

ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA



CHAPTER I

SOUTH AFRICA

THE various questions connected with our possessions, influence, and prospects in South and Central Africa deserve a more complete investigation than has yet been given to them. We have to deal directly with a white population, in the Colonies, of more than two millions, and with a coloured population, in countries where our control is acknowledged, of, perhaps, ten millions. Indirectly we have to deal with a population nearly as large as that of British India, a population which is estimated at not less than two hundred millions. From this population the slave dealers have drawn for many years nearly all their supplies, and this matter alone evokes English interest and sympathy. Again, it is found that the African natives, brutal, bloodthirsty, and demoralised as they have been, are yet amenable to Christian teaching and example. The progress of Christianity is more steady and more rapid in South Africa than in India, and would be still more marked but for the fact that some European Powers represent our religion under the form of adulterated spirits, slavery, and gunpowder. Add to these considerations the fact that gold, diamonds, copper, and other minerals are found in profusion, and that Germany, Portugal, and France are pressing forward claims wherever we have neglected to raise our flag, and it will be seen that the South African question deserves the most careful study and the consideration of our ablest statesmen.

I propose to consider some of the more important matters

connected with British rule in South Africa. I wish to examine its past history, present position, and future prospects. The past history is a melancholy record of imbecility, vacillation, cowardice, and parsimony. The present position will disclose difficulties and complications for which we have only ourselves to thank. The future will depend on our adopting, or declining to adopt, a dignified, persistent, and imperial policy. It will be seen that our treatment of South Africa is only an extreme example of our colonial policy in general. The people of this country are proud of our Colonies, and attached to them. They have sons and daughters, brothers and sisters struggling or thriving there. They do not think chiefly of trade, but look upon the Colonies as a fortunate extension of the narrow limits of these islands. But in our policy as a Government a different spirit may be discovered. It is impossible to read the history of the present century without coming to the conclusion that most of our Administrations, and especially those which professed Liberal principles, have regarded the Colonies without favour. The example of the settlements in North America taught us that it was impolitic to ask for any contribution to the imperial revenue. From this fact men jumped to the further conclusion that colonies were of comparatively little value. Thus the 'Encyclopædia Britannica' says in its article on colonies, 'Many indeed argue that for both sides it would be better that the inter-dependent relation should be totally sundered, and each colony, as soon as possible, left to shift for itself. The trade of neither party, it is alleged, gains anything by the maintenance of the connection; the European State is exposed to needless risk in time of war by her responsibility to her scattered dependencies, and to additional expense in providing against that risk; while the colonies are liable to be dragged into wars with which they have no concern.' The writer of the article does not attempt to meet these arguments, and by his silence approves of them. The 'National Encyclopædia' writes as follows: 'Setting aside the interests of those concerned in the administration of the Colonies, it is asked what advantage does the rest of the nation receive? So far as some colonies may

‘ be desirable ports for protecting British commerce and shipping,
‘ the advantage of maintaining them may be fully equal to the
‘ expense. But, in every particular instance, the real question
‘ as to the value of a colony to the mother country is simply this :
‘ What advantage is this said colony to the productive classes of
‘ the country ? A question not always easy to answer. But this
‘ is the question the solution of which must decide whether a
‘ colony should be maintained or not, if we look only to the
‘ interests of the mother country. If some advantage cannot be
‘ shown, the maintenance of a useless colony is a pure act of
‘ national benevolence to that colony, and to those few of the
‘ mother country who have places or property in it.’ This is the
sort of political teaching to which our fathers were exposed. It
was held that the value of a colony could only be expressed in
money, and that since we levy no tribute we derive no gain.
The pestilent heresy was loudly proclaimed that our trade would
be just as large and as profitable if our colonies became inde-
pendent, or were even absorbed by Foreign Powers. It has
therefore happened that, while *the people* of Great Britain have
become, year by year, more attached to the Colonies, the
Governments of Great Britain have rather aimed at repudiation
of control and responsibility.

I have thought it worth while to introduce these general
remarks because they will be found to have a particular appli-
cation. But I will leave generalities and confine myself to
South Africa. Fifty years ago, nay, even thirty-five years ago,
it was in our power to have assumed the protectorate of South
Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to Zanzibar, and from
Madagascar to Loango. Our mere proclamation would have
preserved us from interference, for it is a settled principle of the
international law of Europe, that what one European govern-
ment has once claimed in uncivilised countries shall be left to
that government until the claim is renounced. Besides this, we
must remember that thirty or forty years ago Germany and
France had little ambition for colonial empire. France, indeed,
had quite enough to do with Algeria, and neither country had
yet cast covetous eyes on South Africa.

We first entered the Cape of Good Hope in 1793 as a possession obtained by conquest. The people had been cruelly treated by the Dutch East India Company, and their trade subjected to grievous monopolies and restrictions. These monopolies and restrictions we at once swept away. To the conquered Dutch we conceded the full and free use of their laws, customs, and language, and we undertook that no new taxes should be imposed. And on behalf of this country we may boldly say this, that whatever faults of indecision or caprice we may have committed, we have usually treated the conquered with indulgence, and, since the abolition of slavery, the natives with kindness. By the Treaty of Amiens the Cape Colony was restored to the Dutch in 1803, but, when war broke out again in 1806, it was re-taken by Great Britain, under whose rule it has since remained.

We have been so much dazzled of late years by the discoveries of gold, diamonds, and copper, that we are apt to forget that the great recommendation of the country to our predecessors was its agricultural resources. In 1817 the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, visited the districts between the Sunday and the Fish Rivers, and wrote home as follows: 'Here is, indeed, a very fine country on which to employ and maintain a multitude of settlers. This tract, particularly healthy for cattle and sheep, well wooded and having many fine springs in it, is nearly uninhabited.' In 1819 a war was commenced by the Kaffirs, and on their defeat and retirement Lord Charles Somerset proposed a scheme of emigration. The British Government approved the scheme. Fifty thousand pounds were voted by the House of Commons, and in 1820 5,000 emigrants were sent out. So anxious were people to emigrate that, although each head of a household was required to deposit 10*l.* before starting, there were no fewer than 90,000 applicants.

In 1806 the population of the Cape Colony was about 74,000, of whom 27,000 were Europeans, 18,000 Hottentots, and 29,000 slaves. The present population is about one and a quarter millions. In 1833 slavery was finally abolished, much to the disgust of the Boers, who forthwith began to seek 'fresh

'fields and pastures new,' where their peculiar views as to the appropriation of the persons and lands of the natives might be more easily carried into practice. They colonised Natal and the Orange River Territories. In Natal they kept up a constant warfare with the Kaffirs, whom they sought to reduce to slavery. Their career was checked by the Governor of the Cape, who took military possession of Natal in 1813, and in 1856 it was declared a separate colony. For the same reasons the Orange River Territory was occupied by the Boers, and (for the same reason) taken by the British. It was declared a colony in 1848, and of course the Boers were again enraged by the prohibition of slavery. If the same policy had been continuously followed by the British Government the Boers might have 'trekked' to the Equator; and, so far as Great Britain followed them, slavery would have ceased, and the seizure of native lands and cattle would have been prohibited.

This brings us to the year 1853, with which the modern history of South Africa may be said to have commenced. In the beginning of that year the British authority had been proclaimed wherever the white man had penetrated, and a protectorate might have been declared over the whole of South Africa without let or hindrance from any European Power. Such a declaration would have been held valid, even although many years should elapse before our actual occupation. But *Dis uliter visum*. In 1853 the ministry of Lord Aberdeen came into power, with Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was called a coalition ministry, not because it included the Tories, but because it united the Peelites and the Whigs. This ministry drifted into the Crimean War, and set the first example of contracting the limits of the Empire. We began with the Orange River sovereignty. We informed the people of that territory that they would no longer be British subjects, but might form a free State for themselves. Our proposals were received with alarm, almost with despair. A powerful tribe, the Basutos, threatened the very existence of the State. The Boers knew that their injustice, robbery, and cruelty had made them hateful to the native tribes, and they were terrified at the

thought that our protection would be withdrawn. The people of Grahamstown met and adopted the following petition to the Queen: 'That your petitioners have read with equal sorrow and dismay the dispatch addressed by your Majesty's Right Honourable Secretary of State, in which an intention is expressed on the part of your Majesty's Government to withdraw the authority hitherto exercised over the Orange River sovereignty. They humbly submit that they cannot legally be shut out from the pale of the realm, nor can the allegiance they owe to your Majesty be set aside on the plea of expediency, and in the face of their deliberately recorded dissent.' To this appeal Lord Aberdeen's ministry gave no heed. A sum of 5,000*l.* was given to the new Republic to start with, instead of the 20,000*l.* they asked for, and the country was cast adrift. It was probably thought that our continued rule might involve us in expenses and interfere with Mr. Gladstone's popular budget. The irony of events is very marked. The very next year, early in 1854, gold and diamonds were discovered in this very State, and copper was said to be procurable from the surface, and in waggon-loads. It will be strange to find, said a Cape newspaper, that 'the country which has so lately been discarded as worthless may yet prove to be richer than any other appendage of her Majesty's possessions.'

In 1856 Sir George Grey, who was then Governor at the Cape, advised the local parliament to provide 200,000*l.* for the purpose of emigration. He said: 'With a very large practical acquaintance with the Continent of Australia, I can now, after having visited so great a portion of South Africa, unhesitatingly state that this country affords at least equal advantages to European immigrants. In some respects, indeed, the Cape of Good Hope holds out greater advantages than any other colony. Its rewards for labour are equal, and its social and moral position superior.' The sum proposed was voted by the Cape Parliament by a majority of twenty-two to fourteen, and was ordered to be issued in sums of 50,000*l.*, and we find that in March 1862 the thirty-second free emigration ship left London at the colonial expense, under this Act of 1857, the operation

of which added nearly ten thousand souls to the population of the colony.

