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TOWARDS A HISTORY OF XENOPHOBIA IN ZIMBABWE: RETHINKING RACISM AND THE CULTURE OF 'OTHERING' IN ZIMBABWE, 1890–2020[1]

ABSTRACT

The article explores Zimbabwe's history of racism, ethnicity, and other forms of "othering" from 1890 to 2020 and argues that, although scholars of Zimbabwe's past have, hitherto, shied away from using the term, these pathologies amounted collectively to xenophobia. It calls on scholars of the country's colonial history to investigate the degree to which the above pathologies were, arguably, xenophobic. The article argues that xenophobic tendencies in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe emanate from a number of key historical developments. These include the establishment of artificial colonial borders at the turn of the 19th century and the creation of an artificial nation-state called Southern Rhodesia, which engendered a new colonial identity that eventually crystallised into an exclusivist Zimbabwean nationalism and the divide-and-rule segregationist racial colonial policies that promoted national disharmony. Also significant was the development of the settler colonial economy and its insatiable hunger for cheap African labour, which led to labour migration from neighbouring countries and the socio-economic tensions this unleashed. Last was the role of an increasingly parochial Shona nationalism, which claimed the Shona as the real owners of the land and whose proponents advanced a particularistic rendition of the past that is known in Zimbabwean historiography as "patriotic history". The article then

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1   The country began its existence in 1890 as Southern Rhodesia and changed its name in 1965 to Rhodesia, before becoming Zimbabwe at independence in 1980. In this article, the name Zimbabwe is used to cover all the stages of the country's history.

concludes by sketching out the various manifestations of xenophobic tendencies in the country in the period under study. The study is essentially a reappraisal of Zimbabwean history and not a product of new research and fieldwork.

Keywords: *xenophobia, racism, chauvinism, migrant labour, Mabwidi, borders, indigenisation, Africanisation*

1. INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe is a country whose history is steeped in inter-group tensions and violence born out of racism, ethnicity, chauvinism, and other forms of "othering". It was founded in the violence of colonial occupation, nurtured in a violent colonial governance system, which, in turn, spawned a violent anti-colonial nationalist movement that resulted in the armed liberation war conflict lasting almost two decades from the early 1960s. Violence continued in the post-colonial period in the *Gukurahundi* massacres of the 1980s and the recurring political violence which has accompanied almost every general election since independence in 1980 and which the ruling party has been mainly responsible for in its determination to maintain political power.[2] Considerable literature on the history and role of racism, ethnicity and other forms of "othering" in Zimbabwe exists, but, with rare exceptions, it tends to treat each of these pathologies as distinct and separate entities and not as part of xenophobic attitudes embedded in Rhodesian/Zimbabwean society. This is unlike its southern neighbour, South Africa, where numerous analyses of and commentaries on xenophobia abound, especially following the violent 2008 South African xenophobic outbreak. This creates the erroneous impression that xenophobia has been unimportant in the history of Zimbabwe.

Consequently, hitherto, there are scarcely any systematic historical accounts of the development of xenophobia or xenophobic tendencies in Zimbabwe since its birth as a country called Southern Rhodesia in 1890, although some interesting and insightful partial coverage exists. Among scholars who have written on aspects of the history of "othering", racism, and ethnicity (all aspects of xenophobia) in Zimbabwe are Everisto Benyera, Anusa Daimon, Zoe Groves, Terence Ranger, James Muzondidya,

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2   L Sachikonye, *When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011); J Alexander and J McGregor, "Introduction: politics, patronage, and violence in *Zimbabwe", Journal of Southern African Studies* 39 (4), 2013, pp. 749-763; H Schmidt, *Colonialism and violence in Zimbabwe: A history of suffering* (UK: Boydell & Brewer, James Currey, 2013).

Alois Mlambo, and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni.[3] There is, thus, a need for a more focused examination of xenophobia in Zimbabwe. This is more so since a perfunctory examination of its history indicates that racial/ethnic discrimination, exclusion, resentment and the demonisation of outsider groups have been an integral part of the country's history since the advent of colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century. This article begins the process of exploring the development of modern-day xenophobic tendencies or "othering" in Zimbabwe as part of a process to historicise xenophobia in the country. It is a call to scholars of Zimbabwe's past to revisit the history of inter-group relations among the various population groups over time to consider the extent to which xenophobia may have been a part of its history.

The article attempts to retrace Zimbabwe's history of racism, ethnicity, and other forms of "othering" as part of the country's xenophobic makeup from colonisation in 1890 to 2020. It argues that intolerance of and resentment of groups seen as "the other" or outsiders, in fact, amounted to xenophobia even though scholars of Zimbabwe's past have hitherto shied away from employing the term. It maintains that the country's history of xenophobia in the colonial and post-colonial periods arises mainly from a number of key

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3   Notable exception is E Benyera, "The xenophobia-coloniality nexus: Zimbabwe's experience". In: AO Akinola (ed.), *The political economy of xenophobia in Africa* (Cham: Springer, 2017), pp. 135-151; AS Mlambo, "Racism in colonial Zimbabwe". In: S Ratuva (ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of ethnicity* (UK: Springer Nature Ltd, 2019), pp. 1-17; AS Mlambo, "Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, nationalism and state-building", *Africa Spectrum* 1, 2013; AS Mlambo, "'Some are more white than others': Racial chauvinism as a factor in Rhodesian immigration policy, 1890 to 1963", *Zambezia* 17 (2), 2001; AS Mlambo, "Building a white man's country: Trends in white immigration into Rhodesia, 1890-1945", *Zambezia* 25 (2), 1998, pp. 123-146; AS Mlambo, "Nationalism and politics in Zimbabwe". In: M Tendi, J Alexander and J McGregor (eds), *The Oxford handbook of Zimbabwean studies* (Oxford: OUP, 2021); AS Mlambo, *White immigration into Rhodesia: From occupation to federation* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2003); A Daimon, "'Totemless aliens': The historical antecedents of the anti-Malawian discourse in Zimbabwe, 1920s–1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 44 (6), 2018, pp. 1095-1114; A Daimon, Maburandaya: The Malawian diaspora in Zimbabwe: 1895 to 2008 (PhD, University of the Free State, 2015); Z Groves, "Zimbabwe is my home": Citizenship and belonging for "Malawians'" in post-independence urban Zimbabwe, *South African Historical Journal* 72 (2), 2020, pp. 299-320; J Muzondidya, "Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33 (2), 2007, pp. 325-341; T Ranger, "Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30 (2), 2004, pp. 215-234. More detailed coverage of aspects of the history of xenophobia in the country is found in J Muzondidya and S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Echoing silences': Ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007", *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 7 (2), 2008, pp. 275-297; SJ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Africa for Africans or Africa for "natives" only? "New nationalism" and nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa", *Africa Spectrum* 44 (1), pp. 61-78; SJ Ndlovu, "Do 'Africans' exist? Genealogies and paradoxes of African identities and the discourses of nativism and xenophobia", *African identities* 8 (3), 2010, pp. 281-295.

historical developments. These include the establishment of artificial colonial borders at the turn of the 19th century and the creation of an artificial nation-state born out of the British colonial imagination, which engendered a new colonial identity that eventually crystallised into an exclusivist Zimbabwean nationalism and the segregationist racial colonial policies based on the principles of divide-and-rule and racial discrimination and marginalisation. Fuelled by a sense of white racial superiority, colonial rule fostered disunity and inter-group antagonism rather than a sense of community and oneness. In addition, was the development of the settler colonial economy and its insatiable hunger for large quantities of cheap African labour, which led to an inflow of migrant workers from neighbouring countries and the socio-economic tensions this unleashed. Last was the role of an increasingly parochial Shona[4] nationalism, which unjustifiably singled out the Shona as the real "owners of the soil" (*vana vevhu*).[5] The article then concludes by sketching out the various manifestations of xenophobic tendencies in the country in the period under study.

2.   DEFINING XENOPHOBIA

The term "xenophobia" comes from a combination of two Greek words, namely, "xenos", meaning "foreigner" or "stranger" and "phobos" meaning fear. Xenophobia is, thus, a dislike, hatred, fear or resentment of strangers or the unfamiliar.[6] Xenophobia usually manifests itself in intense dislike or hatred of people who are perceived as outsiders, or foreigners to a group, community or nation, based on their presumed or real descent, national, ethnic or social origin, race, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds.[7] It can manifest as hostility towards immigrants or foreigners or as "hatred toward members of another tribe, culture or religion".[8]

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4   For a discussion of what groups belong to the Shona, see Mlambo, "Becoming Zimbabwe and becoming Zimbabwean".

5   Directly translated as "the children of the soil", namely, the autochthons of the country.

6   In this sense, xenophobia can manifest in racism, which also contains the same attributes.

7   "The Origins of Xenophobia in South Africa's Colonialism", IPL, <https://www.ipl.org/essay/The-Origins-Of-Xenophobia-In-South-Africas-P3Y3XP7EAJFR>, accessed 6 March 2024.

