

**THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER AND THE  
UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1883-1915**

**by**

**CHRISTOPHER HENRY BECKVOLD**

**A thesis submitted as partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree**

**DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE (HISTORY)**

**In the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies at the**

**UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**

**SUPERVISOR: Dr. T. Simpson**

**July 2021**

## ABSTRACT

This thesis considers the relationship between Germany's South-West African colony and its British South African counterparts (the Cape Colony, Natal, Rhodesia and, after the second Anglo-Boer War, the Orange River Colony, and the Transvaal) between 1883 and 1915. The chapters consider the complex and fraught relationship, including the British Government's surprise and the Cape Government's dismay following Germany's establishment of the colony: the German public's pro-Boer stance juxtaposed against the German Government's refusal to intervene during the second Anglo-Boer War; the Cape Government's dilemmas over whether to aid German South-West Africa (GSWA) during Germany's quasi-genocidal campaigns against the Herero and the Nama; efforts to cooperate with German South-West Africa despite labour competition during the period of the unification of South Africa; and the period after 1910, when the diplomatic relationship became an affair of the Union of South Africa, which simultaneously pursued protectionist policy for South African trade, and bilateral cooperation concerning the diamond industry, as well as security along the border between 1911 and 1914. Finally, I consider the impact of the outbreak of the First World War, which saw Germany and GSWA offer support for an Afrikaner Rebellion to draw Britain's attention away from Europe and install a friendly government in South Africa, while also offering the Union an opportunity to conquer GSWA as part of its sub-imperial ambitions. Among the enduring themes are the interplay between political, economic and military developments, including border disputes, illicit trade, labour competition, and armed incursions led by non-state actors. In conclusion, I argue that as the idea of a South African federation progressed, it was driven in part by geopolitical factors and the desire to counter German imperialism. The British Government endorsed a South African union in part to create a South Africa strong enough to fend off German geopolitical threats.

## KEY TERMS

German South-West Africa, Namibia, Union of South Africa, southern Africa, Union Constitution, British Empire, intercolonial relations, Anglo-German rivalry.

## ABBREVIATIONS

CID - Committee on Imperial Defence

*TEPH - The Eastern Province Herald*

GSWA - German South-West Africa

*HPD - Hansard Parliamentary Debates*

HPRAUW - Historical Papers Research Archive, University of Witwatersrand

NASAP - National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria

*TMMAPG - The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*

TNAK - The National Archives, Kew

*TRDM - The Rand Daily Mail*

UDF - Union Defence Force

WNLA - Witwatersrand Native Labour Association

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many individuals played a role in the completion of this thesis. To them, I owe many thanks. First, I would like to thank Dr. Thula Simpson. Without his willingness to supervise me from across the Atlantic Ocean, this project would not have occurred. I greatly appreciate his patience and guidance throughout this project. In addition to Dr. Simpson, Professor Karen Harris was instrumental in arranging the logistics of my study at the University of Pretoria. To her, I offer my sincere thanks. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Eddie Michel for offering his input during the early stages of this project.

I could not have completed this project without the aid of the various librarians and archivists whom I met along the way. In particular, I thank the librarians and archivists at the National Archives of South Africa at Pretoria, the Historical Papers Research Archive at the University of Witwatersrand, the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford, the National Archives at Kew, the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, the Widener Library at Harvard University, the Harvard Law School Library, and the Boston Public Library in Massachusetts.

There have been educators and friends who have supported me in my academic endeavours throughout the years. The first is Eileen Walls. She taught me a lifelong lesson – to keep learning. To her, I say thank you. The other educator and friend who has been a strong source of encouragement is Dr. Sarah Wiggins. Since my time as an undergraduate, she has encouraged my interest in and study of the British Empire.

I would also like to thank my parents, Christine and Henry Beckvold, for their unwavering support of my educational journey. They have been present for every moment, from fostering my enthusiasm to helping fund my education. To them, I am greatly indebted. I would also like to thank my sister, Katherine Beckvold, and her husband, Tim Leonelli, for encouraging me to step back from my writing when the work seemed daunting.

Lastly, this thesis would have been impossible to complete without the help and support of my wife, Briana. She has listened to my ideas with patience, as well as offered advice and

encouragement when the task seemed impossible. In addition to travelling abroad with me, Briana was vital to the acquisition of research materials at various archives. She sat with me for countless hours, helping me scan documents that I had selected. To her, I am tremendously grateful. I consider myself an exceptionally lucky husband.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>KEY TERMS</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</b> .....	<b>viii</b>

### INTRODUCTION

<b>Research Problem</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Historiography</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>Sources and Methodology</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>Chapter Outline</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Note on Terminology</b> .....	<b>13</b>

### CHAPTER I

<b>THE ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 1883-1902</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>1.1 German colonisation and expansion in South-West Africa, 1883-1889</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>1.2 German South-West Africa’s consolidation and the Anglo-German rivalry, 1890-1898...</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>1.3 The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902</b> .....	<b>21</b>

### CHAPTER II

<b>POSTWAR, 1902-1904</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>2.1 South Africa ‘s economic crisis and German South-West Africa’s economic growth, 1902-1904</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>2.2 Boer emigration to German South-West Africa, 1902-1904</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>2.3 The Situation in 1904</b> .....	<b>34</b>

### CHAPTER III

<b>THE HERERO AND NAMA WARS, 1904-1906</b> .....	<b>36</b>
<b>3.1 Tensions across the border, 1904</b> .....	<b>39</b>
<b>3.2 Employment opportunities during the Herero and Nama Wars, 1904-1906</b> .....	<b>40</b>
<b>3.3 Gunrunning, 1905-1906</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>3.4 Germans’ treatment of blacks outrages the Cape, 1906</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>3.5 Refugees in the Cape, 1904-1906</b> .....	<b>49</b>
<b>3.6 German soldiers crossing the border, 1906</b> .....	<b>54</b>

### CHAPTER IV

<b>GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: AGITATION AND SUSPICION AT THE BORDER, 1906-1907</b> .....	<b>63</b>
<b>4.1 The Orange River, 1906</b> .....	<b>63</b>
<b>4.2 Abduction at the border, 1906</b> .....	<b>66</b>

4.3	Illegal importation from Germany, 1906 .....	70
4.4	Ferreira’s Raid, 1906-1907 .....	73
<b>CHAPTER V</b>		
<b>FEDERATION CONSIDERED: RESOLVING THE GERMAN THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1902-1910.....</b>		
		<b>79</b>
5.1	Federation, 1906-1908.....	79
5.2	Imperial defence, 1907-1909.....	82
5.3	South Africa’s security, 1902-1906 .....	86
5.4	The German threat to South Africa, 1907-1910 .....	89
<b>CHAPTER VI</b>		
<b>DIAMOND DISCOVERIES AND OTHER INTERCOLONIAL COOPERATION, 1907-1910.....</b>		
		<b>96</b>
6.1	Diamond discovery in German South-West Africa, 1908-1910 .....	96
6.2	Intercolonial labour competition, 1907-1910.....	99
6.3	Intercolonial cooperation, 1908-1909 .....	100
6.4	Policing the frontier and upholding the law, 1907-1910.....	102
<b>Chapter VII</b>		
<b>THE POST-UNIFICATION RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, 1911-1914.....</b>		
		<b>106</b>
7.1	Developments in 1911 .....	106
7.2	Developments in 1912 .....	107
7.3	Developments in 1913 .....	109
7.4	Developments in 1914 .....	110
<b>Chapter VIII</b>		
<b>THE END OF THE AFFAIR, 1914-1915 .....</b>		
		<b>112</b>
8.1	The Maritz Rebellion, 1914-1915.....	115
8.2	Invading German South-West Africa, 1914-1915.....	118
<b>CHAPTER IX</b>		
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>		
		<b>122</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>		
		<b>127</b>
<b>ARCHIVAL SOURCES .....</b>		
		<b>127</b>
<b>JOURNAL AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES.....</b>		
		<b>149</b>
<b>LITERATURE .....</b>		
		<b>158</b>
<b>ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SOURCES.....</b>		
		<b>166</b>

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<b>Figure 1: The Opening of Parliament .....</b>	<b>115</b>
--------------------------------------------------	------------

## INTRODUCTION

### Research Problem

Despite differences between liberal, Marxist, and neo-Marxist interpretations, most scholars approach South Africa's unification in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Boer War in a similar way, focusing on developments within the Empire, such as the interplay of colony and metropole, the interests of capital, and the peculiar difficulties posed by the region's racial dynamics – all of which are intra-Imperial phenomena.<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, I examine South Africa's interactions with German South-West Africa (GSWA) between 1883 and 1915 and South Africa's progression toward eliminating the German threat. Throughout the thesis, I review issues of South Africa's security, South Africa's role in imperial defence, and the British military's evolving plans for invading South-West Africa. These three areas demonstrate a direct connection between the larger rivalry between the British and German Empires and unfolding events in southern Africa.

Some specific episodes that marked the rivalry between the two Empires in southern Africa were the border dispute at the Orange River; abductions of Cape citizens; the Herero and Nama Wars (which unsettled Cape Coloureds, created a refugee crisis, and encouraged German troops to violate the frontier); gun smuggling; the Ferreira Raid; and the establishment of economic relations between the British and German colonies.

---

<sup>1</sup> For liberal histories, see L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); L.M. Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1995); L.M. Thompson and M. Wilson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa Volume II, 1870-1966* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971); G.H.L. Le May, *British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1907* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); For a Marxist history, see B.M. Magubane, *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875-1910* (Trenton, NJ, U.S.A.: Africa World Press, Inc., 1996); For neo-Marxist histories, see S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 1987); S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930* (Boston: Addison-Wesley Longman Limited, 1982); S. Marks, War and Union, 1899-1910, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, and Democracy* (Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

As the idea of a South African federation progressed, it was driven in part by geopolitical factors and the desire to counter German imperialism. The British Government endorsed a South African union in part to create a South Africa strong enough to fend off German geopolitical threats.

## Historiography

In the historiography of the Anglo-German relationship in southern Africa, five prominent themes have existed. One has considered German colonisation of South-West Africa as a factor in the deterioration of the larger Anglo-German relationship. A second has focused on Anglo-German competition for mineral wealth and labour sources in southern Africa. A third has been the extent to which Germany's relationship with the Transvaal antagonised Britain. The fourth has addressed the role that South Africa's unification played in improving the British Empire's defences against the German threat. Finally, the most recent area in the historiography has examined the degree to which the dynamics of the bilateral relationship between British South Africa and German South-West Africa were independent of the larger imperial rivalry between Britain and Germany. I will address the literature relevant to these five themes and explain how my thesis builds on them.

One area of historical debate has been the extent to which Germany's decision to colonise South-West Africa antagonised Britain. In "The First German Colony and its diplomatic consequences," an article published in 1937, William Aydelotte argued "The dispute over South-West Africa resulted in the complete, if temporary, destruction of the Anglo-German friendship that had lasted since the British occupation of Egypt in 1881."<sup>2</sup> He further claimed that German colonial policy led to "the *Weltpolitik* of later times and the naval rivalry with England."<sup>3</sup> In Aydelotte's view, when Bismarck decided to engage in colonisation after many years of stating his disinterest, it shocked the British Government. From that point, the British Government's distrust of Germany grew.

In 1959, Francis Hinsley wrote that he believed that German colonisation in South-West Africa contributed to the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. Henry Turner, Jr. disagreed with

---

<sup>2</sup> W.O. Aydelotte, The First German Colony and Its Diplomatic Consequences, *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 5(3), 1937, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Aydelotte and Hinsley in “Bismarck’s Imperialist Ventures,” which was published in 1967. He attributed the rivalry to the German naval arms race with Britain, the Kaiser’s flippant inflammatory political gestures toward Britain, and the German Government’s failure to clearly communicate its diplomatic goals to the British Government. In 1974, in *Bismarck and British Colonial Rule*, Aydelotte re-affirmed his assertion that the colonisation of South-West Africa created Anglo-German tensions.<sup>4</sup>

I believe German colonisation of South-West Africa played a minor role in Britain’s larger relationship with Germany. I believe the tension between GSWA and the British South African colonies was limited to southern Africa, especially after 1902. In particular, Germany’s repression of the Herero and the Nama in southern Africa disrupted South-West Africa’s relationship with Britain’s South African colonies. The South African colonies also pursued a limited economic relationship – for example, labour opportunities – with South-West Africa, despite political tensions. South-West Africa’s relationship with the South African colonies was both contentious and beneficial.

The next area of historiographical debate has been the degree to which Britain and Germany’s competition for mineral wealth and labour sources in southern Africa influenced Anglo-German competition for territory in southern Africa. In Nigel Worden’s *The Making of Modern South Africa*, he claimed that the British sought to acquire southern Bechuanaland to curtail German ambitions for mineral wealth and labour sources in southern Africa from 1870 until 1900.<sup>5</sup> Shula Marks considered control over southern Africa’s mineral wealth to be the key factor that drove British expansion in southern Africa. She explained that “especially after the discovery of gold”, Germany and the Transvaal aimed to expand in southern Africa to control any other sources of mineral wealth.<sup>6</sup> Germany and the Transvaal’s aggression “troubled the Colonial Office and

---

<sup>4</sup> F. H. Hinsley, International Rivalry, 1885-1895, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 263-26; H.A. Turner, Jr., Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 81-82; W.O. Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Rule: The Problem of South West Africa, 1883-1885* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* (Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> S. Marks, Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 107.

undoubtedly fuelled British determination to remain in control of their ‘natural sphere’ in the region.”<sup>7</sup> Consequently, like Worden, she claimed that the British Government secured Bechuanaland to block attempts by the Transvaal and Germany to control mineral wealth in southern Africa.<sup>8</sup> I agree with Worden and Marks’s assertion that Anglo-German competition for mineral wealth and labour sources encouraged British expansion in southern Africa. However, I believe that competition for labour sources – required for mining and later, infrastructure projects – lasted beyond the initial mineral discoveries during the late nineteenth century. My thesis will demonstrate that labour shortages increased Anglo-German competition as a consequence of railway projects and new diamond discoveries in German South-West Africa (GSWA) during the postwar period.

A third theme in the historiography has been the extent that Germany’s relationship with the Transvaal antagonised Britain. In *The Reluctant Imperialists*, Cedric Lowe cited the British Government’s attempt to force the Transvaal into a customs union with Natal and the Cape in 1898. During the incident, the German Government intervened, advising the British Government to respect the Transvaal’s autonomy. Lowe argued that Germany’s willingness to support the Transvaal against British interference encouraged President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal to seek diplomatic relations with Germany, which antagonised Britain. In *The Lion’s Share*, Bernard Porter also claimed that increased diplomatic relations between Germany and the Transvaal challenged British authority in southern Africa, which fuelled British resentment toward Germany. Some historians have called attention to the Kaiser’s supportive telegram to Kruger after thwarting a coup d’état, the Jameson Raid. They assert that the so-called “Kruger Telegram” indicated a strong relationship between Germany and the Transvaal. Furthermore, they maintain that the telegram was most responsible for poisoning Anglo-German relations. Several historians have asserted in their individual work that the telegram generated Anglo-German hostility and encouraged the events most associated with Anglo-German antagonism, namely the German Naval Laws and the naval arms race. These historians include William Tunstall, Francis Hinsley, James

---

<sup>7</sup> S. Marks, Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 107.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Butler, Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, Alice Denny, Paul Kennedy, Cedric Lowe, John Grenville, Peter Cain, Anthony Hopkins, Jason Tomes, John Darwin and Jan Rüger.<sup>9</sup>

Though Germany's relationship with the Transvaal and the ensuing antagonism with Britain began during the late 1890s, I assert that any furtherance of the relationship subsided during the Anglo-Boer War because the German Government assured the British Government that it would not aid the Transvaal. This thesis will demonstrate that the German-Boer relationship of the 1890s evolved from a genuine political threat to British interests to a German-Boer relationship that the British alone suspected to continue to exist. Following the Anglo-Boer War, the British did not fully abandon their belief that some Boers planned to collude with Germany and German South-West Africa against British rule.

The fourth historiographical theme has addressed the role that South Africa's unification played in improving the British Empire's defences against the German threat. Many historians examined South Africa's constitutional development through a domestic lens – including Geoffrey Pyrah, Robert Ross, Stanley Trapido, Shula Marks, and Hermann Giliomee – but few historians have considered how the South African union aided with imperial defence.<sup>10</sup> While imperial defence

---

<sup>9</sup> C.J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 214-219; B. Porter, *The Lion's Share* (London: Pearson Longman Publishing, 2004), pp. 171-172; W.C.B. Tunstall, Imperial Defence, 1897-1914, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 575, 580-581; F.H. Hinsley, Great Britain and the Powers, 1904-1914, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 538; R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians* (London: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 343, 430; P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982), pp. 220-221, 233, 442-446; J.A.S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 102-103; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688-2000* (Harlow, England: Longman Press, 2002), p. 390; J. Tomes, *Balfour and foreign policy: The international thought of a Conservative statesman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 133-134, 137; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 263-264; J. Rüger, *Heligoland: Britain, Germany, and the Struggle for the North Sea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> G.B. Pyrah, *Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-1910* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 1-34, 109; N. Mansergh, *South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 33; H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 13-14; L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 63-70, 123; R. Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 79-80; N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* (Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 36-37; S. Dubow, South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, Belonging, Citizenship, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 34; S. Trapido, Imperialism, Settler Identities, and Colonial Capitalism: The Hundred-Year Origins

was not the primary objective behind the unification of South Africa, some historians – including Leonard Thompson; Nicholas Mansergh; John Darwin’ and Martin Plaut – have attempted to address how a united South Africa benefitted imperial defence. In *The Unification of South Africa*, Thompson mentioned that by the time of the passage of the South Africa Act of 1909, the German threat in Europe had supplanted events in southern Africa as the British Government’s primary concern.<sup>11</sup> The British Government sought to approve the Bill without amendment to enable the country to pivot and counter German aggression. This included approving the Bill without amendments to the racist principles. Regarding the South African union’s significance to the Empire, Thompson expounded that war with Germany concerned the British Government because Germany posed a threat to the Suez Canal’s security. The Cape remained a valuable secondary route to India. Therefore, he argued that securing British access to the Cape route to India became an ancillary reason to favour South African unification.<sup>12</sup> In *South Africa 1906-1961*, Mansergh argued that South African unification benefitted the Empire beyond its strategic value along the sea route to India. Secondly, he believed that unification transformed South Africa into “a strong and friendly” ally to Britain when a European war occurred.<sup>13</sup> In 2014, John Darwin’s conclusions in *The Empire Project* supported Thompson and Mansergh’s assertions concerning South African unification’s importance to the Empire’s defence.<sup>14</sup> In *Promise and Despair*, Plaut concurred about South Africa’s significance as a potential British ally: he argued that the union’s formation allowed Britain to “withdraw their South African garrison and leave the conquest of GSWA to Botha’s forces.”<sup>15</sup>

Taken together, Thompson, Mansergh, Darwin, and Plaut are the only historians to address the role the South African union played in the imperial defence scheme. I argue that South African unification played a role in the Empire’s defence against the German threat. Thompson, Mansergh,

---

of the 1899 South African War, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), S. Marks, War and Union, 1899-1910, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 191, 194; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 253; M. Plaut, *Promise and Despair: The First Struggle for a Non-Racial South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., 2016), pp. 3, 58.

<sup>11</sup> L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 398.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 398-399.

<sup>13</sup> N. Mansergh, *South Africa 1906-1961* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 92.

<sup>14</sup> J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 219-220.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

and Darwin correctly concluded that a unified South Africa was a powerful ally to Britain and protected the secondary sea route to India. However, I claim that South African unification's usefulness to imperial defence extended beyond what the above historians have claimed. My thesis discusses the War Office's plans for South Africa in the Empire's defence scheme from 1902 onward, which called for the invasion of GSWA. I take the discussion forward to 1915, when South Africa's conquest of South-West Africa removed the German threat.

The fifth and most recent area in the historiography has examined the degree that British South Africa's relations with GSWA mirrored Britain's larger interactions with Germany. Ulrike Lindner believed that the Cape and South-West Africa adopted their European homelands' trend of globalisation – for example, coordinating telegraph wire projects – because the British and German governments dictated colonial policy. Despite imitating their respective European homelands, Lindner quickly pointed out that relations between the Cape and GSWA did not replicate the Anglo-German antagonism found in Europe because the two colonies “could always focus on common challenges thrown up by their dealings with the Other, the colonized Africans, and the establishment of colonial rule in unknown African countries.”<sup>16</sup> Consequently, she claimed the Cape and South-West Africa developed a solely mutualistic relationship in which both colonies benefited. In contrast, Tilman Dederling and Peter Curson asserted that the Anglo-German rivalry was present in southern Africa between 1904 and 1907, the period during which the Herero and Nama Wars occurred in GSWA.<sup>17</sup> For example, Britain and the Cape initially refused to render GSWA aid during the wars, which dismayed GSWA and Germany. Dederling also cited the Cape's caution in dealing with GSWA given Britain's experiences with “German Weltpolitik.”<sup>18</sup> My thesis supports Dederling and Curson's assertions that British South Africa and German South-West Africa's relationship paralleled Britain and Germany's fraught relationship. However, I will extend their work by demonstrating that the intercolonial relationship was not only antagonistic, but also collegial.

---

<sup>16</sup> U. Lindner, Imperialism and Globalization, *German Historical Institute London (GHIL) Bulletin*, 32(1), 2010, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*; T. Dederling, War and Mobility in the Borderlands of South Western Africa in the Early Twentieth Century, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006, pp. 278-280; P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), pp. 118-122, 180.

<sup>18</sup> T. Dederling, War and Mobility, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006, p. 278.

No thesis has systematically addressed how the Anglo-German rivalry affected developments in British South Africa from 1883 to 1915. At most, scholars like Dederling, Curson, and Lindner collectively have examined events solely between 1904 and 1908, such as the Ferreira Raid (1906), border incursions between 1904 and 1907, as well as diamond discovery at Lüderitzbucht (1908). In terms of the Anglo-German rivalry after 1902, scholarly treatment of the Anglo-German rivalry shifts to Europe, leaving South Africa unaccounted for until 1914. But South Africa had an intimate ongoing relationship with German South-West Africa and the relations were not uniformly hostile. This thesis will attempt to close the gaps in the abovementioned literature by comprehensively addressing intercolonial events and issues involving South Africa and German South-West Africa between 1883 and 1915.

### **Sources and Methodology**

Secondary and primary sources form the basis of evidence for this thesis. In addition to some of the materials that I already available, I obtained secondary literature from local library networks in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the Boston Public Library; the Widener Library at Harvard University; the Harvard Law School Library; the library at the University of Pretoria, and the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford. Aside from the politics of unification, other literature that I found dealt with topics not specific to my thesis's main idea, such as the Herero and Nama Wars. This peripheral literature supported the smaller arguments contained in the chapters.

The University of Pretoria's Merensky library housed essential texts on South African history that were not available to me in the United States. For example, I gained access to the rare books section of the library to read Walker's biography of W.P. Schreiner and found published copies of the Smuts and Merriman papers. Through the Library Services website, I not only accessed numerous journals, but I also retrieved most of the contemporary newspaper accounts that I referenced in this thesis. In particular, I used the NewsBank database to read stories from *The Rand Daily Mail*. A majority of *The Rand Daily Mail* stories filled in some information gaps when I researched the Ferreira Raid, South African unification, and the Herero and Nama Wars.

During my time in South Africa, I travelled to the University of Witwatersrand with Dr. Simpson to examine sources at the Historical Papers Research Archive. The most helpful collection that I investigated were papers concerning German South-West Africa in “Rebellion, 1914-1915” (A103) collection. Several papers from the collection included ordinances from the governor of South-West Africa and communications from the German consul-general.

I also spent time at the National Archives of South Africa at Pretoria. One interesting collection (LTG 167) contained the original telegram communications between the Cape and the Transvaal that reported on Ferreira’s Raid. Another important collection was the Smuts Papers. The most relevant section contained Jan Smuts’s notes from the National Convention.

One archive that I obtained sources from remotely was the Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, a branch of the National Archives in the United Kingdom. The records that I specifically requested pertained to the Schreiner Delegation’s campaign in London while the British Government passed the South Africa Act. They included printed petitions and letters that *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* published.

Several sources that I used for the thesis came from the National Archives at Kew in the United Kingdom. The two most important collections I accessed were records from the Colonial Office and the War Office. The Colonial Office records included correspondence between colonial officials and reports from the Cape Mounted Police. These papers helped me develop the new material about conflicts at the Cape’s border with German South-West Africa. The Colonial Office records also contained letters between Lord Selborne and Lord Crewe, which addressed the British administration’s approach to South African unification. All the War Office papers that I accessed related to German South-West Africa. Within this collection, I found plans for invading South-West Africa, British assessments of the German threat, and Military Intelligence reports on weapons smuggling. These sources provided me with the necessary information to assess contemporary beliefs in a German threat to South Africa.

The last collection that I visited was located at the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford. I was able to find numerous published primary sources, such as petitions from black political organisations and Dr.

Abdullah Abdurahman's speeches. While at the Bodleian History Faculty Library, I examined academic journals and texts about South African unification, German South-West Africa, the Herero and the Nama Wars, and Anglo-German relations. The information that I acquired at Oxford built the context for the primary sources I discovered in the archives.

A final mode by which I obtained sources was through the internet. One such collection that I accessed was the Hansard database for debates in the British Parliament. The debates provided insight to the wide range of contemporary opinions on British policies in South Africa. These online resources allowed me to spend more time in the National Archives of South Africa and the National Archives at Kew.

At Harvard's Widener Library, I accessed the vast collection of American newspaper articles from the Chicago-based paper, *The Public*, and several unpublished postgraduate theses. The theses were vital because they showed some of the problems that postgraduate students encountered fifty years ago when studying Victorian Era Anglo-German relations. Their work also provided in-depth analysis of documents such as the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. The Harvard Law School Library was also useful because it had Kennedy and Schlosberg's book on the South African Constitution. Their work provided me with a critical understanding of the constitution's development.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in writing this thesis has been the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the pandemic, I gained experience researching remotely while living in the United States. Being in the United States, I cannot easily find copies of European and South African history books and other materials. However, the internet, some local libraries, Harvard University, and booksellers from around the world nearly eliminated impediments during the research process. In some ways, my geographic restrictions – when not in South Africa or the United Kingdom – made me more resourceful when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts implemented restrictions to stem the pandemic's spread beginning in March 2020. However, by the time the examiners asked me to make corrections in December 2020, all local libraries and Harvard University prohibited in-person visits. Additionally, the United States Postal Service became overburdened in December 2020 and January 2021, which extended delivery times for books that I ordered from one week to

six weeks. I found this challenging and frustrating because I wanted to review relevant and recent materials in a timely fashion. Despite closures and delays, the pandemic forced me to accept changes to previous modes of research, as well as to find other ways to research any necessary and new materials online.

## **Chapter Outline**

The first chapter of the thesis summarises the Anglo-German relationship from 1883 until 1902. It includes a discussion of the German Government’s decision to join the “Scramble for Africa” when it colonised German South-West Africa, the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty, and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. I also review local developments in southern Africa between the Jameson Raid in 1895 and the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). This section focuses specifically on how these contests in the colonies fed back to the metropole, and I consider the development of the antagonism between London and Berlin from the so-called Kruger Telegram onwards.

Chapter two addresses the origins of South Africa’s relationship with German South-West Africa between 1902 and 1904. I argue that because of domestic crises, German South-West Africa and Britain’s South African colonies paid little attention to their bilateral relationship between 1902 and 1904. Of the issues that required intercolonial engagement – including African labour recruitment and Boer emigration to German South-West Africa – I argue that most revealed that German South-West Africa and South Africa’s relationship was collegial. However, the 1902 to 1904 period was not devoid of discord, though it was mostly of a minor nature, including occasional arrests of British citizens in South-West Africa without evidence, which upset South Africa.

Chapter three considers the effects of the Herero and Nama Wars on the diplomatic relationship between the German and British territories in southern Africa. At the beginning, I explore the employment opportunities that the wars offered to South Africa’s blacks and Boers. I also show how the conflict unsettled the Cape’s African population, which in turn pressured the Cape Government to intervene. Additionally, I discuss the countervailing pressures created by the

destabilisation of the frontier, as rebels, weapons, and refugees poured across the frontier causing Windhuk to call for tougher measures, while German soldiers also launched operations in pursuit of insurgents.

Chapter four examines aspects of the evolving Anglo-German relationship beyond the Herero and Nama Wars. I introduce the Cape's dispute with South-West Africa over the border demarcation at the Orange River and explore the issue of abductions at the Cape's border with South-West Africa. In 1905 and 1906, German officials kidnapped British citizens without explanation. One case I study is the abduction of Private Edmund Kirkman of the Cape Mounted Police and the concern it generated among British citizens. The next section of the chapter features illegal arms importation from Germany and the British authorities' investigation into possible links to a German-Boer conspiracy. Ferreira's Raid forms the last portion of the chapter. I include the raid in this chapter because the incident ignited the Cape's fears of an insurrection and reinforced the Cape and British authorities' beliefs that a German-Boer conspiracy was in progress. This chapter emphasises the growing number of incidents committed by non-state actors that fed German frustration with the British colonial governments and animated British fears of the military threat that South-West Africa posed to South Africa.

In chapter five, I study the movement toward federation and a unified South Africa and how this was influenced by German challenges to imperial security. In particular, I chronicle the process of South Africa's incorporation into the Empire's defence scheme. I also address South Africa's military plans for combatting the German threat and GSWA's development of its naval station at Swakopmund. The chapter demonstrates British and South African intentions – concerning the German threat to South Africa – once federation was achieved.

Chapter six reconsiders South Africa's economic relationship with GSWA and moments of intercolonial cooperation along the Cape border between 1907 and 1910. This relationship was deeply affected by the discovery of diamonds in South-West Africa in 1908. For example, diamond smuggling from GSWA to the Cape ensued, which the Cape authorities took measures to thwart. The South African colonies also began to lose their African labour force because GSWA recruiters sought labourers there and Africans residing in the South African colonies left for GSWA on

rumours of better wages. South African mining companies in the Transvaal resented GSWA for taking potential workers and the Cape for allowing recruiters to do so. The diamond boom also saw GSWA's increased demand for the Cape's goods. During the same period – although unrelated to the diamond discovery – the Cape aided GSWA in limiting the illicit ammunition trade along the frontier and in apprehending Rolf's raiders who had been attacking Germans. Despite labour competition, GSWA's relationship with the Cape appeared to be improving from 1907 until 1910.

The seventh chapter chronicles the events between 1911 and 1914 involving the Union of South Africa and GSWA. Included in the account are the Cape's animosity toward the GSWA ostrich feather industry and Walvis Bay's role in an attempt to de-escalate the Anglo-German naval armament race in Europe. I also consider further gestures by the Cape authorities to prevent African resistance fighters' progress and to arrest diamond and ammunition smugglers. Lastly, I examine South Africa's negotiations with the Germans to regulate the diamond industry.

Chapter eight concludes with a discussion of the Maritz Rebellion – also known as the Afrikaner Rebellion – and the operations leading to the eventual conquest of the German colony during the First World War.

### **Note on Terminology**

For this thesis, blacks will serve as an all-inclusive term for Africans – termed “natives” during the Edwardian Era – and Coloureds, or blacks of mixed parentage. Any usage of the term “native” in this thesis will appear in direct quotes from primary texts. At several points, the reader will see the terms “Hottentots” and “Bastards.” They will only be used in direct quotes from primary texts.

In chapter two, the contemporary terminology is difficult to define because of unclear colonial sources. As I conducted the research for this chapter, I found contemporary terminology difficult to associate with modern terms. For example, German and British sources used the terms “Hottentots” and “natives” indiscriminately during the Herero and Nama Wars. The only clear term in these sources was “Bastard,” meaning a Coloured person of white and Khoekhoe or Nama descent. African is the modern term for the derogatory “Hottentot” and its offensive equivalent “native.” However, some people that colonial sources classified as “Hottentots” could also be

“Bastards,” or Coloureds. Because primary literature failed to make distinctions or investigate self-proclaimed cultural identities, colonial sources used “Hottentot” and “native” interchangeably without consistency. As a result of these inconsistent colonial labels, it is difficult to discern if colonial reports referred to Coloureds or Africans. Regardless of designation, I will provide a brief explanation of how I address the contemporary terminology specific to that chapter.

Additionally, the term “race” and any other derivative terminology in this thesis will refer to the race in the modern sense. The term’s usage will relate to an individual or a population’s skin colour unless otherwise noted in my analysis of primary text or in the footnotes. Lastly, this thesis will use “Boers” to refer to Afrikaners.

## CHAPTER I THE ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 1883-1902

### 1.1 German colonisation and expansion in South-West Africa, 1883-1889

In 1883, Franz Adolf Lüderitz, a German merchant, purchased Angra Pequena – later known as Lüderitzbucht – in modern-day Namibia. As had been the case with the establishment of many British colonies, the German Government permitted trading companies to establish outposts to test the area's viability as a potential German colony. The German Government allowed trading companies to establish outposts to test the waters and reduce the political and economic risk if the settlement failed.

The Berlin Government, which was led by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, requested that its British counterpart grant special protection to Angra Pequena because it was near British South Africa. Without offering any justification, the British Government refused. Lüderitz meanwhile brokered deals with African groups in South-West Africa for their land, often via dishonest means. In *A History of Namibia*, Marion Wallace has explained that Lüderitz's agents purchased land from African leaders that they measured in geographical miles instead of English miles, giving Lüderitz more land for the price he paid.<sup>19</sup> The likelihood that Germany would bring South-West Africa into the imperial fold increased because Lüderitz's land acquisition efforts made the territory more desirable to the German Government.

Domestic factors also influenced Bismarck's decision to colonise South-West Africa. These factors included Germany's recent industrialisation and demand for raw materials, as well as demands from German merchants and the German public to establish colonies. Bismarck needed to assuage the domestic clamour and wanted to gain political capital for the upcoming election in October 1884.

Additionally, European competition for colonies compelled Bismarck to act. The German chancellor feared that failing to partake in colonisation would diminish Germany's standing among

---

<sup>19</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 137-138. One geographical mile equals approximately 1.15 English miles.

the European nations. Bismarck also desired to frustrate the British Government's attempts to colonise and control all southern Africa. Bismarck could no longer ignore South-West Africa's potential as a German asset and declared the territory a German protectorate in April 1884. Germany's sudden interest in colonisation shocked the British Government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby, had not expected German colonisation of South-West Africa because Berlin had never indicated any previous interest in colonisation.<sup>20</sup>

Bechuanaland was situated between South-West Africa, the Transvaal, and British colonies in the Cape and Rhodesia. Following South-West Africa's colonisation, Germany sought to increase the territory's territorial reach to the east. Lüderitz's endeavours to purchase additional land from African tribes offered one manifestation of this desire. At the same time, the Transvaal was manifesting interest in expanding westwards. The pincer created by German and Boer expansion alarmed Britain. During 1884, President Kruger had attempted to annex two small Boer states to the west, the Goshen Republic and Stellaland. Fearing a junction between Germany and the Transvaal, in March 1885 the British Government annexed the southern section of what became Bechuanaland. The move curtailed the expansion of South-West Africa and the Transvaal. In addition to competing with South-West Africa and the Transvaal for land, the British Government also vied with them for fresh sources of labour. Until 1900, the British Government subjugated additional African tribes.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 33; H.A. Turner, Jr., Bismarck's Imperialist Venture, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 50, 58-59; W.R. Louis, Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 5-6; W.O. Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Rule* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), pp. 19-21; M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 128; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 39-40.

<sup>21</sup> S. Marks, Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 113; N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* (Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 26, 29.

From 1884 to 1885, the Berlin Conference convened, primarily to discuss European claims to colonies in Central Africa. The conference also defined German claims to South-West Africa, declaring “the coastline between the Orange and Kunene rivers...a German interest.”<sup>22</sup>

In the broader international context, Britain viewed Germany as a possible ally against Russian and French encroachment in Europe and abroad, and this served to ameliorate their relationship. The British Government’s posture proved advantageous during the following decade when Germany supported Britain against France in Egypt and the Sudan. In 1889, Bismarck attempted to form an Anglo-German alliance with Britain’s prime minister, Lord Salisbury to ease relations further. While Salisbury was pro-German, he declined the alliance because he believed it would exasperate France and Russia. Ultimately, Salisbury preferred not to agitate Russia, Britain’s century-long enemy.<sup>23</sup>

## **1.2 German South-West Africa’s consolidation and the Anglo-German rivalry, 1890-1898**

In March 1890, Leo von Caprivi replaced Bismarck as Germany’s Chancellor, and this heralded a change in the country’s colonial policy in which the focus shifted to consolidating control over the areas accorded to the country by the Berlin Conference. Until then, South-West Africa’s Africans and various German trading companies owned a patchwork of land parcels and there was no central authority in the territory. When the Hereros’ powerful leader, Maharero, died in October 1890, however, there was a succession crisis as the majority of the tribe did not accept the accession of his son, Samuel, to the role of paramount chief. As a result, Samuel Maharero sought the German administration’s aid to solidify his position. With the German administration helping to fill South-West Africa’s power vacuum, it was now able to consolidate German control.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. xxv. The Hereros believed the excessive cattle deaths were a bad omen.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*; P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982), pp. 183, 222; F. H. Hinsley, *International Rivalry, 1885-1895*, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 260-262, 266; J. Tomes, *Balfour and foreign policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 133.

<sup>24</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 148-149; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. xxv- xxvi; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 43.

In July 1890, despite Salisbury's unwillingness to ally Britain with Germany the year before, the British and German governments resolved to negotiate a treaty that defined their respective spheres of influence. Under the resulting Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890, Britain received Zanzibar while Germany gained control over Heligoland in the North Sea and received land abutting the Zambezi River. By defining these spheres of influence, the British and German governments hoped to avoid potential sources of conflict. The treaty garnered support in the British and German press, which hailed the agreement as a step toward Anglo-German cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

In March 1893, the German colonial administration began a military campaign against the Witbooi, another African population in South-West Africa. The following year, Theodor Leutwein became South-West Africa's administrator. His succession began an aggressive campaign against South-West Africa's African populations. He intended to expand GSWA's borders and to eliminate African resistance to German occupation. In late 1894, Hendrik Witbooi, the Witbooi's leader, concluded peace with the German administration and accepted German rule.<sup>26</sup>

In June 1886, gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand, which shifted the entire axis of the regional economy and increased Britain's ambition to reacquire the Transvaal.<sup>27</sup> In 1894, the German Government intervened in the relationship between Britain and Kruger's republic. The British Government insisted that the Transvaal protect the rights of British settlers residing there. German settlers had also been arriving in the Transvaal since the discovery of gold in the republic, but despite Berlin's nominal responsibility to German section of the *uitlander* population, the German Foreign Office stepped in June 1894 and insisted that the British Government not pressure the Transvaal to guarantee any foreign settlers' rights. Additionally, the German Government felt compelled to aid the Transvaal because many Boers (like Paul Kruger) shared their Germanic

---

<sup>25</sup> M.A. Yokell, *The treaty of Heligoland-Zanzibar: the beginning of the end for the Anglo-German friendship*, M.A. – Dissertation, University of Richmond, 2010, pp. 12, 22; C.J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 121, 135; F. H. Hinsley, *International Rivalry, 1885-1895*, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 266, 269-270; J. Rüger, *Heligoland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 109, 113.

