The Securitization of Identities in Political Campaign Manifestos:

A Qualitative Content Analysis.

By

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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DECLARATION

- I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.
- I declare that this thesis is my own, original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, internet or any other source) this has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.
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Abstract

Populism remains a very contested concept. This is due to the bewildering types of "populism" that have emerged and which lead political scientists to see populism "everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes" (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 1). The concept of populism seems to be in need of conceptual clarification. This dissertation undertakes a Qualitative Content Analysis of four political campaign manifestos emanating from European populist parties to develop an innovative polar typology of populism. The parties under scrutiny are the National Rally (France), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), Podemos (Spain) and Sinn Fein (Ireland), which together, represent the type of populism emerging in Western Europe. Firstly, this dissertation compares and contrasts the political propositions and attitudes of these political parties towards political institutions such as citizenship, residency rights, and rights to political participation. Secondly, this dissertation examines the use of securitizing (and desecuritizing) strategies and the deployment of the security grammar to convince voters to support measures that would otherwise be deemed illiberal or anti-democratic. On the basis of this informed comparison, this dissertation suggests a new conceptual and theoretical distinction between two polar types of populism, namely agonistic and antagonistic populism. As such, this dissertation proposes to differentiate between various strands of populism based on the way they portray and treat the *social other*. This dissertation contends that populist parties that frame the *social other* as an enemy – that is, an antagonistic relationship – are much more likely to propose illiberal and anti-pluralist measures and justify these through the use of securitizing strategies. For these parties, access to political institutions is contingent on nationality. Therefore, the social other should be prevented from participating in the political life of the community. In contrast, populist parties that frame the social other as an opponent – that is, an agonistic relationship – are more likely to propose measures to expand the reach of political and civil rights to *all* who live in the polity. These populist parties promote a vision of society in which everyone is included and encouraged to participate to their full capacity in the development of a more democratic society.

The agonistic/antagonistic polar types developed throughout this dissertation provide an important theoretical distinction between various types of populism. It allows for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of populism in its variety, and reframes the debate on its supposedly anti-democratic and illiberal nature. Ultimately, it contends that populism is not

necessarily a threat to democracy. However, the more a party frames the *social other* as a threatening enemy through the use of securitizing strategies, the more likely this party will embrace anti-pluralist, exclusive, and anti-liberal policies.

Key words: Populism, securitization theory, societal security dilemma, identity politics, democracy, institutions, democratic theory, qualitative content analysis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures

vii

List of acronyms

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
AO	Associative Ownership
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
EU	European Union
HI	Historical Institutionalism
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
IT	Identity Theory
NR	National Rally
NTR	National Territorial Rights
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SF	Sinn Féin
WWII	Second World War

1. Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Robbers Cave experiment: an introduction to inter-group conflict

In 1954, in the woods of the San Bois Mountains of Oklahoma, Muzafer Sherif held an interesting experiment on group identity, cooperation and conflict resolution (Appiah 2018: 29). Two groups of eleven-year-old, white, Protestant, middle-class boys from Oklahoma had been assembled by the researcher and his team and divided into two adjacent but separate campsites (Appiah 2018: 29-30). During the first stage of the experiment, which focused on the creation of ingroups[1], the two groups were separated and not aware of the existence of each other (Appiah 2018: 29-30). As soon as the groups engaged in activities that required some level of cooperation, hierarchies of status surfaced within both groups (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 70-4). Norms and values quickly emerged as the basis of ingroup solidarity (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 71-85). These norms became standardized behaviour among the ingroups (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 94). At the end of stage 1, the two groups were made aware of the presence of each other (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 69). This discovery marked a heightened awareness of group membership - "us" - and a strong desire to compete with "them" (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 95).

The presence of "them" compelled both groups to name themselves – the Rattlers and the Eagles (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 69). Naming a group is an act of delineation; the label signifies who counts as a member and who does not (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 94). Both groups began to develop cultural items such as songs and flags (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 91-4). Derogatory name calling began at the first physical contact with the "others", as a tournament consisting of various physical activities was organized to let the two groups compete (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 98). After the first day of competition, the Eagles had burnt the Rattlers' flag and the Rattlers were devising plans for retaliation (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 109). The competition quickly degenerated to camp raiding, and buckets of stones were collected in the anticipation of an attack (Sherif *et al.* 1988: 110-3).

The Robbers Cave experiment offers insights into the study of group formation and intergroup relations. The boys quickly "developed different norms because they had opposing identities"

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[1] According to Giles and Giles (2012: 144), "an ingroup is a social category or group with which you identify strongly. An outgroup, conversely, is a social category or group with which you do not identify."

(Appiah 2018: 30-1). For example, since the Rattlers used curse words during a baseball game, the Eagles decided to ban their use (Appiah 2018: 30). The worrying part of this experiment is how quickly intergroup conflict occurred, and the implications it has for managing diversity in divided societies, where cultural conflicts have intractable sources.

1.2 Background

We live in an age of profound democratic anxiety as the number of publications by leading political scientists, constitutional lawyers and philosophers on the current 'crisis' in liberal democracies attests. Levitsky and Ziblatt[2] (2018), Runciman[3] (2018), Mounk[4] (2018), and Ginsburg and Huq[5] (2018), for instance, all discussed the threats facing liberal democracies worldwide. This crisis is often blamed on a 'new' and profoundly undemocratic form of politics, populism, which supposedly threatens the pluralist foundations of the liberal democratic order.

The movement of goods, people and ideas fostered by globalisation transformed a world of nation-states into a highly fluid global village (Ritzer & Dean 2015). While the porous nature of borders is a critical characteristic of modern states, the flow of people and ideas came with frictions (Bauman 2013). One of them is the growing antagonism towards migrants since the 2013 'refugee crisis' (Lorenzetti 2020). The uncoordinated response of European institutions paved the way for deeper societal fragmentation and the rise of right-wing populism (Wodak 2015). Within this climate of tensions, right-wing populists presented themselves as the sole protectors of the national community and the true representatives of 'the people', defending its interest against the 'dangerous other' (Wodak 2015).

The refugee and Eurozone crisis allowed populists to increase their influence (Dzurinda 2016: 171). Indeed, the growing tensions between majorities and minorities in Western Europe has propelled many far-right parties to power. By 2018, 8 of the 27 member states of the European Union were led by far-right, nationalist, and xenophobic parties (Traverso 2019: 1).

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[2] See Levitsky & Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (2018).
[3] See Runciman, *How Democracy Ends* (2018).
[4] See Mounk, *The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is In Danger And How To Save It* (2018).
[5] See Huq & Ginsburg, *How To Save A Constitutional Democracy* (2018).

Populist forces promote a Manichean vision of society in which outsiders have usurped the power of the true 'people' (Wodak 2015; Wodak *et al.* 2013). They exploit the growing disaffection of citizens towards, for example, EU institutions, representative democracy, and the long-term consequences of the 2008 global economic crisis (Mair 2013). They prey on people's fears and insecurity to promote a nationalistic view of society that needs to be protected from the 'Social Other" (Mair 2013). For Müller (2016), populism creates a crisis of representative democracy because of its exclusionary nature. Indeed, a monolithic conception of 'the people' necessarily implies that some segments of the population are excluded and portrayed as a threat to society (Albertazzi & McDonnel 2008: 6; Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 324). For Rooduijn (2014a), however, this exclusionism is not a characteristic of populism *per se*, but rather a distinct aspect of right-wing populism.

Racist rhetoric and the depiction of *social others* as criminals is an important part of the politics of fear propagated by right-wing populism (Wodak 2015). The way immigration and minority issues are covered by politicians and political organisations directly contributes to antagonistic attitudes, opinions and ideologies (Van Dijk 2002; 2013). Emphasising fear and insecurity focuses the debate on the problems raised by the fluidity of people and ideas (Van Dijk 2002). It emphasises discrimination and hate speech rather than inclusive solutions (Lakoff 2014). This is important since, as discussed below, it triggers 'spiral' instances of identity securitization.

This dissertation challenges some of the mainstream views on populism, and particularly the near-exclusive association of European populism with far-right parties. It proposes to analyse populism through the lens of securitization of identities to differentiate between various strands of populism and contribute to the debate on the (anti-)democratic nature of populism.

1.3 Research Focus

Liberal democracies are built with checks and balances to avoid concentrating power in the hands of special interests and protecting the rights of minorities against the tyranny of majorities (Mounk 2018: 8). Yet for most populist leaders, the will of the people should be unmediated and free from institutional constraints (Mounk 2018: 8). Indeed, a core element of populism is the belief that nothing should supersede the *general will* of the people (Mudde 2005: 151). Blokker (2005: 382) argues that "from the populist point of view, legalism and the rule of law hinder the full realization of the rule of the people". They assume that the will of

the people should never be questioned, and that, since democracy means an equal weight for each voice, the majority should rule unchallenged (Galston 2018). These assumptions often generate calls for a more "direct" form of democracy, but also highlight an inherent contradiction between liberalism and democracy. For populists, whether the will of the people ascribes to liberal ideals or not is irrelevant, as long as it is enacted through democratic institutions (Galston 2018).

In Europe, as an example, many believe that the European Institutions have stripped their individual influence on public policy (Mounk 2018: 11-13). Likewise, majorities across the continent see their ontological security[6] undermined as the tensions between ethno-cultural groups increase. Interestingly, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which campaigned mostly on Germans' immigration worries, did best in regions with low levels of foreigners (Hansen and Olsen 2019). Anti-immigrant attitudes, fears about the economy and discontent with democracy were the AfD's main driver of support (Hansen and Olsen 2019). AfD supporters did not respond to what *is* but what they feared *might be* (Albright 2018: 182). At the centre of those fears lies the struggle over political institutions and a deep sense of ontological insecurity. This dissertation analyses the link between the inclusiveness of institutions and the tensions between cultural groups. Particular attention is paid to the (de)securitization of identities, the protection of minority rights and the inclusiveness of political institutions. Such a study allows for a deeper understanding of the populist phenomenon as well as the supposed threat it poses to liberal democracies.

Since its inception, the academic debate on populism has been intertwined with discussions on nationalism (Stewart 1969; Doroshenko 2018; Rooduijn & Akkerman 2017; Stanley 2011; Traverso 2019). Jagers and Walgrave (2007), Stewart (1969) and Taggart (2000) all treated nationalism as part of populist politics since both revolve around the sovereignty of the people. Populist parties are frequently described as nationalist threats, though equating the two causes a great deal of confusion. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) used a discursive methodology to test two assumptions regarding the Greek political formation SYRIZA: that SYRIZA is a populist movement, and that, given the near-exclusive association of populism with far-right movements, that SYRIZA must be a danger for Europe. They concluded that, though SYRIZA

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[6] Giddens (1990) developed the notion of ontological security, which "refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action".

presented a distinct articulation of populism, it was not a nationalist threat. Subsequently, De Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017) argued for a conceptual distinction between nationalism and populism based on the ways they construct "the people". While nationalists adopt a horizontal, in/out axis constructing the people on the basis of the nation, populists adopt a down/up approach constructing the people in opposition to an elite. This explains why two populist parties with nationalist tendencies are included in this study. Both ideologies entail a discursive construction of "the people" through internal frontiers, leading to the creation of opposing political identities – "us" and "them". The discursive creation of "the people" is important since it defines "who belongs" to, and can rightly participate in, the political community.

What populism exactly is and whether it compromises democracy is still up for debate. A large part of the literature on populism attempts to categorize populist parties along a left-right spectrum. However, da Silva Tarouco (2011: 71) argues that the left-right distinction is insufficient to politically identify parties and proposes an alternative perspective on political competition focused on "programmatic emphases, able to distinguish party identities by the issues the parties choose as priorities" (da Silva Tarouco 2011: 71). This dissertation, therefore, considers the programmatic emphases of the parties under scrutiny to develop a multidimensional typology of populism.

Due to some constraints such as language and time, this dissertation analysed only four Western European populist parties. To diversify the sample base, two left-wing parties, namely Podemos (Spain) and Sinn Féin (Ireland), and two right-wing parties, the Rassemblement National (France) and Alternative for Germany (Germany) have been chosen. This dissertation focuses only on the last campaign manifesto produced by these parties at the time of writing.

1.4 Overall Research Aim and Research Objective

Considering how important discourse and communication are within the definition of populism itself[7], content analyses of populist rhetoric are relatively common. Most of these studies have focused on the discursive creation of "the people" and the anti-elite rhetoric of populist

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[7] The work of Ernesto Laclau has been extremely influential in the contemporary debate on populism. For Laclau (2015: 160), "we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject, and (…) the building up of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps".

movements (i.e. Oliver & Rahn 2016; Hirvonen & Pennanen 2019; de Vreese *et al.* 2018). This dissertation's objective, however, is to understand how left- and right-wing European populist parties describe political institutions in their election manifestos and how they justify changes to these institutions.

In this dissertation, institutions refer to the rules and norms that regulate the political life of a community, particularly along the dimensions of political participation and public contestation. Such institutions include, among others, access to, and full protection of, civil and political rights, questions of citizenship, residency rights and political representation, ease of access to the organs of the state, and issues of integration and immigration. Inclusion is understood as the equal distribution of material benefits as well as social and political empowerment across all income, genders, ethnicities, regions, religious and other groups (Hickey *et al*. 2014: 5). Understanding the attitudes of populist parties towards political institutions is important for two reasons. First, as noted above, the rhetoric on the *social other* frames and constrains the debate on identity, immigration, and integration. When depicted as a threat, illiberal measures against the *social other* are easily embraced. Secondly, liberal democratic institutions offer the best way to engage in politics in a non-violent manner. As such, inclusive political institutions can be considered as the bedrock of pluralist and liberal democracies, and those seeking to undermine them are indeed a threat to the liberal democratic and constitutional order.

This dissertation undertakes a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) of campaign manifestos to examine the discourse of these parties on political institutions. Political campaign manifestos are analysed as the voices of parties, since they play two crucial roles in the election cycle (Jakobi 2011: 195). First, they express the views of the party, what is seen as important and worth championing. Second, they contain statements intended to persuade voters and draw election support. This dissertation analyses political manifestos through the lens of the securitization of identities to gain a deeper understanding of the populist phenomenon and contribute to the debate on the democratic nature of populist politics. While the concept of securitization of identities is explained in more detail below, in its simplest form, it is the idea that by framing identity issues as security threats, the public comes to accept solutions that would have been otherwise unacceptable. By depicting the *social other* as a danger to society,

identity entrepreneurs[8] are able to exploit the ontological security of citizens to gather support for illiberal measures and demand political institutions that exclude or neglect minorities.

Up to this point, this dissertation has raised a lot of problematics linked to intergroup competitions, societal issues, and governance in diverse societies. But what is the problem exactly, if there is one? As illustrated with the Robbers Cave experiment, group cohesion is organic and natural. Individuals have a natural urge to belong to, and identify with, a group. However, identification and belonging have a flipside. One either belong to a group, or does not. The problem is that group competition follows group identification because inclusion and exclusion are two faces of the same coin. Populist leaders are often said to exploit these differences to gather popular support, resulting in deeper antagonism between 'the people' and the '*social others*'. This dissertation supports the view that antagonism breeds social conflict, because by depicting the *social other* as dangerous, populist leaders can trigger a cycle of securitization of identities. As such, the last resort for peaceful governance in multicultural society resides in compassionate intergroup relations in which the social others are treated with respect and dignity. This dissertation's main research question is to determine whether all populist parties are antagonistic, promoting a Manichean view of society and are therefore dangers to democracy, or if some nuance can be deduced from a careful analysis of populist voices.

This dissertation used a concept-driven coding frame as a starting point, before refining the coding frame through data-driven coding. The initial coding process was guided by the following research questions and objectives:

(a) What do these parties have to say about political institutions such as:
   a. Access to citizenship and residency rights?
   b. Political representation and democratic reforms?
   c. The inclusivity of political institutions?
   d. Immigration and the rights of refugees?
   e. Identity, national identities, and cultural diversity?
   f. Minorities and their rights?

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[8] According to Troy *et al.* (2005), an identity entrepreneur is "an individual or group of individuals who find it desirable, profitable, or otherwise utilitarian to reinforce group identities."

g. Justice, authority, and the use of force?

(b) What is their attitude towards the securitization of identities?

(c) What theoretical points can be drawn from the comparison?

a. Can a typology of populism be developed on the basis of this comparison?

1.5 Key concepts

This section will briefly review some key concepts used in this study. Studying a subject as complex as populism necessitates an interdisciplinary approach taking into account various dimensions pertaining to discourse (Lorenzetti 2016). Following Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 25), this dissertation understands the study of discourse as the study of argumentation about the urgency and priority of an existential threat, and whether the securitizing actor seeks to break free of procedures or rules through these arguments.

1.5.1 The Tensions within Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism attempts to incorporate the perspectives and contributions of diverse cultures while respecting their uniqueness and retaining the need to assimilate them in the dominant culture. As Coakley (2009: 276) points out, ethnic diversity is in itself unproblematic. Most societies exhibit a relatively peaceful coexistence between different groups and witness few group-specific demands (Coakley 2009: 276; Kymlicka 1995: 2). However, the larger minorities within a particular territory become, the more likely they are to demand political concessions that conflict with the dominant group and, invariably, the state (Coakley 2009: 276).[9] Such demands undermine the ontological security of dominant groups and can result in conflicts over the distribution of power and the relative status and privileges of groups (Skey 2014: 328). Consider, for example, the rise of the AfD in Germany. Multiculturalism appeared on the German agenda when the large Turkish community began to challenge the German assimilationist model (Parekh 2000: 5). While a part of the German population recognises Germans of Turkish descent as full members of the society, others feel threatened by the changes in their societies (Mounk 2018: 16). Germany, like many other Western countries, has witnessed a surge against cultural pluralism (Mounk 2018: 16). Yet, as mentioned above, supporters of the AfD were mostly driven more by the perception of threats rather than the

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[9] It is important to note that a dominant group can be a minority. For example, Amy Chua (2019: 48) refers to "market-dominant minority" to describe an ethnic minority that economically dominate the majority, thereby generating resentment among the majority. Examples include Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, Whites in South Africa, Igbos in Nigeria, Croats in former Yugoslavia, and so on.

8

actual presence of a threat. Indeed, the rise of populism and nationalism is intrinsically linked to the ontological insecurities experienced by majorities across the world. This dissertation analyses whether populist parties use the ontological insecurities of citizens to securitize elections and demand exclusive political institutions or seek to desecuritize identities by opening up political institutions.

Connolly (2002: 64) notes that "identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into *otherness* in order to secure its own self-certainty." The danger of identity politics is that it defines the authenticity of a group in opposition to an "*other*". Liberal democratic systems emphasise the importance of individual freedom and the right of all individuals to live a life according to their own conception of the good. Yet the lack of attention towards multiculturalism in liberal political theory raises questions and apparent contradictions. For example, what are the consequences of colour-blind versus colour-conscious public policy? Are affirmative action policies reinforcing racial identification and categorizations? Do inclusive institutions reinforce identities and therefore lead us to a certain deadlock? Is the securitization of identities laying the foundation for future intergroup clashes? These are very uncomfortable questions that need to be discussed to better understand the phenomena of identity politics and populism. The notion of "societal security dilemma" offers an interesting perspective to look at identity-driven conflicts in democratic societies.

1.5.2 Societal Security Dilemma

At the heart of the "societal security dilemma" lies the notion that any increase in one group's security makes other groups feel less secure, because of both a perception of hostility, and an understanding of social hierarchies as a zero-sum game (Jervis 2017). The result is an escalation of tensions possibly to the point of hostilities.

Jervis (2017) developed two conceptual models of the security dilemma, namely the 'spiral' model and the 'deterrence' model. While both models involve a process of action-reaction, the difference resides in what is initially driving them (Jervis 2017: 75-80). In the 'deterrence' model the decision-makers intend to malign a group; measures are taken to prevent aggression (Roe 2002: 61). In contrast, the 'spiral' model, intentions are benign but provoke a hostile response from an initially non-competing group. The 'spiral' model of the societal security dilemma is an instance of self-fulfilling prophecy: "a false definition of the situation which

9

makes the originally false conception come true" (Merton and Merton 1968: 423). Jervis (2017) and Schweller (1996: 17) agree that the security dilemma only occurs in the spiral model, as "(T)he crucial point is that the security dilemma is always apparent, not real". If the threat is real – if aggressors do in fact exist – then it is no longer a 'dilemma' but rather "a coalition mobilizing" and "the targets of that aggression responding and forming alliances to defend themselves" (Schweller 1996: 17). Interestingly, the notion that certain groups pose a threat to the 'people' is a core feature of populism, though who these groups are vary greatly along the spectrum.

1.5.2 Populism

Populism is not a 'new' phenomenon, though previous episodes in the Americas and Europe were characterised by context-specific upsurges (Canovan 1984; Kazin 2017). It is a contested concept and a plethora of diverging definitions have been ambiguously used to label vastly different political movements. Indeed, the NR, Podemos, SF, and the AfD are just a few examples of parties appealing to the ideal of popular democracy and labelled 'populist' despite considerable ideological differences (Lorenzetti 2016).

Appealing to the people is often said to be a central element of populism. However, appeals to the people are insufficient to describe the character of populism, after all, politicians appeal to the people to win votes (Lorenzetti 2020). Another important aspect of populism is the fact that populist actors see themselves as the authentic voice of the people in the face of anti-democratic elite rule and therefore demand a more 'direct' form of democracy (Lorenzetti 2020). For Müller (2016), populism is underpinned by three characteristics: it is anti-elite, anti-pluralist and can be conceived as a form of identity politics.

A growing consensus on the ideational approach to populism has emerged in the recent years (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Mudde (1996; 2004; 2018) developed the most influential definition of populism as a "thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' *versus* 'the corrupt elite,'" thereby reducing democratic politics to the expression of the will of the people (Mudde 2004: 543). Laclau (2005) claims that this division of society into two opposing camps is a pre-condition to the emergence of populism. Indeed, the main common characteristic of the different strands of populism is their reliance on Manichean dichotomies between the virtuous people and usurpers threatening them. Lorenzetti (2020) concludes that

10

the presence of an enemy is a *sine qua non* condition of populism, as populists need a *social other* both as a scapegoat and as a definer for 'the people'.

1.5.3 'The People'

The concept of 'the people', and similarly, the notion of a homogenous 'nation', is the antithesis of the reality of intra-societal cleavages (Pelinka 2013: 6). In reality, people are an amalgamation of various social, economic, religious and ethnic identities with contradicting interests. Yet, populists conceive the people as a pure and idealised entity, possessing an innate wisdom informing its *general will* (Lorenzetti 2016). Canovan (1984; 1999; 2004) identifies several meanings for the term *people* in political discourses. First, in an inclusive sense, it can refer to a whole political community. Second, it can refer to the people as a nation, which reflects a more nativist and exclusionary understanding of the term. Thirdly, it can refer to the underdogs, in contrast to the elite. The *people* is both a collective entity and a collection of individual interests, which adds to the ambiguity of the term (Canovan 2004).

In the populist creed, the exact identity of 'the people' is never fully defined. For Pelinka (2013: 5) and Laclau (2007), this results in a paradoxical situation: who is included in 'the people' results from simplistic dogma ignoring social fragmentations. National, cultural or race identities are constructed to "create the illusion of 'natural' borders between 'us' and 'them'" (Pelinka 2013: 5-6). Once this illusion has been established, little attention is paid to the differences within 'the people'. The 'people' becomes an undefined social group that includes (or excludes) a range of diverging class, religious, cultural and gender identities.

1.5.4 Minority Rights

Minority rights are often challenged on the basis of concerns for the social unity and stability of the nation (Verkuyten & Yildiz 2006: 533). Minority rights are defined by two important features: "they go beyond the familiar set of common civil and political rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; and they are adopted with the intention of recognizing and accommodating the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups" (Kymlicka & Norman 2000). Cultural differences are often perceived as threats to the cohesion of a society (Balibar 1991; Taguieff 1993). However, the fear of a worst-case scenario tends to polarise inter-group relations and create a "societal security dilemma" (Roe 2002: 70).

1.5.5 Organising principles

Who exactly constitutes 'the people' and what kind of 'enemy' is threatening society is crucial to classify the type of populism. Doise *et al.* (1993) introduced the notion of *organising principles* to describe how individuals take a stance within the structure of social representation. Recent studies suggest that social categories act as organising principles in the social order (i.e. Mouffe 1993; Staerklé 2009, 2015; Staerklé *et al.* 2012). Brubaker (2017), for example, argued that right-wing populism is organised by both vertical and horizontal dimensions of differentiation. The vertical dimension refers to the differentiation between the "ordinary people" and the ruling elite, while the horizontal dimension refers to the rejection of (cultural) pluralism (Staerklé & Green 2018: 431-2). Right-wing populists adopt a societal dichotomy distinguishing between an ethno-national community and aliens (horizontal differentiation). In this Manichean worldview, the idealised homogeneity of 'us' must be protected against the threat emanating from 'outsiders'. In contrast, left-wing populists adopt a pyramidal view of society in which the people stand at the bottom. The division is solely vertical, and the Manichean vision pits the elite against the people as 'underdogs'.

Seen through the prism of Jervis' (2017) conceptual models, one can predict that the horizontal differentiation promoted by right-wing populist would likely provoke a hostile response from an initially non-competing group since group relations are often understood as a zero-sum game. This can trigger an apparent social security dilemma, that could become an instance of self-fulfilling prophecy and lead to dissolution of the national social fabric. In contrast, the horizontal differentiation promoted by left-wing populists is predicated on class rather than other markers of identities such as race, religion, and country of origin. Rather than pitting identity groups against each other, they promote a view of society in which, despite cultural differences, everyone is equally included and fully participating in the national community. They do not treat identity issues as threats but as opportunities for the development of an inclusive and democratic society.

1.6 Method

Politics has to do with acquiring and maintaining power. In democratic settings, politicians rely on discourse to acquire and maintain electoral support. Indeed, politics is typically marked by rhetorical competition (Krebs & Jackson 2007: 36). Acknowledging the crucial role played by

12

language in political communication, Chilton and Schäffner (1997: 207) describe political discourse as "a complex form of human activity". Political discourses are produced "to promote acceptance or evaluation of some beliefs or ideas as true vs. false, positive vs. negative" (De Beaugrande & Dressler 1981: 184). Language is the core medium of the social construction of reality, and is therefore carefully selected by politicians to shape the beliefs and attitudes of voters (Lorenzetti 2016). As mentioned above, the language used to frame issues constrains the range of solutions applicable to them. Political manifestos are analysed precisely because they serve the double purpose of framing and offering solutions to issues of concern.

This dissertation analyses the manifestos of Podemos, SF, the NR, and the AfD. The rationale behind this selection is to have sufficient variation across the political spectrum – Podemos and the Sinn Féin illustrate left-wing populism and the NR and the AfD serve as examples of right-wing populism. This study uses a qualitative approach to analyse the variations in commonalities and differences in these parties' manifestos and to draw inferences from the various case studies.

Qualitative approaches allow for a "subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns" (Hsieh & Shannon 2005: 1278). A qualitative approach allows for a deeper understanding of symbolic material that requires some degrees of interpretation. It facilitates the unpacking of the data contained within each manifesto while acknowledging that different interpretations of the material can be equally valid (Schreier 2012: 30).

Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) reduces the material by limiting the analysis to the relevant aspects of the data. In this dissertation, particular attention is paid to political institutions such as citizenship, democratic participation, voting rights and access to social welfare and public resources. These aspects were then classified as instances of the categories of the coding frame (Schreier 2012: 2). Categorising the data produced new information about how cases compared.

1.7 Theoretical Approach

This research uses securitization theory as its main approach and is underpinned by a constructivist perspective. The epistemology of constructivism is subjectivist and advocates that the nature of reality is influenced by our own perceptions, experiences and feelings (Ryan

2018: 42). Since the nature of reality is uncertain, nothing can be known for sure, and everything is subject to interpretation. The ontological perspective of constructivism is relativist and suggests that reality is only knowable through socially constructed meanings (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Therefore, this dissertation uses an inductive reasoning – it began by observing and classifying the data to find relevant patterns that describe a situation (Ryan 2018: 43).

This dissertation first undertakes a descriptive analysis of the manifestos (Chapter 4) underpinned by a constructivist perspective, then interprets the collected data through the lens of securitization theory (Chapter 5). The QCA is primarily descriptive insofar as it describes and interprets the discourse of these parties (Gerring 2012: 722). The second analysis through the lens of securitization theory allows for additional observations and highlights relevant patterns to develop a polar typology of populism. The data is drawn from a purposive sample of manifestos, namely the last election manifestos produced by these parties at the time of writing this dissertation. The unit of analysis is the election manifesto since manifestos are designed to give the clearest indication of what a party stands for (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Manifestos are also publicly available and reasonably comparable across countries and are therefore appropriate for a cross-national study (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011).

