for the morning ride at sunrise—an almost invariable custom in India in the hot weather. The Punjab post generally arrived an hour or two after midnight; and for months he never had a night's rest unbroken by the arrival of expresses, often three or four times in a night, requiring immediate attention. But such was his nerve and calmness of mind that he would fall asleep again, almost in an instant, and waste no time in lying awake. With all the burden of responsibility and of administrative work, civil, military, and political, that rested on his shoulders; with all his powers of body and mind worked and strained to the utmost, he maintained the same unruffled temper and courtesy, the same unvarying cheerfulness; there was the same gentle, deliberate voice and quiet smile, the same deep and constant faith in the presence and over-ruling government of God. "I always prepare," he said, in a letter to his wife in England, "to the best of my power, and then make up my mind by the blessing of God we shall succeed. And I have found it so hitherto."

At the end of August, when matters were about at the worst, he writes as follows, to his sister Mrs. Hart, as to whether Mrs. Frere should come out to him or not:—

"I must tell you why I do not tell Katie to remain in England. As far as she is concerned, I think she will suffer less from anxiety and alarm when out here than at home, with those terrible intervals of suspense between the mails. By November we must be having *our* innings and rolling back the tide of rebellion, and if anything delays us she will soon hear enough to prevent her coming.

"On other than personal grounds I think it very important not to defer her coming, for the alarm and feeling of insecurity among our own people seem to me among the great difficulties we have to contend with; and to live as if we fully intended to remain here and to go on as before, seems to me an important duty. I have told her exactly how matters stand, and have such confidence in her judg-

ment that I propose leaving the course she will pursue to her, assured that if she defers her journey it will be from very good reasons, and if she comes out, that public good will attend her being allowed to follow the dictates of her own feelings, insomuch as the prospect of her coming and her arrival will help to maintain confidence and allay alarm, which is as difficult and important a part of my duty as any. You know I have never from the first thought it more than possible that the evil might be checked, and warned Government two months ago that if the thing was to be done in one campaign, they must begin at once and not lose a day. I own the extent of blundering in various quarters has been more than I bargained for, and the amount of preparation in England less, but by October they will be thoroughly roused at home, and if they do not put forth the whole power of the nation to recover their lost ground, why, we may shut up at once."

Serious illness amongst her children detained Mrs. Frere in England as she was preparing to return to India. She did not go till a year later.

Relying as he did on an attitude of calm confidence as of transcendent importance, it was with consternation that Frere heard of a proposal,—urged in the teeth of Colonel Herbert Edwardes's strenuous protest,—that should the stress of circumstances continue, Peshawur should be voluntarily ceded to the Affghans to conciliate their good-will.

Dost Mahomed, deposed with such unfortunate consequences by the British expedition in 1839, and reinstated at the conclusion of the war, was still the ruler of Affghanistan. During the Sikh War he had sent a contingent of cavalry to aid the Sikhs, but it had been signally routed by a very much smaller force of the Sind Horse at the battle of Goojerat, and chased to the entrance of the Khyber. Thenceforward Dost Mahomed, convinced that the British power was destined to prevail, sought our

alliance. Overtures were made by him to Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawur, in 1854. By the latter's perseverance and persistency, and in spite of Sir J. Lawrence's reiterated expression of opinion that a treaty with Dost Mahomed was impossible, or, if possible, useless, or worse than useless, a treaty *was* made with him in 1855. This was followed by still closer relations and a second treaty, negotiated by Edwardes, which Lawrence, still unconvinced, ratified on January 26, 1857, and in virtue of which Dost Mahomed was to receive a lakh of rupees a month during the continuance of the Persian War, and which was subsequently continued to him fourteen months longer—to September 30, 1858.

Four months later the Mutiny broke out. Thirsting to take vengeance for past defeats and to recover Peshawur which had once been under their sway, the Affghan warriors were eager to attack the British, and make common cause with the mutineers. Nothing but the personal power of Dost Mahomed, and his determination loyally to maintain the treaty, could have prevented an Affghan invasion at the crisis of the Mutiny, which must have driven the British from the Punjab, and probably also from the Bengal Presidency. Of all Edwardes's great services to India, the conclusion of this treaty was the most important. But from Lawrence he never obtained the credit he deserved for it.*

Though differing from him on many important points, Frere fully appreciated the high merit and great services to India of Lawrence, to assist whom in taking Delhi and preserving the Punjab he was now straining every nerve, and denuding his own province of European troops. Six months after this time he wrote to Lord Elphinstone—

* See *Macmillan's Magazine*, February, 1891.

"I was very glad to see the honours conferred on Sir J. Lawrence, but they hardly seem to me to be adequate to the service he has rendered, which I rate more highly every day I see more of the sort of demoralization which had pervaded the officers as well as men of that army."

And to Mr. Mangles:

"By almost superhuman energy and ability Sir J. Lawrence has kept the Punjab quiet—at least free from formidable revolt."

Therefore his dismay was the greater when he heard of Lawrence's proposal to cede, in certain eventualities, Peshawur and the adjacent territory to the Affghans. The proposal reached Frere on its way to Lord Canning. He wrote immediately to Lawrence:—

"June 29, 1857.

"I must say I should be for holding Peshawur at all hazards. We may hope for some reinforcements in August, and very large ones in September and October, and even if they had to re-enact Jellalabad at Peshawur, it would be better than risking the demoralizing effect of a contrary course."

And again two days later he writes:—

"I trust that no extremity will induce you to abandon Peshawur. While you hold it, with Lahore and Mooltan, you are, in the opinion of every native chief, Lord of the Punjab, even if you command nothing beyond the reach of your guns. The voluntary evacuation of any of the three would have a very bad moral effect everywhere out of the Punjab, and I should hardly think the troops which you would thus be enabled to withdraw to the east of the Indus would be more than a counterpoise for the additional disorder which would follow in the Punjab itself, and which will be kept down as long as you continue to hold Peshawur. I may be wrong, but I should regard the loss of Peshawur by mutiny or rebellion as a much smaller calamity. Natives always make allowances in such cases,

and their opinion of our power would be less shocked than by a voluntary evacuation.

"Would it be any assistance to you if we could garrison Mooltan from this? I think we could manage it if we got even a small portion of our Persian force back—and they may be daily looked for."

To Lord Elphinstone he writes, July 2 :—

"I enclose a copy letter from Sir J. Lawrence. You will, I think, be sorry to see him still meditating the evacuation of Peshawur as a measure to be adopted *in extremis*, should Delhi not fall. I enclose an extract from my reply, written in great haste to save post. I think it would be sounder policy to draw in every outpost and stand a siege in Peshawur, Mooltan, and Lahore. While he holds these three posts he will find no difficulty in recovering the rest of the Punjab when reinforcements arrive three or four months hence; but it is impossible to foresee the end of the evils which may result from such a confession of our weakness as a voluntary abandonment of the gate of India. I think he must have underestimated our chances of reinforcement, and if so, good may result from the details I gave him of possible aid from England. I have asked him if he would wish us to occupy Mooltan. We could do it even now, if we had a good officer to command, and could get but one more Native Infantry Regiment from the Gulf. But managing native troops in these days is just like riding a troublesome horse—easy to a man who knows how to do it and has nerve, but not to be done by a man who requires to be told how to sit and hold the reins, and who lacks confidence in himself or his steed."

Lord Canning decided against surrendering Peshawur in any event. Although no direct communication on the question passed between Frere and him, it is believed that the former's strongly expressed opinion being passed on to him by Lord Elphinstone had much to do with his decision, and it was a great support to Herbert Edwardes and those who agreed with him. Long afterwards Frere was asked if he had ever doubted during the Mutiny about

the final result of the struggle. He said, "Never, except once, and that was when it was proposed to abandon Peshawur." *

At the first outbreak, in May, Frere had, as we have seen, expressed his confidence both in the tranquillity of Sind and in the fidelity of the Bombay Native Regiments. But the plague could not be stayed in its course even where the conditions were so little favourable to it and the precautions so wisely and carefully taken. Ever since the middle of May the rebel standard had been flying triumphantly at Delhi. Thither for four long, anxious, dreadful months were turned all eyes and ears in every town and hamlet from end to end of India. Was it true, as had been foretold, or was it false that the English Raj was hastening to its end? As long as the ancient city of the Moguls defied all the efforts of the British power and the mutinous Sepoys successfully resisted our arms, the opinion that that power was doomed strengthened and spread swiftly and silently amongst the great army of waverers, who, in all Oriental races, accustomed to sudden changes of dynasty and subversions of authority, are ever watching the signs of the times, that they may take part with the strongest and be found on the winning side. Religious fanatics, emissaries from Delhi, from Persia, from Affghanistan; agents of Nana Sahib, and of many another intriguing native, swarmed through the country, appealing each to his particular race or sect; letters from

* "When the good news began to come in from Delhi, one of the great Sikh Sirdars, on being exultingly informed of it, paid little attention, but asked significantly, 'What news from Peshawur?' 'Excellent; all quiet there,' answered his informant; 'but why do you always ask so anxiously about Peshawur?' The Sikh hesitated, and taking his scarf, began rolling it from the corner. 'See,' he said, 'if Peshawur goes, the whole Punjab will be rolled up in rebellion like this.'"—*Macmillan's Magazine*, February, 1891.

the mutineers in Delhi, in Oude, and elsewhere, some enigmatically, some plainly worded, came by the post to their relations and friends in the Native Regiments in Sind, calling on them to make common cause with them. And within Sind, at Jacobabad on the frontier, was a Bengal Regiment, the 6th Irregular Cavalry, which the Bengal Government dared not recall, and which, teeming with disaffection, was only kept from open mutiny by the single regiment of Sind Horse, commanded in Jacob's absence by Merewether, who, silent and unflinching, had the task of guarding them added to the now more than ever responsible duty of watching the frontier.