<sup>26</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 149-154; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 28-32.

<sup>27</sup> S. Marks, *Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899*, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 113; N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* (Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 26, 29.

heritage. The German Foreign Office also interfered in British affairs regarding Delagoa Bay in Portuguese-held Mozambique, which had served as the landlocked Transvaal's main access to the sea. In November 1894, the German Government instructed the British Government not to seize Delagoa Bay because of its importance to the Transvaal's trade and communications. As a result of Germany's willingness to support the Transvaal, Kruger began to seek diplomatic relations with Germany in 1895.<sup>28</sup>

In December 1895, the Cape Prime Minister and Southern Rhodesia's administrator – Cecil Rhodes and L.S. Jameson, respectively – plotted an insurrection against the Boer government in the Transvaal, then known as the South African Republic. The purpose of what came to be known as the Jameson Raid was to establish British control over the Boer Republic. The invasion was thwarted in January 1896, however, when the Boer forces outflanked Jameson and his fellow raiders. On 3 January 1896, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a telegram to President Kruger, offering congratulations at the Transvaal's success in repelling the raiders. The event inflamed tensions between Britain and Germany and stiffened the former's desire to bring the Transvaal's republican government to heel. In Germany, the ensuing anti-British sentiment gave Kaiser Wilhelm II the necessary political support for a more robust naval construction programme. This process resulted in the German Naval Law of 1900. Meanwhile, fearing the likelihood of a future war with Britain, the Transvaal exchanged their outdated weapons for Mauser rifles, purchasing them from Ludwig, Loewe, and Company and later, Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabrik in Germany.<sup>29</sup>

In 1897, the goodwill that the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty generated dissipated. The Kaiser and Alfred von Tirpitz sought to incorporate Heligoland into their planned offensive against Britain. At first, the German fleet would be stationed at Heligoland to establish a German presence in the

---

<sup>28</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 149-154; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 28-32; C.J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 215-216.

<sup>29</sup> J. Butler, The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 180-181; B. Porter, *The Lion's Share* (London: Pearson Longman Publishing, 2004), p. 174; P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 221; S. Jones, *From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914* (Norman, OK, U.S.A.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), p. 74; S. Badsey, The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation, *The Journal of Military History* 71(1), 2007, p. 86; J. Ellis, Musketry: The Anglo-Boer War experience, *Historia* 45(2), January 2000, p. 7; J. Dreyer, Cartridges and chronology: an exercise in relative dating, *Southern African Field Archaeology* 3(1), April 1994, p. 45.

North Sea. Gradually, the Germans used it for naval manoeuvres and considered using Heligoland as a jumping-off point for an assault on Britain when an Anglo-War broke out.<sup>30</sup>

That same year, the rinderpest epidemic decreased the cattle population in southern Africa. The event had a profound effect on the Hereros. When cattle died, the Hereros believed it was a bad omen. The epidemic also ruined their livelihood, and a confluence of the two factors meant the Hereros decided to accept German rule. From 1898 until 1903, the German administration restructured itself. The administration developed policy to encourage economic growth, including land-grabbing schemes to build railroads for trade. The colonial overlords negotiated unfair terms with African leaders and aimed to relocate Africans to reserves. White settlers also began issuing loans to Africans in exchange for their land (which I will discuss further in the next chapter). German land-grabbing achieved the effect of increasing German control over the African population, but it also built up a reservoir of indigenous hostility toward the new administration.<sup>31</sup>

By 1898, Portugal stood on the precipice of financial ruin. The British and German governments consented to offer a joint loan to the Portuguese Government, using Portugal's colonies as collateral. If the Portuguese Government defaulted on the loan, the British and German governments planned to incorporate Portugal's colonies into their respective empires. Arthur Balfour, in his capacity as acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Paul von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador to Britain, negotiated terms and signed the Anglo-German Agreement on 30 August 1898. Even though the two governments never loaned Portugal the funds, one important feature of the document was that Germany promised not to ally itself with the Transvaal. In exchange for Germany's promise, Britain offered Germany favourable claims to certain Portuguese colonies. This agreement secured British supremacy in southern Africa, as well as ensured Germany's neutrality during the Anglo-Boer War. When the war broke out, Germany stayed faithful to the agreement because it assumed that Portugal still required a loan and

---

<sup>30</sup> J. Rüger, *Heligoland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 109, 113.

<sup>31</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 127; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 58-59.

consequently, that Germany stood to acquire certain Portuguese colonies. Consequently, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 eased Anglo-German relations between 1898 and 1899.<sup>32</sup>

### 1.3 The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902

In January 1899, the British Foreign Office received news from the British ambassador in Berlin that the Transvaal diplomat, Dr. W.J. Leyds, had travelled to Europe to represent the Transvaal abroad. His presence outraged London, but the British ambassador could do nothing because the British Government had not objected to representatives in the past. However, the British Government informally let its displeasure be known via private letters and British diplomats cited “illness or prior engagements” to avoid private engagements with dignitaries of those foreign countries that they feared might welcome Leyds<sup>33</sup> – the message got through. Consequently, Dr. Leyds did not meet with German officials or any other European diplomats and failed to make progress.<sup>34</sup>

In September 1899, the Transvaal delivered an ultimatum to the British Government: either the British troops on the republic’s border would withdraw or there would be war. There was war, and the Transvaal engaged in the hostilities in partnership with the Orange Free State, another Boer-run state in South Africa. Britain’s belligerence outraged German public opinion. Kaiser Wilhelm II reported to the British ambassador, “What are you wretched fellows about?...I must warn you that the feeling in Germany is very acute against you. I have a lot of subjects out there and unless something is done to guarantee them I do not know what will happen.”<sup>35</sup> In February 1900, a

---

<sup>32</sup> W.R. Louis, Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 24-25, 27; J. Butler, The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 181; R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians* (London: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 290-306, 448; F.H. Hinsley, British Foreign Policy and Colonial Questions, 1895-1904, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 515; R.D. Fiala, *The Anglo-German agreement over Portugal’s African colonies, 1898*, M.A. – Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Omaha, 1963, pp. 64-98, 117-121.

<sup>33</sup> A.N. Porter, *The origins of the South African war: Joseph Chamberlain and the diplomacy of imperialism 1895-99* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 179.

<sup>34</sup> T. Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 50.

<sup>35</sup> The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNAK): FO 800/17, 31, pp. 196-197; F. Lascelles – T. Sanderson, 1899-10-04, p. 196.

rumour circulated at the British Foreign Office that Dr. Leyds planned to meet with Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, the Kaiser never met Dr. Leyds. German royal protocol only permitted foreign government agents to meet the Kaiser informally. The ostensible reason was that foreign government agents could not obtain official audiences with the monarch – Leyds did not therefore receive an invitation to any of the Kaiser’s social events, and the German Government claimed that Dr. Leyds could not contact the Kaiser, but the underlying reason was the 1898 treaty. Queen Victoria had sent a message to Kaiser Wilhelm II in February 1900, asking him not to grant Dr. Leyds an audience. He obliged the Queen because his “devotion to his Grandmother was unbounded.”<sup>36</sup> The German Government aimed to maintain neutrality during the conflict.

During the war’s first year, France, Russia, and Germany threatened to intervene. The Kaiser reported to the British ambassador in Berlin, “I have just received to my utmost astonishment the invitation from the Imp. [Imperial] Russian Government to take part with them & France in a collective intervention for the Boers, to bring England to make peace. I have refused [sic].”<sup>37</sup> France and Russia, who had been allies since 1894 and Britain’s enemies for most of the nineteenth century, sought Germany’s assistance to intercede in the Anglo-Boer War. In part, the French and Russian governments believed that German relations with Britain were friendly since the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. France and Russia hoped to use Germany – as Britain’s friend – to end the Anglo-Boer War because the two countries did not yet have a close relationship with Britain. However, the German Government refused to partake in the proposed intervention. On 3 March 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm II informed the British ambassador in Berlin, Frank Lascelles, that because Germany had refused participation, Russia and France had called off their plan to pursue intervention.<sup>38</sup>

In the same communication with the British ambassador, Kaiser Wilhelm scolded the ambassador for the British Government’s lack of urgency concerning Russia and France’s proposed intervention. He wrote, “I hope the not[e] will give you a good waking up and make you leave your cushions at once.”<sup>39</sup> He sought to convince the British Government that an alliance with

---

<sup>36</sup> TNAK: FO 800/17, 7, pp. 207-208: F. Lascelles – A. Bigge, 1900-02-02, p. 208.

<sup>37</sup> TNAK: FO 800/17, p. 218: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 1900-03-03, p. 218.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

Germany was crucial to Britain's survival. About one week later, on 11 March 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent an urgent telegram to the British Government.<sup>40</sup> The Boer Republics requested the German Government to intercede and oversee peace negotiations. The Kaiser explained that he would respond once he received the British Government's advice. The next day, Queen Victoria thanked the Kaiser via the British ambassador for his forthrightness and speed in alerting Britain to the Boer Republics' request. She wrote: "The German Emperor has shown such kind friendship for England and such affection for me that I desire that he should be informed of the true state of affairs."<sup>41</sup> Queen Victoria informed her grandson, "my whole nation is with me in fixed determination to carry this war through without any intervention."<sup>42</sup> The German Government rejected the Boer Republics' appeal for German mediation.

In December 1900, President Kruger travelled to Germany to request an audience with Kaiser Wilhelm II with the aim of securing Berlin's support for the Boer Republics in their war against Britain. The German Government denied him the chance at Queen Victoria's request. In March 1902, Prime Minister Dr. Abraham Kuyper of the Netherlands also attempted to meet with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Kuyper supported the Boers given their shared Dutch heritage and wanted the German Government to help the Netherlands stage an intervention on the Boers' behalf. The German Government prohibited the meeting based on a desire to preserve its relations with Britain. The Boers' efforts to gain foreign assistance accordingly failed.<sup>43</sup>

In early 1902, the Boers and the British commenced peace negotiations after the failure of a similar attempt the previous year. The British delegation consisted of Lord Alfred Milner, the High

---

<sup>40</sup> TNAK: FO 800/17, p. 222: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 1900-03-11, p. 222

<sup>41</sup> TNAK: FO 800/17, p. 222: Queen Victoria – F. Lascelles, 1900-03-12, p. 222.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> TNAK: FO 800/17, 1, p. 170: F. Lascelles – T. Sanderson, 1899-01-06, p. 170. J.A.S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy* (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 289. Grenville attributed Germany's wartime policy to Kaiser Wilhelm II and not the German Chancellor; TNAK: FO 800/17, 7, pp. 207-208: F. Lascelles – A. Bigge, 1900-02-02, p. 208; TNAK: FO 800/17, p. 218: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 1900-03-03, p. 218; TNAK: FO 800/17, p. 222: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 1900-03-11, p. 222; TNAK: FO 800/128, pp. 21-22: Lord Gough – Foreign Office, 1900-12-03, pp. 21-22; P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 222; J. Tomes, *Balfour and foreign policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 133; F. H. Hinsley, *International Rivalry, 1885-1895*, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 261-262; TNAK: FO 800/18, 18, p. 66: F. Lascelles – Lord Lansdowne, 1902-03-29, p. 66.

Commissioner for South Africa, and Lord Horatio Kitchener, the commander of British forces. Milner and Kitchener met with the Boer leaders to discuss and sign the Peace of Vereeniging that ended the war. Two treaty articles proved to have long-reaching consequences for South Africa. Article 7 defined the Transvaal and the now Orange River Colony's steady progression toward self-government. They would proceed from military rule to crown colony rule followed by representative and responsible government.<sup>44</sup> Article 8 pertained to blacks. The parties agreed, "The question of the Franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of Self-Government."<sup>45</sup>

The Anglo-German relationship in southern Africa from 1883 until 1902 – like the relationship in Europe – experienced flashpoints of tension, despite efforts to avoid conflict. For example, the Jameson Raid and the telegram that Kaiser Wilhelm II sent President Kruger generated Anglo-German conflict and fuelled British beliefs that Germany intended to ally itself with the Boer Republics. There were also instances where the British Government and its German counterpart struck terms to diffuse hostilities. The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 defined spheres of British and German influence. In the immediate aftermath, the negotiated terms of the treaty and agreement temporarily alleviated hostilities related to colonial expansion in southern Africa. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 also reduced British fears of a German-Boer conspiracy in southern African when it became clear that Germany would not render aid to the Boer Republics if they engaged in a conflict with Britain. The Anglo-Boer War demonstrated the agreement's success as Germany did not ally itself with the republics. From 1883 to 1902, the Anglo-German relationship in southern Africa was volatile.

---

<sup>44</sup> TNAK: FO 93/107/9, pp. 1-4: Peace of Vereeniging, 1902-05-31, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER II POSTWAR, 1902-1904

In this chapter, I consider the fallout from the second Anglo-Boer War and how it affected the relationship between British South Africa and German South-West Africa. First, I will provide a synopsis of the South African colonies' economic crisis from 1902, which contrasted with GSWA's economic growth, and I probe the degree to which these processes compelled the respective colonies to turn inwards. The second section will examine the sporadic intercolonial interactions that took place between 1902 and 1904. Of the few intercolonial questions that arose – including African labour recruitment, Boer emigration to and German South-West Africa – most revealed that German South-West Africa and South Africa's relationship was collegial. However, 1902 to 1904 was not devoid of minor intercolonial tensions, such as instances where German authorities arrested British citizens in South-West Africa without evidence, which upset South Africa. I will also explore how these events served as precursors to a fresh intensification of armed conflict, but on this occasion within Germany's south African empire.

### 2.1 South Africa 's economic crisis and German South-West Africa's economic growth, 1902-1904

In the years immediately following the Anglo-Boer War, the Transvaal experienced an economic depression. Its economy had never been diverse. Mining was its primary source of economic growth and it required a substantial workforce to be profitable. There was a labour shortage in the immediate postwar years and the growing economic depression discouraged further immigration to South Africa. Without immigration, there was no outside source of labour, which only worsened the situation. This was troubling to the Colonial Office because the British Government had provided a substantial loan of £3 million to the Transvaal for post-war recovery, as accorded in Article 10 of Vereeniging.<sup>46</sup> Not only did the British Government stand to lose the investment, but the Transvaal's economic situation also threatened to drag the entire subcontinent down with it.

The Anglo-Boer War led to failures in South Africa's gold industry. The Transvaal's mining houses could not acquire enough labour to keep the mines in operation. In 1899, the Transvaal's

---

<sup>46</sup> A. Milner – A. Lyttelton, 1904-05-02, in C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1899-1905 Volume II*, p. 523; TNAK: FO 93/107/9, pp. 1-4: Peace of Vereeniging, 1902-05-31, p. 3.

population consisted of an estimated 107,482 Africans and 12,350 whites. When the war broke out, those numbers decreased. Most potential labourers served as combatants or non-belligerent workers during the war. Africans also refused to work in the mines because the mining houses cut workers' wartime wages in half. Following the war, the mine owners hoped for a return to prewar productivity levels but unskilled African labourers refused to return to the mines because the wages offered remained one-sixth below prewar wages and the working conditions were "unpleasant."<sup>47</sup> Additionally, Africans found work opportunities as railroad workers, in construction, and in "harbour improvement."<sup>48</sup> The region had enough potential labourers to run the mines, but the mine owners refused to increase Africans' wages or to hire "better paid, less manageable white labour" because of the implications that higher wages would have for profits.<sup>49</sup> By May 1904, mine owners' aversion to paying labourers higher wages damaged the mines' labour pool. While the number of prewar white labourers changed marginally – up by 12,411 whites – the number of African labourers decreased by 34 percent.<sup>50</sup>

After the Anglo-Boer War's first year, the mining houses formed the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) "to monopsonize the recruiting of African labour, and thereby to prevent the mines from competing against each other for labourers."<sup>51</sup> From 1902 onward, the WNLA experienced most of its labour recruitment success in Mozambique and it recruited 58,261 and 85,377 African labourers from the Portuguese colony in 1902 and 1903, respectively. Of those totals, Mozambique supplied 67 percent and 53 percent of the labour recruits. Still, the WNLA struggled to find additional labourers in Africa in 1903. An article in *The Rand Daily Mail* from 19 January 1904 explained that colonial administrators elsewhere on the continent did not send labourers to work in the Transvaal for fear of experiencing labour shortages of their own. This perspective has been echoed by the historian Alan Cobley, who has noted that the association attempted to source labour from places such as the Congo Free State, Portuguese West Africa, and Egypt, but its efforts were unsuccessful "because the authorities in those territories were concerned about the potentially negative impact on their own labor supply, or because the available labor was

---

<sup>47</sup> D.J.N. Denoon, The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6, *The Journal of African History* 8(3), 1967, p. 482.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 481.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 481-483; U. Lindner, Imperialism and Globalization, *German Historical Institute London (GHIL) Bulletin*, 32(1), 2010, p. 21.

<sup>51</sup> D.J.N. Denoon, The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6, *The Journal of African History* 8(3), 1967, p. 482.

not deemed suitable.”<sup>52</sup> In comparison to Mozambique, GSWA did not supply any labourers in 1902 and only supplied 620 African labourers in 1903.<sup>53</sup>

At first glance, one might assume that Mozambique simply had more available workers compared to GSWA or that Britain’s relationship with Mozambique was friendlier than with Germany. This was not the case. In “The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6,” Denoon explained that Mozambique provided more labour recruits in exchange for “a larger share of railway traffic to the Rand.”<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, the WNLA had also offered GSWA an incentive to send labourers to the Transvaal in 1904 – it had offered to pay the administration in Windhuk £10 per labourer each year for the first 1,000 recruits by March 1904 and £5 for every labourer beyond the initial 1,000 recruits. On 14 March 1904, the Chamber of Mines monthly meeting revealed that the WNLA only recruited 918 African labourers. GSWA’s “sparse population...made recruitment there unattractive.”<sup>55</sup> Subsequently, *The Rand Daily Mail* reported that the WNLA did not plan to offer GSWA the incentive again due to GSWA’s failure to generate the desired number of labourers. In addition, the WNLA planned to close its recruiting office in Swakopmund. With its government having failed in the task of serving as a reliable labour broker, the WNLA had by mid-1906 ceased looking to GSWA as a source of workers.<sup>56</sup>

Contemporary accounts revealed that GSWA failed to generate enough recruits partly because it needed workers at home. With the hope of continuing its economic expansion, the GSWA Government required labourers for the colony’s railway projects. *The Rand Daily Mail* cited heavy rains as a reason for inadequate Ovambo recruitment for the WNLA. Despite the WNLA’s incentive for sending more labourers to the Transvaal and the colony’s extreme labour shortage, there was reluctance to send Hereros to work in the mines. In April and May 1904, *The Rand Daily Mail* revealed that GSWA Government and the WNLA members hesitated to permit Hereros to labour in the Transvaal’s mines. By then, the GSWA Government had been at war with the

---

<sup>52</sup> A. Copley, ‘Lacking in Respect for Whitemen’: ‘Tropical Africans’ on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1903–1904, *International Labor and Working-Class History* 86, 2014, p. 39.

<sup>53</sup> *The Rand Daily Mail* (hereafter *TRDM*), 1904-01-19; *TRDM*, 1904-04-01; *TRDM*, 1904-05-09.

<sup>54</sup> D.J.N. Denoon, The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6, *The Journal of African History* 8(3), 1967, p. 484.

<sup>55</sup> A. Copley, ‘Lacking in Respect for Whitemen’: ‘Tropical Africans’ on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1903–1904, *International Labor and Working-Class History* 86, 2014, p. 39.

<sup>56</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-04-01; *TRDM*, 1904-03-14; L.G. Irvine and D. Macaulay, The Life-History of the Native Mine Labourer in the Transvaal, *The Journal of Hygiene* 6(2), April 1906, p. 10.

Hereros for more than three months and German authorities prohibited “the emigration of a number of Hereros.”<sup>57</sup> The article’s author also alleged that Hereros were inexperienced labourers. Despite the GSWA Government’s reluctance to send Herero labourers to the Transvaal and most mine owners’ concerns with hiring them, the Lancaster Gold Mining Company Limited did not hesitate to employ Hereros. The company had only made “a working profit” in 1903 and desperately needed labourers.<sup>58</sup> Even though several Herero labourers were inexperienced, the author reported that they quickly became “very serviceable labourers.”<sup>59</sup> Mine owners’ desire for success and the economic depression pressed British South Africa to cooperate with GSWA to receive any available labourers.<sup>60</sup>

On 2 May 1904, Milner reported to Alfred Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that falling immigration and rising emigration offered both the cause and the consequence of the Transvaal’s continual failure to recover pre-war levels of economic activity. The subsequent population decrease, along with Africans’ refusal to work for lower wages, created a labour deficit, which negatively affected the mines’ productivity. Winston Churchill, then the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, would write a secret minute that confirmed the severity of the situation two years later. Generally, whites were too expensive for the mine owners to employ and Africans refused to work for the lower wages offered. Because of the Transvaal’s economic woes, a portion of British Transvaalers demanded, “the speedy introduction of self-government”<sup>61</sup> believing that self-government was the only way to resolve the economic and labour problems promptly.<sup>62</sup> If the Transvaal developed remedies for the declining economic and labour situation via self-government – rather than London – recovery could occur more swiftly. The idea that solutions should spring

---

<sup>57</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-01-19.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> For more on the Lancaster Gold Mining Company Limited and its labourers, see C. de Bruyn and A. Meyer, A Bioarchaeological Analysis of Historical Human Skeletal Remains Recovered from Lancaster Mine, Witwatersrand South Africa, *The South African Archaeological Bulletin* 73(207), June 2018, pp. 5-6; For more on the jobs that African labourers found in GSWA and their experiences, see W. Beinart, ‘Jamani’: Cape Workers in German South-West Africa, 1904-12, in W. Beinart and C. Bundy (eds.), *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930* (Oxford: James Currey, 1987), pp. 166-172.

<sup>61</sup> A. Milner – A. Lyttelton, 1904-05-02, in C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers Volume II*, p. 524.

<sup>62</sup> On 5 March 1906, Selborne reported that the mayor of Johannesburg introduced him to a deputation representing various associations, including accountants, engineers, surveyors, miners, artisans, and religious organisations who believed self-government would save the Transvaal’s economy. See TNAK: CO 879/106, 807, pp. 66-67; Selborne – Elgin, 1906-03-05, p. 67.

from below (within the white community at least) and not unilaterally be decided at the top was a common theme among the settler population in the years leading up to South Africa's unification. Two years later, H.W. Just at the Colonial Office would write a memorandum that concluded any solutions to Transvaal's problems should be developed in the Transvaal – an avenue more amenable to Transvaalers than receiving dictation from London. Just advised the Colonial Office to delay any additional loans to the Transvaal until the Transvaal had self-governing institutions.<sup>63</sup>

GSWA's economic situation differed from South Africa's post-war depression. While GSWA had yet to experience a mineral-led economic boom similar to that which had transformed the Transvaal following the discovery of gold, most of its European settler population and some of its African population enjoyed modest economic gains.

Prior to the 1890s rinderpest outbreak, cattle herding was a major industry in GSWA. Copper ore mining was another, as diamonds had yet to be discovered in the colony. Additionally, oxen had been the primary means for transporting goods across the colony. The German developmental state decided to undertake railway and road construction projects immediately following the outbreak. Such projects were mandatory for GSWA's trade and the colony's long-term prosperity. At first, several railway lines were fragmented, only connecting certain towns and cities. For example, one railway connected GSWA's most important port city, Swakopmund, with GSWA's capital, Windhuk. The Swakopmund-Windhuk railway project finished in 1902. As a sign of the project's significance to the colony's economy and self-confidence, in 1902 GSWA organised an "agricultural exhibition" that demonstrated the railway line's role in transporting an "increased quality and range of European farm production."<sup>64</sup> The European population's increase also signalled GSWA's economic growth. As Helmut Bley noted in his *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* in 1971: "Between 1897 and 1903, the European civilian population nearly doubled from 2,628 to 4,682."<sup>65</sup> He however noted that the population growth was temporary because most new settlers were migrant, single men building the colony's railways.

---

<sup>63</sup> A. Milner – A. Lyttelton, 1904-05-02, in C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers Volume II*, p. 524; TNAK: CO 879/92, 819, pp. 1-17; H.W. Just, Memorandum on the War Contribution Loan, 1906-02-19, pp. 1, 3-5.

<sup>64</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 131.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

Others were Boers who had fled South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War. But it was a positive sign that pointed to potential, long-term, sustainable growth.<sup>66</sup>

Between 1903 and 1904, employment opportunities for blacks and Boers continued to expand beyond those that the railways offered. Marion Wallace has noted that because white settlers and GSWA's government held most of the colony's land by 1902, "Large numbers of Africans were turning to waged work for the first time."<sup>67</sup> Ulrike Lindner has added that blacks from the Cape also considered working in GSWA during these years, because of South Africa's post-war economic depression – oftentimes they could find better wages working in mines or railway construction in GSWA than in South Africa's mines following the Anglo-Boer War.<sup>68</sup>

While GSWA's economic activity increased due to the railway construction boom, the *Rand Daily Mail* on 4 March 1904 described GSWA's economy as floundering. Why? The paper attributed the German colony's "stagnation" to the Transvaal's depression.<sup>69</sup> According to the article, GSWA lacked capital investment in its domestic industries, which prevented the colony's economic development and limited its potential future growth once the time-limited infrastructure spending came to an end. The paper claimed that GSWA's problem could not be as easily solved as the Transvaal's labour shortage, because "you cannot compel capitalists to embark their money where they do not like."<sup>70</sup> Despite the somewhat bleak prognosis for GSWA, the newspaper did not harbour ill will for GSWA. Instead, the article's author hoped that GSWA would burgeon economically and welcomed the German presence in Africa. *The Rand Daily Mail* of 4 March 1904's report appeared to be the only account to articulate that GSWA's colonial economy was not expanding.<sup>71</sup>

As GSWA's colonial economy strengthened, however precariously, Helmut Bley and Jon Bridgman (in his *The Revolt of the Hereros*) have argued respectively that living standards among

---

<sup>66</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 152; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 131.

<sup>67</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 169-170.

<sup>68</sup> U. Lindner, Transnational movements between colonial empires: Migrant workers from the British Cape Colony in the German diamond town of Lüderitzbucht, *European Review of History* 16(5), 2009, pp. 684-685.

<sup>69</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-04.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

the indigenous African population – and particularly the Hereros – declined substantially during these years. They attributed the African tribal economy’s decline to the 1890s rinderpest outbreak and the loan scheme that whites developed for Hereros. Some whites exchanged Herero land for credit upfront while others seized Herero assets when Hereros failed to repay their loans. While the rinderpest outbreak had ended in 1897, Hereros had lost most of their livelihood. The number of cattle they herded greatly reduced. To get the supplies they needed to survive, they traded their land for supplies with white settlers. While Governor Theodor Leutwein intended to acquire African land for GSWA gradually, he did not mean for private individuals to acquire the land. Private land transactions between Hereros and whites concerned Leutwein because they interfered with his plans for establishing a tighter grip on the non-European population.<sup>72</sup>

Hereros borrowed on credit from whites to purchase necessary supplies, and white traders often lent money at a high-interest rate. Consequently, Hereros could not repay the loans and incurred excessive debts. Leutwein thought it would be dangerous if Hereros did not repay the loans because unpaid loans would have broader economic implications for black and white alike. For example, unreimbursed traders could become bankrupt and loan providers who successfully collected debts by seizing Herero assets could impoverish Hereros. Additionally, Leutwein feared that whites beyond GSWA’s borders would view the high-interest loans offered to the Hereros as exploitative.<sup>73</sup>

To stem potential economic ruin and prevent whites from seizing more Herero assets, GSWA’s Governor, Theodor Leutwein, attempted to decree white loans to Hereros and collections of Herero debts unlawful in 1899. In the end, he had to rescind the decree due to white settlers’ lack of support for a measure that would have left them unable to collect debts. The German Colonial Department agreed that Leutwein could not prevent European creditors from offering credit or collecting debt in the colony.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 136.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135-136; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 59.

<sup>74</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 137-138.

Leutwein pressed for another decree to control African debts in July 1903. This time, the measure encountered little resistance. In November 1903, the Colonial Council's new credit and debt collection regulations came into force. The council of German "settlers and representatives of concession companies" allowed creditors to offer loans and collect debts from Africans.<sup>75</sup> However, Leutwein inserted a provision that cleared individual Hereros' debt one year after their loan's term began. The provision was unsuccessful. Instead of allowing Hereros to wait the year to default on their loan, white lenders took drastic steps to ensure the Hereros paid their debt. Lenders began demanding repayments within the year and employed German civil servants and soldiers to collect loans. As a method of repayment, white lenders seized Hereros' cattle. Hereros' destitution due to the GSWA Government's mismanagement of the loan crisis and white lenders' abuses provided the impetus for the Herero resistance campaign the following year.<sup>76</sup>

## 2.2 Boer emigration to German South-West Africa, 1902-1904

While Boer emigration from South Africa to GSWA occurred more frequently following the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the phenomenon began much earlier. In his article on "The Ferreira Raid of 1906," Tilman Dederling has explained that during the Anglo-Boer War "Boer commandos...crossed the German border to evade British troops. The Germans refused to extradite these soldiers, treating them as political refugees."<sup>77</sup> During the Anglo-Boer War, approximately 500 Boer combatants settled in GSWA and Namaqualand. German authorities attempted to remove them. After failing to relocate the Boer settlers, German authorities resigned to allow them to reside in GSWA since they did not inconvenience the German Government.<sup>78</sup>

More Boers left South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War concluded. Most resented British rule and feared that British authorities would punish them for the war. Between 200 and 400 Boers from the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony along with Cape rebels under Manie Maritz, Edwin

---

<sup>75</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 136.

<sup>76</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 158; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 59; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 138.

<sup>77</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906: Boers, Britons and Germans in Southern Africa in the Aftermath of the South African War, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 45.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46, 48; *TRDM*, 1903-01-27.

Conroy, and Abraham Louw's command left South Africa. Before arriving in GSWA, Maritz and van Brummelen had unsuccessfully attempted to settle Boer expatriates in Madagascar between September and November 1902. Most returned having failed to earn a sustainable living.<sup>79</sup>

When Boer resettlement began in GSWA in 1902, the 1,455 Boers comprised 31 percent of the white population. This total did not include the Boer commandos. Most Boer commandos settled in southern GSWA near Keetmanshoop, far away enough to avoid a sentence in a British prison. Upon arrival in GSWA, Boers were unwilling "to become German subjects"<sup>80</sup> and did not adopt German culture. During the German campaigns against the Hereros and Nama, Boers found employment working as transport riders and, secretly, as combatants for the German military.<sup>81</sup>

However, the Boer settler experience was not without tribulation. The land that they settled near Keetmanshoop was one of GSWA's few inhabitable areas, and this placed them in a competitive relationship with the white German population. To mitigate the tensions, the GSWA Government declared that Boers would receive six months to permanently settle in GSWA beginning in September 1902. If the Boers failed to permanently settle, the Boers could no longer reside in GSWA.<sup>82</sup>

Emigration to GSWA continued in 1903, however, which compounded the problem for the German authorities. Boers demanded their own schools and churches, which spread German concerns that their cultural hegemony was under threat. On 27 January 1903, *The Rand Daily Mail* reported that "The persistent immigration of Boers into German South-West Africa is causing anxiety in official circles at Berlin" and had caused German Chancellor Count Bernard von Bülow to address Boer emigration with Leutwein.<sup>83</sup> Four years later, German authorities developed a solution. Friedrich von Lindquist, Leutwein's successor, decreed that Boers could no longer remain permanently settled in the Keetmanshoop region unless they had distinguished themselves

---

<sup>79</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, pp. 48, 51; *TRDM*, 1903-01-27; *TRDM*, 1902-11-27; L. Caves, The South African War 1899-1902: In Pursuit of a Boer settlement in Madagascar, *Military History Journal* 18(3), December 2018. Dederling claimed the high estimate of 400 Boers, while *TRDM* believed 200 left South Africa.

<sup>80</sup> *TRDM*, 1903-01-27.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*; T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 48.

<sup>82</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 51.

<sup>83</sup> *TRDM*, 1903-01-27.

during the Herero and Nama War. Due to the challenges to GSWA that Boers presented to German expansion and their refusal to conform to German culture, German “authorities treated Boer settlers with condescending hostility, rather than embracing them as fellow citizens.”<sup>84</sup> Although many Boers remained in GSWA to fight the Hereros and Nama, some Boers returned to the Cape Colony.

On 14 May 1904, an article, “German Misrule. White Settlers Leaving Damaraland,” claimed “the majority of the white settlers” were leaving because the German treated Boer settlers poorly.<sup>85</sup> Two years later, the Cape Mounted Police reported to the Cape Government that Boers were “dissatisfied with the Germans.”<sup>86</sup> Several Boers were done with German rule and were willing to return to British South Africa. However, many Bittereinders (diehard Boers who refused to surrender to the British during the late war) found permanent settlement. They would remain a lasting security threat to the neighbouring British South African colonies.<sup>87</sup>

### 2.3 The Situation in 1904

For most of 1902 until 1904, intercolonial relations between South Africa and GSWA remained cordial. Their few interactions had been transactional and Boer emigration did not cause intercolonial strife as much as it created tensions between Boers and Germans.

From 1902 until 1904, most of South Africa’s intercolonial relationship with GSWA was civil. South Africa focused on its postwar economic recovery, while GSWA’s economy adapted to the effects of the rinderpest outbreak and thrived. For the first two years, South Africa and GSWA’s governments hardly interacted as they met intracolony economic challenges. Instead, private individuals and organisations bridged British South Africa with GSWA. Aside from serving as a minor labour source for the WNLA’s recruitment efforts, the German colony became a haven for

---

<sup>84</sup> T. Dederig, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 51; Historical Papers Research Archive, University of Witwatersrand (hereafter HPRAUW): A103, p. 1: F. von Lindequist – ‘Foreigners,’ 1907-07-31, p. 1.

<sup>85</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-05-14.

<sup>86</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 351-352: M. Robinson – C.P. Crewe, 1906-03-01, p. 351.

<sup>87</sup> T. Dederig, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, pp. 51-52; HPRAUW: A103, p. 1: F. von Lindequist – ‘Foreigners,’ 1907-07-31, p. 1.

Boers during the immediate postwar period and provided employment opportunities to blacks and Boers. However, intercolonial civility was only part of South Africa and GSWA's relationship.

Unlike Britain, South Africa had yet to view GSWA as an emerging threat in the region. In 1904, South African opinion began to change, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, as the GSWA Government embarked on a campaign against the Herero and Nama. The German authorities' unjustified arrests of the British citizens in GSWA revealed the Germans' growing distrust of South Africans. In turn, the arrests awoke British suspicions of GSWA as the newspaper stories and Milner's involvement in one of the affairs evinced. The Herero and Nama Wars would only exacerbate Anglo-German tensions in southern Africa as the conflicts continued.

### CHAPTER III THE HERERO AND NAMA WARS, 1904-1906

In this chapter, I assess how relations between GSWA and the Cape were impacted by the Herero and Nama Wars between 1904 and 1908. First, I introduce employment opportunities that the Herero and Nama Wars offered to South Africa's blacks and Boers. I also explore how the relationship GSWA with Britain's South African colonies was affected by gunrunning, which both aided African combatants during the Herero and Nama Wars, but also depleted the Cape and the Transvaal's armament stores. Above all, I emphasise how cross-border population movements had a destabilising effect and exacerbated tensions between the two territories.

Many Africans and Coloureds in the Northwest Cape and southern GSWA were of Nama descent. For this chapter, I will use the term blacks instead of referring to individuals from the Cape as specifically African or Coloured because both Africans and Coloureds of Nama descent in the Cape were tied to their Nama kinsmen and the wars in GSWA. Additionally, using blacks as a universal term avoids any mislabelling of individuals as African or Coloured due to contemporary sources' unreliable designations.

The Herero and Nama Wars enveloped GSWA from 1904 to 1906, but mopping up actions lasted into 1908.<sup>88</sup> Many modern historians refer to both wars as genocidal,<sup>89</sup> for they both concluded in the almost complete annihilation of the Herero and Nama.<sup>90</sup> The war the German colonial

---

<sup>88</sup> I.L. Evans, *Native Policy in Southern Africa: An Outline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 137; For a contemporary account of the wars, see *TRDM*, 1905-10-26; Contemporaries in the Transvaal thought that the Germans mismanaged their relations with Africans, African policy, and the conflict. See *TRDM*, 1906-12-24.

<sup>89</sup> Ulrike Lindner claimed that the Germans killed 75 to 80 percent of the Herero population. U. Lindner, Transnational movements between colonial empires: Migrant workers from the British Cape Colony in the German diamond town of Lüderitzbucht, *European Review of History* 16(5), 2009, pp. 684-685; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971); J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981); P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012); P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967); J.B. Gewald, The Great General of the Kaiser, *The Botswana Society* 26, 1994; Martin Legassick claimed the German military killed 50 percent of the Nama population. See M. Legassick, *Hidden Histories of Gordonias: Land dispossession and resistance in the Northern Cape, 1800-1990* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016), p. 251.

<sup>90</sup> For further reading on the causes of the Herero and Nama Wars see J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 57-58; H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 143; For modern perspectives of the genocide, see H. Melber, How to Come to Terms with the Past: Re-Visiting the German Colonial Genocide in

apparatus waged against the Hereros and the Nama was not confined to the borders of GSWA. In every sense, it was a regional event, enveloping neutral British South African possessions.<sup>91</sup>

Several factors led to the Hereros' decision to revolt in January 1904 under their leader, Samuel Maherero. In *The Revolt of the Hereros*, Jon Bridgman explained the first reason was the prospect of Hereros losing their arable land to the Europeans. White creditors had been seizing land due to unsettled debts that the Hereros and the Nama had accrued (see Chapter II). The GSWA Government had also acquired Herero-owned land to construct the Otavi railway line. Samuel Maherero and his followers maintained that "German expansion would never stop."<sup>92</sup> They also believed the German authorities would eventually place them in reserves, forcing them to become a labour pool for whites.<sup>93</sup>

When Samuel Maherero initiated the Herero resistance campaign at Okahandja on 12 January 1904, the atmosphere in GSWA had long been tense. In October 1903 at Warmbad, the Bondelswarts, a Nama ethnic group, rebelled. Like the Hereros, German expansion concerned the Bondelswarts. Their brief campaign heralded further African resistance to German expansion and colonial rule.<sup>94</sup>

After the first shots were fired at Okahandja, the Hereros proceeded to attack German fortifications and settlements at Windhuk and Omaruru. Maherero and his followers only retreated after a German force under Lieutenant Franke arrived and counterattacked. Despite Lieutenant Franke's initial success in driving off the Hereros and numerous attempts by Governor Leutwein and his force to defeat the Hereros, Maherero led a successful campaign against the Germans from January until May 1904.<sup>95</sup>

---

Namibia, *African Spectrum* 40(1), 2005; Additionally, see E. Pape, Postcolonial debates in Germany – An Overview, *African Sociological Review* 21(2), 2017.

