to arrest the tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceful solution of the difficulties between him and the English Government.

When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and that talking should commence. These men did not return to the king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by their own desire, "on the ground that Cetshwayo would kill them for bringing an unfavourable answer."

And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—"Two Zulus arrived here yesterday with a message from the king . . . . The king says: 'Look here, I have taken care of the deserted mission-stations, and not allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson's at Kwamagwaza, and Ofibro's at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army) to the Ekhowe mission-station, and there has made a fort of it, the houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission-stations; and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do with your station Entumeni, for it is reported . . . . that the column at Miltangambill (Ntunjambili) is to . . . . march to Entumeni, turn the station into a fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.' This is the substance of the king's message to me with respect to my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on the decision of

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1 C. 2874, p. 109.
the General, Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni station-houses are to be destroyed or not." Bishop Schreuder says: "The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain Ikolwa (convert) Klaas (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone's report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875.

"Already Umavumendaba (Mavumengwana), had requested the king to send that book with the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations; but Umavumendaba's request was not then acceded to. The king now sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875." [1873].—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37.)

Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, "to receive the message from the messenger's own lips, and communicate it to His Excellency." He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said, refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1,000 head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have delivered up Sihayo's sons to the General, but "any Zulu that showed himself was immediately fired upon." The attack upon Sandhlwana, he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, who he now begged might be sent back to him (ibid. pp. 40, 41).
Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers with the book, and says: "Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen.

"It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has transgressed its provisions" (ibid. p. 47).

On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that "three messengers have arrived with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native of Entumeni), Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry they were fired on by the Native Contingent. . . . The message is very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view to the conclusion of peace." They further brought a message from Dabulamanzi, that "a few days ago he sent a white flag with two messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned. He asks that the men may be released." Mr. Fannin says: "Four other Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers," and he suggests, "that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand" (ibid. pp. 44, 45).

"Owing," says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, "to some misunderstanding between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent back."

"I do not for a moment suppose," he continues, "that either the civil or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for
suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military authorities."  

It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years in carrying the "words" of Government and the Zulu king to each other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, "we fired upon it (i.e. the flag) to test its sincerity."

The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April, and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and military authorities. On the 20th of April he saw Lord Chelmsford in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord Chelmsford) at General Wood's camp, to which he was then bound. Nevertheless the General's message, which would take but two days on the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further attempts on the Zulu king's part at bringing about a peaceful issue to the war, being merely that "if Cetywayo sends any more messengers he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee)."

Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again, brought down, bearing a white flag, to Maritzburg by policemen from Mr. Fynn, resident

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1 Nevertheless, during the end of March and beginning of April communications took place between the Lieut.-Governor and the General commanding, on this subject (O. 2318, p. 45); therefore both the military and civil authorities were aware of it.
magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the "sincerity" of their white flag had been "tested" before, and were sent, not to the military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th, and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to Maritzburg with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer. Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause.

General Clifford's account of this is as follows:

"I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified in sending them on to my chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi (Umfunzi), then made the following statement:—"We are Umfundi and Umkismana (Unkismana), Zulu messengers from Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke's Drift, whom I knew, told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg, so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a year for the last six years as King's messenger, but not as Chief. I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message, asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Galwey, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country, but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him." (This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no message for him.) 'I want to see the Great Chief, as
the King ordered me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King's kraal. Am an old man and cannot go as fast as I could when I was young, and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to Ihabamango Mountain if we go by Rorké's Drift. We only know of two other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango (Sintwangu), the name of the other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the message on. The Chief was at Eshowe fighting, and the answer did not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go to the great White Chief, but we said: "No, those are not the King's orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell the King;" and it was half of the third month when we got back to him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs, and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great White Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet
been sent. The messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began; they were detained and did not return to the King's kraal till we did." I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord Chelmsford.

"I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi, to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the commanding officers along the road they were going to look after them, and to the officer at Rorke's Drift, to see them safe to 'Ibabamango.' 'Would a white man be safe going with them?' 'Yes,' they said, 'quite,' and they wished one could be sent with them; but still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him. I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them, because my Chief did not approve; still less could I send one to the King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when they saw him."—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111.)

At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter. Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Eshowe, who, although brought blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they were supposed to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which they received.

Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that all Cetshwayo's messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue Books, yet Sir Bartle Frere says of them:
"In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that they really came from the king."¹

But the High Commissioner's habit of finding evil motives for every act of the Zulu king made the case of the latter hopeless from the first.

Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner's proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty's Government upon the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that "they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used to avoid."

"The communication which had passed between us," continues the Secretary of State, "as to the objects for which the reinforcements were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially needful that Her Majesty's Government should understand and approve any important step, not already suggested to them, before you were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the circumstances rendered it

¹ John Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message was bond, fide, and that Cetshwayo "meant to have peace if possible."
imperative that, even at the risk of this disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged."

The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the 19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the writer's "general approval of the principles on which the boundary award was based," as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere's emendations by which he seeks to secure the "private rights" of settlers on the wrongfully appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted as far as possible to those cases in which bona fide purchasers had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed. Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty's Government had distinctly said beforehand that "they could not undertake the obligation of protecting" the missionaries in Zululand. His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended for Sir B. Frere's guidance when the time for once more proposing terms should arrive, and he concludes: "It is my wish that, as far as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government."—(P. P. [C. 2260] pp. 108-111.)

Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere's explanations, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach writes as follows:

"Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March, I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st, further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide that the demands made upon Kethwayo must be communicated to him with delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of Her Majesty's Government contained in my despatches
already referred to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa, and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action according to these instructions.

“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of that despatch, to ‘muck that will remain to be done on the northern Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question; and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested in your despatch should be submitted to them for consideration and approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 36.)
CHAPTER XVII.

THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE.

The first step taken towards preparing for the campaign and advance of a column on Ulundi by the coast road was the landing of a "Naval Brigade" from H.M.S *Active*, in November, 1878, under the command of Commander Campbell, R.N. The "Actives" at once marched up to Lower Tugela Drift, and commenced preparations for the crossing of the river. A "pont" was established, and boats collected preparatory to the passage of the troops. Fifty men from the *Tenedos*, under Lieutenant Kingscote, R.N., joined the Naval Brigade on January 7th, 1879, but remained at Fort Pearson and took charge of the pont, &c., when the "Actives" moved up with No. 1 Column.

The passage of the Tugela was a difficult and rather hazardous undertaking, the river being nearly 300 yards wide, with a strong current flowing. The preparations, including taking across a wire hawser for the working of the pont, were conducted in a very business-like and satisfactory manner by Commander Campbell and the Naval Brigade.

The Navy had received early notice of impending hostilities, and, as early as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had requested Commodore Sullivan, C.B. (the naval chief), to remain at Natal, "in order to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable," "as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must shortly
arise with the Zulu tribe . . . which will necessitate active operations."—(P. P. 2144, p. 32.)

The coast was explored by the Commodore as far as St. Lucia Bay, and every possible assistance willingly rendered by him and the force under his command before and throughout the campaign. Valuable assistance was also given by Captain Baynton, agent for the Union Steamship Company’s fleet. The force detailed for Colonel Pearson’s command—styled No. 1 Column—concentrated on Fort Pearson, on the Lower Tugela; its detail has been previously given.

It was directed that this column should cross the river and encamp on the Zulu bank, under the guns of the fort, there to await further orders; but, from the flooded state of the river and other causes, the passage was not effected till the 12th January, when the principal part of the force crossed and encamped in Zululand.

The 2nd (Captain Wynne’s) Company Royal Engineers arrived at Fort Pearson on the 12th, and crossed on the 13th. It immediately set about the construction of Fort Tenedos on the left bank, about 600 yards from the river, to cover the crossing, protect stores, &c.

The Naval Brigade were constantly at work, day and night, working the boats and pontoon across the river, with the exception of the night of the 14th, when a heavy flood swept away the wharves. Twice the pontoon was upset, and one of the Active’s men was drowned.