Gradually it came to the knowledge of the officers that some of the Bombay native regiments in Sind were no longer free from the taint. None could say how far it would spread, and Frere, pretty well assured that an outbreak of some sort would occur before long, confronted the situation with a European force for the whole province, numbering—sick men and recruits included—less than five hundred British bayonets, and of effectives less than three hundred and fifty.*

Jacob's return from Persia with the other regiment of Sind Horse had been eagerly looked for, and it was a keen disappointment to find that when at last they did reach Kurrachee, it was only to touch there on the way to Bombay. Merewether, who had been more uneasy about the 6th Bengal Cavalry than he chose to confess, even to himself, had written on hearing of the arrival of the Sind Horse to beg they might be sent up as speedily as possible by squadrons or even by troops; and he spoke more freely than he had before done of the 6th Bengal Cavalry. Their disorderly habits and bad example were doing much harm. When the Punjab authorities were

* Frere to Lawrence.

asked if they wanted the 6th back again, they always declined; and so bad was their reputation in their own army that their comparatively tolerable conduct on the Sind frontier was a constant theme of remark. Under these circumstances, Frere, while sending on the bulk of the regiment of Sind Horse to Bombay, detained a detachment, which, including some sick and unfit for service, amounted to a hundred or a hundred and ten men. These he decided to send on immediately to their head-quarters at Jacobabad. He writes to Lord Elphinstone :—

"August 20, 1857.

"It will add to the number of Captain Merewether's own men on whom he can depend, and as the number of the body returning from Persia will not be diminished by report as they go through the Hills, their return will probably have more effect than their actual number warrants, and even a few returning to give an account of the absentees to the families, etc., at Jacobabad will be satisfactory to all parties.

"I was rather struck with the manner of the old Rissaldar when he asked me the reason of their going to the Deccan. He seemed satisfied with what he was told, but his first impression seemed to me to have been that there must be some reason beyond what he had heard.

"I have of late observed among many of the Sepoys when talking to them, an expression, not perhaps of distrust, but of puzzle as to what the Government meant to do; and it occurred to me that the effect would, in every way, be good if a small detachment went back to Jacobabad, carrying news as eye-witnesses of doings in Persia, and able to assure the wives, families, and comrades at Jacobabad that we have neither eaten the rest of the 2nd Regiment, nor inveigled them beyond sea for any sinister purpose.

"You can have no idea of the absurd stories circulated here and probably in every station, not only as to the intention of some unknown body of natives against us, but of ours against the native community—an indiscriminate massacre in revenge for the Cawnpore atrocities is to be

one of our mildest measures. It is not merely ladies and their ayahs and half-caste clerks who are answerable for this mischievous nonsense, but many men and officers who ought to know better, though usually the responsibility of originating the story is so divided that it is not possible to get hold of any one who can be made an example of.

"I hope the postal restrictions on native correspondence will be lightened as much as possible, for the distrust and alarm is much aggravated by want of intelligence as to what is going on. I had told the Inspecting Post-master here to desire his deputies to take the local authorities into their councils before acting on the instructions they had received. But on further inquiry I found the mischief was already done, and it was better to let him and them alone. These deputy post-masters, here at all events, are people utterly unfitted, by their condition and education, to discharge properly so confidential and delicate a duty as that of opening and passing an opinion on the innocuous or treasonable character of the whole correspondence of the native troops, and the whole arrangement seems to me one of the many mischievous results of emancipating the post-office from the authority of the local government and their representatives."

The plan of the mutineers in Sind, so far as they had any definite plan, seems to have been to seize the fort at Hyderabad, and make it a rallying place like Delhi; then to cause simultaneous outbreaks at Kurrachee, Shikarpur, Jacobabad, and Mooltan in the Lower Punjab. The premature discovery of disaffection at each place disconcerted the whole scheme.

The first alarm was at Hyderabad. On the evening of September 8, a native Soobedar-Major of Artillery informed his Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Battiscombe, that the men had been holding secret meetings and hatching treason. Battiscombe reported this to Brigadier Morris, and the report having been confirmed, the following evening the guns were taken possession of by the Europeans, the police, and a hundred picked men of the 13th Native



MAIN BAZAAR, HYDERABAD, FROM THE GATEWAY OF THE FORT.

March 23, 1851.

Infantry, and taken into the fort. The ladies also were moved into the fort, and though the station remained quiet, it was suspected that the 13th Native Infantry were disaffected.

Frere, when the news came, perceived that the situation was critical. Colonel Hutt was roused at two in the morning by finding Frere sitting at the foot of his bed, come to arrange with him for the despatch of sixty of the newly enrolled artillerymen under Lieutenant Harris, and fifty-five of the 1st Fusiliers, to Hyderabad, when the tide served in the morning. Hutt went off at once to prepare for their embarkation at a place three or four miles off, whence they sailed the next day. Almost their first duty on arrival at Hyderabad was to assist at the execution of the mutineers who had been tried and found guilty. Opposite them was drawn up the suspected 13th Native Infantry, and to the last moment there was a doubt whether the latter would not take the opportunity of firing into them instead of guarding the execution. All, however, passed off quietly. Hyderabad was saved, and the guns of the disarmed Native Artillery were handed over to the European Artillery Volunteers.*

Some time in the second week in September Frere had moved his sleeping quarters, for the sake of the refreshment of the sea-breeze, to his bungalow at Clifton, about two miles, or ten minutes' gallop over the sand, from Kurrachee. With him were staying Captain Goldsmid and Mr. John Arthur. On the night of the 13th, or rather early on the 14th—the same night that the assault on Delhi began—at about two in the morning the sound of a horse galloping up to the bungalow was heard, and Captain Bob Johnstone entered Frere's sleeping-room,

* This volunteer artillery was afterwards incorporated in the regular artillery.

making in a loud voice some trivial remark, and then in a low voice adding, "the 21st Regiment has mutinied." Arthur and Goldsmid were roused in the same way to avoid spreading panic among the servants—a useless precaution, for native servants generally knew what was happening at least as soon as their masters. He had come to tell them that about eleven o'clock in the evening two native officers of the 21st Native Infantry had informed Major MacGregor, commanding the regiment, that a Havildar had been to them, and, after asking how long they would wait to be blown away from guns as was now done in Hindostan, informed them that the whole regiment was prepared to rise at two o'clock that morning. One man, he said, was to be sent to rouse the 14th Native Infantry, and another to secure the co-operation of the Mahomedans in the town, from both of which quarters they expected aid. They were to murder the Europeans and any native officers who opposed them, and then set off to Delhi with their arms and treasure. This information was subsequently confirmed by an orderly Havildar, and it was clear from its purport that an attempt would be made at the time specified to raise a mutiny in the regiment.*

Frere, Goldsmid, and Arthur hastened across the sand to where the carriage, which had been ordered out, met them. On the way Frere stopped at a bungalow hard by occupied by some ladies and a child. Asking to see one of them, Mrs. Merewether, wife of the officer left in command of the Sind Horse, whom he knew to be possessed of courage and nerve, he told her what had happened, adding that the ladies and children had had the mess-house of the 2nd European Regiment assigned them to take refuge in. As it was possible, however, that they might meet mutineers on the way

* Frere to Lord Elphinstone, September 14, 1857.

thither, she decided by his advice to stay where she was, placing her two Belooch horsemen, and also two other sentinels, in the direction of the camp, to give notice of any one coming up the road. In case of the worst, he told her where there was a boat in a creek a quarter of a mile off, by which they might escape across the harbour to Manora Point.

They then drove on to the camp, listening, as they went, to a sound which came from the direction of the native quarter, like the hum of a hive of bees disturbed.

When they reached the parade-ground the danger was already over. Major Macgregor's first impulse, half broken-hearted as he was at the stain on the honour of his regiment, had been to go straight to his men and address them; but the Subadar told him plainly that to do so would only produce an outbreak at once, and he therefore immediately went to give information to the Brigadier, warning the 2nd Europeans and Artillery on his way.

The Arsenal bell had rung at a quarter to twelve, and in seven minutes from the warning the Artillery turned out with six six-pounders and two nine-pounders, harnessed and ready. The four companies of the 2nd Europeans fell in without sound of bugle, and after placing a guard over the treasury, followed, about two hundred strong, close behind the Artillery. Captain Leith, of the 14th Native Infantry, when he was told what was happening, went at once to his regiment, and before they could turn out, he heard, but could not see in the darkness, the Artillery going by. As they arrived at the parade-ground of the 21st, the Europeans wheeled into line, with the guns half on each flank and loaded with grape. The 14th Native Infantry fell in almost at the same time; by an unfortunate mistake, which might have had serious

consequences, they were ordered to do so without arms, an error which was, however, set right soon afterwards. As the Europeans formed line the assembly was sounded for the 21st to fall in, which they did, slowly and reluctantly. They were then ordered to pile arms and move fifty yards to the flank, and had no choice but to obey. The Europeans and Artillery then changed front to the flank, so as to interpose between the 21st and their arms, and the danger was over.*

On calling the roll and examining the arms, twenty-one men were found to be missing, and thirteen muskets of those present were loaded. Of the absent men the majority had taken their arms with them. One recruit of only a few days' standing afterwards appeared and stated that he had absented himself through fear when he heard the assembly sound at such an unusual hour; and six men had subsequently gone away.

