capitalist support, was to be steadily pushed forward. Rifles and ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. Both the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office might be counted on, it was said, to support a vigorous forward movement for reform. Mr. Phillips and Mr. Leonard, sick and weary of the hopelessness of unsupported constitutional action, and of the continual set back in Boer politics, already casting round in their minds for some new departure, accepted and from that time forth co-operated with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson in the development of the Jameson plan.

In October, 1895, a meeting took place at Groote Schuur, Mr. Rhodes' residence near Cape Town, at which were present, in addition to Mr. Cecil Rhodes, Mr. Lionel Phillips, Mr. Hammond, Mr. Charles Leonard, and Colonel Frank Rhodes. At this meeting the plan was more fully discussed and matured; and in November, 1895, when Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg, the details were finally settled. The letter of invitation was written, signed and handed to Dr. Jameson, and the date of combined action provisionally fixed for the end of December. Dr. Jameson's force was to be about 1,000 strong, and the start to be made when finally summoned by the signatories of the letter. In the meantime the Johannesburg leaders were to have sent in to them 4,500 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of
ammunition, and were, if possible, to arrange for an attack on the Pretoria Arsenal simultaneously with the move from outside.

With regard to the letter of invitation which was subsequently used by Dr. Jameson as a justification for his start, there has, unfortunately, been a good deal of misunderstanding. It is now entirely a matter which concerns Dr. Jameson and the signatories of that letter which they gave him during the final arrangement of the plan in November, and without reference to others than themselves. But as it has been the subject of very careful inquiry on the part of the Select Committee, and as they have recorded their finding thereon in the body of their Report, it is only fair to the signatories of the letter to refer to it.

The Select Committee's Report reads as follows—"As soon as the preparations were well advanced towards the latter end of November, 1895, Dr. Jameson, who had been with Mr. Rhodes at Cape Town, went to Johannesburg and procured a letter signed by Mr. C. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, Mr. L. Phillips, Mr. J. H. Hammond, and Mr. G. Farrar. Mr. Leonard has stated that he was very reluctantly a party to giving this letter of invitation to Dr. Jameson; and he has said in effect that it was given to afford a pretext which might justify Dr. Jameson with the Directors of the Chartered Com-
pany, and induce the officers and men to join him in the raid. This letter was shown to Mr. Rhodes by Dr. Jameson on his return to Cape Town; and upon December 20th, 1895, Mr. Rhodes asked to be supplied with a copy. Mr. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, and Mr. Phillips have all distinctly stated that this letter was never intended as an authority to Dr. Jameson to enter the Transvaal, unless and until he received a further summons from them."

Such was in brief the history of the Jameson plan as far as concerned Johannesburg. And it is necessary here to refer to the position with regard to it of the bulk of the men who subsequently constituted the Reform Committee. They at this time, with the exception of a few of their number, of which I personally was one, were entirely ignorant of what was going on. It was obvious that in such a plan as this the utmost secrecy was necessary; and the Johannesburg leaders, relying on the general sentiment of the community, assumed the responsibility of arranging a basis of operations. So that the plan when it was gradually revealed to various men had either to be accepted by them in its entirety or rejected. There was not much time left for discussion and alteration of plans. Men demanded and received assurance that the movement was to be a Republican one, and in no way to
be an attempt on the independence of the country. A sufficient number of rifles were also to be forthcoming, and the High Commissioner was to be on the spot to expedite the adjustment of matters immediately disturbances arose.

There was nothing in Johannesburg itself at a later juncture which caused so much dissatisfaction as what was held to be the inadequate supply of arms and ammunition. Many men held, and strongly expressed the view, that at least 10,000 rifles and an adequate amount of ammunition would be required wherewith to arm Johannesburg. But they had to content themselves with a prospect of 4,500, which later was cut down to 2,500, and another 1,000 which Dr. Jameson was to bring in with him. True, more were to be obtained from the Pretoria Arsenal, but this was rather a counting of chickens still unhatched. It is of course easy enough to criticise this, as it is many other details of the scheme. It would have been a great thing no doubt to have had, when the time arose, 20,000 rifles to distribute among the eager crowd, but it is only fair to those concerned to consider the difficulties of obtaining them. In the despatch and the receipt of this contraband cargo the greatest precaution had to be observed. Every additional case or oil drum containing rifles added to the risk of detection; while, most exasperating of all (in
fact, there was one of our number who went so far as to declare it constituted a fresh Uitlander grievance), was the prolonged delay in their transit over the Netherlands Railway.

During the month of December was undertaken the extremely difficult work of sounding some of the leading men as to their readiness to support the plan, and every effort consistent with a degree of safety from detection was made at organisation. During November and December there were delivered some memorable speeches, setting forth the Uitlander position and denouncing the Government; but no general public meeting was convened, it being deemed too dangerous to risk a premature and abortive explosion. On December 26th the Manifesto was published in The Star. It was a long and exhaustive indictment, drawn up by Mr. C. Leonard, showing the injustice of the Uitlander position, and it concluded as follows:—

a. What do we want?
b. How shall we get it?

I have stated plainly what our grievances are, and I shall answer with equal directness the question, “What do we want?” We want:—

1. The establishment of this Republic as a true Republic.
2. A Grondwet or Constitution, which shall be framed by competent persons selected by representatives of the whole people and framed on lines laid down by them, a Constitution which shall be safeguarded against hasty alteration.
3. An equitable Franchise Law and fair representation.
5. Responsibility to the Legislature of the heads of the great departments.
8. Liberal and comprehensive education.
9. An efficient civil service, with adequate provision for pay and pension.

This is what we want.

There now remains the question which is to be put before you at the meeting of the 6th of January, viz., "How shall we get it?"

To this question I shall expect from you an answer in plain terms according to your deliberate judgment.

(Signed) CHARLES LEONARD,
Chairman of the Transvaal National Union.

In the meantime the course of affairs at head quarters was not running smoothly. The military department under Colonel Rhodes were chafing at the tardy arrival of the arms and ammunition. The men organising the surprise on the Arsenal at Pretoria had reported that the scheme at that moment was entirely impracticable; and they were confirmed in this opinion by an old and trusted officer of Dr. Jameson's, who had distinguished himself in the service of the Chartered Company, and who had been specially sent to Johannesburg to assist and advise in military matters. He stated that to proceed with this scheme at that time would be nothing short of madness.