Reconnaissances were made in the Zulu country, and a few prisoners taken, but there was no sign of any large body of the enemy. One of John Dunn’s men reported on the 17th that “the whole of his neighbourhood” was “now deserted and the cattle driven into the interior.”

Everything being carefully prepared, the advance was made on the 18th, a strong advanced guard and the Natal Native Pioneers 1 preceding the column. Every

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1 This company of Native Pioneers (one of those organised by Colonel Durnford, R.E., before the war) was raised from the employees of the Colonial Engineer Department, and commanded by Captain Beddoes of the same department; this officer being highly commended by his chief. The
precaution was taken to prevent a surprise, extra vigilance being necessary on account of the long wagon-train carrying tents, rations for fifteen days, and a large quantity of food and ammunition destined for an advance depot to be formed at or near Etshowe.

We may here say a few words on the extreme difficulties of South African transport—difficulties so serious and full of danger that they should have been eliminated from the plan of the campaign.

The wagons used were, as a rule, ordinary South African ox-wagons, clumsy and heavy to move, each drawn by a team of fourteen to eighteen oxen. The Zulu oxen are much superior to the up-country oxen, as they stand more work, and will swim rivers; they even swim the Tugela, whilst the remainder had to be ferried over.

The pace of the ox-wagon is about a mile and a half an hour, and drifts and hills cause frequent delays. Take for instance the train of No. 1 Column: it accomplished the march to Etshowe, a distance of thirty-seven miles, in between five and six days—from daylight on the 18th to 10 a.m. on the 23rd—having only been detained by the enemy at Inyezane for about two hours: the train was necessarily some six miles in length, an element of the utmost danger had the swift-footed Zulus been a little more enterprising. Two or three thousand Zulus might easily have prevented Colonel Pearson reaching Etshowe with his train, in spite of all the precautions he might and did take. The commanding officers of the various columns had no option in the matter of wagon-train, and as far as they were concerned the transport under their control worked well.

The difficulty of moving with a long train of wagons during the summer, or rainy season, can scarcely be exaggerated. Double spanning over drifts and soft places, making bad places good with brushwood, oxen

company worked under the supervision of Lieutenant Main, R.E., and rendered excellent service. Colonel Pearson remarked: "The men worked cheerfully. They had eyes like hawks, and they did their scouting to perfection."
getting tired owing to the length of time they were yoked, rather than from the distance travelled, all gave endless trouble and anxiety, and entirely upset all calculations as to distances to be traversed. The transport duties of No. 1 Column were admirably carried out by Captain Pelly Clarke and Assistant-Commissary Kevill Davis.

The force advanced from the Tugela in two columns—the first crossed the Inyoni and encamped—weather very wet and trying. The second column started on the following day (19th) and joined its leader at the Umsundusi. At this camp the troops remained during the 20th. The reconnoitring parties had reported the Amatikulu impassable, and Colonel Pearson pushed forward engineers (native pioneers), with a strong working-party and guard, to render the drift practicable, which, after a day's hard work, was done. On the 21st the column again advanced, and, crossing the Amatikulu, encamped in the evening at Kwasamabela, four miles from Inyezane; during the day a reconnoitring party burnt a military kraal near Nginginchlovu. Up to this time only a few of the enemy's scouts had been seen, and nothing had, occurred beyond an occasional nocturnal alarm.

On the 22nd the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River, and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow.

At eight o'clock piquets were being placed, and the wagons parked, when a company of the Native Contingent—who were scouting in front, under the direction of Captain Hart, staff-officer attached to the regiment—discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed.
The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns of the Royal Artillery, two companies of "The Buffs," and the Native Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from whence the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry.

The waggons continuing to close up and park, two companies of the "The Buffs," who moved up with them, were ordered to clear the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Maegregor, Deputy-Assistant-Quarter master-General. This they did in excellent style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a heavy fire from the knoll.

The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from the drift, and, supported by a half company of "Buff's," and a half company of the 99th, sent on by Lieut.-Colonel Welman (99th) from the rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll. The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted their turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted on high ground on the left of the road. Lieut.-Colonel Farrell with a company of "Buff's," and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half-past nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and resumed its march at noon.

The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates ("The Buffs") killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers and 4 natives killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. Colonels Pearson and Parnell had their horses shot under them.
The enemy's force was estimated at 4,000—the Umxapu, Udhlambedihi, and Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district—and their loss upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried away, hidden, or killed by our natives.

Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Etshowe at 10 A.M.; the rear-guard not getting in till the afternoon.

Etshowe was a mission-station, abandoned some months before, but now selected for an entrenched post in preference to more open and commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The station consisted of a dwelling-house, school, and workshop, with store-rooms—three buildings of sun-dried brick, thatched; there was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a corrugated-iron roof; and a stream of good water ran close by the station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men were made.

Two companies of “Buffes,” two companies Native Contingent, and some mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march to Etshowe with a convoy of sixty waggons.

On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong escort and forty-eight empty waggons for a further supply of stores; and next day a "runner" arrived with news that a disaster had occurred on the 22nd. On the 26th a telegram was received from Lord Chelmsford, hinting at disaster—that he had been compelled to retire to the frontier—that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel Pearson was to hold Etshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu army.

Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers, when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the Tugela the mounted troops and
Native Contingent. These marched, unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours—a contrast with the upward march! The various buildings were loopholed, and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of wagons. In the evening Colonel Ely’s convoy arrived safely.

The mounted men were sent back from Etshowe, because a large proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually was the case.

To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Shervington, of the Native Contingent, and did excellent service.

These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him through the long grass; he lost two fingers of his right hand, had a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was assegialed; yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his rifle.

The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Shervington and six of the men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the annoyance.

Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been brought up with Colonel Ely’s convoy. The wagons of the troops sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous prices: matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s. each, and tobacco 30s. a pound!

The water supply was excellent, both in quality and
quantity; and in the lower part of the stream bathing-places for both officers and men were constructed; and all sanitary arrangements most carefully attended to.

A wagon-laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it—deepening ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades—all most energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, R.E. So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be collecting; but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm.

On the 11th two "runners" arrived from the Lower Tugela with a despatch from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to carry out what the General seemed to desire.

Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o'clock if necessary.

This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply received.

Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad weather; ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and trous-de-loups and wire entanglements formed on the north, south, and east faces.

On March 1st an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a military kraal (Dabulamanz’s) six miles distant; this was done and the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during the homeward march.

On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were

1 P. P. (C. 2269) p. 104.
being flashed from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out.

Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1,000 men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, by means of a small looking-glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th.

A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very bad weather, and by the working-parties being constantly under fire. Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of "The Buffa."

On March 23rd two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought into the fort each with a mealie-bag over his head; they were said to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as prisoners in irons, as already stated (p. 306), taken down, still in irons, after the relief of Eshowe, and brought across the Lower Tugela into Natal, where they were interviewed by Lord Chelmsford, and then, it is believed, were allowed to return to Zululand.

At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased, there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick-list when it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhoea, dysentery, and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the hospital, and both officers and men lived under the wagons, over which the waggon-sails were spread, propped up with the tent-poles; thus the troops actually lived at their alarm-posts.

The relief took place none too soon, there being then
but six days' further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison.

"From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear cheerfully."

—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 39.)
CHAPTER XVIII.

NGINGINDLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING.

LORD CHELMSFORD, having moved down to Durban, reports (February 8th) that No. 1 Column is secure at Etshowe; that he is about to forward troops to the Lower Tugela; and that Durban, Stanger, Pietermaritzburg, and Greytown are prepared for defence, "with garrisons which should prevent panic among those living around;" the frontier quiet, and the road from Greytown quite open.

