that their services were no longer required. Sir Garnet however, refused, saying that he would not permit his officers to be employed on duties which properly belonged to the police. Pondoland being outside the limits of the Cape Colony, the Colonial troops could not properly act there, and Frere asked that in view of the disturbed condition of the country small detachments of troops might be placed "in the visible neighbourhood" of Pondoland to support the police. But this also was refused. "I thought it might have been in your power," Frere says in reply to his refusal, "to have materially assisted us in preserving the peace on the Natal border, where law and order are as yet but imperfectly established. The aid I asked being refused, I accept your decision, but I do not concur in the grounds on which it is founded, nor can I, of course, accept any responsibility for the possible future consequences of the refusal." *

The refusal was subsequently approved by the Secretary of State. The consequences were that the inquiry was necessarily postponed and, though disturbances were for a time stayed off by Umquikela's falling seriously ill, Pondoland became one of the centres of native disturbance and an additional anxiety when the Basuto troubles came and when Sir George Colley had to deal with the Boer insurrection.† Within its boundaries the worst features of barbarism—murder, rapine, cruelty, "smelling out," and sacrifices of life on charges of witchcraft—have been of continual occurrence up to the present time, when it has at length (1894) been made British territory.

The following extract from a letter of Frere's to the Secretary of State describes its condition, and the channels

* Frere to Sir Garnet Wolseley. C. 2505, p. 7.
† "I can ill spare 58th in view of daily-expected outbreak of Pondos."—Colley to Lanyon, November 26, 1880. C. 2740, p. 125.
through which information was supplied to members of Parliament and others who wished to get up a case against the Government. It was a typical example.

"February 8, 1880.

"The position of Pondoland is not easily defined in the terms of modern European diplomacy. It was a very common position in feudal times, when there were infinite variations in the position of vassal on one side, and feudal superior or sovereign on the other. The position was a common one in the old Turkish Empire, and is still occupied by many states in India. Many of our great Scotch and Irish houses have passed through it, and still survive as subjects. It is a position which gives to the vassal much liberty of internal administration subject to the control of the superior State in extreme cases of abuse of authority, but allows to the vassal none of the attributes of really independent sovereignty. Our trouble with the Pondos arises from not recognizing this position. After being saved by Sir Peregrine Maitland from the Zulus, they accepted by treaty a position which obliged them to subordinate all their foreign relations to the general control of the British Government. Since then our territory has closed round them, and they have now no neighbours but British subjects, and can make war on no one else without crossing British territory. They are a purely pastoral set of barbarians, with no agriculture save a few patches of Indian corn in each kraal, no commerce save barter of cattle and skins for European manufactures, with European traders or pedlars, not even a canal or any river or estuary, no manufactures better than skin karosses, mats, and baskets of rushes and palm-leaves, wooden beer jugs, and assegais.

"To deal with such people as a really independent sovereign state would obviously be as ridiculous as for George II. to have dealt with Campbells, Macleods, Macphersons, and O'Neills on the same terms and in the same way as with the King of Sweden or a German Elector.

"But they have among them a few Europeans, traders, missionaries, and adventurers, some respectable people, others fugitives from the Colonies, and all, with rare exceptions, imperfectly educated, who find their account
in stuffing up the Pondos with ideas of their own importance as an independent State.

"They write for the Pondo Chief to Government or the newspapers, and if the Government does anything they or the Pondos dislike, a letter appears, sometimes confirmed by a worthy but not over-wise missionary, whose knowledge of administration, law, and politics, is little, if at all, superior to that of his brother minister in a small English country town; more often the letter is the work of a storekeeper, bankrupt or prosperous, or of a runaway clerk, who prefers the free life of a Pondokraal to the desk of a trader or attorney in Natal.

"Duly distilled through some intermediate channels, these criticisms on the measures of Government are the materials for Parliamentary and press criticism in England. Little is heard on the Government side till long after, and we are then surprised that South African affairs are so ill understood at home!

"I have said more than I intended about the present state of Pondoland, but you must remember that the case of every tribe on or near our border is very similar. Zulus, Swazis, Amatonga, on the East Coast, and all the tribes to the north and west are now, or will be ere long, in the condition I have described—practically managed by white men, good or bad, who are not Government officials, who have the power and too often the desire to checkmate the Government official when at last he appears on the scene where he ought to have been supreme years before.

"In India there has always been some representative of Government who speedily follows, if he does not precede, the trader or missionary, and a British protectorate has always been in advance of the British frontier proper, i.e. the frontier of territory where British law is supreme. The absence of this intermediate stage is one of our great difficulties and a main cause of all our wars in South Africa."

Frere could not get any information from Sir Garnet Wolseley as to what sort of settlement he proposed for Zululand. Sir Garnet did indeed send him a copy of the despatch containing the terms of settlement, when the matter was concluded; but even this, by some mistake, did
not reach him till it had been to England and back in the portmanteau of the officer charged to deliver it at Cape-town; and the first he heard of it was from the newspapers. To settle Zululand was not a specially difficult matter. The Zulus had accepted their defeat without a thought of further resistance and without even sullenness. They were an intelligent, teachable, and easily governed race, and would have cheerfully accepted the imposition of British authority. To annex the country and govern it by British magistrates was the obvious course; and it would not ultimately have been a charge on either the Colonial or the British Exchequer, for a hut-tax would have been cheerfully paid, which would have defrayed the whole expense.* Or, failing that, something like the plan indicated in Frere's Ultimatum might have been carried out. The Zulus might have been left with their tribal government subject to the influence and, in case of need, the control of a British Resident. This plan had succeeded with the savage races of South Africa, as it had succeeded with the semi-civilized native states of India; but in South Africa, as in India, it was essential to success, first, that the Resident should be known to have the whole power of the empire behind him; and, secondly, that he should not only be a man of firmness and ability, but a gentleman, and respected by his own countrymen.

How far Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement was of his own contriving, and how far moulded on instructions from the Secretary of State, did not transpire. What is certain is that not a single Colonial official of weight or experience was consulted about it, or approved of it when it was made. By it Zululand was divided into thirteen independent little kingdoms, to each of which a chief was assigned to

* This was proved after the annexation in 1887, when a hut-tax was levied which left a surplus of receipts over expenditure.
rule over it.* One kingdom, which was next to Natal, and was three or four times as large as any of the others, and thus conferred a sort of hegemony, was given to John Dunn, an Englishman who had adopted Zulu customs and had several Zulu wives, who had been implicated in gun-running transactions, and who had been on terms of intimacy with Cetywayo up to the outbreak of the war and had then abandoned him. There was to be a British Resident who was to proffer advice and be the "eyes and ears" of the British Government, but who was expressly interdicted from exercising any active interference whatever. The missionaries who had been forced by Cetywayo to leave their mission-stations were not to resume possession of them unless invited to do so by the chiefs.

Frere writes to Sir Garnet Wolseley:

"September 15, 1879.

The copy of your despatch describing the settlement you have made in Zululand, which you mention as sent by the same post, has not yet reached me, so I have nothing but imperfect and possibly erroneous press telegrams, which I feel sure cannot do justice to your work. Meantime much mischief is done by the opportunity afforded to Her Majesty's Opposition to misrepresent and find fault. For instance, I only learnt on Saturday that the terms signed by the thirteen chiefs started with a declaration that the chief recognizes the supremacy of the British arms and Her Majesty's right to deal with Zululand and its chiefs and people as they may think fit. "Now, this is most important, if I have been correctly informed (for I have it only from an unofficial source). It is the essential root of any sound and permanent settlement.

* "Of the chiefs appointed, some were so carelessly chosen that they have no authority whatsoever over the districts to which they were appointed, their nominal subjects preferring to remain under the leadership of their hereditary chief. Several of Sir Garnet's little kings cannot turn out a hundred men, whilst the hereditary chief, who has no official authority, can bring up three or four thousand."—"Cetywayo and his White Neighbours" (Rider Haggard), p. 31.
"With it, a vigorous Resident may do almost anything; without it, the ablest man must fail.

"The Residents are to be the 'eyes and ears' of the British Government.

"The first question which occurs is, where are the 'arms and legs'? Head is provided by the acknowledgment of the Queen's supremacy. But how about 'arms, legs,' etc., i.e. the power to enforce the decisions of the Government?

"The Resident is told he is to give advice to chiefs, but to exercise no authority over them. Now, advice to civilized or semi-civilized people may be of use. But to uncivilized men even as intelligent as Zulus are it is of no use, unless backed by power of some sort—moral, intellectual, or physical, and best of all by all three combined. Hence, unless the Residents are men of power they will be of little use, and as you propose to give them no physical force to back them they will have to depend exclusively on such moral and intellectual power as they may possess.

"Hence the importance of the question: Who are to be the Residents?

"The only name I have heard which I can credit is ———, a good man in his way, but hardly up to a task which would test Livingstone's or Chinese Gordon's powers to the utmost, if the Resident confines himself to advice and to reporting to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal.

"Then what is the Lieutenant-Governor to do?

"If he does no more than Lieutenant-Governors in times past, it will be simply nothing; and if you have among your thirteen chiefs one man with the capacity of Kreli or Cetywayo (you have probably among them three or four as good or better), you will have another war in a few years, as soon as the chief has, by attracting idlers and active spirits and by the natural increase of population, begun to find his borders too narrow for his wants and for the wishes of his people. Vide the history of Gaika, Makomo, Sandilli, Hintza, Kreli, etc., passim.

