THE ZULU WAR.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST CAUSES.

England's collisions with the savage races bordering upon her colonies have in all probability usually been brought about by the exigencies of the moment, by border-troubles, and acts of violence and insolence on the part of the savages, and from the absolute necessity of protecting a small and trembling white population from their assaults.

No such causes as these have led up to the war of 1879. For more than twenty years the Zulus and the colonists of Natal have lived side by side in perfect peace and quietness. The tranquillity of our border had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier farmers on our border, and the entire absence of anything like precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt no real alarm concerning the Zulus until the idea was suggested to them.
by those in authority over them.\textsuperscript{1} The only interruption to this tranquil condition of the public mind about the Zulus was in the year 1861, when a scare took place in the colony, for which, as it afterwards proved, there were no grounds whatsoever. A general but unfounded belief was rife that Cetshwayo,\textsuperscript{2} king, or rather at that time prince, ruling Zululand, was about to invade Natal, in order to obtain possession of his young brother Umkungo, a claimant of the Zulu crown, and who had escaped over the border at the time of the great civil war of which we shall presently treat. This young prince had been placed—by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone—at Bishopstowe,\textsuperscript{3} for his education in the Native Boys’ School there; and it was not until he had been there for years that the fancy arose, suggested and fostered by the border farmers and traders in Zululand, that Cetshwayo intended to take him by force from amongst us, or at all events to make the attempt.

Under the influence of this belief the troops then stationed in Natal were ordered to the frontier, the colonial volunteers were called out, the defence of the principal towns became a matter of consideration; while outlying farmers, and residents in the country, hastened to remove their families to places of comparative safety.

Bishopstowe was supposed to be the special object of the expected attack; but the Bishop himself, having occasional opportunities of learning the state of things in Zululand, through his missionary there, could never be brought thoroughly to believe in the gravity of the danger. It is true that, as a matter of precaution, and in deference to the strongly-expressed opinion of the Lieut.-Governor of the Colony and of Mr. Shepstone, he sent away the threatened boy to some of his own people, in a more

\textsuperscript{1} “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879. P. P. [O. 2918] p. 32.)

\textsuperscript{2} Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”

\textsuperscript{3} Residence of the Bishop of Natal.
remote and safer part of the colony. But he was extremely reluctant to take the further step, strongly urged upon him, of removing his family and people to the adjacent city of Pietermaritzburg, and only consented to do so under protest. During the night following his consent, but before the project had been carried out, he had reason for a few hours to suppose that he had been mistaken in his own judgment. The family at Bishopstowe was knocked up at one o’clock in the morning by a messenger from a passing Dutch farmer, who, on his way into town with his own family, had sent word to the Bishop that Cetshwayo’s army had entered the colony, was already between him and Table Mountain—that is to say within a distance of nine miles—and was burning, killing, and destroying all upon the way to Bishopstowe. There seemed to be no doubt of the fact; so, hastily collecting their native villagers,¹ the Colensos left their homes and started for the town, which they reached, most of them on foot, about daybreak. The consequence of their being accompanied and followed by a considerable party of natives (of both sexes and all ages!) was that the townspeople immediately supposed that the “Zulus had come;” and some of them actually left their houses, and took refuge in the various places of safety—such as the fort, the principal churches, and so on—previously decided upon by the authorities in case of necessity. In common South African terms they “went into laager.”

As the day passed, and still no further tidings arrived of the approach of the Zulus or the destruction of Bishopstowe, the Bishop began to have strong suspicions that, after all, he had been right in his original opinion, and that “the burning, killing, and destroying” had been conjured up by some excited imagination. This opinion was confirmed, if not completely established, in the course of the day, by the reception of a letter from the missionary in Zululand before mentioned, in which he inquired what

¹ These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe, although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter elsewhere.
was the meaning of the rumours about the English being about to invade Zululand, which had scared the Zulus, who were burying their little valuables in all directions. The missionary added that all was perfectly quiet in Zululand, until the border tribes, seeing the British troops approaching, fled inland in alarm, killing their cattle to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, and burying their other possessions where they could not carry them away. In point of fact the "scare" had no foundation whatsoever, and the Zulus were quite as much alarmed by the actual approach of the British troops as the Natalians had been by the imaginary Zulu army. The worst immediate consequence of the mistake was the want, almost amounting to famine, produced amongst the border Zulus by the loss of their cattle. A later and more serious result has been that general impression, which has long obtained credence at home in England, that the colonists of Natal have not only been in fear of their lives on account of the Zulus for many years, but have also had good and sufficient reason for their alarm. But for this fixed, though groundless idea, England would hardly have been in such a hurry to send out additional troops for the protection of the colony as she was in the summer of 1878; to her own great loss and to the very considerable injury of the colony itself, not to speak of its unhappy neighbours and heretofore friends the Zulus.

It is certainly true that during the year 1878, some of the inhabitants of Natal did honestly feel great fear of the Zulus, and of a possible invasion of the colony by them, the alarm in many cases amounting to absolute panic. But this feeling was produced by no warlike menaces from our neighbours, no sinister appearances on our borders. The panic—or "scare," as it would popularly be called in Natal—was forced upon the people by the conduct and language of their rulers, by the preparations made for war, troops being sent from England "for defensive purposes" (as was so repeatedly asserted by both Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, then Lieut.-General the Hon. F.A. Thesiger), and by the perpetual agitation of the local newspaper editors.
It is true indeed that a certain section of the colonists eagerly desired war. To some the presence of the troops was a source of actual fortune, to others the freedom and independence of so large a body of black people, whom they could neither tax nor force to work for them, was, and had long been, odious; the revenue to be derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap labour to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken, formed one of the chief subjects for speculation when the war was first suggested. To others, again, the prospect of war was simply a source of pleasurable excitement, a hunt on a large scale, martial glory to be won, with just spice enough of danger to give zest to the affair; as had been the case in the war just concluded in Kaffraria. Naturally this feeling was commonest amongst the volunteers and their friends. Some of them looked upon the matter in a light which would meet with utter condemnation in any civilised society; but many others, especially the young lads who filled up the ranks of the volunteer corps, were simply dazzled by visions of military distinction, excited by the popular phrases in perpetual use about "fighting for their country, and doing their duty as soldiers," to the extent of losing sight altogether of the question as to whether or not their country really required any defence at all.

Natal cannot honestly claim to be guiltless in bringing about the war with the Zulus, and will hardly deny that in 1878 the prospect was a most popular one amongst her sons. Perhaps Sir Bartle Frere could not so easily have produced a war out of the materials which he had at hand but for the assistance given him by the popular cry in the colony, and the general fear of the Zulus, which called forth England's ready sympathy and assistance. But it must be remembered that the panic was not a genuine one, nor even one like that of 1861, produced by the folly of the people themselves. It was distinctly imposed upon them by those in authority, whose policy was to bring about a collision with the Zulus, and who then made use of the very fears which they had themselves aroused for the furtherance of their own purpose.
The subjugation of the Zulus and the annexation of their country formed part of a policy which has occupied the minds of certain British statesmen for many years. The ambition of creating a South African Empire, to be another jewel in Victoria’s crown, which, if no rival, should at least be a worthy pendant to the great Indian Empire, was a dazzling one, and towards that object all Government action in South Africa has apparently tended since the year 1873. When the idea was first conceived those only know who formed it, but it took practical and visible form in 1873. In that year by crowning the Zulu king we assumed a right to interfere in the internal management of the country, thereby establishing a possible future cause of offence, which, as the Zulus obstinately refused to put themselves in the wrong by any sort of interference with us, was necessary in order to bring about a state of things which would eventually give us a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the country altogether.

