the step which you have thought it right to take in your communication to the Zulu king of the 8th December last, the Government of the Transvaal is placed at a disadvantage, and that the longer action on your part is delayed, the greater that disadvantage grows. It follows, therefore, that any action in the direction of your proposition is better than no action at all; and I was urged to beg your Excellency to take some step in the matter without delay.

Accordingly Sir Henry at once sends a message to Cetshwayo, suggesting the observance of a "neutral belt," pending the settlement of the boundary question (2079, p. 132), and mentioning the two lines, from point to point, which he proposed for the purpose.

The same suggestion was made of course to Sir T. Shepstone, who replies as follows: "You have rightly assumed the concurrence of this Government, and I trust that Cetshwayo will see in your message the necessity that is laid upon him to prove that he was sincere in asking you to undertake the inquiry."

This ready acquiescence is fully accounted for by the fact, shortly apparent, that both the lines mentioned by Sir Henry, between which neutrality should be observed, were within what was claimed by the Zulus as their own country, and Sir T. Shepstone says: "At present the belt of country indicated is occupied solely by Zulus. The whole of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, but has not been occupied by them."

Small wonder that the Zulu king, in reply to this proposal, "informs the Governor of Natal that the two roads mentioned in His Excellency's message are both in Zululand, and therefore the king cannot see how the ground between the roads can belong to both parties."

Nevertheless Sir Henry Bulwer hardly seems to fall in with Sir T. Shepstone's suggestion, that Cetshwayo's consent on this point should be looked upon as a test of his sincerity: "Either," he says (2100, p. 73), "he has misunderstood the real nature of the proposal, or he is disinclined to accept anything which may in his opinion
be taken to signify a withdrawal of one iota of his claim." And, in point of fact, though no "neutral ground" was marked off, the Commission went on just as well without it; all the apprehensions of disturbance and disorder having been falsified by the event.

Sir T. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of the border Boers having been forced by Zulu acts and threats of aggression to abandon their farms and go into laager, &c. &c.; but, on investigation, it is apparent that this abandonment of farms, and trecking into laager, took place in consequence of an intimation from the Landrost of Utrecht, under instructions from Sir T. Shepstone himself; as appears from the following passages of an address from seventy-nine Boers, protesting against arbitration as an "absurdity and an impossibility," which was presented to Sir T. Shepstone on February 2nd, 1878 (2079, p. 140):

"The undersigned burgheers, &c. . . . take the liberty to bring to your Excellency's notice that they, in consequence of intimation from the Landrost of Utrecht, dated 14th December last, on your Excellency's instructions, partly trekked into laager, and partly deserted their farms, in the firm expectation that now a beginning of a war would soon be made. . . . That they have heard with anxiety and understand that arbitration is spoken of, which would have to determine our property and possessions; which we fear will decide in favour of a crowned robber, murderer, and breaker of his word, who knows as well as we that he is claiming a thing which does not belong to him . . . . for which reason we are sure that such arbitration is an absurdity and an impossibility. We therefore hereby protest against all proposed or to be undertaken arbitration; and we will, with all legal means at our disposal, &c., resist a decision, &c., over our property which we know would be unlawful and unjust."

They give as a reason for presenting the address from which these phrases are taken, "because it is impossible for us to remain any longer in laager without any object," which hardly looks as though they thought themselves in daily danger from the Zulus, unless the "beginning of a war"
should "soon be made" by Sir T. Shepstone. They request His Excellency "to commence without any further delay defending" their "rights and property and lives;" and should His Excellency "not be inclined or be without power" to do so, they further signify their intention of requesting him to assist them with ammunition, and not to hinder them seeking assistance of fellow-countrymen and friends to maintain their "rights," and to check their "rapacious enemies and to punish them."

And they conclude: "We, the undersigned, bind ourselves on peril of our honour to assist in subduing the Zulu nation, and making it harmless."

Sir T. Shepstone incloses this in a sympathising despatch, but Sir Henry Bulwer remarks upon it and upon a subsequent memorial\(^1\) of the same description—February 23rd (2100, p. 67):

"Of course, if the object of the memorialists is war, if what they desire is a war with the Zulu nation, it is not to be wondered at that they should find fault with any steps that have been taken to prevent the necessity for war. Nor, if they desire war, is it to be expected that they should be favourable to arbitration, though I find it difficult to reconcile the expression of the memorialists that arbitration would decide against them, with the unanimous expression of opinion, previously given to your Excellency by some of the leading men of the district, that the proposal made by me was a Christian, humane, and admirable one; that they had no misgivings regarding the justice of the claim of the State, and that they believed the more it was investigated . . . the clearer and more rightful would that claim prove itself to be. Your Excellency observes that the deep feeling of distrust shown by the memorialists is scarcely to be wondered at, when it is remembered that they are compelled to occupy with their families fortified camps, while their farms in the neighbourhood are being occupied by Zulus, their crops reaped, and their cultivated lands tilled by Zulus, and the timber of their houses used as Zulu firewood.

\(^1\) 2144, p. 191.
"I do not quite understand what farms and cultivated lands are referred to; because in a previous despatch—your despatch, No. 7, of February 5th—your Excellency, in referring to the disputed territory, states, so I understand, that it 'is at present occupied solely by Zulus,' and that, 'although the whole of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, it has not been occupied by them.'"

The matter was referred to the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, and the appointment of a Commission was approved by him. He plainly took it for granted that, as Sir T. Shepstone had said, the Transvaal claim was based on "evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear," and looked to the Commission for the double advantage of enabling Sir T. Shepstone "to clear up or put on record, in a form calculated to satisfy Her Majesty's Government, an answer to all doubts as to the facts and equity of the question," and of gaining time for preparing a military force to silence and subjugate the Zulus should they object (as he expected) to such an award. That nothing short of military coercion of the Zulus would settle the matter was evidently Sir Bartle Frere's fixed idea; in fact, that was the foregone conclusion with him from beginning to end.

On February 12th Sir Henry Bulwer sent a message to Cetshwayo (2079, p. 140), to this effect:

"The Lieut.-Governor now sends to let Cetshwayo know that he has selected, for the purpose of holding this inquiry, the Queen's Attorney-General in Natal (Hon. M. H. Gallwey, Esq.), the Secretary for Native Affairs (Hon. J. W. Shepstone, Esq.), and Colonel Durnford, an officer in the Queen's army.

"These gentlemen will proceed by and by to the place known as Rorke's Drift, which is on the Buffalo River, and in Natal territory, and they will there open the inquiry on Thursday, March 7th.

"The Lieut.-Governor proposes, as the most convenient course to be taken, that the Zulu king should appoint two or three indunas to represent the Zulu king and the Zulu
case at the inquiry, and that these should be at Rorke's Drift on March 7th, and meet the Natal Commissioners there. The same thing also the Governor proposes shall be done by the Transvaal Government." And the king's reply to the messengers was expressive: "I am very glad to hear what you say—I shall now be able to sleep."

On March 7th the Commission met at Rorke's Drift, and sat for about five weeks, taking evidence day by day in presence of the representatives deputed, three by the Transvaal Government, and three by the Zulus.

Of the three gentlemen who formed the Commission, one was Sir T. Shepstone's brother, already mentioned in this history, whose natural bias would therefore certainly not be upon the Zulu side of the question; another was a Government official and an acute lawyer; and the third, Colonel Durnford, to the writer's personal knowledge, entered upon the subject with an entirely unbiased mind, and with but one intention or desire, that of discovering the actual truth, whatever it might be. The only thing by which his expectations—rather than his opinions—were in the least influenced beforehand, was the natural supposition, shared by all, that Sir T. Shepstone, who had the reputation of being in his public capacity one of the most cautious of men, must have some strong grounds for his very positive statement of the Transvaal claim.

There was, plainly, some slight confusion in the minds of the three Transvaal delegates as to their position relative to the Commissioners, with whom they apparently expected to be on equal terms, and in a different position altogether from the Zulu delegates on the other side. This, however, was a manifest mistake. It was particularly desirable that the Zulus should be made to feel that it was no case of white against black; but a matter in which impartial judges treated either side with equal fairness; and without respect of persons. One of the Commissioners was the brother of their chief opponent, one of the Transvaal delegates his son; it would naturally have seemed to the Zulus that the six white men (five out of whom were either Englishmen, or claimed to be such)
The Boundary Commission.

were combining together to outwit them, had they seen them, evidently on terms of friendship, seated together at the inquiry or talking amongst themselves in their own language.

The Commissioners, however, were careful to avoid this mistake. Finding, on their arrival at Rorke's Drift, that the spot intended for their encampment was already occupied by the Transvaal delegates, who had arrived before them, they caused their own tents to be pitched at some little distance, in order to keep the two apart. The same system was carried out during the sitting of the Court, at which the Commissioners occupied a central position at a table by themselves, the Transvaal delegates being placed at a smaller table on one hand, mats being spread for the Zulu delegates, in a like position, on the other.¹

Care was also necessary to prevent any possible altercations arising between the Boer and Zulu attendants of either party of delegates, who, in fact, formed the one real element of danger in the affair. On one occasion, during the sitting of the Commission, Colonel Durnford observed a Boer poking at a Zulu with his stick, in a manner calculated to bring to the surface some of the feelings of intense irritation common to both sides, and only kept under control by the presence of the Commissioners. The Colonel at once put a stop to this, and placing a sentry between the two parties, with orders to insist on either keeping to its own side of the ground, no further disturbance took place. Popular rumour, of course, greatly exaggerated the danger of the situation, catching as usual at the opportunity for fresh accusations against the Zulu king, who, it was once reported from Durban, had sent an impi to Rorke's Drift, and had massacred the Commissioners and all upon the spot. Fortunately the same day that brought this report to Pietermaritzburg, brought also letters direct

¹ The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience of a table and chairs; they had no "documents" to lay upon the former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that "Only Englishmen and chickens sit upon perches." The mats provided for them were, therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the other delegates.
from the Commissioners themselves, of a later date than the supposed massacre, and in which the Zulus were spoken of as "perfectly quiet."