8   "Xenophobia: Meaning, signs, examples, and stopping it", *MedicalNewsToday.com*, <https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/xenophobia>, accessed 6 March 2024.

While scholars normally distinguish between ethnicity/nativism, racism, and xenophobia,[9] as clear from the above, these pathologies[10] share much in common and are not always possible to categorise in separate silos. They are all rooted in a strong sense of difference between "us" and "them" and a deeply entrenched sense of superiority over those identified as the "other". They share a common ethos of resentment and hatred of, hostility to, and contempt for "outsiders" who are perceived, invariably, as a threat to the status quo or a way of life and who become the targets of exclusion and discrimination and, possibly, abuse or oppression.[11] Thus, while xenophobia and racism, for instance, are distinct in that one is a natural fear of strangers, and the other is a social construction based on a person's race, these two forms of prejudice often occur together and are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, while European colonialism in Africa at the end of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly fuelled by racism, it was, arguably, also xenophobic in the context of the characteristics of exclusion and discrimination outlined above.

George Makari puts the same idea differently by pointing out that while xenophobia had long roots in European history, it gained a new meaning and currency towards the end of the nineteenth century because of the Boxer Uprising in China, which was anti-Western and sought to drive all Europeans out of the country. Europeans regarded the Chinese people's hostility to European presence as "a matter of primitive unreason and intolerance" because, ostensibly, only, "primitive races […] were instinctively fearful of outsiders and perceived all strangers as enemies".[12] From their Chinese experience, Europeans extended the concept of the primitivism of xenophobia to the rest of the non-western world. Thus, what Makari calls "racial xenophobia" became pervasive in the Western world, where the phenomenon was now said, "to be engrained in Africans, Asians and other non-Western races". In this "up-is-down world", Europeans regarded resistance to colonial

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9   According to the Merriman Weber Dictionary, "Xenophobia is the fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners, whereas racism has a broader meaning, including, "a belief that racial differences produce the inherent superiority of a particular race". Although they are similar, they are different enough that it is possible for one to be both xenophobic and racist […] Each word may also have some degree of semantic overlap with *nativism*, which is defined as, "a policy of favouring [sic] native inhabitants as opposed to immigrants". In, Merriam-Webster "The History of the Word 'Xenophobia'", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/a-short-history-of-xenophobia>, accessed 6 March 2024.

10   The term is used in its social rather than medical meaning, for neither of them are mental diseases.

11   The most notorious examples are the holocaust in Nazi Germany and the extermination of the Tutsi in the Rwanda genocide of the mid-1990s. This applies equally to the Africans under European colonisation.

12   G Makari, *Of fear and strangers: A history of xenophobia* (London: W. W Norton & Company, 2021), pp. 66-67.

occupation by the indigenous populations as evidence of the primitive peoples "mistreating the civilised immigrants" and concluded, therefore, "the only language *these people* [sic] understood was force". Therefore, between 1900 and 1914, this reading of xenophobia quickly spread across Europe and "helped Western expansionists justify themselves as they fell into conflict with their hosts abroad". They claimed that their hosts were being "irrational and intolerant" and ungrateful to the Europeans for having brought them civilisation and progress. Thus, "the concept of xenophobia went to work for expanding Western Empires", while, conveniently, "explanations based on race obscured other motives".[13]

Makari argues that, by accusing the people of the non-Western world of xenophobia, the Europeans were displaying their own xenophobia. In his words,

> When the British bureaucrat, French consul, German missionary, or American businessperson landed in India or Congo or Mexico, could they not but note that these [sic] were their strangers, and that their presence could be deeply frightening? Did anyone notice that the Western panic over Eastern or Oriental xenophobia might be driven by motives that were themselves xenophobic?[14]

With specific reference to Zimbabwe, Benyera argues:

> In Zimbabwe, colonial racism laid the foundation for contemporary xenophobia, which created the identities used to perpetrate xenophobic violence, created the boundaries used in identifying targets of xenophobia and established the countries that reinforce current national identities.[15]

Given the above, it makes little sense to classify colonial policies and white settler attitudes towards black Zimbabweans as driven by either racism or xenophobia, as the two were intertwined and inter-penetrating. This article, therefore, makes no distinction between xenophobia and racism in Zimbabwe's colonial history and regards them as part of the same pathology.[16]

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13   Makari, *Of fear and strangers,* p. 66.
14   Makari, *Of fear and strangers*, p. 70.
15   Benyera, "The xenophobia-coloniality nexus".
16   Moreover, according to Merriam-Webster, "while it is certainly possible to distinguish between *xenophobia* and *racism* on a number of levels, it is also possible that the words may be used almost interchangeably. Each word may also have some degree of semantic overlap with *nativism*". In Merriam-Webster, "Xenophobia vs. racism: Where they overlap and how they differ", Merriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/grammar/xenophobia-and-racism-difference>, accessed 6 March 2024.

3.   XENOPHOBIA NOT UNIQUELY SOUTH AFRICAN

Since 2008, South Africa has become the bad poster boy of xenophobia in Africa, in general, and in southern Africa, in particular. This follows a violent outburst of xenophobic violence in South Africa in that year, which saw Black South Africans across the country physically attacking African immigrants from the rest of the continent, resulting in the deaths of more than 60 people. This violent xenophobic orgy drew well-deserved widespread condemnation from fellow Africans across the continent, with critics castigating South Africans for their ingratitude toward the rest of the continent, which had strongly supported the anti-apartheid struggle for years. While justified in their disappointment and anger at this outrage, Africans from outside South Africa seem to have overlooked or underplayed the history of xenophobia, "othering", or intolerance of outsider groups in their own countries and in much of the continent. As will be shown below, xenophobia or Afro phobia,[17] as some scholars have labelled the South African variety of anti-foreigner intolerance, "is not solely a South African problem".[18]

History shows that xenophobia against fellow Africans was a common phenomenon of the colonial and post-colonial African reality, becoming even more evident after the 1960s. For example, in 1969, Ghana expelled Nigerians and migrants from Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo, ostensibly because they were all committing crimes and were taking jobs away from the indigenous population at a time when Ghana was going through an economic crisis and unemployment was mounting.[19] In that year, then President of Ghana Kofi Busia passed the *Aliens Compliance Order* decreeing that all undocumented immigrants leave the country within two weeks.[20] Since then, there have been expulsions of African foreigners in numerous countries, including Benin (1978), Nigeria (1983 and 1985), Cote d'Ivoire (1999), Equatorial Guinea (2004), Angola (2004), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2009), Burundi (2009), Kenya (2013), Tanzania (2013), Republic of the Congo (Congo Brazzaville), 2014, and Chad (2015).[21]

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17   This is not an entirely accurate description of the phenomenon, as Pakistanis and the Chinese have also occasionally been targets of South African xenophobia. However, the majority of victims of South African xenophobia have been other Africans.

18   A Romola, "Preventing xenophobia in Africa: What must the African Union do"?" *AHMR* 1 (3), 2015, pp. 253-272.

19   OJ Aremu, "Responses to the 1983 expulsion of aliens from Nigeria: A critique", *African Research Review* 7 (3), 2013, pp. 340-352.

20   OJ Aremu and TA Ajayi, "Expulsion of Nigerian immigrant community from Ghana in 1969: Causes and impact", *Developing Country Studies* 4 (10), 2014, pp. 176-186.

21   Romola, "Preventing xenophobia in Africa", pp. 256-259.

Other examples of anti-foreigner attitudes were several policies and actions adopted by the newly independent governments across the continent in the 1960s and 1970s. These policies targeted foreigners, including colonial capitalists who had hogged economic opportunities and posts in the past, and fellow Africans who, ostensibly, were taking economic opportunities from the citizens, who justly deserved to enjoy the fruits of their countries' freedom. This was all part of the economic nationalist wave during which the new governments sought to wrest control of their own economies from colonial domination and control by international corporations. This economic nationalism manifested in largely three distinct forms, namely, nationalisation, indigenisation, and Africanisation. Nationalisation involved the state taking over foreign-owned business enterprises on behalf of the people, while indigenisation enabled the state to facilitate a citizens' takeover by limiting participation in particular industries or economic activities to citizens to force foreign owners to sell, or by insisting that citizens should hold a given percentage of the company shares. On its part, Africanisation sought to transfer jobs from foreigners to citizens by, for instance, requiring industries or institutions to "limit the employment of foreigners to a designated number".[22] Examples of Africanisation are "Nigerianisation" and "Zambianisation" in the 1960s and 1970s[23] and Zimbabwe's Africanisation drive in the early 1980s.