The origin of this performance was as follows. In the year 1856 a great revolution took place in Zululand, and a civil war broke out between two claimants to the heirship of the throne (then filled by Umzambele), namely, the present king, Cetshwayo, and his brother Umbulazi. Umbulazi’s party was beaten, he himself being killed in battle, great carnage ensuing, and many fugitives escaping into Natal. Umkungo, own brother of Umbulazi, a mere boy, escaped with his mother Monase into Natal; as did also another brother. Umzambele, fearing for their safety, sent messages expressing his own natural anxieties and alarms lest Cetshwayo should seek to seize them, before Cetshwayo’s continued forbearance towards himself and other members of the Royal House had reassured him.

Between 1856 and 1861 “the Zulu country continued excited and disturbed, . . . but the quarrel being a domestic one, it seemed impossible to hope that any effort would produce permanent good, unless the Zulus themselves would remove the cause of disquiet by nominating the successor.” In 1861 Mr. T. Shepstone undertook the
difficult and somewhat dangerous task of going to Zululand "to endeavour to induce the king and his nobles to agree upon a successor, and to publicly nominate him or his house" in his presence.

This mission was successfully performed, Cetshwayo's house was nominated, and Mr. Shepstone "became chief witness to the formal act." "The result," he says, "was quiet to the Zulu country, and relief to this colony from continual apprehension of fresh disturbances; and with the exception of a serious alarm, which turned out to have no real foundation, although it cost the colony a considerable sum of money, those benefits have continued to this day."

Mr. Shepstone further writes:—"Panda (Umpande) died at Nodwengu about the 18th October, 1872, so that he reigned nearly thirty-three years, during twenty-six of which he was the neighbour of the British Government in Natal. I can from personal knowledge say that he was during all those years faithful and true to the declaration before described, as made by his great predecessor, Chaka, and that little fault could be found with his loyalty and friendliness. Occasional difficulties arose, as was inevitable, considering that the two populations are only separated by a stream of water along a frontier of 100 miles; but the disposition on both sides being to secure a peaceful solution of them, our relations with the Zulus were never seriously disturbed." (P. P. [C. 1137] pp. 6, 7.)

Amidst all the bloodshed and horror which naturally attends a warfare between savages, there stands out the singular, perhaps unprecedented, fact, that Cetshwayo, although victorious to the extent of carrying the nation with him, not only never made any attempt upon the old king, his father's, life, but did not even depose him or seize his throne. The old man lived and—nominally, at all events—reigned for many years, though, owing to his age and obesity, which was so great as to prevent his walking, he seems to have been willing enough to leave the real authority in the hands of his son, while retaining the semblance of it himself. He was treated with all due
respect by Cetshwayo and his followers until he died a
natural death in the year 1872, when Cetshwayo ascended
the throne which had long been virtually his own, and
was proclaimed king of Zululand. This was looked upon
as a fitting time for a little display of authority by our-
selves, hence the friendly expedition to Zululand of 1873,
when we gave Cetshwayo to understand that, however it
might appear to him, he held his power from us, and was
no true king till we made him such. It was also rightly
thought to be an opportunity for suggesting to the Zulu
king such reforms in the government of his country as
would naturally commend themselves to English ideas.
We considered, and with some reason, that capital punish-
ment was an over-frequent occurrence in Zululand, and
that, on the other hand, judicial trials before sentence
should be the universal rule. It was also desirable, if
possible, to decrease the belief in witchcraft, by which so
much power was left in the hands of the witch-doctors or
priests;¹ and finally it was thought necessary to provide
for the safety of the missionaries resident in the land.²
How far this was a desirable step depends entirely on
whether the men themselves were earnest, self-sacrificing,
peace-loving teachers of the gospel of Christ, or mere
traders for their own benefit, under the cloak of a divine
mission, ready to hail a bloody war. “Only the utter
destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South
Africa . . . . we have the approbation of God, our Queen,
and our own conscience.” (See letter from a missionary
clergyman to Sir Bartle Frere,³ dated December 17th,
1878. P. P. [C. 2316] p. 3.)

It was frequently asserted at the time in Natal that
this coronation ceremony (1st September, 1873) was
nothing better than a farce, and the way in which it was
carried out seems hardly to have been understood by the
king himself. The Natalians were puzzled as to what

¹ A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.
² Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in Zululand.
³ Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would be
interesting to see the letter as originally received.
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could be the meaning or intention of what seemed to them a hollow show, and were on the whole rather inclined to put it down to Mr. Shepstone’s supposed habit of “petting the natives,” and to “Exeter Hall influences,” resulting in a ridiculous fuss on their behalf.

From Mr. Shepstone’s despatch on the subject of the coronation of Cetshwayo (P. P. [C. 1137]), and from messages brought from the latter to the Government of Natal after his father’s death, there appears to have been a strong desire on the part, not only of the people, but of the king himself, that his formal succession to the throne should be unattended by bloodshed and disorder, such as had ushered in the rule of his predecessors for several generations. How greatly the character of the Zulu rule had improved in a comparatively short period may be judged by a comparison of the fact [p. 5, *bid.*] (mentioned by Mr. Shopstone), that during the reigns of Chaka and Dingana (brothers of Umpande and uncles to Cetshwayo), all the royal wives were put to death either before the birth of their children, or with their infants afterwards, with the behaviour of Cetshwayo, both to his father and to his father’s wives.\(^1\) And Mr. Shepstone himself speaks of Cetshwayo on the occasion of this visit in the following manner:—“Cetwyayo is a man of considerable ability, much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my conversations with him,” the Secretary for Native Affairs continues, “he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with.” Throughout the despatch, indeed, Mr. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of the king’s “frankness” and “sagacity,” in direct opposition to the charges of craft and duplicity so recklessly brought against the latter of late.

King Umpande died in October, 1872, having reigned nearly thirty-three years, and on the 26th February, 1873, messengers from Cetshwayo brought the news of his father’s death to the Governor of Natal, requesting at the

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\(^1\) One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high treason.
same time that Mr. Shepstone might be sent to instal Cetshwayo as his successor, in order that the Zulu nation should be “more one with the government of Natal,” and be “covered by the same mantle.” The message ended with the request which Cetshwayo never lost an opportunity of making, that we would protect his country from Boer aggressions. We are also commissioned,” say the messengers, “to urge, what has already been urged so frequently, that the government of Natal be extended so as to intervene between the Zulus and the territory of the Transvaal Republic.”

The mere fact that this proposition was frequently and earnestly pressed upon the Natal Government by the Zulus, is in itself a proof positive that the aggressions were not on their side. They desired to place what they looked upon as an impassable barrier between the two countries, and could therefore have had no wish themselves to encroach.

Further messages passed between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government upon the subject, until it was finally arranged that the coronation should be performed by Mr. Shepstone, in Zululand, and, with a party of volunteers as escort, he crossed the Tugela on the 8th August, 1873, accompanied by Major Durnford, R.E., Captain Boyes, 75th Regiment, and several other officers and gentlemen.

Mr. Shepstone’s long despatch, already quoted from, and in which he describes, with true native minuteness, the most trivial circumstances of the journey, and subsequent proceedings, gives the impression that he looked upon his mission as a service of danger to all concerned. It was, however, carried out without any break in the friendly relations between the Zulus and his party, who returned to Pietermaritzburg “without unpleasant incident” on the 19th September.

The coronation mission was carried out—how far

1 As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.

2 Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of arms.
SUCCESSFULLY entirely depends upon the results expected or desired by those in command. The king himself, while looking upon the fact of his recognition as sovereign of Zululand by the English as important, is quite keen enough to have detected certain elements of absurdity in the proceedings by which they invested him with his dignity. There was perhaps a little good-humoured scorn in his reception of the somewhat oddly-chosen presents and marks of honour offered him. Without losing that respect for and faith in the English which has always characterised his dealings with them, he felt impatiently that they were rather making a fool of him; especially when they put upon his shoulders a little scarlet mantle—formerly a lady's opera-cloak—the curtailed dimensions of which made him ridiculous in his own eyes; and upon his head a pasteboard, cloth, and tinsel crown, whose worthlessness he was perfectly capable of comprehending. Mr. Shepstone's despatch represents him as greatly impressed by the ceremony, etc.; but the impression on the minds of many observers was that he put up with much which both seemed and was trifling and ridiculous, for the sake of the solid benefits which he hoped he and his people would derive from a closer connection with the English.

