pointed out that the problem also presented as regards mid-career training: in small MFAs experienced diplomats were highly productive units and in short supply, and any absence due to training necessarily interrupted the organisation's productivity.

Babb's observations remain relevant and it comes as no surprise then that in many developing countries the already existing gaps in staffing continue to make training unpopular with supervisors and presents a very real obstacle to consistency and thoroughness of training programmes[6] (Commonwealth 1971: 125; HSRC 1990: 13). Botswana's DFA (1996), for example, bluntly states that "officers cannot be sacrificed for further training" in light of the small number[7] and size of missions and the large spectrum of duties and interests that existing personnel need to deal with. In the case of South Africa, the foreign ministry has calculated that it needs a 30% increase in staff in order to close its "major capacity gaps", including human resources development of which diplomatic training is an essential component (Dlamini Zuma 2002).

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3.3.3 **Difficulties in retaining the trainees**

As mentioned, the recruitment of potential diplomats in the Developing World is often thwarted by more lucrative private sector offers. This problem also presents after candidates had been successfully recruited to MFAs and had been trained in diplomacy. The profile of suitable candidates matches the type of dynamic, talented individuals who are universally popular with employers, and the problem thus is to maintain their services (De Borja 1999: 33). Vale (1993: 34) says that he has personally observed South African diplomats leaving the foreign ministry "in droves" because they "often can find better-paid jobs elsewhere". First World countries also experience this problem, but in Third World MFAs, which already balk at the idea of investing in diplomatic training, the idea that diplomats are trained for the eventual benefit of external employers makes financial planners even less inclined to commit resources to training (Babb 1974: 8; Harris 1999: 31; Rozental 1999: 143).

3.4 LACK OF TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE

A self-evident impediment to diplomatic training in the Developing World is the material lack of training infrastructure, be that within MFAs or external to government. Some developing states do have functional, dedicated diplomatic training centres – a few of them even with high international profile – but for most states the problem ranges from the complete absence of such centres to cases where they exist but deliver only rudimentary services due to insufficient training material, staff and instructors and generally inadequate training programmes (Commonwealth 1971: 102; Duke 2001: 15).

3.4.1 **Absence of dedicated diplomatic training centres**

The scarcity of diplomatic training centres in the Developing World is in direct contrast to, for example, Europe where as Duke (2001: 12) observes there is "a bewildering array of institutions" with an interest in diplomatic training. Notable exceptions in the Developing World are the diplomatic academies in the powerful leader states such as China, India and Brazil, and the older established states such

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as Vietnam – the latter's diplomatic training institute boasts a staff of more than 100 members (Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2).

On the other side of the equation are countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi that have no[8] diplomatic training infrastructure whatsoever (Botswana DFA 1996; Lesotho MFA 1996; Malawi DHRMD 1996). In the case of Malawi an Institute of Public Administration was established after independence to train the civil service, and diplomatic recruits with a background in public administration continue to be drawn from the public service or seconded from specialised service cadres. By the same token, a Malawian representative of the human resources management department explained that his country has "no true diplomatic career service. People come and go after serving on secondment or contract. For this reason only *ad hoc* training of diplomats is offered ... it is now felt that the systematic training of personnel has to be embarked upon" (Malawi DHRMD 1996). Lack of career-specific training in these countries therefore inhibits the consolidation of diplomacy as a professional activity.

The problem is most acute in Sub-Saharan Africa, where apart from South Africa the only two other reputable diplomatic training centres are in Cameroon and Kenya, respectively a the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) at the University of Yaoundé, and the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) at the University of Nairobi (DSP HEI 2004). Hemery (2002: 144) recounts how at the annual meetings of the IFDT, "a body that brings together almost all the academies and institutes of diplomacy in the world to share best practice, the poorer states are under-represented; of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa occasionally there are one or two at best". He notes the unfortunate phenomenon that a continent which has such an obvious need to be represented more effectively in the international arena is incapacitated to such a severe extent in the area of diplomatic training.

3.4.2 **Inadequate training programmes**

Where diplomatic training centres do exist in the Developing World, the timing, duration and content of training programmes are often inadequate and therefore fail

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in their objective to produce effective diplomats (Commonwealth 1971: 102; Dlamini Zuma 2002). A typical problem is too much, even exclusive, emphasis on initial (entry-level) training. Babb (1974: 21) noted in the early 1970s that MFAs which were not well endowed with resources tried "to fill the first few years with an indigestible marathon of training" in an attempt to match international standards. This phenomenon, which persists, can contribute to another typical inadequacy that is related to human and financial resources management, namely the lack of continuous, mid-career training that has become indispensable in the diplomatic profession (Debrah 1996; Duke 2001: 15).

The content of training programmes may also be lacking in substance and relevance, especially when limited institutional liaison on an international level results in insufficient knowledge of curricular requirements for diplomatic training. This pertains particularly to the specialised skills that have recently come to dominate diplomatic training curricula, *inter alia* public diplomacy, management, multilateral and economic negotiations and the pro-active use of IT. In the case of South Africa, research on the 1993 design of a new, international standard-level diplomatic training programme of which the aim was to produce a corps of professional post-apartheid diplomats, revealed that a number of essential, basic diplomatic skills (such as negotiation) had been absent from previous training curricula. Upgraded, professionalised training, therefore, needed to depart from a system that could justly be described as embryonic (Muller 1998: 180, 198; Pityana 2000).

3.4.3 **Inadequate training facilities and facilitators**

Deficient structural support for diplomatic training in the Developing World manifests tangibly in a serious lack of training facilities and competent training facilitators. Study material, when available, is often outdated, not sufficient, too voluminous or just transplanted from another country, for which it might have been 'custom built' and thus be inappropriate from a national perspective. In addition, the physical infrastructure of training centres might lack IT support, lecture rooms, audio-visual equipment, filing systems and even basic furniture (Angola MFA 1996; Commonwealth 1971: 103; Debrah 1996).

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Lecturers and instructors, when available locally, are not always engaged by MFAs: if curricula of diplomatic training programmes are not well developed, certain study areas will be neglected and the appropriate instructors overlooked. Insufficient MFA networking within the foreign policy community also excludes the assistance of potential instructors and, as previously mentioned, even when approached the latter are sometimes unwilling to cooperate in light of low remuneration or negative public service image. Also, funding to send available staff for specialist training in order to cultivate a cadre of diplomatic training instructors is often simply not available or accessible within a given MFA (Debrah 1996).

As far as facilitation is concerned, the CPDS (1998b) notes that diplomatic training centres in developing countries are sometimes staffed by single officials who act as coordinators. The human resources problem is exacerbated by lack of continuity[9] when such facilitators are moved to other posts and new facilitators need to start afresh. The problem originates in the low priority that MFAs grant to training and their unwillingness to spare competent diplomats to work as training coordinators. Qualified MFA officials might in fact be unwilling to deal with diplomatic training: the work is, in essence, administrative and not directly involved in the conduct of diplomacy and career diplomats will generally not be interested unless they are offered incentives to do the work[10].

Problems that are endogenous to MFAs account for many of the impediments to diplomatic training in the Developing World, and explain why so many of these ministries rely on a public education system, or foreign diplomatic study opportunities, to train their diplomats. Scarce MFA resources, both human and financial, are not allocated to diplomatic training and the phenomenon occurs that diplomats are "posted abroad without the necessary schooling in diplomacy" simply as a "courtesy to the countries to which they are accredited" (Angola MFA 1996). The main problem lies in attitude: training remains a very low priority to those MFAs that do not recognise and employ it as a remedial instrument in building capacity and enhancing their overall efficiency and image.

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4. TRAINING CHALLENGES PECULIAR TO NEW STATES AND STATES IN TRANSITION

Whereas it is self-evident that the least developed states of the Developing World will have diplomatic training problems originating in pervasive state poverty, certain other categories of developing countries are faced with unique challenges in this respect. These categories are newly created states that have no pre-existing MFA culture of infrastructure to support training, and states that have such infrastructure but are in the throes of constitutional transformation. (Imploded states, a further category of developing states with special training needs, will not be addressed in this study).

4.1 NEW STATES

'New states' are countries which for the first time assume a sovereign international identity. They can emerge from the termination of colonial domination (such as East-Timor), emanate from the disintegration of a larger state (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia that emerged from the truncation of Yugoslavia) or be the result of existing states merging (such as North and South Yemen's merger to form Yemen). These new states are faced with a number of extensive and immediate challenges to diplomatic training. These include the establishment of a foreign policy infrastructure *in toto*, the immediate need to recruit diplomats on all levels of that infrastructure and the fact that none (or precious few) of those recruits will have had any form of diplomatic training. All these problems are exacerbated by the general absence of organisational maturity within a brand-new state (Commonwealth 1971: 103; Vale 1993: 39; CPDS 1998b).

4.1.1 ***Tabula rasa* diplomacy**

A 1971 Commonwealth (1971: 103) report observed that new states were faced with the initial task of establishing a new diplomatic service "from scratch", against the backdrop of foreign policy objectives which might themselves still be unresolved. The complete absence of diplomatic service history in such newly established MFAs has as consequence that there is no institutional memory or

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foreign service culture. Swaziland's MFA (1996) recounts how, during the early years of Swazi independence, there existed no defined career in the foreign service. Thus civil servants who were posted to missions abroad returned to other domestic ministries, and were replaced in their postings by serving officers from the home civil service, "who saw their home not in the foreign service but in their parent ministries". For recruits to new MFAs, the newness of the state itself thus evokes representativity issues, firstly in terms of state identity itself and secondly in terms of the distinct profession of diplomacy. On a more positive note, Sharp (1999: 54) contends that although the establishment of new MFAs often happens in unstable and difficult conditions, the opportunity presents in terms of what its new diplomats will be taught about the professional and political values of diplomacy.

The positive potential of brand-new diplomatic training is, however, complicated by the fact that new states, such as Namibia and East Timor, need to build up training capacity within the context of nascent MFA culture and infrastructure and within evolving foreign policy norms (Debrah 1996; Vale 1993: 40). The formidable challenge of starting diplomatic training from a zero base is in stark contrast to the situation in developed states, which – as the Commonwealth (1971: 103) report mentions – have sophisticated institutions and methods for diplomatic training that require only adaptation to changing circumstances and objectives.

4.1.2 **Massive recruitment imperative**

The establishment of MFAs in new states necessitates large-scale, immediate acquisition of human and material resources, rendering MFAs a veritable growth industry (Babb 1974: 21–22; Komachi 1999:114–115; Sharp 1999: 45). This has also applied to states that assumed not necessarily a new legal identity, but a reformed international identity, as happened in Japan[11] after World War Two. It will most likely also be the case for post-occupied Iraq as from July 2004 and for Libya following its unilateral relinquishing of nuclear power during 2003/2004 and resultant international 'rehabilitation', which will require a more universal diplomatic presence.

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Massive and immediate staffing needs in the MFAs of new states mean that recruitment must of necessity be varied and to some extent be determined by the pool of available human resources "with training broadly and in some degree relevant to diplomatic tasks", according to the Commonwealth (1971: 104) report. The same report observed that "countries in this position need not only young entrants for the lower ranks of the service but officers to man essential posts at all levels. So lawyers, businessmen, academics, journalists, civil servants and military officers already established in their own professions are likely to be drawn into the diplomatic service, sometimes temporarily, sometimes on a permanent basis". Broadening of the recruitment base in a service that is being established for the first time also demands that qualifications be kept very flexible (De Borja 1999: 40–41).

4.1.3 **Total training deficit**

The rapid recruitment of many people from other sectors of government or the private sector means that a variety of skills and experience is absorbed by new MFAs. However, it also intimates an overall paucity of career specific skills that is particularly problematic at senior official level. Worsening the problem is the lack of foreign service culture and institutional expertise which excludes the mentoring potential of in-service ('on-the-job') training for new recruits (Business Day 5 October 2000; CPDS 1998b).

In cases where new states emerge from decolonisation, chances are that skilled people in all areas of the civil service are in very short supply, often because skilled positions had previously been the reserve of colonial masters (Malawi DHRMD 1996). This pertains particularly to the area of foreign affairs. As the Angolan MFA (1996) notes, before independence its diplomacy was conducted by its colonising power, a phenomenon that was typical to many other colonies. Thus, after Angola's independence in 1975 "people with no knowledge of diplomacy were sent out to act and perform as diplomats". The immediacy of foreign representation after independence means that there is often simply not time to have diplomats trained before they get posted abroad (De Borja 1999: 40). Swaziland's MFA (1996) explains that at independence in 1968, several educated Swazis, mainly from the teaching profession, were seconded to the Prime Minister's office to form an instant

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nucleus for the foreign service. Most were "put to work with minimum delay" and were thus posted abroad as ambassadors without any experience or training for the profession. In the same vein, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 210) recount how the newly established Czech MFA availed itself of the assistance of academics and publicists who, before independence, had been engaged in propagating the national cause abroad.

A common recourse for poorly capacitated new states has been to avail themselves of foreign offers to train their diplomats. In many cases, particularly as regards the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, such states have continued to rely on foreign training and have never developed a domestic capacity for diplomatic training (Tanzania MFA CFR 1996; Swaziland MFA 1996).

In contrast, the post-Cold War proliferation of new states from the former East-bloc heralded a bloom not only in the establishment of MFAs but also in the almost simultaneous founding of dedicated diplomatic training centres (Ton 1996). Thus, to name but a few examples, the Estonian School of diplomacy (ESD) was founded in 1989, Kazakhstan and Slovenia both established their Diplomatic Academies in 1996 and in 1997 the Czech Republic inaugurated its own Diplomatic Academy (Czech Republic MFA 2003; Estonia MFA ESD 1998; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Slovenia MFA DA 1998). The renewed interest in diplomatic training, spearheaded by new states, seems to have had a domino-effect in the Developing World. During the 1990s, a number of developing states investigated ways to build national or regional capacity in the area of diplomatic training, resulting in dedicated diplomatic training centres. Some examples are: Oman which established its Diplomatic Institute in 1993 "to encourage Omani diplomatic expertise to enrich diplomatic work" (Khaleej Times Online 10 December 2003); the establishment of South Africa's Foreign Service Institute in 1995; the establishment of MEDAC in Malta in 1990; the founding of Jordan's JID in 1996 and the founding of Turkey's Foreign Service Training Centre during 1992.

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4.2 COUNTRIES IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The end of the Cold War, and the demise of communism in particular, has prompted democratic transition in a number of developing countries. Some have been more structurally affected than others, especially states that are grappling simultaneously with being newly sovereign and thus having to establish MFAs, such as the Baltic states, or having to carve up existing MFAs as in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Diplomats of countries in transition have to make a representative leap from one political culture to another and this reality necessitates a profound reconsideration of their training.

4.2.1 **Diplomatic training as part of transition**

Most countries in democratic transition have a history of authoritarian/ideological rule that pervaded and restricted the professional conduct of their diplomats. Most of these countries also have deep-seated societal and political complexities that come to the fore – despite domestic and international political euphoria – when their societies obtain democracy after decades of oppression. This has been the case in large parts of the Developing World after the fall of dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, Southern Europe and Asia and in much of the former East-bloc after the demise of communism. Diplomats who represent these countries are products of a defunct old order – "prisoners of their own history", as Vale (1993: 1) describes it – and are personally affected by the instability brought on by constitutional revolution. Yet, their profession demands of them to transcend the flux in order to represent their countries' new identities in a coherent, dignified and professional way (Otermi 1992: 22).

The enormous challenges that are experienced by diplomats from countries in transition make remedial diplomatic training an imperative. Internal to MFAs much political compromise and bridge-building is required, especially when 'before and after' staff are working together[12] as happened in Uruguay after its return to democracy in 1984, and a decade later in post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, countries in democratic transition typically expand their international representation due to a more open and inclusive foreign policy, which demands increased human

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resources within MFAs. Diplomatic training assists the process by building professional capacity, leveling the playing field as regards differential educational backgrounds and, importantly, by forging a common new value system and *esprit d' corps* among diplomats who may have very diverse, even mutually hostile political histories (Ngwevela 1998; Otermi 1992: 22; Vale 1993: 41).

Externally, countries in democratic transition enjoy greater visibility and more reconstructive involvement by the international community, but this also translates into greater scrutiny of their domestic policies (DSP HEI 2004; Pahad 1996b; Ton 1996). This dual reality demands overhauling of diplomatic training curricula to sensitise diplomats to the dynamics of democratic transition and their enhanced international responsibilities. The Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO 1998) notes that "transitology" has become the core of its diplomatic studies and that "the priority direction in the academic and scientific activity of MGIMO [has become] the adaptation of the existing plans and programmes to the changes taking place both in and outside the country". The role of diplomatic training thus assumes a higher profile than otherwise: diplomats are trained not only in the normal skills and knowledge of their profession, but also in acting as catalysts for democratic change in their own societies, in the context of changing domestic and foreign policy priorities (Vale 1993: 6).

The curricula of diplomatic training for countries in transition also need to be reformed in order to present a more holistic appreciation of national issues and international relations – i.e. minus the ideological filter of before. MGIMO (1997) for example notes that re-training of Russian diplomats in subjects such as international economic affairs had become necessary because they had previously not been sufficiently educated in the theory of free market economics. The necessity for de-ideologised retraining also applies to political exiles who are recruited to a new democracy's MFA. Their prolonged absence and isolation from domestic issues necessitates training in order to restore perspective on their country's politics and international relations (FSLD 1993: 4).

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4.2.2 **The example of South Africa**

South Africa's celebrated transition to democracy during 1993–1994 prompted a complete overhaul of its diplomatic training policy and infrastructure. The country's experience illustrates well the challenges of diplomatic training faced by a developing nation in transition. The example is also included because of the author's personal experience of the transition in her capacity as a South African diplomat.

a) **Impact of South Africa's transition on its MFA:** During South Africa's transition, its Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was metamorphosed by the amalgamation of no fewer than six *de facto* foreign services, including those of the four nominally independent homelands[13] within South African borders and the formerly exiled foreign representatives of the major liberation movements[14]. The DFA thus absorbed over a short period, and at all levels of seniority, huge numbers of new appointees with divergent[15] levels of education, experience and skills (Muller 1998: 188–189; Vale 1993: 41). The reality of former enemies and 'foreigners' becoming colleagues was added to the already daunting challenge for South African diplomats to represent a country that is multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious and whose population straddles the First World-Third World divide. Diplomatic training thus became essential to 'level the playing field'[16], to create *esprit d'corps* and to prepare the post-apartheid era diplomats for their representation of a very complex society in transition.

A further imperative for diplomatic training was presented by the exponential expansion of South Africa's foreign relations. Whereas before the transition the country had diplomatic representation in only 30 states, by June 1997 it had established diplomatic relations with 160 countries and maintained 96 foreign missions. During the same period, the country joined over 70 international organisations (RSA DFA 1997; Muller 1998: 189; Nzo 1999). The country's new international prestige also ushered it into the chairmanship[17] of numerous organisations and the hosting of a series of global summits. Indeed, the very nature of South African diplomacy changed from being primarily bilateral, secret, covert, unrepresentative and inward-looking, to being constitutionally transparent, open,

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representative, outward-looking and with an emphasis on multilateralism (Ngwevela 1998; Vale 1993: 24). The country's transition from international isolation to active participation – even leadership – in multilateral fora, in particular, demanded diplomatic knowledge and skills in areas such as economic diplomacy that had not previously been presented as part of diplomatic training and which were in short supply (Muller 1998: 180, 198; Pityana 2000; Selebi 1998b; RSA DFA FSI 1996a).

b) **Overhaul of South Africa's diplomatic training**: The blossoming of South Africa's diplomatic relations necessitated a more coherent, proactive human resources development programme, including diplomatic training, to produce diplomats that would be capable of steering a new course[18] in foreign policy and handling the country's myriad new international responsibilities (Business Day 3 February 1999; Dlamini Zuma 2002; Nzo 1996b). Thus during 1993, a conference organised by the University of the Western Cape's Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) brought together for the first time various political representatives and role players in the field of diplomacy to deliberate on human resources development within South Africa's DFA. The idea of an independent diplomatic training centre germinated and the conference recommended research into international trends and norms pertaining to diplomatic training.

In response, the South African DFA during the same year conducted an international study visit to diplomatic training centres in North and South America, Africa, Europe and Asia; collecting and collating their study programmes, comparing world-wide trends in diplomatic training and consulting also with local experts. The research and subsequent (1995) establishment of the South African Foreign Service Institute (FSI) was supported by a range of international donors, notably the Commonwealth Secretariat and *inter alia* also the diplomatic training institutes of India, Pakistan, Germany and the Netherlands. A new official, year-long[19] diplomatic training course was designed, containing the best of international practice. In addition, a special transitional diplomatic training programme for mid-level officials was presented as a bridging and integration mechanism (Ngwevela 1998; Pahad 1995 and 1996b; RSA DFA FSI 1996a).

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The diplomatic training challenges experienced by developing states take on new dimensions when such states are newly established, in democratic transition, or undergo a combination of these circumstances. Diplomatic training demands a higher profile in such momentous yet unstable conditions and inevitably needs to address fundamental state identity issues. It also targets a proportionally larger group of MFA officials who need to represent for the first time a newly created or newly transformed state. The international attention that is attracted by new states or states in democratic transition thrusts these entities into the limelight, opening up more possibilities for cooperation but also greater scrutiny of their diplomatic practice, a reality that underscores the need for upgraded diplomatic training.

5. INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

In the previous chapter the relatively new and growing incidence of states providing diplomatic training to foreigners, was briefly discussed. For the Developing World, which for the most part has inadequate diplomatic training capacity, this phenomenon is of great importance and is often its only, or most important, source of training. The scope and nature of international participation in Developing World diplomatic training is therefore germane, and significantly also the extent to which it is taking place within the context of South-South cooperation. However, the advantages *versus* disadvantages of foreign training need to be considered from a recipient perspective.

5.1 DIPLOMATIC TRAINING AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Many industrialised states have elected to include diplomatic training in their ODA to the Developing World. The motivation for granting this type of assistance ranges from a desire to address the obvious paucity of training in the Developing World, to more strategic considerations in the context of foreign policy objectives. Donor states can individually grant such assistance, i.e. as part of bilateral relations, or act collectively and indirectly *via* an IGO. The various manifestations of diplomatic training assistance can range from limited, *ad hoc* courses to full inclusion in donor

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states' national programmes or *in loco* developmental aid to nascent diplomatic training centres.

5.1.1 **Reasons for the phenomenon**

The reasons donor governments grant diplomatic training as a form of ODA can broadly be divided into historical imperatives, and long-term foreign policy objectives that include ideological solidarity, the nurturing of allies and attempts to assist regional integration programmes.

a) **Historical imperatives**: A history of colonial domination serves as a powerful imperative for states to assist former colonies that have a civil service capacity problem, and in the case of MFAs such help often manifests as diplomatic training. Spain's MFA's *Escuela Diplomática* (1998), for example, presents an exclusive diplomatic training course as assistance for Ibero-American diplomats. Developed states that attempt to transcend an historical legacy as international aggressors or imperialists, such as the US, Japan and Germany, are also keen to provide development assistance in an area that so closely impacts on a recipient country's foreign policy establishment (Angola MFA 1996; Debrah 1996; Mauritius MFA 1996; Clingendael 1998a: 6; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996). The purpose, in general, is to create an image of donor state benevolence – to encourage the perception that training interventions are done by "friendly governments" as the Malawian government expresses it (Malawi DHRMD 1996).

b) **Ideological solidarity:** Diplomatic training aid expresses in a tangible way state ideological state solidarity. It can be done, for example, as a means to support (even to 'export') the principles of democracy and good governance within countries that undergo transition. In this regard, the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies (CPDS: 1998a) in the UK asserts that it "was created in 1993 to design and conduct programmes of professional, political and international studies for officials and elected officials from states developing the institutions of democracy and good governance". In other cases, diplomatic training can be used within the Developing World as encouragement of international religious or linguistic cohesion – or combinations thereof, as is evident in Saudi Arabian training granted to diplomats

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from other GCC, Arabic and Islamic countries (Bayazakh 1998; France IIAP 1998a; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; Riordan 2003: 47; Saudi Arabia MFA IDS 1998).

c) **Nurturing allies**: Spain's MFA's *Escuela Diplomática* (1998), which hosts a special course in International Relations (known by its Spanish acronym CIRIDEX[20]) for young developing country diplomats, notes that it is done "with the aim of updating and enlarging their knowledge of Spain, Ibero-America and the European Union". This type of ODA comprises direct investment in bilateral relations because it influences the very officials who will be steering those relations in the future and who will be voting in multilateral organisations where numerical advantage very often holds sway. Spreading influence by assisting Developing World MFAs to build capacity is therefore a powerful incentive for diplomatic training aid.

d) **Assisting regional integration**: Yet another foreign policy objective in granting diplomatic training aid is the need for diplomats from less developed states within a given RIA to be brought on par with their colleagues from the more developed partners, as is done within the EU. In this regard, Duke (2001: 6) notes that since 1996 the European Parliament has determined that courses for junior diplomats from new or aspiring members of the Union should be run with the assistance of established diplomatic training institutes within the EU, such as Austria's *Diplomatische Akademie* (1998) and Clingendael of the Netherlands (CPDS 1998b; Ton 1996).

5.1.2 **Multilateral diplomatic training aid**

Much of the diplomatic training that is done in the context of states' regional foreign policy priorities is conducted, coordinated or financed by intergovernmental organisations to which the donor and recipient states belong. Within the EU, for example, the European Parliament subsidises various diplomatic training institutes to provide training for diplomats from the developing members, in addition to the training provided by the emerging External Service of the European Commission[21]. The latter has become the most significant new provider of diplomatic training within the EU and offers training not only for the Commission's own officials but

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also EU-specific contributions to other donor programmes and directly to the countries in transition (CPDS 1998b; Duke 2001: 6).

Various IGOs that operate on a global scale, such as the Commonwealth and UN, also disburse diplomatic training as development aid. As in the case of regional IGOs, donor members render diplomatic training assistance as a collective and indirect state effort, with all or some of the donor states or the IGO itself serving as hosts of a multilateral training programme (CPDS 1998b). In the case of the Commonwealth, the Secretariat has since the 1960s been instrumental in the training of young diplomats from member states, especially new states such as Namibia, micro-states such as Vanuatu and states in democratic transition such as South Africa. The Commonwealth Secretariat has also allowed young diplomats to work for it on short attachment postings in order to gain practical experience of multilateral diplomacy (Commonwealth 1971: 112; Debrah 1996; Nzo 1996a). On a more universal scale, the UN's training institute, UNITAR, presents diplomatic training in selected specialist areas to diplomats from the Developing World, for example in multilateral diplomacy, negotiation skills and conflict management. In this regard the Institute cooperates with national diplomatic training centres in order to provide tailor-made training programmes for target groups of diplomats and other officials who conduct international affairs on behalf of national governments (Lesotho MFA 1996; UN UNITAR 2004b).

5.1.3 **Various manifestations of diplomatic training aid**

Diplomatic training aid can variously take place in the donor state, *in loco* or subsidised in a third-party state. It can comprise of complete basic diplomatic training, either contained in dedicated aid programmes or as part of a donor state's own training, or it can comprise of short *ad hoc* courses. It can also manifest as institutional development assistance by donor governments, IGOs or NGOs to nascent diplomatic training centres in the Developing World.

a) **Dedicated diplomatic training aid programmes**: Over the past few decades several programmes – and in some cases institutions – dedicated to the training of Developing World diplomats have been established in donor states. In Germany,

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for example, the German Foundation for International Development (DSE)[22] was founded in 1959 by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically with the purpose of providing diplomatic training as development assistance. It operates with partners at home and abroad, including Germany's federal states, the EU and recipient countries and has assisted more than 140 developing countries with training, both at the DSE and *in loco* (DSE 1995).

Likewise in France, the International Institute of Public Administration (IIAP) was founded in 1966 to train senior foreign civil servants and has hosted participants from more than 80 countries. The advanced training of diplomats has gradually gained prominence within this programme, manifesting in increasing institutional links between the IIAP and diplomatic training institutes in the Developing World, such as those in Latin America. An interesting feature of the programme is the internship of two-and-a-half months that foreign diplomats do at a French embassy after completion of the training, which adds to their educational immersion in the French culture of diplomacy (Dromer-North 1998; France IIAP 1998a and 1998b).

