



**The failure of conflict early warning systems in preventing the 2017 insurgency  
in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province.**

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A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

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***Psalm 7:17 – “I will give thanks to the Lord because of his righteousness; I will sing the praises of the Lord Most High”.***

## **ABSTRACT**

The advocacy of using Early Warning Systems (EWS) as a conflict prevention tool is a phenomenon that gained prominence in international security during the emergence of the Human Security paradigm of the early 1990s. The United Nations (UN) 1992 *Agenda for Peace Report* and the 1994 *United Nations Development Report* underscore the centrality of a human security approach towards conflict prevention and a coordinated international early warning effort. The UN has made efforts towards a coordinated international EWS as part of its conflict prevention strategy. Similarly, regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have also responded to this call, made at the UN level, by implementing EWS as conflict prevention mechanisms, viz. through the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Regional Early Warning System (REWS) respectively. Despite these efforts, Mozambique, a member of all three organisations, experienced an insurgency in its Cabo Delgado Province from the year 2017. The insurgency in Mozambique underlines the weaknesses of global EWS and calls into question why conflict EWS failed in preventing the 2017 Mozambican insurgency.

Based upon this, the mini-dissertation explores the failure of conflict EWS in preventing the 2017 insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. In evaluating the reasons for the failure of EWS the project constructs a conceptual framework of analysis of early warning that guides the scope of the study. Subsequently, the study utilises the conceptual framework to interrogate the early warning policies of the custodians of the maintenance of international peace and security in Mozambique, i.e., the UN, AU, and SADC. Thereafter, the study provides the historical background leading to the insurgency in Mozambique. Lastly, the research utilises the conceptual framework to analyse the response inefficiencies and identify the gaps in early warning and conflict prevention synergies of the UN, AU, and SADC in Mozambique towards recommendations that ought to strengthen EWS collaborations and conflict prevention efforts, particularly in light of the current eSwatini crisis.

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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AGA – Africa Governance Architecture

AMM – Africa Media Monitor

APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism

APSA – African Peace and Security Architecture

ASWJ – Al Sunnah Wa Jama'ah

AU – African Union

BCPR – Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery

CADSP – Common African Defence and Security Policy

CEWS – Continental Early Warning System

CRR – Country Review Report

CSCPF – Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework

DAG – Dyke Advisory Group

DDR – Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration

DPA – Political Affairs Department

DPAPS – Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security

DPO – Department of Peace Operations

DPPA – Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

EWI – Early Warning Indicators

EWS – Early Warning Systems

FDI – Foreign Direct Investments

FEWER – Forum on Early Warning and Early Response

Frelimo - Mozambique the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

GCR2P – Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GPA – General Peace Agreement

HEW – Humanitarian Early Warning

HEWS – Humanitarian Early Warning Systems

HRC – United Nations Human Rights Council

HSG – Heads of State and Government

I&W – Indications and Warning

IASC – Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICG – International Crisis Group

ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IS – Islamic State

IS-CAP – Islamic State Central Africa Province

ISS – Institute of Security Studies

LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas

MANU – Makonde African National Union

MIB – Military Information Branch

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

NDI – The United States National Directorate of Intelligence

NEWCs – National Early Warning Centres

NGOs – Nongovernmental Organisations

OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OGP&R2P – Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo



POPDSC – Protocol on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

PSC – Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union

PSD – Peace and Security Departments

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

REC – Regional Economic Communities

RENAMO – Mozambican National Resistance

REWC – Regional Early Warning Centre

REWS – Regional Early Warning System

RMs – Regional Mechanisms

ROU – Regional Observation Unit

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SAMIM – Southern Africa Mission in Mozambique

SIPO – Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

SSA – State Security Agency

TAA – Tanganyika African Association

TANU – Tanganyika African National Union

TNCs – Transnational Corporations

UDENAMO – National Democratic Union of Mozambique

UN – United Nations

UNAMI – National African Union for Independence

UNCT – United Nations Country Teams

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHQ – United Nations Headquarters

UNHRC – United Nations Human Rights Commission

UNOAU – United Nations Office to the African Union

UNOAU – United Nations Office to the African Union

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

## 1) **Chapter One: Introduction to the Study**

### 1.1) **Introduction**

The advocacy of using Early Warning Systems (EWS) as a conflict prevention tool is a phenomenon that gained prominence in international security during the emergence and advancement of the Human Security paradigm of the early 1990s. The emergence of this paradigm was brought onto the international stage by the cessation of the Cold War, which immensely altered the global approach to security by shifting the focus of security from state-centric superpower-guided interstate hostilities to intrastate conflicts that primarily affect the security of people. The magnitude of this shift is best encapsulated by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's 1992 Report *An Agenda for Peace*. This Report not only sets the agenda for the ensuing era but advocates conflict prevention, i.e., the “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN, 1992:11), as being vital to the maintenance of international peace and security.

A critical idea raised by the Report in encapsulating this security focus shift is the need for cooperation, particularly towards “an integrated approach to human security” (UN, 1992:8). This integrated approach was advocated on the strength of declining Cold War tensions, that had not only paralysed the UN Security Council's (UNSC) capacity to function but had also “impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII [Regional Arrangements]” (UN, 1992:35) of the UN Charter. Consequently, the end of the Cold War resulted in a reinvigorated UN and UNSC, that not only emerged as the “central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace” (UN, 1992:7), but that also arose with a renewed outlook that centred on promoting a “deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs” (UN, 1992:37) by seeking greater coordination in the sphere of conflict prevention between the UN, individual States, regional and international organisations as espoused by the Charter.

In pursuing this inclusive conflict prevention strategy, the Report advocates the use of “early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding” (UN, 1992:13) as a conflict prevention mechanism. This mechanism is to be reinforced with

confidence-building measures such as the “systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, [and] arrangements for the free flow of information” (UN 1992:13) that ought to nurture meaningful regional and international relations towards preventive strategies.

After the 1992 Report, at least three significant developments in relation to early warning and the Human Security paradigm are worth noting. The first and most influential is the UN 1994 *Human Development Report*, which extensively delves into “the new frontiers of human security” to, amongst other things, unearth “early warning signals that can spur preventive diplomacy and preventive development to save a society from reaching a crisis point” (Speth in UN, 1994: III). The second is the 2001 *Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Report* by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which inspired the third development, the adoption of *2005 UN World Summit Outcomes*. These developments further reinforce the centrality of EWS in conflict prevention whilst also calling for a comprehensive coordinated effort in the preservation of international peace.

Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have responded to this call, made at the UN level, by implementing EWS as conflict prevention mechanisms, viz. through the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Regional Early Warning System (REWS) respectively. Early Warning in a nutshell is the “communication of information on a crisis area, analysis of that information, and development of potential, timely, strategic response options to the crisis” (Adelman in Hough et al., 2008:59) in an attempt to prevent violence or its escalation to catastrophic levels.

The Republic of Mozambique has since 2017 been experiencing an insurgency, waged by the Al Sunnah Wa Jama’ah Islamic group (ASWJ), locally known as Al Shabab, in its Northern Province of Cabo Delgado. The insurgency’s escalation came to a head in 2020 when the cumulative fatalities since 2017 jumped from 830 in 2019 to 2560 in 2020 (ICG, 2022), drawing international attention and that of the SADC which held an Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit on 27 November 2020 as a reactive rather than a preventative measure. As of September 2022, an estimated 5,900 people have lost their lives with an estimated 946,000 people displaced as a result of the violent conflict in Cabo Delgado (GCR2P, 2022).

Mozambique is a member-state of the UN, the AU, and SADC, and thus the missed opportunity at conflict prevention between 2017 and 2019 warrants an interrogation of early warning strategies that have been adopted by these organisations.

## **1.2) Literature Overview**

The literature overview introduces the mainstream thoughts of early warning and its juxtaposition to the human security paradigm. The theme of early warning, as the literature review elaborates extensively in the following chapter, is central to conflict prevention and accordingly to the human security approach to international security issues. Human Security as the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICISS) (2001:15) has posited, is an approach to security that is concerned with “the security of the people – their physical safety, their economic well-being...and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Thus, to dissect how early warning connects to human security, defining ‘early warning’ as offered in the literature is essential.

The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response<sup>1</sup> (FEWER, 1997:24) defines early warning as

*The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: 1) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; 2) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and 3) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making.*

This definition of early warning is widely accepted, as Kumar Rupesinghe (in Souaré and Handy 2013:3) concurs by claiming that it is “a process of data collection, data analysis and the early communication of the results of this analysis to competent national and international entities”. However, to dissect how early warning is connected to human security, it is Issaka Souaré and Paul-Simon Handy’s (2013:3) definition of early warning as “the detection of the structural and proximate signs of violent conflict at its various stages”, that offers a clearer picture.

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<sup>1</sup> FEWER (1997:24) is “an independent and interdisciplinary consortium of academic research units, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Inter-Governmental Organisations, including UN agencies, to provide decision-makers with information and analysis to warn on the potential for violent conflict in order to prevent their escalation”.

The structural signs referred to, are the underlying or root causes of conflict, which the ICISS (2001:22) posits as “poverty, political repression, and [the] uneven distribution of resources”. The proximate signs referred to, are the precipitating or direct causes which according to William Nhara (1996:1) are the apparent “political, ethnic or religious” tensions that are often the by-products of the structural causes. Consequently, early warning’s concern with the proximate and structural causes, directly speaks to human security’s objectives of preventing immediate physical harm to vulnerable peoples thus ‘freedom from fear’, and ‘freedom from want’ by addressing structural issues that relate to economic security, respectively.

Scholarly emphasis on the conveyance of early warning results to decision-makers is an attempt to underscore that early warning is intended to invoke early action in a crisis, which aligns with the main aim of conflict prevention. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992:3) cites one of the core tasks of conflict prevention as seeking “to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results” or escalates, which corresponds to early warning definitions.

The emphasis on the earliest stage and the call for early action in early warning is connected to what Howard Adelman (1998) identifies as one of the main objectives of early warning, which is to afford “protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is an inability or unwillingness to provide protection by the state with jurisdiction over the territory” (in Hough et al. 2008:79, Van Walraven 1998:53). Jakkie Cilliers (2005:1) agrees with Adelman as he argues that:

*Early warning systems are rooted in new ‘human security’ thinking about the responsibility of leaders to protect ordinary people, and have traditionally been located within technical agencies that forecast food shortages and within the non-governmental sector where they found wide application among humanitarian relief agencies.*

This aligns Early Warning with the R2P doctrine, which according to scholars such as Gareth Evans (2008) and Alex Bellamy (2008), champions conflict prevention as the single most important aspect of sustaining international peace, requiring the international community to utilise non-violent tools to prevent human sufferings (in Williams, 2008:427). Nevertheless, Cilliers (2005:1), along with Hough et al. (2008:79),

in quoting Adelman, emphasises the human-orientated aspect of early warning in order to distinguish it from ‘warning intelligence’ conducted by national intelligence structures or organisations. Warning intelligence is often erroneously synonymised with early warning, due to similarities in the methodological approaches undertaken in both activities of information gathering for timely response to warnings. However, in the former, the focus is state-centric and concerned with the “direct threat to the collector or analyser of information, or those contemplating a response” (Hough et al. 2008:79) and the process is shrouded in secrecy. In the latter instance, it is people-centred, leading Cilliers (2005:1) to assert that early warning “requires a cooperative effort at international, regional, national and local levels, no single state or organization can do it alone or maintain a monopoly over it”, entailing a certain level of coordination and transparency.

These distinguishing factors inform the very design of early warning systems advocated by the UN and adopted by the AU with the implementation of the CEWS, which operates using open-source material to encourage collaboration with not just the UN, but also “other relevant international organisations, research centres and non-governmental organisations” (Hough et al. 2008:81). However, in contrast, SADC’s regional early warning system does not subscribe to open-source methods, rather advocating as per Dimpho Motsamai’s (2011) claim a “clandestine intelligence based early warning system” designated to national intelligence agencies of member-states. Such dynamics raise pertinent questions applicable to this research that are discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

Consequently, this dissertation utilises insights from the literature to develop a framework that enables an analysis of the EWS and policies of the UN, AU, and SADC and an exploration of the failure of early warning in Mozambique. Despite a rather wide-ranging body of work having been developed over time regarding early warning, no analysis has yet been forthcoming of the reasons for the failure of early warning in the Mozambique case.

### **1.3) Defining and Articulating the Research Problem**

The articulation of the research problem is grounded on the principal research question and its demarcated exploratory scope.

The overarching research question is, what caused early warning systems to fail in preventing the onset of the 2017 insurgency and its subsequent escalation in Mozambique? In attempting to answer this question, defining and contextualising EWS and its application, from theoretical and conceptual perspectives that undergird conflict prevention in security studies is required. Beyond this, responding to the research question requires an interrogation of two key aspects that speak to early warning failure in Mozambique. The first analyses early warning policies and operational procedures of the relevant security stakeholder organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security in Mozambique, i.e., the UN, AU, and SADC in order to contextualise their approach to conflict prevention. The second aspect deals with the historical background that led to the insurgency in Mozambique and the response inefficiencies by the UN, AU, and SADC that resulted in inaction to the crisis until 2020.

This leads to three sub-questions: (1) How do the security stakeholder organisations, i.e., the UN, AU, and SADC, approach early warning and conflict prevention from a policy and operational perspective? (2) What were the acute early warning signs, whose neglect not only resulted in an insurgency in 2017 but also saw it escalate and come to a head in 2020? (3) What are the critical issues that hindered the conflict EWS of the UN, AU, and SADC from preventing the insurgency in Mozambique and/ or reducing further violence post its inception? Settling these questions is significant in the context of the eSwatini crisis that currently besets SADC. eSwatini's instability has the potential of escalating to an equal, or a greater scale than the Mozambican insurgency, as evidenced by the rise in the "bombing of state institutions and attacks against security forces" (Chikohomero, 2022). In the face of these two crises the UN, AU, and SADC have all been silent on how they seek to reinforce EWS capabilities to enhance conflict prevention efforts in the SADC region.

Consequently, the objective of this research paper is to fill the void created by this silence by providing an interpretation of the historical context of the insurgency in order to ascertain the neglected early warning indicators (EWI) prior to and post-2017 that resulted in the crisis. In addition to this, the research provides an analysis of the international co-ordination efforts in the sphere of conflict prevention and the design and implementation strategies of EWS from a subregional to UN level in order to ascertain what led to the failure of EWS in the case of Mozambique.



Beyond this, the research proposes recommendations based on the findings of the study, on how conflict EWS can be strengthened towards improving conflict prevention. These findings and recommendations aim to shed light on how the UN, AU, and SADC, through the strengthening and realignment of their conflict EWS synergies, ought to approach the eSwatini crisis. The study in this regard contributes positively to the study of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning by providing a conceptually clear interpretation of early warning that pursues the resolution of issues around early warning and conflict prevention synergies between the UN, AU, and SADC.

#### **1.4) Methodology and Structure of Dissertation**

The methodological approach of this study is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research as defined by Gay et al. (2012:7) is “the collection, analysis, and interpretation of comprehensive narrative and visual (i.e., nonnumerical) data to gain insights into a particular phenomenon of interest”. The study undertakes this process by sourcing data from resolutions and special reports of the UN, and policy documents and resolutions of the AU and SADC form the primary sources of this study. In addition, data is also obtained from secondary sources such as journals, academic research reports, research articles, and open media. Subsequently, the study provides a description and analysis of the data grounded on inductive reasoning based on facts to answer the research questions guiding this project.

The study is structured into **five chapters**. The **first chapter** introduces the research theme, presents an overview of the study, and articulates the research problem and the scope of the study. Additionally, this chapter also identifies the methodological approach that aids the study towards its conclusion. The **second chapter** develops a conceptual framework that is applied as an analytical tool for the study. This conceptual framework is located in human security theory. The framework defines and contextualises EWS within the sphere of conflict prevention and security studies.

The **third chapter** analyses the early warning policies and operational procedures of the UN, AU, and SADC. The analysis assists this study in contextualising the approach of these organisations to early warning and conflict prevention. The **fourth chapter** provides a historical context to the Mozambican insurgency up until 2020. Presenting this context assists the study in identifying the neglected issues and enables an

understanding of what caused the insurgency to occur in 2017 and its escalation thereafter. In addition, this chapter also critically analyses the issues/factors, from a policy and operational perspective, that hindered the effective sounding of an early warning and a prompt early response by the UN, AU, and SADC towards conflict prevention in Mozambique.

The **fifth and final chapter** concludes the study by summarising the findings and proposing recommendations on how conflict EWS can be strengthened towards improving conflict prevention. Additionally, areas in which further research is required are identified.

