they were going, when they learned, to their surprise, that they were in for a patrol to near Sequoi's mountain, breakfastless and without rations or arms.

In Lydenberg, to protect the town, were twelve policemen without horses and insufficiently armed. There were also one cannon, five volunteer town artillerymen, and some forty town special constabulary volunteers, of whom half were armed. Eight miles west of Lydenberg was Mr Eckersley with sixteen dismounted whites and a like number of Wind-vogel's men, with whom he had to protect a district containing not less than 200 square miles. Thence to Middleburg, as well as to Fort Weeber, the line of communications was entirely undefended. Secocoeni's Commandoes were everywhere,—not doing much mischief it is true, but still harassing and disturbing the border, and stealing cattle after their own fashion. On one occasion a force of the enemy passed within three miles of Lydenberg, and could have been easily destroyed, but that Government had no horses in the town, and the Landdrost dared not purchase any. The insults and outrages to which Lydenberg was subjected—men being shot at by the enemy within sight of the village in daylight, cattle being swept off main roads, and on one occasion a town kraal or compound actually entered—were, to say the least, very astonishing. This lasted all through the month of April. Captain Clarke called the Swazis to help him; but they, irritated by the Government employment of Zulus as policemen, did not come. They said they did not know the new Government. Secocoeni had well chosen his time for this outbreak. The unhealthy season had already commenced. There were many down with fever in Kruger's Post, and throughout the district as well as village of Lydenberg. Ashton and Nachtigal were the only practitioners in this immense area, which extends from near Middleburg to the Lobembo Mountains, and from the Vaal to the Oliphants River; and Ashton was struck down on 14th February.

The few medical men in the Transvaal could not be spared from their own districts; and the military doctors had their hands full, in consequence of the forces being divided—some at Utrecht, some at Standerton, and the
main body at Pretoria. The relief-parties that went into the Waterfall suffered severely; and when Captain Clarke abandoned Fort Weeber, bringing in a troop of the Provisional Police to Lydenberg, no less than five of this small body were ill.

Up to this time I had acted as a sort of district adjutant. I had now to become district surgeon.

On 17th February I obtained an order to open a hospital at Government expense. This was speedily full. Even the natives—men, women, and children—of Windvogel's clan, who had lain out for a few nights in the Waterfall valley, in their flight from Fort Burgers, were attacked.

The fever differed materially from that of 1877. It began with extreme anxiety, pains in the back of the neck and left shoulder, with vomiting; and was accompanied by a most singular cough, and inflammation of the lungs.

If the patient were pulled through, he got on to ordinary low fever, and slept off the disease, which finally produced violent haemorrhage from the bowels; after which, with proper remedies, the skin began to act, the bowels and stomach to regain tone, and the patient hope and strength.

When the disease terminated fatally, it did so from the fifth to the twelfth day. The symptoms at first were less violent; and in those cases the vomiting was noticeably absent. High fever, filthy and furred tongue, accompanied by thirst and impatience, marked the opening stage. These symptoms almost at once abated on salines being exhibited; but when the patient was apparently doing well, he would be suddenly seized with a convulsion, his teeth would close, breathing become stertorous, effusion on the brain rapidly took place, and the patient died suddenly, with all the symptoms that had hitherto been noticed only in horse-sickness of the Dyk Kop, or swollen head and staggering type, as distinguished from the pleuritic type common in the Free State and Natal.

The hospital was closed before the end of April, not because the fever had abated, but as there had been no new exposures; and the Bushveld valleys being now utterly abandoned, I had, except two operations, no new cases.

In connection with medical duties, great dissatisfaction
was given to the volunteers by Government not employing Ashton, who had served so long and faithfully in the previous war. Government sent some doctors in whom the men had no confidence, and for months patients were much neglected, many men, including Captain van Deventer, Bathe, and Sergeant Wood, dying of trivial hurts.

This, with the parsimony shown in providing comforts for the sick, lost many a brave man to the service. The ladies of Lydenberg, headed by Mrs Herbert Robins of that town, proved their pluck and humanity most amply at the bedside of the poor during my period of office in the rather odd position which circumstances forced on me.

Captain Clarke, with the feeble forces at his disposal, repeatedly worried the enemy in the vicinity of Fort Weeber. He attacked and half carried Masselleroom, but from unavoidable circumstances, was forced to retire, after four hours' fighting, having lost some Zulu policemen, whose dead bodies and rifles had to be abandoned on the top of the rock. He had also two European officers and two white men seriously wounded. However, he took 230 head of cattle and some goats. At this unfinished storming of Masselleroom occurred one of those incidents which evoke so much excitement and condemnation amongst well-thinking people at home. The Zulu police, in the heat of action, bayoneted and thrust into the flames of the burning huts all the people they met, without distinction of age or sex. In some instances these savage warriors, as the residents of Lydenberg have been publicly informed by eyewitnesses, tossed on the points of their bayonets young infants. In fact they were barbarians, and their conduct was barbarous.

For this their officer, Mr Lloyd, can in no way be blamed. This humane and excellent man had at this time been shot with two bullets, one in the shoulder and the other in the arm, and had plenty of work, guiding and leading his division, without meddling with what he could not prevent. There are no more humane or excellent men in the British service than those who directed the attack I refer to. They cannot be blamed or held responsible in any way for the catastrophe that occurred; and I only mention it here for the purpose of showing plainly to the public that such
terrible incidents can occur under the British flag, and that the condemnation of the use of native allies, with their barbarous methods of warfare addressed by Lord Carnarvon and Sir Henry Barkly to the South African Republican Government, might be applied nearer home. Up to this moment, no bitterness had entered into the conduct of the war. The last war with Secocoeni had not been characterised by such an occurrence. I myself most unhesitatingly condemn such revolting cruelty; and I wish, above all things, to impress upon my readers that it was not the work of Commandoes, cattle-lifters, Boers, or filibusters, but was perpetrated by a police force in the pay and regular employment of the most highly civilised Government in the world. But even atrocities, however blamable and however regrettable, have their results. Kafirs do not usually remain, for purposes of either war or peace, in any place where persons of their own tribe have been recently slain. They have a superstitious horror of dead bodies; and so, although the direct attack was a complete failure, within a week Legolani evacuated her position and Captain Clarke got possession of it. But this was not till other lives were lost. The day after the repulsed attack on Masselleroom, the place was threatened again by a large body of Captain Clarke's Bechuana allies, who had misbehaved in the previous affair. Through this second attempt, the life of one of the bravest and best of Boer leaders, Captain van Deventer, was lost. But as a result of the whole operation, the tribe of Legolani was broken up. Her cattle, with about 140 women, children, and old men, fell into the hands of the Government; while the chieftainess herself, with the best of her warriors, fell back on Secocoeni, and safely effected a junction with him.

The war now languished for a while, Clarke awaiting reinforcements, and enjoying an occasional skirmish. He pushed on his outpost a distance of eighteen miles nearer to the chief, Secocoeni, and built another fort opposite Mamalube. The most remarkable phase of the war, if war it can be called, now ensued. Volunteers began to reach Captain Clarke in daily increasing numbers. The provisional police, both mounted and dismounted, were drafted
to him, and much suffering and grumbling were occasioned in his two forts by the want, not only of luxuries, but too often of necessaries. In fact, the supply department, as usual, broke down. Everybody was more or less discontented. The inhabitants of Lydenberg district complained of the long and exposed border-line being left, by the removal of the provisional police to Fort Weeber, utterly undefended; while the field force was kept in an out-of-the-way corner, irritating and pinching Secocoeni. The volunteers complained because their horses died and they were not provided with remounts, whilst having to pay out of their scanty wages for 80 per cent of the steeds they brought with them to the front. The merchants complained that trade was languishing, and property had lost all value; whilst the inhabitants of Lydenberg objected to doing eternal guards—Pretoria, where there was no war, being full of soldiers. This was, to a certain extent, remedied by the despatch to Lydenberg and Middleburg of several companies of her Majesty's 13th P.A. Light Infantry. More volunteers were summoned from the Diamond Fields; and 100, after some difficulty and delay, reached Pretoria by the 2d of June 1878.

1 The Kafirs said "Clarke was pinching their ears to make them fight."
CHAPTER XVIII.

FIGHTS AND FAILURES.

Fatal affray at Magnet Heights—Mutiny of Zulu police—Advance of her Majesty's troops.

Exertions were made all over the country to get together mounted volunteer forces sufficient to end the campaign during the winter months, the only healthy season. It is not for me to inquire why the 13th, with a powerful artillery train, were not advanced from the towns to the enemy. I only know that this brave and excellent regiment was most eager to have its share in the fighting; and it was pointed out to Government that infantry forces, however spirited or highly disciplined, could not be made available for the protection of houses, stock, or other property at any distance from their camp, and that their great value was for direct attack and the holding of advanced positions, so as to leave the country clear behind. That this view was correct, has since been proved by the Kafirs having, on June 13th, and many subsequent occasions, successfully raided on the main road between Lydenberg and the Gold Fields. The war has outlasted the winter. Captain Clarke intended to effect a forward movement over the Magnet Heights towards the Waterfall, where he expected to co-operate with Mr Eckersley's force, increased by the addition of some tame Kafirs. In doing so, he met with a check in which more men were lost than fell in almost any fight during the late war in the Cape Colony, where vastly superior forces were employed on both sides. In the Cape Colony war, which lasted ten months, and engaged, on our side, an average of not less
than 3000 men per month, but fifty Europeans lost their lives. In this present petty war, concerning which there is almost no information, nearly as many have already perished.