Another example of institutionalised diplomatic training aid is the CPDS which since 1993 has directed the British government's principal programme of diplomatic training for 27 developing CEEC and Central Asia states (CPDS 1998a). An older existing aid programme, dating back to 1969[23], is the Oxford University Foreign Service Programme (FSP) that awards a certificate in diplomatic studies to diplomats (mostly but not exclusively) from developing countries. The FSP was originally established for attendance by diplomats from the Commonwealth, but its mandate has since been expanded world-wide to offer basic diplomatic training to former East Bloc countries and indeed any other states that have a need for basic diplomatic training (Oxford University FSP 1994: 4).

b) **Participation in standard First World diplomatic training programmes**: Some developed countries invite and sponsor diplomats from poorer countries to participate in their own national diplomatic training programmes. Spain's MFA's *Escuela Diplomática* (1998), for example, offers scholarships to diplomats from developing countries to attend its advanced Masters Course in International Studies, which is a continuation of the basic diplomatic training presented to

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Spanish diplomats. The course may also be attended by other foreign diplomats, but on a paying basis.

c) **Presentation of *ad hoc* specialist courses**: Whether or not donor countries have dedicated diplomatic training aid centres or programmes, many of them on an *ad hoc* basis offer short, specialist courses to developing country diplomats. These courses can be presented at the donor state's own training centres, but increasingly are done *in loco* by visiting experts (CPDS 1998b). The Netherlands' Clingendael (1998b), for example, specialises in the teaching of negotiation skills and its instructors have conducted courses, seminars and workshops at various diplomatic training centres in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Central America (Clingendael 1998b; Ton 1996; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

Some other examples of diplomatic training centres in donor countries that offer specialist courses to developing MFAs, are: the Canadian Foreign Service Institute that presents multilateral negotiation techniques, Austria's *Diplomatische Akademie* which conducts courses in human rights, and Ireland's Institute for Public Administration which presents advanced courses in management to civil servants, including diplomats (Canada DFAIT CFSI 2003; Mauritius MFA 1996; Nzo 1996b; Pahad 1996b; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

d) **Institutional development assistance**: Indirect diplomatic training aid that is of great importance to developing countries is the assistance they receive from various donor countries or IGOs in order to institutionalise or enhance their local diplomatic training capacity. This assistance can manifest as curriculum development, the provision of course material and acquisition of infrastructural equipment, setting up of IT support and importantly also in the training of trainers (DSP HEI 2004; CPDS 1998b; Debrah 1996). The Mozambican ISRI, for example, in 1997 signed a three-year cooperation agreement with Clingendael in order to obtain training, research, conferences and library support (Clingendael 1999). The University of Malta's MEDAC, on the other hand, has offered IT development assistance in the form of computer data banks and the setting up of networks, *inter alia* to the Institute of International Relations (IIRT) of the University of the West

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Indies in Trinidad; the University of Yaoundé's IRIC and the University of Nairobi's IDIS. In the case of Jordan, the EU has assisted its diplomatic training institute (JID) with curriculum development to include a research capacity for the study of Euro-Arab studies and has provided financial support to set up a cadre of qualified trainers and experts (Jordan JID 1998b).

e) **Subsidised third party training**: Donor countries sometimes offer scholarships to diplomats from developing countries to study at diplomatic training institutes in third party states. An example is the ODA that various African countries receive to have their diplomats trained in fellow African countries such as Cameroon and Kenya, which have diplomatic training facilities. Kenya's IDIS, for example, has since 1973 received assistance by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to present a post-graduate diploma in diplomacy to junior as well as mid-level diplomats from various African countries. It has also since 1993 run a two-year MA course in international studies, with an emphasis on diplomacy, specifically for African diplomats. The various African diplomats who study diplomacy at IDIS do so on a paying basis, but often receive ODA grants to do so. Lesotho diplomats have for example attended the IDIS with financial help by the Commonwealth (DSP HEI 2004; Hemery 2002: 144; IDIS 2004; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; Lesotho MFA 1996)

f) **Non-governmental international assistance**: In a clear demonstration of the world-wide privatisation and democratisation of diplomacy, NGO assistance to developing countries in the area of diplomatic training is on the increase. A large number of academic and philanthropic organisations, particularly in the US, have become active in this regard. The Vietnamese MOFA's IIR (1995: 5), for example, has received assistance from the Ford Foundation and the Program of International Studies in Asia (PISA) "which help to bring in professors and lecturers from different academic institutions of the US". Another example from the US is the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University which, for a number of years, has been involved in developing customised diplomatic training programmes for developing countries. The FSLD has *inter alia* assisted Pakistan and Nigeria with diplomatic training "at the time of major transitions", and other developing

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countries such as Brunei, India and Bhutan regularly send their diplomats to the FSLD for advanced, mid-career training in international relations (FSLD 1993: 2).

5.2 SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The growing phenomenon of diplomatic training cooperation among Developing World countries can be ascribed to the same reasons that ODA training takes place, i.e. historical considerations or strategic foreign policy objectives such as the promotion of regional integration. However, its exigency for the South stems from the latter's quest for diplomatic cohesion. In this regard collaborative training invariably enhances the capacity of diplomats to present a more united front in pursuing the collective international agenda of the Developing World. Cooperation can manifest as training aid, as a number of the more powerful developing countries host as well as subsidise the training of diplomats from poorer countries. South-South collaboration can also happen on a more egalitarian level, *via* institutional liaison, sharing of facilities and student and lecturer exchanges.

5.2.1 **Training cooperation rooted in colonial heritage**

The bureaucratic heritage and *lingua franca* that marks a common colonial heritage ensures that cooperation in the area of diplomatic training frequently occurs among former colonies. The Angolan MFA (1996) in fact mentions that most of its diplomatic training is done abroad by Portuguese speaking countries with a related colonial heritage such as Brazil. Another example is the Pakistani Foreign Service Academy (FSA) which offers special training courses for fellow Commonwealth diplomats from former British colonies (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b). In the case of Chile, the exchange of lecturers with other diplomatic training centres in South and Central America, is facilitated by the sharing of Spanish as official language and the close historical ties that stem from their common colonial heritage (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998).

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5.2.2 **South-South training as aid**

Various leading diplomatic training centres in the Developing World, such as those of China (PRC), Egypt and Indonesia, offer diplomatic training as assistance to developing countries that have insufficient capacity for regular or specialist diplomatic training. The training can be fully sponsored, as is done by Pakistan and Turkey, or partially[24] financed, as is done by China and Brazil. It can be done as part of a dedicated diplomatic training assistance programme, as in the cases of India and Pakistan, or be accommodated within a state's own diplomatic training programme, usually on a quota basis. Brazil's *Instituto Rio Branco* for example annually presents five scholarships to foreign diplomats to do diplomatic training with its own entry-level candidates (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; RSA DFA FSI 1996b).

India's FSI, which claims to be the "leading diplomatic training institute in the Developing World", has an exclusive programme called the Professional Course for Foreign Diplomats and has since 1989 trained hundreds of foreign diplomats from more than 70 countries (India MEA FSI 1997: Preface, 1). It also offers specialist diplomatic training at the renowned Bangalore Institute of Management. South African diplomats, during the country's transition to democracy, received training at these Indian facilities under the aegis of India's Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) for developing states (RSA DFA 1997; Nzo 1996b).

Pakistan also has a development assistance programme, the Special Technical Assistance Programme (STAP) in terms of which the FSA offers fully sponsored diplomatic training courses, ranging in length from 6 to 22 weeks, for junior as well as mid-level diplomats. These courses are often customised to cater for the particular circumstances of various regions, for example a special course for diplomats from Central Asia (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b). Malaysia's IDFR also offers tailor-made[25] courses for Developing World diplomats, as part of its International Diplomatic Practice Programme. In addition, the IDFR offers specialist training aid in economic diplomacy, for example its course entitled "Development Management in an Open Market Economy" (De Borja 1999: 43; Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998).

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Even some relatively new diplomatic training institutes in the Developing World such as those of Tunisia and Turkey have taken on the challenge of training aid. Turkey's FSTC, for example, managed to train during its first four years of existence no fewer than 310 foreign diplomats in its "Diplomatic Training Program for Junior Foreign Diplomats". The programme, which is fully sponsored by the Turkish government, involves diplomats from as far afield as the Arabic world, Africa, former Soviet republics, and Bangladesh – and aims at expanding even further (Tunisia MFA DITS 1998; Turkey MFA FSTC 1998).

5.2.3 **Regional diplomatic training cooperation**

Just as RIAs with a combination of developed and developing states cooperate in the area of diplomatic training, RIAs that exist exclusively within the Developing World have also increasingly started to pool diplomatic training resources, in some cases to the point of integrating training. In Central America, for example, Costa Rica has since 1992 extended its diplomatic training programme to the whole Central American isthmus – Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. This was done in direct response to the Central American Presidential Summits which called for the coordination of a regional foreign policy for development (Costa Rica MFRCA *Manuel Maria de Peralta* 1998). Central American diplomats are also trained jointly by the *Matias Romero Institute of Diplomatic Studies* in Mexico. In West and East Africa respectively, IRIC and IDIS offer diplomatic training exclusively to Africans, and the case of the sub-region of Southern Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique per agreement between the two governments in 1978 established a joint Centre for Foreign Relations (CFR), based in Tanzania, to train their combined foreign services (DSP HEI 2004; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996).

In Asia, where relatively fewer RIAs exist than in the rest of the world, and where diplomatic training facilities exist in most countries, it is nevertheless common for countries to offer diplomatic training to other diplomats from the same sub-region, as has been noted regarding countries such as Mongolia, Pakistan, Malaysia *et al*. The Vietnamese MOFA's IIR (1995: 4), for example, notes that it trains students from Laos and Cambodia in addition to its own trainees.

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Africa, which proportionally has the largest number of RIAs in the world combined with the greatest paucity of diplomatic training facilities, ironically has the least regional cooperation in the area of diplomatic training. It is a deficiency that has been noted by various commentators. Swaziland's MFA (1996) has complained that although it has national responsibility for the human resources portfolio of SADC, in the organisation's policy "no mention is made of diplomatic training. Diplomacy is still not seen as a priority". Southern Africa has in fact explored the possibility of joint diplomatic training. In 1996, in a first ever for the sub-region, a special consultative meeting on regional diplomatic training, attended by heads of diplomatic training of all (then 12) SADC countries, was convened in Pretoria. The meeting attempted to ascertain needs and determine what regional and international resources could be accessed in order to develop joint diplomatic training programmes. The meeting designed a fully-fledged mid-career course and in principle agreed[26] to a six-week Regional Diplomatic Training Programme. The programme, however, did not advance beyond the planning stage[27] (RSA DFA 1997; Nzo 1996a; RSA DFA FSI 1996a).

From the vantage point of individual countries as well as for a less-developed region as a whole, various factors motivate the phenomenon of regional diplomatic training. These considerations include broader, cost-effective training, the sharing of expertise, circumstantial opportunities to build on commonalities, the establishment of common diplomatic standards and methods, the harmonisation of foreign policy and the strengthening of internal regional cooperation.

a) **Broader, cost-effective training**: Debrah (1996) notes that Commonwealth assistance to regional training programmes in the Pacific for the Melanesian States of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Cook Islands, and the programmes that have been arranged for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique "are excellent examples of how countries with limited intake can pull their resources to provide relevant training for their diplomats". Many poor countries, especially those with a very small annual intake of diplomatic recruits, cannot afford any form of diplomatic training and even those that do will find that it is more cost-effective to share in the wider spectrum of training that can be afforded

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when a region pools its resources (Botswana DFA 1996; Commonwealth 1971: 117; Mauritius MFA 1996).

b) **Sharing of expertise**: For less developed regions, where skills and expertise are scarce, regional diplomatic training will ensure that all member states' diplomats benefit from the pool all available expertise in the region's collective foreign policy community. This consideration has been a driving force behind the establishment of Malta's MEDAC, which offers a nine-month long 'Masters in Diplomacy' specially designed for diplomats from the Mediterranean region (DSP HEI 2004; Nzo 1996a).

c) **Building on commonalities**: Geographic proximity and characteristics of a region that are typically shared or familiar, such as climate, language, culture and history, will make regional diplomatic training relatively cheaper and easier than if it were presented in a completely foreign environment. These complementarities will, according to Ton (1996) also permit a sharper focus to training.

d) **Establishing common standards and methods**: An important advantage of regional training is the establishment of common standards and approaches in diplomatic practice, thereby facilitating professionalisation of the entire region's diplomatic establishment (Debrah 1996; Duke 2001: 17).

e) **Harmonisation of foreign policy**: From a regional perspective – especially if the states are officially involved in an RIA – joint diplomatic training creates synergy among trainees and educates them as to a common foreign policy agenda so they can pursue the region's international agenda in a more coherent, coordinated manner. This renders their diplomatic efforts complementary rather than duplicative and prevents 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies and actions (Duke 2001: 5; Pityana 2000).

f) **Strengthening internal regional cooperation:** The Mozambican MFA's ISRI (1996) observes that new sources of conflict such as illegal migration, organised crime and environmental disasters threaten regional peace and security and require preventative diplomacy so that conflicts can be diffused before they become a reality. It remarks that "the answer lies in regional cooperation, and here

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specifically in the fields of training". Joint training in fact provide diplomats with an important networking base to conduct preventative diplomacy and to address in a coordinated manner problems that affect a region as a whole (Debrah 1996).

5.3 APPRAISAL OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

Most MFAs in the Developing World clearly need, and benefit from, material assistance to their diplomatic training programmes. The attendance by diplomats of foreign diplomatic training programmes, however, holds both advantages and disadvantages. These need to be considered in light of the large incidence of Developing World diplomats receiving foreign diplomatic training *in lieu* of – or in substantial addition to – professional basic training in their own countries.

5.3.1 **Advantages of foreign training**

From the perspective of a developing country that has no local capacity to conduct diplomatic training, being granted access to foreign training is obviously preferable to having none at all. There are also other distinct advantages:

a) **Spill-over education:** Developing countries typically have very limited resources to expend on diplomatic training. Foreign training assistance allows diplomats to benefit from the career-specific experience and research of other, well-established MFAs. It can teach them valuable lessons about diplomacy and save money, time and unnecessary mistakes – i.e. save them from having to 'reinvent the wheel' – when such examples are emulated in their own MFAs. Individuals who had undergone foreign training will, by example or active instruction, act as mentors to other colleagues and thus contribute to the spill-over effect of training (Czech Republic MFA 2003; De Borja 1999: 40; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b).

b) **Acquiring expertise**: Foreign training offers opportunities for diplomats to enhance their knowledge base and acquire skills; it allows for specialisation in crucial areas such as multilateral diplomacy and allows for acquisition of post-graduate diplomatic qualifications. The net effect is broadening of expertise within Developing World MFAs that might otherwise not be possible because of lack of

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resources and infrastructure (Botswana DFA 1996; De Borja 1999: 114–115).

c) **Standardisation of training:** International training programmes expose the attendees to global trends and standards in diplomatic training practice, and facilitate the importation of professional standards into recipient MFAs. The attendance of trainees also facilitate institutional liaison between the diplomatic training centre in the donor state and that of the receiving state – however nascent the latter's capacity might be. In this manner developing country MFAs can stay abreast of new developments in international diplomatic training, *inter alia* its evolving methods and content (Nzo 1996b; CPDS 1998b; Oxford University FSP 1994: 4).

d) **Networking opportunities**: The CPDS (1998b) observes about its training aid programmes for CEEC countries that "according to participants the principal benefit of multinational programmes, in addition to any special qualities each may have, is the opportunity they provide for networking amongst course members". Indeed, like any other form of international training, foreign diplomatic training opens up valuable networking[28] possibilities – particularly germane to the profession of diplomacy which is, after all, fundamentally concerned with networking in an international context (De Borja 1999: 43; Oxford University FSP 1994: 44).

e) **Cross-pollination:** Debrah (1996) observes that "there is considerable merit in sending [diplomats abroad] to attend courses on specific subjects of interest, or even to attend general courses run by other governments for middle level officers, or even for new entrants ... such an officer attends a course with full knowledge of his own country's needs and aspirations. He contributes to the training programme, and learns from it". Cross-fertilisation applies to non-national trainees and nationals of a host country alike, arising from discussion of issues from different national standpoints and personal experiences, thereby allowing more meaningful comparative studies of international relations (Commonwealth 1971: 112; France IIAP 1998b).

f) **Marketing opportunities**: For diplomats from developing countries, which are often under-represented in capitals across the globe, foreign training presents

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opportunities to be unofficially 'posted' to a foreign country. Within a multinational group of peer diplomatic trainees they then have opportunity to do diplomatic marketing: to 'sell' their own country, i.e. promote its political, social and economic interests.

g) **Personal advantages for the trainees:** Individual diplomats who participate in foreign training courses typically rise to senior positions more rapidly, have more self-confidence and a wider contact network. The argument can be made that a small elite, to begin with, is targeted for foreign training opportunities, but the fact remains that Developing World diplomats consider foreign training to be prestigious and thus of personal advantage to the recipients – also for possible career moves outside their MFAs foreign service (De Borja 1999: 114; Commonwealth 1971: 112).

5.3.2 Disadvantages of foreign training

Foreign training comes at a price to the Developing World, whether financially in the event of them being paying clients, or otherwise, in terms of distinct limitations, even disadvantages of such training which can prevent their training needs being met (Botswana DFA 1996).

a) **Lack of national perspective**: Unless foreign training is custom-designed, a common problem experienced by its clients is that such training does not address their national foreign policy priorities. Diplomats from a Pacific Island-state who study in Canada, for example, will therefore find it difficult to relate to the First World perspective of the host state's diplomatic culture. This is the case also among developing states. Debrah (1996) explains hypothetically that "a training course run by the Pakistani foreign service only partially responds to the needs of a Ghanaian diplomat who is entering the Ghanaian service for the first time. Hence if Ghana depends solely on other countries to train its diplomats, it may not have provided them from the start with the full opportunity to serve their country with confidence". The problem thus presents particularly if the foreign training constitutes total basic instruction as opposed to supplementary training.

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This particular disadvantage of foreign training manifested extensively during the Cold War when, as Bayasakh (1998) recounts, diplomats from the East-bloc were trained together in Moscow. He notes that "though the education in Russia was good as regards international affairs and languages, students lacked information about their own country. They had less knowledge about the country, less of an understanding of the interests and the needs of the country". Bayasakh adds that in the case of Mongolia, this problem persisted until it established its own School of Foreign Service in 1991.

b) **Inadequate practical focus**: Various commentators have observed that foreign training programmes tend to have a theoretical rather than practical emphasis. This means, as the Botswana DFA (1996) points out, that "officers are trained under circumstances in which they cannot relate to the realities of the job" (also noted by Hemery 2002: 144). Even when such training includes practical work, the circumstantial differences of developing MFAs, for example a dire lack of IT support or authoritarian political intervention, might make the practical assignments of utopian rather than utilitarian value.

c) **Unreliable training aid source:** Hemery (2002: 141, 144) points out that MFAs of poor states are low on the budget priority list of donor states and that "development agencies are reluctant to divert funds to elites when resources for primary relief already are under pressure". ODA is thus directed primarily at poverty alleviation and health care and any increased demand for these priorities will result in aid resources being redirected away from places such as MFAs. Diplomatic training aid to developing countries is thus constantly subjected to review (Turkey MFA FSTC 1998). Domestic considerations within donor states also lead to re-prioritising of foreign policy priorities and this makes aid, including diplomatic training assistance, an insecure source on which to base crucial human resources development planning within Developing World MFAs.

d) **Exclusive and limited opportunities**: Diplomats from developing countries have to compete for limited training opportunities in foreign programmes not only among their own colleagues but also with diplomats from other potential recipient states. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, for example, each

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year awards only 15 scholarships to Developing World candidates for diplomatic training at the DSP in Geneva (DSP HEI 2004). Similar limitations are set by other donors. This means that very few Developing World diplomats actually have opportunity to benefit from foreign scholarships, especially if the training courses are age-restricted, as most donor programmes are. The prestige of being trained abroad also means that opportunities are often only granted to, or 'recycled' among, an 'elite of an elite'. For developing MFAs, this poses the further problem that the cream of their human resources are exposed to many other opportunities which might lure them away from public service for their sending state (Hemery 2002: 144; CPDS 1998b).

e) **Language restrictions**: Foreign diplomatic training is, as can be expected, presented most often in the official language of the donor state. Spain's MFA's *Escuela Diplomática* (1998) declares that the beneficiaries of its training aid programmes are "strictly required to have an adequate knowledge of the Spanish language, as all lessons and lectures in all the courses at the School are given in Spanish". An intensive course in Spanish is also required of foreign diplomats before attendance of Chile's Diplomatic Academy (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998). Likewise, diplomatic training aid courses in France, Italy, and Brazil are respectively presented in French, Italian and Portuguese (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b). Such language restrictions of course effectively exclude most Developing World diplomats and compel those who do speak the required language to specialise not just in a certain language, but in the associated diplomatic culture.

f) **Disproportionate reliance on foreign training**: The CPDS (1998b), in a summary of developments regarding diplomatic training aid to CEEC states, notes that donor support is increasingly subject to review as the capabilities of participating ministries develop. It notes that both the German and the British governments are considering phasing out their funding of this aspect of transitional capacity-building in the coming years. This temporary, conditional nature of training aid is however not always reflected by the human resources planning of MFA in other parts of the world. Rather than develop an own capacity for training, many poor countries replace basic diplomatic training *in toto* with the courses offered in developed countries, leaving them destitute when training opportunities are

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eventually scaled down or suspended (Debrah 1996).

g) **Political price of foreign training**: As is the case with many other forms of development assistance, critics claim that foreign diplomatic training prods a recipient state to toe the line of a donor state's foreign policy. The idea of diplomatic training as a foreign policy 'Trojan horse' is indeed not far-fetched, because it grants a donor state intellectual access to the individuals who will be instrumental in advising on and executing foreign policy. As De Borja (1999: 40) recounts, the Philippine diplomats who were trained by the US State Department (and who did mission apprenticeships in US embassies) immediately after their country's independence in 1946, became known as the 'State Department boys'. In some cases, the political conditions of training aid are stated from the outset: as mentioned before the CPDS (1998a) makes it clear that it is funded by the British FCO and the EU to train diplomats from developing states that are adhering to principles of democracy and good governance.

Much of the Developing World's diplomatic training happens as a result of international assistance. There is a symbiotic relationship in such training assistance: donor states honour historical commitments or achieve specific foreign policy objectives, whereas recipient states obtain skills and expertise that would otherwise be lacking in their MFAs. When such assistance occurs within the context of South-South relations, particularly within regions, the result can be a crucial strengthening of Developing World solidarity. In all circumstances, however, recipient countries need to be aware of the distinct disadvantages that limit (albeit not eliminate) the benefits of foreign diplomatic training.

6. CONCLUSION

For the Developing World the universal challenges to 21st century diplomacy have been superimposed on developmental disadvantages, thus increasing and complicating the work of its diplomats. This reality and a number of other considerations render professional training for Developing World diplomats a relatively greater imperative than for their peers from developed countries. Training

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is indeed essential because their lack of comparative advantage in alternative foreign policy tools means that poorer states have little choice but to invest in conventional diplomatic infrastructure to advance their interests within the global community. In this dynamic arena, their diplomats have to compete against elite state representatives with more bargaining power, better facilities and more universal representation at their disposal.

Their competitive 'edge' is diminished even further by the considerable training handicap of many developing MFAs. Impediments include the organisational immaturity of foreign ministries and lack of financial and human resources to sustain proper training, which often amount to a complete paucity of training infrastructure. These material disadvantages notwithstanding, the main handicap is attitudinal: many developing MFAs simply do not accord diplomatic training high priority because it is not recognised as a remedial instrument in building capacity and enhancing professionalism.

The diplomatic training challenges experienced by developing states take on new dimensions when such states are newly established or in constitutional transition. Under such conditions diplomatic training needs to address massive shortages of experience and skills and, in addition, address fundamental state identity issues. The advantage is that these states also attract greater international attention, and, as a corollary, assistance with capacity building.

International assistance in the field of diplomatic training is, in fact, of great importance to most developing MFAs, who often rely on it as their only or most important source of staff training. Training collaboration also occurs within the context of South-South cooperation, where it enhances the capacity of diplomats to present a more united front in pursuing the collective international agenda of the Developing World. The attendance by diplomats of foreign diplomatic training programmes has various advantages but its distinct disadvantages can ironically inhibit capacity building within developing MFAs and should therefore be carefully considered.

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The next chapter will offer various proposals in this regard and in general as to the building of capacity within developing world MFAs by means of diplomatic training. It will argue that diplomats can gain crucial comparative advantage only *via* targeted professional training that equips them with the competencies to perform effectively in highly competitive and rapidly changing international affairs.

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[1] The latter examples were included in international trends and practice as discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will thus focus on those (the majority of) developing countries that are not as well endowed.

[2] Of course in some countries that went through revolution, such as Indonesia, Iran and China, Western values and their expression in diplomatic practice were initially rejected entirely (Sofer 1988: 200).

[3] During the author's posting to the ROK (1997–2001) the ambassador of Swaziland, who was based in Seoul, was accredited to no fewer than fifteen countries in Asia, including all the major Asian powers such as China, India and Japan! His workload and travel schedule, needless to say, was extraordinary.

[4] Jones and Whittingham (1998: 6) quote a Zimbabwean ambassador to the UN who remarked: "When we go for negotiations you find that America, for example, has 90 trade officers and poor Zimbabwe just has three officers who are expected to negotiate around the clock ... that's why you find African officials end up sleeping, when others are negotiating. It's not because they are lazy, they are human too and they get tired".

[5] Selebi (1998b) says that historically, the South African MFA was marked by rigid hierarchy: "[Before 1994] contact between senior and junior officers was very rare and occurred only in the form of memoranda from juniors to their seniors and corrections made to proposals from seniors to their juniors. Sitting down and engaging in a debate was unheard of ... we have to find ways to deal with the bureaucratic mind-set which is sometimes so strong that it suffocates and inhibits initiative and progress".

[6] The author has personally observed, throughout her career in the South African DFA, many supervisors who obstruct the training of junior officials because they want to avoid diluted manpower in their divisions. Fortunately this phenomenon is not ubiquitous and many supervisors are responsible enough to encourage and facilitate training.

[7] Botswana (DFA 1996) in 1996 had only ten embassies and three consulates-general.

[8] Information verified on 1 September 2004 by diplomats of the respective High Commissions to South Africa of Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana.

[9] The author has personal experience of this problem as regards the South African FSI, which since 1994 has interrupted or duplicated its own training reforms numerous times due to lack of continuity and poor management.

[10] Author's personal experience as a South African career diplomat working at the FSI.

[11] Japan, after its World War Two humiliation and subsequent entry into international community as a reformed actor, assumed a new political identity on the world stage. Komachi (1999:114–115) notes that unlike in many west-European states the Japanese foreign service remains "a growth industry and many look to the foreign ministry to take the initiative in diplomatic matters. Its budget and staff are continually increasing and are expected to grow in the future."

[12] In the case of Uruguay, Otermi (1992: 22) notes that those candidates that were banned from competing for political posts during the *de facto* regime, upon the return of the country to institutional normality were allowed back into the MFA and allowed a new start in their career, while those that were recruited to the MFA during the reign of the *de facto* regime, were not removed for that reason. By the same token, those diplomats removed from the MFA for political reasons during the same period, were reinstated and compensated.

[13] Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, in spite of the absence of international recognition of their sovereignty, all maintained their own MFAs.

[14] The foreign representatives of the formerly banned African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were absorbed into the South African DFAs.

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[15] The author's personal observation during this period was that training levels and standards even within the same liberation movement varied greatly. This was because the training of exiled, *de facto* diplomats by various donor states was uncoordinated, sporadic, limited and with inconsistent standards.
[16] Vale (1993: 1) refers to the different, yet complementary competencies claimed alternately by "upstairs" (state) diplomats and "downstairs" (liberation movement) diplomats. The former claimed skills and competence, whereas the latter claimed legitimacy. Pityana (2000) notes that the liberation movement diplomats did in fact have *de facto* diplomatic exposure, for example their effective public diplomacy to achieve an international campaign of sanctions against the apartheid government.
[17] In the three years between 1996 and 1999, South Africa was chosen as chair of respectively UNCTAD (1995), SADC (1996), NAM (1998) and the Commonwealth (1999) and hosted summits of all these organisations.
[18] The question can rightly be asked why diplomats from the apartheid era were retained but not retrained to represent the so-called 'new South Africa', when such training was so clearly needed. The author's personal assessment is that it was a matter of inept management of the RSA's DFA's transitional needs, and particularly careless management of the department's human resources development.
[19] The course was initially shortened to six months: it was fast-tracked to accommodate the intake from former liberation movements who needed to be deployed to missions as a matter of urgency. As from 1998/1999, the year-long format was resumed.
[20] CIRIDEX is an annual intensive two-month course for young foreign diplomats from Central and Eastern Europe, the Arab world, Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and the Caribbean. The Spanish MFA, in conjunction with the Spanish International Cooperation Agency and Directorate General for Cultural and Scientific Relations grant scholarships for attendance of the courses. Between 1995 and 1998, 115 diplomatic officials from 43 countries attended the CIRIDEX courses (Spain MFA *Escuela Diplomática* 1998).
[21] According to the CPDS (1998b) the emerging External Service of the European Commission, with 128 missions, is now the fourth largest diplomatic service in the world.
[22] In 2002, the DSE merged with the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft e.V. (CDG) to form InWEnt – Capacity Building International, Germany. Under this new name, InWEnt continues the training programmes of both predecessors. DSE information, however, is still available on the Internet under its original name (http://www.dse.de/wir–e.htm accessed on 6 April 2004).
[23] The FSP developed from a series of predecessor colonial administration courses, namely the Tropical African Services Course (1929), Colonial Administrative Service Course (1934), the Devonshire Course (1945), Course 'A' and 'B' (1953), the Overseas Service Course (1962) and finally the Overseas Course in Government and Management (1964) (Oxford University FSP 1994: 4–5).
[24] In the event of partial scholarships, states such as China and Brazil pay for all expenses of the recipient diplomats except their international air-fares (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b).
[25] Malaysia's IDFR has, for example, on occasion presented a course on "Protocol and Liaison duties" for Ghanaian women officials (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998).
[26] While the course content itself presented no further problems, it was never actually presented because of disagreements about the venue. Tanzania wanted the regional course to be based there, however Clingendael and the DSE, which were prepared to fully subsidise the presentation of the course at the FSI in SA, refused to subsidise the creation of another Institute somewhere else in the region (author's personal recollection).
[27] The only result of the meeting was that the South African FSI agreed to increased calls by SADC countries to have the region's diplomats included in its official diplomatic training programme in Pretoria. A few individuals, notably from Botswana, did attend South African training but the arrangement was suspended after a few years as a result of inadequate resources (RSA DFA 1997; Nzo 1996a; RSA DFA FSI 1996a).
[28] The author's personal experience after attendance of the Oxford University FSP with representatives from 32 other countries: As attendees are posted and rotated across the globe by their respective MFAs, they invariably come into contact again with former class-mates and then capitalise on their personal acquaintance.