The portion of Mr. Shepstone's despatch, however, which it is important that we should study with attention is that which refers to the "coronation promises" (so called) of Cetshwayo, and treats of the political subjects discussed between king and king-maker.

Sir Bartle Frere repeatedly speaks of the transaction as "a solemn act by the king, undertaken as the price of British support and recognition;" of Cetshwayo as having "openly violated his coronation promises;" of his "undoubted promises;" while Sir Garnet Wolseley, in his speech to the assembled chiefs and people of the Zulu nation, speaks of the coronation promises as though the want of attention to them had been the chief, if not the only, cause of the king's misfortunes; and the same tone is taken in all late despatches on the subject.
And now let us turn to Mr. Shepstone's own report, prepared at the time, and see whether we gather from it the impression that the conditions of his treaty with Cetshwayo were thought of, or intended by him, to stand as solemn and binding promises, of which the infraction, or delay in carrying out, would render the king and his people liable to punishment at our hands. After giving his reasons for objecting to "formal or written" treaties with savages, Mr. Shepstone himself remarks, "Ours is an elastic arrangement." This is a singularly candid confession, of the truth of which there can be little doubt. Whether such a term should be applicable to the treaties made by an English Government is quite another question, to which we will leave the English public to find an answer. We have, however, but to quote from Mr. Shepstone's own despatch to prove the convenient "elasticity" of his propositions, and how greatly they have been magnified of late in seeking a quarrel against the Zulu king. At p. 16 of the report, after enumerating the "arrangements and laws" proposed by him, and heartily approved by the Zulus, Mr. Shepstone remarks:—"Although all this was fully, and even vehemently, assented to, it cannot be expected that the amelioration described will immediately take effect. To have got such principles admitted and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and mature." And at p. 17 he says:—"I told the king that I well knew the difficulties of his position, and that he could overcome them only by moderation and prudence and justice, but without these they would certainly overcome him." And again (p. 18, par. 82) he explains that when he left Natal he had looked upon the "charge" which he knew

1 He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such treaties "involve an admission of equality between the contracting parties," and therefore "encourage presumption on the part of the inferior, etc.; secondly, that "men who cannot read are apt to forget or distort the words of a treaty." A third reason, which does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the case with which a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document, which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer treaties with the natives.
that he would be expected to deliver to Cetshwayo on his installation, as something in the nature of an ordination sermon, or bishop's charge to candidates for confirmation, likely to influence only in so far as the consciences of those addressed might respond, etc.; but that, on entering Zulu-land, he found that the people thought so much of this part of the duty he had undertaken that he felt himself to have "become clothed with the power of fundamental legislation," and thought it right to take advantage of the opportunity for introducing improvements in the government of the people. "I have already described my success," he continues, "and I attribute it to the sagacity of Cetywayo."

But in all this there is no mention of "solemn promises," to break which would be an insult to the majesty of England, and an excuse for war;¹ nor is there, from beginning to end of the despatch, any token that Mr. Shepstone looked upon them in that light, or had any immediate expectation of proving the usefulness of his "elastic" arrangement.

In describing his interviews and political discussions with the Zulu king, Mr. Shepstone speaks repeatedly in high praise of the ability and behaviour of the former. He says in one place:—"Cetywayo received us cordially as before. . . . Major Durnford and my son, with the Natal Native Indunas, sat down with me to an interview with Cetywayo and the councillors, that lasted for five hours without intermission. It was of the most interesting and earnest kind, and was conducted with great ability and frankness by Cetywayo. Theoretically, my business was with the councillors who represented the nation; but, had it not been for the straightforward manner in which Cetywayo insisted upon their going direct to the point, it would have been impossible to have got through the serious subjects we were bound to decide in the time we did."

Of the points discussed in this way the most important

¹ For the opinion of the Secretary of State as to these "promises," see Chapter XII.
was that which, a little later, led directly up to the Zulu War—namely, the aggressions of the Transvaal Boers and the disputed boundary between them and the Zulus. "The whole of the afternoon," says Mr. Shepstone, "was occupied with this subject, about which he occasionally grew very earnest, and declared that he and every Zulu would die rather than submit to them—viz. the Boer encroachments. He reproached the Government of Natal for not having taken up the Zulu cause, and for not even having troubled themselves to examine whether their statements were true or not, while they treated them as if without foundation."

In fact, on this, as on every other occasion, the Zulu king lost no opportunity of protesting against the encroachments of the Boers, lest his peaceable conduct towards these latter, maintained in deference to the wishes of the Natal Government, should be brought up against him later as a proof of their rights. Whatever may have been the intentions and opinions of Mr. Shepstone on the subject of the "coronation promises," he left Cetshwayo unfettered in his own opinion, having merely received certain advice as to the government of his people from his respected friends the English, to whose wishes he should certainly give full attention, and whose counsel he would carry out as far as was, in his opinion, wise or feasible. As already stated, the principal item of the English advice related to capital punishment, which we, with some justice, considered a too frequent occurrence in Zululand, especially in cases of supposed witchcraft, this superstition being undoubtedly the bane of the country.

But in judging of the king's acts in this respect, it should be remembered that, to rule a nation without any assistance in the form of gaols or fetters, capital punishment must needs be resorted to rather more frequently than in our own country, where, indeed, it is not so long since we hung a man for stealing a sheep, and for other acts far short of murder. And as to the superstition concerning witches, it can hardly have led to more cruelty and injustice in Zululand than in civilised European
countries. The practice of smelling out a witch, as it is called, is one to be put a stop to as soon as possible by gradual and gentle means, and Cetshwayo himself had arrived at that conclusion without our assistance, as shown in his conversation with the native printer Magema, whose account of a visit paid to the Zulu king appeared in Macmillan's Magazine for March, 1878.

But the custom of a people—the law of a land—is not to be done away with or altered in an hour; nor could we English reasonably expect such radical changes in the administration of a country to follow our orders as immediately and naturally as we should expect a new ordinance to be received by the natives of Natal living under our own rule. Neither could we justly consider the non-fulfilment of our wishes and commands a sufficient cause for attacking Zululand, although such supposed non-fulfilment was the first, and for a long time the only casus belli which could be found against the Zulu king.

The first occasion on which the solemnity of these "coronation promises" was made of importance was in 1875, when Bishop Schreuder undertook to pay Cetshwayo a visit for the purpose of presenting him with a printed and bound copy of Mr. Shepstone's Report upon the coronation in 1873, and impressing him fully with the wishes of the English Government. Even then, judging from Bishop Schreuder's account of his interview, neither king nor councillors were thoroughly satisfied with the result.°

° See Lecky's Rationalism in Europe:—7,000 at Trèves; 800 by a single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in one year, in the bishopric of Wurtzburg; 1,000 in the province of Como; 400 at once, at Toulouse; 500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one Christian judge boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in sixteen years, 800 witches!

In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aida into the moor to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.

Cetshwayo, while admiring the exact report given of what took place during Mr. Shepstone's visit, objected that he had reserved his own royal prerogatives and the right of putting criminals to death for certain serious crimes, and pointed out that Mr. Shepstone had neglected to inform the Queen of this fact.

Bishop Schreuder, from his own account, appears to have overruled all objections with a very high hand, and almost forced the "book," with his own interpretation of it, upon the seemingly reluctant king, who, he says, "evidently felt himself out of his depth."
CHAPTER II.

LANGALIBALELE.

Meanwhile in Natal mischief was brewing. A certain chief in the north of the colony was supposed to be in a very rebellious frame of mind, and it was rumoured that force of arms would prove necessary in order to bring him to his senses.