1.8 Structure of the study

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the aim and objectives of the study and outlines the questions of identity politics, multiculturalism, populism, institutions, and the securitization of identity, and how these concepts interconnect. Chapter two reviews the literature covering these concepts, their operationalisation and their evolution over time. Chapter three explains and outlines the QCA methodology and theoretical lens used in this dissertation. Likewise, it details the coding process and the categories used. Chapter four presents the qualitative content analyses of the four manifestos. It is primarily descriptive and seeks to outline the parties' positions on key issues. Chapter five takes the analysis a step further and offers a cross-manifestos comparison comparing and contrasting the findings of the fourth chapter through the lens of securitization, and where possible, draws theoretical points from this analysis. Chapter six concludes the dissertation by summarizing the key points of the discussion and offers avenues for further enquiries.

1.9 Value of this Research

This dissertation analyses how institutions are portrayed in populist and nationalist manifestos and how the meaning attributed to these institutions generate antagonistic political identities fuelling identity politics. At the core of the research lies questions surrounding the securitization of identities and the 'societal security dilemma'.

The value of this research can be seen in the light of Karl Popper's paradox of tolerance[10] (Popper 2013: 581). For Popper, a society committed to unlimited tolerance would ultimately destroy its own ability to be tolerant. He argues that a society with unlimited tolerance would have to accept those who are intolerant, but without mechanisms to defend this society against the onslaught of the intolerant, tolerance would ultimately be destroyed (Popper 2013: 581). Popper (2013: 581) argues that societies should claim the *right* to suppress those who utter intolerant philosophies "if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols."

Interestingly, there is a clear parallel between the paradox of tolerance and the anti-immigrant attitude of far-right parties who portray Islam as an intolerant and oppressive ideology threatening their free society. Tolerance towards the *social other*, it is argued, may constitute a threat to society. In turn, containment strategies and forced assimilation are perceived by other groups as threats to their own identities. A 'spiral' model of societal security dilemma is likely to emerge from such dynamics. Another consequence of this paradox is that a society might have to reduce its tolerance[11] – through rules, mechanisms and institutions – in order to protect its diversity (Podobnik *et al.* 2019: 460). Tolerant - inclusive - institutions are therefore at the centre of the societal security dilemma. This explains why the rhetoric of populist parties on the inclusiveness of institutions is central to this dissertation: they play a major role in the protection of a tolerant, pluralist and liberal society.

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[10] According to philosopher Karl Popper (2013: 581), the paradox of tolerance is the notion that unlimited tolerance must necessarily lead to the disappearance of tolerance. In other words, a tolerant society must be prepared to tolerate the intolerants, yet at the same time, it must be prepared to defend itself from the intolerants, or its very own tolerance will be destroyed by its intolerant elements.

[11] Practical examples of this paradox include the limitations placed on freedom of expression, and to a certain extent on freedom of association such as the membership of terrorist organisation.

The delicate equilibrium between tolerance and intolerance is never fully secured, and liberal democracies are permanently at risks of sliding toward illiberalism. This is another paradox of democracy, the paradox of majority-rule, or the possibility that a tyrant is elected by the majority (Popper 2013: 581). This paradox is often hiding behind the claim that populism, especially under its right-wing variant, constitutes a threat to democracy. Many authors have argued that minority rights are the best collective strategy to challenge group-based domination and to ensure that all citizens are treated equally (i.e. Tajfel & Turner 1986; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Barry 2001). However, as discussed earlier, the securitization of identities can lead to a spiral model of 'social security dilemma'. The desecuritization of identities is therefore the only way to uphold a tolerant and democratic society.

Understanding how institutions are portrayed in campaign manifestos and how this relates to the (de)securitization of identities is the key objective of this study. In doing so, this study offers new insights to the debates on populism, nationalism, multiculturalism, and other identity-related issues. Ultimately, this dissertation proposes an innovative typology of populism, based on the notion of securitization of identities and the principles of agonism and antagonism.

2. Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter two reviews the literature on concepts central to this dissertation, their evolution over time and their operationalisation. It first discusses general concepts such as democracy, liberalism and multiculturalism, and the relevance of these concepts to this study. It emphasises the role played by political institutions in fostering an egalitarian and democratic society. It then turns its attention to populism, its definition(s) and to a selection of significant studies. The concepts central to the analysis are then operationalized.

2.1 Democracy and Democratic Consolidation Theory

Democracy is notoriously difficult to define, though Dahrendorf (2014) provides an interesting starting point for this dissertation. For Dahrendorf (2014: 6), democracy is a set of institutions providing a coherent response to three questions. The first asks how to manage society without resorting to violence (Dahrendorf 2014: 6). Popper (1994: 118), for example, conceptualized democracy as a government replaceable without violence, implying that democratic governance hinges on the peaceful transition of power. The second concerns a system of checks and balances to prevent power abuse (Dahrendorf 2014: 6). Constraints on power through constitutionalism and the rule of law are essential elements of democratic systems. They protect citizens from tyranny and minority from majority rule. Lastly, Dahrendorf's (2014: 6) asks "how can the people – all the citizens – have a voice in the exercise of power?" For Dahrendorf (2014: 6), the voice of the people establishes and legitimizes the institutions controlling the state.

For Linz and Stepan (1996: 3), a democratic transition is complete when, in addition to the peaceful transition of government, a new democracy's executive, legislative, and judicial powers are not shared with other *de jures* bodies such as military councils or international bodies. Indeed, indeterminacy about the core procedures of a democratic system may postpone democratic consolidation indeterminably (Linz & Stepan 1996: 4). Linz and Stepan (1996: 5-6) offer three definitions of consolidated democracies. *Behaviourally*, a democracy is consolidated when important players do not invest considerable resources to attain nondemocratic regimes or secede from the state. *Attitudinally*, a democracy is consolidated when its members believe its democratic procedures and institutions are adequate for managing society's collective life. This *attitudinal* definition of consolidated democracy is often contested

17

by populist forces who challenge the institutions upholding democracy, such as minority rights or the electoral system. Under this view, populism represents a threat to democracy. *Constitutionally*, a democratic system is consolidated when conflicts are resolved within the rule of law. The lack of anti-democratic forces, universal agreement on democratic procedures and institutions, and a legal system based on the rule of law characterise consolidated democratic regimes. Populists undermining these pillars are threatening the foundation of democracy.

Regilme (2014: 278), however, highlights some shortcomings in democratic consolidation theory. First, merely promising political rights and guarantees for unlimited capital accumulation is unsustainable; economic fairness is required for democratic consolidation (Regilme 2014: 284). Economic fairness means tackling discrimination and disadvantage and reducing the inequality by narrowing the gaps between people while ensuring that opportunity and prosperity are shared among all members of society. For Regilme (2014: 291), true democracy emancipates the citizenry from the hegemony through which tangible inequalities emerge. Regilme (2014: 286) also criticizes the reliance on historical institutionalism (HI) in democratization theory. HI emphasises the institutional structures' immutability and that their enormous power is unmatched with that of the individual. It fails to consider the important role played by individual actors who act within structurally embedded institutions (Schmidt 2000, 2008; Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Hay 2001). Interestingly, populists often frame themselves as agents of change who will destabilize the *status-quo* and advance the interest of the common people.

Regilme's conceptualization of democratic consolidation supports the view that populism is a profoundly democratic phenomenon. In contrast, following Linz and Stepan's (1996) *constitutional* and *attitudinal* definitions, the tendency of populist leaders to undermine democratic institutions and that the rule of law is profoundly anti-democratic. Looking at the attitude of populist parties towards the constitutional and attitudinal aspect of democratic institutions will help us to better understand and classify populism.

2.2 Institutional Designs in Liberal Democratic Settings

Following the collapse of communism, scholarship on the relationship between institutional design and democratic consolidation flourished. Dahl (1971), Horowitz (1985; 1993), Lijphart

18

(1969; 1977), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Sartori (1997) were among those who claimed that inclusive political institutions foster democracy. Political institutions can be altered to manage conflicts democratically, the argument goes. For many countries who began democratic experiments under unfavourable conditions, institutional engineering proved the greatest tool to nurture democracy (Diamond 2000). Egalitarian institutional arrangements have the greatest impact in divided societies since they can systematically favour or disadvantage certain groups (Belmont *et al.* 2000: 3). Institutional designs shape the logic and outcomes of democratic processes (Thelen & Stenmo 1992). For example, a plurality voting system may repeatedly disadvantage significant minority groups. Building system loyalty under such circumstances is problematic (Belmont *et al.* 2000: 3). While scholarship on specific institutions is invaluable, this dissertation prefers to analyse political institutions holistically since institutions interact in complex ways that focused studies find difficult to recognize.

Political institutions often reflect a particular conception of the nation (Bertrand 2002: 59; Greenfeld 1992; Snyder 2000). Constitutions and special laws tend to define the terms of political representation and citizenship in a way that reflects this particular conception of the nation. Unfortunately, political institutions enhancing group identities generate identity conflicts, especially when they facilitate access to jobs and resources (Bertrand 2002: 59). In extreme cases, citizenship is denied to all but one group. In others, power-sharing agreements prevent the institutionalization of identities. The most common kind of power-sharing agreement is what Lijphart (1977) termed "consociationalism". A 'consociational' democracy respects group autonomy while sharing executive power among all significant groups (Lijphart 1977; 1995; 2002). For Horowitz (1985), while majoritarian systems empower majorities, inter-ethnic alliances limit an ethnic identity's political relevance. Proportional representation, it is argued, reduces the authority of majorities and ethnic identities. To foster a peaceful democratic and liberal society, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue for creating "state-nations" – as opposed to "nation-states" – combining the "collective rights of nationalities or minorities in a multinational, multicultural society". For Bertrand (2002: 60), however, the concept of "state-nations" still requires states to determine which groups to include in the nation and to decide on the mechanisms of negotiation over individual and collective rights. Indeed, minorities need an institutional environment that fosters debate, consensus, and collective agreement.

This brings us back to the societal security dilemma. Since people tend to see social hierarchies as a zero-sum game, any change in the distribution of power is perceived as a threat and

19

undermines the ontological security of dominant groups (Jervis 2017). Nonetheless, inclusive political institutions are key to fostering a liberal and democratic regime, especially since the choice between democratic participation and other less peaceful means of contestation is predicated on the type of power-sharing agreement in place in a society. Power-sharing agreements materialized through political institutions are therefore the best safeguard against conflicts. Indeed, it is easier to alter political institutions to ensure the inclusion and participation of all minorities than to change long-standing cultural factors.

Despite the potential of inclusive political institutions, multiculturalism and diversity remain contentious in liberal theory. This dissertation analyses the intentions of various populist political parties toward the inclusivity of political institutions such as political representation, immigration, minority rights, and the management of diversity. In doing so, this dissertation helps to differentiate between various strands of populism based on the scope of inclusivity and their adherence to liberal principles.

Populist parties often manifest hostility towards the idea of representative democracy, preferring a more direct form of democracy (Rydgren 2008: 176). Yet, democracy "is not whatever the people at a given moment may happen to decide, but a set of arrangements for securing their control over the public decision-making process on an on-going basis" (Beetham 1992: 42). Democracy is upheld by a series of institutions that make popular will effective and lasting. For populists, tensions arise when institutions impede on the popular will (Conovan 1999: 13).

2.3 Multiculturalism and the populist challenge

Western political theorists have long neglected multiculturalism, favouring the 'nation-state' model where citizens purportedly share a common culture and history (Kymlicka 1995: 2; Spinner 1994: 2). The 'nation-state' is the convergence of the nation and the state, predicated on the belief that the political and the ethno-cultural unit coincide (May 2012: 58). However, assimilationists and homogenizing nation-state models are being increasingly challenged by multicultural models of citizenship (Kymlicka 2007: 3; Parekh 2000: 1).

Multiculturalism is about the differences that are embedded in the "body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and

organize their individual and collective lives" (Parekh 2000: 2-3). Since a political community requires a shared *ethos*[12] in which to ground its social unity, it is often argued that multiculturalism can undermine social unity (Miller 1995; Kukathas 2003). Indeed, minorities often diverge on questions such as language rights, religion, or political representation (Kymlicka 1995: 1).

Three forms of diversity are prominent in modern societies. *Subcultural* diversity refers to "different beliefs and practices in particular areas of life" despite a broadly shared culture (Parekh 2000: 3), examples include LGBT activists or proponents of same-sex marriages. *Perspectival* diversity refers to the type of diversity that arises when some members of society are deeply critical of its core values and principles (Parekh 2000: 3). Environmentalists criticizing anthropocentric biases and religious leaders opposing same-sex marriage are examples. *Communal* diversity refers to organized communities that follow their own set of ideas and practices (Parekh 2000: 3-4). This type of diversity is rooted in a desire to preserve the long-established system of beliefs and practices (Parekh 2000: 4).

A common critique of populists is that they oppose multiculturalism and minority rights and are therefore illiberal. Interestingly, liberals have also long preferred individual rights over community rights (Spinner 1994: 2). Classical liberal theories assume popular consent and unity but do not explain why different states should exist (Spinner 1994: 2). In Locke's "state of nature," all people are nearly identical, and Kant's "categorical imperative" demands the same from all (Spinner 1994: 2). Hence liberal theories have ignored group differences within states (Spinner 1994: 2). However, the assumed homogeneity of nations never held up: most states are primarily collections of diverse languages, ethnicities, and nations (Spinner 1994: 2). Nonetheless, the ideal of a homogeneous polity prevailed until WWII. Indeed, 'national identity' was often understood in an exclusive, ethnically based, and fundamentally illiberal manner (Fukuyama 2018: 128). Physical extermination, forced assimilation, segregation, and economic discrimination were common practices (Kymlicka 1995: 2).

After WWII, emphasis was placed on individual rights. For many, guaranteeing fundamental individual rights for all would indirectly protect minorities (Kymlicka 1995: 2-3). The

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[12] *Ethos* means "custom" or "character" in Greek. Initially, it referred to an individual's personality or character but today, it refers to the set of values and cultural practices that distinguish one group form another.

assumption was that "members of national minorities do not need, are not entitled to, or cannot be guaranteed rights of special character" (Claude 1955: 211). Core human rights like freedom of association, conscience, and speech are rights practiced in community, and hence were thought protective of minorities (Kymlicka 1995: 3). Minorities were denied any privileges: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) superseded all references to minority rights by entrenching equal rights to all individuals (Spinner 1994; Kymlicka 1995).

After the fall of communism, the resilience of democracies led many to believe that democracy would triumph over any other regime (Mounk 2018: 3-4). In *The End of History?,* Fukuyama (1992: 4) proclaimed "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" based on two assumptions. Firstly, that higher levels of income and education, solid and neutral institutions and a vibrant civil society – in other words, a process of "democratic consolidation" – would entrench liberal democracy (Mounk 2018: 4-5). Secondly, that liberalism and democracy formed a cohesive whole mutually reinforcing each other (Mounk 2018: 6). This second assumption is increasingly challenged as the world has witnessed a surge in illiberal democracies undermining the rights of minorities – i.e. Poland, Hungary and Turkey – and the rise of undemocratic liberal regimes led by appointed decision-makers such as the European Commission (Mounk 2018: 9-13).

Today, most states still aspire to be 'nation-states' with their own culture, language, and mythology (Kymlicka 2007; Parekh 2000). For Gellner (1983: 1), "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent". The core tenet of political nationalism is "the belief that the nation state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit" (Gellner 1993: 409). Once the state coincides with the nation, its primary goal is to perpetuate a sense of nationhood. Yet, fostering a particular national identity through nation-building is not 'natural' and leads to deep-seated exclusion, subordination, and marginalization (Kymlicka 2007). Political nationalism prompted minorities to fight for equality, recognition, and respect for their differences (Parekh 2000: 1). Many identity-based political movements have now begun to defend the legitimacy of their differences as constitutive of their identities (Parekh 2000: 1). While this fight has led to legal and institutional changes, living together also requires a change in beliefs and attitudes (Parekh 2000: 2).

2.4 The "societal security dilemma"

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies introduced the concept of 'societal security' in a seminal book, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (*Wæver *et al*. 1993)*. While *state* security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, *societal* security is concerned with the survival of group identities (Wæver *et al.* 1993: 25). Security is always relative and results from the interplay between vulnerabilities and threats (Wæver *et al.* 1993: 23-4). Societies can be threatened by whatever jeopardizes their identity (Buzan 1993: 42). For example, forbidding the use of languages and dresses or closing places of education or worship can threaten group identities (Buzan 1993: 43).

Violations of minority rights necessarily lead to the securitization of minority identities (Jutila 2006). In response, minorities often assert their cultural ties and strengthen the group's social identity (Buzan 1993). As such, the securitization of minority identities tends to reinforce the 'us' and 'them' divide (Jutila 2006: 170). Yet for Roe (2004: 288), the provisions of minority rights also preserves group identity. Here lies a paradox: without adequate protection, minority identities are threatened, which leads to the securitization of their identities. In turn, the securitization of identities entrenches the 'us' and 'them' divide, leading to further societal and ontological insecurities for dominant groups and resulting in a 'spiral' model of societal security dilemma.

With societal security, what is *perceived* as a threat is not necessarily *objectively* threatening. Indeed, societies freely define what constitutes a threat (Buzan & Segal 1992). Securitization allows state representatives to claim special rights to employ whatever means required to stop certain developments. When something is an existential threat, otherwise unimaginable solutions are conceivable (Jutila 2006: 172). Securitized issues are 'urgent' and need to be resolved swiftly to ensure the survival of the community (Waever 1995: 512). Interestingly, populism thrives on perceived threats, especially when paired with a nationalist worldview. These threats can come from the 'social other' such as migrants or from dangerous transnational elites.

Kymlicka (1995: 10) identifies two patterns of cultural diversity. The first occurs when a previously self-governed polity with a territorially concentrated culture is incorporated into a larger state (Kymlicka 1995: 10). In such cases, incorporated cultures - described as 'national

23

minorities' - usually seek to maintain themselves as a distinct society and insist on keeping a certain level of autonomy and sovereignty to ensure their cultural survival (Kymlicka 1995: 10). The second pattern identified by Kymlicka (1995: 10) concerns the cultural diversity that arises from immigration. In this case, immigrants tend to organise along what Kymlicka (1995: 11) refers to as 'ethnic groups' seeking to be accepted as full members of society and integrating into it. Ethnic groups are not interested in autonomy but seek to transform the institutions and laws to make them more accommodating of differences (Kymlicka 1995: 11). These institutions include, for example, civil and political rights, citizenship and political representation, integration and immigration, and access to social assistance. The notion of ontological security is a useful analytical tool to study the securitization of identities, the social security dilemma, and the effects of increasing cultural pluralism in liberal democracies.

Giddens (1990: 92) advanced the notion of ontological security to refer to "the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action". This idea highlights the anxiety that arises when dominant groups see changes in power distribution and group status. (Skey 2014: 328). When a shared moral horizon disappears, an intense feeling of insecurity arises and lays the foundation for nationalism (Fukuyama 2018: 56). For Stewart (1969), populism is a response to the insecurities felt in times of rapid socioeconomic and cultural transformations. Support for populism is indeed contingent on declinism[13] and the feeling of belonging to a group that is unfairly treated (Elchardus & Spruyt 2016). Supporters of populist parties often feel that the welfare provisions and the state's capacity to support the good life are being undermined and that the growing diversity creates a tension-laden society (Elchardus & Spruyt 2016: 125; Spruyt *et al.* 2016). The growth of populism and nationalism is therefore intrinsically tied to the ontological insecurities of many majorities worldwide.

2.5 Populism

While earlier academic interest focused mostly on Latin American cases, the growth of Western far-right parties in the 1980s and 1990s prompted a flood of literature on populism. Most of it focused on conceptualising populism (Moffit & Tormey 2014; Mudde 1996; Laclau 2005), populist ideologies (Aslanidis 2016; Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; Podobnik *et al.* 2019; Stanley 2008), populist rhetoric (Danaj *et al.* 2018; Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Rooduijn 2014),

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[13] A very negative view of the evolution of society.

the effect of populism on democratic norms (Canovan 1999; Comaroff 2011; Urbinati 2019) and, the societal developments[14] presumably leading to the rise of a global populism (Knight 1998; Stavrakis *et al.* 2017; Taggart 2000; De la Torre 2000; Spruyt *et al.* 2016; Melendez & Rovira Kaltwasser 2019). Others have focused on the various strands of populism along the political spectrum (Ivaldi *et al.* 2017; Font *et al.* 2019; March 2017) and devised indicators to determine "degrees" of populism (Caiani & Graziano 2016; De Raadt *et al.* 2004).

2.5.1 Defining populism

The earliest definitions of populism originated in a conference from the London School of Economics (1967) when a cohort of multidisciplinary scholars attempted to define the phenomenon (Pappas 2019). This conference' proceedings resulted in Ionescu and Gellner's (1969) edited volume *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics,* the first concerted effort to define populism. In this volume, MacRae (1969: 162) defines populism as an a-political ideology rooted in a desire to restore a pristine past or implement an agrarian-utopia. In contrast, Wiles (1969: 166) defines populism as any creed or movement based on the premise that "virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions". For Stewart (1969: 180), it is more revealing to see populism as "the product of a certain type or types of social situation". He argues that populism arises when social groups become aware that they are peripheral to the centres of power. Populism is a response to crises of development and the insecurities felt by people in times of economic change such as rapid industrialization (Stewart 1969: 185). Russian populism, for example, was guided by the desire to industrialize swiftly without passing through the horrendous social conditions of capitalistic industrialization (Stewart 1969: 185-6). Similarly, the emergence of Latin American populism was due to the development of industrial elite seeking to maintain the *status quo* and social divisions (Stewart 1969: 186). Support for populism arose from the realization that the people were being side-lined in the political process and the market economy.

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[14] Fitzi, Mackert and Turner (2018) have jointly edited three volumes dedicated to the analysis of right-wing populism and the socio-economic conditions that have facilitated its resurgence in Western Europe.

These early scholars of populism drew comparisons between disparate cases of "populism", often attributing its rise to the lack of socio-political modernity and market economy.[15] Until the 1970s, most affected societies were pre-modern, non-democratic and pre-capitalist, which led scholars to identify populism "everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes" (Ionescu & Gellner 1969: 1). These pioneering scholars were unable to agree on a definition. For Pappas (2019: 16), the main reason for this failure was that the modern strand of populism we are witnessing today had not yet emerged. By 1981, populism was still conceived as a reactionary political occurrence consisting of "a bewildering variety of phenomena" (Canovan 1981: 3). The failure to provide a unanimous definition of the term caused a great deal of conceptual confusion (Pappas 2019: 16).

A second wave of populism scholarship emerged from Latin America in the late 1970s. These scholars described populism as "a phenomenon primarily related to the socioeconomic determinants of mass political movements" (Pappas 2019: 17-8). They sought to understand "the conditions under which the political participation of the lower classes is channelled through a populist movement" (Germani 1978: 95). In Latin America, populism was seen as "a fundamental democratizing force that marked the entrance of the common people into the political community" (de la Torre 2000: xiii). Populism became prominent among autocratic leaders who advocated for the entry of the masses into politics (Germani 1978). Suffrage was extended to women and illiterate citizens. As a result, many scholars considered Latin American populism as pro-democratic.

Two distinct approaches emerged from these scholars. The first is associated to the modernization theory, and claims that populism served as a springboard for the incorporation of a newly mobilized working classes after the breakdown of oligarchic regimes (i.e. Germani *et al*. 1973; Malloy 1977; Collier 1979; Drake 1982). The second, associated with the Dependency School, became more preoccupied with the unexpected compatibility of sustained economic growth and populist politics (Pappas 2019: 17). For them, populism is a multiclass political movement corresponding with the objectives of "Import Substitution

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[15] It is noteworthy to mention here the parallel between Regilme's critique of democratization theory and its reliance on neo-liberal paradigm, and the attempt by early scholars of populism to attribute the phenomenon to a lack of market economy.

Industrialization"[16] (ISI) (i.e. O'Donnell 1973; Cardoso & Faletto 1979). ISI "allowed populist leaders to build cross-class alliances between urban labour, the middle sectors, and domestic industrialists" (Roberts 1995: 85). The main issue with the second wave of populism scholarship is its lack of comparability. It could only explain authoritarian populism in the socioeconomic context of Latin America (Pappas 2019: 18-9). Nonetheless, it highlighted two key aspects of populism: its nature as a mass movement and the role of charismatic leaders (de la Torre 2000). The role of charismatic leaders was so consequential that their systems are often remembered by their name - *Peronismo* of Juan Perón or *Chavismo* of Huggo Chavez (Pappas 2019: 17).

A new breed of populist leaders emerged in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, which distinguished itself by implementing neo-liberal policies (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1999). In Argentina, Menem adopted a conservative, market-oriented economic policy while on Peru, Fujimori significantly decreased government subsidies and public services, while adopting free market measures such as the elimination of tariffs. For Roberts (1995: 82), "the rise of personalist leaders with broad-based support, who follow neoliberal prescriptions for economic austerity and market-oriented structural adjustments" was a puzzling antinomy renewing academic interest in charismatic leadership (i.e. Weyland 2001; Hawkins 2003). It supported the idea that populism should be studied in a politically instrumental fashion contingent on leadership and symbolic politics (Pappas 2019: 20).

Since the late 1990s, the study of populism has flourished. Contemporary research focuses mostly on four areas: "searching for ever-innovative definitions with general applicability; expanding its comparative scope to include more and more country or political party cases; increasingly banking on quantitative methods, also displaying a certain obsession to "measure" populism; and, even more recently, trying to link the findings of empirical analysis with a normative discussion about liberalism's decay and even democratic deconsolidation" (Pappas 2019: 20). The search for definition focused primarily on the key characteristics of populism: leadership, ideology, discourse and symbolic patterns, mass mobilization capacity and style.

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[16] The ISI model is based on two main pillars: "a closed economy (high tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls) and a strong role for the state (government expenditure as a large share of GDP, extensive regulations and an increasing presence of state-owned firms)" (Sapelli 2003: 2).

Mudde (2007: 23) provided the most comprehensive conceptualisation of populism as a 'thin-centred ideology' considering society to be divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the "pure people" versus the "corrupt elite" and predicated on the belief that "politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004: 543). Mudde's definition follows Freeden's (1996) conceptualization of '*thin*-centred' ideologies as those who do not provide a comprehensive interpretative framework for all societal issues – as opposed to *thick* ideologies such as socialism or liberalism. For Mudde (2004; 2017), populism is malleable and often combined with another *thick* ideology. Some authors still prefer to conceptualise populism as a communication style (i.e. Aslanidis 2016; Bos *et al.* 2011; Cranmer 2011; Hawkins 2009). For Blassnig *et al.* (2019), these conceptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, for Kriesi (2014: 364), ''the populist ideology manifests itself in the political communication strategies of populist leaders.'' The various populist ideologies are to be found in the content of their communication (Engesser *et al.* 2017).

For Laclau (2002), populism is a discursive logic that constructs a 'people' through the articulation of equivalential linkages between a series of unsatisfied demands, thereby forming a collective identity for those whose demands are not met. The collective identity of "the people" is created in opposition to the "elite" which rules for its own interests. Laclau's (2005) influential conceptualisation of populism acknowledges that populists do not speak for a pre-existing 'people', but rather create a collective entity 'the people' through what Austin (1962) refers to as the 'performative act of naming'. For example, the performative act of naming two groups "the Rattlers" and "the Eagles" created two groups defined by labels signifying which individuals count as members. In Laclau's (2005) theory of populism, 'the people' is an empty signifier, a signifier whose meaning is temporarily fixed, and continuously contested and rearticulated by power struggles (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). For Laclau (2005: 160) "we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject, and the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is (…) the building up of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps." The popular subject is constructed through the aggregation of different demands in a logic of equivalence: all the different demands emanating from the people are aggregated into an equivalential chain. The plurality of particularised individual demands is aggregated into the unitary demands of the popular subject, 'the people'. This popular subject gives coherence to the equivalential chain by signifying it as a totality.

2.5.2 Populism and 'the people'

A common feature of populists is their claim to speak on behalf of "the people" (Brubaker 2017: 359). However, the construction of a popular entails "the building of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps" (Laclau 2005: 43). This antagonism between the rulers and the ruled is at the centre of populist discourses (Panizza 2005: 3). Populists feed on hegemonic relations between the political "self" – the 'people' – and the social "other" – often, but not always, the 'elite' (Holliday 2016: 920).

"The people" has three different meanings (Brubaker 2017: 359; Holliday 2016: 920). It can refer to the common people - the proletariat or plebs - or it can refer to the sovereign people - the *demos* (Brubaker 2017: 359). The people can also refer to a religiously, ethnically or culturally distinct 'people' (Brubaker 2017: 359). The creation of the "people" operates along both vertical - the rulers versus the ruled - and horizontal – the nation versus outsiders - divisions (Brubaker 2017: 362). Speaking "in the name of the people" could suggest a broader inclusivity in the political sphere or suggest an exclusive politics of ethno-cultural nationalism (Brubaker 2017: 359). The former would be profoundly democratic, the latter deeply illiberal.

