

The drivers of policy changes and the implication for social protection policy change in Zimbabwe

by

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Declaration 1: Originality

I, Edson Mugore, declare that this thesis, which I hereby submit for a PhD in Rural Development at the University of Pretoria, is my own work. I have not previously submitted it for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

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Declaration 2: Publications

The following manuscripts presented in this paper have been submitted for publication in journals:

Publication 1- Chapter 4 of this thesis

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Abstract

Despite global agreement on the importance of social protection in development programmes, Zimbabwe has not embarked on social protection reform, preserving several colonial-era tools. Consequently, social protection design in Zimbabwe has not kept pace with international developments. Cash transfers remain primarily donor-funded. Social protection policy change remains conservative while little is known about how the government selects and adopts context-specific policy instruments. The overall objective of this study was to identify drivers of policy change and their implication for social protection policy changes in Zimbabwe. The first sub-objective investigated the drivers of policy change in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017. The kaleidoscope model for policy change methodology was adopted to explore how the government identified social protection policies, selected policy instruments and what influenced the policy choice. The second sub-objective sought to establish how policy actors' levels of knowledge, attitudes and perceptions affected the policy process over this period. The Chi-square and Fisher's exact tests tested the statistical significance of the association between the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of policy options of veto players and champions. The third objective sought to establish how policymakers' perceptions of threats and coping appraisals of beneficiaries influenced policy instruments selection. A theoretical framework that borrowed from the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Protective Action Decision Model (PADM was used to address this sub-objective.

International actors used several strategies and significantly drove social protection policy change and even dictate policy preferences in Zimbabwe. This fuelled mistrust among policy actors. Recognised relevant problems created momentum for international and local advocates to initiate discussions about these policies. Notwithstanding a shared understanding in the agenda-setting phase of policy change, diverse stakeholders and context-specific concerns developed throughout the policy cycle design, adoption, implementation and evaluation stages influencing policy change. Power disparities led to token consultation and an appearance of consensus during the agenda-setting and design stages. Champions were knowledgeable about many social protection instruments. Despite this knowledge among champions divergent views are common with many fighting for social protection to align with their institutional mandates. However, veto players requested capacity development about the conditions under which cash

transfers were suitable, the pros and cons of conditional and unconditional cash transfers, exit strategies, handling beneficiary grievances, shock-responsive transfers and setting transfer values.

How social protection instruments are chosen, designed and implemented, as well as their outcomes is a negotiated settlement between divergent attributes among policy actors about social protection instruments. However, shared perceptions gave rise to the critical mass required for policy change. Although policy actors acknowledged cash transfers as a suitable mechanism to respond to covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, in-kind assistance remained the default instrument. Cash transfers represented a small proportion of social assistance initiatives. It is essential for policy actors to keep abreast of international developments regarding social protection best practices. However, policy change should not replicate international best practices, processes, systems without thoroughly considering and adapting instruments to local contexts.

While technocratic concerns about attributes such as evidence of intervention impact, affordability of broad-based social protection, and rights-based concerns about universal principles and standards (among others) are valid, the central role of policy actors' perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes in policy change processes has inadvertently been overlooked. A convergence of perceptions, knowledge, attitudes and attributes mentioned above is crucial for policy change to address food insecurity and poverty. Veto players perceive the evidence from evaluations commissioned by champions with suspicion. Trust is essential for genuine consensus-building and meaningful involvement in policy reform. This calls for the active engagement of veto players in research rather than being the research object. Jointly commissioned independent research could benefit both parties to create common ground regarding perceptions. Building capacity among young professionals, members of parliament, and senior professionals is required to address the knowledge gap among policy actors and to inform policy selection for effective policy dialogue. Knowledge can build positive shared perceptions and change attitudes. The message is as important as the messenger is when it comes to attitudes. Therefore, there is a need to identify knowledgeable local champions to lead policy change, including initiating joint research to inform the policy change process and negotiating instrument selection.

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List of acronyms

АМТО	Assisted Medical Treatment Orders
AU	Africa Union
AU/NEPAD	African Union New Partnership for Africa's Development
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
CA	Commission for Africa
CAAP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
ССТ	Conditional Cash Transfers
CIT	Cash in Transit
COS	Civil Society Organisation
CPC	Child Protection committee
CPF	Child Protection Fund
СРО	Central Processing Office
СРО	Central Programme Office
CPS	Central Processing Office
CWFS	Committee on World Food Security
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSS	Department for Social Services

DSS	District Social Services
DSSO	District Social Services Officer
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EUI	European University Institute
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FCDO	Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office
FDMP	Food Deficit Mitigation Programme
FNC	Food and Nutrition Council
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HLPE	High Level Panel on Experts on Food Security
HSCT	Harmonised Social Cash Transfers
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IFD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
LEAP	Livelihood against Poverty- Ghana
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change

MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERP	Millennium Economic Recovery Programme
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MoHCW	Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
MoLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Services
NAP	National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children
NASSA	National Social Security Authority
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa Development
NERP	National Economic Revival Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPS	National Pension Scheme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OVC &Y	Orphans Vulnerable Children and Youth
PAAP	Poverty Alleviation Action Programme
PADM	Protective Action Decision Model
PMT	Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
PSNP	Productive Safety Net-Ethiopia
RBA	United Nations Regional Bureau for Africa
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
RHVP	Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme

RNFU	Rhodesia National Farmer Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SDA	Social Dimension of Adjustment
SDF	Social Development Fund
SPF	Social Development Fund
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
TFN	Tripartite Negotiating Forum
UCCT	Unconditional cash transfer
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
WCIS	Workers Compensation Insurance Scheme
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZIMCORD	Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe Statistical Agency

ZimVAC

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Historically social protection policies were considered unsuitable for low-income countries (Chitambira, 2010; Merrien, 2013). Social protection is a broad term that includes social security, social assistance, labour market policies and social care. Social protection refers to a set of policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty, vulnerability and inequality. Social protection are programmes that care for those in society who are unable to fend for themselves, such as the impoverished, disabled, jobless children and women during maternity leave (Kumitz, 2013). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) lay the foundation for the provision of social protection. The World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, also committed governments to ensuring that all people receive social and economic protection through the development and implementation of effective policies in child-rearing, disability, employment, health and maternity and old age and widowhood. In Africa, the Livingstone and Windhoek Declarations on social protection contains commitments to improve social protection implementation through specific social protection programmes and targets. (African Union Commission (AUC), 2014). The Livingstone Conference 2006, placed emphasis on the need for urgent responses to the increasing vulnerabilities of people to chronic and new crises in Africa. The protocol recognised that the promotion of an approach that links employment policies and poverty alleviation is critical to a comprehensive social development agenda (Taylor, 2009).

The intersections between social protection and food security have significant economic repercussions. There is growing consensus in the international development debates that social protection is critical to address food insecurity (HLPE, 2012) social, economic and political development of countries. This potential for positive links between the two has long been recognised, and has prompted some optimistic assertions, including one from FAO (2002).

Social protection contributes to the livelihood of food insecure and vulnerable households by enabling them to buy inputs and hire labour when necessary for production (Regional Bureau for Africa, 2011). It focuses on the way individuals or households resilience to adverse events can strengthened. However this relations is not obvious and straight forward. There are opportunities for synergies and complementarities that improve the livelihoods of low-income rural households because social protection and livelihood initiatives such as smallholder agricultural frequently target the same households and share the same geographic area (Farrington et al, 2004). By raising investments in agricultural assets, input utilisation, and farm output, transferring family labour from agricultural wage labour to on-farm labour, and increasing the quantity and quality of food produced at home, cash transfers and public works programmes can have a direct impact on livelihoods (Farrington, Harvey&Slater, 2005). The linkages between social protection and livelihoods depend on the type of instrument used, the household member receiving the transfer, socio-economic status, livelihood activities and contextual factors such as land tenure arrangements, institutional capacities, access to markets, culture and agro-climate. Social protection initiatives can also have an indirect effect on livelihoods by reducing risk-coping techniques that deplete household agriculture resources (e.g. selling ploughs or fishing equipment to buy food). Cash transfers and public works interventions have a strong multiplier effect on local economies (Carter et al., 2019). This happens when beneficiary households spend the transfers on goods and services that are mostly purchased or produced by non-beneficiary households. Transfers of money and goods can also build social capital, enhance unofficial safety nets, and promote risk-sharing arrangements.

Livelihoods interventions in the agricultural sector such as input subsidies and technology transfers can also contribute to social protection schemes. Specifically, smallholder agricultural interventions can reduce household vulnerability and risks as measured by indicators of livelihood security. Social protections interventions that improve access to microcredit, infrastructure, irrigation, extension and input technology can lead to improvements in household consumption, food security, risk taking and the accumulation of durable assets. When these programmes are deliberately targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable households, they become social protection measures in and of themselves. The realization that a significant portion of the world's poor are either forced to alternate between periods of engagement and non-engagement because of old age, illness, disability, or having a large number of dependents, or (a) are chronically unable to participate in the productive economy, is the driving force behind the increase in interest in SP. There is a perception that this first category should be given formal transfers, but these are seen almost universally as 'welfarist' and 'unproductive', and to do so would place additional long-term demands on recurrent budgets. On the other hand, livelihood protection and promotion' are used at times as measures intended to provide social protection, and measures intended to promote pro-poor growth. To achieve food security, it is crucial to address the overlapping challenges of malnutrition, the productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, the resilience of food systems and the sustainable use of biodiversity and genetic resources that can only be addressed by integrated strategy (FAO, 2017). Because of this, the Committee on World Food Security has urged Member States to design and put in place or strengthen comprehensive, nationally owned, context-sensitive social protection systems for food security and nutrition (Committee on World Food Security, 2012). Social protection programmes, when adequately conceived and managed, can address the causes of food insecurity, such as food price inflation, a lack of access to inputs and insufficient access to food (HLPE, 2012). Governments and organisations approach food security as well as social protection from different perspectives. While social protection is part of a comprehensive strategy for food security, it is necessary that the components of social protection be combined with other interventions in the social sectors such as education, health, food security and agriculture and trade policy (HLPE, 2012).

Policy-makers have a critical role in establishing the institutional framework through which public policy and interventions are implemented (Vignola *et al.*, 2009). Policymakers' perceptions and attitudes influence social protection policy choices (McCord, 2010). For example, while many countries include social protection as one of the important instruments to achieve the reduction of poverty and hunger and address social inequities, cash transfers are often not selected and implemented because of a lack of a shared understanding of the efficacy of such instruments (Midgley, 2013; Piachaud, 2013).

Social protection is essential for food security and poverty alleviation and has implications for economic development as well as investment in public health and education.

Zimbabwe ratified the ICESCR convention in May of 1991. Regionally, the Southern African Development Community Code of Social Security (2007) also binds Zimbabwe to implement social protection. Zimbabwe has domesticated social protection in its policy and Acts of Parliament, although implementation has not kept pace with international developments in terms of estimated funding levels and combination of different policy instruments. The constitution of Zimbabwe recognises that "the state must take all practical measures, within the limits of the resources available to it, to provide social security and social care to those who are in need"(Zimbabwe Constitution, 2013(2)(30)p.25).

The Constitution also includes an inclusive Bill of Rights that underscores the provision of social protection (Sections 80 to 84). However, recent crises and structural challenges have eroded the quality and reach of social protection programmes in the country. While some countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia have consolidated their social protection portfolios and now support single flagship programmes, Zimbabwe has continued to implement multiple uncoordinated social protection programmes.

A few studies have sought to explain the drivers of social protection policy changes in Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2000; Skalness, 1995; Rukuni, 2006; Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). After taking over power through a military coup, in November 2017, President Mnangagwa's "New Dispensation" announced a commitment to address gross human rights abuses and address the country's economic collapse, demonstrating new government's level of openness to business and an appetite to implement pro-poor policies (Freeland *et al.*, 2019). However, poverty and food insecurity have continued to worsen (Dashwood, 2000), showing that these programmes and instruments have not been impactful. Integrating relatively new social protection instruments such as cash transfers into policy decisions and implementation is fundamental to addressing poverty and food insecurity (Barrientos, 2010; HLPE, 2012; Grosh *et al.*, 2008).

1.2 Statement of the problem

Amidst a widow of opportunity as pronounced in the National Development Strategy1 (NDS1) of the "New Dispensation" in Zimbabwe, it is essential to address barriers to policy reform to inform policies and programmes that seek to address food insecurity and other vulnerabilities in the country. However, the identification, design and adoption of appropriate social protection policy instruments for specific country contexts and vulnerabilities are a challenge in development work. While there is consensus that social protection is critical to address food insecurity (Committee on World Food Security, 2012; HLPE, 2012), policy change (the identification, design and funding of appropriate social protection instruments) to address food insecurity and other vulnerabilities remains a challenge for the government (Chinsinga, 2009; Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2015). Consequently, social protection is often operationalised through a limited set of donor cash or in-kind transfer programmes, which are usually targeted, based on income and often include conditionalities. While such programmes can be effective in some situations, their performance usually depends on the broader environment and complimentary economic and social policies. The influence of the international community (Dashwood, 2000; Skalness, 1995; Rukuni, 2006; Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020) and limited budgetary resources (Gandure, 2009) has often been cited as the explanations for possible constraints or drivers of social protection policy reform.

Yet some writers(Chinsinga, 2009;McCord, 2010; Niño-Zarazúa *et al.*, 2010; HLPE, 2012), have argued that perceptions of policy actors at times work against the selection and even funding of some social protection policy instruments (Chinsinga, 2009; Nigussa & Mberengwa, 2009; HLPE, 2012). However, perceptions, knowledge and attitudes about social protection are not universal and can be specific to different social assistance instruments and the existing contexts (McCord, 2010). In Zimbabwe, the political decision-making processes, perceptions, attitudes, levels of knowledge of policy actors and questions of how to examine them empirically and consider them in social protection policy reform remain unexplored. Therefore, this study explored the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors towards social assistance instruments to understand the constraints to and drivers of social protection policy reform in Zimbabwe.

Hitherto, no research has been carried out in Zimbabwe to understand political decision-making processes, policy actors' attitudes towards vulnerable and food-insecure people, their perceptions, levels of knowledge, and experience with different social protection instruments. Shared perceptions and attitudes among policy actors could be significant determinants of policy change in that they bring policy actors together and strengthen their policy advocacy (Weible & Sabatier, 2006). The lack of information on the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors calls for researchers to shift their focus from generating more evidence of the effectiveness of different social protection instruments to understanding policy actors' perceptions and attitudes of the causes of the problems. This study sought to establish the attitudes, levels of knowledge and perceptions of policy actors in Zimbabwe towards social protection instruments.

1.3 Research objectives

The overall objective of this study was to identify drivers of policy changes and their implication for social protection policy change (selection, design and implementation) in Zimbabwe after independence. The following specific objectives were investigated:

Sub-objective 1: To identify what has influenced social protection policy reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017.

Sub-objective 2: To determine the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policymakers (veto payers) and champions (sponsors and implementers) towards social assistance instruments in Zimbabwe.

Sub-objective 3: To determine how policy makers' perception of risk and beneficiary coping strategies influence their response strategies-the selection of social protection instruments for food insecurity and poverty in Zimbabwe.

1.4 Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is devoted to the introduction and background to the research problem, social protection as a mechanism for food security, statement of the

research problem, study objectives. Chapter 2 presents the introduction to the literature review relevant to the topic. Chapter 3 sets out the scene by presenting social protection in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 (sub-objective 1) presents the drivers of social protection policy change in Zimbabwe using Kaleidoscope model for food security change. The same chapter also offers a background narrative to the narratives and discussions in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5(sub-objective 2) presents the knowledge levels, perceptions, and attitudes of policy actors in Zimbabwe towards social assistance policy instruments to understand what shapes the social protection policy landscape. Chapter 6 (sub-objective 3) presents the reasons that underlie policymakers' decisions for (or against) the implementation of cash transfers using the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Protective Action Decision Model. Chapter 7 presents the summary, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

International development actors have to a large extend shaped the evolution of social protection in Africa. Social assistance can complement other policies that aim to reduce poverty, improve food security and manage risk and policies relating to health, education, financial services and the provision of utilities, roads, and infrastructure (Cook & Kaber, 2009;HLPE, 2012). Social protection initiatives institutionalise systems that ensure assistance for the very poor and protect the vulnerable against poverty and food insecurity and other livelihood risk. Three main factors that presumably could explain changes is social protection policy have been identified and researched extensively. These are technocratic concerns with what works that sought to build an evidence base about social transfer projects, cost effectiveness, implementation modalities and delivery systems. Secondly a concern with the political impacts of social protection, vote wining and patronage. Thirdly a focus on ideological considerations that are concerned with the realisation of universal rights to food, improving the health of the poor and vulnerable older people and providing for people with disabilities (Devereux & White, 2010). For a long period, research focus on the technocratic concerns, political impact of social protection and ideological concerns about achieving universal rights has resulted in lack of attention to investigate the influence of political decision-making, levels of knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of policy actors on policy change.

2.2 Background to social protection in Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), social protection needs were traditionally addressed through the economy of affection and imported classical or formal forms of government social security schemes (Devereux, 2013). Traditional forms of social protection are based on the economy of affection that entails assistance based on the extended family and village life, neighbourhood or ethnic group of those in need of assistance (Hyden, 1983). Such initiatives are locally organised social protection actions built on cultural beliefs, norms and values (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2013). The range of assistance provided covers all possible areas of need such as financial, social and psychological support.

This meant that the disabled, the poor, food insecure, and other vulnerable members of society could be taken care of by other family members. In Africa, family support and kinship-based social protection systems have filled transitory food consumption gaps and provided relief from shocks and crises (Oduro, 2010). The HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty and malnutrition, volatile food prices, migration, unpredictable weather patterns and political instability have reduced family-based support systems, prompting the need for formal social protection systems (Oduro, 2010). Formal social protection are public measures to provide income security for individuals.

Traditional forms and classical or formal forms of social protection have become inadequate, given new pressures from global shocks that call for increased social protection provisioning from an environment where such capacity is being decimated. Some of the factors that have affected capacity to support social protection include increased food price inflation, climate change (von Braun, 2008), chronic food insecurity, HIV and AIDS and the reorganisation of the family unit into a "nuclear" family in the modern age (Goode, 1963), technological advances in the rural sector (Gilbert, 1976) and other vulnerabilities. Despite the erosion of informal social protection systems, informal social protection continues to play a role within society alongside the establishment of formal social protection systems (Foster, 2007; Ntseane & Solo, 2007; Patel et al., 2012). Formal social protection initiatives are based on statutory arrangements provided by the state through policies and legislation (Mupedziswa& Ntseane 2013). These multilayered vulnerabilities, coupled with the financial crisis, require that the government prioritise social assistance. Informal social protection is non contributory and can be funded by the state, non government organisations or the private sector. In Africa, the movement into urban areas and regionalisation (Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) also weakened community bonds (Apt, 2002; Emmanuel, 2011). Formal social security schemes were introduced into Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) following colonisation in most of the countries.

COVID-19 is one of the greatest global shocks that showed not only the inadequacy of social protection measures but their unpreparedness to respond to shocks. The 2019 UNDP report noted that most African governments that finance their social assistance spend more on average than those governments that relay on international donors to finance their social assistance (SASPEN,

2022). Despite the existence of different instruments of social protection on the continent, COVID-19 brought to the fore the importance of social protection systems that are responsive and have capacity to adapt in times of shocks (Strupat, 2022). When COVID-19 struck protection systems in many countries were ill -prepared to respond to the shocks of the magnitude of COVID-19 pandemic (SASPEN, 2022). Numerous efforts have been undertaken by the governments to safeguard their most vulnerable citizens. In order to provide coverage for those who weren't previously protected, many new social protection programmes have been introduced. These programmes usually draw on infrastructure that already exists in some countries. For the new programmes, considerable challenges were encountered from targeting, registration, transfer amounts, mode of assistance and delivery mechanisms (SASPEN, 2022). The lack of clear legislation and coordination mechanisms, robust registration systems and digital delivery militated against accountability and effectiveness. Different categories of social protection were identified during COVID-19. However, even before the COVID-19 epidemic, there were lingering gaps in social protection that affected the lives of those without disabilities as (Majoko, 2020). However the challenges also spared a number of innovations through the social protection delivery chain (Space, 2020). The lack of transparency in the adaptation of the social protection to COVID-19 and targeting of the recipients for example created feelings of unfairness and resentment that could worsen social relations. In some countries outside the continent of Africa, such as the Cook Islands, Mongolia, universal approach to shock responsive social protection without targeting were key in strengthening the relationship between the citizens and state in the context of COVID-19(UNICEF, 2021).

The social protection innovations in response to COVID-19 came in that form of what commonly became known as shock responsive social protection. This included vertical expansion (topping up of social protection benefits to existing individuals and households and horizontal expansion (registration of new individuals and households on existing programmes (Devereux, 2021). New humanitarian relief or temporary social assistance programmes that were set up were not only slow but susceptible to targeting errors and corruption. COVID-19 also prompted a reassessment of the social contract regarding social protection, with some governments recognising that they need to become better coordinated, more inclusive and rights-based (Devereux, 2021).

2.3 Origins and history of formal social protection

Social protection refers to a wide set of measures such as social assistance (non- contributory assistance), social insurance (contributory schemes), labour market (minimum employment) and social care (family care and for those facing risks). Its value to society has been widely discussed with other considering it drain on national resources while other view social protection as an investment(McCord, 2010; Devereux & White 2010, Handa et al., 2020). Social protection systems have three functions; to guarantee access to essential goods and services for all members of a society, to promote active socio-economic security, and to advance individual and social potential for poverty reduction and societal. Social protection is an investment in the social and economic development of societies and individuals. It thus not only helps people to cope with risks and reduces inequalities, but also enables them to develop full potential for personal growth and meaningful contributions to their societies throughout their life. The benefits can take the form of cash or in kind assistance, to secure protection meant to prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle and in relation to key identifiable social risks (IOM, 2022). The genesis of social protection and social security is grounded in the study of social policy. Social protection has traditionally been a feature of wealthier countries' social policy instruments to help address need of new urban settlers. (Norton et al., 2002). This shift and focus on social protection as opposed to social policy is problematic because it meant a transition from a wider vision that characterises social policy to a narrow vision of social protection (Adesina, 2012). During the late 1980s, the international community pushed African governments towards a sharp focus on social protection policy instruments such as conditional and unconditional cash transfer to address poverty and "vulnerability" (Adesina, 2012). These programmes originated in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries as a response to massive industrialisation. Industrialisation was characterised by the movement of people from rural areas where they grew their own food into urban areas. In these urban areas, their labour was refocused to producing profits for employers (Polyani, 1994). This transformation resulted in farmers who had migrated into urban areas losing their access to subsistence through own production and becoming dependent on poor salaries and wages that were inadequate to buy food and other necessities (Polyani, 1994).

As a result, social policy in the 20th century was characterised by the growth of statutory social services in western countries. This development spurred academic interest in government social security schemes, a major innovation of the welfare state (Midgley, 2013).

The unit of analysis in social policy is the macro level, the national level. Social protection uses the household or community level as a unit of analysis. Although the term social protection is used in social policy cycles, social security has generally been preferred in the literature. Social protection includes both public and private measures, and a mix of the two that are designed to protect individuals from life-cycle crises that limit their ability to meet their requirements (Kaseke & Dhemba, 2007; Midgley, 2013; Mpedi, 2008). Those who specialise in social policy prefer the term social security and interventions that are statutory. From the 1990s, social protection literature has focused on the non-statutory provision of support (social assistance) and how households manage risk. Some of the major challenges of social protection include its excessive focus on the ultra-poor, the preference for means testing and targeting (Adesina, 2012).

Much as the vital role of social protection is acknowledged, the existence of numerous definitions and lack of a standard definition often makes social protection a misunderstood concept in development circles. The World Bank defines formal social protection as public measures to provide income security for individuals (Kaseke, 2004). The HLPE (2012) defines social protection as a menu of policy options capable of addressing both poverty and vulnerability simultaneously through social assistance, social insurance and efforts at social inclusion. Social protection is a set of public and private initiatives designed to support all people across the life cycle and to protect them against social and economic risks and ensure sustainable livelihoods (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2017). The definition that is often described as most inclusive is the one below by (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2008) cited in (Tirivavi & Rodriguey, 2017).

"a set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to essential services; social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination and abuse".

From the preceding, the common denominator in all definitions of social protection is the aim to respond to issues of risk both ex post and ex ante, vulnerability and extreme poverty (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). This aim is also evident when one considers the four objectives of being: protective, preventive, promotive and transformative that characterise social protection programmes (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). In modern history, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) provide for social protection as a basic human and socio-economic right.

Social security is contributory scheme designed to cover the needs of those working in the formal sector of the economy (Hall, 2004; Van Ginneken, 2010; Cichon, 2004) with contributions from employers and/or beneficiaries, for example health, life and asset insurance-the life course risks (Norton *et al.*, 2013). The contributions are defined in statutory arrangements provided by the state through policies and legislation (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2013). Some definitions of social protection systems ensure protection from a lack of work-related income due to sickness, disability, maternity, workplace injury, unemployment, old age, or the death of a family member, as well as general poverty and social exclusion; they also ensure access to basic health care and provide family support, especially for children and adult dependants. However, in SSA, social security still covers only a small percentage of the population (Hall & Midgley, 2004; Van Ginneken, 2008).

Labour market rules protect workers and their families from risks and shocks caused by life course contingencies such as old age, sickness, maternity, unemployment or accidents at the workplace, as well as a drop in income (Barrientos, 2010). In SSA, social security still covers only a small percentage of the population (Hall & Midgley, 2004; Van Ginneken, 2008).

Social assistance is a non-contributory benefit that is provided in cash or in-kind, financed by the state and usually provided based on means test (Howell, 2001).

Social assistance is a set of policies and programmes that protect people against risk, vulnerability, mitigate the impacts of short-term shock and support people who suffer from chronic incapacities to secure basic livelihoods (Adato & Hoddinott, 2008). Social assistance comes in many forms: conditional cash or in-kind transfers; public works or employment guarantee schemes; and unconditional transfers such as non-contributory social pensions or child benefits, social care, fee waivers, subsidies (Freedman and Anderson, 2011). For the purposes of this study, social protection is used interchangeably with the term social assistance.

Governments and non-governmental organisations work together to improve the living conditions of millions of poor people around the world through social assistance (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2013). Social assistance necessitates active participation from both state and non-state actors, as well as the establishment of national organisational and institutional systems that align economic and social policies as part of a broader commitment to people-cantered development. A vibrant process of economic development is a crucial driver of social development. Social development is defined as a process of planned change meant to increase the well-being of the population (Midgley & Tang, 2001; Midgley, 1995). Social assistance programmes are not a drain on societal resources, but rather investments with major economic and social advantages (Patel, 2005).

2.4 Genesis and growth of formal social protection in sub-Saharan Africa

Until the 1980s, social protection in the form of both conditional and unconditional transfers to vulnerable people and households was in the form of in-kind transfers such as food or agricultural inputs (Schubert & Slater, 2006). However, towards the end of the 1980s, many same policies established to provide for smallholder farmers in the protectionist era of the 1960s to 1980s were dismantled due to market liberalisation (Devereux 2009). This left smallholder farmers vulnerable to external shocks such food shortages (Devereux, 2009). The collapse of non-formal/traditional social protection mechanisms, recognition of the limits of market-oriented trickle-down growth policies and the emergence of the approaches that took a human face approach to development in the early 1980s and 1990s raised the need to make growth more inclusive and pro-poor, bringing social protection back on the agenda (Jolly, 1991; World Bank, 2000).

Social protection as a governmental responsibility became more important on the political agenda in Africa during the Ouagadougou Summit of 2004 on Employment and Poverty Alleviation and Livingstone Conference (SASPEN,2022; Ellis et al., 2009; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010; Adato & This was the first global platform where world leaders called for social Hoddinott, 2008). protection mechanisms such as safety nets and social policies for the most vulnerable and pledged significant funding for social protection for the poorest countries to mitigate malnutrition and food shortages (Nations United, 2009; DFID, 2009; European Commission & European University Institute, 2012; OECD, 2009). African governments have taken significant steps towards reaching a consensus on the need and scope for social protection in Africa. The 2006 Livingstone meeting on "A Transformative Agenda for the 21st Century: Examining the Case for Basic Social Protection in Africa", resulted in many countries pledging to prepare social protection strategies (Hagen, 2009). The 2006 Livingstone Call for Action encouraged African governments to put together and cost national social transfer plans integrated within their national development plans and national budgets (African Union, 2008). These initiatives contributed to developing and adopting a number of national social protection strategies throughout the region. In 2009, the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme started to engage governments in Southern Africa in understanding the different available social protection instruments, including the use of cash transfers to reduce poverty and food insecurity. Many countries in the region that donors initially supported began to include cash transfers. Some African countries progressed to support flagship social protection programmes with a significant cash transfer component such as Zambia's Joint Programme on Social Protection, Malawi's Social Action Fund, Ghana's Empowerment Against Poverty Programme and Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2015). Social protection expenditure in the same countries also rose to 1.1 per cent of the GDP (Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank, 2016).

Today, some countries in the region implement a version of social protection while others comprehensive social protection measures for older people and children. Of the 16 countries in the SADC community, 10 countries in Southern Africa have a total of 54 social assistance programmes before COVID 19.

Botswana has the largest percentage of population covered 53% while Tanzania has a smallest coverage at 2% of the population covered (Southern Africa Social protection Network, 2022). The average percentage of the population covered across the 10 countries is 26 %(Southern Africa Social protection Network, 2022). However, more than half the population in this region remains in extreme poverty (earning less than US\$1,90/day/capita) (Chitonge, 2012). However, many people who qualify do not receive the entitlements due to lack of knowledge, programme gaps, the inadequate reach of programmes for the poor or difficulty accessing the services (Ellis et al., 2009; Foster, 2007); and poor coverage (HLPE, 2012; Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, 2011). In Sub Saharan Africa, basic access to basic social protection remains a challenge. Formal social protection in sub Saharan Africa only covers a minority of the population and rarely extends to households facing severe poverty (Haddad, 1996). Before 2011, about nine in every ten people in sub Saharan Africa have no basic social protection (ILO, 2008; ILO, 2011; ISSA, 2008). Currently forty six(46) countries in SSA have some form of state funded social protection with the most common being cash transfers representing, 51% of all social protection spending(Handa et al., 2022). To reduce the vulnerability of the poor households to adverse shocks or prevent new households from falling into food and nutrition insecurity, there is a need to strengthen public and market-led social protection and introduce them at an early stage in the development process (von Braun, 2008).

During the era of the structural adjustment that became prominent from the 1980s to1990s, Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), countries reduced social service provision further reducing prospects of the growth of social protection (Foster, 2007). Much as social protection programmes have been part of government policy in SSA since the 1980s, many of the programmes were transitory and have had very limited impact (Adato *et al.*, 2004). Many of the social protection interventions during the 1980s were delivered in the form of both conditional and unconditional transfers to vulnerable people and households in the form of in-kind transfers such as food or agricultural inputs (Schubert & Slater, 2006). The first social protection programmes were developed in Mexico, Brazil and later in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique around 2000 (DFID, 2005). The growth of social protection has resulted in broad categories of social protection.

The typologies arose from the origin, history, social-economic factors or environment and demographic factors of the countries in which the typologies are found.

2.5 Typologies of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa

There are two broad models of social protection identifiable in SSA, namely the Southern Africa and the East and Middle Africa models (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010). However, the Southern African programmes typically have two variations. The models are largely shaped by the countries' financial capacity, socio-economic factors, environmental and demographic conditions (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010). The first Southern Africa model is adapted from its early origins in the European welfare state (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). Its genesis is mainly a product of local domestic public policy initiatives and is integrated into the countries, laws, development policies and budgets. The first Southern Africa model is common in middle-income countries characterised by relatively higher economic development levels, enhanced revenue collection capacity, and delivery by public agencies. The design and implementation of the schemes are largely driven by the government with minimal influence from donors. The social protection schemes in this region have evolved around categorical means-tested grants for older adults and, more recently, children. Settler elite politics drove the development of the social protection schemes in the Southern Africa region drove the development of the social protection schemes in the Southern Africa region. It is therefore not a coincidence that they are tax-financed to protect the minority white population against poverty and old age (MacKinnon, 2008). The schemes were later extended to mixed race and then indigenous blacks in the 1940s but with discriminatory entitlement rates and benefit levels. The second variation of social protection in Southern Africa manifests a movement from emergency food aid to cash transfers in the context of humanitarian emergencies (Devereux, 2013; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010). Food insecurity in the region has multiple causes spanning socioeconomic, weather conditions/climate change, political, technological and infrastructural related challenges. While food aid addressed immediate suffering, this form of emergency assistance is ill-equipped to address root causes of food insecurity (Clay et al., 1998). This is also characterised by a shift from emergency aid in the form of food, either in kind or in cash to regular, predictable social protection (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010; Devereux, 2013).

A number of countries in Southern Africa such as Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe have gone through this second variation of social protection. In most cases, this variation of social protection initiatives have been mainly proposed as projects, with a shorter life span.

However, many of the countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have in principle made commitment to a national policy or strategy on social protection (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.*, 2010).