The Christmas Naachtmaal, a religious festival, was being celebrated in Pretoria, and the town was
thronged with Boers. To crown all came the flag incident, which was a misgiving on the part of a large number of the revolutionary party as to what was to be the true nature of the external support. It had arisen out of messages brought down from Cape Town, which implied that the Jameson aid would be accorded only to a move in favour of the English flag.

Affairs were in a critical position, and a meeting was hurriedly summoned at Colonel Rhodes' house on Christmas day of December, 1895. It was soon obvious that postponement was an imperative necessity; only a portion of the small supply of arms had arrived, the attempt on Pretoria Arsenal was impracticable, and a large section of the Committee refused point blank to proceed any further with the undertaking until positive assurances with regard to the flag question had been received. Under these circumstances Mr. C. Leonard and Mr. Hamilton were despatched to Cape Town to confer with Mr. Rhodes.

It has been suggested that the importance of the flag incident was exaggerated; but it must be borne in mind that it was not merely a question of what men felt on the subject of English or Republican rule—it was a question of what they were pledged to. The movement within the Transvaal had from its outset been one in favour, not of a British
Colony, but of a sound Republic. It was the one practicable basis on which it had been found possible to secure some sort of political union among a cosmopolitan community; and on this ground it had been adopted. Many Americans and South Africans had accorded their support only on this understanding, and it mattered not what a man's affection for the Union Jack might be; he had accepted the National Union Manifesto, and he was in honour bound to abide by it. No one will accuse Colonel Rhodes of ultra-Republican views, but in this instance he felt the obligation of his position, and frankly said so. The ground on which numbers of men had been induced to join the movement could not be departed from. On the following day Dr. Jameson duly received a telegram from Johannesburg, advising him that it was "absolutely necessary to postpone flotation."

As the Johannesburg postponement has been the subject of a good deal of criticism, it will be of interest, in conjunction with what has already been said, to consider the finding of the Select Committee in their Report. It reads as follows: "There is a conflict of evidence as to what were the true grounds which determined the revolutionary party at Johannesburg on the 26th December to counter-order the insurrection which had been fixed for the 28th, and to prohibit the invasion of the Transvaal
by Dr. Jameson, which had been settled for that day. Colonel Rhodes states that it was 'because they would not rise before they got a distinct assurance about the flag, and they only got that on the Sunday morning. We were told in the telegram we got from Cape Town from C. Leonard that an entirely new departure had been decided on.' Dr. Wolff attributes the failure to the fact that 'being unable to seize the Arsenal at Pretoria they were quite unprepared.' Mr. C. Leonard gives the same reasons, as well as the difficulty about the flag. Mr. Phillips says they had not arms for the men.'

It is difficult to understand what conflict there is in this evidence; it is true that some of the witnesses did not assign all the reasons, but no single reason given is in conflict with any other. Moreover, any one of the reasons alleged was enough to render postponement expedient, and taken altogether they rendered it imperative. But the crash was now nigh at hand.

Dr. Jameson, instead of falling in with the Committee's instructions, and the new departure decided on by Rhodes and Leonard, determined to march to Johannesburg. To quote from the Select Committee's Report: "When they (Mr. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, and Mr. Phillips) learnt that Dr. Jameson was intending to start, so far from authorising him to come in, they used every measure in their power
by telegram and by messenger to prohibit and prevent the Raid. With the full knowledge of all these circumstances, Dr. Jameson, being convinced that no rising was about to take place at Johannesburg, determined to bring matters to a head, and telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes: 'We will make our own flotation, with help of letter which I shall publish.' Immediately upon the Raid becoming known, this letter, by the order of Mr. Rhodes, was cabled by Dr. Harris to Miss Shaw for insertion in the *Times* newspaper, with a date filled in which made it appear that it had been sent as an urgent appeal from Johannesburg just before the Raid.” The news of Dr. Jameson's actual start on Sunday evening reached Johannesburg on the Monday afternoon through the medium of the public press, the Boers having been in possession of the intelligence some hours previously.

The effect of this news on the Johannesburg leaders and the few others who were cognisant of the Jameson plan was one, to use no stronger term, of astonishment. They saw their plans blown to the winds—theirselves discredited and apparently distrusted by their ally—the worst possible hour for action forced upon them; and to what end, for what reason? Whether Dr. Jameson reached Johannesburg or not, would not this premature movement prejudice the whole cause?
Would it not paralyse the High Commissioner's hand?

But if this was the effect on the minds of the leaders, what was it—what was it bound to be?—on the great mass of people in Johannesburg, who, while thoroughly in sympathy with the movement for Reform, knew nothing of the Jameson plan? What did it mean? As far as was possible explanations were given. But it was difficult to make people understand why a man, in the position of an ally, had taken the step of marching into the country because he had been requested not to do so. One thing, however, they not unnaturally argued, and that was that the Johannesburg leaders were entirely in the dark. This, said a large number, is a move quite independent of us. Rhodes has evidently sent Jameson in with the full assurance that he will be supported by the High Commissioner and the British Government. Happy but brief delusion! On the very following evening the High Commissioner's proclamation was placed in their hands.

I am reluctant to be thought hypercritical, but in view of the wholesale detraction and misrepresentation to which the Johannesburg leaders and their followers have at one time and another been subjected by a misinformed Press, some expression of opinion, now that all the facts are known to the world, may not unreasonably find utterance. The
wide mental habit which some one in Mr. Rhodes' case has described as that of "thinking in Continents," is doubtless in a great and strong imperial statesman, as I hold Mr. Rhodes to be, an admirable trait; and in so far as it is the expression of a lofty and generous ambition to further the spread of a free and enlightened civilisation, and the interests of that great nation in whose destinies he has such an abiding faith, I render it every homage. But it has its dangers; the habit is somewhat infectious—it is apt to extend itself to colleagues, and even cable correspondents; and if when carried into the field of practical politics—it is allowed to engender a certain scorn for prosaic details—its influence may be productive of failure, and even disaster.