Frere and his companions had in the mean time arrived on the scene. Before the disarmed men were dismissed from parade, the General, with Frere and Goldsmid by his side, addressed them—Goldsmid interpreting, and Frere, in great measure, judging by internal evidence, prompting his speech—and told them that the disarming was a precaution caused by the misconduct of a few and that when the bad men had been weeded out and brought to justice, he hoped to be able again to place in the regiment that confidence which was due to their former good conduct.

The ladies and children and non-combatants had at the first alarm quietly assembled in the mess-house of the 2nd Europeans, which consisted of a large room and two or

* In the Bombay army the men kept their muskets and a certain quantity of ammunition in their own possession. This made disarming them more critical and difficult than in the Bengal army, where the arms were kept in small armouries on the parade-ground.

three small ones. There were upwards of seventy children. The heat was stifling. Some of the ladies were crying, some in hysterics, some, amongst whom was the General's daughter, doing all they could to help and encourage the rest. One lady, just arrived from Bengal, frightened the others by seating herself in the middle of the room with her two native servants, Oude men, with muskets and bayonets over their shoulders, who, as she was told, would probably join the mutineers if there were a rising. They were kept informed by messengers of what was passing, and when the disarming was over returned to their several homes.

Frere visited the lines of the 14th Native Infantry, where he found all quiet, and by six o'clock, just after sunrise, had returned to Government House to the labours of the day. So quietly had the night's work been done that many in Kurrachee slept through it, and awoke in the morning unaware that anything unusual had occurred in the cantonment.

It was not known in which direction the mutineers had fled. Orders were sent out to watch the ferries, and parties of mounted police were despatched two and two along every road, with instructions to put the country people on the alert, and, if they found any trace, to leave one man to follow it up, while the other went for assistance. Intelligence was soon brought of several of them having been seen. Nine of them, on their way to join the Jam of Beyla, were found at nightfall posted among some rocks on a hill. Watches were set during the night except on one road, by which, as was expected, they stole away. When day dawned their tracks were followed; they were caught off their guard among some thick jungle and were all secured uninjured. Another party of eight was discovered in the western hills about

fifty miles from Kurrachee, and taking up a good position, defended themselves with desperate courage for the greater part of the day, till they were all killed or overpowered. Before a week had passed after the outbreak, out of the thirty-one mutineers only four remained to be accounted for. Three had been killed and twenty-four captured. The country people seem to have aided the police, otherwise the captures could not have been made so quickly and so easily.

Frere was especially careful that there should be no unseemly haste, no departure from the ordinary course of procedure in bringing the mutineers to justice. Before their trial had taken place he noticed a scaffold being made for their execution. He immediately sought an interview with the General, by whose orders it had been erected. "I think we have made a mistake there," he said, pointing to it, and characteristically softening the remonstrance by assuming a share in the blame; "the mutineers have not been tried yet." The General did not see it in this light: the mutineers were caught red-handed; they were sure to be found guilty, and why delay? Frere gently persisted, and at last, gaining a half assent, promptly took his leave, and in a very short time the scaffold had disappeared, and was not re-erected till a verdict had been found and sentence pronounced in due form.

"Up to this point," Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone "the only thing of importance on which I found the General would not adopt my suggestion was in the constitution of the Courts. I earnestly pressed on him that he should leave the cases to be tried by native officers. I felt strongly assured that they would not, as a body, wish or dare to shrink from their duty. He had it always in his power to order a revision of any inadequate sentence, and the separation of classes and suspicion implied by

putting on European officers could not but have a bad effect. However, the officers about him were generally of an opposite opinion. After the first execution I urged the subject again on his attention, and he consented to try a Native Court. As I anticipated, they were even more prompt, and as severe as the European Court."

And there was this great additional advantage in a Court of native officers, that the facts proved at the trial, instead of remaining a mystery, became known to the troops through their own officers, and in many ways the effects were most beneficial. The mutineers, with one or two exceptions, were executed, hanged, or blown from guns, in the evening after their trial. They confessed their guilt and made no attempt to brave it out. One of them called out to his comrades at the last moment, admitting the justice of his sentence.

There being no cavalry at Kurrachee, and the mounted police being most of them detached in parties, pursuing the mutineers, Frere, as a temporary expedient, sanctioned the enrolment of a small force of mounted patrols, composed of any persons not employed in active military duty who might volunteer. At the same time he accepted an offer of Mr. Dalzell to guard the treasury with a body of Naval Volunteers. Some armed French seamen from two ships in the harbour also offered their services, but as no more volunteers were required they were declined with thanks. The patrol was disbanded at the end of about a month.

At Shikarpur, in Upper Sind, the condition of affairs was even more critical. It became known that the Oude men in the Native Artillery were disaffected. There was not a European soldier within two hundred miles. On the north was the Punjab, ripe for insurrection. Merewether guarded the north-west frontier with a single regiment of

the Sind Horse, which had to watch also the 6th Bengal Cavalry.

Early in September the Mahomedan festival of the Mohurrum was at hand.* Three years before, Jacob had issued a Station Order prohibiting all Taboots, etc., as unmilitary, and for two years there were no Mohurrum drummings, Fukkeers, or Taboots allowed. Merewether saw some preparations making by the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and without inquiry or discussion simply called the Kotwal's attention to the order. Some men of the 6th went to an old Rissaldar of the Sind Horse and asked, "What kind of an order was this, prohibiting Mohurrum processions?" The Rissaldar replied, "It was the order, and in his opinion a very good one, but at any rate it *was* the order and must be obeyed." And it *was* obeyed without a murmur.

As early as the month of June, Merewether obtained information that two petty Belooch chiefs, Dil Moorad and Durryah Khan, were intriguing with the troops with a view to an outbreak. Dil Moorad had fled from Sind in 1844, and joined the robbers in Cutchee. He was taken in 1845, and Sir C. Napier intended to have hanged him, but his life was spared. In 1847 he was, for a short time, in Government service, under Jacob, as a guide, with a few of his horsemen, but being found to be in correspondence with the enemy he was dismissed. He was notorious as an inveterate intriguer, prompting others to mischief while keeping himself in the background. This man and Durryah Khan were found to be holding consultations at the latter's residence, at Janadeyra, within the Sind frontier, at which it was proposed that they should try and stir up the other Belooch tribes to join against the Government. At this time, however, it happened that Dil Moorad was in arrears in his payment of Revenue, and not meeting the

* Frere to Lawrence.

demand made on him was arrested and placed under surveillance. This upset their plans for a time, but towards the end of August, Durryah Khan recommenced his intrigues, and went round among the different tribes to induce them to join with him. On his return he assembled his own immediate followers in the sand hills under the pretence of consulting about matters of cultivation, to communicate what he considered the success of his tour, and to propose the immediate carrying out of his scheme, which was to go secretly to Jacobabad, or close to it, on the night before the 20th of September, and on the 21st to go to the Durbar and kill the Sahibs. He came accordingly to Jacobabad on the afternoon of the 20th, when, Merewether having through his native officers information of all this, he was apprehended and lodged in gaol; Dil Moorad was placed in irons at the same time.

That the attempts, if any were made, on the fidelity of the troops at Jacobabad had failed was evident from the fact of the unresisted arrest of the chief conspirator only a few hours before the time fixed on for the outbreak, in which he had told his partisans that the troops were ready to join. Probably, however, this was an invention of his to encourage the wavering. Such an occurrence in those times was an ordinary one enough thus far. What is remarkable about it is that for many days before the arrest, as many as five hundred persons, chiefly of the Sind Horse, were aware that some plot was suspected by their officers, having been specially ordered to be in readiness day and night for various services; yet not one man of the whole number ever attempted to warn the conspirators that their designs were known. These troops, be it remembered, were to a great extent composed of Mahomedans from the Delhi provinces and Hindostan—

"It seems to me that a time has arrived for altering a state of things so anomalous. I think a beginning might be made by organizing a service, which, without being exclusively native, should give opportunities for the employment of natives in the public service and for advancing them when found worthy.

"I would limit its sphere for the present to the Kaffrarian province Transkei."

Just as he was emerging successfully from the crisis in February, the news had reached Frere that Lord Carnarvon had resigned office. It was a great blow to him; and the event proved that it was a great misfortune for South Africa. Lord Carnarvon was not a great statesman. He was deficient in knowledge and perception of men and events, and made not a few mistakes. In speech and writing he was apt to be prolix and tedious. But he was an honourable, single-minded man, with a high standard of duty and a clear, consistent purpose in public life. He worked hard and did his best for the Colonies, over whose affairs he presided with no ulterior purpose of selfish or party advantage. Frere and he were in entire harmony as to South African policy. In striving to bring about federation, they had an object before them, very difficult of attainment, and impossible for any Governor to effect, unless he were loyally supported by the Colonial Office and the Government at home.

The Eastern Question was then in a critical stage, and unfortunately it happened that on the question of sending the British fleet to the Bosphorus at a particular time, Lord Carnarvon differed from the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet. It was apparently a difference not so much of principle as of mode of action and expediency, on a matter outside his own department, and as to which his share of responsibility would have been comparatively small. But with his deficient sense of proportion, he failed to see that, having

initiated a great and bold course of policy in South Africa, he was under a specially strong obligation to remain at the helm himself in order to uphold those whom he had selected to carry it out, and that in abandoning office at a critical time he deprived Frere of a support which was essential to his success. His resignation was the first blow to the prospect of federation and of a consistent policy in South Africa. From that time forward to the end of Frere's life, whichever party was in power, the policy of the Colonial Office and of the British Government came to be inspired less and less by a consistent purpose in the interests of South Africa and the Empire, and was more and more swayed by the desire of conciliating at any price parliamentary adherents or opponents, however ignorant or careless these might be of the facts or rights of the case.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"February 17, 1878.

