Then Bart Pretorius, with a larger number of horsemen, made his third charge from the western face of the square, and was successful in cutting the entire Zulu impi in two. Instantly, the guns were run out and a heavy artillery fire directed on the disorganised mass. They wavered, and then, after the battle had lasted two full hours, Andries Pretorius, putting himself at the head of about three hundred men, rushed out upon them. The pursuing column divided itself, and each section now charged down on a separate body of Zulus, who fled across the plain in opposite directions. The division of the Zulu army under Salela, three or four thousand strong, which had had less fighting than the main body under Tambusa, fared badly. They did not attempt to make a stand; but were driven helter-skelter over the level veld by a body of horsemen, about one hundred and fifty in number, with whom was the impetuous Sarel Cilliers, who tells us in his quaint phraseology that the Kaffirs soon lay as "thick on the ground as pumpkins on a fertile plot of garden land." The one hundred and fifty Farmers with whom Cilliers rode had divided themselves into two columns. Each of these bore down on one extremity of the mass of disorganised and confused Zulu warriors at a gallop, firing scattering volleys of the terrible charges of slug-shot from their long roers, and driving Salela's routed army towards the river.

At the point where the stream was reached there was a deep pool,* such as South African rivers have at

* These long reaches of deep water are known by the Dutch name of seekogat (plural form, seekogaten), being supposed to have at one time constituted the haunts of the Hippo.
Diagrams to illustrate how Bart Pretorius and his Horsemen cut the Zulu Army in two at the Battle of the Blood River:—

2. Horsemen attack the Zulu Army in the rear.
3. The Zulu Impi cut in two.
4. Discorrganised masses, driven across the plain in opposite directions.
5. Leaguer.

A.A. Lines of attack of horsemen under Bart Pretorius.
B.B. Line of fire from sides of Square.
S. Position of Zulus under Sisala in the early stages of the Battle.
T. Tambura and Sisala's united Impi.
D. Dry Downs.
various points along their course. Rushes and reeds grew along the river bank in this locality. Large numbers of Zulus were, in their headlong flight, precipitated into deep water, and, being bad swimmers, were drowned. A very great many were shot. Where the reeds and rushes grew thickest, hundreds sat down in the water and at the water’s edge, attempting to find cover and make a fresh stand. But the avengers of Retief and of the murdered women and children of the Weenen massacre were close upon them. The thunders of the elephant guns echoed on the river banks in the still, clear morning air (it was only about nine o’clock), and few indeed of Dingaan’s warriors made their escape from that fatal spot. The stream was soon stained red with Zulu blood, from which circumstance it derives its present name. Andries Pretorius and his horsemen had now spread their columns out in every direction over the plain, in pursuit of Tambusa’s flying legions. Nowhere did these Zulus attempt to stand. It was a headlong rout. More men had come out from the laager. Louw and Bart Pretorius, Jan and Pieter Jacobs, Gert Potgieter, Hans de Lange, and other officers, led separate bodies of the Emigrants in the pursuit, which was kept up a great way across the plain. Andries Pretorius himself, when at some distance from the camp, was in the act of riding close up to one of the flying Zulu warriors, attempting to take him prisoner in order to send a message to Dingaan, when the Zulu, turning round suddenly, brandished his shield and struck a loud blow on the hard ox-hide. The horse
which Pretorius rode, taking fright, sprang to one side. Gun in hand, he immediately leapt from his saddle; but, in the same instant, the Zulu made a spring towards him. His musket missing fire, Pretorius had to parry the stabbing assegai, which struck him in the wrist. Then he closed with the Zulu warrior, and threw him on the ground. As they lay struggling, one of the burghers, Jan Rudolph, who was near, galloped up, and, seeing the assegai which stuck in the Commandant’s arm, grasped the weapon, pulled it out of the wound, and then killed the Zulu with it. But the sharp cutting edge of the assegai had severed the radial artery, and Pretorius lost a good deal of blood before the rough surgery of the camp arrested the flow.

The battle and pursuit had lasted five hours.

The remnants of Dingaan’s armies, broken, discomfited, routed, and thoroughly disheartened, only saved themselves from further destruction by headlong flight, and because the victors—men and horses—were too much exhausted to keep up the pursuit and continue the slaughter. The Emigrants estimated that they had killed between three thousand and three thousand five hundred Zulus. The Zulus themselves, however, have given the number of those who fell on their side as considerably greater.

The power of Dingaan’s dominion and the terror of his name were gone.

Pretorius now decided to at once attack the Zulu Chief in his capital, before he had time to rally his forces and recover from the great defeat of his main
army. On the 17th, the laager was pushed forward towards the upper basin of the White Umveloosi. While the wagons, always accompanied by a strong guard, and ever ready to take up a defensive position in case of necessity, were advancing down the banks of the river, a flying column, consisting of an effectively organised horse commando, moved rapidly on Umkungunhlovu, which was reached on the 21st December. Dense clouds of smoke rose from the kraal as the commando approached it. Dingaan and his defeated soldiers had, before retiring to the neighbouring bush and deep ravines, set fire to the huts, which were now ablaze. Commandants Jacobus Uys and Sarel Cilliers were among the first to enter the burning town. Soon the avengers stood on the Chlooma Amaboota, the frowning hill overlooking the precipice at the back of the kraal. Here they found the bodies of the victims of the massacre of February. In the dry, rarefied atmosphere of this part of Zululand no putrefaction had taken place. The remains of Retief and his companions, untouched by either vultures or wild animals, were mummified and crumbling into dust. Impaled on stakes driven into the ground, there, with their chief, stood the sixty-five silent, cold, sentinels, the tried and faithful men—faithful even in death—guarding the inheritance which their indomitable leader had obtained for the Republic. Many of those taking part in the commando under Pretorius were kinsmen and near relatives of the men who had been murdered with Retief, and whose bodies were now recognised by the clothes which they had worn. The remains
Sketch Plan of the Battle of the White Umveloos.

M. Hill and Precipice of Chlooma Amaboota, where Belief and his followers were murdered.

L. League of the Emigrants.

F.P. Drifts or fords.

A.D.D. Line of advance of Column under Hans de Lange.

(After a pencil drawing by Oud Commandant J. H. Visser.)
of Pieter Retief himself were easily distinguished by a satin vest, and by a small leather despatch bag which hung suspended from one shoulder, and in which was found—in perfect preservation—the treaty, signed by Dingaan, and ceding to the Emigrants and their descendants all the country lying between the Tugela and Umzimvubu rivers. This document was found by Evert Potgieter, and handed to Pretorius.

The solemnity of the occasion, with its tragic surroundings, deeply impressed on all those who were present the intensely dramatic circumstances associated with this rescue of the title-deeds of the infant Emigrant Commonwealth.

The remains of Retief and his companions were interred in one large grave at the spot (not far from Dingaan's kraal) where the laager stood, and the camp was then moved south-eastward to a point on the southern slope of a mountain—one of the elevations in a range of hills stretching almost parallel with the river. To the north of the stream a broad level plain extends towards another mountainous ridge, which separates the watersheds of the White and Black Umveloosi.

On the morning of 30th December,* a horse commando of about two hundred and fifty or three hundred men started from the camp, and proceeded in a north-easterly direction towards the river. The scouts had brought in a report that a considerable number of cattle had been seen to the north of the river, where the enemy were known to be in force. Andries Pretorius himself had suffered a good deal from the

* Diary : Sarel Cilliers.
wound received on the 16th, and the Krygsraad had given its decision against his leading the expedition or taking part in it. He, therefore, remained in the laager.