## 2) **Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework for analysing the interpretation and implementation of Early Warning as a Conflict Prevention Mechanism**

### 2.1) **Introduction**

The diverging conceptions of conflict EWS, as outlined in the literature overview in Chapter One, entails an incoherent international approach to early warning. The implementation of EWS either on an open-source or intelligence-based methodology from subregional to UN level indicates a general conceptual conundrum of conflict early warning in the international security sphere. From a human security perspective, scholars such as Jakkie Cilliers (2005:1) argue that conflict EWSs are by design characterised by the “use [of] open-source material and generally aim to serve human security, not national or state interests”. In a similar vein, Sharon Rusu (2001:127) posits that “conflict early warning is built on three interlinked principles of human security, transparency and collaboration”.

Therefore, intelligence-based early warning is typically the forte of national intelligence agencies, which forms part of intelligence or strategic warning. The principles upon which this type of EWS is grounded, are not exclusively shared due to the clandestine nature of intelligence agencies. The core functions of national intelligence agencies are, according to Mark Lowenthal (2009:1), “to avoid a strategic surprise, to provide long-term expertise, to support the policy process, and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods” on behalf of the state. Similarly, Loch Johnson (2014:3) argues that the work of national intelligence agencies refers to “the collection and analysis of information, covert action and counterintelligence” towards the protection of national security interests. The emphasis on covert action and the maintenance of secrecy implies an approach to security that is inward-looking, thus state-centred, and in contradiction to the human-oriented security approach, transparency and collaboration principles of early warning as posited by Rusu (2001:127).

This incoherent approach to early warning presents contradictory theoretical implications that have a bearing on its conceptualisation. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to resolve this conceptual conundrum by developing a conceptual framework that articulates a theoretically clear conception for conflict early warning through the literature review. Thereafter, in pursuing a clear conception of conflict early

warning, this chapter defines traditional intelligence warning and expand on the concept of early warning as outlined in the literature overview. The undertaking of this exercise also presents the methodological and theoretical frames of each concept. Consequently, the review of this scholarly literature goes towards presenting good effective practices of conflict early warning and enables a conceptual framework that is utilised in assessing the conflict early warning policy approach of the UN, AU, and SADC, and the inefficiencies of such approaches to the Mozambican crisis.

## **2.2) The Evolution of Early Warning as a Conflict Prevention Mechanism**

The analysis of the history of conflict early warning suggests that its conceptualisation and application occurred in different periods, with its application preceding its conceptualisation. The application of early warning as a conflict prevention mechanism can thus be traced back to the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which was a UN peacekeeping mission that was established in the wake of post-independence violence in the now Democratic Republic of Congo. Early warning in this regard was applied by establishing the Military Information Branch (MIB) as a unit of the UN peacekeeping forces.

According to Walter Dorn and David Bell (1995:15) the MIB “was established in order to accumulate and collate information, evaluate it, and disseminate intelligence” to the UN peacekeepers in the Congo. The need for this intelligence was precipitated by the volatile situation following the death of former Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in February 1961. According to Dorn and Bell (1995:15), the objective of the MIB sought to achieve the following, boost the security of UN workers and forces by forewarning ONUC Military Operations of security threats, provide early warnings on the possible outbreaks of conflict and threats to peace, and to offer support for specific operations, which entails an awareness of activities and estimations of capabilities of secessionist and non-UN military forces. This meant the MIB sought to systematically collect information that related to possible violent attacks on ONUC personnel, internal political and economic tensions as well as externally driven ones, and the flow and type of arms possessed by secessionist and non-UN military forces.

This objective was grounded on the UNSC Resolution 161 adopted in 1961 which mandated the ONUC mission to:

*...take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.*

Central to this mandate was the prevention of conflict and/or its escalation to a civil war, an essential feature of a good conflict EWS. However, as Dorn and Bell posit, the initial demand for an intelligence warning capacity was originally advanced by the peacekeeping military leaders based on the “principles of war and basic tactical conception”, which according to Sun Tzu (in Hughes 2014:51), entails a belief that “all warfare is based on deception”, in pursuit of competitive advantage, as put forth in the national security context. Thus, for Howard Adleman (1998:45) the MIB’s military-oriented intelligence approach to early warning, which employed clandestine tactics, is closely “associated with traditional intelligence gathering to detect, deter, prevent, or counter hostile acts against UN peace-keepers in the Congo” rather than it being a humanitarian centred endeavour concerned with the suffering of others.

This conceptual observation by Adelman was also at the centre of the UN’s hesitance in establishing the MIB. Conor Cruise O’Brien (1962:76) in this regard cites former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld who, although acknowledging the need for intelligence and forewarning capabilities for ONUC, argued that the character of the UN as an international organisation made it impractical for it to employ intelligence tactics. Hammarskjöld’s observations were based on the fact that the UN sources its agents from various countries that have diverging national views and as such operations “would be peculiarly liable to infiltration by [various] national services” (O’Brien 1962:76). The perceived probability of infiltration served to undermine the legitimacy and impartiality of the mission and possibly the national sovereignty of the Congo. Hammarskjöld’s reservations raised questions about how the UN should overcome this impartiality issue that threatens not only the credibility of the UN’s independence and neutrality but also hinders it from embracing a mechanism, that of systematic information collection, for effective peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. This inspired a new way of thinking about the function of intelligence and warning capabilities within a humanitarian crisis that resulted in the conceptualisation of early warning with a humanitarian approach to security.

The conceptualisation of early warning with a humanitarian approach, with which conflict early warning is more closely associated, occurred between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The debate on the use of early warning to forecast the eruption of conflict can be traced to the works of J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace's (1979), *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics* and Israel W. Charney's 1982 *How Can We Commit the Unthinkable: Genocide, the Human Cancer*. However seminal voices in the study of conflict early warning systems, viz. Kumar Rupesinghe (1989), Howard Adelman (1998), and David Nyheim (2009) cite Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's 1981 *Human Rights and Massive Exodus Report for the UN Human Rights Commission* (UNHRC) as instrumental in advocating at the UN level, for the implementation of EWS as a mechanism for preventing and mitigating humanitarian crises that typically arise from massive exoduses and human rights violations.

The EWS envisioned by Aga Khan (in UN, 1981b:69) was to be "based on impartial information gathering and data collection concerning potential mass exodus situations leading to expeditious reporting to the Secretary-General of the UN and competent intergovernmental organs for the purpose of timely action if required". Aga Khan's proposed EWS presented two key ideas relating to the approach to early warning and the objective or focus of early warning. The approach to early warning emphasises impartial information gathering and concern with potential mass exoduses, which is grounded on the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence towards the management of humanitarian crises. In addition, the reporting of this information to the UN and competent intergovernmental organs for the purpose of timely action is also emphasised, illustrating the collaborative and transparent nature of EWS within a global context. This implies a collective approach by international actors towards preventing and mitigating human suffering, which entails governments accepting "a more flexible interpretation of national sovereignty" (UN 1981b:22).

The objective or focus of EWS is to systematically collect information on the root causes of forced migrations and human rights violations in order to enable the UN to prevent or alleviate their outbreak. According to the former Secretary-General of the UN Kurt Waldheim (in UN 1981a:2), the root cause of these crises may be "political or

military conflicts, internal or external, to civil strife, persecution or other forms of violations of human rights, be they civil and political or economic, social and cultural rights”. Contributing to this train of thought, so as to offer a more nuanced explanation Aga Khan (1981b:41-44) posits that these root causes ought to be understood in the context of other fundamental problems that include overpopulation, food insecurity, growing inflation and unemployment, food shortages and soaring prices, and hazardous events brought on by ecological deterioration. These fundamental issues not only make apparent the scarcity of resources but also exacerbates political and economic distress, particularly in the developing world which according to Aga Khan is more prone to violent political instability.

Early warning in this context seeks to comprehensively study humanitarian crisis indicators by not only focusing on warnings of political violence but also, as put forth by Tim Sweijs and Joris Teer (2022:6) on “warnings for crisis events that can indirectly lead to political violence; [which] include large-scale natural hazards, famine and infectious diseases”. These indirect causations can at times exist without resulting in political violence. Furthermore, the central focus of Aga Khan’s EWS is mass exodus/ forced migration and human rights violations, which can also occur outside the context of a violent conflict. A humanitarian approach in this regard takes a rather broad character whose causations range from natural disasters to violent political conflict.

It becomes apparent how the conceptual conundrum came to be. The idea of conflict early warning was initially pursued through military tactics of traditional intelligence that are oriented towards the aversion of violence and humanitarian approaches to preventing and mitigating forced migrations and refugee crises. The humanitarian approach to a great extent has a broad mandate that may at times fall outside the scope of political violence. This then raises the questions of how appropriate these approaches are, particularly from a methodological perspective, and what precisely makes conflict early warning distinct from traditional intelligence warning and Humanitarian Early Warning (HEW), as it came to be known. Thus, to answer these critical questions the following section defines traditional intelligence warning and expands on the nexus of the various forms of early warning, i.e., HEW and conflict early warning. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate the convergences and divergences in the theoretical and methodological approaches.

### **2.3) Traditional Intelligence Warning**

Traditional intelligence warning, which is also referred to as strategic warning or indications and warning (I&W) intelligence is a practice of Intelligence. Prior to defining traditional intelligence warning, it is imperative that this paper also offers a definition of Intelligence, the purpose with which it serves the state and the security theoretical paradigm within which its conception aligns to. According to Abram Shulsky (1991:1), intelligence is “information relevant to a government’s formulating and implementing policy, to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries”. In a similar vein Milton Diaz (in Warner 2014:26) defines intelligence as:

*...any process producing knowledge that might be used in making a decision or influencing the process, knowledge, or decisions of competitors and in the face of competitors’ efforts – real or imagined – to affect one’s own processes, knowledge, or decisions in matters of national policy.*

These definitions underscore the purpose of intelligence as being concerned with the protection and advancement of the state’s national security and as such entails that intelligence exists within a context where the state is the referent object to be secured and where the protection and attainment of national security interests are paramount. In this regard, the pursuit of national security according to Michael Hough (2003:2) entails a traditionalist approach to national security that is concerned with the state’s capacity “to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory, to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms, to protect its nature, institutions and governance from external disruptions, and to control its border”.

This traditional approach, from a theoretical perspective, aligns with the realist (also referred to as the traditional) body of thought in Security Studies. According to Craig Snyder (2012:19-20), realists argue that at the basic level “states are the most important actors in international politics; states seek to maximize their power or their security; and that anarchy – the absences of any common sovereign – is the distinguishing feature of international life”. This conception of national security, according to Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009:11), was predominant during the Cold War era and “entailed a fusion of the security of the state and security of the nation”.



What is clear from the above is that the practice of warning intelligence leans towards this Cold War conception of security. According to Cynthia Grabo (2002:1), warning intelligence was developed by the United States of America's (U.S.) intelligence services in the initial stages of the Cold War, as the need for capabilities of perceiving Soviet threats that could lead to surprise actions or open aggressions arose. The development of warning intelligence entailed the adoption and extrapolation of World War II military methods, into the policy-making process, which Grabo (2002:1) cites as the "collection and analysis of information concerning the military plans and intentions of their enemies in an effort to anticipate future enemy actions".

The purpose of warning intelligence is to collect and analyse information in order to understand the intentions of adversaries, distribute information to forewarn the state of possible threats to its security, and enable it to respond adequately based on its own capabilities and that of its enemies. This collection, analysis, and dissemination of information is a product of the intelligence cycle, which according to David Omand (2014:59-60) involves the planning and direction (intelligence requirements from policy-maker), collection (of raw data relevant to requirements), processing and exploitation of data (into an intelligence form), analysis (data verification process), and dissemination (issuing of a warning to policy-maker).

In relation to warning intelligence, Hough (2004:25) argues that this process is based on I&W methodologies, which include the use of the following types of intelligence "current, estimative, scientific, and other types of intelligence", across a broad spectrum of themes that include "history, domestic and international politics, geography and environmental sciences". The diversity of methodological approaches to warning intelligence entails that warnings may be strategic in that they have a long-term outlook or tactical/ current in that they focus on short-term information towards warning.

#### **2.4) Dissecting Early Warning**

The literature overview presented early warning in the Conflict Prevention context. In this context, early warning is the collection and analysis of information that is concerned with studying the 'structural and proximate' indicators of political violence at various stages so as to warn critical actors of the impending crises, provide strategic responses, in an effort to prevent and mitigate human suffering (FEWER 1997; Souaré

and Handy 2013; Adelman 1998). Similarly, HEW as implied by its name is concerned with preventing humanitarian crises and as such seeks to avert and alleviate human suffering brought on by these crises. Thus, Ahmed and Kassinis (in Hough 2004:26) argue that HEW in a nutshell can be defined as “the identification of crises with humanitarian implications”.

Aga Khan’s 1981 Report, which was instrumental to the notion of HEW, argued that this identification of crises, be based upon the studying of information on the precipitating factors of forced migrations and human rights abuses, which ranged from violent political instability to circumstances of economic distress, and natural disasters. This entailed an extensive range of precipitating humanitarian issues to be studied, with the focus on conflict-oriented early warning becoming more pronounced with the emergence and advancement of the Human Security paradigm. According to Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2020:166), the Human Security paradigm is “an understanding of security that is focused explicitly on the well-being and welfare of individuals rather than on the protection of states”.

Cognisant of this extensive focus of HEW, Jonathan Whittal (2010:1237) defines it as a:

*...generic umbrella term incorporating more specific early warning mechanisms that include the monitoring of political instability, arms flow, ethno-political conflict, environmental conflict, intra-state conflict, genocide, gross human rights violations, state failure, food crises, refugee flows, internal displacement, and of course health trends.*

Whittal’s definition of HEW seeks to cluster conflict early warning and HEW such that the terms are taken as synonymous. However, HEW was conceptualised during the Cold War, which as stated in Chapter One, was an era when the notion of security was state-centric and superpower tensions hindered the ability of the UN and UNSC to adequately focus on violent conflict. The nature of HEW in this regard tended to tilt towards natural disasters with humanitarian implications rather than politically motivated violent crises with humanitarian implications, which by consequence distinguishes HEW from conflict early warning.

Adelman (1998:45) in this regard posits that the practice of HEW was initially centred on ‘natural humanitarian disasters’ and as such studied and collected information on

severe climate patterns, i.e., weather storms, earthquakes, and droughts, which have a profound impact by forcibly displacing people and creating food shortages. Thus, according to Adelman (1998:45), the objective of HEW was twofold in this regard. Firstly, HEW sought to anticipate refugee flows to enable early action in the provision of fresh water, health services, food supplies, and shelter in order to mitigate refugee suffering. Secondly, HEW sought to anticipate the flows “so that preventive action could be taken to alleviate the causes stimulating the flow”.

Similarly, conflict early warning, as put forth by the literature overview, is concerned with anticipating the escalation of violent conflict at its various stages, developing response options and presenting them to critical international actors for early action towards the protection of human life and the provision of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations whose governments are either unable or unwilling to do so (FEWER 1997; Adelman 1998; Cilliers 2005; Hough et al 2008).

In reflecting on these objectives, it is evident that central to HEW is the study of the structural and precipitating factors of forced migration and human rights violations that may possibly lead to violence, entailing a long-term strategic outlook to its warnings. In contrast, conflict early warning according to Hough et al (2008:79), is concerned with structural and proximate indicators, meaning that it “also deals with a conflict that has already erupted, in order to end it or prevent its escalation”, which is a similar trait to traditional intelligence warning.

However, the methodological approaches of both HEW and conflict early warning is similar to Intelligence Warning as Hough (2004:24) states that it is “indicator-based approaches, trend analysis, mathematical modelling, simulation, anomalous developments (behavioural patterns that signal broad societal changes)”. In a similar vein, Adelman (1998:16) substantiates this claim by arguing that early warning in essence is a system of intelligence gathering as it “entails both a process for the collection, analysis, strategic assessment, and dissemination of information, and institutional structure for fostering this process”.

Reflecting on the above definitions, it is evident that from a theoretical perspective, the approaches of traditional intelligence warning and early warning to security differ, as in the former security is concerned with the state whereas in the latter, irrespective of

its various forms, human rights and the wellbeing and security of individuals are at the centre of its approach. However, from a methodological perspective, the similarities in methods illustrate that both systems are quite capable of studying and issuing a warning relating to possible violent crises albeit from differing outlooks. This then raises the pertinent question of what are the essential conditions concerning the effective functioning of an EWS, particularly in the context of Conflict Prevention in international security.

### **2.5) An Effective Conflict Prevention Early Warning System**

The endeavour of establishing the essential conditions required for the effective functioning of an EWS geared towards Conflict Prevention in international security entails briefly revisiting the concept of Conflict Prevention and reviewing the literature on what constitutes good sound practices of an EWS. Conflict Prevention as an approach to maintaining international peace and security, as outlined in Chapter One, was initially championed by the UN Secretary-General's 1992 Report *An Agenda for Peace*. The significance of Conflict Prevention is in the fact that it was instrumental in pointing early warning towards conflict and political violence. Conflict Prevention achieved this by calling for the consolidation of EWS (i.e., HEWS) that are concerned with "environmental threats, the risk of a nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease" with the endeavour of assessing political indicators that threaten the peace (UN 1992:15).