2.5.3 The many faces of populism

Broadly speaking, there are two opposing conceptions of populism (Warren 2020: 21-22). The first is anti-pluralist in nature and appealing to tribal and xenophobic impulses. The other, often derived from historical accounts, sees populism as "a form of economic democracy rooted in a critique of inequality and concentrations of economic and political power" (Warren 2020: 22). For example, Lasch (1996: 105) characterised populism as an "authentic voice of democracy". Lasch undertook an historical analysis of twentieth-century political movements. He argues that populism replaced middle-class nationalism by providing a common ground, standards, and frame of reference without which society would have dissolved into contending factions (Lasch 1996: 43). For Lasch (1996), the real threat to democracy is the emergence of new elites with little sympathy for patriotism, and the reorientation of values emphasizing the individual at the expense of society.

This leads to one of the key aspects of this study. The concentration of wealth and political power has led to the emergence of powerful elites whose rule is being increasingly challenged.

29

For example, Gilens and Page's (2014: 575) observed that "when the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy." After having analysed nearly two thousand policy issues in the US, Gilens and Page (2014: 576) conclude that "In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does *not* rule". Populist leaders demanding inclusive political institutions accounting for the preferences of the average voter, are in essence demanding the re-democratization of a 'captured' political space. As Galston (2018: 127) explains, "although populist movements sometime erode or even overturn democratic regimes, they are not necessarily anti-democratic". For Galston (2018: 127), the bulk of the problem is that populism is always anti-pluralist, and therefore represents a challenge to the liberal governance which stands for the protection of pluralism. Since inclusive political institutions are key to protect pluralism, analysing whether various populist parties demand inclusive or exclusive political institutions can help us to better understand the impact of populism on pluralism and liberal democracies.

Among the plethora of literature on populism[17], few scholars have focused on whether it is exclusive or inclusive. Collier and Collier (1991) and de la Torre (2010) emphasised the inclusive character of Latin American populism, while Berezin (2009), Betz (2001) and Rydgren (2005) underlined the exclusionary nature of European populism. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) compared populism across the continents and concluded that two regional subtypes coexist: "exclusionary populism in Europe and inclusionary populism in Latin America". They compared two radical-right populist parties, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) and the French National Front (FN), with two radical-left populist parties, the Movement for Socialism (MAS) and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). They found that the two radical-right parties focused on the exclusion of non-native groups such as illegal migrants while the MAS and PSUV were primarily interested in material redistribution and improving the quality of life of weak socio-economic groups (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 166). They concluded that Latin American populism is predicated on anti-imperialism and assumes a sense of fraternity among all Latin Americans, while European populism is a xenophobic form of nationalism claiming alien people and values are threatening society (Mudde & Rovira

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[17] See, among others, Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (eds) 2008. Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Me ́ny, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds). 2002. Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Mudde, C. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Panizza, F. (ed.) 2005. Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. London: Verso.

Kaltwasser 2013: 168). Font *et al.* (2019) challenged this view by providing a comparative analysis based on the electoral manifestos of SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement. They found that the inclusionary category can be applied to SYRIZA and Podemos, albeit on different degrees. Similarly, March (2017) argues that left-wing populist parties highlight socio-economic issues, are more inclusionary, and exhibit less "populist" rhetoric than their right-wing counterparts.

Ostiguy and Casullo (2017) attempted to further clarify the distinction between left and right populism. They argued that despite the consensus that populists rail against 'the elite', it is far from being the only antagonist object of populism (Ostiguy & Casullo 2017: 6). Right-wing populists continuously rail against immigrants, who hardly constitute the elite. The true object of the ire of the populists is the '*social other*' (Ostiguy & Casullo 2017: 6). The populist framework often condemns the alleged alliance between the establishment and the *social other*. What distinguishes left and right populists is *who* the sociological *other* is (Ostiguy & Casuallo 2017: 6). On the left, the social other is constituted by the oligarchs and the elite. On the right, it is constituted by the not particularly well off but culturally distinct immigrants. As noted above, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) coined the terminology of 'inclusionary' versus 'exclusionary' to differentiate various strands of populism. However, this distinction is theoretically erroneous since *all* populisms are, *by their very definition*, both exclusionary and inclusionary (Ostiguy & Casuallo 2017: 7-8). While populism relies on antagonism to construct 'the people', it is also necessarily inclusionary in its construction of the people (Ostiguy & Casuallo 2017: 8).

Ostiguy and Casuallo (2017: 8) claim that the main difference between left- and right- populism is not their level of inclusivity, but rather the direction of their punches.[18] For example, extreme right populist parties such as the AfD campaign on the supposed threat posed by immigrants and capitalize on the ontological insecurity of citizens to gather support (Hansen & Olsen 2019). By framing identity issues through the lens of securitization, they are able to impose a very exclusive view of the nation based on ethno-national criteria. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 23) claim, by positing an issue as an existential threat, political leaders can claim

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[18] According to Ostiguy and Casuallo (2018: 8), "sociologically, left-wing populisms are "upward punching" -- toward the socio-economic (not just governing, political) elites. Right-wing populisms, sociologically, are "downward punching", toward a social Other that is depicted, certainly, as culturally (or ethnically) outsider, but that is also at the same time (or "should be", in their view), lower sociologically and in entitlements than their "native" social equivalents".

special rights to handle securitized issues with extraordinary (and often illiberal) measures. In contrast, left wing populists seek to unite the lower classes in their discursive construction of the people, since their popular subject is constructed through the aggregation of different demands in a logic of equivalence (Laclau 2005). In the leftist populist creed, identity issues such as culture, religion, and languages are desecuritized in an attempt to give coherence to the popular subject and place the internal frontier dividing the social space between the - socio-economic - 'elite' and the common people.

Extreme right parties articulate the central populist frame (the people v. the elite) with the traditional frames of the extreme right, such as authoritarianism, ethno-nationalism and nativism (Caiani & Della Porta 2010). These parties portray 'the people' as "suffering from the misdeeds of the elite, and in need of protection by the extreme right itself" (Caiani & Della Porta 2010: 197). Caiani and Della Porta (2010: 198) note "some tensions in the conceptualization of populism when applied to the extreme right". These parties are not advocating for the return of the power to the people, but rather for the return of the power to an exclusive national elite (Caiani & Della Porta 2010: 198). For di Tella (1997: 190) radical nationalist forces, which "are often branded populist, should [...] be put in a different category, because they are not aimed against the dominant groups but rather against the underprivileged ones they see as threatening."

Otjes and Louwerse (2015: 75) compared the voting behaviour of left-wing and right-wing populist parties in the Dutch Parliament. Their voting behaviour had only one strong similarity: their opposition to supranational institutions. This validates the assumption that populist parties believe in the absolute sovereignty of the people. As the parties diverged mostly on immigration, Otjes and Louwerse (2015: 75) suggest to leave "negativity towards 'others', particularly immigrants" out of any definition of populism. What emerge from this discussion is that the concept of populism is in dire need of a clear typology.

2.6 Identity:

Social scientists have long argued that identities are social constructs produced and reproduced through social interactions (Jenkins 1994: 209). Since social situations are neither permanent nor fixed, identity is "situational and ever-changing" (Shoup 2004: 6). Identities, whether ethnic, religious or cultural, function as a 'social radar', a "device through which people come

to see where they stand in relation to the human environment" (Hale 2004: 463). In other words, identity issues are about the *perceived* relationship individuals have with the socio-political environment in which they live. Interestingly, security and identity are two concepts mostly based on *perception*, they are malleable social constructs left free to the interplay of forces.

Identity formation processes have nonetheless important implications for the study of populism and its discursive creation of in-groups and out-groups. Indeed, identification with an in-group increases social stereotyping for the out-groups, and increased group identification correlates with the view of the self as an archetypal group member (Haslam *et al.* 1996; Hogg & Hardie 1992). In-group homogeneity increases when there is no incentive to distinguish the self from others within the group, and leads to greater group commitment, even when group status is relatively low (Brewer 1993; Simon, Pantaleo & Mummendey 1995; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 1997). Individuals identifying with a group are more likely to participate in the group's culture, to differentiate themselves from other groups, and to show attachment to their group (Ethier & Deaux 1994; Simon *et al.* 1998; Ullah 1987). Finally, groupthink and increased group competition correlates with high levels of social identification (Turner *et al.* 1992). The implication identification processes have when coupled with the phenomena of populism are quite evident when the 'in-group' refers to 'the people' or 'the nation' and the 'out-group' refers to 'the social other'. Groupthink and social identification accentuate both perceived and real differences while simultaneously pitting groups against each other. In fact, many social studies have demonstrated the mechanisms at play behind societal security dilemmas.

By including or excluding certain groups from their conception of 'the people', populist parties directly influence the identity formation process of both the national majority and minority groups. The creation of in-groups and out-groups has, in turn, important consequences for social peace, since even arbitrary social identities lead to prejudice (Tatjfel *et al.* 1971). As Roe (2002) further claims, collective identities foster ideal conditions for the emergence of societal security dilemmas. The desecuritization of identities is therefore seen as desirable, both because it promotes the cohesiveness of society, and because of its 'democratic-ness' - because it places back identity issues in the realm of 'normal' politics (Waever 2000). For Huysmans (1995: 66), the best way to desecuritize identities is to tell the story of the *social other* in a non-dichotomic manner, where the *other* is revealed as someone with multiple identities, just as anyone else.

33

2.7 Integration versus assimilation

The difference between the assimilation and the integration models of diversity management is of crucial importance for this dissertation. These models reflect the willingness – or unwillingness – of societies to accommodate immigrants, provide them with equal rights, and allow them to express their differences (Aleksynska & Algan 2010). "Integration" presupposes the existence of a cultural difference that will endure (Kramer 2011: 57). Under this model, the cultural difference that makes up the migrant identity is integrated into the host society (Kramer 2011). Integration is "a process of providing immigrants with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born" (Aleksynska & Algan 2010: 5). In contrast, assimilation means becoming "similar", and presupposes the erasure of difference through a process of socio-cultural homogenization (Kramer 2011: 57). Assimilation is one-way and refers to "a process of convergence of immigrant behavioural and preferential outcomes to the outcomes of the native-born" (Aleksynska & Algan 2010: 5).

The term "integration" encompasses structural aspects of incorporation into society and is often measured through the structural representation of immigrants in employment figures, educational level, and income level (Schneider & Crul 2010: 1145). Given the strong welfare state tradition in Western Europe, integration policies regularly imply positive discrimination and affirmative actions underpinned by open and inclusive political institutions. However, Cantle (2008: 176) argues that "any form of action targeted at one group, rather than others, is in some sense discriminatory and is often seen as a 'special treatment'" even if its intention is to level the playing field for all groups. While states may support an integration model sustained by inclusive political institutions, such systems can be perceived as unfair or threatening the ontological security of majorities, since many citizens see group relations as a "zero-sum" game.

Ultimately, both models can lead to a spiral societal security dilemma and the securitization of identities. The integration model can create the perception that special treatment accorded to other groups are unfair while the assimilation model forces minorities to abandon what is constitutive of their identity. In this context, the key for peaceful coexistence is to desecuritize identities in order to avoid a societal security dilemma.

34

2.8 Immigration

The debate on immigration is structured in a binary way (Smith 2014b: 382). Some believe in "special" obligations owed to their fellow national citizens by virtue of their shared civic identities, while others believe in "general" obligations owed to all human beings by virtue of their shared humanity (Smith 2014b: 382). For example, Miller (2005) and Walzer (1983) defend immigration restrictions on nationalist and communitarian grounds. Issues of identity and identity formation are considered relevant and justify immigration restrictions (Watkins 2020: 482). In this view, the importance of forging and maintaining a collective national identity is compelling enough to justify immigration policies that restrict fundamental freedoms (Watkins 2020: 482). In contrast, those advocating for open borders tie the right to emigrate to fundamental human rights, freedom of movement and other categories without any reference to identity (Watkins 2020: 483). For Pevnick (2011: 39), those who advocate for open borders neglect both the long-term concerted effort necessary to build state institutions and the community's right to self-determination. This argument is often evoked by right wing parties who claim that the state's institutions, which result from efforts enacted by the national community over centuries, are being eroded by the arrival of aliens who threaten its continuity. Indeed, closed borders are often justified through claims of ontological insecurity or, in other words, through the securitization of identities.

2.9 Political Participation

Democracies cannot exist without high levels of political participation. Verba and Nie (1972: 2-3) define political participation as "behaviour designed to affect choice of governmental and/or policies". Conge (1988: 242) criticized this definition for neglecting passive involvement, political violence, civil disobedience, and other non-governmental actions. Conge (1988: 247) proposed a broader definition: "individual or collective action at the national or local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding allocation of public goods". This definition has three important aspects, namely that the action can be written or verbal, violent or nonviolent, and of any intensity (Conge 1988: 247).

A central question with regards to effective political participation concerns the tension between equality and democracy. The only fair approach to deal with conflict is to allow everyone an

35

equal say, argues Swift (2019: 217). Strictly speaking, equality is "a prohibition of any differentiation in order to guarantee the equality of chances of all voters" (Palermo & Woelk 2003: 240). In this view, equality is a purely quantitative, 'majoritarian' concept, with serious implications for minorities (Palmero & Woelk 2003). The politics of universality – treating everyone the same – obscures the long-standing structural inequalities[19] between groups (Wolmarans 2020: 144). Equality should rather be conceived as "treatment as equal" based on people's status as citizens (Swift 2019: 97-8). Unequal social relations lead to marginalization, exclusion and oppression (Swift 2019: 98). While treating citizens equally may merely mean giving their opinions equal weight in collective decision-making, it can also involve offering them equal opportunity to influence the democratic process (Swift 2019: 219). In this view, democracy is both a means of turning preferences into policies and a means of transforming the preferences themselves (Swift 2019).

Achieving effective participation requires mechanisms to promote the integration of minorities while promoting good governance and integrity of the state (Palermo & Woelk 2003: 225). Recognising that there can be no 'one-size-fits-all' answer to effective participation, Palermo and Woelk (2003: 240) stress that "the basic line for participation is the recognition and the – mutual – respect of groups". Political participation is meant to break the dominance of one group over the others by providing minorities a fair chance to be heard. Disregarding power-sharing agreements can result in the long-term political exclusion of minorities (de Gaay Fortman 2011).

Excluding minorities from political participation can lead to violent conflicts. The exclusion of Northern Irish Catholics in the political process of the United Kingdom is a case in point. Effective participation is the best safeguard against violent means of conflict resolution. Without political participation, the choices between conflict and cooperation is limited to the former (Hirschman 1978: 90). The more political institutions exclude certain groups, the more likely these groups will resort to violence. Political institutions listening to all voices and guaranteeing large-scale political engagement are required for political stability and peace (de Gaay Fortman 2011).

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[19] S*tructural inequality* is defined as "a condition that arises out of attributing an unequal status to a category of people in relation to one or more other categories of people, a relationship that is perpetuated and reinforced by a confluence of unequal relations in roles, functions, decision rights, and opportunities." (Dani & de Haan 2008: 3).

2.10 Minority rights

Minority rights are concerned with the maintenance of group identities. They allow minorities to preserve their "own distinctive culture and identity, and obtaining more equal social status in society" (Verkuyten & Yildiz 2006: 531). Three elements frame the minority rights debate: the supposed value of cultural diversity, the need for social equality and equal opportunities, and social cohesion and state unity (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003). For some, cultural communities are the central context in which identities are shaped (Fowers & Richardson 1996). As such, cultural diversity is valued intrinsically, and cultural differences must be respected. Taking these cultural distinctions into account frequently entails special rights (Parekh 2000). Others focus on the notion of equal opportunity: all individuals should be allowed to practice their culture and participate equally in society (Verkuyten & Yildiz 2006). Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2000) and Barry (2001) argue that minority rights are essential for ensuring that all citizens are treated equally. They provide the best collective strategy to challenge group-based hierarchy and domination (Tajfel & Turner 1986). In contrast, some believe minority rights should be opposed as they threaten the stability and unity of society (Verkuyten 2004). Indeed, cultural differences are often framed as threats to the cohesion of society (Balibar 1991; Taguieff 1993). Once again, the notions of ontological security and societal security dilemma are central to the minority rights debate.

Minority rights are usually considered in relation to the democratic principle of majority rule (Verkuyten & Yildiz 2006: 532). The majority rule argument is related to the nationalist view that the political and ethno-cultural unit should coincide (Eriksen 1993; Gellner 1983). Because majority rule is a central tenet of democracy, many believe the majority should rule unchallenged (Verkuyten & Yildiz 2006: 533). For example, despite supporting minority rights, Kymlicka (1995) argues that only *national* minorities[20] should be granted special rights. Those who have immigrated voluntarily should integrate[21].

Populist movements undermining the rights of minorities and calling for anti-pluralist institutions threaten democracy not only because they undermine its liberal foundation, but also

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[20] National minorities are indigenous minorities that have long historical ties with the state in question.
[21] Interestingly, Kymlicka's argument supports the claims of AO.

because, as we have seen, anti-pluralist institutions increase the likelihood of inter-group conflicts, and therefore can undermine another aspect of democracy: the absence of conflict.

2.11 Operationalization of the concepts

In this section, the concepts central to the dissertation are briefly operationalized. Operationalization means turning abstract concept into measurable observations.

2.11.1 Institutions

Institutions are defined as "codifiable systems of social structures (in particular norms and rules) that lead to inclinations for people to act in specific ways" (Gräbner & Ghorbani 2019: 26). The definition and characteristics of 'open' and 'inclusive' institutions are inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson's book *Why Nations Fail* (2013), which sought to understand the origins of power, prosperity and poverty through a cross-continental and historical analysis of political and economic institutions. *Why Nations Fail* compares the impact of 'extractive' and 'inclusive' institutions on prosperity, development, wealth, and democratic stability. It suggests that only inclusive institutions are conducive to long-term prosperity and stability.

Inclusive institutions produce a virtuous circle, "a process of positive feedback, making it more likely that these institutions will persist and even expand" (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 332). First, the logic of pluralistic political institutions makes them less susceptible to power grabs and power abuses and cements the idea that the laws commonly agreed upon should be applied equally to everyone. Likewise, the rule of law allows for greater political participation since it ensures that all people are equal, not only before the law, but also within the political system. The rule of law also implies that laws cannot be used to encroach upon minority rights. While inclusive institutions lead to a virtuous circle of increased pluralism, exclusive institutions offer more incentive for conflict because without constraints on the exercise of power, "there are essentially no institutions to restrain the use and abuse of power" (Acemoglu & Robinson 213: 366).

One of the main concerns with populism is that it is anti-pluralist, illiberal, and seeking to destroy the pluralistic institutions that stand in the way of the *popular will*. If, as many have argued, populism is a danger to democracy, it is because it wants to transform pluralist institutions into a more direct form of majoritarian democracy and replace the rule of law with

38

majority rule. Such measures would undeniably exclude large parts of society and undermine not only pluralism but also the rule of law. As such, populism is not only a threat to democracy, but also to development, wealth and prosperity. However, if populist parties endorse inclusive reforms for political institutions, the institutional framework discussed above suggests that they will rather foster democracy and the rule of law.

2.11.2 Inclusive political institutions:

The inclusiveness of political institutions depends on the distribution of political power within a society (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 79). Liberalism is a political theory mainly concerned with self-governance and popular sovereignty (Spinner 1994: 3). Liberals argue for an equal distribution of political power among citizens who have an equal say in how the government is run (Spinner 1994: 3). The distribution of power within a society is determined by its political institutions: the rules that govern how and by whom the government is chosen, and how the government's coercive power can be used (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 79-80). Liberals submit the arbitrary power of the state to a constitution (Spinner 1994: 4). Political institutions in which political power is broadly distributed and subject to constraints under the rule of law are considered as pluralistic (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 80). For the purpose of this dissertation, inclusive political institutions are defined as those that *allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish* (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 74)[22].

2.11.3 Exclusive political institutions:

Exclusive political institutions are those who do not fulfil the requirements of pluralism (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 81). The rationale is straightforward: exclusive political institutions allow for a narrow elite to hold on tight to the exercise of power and maintain control over the institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 81). For the purpose of this dissertation, political institutions will qualify as exclusive when they *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish* (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013: 74).

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[22] This definition is inspired by Acemoglu & Robinson (2013: 74)'s definition of inclusive political institutions.

2.12 Conclusion

This literature review assessed the current literature relevant to this particular dissertation. It provided definitions for each important term, and the major views and theories surrounding them. Likewise, this literature review exposed how multidisciplinary the study of populism is, and why such a complex topic necessitates an integrative and interpretative approach. While investigating the existing literature, it became clear that the concept of populism is still mired by a great deal of theoretical confusion. For example, according to Regilme's conceptualization of democratic consolidation, populism is profoundly democratic. In contrast, following Linz and Stepan's (1996) constitutional and attitudinal definitions of democracy, populism is profoundly anti-democratic. Looking at the attitude of populist parties towards the constitutional and attitudinal aspect of democratic institutions will help us to better understand and classify populism.

The growth of Western far-right parties in the 1980s and 1990s prompted a flood of literature on populism, often blurring the line between the two. Most states aspire to be 'nation-states' with their own culture, language, and mythology. The core tenet of political nationalism is "the belief that the nation state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit" (Gellner 1993: 409). But fostering a particular national identity through nation-building is not 'natural' and leads to marginalization.

A common critique of populists is that they oppose multiculturalism and minority rights and are therefore illiberal. Political nationalism prompted minorities to fight for equality, recognition, and respect for their differences (Parekh 2000: 1). Since people tend to see social hierarchies as a zero-sum game, any change in the distribution of power is perceived as a threat and undermines the ontological security of dominant groups (Jervis 2017).

The concept of 'societal security' which is particularly useful to discuss group relations in multicultural societies. Securitization allows state representatives to claim special rights to employ whatever means required to stop certain developments (Wæver et al. 1993, Jutila 2006). However, excluding minorities from political participation can lead to violent conflicts. Democracy requires mechanisms to promote the integration of minorities while promoting good governance and integrity of the state. Indeed, inclusive political institutions are key to

40

fostering a liberal and democratic regime, especially since the choice between democratic participation and other less peaceful means of contestation is predicated on the type of power-sharing agreement in place in a society.

The inclusiveness of political institutions depends on the distribution of political power within a society. Inclusive political institutions are those that allow and encourage participation by a great mass of people in political activities that make best use of their talents and skills. Exclusive political institutions allow for a narrow elite to hold on tight to the exercise of power and maintain control over the institutions.

This dissertation introduces a typology based on the attitudes of populist parties towards the inclusivity of political institutions and the use of securitizing strategies. In doing so, it provides a new analytical tool to differentiate between different types of populism while providing clarity to the debate on populism.

3. Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Theoretical Perspective

This dissertation uses Securitization Theory as its theoretical perspective. Securitization theory is a theoretical perspective that focuses on how discourses of threat and security influence the behaviour of nations, with consequences for group relations (Huysmans 1998). According to Waever (1995: 46-47), this new approach grew out of a growing dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to security: namely, the belief that security is an a priori real, measurable threat, and that an improvement in security is always desirable. Departing from the traditional realist conception of security and its focus on national security, the Copenhagen School attempted to of build an alternative constructivist approach to security (i.e. McDonald 2008: 59; Huysmans 1998: 480), by claiming that "the sense of threat, vulnerability and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent" (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 50-51). This group of academics developed a theory of securitization to better understand how threats are generated discursively and to investigate the intersubjective processes that underlie what is perceived – and collectively responded to – as a threat. Starting from the premise that security is a subjective condition susceptible to an interpretation process, the approach explains why not all hazards are considered to be threats (Campbell 1992). Securitization theory follows the epistemological stance of constructivism stating that "social knowledge is the active product of human 'knowers', that knowledge is situated and relative, that it varies across people and their social groups, and that it is context dependent" (Drisko & Maschi 2016: 91). Constructivism states that reality is produced by humans as they assign meaning to the world around them (Appleton & King 2002). Meaning does not lie dormant waiting to be discovered but is rather generated as individuals interact with and interpret the world (Crotty 1998). Constructivism opposes the view that an objective truth can be quantified (Crotty 1998). The objective of constructivist research is to interpret the meaning others have about the world.

"Securitisation" theory was devised by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998) to explain security in a way that does not rely on material capabilities or subjective qualities, but instead emphasizes discourses, or speech acts. The theory sees security as a 'speech act' with the potential to influence the way decisions are made (Busan *et al.* 1998: 26). In this theoretical framework, a securitizing actor performs speech-acts to convince an audience of the need to take emergency measures towards the referent object of securitization (which supposedly faces

an existential threat) to ensure the survival of the state, individual, or society in question (Cardoso dos Santos 2018).

The Copenhagen School views security as a process rather than something that can be crafted. Rather than performing a first-level investigation of the precise meaning of security, it examines how that meaning is socially created (Guzzini 2011: 330). The analysis of security is concerned with what security *'does'* rather than what security '*means*.' Security is defined not by its content but by its performance: securitization (Guzzini 201: 330). Securitization is a process, not a single act or rite, and can have the desired results, but does not necessarily have to (Guzzini 2011: 331). Indeed, Waever describes security as a "speech act" in his 1995 essay *Securitization and Desecuritization*. Drawing from Austin's (1962: 5-6) philosophy of language, Waever (1989) claimed that some utterances not only described the world, but also interact with it. These utterances are performative, in the sense that they have an effect on the real world. For example, when stated by the authorized officiator during a wedding ceremony, the utterance "I now pronounce you husband and wife" is performative, and the couple becomes husband and wife. Taking the idea of speech acts and performative utterance a step further, Waever (1989:5-6) asserts that by framing issues in terms of security, political leaders are able to move these issues into the domain of emergency and claim special rights to use the necessary means to prevent the threat's development. In other words, securitization is "the move which takes politics beyond the normal rules of the game" by framing a problem as an existential threat calling for immediate action (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: 23). In this way, an actor asserts that they have a specific right to deal with the problem in a unique way (Roe 2004). According to Buzan *et al.* (1998: 25), "the way to study securitization is to study discourse". We are witnessing an instance of securitization if the securitizing actor proposes to break free from procedures or norms to which he or she would otherwise be subject (Buzan *et al*. 1998: 25). Waever (1983) highlights some 'facilitating conditions' for turning a speech act into a securitized issue. For Waever (1983), utilising the grammar[23] of security; exploiting the social capital of the securitising actor; and recognising or invoking the existence of conditions historically associated with a threat allows a securitizing actor to transform 'normal' issues into 'securitized' issues.

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[23] According to Waever (1995) and Buzan *et al.* (1998), the 'grammar' of security is understood as its constitutive rules: the construction of "a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out" (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 32).

The Copenhagen School broadens the scope of security concerns by proposing that individuals, societies, and the environment, among other things, can be the subject of securitization. Buzan's initial attempt to address the concept of 'comprehensive security' was presented in *People, States, and Fear* (1983). He dismantled the idea of national security and expanded the scope of its application beyond the military. Apart from states, he incorporated social, economic, and environmental concerns into his security discourse (Buzan 1991). Since all survival could be jeopardized, a referent object could be anything that justifies extraordinary actions to keep it safe. In this dissertation, only the societal – concerned with identity – dimension of securitization is under scrutiny.

When confronted with a securitization initiative, an individual's posture might be defined by their identity. Security analysts should not assume that threats are the consequence of rational choice or historical necessity because identity has no essence, it is a social construct – like a perceived threat. Establishing a constitutive outside the group – a '*them*', as opposed to '*us*' - rather than an internal essence is a precondition to the creation of an identity, and this requires the exercise of political power (Laclau 1990: 183). Indeed, the basis of any identity is the exclusion of anything which contradicts it and this exclusion is a political fact (Laclau 1990: 33). The establishment of hegemonic discourse implies the formation of identities through the logic of equivalence and difference. This is critical to understanding the securitization process, as securitization is impossible without hostility, without the *other* that threatens the *self's* very existence. Yet paradoxically, the existence of the *other* is also a *sine qua non* condition for the existence of the *self* since the *self* is defined in opposition to the *other*. Societal security dilemmas arise within this paradox.

According to Herschinger (2011: 7), the *other* does not have to be a danger because there are various degrees of *otherness*. To understand the 'degrees of otherness', Mouffe (2005) claims that an antagonistic political environment has enemies, whilst an agonistic one has opponents to explain the distinction between antagonism and agonism. In contrast to an agonistic setting, no system of rules governs the players' conduct when engaged in combat with enemies in antagonistic settings (Mouffe 2005: 20, 52). When moral concepts such as "good" and "evil" are used to establish collective identities, it leads to a radicalization that fuels the urge to eradicate the *other* (Mouffe 2005). For example, when it comes to the "war on terror," Mouffe (2005: 75) points to the Bush administration's assertion that an "axis of evil" was fostering worldwide terrorism and should be eradicated. Excessive measures are more easily tolerated

44

as the degree of otherness approaches that of the radical (Herschinger 2011: 158). This stance encourages the desire for annihilation, radicalises the *other*, and obliterates all means of communication with that other person or people. In contrast, in agonistic settings opponents follow the rules of the game. Excessive measures are not tolerated and communicating with the *other* is maintained. In agonistic settings, different groups acknowledge "that there is no rational solution to their conflict" but, "nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents" (Mouffe 2005: 20). For Mouffe (1999: 754), we should no longer regard the "other" as an enemy to be defeated, but as an "opponent". Mouffe asks how the "us/them discrimination" may be established in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. The biggest challenge for democracy is not to arrive at a – impossible - "rational consensus" but to cope with the "fact of antagonism" (Mouffe 1999: 754). The purpose of democracy is to "transform antagonism into agonism" (Mouffe 2005: 20) and "to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human connections" (Mouffe 2005: 6).