"Reuter's telegram, saying that you had left the Ministry, has, without any figure of speech, utterly taken the heart out of me. I try to frame all kinds of theories by which you are again at the helm in the Colonial Office till South African confederation is carried, or at soonest till my share in the work is finished, for I feel my interest in the work, and my hopes of carrying it through, sadly diminished by the possibility of your leaving the post which has so identified your name with the fortunes of South Africa. It is peculiarly trying to us just now, when there seems at last a prospect of a break in the clouds. . . .

"If you have really left the Colonial Office, it adds another, and the strongest of all reasons for my wishing to follow you, and to rest after forty-four years of continuous service with very little holiday."

Lord Carnarvon was succeeded at the Colonial Office by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.

get to the bottom of the plot, and distrustful of their men because they cannot learn all about it. But I doubt whether, here at all events, there was any plot to fathom, or anything more than a knowledge of a tolerably prevalent discontent and suspicion among the Purdesees and consequent disaffection. Some of the more designing thought the whole body was more ripe for mischief than the event proved them to be, and got up a very commonplace scheme for mutiny, robbery, and murder, after which they would have been guided by circumstances. Had they succeeded at first, no doubt hundreds of waverers would have joined them. But a *plot*, such as Mazzini and his friends would call a plot, we have no evidence of, and I think it is waste of time to seek for one.

"I by no means disbelieve that the discontent itself had a deeper origin and was fanned by abler agents—some certainly from Tehran, and perhaps from further north and west,—but I doubt if we have got any of the grand conspirators among us here, where the whole lot seem to me very commonplace traitors and ruffians. Even the Shikarpur Subadar was little better, though he had got a very respectable conspiracy with the chief of the border tribes, and their move was doubtless connected with the rising in the Punjab above Mooltan.

"I mention all this because I fear that, in their hopes of fathoming some deep-laid scheme, of whose existence we have no present evidence, the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers will delay dealing with the clear facts of the case as they stand, and keep good soldiers watching disarmed men who, according to the treatment they get, may be made good or bad soldiers of, but who will not improve by being kept as they are."

It turned out, unfortunately, that Frere was too sanguine about the state of the 21st. Ultimately it had to be disbanded, and the regiment ceased to exist.

With regard to the disaffected 6th Bengal Irregulars, he writes, six months later—

"March 25, 1858.

"I believe General Jacob would not, and I am sure I would not, object for a moment to their being disbanded,

their arms and horses being taken at a valuation. In their present state I believe them to be very useless, and liable to become dangerous, but, unless to disband them at once, I think that their being disarmed and dismounted only renders them more troublesome and more liable to be induced to misbehave. I am sure it is hardly possible to put men in a worse position than the idle, disarmed regiments, conscious that they deserve punishment, certain that we mean to punish them, and prepared in their suspense to believe the worst regarding our intentions. Then, all our friends and foes alike look on them as a very serious source of weakness and anxiety, and in truth they are so.

"I would deal with them at once in one of two ways—

1. "Either tell them that their services were no longer required, pay up, and discharge them, taking their horses and arms at a valuation, and giving each man sufficient to carry him home. There are many and obvious objections to this course now that they have been so long kept from any overt act of mutiny, and I should therefore prefer the second course, viz.

2. "Direct General Jacob to take them in hand to reorganize them entirely on the plan of his own Sind Horse. Give him entire power to remand the European officers to their regiments and to select others, and to discharge any number of the men and native officers he may think fit. The reformed regiment would cost, like the Sind Horse, rupees 29,600, in place of rupees 23,200, per mensem, but it would be much more than twice as efficient.

"It would take a long time to explain the difference between the two systems, as it would in the case of comparison between the first Napoleon's Italian Legion and a brigade of King Bomba's; but the difference is quite as great."

The murders and other horrors of the Mutiny had so engrossed the attention of people in England, that they scarcely realized the extent of the less dramatic sufferings of the survivors who had in so many cases been suddenly reduced from affluence to destitution by the loss or destruction of all they possessed. A relief fund was set on

foot in India, which Frere did his best to assist. He writes (July 25) to the Bishop of Bombay :—

"As to the sort of cases which it was proposed to relieve, we believed that within the limits of the North-Western Provinces, very few Christian families would be found who are not more or less in want of aid. A very large proportion have lost house and property, and possess nothing but the clothes on their backs. There are many widows and orphans, who by the death of husband or father have lost the means of livelihood. Planters and tradesmen have lost their estates and shops, and all out of Government employ are left for the time destitute. Even those in the Government service, though secure from starvation, are in great distress. Treasuries have been plundered, and pay and remittances are now, and must continue for some time, not so regular as in ordinary times. Banks are closed and powerless to effect remittances while the country is disturbed, and families, separated from the husband or father who draws pay, are badly off for the money to meet daily expenses.

"The distressed seem divisible into two classes—those whose wants are merely temporary, and those who are permanently destitute.

"To many of the former loans will be very acceptable. Many hope to have the means of repaying, who for two or three months will be in great distress for ready money. . . .

"But the number who will suffer from utter loss of all means of subsistence and cannot be expected to repay will be very large. . . . To ascertain the wants to be relieved and to decide how and what relief is to be given, are points which we must in the first instance leave to people on the spot. Committees seem to have been appointed at Lahore and all other stations where there are competent persons permanently resident, and our committee proposes to send them small sums to relieve the most urgent and pressing wants of the destitute by loan or gift, as they may think best. . . .

"I meant also to ask you whether you do not think that some public religious service or notice of our present position is called for in addition to the Prayer in time of War and Tumult? If it had no other visible effect, I cannot but think that it might allay the panic so dis-

graceful to us in every way which seems to prevail in every place."

When Frere started on his cold weather tour late in the autumn of 1857, he left directions for Government House to be placed at the disposal of any European ladies or invalids who might be coming down from up the country and passing through Kurrachee. His carriages and horses, also, were left for their use. Many a feeble invalid and desolate widow homeward bound, often impoverished or ruined, was glad of such a resting-place, and his house was occupied all the time he was away. To be able to offer such hospitality was then, as always, especially congenial to him, and then, as always, it made heavy calls upon his purse. To him high office was never a source of wealth.

WRESSIL LODGE, WIMBLEDON.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

General exhaustion—Malcolm Green's campaign —Macauley's campaign—The Khan of Kelat—Quetta—Major H. Green's expedition against the Murrees—Recovery of Major Clibborn's guns—Death of Jacob.

WHEN September was over, not only in Sind, but all over India, men began to breathe more freely. Delhi had at last fallen. The garrison at Lucknow, though not yet delivered, had been reinforced. The summer heat, which in the burning plains had been so terrible an addition to the toils and sufferings of the campaign, was now nearly over, and the approaching cool season would give the Europeans their opportunity. Troops were coming in fast from England, though not faster than they were needed, for there was much hard fighting to be done for many a month to come. The great strain, mental and bodily, which men had undergone had left them wearied and exhausted, if not demoralized, now that the extremity of danger and the consequent excitement were passing away; and out of this exhaustion arose a disposition to shirk the trouble of administering strict, painstaking justice, and to lean sometimes to vindictiveness towards the natives, sometimes—though less often—to an indolently tolerant attitude towards flagrant evildoers.

Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone—

"August 29, 1857.

"I see many symptoms that unless our European troops are kept together in large bodies, well officered, and under strict discipline, they will become disorderly rabble, to an extent seriously to impede the pacification of the country.

"I fear —— and others, and many of our bravest officers, have much to answer for for their indiscriminate severity. If officers and gentlemen cannot control their feelings, we can hardly expect the common soldiers to curb theirs, and all discipline will become loose. I allude to the butchery in cold blood of captives, with little, if any, inquiry except as to their being Purbeas, and without an attempt to discriminate between men who have fled in vain terror with the herd, and the ringleaders and armed murderers."

With equal emphasis he deprecated leniency to proved mutiny. After the outbreak at Shikarpur he wrote to the General, calling his attention to the serious consequences which might arise from a delay which had occurred in dealing with men of the 16th Native Infantry, who were imprisoned at Shikarpur and Larkhana on a charge of attempting to induce the police to mutiny. The charge against them, he pointed out, was a very serious one. They should be tried without delay, and, if acquitted, set at liberty; if found guilty, punished. There had been a suggestion that they should be treated with leniency as a mark of approbation of the late good conduct of the regiment to which they belonged. But leniency, he insists, would in this case be quite misplaced. The good soldiers of their regiment would be glad to have unworthy members removed from their ranks, and would regard any indulgence shown to them as an insult to the corps.

To Colonel Phayre he writes:—

"November 12, 1857.

"All is at present quiet in the Punjab, but the sort of exhaustion which has followed their immense efforts to feed the Delhi army with reliable soldiers, and to keep

down their own mutinous Hindostanees, may be guessed from the length of time it has taken to put down the petty rebellion in the Barre Doab, though the rebels began without arms, and every man who could be prudently spared from Mooltan and Lahore was sent. I have always thought we neglected the Punjab too much, and we may thank Sir John's iron rule that by God's blessing the province has been saved from greater disorders.