The East and Middle Africa model social protection scheme have piloted a brand of social protection, which combines income transfers and services (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.*, 2010). The Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) combines cash transfers with work requirements to improve public infrastructure. The PSNP has two components. The first targets food-insecure households with unemployed heads of households. The second provides transfers to labour constrained households in extreme poverty. This model has also been piloted in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Though well profiled in literature, the influence of international actors is limited and their ideas are implemented when they resonate with local political dynamics and interests of local elites. Parliamentarians and government ministers were harder for international actors to influence (Seekings, 2021). Most of the time, they were successful in putting social protection expansionary policies on the political agenda. They frequently succeeded in getting governments to adopt or at least create documents outlining a national social protection plan by persuading officials in civil society or departments in charge of potential social protection (Seekings, 2021). As a result, the international donors influence is evident in the design, financing, and delivery of the programmes under the second variation in Southern Africa and the East and Middle Africa models. During the process of institutionalising social protection, the influence of the donors in policy formulation is pervasive (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.*, 2010). The delivery of the social protection programmes is through various channels such as NGOs, civil society organisations, and other public agencies. The cash transfer programmes are donor-funded and characterised by limited scope in terms of coverage and budget. The target beneficiaries of the programmes are largely the ultra-poor that is those with no ability to meet even the barest of basic needs and the food insecure people.

There is, however, a move to migrate such projects into policies in the different countries along the Southern Africa typology that focus mainly on old age, child headed households, children, social pensions, households with older and disabled people grants.

2.6 The different functions of social protection

Social protection serves several essential functions. The most commonly used conceptual framework defines four functions: protective function (assistance for the poor/disabled and pensions) and preventative (to avert food insecurity and other disasters), promotive and transformative functions. Preventive measures fall under the ex-ante strategies while the protective and promoting measures usually fall under the ex-post strategies. Ex-ante strategies are social protection programmes implemented before any particular shocks are experienced. Ex-ante interventions are usually more effective because they are forward-looking (Barrientos et al., 2005) and reduce vulnerability. On the corollary, the effectiveness of ex-post strategies may be compromised because of information and coordination problems that are usually widespread during and closely following crisis periods (Del la Fuente, 2010; Vakis, 2006). Ex-post strategies are interventions implemented following the occurrence of shocks. The level of preparedness, however, can influence the depth of suffering and the implications for the human development process. The third and fourth functions are promotive (enhancement through life skills, access to credit and transformative (addressing equity, exclusion, empowerment) (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). Social assistance is a component of comprehensive development approaches that seek to reduce poverty, improve food security and manage the risk of hazards. It also covers policies relating to health, education, financial services and the provision of infrastructure (utilities and roads) to build resilience (Grosh, 2008; FEWSNET, 2019; Handa et al., 2021). Social assistance instruments are effective mechanisms for coping with covariate and idiosyncratic shocks in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA). In particular, cash transfers have demonstrated a capacity to reduce poverty and have widespread human capital development outcomes (Blattman & Niehaus, 2014). Receiving cash provides recipients with dignity and autonomy in that it allows them to decide how, when, and what they want to use the cash for (Bastagli et al., 2016; Blattman & Niehaus, 2014; Gentilini, 2016).

Governments have been rapidly expanding cash transfers as part of their social protection strategy over the last decade (Handa *et al.*, 2021; Barrientos, 2010). A growing body of literature shows that cash transfers can be a cost-effective solution for different dimensions of food security (Plavgo *et al.*, 2013; Monchuk, 2014; Hodges *et al.*, 2013). More recently, social protection is viewed from several perspectives, ranging from a microeconomic stabiliser to humanitarian responses, from household risk management to promoting social justice (Devereux, 2012; Dercon, 2005; HLPE, 2012; Townsend, 1994). Mitigating such detrimental responses to food insecurity and vulnerability is a top priority for governments (Barrientos, 2010).

2.7 Social protection as a food security, development and humanitarian tool

Food insecurity in sub Saharan Africa is a combination of chronic and transitory-emergencyrelated food insecurity (Economic and Social Council., 2009; FAO, 2006). Food security is defined as existing when all people have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food at all times that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for active and healthy lives (HLPE, 2020). Food insecurity is not merely a failure of agricultural production but also inadequate livelihoods that fail to guarantee present and future access to food at the household and individual levels (Maxwell, 2003). It is also the deficiencies in the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food-the food system (New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2009; World Food Programme, 2017) are the main drivers of food insecurity. Chronic undernourishment is higher in areas of conflict (FAO, 2006). It can manifest as chronic, transitory or acute food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity is a product of structural poverty. It manifests in the form of inadequate intake of food caused by an inability to access food over time (Maxwell & Smith, 1992). Transitory food insecurity is a product of natural disasters and conflicts. It manifests in sudden reductions in access to food over a relatively short period (FAO, 2008). At the household level, a household is food insecure if it does not have adequate food to maintain an active and healthy lifestyle for all of its members (Dutta et al., 2006).

The impact of COVID 19 pandemic brought to the fore two additional dimension of food security, urgency and sustainability (HLPE, 2020), that many partners are still to take on board.

Resultantly, the definition of food security now has six dimension; availability, access, utilisation, stability, urgency and sustainability. A commitment and simultaneous fulfilment of the four core competencies will result in the realisation of food security. Food availability pertains to the actual supply of foodstuffs in any country from local production or imports. It involves sufficient quantities of appropriate necessary types of food from domestic or local sources (FAO, 1996). Food access on the other hand refers to the ability of the citizens of a nation to acquire food for personal consumption (FAO, 1996; FAO, 2008) This means that individuals have adequate sources of income to purchase or obtain the levels of appropriate foods needed to maintain consumption of an adequate diet or nutrition level (FAO, 1996). Access to food is vital because, even if enough food is produced, not having the financial means to acquire it can lead to food insecurity. Access to food is important because not having the resources to buy food may contribute to food insecurity even when enough food is produced. Food utilisation refers to the biological availability of nutrients for use by the human body (Bokeloh & Gerster-Bentaya, 2012; Gross et al., 2000). The capacity to use food is linked to one's health and his or her ability to physically eat and process food in suitable quantities (Kelly, 2003). The forth core competency, food stability, refers to the seamless assurance of sufficient availability and accessibility of food.

Urgency refers to situation where individuals or groups have power to make decisions about what food they eat, how the food is produced, processed and distributed in the food system, as well as their ability to participate in processes that determine food system policies and governance (HLPE, 2020). Sustainability refers to a food system's long-term ability to supply food security and nutrition without jeopardising the economic, social, or environmental foundations that ensure future food security and nutrition (HLPE, 2020). The urgency and sustainability dimensions of food security, are recommendations that have not yet been taken on board by other actors.

Access to adequate nutritious food, either through physical or economic access, is a basic human right fundamental to realising the right to food (Mechlem, 2004). The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 11.1) enshrined the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger (Article11.2).

Social assistance is a human right enshrined in articles 22 and 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), which states that everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social protection through national effort and international cooperation aligned with each state's organisation and capabilities. Social assistance is also a human right that is enshrined in articles 22 and 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948), where everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social protection through national effort and international cooperation aligned with the organisation and capabilities of each state. What remains crucial to the achievement of food security is the implementation of an integrated strategy that addresses the overlapping challenges of malnutrition, the productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, the resilience of food systems and the sustainable use of biodiversity and genetic (FAO, 2017).

Consequently, there is growing consensus in the international development debates that social protection is critical to address food insecurity (HLPE, 2012) social, economic and political development of countries. A number of studies have found a direct impact of unconditional cash transfers on food security and nutrition outcomes (Gertler et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2011; Save the Children, 2012). In view of this, the Committee on World Food Security has urged Member States to design and put in place or strengthen comprehensive, nationally owned, context-sensitive social protection systems for food security and nutrition. While social protection is part of a comprehensive strategy for food security, it is necessary that the components of social protection be combined with other interventions in the social sectors such as education and health and economic sectors of agriculture and trade policy (HLPE, 2012). Four sources of food are commonly identified in literature (Sen, 1981). The first category is production, which includes what one grows, labour- what one works for, trade- what one buys, and transfers-what one is given (Sen, 1981). Social protection instruments can be used to address each cause of food entitlement failure (Devereux, 2008), but each one has unique benefits and drawbacks that must be taken into account before deployment. Table 2.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of various social protection instruments.

Table 2.1: Advantages and disadvantages of different social protection instruments for food security

Social	Advantages	Disadvantages
protection Instrument	nuvanages	Disadvantages
Input subsidies	Boost agricultural production, improves access to fertilisers and hybrid seeds for vulnerable smallholder farmers, improves access to inputs for women farmers	High cost, limited effectiveness, distorts trade, development of market of private markets. Targeting is imperfect, over utilization of fertilisers leading to soil degradation, ground water depletion and environmental harm. Difficult to modify and lacks an exit strategy
Crop and livestock insurance	Index-based livestock insurance has potential as a subsidized social protection intervention providing some security at a time when climate change is making a highly risky livelihood.	Imperfect information, challenge of identifying legitimate claims for payouts and those arising from moral hazard. Adverse selection, take up of crop and livestock insurance is low. High premiums because high risk farmers who take insurance forcing result in increase in premiums and forces low risk farmers to move out due to high premiums. Market related premiums are unaffordable
Public works programmes	Self-targeting capacity. Effective to address covariate shocks. Avoids dependency on handouts. Create useful infrastructure if well designed. Agriculture related public works improve farm yields and generate sustainable benefits for households for food security. Address poverty and food insecurity. Work requirement and low wages offered. Payment mostly in food and rarely in form of cash. Most challenges can be addressed by sensitive design.	Energy expended on manual work reduces nutrition impact of food or cash wages. Work requirement excludes highly vulnerable individuals and households. Women are disproportionally represented among the poor and food insecure but are excluded from public works by the heavy manual labour involved and their time constraints. Assets created are not maintained and often deteriorate after the project ends.
Food price stabilisation	Important where social safety nets are not existent or small in scale Allow domestic prices to adjust Builds food security oriented trading system	Rapidly rising food prices causes inflationary pressure. This hurts living standards of many of the poor and near –poor. Can trigger widespread social discontent
Food subsidies	Potentially lowers the price of stable food for all consumers. Increases food consumption especially among low income consumers. Simpler to implement compared to other instruments. Politically more acceptable.	Distributional impacts are not good. Inefficient for helping the neediest individuals in society. Encourage waste and spawn corruption. Targeting and Exit strategy challenges. Unanswered question on whether targeted or universal subsidies are better than generalized subsidies.
Grain reserves	Insurance against shocks and fluctuations in food supplies and prices. Avails easy market to producers at guaranteed price A cereal bank for a country Makes available physical stock for emergency purposes	Grain reserves act as monopoly buyers and sellers of grain Manipulate food prices be intervening in market. Stifles development of private competitive grain sector

Social	Advantages	Disadvantages
protection	Truvunuges	Disuuvuntuges
Instrument		
		Transactions costs of trading where demand was low are too high Cost and management challenges are numerous
School feeding	Reduces hunger and improves food security for children, Increase human capital accumulation-through improving school attendance Food helps children concentrate in class Improves food consumption by children. Meals keep children in school	Targeting challenges-inclusion and exclusions eras. High delivery costs. Its not cost effective to target individual student for feeding Stigmitisation is a challenge Distribution challenges
Supplementary feeding	Addresses women's right to food and nutrition security including supplements of iron and folic acid Improves cognitive skills, schooling and adult economic productivity. It's a long term investment. Addresses mild to moderate malnutrition while clinical malnutrition need therapeutic dietary treatment combined with life-saving rehydration	Dependence on such products is a risk for poor families who may not afford the products.
Conditional cash transfers	Improves both quantity of calories consumed and the quality of diets. Reduce short term food insecurity and long term intergenerational transmission of poverty and vulnerability.	Does not contain food security as an explicit object. Conditionality increases cost and complexity of programmes. Conditions imposes direct costs of participants-mothers who have comply with conditions Households many find conditions difficult to meet. Access to public services is difficult because these are not widely available. Social protection is a right-imposing conditions is not morally indefensible. No evidence that conditionality is effective. Inflationary risks
Unconditional cash transfers	Diginity and autonomy over use by recipients Avoids disincentive effects cash is unlikely to discourage local trade or production. Cost efficient- distributing Cash less costly than commodities	Less effective where markets are weak and food prices are high or volatile More prone to diversion More difficult to target – even the wealthy will want whereas in-kind transfers may be less attractive Security risks – Moving cash around may be
	Cash less costry than commodities	risky for implementing staff and for the recipients.

Author's compilation 2022

While social assistance can boast smallholder farmers' capacity to procure inputs, asset accumulation and reducing poverty and chronic food insecurity (Cohen, 2007; Devereux & White, 2010; European Commission & European University Institute, 2012; HLPE, 2012; UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, 2011) its integration to achieve food security remains minimal. Research to understand how the attitude of policymakers in Zimbabwe towards cash transfers are generated from perceptions could help understand and unlock the social protection policy change and implementation in Zimbabwe.

2.7.1 Universal and targeted cash transfers

Firstly, whether social transfers should be targeted or universal remains an emotive issue. Some of the major challenges in targeting arise from the large numbers of the poor in Africa and the difficulty to achieve accuracy promised by theoretical targeting models, the cost of targeting and the lack of necessary data. Secondly, the issues boils down to who to target, the ultra-poor, AIDS affected, very poor families or use the 10 per cent cut off point. The third dimension around targeting focuses on the appropriate targeting mechanism to reach the identified target group. While in the 1990s and 1970s, the preference of the social protection advocates was toward policies that enshrine universal rights, since 1980s, the balance of the policies has radically tilted in favour of targeting in both developed and developing countries. The primary reason of targeting is to direct programmes to people who will benefit most.

Other goals of targeting include maximising poverty reduction, ensuring that no one is left behind, controlling costs of provision and making the most efficient use of resources when faced with financial constraints or gaining political advantage (Devereux *et al.*, 2015). Targeting is approached from a number of approaches, such as means-testing, geographical, categorical, community-based self-targeting. The effectiveness of a targeting approach should be assessed against its targeting efficiency-extent to which it minimises excluding individuals who should be included (type l error), leakage-probability to include people who should not be included (Type II error), administrative costs as well as political feasibility. In addition, the methods have comparative advantages and limitations in different environments and programmes, (Table 2.2).

Nonetheless, one of the most serious objections of targeting is that it uses punitive tests of discrimination to cement concepts of accepted and disapproved dependency, as well as a harmful assault on the welfare recipient's sense of self-respect and self-determination (Titmuss, 1965).

Targeting Approach	Definition	Advantages	Disadvantages
Categorical	Identifying distinct group who are generally more vulnerable than others-orphans, disabilities	Cheap and simple	Subject to type I and II errors, neglects other vulnerable who do fit categories, challenge category definition
Geographic	Identifies a specific given geographical area, district, drought zone including location of the residence, age, etc.;	Simplest of all, quick and easy and administratively cheap to implement	Benefits can go even to those who do not require them, can be political, exclusion errors when pitched at wide/national level. Commonly used as first level targeting
Means Testing	An administrative mechanism that identifies vulnerable groups with income below an established threshold or other income-related characteristics of an individual or family	Most accurate	Higher administrative costs, complicated, prone to type II error and stigmatisation, validity of means questionable, creates incentives to modify behaviour
Proxy Means Testing/Community based targeting	Involves community officials and members to identify beneficiaries on basis of easy-to- collect asset based indicators/household or individual characteristics than incomes.	Avoids costs and complexity of income assessment, easily verifiable	Not target efficient compared to means testing in light of variation in household conditions and complex configurations of deprivation and dependency.
Self-Selection	Uses peoples own judgement and decision to identify beneficiaries through imposing disincentives to programme participation to attract only those in need.	Not costly to implement, not prone to type ll error, convenient for adjusting coverage, reduces social tensions and improves accuracy	Does not work in environments of widespread and severe poverty, prone to type l and ll errors
Community Selection	Entails a process where communities identify beneficiaries	Socially acceptable due to use of local knowledge and can deliver well	Risk of elite capture, genuine community participation is time consuming, resource intensive, challenging to scale up.

Table 2.2:	Pros and	cons of different	targeting methods
10010 1011			

Author's compilation 2019, based on Ellis et.al. (2009; HLPE 2012; Legovini (undated); Mkandawire 2005).

Most social protection programmes are based on administrative based targeting-means testing of intended beneficiaries (Devereux *et al.*, 2015; Awatkin, 2000; Willies, 1993). One manifestation of this potential divisiveness is the oft expressed opinion voiced in community meetings by key informants that "we are all poor here" (Ellis, 2012). Instead of selecting one or the other mechanisms available, methods should be combined optimally in different areas or stages of a programme. This maximises targeting efficiency and minimises administrative costs.

Another school of thought advocates for universal transfers. The rational for universal systems is that the transfers provide social citizenship rights, which enhance social solidarity and cohesion and can lead to lower levels of inequality, less crime, and so on. It is also frequently claimed that only universal systems can ensure elite and middle-class support for programmes, without which allocations may be difficult to maintain during economic downturns. However, a case can still be made for both universal and targeted transfers, demonstrating that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all sorts of programmes or situations. It is critical to find a balance between ensuring that payments reach the elderly and eliminating artificial boundaries among recipients when targeting is used(Ellis, 2012; Mgemezulu, 2008). Despite this, a number of studies have found that identifying the poor with the accuracy promised by theoretical targeting models requires extremely high administrative expenditures as well as administrative knowledge and competence that may not exist in developing nations.

2.7.2 In-kind versus cash transfer

The debate on whether social transfers should be delivered in the form of food or other in-kind contribution, or cash or vouchers that allows them to purchase a limited set of commodities (HLPE, 2012) is ancient. Though this debate is longstanding, economic theory implies that cash is superior to in-kind transfers because it does not distort individual consumption or production decisions (HLPE, 2012; Ahmed *et al.*, 2010). Cash transfers provide receipts with the option to do whatever they choose with the money they receive, depending on the amount they get.

Social cash transfers empower the poor people to make decisions on their entitlements and can address multiple needs such as education, health, and nutrition, clothing, hygiene, water and sanitation, shelter, hiring of labour (Hanlon, 2010). Additionally, cash-based transfers can stimulate agricultural production, another economic activity within the locality. Further, distributing cash is often less expensive than distributing food or others commodities, with studies showing that in-kind administrative costs are 20-25 per cent higher than those for cash transfers (Cunha, 2011; Ahmed *et al.*, 2010). Therefore, one could see the logical result as supporting cash transfers that allow families to evaluate needs, choose expenditure priorities and accumulate reserves for lean periods as the way to go. While cash transfers would appear as always the best, this may not be appropriate in other environments where local food markets (Maxwell *et al.*, 2007) do not function well.

A cash-transfer is often considered by government officials especially those in finance as consumption-"hand-outs" rather than investment expenditure by governments (Andrews *et al.*, 2012), which may address individual poverty but not contributing to broader economic growth (McCord, 2010). Given this perception, governments for example in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have often not preferred this social protection modality (Chinsinga, 2009; Ministry of Public Service, 2010). The implementation of cash-transfers is simply viewed as committing to significant future liabilities that cannot be sustained through domestic financing and open potential avenues for continued reliance on external funding, exposing the government to the risk of shifting donor preference.

Therefore, extending the limited financing to productive social protection interventions is the rational option. It is interesting to note that the preferred social protection interventions such as agricultural inputs or subsidy programmes, which attract government support, actually fall outside the boundaries of conventional social protection definition. This perception around cash-based social protection as constituting consumptive expenditure and acting as a precedent for potentially unsustainable recurrent budget expenditure are two linked concerns on issues of affordability, which governments usually flank for lack of interest towards support for cash-based social protection.

Notwithstanding the forgoing, deciding on the appropriate transfer modality calls for policy makers to consider a web of issues derived from a proper assessment of context-specific factors. Identifying the most appropriate transfer modality hinges on issues such as; programme objectives, the functioning of markets, implementation capacities, delivery mechanisms, security conditions, cost-efficiency analysis, and beneficiaries' preferences (Adato & Bassett, 2008; Gentilini, 2007).

2.7.3 Delivery of cash transfers

Cash delivery is frequently described in literature as being clouded by concerns that cash is vulnerable to potential misuse, can foster corruption at community levels and pose a security risk(Ellis 2012;McCord, 2010;Edmonds, 2009; DFIF 2005). However, different systems have been designed to counteract such risks. The systems range from building strong local oversight mechanisms so that means testing does not create incentives for corruption at the community level. They can include ensuring transparency in the design and implementation so that beneficiaries know what they should be getting. Designing mechanisms for accountability at local level, delivering transfers through quasi-independent, nationally accountable institutions such as post offices and high profile action to signal zero tolerance of corruption can complement reduction of corruption and other leakages (Omar, 2000). Modern electronic banking, smart cards, point of sale devices and mobile phone systems, which have been devised and widely used in Kenya such as M-PESA while Brazil, South Africa and Namibia use the army and police to accompany the cash distribution. Evidence has demonstrated that automated systems can cut fraud and achieve wider coverage.

2.8 Review of experiences of cash transfers from selected countries

Despite the evidence of success from the pilots and growing interests of political support and innovation in design and delivery of cash transfers, challenges remain. The integration of social transfer in government policies and budgets has remained a challenge with opportunities for strengthening social protection in Africa not being commonplace (Haddad, 1996). This lack of integration of cash-based social protection is usually ascribed to politicians who continue to view social protection ambivalently.

At the same time, many African governments are deeply sceptical about large-scale social transfer programmes. Politicians and senior civil servants view cash-based transfers as unaffordable and breed a dependency culture among beneficiaries (Ellis *et al.*, 2009; HLPE, 2012; Andrews *et al.*, 2012). This can be reflected in the level of contribution by governments towards social transfer, which is often relatively limited (McCord, 2009). For example, domestic financing of the Malawi and Zambia unconditional cash transfers only range from zero to five percent of programme costs.

The involvement of governments in cash transfers remains peripheral. In most such schemes, governments have just offered official endorsements and assigned relevant ministries, departments, and responsibilities for today's implementation of the programmes. This has also led some authors to question the national ownership of the social protection agenda (Chinsinga, 2009; Devereux & White, 2010; Nigussa & Mberengwa, 2009).

Donors have promoted cash transfers as a solution to rebuild the incomes of the extremely poor households, particularly those with orphans and vulnerable children in order for them to meet basic needs like food, access to health and education (Adato & Bassett, 2008; Ministry of Public Service, 2010). However, this support for cash transfers should not be taken to mean that cash is suitable to address every single challenge. There are specific situations where cash transfers work and may not be the suitable response mechanism for some challenges. For donors, one of the major reasons for supporting cash-based social transfers is to demonstrate to the government that cash-based transfers are a potent policy instrument (McCord, 2010). While some high-level keenness and interest has been shown theoretically and through numerous donor-funded pilot cash-based social protection in SSA, these efforts have still not generated enough traction for sustained or nationally –owned social protection systems (McCord, 2010; Andrews *et al.*, 2012).

In Malawi, for example, the government was not anticipating disbursing cash towards cash grants and would only contribute 12 per cent of the total cost per year if the programme was extended (Chinsinga, 2009). In Zambia, the government initially contributed only five per cent of the budget of the cash transfer pilot but shifted its position in 2010 following donor-financing incentives (Chinsinga, 2009).

The shift in position saw the government developing a medium-term plan, which would increase government financing incrementally to cover programme costs. The government of Zimbabwe indicated a preference to support Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) whilst donors would support cash transfers in the joint National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Phases I and II (NAPII) (Ministry of Public Service, 2010). Furthermore, the government has consistently not disbursed budgeted amounts for cash towards the harmonised cash transfers. As indicated by the positions taken by various administrations, there is a lack of support for comprehensive social protection programmes that include cash transfer. However, in Kenya, the pattern is slightly different, with the government making a considerable contribution, 30 per cent of the costs of the donor initiated child benefit programme while wholly funding the domestically created pilot for the elderly. The Kenya example is a reflection of the government promoting stability through predictable resource flows to priority groups (Ikiara, 2009)

South Africa presents a different case from that presented above as a developing and middleincome country. The factors, which set South Africa apart are, the South African government funds social assistance from tax revenue in the country, spending 3,5 per cent of GDP on cash grants (Leibbrandt *et al.*, 2010). The coverage of social assistance in the country is extensive, with a quarter of the population accessing unconditional cash grants (Leibbrandt *et al.*, 2010). The policies, which shape the country's social assistance programmes do not show direct influence by donors or multilateral agencies. The delivery of the cash grants is all through government systems and the private sector such as banks without intermediaries such as NGOs or CSOs. In 2002, President Thambo Mbeki in his state of the nation address, highlighted cash grants as an important instrument for poverty eradication in the country, demonstrating commitment at the highest level of government (Samson *et al.*, 2004).

Budgetary allocation to reduce inequality and poverty and redistribution through progressive taxes and pro-poor cash grants is an efficient way to accomplish this. Apart from the disability, war veteran, care dependency, foster child grants and others, South Africa today has a quasi-universal social assistance programme flag shipped by the child support grant for teenage mothers (Leibbrandt *et al.*, 2010). The existence of welfare systems has been associated with an increase in teenage fertility (Burt et al., 1984). Such perceptions have also characterised the South African child support grant (Makiwane *et al.*, 2006) because teenagers receive assistance when they bear children. However, evidence of the impact of the social assistance programmes from South Africa remains positive. Cash transfers provide a consistent and stable source of income that can have a major impact on households' ability to invest in human and physical capital, breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty cycle (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Evidence demonstrates that pension money received by women was more likely to be spent in ways that enhance child outcomes on food and schooling (Case & Deaton, 1998). Furthermore, children benefit from cash grants intended for a completely different target group (Duflo, 2000). It was noted that school attendance and completed schooling rise and market work declines (Edmonds, 2006) old-age pension has a positive effect on adult labour supply (Ardington et al., 2009). Despite their effectiveness, there needs to be more synergy between programmes and between government agencies and departments. This is a missed chance to create the kinds of synergies that could have significant positive effects on programmes, both alone and collectively. The programme that would gain the most from such integration is the child support grant, which has previously been shown to have major positive benefits on human development. Better alignment of the social protection system, particularly the social assistance system, and to more effectively address the structural reasons of socioeconomic inequality in South Africa (World Bank, 2021).

2.9 International and regional approaches to financing social protection

Internationally, social protection is financed through government revenues. Most developing countries spend one to two percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on social transfers (Weigand & Grosh, 2008). A World Bank review of 2014 indicates that 107 developing and emerging countries spend on average 1,6 percent of GDP on social assistance (World Bank, 2014). The ILO estimated the costs of the basic social protection package ranged of the seven countries as ranging from 2.9 percent-5.2 per cent of GDP in 2008, with an average cost of 4.5 percent.

These have been calculated to range between 0.1per cent and 0.7 percent of GDP in five SSA countries; Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Malawi compared to target expenditure levels of 4.5 percent to achieve the goals of the basic social protection component of the AU Social Policy Framework (Hagen-Zanker & McCord, 2010). The AU SPF has set itself to provide minimum package "a minimum package of essential social protection should cover: essential healthcare, and benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older persons and persons with disabilities" (African Union, 2008). In 2006/7 none of the countries approached the social protection target of 4.5 percent of GDP, with the range being between 0.1 and 0.7per cent (Ethiopia), indicating that even if the lower bound of the ILO costing is considered (2.9percent), there are still significant shortfalls in each country.

Cash transfers, despite their numerous benefits and references in key worldwide frameworks, account for a modest part of social protection when compared to in-kind contributions (Honorati et al., 2015; World Humanitarian Summit, 2016; Gentilini, 2021). In low-income countries, cash transfer spending per capita amounted to a scant \$6 per capita between 2020 and 2021 (Gentilini, 2021). In 2020, out of the 1400 social protection measures implemented, one-third took the form of cash transfers, reaching over 1,1 billion people (Gentilini, 2021). The duration of cash transfers implementation was only 3,3 months in the 215 countries and territories reviewed. Short-term funding coupled with low budgetary allocations for cash transfers points to enduring underlying attitudes that affect the uptake of cash transfers (Gentilini, 2021). While government policy may identify cash transfers as one of the social protection mechanisms, budget support for cash transfers remains minimal, amounting to policy mimicry (Lavis et al., 2010). Studies have looked at whether implementation of cash transfers was stifled by issues of affordability (McCord, 2010 DFID., 2005; Behrendt, 2008; ILO., 2008; Kakwani & K., 2007; Gentilini & Omamo, 2011; ILO, 2008) on the part of the government, on whether cash transfers create a dependency culture(Nino-Zaraua et al., 2010; Parker and Skoufias 2000) on the transfers or are subject to misuse by beneficiaries(Devereux and White 2009).

However, the impact of factors such as perceptions and attitudes of policymakers on implementing cash transfers remains under-researched. Understanding policymakers' perceptions and attitudes of social protection could help understand and unlock the implementation gap.

Chapter 3: Setting the scene: General overview of the context and status of social protection in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a landlocked, low-income country in Southern Africa with one of the highest food insecurity levels in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regardless of the agricultural season (World Bank, 2018. Since the 1990s, the country has experienced multiple challenges that have negatively affected food security (Jayne *et al.*, 2006). Among these challenges are recurrent adverse climate-induced shocks (Bird & Prowse 2009:1; Ministry of Labour and Social Services, 2010), limited employment opportunities, governance failures (Bird & Prowse, 2009; van Donk, 2004), HIV and AIDS, widespread poverty, liquidity challenges and economic instability (World Food Programme, 2020). In addition, the low productivity in smallholder farming, a lack of access to markets, a lack of competitiveness of smallholder farmers and limited access to extension services exacerbate these challenges.

According to the 2020 Zimbabwean Humanitarian Response Plan, seven million out of the fifteen million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2020). The 2019 Global Hunger Index ranked Zimbabwe 109th out of 117 qualifying countries, indicating that 34.4% of Zimbabweans suffered from severe hunger in 2018 (Helvetas, 2019). Moreover, half of Zimbabweans live in poverty, affected by food insecurity, poor health and lack of education, inadequate living standards, disempowerment and poor work quality (UNICEF, 2020). Extreme poverty has risen from 29% in 2018 to 34% in 2019, increasing from 4.7 to 5.7 million people (World Bank, 2020). The most vulnerable individuals reside in orphan-headed and labourconstrained households and include people living with chronic illness (UNICEF, 2018). Zimbabwe is one of ten countries globally where less than 20% of children between 6-23 months consume an inadequate diet (FSIN & Global Network Against Food Crises, 2020). In 2020, eight districts in Zimbabwe recorded acute malnutrition rates of over 5% (UNICEF, 2020). Economic deterioration and food insecurity are poised to worsen as the COVID-19 pandemic spreads (FSIN & Global Network Against Food Crises, 2020). The El Nino event of 2016 resulted in up to three million people needing temporary food assistance (World Bank, 2018). In a shock such as the March 2019 Cyclone Idai, 53,999 people were affected, increasing food insecurity.

In addition, cyclone Idai caused crop destruction estimated to be 60% of crops in Chimanimani and 25 per cent in Chipinge and parts of the Masvingo province (FEWSNET, 2019), worsening household food insecurity. In such contexts, policymakers play a pivotal role in creating a conducive policy environment and setting the institutional context for implementing interventions such as social protection to cope with the different threats.

According to current sector studies, Zimbabwe's social protection system has not evolved in a meaningful and purposeful way in recent years to meet the evolving national concerns such as socio-economic risk, vulnerability and poverty (Freeland *et al.*, 2019). At the same time, there may be an unprecedented political momentum to support social protection change in the country. Looking into the history and current experience of what drives policy change Zimbabwe is important to unlock this puzzle. Before independence, social security did not cover indigenous black people and was the preserve of white people until 1980, when Zimbabwe achieved independence (Chitambira, 2010). After that, black people were supposedly covered through 'an economy of affection' (Hyden, 2005) - relying on village and family networks for survival or private occupational pensions, which though available, catered mainly to white citizens. Four types aspects of social protection: social insurance/social security, social assistance schemes, social care and labour market policies have been available in the country for long, though availability of each was highly skewed in terms of coverage, depth, access and eligibility. Social security was designed to cover only those persons employed in the formal sector.

In 1936, the old age pensions to non-Africans over 60 years and had lived in the country for more than 15 years was enacted. In 1975, the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU) introduced a pension scheme for agricultural workers. Its reach was limited because eligibility was extended to those over 60 years when life expectancy was only 50 years. Not many indigenous blacks reached retirement age (Dhemba *et al.*, 2002) and could benefit.

3.1 Evolution of social assistance in post-independence Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has a long history of social protection programmes (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). This history can be divided into four phases: the pre-independence era (1964-

1979), post-independence (1980-1989), rejection of redistributivisim (1990-2000) and hyperinflation (2001-2017), (Table 4.2).

Pre-independence era, social protection was offered in Rhodesia along racial and gender lines, with Europeans being the primary beneficiaries of the various programmes. The colonial administration established occupational pension plans, workman's compensation plans, and old age pension programmes. The indigenous people were left in a difficult situation because, first, industrialization and the formalization of the economy destroyed their traditional social safety institutions, and second, they were not included in social security programmes. Despite the weakening of these systems due to the formalization of the economy and the migration of people, particularly men, to towns, it was anticipated that the local population would benefit from non-formal protection.

In post-independence Zimbabwe, the dominant social protection policy and practice have been shaped by political ideology of ruling party and government, **(Table 3.2).** In 1980 the government adopted a socialist state approach that actively sought to reduce poverty (Marquette, 1997) and close the welfare gaps produced by years of colonial rule and the war of liberation. Under socialism social protection is centralised and viewed as a responsibility of state (Coll-Black *et al.*, 2006). The system's legitimacy depended in part on its capacity to provide all people with comprehensive protection from birth to death. The focus on universal social protection is complemented by programmes such as old age pensions, social assistance for people with special needs. (Lindeman *et al.*, 2000). Extensive privileges are also extended to special groups such as war veterans (Lindeman *et al.*, 2000). In line with the socialist ideology Zimbabwe, many social assistance schemes were introduced, including free health care for those earning less than 150 Zimbabwe dollars a month, village health schemes, upgrading rural health facilities and the child supplementary feeding programme (Chimhowu, 2010). The discriminatory old-age pensions, which were meant to benefit primarily white expatriates, were repealed as part of the reforms.

Government expenditure on social protection grew by an average of 24 % per annum between 1980 and 1984 (Sanders & Davies, 1988).