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CHAPTER 7
THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATIC TRAINING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSALS

1. INTRODUCTION

Most of the challenges that face diplomats at the beginning of the 21st century can be addressed to some extent or another by means of intensified and 'extensified' training for the profession – an hypothesis that is reflected in the world-wide growth industry that diplomatic training has become. Most developing countries, however, are lagging in this regard, despite the fact that the challenges facing their diplomats are compounded by numerous endogenous handicaps. They are, ironically, in even greater need of career-specific training in order to level the international playing field of their profession, and to be empowered to pursue their countries' vital interests with greater effectiveness. In this regard, the chapter that follows offers an assessment and proposals as to the remedial role of diplomatic training in the Developing World (Barratt and Vale 1998; Commonwealth 1971: 104; Ton 1996).

The point of departure is that a commitment to professionalism, indeed to the profession of diplomacy itself, needs to be made by Developing World governments. Various proposals are subsequently made, based on the imperative for developing MFAs to treat their human resources as potential national assets whose procurement and development ought to be a strategic priority. In light of the reality that most MFAs in the Developing World lack the capacity to conduct sufficient diplomatic training, the crucial role of international assistance in the field is then discussed, with some proposals as to the countering of the inevitable disadvantages embedded in foreign training. The chapter then proceeds to focus on remedial action *in loco* by MFAs, in terms of the structure and method required to establish diplomatic training capacity. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the recommended content of a basic diplomatic training course, as well as the subject matter of supplementary courses that are required for the purpose of continuous diplomatic training. A generic curriculum proposal is attached as an addendum and serves as a broad framework for a basic diplomatic training course,

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to be adapted as appropriate in light of states' individual circumstances, resources and priorities.

Pahad (1996b) remarks that diplomatic training develops the capacity of the right candidates to achieve "the utmost within the limits of the possible" as far as foreign policy is concerned. The proposals made in this chapter, while based on the international standards and trends that were previously discussed, are made from the perspective of developing countries' huge international needs and – importantly – their capabilities to give effect to such proposals.

2. A COMMITMENT TO THE PROFESSION

A theme that runs throughout this thesis is the modern trend to professionalise diplomacy – to make it more efficient, pro-active, transparent, organised and accountable – and hence to have diplomats trained more extensively and substantially. For governments of developing countries, the professionalisation of diplomacy starts with the simple but crucial acceptance that diplomats are state assets, and a subsequent commitment of state intervention to ensure that MFAs are equipped to procure and develop those assets. The professionalisation of recruitment, prioritisation of diplomatic training and monitoring of the effectiveness of training are indispensable elements of this process (Debrah 1996; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Marshall 1997: 139).

2.1 A CAVEAT: RECOGNISING DIPLOMATS AS ASSETS

The proposals in this chapter depend on the pivotal supposition that Developing World governments recognise the significant role of professional diplomats in promoting their foreign policy agendas in the international arena. As Sofer (1988: 206) observes, "foreign policy cannot be conducted without the assistance of a professional diplomatic apparatus". If governments identify diplomats as state assets they will strive to develop such assets to maximum state advantage (Debrah 1996; Lesotho MFA 1996; Newsom 1997: 4; Rozental 1999: 144).

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2.1.1 **Taking diplomats on board**

Eban (1998: 98) remarks that "while governments may sometimes have suffered through taking too much notice of ambassadors, a greater affliction has arisen from taking too little notice of them". This comment encapsulates a universal problem for diplomats, particularly in the Developing World where MFAs are often side-lined in favour of personal diplomacy. The expertise, experience and exposure of diplomats need to be drawn on by national leaders; otherwise diplomatic resources are wasted at best, or at worst amateurs are allowed to experiment in the complicated and sensitive arena of international affairs (Burt and Robison 1998: xii; Holsti 1988: 161; Vale 1993: 3). As a Malaysian President of the UNGA, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, remarked: "We must run away from the belief that we only need glorified protocol people to take care of VIPs at the airport" (Ahmad 1999: 118). Governments need to listen to their diplomats, and more than that, they need to take proactive steps to grant them audience, at appropriate levels, and on a routine[1] basis to ensure that they utilise their international eyes and ears (Babb 1974: 16; Business Day 3 February 1999; Olivier 2002).

2.1.2 **Holding diplomats accountable**

The corollary of granting more status and responsibility to diplomats is that they – in their capacity as national representatives – should be held accountable for their performance. In this regard, MFAs are advised to enforce a professional code of conduct because of its potential to enhance organisational standards and *esprit de corps* and improve external as well as internal credibility. In practice this means that diplomats who behave unethically, immorally or illegally should be disciplined without exception (Business Day 3 February 1999).

Some developing countries, like South Africa, have instituted performance agreements for senior diplomats, including all heads of mission. Dlamini Zuma (2002) says these contracts are concluded to inculcate "a culture of performance and service delivery". The system can only reap benefits, however, if the sanctions of such agreements are implemented visibly and consistently (Selebi 1998b; Rozental 1999: 147).

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2.1.3 **Empowering ministries of foreign affairs to create capacity**

Olivier (2002) declares that "successful states share one common feature: they know how to use their foreign policies as an instrument for national wealth creation". This goal is of critical importance to developing nations that, per definition, are deficient in wealth. However, according to Debrah (1996), the objectives of a foreign policy can scarcely be achieved if MFAs are not enabled to respond to national needs, and this presents, as Hemery (2002: 142) argues, "a powerful case for devoting resources to empowering diplomats from poor countries to play as full and effective a part as possible in regional and international affairs, especially in the multilateral fora on whose decisions their countries' fates usually hang". Internally, the empowerment of an MFA starts with a strategic development plan to enhance its own human resources capacity, by ensuring that the processes of selection, appointment, basic and continuous training, placement and promotion are coordinated, professional and geared towards addressing specific capacity problems (De Borja 1999: 41; UN UNITAR 2004b).

Planning needs to materialise concretely, thereafter, by means of resource allocation. MFAs in developing states, as previously discussed, are relatively low on the priority list of governmental budgets and therefore seldom have funds to spare. Redirecting resources – personnel, funding and equipment – to human resources development is therefore a matter of strategic rethinking of priorities and long-term commitment to the creation of self-sustaining capacity (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Marshall 1997: 139; Swaziland MFA 1996).

2.2 PROFESSIONALISING RECRUITMENT

A 1990 HSRC (1990: 7) study made the observation that no education or training is omnipotent and the role of selection is therefore crucial and self-evident. Injudicious recruitment can in fact be very expensive to an MFA in the long run and the training of unsuitable candidates will be much more difficult. The recruitment process is such a critical intervention in the professionalisation of an MFA that various commentators have recommended the formation of a special board or commission to deliberate on the suitability of prospective entrants. Such a board needs to ensure

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that candidates are selected on principles of merit, and determine proactive measures to ensure that the best possible candidates are attracted (Commonwealth 1971: 107; New Zealand MFAT: 1996: 26; Otermi 1992: 30).

2.2.1 **An elite based on merit**

In an era of democratisation it is tempting to argue that diplomats need to be representative of every societal level of their sending state; yet to do so would be to deny developing states the necessary competitive advantage of sending elite operatives into the diplomatic arena. The Commonwealth (1971: 105) therefore urges developing MFAs to target individuals who are dynamic, with readiness to assume responsibility and ability to learn fast. As Debrah (1996) expresses it, "the men and women who are going to be the ears and eyes of government abroad cannot be selected on criteria which fail to emphasise the best in the society". The point is that diplomats should, indeed, be recruited according to rigorous standards and thus be considered an elite, but with exclusivity and prestige based on merit alone (Ahmad 1999: 128; Burt and Robison 1998: xiii; Otermi 1992: 22).

2.2.2 **Pro-active recruitment**

Otermi (1992: 28–29) says a state can make a pro-active intervention[2] in recruitment even at the preceding vocational stage. This can be done by assisting tertiary institutions that (or aspire to) present diplomatic studies to adopt a functional approach, and by keeping such institutions informed about supply and demand in the profession, i.e. to advise them on accommodation of a realistic number of candidates for work in the foreign service.

As concerns actual recruitment, various commentators propose methods to 'widen the net' in order to secure an adequate number of suitable candidates. One such suggestion is to revise admission requirements to ensure that candidates are not deterred by unessential considerations: an age limit, for example, has been abolished by Chile's Diplomatic Academy (Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004). In another approach, Argentina's MFA allows potential candidates to take admission exams in different provinces of the country, whereas Mexico's MFA places international

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advertisements for its vacancies, and allows entrance exams to be taken at its embassies, in order to tap into the pool of skilled Mexicans who are abroad (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998; Rozental 1999: 147). Recruitment also needs to facilitate lateral entry into the MFA of experienced professionals from other government departments and the private sector, whose diverse skills can enrich the human resources pool of a developing MFA (De Borja 1999: 56; Lesotho MFA 1996; Rozental 1999: 147; Mills 1998b: 22; Riordan 2003: 118).

2.2.3 **Accommodating affirmative action and employment equity**

A number of leading developing countries such as India[3], Malaysia[4], South Africa and Nigeria[5] have implemented affirmative action recruitment policies in an attempt to make the civil service, including MFAs, more representative of demographic diversity. Results have, however, been mixed. Many commentators agree with Vale's (1993: 32–34) contention that the principle underlying preferential politics is beyond reproach, "as it aims to bring all people to the same level of effectiveness". However, large-scale and forced affirmative action can seriously jeopardise efficiency within a developing organisation such as an MFA where experience and training provide the edge to performance. Also, if not subject to a limited time frame ('sun-set clause') and strenuously monitored, it can become an exclusive[6] policy in itself, even to the point of becoming a ruse for nepotism (Business Day 4 October 2000; Pretoria News 31 August 2001; Thakur 2000).

An approach that is less controversial, more pragmatic and with long-term benefit to individuals and organisations alike, is to make affirmative action a human resources development plan. This implies that recruitment starts at the vocational level by granting individuals from disadvantaged groups access to additional educational opportunities to allow them to compete, at a later stage, on a merit basis. As Vale (1993: 33) observes, "even more important than representativity is legitimacy in the sense that people should be made to feel that with appropriate motivation, skills and attributes, they will have access to certain positions in the public service as opposed to the notion that they are obliged to go in there and to fill up quotas". As previously discussed, this is what is being done in New Zealand in order to draw more Maori candidates into the foreign service. It is also the course of action

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followed by the US Department of State (2004) in order to recruit more African-American diplomats. The result is a system that addresses socio-political imperatives while preserving the principle of merit.

2.2.4 **Training political appointees**

"May I say with all due respect that the diplomatic service should not be a convenient way of finding employment for distinguished persons whom governments wish to recall to other duties". This sentiment of Debrah (1996), albeit widely echoed by professional diplomats, is unfortunately not indicative of the way many governments, especially in the Developing World, treat diplomatic posts (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211; Sofer 1988: 206). Barratt and Vale (1998), for example, during early 1998 lamented the discrepant standards reflected by South African heads of mission appointments, calling some of the choices "just bewildering".

The small pool of qualified human resources accessible to many developing country MFAs makes recruitment from political circles almost inevitable. Otermi (1992: 20) says a politically "sterile" diplomatic corps which "would prevent a president from appointing personnel of his absolute confidence to certain embassies that he considers of key importance during his period of government is a utopian hypothesis that could even conspire against achieving the professionalisation of the foreign service". Vale (1993: 43) and Riordan (2003: 28) agree and both propose that the weakness of political appointees on technical issues be compensated for by providing them with strong and capable support teams from MFAs, i.e. well-trained and professional staff.

MFAs are usually passive recipients of political appointees, but can and must play a role in their professional preparation by offering them diplomatic training. Training is, in fact, the key to producing professional diplomats. It should be thorough and compulsory[7], regardless of seniority or source of recruitment, if the professional integrity of an MFA is not to be diluted (Business Day 3 February 1999; Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; De Borja 1999: 36, 57; HSRC 1990: 27).

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2.3 PRIORITISING DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

Malawi's government (DHRMD 1996) notes that Southern African states "cannot afford to leave the training of our diplomats to chance. Proper training would make gains not only for the immediate but also for the long-term future of our respective countries and the region as a whole". The exceptional demands on 21st century diplomats, and the additional responsibilities of Developing World diplomats indeed demand more than a trial and error learning curve in handling the vital foreign interests of states (Ahmad 1999: 117; Babb 1974: 13; Eban 1998: 28; Rozental 1999: 144). In order for training to be seen as a priority – and "to raise the sights of the developing diplomatic service beyond the niceties of protocol", as Hemery (2002: 142) puts it – it needs to be compulsory, continuous, resolute and targeted. It also needs to be inclusive of all officials involved in the execution of a developing state's foreign policy.

2.3.1 **Accepting continuous training as a *sine qua non***

Barratt and Vale (1998) reject as "nonsensical" the notion that diplomatic training is a waste of time, and point out that "no corporation serious about its future would think of cutting down the training of its front-line personnel". Their opinion reflects a growing international realisation that diplomatic training is an essential MFA investment in its own future, just as the acquisition of capital goods and new technologies are (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 211; Malawi DHRMD 1996).

International practice has not only played up the importance of basic diplomatic training, but indeed its continuous application in order for diplomats to respond effectively to changing domestic and international realities (Babb 1974:15; Selebi 1998b; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998). In this regard the Commonwealth (1971: 127–128) notes that "a willingness to arrange mid-career training for diplomatic officers is an important contribution towards maintaining the reputation and skill of national diplomatic services". Developing MFAs need to face this reality and accord diplomatic training the priority it needs as a strategic component in organisational development and manpower management. This will require more than rhetoric:

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firm, strategically formulated MFA policy to institutionalise training is essential. Formal admittance to MFAs and postings and promotion thereafter should, without exception, be made conditional on successful completion of basic as well as supplementary training (HSRC 1990: 7; Barratt and Vale 1998).

2.3.2 **Broadening the target group to include non-diplomats**

Developing MFAs, which in most cases have a dire shortage of human resources, are well advised to prioritise training not only for its career diplomats, but to extend it to all individuals who will be attached to missions abroad and thus be instrumental in the execution of foreign policy. This group includes administrative and technical MFA staff and representatives of functional ministries responsible for *inter alia* international trade and industry, tourism, defence and finance. It should ideally include all government officials who are involved in foreign liaison: in the case of South Africa, for example, limited diplomatic training is also offered to executives from provincial governments and those of semi-government organisations such as the national airline. A more inclusive approach to training policy will ensure that public services benefit from the synergy and expertise of its entire pool of human resources involved in promoting the state's external interests (DAL 2003; Lesotho MFA 1996; DSP HEI 2004; RSA DFA FSI 1996a; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

For this purpose, systematic training, even if limited in scope, should be compulsory for all these officials and – importantly – also for their spouses[8]. Training in such traditional diplomatic skills as negotiation, protocol and etiquette and communications skills, including foreign languages, as well as knowledge of domestic and foreign policy will enable more efficiency in their interaction with foreign clients (Ahmad 1999: 124–125; Meerts 1991: 20; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

2.4 ENSURING THAT TRAINING IS EFFECTIVE

Investment in diplomatic training is futile if the training is ineffective. Hence, as the Tanzanian MFA's CFR (1996) notes, diplomatic training needs to be "periodically reviewed to cope with actual needs, complexity of the international system,

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expansion of the foreign policy constituency and the widening interpretation of foreign policy itself". The mandate of training thus needs to be clearly defined before the effectiveness of training can be evaluated. The latter should be done during and immediately following training by means of direct assessment of trainees, trainers and programmes; as well as on a continuous, indirect basis, *via* client feedback of service delivery in the field (Burt and Robison 1998: 55; Brazil MFR IRBr 2000; Commonwealth 1971: 110).

2.4.1 **Establishing the mandate**

Jaques (2003) says a challenge of all foreign services is the increasing "scrutiny of foreign service responsiveness to stakeholder needs and the quality, effectiveness and appropriateness of service delivered" as well as the development of "staff who can 'add value' in promoting a government's international objectives". Her observation relates to an important element of capacity building within an MFA, namely the targeted training of diplomats to achieve specific strategic objectives. What those objectives are, i.e. what exactly diplomats need to be trained to do, have to be clear, otherwise training will be too superficial, wide and/or irrelevant. As the HSRC (1990: 4) recommends, the objectives of diplomatic training programmes should be formulated and operationalised to be congruent with – and indeed instrumental in achieving – every aspect of an MFA's mission. Only then can the results of training be measured and its effectiveness be monitored (Brazil MFR IRBr 2000; Burt and Robison 1998: 55; Meerts 1991: 20; Mills 1998b: 22).

2.4.2 **Direct performance evaluation of trainees**

Proper and formal evaluation of trainees on all components of diplomatic training is essential to ensure that candidates have mastered the necessary knowledge and skills to operate at optimal efficiency. It is recommended that professional advancement of candidates be conditional on successful completion of all examinations: this will boost professional standards by eliminating unsuitable candidates whereas the successful candidates will have the advantage of credibility and confidence among their peers. Exams should be interdisciplinary, oral as well as written and should test not just theoretical knowledge but application thereof to

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structured tasks. An example would be inclusion of a portfolio of tasks simulating a workday situation in a mission: *inter alia* media interviews, drafting of policy documents and electronic messages to head office and simulated negotiations. The content of such practical exams should be determined by a panel with experience of actual demands on diplomats in missions. Importantly, evaluation of trainees should be concluded by a wide-ranging multi-disciplinary panel interview to evaluate candidates' ability to communicate knowledge and formulate policy positions (De Borja 1999: 20; HSRC 1990: 58; IDIS 2004; Meerts 1991: 20).

An important point is that the performance of diplomatic trainees should be evaluated on a continuous basis during the course of training, not just by formal examination of subject knowledge or skills, but also in terms of feedback on their personal conduct by trainers, course coordinators and fellow trainees. If they are held to professional standards from the outset of training, it will be a proper induction to the continuous assessment by clients that they will be subjected to in the course of their careers. In addition, constructive self-criticism by trainees of their performance should be an integral part of diplomatic training, to stimulate their critical analysis skills and to nurture a culture of continuous self-improvement within an MFA (De Borja 1999: 57).

For developing MFAs that are struggling to implement professional standards, it is important to heed the HSRC's (1990: 9) warning that the objectivity, reliability and validity of evaluation must be above board. The Council warns that if evaluation methods are arbitrary and unprofessional, the results of training will not be cleared and will not have legitimacy and the integrity of training will be undermined.

2.4.3 **Trainee evaluation of courses and trainers**

Diplomatic training, as mentioned before, can never be static. Its structure, methods and content need to be continuously assessed, also by the individuals who are recipients of training. Thus every training group should get the opportunity to evaluate all aspects of training, including the trainers, and their feedback should be taken into account by the authorities that are tasked with monitoring training. This will help to improve quality in both the administration and presentation of training

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(HSRC 1990: 4; Marshall 1997: xvi; Selebi 1998b).

2.4.4 **Indirect evaluation of training results**

Olivier (2002), in a discussion about South African diplomacy, says the fact that diplomats travel around the world with "frenetic frequency, attend numerous international meetings, and feed the media with upbeat communiqués" does not mean that they are doing anything worthwhile. This happens, he surmises, because they "confuse activity with success". Hemery (2002: 142) makes a similar observation about the tendency of developing MFAs to mistake "the process for the product". Their criticism highlights an important challenge for diplomatic training namely the evaluation of its results, i.e. the performance of diplomats in the field. For states with insecure administrations, client feedback on service delivery can be painful because criticism will play up many weaknesses not just of training, but of MFA (and civil service) management in general. The evaluation process is crucial, however, in order to identify those problems that can be solved *via* targeted training.

Various methods to do such evaluation are available. The most conventional technique is the evaluation of trained junior staff's operational skills by their supervisors. The evaluation should also be reversed, in that junior MFA staff should get the opportunity to evaluate the performance of managers, as done for example in Vietnam[9]. The feedback of external clients such as the media, NGOs and legislatures, about the perceived shortcomings in knowledge and skills of diplomats, is another very important assessment of output in the field. Their evaluation should be encouraged, even solicited, and channelled to an appropriate, standing committee that makes recommendations regarding training revision (HSRC 1990: 11; New Zealand MFAT: 1996; Selebi 1998b; UN UNITAR 2004b; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995).

Diplomatic training in the Developing World will be prioritised, and thereby have a remedial role in the enhanced efficiency of MFAs, only if governments recognise the essential role of professional diplomats in pursuing foreign policy objectives. If

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this happens, MFAs will be in a stronger position to take the strategic steps necessary to professionalise their most important resource. The process starts at the vocational stage, where MFAs can guide tertiary institutions in preparing a recruitment base commensurate in size and qualifications with actual recruitment needs within a state's foreign service. Notwithstanding this recommended targeted intervention, prevailing circumstances in the Developing World reduce the impact of recruitment from academic institutions. Inadequate tertiary yield of appropriate candidates, lateral MFA recruitment from other public and private sectors, the common practice of political appointees to diplomatic positions and the political (and/or legal) imperative of affirmative action in the case of some states, all make career-specific training under the direction of MFAs of particular importance in the building of a professional staff corps. It is at this definitive stage, namely training, that MFAs need to focus much more attention by facilitating continuous, compulsory training of diplomats on all levels of seniority. Prioritisation of diplomatic training should also be reflected in a wider strategic vision of training, namely the facilitation of training for the wider foreign service community of a state. The latter includes MFA support staff, seconded personnel and all spouses who accompany officials to missions abroad, as well as other government officials domestically tasked with international liaison. Finally, an MFA commitment to training requires constant monitoring of its effectiveness and relevance, not only by evaluation of trainees, trainers and courses, but more importantly through solicitation of – and appropriate reaction to – feedback by stakeholders in the field.

3. MAXIMISING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

As discussed in the previous two chapters, international collaboration in the field of diplomatic training is increasing exponentially. All states stand to benefit from such exchanges, but the Developing World with its paucity of training has a relatively larger stake in it. Nascent diplomatic training centres should therefore network widely within the international community of diplomatic trainers, also within the South and specifically within regional context, to extract maximum advantage from existing expertise and available resources. Foreign training *per se* should be regarded as opportunities to accumulate expertise, however developing MFAs must be prepared to offset the disadvantages thereof and strive primarily to create or

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enhance a domestic capacity for diplomatic training (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; Nzo 1996b).

3.1 USING INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES

Meerts (1991: 5) remarks that the necessity for disseminating experience and knowledge in the field of diplomatic training is becoming evident as an increasing number of developing countries recognise the necessity to establish a domestic training capacity. Domestic as well as international interaction with other diplomatic training centres, academic and research institutions, the diplomatic community and private sector allows developing MFAs to enhance their institutional capacity, update standards and enrich their training programmes to bring them in line with – and benefit from – the best of international practice (Estonia MFA ESD 1998; IDIS 2004; Ngwevela 1998; UN UNITAR 2004b).

3.1.1 **Joining the international network**

International conferences on diplomatic training, such as the annual IFDT meetings, offer important sources of bilateral and multilateral contacts for staff of developing diplomatic training centres and opportunities to gather information on existing and new approaches in the field (Meerts 1991: 20; Oxford University FSP 1994: 41). Of growing importance is also the increasing number of regional diplomatic training associations that have been established world-wide, such as the Association of Diplomatic Academies of Latin America (Jimenez 1998). The regional associations deliberate on techniques of training course management and content, exchange resource personnel and expand their members' networking opportunities internally as well as further afield by establishing associative relations with other regional associations and with the IFDT. In cases where such a regional association does not exist, for example in Southern Africa, it is recommended that it be established for the reasons mentioned (Debrah 1996; DAL 2003).

International networking is recommended when developing MFAs prepare to establish their own diplomatic training capacity. The inauguration of the Czech Diplomatic Academy in 1997, for example, "was preceded by an analysis of the

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educational requirements of Czech diplomats and the accumulation of information about foreign systems of training diplomats" (Czech Republic MFA 2003). Contact across a broad spectrum allows developing MFAs to benefit from research with proven results and saves them the time, money and human resources they would otherwise have spent on 'reinventing the wheel' in respect of training (Khaleej Times Online 10 December 2003; Oxford University FSP 1994: 42; UN UNITAR 2004b).

3.1.2 **Developing institutional links**

A recommended form of international cooperation is the strengthening of institutional links between developing MFA training centres and foreign training centres. The Tunisian MFA's DITS (1998), for example, even before its establishment during 1997, calculated that it needed institutional cooperation "to make its first steps" and has subsequently established close links with diplomatic training institutions in its geographic vicinity, including the *Escuela Diplomática* in Spain, Malta's MEDAC and the Paris IIAP. It is also pursuing cooperation with various other institutions, including foreign universities, with the aim of exchanging lecturers and study material, colloquia and seminars. The same course of action has been noted by other new diplomatic training centres such as the Estonian School of Diplomacy (Estonia MFA ESD 1998), the Slovene MFA's Diplomatic Academy (1998) and the South African FSI (RSA DFA FSI 1996b). In many cases institutional ties evolve into formal agreements that, in turn, promote closer bilateral relations between states. Examples are Jordan's JID, Mozambique's ISRI and Cameroon's IRIC which have all concluded cooperation agreements and protocols of understanding with international affairs institutes and universities across the globe (IRIC 2004; Jordan JID 1998a; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996).

3.1.3 '**Joint venture' training**

Hemery (2002: 144) says one of the benefits of operating across sector boundaries is that expertise and professionalism can spread into an emerging civil service. In this regard, Barratt and Vale (1998) contend that collaborative partnerships in Developing World diplomatic training could provide "innovative and competitive

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training which would reach beyond the ordinary". Hemery (2002: 144) points out the potential to provide such programmes of integrated education and training by, for instance, combining the academic expertise of domestic and foreign universities with the professional expertise of local diplomatic communities. He cites the example of an initiative which has laid the foundations for a self-sustaining programme of diplomatic studies in Romania's MFA: it involved participation by the University of Bucharest, the London School of Economics, University College London, and the embassies in Bucharest of Brazil, China, India, Israel, Japan, Poland, Russia, the UK and the US. In another example, Estonia's MFA's ESD (1998) remarks that the institutional capacity of diplomatic training centres in Eastern and Central Europe is enhanced by the International Affairs Network, a collaborative venture that includes, *inter alia*, the University of Pittsburgh and 15 graduate schools of international relations in the US.

In Africa, the IDIS at the University of Nairobi is a good example of a joint venture in diplomatic training that cultivated a local capacity for diplomatic training. The Institute's main sponsor, the Swiss-based Graduate Institute of International Studies, works in close collaboration with the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the University of Nairobi which acts as host to the Institute, and other donors such as the governments of France, Germany, the Netherlands and US, IGO's such as the EU and Commonwealth (specifically the latter's fund for technical cooperation) and NGOs such as the Rockefeller Foundation. As a corollary, the governing board of the IDIS reflects both private and public interests and foreign as well as local influence in the project (IDIS 2004).

A joint venture option that applies to developing countries with functioning diplomatic training centres, is to enrich the content of programmes by collaborative cross-sector training ventures. Malaysia's IDFR recounts, for example, that it has as part of its strategic studies programme jointly organised with the French Embassy in Kuala Lumpur a seminar on hostage taking and terrorism, and a seminar on arms control with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998).

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3.1.4 **Exploring the official development assistance spectrum**

In the previous chapter certain disadvantages of foreign diplomatic training were pointed out; but it is important to note that ODA in this field includes a variety of options – other than basic diplomatic training in a foreign country – that can be of great benefit to developing MFAs. Institutional cooperation such as the secondment of lecturers to instruct diplomatic trainees *in loco*, for example, is often sponsored by the government of the more developed partner institution, as is the provision of infrastructural support such as IT systems (Barratt and Vale 1998; CPDS 1998b; Debrah 1996; DSP HEI 2004). A useful method of in-service training assistance is found within the Commonwealth, where certain donor countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK offer attachment posts within their own missions to trainee (or even senior) diplomats from other Commonwealth countries. The advantage to all parties involved is active cultivation of bilateral and multilateral networking opportunities (Commonwealth 1971: 112).

Collective, indirect ODA is another form of international cooperation in training that has fewer disadvantages than foreign training *per se*. International organisations are often at the cutting edge of global research and expertise and – particularly if part of their mandate is training and assistance – developing MFAs are well advised to tap into their resources. The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, for example, provides courses in economic diplomacy and has training materials in most of the official UN languages**.** Likewise, UNITAR which has a mandate to prioritise its training assistance for developing states, can provide training material and crucial supplementary training in the areas of multilateral and economic diplomacy (UN UNITAR 2004b). Kappeler (1998: 45) points out a further advantage of these organisations in the sense that they allow electronic access for member countries to libraries and documentation facilities, thereby facilitating diplomatic training processes. He notes also that the UN offers special technical support to permanent missions of small member states for installing easy access to the UN network.

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3.1.5 **Extending South-South cooperation**

Various commentators have proposed that groups of smaller nations pool human resources capacity in the field of diplomacy by for example sharing representation in multilateral hubs like Geneva and rotating specialists to attend to technical issues in multilateral meetings (Duke 2001: 7–8; Jones and Whittingham 1998: 9). Resistance to such cooperation is to be expected because of tradition, sovereignty or security concerns, but the benefits outweigh the disadvantages particularly for smaller nations which struggle to have their voices heard on a global scale (Kappeler 1998: 45; Marshall 1997: 153). Where political decisions are in fact made to share diplomatic representation (or at least pooling of administrative, technical and research resources) the logical first step will be to arrange joint training to ensure harmonisation of practice and standards and to inculcate a wider appreciation of collective responsibility and mission. Even when representation is not actually shared, Debrah (1996) notes that there is much developing countries can learn from each other to improve the quality and relevance of their training programmes. South-South cooperation in the field of diplomatic training is therefore recommended to allow available expertise to be distributed more widely and to promote the design of curricula that adequately address the wider, collective concerns of the Developing World.