The mismanagement of the volunteer movement began by June (1878) to attract attention and provoke comment. Numbers of men were hurried to the front on ill-defined agreements; whilst the Diamond Field Horse were nearly driven to mutiny by neglect and the noticeable want of provision for their equipment. Some men were the happy recipients of one spur each; others had to toss up for belts, of which but one for every two volunteers had been supplied. At the forts, things were as bad. The want of fresh provisions, vegetables, soap, candles, and other necessaries, was a constant cause of complaint. The men were often threatened with scarcity of more important things. Meal was not plentiful; and the incredible folly of sending waggons to buy from farmers who had none to sell was committed. The local authorities, who alone knew how to cope with such difficulties, were either ignored or got rid of. Even in the matter of officers Government blundered. From the Diamond Fields they had got, as I said before, 100 men; but the officers, although possessing a certain amount of technical knowledge, were entirely unacquainted with frontier work. Lieutenant Lloyd, who had come up raw from Natal, had been, on his arrival in February, put over the head of Mr Eckersley, a really competent man; and as the same course was followed out with other appointments, disaster could not be far off. By degrees, however, Captain Clarke got into a position to assume the offensive. He evidently desired to do something great; for, excepting the "immovable infantry" at Lydenberg, he stripped the border-line of every man available for service, gathering them all together about the south and south-west of the Lulus, of course exposing hundreds of miles of country to raids and reprisals. In fact he fought on strategic principles, which, being utterly unknown to his enemy, had no bearing on the war at all. He was, perhaps, too long in one branch, and had got wedded to certain professional notions of which he could not divest himself. Staff and engineer officers are the best for separate
commands over men not regular soldiers. Engineers, as a rule, have to meet every day artisans, architects, and professional men of various stamps. They must not only understand work, but workmen. Hence their adaptability to new men, strange ways, and perhaps unusual circumstances. But there was no adaptability shown in the getting up of the volunteers. Their wishes were mostly ignored; and they were forced, in a pestilential climate, to pay for their own horses, so that they risked their lives for nothing. The whole reliance of the Commissioner seemed to be placed on native levies. He was, if not jealous of, at least averse to, white talent. In fact he tried (see Blue-book No. 2079 C) to secure that none but strangers to the Transvaal should have command of the so-called "Zulu police," or native army, on the ground that Zulus must be led by gentlemen; as they were very discriminating, they must be led only by "gentlemen" at salaries of £350 each per annum. As there are but few Zulus in the Transvaal, and the people do not speak that language, this proposition was clever; for it provided for Natal officers only with a Zulu army being in the service of the Government.

I have little hesitation in saying that this was a most dangerous precedent, and looked like a threat. I have less in saying that all colonists disapprove of drilling the still pagan races.

The forces gathered together at four stations about July 25th would seem to have been sufficient for any reasonable work. There were about 250 Europeans, at least six pieces of artillery, 100 Zulu police, 408 Kafirs, under Tainton, and a body of men, 110, under Mr Eokersley. The stations were Forts Weeber, Mmalube, and Faugh-a-ballagh, and a camp of Diamond Field Horse at Dwars River. These finally rested on a base secured by infantry at Lydenberg and Middleburg.

Dreadful mismanagement seems to have provoked disaster. On Friday, July 26th, so far as newspaper correspondents can be trusted, the Kafirs cut off from the cattle-guard at Fort Faugh-a-ballagh seventeen head of cattle and six horses. These had been sent to water under an insufficient escort, dismounted. One fine young fellow—Fourie, late Lyden-
berg Volunteer Corps—was found alone, dead, shot through from back to front, his rifle and a cartridge still in his hands, where he had fallen in the act of loading. One of his comrades, almost a child, was found, days afterwards, mad from terror.

The officer in charge seems to have been blamed for want of pluck, instead of for want of precaution in not having the environs of his fort patrolled before sending out his stock to graze.

The next affair seems to have been still more unfortunate. The Kafirs actually seized the whole of the cattle and horses of a troop of cavalry—fifty-two horses, forty oxen, and a number of sheep being carried off, proving the utter unfitness of the commander for his post. In the whole history of South African wars, so disgraceful an incident has never occurred to a border force. Signs of mutiny began to be observable amongst the native forces. The 'Mercury' correspondent, under date July 30th, says, "The 408 Kafirs under Mr Tainton have been sent back again to their kraals."

The Zulu police next began to make themselves conspicuous. It will be remembered that I have elsewhere stated that the Zulus are incorrigible and "utterly impracticable pagans." But Captain Clarke seems to have thought they would make a nice army to prop up a military despotism. Now for the result. The Zulus said they would not fight; that there was "too much fight;" that they were police, &c.; and finally, they began to grow insolent, and burst into open mutiny on August 9th. The cannon had to be turned on them; and, had it not been for the opportune arrival of a small body of her Majesty's troops, detached from Carrington's Mounted Infantry, serious mischief might have occurred. The Zulus were determined enough, and matters were looking very grave. When the gun was pointed at them they fixed bayonets, and said, "We can fight as well as you." Being deprived of their rations, they left their huts in a body to go into the veld and look for food; while absent, their huts were entered and all their arms secured, with the ammunition. On their return they roundly rated the whites as cowards, saying, "Ye white
people are not brave enough. You had to steal our guns, not being men enough to take them from our persons."

It will hardly be credited that, in the face of this, Mr Lloyd is recruiting for this force; and that three sons of Pagadi, Cetywayo's son-in-law, and one of the most rebellious chiefs in Natal, are sergeants in it.

In the meantime the winter of the southern hemisphere (the healthy season) has been suffered to slip past. Summer is approaching, and the ill-used volunteers are melting away. The Kafirs of Secocoeni sit on the hills challenging the Europeans, and joking about the want of skill of their leaders. One of the enemy recently, who was especially jocose, called out to Captain Ferriera, who is of Portuguese descent, "Why don't you come and lead us—men of your own colour?"

And the frontier is left undefended; farmers are plundered within sight of the town of Lydenberg, and Kafir "impis" (commandoes) march unmolested through what parts of the district they will. How different from the work of the Republican Government, how fatally contrary to the advice of the Dutch officials, has been the conduct of this petty campaign, it is needless to show. Suffice it to say, her Majesty's troops have now been ordered to the front—now when the sickly season is at hand. If Secocoeni does not give in before midsummer, many an English mother will have to mourn a son.

Why was this not done sooner? Why did not the 300 men of the 13th march at once, on their arrival in Lydenberg in May last, to Fort Burgers? Had they done so, even if they never fired a shot against the enemy—and had the cavalry been posted in detachments from Walker's Hill, near Pilgrim's Rest, to Lydenberg; and an advance been made by Krum Kloof, Origstadt, and the Waterfall—Secocoeni would not be to-day, as letters from the front tell us, "assuming the offensive." The reason is not far to seek. Official jealousies and desires for self-aggrandisement let the opportunity for real work slip past. There are men who are so intolerant of advice that they will do what is wrong with their eyes open rather than permit themselves to follow the counsel of others.
The troops now moving up will be aided by the Frontier Horse, which corps was expected at Lydenberg on the 24th September last; but it is unlikely that volunteers, whether Boers or others, will be got together to make up for those leaving. Personal influence goes a long way with irregulars. Without something of the kind such forces will not be kept together, unless, of course, where strong patriotic motives supervene.

The state of our Kafir relations at the time of my writing is thus roughly stated: We are all but at war with the Zulus of Zululand; have offended the Amaswazi; are fighting with Seocooeni; have had to disband our paid Kafir forces for mutiny; and have, in fact, no assistance to hope for, save from Mr. Eckersley, who was insulted by seeing raw Natalians preferred and placed over him and Windvogel's little band. In addition to this, the border for 1200 miles is hostile and watchful. The white population of the Transvaal is decreasing, the volunteers are dissatisfied, and desertions are terribly frequent from the regulars. The Boers, whose territory we have annexed, will not help us, and the country is not worth the price that must be paid for it. There are now troops in Pondoland whose marching expenses alone amount to £25,000 per month. Our South African policy promises to satisfy nobody, but to cost us millions.

At the time of my departure from the Transvaal, a few months ago, its present petty, miserable, and ill-conducted war was, on the nearest calculation, already costing £12,000 per month; and the storekeepers of Middleburg and Lydenberg districts were eking out a miserable and hopeless existence on the war expenditure. A better description I cannot give of the wretched state into which the country had drifted than by pointing out the horrible fact that the war was actually popular because it put a few pounds in circulation.

Unless some most unforeseen good fortune should occur to bring Seocooeni to terms, either the country will soon be entirely impoverished and saddled with a new debt that it will not be able to meet, or the British ratepayer will have to put his hands in his pockets to pay the cost of a war in which he has not the slightest interest, and which par-
Having received further accounts of, amongst others, the fight at Magnet Heights, I desire again to draw attention to the difference in the estimate of the work done there by those acquainted with Kafir warfare and by inexperienced persons. The 'Morning Post' said that the Kafirs were driven from their strongholds and positions into the cliffs and caves, but that certain volunteers, too eager to follow the enemy, "prejudiced" (the word is my own) what it evidently wanted us to believe, a victory. This is a most mistaken idea. The Kafir caves and cliffs are their only stronghold, to which they very cleverly and properly lured on Captain Clarke's forces, flushed by their useless conquest of outlying rocks, dry stone walls, and straw huts; and whence, having got the men under an intentional cross-fire, the natives had the pleasure of seeing the dead and wounded borne out by their comrades, whose retreat from before the despised caves and cliffs left to the Kafirs the decided impression that they had won a victory.

A long time ago, Moselekatze, with his formidable "Amandabele," occupied the very position now held by Secocoeni. The Dutch twice, and the Griquas once, penetrated to those rugged north-eastern valleys. On two occasions they remained long enough to expose themselves to, and consequently to meet with, serious disaster. The third time, however, the Dutch merely surprised the enemy's outlying pickets at Mosegu, refrained from pressing home their attack, and fell back rapidly on the Highveld with what cattle they had taken. This utterly disheartened the "Amandabele," who evacuated all their positions and fled no less than 500 miles to the northwards. (Thomas's 'South Africa,' p. 162.)

It is in this way Kafirs must be harassed. They are undoubtedly superstitious, and if made uncomfortable by an enemy whose movements they cannot foresee, and on whom they cannot inflict palpable loss, will rather abandon perfect locations for defence than dwell in them in continual terror.
CHAPTER XIX.

TO-DAY IN THE TRANSVAAL.

