IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY: AN EXAMINATION OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO COMBAT PERPETUAL SECURITY THREATS AGAINST AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS

By

KEABETSWE KGANTICOE

16173156

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SUPERVISOR: DR. C.C. NSHIMBI

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Abstract

Immigration policies during the era of apartheid were meticulous and to a larger extent favoured foreign labour immigration within the country. The post-apartheid era, saw a shift in immigration discourse triggered by the imperative of social reconstruction and universalism in service provision, making it clearly exclusive and selective, since the country had to be accountable simultaneously with increase in migratory flows (refugees, regular and irregular) and skills shortages. The security context presented by these migratory flows has had social repercussions associated with xenophobia and the general negative immigration perceptions, particularly the African origin one. This study explores the gaps in South Africa's immigration and security policy, and to examine the inconsistency of measures that the government has put in place to combat the perpetual security threats against African immigrants. It will investigate topics of inconsistencies in relation to South Africa's National Security agenda, effectiveness of the existing policies of refugees and asylum seekers. The desk study research method was used, which collected data and information from secondary sources such as academic journals, books and the internet. The study shall use the qualitative content analysis strategy as a primary method by using existing sources which will help build the research. The study findings show that the government is not adequately protecting immigrants due to denialism and anti-immigration sentiments are not just a reaction to rising immigration, but rather reflect governments' nationalistic and anti-immigrant stances. The study recommends education and awareness to the citizens and politicians as well as capacitation of departments responsible for protecting migrants.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction and identification of Research Theme

Migration intersects with nearly all other issues affecting the African continent, both generating opportunities and contributing to problems. South Africa's government has been battling for years to have a clear reaction to migration (Piper & Charman, 2012: 23). Since the change to a democratic state from 1994, undocumented migration from nearby nations has remained resistant to the nation's determined plans of bureaucratic change, financial growth, as well as poverty alleviation (Masikane, Hewitt, & Toendepi, 2020: 11). Solving the immediate problems of migration policy, will need new philosophy that can reach further than expert discussions to change the context of public policy debates (Muchineripi, Chinyamurindi & Chimucheka, 2019: 3).

According to Dewa Mavhinga (2020) from the Human Rights Watch, government and police officials have perpetually denied that violent attacks against foreign nationals were xenophobic in nature. The government has further pushed a narrative that such violent attacks were merely criminal acts with unwarranted need for any further interventions (Misago, Freetmantle & Landau 2015:25). The most important casual influences for xenophobia in the country's setting, takes account of both a bold declaration of national identity as well as economic discrimination (Field 2017:12). Therefore, the foreign population, particularly those hailing across the African region, encounter a variety of reactions from the country's residents and government officials (Piper & Charman 2012: 7).

1.2. Background to the study

Irregular migration forms a global issue that has piqued international interests since the early 1960s (Tati 2008:426). Though it generally impacts the industrialised nations, it has been seen in the developing world (Ugochukwu 2016). Since the late 1990s monetary crisis, the main focus of immigration policy has been on limiting the entries of forced migrants going into developed nations, as well as combatting the hiring of illegal foreign workers (Tshishonga 2015). South Africa is not immune to this criticism. In the year after the end of apartheid (post-1994), irregular migration has become a worry in the newly democratic country, as it has been in numerous parts of the globe. Soon after independence, South Africa simultaneously began removing apartheid-era

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border controls and liberalising its economy which attracted migrants into the country (Segatti, 2011).

According to the White Paper on International Migration by the Department of Home Affairs (2017:29), South Africa is faced with great levels of irregular migration. The high costs of enforcing investigations, imprisonments, and repatriations, exacerbates irregular migration. Most irregular migrants hail from neighbouring countries like Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other greater parts of the continent. Irregular migration has remained a global phenomenon since the early 1960s, as it has resulted in a number of concerns such as xenophobia.

Xenophobia is a growing phenomenon and a concern that is reaching uncontrollable levels (Crush & Ramachandran 2016). Based on the Global Commission on International Migration (2005), from 2001, irregular immigrants constituted 3% of South Africa's labour force. Irregular migration is often associated with negative results, which includes xenophobic views not only aimed at migrants who have an irregular footing in a country, but also at organised migrants (Tati 2008:426).

The increase in the number of migrants has put stress on the function of the South African government to fulfil its civil rights commitments whilst supplying sufficient basic needs like health maintenance, education, and safe keeping to new migrants (Kok & Collinson, 2006). Such obstacles originate from the perspective that South Africa is a popular refuge for migrants, deportees and refugees from various parts of the globe, especially those coming from various parts of Africa (Kudejira 2019). South Africa attracts migrant foreigners because of its reputation as a democratic, free and developed state. The country has long been well thought-out as a centre of employment for foreign workforces attracted by the mining industries since the era of apartheid (Piper & Charman 2012: 21). Migrants are drawn to the accessibility of monetary prospects, mainly within the informal business market (Chimbga & Meier 2014). As migrants and refugees flee from their troubled countries, South Africa continues to draw a large number of them from Africa and South Asia (White Paper 2017:7) (Oluwaseun & Olusola 2017:42).

Nonetheless, this migration trend has resulted in long-term conflict between African immigrants and native black South Africans. According to the South African Human

Rights Commission (2010), the conflicts have resulted in home burnings, horrific killings, theft of foreign-owned enterprises, and a slew of acts of local hatred. Violent xenophobia has become a systemic aspect of life in South Africa. Individual refugees, as well as migrants and their business endeavours, are frequently targets of everyday hatred (Kalitanyi & Visser 2010).

Some of these occurrences are brought to the attention of the media and government, but the vast majority go unnoticed (Oluwaseun & Olusola 2017). The three major classifications for the considerable anti-migrant violence that dominated the nation in May 2008 are xenophobia minimalism, xenophobia realism, and xenophobia denialism (Crush & Ramachandran 2014). The denialists dismiss the idea that xenophobia plays a factor in violent behaviour against refugees and asylum seekers as well as migrants. Xenophobia denialism has influenced official South African reactions to foreign criticism.

Furthermore, according to Crush and Ramachandran (2014), politicians continue to justify police and civilian violence as acts of criminality done by individuals who are anti-social or disconnected. The xenophobic minimalists likewise dismiss it as a cause of conflict targeting migrants and refugees, instead of viewing it as a symptom of a larger problem (Crush & Ramachandran 2014).

Although xenophobia may exist, the minimalists believe that it is an epiphenomenon which fails to address the fundamental causes of violence (Crush & Ramachandran 2014). One school of thinking sees the violence as a symptom of a larger, developing socioeconomic calamity in South Africa, one fuelled by fierce competition for finite resources like employment, housing, and services. The realists, on the other hand, argue that xenophobia is a persistent problem in South African society, and that a large percentage of the population is prepared to act violently (Crush & Ramachandran 2014).

In light of its call for an end to assaults on foreign citizens, the South African government made efforts to make sure the prosecution as well as arrests of those guilty and responsible. Law enforcement officials were extremely diligent in their efforts to apprehend, prosecute, and punish individuals responsible for acts of violence. Following the xenophobic violence of 2008, 307 people were arrested for

assaulting immigrants and inciting civil disturbances and violence around the country (Steenkamp 2009). Thus, this proves government's inability to be proactive in combating xenophobia (Tshishonga 2015).

For some, this failure represents the African National Congress's (ANC) schizophrenia, as it condemns xenophobia in local and international venues while allowing it inside its own ranks, denying its breadth and significance, and failing to take meaningful action (Tati 2019). Some scholars and political pundits have repeated the government's view, claiming that such crimes are committed by a small number of people and are not indicative of broader discrimination towards migrants in South African communities (Zihindula *et al.,* 2017).

Many foreign citizens try to find accommodations at police stations or other dwellings, as their homes and belongings were destroyed and looted. It remains uncertain what protections as well as security systems are in position for the immigrants and refugees returning to their communities as the police have failed a number of times to arrest perpetrators (Muchineripi *et al*., 2019: 4).

There are a number of police officers who turn a blind eye to assaults on foreign immigrants and ignore the existence of xenophobia (Zihindula *et al.*, 2017). They often fail to act when foreign nationals are being attacked and insulted. Research shows that very few of the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks were arrested by the South African police (Tshishonga 2015). The lack of significant action by government, particularly the investigations and the prosecution of the accused involved in these violent attacks, proves that the problem continues (Oluwaseun & Olusola 2017: 32). South Africa's allegiance to the "SADC Protocol on Facilitation of Movement Persons (2005)" and the "African Union's Common Position on Migration and Development (2006)" (Boynton 2015:2), that emphasises the importance of migration for growth, increased regional partnership, and the "protection of migrants' rights" (Boynton, 2015:2), are at odds with protectionist migration practices such as the two-gate system (Lu & Treiman 2011).

1.3. Formulation and Demarcation of the Research Problem

A problem statement is an illustration of a problem that must be solved. A good research problem should fill a gap in the field's knowledge and build up to further studies (Denzin & Lincoln 2011).

The continued rise of xenophobia in South Africa are indicators of the inconsistencies in relation to South Arica's National Security agenda which has, to a certain extent not adequately promoted the protection of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. According to Moyo and Nshimbi (2019:311), there is a pattern of hostility and negative attitudes towards African migrants, not only from ordinary citizens but from various national institutions such as the army, the police, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Trading Company, and other government officials.

Moreover, the problem lies in the limited amount of research available regarding these complex investigations of the South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The investigation evaluates topics of inconsistencies in relation to South Africa's National Security agenda, effectiveness of the existing immigration and security policies to the South African government on the increased protection of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

1.4. Research Aims

A research aim conveys a research study's objective or desire; it summarises what must be accomplished by the conclusion of the project (Creswell, 2014).

The aim of this study is to examine South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants.

1.5. Research Objectives

Study objectives succinctly state what the research is attempting to accomplish (Creswell 2014). Furthermore, Creswell (2014) acknowledged that research objectives describe the intents a researcher wants to accomplish in the study and serves as a guide for conducting an empirical study. The specific study objectives are:

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- To determine the measures implemented by the government for the protection of immigrants against xenophobia.
- To determine the effect of the inconsistency of existing policies on ensuring the protection of immigrants in South Africa.
- To understand how nationalism has created threats to the protection of immigrants in South Africa.
- To understand why the South African government is not adequately protecting immigrants against xenophobia.

1.6.   Research Question

A research question is in essence, an approach a researcher must take in conveying his/her interest of a specific phenomenon in question. A research question that is established thoroughly assists to guide the research study to reach its full academic potential. According to Blaikie (2007), The research question is the most important element in a study and a literature review. A research question must be centred around the study, decides the methodology and manages areas such as data analysis and recording.

Thus the rudimentary research problem statement rooted within the initiated study, is subsequently captured in the following research question:

- What are the South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants?

In addition to the aforementioned research question, four research questions appear:

- What measures were implemented by the South African government for the protection of immigrants against xenophobia?
- How do the inconsistencies of existing policies affect the protection of African immigrants in South Africa?
- How has nationalism created threats to the protection of immigrants in South Africa?
- Why is the South African government not adequately protecting immigrants against xenophobia?

1.7.   Motivation of the study

This investigation will be particularly important in view of South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The issue is about the safety of everyone in South Africa, and not just of displaced migrants and immigrants, and their protection. The majority of violent attacks in South Africa have been perpetrated by black South Africans.

The study is essential because it imparts knowledge of South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The study will examine the significant inconsistencies in relation to South Africa's National Security agenda (SANSA) as well as the effectiveness of the existing policies. Moreover, the investigation is vital because it helps to know what challenges are facing the government and SANSA in providing security for the immigrants.

Furthermore, the study is also imperative for universities because of the significant role the South African government plays in providing security for immigrants. The university will use the results of the study to understand the justifications for African immigrations to South Africa, and to find ways to assist South African government on how to focus on providing effective security for immigrants and asylum seekers.

1.8.   Limitations of the study

This study will be conducted via desktop-based research, however there are a number of limitations that come with it. For example, there may be outdated data which may not exactly tell current happenings, there may be a limited amount of useful data as there are a number of writers and publishers who may feel hesitant to share every information that is needed. Finally, as a researcher, it is important to be cautious of certain information that may be inaccurate and will hinder the success of the research (Johnston 2014: 624) Thus, this paper will ensure that updated data and information is used throughout.

1.9.   Research Methodology

A research methodology is a coordination of a structured plan, which is applied in conducting research (Igwenagu 2016:5). In essence, it is a structured way of solving

a research problem. According to Goundar (2012), a research methodology is a science of learning how research ought to be conducted. According to Creswell (2014), research methodologies interpret and describe the types of issues worthy of being investigated. Methodologies assist when it comes to selecting and developing suitable means of data collection. It is made up of a research design, research site and sampling, data collection and data analysis.