"Then, as we hear, the Resident is charged to remember that the chiefs have been told that no white men are to be encouraged to settle. You will find this, I fear, quite inoperative for any purpose but to create causes of dispute between the Resident and chiefs. I cannot find in past history or in any present quarter a single tribe which has
succeeded in excluding white men. Name the tribe anywhere this side the Zambezi and Cuanene, and I will undertake to send you in a few weeks the names of from half a dozen to two or three score of white men, some with a single waggon, some, like Mr. Erickson in Damaraland, with sixty, who have crept in unknown to Government, and, keeping their hunting and trading field and the privileges they have got there a secret even from their friends in the Colony, have acquired great influence in the tribe so that they sometimes actually rule it. The only effect of discouraging the white man's entrance is to ensure all who come being of a bad stamp—either damaged men or unruly spirits—but to exclude them is beyond the power of all the chiefs or Residents in South Africa combined.

"I say nothing about the discouragement of missionaries settling, for it is too long an argument when, as I fear, we do not agree on the basis of discussion. It would have been a great mistake to have actively encouraged them; but it is, in my opinion, a far greater to discourage them. The only plan is to treat them exactly as you do the 'smouser' and 'winkler,'—the hunter or trader—let them alone to depend on their own powers of recommending themselves.

"As for making Zululand a home for the natives exclusively, I more than doubt the possibility of success. I know of many cases in which the creation of such a black Alsatia has been tried. In none has it ever succeeded.

"For a few years Alsatia takes off the scum (white as well as black) of the law-governed neighbourhood; the rogue or vagabond, the idler and outlaw from Natal crosses the Tugela to John Dunn, and if routed out thence, goes on to Oham or further, but after a time the scum becomes noxious, and civilized law-abiding and law-sustaining force has to come in to cleanse the foul den. For instances you may refer to every frontier and every part of it from 1819 to the present time."

But his words fell unheeded. Sir Garnet Wolseley merely replied that all his arrangements had been made with a view of keeping Zululand for the use and enjoyment of its present inhabitants, without any interference from either the Cape or the Natal authorities. The Resident
was to be strictly debarred from exercising any authority whatever. The representatives of the three great tribes paramount before Chaka's time had been reinstated. White men were to be especially precluded from owning land.

John Dunn proceeded at once to warn off some missionaries who had come to reoccupy their burnt stations. Sir Garnet supported his action, saying that it was not right to "force" Christianity on anyone. Subsequently on some stir being made in England about their exclusion, the prohibition was withdrawn and permission to settle was given to missionaries and traders "in a way to delight equally Exeter Hall and Manchester; whilst John Dunn's retention in full vigour secures the adhesion of all polygamous Bohemians and imperfect Christians. . . . You will have trouble in a very few years unless a really able and vigilant man in Natal takes an active oversight of Zululand."*

Six months later he writes to Sir Henry Ponsonby:

"April 3, 1880.

"Gradually the information regarding the settlement of Zululand, which ought to have been given direct to Wolseley's coadjutors in South African work, is coming back to us from England through various channels, official and unofficial, and the course of events is pretty clear. The Government seem early to have recognized the fact that the settlement had few if any elements of real permanence, and was not calculated to last beyond the present generation of officials, most of whom are already departed from South African life. As a consequence many of the essential features of the 'settlement' have been altered and otherwise are altering themselves; but some of the most objectionable still remain. I do not anticipate any dangerous results for, perhaps, years to come. But the certain seeds of future disturbance are there and will require more firm and judicious management to prevent their germinating than we have as yet seen in Zululand.

"This affects us here by disinclining the cautious

* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, January 24, 1880."
Dutchmen to listen to any plan for uniting their interests with those of Natal, and if we can get them to look the thing in the face and discuss the advantages and possible terms of a union, it will be as much as we can expect at present."

Frere's views as to the attitude to be observed by the British Government towards missionaries in territories beyond the Colonial border have been so persistently misrepresented, that an extract from a despatch on the subject written by him to the Secretary of State is given here at some length.

"December 2, 1879.

"To begin with Zululand. Missionaries were first permitted to settle there by Dingaan. His successor, Panda, allowed them to establish themselves at more than sixteen stations, all of which had been abandoned shortly before the war broke out, in consequence of the increasingly hostile spirit evinced by Cetywayo.

Her Majesty's Government very clearly laid down the course which should be followed in our communications on the subject with Cetywayo; and I will only observe that I never contemplated any further interference with his freedom of action in regard to missionaries than I would have recommended in the case of secular persons of European race who had been allowed, under the laws of Zululand, by special permission of the reigning chief, to settle there for their own gain and profit.

"I would always have advocated the same respect for the national rights of Zulus as would have been shown by Her Majesty's Government in the case of Turkey or Spain, but I would have advocated no more.

"I would not have attempted to force the Zulu ruler against his will to permit either a mission to be established or a sugar-mill to be erected; but if, with his express permission, and with the deliberate consent of his national council of chiefs, leave were once given to Europeans to settle, I would not have allowed either the missionary or the sugar-planter to be terrorized out of the country without remonstrance, as long as no charge of breaking the laws of the country or the conditions of his settlement was stated against the person whom it was proposed to expel.

"I beg to make this statement in contradiction of the
assertion industriously circulated, that I had proposed, or intended to impose, either Christianity or civilization on the Zulus by force of arms.

"But since the downfall of the Zulu King, the circumstances of the case are materially changed, and it appears to me that it will be for Her Majesty's Government and for no chief in Zululand to consider and decide whether, under the present state of things, missionaries should or should not be prohibited from returning to, or settling in Zululand on the same terms as sugar-planters or store-keepers.

"I would observe that there is in South Africa no such reason as formerly existed in India for avoiding giving any cause for alarm lest Government should attempt forcible conversion by the use of its secular power. There is not, and never has been in South Africa, any such alarm, nor any cause for it, for the simple reason that the native tribes in South Africa have for the most part nothing in the shape of a definite religion to be converted from. The Zulus and Kaffirs generally have many superstitions about lucky and unlucky, good and evil influences; but no theistic belief in any active agency, good or evil; no God, no demon, nor even any powerful fetish, like their neighbours to the north of the equator. They are simply materialistic Sadducees, and like the same class in other lands, care little for what others believe or disbelieve, as long as it does not interfere with their own enjoyment of life.

"Hence, almost invariably, the native chief and his tribe in South Africa, when white men first appear in their country, have no objection to letting missionaries settle among them. They are, in fact, very glad to get missionaries, as more permanent residents and having more interest in the country than travellers for sport or pleasure; as being more disinterested, more truthful, and more useful to the chief and his tribe in various ways than the casual trader; and as being actuated by higher motives and more sincere good will toward the tribe than the ordinary white adventurer.

"At this moment there are missionaries who have for years been settled hundreds of miles beyond our border in Damaraland, at the capitals of great chiefs like Kama and Lobengula, besides numerous stations among smaller tribes. All these had settled by express invitation from the chief and his tribe and without any intervention of
Government in the way of encouragement or discouragement, and are in every case, as far as I can learn, almost the last of the white races the chief or his people would willingly part from.

Their position seems to me almost in every respect similar to that of the early Christian missionaries in heathen Britain, Germany, or Gaul. After a while, no doubt the chief finds now, as he did then, that a power is growing up which is in some respects antagonistic to his own, and he feels that the pupils of the missionaries are not so subservient to his purposes as his untaught and unsophisticated savage subject. 'The Zulu converted,' is, as Cetywayo expressed it, 'a Zulu spoiled.' The blind obedience which places at the chief's disposal every man, woman, and child, every head of cattle, and every species of property in the tribe, gives place to duties and obligations unknown before; to allegiance to other powers than the chief; to occupations other than herding the King's cattle or executing his behests by 'impis' on persons obnoxious to him.

When this state of things arrives, as it always must sooner or later, the chief may feel inclined to take part against the missionaries, and, if he has favoured them before, to withdraw his countenance and expel them. But unless favoured by exceptional circumstances, he finds his opposition met by a party among his own subjects in favour of the new order of things, and he is obliged to go with the stream or give place to some rival who does....

"Here, as everywhere else, there are many different types of missionary, but the worst are more potent in their influence on native races than most men who are actuated by avowedly selfish and worldly aims.

"Among missionaries in South Africa, as in every other profession, may be found unworthy professors, political busybodies, sordid traders, and idlers, but the great majority are, at their worst, superior in influence over savages to most of their compatriots who, as hunters or traders, may enter the country, and many are worthy to be ranked with the noblest of their profession, or of human kind, who in two thousand years have Christianized and civilized Europe.

"All, as a rule, are in favour of the nearest sovereign
civilized power, in this case the English; all, in profession at least, are friends of the best interests of the native races, and a large proportion are their true friends, long tried and much trusted."

From Natal, Sir Garnet Wolseley went to the Transvaal, reaching Pretoria September 29. He made speeches in every village he visited, declaring the Act of Annexation to be irrevocable, and afterwards published a Proclamation to that effect. At Standerton, which is on the Vaal River, he told the people that the Vaal would flow backward through the Drakensberg before the British would be withdrawn from the Transvaal territory.

Nevertheless there were indications, sufficient to disquiet Frere, that either Sir Garnet or the British Government did not consider the matter as altogether outside the pale of discussion.

Frere writes (December 2) to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: "... I am very certain that to give up the Transvaal is as little to be thought of as surrendering Ireland or India." And in an exhaustive despatch, going over all the aspects of the question, he gives his opinion that the malcontent Boers were neither numerous nor formidable, the leaders and instigators being many of them foreigners, actuated by personal motives, who induced others to join them by intimidation, and owing to the idea that was prevalent that the country was going to be given up.† He urged

* Times correspondent's letter, October 23, 1879.
† "When our power of enforcing the law and upholding the authority of Government were at the lowest, in April last, ... experienced men at Pretoria gave me, through Colonel Lanyon, the following estimate of the strength of parties in the malcontent camp. The educated and intelligent men of influence who advocated the most extreme measures, or were prepared to acquiesce in them, were reckoned at not more than eight. Three, or perhaps four, were men of property in the Transvaal; the rest foreign adventurers, with no property and little weight beyond that due to their skill as political
firmness, and the immediate promulgation of a Constitution with a nominee Council, coupled with a promise that an Elective Council would be granted if they showed themselves fit for it. As to the effect of abandonment of the Transvaal on the prospects of Confederation, he says—

"December 3, 1879.