<sup>91</sup> H. Bley, Social Discord in South West Africa, 1894-1904, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 609-610.

<sup>92</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 143.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 57-58.

<sup>94</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 156.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 161.

In June 1904, General Lothar von Trotha became the German military commander in charge of operations. From June until August, von Trotha spent time regrouping while awaiting the arrival of more troops and supplies. On 11 August, von Trotha and Colonel von Deimling obtained victory over the Hereros at Ohamakari. Von Trotha's victories only increased as he switched to brutal methods – such as giving no quarter to African resistance fighters – and the military tide began to turn in GSWA's favour.<sup>96</sup>

During the war's first year, another Nama ethnic group, the Witbooi under Hendrik Witbooi, had served as the Germans' allies. However, the alliance did not benefit the Witbooi. "Their alliance with the Germans had left them significantly impoverished" because the Germans prevented the Witbooi from stealing cattle, which forced them to liquidate their assets for income.<sup>97</sup> The Witbooi rose against the Germans in October 1904 after a Witbooi combatant fired at a German administrator. The Nama under Jacob Marenga, a Bondelswart leader of Herero and Nama descent, and other leaders – including Simon Kooper and Johannes – joined the Witbooi because they resented German rule. They had also learned of German atrocities against the Hereros during the war.<sup>98</sup>

The chaos surrounding the war against GSWA's African population, Germany's military presence, and the German authorities' arbitrary attitude toward the Cape sustained alarm among Lord Selborne, Sir Edward Grey, and Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson – the High Commissioner for South Africa, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Cape's governor, respectively – "about Germany's long term ambitions in Southern Africa."<sup>99</sup> Peter Curson has cited a War Office report from March 1905 as evidence that the British Government believed the Germans intended to use troops being employed for the campaigns against the Herero and Nama to invade the Cape if an Anglo-German war occurred.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 163; J.B. Gewald, The Great General of the Kaiser, *The Botswana Society* 26, 1994, pp. 70-71.

<sup>97</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 166.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* For contemporary accounts of the wars, see *TRDM*, 1904-02-04; *TRDM*, 1904-02-08; *Cape Times*, 1904-02-27; *The Eastern Province Herald* (hereafter *TEPH*), 1904-02-27; *TRDM*, 1904-03-05; *TRDM*, 1904-04-06; *TRDM*, 1904-04-11; *TRDM*, 1904-05-11; *TRDM*, 1904-07-14; *TRDM*, 1904-08-05; *TRDM*, 1904-11-04; *TRDM*, 1904-11-07; *TRDM*, 1904-11-11; *TRDM*, 1904-11-21; *TRDM*, 1904-12-28.

<sup>99</sup> P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 173.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

### 3.1 Tensions across the border, 1904

In mid-January 1904, the German commandment at Windhuk, Captain Hugo von François, had detained Mrs. L.P. Steenekamp, a Dutch woman, because he suspected that she had been “carrying papers to the natives from the British Government and from Boers.”<sup>101</sup> The German authorities believed Mrs. Steenekamp had been responsible for encouraging the Hereros to resist German rule in early January 1904. On 18 January 1904, German authorities also arrested her husband for allegedly smuggling weapons and ammunition to Herero combatants. Eventually, German authorities released Mr. and Mrs. Steenekamp and they returned to the Cape Colony. Random arrests of British citizens over following months became normal. “Every Englishman and Dutchman at Aries [a settlement near Windhuk] was arrested and brought to Windhoek on suspicion of having assisted the Hereros,” stated Mrs. Steenkamp.<sup>102</sup>

On 10 March 1904, *The Rand Daily Mail* published an interview with the unidentified man “accused of supplying several wagon loads of ammunition and arms to the Hereros.”<sup>103</sup> The man did not provide the interviewer with his name “for various reasons.”<sup>104</sup> The chief of police at Swakopmund had arrested the British citizen on 16 February 1904 under false pretences, having convinced the man that a judge required him to give evidence in an unrelated high treason case. After undergoing examination at the court for several hours, German authorities decided to hold the accused man in jail overnight aboard the *S.M.S. Habicht* without providing a reason. Before being sent down, the accused man was able to send for the resident magistrate at Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay was within the Cape’s territory. The resident magistrate arrived the following day and arranged for the man’s release, as well as for the release of two British Coloured men who German authorities had arrested two weeks earlier.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-10.

<sup>102</sup> *Cape Times*, 1904-02-27. Some papers offer variations on the surname, including “Steinkamp.” See *TEPH*, 1904-02-27; *TEPH*, 1904-03-01.

<sup>103</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-10.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*; *TRDM*, 1904-03-01; *TRDM*, 1904-03-05; *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-02-27.

The British man's arrest shocked South Africans and generated resentment toward GSWA.<sup>106</sup> Notably, the British Coloured men's stories did not garner as much attention, even though German authorities speculated that they had been aiding the Hereros. Beyond the incident, there were other signs of increasing animosity between GSWA and South Africa. German authorities alleged "that British officials incited the natives to rebel" in January.<sup>107</sup>

According to *The Rand Daily Mail*, Milner planned to investigate the British man's arrest at Swakopmund. No further archival evidence exists to suggest that British authorities discovered any further information regarding the event. However, the arrests indicated intercolonial distrust and the development of Anglo-German tensions in southern Africa. In fact, the *Cape Daily Telegraph* claimed the German campaign against the Hereros had induced a strong anti-British feeling among Germans because the Germans had failed to cultivate a relationship with Africans that was as successful as the Anglo-African relationship.<sup>108</sup>

### **3.2 Employment opportunities during the Herero and Nama Wars, 1904-1906**

When the Herero War began in January 1904, "colored transport riders and Nama pastoralists" from Namaqualand found employment in the German army working as transport riders, moving military personnel and materials throughout GSWA.<sup>109</sup> In "War and Mobility in the Borderlands," Tilman Dederling claimed that such job opportunities "revived the precarious economy of the northern borderlands, which was on the brink of subsistence."<sup>110</sup> Boers, seeking employment or escaping British rule and prosecution during the postwar period, likewise benefitted from the German campaign against the Hereros and the Nama. At first, Boers found employment as transport riders and conductors and none supplemented the German military as combatants, but this would change. While exact numbers are uncertain because "Military intelligence tended to

---

<sup>106</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-01; *TRDM*, 1904-03-05; *TEPH*, 1904-03-01; *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-03-01.

<sup>107</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-10; *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-02-27.

<sup>108</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-03-10; *Cape Times*, 1904-02-27; *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-02-27; *TEPH*, 1904-02-27; *TEPH*, 1904-03-01.

<sup>109</sup> T. Dederling, War and Mobility, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006, p. 284.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

exaggerate such things,”<sup>111</sup> Colonels Neylan and Robinson of the Cape Mounted Police reported that between 1,500 and 1,800 Boers worked for the German military by 1906.<sup>112</sup>

In April 1906, intelligence reports from secret agents and the War Office revealed that the German military had employed Boers as combatants. An intelligence officer, Captain H.S. Simon, estimated that 500 Boers were fighting the Herero and Nama. In June 1906, Agent “A” reported that 100 Boer combatants operated out of Rahman’s Drift. By this point in the Herero and Nama Wars, GSWA was paying the Boers a total of £40,000 each month plus £30,000 for gathering intelligence. Captain Simon explained that the GSWA’s use of Boer combatants outraged the Herero and Nama because the Boers were “British subjects” who had sided with the Germans. As Agent “E.A.” – most likely Colonel Altham – discovered, the Boers’ employment as combatants was not a recent event. The information was only new to British and Cape authorities.<sup>113</sup>

When “E.A.” interviewed Jacob Marenga, an African resistance leader of Herero and Nama descent, in June 1906, Marenga revealed that Boers had been fighting for the Germans since at least December 1904. Marenga cited as evidence one Boer combatant whom he knew, John Hyde, as well as that “after a fight, nine Boers were found dead with their rifles beside them.”<sup>114</sup> Until the interview, the British and Cape authorities had no knowledge of Boers fighting in the German campaigns because Boer combatants concealed themselves during engagements, hiding “behind cover.”<sup>115</sup> The Cape and British authorities’ reports did not indicate if Boer participation in the German campaigns offended the British and Cape governments. While the Cape and British authorities did not express opinions of Boers serving GSWA in combatant and non-combatant roles, Boers’ participation in the campaigns did not bother the British and Cape governments enough to prevent Boers from working for the German military.<sup>116</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 48.

<sup>112</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 351-352: J.C. Tancred – Commander-in-Chief, Cape Station, 1906-02-17, p. 352; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 351-352: M. Robinson – C.P. Crewe, 1906-03-01, p. 351.

<sup>113</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 431-432: Report by “A.,” 1906-06-25, p. 431; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, P. 384: Report by Captain H.S. Simon, No. 4 Reconnaissance Party, 1906-04-11, p. 384.

<sup>114</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 431-432: Notes of Information obtained from Jacob Marengo at an Interview with him at Tokai, near Cape Town by “E.A.,” 1906-06-25, p. 432.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*; M. Legassick, *Hidden Histories of Gordonia* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016), p. 251.

### 3.3 Gunrunning, 1905-1906

Gunrunning, or the illicit trade of guns, was not a new operation in southern Africa. Smugglers in the frontier, such as George Lennox (alias “Scotty Smith”), had engaged in robbery and the illegal resale of cattle, supplies, guns, ammunition, and alcohol since at least the 1890s.<sup>117</sup> On 10 January 1906, the Cape Government took a serious interest in these operations. In December 1905, Captain C.C. Bennett, the South African Constabulary’s district commandant at Potchefstroom wrote that Messrs. Wessels and Company had purchased “Old waggons” in the area “presumably to be sold to the German authorities in German South-West Africa for transport purposes, but these waggons are re-made somewhere with [sic within] Vryburg and fitted with false bottoms, &c., and then loaded with rifles and ammunition [sic].”<sup>118</sup> While the German protectorate forces intended to use these waggons, the waggons’ hidden contents were not meant for the Germans, but rather for the Herero and Nama rebels. Captain Bennett explained that secret agents acquired the ammunition from military supply depots and “keepers of magazines” throughout the Transvaal, as well as from distributors in Pretoria.<sup>119</sup> Individuals, only known as “Scotty Smith” and “Kennedy,” facilitated the operations.<sup>120</sup> Toward the end of December 1905, the constabulary discovered that “Scotty Smith” had travelled to GSWA many times since the beginning of the Herero and Nama Wars.<sup>121</sup>

To explore the matter further, the Cape’s prime minister, L.S. Jameson, directed the Cape Mounted Police to search waggons near Kuis Molopo in late January 1906. The German consul at

---

<sup>117</sup> See F.C. Metrowich, *Scotty Smith: South Africa’s Robin Hood* (Cape Town: Books of Africa (Pty), Limited, 1983).

<sup>118</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292; C.C. Bennett – Chief Staff Officer, South African Constabulary, 1905-12-06, p. 291.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292; Selborne – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-01-04, p. 291; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292; C.C. Bennett – Chief Staff Officer, South African Constabulary, 1905-12-06, p. 292; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292; R.S. Curtis – C.H. Rodwell, 1905-12-27, p. 292; “Scotty Smith” had hated the Germans since they had repossessed his property near Keetmanshoop during the 1890s. Since then, he had supplied the Witbooi, Hereros, and Nama with weapons, ammunition, cattle, alcohol, and provisions to aid them in their resistance campaigns against German rule. Most of the goods had been smuggled or stolen from the Germans. The Cape authorities did not bother to apprehend him because of his war service record for the British during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). See F.C. Metrowich, *Scotty Smith* (Cape Town: Books of Africa (Pty), Limited, 1983), pp. 162-167, 170, 182-183, 190.

Johannesburg directed the Cape Government's attention to several waggons moving toward GSWA in early May 1906. In both cases, the Cape Mounted Police found nothing.<sup>122</sup>

On 28 March 1906, Brigadier-General Burn Murdoch, a British officer commanding in the Transvaal, received a letter from a Potchefstroom resident. The man alleged that "Scotty Smith" and a Kennedy had paid soldiers to steal ammunition from British supply depots at Middelburg, Potchefstroom, and Pretoria and had then exported the ammunition via Pretoria, Mafeking and Rhodesia to Herero and Nama rebels. The subsequent investigation failed to discover a trade route. The investigation did, however, unearth irregularities at Pretoria's military supply depot, which had a surplus of arms and ammunition, because a driver for the Army Service Corps had been stockpiling them for resale. Following the investigation, the army imprisoned the driver for a short sentence and discharged him.<sup>123</sup>

On 9 May 1906, Major W.A. White of the General Staff stationed in South Africa informed C.H. Rodwell, the Cape Imperial Secretary that the British authorities had finally identified "Scotty Smith" as George St. Leger Lennox, but that there was no evidence that Kennedy ever existed.<sup>124</sup>

On 18 July 1906, Captain C.A.L. Yate of the General Staff reported to the Cape military secretary that men working for von Nettelblatt, an agent for the GSWA Government, brought ammunition to Port Nolloth aboard the *S.S. Aline Woermann* from Cape Town. The Military Intelligence Department's secret informant "A" believed the shipment acted as a decoy while other illicit trade commenced.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>122</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 10029, pp. 58-63; L.S. Jameson, Minute, 1906-01-23, pp. 61-62; TNAK: FO 367/8, 10029, pp. 58-63; Selborne – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-02-19, p. 63; TNAK: FO 367/8, 21317, pp. 69-76; C.H. Rodwell – Assistant Military Secretary at Pretoria, 1906-05-04, p. 71.

<sup>123</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 21317, pp. 69-76; A.R.F. Dorward – R. Haldane, 1906-04-30, pp. 73-76.

<sup>124</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 398-399; W.A. White – C.H. Rodwell, 1906-05-09, p. 399.

<sup>125</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116; C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 1906-07-18, p. 115. Von Nettelblatt's first name is not present in the archival records. Von Nettelblatt (alternatively spelled von Nettelbladt) had connections with GSWA. He was a manager of a company in Warmbad, South-West Africa and connected the German consul-general with recruiters. The recruiters were responsible for finding Boer volunteers to serve the German protectorate during the Herero and Nama Wars. See TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-2; F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1906-08-01, p. 2. Informant "A" stated that he was deeply embedded in the arms smuggling business. Captain Yate later asked the Cape military secretary if the Cape Government could offer "A" clemency so that he would be more willing to offer further information. See TNAK: FO 367/8, 2, pp. 103-106; C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 1906-08-18, p. 105.

The following day, Cape Military Secretary A.R. Cameron explained in a memorandum that ‘Marshall’, a German Intelligence Agent, had convinced ‘Hughes’, an Englishman, to engage in the lucrative business of selling ammunition to Herero and Nama combatants. During the post-war period, British officials had implemented a permit system to regulate the acquisition and sale of firearms and ammunition. To meet this requirement, Hughes obtained the services of “several people to apply for permits for ammunition,”<sup>126</sup> and after accumulating “a considerable amount of Mauser ammunition” he transported it on *S.S. Aline Woermann*.<sup>127</sup> Once the ammunition crossed into the German protectorate, the Military Intelligence Department surmised that the German authorities would arrest Hughes under Marshall’s direction, take the ammunition for their purposes, and blame the British Government for allowing smuggling operations to occur. The possibility of a carefully crafted plan to legally acquire ammunition and illegally smuggle it into GSWA for resale alarmed the Cape Government. However, the alleged German plot – once Hughes crossed the border – was more likely the result of the Cape Government’s growing suspicions toward GSWA than a possibility grounded in fact. Regardless, the Military Intelligence Department continued to track Hughes.<sup>128</sup>

The magistrate at Port Nolloth revealed on 27 July 1906 that Hughes’s real name was John Charles Huey, and that three days previously, an individual named “Smith” (not George Lennox, whose alias was “Scotty Smith”) had directed Huey to deliver 700 cartridges of ammunition to Ephraim Fredericks, an African combatant.<sup>129</sup>

The allegations led to the Cape authorities arresting Smith and Huey for “supplying ammunition to natives in German South-West Africa.”<sup>130</sup> Further investigations exposed that the smuggling had been occurring for two years.<sup>131</sup> Marshall, the man who had recruited Huey, had overseen the entire operation and used Huey as a front.<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: A.R. Cameron, Memorandum, 1906-07-19, p. 115.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

<sup>129</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: Magistrate at Port Nolloth – C.P. Crewe, 1906-07-27, p. 116.

<sup>130</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: ‘Arms for Rebels. The Port Nolloth Charge,’ *Cape Times*, 1906-07-28, p. 116.

<sup>131</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 2, pp. 100-114: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-08-14, p. 101.

<sup>132</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 2, pp. 103-106: C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 1906-08-01, pp. 103-104.

There could be no mistake this time that the ammunition had been intended for the Hereros and Nama. On 1 August 1906, Captain C.A.L. Yate of the General Staff reported to the Cape Military Secretary, “My informant states that the ammunition was 7.9 mm. (German) calibre: evidently therefore it was intended for the Hottentots and other black insurgents to fire out of captured German rifles.”<sup>133</sup>

The Marshall-Huey episode caused a stir. In the same way as the “Scotty Smith” network demonstrated shortcomings in the Transvaal’s security, the Marshall-Huey affair did the same for the Cape, indicating that Britain’s South African colonies could not prevent illicit activities, either individually or together.

### **3.4 Germans’ treatment of blacks outrages the Cape, 1906**

For two years, the Hereros and Nama attained several victories against German forces and mostly evaded capture. Their victories humiliated the Germans and worried neighbouring, white-run colonies. *The Rand Daily Mail* issued a stark warning that “It would be disastrous to the equilibrium of all Africa south of the Zambesi if any black nation were able to boast of triumph over a white foe.”<sup>134</sup> Germany’s defeat would signal to Africans across the region that their white overlords were not invincible.

During the Anglo-Boer War, GSWA had refused to return Boer rebels to South African custody. The Cape Government reciprocated from 1904 onwards, when it refused to return Herero and Nama refugees to GSWA authorities as part of a blanket asylum policy. That being said, the authorities in Cape Town did offer numerous other forms of aid. The diplomatic complexities of this relationship will be considered below.

Germans’ treatment of the Hereros and the Nama generated fear, discontent, and anger among Cape blacks. At various points during the war, German troops were stationed close to the border. Their presence alarmed Cape blacks, who did not know what German troops might do to them,

---

<sup>133</sup> TNAK: FO 367/8, 2, pp. 103-106: C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 1906-08-01, p. 105.

<sup>134</sup> *TRDM*, 1904-11-01. For other similar sentiments, see *TRDM*, 1905-03-05; *TRDM*, 1905-03-10.

including abducting, arresting, or killing them. The events also affected the relations between the Cape government and its black population. One particular cause of outrage was the Cape Government's decision to offer aid to GSWA. This included permitting GSWA to place supply depots within the Cape's territory. All these war-related concerns fed their fear that the Cape Government was beginning to take similarly severe actions against them.<sup>135</sup>

The archives do not include direct accounts from Cape blacks over these events. Instead, their sentiments were conveyed indirectly in dispatches of the Colonial Office, the Cape Government, and British military intelligence. In January 1906, the Military Intelligence Department relayed some of the frustration felt by Cape blacks, who could not understand the Cape Government's position, and argued that the British seemed "to show that we have forgotten the great assistance these natives were to us as border scouts, &c., in the late war [sic]."<sup>136</sup> Following on from the policy of reconciliation with the Boer population, the government's stance was taken as an indication that the British valued their relationship between whites more than one with blacks.

The creation of supply depots offered the first of these acts of aid. The German military's struggles during the war's first two years convinced its commanders that to execute more effective campaigns, they needed accessible supplies and munitions. Establishing supply depots was the answer, but to ensure that they did not become easy targets for the Nama in the southern GSWA, the military sought to construct them in the Cape. The Cape Government consented to host the depots. While the Cape Government consented, Major R.S. McClintock of the British General Staff, who was stationed in South Africa, wrote a memorandum revealing the difficulty in maintaining these depots on the Cape. The principal problem was that Cape Coloureds viewed the move as aiding "operations against their [Nama] kinsmen north of the Orange River."<sup>137</sup> McClintock speculated that the Cape Coloureds might seize the supplies as a means of aiding their

---

<sup>135</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 372-373: Memorandum by the Honourable the Colonial Secretary [Colonel C.P. Crewe], 1906-04-11, p. 373; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 384: Report by Captain H.S. Simon, No. 4 Reconnaissance Party, 1906-04-11, p. 373.

<sup>136</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, S./201/9, pp. 316-317: Military Intelligence Department – Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 1906-01-17, p. 317,

<sup>137</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 369: R.S. McClintock, Memorandum on the Present State of Affairs on the Border between Cape Colony and German South-West Africa, 1906-03-30, p. 369.

Nama brethren, and that it might also foster “an open rebellion” against the Cape Government<sup>138</sup> that could also involve the Boers in the north-western parts of the colony.<sup>139</sup>

On 1 June 1906, Grey asked Elgin to write a memorandum about the “feeling of unrest among the natives due to the presence of Germans on British territory.”<sup>140</sup> The Colonial Office’s memorandum argued that the German administration purposely placed troops close to the Cape border to arouse anger and fear among blacks, but Elgin thought it wiser to await further information before taking things up with the German Government. He wished to avoid inflaming Anglo-German tensions unnecessarily.<sup>141</sup>

About two months later, with no action having been taken, T.W. Smartt, one of the Cape’s ministers, sought to address the Cape Government’s grievances with GSWA without further delay. On 30 August 1906, Smartt demanded that “the German authorities to abstain from acts calculated to cause unrest amongst the Colonial natives in these parts.”<sup>142</sup> The German response was negative, and involved deriding the Cape for not doing enough to aid them at different junctures during the campaigns.<sup>143</sup> Smartt responded to the German colonial administration’s rebuke, threatening that<sup>144</sup> if Windhuk did not take steps to curb German troops’ cross-border incursions as they pursued the Nama, the Cape might no longer assist the Germans in ending the war. Despite Smartt’s protests, the incursions continued.

On the whole, however, the Cape Government remained relatively indifferent to protests of its African population and viewed the assistance primarily through the prism of intercolonial relations, which they sought to improve, and white prestige, which they were keen to uphold. This military assistance succeeded in hemming in the rebels: in September 1907, the Cape Mounted Police actually killed Jacob Marenga.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>138</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 369; R.S. McClintock, Memorandum on the Present, 1906-03-30, p. 369.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*; P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 115.

<sup>140</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 394; E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 1906-06-01, p. 394.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 473-474; T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-08-30, p. 474.

<sup>143</sup> TRDM, 1904-10-19; TRDM, 1904-10-25; TRDM, 1904-11-01; TRDM, 1904-11-17; TRDM, 1905-01-03.

<sup>144</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 473-474; T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-08-30, p. 474.

<sup>145</sup> J.R. Masson, A Fragment of Colonial History: The Killing of Jakob Marengo, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21(2), June 1995, p. 247.

Another source of cross-border tension concerned the German authorities' conduct toward Cape Africans employed in GSWA, and to Herero and Nama prisoners of war. On 29 August 1906, the Cape Government conveyed to the Colonial Office accounts by Cape Africans of their experiences under German employment. The document also suggested solutions for the situation. The previous month, the Cape Cabinet suggested that the colony install a representative in GSWA to investigate the repeated complaints.<sup>146</sup>

J.R. Quinn, the assistant resident magistrate at the Ndabeni Location in Cape Town, meanwhile reported to the Cape ministers the testimony of Jack Seti, John Culayo, and James Tolibadi that he recorded on 11 August 1906.<sup>147</sup> Seti was a camp labourer in GSWA. He charged that Africans were “constantly being tied up and thrashed for no reason whatever.”<sup>148</sup> The incidents went beyond arbitrary abuse. In December 1905, he argued that when some mules escaped his care, a conductor and a soldier purposely fired their guns at him and another African. Meanwhile, Culayo was a waggon driver for the GSWA government. He testified to having been present at the murder of Barnes Matebe, an African labourer employed by GSWA's military. Because Culayo had been “insolent” toward a conductor, the same conductor ordered a soldier “to shoot Barnes Matebe” who eventually died from the bullet wound he sustained in the groin.<sup>149</sup> Culayo helped bury Matebe the following day. Tolibadi was “a foreman labourer” who spoke of young and old Herero and Nama female prisoners having been forced to carry heavy loads of iron and rations,<sup>150</sup> as a means of “punish[ing] the insurgents” and “pacify[ing] the colony.”<sup>151</sup> If the women fell, soldiers “thrashed and kicked” them.<sup>152</sup> In other cases, the Germans tied up prisoners and flogged them. According to Tolibadi, the situation was not much better for ordinary Cape Africans employed by the German authorities. They were subject to imprisonment without trial and arbitrary floggings.<sup>153</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-08-29, p. 466.

<sup>147</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-08-22, p. 466.

<sup>148</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: Jack Seti's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467.

<sup>149</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: John Culayo's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467.

<sup>150</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: James Tolibadi's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467.

<sup>151</sup> J. Kreienbaum, Guerrilla wars and colonial concentration camps: The exceptional case of German South West Africa, *Journal of Namibian Studies* 11, 2012, p. 85.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: Jack Seti's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: John Culayo's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: James Tolibadi's Sworn Statement, 1906-08-11, p. 467.

On 6 October 1906, F.A. Campbell at the Foreign Office wrote to the Colonial Office about the Cape Government's request to have a British representative stationed in GSWA. He suggested that a British consul in GSWA could "diminish the number of cases of ill-treatment" by investigating abuse claims and advocating on Cape Africans' behalf.<sup>154</sup> Agreement was eventually reached with the Germans on a temporary consular appointment that would receive 50-50 funding from the British and Cape Governments.<sup>155</sup>

### 3.5 Refugees in the Cape, 1904-1906

A refugee crisis developed in the Cape due to the Herero and Nama Wars. From 1903 onward, "the flow of refugees...became something of a persistent issue for both the German and British authorities."<sup>156</sup> The Cape was obligated officially to take in refugees from GSWA who crossed the border because the Cape was a neutral state with a blanket asylum policy and because it exercised a policy of tolerance toward Africans. Additionally, the acting consul-general for Germany requested that the Cape Government permit refugees to pass into the Cape if an altercation at the border presented an "urgent necessity" in November 1904.<sup>157</sup> In return, the acting consul-general promised to reimburse the Cape Government for the refugees' care. Unofficially, German treatment of Africans horrified the Cape's newspapers.<sup>158</sup> The *Cape Daily Telegraph* pronounced,

There have been so many cases of cruelty and injustice to natives...It will be very hard for the British Government to refuse these people a safe asylum, as during this war in German S.W.A. both the Hottentots and Damaras have refrained from doing any injury to the British.<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>154</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 478; F.A. Campbell – Colonial Office, 1906-10-06, p. 478.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 134. Refugees also arrived in Bechuanaland. See J.B. Gewald, 'I Was Afraid of Samuel, Therefore I Came to Sekgoma': Herero Refugees and Patronage Politics in Ngamiland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1890-1914, *The Journal of African History* 43(2), 2002, p. 222.

<sup>157</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429; D.H. von Jacobs – E. Smith-Brook, 1904-11-12, p. 429.

<sup>158</sup> For accounts, see *TRDM*, 1904-03-10; *Cape Times*, 1904-02-27; *TEPH*, 1904-02-27; *TEPH*, 1904-03-01.

<sup>159</sup> *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-02-27.

While the crisis started as a moral issue, it quickly became a question of money. In order “to stem the flow of refugees and bring some degree of order and control” the Cape administration created “a centralised camp near Steinkopf.”<sup>160</sup> The refugee question proved to be a contentious point between the Cape and GSWA governments.

Aside from the Cape Government’s decision to grant all refugees asylum, the ongoing hostilities between the German administration and Africans in the German protectorate were the original reason for the refugee problem. A closer look at the refugee camps, like the camp located at Matjieskloof, revealed that women and children comprised an overwhelming majority. Some refugees arrived as a consequence of non-combatants simply traversing the border into the Cape. But many were escorted there by combatants.<sup>161</sup>

Over time, the increasing flow of refugees created a logistical nightmare for the Cape authorities. In January 1906, Consul-General H.P. von Humboldt relayed a request from Governor von Lindequist who wanted the Cape Government to instruct its police and soldiers to confiscate the incoming refugees’ weapons and to take measures to ensure refugees did not re-enter GSWA. The Cape authorities claimed they attempted to comply, but struggled to restrain the refugees because they did not have the resources to guard the border.<sup>162</sup> In Tilman Dederling’s work, “The Prophet’s ‘War against Whites’”, he suggested that Cape authorities were not interested in helping the Germans because the Cape Government sought to preserve relations with Cape Africans.<sup>163</sup> He also explained that the German authorities were convinced that the Cape Government had more sinister plans, such as “acquiring the territory ‘below its value’ once the Germans had exhausted their strength” fighting the Hereros and Nama.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup> P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 135.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 136; M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 168. For more on the conditions at Matjieskloof, see TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 442-443; A.R. Cameron – C.P. Crewe, 1906-07-26, p. 443; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 442-443; Military Intelligence Department Report, ca. 1906-07-30, pp. 442-443; T. Dederling, War and Mobility, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006, p. 287.

<sup>162</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 306-307; H.P. von Humboldt – Selborne, 1906-01-12, p. 306.

<sup>163</sup> T. Dederling, The Prophet’s ‘War against Whites’: Shepherd Stuurman in Namibia and South Africa, 1904-7, *The Journal of African History* 40(1), 1999, pp. 4-5.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Von Lindequist made the request for aid with refugee containment because he feared that some refugees were claiming asylum to fight another day. Most refugees were women and children, owing to an ostensible Nama strategy of removing non-combatants from the frontlines. Often, Nama men would accompany women and children to the Cape to ensure their safe passage, but after the non-belligerents were settled, the men would use the Cape as a launching pad for operations against the Germans.<sup>165</sup>

Initially, Jameson denied that combatants temporarily claimed asylum to evade capture. However, the Cape Government received intelligence in April from the Cape Mounted Police. A “representative of the German Consul” and German authorities alleged that several “emissaries” had been communicating frequently between the refugees and African resistance fighters in GSWA by crossing the border.<sup>166</sup> The refugees had been able to do so because some of the Cape’s refugee camps were close to GSWA’s border.

In a memorandum dated 11 April 1906, C.P. Crewe admitted, “that the complaint made by the German authorities has some foundation.”<sup>167</sup> Consequently, on 2 April 1906, von Humboldt had called on the Cape authorities to confiscate the refugees’ weapons again, but with the additional condition that they place the refugees in camps at a considerable distance away from the border. The Cape Government was willing to honour the request, provided the Germans were “prepared to pay any extra charge for internment.”<sup>168</sup> They pressed this point because the German Foreign Minister, Baron Oswald von Richthofen, had promised repayment via Baron von Nettelblatt at Carlsbad in August 1905. The Cape ministers set about calculating the costs for the refugees’ care. At the time, the most recent record of the Cape Government’s expenses was from December 1904. The Cape Government maintained that the German Government owed £981 six shillings and sixpence for the care of “320 white and 1,275 coloured men, women, and children.”<sup>169</sup> The cost

---

<sup>165</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 442-443: Military Intelligence Department Report, ca. 1906-07-30, p. 442; P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 133; M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 168.

<sup>166</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 373-375: Report by Colonel Robinson, Chief Commissioner of the Cape Mounted Police, ca. 1906-04-11, p. 373.

<sup>167</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 372-373: Memorandum by the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, 1906-04-11, p. 373.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-06-14, p. 427.

dramatically increased by 1907, accumulating to £6,000.<sup>170</sup> Since August 1905, the German Government had not reiterated further offers of repayment for the refugees' care. The Cape Cabinet needed to take new measures to guarantee repayment. Crewe suggested a series of sanctions. The first of these included withdrawing police and soldiers guarding the refugee camps, leaving the refugees free to leave and return to German territory. He also proposed reneging the Germans' ability to house supply depots in the Cape and closing the drifts to German traffic. As a disclaimer, Crewe wrote that they should seek the British Government's approval for any planned sanctions before enacting them. When Lieutenant Voules of the Cape Mounted Police closed Rahman's Drift to the Germans earlier in 1906, it created a diplomatic disaster for the British Government. Crewe did not want a repeat of the event, which was the reason for his stipulation if they enacted the sanctions.<sup>171</sup>

By 14 June 1906, Windhuk had not answered the Cape Government's request for reimbursement. Jameson reminded Hely-Hutchinson on that day that this was the case and proceeded to detail the history of the refugee crisis. He forwarded to Hely-Hutchinson no fewer than sixteen communications sent to the German authorities between 1904 and 1906. The Cape Cabinet wanted to reach an agreement with the German administration regarding the status of refugees as residents of GSWA and the cost of their care. The content of these communications also included the German authorities' explanation for not paying for the Africans' care. Throughout 1905, the German administration attempted to facilitate the refugees' return to GSWA. In a letter of 19 May 1905 to GSWA's governor, the Cape ministers expressed that they permitted the arrival of refugees and agreed to grant them asylum. In response to the Cape's request for funds to care for the refugees, the German governor replied that he could only provide for their welfare if the refugees returned to GSWA. Three months later, the acting consul-general for Germany requested that the Cape Government return the refugees to the German authorities' care due to the poor conditions under which the Cape authorities kept the refugees. At one point, the Cape ministers had considered returning the refugees to GSWA, especially since Governor von Lindequist promised

---

<sup>170</sup> P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 136.

<sup>171</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429; L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-06-14, pp. 427-428; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-23, p. 408.

that the German authorities would only punish combatants.<sup>172</sup> Doing so would have alleviated the financial burden and simplified the process of settling the refugees. Ultimately, the Cape Government did not return the refugees to the Germans. Jameson justified the Cape Government's decision to keep the refugees. Some of the Africans who crossed the border specifically applied for asylum, while others simply crossed the border. Jameson explained that Cape Common Law granted all incoming refugees blanket asylum, even if they did not apply, and they could only extradite individual refugees to GSWA. However, this was only possible if the individual agreed to extradition, which would never happen, claimed Jameson.<sup>173</sup>

Later in Jameson's history of the refugee question, he included a statement from von Humboldt dated 9 May 1906. The consul-general provided an extensive explanation of the German Government's position toward the refugees, as well as reasons for not paying the Cape for their care. The German authorities could not justify the costs because the refugees were no longer German subjects. Von Humboldt stated they could not be German subjects because they were no longer rebels. In fact, "the natives still in arms in the German Protectorate... [are not] insurgents; they are to a great extent merely a big band of robbers and murderers."<sup>174</sup> Because the refugees claiming asylum had been "robbers and murderers," they were not German subjects and did not qualify for the care of the German colonial administration. In effect, von Humboldt and the German authorities disowned the refugees. The idea – that Hereros and Nama were no longer German subjects – originated in General von Trotha's declaration of extermination, the "Vernichtungsbefehl," in October 1904. Von Trotha's order labelled Hereros GSWA's enemies and promised to kill all Hereros who remained in GSWA. Von Humboldt and the Germans believed it was in the interest of all whites to work together to contain the threat that the Africans posed. Within that context, he explained that the Cape had done a poor job of managing the refugees since they had repeatedly escaped to fight the Germans. On this basis, under the Peace Conference of The Hague, the German Government was not obliged to reimburse the Cape

---

<sup>172</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: Statement concerning the Views of the German Government with respect to the Payment of Costs for the Refugees from German South-West Africa, 1906-05-09, p. 428.

<sup>173</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-06-14, pp. 427-429.

<sup>174</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: Statement concerning the Views of the German Government, 1906-05-09, p. 428.

Government. Because the refugees re-entered the war effort against the German protectorate and the Cape had been complicit, the Cape was not entitled to compensation.<sup>175</sup>

In November 1906, the situation had not changed. Throughout 1906, the Cape Government had also been contesting GSWA's encroachment along the Cape's border at the Orange River. In March 1905, German troops added to the drama when they constructed a road along the river as a supply route for the German army. The Cape Government objected to the project because they believed the road was within the Cape's territory. Since then, the Cape Government had pressured GSWA to halt the project. To ease the situation and re-open negotiations, the British Government pressed Hely-Hutchinson, Jameson, and the Cape ministers to drop the issue of the road that the Germans attempted to build along the Orange River. The British Government hoped this concession would encourage the German Government to pay for the refugees. They never paid, even after the Foreign Office pressured the German Government the following year. While the Germans did not budge, the refugee crisis confirmed that the Cape still sought the British Government's intervention in intercolonial affairs. Although British intervention during the refugee crisis did not resolve the Cape Government's problem. The Cape Government was in a peculiar place in terms of sovereignty. It could not act in ways that would interfere in Britain's foreign affairs. Where it could proceed in intercolonial matters, it was unsuccessful on its own. For a self-governing colony, it still required Britain's oversight. The Cape could be reckless without the British Government's supervision, igniting international incidents between Britain and Germany. As the Germans fought the Hereros and the Nama, another problem arose. Because of the ongoing campaigns, there was an influx of German troops in southern Africa. The increased German military presence in the region would be yet another test for the Cape.<sup>176</sup>

### **3.6 German soldiers crossing the border, 1906**

While the refugee crisis worsened Anglo-German relations, the crisis did not present immediate threats to the Cape's security. The actions of German soldiers dramatically increased Anglo-

---

<sup>175</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: Statement concerning the Views of the German Government, 1906-05-09, p. 428; J.B. Gewald, *The Great General of the Kaiser*, *The Botswana Society* 26, 1994, p. 72.

<sup>176</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 530-531: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-28, p. 530; P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 136.

