

easy and commerce lucrative. In the autumn the sailors have but to spread their broad lateen sails to the north-east monsoon to be driven, faster than a European square-rigged ship, or than any but the fastest steamers can follow, to the African coast. There they have only to wait till the summer season brings the south-west monsoon, to be wafted back with equal ease and swiftness to the shores of Arabia, the Persian Gulf, or Western India.

For two centuries the Portuguese were the ruling maritime power, alike on the coasts of India, as far north as Muscat on the Persian Gulf, where the walls of their cathedral are still standing, and on the East Coast of Africa in its whole extent. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, their supremacy was contested by the ships of the Imam of Muscat, chief of the Arab tribes of Oman, the name given to an undefined region in the south-east corner of Arabia and on the west shore of the Persian Gulf. The power of the degenerate Portuguese gradually gave way before the Arabs of Oman, who exercised a sort of organized and disciplined piracy, mitigated by certain rules and customs which deprived it in popular estimation of its disreputable and lawless character; and trade was carried on with comparative safety by merchant ships under their license and protection.

As the English power became paramount in India, the safety of the seas became a matter of concern to the Indian Government. The Bombay Marine was established, which afterwards developed into the Indian Navy. In 1798 a treaty was made with the ruler of Oman by the East India Company, and in 1800 an English Resident was established at Muscat.

About this time part of Arabia was overrun by the Wahabees, a fanatical sect, of whose religious and political creed it is enough to say that it legalized the indiscriminate

plunder and thralldom of all people, Muslim as well as unbelievers, beyond its own pale. The Wahabees were a constant source of irritation and danger to the Omani; with such fanatics there could be no permanent truce, and though, later on, their capital, Nejd, was taken and occupied by Ibrahim Pasha with his Egyptian army, the sect still spread and made itself formidable.

In 1804 began the reign of Seyyid Said, commonly called—though he laid no claim to the title—Imam or Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar. Throughout his long reign till his death in 1856, he was the faithful ally of the English. Several operations were conducted by the Indian fleet, conjointly with him, for repelling the Wahabees and for suppressing the independent piratical tribes of the Persian Gulf and destroying their strongholds, operations which so far succeeded that, in 1820, the chiefs of all the maritime tribes were constrained to sign a treaty, binding them to a perpetual maritime truce, and to accept the arbitration of the British Agent in the Gulf in case of intertribal disputes. From 1829 to 1844 the Seyyid lived chiefly at Zanzibar, and gradually occupied, sometimes with the assistance of the English, almost every considerable sea-port and all the islands off the coast from near Brava, north, to Cape Delgado, south, of Zanzibar, about twelve degrees of latitude. He had a considerable fleet of ships, fairly manned, and armed after the English fashion. One of them he sent as a present to King William the Fourth, which was placed on the Navy list as H.M.S. *Imam*—a serviceable teak-built frigate. The trade on the coast increased and flourished. Zanzibar grew into an important place. Indian merchants were followed thither by English, Germans, French, and Americans. Foreign consuls of each nationality were established, each of whom contrived to obtain for his countrymen a treaty with a

“most favoured nation” clause, which added to the difficulties of raising revenue.

In Saïd’s absence at Zanzibar, troubles had arisen in Arabia ; the Persians as well as the Wahabees were threatening his territory of Oman ; the Indian Government, it is to be feared, was vacillating in its attitude towards him ; and his later years brought him disappointment and misfortune. In 1856 he was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty with Persia, shortly after which he died, leaving behind him a reputation as a wise and able ruler, and classed by his countrymen in the same rank with Runjeet Sing, Dost Mohammed, and Mohammed Ali.

He left fifteen sons, of whom the eldest, Thouaini, succeeded him at Muscat, and the fourth, Majid, at Zanzibar. These two were each prepared to claim and fight for the undivided inheritance of sovereignty, but referred their dispute to Lord Canning, who deputed Sir W. Coghlan, the Resident at Aden, and Dr. Badger, the great Arabic scholar, to report. The award confirmed the division as it stood, and directed Majid, as having the richer territory, to pay forty thousand dollars annually to Thouaini. The compromise was accepted.

But in a few years difficulties began to arise at Zanzibar. The payments to Thouaini were not made. The slave-trade was increasing, which the Sultan of Zanzibar was bound by treaty to put down. The treaty did not interfere with slavery as an established institution in the country, and slaves might be conveyed from port to port within the territory ; but this was taken advantage of to convey slaves in large numbers to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf—a traffic which the British cruisers could do but little to impede.