With regard to what followed, the story of Dr. Jameson's march and battle need no repetition. The news of Dr. Jameson's actual start filtered through to head-quarters in Johannesburg; about 3 p.m. on Monday; and pocketing whatever feelings they might have on the subject, the leaders at once endeavoured to make every preparation in their power. The arms that had arrived were unpacked, and those that had not were sought for and found by messengers sent down the railway line. These messengers accomplished the delicate task of carefully piloting to Johannesburg the remainder of the rifles, the bulk of the ammunition and three Maxim
guns, which, however, did not arrive until Tuesday evening. The Reform Committee was then formed and remained in perpetual session day and night throughout the crisis. Whatever more this well-abused Committee might have done, they at any rate preserved perfect order among an excited community, both white and black: they enrolled a police force and closed the canteens; they provided food and shelter for numbers of men, women, and children who flocked into the town from the outlying mines; and in common fairness to the members of the Committee of whom not much that is generous has been said, it may as well be recorded that many of them were willing and eager to accompany whatever force might be sent out to meet Dr. Jameson, and would gladly have done so if the Executive of the Committee, with whom the ultimate decision rested, had not concluded that such a step was both impracticable and unnecessary. The responsibility for this decision rests with the Committee, and more especially its Executive—and not with the people of Johannesburg as a whole. That the decision, looking back to the whole circumstances of the position, was a natural one I think must be admitted; but as far as the people of Johannesburg, among whom were campaigners from many a South African battle-field, are concerned, it is only right to say that those of them who had arms would cheerfully
have gone on foot if necessary, to endeavour to effect a junction with the Jameson column, had they been asked or even permitted to do so.

What Johannesburg should have done at this juncture has been the subject of more recrimination, and more controversy than anything else connected with the whole subject of the "Armed Incursion." The Jameson force, which had fought, and fought gallantly according to the testimony of those best able to judge, the Boers who opposed them, naturally had the sympathy of the world in the hour of reverse. Should Johannesburg not have made some effort to assist Dr. Jameson even with the inadequate means at their command and in the circumstances as they then stood? On this question Mr. Phillips writes in the *Nineteenth Century* as follows:—"I think to-day, as I thought at the time, that it would have been an act of grossest folly to send out a force on foot to meet an ally whom we had not the slightest ground for believing was in any need of our aid, in direct opposition to the commands of the High Commissioner, and moreover as a declaration of hostilities against the Government which we were unprepared to fight. The mere fact of the invasion having occurred prior to the internal rising put us hopelessly in the wrong.

"The British Government had declared itself in definite terms from which they could not retreat,
and we had the combined Transvaal and Orange Free State as opponents."

Dr. Jameson and his force, which in November he had stated would be 800 strong, and not, as was only known after the surrender, 500, had started not only after receiving orders from the Johannesburg leaders for postponement, but without advising them of his start. Naturally he could not in these circumstances expect aid, nor did he, as he frankly admitted in his answer to question 5,720 before the South Africa Committee. The High Commissioner's proclamation repudiating Dr. Jameson and warning British subjects was issued in Johannesburg on Tuesday.

Unfortunately, with that persistent bad luck which dogged every step of this expedition, a letter sent by Col. Rhodes to Dr. Jameson appears to have created a misunderstanding. Some of Dr. Jameson's followers stated after the surrender that Col. Rhodes had sent them a letter which reached them on the march, containing a promise to send a column to their assistance at Krugersdorp. Sir J. Willoughby repeated this in his evidence before the Committee, and in support of his contention put in the fragmentary letter found on the battle-field with the missing words filled in by himself and his friends from memory. Col. Rhodes filled in the missing words in examination before the Committee, giving a dif-
ferent meaning to the letter; and in reference to it he said: "I know that some of Dr. Jameson's party really believed that that note contained a distinct promise to meet them at Krugersdorp. All I can say most distinctly is, that it never was in my head to do so; all I meant to do was to send a few men on the road to meet them and show them their camp. Their camp was on the Krugersdorp side of Johannesburg, and I meant to send, and in fact I ordered the men to go out and show them directly they got in sight of Johannesburg. But as for sending a force to meet them, that was not in my mind. If it had been I ought to have sent the men off at the same time as this note left, because the note only left on the Wednesday morning early, and I fully expected them on the Wednesday evening."

"Question 5405. Were you in a military position to enable you to send out anything in the nature of a force?—If one had thought they were in difficulties, of course one would have sent out a force. But I do not think we were in a position to send them anything that would have been of very much service to them.

"Question 5406. And in your opinion I understand you to say that you were clear in your mind that Dr. Jameson would get in without any difficulty?—Certainly, I always thought so."
Mr. Phillips, Mr. George Farrer, and Mr. S. W. Jameson (Dr. Jameson's brother), read this letter before its despatch, and they all assert most positively that it contained no suggestion of sending out a force to Krugersdorp. In order to clear the matter up, Mr. Phillips cabled out for a photograph of the fragments found on the battle-field, which had been pieced together by the Transvaal authorities. On this photograph Mr. Gurrin, an expert on handwriting, reported that the words filled in by Sir John Willoughby and his friends from memory were "not only inconsistent with the amount of space available," but "did not fit in with the letters and position of letters visible."

The cyclists who took the letter and were cognisant of its contents also confirm Col. Rhodes's version.

This subject would not have called for such lengthy treatment here if it had not been made the cause of considerable, and, as I think must now be admitted, unjustifiable reproach to Col. Rhodes and the other Johannesburg leaders. Mr. Cecil Rhodes, when asked for his opinion on this matter, is reported by a correspondent of South Africa to have replied as follows: "Oh," he said, "it is a mistake. I know my brother is absolutely truthful, and I have every reason to believe that Sir
John Willoughby is also; but at the same time, I would rather trust my brother's recollection of what he wrote than Sir John's of what he read."

The evidence of Mr. Lionel Phillips before the Select Committee states that the nature of the arrangement with Dr. Jameson was, what indeed it was always understood to be by those in Johannesburg who were privileged to know anything about it, that when called upon he should come to the aid of Johannesburg. That Johannesburg would be called upon or expected to go to his aid, had never been suggested or contemplated. We have had Col. Rhodes's evidence on the resources at his command, we have had Dr. Jameson's frank statement that at any rate, previous to the start he never anticipated the want of, nor expected, aid. Mr. Phillips is even more emphatic in reply to question 6909, in which he was asked if the statement that an arrangement existed with the leaders of the Reform Committee that "Dr. Jameson should be assisted by troops sent from Johannesburg to Krugersdorp" was true, he said: "It is absolutely untrue. We never made any such arrangement. We never for a moment contemplated that Dr. Jameson would need any assistance."

On Tuesday night, the 31st of December, two delegates were sent to the Reform Committee from the Transvaal Government. They said the Govern-
ment had instructed them to invite the Committee to send a deputation that the matters in dispute might be discussed, and if possible adjusted, in a friendly spirit.

A deputation of four, including Mr. Lionel Phillips, was sent on the following morning to Pretoria, and Mr. Phillips described in his evidence what had occurred. He said:—

"We described the whole of the grievances. We were perfectly frank; we told the Commission exactly the nature of our relations with Dr. Jameson. We told them that by arrangement Dr. Jameson was on the border, that he had certainly left without our instructions. We did not know for what reason he had left, but as we had made arrangements with him we regarded him as one with ourselves."