"To every Colony concerned, such a step must appear as a confession of weakness, of infirmity of purpose, and of disregard for solemn pledges and obligations which would destroy all respect, all wish to belong to a Government which could so behave."

The native chief, Secocoeni, who was called by the natives "Cetywayo's dog," and who, it will be remembered, had helped, by the repulse he had inflicted on the Boers nearly three years before, to bring about the collapse of their Republic, had been in arms and conducting raids into the Transvaal with impunity; and, his stronghold being within the country and not outside its borders, it was the more necessary to repress him. Colonel Rowlands had started with an expedition against him in November, 1878, but had been baffled by fever and horse-sickness. After the Zulu War broke out no British troops could be spared to act against him; but, in June, Colonel agitators. Their unflinching and uncompromising followers in the Boer camp were not reckoned at more than eighty. The disaffected wavering who, according to circumstances, would follow the majority either to acts of overt resistance to Government and lawless violence, or to grumble and disperse, 'accepting the inevitable,' were reckoned at about eight hundred at the outside. The rest of the camp, variously estimated at containing from sixteen hundred to four thousand in all, but probably never exceeding two thousand five hundred present at one time, were men brought to the camp by intimidation, compulsion, or curiosity, who would not willingly resist the authority of Government, and would, if assured of protection, prefer to side with it."—Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, December 3, 1879.
Lanyon had raised some troops, Europeans and natives, and was succeeding so well with them that he was hoping within a short time to force him to surrender. In July, however, Sir Garnet Wolseley sent Colonel Lanyon orders to cease operations, and the force had to be disbanded. But when he arrived in the Transvaal he found that Secocoeni could not be neglected, and had to be attacked with much greater risk of loss than if Colonel Lanyon had been left to do so at an earlier and healthier season of the year. The natural strength of his fortress was great, and careful dispositions had to be made in order to take it without excessive loss. The campaign began on November 20, and on the 28th the stronghold was taken with a loss of about fifty Europeans, and about five hundred Swazi allies, killed and wounded.*

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach:

"December 8, 1879.

"The success has been more complete and brilliant even than I at first supposed. It was a difficult task at any time of the year, owing to the extent of very strong country, full of scrub, ravines, boulders, and caves... At this season, but for unusual rain, the task would have been almost impossible, and Sir Garnet Wolseley seems to me to deserve great credit for determining to make the attack at once, and, still more, for his dispositions, which, as far as I can judge, left nothing to be desired in thorough thoughtfulness or completeness, and nothing could be better than the decision, punctuality, and courage with which every movement seems to have been executed. It seems to have been a complete and, what is better, a well-deserved success, and I hope, in reporting it, he will do justice to all who contributed to it, as well as to those of his own staff."

Frere goes on to mention Colonel Lanyon, Captain Clark, R.A., and Captain Carrington, as deserving a

* C. 2505, p. 110.
share of the credit for the accurate information they had collected during the previous months or years.

Secocoeni was taken prisoner and sent, as Cetywayo had been, to Capetown. A public dinner was given to Sir Garnet Wolseley at Pretoria on December 17. He took the opportunity of returning thanks to announce a new Constitution for the Transvaal. It was to have a nominated Council, instead of an elected one, such as would have been granted but for the insubordination of the malcontents. He went on to declare, with emphasis, that there could be no question of giving up the sovereignty of the country. "There is no Government," he said, "Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, who would dare under any circumstances to give back this country. They would not dare because the English people would not allow them."

Speaking of the malcontents then out in camp, he said, "I think the Transvaal has never had such formidable enemies either outside or within its limits than [as] the fifteen hundred or two thousand Boers assembled near this Town." *

This announcement was emphatic enough. But notwithstanding these strong words his attitude towards the malcontent Boers was still vacillating. They had held a meeting on the High Veldt, threatening any who should absent themselves, on December 10, at which rebellion was openly advocated; parts of the country were disturbed and ammunition plundered. After taking the opinion of his Attorney-General, Sir Garnet caused two Boer leaders, Bok and Pretorius, to be prosecuted on a charge of high treason. Bok was arrested at Pretoria on January 3, 1880, some evidence against him was taken, and he was bailed. Pretorius was arrested at Potchefstrom on the 5th, and bail being refused he was sent to prison. He did not, however, remain there long. Sir Garnet

* C. 2505, p. 112.
changed his tactics, sent for him, and nominated him a member of the new Legislative Council. In both cases the prosecution was subsequently dropped and they were not committed for trial.* It is difficult to say whether the institution of these prosecutions or their abandonment had the worst effect.

Early in March, on the eve of the meeting of the new Legislative Assembly of the Transvaal, Sir Garnet still deemed it necessary to telegraph to the Secretary of State for an explicit assurance that the Queen's sovereignty would not be withdrawn,—which was thereupon given.†

To avoid the sometimes inconvenient presence of special correspondents with an army in the field, or for other reasons, it had been arranged, before Sir Garnet Wolseley left England, that certain members of his staff should act as correspondents to the leading London newspapers. It may be a matter of opinion whether or not it was desirable that officers in the field should undertake to be the anonymous chroniclers in the Press of their own and their General's actions. At any rate, in such employment they were skating upon thin ice, and it behoved them to be careful.

One of them was not careful. A letter from "our own correspondent" appeared in the Times of October 23, charging Frere with having been the cause of opposition to Sir Garnet Wolseley's government by forwarding the Boers' memorial to Her Majesty's Government in terms which created a formidable impression that the question of the restoration of the country to the Dutch was under deliberation at home. The statement on which this allegation was founded had appeared in one of the Boer malcontent papers; but there was no excuse for giving

* C. 2584, p. 193. At a Boer meeting held March 11, 1880, a man was overheard to say in reference to this incident: "Yes, it appears you must be first placed in prison before you can get a good appointment."—C. 2676, p. 28.
† C. C. 2584, p. 208.
credence to it. Lanyon had been present and could be referred to. And all that had passed on the occasion had been taken down, printed and published in a Blue-book, and Frere's repeated and emphatic refusal to support the prayer of the memorial stood recorded.

"Our own correspondent" was Sir Garnet Wolseley's private secretary.

That one of the two High Commissioners who were working side by side should be anonymously attacked in the Press by the private secretary of the other, was a breach, not of good manners only, but of official discipline.

Frere wrote (November 23) to Sir Garnet, calling his attention to it. His reply was that it was not his affair what the officers of his staff might or might not write, and that he should be very sorry to call any newspaper correspondent to account for any views he might express, no matter who that correspondent might be.

As it was a matter materially affecting the public service, Frere called the attention of the Secretary of State to it. He writes afterwards to a friend on the question:—

"February 3, 1880.

"I have seen a good deal of such difficulties for thirty years past, and Wolseley's is not a bad solution if honestly and wisely carried out, but a staff correspondent ought to have as strong a conscience as regards his duty to Government as his Chief has, and he ought to be as careful not to fire a broadside into an ally or brother official, as not to betray military secrets to the enemy. If you can get staff correspondents to write in this spirit, and if generals are self-denying enough not to make press laudation their object, this would be a perfect system, but such correspondents and generals are rare, and you must henceforth make up your mind to have your generals looking more to the daily Press, than to the Commander-in-Chief as the judge of their merits." *

* Frere wrote (July 31, 1882) to one of his nephews: "I do not
Various indications were rousing Frere's anxiety lest the Government should be meditating some change of policy either as regarded the Transvaal or in other matters. "I have had no word of official acknowledgment or approval," he writes to Lord Carnarvon, "unless I may accept as such official abstention from the fierce condemnation with which all I have done has been assailed by both sides in English party warfare." His misgivings were partly suggested by the appearance in English periodicals usually supporting the Government of articles wavering, to say the least, upon this and other important points. In the Quarterly Review, not long after the news of Isandhlwana, had appeared an article deprecating enthusiasm about confederation, and expressing a preference for "the opposite policy of divide et impera;" it spoke of the suspension of the Cape Constitution as the "clearest and completest expedient," and asserted that the Kafirs and Zulus, "if left to the colonists, are doomed to degradation and destruction." Frere speaks of it as "an essay in which for whole pages a truth expressed in brilliant epigrams regularly alternates with mistakes or misstatements which would be scarcely pardoned in a 'special' war correspondent hurriedly writing against time." Its importance did not arise from its intrinsic worth, but from the fact that it found a place in the leading Conservative Review, and was known to be from the pen of Mr. Froude, formerly Lord Carnarvon's apostle of federation.

This feeling of uncertainty, whether the Secretary of like the idea of your going as a newspaper correspondent. It is a false position for a soldier on the active list. From H.R.H. downwards, all officials and authorities would resent it, and it would not be pleasant either for yourself or comrades and acquaintances if you had to choose between writing unpleasant truths or being silent when things went wrong. You could not be an impartial historian without damage to your own feelings and interests."
State meant to stand to his guns, tended to paralyze the progress not only of confederation, but of many other important matters.

For instance, the military defence of South Africa was a question which required to be settled. How many English troops were to be left there, and who was to pay the cost? Some people in England were complaining of the expense of the Zulu War as if it were no affair of theirs, forgetting that it was due, not to any action of the Cape Colony, but to the Imperial Government and its management or mismanagement in past years of the native question in the Crown Colony of Natal and elsewhere; forgetting too that whatever the addition caused to English taxation might be, the burden laid on the Colonies was far heavier in proportion to their wealth and population.

A Commission on Colonial Defence was sitting in London, of which Lord Carnarvon was chairman. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Frere for his views, to which Frere replied in detail.

"December 14, 1879.