Matters were in this state when, early in 1861, Pelly reached Calcutta after his perilous journey from Persia

through Affghanistan. Frere, finding that Lord Canning had no employment for him, wrote to Sir George Clerk at Bombay on his behalf. Clerk telegraphed back offering him a sort of roving commission as Political Agent on the East Coast of Africa. Pelly immediately accepted, went to Zanzibar, where he obtained Majid's assent to all that was asked of him, and then sailed down the coast, visiting the different ports and gathering information. In September the *Semiramis*, the ship in which he was, was shipwrecked on Johanna, one of the Comoro islands, and he was detained a month there till he could get a vessel to take him away to Zanzibar.

Frank, straightforward, ardent, fond of adventure, and fearless, Pelly was ready for any service, the more novel and hazardous the better. His shrewdness, tact, and ready wit generally carried him safely and successfully through the various dangers and difficulties he had to encounter. From the time that he first served under Frere in Sind, the latter had treated him with cordiality and affection, and had done his best to obtain suitable employment for him. Pelly returned Frere's kindness by entire devotion. Writing to Lady Frere some years after his death, he says—

“You say truly that I *loved* Sir Bartle, and that I always felt, when I had the privilege—as I often had—of being received under his and your roof, that I was at home, and with those in whose good will and noble encouragement I had full and implicit confidence. Had I been his son I could not have loved and respected him more than I did, and all possible considerations have been as nothing to me compared with the pleasure I felt in being admitted to his personal friendship. I often ponder all he was to me, and his loss is irreparable—so gentle, so sweet, so considerate, so tender to one's faults, and so bold and firm in support when one tried to serve him honestly and fearlessly.”

Frere, shortly after his appointment as Governor of Bombay, writes to Pelly :—

“ May 17, 1862.

“It seems to me that we may have the cares and responsibilities, if not the other attributes of a great empire, half African, half Arabian, thrust on us, whether we will or no, and I often wish I knew whether anything, and what, occurred to you as better to be done than the just waiting-on-Providence policy which we have hitherto followed in South East Africa.

“All seems just now to hang on this great slavery question which you have brought forward in a way which must, I think, command attention and bear good fruit. . . .

“Now, I want you, my dear Pelly, to tell me, as your old friend, and not as Governor in Council, how you feel you can best apply your abilities to do good in your generation? It seems to me that you have a very magnificent future of usefulness open to you in East Africa, if your situation were put on its proper footing, and I might be able, and would gladly do what I can, to support you in that direction. But if your heart turns towards the tamer routine of Indian official life, the opportunity may not be wanting of showing how I value what you have done, and how highly I estimate what you can do.”

Pelly returned to Bombay in November, 1862. As to the slave-trade, his opinion, founded on what he had seen, was that it was not to be suppressed all at once, or by forcible means solely, or even mainly. The captures which had been made by the English cruisers had of late been comparatively few, and had not had altogether a good effect. Some of them had been really illegal and contrary to treaty, owing to the difficulty of determining the true destination of the boats captured, and had to a certain extent created an impression of overbearing conduct on our part, rather than of disinterested intentions towards the slaves. Slavery Pelly believed to be a social evil indigenous to the country, which could be eradicated only by degrees, by establishing free-labour settlements and

by encouraging commerce, which would gradually lead the old piratical trading spirit into other channels and bring outside influences to bear upon the ideas and manners of the inhabitants.

These views coincided generally with Frere's,* and also with those of Dr. Livingstone,† who had stayed some time with Frere at Bombay, in 1864 and 1865, and who afterwards from time to time wrote to him from Africa.

Pelly did not stay long at Bombay. He was sent out by Frere as *locum tenens* for the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was on furlough. But he needed change of climate, and after a time went home to England. He returned in October, 1865, and the British Resident having retired, he was appointed in his place.

The Seyyid Thouaini had none of his father's energy. The Wahabees were encroaching on the Muscat sea-board, and were carrying on an active importation of slaves for sale in Arabia and Persia. They had sacked two Muscat towns, and besides plundering many, had murdered one or two of the peaceable Hindoo traders who carried on most of the commerce of those seas, and many of whom were British subjects.‡ Thouaini was miserably inert; but at length, urged by his own subjects and by Pelly's remonstrances, he took the field. He released from prison Toorkee, an able but somewhat troublesome brother, and set him at the head of his troops. An English ship was

* Frere to Sir Charles Wood, June 23, 1863.