Later on the Commission handed to the deputation the decision of the Transvaal Executive, and it was to the following effect: "Sir Hercules Robinson has offered his services with a view to a peaceful settlement. The Government of the Republic has accepted his offer. Pending his arrival no hostile step will be taken against Johannesburg, provided that Johannesburg takes no hostile action against the Government. In terms of the proclamation recently issued by the President the grievances will be earnestly considered."
In the meantime the Reform Committee, sitting in Johannesburg, telegraphed to the deputation at Pretoria as follows:—"Meeting has been held since you started to consider telegram from British Agent, and it was unanimously resolved to authorise you to make following offer to Government: In order to avert bloodshed on grounds of Dr. Jameson's action, if Government will allow Dr. Jameson to come in unmolested, the Committee will guarantee, with their persons, if necessary, that he shall leave again peacefully within as little delay as possible."

The deputation then returned to Johannesburg and reported to the Committee, from which time they were free to take any course that seemed best. The above negotiations are what have been described as an armistice—though the term is obviously an inaccurate one. The position was about as difficult as it could be; and, at the risk of placing his neck in jeopardy, Mr. Phillips took upon himself his full share of responsibility for Dr. Jameson's action.

The High Commissioner had always been considered an essential factor to a satisfactory settlement, and on him the leaders were now compelled to rely. That he was in feeble health at the time was no fault of his, but it undoubtedly constituted one more of the unfortunate circumstances with which this whole question was involved. Having arranged for the handing over of Dr. Jameson and
his followers, he felt himself unable to do more, and the grievances and the Reform Committee were left to their fate.

In dealing with the actual facts I have thought it wisest to take as far as possible the statements of the principal actors themselves, wherever any controversial point has come under consideration. With regard to what followed the surrender of the Jameson force there is little that need be said here. Dr. Jameson with his officers and men were, after an imprisonment of some few weeks in Pretoria, handed over to the High Commissioner and forwarded to England, where the officers and Dr. Jameson were tried and punished with imprisonment under the Foreign Enlistment Act. The members of the Reform Committee were arrested and tried by the High Court at Pretoria on charges of high treason, and subsequently imprisoned and fined, although not before the four leaders had been subjected to sentence of death, afterwards commuted.

Punishment, however much or however little merited, has therefore been freely meted out to all concerned. But there are instances in which it fell with undue and disproportionate weight, if, for the sake of argument, one may adopt a scale relative to the knowledge of and participation in, the whole movement of different participators. It did so in the case of a large number (not including myself)
of the Reform Committee, who knew nothing of the Jameson plan until after Dr. Jameson had started, and who joined the Reform Committee, mainly because they did not care to appear backward in supporting what they believed to be a just cause at a critical moment. And these same men, in the great majority of instances, quietly awaited and accepted the consequences of their action afterwards, though they smiled somewhat grimly when in Pretoria prison they learnt that the whole world was denouncing them for having urgently called Dr. Jameson in by letter alleged to have been received by him the day before the start, and then refused to assist him. As, however, Dr. Jameson and his officers were awaiting trial they thought it better to remain silent, and did so, to the great edification of a large section of the Press, which continued to denounce them both in poetry and prose. The consequences fell with undue weight also upon the officers of the Jameson force, who, in addition to suffering imprisonment, lost their commissions. With the policy of starting when they did they had nothing to do. They obeyed the commands of their superior officer; and the reasons adduced by him supported by the belief that their action would not be disapproved by the Imperial authorities, were more than ample to determine them not to refuse to follow their chief, which it is argued they should
have done. To retire on receipt of the High Commissioner's letters and proclamation, while their chief proceeded, would have again placed them in a most invidious position, to say the least of it. Under the circumstances imprisonment was surely ample punishment. If it was right to retain Mr. Cecil Rhodes on Her Majesty's Privy Council, it was wrong to deprive these men of Her Majesty's commissions. The British Government have decided, wisely and rightly in public opinion, to retain Mr. Rhodes; and as trustees for the reputation of fair play, which the English nation looks on as a heritage to be handed down untarnished to posterity, it is their duty to deal in like spirit with the Jameson officers.

With reference to Mr. Chas. Leonard a good many hard things have been said, because he did not return from Capetown after his interview with Mr. Rhodes. The period of the "Armed Incursion" was, it was felt, rather an unfortunate one for the Chairman of the National Union to be absent; and in deference to Mr. Leonard it is only fair to notice the explanation which he at least has been at no great pains to make public. He had intended to return with his colleague Mr. Hamilton, when he received an urgent request from Mr. Rhodes to remain and render him what assistance he could with Mr. Hofmeyer and the Imperial authorities at
Capetown. On this point Mr. Wyndham elicited from Mr. Leonard before the South African Committee, that he had received a letter from Mr. Rhodes from which the following was an extract: "I asked you with Hamilton to stay and help me. You could do no good in a train, you could do great good here. I know you fought for going, but it was nonsense and too late. Afterwards blame me, but I was thoroughly right." It is thus clear that if Mr. Leonard has erred, it was an error of judgment; and personally now that all the circumstances are known, I do not consider him even to have erred in that. To have returned at a later stage after the warrant for his arrest was made public would not have served any useful purpose; whereas it is clear from the unremitting attention which he devoted to the matter in England that he used his liberty to better purpose in the Uitlander cause than any that could have been served by his imprisonment at Pretoria.

The action of the Cape Government in first arresting Messrs. Joel and Bettelheim and subsequently in endeavouring to arrest Mr. Charles Leonard, pursuing him with that end to a Portuguese port, will ever remain a stain on this page of the history of the Cape Colony. The arrest of political refugees, one of them a British subject, in a British colony, to be handed over to a foreign
State, is an act, the character of which might be natural in Turkey, but which surely has never before in history been perpetrated by a British Colonial Government.

To Mr. Leonard it was left to find on the shores of England that protection which even a Portuguese port would not withhold from him, but which was denied him in the land of his birth, a British colony. Well might he exclaim in the bitterness of his heart that Cape politicians, during this crisis in South Africa, thought of nothing but "crawling on their stomachs before the Boers."