The fears entertained by the Orange Free State when its dependence on Great Britain was repudiated were very natural, and were proved to have some foundation in fact. The Boers of that State attacked the Basutos in 1858 and were defeated. In their distress they applied to Sir George Grey, who was then Governor of the Cape Colony, to mediate for them. Sir George Grey, having obtained the consent of the Cape Parliament, went to arrange a peace. It was generally believed in Cape Town that the Free State would be utterly ruined, and that the Kaffirs would accept no terms except the extinction of the Boers. At the same time we are told that 'the Kaffirs have a wholesome dread of the British power, and have been observed in this struggle to respect British property, and to carefully abstain from giving offence to the British Government.' The following note was forwarded to England and printed by 'The Times' on September 24, 1858: 'It is now confessed both by those who are favourable to the British Government and those who are adverse, that the only hope for the future safety, nay, for the very existence, of the Free State, consists in its re-union with the parent colony. It is felt and acknowledged that *the systematic want of good faith practised towards the natives* has produced this melancholy state of things, and that the prestige of British rule, which still conveys to the native mind the idea of good faith, can alone restore confidence and prosperity.' When Sir George Grey returned and opened the Cape Parliament, on March 17, 1859, he congratulated the colony on the proceedings of the first parliament, at whose request he had mediated between the Orange Free State and the Basuto chief, Moshesh. He enjoyed the confidence of both parties, and had succeeded in negotiating peace on a permanent basis.

Alarmed by this difficulty, the Orange Free State solicited a Federal union with the Cape. Sir George Grey took up the idea and carried it further. He proposed a union of all the states, Colonial, Free, and Native, under the British Crown. The proposal was received with enthusiasm. Dispatches were

received from Downing Street, which appeared to regard the scheme with favour. In his opening speech in the Cape Parliament the Governor dwelt upon the subject in the most emphatic manner. Eleven days afterwards, in August 1859, dispatches were received from Lord Derby completely and authoritatively disallowing the policy to which Sir George Grey had been committed, and ordering his immediate resignation and return. This treatment of the South African question is worthy of notice. When the Boers and the English residents were equally in favour of confederation the British Government abruptly put a stop to the scheme. This was in 1859. Nine years later the British Government, as represented by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, earnestly recommended confederation and found that it was too late.

In 1865 the Orange Free State decreed that after January 1, 1866, no foreign bank or branch thereof should be permitted to exist in the State. This order was directed against the London banks which had branches in the Cape. In the same year war was declared against the Free State by the Basutos under their chief Moshesh who declared that he did not wish to make war against England. 'He did not wish to fight with the Queen or any of her Majesty's subjects, but only to protect his people from the aggression of the Free State Government.' A treaty of peace was made in June 1866, but the next year, 1867, war broke out again. A Cape newspaper reports that 'Some of the burghers admit that the Basutos have not enough space to live in. They think it a great mistake to occupy land beyond Caledon, this greed of land having been, in their opinion, a fruitful source of colonial war.' With the Basutos the Orange Free State was perpetually at war. But in 1868 the Basutos were taken under British protection, and declared British subjects. The Volksraad of the Free State decided to oppose Sir Philip Wodehouse's proclamation, and sent a deputation to England to protest against it, giving authority to the deputation to solicit help against England, from Russia, America, Spain, Holland, or any other country. But for once our Government stood firm, and Basutoland became British. The happy hunting-

ground for slaves was closed to the Boers, and the perpetual war ceased. In 1871 the British Government insisted upon the Basutos being annexed either by Natal or the Cape Colony. The first offer was made to the Cape Colony by the Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, and on May 3 an Act was passed for incorporating the territory. But as the natives were not fit to be intrusted with a vote it was enacted (1) That the people shall remain under the rules now in force; (2) that all legislative power shall be in the hands of the Governor; (3) that the Colonial Courts shall have jurisdiction.

The last effort of the Orange Free State to assert itself beyond its present boundaries was a futile attempt to claim the diamond fields. Its Government proposed to submit its claims to local arbitrators, with the King of Holland or the President of the United States as umpire. This offer was very properly declined by Sir H. Barkly, and the diamond fields of Kimberley and Beaconsfield remain in our hands. There are, however, diamonds in the Free State which yielded about 188,000*l.* last year. In 1869 when the differences between Great Britain, the Orange Free State and the Basutos were settled, the Governor of the Cape, Sir Philip Wodehouse, made the following remarks: 'It was natural that, while engaged in these negotiations, I should keep in view the proposition that has been canvassed both here and in England for the restoration of the British sovereignty in the Free State. We have always maintained that it would be most unwise to promote such a measure except in deference to the clear will of a decided majority of the people.' This question of the Free State is, in a legal sense, the most difficult of all the South African difficulties. We made over the territory without reserve, and against the earnest protests of the people. To resume it will be difficult, yet in view of the need for an undivided empire of South Africa that resumption should be always kept before us as a necessity. The land-locked position of the country is in our favour, unless we should be foolish enough to foster a union with the Transvaal and open up through Delagoa Bay an inlet for German and Portuguese intrusion. Already in 1884 we seem to have been preparing this last trouble for

ourselves by providing that the Government of the Transvaal might make treaties with the Free State without requiring the sanction of her Majesty, and we now learn that an alliance between the two Republics has been established. Our surrender in 1858 was a piece of needless folly, founded on the pernicious belief that colonies are not a treasure but a burden. It only needed parochial politicians to dismember the empire: it will need a statesman to restore it.

Let us come next to the Transvaal. I have selected the Orange Free State and the Transvaal for the first part of my subject, simply because these two countries present the greatest difficulty in the way of a united South Africa under imperial control. The story of the Transvaal is more brief but more disastrous and disgraceful than that of the Orange Free State. If the country did not remember Gordon and Khartoum, everyone would have said that no English politician could have been guilty of such weakness as was displayed by Mr. Gladstone in 1881. But we have long since ceased to feel surprise at his decisions, or what he would, perhaps, call his policy.

Till 1875, the Boers who had settled in the Transvaal received little notice from Great Britain. They were excessively disliked by the natives, both in the Transvaal itself and on all its borders. They were accused of kidnapping slaves, of murderous outrages, of robberies of land. They were constantly at war, and were reduced, as a Government, to complete bankruptcy. Gold had been reported to exist in 1866, but its working on a large scale had not commenced. In 1875 Lord Carnarvon was Secretary for the Colonies, and he came to the same conclusion as that reached by Sir George Grey in 1859. In a dispatch to Sir H. Barkly dated in June 1875, Lord Carnarvon pointed out 'the serious disadvantages, whether in regard to security from disorder or to material progress, under which the several colonies and states were placed through the absence of any defined and consistent policy governing questions of vital interest to all.' He showed that 'recent occurrences in Natal had brought the question of the condition and treatment of the natives into the foremost rank of those questions which

‘ especially demand uniformity of treatment,’ that ‘ as long as the
‘ natives, who are shrewd observers, see diversity of counsels and
‘ even estrangement between the various colonies and states they
‘ would continue restless, and would be ready to listen to sugges-
‘ tions as to their power of combining successfully against the dis-
‘ united European Governments,’ and that the result was ‘ a
‘ distinct danger of widely extended disaffection, which, if circum-
‘ stances lent themselves to it, it would be difficult to subdue.’

For these and similar reasons, his lordship wished represen-
tatives to be sent to a conference in London. The scheme was
that of a patriotic statesman, but it came too early or too late.
The Cape Colony declined the proposal. Its Parliament sent
the Premier, Mr. Molteno, and some other members to consult
with the Secretary of State, but not to take part in the con-
ference. Mr. Sprigg declared that he did not object to union
in principle, but ‘ only at that time and under pressure from the
‘ Home Government.’ The Transvaal Volksraad ‘ objected to
‘ confederation under the British flag while there remain un-
‘ settled causes of well-grounded complaint.’ The Orange Free
State ‘ did not object so much to British supremacy as to the
‘ fitful policy which has characterised the representatives of Great
‘ Britain.’

In effect, the conference was a failure. Some resolutions
were passed ‘ as to the regulation of harbours, the action of the
‘ common police, the sale of spirituous liquors,’ and other minor
topics. But as to confederation under the British Crown, Lord
Carnarvon said that ‘ it was not for the British Government to
‘ precipitate such a movement, but he saw no reason against the
‘ idea that such a union might be practicable and desirable, and
‘ that it might be entered into with the hearty consent of all the
‘ parties concerned.’ He promised to bring in a sort of Permis-
sive Bill, a kind of action from which no good ever did or ever
will come in international and intertribal disputes. The
troubles in the Transvaal rapidly supervened, and, before any-
thing further in the way of federation could be attempted, the
management of South African affairs had passed once more into
the hands of Mr. Gladstone.

CHAPTER II

THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

THE Cape Colony is, of course, the most important of our present possessions in South Africa. It has been held by Dutch and English for more than two hundred years. It has a history and a matured civilisation which cannot be claimed for Australia. That the Cape Colonists have very serious complaints to make against the Home Government 'goes without saying.' It is true of every colony we possess, and would have been equally true of India if the government of that country had been left to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office has almost invariably reduced every question to one of money. Colonies might remain with us if they never required any help. If they did, their independence would be preferred. Let us take the following note from Lord Granville, as Colonial Secretary, to Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor of the Cape Colony. It is dated April 7, 1870, and in substance is as follows:—

'Sir,—I have to acknowledge receipt of your despatch, 'No. 17, of February 3, enclosing a memorial from persons 'residing in the eastern province of the Cape of Good Hope, 'who are desirous that military protection may be continued to 'them at the expense of this country. I observe that the memorialists estimate the white population at 200,000, and the cost 'of defence, including police, at 100,000*l.*, which, if the whole 'were paid by persons of European origin, would only amount 'to 10*s.* per head, and they declare this sum to be a strain on the 'finances of the colony greater than it can bear.' Lord Granville goes on to say that military defence, without including police, costs the people of this country 15*s.* per head, and that

the colonists are far more able to pay the charges than we are. He adds, 'I have already informed you that the Home Government, far from being desirous of retaining its present control over the internal or external affairs of the Colony, is only desirous that the government, whether "responsible" or not, should be effective; and I may add that the memorialists' account of the present state of the native population, and the absence of any material native difficulties, sufficiently show that whatever objections may exist in an imperial point of view to the past policy of the British Government (including the acquisition of British Kaffraria), the Cape Colony has, at least, no right to complain of it.'