Meanwhile, in Uganda, Idi Amin forcibly dispossessed the country's Asian population of its businesses and allocated these to locals[24] because Asians, allegedly, had been favoured under colonialism and had unfairly amassed large amounts of wealth at the expense of black Ugandans.[25] Amin subsequently expelled all Asians from Uganda. The expulsion order also targeted other Africans then living in Uganda, including Kenyans, Tanzanians, Rwandans, Burundians, Zairians, and Sudanese.[26] On its part, Kenya pushed indigenisation policies at the expense of non-indigenous Africans by denying operating licenses to aliens and, thus, effectively indigenizing the country's commerce and certain industries. A more recent example of indigenisation is the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy of post-apartheid South Africa, where the government implemented policies that sought to correct

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22   R Leslie, "Nationalisation and indigenisation in Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (3), 1976, pp. 427-447.

23   D Philip, *Africanisation, nationalisation, and inequality: Mining labour and the Copperbelt in Zambian development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

24   Leslie, "Nationalisation and indigenisation in Africa", pp. 427-447.

25   V Jamal, "Asians in Uganda 1880-1972: Inequality and expulsion", *The Economic History Review* 29 (4), 1976, pp. 602-616.

26   WTS Gould, "Regional labour migrations systems in East Africa: Continuity and change". In: R Cohen, *The Cambridge survey of world migration* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 183-189.

the economic imbalances of the apartheid past.[27] Similar nativist economic nationalism debates are currently taking place in Tanzania, where demands to empower the *wazawa* ('Indigenous nationals' in Swahili) have increased since the 1990s. Targeted by these demands are Asian Tanzanians, whom black citizens regard as unfairly economically privileged.[28]

With regard to Zimbabwe, economic nationalism manifested in the form of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007, signed into law on April 17, 2008. Among its many controversial aspects was the following provision, which reserved certain business lines in the country for indigenous people only. Businesses reserved for Zimbabweans [read black Zimbabweans] included:

> primary production of food and cash crops, retail and wholesale trade, barber shops, hairdressing and beauty salons, employment agencies, estate agencies, grain milling, bakeries, tobacco grading, packaging, and processing, advertising agencies, milk processing, provision of local arts and craft, marketing, and distribution.[29]

Consequently, under the Act, Nigerians, South Africans, the Chinese, and other foreigners had to shut down their businesses by January 1, 2014.[30] In May 2013, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment published statutory instrument SI 66, ordering all businesses operating in the country to apply for indigenisation compliance certificates within six months. The law also virtually excluded whites from agriculture, a sector now reserved exclusively for "indigenous" Zimbabweans.[31]

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27   S Andreasson, Confronting the settler legacy: Indigenisation and transformation in South Africa and Zimbabwe, *Political Geography* 29 (8), 2010, pp. 424-433; S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Africa for Africans or Africa for "natives" only? "New nationalism" and nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa", *Africa Spectrum* 1, 2009, pp. 61-78.

28   "Indigenisation (uzawa)", *Tanzanian Affairs*, 1 September 2003, <https://www.tzaffairs. org/2003/09/indigenisation-uzawa/>, accessed 6 March 2023; R Aminzade, "From race to citizenship: The indigenization debate in post-socialist Tanzania", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38 (1), 2003, pp. 43-63.

29   T Chowa and A Mukuvare, "An analysis of Zimbabwe's indigenisation and economic empowerment programme (IEEP) as an economic development approach", *Researchjournali's Journal of Economics*, December 2013, <https://researchjournali.com/ view.php?id=213>, accessed 6 March 2024; CNN, "Zimbabweans decry white economic domination", 8 September 1996, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/08/zimbabwe/>, accessed 6 March 2024.

30   This, eventually, did not materialise as the Act was never fully implemented.

31   Indigenous in this context meant black Zimbabweans. Mugabe then in his most virulently anti-whites phase declared that there were no white Zimbabweans. Only black Zimbabweans could be the owners of the soil.

It is, of course, not only in Africa that xenophobia exists, as many parts of the world confront similar challenges. In the United States, for instance, xenophobia has a very long pedigree, dating back to the days of slavery and the indiscriminate massacre of the indigenous people during the country's westward expansion and continuing to the rise of anti-black terror organisations, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camelia in the late nineteenth century Reconstruction era. It persists in the current (2023) upsurge of white nationalism and mounting anti-Asian xenophobic attacks.[32] Reckless statements by politicians and the media on the Chinese origins of the COVID-19 pandemic fuel these anti-Asian sentiments.[33] There are also reports of anti-Asian sentiment elsewhere in the world. In Italy, for instance, there were reports of "assaults, verbal harassment, bullying and discrimination against people of Asian descent, while various groups in France, Australia and Russia also recorded "Covid-19-related attacks and harassment of people of Asian descent.[34] Increased migration into Europe from Africa and the Middle East has also seen a sharp rise in xenophobia in Europe.[35]

4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE FOCUS ON THE COLONIAL PERIOD

This study has chosen to focus on Zimbabwe's experience since the onset of British colonialism in 1890, not because hatred or resentment of outsiders did not exist in pre-colonial times or because xenophobia was a creation of colonialism. The focus merely arises from the appreciation that colonialism did change existing African identities and, hence, subsequent African interaction dynamics and that this helps in understanding the current manifestation of xenophobia, anchored, as it is, on modern national identities and group consciousness born of colonialism and the resultant nationalism. As noted, group identities and resentment, or suspicions of outsiders are as old as humankind, although the term describing the phenomenon in the English

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32 E Lee, *America for the Americans: A history of xenophobia in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2019).

33 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/Covid-19 Fuelling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide: National Action Plans, May 12, 2020, accessed 10 January 2023.

34 Human Rights Watch, "Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide National Action Plans Needed to Counter Intolerance", <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide>, accessed 12 May 2020.

35 A Lodhi, "The rise of xenophobia in Europe", *Medium*, 20 June 2017, *<https://medium.com/@Anam.Lodhi/the-rise-of-xenophobia-in-europe-b7e42a86a1a3>*, accessed 6 March 2024.

language makes its appearance only in the 1880s.[36] Undoubtedly, ethnicity was a factor in the territory long before European colonialism. It can correctly be assumed that pre-colonial African groups periodically clashed due to political, cultural, or socio-economic contestations. These clashes were most likely rooted in specific grievances, such as the need to combat perceived existential threats or a desire to enhance economic and political power.

As Richard Reid correctly observes, pre-colonial warfare was not without rhyme or reason. In pre-colonial times, specifically,

> War has been [sic] profoundly important in shaping Africa's past; it has been both outcome and driver of broader political, social, and economic change. Throughout the continent's recorded history, organized violence has been the product of the perennial struggle to maximize population—particularly critical in the context of Africa's historical under population. As a relatively land-rich continent, African political and social development has been characterized by continual fission and reformation, involving migratory movements and regional rivalries that have often been violent by their very nature. A common theme across much of the continent in the pre-colonial era was the constant creation and recreation of unifying, and often coercive, ideologies aimed at the maximization of productive and reproductive labor.[37]

Indeed, incorporating conquered groups is, precisely, how Mzilikazi Khumalo[38] managed to build the Ndebele nation on his way from KwaZulu-Natal to southwestern Zimbabwe. He incorporated the northern Sotho/Tswana, Babirwa, baHlubi, the Rozvi (now the Kalanga), and other local ethnic groups into his new nation.[39] The Ndebele of Zimbabwe today are, thus, an amalgamation of different ethno-linguistic groups incorporated into the Ndebele "nation" by Mzilikazi in a masterful stroke of social engineering and nation-building. Thus, while separate identities existed in pre-colonial southern Africa, evidence strongly suggests that ethnic groups were not rigidly exclusive and were relatively accommodating to outsiders who voluntarily became or otherwise found themselves members of their groups or political entities.

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36 The Merriam-Webster dictionary points out that the earlier absence of the term does not necessarily mean the absence of negative sentiments against foreigners or fear or distrust of them. These have existed since the earliest human interactions, in Merriam-Webster "The History of the Word 'Xenophobia'".

37 R Reid, "Warfare in pre-colonial Africa", *The Encyclopedia of War*, 13 November 2011, https://dol.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow687, accessed 6 March 2024.

38 One of the generals, who fell out with Chaka and migrated from Nguni land in the Kwazulu-Natal area westwards and, later, founded the Ndebele Kingdom in southwestern Zimbabwe.

39 S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nation building in Zimbabwe and the challenge of Ndebele particularism", *Accord* 16, 2008.