"The Cape Colony," he pointed out, "so far from having been backward in taking its part in recent military and defensive operations, had, under the present Ministry, honestly set to work to get up a defensive force of their own, passed four useful and well-intentioned measures for organizing police, volunteers, yeomanry, and Burghers, and, what was more indeed, taxed themselves to pay for it—the Brandy, Excise, and House-tax Acts were substantial evidence they were in earnest.

"They were sorely tried by the Zulu War and its consequences, Morosi's rebellion on the Basutoland border, and the rebellion of the Kaffirs, Korannias, etc., on the Orange River and in Griqualand West, before their forces or any one class of them were fairly formed. However, they have got over all and have proved their sincerity by dispensing entirely with Her Majesty's troops in the Cape Colony during the worst part of the Zulu War."
To complete their system of defence they required officers with military training and experience to instruct and organize them, and reasonable assistance to procure guns and arms of the best pattern.* Assistance to this very moderate extent Frere pleaded for as a preliminary to the South African Colonies undertaking ultimately the entire cost of their defence, except that of the Cape Peninsula, which was of importance to the empire at large and to the communication between England and India, Australia and China.

But the foundation of the whole scheme of defence was a confederation of colonies which, like the Cape, were to be self-governing. If Natal and the Transvaal were to remain permanently Crown Colonies, there was an end of it. And therefore he goes on to ask Lord Carnarvon: "Are these apparent indications of a change of policy accidental? Are Froude's articles in the Quarterly or Fortnightly inspired political feelers? Or are they merely his own uninspired lucubrations?"

"If there is any idea of a change of policy, of attempting

* It had been too much the custom for the War Office to supply the Colonies with inferior material. In December, 1879, a battery was completed and armed on the Cape Peninsula which, if efficient, should have been a sufficient protection against any ordinary attack by single ships or filibusters. Frere asked the Colonial Ministers to join him and the military officials in seeing the guns tried in their new positions. A few rounds were fired, in the course of which two out of the five guns were disabled owing to defects in the apparatus for meeting the recoil. Fortunately, though fragments of metal, nuts, and bolts flew about, only two men were hurt, and nobody was killed, and the matter was treated as an inevitable accident. Frere afterwards happened to mention the incident to one of Sir Garnet's Staff, who had been present. He smiled and said, "You probably are not aware that the recoil apparatus which has been furnished to you for those guns has been long since condemned in our own service, and would never be put into a battery in Europe." (Frere to Lord Carnarvon, February 16, 1880.)
to restrict the establishment of responsible government to its present limits by preventing its extension at a reasonable time to Natal and Transvaal, still more if there is any idea of attempting to resume what has already been given to the Cape, as so many of our political physicians recommend, then I am convinced that your labours on the Colonial Defence Commission will be in vain as regards limiting the responsibilities of Great Britain in South Africa, and we may prepare for events not less grave than those which led to the separation of our North American Colonies, a century ago.

"Here in the Transvaal and Natal unless we are careful we shall foster the formation of a powerful anti-English party whose dogged resistance to authority as authority will be quite as troublesome as active rebellion.

"You remember the attempts made by the Transvaal republicans to enlist the sympathy of the German Government. They did not then succeed, but they may have better success if they appeal to the German Socialists, and a few score of them would be a very formidable addition to the ranks of the disaffected in South Africa."

In view of Sir Garnet Wolseley's repeated expressions of impatience to return to England, Frere wrote in January to ask what arrangement was to be made when he left. The ostensible reason given for his appointment as High Commissioner of the eastern provinces had been to bring the Zulu War to a close. No such reason existed any longer. Was Frere to resume his old functions?

If there was to be a United South Africa under British influence, the British Government must speak with but one voice; there must be one High Commissioner, not two. One paramount influence and one consistent native policy, able to overcome local jealousies and selfishness, and destined to make itself felt sooner or later over all the country south of the Zambesi, were essential, not merely to confederation, but to stay the outbreak of native wars, and to relieve England of the burden of them for the future.
Such an extension and unification of British influence had from the first been what Frere contemplated. It was no visionary dream. It was an end quite capable of realization. Amongst the white men in South Africa there was a general desire for union of some kind. "Most men," he says, "at present would desire such union under the British Crown; others, both here and in England, would prefer it on the model of the United States of North America, as a South African Republic, which, according to my own convictions, would mean, for many years to come, an internecine knot of Republics, some of them with a filibustering element of the South American or Mexican type, but all under the influence of some great European Power, possessing a navy, and appreciating as well as, or perhaps better than we do, the dominion of the Southern Ocean, of which the Cape Peninsula is the key." *

The only part of this territory then belonging to another European Power was Delagoa Bay and the strip of east coast north of it. To prevent this strip being an obstacle to intercommunication, and to utilize the important port of Delagoa Bay, Frere was anxious for more intimate commercial relations with the Portuguese, and for the construction of a line of railway thither from the Transvaal. The necessary preliminaries for this were ably accomplished by his old friend Sir Robert Morier, then Minister at Lisbon, who having acquired a special knowledge of and interest in this coast in connection with the suppression of the Slave-trade, had by the most strenuous efforts succeeded in overcoming Portuguese prejudice, and securing the consent of the Portuguese Government to a treaty which promised great advantages to the South African Colonies, and especially to the Transvaal—as the Boers well knew—in giving it direct

* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Jan. 17, 1880.
communication with the nearest sea-port, and opening the port on equal terms to British and Portuguese ships.* But the matter was delayed in England till the Portuguese Ministry favourable to the treaty had left office, and the opportunity was lost. Before getting Sir R. Morier's letter, Frere had written to him (March 5, 1880): "My Ministers see, I think, as strongly as you and I do, that a continuous railway from Capetown to Delagoa Bay is by no means an impossibility within this present generation, and that of all the curbs and bonds that could be invented for keeping the country quiet and attached to the British Crown, none could be stronger."

But the Secretary of State paid no heed to Frere's representations as to the High Commissionership—one wonders sometimes if his letters and despatches were read—and he was informed (March 4) that Sir George Colley was to succeed Sir Garnet Wolseley as Governor of Natal and

* Sir R. Morier wrote (March 4, 1880) to Frere, giving an account of all his difficulties in obtaining assent to the treaty, and asking him to try to hasten its ratification by the British Government, which was waiting—needlessly, as he pointed out—for the assent of the Colonial Legislatures.

Six years before, the question whether the south side of Delagoa Bay was British or Portuguese territory had been referred to the arbitration of MacMahon, the French President, who decided in favour of the Portuguese. Sir George Clerk wrote to Frere at the time (1874): "What could have reconciled Her Majesty's Government to going to arbitration on our right in Delagoa Bay? Why, it was ceded to us, that is a moiety of it, from head to embouchure, by its chiefs in a more deliberate manner, and by more formal documents than the other half was ever ceded to the Portuguese! I once gave you a copy of my letter to the Duke of Newcastle, from South Africa, enclosing copy of the treaty, and urging that we should not hesitate to declare and to stand upon our rights. . . . The reply of the Duke signified to me in private note that Her Majesty's Government were averse to broach a subject that might be disagreeable to the Portuguese Government. . . .

"I fancied I had an undoubted right to my hunter 'Sultan,' . . . Alas! I may have to go to arbitration."
High Commissioner of South-East Africa. Sir Garnet left South Africa early in May.

The curtailment of Frere's jurisdiction as High Commissioner had given him more leisure to attend to the details of administration in the Cape Colony. Railway extension, telegraphic communication—among other projects the overland line to Khartoum—agriculture, vine culture, land and coast surveys, water-supply, sanitation, education, native and European, and the lepers at Robben Island, all engaged his attention.

He had from the first been impressed with the loyalty of the old Dutch population within the Cape Colony, and his impression was strengthened the more he saw of them. They did not fail to appreciate the consistent fairness to all races evinced in his policy and public acts; and socially there was something about his manner, and about the receptions and hospitalities of Government House, a certain undefinable air of ceremony, mingling gracefully and naturally with its cordiality, which was congenial to the quiet stateliness of their old-world manners, and especially attracted them to him personally.

In September, 1879, he had visited the farmers in some of the old Dutch districts of the west; and again in January, 1880, he went to Beaufort West to open a railway extension, and was in the neighbourhood of Stellenbosch, Swellendam, Graaf Reinet, and other places, where the old Dutch population largely predominated. The farmers came from considerable distances to meet him. They seemed to him, in their quiet, Dutch way, intensely loyal to the English Crown, speaking and writing not of "the Queen," "the Governor," but of "our Queen," "our Governor," and "as little disposed to make experiments of other forms of government as a Gloucestershire farmer." "Dutch disaffection," he writes, "of a dangerous kind is
confined to a small clique of Hollanders and Colonial Dutch Republicans, who have little influence except through a temporary alliance with English humanitarians and Radicals now in Opposition."

But these loyal Dutchmen did not forget that the Transvaal Boers were their kith and kin. The way in which things were being managed there was beginning to put a heavy strain on their loyalty, and great efforts were being made by the anti-English party to induce them to make common cause with the malcontents in the Transvaal, efforts which were ultimately too successful.

Frere writes to Sir Henry Ponsonby:

"April 3, 1880.

Whatever Sir Garnet Wolseley may say or think of the general feeling up in the Transvaal, the Dutch population down here who have relations up there, is seriously uneasy and angry, and a feeling has been created here about the Transvaal and its annexation which certainly did not exist a few months ago; and reacts in a manner very prejudicial to the present Ministry here who are Englishmen and known to be thoroughly loyal to the English Crown.

"What may be the precise extent and results of this change of feeling I shall hardly be able to judge till the Colonial Parliament meets next month. I am made aware of it whenever I meet a genuine Dutch Africander farmer, who is apt to let me know that his good-will is personal to me and my office, and is ‘not to be misunderstood as implying any approval of our doings in the Transvaal.’ But the most obvious evidence is to be found in the Radical and Republican English Press in the Colony, which tries to ally itself with the Dutch Africander party and has some success with the Dutch Republican section. But the great body of the Dutch are not more Republican at present than our English Whigs, the Dutch Church (Reformed) especially being very strong and rarely disloyal to the British Crown, though disliking most things British, including the English language and Church

* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, February 8, 1880.
Doctrine, and, not unnaturally, English aggressiveness and Cockneyism.