In 1989, the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) was established to provide social security to people in formal employment (Government of Zimbabwe, 1989). The 1980-1989 period was characterised by a government driven by three core values of "explicit commitment to high moral standards" a people-centred approach to development, and a pan-African orientation (Garba, 2003; Garba, 2007). Its achievements played, *ex ante* what was characterised as a transformative role both intrinsic and instrumental (Adesina, 2009).

The discourse and practice of social protection in post-independence Zimbabwe is shaped by the country's history, political ideology, international and regional conventions, covenants and declarations, which refer to various aspects of social protection, although it is still to ratify some of the conventions. The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) and the Bill of Rights does not refer specially to social assistance but broadly underscores the provision of social protection, social security and social welfare (Sections 80 to 84). The constitutional provision reflects the influence of the colonial period, where emphasis was heavily on contributory social security schemes and not social assistance (Dafuleya, 2020). For instance, social insurance schemes are epitomised by the National Social Security Scheme that was introduced in 1989. NSSA currently manages two compulsory schemes: the Pension and Other Benefits Scheme, also known as the National Pension Scheme and the Accident Prevention and Workers Compensation Insurance Fund. Apart from this government-established vehicle, other private occupational pension schemes in the country offer social security to the employed, including private medical aid societies. The Constitution further emphasises equality of opportunities, non-discrimination, empowerment and employment creation with special focus on children (including orphans and vulnerable children), the elderly, and people with disabilities, women and the youth. Furthermore, specific Acts form the basis for the provision of social protection in Zimbabwe.

Between 1980 and 1989, the government adopted a number of Acts of Parliament to support social protection provisioning; for a comprehensive list, (**Table 3.1**). In line with socialist doctrine, government evolved into a distributive and welfare state that offers social protection benefits that were either means-tested or categorically targeted(Zhou & Masunungure, 2006). The government established hospitals and clinics in many parts of the country especially rural areas.

By 1987, approximately 7,000 community based village workers were trained by the Ministry of health. From 1980 to 1985, healthcare was free to all people who earned less than ZWL150 per month (Chipemba&Tom, 2021).

Enactment Year	Act	Purpose
1980	War Victims Compensation Act (Chapter 11:16)	Provision of compensation in respect to injuries or death caused by war
1985	National Heroes Dependents Assistance Act (Chapter 10:06)	To provide for the designation of national heroes and rendering of state assistance to dependents of such heroes; to establish a fund to finance States assistance to such dependents.
1989	National Social Security Authority Act (Chapter 17:04)	To provide for the establishment of social security schemes for the provision of benefits for employees; to provide for the constitution and functions of the National Social Security Board.
1990	Social Welfare Assistance Act (Chapter 17:06)	To provide for the granting of social welfare assistance to persons in need and their dependents.
1991	Disabled Persons Act (Chapter 17:01)	To provide for the welfare and rehabilitation of disabled persons; to provide for the appointment and functions of a Director for Disabled persons Affairs and the establishment and functions of a National Disability Board.
1995	War Veterans Act (Chapter 11:15)	To establish schemes for assisting war veterans and their dependents; a fund to finance such assistance; and the constitution and functions of the War Veterans Board.
2012	Older Persons Act (Chapter 17:11)	To provide for the well-being of older persons; to provide for the appointment of a Director for Older person affairs, the establishment of an Older Persons Board; to create an older persons fund.

Table 3.1: Social protection acts of parliament in Zimbabwe

Source: Author's compilation, 2021

The government enacted several non-contributory programmes to promote social protection provisioning, such as the Social Welfare Assistance Act (Chapter 17:06) and the Disabled Persons Act (Chapter 17:01), which were wholly funded by the government.

Through the Department of Social Welfare, the Social Welfare Act (Chapter 17:06) provides limited public assistance to poor persons who are unable to work, those over the age of 65, and people with disabilities. In addition, the Act provides for impoverished and handicapped older individuals in homes to receive social assistance through government grants and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Table 3.2 depicts some of the governmental measures that have integrated social protection from 1980 to the present.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the worldwide pre-eminence of capitalism in 1990 and the end of Zimbabwe's honeymoon period as funding from the international community dwindled. The government's socialist leanings meant that the government had to cover a wide range of services for which it lacked adequate resources. At the same time, the social welfare system was beginning to show signs of strain due to spending. Apart from food shortages, the agriculture based economy struggled to recover the effects of the 1991-1992 drought. The government involvement in the expensive Democratic Republic of Congo war compounded the economic collapse triggering food riots in the country. At the bidding of the International Monetary Fund, the government adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990, abandoning socialism and favouring market liberalisation (Rukuni, 2006). This meant government had shifted to a political philosophy of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism refers to a philosophy that places emphasis on state interventionist logic that is designed to extend the market to all spheres of society (Kiely, 2018). ESAP adoption marked the confluence between social protection and neoliberalism in Zimbabwe that meant redirecting resources away from the social services sector to the productive sector. This meant people had to pay for services such as education and health, among others. The high prevalence of HIV and AIDS further compounded the vulnerability of the poor and food-insecure people (van Donk, 2004). For the ESAP, external funding was made conditional on the government paying arrears on its debt with the World Bank.

From 1990, idiosyncratic shocks have been the main driver for the deployment of social protection instruments as mechanisms to respond to shocks. It included the ex-post implementation of social protection programmes and systems to assist the disabled people, the aged and labour constrained households.

The proportion of population receiving at least one social assistance programme increased from 16% in 2017 to 37 % (UNICEF, 2021). Despite an increase in coverage, 51% of the extreme poor received no benefits from any of the social assistance programmes (UNICEF, 2021). Some of the most pronounced challenges that confront social protection provisioning include underfunding, low coverage and the hyperinflation are the major constraints to social protection provisioning in Zimbabwe with only the BEAM that has at times attracted donor funding providing meaning educational assistance. Furthermore, fragmentation, duplication of activities by government departments makes the programmes costly with minimum impact, lack of systematic selection criteria leads to exclusion and inclusion errors while in some cases the size of the benefits are too meagre and coverage too small to make meaningful impact. Cash transfers remain predominantly donor-funded and less preferred than in-kind assistance. COVID-19 pandemic marked a shift from a focus on these traditional social assistance target groups to everyone since all were affected. The statutory instruments announced by the President to provide a platform for COVID-19 response in Zimbabwe are a typical example of the local elites bargain, the politicians, senior bureaucrats, power brokers, and military leaders who hold the reins of the country and wanted it to happen (Dercon 2022).

The ESAP did not accomplish much, and the economy's performance was poor as seen by real income reductions (Sibanda&Makwata, 2017). The fall of the Real GDP from 4% in 1990 to about 1,4% during ESAP was largely due, poor donor support, failure of initial conditions, external factors like the 1991–1992 recession in the economy, and ministries' failure to adhere to government policy(Sibanda&Makwata, 2017). During this period, GoZ focused mainly on BEAM with internal resources much at a reduced scale. ESAP was quickly abandoned after a short period of implementation. In 1997, the government, under the pressure of losing support, issued several populist policies (Kairiza, 2009). The first was the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 1996-2000 (ZIMPREST).The ZIMPREST was characterised by a balance between the productive and social sectors (Van Donk, 2004). One of the chief provisions of the populist policy was the payment of gratuities to liberation war fighters, secondment of armed forces to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war and compulsory acquisition of white-owned commercial farms (Kairiza, 2009).

These policies damaged trust in the government, as signalled by the World Bank's temporary withdrawal of balance of payments support (Kairiza, 2009). The Zimbabwean currency plummeted on November 14, 1997, losing 75% of its value versus the US dollar in a single day (Kairiza, 2009). ZIMPREST suffered from lack of support from external donors and as a result, it was poorly funded. The SDAF, the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (Nkum, 1998) and the Public Assistance programme(Munro, 2005) were completely abandoned and some remained but poorly funded, or redesigned but ineffective in supporting those living in extreme poverty, while new ones were adopted in hide sight. Between 1991 and 2009, the government promulgated several economic frameworks, but all suffered a stillbirth due to financial constraints. In 2000, government and ruling party shifted to a pseudo socialist political philosophy that denotes political tendencies that utilize democratic and populist phraseology to advance the interests of privileged sections of the upper middle class and defend capitalism against socialist revolution(North, 2025).

A pseudo socialist political philosophy is a false version of socialism (North, 2015). In Zimbabwe for example, this was characterised by the fast track reform programme. During the same period the per capita financing of health was USD8.55 in 2000 against a recommendation of USD 23,6 in 1997 by the Commission of Review into the health sector (Nyazema, 2010).

In 2001, an 18-month Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) was launched. Under the MERP, the Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) was launched the same year with technical assistance from the World Bank (Chitambira, 2010). Like its predecessor, ZIMPREST, the MERP suffered from lack of resources, which was marked by an exodus of donors from Zimbabwe. The total number of people assisted under the health programme declined from 25,000 in 2007 to 9,625 in 2008. One challenge, which came with this scheme, is that it did not assist in treatment at private health institutions. The shortages of drugs at referral hospitals meant that patients found themselves with prescriptions of drugs they cannot afford defeating the purpose of the programme (Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare, 2008). The employmenttraining programme had created less than 1000 jobs (Kaseke, 1993). The SDA was introduced as an afterthought and as a subsidiary objective. It was under-funded with implementation centralised in the capital in Harare. The Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PAAP) was launched in 1995 to address the deficiencies of the Social Dimension of Adjustment programme (SDA). The PAAP suffered the same fate as the SDA with one of the major reasons being lack of funding and limited political will. Verbal policy statements and policy objectives were not followed by effective and tangible support in annual budgets and had limited programme coverage (Chitambira, 2010).

The comparative analysis above shows that while the government appeared to have been working on an economic blueprint, the whole policymaking during the 1990s was almost completely haphazard and characterised by policy reversals and re-reversal (Jenkins, 2002). By the middle of 1993, the SDF had only reached 4% of its target population for food money and 20% for school tuition. Some of the challenges which affected BEAM are low coverage of the population at risk, late disbursements to schools resulting in the funds being eroded by inflation and disrupting the school's budgetary processes. It suffered from poor targeting and loss of continuity of support before the student sits for examinations. Support for the programme has been fluctuating with numbers of pupils declining sharply in some years as a result of macro-economic challenges (UNICEF, 2008).

Programme

Political philosophy	Name of Programme	Objective	K	ey Components
Phase I: Socialist inspired	War victims	Provision of compensation in	-	Compensation of those soldiers injured during war of
an era: Targeted	compensation Act	respect to injuries or death		liberation
unconditional grants in		caused by war		
cash or kind				
	Public Assistance	To help those who, because	-	Food subsidies
	programme (1980 –	of age, infirmity, or	-	Maintenance allowance
	1990)	disability and lack of family	-	School and exam fees weavers
		connections, were destined	-	Free primary schools' education
		to be chronically poor	-	Old age grants
Neoliberalism inspired	Economic Structural	Redirecting expenditure	-	Reducing government expenditure by cutting down
era: Loans targeted	Adjust Programme	from social services and		25% per cent of the civil service
conditional, unconditional	1990	emphasising investment	-	Withdrawal of subsidies
grants with labour			-	Introduction of user fees in education and health,
requirement				removal of subsidies, among other things
			-	Government ensuring an adequate supply of grain to
				the market
			-	Food for work for adults
			-	Grain loan scheme and
			-	Supplementary feeding of children under five years
				and primary school children

Political philosophy	Name of Programme	gramme Objective		ey Components	
Rethinking neoliberalism	Social Dimension of	Mitigate impacts of	- Employment and training programme		
and beginning of pseudo-	Adjustment (1991-	adjustment on the vulnerable - Support for informal and small-sca		Support for informal and small-scale enterprises	
socialist policies	1994)	households	-	Public works	
	Introduced as an		-	Food subsidies	
Phase II: Mixture of	afterthought during		-	Exemption from cost-recovery measures for	
targeted conditional,	ESAP			vulnerable groups	
unconditional transfers and			-	Monitoring and evaluation of development	
loans in 1991				programmes.	
			-	Grain Loan Scheme	
	HIV and AIDS Policy	To promote and guide	-	Management of the National Response to HIV and	
	1999	present and future responses		AIDS	
		to AIDS in Zimbabwe			
	Zimbabwe National	Articulation of a shared	l - Clear priorities for resource allocation an		
	HIV AIDS Strategic	sense of direction to the		accountability	
	Plan 2006-2010	national response to HIV		Systems for regular joint review and consultation on	
		AIDS to provide a basis for	r progress		
		advocacy, resource		Recognition of connections between HIV/AIDS	
		Mobilisation for HIV AIDS		framework and poverty reduction	
		responses.	- Managing the private, public partnerships in serv		
				delivery	
Pseudo socialist-inspired	Poverty Alleviation	Alleviate extreme poverty in	-	Community development through social mobilisation	
era	Action Plan (1995-	the country	- Community infrastructure and capacity building		
The mixture of targeted	2000)		- Microenterprise and informal sector developmen		
conditional, unconditional				through credit and technical assistance	

Political philosophy	Name of Programme	Objective	Key Components	
transfers and provision of	Introduced during		- Poverty monitoring and strategic planning, land	
credit/ loans or training	ZIMPREST, well		reform	
	supported in terms of		- Fast track land reform	
	policy but suffered		- Social safety nets to address the challenges in	
	from financial and		education, health and food security of low-income	
	implementation		families.	
	challenges			
	Enhanced Social		- Essential education assistance (BEAM)	
	Protection Project		- Children in difficult circumstances	
	(2001-2010)		- Public Works Component	
	Introduced under the		- Assisted Medical treatment orders (AMTOs)	
	MERP, it suffered		- Emergency drugs and medical supplies	
	from a lack of funding		- Social protection strategy to improve strategic	
	and implementation		planning, monitoring and evaluation in the ministry	
	challenges			
	Medium Term Plan-	Responding to the orphan	- Public Works /Food for Work	
	Social Protection	crisis, HIV and AIDS, access	- Public and Private Contributory Pensions and	
	Priorities	to education, health services,	Contributory Medical Insurance	
	Introduced during the	birth registration, seasonal	- Non-Contributory Pensions including Disability	
	era of the National	targeted inputs, agricultural	Assistance	
	Economic Revival	input support programmes	- War Veterans Fund and Heroes Dependency	
	Programme 2001-2010		Assistance Fund	
			- Assisted Medical Treatment Orders (AMTOs)	
			- Public Assistance	

Political philosophy	Name of Programme	Objective	Key Components		
			Older person Assi	stance	
			National Action	Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable	
			Children I and II.		
	Medium-term 2011-	Productive assets creation	Drought relief		
	2013	Loans and credit	Public works		
			Pauper burial		
			Market-based input	uts	
Phase III: The mixture of	Zimbabwe Agenda for	The focus was reengaging	Food security and	poverty alleviation	
socialism with heavy tilting	Social and Economic	with the global community	Basic education as	ssistance module	
towards a neoliberal era	Recovery 2013-2018		Cash transfers		
			Child protection		
A mixture of targeted					
conditional, unconditional					
transfers and provision of					
loans or training					

Source: Author's compilation

The Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) influenced another 12 months National Economic Revival Programme 2003-2004 (NERP) that was launched in 2003. The plan was developed by stakeholders, which include GoZ, the private sector and labour. This plan received positive buy-in from the wider community, which is evidenced by selective funding of some its component, like the NAP by the OECD donors through funding mechanisms outside government. Zimbabwe is now characterised by developing sector-specific strategic plans such as; The National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan and The National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. These plans are not hinged on an overall national strategic plan, which results in duplication due to coordination challenges usually during implementation. NERP has balanced consideration of the different facets of the country from economic, sectors, social sectors and environmental. It had a Social Protection Fund provision with an estimated amount of \$15.8 billion for 2003. It also provides for a Health Assistance Fund, which makes available medical vouchers to vulnerable community members to access free medical assistance at government hospitals and allocation to support small and microenterprises-the Empowerment Fund.

Under the auspices of NERP, the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP) was launched in 2004 to respond to the orphan crisis fuelled mainly by the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Its mission was to provide orphans and other vulnerable children with critical services such as education, food, health care, birth registration and protection from abuse and exploitation. The essential services extended under the NAP were designed to improve the life of orphans and vulnerable children. The Basic Education Assistance Module is the most visible of these (BEAM). BEAM is a community-run social assistance programme which would ideally make it more sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable children. It also ensures the supply of basic teaching and learning materials to schools and transfers cash to schools as payment for tuition for identified vulnerable children. In 2002, approximately 418,000 children benefited from BEAM representing about 20 per cent of all the primary and secondary school population (Mupawaenda & Murimba, 2003). In 2009, the Government of National Unity (GNU) tried to restore public welfare amid economic stability and growth following the official adoption of the US dollar as the national currency (Kanyedze et al., 2017). In January 2010, programmes under implementation reached only 11,665 vulnerable groups, representing coverage of four per cent of the 250,000 extremely poor and labour constrained households that require social welfare interventions (UNICEF, 2010).

The National Action Plan I (NAP1) was followed by the launch of National Action Plan II (NAPII), which ran from 2011 to 2015. NAPII sought to build on the lessons learnt from National Action Plan I (Ministry of Public Service, 2010). The government agreed to provide resources for the continuation of BEAM support to primary education under National Action Plan II, while development partners increased their support for the social cash transfer component. Although national coverage is the goal, it will take some time for the social cash transfer mechanism to operate at scale. In 2010, the public assistance programme of the Ministry of Labour and social services had a budget of US\$1,000,000. This focused on addressing the social protection needs of approximately 4,166 households.

The social protection interventions have mainly remained inadequate and exclusionary, marked with high levels of lack of predictability, consistency, transparency and durability (Chitambira, 2010; Wallace-Karenga, 2009). In general, the discrepancies are due to the country's vulnerability, which has resulted in programmes cutting back on support or, in the worst-case scenario, shutting down. The inconsistencies in government programmes were a result of a lack of fiscal support for assistance to the poor, such as the aged, crippled and families in distress (Gandure, 2009). However, Van Donk, 2004 argues that the problem was not just a lack of resources for implementation, but also an inappropriate targeting of resources.

The collapse of the economy over the last decade caused some downscaling and retrenchments, resulting in low levels of formal sector employment. As a result, most workplace pensions and social security plans were unviable and unsustainable (Chitambira, 2010). Furthermore, the country's high inflation between 2005 and 2009 rendered most of the payouts useless and worthless. A considerable amount (67%) of social protection expenditure went towards civil service pensions, about 1.3 percent of the population (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). Those who were not in formal employment were expected to be covered through social safety nets. Nonetheless, the coverage was highly unpredictable resulting in a small proportion of the needy being reached by the assistance. Interventions were also heavily dependent on donor financing, which steadily declined.

3.2 The Zimbabwe unconditional harmonised social cash transfer programme

When the Government of National Unity (GNU) was proposed and in place, donors signalled a desire to re-engage with the government.

One of the first signs of reengagement was establishment of the Child Protection Fund (CPF), as a vehicle to support aspects of government desires as expressed in the National Action Plan(NAP) for Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2011-2015(UNICEF & MoLSS 2010). NAP II had four main components: 1) a social cash transfer programme; 2) improved access to child protection services; 3) improved basic education access for OVCs; and 4) improved programme management and service implementation. The CPF was donor-funded mechanism established with UNICEF as the fund manager at a time it was most unlikely because of an extraordinary economic catastrophe and a nascent GNU (UNICEF & MoLSS, 2010). The HSCT began in 2011 as a response to chronic food insecurity and deep poverty in rural Zimbabwe. One of the major pillars of the CPF that the donors were keenly interested in was harmonised social cash transfers (HSCTs that by 2013 covered 10 new districts that later expanded to 16 districts in terms of geography (Fig 3.1) (UNICEF & MoLSS, 2010).

The CPF had three pillars whose objectives were to reduce household poverty by implementing a national cash transfer programme targeting healthy food-poor and labour-constrained households and enabling access to child protection services for all vulnerable children (MoLSS, 2011) The cash transfers sought to strengthen the purchasing power of 55,000 ultra-poor households who were labour-constrained (UNICEF & MoLSS, 2010). The Harmonised Social Cash Transfers (HSCT) programme sought to harmonise social protection programmes in Zimbabwe. The baseline surveys included 236,458 households, of which 18,637 households were identified as labour-constrained, food poor and eligible to receive the cash grants (Schubert, 2012).

The HSCT paid a minimum of \$10 per person twice a month, increasing by \$5 for a second person, up to a maximum of \$25 for four or more persons (MoLSS, 2010). Payments were delivered through a Cash in Transit (CIT) firm (MoLSS, 2010). The programme's exit strategy was implicitly tied to the retargeting exercise (that never happened), where beneficiary households no longer labour-constrained would exit the programme (MoLSS, 2012).

In 2015, Zimbabwe had twenty-three (23) social assistance policy instruments on paper (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). Yet, some programmes were poorly funded, including the Assistance Medical Treatment Orders, Maintenance of Disabled Persons, Support to Children in Difficult Circumstances, Food Mitigation Programme and Support for Families in Distress programmes (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016).

Social assistance expenditure was low and unpredictable, dropping starkly from 1.9% of the national budget in 2010 to 0.72% in 2016 (Freeland *et al.*, 2019) and was less than 1% of total expenditure between 2011 and 2013 (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016).




Figure 3.1: UNICEF 2016: The sixteen districts where the CPF and one of its pillars the HSCT was implemented

Despite increasing demand, the CPF was scaled down from nineteen to eight districts, reaching only 23,000 beneficiaries in 2016 (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). Even though evidence of the cash transfers demonstrated a wide range of benefits to vulnerable families (Miller *et al.*, 2010; Blattman&Niehaus, 2014), the government of Zimbabwe did not expand the HSCTs (Andrews *et al.*, 2012). McCord, Winder and Yablonski (2016) argue that evidence of the impact and affordability of HSCT was not the primary driver of government decisions to downscale social protection financing in 2016. Actually in 2017, government spending on social assistance was 0, 72% of GDP compared to an average of 1.1% in other African countries (The World Bank, 2016).

The health funding dropped from USD 57 in 2017 to USD21 in 2020 along with limited government capacity to procure basic drugs and medical equipment (UNICEF, 2020).

3.3 Management and operation of the HSCT

The Department of Social Services (DSS) is in charge of the programme's general management and monitoring. The programme is managed and implemented at three levels: at the national, provincial, and district levels. The DSS headquarters is in charge of planning and control, capacity development, information management systems, finance and administration, advocacy, and collaborations at the national level. The provincial offices provide the implementing district officials with direction, oversight, and control. The district offices are responsible for ensuring that all district level stakeholders implement the programme in a costeffective, dependable, and timely manner, in accordance with the operations manual.

The district offices are also in charge of overseeing the private service providers that have been hired to target and provide services. They train enumerators and sub-district structures to carry out their responsibilities in the targeting process, which include coordinating referrals triggered by child protection issues identified during the targeting process, administering changes in beneficiary households, and taking corrective action if any problems arise. Child Protection Committees (CPCs) at the ward level supplement the DSS in some of its functions. The CPCs help with verification of targeting results, alerting beneficiaries, monitoring the payment process, counselling beneficiaries, and contacting the District Office in the event that the beneficiary household's head dies (Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare, 2011).

3.4 Eligibility for harmonised social cash transfers

The HSCT phase 1 (2011 to 2012) implementation covered all the wards in the sixteen districts. The districts were chosen using triangulated poverty data from the Poverty Assessment Situation Survey (PASS) 2003, the National Nutrition Survey 2010 and the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) report (2010) and modified to accommodate a mix of urban and rural residents. A private firm in partnership with the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) conducted a household census in all designated districts between September to December 2011.

A total of 236,458 homes were surveyed, with 18,637 households recognised as being labourconstrained and food insecure (Schubert, 2012). Demographic and poverty statistics were included in the census. The information was placed into a centralised database, from which labour-constrained households were selected and interviewed. The findings were re-entered into the database, and a list of eligible households was prepared based on the above-mentioned criteria. The list of eligible households and individuals was sent to the District Social Service Officer (DSSO) for verification. The DSSOs provided the beneficiary cards together with the date and venue of payments to the CPC to announce to the beneficiaries. Although the cash transfer is 'unconditional,' beneficiary, households are encouraged to utilise it to meet their urgent needs, such as education and health, for themselves and their children.

3.5 Transfer amount

The amounts paid were determined by the price of the 'food basket' supplied by the World Food Programme (WFP) to vulnerable households and payment under the government's Public Works scheme. With the exception of one ward in Goromonzi (Ward 4) and one in Bulawayo, the first cycle of HSCT payments commenced in February 2012 and was completed by April 2012 to all authorised families (Schubert 2012). The second instalment was due in May/early June, and the third instalment was due in August 2012. The minimum transfer amount is \$10 per person twice a month, with an extra \$5 for each additional person up to a maximum of \$25 for four or more people. For a household of four or more persons, the transfer equated to \$6 per person, which represented 20 per cent of the individual food poverty threshold of \$30. This transfer value represented 20 percent of the household consumption, a percentage that makes HSCT among the more generous cash transfers programmes in Africa.

3.6 Transfer payment and delivery mechanism

Initially, payments were to be paid bi-monthly and delivered to one or two pay sites across each ward via a Cash in Transit (CIT) company. The Central Programme Office (CPO) sends payment schedules to the delivery agency and instructs the bank to transfer funds to the delivery agency, which starts the payment process. The DSSO holds a ward-level meeting at which the recipients are paid. The delivery agency electronically reports to the CPO at the conclusion of each payment cycle and returns any residual amounts to the programme account. An external agency conducted a verification exercise prior to the start of the next payment schedule to determine if intended recipients got the correct amount of money and whether operations were completed. Following the completion of this procedure, if no financial irregularities are discovered, subsequent payments are disbursed.

The programme's exit plan is implicitly linked to the retargeting process, in which beneficiaries who are no longer labour-constrained are removed. Every two years, a retargeting exercise was supposed to take place, but it never did. Previously, transfers to genuine beneficiary families would only be stopped if the head of a one-person beneficiary home died, the household moved out of the project area, or the household disintegrated totally (Schubert, 2012)

3.7 Legal framework for social protection

Like in most countries in SSA social protection in Zimbabwe is mainly designed to cater only for persons employed in the formal sector and even in such case, the benefits are highly inadequate. The State Services Act Chapter 16:06 governs the Public Service Pensions Scheme while the statutory provisions of the Social Welfare Assistance Act chapter 17:06 governs the public assistance programme. For a long time, there has been conflicting information in relation to the status of a social protection strategy in Zimbabwe. The government indicates that it has had a national social protection strategy for decades, while Chitambira (2010) states that Zimbabwe still does not have a comprehensive social protection strategy in place. However, discussions towards the formulation of a National Social Protection Policy Framework only started and only finalised in November 2015. The policy exercise aimed to harmonise the various social protection instruments under the harmonised social protection policy that will re-establish Zimbabwe's national social protection system.

In 1976, the Pension and Provident Fund was passed. The Act provides for the registration, administration and regulation of private pension funds in Zimbabwe. The Act allows any employer to register and operate not more than one active fund in respect of permanent staff. Employers of local authorities are covered under the Local Authorities Employees Pensions Scheme Act (Chapter 29:09). The state has several non-contributory schemes for civil servants, which are wholly funded by the government. These include, for example, the State Disability Benefits Act and the War Pensions Scheme.

The National Social Security Authority (NSSA) administers social security services in Zimbabwe. NSSA was established by an Act of parliament in 1989 (Chapter 17:04) and began operations in 1994.

This is a contributory pension scheme, which provides for payment of pensions, gratuities and other benefits to or in respect of persons employed by the state on retirement, discharge, resignation, death or other termination of service. As provided under the Act, employees contribute 7.5 per cent while the government contributes 15 per cent. The government contribution is deposited into a Consolidated Revenue Fund and not invested, while contributions by employees are used to pay pensions for those who retire. According to the Act, NSSA has two functions, administering every scheme and fund established in terms of the act and advising the minister on matters concerning the operations of schemes and on matters relating to social security. It started with the National Pensions Scheme (NPS) and the Workers' Compensation Insurance Scheme (WCIS). The NPS is based on a 50/50 contribution, while the WCIS is employer-funded. The coverage of NSSA remains confined to those in formal employment, leaving the majority subsisting in the informal sector uncovered. The National Social Security Authority(NSSA) scheme only covers about 1.2 million, which represents only about 17 percent of the labour force and the other occupational schemes only cater for about 840 000 people(Chikova, 2013). As of December 2009, 142,835 people benefited from pension pay-outs and allowances from NSSA (Chikova, 2013). The state has several non-contributory schemes for civil servants, which are wholly funded by government. These include, for example, the State Disability Benefits Act and the War Pensions Scheme.

The 1998 Social Welfare Assistance Act provides limited public assistance through the Department of Social Welfare to destitute persons incapable of work, people aged over 65 or older or with a disability. The Act also makes a provision for the placement of the needy and vulnerable elder persons in homes where they receive social assistance through government grants as well as other assistance from Non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The government has also provided for other social assistance packages through the Disabled Persons Act, the War Veterans Pensions Scheme governed by the War Veterans Act (Chapter 11:15) and the War Victims Compensation Fund, which provides compensation to persons injured as a result of the war of liberation.

In 1997, the War Victims Compensation Fund was suspended after it paid out \$450 million to 112 to high-level government officials and their families. After massive protests by the war veterans, the government paid a further \$2 billion to 50,000 ex-combatants. As the relationship between the government and the international community continued to deteriorate, resulting in the suspension of the ESPP, the government decided to continue with one of the components of ESPP, namely BEAM.

BEAM aims to reduce the number of people failing to attend school because of hardships and provide school fees waivers to reduce the rate of dropouts. BEAM replaced the department of social welfare's education assistance programme.

The socialist oriented governments are often characterized as the opposite of neoliberal oriented governments because socialists have been associated with the quest to achieve social equality and egalitarianism entailing social protection for all. However even the neoliberal oriented governments have actively utilized social protection and social policy as a political tool to shape the social order along the lines deemed conducive to their interests and ideologies expressed along nationalist, racialized, ethnicised, religious, and patriarchal or other lines, as well as to innovate practices of segregation, exclusion, and subordination(Fisher 2020). For decades ideological inclinations have shaped social protection policy and provisioning in Zimbabwe. However, the COVID-19 pandemic blurred the ideological inclinations. For example, 1980 government that had socialist inclinations typically prefer to expand welfare provisioning whereas the neoliberal of the 1990s preferred to cut welfare budgets, invoking tropes about 'dependency' and the 'undeserving poor' (Tihelková, 2015). The COVID 19 crisis was a shared challenge, everybody was affected by lockdown restrictions on their mobility and activities (Devereux, 2021). COVID-19 highlighted the importance of having well-functioning social services in place, but it also exposed weaknesses and gaps, especially in terms of humanitarian relief capacities, health services and social protection systems (Devereux, 2021). This necessitated a shift from social protection tradition of focusing on idiosyncratic to covariate shocks that the systems in place for targeting, delivery and grievance handling mechanisms among others could not handle resulting in calls reconfiguring social protection so that it is shock responsive. On the 27 March 2020, a Presidential Declaration of COVID-19 was proclaimed classifying COVID-19 as a national disaster.

The policy framework for the COVID-19 response in Zimbabwe was through Statutory Instruments 77 and 83 as well economic recovery and stimulus packages and review. The lack of priority funding for social protection interventions over a long period had implications for the country COVID-19 response. The country was not prepared at all levels to deal with pandemic in that it lack robust registration and digital delivery systems that provided valuable for a countries such as Zambia and South Africa. The two countries were well placed to respond promptly and generously to the social impacts of COVID-19, because of its long-established and well-administered social protection system (Devereux, 2021).

Food relief and cash assistance and later health measures constituted the main instruments of the response to COVID-19. This combination of different social protection instruments is crucial strengthening cohesion in community (Strupat, 2022). However, delays in the identification and delivery of benefits were a common feature throughout.

Government dominated funding through MoPSLSW with the first amount pegged at ZWL 180 late revised to ZWL300 (3) which was still considered inadequate (Chipenda&Tom, 2021). The targeting of the transfers was controversial with some indicating it benefited ZANU PF supporters. The MoPSLSW indicated that a data base was available from which beneficiary's would be identified for vertical expansion while means testing would be used for horizontal expansion. Additionally lists were received from informal traders associations and Ministry of Women Affairs and local authorities. Furthermore the Minister of Finance and Economic Development stated that beneficiaries would be identified through a "sophisticated algorithm" that would determine who would be eligible to receive funding as it would analyse a potential beneficiary bank account and mobile wallet(Mudzingwa 2020). The lack of clear legislation and coordination mechanisms militated against accountability and effectiveness. Different categories of beneficiaries for social protection were identified during COVID- 19. However, even before the COVID-19 epidemic, there were lingering gaps in social protection that affected the lives of those without disabilities as (Majoko, 2020). Following the experiences of COVID-19, the debate on social protection is now titling towards shock responsive social protection in Zimbabwe.

3.8 Financing social protection in Zimbabwe

Despite having a plethora of social protection instruments, Zimbabwe spends considerably less on social protection expenditure in general when compared to other countries (Chitambira, 2010). The focus of the research is mainly on cash transfers as one type of instrument within the broad category of "social assistance which is a sub set of social protection". Social assistance comprises well-known instruments such as noncontributory cash grants, cash for work, feeding schemes, child grants, disability grants etc. These measures aim to keep the poor engaged in production, or to help them to re-engage following a crisis. Zimbabwe spends 3.5% on both contributory and non-contributory social protection, which is less than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 4.5 % (UNICEF, 2021).