1.9.1. Research Approach

The term research approach refers to the procedures for acquiring, organising, and analysing a collection of data for scientific study (Polit & Beck, 2012). Furthermore, Polit and Beck (2012) posited that research approaches refer to the study plans and procedures that include fundamental assumptions of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. There are two broad categories of research approaches and these are qualitative and quantitative approaches. This study was based on the qualitative inquiry strategy. Creswell (2014: 9) defined qualitative research as the systematic inquiry into a research problem to gain understanding of a social occurrence through the participants' descriptive narratives.

A qualitative research approach can be used to improve the understanding necessary for assessing if a variable is to a given problem or situation (Galman 2013: 9). This study adopted the phenomenology research design because it is useful in identifying security threats towards African migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees and will provide an understanding of their experiences (Beck 2020:2) in South Africa with regards to dealing with issues such as xenophobia. Furthermore, phenomenology aids in the comprehension of people's lived experiences. A phenomenology research looks at what individuals have gone through and focuses on their perceptions of a phenomenon (Beck 2020:3). Thus, the phenomenology research design will further explore the missing gaps in South Africa's mission to combat perpetual xenophobic and hostile behaviours from citizens, military officials and government officials. Furthermore, it will look at the lived experiences of foreign nationals living in South Africa.

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1.9.2. Research Site and Sampling

A research site is a place where individuals conduct research. Common research sites comprise hospitals, universities, field research locations as well as research institutes (Cooper & Schindler 2006). For this study, the research site will be the university of Pretoria library and will make use of books, internet and other secondary sources of information that will be used to conduct this desktop-based research.

1.9.3. Data Collection

The practice of gathering, measuring, and analysing correct insights for research using established verified methodologies is referred to as data collection (Cant, Gerber-Nel, Nel, & Kotze, 2005). The fact-finding techniques and tools for data collecting are known as data collection instruments. Questionnaires, interviews, observations, and reading are among them (Cooper & Schindler 2006: 46).

This study will make use of desk study research, which will collect data and information from secondary sources such as academic journals, books, the internet and many more. The secondary sources will focus on a number of elements for the research paper, such as causes of the rising nationalism and continued xenophobia. Secondary research or desk study research is beneficial since it is less expensive than primary data generated through interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD), as it offers a solid basis for any research study. Thus, secondary research is a more viable method of data collection to make use of (Johnson 2014:619). In the end the paper will provide recommendations on how the South African government must increase protection of the safety and security of refugees and asylum seekers against the rising nationalism and continued rise of xenophobia in South Africa. The researcher will not conduct any field work that will require to conduct interviews with any respondents since the information needed is readily available in the public domain.

1.9.4. Data Analysis

The process of converting, cleansing, modelling, and analysing data with the goal of finding valuable information to aid decision-making and offer conclusions is known as data analysis (Creswell 2014: 11).

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The study utilised the qualitative content analysis strategy as a primary method which using existing sources that help build the research. Content analysis is an investigative technique for identifying the existence of specific words, topics, or concepts in qualitative data. Researchers can use content analysis to measure and analyse the existence, meanings, and correlations of certain words, themes, or concepts. The study utilised figures, tables and pictures to permit validation, comparison and reliability of the study findings. The study shall analyse existing data from academic journals.

1.9.5. Ethical Considerations

Ethical deliberations are a set of ethical values which is proposed by an individual group and is then extensively applied (Creswell, 2009). It offers guidelines and conduct anticipations about the most suitable behaviour to respondents. Plagiarism is an important ethical issue that must be looked out for when gathering data and information from secondary sources. All the gathered information will be properly acknowledged and cited. Furthermore, the plagiarism declaration form is signed to acknowledge and show adherence to the university guidelines on plagiarism. The study utilised secondary information which is publicly available and does not require permission to access. The study utilised the desk research method and there were no human participants included in the study hence no interviews were conducted.

1.10. Organisation of the Study

The research is split up into five chapters:

Chapter One: Provides the background, problem statement, research questions and research methodology

Chapter Two: Focuses on the Literature Review

Chapter Three: Examines the Conceptual Framework by looking at two of the most fundamental concepts in this study which includes xenophobia and nationalism, and the key security issues that arise from these two constructs.

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Chapter Four: Analyses South Africa's immigration and security policies and security threats against immigrants.

Chapter Five: Focuses on the conclusion and recommendations of the study based on data analysis.

1.11. Conclusion

Examining the South African government's measures to combat perpetual security threats against African immigrants is the fundamental area of concern in this paper. The intention of this first chapter was to lay a premise upon which the following chapters will form from. This chapter provided an introduction to the research theme and the importance of the theme. The theme is as it is concerned about the security of those living in the country, regardless of nationality. It provided a short literature overview of the context of immigration and security in South Africa. The formulation and demarcation of the research problem were identified, as well as the fundamental research questions that the study will strive to answer were further discovered.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

According to Snyder (2019:33), constructing a research continuously and connecting it to the existing framework of knowledge is the foundation of every academic study. Thus, a literature review can widely be characterised as a close methodical way of gathering and synthesizing past research investigations. According to Petticrew and Roberts (2006), a systematic literature review is a system of constructing wide-ranging bodies of knowledge in one logical manner, and a way of providing answers to questions.

Systematic literature reviews and analysis are systems of sketching out areas that lack certainty, as well as pinpointing where there has been little or no pertinent research that has been conducted, and where up to date research studies are required (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). The study utilises systematic literature review to explore the extant on immigration and security in South Africa, as well as immigration policy. Therefore, in order to provide a balanced illustration in connection with the title of this research paper, this study shall review existing literature on immigration and security as well as literature on immigration and security policy in relation to South Africa.

According to Ilgit and Klotz (2014:147), immigration is a multifaceted phenomenon which provokes a number of concerns beyond national identity. The relationship between immigration and security is not new. "Security" can be seen in numerous forms, and as a result, it has many different meanings across a wide array of cultures and measures.

2.2. Concept of Immigration

Immigration is described as the movement of individuals from their own nation or area to a foreign country to reside (Posel & Casale, 2003). According to Boynton (2015:12), the United Nations has defined an international migrant as someone who moves away from their normal country of residence for a period of at least a year (Borjas, 2014). Immigration is a representation of international migration. According to United Nations (2015) study published in 2015, there are over 200 million foreign migrants globally. Immigration has a long and varied history and has often resulted in the formation of

multicultural communities and nations comprise of a diverse range of cultures and ethnicities developed from earlier eras of immigration (Borjas, 2014).

Scholars classify and study immigration according to several ideas of migration that form the basis for global movement (Joppke, 2010). Until the late 1980s, academic discussion on migration was divided between neoclassical and "historical structuralist" perspectives (de Haas, 2010). According to Boynton (2015, 14), Lewis (1954) as well as Harris & Torado (1970), all emphasise on "income maximisation" as a primary motivator of migration (Monson, 2010). Neoclassical scholars argue that people want to live in a nation that optimizes their well-being (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2012). By contrast, the historical structural perspective views migration as a means by which wealthy nations get cheap labour, maintaining inequality in development and exploiting the human resources of impoverished countries for their own benefit (Castles & Kosack, 2010).

International migration is driven by wealthy countries or rapidly urbanizing countries in need of cheap labour (Castles, 2015). Criticisms of historical and neoclassical migration theories have resulted in a more nuanced and multidisciplinary theoretical approach to migration understanding (Amelina & Horvath, 2017). According to migratory systems theory, different areas are linked through previous connections based on colonialism, political power, commerce, investment, or cultural relations (Castles & Miller, 2009).

In contrast, migration networks theory, which has its origins in anthropology and sociology, asserts that movement persists across time and distance as a result of interpersonal connections (kinship or friendship) between migrants and inhabitants of their home country (Haug, 2008). Migrants often maintain contact with their loved one's in their homelands, return to their homelands, and recruit new migrants to the new country they relocated to (Light & Von Scheven, 2008). Due to the diversity of migration theories, de Haas (2010) attempted to integrate previous theories of migration and provide a complete blueprint for analysing migration by using an interdisciplinary approach to all levels of study.

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However, Haug (2008) acknowledged that there is no cohesive or exhaustive explanation of why international migration exists. The assertion by Hague (2008) is supported by Crush and Fayne (2010) who stated that:

> "*Since the reasons of migration are multiple, varied, scale-dependent, and often country-specific, a complete theory of migration can never fully account for all migratory trends*" (Crush & Frayne, 2010: 4).

2.3. Migration to South Africa: A Historical Perspective

Prior to the twentieth century, interregional migration was important for the South African economy. South Africa encouraged the exploitation of affordable contractual labour from Southern African nations for its own mines under apartheid (Crush, 2011). Contract labour and apartheid legislation had a significant impact on migration to South Africa in the early 1900s (Chirwa, 1998). Prior to 1963, inhabitants of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland could easily travel to South Africa (Boynton 2015:15), but once there, they were subjected to apartheid constraints on mobility and residency (Chirwa, 1998). In addition, migrant workers in mines were also recruited in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi (Neocosmos, 2010).

In 1970, 81% of the 434,000 black foreign workers in South Africa worked in mining, 9% in agricultural, 4% in manufacturing and construction and the remaining 6% in other sectors (Budlender, 2013: 23). Mine migration was strictly regulated and supervised, with the majority of supervision exercised by a single body, the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). Apart from people migrating to work in mines, there was also illegal migration to South Africa.

Illegal migration to South Africa became more common due to financial, political and social problems in the SADC region (Boynton, 2015:15) (Budlender, 2013). Illegal migration to South Africa continues to occur across the SADC area and beyond as a consequence of poverty, economic insecurity, environmental devastation, political uncertainty, and conflict (Machecka et al., 2015). Economic hardships in Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and prompted illegal migration to South Africa in the 1980s. Furthermore, environmental, socioeconomic, and political issues in Lesotho have led in the illegal flow of forced migrants to South Africa (Boynton, 2015:16), which has been helped by porous borders (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015).

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New options and incentives for foreign migration developed with the end of an age of control and exclusion, including pardons in 1995, 1996, and 1999/2000 that allowed illegal labour migrants and other SADC citizens to obtain permanent status in South Africa (Reed, 2013). Thus, migrants from outside the area rushed to the new democratic state to take advantage of the country's political transition, including Nigerians, Congolese, Kenyans, and Ugandans (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015).

South Africa became Africa's primary migratory hotspot between 1990 and 2000, bringing hundreds of thousands of migrants from all across Africa, as well as various countries from the global north like Europe, China and Pakistan (Solomon, 2005). From one million in 1990 to over 11 million in 2010, the number of lawful immigrants entering South Africa rose dramatically. Furthermore, the UN reported that from1990 all the way to 2010, the level of global migrants increased from 1.2 to 1.9 million (UNDESA, 2009: 283).

Water scarcity has been highlighted as a significant migratory factor (Ionesco et al., 2016). In the next sixty years, large sections of Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa will very certainly be unsuitable for cereal crop cultivation, all other factors being equal and these climate alterations will have a severe impact on livelihoods and food scarcity, which will likely function as key catalysts for migration into South Africa (Ionesco et al., 2016).

2.4. Migrant trends in South Africa

South Africa was rated sixth in the world in terms of yearly net migration between 2000 and 2010. (UNDESA, 2013: 13). Despite being ranked sixth in net migration, South Africa's foreign population was just 3% in 2013, opposed to nations like Australia, where the non-citizen born population was approximately 28%, and Singapore, where the non-citizen born population was approximately 43%. (UNDESA, 2013: 13). A survey by Masenya (2017) showed that the proportion of foreign nationals in South Africa is estimated to be between 3% and 7% of the total population. More precisely, migration to South Africa has been marked by two main demographic trends: an increase in African migrants and a decline in European migrants (Khan, 2007).

Khan (2007) on migration trends in South Africa acknowledged that:

"*Patterns of migration observed in South Africa have become progressively more complex and diverse in recent times with South Africa attracting not only refugees and asylum seekers but also skilled professionals from across the continent as well as environmental and socio economic migrants*" (Khan, 2007:1)

According to UNDESA (2020),) approximately 2.9 million migrants are in South Africa and the figures is understated due to non-accounting of illegal migrants. Kok and Collinson (2006) defined migrants who enter South Africa based on four migration dichotomies based on length of stay, reasons for migration and legal status and these are: permanent migrants, labour migrants, refugee/asylum seeking and clandestine or illegal migrants. The study focused on all types of immigrants as noted by Kok and Collinson (2006). According to Human Rights Watch (2019), during the xenophobic attcks, the offenders did not distinguish between undocumented and documented immigrants hence all were at risk. Xenophobia refers to the hostility towards foreign nations (Field, 2017). Based on the assertions by the Human Rights Watch (2019) and Field (2017), the study focused on all immigrants as they are all vulnerable to xenophobic attacks.