The notions of agonism and antagonism deserve more attention since they are closely related to the securitization of identities. Indeed, the self/other distinction is fundamental to the process of securitization (Huynsmans 1995: 66). Moreover, problematizing identity issues in terms of security threats exposes the malleability and contingency of identities, so security action on behalf of identities generally diminish the feeling of security even for those defended (Waever 2000: 53). In fact, the sheer nature of collective identities generates favourable conditions for so-called societal security dilemmas (Roe 2002). When antagonistic identity relation prevails, the friend-enemy dichotomy – from which the traditional 'war' logic of security is derived – usually results in a societal security dilemma. The way forward would then be the desecuritization of identities. For Aradau (2003: 19), desecuritization is "a process of re-thinking the relations between subjects of security, and of imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of integration". This dissertation contends that it is possible to differentiate between 'populist' parties on the basis of the way they problematize identity issues. When identity issues are framed in antagonistic ways, the result is the securitization of identities and a backlash against the notion of pluralism. In contrast, an agonistic point of view recognizes that deep value pluralism[24] protects us from authoritarian standards to resolve conflicts (Devaux 1999). A populist party exhibiting antagonistic attitudes with the *other* will

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[24] Value pluralism, also referred to as political pluralism, is a view associated with political liberalism. Proponents of value pluralism believe that there are irreducibly plural moral values, all equal in moral worth, and that this justifies a liberal political system (See Berlin 1969; Crowder 2002; Galston 2002).

seek to undermine pluralism and is a danger to democracy. On the contrary, a populist party that exhibits agonistic attitudes towards the *other* embraces pluralism and the deliberative ideal since it recognizes the legitimacy of all voices.

This dissertation asserts that it is possible to classify populism based on the notions of securitization of identities, agonism and antagonism. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to develop a typology of populism, its analysis is underpinned by a grounded theory methodology. Researchers like Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1994, 1998), who thought that researchers build theories based on their interpretations of participants' stories, gave shape to grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodology that seeks to construct theory through a process of inductive data collection (Glaser 1978; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1998). Giving people a voice is an essential tenet of grounded theory (Breckenridge *et al.* 2012: 65). Under this method, the researcher constantly compares the voice of participants, progressing from comparison between the data to the interpretation of this comparison through categorization (Mils *et al.* 2006: 27).

In this study, the voices analysed are the manifestos of political parties. Manifestos are a rich source of information about a party's policy and ideology (Dolezal *et al.* 2018: 240). Initially, manifestos were regarded as inconsequential documents paying lip service to the voters (Ostrogorski 1902: 261). They were seen as meaningless since they were made for publicity purposes and did not reflect a party's true ideological position (da Silva Tarouco 2011: 55). Recently, however, authors have concluded that they play a significant role in political campaigning and are frequently executed by party representatives (i.e. Dolezal *et al.* 2012). A few attempts to conceptualize manifestos have been made so far (Dolezal *et al.* 2018: 241) with Ray (2007) providing one of the most comprehensive efforts: manifestos are defined either as sheer party advertising, an abstract statement of the party's ideology or as a contract between the party and the voters. Contract-type manifestos comprise of pledges reflecting the policies the party would enact if in power (Ray 2007: 17). The four manifestos analysed in this dissertation are election campaign manifestos of the contract-type. They expose the parties' preferred behaviour, and the parties pledge to follow through if elected.

According to Robertson's (1976) 'saliency theory', voters are not presented with a choice between alternative policies within a universal agenda but rather a choice between parties' selected agendas emphasising the salience of specific issues. Manifestos present to the voters

46

a choice between salient issues perceived as major concerns by the political parties. They comprise of pledges seeking to address these parties' major concerns. Grounded theory is therefore particularly suited for this study since it seeks to identify and conceptualize behaviours that aim to address major concerns (Glaser 2002).

The 'findings' of a grounded theory study are not about people, but rather patterns of behaviour (Breckenridge *et al*. 2012: 65). While grounded theorists strive for impartiality, findings cannot be considered authoritative. As Glaser (2007: 93) notes, the product of grounded theory is "transcending abstraction, NOT accurate description". It can only claim to provide helpful hypotheses regarding participants' concerns and behaviours. A grounded theory is a theory, not an official truth claim; it is meant to be utilized and modified (Glaser 1992). As such, the typology of populism developed throughout the comparative analysis and presented at the end of this dissertation is meant to provide a helpful and innovative categorization of populism, without claiming for absolute certainty. Two polar types of populism are proposed to guide further research in the study and categorization of populist phenomena.

3.2 Research Design:

This thesis uses an exploratory research design (Drisko & Maschi 2016: 34). The initial sampling plan was purposive and focused specifically on election campaign manifestos emanating from 'populist' parties. Each of the parties selected have been labelled as populist by various scholars or by their own leaders. Populist parties from across the political spectrum have been selected because they exhibit various degrees of institutional inclusivity, which is reflected in their attitude towards the securitizing identity and the social security dilemma.

In a study of the political right in Israel, Filc (2010: 128-138) highlighted three dimensions of exclusion: the material, political, and symbolic dimensions. The material dimension refers to "the distribution of state resources, both monetary and non-monetary, to specific groups in society" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 158). The political dimension refers to Robert Dahl's (1971, 1989) two key aspects of democracy: political participation and public contestation (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 161). Political exclusion occurs when specific groups are prevented from participating in the public arena. The symbolic dimension refers to "setting the boundaries of 'the people', and *ex negativo*, 'the elite'" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 164). In simple terms, this dimension refers to the symbolic inclusion or

exclusion of particular groups from the rhetorical construction of 'the people' and 'the elite'. These three dimensions of exclusion informed the coding process and the analysis of the campaign manifestos, particularly in relation to the depiction of institutions in these manifestos.

This study uses a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), which demanded that the researcher immerse himself in the data to become better informed about its context and nuances. The goal of this immersion process is to become more informed about the context and nuances of the data, to identify key content and omissions, as well as key themes. For this reason, each manifesto was read several times before being coded[25]. This dissertation used an inductive approach to coding: codes were derived from the data upon close analysis to create data-grounded categories.

Once the data had been coded in data-grounded categories, the content of each category was examined through a descriptive analysis to find patterns and similarities in the data (cf. chapter 4). This served as the basis for a data-grounded comparative analysis (cf. chapter 5). Using grounded theory, this dissertation then progresses from comparison between the data to the interpretation of this comparison by highlighting key differences between two poles of populism, namely *agonistic* versus *antagonistic* populism.

3.3 Method:

With the rise of big data analysis, content analyses of party manifestos have become fairly popular. On the one hand, data from party manifestos are impartial and provided by the parties themselves. They provide an accurate picture of a party's policy proposals without requiring acute knowledge of their track record (Dinas & Gemenis 2010: 428). Second, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has produced a large database used by many authors to determine the ideological positions of parties (i.e. Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2007). From the CMP, a large quantity of research focusing on the position of parties along the left-right spectrum have emerged. For example, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), Pauwels (2011), Espinal (2015), Bonikowski and Gidron (2015), Oliver and Rahn (2016), and Hameleers and Vliegenthart (2019) analysed populist political communication with various computerized methods based on the CMP. Graziano and Tsakatika (2019) combined quantitative text analysis

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[25] A code can be thought of as a label, a quasi-sentence that describes what a particular section of text is about and makes it easier to identify connections between meaning units.

of party manifestos with qualitative content analysis of manifestos and speeches. In their study, an automated content analysis based on word counts served to detect inclusionary elements in populist discourses.

Many recent studies have used the predominantly qualitative data sets of the CMP (Jakobi 2011; Smith & Smith 2000; Spoon 2012; Tarouco 2011), which are currently the only data sets of its kind. The CMP coding unit follows the *quasi-sentence* model, understood as the smallest unit containing an independent message. Each *quasi-sentence* is then assigned to one of the 56 categories relating to issues such as welfare, international politics, or the economy. The CMP has, nonetheless, been criticized for its lack of reliability, as well as the fact that the categories were designed in the early 1980s and can sometimes be incomplete or outdated (e.g. Pelizzo 2003; Benoit & Laver 2007; Mikhaylov *et al.* 2008; Benoit *et al.* 2009; Lowe *et al.* 2010; Dinas & Gemenis 2010).

Backlund (2011) analysed the content of the Sweden Democrats[26] 2010 election manifesto by combining content analyses and survey-based approaches to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches. He concluded that context-dependent coding is essential and cites several potential problems. Backlund (2011: 39) notes that "the Sweden Democrats' (…) want to prohibit "ritualistic slaughter of animals". A coder disregarding the manifesto's context (or, similarly, a context-independent approach) may interpret this sentence as being "pro-animal rights", which within the CMP coding scheme would fall into the category *environment positive*. Put into context, however, the coder could very plausibly argue that this statement is not necessarily indicative of a broader commitment to animal rights, but rather an opposition to multicultural minority rights. Backlund (Ibid.) further notes:

> "Context independent approaches run into trouble in two ways: on the one hand, the words alone have a clear difficulty transmitting the deeper sense of opposition to multiculturalism. However, even if the word ritualistic in itself is considered an anti-multiculturalist word, the fact that its frequency can be expected to be exceptionally low means that it may most probably be discarded (…). This is just one example used to highlight the potential difficulties in quantitatively assessing rare words that may – in context – have very significant meanings."

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[26] The Sweden Democrats is commonly referred to as a populist party.

Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) compared classical and computerized methods of qualitative analysis to investigate the degree of populism of various European parties. They concluded that "the classical approach turns out to be more valid, and possibly also more reliable" (Rooduijn & Pauels 2011: 1279), and emphasized the need for "human coders who are able to interpret the contextual meanings of the selected words" (2011: 1280). In light of Backlund's (2011) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) argument, this dissertation has first grounded the study with a contextual description of the phenomena of identity politics. Indeed, following constructivism, knowledge is context dependent and meaning is generated as individuals interact with and interpret objects of knowledge (Crotty 1998).

This dissertation follows Kracauer's (1953) approach that emphasizes qualitative rather than quantitative procedures. For Kracauer (1953: 637-638), a qualitative content analysis achieves its breakdowns without concern for frequencies. What counts is the rational organization of categories that condense the substantive meanings of the given text. In this case, nine categories have been selected to allow for a more substantial comparison of these parties' discourses These categories have been selected because they feature prominently in the manifestos, and allow for a cross-manifesto comparison. Likewise, they have relevance when discussing the inclusivity of political institutions.

This study focuses on the meaning of the content rather than the elements and forms of communication (Drisko & Maschi 2016: 81) to describe and analyse patterns or regularities found in the data (Drisko & Maschi 216: 86). For example, while analysing the data from the immigration category, it appeared that the AfD and the NR were using the grammar of security to create a sense of urgency and threat around this topic. In contrast, Podemos and SF refrain from using securitizing strategies to mobilize popular support. This study carefully analyses the meanings conveyed by the voices of different populist parties on different themes in the hope of findings similarities and patterns. To achieve this, it observe, category per category, what the different parties have to say about political institutions. To facilitate the qualitative content analyses, the researcher used the NVivo data analysis software, a powerful tool to identify patterns and themes and allow data to emerge through interpretation. The researcher draws links and observe patterns in chapter four while laying them out for a more substantial discussion in chapter 5. Chapter 5 explores these voices in more depth and reflect on the commonalities and differences between these parties' messages. It highlights the

commonalities and differences between these voices and draws some theoretical observations which are then laid out clearly in chapter 6.

3.4 Coding Process

The inductive coding process occurred as followed: after several readings, the researcher labelled (coded) each part of the manifestos that related to institutions by briefly describing the content of that section. This first stage was repeated twice to increase the accuracy of the codes. After this verification process, around 2800 unique codes were grouped into nine broad categories that relate to key aspects of political institutions. Sub-categories were then developed to provide further nuance on the detailed content. The qualitative content analysis that follows is divided into nine sections that correspond to the nine categories developed during the coding process.

The manifesto of the FN included 305 nodes with a total of 378 references. The AFD manifesto included 327 nodes for a total of 623 references. The Podemos manifesto included 730 nodes for a total of 191 references, while the Sinn Feinn manifesto included 417 nodes for 1207 references. This great disparity in terms of coding and references is explained by two factors. First, come manifestos are much longer than others. For example, the FN manifesto contains 144 short propositions while the Podemos manifesto contains more than 400 propositions on a total of 195 pages. The second factor influenced the number of references per nodes, and is due to some limitations of the Nvivo software. The software was sometimes unable to highlight and code a paragraph in a single reference, which led to a multiplication of references, particularly in the case of the Podemos and Sinn Feinn manifestos. This issue of multiplication of references has been resolved through the aggregation of nodes and references.

3.5 Description of the data

The primary data of this dissertation consists of four election campaign manifestos from populist parties. Due to some constraints such as language and time, this study focuses its analysis on four Western European 'populist' parties. To diversify the sample base, two 'left-wing' populist parties, namely Podemos (Spain) and the Sinn Féin (Ireland), and two 'right-wing' populist parties, the Rassemblement National (France) and Alternative for Germany (Germany) have been chosen. This dissertation focuses only on the last campaign manifesto

51

produced by these parties at the time of writing (2020). This section will briefly describe these four parties and the manifestos that serves as primary data for this dissertation. These manifestos are:

1. *144 Engagements Presidentiels: Marine 2017* (NR 2017)
2. *Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany* (AfD 2017).
3. *Podemos: 26J.* (Podemos 2016).
4. *Giving Workers & Families a Break: A Manifesto for Change* (SF 2020).

3.5.1 Description of the parties

3.5.1.2 Radical right-wing populism (RRP)

The definition of populism as a "thin ideology" explains why populism often appears in combination with another 'full' ideology such as socialism, nationalism or communism. Mudde (2007: 26) identifies the core ideology of radical right populism as "a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism". Moreover, Mudde (2007: 26) argues that "nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family." Following Betz:

> "radical right-wing populist parties are radical in their rejection of established socio-cultural and socio-political systems and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free market, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general. They are right-wing first in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political projects that seek to achieve it; second in their opposition of the social integration of marginalised groups; and third in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism and anti-Semitism. They are populist in their unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense" (Betz 1994: 4).

According to Berning (2017: 16), radical right-wing populist parties primarily are concerned with ethnic group threats. 'Ethnic group threat' is the expectancy of adverse consequences due

52

to a rise in migration from ethnically different regions (Berning 2017: 16). These ethnic threats stem from perceived competition over material resources on the one hand; but also relates to non-tangible goods such as language or religion on the other (McLaren 2003; Stephan & Renfro 2002). The latter is conceptualised as threats to the ontological security of communities. There is substantial evidence that ethnic group threats to one's ontological security have a considerably bigger effect on preferences for radical right populist parties than economic threat assessments do (Lucassen & Lubbers 2012). As such, radical right-wing populist parties focus on the supposed threat posed by the arrival of other ethnic groups.

3.5.1.2.1 The National Rally (NR)

The National Rally, formerly known as the National Front, is a French radical right-wing populist party, and one of the most successful of its kind in Western Europe (Rydgren 2008: 166). After WWII, strong right-wing views found little support in France. The extreme right was demonized and discredited for its ties to fascism (Kling 2012: 58). Several mostly worldwide developments allowed radical right-wing views to permeate French society in the 1950s, albeit slightly. The Algerian conflict (1954–1962), however, provided an opening for the far-right to reclaim political space the late 1950s (Stockemer 2017: 8). The return of one million French colonists after Algerian independence fuelled nationalist and anti-Arab sentiments in France (Betz & Immerfall 1998: 11). It is in this context that the party was formed on October 5, 1972. It united several French nationalist movements including Poujadists, neo-fascists, anti-Gaullists, activists, and right-wing intellectuals (Betz & Immerfall 1998: 12; Bourseiller 1991: 78–83; Soudais 1996: 184–187) calling for a "French renaissance and a new defence" of the French people (Berezin 2007: 141). Jean-Marie Le Pen became its first president and led the party until 2011 when his daughter, Marine, took over. Beyond its nationalist and racist policy prescriptions, the FN promoted public sector reduction, less state interference, radical immigration reform, anti-Europeanism and proportional representation (Camus 1996: 20).The party's combination of "fervent nationalism, opposition to immigration and a populist hostility to the political establishment" became a model for many other radical right-wing populist parties (Eatwell 2000: 408). The National Rally satisfies the criteria to qualify as populist: it holds a vision of society as 'ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the "pure" people versus "the corrupt elite"' (Mudde 2004: 543). As noted by Rydgren (2008: 176), it holds an image of 'the people' as a single, homogenous and harmonious community, undermined by the political elite and its corrupt globalist project.

Likewise, its slogan, "*in the name of the people*" supports the idea that its leader represents 'the voice of the people' (Rydgren 2008: 176).

The support for the NR and its presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, increased from 17.9% in 2012 to 21.3% in 2017, which allowed her to compete in the second round of the presidential election, where she received a total of 33.9% of the votes. Likewise, the party's results for the national assembly have improved substantially, from 3.7% in 2012 (2 out 577 seats) to 8.8% of the votes in 2017. However, since the seats of the national assembly are distributed along a two-round first past-the-post system, the NR only obtained 8 of the 577 seats.

3.5.1.2.2 Alternative for Germany (AfD)

Alternative for Germany is a German radical right-wing populist party created in the context of the 2008 financial crisis and Germany's First Memorandum of Understanding on Greece in May 2010 (Kim 2017: 4). Initially, the AfD was labelled a 'Eurosceptic party', albeit one with some right-wing populist elements (i.e. Berbuir, Lewandowsky & Siri 2015; Grimm 2015; Mader & Schoen 2015; Franzmann 2014). The party was founded in 2013 and presented a programme centred on opposition to the Euro and rejection of all bailouts for member states of the Eurozone (Kim 2017: 4). The term 'alternative' is a direct reference to the use of the term *alternativelos* (alternative-less), a term used by the German government to justify a law enabling the nationalisation of banks in case of systemic bankruptcy risk (Kim 2017:4). The party first found impetus by mobilizing popular discontent about the European institutions and Germany's role as paymaster (Lees 2017: 299). The party participated in its first elections in 2013 for seats in the Bundestag (parliament). Its first manifesto called for the controlled dissolution of the Euro and the rights of nations to decide democratically on their own currency (AfD 2013). During the 2014 European elections, the AfD pleaded for "a European Union that goes for subsidiarity instead of centralism and competition instead of levelling-out and harmonisation" while criticizing the "unity-Euro" for undermining "fundamental principles" such as "competition between the nations," while reaffirming the need for EU actions that "serve the citizen interest" including "oversight of cartels for the securing of fair competition" (AfD 2014: 2–4). However, following the 2015 European refugee crisis, the AfD benefitted from the salience of the issue and focused on immigration in state election campaigns and public appearances (Berning 2017: 18). Since, the AfD turned to an increasingly ethno-reductionist logic that defined the people in nativist terms (Kim 2017: 7), the identity of the

people is tied to an ethno-nativist essence: one that is not only non-"migrant" and non-"Muslim," but also "native-born" (Kim 2017: 7). As such, the AfD fits in the category of radical right populism. Indeed, nativism has become the core feature of this party.

In the 2017 German federal elections, the AfD was the third best-preforming party, gathering a total of 94 seats out of the 709 seats. This was a huge success for the party that had just missed the 5% barrier to enter the Bundestag after the 2013 federal elections.

3.5.1.3 Radical Left-wing populist parties (RLP)

While nativism is the core programmatic emphasis of RRP, for radical left-wing populist parties, the core programmatic element is to fight against the radicalisation of capitalism (Fernández-García & Luengo 2018: 59) For Fernández-García and Luengo (2018: 59) unfettered capitalism as resulted in a consequential loss of state sovereignty to international organisations and big corporations and this power should be reclaimed by the people (Fernández-García & Luengo 2018: 59). These parties left behind the class struggle discourse and the Marxism-Leninism dogmatism to embrace the anti-establishment and people-centrism (Fernández-García & Luengo 2018: 59). As noted by March (2008) and Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015), RPL parties combine populism as a thin ideology with the full ideology of democratic socialism, and uphold values such as social justice anti-militarism, and the protection of minority rights. Generally speaking RRP are more exclusionary and less socio-economic inclined that RLP.

3.5.1.3.1 Podemos

Podemos is a Spanish left-wing populist political formation. Podemos was created in 2014 and by 2015 it was running among the top four parties of Spain (Kioupkiolis 2016: 100). The party welcomes a politically integrated and solidary Europe, stands up for immigrants and socially marginalized sectors and promotes a strong social rights agenda (Kioupkiolis 2016: 100). Podemos targets both political and socio-economic elites and claims to fight for popular sovereignty, social justice and democratization (Kioupkiolis 2016: 100). Podemos displays a radical left-libertarian universalistic profile and emphasises minority rights, gender equality and civic liberties, while promising to fight discriminations (Podemos 2016). The party puts forward a socially inclusive notion of solidarity strongly tied to social rights and a conception

55

of 'popular sovereignty' that includes immigrants and all the socially marginalized sectors (Ivaldi *et al.* 2017: 374). For Podemos, the antagonism between the elite and the people occurs along socio-economic lines by opposing the privileged minority to the social majority (Ivaldi *et al.* 2017: 374). This left-wing variant of populism is inspired by the work of Laclau, with the 'people' referring to the plebeian mass of the marginalized and the underprivileged (Laclau 2005: 121).

Competing for the first time in the 2016 Spanish general election, Podemos received 21,5% of the vote, resulting in 71 out of 350 seats. The support for Podemos has since been declining steadily, and since the 2019 Spanish General Elections, Podemos occupies 26 seats.

3.5.1.3.2 Sinn Féin (SF)

Sinn Féin (in English, "We Ourselves") is a relatively old political organisation formed in 1905 whose name is an assertion of Irish national sovereignty and self-determination in the face of British rule in the United Kingdom. The party's history is laced with Irish nationalism, which as lead some authors like O'Malley (2014) to argue that SF is a radical-right populist party. Indeed, the Sinn Féin is also well known for its armed branch, the IRA. Von Beyme (1988: 1) distinguishes between the conservatives, who seek to uphold the status quo and 'right-wing extremists [who] want to restore the status quo ante...if necessary, [to] be achieved by the use of force'. Sinn Féin's willingness to use violence to achieve this end makes it quite suitable for this definition. However, as we have seen, nativism is the core feature of radical right-wing populism. Although Sinn Féin is a nationalist movement, the party itself did not succumb to anti-out-group rhetoric (Suiter 2016). While radical right-wing parties are anti-migrants, SF is pro-immigrants, pro-minority rights, and in favour of state involvement in the economy (O'Malley 2006: 3). Moreover, the party displays an avowedly leftist economic position. O'Malley (2014) believes that the party's strong anti-austerity position fits the narrative of Irish nationalism—the subjugated Irish victim of British domination. Sinn Féin is significantly Eurosceptic, denouncing most of the recent EU treaties. However, SF is strongly opposed to Brexit, claiming that "Brexit poses a huge threat to the future of the people of Ireland in terms of a land border on the island, the north being forced out of the single market, barriers to trade, potential devastation of agriculture, not to mention the implications for the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement" (SF 2016).

SF achieved its best-ever results in the 2020 general elections, a success sometimes attributed to its anti-Brexit position (BBC 2020). With all first preferences counted, the left-wing republican party managed 24.5% of the vote in 2020, and won 37 of the 160 parliamentarian seats, an increase of 14 on the 2016 election.

3.5.2 Description of the manifestos

3.5.2.1 The National Rally

The first document under scrutiny emanates from the French National Rally and is titled "144 presidential engagements"[27] (2017). As the name indicates, it contains 144 engagements taken by National Rally's leader, Marine le Pen. These engagements are briefly detailed in 24 pages. The document contains seven sections and an introduction by Marine le Pen. Each section is separated by a blank page with the National Rally's slogan "in the name of the people"[28]. The tone of the manifesto is clearly established in the introduction, as le Pen describes the NR as the patriot choice, the one that puts the defence of the nation and the French people at the centre of all decisions, seeks to protect the French national identity and unity and promote social justice and prosperity for all. The National Rally's programme is contrasted with what is referred to as the "internationalist/globalist[29]" project, which supposedly seeks to "destroy the social balance", wants to abolish all borders, and will almost certainly result in the wasting of public funds on uncontrolled immigration. The introduction then concludes that the people of France have to make "a choice of civilization" on which the future of their children will depend.

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[27] « 144 engagements presidentiels", translated by the author.
[28] "au nom du people", translated by the author.
[29] "mondialiste", translated by the author.

Figure 1 Word cloud for the 50 most used words in the National Rally manifesto

Figure 1 is a word cloud illustrating the 50 most used word in the National Rally's manifesto. It is particularly interesting to note the high frequency of the words France, immigration, protection, defend, French, foreigners, security, true, forbid, and defence. Indeed, these words are indicative of the use of securitizing discourse with a nationalist undertone. Other verbs, such as re-establish, give back and revalorise suggest a nostalgia for a pristine past.

3.4.8.2 The AfD

The second document analysed in this dissertation is the "Manifesto for Germany", published by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The document contains a preamble and is followed by 14 chapters on various themes. Each chapter is briefly introduced by a one-page explanation of the party's position on the theme. In the preamble, the party states its support for direct democracy and represents itself as an alternative to the current political class. Germany uses a Mixed System with two votes. The first vote uses relative majority voting and allows voters to choose a direct candidate from their district for a Bundestag seat. The candidate who receives the most votes wins his/her constituency. There are 299 constituencies and each gets a seat in the Bundestag. But the first vote does not decide party power in the Bundestag.

Whenever a party obtains a direct mandate in a Bundesland[30], it loses one vote in the second. The second vote allows the elector to vote for a party whose candidates are put together on the regional electoral list. An assembly of party members elects the party's nominees in a secret election. For the AfD (2017: 8), this practice results in partisanship and causes MPs to be estranged from their constituents. Party loyalty has caused representatives to lose their legitimacy. Therefore, the AfD believes measures such as nationwide referenda would give back to the people a more direct control on the course of policy. While the party states that it will maintain an open mind toward other cultures, it wishes to be and remain German at heart. Moreover, it mentions the party's ultimate goal: that the government and all its institutions once again dedicate their efforts "to the well-being of the German people, promote their welfare, protect them from harm, uphold and defend the German Constitution and the laws of the Federation, perform duties conscientiously and do justice to all" (AfD 2017: 5).

Figure 2 Word cloud for the 50 most used words in the AfD manifesto

Figure 2 is a word cloud representing the 50 most-used words in the AfD's manifesto. Similarly to the NR, nationalist Germany, German, security, nationals and foreign feature prominently in their discourse. Interestingly, not is also included, suggesting that the manifesto uses negation to frame its arguments. The use of words such as families, children suggests and emphasis on social issues.

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[30] The Federal Republic of Germany is divided in sixteen federal states, or Bundesland in German.

59

3.4.8.3 Podemos

The third document analysed in this dissertation is Podemos' "26J", which referred to the 26 June 2016, the day of the elections. While Podemos opted for a very different presentation of their manifesto, taking the form of an "Ikea catalogue" of political propositions, this document is by far the longest and most complete manifesto under scrutiny here. Podemos members are pictured doing basic chores like loading the dishwasher or reading books. The major point of this Ikea-style manifesto is that the Podemos leadership is not like the political 'casta' it criticizes: its leaders are common people (Bickerton & Accetti 2018: 142). The choice of style conveys another message: like Podemos' policies, Ikea goods are simple, innovative and easy to use. The document contains 394 propositions and engagements and 50 steps to implement their programme in coordination with other political forces. The manifesto contains 14 chapters dedicated to various themes as well as an introduction and a summary of all propositions. As Podemos (2016: 3) explains, their manifesto "is a reissue of our electoral program in an unconventional format". Podemos (2016: 3) further adds "We believe that telling things in a different way can help more people learn about the proposals with which we want to change our country, so that more people can see why we think it is possible".


Figure 3 Word cloud for the 50 most used words in Podemos's manifesto

Figure 3 is a word cloud representing the 50 most-used words in Podemos' manifesto. The most used word in their manifesto is will, which can means an emphasis on the future, or an emphasis on the 'will' of the people. Since words such as people and popular are not part of the word cloud, Podemos is more likely to be future and solution oriented. It also is clearly different from the AfD and the NR who have German and France respectively. Instead of relying on a security-related terms, Podemos vocabulary of choice includes terms such as promotion, development, democracy, rights, access, new, research and create. While this observation is superficial, it does suggest a positive and forward-looking view of society.

3.4.8.4 Sinn Féin

The last document used for primary data for this dissertation is entitled "Giving workers and families a break" and is Sinn Féin's 2020 general election manifesto. It contains 24 sections on a total of 110 pages. The party states its vision in the introduction. It seeks to position itself as the party for the people, as opposed to the "government for the privileged" and wants to establish an egalitarian republic in which the economy serves the needs of the people and not the other way around. Likewise, the party states in the introduction its intention to "deliver for ordinary, working people", notably through social welfare measure such as the largest public housing programme in the history of Ireland and reducing childcare and education costs.