German tensions in the region. As the Herero and Nama Wars wore on, German soldiers committed border-crossing infractions more frequently. In most cases, German soldiers entered well into the Cape. What was the reason? German soldiers were pursuing African combatants.<sup>177</sup> As Marion Wallace explained, “African military success was predicated on mobility” which included “crossing and re-crossing international borders.”<sup>178</sup> Crossing the border into any British territory – the Cape or the Bechuanaland protectorate – allowed the Hereros and others to remain in the field and fight another day. It held off the possibility of defeat until the future. Because of the fluidity of the border, the European understanding that neutral entities’ borders – in this case the Cape – should not be violated during war was disregarded. Individuals could cross borders freely. Dederling supported this idea that the border’s fluidity was the problem. He argued that “Relations between Africans and Europeans and among the European settlers were shaped by the mobility of inhabitants across colonial borders.”<sup>179</sup> Conflict on one side of the border residually affected the abutting colony. In the case of the Herero and Nama Wars, the German military’s border crossings in the Cape unleashed numerous protests from the Cape Government. When the GSWA and Berlin governments did not apologise enough to the Cape for the incidents or take adequate measures to prevent future incursions, it generated resentment in the Cape and strained Anglo-German relations in southern Africa.

In a letter to Selborne on 12 January 1906, von Humboldt informed him that the Cape seemed to be harbouring a Nama leader named Simon Kooper, and that several of Kooper’s fellow combatants had also entered British Bechuanaland, a territory that the Cape administered.<sup>180</sup> At the time, German soldiers had been chasing the African combatants. Von Humboldt was quick to point out that the soldiers did not proceed beyond the border. “The German troops...had to desist from pursuing them at the frontier.”<sup>181</sup> It was one of the last times that German soldiers recognised the border with the Cape. The remainder of von Humboldt’s report hinted that the Cape should aid the Germans in capturing and relocating Cooper and his compatriots to the Cape’s interior. The

---

<sup>177</sup> Gewald also pointed out that German troops received orders to pursue the Herero refugees until they left German South-West Africa. See J.B. Gewald, *The Great General of the Kaiser*, *The Botswana Society* 26, 1994, pp. 70-71.

<sup>178</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 168.

<sup>179</sup> T. Dederling, *War and Mobility*, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006, p. 275.

<sup>180</sup> Kooper’s name was also spelled “Cooper,” “Copper,” and “Kopper” in different reports. British Bechuanaland was the southern section of Bechuanaland.

<sup>181</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 306-307: H.P. von Humboldt – Selborne, 1906-01-12, p. 306.

Cape Government did not respond to the request. Although one German military officer reasoned that the Cape did not remove Kooper and his compatriots because they had “settled across the frontier” and were “a valuable resource for their fellow-tribesmen in the field,” which only offended the German authorities.<sup>182</sup> It provided them with another reason to accuse the Cape and the British Governments of acting “unneighbourly” despite the Cape’s willingness to sell animals, foodstuffs, and supplies to the German military at the risk of jeopardising the Cape’s own supply needs.<sup>183</sup>

March 1906 marked the scene of a bloodthirsty dash after prisoners of war who had escaped German custody. This time, the pursuers crossed into the Cape. Initially, the report from Smartt to Hely-Hutchinson placed four German soldiers at fault for violating the border at Walvis Bay.<sup>184</sup> Walvis Bay had been part of the Cape’s territory since 1884. In late April 1906, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles, would relay to Grey that the soldiers were individuals attached to a “private firm.”<sup>185</sup> During the events of 24 March, the four Germans chased the prisoners eight miles into Walvis Bay and fired at them before their arrest and return to Swakopmund.<sup>186</sup> David Eadie, the resident magistrate at Walvis Bay, apprised the Secretary at the Law Department that his office had collected statements and written a police report, but he had yet to initiate or receive communications from Windhuk.<sup>187</sup> Upon learning about the incident, the Cape Government sought legal action against the German protectorate.<sup>188</sup> The Cape Attorney-General’s office drew up a report on the event, spelling out the Cape’s legal standing as they prepared to take action against the Germans. For the Cape Government, the main issue was the Cape’s sovereignty and not the prisoners’ asylum status. Their asylum status was indisputable.<sup>189</sup> Instead, their concern

---

<sup>182</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 334: Officer Commanding the Troops in the German Protectorate of South-West Africa, Verbal Communication, 1906-03-16, p. 334.

<sup>183</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, S./208/20, pp. 331-333: Extracts from Report of Colonel Trench, 1906-01-19, p. 333.

<sup>184</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-04-02, p. 366.

<sup>185</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 380-381: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 1906-04-29, p. 381.

<sup>186</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-04-02, p. 366.

<sup>187</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: D. Eadie – Secretary at the Law Department, Cape Town, 1906-03-27, p. 366.

<sup>188</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-04-02, p. 366.

<sup>189</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: Violation of British Territory at Walfish Bay by German Soldiers. Report of the Additional Legal Adviser, 1906-03-28, p. 366.

was that “The Germans have carried on hostilities in British territory.”<sup>190</sup> The event was “a clear violation of sovereignty” requiring a response with the British Government’s aid.<sup>191</sup>

On 20 April 1906, the British Government made diplomatic representations on the Cape Government’s behalf. Lascelles communicated with Heinrich von Tschirschky, the Head of the German Foreign Office. He explained, “I am instructed by His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State [Grey] to lose no time in bringing this report to Your Excellency’s notice and to urge that immediate enquiries may be made into the incident.”<sup>192</sup> Grey wanted answers about the incursion at Walvis Bay. He demanded an investigation. Nine days later, the desired information arrived. The four soldiers were “employés of the firm of Arthur Koppel which is carrying out the construction of the Otavi Railway and by which the fugitive natives were employed [sic].”<sup>193</sup> It was to the German Government’s relief that the individuals involved were not the German protectorate’s soldiers. They avoided an international incident. After the findings revealed the nature of the violation, von Lindequist ordered the firm never to undertake any action that would again violate the border. As much as von Lindequist’s assurance eased tensions over the violation, neither he nor the firm apologised for the event. Only Under State Secretary Otto von Mühlberg offered a half-hearted apology. Throughout 1906, this was only one of three apologies that the German Government offered for border infractions.<sup>194</sup>

On 1, 4, and 11 May 1906, German soldiers breached the Cape border. Their actions created an international incident. The infractions were distressing enough to garner the attention of the House of Commons during Prime Minister’s Question Time. It took the Cape Government an entire month to sort through the information and more than three months for the Foreign Office to decide how to address what happened. The incident on 1 May was a misunderstanding. A German patrol was tracking armed Nama and “crossed the English border near Klipdam.”<sup>195</sup> After crossing the border, they had “been stopped by the British Police, half an hour east of Biesjespoort, disarmed,

---

<sup>190</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: Violation of British Territory at Walfish Bay, 1906-03-28, p. 366.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 367-368: F. Lascelles – H. von Tschirschky, 1906-04-20, p. 368.

<sup>193</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 380-381: O. von Mühlberg – F. Lascelles, 1906-04-26, p. 381.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 380-381: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 1906-04-29, p. 381.

<sup>195</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-05-08, p. 411.

and sent back to German South-West Africa. The police kept their arms and ammunition.”<sup>196</sup> Because the patrol crossed the border, the Cape Mounted Police had confiscated the patrol’s firearms. In reaction, von Humboldt, representing von Lindequist, protested the Cape Mounted Police’s disarmament of the German soldiers and the Cape Mounted Police’s failure to return the soldiers’ weapons on their way back to German territory. Eventually, the Cape authorities sent these weapons back to the German military. Von Humboldt also placed some of the blame for the incident on the Cape Government. He pointed out that the Cape Mounted Police were not completing their duties at the border, especially in helping the Germans catch African resistance fighters. To remedy the situation, von Humboldt offered to send German troops to assist the Cape Mounted Police in guarding the border. Later that month, the Cape’s ministers informed Hely-Hutchinson that the offer was unnecessary. Instead, they insisted that the German protectorate instruct its soldiers on the importance of honouring borders.<sup>197</sup>

The Cape offered proof that the Cape Mounted Police had been doing its utmost to guard the border. Major F.H. Elliott of the Cape Mounted Police provided the police commissioner with Private Edward Jarvis’s sworn statement. Private Jarvis had been the trooper who stopped and disarmed the German patrol. Major Elliott presented the testimony as part of his call for the German authorities to put in place orders that would prevent a repeat of the incident. On 1 May, a German patrol became lost and entered the Cape near Narougas. By 25 May, von Humboldt informed Hely-Hutchinson that Windhuk would place the soldiers before a tribunal due to the border violation.<sup>198</sup>

On 4 May, German troops had pursued Marenga into the Cape’s territory. Pursuits often ended in border violations. “During these guerrilla engagements the German forces repeatedly violated the frontiers with Cape Province. They ended under the partial mediation of German missionaries and officers of the British Cape Police.”<sup>199</sup> While the German troops chased Marenga, the Cape

---

<sup>196</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-05-08, p. 411.

<sup>197</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – L.S. Jameson, 1906-05-09, p. 410; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: Cape Ministers – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-05-21, p. 409.

<sup>198</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 416-418: F.H. Elliott – Commissioner Commanding, Cape Mounted Police, 1906-05-10, p. 417; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 416-418: Private Edward Jarvis’s Statement, 1906-05-10, pp. 417-418; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 392: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-25, p. 392.

<sup>199</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 150.

Mounted Police became involved and cut off the German pursuit because they had entered the Cape.<sup>200</sup>

Marenga's manoeuvre and the Cape Mounted Police's interference had angered the German troops who had been trying to capture Marenga for some time. Eventually, Marenga surrendered "to the Cape police, who refused to hand him over to the German authorities" at Riemvasmaak.<sup>201</sup> The Cape authorities' unwillingness to comply was not unusual. According to Dederling, the Cape authorities generally did not deport African combatants to GSWA because it "could antagonize their own African population."<sup>202</sup> Major Elliott described the whole incident as "a race between Germans and Cape Mounted Police."<sup>203</sup> The Germans wanted to apprehend him, while the Cape Mounted Police seemingly desired to save him. Although, the Cape Mounted Police, ironically, were responsible for his death in 1907. To Major Elliott, the Germans' indiscretion when they entered the Cape's territory was of lesser importance compared to the way the Germans had attempted to capture Marenga.<sup>204</sup>

In the meantime, news of the incident reached London. On 16 May 1906, the House of Commons addressed the border violation involving the "pursuit of the insurgent leader Morenga [sic Marenga]."<sup>205</sup> Answering why German troops crossed the border was important to the British Government. Germany was becoming increasingly aggressive toward Britain and it was not impossible that GSWA mirrored Germany's aggressive stance. The British Government's spokesperson, Sir Walter Runciman, explained that the German Chargé D'Affaires had quickly acknowledged the border violation and that the German Government disapproved of it.<sup>206</sup>

---

<sup>200</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 381: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-11, p. 381.

<sup>201</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 170-171; M. Legassick, *Hidden Histories of Gordonia* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016), p. 229.

<sup>202</sup> T. Dederling, The Prophet's 'War against Whites,' 1904-7, *The Journal of African History* 40(1), 1999, p. 4.

<sup>203</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 407-408: F.H. Elliott – Commissioner, Cape Mounted Police, 1906-05-19, p. 408.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*; The German forces ambushed Marenga's forces and wounded Marenga on 4 May. See J.R. Masson, A Fragment of Colonial History, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21(2), June 1995, p. 250.

<sup>205</sup> United Kingdom, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates* (hereafter *HPD*), House of Commons, 'Germany And British South West Africa,' 16 May 1906, Volume No. 157; Simultaneously, *TRDM* reported that London newspapers congratulated Elliott on his success in the affair. *TRDM* celebrated Elliott's capture of Marenga as demonstrating British willingness to aid the Germans during the war. See *TRDM*, 1907-11-07; After Marenga's capture, the Cape authorities arranged to house him far from the South-West Africa border. See *TRDM*, 1907-08-15; Two days later, *TRDM* reported Marenga's escape. See *TRDM*, 1907-08-19.

<sup>206</sup> United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'Germany And British South West Africa,' 16 May 1906, Volume No. 157; For press coverage of the House of Commons debate, see *TRDM*, 1907-08-20.

On 15 May 1906, von Humboldt furnished the Cape Government with an apology for the incident that occurred. Von Humboldt also assured the Cape Government that Windhuk would remind German troops not to cross the border. However, by the time von Humboldt had apologised for the German troops' transgression on 4 May, German soldiers had already entered the Cape's territory allegedly in pursuit of Marenga for a second time. On 11 May German soldiers entered as far as ten miles into the Cape's territory. The Cape Government found the third incursion inexcusable. The consul-general assured them that the German officer commanding had received orders not to cross the Cape's border. Since the instructions had been clear and because the incident had evoked outrage in the Cape Government, GSWA's government took action against the officer commanding.<sup>207</sup>

Still, there were other incidents of border crossings by German soldiers for the remainder of the year. The three that occurred in May 1906 continued to bother the Cape Government. In June of that same year, they pressed the Foreign Office to extract apologies from the German Government for all three incursions. So far, the German Government had issued apologies for the third infraction and "unofficially" via von Humboldt for the second incident.<sup>208</sup> However, it had not proved satisfactory to them because they wanted statements of regret directly from the German Government. In particular, the Cape Government had yet to receive an admission of wrongdoing for the first incident of the roving German patrol. The Foreign Office did not address this episode with the German Government because the Germans had apologised sufficiently. Regarding the second and third incidents, the Foreign Office believed the German authorities had done enough to address the incidents. The German authorities had reprimanded the German officers responsible for the border violations and reissued orders to German troops reminding them not to cross the border. Therefore, the Foreign Office decided to drop all further protests related to the three incursions.<sup>209</sup>

---

<sup>207</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 381: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-11, p. 381; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-05-15, p. 411; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-23, pp. 408-409; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 413-414: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-05-29, p. 413.

<sup>208</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 418-419: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 1906-06-26, p. 419.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid*; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 430-431: E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 1906-07-11, p. 431.

German invasions alarmed the Cape authorities. To the Cape Government, the German troops' willingness to violate the borders and German officials' cool response represented a blatant disregard for the Cape's sovereignty and its borders. They felt insulted that they did not receive a full and direct apology from the German Government. Given the liberties that German soldiers were willing to take to capture African combatants, the Cape ministers began to ask themselves what the presence of aggressive German troops could mean for the Cape and South Africa in the future. Securing the northwest region (an area sprawling between Springbokfontein and Port Nolloth) became critical to the Cape and equally vital to the British Empire. The Cape's borders formed the borders of the Empire and the Cape's borders required rigorous defence. Any weakness along the Cape's borders radiated and became the British Empire's weakness.

The Germans had exacted brutal campaigns since August 1904 and had placed Herero and Nama combatants and non-combatants in concentration camps, which served as sources for forced labour, beginning in November 1905. The Germans had defeated the Herero and other Nama resistance fighters without concluding peace terms. By 1906, the Bondelswarts were the only contingent remaining in the field.<sup>210</sup>

Between October and December 1906, a Bondelswart leader, Johannes Christian, negotiated peace terms with Colonel von Deimling. The Peace of Ukamas signed on 21 December 1906 concluded the conflict between the Bondelswarts and the Germans. However, small bands of Nama drawn to Simon Kooper's ranks remained at large and were still pursued by German forces. Under pressure from the British Government, GSWA's governor, Friedrich von Lindequist, declared an end to operations on 31 March 1907.<sup>211</sup>

Although the Herero and Nama Wars provided work for South Africa's blacks and Boers, the German campaigns frustrated Anglo-German relations in southern Africa. First, gunrunning operations that supplied African resistance fighters eluded the British colonial authorities, which irritated GSWA authorities as they carried out the campaigns. It had troubled Cape Coloureds and Africans, such as Jack Seti, to observe Africans' mistreatment in GSWA. To an extent, GSWA

---

<sup>210</sup> M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), pp. 171, 173; J.M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 160-162.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

forced the Cape Government – arguably blacks’ strongest supporter in South Africa – into an uncomfortable position, playing a role in the German campaigns against Africans. Aside from attempting to install a British consul in GSWA, the Cape Government’s actions alarmed Cape blacks and violated their trust in their government as the war progressed. In addition to the war’s political strain on the Cape Government, the ensuing refugee crisis placed a financial burden on the Cape. Resentment toward GSWA increased in 1906 when German soldiers crossed the border and violated the Cape’s sovereignty, though the German Government attempted to make amends for the violations. These events formed the beginning of the Anglo-German antagonism in southern Africa.

## CHAPTER IV

### GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: AGITATION AND SUSPICION AT THE BORDER, 1906-1907

In this chapter, I consider what initiated the agitation and suspicion that developed between British South Africa and GSWA outside of the Herero and Nama Wars. In this section, I introduce the Cape's dispute with GSWA over the border demarcation at the Orange River. The failure to negotiate a border there irritated the two colonies' governments and slowly became an issue that lasted beyond 1906. Some residual events related to the Orange River border disagreement included the German military's road construction project along the river and a Cape Mounted Police officer's decision to cut off German access to a supply route at Rahman's Drift. The chapter's latter section explores abductions at the Cape's border with GSWA. In 1905 and 1906, German officials kidnapped British citizens without explanation. One case that I study is the abduction of Private Edmund Kirkman of the Cape Mounted Police and the concern it generated among British citizens. From there, I address the illegal arms and ammunition importation trade from Germany to British South Africa and Ferreira's Raid and examine how they fed British fears of a German-Boer conspiracy to overthrow British rule in South Africa. This chapter demonstrates some of the diplomatic frustrations and concerns that the Cape faced during its interactions with GSWA.

#### 4.1 The Orange River, 1906

Between 1893 and 1899, the Cape and GSWA governments had agreed that the border demarcation between the two territories would be on the Orange River's northern bank. At first, this arrangement worked. However, since 1899, the Cape authorities and the Germans gradually developed different definitions of the northern bank. While the Germans believed the northern bank was located where the water touched land at low tide, the Cape authorities claimed it lay on the high tide mark.<sup>212</sup>

---

<sup>212</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 301-303: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-01-22, p. 301; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 313-314: E. Barrington – F. Lascelles, 1906-02-20, p. 314; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 310: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-01-29, p. 310; S. Akweenda, *International Law and the Protection of Namibia's Territorial Integrity: Boundaries and Territorial Claims* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 81-82.

The German military road construction project along the Orange River in 1906 became a flashpoint in this conflict. One contested section of the border was Rahman's Drift. In early March 1906, Governor Hely-Hutchinson of the Cape notified the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, that the Germans were building a road along the riverbed from Rahman's Drift to Hout's Drift. In response to the initiation of the road's construction, the Cape Mounted Police inspector sent two formal letters to German authorities complaining about the incident, but both were ignored. The Cape Government ministers desired Elgin and the British Government to intervene because they believed that the German authorities had been "high-handed" in their handling of the Cape Mounted Police inspector's complaints.<sup>213</sup> While Hely-Hutchinson waited for Elgin's reply, the German consul-general responded to the Cape Government's protests, and argued much to Hely-Hutchinson's chagrin that the riverbed fell within German territory, the edge of which was "formed by the usual waterline."<sup>214</sup> Von Lindequist wanted the German consul-general to press the Cape Government to drop their objections and allow the work to continue. The road was vital to German troop movements in their campaigns against the Herero and the Nama.<sup>215</sup>

To ensure that the Colonial Office fully understood the situation at the Orange River, Hely-Hutchinson forwarded a copy of a letter that he received from H.P. von Humboldt, the German consul-general at Cape Town. Von Humboldt explained that the Cape Government's understanding of the border was impractical. According to the Cape, the waterline was located at the top of the riverbed when the river reached its highest level. The German consul-general pointed out that in the event of flooding, the water level would exceed the Cape Government's designated waterline, meaning that the Cape's territory would extend into German territory.<sup>216</sup>

The February 1906 report of Lieutenant Voules of the Cape Mounted Police added to von Humboldt's frustration.<sup>217</sup> Von Humboldt alleged that the report surveying Rahman's Drift

---

<sup>213</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 320; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-03-06, p. 320.

<sup>214</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 334; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-03-16, p. 334.

<sup>215</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 320; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-03-06, p. 320; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 334; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-03-16, p. 334.

<sup>216</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 354-357; H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-03-14, p. 356.

<sup>217</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 339-340; Sub-Inspector Voules's Report on Rahman's Drift, 1906-02-28, p. 340; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 339-340; N. Neylan – C.P. Crewe, 1906-03-02, p. 340; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 354-357; H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-03-14, p. 356; Voules's name was also spelled "Vowles" in some reports.

exaggerated the German road project's extent and enhanced the Cape's territorial jurisdiction. At the time, Voules had also written to the local German authorities about the road's alleged illegal construction. When the Germans failed to respond to Voules, Voules decided to close Rahman's Drift without the Cape Government's sanction. Shortly after Voules closed Rahman's Drift, Neylan of the Cape Mounted Police instructed Voules to reopen it to German traffic and required him to seek authorisation for future closures. Due to von Humboldt and Neylan's communications, the Cape Government opened an investigation into Voules's actions.<sup>218</sup>

To settle the boundary dispute, on 17 March 1906, Elgin tasked the Foreign Office with proposing that Germany accept "the boundary as being the fixed line marked by the northern margin of the stream after the rains."<sup>219</sup> The Colonial Office needed to end the matter promptly because the German authorities still wanted to build the road.<sup>220</sup>

Eventually, in October 1906, the Foreign Office rescinded its objections to the road project because it learned from the British military attaché at Swakopmund that the so-called road "consists of a little footpath, which can be used by pack-animals only, and that the road-making consisted in shifting a few rocks to one side as to make it possible to drive mules along the path."<sup>221</sup>

Between 22 and 28 November 1906, Hely-Hutchinson informed Elgin that the Cape ministers agreed to retract their protests over the road on the condition that the Germans paid "for the maintenance of the German refugees from German South-West Africa."<sup>222</sup> Even though the road would trespass on British territory, the Cape ministers consented to the arrangement because the refugees' maintenance burdened the Cape financially. T.W. Smartt expressed that he and the other Cape ministers "have no desire to exaggerate the incident," so long as it does not go "beyond the construction of a 'footpath' to serve immediate military requirements."<sup>223</sup>

---

<sup>218</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 339-340: N. Neylan – C.P. Crewe, 1906-03-02, p. 340.

<sup>219</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 335: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 1906-03-17, p. 335.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 490: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-10-27, p. 490.

<sup>222</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 530-531: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-28, p. 530.

<sup>223</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 530-531: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-11-22, p. 531.

## 4.2 Abduction at the border, 1906

At around the same time that the Cape authorities were addressing problems at the Orange River, a peculiar incident occurred at a different location along the Cape's border with GSWA. On 21 January 1906, M. Jansen arrested Private Edmund Bolton Kirkman of the Cape Mounted Police's "S" Division on the German side of the border at Klipdam near Biesjespoort in the North-West Cape. Both Kirkman's strange arrest and how Kirkman came to be on the German side of the border occupied the Cape Government's time. It was not until ten months later that the Cape Government had acquired enough information to understand what had happened, but not necessarily why it had happened. Reports arrived in a flurry and the updates did not always provide clarity.

By 7 March 1906, Kirkman had returned to the Cape and the Cape Government began collecting accounts of what led to Kirkman's arrest in January. From what Hely-Hutchinson could ascertain, the events surrounding the arrest were highly suspect. The magistrate at Rietfontein believed that the testimonies of the Cape Mounted Police at Biesjespoort were false because they all coincided.<sup>224</sup>

On 21 January 1906, Kirkman had been attempting to retrieve a lost camel belonging to the Cape Government and "had been invited" to Klipdam to conduct his search.<sup>225</sup> Soon after he crossed the border, Jansen arrested him for cattle theft. Without conducting a thorough investigation, the German officer commanding at Klipdam, R. Treyse, declared Kirkman guilty a day later. Although Treyse regretted the charges brought to bear on Kirkman, he believed Kirkman was dishonest. After reporting the charges to Kirkman's superior, Corporal Fred Banning, Treyse sent Kirkman to Keetmanshoop, GSWA to await a formal hearing.

Inspector C.E.W. Spencer of the Cape Mounted Police believed Kirkman's arrest was a hoax. It was alarming that a trooper in the Cape Mounted Police – let alone a Cape citizen – could be

---

<sup>224</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-03-06, p. 343; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 321: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-03-07, p. 321; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: C.E.W. Spencer – Commissioner Commanding, Cape Mounted Police, 1906-02-17, pp. 343-344.

<sup>225</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-03-06, p. 343.

coaxed across the border and then, arbitrarily arrested and found guilty. The German authorities' actions fuelled the Cape authorities' suspicions of their neighbours. Inspector Spencer spent the next two weeks gathering witness statements.<sup>226</sup> After interviewing several witnesses, Inspector Spencer concluded that the arrest was illegitimate. One witness explained that the Boers accompanying Jansen forced Kirkman to the German side of the border at gunpoint. After capturing Kirkman, Jansen and his accomplices bound Kirkman to a wagon wheel with rope for the day and later, to the doorpost of Jansen's house.<sup>227</sup>

There were other similar strange seizures in the area. On 3 February 1906, a Khoisan man named Schuilpad from GSWA who worked for "S" division, confirmed the troopers' stories. While Schuilpad gave an account that supported Kirkman and the rest of "S" Division, he failed to mention his history with the police at Klipdam. In late October 1905, at the beginning of his tenure working for the Cape Mounted Police, the German authorities attempted to apprehend him for being an agent in the ongoing German campaigns against the Herero and Nama. Jansen and a corporal in the German army, Thein, along with a third man, tried to arrest Schuilpad for being a messenger between Jacob Marenga and Pietrus Spangenberg, a Biesjespoort shopkeeper. Subsequently, Jansen and his associates crossed into the Cape and planned to abduct Schuilpad, but he escaped and sought the Cape Mounted Police's protection, for whom he now worked. *The Rand Daily Mail* reported on another similar incident one year after the Kirkman's arrest. During the episode, two ex-Cape Mounted Police troopers abducted an African from GSWA near Upington, brought him into the Cape, and killed him.<sup>228</sup>

---

<sup>226</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: R. Treyse – F.W. Banning (Letter "B"), 1906-01-21, p. 344; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: R. Treyse – F.W. Banning (Letter "D"), 1906-01-22, p. 344; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Corporal Fred Wren Banning's Statement, 1906-01-29, p. 345. Throughout Inspector Spencer's report, the witnesses used the terms cattle and oxen interchangeably.

<sup>227</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Pietrus Josephus Matewes Spangenberg's Statement, ca. 1906-01-29, p. 345; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Andreas Booikies's Statement, 1906-01-31, p. 345. For further accounts of Kirkman's arrest see TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Private Holger Jacon Eskildsen's Statement, 1906-02-06, p. 346; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: A.J. Attwood – N. Neylan, 1906-01-26, p. 349; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: M. Jansen – F.W. Banning, 1906-01-23, p. 350; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: J.F. Herbst – Officer Commanding, Upington, 1906-01-25, p. 351; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: H. Hoenblein – J.F. Herbst, 1906-01-23, p. 351.

<sup>228</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Schuilpad (alias Hans Jan)'s Statement, 1906-02-03, p. 348; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Old Jan (alias Hans Jan)'s Statement, 1906-02-07, p. 348; P. Curson, *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony* (Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012), p. 120; *TRDM*, 1907-08-15; In some documents, Schuilpad's name was spelled Skilpad.

Kirkman's release was conditional. On 14 February 1906, Lascelles wrote to Grey regarding the trial. The British Government had been watching the development of the Kirkman episode carefully. Lascelles explained that while the German authorities had released Kirkman, his permanent freedom depended on the German authorities' next steps. In the meantime, Lascelles was pleased to report that Hely-Hutchinson and von Lindequist were able to engage in "friendly and satisfactory communications."<sup>229</sup> This relieved the British Government because events surrounding the Herero and Nama Wars and the Orange River had strained the Cape's relationship with GSWA.<sup>230</sup>

As Inspector Spencer's investigation of Kirkman and the events leading up to his arrest concluded in late February 1906, the Cape Government and Spencer turned their attention to Jansen. Kirkman's arrest and the man who arrested him were strange. Jansen worked closely with the German authorities in GSWA, but the Cape authorities did not believe he had an official title or position. Now, Inspector Spencer sought Jansen's arrest, but the German authorities denied Inspector Spencer's request.<sup>231</sup>

On 18 May 1906, the Cape authorities discovered a rumour that Jansen was a member of the German Secret Service, acting as a spy along the border. To a degree, the allegation proved true. Information from Sub-Inspector Attwood and "other sources" revealed "that Jansen was employed up to January last [1906] by one Busch, who is supposed to have been, till quite recently, in the German Secret Service."<sup>232</sup> A witness had observed Busch and an unnamed accomplice photographing various points along the Cape border for intelligence purposes. In July, British sources would report that Busch also played a role in an arms-smuggling scheme between Germany and South Africa.<sup>233</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 304-305: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 1906-02-14, p. 305.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 526-527: Dr. Forkel – C.E.W. Spencer, 1906-02-21, pp. 526-527.

<sup>232</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 406-407: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-05-18, p. 406.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, S./201/9, pp. 316-317: Military Intelligence Department – Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 1906-01-17, p. 317; TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: "I" – "F" (Secret Letter), 1906-06-20, p. 1; TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1906-07-26, pp. 1-3.

On 22 August that same year, von Tschirschky denied that Jansen had ever worked for GSWA's government or the German military. However, the Foreign Office learned that Jansen was American. This fact puzzled the British and the Cape governments. Why did an American travel to southern Africa, associate with the local German authorities, and arrest Kirkman? What authority did he have as an American and not a German national? The German Government did not have an answer. GSWA's governor refused to answer. Von Lindequist did not see the point in pursuing the issue since he confirmed Jansen was not German.<sup>234</sup>

Since the enquiries with the German Government were fruitless, Grey insisted that the Colonial Office continue its investigation into Jansen. The elusive Jansen had created trouble for the British Government and the Cape, increasing Anglo-German tensions at the Cape's border with GSWA. Grey wanted answers. Elgin forwarded Grey's request to Hely-Hutchinson. The British Government wanted to know the source of Jansen's authority. The Cape Government forwarded the Cape Mounted Police's reports, including one that Sub-Inspector Attwood wrote about another Cape citizen's abduction, Mr. de Beer, the year before. They hoped to draw on Jansen's history for explanations. However, Jansen was nearly impossible to track down and the British Government's investigation ended. In *Hidden Histories of Gordonia*, Martin Legassick's work on Baster, or Coloured, landownership indicated that a Marthinus Jansen owned property near Upington.<sup>235</sup> It is, however, not clear whether this was the same man.

The Cape authorities believed they had heard the last of Jansen and his escapades. Nevertheless, it was not the last time. On 12 November 1906, the Cape authorities reported sighting Jansen. During Ferreira's Raid (which I will address later in this chapter) – Hely-Hutchinson conveyed to Sir Patrick Duncan, the acting lieutenant-governor of the Transvaal, "Among his [Ferreira's] followers is Jansen, [the] man who arrested policeman Kirkman."<sup>236</sup> Since Colonel Neylan's despatch to the Cape Mounted Police commissioner in February, the British and Cape authorities

---

<sup>234</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 457; Granville – E. Grey, 1906-08-22, p. 457.

<sup>235</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 470; F.A. Campbell – Colonial Office, 1906-09-21, p. 470; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 471; Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-09-28, p. 471; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 495; Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-11-10, p. 495; M. Legassick, *Hidden Histories of Gordonia* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016), p. 60.

<sup>236</sup> National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter NASAP): EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 1906-11-12, p. 1.

suspected that Jansen was an agitator. His part in the Ferreira Raid in November reinforced Colonel Neylan's conclusion. Perhaps all Jansen wanted to do was cause problems for the Cape Mounted Police and the British colonial administration, as well as make money off stolen oxen.

Within the first four years following the Anglo-Boer War, the dynamics between the Cape and GSWA fluctuated like the Anglo-German relationship in Europe. Since 1900, tensions had increased in Europe due to the naval arms race. However, brief moments of Anglo-German cooperation balanced the relationship. Southern Africa was similar. The War Office planned to invade GSWA if an Anglo-German war occurred and hired an agent to spy on GSWA. Britain looked to assert dominance throughout southern Africa. British discomfort with German ambitions became a South African problem. South Africa's discomfort with GSWA played out at the Orange River. First, the Cape and GSWA governments disputed the border's demarcation along the river. The two colonial governments competed for an advantageous border, hoping to expand their respective colony's bounds. The Cape Government's protests over the pont service at Rahman's Drift and the German road project along the Orange River demonstrated the Cape Government's resolve to control the border's delineation for the Cape's benefit. Likewise, German counterclaims about the border's location and the road's legality proved the German administration's intent to draw the boundary for GSWA's advantage.

The Kirkman abduction, in addition to Schuilpad and de Beer, only increased the Cape's suspicions of GSWA. Kirkman's unjustified arrest not only highlighted security concerns along the border, but it also challenged diplomatic relations between the colonies. Because the German authorities could not provide much information about Jansen, the Cape and British governments believed that the Germans had withheld information. Lack of German transparency gave rise to the Cape's distrust of its German neighbour. For the German colonial administration, the incident showcased the Cape Mounted Police's engagement in cattle theft and perjury. Their efforts to corroborate enabled their enterprises to continue. The German authorities suspected their dishonesty, which fuelled German apprehension of the Cape.

### **4.3 Illegal importation from Germany, 1906**

The importation of arms and ammunition from Germany into the South African colonies mystified British authorities. There were code names for the participants, secret addresses, spies, and alleged connections to former Boer politicians. What started as an investigation into illegal operations concluded with a startling revelation – that there was a link to the Boer-led community. The Foreign Office and the War Office took responsibility for investigating the matter. On 1 May 1906, the Military Operations Department at the War Office intercepted a letter that prompted a series of investigations that lasted from June 1906 until December 1906.

A person codenamed “I” wrote a vague letter to person “F” on 4 June 1906, about the smuggling of cases containing arms and ammunition. Whomever the doctor and “I” were, they were orchestrators of the German smuggling operation. The War Office intercepted the letter and the Directorate of Military Operations, John Burnett Stuart, arranged for the information to be passed on to Military Intelligence Agent William Melville in Hamburg, Germany.<sup>237</sup> On 4 June, “I” informed “F” that the cases had been examined but that a customs official had been bribed to overlook the content. He added that there were “still about 180 cases of cartridges, several guns (geschütze) and parts of guns in store, and I have yet more on order; I will at once inform you as soon as we start shipping again [sic].”<sup>238</sup> “I” told “F” to pick up the goods from H. Schauham at 51 President Street.<sup>239</sup>

Sixteen days later, “I” wrote again to “F” that he had received letters from Cape Town and Pretoria, but unspecified problems had cropped up. A doctor, later identified as Dr. W.J. Leyds, instructed “I” to go to Cape Town and Pretoria to sort out whatever challenge the smugglers encountered.<sup>240</sup>

William Melville proceeded to Hamburg in July 1906 to find out the identity of C. Werner, a person involved in the smuggling operation who had been writing mysterious letters since 1905 that provided “shipping details, even markings on the packing cases.”<sup>241</sup> Military Intelligence concluded that Werner’s letters alluded to arms and ammunition importation.<sup>242</sup>

---

<sup>237</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: J. Burnett-Stuart – C.H. Montgomery, 1906-06-02, p. 1.

<sup>238</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: “I” – “F” (Secret Letter), 1906-06-04, p. 1.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>240</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: “I” – “F” (Secret Letter), 1906-06-20, p. 1.

<sup>241</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1906-07-26, p. 1.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*; A. Cook, *M: MI5's First Spymaster* (Cheltenham, U.K.: The History Press, 2011), pp. 158-159.

The British Directorate of Military Operations also wanted Melville to find out more about Otto Busch, who had smuggled weapons to the Boers from GSWA during the Anglo-Boer War and had helped the German consul-general acquire supplies for the German protectorate. Busch had also been the German Secret Service agent who had employed Jansen, the American who had arrested Private Kirkman. Recently, Busch had returned to Hamburg to live with his wife. Melville discovered that Busch was having an extramarital affair with Wiesbaden Werner, and Military Intelligence compared Werner's handwriting with that of "C. Werner." Originally, Military Intelligence believed the handwriting was a match, but later revised that opinion before establishing a firmer connection, namely that the letters addressed to C. Werner had been delivered to Frau Angelbeck, Otto Busch's mother-in-law in Hamburg.<sup>243</sup>

Military Intelligence intercepted information concerning Dr. Leyds, the former politician and diplomat. He had requested C. Werner to leave Hamburg for Cape Town.<sup>244</sup>

Military Intelligence also discovered that their analysis of some of the letters they intercepted was faulty. The original translation of the letters indicated that rifles were being smuggled into South Africa. Upon re-examination, the Military Intelligence discovered "Mohrere Geschütze und Theile von Geschützen" meant "several guns and parts of guns" – artillery guns.<sup>245</sup> The difference in meaning was substantial. The importation of artillery to South Africa was much more alarming.

In time, the smugglers realised that they were under surveillance. On 1 August 1906, Sir Charles Hardinge and Sir Edward Grey exchanged notes in the Foreign Office Department Minutes. Hardinge wrote, "It looks as though the suspicions of the importers have been aroused."<sup>246</sup> Grey replied, "I suppose Lord Elgin is kept informed" and suggested that a close watch of the individuals continue.<sup>247</sup> The smugglers considered a more cautious approach for future shipments after the Cape authorities executed a raid between August and October 1906. After the raid, Werner

---

<sup>243</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1906-07-26, pp. 1-3.

<sup>244</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-2: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1906-08-01, p. 1.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1906-08-01, p. 1.

<sup>247</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: E. Grey, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1906-08-01, p. 1.

arranged to send shipments containing smaller items overland, while he directed larger deliveries via Lüderitzbucht.<sup>248</sup> Sending smaller shipments and spacing out the frequency of trips prevented authorities from finding the contraband as easily as larger or more frequent deliveries.

On 8 November 1906, Hardinge wrote to Grey claiming that the arms smuggling operation was linked to another former Boer leader, as well as an officer in the GSWA forces. He reported, “‘C Werner’ apparently in communication with Mr. [Jan] Smuts & Col. von Deimling [sic].”<sup>249</sup> The connection with Smuts, who had worked closely with the British Government during the development of responsible government for the Transvaal, was particularly alarming. Grey replied, “This has a very ugly look. I suppose the attention of Mr. Haldane & Lord Elgin will be directed.”<sup>250</sup> In late December 1906, military intelligence surmised with limited evidence that the smuggling was linked to Ferreira’s Raid during early November 1906 (see next section). From 1907 until 1914, military intelligence and Cape officials continued to uncover gunrunning operations along the frontier, but they were much smaller in scale (see chapters six and seven).