That the impartial conduct of the Commissioners had the desired effect is manifest from Cetshwayo’s words, spoken after the conclusion of the inquiry, but before its result had been made known to him. His messengers, after thanking Sir Henry Bulwer in the name of their king and people for appointing the Commission, said that "Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are perfectly satisfied with the way in which the inquiry was conducted throughout—the way in which everything went on from day to day in proper order, and without the least misunderstanding; but that each party understood the subject that was being talked about.

"Cetshwayo says," they continued, "he now sees that he is a child of this Government, that the desire of this Government is to do him justice. . . ."

"Cetshwayo and the Zulu people are awaiting with beating hearts what the Lieut.-Governor will decide about the land that the Boers have given the Zulus so much trouble about; for the Zulus wish very much now to re-occupy the land they never parted with, as it is now the proper season (of the year) for doing so."

Such was Cetshwayo’s frame of mind (even before he knew that the decision was in his favour) at a time when he was popularly represented as being in an aggressive, turbulent condition, preparing to try his strength against us, and only waiting his opportunity to let loose upon Natal the "war-cloud" which he was supposed to keep "hovering on our borders."

The boundary question resolved itself into this:

1. To whom did the land in dispute belong in the first instance?
2. Was it ever ceded or sold by the original possessors?

1. In answer to the first question the Commissioners took the treaty made in 1843 between the English and the Zulus as a standpoint fixing a period when the territory in dispute belonged entirely to one or other.
There was then no question but that the Zulu country extended over the whole of it.

2. The Zulus deny ever having relinquished any part of their country to the Boers, who on the other hand assert that formal cessions had been made to them of considerable districts. With the latter rested the obligation of proving their assertions, which were simply denied by the Zulus, who accordingly, as they said themselves, "had no witnesses to call," having received no authority from the king to do more than point out the boundary claimed\(^1\) (2242, p. 80).

The Boer delegates brought various documents, from which they professed to prove the truth of their assertions, but which were decided by the Commissioners to be wholly worthless, from the glaring discrepancies and palpable falsehoods which they contained. One of these documents, dated March 16th, 1861, "purporting to give an account of a meeting between Sir T. Shepstone, Panda, and Cetshwayo," they decided to be plainly a fabrication, as Sir T. Shepstone did not arrive at Nodwengu,\(^2\) from Natal, to meet Panda and Cetshwayo, until May 9th, 1861.

Other records of cessions of land professed to be signed by the king, but were witnessed by neither Boer nor Zulu, or else by Boers alone. A definition of boundaries was in one case ratified by one Zulu only, a man of no rank or importance; and in other documents alterations were made and dates inserted clearly at another time.

Meanwhile it was apparent, from authentic Boer official papers, that the Zulus were threatened by the Boer Government that if they dared to complain again to the British Government the South African Republic "would deal severely with them, and that they would also endanger their lives;" while such expressions used by

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\(^1\) Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State the above despatch, "informing me of the incomplete result, in consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo's representatives at the Commission of Inquiry."

\(^2\) The king's kraal at that time.
the Volksraad of the South African Republic as the following, when they resolve "to direct the Government to continue in the course it had adopted with reference to the policy on the eastern frontier, with such caution as the Volksraad expects from the Government with confidence; and in this matter to give it the right to take such steps as will more fully benefit the interests of the population than the strict words of the law of the country lay down" (2220, p. 337), convicts them of dishonesty out of their own mouths.

Finally the Commissioners report that in their judgment, east of the Buffalo "there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu kings, past or present, or by the nation."

They consider however that—as the Utrecht district has long been inhabited by Boers, who have laid out the site for a town, and built upon it, and as the Zulu nation had virtually acquiesced in the Boer authority over it by treating with them for the rendition of fugitives who had taken refuge there—the Transvaal should be allowed to retain that portion of the land in dispute, compensation being given to the Zulus inhabiting that district if they surrendered the lands occupied by them and returned to Zululand, or permission being given them to become British subjects and to continue to occupy the land.

Sir Bartle Frere's version of this is as follows:

"The Commissioners propose to divide the area in dispute between the Blood River and the Pongolo, giving to neither party the whole of its claim." He then quotes the recommendation of the Commissioners, that compensation should be given to Zulus leaving the Utrecht district, and wants to know what is to be done for the farmers who "in good faith, and relying on the right and power of the Transvaal Government to protect them, had settled for many years past on the tract which the Commission proposes to assign to the Zulus." He wishes to know how they are to be placed on an equality with the Zulus from the Utrecht district. To this Sir Henry Bulwer ably replies by pointing out that compensation
to the said farmers lies with their own Government, by whose sanction or permission they had occupied land over which that Government had no power by right. In fact, far from "dividing the area in dispute," and giving half to either party on equal terms, the reservation of the Utrecht district was rather an unavoidable concession to the Boers who had long had actual possession of it—which, with due compensation, the Zulus would have been ready enough to make, while receiving back so much of their own land—than an acknowledgment that they could make good their original claim to it. The Commissioners indeed say distinctly "there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu king, past or present, or by the nation."

But indeed, after the decision in favour of the Zulus was given, Sir Bartle Frere entirely changed the complacent tone in which he had spoken of the Commission beforehand. To all appearance his careful schemes for subjugating the Zulu nation were thrown away—the war and the South African empire were on the point of eluding his grasp. He had sent to England for reinforcements—in direct opposition to the home policy, which for some years had been gradually teaching the colonies to depend upon themselves for protection, and therefore to refrain from rushing headlong into needless and dangerous wars, which might be avoided by a little exercise of tact and forbearance. He and his friend General Theisner had laid out their campaign and had sent men-of-war to investigate the landing capabilities of the Zulu coast, and he had recommended Sir Henry Bulwer to inform the Zulu king—when the latter expressed his disquietude on the subject of these men-of-war—that the ships he saw were "for the most part English merchant vessels, but that the war-vessels of the English Government are quite sufficient to protect his (Cetshwayo's) coast from any descent by any other power" (October 6th, 1878; C 2220, p. 307).

Sir Henry Bulwer was too honest to carry out this recommendation, even had he not had the sense to know that Cetshwayo was accustomed to the passing of
merchantmen, and was not to be thus taken in (supposing him to be likely to fear attacks from "foreign foes"). But the fact remains that an English official of Sir Bartle Frere's rank has put on record, in an official despatch under his own hand, a deliberate proposal that the Zulu king should be tranquillised and his well-founded suspicions allayed by—a "figure of speech," shall we say?

Every possible objection was made by Sir Bartle Frere to the decision of the Commissioners, and it was with the utmost difficulty that he was at last persuaded to ratify it, after a considerable period employed in preparing for a campaign, the idea of which he appears never for a minute to have relinquished. Sir T. Shepstone protested against the decision, which, however, Sir Henry Bulwer upheld; while Sir Bartle Frere finally decides that "Sir H. Bulwer and I, approaching the question by somewhat different roads, agree in the conclusion that we must accept the Commissioners' verdict." Their report was made on June 20th, 1873, but it was not until November 16th that Sir H. Bulwer sent to Cetshwayo to say that "the Lieut.-Governor is now in a position to inform Cetshwayo that His Excellency the High Commissioner has pronounced his award, &c.," and to fix twenty days from the date of the departure of the messengers carrying this message from Pietermaritzburg, as a convenient time for a meeting on the borders of the two countries at the Lower Tugela drift, at which the decision should be delivered to the king's indunas by officers of the Government appointed for the purpose.

But before this conclusion was arrived at another attempt had been made to bring accusations against Cetshwayo, who said himself at the time (June 27th, 1878): "The name of Cetshwayo is always used amongst the Boers as being the first to wish to quarrel." Alarming accounts reached the Natal Government of a fresh military kraal having been built by the king, and notices to quit being served by him upon Boers within the disputed territory, in spite of his engagement to await the decision of the Commissioners. The farmers complained
of being obliged to fly, "leaving homes, homesteads, and improvements to be destroyed by a savage, unbriddled, revengeful nation." Sir T. Shepstone re-echoed their complaint (2220, p. 27), and Sir Bartle Frere comments severely upon the alleged Zulu aggressions.

The matter, however, when sifted, sinks into insignificance. Some squabbles had taken place between individual Boers and Zulus, such as were only natural in the unsettled state of things; and Cetshwayo's explanation of the so-called "notices to quit" placed them in a very different light.

Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere as follows on this point (July 16th): "The Zulu king says that all the message he sent was a request that the Boers should be warned not to return to the disputed country, as he was informed they were doing since the meeting of the Commission. We know that some of the Boers did return to the disputed territory after the Commission broke up; and this, no doubt, was looked upon by the Zulus as an attempt on the part of the Boers to anticipate the result of the inquiry, and led to the giving those notices. . . . The fault has been, no doubt, on both sides."

The military kraal, also, turned out to be no more of the nature ascribed to it than was its predecessor: "An ordinary private Zulu kraal"—see report of Mr. Rudolph (2144, p. 186)—"built simply to have a kraal in that locality, where many of Cetshwayo's people are residing without a head or kraal representing the king . . . . the king having given instructions that neither the white nor the native subjects of the Transvaal were in any way to be molested or disturbed by the Zulus;" and having sent a small force to do the work, because the large one he had

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1 The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of the war nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these farms, killed by this "savage, unbriddled, revengeful nation," before the war began.