The people—The railway party—The annexation.

In the midst of its wars and losses, the Transvaal is torn and divided by contending parties, whose numbers, principles, and programmes I shall endeavour to describe.

The State is peopled by something like 56,000 whites and 300,000 blacks, the majority of whom live on and around the borders.

It might be made a great corn-producing country, but it is importing flour. It has no manufactures; and its exports are confined to a few commodities, which hardly pay for its imports.

It has vast resources, which cannot be developed, because it has no railways—no means of short and easy communication with the markets of the world. For the same reason its fields are untilled, and its wonderful and undoubted agricultural opportunities and advantages neglected. Can you wonder that there should exist parties and factions in such a country? We may blame the factious spirit, but we cannot wonder at its existence.

The Boer party complain bitterly of the annexation. They say, "Our liberties have been unnecessarily taken from us, and our country annexed, not only against the will of the majority, but in utter disregard of Lord Carnarvon’s instructions, which state ‘that no such proclamation shall be issued by you (Sir Theophilus Shepstone), unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants, or a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature, desire to become our subjects.’" The Boers
object also to the annexation, because they assert that the arguments put forward to justify its necessity by Sir Theophilus Shepstone are not borne out by facts; and they are still more angry because they believe the annexation was brought about by false pretences, accompanied and strengthened by attacks made upon their honour and character by a party press interested in their destruction. They say, further, that the terms of the annexation proclamation have not been adhered to; and this party—undoubtedly the strongest in the country—appeal to England to do them justice, and to restore to them their country.

But these people have no personal antipathy to Sir Theophilus Shepstone. They respect in him a man of wonderful experience and superior tact and attainments, who executed what seemed to him to be a necessary act of policy in a most conciliatory and able manner. Neither do they blame Lord Carnarvon or Sir Theophilus Shepstone because the annexation has hitherto not brought to the country that peace and prosperity which it was undoubtedly expected to produce. They feel deeply the vilification to which they have been subjected; and resent strongly the annexation itself and the pretences by which it was brought about. They are emphatically the people of the country.

The next party in importance may be described as the "Railway party." It complains most bitterly that the progress of the country has been retarded by its being ruled with a view to the interests of the neighbouring colony—Natal; and complains that, whereas the country might be made rich and prosperous by its being rapidly connected by railway with the port of Delagoa Bay, and by its being thus thrown open to European industries and emigrants, it has, on the other hand, been placed under personal rule; been treated as a close Crown colony, contrary to the terms of the fifteenth paragraph of the annexation proclamation;¹ has been deprived of its railway prospects; and has been made commercially subject and tributary to Natal. This party embraces the intelligence and enterprise of the country.

These people want railways and progress, with self-gov-

¹ See Appendix C.
ernment, as the only means by which the annexation can be justified, and the country saved from utter ruin.

There is a third and more noisy party, which lately devoted itself simply and purely to the vilification of Sir Theophilus Shepstone. These are a minority amongst minorities; but it is not a little interesting to remark that they are, as a rule, the very same persons who worshipped Sir Theophilus as a saviour about sixteen months ago.

They are literally "the Annexationists." They are the same people who vilified the Boers and misrepresented the course of public opinion, and who, by the success of their schemes for the destruction of the Republic, secured the annexation, the great agent of which they now denounce.

All that they sought in a change of government seems to have been additional sources of consideration or of wealth for themselves. Some of them dreamed of large mineral concessions, others expected public employment; but they have shown by their turbulence under the new Government, following so fast on their opposition to the old one, that they are mainly those pests of society who would be discontented and a nuisance under any rule, good, bad, or indifferent.

The Government itself is practically without local support. It has, as most Governments have in our days, a paper in its pay; but unless a sound public opinion soon comes to its assistance, it must fall, even though supported for years, at vast expense to England, by Imperial troops. Besides the internal troubles and the war with Secocoeni, the country is additionally embarrassed by the near prospect of a Zulu war, for which preparations are, on an extensive scale, now being made.¹ Twice since the annexation have the Transvaal farmers been forced to fly from the district in dispute between the Government and Cetywayo, who is more hostile

¹ "I am not in the least degree surprised that those troubles should now be threatening, because for twenty or twenty-five years Sir Theophilus Shepstone, as representing the head of affairs in Natal, has been supporting Cetywayo and his father, the former king, in their position with reference to the Transvaal Boers. The Transvaal Boers have been represented as encroaching year after year upon the Zulu country; and the Natal Government, of which Sir Theophilus Shepstone was, in regard to native affairs, at the head, appears to have supported the Zulu king in the position he assumed."—Mr Sanderson's Speech at Lecture of G. Pigott Moodie, Esq., United Service Institute, May 3, 1878.
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to the British than he ever was to the Boers. There are not wanting in the Transvaal those who assert that, originally, the Zulu king was incited to make demonstrations against the Boers in order that the embarrassment so created might furnish an additional reason for annexation; and they now say, with some semblance of truth, that the Zulu king, disappointed of the reward promised him for his material assistance, is only anxious to avenge himself in any opportune direction against white colonists, without respect to birth or nationality. There can be no doubt that, in some way or another, the Zulus were led to believe that they might look to the English as allies against the Boers. This, with the revelations of Magema Mahala, has undoubtedly operated to prevent people from recognising the beneficent and friendly intentions of Earl Carnarvon towards the colonists, and tends to cause a universal distrust of the real meaning and objects of English policy to be felt amongst the Boers.

People say that one of the arguments, and the principal one used, in favour of the annexation, was actually furnished by a restlessness amongst the savage Zulus, fostered by the known hostility of Natal colonists and newspapers towards the Transvaal. It is also pointed out by the discontented, that it is not a little singular that the first Secocoeni war, which was held up by the Annexationists as the cause of a general danger to neighbouring colonies, did not provoke or incite any of the numerous tribes—numbering, according to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, 1,700,000, within and without the borders of the Republic—to any acts of hostility to the settlers.

War, as we all know, broke out in September 1877, far down in the Cape Colony, between tribes in immediate contact with the English, which resulted in the campaign of the combined Imperial and Colonial forces against the Red Kafirs of the east coast. This could have been hardly excited by any success claimed by Secocoeni, who, eight months before, had submitted to the Republic, after having failed in securing allies against the Boers amongst any of the numerous tribes of the north and west. It is to be regretted—and very much regretted—that so much distrust
and suspicion should exist between the Transvaal people and the Government; but the fact is, nevertheless, undeniable, and it has its results, not the least terrible of which is the complete cessation of progress, and the serious impairment of the elements of permanent prosperity to which I must now refer.

The fields lie uncultivated, except in the neighbourhood of Pretoria, where the presence of the military, the establishment of the new Government, and consequent influx of visitors, have created a market. Transvaal trade is in a most insecure state; and a period of despondency so great as to threaten the general solvency of the country has, unhappily, succeeded to the sanguine and hopeful tone that resulted as an immediate consequence of the annexation of the 12th April 1877.

Land is valued not for its instant selling price, but only in view of possible future speculation.

The taxes are coming in more irregularly and slowly than even during the most hopeless period of Republican rule; and I and others feel convinced that if immediate steps are not taken, the annexation, from which so much was expected, will prove a prolific source of misery to the Transvaal, and of never-ending expense to the British ratepayer. In fact, the country is drifting towards either anarchy or martial law. This is emphatically not the fault of Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, and is only to be averted by the immediate initiation of great and comprehensive improvements, which, by creating markets and attracting a large population to the fertile and beautiful Transvaal, will give to its inhabitants an assured future.
CHAPTER XX.

THE KEY TO THE FUTURE.

Delagoa Bay—How to pay for the railway.

There can be no doubt that some one, possibly the present Government, will be responsible if, through any withholding of material aid from the Transvaal Government, the annexation should prove a disaster. For the purpose of this chapter, it matters little if the policy which dictated the annexation was a wise or an unwise one; nor does it materially affect my proposition whether the people are contented with the new Government or not. I have only to say, and I only wish to urge, that it is due to Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, who, at great personal risk, with discretion and tact which are beyond all praise, executed the will of his superiors, that now those whom he served should strain every nerve and use every exertion to benefit the country annexed.

The key to the future prosperity of the Transvaal, the only means that will raise it from its present fallen position, is the immediate prosecution of Mr Burgers's great scheme, that of uniting the capital with Delagoa Bay by a direct railway. The distance between the points to be connected is but 300 miles. The part to which access is sought is the only valuable harbour on the east coast. This harbour is obstructed by no bar, is safe in all weathers, and is wide enough and deep enough to contain a larger number of vessels than all other South African ports put together. Having the advantage of position as against Natal, it has the still
greater advantage of being readily accessible in all weathers to ships of the greatest tonnage.¹

From a railway to Delagoa Bay, and from it alone, can civilisation rapidly place itself in contact with the barbarism of the great interior. From the very commencement of the work, the road will pass through a country capable of supplying labour to any extent desired. On its track lie vast forests of iron-wood. Timber will be more easily and cheaply obtained for constructing works there than in any part of the colony. There are obstacles in its way, no doubt. These consist of the Lobembo Mountains and the broken country intervening between them and the Highveld proper. There is also the known unhealthiness of the coast, and the difficulty in maintaining working and transport animals in the narrow belt of fly-country the railway must cross. The latter, although apparently a very formidable matter to deal with, will not be practically so difficult. It is well known—at least it is stated in every work I have seen on the subject, and living authorities agree—that the fly follows the game; and few who are acquainted with the nature of wild beasts will doubt that, within a month, the presence of civilisation, with the congregation of the large labour-parties involved in railway works, would effectually banish the timid inhabitants of the forest from the route in question. Within my own experience I have seen both game and fly expelled from vast regions by the mere advent of a few farmers and traders.