"As for our Europeans in Upper Hindostan, the late army of Delhi, every letter which I see (and a good many are sent me, one way or another) speaks of its utter exhaustion and seriously demoralized condition. They have gone through as much as human flesh and blood will stand, and are only less worn out than the crowds of villains they have been beating every third day for months past. You must give them rest and fill their places with [fresh] troops, otherwise you will get a severe check when you least expect it, simply because they come across some fresh enemies who have not yet been thrashed and hold out a little better than usual."

To Lord Elphinstone he writes, when on his tour up the country, from "camp near Larkhana:"—

"November 23, 1857.

"Matters seem quieting down in Kelat. The Jam * of Beila professes to be very penitent for his late misconduct. I have pointed out to his messengers that when the Khan pardons him I will listen to his excuses, and he declares himself [anxious] to do all in his power to make up matters with his sovereign.

"Sir John Lawrence told me what he had written to you on the subject of assembling a force in Sind. I fear he is not quite free from the general Bengal dislike to owe anything to the Bombay army. It is to me as clear as the day that fresh European troops lose half their value unless you have regular native troops to brigade with them, and that you may with perfect safety send a force of which two-thirds are Bombay native troops anywhere, if you do not send them under Bengal officers or politicals, but that they should be only sent by whole brigades.

* A Chief of consideration in Beloochistan, on the Persian border.

One such brigade, two of our Sind Native Infantry regiments, with about five hundred European Infantry and a troop of Horse Artillery, would, it seems to me, have been invaluable in either the Punjab or Rajpootana. But I suppose he knows his wants best.

"I think our coming out here has done much good. The people seem everywhere very sincerely glad to see us. But there is no doubt late events in Hindostan have made what the French call a 'profound impression,' even at this distance, and things constantly occur which make me think that one of Lord Ellenborough's proclamations declaring the direct sovereignty of Queen Victoria as Empress of Hindostan would be by no means an empty or useless ceremony."

And again—

"Camp Nowshera, in Upper Sind, February 22, 1858.

"The 'lull' to which I alluded is the present pause in the storm which has swept over all Upper India, and which does not yet seem to me spent. . . .

"My mistrust is not by any means confined to this frontier. In Hindostan the mutineers are defeated and for the time being effectually cowed, and the Governor-General may have a plan for its future government with something less expensive than Sir Colin's army of Europeans as a police-force; but we have seen and heard nothing of it; and knowing what a ferocious wild beast can be made out of a native, when fairly worried and alarmed, I would gladly see an end of the dragooning system there, before we have troubles elsewhere.

"It is, however, in the Punjab that there seems to me least security for permanent quiet. I never thought the 'loyalty' of the Seikhs was much more than thirst for fighting and plunder, and for revenge against the Hindostanees. The misunderstanding about the Delhi prize-money was very unfortunate, but the worst feature, to my mind, is the apparent determination of all the Bengal officers who are admirers of the Seikhs, to repeat in their treatment of them exactly the same errors which ruined their old army—to fancy everything depends on the raw material, and to undervalue the effect of the Englishman's brains and workmanship. . . .

"It is not any reverse I dread, but a constant succession of expensive petty wars, which will keep up irritation, injure our character for irresistible power, and increase debt, and make it most difficult to concentrate thirty thousand Europeans on the Indus, where they may any day be wanted.

"Then there are many chances in Europe which may any day turn out against us.

"The Emperor Napoleon's death or a dozen other things might give us a Provisional Government in France, wicked enough to pick a quarrel with us just to employ their army and keep themselves in power. This would seriously interfere with our recruiting troops overland, etc. So might a threat, even, of a breach with the Americans. And how should we feel if we were quite certain, as we might be made any day to feel, that it would be next to impossible to send us out ten thousand additional Europeans in less than six months?

"But it seems to me to this we are tending—to a state which will make the security of India always depend on the ability of the Horse Guards to send us more European troops. . . .

"But I have got far from this frontier. There are more than the usual chances of disturbance across the border, and our force in Sind, exclusive of troops passing through, has *never* been so small. When I proposed to reduce it so low, it was in the confident belief that the 1st Regiment of Sind Horse would have been back ere this, and that within a month after their return there would have been to all appearance three regiments of Sind Horse on the frontier. I also hoped that if the Government of India did not allow Jacob to raise two regiments of Sillidar Infantry they would long ago have intimated their refusal, so that we might have asked for Native Infantry from other quarters. I need hardly tell your lordship that from April to October Europeans are, for real work in the field in Upper Sind, nearly useless. It is as much as we can hope to do to keep them alive and efficient in barracks; nor are Regular Native troops much better, unless very expensive field establishments are always kept up. I feel confident, therefore, that for efficiency and economy combined nothing could be better than General Jacob's plan. I never knew him fail in anything of the kind, and

if he succeeds he will show the way to a large saving in some very expensive departments.

"As for the arms of such Sillidar Infantry—if the orders of the Home Government are very imperative—the men might be armed with ordinary fusees, pending a reference to England; but it seems to me that the arguments against giving them rifles are equally valid against [giving them] anything but staves and stones.

"But the proposed Frontier Force is to hold a post quite different from any police or local corps intended to preserve the peace of the interior. They are to be on the frontier at a place and at a season where Europeans cannot be permanently posted, and they may have to meet well-armed men. Some months ago I sent you Major Lumsden's account of Goolam Hyder's Candahar Rifles, who were, in Major L.'s opinion, quite equal in armament, skill, and drill to any corps in our service. Against such men our troops must be armed with something better than an old-pattern musket.

"Moreover, our great Indian difficulty is financial; and if by giving a man a good rifle you can make him equal to two men with bad muskets, it is clearly the more economical course to give him the rifle. Arm him as you will, he can never be a match for a European similarly armed and trained, so that there need be no fear of our creating a native army which we cannot keep in order, unless we repeat our late errors.

"But if a Frontier Field Force is quite out of the question, we must have something in its place, and even three regiments of Native Infantry will hardly be a fair equivalent.

"At present everything here depends on personal influence, and though I would rely much on such power as Jacob, Green, and Merewether have over the people up here, I do not like to see everything depend on the heads of three or four men longer than is necessary.

"This letter has run to such a length that I will only say once more that I trust your lordship will order back the 1st Regiment of Sind Horse, and if possible get us permission to raise two regiments of Sillidar Infantry, and that, if not, other provision may be made to secure the peace of the frontier, for which Sir Charles Napier used to require fourteen thousand men; for he always maintained

that his army was for the frontier defence and not for Sind.

"In a letter I have just received from Captain Malcolm Green, after alluding to the difficulty of getting good recruits, he says: 'There is no doubt service under the British Government is now at a discount, and a very long time will elapse before the feeling of confidence is restored. Every native of India seems now to feel that if aid had not arrived from England we should have been driven out of the country. In fact, till the Queen is proclaimed Sovereign of India there will be no peace. At present every one appears to be doubtful as to who has a right to call himself the real possessor of the throne of India, and unless this state of things is altered there will soon be another row.'

"This is from Rajpootana; and from the other side his brother Major H. Green describes just the same feeling of uncertainty and insecurity at Kelat. It is this feeling which leads natives to all sorts of foolish and abortive attempts at insurrection, long after the time when they might have been successful has passed. It is not that they are disloyal, but that, for lack of accurate information on matters which they never care about except in times of excitement, they fancy the Government is breaking up, and that it is every one for himself. It was so to a great extent in the Deccan during the Affghan War. There were numerous abortive risings, though there was very little real disloyalty. Just as in France, if you could make the public functionaries believe that there had been a successful Revolution, you might get them to swear fidelity to Henry V., or a Red Republic, or anything else, though well content if left alone to draw their salaries under Louis Napoleon."

On this point it will be remembered that though the Queen's sovereignty over the territory of the East India Company was proclaimed in 1858, the title of Empress of India, which was needed to satisfy the requirements above described, was not assumed till more than eighteen years afterwards. Even then so little was the matter understood in England, that when the proposal was made

it was received there, even by those who should have known better, with astonishment or with derision, as though it were a piece of meaningless vanity and ostentation.

The regiment of Sind Horse which had been on its return from Persia sent on to Bombay, was despatched thence to the southern Mahratta country. In November the detachments were collected at Poona and were ordered to march to Upper Sind, under the command of Major Malcolm Green. Lord Elphinstone sent for Malcolm Green and told him that the route he was to take would be left entirely to his own discretion; and that as some of the Native States through which the regiment would have to pass were understood to be in a disturbed condition, he was to do as much good as he could on the road. They marched, accordingly, after being inspected by Sir Hugh Rose, then in command of the Central Indian Field Force, who expressed his great satisfaction at their efficiency. On January 9, 1858, Malcolm Green received a despatch from Sir George Lawrence, asking him to co-operate with the Nusserabad Field Force, which he joined accordingly on the 19th, and remained with it during the siege and capture of Ahwah. On February 3 the regiment resumed its march, but on the 11th, meeting with Major-General Roberts's Rajpootana Field Force, a detachment of two hundred sabres was at his request left to aid him in the operations which led to the capture of Kotah and the pursuit of the rebels, the rest of the regiment going on by way of the Jodhpur and Jeysulmeer deserts to Jacobabad. This detachment resumed its march on April 16, reached the Sutlej a few miles below Ferozepur, and marching down the left bank of that river to Roree on the Indus, joined head-quarters at Jacobabad on July 6, thus completing a march, including

the distance passed over in the pursuit of the enemy, of two thousand four hundred miles since it left Poona, and being in as good fighting condition as when it started.