2 Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone's orders, as the following phrases appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 26th, 1874: "The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency, left their farms, and after having remained in them for nearly five months, we are to go and live on our farms again."

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sent on a previous occasion had frightened the white people.

Colonel Pearson, commanding the troops in Natal and the Transvaal, writes, June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 236):

"The Landroost of Utrecht I know to be somewhat of an alarmist, and the border farmers have all along been in a great fright, and much given to false reports. I allude more particularly to the Boers. I inclose Lieut.-Colonel Durnford's views of the kraal question. He is an officer who knows South Africa intimately, and his opinion I consider always sound and intelligent."

And the following is the statement of Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., June 8th, 1878 (2144, p. 237):

"I know the district referred to, in which are many Zulu kraals, and believe that, if such a military kraal is in course of erection on the farm of one Kohrs, believed to be a field-cornet in the Wakkerstroom district, residing about fifteen miles from the mission station of the Rev. Mr. Meyer, it is being constructed that order may be kept amongst the Zulus here residing—who owe allegiance to the Zulu king alone—and in the interests of peace... I further believe that, if the German or other residents at or near Lüneburg have been ordered to leave, it is not by orders of the king of Zululand, who is far too wise a man to make a false move at present, when the boundary between himself and the Transvaal is under consideration."

The excitement concerning the "notices to quit," and the second "military kraal," appears to have been as unnecessary as any other imaginary Zulu scare; and there are no proofs to be extracted from the official papers at this period of the slightest signs of aggressive temper on the part of the Zulu king.

On the contrary; if we turn to the "Message from Cetywayo, King of the Zulus, to his Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal," dated November 10th, 1878, we find the concluding paragraph runs: "Cetywayo hereby swears, in the presence of Ōham, Mnyamana, Tashingwayo, and all his other chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the English."—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 16.)
CHAPTER XI.

SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND.

Much has been said of late years concerning the duty imposed by our superior civilisation upon us English, in our dealings with the South African races, of checking amongst the latter such cruel and savage practices as are abhorrent to Christian ideas and practices. We will proceed to show how this duty has been performed by the Government of Natal.

One of the commonest accusations brought against the Zulus, and perhaps the most effectual in rousing English indignation and disgust, is that of buying and selling women as wives, and the cruel treatment of young girls who refuse to be thus purchased.

Without entering into the subject upon its merits, or inquiring how many French and English girls yearly are, to all intents and purposes, sold in marriage, and what amount of moral pressure is brought to bear upon the reluctant or rebellious amongst them; or whether they suffer more or less under the infliction than their wild sisters in Zululand do under physical correction;—we may observe that the terrors of the Zulu system have been very much exaggerated. That cruel and tyrannical things have occasionally been done under it no one will deny, still less that every effort should have been made by us to introduce a better one. Amongst the Zulus, both in their own country and in Natal, marriages are commonly arranged by the parents, and the young people are expected to submit, as they would be in civilised France. But the
instance which came most directly under the present writer’s own observation, is one rather tending to prove that the custom is one which although occasionally bearing hardly upon individuals, has been too long the practice of the people, and to which they have always been brought up, to be looked upon by them as a crying evil, calling for armed intervention on the part of England. In the early days of missionary work at Bishopstowe (between 1856-60), five girls took refuge at the station within a few days of each other, in order to avoid marriages arranged for them by their parents, and objected to by them. They dreaded pretty forcible coercion, although of course, in Natal, they could not actually be put to death. They were, of course, received and protected at Bishopstowe, clothed, and put to school, and there they might have remained in safety for any length of time, or until they could return home on their own terms. But the restraint of the civilised habits imposed on them, however gently, and the obligation of learning to read, sew, and sweep, &c., was too much for these wild young damsels, accustomed at home to a free and idle life. Within a few weeks they all elected to return home and marry the very men on whose account they had fled; and the conclusion finally arrived at concerning them was, that their escape was rather for the sake of attaching a little additional importance to the surrender of their freedom, than from any real objection to the marriages proposed for them.

Now let us see what means had been taken by the English to institute a better state of things and greater liberty for women. In Natal itself, of course, any serious act of violence committed to induce a girl to marry would be punished by law, and girls in fear of such violence could usually appeal for protection to the magistrates or missionaries. Let us suppose that a girl, making such an appeal, receives protection, and is married to the man of her

1 The married women work in the beanies-gardens, &c., and the little girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care.
own choice by English law and with Christian rites. What is the consequence to her? She has no rights as a wife, in fact she is not lawfully a wife at all, nor have her children any legal claims upon their father; the law of the colony protects the rights of native women married by native custom, which it virtually encourages by giving no protection at all to those who contract marriages by the English, or civilised system.¹

So much for our dealings with the Zulus of Natal; and even less can be said for us concerning those over the border.

Until quite lately the practice existed in the colony of surrendering to Zulu demands. refugee women, as well as cattle, as “property,” under an order from the Natal Government, which was in force at the time of Sir H. Bulwer’s arrival, but was at some time after rescinded.²

It was well known that, by the laws of Zululand, the offence of a woman’s escaping from her husband with another man was punishable by death; therefore unhappy creatures thus situated were delivered up by the Natal Government to certain death, and this practice had been continued through a course of many years.

The law being altered in this respect, and cattle only returned, Sir H. Bulwer writes, on February 3rd, 1877: “Some few weeks ago I had occasion to send a message to Cetywayo on account of the forcible removal from Natal territory of a Zulu girl, who had lately taken refuge in it from the Zulu country. A party of Zulus had crossed the Tugela River in pursuit, and taken the girl by force back to Zululand. I therefore sent to inform Cetywayo of this lawless act on the part of some of his subjects” (1776

¹ This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a marriage tax upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax.

² Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the cattle of Zulu refugees, . . . . the refugees themselves are not given up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the Zulus.
pp. 86, 87); and Cetshwayo replies with thanks, saying that he knew nothing previously of what had happened, and that "should anything of the same kind take place to-morrow he (the Governor of Natal) must still open my ears with what is done by my people."

This is apparently all. There is no attempt to make a serious national matter of it; no demand for the surrender of the offenders, nor for the payment of a fine. Nor is there even a warning that any future occurrence of the same description will be viewed in a more severe light. Sir Henry "informs" Cetshwayo of what has taken place, and Cetshwayo politely acknowledges the information, and that the action taken by his people deserves censure. "I do not send and take by force," he says; "why should my people do so? It is not right."

Eighteen months later, on July 28th, 1878, a similar case was reported. A wife of the chief Sihayo had left him and escaped into Natal. She was followed by a party of Zulus, under Mehlokazulu, the chief son of Sihayo, and his brother, seized at the kraal where she had taken refuge, and carried back to Zululand, where she was put to death, in accordance with Zulu law.

The Zulus who seized her did no harm to Natal people or property; in fact their only fault towards England was that of following and seizing her on Natal soil, a fault which would seem less serious in their eyes from the fact that, until quite lately, such fugitives would have been given up to them by the border Government officials. A week later the same young men, with two other brothers and an uncle, captured in like manner another refugee wife of Sihayo, in the company of the young man with whom she had fled. This woman was also carried back, and is supposed to have been put to death likewise; the young man with her, although guilty in Zulu eyes of a most heinous crime, punishable with death, was safe from them on English soil—they did not touch him. But by our own practice for years past, of surrendering female refugees as property, we had taught the Zulus that we regarded women as cattle.
SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES. 167

While fully acknowledging the savagery of the young men's actions, and the necessity of putting a stop to such for the future, it must be conceded that, having so long countenanced the like, we should have given fair notice that, for the future, it would be an act of aggression on us for a refugee of either sex to be followed into our territory, before proceeding to stronger measures.

Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, though taking a decided view of the young men's offence, plainly understood that it was an individual fault, and not a political action for the performance of which the king was responsible. "There is no reason whatsoever as yet to believe that these acts have been committed with the consent or knowledge of the king,"¹ he says (2220, p. 125), and his message to Cetshwayo merely requests that he will send in the ringleaders of the party to be tried by the law of the colony.

On a previous occasion the king had, of his own accord, sent a Zulu named Jolwana to the Natal Government to be punished by it for the murder of a white man in the Zulu country. Jolwana was returned upon his hands with the message that he could not be tried in Natal as he was a Zulu subject. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural that Cetshwayo should have taken the opportunity, apparently offered by the use of the word request, of substituting some other method of apology for the offence committed than that of delivering up the young men, who, Sir Henry Bulwer says, he was afraid would be "sjambokked" (flogged).

Cetshwayo's first answer is merely one acknowledging the message, and regretting the truth of the accusation brought by it. He allows that the young men deserve punishment, and he engages to send indunas of his own to the Natal Government on the subject; but he deprecates

¹ And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: "I do not hold the king responsible for the commission of the act, because there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it."
the matter being looked upon in a more serious light than as the "act of rash boys," who in their zeal for their father's house (i.e. honour) did not think what they were doing.

About this date, August, 1878, when all sorts of wild reports were flying about, in and out of official documents, relative to Cetshwayo's supposed warlike preparations, he had ordered that none of his people should carry arms on pain of death.