Figure 4 Word Cloud for the 50 most used words in the Sinn Féin manifesto

61

Figure 3 is a word cloud representing the 50 most-used words in Podemos' manifesto. Interestingly, Podemos and SF both have will as their most used word. Ireland and Irish are more frequently used that in Podemos' manifesto, but less than by the right wing parties. The absence of security-related terms is noteworthy.

3. 5 Conclusion:

This dissertation uses Securitization Theory as its theoretical perspective. In this theoretical framework, a securitizing actor performs speech-acts to convince an audience of the need to take emergency measures. In this way, an actor asserts that they have a specific right to deal with the problem in a unique way (Roe 2004). For Waever (1983), utilising the grammar of security allows a securitizing actor to transform 'normal' issues into 'securitized' issues. In this dissertation, the scope of security includes individuals, societies, and culture, which can be the object of securitizing strategies.

Mouffe (2005) claims that an antagonistic political environment has enemies, whilst an agonistic one has opponents to explain the distinction between antagonism and agonism. Excessive measures are more easily tolerated as the degree of otherness approaches that of the radical. In agonistic settings, opponents follow the rules of the game and communicate with each other. In antagonistic settings, competition supersedes cooperation, and the result is entrenched difference and increased feelings of divergence, with little prospects for a peacefully diverse society. When identity issues are framed in antagonistic ways, the result is the securitization of identities.

This dissertation contends that it is possible to differentiate between 'populist' parties on the basis of the way they problematize identity issues. A populist party exhibiting antagonistic attitudes with the other will seek to undermine pluralism and is a danger to democracy. An agonistic point of view recognizes that deep value pluralism protects us from authoritarian standards to resolve conflicts. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a typology of populism based on the notions of securitization of identities, agonism and antagonism.

Manifestos are a rich source of information about a party's policy and ideology. The four manifestos analysed in this dissertation are election campaign manifestos of the contract-type. The political parties' election manifestos present voters with a choice between issues perceived

62

as major concerns by the political parties. They provide an accurate picture of a party's policy proposals without requiring acute knowledge of their track record (Dinas & Gemenis 2010: 428).

This dissertation analyses the voices of different parties through a careful analysis of these parties' electoral manifestos. By comparing and contrasting, category by category, the voices of these parties, this dissertation highlights the use of a securitizing discourse by right-wing parties, while observing that left-wing parties have a de-securitizing strategy. Based on these observations, this dissertation proposes an innovative typology of populism incorporating concepts such as agonism, antagonism, and the securitization of identities.

4. Chapter 4: Content Analysis

This chapter describes and compares the manifestos' content. It is divided into nine sections handling the data's key categories. Each subsection focuses on a particular category and contrasts the manifestos on the basis of their content. This analysis is guided by this dissertation's research questions, and seeks to analyse what populist parties say about political institutions. This chapter serves as the basis for the next chapter which discusses how populists parties securitize the issues they see as prominent, notably through the securitization of identities. It's main purpose is to observe comprehensively the discourse of these populist parties surrounding political institutions. Likewise, it looks at the levels of inclusivity or exclusivity these parties champion. These nine broad categories allow for a broad picture of the type of society these parties want to establish. The categories explored in this analysis are:

1. Citizenship, naturalisation and residency
2. Electoral system
3. Political participation
4. Immigration
5. Communal diversity
6. National and foreign culture
7. Religion
8. Rights and Freedom
9. Crime and Justice

Sometimes parties neglect or do not address a category. For example, SF does not mention anything related to religion. This can be expected since parties put more saliency on the issues they consider of concern.

The complete dataset has been uploaded on FigShare, and a link is available in the Appendix.

4.1 Citizenship, naturalisation and residency

The 'politics of belonging' refer to the political sphere associated with various concepts of ethnic, national, cultural, or religious identities. In its simplest form, Crowley (1999) defines the politics of belonging as "the dirty work of boundary maintenance". The dominant political

project of belonging is the nation state, which uses nationalism as its ideological foundation and ties people to national boundaries through citizenship (Isin & Turner 2007; Yuval-Davis 2011). Marshall (1950) and his renowned triangle of civil, political, and social rights accompanying obligations, which citizens hold and are obligated to fulfil, have largely influenced contemporary and liberal theories about citizenship. Brubaker (2009) argues that citizenships have internal inclusivity and exterior exclusivity, which is why the rights of migrants are often discussed in relation to this idea. In this view, citizenship is a dichotomy: one is either included or excluded from the political project. Only the state can confer and define citizenship rights and delimit migrants' rights (Joppke 2010; Albiez *et al*. 2011).

Over the years, post-national, transnational (Ong 1999), cosmopolitan (Isin 2009), as well as cultural (Kymlicka 1995) and religious (Levitt 2004) forms of citizenship have challenged the dominant model of ethno-national citizenship. For example, 'cultural' citizenship is predicated on the assumption that, through dominant discursive and institutional practices, the state is required to take into consideration diversity and difference (Rosald 1989). This more open view of citizenship has recently received more attention to consider the implications of the de-nationalization of politics and economy, political transformations and the emergence of trans-local social ties.[31] Citizenship is regarded as a practice of empowerment rather than a strategy of dominance. In this view, citizenship is perceived as a continuum defined by 'acts of citizenship' such as political activism and participation (Isin 2009; Janoschka & Sequera 2011; Yuval-Davis 1997). This section compares and contrasts the parties' positions on citizenship, naturalization, and residency.

The NR believes that access to citizenship and residency should be restricted to maintain French identity and culture. Naturalisation is portrayed as a threat to the French identity and culture. The NR (2017: 6) proposed automating and streamlining the process of expelling illegal aliens and abolishing family reunification and the automatic acquisition of nationality upon marriage (NR 2017: 6). Similarly, the AfD opposed granting foreigners citizenship since the bulk of organized criminals are foreign nationals and represent a threat (AfD 2017: 26). The AfD (2017: 60) planned to amend residency rights laws since they contradicted deportation measures. Instead, residency rights should be contingent on proper integration (AfD, 2017: 62).

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[31] Trans-local social ties are social ties that transcend the boundaries of locality. For example, an immigrant may feel more socially tied to the members of his cultural group in another nation than to the native members of the local space in which he migrated.

Refusal to 'integrate' should result in loss of residency rights and naturalisation should only be granted after successful "integration' (AfD 2017: 62). For both parties, citizenship should be earned by filiation only, citizenship by birth should be abolished, naturalisation criteria should be strengthened, and dual citizenship rules reinforced (AfD 2017: 64; NR 2017: 6). The NR (2017: 7) planned to also make "French citizenship a privilege for all French people by including national priority in the Constitution". Aside from being overtly nationalist, this idea amounts to positive discrimination in favour of the French. It would give French nationals "preference" over foreigners in positions in France. Positive discrimination also contradicts the concept of "meritocracy" since merit becomes secondary.

In contrast, Podemos wishes to expand citizenship and residency rights to a larger portion of the population living in Spain. Podemos (2016: 170), for example, proposes abolishing the nationality test and will reduce the time required to obtain citizenship by residence from five to three years for refugees and one year for those originating in countries with which Spain has maintained excellent relations. Finally, Podemos supports removing impediments and criteria to obtaining Spanish citizenship, such as the obligation to relinquish nationality of origin (for example, for the refugee population). SF makes no mention of citizenship, residency, or naturalisation.

4.2 Electoral system

Electoral systems are fundamental political institutions forming the backbone of any healthy democracy. There are many electoral systems, from pure proportional to majoritarian first-past-the-post, each resulting in different degrees of equality and inclusion. For example, in a majoritarian 'winner-take-all' election, only the candidate with the most votes win leaving some voters without representation. Comparatively, a proportional system distributes seats based on votes, resulting in a more representative political leadership. This section evaluates the four parties' position on electoral systems.

The NR wants proportional representation for all French people in all elections. In the National Assembly, the NR (2017: 3) wants to reserve for the winning party an extra 30% of the seats

and recommends a 5% of the vote threshold to gain parliamentary representation.[32] Based on the 2017 legislative elections, this would eliminate 10 minor parties representing roughly 9.3% of the vote (French Ministry of Interior, 2017). The NR (2017: 3) also proposes to reduce the number of parliamentarians from 577 to 300 and senators from 348 to 200. Similarly, the AfD (2017: 11-2) wants to reduce the number of Bundestag seats from 709 members to 471 seats (-34%) and proposes a vote threshold for Parliament. "(I)n case of low voter turnouts, the number of parliamentary seats should be reduced accordingly" (AfD 2017: 11). These proposals would reduce representativeness, as fewer representatives equal fewer opportunities for minorities and small parties to gain power. In contrast, Podemos' (2016: 128-9) electoral reform proposal aims to promote political equality for all. Podemos (2016: 170) advocates for extending voting rights to foreign residents in regular situations and allowing foreigners to create political parties. Podemos (2016: 159) will change the way the Congress elects its members and make the autonomous districts the sole territorial basis for allocating deputies. The deputies will be distributed according to the demographic weight of autonomous communities and the use of formulas of the highest average will ensure the equal weight of all votes.

The AfD accuses Germany's party-list system of harming independent candidates. Political elites control parliamentary representation by selecting candidates on election lists (AfD 2017: 11). The system must be changed to put voters in control of the composition of Parliament. The AfD (2017: 11) favours a system in which candidates can self-nominate on election lists, and voters can aggregate or split their votes, or remove candidates from election lists. Similarly, Podemos (2016: 159) wants all parties to hold primaries for all executive positions. The Central Electoral Board will set up a telematic voting mechanism so individuals can vote for a candidate inside their party. An independent Electoral Commission will be responsible for registering all parties, regulate electoral norms (including donations and interests), and proposing proactive ways to encourage voter participation.

The AfD wants to change the Federal President's electoral system. Under the current system, the Federal President is proposed and elected by a Federal Convention made up of half Lower House Members and half proportional representation from the state legislatures. The latter are

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[32] In other words, a party with less than 5% of the vote would not be represented in parliament, even if that party had 4.9% of votes. In a proportional system, a party with 4.9% of the vote should receive 4.9% of the seats (28 seats in this case).

chosen behind closed doors by the political elite. Instead, the German Constitution must be amended to allow the election of the Federal President directly by the people (AfD 2017: 12).

SF wants to decrease the voting age to 16 and provide the Irish diaspora and those living in the North voting rights in the presidential elections (SF 2020: 96). This is significant since Northern Irishmen are legally British citizens. SF (2020: 96) wishes to educate young students about their rights and how to exercise them, and automatically register voters as soon as they become eligible.

SF wants to reform the Seanad (Senate) which currently takes a peculiar form: the second chamber represents occupational concerns[33] (Coakley 2011: 241). The Seanad's members are drawn from three groups, the largest being a group of 43 senators elected from five panels representing a set of vocational interests (Coakley 2011: 241-2). The two other groups are composed of six senators elected by graduates of the University of Dublin and the National University of Ireland, and eleven senators elected by the Prime Minister of Ireland (Coakley 2011: 242). It's not surprising that Sinn Féin wants to make the Seanad more representative. It plans to elect at least 50% of its members by direct suffrage for greater inclusion. For ease of voting, the Seanad and Daíl elections will take place on the same day (SF 2020: 96).

Podemos (2016: 159) proposes a vote-by-mail procedure and prolong the voting period from two to four weeks to allow for overseas Spaniards to vote. Overseas residents who have been away from the municipality for less than five years will be able to register in the Register of Temporarily Absent Resident Voters (ERTA) and granted voting rights. Podemos wants to eliminate the need for a vote and automatically renew the electoral registration of absent residents every five years. Podemos (2016: 159) also wishes to create an external constituency to represent migrants' interests. Finally, Podemos (2016: 159) proposes to open a citizen debate on the remaining electoral components.

4.3 Political participation

Effective political participation is the best safeguard against less peaceful means of conflict resolution. The ability to participate in political activities predetermines the choices between

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[33] The first chamber follows a more conventional proportional representation system, with single transferable votes allocating 160 seats along 39 constituencies.

conflict and cooperation for competing groups (Hirschman 1978: 90). However, the power of the majority must be kept in check to prevent the tyranny of the majority. This is related to Dahrendorf's (2014: 6) second question: "how can we, through a system of checks and balances, control those who are in power in a way that gives assurance that they will not abuse it?" The answer is to institute a strong constitutionalism that will safeguard minorities from the arbitrary rule of majorities. This section analyses the attitudes of the four parties towards political participation and, indirectly, constitutionalism.

The NR (2017: 3) proposes to further political participation of French citizens by putting in place an effective right to referendum for all propositions supported by at least 500,000 votes. It will organise a referendum to review the Constitution[34] and subject all future revision of the constitution to referenda. Similarly, the AfD (2017: 7) believes that only the German people should determine the direction of their polity. For the AfD, voters should be able to propose new laws and have a say on parliamentary legislation. Therefore, the party favours Swiss-style referendums in Germany (AfD, 2017: 8). This would moderate Parliament, eventually halting the flow of 'absurd' laws. The AfD believes that important constitutional changes and international treaties should be subject to the consent of the German people and will put all financial decisions, such as Germany's continued membership to the Eurogroup, to a vote (AfD, 2017: 15). Privatisation at all administrative levels must be authorized by voters, especially if public services, such as housing and real estate, are involved.

Podemos (2016: 160) and SF (2020: 96) will make parliament more accessible to the public, notably by streaming its session online or introducing family-friendly sittings. In addition, Podemos (2016: 161-2) will create a Citizen Observatory for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Accountability to improve evaluation and accountability. Any person or citizen group affected by legislation or public management can intervene or form part of the Observatory and contribute to improving public services.

Podemos (2016: 73) wishes to hold a binding referendum in Catalonia to allow people to decide on the type of territorial relationship they wish to establish with the rest of Spain. Podemos claims that only more democracy can overcome the economic, social, institutional and

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[34] There are two reasons why the NR wants to amend the Constitution: to guarantee freedom of expression and defend the national identity.

territorial crises crippling Spain. Therefore, the party proposes to decide through a referendum whether or not to initiate changes in the Constitution. Similarly, SF (2020: 11-2) will hold a binding referendum on Irish unity to allow all the people of Ireland to exercise their right of self-determination. SF frames the unification of the island as a process of discussion, persuasion, and reconciliation. SF (2020: 12) will open up the process to popular consultation through a dialogue including citizens, unionist, nationalists, and others who have reservations about unity. SF (2020: 96) is also committed to empowering communities with more input and control over their future. Likewise, Podemos proposes to introduce a "recall referendum" if the Government fails to comply and manifests its electoral program and a system of popular recall when a representative has lost legitimacy. Podemos will reduce the requirements for popular legislative initiatives and will open a process of citizen deliberation on issues such as budget and the use of public spaces. Similarly, Podemos (2016: 128) will introduce a popular veto initiative through which citizens will be able to veto norms directly affecting them.

Finally, Podemos (2016: 172) and SF (2020: 34-5) wish to subject to popular consultation the participation of the Armed Forces in international operations. In addition, SF (2020: 35) will hold a referendum on Irish neutrality. The proposed amendment would also affirm the neutrality of Ireland and enshrine a policy of non-membership of military alliances.

4.4 Attitude towards immigration

Attitudes towards immigration are broadly divided in two worldviews and replicate the well-worn "nationalism versus cosmopolitanism" debate. Marine Le Pen's (NR 2017: 2) introduction in the NR's manifesto illustrates this well:

> *" As you are aware, this presidential election will bring two visions face to face. The "globalist" choice on the one hand, represented by all my competitors, which seeks to destroy our great economic and social balances, which wants the abolition of all borders, economic and physical, and which always wants more immigration and less cohesion between the French. On the other hand, the patriotic choice, which I embody in this election, which places the defence of the nation and the people at the heart of all public decision-making and who above all wants the protection of our national identity, our independence, the unity of the French, social justice and prosperity for all."*

This introduction sets the tone for the party's immigration policy. The NR supports closed borders, immigration capped at 10,000 a year, and will re-establish physical borders and leave the Schengen Area (NR 2017: 6). Likewise, the AfD (2017: 59) feels Europe's external borders are unprotected, which threatens Germany and its economy. While the NR (2017: 6) advises reconstituting customs with 6,000 additional officers, the AfD (2017: 26) will reintroduce a national German Border Police force and reopen border crossing sites.

The AfD (2017) manifesto highlights the putative link between immigration and criminality. Protecting civilians against 'migrant crime' should be a top priority for national and European institutions, which is why the AfD (2017: 58) suggests closing German borders. The AfD (2017: 25) frames immigration as such a threat to Germany that the German Armed Forces need to be deployed to protect the borders. This would prevent the arrival of large numbers of foreign nationals who participate in violent and drug-related crimes (AfD 2017: 26). Indeed, since "the majority of organized criminal offenders are foreign nationals", deportation of this "group" must be easier, says the AfD (2017: 26). The AfD (2017: 25) wishes to combine criminal convictions with forced repatriation orders to reduce the requirements for expulsion and arrange with foreign countries to create deportation centres and pre-trial detention facilities.

To reduce migration, the NR (2017: 6) wants to end family reunions and the acquisition of nationality upon marriage. Likewise, asylum has been exploited and should be limited. The AfD (2017: 63) also opposes family reunions since immigration-related criminality, which is "extremely difficult to combat", is anchored in "family, clan, and cultural structures". The AfD (2107: 62) also opposes family reunion on the claim that, by crossing the border, each asylum seeker automatically enters the "social system". The lack of legislative framework allows for a migration into the welfare system rather than into the workforce (AfD 2017: 57). The AfD (2017: 63) estimates that the "huge hidden costs for refugee care and attendance" are "up to several hundred billion Euro". The party criticizes the secrecy surrounding welfare claimants' nationalities which are being concealed by governments and media (AfD 2017: 63). Since the number of permanent asylum seekers in the welfare system is unknown, the success of integration cannot be measured (AfD 2017: 63). As such, the AfD (2017: 63) wants full disclosure of immigration costs and numbers and opposes any refugee solidarity tax. The NR (2017: 11) also wishes to "save money by abolishing State Medical Aid for illegal immigrants".

The AfD and the NR are both worried about migration's economic repercussions. According to them, widespread migration has put pressure on low-wage workers who are now competing with foreigners. They will cancel the "posting of worker" - Free Movement - Directive[35] which creates "inadmissibly unfair competition" (NR 2017: 6). The AfD (2017: 60) accuses European migrants of 'misusing' the Directive to relocate to Germany for social assistance and suggests only the host country should manage the flow of migrants.

For the NR (2017: 7), the state should impose a surcharge on foreign hires to assure 'national priority'. In contrast, the AfD (2017: 35) supports a minimum salary for low-income workers to safeguard them from unfair competition with migrants. The AfD (2017: 57) believes Germany should, like Canada and Australia, manage immigration on socio-economic basis. Immigrants from non-European nations must meet a demand that cannot be met by domestic workers or EU migrants (AfD 2017: 61). The discretion on the amount and nature of immigration is a sovereign state's main prerogative, and should apply unconditionally to Germany (AfD 2017: 61). Immigration threatens Germany's position as a global economic powerhouse (AfD 2017: 62). The AfD (2017: 41) criticizes Germany's support for mass immigration "mainly from Islamic states, without due consideration of the needs and qualifications of the German labour market". "Muslim immigrants to Germany, in particular, only obtain below-average levels of education, training, and employment," says the AfD (2017: 41).

In 2012, Germany received the second most immigrants among OECD nations (Schmidt-Catran & Spies 2016: 243). For the AfD (2017: 58), Germany and its EU partners should help refugees return home and the EU's foreign policy should prioritize these countries' political, economic, and social recovery. The Common EU Asylum Policy is blamed for migrants drowning in the Mediterranean (AfD 2017: 58). Closing the EU's exterior borders would avoid this "misguided humanitarianism" and its "cynically accepted consequences" (AfD 2017: 58). According to the AfD (2017: 59), tight border controls at external EU border crossings are required to avoid an "uncontrolled influx of migrants". The AfD (2017: 58) will create shelter and asylum centres where migration originates rather than accept refugees on European land.

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[35] The "posting of worker" directive is a European directive that allows foreign European workers to work in other European countries while paying their taxes in their country of residence. Since the tax rates are different in each country, this can create an unfair advantage for those whose tax levels are lower.

Refugee centres and shelters in war-torn regions will be improved to avoid further migration (AfD 2017: 59). The UN and EU should oversee these shelters.

The AfD wants asylum seekers to claim asylum in asylum centres outside of Germany and will identify nations ready to host such centres. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees will have outposts in these regional centres (AfD 2017: 59). Those who enter Germany to seek asylum will be returned to these centres and only those granted asylum would be allowed to enter Germany. Similarly, for the NR (2017: 6), asylum should only be granted when requests are lodged in French embassies in countries of origin or nearby countries.

The AfD (2017: 59) supports amending the Geneva Convention of 1951 and other "outdated supra-national and international agreements" to reflect "current global mass migration" situations. An ideologically biased milieu of political correctness, backed with forbidden terminology and 'newspeak'[36], characterizes asylum and immigration debates (AfD 2017: 57). Conformity to political correctness is a sign of 'totalitarian regimes,' not democratic society (AfD 2017: 57). The AfD (2017: 57) demands a paradigm shift regarding: "(1) the influx of asylum seekers, (2) the way how the free movement of people is handled inside the EU, (3) the immigration of skilled labour from third countries, and (4), the integration of immigrants belonging to these three categories". The AfD (2017: 58) claims the term "refugee" is ill-suited to describe those who enter Germany illegally with the intention of remaining permanently. Refugees fleeing war and persecution have a right to protection, but irregular [37] migrants do not (AfD 2017: 58). Once the motivation for fleeing has passed, residence permits should be revoked (AfD 2017: 58). The AfD (2017: 60) also wants to simplify and administer more consistently the Repatriation Law but prefers voluntary departure to expulsion. The party will entice economic migrants to depart by providing a one-time start-up incentive.

Sinn Féin takes a more nuanced approach to immigration and does not discuss the issue into great depth. Only 0.16 percent of the SF's manifesto is dedicated to immigration. Open borders are not on the table, says the party (SF 2020: 70). For SF (2020: 70), the immigration system must first serve the economy, with clear and functional norms and regulations. The state must

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[36] Newspeak is termed coined by George Orwell in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) to refer to propagandistic language that is characterized by euphemism, circumlocution, and the inversion of customary meanings. In the novel, Newspeak is a fictional language designed to actually limit free thought and free speech.

[37] For the AfD, irregular migrants are those who are undocumented or those whose applications have been rejected.

efficiently integrate migrants into the labour market and provide necessary support and resources. For SF (2020: 70), immigration should fill gaps in areas such as healthcare. SF (2020: 70) wants to prioritize "an efficient, fair, and transparent immigration system" protecting those escaping persecution and meeting Ireland's international commitments. This includes ending Direct Provisions[38], implement the All-Party Oireachtas Committee Report and process asylum applications in a timelier manner (SF 2020: 70).

Podemos (2016: 170) similarly believes that successful immigration requires a worthwhile resettlement program and a resource-based commitment from Spain. Spain's socio-ethnic makeup has changed dramatically since Spain joined the European Union in 1986 (de la Rosa 2016). Migrants' share of the Spanish population grew from 0.62 percent in 1985 to 12.18 percent in 2011 (INE 2020). Spanish immigration is unique compared to other European countries. The majority of Spain's migrants are European retirees who have relocated to the sunny coast (de la Rosa 2016: 176). The "western cultural macro-area" comprises 76.8% of the foreign population in Spain (de la Rosa 2016: 180). The influx of Spanish-speaking Latin Americans and older Europeans stimulates the economy, activates employment in the health and social services sectors and did not generate cultural clashes as Spaniards have a cultural affinity with them (Campos *et al.* 2008; de la Rosa 2016: 175). Podemos will reform the procedure of examining and admitting asylum petitions, particularly those based on sexual orientation or other gender-related issues such as forced marriage, and genital mutilations.

Podemos (2016: 170) will close all foreigner detention centres as they are an "anomaly in the democratic system". It will establish proper oversight systems to prevent ethnic or national discrimination and calls for an end to police identity checks that include ethnic profiling and group deportation flights (Podemos 2016: 170). The party will introduce new legal and safe migration routes, and greater flexibility in the family reunification process (Podemos 2016: 170). Podemos believes that renewing a residence permit should be more flexible and not just dependent on a job offer. A work search visa, for example, will allow a person a brief stay in Spain and they must return to the country of origin if no employment could be found. The development of a European Agency for Rescue is also suggested by Podemos (2016: 170) to safeguard the right to asylum.

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[38] The Direct Provision system is a system that provides asylum applicants with accommodation in a refugee center and state-funded medical care. However, the system has been criticized by Human Rights groups because of the lengthy procedures to apply for asylum. Some refugees have waited for more than five years in these centers.

Podemos (2016: 171) aims to restore legality and human rights along the southern borders of Melilla and Ceuta. Hundreds of desperate migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa raided the border in September and October 2005 (Alscher 2017: 1). Podemos (2016: 171) wishes to put an end to the human rights violations that occurs in these borders. It calls for the adoption of a protocol for action by the State Security Forces and Corps on the southern border. Likewise, it will review the bilateral treaty with Morocco to guarantee strict compliance with the principle of non-refoulment [39] (Podemos 2016: 171).

4.5 Attitude towards communal diversity

Communal diversity emerges from the existence of multiple long-established communities, each with its unique way of life (Parekh 2000: 4). These communities can be national minorities like Catalans in Spain or Irish-speaking minorities in Ireland, or larger immigrant or religious communities. This section addresses the parties' attitude towards communal diversity.

The NR opposes communal diversity and intends to enshrine in the constitution that "the Republic does not recognise any community". Rather, it will reinforce the national unity through the promotion of a homogeneous "national roman" [40] (NR 2017: 15). The party will "establish French citizenship as a privilege for all French people by incorporating national priority in the Constitution" (NR 2017: 15). Intensifying group identities through political institutions can escalate group conflicts, especially "if these identities become the foundation for access to positions and resources" (Bertrand 2002: 59). Yet this is exactly what the NR proposes. It will inscribe in the constitution three new fundamental principles: "the defence of our identity as a people to protect our heritage and our traditions", "the national priority to restore the privilege to French nationality" and "the fight against communitarianism to preserve national unity" (Sulzer 2017). For the AfD (2017: 46), the ideology of multiculturalism "is blind to history and puts on a par imported cultural trends with the indigenous culture, thereby degrading the value system of the latter". Multiculturalism is portrayed as a threat to social

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[39] The principle of non-refoulment is a principle contained in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which guarantees that "no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm" (OHCHR 2018).
[40] The expression "national roman "refers to a version of the national history heavily biased by patriotism and chauvinism.

harmony and national survival. Government must confidently safeguard the German cultural identity as the dominant culture (AfD 2017: 46). The rise of sectarian strife and diverse minority communities erodes social solidarity, mutual trust, and public safety (AfD 2017: 41). Multiculturalism is blamed for eroding the pillars of German culture: Christian traditions; the scientific heritage of the Enlightenment; and the Roman law and the constitutional state (AfD 2017: 46). With more immigrants come more parallel societies and a decline of German culture (AfD 2017: 41). For the AfD (2017: 62), "the concept of a multi-cultural society has failed"; only those who fully assimilate deserve the right to stay.

Spain has national minorities with a long history of confrontation with the state – Catalans and Basques for example. Therefore, Podemos (2016: 192) recommends holding a referendum in Catalonia to allow residents to decide on the type of relationship they want with the rest of Spain. The party believes this is the only way to create a multicultural and respectful Spain. For Podemos (2016: 129), it is imperative to "guarantee the recognition of the plurinational character of Spain". Podemos (2016: 165) will evaluate potential measures to grant autonomous communities more autonomy and begin a constitutional revision to address Spain's territorial problem. Likewise, the history of Ireland is ripped with religious conflict. A prominent theme in the SF manifesto is the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The GFA ended nearly 30 years of Irish nationalist and Ulster Unionist strife (Nagle 2018: 2). The conflict arose from the competition between two ethno-nationalist groups with religion as a boundary (Trew 2004: 507; Muldoon *et al.* 2007: 90). The GFA attempted to implement a new framework for political contestation to peacefully resolve the conflict (Nagle 2018: 2). The GFA's history and impact on Irish politics are still unclear. For some, Northern Ireland provides an example of how the staunchest adversaries can work together for the common good (Nagle 2018: 2). For others, the GFA has only institutionalised sectarian divisions (Taylor 2006: 217-8). The GFA is underpinned by two assumptions. First, that "Northern Ireland is irrefutably divided between two competing ethno-national communities; and two, that consociationalism (…) provides the only democratic form of governance that can accommodate such ethno-national antagonism" (Taylor 2006: 217). This supports Lijphart's claim that highly divided societies can only attain democracy through power-sharing agreements that guarantee mutual veto rights and uphold the ideal of proportionality in representation and governance. SF's (2020: 11) main political goal is Irish unity. SF (2020: 11) will fully implement the GFA, including the all-island institutions, and establish a Joint

Oireachtas[41] Committee on Irish Unity and an all-island Citizens' Assembly to discuss and plan for Irish Unity (SF 2020: 12).