Carel Landman acted as patrol-captain, and under him served Hans de Lange as second in command. Early in the morning, before the patrol started, Pretorius cautioned Landman to beware of falling into an ambuscade, and advised him to move forward warily, and with horsemen scouting well in advance and on the flanks of the column, so that the stealthy approach of Zulu impis might be at once detected. The Emigrants had now learned by experience what a skilful foe they had to contend against, and were, therefore, well on their guard. The route by which the commando approached the river was a mountain defile gradually sloping downward and narrowing towards the north-east, where the ford lay. On the north side of the stream was a mielie plantation, and, a little further on, an isolated rocky koppie on the open plain. Landman and De Lange, with their little commando, had traversed the mountain pass, and were approaching the banks of the stream, when they saw, on the plains to the north, what they at first supposed to be large herds of Zulu cattle. Then the curious fact was noticed that the different herds were of distinct colours—black, white, red, black-and-white, etc. The mystery was soon explained.

The river was crossed, and then the burghers found a pretty large mielie plantation in front of them. Some armed Zulus were also observed, but they were
few in numbers. Such an extensive view of the plains to the north as had been obtained from the higher ground in the mountain defile was not then available. But, on glancing round towards the rear, some of the horsemen were struck with amazement at what they saw. "Look!" they shouted to the others; and there, cutting off the retreat, as if by magic, so suddenly had they appeared on the scene, thousands upon thousands of Dingaan's warriors lined the hills on both sides of the ravine, as well as the slopes of the defile through which the column had just passed. As at Iteleni, a Zulu army appeared suddenly to have sprung out of the ground. The great leaders of Dingaan's armies, determined to retrieve the fortunes of their Chief and their race on the field of battle, had been successful in executing as masterly and skilful a piece of strategy as is to be found in the records of the warlike achievements of their nation. Their thoroughly trained scouts had kept them well informed of all the movements of Pretorius and his followers on the south side of the river. When the expedition under Landman had started, and while it was moving north-eastward towards the river, large numbers of Zulus, who, under cover of the hills, had crossed to the southern banks of the White Umveloosi quite unobserved, were advancing round the mountains so as gradually to mass their columns in the line of march of the commando, but well to the rear, so as to keep out of sight.

The Zulu regiments on the southern side of the river now formed roughly a semi-circle which completely prevented all possibility of retreat to the small
Emigrant force. To the north of the river, large masses of Zulus were converging towards the ford where the Farmers had crossed the stream. But in that direction the field was still open—though only relatively so—for, to close up the way and complete the formation of the fatal circle, a thin line of Zulu warriors was already forming. A general skirmish ensued, and had lasted nearly half-an-hour, when Commandants Landman and De Lange quickly consulted as to what was to be done. Landman's plan was to advance straight on the rocky hill in front of them, and there give battle. There was a ridge of stones and boulders running round the kopjie. With the ridge as cover, he intended his commando to hold the Zulus at bay. Hans de Lange swore roundly when he heard this proposal. "Verdom!" said he, "look at the Kaffirs. How many of them do you think there are? How many can we kill, and for what length of time can our powder and lead last us against such an immense number? It is certain death for us to go on that hill. Forward, men, forward! He who loves me follows me."

*This impromptu battle oration is a curious—but quite characteristic admixture of convincing, logical argument and rapid decision, followed by instant action and assumption of responsibility, with a final flourish of the ever popular Biblical phraseology—probably to tone down the somewhat incongruous and incompatible introductory expletive Cambronneism. As given in the text, it is a literal translation, word for word, from the narrative dictated to the author by Senior Commandant J. H. Visser of Schoonspruit, near Potchefstroom, on 26th May, 1881. The entire account of the battle as here given is from the same source. Sarel Cilliers, the pious and decorous Ironside, also fought in the battle of the White Unreloaded, and must have been shocked to hear the swearing. He says nothing about it in his Diary;
Spurring forward their horses, the burghers, led by De Lange, charged down on the thin line of Zulus which was already beginning to block the way towards the north. Past the rocky koppie, where Landman had intended to make a stand, they dashed at a gallop, and, firing from the saddle at the Kaffirs in front of them, they rode straight for the north—right into the heart of the enemy's country. Without them—but narrates how Commandant De Lange ordered every one to mount and charge the enemy in extended line, and how this manœuvre was successful in extricating them from a dangerous position. J. H. Visser, in his narrative, says: "Were it not for Hans Doms (the nickname by which Commandant De Lange was known), we had all been killed that day."
selves losing a single man or horse, and after inflicting heavy loss on the enemy, they emerged on to the open plain. Not a moment too soon. Long black lines were already seen converging from the east and from the west, attempting to surround them. Onward, like black serpents gliding over the plain, came the extended ranks of the Zulu regiments; but the horsemen rushed on at a gallop where the country was still open. About twenty-five men or so, however, were, when clear of the Zulu wings, detached from each flank of the flying column. These charged eastward and westward to delay the enemy's advance. Reining up their horses when close to the foremost Zulus, they fired into the extremities or points of the lines, and then rapidly galloped northward towards their own main column, reloading as they retired, and, when ready with fresh charges of slug-shot, again wheeling round to keep back the Zulus, whose pursuing lines were now following close on the heels of the patrol. By this manoeuvre, constantly repeated, while all the time the little body of horsemen were cantering further and further northward, theburghers managed to inflict considerable loss on the Zulus, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from doing any harm whatever. For two hours this retreating fight was continued. The horses were kept at a canter most of the time, and were beginning to be somewhat tired, for it was a hot day. As may be seen by referring to the illustration on p. 105, the advance had, so far, been in almost a straight line to the north, away from the White Umveloosi river. The enemy were now well
to the rear. Straight in front of the column, and barring further advance northward, was a high mountain with steep rocky slopes and deep glens and gorges. This mountain was one of the chain of hills separating the basin of the White from that of the Black Umveloosi, further to the north. At the foot of this kop the Farmers turned their horses' heads to the west, and pushed across the veld in that direction, i.e., parallel with the mountain range, between which and the White Umveloosi all the plain was covered with the long black rows of the advancing Zulu regiments. The latter, also, had now changed their line of advance and were moving westward. Some of them, by taking short cuts across the level plain, had succeeded in getting close up to the horsemen; but the foremost Zulus again encountered a stubborn resistance, and lost heavily from the well-directed musketry fire. For fully two hours more the horsemen rode in almost a straight line towards the west. During all this time their skirmishers, galloping out towards the left rear, were engaging the enemy and keeping back advance parties of Zulu warriors who threatened the line of march. The entire body of the Zulu army was now also advancing towards the west. By constantly falling back before the main body of Dingaan's battalions, while their own mounted skirmishers in the rear and on the left flank were inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, the Africanders were making a wide detour across the plain. When the advance towards the west had continued for over two hours, the horses' heads were
turned first to the south-west and then to the south. The object of this move was to reach the river and recross it at a point much higher up the stream than where the Zulu force had first been encountered. Between the two points, that at which the battle had commenced in the morning, and that towards which the commando was now moving, the White Umveloosi River was easily fordable all the way. The water was shallow enough. There were no sekoengaten or deep reaches, and the banks were low. The only danger was from quicksands. These, however, had not been met with at the drift where the crossing was effected in the morning, and it was deemed inadvisable to proceed further westward and attempt to recross higher up the stream than the ford towards which the burghers were riding. Indeed, that would have been impossible, for, more to the west, the country became mountainous. The river banks were steep and rocky. There was also a good deal of bush further up the stream, and the small body of horsemen would have run great risk of falling into an ambuscade had they ventured into this hilly country. The Emigrantes, therefore, rode in almost a straight line to the south. For two hours more they cantered their weary horses over the veld, while columns of Zulu warriors were moving westward, attempting to cut off their retreat. Like immense black trailing serpents,* the impis moved across the level plain, directing their course at right angles to that of the

* "Soos groot snoors syf slang." (Oral narrative of J. H. Visser as given to the author.)