This was in consequence of a circumstance which had occurred some months before (January, 1878), when during the Umkosi, or feast of first-fruits, a great Zulu gathering which annually takes place at the king's kraal, two of the regiments fell out, and finally came to blows, resulting in the death of some men on either side. Sir B. Frere says in his correspondence with the Bishop (p. 4), that many hundred men were killed on this occasion; but Mr. F. Colenso, who happened to be there a few days after the fight, heard from a white man, who had helped to remove the dead, that about fifty were killed. In consequence of this, "an order had gone forth, forbidding native Zulus, when travelling, to carry arms, nothing but switches being allowed. A fire took place, which burned the grass over Panda's grave,¹ and the doctors declared that the spirits of Dingane and Chaka had stated that they view with surprise and disgust the conduct of the Zulus at the present day in fighting when called before their king; that this was the reason Panda's grave was burned; and such things would continue until they learned to be peaceful among themselves, and wait until they are attacked by other natives before spilling blood."²

¹ Since riled by our troops, and the bones of the old king are supposed to have been brought over to England.
² In June 1878—just after the Missionaries, acting on Sir T. Shepstone's advice, had quitted Zululand, but before the raid of Sihayo's son had occurred.—Cetshwayo sent Mr. John Dunn to Mr. Escombe (a leading member of the Natal Bar, and now a member both of the Executive and Legislative Councils, and who had assisted at the installation of Cetshwayo in 1873), with a message to this effect:—"Tell Mr. Escombe that, in consequence of various rumours and reports that have reached me from Natal, I begin to be uneasy, and afraid of getting into trouble with the
Cetshwayo's next message, September 9th (2260, p. 32), after he had inquired into the matter of Sihayo's sons, acknowledges again that they had done wrong, but observes that he was glad to find that they had hurt no one belonging to the English. What they had done was done without his knowledge. The request of the Natal Government concerning the surrender of the offenders, he said, should be laid before the great men of the Zulu people, to be decided upon by them; he could not do it alone.

He finally, with full and courteous apologies in the same tone, begs that the Natal Government will accept, instead of the persons of the young men, a fine of fifty pounds, which he sent down by his messengers, but which was promptly refused. Sir Henry Bulwer appears to have been inclined to allow of the substitution of a larger fine for the surrender of the culprits (2222, p. 173); but Sir B. Frere insists on severer measures, saying: "I think it quite necessary that the delivery up to justice of the offenders in this case should have been demanded,¹ and should now be peremptorily insisted on, together with a fine for the delay in complying with the reiterated demand.

John Dunn, who is supposed to have advised the king to send money as an atonement, affirms that the invasion had been mutual, fugitives from justice having been fetched out of Zululand by Natal officers; and he (Dunn) asks whether outraged husbands, even amongst civilised people, are prone to pay much respect to the rights of nations when upon the track of their unfaithful spouses. Plainly, neither he nor the king looked upon the matter in

¹ No "demand" was made until it appeared in Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum.
so serious a light as Sir Bartle Frere chose to do when he said, September 30th, 1878 (2220, p. 280), "and, unless apologised and atoned for by compliance with the Lieut.-Governor's demands (?) that the leader of the murderous gangs shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the Zulu king an ultimatum, which must put an end to pacific relations with our neighbours." ¹

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in reply to Sir Bartle Frere's last-quoted despatch, writes, November 21st: "The abduction and murder of the Zulu woman who had taken refuge in Natal is undoubtedly a serious matter, and no sufficient reparation for it has yet been made. But I observe that Cetshwayo has expressed his regret for this occurrence; and although the compensation offered by him was inadequate, there would seem to have been nothing in his conduct with regard to it which would preclude the hope of a satisfactory arrangement."—(P. P. [C.2220], p. 320.)

But the whole of Sir Bartle Frere's statements at this period concerning Cetshwayo are one-sided, exaggerated, or entirely imaginary accusations, which come in the first instance with force from a man of his importance, but for which not the slightest grounds can be traced in any reliable or official source. He brings grave charges against the king, which are absolutely contradicted by the official reports from which he draws his information; he places before the public as actual fact what, on investigation, is plainly nothing more than his own opinion of what Cetshwayo thinks, wishes, or intends, and what his thoughts, wishes, and intentions may be at a future period. Every circumstance is twisted into a proof of his inimical intentions towards Natal; the worst motives are taken for granted in all he does. When the king's messages were sent

¹ On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of putting "an end to pacific relations with our neighbours." This is hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look upon the matter.
through the ordinary native messengers between him and the Government of Natal, they were termed mere "verbal" messages (as what else should they be?), not "satisfactory or binding;" when they were sent through Mr. John Dunn they were called "unofficial," although Mr. Dunn had been repeatedly recognised, and by Sir B. Frere himself, as an official means of communication with Cetshwayo on matters of grave importance; and, when Mr. Dunn writes, on his own account, his opinion that the "boys" will not be given up, Sir B. Frere calls his letter "a similar informal message (i.e. from the king), couched in insolent and defiant terms." In nothing that passed between the king and the Government of Natal during this whole period is there one single word, on Cetshwayo's part, which could possibly be thus described. There are, indeed, many apologies and entreaties to the Government to be satisfied with some other atonement for the fault committed than the surrender of the culprits, and there is a great deal from various sources, official and otherwise, about cattle collected, even beyond the demands of the Government, as a propitiation; but of Sir B. Frere's "semi-sarcastic, insolent, and defiant" messages not one word.

It would take many pages to point out how utterly misleading is every word spoken by the High Commissioner on this subject; but to those who are curious in the matter, and in proof of the truth of our present statements, we can only recommend the South African Blue Books of 1878-79. We cannot, however, better illustrate our meaning than by a quotation from Lord Blachford: "What did Sir B. Frere say to all this? He was really ashamed to answer that he did not know. He had studied the series of despatches in which Sir B. Frere defended his conduct, and he willingly acknowledged the exuberance of literary skill which they exhibited. But when he tried to grapple with them he felt like a man who was defending himself with a stick against a cloud of locusts. He might knock down one, and knock down another, but 'the cry is, still they come.
His only consolation was, that they did not appear to have convinced Her Majesty's Government, whose replies were from beginning to end a series of cautions, qualifications, and protests."

On turning to the subject of the robber chief, Umbilini, and his raids, we are at once confronted by the fact that he was not a Zulu at all, but a Swazi, and a claimant to the Swazi throne. His claim had not been approved by the majority of the Swazi nation, and his brother Umbandeni, the present king, was appointed instead. Umbilini, however, was not a man to quietly sink into an inferior position, and having taken possession, with his followers, of some rocky caves in the borderland, forming an almost impregnable fortress, he lived for many years, much in the fashion of the border freebooters of whose doings we read in Scottish history, making raids upon his neighbours on all sides, and carrying off cattle, women, and children. His expeditions were most frequently directed towards the party against him in his own country, but neither his Boer nor Zulu neighbours escaped entirely. On first leaving Swaziland he went to offer homage to the Zulu king, and was given land to settle upon in Zululand. No doubt Cetshwayo looked upon a warrior of Umbilini's known prowess as rather an important vassal, especially in the event of a war between him and his ancient enemies the Swazis, in which case Umbilini's adherence would probably divide the enemy amongst themselves. But he appears to have been in perpetual trouble on account of his turbulent vassal, and to have given him up altogether at one time. After a raid committed by him upon the Dutch, the latter applied to Cetshwayo to have him delivered up to them. "I could not do this," says Cetshwayo; "I should have got a bad name if I had done so, and people would have said it was not good to konsa (pay homage) to Cetshwayo. I therefore refused, but paid one hundred head of cattle for the offence he had committed;" 1

1 Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal) acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99).
and Cetshwayo's own account to Mr. Fynney is as follows (1961):

"Umbilini came to me for refuge from his own people, the Ama-Swazis, and I afforded him shelter; what would the world have said had I denied it to him? But, while allowing him to settle in the land as my subject, I have always been particularly careful to warn my people not to afford him any assistance or become mixed up in any quarrel between him and the Boers; and although I do not deny that he is my subject, still I will not endorse his misdeeds. When Mr. Rudolph complained to me of the trouble Umbilini was giving, I told Mr. Rudolph to kill him—I should not shield him; this the Boers tried to do, but, as usual, made a mess of it."

In fact, on a repetition of Umbilini's offence against the Boers, Cetshwayo refused to be longer responsible for his acts, and gave the Dutch permission to kill him. They fought him, and were beaten by him with his small band of only nineteen men. On a subsequent occasion, after a raid committed by Umbilini upon the Swazis, Cetshwayo was so incensed that he sent out a party to take and kill him; but he got notice beforehand, and escaped.

Sir Bartle Frere chooses to consider the king responsible for all Umbilini's doings, and even Sir H. Bulwer says: "The king disowned Umbilini's acts. . . . But there is nothing to show that he has in any way punished him, and, on the contrary, it is quite certain (of which 'certainty,' however, no proofs are forthcoming) that even if Umbilini did not act with the express orders of Cetshwayo, he did so with the knowledge that what he was doing would be agreeable to the king" (2260, p. 46).

This accusation was made in January, 1879, and refers to raids of the previous year, by which time, as the Swazis were our allies and the Boers our subjects, Umbilini's raids in all directions except those on the Zulu side had become offences to us for which Cetshwayo was held responsible. In point of fact, it was no such simple matter to "punish" Umbilini, whose natural fortress could be held by a small number of men against anything
short of the cannon which Cetshwayo did not possess. Nor
was it singular that, at a time when the king had already
strong suspicions that his country was about to be
attacked, he should not have wasted his strength in
subduing one who, in the event of war, would be most
useful to himself.

That, when the evil day came and his country was
invaded, Cetshwayo should have made common cause
with all who would or could assist him is a mere matter
of course, and it was but natural that so bold and skillful
a leader as Umbilini has proved himself to be should then
have been promoted and favoured by the unfortunate king.