In many of the notoriously disaffected towns and districts through which they passed were the birthplaces of the troopers and the homes of their relatives; yet so sure was Malcolm Green of their fidelity, that he constantly gave them leave of absence to revisit their old friends and old haunts, and not one ever failed to report himself at the expiration of his leave. The men's letters, instead of being opened and read, as was the general practice with native regiments during the Mutiny, were delivered to them unopened, and frequently the men would hand over to an officer letters inciting them to mutiny, and they would be read aloud in derision in the orderly room by his order.*

The squadron of Sind Horse were not the only Sind soldiers who served with the Rajpootana Field Force. Early in February, 1858, Frere had received a request

* Jacob's horsemen were at this time armed with double-barrelled carbines in place of the single-barrelled ones which they had had before. The substitution did not take place all at once, but had been carried out gradually, the men having to purchase the new arm, and being permitted to sell the old one. Unfortunately when the old single-barrelled carbines were disposed of the regimental stamp on them was not, as it should have been, erased. Hence when some mutineers were taken with carbines with the Sind Horse stamp upon them in their hands, they were erroneously supposed to be Sind horsemen, or else to have been surreptitiously supplied with arms by men of that corps. Fortunately Jacob was able to prove conclusively that not a single trooper in his corps was absent or unaccounted for at the time. If any additional security had been wanting for the fidelity of the Sind Horse, it might have been found in the fact that whereas most of the Bengal Irregular Regiments were in debt to their bankers, the Sind Horse, under Jacob's careful management, had a sum of no less than thirty thousand pounds, the property of the men, to their credit at the bank. Had a man mutinied or deserted he would have, of course, forfeited his deposit.

from Sir George Lawrence to send him some cavalry. It was impossible at that time to spare the one regiment from the frontier, but, instead, Frere and Jacob arranged to raise and despatch a body of Border Belooch Horse. Lieutenant (now Colonel) Macauley was entrusted with the task. Taking as a nucleus a Russuldar, four Jemadars, and a hundred and twenty-five Sowars of the guides attached to the Sind Horse, he quickly obtained recruits. On February 12 this hastily assembled force of wild borderers made their first day's march of twenty-six miles to Shikarpur, and the next day went on twenty-four miles to Sukkur, and crossed the Indus to Roree, where their numbers increased to five hundred and five, of all ranks. After halting a week to collect supplies, Macauley led them across the desert and reached Nusserabad, four hundred and eighty miles distant, in twenty-six days. They took part in the campaign under General Roberts, and during the siege of Kotah were employed in picket, patrol, and other duties. No matter what work was allotted to them, it was, after their own fashion, performed steadily and well. All through the intense heat of June, and through, what tried the Belooch more, the monsoon rains, of which they had had no experience in their own country, the pursuit of the rebels was carried on. Macauley was invested with supreme powers over his men—powers rarely granted,—and the very existence and coherence of the force depended on his single personal control and authority. Had anything happened to him, "it is impossible to guess," he says, "what mischief some of these wild Borderers would have perpetrated; none but those who have been in my position can understand what it is to work five hundred such wild creatures. I was out the greater part of every day and often all night throughout the hot season and monsoon, and had to

visit all my pickets twice during the night; I may say I lived in my saddle."

When the rebels evacuated Rajpootana there was no more fighting to be done, and Macauley, not caring to trust his wild men on detached duty in time of peace, returned to Jacobabad in September and disbanded them. They had been absent eight months and fourteen days, in the course of which time they had marched two thousand five hundred and twenty-three miles.

Few statesmen, probably, even in India, at this time realized how important an element in the struggle was the attitude of the frontier tribes of Affghanistan and Beloochistan, and how much depended on whether they were friendly or hostile. The Affghans were eager to pour their soldiers into the Punjab and join the insurgents. Nothing but the strong hand, determined will, and unshaken fidelity of Dost Mahomed restrained them; and false reports of his death were constantly in circulation. Persia had long been hostile. She had been put forward as a catspaw by Russia from time to time, and both Russia and Persia were smarting under recent defeat. A Persian proclamation inciting to insurrection had been found at Delhi just before the outbreak; and though the great majority of the Mahomedans in India are Sunnis, who look to the Sultan of Turkey as their spiritual head, and regard the Shah as a schismatic, the insurgents were disposed, for the time being, to sink their religious animosities and to unite against the English power under the banner of the Shah.

Persian emissaries were busy in Beloochistan. In July, 1857, the Khan of Kelat, who under Jacob's and Frere's influence had developed into a just and competent ruler, friendly to the British, had died suddenly. The death of his old minister, Moolla Ahmed, followed soon after. It

seemed as if the fruit of five years' labour and pains had vanished just at the critical time, for he was succeeded by a youth of indifferent character and little ability, a prey to the influence of any one who could get his ear for the moment. Macauley went immediately without any escort to Kelat for a few days, which was as long as he could then be spared. On his return from Persia, Major H. Green went there as Resident, with a few Sind Horse troopers for his escort, to try and keep the new Khan straight, and baffle the influence of Persian and rebel emissaries; and there he remained month after month, going about unarmed and alone, and carrying, as he well knew, his life in his hand from day to day.

The Khan was in the hands of one Gungaram, a crafty old Hindoo, who was afterwards discovered to be implicated in a plot to depose him and put the Jam of Beila in his place. Gungaram was so obnoxious to the Belooch chiefs that an outbreak seemed to be imminent.

Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone:—

"December 16, 1857.

"At his first interview with Green the Khan was ill at ease. Every prominence was given to the obnoxious Minister, and he . . . seemed at first inclined to keep the chiefs away from any personal or unreserved intercourse with Major Green, and to place him in much the same position as the Candahar Mission, isolated from the people and the Sirdars, and in communication with no one but the Ruler. But Green gave them all to understand that that was not at all the style in which he meant to live, and the attempt was abandoned. The effects seem to have been good as regards all parties. The Khan has taken a great fancy to the new envoy, and seems inclined to look to him as his best friend and adviser. The chiefs have frankly stated their wishes, which are reasonable and proper, and compliance with which will strengthen the Khan's position, and make him happier as well as more safe. They have named several old and influential Sirdars, who have the

confidence of all parties, and who they think would make good advisers of the young Khan, and Green seems to think the Khan will be glad to comply, that Gungaram, finding we will not support him in his rapacious and unpopular proceedings, will return to his former post, as Naib of a district and to the charge of his accounts, and that everything else will be settled to the satisfaction of all parties."

Three months later Frere gives the following summary of Major Green's work :—

"March 13, 1858.

"He has carried out the expulsion of Gungaram, the Hindoo Wuzzeer, a man hostile to and disliked by the chiefs, and who, had he remained, would have produced either a civil war or a rupture with us—probably both. . . .

"He has managed to unite all the chiefs near Kelat with the Khan, and to get the young man well married to the daughter of one of the most influential and respectable of them, and by paying the annual subsidy two months before it was due, he has avoided a financial difficulty.

"In short, without using force or even threats, he has laid the foundation of a respectable and stable government, which, if he gets time to consolidate, will not only reduce all Beloochistan to its former quiet and good order, but form a most useful barrier to Persian or Affghan intrigue and encroachment, and a most valuable outpost should we be threatened in that quarter."

The following somewhat fragmentary extracts are given here as showing Frere's opinion as to the vital importance of establishing friendly relations and keeping a sharp look-out in the direction of Affghanistan and Persia, and of the great value of Quetta as an outpost to that end.

He writes to Lord Elphinstone :—

"March 25, 1858.

"With regard to the plan of occupying Quetta, I believe it originated with Ferrier, the French traveller, but I have not his book at hand to refer to. Now that Green has recovered our hold over the Khan, perhaps the best thing we

can do is to leave him and General Jacob alone, merely putting it into their power to secure Quetta, should it be threatened by any external foe. This they can easily do if General Jacob has such a force at his disposal as shall enable him always to support Major Green in case of need. As long as he is on good terms with the Khan and his chiefs he has the resources of the country, such as they are, at his disposal. But I feel convinced it will be a fatal day for us, if either the place passes into other hands, or we cease to be paramount at Kelat. In either case you will need a very large force in Upper Sind, and all will be even then insecure.

"The value of Quetta is probably quite as well known at Paris and St. Petersburg as here; and the Brahoees and Affghans are always discussing it. My *immediate* apprehension is, not that we may see a Russian General above the Bolan, but simply that if we go to sleep and neglect to secure Quetta, we may any day—when Dost Mahomed dies, or the next triennial Affghan revolution comes round—hear that Quetta has been seized by some adventurer, who may or may not be a friend of ours, but who will certainly make the best, for his own profit, of his prize.

"We must either interfere in force, or keep up such a force in the vile climate of Upper Sind, as shall avert all risks of our new neighbour plundering Cutchee and menacing Shikarpur and the Indus.

"This is no chimera. I sent to Government last summer a letter from Azad Khan to his old guest, the Khan's stepmother, urging her to induce the Kelat Sirdars, over whom she has great influence, to break with the English, and offering his own services in any national move of the kind. These people do not lightly or thoughtlessly make or receive such offers. It might be any day renewed, and a trifle might lead to its acceptance. In which case, unless you advanced to shut the door and secure the key, you would not be secure with even a strong brigade in Upper Sind."

Two days later he writes to Jacob:—

"I have heard from Lord Elphinstone. He is, I think, becoming a convert to the necessity of occupying Quetta, but he still seems to consider our hands are too full for it just now. This seems to me as though a man, with a deep

and rapid river in his front, were to abstain from seizing the only bridge across it till the enemy on the other side ceased to threaten him. However, I hope he will see the thing ere long as of something more than *possible* importance."