"I do not think I ever mentioned to you that the Dutch Reformed Church is identical in doctrine, and very similar in its divisions, to the Scotch Kirk. You easily recognize parties here precisely similar to the Established and Free Kirk parties in Scotland, with all their subdivisions of Narrow and Broad and a small phalanx of Neologians and Rationalists—strong in literary ability, and generally bitter anti-English Republicans, but cordially disliked and dreaded by most of their clerical brethren.

"The Church, as a body, has immense influence, and is generally loyal to the English Crown, after the fashion of Welsh and Highland pastors, not liking English language, or ways, but very loyal to the sovereign, and to all that belongs to Her Majesty’s personal authority. . . .

"These Dutchmen are slow to move, but bitter and obstinate when roused, and apt to move in an angry crowd. If any number of them join the Republican faction there will be serious trouble in South Africa, and the drifting may end by these colonies drifting away from the empire."

The uncertainty of the prospect in South Africa was greatly aggravated by the fact that an active section of the Opposition in the British Parliament not only denounced the Zulu War as wrongfully undertaken and unnecessary, but had lately taken to sympathizing with the Boers, and calling for a reversal of the annexation of the Transvaal. A General Election was pending, and all sections of malcontents in South Africa looked to a change of Government in England as involving a possible reversal of all that had been done there for the last three years.

This expectation was strengthened when Mr. Gladstone, who at the time of the Transvaal being annexed had taken no exception to it, in one of his Midlothian speeches described it as "the invasion of a free people." * In another Midlothian speech he spoke of "the Transvaal, a country

where we have chosen, most unwisely, I am tempted to say insanely, to place ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a republic, and to compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse." *

The agitators who pulled the strings of the malcontent Boer movement were not slow to take note of his words and to utilize them for their own purposes. At a Boer meeting held on March 18, a letter to Mr. Gladstone was read, in which he was thanked for his sympathy, and a hope expressed that in case of a change of Government in England, "the injustice done to the Transvaal might find redress." †

In April, 1880, the elections took place and Mr. Gladstone came into power with a large majority. Would he maintain the pledge given over and over again to retain the Transvaal, or would he act in accordance with the tenor of his Midlothian denunciations?

Frere, anxious to allay the general anxiety, and in view of the meeting of the Cape Parliament on May 7, telegraphed (April 27) to the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, to know if any change of policy was contemplated in regard to either the Transvaal or Confederation. On May 1 the answer came that the matter required consideration. On the 3rd Frere telegraphed again, saying that there was great uneasiness and that abandonment might entail civil war. On the 6th he telegraphed again that Krüger and Joubert had arrived at Capetown as emissaries of the malcontents, and begged for an early announcement of policy respecting the Transvaal. On the 12th Lord Kimberley replied that the sovereignty of the Queen over the Transvaal could not be relinquished, that he hoped for the speedy accomplish-

† C. 2676, p. 29.
ment of confederation which would enable free institutions to be given to the Transvaal and Natal as already proposed.

But Mr. Gladstone could not so easily quench the fire which he had done so much to fan into a flame. Krüger and Joubert had come to Capetown to endeavour to hinder any advance towards confederation, and to do all they could to embarrass Mr. Sprigg's Government as representing loyalty to England; and they endeavoured to rekindle the embers of animosity between Dutch and English which Frere had in the last three years done so much to extinguish.

The turn of events sometimes causes public opinion to be greatly and justly excited, as on this native question in South Africa, after Isandhlwana, in a matter as to which it has little or no knowledge. In such a case it is apt to "put its conscience in commission," as Frere used to phrase it, and blindly follow any man or set of men who with sufficient self-assertion lay claim to superior knowledge. During these years a Society in London, called the Aborigines Protection Society, took upon itself the function of judging between the white and the black races in South Africa, and of arraigning the conduct of the white race whenever there was a question between the two. That a Society in London, with paid officers bound to justify their employment by finding something to complain of, should take upon itself to pronounce judgment upon difficult and complex questions between races in South Africa was, on the face of it, not more reasonable than

* C. 2586, p. 12. Lord Kimberley to Sir B. Frere, May 20, 1880. On June 8, Mr. Gladstone wrote to the same effect to Krüger and Joubert in answer to their letter to him, "Our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal." The Queen's speech on May 20 made a similar announcement. C. 2676, p. 468.
that a Society should be started at Capetown, say, to protect women and children in London. By its constitution, which was practically that of *advocatus diaboli* against the white man, such a Society must almost of necessity take a one-sided view, from which misapprehension and mischief could hardly fail to result, however carefully considered were the methods employed.

The methods employed by the Aborigines Protection Society bore some resemblance to those of mediæval Venice. The Blue-books of the time are full of letters from the Society to the Secretary of State, detailing stories of alleged oppression or cruelty, and demanding an inquiry; or sometimes a question was asked to the same effect in Parliament. It would be many months before the reply to the inquiry could come back from the Cape, and in the mean time the story was circulated, and the refutation came too late to be listened to. The Society generally refused to give the name of its informant, or the particulars of time and place, so that, like the Lion's mouths at Venice, it offered an opportunity to anyone—agitator, place-hunter or criminal—having a spite against a magistrate or official, to injure him anonymously; and as the alliance between the Cape Opposition, the malcontent Boers, and the English Radicals became established, the Society practically acted as their instrument in prejudicing the English public against Frere and Mr. Sprigg. The fear of being denounced

* The Society went so far as to charge Mr. Sprigg individually, as the Prime Minister, of having advocated the establishment of slavery in the Colony. He replied in a letter to Frere (September 15, 1879): "Few men in this country or any other have a stronger aversion to slavery than I have. . . . All my early associations and sentiments were adverse to slavery. My father was a neighbour and friend of Clarkson's, and has stood by him on many an anti-slavery platform. One of my brothers bears the name of that great philanthropist. And in all my intercourse with the coloured races in this Colony I have been mindful of their rights and liberties as subjects of the
by some scoundrel to the Society, in some districts seriously interfered with and perverted the administration of justice.* For, by keeping the names of its informants secret, it was necessarily imposed upon. In one instance a man, on whose testimony it placed special reliance, was discovered to be a disfrocked clergyman, who had been in custody for swindling; another informant was a trader who had been in jail for gun-running.

The natural and constitutional place for making and investigating such charges was the Cape Parliament, where all concerned were within reach, and evidence could be tested when it was produced. Some vague denunciations and assertions were made there by the Opposition. "But when challenged by the Ministry to fair investigation and proof, in no instance did they succeed in fixing on the Government any blame for proved abuse or harsh disregard of native rights and interests." †

A conspicuous instance of sham philanthropy in alliance with unprincipled party-spirit interfering with the action of the Government and producing the most unfortunate consequences, occurred in the case of Basutoland.

The Basutos were a tribe who had been driven south by Queen. But I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that though the object of the Aborigines Protection Society and their friends in this Colony is noble, they are utterly wrong in the course they pursue to attain that object."—C. 2482, p. 298.

* Mr. H. Nixon, writing to Frere (March 4, 1880) from "Balmoral near Uitenhage," after giving instances of unpunished outrages and of the inefficiency of the police, says: "The lawlessness of the coloured races and their hopeless state of degradation, their drunkenness, and general dissolute habits may fairly be laid to the baneful influence of the Aborigines Protection Society, which has done everything it possibly could to paralyze the arm of the law in the execution of justice, and I consider the demoralization of the natives is entirely due to their persistent agitation. The drunkenness in this province is quite alarming and unprecedented."

† Unfinished manuscript of Frere's.
the Matabele branch of the Zulus in Chaka's time, half a century before, and after many wanderings and privations, which often reduced them to actual cannibalism, had settled under their chief Moshesh in an unoccupied tract of mountainous country in the Drakensberg chain, between the north-east corner of the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, the Colony of Natal, and Kaffraria. There they thrrove and increased, but, taking to cattle-lifting from the Boers of the Free State, got involved in a war with them, in which they would have been exterminated but for the intervention in their favour of Governor Sir P. Wodehouse in 1868. Basutoland was attached in 1871 to the Cape Colony, not by the desire of the Colony but by the action of the Colonial Office; and the Basutos continued to prosper. When diamonds were found at Kimberley many of them flocked thither and earned money as labourers, with which, amongst other things, they bought guns. They had no legitimate use for guns. There were no wild beasts and no game to shoot in their country. They carried their guns out of swagger, as proofs of independence, and some of them under the idea, which more or less pervaded the natives everywhere, that they only needed guns to profit by their numerical superiority and drive the whites into the sea. Morosi's rebellion in Basutoland and its suppression by the Colonial forces have been already mentioned. What was the Cape Colony to do to prevent a recurrence of rebellion and bloodshed? It was not their doing that they had the Basutos on their hands; but they had lately been warned that, unless by the special direction of the Secretary of State first obtained, they were not to expect any assistance whatever from British troops in case of another war with the natives. The Cape Government became therefore solely responsible for the public safety. A Disarmament Act had been passed about two
years before, under which the native tribes were being gradually disarmed and the natives prohibited from possessing guns. What reason was there to justify an exceptional treatment of the Basutos? The question was brought before the Cape Legislature, and after a long debate, the Cape Government was supported in its decision to carry out their disarmament.*