† Livingstone arrived at Bombay in 1864, having come across from Zanzibar with a native crew in a small lake steamer. Thence he returned to England, and the following year revisited Bombay to make preparations for his last great journey. He took with him to Africa some negro lads from the Church Missionary's establishment for rescued slaves at Nassick, some of whom, in 1873, brought his body all the way from Ujiji to England.

‡ Frere to Lord De Grey, March 13, 1866.

to aid him by sea, and he was to have help to equip his neglected fleet.

In the Gulf there was only one English warship, the *Highflyer*, Captain Pasley, and the Resident's steam yacht, the *Berenice*. In accordance with instructions from Colonel Pelly, Captain Pasley commenced hostilities against Damaun, a Wahabee town on the coast. The water was too shallow to admit of the heavy boats approaching within twelve hundred yards of the shore; but without taking the precaution of reconnoitring the fort the crews of two light cutters went on to the assault. After wading three hundred yards through the mud, they carried the lower story with a rush, only to find gates and walls, manned by numerous marksmen, opposed to them. To scale these was impossible, and they had to retire with a loss of two killed and an officer and two men wounded. The *Highflyer* then returned to Muscat, where Pelly joined her in the *Berenice*, and after destroying the forts of Soor, south of Muscat, the *Highflyer* sailed to Bombay, and the *Berenice* up the Gulf to Cape Mussendon.

That same day (February 13, 1866), as Seyyid Thouaini was resting at Sohar, a town on the coast a little way north of Muscat, his son Salem came stealthily in and shot him, or caused him to be shot, through the head as he slept.

Hearing a rumour of what had happened, Pelly went immediately to Sohar in the *Berenice*. Salem came to meet him and try to deceive him as to the cause of his father's death. But Pelly had ascertained the truth, and peremptorily demanded the release of Toorkee, the murdered ruler's brother, whom Salem had shut up in a dungeon. Toorkee was released and came on board the *Berenice* for safety, shivering and trembling, with nothing on but his shirt. The *Berenice* then went on to Muscat,

where all was in confusion, and Pelly, having no force on the spot to back him, sailed away to await instructions, and soon afterwards returned to Bombay.

A parricide usurper in alliance with Wahabee robbers and slave-traders was not an ally to be desired, especially when his co-operation was wanted for promoting commerce and putting down the slave-traffic, and Frere and Pelly hoped that our Government would have had nothing to say to him. But the Government of India confined itself to finding fault with Pelly for everything he had done, and would give him no intelligible or definite instructions for his future guidance. Frere, on the contrary, thought he had behaved exceedingly well, and wrote to Lawrence in his defence.

“March 23, 1866.

“The repulse at Damaun was certainly very annoying, and the loss of the four brave fellows killed a very lamentable and, it may be said, a very useless expenditure of valuable life. But in apportioning the blame, I think we should consider that the season for naval operations was drawing to a close, that the Admiralty peremptorily forbids the retention of ships in the gulf after the hot weather sets in, and that if the navy was to do anything it was necessary to do it quickly.

“Of course if Colonel Pelly had been on board the information would have been better, the reconnoitring more complete, and the attack would probably have succeeded with possibly no loss; but is Colonel Pelly to blame for not going with the *Highflyer*?

“I certainly think not. He could not be in two places at once, and he was much more wanted at Muscat and with the Sultan than up the gulf. The naval operations were merely auxiliary, the main object was to rouse the Sultan to use his own very ample forces by land to repel the Wahabee aggression. This Colonel Pelly could not do unless he kept close to the Sultan. He did stay close to him and did rouse him, and would have made him do for himself all that was needed had not his parricide son cut him off by a crime which no one could foresee, and

which was so improbable in itself that the poor Sultan when warned by a faithful slave refused to believe it possible.

“Colonel Pelly is, I believe, the first Resident who ever stirred from Bushire except on a holiday trip. He has done his best by personal activity and exertion to make up for the want of a more numerous agency, and has almost literally carried his life in his hand in visiting not only all the shores of the gulf, but in his most perilous journey to Riadh, and this year in his trip through Oman. . . .