Scholarship indicates that, while individual groups identified themselves with specific territories and keenly defended these from invaders or encroachers, they did not regard boundaries as inflexible demarcations marked with fences, palisades, or beacons. Movement into and out of territories was not governed by rigid and formal protocols such as passports or permits. On the contrary, boundaries were often fluid, being the sites of markets where trading between adjacent ethnicities occurred. They allowed for fluid interactions and movement between and among the neighbouring polities. Emphasising the fluidity of pre-colonial African interaction and movement, Aniedi Okure observes that, while in post-colonial Africa, "countries are territories whose borders were drawn artificially at the Berlin Conference in 1885 by colonial powers to fit their economic conveniences", in the pre-colonial period,

> African communities followed the natural process of ethnicization with overlapping and alternate identities with significant movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and linguistic borrowing.[40]

Pre-colonial fluid borders and relatively open inter-group interactions transformed into rigid colonial boundaries with European colonisation and affected the relations between those included within the new borders, who became the insiders or citizens and those beyond the borders, who were now outsiders, even when the new outsiders were yester year's neighbours and kith and kin. This was to influence how anti-colonial nationalism[41] subsequently developed and operated and how the notion of the nation now serves to exclude migrants from other African countries.

5.   COLONIAL BORDERS AND THE BIRTH OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY

The creation of new countries delineated through arbitrarily drawn boundaries occurred at the end of the nineteenth century as part of the partition of Africa when European countries carved up, conquered, dominated and exploited the continent through colonial domination. These boundaries made little sense

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40   A Okure, "Ethnicity in Africa: a road to conflict or a path to peace?", *Africa Faith & Justice Network*, 25 July 2011, <https://afjn.org/ethnicity-in-africa-a-road-to-conflict-or-a-path-to-peace/>, accessed 6 March 2024.

41   By its very nature, nationalism is exclusive and emphasises the "us" versus "them" framework. For an insightful discussion of the xenophobic roots of modern nationalism, see Mpofu, "Xenophobia as racism: The colonial underside of nationalism in South Africa", *International Journal of Critical Diversity Studies* 3 (2), 2020, pp. 33-52.

in terms of the ethnic configurations and relationships that were actually obtained on the ground at the time. As Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, so tellingly confessed at the signing of the Anglo-French Convention on the Nigeria-Niger boundary in 1906,

> We [the British and the French] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod: We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediments that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes [sic] were.[42]

Because the creators of these new artificial countries had no idea of the ethnic and pre-colonial political realities on the ground, they often lumped together ethnicities which had had little to do with each other in the past and which may have been antagonistic. Alternatively, they separated same ethnic groups into different colonial territories; making them, henceforth, foreigners to each other under the new dispensation. Examples of groups separated by the new artificial borders abound. For instance, the border between Botswana and South Africa divides the Tswana people into citizens of two separate countries, while the border between Mozambique and South Africa cuts through the Tsonga/Shangaan groups. The Southern Sotho of the Free State are South Africans, while their relatives across the border are citizens of a separate country called Lesotho. The same senseless separation of peoples occurred among the Vhenda, Pedi, Ndau, Nyanja, Lozi, and the Tonga of southern Africa.

A classic example of the disruptive separation of peoples who had been one before colonialism are the Somalis of north-eastern Africa who were divided among no less than five different countries. According to Tasew Gashaw, colonial boundaries were "focused solely on land control and disregarded the impacts of partitioning on ethnic groups". Consequently,

> Artificial borders split many closely related ethnic groups into different colonial regions. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, they split Somalis into French Somaliland, British Somalia, Italian Somalia, Ethiopian Somalia, and the Somali region of northern Kenya. Such colonial borders have massive effects on Somali people who share a common culture, a similar way of life, and the same religion, but live as separate citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Similarly, the Afar people of Ethiopia were split amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between Ethiopia and South Sudan.

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42   Lord Salisbury quoted, In: JC Anene, *The international boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960* (London: Longman Press, 1970), p. 3.

This, undoubtedly, changed "the lifestyle and structural systems of African communities [and] negatively affected their traditional life, administrative structures, and economic well-being".[43]

On the other side of this coin, groups that had little or nothing to do with each other and, in fact, which may have been traditional adversaries, were lumped together within colonial boundaries to become fellow citizens of the new nations. The best example is Nigeria where over 260 ethno-linguistic groups, in some cases speaking mutually exclusive and mutually incomprehensible languages and, in other cases, practicing different and potentially antagonistic religions[44] were made citizens of a country conjured up overnight by the British as Nigeria. Is it any wonder that post-colonial Nigeria has faced innumerable political challenges arising out of regional dissonance and competing micro-nationalisms? Indeed, Nigeria, like many African countries that emerged from colonialism, is a country but not a nation. Making this very point, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said at a school debate price-presentation ceremony in Umuahia, Abia State, in 2022, "One of the things we need to achieve is nation-building. We have not built a nation yet".[45]

With respect to Zimbabwe, specifically, Ndebele separatists, calling themselves the *Mthwakazi* Liberation Front (MLF), insist that Southern Rhodesia's colonial boundaries bundled together two separate and independent pre-colonial polities, namely, that of the Ndebele, known as *Mthwakazi*, and that of the Shona to the east and northeast. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites an interesting case of one Welshman, Mabhena, who wrote a letter to the British Ambassador in Harare in 2007 as a, "notice of intent to file an application for the review of the verdict of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Land Case Matabeleland on the 19th of 1918". The 1918 Committee had upheld the earlier July 1894 Matabeleland-Order-in-Council, which had imposed British rule in Matabeleland, and the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898, which had made the Matabeleland territory conquered in the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele War part of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. Part of the letter read:

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43   T Gashaw, "Colonial borders in Africa: Improper design and its impact on African borderland communities", *Wilson Center*, 17 November 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/colonial-borders-in-africa-improper-design-and-its-impact-on-african-borderland-communitiesaccessed, accessed 6 March 2024.

44   The northern part of Nigeria had practised Islam for hundreds of years, while the southern part had followed African religions in the past but increasingly adopted Christianity with the arrival of missionaries prior to colonialism, yet they were lumped together into one country.

45   S Oko, "Nigeria is a Country, Not a Nation - Obasanjo", *Vanguard*, 9 March 2022, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/03/nigeria-is-a-country-not-a-nation-obasanjo>, accessed 6 March 2024.

> Your excellence [sic] you may be surprised to hear that I usually get lost when I come across people who mix up my country Matabeleland with Zimbabwe because Zimbabwe is a former British Colony which was colonised in 1890 and granted independence on 18 April 1980. While my homeland Matabeleland is a territory which was an independent Kingdom until it was invaded by the British South Africa Company (BSA Co) on 4 November 1893, in defiance of the authority of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.[46]

Thus, the new colonial boundaries disrupted long-standing inter-group relationships and created new colonial identities in which, despite deep pre-colonial divisions and, perhaps, tensions, those corralled in one colonial boundary grew to identify themselves with the new national entity, namely, as Southern Rhodesians, Mozambicans, Northern Rhodesians, Nyasalanders, and Bechuanas, rather than only their earlier identities. Since they now regarded themselves as citizens of the newly-created nations, they began to consider those from beyond the territorial borders of their new country as outsiders.[47] Consequently, erstwhile kith and kin, now outsiders, needed passports and permits to visit members of their ethnic group on the other side of the border.[48] Unfortunately, with time, the colonised people gradually embraced and owned the new colonial identities to the point where, at independence, inherited boundaries were rigidly enforced and patrolled to keep the "non-nationals" out in the name of preserving national and territorial integrity. Thus, was born the terminology of "foreigners" or foreign nationals, ''aliens" and "undocumented migrants" in wide use today.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Africa found itself in the ridiculous situation where former President Kenneth Kaunda, a legendary anti-colonial struggle stalwart and one of the founding fathers of the Organisation of African Union (OAU), as well as a staunch supporter of the liberation struggle in southern Africa, was re-classified as a "foreign national" in 1999, stripped of his Zambian citizenship, and barred from standing for presidential elections. The reason? His parents were "foreigners" from Malawi who had earlier migrated to Zambia as missionaries. They were, therefore, not real Zambians,

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46 WH Mabhena, "Re: The Question of Matabeleland", Letter, 30 May 2007, cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nation building in Zimbabwe and the challenge of Ndebele particularism".

47 For a discussion of African modernity and the insider-outsider phenomenon, see, FB Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and outsiders: Citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary Southern Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA books, 2006).

48 Interestingly, prior to World War I, people did not need passports or any documentation to move across the world. The adoption of an international model of passports by the League of Nations was only in 1918, meaning that the strict borders of the newly created colonies in Africa were a very recent development in the history of nations or countries. For a discussion of the development of the insider-outsider mentality in southern Africa, see, Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and outsiders*.

even though they were members of the same ethnic group as their hosts in their new home! Zambians, thus, belatedly, woke up to the fact that Kaunda was not a citizen even though he had already ruled the country for 27 years after having led the country's anti-colonial struggle to independence in 1964! This was also despite the fact that he had been pressured to denounce his purported Malawian citizenship many years before, which, in any case, he had never claimed.[49]

A great irony is that the boundaries that were drawn up by the European conquerors as a mark of their racial, political and economic domination of Africa have now become sacrosanct and wholly embraced by the formerly colonised to such an extent that the new post-colonial rulers jealously guard the inherited borders.[50] How arbitrary colonial boundaries are and how clearly colonial borders were designed to serve, not African, but the colonisers' interests is evident in the relationship between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in the early twentieth century in the context of the long-standing South African leaders' desire to incorporate the latter as its fifth province.[51] Unlike most African colonies established by European governments as part of a process of European national aggrandisement, Southern Rhodesia was the product of private enterprise. Cecil John Rhodes funded the colonisation of the territory through his British South Africa Company (BSAC), having earlier received a Royal charter in 1889 from Queen Victoria to enable him to do so. The BSAC was authorised to establish the colony and to administer it as a private concern for 25 years; later extended in 1915 for another ten years.[52] When the Company rule was about to end, white settlers in Southern Rhodesia (not the African majority population) had the option to decide whether to join South Africa as a fifth province or to opt for self-government. A whites-only referendum in October 1922 delivered an overwhelming verdict in support of self-government rather than incorporation into South Africa. Consequently, in 1923, Southern Rhodesia had its first self-government administration.