The provisions of the original Disarming Act had been generally copied from the Irish Disarming Acts of the British Parliament. The Cape Ministers did not put it in force precipitately. They repeatedly extended the term for the voluntary surrender of the arms; they issued precise instructions to ensure a fair valuation and prompt payment for them, and provided for the issue of licenses to all who could show good cause for carrying arms. But, nevertheless, the Basutos were many of them unwilling to part with their guns, and, unfortunately, they were encouraged to persevere in their opposition by the French Protestant missionaries settled in the country, excellent men according to their lights, to whom the natives owed much, but, like too many missionaries, impatient of any authority other than their own amongst their converts, and not disposed to inculcate obedience to law as a virtue. The Aborigines Protection Society and a section of the English Radicals took the part of the Basutos, though it was distinctly the side of war as against peace. Lord

* In a speech (June 1, 1880) Mr. Sprigg said: "I went to the Pitso in Basutoland and I saw a large body of cavalry almost as numerous as that which enabled Marlborough to win his great victory of Blenheim. The force amounted to something like seven or eight thousand men. I thought what a terrible thing it would be for this country if such a body of men, disciplined and trained to the use of their horses, and to a certain extent to the use of their arms, were to break out into open rebellion. . . . It was a force ready to obey at a moment's notice the word of the barbarous chiefs of that country."
Kimberley followed suit, and the Cape Opposition took up the same cry as a party weapon wherewith to assail the Government. The substance of every despatch and of every speech of a prominent speaker disapproving disarmament was promptly telegraphed to them. "The amount of sedition," writes Frere to Captain Mills (April 27, 1880), "preached by their friends from Saul Solomon, at Sea Point, up to the reverend Frenchmen on the skirts of the Drakensberg, is enough to inflame a much less excitable population."—"It will be little short of a miracle," he writes to Sir G. Colley (July 19), "if the poor Basutos are not talked into a rebellion; but I trust we may be spared such a calamity."

Mr. Sprigg went, in August, to Basutoland to do what he could to allay the storm. He writes to Frere from Maseru:—

"August 29, 1880.

From numerous sources I have obtained information which satisfies me that the Peace Preservation Proclamation is not the real cause of the disaffection. It has simply discovered that which was latent. The late Chief Morosi, and the Chief Masupha, and a few others, never approved of the action of Moshesh in handing over the country and the people to the Queen. They have always been rebellious in their hearts, and frequently so in their actions. Advantage is now taken of the discontent excited by the Proclamation to induce the people to help two or three of the chiefs to attain the object of their desire—complete independence. . . ."

"I regret to say that the close proximity of the Frere

* Mr. Rose Innes, writing to Mr. Littleton, October 7, 1880, speaks of a "disclosure of widespread understanding among all tribes within and without the Colony. Basutos sent messengers in all directions to point out the favourable circumstances for such a combination. The colonists, they said, had nothing to depend on save Cape Mounted Rifles and Burghers, who would not be likely to turn out. Sir Bartle Frere's recall indicated that the Colony would not receive support from England."
State is very disadvantageous. Certain persons there are openly encouraging the Basutos in rebellion—selling them guns and ammunition and brandy extensively—telling them that all the English soldiers were killed at Isandhlwana, and that the Colonial Government is in a helpless condition as regards military forces."

The Basuto Chief Letsea obeyed the Proclamation and was followed by the industrious, semi-civilized, and progressive portion of the tribe. But there was another party which clung to the ancient customs, the witch-doctor and the impi, in preference to the British magistrate and the native constable, vain and headstrong semi-savages, whose desire was a life of idleness, varied by war and plunder. Between the two parties there was constant discussion whether they should submit or resist. With so many flatterers and evil counsellors it would, indeed, have been a wonder if the counsel of the malcontents had not prevailed. But there can be little doubt that if it had not been for the sympathy shown to the insurgent party by the Aborigines Protection Society and the British Parliamentary clique who were working with it, by the Cape Opposition, and, lastly, by Lord Kimberley, there would have been no serious resistance to the disarmament, and no Basuto war.

The British Government had two courses open to them. They might have supported the disarmament, or, if they really considered the disarmament unjustifiable, they might have directed Frere, or his successor, to forbid any movement against the Basutos by the Colonial forces. Mr. Sprigg, the Colonial Secretary, would unquestionably have acquiesced in such a direction, for, on taking office in 1878, he had given adhesion to the constitutional principle, that the Colonial forces are under the orders of the Queen's Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kimberley took neither course.
He gave moral support to the Basutos, while acquiescing
in the action of the Colonial forces in endeavouring to
disarm them.* The result was the unfortunate Basuto
war, which broke out immediately after Frere's departure,
and lasted intermittently for more than three years.

Nothing could be more indefensible than the course
taken by the British Government in thus repudiating
responsibility. It left the conviction on the minds of the
colonists, and assented to the principle that the Crown
had abdicated its prerogative of declaring war and peace,
and that in future the Government of a colony might
levy war on its own responsibility. Before any step
had been taken by the Cape Government beyond giving
notice that the law would be carried out, the malcontent
party, led and instigated by Letsea's son Lerothodi and
his half-brother Masupha, made an attack upon Letsea
and those who like him had just sent in their guns,
thus rebelling not only against the authority of the
Colonial Government, but against their own paramount
chief. Several loyal natives were killed, many more
were plundered of all their property; and the rebels
not only drove away or intimidated all who were loyally
disposed to Letsea and the Government, but sent notices
to the magistrates to evacuate the country.† In September
nearly the whole tribe was in revolt, and was followed
by a rising of the Basutos in East Griqualand, and of the

* Frere writes from England (October 21, 1880) to Mr. Sprigg:
"General Leicester Smyth, who will arrive with this, tells me he
has the strictest possible orders on no account to allow the regular
troops or their officers to aid in any operations against the natives
without express permission from the Home Government. I hope to
write and speak very strongly against this policy, which seems to me
as cruel to the natives as it is unfair to the Colony."
See also a letter of Frere's to Lord Derby, published in the Morning
Post, June 21, 1883.
† Frere to Colonial Office, November 18, 1880. C. 2740, p. 104.
Pondomese, Amaquate, Tembus, and other tribes on the eastern side of the Drakensberg. By the end of January, 1881, matters looked a little brighter, and there were hopes of peace. But these hopes were not realized. Mr. Sprigg writes to Frere:

"March 1, 1881.

"You will see the messages which have passed between the Government and the Basutos, which I suspect will end in nothing; and how can any good be expected to come of negotiations when the Home Government publicly censure the Colonial Ministry in the House of Commons, and practically tell the rebels to fight on for better terms? And this is the way in which we are treated when we are the only loyal party in the Colony. . . . I now fully believe, what has often been said, that a section of the English Cabinet desire to dismember the Empire. Cannot some member of the House of Commons be got to take this matter up for us?"

And again:

"March 26, 1881.

"The Basutos have been constantly encouraged to anticipate the intervention of the Home Government in their favour and against the Colonial Government. And the rebels still hold out in the expectation of such relief being afforded them. General Clarke assures me that the censure of our proposals for peace pronounced by Grant Duff in the Commons (and which was immediately telegraphed here), has operated in Basutoland most distinctly in the direction of prolonging the rebellion."

But to return to what was passing in Capetown in May, 1880.

The Boer emissaries, Krüger and Joubert, by way of embarrassing Ministers, set themselves to raise opposition to the Government proposals for a Confederation Conference. In the course of the past year fresh obstacles had arisen. The unsatisfactory settlement of Zululand, the condition of the Transvaal, the unrest of the natives..."
in Pondoland, Basutoland, and elsewhere, the unscrupulous
virulence of a section of the Radical party in the British
Parliament, who were in communication with the Boer
leaders and with the Capetown opposition, the severance
of the High Commissionership, and the want of any warm
and judicious support from the British Government, made
the mischievous ends of the malcontent emissaries only
too easy of attainment.

Sir George Colley, Sir Garnet Wolseley's successor,
arrived at Capetown the third week in June. He was
received by Frere with his usual cordiality, stayed ten
days with him at Government House, and fully reciprocated
his kindly feeling, as was shown by the frank and friendly
tone of their correspondence.

In a letter to Colley, Frere describes what happened
in the Legislative Assembly as to the confederation
proposals.

"July 4, 1880.

"It soon became evident that the Transvaal deputies
had made a very effective impression on Dutch constitu­encies here. One member of the habitual supporters of
the Government after another begged Mr. Sprigg to let
him off voting, or to allow him to vote against the con­ference—not that he or his constituents disapproved of it,
but that ‘they felt bound to show their sympathy with
the Transvaal by voting against any conference till the
Republic was restored.’ At last it became evident that if
they pressed for a division, Ministers would be in a
minority, and the question would be regarded as decided
for some time to come. So, as the smaller of two evils,
Ministers elected to accept the ‘previous question,’ which
does not prevent the question of confederation coming on
next session should circumstances be more favourable." †

* Mr. R. W. Herbert writes (June 24): "I hear that there is a system
of press telegraphing, by which everything tending to show that you
will not be supported here is promptly transmitted, while acts and
words in your favour are suppressed."

† In a letter to Mr. Leonard Courtney, M.P., a Dutch translation
Frere was not surprised by the result of the debate. "Since Sir Garnet Wolseley came out, every act of the Government at home has been to disintegrate and separate, instead of combining and uniting," and under the circumstances no decisive step in the direction of confederation could be looked for.

He writes to Sir George Colley again:—

"August 26, 1880.

"I hold that it is very immaterial to the best interests either of this country or of England whether union be effected by confederation, annexation or any other 'ation.' The thing wanted is unity of purpose and action in all matters which concern more than one province, and the utmost possible freedom for self-action with regard to matters which concern only one province or part of it.