In 1871 Lord Kimberley was Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Sir Henry Barkly became Governor of the Cape. Lord Kimberley's first step was to require that the Basutos should be annexed either by the Cape or by Natal, and he intimated that he should prefer the annexation to Natal. Sir Henry Barkly advised the Cape Colony to accept the possession, and probably was but little informed as to the trouble the Basutos had caused for years, or as to their formidable strength. Lord Kimberley had his own way so far. On May 3, 1871, a short Bill was brought in to annex the Basutos, which was eventually carried.

In this way Lord Kimberley succeeded in removing from the cognizance and control of the Home Government the most troublesome and formidable tribe on the borders of the Cape. The colony had a hard time of it, and as we shall see finally voted its retrocession.

But Lord Kimberley had a few more hard words to say. He pointed out that her Majesty's Government consider that 'Parliamentary institutions in the Cape have, in their present form, proved a failure. They have lasted for seventeen years, and have been tried under the auspices of two very energetic administrations of different temperaments. The time has come when either the Crown must resume its functions, or Parliamentary institutions must be conducted to their legitimate results in the form of responsible government. The example

‘ of Canada should be followed, and a confederation formed ;
‘ but this should be a sequence, not an antecedent, of responsible
‘ government.’

It is to be observed that the Colonial Office draws a strong line of distinction between representative and responsible government in the Colonies. A representative government is practically a council, partly elected and partly nominated, whose duty it is to advise with the Governor, and prepare measures for his approval. But if he differs from the majority of the council, he is not necessarily to give way as to the advice to be offered to her Majesty. Nor is he required to order a dissolution and new election. A ‘ responsible ’ government in the nomenclature of the Colonial Office does not mean one responsible to the Crown or to its representative, but one responsible to the Houses of the Colonial Parliament ; and such a government, if defeated, is expected either to resign or dissolve. That expectation is even more regularly acted on in the Colonies than at home, for in England we have seen ministries continued in office for many months, although they could not command a majority. Be that as it may, the meaning of Lord Kimberley’s note is clear. He did not want to be bothered with Cape politics. He, therefore, required the Colonists either to become a Crown Colony, without any voice in their own affairs, which he knew they would no more desire than he did, or to undertake the full burden of representative and responsible government, under which the appeal from one party against another should be made by a new election to the colonists themselves.

It may be thought that this was in the highest tone of Liberal statesmanship. But everything depends on the character of the colony. The very name of ‘ responsible government ’ shows that new burdens are to be sustained as well as new privileges enjoyed. If a colony is not equal to the burden, it may be well to decline the privileges. The main reason, however, for making these quotations is to point out the cynical indifference, and almost dislike, with which colonial questions were treated. It is well known that these despatches from Lord Granville and Lord Kimberley gave great offence at the

Cape, and helped to produce that reciprocal indifference or dislike which has been shown for some years by the Africander party. In 1872 the Act for the introduction of responsible government was passed, but only by a majority of one, and the circumstances I have to describe prevented its becoming a complete success, at all events for a time. At the best it affords no adequate solution of the general question of South Africa. Lord Carnarvon's rule at the Colonial Office was marked by a more genial spirit, a more suave manner, and a more imperial policy. But he tried in vain to secure a confederacy, and it is a very singular thing that a Conservative minister, Lord Derby, should in 1859 put an abrupt and angry stop to Sir George Grey's nearly completed and accepted scheme, and another Conservative, in 1875, should go vainly about the country imploring the acceptance, or, at the least, the consideration of a new scheme.

When Mr. Gladstone came into power in 1880 a new opportunity for cynical neglect of the Colonies was afforded to him. The rise and the results of the Boer rebellion in the Transvaal had very serious consequences in the Cape Colony. When the news of our defeat at Majuba Hill first reached the Cape no one supposed that Mr. Gladstone would accept it as final. But when his decision was announced and the colonists learned the terms of the convention, there was a great revulsion of feeling. The Boers of the Transvaal openly talked of driving the English out of South Africa. The Dutch inhabitants of the Colony and of Natal began to share the same hopes. Even the Afrianders of mixed descent became discontented with English rule, and many of purely English blood and even recent settlers were shaken in their allegiance. From this time the common division of parties in conversation, in the press, and even in the Cape Parliament, has been between the Dutch and the English; and colonial politicians of purely English race have trusted to the Dutch, and yielded to the Dutch, in order to keep themselves in power. In the Dutch interest the Stamp Act was passed which has fortunately failed to receive the Royal Assent. Strong hopes were expressed and were entertained that Germany would

espouse the Boer cause, and Prince Bismarck's annexations in East and West Africa seemed to give sanction to these hopes. But for our protection Swazieland would long since have been annexed by the Boers, and probably Amatonga also. Lord Salisbury has done very wisely, and not a day too soon, in proclaiming a British protectorate of Bechuanaland. It appears almost certain that the Boers have been calculating on ousting us from South Africa, and have been relying upon all the help that Prince Bismarck could give without openly declaring war.

Before I proceed I may give an answer to those amiable politicians who are always wanting to know why we should acquire and keep colonies, or annex the territories occupied by savages. I will speak only of South Africa. Our interest in the Cape Colony and Natal is: (1) That of sympathy with our own relations and their descendants; (2) that of trade; (3) the amount of caution imposed upon us by observing that colonies which become independent very frequently become hostile. So far as common descent, language, history, and religion are concerned, I need say very little, for those who think highly of these connecting links do not need to be convinced, and those who care nothing for such sentiments are beyond conviction. As to trade, it may be observed that our total commerce with the Cape and Natal (including diamonds) already amounts to fifteen millions sterling per annum, and may admit of indefinite expansion as the teeming populations of natives north of Cape Colony become amenable to civilisation, and escape, on the one hand, from the terror of being enslaved, and, on the other, from the temptation and degradation of becoming slave-hunters and slave-dealers. As regards the possibility of hostile relations with revolted or alienated colonies we have only to look at the United States. We may also, without hypocrisy, claim that we have a real regard for the interests of the natives. Even when we were giving up everything of our own to the Boers of the Transvaal, we claimed in 1881 a right to sanction or reject laws affecting the natives, although the claim was reduced in 1884 to a promise of fair treatment. And besides what we have done as a nation, we may point to a noble catalogue of names, among which

those of Moffat and Livingstone and Mackenzie are only the most exalted, which reminds us of continuous and self-denying efforts for the freedom and civilisation of native races.

Making these assumptions or preliminary notes, I proceed to consider: I. The position, dangers and prospects of the Cape Colony. This territory comprises 213,636 square miles, being nearly double the whole area of the United Kingdom. At present its population is about a million and a quarter, so that as far as space goes, there might easily be ten or twenty times as many. The country is of varied aspect and elevation, and the rainfall is less precarious than in Australia. Nevertheless, when droughts do occur, their consequences are disastrous. Till the discovery of diamonds the Colony subsisted chiefly on its sales of wool, and a very dry year plays sad havoc with the flocks and their fleeces. In 1866 we learn that 'January 12' was publicly and universally observed as a day of humiliation, 'owing to the continued and severe drought which had so long' 'prevailed throughout the land. The accounts that reached' 'Cape Town were most harrowing. Distress appeared to be' 'overtaking some of the north-eastern and eastern portions of the' 'Western province; while the Eastern province had experienced' 'its full measure of wretchedness, consequent on the entire' 'absence of rain.' And again in 1878 a letter from the Cape, dated February 5, says: 'Our troubles seem to accumulate.' 'Whilst war and rebellion prevail over the north-eastern frontier' 'districts, unprecedented drought is causing great loss of stock' 'in the midland pastoral districts.' These accounts seem gloomy enough, but it must be remembered that they are separated from the present date by an interval of eleven years, and at the very worst did not affect all portions of the country, while in Australia we have known a drought of three years' duration, spreading over nearly the whole continent, and causing the loss of millions of sheep. Still, it may be admitted that in the districts in which the rainfall is frequently deficient, money should be spent more freely on the storage and distribution of water. The most remarkable fact about irrigation mentioned in the Official Hand-book of 1886, is the small cost at which, in

many cases, water can be preserved. It is true that the Kimberley Water Works Company spent more than half a million in supplying the diamond fields from a distance of seventeen miles, but then Kimberley was an arid desert, which, but for the diamonds, could never have paid for verdure. But most of the works have been constructed at small cost. An artificial embankment in Calvinia forms a shallow lake about two square miles in area and five feet deep when full. 'The reservoir, shallow though it is, has proved of great service to the neighbourhood, thousands of animals having been kept alive that would otherwise have perished for want of water. But this is not all, for in 1879 eighty muids of wheat were sown on the village erven, from which a return of from sixty to one hundred-fold was obtained.' Yet the total cost was only 835*l.* At Stolskock, near Beaufort West, a reservoir has been made holding 96,000,000 gallons of water, the cost of the work being 8,700*l.* The most important irrigation work is Van Wyk's Vley. The extent of the water surface is nineteen square miles, and the average depth 10 feet. The country served by this lake would, in dry seasons, be absolutely barren without irrigation, although with irrigation, or in seasons of good natural moisture, the land is extremely fertile. Yet the total cost of this work, exclusive of land, has been less than 24,000*l.*

It is clear that the greater part of the country, although not always so well watered as England, could at small expense have plenty of water in store. Another thing is to be observed. Wheat will thrive with less regular rainfall than grass, but the Boers are usually too idle to grow wheat, and indeed for some years the food supply of the Colony was supplemented by imports from India and Australia. Yet the dreary, sodden summers, which so often destroy our English crops, are not known in South Africa; and, as we have seen, the very dry summers of the Cape may be made fruitful by a cheap but large system of irrigation, which would be even more remunerative for barley and wheat than for grass and wool. At the very least the Cape should grow sufficient grain for its own consumption. That it has not done so has been due to the indolence of its farmers.

There would still be plenty of wool, wine, diamonds, and gold for export.