Since 2003, Zimbabwe has not had strategic development plans, but short-term economic stabilisation programmes (Van Donk, 2004) a development, which is not conducive to the growth of social protection. Financing of social protection must be planned through carefully determined comprehensive national strategies that embrace the entire needs of the population. Instead, Zimbabwe is now characterised by developing sector-specific strategic plans such as; The National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan and The National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. These plans are not hinged on an overall national strategic plan, which results in duplication due to coordination challenges usually during implementation. Between 2009 and 2010, there was a decline in budgetary allocations from 467 per cent to 4, 3 percent (Chitambira, 2010). The social expenditure, calculated based on budget pronouncements as a share of the country's GDP was 98 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2, 6 percent of GDP in 2010. From 2011, the government has indicated a commitment, which will run constantly up to 2013. Its support is earmarked to the continuation of BEAM, while development partners will support cash-based social protection. An analysis of development plans and budgets in Zimbabwe shows that military consideration and perceived economic rationality have at times crowded out social issues, resulting in more budgetary allocation towards military and perceived economic aspects.

Table 3.3 Financing and coverage of social protection in Zimbabwe

Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
			HSCT g	overnment expend	iture 2013-20	18			
Total programme Expenditure	Not available	Not available	Not available	7,621,452	17600,768	16,360,734	13,261,470	10,761,590	11,007,330
Total expenditure on benefits	Not available	Not available	Not available	6,627,350	14,079,653	14,786,622	11,788,560	9,536,040	7,733,780
Administration expenditure	Not available	Not available	Not available	994,102	3,521,115	1,574,122	1,472,910	1,225,550	3,273,550
Admin as share of total expenditure	Not available	Not available	Not available	13%	20%	10%	11%	11%	30%
		•	BEAM co	verage and govern	ment expendi	ture from 20	10-2018	•	
Beneficiaries Primary schools	537,594	408,486	339,827	345,567	298,518	118,408	Not available	Not available	Not available
Budgeted expenditure	15,000,000	10,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	10,000,000	4,920,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Total Programme Expenditure	15,000,000	10,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	10,000,000	2,520,000	Not available	Not available	Not available

Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total expenditure on benefits	13,800,000	9,200,000	13,800,00	13,800,00	9,200,000	2,268,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Administration expenditure	1,200,000	800,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	800,000	252,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Beneficiaries- secondary schools	198,229	119,498	106,216	92,917	12,890	78,920	Not available	Not available	Not available
Budgeted expenditure	13,000,000	13,270,000	15,600,000	15,800,000	16,000,000	3,380,00	Not available	Not available	Not available
Total programme expenditure	13,000,000	12,270,000	5,600,000	10,800,000	7,000,000	4,200,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Total expenditure on benefits	11,700,000	11,043,000	5,040,000	9,720,000	7,200,000	1,512,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Administration expenditure	1,300,000	1,227,000	560,000	1,080,000	800,000	168,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
		AN	ITOs covera	ge and governme	nt expenditure	2010-2018	·	-	
Beneficiaries	22,308	25,000	24,000	25,000	26,400	25,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Budgeted expenditure	700,000	800,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	970,000	Not available	Not available	Not available

91	617,190 Public a 14,011	707,872 assistance cov	799,994	249,993	739,999	Not	Not	Not
		ssistance cov				available	available	available
			verage and gover	rnment expendit	ture 2010-201	8.	<u> </u>	
t available		14,501	9,671	7,856	4,875	Not available	Not available	Not available
	3,00,000	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,700,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
t available	1,473,657	350,000	900,000	120,000	1,187,000	Not available	Not available	Not available
Food	l deficit miti	gation progr	amme coverage	and governmen	t expenditure	2010-2018		
000	140,500	36,000	180,000	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
000,000	10,800,000	1,600,000	700,000	4,884,749	3,192,050	Not available	Not available	Not available
21,000	9,200,000	200,000	3,060,000	4,799,273	3,192.050	Not available	Not available	Not available
21,000	8,525,878	76,000	2,788,800	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
	674,122	124,000	272,200	Not	Not	Not	Not	Not
0 2 2	00 00,000 1,000 1,000	00 140,500 00,000 10,800,000 1,000 9,200,000 1,000 8,525,878	00 140,500 36,000 00,000 10,800,000 1,600,000 1,000 9,200,000 200,000 1,000 8,525,878 76,000	00 140,500 36,000 180,000 00,000 10,800,000 1,600,000 700,000 1,000 9,200,000 200,000 3,060,000 1,000 8,525,878 76,000 2,788,800	00 140,500 36,000 180,000 Not available 00,000 10,800,000 1,600,000 700,000 4,884,749 1,000 9,200,000 200,000 3,060,000 4,799,273 1,000 8,525,878 76,000 2,788,800 Not available	00 140,500 36,000 180,000 Not available Not available 00,000 10,800,000 1,600,000 700,000 4,884,749 3,192,050 1,000 9,200,000 200,000 3,060,000 4,799,273 3,192.050 1,000 8,525,878 76,000 2,788,800 Not available Not available	available available available available available available 00,000 10,800,000 1,600,000 700,000 4,884,749 3,192,050 Not available 1,000 9,200,000 200,000 3,060,000 4,799,273 3,192.050 Not available 1,000 8,525,878 76,000 2,788,800 Not available Not available available	00 140,500 36,000 180,000 Not available 1,000 8,525,878 76,000 2,788,800 Not available Not available Not available Not available Not available Not available

Fiscal	Households	Annual cost	Government	Released to HSCT	Donor
Year	covered	in USD	Contribution		Contribution USD
2011	50,000	12,000,00	6,000,000	Nil	6,000,00
2012	70,000	16,800,000	6,000,000	Nil	10,800,000
2013	80,000	19,200,000	6,000,000	Nil	13,200,000
2014	Not	17,300,00	2,000,000	209,000	11,300,000
	available				
2015	Not	19,700,000	1,700,000	300,000	13,700,000
	available				
2016	Not	12,300,000	2,000,000	500,000 (planned)	9,401,000
	available				

 Table 3.4: Expected beneficiaries and government contribution to HSCT by year versus

 donor contribution

While the Zimbabwe government, through budget support to the Ministry, is supposed to match donor funds on a 50-50 basis for transfers to the beneficiaries, this commitment has never been met, (Table 3.4). The trend above reflects a gap between the rhetorical policy endorsements to cash transfer social assistance provision and actual allocations made by the government in response to donor financing incentives. The actual releases had remained very low to non-existent since 2012 when the government started budgeting for the programme. This may also signal that government of Zimbabwe does not prioritise issues of social protection specially cash transfers. This may, however, be a reflection of the limited fiscal space in the country. Most of the funding towards social assistance remains largely contributions from the international community, with the government usually contributing some aspects in-kind and others with limited financial contributions. The international community continues to support cash-based transfers to demonstrate to the government the efficacy of such a policy instrument.

In Zimbabwe, cash transfers remain predominantly donor-funded and less preferred than inkind assistance. However, Zimbabwe is one of 10 countries where less than 20% of children between 6-23 months received an adequate diet, compromising their quality of life (FSIN & Global Network Against Food Crises, 2020). In a shock such as the March 2019 Cyclone Idai, 53,999 people were affected, increasing food insecurity. In addition, cyclone Idai caused crop destruction estimated to be 60% of crops in Chimanimani and 25 per cent in Chipinge and parts of the Masvingo province (FEWSNET, 2019), worsening household food insecurity. In such contexts, policymakers play a pivotal role in creating a conducive policy environment and setting the institutional context for implementing interventions such as social protection to cope with the different threats. Research to understand how the attitude of policymakers in Zimbabwe towards cash transfers are generated from perceptions could help understand and unlock the social protection policy change and implementation in Zimbabwe.

3.9 Conceptual framework for policy decision making

Explaining how people react to socially transmitted warnings about hazards and tragedies has long been of interest to researchers (Tierney, Lindell&Perry, 2001; Lindell&Perry, 1992). One of the most widely used tools in different contexts is the PMT and PADM. The PMT and PADM are used to investigate and comprehend the policy makers' opinions of various social protection instruments in order to better understand the barriers to selection of response instruments. The model captures people's decision-making when they are presented with a threat (such food insecurity) and when evaluating various potential treatments, making it a helpful method for analyzing decision-making processes. It also helps to understand how the attitude towards a particular social protection instrument is generated from perceptions. According to the literature (Rogers, 1983; Lindell & Perry, 2012), risk perception and coping strategies determine behavioural reactions to hazards. They are critical indicators of policy actors', individuals', and groups' willingness to begin evaluating various response measures such cash transfers, food for work, supplemental feeding, food distribution and cash for work programmes (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Rogers, 1983; Lindell & Perry, 2012).

However, understanding the causes of the hazard and its effect do not directly derive only from objectively examining the existing situation (Stone, 2002). Rather, policy actors, individuals and groups shape and define the problems based on their values and interests (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993; Stone, 2002). The groups then create some narrative of the causes and effects of the hazard and concurrently identify possible solutions (Dery, 1984; Lahat, 2010). Studies have established that knowledge, experience, perceptions and value orientation are vital determinants of policy change (Sabatier, 1998; Lahat, 2010). While there is increased recognition and utilisation of policy-relevant knowledge in social protection to achieve rationality in policymaking, it indirectly downgrades the influence of other factors such as politics, perceptions and attitudes and values in policy change (Learmonth & Harding, 2006; Kay, 2011).

The premise of rationality is challenged in cognitive psychology, which emphasises the relevance of how an issue is described in affecting people's decisions (Ariely & Gash, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a world governed by political expediency, evidence plays a little role in policymaking (Gadeberg & Victor, 2011). Furthermore, research reveals that one of the factors influencing policymakers' decisions is their, perceptions, sense of trust, respect, and influence (Ariely & Gash, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The issue of perceptions is even more significant in today policy arena that places emphasis on a multiplicity of working groups, including expert and experienced professionals that gives rise to challenges of collaboration, legitimisation and even trust. On the forefront of emphasising, the importance of perceptions and values held by policy actors in policy change is the Advocacy Coalition Framework.

Knowledge about facts alone does not provide sufficient basis for legitimising the governing of allocative responsibilities (Sandberg *et al.*, 2018). Apparent differences were found between policy actors on the policy left and right (Barton, 1975; Lahat, 2010). The value orientation of the policy actors tends to be associated with their understanding of the cause of the vulnerability and preferred social protection instrument to address it. However, research (Skovdal, Mushati, &Gregson 2013; Gherhes at al., 2021) in social protection has looked at the perceptions of the beneficiaries and not the policy actors.

The Protection-Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 2012) capture individuals' decision-making when faced with a threat (such as food insecurity) and when evaluating different possible interventions. The PMT has its roots in sociology and psychology (Rogers, 1983). The model was created to describe how people are driven to respond in a self-protective manner in response to a perceived health threat (Rogers, 1975). Nonetheless, the model has been used to describe the decision-making process in relation to hazards in a broader sense (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Milne *et al.*, 2000). PADM was originally designed to investigate protective action options in the face of an immediate danger or threat (Lindell & Perry, 1992), but it was later expanded to include long-term hazard modifications (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Risk perception (threat appraisal) and coping appraisal are shown in both models as two connected processes that affect the desire to engage in a protective reaction.

To determine coping evaluation or appraisal, the PMT model incorporates response-efficacy (i.e. perceived effectiveness of protective response), self-efficacy (i.e. perceived capacity to execute protective response), and response costs (i.e. perceived costs associated with protective response implementation). The Protection-Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 2012) capture individuals' decision-making when faced with a threat (such as food insecurity) and when evaluating different possible interventions.

PADM differentiates this process into hazard-related qualities (perceived efficacy for protecting people, property, and utility for other reasons) and resource-related attributes (the relationship between hazard adjustment and household resources). As a result, PAMD (Lindell & Perry, 2012) is a more extensive method to coping evaluation or appraisal (Figure 3.2). According to the PMT and PAMD methodologies, people assess how threatened they feel by hazards based on the perceived chance of occurrence, as well as the impacts of the disaster on people and assets. The perceived probability of the hazard is the extent people feel exposed to a danger and its perceived consequences, representing the threat's influence on people and their property. Both models suggest that diverse sources of information, such as past personal experience, warnings, or observational learning, might activate protection ((Lindell & Perry, 2012; Rogers, 1983). When the perceived risk exceeds a specific level, coping appraisal begins, which is the evaluation of possible response methods. The major pillars that constitute coping appraisal are perceived reaction efficacy for individuals, community and property that assesses whether the proposed coping response effectively minimises the perceived threat and has potential usefulness for other objectives. The protective reaction costs define the link between the proposed response and available resources, such as money, time and effort from both inside and beyond the community, expertise, skills and equipment, and other parties' participation. Finally, self-efficacy refers to one's conviction in one's ability to fulfill the community's recommended coping reaction. While perceived utility for other objectives has not been included in PMT, it is an important variable generated from PADM in order to account for the numerous functions ecosystems and social protection provide and to justify the models' combination. The motive for or against an adaptive response such as a social protection mechanism is the result of the decision-making process (Floyd et al., 2000; Grothmann & Patt, 2005).




Figure 3.2. Model of the decision-making process towards protective action

(Becker et al., 2014; Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Lindell & Perry, 2012).

The PMT and PADM models have mostly been used in quantitative research contexts to explain individual protective responses (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013; Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). However, the PMT and PADM frameworks have been used together to look at the elements that impact municipal flood risk management (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013). According to the authors, such integrated frameworks might be a useful tool for analysing decision-making in public contexts (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013). The PMT and PADM models have, to date, been principally applied in quantitative research settings to explain the protective responses of individuals (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013; Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). However, the PMT and PADM as a combined framework have been applied to investigate the factors that influence municipal flood risk management (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013). The authors report that such integrated frameworks could be a helpful approach to analyse the decision-making process in public settings (Bubeck *et al.*, 2013). The combined PMT and PADM model depicts two perceptual processes that influence the attitude toward a protective response: Threat Appraisal and Coping Appraisal, which offers a framework for describing the links. This, in turn, would have an impact on the effectiveness of policies relating to the specific mechanisms or instruments.

3.10 Review of previous studies on social protection policy change in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, the political decision-making processes, perceptions, experiences, levels of knowledge of policy actors and questions of how to examine them empirically and consider them in social protection policy reform, remain unexplored. Only a few studies have sought to understand what has influenced social protection reform in Zimbabwe. The most recent study entitled "External Donors and Social Protection in Africa: A Case Study of Zimbabwe" by Devereux and Kapingidza (2020), explores the role of external donors in social protection reform. Devereux and Kapingidza's (2020) study found that Zimbabwe's social protection policy process could be characterised as "donor-driven" rather than "nationally-owned". According to the findings, development partners in Zimbabwe are political players who utilise their financial clout and technical competence to promote their own interests in the social protection. They profess to be objective and present their policy recommendations as based on technical analysis and empirical evidence (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). Chinyoka and Seeking's (2016) study of social protection reform under the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe reached similar conclusions despite different time periods. Chinyoka and Seeking's (2016) noted that the development of social protection strategy documents, defining the details of programmes was done by donors that also substantially funded and oversaw execution of the programmes. In some instances, UNICEF functioned practically as a shadow government in certain ways. Consequently, their study concluded that social protection policy reform in Zimbabwe was driven by donors. The study also noted that concerns about "dependency" on "handouts" continued to affect the uptake of the cash transfers social protection policy instrument. However, other studies argue that the influence of donors and international agencies has been over estimated (Hickey et al., 2020). In reality, domestic political considerations have fuelled the rise of social assistance, reflecting the political elite's desire to maintain support and political allegiance (Hickey et al., 2020). Freeland et al. (2019) identified that the social assistance sector faced severe financial constraints, work on systems development for social assistance was progressing strongly and that there was a need for subnational staff to be involved in policy discourse and systems building (Freeland et al., 2019).

Earlier studies that analysed the performance of social protection in specific sectors, and in general have also alluded to possible drivers of policy change (Chitambira, 2010; Dashwood, 2000; Rukuni, 2006; Skalness, 1995).

These studies argued that changes in Zimbabwe's social protection policies were a reaction to international pressure, particularly from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Rukuni, 2006; Chitambira, 2010). On the other hand, authors (Dashwood, 2000; Skalness, 1995) argue that foreign pressure alone cannot explain Zimbabwe's significant shift in Zimbabwe's development strategy, rather, it is the governing elite's gradual embourgeoisement that explains the changes in Zimbabwe's development strategy. Other studies have analysed the performance of the social protection policies and noted that from 1980 to 1989, the sector achieved remarkable success in the health and education sectors in Zimbabwe (Chimhowu, 2010; Wallace-Karenga, 2009). However, from 1989 on, the planning framework was based on short-term development plans that factored in social protection as an afterthought (Van Donk, 2004). The lack of funding affected the depth and coverage of the social protection initiatives in Zimbabwe (Gandure, 2009; Kaseke, 1993; Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016; Wallace-Karenga, 2009).

McCord *et al.* (2019) noted that the findings of the evaluation of the Child Protection Fund in Zimbabwe were beneficial in encouraging perceptions of impact and affordability, as well as increasing political momentum for social protection in general. However, the evidence from the assessments was not seen as the primary driver of government decisions to increase or cut funding in Zimbabwe in the majority of situations.

Most social protection programmes in Zimbabwe such as the BEAM, AMTOs and FDMP have never been evaluated. However, there have been several reviews and evaluations of the HSCT programme in Zimbabwe. One of the reviews noted that a programme in Zimbabwe that provides cash transfers and child support services in Zimbabwe minimises youth exposure to physical abuse while also improving household food security and caregiver subjective wellbeing might be channelling the decreases in violence (Chakrabati *et al.*, 2020). Another study found that the Child Protection Fund had a significant impact on food purchases and diet diversity. This, combined with the programme's strong multiplier effects, suggests that the HSCT is making a significant positive difference in beneficiaries' lives in both protective and productive domains. As a result, the initiative serves as a successful model for scaling up to accomplish the Government of Zimbabwe's poverty reduction, productivity and social inclusion goals. The review shows that the programme has had a good influence on a variety of dimensions, including consumption and food diversity, productive activity, and child protection (American Institute of Research, 2014). This evidence, it was recommended might be packaged in a user-friendly, accessible format (for example, in short, focused study summaries) and distributed to important change agents including the media, academia, and legislators (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007).

Chapter 4: What drives policy reform? An analysis of social protection policy change in Zimbabwe

4.1 Introduction

While social protection has a long history in industrialised nations, it was only during the 2004 Ouagadougou Summit on Employment and Poverty Alleviation and the 2006 Livingstone Conferences that it became an important political issue in Africa (SASPEN, 2022; Nino-Zarazua et al., 2010). Several worldwide studies of the efficacy of different social protection have been conducted (Handa et al., 2021; Hidrobo et al., 2012, Alderman, 2002). As with many other development areas, the studies have generated and widely documented many technical solutions to poverty and food insecurity. As a result, political will among the parties to adopt "evidence-based" development approaches and a stronger commitment to scaling up programmes that have been shown to produce positive change has prevailed (Kadio et al., 2018). Drivers of policy change are crucial because they provide an understanding of what needs to be done to improve the lives of the poor, or successfully replicate or scale up evidencebased policy or initiatives. Furthermore drivers of policy change are crucial in light of the importance of policy environments in shaping development outcomes and the growing need to achieve development impact with limited resources. However, clear pathways to achieve policy change are always not available. Understanding what drives policy change enables anticipating and responding to the potential transformative impact to ensure relevance in shifting contexts of social protection. Consequently, government, donors and even the corporate sector are all interested in learning more about what drives policy reform. This is evident from policy initiatives such as the National Social Protection Policy or Strategy that rose from zero in 2000 to 30 by 2017, including the Zimbabwe National Social Protection Policy (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). The objectives for such policies ranges from desire to establish and strengthen social protection systems, to respond to different challenges such as access through in-kind and cash transfers to improve access to health, food and education for the poor. Some countries have sought to address poor coordination and fragmentation of isolated programmes and projects. Empirical country studies that have sought to analyse policy change- the process of formulation of National Social Protection Policies (NSPP) in Africa are far apart and rare (Kadio et al., 2018). This is despite the fact that problems in establishing a policy limit its execution and ability to achieve its objectives.

Despite evidence of social protection's effectiveness, policy decisions are often driven by the logic of bargaining and the desire to influence political outcomes rather than careful discussion of evaluation findings (Howelett & Mukherjee, 2017). As a result, progress in decreasing poverty and food insecurity in Africa has been slower than predicted, prompting donors and developing country governments to experiment with policy innovation in recent years (Development Initiatives, 2017). Some cash transfer pilot programmes in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia have established their ability to bring about good change, motivating donors and governments to want to scale up such proven initiatives.

Development is concerned about understanding what needs to be done to improve the lives of the poor or to successfully replicate or scale an evidence-based policy or programme. But they are not always clear about how to make this happen most effectively hence growth in research to understand drivers of policy change. Policy provides the enabling environment for implementation or scaling up of sustainable development initiatives. This has sparked interest in understanding what motivates or inhibits policy change in various countries. While the effect of social protection programmes has garnered a lot of attention, research on the design of social protection policies has gotten less attention (Kadio *et al.*, 2018). It is critical to chronicle the experiences of policymakers, programme managers, and implementers in this development area in order to learn what drives or constrains policy change in diverse national contexts because policies can either enable or inhibit development initiatives. (Gillespie & Bold, 2017).

Drivers of policy change studies have gone through four phases in developed capitalist economies from 1975-2013(Hickey *et al.*, 2020). Nonetheless, fewer particular country studies have looked at the process of policy change in Africa (Lavigne, 2017). As a result, limited focus has been dedicated to understanding how governments identity which policies to pursue and what leads to impetus in the public policy cycle. In 2020, a descriptive study in Zimbabwe to understand drivers of social protection policy reform identified international actors as the main drivers of social protection policy change (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). Nevertheless, the strategies failed to entrench social cash transfers as one of the social protection policy tools in the country (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). However, descriptive studies have generally concentrated primarily on describing the policy context rather than identifying how to overcome policy change inertia (Berlan *et al.*, 2014).

Process tracing was employed in previous research that looked at the politics of policy reform or non-reform in Africa to uncover significant drivers of government choices either to reject proposed policy reforms or to approve or extend social assistance programmes. (George & Bennett, 2004; Collier, 2011). Recent scholarship that used the same methodology of process tracing argues that the power of donors and international agencies working on social protection in Eastern and Southern Africa has often been overestimated; challenging the common conception, that social protection policy change is entirely driven by international development agencies (Hickey et al., 2020). Instead, it found that political dynamics within specific African countries played a critical role in policy reform. The findings highlighted how foreign pressures are only successful when they align with the governing elite's aims and ideas (Hickey et al., 2020). It also maintains that, in the end, domestic political factors have pushed the development of social assistance, reflecting the political elite's need to assure support and political allegiance, i.e. patronage politics rather than a politics of 'rightful demands.' Elections, clientelism politics, political ideologies and elite attitudes all play important roles in determining when and at what levels countries adopt social protection, which groups get benefits, and how programmes are implemented (Hickey et al., 2020). The common thread from the different studies point to the salient role of international actors in policy change, however governments have at times decided on content against the advice of donors (Wireko & Beland, 2017).

In some cases the donors have only managed to push specific policy focus onto the agenda but its rollout has depended on timing and the extent to which politicians saw the specific policy as favourable to political processes. The limited power of international organisations reflects in part Africa's changing financial situation (Hickey *et al.*, 2020). However, the drawback with process tracing is that it requires a sample that contains the most significant political participants who have engaged in the political events under investigation that may be difficult to locate. While random sampling has been utilised, it contradicts the logic of the process tracing approach since it risks omitting essential responders from the sample only by chance; consequently, non-probability sampling is critical (Tansey, 2009). Secondly, the evidence you find may not necessarily adequately explain the process. Its capacity to trace mutually exclusive hypothesis is limited in an environment like social protection policy change where there are no singular causes and explanation (Aston, 2017).

Furthermore, researchers rarely use theories of policy process to guide their thinking and barely address the decisive factors that drive policy reform (Berlan *et al.*, 2014; Gilson & Raphaely, 2008). As a result, little emphasis has been dedicated to understanding how governments choose which policies to pursue and what leads to momentum in the social protection policy cycle.

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness highlighted a growing realisation that technical expertise and policy options are not the fundamental constraints to development (Warrener, 2004). Instead, officials' political orientation, the power matrix, interests and the political economy of the country all have a crucial roles in driving or restricting policy change. This makes influencing development a challenge in that it invariably necessitates policy change that puts to test established interests, prevailing power structures and institutional frameworks or rules of the game (Booth *et al.*, 2006). Researchers take a range of approaches to policy change processes. The policy change process has been divided into five research viewpoints by some authors: scientific, professional, political, administrative, and personal (Dubnick & Bardes, 1983). Other scholars have identified nine distinct research perspectives for policy analysis: substantive, process, logical-positivists, econometrics, phenomenology, participative, normative, ideological, and historical viewpoints (Lester & Stewardt, 2000). According to a 2013 categorisation of conceptual research approaches for policy studies, policy analysis is split into nine models in Table 4.1 below.

Policy Analysis model	Focus of Analysis
Process model	Policy as a political activity
Institutional model	Policy as an institutional output
Rational model	Policy as maximum social gain
Incremental model	Policy as variations of the past
Group model	Equilibrium in group struggle
Elite model	Policy as elite preferences
Public choice model	Collective decision making by self-interested individuals
Game theory model	Rationale choice in competitive situations

Source: Author's assessment adapted from (Dye, 2013)

While table 4.1 above shows academics propose different theoretical frameworks for policy studies, the frameworks also have numerous similarities, as seen in table 4.1. Policy process theories have broadly focused on actors that identify a policy issue and bring it to the table for debate, adoption, and execution (Sabatier *et al.*, 2014). The policy process model identifies six stages along the process that are agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimation, policy implementation, policy and programme evaluation and policy change(Jones, 1984). It is generally expected that systematic use of rigorous evidence in the policy process will result in more accurate policy guidance. However, democratic political debates, stakeholder lobbying, and public opinion will always place restrictions on these scientific objectives (Howlett&Giest, 2015). Although the premise that policies are composed of a series of related stages offers a simpler framework within which the process of developing policies occurs, the policy cycle model has several drawbacks. This framework simplifies a highly variable and intricate policy-making process. The process of creating policies is not as organized and linear as the model might imply. Additionally, the steps are frequently shortened, omitted, or changed entirely (Howlett&Giest, 2015).

The institutional policy model perspective is premised on the traditional organisation and institutional structures, roles, and functions of governmental institutions without looking at how these affected public policy (Hahn, 1987). In determining, carrying out, and enforcing public policy, they take into account judicial rulings, administrative and common law rules, and constitutional provisions. According to this school of thought, a policy becomes a public policy if it has been approved, put into effect, and upheld by a few governmental organizations.

Rationalism typifies policy making as going through different stages of clarifying and ranking goals, predicting the consequences of each alternative, comparing the expected consequences of each option and selecting the alternative that gives the optimal attainment of the goals (Alexander, 1984). Like incrementalism rationalism is considered as a decision making model as opposed to policy making (Anderson, 1979). Rationalism has been criticised for being unrealistic for treating decision making as an intellectual process as opposed to a political process. It's unrealistic in terms of the difficulty of having perfect information and in making decisions where the factors that are considered can be ranked in a fair and impartial manner (Deegan, 2017).

The incremental model was formed as a response to the rationalism. Incrementalism is premised on the philosophy that decision makers are more likely to move from away from problems rather toward goals (Hahn, 1987). In this process, policy makers look at a small number of alternatives for dealing with a problem and tend to choose options that differ only marginally from the status quo (Sutton, 1999). Consequently, only a limited number of alternatives are considered and selected. Decision makers focus on short term consequences that are considered for each alternative, only enough analysis is done to find a solution that policy makers can agree on and adjustments are continually made if solution remain unpredictable.

The elite policy model is based on the idea that elites rule over a mostly apathetic populace in an environment where knowledge is distorted and apathy is prevalent (Hahn 1987). Only a few, the elite allocate values and policy is communicated to the masses at a lower level. Society is composed of those who have power and the powerless. Elites have common values that set them apart from the general populace. Elite beliefs are reflected in the current public policies, which typically uphold the status quo. Elites are wealthier, better educated, and of greater rank than the general population. For this model, only policy alternatives that fall within the range of elite value consensus will be given serious consideration and the legitimacy of free enterprise and capitalism (Hahn, 1987). Competition centers on a narrow range of issues, and elites agree more than they disagree (Dye, 2013). The prevailing public policies reflect elite values, which generally preserve the status quo. More so than the other way around, elites influence the masses opinion. Policy change is viewed as incremental rather than revolutionary, reflecting changes in elite values (not mass demands). Public servants and administrators merely implement policies chosen by the elite and "distributed" to the populace.

The group model also the known as the equilibrium theory is built on the philosophy that public policy results from a system of forces and pressures acting on and reacting to one another (Hahn, 1987). Formal or informal coalitions composed of likeminded individuals or the executives, legislators, and agency heads come together to push on government for specific policies or programmes. Usually focuses on the legislature, but the executive is also pressured by interest groups. Agencies may be captured by the groups they are meant to regulate, and administrators become increasingly unable to distinguish between policies that will benefit the general public and policies that will benefit the groups being regulated (Hahn, 1987).

Interaction among groups is the central fact of politics. Individuals are important in politics only when they act as part of or on behalf of group interests. The group is the bridge between the individual and the government. The political system establishes the rules of the game, arrange compromises and balance interests, enact compromises in public policy and enforces the compromises. Influence is determined by numbers, wealth, and organizational strength, leadership, access to decision makers and internal cohesion with checks and checks and balances on group competition.

The most popular form of pluralism, game theory, views policymaking as the result of the influence of several groups. Local dynamics are thought to have less of an impact on policymaking than prominent people, who are thought to be diverse, contradictory, and different from one subject to another. Under this approach, competition and conflict play a big part in how policies are made (Hahn, 1987). The approach aids in emphasizing participant and interest diversity, the likelihood of conflict, and the significance of being willing to strive toward conflict resolution.

The historical method has focused on understanding the histories and practices associated with evolving policy discourses, as well as how these affect and steer actors and networks, in order to better understand policy change. Political economists have looked at how politicians might strike a compromise between solid economic policies and political reality (Resnick *et al.*, 2018). Furthermore, economists have sought to comprehend the function of political institutions in influencing sectoral policy (Meier, 1991). Scholars of policy are becoming more prominent in recent years. In addition, researchers in economics have attempted to understand the role of political institutions in shaping sectoral policies. Increasingly, scholars of policy change focus on the mechanisms of change, politics and economics (Dale, 1999; Steiner-Khamsi & Ines Stolpe, 2006).

Standardised views of policymaking risk obscuring the complexities of policymaking both across and within countries. Since then, further proliferation of variables has led sceptics to dismiss the value of policy process analysis as too context-specific and not rigorous enough to uncover generalizable findings (Goodin *et al.*, 2006, Meier, 2009, Smith & Larimer, 2017). Motivations include improved accountability to donor country taxpayers and increased responsiveness to the needs of developing country citizens.

Yet, policy impact requires an informed understanding of the nuances of policymaking processes to recognize the opportunities for, and feasibility of generating intended reforms. As alluded from the start, the readings mentioned above show that the different techniques are used in the policymaking process in a way that significantly overlaps. However, a look at the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches, shows a lot of flexibility in how for example incrementalism and the rational approach to policy formation can be applied.

This chapter addresses sub objective one that sought to identify what has influenced social protection policy reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017. It uses Resnick et al., 2008 Kaleidoscope's model (KM) for food security transformation to identify the drivers of social protection policy change in Zimbabwe. The KM is used in this study because it aligns the proximal influence of the 16 major drivers of policy change in a manageable and testable framework. The model is a consolidation of a wide range of scientific work and donor experience. Achieving policy impact is dependent on understanding policy processes that the KM strives to achieve. Apart from building on previous models, KM offers three additional tools for analysing policy systems and outcomes. One of the unique attributes of the KM is that if offers measurement criteria to promote replicability and refinements by others. Additionally, the KM provides a useful framework for practitioners and researchers to determine when and where investments in policy reforms are most viable in light of a nation's underlying political, economic, and institutional qualities. While relatively a new model the KM has been applied to food security policies analysis in countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The kaleidoscope model (Figure 1) was created after a thorough assessment of the literature in policy science, political economy and public administration. KM draws together evidence and experience from the academic and donor communities to develop a practical and holistic framework for analysing the policy process in developing country contexts. It provides a systematic framework for analysing policy reform (Resnick et al., 2018). The model proposes 16 hypotheses that act as key drivers in explaining when and why policy shifts. The five stages of the policy cycle are linked to these 16 hypotheses: agendasetting, design, adoption, implementation, and assessment and reform. However, the one of the drawback is the challenge of different iterations that the model requires. Locating people who are knowledge about the different times periods also provide to be difficult. The purpose of the study was not to evaluate the success of Zimbabwe's intervention programmes or to appraise their appropriateness.




Figure 4.1: Kaleidoscope Model

Source: (Resnick et al., 2018)

4.2 Methodology

In-depth phenomenological interviews with key stakeholders were conducted using the Kaleidoscope Model's five stages of the policy change and the corresponding 16 hypotheses in 2018/19. Phenomenology is a qualitative research method used to describe how people experience certain phenomena (Hycner, 1999). Phenomenology facilitates direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced by people living those experiences (Greene, 1997).

Interviewees signed the Consent Form to participate in the study and were allowed to withdraw or refuse to take part in the study at any time. The interviews were complemented by an extensive review of published policies, grey literature, national reports and documentation provided by respondents.