3.2 REGIONALISING DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

From Mozambique to Mongolia, poorer states of the world are realising the benefits – indeed the imperative – of pooling regional resources as a means to enhance competitive advantage in the international environment. Collective regional diplomatic training is one such option and is a recommendation in cases where one or more individual member of an RIA does not have sufficient domestic capacity to conduct diplomatic training, as is the case in most of Sub-Saharan Africa (Bayasakh 1998; Jaques 2003; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Nzo 1996a). In this regard, Kenya's IDIS notes that the modest size of most African diplomatic establishments does not warrant the creation of a national training facility. However, in its aims and objectives it states that Africa's participation in international affairs 'demands' diplomatic training – an imperative that is its own constitutional *raison*

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d'être (IDIS 2004).

The Tanzanian MFA's CFR (1996) declares that "the same way that [Southern African] economies cannot be self-sufficient and self-sustaining except through cooperation and interdependency, diplomatic training also needs concerted efforts at a regional level. We can achieve our objectives by coordinating among ourselves so as to utilise expertise, infrastructure, as well as experience, wherever these are available in the region". The Malawi government echoes the recommendation that existing institutions be used to conduct regional training – as opposed to "isolated attempts to train our own diplomats" – and adds the concern that diplomatic training does not yet receive equal priority across the Southern African region (Malawi DHRMD 1996). The need for Southern Africa to join forces in this respect was recognised by all stake-holders during a regional conference on diplomatic training in 1996, and donor support was expressed for the proposal to host such a programme at the South African FSI. This proposal, which has not been followed up, needs to be revived and implemented by SADC as a matter of priority (Botswana DFA 1996; Ngwevela 1998).

Donor states are indeed often susceptible to the use of ODA for regional efforts, as is the case in Switzerland's Graduate Institute of International Studies targeted support for four regional diplomatic training initiatives in the Developing World: IRIC, IDIS, MEDAC and the IIRT (DSP HEI 2004. In another example, Chile's Diplomatic Academy (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998) is financially supported by the Organisation of American States to train entry-level diplomats from Central America. Other regions that do not benefit from ODA grants for diplomatic training should pursue this avenue in addition to taking concerted steps towards creating a regional capacity for training.

3.3 COUNTERING THE DISADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN TRAINING

As discussed in the previous chapter, developing countries that lack domestic capacity to conduct diplomatic training encounter benefits as well as disadvantages in foreign diplomatic training opportunities. The following proposals are geared towards countering the negative implications of foreign training:

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3.3.1 **Diversify sources**

In order to balance the foreign influence that invariably attends diplomatic training in a host country, it is proposed that as large a variety of training aid sources as possible be utilised by any one recipient country. Exposure to a wider range of training experiences will dilute and place into perspective the political, cultural or religious environment that inevitably impacts on an educational programme. An additional advantage is that such diversity in training sources will enrich the experience-base of a developing MFA and stimulate more critical, comparative analysis of international affairs within the ranks of trainees (De Borja 1999: 42–43).

3.3.2 **Use only as supplementary**

In order to reduce disproportionate reliance on foreign diplomatic training, it is recommended that developing countries use foreign training opportunities only on a supplementary basis, as is done by countries such as Chile[10] and South Africa (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998; Duke 2001: 17). The priority should be to invest in development of a domestic capacity to conduct at least basic diplomatic training. Malawi's government emphasises this primary MFA responsibility when it urges Southern African states to "allocate more resources to the training of diplomats and not leave the burden to donor countries. If anything, our partners in development should supplement our efforts" (Malawi DHRMD 1996). This responsibility is also emphasised by Debrah (1996) when he recommends that states "must also ensure that they get an increase in their training budgets. After all, independence and sovereignty also call for picking up the bills". If foreign training complements, rather than replaces basic training, its various negative effects will be much diluted.

3.3.3 **Become partners in design of courses**

A common disadvantage of foreign training programmes is their lack of relevance to the national concerns of trainees. The problem can be addressed if client states play a more proactive, participatory role in designing the training courses, and by insisting on a more practical, context-based and interactive curriculum. UNITAR emphasises this point when it states among its training assistance principles that it

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maintains a constant dialogue with recipient countries in the process of providing training: "This increases accuracy in the identification of the needs of member states and makes for a more imaginative approach to meeting those needs as well as giving a sense of ownership to the recipient parties" (UN UNITAR 2004b). Various other diplomatic training centres, such as Pakistan's FSA, the DAL at the University of Westminster and the Dutch Clingendael have in recent years started to 'customise' or 'tailor-make' diplomatic training programmes for foreign clients (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; Clingendael 1999; DAL 2003). The advantage for recipient MFAs is that partnership in design of training will ensure greater benefit from, and ownership of, training.

3.3.4 **Ground trainees in national studies**

Various disadvantages of foreign training can be countered when diplomats have had *ab initio* training in their own countries. General courses in basic training do not apply equally to a multinational group of diplomatic trainees, who represent countries with very diverse international needs and aspirations. When diplomats have had preparatory training in their own national studies and foreign policy, they are able to place supplementary training in the correct foreign policy perspective and extract and apply the appropriate complementarities. They are also better informed and more self-confident in their representation of sending-states, which will allow them to contribute more to the foreign training programme. The facilitation of more meaningful cross-pollination and comparative studies will, in turn, render the training course more valuable for all participants (Commonwealth 1971: 126; Debrah 1996).

Developing MFAs, especially those that are in the process of establishing a diplomatic training capacity, stand to benefit enormously from cooperation within the international community of diplomatic trainers. Networking and institutional links allow access to expertise, resources and research with proven results and save insufficiently capacitated MFAs from having to 'reinvent the wheel'. By the same token, South-South cooperation in diplomatic training can improve the quality and relevance of programmes and, as an added benefit, strengthen the South's

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diplomatic alliance. In this regard, regional cooperation in diplomatic training is of particular importance, to pool scarce expertise and resources and – in the case of joint training – to harmonise regional diplomatic practice and to inculcate common foreign policy objectives.

An innovative concept, already in practice in a few states, is for developing MFAs to pursue diplomatic training 'joint ventures', i.e. collaborative partnerships across sector boundaries, utilising as much domestic and foreign assistance as possible in diplomatic training. In this same vein, the full spectrum of ODA opportunities in the field of diplomatic training should be explored, particularly as concerns infrastructural development *in loco* and advanced, mid-career training at international organisations. In light of the disadvantages of foreign diplomatic training, as previously discussed, the bilateral sources of foreign training should be diversified as far as possible and be utilised only on a supplementary basis, i.e. it should not replace domestic training, particularly as regards national studies. In all instances, donor-recipient part partnership in the design of foreign courses is necessary, so as to ensure greater benefit from, and ownership of, foreign training for developing country MFAs.

4. PROPOSALS REGARDING METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF TRAINING

Diplomacy, as discussed, is of tremendous strategic importance to developing countries and the training of professional diplomats can therefore not simply be delegated to the private sector or left to *ad hoc* foreign opportunities. On the contrary, pro-active steps need to be taken by MFAs in order to ensure that the most appropriate structure and methods of training are employed in order to build self-sustaining capacity. As a first step, the establishment of a basic diplomatic training centre is essential (Meerts 1991: 20; CPDS 1998b). This core facility should coordinate on a permanent basis all MFA training and ensure that it remains focused on functional needs within the context of foreign policy objectives. In light of limited human and financial resources it should explore the full spectrum of locally available expertise and ensure that as many affordable training methods as possible, other than traditional lecture situations, be implemented.

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4.1 ESTABLISHING DEDICATED DIPLOMATIC TRAINING CENTRES

Ngwevela (1998) rightly observes that no academic institution or private enterprise external to MFAs can offer candidate diplomats the necessary induction as concerns "real diplomacy". In light of this consideration, a principal proposal is that countries without diplomatic training capacity should establish within their MFAs, as a matter of priority, a permanent, dedicated centre for this purpose. There is considerable advantage to having such a centre, even if it functions merely as rudimentary planning, coordination and liaison unit (Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Slovenia Times 2003; Vale 1993: 47).

4.1.1 **Institutionalising diplomatic training**

Various commentators in the developing World have noted that, if diplomacy is to be treated as a profession, it is imperative that its preparatory training be permanently institutionalised (Ahmad 1999: 124; Ngwevela 1998; Otermi 1992: 29). In response to this realisation, CEEC MFAs had by 1998 all established their own training capacity, ranging in scope from a single training coordinator to formal academies such as those in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia and Ukraine (CPDS 1998b). In various other parts of the Developing World, MFAs of countries such as South Africa, Tunisia and Mongolia have also in recent years created permanent internal structures for that purpose.

Most of these diplomatic training centres, despite their confusing array of appellation, have in common that they are structurally integrated with their host ministry. Thus the diplomatic training 'institute' of Tunisia, 'academy' of Kazakhstan, 'school' of Estonia or 'centre' of Turkey are all dedicated training units that are financially and administratively under the control of parent MFAs (HSRC 1990: 13; Mauritius MFA 1996; Nzo 1996b; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998; Turkey MFA FSTC 1998). The advantage for developing states is that establishment costs of such diplomatic training centres can be kept to a minimum when they use an existing institution (MFA) as a basis, rendering them "relatively light structures" as Meerts (1991: 20) observes. It also facilitates external assistance to a developing state's diplomatic training efforts by coordinating all relevant initiatives in one central unit.

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Developing countries with more institutional experience and capacity in the area of domestic training may eventually opt for a semi-autonomous diplomatic training dispensation, where the training centre operates under the aegis of the MFA but has its own budget and charter. This is the case in Argentina where the ISEN in 1998 reported that it had studied the example of diplomatic academies such as that of Austria and had decided to commence the procedure necessary to become a semi-autonomous entity resorting under its MFA. The advantage would be "to broaden the academic horizons of the ISEN" by, for example, hiring professors and eventually offering a full Masters program in diplomacy (Argentina MFA ISEN 1998). Such expansion of a training centre should be a long-term objective but is not proposed as a preliminary priority for developing countries.

4.1.2 **Functional benefits of dedicated diplomatic training centres**

By establishing dedicated centres of diplomatic training, developing MFAs will secure several distinct benefits, on the one hand to enhance their own capacity and on the other hand by advancing foreign policy objectives. The various functional considerations are as follows:

a) **Facilitating and coordinating all MFA training**: As is evident from its designation, a diplomatic training centre has as primary duty the functional, career-specific training of diplomats. In this regard Ahmad (1999: 124) notes that Malaysia's IDFR was established "to provide training programmes that are specifically tailored to improve knowledge and skills in this area, and to inculcate the right attitudes in consonance with [diplomats'] roles and responsibilities". Equally important is that such a centre oversees all training within an MFA on a continuous, coordinated basis, to ensure that the skills and knowledge of all serving diplomats remain relevant to the demands of their profession (Tunisia MFA DITS 1998; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2). This function applies also to non-diplomatic training courses that are routinely required by MFA staff – administrative and technical training, spouses training *et al* need to be coordinated in order to ensure that MFA staff complement and support one another's duties and that everybody performs to optimal capacity (Slovenia Times 2003).

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A necessary role in this regard is the cultivation of appropriate and diverse local as well as foreign sources of instruction. In cases where a centre is not equipped to offer such training itself, it needs to negotiate, arrange and coordinate all external training, including opportunities abroad, to ensure that the external training meets the operational needs of the recipient MFA (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Nzo 1996a).

b) **Matching needs to standards**: A primary duty and advantage of a diplomatic training centre is the strategic role it plays in advising on and implementing human resources development of MFAs. In this regard, as already proposed, a clearly defined training policy is required, setting out the parameters and standards of training and clarifying how training supports the mission statement of a given MFA (Debrah 1996). For training policy to be formulated in a meaningful way, training centres need to be continuously informed regarding a number of crucial areas: the foreign policy context of the state itself; the human resources development needs of the parent MFA; world-wide trends and standards in diplomatic training practice and the changing international challenges to the profession that inform those trends and standards. This task requires wide, pro-active networking with own colleagues, clients in the foreign policy community and other international diplomatic training centres to identify the competencies that are required of trainees delivered by the training division (Czech Republic MFA 2003; HSRC 1990: 10; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

Being a human resources development tool, training centres also have the duty of evaluating and revising as required existing methods, content and structure of training. This involves constant monitoring of the returns of training and arranging remedies to address performance deficits. Although it is not their primary responsibility, training centres on account of their close observation of the individual skills and capabilities of trainees, also have a valuable advisory input to make regarding the admission requirements of candidates for MFAs and the appropriate placement of trainees after completion of training.

c) **Professionalising ministries of foreign affairs**: Ngwevela (1998) remarks that

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the South African foreign ministry "sees the FSI as pivotal in building a healthy culture of professionalism[11] in the foreign service and as a standard bearer for the conduct of our foreign relations". Ahmad (1999: 124) makes a similar observation about Malaysia's IDFR, which he notes was established "to enhance the professionalism of government officers as Malaysia began to play a larger international role". It is indeed necessary for a developing MFA to enhance the professional quality of staff in order to achieve the necessary reputation and recognition for its paramount role in coordinating a state's external relations. As Vale (1993: 3) says, diplomacy belongs in a "neutral, depoliticised place" and this can only be done "by establishing an academy or institution for diplomacy". The essential link between diplomacy as a profession and the existence of a dedicated institution to train diplomats is in fact widely emphasised in the literature, as noted for example by Barston (1997: 13), Kazakhstan's MFA's Diplomatic Academy (1998) and Otermi (1992: 27).

d) **'Think tank' services**: Developing World diplomatic training centres have the potential of being intellectual hubs, serving as 'think tanks' for MFAs and providing policy recommendations to the executive and legislative branches of government. They can also provide useful consultancy services to other domestic clients such as *inter alia* business, NGOs and academia that are involved in international relations (Ton 1996; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2). For this purpose wide networking is required among domestic and foreign experts in economics, politics and security, in order to link domestic and international variables with the formulation of foreign policy.

A beneficial contribution to strategic planning is the facilitation of occasional seminars or colloquia on substantive foreign policy issues, involving all foreign policy stakeholders (Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Pahad 1996b; RSA DFA FSI 1996a; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996). Muller (1998: 198–199) notes that in the case of South Africa, post-apartheid policy-making workshops arranged by the FSI consolidated a network of second-track diplomacy in cooperation rather than conflict or duplication with the foreign ministry. In the same vein, Ahmad (1999: 124) notes that closer coordination between government and non-government agencies involved in promoting Malaysia's external interests was one of the

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motivating forces behind the establishment of the IDFR.

e) **Institutionalised research**: An important aspect of a training centre's analytical consultancy function is institutional research on international relations (Pahad 1996b; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998). Research on, and publication of, foreign policy related issues have in fact been noted as part of the *raison d'être* for the establishment of various diplomatic training centres in the Developing World, such as those in the Philippines and Malaysia (De Borja 1999: 41; Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998). A common structural choice for such centres is to establish a research function parallel to its diplomatic training function, as done for example by Mozambique's MFA's ISRI (1996) and the FSI of Costa Rica (MFRCA *Manuel Maria de Peralta* 1998). The Vietnamese MOFA's IIR (1995: 4), which has a strong research mandate, ensures that capacity for comprehensive and updated research is enhanced by sending its researchers on sabbaticals to universities abroad as far afield as the US, Australia, Sweden and Japan.

A recommendation is that diplomatic training should require of each trainee to deliver independent research in the course of diplomatic training. Such research will strengthen the academic grounding of individual trainees, and enrich the intellectual property of the training centre. This is done by, for example, the Institute of High Diplomatic Studies (IHDS) of Venezuela, and Slovenia's Diplomatic Academy, which require of diplomatic trainees to submit a thesis before final graduation[12] (Jimenez 1998; Slovenia MFA DA 1998). If such research or other commissioned reports is published by a training centre it has the added advantage of improving the centre's educational profile and encouraging more debate by external stakeholders.

f) **Promoting bilateral and regional foreign policy objectives**: The Vietnamese MOFA's IIR (1995: 2) notes that one of its existential objectives is "to promote better understanding and cooperative relations with various countries by exchanging knowledge and views on international and domestic policies between Vietnamese officials, scholars and their counterparts through conferences, symposiums and seminars". A dedicated diplomatic training centre can indeed play a meaningful role in the fostering of global bilateral and multilateral relations by

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virtue of its mandate: Institutional liaison, for example, can produce bilateral agreements which will stimulate, or add to existing, bilateral relations with other states. The same goal applies to the hosting of *ad hoc* seminars and – if capacity allows – diplomatic training for foreign diplomats. This is especially important in a regional context, where a training centre can promote a state's foreign policy agenda in various ways: firstly by preparing its own diplomats to represent more than just their national interests; secondly by providing collective training to a region's diplomats in order to harmonise foreign policy execution; and thirdly – as done by Chile – by offering specialist training in the region's affairs to other foreign diplomats (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998; IDIS 2004; Ngwevela 1998).

g) **Providing wider training to government**: Ahmad (1999: 124–125) notes that the establishment of Malaysia's IDFR "was and is a recognition of the expanding areas of diplomacy and the need to involve other [state] agencies in international matters, apart from *Wisma Putra*". As discussed, globalisation and the 'democratisation' of diplomacy have thrusted many additional areas of government into *de facto* diplomacy, also in the Developing World, and the role of diplomatic training centres thus needs to be enhanced commensurately to accommodate an expanding target group of officials who are involved in international liaison (Barratt and Vale 1998; Meerts 1991: 20; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

h) **Serving as a reference and networking centre**: Because of their varied external exposure and because all MFA staff (should) pass through diplomatic training centres for some training or another, such centres are ideally situated to serve as a networking link between the various divisions of head office, officials assigned to posts abroad, and a host of other domestic and international institutions and experts in the field of international relations. This role is facilitated if an accessible and updated data-base of contacts is maintained. The contact network should include an inventory of human resources with information on instructors in specific skills as well as of skills and abilities of a centre's own trainees. In addition, a centre should be positioned to accumulate or trace appropriate literature for the purpose of diplomatic training and research, ideally with an own library that contains *inter alia* all in-house research and literature

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germane to diplomacy and foreign policy. Cameroon's IRIC, for example, declares that its young library has developed into one of the country and sub-region's "best" libraries (IRIC 2004; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Ngwevela 1998; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

i) **Serving as international liaison unit**: A diplomatic training centre can act as vital international liaison unit and in the process obtain expertise and secure cooperation, even ODA, for the purpose of improving MFA training standards and opportunities. It should handle all interaction with counterpart institutions in other countries and actively participate in international and regional diplomatic training fora, to which it would have automatic access by virtue of its constitutive mandate (Debrah 1996; DAL 2003; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 5).

4.1.3 **Staffing of centres**

Whereas some of the larger diplomatic training centres in the Developing World – such as those of Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Vietnam – have a permanent professorial staff, most training centres can afford only a small core staff to coordinate the *ad hoc* assistance of external instructors (Jimenez 1998; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1995: 2). A small staff in itself is not problematic, provided that there is continuity of institutional coordination, and for this purpose it is advised that centres create – as a minimum – a permanent position for the head of training. Such a person should ideally combine a strong academic background with experience in the field of professional diplomacy in order to bridge the gap between theoretical instruction and practical orientation. Experience in human resources development, and training in particular, would of course be of added advantage (De Borja 1999: 40; Hilliard and Wissink 2002: 18; HSRC 1990: 9–10; Meerts 1991: 20). An additional recommendation is that a head of training should have sufficient seniority within the hierarchy of the MFA. This will confer more status on the centre, which is useful in foreign liaison and in overseeing the range of lecturers, contacts of and visitors to the centre, as well as senior staff who undergo training. It will also enable the incumbent to lobby more authoritatively for training resources.

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A useful course of action is to appoint a governing or advisory body for a training centre in a cooperative venture with outside stakeholders. Slovenia's MFA's Diplomatic Academy (1998) for example has a governing council of which the chair and half of the members are appointed by the MFA, but the remainder of the councillors are appointed by the University of Ljubljana. The official input of other domestic stakeholders such as legislatures, academia and civil groups, will render diplomatic training more dynamic, transparent and relevant to the needs of stakeholders. It will also increase its legitimacy and hence its chances of attracting external assistance (Langhorne 1999).

4.1.4 **Garnering local sources of instruction**

As mentioned, lack of capacity often compels diplomatic training centres in the Developing World to enlist the assistance of external instructors. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, as varied external inputs can be more stimulating to trainees and make the programmes more flexible and competitive. India's MEA's FSI (1997: 2) for example, in addition to a staff of career diplomats assigned from the MFA, has "an extensive guest faculty drawn from specialists in the academic and research community, the Government, the media, public life, industry and trade". Their instruction can be very valuable provided that individual instructors are carefully selected, orientated sufficiently on the training needs of the MFA and the context of the subject matter, and evaluated continuously to ensure that they fulfil their brief (Estonia MFA ESD 1998; HSRC 1990: 12; Muller 1998: 198–199).

A recommendation is that developing MFAs invest in the training of instructors in select areas of diplomacy, in order to develop a domestic cadre of specialist diplomatic training instructors. Kenya's IDIS mentions, for example, that its new masters and doctoral programmes, presented as from 1994, are specifically aimed at producing "source trainers in international studies, and promote research for the benefit of both scholars and governments" (IDIS 2004). Enhanced capacity in instruction will diminish the reliance of host institutions in developing countries on foreign trainers. For this purpose, the assistance of institutions such as UNITAR and the World Bank should be used for specialist training in areas such as economic diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy and negotiations (Baldi 1998: 247;

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Debrah 1996; HSRC 1990: 9–10).

A further recommendation is that existing in-house MFA expertise should be exploited more by means of briefings, workshops, seminars and panel discussions – it is cost effective and the experience of co-workers, as (Ton 1996) points out, is extremely relevant in addressing "the range of problems diplomats have to face and are likely to face" (also noted by Mauritius MFA 1996). NGOs, representatives of international organisations and foreign embassies, experts from other government sectors and a host of other locally available sources can also provide varied perspectives and valuable inputs in discussions of diplomatic training subjects, often at no extra cost to a training centre (DSP HEI 2004; IDIS 2004; Jimenez 1998).

4.2 TIMING AND CONFIGURATION OF TRAINING

As mentioned previously, the world-wide norm for basic diplomatic training is a compulsory one (academic) year long, full time course. This system holds merit for developing countries because it is a reasonable period of concentrated education to allow students of diverse backgrounds and different levels of academic preparation to reach an acceptable entry-level standard for the profession, and to build professional *esprit de corps*. It is also less disruptive than part-time, *ad hoc* training and diminishes opportunities for arbitrary delay or suspension of training, which so often happens when staggered training coincides with a lack of manpower (Czech Republic MFA 2003; De Borja 1999: 39; Duke 2001: 13; IDIS 2004; Meerts 1991: 7).

Formal admittance to MFAs and a minimum period of practical head office work, i.e. on-the-job training, should either precede or follow on the official training. Training immediately after recruitment is of necessity *inter alia* head office orientation whereas training that directly precedes a posting is more focused on diplomatic skills in a mission environment. Either option has arbitrary merit and should be augmented as appropriate by post-specific training and an MFA orientation/induction course. However, this thesis proposes that training should in fact, form part of the selection process in developing countries by making

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admittance to MFAs conditional on training performance, as is done by Mozambique[13] and Chile (Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996).

It is recommended that whichever model developing countries choose, each stage be evaluated and completed successfully before diplomats eventually become eligible for posting abroad.

4.3 TRAINING METHODS WITHIN DEVELOPMENTAL RESTRAINTS

The training methods discussed in this section are a combination of formal classroom training and practical exposure, including on-the-job training. It is proposed is that an integrated approach be used by developing MFAs, involving as many of the methods as possible to ensure variety, stimulation and an holistic balance between individual activities and interactive team work. All methods are considered feasible from the perspective of developing MFAs with limited resources.

4.3.1 **The use of classroom techniques**

Diplomatic training centres with limited capacity can make the most of class-room instruction by using varied and interactive educational exercises such as case studies, simulation exercises, group projects, debates and panel discussions. Traditional 'unilateral' lecture situations should be limited to only where unavoidable because the work of diplomats is by nature interactive with a high premium on communication (HSRC 1990: 65; Ton 1996). For this reason every trainee should be drawn into – and formally evaluated on – active participation in tuition. Also, simulated exercises such as mock television interviews and negotiations should be done aggressively and repeatedly to prepare trainees for the reality of highly competitive and challenging international diplomatic practice.

An area that needs daily attention during the course of study is guided discussion of local and foreign current affairs. Debating these issues will prepare diplomats for the need to be continuously informed and engaged on a broad spectrum of

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knowledge about world affairs in the social, economic and political fields. Trainees should thus be encouraged to read widely and must preferably have access to local and international periodicals and/or Internet facilities. They should also be tested on their general knowledge by means of quizzes, team competitions, debates and daily discussion sessions (HSRC 1990: 58; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 137).

4.3.2 **The use of mentors**

The Commonwealth (1971: 124) notes that careful supervision by senior officers during in-service training "is of great importance to ensure that the potentialities of recently appointed officers are appreciated and brought out". This system of mentoring is a traditional training technique in foreign services and continues to have educational value, especially when formal training is limited or not available (Marshall 1997: xvii). The Tanzanian MFA's CFR (1996) explains, for example, how during the two decades following independence in 1961, training of Tanzanian diplomats abroad was combined with rotation of recruits in various sections at Head Office to expose them to the scope of the foreign ministry's work, *in lieu* of formal in-house training. In the Philippines, rotation among various Head Office divisions is done as an essential addition to formal diplomatic training and as an opportunity for practical evaluation of trainee performance (De Borja 1999: 42). The quality and value of mentoring is increased when supervisors are instructed in human resources management skills, and when they understand the importance of giving trainees meaningful tasks with the necessary guidance and constant constructive feedback.

4.3.3 **Mission apprenticeships**

MFAs of states such as Kazakhstan and Turkey arrange for diplomatic trainees to spend some time as apprentices in their countries' foreign missions after the completion of formal training. This exposure to the realities of diplomatic practice is extremely valuable and allows additional opportunity for an MFA to gauge the effectiveness of preceding training. For this purpose, transfer costs can be kept to a minimum by sending trainees to neighbouring states, granting them only a basic subsistence allowance and arranging for them to board with colleagues. A cost-

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effective alternative is to make use of aid offers by friendly states to host such trainees as apprentices in their own missions, as done by various Commonwealth donor states (Commonwealth 1971: 112: Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Turkey MFA FCTC 1998; US DOS 2004).

4.3.4 **Grassroots experience**

An irony of the Developing World is that diplomats often represent a social elite that is insulated from the hardship experienced by many of their fellow countrymen. Their representation of a developing country while living in relative comfort abroad, further diminishes their intimate knowledge of the tribulations and needs of a population that inform a developing state's crucial foreign policy. It is therefore advisable to include in diplomatic training programmes a short sojourn for trainees in socio-economically deprived areas, to stimulate their social conscience by means of 'grassroots experience' before they are posted abroad (Rafael 1997).

4.3.5 **Field trips**

Educational excursions – or "observation tours" as Debrah (1996) calls them – to areas that impact on foreign policy or that attract international attention, are an important tool in deepening and broadening the knowledge and experiential base of diplomatic trainees. Visits to external entities that have a stake in foreign policy, such as ODA projects, offices of international or regional organisations and parliamentary committees on foreign affairs, should therefore form an integral part of training curricula. Such field trips will provide variety to training schedules and provide important opportunities for trainees to establish a domestic networking contact base (De Borja 1999: 42; HSRC 1990: 33; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996).

4.3.6 **Study and professional exchanges**

Burt and Robison (1998: 64) recommend that MFAs, if "not to be frozen in time" should encourage lifetime learning and "must offer more professional education, more exchanges out of government and more rewards for professional growth". They mention, as does Langhorne (1999), the value of so-called 'revolving door'

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schemes whereby secondments are made to and from other government departments and even civil organisations that deal with foreign policy related areas such as humanitarian aid, environmental issues and human rights. In this regard, Rozental (1999: 145) notes that Mexico's MFA encourages "diplomats to take leave of absence for temporary secondment to other government agencies and to bring senior officials into the [MFA] from ministries whose work is foreign policy related". De Borja (1999: 63) notes that the Philippines MFA does the same but concentrates on economic agencies. There is a dual purpose to these exchanges: on the one hand it is an educational experience for diplomats, and on the other hand it fosters greater cooperation with other agencies that are involved in the execution of foreign policy (Jaques 2003).

Exchanges can and should also be arranged with foreign entities, particularly secondments to international organisations, as done by Kazakhstan's MFA. During basic diplomatic training, foreign exchanges can take the form of supplementary training courses at other diplomatic training centres, as arranged for their trainees by the MFAs of Tunisia and Slovenia. Such courses are often offered on a fully-sponsored, ODA basis (Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Slovenia MFA DA 1998; Tunisia MFA DITS 1998).

4.3.7 **Information technology-supported training**

Diplomatic training in MFAs with economic constraints can benefit substantially from IT support because the latter saves both time and money. Kappeler (1992: 36) recommends that training centres in developing countries invest in computer data banks because it will obviate the need for foreign currency to build up and maintain an adequate library and to subscribe to international periodicals. Baldi (1998: 242–243) adds that manpower can also be saved in this way because documents need not be retyped but can be downloaded from data-banks or the Internet, requiring only basic computer literacy from diplomatic trainees.

Kappeler (1992: 35) says "the real leap forward" provided by computer technology is contained in the global networking possibilities among computers *via* ordinary telephone lines. E-mail communication, in particular, is low cost and is not limited

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by time zones and geographic area, and hence facilitates international liaison among stakeholders in diplomatic training. It also gives access to a wealth of electronically available documents[14] and information that is useful to diplomatic trainees (Mozambican MFA ISRI 1996; CPDS 1998b).