Podemos (2016: 168) proposes an Operational Plan for the Promotion of Cultural Diversity, which includes measures to support artistic diversity, the diversity of languages and cultures in Spanish society, and the preservation of fading cultures. Podemos (2016: 158) also proposes an Operational Plan for Social Inclusion in Cultural Matters to support diverse cultural scenes from migrant groups and encourage the artistic expressions of children, teens and individuals with disabilities. Similarly, SF (2020: 31) values communal diversity and will assist, promote, and nurture social innovation in every neighbourhood on the island. SF (2020: 72) will improve the institutional frameworks to foster Irish unity and implement a few initiatives to aid the Traveller minority such as implementing the 2019 Expert Group on Traveller Accommodation's 32 recommendations and increasing financing for culturally appropriate traveller accommodation. Support also needs to be extended in the field of Public Health. According to SF (2020: 55), significant levels of health inequalities endure in the Republic. SF (2020: 55) therefore proposes to "address these inequalities and work to improve the health of *everybody who lives here"[42]*. Finally, SF (2020: 95) propose all-Ireland leagues and sporting teams, not only to strengthen Ireland's competitiveness on the world scene, but more importantly, as a process of reconciliation between the North and the rest of Ireland.

4.6 Attitude toward national and foreign culture:

The NR (2017: 1) will place the defence of the nation at the heart of all governmental decisions, and will protect the national identity, independence and unity of the French people. For the NR, the French civilization's ideals and traditions need to be protected, since they are under threat. The NR (2017: 15-16) will end the policy of foreign and private sales of palaces and state buildings and suggests that all public buildings be permanently marked with the French flag only. Like the NR, the AfD stresses the need to preserve German culture and national identity. The German culture is intrinsically tied to the German language, which has evolved through time to reflect its intellectual past, national identity and set of core values, the party claims (AfD 2017: 46). Identity is shaped by culture and should not be left to random forces (AfD 2017: 45). Likewise, "the link between education, culture and identity is of paramount

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[41] Oireachtas refers to the parliament of the Irish Republic.
[42] Emphasis by the author

77

importance for the development of society" (AfD 2017: 45). The AfD (2017: 46) will declare the protection of German culture a statutory duty of federal and state governments. Defending the French language is a priority for the NR (2017: 16), so it will repeal the Fioraso Law (2013), which legalised English-medium instruction in French universities. Prior to the Fioraso Law, the Toubon Law (1994) stated that as the language of the Republic, French was the language of teaching, work, communication and public services. The Toubon Law required teaching, dissertations, and exams to be conducted in French in both public and private universities (Blattès 2018: 15-6). The Fioraso Law added exceptions such as occasions where a curriculum is provided in collaboration with an international institution, or when professors are foreigners (Blattès 2018: 16). During the 1960s and 1970s, a flurry of commissions was created to resist the "invasion" of English words in the French vocabulary. The threat of English resulted in the introduction of "language rights" and protectionist measures such as the Toubon Law (Blattès 2018: 15). The NR's (2017: 1) new protectionist measures include allocating half of the primary school schedule to oral and written French and not teaching languages and cultures of origin. Like the NR, the AfD (2017: 46-7) worries about the "internationalisation" of German and the propensity to replace German terminology with English. Aside from that, the party condemns the use of 'genderised' terminology as a violation of German culture and customs and firmly rejects all 'politically correct' language guidelines (AfD 2017: 54).

The NR (2017: 1) will also strengthen the global network of French schools. Similarly, the AfD (2017: 46) will fund the Goethe Institute and other cultural institutions to promote German globally. Likewise, more scholarships and bilateral accords must be implemented. Since German citizenship is organically linked to German language and culture, the AfD (2017: 46) will make the protection of the German language a constitutional duty of the state. Citizenship will require full command of German (AfD 2017: 62). It also wants German to be a mainstream language of communication across Europe on par with English and French (AfD 2017: 46). The AfD (2017: 46) will support standard German and its regional dialects as intangible cultural heritage of mankind and will digitise German Literature "like historical artefacts" (AfD 2017: 69).

SF (2020: 32) is also committed to the protection of the Irish language. A 2016 census indicated that while 39.8% of the population spoke Irish, only 4.2 percent did so daily (CSO 2017). The decline is blamed on the lack of interest in and support for the Irish language. By allowing Irish speakers to do business with the state in Irish, the party believes it can keep Irish alive (SF

2020: 33). The party also wants more Irish speakers in public administration and proposes a roadmap for Irish education from pre-school to third-level institutions (SF 2020: 33). SF believes that with enough political will and money, it can reach its aim of having 50% of civil servants bilingual. If elected, SF (2020: 33) will enact this in an Official Languages Act. SF (2020: 33) will also ensure that each county has at least one full-time Irish language officer to ensure that public services are delivered in Irish.

To achieve a more equal Ireland, SF (2020: 33) will appoint a senior minister fluent in Irish responsible for the Irish language and the Gaeltacht and expand the number of bilingual civil personnel. Ireland's culture and language are intertwined, and SF (2020: 33) wants to tap into the genius of Irish writers, singers, and musicians to support both. The party proposes increasing support for Irish folklore artists, Irish language radio, and Irish print and internet content production, development, and marketing. A holistic, all-island approach will develop the tourism sector and potentially redistribute investment around the island (SF 2020: 93).

Podemos (2016: 134) also wants to encourage the development, production, distribution, and access to cultural services and products since a robust and sustained cultural fabric requires citizens to participate in cultural matters. The party will lower the VAT rate on cultural commodities, increase support for cultural institutions, and combine Higher Artistic Education with universities (Podemos 2016: 134-5). Podemos supports the right of citizens to participate in cultural life, as stipulated in articles 9.2 and 44.1 of the Spanish Constitution. A democratic and engaged citizenry requires increased participation in cultural initiatives. For Podemos (2016: 153), culture is a basic right, a common good, and a productive sector that requires its own Ministry. Podemos (2016: 153-4) will create a Ministry of Culture and Communication supervising 1.5 percent of GDP. Podemos wants to introduce an Assembly of Culture Professionals and a Citizen Observatory of Culture to represent the cultural industry at the ministerial level. Both groups will help neutralize political meddling and avoid partisan management of cultural activities (Podemos 2016: 154). The Assembly of Culture Professionals will ensure direct, effective and transparent channels to encouraging citizen involvement in policy formation. Indicators of social return on investment will be used to assess the success of various projects and assure their proper operation. Podemos (2016: 154) also proposes a Social Fund for Culture to protect artistic and cultural diversity and support the sector's growth. The Fund will value artistic, cultural, and social return, and will be controlled by standards that enable public expenditure monitoring. Contributions to the Fund will be

79

voluntary and tax-deductible. SF's Manifesto for Arts, Culture and Heritage also emphasizes rights and guarantees. The party wants to protect citizens' and communities' cultural and creative rights (SF 2020: 31). SF presents a legislative and economic framework to support the cultural economy responsibly and sustainably. "Culture reveals to ourselves and the world the kind of people and society we are", says the party (SF 2020: 31). The cultural and heritage industry is viewed as vital for attracting foreign direct investment and tourists. Artists and heritage workers are underpaid and under-supported, SF (2020: 31) laments.

Podemos has an Operational Plan to Promote Diffusion and Access to Digital Culture to ensure citizens' rights to access culture, and protect creators' rights, and cultural diversity in the digital environment. It includes more funding for libraries, a public platform for lending electronic books, and a framework for rights holders and legal access platforms to communicate. Podemos also wants an expert commission to improve the present mechanism of intellectual property protection. This commission will find a balance between open access to culture and support for author, rights holder[43], and the cultural industry and find solutions to compensate authors and rights holders for new uses of their works on the Internet.

A common past is an important feature of national identities. Therefore, the relationship parties have with their national past is an important aspect of their manifesto. For example, Ireland's colonial struggle against the British empire is part of its cultural legacy and SF (2020: 32) proposes to erect a National Monument for Moore Street, the final remaining 1916 battlefield in Dublin. For SF (2020: 32), anything else would be an insult to those the National Monument is designed to honour.

Podemos' attitude towards its own national history is noteworthy. Podemos' project on democratic memory and the culture of human rights is articulated around the triad "memory, truth, and justice". Podemos' recollection policies aim to guarantee non-repetition of painful memories. Podemos proposes to remove or reinterpret symbols and monuments that honour the military insurrection and Franco's regime. Podemos envisions memory spaces as pedagogic venues for critical interactions. It advocates developing measures to restore a plural, social, and democratic memory in education institutions. It will establish institutional channels for truth clarification and dissemination, ensure access to archives and public and judicial

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[43] Rights holders are owners of intellectual property rights.

investigations, and prepare a detailed map of common graves that will facilitate future exhumations of victims. To ensure justice for victims of the Franco era, Podemos wants to repeal all civil war and dictatorship court sentences and let victims of crimes against humanity receive justice.

Podemos attitude towards its national past contrasts starkly with the NR's (2017: 15), which criticizes state repentances as divisive. To safeguard France's territorial unity and integrity, the NR (2017: 15) believes France must reassert the "indissoluble" linkages between its metropolitan and overseas regions, notably through the national roman. The NR's opposition to state repentance deserve more attention. There are two 'modes' of remembering the past (Noussis 2020; Bull & Hansen 2016). The 'cosmopolitan' mode acknowledges past suffering, and is driven towards reflexivity and regret (Bull & Hansen 2016: 390). The 'antagonistic' mode of remembering relies on monumentalism and glorifying narrative to promote a Manichean version of history (Bull & Hansen 2016: 390). The antagonistic mode of remembering revolves around the artificial construction an imagined community – for example, the French, who share a common culture and values.

After the Algerian War of Independence, a collective amnesia was imposed on France's wrongdoings throughout the War to "heal the wounds of the past" (Noussis 2020: 3). Until the 1990s, France imposed a collective 'repression' of memory (Jansen 2010: 278). This amnesia fragmented the French society, as many social groupings and associations vied to have their own version of history conveyed in public (Enjelvin & Korac-Kakabadse 2012: 152-70). The attentive reader will also note that this is a clear example of a 'spiral' mode of identity securitization. The NR's anti-repentance attitude is particularly excluding, as it aims to remove some social groups' collective memory, a vital ingredient of identity building (Noussis 2020: 3). This communal memory would be supplanted by the national roman, a nationalist tale linking all French inhabitants from the metropole to the former colonies.

4.7 Attitudes towards religion

The NR (2017: 15) supports strict laicity and wants to impose it throughout the public sphere and have it enshrined in the Labour Law. Laicity must also be strictly respected in schools and sports clubs. The AfD (201: 54) will follow France in banning full-body veiling in public places since it supposedly impedes on cultural integration and social coexistence. The headscarf is

described as a symbol of women's submission to men, threatening their emancipation. The AfD (2017: 54) will not provide Muslim students any special rights because special rights are unjustified. The AfD and the NR agree that state funding of all religious and cultural institutions must be banned, particularly foreign state sponsored mosques, because Islam undermines women's rights. The AfD (2017: 54) will shut down all Qur'an schools until Islam is fundamentally reformed because "uncontrolled radical and unconstitutional indoctrination is likely to take place there". The NR (2017: 6) will ban all Islamist fundamentalist organizations, expel all foreigners related to them, close all extremist mosques in France. Likewise, the AfD (2017: 47) will ban all groups that oppose the liberal constitutional state and classify them as extremist groups, because these groups endanger German national security and hinder Muslim integration. Both parties will also ban slaughter without pre-stunning to "defend animal welfare" (NR 2017: 22; AfD 2017: 86)[44]

The AfD (2017: 48-9) prefers state control over laicity and will give the state prerogatives in the appointment of Imams. Imams will require government authorization to preach, and will have to do so in German. Those who refuse will be prevented from preaching and deported if possible. Islamic studies will be taught in German. Theological Islam studies chairs in German universities will be abolished and replaced by non-denominational chairs. The AfD (2017: 49) opposes any plans to provide Islamic organizations public status since these groups lack appropriate representation, permanency, and respect for liberal state-church law such as recognizing religious freedom, governmental neutrality, and religious equality.

The AfD claims to unconditionally support religious freedom, but only within the limitations of public law, human rights and the AfD's own "value system". "Islam does not belong to Germany", and the increasing number of Muslims is "a danger to our state, our society, and our values", claims the AfD (2017: 48). The AfD sees an evident conflict between Shari'a law and Germany's legal and value system. The party cites the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) as an example of this contradiction (AfD 2017: 49). The party will ban muezzin calls that say there is no god other than Allah because they contravene tolerance as practiced by "the Christian churches of modernity". The AfD accuses Islam of claiming supremacy as the sole genuine religion, which contradicts the idea of a pluralistic society. Islamophobic

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[44] Jewish law strongly prohibits stunning, and the Halal Food Authority prohibits most forms of stunning since the animal must be alive and healthy when slaughtered.

criticism is not Islamophobic and religious satire are protected by the right to freedom of expression.

For Podemos (2016: 168-9), neutrality is preferable to laicity and/or state control. Podemos will replace the current Law on Religious Freedom (1980) with a Law on Freedom of Conscience guaranteeing the secularism of the State and its neutrality against all religious confessions. In addition, it will promote the commitment to secular, public and quality education, the elimination of chaplaincies and religious services in public institutions, the recovery of the assets unregistered by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, the abolition of tax privileges, such as non-payment of the IBI (real estate tax) or state funding, for the Catholic Church and other religious confessions, and the suppression of celebrations and religious symbols in official acts. Lastly, Podemos (2016: 168) proposes to repeal of the articles of the Penal Code that criminalize the alleged offense to religious feelings.

SF does not mention anything related to religion in its manifesto.

4.8 Rights and Freedom:

Conventionally, rights set up those areas off limits to regulation (Bedi 2009: 14). Rights define areas or interests where the state should not intervene. The state may legislate "public" but not "private" matters because they fall into the realm of rights. Rights have two features: they are attached to individuals or groups of individuals and are always a right to something (Shapiro 1989: 14). Perry (1998: 45) distinguishes between three types of rights. Firstly, there are rights as "freedoms from" - rights to be free from something being done to us. Secondly, there are rights as "claims" or "entitlements" - rights to have something done for us (Perry 1998: 45). Thirdly, there are rights as "privileges: rights to do something—for example, to speak one's mind (Perry 1998: 45).

The logic of rights is negative, expressing not what should be regulated by the state but what should be left unregulated. Rights represent the mainstream account of limited government, an account that makes no necessary room for collective decisions by the democratic polity (Bedi 2009: 15-6). This section describes the parties' attitude towards rights and freedoms.

83

The NR and the AfD do not elaborate much on rights and freedoms. The NR (2017: 4) simply blames Islam as impeding and repressing women's rights and fundamental liberties, and hence proposes to 'contain' it.

In terms of "freedom to", the NR (2017: 4) intends to safeguard citizens' right to free expression by inscribing it in the Constitution. The party wants to guarantee freedom of association by ending unions' monopoly on representation (NR 2017: 4). Nonetheless, it wants to criminalize certain groupings, such as Islamic fundamentalist groups. The AfD's position on rights as "freedom to" is limited to defending citizens' freedom of expression and freedom to possess weapons. The AfD's (2017: 25) proposes halting the tightening of gun laws, since a constitutional state should not interfere with citizens' rights, including their right to own guns. For the AfD (2017: 25), criminalizing gun ownership makes victims more vulnerable without deterring criminals and terrorists from getting and using weapons. The strengthening of weapons laws is a step towards the criminalization of citizens, state surveillance, and paternalism (AfD 2017: 25). Secondly, the AfD asserts that "criticism of Islam is not Islamophobic or derogatory" (AfD 2017: 48). The AfD (2017: 57) calls for tolerating criticism of Islam and re-emphasizes: "The fundamental right of freedom of speech must be re-established when dealing with this policy area". Podemos attitudes to rights as "freedoms to" is radically different. Podemos first wants to strengthen collective bargaining and strike rights (Podemos 2016: 150-1). It will then rebalance collective bargaining by recognizing businesses as bargaining units. Similarly, the party advocates a union representation structure that brings together all employees in the same industry (Podemos 2016: 139). Similarly, SF (2020: 98-9) believes a legal framework for collective interaction will ensure true participation and respect amongst all parties and avert industrial disputes. Companies might refuse to recognize trade unions or their representatives under current legislation. To make volunteer engagement meaningful, an overhauled legal framework is essential. Therefore, SF promotes public participation in industrial relations. This involves introducing "a domestic Trade Union Rights Act that incorporates the right to collective bargaining and advocating" based on the EU Directive, as well as reforming strike legislation to prevent government intervention in workers' rights.

Podemos (2016: 141) also proposes a public debate between citizens and health experts concerning people's autonomy in choosing end-of-life decisions. Podemos believes that people should be able to choose when to end their lives and supports women's right to a free and

determined motherhood (2016: 153). The party wants all women to have access to both assisted reproduction and modern contraceptive techniques. Lastly, Podemos (2016: 153) proposes amending the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act to allow minors who have been abused or are in a vulnerable position in their families to terminate their pregnancy without parental approval. In contrast, the AfD (2017: 43) rejects any attempt to make abortion a human right. Rather, it demands that abortion counselling be aimed at protecting foetal life and criticizes the lack of penalties for abortions performed for "social reasons" (AfD 2017: 41).

Following neoliberal ideas, the AfD thinks it must protect ownership, personal responsibility, and free pricing (AfD 2017: 66). Islam is depicted as a danger to these freedoms. In terms of freedom as privileges, the AfD (2017: 68) values private property and wishes to extend data protection to all identifiable personal information. Likewise, the NR (2017: 4) believes rigorous data privacy laws should be implemented and will require corporations to retain personal data of French individuals on French servers. While the AfD supports the idea of data privacy, it believes that public, business and industrial safety should come first. The AfD (2017: 25-6) will abolish data protection for perpetrators in order to improve national security. When doubts exist, public safety must be valued above the right to privacy, especially for criminals since data protection measures paralyse the authorities bureaucratically and reduce citizens' security (AfD 2017: 25).

The NR also recommends enforcing a 'right to be forgotten' after a period of 5 years[45]. The NR (2017: 9) wishes to repeal the so-called "El Khomri" bill, a labour law put forward by then President Hollande that undermined worker's rights (Béroud 2018: 182). The reform had for objectives "the easing of protections around permanent contracts and dismissal procedures, the role of employee-representations bodies and the place given to company-level agreements" (Béroud 2018: 182-3). The AfD (2017: 68) also supports free WiFi in public places to promote the right to information.

In contrast with the AfD and the NR, Podemos devotes a large portion of its manifesto to rights and freedom. For example, it calls for the repeal of the July 2015 "Gag" Law, which supports repression as a response to popular mobilization (Simsa & Berraquero-Daz 2015: 2). The Bill

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[45] The right to be forgotten is the right to have private information about a person removed from Internet searches and other public directories.

85

introduced three major changes: "First, the reform of the criminal law allows higher penalties. Second, the anti-terrorist law formulates a very wide and open definition of terrorism. Third, the law on public security curtails the rights to protest and demonstrate" (Simsa & Berraquero-Díaz 2015: 3). Human Rights organisations and opposition parties have slammed the law for attempting to criminalize political dissent (Simsa & Berraquero-Daz 2015: 4). Podemos (2016: 192) intends to replace it with laws that promotes freedom of expression, assembly, and protest. It promises to abolish the deprivation of liberty without strong judicial protection (Podemos 2016: 156). Likewise, Podemos (2016: 163) commits to establishing a Government Human Rights Office to ensure conformity with the international human rights obligations assumed by Spain, whether they are civil and political rights, economic and social rights, or childhood and gender equality.

In terms of rights as privileges, Podemos (2016: 128) wants a country in which the institutions work with the same zeal in safeguarding the right to work of the people and the right to political equality, universal healthcare, the right to petition, free public education and fair taxation. Public institutions must ensure that people's rights to health, education, housing and decent job are legally protected (Podemos 2016: 129). Podemos (2016: 142) believes access to water and basic supplies is a fundamental right and wants to guarantee each citizen a minimal endowment to meet their basic needs. SF is also committed to developing healthcare and social care services as a right, with equitable access for all based on need (SF 2020: 45). Likewise, the right to a home should be guaranteed under the Constitution.

For SF (2020: 31), it is imperative to guarantee "the rights of citizens and communities to create, celebrate, engage with and develop their culture and its artistic expression as they see fit and design a legislative and economic framework that supports the cultural economy in an appropriate and sustainable way". For the party, culture is the product and the property of people and communities and should not be produce by the state (SF 2020: 31). The state has a duty to support artistic endeavours. This reflects an "entitlement" understanding of rights as the state is expected to support citizens in the exercise of their cultural rights.

4.9 Crime and Justice:

Restoring the republican order and the rule of law is a top priority for the NR. A quick and strict response to criminality will achieve this goal (NR 2017: 5). The NR will restore security

86

while protecting individual liberties. Similarly, the AfD (2017: 23) believes citizens should have confidence in the judicial system. Government entities must scrupulously observe the law because national security can only be assured when the state properly follows the law (AfD 2017: 23). The AfD (2017: 23) demands "a return to state authorities who are capable of providing maximum protection to citizens by way of immigration authorities, law enforcement agencies, and criminal prosecution". What is required is more control, authority, and power.

Interestingly, the AfD sees national security as the foundation for an open and free society where individuals can peacefully coexist regardless of background or faith. National security is, for the AfD (2017: 23), "essential for our freedom, riches, and democracy". However, the AfD deplores the decline of national security. 'Immigrant crime' requires an overhaul of the police force and the judiciary (AfD 2017: 63-65). Their power must be adapted to new circumstances and growing criminality while other "state interests" should "stand back" (AfD 2017: 23). The AfD (2017: 24) condemns austerity policies that have rendered polices toothless and wants to reinvigorate police capability in terms of manpower and equipment. The party will implement a unified IT landscape at the federal and regional levels to facilitate security agency coordination. For similar reasons, the NR (2017: 5) will massively re-arm the security forces: hire 15,000 more police officers and gendarmes, upgrade their equipment and offices, and restructure their moral and judicial status, including strengthening the laws on presumption of lawful defence. In simple terms, this means that the NR wishes to allow police officers greater powers to legitimately use violence. Moreover, the police and gendarmerie should be freed from their administrative responsibilities and focus only on their responsibility of ensuring public safety (NR 2017: 5). The NR (2017: 5) will disarm the suburbs, re-establish state control in lawless areas, targeting the 5,000 gangs recognized by the Interior Ministry and impose restraining orders between their members to prevent their rebuilding. Intelligence services on the ground are also suggested (NR 2017: 5). In response to radicalism in prison, it will strengthen prison intelligence and put jail administration directly under the Ministry of Interior (NR 2017: 5). SF also stresses the need to expand police capabilities. SF will raise Garda (police) numbers to record levels. The Garda currently has 14,539 members (Garda 2021), but SF (2020: 62) wants to increase that to 16,000. It also proposes hiring 2,000 more civilians to relieve the Garda of clerical work. The police's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to citizen calls will restore confidence in the police. SF (2020: 61) wishes to restore the confidence that criminals will be caught, convicted and sentenced according to their crimes, and prioritizes community policing: rural and working-class areas in Ireland must be better

87

safeguarded. For SF (2020: 69), the sentences imposed on serious and repeated offenses are too lenient. Rather, the party calls for longer sentences and tougher bail conditions. SF (2020: 69) also claims that criminals expand their criminal operations while in prison and are able to pull low level dealers deeper into their gangs. The whole penal system needs to be overhauled, notably through increased funding (SF 2020: 69). Its annual funding should be increased by 19.5 million euros to ensure the disruption of criminal activities and recruitment by organised bands.

The NR also wants to streamline the procedures for recognizing defamation or insult. The NR (2017: 4-5) supports the inclusion of freedom of expression and digital freedoms in the French Constitution and demands a greater effort against cyber-jihadism and pedo-criminality. It also suggests reintroducing "national indignity" for those who commit crimes linked to Islamic terrorism (NR 2017: 6). The concept of "national indignity" has a deep meaning in France. It was introduced in 1944 to punish Nazi collaborators (Robcis 2016: 313-4). Those convicted were barred from public office and some professions (such as lawyer or banker) (Robcis 2016: 314). Following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo office assaults, national indignity was proposed over citizenship forfeiture (Pougnet 2020: 65). Restricting civic liberties was justified as a response to the alleged return of Jihadis (Pougnet 2020: 65).

The NR (2017: 6) claims a zero-tolerance policy will end the existing 'judicial laxity[46]'. For the NR, the judiciary is too soft on crime, which results in a climate of impunity and lack of accountability for criminals. The party believes permissive legislation like the Tobira Law should be repealed and minimum penalties reinstated. Similarly, the NR (2017: 5) wants to end automatic sentence reductions and reinstate life sentences for major offenses. Along with stiffer punishments, the NR (2017: 6) wants 40,000 new jail beds over five years and a larger magistrate population to deal with the probable increase in criminal arrests. The NR will fight terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist networks. The NR (2017: 6) advocates strengthening human and technical resources of both domestic and foreign intelligence services and creating a centralized anti-terrorist organization tasked with operational coordination and analysis of terrorist threats.

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[46] Laxity is a tendency of being too easy-going, or not strict enough.

Less salient in the NR manifesto is the issue of white-collar crime. Improving public expenditures and fighting social and fiscal fraud are secondary priorities for the NR (2017: 9-10). The party proposes tougher penalties for executives who engage in dishonest business practices or act to reduce consumer purchasing power. Similarly, the NR (2017: 12) wants to save the French social system by fighting tax havens, taxing multinationals' activities in France, and retrieving plundered profits. International tax cooperation should be pursued for this. In contrast, 'white-collar' crime, tax evasion, gender-based violence, and human trafficking are prominent in Podemos' and SF's manifesto. Podemos (2016: 171) wants a UN-sponsored international tax body to combat tax evasion and tax competition. This agency will impose sanctions and make global corporations pay taxes where they make money. Podemos (2016: 162) will make "unfair or unlawful enrichment" a crime to punish top officials who benefited from political actions without directly intervening in corruption offenses. Podemos (2016: 71) will add bribery, influence peddling, and fraud to the list of severe offences. SF (2020: 70) demands probity, accountability, and transparency from all power brokers. Recently, the Mahon Tribunal Report (2010) showed the intimate link between politicians, property developers, and the financial sector (Smith 2010: 194). SF sees white collar crime as a major hindrance to the common good. Therefore, SF (2020: 71) will expand whistle-blower protections to include students and volunteers and abolish compensation caps for workers who have been harmed by making a disclosure. These measures are part of a White-Collar Crime Bill that will improve investigation, enforcement, and prosecution capabilities. SF also wants to introduce a denunciation website and phone line and hold a public awareness campaign to help eliminate white-collar crime.

The AfD recognizes the importance of preserving the independence of the judiciary and will abolish the practice of public prosecutors being required to report to the Minister of Justice (AfD 2017: 24). The AfD (2017: 24) will also end political party influence on judicial appointments and nominations and implement the German Association of Judges' proposal to create a judicial selection board and a judicial oversight agency. Similarly, political involvement in constitutional courts and audit offices should be avoided. The AfD (2017: 24) claims that criminal statistics are biased for political reasons and promises to free criminal statistics from political interference.

The AfD argues that the German legal system fails to adequately safeguard citizens and needs to be more responsive and reliable. The AfD (2017: 24) proposes draconian measures, like

decreasing the criminal responsibility age to 12 years. Although Germany's current criminal liability age is 14, German criminal law assumes that full criminal responsibility may only be assumed after a fully finished process of moral growth and socialization (Albrecht 2004: 451). Young criminals are subject to a special juvenile justice system but under certain conditions, those aged 18 to 20 can be charged as juveniles (Albrecht 2004: 451). The AfD opposes this system and wants all majors to be subject to adult criminal law. Harsh punishment for serious offenses will "send out an unequivocal warning" and re-gain the respect of young serial offenders (AfD 2017: 24). Likewise, the AfD (2017: 24) will introduce a bill to allow the possibility of imprisonment on remand[47] for those suspected of a serious crime.

The AfD believes a fundamental overhaul of the criminal justice system is required, including quicker prosecution and increased staffing. The party will abolish the practice of overturning sentences and dismissing retrials (AfD 2017: 24). The AfD also wants a new law to protect cops against unwarranted attacks. Attacks on authorities and emergency personnel should result in a three-month minimum sentence (AfD 2017: 25). The AfD (2017: 25) also emphasizes the need to "objectively refocus on victim protection" rather than offender protection. For the AfD (2017: 25), "untreatable alcoholics, incurable drug addicts, and the psychologically ill, who pose a serious threat to society, should not be placed in psychiatric wards, but held in *protective custody*"[48].

Lastly, the AfD addresses organized crime, which must be fought more intensely. According to the AfD (2017: 26), "most organized crime criminals are foreign citizens." Deporting "this group of people" is the solution (AfD 2017: 26). The AfD (2017: 26) wants all foreigners "suspected and convicted of organised crime" deported immediately. The party also wants to remodel the legal tools of forfeiture and confiscation (AfD 2017: 26). The AfD (2017: 26) will restructure and modernize the intelligence agencies to better combat organized crime and recommends significantly increasing the budget for intelligence services (AfD 2017: 31). The reasoning is that uncontrolled mass immigration and lack of efficient border control has resulted in significant increases in organized crime (AfD 2017: 63). It must be noted that preventive detention is generally subject to safeguards and restrictions in liberal democracies since imprisonment without trial is contrary to the presumption of innocence.