And to Sir George Clerk :—

"April 3, 1858.

"To-day I got an answer to Major Merewether's report for 1856 for frontier affairs, which was sent last February twelvemonth to Calcutta. During the heat of the Persian war Merewether had pressed the occupation of Quetta, and they *now* say they have had so much to do in India that they do not consider it expedient 'to pass a judgment on the isolated question of the formation of a cantonment at Quetta.'"

To Lord Elphinstone he writes :—

"March 30, 1858.

"You will probably have heard direct that the Herat mission left, on its return to Tehran, on the 1st inst. Major Lumsden infers from this that his mission will also be allowed to return to India. If so, I trust your lordship will urge on the Governor-General the necessity of keeping Major Green at Kelat, and allowing him to communicate freely with whoever may be Sirdar at Candahar.

"I do not know what results have been secured in return for our subsidy to Dost Mahomed, but I am very sure we shall soon rue the day when we leave ourselves without eyes or ears to learn what goes on above the passes. You could not have a better man than Major Green, for he is very averse to meddle, and will not overdo the thing. . . .

"Two months more will probably find many of the more active and enterprising of the rebels and mutineers seeking an asylum in Affghanistan, where as drill-masters they will be welcome guests of every petty chief who hopes to do something for himself in the coming scramble, which all foresee will follow Dost Mahomed's death. Even the Hindoos, if sepoys, will be welcomed. It is only the Afreedis who forcibly convert their Hindoo guests. These men will go burning with vengeance, and not ill-informed as to our weak points and as to the best means of doing

us mischief, and even the most abortive invasion or rising will be a serious nuisance, if it happens when your fresh English troops have been harassed by a campaign protracted into the hot weather, and are beginning to sicken of dysentery and other reactionary diseases in the hastily constructed barracks on the hot plains of Hindostan.

"I do earnestly trust, therefore, that you will give General Jacob *carte blanche* to do his best on his burning frontier, where there can be no doubt that your permanent garrison must be native, and must be as efficient as you can make it. It is not a place where Eurasian volunteers, or English troops, or Goorkhas, or any of the proposed alternatives for our Native army can live, or by any possibility be tried, and therefore I trust there will be no delay while such nostrums are being discussed."

To Major Merewether, then on leave in England, Frere writes:—

"October 1, 1858.

"The Punjab is uneasy. The system of physical force, repression, and bribery of the Sikhs cannot last for ever, and Sir J. Lawrence's successor will find himself on no bed of roses. Here we are doing what we can with small thanks and little aid from any one at Bombay or Lahore to improve communication with Mooltan, the real key of the Punjab. Jacob is forming what will be a very powerful force in front of the Bolan, and I have enough to do to keep the peace between him and the solemn gentlemen on high chairs at desks in various departments. But he will be the bulwark of this frontier if time and life be granted him."

Instructions from Government put an end for the present to any project for occupying Quetta.

Upon the question of English and Russian influence in Affghanistan, he writes to Sir George Clerk:—

"April 17, 1859.

"I did not meet a Candahar horse-dealer or Shikarpur merchant who did not at once broach the subject of the Russian Mission, which had evidently created a great stir in Affghanistan. What is most wanted up there seems to

me to be that we should lay down to ourselves and tell our agents on the frontier and elsewhere what our policy, if we have one, is to be. It may be very convenient to say we will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy that wins friends and deters enemies; we cannot pretend that it will be a matter of indifference to us what happens when Dost Mahomed dies—whether the best Affghan takes the reins, or a puppet in Russian, French, or Persian leading-strings. As a matter of fact Affghan politics cannot be matter of indifference to us, and I cannot see why we should not honestly say so, to both Affghans and Russians—tell them we do not want to interfere more than we can help, but that we mean to see and hear all we can, and not to allow other people to meddle more than we do ourselves; and deal openly with the Russians, giving them credit for being actuated by no worse motives than we are ourselves, viz. a natural interest in the affairs of such near neighbours."

And to Major H. Green he writes:—

"April 23, 1859.

"My policy would be to tell the people 'we mean to see and hear all that goes on, and to leave you as much freedom to manage your own affairs as possible, but not to allow other Foreign Powers to meddle more than we do ourselves. The Russians are as much concerned in these matters as we are, and we shall always be willing to discuss them with accredited Russian agents; but the Russians must disavow all secret and irresponsible agents. We shall not interfere with the people of Affghanistan in their choice of a Ruler; we shall deal with him, when chosen, as we find him—and not pass over any slight or want of attention to our interest and wishes.' I cannot see why we should deal with them on any other terms."

More than a year after he had left Sind, Frere writes to Lord Canning:—

"December 1, 1860.

"I do not look on the Russian advance into Central Asia as any evil, and I know a time must come when the limit of our legitimate influence will touch the limits of



Walker & Boutall sc.

SIND, SHOWING AFFGHANISTAN AND BELOOCHISTAN BOUNDARIES.

theirs. This may be done in peace, and I think the sooner the better. But I should like it to be, if possible, far from our own frontier, and that we should meantime, by extending our common and honourable influence, unite our neighbours as closely as possible to us in interest and feeling. This is one of my great reasons for wishing to make the most of facilities for commerce in Kurrachee and the Indus, and for highly valuing such work as Major Green's, taking every care that he does not commit us to any advance in force."

But to return to the autumn of 1858. On September 28, Frere was writing to Lord Elphinstone:—

"I have just received from General Jacob an account of a raid by the Boogtees into the Murree country, which shows what these men are up to if they did not know that it was unsafe to meddle with us. While the Murrees were occupied by a threat of attack from the Khetranees, Islam Khan and Moorteza Khan, the two principal chiefs, with the *élite* of the Boogtees, made a descent on Mundahee, a place seventy or eighty miles north-west of Kahun, where, as being remote from danger, the Murrees had collected their cattle. The Murrees were quite surprised, fifty or sixty were slain, and the Boogtees,* with the loss of only five wounded, 'lifted' a greater booty than had ever been taken *in* the hills before. A patrol of the Sind Horse met them at Shapoor and counted eight thousand sheep, eight hundred cows and oxen, four hundred she camels, thirty horses and mares, and eighty asses.

In forwarding Jacob's account, Frere writes:—

"October 15, 1858.

"It is obvious that the old Border spirit has by no means died out. In daring, skilful arrangement and enterprise the foray described is quite equal to any of those, the memory of which survives among the legends of the frontier tribes, or of which we occasionally hear on other portions of the border.

"It is well to bear this in mind, because, since the

* The Boogtees, it will be remembered, were the tribe so severely defeated by Major Merewether in 1847.

arrangements on this frontier were first left in General Jacob's hands, the success of his measures has been so complete that it is frequently ascribed to some difference in the character of the tribes with which he has to deal; and because, since 1847, there has been no single instance of a really successful raid, great or small, within the line of General Jacob's frontier outposts, it is difficult to persuade persons at a distance that the tribes on this part of the border are still really as formidable as they were before that period, or as any of their fellow tribes on any part of the north-western frontier of India. But no one can have any doubt upon this point who considers what the same energy and skill which directed the present enterprise might have effected if, instead of wresting such a booty from the rocky fastnesses of the Murree Hills, the Boogtees had ventured to sweep the flat plains and open defenceless towns of Sind.

"Secondly, it is well to consider what a commentary a successful enterprise like this furnishes on the opinion of those who deem that no serious danger can be apprehended from our neighbours beyond this frontier.

"We ought never to forget that the real weakness of these tribes consists in their want of union and combination, and that one combining and directing mind, who could give them a common object and induce them to unite till it was attained, might render them very formidable." . . .

The Murrees were the most insubordinate and amongst the most powerful of the tribes owing nominal allegiance to the Khan of Kelat. Robbers by profession and almost by necessity—for their country did not grow sufficient corn for their sustenance, and when their stores of food were exhausted, a plundering raid was the only available means of replenishing them—they used to boast that of all the clans with which the English had come in contact during the occupation of Affghanistan, they alone had never submitted or been fairly defeated. Thrice in the year 1840 they destroyed, almost to a man, detachments of British troops, one of which, under Major

Clibborn, lost three guns, which had never been recovered—to Jacob, as an old artilleryman, a sore subject. Sir Charles Napier, in his Hill Campaign, did not penetrate into their fastnesses; and they were constantly extending the range of their plundering parties, till Jacob took command of the Sind frontier in 1847, and put an effectual stop to their depredations in that direction. Henceforth, therefore, on the western side they confined themselves to periodical plundering in the Khan's territory of Cutchee and the Bolan Pass, which they rendered at times impassable to any but large Kaffilas; and thither Jacob could not follow them, for he was prevented by strict orders from doing more than was necessary to protect the frontier. On their eastern boundary was the Punjab, and on this side their raids were more frequent and formidable. Frere and Jacob, as has been already mentioned, protested against the Punjab authorities making retaliatory expeditions against the tribes owing allegiance to the Khan of Kelat, instead of seeking redress from him as their suzerain; and the Punjab authorities consequently asked that if they were not to be allowed to protect themselves from the Murrees after their own fashion, the Sind authorities should take the necessary measures after theirs.

The legitimate way of bringing them to order was by the authority and armed interposition of the Khan himself. Jacob and Major Green had often talked over and planned out such an expedition, and Major Green, now political agent with the Khan, was making preparations for carrying it out.