With the difficulties presented by the hilly nature of a portion of the country to be crossed I am less qualified to deal. I cannot pretend to be an engineer, but as a layman I feel bound to give my opinion that the obstacles in the way of the Delagoa Bay route are much less formidable than those presented by the Inchanga, across which the Natal road is now being attempted to be led. For four-fifths of its length, the Delagoa Bay and Pretoria Railway will run over as flat and favourable a country as is to be found in the

¹ "Delagoa Bay is undoubtedly the best harbour in South Africa, and it is the nearest to the Transvaal... I should like to see a railway from Delagoa Bay into the Transvaal."—Speech of General Sir A. Cunynghame, May 3, 1878.
THE DELAGOA BAY RAILWAY.

Close to its route are the vast copper-mines of North Lydenberg. Coal will not be wanting; and Transvaal coal is quite as good as that found in Natal. This railway will actually tap the best agricultural districts of the Republic, having in its immediate neighbourhood land, which, occupied and cultivated, would add immensely to the corn-producing area from which the world is fed.

I will not dwell upon all the good this railway would do; I will simply say that, if it is not constructed, the north-east of the Transvaal will never carry a population, because it will never have a market. It avails nothing to have countless acres of fertile land at your disposal if you must pay more than the price that your corn, cotton, or sugar will fetch for its mere conveyance to the place of sale. It profits the empire nothing to have gained possession of a country alleged to be rich in minerals (I do not allude to gold, but to copper, cobalt, and other metals), if these cannot be brought cheaply and rapidly to market.

It may be years before the Natal Railway reaches to the Tugela, much less to Newcastle. At its present rate of construction ten years may elapse before it will begin to exercise a beneficial influence on the Transvaal. Even if this projected railway could be brought to Pretoria within the next twelve months, its length and the disqualifications of the port at its terminus would prevent any sane man from anticipating any good result whatever from its construction.

If British annexation is to civilise the Transvaal, if it is to extend amongst the natives the blessings of cultivation and labour, philanthropists themselves, I am sure, can see no readier way, no easier plan to produce an effect upon native habits—to give to the natives new wants, and a knowledge of the glory of labour and the power of money—than to make the Delagoa Railway. So extraordinarily well populated with willing labourers is the country to the north of its course, that from thence the Diamond Fields draw yearly from 3000 to 4000 black workmen, who undertake, in search of the golden reward, to journey more than 600 miles year after year in search of work. If this railway is not constructed, I have not the least hesitation in saying that many places now occupied by white people will ere long be
abandoned, and that the barbarism of the north-east will, in defiance of troops and Government, become darker and more threatening as years roll on.

People already contemplate quitting that part of South Africa, because they have no outlet for their capital, no market for their produce, no hope of a better future. Even gold-diggers are forced to abandon comparatively good though limited diggings by the terrible prices they must pay for articles of necessity, which have to be transported to them by the bullock-waggon system, one of the most expensive modes of carriage in the world.

But besides all this there is another reason, and a not unimportant one, for this railway to be undertaken. There are £90,000 worth of plant for it even now lying in Delagoa Bay which must be paid for, whether it is left to rust or not. There is also a moral obligation to carry out this work binding on the British Government; because Sir Theophilus Shepstone, in his proclamation of the 12th April 1877, especially introduced this quieting clause: "All bona fide concessions and contracts with Governments, companies, or individuals, by which the State is now bound, will be honourably maintained and respected, and the payment of the debts of the State must be provided for."

I know of many persons who have invested in Transvaal property solely on the faith of that guarantee, and in the belief that those works would be constructed, and that within a reasonable period. The benefit that the construction of this line must cause by cheapening imports is shown in a remarkable manner by the result of the operations of a few enterprising persons, who every winter go down to Delagoa Bay, and make purchases of goods, which they have conveyed up country by Kafir carriers. I have known such goods sold at Pilgrim's Rest and in Lydenberg forty per cent cheaper than the same articles obtained by transport-train from Natal. It is especially to be remarked, in connection with this railroad, that its expense was proposed to be met, and was actually provided for, by the imposition of a tax of thirty shillings per annum on every Transvaal farm. As Mr Bekker stated, in answer to Mr Donald Currie, on the occasion of a recent public lecture, there are no less than
25,000 farms in the Transvaal; and as the tax has been, and is now actually being paid on the faith that the Delagoa Bay Railway and no other shall be constructed with the funds so obtained, the people are justified in demanding that this route shall be adopted. No doubt, the Natal Railway line is in progress, but the Transvaal is weary of paying excessive duties on all imports to colonial neighbours. The taxes and landing charges at Port Durban in Natal are almost immeasurably greater than those levied at Lorenzo Marquez; and, unpatriotic as it may sound, the Boers would rather make a profit by railway connection with the Portuguese than be fleeced for the benefit of their too dear friends in Natal.

Between the two harbours, in point of safety for shipping, there can be no comparison. Durban is a dangerous mud-hole, outside of which it is not unusual for valuable cargoes to be detained and knocked about for weeks and months, to the great loss of shippers and merchants. Admiral Hall, in his excellent work 'The Ocean World,' published some ten years ago, and to which I would refer the reader, gives a far different account of Delagoa Bay. He says in effect, with the exception of the man-of-war harbour of Simon's Town, situated near the extreme southern point of the Cape Colony, there is no really open and valuable port in all South-eastern Africa, except that at the Portuguese settlement with which the Boers wish to be connected.

Besides all this, it is necessary for some Power more active for good than the Portuguese to obtain a permanent footing on, if not a permanent hold of, Delagoa Bay itself. But little progress has marked that settlement under Portuguese rule. It is a pest-house and a den of immorality. I would not venture to shock the feelings of even average Christians by repeating what I know to be true of the degraded tone of life and morals that marks society in Lorenzo Marquez.

I do not consider that Delagoa Bay should be forcibly taken from the Portuguese; but, without doubt, unless some other Power establishes itself, or at least its mercantile influence, with and alongside of theirs on the east coast, great evil will continue to arise in various ways from their isolation from better influences.
It is but recently that a number of men who went down there from the Gold Fields misbehaved themselves in such a way as to disgrace our civilisation, and in return suffered outrages which were a disgrace to our prestige. One Robertson was murdered in some low haunt; while Lucas, also a British subject, was flogged without any form of law until he gave up some plunder. A vessel, manned by Banians, put in there not long ago, pretending to give passages to black labourers to Natal. I have it on the best authority that when the vessel was filled up, she sailed for Madagascar, where her cargo of blacks were sold as slaves.

In addition to this, it is alleged, and not without reason, that a dangerous trade in firearms is carried on with the Kafirs from this port. Quite recently, just before the outbreak of the second Seccoceni war on the 12th September 1877, Field-Cornet Erasmus of Kruger's Port reported that fifteen breech-loading rifles, Westley-Richards's pattern, had been smuggled from Delagoa, vid Pilgrim's Rest and Origstadt, past his place into Seccoceni's. For every reason, it is necessary that this bay, and the route from it into the interior, should be placed immediately under the influence of British mercantile enterprise. If it is not done, I have only to say that the work of the annexation will have been in vain,—that poverty and discontent will brood for years over the Transvaal,—that its lands will lie uncultivated, its mines undeveloped, and its resources untouched; whilst the British people, deprived of easy access to a great country forming a natural outlet for their surplus labour and capital, will, year after year, have to give from their hard earnings considerable sums to make up a deficient revenue; and life and treasure to preserve peace north of the Vaal River.

Emigration and railway construction are the only two measures by which the Transvaal can be rendered either a profitable investment or a contented acquisition; and, as I have shown from the scarcity of markets, emigration without railway construction would be disappointing and valueless.

At the present moment Great Britain is put to the expense of maintaining a military establishment in Pretoria. The 13th Regiment has been stationed in the Transvaal for
twenty months; the 80th is on its way thither. A volunteer force, with native contingents, has to be maintained at immense expense for the war with Secocoeni; many lives and thousands of pounds' worth of horse-flesh must be expended before peace is re-established, even with this one chief. There are elements of danger and disturbance everywhere.

But it may not unreasonably be argued—Why this discontent? Has not Sir Theophilus Shepstone guaranteed you the continuance of your constitution, the inviolability of your laws, the maintenance of your national contracts, and fulfilment of your pledges? Has he not in the proclamation of April 12, 1877, stated "that the Transvaal will remain a separate Government, with its own laws and legislature; and that the laws now in force will be retained until altered by competent legislative authority"?

It is so, but the pledge has been broken. When Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered the country he found its Volksraad in session. That body he has, without competent, or, indeed, any authority whatever, dissolved, and since then he has governed the country without any pretence of constitutional support.

It is now eighteen months since the Volksraad last sat. What authority for taxation has there been since? None, say the Boers. Is it to be wondered at that, in face of this state of facts, discontent exists? To this negation of law, to this denial of their guaranteed rights of legislation, is to be attributed the breach of contract in the railway matter, the gradual impoverishment of the country, the monstrous proceedings that mark the Secocoeni war, and, in fact, the ruin of the country.

It is now nearly too late to provide a remedy, but it is not too late for the people of England to take the matter into their own hands, and compel those who have pledged their honour to the maintenance of the Transvaal constitution, to fulfil that pledge.

Further discontent may result in consequences too terrible to contemplate. Men already speak of abandonment. It is certain that abandonment must take place, or enormous unprofitable expense be incurred, if steps are not taken to in-
crease the population, to develop the resources of the country, to restore the constitution, to fulfill the promises made in the annexation proclamation, and thereby to appease the maddening discontent which now threatens to drag it through anarchy to destruction.
CHAPTER XXI.

CONCLUSION.

Justified or not?—A Court of Appeal—Slaves to theories—Froude on the Free States—Proconsuls—Conclusion.

"It is not easy to justify what we have done in the Transvaal. If there be any laws of right and wrong by which nations should govern themselves in their dealings with other nations, it is hard to find the law in conformity with which that act was done. But for that act expediency can be pleaded." (Trollope’s ‘South Africa,’ vol. ii. p. 251.)

I have now but to show that neither expediency nor even temporary convenience, much less the obtaining of strikingly or even fairly beneficial results, have as yet justified the high-handed proceeding by which 50,000 people were converted into enemies; and a most deplorable state of feeling between English and Dutch South Africans engendered: a feeling that may be the cause of tears and misery, if not of blows and blood, in years to come.