Among those who have suffered heavily the consequences of the Incursion is assuredly Dr. Jameson. In dealing with his action I have taken recorded fact, and I should be sorry indeed if I felt that I had done him the least injustice. He came to the conclusion that expediency demanded a bold forward movement, and, contrary instructions notwithstanding, he endeavoured to carry it out. Mr. Rhodes, it has been shown, although a party to and a principal in the Jameson plan, was not a party to the actual start of Dr. Jameson's force. Moreover, the apparent readiness with which he agreed to a new departure, after the interview with Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard, and also with which he offered to keep Dr. Jameson on the border for "six or nine months if necessary," clearly shows his appreciation of their reasons for
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preventing precipitate action. Mr. Rhodes's name has come continually before us; and whatever errors, ethical or political, he may or may not have committed, one thing at least has been made clear to any impartial man, and that is that he was inspired in his actions by public spirit and an honourable ambition to further the cause of civilisation in South Africa. In his successful career it has not often occurred to him to have to exclaim with Voltaire:

Nous tromper dans nos entreprises,
C'est à quoi nous sommes sujets.

But we have been brought face to face with political disaster; and now that the episode is past and the tale told, with a fulness which in the world's history no such tale has ever been told before, it is not unreasonable to speculate on what were the causes of failure, and what under different circumstances might have been the prospects of success. And at the outset of the consideration of the problem the question which forces itself upon one is, whether there was not too much lofty contemplation of the end and an insufficient consideration of the means on the part of all the originators of the Jameson plan. Was not a federated South Africa—the avowed object of at least some of the originators—a too distant object, a matter too remote to the immediate business in hand? Was it not allowed to obscure the real and immediate issue,
and that in a disastrous manner, for instance, when at the eleventh hour it appears to have inspired an attempt to force the British flag on the internal movement at Johannesburg, which was avowedly and irretrievably republican in its object? Federation must bide its time; and when it comes—if it come at all—it can only come as the spontaneous wish of the various States and Colonies of South Africa; attempts to force it drive it further away.

It has been contended, and not without reason, that the Jameson plan was never put into execution, and therefore never had a trial. Dr. Jameson, impatient at delay, determined on an immediate movement, which inevitably alienated the support of the British Government and the aid of the High Commissioner, both deemed indispensable to the original plan. In fact they were the vital essence of the original plan; it was never supposed that the Jameson force plus the men to be hurriedly armed in Johannesburg could defeat the burgher army; it was expected that they would be able to hold Johannesburg until they received the moral support of the High Commissioner and if necessary the physical support of the British Government. But if, as Mr. Charles Leonard says in his evidence, things were “misfitting” in Johannesburg, they “mislfit” a good deal worse between Capetown and the Colonial Office. Of any knowledge of the “Jameson plan” the Colonial Office
have been, and in the light of the evidence must be, acquitted. Moreover, Mr. Chamberlain's immediate repudiation of Dr. Jameson's move was in itself conclusive. Of charges of Colonial Office complicity the world is heartily sick. As Sir William Harcourt said in the South African debate on the Committee's Report: "Men have gone muttering about the world and they are muttering still;" but what particle of proof has been forthcoming to justify all the head shaking and inuendo? Where then was this moral support to come from?

The fact is Mr. Rhodes was either deceived by the sensational telegrams of his cable correspondents, or he was mistaken in his estimate of the Colonial Office mind.

He probably was both.

The latter he might not unnaturally to some extent have been, by the policy which had induced the Colonial Office to arrange for a joint expedition with the Cape Government against the Transvaal in case the ultimatum on the Drifts question was not complied with; as to the former, their ambiguous language speaks for itself.

To be wise after the event is a privilege accorded to Courts of Inquiry and even to writers; and one important question remains: Given the position of the Uitlander in the Transvaal in 1895, was revolution of any sort or kind a wise or expedient
policy? That it was justifiable, looking to the aggravation of the position, I believe; that is, if any revolution or rebellion in the whole course of history—and in the Transvaal there have been several—ever was justifiable. Failure was its worst condemnation.

But was it in any shape or form expedient? Against the solid wall of Boer prejudice and ignorance was it the most effective weapon?

In the light of subsequent events it is probable that any scheme involving the use by invasion of a foreign force not directly under Imperial control would have been doomed to failure. The arrival of such a force at Johannesburg might have postponed the catastrophe—it would not have averted it—much less would it have achieved the object of a revolution. On the other hand it is possible that a movement purely internal, which would not have alienated and wounded the Progressive布尔ger sentiment, and which would not have precluded the possibility of some measure of Imperial support, might at least have obtained a liberal instalment of reform.

But there is another alternative course which might have been adopted. There was the alternative of a firm but patient policy, carried on both internally and externally within constitutional lines in the open light of day. This statement would sound somewhat trite if it were not for the fact that at the time
we are reviewing new factors had been imported into the problem which had not yet been taken into the calculation, new elements had been introduced into the position which were only beginning to make their presence felt.

The true attitude of the British Government on the question of the Drifts towards the end of 1895, although known to Mr. Rhodes and other members of the Cape Government, came as a revelation to the world generally long after the Jameson Raid. The British Government and the Government of the Cape Colony pledged under certain conditions to co-operate in coercing the Transvaal. Here was an alliance, here was a menace which even the Boer Executive could not have realised without alarm. Unrest within, profound irritation without, the British and Cape Colonial Government united, some of the grievances of the Uitlander held to constitute breaches of the Convention, a strong Conservative Government in office in England—was there not material here for a statesman to manipulate? Would not co-operation with the Imperial authorities at this juncture have been a better policy than any policy of isolation? But the incident is over, the day has passed; the great Proconsul, at least for a time, is out of power, and the curtain has risen on a new act in the South African political drama, which it is not our object here to consider.
The whole episode has not been the first, nor I fear will it be the last blunder, committed on the confines of a world-wide Empire. Every step has been revealed for the edification and sometimes the amusement of an eager public; every mistake has been duly censured, and every action which has fallen below the ethical standard of public morality been severely condemned. Fortunately, perhaps, for the happiness of mankind, it is not given to many persons to have either their public or their private conduct laid so absolutely bare. The verdict of posterity has been variously estimated; but as posterity will see things in perspective, that portion of it which regards South African history will find a bigger blunder looming larger on their view on which to visit their condemnation.

They will look to 1881, and they will see a British Colony, the Transvaal, with one section of its inhabitants in rebellion; they will see English soldiers hurrying to the support of their defeated and overpowered comrades countermanded; their fellow countrymen, loyal colonists, stoutly holding Pretoria and other towns, deserted and betrayed; concessions refused in the day of England's power, granted under pressure of temporary defeat; and English prestige so shattered and pitiful a thing as within the confines of South Africa to threaten the very foundation of Empire.
In this they will recognise so many mistakes, so many lapses from public virtue, so much of political poltroonery, that beside it the Jameson Raid will sink into insignificance.