The respondents included government and civil society senior managers to avoid bias in data collection. Respondents from the government included government employees - directors, deputy directors, principal directors, chief directors, and permanent secretaries. Some of the senior officers and permanent secretaries have been in government since 1980. The civil society respondents included heads of agencies - programme directors and deputy directors from international agencies and international non-governmental organisations. These prominent players in the social protection policy process were identified and contacted to arrange interviews. Snowball sampling contributed to identifying interviewees' diversity by asking an interviewee to recommend others for the interviewing. The cascading approach to information collection was used to verify the facts and get detailed information through further follow-up. Interviewing a wide range of individuals helped crosscheck facts and brought together the policy events and influences systematically. The high turnover and changing roles and movement of staff in government departments meant that referrals to others who were more informed were essential. Follow-up discussions happened through email and telephone where additional information was necessary.

Individuals were asked specific questions about social protection instruments of interest and described the events of the policy process time from their perspectives and involvement. Although there were differences in their narration of events, most interviewees converged on broad issues and processes regarding social protection policy. We explicitly sought multiple accounts of each significant policy episode to crosscheck and verify the various eyewitness accounts to improve the accuracy. In each case, the respondent accounts provided surprisingly consistent readings of key events, enabling us to paint what we consider an accurate account of the interactions that led to policy change or inaction.

The available literature and phenomenological interviews were used for developing the policy chronology, triangulation of information, and filling gaps in the analysis.

The policy chronology lists in strict order all key occurrences/decisions relating to social protection policy change. The chronology provides a concise information on the background to the different policy change episodes in Zimbabwe.

This timeline helped to study the sequencing of policy decisions and relate such findings to other political, economic, and historical events. It showed why and when specific policies were triggered and helped identify patterns in policy issues that emerged in the policy system. The policy chronology covered the period from 1980 to 2017, (Table 4.2).

In development of the policy chronology, political and international events were taken into account in addition to the time lines. The timeline was first constructed to aid in the focus of stakeholder interviews, but it evolved as the researchers gained a better understanding of how policy interactions function. The chronology's events also provided as a point of reference for the interview. They also gave respondents the opportunity to talk on their involvement in the process and how it may have affected policy development (or lack thereof). Policy changes take place in distinct situations. For the sake of knowledge, both past changes and future difficulties must be acknowledged to reduce poverty and food security (Harris *et al.*, 2017).

The following section gives a quick rundown of recent developments in social protection reform events of concern, as well as some background on literature and phenomenological interviews. It also provides context for understanding the policy change drivers established through the Kaleidoscope Model's framework. Following that, I provide the results from social protection evaluation of the 16 Kaleidoscope parameters.

 Table 4.2: Zimbabwe Social Protection Policy Chronology: political events, policy environment/legal statutory instruments, values, principles, stakeholders and local and international events

Social protection focusing events	Dates	Political Event and Economic Policies	Social Protection policy environment/ statutory instruments	Values and principles	Stakeholder inventory	International focusing ever
Independence	1980	Zimbabwe African National Union(ZANU) wins elections Independence of Zimbabwe(Robert Gabriel Mugabe Prime Minister and Canaan Banana as ceremonial President)	War victims compensation fund	Socialism		
	1981	Growth with equity policy	Public assistance	Socialist inspired give people share of the wealth created inspired by Chinese Soviet Union support and socialist ideology during war of liberation.	31 United Nations agencies, 26 International Non-Governmental Originations, Blaseral Aid Agencies with USAND-32 million 1.45 billion over 3 years	Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development(ZIMCORD)
Drought	1982	Transitional National Development Plan 1982-1985	Three year drought relief-food aid programme	1		
	1983		Refuges Act	1		
	1984		National Heroes dependents Act	1		
	1504		Repeal of discriminatory old age pensions			
	1985	First Five Year National Development Plan 1985-1990	Assisted Medical Treatment Orders			
	1987	Unity Accord ZANU and Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union(ZAPU) become Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front(ZANU PF)	From food aid to public works programme with limited food distribution			
	1988		Social welfare assistance act	(Limited public assistance to destitute, unable to work,elderly, disbaled and chronically ill)		
			Public Assistance			
	1989			Neoliberalism		Collapse of the Berlin Wall- symbolising the bankruptcy of communism and rise of capitalism
	1990		Reducing government expenditure, deregulating economy. Redirect resources from social services to productive sectors, cost recovery in health and education.		IMF and World Bank	Elliot Berg Report of 1981
	1991	Economic structural adjustments implementation started	Adequate supply of grain to the market, grain loan scheme. Under 5 and primary school supplementary feeding, food for work			Zimbabwe acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultura Rights(CESCR)

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	Social protection focusing events	Dates	Political Event and Economic Policies	Social Protection policy environment/ statutory instruments	Values and principles	Stakeholder inventory	International focu
				Social Dimension of Adjustment			
	Worst drought hits Zimbabwe			Crop and Livestock input scheme			
PHASE 2		1992		Food for work for adults, Remove government support for inputs and fertilizers and ploughing for peasant farmers, cuts in government support to research and development in new crop varieties.			
-				Disabled person Act			
				War veterans Act		Government and ZANU PF	
		1995		Gratuities for war veterans			
		1996	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation	Employment and training, public works, food subsidies, exemption from cost recovery measures for vulnerable groups			
				Poverty alleviation action plan			
ſ		1997	Hunzvi becomes chairmen of war veterans marking	One-off payments of US \$2,500, as well as monthly pensions of US \$100. Compensation fund set up to benefit those disabled following war service, with the amount paid determined by the degree of disability.	Rethinking of neoliberalism.		
			Vision 2020 and Long Term Development Strategy	Gnesis of politicization of all areas of public sector work and social protection in Zimbabwe. Scope for professionalism within the public service			
	Worst economic collapse even shops		Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation	Social welfare Act			
	were empty	1998	Social Development Fund/Social Dimension of Adjustment	Offsetting the impact of ESAP on the poor			
SE 3			Poverty alleviation action plan	Disability grants, welfare assistance, assistance to war veterans			
- PHASE		1999	Formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)		Pseudo socialism	1	
			(100)				
	National Referendum Food riots War veterans 	2000	ZANU PF defeated on referendum on constitutional reform	Enhanced Social Protection Project			Millennium Developn
	protest		Vision 2020 and Long Term Development Strategy	Land reform-seized and forcibly redistribute commercial farms			
				Discretionary food distribution controlled by war			
	Deepening economic dislocation, state failure to pay for	2001	Millenium Economic Recovery Plan	Basic Education Assistance Module		USAID,DFID,Mercy Corps, private sector, Government	
	imports of food, fuel and power. Export earnings dried.						
		2002	Mugabe defeats Tsvangirai in presidential elections	Government turns to World Food programme for assistance. Basic Education Assistance Module 2011 - 2013 - Ministry Public Service Labour and Social Welfare, UNICE, DPID, SIDA and SDC.		World Food Programme The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,	

Soc foo	cial protection ocusing events	Dates	Political Event and Economic Policies	Social Protection policy environment/ statutory instruments	Values and principles	Stakeholder inventory	International focusing events
	tion at 208 per annually. 7		National Economic Revival Plan				UNICEF World summit on Children
millio worst mond	on facing the st famine. State lopoly on food orts was helping	2003				SADC Heads of State and Government	SADC Treaty and the Carter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC
		2004	Macroeconomic Recovery Plan(2004)	World Food Programme and food donors expelled from Zimbabwe	Insensitivity to international governance frameworks		The Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate food in the context of Ouagadougou Declaration and Action
		2005	MDC boycotts senatorial elections ZANUP PF performs poorly in parliamentary elections MDC defeated in elections	World Food Programme recalled to resume food distribution after ZANU PF won elections		USAID, USA, UK and EU	Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (Social protection and cash transfers capacity development and advocay)
		2006	National Economic development Priority Programme	Seasonal targeted assistance, Child supplementary feeding, school feeding programme		WFP, Ministry of Health and Child welfare, Ministry of primary and secondary education	Yaoundé Call of Action The Livingstone Call for Action
		2007	Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy				Chief Executive Board of Coordination (implement policies that ensure most vulnerable people have access to income&vital basic services)
,		2008	Tsvangirai defeats Mugabe. Elections disputed. Rerun called, Tsvangirai withdraws. Mugabe declared president	Support to Children in difficult circumstances 2. Public Assistance 3.Food Mitigation.2011-2013) Various Public Works Programmes and Drought Relief Programmes	Socialism tilted towards neo liberalism	USAID, MoPSLSW, WFP,NGOS World Bank and the Multidonor Trust Fund	African Union Social Protection Policy WFP corporate strategy 2008- 2013 policy shifts from food aid to cash for work, productive assets creation etc. GNU food mitigation strategy influenced by shift.
	al, political and nomic stabilization ed	2008	Global Political Agreement				African platform for Social protection
							Africa Brazil Cooperation on Social Protection Windhoek Declaration

focus	l protection sing events	Dates	Political Event and Economic Policies	Social Protection policy environment/ statutory instruments	Values and principles	Stakeholder inventory	International focusing ev
Fund Sc	onor Trust ocial Protection		Morgan Tsvangirai becomes Prime Minister	Child Protection Fund I (CPF) for the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children II(NAP II) 2011-2015		DFID, AusAID, EU, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand USAID, Germany, SIDA,	Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme and the Southern African
Reports	5		Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme I	Respond to orphan crisis, fueled by HIV and AIDS access to education, health food services birth		SDC (under the banner of OECD donors) and 33 NGOs as sub grantees to UNICEF Fund	Development Community Parliamentary Forum on Dialogue on Poverty and So
			Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme II	registration protection from abuse and exploitation,		manager	Transfers Initiative
Technic Forum	al Negotiation	2009		Child supplementary feeding(2006-2007) Seasonal targeted assistance(WFP 206) Assisted medical Treatment Orders(2010-2013) Agriculture Input Support Scheme(2010 Care for the elderly (2005)			G20 Summit (First global summit on the vulnerable)
				Food Deficit Mitigation Strategy through Public works (July 2010) A National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Phase II (2011) and a National Social Transfers Policy 2011 finalised in 2012			
			Zimbabwe Government of National Unity(GNU)	Child Protection Fund I (CPF) for the National	(Mixture of neoliberal and socialist values)	MDC T Maria Gwanyaya as	African Union Social
			Zimbaowe Government of National Onity(GNO)	Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children II (NAP II) 2011-2015	(Mixture of neoliberal and socialist values)	minister to the key ministry to address poverty-Ministry of Public service labour and social welfare.	Development Ministers me
		2010		Support to Children in difficult circumstances 2 Public Assistance 3.Food Mitigation.2011-2013) Various Public Works Programmes and Drought Relief Programmes Harmonised Cash Transfer programme launched		Biti as finance minister just after Mpariwa	
	- 1		Medium Term Plan 2001-2013 Designed by the World bank leading to the	Drought relief aid		World Bank leading the Multidonor Trust Trust	South South Learning on S protection
		2011	Multidonor Trust Fund	Public Works		Maddonor Hast Hast	protection
		2011	Medium Term Plan (2011)	Pauper Burials			
				Market Based Inputs Assistance			
	1			Older Person Act			World economic Forum ca
		2012		Works Programmes (supported by GNU and			for new approach to grow pitching social protection a economic stabilizer
		2012		World Bank). Public Assistance Pauper Burial (2011-2013) Basic Education Assistance Module (2011-2013)			economic stabilizer
	1		Morgan Tsvangirai leaves office.			UNICEF, DFID. AusAID, EU, SDC, SIDA, Denmark	
			Constitution of Zimbabwe Section 80-84			Sibiy berman	
gradual	nic meltdown lly and slowly	2013	MDC defeated by ZANU PF in parliamentary elections	Food security and poverty alleviation focus			
started			Zimbabwe Agenda for Social Economic Transformation(ZIM Asset)	Highlighted social protection as one of the key pillars of the policy			

es Political Event and Economic Policies	Social Protection policy environment/ statutory instruments Child Protection Fund II (CPF) for the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children III (NAP II) 2016-2020. Basic Education Assistance Module, Child protection and harmonized social cash transfers	Values and principles	Stakeholder inventory DFID, SIDA,SDC and Government of Zimbabwe	International focusing even
15	Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children III (NAP II) 2016-2020. Basic Education Assistance Module. Child		DFID, SIDA,SDC and Government of Zimbabwe	
5	Basic Education Assistance Module, Child protection and harmonized social cash transfers			
			International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Development Bank.	
	Social protection framework finalised.			
6	Zimbabwe National Social Protection Policy Framework launched			
 Mugabe falls and Munangagwa becomes president. Secured his first term as president following 2018 elections under what he called the "New Dispensation" 		Mixture of neoliberal and socialist values continue		
8 Zimbabwe Transitional Stabilisation Plan 2018-2019				
9				

4.3 Slow but noticeable policy change, yet progress off target for several social protection mechanisms in Zimbabwe

According to documentary evidence, the colonial authority in Southern Rhodesia established the Old Age Pensions Act of 1936 to aid non-Africans over 60 years who had been in the country for more than 15 years. Furthermore, the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU) developed a pension programme for agricultural employees in 1975, which disregarded black workers. The age limit for this pension plan was established at 60 years. Given that the average life expectancy for Africans was barely 50 years, agricultural labourers seldom reached retirement age (Dhemba *et al.*, 2002). Despite the fact that different types of official social protection policy tools have long been available in Zimbabwe, access has been skewed in terms of breadth, depth, and eligibility. The interviews revealed that colonial regulations in place before to 1980 excluded the black majority from mainstream social protection.

Notwithstanding mounting evidence of the need for context-specific social protection programmes, Zimbabwe has not reformed its social protection system, preserving many of the same tools, such as grants for disabled, old age pensions and for the disabled in place since the colonial era (Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). Many of these programmes are sponsored by limited cash transfers from donors, as well as government and in-kind donor transfers (Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). From the policy, chronology five distinct social protection periods were recognised from the information collected. The pre-independence period was the first, followed by the years 1980-1989, 1990-1996, 1997-2007, and 2008 to date (Table 4.2). Nonetheless, understanding the complexities of social protection change in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017 requires a thorough understanding of the country's social protection policy history. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Sections 80 to 84 underscored the provision of social protection.

Despite the constitutional guarantee, Zimbabwe's social protection system fell behind those of its neighbours, including Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zambia. Interestingly, by 2008, even countries like Malawi and Zambia, for example, had begun experimenting with cash transfers to respond to the changing social protection demands of their impoverished and vulnerable people by 2008 (Chinyoka & Seeking, 2016). At the time, Zimbabwe was still focusing on agricultural development rather than cash transfers as a means of reducing poverty, despite the changing context and alternative innovative social protection mechanisms.

What is important to remember at this time is that, despite the fact that significant concerns arose and social protection became a priority, change remained marginal.

4.4 Identifying the drivers of social protection policy change

In 2009/10, the Zimbabwean government requested donors to fund a countrywide cash transfer scheme, drawing on lessons learned from neighbouring countries. Donors, on the other hand, resisted, wanting to put the concept to the test in Zimbabwe first. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union (EU), the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Swedish Agency for International Development (SIDA) and the Swiss Agency for International Development (SDC) under the banner of the OECD donors launched the Child Protection Fund one of whose major pillars was a pilot cash transfer project in 2011. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was the fund manager of the Child Protection Fund.

For the whole period of its implementation, the CPF was subjected to several process and impact evaluations. The reviews and evaluations focused on generating evidence that the donors wanted to present to motivate government to support especially cash transfers. The reviews were contracted to evaluation companies such as the Oxford Management Group, Codey, the American Institutes of Research and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the American Institute of Research. The evaluations of the pilot cash transfers demonstrated several positive outcomes and impacts (Schubert, 2010; American Institute of Research, 2014; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007). The donors and UNICEF employed several strategies to share emerging evidence with government and other stakeholders. While government expressed commitment, it has continually demonstrated a reluctance to meet its 50% commitment throughout the life of the CPF. The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation(ZimAsset), published in 2013, had an explicit goal of reaching 100,000 households by 2015 and 200,000 by 2018 with cash transfers (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). However, this was not realised. Despite the results of the cash transfers pilot programme and the government's policy commitment, government takeover of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme remained slow and controversial.

4.5 Same solution, but different target groups for social protection

The lengthy history of significant economic inequality was crucial in defining the bounds of Zimbabwe's social protection policy change. Following independence in the 1980s, policy changes were implemented. The discriminatory old-age pensions, which were meant to favour white expatriates, were repealed as part of the reforms (Chitambira, 2010). The primary goal, inspired by socialist philosophy, was to address substantial disparities in wealth and opportunities by moving social protection to the majority black population. The government established a number of programmes to alleviate poverty beginning in 1995, including the 1995 Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (Chinyoka & Seeking, 2016). The National Action Plan for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children was also published in 2004 (Chinyoka & Seeking, 2016). These policies, on the other hand, continued to rely on discretionary, non-programmatic interventions to attain political goals. During the 2002 drought, for example, social protection was mainly focused on providing free drought relief food supplies. Between 1980 and 1990, government response to the drought was premised in free food distribution that later transformed into food work and school feeding programmes.

The majority of social protection instruments inherited from the colonial government remained in use by the independent government until 2016. This is not always due to policy problems; it might also be due to policy implementation challenges. Several alternative motivations have been suggested in available literature and stakeholder interviews. One crucial motivation for keeping the different social protection mechanisms was the desire to employ social protection to reward allies and even penalise opponents. For example, to build its support base, the government reverted to pseudo-social policies after the Zimbabwe African Nation Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was defeated in a nationwide referendum on the constitution in 2000. As remarked during the interviews,...*the government and the party used social assistance as political bribes administered and managed by war veterans*. However, the impact of whatever was availed between 2005 and 2009 was heavily diluted by the high inflation that rendered most payouts worthless to recipients.

4.6 Social protection: What is the sticking point?

Social protection initiatives in Zimbabwe have remained insufficient and exclusionary; disorganised and fragmented.

The initiatives targeted at the poor were characterised by a lack of predictability, consistency, transparency and durability (Chitambira, 2010; Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). Generally, consistent assistance to disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, disabled, and bereaved families has been negatively affected by insufficient funding, which has resulted in the initiatives cutting back either on support or, in worst cases, closing down (Gandure, 2009). However, a lack of resources was not the only issue that hampered implementation; ineffective resource allocation was also a factor (Van Donk, 2004). Many of the existing social protection measures were implemented using donor-funded cash or in-kind transfers that were limited in scope (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). The absence of integration of social assistance into short- and medium-term economic frameworks posed a barrier until recently. Accordingly, in Zimbabwe, social protection has been more of an afterthought than an integral part of economic development measure and policies (Van Donk, 2004). These programmes were primarily means-tested, and they frequently included conditions like using health services or going to school. Between 2005 and 2009, high inflation rendered most payments useless, as the amounts were insufficient to purchase basic essentials. In certain circumstances, the amounts were all used up on a bus trip to collect the benefits.

The policy chronology demonstrates that social protection has been on the agenda in Zimbabwe multiple times, including in 2000, 2005, and 2009 (Table 4.2). Cash transfer adoption, on the other hand, remained an issue due to policy implementation failure (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). The inability of the social protection policy process to proceed from agenda setting to implementation demonstrates that putting a problem on the policy agenda does not always imply that it will be adopted and implemented.

4.7 What drives social protection policy change in Zimbabwe?

Four schools of thought have sought to explain the shift of social protection policies in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017. The first school of thought identifies international actors such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UN agencies and donors as the force behind the policy changes (Rukuni, 2006; Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020). Devereux and Kapingidza (2020) further cite the flagship harmonised social cash transfers (HSCT) programmes as exclusively donor-driven, from design to piloting to rolling out and then scaling down. The authors argue that external players have employed four techniques to press for social protection policy change in Zimbabwe and other countries.

The techniques are building evidence to validate the effectiveness of social protection specifically cash transfers; building capacity of government; financing technical and operational costs of social protection programmes and providing technical inputs to the process of developing social protection policies.

The second school of thought argues that the international pressure cannot be the only driver of the changes in development frameworks in Zimbabwe. They claim that the ruling elite's progressive embourgeoisement influenced policy changes in Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2000; Skalness, 1995).

The third and most recent scholarship, on the other hand, contends that the power of donors and international agencies working on social protection in Eastern and Southern Africa has been greatly exaggerated, casting doubt on the widely held belief that international development agencies are solely responsible for policy change in this area (Hickey *et al.*, 2020). Instead, it highlights political processes within specific African countries as crucial drivers of policy change, revealing how foreign influences only take root when they fit with ruling elite interests and beliefs (Hickey *et al.*, 2020).

The fourth school of thought to examine the drivers of policy change utilised the kaleidoscope model and impediments to social protection policy change in Zimbabwe. The 16 kaleidoscope hypotheses are explored in the sections that follow. For easy reference, the main determinants are provided in italics (Table 4.3).

D I'		minants of policy	War Victims	Public	AMTOS	National	Social	War	BEAM	FDMP	Older	HSCT	Total/instance
Policy Stages	Change-Kaleidoscope Hypothesis		Compensation Act	assistance Act		Heroes Dependency Act	Welfare Act	Vet Act			Persons Act		variable was present%
Agenda Setting	1	Recognised relevant Event	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
	2	Focusing event	+	-	+	0	0	+	+			+	60%
	3	Powerful advocates	+	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	0	+	50%
Design	4	Knowledge, research and ideas	0	0	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	80%
	5	Norms,biases, ideology and belief	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	100%
	6	Cost benefit risk analysis	-	0		0	0	0	0	-	-	+	40%
Adoption	7	Powerful opponents vs proponents	0	0	0	-	0	+	+	+	0	+	50%
	8	Government veto players + affirmative	+	+	0	+	+	+		+	-	-	80%

Table 4.3: Hypothesis testing for Zimbabwe social protection policy change cases

		decision- exercise veto											
	9	Propitious Timing	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	0	+	88%
Implement ation	10	Requisite Budget	0	0	0	-	-	0	+	-		+	50%
	11	Institutional capacity	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	0	+	70%
	12	Implementation Stage veto players	-	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	50%
	13	Commitment of policy champions	-	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	80%
Evaluation and Reform	14	Changing information and beliefs	+	+	+	-	+	+	+		-	+	100%
	15	Changing material conditions	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	80%
	16	Institutional changes	-	-	+	-	0	0	-	-	-	+	80%

Key: A positive (+) sign indicates that variable was present in cases and played a role in the reform proceeding as intended A negative (-) sign indicates that variable was present in cases and played a negative role in the reform proceeding as intended A zero (0) sign indicates that variable was present, it did not affect the reform moving forward

4.8 Social protection resurfaces on the policy agenda

According to the policy chronology and hypothesis testing table, nine episodes of social protection policy change occurred in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017. One of the cases concerned social security, while the others concerned social assistance. While the government stated that, it intended to implement all of the social protection initiatives, most of them were hampered by a lack of government funding. The dual economy that Zimbabwe inherited at independence made social protection a pressing *relevant problem (HI)* in the fight against social inequality, education and health inequities.

The necessity for reform was underlined by the country's independence, which was bolstered by the reconciliation rhetoric (Fisher, 2010). The government and development partners rallied around the goal of reducing inequities and quickly redressing colonial injustices. As a result of this situation, the new government wanted to invest its funds in social sectors, with a particular focus on rural infrastructure development. Redressing economic and social inequalities through land resettlement programmes was based on the Lancaster House Agreement and became one of the rapid triumphs in rural areas (Zhou & Masunungure, 2006). The attainment of independence and the identification of a relevant event were important drivers of social protection policy change after 1980, (Table 4.3).

Throughout the revisions in social protection policy, the role of *focusing events* (*H2*) was quite apparent. One important focusing event that necessitated the introduction of new types of social protection mechanisms was the economic crisis that peaked in the late 2000s. As seen in the policy chronology, several focusing events at the regional and global levels drove with limited impact social protection into the agenda between 1980 and 2017. However, the strength and impact of the different focusing events differed. The focusing events included:

- Independence, 18 April 1980
- Zimbabwe Economic collapse of 2000
- Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food 2004
- Form of the Ouagadougou Declaration and Action of 2004;
- Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme 2005-2011;

- Livingstone Call to Action 2006,
- Windhoek Declaration 2008;
- Global Political Agreement 2008
- Parliamentary Forum Dialogue on Poverty and Social Transfers Initiative,
- African Platform for Social Protection,2008
- Millennium Development Goals Summit was held in 2000,
- Berg Report 1981
- World Economic Forum. 2012.

The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) and the severe drought 1981-1983 served as focusing events and opportunities for national discussions on social protection. In 1981, ZIMCORD brought together 31 nations and 26 international organisations to debate the funding of Zimbabwe's rebuilding efforts. The discussions were held in the framework of Zimbabwe's first national development plan, the Growth with Equity policy, which focused on equity and satisfying the needs of the poor. Inside and beyond the government, as well as the Zimbabwe African national Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) party, shifting coalitions of interest were active. Between 1981 and 1983, Zimbabwe had a severe drought and a corresponding food crisis. This prompted the development of a three-year drought relief food aid programme, which was well-funded by the same donors. International advocates strongly shaped the agenda and resource mobilisation strategies for social protection in Zimbabwe.

The drought, along with decreasing terms of trade and foreign currency shortages, as well as other economic and political concerns such as skills shortages, resulted in unpredictable and public-sector-dominated development. Because of the lack of political commitment, prominent NGOs involved in food distribution in Zimbabwe decided the many characteristics of food distribution. While political dedication was important, it was not enough to get things done when it comes to social protection (Gillespie & Bold, 2017). Pledges and promises must be converted into changes in incentives, decisions and actions in order for political commitments to achieve social protection.

Powerful advocates and advocacy coalitions (H3) groups were crucial in defining the agenda and maintaining momentum thought the policy cycle. The lobbying by the first determined and strong leadership from government during the first years of independence witnessed a convergence of thinking with the donors that resulted in Zimbabwe launching a successfully programmes aimed at redressing inequities and colonial injustices.

4.9 Social protection design modalities and aspects to consider

Norms, biases, ideologies, and beliefs (H5) did play a significant role in the design of social protection in Zimbabwe (Table 4.3). Between 1980 and 1990, the government evolved into a distributive and welfare state in line with the socialist orientation or ideology, which offers categorical means-tested compensation for war-related injuries or deaths (Zhou & Masunungure, 2006). Consequently, most social protection benefits were either means-tested or categorical targeted, in keeping with socialist ideology. Numerous factors contributed to the popularity of this ideological trend among the diverse stakeholders, the most important of which was the need to correct previous colonial inequities. In addition, from 1980 to 1989, the government enacted several Acts of Parliament to promote social protection and security policy reform.

The government enacted acts of parliament that provided for state funded non-contributory benefits such as the Social assistance Act 10, 1988, 22 Chapter 17:06. Through the Department of Social Welfare, the Act offers limited public help to poor individuals who are unable to work, those over the age of 65 and people with disabilities. The Disabled Act of 1992, Chapter 17:01 provides for poor and disabled older people in households where they can obtain social services from government grants and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As one interviewee noted during the interviews, *we were still the people for the people... we did not see them and us at that time*. Success in the war and winning the elections could have created a sense of entitled among the policy actors. Nevertheless, they remained connected with the people that supported them as they battled against the colonial administration. As a response to the drought in 1982, the government used non-contributory methods to ensure that free food was distribution to the afflicted populace. Equally important were minimum wages, black affirmative action, and indigenisation policies that were employed to improve the living conditions of the urban population. However, this was not the subject of this research.

In many ways, this redistributive approach paralleled the intellectual and policy concepts articulated by nationalist liberation groups during the military struggle in China and the Soviet Union (Zhou & Masunungure, 2006). Simultaneously, Zimbabwe joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980 and the World Bank to be eligible for balance-of-payments assistance and access concessionary loans to fund expansionary economic programmes.

In 1987, the Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was signed (Sibanda, 2005). One key attribute of the Unity Accord was that it softened the hard-line instincts of ZANU PF. This mighty have made it easier to pass the Social Welfare Act of 1989 and ensuring that the shift from food aid to public works still carried a provision of free food aid for those who could not work. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the end of communism across the world and beginning 1990 of capitalism. This global event also signaled the end of Zimbabwe's honeymoon period as funding from the international community dwindled. In addition, the social welfare system was beginning to show signs of strain due to spending. The economic collapse compounded by the government involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The defeat of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia instilled panic in the government in Zimbabwe (Maravanyika & Mutimukuru-Maravanyika, 2009). In addition to the aforementioned factors, the 1992 drought may have compelled the government to examine economic liberalisation as a strategy of boosting the economy.

The Economic Structural Adjustment Policy (ESAP) was implemented in 1990, signaling a shift in official ideology from socialism to neoliberalism and the commencement of phase II social protection policy change (Table 3.2). In general, the ESAPs are market-driven neoliberal policies that were introduced in the reaction to the 1980s economic crisis. The ESAP advocated for a transition from a regulated to market-based economy. The external funding under ESAP resulted in a significant fall in government spending on numerous social areas, putting residents at even greater risk from different vulnerabilities. This meant diverting funds away from social services and towards businesses that promote material development such as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.

In keeping with the dominant state ideology, the focus of social protection changed to maintaining an adequate supply of food on the market, food for work for adults, grain loan scheme and supplementary feeding for children under five in primary school. The introduction of ESAP had a terrible effect on the population's welfare since it exposed individuals particularly the weak to a variety of risks.

Poverty and hunger continued to increase compounded by HIV and AIDS. The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), an indigenous reform programme was launched in response to the devastating effect of ESAP in 1996 - phase III. The (ZIMPREST) unlike ESAP was notable for balancing the productive and social sectors (Van Donk, 2004). However, the abandonment of ESAP by the government of Zimbabwe increased the ideological gap between the government and development partners/donors. Due to lack of financial assistance, ZIMPREST experienced a stillbirth.

From 2001 through to 2013, the government responded by enacting nine more economic stabilisation measures/frameworks and programmes without review of performance previous frameworks. Despite the fact that they were all aimed at ensuring macroeconomic stability and the return of donors none of them were implemented well, and they all failed to ameliorate the mounting crises. Most public policies, however, included social protection as an afterthought or add-on to the economic policy structure. The lack of budgetary resources to support the different policy frameworks meant the changes and expansion were just theoretical. While low investments, slow and uncertain economic growth meant that available resources could not keep up with demands in the social services sectors, other variables were undoubtedly at play as independence grew. The limited discretionary, non-programmatic social protection benefits that were available were used to attain partisan political goals in public policy.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) conducted its World Summit on Children in 1998, calling for universal access to basic education, the safety of children in dangerous settings, and pushing Member States to adopt national action plans to address the issues. The ongoing economic collapse in Zimbabwe, which began in the 1990s but only crested in 2000, remains a major focal event. The veteran demonstrations, food riots, and a national referendum defeat in 2000 forced the government to reconsider its neoliberal ideals and policies in favour of pseudo-socialist programmes.

However, there was little change in social protection, particularly when it came to cash transfers. The government created the Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP) with technical help from the World Bank (Chitambira, 2010). In 2008, the World Food Programme changed its corporate strategy from free food distribution to work for food, wealth creation and food for work. This change coincided with the formation of the Government of national Unity in 2010 and the gathering of the African Union Social Development Ministers in conjunction with the World economic Forum in 2012. Zimbabwe followed suit with noticeable shift in social protection from massive free food distribution to increased self-targeted food for work, active asset production, and targeted cash for food.

The signing of the Global Political Agreement (GNU) in Zimbabwe in 2008 remains a major focusing event for social protection reform in Zimbabwe. State ideology was characterised by a mixture of socialism strongly tilted towards neoliberalism-phase IV, (**Table 3.2**). The GNU was open to re-engagement with donors. During GNU tenure, Zimbabwe's first sustained experiments with cash transfers and innovative food aid programmes started. The role of the MDC in the policy arena was appealing to the development partner group, which had waited a long time to have a chance to influence government policy. Only when influential proponents the development partners came on the scene did change happen and cash transfers were implemented.

The MDC's interests frequently corresponded with those of donors in the reconfigured and paradoxical mix of players and aims. ZANU PF, in contrast, welcomed donor help but chastised the policy and governance sacrifices necessary to get it. Other stakeholders for whom the GNU appeared to provide prospects for engagement in policy-making were less effective in pursuing their claims in the end. Civil society organisations focusing on human rights, a weak labour movement, small enterprises and others acquired more access to the state first through political interests with which they were linked. Without constraints of political rivalry, ZANU PF showed a willingness to engage with industry, civil society and donors. Tripartite interactions through the Technical Negotiation Forum (TNF) and budget consultations with stakeholders became regular budget processes during GNU. The IMF, World Bank and other development partners partially reengaged with the government leading to dollarization of the economy that resulted in reasonable growth rates.

The proponents used the Multidonor Trust Fund (AMDTF), a World Bank-managed instrument to carry out several studies one of which was the social protection study in Zimbabwe. The studies generated the much-needed knowledge (H4) and information that would shape social protection policy going forward. The outcome of the studies and a UNICEF commissioned study by Schubert were the basis of the Child Protection Fund, which discussed many social protection concerns found in the National Action for Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC&Y). Simultaneously, development partners EU, DFID, SIDA, and SDC had started to reengage. Powerful advocates from the MDC in the government of national unity and champions EU, DFID, SIDA, World Bank, ILO and SDC began to reengage. Advocates from the MDC in the government of national unity as well as champions from the EU DFID,SIDA World Bank, ILO and SDC played a crucial role in putting social protection notably cash transfers on the policy agenda as a key tool for combating poverty and vulnerability.

According to the KM, *cost-benefit analysis* (H6) is a crucial consideration at the design stages of a policy initiative and it dictates the preferred design. Cost-benefit analysis did not emerge strongly in Zimbabwe's social protection deliberations (Table 4.3), except the concern with addressing former colonial imbalances. To achieve the redistribution drive, the government to promote, develop, regulate, allocate and distribute strategic and fundamental services and products to society created parastatals. In addition, to overcome colonial inequities, a focus was placed on rural development boosting access to public services and creating jobs.

4.10 From an agenda item to an adopted policy

Since 1980, influential **proponents** (H7) in Zimbabwe have played a critical role in bringing social protection policy problems to the forefront of the national agenda. International organisations were involved in the agenda-setting process and offered technical assistance throughout the policy development process. The benefits of wealth redistribution and their implementation were essentially unchallenged in all of the occurrences from 1980 to 1987.