“In sending his native agent with the *Highflyer*, Colonel Pelly did the utmost he could, and that at great personal inconvenience and considerable risk to himself ; he advised Captain Pasley to go *via* Bahrein, where he would have got any pilots and information he could require, and had he done this and reconnoitred with ordinary caution, he would either not have attacked the fort at all, or ensured its capture and destruction with little risk of loss.

“Do I, then, blame Captain Pasley and his officers for their rashness? I should be very sorry to do anything of the kind. Of course what they did was very rash, but so are all stormings and boardings and cuttings out. It is owing to such rashness, joined to other great qualities, that our navy is what it is. We should have thought them very fine fellows if they had succeeded, and I trust the Admiralty will not think the worse of them for having honourably failed in an enterprise so desperate that few but British troops would have attempted it, and in which none could have been defeated with so little disgrace.”

In another letter, Frere suggested that Colonel Pelly should go and see Sir J. Lawrence at Simla.

“April 13, 1866.

“There is so much which it is difficult to write, and so easy to understand by oral discussion, that I believe an hour’s conversation with him would save you many hours’ reading and writing ; and it is so much easier to instruct and obey a man you have seen, that I feel sure it would be every way advantageous if you could see him.”

Lawrence writes in reply :—

" April 21, 1866.

"I would not ask Colonel Pelly to come up to Simla, more particularly at such an inclement season of the year. If necessary he might come across on my return to Calcutta. I do not, however, desire to arrange myself for the policy to be adopted in the Persian Gulf. I would prefer that all that was done was carried by or through your Government. What that policy is will mainly depend, no doubt, on the views of the authorities at home. If I have any influence on that policy, I should advise that we interfere as little as may be practicable in the affairs of the Arab tribes on the sea-board, and of course still less with those of the tribes in the interior of the country. I would be slow to take up the cause of natives of India, or their descendants who call themselves British subjects, for injuries received in the country, and where I did so, I would confine the interference, as a rule, to remonstrance. Unless we act in this way, we shall make enemies and not friends of these Arab tribes, and our interference will be misrepresented, misunderstood, and, when opportunity offers, will be resented also.

"I would confine our labours, as a rule, to the suppression of piracy on the high seas. This seems to me quite as much as we can undertake with any advantage."

Thus Frere could get no definite instructions for himself or for Pelly, verbal or written, beyond general advice to be inactive.

He writes, in answer to Lawrence :—

" April 29.

"With the advantage of your own letters before me, an advantage which Colonel Pelly does not possess, I can understand clearly enough your own views. But you must forgive me for saying that it will be impossible to carry them out without a total reversal of our policy of the last half century in these parts.

"The policy of non-interference which you describe might have been a very convenient one two generations ago, as it would have been in China or Japan, in Turkey or Egypt.

"But for the last forty-five years at least, our policy from Bahrein to Rasel Had has been one of active interference

and avowed assumption of the duty and responsibility of protecting general commerce. Trade has greatly increased, not less, I believe, than fourfold in forty years. It has been generally under the British flag and carried on by men who claimed protection as British subjects, and received it from the Resident, who had always an efficient squadron at his command, and used it very freely to enforce his demands.

“This system has been popular even with the Arabs themselves. They begin to find commerce profitable, and though you cannot convert pirates into merchants in one generation, much is being done to reclaim them. They look with dread, so Salem’s own envoys tell me, to being cast off by us, and if we abdicate the position of general arbiters and active preservers of the peace which we have occupied so long, I have no doubt some other naval power, probably the French, will be invited or will invite themselves and will step in. . . .

“As for remonstrance with the Arabs, I need hardly remind you that it will be effective in exact proportion to their estimate of our power and intention to use it in enforcing our remonstrances.

“In acting as he did at Soor and Khatiff, Colonel Pelly did exactly, I believe, what his predecessors had been in the habit of doing under similar circumstances. We have sent you copies, I believe, of every letter we sent him. The position is one in which a very large discretion must always, I think, be entrusted to the Political Agent, and when it is impossible to refer for orders and he acts for the best, great allowance should, I think, be made for him, even if all does not turn out as he expected.”

The French were more nearly gaining a footing in the Persian Gulf than the Government of India dreamt of. Colonel Merewether, who was on his way home on leave, writes to Frere from Alexandria :—

“May 26, 1866.