The first reinforcement for Natal was brought by H.M.S. Shah, which chanced to be at St. Helena (on her voyage home from the Pacific), when the news of the disaster in Zululand arrived. Captain Bradshaw, R.N., immediately decided to proceed to Natal with his ship; the Governor, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops, Colonel Phillips, R.E., arranging to send in her all the available force that could be spared from the island. Accordingly she sailed on February 12th, with 3 officers and 52 men of the Royal Artillery, and 2 officers and 109 men of the 88th Regiment.

H.M.S. Boadicea also arrived on the station, bringing Commodore Richards, who relieved Rear-Admiral Sullivan, C.B.

Communications had been established with Etshowe by means of flashing signals, which were conducted by Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., who after some failure and discouragement at first, persevered until complete success was attained.
Previous to this there had been no communications with Colonel Pearson for a considerable time, but on March 11th a cypher message from him (dated 9th) said that the flashing signals had been understood, and that as officers and men were generally sickly, it would be desirable to relieve the whole of the garrison, and that any relieving force should bring a convoy and be prepared to fight.—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 81.)

On March 16th the signals from Etshowe were first made out, and one of the messages received was: "Short rations until 3rd April. Breadstuffs until 4th April. Plenty of trek oxen. Captain Williams, 'The Buffs,' died at Ekowe on 13th March." (ibid. p. 83).

Reinforcements arriving from England, Lord Chelmsford determined to effect the relief of Etshowe, and assembled a strong force on the Lower Tugela for that purpose. The column to be in two divisions: the first, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., composed of the Naval Brigade of Shah and Tenesos, 57th Regiment, 2 companies "Buffa," 5 companies 99th Regiment, mounted infantry, volunteers, and natives, and 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery—2 9-pounders, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes, and 1 Gatling gun; also 150 of John Dunn's people as scouts. The second division Lieut.-Colonel Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding—Naval Brigade of H.M.S. Boadicea, Royal Marines of Shah and Boadicea, 60th Rifles, 91st Highlanders, and 4th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes and 1 Gatling gun; making a total fighting strength of 3,390 white troops and 2,280 natives. The Lieut.-General decided to take command of the column himself, and directed that it should advance by the coast road, so as to avoid the bush country; to advance without tents, and with only a blanket and waterproof-sheet for each man. The convoy, taking one month's provisions for the garrison and ten days' supplies for the column, consisted of about 100 waggons and 44 carts.—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 74, 75.)

The assembling of this column and preparation for
an advance occupied some weeks, and on the 23rd March Lord Chelmsford assumed the personal command, the force being assembled on the left bank of the Tugela and organised in two brigades, as already detailed, by the 28th. Next day, at 6 A.M., the column marched from the Tugela and encamped at Inyone, reaching next day the Amatakulu River. Now, profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken, and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each halting-place.

The crossing of the Amatakulu River took nine hours, and the column encamped a mile and a half beyond it. Nothing had been seen of the enemy until the 31st, when the scouts noticed small bodies of Zulus near the Amatakulu bush. Captain Barrow, with a mounted force, reconnoitred towards the Ngoye forest, and burnt the kraal of one of the king’s brothers.

On April 1st, the column marched to Ngingindhlovu, and about a mile from the Inyesane River a laager was formed in a favourable position. From this point to Etshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground, winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles, the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover.

Etshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling was at once established.

As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops: Front face (north), 60th Rifles; right flank, 57th Regiment; left flank, 99th Regiment and “Buff’s;” rear face, 91st Regiment; the angles manned by blue-jackets and marines, and armed with the guns, Gatlings, and rocket-tubes. The night passed without alarm, and the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came reports at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover; they even pushed forward to within
twenty or thirty yards of the entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and the Gatling gun. Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 3-60th Rifles, received a dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement.

The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face; and, whilst this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear, probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground, finding cover in the long grass and undulations.

The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack the enemy's right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M.; and the Natal Native Contingent, clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which, led by Captain Barrow's horsemen, was carried on for several miles.

The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1,000; 671 bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have numbered about 11,000 men.

Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass, telegraphed his congratulations to the General.

The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded.

On the 3rd April, leaving a garrison in the laager, Lord Chelmsford pushed on to Etshowe with a convoy of fifty-eight carts with stores. The advance was unopposed, but the difficulties of the country were such that it was nearly midnight before the rear-guard had traversed the fifteen miles and entered Etshowe.

The garrison had suffered severely from sickness during the preceding month, losing by disease 4 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers and men; and when relieved there were sick in hospital, 8 officers and 44 non-commissioned officers and men, and attending hospital, 1 officer and 78 non-commissioned officers and men—out of
a total force of 53 officers, 1,289 non-commissioned officers and men, and 121 natives.

The constant wet weather and close quarters in the fort, with little or no shelter, the want of medicines, and insufficient food, might well have caused even heavier loss.

The General determined to evacuate Etshowe, as he found it so difficult of approach; future operations being planned to be carried on by the coast road. On the 4th Colonel Pearson evacuated the fort he had so tenaciously held, taking with him his waggons and all his stores that were of any use; unserviceable tools and metal-work were buried, but the fort was not destroyed.

Colonel Pearson’s march to the Tugela was performed without any interruption from the enemy.

On the 4th another kraal of Dabulamanzi’s on the Entumeni Hill was destroyed by a patrol from Etshowe, and on the fifth the relieving column left, and bivouacked near the Emputshini mission-station. Early next morning an unfortunate alarm occurred, causing the death of three men. A sentry fired at what he thought was a body of the enemy, and the piquet on the opposite side of the entrenchment retired into shelter, together with native scouts who were out in front. Although it was a bright moonlight night, and no mistakes should have been made, fire was opened from the entrenchment, and five of the 60th were wounded and nine natives bayoneted as they attempted to gain the shelter of the laager.

On reaching Ngingindhlouvı a new laager was formed, about a mile from the old one; this was garrisoned on the 7th, the column moving on to the Tugela.

The small mounted force under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars, rendered excellent service, both during the engagement at Ngingindhlouvı, and by the manner in which the scouting duties were carried out.

A party of Mr. John Dunn’s people (natives), 150 in number, were also of the greatest utility in scouting and outpost duties. Mr. Dunn himself accompanied the General; his knowledge of the country and sound advice being of much use.—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 122.)
John Dunn was an Englishman, resident in Zululand, where he had lived for many years and adopted many Zulu customs. He amassed a considerable property, and had an extensive following. He invariably received the greatest kindness and consideration from the Zulu king, and was frequently employed by him in various communications with the English Government. When the danger of war between English and Zulus appeared imminent, John Dunn appealed to the English for protection for himself, his property and people, who were ready, he said, to fight on the English side. At the same time Cetshwayo sent him a message to the effect that he saw the English were going to attack him, and therefore Dunn had better leave his country, with his people and cattle, and go to a place of safety. This John Dunn did, crossing the Tugela about the 3rd of January, and settling near Fort Pearson.

At the time the General determined to move to the relief of Etshowe he "sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible, to raid into Zululand in order to make a diversion in favour of the relieving column," thinking he "might possibly have to meet the full strength of the Zulu army."—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.)

On the 2nd of April a small force of Native Contingent crossed the Tugela and burnt two large kraals, no resistance being made. On the next day a force crossed again and burnt an unoccupied kraal, exchanging a few shots with Zulus, of whom a considerable number were seen at a distance. On the following day the natives refused to cross, and the Border Agent, Mr. Fannin, remarks: "I think it is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a considerable body of men to resist."—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 104.)

The reserve native force had co-operated in these movements by being assembled and placed in position along the Tugela, but the Colonial Commander declined to proceed
over the border, or send any of his force into Zululand, without the sanction of the Lieut.-Governor.

The Government of Natal had placed at Lord Chelmsford's disposal a number of natives (over 8,000) for service in the Zulu country. Some of these were intended for fighting purposes, and formed what we have already described as the Natal Native Contingent. The rest were supplied for transport, pioneer, and hospital-corps services, and all were expected to cross the border.