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49   DG McNeil Jr, "Founder of Zambia is declared stateless in High Court ruling", *New York Times*, 1 April 1999. His successor Frederick Chiluba who had been instrumental in stripping Kaunda of his citizenship was himself later accused of not being a true citizen of Zambia because his parents were, ostensibly, born in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

50   An Organisation of African Unity (AOU) meeting in 1963 deliberated on what to do about the arbitrary boundaries drawn up by the colonialists and decided that it was less problematic to leave them as they were, no matter how nonsensical they were, than to attempt to redraw them, as this would create even more problems for the continent.

51   The Union Act of 1908, which created South Africa after the South African War, included provisions for the future incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into the Union.

52   "British South Africa Company", *Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-South-Africa-Company>, accessed 6 March 2024.

Thus, by a quirk of history, present-day Black Zimbabweans "missed" the "opportunity" to become South African citizens! Had the referendum gone the other way, Zimbabweans would be "insiders" instead of "outsiders" in South Africa today, joining the ranks of present-day black South Africans in defending the integrity of "their" country from "foreigners" from other parts of the continent! Similarly, had Britain conceded to South African pressure to cede the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Lesotho to the Union, the peoples of these countries would also be South Africans today.

6.   RACISM AND RACIAL CHAUVINISM, ETHNICITY AND XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The dominant ethos of colonial rulers in Southern Rhodesia was racist and xenophobic to its very core and promoted division, suspicion, and resentment among the country's population. Fuelled, mainly, by an abiding fear of the African majority, whom the colonialists had forcibly subdued and on whom they had imposed their rule, and firmly rooted in a conception of the African as the savage or primitive "other", colonial rule was firmly grounded in racial exclusion and discrimination against the Africans. It is contended here that, as argued earlier, in this particular case, xenophobia and racism were intertwined and that the "othering", exclusion, and discrimination that was the hallmark of European colonialism in Zimbabwe was a manifestation of xenophobia.

The colonisers were also determined to ensure that Africans would remain divided to prevent them from undertaking any concerted anti-colonial mobilisation or uprising.[53] Therefore, the colonial regime promoted ethnic rivalry and treated and governed various African groups differently. Thus, successive Rhodesian governments treated the Ndebele differently from the Shona, while they also governed the so-called "indigenous natives" or "aboriginal natives" differently from those labelled as "alien natives" or "colonial natives". Indigenous "natives" were those descended from Southern Rhodesian Africans, namely the Shona and the Ndebele, while "alien natives" were those who came into the country from neighbouring colonies as migrant workers.[54] In this way, colonial policies reinforced the new colonial identities fomented by colonial boundaries.

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53   J Bonello, "The development of early settler identity in Southern Rhodesia: 1890–1914", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 43 (2), 2010, pp. 341-367.
54   Muzondidya, "Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe".

Southern Rhodesia's racist foundations lay in the bedrock of late nineteenth-century European imperialism, namely, the firm belief by Europeans, particularly the Anglo-Saxons, that they were the superior race and that it was their right and duty to rule over the "lesser breeds" around the globe. This gave rise to the American concept of "manifest destiny" and the British and the French's "civilising mission" or "*mission civilisatrice*", respectively. The ideological support for all this was the pseudo-intellectual arguments of scientific racists, otherwise known as Social Darwinists, of the late nineteenth century who propounded the doctrine of the White Man's Burden. Social Darwinists argued that because the Anglo-Saxon civilisation was the most advanced at the end of the nineteenth century, it was the fittest to rule over the darker races of the world. This was not a matter of choice but a God-given mandate; a God-ordained burden that white people had to carry.[55] Rhodes was a firm believer in this concept and felt that he was doing the Africans a huge favour by imposing British colonial rule on them because this would bring them the best civilisation ever devised by humankind.[56]

Many of the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia shared this view and regarded themselves as engaged in the noble mission of civilising the savage, ignorant and child-like "natives".[57] Indeed, a columnist for one of the contemporary newspapers at the time wrote, "The natives are children in everything but vice and therefore ought to be treated accordingly [...] always impressing upon them the wholesome fact that they are our inferiors, morally, socially and mentally, and can never hope to be otherwise".[58] Consequently, colonial governments based their colonial policies on land occupation, economic and political participation, and social and cultural interaction on racial superiority and an unwavering determination to keep Africans in their allotted place of inferiority to whites.

Regarding land, from occupation, colonial authorities ensured that Africans had very limited access to productive land to protect white farmers from African competition as well as to ensure a ready supply of cheap labour for the white economy. By forcibly relocating Africans from the more productive

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55   R Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944);

56   CJ Rhodes, "Confessions of faith (1877)". In: JE Flint, *Cecil Rhodes* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974).

57   For literature on the White man's burden and scientific racism and Cecil John Rhodes' belief of Anglo-Saxon superiority, see Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American thought*. Regarding the childlike feature of Africans, it is instructive that, during the colonial days, white people, including young children, routinely referred to old African men and women as "boys" [garden boys] and "girls" [kitchen girls].

58   Bonello, "The development of early settler identity in Southern Rhodesia: 1890–1914", pp. 341-367.

and fertile parts of the country to marginal lands far away from the emerging urban markets in, so-called, African reserves, and by imposing a wide range of taxes, colonial authorities ensured a steady flow of cheap African labour to the white economy. Similarly, by excluding Africans from the so-called white areas, they prevented them from any meaningful economic participation as they could own, neither factories nor mines, or other commercially lucrative enterprises and, thus, guaranteed that the African majority would remain on the margins of the colonial economy.[59]

The most defining land segregation legislation was the 1930 Land Apportionment Act (LAA), which divided the colony's land mass into white, African, and Crown lands and decreed where the two racial groups could legally own land and reside. Although a tiny minority, the white population, amounting to only 50 000 people, received 52 per cent of the land. In contrast, the Act allocated a mere 29.8 per cent of the land to the 1 million African majority and decreed such land, called the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), communally owned. The colonial state also created a buffer class between whites and African peasants in the form of the Native Purchase Areas (NPAs), where some Africans could purchase land.[60] Other land laws followed and equally sought to marginalise African agriculture to prevent competition with white farmers. These were the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969.[61] Such racial segregation was also prevalent in national politics, education, a racialised labour regime and social relations and interactions.[62]

Although, technically, the franchise in colonial Zimbabwe remained open to everyone, colonial authorities placed various impediments in the path of the Africans to ensure their continued marginalisation in national politics. Voters had to meet stipulated qualifications, which were set so high that very

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59   AS Mlambo, "Land grab or 'taking back stolen land': The fast track land reform process in Zimbabwe in historical perspective", *Compass* 3, 2005, pp. 1-21; AS Mlambo, "This is our land: The racialisation of land in Zimbabwe in the context of the current Zimbabwe crisis", *Journal of Developing Societies* 26 (1), 2010, pp. 39-69; H Moyana, *The Political economy of land in Zimbabwe* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984); S Moyo, *The land question in Zimbabwe* (Harare: SAPES, 1995); R Palmer, *Land and racial domination in Rhodesia* (London: Heinemann, 1977); I Phimister, "Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia", *African Affairs* 13, 1975.

60   Moyana, *Political economy of land*; Palmer, *Land and racial domination*.

61   Mashingaidze, "Agrarian change from above: The Southern Rhodesia native land husbandry act and African response", *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 24 (3), 1991, pp. 557-588; AS Mlambo, *History of Zimbabwe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

62   See, Mlambo, "Racism in colonial Zimbabwe".

few Africans could meet them.[63] Moreover, the colonial state showed very little interest in developing African education until the 1940s; being content to leave that burden to the missionaries. In addition, throughout the colonial period, African education was consistently underfunded. In the meantime, while education was compulsory for all white children from 1930, over 50 per cent of African children were not attending school as late as 1979, while the government established the first secondary school in the country only in 1946.[64] The main type of education the colonial authorities were interested in was industrial education, designed to prepare young Africans to become able menial workers in the colonial economy.[65] It is no wonder most Africans could not meet the educational requirements for voting.