#### 4.4 Ferreira’s Raid, 1906-1907

In November 1906, Colonel John Ferreira, a Bittereinder now serving in the German campaign against the Nama, was at large. Ferreira and some like-minded Bittereinders crossed the frontier into the Northwest Cape, intending to initiate a rebellion and reclaim the South African colonies for the Boers. Rumours trickled in that he was recruiting many followers as he made his way through the Cape. The event caused a sensation. As *The Rand Daily Mail* reported on 13 November 1906,

Some of the morning half-penny journals give great prominence in their news columns to the so-called Boer raid in Cape Colony, dignifying the incident with ‘scare’ headings, maps showing the movements of Ferreira and his followers, and statistics regarding the numbers of Imperial troops in various parts of South Africa.<sup>251</sup>

---

<sup>248</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Werner – Harold, 1906-10-15, p. 1.

<sup>249</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1906-11-08, p. 1.

<sup>250</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: E. Grey, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1906-11-08, p. 1.

<sup>251</sup> *TRDM*, 1906-11-13.

*The Mail*, however, counselled that these speculations were “doomed to disappointment” and expressed its confidence that local authorities could handle the matter without “the assistance of Imperial troops” adding that the House of Commons was equally confident that the rebellion did not pose a considerable threat.<sup>252</sup>

Ferreira’s Raid was the latest in a series of rumblings among Boers who had been politically marginalised following the Anglo-Boer War. In April 1904, men under the command of William Hendrik Durand had been arrested for attempting to start a revolt in Lydenburg. Most Transvaal burghers were relieved at the arrest. They did not support “the riff-raff of Johannesburg and Pretoria.”<sup>253</sup> Since then, fear of another revolt loomed. In the case of the Cape Colony, Hely-Hutchinson expressed that it would come as no surprise if such an event occurred in the northwest region of the colony where “former Cape Rebels” resided.<sup>254</sup> The Cape authorities decided to keep the region under surveillance.<sup>255</sup>

On 5 November 1906, Ferreira’s Raid commenced. As they entered the Cape via Klipdam, Ferreira and his accomplices brought with them “not only stolen rifles, ammunition and horses from a South West African depot, but also several khaki tunics and German-style riding breeches.”<sup>256</sup> Their German clothing fuelled rumours “about a joint military operation of Boers and Germans.”<sup>257</sup> Adding to initial fears surrounding the raid were speculations that two hundred Boer followers accompanied him and five hundred more were expected to converge at Upington.<sup>258</sup>

Four days later, the magistrate at Keimoes reported that only fifteen more men joined Ferreira and “Most had been forced to join the rebels at gunpoint.”<sup>259</sup> That same day Ferreira and five Transvaal raiders attacked Corporal Skipper, who survived.<sup>260</sup>

---

<sup>252</sup> TRDM, 1906-11-13.

<sup>253</sup> W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel, in W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 165.

<sup>254</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 48.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50; W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel, in W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume II June 1902-May 1910* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 165; *The Register*, 1904-07-28.

<sup>256</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 53.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>260</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: Magistrate at Keimoes – C.P. Crewe, 1906-11-09, p. 513.

For the rest of 9 November, reports kept arriving that Ferreira was admitting gaining more adherents, but the claims overestimated the numbers involved.<sup>261</sup>

On 10 November, Hely-Hutchinson wrote to von Lindequist to request the German governor's aid, and to ask specifically that if Ferreira returned to GSWA, he would be extradited to the Cape to face criminal charges. Boer leaders began playing their part to inhibit Ferreira from gathering momentum, including Jan Hofmeyr and later, Louis Botha. Botha wanted to limit the possibility that the British Government would renege on its promises of self-government because of the raid. In December, the British Government planned to approve the self-governing constitutions for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. Hely-Hutchinson had seen Hofmeyr's efforts and had been pleased with Hofmeyr because of his attempts to preserve peace. On the following day, Hely-Hutchinson telegraphed Elgin, commending Hofmeyr for attempting to curb the success of the raid.<sup>262</sup>

On 11 November, Ferreira made his way through communities surrounding Upington, but he still only had twenty men. Perhaps his campaign was not popular after all. Just as contemporaries breathed a collective sigh of relief, a report emerged that Jansen, who had arrested Private Kirkman of the Cape Mounted Police under suspicious circumstances in January 1906, was working with Ferreira. Hely-Hutchinson assured Elgin that the Cape Mounted Police and the Cape Mounted Rifles would make every effort to intercept and break up the two forces under Ferreira and Jansen.<sup>263</sup>

In Gordonia, Inspector White of the Cape Mounted Police reported that locals had long known about Ferreira's Raid.<sup>264</sup> Hely-Hutchinson also discovered "that a Dutchman came to him [German

---

<sup>261</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 54.

<sup>262</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 494; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-10, p. 494; NASAP, EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1; A.R. Cameron – P. Duncan, 1906-11-10, p. 1; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517; J. Hofmeyr – Reverend Schroder, 1906-11-10, p. 514; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517; J. Hofmeyr – T.P. Theron, 1906-11-10, p. 514; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 495; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-11, p. 495; NASAP: LTG 167, TEL1908, p. 1; L. Botha – P. Duncan, 1906-11-13, p. 1; T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, pp. 44, 57.

<sup>263</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 495; W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-11, p. 495.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid*; NASAP: EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1; W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 1906-11-12, p. 1.

Consul General von Humboldt] about a month ago and said he supposed it would suit Germany if a Boer raid were made into Cape Colony from German South-West Africa.”<sup>265</sup> At the time, Von Humboldt did not seriously consider Ferreira’s suggestion and did not report it to the Cape.<sup>266</sup> Meanwhile, C.P. Crewe also revealed that the officer commanding at Klipdam knew about the impending raid. A messenger for Ferreira stated to the officer that Ferreira planned to start “a rebellion in the Cape Colony.”<sup>267</sup>

As a sort of *mea culpa*, von Humboldt began to cooperate more openly with the Cape authorities. On 13 November, he passed along information from a German officer in GSWA that the German army had provided arms and ammunition to Cape Boers. Von Humboldt promised an inquiry into the matter.<sup>268</sup>

The next day, Major Wade received information from Colonel von Deimling, an officer in the German Protectorate forces, about the origin of Ferreira’s weapons and the reason for the raid. Ferreira allegedly feared that Africans would attack him on the way to a farm at Kheis, so he asked Captain Siebert, who was in charge of a “horse and cattle depot at Lifdood, for arms, and these were issued to them, although the practice of arming conductors is forbidden.”<sup>269</sup> Ferreira and his associates travelled across the border and failed to return. After relaying Colonel von Deimling’s findings, Major Wade concluded that Ferreira had started the raid in error. Rumours of the Natal African uprising, the Bambatha Rebellion, had spread and Ferreira might have believed Africans were in revolt across South Africa and that the British were suffering heavy losses.<sup>270</sup>

During the evening of 14 November, Sub-Inspector Adams had been out with his patrol, looking for Ferreira near Upington. They received information that he might be attempting to head for the

---

<sup>265</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 495: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-11, p. 495. Corporal Skipper also reported that raiders wore German uniforms. See TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: Magistrate at Keimoes – C.P. Crewe, 1906-11-09, p. 513. Henrik Erhard Jooste, who partook in Ferreira’s Raid, claimed “that the raid was engineered by the Germans in South West Africa.” See *TRDM*, 1907-03-05.

<sup>266</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 495: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-11, p. 495.

<sup>267</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-11-13, p. 517.

<sup>268</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-11-13, pp. 516-517. *TRDM* reported Hely-Hutchinson had asked for von Lindequist’s aid in capturing Ferreira. *TRDM*, 1906-11-13.

<sup>269</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 537-538: T.H. Wade – Colonel of the General Staff at Cape Colony, 1906-11-14, p. 538.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*

German border and suspected that his party would stop for water at Lentlands Pan, a farm owned by George (“Scotty Smith”) Lennox.<sup>271</sup>

Their hunch proved correct and on 17 November, Hely-Hutchinson reported to Elgin that they had finally captured Ferreira near Upington. In the days that followed, the Cape authorities rounded up or tracked down most of Ferreira’s original accomplices.<sup>272</sup>

On 12 December, the trial began for Ferreira and his associates. Hely-Hutchinson concluded that fault for the incident fell on the Germans “for not preventing the incursion, even though any active involvement on their part could not be proven.”<sup>273</sup> The belief was widespread but it was never tested in court. According to Tilman Dederling in “The Ferreira Raid of 1906,” the Attorney General, Victor Sampson, argued for mild punishments, precisely because he also believed the Germans might have instigated the raid. He wanted to avoid a diplomatic incident. Four years later, the Union Government commuted their sentences and they were never heard of again.<sup>274</sup>

In December 1906, the Directorate of Military Operations provided a final update on C. Werner’s German gun importation enterprise. While the allegations that Dr. Leyds’s involvement in illegal gun importation from Germany proved untrue, the Directorate of Military Operations, Burnett-Stuart, discovered sound evidence that explained the illegal weapons importation scheme’s purpose. Werner had sent a letter on 26 November 1906 that linked his operations to the Ferreira Raid. He claimed the raid had been a test of South Africa’s military readiness. To a degree, Werner was disappointed that the raid had occurred. In his opinion, it was premature and he would have preferred to wait for all three million cartridges to arrive in South Africa before acting. At the time, only half of the cartridges had departed Germany. Following Burnett-Stuart’s report on 26 December 1906, all further mention of the investigation into C. Werner’s identity and the arms smuggling in South Africa ceased.<sup>275</sup>

---

<sup>271</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 521-522: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-11-15, p. 521; TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, p. 497: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-15, p. 497.

<sup>272</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 805, pp. 521-522: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 1906-11-21, p. 521.

<sup>273</sup> T. Dederling, The Ferreira Raid of 1906, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000, p. 58.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 60.

<sup>275</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: J. Burnett-Stuart, Alleged Importation of Arms into British South Africa, 1906-12-26, p. 3. Leyds’s alleged involvement in German schemes to help the Boers overthrow British rule never went away. In

In the aftermath of Ferreira's Raid, the British Government continued its investigations. Burnett-Stuart had already concluded that the guns being smuggled into South Africa from Germany were part of a more comprehensive scheme. On 5 January 1907, Sir Edward Grey concurred with Burnett-Stuart's assessment. After reading the report, he asserted to Elgin "some mischief was afoot. Ferreira's raid was no doubt absurd, but he may have known that something serious was being prepared [the gun smuggling], and this may have given him the impulse to act as he did."<sup>276</sup> Knowing that there were more weapons on their way might have influenced Ferreira to proceed with the raid. Additionally, he could have believed that the vast store of smuggled weapons meant that a sizeable armed rebellion would take place soon, which could support his efforts during the raid. Grey suspected that smuggling and Ferreira's Raid received financial support from Dr. Leyds. He concluded his letter to Elgin with the advice to bear the information in mind should a similar incident occur in the future.

Despite the Anglo-German antagonism in the region, the Cape Government attempted to open communication between the Cape governor and GSWA's governor. The Cape Government sought to resolve issues, like those at the Orange River, locally, without the British and German governments' intervention. Lieutenant Voules's decision to close Rahman's Drift and the subsequent resolution exemplified the potential of Anglo-German cooperation. While that moment demonstrated the colonial governments' ability to collaborate, cooperation was not sustainable. The Cape Government was the only party keen on engaging in direct intercolonial communication. Because of the abovementioned incidents and limited communication, the two colonies struggled to coexist. A lack of German cooperation strained the Cape and GSWA's early relationship. Additionally, the alleged illegal weapons importation from Germany and Ferreira's Raid stirred the British authorities' fears of a German plot to overthrow British rule in southern Africa. Together, these events stoked Anglo-German animosity in southern Africa because authorities in GSWA and the South African colonies believed the other side was undermining colonial rule in their respective colonies.

---

April 1908, an anonymous German spy working for the British Government published a book in which he claimed that Leyds liaised with the German Government and Boer leaders throughout South Africa. See *TRDM*, 1908-04-21.

<sup>276</sup> TNAK: FO 800/91, p. 57: E. Grey – Elgin, 1907-01-05, p. 57.

## CHAPTER V

### FEDERATION CONSIDERED: RESOLVING THE GERMAN THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1902-1910

In this chapter, I examine the movement toward South African unification and the influence exercised on the process by German challenges to British imperial security, not just in southern Africa but internationally.

#### 5.1 Federation, 1906-1908

The idea for federation was not new for South Africa. It stretched back to the 1870s when the then British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon, pursued the idea.<sup>277</sup> Lord Carnarvon's push failed when the 1877 annexation of the Transvaal was reversed at the Battle of Majuba on 27 February 1881. However, Whitehall persisted with its ambition to that end, especially after the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886. The British Government had considered federation at times until the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and had shown some interest in federating the four colonies gathered during the closing months of 1906. However, Boer resistance to British rule complicated the issue.

On 28 November 1906, Jameson broached the subject of federation in the Ministers' Minutes to Hely-Hutchinson. He wanted a federal, central government for such things as the railway system. The existence of multiple systems – including railways, trade, and policy toward blacks – posed a problem for intercolonial trade.<sup>278</sup> The following day, the Cape governor forwarded this information to Selborne, saying the current system fostered friction and distrust between “the various South African communities.”<sup>279</sup>

The Cape Government had asked Selborne to write a memorandum that explained “difficulties which confront British South African Colonies in the management of their own affairs, owing to

---

<sup>277</sup> C. Headlam, in C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers Volume II* (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1933), p. 453.

<sup>278</sup> L.S. Jameson, Minute No. 1/816, 1906-11-28, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 4.

<sup>279</sup> W. Hely-Hutchinson – Selborne, 1906-11-29, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 4.

the absence of any form of union between them.”<sup>280</sup> Selborne contacted Elgin seeking approval to publish the memorandum to prompt federation and to influence the Transvaal elections scheduled for January 1907. He clarified on 15 December, that several political candidates in the Transvaal “pledge themselves, out of sheer ignorance, to the simple, selfish Transvaal view of South African matters, and so handicap in advance the definite movement towards federation which will certainly be made next year or the year after by the Responsible Governments of South Africa.”<sup>281</sup> Selborne’s goal in publishing it was to ensure that a pro-federation administration formed in the Transvaal.<sup>282</sup>

Having overcome the objections of Elgin, who initially worried that it might be seen as inappropriate imperial intervention, Selborne completed a memorandum on federation, “A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies.” The memorandum in part addressed South Africa’s security and declared, “The primary function of the Imperial Power is to protect from foreign invasion the frontiers of all the countries united under the British flag”<sup>283</sup> and recommended “The creation of political machinery which will enable the Colonies to assume their due share in the control of foreign policy by undertaking their due share of the obligation of defence, is the ideal which more than one Imperial statesman has set as the problem for future solution.”<sup>284</sup> He also emphasised that federation would be beneficial in other spheres.

In Part IV of the memorandum, “Disunion as Affecting the Native and Labour Questions,” he pointed out that “the question of defence is a secondary problem, a mere adjunct and consequence of the primary problem of native policy.”<sup>285</sup> He argued that achieving a uniform policy toward blacks across the South African colonies was necessary, and unresolved inconsistencies in policy

---

<sup>280</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 807, p. 409: Selborne – Elgin, 1906-12-07, p. 409.

<sup>281</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 807, p. 409: Selborne – Elgin, 1906-12-15, p. 420.

<sup>282</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 807, p. 409: Selborne – Elgin, 1906-12-07, p. 409. For more on the Cape Government’s request for federation, see L.S. Jameson, Minute No. 1/816, 1906-11-28, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 4.

<sup>283</sup> Selborne, A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies, 1907-01-01, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 39.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*

would be “accidental if not disastrous in its effects.”<sup>286</sup>

Selborne dedicated most of the Memorandum to the railway networks and the role the federation would play in their amalgamation. The four colonies competed for their share of intercolonial trade because the trade revenue went to the colony through which the trade passed. As the High Commissioner later expounded to Hely-Hutchinson on 7 January 1907, federation would eliminate the “conflict of interests between the railway systems of Natal, of Cape Colony, and of the Orange River Colony. Nor would it any longer be to the interest of the Transvaal to lean exclusively towards Delagoa Bay.”<sup>287</sup> Selborne concluded by emphasising the need for a South African union to address all these issues.<sup>288</sup>

Throughout 1907, the South African colonies’ leaders – John X. Merriman for the Cape, Botha and Smuts for the Transvaal, and Marthinus T. Steyn for the Orange River Colony – exchanged letters discussing the Selborne Memorandum. Merriman and Steyn were suspicious of the Selborne Memorandum because they believed it was self-serving<sup>289</sup> and its excessive concern over “paltry trade squabbles” hinted that Milner’s Kindergarten might have been the real authors.<sup>290</sup> Merriman’s suspicion of Selborne only increased at Selborne’s recent attempts to oversee “a series of nominated conferences” to discuss the details of a future federation.<sup>291</sup> In May 1908, Selborne hosted an intercolonial conference to consider railway and customs concerns.<sup>292</sup> After the representatives failed to develop solutions to railway and customs issues they consented to move the colonies toward federation.<sup>293</sup>

---

<sup>286</sup> Selborne, A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies, 1907-01-01, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 40.

<sup>287</sup> Selborne – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1907-01-07, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 6.

<sup>288</sup> Selborne, A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies, 1907-01-01, in Selborne (ed.), *Papers relating to a Federation of the South African Colonies* (London: Darling & Son, Limited, 1907), p. 59.

<sup>289</sup> J.X. Merriman – M.T. Steyn, June 1907, in P. Lewsen (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman, 1905-1924* (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1969), p. 43.

<sup>290</sup> J.X. Merriman – M.T. Steyn, 1907-09-22, in P. Lewsen (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman, 1905-1924* (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1969), p. 50.

<sup>291</sup> J.X. Merriman – M.T. Steyn, June 1907, in P. Lewsen (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman, 1905-1924* (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1969), p. 43.

<sup>292</sup> L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 148-149.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*

## 5.2 Imperial defence, 1907-1909

As the challenges facing the British Empire increased, the British Government came to rely on the self-governing colonies and Dominions for support. This arrangement applied to the self-governing colonies of South Africa, whose capacity to fulfil this role depended on their successful unification. In 1907 and 1908, there was some doubt as to whether the South African colonies could support the Empire and provide for their own colonial defences.

The South Africa colonies decided to contribute as much as they could to the Empire's defence without bankrupting themselves. During the April to May 1907 Imperial Conference, the Transvaal, the Cape, and Natal considered combining their resources to increase their defence contributions' effectiveness. Then, the Cape and Natal's governments appealed to the Admiralty to create their own flotilla and naval volunteers. The Admiralty consented and promised to help the Cape and Natal organise their flotilla. Their combined efforts would reduce the Empire's costs while increasing the impact of their financial, as well as human contributions to South Africa's naval defence. During the same conference, Botha proposed a single defence system for South Africa because the Transvaal's location did not necessitate a navy. A centralised system would streamline the War Office's administration of imperial defence in South Africa. One system would also reduce the individual colonies and the British Government's costs and create a more comprehensive defence of South Africa. If the British Government agreed to this, Botha said "we shall be prepared to spend a large sum of money" to aid the Empire.<sup>294</sup> The ideas for defence and pooling resources that came out of the Imperial Conference would later serve as an impetus and a roadmap for defence under the union.<sup>295</sup>

During 1907, upon bestowing self-governing institutions on the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, it became increasingly clear that the British Government planned to reduce its aid to the South African colonies. By the end of 1907, the War Office acknowledged that it could no longer

---

<sup>294</sup> R. Jebb, *The Imperial Conference* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), p. 164.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165, 169; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'Transvaal and Orange River Colonies (Constitutions)', 17 December 1906, Vol. 167; The Orange River Colony was not present at the Conference because it was not yet a self-governing colony.

contribute to the colonies' defences for it was too expensive. On 7 November 1907, Elgin informed Selborne that the War Office planned to reduce British military presence in South Africa during the next five years. He explained it was only natural that reductions occurred when colonies received self-government.<sup>296</sup>

On 9 November, Selborne replied in dismay to Elgin. He asserted that the four separate colonies presented an atypical case, pointing to the recent Anglo-Boer War, the strong German military presence in the region, and the risk of African uprisings. He wrote, "We are passing through a very critical time, quite independently of existence of a German garrison in the sub-continent and of the possibility of native trouble, which are only important facts to be considered as part of the whole situation."<sup>297</sup> South Africa was on the cusp of federation and Selborne deemed the cutbacks' timing risky and inappropriate. To prevent the British Government from making this mistake, Selborne requested to be allowed to meet with the General Officer Commanding of South Africa "to make suggestions resulting in large administrative economies" as an alternative to decreasing the British military's presence.<sup>298</sup> Selborne had personal experience of the British Government's strategic anxieties when he had served as First Lord of the Admiralty during the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902) and the entente with France (1904).<sup>299</sup>

In August 1908, Selborne informed the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Crewe, about Prime Minister Louis Botha's defence concerns for the Transvaal. Botha feared the effects of the troop reductions on the Transvaal. During the Transvaal's first years of responsible government, Botha was sure that the Transvaal would not survive without the British Government, nor the other South African colonies' help. Botha emphasised that would be "a grave political error" if the British Government adhered to the proposed reductions and did not "hold their [the Transvaal's] hands."<sup>300</sup> To maintain the British garrison in the Transvaal, Botha proposed that Selborne ascertain how much it would cost to maintain British troops in the Transvaal. He said he was

---

<sup>296</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 874, p. 173: Elgin – Selborne, 1907-11-07, p. 173.

<sup>297</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 874, pp. 173-174: Selborne – Elgin, 1907-11-09, pp. 173-174.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 252.

<sup>300</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, pp. 96-97: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-08-10, pp. 96-97.

willing to negotiate with the British Government and would find a way to pay for British troops' maintenance.<sup>301</sup>

Botha's desire for British troops' continued presence went beyond using them for regular duties. He claimed that the future of a union was in danger. According to Selborne, "He [Botha] told me that Hollanders, Krugerites, and a large section of Predikants were engaged in a desperate intrigue against him and his policy of closer union and conciliation."<sup>302</sup> In effect Botha was attempting to lure the British Government into changing course by demonstrating that British military withdrawal presented a danger to unification. If the troops left, the union might not come to fruition.<sup>303</sup>

On 19 August, Crewe informed Selborne that the War Office planned to proceed with its plans for reductions in South Africa. In early September, Selborne discovered that the planned reductions were more troubling than he anticipated. The General Officer Commanding, Lord Methuen, revealed that "all, or almost all, reduction now being carried out will fall on Transvaal [sic]."<sup>304</sup> The War Office's logic mystified Selborne, mainly because the Botha had offered to pay the British Government for the troops' maintenance. He reminded Crewe of Botha's offer. On 20 September, Crewe informed Selborne that a continued presence by the British forces was impossible, and a committee convened to consider Botha's request ratified the decision.<sup>305</sup>

Selborne continued to protest the final decision for reductions in South Africa and the Transvaal by emphasising Botha's commitment to pay. He warned Crewe in a letter on 22 September 1908 that if Britain denied the offer, it would have "now and hereafter a very discouraging effect" on Botha and he might not offer financial contributions after the union's establishment.<sup>306</sup> With the

---

<sup>301</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, pp. 96-97: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-08-10, p. 97.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>304</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, p. 109: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-09-09, p. 109.

<sup>305</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, p. 101: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 1908-08-19, p. 101; TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, p. 109: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-09-09, p. 109; TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, p. 118: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 1908-09-20, p. 118.

<sup>306</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, pp. 118-119: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-09-22, p. 119.

National Convention only weeks away, the British Government could not reject the importance of this point.<sup>307</sup>

All that the Liberal Government had invested monetarily, in time spent negotiating, and expended in political capital during the past two years to ensure British supremacy in South Africa could have been all for nought. Not only would the relationship have been tattered, but also dissidents would have been able to challenge Botha and his decision to support federation. On 9 October, Selborne received promising news. Methuen informed him that the War Office would redistribute troops from Middelburg or Bloemfontein to resupply the garrison at Pretoria. Furthermore, the War Office was prepared to accept Botha's financial assistance offer.<sup>308</sup>

Imperial defence requirements partially motivated the British Government's decision to support South African unification. One of the promises of the union was that Britain could reduce its military presence in South Africa, which would decrease the British Government's expenses, while also securing a corner of the Empire as tensions in Europe mounted. In *The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910*, Leonard Thompson wrote, "In time of war the Suez Canal might be closed to the shipping of Britain and her allies, in which case the Cape route would reassume its former importance and a friendly, self-sufficient, united South Africa would be a vital asset."<sup>309</sup> With the possibility of a global war materialising, the British Government would depend on South Africa to defend Britain's shipping route along the Cape. A unified South Africa guaranteed the safety of the route.<sup>310</sup>

Britain had also needed monetary assistance to pay for eight dreadnoughts that the British Government proposed in April 1909, but Merriman refused to pay the British Government any more taxes. In Europe, Anglo-German tensions had led to a naval arms race. After the German navy received further funding in 1908, the British public, fearful of Germany closing the gap with Britain, demanded the British Government increase the number of dreadnoughts to eight for 1909.

---

<sup>307</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, pp. 118-119: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-09-22, p. 118.

<sup>308</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 900, pp. 127-128: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1908-10-09, p. 127.

<sup>309</sup> L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 398.

<sup>310</sup> A.B. Keith, *The Sovereignty of the British Dominions* (London: MacMillan & Co. Limited, 1929), pp. 135-136; B.M. Magubane, *The Making of a Racist State* (Trenton, NJ, U.S.A.: Africa World Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 278, 296; B. Porter, *The Lion's Share* (London: Pearson Longman Publishing, 2004), pp. 203-204.

To get Merriman and the other white South African leaders to help fund the Empire's defence, the British Government had promised to steer clear of South Africa's internal affairs.<sup>311</sup> This affected the constitutional rights of the non-European population within the Union. Plaut claimed this exchange sealed the fate of black political inclusion under the union.<sup>312</sup>

### 5.3 South Africa's security, 1902-1906

From 1902 onward, South Africa's security took on renewed importance to the British Government. While South Africa's purpose within the Empire had long been associated with its position along the trade route to India and the struggle with the Boer republics for control of the region's mineral wealth, a third objective was added – it now played a part in German containment because the British Government was at odds with Germany. German trade expansion into South Africa and GSWA's proximity to the Cape's rebellious northwest formed debating points in several of the British Parliament's sessions.<sup>313</sup>

On 17 October 1902, the War Office produced an eleven-page report about GSWA, including plans for a military invasion. D. Fasson's "Paper on Occupation of Swakopmund German South West Africa" provided the framework for the idea that British invasion of GWSA was contingent

---

<sup>311</sup> Debates in the Houses of Parliament in July and August 1909 – as well as correspondence between members of the British Government – indicated that some liberal Members of Parliament demanded a nonracial franchise modelled on the Cape. There were also moderate British politicians who would have preferred a nonracial franchise. However, South African unification was at stake. Many white South African politicians were unwilling to accept a constitution that they did not draft because they sought to ensure a nonracial franchise was not incorporated into the Union Constitution – something for which the British Government would have pressed. If the nonracial franchise became part of the Union Constitution, many white South African politicians threatened that South African unification would not occur. For unification to come to fruition, the British Government abided by the white South African politicians' stipulation that the British Government could not change the Union Constitution's substance. Consequently, the British Government was forced to accept the racial franchise in South Africa, except for the Cape. See United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'Native Affairs (South Africa)', 13 May 1908, Volume No. 188; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'South Africa Union Bill (Delegates and Government Conference)', 27 July 1909, Volume No. 8; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Lords, 'South Africa Bill', 27 July 1909, Volume No. 2; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Lords, 'South Africa Bill', 3 August 1909, Volume No. 2; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'Clause 35 – (Qualifications of Voters)', 19 August 1909, Volume No. 9.

<sup>312</sup> M. Plaut, *Promise and Despair* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., 2016), p. 104, 106; For more on the Anglo-German naval arms race, see R.K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (New York: Random House, 1991).

<sup>313</sup> United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'South Africa – Conduct of the War', 21 January 1902, Volume No. 101; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Commons, 'Class V', 15 July 1902, Volume No. 111; United Kingdom, *HPD*, House of Lords, 'Rhodesia', 11 August 1904, Volume No. 140.

upon Britain commencing a war against Germany. Another member of the War Office, D.M. Crowe, summarised Fasson's proposals, writing that "Swakopmund should be occupied by 1500 Mounted Infantry men from South Africa."<sup>314</sup> But for British and South African forces to successfully occupy all GSWA, they would need at least 3,000 troops. Fasson explained that GSWA had a small standing army with reservists and Boers, of whom the GSWA Government required service in GSWA's military since they resided in the colony. The War Office concluded that British and South African forces could easily take control over GSWA via Walvis Bay because they outnumbered German protectorate's forces.<sup>315</sup>

On 16 December 1902, Louis Mountbatten, the director of Naval Intelligence, concurred that Walvis Bay would be the most logical entry point because ships could bombard GSWA's defences and provide supplies to maintain the ground assault. Fasson and Mountbatten's proposals for the German protectorate later served as a basis for other plans to invade GSWA.<sup>316</sup>

The Colonial Office was equally concerned with the German presence in southern Africa. As part of his 14 December 1905 memorandum, Lord Selborne addressed the German factor in southern Africa. At several points, Selborne expressed, "I do view with anxiety the large accumulation of German troops in German South-West Africa and of armed Boers who are assisting them. There are certainly from 15,000 to 20,000 troops in German South-West Africa."<sup>317</sup> Although the German Government intended to use the troops to fight in the Herero and Nama Wars, they amassed close to the Cape border.

Three months later, a rumour abounded that 10,000 Boers were assisting the German forces at Steinkopf, GSWA. While the Boer force's size in GSWA was incorrect, Selborne conveyed to Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that their presence along the border "again

---

<sup>314</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6 A.9, pp. 63-65: D.M. Crowe, Introduction to 'Paper on Occupation of Swakopmund German South West Africa,' 1902-10-17, p. 63.

<sup>315</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6 A.9, pp. 66-77: D. Fasson, Paper on Occupation of Swakopmund German South West Africa, 1902-10-16, pp. 70-73, 75. Several documents from the National Archives at Kew contain spelling variations for "Walvis," including "Walfish" and "Walfisch."

<sup>316</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6 A.9, pp. 66-77: D. Fasson, Paper on Occupation of Swakopmund, 1902-10-16, pp. 70-73, 75; TNAK: WO 106/47, C LV/2110, p. 62: L. Mountbatten, Untitled Letter on the Invasion of German South-West Africa, 1902-12-16, p. 62.

<sup>317</sup> TNAK: CO 879/91, 812, pp. 588-592: Selborne, Memorandum, 1905-12-14, p. 591.

confirms the warnings” that the Germans could invade South Africa.<sup>318</sup> While this possibility unsettled Selborne, he acknowledged that Kaiser Wilhelm II had not expressly sent the troops to the German protectorate for invasion. Selborne proposed to the Colonial Office that GSWA should be surveilled so the South African colonies would be prepared in the event of an attack.<sup>319</sup>

In 1906, the War Office published the *Military Report on German South-West Africa*. The book contained extensive military intelligence on GSWA, including the geography and the German uniforms’ exact colours. Additionally, the report suggested invasion plans similar to those developed in 1902. Because this report existed alongside previous plans for invading GSWA, the British Government demonstrated its seriousness in executing an attack on GSWA. Furthermore, because the War Office maintained and updated an extensive collection of data on GSWA, the British Government showed concern for the German threat in southern Africa. The information helped the War Office assess the extent of the German threat in southern Africa and how South Africa could eliminate it.<sup>320</sup>

In June 1906, the War Office and the Foreign Office planned to employ a secret agent to spy along the Cape’s border with GSWA. Assistant Directorate of Military Operations Francis Davies wrote to Charles Hardinge at the Foreign Office, “I have an opportunity of obtaining the services of what I believe to be a good man to act as agent along the border of German S.W.A. [sic South-West Africa].”<sup>321</sup> Davies proposed using an intermediary to contact the secret agent and that the British Government could pay the agent per month. In response, Hardinge expressed support for the idea, but he deemed it unlikely that the Foreign Office would pay for the secret agent’s services. Instead, the Foreign Office suggested charging the colonial governments for the expense. As the British Empire’s resources stretched thinly after 1902, the British Government increasingly relied on the colonies to take on portions of collective imperial expenses, as well as their own individual expenses. In this case, the Foreign Office was keen to pass on the cost of employing a secret agent to the South African colonies because it was for their security. The War Office concurred. However, Davies preferred to use the agent to monitor illegal arms importation into South Africa.

---

<sup>318</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 820, p. 2: Selborne – Elgin, 1906-02-05, p. 2.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid*: TNAK: CO 879/91, 812, pp. 588-592: Selborne, Memorandum, 1905-12-14, pp. 591-592.

<sup>320</sup> TNAK: WO 33/416, *Military Report on German South-West Africa*, December 1906, p. 81.

<sup>321</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-6: F. Davies – C. Hardinge, 1906-06-08, p. 1.

He also wanted access to the agent so he could crosscheck intelligence from South Africa. The British Government wanted the benefits of the information without paying for the agent.<sup>322</sup>

That same month, the Cape Government requested the Colonial Office's aid in reducing border breaches along the Cape's frontier. On 11 June, Elgin permitted two army officers to liaise with the Cape Mounted Police at the border.<sup>323</sup>

The next day, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Grey approved Davies's request to hire a secret agent to spy on GSWA provided that the colonial governments paid for the agent. Grey also informed Davies that he was responsible for monitoring the agent to avoid any mishaps that might reveal the British Government's usage of spies.<sup>324</sup>

#### **5.4 The German threat to South Africa, 1907-1910**

Despite the alleviation of some tension that the Herero and Nama Wars' conclusion brought to the Cape's relationship with GSWA, as long as the Germans were present in southern Africa, the South African colonies (later, the Union of South Africa) remained cautious.

On 16 January 1907, Bernard Dernburg, the German Secretary for Colonial Affairs, announced that the German Government and financiers planned to develop GSWA. Specifically, they aimed to import German settlers to farm GSWA's southern section. They also hoped to make use of GSWA's mineral wealth. "Damaraland contains some of the richest copper deposits in the world, and in the northern districts indications of gold and diamonds have been found."<sup>325</sup> The most alarming news for the South African colonies was the German Government's planned updates for Swakopmund – "a fortified coaling station for vessels of the German Navy."<sup>326</sup> The investment would intensify the German naval presence in the region.

---

<sup>322</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-6: F. Davies – C. Hardinge, 1906-06-08, pp. 1, 3; TNAK: HD 3/131, pp. 1-10: F. Davies – C. Hardinge, 1906-06-08, pp. 1-3, 9-10.

<sup>323</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 820, p. 3: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 1906-06-11, p. 3.

<sup>324</sup> TNAK: HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge – F. Davies, 1906-06-12, p. 1.

<sup>325</sup> *TRDM*, 1907-01-16.

<sup>326</sup> *TRDM*, 1907-01-28.

On 6 May 1907, Dernburg, reacted to calls from the Reichstag to reduce the German troop presence in GSWA since the Herero and Nama Wars were coming to an end. The Reichstag was concerned that “the army was being maintained in South West Africa in view of probable international complications.”<sup>327</sup> Recently, the number of troops present had been reduced from 16,500 to 6,500 men. Dernburg claimed that the soldiers were there to maintain peace so Germany could “develop the resources of that Colony.”<sup>328</sup> He further justified the troops’ presence, explaining that the Cape had dedicated significant resources to subdue African uprisings in the past. If the Germans expected to assert control over GSWA, Dernburg conjectured that they would have to invest as much as the Cape had. In support of Dernburg’s assertion that the troops were not intended to cause an international incident, German Minister of the Interior Count Posadowsky “declared that the idea that the Government entertained sinister designs on the Cape was a fantastic supposition worthy of Jules Verne.”<sup>329</sup>

The British Empire remained acutely conscious of possible future instability on the Cape-German border. The War Office continued to collect data on GSWA, as well as develop plans for invading the territory. In May 1908, the General Staff at the War Office released *Addendum I*, an update of the 1906 *Military Report on German South-West Africa*. It recorded that there were 3,988 German troops in GSWA, which reflected a considerable decrease from the 1906 number when there had been 12,281 German troops. The reduction occurred because the Herero and Nama Wars had ended. However, the British decided to remain vigilant, and the War Office opted to continue its surveillance of GSWA.<sup>330</sup>

As agreed to at the May 1908 Intercolonial Conference, delegates from the South African colonies convened in October 1908 to draft a constitution for South African unification. The National Convention sat from October 1908 to May 1909, and its draft act of Union was ratified by the

---

<sup>327</sup> TRDM, 1907-05-06.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>330</sup> TNAK: WO 33/416, *Addendum I, May, 1908, The Military Report on German South-West Africa, 1906*, pp. 34, 35; The report was somewhat flawed. On page 35 of the report, the General Staff wrote that 9,342 troops had left South-West Africa. Based on the 1906 original numbers, after the 9,342 soldiers left there would have been 2,939 soldiers remaining in South-West Africa in 1908. This was different from the 3,988 soldiers remaining as stated in the 1908 report. In July 1907, the German Government claimed that it still required more troops to be sent to South-West Africa to full subdue the African population. See TRDM, 1907-07-15.

British Parliament,) receiving the Royal Assent from Edward VII on 20 September 1909. The completion of the process was met with relief by the British Government. Though matters of regional defence, border security, and the stability of the frontier with GSWA generally were second to issues within the British colonies (as were set out in the Selborne Memorandum) in driving the movement to unification, inter-imperial relations with Germany were a factor in this process.

In February 1908, John X. Merriman became the Cape's prime minister as the result of a coalition between his party, the South African Party, and the Afrikaner Bond. On 19 January 1909, Hely-Hutchinson wrote to Merriman that the German presence in the region made him weary. Though GSWA's forces had dwindled since the end of the Herero and Nama Wars, Hely-Hutchinson and Merriman both believed that the Germans might launch a raid from GSWA in the near future. This created a major incentive for the Cape to join the unification process: if additional German troops arrived in the region it would struggle to repel an invasion.<sup>331</sup>

By then, Methuen had commenced planning for South Africa's defence requirements against GSWA. On 19 January 1909, he met with Selborne, Hely-Hutchinson, and Admiral Sir George Egerton to discuss the Cape Colony's preparations in case GSWA attacked.<sup>332</sup> Hely-Hutchinson proposed to assemble "a naval force at the Simonstown base" to attack GSWA at Angra Pequena.<sup>333</sup> The other committee members concurred.

In Europe, German aggression and shipbuilding were causing alarm in Britain. On a previous occasion, Lord Methuen, the General Officer Commanding for South Africa, had written to the War Office to request funding for an intelligence officer, Captain Simon, to monitor German activity at GSWA's border with the Cape. On 22 January 1909, Director of Military Operations Sir John Spencer Ewart, and J.E. Edmonds in Military Defence agreed to the measure in line with the 1906 decision referred to earlier.<sup>334</sup>

---

<sup>331</sup> TNAK: CO 879/106, 925, pp. 107-108: W. Hely-Hutchinson – J.X. Merriman, 1909-01-19, p. 108.