I am firmly convinced that the British public knew nothing of the Transvaal and its circumstances before the annexation; and that, even now, they are not over well informed about the country they have acquired. I am equally well assured that the intentions of the Colonial Office towards South Africa and South Africans were most kind; and that the "Office" intended to be just, and even liberal, in its treatment of the Dutch. I am prepared to go still further, and to agree with Lord Carnarvon, that the Transvaal "has neither been sought nor coveted by him;" but I am also in a position to prove that the Earl and the Colonial Office were deceived and "bustled" by their South African agents and
proconsuls into hasty and unfortunate actions; and that it will be well for the name and reputation of English officials, and well also for the honour of the English people, if the annexation is reconsidered, and the representations on which it was based authoritatively repudiated.

Mr Anthony Trollope's defence of the annexation is perhaps the jauntiest and most pleasant of his late literary efforts—no—triumphants! Yet he deplores, in his pages, the unfortunate constitution of the Colonial Office; and while very properly ascribing to every living and dead worthy who has filled the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies, credit for the possession of public virtue of no inferior order, he, with equal propriety and truth, points out that each individual office-bearer was likely to be distinguished by some different virtue from his immediate predecessor, if not from all his official forbears.

The economist is succeeded in office by the ambitious enlarger of imperial responsibilities, who, in his turn, makes way for some patron of the close Crown colony system, only to be quickly followed by a minister with a firm belief in the virtues of petty parliaments and in colonial imitations of representative government. All this is injurious to colonists, who, in the meantime, suffer from experiments in administration, which are only saved from being dangerous by their being, as a rule, short-lived. Would it not be well if this system, or rather no system, were to be altered or abolished?

It appears to colonists most unreasonable that the ruler of the colonies should go in and out of office with the British Ministry, in whose overthrow or triumph colonial public men have no part. This is indeed the *origo et fons malorum*—the reason of ever-recurring colonial discontent.

Some reform in our system of colonial administration is wanted, and that immediately.\(^1\) It is impossible to expect

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\(^1\) "The obstacle which lies in the way is the existing Colonial Office. Over that department there has always hung a veil of the profoundest mystery. . . . The colonial dependencies of Britain are by far too large and too important to be worked by such machinery; and the first step towards placing them in their proper position should be the abolition of the Colonial Office as at present constituted, and the substitution in its place of a Colonial Board of Control."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. lxxxii., July 1857, p. 122.
A COURT OF APPEAL NEEDED.

the colonies to remain contented with a method of rule by which their destinies are handed about from one experimentalist to another, to suit the exigencies of strictly English political parties. It is still worse when the experimentalists, who are in no way amenable to colonial opinion, deal with territories over which they have but a colourable right, if any right of rule at all. Great satisfaction would be given to colonists and subject (colonial) populations by the construction of a council sitting in England, which would form a court of appeal against colonial rulers, as well as against the Colonial Office itself. This council should be a standing committee on colonial questions, and might easily be so constituted as to include a few distinguished colonists living in England; and could be even further qualified for special investigations by having added to it, from time to time—temporarily—men technically acquainted with particular subjects under examination or appeal. It should, however, not consist wholly of ex-governors, retired high commissioners, and the like; for these would undoubtedly bring to its deliberations prejudices and previously formed ideas, which could not fail to obstruct the course of justice.

This council should be a deliberative committee, acting for colonies and subject populations in much the same way as Parliament is supposed to act as between the English people and the Executive; and its recommendations and reports should have weight and authority sufficient to arrest the Colonial office in any of its actions at any moment. The peoples subject to and dependent on England, whether foreign or English born, have a most wonderful belief in the justice of their English rulers, and are to be found constantly appealing to her Majesty's Government against the misrule and arbitrary actions of her proconsuls; but when they find, as they too often do, that their appeals are unheeded—that the Colonial Office blocks the way—that they can never get forward because of circumlocution, forms, and routine,—then they not unfrequently say, "England rejects our petitions—refuses to hear us; her ears are only open to the reports of her governors and clerks; we must do something to prove that we are in earnest, or we will continue to be ignored."

Then comes a demonstration more or less forcible, and
CONCLUSION.

described by the proconsuls as more or less criminal; prose­
cuctions are put in action, troops are moved, vast expenses
incurred, and, finally, redress is given, the offending gov­
ernor pensioned off, and the people pacified. This thing
has occurred very often. Australasia, Mauritius, Canada, the
Cape Colony, and, more recently, the Diamond Fields¹ have
had to make very forcible appeals indeed to the public mind
before they could secure inquiry and redress.

It must be remembered that a Colonial Secretary is, to a
terrible extent, at the mercy of his colonial subordinates,
who are, as a rule, men filled with their own self-importance,
slaves to their own theories, or utterly blinded to facts by
official traditions—traditions which have grown up with and
around them during their longer or shorter periods of official
employment. In colonies more than at home are the officials
a class; their surroundings are "society"—a society that is
utterly foreign to the people amongst whom it is planted,
and by whom, as a rule, it is despised. Whatever the guid­
ing prejudice of this society may be, that will almost invari­
ably be the rule, belief, and official religion of the local
Government whose opinions, in turn, react on the society
amongst which it festers, which shines by a light reflected
from its petty dignity, and which would not be "society"
if it were not semi-official.

Now this is an unmixed evil. It is only very rarely that
a colony can get free from this "society" incubus. I think,
of the present colonial rulers (in Africa, at all events),
Colonel Lanyon is the only one free from the wretched
influences I refer to. He went in to the Diamond Fields as
a purge; and although he had about him men who would
 gladly have used their positions to warp his mind into the
traditions they lived amongst, yet they failed, and that
only because, on his first arrival, they tried to do too much

¹ "Three years ago there was nearly a revolution at the Diamond
Fields. What was the cause of it? The people represented the case to
the Imperial Government, and very fortunately the Government sent out
a British soldier and a gentleman, Colonel Crossman. That gentleman
investigated matters and restored order, and the unpopular Governor
then administering the Government was superseded by Major Lanyon.
The present happy result is a proof of his administration."—Mr Becken,
at Mr Moodie's Lecture before the United Service Institute.
in this direction. Colonel Lanyon had heard of the obstructiveness of the "clique," and knew, almost from the outset, that they would try to tie his hands with "formulas," and hinder his efforts for good by the dead-weight of routine. In his seventh month, however, he broke through the meshes that were gathered round him, saying, "Since the day I came here you have been telling me what I cannot do; now what I want to know is, not how things cannot be done, but how they are to be done, and done at once."

So he began, in spite of his surroundings, to do something. Hence the existing political content of the Diamond Fields.

But if English colonists are misrepresented to the Colonial Office by its underlings, how much worse and more uncontrolled is the misrepresentation continually taking place about subject populations and neighbouring races! Every day the Government of England is asked by its satraps to endorse some high-handed aggression, approve of some seizure of new territory, or crush some, till then, independent, people; and the proconsul supports his application by quoting the views of his clique, his official surroundings, and the "society" they affect.

What can a Colonial Minister do? He is himself utterly unacquainted with facts, except as they reach him through the offices below him. The result is, injustice is perpetrated, and a multitude of people are rendered miserable, because there is no court of appeal against the decision of the Colonial Minister.

Of course I will be told there is a court of appeal—Parliament, and, perhaps through the press, "the public." This is an illusion; and that it is an illusion is to be proved by referring to the recent annexation of the Transvaal. A question was raised about the matter before the "House;" and no doubt the people of England are perfectly satisfied that, this form having been gone through, justice is, or ought to be, satisfied; but it is not so. Parliament was not in an inquiring humour, and was perfectly happy to hear from an official source a not very detailed statement of the reasons that impelled the Colonial Office to sanction the annexation. But Parliament did not inquire, by the personal examination of witnesses, into the truth of the charges made
against the Dutch, nor into the validity of the reasons put forth for the annexation. The House was satisfied, on hearing—although it was not at all true—that a majority of the inhabitants of the country had expressed their desire to become her Majesty's subjects, that the annexation was unsought and unavoidable. Above all things, it was an accomplished fact, and therefore merited approval. So the House decided that it was done, and well done, and the matter ended.

Now, let any Englishman consider what evidence the House had before it on this subject at the moment it came to its momentous decision. It had the same evidence that the Colonial Minister had, and not one particle more. In fact it had the representations, tales, and reasonings of the Annexationists only, supported by the statements of the chief actor in the work.

This is a most unfortunate state of affairs, and quite apart from the question of the right or wrong of the Transvaal annexation, my contention is, that there should have been in existence an English tribunal, a parliamentary commission, or an imperial and colonial council, to which witnesses on oath could have been brought, petitions presented, and appeals made by those who considered themselves wronged in the matter. But the Transvaal had no appeal, except from the Minister in Downing Street to the Minister in his place in the House; and his decision was everywhere the same, "that he had acted for the best,"—as no doubt he still believes he did.

The Transvaal protested against the annexation, and sent delegates to England to pray at the foot of the Throne for justice. They had again to appeal to the Colonial Office, and of course the result was that their petition was rejected. Now what is a State situated like the Transvaal to do? To whom must colonists resort? The system that leaves them no appeal except to the Colonial Office is clearly wrong. Therefore it is that some kind of council which would have power to hear and determine important questions between England and her dependencies should be constituted. If the complainants are the vast majority, and yet find their protests rejected, on the grounds that they
are, as stated by the Annexationists, only a small minority, what are they to do? Petitions are nowadays not looked upon as very reliable expositions of real public opinion. If the complainants appeal anew to Parliament, they are told that the whole question was settled last year; that the matter has been heard and decided upon, and cannot now be reopened. What then can they do? They know thoroughly well that their case has never been heard; that only the case of the Colonial Office has been put before Parliament and the country; and that it was adjudicated on hurriedly, without the hearing of witnesses, and in a spirit of utter indifference to their views. They appeal to the press of England; it is closed against them by the utter insignificance of their affairs in the eyes of the caterers for the reading public.