7.   THE FEAR FACTOR AND RACIAL CHAUVINISM

While Southern Rhodesian white racism stemmed, mainly, from the settlers' sense of superiority as argued above, it also was the result of an ever-present fear of the African majority. For instance, Africans outnumbered whites to the ratio of 45:1 in 1901 and 22:1 in 1931.[66] Thus, the fear of being overwhelmed by a resentful African population seething with anger over colonial conquest and domination was ever-present. As Julie Bonello argues,

> The white view of indigenous groups as inherently inferior was vital to maintaining settlers' privileged social status as well as their self-confidence, which was in short supply given their vulnerability as a very small group amid a large black majority. Much attention was given to shaping a crude and simplistic picture of African behaviour [sic] that provided an exaggerated foil for how whites perceived themselves (or wished to appear) and reveals their ever-present concern with safety and security in an unpredictable environment. [67]

There was also fear that African males might exact their revenge on the settlers through the abuse of white women, a fear that gave birth to the black peril phenomenon prevalent among white colonial men at the time. To protect white womanhood, colonial authorities passed several laws prohibiting sexual relations between African males and white women. These included

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63   AB, Mutiti, "Rhodesia and her four discriminatory constitutions", *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs* 4 (2),1974, pp. 259-278.
64   Mlambo, *History of Zimbabwe*.
65   L Dierdorp, Segregated education in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (MA, Utrecht University, 2015).
66   I Mhike, Deviance and colonial power: a history of juvenile delinquency in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890–c1960 (PhD, University of the Free State, 2016).
67   Bonello, "The development of early settler identity", pp. 341-367.

the Native Locations Ordinance of 1901, designed to keep Africans out of white residential areas, the Immorality Suppression Ordinance of 1903, and the Immorality and Indecency (Suppression) Ordinance of 1916. The 1903 Ordinance outlawed sexual relations between white women and black men and made such transgressions punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment for white women and five years for black men. In addition, black men accused of attempted rape could receive a death sentence. McCulloch reports that, because of the immorality and indecency legislation, approximately 20 African men were "charged and executed for sexual assault of white women"[68] while, according to Michael West, "two hundred others were either imprisoned or flogged between 1902 and 1935".[69] Significant is the fact that no such laws prevented white men from having sexual relations with black women. The growing number of mixed-race children, known in Southern Rhodesia as Coloureds, is, however, clear evidence that what was good for the goose was definitely not also good for the gander.[70]

White xenophobia, read racism, in Southern Rhodesia did not only target Africans, as other groups, including other whites and those who Muzondidya calls the "invisible subject minorities", (Coloureds and Asians), were, equally, victims of white racial chauvinism and discrimination. These two groups were not "natives", as defined in the colonial lexicon. The invisible subject minorities included "Griquas, Malays, and Cape Coloureds from South Africa" who had come into the country with the Pioneer Column in 1890 and Indian immigrants.[71] Mostly, fear of economic competition from Indians had promoted anti-Asian immigration policies, including the 1908 Asiatic Immigration Ordinance, which left the volume of Asian immigration into the country at the discretion of BSAC authorities.[72] However, while considering these minorities inferior to whites, the colonial dispensation regarded them as superior to the Africans and, therefore, accorded them some privileges enjoyed by the whites

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68   J McCulloch, *Black peril, white virtue: Sexual crime in Southern Rhodesia, 1902-1935* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2000).

69   MO West, "Review of black peril, white virtue: sexual crime in Southern Rhodesia, 1902-1935 by J McCulloch", *Social History* 36 (3), 2003, pp. 815–819.

70   M Mushonga, "White power, white desire: miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia. Zimbabwe", *African Journal of History and Culture* 5 (1), 2013, pp. 1–12; E Schmidt, *Peasants, traders and wives* (Harare: Baobab, 1992).

71   Muzondidya, "Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land".

72   RGS Douglas "The development of the Department of Immigration to 1953", Cyclostyled paper in the National Archives of Zimbabwe, n. d. For a detailed account of how the colonial authorities treated Indians in the colonial period and how Indians were generally discriminated against and barely tolerated by the white settlers, see TR Patel, Becoming Zimbabwean: A history of Indians in Rhodesia, 1890-1980 (PhD, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 2021).

but denied to the Africans. These included exemption from carrying passes and the freedom to live in urban areas, as well as access to white hospitals, schools, and other social amenities. Despite these concessions, Coloured and Asians "remained on the margins of colonial society where they faced exploitation, discrimination and denial of full citizenship because of their race and origin".[73]

In addition, racial chauvinism played a central role in relations between English-speaking settlers and the other whites in the colony. Those of British stock considered themselves superior to the other whites who were not of their own pedigree. As Mlambo notes, Rhodes' dream of building Southern Rhodesia as a white man's country did not materialise mainly because the colony's white settlers of British stock were very choosy about what sorts of white people were acceptable as immigrants into "their" country. They looked down on other white people, such as Poles. Greeks, Italians, Spaniards, the Portuguese, and people of the Jewish religion.[74] They consistently discouraged immigration from these other white groups, at least until the collapse of the Central African Federation in 1963.[75]

According to Ginsburg, among those listed as undesirable immigrants in the country's Immigration Bill in 1933 were, "Levantines, Europeans from Eastern Europe, Europeans from South Eastern Europe, Low class Greeks, low class Italians, 'Jews of low type and mixed origin and other persons of mixed origin and continental birth'".[76] One could also add Afrikaners to the list of those whom the Rhodesian settlers of British extraction looked down on. While Afrikaners were among the first settlers in Southern Rhodesia, with Rhodes' endorsement, dominant English-speaking settlers never fully accepted or even respected them, considering Afrikaners inferior and hardly civilised. The British referred to them derogatively as "low class", "persons of a poor and shiftless type, physical degenerates, sick and diseased" "worse than animals and mentally deficient", and "little removed from the native".[77]

From the above, it is clear Rhodesia was a country built on racism, racial chauvinism, fear of the African majority and general hostility to and suspicion of those perceived to be different or outsiders, in other words, on a foundation of xenophobia. Xenophobia was, thus, part of the very fabric of colonial

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73   Muzondidya, "Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land".
74   Mlambo, *White immigration into Rhodesia*.
75   Mlambo, *White immigration into Rhodesia*.
76   N Ginsburg, White workers and the production of race in Southern Rhodesia, 1910–1980 (PhD, University of Leeds, 2017).
77   HG Townsend, "Colour bar or community: reflections on Rhodesia", *New Blackfriars* 45 (531), 1964, pp. 367–375; Mlambo, *White immigration into Rhodesia.*

society and its governance. Resentment and marginalisation of those who did not belong to one's group, whether it was between white and black, among whites, or among black communities, was the hallmark of colonial society. As shown, this resentment manifested as racism between whites and as racial chauvinism among white groups. As shown later, it also manifested as ethnic stereotyping, denigration, and resentment by the majority Shona ethnic group of immigrant workers who came into the country from neighbouring territories to service the growing colonial economy. As Marko Phiri observed, these "non-indigenous natives", especially those from Nyasaland (Malawi), became the butt of many derogatory jokes and "were stereotyped as folks with below-average IQs" in Zimbabwean "social life or sitcoms in radio and television" and were seen as buffoons.[78]

They were also victims of verbal hostility and, in some cases, violence. These labour migrants entered the country in the early days of colonialism to work in the colony's mines, farms, and other sectors, including domestic service.

8.　THE COLONIAL ECONOMY AND LABOUR MIGRATION

Xenophobia in Zimbabwe, particularly the black-on-black variety that surfaced in the colonial era, would make no sense without an understanding of how the colonial economy's need for cheap labour brought in large numbers of migrant labourers from surrounding territories. The Rhodesian economy was based mainly on mining and agriculture in the first three or four decades and also on manufacturing from the Second World War onwards. As is well documented, the failure of the dream to establish another prosperous gold mining industry in Rhodesia led some white settlers to turn to agriculture. Due to state support through the White agriculture policy of 1908, state measures to protect white farmers from African competition, and making sure that there was ample cheap labour to work on the farms, white agriculture developed rapidly. A major problem confronting white farmers, however, was that local Africans were not keen to work for them. This is evident in the 1927 observation by Tawse Jollie, the only female Member of Parliament in the first Responsible Government of Southern Rhodesia, that the early settlers of Melsetter (a district in the eastern part of the colony) struggled to obtain African labour. In her words, "life [for the white settlers] must have

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78　　M Phiri, "Zimbabwe: musicians use Chewa to disseminate messages", *The Daily News*, 21 August 2002.

been incredibly hard. The natives did not want to work for the newcomers and their sons and daughters had to herd and hoe and drive the oxen."[79] African reluctance to work for the colonialists then was widespread. Works by Yoshikuni and others[80] document the reluctance of local Africans around Salisbury, for instance, to work permanently for the white urban economy. Lawrence Vambe also points out that local Africans preferred to stay in their rural homes on the outskirts of Salisbury in Chishawasha and to commute to work in Salisbury rather than take up permanent settlements in the town. Many others preferred to sell their agricultural produce in the urban market to meet their financial obligations rather than to take up wage employment. Because of this reluctance, Salisbury developed on the basis, essentially, of foreign immigrant labour, mostly from Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and, later, Mozambique.

