The Realignment of Poqo as the PAC:
A Remedial to South Africa's Apartheid
and Post-Apartheid Liberation Historiography

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Abstract

Post-apartheid South Africa's liberation historiography has been constructed and curated in a manner that influences public and collective memory to assume that only one specific liberation movement (the African National Congress) was involved in the South African liberation struggle. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and its military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), have largely been given perfunctory attention or ignored because of bias and the selective politics of memory. In instances where the history of PAC or APLA is given some attention pre and post-apartheid, the focus has been mainly on uPoqo as the paramilitary wing of the PAC, or on the leadership conflicts within it, at the expense of interrogating other important aspects within the movement. This article explores the development of the term Poqo, mapping its roots from the shorthand for "Umbutho wama-Afrika Poqo." It then shows that the prohibition of the PAC in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre led the movement to operate under the auspices of Poqo, an underground name. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that Poqo was not a paramilitary wing of the PAC but is/was the PAC itself in another form. Ultimately, this historical and historiographical contribution seeks to achieve a re-alignment of Poqo in South Africa's post-apartheid history writing and public memory.

Keywords: APLA; historiography; memory; Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); Poqo; post-apartheid; public memory

Introduction: Reflection, Rectification, and Rededication: 60 Years Later

At the 60th anniversary of the "Paarl Uprising" hosted at eMbekweni Township in Paarl on 11 November 2022, scores of African people came to "*khumbula ooVuthumlimlo bakaPoqo*" ("remember fiery warriors of Poqo")*.* The anniversary was celebrated under the theme "Reflection, Rectification and Rededication*.*" Speakers followed each other narrating some of the events of that fateful night and morning, 60 years ago. On reflection, it was clear that there was a misalignment between the standard histories that are taught in schools and written and researched by academics and the version of events proffered by those speakers who were present during the "Paarl Uprising." The issue was the identity of Poqo, whether it was a paramilitary wing of the PAC or another form of the PAC. The theme of the day ignited an idea to relook at the PAC's past to understand how the issue arose. At the time of the 60th anniversary, I was in the middle of researching and reading for a master's degree.[1] The anniversary and the argument that "the Snyman Commission and the trials seem to have moulded Poqo into a formal political organisation, folding it unproblematically into the PAC"[2] propelled further excavation into the reasons for the "errors and misalignment."

South Africa's post-apartheid liberation historiography and public heritage on the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Poqo, and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) are distorted owing to the logic applied in examining and analysing them. The assertions in the PAC-associated liberation scholarship are misaligned, resulting in skewed public heritage and historiographical conclusions. For many years, the PAC-linked historical moments, especially the "Poqo Paarl Uprising" that occurred on 22 November 1962, have been misinterpreted by scholars (historians and political), and members of the public have also been in thrall of these dominant albeit distorted historical narratives. The narrative not only projected the PAC (which is Poqo) through a perfunctory status and discrete pieces,[3] it misaligned the PAC's history by claiming that Poqo (another name for the PAC) was a military or paramilitary wing or a separate movement of the PAC and that APLA was a conversion from Poqo. This misinterpretation has been accepted as official history in South Africa—a history that is recognised, unchanging, and singular.[4]

Intellectually, this historical error has its foundation in the writings of Tom Lodge.[5] Lodge's work, which is hailed as an authoritative word on this subject, is therefore the

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1   Olwethu Dlanga, "The Great Storm of South Africa's Liberation Struggle : Bridging the Gap between APLA and Post-Apartheid Public and Collective Memory" (MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 2023).

2   B. P. van Laun, "In the Shadows of the Archive: Investigating the Paarl March of November 22nd 1962" (MA thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2012), 63–64.

3   Kwandiwe Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) 1959–1994* (Klosterberg: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009), 3.