<sup>332</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 9139, p. 51: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 1909-02-16, p. 51; J.E. Edmonds ruled out a GSWA attack on the Cape for the moment. *See* TNAK: WO 106/47, p. 27: J.E. Edmonds – J.S. Ewart, 1909, p. 27.

<sup>333</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 9139, p. 51: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 1909-02-16, p. 51.

<sup>334</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 9139, pp. 6-7: J.S. Ewart – Methuen, 1909-01-22, p. 6; TNAK: WO 106/47, p. 27: J.E. Edmonds – J.S. Ewart, 1909, p. 27.

Ewart, however, also informed Methuen that Britain intended to move imperial troops from South Africa to “some more important theatre” due to increasing tensions with Germany:<sup>335</sup> “It seems therefore desirable that you should approach the question of possible hostilities in connection with German South-West Africa with the assumption that only Colonial troops would be available.”<sup>336</sup>

On 2 March of that same year, Methuen gathered information on the Cape’s military strength and reported it to Selborne. He deemed the Colony’s defences satisfactory, but he recommended waiting “until the Union Parliament of the near future appoints a Defence Committee” to address a coordinated South African defence strategy.<sup>337</sup>

Six days later, Methuen completed a document titled “Notes on the Preparation of a Plan of Operations against the German Forces in South-West Africa.”<sup>338</sup> His assessment was that the colonies would not be able to carry out large-scale operations because the military was not centralised, and the colonies did not have enough troops for defensive and offensive actions simultaneously. He estimated that this situation would only be remedied after the unification process was complete.<sup>339</sup>

On 4 April 1909, Colonel Sir John Adye at the War Office also counselled Director of Military Operations Ewart in favour of defusing tensions on the border because a number of the British troops stationed in South Africa were “already ear-marked for employment in Egypt.”<sup>340</sup> As to the threat posed by GSWA, Adye surmised that the protectorate had 5,000 men at its immediate disposal, and he concluded that this “does not suggest a serious invasion of our territory.”<sup>341</sup> Although he believed that the German forces might carry out an isolated raid in the North-West

---

<sup>335</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 9139, pp. 6-7: J.S. Ewart – Methuen, 1909-01-22, p. 6.

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>337</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 9139, p. 51: Methuen – Selborne, 1909-03-02, p. 51.

<sup>338</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, G.S.S. 15, pp. 10-14: Methuen, Notes on the Preparation of a Plan of Operations against the German Forces in South-West Africa, 1909-03-08.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 11-12, 14.

<sup>340</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 079/2455, pp. 36-37: J. Adye – J.S. Ewart, 1909-04-04, p. 36.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

Cape. He also asserted that GSWA could take over Walvis Bay easily, given its isolation from the other British territories, but his verdict was that only minor military actions should be expected.<sup>342</sup>

In May 1909, Major Adrian Grant Duff rebuked Methuen, saying he had overstepped his brief by sharing his plans with the British and Cape governments. Duff advised that secrecy now needed to be observed to avoid an international incident. The War Office also revoked Methuen's ability to select war plans and transferred the responsibility to Selborne, guaranteeing that Methuen could no longer interfere in Britain's foreign affairs.<sup>343</sup>

The War Office continued to watch GSWA and consider future South African-led military operations. As Colonel Adye explained to an undercover member of Military Operations, 'M.O.2', that "German S.W. Africa is a growing inconvenience to our Colonies and it is I think probable that it will be necessary to eliminate its powers of mischief as soon as possible after an outbreak of war."<sup>344</sup> To defeat GSWA in the future, Adye advocated that South Africa strengthen its military intelligence.<sup>345</sup>

As of 1909, the Orange River boundary question had not yet been settled.<sup>346</sup> During the final steps of the South Africa Act's approval in July 1909, the Foreign Office wrote an extensive despatch to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin. The Foreign Office set out detailed terms of what the Cape Government demanded, namely "landing facilities on the north bank and a monopoly on the ferrying trade on the river" and sovereignty over the islands located in the middle of the river.<sup>347</sup> These were steep terms. The GSWA Government was unlikely to find them acceptable.

---

<sup>342</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, 079/2455, pp. 36-37; J. Adye – J.S. Ewart, 1909-04-04, pp. 36-37; TNAK: WO 106/47, pp. 39-45; J.S. Ewart, *War with Germany: Operations in South Africa*, 1909-04-16.

<sup>343</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.7, pp. 29-33; A.G. Duff, *Précis of Correspondence on the Subject of Military Operations against German S.W. Africa*, 1909-05-03, pp. 32-33.

<sup>344</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.3, p. 1; J. Adye – M.O.2., 1909-05-11, p. 1.

<sup>345</sup> TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.9, pp. 54-58; Memorandum on Military Policy in a War with German in S. Africa, May 1909; TNAK: WO 106/47, pp. 78-132; *German South West Africa*, 1910-04-18; TNAK: WO 33/416, *Addendum II., October, 1910, The Military Report on German South-West Africa, 1906*; TNAK: WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.3, p. 1; J. Adye – M.O.2., 1909-05-11, p. 1.

<sup>346</sup> TNAK: WO 33/416, *Addendum II., October, 1910, The Military Report*, p. 9.

<sup>347</sup> TNAK: WO 181/208, 23472, p. 1; Foreign Office – J.F.C. de Salis, July 1909, p. 1.

In August 1909, the Cape Government accepted that the Orange River boundary question was an issue that could be resolved locally. H.W. Just reported to the Foreign Office, “Mr. Merriman expressed the view that the question should remain over to be dealt with by the South African Union Government.”<sup>348</sup>

Meanwhile, on 10 September 1910, Lord Methuen spoke to a crowd in Hoopstad as part of a tour of the Free State. He was campaigning to improve South Africa’s defences. While he at present did not suspect an immediate danger emanating from GSWA or from Africans, he expounded that it was better to be prepared for the eventuality. At the moment, he asserted that South Africa was not adequately prepared for a defensive effort. Methuen called on the Union Government to create volunteer forces, a cadet corps, and a military college so South Africa could combat fresh threats.<sup>349</sup>

The new South African Government looked to use its newfound power to engage in negotiations and finally end the Orange River boundary question. On 20 December 1910, Governor-General Herbert Gladstone informed Lord Crewe of South Africa’s objectives in the talks with GSWA. He wrote that Louis Botha’s government wanted to go further than the Cape ever had, by proposing that the desert-like area “immediately north of the Orange River makes it unsuitable for agricultural or industrial occupation at present, and forms a natural buffer between the territory of the Union and the German settlements to the north of the Orange River.”<sup>350</sup> This represented the Union Government’s tentative agreement in March 1908 that the border was the midpoint, or thalweg, of the Orange River.<sup>351</sup> Not only would adopting the desert as a buffer between South Africa and GSWA make marking the boundary simpler, but it would also make “the Union Government the legal authority in respect of the Orange River instead of the British Government as heretofore.”<sup>352</sup> If the Union Government successfully negotiated this point, GSWA’s nearly decade-long challenge to the Cape’s border would conclude.

---

<sup>348</sup> TNAK: WO 181/208, 23472, p. 1: H.W. Just – Foreign Office, 1909-08-25, p. 1.

<sup>349</sup> *TRDM*, 1910-09-10.

<sup>350</sup> TNAK: CO 879/104, 948, p. 143: H. Gladstone – Lord Crewe, 1910-12-20, p. 143.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*

As the South African colonies progressed toward unification and the Union of South Africa was established, the primary sources of motivation were at once intercolonial and economic. Imperial defence and the threat GSWA posed to the South African colonies' security were secondary. It just so happened that by transferring autonomy to the future Union of South Africa would reduce the British Empire's military – and therefore, financial – obligations in southern Africa. Also on the minds of colonial authorities was GSWA. While the German Government claimed that it was withdrawing troops from GSWA and appeared to be taking a less aggressive posture, the Germans were increasing the regional temperature by facilitating improvements to Swakopmund. South African and British authorities were also increasing tensions by preparing South Africa's defences against GSWA.

## CHAPTER VI DIAMOND DISCOVERIES AND OTHER INTERCOLONIAL COOPERATION, 1907-1910

This chapter reconsiders South Africa's economic relationship with South-West Africa after the discovery of diamonds at Lüderitzbucht in 1908. Controversies raised by that discovery included the fate of previous mining claims of individual South Africans held in GSWA, diamond smuggling, and competition between the colonies over labour. Other aspects of the colonies' economic relationship are also discussed, including the impact of a locust plague in southern Africa and the growing trade in non-mineral resources between GSWA and the Cape. Lastly, the chapter also shows how the Cape's efforts to police the frontier and uphold the law secured the colony's sovereignty and improved relations with GSWA.

### 6.1 Diamond discovery in German South-West Africa, 1908-1910

Leading up to 1908, while independent mine owners had found tin and copper, they had been unable to find gold and diamonds in large amounts.<sup>353</sup> Before the April 1908 diamond discovery, South African opinion remained sceptical about GSWA's economic potential. In an article on 16 January 1907, the *Rand Daily Mail* observed that German opinion was overconfident in the colony's diamondiferous potential, though it added "no feeling of international jealousy will prevent the British States wishing the Germans success."<sup>354</sup>

On 14 April 1908, miners found a wealth of diamonds outside Lüderitzbucht, after which further finds of diamonds occurred in various locations, including near Franshenrikue Bay, Osterkliffs, Sylvia Hill, and Pomona. Accessing the diamonds was not labour-intensive because unlike diamonds found in the Transvaal and the Cape, the Lüderitzbucht diamonds were "embedded in loose sand and gravel in valleys resembling river beds" and only required a sieve to excavate.<sup>355</sup> One account in the *Rand Daily Mail* boasted, "The diamonds are so plentiful that in some places [that] by scratching about the surface with a penknife, a couple of match-boxes can be filled by

---

<sup>353</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 195; *TRDM*, 1908-06-25; M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p. 197.

<sup>354</sup> *TRDM*, 1907-01-16.

<sup>355</sup> *TRDM*, 1908-12-29.

one person in half a day.”<sup>356</sup> Initially, German settlers and the South African colonies doubted whether Lüderitzbucht would yield enough diamonds to sustainably support GSWA, but despite the risk of failure, miners pegged claims and syndicates formed. Many found success and this enabled the GSWA Government to invest in copper mines, railway construction, and agriculture.<sup>357</sup>

By 1 June 1909, the *Cape Argus*'s correspondent at Lüderitzbucht told readers, “the discovery of diamonds in the colony [GSWA] is one of the richest finds that have ever been made in the history of the world’s mining record.”<sup>358</sup> Even though the GSWA Government introduced an investment barrier – stipulating that capital had to pass through “a German channel” – smaller British financiers readily invested in German diamond mines expecting them to pay dividends.<sup>359</sup> Larger Johannesburg firms did not partake, and refused to surrender control of their capital, while some German investors also withheld their capital, preferring to invest in the Transvaal’s financially sound gold mines. Larger South African firms and German investors waited for the GSWA Government to permit British capital to run the diamond mines profitably before they waded in.<sup>360</sup>

In July and August 1909, South African mining firms attempted to open GSWA to South African capital. On 20 July 1909, the South African Territories (Ltd.), which possessed claims in GSWA dating back to at least 1900, announced that it had “issued a large number of prospecting licenses through their various agencies” to interested individuals.<sup>361</sup> The GSWA Government sought to control who could mine in the colony out of fear that GSWA’s chance for economic growth would diminish if too many miners flooded the diamond market. Berlin and the GSWA Government wanted to ensure a German monopoly on GSWA’s diamonds. News reached Johannesburg on 20 August 1909 that GSWA had passed legislation to guarantee that the diamonds remained German property. *The Rand Daily Mail* was disgusted and criticised the Germans for blocking foreign

---

<sup>356</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-08-13.

<sup>357</sup> H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 197; P. Prein, Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(1), March 1994, p. 105; *TRDM*, 1908-12-29; *TRDM*, 1909-07-09; *TRDM*, 1909-07-24; *TRDM*, 1909-08-13.

<sup>358</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-06-01.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>361</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-07-20.

claims, but six days later, De Beers attempted to profit from the prospective diamond boom by offering “£100,000 for the right to prospect for diamonds on the South West African Company’s properties.”<sup>362</sup> The German Colonial Office turned them down because Dernburg had already transferred the rights to the South African Territories, Limited’s subsidiary firm.<sup>363</sup>

The German decision to exercise custodianship over the new discoveries created an issue over the future of pre-existing mining claims in GSWA. A Cape Town-based mining firm, Messrs. Depass, Spence, and Company, owned claims near Pomona, a town approximately 40 miles south of Lüderitzbucht. On 26 August 1909, the company alleged that it had retained the rights since the 1850s. However, German authorities denied the company access to its claims to ensure diamonds mined remained in German control. The GSWA Government sought control over the number of diamonds mined to maintain diamond prices favourable to the German mining companies. The Foreign Office took up the matter with the German authorities because the company’s claims were legitimate and several Cape Town residents had invested in the company.<sup>364</sup>

Several instances of diamond smuggling from GSWA to the Cape also ensued following initial discoveries. German authorities repeatedly alleged that African labourers from the Cape stole diamonds on the job and supplied the illicit trade, but the Cape authorities would prove keen to apprehend diamond smugglers to tighten up the Northwest Cape and to generate goodwill with the German authorities for the sake of good intercolonial economic relations. On 26 November 1908, a judge in the Cape forced a jury to convict an African for contravening the Diamond Trade Act, which penalised diamond theft in the Cape. The jury disagreed that the law applied to the man because he had stolen “nine rough diamonds” from GSWA, not the Cape.<sup>365</sup> Regardless, the judge sentenced the man to “two years’ hard labour.”<sup>366</sup> On 24 August 1909, German officials arrested Heinrich Kamp at Princess Bay, GSWA.

When told he was a prisoner, Mr. Kamp, who was on his way back to Capetown, treated it as a joke, but the warrant was produced. Kamp’s luggage was searched,

---

<sup>362</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-08-20.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid*; *TRDM*, 1909-08-13.

<sup>364</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-01-05; *TRDM*, 1909-02-19; *TRDM*, 1909-11-06; *TRDM*, 1909-08-26.

<sup>365</sup> *TRDM*, 1908-11-26.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid*.

and the officials took possession of a package alleged to contain diamonds which were sealed up.<sup>367</sup>

Kamp was found guilty of diamond theft.

## 6.2 Intercolonial labour competition, 1907-1910

During the Herero and Nama Wars, the Cape's Coloured and African populations were employed as labourers by the German military when the colony could not use Hereros, Nama, and Ovambo to fill the positions. But this demand for labour ended when the wars concluded in 1907. The GSWA Government shifted to infrastructural development and sought to update and expand existing railway lines, chiefly between Windhuk and Swakopmund, as well as the Lüderitz line. Bachstein-Koppel was charged with carrying out the projects. The influx of revenue collected from the 1908 diamond boom made these infrastructure projects possible. Bachstein-Koppel sent licenced recruiters to Cape Town and the Eastern Cape.<sup>368</sup> Blacks from the Cape responded, filling GSWA's labour requirements until GSWA authorities had to pause labourer migration at the border in October 1908. Recruitment resumed the following year. In March 1910, Bachstein-Koppel's recruiters in Cape Town and East London sought 9,000 labourers for further railway projects in GSWA.<sup>369</sup>

In conjunction with recruiting blacks from the Cape for railway projects, German mining companies also sought black labourers from the Cape for diamond mines in GSWA. In January 1909, *The Rand Daily Mail* expounded that German mining companies employed Cape labourers instead of GSWA African labourers because they believed "the Hottentot [German Africans] is inferior as a mine-worker."<sup>370</sup> As had been the case between 1902 and 1904, German companies favoured Cape labourers because they were already familiar with mining.<sup>371</sup>

---

<sup>367</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-08-24.

<sup>368</sup> The Cape Government enforced "licensing of agents and runners" so that there would be fewer cases of injustices toward Cape workers. See W. Beinart, 'Jamani': Cape Workers in German South-West Africa, 1904-12, in W. Beinart and C. Bundy (eds.), *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1987), p. 175.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 173-179.

<sup>370</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-01-05.

<sup>371</sup> See Chapter II: Postwar, 1902-1904.

In 1910, the steady exodus of black labour to GSWA contributed to a labour shortage in the Transvaal and the Cape. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association's June 1910 report revealed that the total number of labour recruits had fallen from 18,873 in April 1910 to 14,215 in May 1910.<sup>372</sup> The Transvaal's mines now depended on the Cape to provide the necessary labour. However, the Cape could not fill the labour void – despite the Chairman of the Rand Mines' protests – in part because it would not revoke GSWA's labour recruiting licences until the Union Parliament convened following the Union's establishment on 31 May 1910.<sup>373</sup>

Even if the Cape Government had been in the position to curtail or revoke recruitment licences, one labour recruiter for the Transvaal Mines Labour Company, A.E. Wilson, doubted it would remedy the domestic shortage. He knew the Rand's gold mines could not offer a wage that matched or exceeded the mythically high wages promised to Cape labourers in GSWA. *The Rand Daily Mail* estimated that the Cape's workers sent home £1,500 in December 1908.<sup>374</sup> Nor could the Rand's mines compete with the above ground mining conditions available in GSWA's diamond fields. In April 1910, Wilson initiated a request for J.X. Merriman to refuse GSWA recruiter licences, but Merriman failed to respond. On 17 May 1910, South African mining companies protested the Cape's pro-GSWA licencing programme because GSWA had not offered labourers to South Africa in return. In response, "the Cape Government has warned the German recruiting agents that after the end of the present year no further recruiting will be allowed for other than Union territories," though licenses already issued would remain valid for the remainder of the year.<sup>375</sup>

### 6.3 Intercolonial cooperation, 1908-1909

Aside from minor flashpoints following the diamond discovery, GSWA and the South African colonies pursued generally mutually beneficial economic relationships. On 5 January 1909, *The Rand Daily Mail* interviewed an expert from Cape Town, Professor Paul Hahn. He expected Cape

---

<sup>372</sup> *TRDM*, 1910-06-13.

<sup>373</sup> W. Beinart, 'Jamani': Cape Workers in German South-West Africa, 1904-12, in W. Beinart and C. Bundy (eds.), *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1987), p. 179.

<sup>374</sup> *TRDM*, 1910-04-14.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid*; *TRDM*, 1910-04-02; *TRDM*, 1910-05-17.

Town would supply fruit, vegetables, and horses to GSWA's mines, as well as benefit from "trade in wine and in other Cape produce."<sup>376</sup> In 1908 alone, the South African colonies had exported 278 horses to GSWA that were worth £7,679. This was nearly double the number of horses sent to Britain, British East Africa, Madagascar, Portuguese East Africa, and Portuguese West Africa combined.<sup>377</sup> He also suggested that miners might seek Cape Town "as their holiday place."<sup>378</sup>

By August 1909, demand for Cape goods showed every sign of continual increase. Allegedly, the cargo ship, *Hippomenes*, had doubled its weight. It now brought 1,250 tons worth of "general merchandise and timber" to Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund.<sup>379</sup>

On 11 April 1910, John W. Jagger, the president of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, informed members that the outlook of Cape Town's trade with GSWA continued to trend upward. Unlike South Africa's mining firms who expressed dissatisfaction over the issue, Jagger was delighted, and explained that Cape labourers helped expand the German mines' productivity, which drove demand for goods from the Cape.<sup>380</sup>

The cordial relations between the colonies were also highlighted during moments of crisis. Each year, locusts hatched and devastated crops irrespective of borders. In May 1907, Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa, organised a meeting that included government entomologists, a chief locust officer, the South African colonies' leaders, and other colonial representatives, including Lieutenant Alberto Cezar Graça for Mozambique and Consul General Francke for GSWA. Smuts served as the conference's chairperson. Recently, "there had been everywhere an almost unprecedented plague of locusts."<sup>381</sup>

The locusts' damage to crops had been tremendous, but attendees reckoned that the situation could have been worse if the British, German, and Portuguese colonies had not acted jointly to combat the plague. The various colonies had studied the locusts' life cycle and were coordinating when

---

<sup>376</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-01-05.

<sup>377</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-09-04.

<sup>378</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-01-05.

<sup>379</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-08-20.

<sup>380</sup> *TRDM*, 1910-04-14.

<sup>381</sup> *TRDM*, 1907-05-18.

and where to use “arsenite of soda” to exterminate locusts in their colonies to ensure adequate crop yields.<sup>382</sup> Selborne emphasised all the colonies “would be guilty of criminal neglect if they did not one and all endeavour to grapple with the problem.”<sup>383</sup> He was gratified to know that Mozambique and GSWA were willing to aid the South African colonies in bringing an end to the plague.

#### **6.4 Policing the frontier and upholding the law, 1907-1910**

In 1906, the GSWA Government had criticised the Cape Government for not doing enough to prevent Herero and Nama fighters from moving across the frontier. The Cape authorities’ ability to thwart attempts to smuggle arms and ammunition destined for African resistance fighters in GSWA also drew German reproach. In 1907, the Cape Government showed signs of learning from GSWA’s criticism and began to assert its sovereignty along its frontier with GSWA. One such previously mentioned case was the Cape Mounted Police’s role in killing Marenga in September 1907.<sup>384</sup>

On 24 January 1907, the German Consul General awarded Corporal Pinnook and Trooper Walker of the Cape Mounted Police at “Port Nolloth with a gold watch and chain and a pair of binoculars respectively.”<sup>385</sup> While patrolling between the Orange River and Richtersveld, they had blocked an ammunition shipment from crossing the frontier. The shipment had been destined for African resistance fighters in GSWA. German authorities were particularly impressed because the operation had only required two troopers to carry out.<sup>386</sup>

Pinnook and Walkers’ action against the illicit ammunition supply were part of a greater effort to prevent weapons from reaching GSWA. The Cape Government had refused to grant ammunition permits to anyone in the district, largely because Ferreira’s Raid remained fresh in the Cape authorities’ memories. As a result of the Cape Government’s efforts, only pre-existing supplies of

---

<sup>382</sup> *TRDM*, 1907-05-18.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>384</sup> For more on the praise the Cape Mounted Police garnered before Marenga’s death in September 1907, see *TRDM*, 1907-08-20. See *TRDM*, 1907-11-07 for the German authorities’ gratitude for the Cape Mounted Police’s aid in killing Marenga.

<sup>385</sup> *Cape Times*, 1907-01-24.

<sup>386</sup> Pinnook and Walker were two of three Cape Mounted Police troopers stationed at Port Nolloth.

older ammunition were available in the area. While smugglers brought older ammunition to the African resistance fighters across the border, it did not concern the Cape authorities. As previous smuggling activity revealed, most of the Cape's ammunition was not compatible with German weapons unless corresponding weapons also entered GSWA.<sup>387</sup>

Another incident that pressed the Cape Government to assert its authority along the GSWA border was Rolf's Raid. Abraham Rolf was one of about seventeen Bondelswarts who had been labourers on a railway construction project in GSWA in 1907. They despised the work and German rule, so they escaped service and conducted raids against Germans and some Ovambo.

In "Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915," Philipp Prein referred to Rolf and his comrades as "bandits," and claimed that to call them "radical anti-colonial rebels" would be too "reductionist."<sup>388</sup> However, their actions indicated otherwise. During the last week of December 1908, Rolf and nineteen raiders ambushed a camp of German workers at Vettkloof. One of the raiders, Jan April, shot an unarmed German soldier in "the arm and body."<sup>389</sup> Another raider shot a German worker "through the head."<sup>390</sup> The raiders left all but one man dead, Max Humphreys, who they took hostage. On their way to Fontein Kloof, Rolf and his comrades killed another German soldier and took possession of his supply cart.

The day following his abduction, Humphreys alleged that Rolf, Isaac Petrus and Gert Swartbooi had led an attack on a German military station, killing approximately eight soldiers (the account was second-hand: Humphreys had not been near the action) after which they robbed a German store at Blaauwfontein. About 25 German soldiers stationed at Klipdam responded and pursued the raiders until the raiders slipped into the mountains near Keetmanshoop.<sup>391</sup>

According to a contemporary account in *United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal*, the raiders killed six farm workers and a Boer near Warmbad around the same time. In Rietfontein,

---

<sup>387</sup> *Cape Times*, 1907-01-24.

<sup>388</sup> P. Prein, Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(1), March 1994, p. 106.

<sup>389</sup> *Cape Times*, 1909-06-29.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*

the Cape Mounted Police caught up with Rolf's raiders and apprehended some of them before they escaped across the frontier.<sup>392</sup>

On 30 December 1908, Sub-Inspector Arthur Mander of the Cape Mounted Police at Rietfontein received a fresh lead and "sent out a patrol"<sup>393</sup> that followed the tracks toward Bechuanaland but did not find the raiders until 1 January 1909 on a farm near Rietfontein. The following day, Rolf and his raiders surrendered to the magistrate of Rietfontein, once Mander guaranteed that they "would receive fair treatment from the Colonial Government."<sup>394</sup> Upon their arrest the Cape authorities recovered rifles and "and about 100 rounds of ball ammunition."<sup>395</sup> Following the raiders' apprehension, "Official notification was received from Berlin... gratefully acknowledging the assistance of the Cape Colony in suppressing the bands of native who were recently devastating the British-German frontier."<sup>396</sup>

Allegedly, Rolf, who served under Marenga, and the raiders attempted to rendezvous with Simon Kooper and 300 African resistance fighters as part of a larger operation against German forces. Following the raiders' arrest, Cape authorities were confident that they had eliminated the chance of further disturbances. They had created a volunteer service in Upington to augment the Cape Mounted Police's efforts.<sup>397</sup>

In June 1909, the First Police Court held a hearing to decide if the Cape Government would extradite the raiders. The Crown prosecution's case depended on proving that the raiders understood that the GSWA Government campaigns against the Herero and Nama had concluded. Because the Crown prosecution could not prove the point, the hearing was inconclusive and the case proceeded to the Cape's Supreme Court.<sup>398</sup>

---

<sup>392</sup> L. Hamilton, The German Colonies in 1909, *United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal* 1, January 1910, p. 404.

<sup>393</sup> *Cape Times*, 1909-06-29.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>396</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-01-08.

<sup>397</sup> *Cape Times*, 1909-01-19. The same appeared in *TEPH*, 1909-01-22; *TRDM*, 1909-02-09.

<sup>398</sup> *Cape Times*, 1909-06-29.

On 27 August 1909, *The Rand Daily Mail* reported that “The Court held that the crimes with which the prisoners were charged were not political, and that they were marauders, not patriots. Therefore, the prisoners were extraditable under the treaty with Germany.”<sup>399</sup> The Cape Government sent Rolf and his raiders to GSWA and in October 1909, the German authorities executed the men at Keetmanshoop.<sup>400</sup>

Between 1907 and 1910, the relationship between GSWA and the South African colonies was mostly collegial. Aside from competition for labourers and disputes over land claims brought on by the Lüderitzbucht diamond discovery, South Africa and GSWA collaborated. The diamond industry brought economic prosperity to the Cape. Additionally, the two entities worked together to end the locust plague and the Cape asserted itself in the region to secure its shared border for GSWA’s benefit and to safeguard the Cape’s sovereignty.

---

<sup>399</sup> *TRDM*, 1909-08-27.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid*; P. Prein, African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(1), March 1994, p. 106.

## Chapter VII

### THE POST-UNIFICATION RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, 1911-1914

From 1911 until June 1914, relations between South Africa and GSWA featured elements of both cooperation and conflict. Whereas the two territories sought to jointly control the diamond industry, coordinate the arrest of smugglers, and secure the border against African resistance fighters, the ostrich feather industry generated competition between them, while German attempts to renegotiate South African ownership of Walvis Bay also became a flashpoint and received a hostile response.

#### 7.1 Developments in 1911

In 1911, the United States Department of Commerce reported that South Africa owned 746,736 ostriches, of which the Cape contributed 97.5 percent. At the time, Americans purchased approximately “£900,000 worth of feathers” annually, and it was South Africa’s second largest agricultural export.<sup>401</sup> On 29 March 1911, the Union Parliament addressed the issue of the ostrich trade with GSWA. The Minister of the Interior, Jan Smuts, reported that the Cape had shipped 200 ostriches to GSWA via Prieska. Some House of Assembly members – including Schoeman of Oudtshoorn, Vincent of Mossel Bay, and Van Niekerk of Boshof – objected to the trade because they wanted to protect the Cape’s ostrich feather industry.<sup>402</sup> The above members sought to ensure the Cape maintained its monopoly on the market.<sup>403</sup>

During the Union Parliament’s debate on the 1911 Estimates on 3 April, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick warned that if the Union Government did not develop the ostrich feather industry and take protectionist measures, “German South-West [Africa] with the best birds we could supply” would threaten South Africa’s ostrich feather industry.<sup>404</sup> Members from the Cape meanwhile warned of the overproduction of ostrich feathers. Accordingly, Fitzpatrick and Cape members of the

---

<sup>401</sup> *TRDM*, 1911-04-01.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>403</sup> *TRDM*, 1911-03-30; J. Homs, *Markets for Agricultural Implements and Machinery in South Africa* (United States: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 110-111. In November 1910, ostrich farmers and angora goat herders passed a resolution to request the Union Government to prohibit further exportation to GSWA. *See TRDM*, 1910-11-25.

<sup>404</sup> *TRDM*, 1911-04-04.

Assembly sought to pass the Ostrich Exportation Prohibition Bill to protect the Cape's industry by ensuring the Union Government did not send any more ostriches to GSWA.<sup>405</sup>

On 6 April, Charles Weidner criticised the bill in a letter to the *Cape Times*' editor in which he charged that GSWA had no intention of interrupting South Africa's ostrich feather industry. To prove that GSWA had respected South Africa's industry and had been neighbourly, he cited ordinances passed by the GSWA Government on 15 February 1909 and 8 May 1910 that limited the colony's ostrich exportation to the Union. Weidner's principal argument was not with the Union Government, which wished to cooperate with the GSWA Government, but with Fitzpatrick and the Cape politicians who were determined to pursue a confrontational course.<sup>406</sup>

The Union Parliament's Estimates also looked to allocate £1,620 to the development of the ostrich feather industry in the Transvaal, the Free State (formerly the Orange River Colony), and Natal.<sup>407</sup> The Union Parliament approved these funds, but it ultimately rejected the Ostrich Exportation Prohibition Bill.

During the first five months of 1911, German authorities also disputed Walvis Bay's boundaries. Since 1884, the harbour had been part of the Cape and it was brought under South Africa upon unification. The Germans believed this provided an opportune moment to seek the incorporation of the territory's only deep-water harbour. Spain arbitrated the dispute but in May 1911, ruled "in favour of Britain."<sup>408</sup>

## 7.2 Developments in 1912

In February 1912, South Africa learned that the British Government had decided to enter negotiations to de-escalate its naval armament race with Germany. By 7 February 1912, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Haldane, embarked for Berlin to present a memorandum of terms

---

<sup>405</sup> TRDM, 1911-04-04.

<sup>406</sup> *Cape Times*, 1911-04-13.

<sup>407</sup> TRDM, 1911-04-04; The *Cape Times* reported the amount allocated would be £1,000. See *Cape Times*, 1911-04-04.

<sup>408</sup> I. Griffiths, Walvis Bay: enclave no more, *Geography* 79(4), October 1994, p. 354.

to the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg.<sup>409</sup> One term of the memorandum that prickled South Africa's concern was:

England sincerely desires not to interfere with German Colonial expansion. To give effect to this she is prepared forthwith to discuss whatever the German aspirations in that direction may be. England will be glad to know that there is a field or special points where she can help Germany.<sup>410</sup>

As part of this clause, the British Government discussed the possibility of arranging “an exchange of territory in Africa for the purpose of ‘shop-window dressing’...a most effective way of removing the widespread impression amongst Germans that we [the British] grudged them any and every place under the sun.”<sup>411</sup> The British Government considered ceding Walvis Bay to GSWA as part of the de-escalation agreement.<sup>412</sup>

On 19 February, *The Rand Daily Mail* expressed its dismay at the British Government's concession, warning that Walvis Bay could easily become “an important naval station” that could complicate “the politics of the sub-continent”<sup>413</sup> by threatening the South African station at Simonstown. Additionally, the paper posited “that with the Suez Canal closed in any way in war time, the road to India would be via the Cape, and it would be bad policy to encourage the establishment of a great naval base belonging to a foreign Power on that route.”<sup>414</sup> On 26 February, the possibility that South Africa would lose Walvis Bay continued to circulate. South African public sentiment was wholly against the concession, especially if the German Government did not reciprocate with an equally important possession. Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, attempted to ease South Africa's concerns. He told the House of Commons that the British Government did not intend to offer Walvis Bay to the Germans.<sup>415</sup> Although, there was

---

<sup>409</sup> TNAK: CAB 37/109, 16, p. 297; E. Grey – F. Bertie, 1912-02-07, p. 297.

<sup>410</sup> W. Churchill, E. Grey, and D. Lloyd George, *Der Haldane-Mission in J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme, (eds), Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, XXXI: Das Scheitern der Haldane-Mission und ihre Rückwirkung auf die Tripelentente 1911 - 1912* (Berlin: Deutsche verlagsgesellschaft für politik und geschichte, 1927), p. 98.

<sup>411</sup> TNAK: FO 800/94, pp. 80-81, W. Tyrell, Memorandum, 1912-04-08, p. 80.

<sup>412</sup> R. Dreyer, Dispute over Walvis Bay Origins and Implications for Namibian Independence, *African Affairs* 83(333), October 1984, p. 502.

<sup>413</sup> TRDM, 1912-02-19.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>415</sup> TRDM, 1912-02-26.

no indication what had prompted the British Government's decision not to give Walvis Bay to GSWA.

By November 1912, the prospect (or alternatively the threat) of an Anglo-German agreement disintegrated, for the British Government declined to commit to neutrality if Germany was at war with another European Power – namely France. The likelihood that GSWA would absorb Walvis Bay accordingly disappeared, for the time being.<sup>416</sup>

An area of potential friction involved the activities of African resistance fighters across the border. In Gibeon on 2 September 1912, a German patrol commanded by Captain Kirschliem apprehended Nama resistance fighters, who were suspected of launching an attack from British territory on “Bushman’s Kraal” and taking hostages.<sup>417</sup> The rebels were believed to be in league with Simon Kooper, who was not among them. They were tried for “violating the public peace” and after being found guilty, they were hanged in December 1912.<sup>418</sup> Kooper died in exile on 31 January 1913 in Bechuanaland.<sup>419</sup>

### 7.3 Developments in 1913

There were further instances of ammunition and diamond smuggling in 1913. In late July 3, the Cape authorities arrested a prominent farmer and field cornet named Hendrik Louw near Port Nolloth. Louw was charged for trafficking ammunition into the Cape from GSWA. Following a two-day trial that began 30 July, Louw was found guilty, and fined £25, a fraction of the £350 maximum penalty.<sup>420</sup>

In August, Adrian Ludewick du Plessis and Richard Walter appeared separately at the Bloemhof magistrate's court in separate incidents. Du Plessis and Walter were not associates. Du Plessis

---

<sup>416</sup> P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982), pp. 451-452; *TRDM*, 1913-10-27.

<sup>417</sup> *TRDM*, 1912-12-10.

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>420</sup> *TRDM*, 1913-07-30.

allegedly stole 155 diamonds, weighing 51 carats. Both men were found guilty of stealing diamonds from GSWA.<sup>421</sup>

On the whole South Africa and South-West Africa were in accord in their opposition to rebels and smugglers. Since 1909, German authorities had declared that all diamonds mined in GSWA belonged to the German Government, and the Diamond Regie, a private agency formed by several German banks in February that year, was accorded responsibility for ensuring price stability and representing firms in the sale of German diamonds abroad. By December 1913, the German Government had acquired most of the Regie's shares, and this led to opposition from German mining firms which demanded a discussion on the subject in the Reichstag failing which they would shut down the diamond mines.<sup>422</sup>

On 17 December, the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that the Lüderitzbucht Chamber of Mines considered collaborating with South African mines to jointly control diamond production to seek better terms. The chamber had pointed to the futility of the German Government's efforts to control the diamond market. GSWA's limited production and profits only boosted South African firms.<sup>423</sup>

In response to such protests, the German Government decided at the end of December to supplant the Regie and become the sole agent controlling GSWA's diamond production. The measure concerned South African diamond producers because they believed GSWA would dump its diamonds onto the market and drive diamond prices down – during 1911 and 1912, GSWA's diamonds had accounted for 27 percent and 12 percent of southern Africa's diamond sales, respectively.<sup>424</sup>

#### **7.4 Developments in 1914**

In February 1914, Gustav Imroth informed a meeting for the Premier Diamond Mining Company (Ltd) that to forestall this threat, South African firms should push for “a combine” – a principle of

---

<sup>421</sup> *TRDM*, 1913-08-16.

<sup>422</sup> *TRDM*, 1913-12-17.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>424</sup> *TRDM*, 1913-12-29; *TRDM*, 1914-02-14. In 1911, South Africa yielded £8,746,724 in diamond sales and £10,610,489 for 1912. *TRDM* reckoned that GSWA rounded the total diamond sales each year to about £12,000,000.

collective regulation of diamond output in order to preserve optimal prices.<sup>425</sup> Imroth called for the mining lobby to push the Union Government to accept cooperation with Germany along these lines.<sup>426</sup>

In London in June 1914, representatives of the Premier Diamond Mining, De Beers and the New Jagersfontein Mining Exploration Company met with counterparts from the Diamond Regie, and with August Stauch – a German mining director who was a representative of several diamond mining companies. The diamond producers' conference was organised at the behest of De Beers and the Union Government. The talks proceeded from 20 June to 30 July and concluded with an agreement between the South African producers and the Diamond Regie. But five days later, Britain and Germany were at war.<sup>427</sup>

South Africa's post-unification relationship with GSWA was at once contentious and friendly. With the prospect of GSWA gaining ground on the Cape's profitable ostrich feather industry, Cape politicians wanted to prevent German advancement. The possibility of Walvis Bay's incorporation into GSWA also prompted South Africa's resentment toward the Germans. Despite moments that threatened to change South Africa's status quo, South Africa was also willing to cooperate with GSWA where interests intersected. Securing the frontier, preventing trafficking, and the attempt to jointly regulate the diamond industry demonstrated their openness to collaboration.

---

<sup>425</sup> *TRDM*, 1914-02-14.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>427</sup> *TRDM*, 1914-06-20; D. Innes, *The Exercise of Control in the Diamond Industry of South Africa: Some Preliminary Remarks*—Seminar Paper, University of Witwatersrand, 1975, p. 9.

## Chapter VIII

### THE END OF THE AFFAIR, 1914-1915

The chapter addresses the final stage of the Anglo-German relationship during the Great War, involving the Afrikaner Rebellion – also known as the Maritz Rebellion – and South Africa’s conquest of GSWA. It chronicles South Africa’s final act to eliminate the German threat in southern Africa.