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white horsemen. It was now a race as to who should reach the river's crossing first. The heat was intense. The panting horses were utterly exhausted by their long six hours' gallop; and yet everything now depended on their exertions. Close on their hind quarters pressed the fleet-footed Zulu soldiers who were still keeping up the pursuit, and, nearer and nearer—every moment threatening to bar the way to the river—crept the points of the long black lines which were moving forward from the east.

At last the river was reached. As the horses dashed forward into the stream, some Zulus who had crept up the banks of the river—to intercept the column—rushed at them in the water, brandishing the stabbing assegai. Hardly had a few yards of the drift been crossed, when several of the horses sank up to their shoulders in quicksands. The Zulus threw themselves on the struggling mass of men and horses in the river, and a fierce hand-to-hand combat followed. While many of the savages were shot down in the water, others rushed forward to take their places; for the plain up to the water's edge was now covered with large numbers of warriors swarming to the assault. Soon there were several riderless horses. Alexander Biggar, whose two sons had already given their lives in the struggle for the foundation of the Republic, was slain, and five others* also fell in the fierce onslaught of the Zulus.

* Jan Oosthuizen, Martlinus Goosen, Gerrit van Staden, Barend Bester, and Nicolaas le Roux. Some half-dozen Natal Kaffirs, who had followed Biggar in the campaign, were also killed at the drift.
Bart Pretorius had a narrow escape. Having had his horse killed under him, he was fighting on foot in the water, attempting as best he could to get through to the opposite river bank. But he saw Zulus closing in around him on every side, and most of his companions already a good distance off. Striking down several of his stalwart foemen with the butt end of his gun, and successfully parrying more than one deadly stroke of the broad-bladed stabbing assegai, he fought his way to where a riderless horse was wading through the stream. Then, leaping into the saddle, and dashing past the astonished Zulus, he was soon in safety on the other side of the river.

On the southern bank of the White Umveloosi the commando again adopted the formation to which they had adhered in their six hours' ride across the plains north of the river. For the Zulus, now in thousands on the other side of the drift, had already commenced to cross the stream. While the main body of the horsemen were advancing—as rapidly as their jaded steeds could travel—towards the laager from which they had started in the morning, a rear guard of from twenty-five to fifty in number was told off to keep the enemy back. About half way between the camp and the river a small reinforcement, which had been sent forward by Andries Pretorius, came up and assisted in covering the retreat. When the Zulus finally fell back, the retreating commando were in sight of the laager. Seven hours had elapsed since the battle began in the mielie plantation at the lower drift of the Umveloosi. During all that time the
small body of two hundred and fifty men on horseback, in constant danger of being cut off and surrounded by Zulu regiments numbering between seven and ten thousand men, had kept up a running fight against large detachments of a brave and determined enemy. A line describing a semi-circle, over the plain to the north of the Umveloosi, shows the route followed by the commando in its ride from the lower river crossing, where the battle began, to the upper drift or ford, where Alexander Biggar and the five others were killed by the Zulus. All along this line there had been almost constant fighting, and, when at last the river was reached, it was not a moment too soon. Large numbers of Zulus would have cut off their retreat had the Farmers been a quarter of an hour later in arriving at the drift; for while the horsemen were making their wide detour over the open veld, Zulu regiments — thousands strong — were moving parallel with the river to intercept them. The various movements executed by the opposing forces on the plain to the north of the Umveloosi River during a period of more than six hours can be diagrammatically represented by a bow-shaped figure. The extended black lines of Dingaan's warriors moving parallel with the river form the string, while the course which the horsemen followed in their long ride forms the arc of the bow. But at almost every step along this arc-shaped course there was fighting going on; for large numbers of the enemy were in close pursuit, and had to be kept back. The Zulus fought bravely, and put their own losses at considerably over a thousand.
IN SOUTH AFRICA

Such is a brief description of the battle of the White Umveloosi, the first engagement in the open which the Emigrants had fought against the armies of Dingaan since Uys had met his death. The presence of mind and sound judgment of Commandant Hans de Lange had saved the commando from utter annihilation; to this result the hardihood and power of endurance of their horses had in no small measure helped to contribute.

Carel Landman, the Commandant who took the place of Pretorius in this expedition across the river, was a favourite officer of the Emigrants. He was well advanced in years, and not so active as some of the younger leaders; but he was as brave a man as any among them. If he lacked any of the qualities of a commander, it was prudence. As was the case with the division under Pieter Uys at the battle of Italeni, his commando had fallen into a trap set for them by the Zulus; and this had happened because, in moving north-eastward towards the river, the troop was not sufficiently protected by scouts thrown forward on either side of their advance, as Andries Pretorius had advised when he handed over the command to Landman in the morning.*

On 31st December what was left of Dingaan's capital was burned and razed to the ground. The

* "Landman, set jou spioene wyd uit an weerskante van die patrouille" ("Landman, place your scouts well forward on both sides of the patrol"), were the words used by Pretorius.

"Carel Landman had bevel. Hy was 'n goetje ou man, wat nooit gevaar kon sien nie, daar hy van gedagte was dat almal soo'n goetje hart als hy self had." ("Carel Landman was in command. He was a good old man, who could never see danger, because he took it for granted that others were as well disposed and kind-hearted as he was himself"). (Oral narrative of J. H. Visser.)
two large regimental kraals near Umkungunhlovu were also destroyed by fire. The return march to Natal was commenced on New Year's Day. In the early morning of 2nd January, before daybreak, a horse patrol started from New Year's Spruit, and, after riding some considerable distance eastward through mountainous country, succeeded in surprising a detachment of a Zulu regiment which was guarding some five thousand of the King's cattle.

Less than a month had passed since the small force of the Emigrant Farmers in Natal had entered into the solemn covenant in their camp on the Sundays River, and had commenced the campaign against Dingaan in order to avenge the death of Retief and his companions, and of those men, women, and children who had been massacred in the encampments on the Bushman's, Mooi, and Blauwkrans rivers. In less than a month, the mighty military hosts of the great Zulu Chief had been routed with a loss of several thousands; Umkungunhlovu, Dingaan's capital, and the two great regimental kraals near it, had been captured and burnt to the ground; and half of Zululand—all the country to the south of the White Umveloosi River—was in the power of the handful of bold invaders.