2.4.1. Labour Migrants

As many African nations struggle to realise economic growth and development, the majority of migrants to South Africa are economic migrants seeking employment. Additionally, high unemployment levels in Southern African nations has contributed to high numbers of migrants to South Africa where Botswana had a 17.2% unemployment rate in 2012, Lesotho had a 28.3% unemployment and Namibia stood at 37.5% (Boynton, 2015:20) (Statistics South African Survey, 2012: 267). With the liberalization of the economy, the number of foreign workers who moved to South increased (Kok & Collinson, 2006).

Female low-skilled workers were also among the migrants to South Africa by 2006, accounting for 30% of all Basotho migrant workers in the country (IOM, 2017). From 1994 to 2010, the number of people visiting South Africa with the intention of working increased from 70,000 in 1994 to 179,000 in 2010. (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 37). However, Crush *et al*. (2005) argued the labour migrant figures do not include the number of individuals arriving for work or who are "job-seeking," which is considerably

greater. Since 1990, the Department of Home Affairs has increased the number of work permits granted, doubling the amount in 2008 (to 32,000 permits issued) (Williams, 2015).

African and Asian nationals currently get more work permits in South Africa than they did prior to 1994. Zimbabwe is South Africa's largest receiver of work permits, representing 24% of all work permits granted by the country (Williams, 2015). South Africa is the primary destination for highly trained labour in the financial services sector (African Union, 2017). Up-skilling is becoming more popular among semi-skilled migrants to South Africa, while commercial agriculture consumes a significant share of low-skilled migrant labour (UNCTAD, 2018: 81-85).

2.4.2. Refugee and Asylum Seekers

Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and across the continent is another important reason pushing migration to South Africa (Johnson, 2015). Civil unrest, political violence, financial turmoil, sustainability concerns, human rights violations, and cultural disputes have all played a significant role to the surge of African refugees and asylum seekers (Belvedere, 2007). Around the 1990s, migrant workers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola arrived in South Africa seeking sanctuary from unstable political regimes. Since 1998, South African law has incorporated refugee protection, namely freedom of movement, employment, and social assistance for refugees and asylum seekers (Belvedere, 2007).

In 2014, South Africa had about 65,000 refugees, many of whom had been there for years (Budlender, 2013: 41). Regardless of the fact that South Africa has long been Africa's leading refugee and asylum option, the quantity of applications continues to rise year after year. Between 1998 and 2011, the number of new refugee requests (Boynton, 2015: 22) grew from 11,000 to over 100,000, reaching a high of 340,000 in 2009 (Budlender, 2013: 41).

While the majority of refugees have recently arrived from the SADC area, asylum seekers are also travelling from other regions of Africa and south-central Asia (Johnson, 2015). Despite the fact that South Africa has a large number of asylum seekers, only a small percentage of them get accepted (Budlender, 2013). In 2013, about 68,000 asylum requests were filed in the country (Boynton, 2015:23),

however, approximately 7,000 were given asylum (Department of Home Affairs Asylum Statistics, 2013: 8). According to World Bank (2018) the number of asylum applications has been declining since 2009 to 2018 hence 18 104 applications were recorded in 2018.

2.4.3. Permanent Migrants

Individuals become permanent residents or citizens of another nation via the immigration process (Kok & Collinson, 2006). In the early 1980s, about 30,000 foreigners were granted permanent residency annually on average; although, from 1994, the annual number of foreigners granted legal residency has therefore been at or less than 5,000, with just 1,000 permits granted in 2012 (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 36). While European permanent immigration has decreased, the number of permanent migrants from African states to South Africa has risen (Johnson, 2015).

In 2013, African immigrants accounted for 67% of all permanent residents, with 46% coming from the SADC area alone (Gordon, 2016). Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Nigeria, as well as China received the most permanent residence visas (Weda & De Villiers, 2019). As is the case with temporary visas, the sum total of Chinese and Indian immigrants is increasing, as are those from Pakistan and Bangladesh (Johnson, 2015).

2.4.4. Illegal Migrants

South Africa is challenged with a high rate of irregular migration and this is exacerbated by the prohibitively high expense of enforcement (Department of Home Affairs, 2017). According to Crush (2017), the number of illegal migrants to South Africa has increased over the years but not "floods" as portrayed in the public media (Kupakuwana, 2017). In addition Kupakuwana (2017) noted that although the trend shows that there has been an increase in illegal migrants, there are debates around the figure which in most cases is an estimate. Statistics South Africa (2021) noted that based on estimates, the number of migrants is estimated to be 3.95 million which is inclusive of both legal and illegal migrants.

The number of illegal migrants increased in the 1990s as a result of the poor institutional and legal procedures to regulate migration in post-apartheid South Africa (Steenkamp, 2009). Nonetheless, the precise figure of illegal migrants in South Africa is difficult to determine (Adepoju, 2003). According to Crush (1999), the South African government and law enforcement purposefully exacerbated the total of illegal migrants in the nation for strategic motives or other reasons. Thus, government officials in South Africa have exploited and manufactured enormous statistics of illegal migrants in order to sell a narrative of "floods" and "waves" of undocumented "aliens" threatening their socioeconomic interests (Crush, 1999: 5).

According to Budlender (2013:33), the estimated number of illegal migrants in the country is likely to be around 3 million. Employers in South Africa's construction and service industries show a clear preference for illegal and undocumented non-South African workers (Crush, 2011: 16). Employers may more easily circumvent labour rules, reduce salaries, and withhold benefits when they hire illegal workers (Dana, 2007).

The increase in the number of illegal migrants is explained by the institutional theory of migration. The institutional theory of migration posits that once there is international migration, non-governmental and private organisations arise to capture the flow of migrants into capital rich countries there by creating a black market for falsification of documents and arranged marriages between locals and migrants (Karpestam & Andersson, 2013).

2.5. National Security and immigration

With the rapid increase of the worldwide immigrant population, the belief of immigration as a threat to security has changed (Tallmeister, 2013:6). In the battle against human and drug trafficking, as well as terrorism, immigration policy has been connected to national and regional security. Indeed, greater national initiatives to reinforce and redefine the sovereign nation-borders states have resulted from the securitisation of immigration. National security concerns were connected to views about national culture and how immigration was changing national identity (Bordeau, 2009).

The existence of diverse ethnic communities in formerly racial or tribal homogenous regions has also led to the notion that national identity is being questioned. As a result, national culture and identity must be safeguarded against immigration. In the instance of South Africa, the development of a new national identity was critical to the development of unity in the post-apartheid era, to the point where it produced a shared identity while also establishing a boundary between South African residents and everyone else residing in the country (Huysmans, 2012).

It is vital for immigration and security policies to be consistent in promoting positive immigration narratives and perceptions emphasising on positive refugee and migrant dividend. Anti-migrant, xenophobic narratives by politicians who seek to profiteer from popular discontent and making migrants a scapegoat for advancement of their own agendas reflects non- acceptance of evidence of migrant dividends (Yakushko, 2009).

Immigration and security policy should find means to govern migration in positive ways that create and strengthen migrant's conditions for positive contributions to societies instead of directing them to unsafe and informal routes. Policies that create limited legal and safe pathways for migrants, ascribing criminality to migration as well as threats and inducement of fear to undocumented migrants will do little to curb migration flows and instead it propels illicit migration (Huysmans, 2012).

2.6. Conclusion

The Chapter presented the literature on migration and national security. The immigration is the process of moving from one country to the other. There are four types of migrants and these are refugees/asylum seekers, labour migrants, permanent migrants and illegal migrants. Immigration is considered a threat to national security. The concept of national security has changed from focusing on war but also includes humanistic security. The next chapter presents the conceptual framework for immigration, xenophobia and national security.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

Chapter one provided a basis for the study by formulating and demarcating the research problem and providing key research questions that ought to be explored. Chapter One also made reference to specific concepts that will be further explored in this chapter. A theoretical framework is the foundation of the research problem and it provides an understanding of how specific variables in the research study connect. It provides a clear map in furthering the investigation (Kumar, 2014:57). In this case, the chapter will focus on two concepts of xenophobia and nationalism, and it will further look at its effects on the issue of national security in South Africa.

3.2. Conceptualising Xenophobia

According to Akinola (2017:32), the word xenophobia comes from two Greek words: *xeno,* which means stranger, and *phobia* which means dread. In general, xenophobia is defined as the intolerance of "outsiders" but it has recently been carried out to encompass the dislike of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and it is frequently associated with hostile acts of violence (Field, 2017). Mogekwu (2002) defines xenophobia as a strong hate of a receiving state's non-nationals shown in a discriminating attitude and conduct toward such non-nationals and often resulting in violence against them, other forms of abuse, and the display of hatred.

According to some scholars, Xenophobia is referred to as the animosity or dread of others (Nyamnjoh, 2006); phobia of dissimilarity expressed in individuals or societies (Berezin, 2006); or antagonism towards outsiders and all who are foreign (Stolcke, 1999). The interchangeability or complementarity of words like nationalism, indigenous, xeno-racism and afrophobia (Crush et al., 2009) exemplifies the abstract ambiguity around xenophobia. Xenophobia is a worldwide issue that has affected both developed and underdeveloped nations.

According to Banton (1996:8), sociologists have identified that racism and xenophobia are two facets from the same movement within a given society. Kollapan (1999:22), former Chairperson of South Africa`s Human Rights Commission, argued that the word xenophobia has to embody practice or action and cannot just be defined as an attitude. Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in Africa and has occurred across

many continents and countries for years (Okem & Asuelime 2015:43). The prevalent xenophobic milieu in South Africa clearly provides a common mental state and an intense psychological setting for xenophobic violence mobilisation (Bostock, 2010).

3.2.1. Theoretical Model on Xenophobia

This part looks at how the literature characterises theoretical responses to xenophobic attacks, as well as the larger theoretical arguments that this subject is located within or interacts with. It demonstrates that, although dominant theoretical theories contribute significantly to our knowledge of xenophobic and collective violence, when used as adequate explanations, they fall short and need augmentation. There deprivation approach is the most common approach which theoretically highlights xenophobia (Nukaga, 2006).

The core thesis of theories under the deprivation method, also known as the dissatisfaction or volcano model, is that widespread objective and recognised deficiency in social, political or economic security results to widespread dissatisfaction, which then breaks out in collective violence. (Aya, 1979; Snyder, 1978). The most prominent theories under the deprivation approach are relative deprivation theory, realistic conflict theory and functionalism (Sen, 2008).

3.2.1.1. Functionalism Theory

The functionalist theory of "collective violence" (Misago, 2016a:13) analyses it in terms of its purpose and motivations, rather than the reasons upon which it is predicated (Cohen, 1995). Coser (1967) stated that:

> *"The determination of function is necessary for the complete explanation of the phenomena. To explain a social fact it is not enough to show the cause on which it depends; we must also, at least in most cases, show its function in the establishment of social order"* (Coser, 1967:140).

At both the individual and collective levels, violence may be used to achieve personal and social objectives when lawful methods are seen to have failed (Straus, 1973). According to Misago (2016a: 14) "collective violence" is frequently viewed as a justified effort to preserve or restore 'threatening', collective, and systemic systems (Coser,

1967). It is driven by the critical need for grievance resolution (Aya, 1979). According to Human Rights Watch (2019), the xenophobic attacks in 2019 were viewed as a way of getting rid of criminal elements brought by foreign nationals into the society. A study by Helen Suzman Foundation (2019) noted that 33% of interviewed South Africans viewed xnophoic attacks as way of responding to criminal activities of illegal foreign national. The notion by Human Rights Watch and the findings by Helen Suzman Foundation (2019) support the functionalism theory to collective violence.

3.2.1.2. Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Pragmatic group conflict theory, is a variation on functionalism, which claims that violent disputes within communities is driven by a battle of conflicting group interests, such as financial or social status (Brief et al, 2005). Realistic conflict theories assume that economic rivalry and the desire to be materially better off are the primary explaining mechanism for social violence. Interpersonal conflict over legitimate interests such as territory, employment, authority, and financial gain, according to Insko et al. (1992), causes social violence. Competition among groups for resources and opportunities, according to the theory, can lead to collective tension and, finally, hostile group conflict (Sniderman et al, 2004). According to Helen Suzman Foundation (2019) foreign nationals are regarded as competing with locals for jobs and are used as a scapegoat for increased unemployment by the government.