But besides these men, native levies were called out, when the war began, for service in the colony—that is to say, for the defence of the border under colonial district commanders. These levies were to be used solely as a border-guard, and were not intended to cross into Zululand at all. Sir Henry Bulwer, in permitting them to be raised, had been careful to protect as far as possible the interests of both the white and the native population of Natal, and had made very proper stipulations as to the services for which he placed these levies at the disposal of the General. The latter, indeed, expressed it as his opinion that every available fighting native in the colony should be called out; but Sir Henry, with a greater comprehension of consequences, demurred to this rash proposal, and a personal interview between the two resulted in the above mentioned arrangement.

Consequently the Lieut.-Governor was not a little surprised to learn on the 8th April that the native levies (border-guard) had been ordered, in conjunction with the other troops, to make raids across the border into Zululand. To this he objected, writing to the High Commissioner on April 9th in the following terms: "I venture to suggest for your Excellency's consideration the question of the policy of raids of this kind. The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are well disposed to us. We started on this war on the
ground that it was a war against the king and the Zulu Government, and not against the nation. . . .”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 103.)

A correspondence ensued between the Lieut.-Governor and the Lieut.-General, in which the two differed in a very decided manner. Lord Chelmsford complained that the action taken by the Lieut.-Governor, “in refusing to allow the orders issued by” him to the native forces to be carried out, appeared to him “fraught with such dangerous consequences” that he considered it necessary to refer the question to the Home Government. (P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.) He implied that this interference had (in conjunction with the state of the Tugela River) prevented a general raid being made, which might have proved an important diversion in favour of the column relieving Etshowe, and he declared, in behalf of the raiding system, that “it would be madness to refrain from inflicting as much damage as possible upon our enemy” (ibid. p. 56).

It was a well-known fact that the fighting men of the Zulu nation were with their army, and that the only occupants of the kraals to be raided were the women, children, and the infirm, and other non-combatants; therefore the General’s following remark, “I am satisfied that the more the Zulu nation at large feels the strain brought upon them by the war, the more anxious will they be to see it brought to an end,” was of a highly Christian, wise, and soldierly nature, hardly to be matched by anything attributed to the Zulu monarch himself.

Sir Henry Bulwer’s replies were temperate but decided. He pointed out that the statement contained in Lord Chelmsford’s despatch to the Secretary of State for War, implying that the Governor’s interference had (or might have) seriously interfered with the relief of Etshowe, was erroneous; Etshowe having been relieved on the 3rd of April, five days before Sir Henry even heard of the order for the Natal natives to make raids. To the General himself he observed that his interference had been limited to approval of the action of the district commander, who
declined to employ his force in a manner contrary to the express stipulations under which they were raised, and concludes: "The views of this Government are very strongly against the employment, under the present circumstances, of the native levies and native population along the border in making raids into the Zulu country, as being, in the opinion of the Government, calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to the natives engaged in raiding."—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 55.)

The Lieut.-Governor's views were that these native levies "were called out expressly and solely for service in the colony, and for the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial district commanders for that purpose only," and that no authority had been given to employ these native levies "on any service in the Zulu country" (ibid. p. 54).

And it seems that raids along the border had been ordered after the relief of Eshowe was effected.

Sir H. Bulwer writes, 16th April, that he had received, on the 7th, a copy of a military telegram written after the relief of Eshowe, showing that the General had "ordered raids to be made across the border wherever feasible," and on the following day, a copy of a memorandum, written from Eshowe by Colonel Crealock, the Assistant Military Secretary, and addressed to the officer commanding at the Lower Tugela, and, among other things it contained the following instruction: "Send word up to the frontier to raid across the river wherever the river permits." And the same evening he heard of the native levies having been required to cross (ibid. p. 53).

The question of the employment of the native levies in making raids across the border was referred by the Lieut.-Governor to the Executive Council of Natal, which, on the 23rd April, expressed itself as "strongly opposed to the employment, in making raids into the Zulu country, of the native levies, who . . . . have been called out for the defence of the colony only." But in view of the Lieut.-General's strongly-expressed opinions, the Council felt there was no alternative but that the General "should
have the power of so employing the native levies on the border. At the same time the Council desires . . . to record emphatically its objections to the course proposed, and to such employment of the levies."—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 132.)

This decision of the Executive Council was communicated to the General on April 25th by the Lieut.-Governor with the remark: "Your Excellency will therefore have the power to employ the native levies across the border in the way named by you, should you think it imperatively necessary for military reasons. Your Excellency will not fail to perceive, however, that such employment of the native levies is against the decided opinion of this colony as to its inexpediency" (ibid. p. 133).

On the 20th May raids were again made into Zululand from three different points, under Major Twentyman's command. One party crossed at the Elibomvu Drift, and burnt fifteen kraals and large quantities of grain; another burnt three kraals and captured a large herd of cattle; and the third burnt two kraals, and then, seeing the Zulus assembling in force, beat a hurried retreat across the Tugela. 

—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 91.)

Sir Henry Bulwer on the 24th May, writes to the High Commissioner: "Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, commanding the base of operations . . . was wholly unaware that any such a raid was being organised by Major Twentyman, who, I believe, acted under general instructions received from head-quarters. . . The views of the Government of Natal on the subject of these raids your Excellency is already acquainted with. The material advantage to be gained by the work of destruction or of plunder of Zulu property can be at the best but trifling and insignificant, and on every other account I fear our action will prove positively injurious to us, to our interests, and to our cause. We are absolutely provoking retaliation. Already, I am informed, since the raid reported in these papers took place, some native huts on the Natal side of the Tugela have been burned by Zulus; and to what extent this work of revenge and retaliation may be
carried, with what losses of property, and even of life, inflicted on our border natives, it is impossible to say. . . . What result we have gained to justify even the risk of such retaliation against us, and of such a sacrifice to our own native population, I know not.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] pp. 89, 90).

The fears of the Lieutenant-Governor were in some measure realised on the 25th June, when he writes: “A raid was made by two bodies of Zulus, numbering, it is estimated, about 1,000, into the Tugela Valley, below the Krans Kop in this colony. The Zulus destroyed several kraals, and carried off a number of cattle. I regret to say also that several of our Natal natives, including women, were killed, and some women and children carried off.

“There can be little doubt that this raid has been made in retaliation for the one that was made into the Zulu country opposite the Krans Kop by a force under Major Twentyman, of Her Majesty’s 4th Regiment, on the 20th May, and which was reported to you in my despatch of the 31st of that month.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 150.)

Thus the opinions expressed in Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch of 24th May were to some extent justified, with the probability of a blood-feud being set up between the two border populations, and widening the breach between ourselves and the Zulu people; and with it the increased difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement for the future.
CHAPTER XIX.

REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED.

DURING the latter part of March and April reinforcements kept steadily pouring into Natal, and with them four general officers—Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, V.C., C.B., who was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, to command at the base of operations; Major-General Craelock, C.B., to command No. 1 Division, concentrating on the Lower Tugela; Major-General Newdigate, to command No. 2 Division, head-quarters Dundee; and Major-General Marshall, to command the Cavalry Brigade attached to No. 2 Division; Brigadier-General Wood, V.C., C.B., retaining his previous command—to be styled the Flying Column.

By the middle of March the available force consisted of an effective strength of non-commissioned officers and men—Imperial troops, 7,520; volunteer cavalry, etc., 1,367; Europeans, attached to native contingents, 495; making a total of 9,382 Europeans, with 5,769 natives.—(P. P. [O. 2316] p. 85.)

No operations of any consequence took place beyond concentrating troops and forwarding supplies. On the 20th April, Lord Chelmsford reported that Major-General Craelock had taken up his command and, if transport arrangements permitted, would shortly commence operations. Major-General Newdigate was on his way to his command.