The expedition of the preceding April, ending in disaster, had but served to accentuate the sorrows and to emphasise the forlorn condition of those who had survived the treacherous and cruel massacres of February. The tragic death of Uys and his son with their followers, the withdrawal of Potgieter and his adherents, had come as further afflictions to those who—on the blood-
stained soil of Natal—had wept by the lonely graves of their murdered relatives, then unavenged. The first campaign against the ruthless enemy had ended in humiliating defeat for them. Another of their leaders had been struck down, and yet another, from whom they had expected much, had abandoned them to their fate. The dark clouds of grief, which had hung over the new settlement since the death of Retief, had been made still blacker by the failure of the first campaign under Potgiester. But now all this was changed. Andries Pretorius, the new leader, by his skilful conduct of the second expedition against Dingaan, had secured victory to their standards, re-established confidence in the ranks of the Emigrants, and completely broken the power of the Zulu King. In the camps beyond the Tugela, tidings of the great triumph in Zululand, and of the capture of Umkungunhlouvu, were brought by Kaffir runners. It was evident to the Emigrants that a great military leader had appeared among them.
CHAPTER XXI

FIRST PLOT AND PLAN OF CAPE EMPIRE-EXTENDERS FOILED

THE NAPIER-CHARTERS RAID

Governor Napier's Plan—Annexation Urged from Cape Town—
Downing Street Refuses its Sanction—Sympathy with the
Emigrants in Cape Colony—Sir George Napier "takes the Bit
between his Teeth"—Major Charters sent to Seize Port Natal—
Instructions from Cape Town—Closing of the Harbour of Natal—
Arbitrary Buccaneering—Onze Grootse God wogen wij toen Dank—
A Test Case—the New Townships in Natal—Condition of the
People in the Laagers—Evidence of Major Charters—Brave
Women—Negotiations with Dingaan, who sends Spies instead of
Delegates—The Burghers on Guard against his Treachery—Volks-
raad Instructs Pretorius to Demand Restoration of Stores and
Ammunition—Correspondence—Volksraad Proclamation—Down-
ing Street Despatch—Check to Cape Town Rumramania—Failure
of First Raid.

At this crisis of their fate it seemed as if the Voortrekkers would soon, more than ever before, require a
good commander. As Pretorius and his officers re-crossed the Buffalo River, intelligence was brought to
them from the Natal laagers that English troops had occupied the Port of Durban; seized stores and
ammunition belonging to the Emigrant settlement;
and put a stop to all sea traffic except in the case of
such vessels as had a license from the Governor at
Cape Town, Sir George Napier. This step had been
taken by Sir George Napier entirely on his own
responsibility. The Glencoul administration in England
HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC

had not so far shown itself at all in favour of extending British dominion in South Africa. Governor Napier's predecessor at the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, had, in December, 1835, recommended the annexation of Natal, and in January, 1834, the same course had been urged on Downing Street by the petition forwarded from Cape Town after the public meeting at the Commercial Exchange. On both occasions the Home authorities had refused to sanction any extension of the territories of the Crown in South Africa. (See pp. 207, vol. i.; 5, 72, vol. ii.)

"In the opinion of Earl Glenelg extension of the Colonial territory implied not alone extension of responsibility and increase of military expenditure, but injustice towards native tribes. Knowing nothing of the condition of the Bantu of the interior, the Secretary of State and the English people believed that the emigrant farmers were in collision with peaceful and inoffensive clans of aborigines, and did not imagine that the Zulus and the Matabele were the most cruel foes the aborigines ever had. These erroneous impressions were strengthened by the violent language of Captain Stockenstrom and the Rev. Dr. Philip concerning the dealings of the emigrants with the blacks, which, though it seemed to South Africans to be the phraseology of vindictiveness, appeared to Earl Glenelg as the outpouring of indignation against the perpetrators of wrong.

"How could further emigration be prevented, and the farmers who had left the Cape Colony be compelled to return? Captain Stockenstrom urged that
Port Natal should be occupied by troops, so as to cut off supplies of ammunition, and thus leave the emigrants only the alternative of retreat or death. His representations on this subject show as plainly as his evidence before the Commons Committee that at this unhappy period of his life his chief object was to please the Secretary of State. Thus he recommended Earl Glenelg to occupy Port Natal as 'the first step towards further arrangements for arresting a system of encroachment, usurpation, oppression, and bloodshed, which, though familiar in the history of South Africa, was even there unparalleled in atrocity and extent.' Lord Glenelg could not see that language such as this conveyed utterly erroneous impressions, but he declined to act as advised. — Theal.

Ever since his accession to the Governorship, Sir George Napier at Cape Town had had abundant evidence— as had his predecessor Sir Benjamin D'Urban—of the widespread sympathy with the Emigrants which existed throughout the country districts of the Colony, and more especially on the frontiers. He had seen many of the frontier districts being gradually depleted of their best inhabitants, who were leaving their homes to join in the movement which was to build up the Republic in South Africa. The reverses and disasters which had overtaken the pioneers of Natal and Zululand had but served to swell the stream of those who were on the roads leading north-eastward across the Orange River and toward the Drakensbergen. It was known to the Governor that the English settlers in Natal, spurned and repulsed by the mother-country, had
thrown in their lot with those who were founding a new State, and that a township under the Government of the Emigrants had already been established on the Bay of Natal, towards which port trade and commerce were being attracted. The English merchants and shopkeepers of Cape Town became afraid of losing their trade monopoly with the interior. Is it strange that they should have hated Retief and Pretorius, whose policy was to enrich South Africa by giving it another harbour?

As to the attitude of the authorities at Government House towards the Emigrants, it was consistent enough. As servants of the British Crown they did all they could to prevent the formation of a new settlement, where,—owing to the action of the Home officials in refusing to sanction any scheme of extension of territory or any annexation—the British flag would not be acknowledged. True, the policy of England in South Africa at the time was that of the dog in the manger. But Sir George Napier and the Cape Town merchants determined to show that they, at least, were not responsible for this. In May, 1838, a Government mission had been sent to the Emigrants in order to persuade them to return and abandon the settlement in Natal (see p. 69). This had failed, and had been followed in July by a proclamation again advising the Emigrants to return to the Old Colony, refusing British sanction to the establishment of any independent Republic, and threatening military occupation of Port Natal. And now the Governor, pressed by the inhabitants of Cape Town, had resolved to carry out this threat, even without the sanction of the Home Government.
Accordingly, in November, 1838, a small expedition, consisting of a company of the 72nd Highlanders and a detachment of artillery, left Port Elizabeth for Natal in the chartered transport Helen. The officer in command was Major Sam Charters, R.A., the Governor's military secretary. Stores for the expedition were conveyed in the coasting schooner Mary, and the interpreter was Shepstone, who, forty years later, became the famous would-be Boer-Extinguisher, Sir Theophilus.

Major Charters' instructions were to occupy the Bay of Natal, but not to annex any territory* (in order not to offend Downing Street); to seize all arms and war-like stores; to disarm, and, if necessary, apprehend or expel any individuals whom he might consider dangerous; and to close the harbour against all trade not expressly sanctioned from Cape Town. Peaceful trading vessels sailing under flags of foreign nations were to be prevented from entering the Port. The landing of cargoes, even on the neighbouring coasts, and all commerce, unless licensed at Cape Town, were to be stopped; and, where necessary, force of arms was to be used by the British officer to carry out his instructions.

It seems hardly conceivable to us at the present day that such arbitrary proceedings and such a direct violation of the rights and privileges of other nations could be resorted to by British officials†.

* "In a proclamation the Governor announced that the occupation of Port Natal was temporary and purely military, not partaking in any degree of the nature of colonisation or annexation to the British dominions."—Theral.
† Written before the Jameson Raid, this sentence now requires qualification.
more especially when we consider that Sir George Napier was acting without the sanction of Lord Glenelg. There is, however, no doubt that these were the orders given to Major Charters. They were all publicly made known in a proclamation issued by the Governor.