3.2.1.3. Realistic Deprivation Theory

According to the realistic deprivation hypothesis, individual or group-level sensations of deprivation, as well as accompanying emotions of disillusionment and marginalisation, occur when there is a mismatch between "value expectations and value capabilities" (Misago, 2016a: 15) as represented in the collective and mortal conditions (Aya, 1979). The risk of violence increases where widespread and severe deprivation occurs (Conteh-Morgan, 2004), and the likelihood for domestic crime varies considerably depending on the severity and breadth of poverty amongst members of a community (de Gaay Fortman, 2005). The extent and severity of relative deprivation on some criteria generates differences in collective dissatisfaction, which is a key predictor of collective violence according to the relative deprivation theory (Snyder, 1978).

Due to the high unemployment and declining public service, xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals show the frustrations of locals towards the failures of the government in providing sufficient economic opportunities and failure to control immigration (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Several incidents of xenophobic violence have been documented in areas where violent protests over lack of service delivery were formerly common, and community rallies frequently contain components of xenophobic violence against foreign-owned informal trades (Misago, 2016a: 57) (von Holdt et al, 2011).

Despite its widespread usage, the deprivation strategy does not define the circumstances under which expectations may be disappointed without resulting in violence.

> *"They merely presume causal links between dissatisfaction and rebellion, thus deficient in explaining the issue they claim to have addressed"* (Aya, 1979: 57).

South African societies have a recorded background of resorting to vigilantism and violence to problem solving when appropriate institutions and existing practices for resolving conflict have fallen short of properly addressing problems of concern (Misago, 2016b). However, the deprivation approach to collective violence has been subjected to criticism. Many academics have found that changes in deprivation (poverty) and the occurrence and timing of collective violence have almost no link (Oberschall, 2010). According to Simpson (1991), deprivation and the consequent dissatisfaction are a "constant" that fails to properly outline the frequency of community violence in various locations as well as periods.

3.2.2. Xenophobia in South Africa

Tevera (2013), xenophobia is a word more frequently used to indicate a 'dislike of immigrants and it leads to high hostility and violence directed against immigrants by South Africans. Migration has become more prominent in a rapidly globalising environment and is a policy challenge for many countries around the globe, including the South African government (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017). Violent xenophobia has been a common occurrence in South Africa. For instance, between March 25 to April 2 of 2019, South African citizens who were mainly black, showed vast levels of hostility and violence against African immigrants in the eastern eThekwini Municipality.

The presence of non-nationals of black and Asian ancestry in South Africa is typically unsettling to South Africans. This is demonstrated in a variety of statistical data generated at both the national and provincial levels:

- A quarter (25%) of South Africans want an outright ban on immigration and migration, significantly greater than the rest of the region's countries (Crush, 2000);
- 87% of the locals are of the view that the government is ignorant towards foreign nationals (Misago, 2016a: 34);
- 20% of South Africans believe that those who hail from a neighbouring country and is legitimately or illegally present in South Africa, should be deported (IDASA, 2011);
- 64.8% are of the view that all black foreign national (legal or illegal) should be deported. By contrast, few view it as a priority to eradicate the country's white population (Misago et al., 2015).

The attacks resulted in the deaths and serious injuries of foreign national victims, with many of these incidences attracting attention of the media and officials, while the majority remain unnoticed and unreported (Gordon, 2015). While the South African government permits refugees to work for basic services, the competition between the nationals and refugees for housing, work, social services and other opportunities has elevated tensions and serious attitudes of xenophobia (Zihindula et al. 2017). According to Misago (2017):

> *"In South African and perhaps in other contexts, xenophobia manifests in various forms, ranging from everyday street-level abuse to discrimination and harassment by government officials and recurring bouts of popular xenophobic violence in varying intensity and scale. There is strong evidence that non-nationals and other outsiders living and working in South Africa face discrimination at the hands of citizens, government officials, the police, and private organisations contracted to manage and provide services, promote urban development or manage detention and deportation processes"* (Masango, 2017:9)

Thus, xenophobia is an increasing phenomenon in South Africa and it is ultimately affecting the country's democratic constitution and its influence to the country's state

security system. There are a number of reasons for cross-border migration, often being poverty and oppressive regimes. Therefore, people often flee their birth country in search for a better life that is more sustainable and secure. This is often seen with African migrants from various parts of the continent, migrating to South Africa where there is less political instability. However, this pursuit for a more sustainable life can result in competition for scarce resources in the host economy. This is commonly seen in South Africa where there is high unemployment rate (Tshishonga, 2015).

As a result, these tensions lead to xenophobic attacks. Towards the end of 2006, a report from New Partnership for Africa's Development's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) for South Africa alerted of xenophobic attacks and violence in the country, however, little effort was made to alleviate or prevent the attacks during Mbeki's presidency (Crush & Ramachandran, 2017). In 2008, a number of South African mob- groups attacked and murdered migrants mostly from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and as a result, 62 people were murdered and over 100,000 were dispersed. In most cases such as this, xenophobic attacks usually occur in poor and informal settlements (Nagar & Saunders 2011:37).

Furthermore, the presence of xenophobia in the country has affected a number of informal migrant businesses. For example, the vast development of informal migrant business in the Republic since 1990 could have been greatly applauded if it was not for the prominent characteristic that the individuals in question are perceived as outsiders or foreigners. In essence, they are consistently viewed as being unwanted as well as disadvantaged and poor South African populations (Tshishonga, 2015).

The developing presence of refugees and foreign nationals in the informal settlements has generated numerous strains in the country, together with the administrative spheres, disregarding the basis that in the open market economy of South Africa, immigrants as well as refugees, like citizens as well as business enterprises, would then appreciate the freedom to create, function and expand. A number of immigrant entrepreneurs living in South Africa have in some cases been forced to close their businesses temporarily because of xenophobic assaults, while others have had to close permanently due to losses suffered as a result of the attacks (Khosa & Kalitanyi 2014: 11). Racism, cultural adaptation, and fear of outsiders all contribute to

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the ultimate threat of immigrants' entrepreneurial mindset (Halkias, Thuram, Harkiolaskis & Caracatsanis, 2015: 18).

Non-South Africans were obliged to close their enterprises and flee the country (Tshishonga, 2015: 32). Crush and Ramachandran (2017: 9) emphasised on the failure of key authorities to tackle the issue, claiming that bureaucrats have prejudiced attitudes that are indistinguishable from those of regular residents, and that assaults on immigrant businesses are not xenophobic. Xenophobia may wreak havoc on immigrant business owners' plans by causing them to lose their livelihood and revenue (Masocha, Buso, & Fatoki, 2017).

3.2.3. Causes of Xenophobia in South Africa

3.2.3.1. Socioeconomic Factors

The main reason of xenophobic conflicts in South Africa is competition for scarce opportunities as well as resources amongst locals and an increasing number of poor African migrants, particularly during a period of high unemployment, poverty, and price inflation that continues to rise for basic needs such as food (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013). According to Dodson (2010) analysts commonly refer to large-scale reasons (poverty, widespread discontent, extremism, resource competition, and bad living circumstances) as conditions for conflict and violence.

Bekkers et al (2011) posited that the explanations for xenophobia provided by the media, government leaders and academics, observed the socio-economic constraints within affected communities. Labonté et al. (2015) highlighted that:

> *"The government's inability to address chronic poverty, joblessness, a lack of adequate housing and basic amenities had resulted in dissatisfied people scapegoating foreign migrants."* (Labonté et al., 2015: 9)

The socio-economic factors that are recognised as the causes of xenophobia in South Africa are divided into competition for resources, poor service delivery and poor border controls.

3.2.3.1.1. Competition for Resources

Discourse produces and reproduces the image of immigrants as a burden on a country's social care system. According to Zanker and Moyo (2020), using metaphors like "floods" or "invasions" to describe refugee and asylum seeker flows, promotes the sense that immigrants pose a threat to the host country's political and social security by exaggerating the problems that these flows create.

According to a report by Sian et al. (2012) on journalists' and reporters' depiction of displaced migrants in London, factually incorrect and unreliable publications, which frequently relates to massive influxes of asylum seekers and refugees, caused fear and insecurity among the local indigenous group, as well as hostile attitudes towards immigrants.

Residents, politicians, and a number of scholars think that violent assaults on foreign nationals were prompted by heated and "illegitimate" rivalry between locals and foreign nationals for limited economic opportunities in an environment of widespread poverty and unemployment (Smith, 2011). Competition is more strongly felt and disliked in the areas of employment, housing, business prospects, and essential services such as welfare and social assistance (Gomo, 2010).

In terms of commercial rivalry, some community members, especially informal company owners, claim that immigrants have harmed local companies to the point that they have been forced to stop operations due to their inability to compete (Gomo, 2010). According to Steenkamp (2009), the spread of hostilities over economic rivalry between Somali and locally owned enterprises sparked xenophobic violence in Masiphumelele in August 2006.

3.2.3.1.2. Poor Service Delivery

Numerous academics have connected the eruption of violence to the government's inability to construct state-funded housing, supply enough water, or generate the employment people believed they deserved (Joubert, 2008). Similarly, poor service delivery as a contributor of xenophobic violence, CRAI (2009:6) noted that:

"Government of South Africa's inability to live up to post-apartheid expectations about economic circumstances and service delivery" (CRAI, 2009:6).

Furthermore, according to Joubert (2008), public officials have occasionally faulted foreigners for the lack of service delivery, and have stated that the growing pressure foreign nationals place on government services and the challenges communities face in planning adequately, has been jeopardised by the increases in foreign nationals. Conversely, a study by Fauvelle-Aymar (2015) highlighted that it was not always the poorest regions or groups that mobilized to fight foreigners in their midst.

3.2.3.1.3. Poor Border Control

Another often cited argument, related to economic considerations, Some scholars argue that government's inability to manage its borders, which resulted in an increase in illegal immigrants into South Africa, played a fundamental role to the outbreak of violence. The portrayal of porous borders by the media heightened long-held concerns about foreign invasion of South Africa. Crush et al (2009) stated that:

"South African held the view that the nation is being 'flooded' by millions of illegal migrants from the rest of Africa" (Crush et al, 2009:16)(Misago, 2016a: 108).

Similarly, Misago (2011) acknowledged the view of foreign invasion of South Africa and termed it:

"The people tsunami over porous boundaries" (Misago, 2011:91).

Fauvelle-Aymar (2015) highlighted that proponents of the "mass inflow" theory, suggests or utilises the concept of a "threshold of tolerance," which is frequently cited by anti-immigrant activists in the United Kingdom and further afield to try and validate "anti-immigrant violence" (Misago, 2016a: 109). The concept behind the "threshold of tolerance" (Misago, 2016a: 109) theorem is that the more migrants there are and the more varied they are, the more violent the response will be (Fauvelle-Aymar, 2015).

Although there is substantive proof that migration rose as a consequence of the Zimbabwean crisis, there is no indication that regions experiencing violence were

disproportionately impacted by the increasing inflows (Crush & Tevera, 2010). The regions that were most hit by xenophobic violence in May 2008 were not necessarily those with the greatest concentrations of immigrants according to statistics (Fauvelle-Aymar, 2015).

These material and financial reasons are highlighted in the deprivation theoretical paradigm. Bekkers *et al.* (2011) noted that economic explanations overwhelmingly fit within the relative deprivation framework. According to Tella (2016) the rise in inequality after the end of Apartheid has resulted in unjust attitudes of superiority and feelings of "relative hardship" , thus are at the core of social unrest (Pillay, 2008:94). Furthermore, (Tella, 2016) added that reasonable expectations and unfulfilled fundamental rights and needs generate a unique kind of dissatisfaction that makes immigrants easy targets anytime service delivery problems arise.

Conversely, McConnell (2009) are of the view that while it is reasonable to see xenophobic violence as a straight result of "material hardship" and competitiveness among impoverished South Africans, it fails to justify why all impoverished areas did not erupt in May 2008 (Misago, 2016a: 17). The findings by Everatt (2011) are aligned to the results found by Bötticher (2009). A study by Bötticher (2009) concluded that there was no clear causal link around joblessness, standards of living, or mass migration and the emergence of violence against immigrants in Germany. Suhrke (2011) posited that it is because of their visibility and noticeability that immigrants are exploited as scapegoats for resentment against broader socioeconomic problems and changes rather than the actual challenges.