"One great mistake hitherto seems to me to have been trying to hasten and push on what can only result from natural growth, which must of necessity be tardy if it is to be enduring. I saw this from the very early days of my stay in South Africa, and resisted, as well as I could, the precipitate action to which we were urged by indiscreet advocates of confederation both at home and out here. I was not at all surprised or disappointed by the result of the debate on the subject in our House of Assembly. Had the proposal for a conference been carried, the discussion at the conference would no doubt have done good. As it was, there was much valuable discussion in and out of Parliament on the subject, and it is well advanced by what passed. More might have been done could we have foreseen the great effect produced on the Dutch constituencies by the stumping oratory of Krüger and Joubert . . . . The best step Her Majesty's Government can now take is to interfere as little as possible with the of which appeared in the Zuid Afrikaan, Messrs. Krüger and Joubert claim credit for this result: "We have done our duty," they say, "and have used all legitimate influence to cause the Conference proposals to fail." . . . "It is a satisfaction to us candidly and without reservation to inform you that the Conference proposal has failed also through our efforts" (C. 2655, p. 96). Immediately afterwards, however, a vote of confidence in Mr. Gordon Sprigg's Ministry was passed by an unusually large majority."
responsible Ministers of this Colony, but as soon as possible to reverse the disintegration policy of the past fifteen months and revert to the system which had been in force for some months before Wolseley came out, when all subjects of Imperial moment . . . passed through my office under 'flying seal,' thus giving me an opportunity of knowing what was proposed in Natal or the Transvaal, and expressing an opinion upon it. This alone would soon have proved a great step towards a virtual union of all South Africa, as regarded such subjects as customs, postage, steamer lines, railways, and the like."

Another cause of the failure of support to confederation was the impression that the hostility to Frere on the part of the English Liberal party was such that he was not likely to remain long in office. The colonists knew well enough what Frere intended by confederation, but they were reluctant to commit themselves to it if it was to be carried out by a new and unknown High Commissioner.

From the time of the receipt of the news of Isandhlwana to the General Election a year afterwards, the attacks of the English Radical party and Press on him had continued. He had been defended, if at all, feebly and inefficiently.* A special correspondent in Zululand during the war, on being remonstrated with by an officer on Lord Chelmsford's staff for what he had written, replied, "Oh! but you should see my instructions;" which he said were "to write down Frere, whatever he might do." "For some time past it has been impossible for you to get any honest treatment from the Press," writes Mr. R. W. Herbert (August 5, 1880); and he encloses as an example a cutting from the Pall Mall Gazette, in which Mr. John Morley, the editor, "who has given much study to South African affairs, prints, and

* Some speeches by Lord Carnarvon, Lord Cranbrook, and Lord Elcho are almost the only noteworthy exceptions in Parliament.
so endorses as correct, the allegation of the *Scotsman* that the appropriation of the Transvaal and the settlement in Zululand are parts of the 'foolish and dangerous policy of Sir Bartle Frere.'"

Constantly thwarted by the action of the Secretary of State, and never sure of being supported, his influence and his power for good were so impaired that the question frequently recurred to him whether in the interest of South Africa he ought not to resign; but it seemed to him that his duty was to remain at his post—speaking his mind very plainly to the Secretary of State as he saw occasion—and to stand by the Cape Ministers who had done such loyal service to the Crown and to the Colony.

To Sir Robert Morier he writes—

"April 6, 1880.

"Some day I may be able to recount to you all I have had to go through since Isandhlwana caused a demand for scapegoats. I should have objected as strongly to being victim, as I should do to officiating as priest in such a sacrifice, but the solemn inquiry in Press and Parliament was over, judgment passed, and the victim condemned and sent off into the desert whilst we were still fighting Cetywayo.

"I sometimes wish now I had gone home at once and placed the blame on the shoulders which really deserved to bear it. But the Government at home assured me of unabated confidence and begged me to remain; and the Government here begged me with obvious sincerity not to desert them, and I thought the work deserved more consideration than the workman. My only regret now is from doubts whether the course which would obviously have been best for my personal interests might not have been also best for the work. Time will show.

"Meanwhile I have seen no reason to doubt the soundness of any one principle on which I have acted, nor the truth and soundness of any advice I have given; and as I do not serve either press or party, I am content to leave the result to time, and hope when I am gone that men like
you will judge that I served my Queen and country truly and well."

Mr. Gladstone, in courting the constituency of Midlothian in December, 1879, had joined in the hue and cry against Frere. He spoke of the Zulu war as "the record of ten thousand Zulus slain for no other offence than their attempt to defend against your artillery with their naked bodies their hearths and homes, their wives and families." * Naturally, therefore, it was expected that the chief actor in this alleged monstrosity would be recalled as soon as Mr. Gladstone came into power. But it soon became apparent that his words—like those about the Austrian Empire—were not so much the expression of his convictions as rhetorical phrases and sentiments adapted to the exigencies of an election contest. Lord Kimberley, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, treated Frere's continuance in office as a matter of course; there was no indication of departure from the policy of the late Government, either as regarded the Transvaal or confederation, nor was there any expression of disagreement with Frere's course of action in any respect, either in Lord Kimberley's despatches or in his private letters.

But when the new Parliament met at Westminster in May, Ministers found many of their supporters greatly dissatisfied at this sudden cooling of the heat of the Midlothian invective. Notice of motion was given of an address to the Crown praying for Frere's removal.†

* "Midlothian Speeches," vol. i. p. 209. He also said of Frere (p. 209) that he had not "ever been in a position of real responsibility," or "ever imbibed from actual acquaintance with British institutions the spirit by which British Government ought to be regulated and controlled." He attacked him also in reference to the Afghan policy. See chap. xxii. p. 436.
† Frere's recall prevented any debate taking place specifically on
Several members of Parliament met together two or three times about the end of May, and, at the suggestion of Mr. Courtney and Mr. Dillwyn, a memorial to Mr. Gladstone was drawn up, which was signed by about ninety of them, and sent to him on June 3, to the following effect:


"We the undersigned, members of the Liberal party, respectfully submit that as there is a strong feeling throughout the country in favour of the recall of Sir Bartle Frere, it would greatly conduce to the unity of the party and relieve many members from the charge of breaking their pledges to their constituents if that step were taken."

The first three signatures to this document were those of L. L. Dillwyn, Wilfred Lawson, and Leonard Courtney.

A more cynically candid document, perhaps, never was penned. The "unity of the party" and "pledges to constituents" are the only considerations even alluded to.

Probably the memorialists knew the man they were addressing. At any rate they must have felt that the following action of the Colonial Office was a move in anticipation of the formal expression of their wishes.

On May 31, the Colonial Office addressed the Treasury, suggesting that the special allowance of £2,000 a year, that subject, but there was a debate (September 1, 1880) on the question of the annexation of the Transvaal, which incidentally raised the same matter. The speeches, though more temperate than in the debate of April, 1879, showed little acquaintance with the facts, for which there was no longer the same excuse; and Frere, as before, was very inadequately defended except by Lord Elcho. "I have given your memorandum and letter to Lord Elcho, who is the only man I know who has consistently stood by you, and who is willing and eager to fight your battle now," writes Mr. Albert Grey; "at present members remember that they have committed themselves blindly to certain views at the General Election."
granted to Frere at Lord Carnarvon's instance, and which was part of the conditions upon which Frere accepted office, should henceforth be stopped "under the altered circumstances of his position as High Commissioner." The Treasury concurring, on June 1 Lord Kimberley wrote in a despatch to Frere—

"I have the honour to acquaint you that, looking to the diminution of your duties, and the necessity of asking for a grant of £2,500 as a supplement to the salary of Sir G. Pomeroy Colley as Governor of Natal, in consequence of his appointment to be High Commissioner for South-East Africa, they have come to the conclusion that they could not justify the continuance of your special allowance." *

It was not even correct that the Exchequer was at the extra cost of £2,500 in consequence of Sir G. Colley's appointment. The £2,500 was allowed him only on the understanding that his pay allowance as Commander of the Forces, as well as his own half-pay, should be included in it; and the Colonial Office took credit, when recommending the grant, for the saving of some £1,500 effected in the military budget, so that the extra cost was only one, and not two thousand pounds.† And when the

* C. 2601, p. 7.
† Sir G. Colley to Frere, June 28, 1880. Sir G. Colley arrived at Cape-town on his way to Natal, and went to stay with Frere just after the telegraph had announced to the public the docking of Frere's salary. He, however, did not hear of it till the morning he was leaving Government House after a ten days' visit. In the Colony it was interpreted as an intentional rebuff to Frere. Sir G. Colley was greatly pained at it. He wrote to Frere from Durban (June 28): "I cannot let this mail go back to Capetown without a line to thank you for all your kindness and hospitality to Lady Colley and myself during our stay at Cape-town, and to tell you how deeply I feel your warm kindness and ever-ready help and advice under circumstances hardly calculated to ensure a cordial welcome. One telegram in particular has been a constant source of pain and vexation to me since I saw it, for the
office was pressed upon Frere, he had accepted it only on condition of receiving such a salary as would enable him, notwithstanding the smallness of his private fortune, to "provide everything necessary to maintain the dignity of the position." In the course of three years, the duties and obligations of his office had greatly increased; and as he had anticipated, his salary, even with the extra allowance, had not sufficed to cover his expenses, and had left him with a deficit to be paid from his private means.*

By Frere himself, and by the Cape press and public, the despatch was interpreted as a hint from the Government to resign. Lord Kimberley afterwards repudiated this interpretation. But, whatever was intended, it only strengthened Frere's resolve to remain at his post till actually recalled, lest it should be supposed that a question of personal emolument had any influence on his conduct at such a time.†

first time, in your room, and it does not diminish the annoyance to know that that telegram is not strictly true."

* Sir B. Frere to Mr. G. T. Clark, October 16, 1880. See ch. xviii. p. 163.
† This was not the only attempt at docking Frere's salary.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, before leaving office, had written a despatch in which he had treated the £2000 extra allowance to Frere as having been granted to meet travelling expenses, so that no extra sum could be claimed by him on that account. Lord Kimberley took up the point, but it had no foundation, and ultimately it was dropped.

But even this was not all.