IT support can also provide long-distance conference facilities, including the means to conduct distance training in diplomacy. This is useful for developing MFAs whose personnel abroad may not be able (due to workload or financial resources) to travel to head office for training courses; or for staff to participate in international training programmes. In this regard MEDAC's "DiploEdu" programme is of special significance because it allows developing MFAs to draw on a much wider body of instruction than can be provided by sending diplomats to any single donor country for training (Baldi 1998: 257). The advantages of distance training are prompting an increasing number of training centres to make available distance learning programmes, such as those offered by UNITAR (UN UNITAR 2004b). From a pedagogic as well as financial perspective, developing MFAs are therefore well advised to utilise these opportunities. However, its disadvantages[15] – notably the lack of traditional educational interaction with its flexibility and richness of direct human contact – means that it should be used only in a supplementary capacity, or as part of a hybrid course that combines an introductory practical workshop with a follow-up distance education programme (Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 140).

A fundamental proposition regarding the structure of diplomatic training is that every developing MFA should establish an integral and permanent host of training, i.e. a centre that is dedicated to the continuous planning, coordination and facilitation of all staff training. The prevailing lack of developing MFA resources on all levels will inevitably present within diplomatic training centres also and for that reason, in addition to the spectrum of international cooperation, all possible local resources should be explored. These include the participation of locally based foreign diplomats and a range of private and public experts, in order to make training as cost-effective yet varied and stimulating as possible. Existing in-house MFA expertise presents the most accessible and cost-effective resource. In this

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regard, MFA investment in the specialist training of mid-career staff in areas of foreign policy objectives would create capacity within the MFA and at the same time create a cadre of specialist, in-house diplomatic training instructors.

Where resources permit, basic diplomatic training should be presented under the direction of an MFA immediately after recruitment, as part of the selection process, in a one year long, full time course. Entry to an MFA, as well as subsequent promotion and posting abroad, should be made conditional on successful completion of career-specific training to ensure the incremental professionalisation of a developing country's foreign service.

With regard to the method of training, international best practice dictates an integrated training approach, i.e. combination of formal classroom training and practical exposure, including on-the-job training and mission apprenticeships. Where formal classroom instruction takes place, it will be more effective if it is done in an interactive and practice-oriented manner by using techniques such as case studies, simulation exercises, group projects, debates and panel discussions. Training methods should also embrace the principle of continuous learning: MFA supervisors should, for example, be instructed in human resources management skills so that they can act as competent mentors to trainees and thus continue the training process. In addition, MFAs should facilitate 'revolving door' schemes whereby secondments are made to and from other government departments, civil organisations and international organisations. Finally, for the sake of international competitiveness and also for its practical and cost-effective benefits, MFAs should invest in (or lobby for ODA assistance in obtaining) information-technology supported training.

5. PROPOSALS REGARDING CONTENT OF DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The content of international diplomatic training courses varies little among institutions as a result of broad international consensus on the range of skills and knowledge required by professional diplomats (Barston 1997: 5; Duke 2001: 15; CPDS 1998b). As Marshall (1997: xv) observes, "there is a vast range of subject matter and of procedure of concern to virtually every diplomat, whatever country he

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or she may represent. The common background is great and growing. Its study at the outset of a diplomatic career is not merely desirable, it is essential". Marshall's comment encapsulates the necessity for diplomatic training curricula in the Developing World to comply with international best practice as concerns content of training. In the following discussion, the subjects that were previously discussed within an international context are approached from the perspective of (hence priority to) Developing World diplomats. The combined theoretical and practical content of training (excluding supplementary and language training) is reflected in the holistically structured, generic basic diplomatic training curriculum for developing countries, details of which are attached as Addendum B.

5.1 DETERMINATION OF CONTENT

The design of a diplomatic training curriculum for a developing country should take into account various strategic perspectives: firstly the global norms of diplomatic practice and hence the skills and knowledge that are generically required by diplomats; secondly the national foreign policy agenda that diplomats are tasked to pursue; and thirdly the nature and scope of functions that they will be performing at head office and abroad (Commonwealth 1971: 102; Czech Republic MFA 2003; HSRC 1990: 123; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996). Within the context of these considerations, curricula should be designed with careful attention to the correct balance between theory and practice, and realistic provision for specialisation in certain areas.

5.1.1 **The balance between theory and practice**

Babb (1974: 1) asserts that "training starts where education stops". His remark encapsulates an important characteristic of professional diplomatic training, namely that it should not be a mere repetition of tertiary education, but that it should build on existing knowledge by providing occupational skills – what Muller (1998: 198) refers to as "function-specific" training. Theoretical perspective is therefore important, but it should be linked to practical application, i.e. the actual functions that officials are expected to perform in the course of their careers (Hilliard and Wissink 2002: 12–13; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 140; Pahad 1996a; Tanzania MFA

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CFR 1996; UN UNITAR 2004b).

The HSRC (1990: 9) warns that strictly discipline-based diplomatic training causes an unnecessary overlap with trainees' tertiary education and leads to frustration and wasted time and resources. For most developing MFAs, such wastage is simply unaffordable. Gaps in the theoretical education of trainees can rather be augmented, if deemed necessary, on a part-time self-study basis. The same does not apply to skills training, however, and neither does it apply to national foreign policy studies, both of which need to be done at post-graduate level within the parameters of 'real diplomacy', i.e. as part of official diplomatic training (Newsom 1997: 3; Ngwevela 1998).

5.1.2 **Specialisation and generalisation**

Whereas some of the more powerful and well-staffed Developing World MFAs, such as that of Mexico, encourage geographic, thematic or linguistic specialisation among its diplomats, most of the poorer states have no choice but to train generalists: the sheer paucity of human resources compels individual diplomats to handle all political, consular, economic, commercial, cultural and information work that would, in more developed MFAs, be delegated to various specialists (Czech Republic MFA 2003; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996; Rozental 1999: 147). This approach, according to Hilliard and Wissink (2002: 10), is not necessarily counter-productive within a public service as it yields officials who are flexible and versatile - attributes that are more important than formal academic qualifications in fluid organisational structures and "vacillating workplace climates".

Where curricula do include specialisation, the extent thereof should be determined by the functional scope of a given MFA because this will impact on the extent to which embassy work will be shared[16] by other seconded government representatives. The aim of training must of necessity be broader if a foreign service is mandated to deal with such matters as trade and commerce, information and cultural affairs in addition to its other foreign policy interests (Barston 1997: 13; Commonwealth 1971: 109; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 217).

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The focused nature of a developing state's foreign interests in some cases also necessitates specialist diplomatic training. Developing MFAs need specialists when the state in question is overwhelmingly concerned with a single foreign policy priority, such as *inter alia* ODA (LDCs), ideological fortification (North Korea, Cuba), territorial security (Palestine, Eritrea), regional integration (developing EU members, SADC members) or participation in multilateral ventures (small island states). Certain developing countries also have capabilities, properties or phenomena that are pertinent to global politic and superpower interests; be that oil reserves in Nigeria and Venezuela or Muslim fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Algeria. An example of an imperative for diplomatic specialisation is the (existing or former) nuclear arms manufacturing capacity of developing states such as North Korea, Libya, Iran, South Africa, India, Pakistan and China. Their diplomats' expertise in nuclear non-proliferation matters can be very useful in international organisations and can increase the profile and impact of their own, as well as Developing World diplomacy in general (Commonwealth 1971: 109; Muller 1998: 183–184).

The very fact that a country is classified as 'developing' fundamentally affects its diplomats' work and therefore, in a generic sense, they should all specialise in developmental studies. Other than that, the choice of specialisation should be determined, as Otermi (1992: 31–32) proposes, by an individual state's "real needs and economic possibilities".

5.2 THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The complexity of the modern world demand, as international trends indicate, an interdisciplinary, holistic approach in diplomatic training to prepare them for the wide spectrum of interconnected domestic and global issues that Developing World diplomats will have to deal with in the course of their careers (JMCIS 1998; Leifer 1998; Newsom 1997: 4). The various aspects of international and national theoretical studies in this section, though separately addressed, should therefore be combined and integrated as appropriate with the practical diplomatic skills of the section that follows. (See curriculum proposal, Addendum B).

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5.2.1 **International studies**

The academic disciplines traditionally studied in diplomatic training programmes, i.e. international politics, law and economics, are as germane to Developing World diplomatic trainees as to any other aspiring diplomats. The study of international politics, the parent discipline of foreign policy and diplomacy, is fundamental to diplomatic training because its analysis provides Developing World diplomats with the crucial ability to comprehend domestic and international political relations. It also enables them to appreciate the historical and conceptual parameters of their profession, which as previously discussed, exists only in an international context and is subject thus to international norms and standards (Debrah 1996; Hemery 2002: 141; Newsom 1997: 3).

The concerns, concepts and issues of international law are important because vulnerable developing countries are relatively more dependent on international legal recourse in the absence of political, economic or military might to protect their interests. The principles of international economic relations, on the other hand, form the basis of the North-South debate and inform the diplomacy of development which is aimed at narrowing the developmental gap (Ahmad 1999: 124; Commonwealth 1971: 107–108; India MEA FSI 1997: 38; RSA DFA FSI 2000).

The developmental deficit causes most global issues to impact on the South more harshly in economic and political terms than on the industrialised North. Thus problems such as refugees, hunger, energy, narcotics and terrorism need to be analysed within an holistic context because their spill-over effects have far-reaching socio-economic, legal as well as political implications for developing states (HSRC 1990: 12; India MEA FSI 1997: 61–63; Pityana 2000). Humanitarian and natural disasters, intrastate conflicts *et al* all necessitate appropriate remedial diplomacy, at the very least an effort to keep crucial interventions such as conflict resolution and prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance on the international agenda (Jaques 2003). It is clear, therefore, that the traditional academic disciplines overlap to such an extent in the international and domestic dimensions of 'diplomacy of development' that an interdisciplinary diplomatic training approach is essential in order to link analysis, policy and practice (Meerts 1991: 15; Kaufmann 1998: 3;

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MGIMO 1998).

Area (or regional) studies, a new interdisciplinary trend in diplomatic training, is a useful method to analyse global trends region by region, and should be included in curricula. Its presentation should focus first and foremost on a state's immediate region, sub-continent or continent. For African diplomats, for example, intimate knowledge of the continent's colonial history, struggle for independence, quest for political unity, conflicts and current socio-economic issues, will better enable them to work towards an 'African Renaissance' and fight the marginalisation of Africa (Salim 1998; Ton 1996).

Multilateral studies are another interdisciplinary area that has specific value for Developing World diplomats because of the collective effort involved in the 'diplomacy of development'. Diplomats need to be *au fait* with the structure, procedures, rules and techniques that are particular to multilateral systems. Regional multilateralism in particular is important for diplomats from developing states because most of their countries are involved in RIAs (Barston 1997: 3, 5; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 199; India MEA FSI 1997: 49–56; Pityana 2000; RSA DFA FSI 2000).

5.2.2 **National studies**

The grounding of diplomatic trainees in national studies is absolutely essential, regardless of any supplementary training received domestically or abroad. Foreign interlocutors will expect of diplomats, in their capacity as official state representatives, to hold expert opinions and privileged information on domestic issues and national foreign policy. A thorough analysis of national issues, especially the structure and functioning of government and its policies in the political, economic and social domain, is therefore called for (Ahmad 1999: 117–118; De Borja 1999: 20; HSRC 1990: 28).

In an age of globalisation, domestic issues increasingly have international implications. A host of domestic challenges can only be satisfactorily addressed with international involvement, and Developing World diplomats need

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comprehensive knowledge of such socio-economic developmental needs in order to lobby for, and provide direction to, international assistance. As Newsom (1997: 3) observes, issues such as "human rights and gender cross the line that traditionally divided diplomacy from internal affairs; each delves into some of the most sensitive aspects of a sovereign society" – especially in countries where sovereignty is hard-won, new and jealously guarded from international involvement. In addition, the containment of various domestic problems such as communicable diseases and environmental disasters requires a multilateral diplomatic strategy that needs to be pursued in cooperation with diplomats from other states (Malaysia PMD IDFR 1998; Mozambique MFA ISRI 1996). Diplomats also need to be particularly sensitive to real or perceived stability threats such as crime and ethnic conflict that could affect their state's political risk profile and diminish its attraction as an investment, trade or tourism destination. On the other hand they need to be aware of under-reported issues and misconceptions about their countries in order to focus public diplomacy campaigns in the international domain (Coolsaet 1998: 11; Smith 1998: 102).

At the same time, diplomats of less developed states need intimate knowledge of the challenges and achievements of political evolution in their countries, because the granting of international aid is increasingly linked to institutionalisation of good governance, human rights and democracy in recipient states. Moreover, the credibility that is required to guarantee adherence to the international agreements that diplomats negotiate will often depend on their knowledge of their own country's legal system, including its constitution (Commonwealth 1971: 107–108; Ngwevela 1998; CPDS 1998a).

National studies should also include essential in-depth knowledge of the formulation and implementation of a state's foreign policy because, simply put, the pursuit of foreign policy objectives will be its diplomats' most pressing mandate when sent abroad. A thorough analysis of economic, political, security or other considerations will provide a framework for understanding the vital interests that comprise the content of a foreign policy agenda and that determine its bilateral and multilateral priorities (Selebi 1998b).

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5.3 PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY

The difference between students of international relations and professional diplomats lies in their operational skills, and this is where the Developing World needs to concentrate the bulk of diplomatic training. The many practical skills that need to be included in a training curriculum include basic (or traditional) diplomatic skills, skills that have become specialised as a result of recent development within diplomatic practice, and auxiliary (essentially non-diplomatic) skills that support and enhance diplomatic functions. The various skills are separately discussed but in practice overlap substantially and reinforce each other, for example when negotiation techniques are used in a multilateral environment to pursue economic objectives. Curricula will therefore of necessity have to be flexible enough to accommodate these overlaps, yet skills training should be focussed enough so as not to become too generalised and vague.

5.3.1 **Basic diplomatic skills**

Basic, traditional diplomatic skills include skills in communication, negotiation and representation as well as expertise in protocol and etiquette.

5.3.1.1 Communication skills: Good communication skills are universally required of diplomats and are easily and effectively taught. A curriculum should be designed with the objective to induce in diplomats professionalism, credibility and ease with which to conduct liaison duties across a broad spectrum of interlocutors. In an international environment such honed skills can help to diminish some of the common discourse problems of Third World representatives, such as verbosity and rhetoric – teaching them to move beyond the simple "stating of shibboleths", as Ahmad (1999: 119) puts it, in order to conduct constructive dialogue. Domestically, good communication skills can enhance the instrumental role that diplomats have in early warning systems through the delivery of succinct, accurate reports that save time and ensure that attention is received where and when it matters (De Borja 1999: 86–87; Eban 1998: 28; Pahad 1996a).

Hemery (2002: 143–144) says communications training for diplomats from poorer

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state is often regarded as an expendable luxury while on the contrary, "the weaker the country, the greater the relative impact that can be made on its behalf by articulate spokespersons". He argues that even if they represent authoritarian societies, relatively junior diplomats still have a role in reaching out to opinion formers in a host country's civil society "if for no other reason than to raise the profile of the state they represent and to have its voice heard". This ability, Hemery notes, requires confidence that can only be acquired through training and practice.

5.3.1.2 Negotiation skills: When it comes to international negotiations, the North-South playing field is so uneven, and the Developing World's agenda so ambitious, that the latter needs greatly enhanced negotiation capacity to 'punch above its weight', i.e. to score diplomatic victories against highly skilled interlocutors from the First World. This strengthening of capacity can only be realised *via* intensive training in negotiation skills (Barratt and Vale 1998; Hemery 2002: 142; Jones and Whittingham 1998: 89; Marshall 1997: 140). Rozental (1999: 138) notes for example how Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA has necessitated a more assertive approach by its diplomats, and thus training in negotiating skills, in order to hold their ground against a superpower interlocutor. In the same vein, Dlamini Zuma (2000) recounts the challenges of the ACP group's protracted negotiations with highly skilled representatives of the EU during the late 1990s for a successor agreement to the Lomé IV Convention.

The negotiation skills of Developing World diplomats have, however, a much wider application than the admittedly crucial area of North-South dialogue. Much of developmental diplomacy takes place in a South-South context within multilateral frameworks such as the G77, where common positions on important issues are often elusive due to the diversity of member states. Negotiation expertise allows for faster and more effective consolidation of positions than would otherwise be possible. Hemery (2002: 143) adds that negotiation expertise also has a crucial domestic advantage: it contributes to the internal development of policy in MFAs because it sharpens the ability of diplomats to clarify objectives, set priorities and focus on essentials. The same applies to wider cooperation within government circles to coordinate strategy in foreign policy formulation and execution, especially in the field of economic development that normally involves a range of domestic

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ministries (Barston 1997: 15). Negotiation of foreign policy strategies is also increasingly required with stakeholders in civil society. As Rozental (1999: 141) observes about Mexico, its participation in major international conferences or bilateral talks must now be negotiated beforehand "with dozens of NGOs ... which did not exist ten years ago", on issues as diverse as the environment and women's rights.

5.3.1.3 Protocol and etiquette: Rather than being antiquated, the perennial diplomatic skills of protocol and etiquette – by virtue of their functional and professional egalitarianism – can arguably be considered even more important in an era where diplomacy is no longer the domain of an exclusive European social circle. Ceremonial protocol, for example, has very important symbolic relevance for the Developing World in that routine precepts – such as presentation of ambassadorial credentials and the compilation of an order of precedence – confirm state sovereignty and heed the diplomatic principle of the equality of states (Armstrong 1999: 55–56; Sofer 1988: 202).

For diplomats from poorer states, and especially from new states, international diplomatic life might seem like a mine-field of potential *faux pas* and a solid grounding in protocol and the various areas of etiquette is therefore essential to give them confidence and to allow them to project a sophisticated image. Business etiquette, in particular, has the added advantage that it increases efficiency and adds to a professional working environment within MFAs (Commonwealth 1971: 107–108; De Borja 1999: 96–97; Lesotho MFA 1996).

5.3.1.4 Representational skills: Representational skills are very closely linked to protocol and etiquette, but rather than focus on the rules of diplomatic interaction, diplomats are trained to use innovation and creativity to create the best possible image of themselves and their country. These skills assume a much higher priority in the case of Developing World diplomats who typically have access to few material resources and who are often confronted with cultural prejudice on account of their sending state's developing status (Hemery 2002: 141; Sharp 1999: 54).

Official entertainment, for example, is a necessary component of diplomatic life

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because of the opportunities to network and enhance a country's image. Training in this regard can alert Developing World diplomats to the many options and opportunities within restricted financial means by utilising originality and all the creative talent of a human resources team. It should also teach trainees techniques in using accessible, affordable resources such as *inter alia* personal appearance, traditional decor and ambience to create maximum positive impact in the course of executing their duties (De Borja 1999: 93; India MEA FSI 1997: 43).

5.3.2 **Specialised diplomatic skills required by contemporary diplomatic practice**

As discussed previously, new and specialised diplomatic skills have become necessary to address the many contemporary challenges posed to the diplomatic profession, namely skills in information handling, public, economic and multilateral diplomacy and consular matters.

5.3.2.1 Information handling: Rozental (1999: 144) mentions that Mexico has deemed it necessary to overhaul its instruction of information handling skills to diplomats because the latter, who work with information on a continuous basis cannot successfully do so with "outdated hunting and gathering techniques". Indeed, with information continuing to be the main commodity that diplomats deal with, its collection, analysis and dissemination in the international environment needs to be an integral part of diplomatic training curricula (Barston 1997: 22; Hilliard and Wissink 2002: 15; Langhorne 1999).

The predicted RDA by implication will place a much higher premium on the development of information handling skills. However, diplomats from poorer states continue to operate from a disadvantaged position in terms of IT infrastructure and hence do not utilise sufficiently the wealth of information that IT gives access to, such as *inter alia* the documents of organisations like the UN, information on activities of non-state actors in the field of diplomacy and early-warning information on humanitarian disasters or conflict situations[17]. Ironically, their pursuit of more cumbersome alternative sources is vastly more expensive in terms of time, money and manpower required. In this regard, training in Internet use is of particular importance. Developing World diplomats should be taught not just to be end users

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but to use the Internet pro-actively and to their advantage by setting up and maintaining sites, i.e. to disseminate strategically targeted information (Baldi 1998: 248; Kappeler 1998: 45; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 93).

Two different functions of Developing World diplomats will be facilitated by enhanced information handling skills: on the one hand their building of confidence in (and improving of the external image of) their own state; and on the other hand their channelling of accurate and useful information back to their own governments for the purpose of appropriate policy making. Developing World diplomats can gain competitive advantage in the world of information only by means of upgraded skills in handling information as efficiently and advantageously as possible (Newsom 1997: 3–4). This consideration is evident in the presentation since 1999 of a Master's Degree in Diplomacy and Information Technology by Malta's MEDAC.

5.3.2.2 Public diplomatic skills: Langhorne (1999) makes the interesting observation that "it is almost as though the role of the state has shrunk so much domestically that it is to be defined by the external perception it extrudes and that the very activity [of forming public diplomacy] may be crucial to its survival". The practice of public diplomacy has indeed gained huge prominence over the past few decades, and increasingly developing countries are realising the danger of neglecting tuition of the skills associated with this modern development in diplomatic practice (Smith 1998: 111; Sofer 1988: 204; CPDS 1998b). As Mauritius' MFA (1996) observes, in its absence "we in Mauritius, but also regionally, are weak in projecting our respective countries on an international level". Hemery (2002: 144) explains how a well-coordinated strategy of networking with influential international NGOs and with opinion formers and publics in richer, more powerful states "can do more for less than much formal diplomatic activity", because most donor states are democratic societies whose governments are susceptible to popular pressure. He notes the example of successful public diplomacy used by East-Timor in its drive for independence from Indonesia as an example of what can be achieved with "imagination, determination and professionalism". Langhorne (1999) says public diplomacy requires multi-dimensional interconnectivity on all levels of a host country's society in order to exploit all potential for promotion of a broadly favourable view of a country. This, he says, can determine the likelihood of global

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business locating itself in one country rather than another. Public diplomacy can also be instrumental in rallying private aid, as well as popular pressure for official aid, in cases where humanitarian intervention is called for (Coolsaet 1998: 11; Riordan 2003: 6–7; Wiseman 1999: 11).

An essential and specialised part of public diplomacy, and an area that demands prominent attention in curricula, is media diplomacy. Smith (1998: 102) explains that for poorer countries, media coverage assumes a greater significance because, unfortunately, "the smaller powers do not enter the global public discussion unless a crisis or scandal envelops them ... the task for the smaller powers is to be heard on the stories that matter to them, to explain their positions and aspirations during the non-crisis moments, and to do so in a way that captures attention" (also noted by Deleito 1992: 42). Another reason for upgrading media diplomacy skills, especially in developing democracies, is that foreign policy is increasingly being scrutinised by the media and the processes associated with its execution, including diplomacy, need to be more transparent to facilitate public participation (Jaques 2003; Rozental 1999: 142).

As in the case of negotiation skills, public diplomacy also impacts on the relationship between governments and their domestic private sector (*inter alia* business, trade unions, individual entrepreneurs and workers) which, in many developing countries, is the driving force in the process of development. Hence effective networking with them to take advantage of their knowledge, expertise and experience is a major duty of Developing World diplomats in order to establish a cooperative as opposed to an adversarial or duplicative relationship (Coolsaet 1998: 11; Kaufmann 1998: 13; Rozental 1999: 146; Riordan 2003: 131; Selebi 1998b). A number of observers have also pointed out the necessity for diplomats to liaise more with their own broader public to promote a better image of, and public confidence in, the diplomatic profession. This poses a particular challenge in weak states or states with governments that are widely seen as illegitimate (Hemery 2002: 145; Jaques 2003; Lesotho MFA 1996).

5.3.2.3 Economic diplomatic skills: The South African foreign minister (Dlamini Zuma 2000) in 2000 informed Parliament that South African missions spent more

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than 60% of their time on economic issues. This quoted percentage (which she observed is expected to grow) is in line with a world-wide trend and explains why economic diplomacy should be one of the most important areas of entry-level (as well as continuous) diplomatic training for Third World countries. Enhanced skills in this area will enable diplomats to participate actively in the promotion of economic development of their own countries specifically, and generally in narrowing the North-South development gap (De Borja 1999: 63; Rozental 1999: 138; Tanzania MFA CFR 1996; Vale 1993: 18). As Pityana (2000) observes: "Clearly, if we are to meet the needs and expectations of our fellow citizens in terms of service delivery, job creation, and economic and social development, then we have to lay our claim for a fair share of the global economy". Ahmad (1999: 123–124) recounts former Prime Minister Mahathir's instruction to Malaysian diplomats to "go beyond traditional diplomacy and 'sell' Malaysia". Diplomatic opportunities to reinforce the economic development of a country are presented by securing trade, aid, international finance and investment, negotiating solutions to problems arising from the scheduling of loans, countering trade protectionism by the Developed World, and promoting relations with major foreign corporations. It also calls for cooperative efforts and a complementary relationship with a state's business sector and NGOs involved in economic developmental projects (Barston 1997: 15; Business Day 3 February 1999; FSLD 1993: 3; India MEA FSI 1997: 67–69).

Vale (1993: 19) and Pityana (2000) both point out the necessity for pro-active economic diplomacy not just *vis-à-vis* the powerful North, but also within South-South alliances. These fora include regional and other same-interest groups wherein diplomats need to negotiate bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation agreements, facilitate joint ventures, and work collectively on strategies within the multilateral trading system. Skills in economic diplomacy thus draw heavily on a variety of other diplomatic skills, including communication and negotiation skills and skills in public and multilateral diplomacy. These skills also, needless to say, demand a firm grasp of international and national economic systems and issues.

5.3.2.4 Multilateral diplomatic skills: According to Pityana (2000) multilateral institutions, which provide fora "at which discussion of global solutions to global problems can be considered ... increasingly set and administer the rules of the

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game". Mastering this type of diplomacy is thus of self-evident importance to diplomats from the Developing World, who typically seek fortification of diplomatic strategies in a collective – regional as well as global – context. Multilateral diplomatic missions of smaller states usually also have a larger mandate relative to their bilateral counterparts, which are often limited in size and number due to budgetary constraints. This proportionately higher reliance on multilateralism makes it imperative that increased capacity building in the skills associated with multilateral diplomacy should be a priority of Developing World diplomatic training (HSRC 1990: 128; Jones and Whittingham 1998: 6; RSA DFA FSI 1996a; CPDS 1998b).

Skills in multilateral diplomacy are inseparable from extensive knowledge of the *modus operandi* of economic, political and social multilateral systems. The operational techniques that are acquired within this theoretical framework, such as lobbying and the construction and mobilisation of political coalitions, take on an added domestic advantage for diplomats from the Developing World: their ability to consolidate concerted national strategies on specific foreign policy issues, involving an array of public and private sector actors, will be greatly enhanced and their intermediary role will attain a more professional – hence respected and valued – public image (DSP HEI 2004).

5.3.2.5 Conflict management skills: Notwithstanding the fact that this area of diplomacy is increasingly being conducted by international organisations, conflict management has special significance for poorer states because of the relatively high incidence of destabilising intra-state and inter-state conflict situations in the Developing World. Its negotiators are thus more likely to be drawn into situations where mediation, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacekeeping are called for (RSA DFA FSI 1999).

As Hemery (2002: 142) observes: "poor countries, after all, are often the source of instability and conflict which siphon off both their own funds and those of the donor community to the detriment of their peoples. Serious commitment to home-grown preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution is bound in the end to be more effective and less costly than well-intentioned dabbling from a distance". The advantage of, even necessity for, Developing World diplomats to be schooled in

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conflict management is also played up by the emphasis within the diplomacy of development on multilateral initiatives, including regional efforts. It is thus of the utmost importance that groupings of developing states ensure their members are politically secure in order to preserve and focus scarce internal resources and to present a united international front in the pursuit of developmental goals (Barston 1997: 18, 28; Jaques 2003; Ngwevela 1998).

5.3.2.6 Consular skills: As discussed previously, the international trend among developed MFAs is to make consular services more customer-friendly as part of a wider service-oriented notion of relations with an own or foreign public (Jaques 2003). Developing MFAs are well advised to implement this policy because, for the majority of foreign visitors, consular service is the first impression of a country – its able performance can therefore significantly enhance public diplomacy campaigns and thus positively impact on potential investors, tourists and other foreign engagement.

Even when diplomats are not required to handle consular duties on a routine basis, their understanding of consular practice can render them more effective in channelling enquiries and in managing crisis situations swiftly and efficiently. This 'value added' consideration in respect of the potential performance of individual diplomats is important especially when they are required to operate without sufficient material and manpower infrastructure (Coolsaet 1998: 17; De Borja 1999: 98–99; Simpson 1983: 14). Because of a paucity of human resources, in fact, many developing countries' diplomats are required to act as consular officers in addition to their political duties. In such cases, a more substantial and practical study of consular practice, including its legal foundation, needs to be an integral part of basic diplomatic training (HSRC 1990: 123; India MEA FSI 1997: 38).

5.3.3 **Essential auxiliary skills**

The auxiliary diplomatic skills that provide essential reinforcement to basic and specialised diplomatic skills, are intellectual and management skills. These skills should therefore form part of basic diplomatic training programmes.

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5.3.3.1 Intellectual skills: Eban (1998: 43), in a discussion of catastrophic failures in diplomatic foresight during recent history, observes that diplomats cannot simply be trained to strategise according to experience and analogy, because that would make them insensitive to the "original, unpredictable, innovative factors in international conduct". What they need is agility and creativity of mind to facilitate analysis, reasoning and lateral thinking. Fortunately for developing MFAs, such intellectual skills are, as the HSRC (1990: 12) contends, very "trainable". A spill-over advantage of tuition in intellectual skills is that it will enable trainees to assimilate more of the substance of diplomatic training, thereby making such training more cost and goal-effective.