On 28 June 1914, members of a Serbian organisation assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Sarajevo. The Serbian Government refused to extradite the assassins. In reaction, the Austro-Hungarian Empire sent Serbia an ultimatum after the empire received backing from Germany in July. This triggered a domino effect of European countries invoking their alliances. During the first three days of August, Germany declared war on Russia and France. Belgium had declared neutrality. However, German forces invaded Belgium as part of the German military’s plans to attack France on 4 August. Because Britain promised to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality in 1839, the British Government delivered an ultimatum to the German Government the same day as the invasion of Belgium. The German Government rejected the ultimatum, so the British Government declared war on Germany.

When the First World War broke out, the conflict was not restricted to the battles between European countries. In South Africa, the War Office deemed it expedient for South African forces to invade and take control of GSWA. As a loyal member of the Empire, South Africa was willing to oblige. Since 1902, the War Office had been developing plans for South Africa to launch an offensive against GSWA. The Cape Government had also been keen to take part because GSWA had been a threat to the Cape’s security.<sup>428</sup>

Sensing that Britain would soon enter the First World War, Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, wrote on 2 August 1914 about the need to support “a Boer rebellion in a catalogue of indirect means by which Britain might be distracted from Europe.”<sup>429</sup> As a

---

<sup>428</sup> M.H. Park, German South-West African Campaign, *Journal of the Royal African Society* 15(58), January 1916, p. 115; T.H. Parsons, Mobilising Britain’s African Empire for War, *Journal of Modern European History* 13(2), 2015, pp. 190-191.

<sup>429</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 75.

counterpoint, the British military had long considered an invasion of GSWA. The War Office had designed plans for invading GSWA since 1902 – as seen in previous chapters – but subsequent developments meant that the task could be devolved to the Union of South Africa. On 7 August 1914, the British Government asked South Africa to prepare to attack GSWA, based on plans that the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID) developed that called for the capture of Windhuk’s wireless station and the harbours at Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund. These war aims overlapped with South Africa’s expansionist objectives. During the 1911 Imperial Conference from May until June, South Africa’s prime minister Louis “Botha declared to Lloyd George [the British prime minister] his intention then to invade South West [Africa] on the occasion of war in Europe.”<sup>430</sup>

When the Union Government answered the Empire’s call to join the war effort on 10 August 1914, Botha and Smuts believed that the war would encourage reconciliation between Boers and Britons.<sup>431</sup> Mostly, Boers however resented the war and the proposed invasion of GSWA.<sup>432</sup> On 14 August, Union Defence Force (UDF) commanders Christian F. Beyers, Jan C.G. Kemp and S.G. “Manie” Maritz informed the Union Government of their disapproval of the invasion campaign.<sup>433</sup>

On 21 August, German troops “crossed the border in the neighbourhood of”<sup>434</sup> Nakab, which was midway between Upington, South Africa and Warmbad, GSWA.<sup>435</sup> The German invasion prompted many South Africans to support the Union’s role within the imperial war effort. GSWA had violated South Africa’s sovereignty. To consolidate the Union Government’s resolve to neutralise the German threat, the Union Parliament convened on 9 September. There was a belief that the war would unite white South Africans, in the sense that rather than focusing on political

---

<sup>430</sup> M.W. Swanson, South West Africa in Trust, 1915-1939, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa* (New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 634.

<sup>431</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 64; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 344.

<sup>432</sup> J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 344.

<sup>433</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 66; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners: An Historical Interpretation* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 153; Beyers also wrote to Jan Smuts to express his dismay when the Union Parliament approved the invasion of GSWA. See *The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian* (hereafter *TMMAPG*), 1914-09-22.

<sup>434</sup> *The Beira Post*, 1914-08-25.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid*; *TRDM*, 1914-08-22.

differences, they would carry out a war against a common enemy – the Germans. This hope was evidenced by *The Rand Daily Mail*'s political cartoon (see Figure 1).

Botha expounded to the Union Parliament, “their conscience and duty told them to be faithful to the Imperial Government in this hour of trouble.”<sup>436</sup> He called up them to support South Africa’s campaign against GSWA. Botha also attempted to evoke unanimity between the political factions, advocating, “The whole country must stand united in support of the Government.”<sup>437</sup> To enforce this point, Botha reminded them that they now faced a common enemy, namely the German troops who had crossed the frontier into South Africa. Smuts also reminded the Union Parliament of the threat German troops posed. To further convince the Union Parliament to back the Union Government, Smuts informed them that German ships had arrived off South Africa’s coast. As Smuts concluded, he reminded the Union Parliament that the threat that GSWA posed to South Africa was a South African problem that would be resolved using South African troops, not British troops.<sup>438</sup> Later, in January 1915, *The Eastern Providence Herald* would allege the Germans had long sought to invade South Africa. It declared the Germans “are a continual source of danger and there is no peace for South Africa while they occupy this land on our borders.”<sup>439</sup> The only recourse was to eliminate the threat.

Between 10 and 12 September 1914, both houses of the Union Parliament voted to invade GSWA.<sup>440</sup> However, further protests ensued, including a meeting at Lichtenberg on 21 September where Generals Beyers and Christiaan De Wet tried to gain popular support to end the GSWA campaign. To stem any violent acts of opposition, the Union Government declared rebellions unlawful.<sup>441</sup>

---

<sup>436</sup> *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-09-14. For more on Botha’s speech to the Union Parliament see *The Beira Post*, 1914-09-11 and *TMMAPG*, 1914-09-10. For more on initial South African support of the GSWA campaign, see *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-09-28.

<sup>437</sup> *TRDM*, 1914-09-10.

<sup>438</sup> *Ibid*; *TRDM*, 1914-09-11.

<sup>439</sup> *TEPH*, 1915-01-04.

<sup>440</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 65.

<sup>441</sup> *The Nyasaland Times*, 1915-10-15; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 153.



defence.”<sup>442</sup> When Britain joined the war on 4 August 1914, Maritz and other Bittereinders saw an opportunity to overthrow British rule. As early as 14 August 1914, Maritz had considered “a plot to install [C.F.] Beyers as president of a provisional government, with J.H. De La Rey as commandant-general of the defence force, Christiaan De Wet as the head of the Orange Free State, and himself as head of the Cape.”<sup>443</sup> Maritz sought Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, and Kemp’s support. All but Hertzog eventually joined Maritz.<sup>444</sup>

On 15 September, military leaders – including Maritz, Beyers, and Kemp – “resigned their commissions.”<sup>445</sup> Their resignations cleared them facing the penalties doled out at a court-martial. Due to poor coordination, the rebellion did not begin that day. However, in the interlude a following of Boers gathered who not only resented British rule, but also despised conscription, the GSWA campaign, and Botha and Smuts for pandering to the British. On 1 October 1914, *The Bulawayo Chronicle* acquired a pamphlet that Andries and Pieter De Wet, two Boer rebels, disseminated to Boer farmers along the frontier. The document indicated that they intended to incite the farmers to rebel against the Union Government with promises of independence from British rule and the weapons – supplied by the Germans – to carry out the fight.<sup>446</sup>

When called upon to attack the Germans, Maritz took his commando from Upington and joined the Germans between 7 and 9 October 1914. Upon Maritz’s betrayal, Colonel Coenraad Brits took command at Upington. By 13 October, Maritz prepared to fight Union forces, forcing Beyers, De Wet, and Kemp’s hand to join him. Maritz had continued with the rebellion where the other leaders had shied away from it.<sup>447</sup>

---

<sup>442</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 75.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 70-71, 75; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 153; J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 344

<sup>445</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 71; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 155; For more on South African opinion regarding Beyers’s resignation, see *TEPH*, 1914-09-22 and *TEPH*, 1914-09-24.

<sup>446</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 70, 72; *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1914-10-02.

<sup>447</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 70-71; *The Christian Express*, 1914-11-02. For the newspapers’ reactions to Maritz’s actions, see *The Christian Express*, 1914-11-02; *The Beira Post*, 1914-10-13; *The East African Standard*, 1914-10-17.

In reaction to the rebellion, Botha insisted on using only Boers to fight the rebels “to preserve his policy of conciliation between the white races.”<sup>448</sup> He did not want to reopen the Anglo-Boer War’s wounds. Botha did not have trouble finding Boer support against Maritz and the rebels. *The Christian Express* reported on 2 November that the rebellion “has given a great impetus to recruiting and it has called forth from all quarters indignant and unqualified condemnation of the rebellion and strong expressions of loyalty to the Government from” F.W. Reitz, Dutch Reformed Church ministers, students at Stellenbosch University, *Ons Land*, and *De Volkstem*.<sup>449</sup>

On 16 October 1914, Colonel Brits received a letter from Maritz who was now at Keimoes. The letter contained a copy of Maritz’s treaty with GSWA and the German Government. First, the treaty guaranteed GSWA’s support for Maritz in his war against Britain and accepted Maritz’s declaration of South Africa’s independence from British rule. In return for German support, Maritz promised to cede Walvis Bay “and the islands opposite German South-West Africa and the Cape Province” to GSWA.<sup>450</sup> The treaty’s last term stated, “If the rebellion fails, the rebels who enter German territory will be recognised as German subjects, and be treated as such.”<sup>451</sup>

On 2 December 1914, Union forces apprehended De Wet. Six days later, Beyers “drowned in the Vaal river while trying to escape” the UDF.<sup>452</sup> By 9 December, the UDF had taken 820 rebels as prisoners.<sup>453</sup> To rally support for the rebellion following these losses, Maritz declared the rebellion’s aims on 16 December. He declared South Africa’s four provinces’ independence from British rule and appealed to “all white inhabitants of the mentioned areas of whatever nationality are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa [sic].”<sup>454</sup> However, Maritz’s efforts to regroup failed. In-

---

<sup>448</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 72; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 157.

<sup>449</sup> *The Christian Express*, 1914-11-02.

<sup>450</sup> *TRDM*, 1914-10-26.

<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.* For more on the treaty, see H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 75; *TRDM*, 1914-10-12.

<sup>452</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 73.

<sup>453</sup> *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-12-10.

<sup>454</sup> S.G. Maritz cited in G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 157.

fighting between members of the rebellion and the lack of respect for Maritz among the German command led to the rebellion's subsequent failures.<sup>455</sup>

On 16 January 1915, *The East African Standard* surmised that it would not be long until the rebellion collapsed. Several commanders had surrendered “near Bethlehem.”<sup>456</sup> Additionally, Maritz and Kemp – having failed on their own – escaped to GSWA. They hoped to invade South Africa with the help of German forces. However, Maritz and Kemp sustained losses at Upington on 24 January. One week later, German forces attempted “to revive the rebellion...at Kakamas”<sup>457</sup> but their efforts failed, too. With no realistic chance of success, Kemp surrendered on 30 January and Maritz permanently retreated with the German forces across the frontier.<sup>458</sup>

In all, the Union Government prosecuted 281 rebel leaders of which most received short sentences. One was put to death because he “had not taken the precaution of resigning his commission before turning against the government.”<sup>459</sup> Domestically, Botha's South Africa Party lost seats while Hertzog's National Party gained seats because Boers were not keen to help the British during the war if it meant turning on their brethren and republicanism.<sup>460</sup>

## 8.2 Invading German South-West Africa, 1914-1915

When war broke out in August 1914, GSWA had 2,000 regular troops, 3,000 reservists, and 180 Boers. After German forces invaded Nakab, the South African military planned a four-pronged invasion of GSWA. The navy would attack Swakopmund's wireless station and by land, the UDF would invade from Lüderitz, Port Nolloth, and Upington. Attacks commenced on 14 September. Five days later, the UDF took Lüderitzbucht “and at midday [UDF troops] ceremoniously hoisted the Union Jack over the Town Hall, which they saluted.”<sup>461</sup> The *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle* did not hesitate to point out what South Africa accomplished when the UDF took

---

<sup>455</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 73.

<sup>456</sup> *The East African Standard*, 1915-01-16.

<sup>457</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 74.

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid*; *The East African Standard*, 1915-01-16.

<sup>459</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 74.

<sup>460</sup> *Ibid*; G.H.L. Le May, *The Afrikaners* (Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 157; *TEPH*, 1915-03-03; *TMMAPG*, 1915-04-28.

<sup>461</sup> *TMMAPG*, 1914-09-26.

Lüderitzbucht on 19 September 1914. The Moroccan newspaper's headline read, "South-West Africa. £1,000,000 A Year. Rich Diamond Yield of the Empire's New Possession."<sup>462</sup> The UDF's victory at Lüderitzbucht had been virtually assured since German troops had evacuated after destroying the railway and the wireless station.<sup>463</sup>

On 24 October 1914, the Union Government introduced martial law in Pretoria, which called for "the surrender of all firearms to the District Commandant."<sup>464</sup> Martial law also suspended meetings and "the sale of petrol, horses, [and] vehicles."<sup>465</sup> By this point, Maritz had betrayed the Union and joined the German campaign against South Africa. Between October and January, the UDF's efforts concentrated on Maritz. As Maritz's defeat became more certain during the first weeks of January 1915, the Union Government introduced "compulsory service...to smash G.S.W.A." on 2 January.<sup>466</sup> Prior to this declaration, the Union Government relied on voluntary service to avoid generating Boer resentment toward joining a British war.

On 13 January, South African forces took Swakopmund "without opposition."<sup>467</sup> By the time that Union forces arrived, the Germans had destroyed the "electric power station, cranes on the jetty, the cable and telegraph instruments."<sup>468</sup> The following month, Botha joined the campaign and directed forces toward Windhuk. From February through March 1915, the South African campaign did not progress speedily due to poor animal transport, destroyed German rail lines, poor water supply, and failure to coordinate plans. By 5 April, South African forces had taken the Orange River, part of the German railway and Southern GSWA. Throughout April, the UDF made progress, capturing important outposts in southern GSWA. *The Eastern Province Herald* reported on 21 April that Colonels Japie Van de Venter (possibly Jacob Van Deventer) and Barend Bouwer took Keetmanshoop. From there, UDF forces under their command continued to push north.<sup>469</sup>

---

<sup>462</sup> *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-10-12.

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid*; *TMMAPG*, 1914-09-26; *TEPH*, 1914-09-22; H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 69, 76.

<sup>464</sup> *TMMAPG*, 1914-10-26.

<sup>465</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>466</sup> *TEPH*, 1915-01-02.

<sup>467</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 82.

<sup>468</sup> *TMMAPG*, 1915-01-19.

<sup>469</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 82-84, 85; *TEPH*, 1915-04-21.

On 13 May, Botha captured Windhuk, GSWA's capital. Simultaneously, due to growing anti-German sentiments among South Africans, riots targeting German residents and businesses broke out in Johannesburg and Cape Town.<sup>470</sup> The following day, Botha who remained in the field, sent a message to South Africans, imploring them to stop. He reminded South Africans that "in many cases the victims being men whose sons are gallantly fighting under me at the front."<sup>471</sup> Two days after Botha captured Windhuk, "several of the Canadian newspapers" paid "tribute to General Botha's strategy and loyalty."<sup>472</sup> Most importantly, the papers noted that by taking Windhuk, South Africa no longer had to fear the German threat. George V also sent along his congratulations.<sup>473</sup>

By 17 May, Botha declared martial law over Windhuk's 3,000 whites and 12,060 Africans.<sup>474</sup> Although the UDF had captured GSWA's capital, the Union Government had no plans to send South African troops abroad until the GSWA campaign concluded.<sup>475</sup> The *Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzantsi Africa* praised Botha and the UDF on 1 June for eliminating "this source of trouble to the Peace of South Africa."<sup>476</sup> Furthermore, the newspaper asserted it would not be long before the campaign ended.<sup>477</sup>

Following the invasion in 1915, the Union Government allowed Germans to continue their ownership over GSWA's copper mines. However, "the interests of the German diamond-mining companies were consolidated and largely taken over by the South African-controlled firm Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (CDM)."<sup>478</sup> On 9 July, GSWA Governor Theodor Seitz and Viktor Franke, the commander of GSWA's forces surrendered at Otavifontein.

---

<sup>470</sup> South Africans also exhibited their anti-German sentiments via their treatment of German nationals residing in South Africa during the war. Many were placed in prisoner-of-war camps in 1915 and remained there until the war's end.

<sup>471</sup> L. Botha quoted in *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-05-21.

<sup>472</sup> *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-05-21.

<sup>473</sup> H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 87; *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-05-21; *TMMAPG*, 1915-05-18.

<sup>474</sup> *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1915-05-17; For another account of Botha's capture of Windhuk, see *TEPH*, 1915-05-15.

<sup>475</sup> *TMMAPG*, 1915-05-28.

<sup>476</sup> *Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzantsi Africa*, 1915-06-01.

<sup>477</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>478</sup> P. Hayes, J. Silvester, and M. Wallace, "Trees Never Meet" Mobility and Containment: An Overview, 1915-1946, in P. Hayes, J. Silvester, M. Wallace, and W. Hartmann (eds.), *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915-1946* (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 1998), p. 28.

The campaign was over.<sup>479</sup> Once the 1919 Treaty of Versailles's terms came into effect in 1920, GSWA became South Africa's mandate, a territory under South Africa's jurisdiction.

South African forces put down the rebellion after about three months. Only a unified and robust South Africa could handle the threat the Maritz and his associates posed. After their arrests, Botha was free to continue South Africa's campaign in GSWA. The whole affair involving GSWA was a two-fold victory for South Africa. First, South African forces defeated the German troops and conquered GSWA. It displayed South Africa's willingness to serve the Empire and its ability to defend itself from the German threat. Second, South Africa had quelled a significant rebellion. The Union Government demonstrated not only its ability to handle an uprising, but also the Boers' willingness to fight their own people to preserve the union. Despite the Maritz Rebellion's display of disloyalty, South Africa passed the test.<sup>480</sup>

---

<sup>479</sup> *TEPH*, 1915-07-13; *TRDM*, 1915-07-13; H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 91.

<sup>480</sup> M.H. Park, German South-West African Campaign, *Journal of the Royal African Society* 15(58), January 1916, pp. 121-123.

## CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I argued that as the idea of a South African federation progressed, it was driven in part by geopolitical factors and the desire to counter German imperialism. The British Government endorsed a South African union in part to create a South Africa strong enough to fend off German geopolitical threats.

This thesis considered the interplay between political, economic, and military developments in South Africa's relationship with GSWA. Some of the major themes that addressed the interplay of these developments included border disputes, illicit trade, labour competition, and armed incursions led by non-state actors.

From the beginning, I sought to demonstrate the consistency of these themes throughout South Africa's relationship with GSWA. To that end, I explored developments that linked GSWA with Britain's South African colonies (after 1910, the Union of South Africa) between German settlement in South-West Africa in 1883 and South Africa's conquest of GSWA in 1915. Many events included in my thesis have not been catalogued or used systematically elsewhere/by others to address the Anglo-German antagonism in southern Africa.

In the first chapter, I summarised the Anglo-German rivalry in Europe and Germany's colonisation of South-West Africa. The settlement of GSWA in 1883 and colonisation in 1884 surprised the British Government because they did not suspect their German counterpart of taking an interest in acquiring colonies. Simultaneously, the event upset the Cape Government because they expressed an interest in the territory. Another significant event in the relationship was the so-called Kruger Telegram of 1896. After the Jameson Raid's failure, Kaiser Wilhelm II's congratulatory message implanted the notion of a German effort to help the Boers overthrow British rule in South Africa and initiated the Anglo-German rivalry in Europe. At the end of the chapter, I examined German policy concerning the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). While the German public supported the Boers, the Kaiser and the German Government maintained neutrality during the war and rebuked foreign governments' attempted intervention in the conflict. It exemplified the complexity of the Anglo-German relationship. During the Kruger Telegram episode, Germany sought to antagonise

Britain, but Germany's refusal to support intervention during the Anglo-Boer showed Germany's willingness to aid Britain.

In the second chapter, I surveyed the South African colonies and GSWA's internal evolution during the immediate postwar period. Between 1902 and 1904, the South African colonies dealt with an economic crisis and a labour shortage while GSWA experienced modest economic growth. Due to the colonies' concentration on internal affairs, their bilateral relationship was limited. During this period, Boers emigrated to GSWA and GSWA competed with the South African colonies for sources of labour. Conflict between British South Africa and GSWA was minor, with German authorities randomly arresting a handful of British citizens on suspicion of colluding with African resistance fighters in GSWA. The arrests did not garner enough concern to cause a major intercolonial incident.

Chapter three considered multiple developments that were a result of the Herero and Nama Wars in GSWA. Initially, the wars proved to be a source of employment for South Africa's blacks and Boers. When the Boers found employment with the German military during the wars, it did not alarm the Cape and British governments. During the wars, gunrunning became a rampant problem that British, South African, and German authorities attempted to thwart. The minor depletion of ammunition stores caused little concern to British and South African authorities, but it frustrated them and the German authorities that they failed to bring an end to the illicit trade. The German authorities were particularly vexed because it allowed African resistance fighters to continue their campaigns.

The Cape Government also faced dilemmas over whether to aid Germany's quasi-genocidal campaigns against the Hereros and the Nama. While the Cape's black population in the Northwest pressed the Cape Government to intervene in the ill-treatment of blacks in GSWA and to care for Nama refugees, the GSWA Government pushed the Cape authorities to augment efforts to bring the wars to a conclusion. Lastly, the wars highlighted the Cape Government's frustration with the GSWA Government concerning its refusal to engage in direct communications with the Cape, especially regarding border violations by German soldiers. The Herero and Nama Wars brought about sources of tension between GSWA and the Cape.

Chapter four examined aspects of the evolving Anglo-German relationship beyond the Herero and Nama Wars. Events occurring at the Cape-GSWA border between 1906 and 1907 had a destabilising effect on the frontier. First, there was the contention over the border demarcation along the Orange River. It brought to the fore further cases of poor communication between the Cape and GSWA governments. Next, there were the abductions of Mr. de Beer, Schuilpad, and Private Kirkman. The suspicious nature of their abductions generated minor flashpoints between the two colonies and the corruption of German and Cape authorities near Upington revealed the frontier's instability. In the second half of the chapter, I focused on the illegal importation of guns from Germany to the South African colonies and Ferreira's Raid. Together, the two incidents promoted British suspicions of a German-Boer plot to overthrow British rule in South Africa.

In chapter five, I considered the movement toward South Africa's unification and how this was influenced by German challenges to imperial security. Specifically, I recounted the process of South Africa's incorporation into the Empire's defence scheme, as well as the Empire's plans to invade GSWA from 1902. I also examined South Africa's military plans for combatting the German threat as the colonies progressed toward federation. The chapter revealed British and South African intentions to eliminate the German threat once federation was achieved.

Chapter six surveyed South Africa's economic relationship with GSWA and moments of intercolonial cooperation along the Cape border between 1907 and 1910. The diamond discovery at Lüderitzbucht affected the intercolonial relations during this period. While the discovery created labour competition between GSWA and the Rand, the event strengthened GSWA's relationship with the Cape in particular. Because of the diamond mining efforts, GSWA provided a market for the Cape's goods and blacks residing in the Cape found work in the mines in addition to employment opportunities they found constructing GSWA's railways. In 1907, the South African colonies coordinated with other colonies in southern Africa, including GSWA, to end the locust plague. The Cape also made more concerted efforts to secure the frontier against arms and ammunition trafficking, as well as the raids perpetrated by Rolf and his compatriots in 1908 and 1909. Largely, 1907 to 1910 was marked by improved relations between the South African colonies and GSWA.

In chapter seven, I chronicled the events between 1911 and 1914 involving the Union of South Africa and GSWA. One event that brought about anti-German sentiment among Cape politicians was the ostrich feather industry. Cape politicians responded with calls for protectionist policy that would prevent GSWA from obtaining a stake in the valuable industry. Another incident that generated outrage and anti-German feeling in South Africa was the British Government's usage of Walvis Bay in a deal to reduce the pace of the Anglo-German naval arms race in Europe. In contrast to these incidents that generated South Africans' animosity toward GSWA, there remained moments of cooperation leading up to the First World War. For example, South African authorities apprehended Nama resistance fighters, as well as traffickers who were smuggling diamonds out of GSWA and ammunition into GSWA. On the eve of the First World War, South Africa and GSWA also convened a diamond conference to regulate the diamond industry for their mutual benefit. These remaining interactions before the First World War exemplified the complexity of South Africa's relationship with GSWA.

Chapter nine addressed the First World War and South Africa's participation in the affair. The conflict revealed a schism within South Africa – those Britons and Afrikaners who supported South African involvement and Afrikaner nationalists who did not. When German forces invaded South Africa in August 1914, the event created a sense of South African resolve to meet the threat. However, before the UDF could fully engage with German forces, the Maritz Rebellion commenced. Here, I considered how the Maritz Rebellion extended the German threat to South Africa through his agreement with the Germans to surrender Walvis Bay to GSWA in exchange for South Africa's independence from Britain. After the UDF defeated Maritz and his compatriots, I surveyed the South African invasion campaign of GSWA until its conquest in July 1915. When the UDF defeated German forces and South Africa assumed control over GSWA, it marked the end of the German threat to South Africa.

This study revealed that the southern African iteration of the Anglo-German relationship was volatile between 1883 and 1915. With exception to the period of 1902 until 1904, the South African colonies – later, the Union of South Africa – and GSWA exhibited intercolonial cooperation interspersed with moments of animosity. During the 1902 to 1904 period, the South African

colonies and GSWA interacted minimally as they addressed concerns related to the economic depression and coordinated infrastructure projects, respectively.

The study reflected Tilman Dederling and Peter Curson's assertions that the South African colonies' relationship with GSWA mirrored the Anglo-German rivalry in Europe. For example, the study considered the Ferreira Raid of 1906 and intercolonial competition for labour between 1902 and 1914. However, the study also incorporated Ulrike Lindner's conclusion that the South African colonies were collegial in matters of mutual interest, including border security and the diamond trade. This study demonstrates that the intercolonial relationship was complex, alternating between rivalry and cooperation. Only in 1915 did the inconsistency and volatility of the relationship end. Two factors led to this: South African unification in 1910 and the use of the Union to eliminate the German threat in southern Africa – via GSWA's conquest – in 1915.

## **Bibliography**

### **ARCHIVAL SOURCES**

#### **Historical Papers Research Archive, University of Witwatersrand**

A103, p. 1: F. von Lindequist – ‘Foreigners,’ 31 July 1907.

#### **National Archives (U.K.), Kew**

Cabinet, CAB 37/109, 16, p. 297: E. Grey – F. Bertie, 7 February 1912.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 804, pp. 251-254: W.S. Churchill, A Note upon the Transvaal Constitution as established by Letters Patent, 2 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805: Further Correspondence (1906) relating to the Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German South-West Protectorate.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 29 October 1904.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292: C.C. Bennett – Chief Staff Officer, South African Constabulary, 6 December 1905.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292: R.S. Curtis – C.H. Rodwell, 27 December 1905.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 291-292: Selborne – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 4 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 306-307: H.P. von Humboldt – Selborne, 12 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, S./201/9, pp. 316-317: Military Intelligence Department – Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 17 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, S./208/20, pp. 331-333: Extracts from Report of Colonel Trench, 19 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 293-295: F. Lascelles – O. von Mühlberg, 20 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Telegram No. III, ca. 20 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: R. Treyse – F.W. Banning (Letter “B”), 21 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 301-303: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 22 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: R. Treyse – F.W. Banning (Letter “D”), 22 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: H. Hoenblein – J.F. Herbst, 23 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: H. Hoenblein – C.E.W. Spencer, 23 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: M. Jansen – F.W. Banning, 23 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: A.J. Attwood – N. Neylan, 26 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 310: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 29 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Corporal Fred Wren Banning’s Statement, 29 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Pietrus Josephus Matewes Spangenberg’s Statement, ca. 29 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Andreas Booikies’s Statement, 31 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Julius Faure’s Statement, 31 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Lieutenant Schmidt – C.E.W. Spencer, 31 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Schuilpad (alias Hans Jan)’s Statement, 3 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Private William Johnstone’s Statement, 4 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Private Holger Jacon Eskildsen’s Statement, 6 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Old Jan (alias Hans Jan)'s Statement, 7 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Private George Mason's Statement, 7 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Private John Nickoll's Statement, 7 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: Lieutenant Schmidt – C.E.W. Spencer, 7 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 318: N. Neylan – Commissioner, Cape Mounted Police, ca. 7 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 304-305: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 14 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 305: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 16 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: C.E.W. Spencer – Commissioner Commanding, Cape Mounted Police, 17 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 351-352: J.C. Tancred – Commander-in-Chief, Cape Station, 17 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 313-314: E. Barrington – F. Lascelles, 20 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 526-527: Dr. Forkel – C.E.W. Spencer, 21 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 321: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 24 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 321: F. Lascelles – H. von Tschirschky, 24 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 370-372: Private Edmund Bolton Kirkman's Statement, 28 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 339-340: Sub-Inspector Voules's Report on Rahman's Drift, 28 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 351-352: M. Robinson – C.P. Crewe, 1 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 339-340: N. Neylan – C.P. Crewe, 2 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 343-351: C.P. Crewe –W. Hely-Hutchinson, 6 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 320: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 6 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 321: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 7 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 354-357: H.P. von Humboldt –W. Hely-Hutchinson, 14 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 370-372: Private Edmund Bolton Kirkman's Statement, 14 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 334: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 16 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 354-357: V. Sampson, Report of the Attorney-General, 16 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 335: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 17 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 354-357: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 19 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 369: R.S. McClintock, Memorandum on the Present State of Affairs on the Border between Cape Colony and German South-West Africa, 20 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: D. Eadie – Secretary at the Law Department, Cape Town, 27 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 342: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 27 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: Violation of British Territory at Walfish Bay by German Soldiers. Report of the Additional Legal Adviser, 28 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 366-367: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 2 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 357-358: E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 9 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 370-372: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 10 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 372-373: Memorandum by the Honourable the Colonial Secretary [C.P. Crewe], 11 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 384: Report by Captain H.S. Simon, No. 4 Reconnaissance Party, 11 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 373-375: Report by Colonel Robinson, Chief Commissioner of the Cape Mounted Police, ca. April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 365: F. Lascelles – H. von Tschirschky, 12 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 367-368: F. Lascelles – H. von Tschirschky, 20 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 380-381: O. von Mühlberg – F. Lascelles, 26 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 380-381: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 29 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 389-390: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 4 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 8 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: Statement concerning the Views of the German Government with respect to the Payment of Costs for the Refugees from German South-West Africa, 9 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 398-399: W.A. White – C.H. Rodwell, 9 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 416-418: F.H. Elliott – Commissioner Commanding, Cape Mounted Police, 10 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 416-418: Private Edward Jarvis's Statement, 10 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 381: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 11 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 15 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 407-408: F.H. Elliott – Commissioner, Cape Mounted Police, 19 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 389-390: E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 19 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: Cape Ministers – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 21 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 389-390: H. von Tschirschky – F. Lascelles, 22 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 408-411: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 23 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 392: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 25 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 413-414: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 29 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 415: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 29 May 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 394: E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 1 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 427-429: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 14 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 416: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 20 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 418: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 23 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 418: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 25 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 431-432: Notes of Information obtained from Jacob Marengo at an Interview with him at Tokai, near Cape Town by “E.A.,” 25 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 431-432: Report by “A.,” 25 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 418-419: F. Graham – Foreign Office, 26 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 430-431: E. Barrington – Colonial Office, 11 July 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 442-443: A.R. Cameron – C.P. Crewe, 26 July 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 442-443: Military Intelligence Department Report, ca. 30 July 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 455-456: A.R. Cameron – C.P. Crewe, 1 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 454: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 10 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: John Culayo's Sworn Statement, 11 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: Jack Seti's Sworn Statement, 11 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: James Tolibadi's Sworn Statement, 11 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 457: Granville – E. Grey, 22 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: L.S. Jameson – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 22 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 466-467: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 29 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 473-474: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 30 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 470: F.A. Campbell – Colonial Office, 21 September 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 471: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 28 September 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 478: F.A. Campbell – Colonial Office, 6 October 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 487: E. Barrington – Elgin, 20 October 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 490: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 27 October 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: Magistrate at Keimoes – C.P. Crewe, 9 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 495: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 10 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 494: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 10 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: J. Hofmeyr – Reverend Schroder, 10 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: Magistrate at Upington – C.P. Crewe and Commandant-General at Prieska, 10 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: C.P. Crewe – Colonel Lukin, 11 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 1-2: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 11 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 495: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 11 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 13 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 495: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 13 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 512-517: H.P. von Humboldt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 13 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 518-519: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 14 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 537-538: T.H. Wade – Colonel of the General Staff at Cape Colony, 14 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 521-522: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 15 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 497: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 15 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 521-522: C.P. Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 16 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 502: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 17 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 521-522: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 21 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 530-531: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 22 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, pp. 530-531: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 28 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 805, p. 512: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 30 November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 811, pp. 585-587: A. Lawley – Elgin, Transvaal Constitution, 12 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/91, 812, pp. 588-592: Selborne, Memorandum, 14 December 1905.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 817, pp. 1-7: W.S. Churchill, A Note Upon the Transvaal Constitution Question, 30 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 819, pp. 1-17: H.W. Just, Memorandum on the War Contribution Loan, 19 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 822, pp. 1-2: H.W. Just, Orange River Colony Constitution, 3 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 826, pp. 1-4: G.R. Jones – A.J.C.H. de Reuter, 16 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 826, pp. 1-4: A.J.C.H. de Reuter – W.S. Churchill, 8 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 827, pp. 1-2: A. Beit and Mr. Creswell, Johannesburg Town Council, March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 837, pp. 1-13: J.C. Smuts, Memorandum on Points in Reference to the Transvaal Constitution, January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 837A, pp. 1-3: F. Graham, Transvaal Constitution: Remarks on the Memorandum of Mr. J.C. Smuts (African No. 837), 1 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 838, pp. 1-5: S. Evans – L.H. Courtney, 28 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 840, pp. 1-6: South Africa: Memorandum on two Points not included in Letter of Instructions for consideration of the Commissioners, April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842: Further Correspondence Relating to Native Disturbances in Natal, 1906-1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, pp. 2-3: C. Leuchars, Intelligence Report, 21 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, pp. 3-4: H. McCallum – Elgin, 23 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, p. 9: D. McKenzie – Minister of Defence for Natal, 9 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, pp. 6-8: H. Lugg, Intelligence Report, 12 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, p. 10: J. Schofield – Prime Minister of Natal, 12 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, p. 11: H. McCallum – to Elgin, 16 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/92, 842, pp. 11-12: Messrs. Royle and Company – Colonial Office, 11 April 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 851, pp. 1-8: J.P. FitzPatrick, Memorandum, 20 July 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 852, pp. 1-46, D.A. Johnston, Transvaal Constitution: Draft Letters Patent and Order in Council, 9 July 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 852, pp. 1-46: F. Hopwood, Transvaal Constitution: Draft Letters Patent and Order in Council, August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 857, pp. 1-16: Transvaal Constitution Letter Patent, 1906: Amendment to the draft B proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, October 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 857, pp. 1-51: Containing Amendments proposed by the Lord Chancellor, 20 October 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 858, pp. 1-19: Draft Transvaal Letters Patent: Memorandum, November 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/93, 863, pp. 1-7: Selborne – W.S. Churchill, 18 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927: Further Correspondence (1909) Relating to Affairs in South Africa.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 73: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 22 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 173-175: W. Letseleba, Z. More, D.D. Tzwakadi, and other members of the Transvaal Native Union – Edward VII, 8 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 151-153: B. Monsioa – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 8 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 116-117: M.J. Fredericks – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 22 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 151-153: E. Dower – B. Monsioa, 23 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 124-127: J.D. Goronyane – Selborne, 26 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 124-127: A.K. Sofa – Selborne, 27 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: J. Antony – Lord Crewe, 29 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 116-117: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 29 March 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 124-127: D.O. Malcolm – J.D. Goronyane, 2 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Cape Ministers, 2 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: A. Will Sauls – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 5 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: C. Tallard – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 7 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 141-143: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 19 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: J.X. Merriman – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 21 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 143-146: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 26 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 217-218: W.M. Carter, J.J. McClure, R. Balmforth, E. Baker, A. Pitt, and G. Robson – J.H. de Villiers, 30 April 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 182-183: M.J. Fredericks – Selborne, 3 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 173-175: Methuen – Lord Crewe, 6 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 210-212: Becoana Mutual Association of Thaba 'Nchu, Resolution, 13 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 182-183: W.G. Bentinck – M.J. Fredericks, 13 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 238-240: C.V. Nelson – Selborne, June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 217-218: W.M. Carter – Selborne, 2 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 202-203: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 2 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 214-216: ‘Mr. Merriman’s Statement on Introducing the Draft South Africa Constitution Act,’ *Cape Times*, 3 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 214-216: ‘Mr. Sauer,’ *Cape Times*, 3 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 210-212: H. Goold-Adams – Lord Crewe, 7 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 200: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 12 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 223: A.J. Carelse – Selborne, 15 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 238-240: A. Abdurahman, D.J. Lenders, H. Hartog, A. Mockriel, and M.J. Fredericks – Selborne, 16 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 223-229: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 16 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 223-229: J.G. Sprigg, W.P. Schreiner, W. Bisset Berry, C. Abercrombie Smith, W.M. Carter, J.M. Stephen, J.J. McClure, G. Robson, H. Beard, R. Balmforth, J.S. Moffat, T.L. Schreiner, J. Brown, C.M. McCarthy, J.D. Cartwright, R. Forsyth, R. Brooke, M.W. Searle, M. Alexander, H.P. Bull, W. Hay, F.G. Gardiner, ‘The Draft Act of South African Union: The Native Question and Rights of Citizenship in Cape Colony. An Appeal to the Parliament and Government of Great Britain and Ireland’, 16 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 238-240: W.G. Bentinck – African Political Organisation, 17 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 238-240: W.G. Bentinck – C.V. Nelson, 17 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 275-276: Lord Crewe – H. Goold-Adams, 21 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 234: H. Goold-Adams – Lord Crewe, 21 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, pp. 275-276: ‘To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty. Petition of the Executive Committee of the Orange River Colony Native Association’, 21 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 273: W.P. Letsleba – J.F.B. Rissik, 25 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/100, 927, p. 251: Lord Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 21 July 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/104, 948: South Africa. Further Correspondence relating to the German South-West Africa Protectorate, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Rhodesia, 1910.