Such being the case, it is natural that we should regard the possession of the country with satisfaction and pride, should jealously guard, and even seek to extend, its boundaries, and should use it as a field for emigration on a large scale. This would, no doubt, have been the feeling of the people of English descent if they had always understood the facts of the case and felt that they could rely on the friendly support of our own Government. But our difficulty lay in the character of the Dutch population which we had subdued. They were a race singularly obstinate, national, and prolific, and on the great question of the treatment of the native population they held views bitterly opposed to those of England. To this must be added our own shiftless and vacillating policy. We have never possessed the powers of absorption and assimilation which were the grandest characteristics of ancient Rome. In about the same number of years as we have held the Cape, Rome so governed the countries which are now France, Spain, and Portugal, that the population became completely Latinised. Scores of the wealthiest Roman senators were the sons and grandsons of chiefs who had been subdued. Latin literature was enriched by natives of Gaul and Spain, and one of the greatest emperors, Trajan, was by birth a Spaniard. If we had possessed the same faculties for empire, the Boers of South Africa would by this time have become completely English in language, manners, and policy. Failing in this supreme art of rule, we might still have expected that, by giving equal rights to the Dutch and English races, and ruling both with liberality and firmness, our subjects, or colonists, would have become equally loyal. Our main faults have not arisen from unjust dealing, but from a harsh and dictatorial manner and a penurious policy. On the main point of disagreement with the Boers—the abolition of slavery—we must ever insist that we were entirely in the right. It must also be always remembered that there are many thousands of the Dutch population in the Cape who are still heartily loyal, and who recognise

in Great Britain a truer and more kindly friend and protector than they could hope to find in Germany or Holland. But the fact remains that a majority of the Boers are not loyal, and are inclined, if they could find it safe, to sympathise with the Transvaal and to look for support to Germany. This party has the assistance of a number of politicians and electors of British descent, some from personal caprice and some from a desire to side with the majority. The result is that the House of Representatives is usually considered to contain a Dutch party and an English party, and the Dutch have always the majority at the polls. We have thus a situation something like what would occur in Ireland under a system of home rule under imperial control, and it is needless to say that it involves problems of considerable difficulty.

It must be remembered that no open declaration of treasonable intent has been made by the Dutch majority of the Cape Parliament. There have been no threats in Parliament of secession or rebellion. There has only been an under-current of disaffection, stimulated, if not caused, by the success of the Transvaal Boers, and by the doubt whether, after all, the supremacy in South Africa may not be acquired by Germany. There are no political concessions to be made. The final aim of our policy must be that, if possible, Boers and English alike shall heartily support the British rule, and that the population and the electorate shall show an English, and not a Dutch, majority.

One great preventive of political discontent is material prosperity, and of late years this has been abundant. We must not forget, however, that it is always precarious. For three or four years the low price of wool, and the reduction in the shearings owing to drought, produced great distress. Our exports to the Cape fell to less than half of what they had been. It is fortunate that now there are several industries to rely upon. The yield of diamonds, which is never mentioned in our Board of Trade returns, is more than four millions sterling per annum. The production of gold has reached about a million a year, and though very little has yet been found in the colony the profits of transit are not inconsiderable. For the decline of one in-

dustry Mr. Gladstone is largely responsible. Before 1860 the duty on foreign wines was 5*s.* 10*d.* per gallon, and on colonial wines 2*s.* 11*d.* Under these duties the colonial trade, which at that time was entirely in the hands of the Cape, rapidly increased. But Mr. Gladstone so manipulated the duties that French wine came in at 1*s.* duty, while Cape wines were charged 2*s.* 6*d.* Under this new duty our importation of wines from the Cape fell from 800,000 gallons in 1859, to less than 50,000 in 1862. The old principle deserves to be adopted again, under which the duty on colonial wines shall be less, or at all events not more, than that on French wines. South Africa produces the finest grapes, and in the greatest abundance, of any country in the world. An alteration in the duty would probably give a great impulse to this industry and to the trade with England.

But the most powerful means at our disposal for making the Cape Colony thoroughly English is large and continuous emigration, especially to Khama country, Swaziland, &c. We do not wish for a greater total emigration from Great Britain and Ireland than now goes on, but we should gladly see some of it diverted from the United States to our own colonies, and of these the Cape and Natal appear to afford, in some respects, great advantages. The chief of these advantages is that the cost of the passage is so much less than to Australia and New Zealand, that the climate is generally better, and that the population is less massed in large towns. The price of good and easily accessible land is low, and arrangements might easily be made for its purchase by instalments. What is wanted is that funds should be provided for passage-money. We have seen that in 1856 Sir Charles Grey advised the Cape Parliament to vote 200,000*l.* for immigration, and that, his advice having been acted upon, about ten thousand settlers arrived. With the present rates of passage and the increased facilities for moving up the country, the cost of settlement need not be more than 10*l.* to 20*l.* per family. If the Colonial Government is not willing to repeat the experiment of 1856 it would surely be wise for our own Government to do so. Even if the requisite money were only lent, it would almost certainly be repaid,

and there can be little doubt that the Cape would sell land of good quality on easy terms. There is no need that the allotments should be large. With ten or twenty acres, tillage and not pasturage would be necessary. Wheat would be grown as well as wool, and we have already seen that the present growth of wheat is often insufficient for the mere consumption of the colony itself. It must always be borne in mind that every Englishman who acquires land in the United States becomes a foreigner perforce. The first necessary step is to take an oath abjuring all allegiance to the Queen. Not only so, but his purchases of our goods amount to only a few shillings per head per annum. Every colonist in the Cape and Natal remains an Englishman, and on an average purchases goods from this country to the amount of 8*l.* or 9*l.* per annum.

I have dwelt at some length on this question, partly because it is one of great interest in itself, but still more because it is of the utmost importance, when our supremacy in South Africa is threatened, that the Cape Colony and Natal shall be heart and soul on the side of Great Britain. But there is a further question. We have now under our protection, or under our direct rule, large tracts of territory in which the native population is very large and the European population very small. Such countries are Zululand, Basutoland, Swazieland, Bechuanaland. It is necessary that we should be supreme in districts outside the boundaries of the Cape, partly because there may be, and indeed there are known to be, large deposits of gold, silver, copper, and iron, partly because we wish to protect and Christianise the native races, and partly because Germany may probably establish its own power wherever we make no claim, and may, by uniting with the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, endanger our whole empire in South Africa. But the question is sure to be raised whether we cannot obtain the honours of empire and the profits of commerce without assuming the responsibility and labour of government. In short, the plan of a confederation will again be mooted. I believe that only one answer to such a scheme is possible. It was ignominiously rejected when proposed by Lord Carnarvon.

But the causes of disunion are infinitely greater and more potent now than they were in 1876. Even a little scheme, proposed by Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, for the promotion of railways and adjustment of customs duties came to grief. That a union of so many and such discordant elements could be placed under the control of the Cape Parliament is obviously impossible. A single illustration will suffice. In 1871 the British Government issued orders that either Cape Colony or Natal should undertake the management of Basutoland, and, by the advice of the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, the Cape Colony did annex that country. In 1883 Basutoland was disannexed and placed directly under the British Crown. The example of Canadian federation urged by Lord Kimberley in 1871 is wholly misleading.

The best land in the colony is on the eastern side, in Kaffraria. The pick of this is in the hands of the natives. Where they use it for crops the soil is being exhausted, but for the most part they use it for flocks and herds. Colonel Coope says 'The only remedy is to give to the individual natives titles. 'The black population is increasing so rapidly that there is 'already insufficient land to supply their wants as graziers. 'Native individual titles would solve this question, as it would 'compel the surplus population to work, and at the same time 'would encourage agriculture, and supply the great need of the 'colony, viz., labour in the country teeming with idlers. But 'the work must be undertaken by the Colonial Government. 'Interference of the Imperial Government is out of the question.' I quote this as the dictum of a man who knows South Africa well, but I do not agree with his conclusions. Native locations may be good things. I have no doubt but that they are. I have only the impression that they will not be generally made by the Cape Government, which, so far as I can learn, regards the acquisition of land by natives with displeasure.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSVAAL

THE history of the South African Republic, or, as it is more frequently called, the Transvaal, dates, like that of the Orange Free State and Natal, from the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1833. The Boers, disgusted by this abolition, removed from the Cape Colony, and, after enduring great hardships and heavy losses, settled in the three territories I have named. With the Orange Free State, as we have seen, our relations have been almost continuous since we abandoned our rule over that country. The Boers, who took possession of the Transvaal, seem to have separated themselves more completely from Great Britain, although they were still, in point of law, British subjects. They were left for many years to do very much as they pleased. Their territory was fertile and well watered. It had a plentiful supply of natives, and as many of these as were required for cultivating the land and doing other work were taken and employed as slaves. The Basutos, whose wrongs and revenges form so great a part of the history of the Orange Free State did not trouble the Transvaal, and the Boers of the Transvaal for many years did not seriously trouble us. Since 1875, however, their increasing number and rapacity have brought them into frequent collision with Great Britain, and the history of the next ten years is but melancholy reading for any patriotic Englishman. Yet it will probably be found in the future that the complete incorporation of the Transvaal with our Empire presents fewer difficulties than that of the Orange Free State. For we have, by good fortune rather than by good guidance, never entirely abandoned our rights over the South

African Republic, in the manner for which Lord Aberdeen's Government has been justly blamed in the case of the Orange Free State.

For some years before 1875 the Boers of the Transvaal had begun to seize on the territory of the natives and to carry off the people as slaves. In 1876 Lieutenant Cameron, R.N., C.B., delivered an address on South Africa beyond the limits of British occupation, in which he spoke as follows: 'What was wanted was that a strong and determined government, or a great company, should see what could be done with the country. If the country were not taken in hand it would become a wilderness, and its valuable products lost.' The truth and justice of these remarks were made abundantly clear in that same year. The Transvaal was being rapidly ruined. Secocoeni, an able and powerful native chief, was engaged in war with the Boers. The excuse or justification for his rising was, as usual, that the Boers kidnapped and enslaved his people and seized their lands. A letter from an 'Old Colonist,' in the 'Natal Mercantile Advertiser,' seems to show that other people besides the Kaffirs regarded the Boers as the real aggressors. The writer says: 'The Boers have an ingrained persuasion that they have an undoubted right to treat with black servants as slaves, and that the black races were, as the accursed sons of Ham, consigned by heaven to perpetual servitude, without the restraints due to human beings.' While we must condemn the Boers as being fifty years or more behind the times, we have to remember that it was not till the beginning of this century that the majority of Englishmen learned to denounce slavery. Cowper, indeed, said, nearly a hundred years ago:

I had much rather be myself the slave,
And wear the bonds, than fasten them on him.—TASK II.