On the 4th of December, the Major landed at Durban without opposition, and proclaimed martial law in the town and for two miles inland. Three guns were landed and mounted in commanding positions, and while an encampment for the troops was being constructed, a message was sent up country to warn the Emigrants against undertaking any expedition against the Zulus. But the Burgher army under Pretorius was already well on its way towards Zululand when the messengers reached the nearest Africander laager. Sarel Cilliers says that when he was returning from Zululand with the commando under Pretorius, they were startled, after their last fight with the Zulus near New Year's Spruit on 2nd January, "by a Proclamation which the British Government sent us, in which we were threatened that, should we go into Dingaan's country, armed help would be given to Dingaan against us."

It is not difficult to understand that the simple farmer warriors felt incensed and bitter against England. They had left the British dominions in South Africa, and, at great sacrifice, settled in a land where England had no authority and could claim none—a country which the British Government had refused to annex, and expressly declared to be outside its rule and its responsibilities. Here, without provocation on their
part, they had been cruelly attacked by a ruthless and barbaric foe; their beloved leader and all with him treacherously murdered; their women and children and their old men—the helpless and defenceless—brutally massacred. For an entire year they had carried on a war of self-defence against a powerful savage nation. Many of them shoeless and in threadbare clothes; others famishing with hunger: overwhelmed by disaster, out-numbered by the enemy, maligned and slandered in Europe; this handful of African pioneers had persevered in their heroic struggle for independence. They had bravely defended their surviving women and children while Dingaan hurled his countless battalions of savage warriors, and the British Governor his inhuman proclamations, on their sorrow-stricken laagers. Even their countrymen in the old Colony had been forbidden by the authorities to come to their assistance. When their supplies of ammunition had run short—when fell disease had attacked them in their camps—it was again the British Government which had interfered and prevented succour being brought to them by those who sympathised with them in the South. And, after having endured unheard-of privations and sufferings; after having dauntlessly persevered in what at one time seemed a hopeless struggle; when the day of victory was at last dawning on their standard, and the savage foe was receiving some slight castigation for the enormities and atrocities which his regiments had committed:—again British interference and a British proclamation. “Maar onze groote God zeggen wij toen dank,” exclaims Cilliers. “De slag
was geloerd." ("But we thanked our Lord God. The battle had been fought.")

When Major Charters landed at Durban, and during the time that the campaign in Zululand was in progress, the main encampments of the Emigrants were on the Upper Umgeni. The township of Pietermaritzburg had not yet been formally established, but there were several laagers where the capital of Natal now is. A good many small buildings had already been erected, and the place was known as Pieter Mauritsburg, in memory of Pieter Maurits Retief, the fallen leader. There were also encampments of the Emigrants on the Bay of Natal and on the Umlaas River. The Volksraad then consisted of twenty-four members, and met every three months. All appointments were made by this assembly, which, therefore, acted not only as a legislative but also as an executive body. The members of the Volksraad were chosen every year by the people.

Immediately after the return of the commando under Pretorius, the Volksraad instructed Carel Landman to proceed to the Bay and request Major Charters to give up the ammunition and stores which the English officer had seized. The latter declared himself willing to accede to the request on condition of the leaders of the Emigrants agreeing to bind themselves only to use the arms and ammunition in self-defence, and not again to cross the Tugela into Zululand—in other words, not to follow up the victory they had gained over Dingaan. After due consideration, the Emigrant leaders decided not to agree to these conditions. They stated that they were a free people; that they had a perfect right
to carry on war against the Zulus; that the ammunition was their lawful property, and ought to be given up unconditionally. Major Charters, however, took a different view of the matter, and retained the stores and ammunition.

The British troops had now constructed an encampment of huts enclosed by stockades and earthworks. This camp was called Fort Victoria. The three guns, mounted on sandhills, commanded all the approaches to the spot. A large stone building near the Point was converted into a magazine and store-room. When all these arrangements had been completed, Major Charters returned overland to Cape Town, leaving Captain Jervis, of the 72nd Highlanders, in command. Meanwhile Governor Napier was pressing the Home authorities for their sanction to the seizure and annexation of all Natal; but Lord Glenelg persistently refused.

A Farmer being charged with assault, Captain Jervis summoned him to appear and stand his trial. This summons was issued under the provisions of that strange enactment, the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Bill. The Farmer refused to appear, stating that he was a subject of an independent State, and responsible for his actions only to the Landdrost holding a commission from the Volksraad. Captain Jervis, canny Scot as he was, now asked for further instructions from the Governor, who thought it unwise to proceed further in the matter. "Thus," says Theal, "began and ended the attempt to exercise judicial authority over the emigrants at Natal, for in no other instance was the slightest effort made to interfere with their
civil government. In the absence of instructions from the Secretary of State, which were repeatedly solicited, but in vain, the Governor could do nothing more than inform them on every opportunity that they were still regarded as British subjects, and officially ignore their Volksraad and courts of law, while all the time they were acting as an independent people."

In January, 1839, the Volksraad took steps for the establishment of a township at Durban. A resolution to the same effect had already been passed by the English settlers on the Bay, in 1835. Now streets were laid out and the limits of the town were fixed. The village of Weenen was built at a later date. In New Townships, March, 1839, Pietermaritzburg was established as a township, the old name of Pieter Mauritsburg being changed in order to do honour to the memory of Gerrit Maritz as well as that of Retief. This town was made the capital of the settlement, and here the Volksraad now held its meetings. But the great majority of the Emigrants still lived in laagers and camps scattered along the Tugela, Klip River, Bushman's River, and Umgeni. The country had so far been too unsettled to permit of the occupation of many farms. The few that were established were near some of the great laagers. There was much poverty among the people, and the closing of the Port by the English had not improved matters in this respect. Major Charters in travelling overland to Cape Town, passed through the districts where many of the encampments were, and he has left us a picture of the condition in which he found the inhabitants.
Evidence of Major Charters.

"A few of them were tolerably comfortable, but, generally speaking, there existed every indication of squalid poverty and wretchedness; and it was deplorable to see many families who, a short time previously, had been living in ease and comfort in the Colony, now reduced to poverty and misery. They bore up against these calamities with wonderful firmness, however, and, with very few exceptions, showed no inclination to return. They considered themselves as unjustly and hardly treated by the Colonial Government while under its jurisdiction, and all they now desired from it was to leave them to their own resources, and not molest them again.

"This spirit of dislike to the English sway was remarkably dominant amongst the women. Most of these, who formerly had lived in affluence, but were now in comparative want and subject to all the inconveniences accompanying the insecure state in which they were existing, having lost, moreover, their husbands and brothers by the savages, still rejected with scorn the idea of returning to the Colony. If any of the men began to droop, or lose courage, they urged them on to fresh exertions and kept alive the spirit of resistance within them." *

Captain Jervis, who was left in charge of the troops by Major Charters, also seems to have been favourably disposed towards the Emigrants, and did his best, in the beginning of 1839, to make Dingaan agree to peace. He sent a messenger to the Zulu King,

* Major Charters' report, as quoted in Norris Newman's "With the Boers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, in 1880-1."
inviting him to delegate some of his chiefs with authorisation to discuss terms and conditions. The indunas soon made their appearance in Natal, bringing with them over three hundred horses. These animals had been taken from the Emigrants during the previous year; and were now returned by Dingaan, doubtless by way of showing his sincerity.