4   M. Houdek and Kendall R. Phillips, "Public Memory*,*" in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.

5   Tom Lodge. "Insurrection in South Africa: The Pan Africanist Congress and the Poqo movement.1959–1965" (PhD diss., University of York, 1984).

primary focus of my critique. Numerous scholars who researched this subject after him, such as Kwandiwe Kondlo,[6] Bernard Leeman,[7] Thembinkosi Khumalo,[8] Gordon Zide,[9] and Siphokazi Magadla[10] to name a few, have drawn mostly from Lodge's premises to reach the same faulty conclusion that Poqo was either a military or paramilitary wing of the PAC, a conclusion that this article will refute.

This article will illustrate how the view that Poqo was a military or paramilitary wing or a separate movement of the PAC is incorrect by tracing the popularity of the usage of the name Poqo after the prohibition of the PAC on 8 April 1960. It will underscore that Poqo was the PAC in another form, and that APLA, which was established in 1968, derives from the Africanist Task Force. The article employs both a narrative and interpretative approach with the support of oral histories supplementing the limited secondary sources on this subject. The article is part of ongoing research on the history of the PAC and APLA. More broadly, this article reflects on South African post-apartheid liberation historiography that is biased against the PAC.[11] In the process, the author intends to reposition Poqo in its proper position in South African liberation history and historiography.

Methodologically, the article initially offers an overview of scholarship about Poqo in South African historiography. The overview seeks to broadly demonstrate the development and sustenance of the perception that Poqo was a paramilitary or military wing or a separate movement of the PAC. While making this demonstration, the article will introduce a counter-argument that posits that Poqo was the PAC in another form. To sustain this argument, the second part of the article introduces the Africanist Task Force narrative, which will demonstrate that a resemblance to a paramilitary wing, military wing (rudimentary and otherwise), or separate movement can be attributed to the Africanist Task Forces instead of Poqo. It is important to excavate this narrative as it is limited in South African history writing. In the third phase, the article links together the overall arguments in a quest to locate Poqo, the Africanist Task Force, and APLA in their correct position. The conclusion of the article posits that Poqo is not a separate entity of the PAC but the other side of the same coin. The article further concludes that APLA's metamorphosis should be attributed to the Africanist Task Force.

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6   Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution*.
7   Bernard Leeman, *Mandela, Sobukwe and Leballo: The South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Congress* (self-published, 2016)
8   Thembinkosi Khumalo, "From uPoqo to APLA: The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and its Armed Struggle: 1960–1982" (MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 2020).
9   Gordon Zide, *The Struggle for Freedom of Azania Was Her Life: The Portrait of an African Woman: Zondeni Veronica Zodwa Sobukwe* (Nordestedt, Germany: Scholar's Press, 2021).
10   Siphokazi Magadla, *Guerrillas and Combative Mothers: Women and the Armed Struggle in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2023).
11   Khumalo, "From uPoqo to APLA," 12.

An Overview of PAC and Poqo Liberation Literature

Modern South African liberation historiography overwhelmingly contends that Poqo was a military or paramilitary wing of the PAC. Siphokazi Magadla presents Poqo as "the Pan Africanist Congress's (PAC's) armed wing."[12] Gordon Zide opines that when the PAC had exhausted all peaceful means to oppose the apartheid regime, they opted for its military force, uPoqo, which was formed in 1961.[13] Thembinkosi Khumalo argued that "uPoqo and APLA were founded as military faculties of the PAC, aimed to be a response to the hostility and violence of the apartheid state."[14] Khumalo, Zide, and Magadla's submissions concerning this aspect perceive Poqo as a "separate" entity from the PAC. They do this by disregarding the fact that some PAC founding members who were isiXhosa speaking understood it to be *umbutho wama-Afrika Poqo* (an organisation of authentic Africans*)*, which is where the name Poqo emanates from.

Bernard Leeman traces the planning of the uprising of Poqo to the Transkei and provides the date on which the decision by the PAC to adopt armed struggle was made.[15] Like others, Leeman argues that APLA, the military wing of the PAC, was a metamorphosis from Poqo. By this logic, Poqo was a paramilitary wing of the PAC, and APLA came later as a more conventional army.