For diplomats from poorer states, who have only their diplomatic skills as armoury in an extremely competitive and ever-changing international arena, intellectual skills that can improve their efficiency and effectiveness can mean a much-needed increase in personal comparative advantage. Slovenia's Diplomatic Academy even includes psychoanalysis as part of formal diplomatic training, to enable diplomats to prognosticate the behaviour of individual interlocutors (Kappeler 1998: 46; Nzo 1996b; Slovenia MFA DA 1998). Analytical skills in general are required on a routine basis: political risk analysis of developments in Third World countries or regions can have far-reaching economic consequences and diplomats must be able to evaluate circumstances in order to give better conceived advice to potential investors, trade and integration partners, ODA providers *et al*; as well as succinct pointers on foreign policy formulation to their own governments (Riordan 2003: 82). Sober advice – free from "dogmatism [and] crusading bigotry" as Pahad (1996b) refers to it – can save their and their country's reputation and resources.

5.3.3.2 Management skills: Norms and styles of management vary greatly among societies, but the generic importance of management training in areas such as planning, organising, leading and controlling, is that it improves the effectiveness of MFAs by teaching officials to set and achieve goals and objectives. This means inculcating a concern for results and an emphasis on client service, rather than the exercise of authority for its own sake – an issue that often prevents traditional systems of authority from being competitive in the international arena. For developing MFAs, expertise in this area is of great importance because

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professional management can maximise capacity by using scarce resources to their full potential. These resources include time – which Reychler (1996: 6) says deserves attention as a "major strategic[18] variable" – as well as money and skilled manpower, both of which are in short supply in poor countries. The diplomatic missions of poorer states are typically small and understaffed, and human resources management thus becomes crucial. Skills in this area are also of increasing necessity in light of the coordinating function of diplomats to ensure cooperative domestic and international ventures in the quest for development (De Borja 1999: 91–92; India MEA FSI 1997: 38; Langhorne 1999; RSA DFA FSI 1999).

Tuition in management techniques is particularly useful in new states and states in transition where supervisory and senior managerial positions in the public service often need to be filled by officials without relevant experience. Management training will be more focused and cost-effective if MFAs evaluate the generic managerial skills[19] of officials (as done by the South African MFA) by means of MDCs prior to commencing management courses. This method will identify specific areas where officials require development and enable instructors to attend to problem areas (Canada DFAIT CFSI 1997; Coolsaet 1998: 18; Hemery 2002: 143; CPDS 1998b; Pahad 1995).

5.4 SUPPLEMENTARY TRAINING

Supplementary training, as set out in this section, is not included in the curriculum for basic diplomatic training because it addresses training needs at specific other stages of diplomats' careers. Its inclusion would render basic training programmes too cumbersome, expensive, drawn-out and, as a result, superficial. There are overlaps, however, because the subjects – with the exception of induction – build on prior training and in some cases assume a greater priority or need for specialisation in light of changing circumstances related to a diplomat's rise in seniority and accumulation of professional experience (HSRC 1990: 7; CPDS 1998b).

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5.4.1 **Induction programmes**

MFA induction programmes are essential professional orientation for new recruits, regardless of their seniority, especially when their admittance to an MFA precedes formal diplomatic training (or if no training is available). Course length can vary from a few weeks to a few months, but must sufficiently enable recruits to become operational at head office in an efficient, confident and professional manner. If an induction course is not presented, basic diplomatic training should cover all the relevant functional skills.

On a macro level, induction should inform recruits as to the parameters of their new professional environment, including the mission statement of an MFA, its organisational structure and functions and the broad foreign policy principles it is mandated to pursue. On a micro level, the curriculum should cover *inter alia* working methods of head office, including budgeting, logistical information, office administration and etiquette, written and other internal communication formats, security precautions, and proper use of common resources that might be available such as a legal section, library, filing system and IT facilities. Computer literacy is essential even if a developing MFA does not have IT infrastructure because diplomats will have – or must obtain – access to IT facilities both domestically and abroad, either at commercial enterprises or by using communal facilities available to members of multilateral organisations (De Borja 1999: 91; HSRC 1990: 12).

Induction should also inform recruits about labour relations, conditions of service, code of conduct imperatives, and realistic prospects for their career progression, including training options and possible study aid. A recommendation is that a developing MFA should provide each new recruit with the induction course content in manual form, so as to ensure that they can refer back to instructions on a continuous basis after completing the course (De Borja 1999: 41–42; RSA DFA FSI 1999).

5.4.2 **Post-specific training**

For cash-strapped and under-capacitated developing MFAs it is of specific

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advantage to have diplomats 'hit the ground running' when deployed abroad. However, generic diplomatic training cannot address the divergent circumstances in missions and host countries all over the world and therefore customised training that immediately precedes a diplomat's posting abroad (as presented for all its diplomats by the Israeli[20] MFA) is essential. Bilateral relations with a specific country and its cultural, socio-economic and political dynamics all warrant special attention in preparation for a specific posting. Post-specific diplomatic training is thus a bridging exercise, designed to address lacunae in officials' knowledge and skills. It should ideally be accompanied by appropriate foreign language training and culture studies to help minimise culture shock and make diplomats more confident and efficient (Wolfe 1997: 17).

It should also be augmented with functional mission-skills and knowledge of transfer procedures. A useful theme to include is personal 'survival' techniques which are specifically aimed at helping novice diplomats master the necessary logistics and avoiding potential personal problems when stationed abroad. Course information should start with advice on getting personal affairs in order before leaving for a posting and should include practical advice on housing, health, finances, immunities and privileges, as well as any other information that can avoid embarrassment, demotivation and even legal problems of diplomats who have never experienced diplomatic (or any other) life abroad. For self-evident practical reasons, post-specific training should therefore be attended by spouses as well (HSRC 1990: 26; India FSI 1998; RSA DFA FSI 1999).

Post-specific training is cost-effective because it is eminently suitable for in-house training and per definition needs-oriented because it enables the individual diplomat to be fully operational as soon as possible after arriving in a specific post. It does not have to be a full-time course and should coincide with the appointee to a mission working at the relevant geographical or functional head office division for a specified period prior to departure (HSRC 1990: 124).

Useful training methods include briefings by own staff who have worked in the particular mission and/or country, diplomats or other natives from the country in question or private sector representatives who have dealt with the country. Another

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very useful training tool is a comprehensive and updated post report with practical advice and information on *inter alia* housing, medical facilities, schools, climate, availability of merchandise and social taboos. The report should be compiled and regularly updated in consultation with the relevant missions, private sector surveys, foreign diplomats of the country in question, and geographical/functional divisions at head office.

5.4.3 **Mid-posting and post-posting training**

For reasons of financial and human resources paucity, and sometimes because of a lack of democratic public service procedures, many developing countries have a slow turn-over of diplomats in missions abroad, i.e. they allow them to remain in their postings for lengthy periods[21]. The advantage is that such officials provide continuity and stability, however the danger exists that they can lose touch with the socio-economic, even political, realities of their own countries (De Borja 1999: 105).

The solution, as Otermi (1992: 32) explains, is a necessary intervention in the professional development of diplomats by means of compulsory "refresher" training at head office at regular intervals during a long posting abroad (or halfway through a short posting). These programmes should re-connect diplomats to current affairs and evolving national foreign policy and allow them to cultivate or renew local contacts that can assist with achieving mission objectives in the country of posting. Contact with, and briefings by, a wide variety of public and private stakeholders in foreign policy should thus form part of such training. By the same token, officials who return from postings abroad, particularly long postings, should undergo re-connection training to help them and their families deal with reverse culture-shock and to allow them to function effectively again as soon as possible within head office circumstances.

5.4.4 **Mid-career training**

There is growing recognition within developing MFAs that diplomats, regardless of seniority or experience, need continuous[22] training in order to keep performing at maximum capacity (Barratt and Vale 1998; Commonwealth 1971: 128; Estonia

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MFA ESD 1998; Mauritius MFA 1996). The high incidence of personnel in senior positions who had never undergone diplomatic training accords mid-career training an added imperative. Even if such staff had been trained in basic diplomacy, they eventually require higher level competencies, not least of which management skills, to handle the added responsibilities of rising seniority. MFAs of developing countries are also increasingly seeking diplomatic skill-sharpening and even specialisation in areas where they have concentrated foreign interests, most notably in economic and multilateral diplomacy (HSRC 1990: 7; Kappeler 1998: 46; Rozental 1999: 145; CPDS 1998b).

Mid-career training should be made available in as many as possible of its manifestations in international practice. These include in-house MFA refresher courses, as is done by the diplomatic training centres of Kazakhstan and Vietnam, domestic and/or foreign sabbaticals at academic institutions, specialist training at appropriate institutions both domestic and/or abroad; and professional secondments to other public and private institutions (Burt and Robison 1998: 64; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; RSA DFA FSI 1996a and 1996b; Vietnam MOFA IIR 1996: 2). A proposal in this regard is that MFAs should create incentives for professional growth by making promotion within MFAs conditional on successful completion of specified continuous training requirements (Burt and Robison 1998: 64; Chile MFA *Andrés Bello* 2004). Developing MFAs need to be careful, however, that incentives for specialist skills and/or languages are strategically aligned to the long-term capacity needs of an MFA and that due consideration is given to the appropriate placement of candidates after completion of training.

5.4.5 **Heads of mission training**

Heads of mission training, although not universally accorded high priority, is a particular form of post-specific training that developing MFAs are well-advised not just to facilitate on a routine basis, but to make compulsory. For traditional societies in particular, the authority of a head of mission is so extensive that he needs to be much more of a role model for other staff than in societies where democracy allows for more dilution of personal power. Training is especially necessary because of the large incidence of political appointees in the Developing World, who need an

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induction in the operational aspects of an MFA, a thorough grounding in national foreign policy as well as training in basic diplomatic skills such as communications, negotiation, protocol and etiquette (Hemery 2002: 141; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998; Selebi 1998b).

Heads of mission courses should be compact but dynamic and should, importantly, include a high quality course in management. Proper training in financial and human resources management is particularly essential because those are the areas where missions will show the biggest deficiencies. A useful training aid is to have a comprehensive yet compact manual for heads of mission with essential regulations, contact information and pointers on mission management. It is also recommended that round-table discussions be conducted during the course of training with former heads of mission and selected MFA and other public service officials as well as private sector personalities, regarding the challenges of the position and client expectations about service delivery.

5.5 LANGUAGE TRAINING

An ironic benefit of the colonial heritage that affects large parts of the Developing World is that its inhabitants mostly speak at least one international language. Nevertheless, foreign language proficiency is a core skill of the diplomatic profession and diplomatic training centres should therefore arrange for trainees to acquire the necessary skills in order to communicate effectively in the international arena. Proficiency in English is rapidly becoming a global requirement whereas investment in other foreign languages should be carefully considered in light of the considerable expenses involved in tuition (HSRC 1990: 131; Meerts 1991: 10).

5.5.1 **Proficiency in English**

In recognition of its growing status as international *lingua franca*, more and more developing MFAs are requiring that diplomats be or become proficient in English. As mentioned, many diplomatic training centres, such as Estonia's and that of the PRC, have in recent years adopted English as a working medium (Ahmad 1999: 124; De Borja 1999: 14; Estonia MFA ESD 1998; Japan MFA FSTI 1998b). In

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addition, a growing number of ODA training courses are presented in English, regardless of the donor or recipient state's official language. Thus Austria's *Diplomatische Akademie* (1998) has since 1990 been offering English-medium training courses for former east-bloc countries, Turkey's Diplomatic Training Program for Junior Foreign Diplomats is conducted in English and the German DSE presents its courses to developing countries[23] in English (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b; Turkey MFA FSTC 1998).

It is thus proposed that, for the sake of international competitiveness, the language medium of diplomatic training should be an international language, preferably English. Candidates should in fact be tested for proficiency in the language, as is done in the Philippines, before they embark on costly training courses, and should even at the vocational stage be advised to obtain the necessary skills (De Borja 1999: 14). Meerts (1991: 10) advises that some flexibility in this proposal is required, as not all countries will be able to find teachers of various political or international subjects who are fully proficient in English.

5.5.2 **Selective foreign language proficiency**

Fluency in a foreign language is a major asset for diplomats because it renders them more competent in international liaison and eminently enhances the comfort and effectiveness of communication in a foreign environment. Diplomats have therefore historically been polyglots and many diplomatic training centres, also in the Developing World, continue to place great emphasis on, and investment in, the tuition of a range[24] of foreign languages (Czech Republic MFA 2003; HSRC 1990: 131; Sharp 1999: 41).

The predicament for developing MFAs is that foreign language training is time-consuming and very expensive. It also inevitably requires a measure of specialisation, which is problematic when human resources are limited. In addition, adequately qualified native language instructors are often in short domestic supply (Commonwealth 1971: 117; Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998). It is therefore proposed that developing MFAs do targeted recruitment of people who are fluent in selected foreign languages, and invest in foreign language training only as part of strategic,

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long-term human resources development planning – and then in consultation with individual diplomats as part of their career-planning (Marshall 1997: 142).

It is further proposed that language training not form part of a basic diplomatic training course, because of the latter's extensive content and because candidates should be matched with foreign postings before an investment is made in language training. Training should thus immediately precede a posting, i.e. coincide with post-specific training to be enriched by cultural studies of the destination country. A cost-effective alternative is to avail of ODA assistance to send trainees on language attachment-postings[25]which will enable them to develop sufficient communicative skills *via* intensive language immersion before taking on full responsibilities at missions (Commonwealth 1971: 119; RSA DFA FSI 2000). MFAs are also advised to encourage as far as possible the language skills that do exist among its diplomats, by offering grants or leave for self-study and by arranging routine foreign language conversation classes to allow officials to sharpen or maintain communicative skills.

The subjects discussed in this section reflect the wide scope of knowledge and skills that are internationally required of career diplomats, and which need to be imparted also to diplomats from developing states. Their training cannot be a one-off event: before they are immersed in the profession, they need basic diplomatic training and thereafter continuous, supplementary training regardless of seniority, in order to remain competitive in a rapidly changing and extremely challenging international environment. Their curricula, as is the case in international best practice, need to be inter-disciplinary, holistic and should focus primarily on occupational skills, without sacrificing the essential theoretical foundation of the enabling environment of diplomacy, namely International Relations. Curricula should be designed with primary emphasis on development of generalists, but with some provision for specialisation in select areas (including languages) as determined by individual states' foreign policy priorities and human resources capacity.

Training curricula should include all the theoretical areas and core skills that are

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addressed in international practice. Theory should cover international as well as national studies; in both cases focusing on the developmental aspects that impact on the diplomatic agenda of the South. Practical diplomacy should include the core skills of communication, negotiation, protocol and etiquette and representation; the new specialist skills in information handling, public, economic and multilateral diplomacy, conflict management, and consular relations; as well as auxiliary skills in intellectual and managerial application. Of these practical skills, greater emphasis is required as regards negotiation and the various specialist skills, particularly skills in mastering public, multilateral diplomacy and economic diplomacy. The most compelling reason is that expertise in these skills can provide a rare opportunity for diplomats from the Developing World to gain comparative advantage among their peers.

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has drawn on all the previously discussed factors that determine the performance requirements of Developing World diplomats: the evolving nature of diplomatic practice, especially its challenges at the start of the 21st century; the specific nature and agenda of Developing World diplomacy; the international standards and trends within professional diplomatic training; and the specific issues that complicate diplomatic training in a Developing World environment. To produce effective diplomats in the context of all these considerations, strategic and pro-active MFA intervention is required at the vocational, recruitment and training stages of human resources development. Several practical proposals have been made in this respect, with the objective of achieving the utmost with available (and admittedly limited) domestic resources. The various proposals, while aiming to reduce the inordinate dependency of developing MFAs on foreign training aid, nonetheless emphasise the importance of extensive international collaboration in the field of diplomatic training. Cooperation to extract maximum advantage from existing expertise and available resources is crucial, and the pooling of collective resources is an imperative particularly in impoverished regions. International assistance with career-specific training notwithstanding, the onus is on MFAs to develop 'home-grown' remedies and long-term solutions for deficiencies in human resources capacity.

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As far as the structure of training is concerned, the chapter has established that *ad hoc* diplomatic training does not suffice to address the complex demands on diplomats in today's global arena, and that adequate preparation for the profession merits more than generic accommodation within the human resources management units of MFAs. A principal proposal, therefore, is that all MFAs should establish (or upgrade, if in existence) dedicated diplomatic training centres to coordinate the process of building professional capacity in the execution of foreign policy. The required financial investment will be offset by a range of advantages and long-term, self-sustaining capacity-building not only within MFAs but in a wider sense within Developing World governments. Where resources are extremely limited, MFAs should initiate joint ventures with domestic and/or international partners in establishing diplomatic training capacity hosted by local academic or NGO institutions.

As concerns the proposed training methods to be used by dedicated diplomatic training centres, these have been recommended in full cognisance of financial and human resources limitations that prevail in many developing MFAs. The proposals nevertheless represent a benchmarking paradigm, reflecting international best practice in an approach that emphasises integrated, interactive and practice-oriented training.

As regards the content of diplomatic training, the wide scope of theory and operational skills that Developing World diplomats should acquire in order to become able and confident national representatives generally correspond with what their peers in the more powerful countries are taught. The difference is that some of these skills – notably negotiation and the new, specialised skills of information handling, public, economic and multilateral diplomacy – assume a higher urgency in light of the limited resources, ambitious agenda and competitive disadvantages of the Developing World in the international arena. These competencies need to be reinforced not only *via* basic diplomatic training, but through continuous, supplementary training in operational skills and empirical knowledge.

The broad conclusion corresponds with Kappeler's contention (1998: 46) that

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diplomatic training, particularly in the case of poorer countries. is essential so as "to prepare diplomats of tomorrow and retrain diplomats of today" in such a way that they may be "effectively present on the international scene for the first time". In essence, diplomatic training therefore amounts to Developing World MFA empowerment because it equips their principal assets, i.e. human resources, with the necessary knowledge and skills to compete internationally with their only viable foreign policy tool, namely diplomacy. If this 'value adding' potential of diplomatic training is espoused by Developing World governments and MFAs, a self-sustaining remedy for creation of diplomatic capacity will be within their reach.

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[1] According to information received during May 2000 from Renier Nijskens, the Belgian Ambassador to ROK, Belgium's heads of mission now have to see every single cabinet minister during their annual home leave, including the Prime Minister.

[2] Otermi (1992: 28–29) cautions that state intervention should be limited to an advisory role and notes that intervention is only advisable if the particular country experiences less interest in the career than requirements for personnel. Otherwise, it would be a waste of financial resources to encourage and support studies of potential candidates if they cannot be accommodated in a given MFA.

[3] Thakur (2000) says that affirmative action in India, meant to have ended in 1965 after 15 years of independence, is still entrenched and ended up institutionalising the very divisions it was meant to eradicate.

[4] Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, towards the end of his tenure, admitted that his country had "overdone" an affirmative action programme during his 20 year rule, but protested that good intentions had mitigated the misjudgment (Pretoria News 31 August 2001).

[5] Vale (1993: 31) notes that in Nigeria, the federal constitution prescribes that the multi-ethnic society be fully represented in the civil service. With regards to recruitment, this means that, in principle, every federal state should be represented in each new intake. In practice, this rarely happens because not all states, for example, are equally interested in the foreign service. As a result, people are selected on merit, no matter where they come from.

[6] When small elìtes from previously disadvantaged groups are being rotated among prestigious positions, it prevents development and assimilation of their larger group and, needless to say, is anathema to the whole purpose of affirmative action.

[7] Ngwevela (1998) says all newly appointed South African heads of mission (of whom about one third are political appointees) attend training at the FSI. In practice, however, attendance is voluntary and they can – and do – stay away from courses as they please without any disciplinary remedies. This has been the student's personal observation while working and attending courses at the South African FSI.

[8]Spouses, for example, whose accommodation abroad is state sponsored in any case and who are routinely involved in a large number of embassy activities, might as well be utilised more effectively by being trained to work informally or even formally for embassies.

[9] Information as received on 16 September 1999 from the Vietnamese Ambassador to ROK, Nguyen Van Xuong. He had formerly been responsible for Vietnamese diplomatic training.

[10] Chile allocates foreign training scholarships granted by countries such as Britain and France as an incentive for merit: the top three students of its annual diplomatic training programme are awarded such opportunities (Chile MFA *Andres Bello* 1998).

[11] In pursuit of professional standards, the South African FSI during 2004 commenced a process of accrediting the *Advanced Diploma in Diplomacy*, i.e. its junior diplomatic training proramme, with the South African Qualifications Authority. The curriculum of the diploma was published on 13 February 2004 in the South African Government Gazette (Vol 464, no 25991), for public comment.

[12] The added benefit for Venezuelan diplomats is that they graduate from the Venezuelan Institute of High Diplomatic Studies with a Masters degree in international relations (Jimenez 1998).

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[13] Mozambique's MFA's ISRI (1996), for example, annually trains some 250 international relations experts, of whom only 30 are recruited to join the MFA, based on their performance during training.
[14] An example is the electronic documents of the Diplomatic Studies Programme of the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy at the University of Leicester, which is a growing network of academics and practitioners in the field of diplomacy (CPDS 1998b). Another example is the "E-briefing papers" circulated to a network of contacts by the University of Pretoria's Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS), available at www.up.ac.za/academics/cips
[15] Other disadvantages are the lack of security and net congestion, as all Internet users experience. Specially dedicated channels, as used by the Canadian CFSI, can overcome the latter problem, but are expensive (Baldi 1998: 257; Kurbalija and Baldi 2000: 140).
[16] Barston (1997: 13) says the traditional broad-spectrum training of diplomats and the paucity of resources in developing states make the secondment to functional areas in a foreign ministry/its missions, from other domestic departments, more practical.
[17] An example is the ReliefWeb site http://www.reliefweb.int/ which is a project of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The website states that it is aimed at strengthening "the response capacity of the humanitarian relief community through timely dissemination of reliable information on prevention, preparedness and disaster response".
[18] Reychler (1996: 6) mentions Der Derian's concept of 'chronopolitics'– "in which time and speed is considered a crucial ingredient of power".
[19] The MDC measures the following generic managerial skills: manpower utilisation, task structuring, planning and analytical ability, initiative, judgement and reasoning ability (Pahad 1995) .
[20] Information as received from Ari Arazi, the Israeli Ambassador to the ROK, on 29 September 1999.
[21] The Ambassador of Palestine to South Africa, Salman Al-Herfi, has for example been in his post since 1995 (as confirmed by the Palestine Embassy in Pretoria on 28 June 2004)
[22] The Estonian MFA's ESD (1998) states that mid-career training is one of its two *raisons d' être* – the other one being general training of international relations "specialists".
[23] Except for those new states from Central and Eastern Europe, in which case training is conducted in German (Japan MFA FSTI 1998b).
[24] Kazakhstan's Diplomatic Academy for example teaches English, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Arabic, Japanese, Urdu and Turkish (Kazakhstan MFA DA 1998),
[25] The Japanese government, for example, offers ODA language tuition to diplomats at the Japan Foundation Japanese Language Institute in Tokyo

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CHAPTER 8
EVALUATION

In the course of the research, various perspectives were investigated in order to address the fundamental research question that contemplates the instrumental role of diplomatic training in meeting the contemporary challenges faced by Developing World diplomats. Examination of the research problem departed from the fundamental research proposition that – in the challenging environment of contemporary global relations and in light of the challenges presented by its developmental deficit – the Developing World's pivotal interest in global diplomacy renders the contribution of its diplomats relatively more crucial to the national and collective well-being of its member states, hence the imperative to enhance diplomatic capacity. The proposition incorporated the suggestion that a feasible remedy would entail career-specific training that meets international standards and is specifically directed at enabling diplomats to advance the diplomacy of development more effectively.

A theoretical foundation for analysis of the research problem was provided at the outset and reviewed the intellectual environment that yields reflection on Developing World diplomacy and the training associated with its attendant profession. Importantly, the substantive *raison d'être* for diplomatic training was investigated in light of the *de jure* functions and *de facto* roles of contemporary diplomats. This conceptual framework was followed by historical perspective on the evolution of diplomacy, which provided insight as to the contemporary challenges facing professional diplomats. The incremental professionalisation of the institution and the development of career-specific training were addressed, as well as the impact of 20th century developments in international relations that exponentially increased the scope, methods and the diversity of actors involved in the field of diplomacy. The research then focused on the phenomenon of the distinct, agenda-driven 'diplomacy of development' – i.e. the historical imperatives, norms and conduct that have marked the diplomatic awakening of a huge part of the world that, until the second half of the 20th century, had effectively been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. The investigation explored the inordinate relevance of diplomacy to the Developing World, as a guarantor of its symbolic as

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well as practical presence in the global arena. The concomitant imperative for enhanced diplomatic capacity within the Developing World was determined, and the study proceeded to focus on a practical remedy for this exigency. A global perspective indicated how the practice of diplomacy – historically considered an innate art rather than an acquirable science – is increasingly and on a universal scale treated as a profession that demands institutionalised and professionalised training. Broad commonalities and salient trends and standards within diplomatic recruitment and training were identified because these set the norms of best practice in the field, hence a crucial exemplar for nascent diplomatic training in the Developing World.

Subsequent examination focused on diplomatic training practice in the Developing World, where – with few exceptions – the practical reality of daunting obstacles to diplomatic training is inversely proportionate to capacity of MFAs. Exogenous and endogenous impediments to diplomatic training were investigated, particularly those experienced by MFAs of new states and states in democratic transition. A final evaluation assimilated the findings of the before-going and offered various practical proposals as regards the prioritisation of diplomatic training, the utilisation of international assistance in the field and the structure, method and content of actual training.

Various key findings have been presented in the course of the research. Initial demarcation of the intellectual environment in which training for Developing World diplomats is reflected on, indicated that the relevant theoretical paradigms are addressed within IR literature respectively as part of diplomatic theory and as part of theorising on the Developing World. Traditional, mainstream IR theory displays a paucity of critical analysis in both these areas; however the full spectrum of existing and evolving IR theory, from its rationalist paradigms to the intellectual challenges presented by post-positivist theories, is relevant to the training of Developing World diplomats. Realist foreign policy positions, albeit unsympathetic to the concerns of peripheral states, continue to have such a material and universal impact on world politics that all diplomats, to some extent or another, are confronted by their influence. Realism is also reflected in the competitive skills diplomats are equipped with *via* diplomatic training in order to maximise the interests of their principals.

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Diplomacy by its very emphasis on reciprocity, however, also fits into the system-reforming paradigm: its reliance on cooperation and interaction presupposes peaceful coexistence and the inter-dependence of states and enhances the notion that diplomacy transcends the limited capacity of states to achieve satisfactory solutions by unilateral means. This consideration is particularly germane to the many weaker states that find security in multilateralism and for whose diplomats the skills required to participate in cooperative international ventures are essential.

A rationalist approach that continues to impact on the Developing World, in spite of the post-Cold War demise of the communist bloc, is the world-system approach. Diplomatic training in the Developing World prepares diplomats to represent not just national interests but those of an entire 'world's' marginalised and disadvantaged people, hence to conduct a collective 'class-struggle' in the international arena. Even more important to the rhetorical armoury of diplomats from peripheral states, representing as they do a 'world' in which emancipatory and alternative approaches are the norm rather than the exception; are the post-positivist, reflectivist IR approaches that have rejected mainstream IR theory's Western-centric bias. These system-transforming approaches have provided an intellectual space for the academic study of Developing World diplomacy by embracing its international concerns: addressing the pivotal question of why it has a tendency to be exploitable, and hypothesising about how its disadvantaged position might be remedied.

As mentioned, the study also found a deficiency in IR reflection on diplomacy, in particular diplomatic practice which embraces training. An attempt at conceptual demarcation of diplomacy yielded the following essential elements: its nature as intermediation; its role as a basic, structure-giving institution of international society (even if its status as the 'master institution of international society' has been attenuated); its limited but crucial place within the spectrum of foreign policy instruments; and its perennial representational character. The normative character of the institution was found to be too controversial to be included in a functional definition. However, disagreement is expressed with post-positivists' rejection of diplomacy's state-centric character, as it is contended in this study that the modalities of the international legal and institutional framework of diplomacy

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continue to provide legitimisation of diplomats' symbolic and formalistic representation and an enabling environment for their substantive representation. The reality remains that the entities professional diplomats represent are predominantly states – the majority of which are considered to be in the developing category. In this regard, the institutional framework of diplomatic practice was found to be remarkably stable and universally replicated, even by states that are attempting to reform the international order. This phenomenon affirms the *de jure* functions of diplomats and – in combination with their expanding *de facto* roles that emanate from diplomacy's expanding scope – provides compelling substantive *raison d'être* for diplomatic training.

The historical overview of the evolution of diplomacy found that the institution has always been in a state of flux. However, unprecedented global developments during the past century have had a particularly dramatic impact on the substance and form of diplomacy. On a global scale, the changing world order, the growth of personal diplomacy, the technological revolution and expansion of the agenda of diplomacy, the democratisation of diplomacy and the growth of multilateralism have challenged and changed old paradigms. Increasing numbers of human concerns now transcend the traditional jurisdiction of states and impact on even the remotest, most isolated parts of the world. This reality has added to the creation of supranational organisations and has informed the proliferation of multilateral diplomacy during the second half of the 20th century. In addition, the democratisation of international society and the fact that many issues on the diplomatic agenda are of a technical nature have prompted the involvement of a-national and sub-national entities in the international arena, rivalling the traditional monopoly of professional diplomats in the field. The field of diplomacy has, as a result, become much more complex and the profession increasingly subject to public scrutiny and involvement, with a symbiotic relationship developing between 'official' and 'unofficial' diplomacy. In this regard the role of professional diplomats has morphed to that of managers of diplomatic processes, a position that is enabled by their legal (formalistic) status as representatives of sovereign states.