This chief was one Langalibalele, who, with his tribe, the Ama-Hlubi, had been driven out of Zululand by Umpande in the year 1848, and had taken refuge in Natal. He was located by the English Government in the country below the Drakensberg Mountains, with the duty imposed upon him of defending Natal against the attacks of the predatory hordes of Bushmen who, in the early days of the colony, made perpetual and destructive raids over the mountains. From this point of view it would seem reasonable that the Hlubi tribe should be permitted the use of firearms, prohibited, except under certain restrictions, to the natives of Natal; inattention to which prohibition was the ground upon which the original suspicions concerning Langalibalele's loyalty were based. The law, however, by which this prohibition and these restrictions were made was one of those enactments which, even when theoretically wise, are often practically impossible, and to which new communities are so prone.

Theoretically no native can possess a gun in Natal which has not been registered before a magistrate. Practically, in every kraal, in every part of the colony,
there were, and doubtless still are, many unregistered guns, bought by natives, or given to them in lieu of wages by their masters (a common practice at the Diamond Fields), with very vague comprehension or total ignorance on the part of the native that any unlawful act had been committed. This would be more especially natural when the masters who thus furnished their men with the forbidden weapon were themselves in some way connected with the government of the country (Natal), whose sanction would therefore be looked upon by the natives as an equivalent to the permission of Government itself. But in point of fact the law had always been enforced in such an extremely lax way, the evasions of it were so easy and numerous, and so many white men of position and respectability in the colony were party to the infraction of it, that it is no wonder that its reality and importance was but lightly engraved upon the native mind.

The special accusation, however, brought against Langalibalele to prove his rebellious tendencies was that young men of his tribe were in possession of unregistered guns, which, in addition, had not been brought in to the magistrate, when demanded, for registration. The reason for this unwillingness (on the part of the young men) to comply with the above demands, appeared afterwards in the fact that other guns which had been properly produced for registration, had, after considerable delay, been returned to their owners in an injured condition, rendering them unfit for use.

As these guns were the well-earned reward of hard labour, and greatly valued by their possessors, it is little to be wondered at that there should be considerable reluctance on the part of others to risk the same loss. A little forbearance and consideration on the part of those in authority might, however, easily have overcome the difficulty. But in this case, as in others, the mistake was committed of requiring prompt and unquestioning obedience, without sufficient care being taken to protect the rights of those who rendered it. As usual we would not
stop to reason or deal justly with the savage. Carelessness of the property of the natives, the overbearing impatience of a magistrate, the want of tact and good feeling on the part of a commonplace subordinate—all these led to an indefinitely uneasy state of things, which soon produced considerable anxiety in the colonial mind. This feeling prevailed during Mr. Shepstone's absence in Zululand, and it was generally understood that the Secretary for Native Affairs' next piece of work after crowning Cetshwayo would be that of "settling Langalibalele."

But beyond the reluctance to produce their guns for registration, there was nothing in the behaviour of the Hlubi tribe to give the colonists cause for apprehension. No lawless acts were committed, no cattle stolen, no farmhouse fired, and the vague fears which existed amongst the white inhabitants as to what might happen were rather the result of the way in which "Government" shook its head over the matter as a serious one, than justified by any real cause for alarm. It was in fact one of those "Government scares" which occasionally were produced from causes or for reasons not apparent on the surface.

On Mr. Shepstone's return from the coronation of Cetshwayo, Government native messengers were sent to Langalibalele, requiring the latter to come down in person to Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, to answer for the conduct of his tribe concerning their guns. The message produced a great—and to those who were ignorant of the cause of it—a most unreasonable panic in the tribe, in which the chief himself shared considerably. The Ama-Hlubi appeared exceedingly suspicious, even of the designs of the Government messengers, who were made to take off their great-coats, and were searched for concealed weapons before being admitted into the presence of Langalibalele. Such distrust of British good faith was held in itself to be a crime, the insolence of which could not be overlooked. Furthermore it was soon evident that the tribe would not trust their chief, nor he his person, in the hands of the Government,
now that he was in disfavour. Without actually refusing to obey the orders he had received and proceed to Pietermaritzburg, Langalibalele sent excuses and apologies, chiefly turning upon his own ill-health, which made travelling difficult to him. This answer was the signal for the military expedition of 1873, which was entered upon without any further attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the affair, or to find out the real grounds for the evident fear and distrust of the Hlubi tribe. In October, 1873, the force, partly of regulars, partly colonial, a few Basuto horse, with an entirely unorganised and useless addition of untrained Natal natives, started from Pietermaritzburg, with all the pomp and circumstance of war; and much to the delight of the young colonial blood on the look-out for martial distinction. The tribe, however, far from having the least wish to fight, or intention of opposing the British force, deserted their location as soon as the news reached them that the army had started, and fled with their chief over the Drakensberg Mountains. Our force, commanded by Colonel Milles of the 75th Regiment, and accompanied by the Lieut.-Governor Sir B. C. O. Pine and Mr. Shepstone, reached a place called Meshlyn, situated on the confines of the district to be subdued, on October 31st; but the "enemy" had vanished, and were reported to be making the best of their way out of the colony, without, however, committing ravages of any description on their way, even to the extent of carrying off any of their neighbours' cattle. In fact they were frightened, and simply ran away. Our object now was to arrest the tribe in its flight; and a plan was formed for inclosing it in a network of troops, seizing all the passes over the mountains, and thus reducing it to submission.

Positions were assigned to the different officers in command, and the scheme looked extremely well on paper, and to men who were not acquainted with the district and the exceeding difficulty of travelling through it. Unfortunately, with the same lamentable failure in the Intelligence Department which has characterised the
more important proceedings of 1879, very little was known, by those in command, of the country, or of what was going on in it. Mr. Shepstone himself, whose supposed knowledge of the people, their land, and all concerning them was so greatly and naturally relied upon, proved totally ignorant of the distances which lay between one point and another, or of the difficulties to be overcome in reaching them.

In consequence of this singular ignorance a little force was sent out on the evening of November 2nd, under command of Major Durnford, R.E., chief of the staff, with orders to seize and hold a certain pass known as the Bushman's River Pass, over which Langalibalele was expected to escape; the distance having been miscalculated by about two-thirds, and the difficulties of the way immensely underrated.

Major Durnford was himself a new-comer in the colony at that time, and had therefore no personal knowledge of the country; but he was supplied with full, though, as it soon appeared, unreliable information by those under whose command he served, and who were in possession of a plan or diagram of the district which turned out to be altogether incorrect. He did, indeed, reach his assigned post, though four-and-twenty hours after the time by which he expected to be there; while those sent out to take up other positions never reached them at all, owing to the same incorrect information concerning locality.

Major Durnford was in command of a party composed of 2 officers, 6 non-commissioned officers, and 47 rank and file of the Natal and Karkloof Carbineers, 24 mounted Basutos,\(^1\) and a native interpreter. His orders were\(^2\) to seize and hold the Bushman's River Pass, "with a view to preventing the entrance in or out of the colony of any natives until the expedition is ready to cross over." Special orders were also given to him that he was on no account to fire the first shot.

There was one excellent reason, not generally taken

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\(^1\) Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.
\(^2\) See Field Force Ordr., 1873.
into consideration, for this order, in the fact that the three days given by Government to the tribe in which to surrender would not be over until midday on the 3rd of November.

Starting at 8.30 p.m. on the 2nd November, Major Durnford's force only reached its destination at 6.30 a.m. on the 4th, having traversed a most difficult country, broken, pathless, and well-nigh inaccessible. On the line of march many men fell out, utterly unable to keep up; pack-horses with provisions and spare ammunition were lost; and Major Durnford had his left shoulder dislocated, and other severe injuries, by his horse falling with him over a precipice on the 3rd. He pressed on for some hours, but became quite exhausted at the foot of the Giant's Castle Pass, where he lay some time; he was then dragged up with the aid of a blanket, reaching the top of the pass at 2 a.m. At 4 a.m. Major Durnford was lifted on his horse, and with his force—reduced to 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 33 troopers, and the Basutos—pushed on to Bushman's River Pass, and occupied it at 6.30 a.m., finding Langalibalele's men already in the pass.