Kwandiwe Kondlo's *In the Twilight of the Revolution* (2009) ranks as one of the more popular texts on the history of the PAC. It probes and narrates numerous aspects of the PAC from its formation. Mention of Poqo as a paramilitary wing of the PAC is glaring in Kondlo's work. He writes, "The military wing of the PAC originated from the activities of 'Poqo', an underground military movement which operated inside South Africa after the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960."[16] He further points out that although there was no formal rechristening of the PAC, the organisation resurfaced in 1961 bearing the name Poqo, which has since been described as the military wing of the PAC.[17] In these passages, Kondlo seems to be stating that Poqo was a military wing of the PAC while on the other hand he contradicts himself and states that Poqo has since been described as the military wing of the PAC. This could be a result of fluidity within the PAC in its infancy. In the PAC's developmental years, it could be argued that the popular rhetoric did not separate Poqo from the PAC.

Tom Lodge's publications titled "Insurrection in South Africa: The Pan Africanist Congress and the Poqo Movement, 1959–1965" (1984) and "The Poqo Insurrection" (1986) posit that Poqo was a paramilitary or guerrilla wing of the PAC, and also refer

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12   Magadla, "Guerrillas and Combative Mothers," 4.

13   Zide, "The Struggle for Freedom of Azania Was Her Life," 28.

14   Khumalo, "From uPoqo to APLA," 48.

15   Leeman, *Mandela, Sobukwe and Leballo*.

16   Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution*, 284.

17   Kondlo, 284.

to Poqo as a "movement."[18] Poqo as a military movement is a characterisation witnessed consistently in Lodge's earlier arguments, and it is at times partially adopted by Kondlo. In Lodge's logic, the Poqo "movement" was a PAC-oriented insurgent or guerrilla organisation that emerged after the Sharpeville crisis and was dedicated to transforming society through revolutionary violent means.[19] He argues that Poqo was a new development, organisation, or group that was distinct from the PAC.[20] Additionally, its activists fanned out of Cape Town to smaller urban areas by starting new cells or reactivating PAC branches.[21] In the sources consulted, Poqo activists are seemingly separated from the PAC and its Africanist Task Force. The Task Force narrative is a glaring omission in Lodge's narration and that of most historians of this subject. Like most modern scholars on this subject, Tom Lodge's texts disconnect Poqo from the PAC by positing that the former is a paramilitary or guerrilla arm of the latter when that seems to be not the case.

In *South Africa 1960–66: Underground African Politics*, published in 1973, Henry Strauss says that Poqo was the PAC but in another form.[22] He writes,

> It has always been claimed by leaders of P.A.C. that from their formation in 1959, they always envisaged the inevitability of direct violence in their struggle and that their Disciplinary Code made provision for its adoption as a direct tactic. Evidence of this, however, does not appear till late in 1961.[23]

Strauss introduces us to the "claim" and idea of violent armed struggle by the PAC even before the Sharpeville massacre. This passage insinuates that the violence which was later attributed to Poqo, "a so-called armed wing of the PAC," is the violence of the PAC itself. To substantiate this claim, Strauss cites Frank Barton, an editor of *Drum* and *Post*, who is reported to have stated regarding the violence:

> ... giving evidence before the Snyman Commission in 1963, Philip Kgosana said, in March 1960: "The march (on Capetown [*sic*]) had been the government's last chance to come to terms with legitimate African demands. When the government refused to negotiate, it cast the die for a bloodbath."[24]

Strauss further promotes his argument of the "oneness" of the PAC and Poqo by stating that "unlike the A.N.C., [the] P.A.C. in the form of Poqo, rejected the concept of

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18 Lodge, "Insurrection in South Africa"; T. Lodge, "The Poqo Insurrection" (paper presented at the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986), 1.
19 Lodge, 1.
20 Lodge, 1.
21 T. Lodge, "The Paarl Insurrection: A South African Uprising," *African Studies Review* 25, no. 4 (1982): 107.
22 Henry Strauss, *South Africa 1960–1966: Underground African Politics* (Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1973), 136.
23 Strauss, 135–36.
24 Strauss, 136.