Thus, the idea of Conflict Prevention, in a nutshell, seeks to champion the prevention of disputes from occurring and or intensifying into conflicts and the containment of such conflicts should they occur (UN 1992:11). Fundamental to its approach to conflict EWSs is the analysis of structural and proximate causes of conflict thus entailing strategic/ long-term and tactical/ direct responses to a crisis. In this regard, Adelman (1998:57) argues that conflict EWS are used for the analysis of: "structural and proximate factors that might lead to violence", "a conflict that has already begun" in order to end it or prevent its escalation, and threats towards peacekeepers, which collectively require a strategic and direct approach.

Furthermore, the promotion of systems that are driven from either the UN level or at the Regional or Sub-regional level (as espoused by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), based on security confidence-building measures that encourage transparent and

collaborative synergies between these spheres (UN 1992:15-16) is critical. To further strengthen this view, Cilliers (2005:1) argues that good effective early warning is a disinterested intelligence system that is based on open-source information gathering within which collaboration and information sharing is an essential component across the international, regional, national, and local spheres and amongst various actors.

A state-driven approach to early warning is deliberately omitted from Conflict Prevention's envisioned EWS, presumably to allay the reservations that the UN had when trying to establish the MIB as part of the ONUC mission. These reservations were centred on issues of transparency and collaboration and the management of state actors' opposing national interests in the peacekeeping process. The clandestine nature of national intelligence agencies, which according to Cilliers (2005:2) are undertaken in order "to ensure the integrity and objectivity of secret analysis (i.e., based on information not available in the public domain)", enables a selective approach to information sharing as this information is "without the benefit of external peer review", unlike an open-source system. The practice of traditional intelligence warning in this regard is thus discounted as an effective approach to early warning, as its secretive nature is contrary to ideals of transparency and collaboration.

In addition to this, the methodological approach to the dissemination of information further discounts warning intelligence as an efficient approach. The intelligence cycle, which regulates the process of warning intelligence is explicit in that the dissemination of information in the warning process serves only to issue a warning to policy/decision-makers and not prescribe policy or action. In this regard, Cilliers (2005:2) posits that "intelligence is divorced from action/policy so that analysis does not merely reflect 'his masters' voice'". Similarly, Hough et al (2008:76) argue that the warning cycle is completed only when the decision-maker has been warned and a decision is made. However, it must be noted that the decision made is not prescribed by the intelligence analyst and the decision may also be inaction towards the warning.

In contrast, Adelman (1998:57) argues that good "early warning goes beyond the collection and sharing of information to include both the analysis of that information and the formulation of appropriate strategic choices given the analysis". In a similar vein, Cilliers (2005:2) posits that "the purpose of early warning is the formulation of strategic options directed at taking preventive action in the common (regional or

international) good as opposed to the national interest”. Efficient early warning in this regard seeks to prescribe action/policy, to the relevant decision-makers, that is geared towards timely preventive action. Evidently, traditional intelligence methodological inconsistency does indeed reject warning intelligence as a competent approach to early warning as its failure to prescribe policy that is geared towards action has detrimental consequences to the purpose of early warning and preventive action, which is the protection of lives and the provision of emergency humanitarian aid to the vulnerable in a conflict crisis and that are centred on human security considerations.

In light of this purpose, the theoretical foundations upon which traditional intelligence and early warning are rooted become critical. Traditional intelligence, as this chapter has established, leans towards a state-centric or traditional approach to security. This entails an approach that seeks to maximise state security as Warner (2014:30) argues that Strategic Warning analysis is fixated on securing the state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its foreign policy objectives, its affluence, and determining existential threats to it both at home and abroad. Taking this context into account, in the event that a conflict crisis was to arise either within or outside a said state’s borders, the considerations of sovereignty, non-interference, and national interests will reign supreme over human security considerations resulting in a suppressive reaction internally or an indifferent approach externally.

In contrast, sound conflict early warning is not fixated with these traditional security concerns as it was conceived in an era where, according to Rupesinghe (1989:183), “the global concern for human rights and peace entails that the concept of sovereign and non-interference in the internal affairs of governments need not imply silence by the global community in cases of gross and persistent violations”. This entails that in the event of a conflict crisis arising a good EWS should be, according to Adelman (1998:53), concerned with human security imperatives, therefore the “protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is an inability or unwillingness to provide protection by the state with jurisdiction over the territory” above any other consideration.

It is clear from the above that, as stated by Rusu (2001:127) in the introduction of this chapter, an efficient EWS is based on three interlinked principles of human security, transparency and collaboration. This entails that a good EWS exhibits at the very least

the following dimensions. Firstly, a good EWS needs to be oriented to a strategic and proximate approach towards the analysis of factors that may contribute towards a violent crisis. This is mainly due to the fact that a good conflict EWS needs to be able to anticipate a violent crisis that has not yet begun and anticipate the escalation of an existing one in order end or deescalate it.

Secondly, a good EWS needs to be devoid of any state or national interests. An efficient EWS must be established and steered from an international, regional or sub-regional organisation. Thirdly, a good EWS theoretical foundation needs to be strictly aligned with human security principles. This entails processes that are removed from intelligence-based methods, which seek to adopt open-source methods that encourage collaboration and transparency across international, regional, national, and local spheres and amongst various actors that include, as stated in the previous chapter, relevant international organisations, research centres and non-governmental organisations. Such an arrangement deprives and deters national interests from taking centre stage during conflict crises, and enables non-state actors from the local to international level to raise awareness on critical humanitarian issues and solutions towards resolving crises. Lastly, a good EWS process must be exclusively geared towards early action, thus being explicitly prescriptive in what exactly has to be done towards the prevention or de-escalation of conflict. Based upon the fact these features are contrary to the nature of traditional intelligence, this totally discounts strategic warning as a good practice of early warning either in the conflict prevention or humanitarian context.

## **2.6) Conclusion**

In conclusion, based on the above analysis of the concept of early warning, the most appropriate manner in which to implement an EWS is through open-source methods. This is due to the fact that human security considerations are better able to find expression, during a humanitarian crisis, than in an intelligence-based environment. Reflecting on the history of how the idea of early warning and its subsequent development evolved in international security and the similarities in the methodological approaches of warning intelligence and early warning, it becomes apparent why a conceptual conundrum in the implementation of conflict early warning exists. The methodological approaches of traditional warning intelligence which were employed

by MIB in supporting the ONUC mission were quite successful in assessing and anticipating incidences that may have led to the possible outbreak of violence. However, the conceptual foundations of warning intelligence entailed that the UN was willing to engage in clandestine operations with certain member states. By implication this made all other UN member states uncomfortable as this exhibited an inclination by the UN to totally disregard their sovereignty, and in the worst-case scenario hypothetically conspire with their rivals, hence Hammarskjöld's reservations on the establishment of the MIB.

Accordingly, the conceptualisation of early warning in all its forms sought to shift the practice of information gathering towards alleviating a humanitarian crisis away from the constraints of traditional security thinking. At the core of early warning thinking were humanitarian imperatives that emphasised humanity, thus the importance of human rights, human well-being and security over sovereignty concerns, impartiality, neutrality, and independence that resonate with applying transparent and collaborative initiatives towards the management of humanitarian crises. These imperatives not only align very well with the human security paradigm but enable a process that is devoid of state interests and is geared towards tangible policy action that seeks to encourage early action. This speaks to good early warning practice that further entails an EWS that is, established and steered by international and regional organisations, operated on an open-source system that seeks to involve a variety of actors, and that is founded upon human security. In the following chapters, the study assesses and evaluates the conflict early warning policies and procedures of the UN, AU, and SADC and the failure of conflict early warning in Mozambique by exploring the extent to which early warning policy and practice failed to exhibit the qualities identified in this chapter.



### 3) **Chapter Three: An analysis of the Conflict Early Warning policy approaches and operational procedures of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).**

#### 3.1) **Introduction**

The analytical debates of the literature review in Chapter Two culminate with a clear conceptual framework as to what an effective Conflict Prevention EWS entails. In this regard, the conceptual framework posits four key characteristics of an effective EWS. The first is that a good EWS system needs to analyse structural and direct factors contributing to a violent crisis to anticipate or de-escalate a violent conflict. The second feature relates to an effective EWS being devoid of any state or national interests meaning it must be an initiative driven from either an international, regional or sub-regional organisation. Building on from the second, the third characteristic seeks to align an effective EWS with human security principles that encourage transparent and collaborative open-source methodologies that deter undue national interests. Lastly, a good EWS must be exclusively geared towards early action with the capacity of prescribing policy responses towards the prevention or de-escalation of conflict.

Considering these key features, the purpose of this chapter is analysing how the custodians of international peace and security in Mozambique, i.e., the UN, AU, and SADC align their EWS to these features. This entails an analysis of their approach to conflict EWS that examines their conflict early warning policies and procedures and the challenges faced in implementing them. The analysis focuses on the period when EWS were initiated leading up to 2020 when the escalation of the insurgency in Mozambique came to a head. In addition, the centrality of EWS to conflict prevention demands that their conflict prevention philosophy be presented before analysing each organisation's policies and procedures to holistically capture the essence of their conflict early warning strategy.

#### 3.2) **The United Nation's Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Strategies**

The UN does not have a single document which clearly expresses its conflict early warning policies and procedures. Therefore, these policies and procedures will be examined by studying scholarly work and documents published by the UN which shed light on its conflict prevention strategy and conflict early warning approach.

The analysis of the objectives and values upon which the UN was established illustrates a coherence of thought with the ideas advanced by the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace Report*. These ideas pivot on a coordinated international approach that encompasses an integrated approach to human security towards resolving conflict crises (UN 1992:8). Indeed, the first chapter of the UN Charter underscores these sentiments when it declares the purpose of the UN as being underpinned by three main objectives. These are the maintenance of international peace and security, fostering friendly relations among nations, and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms (economic, social, and cultural rights) for all the world's peoples (UN 1945:3).

Towards achieving this coordinated approach, the Report encourages participation, consensus and democratisation of international affairs through the proper use of Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements (UN 1992:35&37). Chapter VIII of the UN charter “provides [for] the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security for which the UNSC is primarily responsible” (Van Langenhove 2014).

The UN's conflict prevention strategy is underpinned by its active pursuit and promotion of these objectives and values in a holistic manner. This is substantiated by the adoption of resolutions A/RES/70/262: *Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture* (2016:3) and S/RES/2282 (2016:2) by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and UNSC respectively. These resolutions both stress:

*...the importance of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace, particularly through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes. Strengthening the rule of law at the international and national levels. Promoting sustained and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation and unity, including through inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.*

The above entails that the UN's early warning practises involve approaches that are both oriented towards the analysis of structural root causes of political violence and direct causes of political violence. This dual approach seeks to assess a state's fragility

and structural vulnerabilities in order to craft early response policies that are able to avert or mitigate a crisis in a sustainable manner.

From a structural perspective, the UN seeks to “strengthen the institutions and social mechanisms of states and societies” (UN 2018:3) in order for them to be more resilient and equipped to deal with humanitarian issues. These issues include poverty, famine, infectious diseases and the impact of large-scale natural disasters that may likely cause and trigger conflict. From a proximate perspective, the UN seeks short-term solutions that are highly focused on efforts to stave off impending violence, escalation or continuation of conflict (UN 2018:3). These short-term solutions concentrate on the apparent indicators of civil strife that manifest through political, ethnic or religious tensions. At a methodological level of early warning analysis, this entails a dual focus on strategic and tactical preventive early warning and action. Such a dual focus is geared towards structural issues that deny ‘freedoms from want’ and proximate issues that deny ‘freedoms from fear’. At a theoretical level, it is quite evident, by the emphasis placed on human rights and fundamental freedoms, that this approach is human security-oriented.

The operational implications of such a holistic approach for the UN are that they involve a variety of actors from within the UN system, thus UN departments and institutions. This is mainly due to the UN’s multifaceted approach to humanitarianism, which entails a variety of departments and institutions specialising in the different spheres of humanitarian work. Each of these departments and institutions conducts its own analysis and contributes towards the ‘comprehensive’ conflict early warning analysis of the UN. The UN’s *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention* (2014:4-5) identifies eight UN departments and institutions as being involved in early warning analysis for the UN.

The first of these departments and institutions is the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (OGP&R2P). This Office works towards supporting the work of two Special Advisers, the adviser on Genocide Prevention and the adviser on the R2P. Both these advisers have a common approach towards early warning, assessment, convening, learning, and advocacy (UN 2023g). As a form of early warning practice these advisers “collect information, conduct assessments of situations worldwide and alert the Secretary-General and relevant actors to the risk of

atrocious crimes, as well as their incitement” (UN 2023g). The most significant contribution the OGP&R2P has made to the pursuit of a coordinated comprehensive international early warning is the publication of the UN’s 2014 *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention*. This publication aims to standardise at an international level how conflict early warning analysis is conducted by prescribing a set of indicators that ought to be analysed.

The second is the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) which is the custodian department of the UN’s Conflict Prevention strategy. The DPPA has a mandate that seeks to “monitor and assess global political developments [towards] detecting potential crises before they erupt and devising effective responses” (UN 2023c). This mandate is undertaken through, the establishment of sound analysis and early warning practices, “preventing conflict and engaging in peace-making, managing political crises and violent conflicts, sustaining peace, and enhancing partnerships” (UN 2023c). This entails that the DPPA provides support to the Secretary-General and his envoys that play a strategic role in steering the UN’s Special Political Missions and ‘Good Offices Engagements’. The DPPA thus forms part of the envoys, which are deployed around the world in the form of regional offices or country-specific mission teams at the country level. Support to these envoys is mainly through early warning analysis of conflict zones by the DPPA, towards sustainable conflict prevention strategies (UN 2023d).

The third is the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), which is mandated to “provide political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world” (UN 2023b). The DPO undertakes this mandate through planning, managing and deploying peacekeepers and maintaining communication with key stakeholders (UN Headquarters, field missions, troop-contributing countries, and NGOs) to the peacekeeping mission (Zenko and Friedman 2011:24). In relation to conflict early warning, the DPO provides early warning analysis on active conflict zones through its 24-hour Situation Centre. The Centre is made up of two components, the Operation Room and the Research Liaison Unit that focus on situational awareness and strategic policy advisory respectively (Zenko and Friedman 2011:24). The work of the DPO thus focuses more on direct preventive action towards protecting peacekeeping personnel.

The fourth and fifth are the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). In a nutshell, these two institutions work in unison towards broadly facilitating the promotion and protection of all human rights for all (UN 2023f). The role of these institutions with regard to conflict early warning relates to their work on analysing and sounding the alarm on gross human rights violations. Zenko and Friedman (2011:27) explain the process of sounding the alarm on human rights violations as being initiated by the OHCHR through HRC's 'special procedures' system. The special procedures mandate special rapporteurs and representatives to "monitor and publicly report on thematic issues or human rights situations in specific countries", particularly if those violations are indicating a potential outbreak of violent conflict. The focus of their work is rather fluid, as based on a crisis, it can move from structural analysis towards direct analysis and preventive action.

The sixth is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has a mandate of protecting and safeguarding the rights of those forcibly uprooted from their homes (UN 2023i). As part of its work towards protecting refugee rights, the UNHCR studies patterns of forced migration in order to anticipate a mass exodus crisis and issue a warning. The sounding of an alarm in this regard may assist in uncovering a brewing violent conflict which is one of the many causes of a mass exodus crisis.

The seventh is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which works towards the mandate of eradicating poverty, "building democratic governance, rule of law, and inclusive institutions" (UN 2023h). Through its Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) the UNDP aims by means of early warning analysis to assist countries, in averting episodes of violent conflict and to recover from the ravages of natural disasters. This it seeks to achieve by "integrating conflict prevention into country programming and producing conflict assessments in politically sensitive, pre-conflict countries" (Zenko and Friedman 2011:23). This work is led by UNDP's peace and development advisers and undertaken jointly with the DPPA. Furthermore, the BCPR hosts the UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action referred to as the Framework Team. The Framework Team is "an internal UN support mechanism that promotes interagency collaboration" in the spheres of early warning, preventive

action, contingency measures and capacity-building between UN Organisations at Headquarters (UNHQ), UN Resident Coordinators, and UN Country Teams (UNCT) (UN 2012:1). The UN Resident Coordinators and UNCT, at country level, operate an open source EWS as they collect and analyse information from open sources and disseminate the information at the Framework Team platform in New York at UNHQ (Nyheim 2009:54). The Framework Team consists of 22 UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes.