The language betrays some poetic exaggeration, but in any case he was speaking only for the minority of his countrymen. In fact, it was not till 1833 that slavery was abolished in our dominions in South Africa and elsewhere. It might be thought that our experience of free labour for more than forty years

would have some weight as an example to our Dutch subjects. But their policy and conduct were such that Secocoeni declared war, and his attack was successful so far as the Boers were concerned. The forces of President Burgess were defeated, and he found it impossible to enlist a fresh army. His people were in despair. The State was on the verge of bankruptcy, and President Burgess proposed that he should be intrusted with the powers of a dictator for a number of years. Under these circumstances Great Britain interfered, and Sir Garnet Wolseley subdued Secocoeni. Peace was concluded on February 5, 1877. This last outcome of the Boer management of the native tribes brought about our definite annexation of the Transvaal. Early in March, Sir Theophilus Shepstone informed the President of the Transvaal Legislature that 'if things were not put into proper order he would annex the Republic to the British Empire, peaceably if possible, and if not, by other means.' President Burgess submitted to the Volksraad plans of reform in administration. He pointed out that the State owed a quarter of a million sterling which it was unable to pay; and 'repeatedly declared that the country would be utterly ruined unless radical measures of reform were adopted.' He thought that the first step should be to give to himself the powers of a dictator. His plans were summarily rejected, and the Volksraad declined to take any initiative which could lead to giving up the independence of the State. Here was a country peopled by fugitive subjects of the British Crown, whose only claim to possession was founded on the apathy of the British Government; its exchequer was bankrupt; its forces had been hopelessly defeated; the people had been saved from extermination by our army, yet they doggedly refused to ask for the protection and control that was so necessary to their safety, and thought that since Secocoeni had been subdued, though not by themselves, they should have free liberty for a repetition of their faults. The resolution of the Volksraad was passed on March 20, 1877, and on April 11 President Burgess informed the Volksraad that her Majesty had resolved to annex the Transvaal, that he had no means of resistance, and had, therefore, only entered his protest.

On April 12, 1877, the proclamation of British sovereignty over the Transvaal territory was made at Pretoria. There was no excitement. 'The excitement,' says a Cape newspaper, 'would have occurred if Sir Theophilus Shepstone had been marching *out of* Pretoria. Had he done so, he would have left the Transvaal to immediate anarchy and violence, civil war and native aggression. Now everyone breathes freely. Merchants are beginning to think of re-opening the trade, farmers of buying land.' On May 14 Lord Carnarvon read in the House of Lords the following telegram from Sir Bartle Frere. The telegram was dated Capetown, April 25, 1877. It was in the following terms: 'Sir Theophilus Shepstone issued proclamation April 12. Recites commission, sketches history of existing disorder and anarchy, refers to wishes of inhabitants that country should be taken under British protection, declares territory henceforth British, continues existing courts. Transvaal will remain a separate government. Queen's new subjects to enjoy reasonable legislative privileges, arrangements for the optional use of the Dutch language, existing laws to remain until altered by competent legislative authority, equal justice to all races, private rights of property respected, Government officials able and willing to serve continued in office, *bond fide* concessions and contracts of the State to be honourably maintained, payment of the State debt to be provided for.

'Another proclamation notifies assumption of office as Administrator of the Transvaal.' A separate address was issued to the burghers, and the war tax was suspended. 'The inhabitants were reported to acquiesce willingly in the new order of things.'

I may pass very lightly over the troubles from the Zulu Kaffirs during the first two years after the annexation of the Transvaal, because it will be necessary to refer to the question of Zululand under another part of the subject. It is sufficient to say that towards the end of October 1878 the Zulus attacked Colonel Griffiths, the Resident in the Transvaal, with overwhelming forces, and compelled him to retire; that in January 1879 we were defeated with heavy loss at Rorke's Drift, and

again in March at Intombi Drift; that Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out in May, and that before his arrival at the scene of action Lord Chelmsford had signally defeated Cetewayo at Ulundi. It must be added that, however skilful Sir Garnet Wolseley may have been as a general, he showed little capacity for constructive statesmanship. His division of Zululand into thirteen districts under different chiefs was a failure from the beginning, and we have since been compelled to do, what should have been done at first, viz. to annex Zululand as a single province under the immediate government of the Crown.

In the middle of November 1879 a mass meeting of the English and loyal Dutch in the Transvaal was held at Pretoria. Resolutions were passed stating the satisfaction felt at the reiterated assurance of Sir M. Hicks Beach, Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Garnet Wolseley that the British Sovereignty is irrevocable, and urging the necessity for the immediate granting of a constitution for the government of all classes which would allay discontent, and also for the reform of the native administration, and additional judges and railways. This meeting is interesting as showing that there is a party in the Transvaal devoted to the English connection. But at the end of December 1879 a very different conference took place. A party of the Boers appointed Mr. Kruger as President, and instructed him to summon the Volksraad. From this time the people began to arm. Sir Garnet Wolseley announced at a dinner at Pretoria that henceforward the Transvaal would be regarded as a Crown Colony, and in January 1880, when he was pressed to grant a constitution, he said that it was impossible 'so long as 1,500 or 2,000 men at High Veldt were trifling with sedition and coquetting with rebellion.' On May 21, 1880, the Queen's Speech referred to South Africa in these terms: 'In maintaining my supremacy over the Transvaal, with its diversified population, I desire both to make provision for the security of the indigenious races, and to extend to the European settlers institutions based on large and liberal principles of self-government.' This was the first Queen's Speech during Mr. Gladstone's last administration, and for everything done during the next five years Mr.

Gladstone must be held responsible. At no time in English history has any one man become so nearly a dictator. He was returned with an overwhelming majority. His opponents were powerless. His followers were servile. The meaning of the Queen's Speech in 1880 seems to be clear enough. The natives were to be protected, and the European population of the Transvaal, *not the Boers only*, were to obtain some kind of self-government. On December 28, 1880, the Republic of the Transvaal was proclaimed at Utrecht, and on January 7, 1881, Mr. Gladstone advised her Majesty to speak as follows: 'A rising in the Transvaal has recently imposed on me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority, and has, of necessity, set aside for the time any plan for securing to the European settlers that full control over their own local affairs, without prejudice to the interests of the natives, which I had been desirous to confer.' On February 27, 1881, the battle of Majuba Hill was fought and our forces signally defeated. About the same date the Volksraad of the Orange Free State passed a vote of sympathy with the Government of the Transvaal. On March 7, Major-General Roberts was ordered to proceed to South Africa and crush the rebellion. Suddenly, and without any reason, except the imperious will of Mr. Gladstone, the whole situation was changed. Sir Evelyn Wood was ordered to secure a suspension of hostilities by the promise of a convention which would practically give the Boers all that they asked. It was rightly believed that this policy was dictated by the Home Government and disapproved by Sir Evelyn Wood. The Cape newspapers said that 'military men and colonists alike regard the issue as most humiliating to England, and as destructive of her prestige in these territories.' A trustworthy informant who had just returned from Swaziland described in bitter terms the hostile attitude of the Boers there towards England. He had left his home for a short time, and during his absence the Boers had taken or destroyed everything he had left. From Durban it was reported that 'should the Boer sovereignty be conceded in the Transvaal, the Boers will by every native in South Africa be regarded as the stronger

‘ Power. In Cape Colony the loyalty of the Dutch inhabitants ‘ is being severely strained, and the Boer dream of a free South ‘ African Republic seems to the Boer mind hastening towards ‘ realisation.’ On April 4, we hear that there had been a great demonstration. The British Lion was caricatured and Mr. Gladstone burnt in effigy in Capetown. From this date the politics of the Cape Colony itself acquired a different tone, and the contending factions have been known as the Dutch and the English parties. So much is this the case that Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, who has managed to conciliate and now represents the Dutch party, explained or apologised for his leaning towards England, not on the ground of his duty to the Queen, but on the lower ground that England, being more powerful at sea than Germany, offered the best basis of alliance !

On August 5, 1881, a convention was signed which includes the following words: ‘ Her Majesty’s Commissioners for the settle- ‘ ment of the Transvaal Territory do hereby undertake and ‘ guarantee on behalf of her Majesty that from and after the 8th ‘ day of August, 1881, complete self-government, subject to the ‘ suzerainty of her Majesty, her heirs and successors, will be ‘ accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal upon the following ‘ terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations ‘ and limitations.’ It is not necessary to go through all the provisions of the convention, but some clauses require attention. The boundaries of the Transvaal, or, as it is now to be called, the South African Republic, are fixed by Clause I. Under Clause II her Majesty reserves (1) the right to appoint a British Resident, (2) to move troops through the State, (3) to control the external relations of the State, the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through her Majesty’s representatives. By Clause III all laws especially affecting natives must receive the suzerain’s assent. A Native Location Commission was to be appointed, of which the President should be an ex-officio member. It was provided that no slavery or apprenticeship partaking of slavery should be tolerated; that natives should be allowed to acquire, hold, and dispose of land, but that

all such transactions should be made and registered in the name of the Native Location Commission. The more impetuous politicians of the Transvaal objected even to these terms, and the Volksraad requested that articles 2 and 18 should be so altered as that the suzerain should have no right to the conduct of foreign affairs, but only to their control. They declared that articles 3, 13 and 26 are a breach of the Sand River Treaty of 1852; they denied the right of the suzerain to approve or reject any laws passed by the Volksraad. They declared that the British Resident *being a foreigner* could not be a trustee of property belonging to citizens, and that it was beneath the dignity of the President to become a member of the Native Location Commission. For a time it was thought that the war would be renewed, but Mr. Gladstone would not give way any further, and the convention was signed as it stood on October 25, the Volksraad declaring that they 'relied on England's magnanimity to remedy provisions distasteful to the people.'

The Boers have always claimed that this Sand River Convention made them an absolutely free and independent nation. So perhaps it might be interpreted if, on their part, its provisions had been respected. But one of the most important clauses provides that 'no slavery is or shall be permitted.' The Boers treated this clause with contempt from the very first, and the British Government seems, for a long time, to have been uncertain how to act. A series of papers extending from August, 1867, to March, 1869, was published in a Blue Book, entitled the 'Kidnapping and Enslaving of Young Africans.' It begins with the following letter, addressed by Mr. James Murray, of the Foreign Office, to the Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office :—

'Foreign Office, August 30, 1867.