We need scarcely say more upon this point, beyond
calling our readers’ attention to the fact that the expres-
sions “Zulu raids,” “indiscriminate massacres,” “violation
by the Zulus of Transvaal territory,” “horrible cruelties”
(2308, p. 62, and elsewhere), so freely scattered through
the despatches written to prove the criminality of the
Zulu king, all, without exception, apply to acts committed
either by Umbilini and his (chiefly) Swazi followers, or by
Manyonyoba, a small but independent native chief, living
north of the Pongolo.¹

The “case of Messrs. Smith and Deighton” is the only
charge against the Zulu king, in connection with Natal,
which we have now to consider, and it is one in which, as
we shall see, a great deal was made of a very small matter.

Mr. Smith, a surveyor in the Colonial Engineer’s depart-
ment, was on duty inspecting the road down to the Tugela,
near Fort Buckingham. The Zulu mind being in a very
excited state at the time—owing to the obvious preparation
for war, of which they heard reports from Natal, troops
stationed at Greytown, and war-ships seen close to the
Zulu shore, as though looking for a landing-place—Mr.
Smith was specially instructed to proceed upon his errand
alone, and with great discretion. By way of carrying out

¹ Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He
lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which Sir Battle
Fresco and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s supremacy, and
was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government.
these directions he took with him only a trader—Deighton by name—and their discretion was shown by “taking no notice” when, having arrived at the drift into Zululand, they were questioned by Zulus, who were on guard there in consequence of rumours that our troops were about to cross.1

Mr. Wheelwright (a Government official), to whom the matter was reported a week after it occurred, not by Mr. Smith, the principal person concerned, but by Mr. Deighton, says: “The fact that the two white men took no notice of ‘lots of Zulus shouting out’ from their own bank, ‘What do you want there?’ but ‘walked quietly along,’2 as if they had not heard, or as if they were deaf, very naturally confirmed the suspicion that they were about no good.”

The consequence was, that when the white men reached an islet in the middle of the river (or rather one which is generally in the middle of the stream when it is full—it was low at the time), they were seized by the Zulus, and detained by them for about an hour and a half, whilst all sorts of questions were asked: “What are you doing there?” “What had the soldiers come to Greytown for?” “What did the white men want coming down there? There were two down not long ago, then other two only a few days since, and now there is another two; you must come for some reason.”

However, after a time, they were allowed to depart, an attempt made to take their horses from them being prevented by the induna of the Zulus.

Sir Bartle Frere does not seem to have thought very much of the matter at first, for Sir M. Hicks-Beach, when acknowledging his despatch reporting it, says (2220, p. 320): “I concur with you in attributing no special importance to the seizure and temporary arrest of the

1 Sir H. Bulwer says, “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly inspected by Mr. Smith for the same.

2 Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright.
surveyors, which was partly due to their own indiscretion, and was evidently in no way sanctioned by the Zulu authorities."

But a little later—although with no fresh facts before him—Sir B. Frere takes a very different tone (2222, p. 176):

"I cannot at all agree with the lenient view taken by the Lieut.-Governor of this case. Had it stood quite alone, a prompt apology and punishment of the offenders might have been sufficient. As the case stands, it was only one of many instances of insult and threatening, such as cannot possibly be passed over without severe notice being taken of them. What occurred," he says, "whether done by the king's order, or only by his border-guards, and subsequently only tacitly approved by his not punishing the offenders, seems to me a most serious insult and outrage, and should be severely noticed."

There is no sign that it was ever brought to the king's knowledge, and when Sir B. Frere speaks of its being "only one of many instances of insult and threatening," he is drawing largely on his imagination, as there is no other recorded at all, unless he means to refer to the "notices to quit" in the disputed territory, of which we have already treated.

We must now consider the points connected with the internal management of the Zulu country, which have generally been looked upon as a partial excuse for our invasion. Foremost amongst these is the infraction of the so-called "coronation promises," of which we have spoken in a previous chapter. Frequent rumours were current in Natal that the king, in defiance of the said promises, was in the habit of shedding the blood of his people upon the smallest provocation, and without any form of trial. Such stories of his inhuman atrocities were circulated in the colony that many kind-hearted and gentle people were ready to think that war would be a lesser evil. Yet, whenever one of these stories was examined into or traced to its source, it turned out either to be purely imaginary, or to have for its
foundation some small act of more or less arbitrary authority, the justice of which we might possibly question, but to which no one would apply the words "barbarities," "savage murders," etc.

An instance of the manner in which the Zulu king has obtained his character of "a treacherous and blood-thirsty sovereign," came under the notice of the present writer about December, 1878. Happening to be on a visit to some friends in Pietermaritzburg, and hearing them mention Cetahwayo's cruelties, I observed that I did not much credit them, as I had never yet met any one who knew of them from any trustworthy source. I was met with the assurance that their "kitchen-Kafir," Tom, from whom they had received their accounts, was a personal witness, having himself escaped from a massacre, and they vouched for the truthfulness of the man's character. I asked and obtained permission to question the man in his own language, being myself anxious to find any real evidence on the subject, especially as, at that time—with military preparations going on on every side—it was apparent to all that "we" intended war, and one would have been glad to discover that there was any justification for it on our side. The same evening I took an opportunity of interrogating "Tom," saying, "So I hear that you know all about this wicked Zulu king. Tell me all about it." Whereupon the man launched out into a long account of the slaughter of his people, from which not even infants were spared, and from which he was one of the few who had escaped. He had plainly been accustomed to tell the tale (doubtless a true one), and there were touches in it concerning the killing of the children which showed that he had been in the habit of recounting it to tender-hearted and horror-struck English mothers. When he had finished his tale I asked him when all the horrors which he had described had taken place. "Oh!" he

1 Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native Affairs of the Cape Government.
replied, "it was at the time of the fight between Cetshwayo and Umbulazi (1856); that was when I left Zululand."

"And you have never been there since?"

"No; I should be afraid to go, for Cetshwayo kills always."

"How do you know that?" I inquired, for he had started upon a fresh account of horrors relating to the time at which he was speaking.

"Oh! I know it is true," was the ready and confident reply, "because the white people here in 'Maritzburg tell me so out of the papers."

In point of fact the man, on whose word to my own knowledge rested the belief of a considerable circle of the citizens, could only give personal evidence concerning what happened at the time of the great civil war, when Zululand was in such confusion that it would not be easy to distribute responsibility, and when Cetshwayo himself was a young man in the hands of his warriors. All he could tell of a later date he had himself learnt from "white people" in the town, who, again, had gathered their information from the newspapers; and Bishop Schreuder, long resident in Zululand, says: "I had not with my own eyes seen any corpse, and personally only knew of them said to have been killed. . . . I myself had my information principally from the same sources as people in Natal, and often from Natal newspapers."

The public press of Natal certainly assisted in bringing about the Zulu war, by industriously circulating every sort of accusation against Cetshwayo; thus, working on the fears of the people, a strong feeling against the natives was raised.

It would be an injustice not to mention that one paper was consistently found on the other side. The Natal Colonist, edited by Mr. John Sanderson, of Durban, may be said to owe the close of its existence to its editor having fearlessly and honestly taken the unpopular side in native matters.

As early as 1873 Mr. Sanderson's popularity was con-
siderably affected by his determined stand against the injustice done to the Ama-Hlubi and Putini tribes (see Chap. V.), and, although he may at one time have been misled as to the character and intentions of the Zulu king, his voice was always raised against what he considered unjust or wrong throughout the war.

The king's own reply to these accusations may be taken entire from Mr. Fynney's report on July 4th, 1877 (1861), with the portions of the message delivered by the latter to which it refers:

"You have repeatedly acknowledged the house of England to be a great and powerful house, and have expressed yourself as relying entirely upon the good-will and power of that house for your own strength and the strength of the country over which you are king; in fact you have always looked towards the English Government.

"Which way is your face turned today? Do you look, and still desire to look, in the same direction? Do you rely on the good-will and support of the British Government as much as you formerly did?

"The Government of Natal has repeatedly heard that you have not regarded the agreements you entered into with that Government, through its representative, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the occasion of your coronation. These agreements you entered into with the sun shining around you, but since that time you have practised great cruelties upon your people, putting great numbers of them to death. What do you say?"

In reply to the above, Cetshwayo said: "I have not changed; I still look upon the English as my friends, as they have not yet done or said anything to make me feel otherwise. They have not in any way turned my heart, therefore I feel that we have still hold of each other's hands. But you must know that from the first the Zulu nation grew up alone, separate and distinct from all others, and has never been subject to any other nation; Tyaka (Chaka) was the first to find out the English and make friends with them; he saved the lives of seven Englishmen
from shipwreck at the mouth of the Umfolosi, he took care of them, and from that day even until now the English and Zulu nations have held each other's hands. The English nation is a just one, and we are together" (we are at one with each other). "I admit that people have been killed. There are three classes of wrong-doers that I kill—(1) the abatakati—witches, poisoners, &c.; (2) those who take the women of the great house, those belonging to the royal household; and (3) those who kill, hide, or make away with the king's cattle. I mentioned these three classes of wrong-doers to Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), when he came to place me as king over the Zulu nation, as those who had always been killed. I told him that it was our law, and that these classes of wrong-doers I would kill, and he replied: 'Well, I cannot put aside a standing law of the land.' I always give a wrong-doer three chances, and kill him if he passes the last. Evil-doers would go over my head if I did not punish them, and that is our mode of punishing. . . . I do not see that I have in any way departed from, or broken in anything, the compact I made with the Natal Government through Somtseu."

The next subject to be considered is that of the treatment of the missionaries and their converts in Zululand.