The Zulu delegates, after meeting Pretorius and other Emigrant leaders in the presence of Captain Jervis near the English fort, returned to Zululand in order to convey to their Chief the conditions under which the Farmers would agree to peace. These were:

1. Confirmation by Dingaan of cession of territory made to Retief.
2. Restoration as far as possible of all cattle, sheep, horses, guns, and other property taken from the Emigrants, and, where this was impossible, indemnity for losses.
3. No Zulus in future to cross the Tugela into Natal, and no white Emigrants to cross the same river into Zululand, and parties so transgressing to be shot.

Dingaan's answer was forwarded to Captain Jervis at the Bay, and was to the effect that the other property belonging to the Emigrants would be given back to them if they would send for it. Commandant Badenhorst, on receiving intelligence of this message from Captain Jervis, had it taken on to Pietermaritzburg, where the Volksraad at once issued instructions to Commandant-General Pretorius, who, with a commando of three hundred and thirty burghers, formed a laager at the junction of the Mool with the Tugela, and then sent William Cowie, J. A. van Niekerk,
and J. P. Roscher to interview Dingaan and receive from him the property of the Emigrants. Not far removed from the site of Umkungunhlovu the commission came to Dingaan's new head kraal. Surrounded by large numbers of his warriors and attended by his chief indunas, he received the messengers of Pretorius, with whom he pretended to be very desirous of concluding peace. Being kept well informed of the movements of the Emigrant leader by his own scouts, fearing the destruction of his new kraal, and remembering that already nearly ten thousand of his warriors had fallen during a year's hostilities with the white strangers, he took care to send to the laager some 300 cattle, 400 sheep, 52 muskets, and 43 saddles. He at the same time expressed to the commissioners his regret at large numbers of the captured cattle and sheep having died, and many of the guns having been lost. Pretorius and the Farmers with him were not deceived. They understood that the savage Chief was temporising and quietly preparing to resume hostilities at a more favourable moment. They resolved to be more on their guard than ever against that treachery on the part of Dingaan of which they had already had such terrible experience. Zulu indunas of high rank were now expected at the laager, Dingaan having stated that he would send these chiefs to arrange with Pretorius as to the proposed treaty of peace. At the appointed time (13th May, 1839), two minor chiefs only made their appearance. They were received, however, as delegates, declared that they were authorised by the King to accept the
IN SOUTH AFRICA

conditions of peace already laid down, and, promising that chiefs of higher rank should come to confirm their signatures, affixed crosses to the document placed before them. Pretorius told them what the estimate was as to the number of cattle still due as indemnity, and agreed to accept ivory in part payment.

The indunas who should have ratified the treaty did not arrive. But at the end of June two other delegates reached Pietermaritzburg. They stated that they came from Dingaan, and that they were authorised to confirm the treaty. They brought neither cattle nor any of the other property of the Emigrants with them. Nor did they bring even a part of the promised indemnity in ivory. Moreover, they were not chiefs at all. It had now become more than evident that Dingaan, while pretending to be anxious for peace, was treacherously preparing for further fighting. The leaders of the Emigrants therefore sent word to the Zulu King that, unless the indunas authorised by him to agree to the terms of peace arrived within twelve days, no more delegates would be received and Pretorius would march into Zululand to resume the campaign. The only effect produced by this peremptory message was the arrival at Maritzburg—at different times—of so-called delegates from Dingaan, who were in reality spies.*

* "On several occasions afterwards messengers arrived, but they did nothing else than deliver compliments, make promises, and apologies for mistakes, until it became evident that Dingaan's only object was to ascertain whether the farmers kept in larger or were dispersing over the country." TREAR: "History of South Africa," vol. iv. p. 158.
The history of the interruption of these negotiations through Dingaan's treachery and double-dealing is important as bearing on the shooting of the spies Tambusa and Combezana at a later date. The Voortrekkers still living agree in stating that Dingaan was distinctly warned through his messengers that should he send any more pseudo-delegates, they would be dealt with as spies—and shot.

Meanwhile, Pretorius had been instructed by the Volksraad to ask Captain Jervis for the ammunition and stores which Major Charters had seized in the previous year. The British officer, however, did not see his way to agreeing to this request unless Pretorius would promise that neither the arms nor the ammunition should be used in aggressive warfare against the Zulus; and, of course, this promise could not be given.

The long continued occupation of the Bay of Natal was causing considerable uneasiness to the Volksraad and Executive of the Emigrants. Although Major Charters and Captain Jervis had made themselves personally very popular with all who had come in contact with them, and although the most friendly relations existed between the British officers and the Afrikaner leaders, the latter could not be indifferent to the gravity of a situation which, at any moment, might become more strained and even critical. Rumours found their way to the Emigrant encampments and to Pietermaritzburg, that the Cape Town Government intended shortly to land large numbers of Scotch and English Colonists in the country—in order to bring
about a peaceful incorporation with the British Empire. To be prepared for any forward movement that might be intended, a burgher guard of forty or fifty men was permanently stationed near Captain Jervis' encampment; and Pretorius wrote a despatch to the English officer, pointing out to him the serious consequences which such a step as the rumoured immigration scheme would bring about. On the 11th November the Volksraad issued a proclamation in the following terms:

"Should foreign emigrants land in the Bay of Natal without having previously obtained the Volksraad's consent, such emigrants will be regarded as enemies of the State. In case the British Colonists are landed under the protection of such a strong military force as to make resistance impossible, then we shall retreat to the woods, mountains, and ravines, which surround the Bay on all sides, and there—in separate small parties, each one acting on his own responsibility—follow the example of the oppressed Spaniards, and, actuated by the same principles as the adherents of Don Carlos, neither ask for nor give quarter until we have recovered what is lawfully ours."

But Cape Town and Sir George Napier were not yet to have their way. Under date of 30th April, 1839, there had been sent from Downing Street a despatch, in which the Earl of Normandy, Lord Glenelg's successor at the Colonial Office, informed the Governor that there was to be no attempt at further extension of the British Empire in South Africa. Captain Jervis, therefore, received orders to return to the Cape with
his expedition. The arms, ammunition, and stores which had been seized were now given up to Pretorius unconditionally, and, on 24th December, the gallant Captain and his soldiers set sail from Natal, leaving the harbour and the new settlement once more free. On the 25th, the Emigrants hoisted their flag over the fort which Captain Jervis had built, and proclaimed the re-establishment of the Government of the South African Association of Port Natal at the Bay. Salutes of artillery were fired from the cannons which had done service against the Zulus on the Bushman's River, and there were public rejoicings at Durban and at Pieter- maritzburg.
CHAPTER XXII

THE CONQUEST OF ZULULAND

WENEN AVENGED


While the English expeditionary force had been stationed on the Bay, the closing of the harbour had interfered considerably with trade in the new settlement. The cutting off of their supplies of provisions led to great distress and want in several of the Emigrant encampments. To add to their sufferings, measles broke out among the children, assumed a very virulent type, and carried off large numbers. Of the adults, also, many were ill with fever, and there was much poverty. Even the best families did not escape the effect of the great losses which they had sustained in the war against the Zulus, and of the heartless
aggression of the British officials at Cape Town. To mention only one instance among many: Anna Steene-
camp—a cousin of the murdered Commandant-General Retief—while tending her sick children and grand-
children, had to endure the heat by day and the cold by night without other shelter than that afforded by
a waggon tent, and had barely enough food to keep herself alive. Stores for the sick and medical comforts
had been sent to the settlement by sympathising friends in the Cape Colony; but the vessel containing these
hospital necessaries was refused admission to the harbour of Natal by the agents of the British Govern-
ment.*