Is this to go on for ever? Is a department to ruin a colonial empire simply because the colonists have no court of appeal against officialism and official misrepresentation? I hope not. The meanest wretch that pilfers a pocket-handkerchief has, in free England, the right to claim that he shall be tried by his peers before he is sentenced to an imprisonment however short. What injustice is it, then, to say to a free people, "You are accused of being weak, incompetent to manage your own affairs, and addicted to slavery. Your accuser is the Colonial Office. It has judged you; it has executed judgment on you. From that judgment there is no appeal. Evidence and argument are unnecessary, and will be useless. You have now only to consider how matters may be so arranged that you may regain a portion of the liberties we have deprived you of"?

It must be borne in mind that this sentence may result in the spread of discontent and the consequent subjection of a people to the heavy expenses that must be incurred in the suppression of that discontent, as well as to criminal prosecutions, destruction of families, and perhaps the death or disgrace of individuals, who may seek, in despair, or ignorance of their own weakness, to resist the dreadful judgment of national annihilation. No more is asked for these people than that they may have a fair, open, and public trial, and that as their defence has not been heard before sentence was
executed, that now at least they may be permitted to ask for a revision of their case before lapse of time and the progress of years and the sanctity of custom and long continuance to what they consider an iniquitous spoliation.

It is here not unreasonable to put before the English reader a deliberate statement of fact and opinion, made by an impartial judge in the conflict between the colonial authorities and the Republics, put on record some years ago in such a way (when looked on by the light of recent events) as almost to partake of the spirit and nature of prophecy:—

"Between the Republics and the Imperial Government a quarrel had arisen in consequence of the British occupation of the lately discovered Diamond Fields. The dispute had interested me from the contradictory statements which I had heard about it. I wished to learn the history of the transaction from disinterested parties on the spot, and to learn, especially, how far the annexation had been approved by colonial opinion.

"I am told that if Natal is irritated it may petition to relinquish the English connection and join the Free States. I cannot but think that it would have been a wise policy, when the Free States were thrown off, to have attached Natal to them.

"If we had said openly, when the diamond mines were discovered, that circumstances were altered, and that it was no longer convenient to leave these provinces in their present state, they would have grumbled, but they would have borne it.

"We have heaped charges of foul dealing on the unhappy Free State Governments. We have sent menacing intimations to both of them, as if we were deliberately making or finding excuses to suppress them.

"It has become painfully clear to me that the English Government has been misled, by a set of border land-jobbers, into doing an unjust thing, and it is now equally difficult to persist and to draw back.

"The English Government, in taking up Waterboer's cause, have distinctly broken a treaty which they had renewed but one year before in a very solemn manner; and the Colonial Office, it is painfully evident to me, have been duped by a most ingenious conspiracy."

What a state of things these extracts from Mr Froude's 'Diary' indicate as existing in an English colony, land-jobbers using England and her flag to make conspiracy successful! I do not need to add anything to this painful picture; but if England ever hears the case of the Transvaal, another nefarious scheme will have been laid bare.

I shall now turn to the question of fact. Was the Colonial Office deceived? Of this there can be little doubt. Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself was deceived on a matter
within his own especial knowledge. He had repeatedly ad-
vised against the Transvaal claim to portion of the Utrecht
district, and was convinced, as he says, that that claim was
defective. He, on native affairs, was the chief adviser not
only of the Natal Government, but of the Imperial Gov­
ernment; and on all such questions his advice and opinion
were looked upon as of the greatest weight. Yet we find
him on January 2, 1878, confessing that he had all along
been miserably wrong, and been misinformed as to the facts
in dispute. He, in fact, recants the errors of twenty years
in as many lines of a despatch.

Again, we find that whereas his annexation proclamation,
12th April 1878, speaks of Republican weakness and loss of
territory as the cause of the invasion, yet in enclosure 8 of
despatch, 1878, he admits that the Boers are in a worse
position than they have ever been; and clearly allows it to
be seen, that under him and his, for the first time in history,
had disputed territory actually fallen into the hands of the
savages.

If Sir Theophilus has thus to correct himself on two most
important points, and if these points were amongst those
that principally induced Lord Carnarvon to permit the
annexation, then it is clear that a case for inquiry is made out,
when it can be ascertained where and how the statements
originated that have been so fatally used.

If something is not done, and done soon, misfortune must
and will come. The Boers are a stern Protestant people,
unused to luxury, and unswayed by the mean considerations
that enervate the masses elsewhere; they are the majority,
and are, so far as I know, the colonists. There never yet
was a good cause that did not bring forth a leader; few
religions want for martyrs.

The one great fact I want to keep before the mind of my
readers is, that false representations are not only possible,
but are too commonly resorted to by colonial parties desiring
to secure the ear of the Colonial Minister. Few—very few
—colonial officials ever gather a correct knowledge of sur-
rounding facts. They live in a sort of misty traditionary
atmosphere, into which truth seldom penetrates. Even col-

1 See Appendix I, despatch 33.  
8 See Appendix K.
Colonial newspapers get into the same fog from their editors—they seldom have more than one—getting into the clique. Now one of the best proofs of this is the great Zulu nation theory. Captain Clarke, an officer of many years' experience, writing about the Zulus in a public despatch, says they have attacked successfully every native race which they have come in contact with. This is ludicrously incorrect. The fact really is that they have always met defeat at the hands of the Basutos—Mosheh having formed a nation in defiance of them. At the outset of his career, before the days of the Orange River sovereignty, when all the influential men of the country were carried away by the stream of Zulu invasion, he laid the foundations of, and successfully defended, the first towns of Basutoland. He drove away Chaka, and, as Noble says—

"Moselekatze's regiments on one occasion had attacked his stronghold. They rushed up its sides in great numbers; but an avalanche of stones, accompanied by a shower of assegais, sent them back with more rapidity than they had advanced. Their repulse was decisive, and the Zulus had to march away. At the moment of their departure a messenger came towards them, driving some fat oxen, with the word of the chief: 'Mosheh salutes you. Supposing that hunger has brought you into his country, he sends you these cattle, that you may eat them on the way home.' The Zulus were amazed. 'This man,' said they, 'after having rolled down rocks on our heads, sends us oxen for food. We will never attack him again.' And they kept their word."

But it is the fashion of a certain clique to praise the Zulus, so history and fact are ignored in their favour. In the same way it is customary to sneer at the Korannas, Basutos, Balapini, and Bapedi; but circumstances are stronger than sneers. These despised races are inflicting, in proportion to the forces engaged, much more severe losses on the men now in the field than the Red Kafirs have done in the late war.

That even colonial newspapers can err I have pointed out more forcibly in another chapter. The 'Natal Mercury' was the great organ of the party in favour of annexing the Transvaal, and, whether unwittingly or not, it has been made the medium for circulating tales of doubtful authenticity concerning both Boers and Kafirs. It is not long ago since this presumably well-informed colonial newspaper, referring
WHY THE BOERS WON'T FIGHT FOR US.

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to the attack on Legolani's kraal, misled its readers, unintentionally I hope, by stating that Clarke had captured the famous stronghold, "world renowned as Johannes's Mountain, from before which the Boers had retreated, having vainly assailed it with a force of 2000 white men the year before."

In reference to this wonderful error, I shall merely say: Johannes's place was not a mountain. It is not within 120 miles of the scene of Captain Clarke's operations against Masselleroom (Legolani). Captain Clarke has never seen Johannes's Kop in his life. The Boer army never attacked or were defeated at it. The largest number of white men that ever threatened it was forty-seven, the majority of whom were English. It fell into our hands early in December 1876, and was, at the period referred to by the 'Mercury,' the scene of a picnic from Lydenberg. It is the 'Mercury' that has misled the public to think that the Kafirs hated the Dutch, and the Dutch only; while the fact is that, just at present, the Bapedi are at war with Captain Clarke and the few English settlers, and not with the Boers, whose power they admitted in January 1877 when they sued for peace.

The Transvaal question will soon become the question of the day, and is likely to absorb quite as much attention as the Abyssinian war did in its time; and I have not the least doubt that, if not speedily looked to, it will cost as much in money. A great war of races is being provoked at the present moment. I doubt if this work will be in the hands of the public before it shall have commenced.

In this and in all future native wars the English in Africa must fight alone. In former cases, the Boers have refused to aid the Government against native tribes, and this for a most excellent reason. British wars are undertaken to protect one tribe against another. Natives will squabble. The last war in the colony was in favour of the Fingoes; whilst the monstrous waste of public money now going on in the Transvaal is incurred because, forsooth, Captain Clarke must protect Pogwani and Logwani—insignificant robbers—against Legolani and Secocoeni—greater robbers. Burghers will not join in any hostilities undertaken on account of natives. Why did not Captain Clarke order the paltry tribe of Pog-
wani to go into some inside location if they so badly wanted protection? During the sovereignty a similar thing occurred; and Noble, in his history, remarks—

"The Resident now found himself committed to offensive operations against Musheesh's tribe, which numbered at the least 10,000 fighting men, whilst he had no adequate force to oppose against them. The burghers refused to muster for such service. They could not comprehend or appreciate the motives which induced the Government of so powerful a nation as Great Britain to call out farmers from their homes and lawful employments on the occurrence of these chronic squabbles among the natives. Military duty under such circumstances was extremely distasteful and harassing to them, especially as, in addition to their own personal hardships and risks in the field, their families and property were exposed to be plundered and ruined by the tribes against whom they acted. Many of the farmers had already in this manner suffered severe losses of their flocks."

To all these causes for not fighting in quarrels not their own, is now added the vexation they must feel at having been deprived of their liberties. And if they will not fight, neither will they pay. It is yet to be seen if any attempt to tax them for wars undertaken by a foreign governor, and without their own consent, will be resisted.

The English people will find out, sooner or later, that they must begin to keep a firmer hand on colonial governors. Up to the present, in Africa their action has produced little save heart-burnings, mischief, and expense. Their Kafir policy has ever been, and still is, but a costly failure; and their schemes for the extension of the empire in South Africa are tending hourly to put England to the cost of keeping down one, if not several, insurgent populations.