'SIR,—I am directed by Lord Stanley to transmit to you, to be laid before the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, copy of a memorial which he has received from the Aborigines Protection Society upon the system of slavery stated to be carried on by the Boers in the Transvaal Republic; and I am to request that

‘ you will move his Grace to favour Lord Stanley with any
‘ observations which he may have to make upon this subject.

‘ I am, &c.,

‘ JAMES MURRAY.’

The reply to this letter shows the extreme reluctance of the Colonial Office to interfere. The general idea seems to have been that we had succeeded in getting rid of the Transvaal, and that we ought not to be troubled about anything that the Boers did. This letter is from Sir F. Rogers, Bart., to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and is dated Downing Street, September 20, 1867 :—

‘ SIR,—I am directed by the Duke of Buckingham and
‘ Chandos to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
‘ 30th ultimo forwarding a copy of a memorial addressed to
‘ Lord Stanley by the Aborigines Protection Society respecting
‘ the practice of slavery, which is alleged to be carried on by the
‘ Boers in the Transvaal Republic. The particular case quoted
‘ in the memorial appears to be the same one which was dealt
‘ with by Mr. Cardwell’s despatch to the Lieutenant-Governor
‘ of Natal, of which a copy was forwarded to the Foreign Office
‘ in my letter of the 12th October, 1865. The Lieutenant-
‘ Governor had consulted the Governor of the Cape of Good
‘ Hope, as Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, as to the steps
‘ which he should take in regard to the alleged existence of
‘ slavery in the Transvaal Republic; and Sir P. Wodehouse
‘ stated his opinion that any *bonâ fide* inquiry into the matter
‘ would be almost impracticable, and that nothing was likely to
‘ be gained by interference on the part of the British authorities.
‘ Mr. Cardwell concurred in the opinion expressed by the
‘ Governor of the Cape; and his Grace is not aware of any
‘ reason for reversing the decision arrived at in 1865.’

Here is another communication from the Colonial to the Foreign Office. It is a letter addressed to E. C. Egerton, Esq., M.P., the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by

Sir F. Rogers, the permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office :—

‘ Downing Street, October 6, 1868.

‘ SIR,—I am directed by the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos to transmit to you, for the consideration of Lord Stanley, the copy of a despatch of the 18th July from the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, in which he alludes to a proclamation alleged to have been issued by the President of the Transvaal Republic annexing to that Republic a very large extent of territory.

‘ It will be seen that the terms of this proclamation, though publicly announced, are not officially known ; but the nature of them may be gathered from the accompanying extract from a local paper, the *Natal Mercury*. I am directed also to transmit to you a copy of the Convention of the 17th January, 1852, under which the Boers who emigrated from British territory and settled beyond the Vaal were recognised as a separate Government. That Convention, as will be seen, guaranteed in the fullest manner to the Boers the right to manage their own affairs, and that no encroachment shall be made by Her Majesty’s Government on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River ; but no boundaries are specially assigned in respect of the territory of the Boers, nor was anything provided for or against their power to extend that territory.

‘ But, assuming the proclamation to be genuine, the question will arise whether, adverting to international law and usage, it is competent to the Transvaal Republic to appropriate by such a proclamation vast territories in South Africa ; and whether, looking to the terms of the Convention, Her Majesty’s Government are in a position entitling them to interfere.

‘ I am desired by his Grace to request that he may be favoured with Lord Stanley’s views upon this question.

‘ It seems very undesirable that this large extent of territory, including as it does the gold fields recently discovered, should be arbitrarily placed under the government of a people who have, in truth, no power to occupy or govern it. Nor will

‘ it escape Lord Stanley’s observation that the annexation of
 ‘ this territory would very considerably enlarge the field for
 ‘ continuing those highly objectionable practices which have
 ‘ been carried on under the colour of apprenticeships, and which
 ‘ have formed the subject of recent correspondence between this
 ‘ Department and the Foreign Office.

‘ (Signed) FREDERICK ROGERS.’

These extracts are chiefly interesting as showing the difficulty of managing any business that lies between two or more Government Departments. The Foreign Office wants to know what the Colonial Office thinks, and *vice versa*. While the two Offices are laboriously corresponding, the subject-matter slips out of their hands, and new questions arise with Germany and Portugal. One of the most urgent reforms now required is that there should be a distinct separation between the Foreign and the Colonial Office. The countries in which Her Majesty has a governor or deputy-governor should be completely under the rule of the Colonial Office, while the Foreign Office should be able to act in all other cases without consulting the Colonial Office at all. The shambling interchange of notes between the two Departments serves only to make both of them dilatory and impotent.

But the review of the Transvaal under the Sand River Convention would not be complete without some notice of the despatch of Mr. E. L. Layard, who in 1868 was Her Majesty’s Commissioner at the Mixed Commission Court at the Cape of Good Hope. This despatch was sent direct to the Foreign Office, and then submitted to the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office wishes to know whether the Colonial Office has received any reports on the subject of kidnapping and slavery by the Boers of the Transvaal from the authorities at the Cape, and, if so, what steps, if any, his Grace (the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos) proposes to take in the matter.

Mr. Layard’s report is too long for complete quotation, but some of its paragraphs deserve to be preserved. He writes from Cape Town on July 2, 1868, to Lord Stanley, and says: ‘ My

‘ LORD,—My predecessors and myself have on more than one
 ‘ occasion deemed it our duty to bring to the notice of Her
 ‘ Majesty’s Government the fact that a system of slavery existed
 ‘ in the Republics on our borders, under the specious plea of
 ‘ apprenticing, or *imbocking*, under which some of the worst
 ‘ barbarities have been committed on the native tribes. In
 ‘ particular I would refer your Lordship to a despatch from
 ‘ Mr. Surtees, dated December 1, 1855, published in the Blue
 ‘ Book for 1856.

‘ It again becomes my painful duty to draw your Lordship’s
 ‘ attention to the statements contained in the enclosed
 ‘ annexures, chiefly extracts from local journals, and to
 ‘ acquaint you that the general impression among those who
 ‘ are thought to be good authorities on local politics is that
 ‘ the statements are to a very great extent true. I confess I
 ‘ believe them myself from what I have seen in private letters
 ‘ addressed to other parties, but which I am precluded from
 ‘ using.’

‘ I fear from the records of former transactions that Mr. ———
 ‘ is right in saying that, unless a commission is sent to investi-
 ‘ gate the subject on the spot, no information will be got from
 ‘ the authorities.’

It is clear, therefore, that from the very first the Boers who settled in the Transvaal practised the kidnapping and enslaving of Kaffir children, although the Sand River Convention, which they regard as their charter, distinctly prohibited slavery. It is clear that the British authorities in South Africa from 1855 to 1877 were perpetually protesting against this system. It is clear that we were so unwilling to take the responsibility of a new colony that for twenty-two years the complaints made did not move us to action. But when Mr. Disraeli was in power we took a new departure. The Boers were warned that their kidnapping and slavery must cease, or that their country would be proclaimed as British territory, and, as they were still obdurate and obstinate, the proclamation was at last issued. Their present position and immunities depend entirely on the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, the chief provisions of which I

will shortly give. The full text of these Conventions will be found in the appendix to this book.

In 1882, a Blue Book was issued on March 15, containing the report of the Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon all matters connected with the settlement of the Transvaal Territory. From this report Sir Evelyn Wood dissented. He pointed out that the natives preferred British rule to that of the Boers, and that the boundaries ought to be reduced. The debt of the Transvaal Republic amounted to 425,000*l.*, of which 265,000*l.* is for sums advanced by the British Government. The expense of the war with Secocoeni was 382,000*l.* The commissioners thought that payment should not be insisted upon, but Sir Evelyn Wood pointed out that we had saved the Boers not only from bankruptcy but from extinction, and that they ought to pay. This question obtained a sort of solution in 1884. It was then decided that the Republic should be held liable for payment of the Cape Commercial Bank Loan, the Railway Loan and the Orphan Chamber Debt. These were to be the first charge on the revenue. The second charge was to be the debt to her Majesty's Government which was reckoned at 250,000*l.* with interest at 3½ per cent. The whole was to be repaid in twenty-five years by a sinking fund of 6*l.* 0*s.* 9*d.* per 100*l.* I have looked through the items of our revenue for several years, but cannot find that we have yet received a penny on this account.

The provisions as to the integrity of Swazieland and the prohibition of anything like slavery were renewed by the Convention of 1884. A special clause was inserted to provide for the preservation of the graves of Englishmen, which reminds one of the Jews building the sepulchres of the Prophets. The right of her Majesty to control the foreign affairs was so far modified as to allow any treaty to be made with the Orange Free State. As the Orange Free State can make what treaties it pleases with Holland, Germany, or any other Power, this clause may surrender a great deal of our suzerainty or may cause very serious differences. The claim of the Transvaal to independence practically dates from the Sand River Convention, by which her Majesty conceded to the Boers the right to make their own laws and to

govern themselves in their own way. The claim of Great Britain to interfere was founded on the obvious and notorious facts that the laws so made, and the system of government adopted became a standing menace to the peace of South Africa. The annexation of the Transvaal was effected under Mr. Disraeli. The surrender of 1881, and the further surrender of 1884, were made by Mr. Gladstone as Premier. It is of great importance that we should clearly understand the essential points of difference between the Convention of Pretoria in 1881, and that of London in 1884. It will be seen that the Convention of 1881 grants a very limited, and that of 1884 a very large, measure of 'home rule' to the Boers. In 1881, the first article states that 'the Commissioners for the settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual bearing date the 5th April 1881, do hereby undertake that, from and after the 8th day of August 1881, complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations and limitations.' Article 2. declares that 'her Majesty reserves to herself, her heirs and successors (a) the right from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for the said State with such duties as are hereinafter defined.' The right to appoint a Resident is preserved in the Treaty of 1884, but his authority is cut down to the level of a Consul in a foreign State. He has no longer any power, but can only report in the same way as our Consul in Peru or Chile. The next claim (b) is the right to move troops through the State in time of war. This provision disappears in the Treaty of 1884. The third reservation (c) is 'the control of the external relations of the said State.' This was so far modified in 1884 as to permit, without asking our consent, any treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State, a permission of which President Kruger availed himself so soon as the death of Sir John Brand and the election of Mr. Riez as President of the Orange River Free State supplied the opportunity of an alliance hostile to this country.