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[47] Remand, also known as, preventive detention, is the process of detaining a person until their trial after they have been arrested and charged with an offence.
[48] Emphasis by the author.

Podemos (2016: 129) will end impunity for corrupt officials by changing normative frameworks related to party financing, transparency of accounts, citizen engagement, and the constitutional protection of parties. Podemos (2016: 161-2) has a National Plan against Corruption and Institutional Transparency to tackle white-collar crime. Podemos (2016: 162) will establish an Asset Recovery Department to reclaim assets linked to corruption. This department will consist of professional officials and will expand existing international cooperation tools in the areas of information, judicial support, and asset recovery. Podemos wishes to improve the legislative review of corruption and criminal policy. Podemos (2016: 162) proposes creating a National Centre for the Prevention of Crime to assess both current and proposed reforms and proposes launching a public awareness campaign on crime. Finally, Podemos (2016: 171) suggests supporting measures for the recovery of irregularly evaded capital, particularly in the South.

Podemos (2016: 133-4) recommends lowering the threshold for a "tax offense" to 50,000 euros. Tax evasion under 120,000 euros is not considered a tax offense in Spain or Europe (Olive, 2018: 18). Podemos (2016: 133-4) will harmonize tax law, extend the statute of limitations to ten years, and impose aggravated penalties when the defrauded sum surpasses 120,000 euros.

Podemos (2016: 193) will adjust fines and administrative punishments to people's incomes. According to Podemos (2016: 193), this will strengthen offenders' accountability and fulfil the deterrence role of penalties. Proportional fines are fundamentally fair because they are neither too low for some nor too excessive for others. Podemos (2016: 193) proposes a proportionate system with a base rate and thresholds similar to personal income tax. Podemos wants a public and external audit of the judicial system based on efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

Podemos (2016: 162) will also reform the Prosecutor's Office, specifically the selection method for State Attorney General. Podemos will equip the Prosecutor's Office with a transparent framework to better control the State Attorney General's agenda, decision-making criteria, and activities. Podemos (2016: 163) will construct a judicial office able to generate effective action closer to citizens, which manifests as a true citizen service. With a particular budget item, this office will be directly funded by the State, under the Ministry of Justice, and will be able to transfer publicly held facilities. Podemos (2016: 164) also wants to change the Fiscal Ministry's

Organic Statute to grant the Prosecutor's Office organic and functional autonomy from the executive.

After tackling white-collar crime and police capability, SF (2020: 62) addresses the Irish drug epidemic. Addiction to drugs and alcohol is intrinsically related to mental illness, as nearly a third of people with severe mental illness abuse drugs and alcohol, says the party. To combat both mental illness and the drug epidemic, present spending levels must be increased. Any incoming government must prioritize the drug epidemic. SF (2020: 61) supports investing 12 million more in the Drugs Strategy and Drug and Alcohol Task Forces and increasing the number of Garda in the National Drugs Unit in addition to local Garda Drug Units. SF wishes to introduce drug-free zones around schools, with harsher punishments for drug-related acts within these zones. SF (2020: 70) also addresses the need to combat domestic, sexual, and gender-based violence, as well as increase victim support.

Podemos is the only party to advocate for some decriminalization. First, Podemos (2016: 138-42) advocates for an organic law protecting the inviolable right to housing and prohibiting forced evictions without alternative accommodation. The party will ensure legal protection in circumstances where the right to housing is restricted and decriminalize the usage of abandoned homes (Podemos 2016: 142). Likewise, personal and collective possession and cultivation of cannabis will be decriminalized (Podemos 2016: 164). Podemos believes Cannabis Social Clubs (CSC) are a better way to regulate cannabis consumption. Members of a CSC collaboratively cultivate cannabis plants to satisfy their personal requirements (Decorte *et al.* 2017: 45). According to the European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies (2011: 61-2), CSCs are transparent, democratic, and non-profitable. Podemos (2016: 164) will form a sectoral working group to draft a proposal that protects consumers' freedoms and fundamental rights while regulating cannabis production, distribution, and consumption.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter consisted of a primarily descriptive qualitative content analysis of the manifestos under scrutiny. It has laid out the discourse of the four parties under scrutiny on nine key themes to allow for a deeper analysis in the next chapter. There are a two points that are particularly relevant for the next chapter and deserve to be highlighted in this conclusion. Both are linked to the vague nature and lack of definitional clarity of the term populism.

92

The first as to do with the interconnected notions of peoplehood, nationality and citizenship. There is a general misconception that populism is an appeal to the people to take back the power from the oppressive elite. However, in the case of the AfD and the NR, the core issue is framed as an appeal to the national community to protect their values and heritage from the uncalled influence of foreigners. Their argument is always based on a certain need to protect what the national community has built for itself. The right wing parties wish to restrict access to political representation and to reduce the representativeness of their electoral process in order to protect the political power of the national community. Whereas left wing populist parties suggest to ease access to citizenship, right wing populist parties propose to make it more difficult to obtain. This difference in view as to who rightly belong to society is replicated in these parties discourses on immigration and communal diversity. Whereas the leftist parties adopt the view that they have an obligation towards the social other by virtue of their humanity, the far right parties clearly articulates that the only obligation they have is to defend their national community, heritage, and culture.

Another important point is the relationship between the triad of populism, liberalism, and democracy. Generally speaking, liberalism emphasizes self-governance and popular sovereignty. Likewise, liberals stand for the protection of pluralism as they believe that individuals should be left free to live a life they find worthwhile. This is reflected in Podemos and SF's discourse, as they promote the freedom of religion, pledge support to cultural organisations, and do not intend to use the apparatus of the state to restrict the rights and privileges of those living within their respective borders. In contrast, the NR and the AfD adopts positions that justify the restriction of these rights on the grounds that their exercise is damaging their national community.

The purpose of this chapter was to give to the reader a sense of what these parties actually stand for, the content of their political programme, and the type of society they want to create. This descriptive analysis clearly showed that the four parties have radically different positions on most the issues they address, and that their programmatic emphases differ quite substantially. Likewise, it showed that the NR and the AfD consistently use the notion of threat to justify their political propositions. The next chapter takes this analysis a step further and interprets this data through the lens of securitization theory.

5. Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis

This dissertation analyses the discourse of populist parties in their election manifestos, and in particular, whether they use the securitization of identities to justify exclusive and illiberal measures that are unlikely to be accepted without the securitization of these issues. The fourth chapter consisted of a primarily descriptive analysis of the content of the four sample parties' manifestos. In this chapter, the descriptive analysis of chapter 4 is processed through the lens of securitization theory. As such, this chapter seeks to find out whether these parties use the grammar of security – existential threats, point of no return and possible way out – to justify measures that would undermine the liberal pluralist and democratic order. Some similarities and patterns in the discourse of the two left-wing and the two right-wing populist parties are put in evidence to emphasize key differences between two poles of populism. This chapter draws attention to the use of securitizing strategies by right-wing populist parties and contrasts it with the agonistic approach used by left-wing populist parties. This chapter concludes with a polar typology of populism developed on the basis of this comparison.

5.1 Citizenship, naturalisation and residency

The NR and the AfD are fiercely patriotic. Both parties consider citizenship as a precious gift that should be acquired only under strict conditions. Both parties adopt the position of securitizing actors by framing the question of citizenship as a security threat. The alien, depicted as an enemy, must become similar or else pose a threat to the national identity. As such, citizenship is conditioned on excellent integration and thorough command of the national language. Both right wing parties want to limit residency privileges and prevent family reunions, deport all foreign criminals and end dual citizenship. Their reliance on filiation, grasp of the national language, and derogatory attitude towards Islam demonstrate their understanding of the nation as a culturally and ethnically homogeneous group. They attempt to move citizenship and residency questions into the realm of security by mobilizing a 'we' against a supposedly threatening 'them'. The nation is understood as the intergenerational community occupying the homeland and sharing a distinct language and history. Outsiders threaten the national community's peace and order. As Williams (2003: 519) notes, "within the specific terms of security as a speech act ... it is precisely under the condition of attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared' and, if this is successful, '[the identity's] negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed". He adds: "A successful securitization of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits

94

of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity" (Williams 2003: 520). It is clear that the AfD and the NR frame citizenship, naturalization and residency issues as a referent object of securitization and disregard other conceptions of the good. For example, the AfD believes multiculturalism weakens German culture and values. To integrate, non-Germans must embrace German cultural ideals, and act "German". The NR even proposes to enshrine national preference in the Constitution to discourage foreigners from migrating to France. Citizenship can only be acquired with both sufficient assimilation and kinship ties with the national community. This limits the prospects of newcomers since citizenship is often the pre-condition to access state resources such as welfare and healthcare. The way the AfD and the NR securitize citizenship, naturalization and residency issues, in turn, *restrict participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and enable individuals to make the choices they wish.*[49] Their attitude is therefore exclusive, antagonistic, and anti-pluralist.

Podemos takes a more functionalist approach to citizenship and nationality. Because citizenship is required for political participation, Podemos proposes making it easier to obtain. It wants to abolish nationality tests and shorten residency requirements, lower the requirements for nationality and granting political rights to foreigners living in Spain. Podemos adopts an agonistic view of democracy and citizenship that seeks to recognize the deep value of pluralism. This attitude is also consistent with Regilme's (2014) view on democratic consolidation. Since Podemos is seeking to extend political rights and to empower the disempowered individuals who find themselves amidst extremely minimal endowments, Podemos is a profoundly democratic movement. As noted by Deveaux (1999: 4), proponents of agonism believe in the need to reconceptualize citizenship in order to allow for a broader range of ethical differences to be expressed in political dialogues. This is precisely the view of citizenship embraced by Podemos. Indeed, Podemos seeks to emancipate people through democratic means. As we will see, this aspect is also present in Podemos' call for electoral reforms and its strong support in favour of foreigners' political participation. Podemos' approach to citizenship *encourages participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish*[50]. It is therefore inclusive, agonistic and pluralist.

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[49] This definition is inspired by Acemoglu & Robinson (2013: 74)'s definition of inclusive political institutions.
[50] This definition is inspired by Acemoglu & Robinson (2013: 74)'s definition of inclusive political institutions.

5.2 Elections and electoral system

According to Sahin (2021: 10), people's desire for ontological security is skilfully exploited by populist movements to garner electoral support during electoral periods. Populist movements exploit perceived or imagined threats and concerns that people have towards their culture, religion, and tradition. Indeed, populist movements portray a situation as a crisis and characterize it as an existential threat. This crisis-setting allows populist movements to "amplify voters' negative image of themselves, the country they live in and the challenges they face," which benefit them in the election process (Homolar & Scholz 2019: 346).

For Sahin (2021: 11), populist parties' electoral strategy is to frame elections as moments of crisis when voters must make a 'life-or-death' decision against an existential threat. The securitization of elections is a two-step process. First, the opposition is framed by populists as a source of ontological insecurity, and this perception spreads among the party's supporters. As a result, the opposition is not just a political foe but also a driving force behind the nation's growing ontological insecurity. An alternative scenario in which an opponent's victory would worsen and imperil the nation is presented as a plausible outcome, leading to the securitization of elections. The elections are a crucial turning point in the solution to that crisis. Second, the populist movement justifies the deployment of extraordinary measures in order to avert an opposition triumph.

Interestingly, the introduction of the NR's manifesto is doing exactly that. Marine Le Pen explains that the elections are a choice between civilizations. The first, defended by her opponents, seeks to "destroy our great socio-economic balance" and social cohesion, while the leadership she embodies will "defend the nation and the people" and will ensure the protection of the French national identity, and further social justice and prosperity for all French (Le Pen, in NR 2017: 1). Similarly, the AfD claims that "Behind the scenes a small and powerful elite within the political parties is secretly in charge, and is responsible for the misguided development of past decades" (AfD 2017: 7). The opposition is responsible for "the breaches to justice and the rule of law, the destruction of the constitutional state, and irresponsible political actions which clash with sound economic principles" and this can no longer be tolerated (AfD 2017: 5). As can be seen, the two right-wing parties use the grammar of security to depict a situation of danger and create a sense of urgency. This contrasts with Podemos

96

(2016: 1), which simply states "On June 26 our country has the opportunity to launch a new future". While SF (2020: 3) do claim that the opposition has mostly benefitted the wealthy and privileged, and that it "believes that it's time that we had (…) a government that puts the welfare of its citizens above vested interests" (SF 2020: 3), it does so without relying on the grammar of security. As such, Podemos and SF refrain from framing the elections as a moment of crisis in which the future of their polity is hanging in the balance. Elections are indeed famed as pivotal moments, but simply because they present an opportunity for a better future, not because their civilization is in peril.

True, all parties under scrutiny propose to reform their electoral system, supposedly to make them more democratic. A common argument surrounding populism is that it calls for more 'direct' forms of democracies. Yet it is unclear as to what exactly this would entail. For example, the NR and the AfD want to drastically reduce the number of representatives and introduce a minimum threshold of votes to obtain a seat in parliament. These two measures will undoubtedly result in a loss of representativity for minorities and would not grant each vote the same weight. Moreover, as Horowitz (1985) claimed, proportional representation is the only way to reduce the political authority of both the majority and ethnic minorities. By undermining the principle of proportional representation, the NR and the AfD are exposing their society to a societal security dilemma, since it forces minorities to mobilize against the threat emanating from the majority. Indeed, as Buzan (1993) asserts, minorities will be forced to assert their cultural ties and strengthen their group's social identity. Likewise, it will restrict the range of political actions available to minorities, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict over cooperation.

The implicit aim of the NR and the AfD's reforms is to endow the national majority with an increased political power to be able to by-pass the constraints of the rule of law. Likewise, a single majoritarian calculation would ensure the dominance of the national majority. For example, with an additional 30% of seats for the best performing party, it would become much easier to obtain a parliamentary majority and direct the political agenda, initiate changes in the constitution and undermine the rule of law without regards to the rights of minorities such as LGBTI+ minority groups and immigrants. This must also be put in perspective according to how these parties frame elections. Elections are a moment of existential crisis, and the solutions to this crisis are strong leadership and extraordinary measures, which can only be enacted if the party has extended power. In fact, their whole political project would crumble without the

97

necessary political power to enact their excessive measures. In addition, both nationalist parties want to restrict political rights for non-citizens. This is another way to ensure that the national community retains the reign of power. These parties' understanding of 'direct' democracy is underpinned by the idea that the national majority should rule in an unmediated fashion – that is, political institutions should not impede on the will of the people. In addition, the AfD criticizes the party-list system in place in Germany as undermining the choice of voters. Party-list systems can ensure that parties include members of the minority on their lists, as is the case, for example, in South Africa. This is one of the ways in which "institutional design can systematically favour or disadvantage ethnic, national, and religious groups." (Belmont *et al.* 2000: 3). Interestingly, Jenichen (2021) notes that besides the Freedom Democratic Party and the AfD, all major German parties follow some sort of gender and diversity quota for the compilation of their lists. By 2021, the share of parliamentarians with a migration background was at least 11.3 per cent (Jenichen 2021). For the AfD and the NR, the electoral system must ensure that political power is endowed to the members of the national community only, which is also explicit in their conception of citizenship and residency rights. For these parties, citizenship is acquired on kinship ties, so nationals living abroad should have a right to vote, but not the foreigners living in their country. Rather, these aliens should be denied the right to have a say in the political affairs of the national community. As such, the AfD and the NR attitude towards the electoral system is to *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that makes the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* Moreover, by undermining the political equality of minorities, these parties expose their societies to a 'spiral' mode of securitization of identities whereby the securitizing moves done by securitizing actors such as the AfD and the NR threaten minorities. In turn, this incentivizes minorities to reinforce their cultural ties and mobilize their cultural group to defend their rights. As minorities become more vocal, majorities feel threaten and are prone to another cycle of securitizing moves by identity entrepreneurs.

In contrast, Podemos' reforms are geared towards the facilitation of political equality and the extension of political rights to the greater masses. Podemos attempts to desecuritize the issue of political participation by framing it as the only possible way to foster a peaceful and democratic society. For example, Podemos (2016: 12) believes that "improving the democratic framework is essential to promote citizen participation in political activities". Catalonia's bid for separation is not framed as a security threat but is framed as an opportunity to further the

'democratic-ness' of Spain. Podemos (2016: 162) promises to respect the right of the Autonomous Governments such as Catalonia to decide the type of relationship they wish to establish with the rest of Spain. Podemos is committed to an electoral system capable of certifying the equal weight of each vote. Its plans to ease the participation process for Spaniards living abroad and to create an additional constituency for migrants are very inclusive propositions. Likewise, SF advances bold reforms for the electoral system such as a proposal to lower the voting age to 16 and to extend voting rights for Presidential elections to those living in Northern Ireland. According to Sinn Féin MLA Catherine Kelly (2018), "only by widening the political franchise can we guarantee that the rights of young people stay firmly on the political agenda." SF also wishes to follow the example of Wales and Scotland which lower the voting age to 16 as a pathway to participation for young and first-time voters. Extending voting rights to persons who had lived in Ireland for longer than five years is also considered by SF. Interestingly, SF also proposes to introduce an information and education program to inform young people about their political rights. Both parties *encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* They propose to change the electoral institutions to allow for larger participation and believe that political participation is a better alternative to discrimination and political violence. Ultimately, Podemos and SF adopt an inclusive attitude towards electoral institutions.

5.3 Political participation

Interestingly, all parties propose to subject their Constitution to a revision to put in place an effective right to referendum. All parties present themselves as supporters of direct democracy, which can, under certain conditions, undermine constitutionalism and minority rights. Changing the Constitution to allow for an effective right to referendum without any safeguards for minorities could seriously endanger the pluralist foundations of a democratic regime. It also has the potential to restrict the range of political actions available to minorities to protect their rights and identities, restricting their choice to compliance or conflict.

The AfD and the NR limit their propositions to hold a referendum on whether or not the Constitution should be revised to introduce referenda legislation to allow greater popular control over parliament. At first sight, these propositions may seem inclusive, but they need to

99

be put in perspective. As Caiani and Della Porta (2010: 198) note, these parties are not advocating for the return of the power to the people, but rather for the return of the power to an exclusive national elite. This is clearly articulated in their vision of citizenship and electoral rights. Indeed, the AfD and the NR attitude towards political participation is to *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* In contrast, Podemos proposes many other measures such as opening the deliberative process to popular initiatives and a system of popular recall when parties do not hold their election promises. It wants to allow any individual or groups affected by legislation to intervene in the policy process. Both SF and Podemos will improve the transparency of parliamentary sittings, notably by streaming parliamentary debate online and introducing family-friendly sittings. They will hold a binding referendum to allow people to decide on the territorial relationship they wish to have with the rest of the country – Catalonia in Spain and Northern Ireland in Ireland. Both parties also propose to extend civilian oversight to the armed forces. As such, Podemos and SF's attitude towards political participation is to *encourage participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* They qualify as inclusive and pluralist.

5.4 Attitude towards immigration

Both nationalist parties openly exploit the ontological security of their electorate to leverage political support. For example, Le Pen's (NR 2017: 2) introduction states that the 'globalists' will "destroy our great economic and social balances". The AfD also constantly refers to the 'threat' posed by migrants. The national community and the pillar of its civilization are presented as objects of securitization: the nation's economy, culture and society are threatened by aliens and foreign cultural forces and need to be protected from these influences. Both parties embrace a narrative equating the *social other* to danger and use that narrative as a justification for closed borders, strict immigration laws and deportations. These measures might be seen as excessive but come to be easily accepted if the alternative is the inevitable destruction of the nation and its economy. Indeed, immigration should only be allowed under strict quotas, and where it serves the economic goals of the national community. Both parties equate migration with unfair labour competition and a drain of the public coffers. This

100

antagonism is emphasized with broad claims that the political and economic elites – Brussels bureaucrats and political competitors – are complicit in their attempt to undermine the common people since they support and facilitate large-scale immigration. Rather, they wish to implement expulsion and deportation laws, reinforce immigration laws and focus their foreign policy on halting immigration. The whole argumentation is framed in a securitizing language of threats, destruction and dangerous imbalances. In short, they securitize the issue of migration which supposedly poses a threat to their national identity and culture. In doing so, they constrain the debate on immigration to the simplistic argument that it poses a security threat and should therefore be contained by all means. Their attitude towards immigration is to *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* It qualifies as exclusive and antagonistic.

SF is situated somewhere in between. SF opposes open borders and wishes to cede the sovereignty on migration prerogatives to the state. While SF believes Ireland needs migrants to meet shortages in the labour market, it needs to be mindful of how many people can be integrated effectively with adequate support and resourcing. SF does not portray migrants as violent criminals, and does not see migration as a security threat. SF does not used the language of security to argue for stricter border control. Rather, the justification for a controlled immigration is that the Irish state struggles to fulfil its international and human rights obligations towards migrants. For example, SF criticizes the Direct Provision[51] system as lengthy, inefficient and resulting in human rights abuses. SF does not frame migration as a security threat or in an antagonistic manner.

Podemos, in contrasts, wants to increase the number of legal routes to asylum, and facilitate the migration process. It wishes to centralize all the prerogatives on immigration in a single office to improve support, guidance, and information, and promote a better integration. Podemos does not frame immigration as a security issue and rather emphasizes the need to respect human rights on its southern border and review the bilateral treaty with Morocco to guarantee strict compliance with the principle of non-refoulment[52]. It believes that Foreigner

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[51] Direct provision is the name given to the housing, food, money, and medical services that asylum seekers get while their claim for international protection is being processed.

[52] As a reminder to the reader, under international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

Detention Centres are an anomaly in a democratic society. Altogether, this denotes the agonistic view of society espoused by Podemos. Rather than limiting migration because of the supposed threat it poses, states should commit to worthy resettlement programs that will further integration and allow immigrants to be full members of society. Seen in the light of Aradau's (2003: 13) argument, Podemos is de-securitizing immigration issues since it seeks a "re-thinking [of] the relations between subjects of security (in this case, migrants), and of imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of integration". For example, Podemos is supportive of economic migration, and proposes to change the visa regime to allow for economic migrants to temporarily stay in Spain and search for a job, without prohibiting new entry if the search is unsuccessful. The migrant is seen as just another individual with a different culture, not an economic threat that will destroy the nation's economy. Podemos' attitude towards immigration seeks to *allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* It qualifies as inclusive, and agonistic.

5.5 Attitude towards communal diversity

The AfD and the NR put the defence of their 'national community' as a primary objective. They both hold a monolithic conception of the nation that is at risk of being altered by alien forces, and therefore needs to be protected. For example, the NR intends to develop the national roman, rejects state repentances, and affirms its "indissoluble ties" with French overseas[53] territories. The expression "national roman" refers to a patriotic version of history that it aims to promote a national identity based on a common "historical imaginary". The purpose of such a version of history is to erase difference between French citizens and glorify the history of France. It emphasizes the key pillars of the French civilization – i.e. Christianity and the Enlightenment - while minimizing negative aspects of French history such as colonization or the horrors of the Algerian War. It promotes a national identity based on the erasure of certain painful memories, especially for cultural minorities. In fact, the AfD and the NR see communal diversity as a threat to society; it needs to be contained by all means. For them, allowing other cultures to flourish within their national boundaries would inevitably result in a loss of ontological security for the nation. They are motivated by a strong political nationalism, or "the

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[53] After decolonization, thirteen French-governed regions outside Europe voted to stay part of France under various statuses.

102

belief that the nation state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit" (Gellner 1993: 409). The nation-state's primary goal is to perpetuate its sense of nationhood, national identity, and culture. They advocate for a mono-national nation-state with minimal room for communal diversity. In other words, they view national identity and culture as a threat to the foundation of the nation-state. They prominently securitize the issue of cultural diversity and *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* Their attitude qualifies as exclusive and antagonistic.

In contrast, Podemos and SF stress the need to acknowledge their states' plurinational character. They both support national "native" minority communities and are willing to recognize and defend their rights and freedoms. For them, respecting and preserving communal diversity is the best way to protect the social peace. Diversity is celebrated as an opportunity, not a threat. They desecuritize issues of cultural diversity by claiming that the only way to protect social peace is to allow for unmediated diversity. Since culture is fluid and ever evolving, the role of the state is not to protect it but to support the development of culture. They adopt an agonistic point of view, since, following Deveaux (1999), they recognize that deep value pluralism is the best protection against authoritarian standard to resolve conflicts of value. Indeed, Podemos and SF's attitude towards communal diversity seeks to *encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* Their attitude qualifies as inclusive and agonistic.

5.6 Attitude toward national and foreign culture:

The AfD and the NR, and to a lesser extent, SF, adopt protective stands towards their national culture. The AfD and the NR dedicate a substantial part of their manifesto to discussing the importance of their national culture. For example, they want to reinforce the learning of their national language and oppose their internationalisation. For the AfD (2017: 45), the German language is a central bonding element in the German identity and cannot be left to "the free play of forces". Interestingly, it induces an understanding of culture as something that should be fixed, upheld by traditions, and therefore in need of being protected from external influences. This refusal to allow space for socio-cultural transformation through social

103

interactions *discourages participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* Their attitude towards cultural affairs qualifies as exclusive and is once again justified through the securitization of identities.

In contrast, Podemos and SF do not portray their national culture as something sacred that must be protected, but rather see culture as a living phenomenon that connects communities together. They believe that the national fabric is enriched by the diversity of cultures. Both parties dedicate a substantial amount of their manifesto to cultural affairs and commit themselves to higher funding for cultural matters across the board. Their attitude towards cultural affairs is to *allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* It qualifies as inclusive.

5.7 Attitudes towards religion

The NR's strict interpretation of laicity limits religious freedoms to the private sphere. The party refuses all religious signs in the public sphere, but specifically uses Muslim examples in its manifesto while being silent about Catholicism. The AfD uses a similar rhetoric but is explicit on Christianity: it is one of the three pillars of German culture and should be protected. In contrast, Islam is said to undermine women's rights and the pluralist foundations of the democratic state. Once again, the two right wing parties adopt antagonistic attitudes towards those who have adopted a non-Christian religious confession. For example, both parties believe that Islam is a threat to their society and are willing to use the state apparatus to contain it. For the AfD, the state should sanitize and control Islam by appointing Imams loyal to the constitutional order. With measures such as the banning of headscarves and minarets, the removal of Islamic studies from schools and universities, the banning of religious slaughter and an asserted state control over religious freedom, the AfD and the NR will *restrict or discourage participation by the great mass of people in religious activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* Their attitude towards religion qualifies as exclusive and antagonistic. They pretend to defend secularism but the measures they propose undermine the neutrality of state towards religious confessions since some religions are threatening the state.

In contrast, Podemos proposes a Law on Freedom of Conscience geared towards the state's neutrality against all religious confessions. Podemos proposes measures to reduce the role of the state in religious activities and end the privileges of the Catholic church. Podemos does not securitize the issue of religion and does not use the language of security to discuss religious issues, even though Spain, a highly Christian and devoted nation, has been the subject of Arab colonialism in the past. Using past historical narratives to convince the audience of the supposed threat posed by others is a common securitizing strategy. Yet despite their respective national histories of religious conflicts, Podemos and SF refuse to capitalize on past strife to mobilize group interests against each other. Podemos and SF *do not seek to restrict or discourage participation in religious activities in many ways and wish to allow the individuals to make the choices they wish*. Therefore, they adopt an inclusive approach to religion. SF is relatively silent on issues related to religion, and one can only speculate that this silence is due to the heavy history of religious conflicts in Ireland. It must nonetheless be noted that in contrast to the AfD and the NR, and despite the real threat posed by some religious groups in Ireland, SF refrains from securitizing the issue of religion and rather seeks to develop inclusive all-Ireland institutions to foster the peace between Catholics and Protestants. Rather than seeing the followers of other religious confession as enemies that should be dealt with, SF frame them as opponents with whom consensus is preferable over conflict. SF therefore adopts an agonistic position towards religion, embraces religious pluralism, and therefore qualifies as inclusive.

5.8 Rights and Freedom:

The NR and the AfD respect their national citizens' rights and freedoms, yet the continual allusion to their nationality indicates their exclusive feature. The NR wants to protect French workers' rights and stop unfair dismissals, mostly because French workers' positions are being threatened by the arrival of migrants who accept lower wages. While they are light on details, the grammar of security used by the NR is implicit in the choice of words. The French workers must be "protected" from the "unacceptable unfair competition", that "harm national interests" (NR 2017: 7). It offers policies that include women and individuals with disabilities, but by implying that Islam threatens women, it excludes Muslim women. The NR and the AfD subordinate religious freedom to other liberties like freedom of expression. This is mostly justified because Islam is equated to a totalitarian ideology that threatens the right of the

national community. Limiting freedom of association for organizations related to Islam exposes this bias against the followers of Allah. The AfD is supportive of German citizens' rights, but its views on Islam and family planning are exclusionary, since it does not seek to allow individuals to follow their own conception of the good. Both the AfD and the NR claim to support freedom of expression and wish for a more open criticism of Islam, which is depicted as a dangerous threat undermining the rights of virtuous women in the nation. The AfD does not propose to limit the political rights of non-naturalized citizens because it offers a more extreme alternative: deportation. Their views on rights and freedoms *limit or discourage the engagement of the masses in political activities that best utilize their talents and skills and allow individuals to make their own choices.* It is exclusive.