Eight years after the socialist-inspired adoption of several social protection programmes, **powerful opponents** (H7) emerged in 1988. The resistance to the socialist ideology in favour of neoliberalism came from the same donors and business people connected to ZANU PF who started to wield increasingly important influence on government.

The opponents, led by the IMF and the World Bank, advocated for social and economic policies geared to the requirements of capital, notably foreign interests, following the recommendations of the Berg Report (Berg, 1981). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions(ZCTU), which had previously been affiliated with the ruling party, turned into a powerful opponent of the government after the implementation of ESAP in the 1990s (Bond *et al.*, 2005). The ESAP, 1992 drought, coupled with worsening economic conditions, the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and continued impoverishment of the people saw government corned to rethink its neoliberalism policies in favour of pseudo-socialist orientation. Social protection became heavily politicised during this period as government and party sought to rebuild and maintain its political base.

In Zimbabwe, the country's independence and Government of National Unity (GNU) provides examples of *propitious* (H9) timing for social protection policy change. Many circumstances and events aided the attention and momentum on social protection to redress colonial inequities at this period. The Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2008 is another good timing for social protection that saw the rise of proponents of cash transfers, cash for work and other innovative social protection mechanisms. The HSCT proponents used the occasion to press for a social protection strategy, similar to what UNDP proposed in the 1990s. UNICEF, the fund manager of HSCT, took the lead, but a different understanding of social protection and the mandates of the various proponents became problematic. Firstly, the stakeholders failed to identify the issues and their relationship with the policy objectives. One participant echoed during interviews,... we brought all the stakeholders together, and everyone told us what he was doing, and we tried to put everything together. While donors are identified as proponents of social protection, particularly cash transfers, there were disagreements among them about the aim of and appropriate designs of social protection and the best ways to implement it. These differences have expressed themselves in Zimbabwe's social protection policy change. The differences at times stretched government capacity to coordinate the process. One interviewee noted the...major organisations pooled discussions to align with their mandates UNICEF's... on child grants and pro-poor access to essential services such as education and health care, the ILO a human right to social protection, labour markets, social security for informal sector a guaranteed social protection floor and while the World Bank-- conditional cash transfers, which is perceived as an investment in human capital for long term poverty reduction and poverty targeting to maximise efficient use of scarce public resources. An interviewee remarked,...We become spectators as the agencies and the experts argued over the parameters and focus of social protection, invited experts from universities also joined the debate, but it was the agencies that fought hard...

During the interviews, one policymaker described the social protection policy-making and implementation of HSCT in Zimbabwe as a form of "state capture." According to senior policymakers, the cash transfers part remains contentious. One interviewee stated that: "*Cash transfers*...*this is not how we assist the needy in our community and even our relatives*...*when my relative is sick, we bring him/her to our home, take him to hospital and pay all the bills until they are healed. When I find a relative in a challenge*... *no problem, I can even give him my shirt---blanket, buy meal mealie, plough filed for him etc. Giving money to buy a shirt or blanket is not part of how we care for each other*... *idea of just giving money* ... *it creates dependency.* It's apparent that as expressed in the Zimbabwe National Social Protection Framework of 2016, a combination of neoliberal and socialist ideologies pervaded social protection policy.

4.11 Requirements for implementation of the Policy (ies)

Requisite budget allocations (HI0) are required for implementation of policies into programmes. The Zimbabwean case highlights the critical importance of political nuances and opposing interests in resource brokering and development policy. In the aftermath of neoliberal austerity, state capture, and intra-elite competition, it also underlines the distinctive character of social actors' access to and influence in bargaining processes, as well as the State itself. The funding of social protection in Zimbabwe still largely depends on donor funding through the ZIMCORD resources that were slow to materialise. The government and donors funded social protection programmes from the start. However, the severe drought led to a sharp downturn in Growth amid rising government recovery and drought-related expenditure (Kanyedze, 2014).

High donor indifference in the country following the abandonment of ESAP was a defining feature of the period from 1995 to 1999. Aside from a lack of fiscal support, the initiatives failed to attract the attention of donors.

Government designed successor initiatives such as the Poverty Alleviation Action Programme (PAAP), Enhanced Social Protection Project (ESPP), the Community Action Project, the Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA), Vision 2020 and Long Term Development Strategy, the National Economic Revival Plan, 2001 and the Millennium Economic Recovery Plan. For the same reasons, these programmes designed to aid underprivileged areas that had not been effectively prepared for the liberal order's transition, did not succeed. One interviewee noted:...*These were serious attempts to clean or correct what we had done wrong or missed by the different macroeconomic policies*. Following the boycott of the MDC in 2005, ZANU PF won the elections. To rebuild its support base, the government has recalled the WFP to restart food.

The advocates or proponents of cash transfers (DFID, EU, Netherlands, SDC, and SIDA) utilised their financial clout to sway Zimbabwe's social protection policy and execution. These donors were more interested in the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCTs), than other social security policy mechanisms.

The breadth and efficacy of social protection programmes are limited by **institutional ability** (H16) to administer them. The chosen implementers from the government, non-governmental organisations, or local agencies who have both the incentives and desire to implement a policy are known as **implementation veto players** (H12) (Resnick *et al.*, 2018). All of the capacity building in Zimbabwe was aimed at ensuring that the donors' preferred programmes and policies were executed. Following diminishing donor funding for the HSCT, the technical support section was disbanded in 2014. While concerted and targeted advocacy characterised agenda-setting in the early phases, the influence of high-level bureaucrats and policical leaders became increasingly apparent in the implementation stage of Zimbabwe's social protection measures. Even when foreign donors were withdrawing, UNICEF and USAID remained in support due to vested interested in the initiatives.

4.12 Evaluation and reform

The majority of assessments or evaluations of social protection initiatives in Zimbabwe have been carried out by UN agencies or non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The Child Protection Fund, one of whose components is the HSCT, stands out as the most reviewed initiative. While the findings of HSCT are shared with the government, the evidence provided is only used in a minor way. As remarked by one interviewee... these organisations push for their programmes, fund them and hire themselves to review the same programmes....they generate results that are palatable to themselves. The foregoing could be an indication that government considers the findings of the evaluations with suspicion even though this has never been communicated officially. However, government funded programmes, such as the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) and the Assisted Medical Treatment Orders (AMTOs) and Food Deficit Mitigation Programmes, have never been subjected to process or impact evaluations. Consequently, there is scant information on the effects of various social protection programmes. Other social protection programmes, aside from social assistance, have mainly been ineffectual, resulting in poor progress toward international and national goals. With increasing recent attention on the imperatives of poverty and food insecurity in Zimbabwe, research has slowly and gradually initiated transformation of information and beliefs (H14) regarding the efficiency of various social protection programmes.

The execution of social protection schemes has been hampered by **changing material conditions** (H15). Following Chenjerai Hunzvi's election as chair of the war veterans, another key element of shifting material conditions was the politicisation of all aspects of the public service and social protection in Zimbabwe. Social protection literally moved from the government to the ruling political party, ZANU PF. Benefits from social protection were utilised as political bribes. Several policies were issued by the government, some of which even envisioned social protection as part of the solution to food insecurity, poverty and humanitarian response (Table 4.2). Financial restrictions also jeopardise implementation, monitoring and assessment activities. Budgetary resources have an impact on social protection coverage, but they have had little impact on implementation of those programmes where government had stakes.

In 1980, 1987, 1991, 1997, and 2009, institutional alterations affected social protection policy change. The most significant changes occurred between 1980 and 2009, during the independence and GNU eras, respectively.

During this time of relative democracy in Zimbabwe, a number of cross-ministerial institutional changes were implemented, giving advocates for social protection and cash transfers unparalleled exposure and political access.

4.13 Conclusions and broader implications

Since the World Summit on Social Development in 1990 and the World Food Summit in 1996, poverty and food insecurity have been recognised as important issues that have received increased international attention. This has given prominent international and local campaigners the impetus to start conversations about social protection. National surveys and localised research offered compelling evidence of social protection's effectiveness in addressing poverty and food insecurity. During the agenda-setting stages in the 1990s and early 2000s, high-level local champions campaigned for compliance with binding international commitments to achieve food security and poverty reduction.

Coalitions of multinational agents (including donors and UN agencies), NGOs, and international researchers aided their efforts. Existing solutions and proof of their efficacy in tackling poverty and food insecurity were addressed through off-the-shelf choices. Zimbabwe, in contrast, examined the data and did not necessarily reach the same conclusions or pursue the same strategies. Despite broad understanding throughout the agenda-setting phase of social protection policy procedures, diverse stakeholders and context-specific concerns evolved during the policy cycle design, adoption, implementation, and assessment phases. Beginning in the 1990s, powerful campaigners supported social protection programmes that included cash transfers, resulting in a substantial wave of legislative change in 2016. Once the benefits of social protection, notably transfers, were established, their acceptance appeared to be uncontested at agenda-setting. In the implementation stage, the commitment of government veto actors was less visible. Several stakeholders collabourated in order for social protection to be implemented. This working together would be the basis of contributions towards the different social protection initiatives. Budgets, institutional capacity, monitoring and compliance during implementation have a significant impact on the quality of service and coverage of social protection projects. Despite this, budgets do not seem to have a big influence in the design stage.

While changing facts and opinions necessitate ongoing examination and revision of social protection programmes, both material conditions and institutional transformations appeared to have an impact on the policymaking process. In order to secure the long-term viability of programmes, the expense of social protection was moved. Zimbabwe's donor community continues to fund social protection efforts, notably cash transfers. Donors in Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries have re-invested in research because of increased global attention to social protection. As a result, the ILO's social protection floors, as well as other regional and worldwide conferences, have issued updated guidelines on the implementation and administration of social protection.

Discussions between civil society, foreign organisations, and the government in Zimbabwe are continuous, and research continues to attempt to inform practice, leading to policy change. The role of international attention, focusing events and guidelines on best practice, is essential in initiating national policy reform in social protection. Government, donor assistance, coordination of a wide variety of stakeholders, and implementing partners, including the commercial sector, are all essential to keeping social protection programmes moving forward in Zimbabwe. Credible evidence and comprehension are required at every stage of the policy cycle. This study addresses a gap in existing research on policy change dynamics, allowing researchers to better understand how to encourage speedier social protection policy changes in the country.

Hypothesis testing (Table 4.3) shows that recognised relevant events, norms, biases, ideology changing information and beliefs, changing material conditions, commitment of international and domestic policy champions and powerful advocates were the main drivers of policy change in Zimbabwe. The Kaleidoscope Model's 16 variables are significant for understanding all policy change events throughout Zimbabwe's social protection policy path, according to this study. As a result, the variables create a collection of criteria that policymakers and academics should evaluate when identifying policy reform possibilities and restrictions. Furthermore, the findings show that external events focusing on tackling poverty, food insecurity, and child protection concerns as part of the global development agenda drove most of the agenda-setting for social protection policy change and initiatives.

The worldwide high food price crisis of 2007–2008, the G20 Summit of 2009, and the Sustainable Development Goals, are among these events.

Chapter 5: Veto players and Champions policy actors: Two worlds in social protection policy change

5.1 Introduction

Social protection is a well-recognised instrument to reduce poverty and inequality and stimulate the demand for food and other non-food products in needy communities (HLPE, 2012). The focus of this chapter is specifically on social assistance and not the other modalities of social protection. The Constitution of Zimbabwe of 2013 (Article 30) refers broadly to social security and social care (Dafuleya, 2020). The Constitution (Article 30) sets out the rights of citizens concerning social security but does not mention social assistance.

Despite the sustained economic crisis and recurrent emergencies, most social assistance instruments, such as public assistance, assisted medical treatment orders, food for work, supplementary feeding cash transfers, in Zimbabwe have not been scaled up to respond to current crises such as Cyclone Ida or reviewed for effectiveness (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). On the other hand, Zimbabwe continues to implement a varied mix of uncoordinated social protection instruments, spending on social protection taking a downward trend that reached 0.72 % of GDP in 2015 (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016). In 2020, there has been an increase in the nominal allocation to social protection. However, its share to total expenditure declined from 5% in 2019 to 4% in 2020, while its share to GDP remained constant for 2019 and 2020 (UNICEF,2020). The health budget still remained below 15% and 20% of the Abuja and Dakar declaration, respectively (ZIMCODD 2020). The failure of social protection policy to evolve in Zimbabwe could reflect policy actors' knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of the causes of poverty and food insecurity.

Globally, several studies (Meijer, 2014; Sandberg, Persson and Garpenby, 2018; Verba *et al.*, 1987; McCord, Rossi, & Yablonski, 2019) have explored the influence of evidence on policy actors' perceptions, attitudes and knowledge and how this shapes policy reform. The critical insight from these studies is that evidence is not the primary driver of policy change (Sandberg, Persson and Garpenby, 2018), even for Zimbabwe's social protection policy (McCord, Rossi, & Yablonski, 2019).

Political expediency, institutional environment and organisational association (Verba *et al.*, 1987), and policymakers' perceptions of the cause of the problem (Resnick *et al.*, 2018) could be key drivers of policy change.

Shared perceptions and attitudes among policy actors could be significant determinants of policy change in that they bring policy actors together and strengthen their policy advocacy (Weible and Sabatier, 2006. The lack of information on the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors calls for researchers to shift their focus from generating more evidence of the effectiveness of different social protection instruments to understanding policy actors' perceptions and attitudes of the causes of the problems. This chapter aimed to present the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors in Zimbabwe towards different social assistance. A survey and in-depth phenomenological interviews were used in this research. A six-point Likert scale was used to measure policy actors' knowledge levels, perceptions, and attitudes. The scale was collapsed into three categories for a more straightforward interpretation. The interviews took place between August 2019 and February 2020 in Harare. The veto players (senior government officials and champions (senior bilateral, multilateral and NGOs officers) were the target population (see methodology section). The chapter opens with an introduction, followed by sections covering the background, conceptual framework for food security and social protection, a section on social protection in Zimbabwe that sets the scene, methodology, results, discussion and conclusions and recommendations section.

5.2 Background to the study

Despite the growing body of evidence of the need to adopt context-specific social protection, especially social assistance programmes, Zimbabwe has not embarked on social protection reform; retaining many of the same instruments that have been in existence since the colonial era (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016), which hamper the achievement of food security. Many of these programmes are implemented through limited donor-funded cash or in-kind transfers (Government of Zimbabwe & World Bank, 2016).

Establishing the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors and considering them in policy dialogue could support policy reform.

Knowledge is important for decision-making during policy reform and influences other aspects, such as selecting instruments and implementation strategies (Daviter, 2015). Knowledge is the information and understanding of how specific tools work and what they can achieve (Meijer *et al.*, 2014).

Perceptions of policy players are important in selecting and implementing various tools (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). The beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge that policy actors have regarding the feasibility and optimality of deploying various social protection policy tools to address food insecurity and poverty are a fundamental component of the content of policy change formation. Policy actors' opinions, attitudes, and knowledge of various social protection tools, understandably, influence their efforts to design policy alternatives and appraise policy possibilities (George, 1969; Jacobsen, 1995). As a result, when it comes to policy formulation, assessment, and design, some perceptions, attitudes, and knowledge about social assistance policy instrument choices and options are likely to be more influential than others (Lindvall, 2009), and different perceptions and attitudes will impact different elements of policy change. Despite the importance of perceptions, attitudes and knowledge in policy change, questions of how to examine them empirically remain off the research agenda resulting in knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors towards social protection instruments remaining poorly understood in Zimbabwe. Perceptions are the views policy actors hold about specific instruments based on their understanding of the cause of the problem, felt needs and prior knowledge (Meijer et al., 2014). These do not necessarily align with the reality of the poor and food-insecure people.

Attitudes are a set of beliefs and behaviours toward a particular group of people (Meijer *et al.*, 2014). Attitudes are shaped by knowledge, perceptions, and upbringing (Meijer *et al.*, 2014). The attitude towards a group of people or social assistance instrument affects a policy actor's support for or rejection of the specific mechanism (Meijer *et al.*, 2014). Shared perceptions are the building block for policy change (Weible and Sabatier, 2009; Sabatier, 1998). Where these perceptions, levels of knowledge and attitudes differ, they can result in serious delays, a stalemate or the complete failure of policy change. Understanding policy actors' perceptions, attitudes and knowledge in particular contexts is essential to explain why some instruments are not implemented (McCord, 2010) or are poorly funded (Chinsinga, 2009; HLPE, 2012).

The knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes of policy actors determine which specific instruments will be adopted and implemented. Despite the central role of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes in policy change, they have not been explored in Zimbabwe. This study investigated the policy actors' levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes towards different social assistance policy instruments in Zimbabwe.

5.3 Methodology

This study employed a survey and in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted in Harare between August 2019 and February 2020. The target population was made up of veto players and champions. The veto players included government employees - directors, deputy directors, principal directors, chief directors, and permanent secretaries. Perceptions of government experts through setting the institutional context for implementation are crucial to understand the implementation gap. Experts provide an indication of institutional behaviours, attitudes and perspectives that in the end define and shape policies for or against. The champions included heads of agencies - programme directors and deputy directors from UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations. Primary data was gathered from respondents through a digital questionnaire administered to the selected participants and indepth phenomenological interviews. Secondary data was gathered to validate the primary data. Systematic random sampling was used to identify those who responded to the questionnaire. A two-stage stage approach was used to select interviewes.

First, the study population was identified based on lists provided by the Ministry human resources manager. Systemic random sampling was then used to select the appropriate samples for each cluster. Systemic random sampling, where N (344) was the population size, n was the sample size (80) and K, the interval was then used to select the appropriate samples for each cluster (Table 1). The officers' names were listed in alphabetic order, and the first was randomly chosen between the first and the fourth person. Thereafter, every fourth officer was chosen to reach a sample of 80 in line with Bartlett *et al.*,'s. (2001) table for determining the sample size for a given population size for continuous and categorical data.

Table 5.1: The sample size

Organisation worked for	Population	Sample size	Achieved sample
		required	size (%)
Ministries and Government Departments	240	54	41(76%)
UN Agencies, donor organisations and	104	26	25(96%)
NGOs			
Total	344	80	66(83%)

The questionnaires were assessed for completeness and validity. Cronbach's alpha was used to measure the reliability of the questionnaire (Sharma, 2016). A Cronbach's alpha coefficient greater than 0.70 is usually preferred and considered reliable (Ursachi *et al.*, 2015). The reliability value for the study's items for veto players (α = 0.7866) and champions (α = 0.858) was above 0.7 (Table 5.2)

Table 5.2: Cronbach's alpha Reliability Test

Cronbach's Alpha-Veto players	N of Items on scale
0.7866-veto players	68
0.8402-champions	78

The return rate of the questionnaires was 83%, while 79% of the targeted 15 interviewees participated in the in-depth phenomenological interviews (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Response rate analysis

	Target number	Frequency	Percent
Questionnaires	80	66	83
Interviews	19	15	79

GoogleForms were applied in administering the questionnaire. Information provided by the participants was treated as anonymous and confidential. They were also allowed to withdraw or refuse to take part in the study at any time. Data was first exported to a Microsoft Excel

spreadsheet and then to STATA version 13.0 statistical software for analysis. For the three elements - knowledge, perceptions and attitudes - Chi-square and Fisher's exact tests were used to test the association between the veto players and the champions' responses. Fisher's exact test is valid for all sample sizes, however it is commonly used in the analysis of small samples and for 2×2 contingency tables(Kim, 2017). We used web page 'Social Science Statistics' that permits performance of Fisher exact test for larger tables up to 5×5 contingency tables.(Kim, 2017). Fisher's exact test was used to determine whether there was a difference or agreement on veto players' views and the champions regarding the three variables. The Chi-square and Fisher's exact tests were performed to check the statistical significance of the association between the two categorical variables, based on the null hypothesis that there was no association between the variables concerned. Both tests were set at a 5% significance level. As such, the null hypotheses were rejected whenever the p-value from either the Chi-square or Fisher's exact test was lower than five per cent.

A phenomenological interview approach was used to fill this gap. For phenomenological interviews 10 participants are considered adequate (Boyd, 2001; Criswell 1998). For this study we conducted phenomenological interviews with 15 participants. Phenomenology is a qualitative research method used to describe how human beings experience certain phenomena (Bentz and Shapiro, 1998; Hycner, 1999). The data were collected through phenomenological interviews from permanent secretaries and principal directors from ministries, Head of AID/Team Leaders from UNICEF, WFP, ILO, DFID, SIDA and SDC and Directors and Programme Managers from Care International and Oxfam. The sampling resulted in a sample that consisted of five government ministries, three United Nations (UN) agencies and four donors and two international NGOs. The ministries were: the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development. The United Nations agencies involved are the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation. The Department for International Development, Swedish International Development Agency, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and two international non governmental organisations, care international and Oxfam . Our sample reflects the limits of the budget and the time.

Phenomenology is a qualitative research method used to describe how human beings experience certain phenomena (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998; Hycner, 1999). Phenomenology facilitates direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced by people living those experiences (Welman & Kruger, 1999; Sadala & Adorna, 2001). Greene, 1997; Kruger, 1988. A phenomenological interview is characterised by a focus on qualitative interpretation of people's perceptions and meanings attached to social phenomena, attitudes, beliefs, and value systems. The phenomenological paradigm emphasises understanding, analysing, and describing phenomena without necessarily relying on quantitative measurements and statistics (Dawson; 2007; Sadala & Adorno, 2000). Phenomenological approaches accept subjectivity as opposed to objectivity.

Phenomenological interviews were conducted with 15 senior officers selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques. After securing the interview, the participant's consent was obtained. The first interviewee or the subsequent was requested to recommend the next suitable interviewee (Groenewald, 2001). Snowball sampling contributed towards identifying a diversity of interviewees by asking an interviewee to recommend others for the interviewing (Babbie, 1995). This contributed to the diversity of opinions being collected for triangulation. Their responses were reported on a 3-point Likert scale wherein respondents were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with certain statements.

Findings from the interviews were presented in narrative form, capturing the actual wordings from the interviews on areas of particular importance. Summaries were compiled for each interview that incorporated all the themes elicited from the data to develop a holistic context. Data analysis used a thematic approach, with the presentation, analysis and discussion of the results being guided by the themes emerging from the research objectives. Triangulation of the data was applied by corroborating data from the questionnaires and the in-depth interviews.

5.4 Results

The demographic characteristics showed a wide variation in terms of the participant's ages, backgrounds, levels of education, workplaces and experience (Table 5.4).

	Total (N=66)	
Group of participants		
Government	41(62%)	
UN, WB, NGOs	25(38%)	
Sex		
Male	36(55%)	
Female	30(45%)	
Experience		
1-2 years	7(11%)	
3-4 years	31(47%)	
5+ years	28(42%)	
Highest level of education		
Diploma	10(15%)	
General degree	5(8%)	
Honours degree	23(35%)	
Masters degree	23(35%)	
PhD	5(8%)	
Background		
Agricultural economics	4(6%)	
Agriculture	5(8%)	
Development studies	1(2%)	
Economics	3(5%)	
Education	2(3%)	
Political science	3(5%)	
Social work	17(26%)	
Sociology	10(15%)	
Social protection	2(3%)	
Other	19(29%%)	

Table 5.4: Demographic characteristics of participants

Veto players and champions attributed poverty and food insecurity to structural and social arrangements and not individual factors. The perceptions of respondents on why some people were poor was because they lacked opportunities to work, ($\chi 2$ (2) = 18.242, p= <0.001).

Both groups disagreed with the postulation the postulation that people were poor and food insecure because of behavioural factors such as laziness (veto players: 93% n=38 and champions: 60% n=15). However chi-square ($\chi 2$ (2) = 13.64, p<0.001) suggested a difference in opinion. This is likely because veto players were absolutely disagreed 93%. On the other hand the champions had a simple majority disagreeing 60%.

The same sentiment was shared during phenomenological interviews".... it's a challenging environment we live in, work may not produce much, and vulnerability of a person cannot be ascribed to one's laziness". In cases where policy actors share similar perceptions about a specific social protection policy component, this increases the chances of them coming together to advocate for a particular policy option, improving the possibility of policy change.

The veto players (73% n=31) indicated that the budget allocation for social protection was inadequate. The champions (76% n=19) agreed that the 2016 budgetary allocation for social protection could enable the government to achieve the desired social protection outcomes (Table 5. 5). The respondents did not concur about the adequacy of the budget for social protection. The disagreement was statistically significant ($\chi 2$ (2) = 33.67, p=0.000). The difference in the perceptions of the veto players and champions about the adequacy of the social protection budget was much clearer during interviews, where one champion respondent remarked...*the government has enough money for social protection. The challenge is the lack of prioritisation, scatter of the instruments, lack of transparency in targeting and duplication...*

Different perceptions indicate contestation during policy change processes, which may delay policy change. Such contestation can go beyond policy promulgation to affect budget allocation and disbursement. The differences in perception could also explain the abandoning of many donors supported policies.

There was a statistically significant difference in reported levels of knowledge among the respondents on different social protection instruments.

The reported levels of knowledge on public works programme (80% n=20 vs 58% n=24), cash transfers (72%, n=18 vs 11% n=11), school grants (84% n =21 vs 23% n=23) and food price stabilisation (48% n=12 vs 39% n=16) were higher among champions than veto players (Table 5.6). More veto players (61% n=23) than champions (20% n=5) reported that they were not knowledgeable about cash transfers; (27% n=11) of veto players were knowledgeable compared to champions (72% n=18). The difference between knowledge levels was statistically significant ($\chi 2$ (2) = 13.206, p=0.001).

Characteristic	Veto	Champions	Total	Chi-square(p-	Fisher's
	players(N=41)	(N=25)	(N=66)	value)	1	exact
	(%)	(%)	(%)	,		
Government has	the responsibility of p	rotecting the vulne	rable			
Agree	41(100%)	23(92%)	64	3.383(0.066)		0.140
Undecided	0	2(8%)	2			
Disagree	0	0	0			
	oney the government	of Zimbabwe is sp	ending to assist	t the poor is too mu	ıch	
Agree	9(22%)	19(76%)	28	33.672(0.000)		0.000
Undecided	2(5%)	6(24%)	8			
Disagree	30(73%)	0	30			
	oney the government	of Zimbabwe is sp	ending to assist	t the poor is too litt	le	
Agree	31(76%)	19(76%)	50	9.563(0.008)		0.005
Undecided	2(5%)	6(24%)	8			
Disagree	8(20%)	0	8			
	noney the government	t of Zimbabwe is s	pending to assi	ist the poor is the r	ight	
amount			e e	1	U	
Agree	3(7%)	5(20%)	8	3.944(0.139)		0.163
Undecided	3(7%)	0	3			
Disagree	35(85%)	20(80%)	55			
People are poor b	because they are lazy					
Agree	1(2%)	9(36%)	10	13.637(0.001)		0.001
Undecided	2(5%)	1(4%)	3			
Disagree	38(93%)	15(60%)	53			
People are poor b	because they did not w	ork hard at school				
Agree	1(2%)	2(8%)	3	1.620(0.445)		0.470
Undecided	3(7%)	3(12%)	6			
Disagree	37(90%)	20(80%)	57			
People are poor b	because they misuse the	neir resources				
Agree	4(10%)	8(32%)	12	6.954(0.031)		0.031
Undecided	5(12%)	5(20%)	10			
Disagree	32(78%)	12(48%)	44			
Ŭ	it hard to get work					
Agree	28(68%)	9(36%)	37	7.611(0.022)		0.017
Undecided	2(5%)	5(20%)	7			
Disagree	11(27%)	11(44%)	22			
	assisted with in-kind		nt misuse of re	sources		
Agree	11(27%)	1(4%)	12	5.992(0.050)		0.041
Undecided	3(7%)	4(16%)	7			
Disagree	27(66%)	20(80%)	47			
0	because of lack of opp					
Agree	30(73%)	14(56%)	44	18.242(0.000)		0.000
Undecided	2(5%)	11(44%)	13	(*)		-
	9(22%)	0	9			

Table 5.5: Attitudes towards vulnerable people

Characteristic	Government(N =41)	NGOs (N=25)	Total (N=66)	Chi-square (p- value)	Fisher's exact
	(%)	(%)	(%)		
How informed/kn					
Not	13(32%)	3(12%)	16	3.614(0.0164)	0.161
knowledgeable					
Neutral	4(10%)	2(8%)	6		
Knowledgeable	24(58%)	20(80%)	44		
How informed/kn	<u> </u>				
Not	25(61%)	5(20%)	30	13.206(0.001)	(0.001)
knowledgeable					
Neutral	5(12%)	2(8%)	7		
Knowledgeable	11(27%)	18(72%)	29		
How informed/kn	owledgeable are y	vou about gr	ain reserves?		
Not	19(46%)	11(44%)	30	0.188(0.910)	(895)
knowledgeable					
Neutral	8(20%)	6(24%)	14		
Knowledgeable	14(34%)	8(32%)	22		
How informed/kn	owledgeable are y	ou about cr	op and livest	ock insurance?	
Not	12(29%)	8(32%)	20	0.102(0.950)	0.950
knowledgeable					
Neutral	11(27%)	7(28%)	18		
Knowledgeable	18(44%)	10(40%)	28		
How informed/kn	owledgeable are y	ou about sc	chool grants?		
Not	15(37%)	0	15	12.064(0.002)	0.000
knowledgeable	× ,				
Neutral	3(7%)	4(16%)	7		
Knowledgeable	23(56%)	21(84%)	44		
How informed/kn	owledgeable are y	ou about in	put subsidies	?	
Not	16(39%)	15(60%)	31	4.156(0.125)	0.138
knowledgeable					
Neutral	3(7%)	3(12%)	6		
Knowledgeable	22(54%)	7(28%)	29		
How informed/kn	/	(/	od price stab	ilisation?	
Not	21(52%)	7(28%)	28	5.503(0.064)	0.070
knowledgeable	× /				
Neutral	10(24%)	5(20%)	15		
Knowledgeable	10(24%)	13(52%)	23		
How informed/kn	· /			?	
Not	15(37%)	7(28%)	22	0.639(0.726)	0.727
knowledgeable	- ()	()		(
Neutral	10(24%)	6(24%)	16		
	· • (= • · •)	~ \ - · · · · /			

Table 5.6: Knowledge of social protection among policy players

The respondents agreed with the assertion that cash transfers were essential for food security and economic development. The same sentiments were expressed during phenomenological interviews:...*cash transfers can work to achieve food security, if recipients use the money to buy inputs, procure additional labour to work on the land*.... There was evidence that this association of the perceptions was statistically significant, $\chi^2(2) = 13.41$, p=0.001, (Table 5.7).

Characteristic	Government	NGOs	Total	Chi-square(p-	Fisher's
	(N=41)	(N=25)	(N=66)	value)	exact
D	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Public works pr	0	2(00/)	11	2 4(1(0 202)	0.200
Likely	9(22%)	$\frac{2(8\%)}{2(120/)}$	<u> </u>	2.461(0.292)	0.299
Undecided	9(22%)	3(12%)			
Unlikely	23(56%)	20(80%)	43		
Cash grants	20(510()		22	10.000(0.005)	0.004
Likely	29(71%)	4(16%)	33	10.022(0.007)	0.004
Undecided	6(15%)	5(20%)	11		
Unlikely	6(15%)	16(64%)	22		
Crop and livesto					
Likely	4(10%)	6(24%)	10	4.945(0.084)	0.089
Undecided	17(41%)	9(36%)	26		
Unlikely	20(49%)	10(40%)	30		
Input subsidies					
Likely	18(44%)	18(72%)	36	0.589(0.0745)	0.714
Undecided	7(17%)	6(24%)	13		
Unlikely	16(39%)	1(4%)	17		
Food price stabi	lization	· · ·			
Likely	8(20%)	11(44%)	19	33.702(0.000)	0.000
Undecided	13(32%)	7(28%)	20	· · ·	
Unlikely	20(49%)	7(28%)	27		
Food subsidies					
Likely	18(44%)	11(44%)	29	3.214(0.201)	0.223
Undecided	7(17%)	6(24%)	13		
Unlikely	16(39%)	8(32%)	24		
Food distributio	n				
Likely	33(80%)	2(8%)	35	9.600(0.008)	0.008
Undecided	0	3(12%)	3	· /	
Unlikely	8(20%)	20(80%)	28		
School feeding		X /			
Likely	20(49%)	7(28%)	27	2.016(0.365)	0.384
Undecided	4(10%)	5(20%)	9		
Unlikely	17(41%)	13(52%)	30		

Table 5.7: Perception on dependency and different instruments

Supplementary feeding								
Likely	18(44%)	3(12%)	21	27.550(0.000)	0.000			
Undecided	10(24%)	5(20%)	15					
Unlikely	13(32%)	17(60%)	30					
Conditional cash	grants							
Likely	13(32%)	4(16%)	17	6.177(0.046)	0.050			
Undecided	5(12%)	4(16%)	9					
Unlikely	23(56%)	17(68%)	40					
Unconditional ca	Unconditional cash grants							
Likely	26(63%)	0	26	28.578(0.000)	0.000			
Undecided	4(10%)	3(12%)	7					
Unlikely	11(27%)	22(88%)	33					

Broadly, veto players (71%) consider cash grants as potentially capable of contributing to dependency on the grant while champions (64%) held the opposite view. This disagreement was statistically significant ($\chi 2$ (2) = 10.022, p=0.007). The difference in perception was observed after splitting cash grants into conditional and unconditional cash grants. Veto players held the perception that unconditional grants lead to beneficiary dependency on the grants (63% n= 26), while champions (88% n= 22) believed unconditional cash grants do not lead to dependence (Table 5.7). This disagreement was statistically significant (χ^2 (2) = 28.578, p=0.000) and was corroborated during interviews by one veto player who commented: ... money is the route of all evil, you do not just give money, it can lead to dependency on the cash ...it is unsustainable. However, I will pay for the ploughing of my vulnerable relative's field or pay hospital bills, not give him /her cash to go and pay...it creates all sorts of challenges "one can hope to get used to what is unsustainable. ... come on, this is not how we have assisted our vulnerable and food-insecure people, but we care While the perception that cash transfers foster dependency in that the recipient families will work less and become lazy, resulting in dependence on the transfer. This is also common with food distribution, input subsidies and cash grants.