The last institution identified by the *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes* is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The OCHA is mandated with “coordinating the global emergency response to save lives and protect people in humanitarian crises” (UN 2023j). As a coordinating agency, the OCHA acts through its Coordination and Response Division to perform Early Warning and Contingency Planning for humanitarian disasters. The analysis, conducted from the UN’s Humanitarian Situation Room, focuses on a state’s fragility and structural vulnerabilities. This involves analysing “social, economic, political and environmental indicators” in order “to assess risks, evaluate trends and produce early warning [reports]...[with] in-depth analysis of the human security sectors” (Zenko and Friedman 2011:26). The finalised report becomes the product of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that consists of 18 UN and non-UN partners who coordinate humanitarian efforts under the authority of the OCHA.

The above overview illustrates how the various UN organisations play a role towards contributing to the UN’s conflict early warning, both from structural and proximate perspectives. The OGP&R2P and the DPPA, from a thematic perspective, play a central role in driving the UN’s conflict prevention agenda as their work is centred on the prevention of political violence. Furthermore, these organisations’ mandates place them in close proximity to decision-makers as their work aims to support the work of the UN Secretary-General. The Secretary-General’s Office bridges the gap between the early warning work conducted by the UN system and the decision-making structures, in this case the UNSC. This is substantiated by a provision under Article 99 of the UN Charter, which empowers the Secretary-General to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN 1945:18).

The platforms created by UNDP through its BCPR and Framework Team and the OCHA through the IASC seek to coordinate the UN's early warning for analysis consolidation and strategic advisory services towards policy responses. In this regard, these platforms create internal synergies within the UN system between UNHQ, UN Resident Coordinators, and UNCT. Coordination internationally with regional and subregional arrangements is conducted through the DPPA. Ramcharan (2008:194) posits that "the DPPA is in regular contact with the conflict prevention arrangements of regional and subregional organisations [in order] to exchange views and information with them generally or on particular situations". The DPPA achieves this through its good offices' engagements. In the African context, good offices practice is accomplished through the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the DPPA's SADC Liaison Team in Gaborone, Botswana (UN 2023e, UN 2023k). In a nutshell, both the UNOAU and the SADC Liaison Team have a similar mandate. This mandate seeks to strengthen cooperation between the UN and the AU and SADC respectively, in the spheres of conflict prevention, management and resolution by coordinating and building their capacities towards sustainable international peace and security (UN 2023d, UN 2023e, UN 2023k).

Assessing the UN's early warning architecture considering the conceptual framework's key features of an effective conflict prevention EWS, hypothetically claiming that the UN's EWS leans towards these features is considerably a plausible claim. First, the UN's early warning analyses both strategic and proximate indicators. Secondly, it is devoid of any state or national interests as it is practised by the UN's organisations at the country level through open sources rather than by State Intelligence. Thirdly, the humanitarian aspect towards early warning and action entails a human security-oriented system. Lastly, the proximity of the DPPA and the OGP&R2P (the custodians of the UN's conflict prevention strategy) to decision-makers creates the impression the UN's EWS is geared towards early action. This begs the question of what have been the challenges to implementing an effective conflict prevention EWS, considering its shortcomings.

The fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of the UN's early warning is the lack of political will from its member states in supporting the system towards being an effective conflict prevention EWS. This lack of political will manifests itself in various

forms, from funding shortfalls to the active interference by member states in the analytical focus scope of early warning.

Zenko and Friedman (2011:23&27) highlight funding and staffing issues with two of the UN's institutions. The first is the DPPA's early warning team which forms part of its regional and country-level special political missions. The second is OHCHR's special procedures early warning function. The issues of funding and staffing in these two institutions have set limitations on the desk officers' and special rapporteurs' ability to collect information from open sources in the field. Furthermore, mechanisms which seek to coordinate the early warning work of the UN, such as the Framework Team, have no defined authority and as such "cannot compel the active participation of all relevant agencies and departments" (Zenko and Friedman 2011:24). This has resulted in only about six of the 22 agencies and departments that form part of the platform participating. The strengthening of these issues will need the UN General Assembly's buy-in, thus political will, which judging by some member state's interference, is unlikely.

Interference by member states in the analytical scope of early warning emanates from "member state's sensitivities on the monitoring of violent conflict and state fragility [of their country], as well as the labelling of their country as 'conflict prone' or a 'fragile state'" (Nyheim 2009:54). This sensitivity mainly has to do with a state not wanting to be perceived as incapable of managing its affairs by its peers and as such exercises its sovereign right to non-interference in its internal affairs. These sovereign rights are exercised despite member states subscribing, through the adoption of the *2005 World Summit Outcomes*, to the R2P norms and values. This has resulted in "political interference and manipulation of early warning analysis" and "restrictions on EWS coverage" thus limiting the analysis to humanitarian issues or pastoral conflicts rather than political violence (Nyheim 2009:54). In the African context sensitivity issues of states being perceived as incapable of maintaining their sovereignty have encouraged an "African solutions for African problems" (Williams 2016:67) approach to resolving conflicts. The impact of this approach has been a UN leaning towards Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements in respect of peace operations (Williams 2016:67). The UN's posture in this regard is motivated by efforts towards reinforcing collaborative



synergies with regional organisations so as to solidify its centrality in the maintenance of international peace and security (Williams 2016:67).

Therefore, the lack of political will towards addressing the ambiguity of mandates for mechanisms and frameworks or of galvanising support for the necessary funding of operations certainly impedes the UN's early warning architecture from being coordinated or geared towards early action. Additionally, the failure to accept that early warning processes are geared towards human security interests rather than passing judgement on a particular state's capability further compounds the UN's challenges.

### **3.3) The African Union's Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Strategies**

The custodian of the AU's conflict prevention and early warning strategies, thus the body charged with promoting and implementing these strategies, is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. The PSC forms the very foundation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The Protocol that establishes the PSC (AU 2002:4) defines the PSC as a "standing decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts". The PSC serves to function as "a collective security and early warning arrangement" that is capable of enabling "timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations" on the African continent (AU 2002:4). In establishing the PSC, the Protocol stipulates that the work of the PSC shall be supported by the "Commission of the AU, a Panel of the Wise, a CEWS, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund" (AU 2002:5). These structures collectively form the APSA, and their mandates find expression in the work of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU.

The APSA's approach to conflict prevention is guided by Articles 3 and 4 of the Protocol which express the objectives and principles upon which peace and security will be pursued. Fundamental to these objectives and principles are the values enshrined in *the AU Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (AU 2002:5-6). All three documents essentially emphasise the significance of advancing and safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people (AU 2000; UN 1945; and UN 1948). Furthermore, the AU's *Common African Defence and Security Policy* (CADSP) acknowledges the continent's high incidence of intra-state conflicts and advocates "a new emphasis on

human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well” (AU 2004:3). Therefore, the conflict prevention approach of the AU is oriented towards human security. This entails “the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, [and] the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development” (AU 2002:5).

The APSA functions as a “strategic framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa” (AU 2023). The CEWS augments this framework by serving as an information-gathering unit that collects, analyses, and monitors information towards “anticipating and preventing conflicts on the continent and providing timely information about evolving violent conflicts, based on specifically developed indicators” (AU 2018b:3). In collecting this information towards anticipating and preventing conflicts, the CEWS is also required to cooperate and coordinate with “the UN, its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)” (AU 2018b:2). The specifically developed indicators of the CEWS are based on “clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators” (AU 2002:17), entailing a focus analysing the structural and proximate causes of conflict.

The CEWS consists of two observation and monitoring units. The first is ‘the Situation Room’, which is charged with the data collection and analysis at the continental level and is “located at the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division of the African Union” (AU 2018b:2) in Addis Ababa. The Situation Room sources its indicators from in-house tools for data collection and analysis that utilise open sources from a variety of online media platforms. These tools include the Africa Media Monitor (AMM), which is a group of applications that systematically gather data from various online media platforms and subscribed wires (AU 2018b:4). The Africa Reporter, which is a customised online reporting and analytical tool that enables the submission of incident and situation reports (AU 2018:4). The Indicators and Profiles Module, which facilitates “the storage and processing of quantitative structural data as well as qualitative profiles data” (AU 2018b:5).

The second unit of the CEWS is a ‘Regional Observation Unit’ (ROU) that is charged with monitoring the data collection and analysis, streaming in from the Regional Mechanisms (RMs) responsible for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The data collected by this unit seeks to coordinate conflict prevention efforts between the AU's Situation Room and Early Warning of RMs (AU 2018b:2). The ROU utilises an online portal to exchange information with Regional Economic Communities (REC) early warning mechanisms (AU 2018b:4). The purpose of creating these synergies does not only seek to strengthen continental early warning efforts but also to give expression to Article 16(1) of the protocol. This Article states that "RMs are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa" (AU 2002:23).

The early warning product concluded from this coordinated effort is presented to the PSC in the form of Horizon Scanning briefings. These are presented bi-annually in an effort towards reinforcing "the linkages between early warning and early response in the AU conflict prevention efforts" (AU 2018b:6). In evaluating AU's conflict prevention approach through the APSA apparatus, it is apparent that the CEWS leans towards the conceptual framework's key features of an effective conflict prevention EWS.

The analysis of CEWS, much like the UN's approach, is aligned to the conceptual framework's key features of an effective EWS. This entails a focus on strategic and proximate indicators that incorporate political and humanitarian aspects towards early warning and action. Furthermore, the CEWS is also devoid of state or national interests as it is practised by analysts, in the Situation Room and ROU, who utilise open sources, rather than State Intelligence. The APSA's approach to security is also underpinned by advancing and safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people entailing an EWS that is human security-oriented. The bi-annual Horizon Scanning briefings are a mechanism that gears early warning towards early action. This begs the question of what have been the challenges to implementing an effective conflict prevention EWS, considering its shortcomings in Mozambique.

The challenges faced by the AU in implementing its CEWS are to a great extent the same challenges faced by the UN. This assertion is made on the fact that the 'actors' or member states of the AU form part of the member states of the UN. Therefore, their behavioural patterns, particularly with regard to sensitivities around the monitoring of violent conflict and state fragility and the application of the ideas of sovereignty and non-interference, will remain consistent. This is despite the fact that when the AU was formed it sought to address the insufficiencies of the Organisation of African Unity in

tackling contemporary security issues on the continent. The AU sought to do this by capacitating the continent with mechanisms to deal with its own security issues, and by redefining sovereignty in order to be non-indifferent and to position people at the centre of security issues. This aligns with the R2P norms and values and is expressed by the AU (2002:7) Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h):

*...the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.*

However, the prevalence of the ideas of sovereignty and non-interference is not surprising, given the contradictory nature of Article 6 of the CADSP which is cited above as advocating a new emphasis on human security. Prior to advancing human security, Article 6 advances the “traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression” (AU 2004:3) as one of the core areas of security for the AU. Furthermore, the consistency of these behavioural patterns is substantiated by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) 19 April 2017 PSC Report<sup>2</sup>. It identifies the main challenge to the CEWS as “the negative reaction by some member states when situations in their countries are the subject of early warning” (ISS 2017).

These negative reactions stem mainly from a lack of willingness by political actors to support the CEWS towards being effective. This political unwillingness has negatively impacted the CEWS realising its full potential. This is evident mainly through the challenges faced by the CEWS of funding and staff shortages and the purposeful “denial of objective and credible early warning signals” (ISS 2017). The impact of these challenges has entailed that the mandate of the CEWS is confined to direct prevention as opposed to structural prevention due to member-states not consenting to structural analysis (ISS 2017). Consequently, this has resulted in the bi-annual horizon scanning briefings being confined to thematic issues as they rarely address any country-specific issues. In addition, member states have also been known to “lobby their allies within the PSC to avoid being placed on the agenda” of the horizon scanning (ISS 2017). This is despite the adoption of the AU’s 2015 *Continental Structural Conflict Prevention*

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<sup>2</sup> The Institute of Security Studies’ Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union Peace and Security Council (ISS 2017).

*Framework* (CSCPF), which aims to “identify and address structural weaknesses which often evolve over time, with a potential to cause violent conflicts if they remain unaddressed” (AU 2015:1). Evidently, these behavioural patterns derail the CEWS from being geared towards early action.

Beyond these challenges, a critical issue facing the functioning of the CEWS is the adverse effect of *the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RMs*, on conflict prevention strategies. This MoU seeks cooperation in the sphere of peace and security and advances “the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage” (AU 2007:4) towards conflict prevention strategies. The principle of subsidiarity presents the greatest challenge for joint coordinated conflict prevention efforts of the AU and RMs. Subsidiarity as a governance principle refers to “a degree of independence for a lower authority in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central government” (AU 2016:12). This entails that governance responsibilities, in the sphere of peace and security, thus early warning analysis, are distributed between two hierarchical levels of authority. The lower authority is given leeway to address governance issues within its sphere of governance prior to the intervention of the higher authority. Taking Article 16 of the protocol into account, the impression created is that RMs are the lower authority and the AU the higher authority. However, as Djilo and Handy (2021:3) have argued, the 2007 MoU fails to expand sufficiently on subsidiarity and “to identify which actor – either regional or continental – should be the first to respond to peace and security challenges”.

The failure of the 2007 MoU in creating clear institutional frameworks towards systematic collaboration between the AU and RMs has resulted in a significant challenge for CEWS. This is evident in RM utilising the principle of subsidiarity “as a strategy of the regional levels to protect themselves against a continental peace and security architecture, often seen as intrusive” (Djilo and Handy 2021:5). Consequently, the idea of sovereignty at the regional level is reinforced and thus the early warning function is seized by RMs through this strategy. Furthermore, the impact of this strategy has seen a competitive attitude by the AU and RMs over who has the rightful authority to perform early warning analysis. In this regards Djilo and Handy (2021:7) argue that “the lack of strict delimitation between the continental organisation and

regional mechanisms results in competition between states, according to the interests of the day”. This further weakens the effectiveness of the CEWS and is a damning indictment of collaborative synergies between the AU and RMs.

Cognisant of the sluggish effect these challenges have on the AU’s conflict prevention machinery, the AU assembly in January 2017, at its 28<sup>th</sup> ordinary session, decided on adopting institutional reforms. These institutional reforms emanate from the 2017 AU-commissioned Kagame Report that proposed reforms to counter the predominant perception of the AU’s “chronic failure to see through [its own] decisions” (Engel 2022). In this regard, the AU identified the augmentation of the functions of the APSA through harmonising its work towards collaborations with the APRM, and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) (AU 2018a:1) as a countermeasure against this perception. The rationale for such a reform lies with the AU seeking to advance a holistic approach to conflict prevention that embodies governance and security issues, thus structural and proximate issues. Between 2018 and 2020, this resulted in the restructuring and amalgamation “of the political affairs department (DPA), and the PSD into the Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security” (DPAPS) (Handy and Djilo 2022:3).

The net effect of this merger has been the obliteration of the CEWS as analysts of the Situation Room have been redeployed to regional desks/ ROUs (Engel 2022), towards reinforcing synergies between the AU and RMs. This means that there is no dedicated unit for early warning and the broader agenda of focusing on governance challenges further takes away from early warning analysis (Engel 2022). The ramifications of these reforms on the CEWS are not accidental as the PSC has supported the AU Assembly’s decision “to position the APRM as an early warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent” (AU 2018a:1). However, the APRM and the CEWS are regulated by two different legal instruments (Handy and Djilo 2022:8), thus raising questions about the efficiency in the functioning of DPAPS, particularly in relation to AU and RMs synergies. Considering the above, the lack of political will in addressing funding, human resources issues and institutional frameworks is what makes the CEWS ineffective in early action. The AU needs to consider a number of factors in addressing these issues, most of which are centred on reforming its institutional frameworks. The AU needs to resolve how it can strengthen its posture, in a legally

binding fashion, towards the broader understanding of sovereignty that conforms with the R2P norms and values. Furthermore, reforms around the institutional frameworks need to clearly set out the functions and responsibilities of the AU and RMs and also consider the inefficiencies of the 2017 Kagame reforms. Addressing these will contribute to the AU realising a more effective conflict prevention and early warning strategy

### **3.4) The Southern African Development Community's Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Strategies**

The conflict prevention strategies of SADC are mainly expressed in the *2001 Protocol establishing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (POPDSOC)* and the *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO)*. The Organ is an institution of SADC, equivalent to the AU's PSC at the continental level, which is charged with promoting regional peace and security. The SIPO serves to complement the POPDSOC as it provides a framework of procedures for its implementation (SADC 2010:15). The POPDSOC's Article 11 explicitly expresses how the SADC seeks to manage and resolve conflict crises within the region. In analysing Article 11, three significant points underscore the conflict prevention posture of SADC.