symbolic sabotage and immediately embarked upon a policy of terrorism and killing in a futile attempt to obtain 'freedom by 1963.'"[25] It is imperative to note that Strauss's conclusions are reached based on the findings of the Snyman Commission of 1963, and the PAC leadership's (P. K. Leballo) acknowledgement of this oneness. Additionally, Strauss appreciates that before 1958 in the ANC-Africanist ideological tussle, the term Poqo had commonly been used by members of the Africanist group to distinguish them from the multiracial outlook of other members.[26] It is therefore Strauss's view concerning Poqo as the PAC but in another form that I accede to, and which this article seeks to amplify.

A Resemblance of a Paramilitary Wing: The Africanist Task Force

After its formation on 6 April 1959, inspired by the abandoned yet radical 1949 ANC Programme of Action, the PAC resolved to maintain a radical and confrontational form of politics and protests in South Africa. To ensure its confrontational campaigns were successful, the PAC established an "endogenous" safety and security organ at its branches, where some of the members were enlisted to serve in it as safety and security personnel. The organ was named the Africanist Task Force (henceforth Task Force), "foot soldiers of the organisations"[27] who took care of the safety, security, and discipline of the organisation. In the 1960s, after the banning of the PAC, most members of the Task Force would later operate under the strategically adopted name Poqo.[28]

Initially, the Task Force only provided security against the infiltration of the organisation by special branch agents; however, it later extended to the protection of the organisation's leadership. Its scope was broadened to include maintaining discipline within the organisation and Sobukwe instructed the Task Force at the 1960 non-violent anti-pass campaign to ensure non-violence by, among other things, isolating agent provocateurs. As in the case of the Fruit of Islam which stood in the city of Harlem in the United States of America on 26 April 1957, bracing itself for another riot, the PAC Task Force would perform semi-military roles, standing rank upon rank to protect the PAC's 1960 anti-pass campaign against saboteurs.

Although the Task Force provided ad hoc functions like organising safe venues for meetings, its ultimate purpose was to be the military combat organ of the PAC. The Task Force members' conduct was to be regulated by the PAC's code of conduct—one of the founding documents adopted at its inaugural conference. The 1962 Tlonze and Paarl uprisings were the work of the Africanist Task Force popularly known as Poqo.[29] The song composed at the formation of the PAC, "*Sifuna amajoni, amajoni eAfrika amajoni enkululeko*" ("We want scores of soldiers, soldiers for Africa and soldiers for

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25   Strauss, 136.
26   Strauss, 136.
27   M. Mgxashe, *Are You With Us? The Story of a PAC Activist* (Tafelberg: Mafube, 2006), 58.
28   Personal communication; WhatsApp text message from Prof. Sipho Shabalala, 30 June 2022.
29   Telephonic interview with Prof. Sipho Shabalala, 26 June 2022.

liberation") showed the ultimate aims of the PAC regarding militancy, combativeness, and confrontational approaches.

On 21 March 1960, the PAC and its Task Force confronted the apartheid regime through positive action and anti-pass campaigns. At the Hercules police station in Pretoria, Elias Ntloedibe and a handful of his colleagues handed themselves over for not carrying passbooks; they were detained and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.[30] Sobukwe and some of his comrades handed themselves over at Johannesburg's Orlando police station. They were arrested and sentenced to various prison terms. The most dramatic event that day took place in Sharpeville, where many people were mercilessly injured and killed, sparking international outrage. The Sharpeville leg of the anti-pass campaign was led by Nyakane Tsolo, a Kroonstad-born unionist who worked as a labourer at African Cables.[31] Nyakane Tsolo and his brother Job aided in the establishment of the PAC branch in Sharpeville in 1959.[32]

In the aftermath of the deadly confrontation of 21 March 1960 lay dead men, women, and children at Sharpeville, Langa, Nyanga, and Bophelong.[33] The world was shocked by the barbarism of the racist South African regime, but for the PAC and the people of Azania, the chapter of non-violent struggle seemed closed. Passbooks were then "suspended" on 26 March 1960, a state of emergency was declared, and the Unlawful Organisation Act was enacted. It was under this law that on 8 April 1960 the PAC and ANC as collateral were banned.