Significant challenges to the primacy of the state both in theory and practice has generated post-positivist criticism that the state-centric profession, notably the

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institution of resident ambassadors, has become obsolete. Proponents of the profession contend however that the debate confuses normative reflection on the institution of diplomacy with efficacy in the attendant profession and its machinery. They point out that the institution of diplomacy is evolving continuously in adaptation and response to global developments and note that its mechanisms, specifically the resident ambassador, have increased rather than decreased in significance. In this regard, a key finding of the study is that the incremental professionalisation of diplomacy is relentless: if anything, it has become more institutionalised, more legalised and more exercised than ever before. Notwithstanding this phenomenon, the criticisms of diplomacy and its mechanisms are important because they highlight the areas within the profession that need transformation in order to meet the changing needs of the players on the international stage. In response, MFAs across the globe are including professional diplomatic training among pro-active measures to produce the kind of professionals that can counter the risks and seize the opportunities presented by contemporary challenges to diplomacy.

A key finding concerns the emergence of the so-called Developing World during the 20th century as dozens of new states entered the international arena and diffused diplomacy's European centre of gravity. These new actors increasingly impacted on global diplomacy as the end of the Cold War opened up new prospects for smaller states to play a more significant role in international relations. Investigation of IR literature has not yielded a uniform definition of this 'Developing World', which is *inter alia* labelled also as 'Third World', the 'South' or world 'periphery'. Conceptual demarcation of this highly dissimilar group of states indicates that the most compelling commonality is a shared sense of historical and present vulnerability *vis-à-vis* the Developed World, i.e. the industrialised, northern-hemispheric 'First World' nations. In response to this comparative lack of socio-economic and political power, the Developing World has embraced a collective international identity and has defined itself as a distinct diplomatic assemblage in the global arena by means of assertive diplomatic practice that has become known as the diplomacy of development.

At its core lies an approach that is informed by acute concern about the growing

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developmental gap between the two 'worlds', and a mandate to change developing countries' peripheral position within global politics by means of a concerted diplomatic struggle. This struggle is a multidimensional process, affected by and impinging on domestic circumstances as well as international dynamics, and has left indelible marks on the substance and form of contemporary diplomacy. Its very evolution has contributed to global democratisation of diplomatic practice and the groundswell in multilateralism, especially because its diplomatic strategy has almost exclusively been based on collective action such as institutionalisation and regional integration. It has also added to the practice of diplomacy new and varied – even radical – formations of thought and behavioural norms. Most conspicuous has been a diplomatic style that has not only been different from traditional diplomacy, but which in fact has actively sought highly visible diplomatic confrontation to attain diplomatic goals, *inter alia* by using advocacy techniques, rhetoric, and appealing primarily to international public opinion. Of specific importance to the theme of this study is the fact that the diplomacy of development has not been entrusted to professional diplomats to the extent that state diplomacy is handled in the Developed World. A general predilection for personal diplomacy, the prevalence of 'big men' cultures, centralisation of foreign policy, internal state weakness, lack of professional diplomatic capacity and pervasive financial constraints have all ensured that professional diplomats have remained peripheral to the diplomacy of the Developing World. Notwithstanding these differences in style, traditional diplomatic rules of procedure have mostly been maintained by developing states, both as a symbolic affirmation of statehood and as a practical, enabling mechanism to function within the international community.

The substance of the Developing World's collective diplomacy translates into the agenda it pursues in the diplomatic arena. Its objective to level the global socio-political 'playing field' manifests in its drive to internationalise human rights, including the disputed right of states to development; an ongoing quest for sovereignty and right to self-determination; insistence on non-intervention by external actors; eradication of the scourge of inter and intra-state conflicts in the Developing World; and democratisation of the global organisations that exert political governance over states. In tandem and overlapping with these socio-political goals is the economic agenda of the Developing World. The realisation of

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this agenda is intended to bring about an NIEO: the eradication of endemic poverty, *inter alia* by cancellation of poorer states' international debt; preservation and encouragement of ODA; transformation of the 'international financial architecture' to make it more representative of the Developing World's interests; aggressive negotiation to make the terms of international trade more equitable; and efforts to secure FDI and to bridge the technological divide between the two 'worlds'. A long-term, overarching mission is to obtain lasting, i.e. sustainable, development. Encouragingly, in terms of its prospects, the agenda of the Developing World is not exclusive of the interests of the Developed World. The deep divisions between the two polities have played up the extent to which their destinies are intertwined, making it imperative that a North-South partnership be established in order to obtain global peace and security. Various initiatives have been taken in this regard, but from the Developing World's perspective much remains to be done.

In the absence of comparative advantage in economic or other foreign policy tools, the Developing World's ambitious international agenda can only be pursued by means of effective diplomatic participation in global affairs. The enhanced role of its diplomats is thus instrumental and indispensable. An important consideration in realising this goal is that in the global arena, all diplomatic practice is subjected to institutionalised, international norms and standards. This reality informs a universal objective of diplomatic training, namely to embed in the profession certain benchmarks in diplomatic practice. An overview of best practice in international diplomatic training thus provides an important exemplar to developing MFAs services that are in the process of building diplomatic training capacity.

The overview of international diplomatic training practice found that both the recruitment and training of diplomats are marked by considerable variations in structure and method; also among states of similar developmental stage. These differences reflect national cultures, attitudes and priorities, and are decisively influenced by the pressures of prevailing circumstances, the resources available to MFAs, and the degree to which the latter are willing to commit such resources for training purposes. On a global scale, the advantages of diplomatic training have become sufficiently compelling to create a trend towards vertical and horizontal expansion. Greater investment in diplomatic training has created new opportunities

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for MFAs to implement aspects of foreign policy *via* the training of their own diplomats, non-diplomatic support networks, private sector clients of diplomacy and even foreign diplomats. The world-wide growth in emphasis on diplomatic training has spawned unprecedented international cooperation among stake-holders in the field as a result of which more resources and information are shared and national programmes are amended to reflect international standards and trends.

As concluded by the study, the intervention of MFAs in the process of 'producing' effective diplomats commences with targeted recruitment for the profession. Traditionally, elitist recruitment obviated the need for training, but the process is increasingly being seen as a functional and egalitarian pre-selection that provides a fundamental base from whence formal training can proceed to produce effective diplomats who are also representative of their publics. Importantly, the world-wide trend is for diplomatic training to be both compulsory and continuous: MFAs are increasingly making the career advancement of diplomats conditional on successful completion of available training, and are offering continuous supplementary training courses to ensure that diplomats remain maximally competitive throughout their careers.

Evaluation of training in itself is gaining functional prominence in that its emphasis is shifting towards service delivery in the framework of foreign policy objectives, demanding assessment not just of trainee performance during formal courses, but of the indirect manifestation thereof in terms of MFA efficiency and productivity. This emphasis on evaluation in itself provides an important incentive for continuous adaptation and improvement of diplomatic training to reflect international best practice, for the sake of international competitiveness.

The increasing world-wide demand for diplomatic training has resulted in the multiplication of the hosts of training to include non-traditional private and multinational host institutions, thus making the outsourcing of diplomatic training more common and acceptable. Training itself is configured in multiform packages but the general inclination as regards basic diplomatic training amounts to a full-time, year-long course, incorporating a range of experiential training methodologies.

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Broad international agreement exists on the knowledge (theory) and skills (practice) that professional diplomats should acquire, i.e. on the content (curricula) of diplomatic training programmes. The combined range is vast, reflecting the scope of diverse issues that fall under the rubric of 21st century diplomacy, all of which diplomats need to be *au fait* with on a routine basis. A major trend is the move towards a more interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach, combining theoretical perspectives with practical skills training to prepare diplomats for the many *de facto* roles they will have to assume in the course of their careers. The primary emphasis of training is thus on rendering diplomats operational. In this regard, the basic traditional diplomatic skills in communication, negotiation, protocol and etiquette and representation remain important, and are increasingly augmented by skills in intellectual ability and the technical support skills contained in management studies. In addition, skills related to various areas of diplomatic practice that have become specialised in the course of the past few decades, are being taught on a routine basis as part of basic diplomatic training, on account of their ubiquitous and growing importance in diplomatic practice. These areas include information handling, public, economic and multilateral diplomacy as well as conflict management and consular work. A world-wide trend is to offer mid-career diplomats supplementary training in all of the various practical skills to ensure that they remain competitive, in light of the continuously evolving nature of the profession. In addition, specialised courses are presented at various junctures of diplomats' careers: induction courses to introduce new recruits to the functional parameters of MFA work; post-specific training to prepare them for imminent transfer to a specific mission and region of the world, and mid-posting and post-posting training to ensure seamless professional conduct whether at head office or abroad. Heads of mission, who in many cases are political appointees rather than career diplomats, are also being trained on an increasing scale in recognition of the competitive skills they require in the complex environment of international diplomacy.

As concerns diplomatic training in the Developing World, the study found that a broad distinction could be made between the training requirements of developing countries as opposed to those of developed countries. The latter, which have

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accumulated and institutionalised experience of the conduct of international relations, generally have a bigger pool of highly educated candidates from which to recruit diplomats, as well as more sophisticated institutions and methods for their training. In contrast (notwithstanding a few renowned diplomatic academies in the Developing World) the reality is that most developing states lack sufficient diplomatic training capacity, and in some cases it is completely absent. The training handicap of many developing MFAs is exacerbated by various impediments, in particular the organisational immaturity of foreign ministries and lack of financial and human resources to sustain proper training, which often amount to an absence of training infrastructure. These material disadvantages notwithstanding, the main handicap is attitudinal: many developing MFAs simply do not accord diplomatic training high priority because it is not recognised as a remedial instrument in building capacity and enhancing professionalism.

The diplomatic training challenges experienced by developing states take on added dimensions when such states are newly established or in constitutional transition. Under such conditions diplomatic training has to address immediate and massive shortages of experience and skills and, in addition, fundamental state identity issues. The advantage is that these states also attract greater international attention, and, as a corollary, assistance with capacity building. International assistance in the field of diplomatic training is, in fact, of great importance to most developing MFAs, who often rely on it as their only or most important source of personnel training. Training collaboration also occurs within the context of South-South cooperation, where it enhances the capacity of diplomats to present a more united front in pursuing the collective international agenda of the Developing World. The attendance by diplomats of foreign diplomatic training programmes has various advantages but the study found that its distinct disadvantages can actually inhibit capacity building within developing MFAs. These include obvious deficiencies such as exclusive and limited training opportunities and language restrictions that effectively exclude many Developing World diplomats and compel those who do speak the required language to specialise not just in a certain language, but in the associated diplomatic culture. A practical shortcoming is that foreign training usually lacks applicable practical focus and in addition does not approach diplomatic practice from the recipients' perspective of national foreign policy imperatives.

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Diplomatic training as aid also amounts to an unreliable source of ODA, as it is not considered of equal priority as relief efforts in socio-economic areas in need of aid, and because aid in general is subject to arbitrary reconsideration by donor governments. A more insidious eventuality is that diplomatic training can be used as a foreign policy 'Trojan horse'. This problem is exacerbated by the phenomenon that many poor countries rely disproportionately on foreign training, replacing basic diplomatic training *in toto* with *ad hoc* foreign training and in the process foregoing any capacity building in training. These considerations, among the other conclusions reached, indicate an imperative for developing states to establish a domestic capacity for diplomatic training.

An assessment of the role of diplomatic training in the Developing World yields a number of proposals. These address various aspects: the imperative of greater commitment to the professionalisation of diplomacy itself; the maximisation of international cooperation in the field of diplomatic training; and suggestions regarding the method, structure and content of diplomatic training. The caveat, and an imperative that renders all proposals conditional, is that a commitment to the professionalisation of diplomatic practice needs to be made by Developing World governments. This means that diplomats should be dealt with as potential national assets whose procurement and development ought to be a strategic priority. As a corollary, MFAs should create the conditions necessary to enhance the performance of diplomats, by committing the required resources and implementing a strategic development plan to build MFA human resources capacity.

As the first step in building capacity, MFAs should adopt a pro-active, strategic approach to recruitment with the aim of procuring the best possible candidates. If affirmative action (and employment equity along demographic lines) happens to be a civil service imperative in a given state, its goals should preferably be realised *via* supplementary training opportunities at the vocational stage. By the same token, political appointees should be integrated into the profession in a functional and egalitarian manner: they should be held to the same standards and rules of an MFA, including all prescribed training. Indeed, all diplomats, regardless of origin, should have their career advancement made conditional on successful completion of prescribed basic and supplementary training. A major duty of MFAs therefore is

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the facilitation and prioritisation of continuous, compulsory training of all diplomats on all levels of seniority. A secondary yet crucial duty is the facilitation of selected diplomatic training courses for all MFA support staff, seconded personnel and all spouses who accompany such officials to missions abroad, as well as for other government officials tasked with international liaison.

For the purpose of ensuring that training is effective, congruence should be established between the mission statement of an MFA and the specific objectives of its diplomatic training policy. On a micro-level, trainees as well as trainers need to be evaluated continuously during the course of formal training. In this regard the training process and results should preferably be monitored by an appropriately qualified committee with the aim of continuous revision and upgrading. As part of this revision process, client (stake-holder) feed-back on the effectiveness and relevance of training needs to be solicited.

As mentioned, the assessment of existing diplomatic training conditions in the Developing World indicates that most MFAs in the Developing World lack the capacity to conduct sufficient diplomatic training. Considerable international assistance is therefore required to bring the training of Developing World diplomats on a par with that available to their peers from the Developed World. Aid is indispensable particularly when diplomatic training capacity (or, indeed, an MFA) is established in its entirety. In such cases, the concerned MFAs should network widely within the international community of diplomatic trainers, to extract maximum exposure to expertise and advantage from available resources and to benefit from research with proven results. In addition, institutional links between diplomatic training centres should be pursued in the strategic context of bilateral foreign policy.

A natural vehicle for cooperation in the field of diplomatic training is South-South cooperation – an option that should be encouraged in order to improve quality and relevance of programmes and to strengthen the Developing World's diplomatic alliance. In the event of South-South diplomatic alliances resulting in joint representative offices at multilateral organisations, joint diplomatic training of the officials in such missions is called for in order to harmonise diplomatic practice and to inculcate common foreign policy objectives in the responsible officials.

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Considerable advantages also indicate the need for regional cooperation in diplomatic training: broader, cost-effective training, the sharing of expertise, circumstantial opportunities to build on commonalities, the establishment of common diplomatic standards and methods, the harmonisation of foreign policy and the strengthening of internal regional cooperation. In this respect, regional diplomatic training associations should be established (or strengthened, if existing) to expand their members' networking opportunities in order to exchange information and resources. In the case of regions such as Southern Africa where several members have no capacity for training, resources should be pooled to establish a regional training centre, preferably at an existing training institute.

In general, developing MFAs should explore the full spectrum of ODA opportunities in the field of diplomatic training, particularly as concerns infrastructural development *in loco* and the advanced, mid-career training offered by international organisations. As concerns bilateral foreign training aid, it would offset the disadvantages of such training if sources were to be diversified; if recipient diplomats were grounded at least in national studies before undergoing any foreign training; if foreign training opportunities were to be utilised only on a supplementary basis, i.e. not replacing domestic training; and if developing MFAs insisted on partnership in the design of foreign courses so as to ensure greater benefit from, and ownership of, training results.

A fundamental proposal regarding the structure of diplomatic training is that every developing MFA should establish an integral and permanent centre that is dedicated to diplomatic training to plan, coordinate and facilitate on a continuous basis all training for the MFA. Where capacity is seriously limited, partnerships across sector boundaries should be pursued to utilise as much domestic and foreign assistance as possible in establishing diplomatic training 'joint ventures', hence the centre's locus could be outside a given MFA. It is advised that centres be staffed with a core of reliable and committed, permanent staff, or at least that a permanent head of training with sufficient MFA seniority be appointed; and that a governing or advisory body for a training centre be appointed in a cooperative venture with selected external stakeholders. The prevailing lack of developing MFA resources on all levels will inevitably also present as regards the instruction sources

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of diplomatic training programmes and for that reason, in addition to the spectrum of international cooperation, all possible local resources should be explored. These include the participation of locally based foreign diplomats and a range of private and public experts, in order to make training as cost-effective yet varied and stimulating as possible. However, care should be taken that external instructors are carefully selected, orientated sufficiently on the training needs of the MFA and the context of the subject matter, and evaluated continuously to ensure that they fulfil their brief. Existing in-house MFA expertise presents the most accessible and cost-effective resource. In this regard, MFA investment in the specialist training of mid-career staff in areas of foreign policy objectives would create capacity within the MFA and at the same time establish a cadre of specialist, in-house diplomatic training instructors.

Where resources permit, basic diplomatic training should be presented under the direction of an MFA immediately after recruitment, as part of the selection process, in a one year long, full time course. It is recommended that entry to an MFA, as well as subsequent promotion and posting abroad, be made conditional on successful completion of career-specific training to ensure the incremental professionalisation of a developing country's foreign service.

With regard to the method of training, international best practice dictates an integrated training approach, i.e. combination of formal classroom training and practical exposure, including on-the-job training by means of rotational Head Office work and short apprenticeships in missions. Where formal classroom instruction takes place, it will be more effective if it is done in an interactive and practice-oriented manner by using techniques such as case studies, simulation exercises, group projects, debates and panel discussions. Diplomatic training should include a variety of educational excursions to domestic – and regional, if possible – areas/institutions that impact on national foreign policy. In addition, the agenda of the diplomacy of development makes it important that diplomats undergo a short domestic 'grassroots' experience in socio-economically-deprived areas. For the sake of institutional enrichment as well as individual trainee development, it is recommended that each trainee be required to deliver independent research in the course of diplomatic training.

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Training methods should also embrace the principle of continuous learning: MFA supervisors should, for example, be instructed in human resources management skills so that they can act as competent mentors to trainees and thus augment and continue the training process. In addition, MFAs should facilitate 'revolving door' schemes whereby secondments are made to and from other government departments, civil organisations and international organisations, as well as trainee exchanges with other diplomatic training institutes. Finally, for the sake of international competitiveness and also for its practical and cost-effective benefits, MFAs should invest in (or lobby for ODA assistance in obtaining) information-technology supported training, as manifesting *inter alia* in computer data banks, Internet facilities and distance education programmes.

As regards the content of training, a recommendation is that diplomatic training curricula should be designed with primary emphasis on development of generalists, but with some provision for specialisation in select areas as determined by individual states' foreign policy priorities. Training itself should be inter-disciplinary, holistic and should focus primarily on occupational skills, although curricula should include the theoretical areas that are addressed in international best practice, i.e. international and national studies. Of these theoretical areas, relatively greater attention is required as regards developmental studies and national studies, particularly foreign policy. Practical diplomacy should include the core skills of communication, negotiation, protocol and etiquette and representation; the new specialist skills in information handling, public, economic and multilateral diplomacy, conflict management, and consular relations; as well as auxiliary skills in intellectual and managerial application. Greater emphasis in practical diplomacy is required as regards negotiation and the various specialist skills, particularly skills in mastering public, multilateral and economic diplomacy; because these areas are integral to the agenda and method of the diplomacy of development.

As concerns supplementary training, a compulsory MFA induction course should be attended immediately after candidates are admitted to the ministry, and all attendees should receive the course content in manual form as well. Induction is essential to render new recruits to MFAs operational; therefore if it is not presented

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separately, it needs to be included in basic diplomatic training. Customised post-specific training should immediately precede a posting abroad and should be attended by spouses. It needs to be facilitated by updated post-reports and ought to be accompanied by foreign language training (if applicable) and the relevant culture and area studies. A further recommendation is that compulsory mid-posting and post-posting training at head office should be presented at regular intervals to diplomats during their tour of duty abroad and immediately following their placement back at head office, in order to keep them updated with evolving national issues and MFA culture. On a general level, MFAs should arrange for continuous and compulsory mid-career training in various forms for all officials to sharpen or acquire new skills as required by rising seniority, emerging specialisation needs within MFAs, and to meet the general and specific challenges of universal diplomatic evolution. Indeed, it is recommended that MFAs create incentives for professional growth by making promotion within its structures conditional on successful completion of all available training. Heads of mission training which includes select diplomatic skills, MFA induction, national studies and management training should be compulsory for all newly appointed heads of mission, especially when they are political appointees; and manuals with relevant information should be made available to them. As regards language training, the study concluded that English should be a proficiency requirement for all diplomats and it – or another international language – should be the medium of instruction of diplomatic training, for the sake of international competitiveness. Other foreign language skills should be encouraged as part of self-study or language scholarships, but prohibitive costs dictate that MFA investment in such training be carefully considered as part of strategic specialisation planning and individual career-path planning.

A critical assessment of the study indicates a number of areas that necessitate attention in a future study agenda. These lacunae are largely a function of the vast scope of the investigation that has prevented more in-depth coverage of various themes. Among these is a single state analysis of South African diplomatic training as an example of MFA capacity building within a developing state that is undergoing democratic transition. Only very limited reference to South Africa's unique circumstances was included in this particular study, in light of the fact that the study’s nature, scope and focus addressed the wider contextual and

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operational problem of Developing Word diplomatic training. Another focus that would contribute to the research theme would be an in-depth comparative study of the diplomatic training of a few selected states, for example as a case study comparison between advanced Developed World training and nascent Developing World training to determine how, and to what extent, the cases differ, correspond and perhaps complement each other. As concerns specific categories of states, the diplomatic training of failed states comprises an area in need of research. This small subdivision of the Developing World includes states such as Somalia and Afghanistan that have imploded politically, i.e. have disintegrated rather than broken into smaller functional units such as in the case of the former Soviet and greater Yugoslavia. The complex circumstances pertaining to governmental capacity and representational issues of these failed states cannot be addressed adequately within the framework of a generalised study such as this one. A more universal issue within the Developing World, namely diminished human resources capacity as a result of gender discrimination, also needs to be addressed in the context of diplomatic training. Finally, a theoretical dimension that ought to receive more attention is the applicability of a universal exemplar in diplomatic training to developing states. In the case of this study, it could be argued that sweeping generalisation of diplomatic training conditions in the Developing World makes the proposals too generic and thus idealistic to be of practical use. A redefinition of diplomatic training might thus be called for in the case of the Developing World.

For the limited purpose of this study, however, the initial research proposition is vindicated, in the sense that the benefits of diplomatic training to the Developing World have been found to be sufficiently compelling to render investment in this area of human resources development an absolute imperative. At the start of the new millennium, the international system is more complicated than ever, more polarised, less secure for its weakest members. For the Developing World, the universal challenges to diplomacy have been superimposed on developmental disadvantages, thus increasing and complicating the work of its diplomats. They have to compete against peers from the Developed World who have more bargaining power in foreign policy, superior diplomatic infrastructure to execute policy and the benefit of more extensive diplomatic training to enhance their skills in doing so. The Developing World's lack of comparative advantage in alternative

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foreign policy tools means that poorer states have little choice but to invest in diplomatic practice to advance their interests within the global community. In a fiercely competitive world, the stakes are high: foreign investment, employment, trade, tourism, development grants, peace versus war – indeed, the results of diplomacy have the potential to affect materially the standard of living of *every single* citizen of the Developing World, and in many cases their actual survival. This reality renders professional training for Developing World diplomats a relatively greater imperative than for their peers from developed countries. The high premium on human rather than any other resources as key national developmental assets means that Developing World governments, and by inference MFAs, should develop and utilise diplomats to their full strategic potential.

In summary, then, the research has provided a definitive answer to the fundamental research question through verification of the five subsidiary research propositions, namely:

a) The characteristics of the contemporary diplomatic arena present, on a universal scale, formidable challenges to diplomats, complicating and expanding the profession rather than simplifying or diminishing its practice.
b) The distinct impediments and imperatives of the 'diplomacy of development' impact significantly on the substance and form of Developing World diplomats' professional performance, thereby demanding enhanced diplomatic capacity.
c) On a global scale, career-specific training of diplomats is increasingly prioritised and professionalised as a means to meet contemporary challenges in international relations, hence trends in method, structure and content of diplomatic training reflect a growing convergence of best practice and standards in the field.
d) Specific circumstances within the Developing World, also within particular sub-groups of developing states, hold important challenges for diplomatic training that, on the one hand, render its increased prioritisation and professionalisation imperative and, on the other hand, necessitate its customised application.
e) In order to build crucial diplomatic capacity and to advance the diplomacy of development more effectively, developing countries must prioritise and implement diplomatic training that is customised yet reflects international benchmarking in method, structure and content.

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Eban (1998: 102) declares that "there is no effective substitute for the exercise of trained professional minds by those who understand the attitudes of other nations in their full complexity". To presume that any diplomat from any country can embark on a profession as complex as diplomacy without proper and adequate training, would be short-sighted. In the case of the Developing World, it would be patently irresponsible.

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My career in diplomacy has been much more than the education, privilege and adventure that it has been and continues to be. It has, above all, been a passion – one that I share with my husband, who greatly contributed to my resolve to research a subject of mutual professional experience and interest, namely diplomatic training. Our concern about the issue stems from our conviction that career-specific training for diplomats holds the key to more professional and ultimately more effective national representatives. These 'foot soldiers', we believe, are indispensable to developing countries such as our own because they have legal and circumstantial occasion to fight for our vital interests in the international arena.

I am indebted to the dozens of fellow diplomats, both South African and foreign, as well as various academics, journalists and other commentators on the diplomatic profession whom I have approached over the past few years for informal discussion on the relevance of diplomatic training. Their frank insights (solicited with the undertaking that they would not be quoted) did much to educate me about the enormous challenges facing diplomats at the cusp of the 21st century. They also, with very few exceptions, confirmed my conjecture that prioritisation of – hence investment in – diplomatic training is of critical importance to Developing World ministries of foreign affairs. Their advice assisted me in obtaining sufficient empirical substance for the research – much needed help in an area of study that is so expansive and often obscured from public scrutiny by formidable government bureaucracies.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the invaluable guidance of my supervisor, Prof Anton du Plessis. He is an academic of unshakeable intellectual integrity, and his calm but resolute approach to my work forced me to keep sight of the scientific purpose of the study, despite my very subjective disposition *vis-à-vis* the theme.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP	–	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
AEC	–	African Economic Community
ANC	–	African National Congress (South Africa)
ASEAN	–	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASIU	–	Albert Schweitzer International University
AU	–	African Union
BCE	–	before the common era
CAF	–	China-Africa Forum
CEEC	–	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFP	–	Comparative Foreign Policy
CFR	–	Centre for Foreign Relations (Tanzania)
CFSI	–	Canadian Foreign Service Institute
CNN	–	Cable News Network
CPDS	–	Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, Oxford
CSAS	–	Centre for Southern African Studies (University of the Western Cape)
DA	–	Diplomatic Academy
DAL	–	Diplomatic Academy of London
DFA	–	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFAIT	–	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DHRMD	–	Department of Human Resource Management and Development (Malawi)
DOS	–	Department of State (US)
DPSA	–	Department of Public Service and Administration (South Africa)
DRC	–	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSE	–	*Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung* (German Foundation for International Development)
DSP		Diplomatic Studies Programmes (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva)
EAC	–	East African Community

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EAI	–	European Academy of Informatization
ECA	–	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSOC	–	(United Nations) Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	–	Economic Community of West African States
EU	–	European Union
FCO	–	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDI	–	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD	–	Foundation for Global Dialogue (South Africa)
FSA	–	Foreign Service Academy (Pakistan)
FSI	–	Foreign Service Institute
FSLD	–	Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University)
FSP	–	Foreign Service Programme (Oxford University)
FSTC	–	Foreign Service Training Centre (Turkey)
FSTI	–	Foreign Service Training Institute (Japan)
FTA	–	Free Trade Area
G7	–	Group of Seven (industrialised countries)
G8	–	Group of Eight (G7 plus Russia)
G77	–	Group of 77 (developing countries)
GATT	–	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	–	Gulf Cooperation Council
GEAR	–	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan
GNP	–	Gross National Product
HDI	–	Human Development Index
HEI	–	Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (*Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Genève*)
HIPCs	–	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS	–	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HSRC	–	Human Science Research Council (South Africa)
IBRD	–	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (a.k.a. World Bank)
IBSA	–	India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum

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ICJ	–	International Court of Justice
ICT	–	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	–	International Diplomatic Academy (Switzerland)
IDFR	–	Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (Malaysia)
IDIS	–	Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (University of Nairobi)
IDS	–	Institute of Diplomatic Studies (Saudi Arabia)
IFA	–	Institute of Foreign Affairs (Thailand)
IFANS	–	Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)
IFDT	–	International Forum on Diplomatic Training
IGO	–	Inter-governmental Organisation
IIAP	–	International Institute for Public Administration (France) *(Institut International d'Administration Publique)*
IIR	–	Institute for International Relations (Vietnam)
IIRT	–	Institute of International Relations of the University of the West Indies in Trinidad
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
IOR-ARC	–	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IR	–	International Relations
IRIC	–	International Relations Institute of Cameroon
IS	–	International Studies
ISD	–	Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown University)
ISEN	–	National Foreign Service Institute (Argentina) (*Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación)*
ISRI	–	Higher Institute for International Relations (Mozambique)
ISU	–	International Studies Unit
IT	–	Information Technology
JID	–	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
JMCIS	–	Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies

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		(University of Economics, Prague)
LAIA	–	Latin American Integration Association
LDC	–	Least Developed Country
MDC	–	Management Development Centre
MDGs	–	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	–	Ministry of External Affairs
MEDAC	–	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (University of Malta)
MERCOSUR	–	Southern Cone Common Market (*Mercado Commún del Sur)*
MFA	–	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFR	–	Ministry of Foreign Relations
MFRCA	–	Ministry of Foreign Relations and Church Affairs (Costa Rica)
MGIMO	–	Moscow State Institute for International Relations
MNC	–	Multinational Corporation
MOFAT	–	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (ROK)
MOU	–	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	–	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	–	Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO	–	New International Economic Order
NGO	–	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	–	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	–	Official Development Assistance
OECD	–	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	–	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	–	Pan-Africanist Congress
PISA	–	Program of International Studies in Asia
PMD	–	Prime Minister's Department (Malaysia)
PRC	–	People’s Republic of China
RDA	–	Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs
RIA	–	Regional Integration Arrangement
ROK	–	Republic of Korea (South Korea)