Major Durnford posted his men, and went forward with the interpreter to parley with the chiefs, and induce them to return to their allegiance. This was a service of danger, for the young warriors were very excited. Seeing that the enemy were getting behind rocks, &c., commanding the mouth of the pass, he made every preparation for hostilities, though restricted by the order not to fire the first shot. Finding that, although the natives drew back when he bade them, they pressed on again when his back was turned, and that the volunteers were wavering, he at last reluctantly directed an orderly retreat to higher ground, from whence he could still command the pass. Upon a shot being fired by the natives, the retreat became a stampede, and a heavy fire being opened, three of the Carbineers and one Basuto fell. The horse of the interpreter was killed, and, while Major Durnford was endea-vouring to reach the man and lift him on his own horse,
the interpreter was killed by his side, and Major Durnford was surrounded and left alone. Dropping the reins, he drew his revolver, and shot his immediate assailants, who had seized his horse’s bridle, and, after running the gauntlet of a numerous enemy at close quarters, escaped with one serious wound, an assegai-stab in the left arm, whereby it was permanently disabled. He received one or two trifling cuts besides, and his patrol-jacket was pierced in many places. Getting clear of the enemy, Major Durnford rallied a few Carbineers and the Basutos, and covered the retreat.

The head-quarters camp was reached about 1 A.M. on the 5th. At 11 p.m. on that day, Major Durnford led out a volunteer party—artillery with rockets, 50 men of the 75th Regiment, 7 Carbineers, and 30 Basutos—to the rescue of Captain Boyes, 75th Regiment, who had been sent out with a support on the 3rd, and was believed to be in great danger. Major Durnford had received such serious injuries that the doctor endeavoured to dissuade him from further exertion, but as those sent to his support were in danger and he knew the country, he determined to go. He was lifted on his horse, and left amid the cheers of the troops in camp. Having marched all night—resting only from 3 to 5 A.M.—they met Captain Boyes’ party about mid-day; they had lost their way, and thus did not find the Giant’s Castle Pass.

After this, Major Durnford, with a considerable force occupied Bushman’s River Pass, recovered and buried the bodies of his comrades, and held the pass. He afterwards patrolled the disturbed districts. The Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. C. C. Pine, in a despatch dated 13th November, 1873, accepted the responsibility of the orders not to fire the first shot, and said of Major Durnford: “He behaved, by testimony of all present, in the most gallant manner, using his utmost exertions to rally his little force, till, left absolutely alone, he was reluctantly compelled to follow them—wounded.”

Colonel Milles, commanding the field force, published the following order:
"Camp Meshlyn, 7th November, 1879.

"The Commandant, with deep regret, announces to the field force under his command the loss of three Carbineers, viz.: Mr. Erskine, Mr. Potterill, and Mr. Bond, and of one native interpreter, Elijah, who formed part of the small force sent up with Major Durnford, R.E., to secure the passes, and who were killed during the retreat of that party from the passes, which, although they had gallantly seized, they were unable to hold, the orders being for 'the forces not to fire the first shot,' and so having to wait till they were placed at a great disadvantage. The brave conduct of those killed is testified to by all their comrades, and there is consolation alone in the thought that they died nobly fighting for their country. The Commandant must, however, publicly render his thanks to Major Durnford for the way in which he commanded the party, for his courage and coolness, and especially for the noble way in which, after his return from the passes, being almost exhausted, he mustered a volunteer party and marched to the relief of Captain Boyes, who was considered in great danger.

"By command,

"A. E. ARENGO CROSS
"(For Chief of the Staff).

Although the main body of the fighting-men of the tribe had left Natal, most of the women and children, the sick and infirm, with a few able-bodied men to watch over them, had taken refuge in holes and caves, of which there are a considerable number in that mountainous part of the colony. The men of the tribe, indeed, were in disgrace with the Government, and thought it best to be out of the way when the British force paid their homes a visit, but it was not for a moment imagined that the soldiers would make war upon women and children. The latter, in any case, could not have taken that tremendous and hurried journey across the great mountains; and, with what soon proved a very mistaken confidence on the part of the people, all who could neither fight nor travel were left in these hiding-places, from which they expected to emerge
in safety as soon as the troops, finding no one to oppose them, should have left the district. "The English soldiers will not touch the children," was the expression used. So far, however, was this idea from being realised, that the remainder of the expedition consisted of a series of attempts, more or less successful, to hunt the unfortunate "children" out of their hiding-places and take them prisoners.

During these proceedings many acts were committed under Government sanction which can only be characterised by the word "atrocities," and which were as useless and unnecessary as they were cruel.\(^1\)

Poor frightened, creatures were smoked to death or killed by rockets in caves which they dared not leave for fear of a worse fate at the hands of their captors; women and children were killed, men were tortured, and prisoners put to death. On one occasion a white commander of native forces is said to have given the significant information to his men that he did not wish to see the faces of any prisoners; and it is reported that a prisoner was made over to the native force to be put to death as the latter chose. The colonial newspapers apologised at the time for some of these acts, on the score that they were the result of the youthful enthusiasm of "Young Natal" fleshing his maiden sword.

These acts were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops and native levies, and are a signal proof of how great a crime it is to turn undisciplined or savage troops, over whom no responsible person has any real control, loose upon a defenceless people. The excuse made by those in authority in such cases is always, "We did not intend these things to take place, but horrors are always attendant on savage warfare." But such excuses are of small value when, in campaign after campaign, it has been proved that the use of colonial troops under their own

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\(^1\) In the Zulu language the word *abantu ama* (children) is a general one, including both women and children.

\(^2\) It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit of an enemy to be fought.
officers, and of disorganised masses of armed "friendly natives," is invariably productive of scenes disgraceful to the name of England without any attempt being made to introduce a better system. Certainly if "horrors" beyond the fair fortune of war are necessarily attendant upon savage warfare, they should not be those inflicted by British troops and their allies upon unarmed or solitary men, women, and children.

So many women were injured in dislodging them from the caves that Major Durnford, on his second return from the mountains, instituted a hospital-tent where they might be attended to; but such humanity was by no means the general rule.

If acts of barbarity were for the most part committed by the irregular troops, there is one instance to the contrary which can never be forgotten in connection with this affair—so flagrant a case that the friends of the officer in command, when the story first appeared in the colonial papers, refused to believe in it until it was authenticated beyond a doubt.

A body of troops—six artillermen, irregular cavalry, and undisciplined natives—upon one occasion during this expedition were engaged for some hours in trying to dislodge a solitary native from a cave in which he had taken refuge. The force had discovered the hiding-place by the assistance of a little boy, whom they captured and induced to betray his friends.

The "rebel" (in this case there was but one) refused to surrender, and for a long while defended himself gallantly against the attacks of the whole force. Shots were fired through the apertures of the cave, rockets (a new and horrible experience to the poor creature) were discharged upon him. At last after holding out for some hours, the man gave up the struggle, and coming out from his insufficient shelter begged for mercy at the hands of his numerous foe. He had a good many wounds upon him, but none sufficiently severe to prevent his walking out amongst his captors, and asking them to spare his life. After a short consultation amongst the officers, a decision was arrived at as to the
proper treatment of this man, who had proved himself a brave soldier and was now a helpless captive.