Forced to operate as an outlawed organisation, an "underground movement" in the popular political dialogue, with most of its national leaders arrested, in exile, or in hiding, the PAC, in the words of Justice Minister Balthazar Johannes "John" Vorster, "was dealt a technical knock-out."[34] As a result of this "knock-out," new tactics and strategies were devised. During the Easter weekend of 1961, a clandestine PAC consultative conference was organised and held in Port Elizabeth (now Gqeberha) in the Eastern Cape where it was agreed that the armed struggle was the next phase. The decision was endorsed at the Maseru conference of 1961, confirming the PAC's mass insurrection or armed liberation struggle.[35]

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30   T. Lodge, "Political Organizations in Pretoria's African Township: 1940–1963" *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995): 82.

31   D. O'Sullivan, "Remembering Forgotten Hero, Nyakane Tsolo from the Sharpeville Massacre, " Kaya959, https://www.kaya959.co.za/remembering-forgotten-hero-nyakane-tsolo-from-the-sharpeville-massacre/.

32   T. Sipuye, "The Sharpeville Leader: Michael Nyakane Tsolo," https://consciousness.co.za/the-sharpeville-leader-michael-nyakane-tsolo/.

33   E. L. Ntloedibe, *Here is a Tree: Political Biography of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe* (Ga-Rankua: Century-Turn, 1995), 76.

34   Mgxashe, "Are You With Us?" 77.

35   Mgxashe, 104

The PAC sought to recruit over 20 000 youths for military training and the Task Force was identified as the main channel for conscripting trainee combatants into the campaign.[36] The choice of the Task Force as conduit for the PAC's armed struggle was because it had already assumed a paramilitary outlook since its formation. Also, the Task Force had a youthful membership and volunteers who wanted to convert the war rhetoric into an armed liberation struggle to overthrow the apartheid settler colonial regime. From 1961 until the formation of APLA in 1968, combative campaigns of the banned PAC which adopted the name Poqo were executed by members of the Task Force, who Kondlo refers to as "Poqo militants" who reduced the organisation's ideological statements to a set of slogans: "we must stand alone in our land; Freedom— to stand alone and not be suppressed by whites; 'amaAfrika Poqo'; 'Izwe Lethu.'"[37]

The Repositioning of Poqo: A Correct Placement!

The disaggregation of Poqo from the PAC as evidenced in the previously mentioned scholarship is the result of various reasons such as a lack of vigorous analysis of the past and the over-reliance on secondary sources at the expense of oral histories which enables people to share their stories in their own words and voices and through their own understanding. It could also be the result of the fluidity experienced in the PAC during its infancy, a characteristic that was never entirely resolved as reflected in most of its official documents. It could also be the result of the fossilisation of prior scholarship that has been popular or was popularised for one reason or another.

One such popular scholarship on the subject is that of Tom Lodge who is a former emeritus professor at the University of Limerick. He is the author of several books on African history, including *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences* (2011).[38] It is in Lodge's academic work that we begin to witness the disaggregation and the framing of Poqo as an armed wing or separate movement of the PAC.

In a paper published in 1984, Lodge narrates the emergence of two insurgent organisations which are "the PAC-oriented Poqo movement and the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe" with the former attaining the dimension of a mass movement in certain areas.[39] To solidify his argument, he traces the formation of APLA to a vacuum left by the capture of Poqo cadres in 1963 as the PAC's armed wing was now known in 1968.[40]

From this premise that frames Poqo as a separate movement from the PAC-*Umbutho wama-Afrika Poqo* (transl. an organisation of authentic Africans), almost all scholarship in print after Lodge's popular 1984 publication regurgitated this incorrect perspective.

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36   Mgxashe, 105.

37   Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution*, 286.