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RSA	–	Republic of South Africa
SACU	–	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	–	Southern African Development Community
SAP	–	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDC	–	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
TBVC	–	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei
TNC	–	Transnational Corporation
UK	–	United Kingdom
UN	–	United Nations
UNCTAD	–	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	–	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	–	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	–	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR	–	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSC	–	United Nations Security Council
US	–	United States (of America)
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development
VDA	–	Diplomatic Academy in Vienna *(Vien Diplomatische Akademie)*
VDI	–	Virtual Diplomacy Initiative (United States Institute of Peace)
VIP	–	Very Important Person
WEF	–	World Economic Forum
WTO	–	World Trade Organisation
ZPCSA	–	Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic

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ADDENDUM A
International Forum on Diplomatic Training:
List of affiliated diplomatic academies and Institutes
of International Relations

Source: Internet web-site of the IFDT, information as on 26 April 2005. http://www.diplomacy.edu/ifdt-dir/view.asp and http://textus.diplomacy.edu/portals/ifdt/

Institution	Country/IGO
Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Albania
Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Algeria
Institute for International Relations	Angola
Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, Ministry of External Relations	Argentina
Diplomatische Akademie Wien	Austria
Academia Diplomática Rafael Bustillo	Bolivia
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Instituto Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Relations	Brazil
Department of International Relations, University of National and World Economy	Bulgaria
International Relations Institute of Cameroon, University of Yaoundé	Cameroon
Canadian Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	Canada
Diplomatic Academy *Andrés Bello,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Chile
Foreign Affairs College , Beijing	China (PRC)
Academia Diplomática de San Carlos, Ministry of External Relations	Colombia
Foreign Service Institute: *Manuel Maria de Peralta*, Ministry of Foreign Relations & Church Affairs	Costa Rica
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Croatia
Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales: Raúl Roa García	Cuba
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Czech Republic
Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies University of Economics, Prague	Czech Republic
Academia Diplomática de la República Dominicana	Dominican Rep.
Academia Diplomática Antonio J. Quevedo	Equador
Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Egypt
Estonian School of Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Estonia

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Institution	Country/IGO
Directorate General External Relations, European Commission	EU
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki	Finland
Institut International D'Administration Publique	France
Training Centre of the German Foreign Office	Germany
Leiter der Aus-und Fotbildungsstätte des Auswaertigen Amtes	Germany
Diplomatic Academy of Greece, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Greece
Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Guyana
Escuela de Diplomacia y Relaciones Internacionales	Honduras
Budapest Institute for Graduate International and Diplomatic Studies	Hungary
Department of International Relations and European Studies, Central European University	Hungary
Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of External Affairs	India
Centre for Education and Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Indonesia
Diplomatic Academy, University for International Relations	Iran
Department of Training and Human Resources Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Israel
The Bologna Center, Johns Hopkins University	Italy
Societa Italiana Organizzazioni Internationale	Italy
Istituto Diplomatico Mario Toscana, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Italy
Foreign Service Training Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Japan
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	Jordan
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Kazakhstan
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi	Kenya
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Korea (ROK)
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Kyrgyzstan
Diplomatic Academy for International Relations	Lebanon
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Macedonia
Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Prime Minister's Department	Malaysia
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies	Malta
Matías Romero Institute of Diplomatic Studies	Mexico
School of Foreign Service at the National University of Mongolia	Mongolia
Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations	Netherlands
Academia Diplomática José de Marcoleta	Nicaragua
Foreign Service Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Nigeria
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs	Norway

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Institution	Country/IGO
Omani Diplomatic Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Oman
Foreign Service Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Pakistan
Academia Diplomática, Ministry of External Relations	Panama
Academia Diplomática y Consular, Ministry of External Relations	Paraguay
Academia Diplomática del Peru, Ministry of External Relations	Peru
Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Philippines
PWSBIA (First independent University of Business and Government, Warsaw)	Poland
Jan Woroniecki Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Poland
The Polish Institute of International Affairs	Poland
Instituto Diplomatico, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Portugal
Academia Diplomatica Bucharest	Romania
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Russian Fed.
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)	Russian Fed.
Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Saudi Arabia
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Serbia& Montenegro
Akademia istrapolitana Nuova, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,	Slovakia
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Slovenia
Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs	South Africa
La Escuela Diplomática, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Spain
Bandaranaike international Diplomatic Training Institute	Sri Lanka
Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales	Switzerland
International Diplomatic Academy	Switzerland
Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Thailand
Institute of International Relations	Trinidad& Tobago
Diplomatic Institute for Training and Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Tunisia
Foreign Service Training Centre, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey
Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, University of Kiev	Ukraine
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ukraine
Emirates Institute of Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	UAE
International Peace Academy	UN/US
UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research)	UN
UNODP (UN Organisational Development Programme)	UN
Centre for Political & Diplomatic Studies	UK
Diplomatic Academy of London, University of Westminster	UK
Oxford University Department for Continuing Education	UK

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Institution	Country/IGO
Oxford University Foreign Service Programme	UK
SPIRE (School of Politics, IR and Environment), Keele University	UK
Instituto Artigas: Institute of Foreign Service, Ministry of External Relations	Uruguay
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University	US
Foreign Service Institute, Department of State	US
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University	US
University of World Economy and Diplomacy	Uzbekistan
Instituto de Altos Estudios Diplomáticos, Ministry of External Relations	Venezuela
Institute for International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Vietnam

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ADDENDUM B

PROPOSED BASIC DIPLOMATIC TRAINING CURRICULUM FOR DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMATS

Outline of curriculum:

1. National studies
1.1 general country overview
1.2 national foreign policy

2. International studies
2.1 international relations theory
2.2 international political and economic relations
2.3 international law

3. Study of own region and sub-region
3.1 Africa
3.2 Southern Africa

4. Studies in diplomacy I: Theory and history of diplomacy
4.1 diplomatic theory
4.2 history of diplomacy

5. Studies in diplomacy II: Diplomatic practice
5.1 institutional framework of diplomacy
5.2 methods of diplomacy
5.3 styles of diplomacy
5.4 functions and roles of diplomats

6. Studies in diplomacy III: Basic and auxiliary diplomatic skills
6.1 communication skills
6.2 negotiation skills
6.3 protocol and etiquette
6.4 representational skills
6.5 intellectual skills
6.6 management skills

7. Studies in diplomacy IV: Specialised areas of diplomatic practice
7.1 information handling
7.2 public diplomacy
7.3 economic diplomacy
7.4 multilateral diplomacy
7.5 conflict management
7.6 consular work

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Content of curriculum:

1. NATIONAL STUDIES

1.1 GENERAL COUNTRY OVERVIEW

*** historical overview**

*** political perspective**

political system (evolution of system, status of democracy, political parties); structure and functioning of government; ideology and value-system (including human rights and good governance)

*** socio-economic perspective**

evolution of economic system; macroeconomic performance; monetary and fiscal policy; developmental challenges and policy; natural and human resources; culture(s); societal issues and policies (*inter alia* gender, HIV/AIDS, death penalty); particular challenges faced by each government ministry; civil society organisation

*** security**

crime; ethnic or other internal conflicts; fundamentalism; environmental threats

*** national law**

national constitution (history of constitution, constitutional court, bill of human rights); relationship between national and international law, aspects of national law that impact on diplomatic roles and functions

*** national symbols**

history; significance

1.2 NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

*** formulation of foreign policy**

who makes foreign policy and how; role of diplomats and MFA in the process

*** execution of foreign policy**

various ministries involved; the role of the MFA; cooperation with non-state stake-holders

*** foreign policy objectives**

geopolitics; security concerns; participation in global governance (eg position on UNSC reform); regional/continental priorities; international economic objectives; policies on global issues (eg human rights, humanitarian intervention); harmonisation of foreign policy objectives with broader international agenda of the Developing World

*** status of foreign relations**

key partners; bilateral relations; multilateral relations; polylateral relations; regional relations; global diplomatic representation; foreign representation in own capital.

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2. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

2.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

*** contending theories and approaches to IR**
rationalist paradigms; social constructivism; reflectivist theories

*** foreign policy theory**
definitions of foreign policy; foreign policy analysis; the tools of foreign policy

*** interplay among IR, foreign policy and diplomacy**

*** the Developing World and IR theory**

2.2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

*** the international system**
evolution; contemporary features; actors (states, IGOs NGOs; MNCs, sub-national actors); power relations; political systems

*** international trade and finance**
economic systems; basic economic terms and indicators; micro and macroeconomics; international economic policy; structure and dynamics of the international trade system; international financial regime; multinational companies.

*** multilateral studies** *(see multilateral diplomacy)*

*** regional studies**
major regions of the world (historical, political, social and economic issues; values and norms intra-regional relations; international agenda); regional integration as a phenomenon; history and evolution of selected RIAs (Eg EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR).

***developmental studies**
conceptual perspectives on the Developing World; commonalities of developing states; evolution and status of North-South relations; South-South cooperation; Developing World institutions (*inter alia* NAM, G77); the South's socio-political agenda (internationalising human rights, institutionalising the right to development, quest for sovereignty and right to self-determination, non-intervention *versus* humanitarian intervention, eradicating inter and intra-state conflicts, democratising global political governance); the South's economic agenda (eradication of poverty, debt cancellation, preserving ODA, re-designing the 'international financial architecture', making international trade more equitable, securing FDI, bridging the technological divide, sustaining development); impact of SAPs; aid (bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, types of aid, critiques of aid)

*** peace and security**
disarmament; non-proliferation and arms control; peacekeeping; international terrorism; humanitarian intervention; environment and security; diplomacy and security; inter and intra-state conflicts

*** global issues**
globalisation; democracy; human rights; the environment; energy; hunger; sustainable development; fundamentalism; humanitarian crises; crime

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2.3 INTERNATIONAL LAW

*** historical evolution**
*** sources and evidence**
*** subjects of international law**
(including disputed subjects, liberation movements etc)
*** relationship between international and municipal law**
*** public international law**
*** treaty law**
*** law of the sea**
*** international human rights law**
*** international humanitarian law**
*** diplomatic law**
*** statehood**
sovereignty, recognition
*** pacific settlement of disputes**.

3. STUDY OF OWN REGION AND SUB-REGION

(Note: Africa/Southern Africa has been selected as an example, it would be the selected region/sub-region for study by diplomats from Southern Africa)

3.1 REGION: AFRICA

*** history**
pre-colonisation; colonisation; struggle for independence; decolonisation; post-colonisation
*** socio-economic profile**
geography, cultural diversity, developmental challenges (structural and systemic constraints to development), international responses
*** political profile**
political systems, intra and inter-state conflict areas; quest for political unity (history of regional integration, existing RIAs, predecessors of the AU); human rights (including African Court of Human Rights, African Commission on Human and People's Rights; status of women)
***African Renaissance**
origin, philosophy, action plan, institutions, diplomatic implications, NEPAD
* **African Union**
evolution, institutional analysis, prospects, problems, diplomatic implications

3.2 SUB-REGION: SOUTHERN AFRICA

*** history**
*** socio-economic profile**
geography, cultural diversity, socio-economic challenges, intra-regional trade and other relations
*** political profile**
political systems, conflict areas; quest for regional integration, international relations
* **institutional analysis of SADC**

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4. STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY I: THEORY AND HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

4.1 DIPLOMATIC THEORY

*** categories of diplomatic theory**

*** conceptual perspectives on diplomacy**

definitions of diplomacy, diplomacy as a state-centric activity, diplomacy as representation, diplomacy as a normative concept; diplomacy as intermediation, diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy

*** diplomatic theory and foreign policy theory**

*** diplomatic theory and IR theory**

4.2 HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

*** pre-20th century evolution of diplomacy**

bureaucratisation; institutionalisation; legalisation; and professionalisation of diplomacy

*** challenges to the profession brought on by 20th century developments**

globalisation and fragmentation; challenges to state sovereignty; expansion of the international society; the growth of personal diplomacy; the technological revolution; diversification and expansion of the agenda of diplomacy; 'democratisation' of diplomacy; growth of multilateralism

*** the response of the profession to these challenges**

MFA transformation; polylateral diplomacy (see methods of diplomacy); using technology; training

5. STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY II: DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

5.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF DIPLOMACY

*** legal framework of diplomatic practice**

Vienna Conventions; privileges, immunities and responsibilities of diplomats; diplomatic law (if not covered by international law)

*** ministries of foreign affairs**

structure and organisation; functions; relationship with broader government; particular problems facing developing MFAs

*** diplomatic missions**

types of missions; categories and duties of mission staff; responsibilities and limitations of missions; factors that determine number and location of missions

5.2 METHODS OF DIPLOMACY

*** bilateral diplomacy**

conventional and unconventional diplomacy; establishment and termination of relations; bilateral diplomacy in the absence of permanent missions.

*** multilateral diplomacy**

parliamentary/governance diplomacy; conference diplomacy; associative diplomacy

*** summitry**

reasons for the phenomenon; pro's and con's; the role of personal diplomacy; the role of diplomats

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*** diplomatic mediation**
difference from other forms of mediation; good offices
* **polylateral diplomacy**
manifestations of non-state diplomacy; cooperation between state and non-state actors; the new government-to-people specialisations within diplomatic practice (definitions of public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, media diplomacy)

5.3 STYLES OF DIPLOMACY
*** the evolution of diplomatic style**
traditional diplomacy; new/open diplomacy; Cold War diplomacy; post-Cold War diplomacy
*** determinants of style**
negotiating behaviour; preference for open or secret diplomacy; kinds of envoys used; diplomatic language; preferred institutions; types of treaty instruments
*** variables that affect the differences among diplomatic styles**
'ppen' or 'closed' states; foreign policy objectives; state position in the international system; bureaucratic traditions; level of development
*** prevailing styles in the Developing World**
personal diplomacy; advocacy diplomacy; radical diplomacy

5.4 FUNCTIONS AND ROLES OF DIPLOMATS
*** the professional agents of diplomacy**
legal interpretation of diplomats, professional interpretation, historical and contemporary profiling (qualities, skills, knowledge)
*** *de jure* functions of diplomats**
representation; negotiation; interests protection; information gathering and reporting; relations building.
*** *de facto* roles of modern diplomats**
roles emanating from the various *de jure* functions; additional technical and bureaucratic roles

6. STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY III: BASIC AND AUXILIARY DIPLOMATIC SKILLS

6.1 COMMUNICATION SKILLS
*** intercultural communication** (*see also cultural diplomacy*).
ethnocentric variations in communication styles; knowing the taboos; overcoming the drawbacks of verbosity and rhetoric,
*** interpersonal communication**
non-verbal communication; formal and informal communication; voice control; personal image control; conflict management; listening skills
*** public speaking** (*see also public diplomacy*)
preparation and presentation of/participation in lectures, meetings, media interviews, debates, panel discussions; voice control; non-verbal signals
* **networking and lobbying**

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* **effective writing**
persuasive and professional correspondence; writing of political reports, minutes, speeches, submissions, memoranda; speaking notes; note taking, diplomatic correspondence (if not included with protocol)

6.2 NEGOTIATION SKILLS

*** negotiation typology**
*** negotiation paradigms**
*** negotiation phases**
*** assessing own negotiating capacity**
analysing own style; composing delegations; strengths and weaknesses; possible improvements
*** procedural aspects of negotiation**
preparation for the process; information gathering on opponent's negotiating strategy and tactics; determination of own negotiating strategy and tactics; definition of objectives; interests analysis for all the parties to the process; understanding of the nature and elements of the persuasion process; setting of agendas; focusing on essentials and priorities; troubleshooting
*** packaging agreements**
*** negotiating with domestic stake holders in diplomacy**

6.3 PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE

*** protocol**
history and application of protocol; appropriate use of national symbols; official table of precedence, official forms of address, VIP seating arrangements; diplomatic correspondence; diplomatic terminology; presentation of ambassadorial credentials; guidelines for state and official visits
***business etiquette**
telephone/fax/e-mail etiquette; office behaviour; punctuality; follow-up imperative; dress code
*** social etiquette**
introductions, being both a gracious guest and a gracious host, invitations format, restaurant etiquette, culinary jargon, compiling menus in light of religious and health restrictions, table plans, dress codes, respecting local customs/taboos

6.4 REPRESENTATIONAL SKILLS

*** spatial aesthetics**
chancery and residence decorating (using cultural goods, using accessible, affordable resources); planning a public image
*** entertaining**
arranging parties, receptions; alcoholic beverages (serving them, wine tasting; handling excessive users) pro's and cons of home entertaining; using indigenous cuisine and decor; using entertainment opportunities to network
*** personal style**
wardrobe planning; grooming; dressing for success

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6.5 INTELLECTUAL SKILLS

* **professional ethics**
* **emotional intelligence**
* **speed reading and note taking**
* **observation skills**
* **thinking skills**

  logical and vertical thinking; creative and lateral thinking; inductive and deductive reasoning; strategic thinking; decision-making; critical judgement; assimilation

* **analysis**

  applying thinking skills; communicating an analysis; method of political and economic risk analysis

* **problem-solving**

  identifying, defining and diagnosing causes of problems; evaluating alternative solutions; selecting and implementing options

* **memory training**

6.6 MANAGEMENT SKILLS

* **various norms and styles of management**

  traditional, professional; influence of personality types

* **management principles**

  planning, organising, leading and controlling

* **office administration**
* **overview of mission administration**
* **effective meetings**

  organising; chairing meetings; logistics (securing venues; creating proper ambience; use of audio-visual equipment); etiquette during meetings; preparation and follow-up; taking minutes; setting an agenda

* **human resources management**

  teambuilding and fostering *esprit de corps*; inter-personal conflict management; supervision of personnel; mentoring; stress management

* **time and work-load management**

  setting and achieving goals and objectives, delegation; scheduling, establishing priorities; identifying and eliminating sources of interruption

* **financial management**

  drawing up budgets, evaluating budgets; financial ethics

* **project management**

  characteristics of a project, structure and criteria for selection, starting a project, managing a project, identifying and cooperating with stakeholders, objective analysis

* **events management**

  planning and coordination of events such as conferences, exhibitions, large receptions and official visits (securing venues, arranging props, invitations, MC procurement, logistics, emergency alternatives, financial arrangements, follow-up imperative).

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7. STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY IV: SPECIALISED AREAS OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

7.1 INFORMATION HANDLING

*** the IT revolution**

Impact on diplomacy; RDA

*** collection of information**

purpose of information gathering; parameters of diplomatic information gathering (distinction between diplomatic information gathering and intelligence activities, legal issues); methods of information gathering; using sources

*** analysis of information**

interpretation and evaluation of information; updating information, verification of facts

*** dissemination of information**

methods of information dissemination; targeting recipients, being a source oneself

*** pitfalls of information handling**

human error; propaganda and planted information; hype; sensationalism

*** security of information**

diplomatic mail bags, cryptography, combination locks, IT system security; personal code of conduct

*** IT literacy**

use of personal computers; internet use (how to find and disseminate electronic information; setting up and maintaining sites); accessing distance learning; spreadsheets; data bases; word-processing

7.2 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

*** explaining the phenomenon**

public opinion and 'soft power', relationship with propaganda, identifying 'the public' (Influential groups, clients of diplomacy, foreign as well as domestic)

*** networking**

multi-dimensional interconnectivity within a host country; cultivating contacts, maintaining contact lists, business cards

*** public diplomacy campaigns**

gauging public opinion; influencing policy decisions, using publicity material; handling consultants and friendship groups; countering negative country-image; identifying and targeting groups, branding (marketing of own country and its policies); garnering soft power support

*** media diplomacy**

understanding types of media and how they function (historical and changing role and the sociological, political and economic impact on society); identifying target audiences and securing media coverage to reach them; preparation of press releases; letters to the editor; supplements, radio/TV/print media interviews; media briefings; do's and don'ts in liaison with journalists; legal aspects of media diplomacy (issues such as defamation); media arrangements during official visits

*** cultural diplomacy**

cultural diversity, handling culture shock; intercultural communication (*see communication skills*); promoting cultural/educational exchanges

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7.3 ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

*** economic analysis**

analysing basic economic indicators; economic risk analysis; describing, explaining and making predictions about own economy's development as well as trends in the international economic system

*** conduct of economic negotiations**

obtaining and scheduling loans; countering trade protectionism; debt management; pursuing bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation agreements and strategies

*** ODA management**

*** joint ventures**

identifying recipient developmental projects, identifying partners, procuring involvement, trouble shooting

*** investment procurement**

identifying suitable areas, eg infrastructural development; promoting relations with major MNCs

*** trade promotion**

export promotion; participation in trade fairs and exhibitions; international marketing; trade-dispute settlement; techniques of commercial relations

*** collaborative relations with own private sector**

liaison with state's business sector and NGOs involved in economic developmental projects; steering action by diplomats; choice of businesses to be included in national delegations; identification of agendas.

7.4 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

*** evolution and importance of multilateralism**

*** manifestations of multilateralism** *(see also diplomatic methods)*

*** regional multilateralism** (*see int. political and economic relations*)

*** multilateral systems**

the UN system (history, role, structure, functioning, challenges and achievements); economic multilateral organisations (WTO, UNCTAD, Bretton Woods system); social multilateral organisations (WHO; UNICEF; UNESCO) security-related multilateral organisations (i.a. NATO; UNSC)

*** *modus operandi* of multilateral diplomacy**

procedural issues; structure and legal framework of multilateralism

*** operational techniques**

drafting of resolutions; chairing meetings; conducting multilateral negotiations; constructing and mobilising political coalitions; lobbying

*** using multilateral settings for bilateral engagement**

7.5 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

*** analysing conflicts**

causes of conflicts and disputes, nature of conflict, course of conflict

*** conflict management styles**

*** impact of conflicts on the conduct of diplomacy**

*** preventative diplomacy**

setting up early warning systems; identifying potential conflicts; bilateral and multilateral strategies

*** conflict resolution**

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methods of dispute settlement (adjudication, arbitration, diplomatic methods including mediation and negotiation); role of individual personalities, strategies

*** peacekeeping**

military involvement, post-conflict peace-building

*** good offices**

7.6 CONSULAR WORK

*** scope of consular activities**

*** legal framework**

constitutional issues, visa and immigration policy, citizenship

*** consular work as public diplomacy**

*** aspects of consular assistance**

protecting and helping nationals abroad;; acting as notary and civil registrar, mediation in civil disputes; dealing with refugees and asylum seekers, issuing travel documents, visas and work permits.

***crisis management**

consular assistance in times of natural disaster or political turmoil, logistical management, setting up of an emergency operations centre, liaison with appropriate international agencies

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SUMMARY

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING WORLD DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ASSESSMENT OF PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

by

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Degree for which thesis is presented:
Doctor Philosophiæ (International Relations)

This thesis examines perspectives on the role of contemporary diplomatic training in meeting the challenge of Developing World diplomacy at the cusp of the 21st century. An historical overview of diplomatic practice reveals that in the course (particularly the second half) of the past century, changes in the form and substance of international relations have confronted the profession on an unprecedented scale and increased exponentially the scope, methods and diversity of stakeholders in diplomacy. These changes have spawned widespread critical reflection on the *raison d'être* of professional diplomacy, but the study contends that in the more demanding and competitive contemporary environment diplomats are actually experiencing affirmation of their *de jure* functions and a marked increase in their *de facto* roles.

The research also highlights the emergence during the same period of the 'Developing World' – a group of states that share a sense of present and historical vulnerability *vis-à-vis* the more developed, industrialised nations of the Developed World. In an attempt to overcome its comparative lack of power in the global arena, the less-developed group has positioned itself as a distinct diplomatic assemblage with an ambitious agenda and assertive approach, known as the diplomacy of

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development. The general absence of competitive advantage in other foreign policy tools has bestowed on diplomacy a key role as guarantor of the Developing World's symbolic and practical presence in the global arena. It is precisely in this area of diplomatic capacity, however, that an exigency exists, as professional diplomats continue to be neglected state resources in many developing countries.

An investigation into contemporary diplomatic practice reveals that challenges to the profession are increasingly prompting authorities all over the world to enhance diplomats' performance by means of career-specific training. Recognition of its advantages is informing the global trend to widen and deepen institutionalised training and is contributing to the growing convergence of international practice in the field. In spite of this phenomenon, in many parts of the Developing World – particularly Sub-Saharan Africa – daunting obstacles to diplomatic training are inversely proportionate to capacity. Certain sub-groups of the Developing World, such as new states and states in transition, present even greater challenges – and, conversely even greater demand – for diplomatic training.

The study finds that the long-term benefits of diplomatic training are sufficiently compelling to render imperative a strategic commitment by Developing World ministries of foreign affairs to this area of human resource development. In addition, more proactive but circumspect participation in international cooperation in the field is necessary. The establishment of domestic diplomatic training capacity is presented as an ideal, provided that the norms of international best practice in structure, method and content of training are heeded, and that programmes are adequately customised to focus on the pursuit of the diplomacy of development. In conclusion, thus, the fundamental research proposition is verified in the sense that diplomatic training is found to be instrumental in meeting the challenge of 21st century Developing World diplomacy.

KEY TERMS:
diplomat, diplomacy, diplomatic practice, diplomatic profession, diplomatic training, diplomatic training standards, capacity building, ministry of foreign affairs/foreign ministry, Developing World, diplomacy of development, international relations.

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SAMEVATTING

DIE UITDAGING VAN ONTWIKKELENDE WÊRELD DIPLOMASIE IN DIE 21STE EEU: 'N BEOORDELING VAN PERSPEKTIEWE AANGAANDE HEDENDAAGSE DIPLOMATIEKE OPLEIDING

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Doctor Philosophiæ (Internasionale Verhoudinge)

Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek perspektiewe aangaande die uitdaging van Ontwikkelende Wêreld diplomasie aan die begin van die 21ste eeu, en die rol van hedendaagse diplomatieke opleiding in die ondervanging daarvan. 'n Historiese oorsig van diplomatieke praktyk bring aan die lig dat veranderinge in die aard en inhoud van internasionale betrekkinge, veral in die tweede helfte van die afgelope eeu, die professie konfronteer het op 'n ongekende skaal en die spektrum en metodes van, sowel as die diversiteit van aandeelhouers in, diplomasie eksponensiëel vermeerder het. Hierdie veranderinge het aanleiding gegee tot wydverspreide kritiese refleksie op die *raison d'être* van professionele diplomasie. Nietemin bevind die studie dat, in die meer veeleisende en mededingende hedendaagse omgewing, diplomate inderdaad bevestiging van hulle *de jure* funksies en 'n merkbare vermeerdering in hulle *de facto* rolle ondervind.

Die navorsing beklemtoon ook die verskyning, tydens dieselfde periode, van die 'Ontwikkelende Wêreld' – 'n groep state wat 'n gemeenskaplike bewussyn het van teenswoordige en historiese kwetsbaarheid *vis-à-vis* die meer ontwikkelde, geïndustrialiseerde state van die Ontwikkelde Wêreld. In 'n poging om sy relatiewe gebrek aan mag in die globale arena te besweer, het die minder-ontwikkelde groep

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homself posisioneer as ‘n afsonderlike diplomatieke groepering met ‘n ambisieuse agenda en assertiewe benadering, bekend as die diplomasie van ontwikkeling. Die algemene afwesigheid van kompeterende voordeel in ander instrumente van buitelandse beleid het aan diplomasie ‘n sleutelrol verleen as waarborg van die Ontwikkelende Wêreld se simboliese en praktiese teenwoordigheid in the globale arena. Dit is egter juis in die area van diplomatieke kapasiteit dat ‘n nood bestaan, aangestaan diplomate in baie ontwikkelende state steeds verwaarloosde menslike hulpbronne is.

‘n Ondersoek na hedendaagse diplomatieke praktyk bring aan die lig dat die professie se uitdagings toenemend en wêreldwyd owerhede noop om diplomate se prestasie te bevorder deur middel van loopbaangerigte opleiding. Erkenning van die voordele daarvan dra by tot die globale neiging om geïnstitusionaliseerde diplomatieke opleiding te verbreed en te verdiep en dra by tot groeiende konvergensie van internasionale praktyk in die veld. Ongeag hierdie verskynsel heers daar in verskeie dele van die Ontwikkelende Wêreld – veral in Sub-Sahara Afrika – ‘n omgekeerde eweredigheid tussen intimiderende struikelblokke tot diplomatieke opleiding enersyds, en kapasiteit andersyds. Sekere subgroepe van die Ontwikkelende Wêreld, soos nuwe state en state in oorgang, ondervind selfs groter uitdagings, sowel as ‘n groter aanvraag na diplomatieke opleiding.

Die studie bevind dat die langtermyn voordele van diplomatieke opleiding voldoende gebiedend is om te bepaal dat ‘n strategiese verbintenis tot ontwikkeling van hierdie area van menslike hulpbronne ‘n absolute imperatief is vir ontwikkelende ministeries van buitelandse sake. Daarbenewens is meer proaktiewe dog deurdagte deelname in internasionale samewerking in die veld ‘n noodsaaklikheid. Die vestiging van binnelandse diplomatieke opleidingskapasiteit word aangebied as ideaal, mits die norme van internasionale beste praktyk in struktuur, metode en inhoud van opleiding gehandhaaf word, en programme sodanig rondom kliëntspesifieke behoeftes ontwerp word dat hulle fokus op die diplomasie van ontwikkeling. Ten slotte word die fundamentele navorsingsproposisie geverifieer, in die sin dat bevind is dat diplomatieke opleiding

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instrumenteel is om die uitdaging van Ontwikkelende Wêreld diplomasie in die 21ste eeu te ondervang.

SLEUTELKONSEPTE:

diplomaat, diplomasie, diplomatieke praktyk, diplomatieke professie, diplomatieke opleiding, diplomatieke opleidingstandaarde, kapasiteitsbou, ministerie van buitelandse sake/buitelandse ministerie, Ontwikkelende Wêreld, diplomasie van ontwikkeling, internasionale verhoudinge.

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