Thus, the colonial economy, with its insatiable appetite for cheap labour, spawned a vast regional labour migration network, which drew workers from the surrounding territories of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique and even from further afield like Tanganyika and other eastern African countries to provide the requisite labour.[81] The idea to import cheap labour from neighbouring territories was first mooted in 1892, but large-scale migration began in 1903, organised and managed by the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (NLB). Those recruited by the Bureau were deployed in the country's mining and agricultural economic sectors. The Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission replaced the NLB in 1946. The influx of migrant workers eventually fuelled anti-migrant xenophobia, as shown below.

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79   E Tawse Jollie, "The romance of Melsetter", *Window on Rhodesia: The Jewel of Africa*, <https://www.rhodesia.me.uk/melsetter>, accessed 6 March 2024.

80   T Yoshikuni, *Urban experiences in colonial Zimbabwe: A social history of Harare before 1925* (Harare: African Books Collective 2007). See also, L Vambe, *An ill-fated people: Zimbabwe before and after Rhodes* (London: Heinemann, 1972); L Malaba, "Supply, control and organization of African labour in Rhodesia", *Review of African Political Economy* 18, 1980, pp. 7-28.

81   C van Onselen, *Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933* (London: Pluto Press, 1976); W Chirwa, "TEBA is power": rural labour, migrancy and fishing in Malawi, 1890s -1985 (PhD, Queens University, 1992), pp. 133-4; F Sanderson, "The development of labour migration from Nyasaland, 1891-1914", *Journal of African History* 2, 1961, pp. 259-71.

9. BLACK-ON-BLACK XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

One of the major criticisms of recent developments in South Africa's relations with immigrants is that South Africans are targeting other Africans and, therefore, are guilty of Afro-phobia. While that is undoubtedly true, this is not the first time that Afro-phobia has manifested itself in southern Africa, as indigenous Zimbabweans demonstrated their resentment, hostility, and disrespect for African migrant workers from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Mozambique, among others from the early years of the twentieth century. Evidence of such disrespect and resentment were the many derogatory names used by Zimbabweans to refer to migrant labourers; similar to the M*akwerekwere, Magrigamba,* and other terms of contempt used to describe African immigrants in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, the terms in daily use since the colonial days have ranged from *Mabwidi, Mateveranjanji* [those who followed the railway line into Rhodesia in search of a better life]*, Maburandaya, ana achimwene,* to *MaNyasarandi* and *vanhu vasina Mutupo* [people without a totem][82] for people from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For migrant workers from Mozambique, it was *Masena,* and *Mamoskeni,* among others. All the above terms were expressions of contempt of and disrespect for migrant workers whom the Shona people of Zimbabwe despised as uncivilised and without any respectable cultural roots and history.[83] Although not as violent as those in present-day South Africa, Zimbabwean xenophobes were, sometimes, violent, physically attacking the African migrants and calling for them to go back where they came from. For instance, Daimon recounts how an economic downturn in the 1950s that resulted in job cuts led to a growth in anti-immigrant sentiment, resulting in locals demanding that Malawians leave the country. According to him, in March 1964, Malawians and immigrants from Tanganyika were roughed up on the streets of Salisbury, while one Posta Chitimbe also came under physical attack in the Southern industrial area of Salisbury because his attackers accused him and other foreigners of "taking over their country and usurping their jobs and women.[84]

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82 In Zimbabwe where totems signify belonging and culture, to be dismissed as a totemless person is a serious insult. It implies lack of civilization, culture, manners, and decency and any claim to respect by those who have totems.

83 The irony, of course, was that these refugees, especially from Mozambique, spoke the same Ndau language spoken in eastern Zimbabwe and were part of the same community prior to colonisation.

84 Daimon, "Mabhurandaya", p. 124.

Zoe Groves and Daimon have also documented how Malawian migrants suffered all manner of stereotyping and name-calling at the hands of the indigenous Africans and were resented for a variety of reasons. These included the fact that they were often better educated than the locals and, consequently, held positions of authority at workplaces.[85] They also owned most houses in the urban townships of Harare and, by default, became landlords for many indigenous Africans who moved into the cities much later than the immigrants.[86] As in 21st century South Africa's resentment against *Makwerekwere* because "they take our women", by practising "Mapoto" [temporary] marriages,[87] migrant workers from Malawi were also resented because they "took" Shona women, as some women preferred Malawian men who were, reportedly, gentler and more loving and took good care of them.[88]

With regard to the new wave of immigration that resulted from the Mozambican civil war from 1977 onwards, it would appear that the Zimbabweans' reactions to Mozambican refugees were somewhat mixed. Possibly, remembering how Mozambique had accommodated large numbers of Zimbabwean refugees in the Mozambican refugee camps of Nyadzonya, Chimoio, Tembwe, and Doroi, among others, during Zimbabwe's armed liberation struggle, Zimbabweans generally extended a hand of welcome to the refugees and accommodated them in, mostly, Tongogara Refugee Camp in Manicaland. Those who chose to live among local communities, however, soon became the objects of name-calling and disdain and were taunted for being uneducated and backward and accused of being prone to crime.

As Rodrick Chinodakufa reported in an August 1995 article entitled "Former 'Mosken' Refugees Terrorised in Manicaland" that appeared in *Moto* magazine, anti-immigrant violence flared up in Manicaland, Eastern Zimbabwe. The article reported how former Mozambican refugees in the Mandeya area of Manicaland were being terrorised by locals who were demanding that they "should go back to their country" because the civil war in their country was over. While many Mozambican refugees had gone back at the end of the civil war in 1992, some who had acquired land over the years had built homes and decided to stay in Zimbabwe. These people were being pressured to return to their country and subjected to incessant name-calling and violence. Locals sometimes burnt their homesteads and assaulted them when they went to fetch water from local boreholes. According to one Marlo

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85   Groves, "Zimbabwe is my home"; Daimon, "Totemless aliens".
86   Daimon, "Totemless aliens".
87   Daimon, Maburandaya. p. 61; Daimon, "Totemless aliens".
88   Daimon, "Mabhurandaya", pp. 103-104; Daimon, "Totemless aliens".

Sidhule, he had to, "fetch borehole water in the small hours of the morning when everyone would be asleep for fear of being assaulted". Locals told him and other Mozambicans to fetch water in Mozambique instead.[89]

Meanwhile, an internal outbreak of xenophobia occurred with the *Gukurahundi* massacres of the 1980s. Although not couched in official government language as an anti-Ndebele war, the government's military campaign specifically targeted Ndebele-speaking people in Matabeleland and the Midlands region of the country who were accused of supporting anti-government dissidents who had taken up arms against the Zimbabwean state. *Gukurahundi* resulted in an estimated 20 000 deaths by 1987.[90] Unleashed by Mugabe to eradicate what he claimed to be efforts to overthrow his government by ZAPU, the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean Army wreaked havoc in Matabeleland, targeting all those who could not speak Shona.[91] The carnage only stopped in 1987, when ZAPU signed an agreement with the ruling party, ZANU-PF, agreeing to merge with it.

Xenophobia next surfaced during the farm invasions of 2000 and beyond; this time targeting white farmers, with government supporters violently driving them off the land in the *hondo yeminda* or the campaign or the war to recover the land. This was because, despite all talk of reconciliation at independence, resentment against whites in the country had continued to fester, mainly because whites remained in control of the economy and monopolised the most productive land, in spite of the Lancaster House Agreement promises for a fully funded managed land reform process. Hostility to the whites came to a head in 2000 following the Government's defeat in a referendum held to consider the government's recent constitutional reform proposal in which the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Party, with the support of the white farmers, mobilised for a resounding "no" vote. Angry at perceived white collaboration with the opposition, Mugabe unleashed his supporters on white farmers that year. He was no longer using the rhetoric of reconciliation; he was now denouncing whites as enemies of the state and foreigners who were not entitled to own land in Zimbabwe. For instance, he told his supporters,

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89   R Chinodakufa. "Former 'Mosken' refugees terrorised in Manicaland", *Moto*, August 1995.
90   Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice, *Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A report on the disturbances in the Matabeleland and the Midlands, by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace* (London: Hurst and Company, 2007).
91   At the time, supporters of the government taunted the Ndebele people as being foreigners who should go back to where they came from, namely Zululand. A major irony was that some of the government leaders promoting *Gukurahundi* were themselves, Ndebele speakers from Matebeleland.