3.2.3.2. Political Factors

The origins of xenophobic assaults in South Africa are founded in historical and present political and institutional structures that continue to see unrestricted human movement as a danger to insiders' financial and personal security, as well as national success (Landau, 2011). CRAI (2009:7) contends that South Africa's history of apartheid and segregation, fostered xenophobic violence in a variety of ways.

> *"To begin, it politicized concepts of identity and value, encouraging black South*
> *Africans to see themselves not just as inferior to whites, but also as distinct from*

the rest of the continent. Second, it promoted the isolation and compartmentalization of different communities as a method of administration, while discouraging integration or interaction between groups. Finally, it institutionalized violence as a method of expressing complaints and advancing political objectives" (CRAI, 2009:7)

Post-apartheid immigration laws and enactments emphasised a profound wariness of those who relocate to South Africa (Dodson, 2010) and recast the non-citizen as the "violable alien" (Misago, 2016a: 114), all in the name of establishing a new national identity and protecting the new generation of citizens (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011). Landau (2011) noted that Home Affairs Minister in 1997 commented that:

"South Africa is also confronted with another threat: the SADC philosophy of free movement of people, open commerce, and the right to choose one's place of residence or employment. Individual freedom of movement means catastrophe for our nation" (Laundau, 2011: 6)

Along with government policies and rhetoric, the media contributed significantly to the poor portrayal of foreign people, which fostered prejudice (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011). Migrants are dehumanized and the probability of violence increases when they are shown as arriving in 'waves' and 'hordes' and when they are referred to as 'job stealers' and 'aliens (Hagensen, 2014).

Analysts have argued that the government's inability to fulfill people's social and economic rights after 1994 (for instance, its failure to live up to post-apartheid expectations for economic circumstances and service delivery), is the cause of violence towards foreign nationals (Adam & Moodley, 2013). According to Hagensen (2014), these faults are an indication of general concern with the democratic nation's development, government's seeming failure to generate employment or deliver public services, and the citizens' subsequent estrangement from the state's leaders. Under President Thabo Mbeki's administration, Klotz (2016) found that impoverished residents rapidly saw the elites in politics, business and government entities, as disconnected from their interests about employment, public services, as well as welfare and security.

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3.2.4. Response to Xenophobia

The African Union's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) acknowledged in its assessment on South Africa that xenophobia was a significant issue for the country and encouraged the ANC government to address it via coordinated effort (AU, 2006). Landau (2015) argued that denial and relocation best describe the government's responses to evidence of post-1994 xenophobic sentiments and behaviours. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the May 2008 violence was also marked by tumultuous first statements from a variety of players, including various levels of government, opposition leaders, the law enforcement agencies, non-state actors, the media, and ordinary citizens (Sichone, 2020). The persistence of violence over many days in the majority of impacted regions demonstrated the police and other relevant local authorities' incapacity to put an end to the violence and/or prevent it from expanding to other places (Sichoone, 2020). According to Pillay (2017) the severity and fast geographic distribution of the May 2008 xenophobic unrest exceeded the capabilities of conventional law enforcement agencies, necessitating the deployment of the military to quell the assaults.

After almost two weeks of murder and looting, former President Thabo Mbeki authorised the mobilisation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in response to a plea from an overburdened police force (Steinberg, 2012). However, by the time the army arrived, the bulk of foreign nationals had been purged from their hostile neighbourhoods and had quietly re-entered the townships' embrace (Steinberg, 2012). Local authorities and police were usually unwilling to intervene when faced with the danger and breakout of violence for a variety of reasons, including:

- their common perceptions of the general public and a desire for foreign nationals to depart;
- risk of victimisation; and
- risk of losing political power and credibility (Misago, 2019).

During the xenophobic violence in May 2008, the South African government activated dedicated units, established ad hoc delegations, and appointed task forces within the

legislature, ministries, province and municipal governments, and the police (Mosselson, 2010). Prior to and after the 2008 attacks, it was widely claimed that denialism was to blame for the government's general reaction to xenophobia and related violence in South Africa (Crush, 2014). In many situations, such denial is rooted in a language that classifies all xenophobic violence as simply being a crime, rather as xenophobia, a definition that necessitates few particular interventions or policy adjustments (Crush, 2011). The initial government responses for the xenophobic attacks of 2008 was denialism where it was argued that the violence that erupted were pure acts of criminality (Misago, 2016). With respect to xenophobia denial, the Mandela and Mbeki administrations made little efforts to recognise or confront increasing xenophobia (Crush, 2001). President Thabo Mbeki stated publicly that not once did he ever encounter a xenophobic South African, and that anybody who labelled South Africans as being "xenophobic was guilty of xenophobia" (Crush, 2014).

> "None in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia." (Crush, 2014: 8).

From 2008 on, ruling-party leaders avoided using the word xenophobia in referral to violence against migrants and blamed it on crime (Crush, 2020). The notion that assaults on migrants and refugees are criminal actions, not acts of xenophobia, remained official dogma even after President Mbeki (Crush, 2014). In 2015 at the African Union meeting, President Zuma noted that South Africans were not xenophobic and stated that:

> "Millions of peace-loving South Africans are in pain also because they are being accused of xenophobia, which is not true. South Africans are definitely not xenophobic" (Crush, 2020).

Denialism of xenophobia indicated a clear misunderstanding and ignorance by the state officials (Muchiri, 2016). The second component of denial and displacement governance is scapegoating or attributing responsibility for violence to migrants themselves (Masuku & Rama, 2020). Denialism also came in the form of shifting the blame to the government for the failure to effectively manage the borders (Crush,

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2014). The citizens blame the government for failure to control the borders and criminality in foreign communities as a result of increases in xenophobic violence (Copland, 2009). Denialism was compatible with the propensity to disregard scientific data about the existence of xenophobia by the government (Muchiri, 2016). Xenophobia is still prevalent as mechanisms against violence and discriminations have been largely overlooked by the government and tagged as mere criminality (Landau, 2012). Furthermore, Landau (2012) posited that denialism of xenophobia is a hindrance towards combating it.

After first denying the xenophobic situation and making futile pleas for calm, the administration sent military in June 2008 to quell the unrest (Landau, 2011). Official denial was followed by reactive efforts to explain the violence's origins and quell the violence. Initial responses were naturally unsubstantial and based on erroneous or out-dated evidence, political justifications, and idealistic positions instead of scientific facts (Fauvelle-Aymar et al., 2011). According to a study of the government's reaction to the APRM report, official efforts to combat xenophobia were inadequate and were weakened additionally by strives to deny its presence (Masuku & Rama, 2020).

Another government response was xenophobia minimalism. Xenophobic minimalists reject it as a cause of violence towards refugees and migrants, regarding it as a symptom of more fundamental problems (Crush, 2014). The fundamental problems that are attributed as causes of xenophobia are few job opportunities and poor service delivery (Labonté et al., 2015). The minimalists support the deprivation approach to violence where competition for economic resources led to xenophobia (Crush, 2014). Other governmental actions also contributed to the violence by supporting the attackers' objectives - to separate foreigners from areas and the nation - and additionally, criminalising the victims (Monson & Misago, 2009). The police were tasked with the responsibility of transporting foreign people to police stations and other secure locations, rather than guarding them and their belongings on the ground. Authorities from the Department of Home Affairs inspected several refuges to verify on the victims' immigration status, and those who were determined to be ineligible for deportation were removed (Gordon, 2015).

Furthermore, the Department of Home Affairs organised "voluntary" deportation vehicles for refugees who desired to travel back to their homelands

(Gordon, 2015). Monson & Misago (2009) disagreed on the likelihood of genuinely voluntary repatriation in the face of increasing violence, a lack of prospects for return to originating communities, and a dearth of safety and social assurances. Enabling quick departure or voluntary deportation weakened the ultimate prosecution of criminals (Gordon, 2015).

Migrant incarceration and deportation rates have been quite high, with only Western nations such as the United States spending considerably more on preventative efforts (Chacón, 2014).

State agents have in certain cases actively defended individuals accused of anti-foreigner violence (Everatt, 2011). Little attempts have been made to hold regulated organisations such as the law enforcement officers and intelligence responsible for their lack of preventative measures to prevent and end violence in the face of obvious warning signals (Klotz, 2016). The administration views police sweep's as a completely acceptable method for ridding the nation of illegal immigrants (Dodson & Crush, 2016) However, sometimes the police violence targeted foreign nationals for instance, in 1998, six white policemen from the South African Police Services' (SAPS) East Rand Dog Unit unleashed police dogs on three Mozambican migrants, who were severely wounded and subsequently subjected to physical and verbal abuse (Crush, 2014).

According to Crush (2014) in February 2013, eight black officers of the SAPS seized Mido Macia, a 27-year-old Mozambican taxi driver, chained him to the rear of a police vehicle, and hauled him through the streets of Daveyton, Gauteng, in front of a huge throng of witnesses. In all instances, the assaults' xenophobic nature was minimized, and they were presented as "isolated" acts carried out by rogue people (Dodson & Crush, 2016)

In 2013, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) created and released the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (or NIBUS) (Crush & Chikanda, 2015). The Strategy has a section on the inflow of foreigners into the informal sector and the resulting conflict with indigenous people (Rogerson, 2016). The "criminalization" of migrant-owned informal businesses reached a nadir in 2013 with the DTI's introduction of the Licensing of Businesses Bill in Parliament (Skinner, 2018). The Bill stipulated

that everyone engaged in commercial operations would need a license to operate, and those licenses would be granted only to non-citizens who had a refugee permit or a business permission (Skinner, 2018).

The Minister of Trade and Industry, Robert Davies, defended the law, claiming that it was intended to prevent illicit products from entering and being marketed in the nation (Rogerson, 2015). Additionally, the national government has aided provincial initiatives to combat informal migrant entreprise. In 2013, the Limpopo SAPS unit initiated "Operation Hard Stick", which resulted in the closure of over 600 informal enterprises, the detention of proprietors, the confiscation of their goods, and the imposition of arbitrary penalties for operating without licenses (Gastrow, 2018).

In June 2015, Lawyers for Human Rights unsuccessfully challenged Operation Fiela's legality in the North Gauteng High Court (Naicker, 2015). In December 2016, a request for permission to appeal to the Constitutional Court was denied (Constitutional Court, 2016). According to Lawyers for Human Rights, Operation Fiela promoted "state-sponsored xenophobia" and "institutional xenophobia" by blurring stark distinctions between criminals and migrants, "while deepening the divide between citizens and foreigners by bolstering negative perceptions rather than correcting them" (Jordaan, 2015; LHR, 2015).

Operation Fiela was a multidisciplinary interdepartmental operation, according to the South African government, intended at eliminating crime and general disorder in the communities (Naicker, 2015). It was a deliberate attempt to harass migrant-owned businesses and to identify and deport illegal workers. By the end of 2015, the authorities highlighted searching 460,000 individuals, 151,000 cars, and 38,000 buildings as part of Operation Fiela (Mabera, 2017). Operation Fiela was a government-led, high-profile attempt to convince South Africans that it was taking action to address the 'issue' of migration from other countries (Bekker, 2015).

3.3. Conceptualising Nationalism

Nationalism is an ideology and a movement that supports a nation's interests, particularly with the goal of attaining and retaining the nation's sovereignty (Keskinen, 2016:1). In South Africa as a host country, many kinds of nationalism pose a danger to the safety of African immigrants. The difficulty is that nationalism argues that each

nation should rule itself, free of outside influence, that a nation is a natural and ideal foundation for a polity, and that the nation is the sole legitimate source of power, which leads to xenophobia (Segatti & Landau, 2011). As a result, according to this research, nationalism is defined as affiliation with one's own country and support for it (Odunayo et al. 2017:81).

The primal, instrumentalist and modernisation theories were developed to explain the concept and evolution of nationalism (Snyder & Montgomery, 2017). Primordialists and contemporary scholars alike, view nationalism as a matter that has frequently existed in individuals but was revived by "political consciousness" (Sannan, 2011). Geertz (1973) highlighted that nationalism in primal theory is linked to the notion of given identity where a person acquires the identity of a nation he or she is born into. Owing to the notion of shared identity, ethnic borders are created, which are defined by the shared experiences of the person with relatives and the collective (Tishkov, 1997).

Socio-biologists assert that ancestry and, indirectly, ethnicity are genetically transmitted (Llobera, 1999). Primal theories provide a framework for the concepts of ethnic and cultural nationalism. Ozkirimli (2017) noted that ethnic and cultural of nationalism stem from primal theory. Nationalism is a manifestation of an individual's primal attachments to a group, and it is a phenomena that existed long before the group to which such intense allegiance was connected became the contemporary nation-state.