By order of the officer commanding, a trooper named Moodie put his pistol to the prisoner's head and blew out his brains. A court-martial sat upon this officer in the course of the following year, and he was acquitted of all blame. The defence was that the man was so seriously injured that it was an act of humanity to put an end to him, and that the officer dared not trust him in the hands of the natives belonging to the English force, who were exasperated by the long defence he had made. But the prisoner was not mortally nor even dangerously wounded. He was able to walk and to speak, and had no wound upon him which need necessarily have caused his death. And as to the savage temper of the native force, there was no reason why the prisoner should be left in their charge at all, as there was a considerable white force present at the time.¹

The result of the expedition against the Hlubi tribe was so little satisfactory that those in authority felt themselves obliged to look about for something else to do before taking the troops back to Pietermaritzburg.

¹ The following account of the above transaction was given by one of those concerned, in a letter to The Natal Times of that date: "Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot, took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have some more."

² The Natal Government Gazette, December 9th, 1873, contains the following enactment: "All officers and other persons who have acted under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chilley Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G., as Lieutenant-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over the native population, or have acted bona fide for the purposes and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts, matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and declared to be lawful, and are confirmed."
They found what they wanted ready to their hand. Next to Langalibalele's location lay that of the well-to-do and quiet little tribe of Putini. "Government" had as yet found no fault with these people, and, secure in their own innocence, they had made no attempt to get out of the way of the force which had come to destroy their neighbours, but remained at home, herded their cattle, and planted their crops as usual in obedience to the express instructions of the resident magistrate. Unfortunately, however, the two tribes were intimately related, and when that of Langalibalele fled, the wives of several of his men took refuge in their fathers' kraals in the next location. No further proof was required of the complicity of Putini with Langalibalele, or of the rebellious condition of the small tribe. Consequently it was at once, as the natives term it, "eaten up," falling an easy prey owing to its unsuspecting state. The whole tribe—men, women, and children—were taken prisoners and carried down to Pietermaritzburg, their cattle and goods were confiscated, and their homes destroyed. Several of the Putini men were killed, but there was very little resistance, as they were wholly taken by surprise. The colony was charmed with this success, and the spoils of the Putini people were generally looked to to pay some of the expenses of the campaign. Whatever may have been the gain to the Government, by orders of which the cattle (the chief wealth of the tribe) were sold, it was not long shared by the individual colonists who purchased the animals. The pasture in that part of the country from which they had come is of a very different description from any to be found in the environs of Pietermaritzburg, and, in consequence of the change, the captured cattle died off rapidly almost as soon as they changed hands. But this was not all, for they had time, before they died, to spread amongst the original cattle of their new owners two terrible scourges, in the shape of "lung-sickness" and "red-water," from which the midland districts had long been free. One practical result of the expedition of 1873 seems to be that neither meat, milk, nor butter have ever
again been so cheap in the colony as they were before that date, the two latter articles being often unobtainable to this day.

The unhappy prisoners of both tribes were driven down like beasts to Pietermaritzburg, many of the weaker dying from want and exposure on the way. Although summer-time, it happened to be very wet, and therefore cold; our native force had been allowed to strip the unfortunates of all their possessions, even to their blankets and the leather petticoats of the women. The sufferings of these poor creatures—many of them with infants a few days old, or born on the march down—were very great. A scheme was at first laid, by those in authority, for "giving the women and children out" as servants for a term of years—that is to say, for making temporary slaves of them to the white colonists. This additional enormity was vetoed by the home Government, but the fact remains that its perpetration was actually contemplated by those intrusted with the government of the colony, and especially of the natives, and was hailed by the colonists as one of the advantages to accrue to them from the expedition of 1873. Several children were actually given out in the way referred to before the order to the contrary arrived from England, and a considerable time elapsed before they were all recovered by their relatives.

The unhappy women and children of the Langalibalele tribe were mere emaciated skeletons when they reached the various places where they were to live under surveillance. They seemed crushed with misery, utterly ignorant of the cause of their misfortunes, but silent and uncomplaining. Many of the women had lost children—few knew whether their male relatives were yet alive. On being questioned, they knew nothing of Mr. Shepstone, not even his name, which was always supposed to command the love and fear of natives throughout the length and breadth of the land. They did not know what the tribe had done to get into such trouble; they only knew that the soldiers had come, and that they had run away and hidden themselves; that
some of them were dead, and the rest were ready to die too and have it all over. A considerable number of these poor creatures were permitted by Government to remain upon the Bishop's land, where most of them gradually regained health and spirits, but retained always the longing for their own homes and people and their lost chief which characterises them still.  

1 It is hard to understand why these people should yet be deprived of all their property and land, and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one. Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. "I am weary; when will they let me go?" was his continual question.
CHAPTER III.

TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE.

Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief. Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled, carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the money, whether it became Molappo's perquisite, or whether it formed part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof that their tendencies were by no means rebellious.

Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and head-men, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the town on the 31st December.

So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted from the expedition, that the
unhappy man, a helpless captive, was insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon his way to Durban.

It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed. Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone's word in all that concerned them.

That so many years should have passed without the Bishop's having discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone's real personal regard for the Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and, where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the Bishop's mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details before a mind otherwise and fully employed.

The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the
Bishop's eyes. While it lasted, although deeply deploiring the loss of life on either side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges against their chief should be proved.

The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been done was the first blow to his friend's reliance on him. The mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr. Shepstone's policy closed the intimacy of their friendship.

It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home that justice had been done, but which could have but one result, the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be proved innocent of the charges brought against him.

That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to cross-examine the witnesses: consequently the official record of the trial can only be looked upon as an ex parte statement of the case, derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief, examined by the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner's behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafr law.

1 Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.
2 The Lieutenant-Governor of the colony.
3 Kafr law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by English law.
But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction; and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal. Even those colonists who were most violent against the so-called "rebel," and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had been "taken red-handed," saw that the authorities had put themselves in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of which so much could be alleged.

In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of His Excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only debarred by an ordinance of the colony 1 from sitting as judge in such a court, from which he (with his Executive Council) would be the sole judge in a court of appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th, 1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had "set themselves in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty's Government in this colony," and "proclaiming and making known that they were in rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws," and that "the said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to exist," and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.

His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an unpredisposed judge of the first instance in the prisoner's case; nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone (one of the Executive Council, and therefore a member of the Court of Appeal), by whose advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken. As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected to have an independent opinion in the

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1 Ordinance No. 3, 1849.
matter, especially the "native chiefs and indunas," who knew very well that they would be liable to the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show any favour towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly follow the lead of their white "brother-judges" (!) and masters.

The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they were but dummy judges after all.

Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered to be, a native court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could possibly tell on the prisoner's side (notably the use of counsel) being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction admitted.

It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the Supreme Chief to "appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or other authorities" among the natives, but gives him no power to sentence to death, or to "banishment or transportation for life to such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint." When Langalibalele had been "removed" from his chieftainship, and himself and the bulk of his tribe "driven over the mountain out of the colony" by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in *Kafir Laws and Customs*, p. 39.
Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose "evidence would justify or extenuate what he had done," a plea which in any ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of "Not guilty."

The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment, the contents of which had been "interpreted" to them, and their signatures "witnessed," by which the prisoner is declared to have been "convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world." The absurdity of this is palpable, since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to please him—one of them being "Head Induna of the Natal Government," and another the "Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs."

To turn to these crimes, "for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world"—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:—

1. "Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner\(^1\) not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible coercion according to our (civilised) laws and customs." Which charge we may at once dismiss as absurd.

2. "Permitting, or probably encouraging, his tribe to possess firearms, and retain them contrary to law."

3. "With reference to these firearms, defying the authority of the magistrate, and once insulting the messenger."

\(^1\) The italics are the Author's own in this and the following charge.
4. "Refusing to appear before" the Supreme Chief when summoned, "excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood," and "insulting his messenger."

5. "Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the colony under an armed escort."

6. "Causing the death of Her Majesty's subjects at the Bushman's River Pass."