The relation of the Belooch and Brahoe chiefs to the Khan of Kelat resembled that of the German barons of the Middle Ages to the Emperor. Each tribe held its territory on condition of furnishing the Khan with a quota of armed men in war time, to be commanded and

fed by him. Their allegiance was at best little more than nominal, and their power of cohesion was further weakened by the reigning Khan having secretly sown discord among them with the object of strengthening his power.

Amongst the most important of the chiefs whom Major Green was endeavouring to bring to join the Khan's force was the Jam of Beila. His territory was on the borders of Persia, with which Power he was known to have been, during the Mutiny, constantly intriguing against his suzerain the Khan and against the English. In respect of this chief, Frere writes encouragingly, but inculcating caution to Major Green :—

"October 16, 1858.

"I sent on your letter to the Jam, with one from myself, of which a copy will reach you through the General, and I trust they will have the effect of making him join you at Koydar, or wherever you may be when he gets your letter, and placing himself entirely in your hands. It will be the best thing he can do, and I think if he can screw up his courage to meet you, you will soon get over him the same influence you have acquired over the other chiefs.

"I never believed him to be an injured innocent, nor do I think he laid much claim to that character. He was, I suppose, like all the rest of the chiefs, on the look-out for something to his own advantage, and if he had been forced into the Musnud, killing a few scores in hot or cold blood as the case might be, I do not suppose he or any of the others would have declined the honour from conscientious scruples.

"But one must not expect too much from these men. Loyalty, in *our* sense of the word, is hardly to be expected among them any more than among the Scotch or English nobles of the early feudal times, and for the same reason, viz. that every man has some sort of connection by blood or marriage with the reigning house, and can get up some sort of claim to reign himself, if he is strong enough. Soldiers, not lawyers, elect and support the sovereign, and a stout arm and wise head are better charters than a

pedigree proving you the rightful heir. Fidelity to certain persons and families all these people have who are accustomed to consider themselves as vassals and servants; but that can hardly be felt towards the present Khan whose escutcheon is not quite without blot, nor does he command personal respect or regard. You, and you alone, have saved him; and in saving him, have saved the peace of all that country, and of much of our own too. But do not expect too much from these people, nor set them down as villains because they waver in their allegiance to their Khan or to us, when they think us going down hill. Success is one of their tests of right, and as long as we are visibly able to command them, they will obey us, and no longer. It is because they feel that the moral power of you and your small escort is greater than that of a host of plunderers and murderers that they obey you so willingly. But take care you do not overstrain your power by exacting too much.

"This Jam has been a good neighbour to us down here, and whatever schemes of ambition he may have entertained to the prejudice of a Power of which his father never heard probably, he has always acted as we have a right to expect: catches and gives up fugitives and thieves, and prevents his own people from molesting ours. We must deal with him according to his acts, not according to any foolish dreams which may have entered his head. . . .

"If the Khan wishes to distinguish himself by reducing to order a refractory vassal, let him try his hand on Osmeid Alla Choota, who is nearer to him and as bad a neighbour to us as the Jam is a good one—always evading help to our police, and harbouring criminals. I do not want him to carry fire and sword into Osmeid Alla's villages. He and his people are not worse than the Elliotts, Armstrongs, Maxwells, and Johnstones of a hundred and fifty years ago; and in less than that time, if we go on patiently, as Jacob and you have been doing hitherto, we shall make the Chootas, please God, into respectable people, like the Elliotts & Co. of these days (Porter Brewers, perhaps, to H.M.'s Forces in Sind); but we must not drive them too fast. . . .

"We must remember that the act transferring India to the direct government of the Crown has materially changed our powers. Before, we could, if we saw good

cause, have marched our army to Candahar or Herat, and trusted to the Court approving. Now any employment of our Indian army beyond our own frontier (except to repel invasion) without the sanction of Parliament is strictly forbidden. No doubt it will be done some day, but the attempt, without the strongest reasons, will be checked, and if we bring on ourselves any check of the kind, it may extend to the growth of the bulwark which Jacob is slowly but surely building against external aggression, and which, as the only defence of the kind we have, I would not willingly see interrupted.

"I am afraid you will never read all this yarn unless I get a certificate from some credible person that it is good for you; so I shall send it to Jacob and ask him to read it, and, if approved, to add such a certificate as Professor Holloway gets."

So he writes to Jacob as follows:—

"October 22, 1858.

"What will you think of me? Not give me quite up, I hope. The enclosed is a letter to Green in answer to one of his about the Jam. Please read and, if you approve, say a word in support. I am a little afraid that Green, in his honest zeal for a united and powerful Khanate, will go on too fast, and try forcibly to convert the somewhat vague and nominal allegiance of the Jam into the position of vassal, bound to 'come when he is called and do what he is bid;' in fact, that he will try to do what MacNaughten wanted done twenty years ago.

"I hope the Jam will go to him, for I am sure if Green were a week with even Azaard Khan himself, the chief would be his humble servant; but till they know and feel by personal observation the power of his honest, right-minded character, it is useless to drive them The Khan they can never respect, but as Green consolidates something like a powerful Government at Kelat, they will respect and lean to him, as the chiefs now with him do. But it seems to me a mistake to suppose that these men are specifically different from the rest. Of course there is great difference of individual character, but the main difference of all seems to me to be that the one set see and know Green personally and the others do not."

Major Green's answer is not extant, and its purport can only be gathered from Frere's reply to it:—

"November 20, 1858.

"I hope you are better for the broadside you fired into me in yours of the 4th, just received, for I assure you it nearly took away my breath. However, as Jacob says, pitch into me, if it does you good, for I know it is all meant for the good of the nation. But do not suppose I ever imagined you were going about the country à la political. I know you could not do it, if you tried, and if any one tried to make you do it, you would, I know, either die under the operation or slay the operator outright.

"Just read my letter again, if you have got it, and you will see that what I said—certainly what I meant to say—was that any attempt to force all these chiefs to obey the Khan as they would have obeyed his brother Nusseer Khan or their father, would end in the policy which you and I equally abhor and detest.

"All that a just and manly course of action can do to create a firm and united Government in Beloochistan, you have done and are doing. . . .

"Do not for a moment suppose that I do not feel as much as you or any other man living, the evil of shutting our eyes to the only true policy, and adopting the timid course, which, as you justly say, is in the end the most aggressive. Publicly and privately I have used what weight my opinion has, to support the views you and Jacob have propounded, confident that they are not only just and right in themselves, but the only way to avoid being driven forward against our will and our interest.

"But we are in a minority of half a dozen against the world. It is useless fretting. The only thing is to wait patiently and prepare, as well as we can, for the storm which will come, and which will, for the first time, satisfy the world that the half dozen though in the minority were not knaves or fools, nor any way in error as to what must happen.

"The only fault I have ever found with you is that you do not seem satisfied with your own work; that you seem impatient and anxious to be doing more, when I see you have done and are doing more than I believed possible, and that you are rapidly working a great revolution, and

converting one of our posts of danger into an outwork of commanding strength.

"If I gave you any other impression than this you must forgive me, for, believe me, that was what I meant, and few things could vex me more than [for you] to think I had any feeling but one of the highest admiration for all you have done with so much courage and self-devotion.

"If still wroth, fire a second broadside at me, but in any case believe me ever your sincere and affectionate friend."

Frere, as usual, was doing all he could to help and support Major Green, while leaving him a free hand. He writes to him :—

"December 23, 1858.

"I have sent to Government your official letter of the 20th, relative to the Khan's expedition against the Murrees.

"Do not consider me an old woman for reminding you that you have now duties even higher than that of showing H.H. and his paladins how to scale a hill crowned by Murree matchlockmen. You know I always admit that there are times when a General may properly pick up a firelock and use it, but it is not his usual duty. Your duty is now to direct others, and my only misgiving is that your love of danger and adventure may lead you to expose yourself, not only more than is necessary, but more than is justifiable in a man who is to be the brain, and not the hands and feet, of frontier enterprise."

At length, by January 21, 1859, and in spite of the occurrence of a calamity which might well have deterred him, Major Green had assembled at Bagh in Cutchee, at the foot of the hills, a force which it was impossible to count, but which may have been about four thousand horse and four thousand foot, together with his own escort of a single squadron of Sind Horse under his brother, Captain Malcolm Green. Robbers by profession, and

without any cohesion or discipline, the tribes of which the force was composed were not unlikely, on the smallest provocation, to attack one another instead of the enemy. The only bond that held them together and controlled them was Green's personal authority. Many of the men had never seen a European before, yet such was the ascendency that he exercised over them, that his mere presence was sufficient to stop any quarrel which arose. And though the Jam of Beila was soon discovered to be in treacherous communication with the enemy, Major Green succeeded in keeping the force together for nearly two months, and conducted it into the heart of the Murree country, nearly a hundred miles beyond the farthest point reached by Sir Charles Napier in his Hill Campaign, through defiles and over mountain tracks of almost unexampled difficulty, never before traversed by a European. The column on the march was about ten miles in length. In going along a valley it would spread out for a battue, driving before it and hunting down all the game, so that nothing could escape. Yet at one place, when encamped for days close to unprotected corn-fields, these semi-savages paid such respect to Major Green's injunctions that not a blade of the crop was touched.

Against a force under such control, the Murrees, who mustered about two thousand fighting men, could make no effectual stand. Kahun and the other chief places were occupied one after the other and the forts destroyed, and the Murrees professed their willingness to submit to the authority of the Khan, and give hostages for their future good conduct. "This was accomplished," Frere writes to Lord Elphinstone, "without any mishap or distress to the forces which he [Green] led, without indiscriminate massacre, plunder, or destruction, or barbarity, or severity beyond what is justified among civilized nations [and]