Smith et al. (1994) conducted an in-depth examination of primordialism and concluded that human social interaction is determined by three factors: kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion where ethnic groupings regarded as "super-families" . Those who form part of such families, exhibit a biological proclivity for collaboration and mutuality among their own families while simultaneously succumbing to various types of violence (Smith et al., 1994). The concepts associating and implicitly prohibiting others included in interpretations of nationalism stem from the primal theory.

Instrumentalist theories differ from primordial theories in that they argue that ethnic groupings may be considered countries and that their borders are not permanent, but can change in response to certain demands (e.g. economic development) (Llobera,

1999). Ethnicity, according to Barth (2012), is a method of social organization rather than a connection to biological or cultural past. Borders have biological, environmental, economic, political, as well as institutional functions (Barth, 2012). When this notion is shifted, it may be seen in the concept of "religious nationalism" (Sandler, 2004), in which Islamic societies maintain political lines but those who convert to Islam become citizens of their country.

Modernisation theories vehemently reject primordialism, disputing that nationalism developed as a result of contemporary practices such as industrialisation, suitable political, cultural, and socioeconomic circumstances (Llobera, 1999). Modernisation theorists regard nationalism as a recent construct (Shaw & Wong, 2020). According to Ogden (2014), modern theories of nationalism may be observed in civic and intellectual nationalism. While these three theories exhibit significant disparities, the fourth theory of nationalism, the evolutionary theory, seeks to reconcile the contemporary and primordial concepts of nationality (Shaw & Wong, 2020).

According to evolutionary views, nationalism is a recent phenomenon that arose from the notion of imagined communities backed by a sort of patriotic nationalism that stretches back to the Middle Ages (Llobera, 1999). However, as Kuzio (2016) pointed out, tracing the origins of nationalism requires a look at the shift from medieval to modern periods. To accomplish this, all aspects of society must be studied, including the economic, social, political, and ideological (Kuzio, 2016).

Smith (2013) characterizes nationalism in terms of three general aims that have evolved from academic research on this ideology: national unity, national autonomy, and national identity. Nationalism is described in this context as an ideology movement aimed at achieving and sustaining sense of unity and identity for a people that some members believe constitutes an actual or future nation (Shaw & Wong, 2020). According to Anderson (2019), nations are just imagined communities, as its people will seldom interact, and therefore will take their idea of nationality from their own imagined population. Gellner (2012) stated that nationalism is only the act of inventing nations.

Smith (2013) defined nationalism as a concept that refers to the ability for self-government, whereas Andersen (2019) and Gellner (2012) define it as the act of

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envisioning communities. Subaryana (2012) points out that there are debates over nationalism's definition hence there is no consensus among scholars on what nationalism is.

3.3.1. Forms of Nationalism

Nationalism can take the form of a state ideology or a popular non-state movement which expressions result in five distinct and common categories of nationalism which include ethnic, religious or cultural (May et al., 2004). Other types of nationalism have been criticised for concealing racism, for instance, right-wing nationalism advocating white supremacy (Snyder & Montgomery, 2017), whereas others strive to promote societal unity and equality regardless of ethnic origin (Tamir, 2019).

3.3.1.1. Ethnic Nationalism

Nationalism operates on the idea that a country may strictly be explained by its ethnic ties, which include common language, civilisation, tradition, and genealogy. Tamir (2019) characterizes ethnic nationalism as bigoted and indicative of authoritarian governments. According to Suzman (2016), ethnic nationalism, also referred to as ethnonationalism, is a type of nationalism in which the country and nationality are defined in terms of ethnicity, with a focus on ethnocentric approaches to different political problems concerning the national affirmation of a specific ethnic group. When examining global forms of ethic nationalism, research illustrates that ethnic nationalism inevitably results in violence, particularly in ethnically diverse areas (e.g., the Niger Delta) (Suzman, 2016).

3.3.1.2. Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism is a structure of nationalism that is founded on a core religion or belief that has political and state consequences (Omer & Springs, 2013). Religious nationalism stands in stark contrast to contemporary forms of nationalism and has been dubbed an illogical kind of nationalism (Omer & Springs, 2013: 80). There are numerous ecclesiastical governments such as Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and more, where religion law (Sharia Law or Islamic Law) serves as the state's supreme law (Kavalski, 2016). Religious nationalism, like ethnic nationalism, exhibits little to no

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tolerance for different religious ideas (Kavalski, 2016), but it focuses on religious unity by repelling any competing viewpoints.

3.3.1.3. Civic Nationalism

Civic nationalism which is alternatively called "progressive nationalism" argues for social cohesion, personal rights, and liberties (Modongal, 2016). Civic nationalism is based on the concept of an anti-xenophobic nation that embraces all of its citizens and works for equality and social justice (Tamir, 2019). In addition, Stewart (2020) asserts that civic nationalism is a free choice of loyalty based on principles. Civic nationalism is characterized not just from a societal-national viewpoint (Tamir, 2019), but also from a global, international one (Stewart, 2020). In this case, states would cooperate with other nations that share similar ideals (Modongal, 2016). Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism share a common denominator: shared culture.

Nationalism as a cultural expression establishes a space amongst civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Fedorenko, 2012). Hutchinson (2015) contends, cultural nationalism is critical for the formation of states, since it is a common theory, value, and idea, in addition to ethnic and national history, that can result in state unification. A concrete illustration of civic nationalism may be seen in Singapore, where the government's development plan is closely related to civic nationalism and globalisation (Barnett, 2015).While empirical data indicates that civic nationalism is the key indicator for globalisation, it also results in a dilution of core principles in distinctly traditional countries such as China and Japan (Kwan, 2016).

3.3.1.4. Ideological Nationalism

Ideological nationalism advocates for nations' ability to rule themselves (Smith, 2013). Ideological nationalism maintains that each country should rule itself, that a nation is the inherent and desirable foundation for a civil order, and that the country is the only authoritative source of political power (Nie, 2013). Ideological nationalism seeks to establish and uphold a unified national identity, embedded on shared socio-economic factors such as society, ideology, physical location, politics, ethnicity, language and politics, as well as and to encourage national cohesion (Smith, 2013).

3.3.2. Nationalism as a threat to immigrants

Nationalism forms are creating threats to the protection of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa as a host country (Jeram, 2014). Xenophobia is a radical form of nationalism, making more important to humiliate national minorities than to ensure prosperity for national majority first (Landau & Amit, 2014). Through its partnerships, supported programmes and strategies, the South African government has availed asylum seekers and refugees some temporary reprieve in certain aspects (Odunayo et al. 2017).

Mazzini was the first scholar to present bad nationalisms which is regarded as harmful to humanity (Jeram, 2014). Good nationalism seeks to build a state or community emphasizes justice, tolerates other nationalisms and may even argue in their defence and incorporate them into a single historical perspective (Orwell, 2018). Conversely, bad nationalism seeks to subjugate, destroy; emphasizes might and radically excludes other nationalities in an imperialist and racist era (Orwell, 2018). When societal tensions and national anxieties become are high, it is relatively simple for individuals to reconcile non-national and national loyalties, according to Calhoun (2017).

Anti-immigration sentiments are not just a reaction to rising immigration, but rather reflect governments' nationalistic and anti-immigrant stances (Foote & Goebel, 2014). According to Andersen (2019) divergent ideas on nationalism have resulted in divergent attitudes on immigration. Evidence shows that strong nationalistic sentiments resulted in more unfavourable views toward immigrants where persons who identify strongly with a group identity, such as a nationalist identity, exhibit greater bias toward other groups (Kaber Lewis, 2010). In addition, Verkuyten (2013) argued that as a region grows more racially and ethnically diverse, it will perceive a danger to its social, economic, and political dominance. Politics significantly influences attitudes and institutional actions toward immigration (Andersen, 2019).

The term "group threat" alludes to the belief that dominant members of a society develop attitudes toward real or imagined socities of racial or ethnic minority communities, resulting in worries of the minority group gaining access to scarce resources as their population grows (Hogan & Haltinner, 2015). Group threats comprises of the cultural threat that refers to dread of invasion, concern that majority

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descendants would become a minority, and the idea that immigrants will not integrate (Chiricos et al., 2014).

However, its attempts remain conceded by the lack of an experimentally based, coherent methodology, the inclusion of narrow and short-term programming and the inability to resolve political incentives and structures (Tshishonga, 2015). The South African government is in need of a strategy with capacity to cause a commitment of the government, informs asylum seekers and refugee selection, human security programme funding and selection and recognizes actions with sound change theories that provide sustainable and long-term protection as the uppermost priority. The government needs to sufficiently invest in a strategy that focuses on immigrants, asylum seekers and refugee security (Tewolde, 2019:41).

Likewise, Jaynes (2008) claims that the lack of inclusion and hostility towards foreign nationals and violence against them are products of the country's past apartheid life (Misago, 2016a: 113-114), which isolated and dehumanised non-whites and most importantly black Africans, while reinforcing the idea that separation and marginalisation are both justified and necessary for South Africa's development and security (Landau et al., 2011). On racial and socioeconomic reasons, Pre-Democratic South Africa saw itself as a superior state in comparison to other African countries for racial and socioeconomic grounds (Klotz, 2016). The perspective of South African exceptionalism continues to inform widespread unfavourable sentiments and hatred against foreign nationals, particularly those from the African continent (Klotz, 2016).

Gordon (2015) states that South Africa has no specific legislation or even strengthened the justice authorities and police response to guarantee hate crimes perpetrators are held liable. The South African government has not developed sufficient measures of monitoring hate crimes cases against foreigners or accessible and visible mechanism for public members to report the violence cases against foreigners, however, there are protection measures that exist, in order to protect South Africans from racism (Tewolde, 2019). For example, in 2018 a white woman by the name of Vicki Momberg was sentenced to three years imprisonment, with one year suspended for racism (Tewolde, 2019). In 2018 a white woman by the name of Vicki Momberg was sentenced to three years imprisonment, with one year suspended for racism (Tewolde, 2019). However Human Rights Watch (2019) noted that the rate of

arrest and conviction of xenophobic criminals has been appalling throughout the years. In today`s world, xenophobia is closely related to racism since race and ethnic are the most visible indicators of an individual nationality.

Cultural nationalists who adopt anti-migrant narratives propagate the fallacy that by sharing a country and culture with foreign people, the communities of destination lose part of their identity (Ha & Jang, 2015). South Africans have low better tolerance to people from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland whom they share cultural practises whilst having a low tolerance towards Africans from other cultures. Xenophobia and prejudice increases in communities which lack intercultural values, and thus target migrants, portraying them as an amorphous and homogenous group and the source of numerous ills (Hervik, 2015).

3.4. Conceptualising National Security

Since South Africa became a democratic state in 1994, the country's definition of security and its defence preparations have been shaped mostly by the reconceptualization of security as a scholarly and policy construct, and a realignment of the function of the army in the community (Mukonza, 2011). Theoretical reconceptualization of South Africa's National Security occurred simultaneously with the end of the Cold War, the publication of the UN Human Development Report (1994) and the process of democratisation in the country (Mukonza, 2011). During the late 1980's and early 1990's, the reconceptualization of security was characterised by a need to widen and extend the understandings about security threat discourse to include domestic and non-military threats, and to demilitarise the notion of security (Shalala 2006).

Security, in the broadest meaning, refers to the absence of dangers (Craig & Valeriano, 2016). According to Buzan (1991:18), security is "the pursuit of freedom from threat", however, the meaning of this notion remains a mystery.

Historically, international security has been mainly concerned with military issues (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Against this vantage point, the state serves as the reference object that requires protection from dangerous forces, most notably those of war (Rudolph, 2017). However, security studies have shifted away from a

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state-centric perspective in the post-Cold War period, expanding the concept of security to include a variety of possible dangers (Givens, 2010).

Therefore, according to various scholars including Barry Buzan, security studies should be expanded to include five security sectors which are social, environmental, economic, political and military security sectors (Tallmeister, 2013:1). In Barry Buzan's article titled "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century" he states that all five sectors of security do not operate separately from one another. Each security sector defines a prime focus within the security problem and a method of prioritization, yet they are all intertwined in a powerful linkage (Buzan 1991:433). As the notion of security has expanded, a plethora of problems such as the economic climate, destitution, and migratory flows have been classified as security threats (Rudolph, 2017). Rather than the state as the endangered referent object, non-state things such as society, national identity (Tallmeister 2013:1), and the individual self are deemed threatened (Huysmans 2006). The securitization of migration has been a hot subject of discussion among academics, policymakers, and international actors, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, resulting in a more nuanced view of what constitutes a security risk (Estevens, 2018). According to some academics, migration jeopardizes both national sovereignty and human security (Thompson, 2020). Securitisation is a term that refers to the character of existential danger that a problem may acquire, even if the threat itself is not there (Ullah et al., 2020).