Article 3 in the Convention of 1881 declares that 'no future enactment especially affecting the interests of the natives shall have any force or effect in the said State without the consent of her Majesty, her heirs and successors first had and obtained and signified to the Government of the said State through a British Resident.' This provision is abandoned in 1884, and in lieu of it we have the following: 'The South African Republic renews the declaration made in the Sand River Convention and in the Convention of Pretoria that no slavery or apprenticeship partaking of slavery will be tolerated by the Government of the said Republic.' It is to be noticed that this undertaking in the Sand River Convention was never observed by the Boers, and that the troubles and disasters from which we had to rescue the Transvaal were mainly caused by their persistent habit of treating the natives as slaves. How far the spirit of this engagement to abolish slavery is carried out may be seen from the following extracts from law No. 10, of the year 1887.

The position of a Resident to represent Great Britain was reduced to that of a Consul in a foreign country. In short, the whole convention suggests the idea that although Mr. Gladstone did not venture to take the high-handed course which had been taken by Lord Aberdeen's Ministry in 1853, when we abandoned the Orange River Territory, yet that he was determined to go as near to the concession of absolute independence as he dared. It is still, however, necessary to receive the sanction of the Queen to any treaty with natives on the eastern or western frontiers. On a careful consideration of this convention one can only come to the conclusion that the articles binding on the Transvaal were never observed and never intended to be observed.

As I have already pointed out, the Convention in 1881 required the sanction of the suzerain to all laws affecting the coloured population, in addition to the general provision forbidding all 'slavery, or apprenticeship partaking of the nature of slavery.' In 1884 the general provision alone was retained. The good faith and humanity of the Boers were accepted as sufficient guarantee. How far this expectation was realised may be judged by quoting some provisions of the Boer Law

No. 10, 1887, for the regulation of the Gold Fields. The following provisions refer to coloured people :—

Clause 76 provides that ‘no coloured person, coolie, or Chinese can hold a licence or be in any capacity engaged in working the gold-fields otherwise than in the service of white men.’ Clause 79 provides that ‘any coloured person, coolie, or Chinese, selling, bartering, or possessing precious metals or precious stones shall be punished by *not more than fifty lashes* and imprisonment for *not more than twelve months*.’ By clause 83 a coloured person who has contracted to serve in any capacity, either verbally or in writing, and who shall neglect or withdraw from his employment or ‘shall use threatening or abusive language towards his master or his master’s wife or any other person lawfully placed over him,’ shall be punished by a fine of not more than 2*l.* or by imprisonment not exceeding one month or by twenty-five lashes. When we consider that the contract may be verbal, and that the master’s evidence as to its effect is sure to have undue weight, we shall see that these clauses sanction what amounts to slavery. Under the Convention of 1881,¹ our Resident would have seen that justice was done. Indeed, the law could not have been passed except after the consent of the Queen. In short, the Convention of 1884¹ was merely a blind or a fraud. Not a single provision in favour of this country has been observed. And there is this fatal flaw—there is no clause providing that the English as well as the Dutch should have a vote. In the Cape Colony the Dutch have equal voting power with ourselves, but in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal we are left out in the cold. Legally, the people of the Transvaal are her Majesty’s subjects who have received a constitution or measure of home rule by her Majesty’s pleasure. Practically, they claim to be an independent State, speak of a British Resident as a foreigner, and propose to place themselves on the same level in all their relations with us as could be maintained by Germany or France.

Article 13 in the Convention of 1881 declares that ‘Natives

¹ For full text of these treaties see Appendices A and B.

‘ will be allowed to acquire land, but the grant or transfer of such land will in every case be made to and registered in the name of the Native Location Commission in trust for such natives.’ This provision is omitted in the Treaty of 1884, and, as I have said, the natives are liable to be beaten or imprisoned for even having in their possession a pennyweight of gold.

It will thus be seen that the suzerainty of the Queen was reduced in 1884 to a mere shadow. But even that treaty has not been observed. Article 2 runs thus: ‘ The South African Republic will strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the first article of this convention, and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon lands beyond the said boundaries. The Government will appoint Commissioners upon the east and west borders, whose duty it will be strictly to guard against irregularities and all trespassing beyond the boundaries.’ This clause was clearly intended to preserve Zululand and Bechuanaland. But, in spite of the clause, a large slice of Zululand has been seized by the Boers, and forms a country called the ‘ New Republic,’ which has now received the recognition of the British Government. Raids have also been repeatedly made into Bechuanaland, and have only ceased since Lord Salisbury’s proclamation of a British Protectorate.

Of course there will be some people to say: ‘ What does it matter? Let them go. Give them complete independence.’ On consideration, it does matter a great deal. The position has been very much altered by the discovery of gold. The Dutch Boers neither discovered the gold, nor, when it was discovered, did they attempt to work it. All this was left to England. In 1882 the population was estimated at 5,000 English, 38,000 Dutch, and 774,000 natives. Now there are more English than Dutch. A sum of twenty millions has been spent on the mines, but it has been English or Colonial money, not Dutch. Are we then to sit still and allow President Kruger to rule over us as if we were settlers in Spain or Portugal? It must be remembered that the Convention of 1881 accorded self-government not to the

Dutch only, but to the *European inhabitants of the Transvaal*. The least therefore that our Government can do is to declare that the Volksraad shall be chosen by all duly-qualified inhabitants whether Boers or English. Let this be done. Our Government may be, it usually is, indolent and irresolute in its dealings with Colonial affairs, but if it neglects its duty and leaves the Boers to enact such laws as have recently been made, there will probably be a serious civil war and the whole interests of the country, material and moral, will be put in jeopardy.

The Boers with all their bluster, and notwithstanding Majuba Hill, do not suppose themselves a match for this country, and they must be prepared for the contingency that our Government may not always be under the control of a dictator, subservient abroad and tyrannical at home. But they do rely on the supposed complicity of Prince Bismarck. Now, I do not for a moment imagine that Prince Bismarck has any regard for the interests of Great Britain, except so far as they forward those of Germany. If he could obtain a small advantage for Germany by inflicting a serious injury on this country he would obtain that advantage *coûte que coûte*. Nay, more, both Germany and the United States will seek *unfair* advantages over us, in the belief that nothing they could do would induce Great Britain to declare war. In our dealings with these Powers we are heavily handicapped, and they know it and let us know it. But Bismarck will respect all legal rights, and whatever we may claim to be the meaning of our suzerainty over the Transvaal he will assuredly not dispute the claim. We have subdued the enemies by whom the Boers were completely conquered; we have changed their bankruptcy into plenty; we are legally their feudal superiors, or rather they are legally our subjects, enjoying such a measure of home rule as Mr. Gladstone chose to confer upon them. It is hard if in such a country we cannot insist that the English settler who brings money and industry shall have an equal share with the Boer who only sits at his house-door to sell his lands at enormous prices. The one thing to be remembered is that the autonomy which we forced on the Orange River Territory has never been conceded to the Transvaal. We have rights

there which it only requires a competent and determined statesman to enforce.

The history of the Transvaal is not complete without some reference to the question of Delagoa Bay. The chief complaint of President Kruger is that he is shut out from the sea. The following conversation is reported by Mr. Mathers in his book on 'Golden South Africa.' Mr. Mathers said: 'The Free State are at present favoured by the free admission here of grain, flour, &c., to the disadvantage of Natal. Natal admits Transvaal tobacco free of duty; will not the Transvaal admit Natal sugar and rum free in return?' To which President Kruger replied: 'Yes, certainly, if they will help me with a portion of the customs from a port of my own. Certainly, if they will allow me a portion of the sea-board; but if they hem me in and monopolise the sea-board, and leave me inside the country, as it were in a kraal, and then wish to make terms with me when I am at bay, then I say, Certainly not. If I have my sea-board on the same footing as they have, then we can come to terms over the whole of South Africa, and make an honourable settlement.' It will be seen that President Kruger considers himself quite on the same footing with Queen Victoria, and expects to treat with her on equal terms. But this question of a sea-board oppresses him, and therefore he eagerly seized an opportunity which seemed to offer itself. There is a small piece of territory which belongs to Portugal. The right to it was disputed by England, but we placidly submitted our claims to the arbitration of Marshal McMahon in 1877, and, as a matter of course, his decision was in favour of Portugal. The country was of no value to Portugal, and in 1881 a formal proposal was made to that country for its retrocession on certain terms. That proposal was accepted by the Portuguese Government, and submitted for the approval of the Cortes. But while the debates were going on the battle of Majuba Hill was fought, and following this the surrender of English interests by Mr. Gladstone. Among the other evil results of that surrender was this, that Portugal declined to treat with us for the cession of Lorenzo Marquez.