But Sir Theophilus Shepstone's annexation of the Transvaal is, of all, the most disastrous experiment yet undertaken. It has cost one Kafir war, and will cost another. It has injured the natives, irritated the Boers, and thrown the whole country into a state of anarchy.

What justification, then, can the poor Boers see for the annexation? They say, "It has been brought about by misrepresentation." It has certainly not resulted in any increase of glory to the great empire that permitted it; and its apparent object—the bringing of peace to the Transvaal—has not been attained.
Some years ago there was a book published about Australia in which was a sort of poem, satirical and witty, describing an imaginary interview between an evil spirit and Sir George Gipps. Two stanzas have dwelt in my memory, and, I am afraid, have had much to do with the production of the present volume. There were troubles in the colony, and the "hoofed one" suggested to the ruler that perhaps the people might be driven to forcible ways of demonstrating their opinions:—

Gipps (log.)—

"Rebel! rebel! you're surely in joke!
Rebellion here!—a mere puff of smoke:
A handful of troops would put them down,
And the higher classes would join the Crown."

The D——, after cautioning the governor, points out the final issue of such a calamity—

"John Bull, from his drowsy lethargy waking,
Will give you small despots a terrible shaking.  
You'll be robbed of your berth and your reputation,  
For causing your masters so much vexation."

It is very much in the spirit of 'The Adviser' that I have written. There are ugly possibilities in Africa, and although I have no thought that strong measures, if taken by any party of colonists, will do anything more than draw attention to their grievances, whilst ruining, for the moment, themselves and their local rulers; yet I think it right that England should know that such calamities are possible, and preventible. I "appeal from petty tyrants to the Throne."

It is not Parliament that rules "Greater Britain," but clerks who sway their superiors.

Rome had her proconsuls. England, as regards her colonies, her subject-populations, and her proconsuls, is the Rome of to-day. We are now at war in Africa—a war of which not one thousand people in England know the cause or the cost. With whom and why, this book is intended to show. In a few months a still greater war will have commenced—a war that may cost hundreds of lives and millions of money. There is now no averting it. It must come, and
will have to be paid for. In the meantime there is the Dutch question, which may yet be a costly one. If Mr. Froude is right, it has already cost us something priceless.

I am told "that people will not bother themselves by reading contemporary history." Those who will not read will not rule very long. Men must keep pace with the age; and an empire indifferent to the wrongs of its subject-populations will not be likely to retain them. Much of this book is devoted to the recent annexation of the Transvaal. I am told that "the settlement is final, and that the Transvaal question is closed for ever." It may be so, but that final settlement has not settled the bill; and I think Great Britain will yet want to scrutinise the account. Besides, it is never too late to do justice. Every outrage upon justice, sooner or later, avenges itself. It is no use speaking of expediency when wrong-doing is to be defended. It may excuse, but cannot justify; still less can it avert the consequences of wrong-doing. When used as a plea, it cannot save the criminal from eventual and inexorable punishment and remorse. The day of reckoning may be delayed; it cannot be averted.

England must pay for colonial military purposes, because there is a class that is daily annexing fresh lands, undertaking new responsibilities, and incurring increasing expense for the purpose of extending its own influence and creating vacancies for an ever-increasing army of hungry expectants. If this work opens the eyes of ratepayers to the fact that a class exists that has a policy distinct from that of the English people, independent of Parliament, and though unknown or unanalysed at home, yet carried on in the name and by the power of England, then I will not have written in vain.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX.

A, page 10.

FREE STATE CONVENTION.

1. Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, in entering into a Convention for finally transferring the government of the Orange River Territory to the representatives delegated by the inhabitants to receive it, guarantees, on the part of her Majesty's Government, the future independence of that country and its government; and that after the necessary preliminary arrangements for making over the same between her Majesty's Special Commissioner and the said representatives shall have been completed, the inhabitants of the country shall then be free; and that this independence shall, without unnecessary delay, be confirmed and ratified by an instrument, promulgated in such form and substance as her Majesty may approve, finally freeing them from their allegiance to the British Crown, and declaring them, to all intents and purposes, a free and independent people, and their Government to be treated and considered thenceforth as a free and independent Government.

2. The British Government has no alliance whatever with any native chiefs or tribes to the northward of the Orange River, with the exception of the Griqua chief, Captain Adam Kok; and her Majesty's Government has no wish or intention to enter hereafter into any treaties which may be injurious or prejudicial to the interests of the Orange River Government.

3. With regard to the treaty existing between the British Government and the chief, Captain Adam Kok, some modification of it is indispensable. Contrary to the provisions of that treaty, the sale of lands in the inalienable territory has been of frequent occurrence, and the principal object of the treaty thus disregarded. Her Majesty's
Government therefore intends to remove all restrictions preventing Griquas from selling their lands; and measures are in progress for the purpose of affording every facility for such transactions,—the chief, Adam Kok, having, for himself, concurred in and sanctioned the same. And with regard to those further alterations arising out of the proposed revision of relations with Captain Adam Kok, in consequence of the aforesaid sales of land having from time to time been effected in the inalienable territory, contrary to the stipulations of the Maitland Treaty, it is the intention of her Majesty's Special Commissioner, personally, without any unnecessary loss of time, to establish the affairs in Griqualand on a footing suitable to the just expectations of all parties.

4. After the withdrawal of her Majesty’s Government from the Orange River Territory, the new Orange River Government shall not permit any vexatious proceedings towards those of her Majesty’s present subjects remaining within the Orange River Territory who may heretofore have been acting under the authority of Her Majesty’s Government, for or on account of any acts lawfully done by them—that is, under the law as it existed during the occupation of the Orange River Territory by the British Government. Such persons shall be considered to be guaranteed in the possession of their estates by the new Orange River Government.

Also, with regard to those of her Majesty’s present subjects who may prefer to return under the dominion and authority of her Majesty to remaining where they now are, as subjects of the Orange River Government, such persons shall enjoy full right and facility for the transfer of their properties, should they desire to leave the country under the Orange River Government, at any subsequent period within three years from the date of this convention.

5. Her Majesty’s Government and the Orange River Government shall, within their respective territories, mutually use every exertion for the suppression of crime, and keeping the peace, by apprehending and delivering up all criminals who may have escaped or fled from justice either way across the Orange River; and the courts, as well the British as those of the Orange River Government, shall be mutually open and available to the inhabitants of both territories for all lawful processes. And all summonses for witnesses, directed either way across the Orange River, shall be countersigned by the magistrates of both Governments respectively, to compel the attendance of such witnesses when and where they may be required, thus affording to the community north of the Orange River every assistance from the British courts, and giving, on the other hand, assurance to such colonial merchants and traders as have naturally entered into credit transactions in the Orange River Territory during its occupation by the British Government, and to whom, in many cases, debts may be owing, every facility for the recovery of just claims in the courts of the Orange River Government. And her
Majesty's Special Commissioner will recommend the adoption of the like reciprocal privileges by the Government of Natal in its relations with the Orange River Government.

6. Certificates issued by the proper authorities, as well in the colonies and possessions of her Majesty as in the Orange River Territory, shall be held valid and sufficient to entitle heirs of lawful marriages, and legatees, to receive portions and legacies accruing to them respectively, either within the jurisdiction of the British or Orange River Government.

7. The Orange River Government shall, as hitherto, permit no slavery, or trade in slaves, in their territory north of the Orange River.

8. The Orange River Government shall have freedom to purchase their supplies of ammunition in any British colony or possession in South Africa, subject to the laws provided for the regulation of the sale and transit of ammunition in such colonies and possessions; and her Majesty's Special Commissioner will recommend to the Colonial Government that privileges of a liberal character, in connection of import duties generally, be granted to the Orange River Government, as measures in regard to which it is entitled to be treated with every indulgence, in consideration of its peculiar position and distance from the seaports.

9. In order to promote mutual facilities and liberty to traders and travellers, as well in the British possessions as in those of the Orange River Government, and it being the earnest wish of her Majesty's Government that a friendly intercourse between these territories should at all times subsist, and be promoted by every possible arrangement, a consul or agent of the British Government, whose especial attention shall be directed to the promotion of these desirable objects, will be stationed within the colony, near to the frontier, to whom access at all times may readily be had by the inhabitants on both sides of the Orange River, for advice and information, as circumstances may require.

(Signed, &c.)

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THE GOLD FIELDS REVOLT.

No. 765.

GOVERNMENT OFFICE, PRETORIA, March 10, 1877.

SIR,—I have been instructed by his Honour the State President to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 27th of February and 3d of March last, and to thank you for the able and judicious manner in which you arranged matters at the Gold Fields.
You may rest assured that your services shall not be forgotten, and are duly appreciated.—I have the honour to be,

The State Secretary,

CAPTAIN A. AYLWARD,
Lydenberg Volunteer, Burger's Fort.

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The following is the text of the official documents proclaiming the Transvaal British Territory, published in a *Gazette Extraordinary*, dated Pretoria, Transvaal, 12th April 1877:

Commission appointing Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., of Natal, to be a Special Commissioner for certain purposes.

VICTORIA R.