The reinforcements alone considerably exceeded the
strength of the force with which the war was so rashly undertaken. They consisted of the 1st Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers; 21st, 57th, 58th, 60th, 88th (one company), 91st, 94th Foot; two batteries Royal Artillery, and detachments from St. Helena and Mauritius; one company and half C troop Royal Engineers; drafts for various regiments; detachments of Army Service and Army Hospital Corps; etc. etc.;—a total (including the staff embarked in February from England) of 387 officers and 8,901 men.

But even after the arrival of this enormous accession of strength, further reinforcements of three battalions were demanded “for reserve and garrison purposes.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 162.)

At the end of April the effective force was:

First Division, Major-General Crealock:
  Imperial and irregular troops . . . 6508
  Native Contingent (151 mounted) . . . 2707

Second Division, Major-General Newdigate:
  Imperial and irregular troops . . . 6867
  Natives (243 mounted) . . . 3371

Flying Column, Brigadier-General Wood:
  Imperial and irregular troops . . . 2285
  Native (75 mounted) . . . 807

Making a total strength of 22,545 men available for the conquest of Zululand.

On the 14th May, Lord Chelmsford reported: “The troops are in position, and are only waiting for sufficient supplies and transport to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 97.)

The transport difficulties naturally increased with the increasing force. The colony did not eagerly press forward to the rescue, and although transport for service in the colony could be obtained, that for trans-frontier work was not procurable in any quantity on any terms.

The colonial view somewhat appeared to be, “No government has power, either legally or morally, to force any man to perform acts detrimental to his own
interest." No doubt the colony felt itself more secure whilst the troops remained within its borders, and naturally was not anxious to assist in their departure; and it may have thought the war "was an Imperial concern, brought about by an Imperial functionary;" and therefore the Empire should be left "to worry out the affair for itself;" as remarked by a colonial paper at the time.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the necessities of the troops, during this campaign, taxed the resources of the colonists to the utmost. If some profited in a mercantile point of view, and were unpatriotic enough to try to make every penny they could out of the army intended for their protection, there were others who acted in a very different spirit. The sacrifice and loss of both life and property through the Zulu war has been as great, in proportion, to Natal as to the mother country; and if the former was weak and wicked—or perhaps only thoughtless—enough to wish for war, she has now received a lesson which will prevent her ever making so great a mistake again. While upon the one side we hear stories of transport riders and others who lost no opportunity of fleecing at every turn both Government and military in their necessity, on the other hand we have equally well-authenticated accounts of strict honesty, and even generosity, on the part of other Natalians. One story is told of a transport rider who had earned the sum of £1,500, which was to be paid by instalments of £500 each: after he had received two of these the officer who paid him was removed, and his successor, unaware of previous payments, handed over to the transport rider's messenger the whole £1,500. The honest fellow at once returned the £1,000 overpaid.

It is also a well-known fact that many of the principal tradesmen permitted their shopmen to join the volunteer corps to which they belonged, still continuing to pay them their respective salaries during their absence.

The colony was not revelling in a shower of gold, as some at home imagine: a few individuals, doubtless,
thought to "make hay while the sun shines," but to
the population at large the war was certainly not advan-
tageous. For some months fresh provisions were almost
at famine prices, or even unattainable by private persons.
Many farmers were with the army either as volunteers
or with the transport train; others again had sold their
waggons and oxen, and thus had no means of bringing
in their produce. The market supply was consequently
very small, and generally at once bought up for the
garrisons.
Transport difficulties, we have said, increased with the
increasing force. The 9,000 Imperial troops sent as rein-
forcements had to be fed, and their food conveyed to where
they were stationed. Three or four thousand horses and
mules also had to be fed in a country from which grass
was disappearing, and in which supplies of forage
were small, the larger part of the troops and horses
were sent up-country—some two hundred miles from
the coast—where winter grass fires might be expected,
and nature's stores were certain soon to be exhausted;
and thus arose the terrible strain on the transport resources
of the country.

But much more was required than was necessary. In
place of the ponderous train accompanying each column—
a fruitful source of difficulty and danger on the march by
day, if a protection when halted at night—the advance
should have been made from entrenched depots in the
lightest possible order. A rapid advance on the king's
kraal in compact formation, and, wherever the enemy
might stand, a decisive battle fought—the result of which,
with the most ordinary care, could not be doubtful—and
the war would be virtually over. There need have been
no weary inactivity, with its following of disease and
death, and the saving to the country would have been
enormous.

Supplies were pushed forward from the Lower Tugela to
the Inyezane, where a fort was constructed (Fort Chelms-
ford); and from the base up to Conference Hill—the
supplies required by Lord Chelmsford before an advance
could be made being two months' with the forces advancing, and one month's at the advance depôts.\textsuperscript{1}

But little further was done through this period of indecision and vacillation, in which plans were made only to be changed, and orders given one day to be countermanded the next. Sickness laid its heavy hand on many a man—exposure and inaction in the first place, then want of proper care and nursing, gradually swelling the death-roll. Before the war, and throughout its course, a body of ladies of Natal were most anxious to place themselves under the orders of the medical staff as nurses for the sick and wounded; but their offers, though repeatedly pressed upon the authorities, were declined.

It was at this period that the following message was telegraphed by Lord Chelmsford to the High Commissioner:

"May 16th, 1879. — General Crealock telegraphs: Messengers from king are at his advanced post. King sues for peace. John Dunn sent to see them. Message as follows: 'White man has made me king, and I am their son. Do they kill the man in the afternoon whom they have made king in the morning? What have I done? I want peace; I ask for peace.' King asks for a black man or white man to return with his messengers to say message delivered rightly. Undwana, one of the messengers, states that he has sent to Dabulamanzi to order him to go to the king. Message had been delivered to him by Undwana, and he ought to have reached king yesterday. All principal chiefs have been sent for to the king. He says army is dispersed. Chiefs have been urging peace on king. General C. has only informed Clifford and Lieutenant-Governor of the above. I have telegraphed back to Crealock: 'Tell messengers I informed king's messenger at Eshowe that any message must be sent to me at Colonel Wood's camp. I am ready to receive any messenger under flag of truce. Tell them something more than words will be required. Supply them with flag of truce; relax no preparations of precautions.'"

\textsuperscript{1} P. P. (C. 2874) p. 115.
Lord Chelmsford continues: "I shall be glad to receive your Excellency's early instructions. I consider the king should not be allowed to remain on the throne, and that the terms of peace should be signed at Ulundi in presence of British force. I shall not make any change in my arrangements in the meantime."—(P. P. [C. 2374] pp. 100, 101.)

To Major-General Marshall belongs the credit of performing the long-neglected duty of revisiting the fatal battle-field of Isandhlwana, and burying as many as possible of those that fell there. With General Newdigate's permission, the Cavalry Brigade under General Marshall made a reconnaissance of the Bashi Valley and Isandhlwana, having moved down to Rorke's Drift for that purpose.

The left column of the brigade proceeded up the Bashi Valley, and moving round the Ingqutu range, joined the right column at Isandhlwana.

The reconnaissance was proposed to include burying the dead, bringing away the waggons, etc.; but an order was received prohibiting touching the 24th, who were to be interred by their own comrades.

The battle-field was a fearful sight—though softened much by the kindly hand of nature. There plainly lay revealed the widely-spread camp (or rather line of camps), the hopeless position in which it was placed; the absolute impossibility, circumstanced as it was, of any result but the sad one we have already chronicled. And there, too, were the evidences of a gallant resistance, and a stand made by men "faithful unto death."

It was well said: "The field of Isandhlwana is beginning to give up its secrets; the mists of fiction are being dispersed by the dry light of fact. It has not been through mere idle curiosity that there has been a desire to know what passed during the final moments of that fatal struggle. There were difficulties to be explained, reputations to be cleared, allegations to be contradicted. There was the desire to know how those who were lost had died. To be sure that they died with their faces to the foe; to be satisfied
that their death was not attended with any excess of cruelty or suffering. And there can be little doubt that it is the very anxiety to be assured of all this that stands responsible for the numerous fictions—as we must now hold them to be—which have been circulated with regard to what passed on that memorable day.”—Natal Witness, 29th May, 1879.