The champions reported that input subsidies could lead to dependency among beneficiaries (72% n=18) while veto players had mixed feelings (likely = 44% n=18; unlikely = 39% n=16). The results showed a significant difference in perception that input subsidies could lead to dependency ($\chi 2$ (2) = 10.022, p=0.01). The two different standpoints were clearer during phenomenological interviews.

One champion respondent contended,...We do things without looking at the long-term implications, input subsidies result not only in dependency but can cause market distortions, corruption and political patronage, there is a huge risk of inputs not suitable to some areas being distributed to such areas, and the support may not be in line with immediate needs hence the sale of inputs in exchange for maize grain...

Even during interviews, the veto players' perceptions were consistent, ...*input subsidies are key for food security, our different input distribution schemes have demonstrated this ever since...* Eighty percent of veto players reported that food distribution does not result in the food parcel beneficiaries depending on the food, while 8% of champions believed otherwise.

This perception significantly differed from that of the champions on food distribution ($\chi 2$ (2) = 33.702, p=0.000) and unconditional cash grants ($\chi 2$ (2) = 27.550, p<0.000) meaning this could create controversy, failure to collaborate and mistrust among policy actors during policy reform.

Veto players (80% n=33) indicated that cash grants were not affordable for the government, a view disputed by champions (68%=17) (Table 5.8).

The difference in perceptions among the respondents on the affordability of cash grants was statically significant ($\chi 2$ (2) = 28.58, p<0.001) and was confirmed by the Fisher's exact test (p=0.050).

Characteristic	Government (N=41)	NGOs (N=25)	Total (N=66)	Chi-square p- value	Fisher's exact
	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Public works p	rogrammes				
Not	6(15%)	9(36%)	15	6.177(0.0460	0.050
affordable					
Undecided	19(46%)	5(20%)	24		
Affordable	16(39%)	11(44%)	27		
Cash grants					
Not	33(80%)	4(16%)	37	28.578(0.000)	0.000
affordable					

Table 5.8: Perceptions on the affordability of different instruments

Affordable $4(10\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 21 Crop and livestock insurance Not $17(41\%)$ $9(36\%)$ 26 $6.994(0.030)$ 0.035 affordable Undecided $16(39\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 20 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable 15(37\%) $6(24\%)$ 21 $ Food price stabilisation Not 13(32\%) 7(28\%) 27 Affordable 8(20\%) 11(44\%) 19 $	Characteristic	Government	NGOs	Total	Chi-square p-	Fisher's
Undecided $4(10\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 8 Affordable $4(10\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 21 Crop and livestock insurance		(N=41)	(N=25)	(N=66)	value	exact
Affordable $4(10\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 21 Crop and livestock insurance Not $17(41\%)$ $9(36\%)$ 26 $6.994(0.030)$ 0.035 affordable Undecided $16(39\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 20 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable 15(37\%) $6(24\%)$ 21 $ Food price stabilisation Not 13(32\%) 7(28\%) 27 Affordable 8(20\%) 11(44\%) 19 $		(%)	(%)	(%)		
Crop and livestock insurance Not $17(41\%)$ $9(36\%)$ 26 $6.994(0.030)$ 0.035 affordable Undecided $16(39\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 20 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 21 560 Food price stabilisation Not $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable Undecided $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 7 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 7 7 Food aid Undecided $5(12\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 7 Mot $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $11(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ <t< td=""><td>Undecided</td><td>4(10%)</td><td>4(16%)</td><td>8</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	Undecided	4(10%)	4(16%)	8		
Not $17(41\%)$ $9(36\%)$ 26 $6.994(0.030)$ 0.035 affordable Undecided $16(39\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 20 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable 0.0890 Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation 0.0890 Not $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $0.049\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 0.0890 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 Food aid 0.002 0.002 $1167dable$ Undecided $5(12\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 24 Supplementary feeding $10(40\%)$ <td>Affordable</td> <td>4(10%)</td> <td>17(68%)</td> <td>21</td> <td></td> <td></td>	Affordable	4(10%)	17(68%)	21		
affordable Undecided $16(39\%)$ $4(16\%)$ 20 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation Not $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable Undecided $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 $Affordable$ 0.0890 affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 $Food$ aid $Food$ aid Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $2(151\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 $Affordable$ $Supplementary feeding$ Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 8 $Affordable$ $Supplementary feeding$ Not $14(34\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 affordable $Undecided$ $16(39\%)$ $5($	Crop and lives	tock insurance				
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Not	17(41%)	9(36%)	26	6.994(0.030)	0.035
Affordable $8(20\%)$ $12(48\%)$ 20 Input subsidies	affordable					
Input subsidies Imput subsidies Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordable Imput subsidies $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 7 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 7 Food aid $7(28\%)$ 27 7 7 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 7 Food aid 7 8 7 7 Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 7 $760(0.252)$ 0.277 Mot $14(34\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $760(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $11(27\%)$	Undecided	16(39%)	4(16%)	20		
Not $12(29\%)$ $14(56\%)$ 26 $4.670(0.097)$ 0.114 affordableUndecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisationNot $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordableUndecided $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordableUndecided $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.004)$ 0.002 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.004)$ 0.002 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.004)$ 0.002 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.004)$ 0.002 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $11(27\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 $4.945(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $760(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $760(0.270)$ 0.296 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 37 $2.616(0.270)$ 0.296 Affordable 12 116% 12 116%	Affordable	8(20%)	12(48%)	20		
affordable Undecided 14(34%) $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable 15(37%) $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation	Input subsidies					
Undecided $14(34\%)$ $5(20\%)$ 19 Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $7(28\%)$ 27 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 Food aid $7(28\%)$ 27 Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $11(25\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 4 $3(12\%)$ 8 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 affordable $14(34\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 112 112	Not	12(29%)	14(56%)	26	4.670(0.097)	0.114
Affordable $15(37\%)$ $6(24\%)$ 21 Food price stabilisation	affordable					
Food price stabilisation Not 13(32%) 7(28%) 20 4.945(0.084) 0.0890 affordable Undecided 20(49%) 7(28%) 27 Affordable 8(20%) 11(44%) 19 Food aid 11(44%) 19 Not 15(37%) 19(76%) 34 11.253(0.004) 0.002 affordable 11(25%) 3(12%) 8 Affordable 21(51%) 3(12%) 8 Supplementary feeding 24 2.760(0.252) 0.277 affordable 10(40%) 24 2.760(0.252) 0.277 affordable 21 Undecided 16(39%) 5(20%) 21 Food subsidies 37 2.616(0.270) 0.296 affordable 37	Undecided	14(34%)	5(20%)	19		
Not $13(32\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 20 $4.945(0.084)$ 0.0890 affordable $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 Food aid $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 Supplementary feeding $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.022 Mot $14(34\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.0277 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $11.253(0.0252)$ 0.277 Mot $20(49\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 37 $2.616(0.270)$ 0.296 affordable $10(40\%)$ 12 12	Affordable	15(37%)	6(24%)	21		
affordable 20(49%) 7(28%) 27 Affordable 8(20%) 11(44%) 19 Food aid 15(37%) 19(76%) 34 11.253(0.004) 0.002 affordable 21(51%) 3(12%) 8	Food price stat	oilisation				
Undecided $20(49\%)$ $7(28\%)$ 27 Affordable $8(20\%)$ $11(44\%)$ 19 Food aid Food aid $11(24\%)$ 19 Not $15(37\%)$ $19(76\%)$ 34 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $11(25\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 Affordable $21(51\%)$ $3(12\%)$ 8 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 Supplementary feeding $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 $11.253(0.004)$ 0.002 Not $14(34\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 24 $2.760(0.252)$ 0.277 affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $11(27\%)$ 0.296 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $10(40\%)$ 21 $11.256(0.270)$ 0.296 Affordable $11(27\%)$ $17(68\%)$ 37 $2.616(0.270)$ 0.296 affordable 12 112	Not	13(32%)	7(28%)	20	4.945(0.084)	0.0890
Affordable 8(20%) 11(44%) 19 Food aid Food aid 11.253(0.004) 0.002 Not 15(37%) 19(76%) 34 11.253(0.004) 0.002 affordable Undecided 5(12%) 3(12%) 8 4ffordable 21(51%) 3(12%) 24 Supplementary feeding 10(40%) 24 2.760(0.252) 0.277 Affordable 11(27%) 10(40%) 21 24 Undecided 16(39%) 5(20%) 21 4ffordable Undecided 16(39%) 5(20%) 21 5(20%) 21 Affordable 11(27%) 10(40%) 21 5(20%) 21 Food subsidies 5(20%) 21 5(20%) 21 5(20%) 21 Food subsidies 5(20%) 37 2.616(0.270) 0.296 3(167dable Not 20(49%) 17(68%) 37 2.616(0.270) 0.296 3(167dable Undecided 8(20%) 4(16%) <td< td=""><td>affordable</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>	affordable					
Food aid Image: Second state of the seco	Undecided	20(49%)	7(28%)	27		
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affordable Undecided 8(20%) 4(16%) 12	Food subsidies					
Undecided 8(20%) 4(16%) 12	Not	20(49%)	17(68%)	37	2.616(0.270)	0.296
	affordable					
Affordable 13(32%) 4(16%) 17	Undecided	8(20%)	4(16%)	12		
	Affordable	13(32%)	4(16%)	17		

The difference in the perceptions on affordability was strongly expressed during the interviews, where veto players remarked,its not about affordability, its just that government has never been put in a situation where it has support innovative programmes such as the harmonised social cash transfers from the start...when such programmes are introduced, they come with

funding for example, we have the harmonised social cash transfers, but this is a typical example of state capture.... all the papers were prepared outside government, even a simple letter on this I do not write, it is written somewhere. It comes only for signature; even my travel costs for this project come directly from outside government... this is not how we assist our vulnerable and food-insecure people; it's not an affordable and sustainable option. What guarantee do you have that the cash will be used judiciously?.

From the interview, veto players questioned affordability as a constraint to implementation of different social assistance schemes. They argue that government has funded for example input assistance schemes and affordability has never been an issue as one veto player remarked during interviews....look year in, year out government funded input schemes under different names and schemes country wide, there is never a shortage of money for such schemes.....if one scheme is not supported, this could just be an issue of prioritisation and not affordability of cash grants for the government....

Many veto players (51% n=21) perceived that food aid was affordable, while champions (76% n=19) held the opposite view. The different perceptions of veto players and champions on the affordability of food aid were statistically significant ($\chi 2$ (2) = 11.25, p<0. 001) and was confirmed by Fisher's exact test (p=0.296). Respondents expressed mixed feelings about the affordability of livestock insurance - 41% veto players and 36% champions reported that crop and livestock insurance was unaffordable. The chi-square test ($\chi 2$ (2) = 6.995.00, p<0.05) confirmed there was some agreement among respondents, presenting an opportunity to cooperate in policy reform.

Diverse perceptions were expressed on the appropriateness of the different instruments to address multiple vulnerabilities such as poverty, food insecurity, health, and education. Champions identified cash grants as an appropriate instrument (56% n=13) to address multiple vulnerabilities, but veto players considered these inappropriate (73% n=30), confirmed by a Fisher's exact test (p=0.631). Differences in perceptions could cause controversy in policy change.

Policy actors were asked what policy instruments they would recommend if they had the authority to recommend a social protection policy instrument.

Educational grants, food for work, conditional cash grants and school feeding were supported by both veto players and champions ($\chi 2$ (2) = 7.86, p=0.02). Shared perceptions could unite policy actors.

5.5 Discussion

The differences in perceptions and attitudes could explain why some policy instruments are not adopted. The substantial lack of knowledge about cash transfers among veto players was concerning. Without knowing the likely impact of cash transfers, the uptake could remain temporary and at the periphery. Veto players and champions held the same attitude towards the poor and food-insecure people and agreed that structural factors caused poverty and food insecurity. However, their preferred policy instruments to address these problems differed.

Three possible reasons could explain policy actors' differences in preferred policy. First, policy actors' perceptions do not necessarily express their actual positions about different social protection instruments in policy change but rather their lived experience with the instruments. The second explanation could be rooted in the roles of the players in the process. Champions' roles in policy change are informal, contributing to discussions and, in some cases, to written submissions. The formal power for policy change rests with veto players. Third, as Verba *et al.*, (1987) noted, different choices could reflect policy actors' institutional affiliation and length of experience. The perception that cash transfers led to dependency was common among veto players but not among champions. Such differences could constitute stumbling blocks to policy change in Zimbabwe.

Literature (Barton 1974-1975, George 1998, Bochel and Defty 2007) states that policy actors who believe that behavioural factors cause poverty and food insecurity would support government policies and programmes that provide state assistance. However, veto players in this study did not support unconditional cash transfers despite reporting structural causes to poverty and food insecurity. Veto players perceived cash transfers as fostering dependency among the beneficiaries. Consequently, they preferred policies that required the poor and food insecure to work for benefits, programmes that are limited "handouts" and their shorter-term programmes.

5.6 Conclusions and recommendations

Social protection programme design in Zimbabwe has not kept pace with international developments, nor has the country scaled up existing social assistance instruments to meet demand. Despite agreement over the causes of poverty and food insecurity and that current budgetary allocations to these programmes were inadequate, the attitudes towards social protection programmes and the perceptions of veto players and champions differed. This could lead to a lack of reform and implementation of these important and much-needed interventions. While there is global consensus on the efficacy of social protection, such an agreement does not exist in Zimbabwe due to the lack of substantial knowledge about cash transfers, particularly among veto players. The veto players and champions disagreed about whether grants led to dependency among beneficiaries.

Institutional cultures and practical experiences informed the attitudes and perceptions of players, rather than being based on independent research.

Building trust among policy actors and continued training and exposure for veto players focusing on young professionals, members of parliament and senior professionals remain paramount. For the champions, it is crucial to avoid pushing to align every social protection policy with their institutional mandates, irrespective of the contexts. Champion's capacity building support should not create parallel structures and not focus on donor-funded projects. Capacity development of veto players and genuine consideration of local contexts by the champions as well as supporting government systems, for example, creates trust and a level playing field for the policy actors to facilitate meaningful engagement in policy reform. The trained veto players could act as the voice of reason in policy change. For the effectiveness of the training, the messenger (who delivers the training) is just as important as the message (the content) - building trust among policy actors through platforms for dialogue is essential. The research model also has to change to involve veto players as active participants rather than only research subjects. Veto players should be change agents in agenda-setting and dialogue between players. Identifying shared perceptions offers a platform for partnership among different policy actors. Shared perceptions provide the critical mass to advocate for a specific policy position.

Understanding policy actors' perceptions of the causes of poverty and food insecurity can influence policy. For example, in this study, the perception of veto players is that cash transfers foster dependency and are a drain on resources that could be used for productive purposes. To address these stumbling blocks, veto players need to improve their knowledge, change perceptions and attitudes. In contrast, champions need to change attitudes, rally towards agreed-upon focus areas and not push towards their institutional mandates. One key ingredient is information available to the policy actors for this to happen. Researchers should shift their focus from generating more evidence of the effectiveness of different social protection instruments to understanding policy actors' perceptions and attitudes of the causes of the problems. Finally, this information from research is crucial to improve the knowledge and change the perceptions and attitudes of policy actors.

Literature contains anecdotal evidence and reference to the influence of policy actors' perceptions and attitudes as driver policy change (McCord, 2010; Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). However, none of these studies has sought to establish and understand policy actors' perceptions, knowledge and attitudes towards different social protection instruments. Having established that negative perceptions exist, analytical studies are needed to establish context-specific information on policy actors' knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes to influence positive and progressive policy change.

Chapter 6: Understanding the implementation gap: Social protection policy and practice in Zimbabwe

6.1 Introduction

Policymakers play a pivotal role in creating a conducive policy environment and setting the institutional context for implementing interventions such as social protection (Vignola *et al.*, 2009). Therefore, they are key stakeholders for understanding this implementation gap. It is important to understand how their perceptions and attitudes influence policy preferences. Apart from policymakers, government specialists' perceptions of various social protection measures reveal institutional behaviours, attitudes, and perspectives about the interventions (Williamson *et al.*, 2005). In addition, by developing social norms, institutions also influence the population's values and interests (Wachinger & Renn, 2010). Likewise, prevalent social norms influence the policies, resources and priorities that governments and organisations implement. However, despite the vital role national and provincial policymakers play in shaping social protection policy and, subsequently, the measures that are implemented, little is known about what shapes their perceptions and attitudes of social protection in general and cash transfers in particular. Consequently, it is essential to investigate what shapes policymakers' perceptions and attitudes about social protection to close the gap that sometimes exists between policy, evidence and implementation.

The reasons that underlie policymakers' decisions for (or against) the implementation of cash transfers remain an enigma. Despite, evidence on the positive impacts of cash transfers and their affordability even in low-income countries (DFID., 2005; McCord, 2010; Behrendt, 2008; ILO., 2008; Kakwani & K., 2007;Gentilini & Omamo, 2011; ILO, 2008), policymakers have have not developed much appetite for cash transfers. The perceptions of policymakers that cash transfers are unaffordable and breed a dependency culture among beneficiaries persist and underpin the lack of political will to implement cash transfers as part of social protection measures. (Ellis *et al.*, 2009; HLPE, 2012; Andrews *et al.*, 2012; McCord, 2010). However, evidence supporting the perception that cash transfers are unaffordable, subject to misuse by beneficiaries and can create a dependency culture among beneficiaries is lacking and not supported by international evidence (Handa, *et al.*, 2018).

Furthermore, some policymakers hold the perception that cash transfers have potential to increase spending on unproductive expenditure, encourage consumption (rather than investment), increase fertility and have negative community-level economic effects that include price distortion and inflation(Handa et al., 2018). Such perceptions about cash transfers have led to conclusions by some stakeholders that cash transfers are just handouts and nothing more. However, such negative perceptions and attitudes towards cash transfers as a social protection instrument are not always correct as evidence demonstrates that these perceptions are actually myths. These narratives influence the public perception of cash transfers and can play an important role in the political and social acceptability of financing, piloting, and scaling up such programmes. Cash transfers, especially unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) have been shown to reduce poverty and have widespread human capital development impacts-often larger than traditional forms of assistance; cash also provides recipients with dignity and autonomy over use (Blattman and Niehaus 2014; UNICEF ESARO/Transfer Project 2015; Bastagli et al., 2016; Gentilini 2016). In some cases, the perceptions are exaggerated and not borne out of practice (Pantuliano, 2007; HLPE, 2012; Piachaud, 2013) (ILO., 2008; African Union, 2006; OECD, 2009). This demonstrates that evidence alone is insufficient to explain why policy actors prefer or not different policy options available to them.

Continued citation of such negative and at times mistaken perceptions and attitudes in policy debates, limit the range of feasible tools that governments can consider to reduce poverty and support inclusive growth (Handa, et. al.2018). The foregoing has resulted in an implementation between evidence, policy and implementation. Therefore to close the implementation gap, insights into factors that influence policymakers' perceptions of risk and attitudes about social protection are needed to facilitate policy change for the inclusion of cash transfers as one of the social protection mechanisms for the achievement of food security.

6.2 Adopted conceptual framework for policy decision making for this research

Researchers have long been interested in explaining the process by which people respond to socially transmitted warnings about hazards and disasters (Tierney, Lindell &Perry, 2001; Lindell&Perry, 1992). To better understand the barriers to selection of respond instruments, the PMT and PADM is used to examine and understand the policy makers' perceptions of different social protection instruments.

The model is a useful approach to analyses decision making processes because it captures individuals' decision-making when faced with a threat (such as food insecurity) and when evaluating different possible interventions. It also helps to understand how the attitude towards a particular social protection instrument is generated from perceptions. This research set out to determine the drivers of policy actors perceptions that shape attitudes towards social protection mechanisms, in particular cash transfers, based on the following two questions: Perceptions in this study are the interpretation of the sensations while attitudes are the behavours or the actions that are taken.

- Do policy actors perceive the necessity for additional protective measures when weighing risk from food insecurity and natural hazards?
- What are the policy actors' perceptions and attitudes toward cash transfers as possible coping strategies for food security in Zimbabwe?

The study used the modified PMT and PADM (Lindell & Perry, 1992), to which we added norms and values before coping appraisal (Figure 6.2), in particular, to understand policy actors' attitudes on cash transfers mechanisms for food security and poverty alleviation. Norms and values are the underlying intangible factors, the lived experience of individuals. They influence the perceptions about efficiency, self-efficacy, costs and utility for other purposes of different mechanisms. This study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of decisionmaking in the context of food insecurity by delving into the elements that influence risk perception and social protection.




Figure 6.2. Model of the decision-making process towards protective action

Source: Author 2020: (based on Becker *et al*, 2014; Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Lindell & Perry, 2012)

6.3 Methodology

A qualitative design involving in-depth phenomenological interviews was adopted to elicit and investigate policymakers' knowledge, perceptions and attitudes toward different social protection measures. Phenomenological interviews may reveal the complex interdependencies between rationalities, experiences, and beliefs that define a social group's perspective on a particular practice (Cloke *et al.*, 2004; Flick, 2009). Phenomenology is a qualitative research method used to describe how human beings experience a specific phenomenon (Hycner, 1999).

The sampling was purposive and snowballing so that only policy actors aware of the implementation of cash transfers and social protection in Zimbabwe were identified for the study. The first respondents were identified through phone calls to the concerned ministries and also based on the researcher's experience. The first respondents were asked to identify and recommend other respondents who were familiar with cash transfers and social protection implementation. Snowball sampling contributed towards the identification of a diversity of respondents, asking each interviewee to recommend others for interviewing (Babbie, 1995; Halloway, 1997).

The study population consisted of veto players and champions, senior policy actors from the government, principal directors and chief directors from government, heads of bilateral aid organisations and United Nations (UN) organisations, respectively and international non-governmental organisations (INGO). Phenomenological interviews were conducted with 15 senior officers. These respondents were thought to be involved in policy reform at their respective institutions and hence better suited to reply to the research questions. (Table 6.1) for list of respondents.

Table 6.1: List of Respondents

Respondents
Government (Gov1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7)
Non-governmental organisations (NGO1 and 2)
Development Partners or donors (Donor 1, 2, 3 and 4)
United Nations Agencies (UN1 and 2)

Face-to-face phenomenological interviews were conducted. The aim was to gain in-depth insight and understanding of phenomena as consciously experienced by people living those experiences (Greene, 1997; Kruger, 1988; Maypole & Davies, 2001; Sadala & Adorna, 2001; Bryman, 2016). All interviews were recorded with the consent of the participants (Bailey, 1996; Arksey, 1999; Street, 1988). The interviewer took notes and recorded the responses to avoid possible challenges with time constraints and restricting the senior officials by asking them to answer a lengthy questionnaire with closed questions.

The interviews were carried out between August 2019 and February 2020. Some respondents were interviewed in their offices, others in restaurant gardens. The discussions were long and continued until the topic was exhausted. A phenomenological interview guide with thematically grouped questions based on the theoretical framework guided the interviews. These groups included:

- The threat appraisal of the risk from food insecurity and climate change,
- Questions concerning the general attitude towards food insecurity, poverty and climate change to understand protection motivation decision and coping appraisal of vulnerable people and

 Questions concerning the perceptions and attitudes towards social protection and cash transfers in particular to understand the protection motivation decision.

The consistency in asking made the findings more comparable and transferable. It assisted the acceptance of the theoretical framework (Figure 6.2), allowing for unanticipated findings through departure or in-depth inquiry (Flick, 2009; Gillman, 2000). This allowed for verbatim quotations, which helped to illustrate the findings and promote strong data-construct connections (Baxter & Eyles, 1997).

6.4 Data analysis

After the interviews were transcribed and the transcriptions crosschecked. The data were manually coded and thematically analysed following the suggested categories of the developed framework (**Figure 2**) to identify patterns across the interviews. Identifying patterns across the interviews involved delving further into the concerns mentioned by the interviewees and forging new connections or placing old concepts in new contexts, resulting in a more nuanced analysis and a contribution to knowledge advancement (Danermark *et al.*, 2002; Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). The involvement of national and provincial policy actors and the subsequent cross-referencing of the data enabled enhanced data triangulation (Denzin, 1989). Any points of agreement or deviation in opinions of the veto players and champions were of particular importance, given differences in their background. However, they operate in the same area on social protection. Such areas of convergence or divergence in views would lay the basis for policy development and policy implementation.

One of the study's limitations pertains to the reliability of the survey participants' views that could falsify information to achieve social desirability bias. To address the challenge of a non-response bias, a situation when participants do not or cannot participate, a personalised pre-notification email and reminder were sent out to participants. The study assumed that attrition, acquiescence, social desirability, confirmation and interview biases would not affect the reliability of the data. Acquiescence bias was avoided by formulating the questions so that they avoided asking leading questions, asking for agreement and were neutral. Confirmation bias was counteracted by fostering an environment of openness, keeping information exchange channels open and ensuring that disagreement is encouraged.

Interviewer bias was avoided by ensuring privacy, focusing on evidence and adopting a professional approach to the survey process.

6.5 Results

For the sake of determining the drivers of policy actors' attitudes towards social protection mechanisms, this section is organised around the categories set out in the theoretical framework (Figure 2). Using a theoretical framework based on the modified PMT and PADM, potential social protection mechanisms are evaluated for efficacy to respond once the **perceived threat appraisal** reaches a specific threshold. The interviews revealed that policymakers' threat assessments were mostly based on a high assessed likelihood of the danger and its projected implications. *The interviews showed that the threat appraisal among policymakers was primarily based on a high-perceived probability of the threat and the perceived consequences* (Gov1, Gov2, Donor1, UN1, NGO1, Gov5 and Gov7).

Binga, Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe, Chimanimani, Gwanda and Mwenezi districts were assessed as prone to floods and droughts (Gov2, NGO2, and Gov4). The high **perceived probability of hazards** in the districts mentioned above was ascribed to the physical location, natural regions IV and V and exposure of the areas. The country's likelihood of being exposed to the threat of natural hazards was perceived to significantly increase with climate change (Gov7, Donor1, and Donor2). Many respondents were aware of threats from food insecurity and climate change. The policy actors noted that the incidence, intensity and variability of the most common hazard events (cyclones, storms, droughts and floods) had increased in recent years and will continue to worsen in the future(Donor1, NGO2, Gov1, Gov7). Existing disaster risks will be worsened by new threats. *New hazards will exacerbate the existing disaster risk* (Donor1, UN2 NGO2).

Policy actors consistently mentioned food insecurity, health difficulties and the damage of infrastructure, environment and private property as the **perceived consequences of disasters**. The disruption of livelihoods was cited as the most common consequence of disasters (Donor1, Donor2, UN1 and NGO1). However, policy actors' assessments of the incidence and severity of these consequences of disasters on the population vary.

The difference arose from the policy actors' appraisals of the status of the existing disaster management arrangements and the socio-economic conditions of the people that facilitate or fail to respond to a specific hazard. Respondents concurred that the frequency and regularity of hazards in Manicaland, Masvingo, Matabeleland North and South and even Mashonaland West, particularly extreme events like the Cyclone Idai 2019, have pointed to the need for early warning systems and improved management of disaster risk. People's ability to sufficiently prepare for hazards is compromised by the mire size and timing of the hazards. In some cases, people are not familiar with other types of hazards.

This unfamiliarity with some hazards compounds the situation in that citizens may not know how or have the means and mechanisms to respond to something new (Donor1, UN2, Gov5, NGO1 and Gov2).

Hence, respondents emphasised the need for additional protective action, for example, cash transfers, to mitigate the risk of increasing disaster risk due to food insecurity and climate change (UN1, Gov6, Donor1, and Donor2). However, in-kind assistance remained the default mechanism in times of disaster (Gov2, Gov5, Gov4, and Gov6, Gov7). Gov5 remarked during the interviews:...*The cyclones are a relatively new phenomena, with exposure to media, we now all know about these events throughout the world. However, we still have not put in place effective early warning systems for communities and the impact may be grave in future... The occurrence of unfamiliar types of hazards such as cyclones and their timing are believed to affect people's ability to prepare adequately (Gov2 and Donor2). As Donor1, remarked...<i>some communities are familiar with drought...they now know when and what to set aside for such occurrences. Now with climate change, everything is unpredictable, you can have floods, strong winds.... these things cyclones nobody knows what to prepare for such and when, Even when we go with projects such as environmental management, resettlement, early warning systems, people do not as yet see the import and participation and commitment is difficult to get...'*

Those policy actors who were uncertain about the magnitude of the impacts but knowledgeable and confident of existing disaster preparedness in their areas did not see the need for additional protective measures (Gov7, Gov1, Gov5 and NGO1).

According to the modified framework policy actors analyze potential **coping appraisals** when the perceived threat appraisal reaches a specific threshold.

The policy actors' attitudes towards cash transfers as a response strategy is then formed after considering the perceived response efficacy for persons and the mechanism's potential utility for other purposes, protective response costs and self-efficacy.

Most policy actors confirmed the **perceived response efficacy** of cash transfers as a suitable mechanism to respond to different covariate and idiosyncratic shocks such as droughts, food insecurity, cyclones, sickness etc. However, some policy actors insisted that cash transfers were unaffordable for the government, creating dependency on the transfers among the beneficiaries and promoting laziness of the recipients (Gov3, Gov7 and Gov2).

Furthermore, considering the magnitude of hazards, food for work, public works, school feeding, social assistance and supplementary feeding programmes were reported to provide sufficient protection (Gov5, Gov2, NGO2 and Gov3). Therefore, some policy actors either preferred the adoption of food for work, public works, or input subsidies as opposed to cash transfers. Most of the respondents were even conversant with the perceived benefits of cash transfer compared to in-kind transfers for the beneficiaries. For example, NGO1 remarked during the interviews:...*The beauty of cash is that it has some flexibility, provides decency to the beneficiaries, beneficiaries can prioritise where what they want to use the cash on, even the timing* ...

The destruction of assets during disasters worsens livelihoods and prolongs the recovery process (NGO2, NGO1, Gov6 and UN2). Even though the majority of policy actors were certain that existing levels of preparedness are insufficient to protect people from the current risk of natural disasters, there is a perceived need to assess different risk-reduction strategies, which is primarily caused by climate change was reported. In particular, climate variability, manifested in variations in seasons and precipitation patterns and was thought to disrupt local livelihoods. Consequently, it was the principal concern of all policy actors for worsened perceived repercussions in the future (Gov5, Gov2, Gov7, NGO1, Donor1, Donor2 and UN2). Floods, droughts, and storms significantly affected agriculture and small businesses (UN2, NGO1, NGO1, Gov4, and Gov3).

Consequently, many policy actors emphasised the need for additional social protection measures to mitigate the risk of food insecurity due to an increase in disaster risk through climate change. (UN2, Donor1, Gov5, Gov7, NGO2 and NGO1).

On the other hand, some policy actors voiced scepticism about their capacity to estimate the magnitude of the repercussions within their localities (NGO1 and Donor2). Despite this challenge, policy actors emphasised the need for enhanced social protection for vulnerable communities to adapt to climate change and food insecurity (NGO1, UN2, Gov7 and Donor 1).

Respondents expressed the view that the lack of environmental awareness in Manicaland and Masvingo provinces and the non-existence or non-enforcement of laws have contributed to the degradation of the ecosystems in the past resulting in food insecurity and destruction of infrastructure in the event of hazards such as drought and cyclones.

Therefore, effective ecosystem management through the local people and the restriction of access for communities to fragile and protected areas through enforcement by government is perceived as necessary for the sustainability of ecosystems (Donor1, Donor2).

The **perceived response costs** reported include time, technical skills, tools and knowledge for implementation of additional response measures such as cash transfers (Gov2, Gov1, Gov6, UN2, Donor1, and NGO2). The respondents noted that the ability of government and development partners to implement cash transfer and sustainability of cash transfers as a response mechanism depends on government attitude (UN1, Donor1, Donor2, NGO1, NGO2 and Gov7). Government commitment to long term support for cash transfers was identified as major cost in terms of money, time and effort for government and development partners. Evidence was identified as necessary to demonstrate to different constituencies that cash transfers as a response mechanism are a cheaper response mechanism to address some hazards compared to large scale in-kind distributions (UN1, Donor2 and NGO2). Some policy actors displayed skepticism towards cash transfers indicating that it diverts crucial resources necessary for economic development (Gov7, Gov2 and Gov3).

Cash transfers were valued for their potential **perceived utility for other purposes**, including provisioning, education, health, agricultural productivity-seed purchases, additional labour and ecosystem services that benefit local people's wellbeing and livelihoods. Some respondents recommended using cash transfers because of the multiple benefits of cash transfers beyond food security and poverty.

However, most respondents confirmed that the fungibility of money was its primary weakness as a response mechanism to either transitory or chronic vulnerabilities (Gov6, Gov2, Gov1, NGO2, Gov7 Gov4, Donor4 and Gov1).