According to Ting (2006), the impression that migration is a danger to national security has become stronger as the number of 'illegal' migrants has increased. It is a social construction that infiltrates a zone of security via the use of discursive emergence, threat, and danger language to justify the adoption of extreme measures (Givens, 2010). According to Ting (2006), securitisation is an expansive process in where an actor asserts that a referent object is empirically in danger; commands the authority to make use of exceptional countermeasures to tackle the threat; and persuades an audience that law-bending actions are justified in order to address the threat, consequently justifying the use of narrow strategies to protect the referent object.

The notion of societal security in relation to international migration refers to how citizens of a particular country interpret their heritage, ideological, or political identity as being challenged by immigrants, and based on this vantage point (Ullah et al., 2020)

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that the receiving country's national values are threatened (Weiner & Russell, 2001). This danger is posed by all forms of immigration, whether controllable or uncontrollable, legal or illegal, provided that the immigrants represent a threat to the identity of the host country owing to their unique heritage or ideology (Thompson, 2013).

The threat of immigration to a state's social security is not an objective and generic concern, but a subjective one, contingent on how the receiving state defines itself (Weiner & Russell, 2001). While some nations may despise multiculturalism, others may take pleasure in their cultural variety. While some nations may despise multiculturalism, others may take pleasure in their cultural variety. Scholars have argued that there are five types of national security risks which are posed by immigration and these are economic, public and internal threats (Guild, 2009).

According to LeMay (2006), national security is concerned about political, social and economic morals which include the regard of the rule of law, democracy, human rights, free enterprise as well as the environment. As a result, these are all important elements which are crucial to the standard of living in a modern sovereign state (Wadhia 2016). As a result, the UN publication of Human Development Report (1994) presented the concept of human security as a new framework for learning global, regional and national vulnerabilities and people-centred development as an option in contrast to the more typical idea of national and military security (Esterhuyse 2016). UN Human Development report has argued that the search for human security rests in development and not in military forces, furthermore, risks to human security are growing more global, and not simply personal, local, or national (Esterhuyse 2016).

3.4.1. Economic Security

Another method in which immigration is said to jeopardise a country's national interest is through its economic impact (Tallmeister, 2013:2). Immigration has had a major economic effect on both the host nation and the country of birth of migrants, and will continue to do so (Givens, 2010). Immigration may be considered to be a danger to the economic security of a receiving nation due to its effect on the labour market (Tallmeister, 2013). With regards to the impact on the labour market, Guild (2009) emphasised several critical points:

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Do migrant workers have a negative effect on wages in developed economies?
(Guild, 2009)

And, in a healthy economy, do immigrants rob native-born employees of jobs?
(Guild, 2009)

Furthermore, it has been said that immigrants, especially displaced migrants, represent a threat to the basic security and welfare programs of the receiving country (Guild, 2009). Refugees and asylum seekers are depicted as "extortionists" and "freeloaders" that unlawfully take advantage of the welfare system of the host country, while the welfare system of the host country is portrayed as incapable of supporting high levels of immigrants (Huysmans, 2016). They are depicted as being impoverished and constitute a significant financial danger to the host country, causing housing scarcities and putting a burden on education, transportation, sanitation, and communication facilities (Ahmed, 2017). According to Huysmans (2020) providing social grant benefits to migrant and refugee employees, consequently generates animosity among the host society. There is a prevalent perception that immigrants not only rob local people of employment, but also deprive them of social benefits (Huysmans 2016).

The general public have supported the idea that immigrants reduce salaries of local citizens and eliminate employment, thus adding on to the prevailing economic difficulties (Somerville and Sumption 2009:3). The argument is frequently used to support restricted and discriminatory immigration policy (Tallmeister, 2013:3). This perception, however, is subjective rather than based on facts, and Chomsky (2007) claims that the assumption that the quantity of people influences how many jobs are created, is incorrect. Rather, immigration facilitates population expansion, which provides employment while also supplying individuals to fill them (Chomsky 2007:8).

Immigration has a minimal influence on wages, according to research by Somerville and Sumption (2009). While the impacts of immigration differ by state, it has a minor effect on salaries and labour. Furthermore, according to Somerville and Sumption (2009), the majority of employees in the United Kingdom are unaffected by immigration or even gain from it. The long-term financial advantages of refugee movements must not be overlooked in favour of the possibility of short-term costs (Tallmeister, 2013).

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The impact of migrants in Australia suggests that the main expenses of resettling asylum seekers are covered by social security benefits after 10 years (Mascitelli, 2015).

3.4.2. Internal Security

National security is the most fundamental responsibility of any government and it does not only entail the security and protection of the country and its citizens, but it further involves elements such as protecting national interests and values against internal threats (Cross, 2013). Internal security is concerned about threats that have the likelihood to weaken the security of the country, citizens and the rest of society from within the borders of a nation. It is a necessity for it to not only include

> "*Freedom from undue fear of attack against their person, communities or sources of their prosperity and sovereignty*" (Cawthra 2013:3).

Since the 1980s, the idea of immigration as a danger to domestic security has persisted (Huysmans, 2000). The Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention established a link between immigration and terrorism, international crime, and border control (Cawthra, 2013). Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, immigration has dominated the terrorism prevention discourse; countries around the globe have toughened and secured laws around immigration, equating immigration with terrorist activity (Hülsse & Spencer, 2008).

Numerous academics argue that restrictive immigration policies are necessary to safeguard the host country's internal security (Cawthra, 2013). Stoffman (2008) asserts that since Canada has a high influx of immigration per population, each immigrant is unable to be properly vetted; as a result, hazardous individuals enter the nation. Thus, the most efficient method of excluding undesirable immigrants would be to reduce yearly influx of immigrants (Stoffman 2008).

As terrorism is unquestionably a serious danger to the internal security of nations worldwide, its relationship to immigration must be questioned. According to Tallmeister (2013:4), in an investigation on immigration and terrorism in Spain, claims that the relationship between "illegal immigration and terrorism" is fabricated rather than real. In addition, Saux (2007:63) proposes that the supposed threat of terrorism drove

people to accuse a certain grouping of individuals, identifying them as the aggressor and establishing a separation between "us" and "them" using Moral-Panics Theory. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Madrid train bombings that took place in 2004, as well as the London bombings from 2005, immigrants and asylum seekers were reviled (Saux 2007:63).

3.4.3. Public Security

Additionally, immigration has been associated with an increase in criminal activity, creating the impression that immigration is a danger to public security (Rudolph, 2017). Whilst society has become more worried with the increased levels of crime and the danger to public order posed by immigrants, these worries are factually unfounded (Wang, 2012). It cannot be disputed that increasing immigrant numbers have resulted in rising crime rates in certain areas. Indeed, there is a pattern indicating that towns and nations with high crime rates have a larger immigrant population (Rudolph, 2017). The percentage of the jail populace born internationally and residing in Spain, was 25 times that of the general population (Westbrook, 2010).

Hamood (2006) stated that xenophobia is mostly manifested in Libya via sweeping allegations of crime, verbal and physical assaults, and harassment. The rise in criminality due to foreigners is highlighted by the Director-General of Home Affairs who stated that:

> *"The incidence of serious criminal activities amongst them is obvious. For one, few South Africans would dare to walk the streets of Hillbrow in Johannesburg. The risk to their personal safety is just too great and it is known that a fair majority of residents in that neighbourhood are now of foreign origin. What is more, the illegal entry and sojourn in South Africa is prohibited by law and therefore an offence similar to all other crimes. Turning a blind eye to this dimension of law enforcement solely because foreigners are involved, would make a mockery of the criminal system"* (Tagwirei, 2016: 201).

According to a study by Givens (2010) on three American neighbourhoods, immigration does not generally result in an increase in murder rates among Latinos and African American. Butcher and Piehl (1998) found out that migration has no impact on crime rate. Bell (2019) examined the connection between immigration and crime in

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the United Kingdom over two distinct eras of high migration flows: during the 1990s and early 2000s surge of asylum seekers, and starting in 2004, the influx of economic migrants from EU accession nations. According to the research, neither wave had an effect on violent crime levels, and immigrant prosecution levels were comparable to native prosecution levels (Bell et al. 2010). Although broad public opinion considers immigration to be a danger to public security, scholars argue that it is a manufactured threat that is not based on actual facts (Givens, 2010).

3.4.4. National Security and immigration in South Africa

South Africa's history of armed conflict, human rights violations and societal oppressions under the apartheid rule, influenced the ANC government's new agenda of national security by focusing on human security (Sidirpoulos 2009:87). Human security focuses on a number of concerns such as work security, financial stability security, health security, sustainable livelihoods security as well as security from crime (Lemanski 2012:61-62).

All these types of human security have become emerging concerns all over the world and especially in South Africa. The Military Research Group, the "*Institute for Defence Policy*" and the "*Centre for Conflict Resolution*" were important factors to the new security agenda in the country. As a result, the new security agenda formulated by the ANC government focused primarily on human security in the country and in the region. Since the start of 1994, a vast range of options of documents including policies and strategies have been drafted and implemented by the South African policy makers to bring about the modifications that are required in the democratic South African security agenda.

These policy documents include the 1996 Defence White Paper, the two Defence Reviews published since 1994, the Working Papers of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, as well as the White Paper on South African Participation in Peacekeeping. The 1996 Defence White Paper has become the most prominent policy document which focuses on human security as the new blueprint for the security formation in South Africa. It further stipulates that the country pursues peaceful relations with other states through economic, political and military cooperation.

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According to Julia Tallmeister (2013:6), there is to a large extent, a false narrative of classifying immigration as a threat to a state's national security because in the end, it creates more harm to a society, than it does to safeguard it. Thus, classifying it as a security threat often results in xenophobic and racist attitudes and it leads to the exclusion and rejection of immigrant groups in the host country. This is quite evident in the case of South Africa as a host to many African immigrants from countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and many more.

South Africa's National security agenda is threatened by a number of structural weaknesses especially in its continuous claims to represent Africa's interest. South Africa has been criticised for having a "love-hate" relationship with Africa and sometimes acts as if it is not part of Africa. For example, the National Development Plan oddly enough finds it necessary to declare that "We are Africans, we are an African country, We are an essential part of our continent". Many have criticised and argued that South Africa is a state that is pushing its own agenda to obtain status and positions in global organisations such as the UN and wants to be seen as a voice for Africa. As a result, South Africa's political approach and security agenda to Africa, has been criticised for being dogmatic in its "Africa at all-cost" approach as it shows signs of inconsistencies and contradictions (Esterhuyse 2016:194).

The Refugee Act was passed in 1998 and began to be implemented in 2000. South Africa had to keep its promises as a signatory to international treaties. It was witnessing record surges in asylum seekers due to rising insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes area (Khosa & Kalitanyi 2014: 11). Despite being widely praised as a significant advancement in refugee protection, the 1998 Refugee Act, as well as the debate surrounding it, demonstrate the clash around two narratives: global human rights law and the sovereign nation, as facilitated by the Department of Home Affairs and the cabinet (Crush & Ramachandran, 2016).

The Department of Home Affairs attempted to enforce the act's most regressive provisions while also making changes to make it more restricted. Human rights groups fought back in court in each instance, and they have so far been successful in halting major reforms, including as the creation of refugee camps and the prohibition of third-country applications (Tshishonga, 2015). Despite legislative progress in support of

immigration, the Department of Home Affairs lacks the ability to fulfil its duty to protect refugees, as seen by the backlog in asylum seekers' requests (Tewolde, 2019).

In the new global production structures, South Africa is considered as a developing economy along with Brazil, India or Malaysia (Tewolde, 2019). As such the nation has an actual potential for drawing international migrants from different nations (Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). In South Africa, African immigrants encounter several challenges in integration due to the lack of a clear strategy. So far, there has been an ineffective political response to xenophobia that has targeted these displaced individuals in metropolitan areas.

According to Segatti and Landau (2011), due to nationalism, South Africans are not the only ones who have turned their backs on migrants living among them. Xenophobic violence has been documented in Botswana, Mozambique, and other African countries, but on a smaller scale. These instances highlight the necessity for governments to begin adopting socioeconomic and political reform strategies that recognize migration as an inextricable element of the area. At least 62 people were murdered in assaults in 2008, with another 670 injured. Over 150,000 individuals were forced or deported from South Africa.