A short description of the spot, taken from that written by Mr. Archibald Forbes, may be of interest: “At the top of the ascent beyond the Bashi we saw, on our left front, rising above the surrounding country, the steep, isolated, and almost inaccessible hill, or rather crag, of Isandhlwana; the contour of its rugged crest strangely resembling a side view of a couchant lion. On the lower neck of the high ground on its right were clearly visible up against the sky-line the abandoned waggons of the destroyed column. Now we crossed the rocky bed of the little stream and were cantering up the slope leading to the crest on which were the waggons, and already tokens of the combat and bootless flight were apparent. The line of retreat towards Fugitives’ Drift, along which, through a gap in the Zulu environment, our unfortunate comrades who thus far survived tried to escape, lay athwart a rocky slope to our right front, with a precipitous ravine at its base. In this ravine dead men lay thick. All the way up the slope could be traced the fitful line of flight. Most of the dead here were 24th men; single bodies and groups where they seemed to have gathered to make a hopeless gallant stand and die. On the edge of a gully was a gun-limber jammed, its horses hanging in their harness down the steep face of the ravine; a little farther on a broken ambulance-waggon, with its team of mules dead in their harness, and around were the bodies of the poor fellows who had been dragged from the intercepted vehicle. Following the trail of bodies through long grass and scattered stores, the crest was reached. Here the dead lay thick, many in the uniform of the Natal Mounted Police. On the bare ground on the crest itself, among the waggons, the dead were less thick; but on the
slope beyond, on which from the crest we looked down, the scene was the saddest, and more full of weird desolation than any I had yet gazed upon. There was none of the horror of a recent battle-field; nothing of all that makes the scene of yesterday's battle so rampantly ghastly shocked the senses. A strange dead calm reigned in this solitude; grain had grown luxuriantly round the waggons, sprouting from the seeds that dropped from the loads, falling on soil fertilized by the life-blood of gallant men. So long in most places had grown the grass that it mercifully shrouded the dead, whom four long months tomorrow we have left unburied. In a patch of long grass, near the right flank of the camp, lay Colonel Durnford's body, a central figure of a knot of brave men who had fought it out around their chief to the bitter end. A stalwart Zulu, covered by his shield, lay at the Colonel's feet. Around him lay fourteen Natal Carbineers and their officer, Lieutenant Scott, with a few Mounted Police (twenty). Clearly they had rallied round Colonel Durnford in a last despairing attempt to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice, when they might have essayed to fly for their horses, who were close by their side at the piquet-line. With this group were about thirty gallant fellows of the 24th. In other places the 24th men were found as if fallen in rallying square, and there were bodies scattered all along the front of the camp.

"The fallen were roughly buried (or rather, covered with stones, there being no tools), except those of the men of the 24th Regiment. These were ordered to be left untouched. General Marshall had nourished a natural and seemly wish to give interment to all the dead who so long had lain at Isandhlwana, but it appeared that the 24th

1 Mr. Mansel, the officer commanding this troop of Natal Mounted Police, says: "When we went out the morning before the fight we left thirty-one men behind, men whose horses had sore backs, etc. These men were in charge of only a corporal. Seven men escaped, and we buried all of the twenty-four that were killed. Twenty were killed just around Colonel Durnford. Three about two hundred yards away, and one at the Fugitives' Drift."
desired to perform the ceremony themselves in presence of both battalions. One has much sympathy with the regiment, but General Marshall offered to convey a burial-party with tools from Rorke's Drift in waggons, and it seemed scarcely right to postpone longer than absolutely necessary what respect for our honoured dead required. Thus, the Zulus, who have carefully buried their own dead, will return to find we visited the place, not to bury our dead, but to remove a batch of waggons!

"In the desolate camp were many sad relics, and the ground was strewn with them and the spoil of the plundered waggons. Scarcely any arms were found, and no ammunition—a few stray rusted bayonets and assegais only were to be seen.

"Teams of horses were hitched on to the soundest of the waggons, till forty fit to travel were collected on the crest, and sent under escort to Rorke's Drift, and meantime scouting-parties had fired the kraals around, but found no Zulus.

"I shall offer few comments on the Isandhlwana position. Had the world been searched for a position offering the easiest facilities for being surprised, none could have been well found to surpass it. The position seems to offer a premium on disaster, and asks to be attacked. In the rear laagered waggons would have discounted its defects; but the camp was more defenceless than an English village. Systematic scouting could alone have justified such a position, and this too clearly cannot have been carried out."—Daily News, 20th June, 1879.

On the 20th, 23rd, and 26th June the burial of the remainder of those who fell at Isandhlwana was completed by a force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Black, 24th Regiment. He carefully noted the signs of the fight, and reported that the bodies of the slain lay thickest in the 1-24th camp, in which 130 dead lay (in two distinct spots), with their officers, Captain Wardell, Lieutenants Dyer, and a captain and a subaltern not recognisable; close to the place where the bodies of Colonels Durnford, Lieutenant Scott, and other Carbineers, and men of the Natal Mounted Police were found. This is described
as being a "centre of resistance," as the bodies of men of all arms were found converging as it were to the spot. About sixty bodies, with those of Captain Younghusband and two other officers, lay in a group high up the Isandhlwana hill, under the southern precipice, as if they had held the crags and fought till ammunition failed. The proofs of hand-to-hand fighting were frequent. The fugitives' track, too, told its tale: "Here and there around a waggon, here and there around a tree, a group had formed and stood at bay; shoulder to shoulder they fired their last cartridge, and shoulder to shoulder they plied the steel; side by side their bones are lying and tell the tale."

Eight hundred yards from the road the guns had come upon ground no wheels could pass, and from here the bodies were more and more apart till, about two miles from camp, the last one lies and marks the limit reached by white men on foot.

The fatal trail again began near the river's bank, where Major Smith, R.A., and others rest, a river's breadth from Natal; across the river it runs until the graves of Melville and Coghill nearly mark its end.

The Standard and Mail of September 16th says: "It is a noticeable fact that Cetywayo declares that his men were completely disheartened by Isandula, and that as a matter of fact he was never able to get them thoroughly together again after that event. He says that a large part of the forces engaged on that occasion were actually retreating when another part made the fatal rush."

Bishop Schreuder, on the 3rd March, says: "The Zulus' version of the Isan'lwana story tells us some most remarkable things with respect to the battle and the effect of it on the Zulus. The Zulus, after having ransacked the camp, bolted off with the booty as fast as they could when the English army was seen returning

1 It is asserted on good authority that the Zulus "felt that Isandhlwana was the turning point of the war, that if the camp guard, without even an ordinary 'isager,' could so nearly withstand their overwhelming numbers, they would not be successful in driving out the white man from their country."
to the camp, even at a great distance. The detachment of the Zulu army, seen, on 23rd of January, by Glyn’s column on its way back to Rorke’s Drift, was a part of the Undi corps and Utako (Udhloko) retreating from the unsuccessful attack on the Commissariat stores at Rorke’s Drift. Among the horsemen was Udabulamanzi, who says that they were so tired, and glad that Glyn’s column did not attack them, for if attacked they would have bolted every one. Comparatively few and inferior oxen were brought to the king, as the izinduna appropriated to themselves the best and most of the captured oxen; Udabulamanzi, for instance, took home twenty good oxen. The Zulus say that the affair at Isandlwana commenced with a victory and ended with a flight, for, as it is the case after a defeat, the whole army did not return to the king, but the soldiers dispersed, making the best of their way with what booty they had got to their respective homes, and to this day they have not reassembled to the king, who is very much displeased with his two generals, Umnklingwayo (Ntshingwayo) and Umavumengwane (Mavumengwana), and other izinduna.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 37).