VICTORIA, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India: To our Trusty and Well-beloved SIR THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE, Knight Commander of our most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, greeting:

Whereas grievous disturbances have broken out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa, with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies; and whereas, having regard to the safety of our said colonies, it greatly concerns us that full inquiry should be made into the origin, nature, and circumstances of the said disturbances, and with respect to the measures to be adopted for preventing the recurrence of the like disturbances in the future; and whereas it may become requisite to this end that the said territories or portions of them should be administered in our name and on our behalf. Now know you that we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty and fidelity of you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, have appointed you to be our Special Commissioner for the purpose of making such inquiry as aforesaid, and we do authorise and require you with all convenient despatch, and by all lawful ways and means to enter upon such inquiry, and we do require you to communicate to us through one of our Principal Secretaries of State, any facts which ought to be made known to us, as well as any opinions which you may think fit to express thereon, and if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said colonies, and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories, or any portion or portions of the same should provisionally, and pending the announcement of our pleasure,
be administered in our name and on our behalf, then, and in such case only, we do further authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation under your hand, to declare that from and after a day to be therein named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you, after due consideration, shall seem fit, shall be annexed to, and form part of our dominions. And we do hereby constitute and appoint you to be thereupon administrator of the same provisionally and until our pleasure is more fully known: Provided, first, that no such proclamation should be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or state, unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to become our subjects; nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power and authority therein are sought to be imposed: and, secondly, that unless the circumstances of the case are such as in your opinion make it necessary to issue a proclamation forthwith, no such proclamation shall be issued by you until the same has been submitted to and approved by our trusty and well-beloved Sir Henry Barkly, Knight Grand Cross of our most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Commander of our most Honourable Order of the Bath, our Governor and Commander-in-chief of our colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and our Commissioner for the settling and adjustment of the affairs of the territories adjacent or contiguous to the eastern frontier of our said colony of the Cape of Good Hope. And we do further require that you do in all things conform to such instructions as shall at any time be addressed to you by us through one of our Principal Secretaries of State; and we do strictly charge and command all our officers, civil and military, and all other our faithful subjects, that in their several places, and according to their respective powers and opportunities, they be aiding to you in the execution of this our commission. And for so doing this shall be your warrant.

Given at our Court, at Balmoral, this fifth day of October 1876, in the fortieth year of our reign.

By her Majesty's command,

CARNARVON.

PROCLAMATION

By his Excellency Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Knight Commander of the most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, her Majesty's Special Commissioner for certain purposes in South Africa.

Whereas at a meeting held on the sixteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two, at the Sand River, between her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners, Major Hogge and C. M. Owen, Esq., on the one part, and a deputation from the emigrant farmers then residing north of the Vaal River, at the head of
which was Commander-General A. W. J. Pretorius, on the other part, the said her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners did "guarantee in the fullest manner on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal River, the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government:"

And whereas the evident objects and inciting motives of the Assistant Commissioners in granting such guarantee or permission to persons who were her Majesty's subjects, were "to promote peace, free trade, and friendly intercourse" with and among the inhabitants of the Transvaal, in the hope and belief that the territory which a few years afterwards—namely, in February 1858—became known by the style and title of "The South African Republic," would become a flourishing and self-sustaining State, a source of strength and security to neighbouring European communities, and a point from which Christianity and civilization might rapidly spread towards Central Africa:

And whereas the hopes and expectations upon which this mutual compact was reasonably and honourably founded have been disappointed, and the circumstances as set forth more at length in my address to the people, of to-day's date, hereunto attached, show that increasing weakness in the State itself on the one side, and more than corresponding growth of real strength and confidence among the native tribes on the other, have produced their natural and inevitable consequences, as will more fully appear from a brief allusion to the facts; that after more or less of irritating contact with aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867 gradual abandonment to the natives in that direction, of territory settled by burghers of this State, in well-built towns and villages, and on granted farms; that this was succeeded by the extinction of all effective rule over extensive tracts of country, included within the boundaries of the State, and as a consequence by the practical independence, which still continues, of large native tribes residing therein, who had until then considered themselves subjects:

That some few farmers, unwilling to forfeit homes which they had created for their families, and to which they held grants from the Government of the Transvaal, which grants had, however, ceased and still fail to protect them in their occupation, made terms with the chiefs and now occupy their farms on conditions of periodical payments to those chiefs, notwithstanding the acknowledgment which such payments involve:

That this decay of power and ebb of authority in the north is being followed by similar processes in the south under yet more dangerous circumstances; people of this State residing in that direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the bidding of native chiefs, and at a moment's notice, to leave their farms and homes, their standing
crops, some of which were ready for reaping, and other property, all to be taken possession of by natives, but that the Government is more powerless than ever to vindicate its assumed rights, or to resist the declension that is threatening its existence; that all confidence in its stability once felt by surrounding and distant European communities has been withdrawn; that commerce is wellnigh destroyed; that the country is in a state of bankruptcy; that the white inhabitants, discontented with their condition, are divided into factions; that the Government has fallen into helpless paralysis from causes which it has been and is unable to control or counteract; and that the prospect of the election of a new president, so far from allaying the general anxiety, or from inspiring hope in the future, is looked forward to by all parties as most likely to result in civil war, with its attendant anarchy and bloodshed:

That the condition above described affords strong temptation to neighbouring native powers, who are known to be anxious and ready to do so, to make attacks and inroads upon the State, which from its weakness it cannot repel, and from which it has hitherto been saved by the restraining influence of the British Government, exercised from Natal by her Majesty's representative in that colony, in the hope, yet unfulfilled, that a friendly understanding might be arrived at between the Government of the Transvaal and the complaining native chiefs:

That the Secoceni war, which would have produced but little effect upon a healthy constitution, has not only proved suddenly fatal to the resources and reputation of the Republic, but has shown itself to be a culminating point in the history of South Africa, in that a Makatee or Basuto tribe, unwarlike, and of no account in Zulu estimation, successfully withstood the strength of the State, and disclosed for the first time to the native powers outside the Republic, from the Zambezi to the Cape, the great change that had taken place in the relative strength of the white and the black races; that this disclosure at once shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa, and placed every European community in peril; that this common danger has caused universal anxiety, has given to all concerned the right to investigate its causes and to protect themselves from its consequences, and has imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled civilization from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity:

And whereas the inherent weakness of this Government and State, from causes above alluded to, and briefly set forth, and the fact that the past policy of the Republic has not only failed to conciliate the friendship and goodwill, but has forfeited the respect of the overwhelming native populations within and beyond its boundaries, which together probably exceed one and a half millions, render it certain that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer from the consequences of a pressure that has already reduced its political life to so feeble a condition:
And whereas the ravaging of an adjoining friendly State by warlike savage tribes cannot for a moment be contemplated by her Majesty's Government without the most earnest and painful solicitude, both on account of the miseries which such an event must inflict upon the inhabitants of the Transvaal, and because of the peril and insecurity to which it would expose her Majesty's possessions and subjects in South Africa; and seeing that the circumstances of the case have, from the inherent weakness of the country already touched upon, become so grave, that neither this country nor the British colonies in South Africa can be saved from the most calamitous circumstances except by the extension over this State of her Majesty's authority and protection, by means of which alone oneness of purpose and action can be secured, and a fair prospect of peace and prosperity in the future be established:

And whereas I have been satisfied by the numerous addresses, memorials and letters which I have received, and by the abundant assurances which personal intercourse has given me, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal see, in a clearer and stronger light than I am able to describe them, the urgency and imminence of the circumstances by which they are surrounded, the ruined condition of the country, and the absence within it of any element capable of rescuing it from its depressed and afflicted state, and therefore earnestly desire the establishment within and over it of her Majesty's authority and rule; and whereas the Government has been unable to point out or devise any means by which the country can save itself, and as a consequence relieve the other white communities of South Africa from the danger of the dire events certain speedily to result from the circumstances by which it is surrounded, and can entertain no reasonable hope that it possesses, or is likely under its present form of Government to possess, the means to raise itself to a safe and prosperous condition:

And whereas the emergency seems to me to be such as to render it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of the Transvaal territory, as well as the peace and safety of her Majesty's colonies and of her Majesty's subjects elsewhere, that the said Transvaal territory should provisionally, and pending the announcement of her Majesty's pleasure, be administered in her Majesty's name and on her behalf:

Now therefore I do, in virtue of the power and authority conferred upon me by her Majesty's Royal Commission, dated at Balmoral, the fifth day of October 1876, and published herewith, and in accordance with instructions conveyed to me thereby and otherwise, proclaim and make known that from and after the publication hereof, the territory heretofore known as the South African Republic, as now measured and bounded, subject however to such local modifications as may hereafter appear necessary, and as may be approved of by her Majesty, shall be and shall be taken to be British territory; and I hereby call upon and
require the inhabitants of the Transvaal, of every class and degree, and all her Majesty's subjects in South Africa, to take notice of this my Proclamation, and to guide themselves accordingly.

And I hereby further proclaim and declare that I shall hold responsible all such persons who in the Transvaal shall venture opposition, armed or otherwise, to her Majesty's authority hereby proclaimed, or who shall, by seditious and inflammatory language or exhortations or otherwise, incite or encourage others to offer such opposition, or who shall injure, harass, disturb, or molest others because they may not think with them on political matters, and I do warn all such that upon conviction of any of the above offences they will be liable to the severe penalties which the law in such cases ordains; and I hereby appeal to and call upon the orderly, right-thinking, and peace-loving people of the Transvaal to be aiding and supporting her Majesty's authority.

And I proclaim further, that all legal courts of justice now in existence for the trial of criminal or civil cases or questions are hereby continued and kept in full force and effect, and that all decrees, judgments and sentences, rules and orders, lawfully made or issued, or to be made or issued by such courts, shall be as good and valid as if this Proclamation had not been published; all civil obligations, all suits and actions civil, criminal, or mixed, and all criminal acts here committed which may have been incurred, commenced, done, or committed before the publication of this Proclamation, but which are not fully tried and determined, may be tried and determined by any such lawful courts or by such others as it may be found hereafter necessary to establish for that purpose.

And I further proclaim and make known that the Transvaal will remain a separate Government, with its own laws and Legislature, and that it is the wish of her Most Gracious Majesty that it shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people. That arrangements will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as much the official language as the English; all laws, proclamations, and Government notices will be published in the Dutch language; in the Legislative Assembly members may, as they do now, use either language; and in the courts of law the same may be done at the option of suitors to a cause. The laws now in force in the State will be retained until altered by competent legislative authority.

Equal justice is guaranteed to the persons and property of both white and coloured; but the adoption of this principle does not and should not involve the granting of equal civil rights, such as the exercise of the right of voting by savages, or their becoming members of a legislative body, or their being entitled to other civil privileges which are incompatible with their uncivilised condition.

The native tribes living within the jurisdiction and under the protec-