The widows and orphans of those who had fallen
would now have to be provided for out of the indemnity
which Dingaan had bound himself to pay. But months
passed, and neither this nor the large number of cattle
which the Zulus had captured, and which their Chief
had also agreed to return to the Emigrants, was forth-
coming. Zulu spies had been seen in the neighbour-
hood of many of the Emigrant encampments, and it
became more evident every day that, while the settlers
were suffering from poverty and sickness, their powerful
enemy was preparing for another onslaught. Realising
that their very existence as a nation was again at
stake, and believing that the surest method of defence
lies in attack, Pretorius and the Volksraad at once
made preparations for invading Zululand before
Dingaan's indunas again brought their regiments

* Stuart: "Hollandsche Afrikanen"; and "Zuid Afrikan" (Cape
Town).
south of the Tugela. Messengers were therefore sent to the King's kraal on the White Umveloosi River to inform Dingaan and his councillors that, as they had not carried out the stipulations of the treaty to which they had bound themselves, as they were sending spies into Natal, and as they were known to be preparing for war while pretending to desire peace, the Volksraad refused to negotiate with them any longer, and that Pretorius would lead another commando against them, to punish them for their treachery and for the atrocities which they had committed, and to exact from them the indemnity that was due to the Emigrants.

Meanwhile, important events were transpiring in Zululand. Umpanda or Panda was Dingaan's elder brother, who should, by right, have ruled the country after the death of Chaka, but was too effeminate, too fond of ease and luxury, to assert his claims to dominion. He had taken part in Chaka's ill-fated expedition against the Sosangaan Kaffirs of Delagoa Bay. When he returned with the remnants of the army, he found his elder brother slain and the throne of Zululand usurped by the assassin. Retiring to a kraal situated between the White and Black Umveloosi rivers, he entirely withdrew himself from all interference with the affairs of State or of the army, and, surrounded by boon companions and by women, spent his days and nights in debauchery and dissipation. This was, perhaps, as much diplomacy as inclination on Panda's part. Dingaan had, so far, encouraged him in dallying and toying with women. While many of the ablest councillors and bravest warriors, the men who
had helped Chaka to build up their country's power and greatness, were put to death by Dingaan, who feared them, Panda was spared. It was thought that he was without ambition, and never likely to exchange the life of licentious indulgence which he was leading for that of either the military chieftain or the statesman. During a time of murders and massacres innumerable, perpetrated by Dingaan and his councillors Tambusa and Salela, after the assassination of Chaka, when every chief suspected of being dangerous to the new ruler was slain, the elder son of Sensengakona was safe amongst his concubines, because the usurper supposed him to be perfectly harmless and without influence in that warlike land. But, as year after year went by, and Dingaan's iniquitous atrocities went on increasing, numbers of the disaffected in Zululand, and among them some indunas of high rank who still regretted the fall of Chaka, found their way stealthily and in secret—so as not to arouse Dingaan's suspicions—to Panda's kraal, north of the White Umveloosi, and began to arrange plans to bring about a revolution. Among the women at Panda's stad were many of the daughters and widows of adherents of Chaka—chiefs who had been put to death by order of Dingaan. These women became active conspirators; and, soon, all the south of Zululand was ready to rise in arms against the tyrant. The indunas Nongalaza, Sotobe (formerly Chaka's ambassador to Cape Town), and Sapusa were, with Panda and three or four other chiefs, the principal plotters. Their plans were to bring about the fall of Dingaan by forming an alliance.
with the Emigrants under Pretorius. But, before they could complete their deliberations and carry out their project, Dingaan, whose suspicions had been aroused, and whose spies had not been idle, fell upon Sapusu's kraal with four regiments. The tide of victory was, however, turning against the tyrant. In the battle that ensued Dingaan lost a very large number of his best men. According to Panda's statement,* half of Dingaan's fighting force were slain. Hurrying up two more regiments to the scene of the engagement, the Zulu King at the same time sent messengers to order his brother to come to his assistance. But Panda saw the trap, and refused to move. All the south of Zululand was now in revolt against the usurper King, who, concentrating his army north of the Black Umveloosi, and taking with him all his women and cattle, sent Salela to Panda's head kraal to attempt to gain over some of the minor chiefs and their followers. This mission also failed, and Panda with Nongalaza, Sotobe, Sapusu, and other indunas, collecting all their adherents, moved towards the Tugela. They then sent messengers to the Landdrost of Durban, asking for the help and alliance of the Emigrants. On the 14th September these ambassadors reached the Bay, and, soon after, Panda and the other chiefs, crossing the Tugela, had an interview with Commandant Hans de Lange, who was guarding the frontier with a small patrol of burghers. Suspicious of further treachery on the part

*Report of interview between members of Volksraad and Panda, 15th October, 1889. Hofstede: "Geschiedenis van den Oranje Vrijstaat."
of the Zulus, the Emigrant leaders were at first disinclined to entertain Panda's offers of alliance, and disregarded his request for protection against his brother. As, however, large numbers of Zulus, with their women and cattle, continued to cross to the southern banks of the Tugela, and as Panda and his indunas persisted in their efforts to obtain assistance from the burghers, it became evident that the Zulu nation was now divided into two hostile camps, and that the downfall of Dingaan was at hand. On the 15th October, 1839, Panda was admitted to an interview with the members of the Volksraad at Pietermaritzburg, where it was agreed that he should be acknowledged as King of the Zulus, that he should for the present be allowed to remain in the country between the Tugela and Umvoti, but should, with his followers, remove to Zululand after the war was concluded, and should then assume the rulership of that country as a vassal of the Republic. Landdrost F. Roos with the Heemraad Servaes van Breda, Commandant Fourie, Fieldcornet Jan Meyer, Dr. Krause, and Messrs. Delegorgue,* Morwood, and G. Kemp were deputed by the Raad to proclaim Panda's accession to the chieftainship of the emigrant Zulus. This was done on 27th October. Surrounded by his chief indunas and councillors, Panda promised to be the faithful vassal and ally of the white Emigrants, not to engage in hostilities with any neighbouring tribes without the

*Adulphe Delegorgue, author of "Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe, notamment dans le territoire de Natal, etc., exécuté durant les années 1838—1844."
Volksraad’s consent, and always to spare the lives of women and children in war.*

An artillery salute was fired when the Volksraad’s proclamation had been read, and, on the termination of the ceremony, Panda sent a present of one hundred and one cattle to the members of the commission, for distribution among the families who had suffered losses from Zulu depredations in the war with Dingaan.

In the months of November and December, 1839, Pretorius and his Commandants were engaged in active preparations for the coming campaign. A commando of two hundred and sixty-five men was lagered on the Tugela. This was joined in January, 1840, by some seventy burghers from the country to the west of the mountains (now the Orange Free State). These men were under Commandant Andries Spies, and came as volunteers to take part in the campaign. Further reinforcements raised the total number of burghers under Pretorius to about four hundred. Panda’s fighting forces, under command of the Zulu indunas Nongalaza and Sapusa, numbered altogether between four and six thousand. A native contingent under the minor chiefs Matawaan and Joob—some six hundred strong—also joined the expedition. Dingaan’s available forces still amounted to ten thousand men. On January 4th, 1840, the Volksraad instructed Pretorius to march into Zululand, and demand from Dingaan the forty thousand

cattle which he had agreed to pay and failed to deliver. The Commandant-General's instructions were contained in a written document consisting of twenty-two articles, which had been drawn up for his guidance in the conduct of hostilities. These instructions bear evidence that the Emigrants had resolved to carry on with humanity the war which had been forced upon them, and that, notwithstanding the great provocation which they had received when their leader and his companions were treacherously murdered and their women and children cruelly massacred, they were guided by loftier and nobler motives than the thirst for revenge. A point on which great stress was laid was that the chief officers of the native allies should take their orders from Pretorius and his Commandants, who were to see that no harm befell any women and children or unarmed men on the side of the enemy. The Zulu auxiliary forces were to be prevented from committing any excesses, and compelled to conform to civilised methods of warfare by sparing the helpless and the weak.