> We say no to whites owning our land, and they should go [...] they can own companies and apartments [...] but not the soil. It is ours and that message should ring loud and clear in Britain and the United States.[92]

On another occasion, he said, "The land is ours. The British who are here should all go back to England".[93] The message was clear: only indigenous Africans or *Vana vevhu/abantwana bomhlabathi* (sons of the soil) "had pre-eminent rights to the country's land and other resources", while all whites were, "foreigners or usurpers, with little or no permanent stake in the country".[94] While the land invasion campaign manifested as racism and nativism, it was also xenophobic for singling out a particular group as being undesirable outsider foreigners whose presence was inimical to the national good. This was reminiscent of the "*buyelekhaya*" or "go home *Makwerekwere*" slogans of 2008 South Africa. Thus, ironically, the racism that had informed colonial policies and practices earlier had come full circle in 2000, with Mugabe now practising reverse racism against whites and discriminating against them based on their skin colour and otherness, just as the colonial dispensation had operated against the Africans. Thus, yesterday's white xenophobes were now the victims of black xenophobes in a country whose history had always been characterised by inter-group tension, othering, and violence.

This was in direct contradiction to the sentiments expressed by Mugabe in 1980 in his well-known reconciliation speech when he said:

> I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and together as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery[95]

Meanwhile, a new version of history, which Terence Ranger labelled "Patriotic History", surfaced in which the past was re-written to claim that Zimbabwe was and had always been a Shona country and that no other people belonged. This parochial nationalism drew distinctions between real and patriotic Zimbabweans, *vana vevhu*, foreigners, and sell-outs or puppets of

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92   *Newsweek,* 7 August 2014.
93   Zimbabwe situation 7 September 2014, https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/Zimsit-m-kick-out-remaining-whites-, accessed 21 December 2022.
94   Muzondidya, "Jambanja; Ideological ambiguities", pp. 333–38.
95   R Mugabe, "Mugabe on reconciliation", 13 March 2008 <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabe-on-reconciliation>, accessed 6 March 2024.

the West. [96] Descendants of migrant workers became direct victims of this new and contrived patriotism, which belied the fact, of course, that Zimbabwe was, in fact, a nation of immigrants, including the Shona.[97] However, because they were deemed foreigners, migrant workers and their descendants, dating from the colonial times, either lost their citizenship or were granted limited citizenship because they were regarded as *vanhu vasina mutupo*' (people without totems), a derogatory term for foreigners.

Consequently, in post-colonial Zimbabwe, descendants of colonial migrant workers were now required to renounce their "original" citizenship first, namely the citizenship of their fathers in countries of origin, before they could become eligible for Zimbabwean citizenship even though most of them were born in the country and knew no other country than Zimbabwe.

Amnesty International reported in 2021 how "hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from neighbouring countries and their descendants who settled or were born in Zimbabwe before independence in 1980 face barriers to acquiring citizenship and have effectively been rendered stateless".[98] This is despite the fact that, at independence, with very few specified cases,[99] full citizenship had been accorded to "everyone born in Zimbabwe whether before or after 1980". Citizens then could have dual citizenship. In 1983, however, dual citizenship was disallowed. Those with dual citizenship had to renounce their foreign citizenship to remain Zimbabwean citizens. This was a big blow, particularly to colonial migrant workers and their descendants, who had to choose between Zimbabwe and their country of descent. Then, in 1985, migrant workers and their children got a reprieve in the form of a certificate of citizenship recognising their Zimbabwean citizenship and allowing them to vote. However, the certificate was inscribed "Alien", meaning "they were not first-class citizens in Zimbabwe". In 2001, even this concession was nullified by a new law on nationality that required migrant workers and their descendants to renounce their ancestral nationality within six months of the

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96   T Ranger, "Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the struggle over the past in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30 (2), 2004, pp. 215-234; AS Mlambo, "Nationalism and politics in Zimbabwe", *The Oxford Handbook of Zimbabwean politics*, 8 September 2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198805472.013.17; BM Tendi, *Making history in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, intellectuals and the media* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2020).

97   Mlambo, "Becoming Zimbabwe or Becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, nationalism and state-building".

98   Amnesty International, "Zimbabwe: Statelessness crisis traps hundreds of thousands in limbo", 16 April 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/zimbabwe-statelessness-crisis-traps-hundreds-of-thousands-in-limbo-2/>, accessed 6 March 2024.

99   Exceptions were children of foreign diplomats, enemy aliens, and illegal immigrants.

law entering into force. This was aimed at crippling this group's suspected support for the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Amnesty International argued,

> The immigrant population, especially those whose parents and ancestors had migrated to Zimbabwe in search of employment from neighbouring countries and who were perceived to be largely pro-opposition MDC supporters, became a target as the country prepared for both the 2000 parliamentary election and the crucial 2002 presidential election. Authorities disparagingly referred to the migrant population as "totemless aliens" and sought to deliberately exclude them from voting via citizenship legislation. The ZANU-PF government responded by tightening rules against dual citizenship through the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2001. This amendment to the Citizenship Act of Zimbabwe required any person of foreign nationality to renounce that nationality within six months. Those who failed to do so lost their Zimbabwean citizenship, reducing many migrants and their descendants to non-citizens and rendering them effectively stateless.[100]

For descendants of migrant workers, this requirement meant that "to be granted Zimbabwean citizenship, they first needed to prove that their parents had been nationals of other countries"; something that many could not do because they did not have the pertinent documentation from their parents' original home countries[101], while, they had no claim to citizenship in any other country.[102] Without citizenship, they became, essentially, stateless and could access neither land, birth certificates, education nor other rights available to other Zimbabwean citizens.

Thus, those regarded as foreigners to Zimbabwean society were victims of xenophobic treatment because they were deemed outsiders. Descendants of migrant workers were marginalised and discriminated against despite the fact that they have contributed immensely to Zimbabwe's economy and culture over the years. Indeed, some of the country's leading sportsmen, especially footballers, musicians, and leaders, have, in fact, been descendants of colonial migrant workers.[103] Thus, xenophobia continued to haunt Zimbabwean public life way into the post-colonial period and continues to do so today.

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100   Amnesty International, "Zimbabwe: Statelessness crisis".
101   Amnesty International, "Zimbabwe: Statelessness crisis".
102   Amnesty International, "Zimbabwe: Statelessness crisis".
103   Benjani Mwaruwari, Makwinji Soma-Phiri, Moses Chunga, Peter Nyama, and Agent Sawu are some of the famous Zimbabwean footballers of Malawian descent, while. Alick Macheso and Nicholas Zacharia are popular Zimbabwean musicians, also of Malawian extraction. In politics and national leadership, Bernard Chidzero was a prominent statesman, while Robert Mugabe himself was, allegedly, also a descendant of a Malawian father.

10. CONCLUSION

This article has argued that Zimbabwe was a country which was characterised by inter-group tensions and resentment resulting in periodic violence due to xenophobia, which manifested as racism, exclusion, discrimination, and the denigration of some groups thought to be inferior. It has mapped out the development of xenophobia in Zimbabwe from the coming of colonialism to 2000, highlighting the colonial creation of a new country called Southern Rhodesia, the development of a new identity, which morphed into an exclusive nationalism, and the role of the divisive racism of the colonial rulers. It also traced the rise of black-on-black xenophobia, with the coming of migrant workers to service the colonial economy and further showed that xenophobia continued in the post-colonial period; this time, targeted at the Ndebele during the *Gukurahundi* military campaign against whites under the farm invasions, and against descendants of migrant workers during the land reform exercise of the 2000s. Lastly, it pointed to the rise of a narrow parochial nationalism propagated by patriotic history in the effort by the ruling elites to present Zimbabwe as a Shona country to the exclusion of everyone else. It highlighted the victimisation of migrant workers and their descendants through nationality laws that either denied them citizenship or made it extremely difficult for them to qualify for such citizenship.

Scholars have attributed such discriminatory and exclusionary tendencies throughout the country's history, thus far, to colonial racism or racial chauvinism and tribalism/ethnicity or nativism and not to xenophobia. It has been argued here that, perhaps, it is time for scholars of Zimbabwe's past to re-visit and re-interpret the country's history to assess the degree to which xenophobia may have been a part of its historical experience. There is a need to shift from the view that racism, ethnicity/nativism, and xenophobia were completely separate and independent phobias that operated individually. As is evident from studies of xenophobia in other African countries to the north of Zimbabwe since the 1960s, nativism, ethnicity, and, indeed, racism were part of the complex mix that produced xenophobic outbursts in those countries. There is no reason to think that Zimbabwe was somehow immune to similar forces. There is, thus, clearly, a need to investigate this aspect of Zimbabwe's past further if we are to fully understand the dynamics of inter-group relations and interactions since the advent of European colonialism to Zimbabwe and the persistence of social discord in the country's history. Hopefully, this article will provoke some interest in such an undertaking.