Firstly, paragraph 3(a) of this article expresses the methodology that SADC will employ in managing and resolving conflicts, which is through peaceful means. These peaceful means involve "preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal" (SADC 2001:12). As a result, paragraph 3(b) calls for the establishment of a Regional Early Warning System (REWS) in order to enhance the peaceful efforts by enabling "timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict" (SADC 2001:13). Secondly, with regard to intra-state conflict, SADC seeks to resolve violent conflicts that include "genocide, ethnic cleansing, and gross violation of human rights" (SADC 2001:12). This is a vote of confidence in SADC's posture being toward human security as these conflict crises can either be between sections of the civilian population or between the State and sections of the civilian population with the most vulnerable being ordinary people. However, the last significant point underscores the fact that in order for SADC to pursue these conflict prevention strategies, paragraph 4(a) states that "the Organ shall seek to obtain the consent of the disputant parties" (SADC 2001:13). Furthermore,

paragraph 4(d) is quite explicit in that “the Organ shall respond to a request by a State Party to mediate a conflict the territory of that State” (SADC 2001:14).

Although provisions have been made for the use of diplomatic channels to request to intervene should such a request not be forthcoming from the affected State Party. The decision to accede to such a request ultimately still lies with the affected State Party. The notions of sovereignty and non-interference are reinforced through the design of these provisions within SADC. Consequently, this has resulted in the “development...of a seemingly clandestine intelligence-based REWS”, whose design offers little information about its operational procedures (Motsamai 2011). Therefore, the analysis of the effectiveness of the REWS will rely on the page-long SADC publication on the Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) and research conducted on governmental EWS.

The REWS is based on the integration of “inputs from National Early Warning Centres (NEWCs) and the REWC” (SADC 2023). The NEWCs are operated by the national governments of member states and REWC is operated at SADC Headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. According to Nyheim (2009:51), NEWCs mainly serve to “identify and assess threats to national interests and/or inform crisis prevention and peacebuilding strategies”, which essentially is an Intelligence Services function. The sourcing of early warning information is at the discretion of national governments and as such varies. Information is mainly sourced through intelligence gathering exercises by Intelligence Services, however, member state’s “diplomatic missions in affected countries” are also utilised (Nyheim 2009:48). It must also be noted that the early warning analysis of inter-governmental organisations such as the UN and the AU and of non-governmental organisations, may be utilised by NEWCs, at the discretion of national governments (Nyheim 2009:28).

The REWC serves to coordinate and synthesise the inputs from all the NEWCs of SADC member states in order to form a holistic early warning analysis for the region. In this regard, the functions of the REWC include:

*compiling strategic assessment and analysis of data collected at the regional level, sharing information on major issues posing a threat to the security and stability of the region, and proposing ways and means for preventing, combating and managing such threats (SADC 2023).*



The REWC's final early warning product serves to strengthen the work of the SADC Regional Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Programme (SADC 2023), which can entail a focus on structural and proximate indicators towards analysis. With the REWC coordinating a holistic early warning product for the region, it consequently serves to connect the SADC to the AU's CEWS with the NEWCs of its member states (SADC 2023).

In evaluating SADC's REWS it is evident that its effectiveness is heavily dependent on the willingness of its member states to submit accurate early warning analysis. Accurate analysis needs to conform to the standards of an effective EWS that is geared toward early action as established in Chapter Two. Considering the behavioural pattern of states towards early warning at the UN and the AU, the submission of any analysis is highly unlikely as states are opposed to the scrutiny of their structural problems by their peers. This begs the question as to whether an EWS exists in the context of SADC, as Nyheim (2009:54) has argued that SADC's approach to early warning "is more formalised intelligence sharing than early warning". Thus, one can only deduce that SADC has no EWS. Furthermore, its REWS has no mechanism, such as the AU's horizon scanning briefings, that gears it to early action. In addition, the analysis scope of the REWS faces a similar challenge. A good early warning needs to analyse both proximate and structural issues of a conflict-affected State. However, the lack of information published by the SADC with regard to analytical focus scope and the fact that member states determine their early warning practices, leaves this as a grey area.

What is apparent about the REWS is that its close proximity to Intelligence Services through NEWCs entails that state interests take precedence over any other considerations. This is evident in the work of NEWCs being geared towards classifying and evaluating threats to national interests. This may be detrimental to human security considerations, particularly if SADC member states should be in conflict with sections of their populations. Similarly, the sourcing of early warning signals is geared towards state interests, as how and what information is sourced and from where, is a secret of the State that is not subject to peer review. Thus, information sourced may be manipulated towards state interests to the detriment of human security considerations. Though the POPDSC makes an attempt at including human security considerations in

SADC's conflict prevention strategy, this is not as explicit as the reinforcement of the member state's sovereignty.

Essentially, the design of the REWS, coupled with a lack of political will, and the reinforcement of member states' sovereign rights, not only makes SADC's EWS non-existent or ineffective but also renders its interoperability with the UN's and the AU's EWS unachievable. In this regard, Djilo and Handy (2021:7) posit that the SADC has utilised the subsidiarity principle to give primacy to SADC's role in the Mozambican crises, in an effort of delaying the matter from being discussed at the PSC. Thus, coordination with the AU is hindered by considerations of sovereignty coupled with subsidiarity and consequently, no early warning information on SADC can be shared/forwarded with/ to the CEWS and subsequently the UNOAU.

### **3.5) Conclusion**

In conclusion, it is evident that the challenges faced by the UN, the AU, and SADC in implementing their EWS hamper any prospect of an internationally coordinated or collaborative EWS. Although attempts through UNOAU and CEWS interface have been made at connecting the security mechanisms of the UN, the AU, and SADC towards coordination and collaboration. The free flow of information is hindered by the design of SADC's REWS whose information is (pre)determined and provided at the discretion of the State rather than being open to various sources as is the case with the UN's EWS and the AU's CEWS. The variance of SADC's REWS to the key characteristics of the conceptual framework is a major obstacle towards an internationally coordinated and collaborative EWS. Furthermore, the problem of member states exercising their sovereign rights to the detriment of early warning analysis is an aggravating issue.

The behavioural pattern of member states levitating toward the narrow understanding of sovereignty is to a great extent a problem that resonates in all three organisations. This problem indicates a lack of political will towards early warning across the whole international system. The net effect has been an uneven approach to embracing early warning, evident in funding and human resource issues, and the unclear institutional frameworks that are unable to efficiently delineate roles or have a legally binding effect. Additionally, the UN's posture signals a preference towards Chapter VIII Regional

Arrangements in resolving conflicts has seen a laissez-faire approach to conflict prevention. This exacerbates the challenges faced by these organisations both at the organisational and political levels. At the organisational level, the functioning of the UN's various departments and institutions that essentially work silos rather than in unison poses a significant challenge. The UN would need to strengthen collaborative frameworks between its agencies in order to improve the function of its EWS. Additionally, striking the right kind of balance that does not compromise conflict prevention strategies in respect of UN and regional arrangement synergies is something the UN needs to address. Similarly, the AU would need to address issues around the subsidiarity principle in cooperating with its RMs as this significantly hinders its conflict prevention strategies. The SADC's REWS lacks detail in how it operates with the information available pointing to much-needed reforms at the political level.

Addressing this lack of detail would need to involve SADC explicitly aligning its REWS towards a human security approach. In addition, the redesigning of the REWS to being an open-source system would also need to be incorporated should the region desire an effective early warning. In fact, such an undertaking by SADC would actually see the region develop a more 'tangible' EWS. In a similar vein, the UN and the AU would need to re-emphasise the norms and values of human security and the R2P doctrine at a political level. For the AU this would entail addressing the contradictory nature of its security norms and values as expressed in Article 6 of the CADSP. However, in relation to all three organisations, political reforms should include institutional frameworks that legally bind them to these norms and values. This would go a long way towards gearing EWS to early action, as it would positively reinvigorate the general perception of early warning and consequently attitudes towards its practice. To fully grasp how these recommendations ought to reinforce efforts towards a coordinated international EWS, the following chapter applies the above challenges to the Mozambican crisis.

#### 4) **Chapter Four: An analysis of the factors contributing to the Mozambican Insurgency and the failure of Early Warning**

##### 4.1) **Introduction**

The discussions of the preceding Chapters Two and Three have steered this study towards answering what caused Early Warning to fail in preventing the onset of the 2017 insurgency and its subsequent escalation in Mozambique. In Chapter Two a conceptual framework upon which the functioning of an effective EWS can be analysed was established. In Chapter Three, the early warning policies and operational procedures of the UN, AU, and SADC were analysed to determine the challenges faced by these organisations in implementing their EWS in a coordinated and effective manner. The purpose of this chapter is to apply these discussions to the 2017 Mozambican insurgency, by analysing the key contributing factors towards the insurgency's outbreak and escalation and the failure of early warning.

In this regard, the key contributing factors relate to the acute early warning signs that led to the 2017 insurgency and the EWS response inefficiencies that contributed to its subsequent escalation. This chapter thus provides a historical context to the Mozambican insurgency leading to its inception in 2017, its peak in 2020 and events in 2021 that led to an international response. This historical context will briefly give an outline of events surrounding the inception of the insurgency and its escalation. Subsequently, the history of Mozambique and the significance of Cabo Delgado will be explored, in order to understand the security and governance context that fuelled the insurgency.

Furthermore, the chapter examines the critical issues that hindered the conflict EWSs of the UN, AU, and SADC from preventing the 2017 insurgency and/ or reducing further violence post its inception. The purpose of examining these critical issues is to understand the policy and operational shortcomings that hindered the effective sounding of an early warning and a prompt early response in Mozambique. Although Chapter Three identifies the implementation challenges of the UN, AU, and SADC's conflict EWSs, the analysis is not specific to the Mozambican crisis. Therefore, this chapter examines these critical issues by analysing the UN, AU, and SADC's responses to the Mozambican insurgency cognisant and within the context of Chapter Three's findings.

#### **4.2) Brief Outline to the 2017 Mozambican Insurgency**

The current insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province has been an ongoing conflict for almost six years. The insurgency began on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2017 as violent attacks on police stations in Cabo Delgado's Mocímboa da Praia by a group of 30 assailants (Ewi et al 2022:4). This group of 30 assailants belonged to the Al Sunnah Wa Jama'ah Islamic group (ASWJ), and as stated in Chapter One, the group is locally known as Al Shabab. Although the group shares a name with the Somali terrorist group 'Al-Shabab', various media and scholarly articles have emphasised that the two groups are unrelated (Coetzee-Swart 2021). The U.S. National Directorate of Intelligence (NDI) defines ASWJ as "a violent insurgent group that seeks the overthrow of the Mozambique Government and the expulsion of foreign influences" (USA 2021) in Cabo Delgado.

The pursuit of overthrowing the government and expelling foreign elements is ideologically rooted in the "1990s Ansar al-Sunna Islamic movement, which demanded governance by Sharia and rejected secular education" (USA 2021). In the Mozambican context, ASWJ are calling for the dismantling of secular state structures in favour of Sharia law as they believe it would ensure a fair distribution of Cabo Delgado's resources (Hanlon 2021a; Ewi et al 2022:4). Although their message appears to be disseminated towards pursuing a fundamentalist Islamic society, it is also apparent that just access to resources is central to their objectives. The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2022:2) corroborates this by arguing that at the core of the insurgents' demands is participating in and acquiring a significant share of the Cabo Delgado economy. The opportunities created by this economy are rooted in Cabo Delgado's vast natural resources and range from "major mining and gas projects" to "smuggling rackets" that have mainly benefited foreigners and the political elite (the Makonde tribe) (Hanlon 2021c; ICG 2022:2).

Following the initial October 2017 attack and leading up to 2020, ASWJ intensified its campaign resulting in an intense recruitment drive by the group. ASWJ's recruitment drive saw a substantial membership increase with an estimated 1,200 fighters, as of November 2022 (USA 2022). Although, the demographics of these fighters vary in terms of their age, gender, ethnicity, and nationality, and this will be expanded on later in the chapter. The majority, as advanced by various scholarly works, are young males

belonging to the Mwani tribe and subscribing to the Islamic faith, who feel socially marginalised, are uneducated and poor with grim future economic prospects (Ewi et al 2022; Müller and Vorrath 2019; Faleg 2019). The recruitment strategy of ASWJ initially relied on “family networks, friends, [and] mosques” (Faleg 2019:4) with assurances of “marriage, jobs, and cash” as incentives (Ewi et al 2022:11). But by 2019 ASWJ’s recruitment strategy had shifted towards coercive tactics of “abductions, kidnappings and [the] use of brutal force” a trait similar to insurgent groups associated with the Islamic State (IS) (Ewi et al 2022:11).

Furthermore, ASWJ’s intense campaign was also characterised by a shift in its attack strategies. As Ewi et al (2022:5) point out, the attacks by ASWJ initially targeted institutions or persons associated with the state, i.e., the police, soldiers and councillors. However, this shifted towards indiscriminate violent attacks on civilians that included acts of “extrajudicial executions, beheadings, sexual and gender-based violence, sexual slavery, abductions, recruitment of child soldiers and destruction of civilian infrastructure” (GCR2P 2023). This shift in attack strategy resulted in “more than 1,700 fatalities in a single year”, more than any other year, marking 2020 as the pinnacle of the insurgency (Ewi et al 2022:7). As of the 31st of May 2023, the intensified campaign’s net effect has been the loss of more than 6,500 lives and the displacement of nearly one million people (GCR2P 2023). The brutality of the insurgents has had an immense impact on Mozambique’s general population, illustrating widespread human insecurity in Cabo Delgado.

The insurgency’s progression into 2021, revealed Mozambique’s inability to maintain its territorial integrity, as the insurgents had managed to gain control of “most of five districts [of the sixteen districts] in Cabo Delgado” (Hanlon 2021b). The limitations of the security forces in this regard resulted in French oil company Total Energies halting its U\$20-billion liquified natural gas (LNG) project in 2021. This LNG project is touted as “the second largest gas reserve in Africa” (Hanlon 2021b), with the potential it holds, elevating its significance to Mozambique’s economic security. Such optimism about the natural gas project has resulted in it being cited as an “investment that symbolises Mozambique’s dreams of using its mineral wealth to lift the nation from poverty” (AFP 2022). Thus, the stoppage of the gas project twice over, on 1 January 2021 and 26 April 2021, has negatively impacted the economic security of Mozambique. The

second stoppage resulted in a declaration of a 'Force Majeure' by Total Energies due to the glaringly apparent limitations of the Mozambican security forces in repelling the insurgency (Hanlon 2021c).

The decision to halt the project was mainly due to the risks associated with the excessive loss of lives and property damage. In this regard, Total Energies has maintained it will not resume operations until Mozambique can assure "security and human rights in Cabo Delgado" (Aljazeera 2023). As a result of the cessation of the natural gas project, Mozambique requested military assistance, in the form of boots on the ground, from Rwanda. The requested assistance aimed to turn the tide on the ground towards effectively repelling the insurgents in the area surrounding the Total gas project (Olivier 2021). Subsequent to this request, the Mozambican government also invited SADC to intervene in Cabo Delgado through military intervention. The invitation was extended after mounting pressure from the regional bloc and on 15 July 2021 four years after the insurgency began, SADC deployed armed forces as part of the Southern Africa Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

The manner in which the above events unfolded raises the key question of what exactly it is that caused Mozambique to find itself in this predicament. Consequently, exploring the history of Mozambique and the security and governance context which gave rise to this situation will aid in unravelling the exact cause of the insurgency.

#### **4.3) The History of Mozambique and the Security and Governance Context**

The Republic of Mozambique is a country located on the east coast of Southern Africa, with a coastline that stretches 2,470 kilometres (km) (AU 2009:9), right into the East African Region. Considering the above outline, the predicament faced by Mozambique in Cabo Delgado, of being engulfed by a violent insurgency, is to a great extent rooted in governance failures. The failure to address issues of marginalisation, poverty, unemployment, and equitable distribution of resources sowed the seeds of anger and resentment towards the government. However, in addition to these issues, scholars such as Joseph Hanlon (2021c), argue that the insurgency is also rooted in "a complex mix of history, ethnicity and religion" in Cabo Delgado. Similarly, Louw-Vaudran (2021) posits that ethnic "tensions between the mostly Muslim coastal communities of the Mwani and Makua groups, and the Christian Makonde" are cited as the root cause of

the insurgency. Therefore, in analysing the history of Mozambique, the historical significance of Cabo Delgado and the role of ethnicity and religion towards the security and governance context of the province will be highlighted.

#### 4.3.1) Historical Outline of Mozambique

Mozambique attained its independence on 25 June 1975 following a protracted “10-year war for independence that freed the country from Portuguese rule” (Reppell et al 2016:5). The war for independence was an armed struggle waged by the liberation movement and current ruling party of Mozambique the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) against Portugal. The war was launched and waged for its entire duration in northern Mozambique, initially beginning on 24 September 1964 in Chai, Cabo Delgado and subsequently spreading to the Niassa and Tete Provinces (Funada-Classen 2012:242,248 & 260).

Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique had been firmly entrenched since the conclusion of the Berlin Conference that spanned from 1884-1885 (BBC 2023). However, informally Portuguese influence over Mozambique, particularly at an economic, political, and societal level, dates back to 1498 with the arrival of Vasco da Gama (BBC 2023). Prior to colonialism, the territorial area referred to as Mozambique today was a region mainly influenced by the Swahili people and culture. The Swahili culture arose from a merger of the cultures of the Bantu and Arabian people that dates back to the 8<sup>th</sup> century a.d, (Rangeley 1963:13). The merger occurred along the islands and coastal communities extending from southern Somalia to the northern provinces of Mozambique, viz. Cabo Delgado and Nampula (Chami 1998:200; Hanlon 2021c). The arrival of the Arabian people along this coastal stretch was mainly motivated by trade interests in the Indian Ocean and saw the introduction of the Islamic faith (Bonate 2010:574). The cultural and trade activities on the Swahili coast created, relationships based on familial and religious ties, and labour migration trends between northern Mozambicans and the people of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Bonate 2009:281).

The attainment of independence in 1975 saw Frelimo assume state power and introduce a single-party government system based on Marxist-Leninist ideology (Reppell et al 2016:5). The introduction of this system of government, two years after independence, led to the Mozambican Civil War in 1977 which was waged by the



Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) movement against the Frelimo. The Civil War was a result of Renamo's opposition to a Marxist one-party state (Reppell et al 2016:5) and lasted fifteen years. The Civil War ended with the adoption of the 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA), which initiated democratic reforms "that promote[d] inclusive political and economic institutions" in Mozambique (Phiri and Macheve 2014). Mozambique's transition towards being a democratic state, with the first multiparty elections in 1994 stems from the GPA's adoption. The advent of democracy in Mozambique ushered in an era of relative peace and stability with the exception being Renamo's "raids against key transit routes" (Reppell et al 2016:5) between 2013 to 2021 and the 2017 Mozambican insurgency.

#### 4.3.2) The Historical Significance of Cabo Delgado

Based on the above historical outline, Cabo Delgado is significant to Mozambique's history in that it is the birthplace of the 1964 War of Independence. The province became the birthplace of the War of Independence mainly due to two reasons. The first relates to its close proximity to Tanzania which had recently gained independence in 1961. Cabo Delgado is Mozambique's most northern province bordering Tanzania to the North, and the Indian Ocean to the East. The Uhuru<sup>3</sup> debates advanced by the independence movements of Tanzania<sup>4</sup> swept into northern Mozambique in the 1950s inspiring a spirit of anti-colonialism (Bonate 2009:281).

Furthermore, Frelimo was founded (on 25 June 1962) and headquartered in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania until the end of the War (Funada-Classen 2012:229&255). The second reason Cabo Delgado is the birthplace of the War of Independence is mainly due to its remoteness and underdevelopment. Cabo Delgado is 1,672km away from Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) the colonial capital and economic centre. The long distance from the administrative capital entailed a certain level of neglect resulting in "an administrative vacuum in the area for the colonial rulers" (Funada-Classen 2012:244). The above factors created a ripe environment for Frelimo to mobilise fighters and wage its armed struggle against the Portuguese.

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<sup>3</sup> The Swahili word for 'independence' (Bonate 2009:281)

<sup>4</sup> The Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) (Bonate 2009:281)

#### 4.3.3) The Role of Ethnicity and Religion

The role of ethnicity and religion as a factor in the insurgency is closely intertwined with the history of the War of Independence. Cabo Delgado is a predominately Muslim province with the Mwani and the Makua subscribing to the Islamic faith whilst the Makonde subscribe to Christianity. The Mwani, Makua, and Makonde make up 10%, 70%, and 10% of Cabo Delgado's population (Ewi et al 2022:14). All three ethnic groups participated in the Liberation War albeit playing different roles. The Makonde occupied leadership positions in Frelimo's armed struggle whilst the Mwani and Makua were strongly involved in the Liberation War as combatants (Hanlon 2021c). Similarly, all three ethnic groups were drawn to anti-colonial movements for different reasons.

The Mwani and the Makua's inclination towards the independence movements had cultural and religious undertones. The anti-colonial sentiments in northern Mozambique, largely shaped by the Tanzanian Uhuru debates, thrived because they appealed to the Muslim majority. The appeal was centred on the historical Swahili cultural and commercial ties, which the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) embraced as part of its character. This is evident in the party's Islamic overtones attested by the role Muslim activists played in its creation, its coastal origins and TANU's use of KiSwahili (Bonate 2009:281). However, beyond the historic cultural ties, the anti-colonial appeal coincided with a period when Muslims in northern Mozambique had grown tired of being persecuted for their faith. Since the 1930s the Portuguese embarked on a campaign that sought to repress the spread of Islam (Funada-Classen 2012:238), culminating in the Mozambican Missionary Statute of 1941 (Friedland 1977:333). The Statute granted Catholic Missions in Mozambique, the absolute responsibility for the education of African natives towards indoctrinating and subduing them under Portuguese rule (Friedland 1977:333). The colonial administration's actions in this regard resulted in the rapid expansion of Islam and entrenched a "deep-rooted antipathy of Islamic northerners against the Portuguese" (Funada-Classen 2012:238).

The Makonde's inclination towards the independence movement was initially characterised by a tribal agenda of "liberating the Makonde" (Funada-Classen 2012:175). The 1958 Makonde African National Union (MANU) formation in Dar es Salaam attests to this. The success of TANU in Tanzania, with its Pan-African outlook,

contributed to a shift in MANU's approach towards being an inclusive "all-Mozambican political movement" resulting in Makonde in MANU changing to Mozambique (Bonate 2009:281). In spite of this MANU failed to attract Mwani and Makua supporters due to the "popular perception that [it] was basically a Christian Makonde organisation" (Bonate 2009:282). For MANU, partaking in the formation of Frelimo, which saw it merge with the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union for Independence (UNAMI), was in pursuance of a mass appeal. However, even within Frelimo, the tribalistic tendencies of the Makonde failed to subside. This was evident with the defection and re-launch of MANU by some Makonde due to a general mistrust of Muslims and Southern Mozambicans who were mostly Christians, educated and dominated the leadership ranks of Frelimo (Bonate 2009:286; Funada-Classen 2012:254).

#### 4.3.4) The Security and Governance Context of Cabo Delgado

The War of Independence, which defined Mozambique's security context prior to independence, immensely shaped the ensuing governance context. The attainment of independence for Mozambique held promise of a governance context geared towards a government serving the interests of all its people. Accordingly, the newly independent Mozambican government "assigned priority towards achieving development for the well-being of its citizens" (Hoffman 2013:4). However, in Cabo Delgado the formation of its Provincial Government mimicked the ethnic armed struggle roles, with the Makonde dominating leadership positions. This came to be largely due to senior Frelimo leaders of Makonde descent claiming top government positions for themselves, as 'spoils of war' for their central role in the War of Independence (ICG 2021:3). Furthermore, to maintain their grip on power in the province these senior Makondes lobbied for their allies to be placed in national administrative and military posts (ICG 2021:3). The composition of government entailed that the control of resources in Cabo Delgado was in the hands of this Makonde elite.

In 1977 the Mozambican Civil War came to define the security context of Mozambique for the next 15 years. The Civil War negatively impacted the governance and development of Mozambique resulting in widespread human insecurity. This human insecurity was manifested in the high mortality rate of one million deaths and through

food insecurity as agricultural outputs had contracted to 2/3 of pre-war productivity levels (Hoffman 2013:5). Furthermore, the destruction of key developmental infrastructure (schools, health facilities, and railway system) and the rising fiscal deficit heightened insecurity and resulted in Mozambique being aid-dependent by the time the war ended (Hoffman 2013:5). However, in Cabo Delgado the Civil War had negligible impact largely due to the province's remoteness. Instead, Cabo Delgado experienced a boom of an illicit economy, trading in smuggled timber, precious stones and ivory (ICG 2021:3). This illicit economy was however not equally distributed nor was it directed towards Cabo Delgado's development, rather it remained in the hands of the local Makonde elite (ICG 2021:3). This resulted in Cabo Delgado retaining its neglected and underdeveloped character, which defined the province during the colonial era.

The adoption of the 1992 GPA marked the end of the Civil War, signifying a security context of relative peace and stability from which the 2017 insurgency arose from. The governance context born from this period of stability has been centred on Mozambique's reliance on aid geared towards Mozambique's post-Civil War economic reconstruction agenda (Wentworth 2016:5). The reliance on aid coupled with the flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) saw Mozambique "become one of the world's fastest-growing economies" with an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaging 8% growth at its best (Reppell et al 2016:5). Furthermore, FDI initiatives led to the "discovery of natural resources" and the development of key sectors such as "construction, transportation and communications" (Reppell et al 2016:5). Nevertheless, these developments had little impact on transforming Cabo Delgado's economy due to its remoteness and rent-seeking nature. The exception to this predicament of the discovery of natural resources having a minute impact on Cabo Delgado's economy came with the discoveries of Rubies in 2009 and LNG in 2010 (Ewi et al 2022:14). These discoveries, particularly of LNG, resulted in a "dramatic increase in FDI...attracting approximately US\$4.9 billion in 2014" (Reppell et al 2016:18). However, the opportunities presented by these discoveries benefited the local Makonde elite who through access to state loans expanded their business interests in forestry, mining and transportation (ICG, 2021:3). Additionally, an illicit

heroin trade that benefits the political elite in Maputo flourished creating an incentive for Cabo Delgado's status quo to remain unchanged (ICG, 2021:3).

The above historical analysis of Mozambique and its security and governance context illustrates a rather grim picture in terms of the uneven distribution of resources in Cabo Delgado. It is obvious that since independence Cabo Delgado has been neglected, with the Makonde elite given carte blanche over the governance of the province's resources. Cabo Delgado's neglect is something acknowledged by senior Frelimo officials. In this regard, they argue that the failure to uplift Cabo Delgado's out of a war economy is due to the Frelimo government's "focus on the development of the southern and central regions" (Ewi et al 2022:14). Such an observation by Frelimo senior official raises the pertinent question of whether there were any early indications that could have assisted Mozambique avert the insurgency. The following section dissects these indications.

#### **4.4) Dissecting the Early Warning Signs of the Mozambican Insurgency**

The early warning signs or indicators (EWI) of the Mozambican insurgency, as expanded on in Chapter Two, are the structural and proximate signs that would have signalled Mozambique's disposition to a violent crisis. As discussed in Chapter Two, conflict EWS are by their design intended to detect and flag these indicators towards forewarning decision-makers. The conceptual framework of this study defines these structural indicators as the underlying or root causes of conflict, thus "poverty, political repression, and [the] uneven distribution of resources" (ICISS 2001:22). It is apparent that the nature of structural indicators speaks to the governance inefficiencies that form the very basis of political violence. The proximate indicators are the observable triggering or direct causes, which manifest as "political, ethnic or religious" tensions and are the by-products of the structural causes (Nhara 1996:1). Therefore, the interrelatedness of structural and proximate EWI entails an analysis that will illustrate how the indicators correspond towards identifying a crisis.

The journey towards identifying a crisis in Mozambique begins with the October 2017 attack on state institutions as this was the most palpable indicator of a crisis existing in Cabo Delgado. The ideological orientation of ASWJ towards the 1990s Ansar al-Sunna Islamic movement entails that since its establishment the intention of the group

had always been to challenge the authority of the state. The formation of ASWJ in Mozambique is believed to have occurred in 2007,

*...when 'frustrated' youth in the ethnic Makua-dominated southern part of the province rejected the authority of their local religious (Islamic) leaders. Not long after, ethnic Mwani militants joined, and by the mid-2010s unrest had spread to the coastal part of the province (Bosman and Clifford 2022:32).*

The formation of ASWJ coincided with the post-2000 boom in the natural resources discoveries of gold, rubies, graphite and LNG whose discovery resulted in increased poverty and inequality (Hanlon 2021c).

The soaring poverty and inequality are attributed to various factors. The migration of artisanal miners to Cabo Delgado from east, southern and central Africa, as far back as the early 2000s, upon the resource discovery (Ewi et al 2022:13) is a factor for two reasons. Firstly, it increased trade competition for the local artisanal miners. Secondly, the formalisation of the mining sector through the introduction of Mining Law 20 of 2014 which regulates mining activities and the granting of concessions to Transnational Corporations (TNCs) (USA, 2023) decimated opportunities for artisanal miners. However, the decimation of opportunities was not the only drawback of granting mining concessions. An example is the land displacements related to the 2010 LNG project in the Afungi region of the Rovuma basin in Cabo Delgado. The 2010 government-initiated land relocation programme for this LNG project resulted in widespread human insecurity, as over 550 families lost “their houses, farmlands, fishing grounds, and most other aspects of their livelihoods” (Ewi et al 2022:13). The extent of human insecurity was quite severe considering that 80% of Mozambique’s population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods (Ewi et al 2022:14).

The contextual setting of the above events, from a structural perspective, was a historically neglected province in terms of governance. The implications of this neglect resulted in Mozambique’s limited statehood<sup>5</sup> in Cabo Delgado which was/is characterised by “weak State institutions, poor governance, and resultant [human] insecurity” (Neethling 2021). Accordingly, this state of decline reduced Cabo Delgado to being a province synonymous with deprivation. The province accounts for the most

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<sup>5</sup> According to Neethling (2021) limited statehood is “where the ability of the state to implement or enforce political-[governance] decisions and/or to maintain a monopoly on the use of force is simply incomplete”.

impoverished health and sanitation facilities and dilapidated schools in Mozambique, with its social and economic indicators ranking it as the poorest province (Neethling 2021). Among these indicators is the high illiteracy rate in Cabo Delgado with 81% of females and 51% of males being illiterate entailing a substantial figure of people prone to manipulation (Ewi et al 2022:15). Thus, the north-south divide stemming from the colonial era remained unaltered as poverty in Mozambique still has a regional pattern affecting central and northern provinces (BTI 2022:20). Additionally, government corruption that had marginalised predominately Muslim ethnic groups had also been unabated since independence in 1975 and became a defining characteristic of the province.

The subsequent period from 2012 to 2017 witnessed a dramatic rise in Islamic radicalism that positively contributed to Al-Shabab's recruitment. The increase in radicalism was offset by the death of Kenyan Islamist preacher Aboud Rogo, who was assassinated in Kenya in August 2012 (Ewi et al 2022:13). Rogo's notoriety stems from his recorded sermons that were effective in radicalising and recruiting the youth into Somalia's al-Shabaab (Ewi et al 2022:13). Thus, following Rogo's death his followers fled to Tanzania and northern Mozambique, with their arrival influencing the local teachings of Abdul Carimo and Suale Rafayel in northern Mozambique (Ewi et al 2022:13). Between 2014 and 2015, Carimo and Rafayel's teachings fuelled radicalism in Cabo Delgado under the ASWJ banner. This period saw the establishment of mosques and madrassas that challenged other Muslim institutions resulting in violent clashes between the two factions (Ewi et al 2022:13).

The instability that arose from these clashes pitted the group against the state, invoking a predominantly brutal response that resulted in arrests. Moreover, the centrality of the dismantling of secular structures in ASWJ's message also saw a brutal response from ASWJ. An example is the 2016 attack on a police station in Nhamissir by 36 insurgents in an attempt to free their brethren (Ewi et al 2022:13). The soaring arrests of ASWJ members coupled with the brutality of the state towards the insurgents shifted ASWJ "strategy from an ideological battle to armed resistance against the state and the Islamic Council of Mozambique" (Ewi et al 2022:13).

The above illustrates that EWI in Cabo Delgado became apparent 10 years prior to the insurgency's inception. Although at present ASWJ is predominately Mwani, its

formation was led by the Makua who are still significant in their numbers. The discovery of natural resources exacerbated poverty and structural inefficiencies related to governance, and further entrenched inequality and the marginalisation of people based on religious and ethnic grounds. This, coupled with Mozambique's limited statehood in Cabo Delgado, the implications of Rogo's death and the brutal response of the state created a fertile environment for radicalisation that has transnational elements. The insurgents' brazenness in engaging in violence, particularly against state security forces, pointed towards a looming crisis of Jihadism in Cabo Delgado. The question of whether the relevant security stakeholders were aware of the EWI and their response to the crisis therefore becomes relevant.

#### **4.5) Mapping the Responses to the Insurgency in Tandem with Early Warning Signs**

Mapping the responses to the insurgency highlights how the UN, AU, and SADC, in terms of their EWS, approached the EWI that contributed towards the insurgency. The early warning policy considerations of these organisations entail a bottom-up approach towards the response analysis, thus an analysis from the state level to the UN level. These policy considerations, as expanded in the previous chapters include the use of the UN's Chapter VIII which encourages regional arrangements to resolve conflict crises prior to UNSC involvement. The AU's subsidiarity principle, which empowers sub-regions to take ownership of security challenges prior to AU involvement, and the principle of sovereignty which is a defining feature of SADC's security cooperation that idealises the state's autonomy in security matters.