38   T. Lodge, *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

39   Lodge, "Insurrection in South Africa," 189–90.

40   Lodge, 410.

It is a disaggregation in the sense that Poqo was not understood as the PAC in another form but as an auxiliary. It is this original historiographical error that led Kondlo, Khumalo, Zide, and Magadla to reach the type of historical conclusions they did. As it turns out, this repeated error has misaligned South Africa's liberation history and historiography.

The evidence for the realignment and rectification of this error can be found in the Snyman Commission's interim report of March 1963, corroborated by insights from P. K. Leballo (acting PAC president by 1963), Henry Strauss's seminal 1972 work,[41] and oral evidence of PAC and Task Force founding members. The Snyman Commission's report is considered although it has its biases as reflected by Advocate Steyn who represented the Bantu Affairs Department and the South African Police. Steyn argued that the Commission was "not created with the purpose of supplying a platform for the propagation of purely political grievances against the state as such."[42] It is equally considered as evidence although it explained in the procedures of attaining the Commission's witnesses and evidence that there would be a type of selection, summation, and interpretation.[43] Ultimately this proves, as van Laun argued, that the Commission's mandate was in many ways limited and single-minded in the nature of conclusions reached.[44] Even in such a situation, its evidence as corroborated by members of the PAC is in this instance permissible on the basis that we can neither wholly rely on nor dismiss it, instead carefully read it to excavate its essence.

In 1962, when the PAC known as Poqo and its Task Force members made headlines about the violent attacks, especially after the Paarl riots, the apartheid regime established a commission that was presided over by Mr Justice H. Snyman, a judge in the Cape division of the Supreme Court. The Commission was established to investigate the root causes of the "Poqo problem." After a year, the Commission's interim report concluded that Poqo and the PAC were two sides of the same coin. In the report, Justice Snyman found Poqo to be the banned PAC and stated:

> The people who address *Poqo* gatherings previously had addressed PAC gatherings. The entrance fee including subscriptions are the same as those of PAC. The aims are the same. The division of the work is the same.[45]

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41   Strauss, *South Africa 1960–66*.

42   J. H. Snyman, *Report of the Paarl Commission of Enquiry, Consisting of the Honourable Mr. Justice J.H. Snyman, Judge of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Upon the Events on the 20th to 22nd November, 1962, at Paarl in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, and the Causes Which Gave Rise Thereto* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1964), 24.

43   Van Laun, "In the Shadows of the Archive," 134.

44   Van Laun, 134.

45   Strauss, *South Africa 1960–66*, 136.

Although some researchers have perceived that Poqo was an imaginary creation of the state which saw it as a threat to its security,[46] those PAC and Task Force members involved in the riot accept the verdict of the Snyman Commission report in this regard.

Before the Commission, there were some doubts about the direct link between the PAC and Poqo. At the time, ANC members explained the Poqo riots as the random and secluded violence of frustrated individuals which the PAC was capitalising on.[47] When the Snyman report was released in March 1963, P. K. Leballo dismissed the ANC assertion and corroborated Justice Snyman's findings that Poqo was a continuation of the PAC. It was certainly claimed by its leadership that Poqo was the continuation of PAC activities after the banning of the movement.[48] For this reason, many arrests were made against members of the PAC in Lesotho and South Africa owing to the successful infiltration and tactics of the police Special Branch.

In addition to Leballo and Snyman's claims that Poqo was the PAC, Henry Strauss postulates that "the evidence seems clearly to indicate that Poqo nevertheless was the continuation of P.A.C. activities underground."[49] He found that the term Poqo was frequently used by the Africanists while still in the ANC to separate themselves from the Charterists. In his analysis of the underground movement in South Africa, Strauss records the synonymity of the PAC and Poqo as early as 1974; the perfunctory scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s seems to have overlooked this synonymity resulting in what I refer to as historiographical misalignment.