Both right-wing parties limit eligibility to rights to national community members. As such, the national community is understood horizontally - the "people" versus outsiders. Rights as claims are limited to data protection and labour rights. All four parties take a strong position on the defence of worker's rights. This should not be a surprise since populism thrives on the antagonism between the elite and the common people. In contrast though, Podemos and SF emphasise the need to protect and further socio-economic rights as "claims" or "entitlements". Podemos and SF seek to defend and promote socio-economic rights for *all*. They do not introduce nationality as a basis for rights protection, and rather seek to include *everyone* in their society. Both are committed to developing social services for *all* and propose entitling *everyone* to the right to housing and healthcare. Podemos also advocates ensuring access to basic services like water and electricity. Whether for refugees, economic migrants or extra-national communities such as the northern Irish, these two parties seek to *allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish*. As a result, their approach to rights is inclusive.

5.9 Crime and Justice:

The AfD, NR, and SF exhibit authoritarian and strict approaches to justice. Each party vows to toughen up on crime and expand state policing capacity. Judicial laxity is a problem that requires action. Criminals must be dealt with harshly, especially if they are not citizens. The state's monopoly on violence must be strengthened by improved judicial status for cops,

106

substantial re-arming of the police, recruiting additional security personnel, and harsher sentencing for violent criminals. Unlike SF, the AfD and the NR place a high priority on the *social other* accountable for domestic crime - Islamic fanatics and foreign criminals are threatening their society, civilization and state. Once again, they clearly use the securitization of identities to justify illiberal and authoritarian measures such expulsions of criminals, increased state power, protective custody and national indignity.

Podemos, SF, and to a lesser extent, the NR address white-collar crime. They agree that the elite and multinationals misappropriate cash, which lowers the tax-base and public funds. They support the development of a worldwide tax agency to combat fiscal fraud and tax evasion. However, while white-collar crime is framed as a threat to the security of the nation's finance, it is not associated with a particular identity. As such, their view of white-collar crime is not, *per se,* an instance of securitization of identities. Interestingly, Podemos is also in favour of decriminalizing some offences such as the possession and cultivation of cannabis and the use of abandoned homes. This is explained notably by the fact that Podemos embraces a "claim" approach to rights such as the right to housing.

There is a common thread among the four parties. All insist on the need to re-assert the judiciary's autonomy and independence from the executive power. Podemos and the SF emphasize the need to hold political office holders to account and wish to strengthen anti-corruption bills, protect and facilitate whistleblowing and toughen investigative, prosecution and enforcement powers.

The AfD's proposal to confine "untreatable alcoholics, incurable drug users, and the mentally sick" is disturbing. The term "protective custody" conjures up images of Nazi Germany. The Nazi vision was centred on the concept of national community. Hitler thought that building a strong national community would lead to Germany's revival and sought to 'cleanse' it by removing from society all that was not 'pure' (Wachsmann 2008: 122). Three categories were targeted: racial aliens, deviants, and political opponents (Wachsmann 2008: 123). By mid-July 1933, a legislation requiring compulsory sterilization of the 'hereditary ill' had been passed, and by November 1933, a law requiring 'protective custody' of 'dangerous habitual' and 'professional' criminals was passed (Wachsmann 2008: 125). Protective custody and the sterilization statute "led to the persecution of hundreds of thousands of 'community aliens' in

107

the years to come" (Wachsmann 2008: 126). The AfD's use of the term "protective custody" and the Nazi's use of this legal device raises fundamental doubts about the party's intentions.

While crime and justice are two concepts intrinsically linked to the notion of security, the left-wing parties, in contrast to the right-wing parties, refrains from using identities as the basis of their securitization process. While they agree that crime poses a threat to the long-term stability of their society, they do not use identity-related terms to justify the measures they put forward. This contrast strikingly with the right-wing parties who ostracize the other by claiming that minorities are the source of criminality. Their approach to crime and justice is antagonistic, pitting a supposedly virtuous and homogeneous national group against other dangerous criminals from various minority groups.

5.10 Developing a typology of populism

Throughout the first two chapters of this dissertation, it was highlighted that the concept of populism is in dire need of further conceptual clarification. In this section, some theoretical points are drawn from the comparison exposed above. A typology of populism is proposed to further clarify the concept of populism and the danger it supposedly poses to liberal democracies. This chapter has exposed the attitudes of the four populist parties scrutinized towards the securitization of identity and the notion of inclusivity. As one of the criteria to develop an innovative typology of populism, this analysis suggest it is possible to differentiate populist parties on the basis of their attitude towards the liberal tenets and particularly pluralism, and whether or not they call for restrictive or illiberal measures through the securitization of identities. Indeed, the attitudes of populist parties towards inclusivity and therefore the ideal of pluralism varies greatly along the spectrum. Theoretical arguments on what constitutes populism has caused a great deal of confusion thus far. In developing a typology based on populist attitudes towards pluralism, this dissertation contributes to the debate on the supposed illiberal nature of populist movements.

5.10.1 The scope of inclusivity

The comparative analysis developed in this chapter highlighted the exclusive character of the AfD and the NR, as they consistently seek to *restrict participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable*

108

individuals to make the choices they wish. In contrast, Podemos and SF are inclusive since they seek to *encourage participation by the great mass of people in political activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish.* An interesting aspect to look at is therefore who, exactly, is 'the people' they claim to represent, and who they believe should be included in the national community.

Indeed, it has been argued that a common feature of populists is their claim to speak on behalf of "the people" (Brubaker 2017: 359). Laclau (2005), for example, argues that populists do not speak for a pre-existing 'people', but rather create a collective entity 'the people' through speech-acts. In the case of nationalist parties, however, the 'people' they claim to represent is a collective entity defined by ethno-national boundaries. Laclau (2005: 160) argued that "we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject, and the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is (…) the building up of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps." While nationalist parties do divide the social space, their popular subject is not constructed through the aggregation of different demands in a logic of equivalence: the popular subject is assumed to already exist and is defined as the national community sharing a common culture, language, and history. Both parties adopt Miller's (1995: 205-6) conception of the nation as "a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinctive public culture". As noted earlier, this view is related to Huntington's four components of civilization: history, social institutions, religion and customs (Thelen & Honeycutt 2004: 59). The discourse of these two parties is articulated around the claim that the pillars of their civilization are being undermined by multiculturalism. For these parties, the role of the state is to protect the national identity, which is itself derived from these pillars. As such, they frame identity relations in an antagonistic manner, which results in a dichotomy between "us", the members of the national community, and "them", the social other defined as the foreigner, dangerous and threatening the national community. Interestingly, these two parties acknowledge that culture and identity are fluid since they claim it should not be left to random forces. Instead of allowing diverging voices to participate in the transformation of their national culture and identity, both parties emphasize the need to use the state apparatus (notably through the national roman, education systems, or state control over certain aspects of private life such as freedom of religion and freedom of association) to contain the emergence of parallel societies and all cultural practices perceived as deviant from the national homogeneous culture.

109

This opposition to the basic tenets of pluralism is often used as an argument to claim that populism is a deeply illiberal and anti-democratic phenomenon.

The discourse of SF and Podemos, in contrast, seeks to create a 'people' without reference to a national community, extended history and rooted in a particular culture. The popular subject constructed through the aggregation of different demands in a logic of equivalence without reference to identity. Indeed, their discourse is agonistic since it recognizes the legitimacy of diverse opinions without pitting them against each other. This is notably revealed trough their calls for increased popular involvement in the decision-making process, the call for additional constituencies for migrants, and the range of inclusive institutions they wish to establish. Based on the same recognition that identity and culture are fluid, they believe that the role of the state is to support and promote the emergence of a multicultural society in which everyone is left free to follow their own conception of the good. These parties adopt an agonistic view of identity relations, since they recognize the existence of "us" and "them" (for example, they use descriptive categories like "immigrants" and "foreigners") without resorting to a "friends versus foes" dichotomy. They recognize that difference, though constitutive of identity, does not necessarily entail conflict. In other words, there can be "us" *and* "them" without "us" *versus* "them". While the first reflects an agonistic view of group relations underpinned by the universal moral equality of all individuals, the latter is underpinned by an antagonistic view of group relations in which the "other" threatens the ontological security of "us", implicitly revealing the supposition that the "other" is morally inferior and will undermine the foundation of the national community.

Undeniably, the first principle of liberalism is the universal equality of all persons. Gray (1986: xii) outlined three other principles underpinning liberalism: egalitarism, in which equal moral 'worth' is given to all people; the universalism of the human species as opposed to its 'specific historical affiliations and cultural forms'; and meliorism, which attempts to improve social and political institutions by relying on human effort. After scrutinizing the manifestos, it became clear that the right-wing parties disregard liberalism, and particularly the notion of universalism. Indeed, the NR and the AfD do not believe that all moral traditions are of equal worth. This is notably exposed in their opposition to and criticism of Islam as undermining women's rights. Likewise, not everyone is of equal moral worth. For example, migrants are portrayed as deviant criminals and Muslims as oppressive. To become worthy of citizenship, the alien must adopt the culture, language, and tradition of the national community. Indeed,

110

since these parties frame identity relations in an antagonistic manner, the only viable options to manage diversity are either assimilation or expulsion. In a similar vein, the proposition to attribute preferential constitutional privilege to French citizens clearly highlights this view of the nation as morally superior to the alien communities. This anti-pluralist and illiberal vision of the national community is also reflected in those parties' attitudes towards electoral systems. While the AfD and NR claim to support a more direct form of democracy, the measures they propose suggest otherwise. Reducing the number of representatives equates to reducing minority and small party representation, resulting in a lack of representativity for these groups. They are not looking into expanding political rights to more individuals but rather seek to give back the control of the state to an exclusive national elite. This contrast starkly with Podemos and SF's attitude, as these two parties' electoral measures seek to change the electoral institutions to allow for larger participation and are predicated on the belief that political participation is a better alternative to discrimination and political violence.

As such, two opposite categories of populism emerged: one that is anti-pluralist in nature, underpinned by a nationalist understanding of the people, and refusing to attribute equal moral worth to all who are deviant from the mono-national culture. These populist movements do not believe in the universalism of the human species, and rather see inter-group relations as structured by some kind of hierarchy in which outsiders are deemed inferior and threatening the cultural legacy of the national community. As such, they frame identity relations in an antagonistic manner. For them, minority communities erode social solidarity, mutual trust, and public safety. For these parties, the state only owes "special" obligations to fellow national citizens by virtue of their shared civic identities (Smith 2014b: 382). In contrast, other populist parties such as Podemos and SF are profoundly pluralist and want to expand socio-political rights to the greater masses. These parties believe in the universal equality of all humans and see the emergence of parallel communities as an opportunity to improve their society. They frame identity relations in an agonistic manner, and recognize the diversity, yet legitimacy of diverse conceptions of the good. For these parties, the state owes "general" obligations to all human beings by virtue of their shared humanity (Smith 2014b: 382). Since all humans are equals, factors such as country of origin, race or religions are seen as inconsequential for the attribution of socio-political rights. Meliorism stands at the centre of their discourse but must be achieved by opening up the political process. Allowing all individuals living in the national territory to have a say in the political process is seen as the only road to foster a peaceful and democratic society.

5.10.2 The securitization of identities

Manifestos expose a party's preferred course of action, and if elected, the party follows through. They contain statements intended to secure the support of voters. Manifestos both disclose the type of society a party wants to create, and the justification behind those measures. It became clear throughout the analysis that the AfD and the NR's main objectives are to protect the foundations of their respective national identities. In order to achieve this, the two parties frame almost all issues as societal security threats and justify all their illiberal measures by constraining the debate to a dichotomy between protection of the national community and its inevitable disintegration. Since everything is framed as a threat to the national community, these parties are able to justify a vast array of illiberal and authoritarian measures. In contrast, Podemos and SF refrain from securitizing identities or even de-securitize identities by framing cultural questions as an opportunity for the betterment of society. Allowing everyone to practice their own culture and follow their own concept of the good is seen as the only alternative to cultural conflicts.

Looking at populist parties through the prism of the securitization of identities reinforces the distinction between illiberal, antagonistic, exclusive populism and liberal, agonistic, inclusive populism. The securitization of identities allows illiberal populist parties to articulate a frame of reference in which the dangerous social other is the root cause of all social ills. The simple solution offered by such parties is to exclude the other in order to maintain the supposed superiority of the national community. Following Berning (2017), this dissertation argues that radical right-wing populist parties primarily are concerned with ethnic group threats. By focusing mostly on the threatening aspect of modern pluralism, these parties exploit the ontological security of dominant societal groups to gather public support. In a nutshell, they practice the politics of fear. In contrast, for liberal, agonistic and inclusive populism, it is the exclusion of the social other that is at the root of social ills. Since the ability to participate in political activities predetermines the choices between conflict and cooperation for competing groups (Hirschman 1978: 90), these parties believe that a strong constitutionalism will safeguard minorities from the arbitrary rule of majorities. Migration is not perceived as a threat, but rather as an opportunity that simply requires a worthwhile resettlement program and a resource-based commitment from the state to make the most of it.

5.10.3 A typology of populism

Based on the observation described above, this dissertation proposes to distinguish between two polar types of populism, namely *antagonistic* populism and *agonistic* populism. Polar types refer to types at opposite ends of a spectrum of symptoms or manifestations. In this case, the spectrums of reference are the use of securitizing strategies in their political discourse, their attitude towards the notion of inclusivity, and consequently, their attitude towards the tenets of liberalism.

Agonistic populism can be conceived as illiberal since it is based on ethno-national exclusivity and opposes some of the basic tenets of liberalism such as pluralism, while denying the moral equality of all human beings. Its populist discourse is articulated around notions of ontological insecurities and the securitization of identities. Since the *social other* is a threat to society, the political institutions must be protected from their influence. One of the ways to protect these institutions is to advocate for exclusive political institutions. As discussed in chapter 2, by excluding minorities from political institutions and political participation, these parties also pre-dispose their societies to societal and identity conflicts. In contrast, the polar type of agonistic populism is pro-liberal, embraces the universal moral equality of all human beings, and articulates its populist discourse around the de-securitization of identities. Its populist discourse is articulated around a logic of equivalence in which everyone is universally equal despite espousing different identities. The existence of the *other* is acknowledged but not framed as a security threat. Since the *other* is of equal moral worth, his contribution to the political community is to be welcomed and encouraged. Likewise, the state has a general obligation towards all human beings, by virtue of their humanity. The characteristics of the two polar types of populism are summarized in the table below.

	Antagonistic populism	**Agonistic populism**
Scope of inclusivity	The ethno-national community	Universalist
Use of securitizing strategies	Yes	No
Attitude towards liberalism	Illiberal	Liberal

Table 1. Characteristics of agonistic and antagonistic populism.

113

This polar typology contributes to the literature on populism in several crucial ways. First, it allows for the distinction between various forms of populism within the framework of populism as a thin-centred ideology, and without reference to thick ideologies. Secondly, it recognizes that all forms of populism are, by nature, both inclusive and exclusive. Instead of focusing on *who* the populists exclude in their discursive creation of the people, it shifts the focus on the type of relations populists establish with the *other*, whose existence is pre-condition to the emergence of populism. Third, it mediates the debate on the anti-democratic and illiberal nature of populist movements. Such a polar typology recognizes that populist movements can adopt very different attitudes towards the tenets of liberalism.

5.11 Conclusion:

This chapter focused on the use of securitizing strategies by populist parties, and their attitude towards pluralism and inclusivity. The main finding of this chapter is that it is possible to differentiate between various strands of populism on the basis of the aforementioned elements. As such, a typology was proposed to allow for a theoretical distinction between agonistic and antagonistic populism.

This typology is based on the observation that populist parties can take two vastly different path to appeal to the people. The first one is universalist in nature, and seeks to include the broadest segment of the population in its definition of the people. These populist seek to encourage the participation of *everyone* in the life of the political community. It is liberal, in the sense that it seeks to allow everyone to participate in the political life of the community according to their own perception of the goods. These agonistic populists recognize that diversity is here to stay, and rather than discouraging the co-existence of multiple cultures and identities, they seek to promote cooperation between them. In contrast, the second is exclusive by nature, and seeks to restrict participation in the life of the political community only to those who, by accident of birth, happen to be part of the national community. Moreover, These members of the nation community are assumed to be culturally and religiously homogeneous. They have illiberal tendencies, in the sense that they seek to restrict the participation in the political life, and do not consider all conceptions of the good as equally valid. This is reflected, for example, in their attitude towards religion or cultural diversity. These antagonistic populists see the co-existence of multiple communities as a zero-sum game in which the national community stands to lose most of its hardly acquired privileges. Antagonistic populists see

114

group relations as a competition in which cooperation means less absolute power and privilege. As such, they see the other not only has a direct competitor, but also as a danger to the national community.

The distinction between agonistic and antagonistic populism brings novelty to the field of political science. It allows for more nuanced discussions and studies of a concept that has been mired with confusion while avoiding to through away many valid theoretical observations regarding the phenomenon of populism. It recognizes the discursive creation of "the people" within populist movements, while simultaneously acknowledging that the basis on which "people" are created can be vastly different, and serving even more vastly different goals. It is hoped that this distinction will further stimulate debates on populism, as the term continues to be associated with fears of democratic decline and decay, even though some of these movements are profoundly democratic, liberal, and inclusive.

6. Chapter 6: Conclusion and avenues for further research

As a human being, we have an inherent desire to be part of a larger group. But as with all good things, there is an adverse effect: group rivalry. Group distinctions are claimed to be used by populist politicians in order to garner support from the people, resulting in a greater animosity between 'the people' and the 'social others'. Antagonism generates social conflict because populist politicians can begin a cycle of securitization of identities by portraying the social other as harmful. When it comes to stable administration in multicultural societies, intergroup relations based on mutual respect and dignity are the final resort. The primary goal of this dissertation was to determine whether all populist parties are antagonistic, promoting a Manichean view of society and are therefore dangers to democracy, or if some nuance can be deduced from a careful analysis of populist voices.

This dissertation undertook a qualitative content analysis of populist manifestos to understand some of the points of contention surrounding the study of populism. The QCA investigated the discourse of four populist parties in their election campaign manifesto to contrast and compare the attitudes of these parties towards political institutions such as residency rights, citizenship, political representation and the rights of minorities. Particular attention was paid to the use of securitizing strategies and the deployment of security grammar. Following the QCA, it appears that the parties under scrutiny adopted radically opposed positions in virtually all the categories in which they were compared. This is consistent with Otjes and Louwerse's (2015: 75) claim that left-wing and right-wing populists have opposing voting behaviour on most political issues. However, while Otjes and Louwerse (2015: 75) suggest to leave "negativity towards 'others', particularly immigrants" out of any definition of populism, this dissertation suggests that to use negativity towards the others, particularly migrants, has a differentiating factor between different types of populism. Indeed, it is the negativity towards the other that sets apart antagonistic relationships from agonistic relationships.

In order to arrive to this conclusion, this dissertation first focused on the discourse of these parties and their interpretation of access to citizenship and residency rights. As shown in the fifth chapter, the difference between the AfD and the NR on the one hand, and Podemos and SF on the other, is unambiguous. For the first two, citizenship is seen as a precious gift that should be acquired only through filiation and protected from external influences. The sole presence of foreign residents is seen as threatening the national identity. Securitizing strategies

116

are, therefore, deployed in an attempt to mobilize the national community against the "*other*" supposedly threatening them. In contrast, Podemos sees citizenship in functional terms: since citizenship is required for full political participation, Podemos proposes to make it easier to obtain.

The discourse of these parties on democratic reforms and political representation was another crucial aspect of this dissertation. While the QCA demonstrated that all parties supported democratic reforms, it also suggested that the purpose of these reforms were vastly different. One the one hand, the AfD and the NR frame elections as a moment of crisis and propose reforms that would undoubtedly endow the national majority with increased political power while diminishing the political power of minorities and possibly allowing political majorities to by-pass the constraints of the rule of law. This behaviour is typically highlighted by scholars who claim that populism is undermining the rule of law and the democratic order. However, SF and Podemos, on the other hand, frame elections as an opportunity to create a more inclusive, accommodating and democratic society. Their reforms are explicitly geared towards the entrenchment of greater political equality and the extension of political rights to the greater masses including immigrants. Since they seek to encourage participation by the great mass of people in socio-cultural activities that make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish, their attitude towards political participation and democratic reforms qualifies as inclusive and pluralist.

In fact, it became clear throughout the QCA that the two left-wing parties adopted considerably more inclusive positions than their right-wing counterparts. For the left-wing populist parties, a democracy can only be democratic if it seeks to include everyone in its decision-making process. In contrast, the right-wing parties believe that decision-making powers are vested in the national community and inherited through filiation. As such, two vastly different concepts of democracy emerged. First, one that believes that inclusivity and pluralism is the foundation of democratic decision-making and that participation should not depend on factors such as filiation but rather conceded to *all* who live in the political community by virtue of their humanity. Second, one that believes that political institutions are the fruit of the hard work of the national community and should, therefore, be protected from the influence of outsiders who will undoubtedly affect the historical development of the polity in a negative fashion. Of course, these opposing conceptions of democracy result in vastly different claims about immigration and the rights of refugees.

117

The discussion on immigration and the rights of refugees featured more prominently in the manifestos of the NR (4.61%) and the AfD (4.77%) than in Podemos' (0.89%) and SF's (0.16%)[54] manifestos. The first two parties attempted to highlight the putative link between immigration and criminality through the use of securitizing strategies. Because immigrants are framed as threats to the national community, the national economy and the national identity, immigration should be highly restricted and residency rights should be subject to quotas and integration standards such as the command of the national language. State support to immigrants should be minimised since they drain the public coffers. While SF does not elaborate much on immigration, it states its wish to implement a transparent and fair immigration system meeting Ireland's international commitments without overstretching the state's resources. Similarly, Podemos believes that a successful resettlement program requires a resource-based commitment from Spain. For Podemos, the migrant is not a threat to society. What is threatening the social order is not the presence of migrants but the exclusionary and violent forms of integration that forces migrants to abandon some aspects of their identity. While for the NR and the AfD, the solution to migration is to keep the threatening other outside of society, for Podemos and SF, the solution to migration is predicated upon greater inclusivity, greater resource commitment from the state and worthy resettlement programs that will help immigrants integrate in society without asking them to abandon some elements constitutive of their identity.

The attitudes of these parties towards identity-related matters such as cultural diversity and minority rights was, of course, predicated on their view of multiculturalism. While the NR and the AfD portray multiculturalism as an ontological threat that will undoubtedly result in the degradation of their value system, Podemos and SF celebrate diversity as an opportunity to foster a more inclusive society. Podemos and SF adopt an agonistic point of view since they believe that pluralism is the best protection against authoritarian standards to resolve conflicts of value. Interestingly, all parties acknowledge that culture is fluid and subject to constant influences. For the NR and the AfD, the national culture and identity should be protected from the influence of external forces. In contrast, Podemos and SF see culture as a living phenomenon that connects communities together. Transcultural interactions are seen as enriching the national fabric and are therefore encouraged.

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[54] Percentage indicates the total percentage of their manifestos allocated to discussion on immigration.

118

The parties' attitudes towards minority and religious rights are aligned with their view of multiculturalism. Since the AfD and the NR strongly oppose multiculturalism, they also adopt antagonistic attitudes towards everything that is not considered part of the national culture. Islam is depicted as a threat, and minorities are portrayed as morally inferior since they "degrade" the national community's value system. In contrast, Podemos and SF adopt an agonistic position towards religion, embrace religious pluralism, and refrain from securitizing the issues of religion and minority rights. In contrast to the AfD and the NR, Podemos and SF believe that the state should not interfere in the individual's right to practice he/r religious as s/he sees fit.

This leads us to a last important point: the role and the reach of the state apparatus. The NR and the AfD are quite adamant on increasing the state's power, notably through a myriad of police and judicial reforms seeking to increase the state's capacity to use force and to entrench stricter punishments for criminals. The rational to justify increased state capacity and authority is that immigrants, who supposedly commit most crimes, are fostering a climate of lawlessness. As such, the NR and the AfD deploy securitizing strategies to convince their audience that immigrants are committing most crimes, and that a complete overhaul of the judiciary and the police force is necessary to protect the citizens from the danger emanating from the "*others*". This contrasts with Podemos and SF, who refrained from using any identity-related terms to justify the measures they put forward. Rather, their focus is mostly on white-collar crime and the negative impact it has on the finance of the state.

The QCA highlighted several crucial points. The four parties studied propose, though their manifestos are vastly different if not opposing, projects for their respective societies. This was to be expected since, as argued by Mudde (1996; 2007), populism is a *thin*-centred ideology often combined with another *thick* ideology. As Engesser *et al.* (2017) suggests, various populist ideologies are to be found in the content of their communication – in this case, their manifestos. As noted in the second chapter, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) claimed that two regional subtypes of populism coexist: "exclusionary populism in Europe and inclusionary populism in Latin America". However, this dissertation has shown that while the NR and the AfD were indeed exclusionary, Podemos and SF adopted significantly inclusive attitudes towards the issues they addressed in their manifestos, thereby invalidating the regional subtypes theory. Likewise, the QCA clearly showed that the NR and the AfD's position on

119

issues such as immigration, access to citizenship and political participation is diametrically opposed to that of Podemos and SF. As such, this dissertation agrees with Warren (2020: 22) who argued that there are two opposing conceptions of populism; one that is anti-pluralist in nature and appealing to tribal and xenophobic impulses, and one that is "a form of economic democracy rooted in a critique of inequality and concentrations of economic and political power". However, instead of understanding these two opposing conceptions of populism as separate and distinct, this dissertation proposes to conceptualize populism along the spectrum of agonism/antagonism. In contrast with Lorenzetti (2020), who claims that the presence of an *enemy*[55] is a *sine qua non* condition of populism, the agonism/antagonism distinction claims that the presence of an '*other*' is a *sine que non* condition of populism since populism needs an '*other*' as a definer for 'the people'. However, this distinction acknowledges that the *social other* does not necessarily have to be presented as an enemy or a threat. Likewise, it recognizes that populism is not necessarily anti-pluralist, thereby providing nuance to a contested concept.

This dissertation proposed a polar typology of populism to unlock some of the conceptual deadlocks that have stymied the academic debate on populism, notably on its supposedly anti-democratic nature and the relation populists have with those characterised as the out-group. This dissertation proposes to differentiate between various strands of populism on the basis of their attitude towards the securitization of identities. Following Ostiguy and Casuallo (2017), this dissertation asserts that while the terminology of '*inclusionary*' versus '*exclusionary*' populism is analytically helpful it is theoretically erroneous. As such, it rather proposes a polar typology of '*agonistic*' versus '*antagonistic*' populism which recognizes both the exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of populism while allowing for a clear theoretical distinction between two poles of populism. In doing so, this dissertation contributes to the debates on identity politics, populism, and the re-emergence of far-right nationalism. In contrast to Otjes and Louwerse (2015), it places "negativity towards the other" as a central point of comparison between various types of thin-centred ideologies. Negativity towards the other is measured through the securitizing discourse of various parties within their campaign manifestos.

While theoretically helpful, this distinction can nonetheless be subject to further empirical testing and refinement. For example, it could be possible to further test this typology with broad-scale studies comparing populism across the world rather than focusing solely on

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[55] My emphasis.

European populism. Another weakness of this study is that it focuses mostly on political institutions at the expense of economic institutions. A similar study focusing on economic institutions would undoubtedly be helpful to further refine the characteristics of agonistic and antagonistic populism. Likewise, it would be useful to study whether, if elected, parties actually follow through with the measures they put forward through securitizing strategies.

The polar types proposed in this dissertation are based on three dimensions, namely the use of securitizing strategies, the scope of inclusivity and their attitude towards liberalism. Though it goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, further research could develop scales along these three dimensions. This would greatly help to develop a clear classification system of populism.

Another way to empirically test the agonistic/antagonistic polar types would be to study the effects of securitizing and desecuritizing strategies on voters' perception and support, as well as the effect of securitizing strategies on ontologically insecure citizens. While not directly related to this typology, another avenue of further research related to the securitization framework is the effect of securitizing strategies on electoral outcomes. Indeed, securitizing moves have to be accepted as such by an audience and it is unclear under which conditions securitizing strategies are the most effective, how political opponents can counter securitizing strategies, and whether parties can lose support when their securitizing strategies are unsuccessful.

Finally, while the mechanism of securitizing strategies have been subjected to academic research, the mechanism and effects of desecuritizing strategies have not been subject to much academic research. A deeper appreciation of desecuritizing strategies and their effect on voters could radically transform our understanding of identity politics and our way to deal with anti-pluralist politics.

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145

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151

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Appendix A: Data and Code

For ease of access, the entire data set is available on FigShare:
https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/MASTER_AGGREGATED_nvpx/17157842