On the 14th January all was in readiness for the commencement of the campaign. While Nongalaza was sending scouts to the northern side of the Tugela, to penetrate Zululand in all directions and to bring back reports as to the movements of the enemy, Pretorius, with his commando, marched along the south side of the Upper Tugela, in the direction of the modern village of Colenso, to the spot from where the campaign of 1838 had been commenced and Zululand entered; for the country to the north of the
Upper Tugela was not then part of the settlement of Natal—it was included in the land still under the sway of Dingaan. The line of march from the Upper Tugela was the same as in the first campaign; but it was a double line, for, parallel with the commando under Pretorius, moved the army of Nongalaza's Zulus—between four and six thousand strong. While Panda's followers were thus kept some distance from the fighting force of the Emigrants, the Chief himself remained with Pretorius, whose officers retained complete control of the Zulu allies, and who was in reality the Commander-in-Chief of both armies. Every precaution was thus taken to guard against treachery; for their previous experience had taught the Emigrants that precautions were necessary, and the good faith of Panda and his adherents had yet to be proved.

Shortly after the campaign had commenced, two Zulus suddenly made their appearance one day at the encampment of the Emigrants, and announced themselves as emissaries of Dingaan. The one was evidently an induna of high rank, and proved to be the commander Tambusa, one of Dingaan's chief counsellors. The other was a warrior named Combezana. They were immediately arrested as spies. Previous ambassadors of Dingaan had shown themselves to be spies. On a former occasion the Chief had been warned that no more embassies would be received, and that no further negotiations could be entered into with him and his counsellors,—accomplices in the murder of Retief and the women and children, and likewise culpable through breaking faith with
Pretorius in not carrying out the provisions of the treaty to which they had agreed in May, 1839. Now Tambusa himself, the chief of these counsellors, had come as an ambassador. When arrested and accused of being a spy, he unhesitatingly admitted that such was the case, and that he and Combezana had instructions from Dingaan to obtain all possible information as to the preparations and dispositions of the Emigrants for the coming campaign.

While the columns were moving forward, Pretorius took care to protect his men against being surprised by the enemy. A fixed laager was made every day, and garrisoned by a small detachment. Each laager was constructed of improvised earthworks protected by huge hedges of the thorny branches of the acacia tree, behind which the defenders could defy a strong Zulu force. On this entrenchment the commando could fall back in case of a check, or even in the event of a reverse. The column did not move forward at the same rate of speed as in the first campaign. The banks of the Upper Tugela were left on 21st January, and the Buffalo River was not crossed before 29th January. There was considerable difficulty in getting the waggons across this stream, for heavy rains had fallen in the mountains, and the current of the swollen river was strong in some parts of the drift or ford, while in others the water was so deep that the oxen had to swim. On the evening of 29th January the camp was formed on the banks of the Bloe River, at the spot where, on the 16th December, 1838, Dingaan’s forces had been defeated.
Then the commando proceeded down the valley of the White Umveloosi to Dingaan's new head kraal near to Umkungunhlwvu. This was reached on 31st January, and found deserted by the enemy.

Nongalaza's scouts had not been idle. Reports were now coming in from the country to the north of the Black Umveloosi as to the whereabouts of Dingaan's fighting force. Panda's general was distinguishing himself as a great military leader. The Zulus under his command had several skirmishes with the enemy, and took several prisoners. By order of Pretorius, the lives of these prisoners were spared, and they were set at liberty. On 30th January, a great battle was fought between the regiments under Nongalaza and a superior force of Dingaan's men under the induna Salela. Shortly after the engagement had commenced, one of Dingaan's regiments deserted and joined Nongalaza. The Black and White Shields, the two most famous of Dingaan's cohorts, stood their ground, and were almost annihilated. Salela himself and many other chiefs were slain, and Panda's army gained a great victory, although they also had lost heavily.

On the 31st of January, Pretorius had his head quarters at Dingaan's new kraal, not far from Umkungunhlwvu—the place where Retief and his followers had been murdered. Tambusa, one of the murderers, was still under arrest as a spy, and was now brought to trial before the Krygsraad or Court Martial. He and Combesana were both condemned to death as spies, and Tambusa was also found guilty, on the evidence of Panda and other Zulu leaders, of having
instigated Dingaan to commit the murder and to order the massacres on the Bushman’s River. After Tambusa had confessed that the evidence brought against him was true, both were shot. They met their fate with all the stoicism and the fortitude of Zulu warriors. When admonished to pray to God for forgiveness before the death sentence was executed, Tambusa answered that he had but one master—Dingaan—and that it was his duty to remain faithful to his own Chief to the last. “The Great Chief,” he said, “before whom the white men say I shall have to appear hereafter, cannot find fault with me for this.”

In his “Lectures on the Emigrant Farmers,” Cloete says that this campaign against the Zulus was conducted with as much skill and bravery as humanity, that the burghers showed mercy to the women and children and to all non-combatants, and that the only stain on their cause and their fame was the execution of Tambusa and Combezana, who should have been regarded as ambassadors of Dingaan. All English historians of South African events who deal with the matter take the same view. Even Theal, one of the few impartial British writers, says (vol iv. p 163): “This act of Mr. Pretorius—for the chief blame must rest upon him—was a great mistake as well as a great crime. It gave those who were jealous of his influence an opportunity to attack him, which they at once availed themselves of. In the Volksraad he was accused of having exceeded the authority entrusted to him by creating a tribunal with power of life and death. His partisans, however, were so strong that, after a time, the charge was allowed to drop.”
The impartial reader must form his own opinion. The facts are before him. To claim the sanctity of an ambassador for a treacherous murderer and a spy is absurd. Tambusa and Combezana had been arrested as spies at a time which was a turning point in the career of the Emigrants in Natal, and after Dingaan had been warned that no more delegates would be received. Moreover, Tambusa had himself admitted that he came as a spy. The mere handful of white men constituting the entire fighting force of the Voortrekkers were threatened by a powerful and treacherous enemy bent on their destruction, and had, at the same time, to be on their guard against an army of Zulu allies, who, on the least sign of weakness, might be expected to go over in large numbers to the foe. The greatest precautions, the most constant watchfulness, the most determined and undaunted firmness had, under these circumstances, to be exercised by the leader of the expedition to ensure its success. As the commando had advanced into the heart of Zululand, more and more evidence had accumulated to show that Dingaan was bent on war, that his pretended overtures for peace were a farce. All the conditions to which he had agreed in the treaty of 13th May were not only evaded, but entirely ignored by this Chief, from whose treachery and duplicity the Emigrants had already suffered so much. When the White Umveloosi—the scene of the cruel murder of Retief and his companions—was reached, it had further become clear to Pretorius that Tambusa was not only a spy, but also one of the chief instigators and planners of that