##### **4.5.1) Mozambique's Response**

The fact that the insurgency is at present still ongoing illustrates that Mozambique's approach to the above EWI resulted in the escalation of the insurgency. The response by the state failed to address the structural issues of poverty, unemployment, inequality, and marginalisation which are associated with governance inefficiencies. The state's failure was likely due to the fact that its approach was rigid and mainly focused on trying to quell the insurrection through heavy-handed tactics. These heavy-handed tactics in certain circumstances amounted to human rights abuses as in the process of suppressing the insurgency the police would arbitrarily arrest, detain, and



administer beatings without trial, sometimes resulting in fatalities, on civilians suspected of either being insurgents or of aiding and abetting ASWJ (Hanlon 2021c). Consequently, these human rights abuses on innocent civilians, at times, resulted in anger and resentment towards the state fuelling the insurgency to greater heights.

These heavy-handed tactics continued and were a defining feature of Mozambique's response strategy from 2018 to 2020. In 2018 Mozambique deployed paramilitary riot police under the Ministry of Interior towards suppressing the insurgents (Hanlon 2021c). ASWJ responded by intensifying its campaign. This saw more attacks in Mocimboa da Praia, an intense recruitment drive through the dissemination of audiovisual material that promote "Islamic values and the establishment of Sharia Law", and ASWJ aligning to the IS Central Africa Province (IS-CAP) (Ewi et al 2022:13). In late 2019 towards early 2020 Mozambique outsourced security and training services from the Russian Wagner Group, from September to December 2019 and the Dyke Advisory Group (DAG) in 2020 (Ewi et al 2022:13). Similar to events of 2018, ASWJ's response was even more intense with IS-CAP sponsored attacks escalating and becoming more brutal and indiscriminate. This resulted in the capture of Mocimboa da Praia twice over by ASWJ, in June and August 2020, the insurgency spilling over into Mtwara, Tanzania in October 2020 leading 20 civilian fatalities, and the November 2020 beheadings 50 villagers Muatide (Ewi et al 2022:13).

Seemingly, it is as though Mozambique undertook this approach as if it were oblivious to the structural issues underlying the crisis. However, Mozambique has subjected itself to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process twice, from 2007 to 2009 and also from 2018 to 2019 (Bosman and Clifford 2021:22). The APRM is an assessment tool "voluntarily acceded to by member states of the AU for self-evaluation" (AU 2009:28). The APRM seeks to strengthen governance practices by assessing governance performance in spheres of "democracy and political governance, economic governance and management corporate governance, and socio-economic development" (AU 2009:29). Mozambique's first Country Review Report (CRR) identifies poverty in tandem with an "incomplete disarmament [process], economic exclusion and social exclusion" as structural challenges posing a threat to stability (Bosman and Clifford 2021:26). The second CRR reemphasises the existence of these structural issues within the context of the 2017 insurgency. In this regard, it

further highlights the high levels of youth unemployment as a catalyst for poverty and instability as the youth make up “more than half of Mozambique’s population” (Bosman and Clifford 2021:29).

Thus, Mozambique was aware of its structural challenges from as far back as 2007 when the earliest EWI started surfacing. Nevertheless, macroeconomic factors and government corruption hindered Mozambique’s capacity to address these challenges. In 2011 the Mozambican economy began reeling from a ‘sustained slump’ in commodity prices that resulted in an increased public debt “from 40% of GDP in 2011 to 56.8% in 2014” (Wentworth 2016:6). Subsequently, in 2016 a ‘hidden debt’<sup>6</sup> scandal worth U\$2-billion came to light, agitating donors and investors, resulting in “reduced FDI, suspension of direct budget assistance by donors and a depreciation of the national currency” (BTI 2022:19). As of 2020 Mozambique’s public debt stood at 128.5% of GDP (BTI 2022:21).

Evidently, Mozambique’s inability of addressing its structural issues is largely due to budgetary constraints. Additionally, in March and April 2019 Mozambique was battered by cyclones Idai and Kenneth, resulting in 2,5million people requiring humanitarian assistance in the central and northern provinces (UN 2023a). The implications of the cyclones meant that the Mozambican government had to redirect funds towards relief efforts in the affected provinces. Thus, the budgetary constraints coupled with and the humanitarian situation brought on by the cyclones made it unfeasible for Mozambique to attend to structural development issues or reinforce its weak state institutions such as the security forces. Furthermore, the incomplete demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programme cited in Mozambique’s CRRs created a fertile environment for the free flow of arms. Considering these factors, it is evident that Mozambique’s efforts at suppressing the insurgency were an act in futility and this calls into question the AU’s and SADC’s response to the unfolding of Mozambique’s prolonged crisis. This question is even more significant, considering that the APRM exists within the AU’s framework.

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<sup>6</sup>Refers to the Republic of Mozambique’s non-disclosure of loans by three state-owned companies worth U\$2-billion as required by its donors (France24 2021).

#### 4.5.2) The Southern African Development Community's Response

As highlighted in Chapter One, the Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit, held in Botswana on 27 November 2020 is the first tangible response to the insurgency by the SADC. The Summit's resolutions called for "the finalisation of a comprehensive regional response and support to Mozambique to be considered urgently by the Summit" (SADC 2020:2). The Troika Summit response illustrated the weaknesses of SADC's REWS as it came three years after the insurgency began, and was a reactive measure rather than a preventative action. Subsequent to the Troika Summit, the next tangible SADC response came six months later with the 23 June 2021 Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government (HSG) in Mozambique. The HSG Summit approved the 15 July 2021 deployment of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) towards combating "terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado" (SADC 2021:3). Considering that the insurgency was in its third year, the six-month period between the Troika Summit that resolved to act and the HSG Summit that approved military action, further illustrates SADC's lack of urgency.

The lack of urgency illustrated above in SADC's conflict prevention efforts is likely due to policy considerations expressed in the POPDSC. As stated in Chapter Three, paragraphs 4 (a) and (d) of the POPDSC require consent and a formal request from the state party experiencing conflict, for SADC to intervene, reaffirming the principle of sovereignty. It is apparent that the Mozambican government was averse to foreign governmental intervention and as such no consent or formal request would have been forthcoming. This is substantiated by Mozambique's deployment of its riot police and the solicitation of private security services from the Wagner Group and the DAG, in the face of an escalating insurgency. Moreover, the six-month delay in finalising a SADC deployment plan was intentional on the part of Mozambique. The 29 April 2021 SADC Troika meant to finalise a comprehensive regional response was postponed due to the Mozambican government's opposition to foreign intervention (EIU 2021). The Mozambican government was averse to intervention as it believed this will invite scrutiny that may challenge its narrative on Cabo Delgado and possibly have a negative impact on the commercial interests of the political elite in the province (EIU 2021). In this regard, the Mozambican government solicited a rapid deployment of

1,000 Rwandan soldiers to its Total LNG project so as to avoid having SADC Forces being deployed there (Olivier 2021).

Mozambique's actions give credence to the assumption that its NEWC was probably not forthcoming with SADC's REWC in relation to early warning analysis both prior to and post the insurgency's inception. This assumption is further bolstered by the 2021 arrest and detention of South African agents of the State Security Agency (SSA) by Mozambican authorities (Stone 2021). The SSA agents undertook an operation focused on countering the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, possibly around March 2021, a period coinciding with a spike in terrorist attacks (Stone 2021). The government of Mozambique voiced its displeasure to the South African government in April 2021, who were surprised and embarrassed by this debacle (Stone 2021). Mozambique's displeasure is understandable under normal circumstances, no country appreciates foreign interference in its internal affairs. However, in the face of an escalating insurgency and in the context of South Africa and Mozambique coexisting within the SADC security community such efforts should have been welcomed.

The repudiation of SSA interventions laments the challenges faced by SADC member states who seek to contribute positively to the REW efforts. Furthermore, when this SSA incident is coupled with Mozambique's push to deploy Rwandan troops prior to the SAMIM deployment, it illustrates the Mozambican government's unease with SADC's presence in Cabo Delgado. The source of the Mozambican government's unease is rooted in the dynamics of historical relations within SADC. These relations are characterised by a reluctance towards the SADC "collective security regime that encompasses formal rules, binding decision-making and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs" due to a "lack of common values and mutual trust" (Nathan 2013:10). The lack of common values persists despite the founding SADC Declaration promoting the enhancement of "good governance and democracy" as a value of the region (SADC 1992:5). Considering Cabo Delgado's illicit economy that benefits the political elite, it becomes glaringly clear that the Mozambican government's unease is centred on avoiding regional rebuke and interference, particularly on regional governance platforms. Thus, in essence, the above challenges to the SADC security regime give credence to the argument that SADC has no EWS but rather has an intelligence-sharing platform that is dependent on state cooperation.

#### 4.5.3) The African Union's Response

The AU's response through APSA has seen it play a more supportive role to the SADC, due to the considerations around the subsidiarity principle, discussed in Chapter Three. The AU's first substantive response to the 2017 insurgency was at its PSC 962<sup>nd</sup> meeting related to the APRM's apprising of Mozambique CRR on 5 November 2020. The AU "expressed grave concern" and "condemned" the escalating violence in Cabo Delgado (AU 2020:2). The AU also called on its "member states, in a position to do so, to provide support to" Mozambique's efforts in suppressing the insurgency (AU 2020:2). The AU's subsequent responses illustrate the AU's inclination towards the subsidiarity principle as both responses seek reaffirm SADC's lead role in resolving the insurgency as part of continental efforts. The first response, after the 962<sup>nd</sup> meeting, came from the 1062<sup>nd</sup> PSC meeting held on 31 January 2022, fourteen months later. The meeting resolved to condemn "the continued acts of terrorism in Cabo Delgado" and supported the deployment of SAMIM and its extension for a further three months as a regional response towards combatting violent extremism (AU 2022a:1). These resolutions were further reaffirmed by the AU's second response, the communiqué of the PSC's 1119<sup>th</sup> ministerial meeting held on 7 November 2022. The 1119<sup>th</sup> ministerial meeting furthermore appreciated the contributions of military arms and equipment from the AU and China, and financial assistance from the European Union (AU 2022b:2). The meeting also appreciated the role of Rwanda in combating "terrorism and stabilizing the security situation" in Cabo Delgado under the banner of "African solutions to African problems" (AU 2022b:2).

The AU's responses surfaced at the height of the insurgency, thus being reactive rather than preventive, thereby highlighting the CEWS weaknesses. In analysing the AU's responses, the communiqué of the 962<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the PSC on the APRM is the closest thing to the sounding of an early warning. Nonetheless, there are a variety of drawbacks relating to how this warning was sounded. Firstly, the warning was sounded in November 2020 and is thus aimed deescalating an existing conflict than preventing one. Secondly, though the communiqué stems from Mozambique's APRM Report, which has examined the structural and proximate issues contributing to the insurgency, it fails to be explicit on the structural issues. Rather than addressing the structural issues, the communiqué pays tribute to President Nyusi's "steadfast and

sustained leadership in the promotion of good governance in Mozambique" (AU 2020:2). In the face of a raging insurgency, the AU's praises to President Nyusi is inappropriate, as the very existence of insurgency is indicative of a lack of good governance leadership. Thus, drawing on Chapter Three's discussion, such a praise seeks to allay Mozambique's unease at being scrutinised, particularly in the context of sensitivity issues of states being perceived as incapable of maintaining their sovereignty.

The third drawback is the failure of the communiqué in prescribing precise policy options towards early action in de-escalating the insurgency. In this regard, the communiqué notes Mozambique's structural issues and the need to address them and subsequently calls on able member states to support Mozambique's counter-insurgency efforts. These policy options lack the necessary detail around how Mozambique's structural issues should be addressed and what legal instruments within the APSA should member states seeking to assist Mozambique rely on towards taking action in this regard. The last drawback of the communiqué sounding the warning is the apparent shift of early warning analysis from the CEWS to the APRM. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this shift is in line with the AU's institutional reforms that seek to position the APRM as an early warning tool for conflict prevention within the new DPAPS. However, a consequence of these reforms has been the decimation of the CEWS due to early warning analysts being repurposed for regional observation, focusing on identifying governance challenges towards conflict prevention (Engel 2022). This approach is aligned with the APRM's early warning methodology and consequently elevates its centrality. However, such presents a challenge for the AU's early warning as participation in the APRM is voluntary, which underscores the need to revive the CEWS.

It becomes apparent why the AU failed in sounding an early warning in Mozambique. The AU's failure is largely due to two reasons, the first is its inclination to the subsidiarity principle as a consideration for member states sensitivity around issues of sovereignty. The AU's tributary to President Nyusi and the almost docile and supportive posture toward SADC underscore how significant considerations of sovereignty are. The second reason for the AU's failure are rooted in its 2018 institutional reforms, which instead of reinforcing the capacity for structural analysis

and prevention, they decimated an existing early warning tool that had the capacity to fulfil structural prevention.

#### 4.5.4) The United Nation's Response

The UN's first response to the insurgency came on 7 February 2020 through the daily press briefing of the Secretary-General's Spokesperson. The briefing conveyed how the UNHCR was reinforcing its capacity, in response to the escalating violence in Cabo Delgado and to Mozambique's appeal to all humanitarian agencies to expand their presence in the province (UN 2020a). Mozambique's appeal speaks to the fact that the UNHCR, along with the OCHA, WFP, and the World Health Organisation, was already active in Cabo Delgado as part of the UN's 2019 humanitarian response to Cyclone Kenneth (UN 2019a, UN 2019b, UN 2020a). The UN's following response to the insurgency was on 10 November 2020, where the UN Secretary-General "strongly condemned [the] wanton brutality of reported massacres in northern Mozambique" (UN 2020c). The Secretary-General's condemnation further called on the Mozambican authorities to investigate "these incidents and hold those responsible to account" (UN 2020c). Thereafter, on 20 January 2021, the UN issued a joint statement from its regional directors in Southern and Eastern Africa<sup>7</sup>. The statement expressed grave concern with the deteriorating humanitarian crisis and escalating violence that has displaced thousands in Cabo Delgado (UN 2021). The statement emanates from a December 2020 fact-finding mission to Cabo Delgado by the regional directors.

The UN's responses, like those of the AU and SADC, came at the height of the insurgency thus also highlighting the preventive weaknesses of the UN's EWS. However, the UN circumstances differ from the AU and SADC in that as early as April 2019 agencies forming part of its early warning architecture were already in Cabo Delgado following Cyclone Kenneth. This means that the UN through the UNHCR, OCHA, WFP and the Country Team, had teams whose 'as-is' analysis could have coordinated an early warning signal towards de-escalation of the conflict yet failed to do so. In this regard, there are a variety of reasons why a signal failed to take root. As

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<sup>7</sup> Regional Directors leading the following UN agencies; the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNHCR and WFP, as well as the UNDP Resilience Hub Manager and members of the UN Country Team (UN 2021).

highlighted in Chapter Three, these reasons may include insufficient early warning personnel on the ground and funding issues, to a lack of a joint effort due to there being no defined frameworks guiding interagency cooperation on EWS. However, considering how events played out, the most plausible reason was that more facts were needed prior to issuing a formal warning through the Secretary-General towards the UNSC, hence the December 2020 fact-finding mission.

The regional director's joint statement, emanating from this fact-finding mission, represents the facts gathered in Cabo Delgado and the sounding of a warning on the insurgency. In analysing the statement there are three urgent calls to action or objectives to be pursued worth noting towards resolving the crisis. The first objective speaks to the necessity of increasing "protection, health, food and nutrition programmes" while working towards re-establishing sustainable livelihoods for uprooted farming and fishing communities (UN 2021). The second objective speaks to the sustainable reduction of violent extremism through transnational development and resilience-building initiatives that will "prioritise the economic empowerment and social and political inclusion of women and young people" (UN 2021). Lastly, the statement calls on the Mozambican government together with "the international community to step up efforts to end all forms of violence in the country" (UN 2021).

These 'calls to action' illustrate that the UN's posture in resolving the crisis is inclined more towards a humanitarian approach. As discussed in Chapter Two, such an approach entails a focus on the welfare of people rather than on political violence, while maintaining a structural and proximate analytical focus. This is consistent with the UN's humanitarian character, highlighted in Chapter Two, which is centred on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The responsibility of resolving the political violence seems to be placed with Mozambique, its neighbouring countries affected by the transnational character of the insurgency and the international community that includes actors such as regional arrangements. This is substantiated by the statement's emphasis on a transnational approach to development and its call on the Mozambican government together with the international community to resolve the conflict. It is as though the joint statement seeks to excuse the UN from acting, despite the fact that the UNSC has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. This is substantiated by



the statement's failure to make a direct appeal to the Secretary-General or the UNSC, and rather appealing to Mozambique and interested international actors.