Sir T. Shepstone, in his account of what passed at the installation of Cetshwayo, writes as follows (C. 1137, p. 19):

"The fourth point was the position of Christian missionaries and their converts. Cetywayo evidently regretted that they had ever been admitted at all, and had made up his mind to reduce their numbers by some means or other. . . . He said they had committed no actual wrong, but they did no good, and that the tendency of their teaching was mischievous; he added that he did not wish to harm them, that they might take all their property with them and go in peace.

"I suggested that they could not take their houses away. He replied that the materials of which they were built—stone, earth, and wood—were all Zulu property, but they might take them also if they wished. He thought that
four, however, were entitled to greater consideration; these were Bishop Schreuder and Mr. Oftebro, of the Norwegian Mission, because of their long residence—more than twenty years—and their services in other ways than as missionaries; and Bishop Wilkinson and Mr. Robertson, because they had brought an introduction from the Governor of Natal; but that the teaching even of these was mischievous, and could not be received by the Zulus without injury. . . .

The advantages of education, the value to a man of being able to read and write, and the extreme inconvenience of ignorance, were discussed. Cetywayo heartily concurred in all that was said on these subjects, and said it was education made the English so great; and that, if he thought he could remember what he might learn, he would be taught himself; and he expressed regret that the missionaries did not confine themselves to that kind of teaching.

"The result of our conversations on the subject of the missionaries was an understanding that those who were already in the country should not be interfered with, and that, if any of them committed an offence for which the offender might be considered deserving of expulsion, the case should be submitted to the Government of Natal, and its assent be received before the sentence should be carried out. It is necessary to explain that the Zulus have no idea of inflicting any punishment upon a missionary except that of expulsion from the country. I did not consider it wise to attempt to make any arrangements in favour of native converts."1

What was meant by the teaching of the missionaries being mischievous is fully explained by the remarks of the prime ministers Mnyamana and Vumandaba, reported by Mr. Fynney in 1877 (1961, p. 47) as follows:

"We will not allow the Zulus to become so-called Christians. It is not the king says so, but every man in Zululand. If a Zulu does anything wrong, he at once goes to a mission station, and says he wants to become a

1 Author's italics.
Christian; if he wants to run away with a girl, he becomes a Christian; if he wishes to be exempt from serving the king, he puts on clothes, and is a Christian; if a man is an umtagati (evil-doer), he becomes a Christian. All these people are the subjects of the king; and who will keep a cow for another to milk it? . . . The missionaries desire to set up another power in the land, and, as Zululand has only one king, that cannot be allowed.”

Mr. Fynney continues: “Before I left Zululand (before July, 1877) most of the missionaries had decided upon leaving; some had already left, not from any fear of personal danger, but because in some cases they have been deserted by the natives on their stations; in others the native converts were uneasy, and wished to leave; and from the attitude of both the king and chiefs, they could plainly see that all chances of making fresh converts, or even retaining those around them, were for the present at an end. . . . I find there were all sorts of wild (?) rumours going about from station to station—one that the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once. I am afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the missionaries have been frequently to the king of late, and, as he told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to see them any more.”

In August of the same year Lord Carnarvon requests Sir Henry Bulwer to make a special point of causing “the missionaries to understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in Zululand,” and to recommend them, if they cannot carry on their work without armed support, to leave it for the present.

Sir Henry Bulwer writes (2000, p. 33):

“The action taken by some of the missionaries in leaving that country has apparently proved not only unnecessary, but ill-advised for their own interests. The king was not sorry that they should go, but he was angry with them for

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1 On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!); upon which Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more.
going;" ¹ and on January 26th, 1878, a message arrived from Cetshwayo, concerning those that remained, to this effect (2100, p. 61):

"Cetshwayo states that he wishes His Excellency to know that he is not pleased with the missionaries in the Zulu country, as he finds out that they are the cause of much harm, and are always spreading false reports about the Zulu country, and (he) would wish His Excellency to advise them to remove, as they do no good."

Shortly after the Rev. Mr. Oftebro and Dr. Oftebro, Norwegian missionaries from Zululand, were granted an interview by the Lieut.-Governor of Natal for the purpose of laying their case before His Excellency. The king, they said, had informed them that he was now quite persuaded that they had communicated to the governors of Natal and the Transvaal, and to the editors of the public papers in Natal, all important matters that occurred in the Zulu country—that the accounts they sent were not even truthful—and that he had believed these missionaries were "men," but that he now found them to be his enemies.

They believed that amongst the "white men," from whom he had obtained his information, were Mr. John Mullins, a trader, and Mr. F. E. Colenso, a son of the Bishop of Natal, who had been at the king’s kraal for some six days and who, they said, "had translated, for the king’s information, accounts of doings in the Zulu country, from several newspapers of the colony." This last, as it happens, was pure fiction. Sir Henry Bulwer, indeed, believed it at the time, and wrote upon it as follows (2100, p. 89):

"I notice in Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s letter to the Earl of Carnarvon, a statement to the effect that the disposition and dealings of Cetshwayo had been sedulously misrepresented by the missionaries and by the Press. And this statement tends, I am afraid, to confirm the

¹ Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they committed in going without taking leave. He said they had never received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid him the compliment of a farewell salutation.
belief that Mr. F. E. Colenso, when he lately visited the Zulu country, . . . made certain representations regarding the missionaries in Zululand, which were greatly calculated to prejudice the king's mind against them, or against some of them."

But Mr. Colenso, on seeing for the first time the above statements in the Blue Book, wrote to Sir M. Hicks-Beach as follows (2220, p. 318):

"The suspicions expressed by the missionaries as to my proceedings are entirely without foundation in fact. So far from attempting to prejudice the king's mind against them, I confined myself, in the little I did say to Cetshwayo on the subject, to supporting their cause with him. The king had received, through some of his various channels of information, an account of the numerous contributions, made by missionaries and others living under his protection in Zululand, to the colonial newspapers, and in particular, of an exaggerated and sensational report, written by the Zululand correspondent of The Natal Mercury, of the catastrophe which occurred at the annual Feast of First-fruits some ten days before my last conversation with the king, which report he attributed to the Rev. Mr. Robertson, from the fact that his waggon-driver was the only white man present on the occasion, except Dr. Oftebro, Mr. Mullins, and Mr. Dunn. Cetshwayo expressed himself as indignant at the conduct of Mr. Robertson, who, he said, had never, during his long residence in Zululand, received anything but good treatment at the hands of his (Cetshwayo's) father and himself, and, he added, 'I have borne with him too long.' To this I replied that, if he had any distinct ground of complaint against Mr. Robertson, he (the king) should get it set down in writing, and send it to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal; and I wished him to understand that any different course would be productive of no good effect. I then told Cetshwayo, omitting further reference to Mr. Robertson, that in my opinion the presence of the missionaries as a body in his country was a great advantage to him, and that they merited his protection. He disclaimed
having ever treated them with anything but great considera-
tion."

The particular statement of the two missionaries Oftebro,
concerning the translation of newspapers, also Mr. Colenso
specially and distinctly contradicts, saying that he had no
newspapers with him nor extracts of newspapers, nor were
any such read to Cetshwayo in his presence.

Sir Henry Bulwer states, at the request of the Messrs.
Oftebro (2100, p. 61), that no member of the Norwegian
mission had supplied this Government with information
as above. But it does not follow that no such communi-
cations had been made to Sir Bartle Frere and Lord
Carnarvon. Missionaries had written anonymously to the
colonial papers, and the account in The Natal Mercury
of the fight at the Umkosi was attributed by Cetshwayo,
not without reason, to the Rev. R. Robertson. The tone
of this letter, and its accuracy, may be gathered from the
following extract, referring to the land which, in the
opinion of the Commissioners, "was by right belonging to
the Zulus":

"Never was a more preposterous demand made upon
any Government than that which Cetshwayo is now
making upon the English Government of the Transvaal.
. . . For be it remembered that, until very lately, the
Zulus have never occupied any portion of it, (0) and even
now very partially. It is most earnestly to be hoped that
Sir T. Shepstone, while doing all in his power to keep the
peace, will be equally firm in resisting the unjust pretensions
of the Zulus."\(^1\)

How far the Zulu king was justified in his opinion that
the missionaries were not his friends may be gathered
from the above, and from the replies to Sir B. Frere's
appeal to the "missionaries of all denominations" for
their opinions on native politics, as published in the
Blue Book (2316), of which the following examples
may be given:

From letter of the Rev. P. D. Hepburn, December 17th,
1878: "All in these parts are quiet, and are likely to

\(^1\) Author's italics.
remain quiet, if His Excellency overthrows the Zulu chief, and disarms the remaining Zulus. The Zulus are very warlike; will attack in front, flank, and rear. They are, and have been, the terror of the neighbouring tribes since the days of Chaka. Only the utter destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South Africa. May His Excellency not allow himself to be deceived by the Zulu chief Cetywayo."

"On full inquiry it will be found that our late war here (Kaffaria) was to a great extent attributable to Zulu influence. If our forces suffer defeat at Natal, all native tribes in South Africa will rise against us. I am a man of peace; I hate war; but if war, let there be no dawdling and sentimental nonsense.

"True and faithful to God, our Queen, and the interests of the empire, we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own conscience. I would have much liked had there been a regiment of British cavalry at Natal. Sword in hand the British are irresistible over all natives. The battle at the Gwanga in 1846, under Sir Henry Darrell, lasted only about fifteen minutes; about four hundred Kafirs were cut down . . . .

"God, our God, put it into the minds of our rulers that all tribes in south-east and east Africa must submit to British power, and that it is the interest of all Africans to do so. Heathenism must perish; God wills it so."

These remarks are from a missionary in Kaffaria, but the tone of those in Zululand is the same, or even worse. Compare the following statement made to the Natal Government by two native converts from the Eshowe

1 "Our Correspondent" of The Daily News speaks, in to-day's issue (November 17th, 1878), of the "tranquilising fear" of Cetshwayo having been removed from "our own native population."