The travelling expenses of the High Commissioner had always been paid by the Colonial Office as extras, and repaid by the Colonial Government of the Colony in which he travelled. This had already been done by the Cape Government in the case of Frere's expenses when he was living for seven months in barracks at King William's Town during the Transkei war. On the same principle the expenses of his journey, in 1879, through Natal and the Transvaal—which, being at the seat of war, and with war prices, were necessarily heavy, though he had not a single soldier in the Transvaal to guard him—would, in the
In the course of his reply to Lord Kimberley, he says—

"July 15, 1880.

"The duties which it was proposed to entrust to me when I first came here appeared so honourable and important that I would, as far as my means allowed, have undertaken them without any special reference to salary; and I only hesitated to do so from a doubt whether I could afford to undertake their proper discharge on a salary which I was assured was hardly adequate to the expenses of the office in the quietest time. Nothing was further from my intention than to haggle for payment then, and nothing is further now.

"It is unnecessary to assure Her Majesty's Government that I have throughout thought less of the amount of salary withheld than of the important duties and useful influence withdrawn, rendering my task in future so much more difficult than it was before.

"If Her Majesty's Government think the office can be better filled by another, the only favour I would ask is that they would distinctly say so. In making this request I may be permitted to remind your lordship that in the case of both Sir Garnet Wolseley's and Sir George Colley's appointments I was informed that my supersession was only temporary,* I am now left to infer that it is intended to be permanent. Under such circumstances I am sure your lordship will not think it unseemly or unreasonable that I should ask for an explicit assurance of confidence to enable me to do the work still remaining to be done."

But it was not long before the sacrifice to the "unity of the Liberal party" was completed.

natural course, have been reimbursed to the British Government by Natal and the Transvaal. But before the claim was made on them, all accounts relating to the war time had been by arrangement closed as between the Home Government and Natal; and the Transvaal had broken away all together. The Home Government, having thus by their own act lost the means of reimbursing themselves, demurred to paying what was due on this account to Frere. Ultimately, on his representing the facts and pressing his claim as a matter of right, it was paid, though with an ill grace.

* This is distinctly stated in Sir M. Hicks-Beach's last letter (April 22, 1880) before he went out of office.
On August 2, Frere received a telegraphic despatch from Lord Kimberley announcing his recall. It ran as follows:

"August 1, 1880.

"There has been so much divergence between your views and those of Her Majesty's present Government on South African affairs that they would not have thought it either desirable or fair towards yourself that you should remain at the Cape, had it not been for the special reason that there was a prospect of your being able materially to forward the policy of confederation. This special reason has now disappeared, not through any want of earnestness and ability on your part, but through the recent action of the Cape Parliament in refusing to take even the preliminary step of a conference, and Her Majesty's Government have therefore with regret come to the conclusion that Her Majesty should be advised to replace you by another Governor."

It was the first word Frere had heard, officially or privately, from Lord Kimberley, of any "divergence of views" between the British Government and himself; and it was the first time that it had been suggested to him that he was retained in office only for the special purpose of promoting confederation. But the news of the Cape Parliament having declined for the present any further step in the direction of confederation had reached England at a convenient time to constitute a plausible excuse for satisfying the anxiety of the memorialists as to the storm which threatened to ruffle the harmony of the Liberal party, and Frere was the Jonah thrown out to allay it.

At the news of his recall there arose for the second time a burst of sympathy from town, village, and farm, throughout the country, in terms of mingled indignation and sorrow.* The addresses and resolutions, being

* There are between sixty and seventy resolutions and addresses recorded in the Blue-book, all passed unanimously except in one case, at Stellenbosch, where a minority opposed the resolution. The
spontaneous at each place, varied much, and laid stress on different points, but in all there was a tone of deep regret, of conviction that Frere's policy and his actions had been wise, just, and merciful towards all men, of hope that the British Government and people would in time learn the truth. Some were worded in terms so strong and indignant as regarded the British Government that Frere had to insist on their being modified before he would forward them.

It is impossible to summarize them so as to convey an adequate sense of their collective force. One, from farmers in the East London district, expresses "sorrow and alarm" at his recall. "It is to your wise policy," it says, "we are indebted for the remnant of our property preserved to us from the late war and rebellion, which your Excellency nipped in the bud. . . . Although we have suffered severely by the late war, we know matters would have been even worse had the enemy been allowed to mature its plans for the destruction of the Colonies. May God Almighty bless you and grant you and yours a safe passage to the Mother Country, give you grace before our Sovereign Lady the Queen, and eloquence to vindicate your righteous cause before the British nation." *

The Natal colonists say—

"We shall never forget that your Excellency personally shared with us in Natal the anxieties and perils that beset the Colony during the first weeks of the Zulu war. . . . We feel that in you we have had, and shall ever have, a true and earnest friend. . . . We confidently believe that when the truth is better known at home, justice will be done to your Excellency." †

spokesman of the minority, however, based his opposition not on Frere's general policy, still less on his character, but as a protest against an Excise Act, which was one of Mr. Sprigg's measures.

* C. 2740, p. 22.  † C. 2740, p. 23.
The Malays and other Orientals, of whom there is a considerable population at Capetown, looked upon Frere, an Indian statesman, as their special property. The address from the Mahommedan subjects of the Queen says:—

"We regret that our gracious Queen has seen fit to recall your Excellency. We cannot help thinking it is through a mistake. The white subjects of Her Majesty have had good friends and good rulers in former Governors, but your Excellency has been the friend of white and coloured alike."

The address of the natives of Mount Coke tells with pathetic simplicity the old story of the failure of the British Government to place confidence in their South African Governors.

"Our hearts are very bitter this day. We hear that the Queen calls you to England. We have not heard that you are sick, then why have you to leave us? . . . By you we have now peace. We sleep now without fear. Old men tell us of a good Governor Durban (Sir Benjamin Durban) who had to leave before his good works became law; but red coals were under the ashes which he left. Words of wicked men, when he left, like the wind blew up the fire, and the country was again in war. So also Sir George Grey, a good Governor, good to tie up the hands of bad men, good to plant schools, good to feed the hungry, good to have mercy and feed the heathen when dying from hunger. He also had to leave us. We do not understand this. But your Excellency is not to leave us. Natal has now peace by you; we have peace by you because God and the Queen sent you. Do not leave us. Surely it is not the way of the Queen to leave her children here unprotected until peace is everywhere . . . We shall ever pray for you as well as for the Queen. These are our words to our good Governor, though he turns his back on us."

What the feeling of the Natal Zulus towards Frere was,

* C. 2740, p. 63.
† C. 2740, p. 46.
is expressed in a letter from Mr. J. Eustace Fannin, who was Border Agent in Natal, during the war, to Mr. Littleton:—

"August 14, 1880.

"From all parts of South Africa Sir B. Frere has received from the European colonists expressions of approval and gratitude . . . but he has not had the same opportunity of knowing the Natal natives' view of the matter, and as I have had many chances of ascertaining what their true opinion is, both whilst holding office during the war and since while travelling through this Colony, I think I am justified in stating what it is.

"They all believe that Cetywayo had determined to try conclusions with the white man, and that had he not been stopped by the decided action of the High Commissioner, the Zulu impis would have overrun Natal as they did in Chaka's time. I have overheard the natives in discussing the matter among themselves applaud his Excellency's action as the best proof they have yet had of the wisdom (ukuhlakanipha) of the English Government.

"Any one who knows what a hostile inroad of a Zulu impi means can understand their thankfulness at being saved from its ruthless cruelty. Had it crossed into Natal, the Natal natives would have been the principal sufferers; each Zulu warrior was anxious to wash his assegai, and he would have done so to his heart's content among the thousands of unprotected women and children living in the native locations near the Zulu border.

"His Excellency is being recalled because of the clamour raised by people at a distance unable to understand the true state of affairs, but he may rest assured that by those on the spot his memory will be long cherished with gratitude for his quickness in discerning the great danger that threatened them, and his promptitude in averting it."

Mr. Sprigg writes (August 29, 1880)—

"I don't feel able yet to give expression to my sentiments of profound regret that Her Majesty's Government have thought it advisable to recall you from the post which you have held for more than three years with such conspicuous advantage to South Africa. They have given way to pressure on the part of a section of their supporters who in their ignorance and passion have driven from South Africa
the best friend it has ever known. . . . For myself I may say that in the midst of all the difficulties with which I have been surrounded, I have always been encouraged and strengthened by the cheerful view you have taken of public affairs, and that I have never had half an hour's conversation with your Excellency without feeling a better, and, I believe, a wiser man."

The following letter is from Mr. (now Sir John) Akerman, a member of the Legislative Council of Natal, who, though an advocate for confederation, had thought Lord Carnarvon rather too impatient and too hurried in the methods he employed:—

"August 9, 1880.

"Having become aware of your recall to England from the office of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, etc., etc., I cannot allow your departure to take place without conveying to you, which I hereby do, the profound sense I feel of the faithful and conscientious manner in which you, to the best of your judgment and belief, have in my opinion endeavoured to fulfil those engagements which, at the solicitation of Great Britain, you entered upon in 1877. The policy was not your own, but was thrust upon you. Having given in London, in 1876, advice to pursue a different course in South Africa from the one then all the fashion and ultimately confided to yourself, it affords me the greatest pleasure to testify to the consistency of the efforts put forth by you to carry out the (then) plan of those who commissioned you, and availed themselves of your acknowledged skill and experience. Though my own advice was unheeded, I yet feel that you have done your duty in South Africa in accordance with your promises. I rejoice, therefore, that you did not resign your post, but elected to impose the responsibility of a recall on those who have by so doing broken their faith with South Africa and especially with yourself. As a public man of long standing in South Africa, I would likewise add that since the days of Sir G. Grey, no Governor but yourself has grasped the native question here at all. Britain, through her local officials, has bolstered up, protected, and conserved a system of heathendom unworthy of her instincts and pretensions and injurious to the natives, and I feel confident that had your full