They will observe, moreover, with something akin to indignation, that the Ministers responsible for this policy in 1881 were neither imprisoned, fined, nor deprived of their commissions, and that the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone was not even threatened with dismissal from Her Majesty's Privy Council.
DIARY OF A POLITICAL PRISONER IN PRETORIA

NOTE.—The sentences under which the sixty-three Reform prisoners were sent from the High Court of the Transvaal to Pretoria prison on April 28th, 1895, were as follows:—

The four leaders were sentenced to death, which sentence on the following day was commuted to fifteen years' imprisonment.

The fifty-nine remaining Reformers were sentenced to

Two years' imprisonment.
£2,000 fine, or another year.
Three years' banishment.

Previous to the imprisonment under sentence was the imprisonment after arrest in January, extending over a fortnight, but of this I kept no note at the time.

The diary was written in prison at intervals during the term of our imprisonment. It is not a
daily record, nor does it do more than describe some of the details of the life there. A few portions of no general interest are omitted.

It was written with a view more to filling up the time then than to publication afterwards. I have since added a few notes, which make the picture a little more complete.

One of the first matters that came up for our consideration was the question of whether we were to be treated under ordinary gaol regulations, or whether we were to have such treatment as political prisoners or first-class misdemeanants would be entitled to in most civilised countries. In this question were involved such points as clothing, food, correspondence, and the right to see friends. Our accommodation was as vile as it could be; the prison food, which we had tried for some days, consisted of mealie meal porridge at 7 a.m. with salt. At noon, thin soup, coarse meat and bread. At 4 p.m. mealie meal with salt, water ad lib. and no other liquid.

To many men the porridge and salt were uneatable, and at the end of a few days there were men weak and ill from hunger. It was therefore obvious that a continuance of this food must mean illness to a certain number.

At this juncture we were informed that if we applied for privileges as political prisoners, they
would be granted; failing an application we were to don prison clothes on the following day and continue prison food. The men who objected to signing this application urged that it would be better to come under gaol regulations, wear prison clothes, &c., than ask for any privileges. As against this it was urged that we were only asking for what we were entitled to in the way of treatment; and the request, partially signed, was eventually sent in, with the result that some modification of the regulations was allowed.

Pretoria Prison,
May, 1895.

Our daily life here is somewhat monotonous. We rise about seven, and take a walk in the yard. We then wash in the muddy stream which runs through the yard, (Note:—When it was not occupied by native prisoners washing their clothes,) and have breakfast. After breakfast beds, consisting of straw mattresses on the floor, have to be taken out, and the cells are swept by native prisoners. Men spend the morning according to their different tastes—walking, talking, loafing, or reading and writing. The difficulty of both the latter is to find a spot which is quiet and shaded. I am now writing among the trunks in the cell used for our luggage. It is the best spot I know. The greatest drawback to our life is the throng; there are
sixty-three of us all crowded together, and anything like even momentary seclusion is almost impossible. In the cells or rooms themselves there is always inevitably noise and movement. In our cell there are, or rather originally were, thirty-five men. It is a small low structure, of galvanised iron sheeting, 22 feet long by 14 feet 6 inches across, and about 9 feet high. (Note:—The inner, or back wall of our cell, which is described in the diary, was only the thickness of a sheet of corrugated iron, and was one common to ourselves and the inmates of a similar cell on the other side of it, who were a lot of native prisoners. We heard their every word and movement; and through the greater portion of one night the short gasping respiration of a poor Kaffir dying from pneumonia. Our mattresses, which were small, covered the whole of the floor, with the exception of a narrow gangway down the middle. We were thus for sleeping purposes packed something like sardines.)

The floor of our cell is boarded, but not the walls. It is villainously ventilated, with small holes cut in the corrugated iron wall. These holes are situated near the roof, and are about one foot long and six inches deep. It is naturally hot by day and cold by night. The yard of bare gravel into which our cell opens is the best feature about the prison. In this we can get fresh open air, and as it is about 50
yards square, a fair stretch for exercise. (*Note:*—
The yard was the one used by all the native prisoners as well as ourselves.)

Mr. Clemens (Mark Twain) visited us yesterday, and gave us a bright hour of his conversation. He is a man of somewhat delicate physique, but with a fine head, shaggy eyebrows, a shock of strong grey hair, and a long eye which nearly closes when he laughs. He speaks in the slow American staccato manner, and has an easy and graceful command of language. He spoke of prison life as in many respects an ideal existence, the one he had ever sought, and never found—healthy, undisturbed, plenty of repose, no fatigue, no distraction—such a life as enabled Bunyan to write the *Pilgrim's Progress*, and Cervantes *Don Quixote*. Bunyan while in prison had for companions "angels, devils, and other scarecrows," and he enjoyed many handsome adventures and interesting travels without undue risk and with no more concern than was involved in their superintendence on paper. The body of Cervantes may have been enclosed in four walls; but his spirit roamed at large, and he had for his friends two such splendid fellows as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Thus two great works classic for all time would probably never have seen the light had it not been for the imprisonment of these two men. For himself, Mark Twain continued, he could
conceive of nothing better than such a life; he
would willingly change places with any one of us,
and, with such an opportunity as had never yet
been offered him before, would write a book—the
book of his life. Of course some of us failed to look
at it in this philosophic light, and he admitted that it
was not always easy to discover the concealed com-
pen|sation which invariably existed under apparently
adverse circumstances. Still, this was such a clear
case that he would assuredly, in the interview which
he was to have with the President on the following
day, endeavour to get our sentences extended. For
Clement—one of the prisoners who improperly spelt
his name with a "t"—descended like himself on the
left-hand side from a long papal ancestry, he would
endeavour to get thirty years.