2 A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the slightest proof.

3 And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of what would befall them if they refused to become Christians.—Vide The Sotoman, February 5th, 1880.
mission station—Mr. Oftebro's (1883, p. 2): "We know that as many as a hundred (Zulus) in one day see the sun rise, but don't see it go down. . . . The people, great and small, are tired of the rule of Cetshwayo, by which he is finishing his people. The Zulu army is not what it was, there are only six full regiments. Cetshwayo had by his rule made himself so disliked, that they knew of no one, and especially of the headmen, who would raise a hand to save him from ruin, no matter from what cause."

Mr. John Shepstone adds, April 27th, 1877 (p. 4): "The above was confirmed only yesterday by reliable authority, who added that a power such as the English, stepping in now, would be most welcome to the Zulus generally, through the unpopularity of the king, by his cruel and reckless treatment of his subjects." And Mr. Fynney, in the report already quoted from, says:

"The king appeared to have a very exaggerated idea both of his power, the number of his warriors, and their ability as such. . . . While speaking of the king as having exaggerated ideas as to the number of his fighting-men, I would not wish to be understood as underrating the power of the Zulu nation. . . . I am of the opinion that King Cetywayo could bring six thousand men into the field at a short notice, great numbers armed with guns; but the question is, would they fight? . . . I am of opinion that it would greatly depend against whom they were called to fight. . . . While the Zulu nation, to a man, would have willingly turned out to fight either the Boers or the Ama-Swazi, the case would be very different, I believe, in the event of a misunderstanding arising between the British Government and the Zulu nation. . . . I further believe, from what I heard, that a quarrel with the British Government would be the signal for a general split up amongst the Zulus, and the king would find himself deserted by the majority of those upon whom he would at present appear to rely."

While Sir T. Shepstone says, November 30th, 1878 (2222, p. 175): "I will, however, add my belief that the Zulu power is likely to fall to pieces when touched."
Such were the opinions given by men supposed to be intimately acquainted with Zulu character and feeling, one of them being the great authority on all native matters; and on such statements did Sir Bartle Frere rely when he laid his scheme for the Zulu War. How absolutely ignorant, how foolishly mistaken, were these "blind leaders of the blind" has been amply proved by the events of 1879.

We need not enter very fully into the accusations brought by the missionaries against the Zulu king of indiscriminate slaughter of native converts for their religion's sake. They were thoroughly believed in Natal at the time; but, upon investigation, they dwindled down to three separate cases of the execution of men (one in each case) who happened to be converts, but of whom two were put to death for causes which had nothing whatever to do with their faith (one of them being indeed a relapsed convert); and the third, an old man, Maqamsela, whose name certainly deserves to be handed down to fame in the list of martyrs for religion's sake, was killed without the sanction or even knowledge of the king, by the order of his prime minister Goozi.¹

¹ Story of Maqamsela, from The Natal Colonist of May 4th, 1877: "Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses, we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he attended morning service at Eshowe mission station as usual, went home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of Minyeguna, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a Christian!"

"For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his own desire was reported to Goozi, his immediate chief, who scolded him, saying, "it would occasion him (Goozi's) trouble." The earnest and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary (Mr. Osebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to mention it to the king; but, failing to see Goozi first, deemed it imprudent to do so at that time. Maqamsela was greatly grieved at this, saying, "I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I am killed for being a Christian." When an opportunity occurred of speaking to Goozi about Maqamsela's wish to be baptized, he would give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct. Maqamsela, however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported to the king. 'If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for
That the latter received no punishment, although the king disapproved of this action, is not a fact of any importance. It is not always convenient to punish prime ministers and high commissioners, or powerful indunas.

Sir Bartle Frere of course takes the strongest possible view of the matter against the king, and speaks of his having killed Zulu converts (2220, p. 270), "at first rarely, as if with reluctance, and a desire to conceal what he had ordered, and to shift the responsibility to other shoulders, latterly more frequently, openly, and as an avowed part of a general policy for re-establishing the system of Chaka and Dingane." This little phrase is of a slightly imaginative nature, resting on no (produced) evidence. It is, in fact, a "statement."

Sir Henry Bulwer's reply—Nov. 18th, 1878 (2222, p. 172)—which forms an able refutation of various statements of Sir B. Frere, contains the following sentence: "I took some pains to find out how the case really stood, me! Why should I fear?" A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise they might remain in peace. Maqamela was then mentioned as being desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name being mentioned, the king replied that he would say nothing, Gwari, Mnyamane, and Kubane not being there. Maqamela was glad when he heard what had been done, and said, "If they kill me now it is all right."

"A week later his time came. An induna, named Jabane, sent for him, and on his return from Jabane's, an 'impi' came to him, saying they had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again, 'Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.' He begged leave to kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he said, 'Kill me now.' They had never seen any man act in this manner before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him. After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and they all ran away."

1 This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (vide "A Visit to King Cetshwayo," Macmillan's Magazine, March, 1878).
and ascertained that the number of natives, either converts or living on mission stations, who had been killed, was three. I have never heard since that time of any other mission natives being killed. . . . I was, therefore, surprised, on reading your Excellency’s despatch, to see what Messrs. Oftebro and Staven had said. I have since made particular inquiries on that point, but have failed to obtain any information showing that more than three mission natives have been killed. Among others to whom I have spoken is the Rev. Mr. Robertson, of Zululand, who was in ‘Maritzburg a few weeks ago. He told me that he had not heard of any other than the three cases.”

Sir Bartle Frere replies, December 6th, 1878 (2222, p. 175): “I have since made further inquiry (he does not say what), and have no doubt that though His Excellency may possibly be right as to the number regarding which there is judicial evidence (Sir H. Bulwer plainly decides that there was no evidence at all); the missionaries had every reason to believe that the number slain on account of their inclination to Christianity was considerably greater than three. One gentleman, who had better means of obtaining the truth than any one else, told me he had no doubt the number of converts killed was considerable.”

This gentleman, Sir Bartle Frere assures us, “knows the Zulus probably better than any living European; he is himself an old resident in Zululand, and a man above all suspicion of exaggeration or misrepresentation (>). He gave me this information under stipulation that his name should not be mentioned, otherwise it would, I am sure, at once be accepted as a guarantee for the accuracy of his statements.”

With such phrases, “I have no doubt,” “every reason to believe,” “I feel sure,” &c. &c., has Sir Bartle Frere continually maligned the character of the Zulu king, called since the war, by Mr. John Dunn, “the most injured man in South Africa.”

1 Author’s italics throughout.
One is rather puzzled who the man may be to whom Sir Bartle Frere gives so high a character, his opinion of which he evidently expects will quite satisfy his readers. We should much like to have the gentleman's name. The number of gentlemen "long resident in Zululand" are not so many as to leave a wide field for conjecture. Besides the missionaries, the only names that occur to us to which the phrase can apply are those of Mr. John Shepstone, Mr. John Dunn, and Mr. Robertson.

The only point in the indictment against Cetshwayo which we have now to consider, is that of the killing of girls under the Zulu marriage law, and the reply to Sir Henry Bulwer's remonstrance on the point, which Sir Bartle Frere speaks of in his final memorandum as expressed "in terms of unprecedented insolence and defiance;" while The Times of Natal (generally recognised as the Government organ) went still further, and has twice charged the Zulu king with sending, repeatedly, insolent messages to the Natal Government. As to the repetition of the offence, it need only be said that there is no foundation in the Blue Books for the assertion. And as to this particular offence it is enough to say that no notice had been taken of it to Cetshwayo himself, till two years afterwards it was unearthed, and charged upon him as above, by the High Commissioner, notwithstanding that, whatever it may have been, it had been subsequently condoned by friendly messages from this Government.

The marriage law of Zululand is thus described by Sir T. Shepstone (1137, p. 21): "The Zulu country is but sparsely inhabited when compared with Natal, and the increase of its population is checked more by its peculiar marriage regulations than by the exodus of refugees to surrounding governments. Both boys and girls are formed into regiments, and are not allowed to marry without special leave from the king, or until the regiments to which they belong are fortunate enough to receive his dispensation. Caprice or state reasons occasionally delay this permission, and it sometimes happens that years pass
before it is given. Contravention of these regulations is visited by the severest penalties.”

The history of the case which we are now considering may be given in the following extracts:

On September 22nd, 1876, Mr. Osborn, resident magistrate of Newcastle, writes: “The Zulu king lately granted permission to two regiments of middle-aged men to marry. These were, however, rejected by the girls, on the ground that the men were too old; upon which the king ordered that those girls who refused to marry the soldiers were to be put to death. Several girls were killed in consequence, some fled into the colony, others into the Transvaal Republic.”

And on October 9th, Government messengers report (1748, p. 198):

“We heard that the king was causing some of the Zulus to be killed on account of disobeying his orders respecting the marriage of girls, and we saw large numbers of cattle which had been taken as fines. Otherwise the land was quiet.”

As far as the most careful investigations could discover, the number killed was not more than four or five, while the two Zulus already quoted said that, although they had heard of the matter, they did not know of a single instance; and as these young men themselves belonged to one of the regiments, it can hardly be supposed that any

1 Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations, and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty was the fashion nearer the court. It was in these very coast districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the loyal inhabitants proving their loyalty to the bitter end.
great slaughter could have taken place unknown to them. At the time, however, report as usual exaggerated the circumstances, and Sir Henry Bulwer speaks (1748, p. 198) of “numbers of girls and young men,” and “large numbers of girls and others connected with them,” as having been killed.