Colonial Office, CO 879/104, 948, pp. 13-14: J.X. Merriman – E.H.W. Müller, 15 November 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/104, 948, p. 143: H. Gladstone – Lord Crewe, 20 December 1910.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, Telegrams Relating to Affairs in South Africa, 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 12: Elgin – Selborne, 11 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 17-18: Selborne – Elgin, 18 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 24-25: A. Woolls Sampson – Selborne's Private Secretary, 27 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 24-25: Selborne – Elgin, 28 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 26: Selborne – Elgin, 29 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 28: Elgin – Selborne, 31 January 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 29-30: Selborne – Elgin, 1 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 34: Selborne – Elgin, 5 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 50: Elgin – Selborne, 18 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 56: Selborne – Elgin, 22 February 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 66-67: Selborne – Elgin, 5 March 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 170: Elgin – Selborne, 4 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 181: Selborne – Elgin, 17 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 190: Selborne – Elgin, 21 June 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 240-241: Selborne – Elgin, 26 July 1906.

- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 244: Elgin – Selborne, 31 July 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 367: Selborne – Elgin, 31 October 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, pp. 405-406: Selborne – Elgin, 3 December 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 409: Selborne – Elgin, 7 December 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 418: Elgin – Selborne, 13 December 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 420: Selborne – Elgin, 13 December 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 421: Elgin – Selborne, 17 December 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 807, p. 435: Elgin – Selborne, 29 December 1906
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820: Secret Papers (1906 and 1907) Relating to Affairs in South Africa
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820, p. 2: Selborne – Elgin, 5 February 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820, p. 73: Selborne – Elgin, 12 March 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820, p. 3: Elgin – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 11 June 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820, pp. 3-4: Elgin – Selborne, 16 June 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 820, pp. 4-6: Selborne – Elgin, 18 June 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 834, pp. 1-3: Secret: Situation in South Africa Minute by Mr. Churchill, 15 March 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 853, pp. 37-38: F. Graham – The Ridgeway Committee, 21 March 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 853, pp. 1-57: *Report of the Committee appointed to enquire and report upon certain matters connected with the Future Constitutions of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, Part I: Transvaal*, 30 July 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 854, pp. 19-20: W. Ehrlich, E.E. Watkeys, F.F. Johnson, W. Reid, H. Ibbotson, and A.E. O’Flaherty, ‘To the Chairman and Members of the Royal Commission, Bloemfontein’, June 1906.
- Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 854, pp. 1-27: *Report of the Committee appointed to enquire and report upon certain matters connected with the Future Constitutions of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, Part II: Orange River Colony*, 15 August 1906.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874: Telegrams Relating to Affairs in South Africa, 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, pp. 6-7: Selborne – Elgin, 9 January 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 57: Selborne – Elgin, 28 February 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 60, Selborne – Elgin, 4 March 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874 p. 93, Selborne – Elgin, 4 May 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 94: Selborne – Elgin, 10 May 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 106: Elgin – Selborne, 7 June 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 173: Elgin – Selborne, 7 November 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, pp. 173-174: Selborne – Elgin, 9 November 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 874, p. 194: H. Goold-Adams – Elgin, 18 December 1907.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900: Telegrams Relating to Affairs in South Africa, 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 72-73: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 7 July 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 75: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 11 July 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 96-97: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 10 August 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 101: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 19 August 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 109: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 9 September 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 118: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 20 September 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 118-119: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 22 September 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 127-128: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 9 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 129: Lord Crewe – J.H. de Villiers, 12 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 129: M. Nathan – Lord Crewe, 12 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, p. 130: J.H. de Villiers – Lord Crewe, 13 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 132-133: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 16 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 135-136: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 22 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 900, pp. 138-139: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 27 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 925: Secret Papers (1908 and 1909) Relating to Affairs in South Africa.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 925, pp. 107-108: W. Hely-Hutchinson – J.X. Merriman, 19 January 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 925, pp. 12-14: H.W. Just, South African Closer Union Convention and Native Protectorates, 5 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 925, pp. 16-17: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 24 October 1908.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934: Telegrams Relating to Affairs in South Africa, 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 11: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 6 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 12: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 9 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, pp. 12-13: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 11 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 13: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 11 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 17: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 23 February 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, pp. 46-47: H. Goold-Adams – Lord Crewe, 28 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 46: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 28 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 47: Lord Crewe – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 31 May 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 48: Lord Crewe – Selborne, 1 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 48: Selborne – Lord Crewe, 1 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 50: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 3 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 50: H. Goold-Adams – Lord Crewe, 4 June 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 879/106, 934, p. 65: M. Nathan – Lord Crewe, 2 August 1909.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 24796, pp. 578-584: Notes on Meetings with Boer Representatives at Pretoria, 12 April 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 24796, pp. 578-584: Notes on Meetings with Boer Representatives at Pretoria, 14 April 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 24796, pp. 578-584: Notes on Meetings with Boer Representatives at Pretoria, 17 April 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, pp. 471-473: H.O.P. Wright, Report, 1902-05-01.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 25799, pp. 607-621: Minutes of Meeting of Commission with Lords Kitchener and Milner, 19 May 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 25799, pp. 607-621: Minutes of Meeting of Commission with Lords Kitchener and Milner, 20 May 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 417/361, 25799, pp. 607-621: Minutes of Meeting of Commission with Lords Kitchener and Milner on the 21st May, at Noon, 21 May 1902.

Colonial Office, CO 537/518, 24582, p. 1: H.W. Just, Native Franchise, Admin. of Native Territories, 7 July 1908.

Dominion Office, DO 119/843, pp. 1-8: Selborne – J.H. de Villiers, 20 October 1908.

Dominion Office, DO 119/843, pp. 1-2: J.H. de Villiers – Selborne, 21 October 1908.

Dominion Office, DO 119/843, pp. 1-3: Selborne – J.H. de Villiers, 22 October 1908.

Foreign Office, FO 93/107/9, pp. 1-4: Peace of Vereeniging, 31 May 1902.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 10029, pp. 58-63: L.S. Jameson, Minute, 23 January 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 10029, pp. 58-63: Selborne – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 19 February 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 21317, pp. 69-76: A.R.F. Dorward – R. Haldane, 30 April 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 21317, pp. 69-76: C.H. Rodwell – Assistant Military Secretary at Pretoria, 4 May 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 18 July 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: A.R. Cameron, Memorandum, 19 July 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: Magistrate at Port Nolloth – C.P. Crewe, 27 July 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 30641, pp. 115-116: ‘Arms for Rebels. The Port Nolloth Charge,’ *Cape Times*, 28 July 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, p. 107: A.R. Cameron – C.P. Crewe, 1 August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, pp. 103-106: C.A.L. Yate – A.R. Cameron, 1 August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, pp. 110-113: H.S.S., Précis of Evidence in the Case of Huey and Smith, 3 August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, pp. 108-109: H.S.S., Report, 3 August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, pp. 100-114: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 14 August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 2, p. 114: A.R. Cameron, Memorandum, ca. August 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 367/8, 326, pp. 121-122: T.W. Smartt – W. Hely-Hutchinson, 17 October 1906.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, 1, p. 170: F. Lascelles – T. Sanderson, 6 January 1899.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, 7, pp. 207-208: F. Lascelles – A. Bigge, 2 February 1900.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, 31, pp. 196-197: F. Lascelles – T. Sanderson, 4 October 1899.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, p. 222: Queen Victoria – F. Lascelles, 12 March 1900.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, p. 218: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 3 March 1900.

Foreign Office, FO 800/17, p. 222: Kaiser Wilhelm II – F. Lascelles, 11 March 1900.

Foreign Office, FO 800/18, 18, p. 66: F. Lascelles – Lord Lansdowne, 29 March 1902.

Foreign Office, FO 800/91, p. 57: E. Grey – Elgin, 5 January 1907.

Foreign Office, FO 800/91, p. 203: E. Grey – Lord Crewe, 24 July 1908.

Foreign Office, FO 800/94, pp. 80-81, W. Tyrell, Memorandum, 8 April 1912.

Foreign Office, FO 800/128, pp. 21-22: Lord Gough – Foreign Office, 3 December 1900.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: "I" – "F" (Secret Letter), 1 May 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: J. Burnett-Stuart – C.H. Montgomery, 2 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: "I" – "F" (Secret Letter), 4 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, pp. 1-6: F. Davies – C. Hardinge, 8 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, pp. 1-10: F. Davies – C. Hardinge, 8 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge – F. Davies, 12 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: "I" – "F" (Secret Letter), 20 June 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 26 July 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, pp. 1-2: F. Davies, Secret Memorandum, 1 August 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: E. Grey, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1 August 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 1 August 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Werner – Harold, 15 October 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: E. Grey, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 8 November 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, p. 1: C. Hardinge, Foreign Office Department Minutes, 8 November 1906.

Foreign Office, Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, Correspondence and Papers, HD 3/131, pp. 1-4: J. Burnett-Stuart, Alleged Importation of Arms into British South Africa, 26 December 1906.

War Office, WO 33/416, *Military Report on German South-West Africa*, December 1906.

War Office, WO 33/416, *Addendum I., May, 1908, The Military Report on German South-West Africa, 1906.*

War Office, WO 33/416, *Addendum II., October, 1910, The Military Report on German South-West Africa, 1906.*

War Office, WO 106/47, p. 27: J.E. Edmonds – J.S. Ewart, 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, 9139, pp. 6-7: J.S. Ewart – Methuen, 22 January 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, 9139, p. 51: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Lord Crewe, 16 February 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, 9139, p. 51: Methuen – Selborne, 2 March 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, G.S.S. 15, pp. 10-14: Methuen, Notes on the Preparation of a Plan of Operations against the German Forces in South-West Africa, 8 March 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, 079/2455, pp. 36-37: J. Adye – J.S. Ewart, 4 April 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, pp. 39-45: J.S. Ewart, War with Germany: Operations in South Africa, 16 April 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.9, pp. 54-58: Memorandum on Military Policy in a War with German in S. Africa, May 1909

War Office, WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.7, pp. 29-33: A.G. Duff, Précis of Correspondence on the Subject of Military Operations against German S.W. Africa, 3 May 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, E 2/6/A.3, p. 1: J. Adye – M.O.2., 11 May 1909.

War Office, WO 106/47, pp. 78-132: German South West Africa, 18 April 1910.

War Office, WO 181/208, 6493, p. 1: Military Secretary for Cape Colony – F.T. Henstock, 31 January 1907.

War Office, WO 181/208, 38378, p. 1: German Embassy – Foreign Office, October 1907.

War Office, WO 181/208, 38378, p. 1: F. Lascelles – E. Grey, 21 October 1907.

War Office, WO 181/208, 6493, p. 1: H.S.P. Simon – Staff Captain in Command Reconnaissance Surveys, January 1908.

War Office, WO 181/208, 11105, pp. 1-2: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 10 March 1908.

War Office, WO 181/208, 11106, p. 1: W. Hely-Hutchinson – Elgin, 10 March 1908.

War Office, WO 181/208, 23472, p. 1: Foreign Office, FO – J.F.C. de Salis, July 1909.

War Office, WO 181/208, 23472, p. 1: H.W. Just – Foreign Office, 25 August 1909.

### **National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria**

A1/109, National Convention Papers Nos. 1-131, pp. 1-3: J.C. Smuts, Coloured and Native Franchise, ca. 22 October - 1 November 1908.

A1/109, National Convention Papers Nos. 1-131, pp. 1-2: J.C. Smuts, Franchise, ca. 22 October - 1 November 1908.

A1/109, National Convention Papers Nos. 1-131, p. 1: J.C. Smuts, [Miscellaneous Paper concerning the franchise], ca. 22 October - 1 November 1908.

A1/109, National Convention Papers Nos. 1-131, pp. 1-3: Methuen, Memorandum on Conference on Military Defence Held at Durban, 12 May 1909.

Biblioteek 968.02 HOF, *Volume I: Minutes of Proceedings with Annexures (Selected) of the South African National Convention Held at Durban, Cape Town and Bloemfontein, 12th October, 1908 to 11th May, 1909.*

Biblioteek 968.02 HOF, *Volume II: Minutes of Proceedings with Annexures (Selected) of the South African National Convention Held at Durban, Cape Town and Bloemfontein, 12th October, 1908 to 11th May, 1909.*

CS 383, 9561/03, pp. 1-4: H. Kemball-Cook – P. Duncan, 13 October 1903.

CS 383, 9561/03, pp. 1-4: H. Kemball-Cook – P. Duncan, 22 October 1903.

CS 998, 9/21101, p. 1: Under-Secretary for the Interior – the Government Printer, 21 October 1911.

EC 101, EC275/06, pp. 1-2: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 11 November 1906.

EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1: A.R. Cameron – P. Duncan, 10 November 1906.

EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 12 November 1906.

EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 13 November 1906.

- EC 101, EC275/06, p. 1: W. Hely-Hutchinson – P. Duncan, 14 November 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, pp. 1-5: W. Windham – Private Secretary for R. Solomon, 14 June 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, pp. 1-2: D.O. Malcolm – J. Lyttelton, 21 June 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, pp. 1-16: The Executive of the Transvaal Native Congress, Questions affecting the Native Subjects of His Majesty the King: A Petition respectfully presented to the Honourable the House of Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, ca. 21 June 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, p. 1: J.M. Makhothe – J.S. Marwick, 25 June 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, pp. 1-3: D.O. Malcolm – P.N. Russell, 26 June 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, pp. 1-2: R. Solomon – D.O. Malcolm, 5 July 1906.
- GOV 1012, PS50/35/06, p. 1: D.O. Malcolm – J. Lyttelton, 6 July 1906.
- LD 517, 3694/03, pp. 1-4: J.M. Makhothe – Commissioner of Native Affairs at Pretoria, 5 June 1906.
- LTG 167, TEL1908, p. 1: L. Botha – P. Duncan, 13 November 1906.
- LTG 167, TEL1908, p. 1: ‘The Ferreira Sensation,’ *De Volkstein*, 14 November 1906.
- SNA 214, NA809/04, pp. 1-11: The Stone Movement, 15 June 1904.
- SNA 324, NA1642/06, pp. 1-2: J.S. Marwick – Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 May 1906.
- SNA 418, NA3373/08, pp. 1-3: M.R. Ruoele and the ‘aboriginal Natives of South Africa’, ‘To the President and Members of the National Convention of the British South African Colonies’, 22 October 1908.
- SNA 418, NA3373/08, pp. 1-3: M.R. Ruoele – J. Mphahlele, 30 October 1908.
- SNA 437, NA2418/09, pp. 1-5: J.M. Makhothe – Native Commissioner at Johannesburg, 12 July 1909.

### **Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre (U.K.)**

- 947-490, pp. 1-4: A. Abdurahman – Editor of *The Times*, South African Union and the Coloured Races, 19 May 1909.

947-490, p. 1: H.H. Johnston, The Native Franchise in Cape Colony, 17 July 1909.

947-490, p. 1: W.P. Schreiner, A. Abdurahman, et al. – Unaddressed Newspaper Editor, 21 July 1909.

947-490, p. 1: C. Bruce, The Franchise in South Africa, 22 July 1909.

947-490, p. 1: W.P. Schreiner – Unaddressed Newspaper Editor, 28 July 1909.

## JOURNAL AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

### Journals

AYDELOTTE, W.O., The First German Colony and Its Diplomatic Consequences, *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 5(3), 1937.

ADHIKARI, M., Protest and Accommodation: Ambiguities in the racial politics of the APO, 1909-1923, *Kronos* 20, November 1993.

BADSEY, S., The Boer War (1899-1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation, *The Journal of Military History* 71(1), 2007.

BICKFORD-SMITH, V., Black Ethnicities, Communities and Political Expression in Late Victorian Cape Town, *The Journal of African History* 36(3), 1995.

CAVES, L., The South African War 1899-1902: In Pursuit of a Boer settlement in Madagascar, *Military History Journal* 18(3), December 2018.

COBLEY, A., ‘Lacking in Respect for Whitemen’: ‘Tropical Africans’ on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1903–1904, *International Labor and Working-Class History* 86, 2014.

DE BRUYN, C. and A. MEYER, A Bioarchaeological Analysis of Historical Human Skeletal Remains Recovered from Lancaster Mine, Witwatersrand South Africa, *The South African Archaeological Bulletin* 73(207), June 2018.

DEDERING, T., The Ferreira Raid of 1906: Boers, Britons and Germans in Southern Africa in the Aftermath of the South African War, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), March 2000.

DEDERING, T., The Prophet’s ‘War against Whites’: Shepherd Stuurman in Namibia and South Africa, 1904-7, *The Journal of African History* 40(1), 1999.

DEDERING, T., War and Mobility in the Borderlands of South Western Africa in the Early Twentieth Century, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39(2), 2006.

DENOON, D.J.N., The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6, *The Journal of African History* 8(3), 1967.

DREYER, R., Dispute over Walvis Bay Origins and Implications for Namibian Independence, *African Affairs* 83(333), October 1984.

DREYER, J., Cartridges and chronology: an exercise in relative dating, *Southern African Field Archaeology* 3(1), April 1994.

ELLIS, J., Musketry: The Anglo-Boer War experience, *Historia* 45(2), January 2000.

GEWALD, J.B., The Great General of the Kaiser, *The Botswana Society* 26, 1994.

GEWALD, J.B., 'I Was Afraid of Samuel, Therefore I Came to Sekgoma': Herero Refugees and Patronage Politics in Ngamiland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1890-1914, *The Journal of African History* 43(2), 2002.

GEWALD, J.B., The Road of the Man Called Love and the Sack of Sero: The Herero-German War and the Export of Herero Labour to the South African Rand, *The Journal of African History* 40(1), 1999.

GILIOME, H., The Non-Racial Franchise and Afrikaner and Coloured Identities, 1910-1994, *African Affairs* 94(375), April 1995.

GRIFFITHS, I., Walvis Bay: enclave no more, *Geography* 79(4), October 1994.

GÜNARSLAN, H., Güney Afrika 'da İngiliz-Boer Savaşı ve St. Helena Adası'ndaki Boer Esir Kampları, *Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 7(20), May 2020.

HAMILTON, L., The German Colonies in 1909, *United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal* 1, January 1910.

HYAM, R., African interests and the South Africa Act 1908-1910, *The Historical Journal* 13(1), March 1970.

IRVINE, L.G. and D. MACAULAY, The Life-History of the Native Mine Labourer in the Transvaal, *The Journal of Hygiene* 6(2), April 1906.

KOCH, H.W., The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed Opportunity or Myth? *History* 54(182), October 1969.

KREIENBAUM, J., Guerrilla wars and colonial concentration camps: The exceptional case of German South West Africa, *Journal of Namibian Studies* 11, 2012.

LEACOCK, S., The Union of South Africa, *American Political Science Review* 4(4), November 1910.

LINDNER, U., Imperialism and Globalization: Entanglements and interactions between the British and German colonial empires in Africa before the First World War, *German Historical Institute London (GHIL) Bulletin*, 32(1), 2010.

LINDNER, U., Transnational movements between colonial empires: Migrant workers from the British Cape Colony in the German diamond town of Lüderitzbucht, *European Review of History* 16(5), 2009.

MACKENZIE, K., Some British Reactions to German Colonial Methods, 1885-1907, *The Historical Journal* 17(1), March 1974.

MASSON, J.R., A Fragment of Colonial History: The Killing of Jakob Marengo, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21(2), June 1995.

MELBER, H., How to Come to Terms with the Past: Re-Visiting the German Colonial Genocide in Namibia, *African Spectrum* 40(1), 2005.

NATHAN, A.J., Boer prisoners of war on the Island of St. Helena, *Military History Journal* 2(3), October 1999.

PAPE, E., Postcolonial debates in Germany – An Overview, *African Sociological Review* 21(2), 2017.

PARK, M.H., German South-West African Campaign, *Journal of the Royal African Society* 15(58), January 1916.

PARSONS, T.H., Mobilising Britain's African Empire for War, *Journal of Modern European History* 13(2), 2015.

PEIRES, J., 'The Expenditure of a Million of British Sovereigns in this Otherwise Miserable Place': Frontier Wars, Public Debt and the Cape's Non-racial Constitution, *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 63(147), June 2016.

PREIN, P., Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(1), March 1994.

THOMPSON, P.S., Dinizulu and the Quest for Zulu Paramountcy, 1898-1906, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 49(3), 2016.

THOMPSON, P.S., The Zulu Rebellion of 1906: The Collusion of Bambatha and Dinizulu, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36(3), 2003.

ZOLLMAN, J., Communicating Colonial Order: The Police of German South-West-Africa (c.1894-1915), *Crime, History & Societies* 15(1), 2011.

### **Newspaper Articles**

*Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-09-14.

*Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-09-28.

*Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-10-12.

*Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1914-12-10.

*Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa Tangier Chronicle*, 1915-05-17.

*Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-02-27.

*Cape Daily Telegraph*, 1904-03-01.

*Cape Times*, 1904-02-27.

*Cape Times*, 1907-01-22.

*Cape Times*, 1907-01-24.

*Cape Times*, 1909-01-19.

*Cape Times*, 1909-06-29.

*Cape Times*, 1911-04-04.

*Cape Times*, 1911-04-13.

*Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzantsi Africa*, 1915-06-01.

*The Beira Post*, 1914-08-14.

*The Beira Post*, 1914-08-25.

*The Beira Post*, 1914-09-11.

*The Beira Post*, 1914-09-29.

*The Beira Post*, 1914-10-13.

*The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1914-10-02.

*The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-02-05.

*The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-03-26.

*The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1915-05-21.

*The Christian Express*, 1914-10-01.

*The Christian Express*, 1914-11-02.

*The East African Standard*, 1914-10-17.

*The East African Standard*, 1915-01-16.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1904-02-27.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1904-03-01.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1909-01-22.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1914-09-22.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1914-09-24.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-01-02.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-01-04.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-03-03.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-04-21.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-05-15.

*The Eastern Province Herald*, 1915-07-13.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1911-04-04.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-09-10.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-09-22.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-09-26.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-09-29.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-10-02.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1914-10-26.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1915-01-19.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1915-04-28.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1915-05-18.

*The Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian*, 1915-05-28.

*The Nyasaland Times*, 1915-10-15.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1906-12-22.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-02-26.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-03-12.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-05-21.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-05-28.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-07-02.

*The Public* (Chicago, IL, U.S.A.), 1909-09-03.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1902-11-27.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1903-01-27.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-01-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-03-01.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-03-04.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-03-05.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-03-10.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-03-14.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-04-01.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-04-06.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-04-11.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-05-09.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-05-11.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-05-14.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-06-13.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-07-14.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-08-05.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-10-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-10-25.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-01.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-04.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-07.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-11.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-17.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-11-21.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1904-12-28.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1905-01-03.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1905-03-05.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1905-03-10.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1905-07-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1905-10-26.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1906-11-13.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1906-12-24.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1906-12-31.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-01-16.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-03-05.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-05-09.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-05-18.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-07-15.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-08-15.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-08-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-08-20.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1907-11-07.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1908-04-21.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1908-11-26.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1908-12-29.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-01-05.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-01-08.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-02-09.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-02-11.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-02-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-06-01.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-07-09.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-07-20.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-07-24.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-08-13.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-08-20.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-08-24.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-08-26.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-08-27.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-09-04.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1909-11-06.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-04-02.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-04-14.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-05-17.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-06-13.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-09-10.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1910-11-25.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1911-03-30.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1911-04-01.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1911-04-04.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1912-02-19.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1912-02-26.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1912-06-20.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1912-07-31.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1912-12-10.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1913-07-30.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1913-08-16.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1913-10-27.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1913-12-17.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1913-12-29.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-02-14.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-03-06.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-03-12.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-06-20.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-08-22.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-09-09.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-09-10.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-09-11.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-10-12.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-10-22.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1914-10-26.

*The Rand Daily Mail*, 1915-07-13.

*The Register* (Australia), 1904-07-28.

*The Times*, 1909-07-28.

## **LITERATURE**

ADHIKARI, M., *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community*, Athens, OH, U.S.A.: Ohio University Press, 2005.

AKWEENDA, S., *International Law and the Protection of Namibia's Territorial Integrity: Boundaries and Territorial Claims*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997.

AYDELOTTE, W.O., *Bismarck and British Colonial Rule: The Problem of South West Africa, 1883-1885*, New York: Octagon Books, 1974.

BECKVOLD, C.H., *The Transvaal Constitution and Responsible Government: How Churchill influenced Apartheid*, M.A. – Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Boston, 2014.

BEINART, W., 'Jamani': Cape Workers in German South-West Africa, 1904-12, in W. Beinart and C. Bundy (eds.), *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930*, Oxford: James Currey, 1987.

BLEY, H., Social Discord in South West Africa, 1894-1904, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967.

BLEY, H., *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914*, Evanston, IL, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

BRIDGMAN, J.M., *The Revolt of the Hereros*, Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1981.

BROOKES, E.H., *White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910: Varieties in Governmental Policies affecting Africans*, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1974.

BUTLER, J., The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967.

CAIN, P.J., and A.G. HOPKINS, *British Imperialism: 1688-2000*, Harlow, England: Longman Press, 2002.

CANNADINE, D., *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

CARTER, G.M., and T. KARIS, (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Volume I: Protest and Hope, 1882-1934*, Stanford, CA, U.S.A.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972.

CELL, J.W., *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

CHURCHILL, R.S., *Winston S. Churchill: "Young Statesman," 1901-1914. Vol. 2*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.

CHURCHILL, R.S. (ed.), *Winston S. Churchill: "Young Statesman," 1901-1907 Companion Vol. 2: Part 1*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.

CHURCHILL, R.S. (ed.), *Winston S. Churchill: "Young Statesman," 1907-1911 Companion Vol. 2: Part 2*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.

CHURCHILL, W., E. GREY, and D. LLOYD GEORGE, Der Haldane-Mission in J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme, (eds), *Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, XXXI: Das Scheitern*

*der Haldane-Mission und ihre Rückwirkung auf die Tripelentente 1911 - 1912* (Berlin: Deutsche verlagsgesellschaft für politik und geschichte, 1927)

COBLEY, A. (ed.), *From Cattle Herding to Editor's Chair: The Unfinished Autobiography and Writings of Richard Victor Selope Thema*, Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 2016.

COOK, A., *M: MI5's First Spymaster*, Cheltenham, U.K.: The History Press, 2011.

CURSON, P., *Border Conflicts in a German African Colony: Jakob Morengo and the Untold Tragedy of Edward Presgrave*, Bury St. Edmunds, U.K.: Arena Books, 2012.

DARWIN, J., *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970*, 5th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

DAVENPORT, T.R.H., *The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African Political Party, 1880-1911*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

DUBOW, S., *Imagining the New South Africa in the Era of Reconstruction*, in D. Omissi and A.S. Thompson (eds.), *The Impact of the South African War*, New York: Palgrave, 2002.

DUBOW, S., *South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, Belonging, Citizenship*, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

DUMINY, A.H., and W.R. GUEST, (eds.), *Fitzpatrick South African Politician Selected Papers, 1888-1906*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976.

EVANS, I.L., *Native Policy in Southern Africa: An Outline*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934.

FIALA, R.D., *The Anglo-German agreement over Portugal's African colonies, 1898*, M.A. – Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Omaha, 1963.

GILBERT, M., *Churchill: A Life*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1991.

GILIOME, H. and L. SCHLEMMER, *From Apartheid to Nation-building*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

GRENVILLE, J.A.S., *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century*, London: The Athlone Press, 1970.

GRIMSHAW, D., *Britain's Response to the Herero and Nama Genocide, 1904-07: A Realist Perspective on Britain's Assistance to Germany During the Genocide in German South-West Africa*, M.A. – Dissertation, Uppsala Universitet, 2014.

HANCOCK, W.K. and J. VAN DER POEL, (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume II June 1902-May 1910*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

HAYES, P., J. SILVESTER, and M. WALLACE, “Trees Never Meet” Mobility and Containment: An Overview, 1915-1946, in P. Hayes, J. Silvester, M. Wallace, and W. Hartmann (eds.), *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915-1946*, Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 1998.

HEADLAM, C., (ed.), *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1899-1905, Volume II*, London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1933.

HINSLEY, F.H., British Foreign Policy and Colonial Questions, 1895-1904, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

HINSLEY, F.H., Great Britain and the Powers, 1904-1914, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

HINSLEY, F.H., International Rivalry, 1885-1895, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

HOMS, J., *Markets for Agricultural Implements and Machinery in South Africa*, United States: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917.

HYAM, R., Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in the Colonial Empire, in J.M. Brown and W.R. Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, Volume IV*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

HYAM, R., *Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth*, London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1968.

HYAM, R., *Understanding the British Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

HYAM, R. and P. HENSHAW, *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

JABAVU, D.D.T., *The Life of John Tengo Jabavu, Editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, 1884-1921*, King William’s Town, R.S.A.: Lovedale Institution Press, 1922.

JEBB, R., *The Imperial Conference: A History and Study, Volume II*, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911.

JONES, S., *From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914*. Norman, OK, U.S.A.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012.

KEITH, A.B., *The Sovereignty of the British Dominions*, London: MacMillan & Co. Limited, 1929.

KENNEDY, P.M., *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914*, London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers Limited, 1982.

KENNEDY, W.P.M., and H.J. SCHLOSBERG, *The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution: A Treatise on the Constitutional and Administrative Law of the Union of South Africa, the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa, and the South African Territories*, London: Oxford University Press, 1935.

KESTELL, J.D., and D.E. VAN VELDEN, *The Peace Negotiations: Between the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, and the Representatives of the British Government, which terminated in the Peace concluded at Vereeniging on the 31 May, 1902*, London: Richard Clay & Sons, Ltd., 1912.

LEGASSICK, M., *Hidden Histories of Gordonia: Land dispossession and resistance in the Northern Cape, 1800-1990*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016.

LE MAY, G.H.L., *British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1907*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.

LE MAY, G.H.L., *The Afrikaners: An Historical Interpretation*, Hoboken, NJ, U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.

LEWSEN, P. (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman, 1905-1924*, Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1969.

LOUIS, W.R., Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967.

LOWE, C.J., *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902*, London: The Macmillan Company, 1967.

MAGUBANE, B.M., *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875-1910*, Trenton, NJ, U.S.A.: Africa World Press, Inc., 1996.

MANSERGH, N., *South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962.

MARKS, S., Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

MARKS, S., *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-08 Disturbances in Natal*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

MARKS, S., War and Union, 1899-1910, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

MARKS, S. and R. RATHBONE (eds.), *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930*, Boston: Addison-Wesley Longman Limited, 1982.

MARKS, S. and S. TRAPIDO (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa*, Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 1987.

MASSIE, R.K., *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War*, New York: Random House, 1991.

MAY, H.J., *The South African Constitution*, 3rd ed., Johannesburg: Juta & CO., Limited, 1955.

METROWICH, F.C., *Scotty Smith: South Africa's Robin Hood*, 3rd ed., Cape Town: Books of Africa (Pty), Limited, 1983.

MILNER, A., *The Nation and the Empire: Being a Collection of Speeches and Addresses*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913.

MORGAN, T., *Churchill: Young Man in a Hurry, 1874-1915*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982.

MOFFAT, J.S., *The Black Man and the War*, Cape Town: The South African Vigilance Committee, 1900.

NASSON, B., *Abraham Esau's War: A Black South African War in the Cape 1899-1902*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

OMER-COOPER, J.D., *History of Southern Africa*, Portsmouth, NH, U.S.A.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1987.

PADFIELD, P., *The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900-1914*, Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2005.

PAKENHAM, T., *The Boer War*, New York: Random House, 1979.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, *Parliamentary Papers Accounts and Papers: Colonies and Possessions – Africa, Session 16 January 1902-18 December 1902*, Vol. LXVI, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1902.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND HIS MAJESTY, KING EDWARD VII, *Transvaal. Transvaal Constitution, [6 December] 1906. Letters Patent and Instructions relating to the Transvaal; and Swaziland Order in Council*, Original Parliamentary Blue Book, London: Harrison and Sons, 1906.

PLAATJE, S.T., *A Native Life in South Africa*, Athens, OH, U.S.A.: Ohio University Press, 1991.

PLAUT, M., *Promise and Despair: The First Struggle for a Non-Racial South Africa*, Johannesburg: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., 2016.

PORTER, A.N., *The origins of the South African war: Joseph Chamberlain and the diplomacy of imperialism 1895-99*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980.

PORTER, B., *Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2008.

PORTER, B., *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-2004*, London: Pearson Longman Publishing, 2004.

PYRAH, G.B., *Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-1910*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955.

ROBINSON, R., J. GALLAGHER, and A. DENNY, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, London: MacMillan, 1981.

ROSS, R., *A Concise History of South Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

ROSS, R., A.K. MAGER, and B. NASSON (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

RÜGER, J., *Heligoland: Britain, Germany, and the Struggle for the North Sea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

SAUNDERS, C., African attitudes to Britain and the Empire before and after the South African War, in D. Lowry (ed.), *The South African War reappraised*, New York: Manchester University Press, 2000.

SELIGMANN, M.S., F. NÄGLER, and M. EPKENHANS (eds.), *The Naval Route to the Abyss: The Anglo-German Naval Race 1895-1914*, Burlington, VT, U.S.A.: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015.

SILBURN, P.A., *South Africa: White and Black – or Brown*, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1927.

SMITH, I.R., *The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902*, New York: Longman Publishing, 1996.

STRACHAN, H., *The First World War in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

SWANSON, M.W., South West Africa in Trust, 1915-1939, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967.

SWITZER, L., *Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of South Africa*, Madison, WI, U.S.A.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.

THOMPSON, L.M., *A History of South Africa, Revised Edition*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1995.

THOMPSON, L.M., The Compromise of Union, in L.M. Thompson and M. Wilson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa Volume II, 1870-1966*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971.

THOMPSON, L.M., *The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910*, London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

THOMPSON, L.M. and M. WILSON (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa Volume II, 1870-1966*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971.

TOMES, J., *Balfour and foreign policy: The international thought of a Conservative statesman*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

TORRANCE, D.E., *The Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in South Africa*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.

TRAPIDO, S. Imperialism, Settler Identities, and Colonial Capitalism: The Hundred-Year Origins of the 1899 South African War, in R. Ross, A.K. Mager, and B. Nasson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2, 1885-1994*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

TUNSTALL, W.C.B., Imperial Defence, 1897-1914, in E.A. Benians, J.R.M. Butler, and C.E. Carrington (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

TURNER, JR., H.A., Bismarck's Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?, in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, CT, U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1967.

VAN DER ROSS, R.E. (ed.), *Say It Out Loud: The A.P.O. Presidential Addresses and other Major Political Speeches 1906-1940 of Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman*, Bellville: Western Cape Institute for Historical Research (IHR), University of the Western Cape, 1990.

WALLACE, M., *A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990*, London: Hurst & Co., 2011.

WALKER, E.A., *W.P. Schreiner: A South African*, London: Oxford University Press, 1937.

WALTON, E.H., *The Inner History of The National Convention of South Africa*, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912.

WAUGH, A.S., *Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman: A Scottish Life and UK Politics 1836-1908*, London: Austin Macauley Publishers, 2019.

WEIR, G.E., *Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919*, Annapolis, MD, U.S.A.: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

WILLAN, B., *Sol Plaatje Selected Writings*, Athens, OH, U.S.A.: Ohio University Press, 1996.

WORDEN, N., *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, and Democracy*, Malden, MA, U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

WORSFOLD, W.B., *Lord Milner's Work in South Africa: From Its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902*, London: Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Ltd., 1906.

YOKELL, M.A., *The treaty of Helgoland-Zanzibar: the beginning of the end for the Anglo-German friendship*, M.A. – Dissertation, University of Richmond, 2010.

#### ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SOURCES

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 'South Africa – Conduct of the War', 21 January 1902, Volume No. 101, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1902-01-21/debates/d914df51-3fac-4338-b508-c3d27992f2ec/SouthAfrica—CouductOfTheWar?highlight=german%20colonies%20africa#contribution-77212ade-6e7d-407b-a4a1-1d3700f4712a>>, s.a. Access: 2021-03-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 'Class V', 15 July 1902, Volume No. 111, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1902-07-15/debates/52b461ee-012f-4164-8103-f8bd6b6af719/ClassV?highlight=german%20colonies%20africa#contribution-4a41e8ec-5b46-45af-b9b5-a6f17a00c7b9>>, s.a. Access: 2021-03-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 'Rhodesia', 11 August 1904, Volume No. 140, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1904-08-11/debates/bbec434e-922f-437d-b532-1d36fe92d2a2/Rhodesia?highlight=german%20colonies>>, s.a. Access: 2021-03-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 'The Transvaal and Orange River Colonies', 26 February 1906, Vol. 152, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1906-02-26/debates/eeb87351-659a-474f-92b7-f3258a744692/TheTransvaalAndOrangeRiverColonies>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, ‘The Transvaal and Orange River Colonies’, 27 February 1906, Vol. 152, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1906-02-27/debates/62c7ff44-dc2c-4e78-a9a7-ac24c0695e9f/TheTransvaalAndOrangeRiverColonies>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘South African Native Races’, 28 February 1906, Vol. 152, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1906-02-28/debates/e2d30bf4-8025-4820-99e0-263cb8810cd6/SouthAfricanNativeRaces>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘Germany And British South West Africa’, 16 May 1906, Volume No. 157, <<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1906/may/16/germany-and-british-south-west-africa>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, ‘The Transvaal Constitution’, 31 July 1906, Vol. 162, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1906-07-31/debates/3b8e3b40-c483-408d-9020-baa9b1c92685/TheTransvaalConstitution>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘Ex-President Steyn and the Orange River Franchise’, 28 November 1906, Vol. 166, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1906-11-28/debates/250063c8-2a86-469c-872a-f9901fcc724e/Ex-PresidentSteynAndTheOrangeRiverFranchise>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘Transvaal and Orange River Colonies (Constitutions)’, 17 December 1906, Vol. 167, <<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1906/dec/17/transvaal-and-orange-river-colonies>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘Native Affairs (South Africa)’, 13 May 1908, Vol. 188, <[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1908/may/13/native-affairs-south-africa#S4V0188P0\\_19080513\\_HOC\\_354](https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1908/may/13/native-affairs-south-africa#S4V0188P0_19080513_HOC_354)>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘South Africa Union Bill (Delegates and Government Conference)’, 27 July 1909, Vol. 8, <<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1909/jul/27/south-africa-union-bill-delegates-and>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, ‘South Africa Bill’, 27 July 1909, Vol. 2, <[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1909/jul/27/south-africa-bill-hl#S5LV0002P0\\_19090727\\_HOL\\_26](https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1909/jul/27/south-africa-bill-hl#S5LV0002P0_19090727_HOL_26)>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, ‘South Africa Bill’, 3 August 1909, Vol. 2, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1909-08-03/debates/997db036-3677-4cb0-857f-652f4d6cc04c/SouthAfricaBillHl>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.

UNITED KINGDOM, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, ‘Clause 35 – (Qualifications of Voters)’, 19 August 1909, Vol. 9, <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1909-08-19/debates/9ec1e85a-76bb-4686-a4e3-434adfd0b80e/Clause35%E2%80%94>>, s.a. Access: 2019-06-22.