It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the chief could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last, seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express commands, and to his great regret.

Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the statements contained in the second and third charges are the only proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that "this was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him when ordered to do so;" and this was the first time for more than twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.

Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor could he justly be said to have even "permitted" them to do so merely because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It is also to be observed that amongst the six sons captured with him only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged them to possess themselves of firearms.

But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might
be considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of this assertion may be brought *Perrin’s Register* for the years 1871–2–3—the years during which a large number of natives received payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named chiefs being *indunas* to the very magistrate who complained of Langalibalele—was as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Huts</th>
<th>GUNS REGISTERED IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndomba</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faku</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mzanu</td>
<td>1277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fukade</td>
<td>2222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zikali</td>
<td>1651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodada</td>
<td>3000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Putini</td>
<td>1239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langalibalele</td>
<td>2244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial Court under the ordinary law of the colony. The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered guns—because they
had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened by
the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and
that he could not find eight others, said to have come into
the colony with guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such
insufficient data, and unless their names were given to
him. The sincerity of which reasoning was shortly proved
by the fact that, as soon as their names were notified to
him, he did send in three of those very lads, with their
guns, and two more belonging to other members of their
party, besides sending in with their guns those who had
worked for Mr. W. E. Shepstone, and who probably thought
that the name of their master was a sufficient guarantee
for their right to possess firearms.

The charge of insulting the native messengers from
Government, of which a great deal was made at first,
proved to be of very little consequence when investig-
tated, but it is one to which special attention should
be given, because, indirectly, it is connected with the
Zulu War.

The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for
the prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government,
stated in his evidence-in-chief on the second day of the
trial, that on the occasion of his carrying a message from
Government, the prisoner’s people had “taken all his things
from him,” and had “stripped, and taken him naked”
into the Chief’s presence. But on the fourth day, in
answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that
they had intended to strip him but had allowed him to
retain his trousers and boots,” thereby contradicting him-
self flatly. Nevertheless the court being asked by His
Excellency whether it required further evidence on this
point, replied in the negative. They did not even ask a
question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion mes-
sengers, Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were
examined; Mnyembe’s evidence-in-chief being cut short
before he came to that part of the story, and Gayede’s taken
up just after it.

The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day
when he was brought down to Pietermaritzburg. December
THE ZULU WAR.

'31st, till the day when his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede would have done, that Mawiza's statements about the "stripping" were false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the "stripping" in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two coats, by the chief's orders, "as a matter of precaution caused by fear" and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance.

This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal to "appear before" the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive native chiefs had languished and died before him.¹

¹ The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to, however, were not "banished," but merely imprisoned in a portion of their own Supreme Chief's territory, where, at proper times, they could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover, they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory; whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.
CHAPTER IV.

THE BISHOP'S DEFENCE.

The daily accounts of the trial which appeared in the local papers were read with great interest and attention by the Bishop, who quickly discerned the injustice of the proceedings. Mawiza's manifest contradiction of his own evidence first attracted his attention, and led to his hearing from some of his own natives what was not allowed to appear at the trial, that Mawiza's story was entirely false. Seeing how seriously this fact bore upon the prisoner's case, he went to Mr. Shepstone and told him what he had heard.

The Secretary for Native Affairs was at first very indignant with the Bishop's informant, doubting the truth of his statement, and declaring that the man must be severely punished if it were proved that he had lied. The Bishop, confident in the integrity of his native,\(^1\) assented, saying, however that the same argument should apply to Mawiza. The matter was at once privately investigated by Mr. Shepstone—the Bishop, Mawiza, Magema, and others being present—with the result that Mr. Shepstone himself was obliged to acknowledge the untrustworthiness of Mawiza, who was reproved in the severest terms for his prevarications by the other native indunas.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The same Magema, the Bishop's printer, before mentioned.

\(^2\) Although Mawiza's lies were plainly exposed, he was never punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over which he has been placed by the Government.
Singularly enough, however, this discovery made no difference whatever in the condemnation and sentence of the prisoner, although the charge thus, to a great extent, disposed of, was the most serious of those brought against him.

But this was not all. Another point struck the Bishop very forcibly; namely, the perpetual recurrence of one phrase from various witnesses. "He (Langalibalele) was afraid, remembering what was done to Matshana," and "he was afraid that he should be treated as Matshana was, when he was summoned to appear by Government." Such expressions, used in excuse of the chief's conduct, would, of course, have been inquired into had the prisoner been allowed counsel, or had any one watched the case on his behalf. But although the court judged the excuse of "fear" to be an added fault on the chief's part, and although several allusions were made by witnesses to a specific cause for this fear, no question was asked, and no notice taken by those present of the frequently recurring phrase. The Bishop, however, in the interests of justice and truth, made inquiries amongst his own natives as to the meaning of these allusions. He knew, of course, in common with the rest of the inhabitants of Natal, that in the year 1858, a native chief named Matshana had got into some trouble with the Government of Natal. A commando had gone out against him, and, after a skirmish with some native troops under Mr. John Shepstone, in which Mr. Shepstone was wounded, and some men on the other side killed, he had escaped with his people into Zululand, where he had lived ever since. The Bishop had never heard the details of the affair, and knew of nothing in connection with this incident which could account for the "fear because of what was done to Matshana."

"Can you tell me anything of the story of Matshana's escape from Natal?" was the question put by him at different times to different natives; and every one thus questioned gave substantially the same account, of what was plainly among them a well-known, and well-remembered incident in the history of the colony.

Matshana, they said, was accused of some offence, and
being summoned before the authorities to answer for it, had refused to appear. Mr. John Shepstone, with a native force, of whom the people of this very Langalibalele, then a young chief, formed a portion, was sent out to endeavour to reduce him to obedience. Mr. Shepstone invited him to a friendly interview, in which they might talk over matters, but to which Matshana's men were to bring no weapons. In consequence of the reluctance of Matshana to fulfil this condition, the proposed interview fell through several times before it was finally arranged. Matshana's people, even then, however, brought their weapons with them, but they were induced to leave them at a certain spot a short distance off. The meeting took place; Mr. Shepstone being seated in a chair with his people behind him, Matshana and his men crouched native fashion upon the ground, suspicious and alert, in a semicircle before him. Suddenly Mr. Shepstone drew a gun from beneath the rug at his feet, and fired it (he says, as a signal), whereupon his men, some of whom had already ridden between Matshana's party and their arms, fell on, and the struggle became general, resulting in the death of many of Matshana's people. The chief himself, who seems to have been on the look-out for a surprise, escaped unhurt. He was resting upon one knee only when the first shot was fired, and sprang over the man crouching behind him. Another man, named Deke, who was sitting close to him, and on whose knee Matshana set his foot in jumping, was wounded in the knee, but is alive to this day.

This story, which in varied form, but substantially as given above, was generally known and believed by the natives, furnished a very complete explanation of why Langalibalele ventured to distrust the good faith and honour of the Government, having himself taken part in, and been witness of, such a disgraceful transaction; which, when it came to the knowledge of the Secretary of State, was emphatically condemned by him. Remembering this circumstance, it is not wonderful that Langalibalele should have taken the precaution of searching the Government messengers for concealed weapons.
It seemed strange that Mr. Shepstone, sitting as judge upon the bench to try a man for his life, should silently allow so great a justification of his chief offence to remain concealed. But it seemed stranger still to suppose him ignorant of any part of an affair carried out under his authority, and by his own brother.

However, the Bishop took the matter privately to him in the first instance, telling him what he had heard, and pointing out what an important bearing it had upon the unfortunate prisoner’s case. He was met by a total denial on Mr. Shepstone’s part that any such act of treachery had ever taken place, or that there were any grounds for the accusation.