There is a run on the luggage room this morning,
and I have had to move on to the yard, where I
am now lying on my bed, trying to write legibly.
At noon I generally take some of the prison soup
and bread. At 5 P.M. we have dinner; and this, as
well as breakfast, is now sent in from outside. We
have formed into different messes, and two members
of each mess are appointed daily to superintend
operations. As we have neither chairs nor tables,
these operations are somewhat intricate. Planks are
raised on boxes, newspapers spread on the planks;
and the meal, with such plates, cups, knives, forks,
&c., as we are able to muster placed on them. Baskets and small boxes serve as seats. Visitors are allowed in daily, for ten minutes each, from ten to twelve and two to four, except on Sundays, Saturdays and public holidays. For the first three weeks we slept with mattresses on the floor; but since Hull and King, two of our number, have been liberated, they have used their influence in our behalf and have procured stretchers; these are an improvement, as it is trying work to be always sitting or lying on the ground. Perhaps our best time is after dinner in the evenings. When we first came in we were locked up at 5.30 P.M., and lights had to be extinguished shortly afterwards; these rules were gradually relaxed, and now lights are allowed to any reasonable hour, and doors remain open till 8.30 P.M. A new moon rose shortly after our imprisonment, and now is making to the full. Nightly we see her in our after-dinner stroll—white and splendid in the still deep tropic sky. Inside scratch games of whist and poker are being played; and in the little inner yard, outside Jim Leonards' cell—the piazza, as we call it—Muggins Williams sings, in a fair tenor voice, a host of ballads, operettas, and songs, of which he remembers with wonderful facility both the melody and the words. It is a poor heart that never rejoices; and as the last candle is blown out the snoring brigade, of which we have a large con-
tingent in our cell, take up the running, happy them-
selves and "innocent of hostile intent," but adding
one more to the cares that produce insomnia in
their less fortunate friends.

Amongst us are men of all nationalities—men of
all creeds and no creeds—of every shade of opinion
—political, ethical, or religious—British, English
South African, and Dutch South African, Americans,
Hollander, Swiss, Germans, a Turkish Effendi and
a Scotch baronet.¹ Barristers, lawyers, doctors,
mining men, speculators, commercial men—all are
represented. Men of great wealth and men of
poverty—luxurious effeminate men and hardy
pioneers—lie side by side on the prison floor, and
whistle or sigh as the spirit moves them to the
morning star shining clear through the narrow
window. For if, as Bacon says, "adversity doth
best discover virtue," it also "makes strange bed-
fellows." Of raconteurs we have our share; and
none of us will ever forget the pithy yarns of those
astute old Americans, Mein and Lingham. Their
supply would, if necessary, last out the two years.
They never tell the same yarn twice, and never tell a
flat one. There are among us men who are staunch

¹ The Reform Committee, of which only sixty-three were arrested
or voluntarily surrendered themselves, actually consisted of thirty-
four men of British nationality, seventeen South Africans, eight
Americans, two Germans, one Australian, one Swiss, one Hollander,
one Turk, and one Transvaal burgher.
champions and pillars of the Y.M.C.A., and men whose language is shockingly frequent and free. One is a vegetarian and has conscientious objections to penny points at whist; others of our number have in their time lost and won thousands at poker.

*Literature in prison.*—My two books since I have been here have been Macaulay’s *Essays* and Plutarch’s *Lives*. Of the former I have been reading again the essay on Bacon. Bacon’s career as Attorney-General and Judge is interesting politically, as throwing a lurid light on the influence exercised by the Crown on the courts of justice in England in the days of James I. To this practice Bacon lent himself an only too willing instrument, and in this matter he covered an illustrious name with ignominy. He was an opportunist, and a somewhat sordid one. As a philosopher he has conferred a great debt on mankind. He saw the barrenness of the speculations of the Platonists and the Schoolmen, and became the founder of the Philosophy of Fruit, as he called it. In his *De Augmentis* and *Novum Organum* he set forth in most brilliant manner the claims of experiment and research in every department of nature, the sciences and arts. Experimental philosophy, not metaphysics, was his doctrine; and the exposition of this, along with his *Inductive Logic*, seem to have constituted his great life work.
I have read several of Plutarch's lives. His favourite method appears to be to take a famous Greek and a famous Roman, and, after giving the life and history of both in separate essays, to compare the two. The parallel is generally a striking one, and serves to illustrate more than anything else how Greek civilisation, with its philosophy, art, and political institutions, impressed itself upon Rome. The writing is concise and condensed, and the comparison is made in an epitome of both lives in a short essay by itself—to epitomise all this again is difficult. In vol. ii. the essays on Alcibiades and Caius Marcius Coriolanus are most interesting. Alcibiades, in whom the pursuit of pleasure was as strong a passion as ambition, has been for ages the ideal of numbers of men of the Bulwer Lytton type. His liberality, eloquence, beauty, bravery, and personal strength all won the hearts of the Athenians.

Coriolanus, who was exiled, returned at the head of an armed force of Volscians against Rome. The appeals of ambassadors and priests were disregarded by him; but he gave way to the appeal of his mother and wife, who prostrated themselves before him, begging that Rome might be spared. His leniency cost him his life, for he was slain by the indignant Volscians on his return to Antrium.

These notes are written a week or two after
reading the essays; and the conditions for reading in the midst of the sixty-three Reform prisoners have been so bad that my recollection of details is uncertain. At present, after a month in a cell with thirty-four others, I am sharing a small room with Bettelheim, which gives one more quiet.

The extremes of virtue and vice, crime and high nobility of character, in these old Greeks and Romans are astounding—heights high as heaven and depths deep as hell, as Ouida puts it in reference to some of her heroes. The two extremes occasionally, though rarely, occur in the same individual.

Among the moralists Aristides and Cato the Censor are the most interesting; and I think Plutarch's essay on the last is the best of his I have read. Cato was parsimonious, industrious, and severe. The position of censor was the highest dignity in the Roman Republic. "For, beside the power and authority that attended this office, it gave the magistrate a right of inquiry into the lives and manners of the citizens. The Romans did not think it proper that any one should be left to follow his own inclinations without inspection or control, either in marriage, in the procreation of children, in his table, or in the company he kept."¹

¹ Aristides and Cato compared, see p. 340
Yesterday Bettelheim and I moved into a little room with earth floor opening on the main yard. This gives one some quiet and peace for reading or writing. Our furniture is of course confined to the stretchers and blankets, it still being apparently impossible to get in tables or chairs. For the last few evenings I have been learning poker.

New building is going up apace, yet benevolent rumours about further mitigation amounting to immediate release keep coming in. Jim is more sanguine than ever.

I have succeeded in getting off Bettington and Clement, both of whom have been ill, to hospital in the last few days—previously Joel, Buckland, and Lingham had gone up there. Hammond is the only American left in now. The question of appeal for mitigation of the sentence to the Executive of the Government has caused much discussion among us. As usual, all shades of view. Our demand is simply for justice. South Africa denounces the sentence.