“I met Palgrave* at Suez and had about an hour’s most interesting talk with him. He told me in confidence, what I may communicate to you in the same way, that

* Gifford Palgrave, the traveller and orientalist.

the main object of the journey he was sent upon by Napoleon, was to report on the position and proceedings of the English in the Persian Gulf, and to recommend a place for a French settlement there. He had presents for, and authority to close a bargain with, the Imaum, if he had the opportunity—but his wreck and the absence of the Imaum from Muscat when he was there, prevented his doing anything. . . .”

Pelly went back to the gulf with orders from Calcutta to recognize the parricide Salem, and to do the best he could with him and the Wahabee Chief. The confident and determined attitude he maintained was successful. Frere writes to Captain Eastwick:—

“ May 12, 1866.

“ Pelly writes that the Wahabees have given in on all points and ‘paid the money.’ I suppose he means the compensation for the British subjects murdered and plundered by the Wahabees in one of their raids on a Muscat port. I hope this will satisfy Sir John Lawrence that our protectorate over British subjects in those parts is not such an empty form as he has supposed. But I fear it will not be easy to remove from Pelly’s mind the very unpleasant impression that he was judged by the Government of India after the event, and that they would have thrown him over, had anything gone wrong, without reference to his deserts or to anything but success.”

And to Lord John Hay he writes:—

“ May 3, 1866.

“ Up to the present time the orders of the Government of India are enough to puzzle any plain man—like nothing I ever read save *Punch’s* caricature of the orders of the Admiral in the Baltic. The fact is I doubt whether the Government of India has at present any foreign policy beyond a sort of resolve to “keep within our shell,” as they call it, and not to incur risk or expense for anything which may happen beyond the jurisdiction of our High Courts. This is a tempting sort of policy and looks safe and cheap, but it is not easy to carry out where we have treaties, and other obligations and responsibilities as strong

as treaties, incurred by men of old time who knew what honour and empire meant; and one of these days we shall reap bitter fruit from our present selfish and timid way of dealing with all our independent neighbours."

Included, like the Persian Gulf and Zanzibar, within the jurisdiction and authority of the Bombay Government was Aden, the key of the Red Sea and of the ocean highway from Europe to India, China, Australia, and the East Coast of Africa. There also the question arose of activity or inactivity, of an advancing or receding British influence.

Sir W. Coghlan, who commanded there when Frere went to Bombay, wrote thence, early in 1863, that Sheebur and Maculla, two places on the opposite coast, were two of the greatest slave depôts, and that at that time there were two thousand slaves at the latter place, and many also at the former, ready for despatch to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. He went on to say that he had succeeded beyond his expectations in obtaining treaties binding the chiefs of those places to stop the traffic, which he hoped the Government would provide him with the means of enforcing, if necessary. Coghlan's command ended in 1863. He was succeeded by Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Merewether.

Merewether, already mentioned as a worthy disciple of Jacob's school, had succeeded him in the command of the Sind frontier at his death in 1858. "It was solely owing to his excellent judgment and power of command," Frere writes, "that he was so little heard of in 1857-58. He maintained order and cheerful obedience where inferior men would have let matters come to a crisis, and perhaps have earned great repute in dealing with it." Frere, on going to Bombay, at once offered him the post of military secretary to Government. Merewether, thinking only of the duty entrusted to him and

not of his own advancement, answered gratefully that he felt he could not be spared from the frontier; that if he went, others would go too, as opportunity offered, and that the charge—laborious and shunned save by enthusiasts—would fall into weak hands, and Jacob's work be undone. But a few days' reflection convinced him that he had been wrong to consider himself indispensable, that Henry and Malcolm Green, Macauley and others were ready and competent to carry on the work, and he telegraphed to Frere, "I was wrong to show difficulties. Have now made all arrangements, and am ready to start."

He had not been at head-quarters much more than a year, when he was appointed by Frere to Aden.

Aden is a poor Arab town lying treeless and waterless at the foot of the bare red cliffs of a mountain scorched by the unclouded rays of the sun from year's end to year's end, where scarcely a blade of grass, much less of corn, can find heart to grow. The British occupants had been ordered to keep within the narrow strip of land around it which had been proclaimed British territory, and to have no friendships or enmities with the Arab tribes who fought and plundered outside. Food had to come from a distance, and if the supplies by sea were delayed, as they sometimes were, it rose to famine prices, and the garrison could not get enough to eat; for the roads from the interior were infested by robbers, who intercepted the produce which would otherwise have found a profitable market there. The state of matters resembled on a smaller scale that on the Sind frontier, as Jacob had found it. But the Arab tribes were far less formidable than the Beloochees, and the country within a short distance of Aden more easily susceptible of profitable cultivation than the Sind desert; and Merewether sought to apply a similar remedy.