The actions of the UN in this regard are motivated by considerations of sensitivity to issues of sovereignty. As stated in the previous chapter, the AU's "African solutions for African problems" (Williams 2016:67) approach to resolving conflicts is a byproduct of this sensitivity to issues of sovereignty. These sovereignty considerations are also underscored by how the regional director's joint statement closes. The statement closes by "expressing gratitude to the [Mozambican] government for its role in helping to meet the humanitarian needs of people in the north of the country" (UN 2021). Similar to the AU statement highlighted above, such a statement is inappropriate as the very existence of insurgency is indicative of a government not fulfilling the humanitarian needs of its people.

Beyond the above analysis, the UN's EWS also works towards coordinating with regions. As expanded in the previous chapter, the UNOAU and SADC Liaison Team were established to facilitate coordinating channels between the UN and the AU and SADC. This raises questions about this aspect of the UN EWS. Incidentally, the press briefing that also consisted of the UN's first response on 7 February 2020 noted the Secretary-General's upcoming participation in the thirty-third AU Summit, held from 09 to 10 February 2020 (UN 2021). Thus, the UN's first response came two days before an AU Summit, in which the Secretary-General had a platform to discuss areas of cooperation in international peace and security. However, in a meeting of the AU's HSG and its PSC, the Secretary-General highlighted "supporting peace and stability in Libya and the Sahel as a priority for the UN and the AU" (UN 2020b). In the sphere of international peace and security, the instability in Libya and the Sahel region along with the South Sudan crisis marked the highlight of the Secretary-General's addresses (UN 2021). The Mozambican insurgency failed to make it onto any of his addresses during the course of engagements at the Summit.

The good offices of the UNOAU and the SADC Liaison Team, as discussed in the previous chapter, serve a pivotal role in the Secretary-General's engagement with the AU. Thus, considering this pivotal role, it becomes evident that his silence on the Mozambican insurgency may have largely been due to an advisory by these good offices. In assessing the above responses to the insurgency by the AU and SADC and

the sequence of events in the UN's response it becomes clear why an advisory on remaining silent on the matter may have been issued. The issuance of this advisory was likely due to the good offices not having a substantial amount of information on the insurgency to warrant a UN position. This is substantiated by the flawed nature of SADC's REWS and the chaotic dysfunctionality brought on by the AU's 2018 institutional reforms that decimated the CEWS, resulting in no early warning feed to the good offices. Additionally, the December 2020 fact-finding mission corroborates this, as after the mission the UN through its regional directors came into being in a better position to sound an informed warning on the insurgency.

Consequently, it becomes apparent why the UN failed in sounding an early warning in Mozambique. The lack of capital and human resources coupled with a non-existent institutional framework guiding interagency collaboration to a great extent are contributing factors. However, the analysis of how the UN managed its responses to the insurgency illustrates that politics around sensitivity issues of sovereignty were more central than any other factor. This is substantiated by the UN's insistence on positioning Mozambique and its neighbouring states along with the greater international community central to resolving the conflict rather than the UNSC. The UN's insistence seeks to accommodate the AU with the African solutions to African problems and reaffirm Mozambique's sovereignty. Furthermore, it is apparent that the challenges faced by the AU and SADC greatly affected the UN's early warning coordination towards detecting the 2017 Mozambican insurgency.

#### **4.6) Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter at its outset resolved to pursue two objectives. The first objective sought to examine the key contributing factors towards the outbreak and escalation of the 2017 insurgency. These contributing factors were deciphered through an analysis of the history that underscores Mozambique's security and governance context. Based on this historical analysis, the key contributing factors to the inception and escalation of the insurgency are summed up by the following three findings.

The first finding is that the 2017 Mozambican insurgency is rooted in the systemic marginalisation of the Mwani and Makua people from Cabo Delgado's mainstream economy. This systemic marginalisation stems from Cabo Delgado's post-

independence governance context that benefited the Makonde and sowed the seeds of resentment from the Mwani and Makua that resulted in the formation of ASWJ. The second finding is that the discovery of natural resources within this governance context and the implications thereof in Cabo Delgado were key in further propelling these seeds of resentment. The discovery of natural resources brought with it a promise of prosperity. However, as discussed above poverty increased in Cabo Delgado due to these discoveries. The third finding is that Mozambique's limited statehood created a conducive environment for the insurgency to take root and thrive. The limitedness of Mozambique's statehood stems from unintentional and intentional factors.

The second objective was to examine the reasons for the failure of EWS in Mozambique. The reasons for the failure of EWS in Mozambique were sought through an analysis of Mozambique's, SADC's, the AU's, and the UN's responses to the insurgency. The response analysis led this chapter to find that the key underlying factor towards the failure of early warning in Mozambique is the high regard the international community has for the narrow understanding of sovereignty. The net effect of this consideration speaks to SADC's flawed EWS design, the AU's subsidiarity principle, and the UN's preference to defer to regional arrangements. Moreover, the posture and enthusiasm with which the above organisations, structure or reform their legislative frameworks on early warning also suffer due to sovereignty considerations. The following chapter, which concludes the study, expands on the above finding and offers recommendations towards improving EWS. Prior to the recommendations, the arguments of the preceding chapter are put forth.

## 5) **Chapter Five: Summary of Findings and Proposition of Recommendations**

### 5.1) **Introduction**

This study aimed to explore the failure of conflict EWS in preventing the 2017 insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. In pursuing this objective three questions assisted the study in its exploration. The first question explored how the security stakeholder organisations, i.e., the UN, AU, and SADC, approach early warning and conflict prevention from a policy and operational perspective. The second question investigated what were the acute early warning signs, whose neglect not only resulted in an insurgency in 2017 but also saw it escalate and come to a head in 2020. The third question sought to answer the critical issues that hindered the conflict EWS of the UN, AU, and SADC from preventing the insurgency in Mozambique and/ or reducing further violence after its inception. The answers to these questions are contained in the findings of the preceding chapters of this study. Consequently, this chapter aims to summarise the findings and propose recommendations, also with a view to further research.

### 5.2) **Structure and Motivation for the Research**

In the first chapter, the research problem identified two interrelated reasons that make pursuing the study essential. The first speaks to the need to prevent further conflicts in Southern Africa with eSwatini's instability highlighting the urgency in this regard. The second seeks to address the silence of the UN, AU, and SADC in reinforcing EWS in Mozambique, in light of the material danger posed by the eSwatini crisis. The scholarly arguments of the literature overview in the first chapter exposed a conceptual conundrum in the interpretation of early warning within the international community. The UN's *An Agenda for Peace* Report's advocacy for coordinated and collaborative international efforts towards conflict prevention further warranted the purpose of the study. These issues presented a reality void of solutions for the strengthening of EWS. Seized with this challenge, the first chapter resolved to adopt a qualitative methodology that is descriptive-analytical in nature in pursuance of solutions towards reinforcing EWS.

Chapter Two advanced a conceptual framework that undergirds the analysis of the study in the succeeding chapters. The advanced conceptual framework is critical to the analysis of how early warning should be interpreted and implemented as a conflict prevention tool. Underpinned by the conceptual framework, Chapter Three analysed the conflict early warning policies and operational procedures of the UN, AU, and SADC, highlighting the policy flaws and operational challenges, with Chapter Four analysing the contributing factors to the Mozambican insurgency and the failure of EWS in Mozambique.

### **5.3) Summary of Research Arguments and Key Findings**

The research arguments that seek to resolve the research problem are initiated in the second chapter towards developing a conceptual framework of analysis. Beyond establishing an analytical framework, the chapter also explored the conceptual conundrum of conflict early warning. To this end, the chapter covered the evolution of early warning as a conflict prevention tool and pointed out the fact that conflict EWS was initially pursued by the UN through two mechanisms with contradicting theoretical foundations.

The first mechanism is founded on clandestine military tactics of traditional warning intelligence oriented towards the aversion to political violence. The theoretical foundations of warning intelligence are characterised by the realist traditional approach to national security that positions the state as the referent object. This theoretical posture reinforces the traditional notion of state sovereignty. The drawback of this mechanism was its dependence on military personnel from various national armies in undertaking clandestine operations for UN Peace Missions. This dependence entailed that the UN may be subject to infiltration that would see it inadvertently advance the national interest of states, undermining its neutrality.

The second mechanism of HEW is founded on humanitarian approaches to preventing and mitigating forced migrations and refugee crises. The theoretical foundations of HEW are rooted in human security where the security focus is on people as the referent object. This theoretical posture prioritises the security of people over that of the state and its sovereignty. The inclination to human security reinforces the UN's neutrality as it is aligned with its humanitarian character that advances the attainment

of fundamental freedoms for all peoples. The suppression of these rights creates a conducive environment for violent conflict. The emphasis on fundamental freedom entails a broader analysis that focuses on the structural issues that hinder the attainment of these rights. Such an analysis encompasses secondary issues to political violence, such as natural disasters and developmental issues. HEW's broader approach serves as a drawback as it can deviate the focus from political issues of violent conflict by emphasising the humanitarian aspects.

The chapter also notes that the UN, through *An Agenda for Peace* Report, pushed for the creation of an EWS that is oriented toward political violence while serving a humanitarian purpose. To this end, the chapter posits four key characteristics that frame this EWS and render its functioning effective. The first is that a good EWS system needs to analyse both structural and direct factors that contribute towards a violent crisis, to anticipate or de-escalate a violent conflict. The second feature relates to an effective EWS being devoid of state or national interests, meaning it must be an initiative driven by an international, regional or sub-regional organisation. The third characteristic seeks to align an effective EWS with human security principles, encouraging transparent and collaborative open-source methodologies that deter undue national interests. Lastly, a good EWS must be exclusively geared towards early action with the capacity to prescribe policy responses towards the prevention or de-escalation of conflict.

In Chapter Three, the EWS of the UN, AU and SADC were analysed, utilising the framework developed in Chapter Two. The relevance of these organisations is substantiated by their significance in the maintenance of international peace and security, as it relates to Mozambique. Furthermore, the chapter also sought to evaluate whether efforts at coordinating EWS internationally were achieved. The chapter found that on paper the designs of the UN and the AU's EWS adhere to the four outlined characteristics of the conceptual framework. However, the EWS of the UN and AU face various policy and operational challenges towards their effectiveness.

Concerning the UN, the chapter found the lack of political will by member states towards EWS as the overarching challenge underpinning all of the UN's early warning issues. This attitude to EWS is due to member states being sensitive regarding issues related to their sovereignty. The net effect of these attitudes has been a UN that is

postured towards allaying the fears of its member states concerning sensitivity to any action that might imply a threat to sovereignty. The implication of this posture is an under-resourced early warning architecture that lacks funding and adequate personnel. Additionally, this has also entailed a non-existent legislative framework towards regulating interagency collaboration, a telling fact considering that the UN's early warning analysis is performed by eight of the UN's agencies and institutions and a framework for guidance and alignment is therefore of the utmost importance to ensure efficiency. It has also resulted in a UN that prefers resorting to Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements towards conflict prevention and resolution, devolving responsibility to regional organisations.

Similarly, concerning the AU, the chapter found that a lack of political will by member states towards EWS due to sensitivity around sovereignty underpins all of the AU's early warning issues. This is evident in the contradictory nature of the AU's CADSP which advances both traditional and human security towards conflict prevention. The ambiguity of the CADSP creates a conducive environment for regional blocs to strategically use the subsidiarity principle towards averting or delaying the 'intrusive' scrutiny of APSA, resulting in an inefficient AU early warning architecture. This has led to an AU with a conflict prevention posture that, much like the UN's, prefers subsidiarity. A major flaw of the subsidiarity principle is its weak legislative framework that fails to demarcate the roles and responsibilities between the AU and its RMs. Furthermore, considering that participation in the APRM is voluntary, the AU's 2018 institutional reforms highlight the significance of sovereignty. The reforms elevated the APRM as the AU's central early warning tool and decimated the CEWS, entailing that conflict structural analysis can only be conducted on willing APRM participating states.

Concerning SADC, the chapter found that the design of its REWS does not adhere to the four outlined characteristics of the conceptual framework. SADC's POPDSC and its Common Defence Pact reinforce traditional notions of state-centric security and state sovereignty. This entails a REWS aligned with these principles resulting in an EWS that is dependent on the state intelligence NEWC for early warning analysis. Thus, early warning analysis in SADC is undertaken clandestinely and forwarded to the REWC at the behest of the affected state towards serving its interests. This design flaw renders SADC's interoperability with the UN's and the AU's EWS unachievable,

though it should be noted that the UN and AU through the UNAOU, SADC Liaison Team and the CEWS have made efforts at international coordination in this regard.

The fourth chapter set out to contextualise the cause of the insurgency and to apply the findings of the previous chapter towards determining the cause for the failure of EWS in Mozambique. Through a historical analysis of Mozambique's security and governance context, the chapter made the following findings as to the cause of the insurgency: The insurgency is rooted in the historical political, economic and social exclusion of the Mwani and Makua by a Makonde political elite that governs Cabo Delgado. The exclusionary governance practice created a conducive environment for the province's structural issues and exacerbated religious tensions. Within this context, the EWI, which Mozambique was aware of since 2009, could have been identified through the following events: The formation of ASWJ in 2007 and the discovery of natural resources, coupled with the land disposition and the implications thereof. The religious developments within the Swahili coastal region and the suppressive reaction by state machinery towards the disenfranchised pursuit of just redistribution were further contributory factors to the outbreak of and intensification in the level of the insurgency.

Concerning the failure of EWS in Mozambique, the chapter made a number of findings. Firstly, the key underlying factor towards the failure of early warning in Mozambique is the high emphasis that the international community places on the narrow understanding of sovereignty. This high regard for sovereignty is illustrated by SADC's REWS, the AU's subsidiarity principle, the UN's preference for regional arrangements, and the persistently weak legislative frameworks governing EWS. As a consequence, secondly, the international community's posture in this regard facilitated actions from the Mozambican government that weakened the international architecture for EWS and thus served to escalate the insurgency.

#### **5.4) Conclusion and Recommendations**

Considering the above summary and key findings, the study makes the following recommendations:

- SADC must pursue redesigning its REWS in alignment with the characteristics of an effective EWS as defined by the conceptual framework. The flawed nature



of SADC's REWS enabled Mozambique to strategically exercise its sovereign authority in stalling and deterring foreign assistance/intervention. Mozambique's actions were motivated by the interests of Frelimo's elite rather than those of its citizens. This resulted in the Mozambique government withholding information required by SADC's REWC to forewarn regional leaders of the crisis. The implications were an incapacitated region that was also not in a position to contribute to structures such as the CEWS and the SADC Liaison Team, that sought to reinforce its early warning efforts. These factors resulted in an escalating insurgency.

- The AU must pursue reforms that will strengthen its legislative frameworks towards the coherent functioning of the APSA in the sphere of early warning. In the sphere of policy, these reforms need to address the subsidiarity principle and the contradictory nature of the CADSP. In the operational sphere, the reforms need to address how coherence in the CEWS and APRM functioning is achieved. Furthermore, should the AU continue to centre the APRM as an early warning tool, then participation in the mechanism must be compulsory for all its member states if it is to be effective.
- The UN must pursue legislative frameworks that will regulate interagency collaboration in the sphere of conflict EWS towards strengthening UN early warning efforts. Furthermore, considering that the UNSC is empowered with issuing binding resolutions on UN member states, the council must have a unit dedicated to collating the UN's early warning analysis. This will ensure that early warning is geared to early action and may also assist in overcoming sovereignty issues in instances where the Permanent Five have no interests.
- The AU and SADC must assist Mozambique in addressing its structural issues towards sustainable peace on the continent.

The implementation of these recommendations will ensure sustainable peace in Mozambique and reinforce coordinated efforts in international conflict prevention and EWS. However, all of these recommendations are in essence deeply political, and

though theoretically these would be logical steps and processes, it is doubtful that such practical efforts to improve efficiency and to attend to human security would in fact realise.

### **5.5) Opportunities for Further Research**

Assessing the above findings and recommendations this study makes the following recommendations regarding future early warning and conflict prevention research agendas:

- Further research is needed towards understanding the role international organisations need to play in encouraging their member states towards embodying values associated with human security and redefined sovereignty and how this role can be reinforced.
- Turning to the operational frameworks of EWS, further research is needed towards identifying the appropriate modalities to make EWS more transparent while not compromising their effectiveness. This study's analysis of the key actors' responses to the insurgency was at a disadvantage as it mostly interpreted information that was secondary to an early warning product.
- Lastly, in the context of the AU and SADC, a comparative study with other regional bodies, within and outside the AU framework, needs to be undertaken towards a comprehensive understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of EWS in the continental and global context.

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