Some government respondents reported that their knowledge of cash transfers, particularly Gov4 remarked during the interviews:...Understanding of social protection seems different always. There are people whose understanding of social protection is cash transfers......as a result, we are expected to be cash transfer experts over one or two workshops or through a few policy briefs that are shared...., we cannot be experts overnight... On the other hand, respondents from the government exhibited a lack of understanding of the concept of social protection, which was mirrored in confusion about the terms 'social protection, social security, social cash transfers, social assistance, social care' (Gov5, Gov2, Gov7, Gov3, Gov1). Gov7 remarked during the interviews...Are cash grants the same as social protection? Are grants not part of social insurance, the cash people get after retirement? Even though, how do we ensure that these are used to buy food, there is no such system in place. Is it not farfetched to think that giving cash can assist vulnerable people or households in becoming food secure or even expect them to become less prone to climate change effects...

6.6 Discussion

These results demonstrated that while respondents' perceptions about cash transfers persist, many are increasingly concerned about the lack of access to social protection in an environment of increasing impacts of food insecurity and climate change on livelihoods. In light of this, many respondents believed that further preventive measures were necessary, according to the perceived implications of threats. This is not an unusual finding. The demand for risk reduction is principally driven by the projected severity of impacts, rather than the perceived chance or risk of harm to the population.

Government respondents who expressed confidence in the existing government risk management and coping capacities of communities did not see a need for cash transfers as a risk-reduction measure for the population. This is further evidence of the fact that the perceived consequences drive the demand for additional protective responses. Policy actors generally consider cash transfer as a promising response option, mainly due to its multiple benefits.

While policy actors in this study were aware of the numerous benefits of cash transfers, the lack of knowledge, technical capacity and continued negative perceptions about cash transfers have been identified as the main impediments for implementing cash transfers.

One salient sentiment was the difficulty to evaluate the various (non-monetary) benefits of cash transfers. This was brought forward as an impediment to the implementation of cash transfers. Some of the critical obstacles identified for the lack of uptake of cash transfers mechanisms are related to the perceived limited response efficacy and, to a lesser extent, the perceived response cost. In some cases, in terms of response efficacy, policy actors did not deem cash transfers appropriate and sufficient to mitigate the perceived future impacts, especially during severe events that might overwhelm in-kind assistance. Consequently, in-kind measures were favoured over cash transfers.

Regarding response costs, some policy actors expressed concern about the trade-offs in money and the time and effort it takes to address food insecurity effectively. Especially the necessary long-term support by local stakeholders and the potential trade-offs with economic growth were stressed. Some respondents mentioned the perceived response costs included time, technical skills, tools, and knowledge for cash transfer implementation. Therefore, capacity development, communicating the various benefits of cash transfers were considered vital. Respondents also reported that cash transfers should not be implemented as a stand-alone solution but combined with other measures for improved outcomes.

Policy actors suggested that pilot projects could help raise awareness among decision-makers to overcome the barriers mentioned above. Insufficient budgetary allocation for cash transfers at the national level is also a consequence of the lack of recognition of cash transfers as a critical social protection mechanism. The reasons identified are an insufficient integration of cash transfers government policies.

The weak integration of cash transfers in government policies is also reflected in the limited understanding and knowledge of the concept of social protection, in particular cash transfers by policy actors at provincial and national levels. Clear definitions are crucial to facilitate social protection policy dialogue for policy change and consequent articulation of the policy document and framework. Social protection includes social security measures. However, some policy documents used 'social protection' interchangeably with 'social security', muddling the measures. The result is sometimes confusion.

The Zimbabwe National Development Strategy 1, for example, refers broadly to social protection, social security, social care and does not explicitly mention social assistance. As national policies provide leadership and set the framework for operation, recognition and application of social assistance and cash transfers in cross-cutting and sectoral national development frameworks and policies was fundamental. A policy sets the framework for mainstreaming cash transfers at all levels and facilitates the practical implementation of proposed mechanisms.

This research used a theoretical framework based on PMT and PADM to structure the analysis. Though PMT and PADM have preliminary been used quantitatively to evaluate the motivation for risk-reducing behaviour of individuals in the face of a concrete hazard. The applied framework proved useful for analysing policy actors' perceptions and attitudes towards social protection, particularly cash transfers.

6.7 Conclusions

Social protection works as a risk management approach to address both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. It augments the resilience of vulnerable groups and supports the 2030 SDG targets as elaborated in the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework. Cash transfers, in particular, offer a more flexible and adaptive mechanism to address different challenges that vulnerable populations encounter. Despite these multiple benefits, cash transfers remain a smaller proportion of social assistance initiatives in Zimbabwe.

The multiple values that policy actors recognise in cash transfers are an encouraging finding and present opportunities to increase uptake through further work to understand and communicate these multiple benefits at various scales. Increasing awareness of the benefits of cash transfers in social protection policies may increase policy actors' incentives and help build a stronger case to mobilise local funding. Communicating these benefits in an appropriate language across a range of stakeholders was also critical. Mainstreaming cash transfers horizontally (expanding coverage by bringing in new beneficiaries when disaster strikes) and vertically (making transfers shock responsive by topping up when there are new disasters) into development policies sets the political framework necessary for promoting the concept and facilitating implementation.

By exploring the factors that determine the perception of risk, this research has contributed to a more thorough understanding of political decision-making in the face of food insecurity and climate change. Understanding the perceptions and attitudes of policy actors could contribute to unlocking the negative attitudes and facilitate mainstreaming of cash transfers into social protection policies and plans, thereby helping to end poverty, food insecurity, protect ecosystems and build the resilience of the most vulnerable people. As this was one of the first studies that evaluated what drives policymakers' perceptions and attitudes of cash transfers, further research is needed to corroborate the findings in different risk management contexts, socio-political and geographical spaces.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Synopsis

An understanding about how the government selects and adopts context-specific policy instruments is crucial for policy change. This requires a thorough understanding of a web of issues derived from a proper assessment of context that should include knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy actors and an understanding of the political decision-making processes. Yet the increased recognition and utilisation of policy-relevant knowledge in social protection to achieve rationality in policymaking, continues to downgrade the influence of other factors such as politics, perceptions and attitudes and values in policy change. The policy actor's perceptions of risk and coping strategies influence behavioural responses to hazards and are crucial factors for understanding the readiness of policy actors, individuals and groups to start the evaluation of different response strategies. The elements that influence policymakers' choice is their perceptions, trust and respect. Understanding the levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of policy is even more significant in today policy arena that places emplaces on a multiplicity of working groups, including expert professionals that gives rise to challenges of collaboration, legitimisation and even trust. An understanding of the forgoing is crucial for the policy change-the identification, design and funding of appropriate social protection instruments to address food insecurity and other vulnerabilities.

The overall objective of this study was to identify drivers of policy change and their implications for social protection policy change (selection, design and implementation) in Zimbabwe after independence. The following specific objectives were investigated:

- To identify what has influenced social protection policy reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017.
- To determine the levels of knowledge, experiences, perceptions and attitudes of policymakers (veto payers) and champions (sponsors and implementers) towards social assistance instruments in Zimbabwe.
- To determine how policy actors' perceptions of risk (poverty, food insecurity, climate change) and coping strategies (precautionary actions) influenced their response -the social protection instruments for food insecurity and poverty in Zimbabwe.

Between 1980 and 2017, the Zimbabwean government sought to enact social protection policy change in nine instances. The primary drivers of social protection policy change were changes in the global, regional environment, the political ideology in the country and relevant problems. The first instance of social protection policy change was soon after independence in 1980 that was followed by a decade of a strong commitment to social protection, motivated by an imperative to address colonial imbalances regarding access to services and wealth. This imperative was shared by the government (veto players) and champions (the international non-governmental organisations, United Nations Agencies, and bilateral aid organisations). The government's socialist ideology pushed policy change items onto the agenda that were supported by the international actors.

From 1989, the government adopted a neoliberal approach to protection policy change. Following the World Summit on Social Development in 1990 and the World Food Summit in 1996, poverty and food insecurity were recognized as pressing issues that drew increased international attention. During the agenda-setting stages, high-level international and local champions argued for adherence to binding international commitments to ensure food security and poverty reduction. Coalitions of multinational agents (including donors and UN agencies), NGOs, and international researchers aided their efforts. The champions recommended reforms that need the government to reduce expenditure and deregulate the economy. The impact of the policy change reversed the gains achieved in the first ten years of independence. International actors started gaining a strong influence on social protection change.

The continually changing material conditions within the country, demonstrated by the collapse of the local currency and a wild strike by the war veterans, resulted in a forced change in the government-espoused political ideology of socialism to pseudo socialism. The mistrust among policy actors was becoming apparent as exhibited by a chain of government policies that were not supported by international actors and therefore could not rescue the country's ever-deteriorating socio-economic environment. Some improvement in the socio economic environment was experienced between 2009 and 2010, with the consummation of the Government of National Unity. During this time, veto players and champions pushed for social protection change that, for the first time, included a component of cash transfers.

The changes were supported by the international actors resulting in a change in social protection policy change in the country.

However, this period was short-lived. A mixture of neoliberal and socialist political ideology characterised government social protection policy change from 2008 to 2017. The mistrust between veto players and champions continued to manifest in half-hearted commitments by the government to social protection policy change.

International actors have continued to engage in policy change actively. The international proponents' objective in policy change was focused on ensuring that policy change in the county was responded and was aligned with international focusing events such as the Sustainable Development Goals, UNICEF World Summit on Children and Livingstone Call for Action. Attempts by policy actors to accommodate each other have resulted in policy changes that were imitations as opposed to serving functional needs in the country. This study noted that all 16 variables embedded within the Kaleidoscope Model were relevant for explaining the policy reform episodes in Zimbabwe's social protection policy journey from 1980 to 2017. Policy actors in Zimbabwe shared the same attitude that people are poor and food-insecure owing to the adverse socio-economic conditions in the country. Such shared attitudes create opportunities for the policy actors to coalesce and advocate, thus improving the possibility of policy change.

Policy actors in Zimbabwe have different levels of knowledge and experience about various social protection mechanisms. Champions were generally more knowledgeable about various social protection instruments compared to veto players. Knowledge and experience have the potential to sway policy change dialogue in favour of those who are knowledgeable and experienced. The champions and veto players expressed diverse perceptions on the appropriateness of the various instruments to address multiple vulnerabilities such as poverty, food insecurity, health and education. For example, while veto players believed that cash transfers foster dependency in that the recipient families will work less and become lazy, resulting in dependence on the transfer, champions held the same perceptions about food distribution and input subsidies. Differences in perceptions could either be a source of mistrust or cause controversy in policy change.

Knowing the perceptions of policy actors improves the chances of managing the perceptions and attitudes during policy change for improved policy outcomes.

The evaluation of the efficacy of different social protection measures by policy actors started when a certain threshold was reached, i.e. a point where policy actors believe the threat needs a response. Threat appraisal was primarily based on a high-perceived probability of the threat and the perceived consequences among policymakers. The process was influenced by different norms and values that shape the policy actors' perceptions and attitudes of the various social protection instruments. In situations where the perception and attitudes of the policy actors were negative towards a social protection policy instrument, the likelihood of the instrument being included in policy was unlikely. Likewise, societal norms and values influence the policies that were enacted, the resources and priorities that governments and organisations implement.

Norms and values specifically influenced the perceptions and attitudes about efficiency, selfefficacy, costs and utility for other purposes of different social protection mechanisms. Awareness and understanding of norms and values facilitated policy actors' perception and attitude management in the process of the policy change and created improved chances of successful implementation of various social protection mechanisms. Understanding such variables' helps explain why some instruments were included or not in policy and why some mechanisms, even though included in policy frameworks, are not implemented. Despite policy actors' negative perceptions about cash transfers, concern over the lack of access to social protection in an environment of increasing impacts of food insecurity and climate change on livelihoods was reported. This has spurred the necessity for additional protective measures, driven mainly by perceived consequences of threats.

The adoption of cash transfers continues to be affected by the persistent perceptions that cash transfers were not affordable for the government, were subject to misuse by beneficiaries and created a dependency culture on the transfers by beneficiaries. Such perceptions were also common with other social protection mechanisms. Food insecurity, health challenges and the damage of infrastructure, environment, and private property were considered the most common consequences of disasters and the disruption of livelihoods.

Despite the shared understanding of the effects of disasters, policy actors' perceptions regarding the occurrence and severity of these effects on vulnerable people differed. While there was consensus on the need for additional protective measures (for example, cash transfers), to mitigate the risk of increasing disaster risk, in-kind assistance remained the default mechanism in times of disaster. Food for work, cash for work, and supplementary feeding were perceived to provide sufficient protection for communities affected by food insecurity and climate change and even poverty. Cash transfers were acknowledged for their multiple benefits beyond food security and poverty. Nevertheless, the fungibility of money was its primary weakness as a response mechanism to either transitory or chronic vulnerabilities

Consequently, social protection in Zimbabwe has not kept pace with international developments, neither has the country scaled up existing social assistance instruments to meet demand. The domestication of the global consensus on the efficacy of social protection remains in partial in Zimbabwe due to the lack of substantial knowledge about cash transfers, particularly among veto players and contestation among champions on what constitutes social protection. The different champions insist on social protection aligning with their different mandates that may at times differ with veto players' preferences. Institutional cultures and practical experiences informed the attitudes and perceptions of players, rather than being based on independent research.

7.2 Conclusions

The study draw seven conclusions. First, propitious timing for social protection policy change came after 1980. Recognised relevant problems created momentum for international and local advocates to initiate discussions about these policies. The trust at the agenda-setting stage among the different policy actors could explain the social protection policy change during the first ten years after independence. The need to address colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe resonated with both veto players and champions. This consensus was crucial in that it facilitated social protection policy change as well as the implementation of social protection programmes. Government efforts were reinforced by partnerships of international agents (including donors and UN agencies, NGOs, and international researchers). Not many opponents to policy change emerged during this period.

Secondly, agenda-setting in the policy process for social protection policies and programmes was triggered by a shared desire among powerful local and international proponents to address the colonial imbalances that resonated with the socialist ideology of the government. Zimbabwe's social protection policy change was mainly driven by international actors who used pilot project funding to dictate policy preferences. This fuelled mistrust among policy actors. Despite seemingly common understanding at the agenda-setting stage of policy change, stakeholders and context-specific issues emerged during the policy cycle design, adoption, implementation and assessment stages, influencing policy change.

Thirdly, changing material conditions, information and beliefs resulted in the government adopting a neoliberal ideology that the powerful opponents rode on to set the agenda for policy change. Power disparities led to token consultation and an appearance of consensus during the agenda-setting and design stages International actors influenced agenda formation and implementation by prioritizing events such as addressing poverty, food insecurity, and child protection concerns as part of the global development agenda. Donor assistance and cooperation among stakeholders and implementing partners were essential for policy change. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, examined the facts offered about various social protection policy instruments and did not necessarily reach the same findings or implement the same policies. The result was the emergence of a gap in understanding and mistrust between veto players and champions that manifested in policy change inertia. In the implementation stage, the commitment of government veto actors was less visible. As a result, during implementation, resources, institutional capacity, and monitoring and compliance constraints significantly limited the quality of delivery and coverage of social protection efforts.

Fourthly, how social protection instruments are chosen, how they are designed and executed, and their outcomes are determined by the negotiated settlement between divergent attributes among the policy actors about social protection instruments. However, shared perceptions gave rise to the critical mass required for policy change. Although policy actors acknowledged cash transfers as a suitable mechanism to respond to covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, in-kind assistance remained the default instrument. Cash transfers represented a small proportion of social assistance initiatives. It is essential for policy actors to keep abreast of international developments regarding social protection best practices.

However, policy change should not replicate international best practices, processes, systems without thoroughly considering and adapting instruments to local contexts.

Fifth, policy actors did perceive the need for additional protective measures such as cash transfers. This need is driven by the perceived consequences of the risk by the policy actors. For the additional measures to be taken up, the benefits of the mechanism need to be communicated in an appropriate language across the breath and stakeholders.

Sixth, while technocratic concerns focused on attributes such as about evidence of the impact of interventions, the affordability of broad-based social protection and rights-based concerns about universal principles and standards (among others) are legitimate, the central role of policy actors' perceptions, knowledge and attitudes have been overlooked in policy change processes. A thorough understanding of factors that influence decision-making in the face of food insecurity and poverty is crucial for policy change. However, the convergence of perceptions, knowledge, attitudes and attributes is the driver of policy change. The selection of any particular social protection measure is an outcome of a decision-making process that policymakers undertake when faced with a threat. Several other factors, therefore, influence the outcome.

Seventh, cash transfers offer a more flexible and adaptive mechanism to address different challenges that vulnerable populations encounter. Despite these multiple benefits, cash transfers remain a smaller proportion of social assistance initiatives in Zimbabwe. Policy actors' perceptions, attitudes and ideologies continue to stifle the growth of cash transfers. Increasing awareness of the benefits of cash transfers in social protection policies may increase policy actors' incentives and help build a stronger case to mobilise local funding. Understanding the perceptions and attitudes of policy actors could contribute to unlocking the negative attitudes and facilitate mainstreaming of cash transfers into social protection policies and plans, thereby helping to end poverty, food insecurity, protect ecosystems and build resilience. To facilitate poverty reduction, food insecurity, ecosystem protection and resilience, building an understanding and management of policy actors' perceptions during policy change dialogue could promote the mainstreaming of cash transfers as one of the social protection mechanisms.

7.3 Recommendations

Deliberate efforts should be focused on understanding and managing the perceptions, attitudes and knowledge of policy actors to facilitate policy change. Without understanding and managing such attributes, mistrust among policy actors and friction could lead to policy inertia and lack of implementation. Norms and values are the underlying drivers that influence attitudes towards specific social protection measures. Therefore, in considering the two perceptual processes that determine the attitude towards a protective mechanism, norms and values should always be considered.

Building trust among policy actors should be strengthened for effective policy change. Champions perceived veto players as lacking in knowledge-not expert enough, lacking operational and accountability, while veto players perceive champions as not aware of local contexts, just pushing through their own experiments and experiences from elsewhere. This mistrust also arises from highly inequitable power dynamics that functionally places on hold any shift in power and meaningful participation in policy change processes.

An environment where policy actors believe in each other is conducive to policy dialogue and policy change. They can coalesce to push through an idea from agenda-setting to policy formulation and implementation. Trust is essential for genuine consensus-building and meaningful involvement in policy reform. The mistrust that manifests in diverse perceptions and attitudes about the different social protection instruments is always at the center of the persistent resistance to social protection policy change. This calls for the active engagement of veto players in research rather than being the research object. Jointly commissioned independent research could benefit both parties to create common ground regarding perceptions. Therefore, there is a need to identify knowledgeable local champions to lead policy change, including initiating joint research to inform the policy change process and negotiating instrument selection.

Building capacity among young professionals, members of parliament, and senior professionals is required to address the knowledge gap among policy actors and to inform policy selection for effective policy dialogue. Knowledge can build positive shared perceptions and change attitudes.

The message is as important as the messenger when it comes to attitudes. The trained veto players could act as the voice of reason in policy change. For the effectiveness of the training, the messenger (who delivers the training) is just as important as the message (the content) - building trust among policy actors through platforms for dialogue is essential.

Researchers must shift their focus from generating more evidence of the effectiveness of vari ous social protection mechanisms to gaining a better understanding of policy actors' perception ns and attitudes toward the problems' origins. An understanding of policy actor's perceptions, attitudes and levels of knowledge could demystify the negative stereotypes. The research model of champions has to change to involve veto players as active participants rather than only being the subject of research. Veto players should be change agents in agenda-setting and dialogue between players. Identifying shared perceptions offers a platform for partnership among different policy actors. Shared perceptions provide the critical mass to advocate for a specific policy position. Strengthening the capacity of government capacity to prioritise evaluations of its initiatives, evidence of which is critical for improving implementation and planning new programmes should be considered. Lastly, consideration should be given to make capacity building by development partners do not create parallel systems in government or focus only on capacity to implement donor-funded initiatives.

7.4 Contribution to the global knowledge

The findings help explain policy reform in Zimbabwe in understanding why policymakers may not support some policy instruments despite their capacity to address chronic food insecurity and vulnerability. More broadly, the findings add to a body of information that provides academia, global leaders, policy actors, local authorities and planners with a complete grasp of policy actors' perceptions of cash transfers and local livelihood dynamics as they relate to food security.

The study generated context-specific data on policy actors' levels of knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes of policy actors' levels of knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes towards vulnerable people and political drivers for or against the adoption and implementation of different social assistance instruments in Zimbabwe.

The data are critical in filling the scholarly and philosophical vacuum, as well as in igniting policy discourse about ensuring livelihood resilience to external shocks like food and nutrition insecurity.

Such information and understanding are essential to address implementation gaps and policy change to facilitate the fusion of social assistance as critical components for the realisation of food security and nutrition. In addition, identifying the perceptions around social assistance will help in capacity development and managing these perceptions and other differences in policy change to facilitate collaboration and build trust among policy actors that improve the legitimacy of policy reform outcomes.

This is the first research to investigate policy actors' perceptions, attitudes and levels of knowledge about social protection mechanisms and political drivers that result in social protection policy change to address food insecurity and poverty. The study provides a model and methodology for future research into policy change, policy actors' perceptions, attitudes and knowledge, and decision-making. Although, this study is one of the first studies that evaluated what drives policymakers' perceptions and attitudes of cash transfers, further research is needed to corroborate the findings in different risk management contexts, sociopolitical and geographical spaces.

7.5 Study limitations

This section provides recommendations to overcome the limitations the study. The sample size for the project could have been expanded to include members of parliament, the elected official and private sector representatives.

This study focused on a specific period from 1980 to 2017. The social protection policy and implementation are not static but vibrant in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the findings and recommendations of this study are only relevant to this specific period.

7.6 Recommendations for further research

This study did not directly explore whether there is a direct relationship between policy actors' age, experience, gender, education, perceptions, attitudes and knowledge of policy actors.

Researchers needs to understand if there are casual relations between the different variables and how these influence policy change.

Further research using regression analysis that permits correlation analysis that determines the strength and character of the relation between the variables could improve this study on perceptions, attitudes and levels of knowledge effects on policy change.

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SDG Number	Target	Indicator
1:No poverty	Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve	Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, by sex,
	substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant
		disabilities, pregnant women, new-borns, work- injury victims and the poor and the vulnerable
2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture	By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons	Prevalence of stunting (height for age <-2 standard deviation from the median of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age. Prevalence of malnutrition (weight for height >+2 or <-2 standard deviation from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age, by type (wasting and overweight)
3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	Proportion of women of reproductive age (aged 15- 49 years) who have their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods. Adolescent birth rate (aged 10-14 years; aged 15-19 years) per 1,000 women in that age group
4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning	By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	Proportion of youth and adults with information and communications technology (ICT) skills, by type of skill

Annex A: Social protection related SDGs, target and indicators

SDG Number	Target	Indicator
opportunities	~~~~~	
for all		
5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments. Proportion of women in managerial positions
8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	Average hourly earnings of female and male employees, by occupation, age and persons with disabilities. Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities
10: Reduce inequality within and among countries	Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	Labour share of GDP, comprising wages and social protection transfers
13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies. Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar). Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services
17:Strengthen the means of	Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance	Net official development assistance, total and to least
the means of	their official development assistance	assistance, total and to least

SDG Number	Target	Indicator
implementation	commitments, including the commitment	developed countries, as a
and revitalise	by many developed countries to achieve	proportion of the
the Global	the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national	Organization for Economic
Partnership for	income for official development assistance	Cooperation and
Sustainable	(ODA/GNI) to developing countries and	Development (OECD)
Development	0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least	Development Assistance
	developed countries; ODA providers are	Committee donors' gross
	encouraged to consider setting a target to	national income (GNI)
	provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI	
	to least developed countries	

Source: Author (2020) using UN 2016.

Annex B: Ethical clearance



Faculty of Natural and Agricultural Sciences Ethics Committee

E-mail: ethics.nas@up.ac.za

29 May 2018

ETHICS SUBMISSION: LETTER OF APPROVAL

Prof SL Hendriks Institute for Food, Nutrition and Well-being University of Pretoria

Reference number: EC180517-189 Project title: Food Security Policy Innovation Lab

Dear Prof Sheryl Hendriks,

Your application was granted retrospective approval by the Faculty of Natural and Agricultural Sciences Research Ethics committee.

Please note that you are required to submit annual progress reports (no later than two months after the anniversary of this approval) until the project is completed. Completion will be when the data has been analysed and documented in a postgraduate student's thesis or dissertation, or in a paper or a report for publication. The progress report document is accessible off the NAS faculty's website: Research/Ethics Committee.

If you wish to submit an amendment to the application, you can obtain the amendment form on the NAS faculty's website: Research/Ethics Committee.

The digital archiving of data is a requirement of the University of Pretoria. The data should be accessible in the event of an enquiry or further analysis of the data.

Yours sincerely,

Chairperson NAS Ethics Committee

Annex C: Semi structured Questionnaire

Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions - Google Forms

Annex D: Phenomenological Interview Guide

The Sustainable Development Goals now contain social protection as one of key instruments to address not only poverty, but also education, food security etc. There is so much debate in Zimbabwe and the region about SP policy, budgets, policy instruments and systems.

1. Since your ministry is one of the key social protection stakeholders, talk to me about the issue that concern you on this subject.

Probe: Whom are you working with in this area as a country? Points of divergence etc. What do they bring to the table, grants ideas etc.? Which organisation would you single pout as the most proponent of social protection in Zimbabwe.

Probe: Tell me some social protection policy instruments that you aware of? Do you see a relationship of these instruments to addressing food security challenges- Cash grants, food for work, supplementary feeding etc.?

2. Tell me the status of the social protection sector.

Its history, the instruments available. How did the HSCT come into being-its conceptualisation? Who were the major actors, sponsors, champions? What did this mean to the social protection landscape in the country? Did you receive any specific advice on the HSCT, if yes from whom? How has the social protection progressed from independence to date, what are the reasons behind the chances?

3. What are some of the challenges that affect the social protection in the country from policy to implementation?

Probe: Staff, transport, policy stakeholder engagement etc.

4. What value and challenges do you see from your collaboration with different development partners in the social protection sector

Probe: capacity development, policy formulation, different perspectives from development partners on social protection.

How has your government managed to harmonise the difference among the development partners and defined one common focus in the sector

5. What threats do the different social protection instrument you implement respond to specifically and what is the most common threat you perceive in the country

Probe: What is the greatest threat to the people of the country especially the poor vulnerable households. Is food insecurity due to drought, floods, climate change poverty etc.? I drought or a flood an issue that you perceive as a really challenge. What is your perception of the capacities of vulnerable people, how do you assess the levels of resilience?

- 6. How does the decision-making around what instruments to activate happen within government starting from your ministry? What influence such decisions, is it knowledge, attitude, experience etc.
- 7. Thank for outlining the different social protection instruments that you deploy in the event of different threats. Let us focus on cash transfers. What is your understanding of cash transfers?

Probe: How do you assess cash transfers as a social protection instrument? Is this progressive? Does government have the money, what is the effect or result of giving people cash in time s of drought, floods to respond to climate change, poverty etc. How do assess existing capacity to assess when such an instrument is suitable or not. How do you deliver it to the targeted households, any assessment of effectiveness of the process?

8 What else would you like to share with me about the social protection in Zimbabwe?

Probe: It could be an emphasis of what we discussed or an issue you want to revisit.

Thank you very much for agreeing to share your opinions with me.

Annex E: Secondary data sources for the policy chronology

First five year national development plan 1985-1990: Zimbabwe

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Ministry of Labour and Social Services 2011, Manual of Operations for the Zimbabwe harmonized social cash Transfers Programme, Government printers, Harare Zimbabwe

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Sanders D and Davis R 1998, The economy, the health and child health in Zimbabwe since independence; social science and medicine vol.27 no.7 pp723-731

Schubert, B 2012 Zimbabwe Harmonised Social Cash Transfers Programme, Analysis of the process and results of targeting labour constrained food poor households in the first 10 districts, Harare, Zimbabwe, Schubert, UNICEF, Harare, Zimbabwe

Second five-year national development plan 1991-1995, Harare, 1991; Congress of Trade Unions

Skalness, T. 1995, The politics of economic reform in Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change in Development, St Martins Press, New York

The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction (ZIMCORD), Conference Documentation, and Development, Salisbury, 23-27 March 1981; www.britannica.com\$

Transitional national development plan 1982/83-1984/85, Harare, 1982-1983

UNICEF 2010, Child Sensitive Social protection in Zimbabwe: Report prepared for UNICEF by

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, 1996: Beyond ESAP: Framework for a long-term development strategy in Zimbabwe beyond the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP), Harare.

Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development and Social Welfare and UNICEF, Harare, Zimbabwe

Annex F: Ministry of Finance Requirements Letter

Telegrams: "MINFIN", Harare Telex: 2141 Telephone: 263 4 -794571 - 8 Fax: 263-04-250614/5 Private Bag 7705 CY, Causeway Harare Zimbabwe



MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT New Government Composite Building Corner Samora Machel Avenue/ Fourth Street Harare Zimbabwe

Edson Mugore

27 September 2016

2965 Gaydon Crescent

Geln Lorne

Harare

Dear Sir

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO DISCUSS SOCIAL PROTECTION AND FOOD SECURITY POLICY IN ZIMBABWE.

You are being advised that to carry out a research you are required to have the following documents.

- Individual signed application for research
- Confirmation letter from the training institution
- Research guide, that is, interview guide or
- Questionnaire

• CV

F. Muchemwa For: Secretary for Finance and Economic Development.

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Annex G: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

Telegrams: "MINFIN", Harare

Telex: 2141

Telephone: 263 4-794571 -8

Fax: 263-04-250614/5

Private Bag 7705 CY, Causeway

Harare

Zimbabwe

ZIMBABWE

24 January 2017

2965 Gaydon Crescent Glen Lorne

Harare

Dear Sir

MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

New Government Composite Building



Corner Samora Machel

Avenue/ Fourth Street

Harare

Zimbabwe



RE: REQUEST TO CARRY OUT ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON SOCIAL PROTECTION AND FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Reference is made to your request to conduct an academic research in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development on the above subject.

I am pleased to advise that your request has been approved to carry out research in the departments of Fiscal Policy and Advisory Services, National Budgets and International Cooperation.

The approval is on condition that your research will be confined to the area of "Social Protection and Food Security in Zimbabwe" as per your request and that the research is for academic purpose only.

H. Nyangani

FOR SECRETARY FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Annex H: Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare

Official communications should

Not be addressed to individuals

MINISTRY PUBLIC SERVICE, LABOU AND

SOCIAL WELFARE

Compensation House



Telephone: Harare 790871177P Bag 7707 Causeway

Fax: Telegraphic 794567Address: 'SECLAB"Cnr Fourth Street/Central Avenue

Harare

ZIMBABWE

SW 12/5 2

26 September 2016

Mr. E. Mugore

RE: PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

POLICY AND TECHNICAL OFFICIALS ON SOCIAL PROTECTION IN PURSUANCE OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH BY EDISON

MUGORE ENTITLED "Barriers to change: Scepticism and Incongruity towards social protection in Zimbabwe?

We hereby acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 21 July, 2016.

Please be advised that permission is hereby granted for you to interview

Department of Social Services officials on implementation of social protection policies and their impact on the communities. Please note that permission is hereby granted STRICTLY, on

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE 1 3 UCT 2016 P.O. BOX CY 429, CAUSEWAY

condition that you restrict to matters related to pursuit of your academic studies not for PUBLICITY purposes and that you confine yourself to questions specified in your request. You are also expected to abide by the research ethic of maintaining anonymity of identities of the respondents.

We hereby also kindly request you to share your final research findings regarding the same upon completion.

Massha

N. Masoka

Secretary for Public Service, Labour and

Social Welfare

Annex I: University Letter of support





Institute for Food, Nutrition and Well-being

To whom it may concern:

Requesting research clearance

Edson Mugore is a part time student at the University of Pretoria and is part of the research team for the USAID Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy. This is a USAID funded project under the project number CGA129523. The overall objective of the FSP project is to fight hunger, reduce poverty and improve nutritional outcomes through better food policies. The project aims to improve the policy-making environment in low income countries through improved transparency, mutual accountability and inclusivity.

Michigan State University is the lead research institution partnering with University of Pretoria and International Food Policy Research Institute. The principal investigator for the FSP project is Professor Duncan Boughton from Michigan State University. The collaborative institutional lead and the person responsible for the study at the University of Pretoria is Prof. Sheryl Hendriks.

The research Edson will be conducting will specifically look at local policy processes in the understanding political processes around social protection and political drivers that result in social protection being either adopted or implemented or adopted but resisted at implementation by governments is important for effective programming. The findings will contribute to a body of knowledge to furnish academia, global leaders, policy makers, local authorities and planners with a comprehensive understanding of the policy-makers perceptions towards cash-based social protection and local livelihoods dynamics to food security. Academic literature shows that throughout the past decades most of the effort by international players has been on building the knowledge base, on technical issues and generating evidence on the efficacy of social protection.

His research adopts a mixed methods approach utilising both quantitative and qualitative methods so as to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. The use of multiple methods and sources of data in a complementary manner will enhance interpretability of the findings and assess the plausibility of the threats to validity of the primary research technique used. The research methods include carrying out semistructured and phenomelogical interviews with different policy-makers and programme implementers as well as UN agencies in Zimbabwe.

The Institutional Review Board of Michigan State University reviewed the project in February 2015, under IRB# x13-635e and provided ethical clearance for conducting research with human subjects. Please see attached approval from the review board.

Kindly assist the researcher by providing research clearance to facilitate engagement with the necessary participants.

Yours sincerely,

12 ŀ UAU 100

Professor Sheryl Hendriks

Director: Institute for Food, Nutrition and Well-being

Institute for Food, Nutrition and Well-being

Postal and courier address: Private Bag X20 Hatfield, 0028 South Africa

Physical address: Room 8-4 Agricultural Sciences Building, Chr Lynnwood and University Roads, Hatfield, Pretoria Tel. +27 (0)12 420 3811 Email: sheryl.hendriks@up.ac.za www.up.ac.za