The synonymity of the PAC and Poqo was confirmed by Sipho Shabalala, a stalwart of the PAC. He stated that the name Poqo was strategically adopted and used mostly in South Africa after 1961. This "new" identity, he said, provided an opportunity for PAC members to openly recruit, speak, and operate while having prospects of acquittal at the South African courts considering that Poqo was not a banned organisation.[50] It was this overt usage of the name that made it prominent in their collective memory, and Task Force members continued to operate as an organ of the same banned PAC with the unbanned name of Poqo, Shabalala claimed.

When the Poqo-PAC synonymity was confirmed in 1963, swift arrests of PAC members across the country and in Basutoland followed. The *Cape Argus* reported that over 400 police personnel were deployed and over 300 residents were arrested in Mbekweni alone.[51] Malcom Dyani, another stalwart of the PAC in Duncan Village (Monti), remembered: "I believe that the police influence to pounce on us was as a result of the Paarl uprising, and they [police] expected that we were going launch an attack in the

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46   Van Laun, "In the Shadows of the Archive," 139.
47   Strauss, "South Africa 1960–66," 136.
48   Strauss, 136.
49   Strauss, 136.
50   Personal communication; WhatsApp text message from Prof. Sipho Shabalala, 28 June 2022.
51   "Hundreds Arrested as 300 Police Raid Mbekweni" (*Cape Argus*, 23 November 1962).

Border area."[52] From the arrests, the confirmation of the Commission, and Leballo's and the PAC stalwarts' claims, it is clear that Poqo was not a new organisation, nor a separate movement or a new term within the PAC; instead, it was a name that became popular after the banning of the PAC.

The outlining of Poqo as a separate movement and paramilitary wing of the PAC, and even arguing that APLA was the result of a vacuum left by Poqo, is an inaccurate theorisation, analysis, and historicisation of the PAC liberation history. If paramilitary status should be granted to any organ, it should be to the Africanist Task Force whose last commander was Templeton M. Ntantala. Although the Task Force's efforts have been dismembered in the PAC liberation heritage and related scholarship, it remains an important aspect of the South African liberation struggle. Unfortunately, the Task Force has been overtaken by the widespread narrative of Poqo as an armed or paramilitary wing of the PAC after 1960 before 1968. The Poqo movement narrative and euphoria were initially perpetuated and popularised by "the media that was more sympathetic to white victims in the hands of Black 'perpetrators.'"[53] Beyond the media, it was scholars and some within the PAC who carried it through.

Conclusion

The events of the Paarl uprising have been described extensively in various ways in the literature on South Africa's liberation struggle. They are also detailed extensively in the Snyman Commission Report.[54] This article, though it commenced with the mention of the events of 22 November 1963, had less interest in detailing the events of the actual day than in interrogating whether *Poqo* was a military wing of the PAC or not. In the exploration, the article considers that *Poqo* was always synonymous with the PAC.

The PAC is Poqo and the name Poqo was popularly utilised after the organisation was banned. After the prohibition of the PAC in 1961, the name was strategically, overtly, and popularly used since there was no banned organisation by the name Poqo in South Africa, hence its popularity during the 1961–1967 period. Although Poqo has always been part of the Africanists since 1958 and PAC rhetoric since 1959, it was in March 1963 that Poqo was "officially" confirmed to be the PAC in another form. The confirmation proved that Poqo was not a subsidiary of the PAC but the PAC itself. The confirmation came from P. K. Leballo, the Snyman Commission, and founding members of the PAC. Tom Lodge and other scholars (excluding Henry Strauss) have erroneously granted Poqo paramilitary status. This article argues that paramilitary status should be granted to the Africanist Task Force which was the precursor to APLA. Poqo is an isiXhosa abbreviation of *Ama-Afrika Poqo* which was used by PAC members to

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52   Personal communication with Malcom Dyani, voice telephone call, 13 August 2022.
53   Dlanga, "The Great Storm of South Africa's Liberation Struggle," 61.
54   Lodge, "Insurrection in South Africa," 113.

distinguish between the Charterist congress and the Africanist congress. APLA draws its metamorphosis from the Africanist Task Force which was the PAC's paramilitary wing from 1959–1968.

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