Now, in 1883 a certain American, Colonel McMurdo, formed the plan of a railway from Lorenzo Marquez towards the Transvaal. The first step was to get through Portuguese territory. How he intended to proceed afterwards we cannot learn. It was commonly believed that the railway would climb the Drakensburg mountains, a rugged and precipitous range of 6,000 to 7,000 feet in height. But Colonel McMurdo thought that if he once got a railway from the sea to any part of the Transvaal, or to any place beyond the Portuguese territory, the rest of his task would be easy. A concession was obtained in 1883 from the Portuguese Parliament. It was made to a Portuguese company, but from the first, everyone knew that Portugal would not spend a penny on the line. The concession was, therefore, hawked about Europe for four years, and its chances of acceptance were greatly retarded by rumours of another concession for a tramway. These rumours were at last set to rest by a distinct statement that the tramway concession would only be valid in case the railway should not be made. So, at last, the Delagoa Bay Railway Company was floated. Of course it was by English and American, not by Portuguese, capital that it was to be built. So long as the matter was in the hands of a Portuguese company the government granted perpetual renewals of time for making the railway. Indeed the time was renewed from 1883 to 1887, without any real work being done. But when once a presumably solvent English company undertook the work, the time for its completion was more sharply defined. The conduct of the company cannot be altogether approved. The line was badly laid out, and, when frequent floods had destroyed it, the discovery was made that a new course must be adopted. A 'competent engineer' was then employed, and a new line planned. Then the company got to work. But by this time the rains had set in, and continuous work was impossible. The end of all was that the railway could not be completed, as promised, by the beginning of July, 1889, and thereupon Portugal cancelled the contract and took possession of the works. It has been stated, on apparently high authority, that this course was adopted quite independently of

the Transvaal. But no one believes this. Portugal does not want the line for itself. President Kruger does want it. The delay in completing the line formed an excuse for the confiscation, and the railway may now be sold to the Transvaal Government. If anything like what has been spent upon it be offered by President Kruger, the shareholders would be wise to accept. But when President Kruger has got the railway, what is he to do with it? It ends at the foot of almost inaccessible mountains. To get it carried on to Pretoria will cost millions, and, although the enterprise and capital of England have greatly enriched the Transvaal, it is unlikely that the millions will be forthcoming. Besides all this, the Transvaal has something else which it should do with its mining royalties. Our Government kindly wiped out about 350,000*l.* of debt incurred in saving the Transvaal from the attacks of Secocoeni, but there is still more than 300,000*l.* owing, with interest accruing year after year at 3½ per cent. We have certainly a right to see that a treaty so disastrous to ourselves should not be made a dead letter whenever a clause was inserted in our interests. The Boers laughed at the treaty when it was made, and openly declared that they would not be bound by its provisions. Nor have they been. They have not respected the boundaries laid down. They have re-introduced a system which is only a disguised slavery, and they have not paid their debts. Are we then to coerce the Transvaal? I venture to think that it is our duty to do so. As I have already said, the population is now more English than Dutch, but it must ever be remembered that the English emigrants to South Africa are apt to acquire Boer sympathies, because of the weakness of our colonial rule, just as English settlers in Ireland are said to become '*Hibernis ipsis Hiberniores.*' But shall we employ force if necessary? Most assuredly. Shall we spend money? Most assuredly. The curse of this country is the doctrine that our empire is no worth preserving if it costs anything to preserve it.

The Sand River Convention, on which the Boers of the Transvaal have always relied as their charter of independence is as follows. It was signed at a meeting held in the house c

Mr. P. A. Venter, Sand River, on Friday, the 18th day of February, 1852, between Major W. Hogge and C. M. Owen, Esq., Her Majesty's Assistant-Commissioners for the settling and adjusting of the affairs of the eastern and north-eastern boundaries of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the one part, and a deputation of sixteen emigrant farmers residing north of the Vaal River. 'The Assistant-Commissioners guarantee in
' the fullest manner on the part of the British Government to
' the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to
' manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according
' to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the
' British Government, and that no encroachment shall be made
' by the said Government on the territory beyond to the north
' of the Vaal River; with the further assurance that the warmest
' wish of the British Government is to promote peace, free-
' trade, and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers
' now inhabiting, or who may hereafter inhabit, that country, it
' being understood that this system of non-interference is bind-
' ing upon both parties.

' Should any misunderstanding hereafter arise as to the true
' meaning of the words "The Vaal River," this question, in so
' far as regards the line from the source of that river over the
' Drackensburg, shall be settled and adjusted by Commissioners
' chosen by both parties.

' Her Majesty's Assistant-Commissioners hereby disclaim all
' alliance whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations
' to the north of the Vaal River.

' It is agreed that no slavery is or shall be permitted or
' practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the
' emigrant farmers.

' Mutual facilities and liberty shall be afforded to traders
' and travellers on both sides of the Vaal River; it being
' understood that every waggon containing ammunition and
' firearms coming from the south side of the Vaal River shall
' produce a certificate signed by a British magistrate or other
' functionary duly authorised to grant such, and which shall
' state the quantities of such articles contained in said waggon

‘ to the nearest magistrate north of the Vaal River, who shall
‘ act in the case as the regulations of the emigrant farmers
‘ direct. It is agreed that no objection shall be made by any
‘ British authority against the emigrant Boers purchasing their
‘ supplies of ammunition in any of the British colonies and
‘ possessions of South Africa, it being mutually understood that
‘ all trade in ammunition with the native tribes is prohibited
‘ both by the British Government and the emigrant farmers on
‘ both sides of the Vaal River.

‘ It is agreed that so far as possible all criminals and other
‘ guilty parties who may fly from justice either way across the
‘ Vaal River shall be mutually given up, if such should be
‘ required, and that the British Courts as well as those of the
‘ emigrant farmers shall be mutually open to each other for all
‘ legitimate processes, and that summonses for witnesses sent
‘ either way across the Vaal River shall be backed by the
‘ magistrates on each side of the same respectively, to compel the
‘ attendance of such witnesses when required.

‘ It is agreed that certificates of marriage issued by the
‘ proper authorities of the emigrant farmers shall be held valid
‘ and sufficient to entitle children of such marriages to receive
‘ portions accruing to them in any British colony or possession
‘ in South Africa.

‘ It is agreed that any and every person now in possession
‘ of land and residing in British territory shall have free right
‘ and power to sell his said property and remove unmolested
‘ across the Vaal River, and *vice versa*; it being distinctly
‘ understood that this arrangement does not comprehend pri-
‘ soners or debtors without providing for their just and lawful
‘ debts.

‘ This done and signed at Sand River aforesaid this 17th
‘ day of January, 1852.’

CHAPTER IV

NATAL

IN order to make our survey of South Africa complete we must next consider the British Colony of Natal. This colony contains about one-third the area of England and Wales and one-twelfth that of the Cape of Good Hope. The population consists of about 32,000 whites and 388,000 natives, so that the proportion of natives to Europeans is twelve to one, while in the Cape the proportion is only two to one. Owing mainly to the opening up of the goldfields in the Transvaal, the trade of Natal has very rapidly increased. Its exports to this country, which consist mostly of wool and maize, amounted in 1886 in round numbers to 682,000*l.*, in 1887 to 904,000*l.*, and in 1888 to 1,070,000*l.* But the Natal imports of British and Irish produce show an advance still more rapid. In 1886 we sent to Natal goods valued at 877,000*l.* In 1887 the value was 1,590,000*l.*, and in 1888, 2,024,000*l.* The total imports of Natal in 1888 were 2,890,000*l.* There can be no doubt but that a great part of this increase is due to the demand for British goods from the gold mines. If railways were made from Durban to Pretoria and from the Cape to the same town, the commerce of Natal and the Cape Colony would continue to increase. But the authorities of the Transvaal wish to remove trade from British territory. They have therefore thrown all their influence to the side of the Delagoa Bay Railway. Commerce appears to know no country, and it is therefore not surprising that the English traders in South Africa, and English financiers at home have warmly supported the Delagoa Bay scheme. In a conference on Railway Extension, called together by Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Transvaal Government was not

represented, and the Orange Free State declared that it would not support any extension of railways beyond Bloemfontein. The extension of the Cape railways from Kimberley to Pretoria and of the Natal railway from Ladysmith to Pretoria would be comparatively easy, but the Boers prefer a railway entirely to themselves although it must cross Portuguese territory. Of course, it is the English and not the Boers who are to find the money. It is very probable that the making of this railway will be found much more costly than has been estimated. The height to be reached from the coast is 8,000 feet and there is then a descent of 4,000 feet. But it will satisfy the Boers if English capital builds a railway whose main object is to transfer British trade into German hands. In all these proceedings and intrigues it is not the Boer people, still less the English residents in the Transvaal, that are interested. It is simply President Kruger and the Boer Government who dread the extension of English influence, and know that their domination is threatened. It would be for the interest of Natal to push forward its railway to the frontier of the Transvaal and if possible to Johannesburg and Pretoria, and it would be for the interest of this country to assist.

One result of the confiscation of the Delagoa Bay Railway by Portugal has been that new projects have been started for constructing a British competing line. The adjacent native territories have been examined with a view to discovering some other route that could be opened up under the absolute control of Great Britain. Colonel Jesser Coope claims to have discovered passes through which a railway could easily be made to the coast of Swazieland. The Delagoa Bay Railway ends at the foot of the Drackensburg mountains, just where these are highest and most precipitous. But about seventy miles further south Colonel Coope says that there are easy passages through the Drackensburg, offering scarcely any difficulties to the railway engineer. The Boers are said to be well aware of this, and to be straining every nerve to annex Swazieland, so as to secure this route for themselves. It becomes, therefore, extremely important that Great Britain should establish such a protec-

torate over Swazieland as may secure the sea-coast. But that is not all. The country itself is rich in gold, iron, and coal. It is probably as rich as any but the very best part of the Transvaal. So far as it has been worked, the capital and management have been found by English subjects. There is, therefore, a double reason for such a protectorate. The king is understood to prefer the English ascendancy, and, indeed, to detest and dread the Boers. For some years Mr. Shepstone, son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, represented English interests in an informal way. But he has been dismissed, and he is now supposed to favour the Dutch rather than the English party. Perhaps that was one cause of his dismissal. But in any case we ought to have in Swazieland not an informal agent, but a duly qualified and appointed English Resident. In fact it is generally thought that the absolute incorporation of the country by Great Britain is the only way to save it from becoming subject to the Boers. These considerations have now been urged upon Lord Knutsford, and may probably secure his attention. It is certain that since the rebellion in Canada forty years ago no Colonial Minister has had a more difficult task than Lord Knutsford has now in South Africa. But it is all the natural consequence of our timidity and concessions in 1881 and 1884.

But I do not wish to insist mainly on the trade question ; there are three points to be considered—empire, colonisation and trade—and of these three trade is not the most important. The first thing to be desired is that our empire shall be strong, as strong as any other empire upon earth, and that cannot be secured by mere wealth. Everything has too long been subordinated to the one question of money. It is a gross, base, detestable heresy, and all the benefits we may have received from Radical rule can never atone for the injury and demoralisation of this creed. To be great, nay even to fulfil our duty, requires, not money only, but land and men. The Romans were not indifferent to money, but above everything they aspired to rule, because they thought themselves worthy of empire. That should be our own attitude, unless we wish to sink into the