He requested to be allowed to raise a force of a hundred

horsemen, equipped and trained like the Sind horse ; but this was refused. He then suggested—a plan for which he confessed he had no liking—subsidizing the Sultan of Lahej, who belonged to a friendly tribe through whose territory the roads passed, and paying him to protect the kafilahs as they passed through his territory.

Frere, though full of sympathy with his object, writes a word of caution. Comparing Aden to Gibraltar, he says—

“February 15, 1865.

“We do not need Gibraltar to establish an influence in Spain, and the possession of much interest or responsibility, still more the actual possession of territorial sovereignty on the mainland of Spain, would be a serious source of weakness. Now, if we once begin as arbiters, it will be very difficult to avoid having sovereignty, or at least a protectorate quite as onerous, thrust on us at Aden. We ought to be respected and feared at Aden, but if we once quit it to interfere by force of arms, save in the most selfish manner, and for purely selfish purposes—*e.g.* to secure our supplies of grain, fowls, and forage—we cannot help being drawn on to protest, to arbitrate, and to rule ; a very glorious result, perhaps, but one not at all contemplated by our rulers, and not one which we are likely to be allowed to follow up. To begin, and then to be called back, leaving those who have trusted us in the lurch, is every way evil.”

But matters grew worse. The Foodthelee tribe plundered vessels belonging to British subjects, and robbed kafilahs bringing supplies into Aden within a mile of the barrier gate. Merewether again applied for leave to raise a cavalry force, and, though supported by the opinion of Sir W. Coghlan, then in England, it was again refused ; but Sir Charles Wood authorized “a raid to punish a thief,” and Merewether prepared, not very hopefully, to do the best he could with his infantry. He succeeded beyond his expectation. The tribe was taken by surprise, and suffered so much loss—more than a hundred being

killed—that they were disposed to pay the indemnity demanded, and to give security for better behaviour in future. The good effect produced was instantaneous. Merewether writes—

“December 31, 1865.

“The people in Aden are delighted at the prospect of future security, which will follow on the punishment of these Foodtheles. One of the Parsee merchants, to show his delight, wished to send a present of soda water and lemonade to the soldiers out here. He despatched it on a couple of camels, without asking for any guard, and it reached our camp safely last night, thirty-five miles from Aden. Formerly nothing could go two miles from the barrier gate without a guard. Give me the hundred horsemen, and the new state of affairs will become vigorous, and be perpetuated without undue interference on our part.”


But the absence of cavalry marred the complete success of the expedition. The tribe was quite willing to do all that was asked, but the old chief, Ahmed bin Abdulla, who could have been caught if there had been fifty horsemen present, escaped to the hills and would not come in. In three or four months he was found to be plundering again, and a second expedition became necessary. The force consisted only of the 109th Europeans. The native regiment, being armed with smooth-bore muskets, Merewether did not venture to bring to the front, though otherwise he would have been glad of them. The old chief still kept out of the way, though he had no longer much power for mischief. A year later, in the spring of 1867, Merewether's request for a small cavalry force was at last granted, just as he was leaving to take up the Commissionership of Sind, to which he had been appointed. In answer to her congratulations, he writes to Lady Frere :—

“June 19, 1867.

“The Foodtheles have formally and unconditionally surrendered. On the second friendly visit they received


an electric shock all round, and had sparks taken out of their noses to completely ratify their reception into civilized society. This—the surrender, not the shocking—is a very satisfactory conclusion to the little expedition into the Foodthelee country in 1865–66. It is Frontier all over again, and poor Jacob would, I am sure, have approved. When the troop now raising at Jacobabad has arrived, the country will, I hope, be settled for very many years to come. Their lines will be outside the fortifications on British territory, to show the Arabs we don't care a straw for them, and are in earnest when it is said there *must* be peace in the land."

END OF VOL. I.



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F.S. Weiler, F.R.G.S.





THE LIFE
OF
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