For feeding purposes we are divided up into messes. My first mess included Fritz Mosenthal, Buckland, and Brodie; but as all these were on the free list, as the list of those first liberated is called, their departure necessitated new arrangements; so I have since cut in with St. John Carr, H. A. Rogers, Dr. Mitchell, Van Hulsteyn,
Hosken, and Clement. Two of us are on duty daily.

Number two mess have obtained—fairly or not I don’t know—the reputation of jumping everything worth having in the way of boxes, planks, milk, knives, forks, &c., that are to be found; so Sandy last night, when the mess was decorously asleep, inscribed their walls in large letters with the legend “Beware of pickpockets.”

Du Plessis, the gaoler, is a typical Boer. He is an intimate friend of the President and an old one; and although a rough old wolf, is not without intelligence. (Note:—He had a keen nose for contraband articles, such as cigars in the provision baskets sent in.)

It has been announced that the banishment part of our sentence, which was subject to the confirmation of the Executive, has now been confirmed by them; this, it was explained by our legal Reform colleagues, including the Q.C., was probably only done as a matter of form and out of courtesy to the Judge; nevertheless, when daily led by all our Pretoria attorneys to expect an early mitigation, it came as rather an unpleasant surprise—to Grey it was a cause of great consternation—confirming his worst fears that the whole sentence was to be carried out in its entirety, and that all the outside rumours that reached us were simply intended to lull us into a fool’s paradise. I had a talk with him
on the whole question on Friday, and took the best view I could of the situation. I assured him that there was no need for despondency, and that the matter would be favourably settled within a few days. The following night he professed to have slept well, but on Saturday morning after taking a walk and talking apparently cheerfully with Duirs, he slipped away and ended his own life. I was on the spot before he actually died; but it was the most determined case of suicide I have ever seen, and on the Diamond Fields and Gold Fields I have seen a good many. He was dead within a minute of the occurrence.

The funeral was arranged for outside. We drew up behind the hearse sent to fetch the body, and with bare heads followed it across the yard to the prison gates, where our procession ended.

It was a sad day for us all, and one we are not likely ever to forget. His poor distracted wife had been in daily to see and comfort him, spending the brief ten minutes allowed her by the authorities with him in the open yard—their only meeting place. She knew of his constitutional nervous weakness, and dreaded the worst. It was of her and of our own anxious harassed wives we thought, when poor Grey's end came.

This event has naturally cast a gloom over us all, and made a tremendous impression in Pretoria
and throughout South Africa. The suspense lasting over three weeks has been trying, and its effect has been very much heightened by the assurances of well-meaning but ill-informed friends, who, visiting us daily, have kept reiterating from the very first day of our incarceration that the sentences would be forthwith considered—considered so favourably that the imprisonment in probably all the cases of the fifty-nine would be entirely remitted. This had gone on day after day, and it was but small wonder that one or two per cent. of mankind should be mentally worn out and affected by it. As a matter of fact, with very few exceptions up to the time of Grey's death, men had taken it philosophically and well. The "to-morrow" of the optimists became a standing joke, and many an evening the cells rang with laughter over the yarns of Yankee diggers and South African pioneers.

It is the custom every Sunday for one or two clergymen of different denominations to obtain leave of admission and hold service among us. These services, generally held in cells two and three, were fairly attended and appreciated by many of the Reformers.

On Monday evening—to have been the evening of our release—we were still in, but heard that a decision had been come to; later on that night we learnt that it was unfavourable.
At the next morning our sanguine, devoted and never-deterred Pretoria attorneys arrived with long lists in their hands. Eight of the fifty-nine were to be released forthwith; twenty-three, myself amongst them, had our sentences reduced to three months; some were to be considered again in five months, and four in twelve months. The four leaders were still under fifteen years' sentence, and had not yet been considered.

Only in the case of the three months' men was the commutation absolute; in the cases of the five and twelve months' men, whose sentences were to be reconsidered at the expiration of these periods, the pretence at commutation was a farce.

Thus, what the prosecution, after months of collecting, sifting, and weighing evidence, did not deem it its duty to do; what the Judge, whose function it was above all others to perform, apparently felt himself unable or unjustified to attempt; the Executive did. They endeavoured to discriminate between fifty-nine men, all of whom had pleaded guilty to the same offence.

This action was not merely unwise, it was as an act of clemency or even justice ridiculous. It was the first false step the Boer Government had taken throughout the course of the whole movement; it did not bear on its face the Kruger hallmark, and, as we are informed, it was taken in the teeth of
Kruger's strong opposition. Underlying it was palpably the idea of holding a number of men prisoners, practically "at the King's pleasure" as political pawns.

Following this decision in a few days came the erection of a new iron building opposite cell No. 3 in the prison yard—for our better accommodation; and the information from Du Plessis that inquiries were being made from the State Prosecutor's office as to the accommodation at the various prisons throughout the country, viler hells possibly even than the one at Pretoria. Du Plessis, however, told us that this splitting up throughout the country would not be carried out if we were content with our accommodation—a hint not to grumble further.

July 20th, 1896, finds me, thank God, with all my family aboard the good ship "Norman" in mid-Atlantic bound for Southampton. As my prison diary still wants completing, I take this the first opportunity of leisure since our release to finish it.

The mitigation to the shorter periods of sentence, while it gave some relief to the three months men, was felt to be most unsatisfactory as regards all the others, not only in the prison itself, but throughout South Africa. Fresh petitions, got up in some instances, I believe, at Kruger's instigation, kept coming in; delegates were sent up from the Free State and from nearly every town in the Cape
Colony and Natal; and we soon learnt that in all probability the sentences would again be considered by the Executive. On May 30th their further decision was announced. All, with the exception of six, were released on payment of the fines, £2,000 each and the signature of the bond to take no active part in Transvaal politics for three years from the date of release, which was substituted in lieu of banishment for that period.

We reached Johannesburg on the evening of May 30th. We were cheered by sympathetic friends as the train passed the different mines along the reef, and at Park Station we got a hearty reception.

Note.—A few weeks after the release of the fifty-six prisoners, the four leaders were released on payment of £25,000 each and a signature of a bond to take no further part in the politics of the Transvaal. This last was signed by all but Col. Frank Rhodes, who in place of it incurred the penalty of banishment. Messrs. Karri Davis and Sampson, the two irreconcilables, refusing to make any request whatever of the Government, were left in prison. Inasmuch as there was no special purpose to be served by this action or rather inaction on their part it has been described as unreasonable and quixotic. Quixotic it may have been, but courageous it undoubtedly was; and one cannot deny that in making any request whatever of the Boer