He sent a message to Cetshwayo on the subject, which in itself was a temperate and very proper one for an English governor to send, in the hope of checking such cruelty in future, and was not unnaturally somewhat surprised at receiving an answer from the usually courteous and respectful king, which showed plainly enough that he was highly irritated and resented the interference with his management of his people. Sir Henry had reminded him of what had passed at his coronation, and Cetshwayo replies that if Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) had told the white people that he (the king) had promised never to kill, Somtseu had deceived them. “I have yet to kill,” he says. He objects to being dictated to about his laws, and says that, while wishing to be friends with the English, he does not intend to govern his people by laws sent to him by them. He remarks, in a somewhat threatening way, that in future he shall act on his own account, and that, if the English interfere with him, he will go away and become a wanderer, but not without first showing what he can do if he chooses. Finally he points out that he and the Governor of Natal are in like positions, one being governor of Natal, the other of Zululand.

It is plain that this reply, as reported by the Government messengers, produced a strong effect on Sir H. Bulwer’s mind, and considerably affected his feeling towards the king, though, as already stated, he never brought it, at

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1 Cetshwayo says that “he knew only of four girls who were killed, Sigmil’s two and two near the Pongolo, and that these were killed without his will, though he was responsible, insomuch as he had yielded to the advice of the indunas that an ‘impl’ should be sent out to frighten the girls, which ‘impl’ had exceeded its orders and had killed these four.”

2 “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used is more correctly translated as above.
the time or afterwards, to the notice of Cetshwayo, and has since exchanged friendly messages with him. And no doubt the reply was petulant and wanting in due respect, though a dash of arrogance was added to it by the interpreter's use of the expression "we are equal," instead of "we are in like positions"—each towards our own people. But that the formidable words "I have yet to kill," "I shall now act on my own account," meant nothing more than the mere irritation of the moment is plain from the fact that he never made the slightest attempt to carry them out, though recent events have taught us what he might have done had he chosen to "act on his own account."

The tone of the reply would probably have been very different had it been brought by Cetshwayo's own messengers. By an unfortunate mistake on the part of the Natal Government, one of the messengers sent was a Zulu refugees of the party of Umbulazi and Umkungo, between whom and the king there was deadly hostility, which had lately been intensified by the insulting manner in which Umkungo's people had received Cetshwayo's messengers, sent in a friendly spirit to inform them of King Umbande's death. The very presence of this man, bringing a reproach from the Government of Natal, would naturally be resented by the Zulu king, who had already declined communications from the Transvaal sent through refugees subjects of his own (Sir Henry Bulwer—1748, p. 10); and was now obliged to receive with courtesy, and listen to words of remonstrance from, one of these very refugees who had fled to Natal, and, under Zulu law, was liable to be put to death as a traitor, when he made his appearance in Zululand. The king's words, exhibiting the irritation of the moment, whatever they may have been, would lose nothing of their fierceness and bitterness by being conveyed through such a medium.1

We do not wish to defend such practices as those of

1 Cetshwayo denies ever seeing these messengers, or sending any message by them. "No," he says, "these are not my words, they are those of the messengers" (i.e. invented by them).
forcing girls into distasteful marriages, or putting them to death for disobedience in that respect. But we must remember that, after all, the king, in ordering these executions, was enforcing, not a new law laid down by himself, but "an old custom" (1748, p. 198). From his point of view the exercise of such severity was as necessary to maintaining his authority as the decimation of a regiment for mutiny might appear to a commander, or the slaughter of hundreds of Langalibalele's people, hiding in caves or running away, which we have already described, appeared to Sir B. Pine and Sir T. Shepstone in 1873-74.

The king himself gave an illustration of his difficulties in a message sent to Sir H. Bulwer early in 1878 (2079, p. 96). He reported to His Excellency that two of his regiments had had a fight, and many of his men had been killed, at which he was much annoyed. He reports this to show His Excellency that, although he warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused any disturbance at the Umkosi (Feast of the First-fruits), he cannot rule them without sometimes killing them, especially as they know they can run to Natal.

We have now considered in turn every accusation brought against the Zulu king up to the end of 1878, when Sir Bartle Frere delivered his ultimatum, which he had said beforehand would put an end to our peaceful relations with our neighbours. We venture to assert that, with the exception of the last, every one of these accusations is distinctly refuted on evidence gathered from official sources. Of that last, we would observe, that, although it cannot be entirely denied, the fault has been greatly exaggerated; while that part of it which referred to the sole instance of a hasty reply to the Natal Government, has been condoned by two years' friendly relations since the offence, before it was raked up by Sir Bartle Frere as an additional pretext for the war. And, at all events, had Cetshwayo's severity to his people been a hundred times greater that it ever was, he could not in a lifetime have produced the misery which this one year's campaign has wrought.

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Yet these accusations were the sole pretexts for the
war, except that fear of the proximity of a nation strong
enough and warlike enough to injure us, if it wished to
do so, which Sir Bartle Frere declared made it impossible
for peaceful subjects of Her Majesty to feel security for
life or property within fifty miles of the border, and made
the existence of a peaceful English community in the
neighbourhood impossible.\footnote{The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were living
in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus on the other,
the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the most friendly
manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to life or property,
when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban.} He speaks in the same des-
patch (2269, pp. 1, 2) of the king as an “irresponsible,
bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot,” which terms, and
others like them, do duty again and again for solid facts,
but of the justice of which he gives no proof whatever.
We cannot do better than give, in conclusion, and as
a comment upon the above fear, a quotation from Lord
Blachford’s speech in the House of Lords, March 26th,
1879, which runs:

“If some people assumed that the growth of the Zulu
power in the neighbourhood of a British colony constituted
such a danger that, in a common phrase, it had to be got
rid of, and that, when a thing had to be done, it was idle
and inconvenient to examine too closely into the pretexts
which were set up. And this was summed up in a phrase
which is used more than once by the High Commissioner,
and had obtained currency in what he might call the light
literature of politics. We might be told to obey our
‘instincts of self-preservation.’ No doubt the instinct
of self-preservation was one of the most necessary of our
instincts. But it was one of those which we had in
common with the lowest brute—one of those which we
are most frequently called on to keep in order. It was in
obedience to the ‘instinct of self-preservation’ that a
coward ran away in battle, that a burglar murdered a
policeman, or, what was more to our present purpose, that
a nervous woman jumped out of a carriage lest she should
be upset; or that one man in a fright fired at another who, he thought, meant to do him an injury, though he had not yet shown any sign of an intention of doing so. The soldiers who went down in the Birkenhead—what should we have thought of them if, instead of standing in their ranks to be drowned, they had pushed the women and children into the hold and saved themselves? A reasonable determination to do that which our safety requires, so far as it is consistent with our duty to others, is the duty and interest of every man. To evade an appeal to the claims of reason and justice, by a clamorous allegation of our animal instinct, is to abdicate our privileges as men, and to revert to brutality."
CHAPTER XII.

THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND
COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN.

On December 11th the boundary award was delivered to the Zulus by four gentlemen selected for the purpose, who, by previous arrangement, met the king's envoys at the Lower Tugela Drift. The award itself, as we already know, was in favour of the Zulus; nevertheless it is impossible to read the terms in which it was given without feeling that it was reluctantly done. It is fenced in with warnings to the Zulus against transgressing the limits assigned to them, without a word assuring them that their rights also shall in future be respected; and, while touching on Zulu aggressions on Boers in the late disputed territory, it says nothing of those committed by Boers.

But perhaps the most remarkable phrase in the whole award is that in which Sir Bartle Frere gives the Zulus to understand that they will have to pay the compensation due to the ejected Transvaal farmers, while he entirely ignores all that can be said on the other side of injuries to property and person inflicted on Zulus in the disputed territory (of which the Blue Books contain ample proof), not to speak of the rights and advantages so long withheld from them, and now decided to be their due.

Sir Henry Bulwer plainly took a very different view on this point when he summed up the judgment of the Commissioners (2220, p. 388), and added as follows: "I would venture to suggest that it is a fair matter for consideration
if those Transvaal subjects, who have been induced . . . .
under the sanction, expressed or tacit, of the Government
of the Republic, to settle and remain in that portion of
the country, have not a claim for compensation from their
Government for the individual losses they may sustain.”

Sir Bartle Frere, starting with phrases which might be
supposed to agree with the above, gradually and ingeniously
shifts his ground through propositions for compensation
to be paid to farmers “required or obliged to leave”
(omitting the detail of who is to pay), and then for compen-
sation to be paid to farmers wishing to remove, until
he finally arrives, by a process peculiarly his own, at a
measure intended to “secure private rights of property,”
which eventually blossomed out into a scheme for main-
taining, in spite of the award, the Boer farmers on the
land claimed by them, which we shall presently relate in
full. Although nothing appeared in the award itself on
this point, the whole tone of it was calculated to take
the edge off the pleasure which the justice done them
at last would naturally give the Zulus, and it was promptly
followed up by an “ultimatum” from the High Commiss-
ioner calculated to absorb their whole attention.

This “ultimatum” contained the following thirteen
demands, and was delivered on the same day with the
award, an hour later:

1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by the
Natal courts.
2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the out-
grages committed by the above, and for Ketshiwayo’s delay in
complying with the request (N.B., not demand) of the Natal Govern-
ment for the surrender of the offenders.
3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed
against Messrs. Smith and Deighton (N.B., twenty days were allowed
for compliance with the above demands, i.e. until December 31st,
inclusive).
4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini, and others to be named
hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts (N.B., no time was
fixed for compliance with this demand).
5. Observance of the coronation “promises.”
6. That the Zulu army be disbanded, and the men allowed to
go home.