Some of the Zulu and native accounts of Isandlwana are worth noticing. One says the engagement “lasted till late in the afternoon.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 24.) Another speaks of the fighting when the 24th retired on the tents, and of their ammunition failing. Another (Magwenda, a brother of Cetsawayo) says that the main, or front, and the left flank attack of the Zulu army were beaten and fell back with great loss until the fire of the white troops slackened. The right flank entering the camp, the main body was ordered to renew the attack, which the English were unable to prevent from want of ammunition.

The following “Statement of a Zulu Deserter regarding the Isandlwana Battle” was taken by Mr. Drummond, head-quarter staff:

The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps, about 3000 strong; the Nokwenke Regiment, 2000 strong; the Ngobamakosi
Regiment, including the Uve, about 5000 strong; the Umcityu, about 4000 strong; the Ndwengu, 2000 strong; the Unbonambi, 3000 strong; and the Udholo, about 1000 strong, or a total of about 20,000 men in all, left the military kraal of Ndwengu on the afternoon of the 17th of January. It was first addressed by the King, who said:

"I am sending you out against the whites, who have invaded Zululand and driven away our cattle. You are to go against the column at Rorke's Drift, and drive it back into Natal; and, if the state of the river will allow, follow it up through Natal, right up to the Drakensberg. You will attack by daylight, as there are enough of you to 'eat it up,' and you will march slowly, so as not to tire yourselves."

We accordingly left Ndwengu late in the afternoon, and marched in column to the west bank of the White Umfolosi, about six miles distant, where we bivouacked for the night. Next day we marched to the Isipizi military kraal, about nine miles off, where we slept; and on the 19th we ascended to the table-land near the Isihlunngu hills, a march of about equal duration with that of the day previous. On this day the army, which had hitherto been marching in single column, divided into two, marching parallel to and within sight of each other, that on the left consisting of the Nokenke, Umcityu, and Ndwengu Regiments, under the command of Tyingwayo, the other commanded by Marumungwana. There were a few mounted men belonging to the chief Usirayo, who were made use of as scouts. On the 20th we moved across the open country and slept by the Isipizi hill. We saw a body of mounted white men on this day to our left (a strong reconnaissance was made on the 20th, to the west of the Isipizi hill, which was probably the force here indicated). On the 21st, keeping away to the eastward, we occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed the Isandhlwana hill, distant from us about four miles, and nearly due west of our encampment. We had been well fed during our whole march, our scouts driving in cattle and goats, and on that evening we lit our camp fires as usual. Our scouts also reported to us that they had seen the vedettes of the English force at sunset on some hills west-south-west of us (Lord Chelmsford with some of his staff rode up in this direction, and about this time, and saw some of the mounted enemy). Our order of encampment on the 21st of January was as follows: On the extreme right were the Ndwengu, Nokenke, and Umcityu; the centre was formed by the Ngobamakosi and Mbonambi; and the left, of the Undi Corps and the Udholo Regiment. On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making any attack, on account of a superstition regarding the state of the moon, and we were sitting resting, when firing was heard on our right (the narrator was in the Nokenke Regiment), which we at first imagined was the Ngobamakosi engaged, and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We
were, however, soon told it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people some ten miles away to our left front, and returned to our original position. Just after we had sat down again, a small herd of cattle came past our line from our right, being driven down by some of our scouts, and just when they were opposite to the Umcityu Regiment, a body of mounted men, on the hill to the west, were seen galloping, evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, they perceived the Umcityu, and, dismounting, fired one volley at them and then retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged, an example which was taken up by the Nokenke and Ndwengu on their right, and the Ngobamakosi and Mbomambi on the left, while the Undi Corps and the Udhloklo formed a circle (as is customary in Zulu warfare when a force is about to be engaged) and remained where they were. With the latter were the two commanding officers, Mavunwingana and Tyingwayo, and several of the king's brothers, who with these two corps bore away to the north-west, after a short pause, and keeping on the northern side of the Isandlilana, performed a turning movement on the right without any opposition from the whites, who, from the nature of the ground, could not see them. Thus the original Zulu left became their extreme right, while their right became their centre, and the centre the left. The two regiments which formed the latter, the Ngobamakosi and Mbomambi, made a turning along the front of the camp towards the English right, but became engaged long before they could accomplish it; and the Uve Regiment, a battalion of the Ngobamakosi, was repulsed and had to retire until reinforced by the other battalion, while the Mbomambi suffered very severely from the artillery fire. Meanwhile, the centre, consisting of the Umcityu on the left, centre, and the Nokenke and Ndwengu higher up on the right, under the hill, were making a direct attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely, both from artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone; while the Ndwengu lost least. When we at last carried the camp, our regiments became mixed up; a portion pursued the fugitives down to the Buffalo River, and the remainder plundered the camp; while the Undi and Udhloklo Regiments made the best of their way to Borke's Drift to plunder the post there—in which they failed, and lost very heavily, after fighting all the afternoon and night. We stripped the dead of all their clothes (the dead were only partially stripped). To my knowledge no one was made prisoner, and I saw no dead body carried away or mutilated. If the doctors carried away any dead bodies for the purpose of afterwards doctoring the army, it was done without my knowing of it; nor did I see any prisoner taken and afterwards killed. I was, however, one of the men who followed the refugees down to the Buffalo River and only returned to the English camp late in the afternoon. (This portion of the prisoner's statement was made very reluctantly.) The portion of the army which had remained to plunder the camp did so thoroughly,
carrying off the maize, breadstuffs (sic), and stores of all kinds, and drinking such spirits as were in camp. Many were drunk, and all laden with their booty; and towards sunset the whole force moved back to the encampment of the previous night, hastened by having seen another English force approaching from the south. Next morning the greater part of the men dispersed to their homes with their plunder, a few accompanying the principal officers to the king, and they have not reassembled since.—*The Times*, March 22nd, 1879.

An account, told on the battle-field by a Zulu soldier of the Uve Regiment, says that when the men belonging to the "horns" got to Isandhlwana "they found that the main body or 'breast' of the army had pressed into the British camp, and that the soldiers and remaining Europeans were retiring slowly, fighting, to the 'neck' or pass, where the waggon road or track crosses it. As near as I could make out (says the writer) this must have been about 2 p.m. In this vicinity among the 'dougas' (dry water washes), they must have fought a long time, till at length the Zulus managed to divide them into two bodies, one of which retired slowly, and always fighting up the slopes of Isandhlwana killing many of the enemy. . . . While this body retreated on Isandhlwana, the other party made steadily for a little 'kopje' or hill on the opposite side of the road, probably about a hundred yards from the road and 'neck.' All this time the horns were watching the Taifuba (breast) of the army fight . . . Gradually the English on the kopje got fewer and fewer, though still fighting obstinately, till the Zulus at length, becoming weary, resolved to make an end of them: fresh companies were ordered up from the right 'horn' . . . till finally, but few being left, and when in the act of reloading their guns, the Zulus rushed in, and stabbing them with their assegais, killed them to the last man. . . . All this time the English fought splendidly, never for a moment forgetting what they were about, and keeping steadily to their work.

"The other body of men who retired on Isandhlwana fared in much the same way, having, however, this advantage, that they could not be surrounded, their backs being to the hill, and it was long before the Zulus could close in on them."
One brave man, probably the last survivor of the day, appears to have excited all their admiration. He struggled on and on, retreating higher and higher up the hill, till he reached a small cave or recess in the rocks, into which he crept, and with his gun kept off his enemies. The ground in front of the little cave falls steeply down, and the Zulus, taking advantage of the rocks and stones scattered about, endeavoured, two or three at a time, to approach and shoot him. The soldier, however, was very cool and wary, and invariably shot every Zulu as he appeared; he did not blaze away hurriedly, but loaded quietly, took deliberate aim, and killed a man with every shot; till at last, the Zulus being now very tired, a number of men, good shots, were brought up with guns, who fired simultaneously at the unfortunate man, and so killed him. This lasted far into the afternoon, and 'the shadows were long on the hills' (probably about 5 p.m.) before this man, who my informant said was the last to die, met his fate.