Nevertheless, after careful consideration, and on thoroughly sifting the obtainable evidence, the Bishop could not avoid coming to the painful conclusion that the story was substantially true, and was a valid excuse for Langalibalele’s fear. Finding that further appeal on behalf of the prisoner to those on the spot was in vain, he now wrote and printed a pamphlet (giving the usual native version that the first shot fired was at Matshana) on the subject for private circulation, and especially for Lord Carnarvon’s information.¹

One of the first results of the appearance of this pamphlet was a demand on the part of Mr. J. Shepstone’s solicitor for “an immediate, full, and unqualified retractation of the libel falsely and maliciously published in the pamphlet, with a claim for 1,000L damages for the injury done to Mr. J. Shepstone by the same.”

Such an action would have had but a small chance of a decision upon the Bishop’s side at that time in Natal, so,

¹ On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal and the executive Council of the Colony. The appeal was made in the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the Lieutenant-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his correspondence, with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August 6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home on route for England.
to defend himself—and not, as generally supposed, out of enmity to the Shepstones—he appealed to Lord Carnarvon in the matter, on the grounds that his action had been taken for the public good, and in the interests of justice.

Meanwhile the unfortunate chief and his eldest son Malambule were sent to Robben Island, the former as a prisoner for life, the latter for five years. They were secretly conveyed away from Pietermaritzburg to the port, and every effort made to prevent the Bishop from seeing them, or interfering on their behalf. 1 Other sons, two of them mere lads, who had as yet held no more important position in the tribe than that of herdboys to their father’s cattle, and many of the head men and indunas, were condemned to imprisonment in the gaol at Pietermaritzburg for terms varying in length from six months to seven years. The two young sons, lads named Mazwi and Siyepu, were kept prisoners for the shortest period named, six months; but it was some little time after they left the gaol before they were really set at liberty. The family at Bishopstowe, where the old Induna Umhlaba was already located with his children, desired to have the two boys also sent to Bishopstowe, in accordance with their father’s wishes, as soon as their imprisonment was at an end, and therefore applied for them. Somewhat to their surprise all sorts of difficulties were raised on the point—one would have thought a very simple one—and they were at last curtly informed that the boys did not wish to go to Bishopstowe, and would remain where they were, under surveillance in another district. The Bishop himself was away at the time, but his eldest daughter, acting for him, soon discovered through native sources that in point of fact the boys were extremely anxious to go to Bishopstowe, but were in too terrified a condition to express

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1 The Bishop states in an official letter to Mr. Shepstone:—“The first petition in the matter was presented on March 1, and more than five weeks elapsed before permission to appeal was granted (April 9); and then my request to be allowed to see the prisoner with a view to preparing the appeal, first made on April 16, was not granted till a month afterwards (May 16), at which time the prisoner had been removed to Durban (May 1), which involved a delay of ten days more.”
a wish. The question had been put to them in this form: "So! you have been complaining! you say you want to leave the place you have been sent to, and go to Bishopstowe?" Whereupon the frightened lad's spirits crushed by all that had befallen them, naturally answered: "We never complained, nor asked to go anywhere"—which was perfectly true. The Bishop, however, having heard in England an account of this from Miss Colenso, reported the matter to Lord Carnarvon, who gave the necessary instructions, and, on the Bishop's return, Mazwi and Siyepu entered the Bishopstowe school, which had already been established for the boys of the scattered tribe. Under the treatment which they there received they soon began to recover from their distress, and to lose the terrified expression in the eyes which characterised them painfully at first. But the health of Mazwi, the elder, was broken by hardship and confinement, and he died of consumption a few years after.1

It soon became apparent that there must be something specially injurious to the prisoners in their life in gaol beyond the mere fact of confinement. Nearly all the men of the Hlubi tribe left it labouring under a dreadful complaint of a complicated form (said to be some species of elephantiasis), of which a considerable number died; others, as in Mazwi's case, falling victims to consumption. On inquiry it appeared that the fault lay in the excessive washing to which every part of the building was habitually subjected—floors and bed-boards being perpetually scrubbed, and therefore seldom thoroughly dry. This state of things was naturally a trial to the constitutions of people accustomed to life in the warm smoke-laden atmosphere of a native hut. However beneficial it might be to the natives to instruct them in habits of cleanliness,2 this was hardly the way to do it, and the results

1 He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind, to go to England, and see a civilized country.
2 The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and habitations, although they are very particular about their food, utensils, and other matters.
were distressing. The peculiar complaint resulting from confinement in the city gaol was commonly known amongst the natives as the "gaol-disease," but it had not attracted the same attention while the victims to it were occasional convicts, as it did when it attacked a large number of innocent prisoners of war!

After the chief had been sent to Robben Island, it was represented, by those interested in his welfare, that to leave him there for the rest of his life without any of his family or people near him—except his son Malambule, who was to be released in five years' time—would be a great and unnecessary addition to the hardship of his position; and it was finally decided that one of his wives and a servant of his own should be sent to join him in captivity, but not till six months after Langalibalele had been removed, by Lord Carnarvon's order, through the intervention of the Bishop, from Robben Island—where he had been imprisoned twelve months, besides eight months previously in Natal, to Uitvlugt, an adjoining portion of the mainland, bleak and barren indeed, but an improvement upon Robben Island. A few days after this decision a story was circulated in the colony, causing some amusement, and a little triumph on the part of the special opponents of the chief and his cause: it was to the effect that "out of all Langalibalele's wives not one was willing to go to him," and many were the sarcastic comments made upon the want of family affection thus evinced by the natives. On due inquiry it turned out that the manner in which the question had been put to them was one highly calculated to produce a negative answer. Native policemen, who were sent to the kraals where they were living, to inquire which of them would be willing to go, accosted them with "Come along! come along and be killed with your chief!" which proposition was not unnaturally looked upon with considerable disfavour. When, however, the matter was properly explained to them, they all expressed their willingness to go, although a journey across the (to them) great unknown element was by no means a trifling matter in their eyes. The woman selected in the first instance
was one Nokwetuka, who then came to Bishopstowe, where she was fitted out for her journey, and provided with suitable clothes. She joined her husband as proposed, as also did a lad of the tribe Fife, who happened to be residing (free) at the Cape, and obtained permission to attend upon his chief. Six months afterwards two other women, and after six months more a little son were added to the party.

For the son, Malambule, however, there was no possibility of making any such arrangements during the five years of his captivity, as he was a bachelor; although when he was captured he had a bride in prospect, the separation from and probable loss of whom weighed greatly upon his mind. He could not even learn whether she was yet alive, as so many women had been killed, and others had died since from the effects of the hardships they had undergone; while it was more than probable, supposing her to be yet living, that she might be given in marriage to some other more fortunate individual, either by the authority of her relatives, or as happened in another case, by that of the Government of Natal.

1 This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the captives.

2 The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which in its absurd and causeless fear of "treasonable correspondence," will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele's confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the family in September, 1878, and asked them to tell her what tribes they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she had no power to send some babies' socks which the women had chosen, and a comforter for the old man's neck, except through an official individual and by formal permission.

3 A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs), who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was granted, but the woman
Towards the end of his imprisonment, Malambule grew very restless and morose; and, when he found himself detained some time after the term of years had elapsed, he became extremely indignant and difficult to manage, being in fact in a far more "rebellious" frame of mind than he ever was before. On one occasion he showed so much temper that it was thought necessary to put him under temporary restraint in the gaol. Apparently he was very wise in giving so much trouble, for it was shortly found expedient to let him go. He was sent back to Natal, but still treated as a prisoner until he reached Pietermaritzburg, where he was finally set at liberty; putting in a sudden and unexpected appearance at Bishopstowe, where he was joyfully welcomed by his own people. He did not, however, spend much time amongst them, but hurried off as soon as possible up-country to find his bride. It is pleasant to be able to record that he found her just in time to prevent another marriage being arranged for her, and that his return was as satisfactory an event to her as to himself.

refused, saying that she had a husband already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam's wife. The man took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.