Another account, taken by the interpreter of one of the column commanding officers (a version of which has appeared in the columns of the Army and Navy Gazette of 11th October, 1879, and is described as a 'full and accurate account'), is selected as being corroborated in all main points by survivors of the British force, and by the battlefield itself. It is the story of Uguku, a Zulu belonging to the Kandampemvu (or Umcityu) Regiment, who says: 'We arrived at Ingyutu eight regiments strong (20,000 to 25,000 men) and slept in the valley of a small stream which runs into the Nondweni river to the eastward of Sandhlwana. The regiments were Kandampemvu (or Umcityu), Ngobamakosi, Uve, Nokenke, Umbonambi, Udholoko, Ndwengu (name of military kraal of the Inkulu-tyane Regiment), and Undi (which comprises the Tulwana, Ndhlondhlo, and Indhluyengwe). The army was under the joint command of Mavumengwana, Ntshingwayo, and Sihayo. It was intended that Matshana ka Mondisa was to be in chief command, but he having been a Natal Kafir, the other three were jealous of him, and did not like him to be put over them; they therefore devised a plan of
getting him out of the way on the day of the battle. They accomplished this plan by getting him to go forward with Undwandwe to the Upindo to reconnoitre, and promised to follow. As soon as he had gone they took another road, viz. north of Babanango, while Matshana and Undwandwe went south of it, being accompanied by six amaviyo (companies). It was our intention to have rested for a day in the valley where we arrived the night before the battle, but having on the morning of the battle heard firing of the English advance guard who had engaged Matshana's men, and it being reported that the Ngobamakosi were engaged, we went up from the valley to the top of Ingqutu, which was between us and the camp; we then found that the Ngobamakosi were not engaged, but were quietly encamped lower down the valley. We saw a body of horse coming up the hill towards us from the Sandhlanwa side. We opened fire on them, and then the whole of our army rose and came up the hill. The enemy returned our fire, but retired down the hill, leaving one dead man (a black) and a horse on the field. The Uve and Ngobamakosi then became engaged on our left with the enemy's skirmishers, and soon afterwards we were all engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy. We were not checked by them" (i.e. stopped), "but continued our march on the camp until the artillery opened upon us. The first shell took effect in the ranks of my regiment, just above the kraal of Baza. The Nokenke then ran out in the shape of a horn towards the kraal of Nyenzani on the road between Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift. The engagement now became very hot between the Mangwane (mounted natives) and us, the Mangwane being supported by the infantry, who were some distance in their rear. We were now falling very fast. The Mangwane had put their horses in a donga, and were firing away at us on foot. We shouted 'Izulu!' ('The Heavens!') and made for the donga, driving out the Mangwane towards the camp. The infantry then opened fire on us, and their fire was so hot, that those of

1 Properly Usutu—the Zulu battle cry.
us who were not in the donga retired back over the hill. It was then that the Nokenke and Nodwengu regiments ran out towards Nyenzani's kraal. We then shouted 'Izulu!' again, and got up out of the dongas. The soldiers opened fire on us again, and we lay down. We then got up again, and the whole of my regiment charged the infantry, who formed into two separate parties—one party standing four deep with their backs towards Sandhlwana, the other standing about fifty yards from the camp in like formation. We were checked by the fire of the soldiers standing near Sandhlwana, but charged on towards those standing in front of the camp, in spite of a very heavy fire on our right flank from those by Sandhlwana. As we got nearer we saw the soldiers were beginning to fall from the effects of our fire. On our left we were supported by the Ubonambi, half the Undi, Ngobamakosi, and Uva. Behind us were the other half of the Undi and Udhloko, who never came into action at Sandhlwana, but formed the reserve (which passed on and attacked Rorke's Drift). As we rushed on the soldiers retired on the camp, fighting all the way, and as they got into the camp we were intermingled with them. It was a disputed point as to which of the following regiments was the first in the English camp, viz.; Undi, Kandampenuv, Ngobamakosi, and Ubonambi; but it was eventually decided that the Ubonambi was the first, followed by Undi.

"One party of soldiers came out from among the tents and formed up a little above the ammunition-waggons. They held their ground there until their ammunition failed them, when they were nearly all assegaiied. Those that were not killed at this place formed again in a solid square in the neck of Sandhlwana. They were completely surrounded on all sides, and stood back to back, and surrounding some men who were in the centre. Their ammunition was now done, except that they had some revolvers which they fired at us at close quarters. We were quite unable to break their square until we had killed a great many of them by throwing our assegais at
short distances. We eventually overcame them in this way.”

When all we have narrated was known in Natal, the question was asked in the public prints: “Who in the light of these recently-discovered facts, were the real heroes of that day? Surely the two officers who commanded in that narrow pass at the rear of the camp. . . . Surely, too, no smaller heroism was that of the fourteen carbiniers. . . . who, mere boys as they were, gave their lives away in order to afford their comrades-in-arms a chance of retreat. . . . Any one of these men might have had a chance for his life, had he chosen to follow the example set by so many. They remained, however, and they died, and only after four months of doubt, contradiction, and despatch-writing, is it made known to the world who they were who have most deserved the coveted decoration ‘For Valour.’”

“The dead shall live, the living die!” Never was this well-known line of Dryden’s more strikingly illustrated than by the events of the past fortnight,” writes The Natal Witness of June 7th, 1879. “‘The dead shall live,’ the mists of doubt, overclouding many a reputa-

1 The above is corroborated on all main points by Mehlokazulu, son of Sihayo, who states that he was sent with three other Indunas (mounted), on the morning of the 22nd, to see what the English were doing. On reporting to Nthingwayo, he said, “All right, we will see what they are going to do.” “Presently,” says Mehlokazulu, “I heard Nthingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngayza (Umgqikaz) regiments to assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” He says the soldiers were at first “in loose order,” but afterwards he saw them “massing together,” when “they fired at a fearful rate.” When the Zulus broke the infantry and closed in, they “came on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men,” about one hundred, who “made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols and others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word ‘Fire!’ given by someone. But we proved too many for them, and killed them all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men, and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache (Colonel Durnford, R.E.), surrounded by dead carbiniers, soldiers, and other men whom I did not know.”—Vide R. E. Journal, Feb. 1880.
tion, have been cleared up by a visit to the now sacred field of Isandhlwana.

"'The living die:' the hopes of a large party in an European nation have been extinguished by the assegais of a mere handful of savages." (The allusion is to the death of the Prince Imperial of France.) "The two events stand side by side in startling contrast, and suggest thoughts which even the wisest might with advantage ponder. Turn, for instance, to the story of the field of Isandhlwana, as now told in plain though interrupted and awful characters by the remains found resting near the 'neck.' Could it have been guessed that, while human recollection and human intelligence failed so utterly to convey to the world a history of the events of that too memorable day, Nature herself would have taken the matter in hand, and told us such a story as no one who hears it will ever forget? Four months, all but a day, had elapsed since the defenders of the field stood facing the Zulu myriads—four months of rain and sun, of the hovering of slow-sailing birds of prey, and of the predatory visits, as it might well be deemed, of unregarding enemies. Four months! and during all that time, while the world was ringing from one end to the other with the news of a terrible disaster, while reinforcements were crowding on to our shores, and special correspondents were flooding the telegraph-wires with the last new thing, all through those four months the dead slept quietly on, waiting almost consciously, as one might think, for the revelation which was to establish their fame, and, where necessary, relieve their unjustly sullied reputation. For four months was there a sleep of honour slept upon that bitter field—a sleep unbroken by any of the noise of the war that rolled both to southward and to northward. The defeat of Indhlobane had been suffered; the victory of Kambula had been gained; the defenders of Rorke's Drift had been rewarded, at least with a nation's praise; the imprisoned column had been released from Eshowe; all the roads in Natal had rung to the tread of men and the rolling of waggon-wheels, as the force which was to 'wipe out' the disaster of Isandhlwana moved up