The majority of the casualties were from outside of Southern Africa and from other parts of the world (Tewolde, 2019). The initial security situation quickly morphed into a humanitarian crisis, as many people were left without protection, housing, clothes, or food (Khosa & Kalitanyi 2014: 11). There is no contact between government domains in other areas, such as communication between the province and municipal levels on migration control concerns.

In terms of due procedure, constitutionalism permitted the NGO sector to safeguard migrants as well as immigrant from state abuses as well as to prevent government attempts at changing asylum legislation (Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). Nevertheless, despite a large corpus of case law safeguarding migrants' rights, particularly in respect to family life and unjust treatment, only those migrants with access to the judicial system and links to NGOs have benefitted. (Khosa & Kalitanyi 2014: 11).

3.5. Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter was to examine the three notable concepts of xenophobia, national security and nationalism in the study. The chapter has provided an in-depth analysis on how xenophobia, national security and nationalism have threatened the concept of the human security agenda that was formulated by the United Nations in 1994. Due to the growing nature of immigration into South Africa, nationalism, national security and xenophobia have become major challenges to the security and protection of immigrants, particularly of those hailing from various African countries. Daily antagonism constantly leaks over into violent acts against migrants. Chapter Four will examine South Africa's Immigration and Security policies and their inconsistencies relating to the lack of protection of African immigrants.

CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION-SECURITY POLICIES AND SECURITY THREATS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS

4.1. Introduction

South Africa's immigration and security policy documents are influenced by the country's constitutional democracy and the favouring of skilled migration. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the existing immigration and security policy documents in South Africa and to observe the inconsistencies within the existing security and immigration policies which ultimately contribute to the lack of protection of African immigrants, by the South African government and law enforcement officers. The policies are the Immigration Act of 2002 and the White Paper on International Migration.

4.2. South African Immigration and Security Policy Framework

South Africa is commonly viewed as one among the most sophisticated and diversified nations in Africa and the globe (Oluwaseun & Olusola 2017:42). It continues to attract high volumes of tourists in and around the globe. Furthermore, as a constitutional democracy and a country that is viewed as one of the economically better-off countries on the African soil, South Africa ultimately attracts large numbers of African immigrants (Oluwaseun & Olusola 2017:42).

According to Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) (2018), it was expected that South Africa would have about 1.02 million international immigrants coming to the country by 2020. Most immigrants prefer to settle in Gauteng (47.5%) whereas other provinces like the Northern Cape (0.7%) have the least (Mazars et al., 2013:9). Gauteng receives the most immigrants because of its economic hubs like Johannesburg and Pretoria (Mazars, Matsuyama, Rispoli & Vearey 2013:9).

When looking at South Africa's existing immigration and security policy documents and their frameworks, they are advanced, cultivated and provide a great deal of options for immigrants and migrants as they are continuously amended in order to have holistic approaches to security and migration in the country (Kanayo & Anjofui, 2021). According to Segatti and Landau (2011:38-43) the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) is one of the best constitutions in the world, and as a result, it has great influence on the immigration and security policies (Segatti & Landau 2011).

Migration policies and laws are based on containing and restricting irregular and illegal migration, placing a greater emphasis on the legal status of migrants than on migrants' rights and protection (Lennep 2019). Stricter immigration policies are necessary precisely placed on African migrants as they are regarded to be strong competitors with South African residents for employment and resources, as well as access to basic services like as health and education (Maiter & Stalker, 2011). The competition for resources and facilities mentioned by policy makers is the source of hostility towards foreign nationals in South Africa (Boynton, 2015). The view by Department of Home Affairs that in-migration hinders growth and development as it precluded the inclusion of a skills importation provision in the law while the Aliens Control Amendment Act (ACA) (No.76) of 1995 was being drafted (Boynton, 2015).

However, many of the inconsistencies and challenges related to the immigration and security policies come from the implementation spectrum of things and how these policies are generally approached as well as the role government has played (Choane, Shulika & Mthombeni 2011). According to Tove Van Lennep (2019), there are a number of contradictions in the existing security and migration policies and their objectives. The themes and ideas of the post-Apartheid security and immigration policy frameworks have all been de-racialised by moving away from apartheid bureaucracies (Maiter & Stalker, 2011).

However, the rising phenomenon of xenophobia, has to a certain extent, filled the cracks of racialisation, and as a result, although these policies have objectives that are meant to protect African migrants by taking a pro-African stance, what is practiced by the government and law enforcement officers, contradicts what has been written in these policy documents (Lennep 2019). The biggest challenge is the lack of protection of African immigrants compared to their white counterparts (Maiter & Stalker, 2011). Non-black foreigners who hail from different parts of the world, are seen to be in South Africa for legitimate reasons such as tourism or investment opportunities (Adeogun & Faluyi, 2018). Therefore this misconception creates racial prejudice and grows the phenomenon of xenophobia.

The most fundamental policies on immigration and security in South Africa include the 2017 White Paper on International Migration for South Africa, which was amended in

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2017 and the Immigration Act of 2002 which was amended by 2007 and the Refugee Act of 2016.

4.2.1. White Paper on International Migration

South Africa's policy on international migration was set forth in the 1999 White Paper on International Migration. It was enacted through the Immigration Act (13 of 2002), and slightly via the Refugees Act of 1998. The White Paper omitted all references to asylum seekers and refugees, while the Green Paper's section on "Rights-based Enforcement" was replaced with one on Enforcement (Mbiyozo, 2018). Although the White Paper of 1999 acknowledged the need of importing talents and fighting xenophobia, it was primarily concerned with immigration restriction.

While the White Paper recognizes that migration may assist South Africa in achieving its National Development Plan objectives, it also makes a clear connection between migration and security concerns, human trafficking, and corruption (Mbiyozo, 2018). The Paper makes reference to the African Union's Agenda 2063, which aims for the complete elimination of visa restrictions for all African nationals. Before the amendments that were made in 2017, there were a number of policy gaps existing in certain scopes such as irregular migration, human rights protection and corruption (Vanyoro, 2019). One of the gaps is the regularisation of current undocumented SADC migrants in South Africa, comparable to the special permits for Zimbabwean and Lesotho migrants and other previous amnesties (Vanyoro, 2019).

Furthermore, the White Paper propounds the liberalisation of the visa system for some economic migrants from neighbouring countries in order to deter irregular migration to South Africa (Ugwu, 2019). The white paper advocates for focused enforcement of immigration and labour rules, with a concentration on businesses rather than individual migrants, since employers' recruiting practices are seen as a significant draw for irregular migration (Zhou, 2019).

> "*Management of integration for international migrants, management of emigration and management of asylum seekers and refugees*" (White Paper 2017)

The White Papers seeks to destabilize a system that perpetuates irregular migration, resulting in intolerable levels of corruption, human rights violations, and national security threats (Cross & Cross, 2020). Thus, the need for an amended White Paper on International Migration for South Africa (2017) is that international migration should be handled in a comprehensive and holistic manner, as numerous facets are intertwined and this demonstrates in tangible approaches as well as the well-being of people.

Furthermore, the recently amended document takes on an anti-African stance (Lennep 2019). Regional collaboration was glossed over, as the White Paper stated unequivocally that South Africa's policies must represent its people' priorities. According to the newly amended White Paper on International Migration for South Africa (2017:4), the Department of Home Affairs has taken a new approach in dealing with International Migration in a more holistic manner. This is because there are numerous areas that are linked, for example it is important for the country to have a good security system however, the livelihoods of the people must also be considered.

The Department of Home Affairs (2017) further goes on to say that when it comes to giving protection to refugees and asylum seekers, this falls in the human rights category, however, it also contains security risks for the host country (South Africa) that must be governed using the same security methods covering immigration. However, although the newly amended policy has established a holistic approach on international migration in South Africa, the policy fails to address on the lack of protection of African immigrants against xenophobia (Cross & Cross, 2020).

The amended 2017 White Paper states:

> "In South Africa risks have to be managed within the framework of the Constitution and the human rights of both citizens and other nationals must be respected and protected. Immigration that is not managed through a risk-based approach is poorly managed immigration. This gives rise to systemic corruption as well as exposing all who live in the country to serious risks such as terrorism and drug smuggling. If risks are not managed, instability will increase and skilled migrants will not be recruited efficiently, thus undermining development. Job opportunities will not expand and this in turn will generate xenophobia and

> *more instability." (*White Paper on International Migration for South Africa 2017:3-4)*.

Thus, the policy only focuses on risks such as drug smuggling and terrorism in the country. The White Paper establishes a Border Management Authority and uses screening and risk profiling to 'externalize the boundaries and assures risk-based and successful deportation that takes into account bilateral agreements with neighboring states (Sparreboom et al., 2020). In addition, the White Paper aims to adopt a risk-based and securitized migration policy that protects South Africa's sovereignty and guarantees the safety of its people (Murenje, 2020). However, it fails to address the rise of xenophobia and how to tackle this ongoing issue in the country. According to Lennep (2019), the risk-based security approach as stipulated above, is to a large extent problematic, as it claims that African foreign nationals have a greater chance of being criminals, and as a result this gives a dangerous xenophobic portrayal of the country (Lennep 2019).

The White Paper seeks to counter colonial migratory trends by reserving immigration and citizenship privileges for individuals with advanced degrees which drives low-skilled immigrants towards irregularity (Zanker & Moyo, 2020). Immigration will continue indefinitely as long as the sub-region is a supply of labour for South Africa (Zhou, 2019). Strengthening immigration enforcement would not dissuade migrants, but will instead push them underground, increasing their susceptibility to xenophobic violence (Hall & Posel, 2019).

The White Paper makes disparaging remarks about organisations dedicated to human rights organisations, legal professionals, and the judicial system as a means of influencing legislation (Phillip, 2017). The white paper profoundly misunderstands the function of attorneys in representing civil society collectively and the role of litigation in influencing immigration policy (Gastrow, 2018). To achieve a comprehensive approach to border management that is consistent with government and public representation, home affairs administrators' attitudes towards human rights and service delivery need to be shifted into a lawfully sympathetic approach (Mbiyozo, 2018).

The White Paper was amended to address significant policy gaps, it lacks on addressing important issues such as xenophobia and the lack of protection of African immigrants living legally or illegally in South Africa and the challenges they face which negatively impacts their human security and wellbeing (Moyo, 2020). For instance, South African border officials as well as law enforcement officers have persistently been implicated in acts of corruption by bribing poor African immigrants, as well as intimidating and abusing them (Maunganidze & Mbiyozo 2020).

Therefore, to a large extent, the Department of Home Affairs and its policy document, condemns human rights groups, and this is rather sensitive because it showcases the Department's hostility towards maintaining human security and protecting African immigrants in the country (Lennep 2019). In July 2016, the Heinrich Böll Foundation concluded that South Africa's role as an emerging power is harmed by restrictive integration of migrants and xenophobic denial. South Africa's position on the continent is gravely threatened and has lost the trust of key African nations in its ability to represent the region in international for a due to poor protection of migrants from xenophobic attacks (Kent & Behrman, 2020).

While the white paper criticizes the existing debate on immigration's strong emotions, stereotypes, and disputed facts, it makes no attempt to provide a new statistical and factual basis upon which a new policy stance may be formed (Umeh, 2018). Apart from linear estimates of asylum and immigration applications, it is completely opaque about its sources and the statistical models upon which it relies (Carciotto, 2020). The white paper tries to superimpose the World Bank research on the unique footprint of South Africa and it fails to account for the reality that, despite many opportunities, existing infrastructure has not converted itself into an efficient immigration management system since 1994 (Sparreboom et al., 2020). The nation has essentially abandoned a protection-based strategy to managing vulnerable non-citizens in favour of a risk-based approach since the White Paper was released (Darch et al., 2020).

Detention and deportation are important in the paper's recommended agenda, which emphasizes the implementation of measures that may increase enforcement effectiveness while lowering its costs (Mbiyozo, 2018). In addition, Mbiyozo (2018) argued that enforcing compliance via detentions and deportations is not sustainable

due to the high cost of detentions and deportations. Encampment rules may not discourage migration—and may incite animosity among indigenous South Africans (Ngozi, 2017).

More broadly, the White Paper's terminology (for example, 'illegal migrant' rather than 'undocumented person') adds to the needless criminalization of migrants (Darch et al., 2020). The White Paper emphasises that South Africa is a destination for illegal immigrants who represent a security threat to the country's economic stability and sovereignty (Darch et al., 2020).

4.2.2. Immigration Act 13 of 2002

Over the years since the Act was first implemented in 2002, it has been amended to take on holistic approaches to security and immigration. By 2007, the Immigration Act was amended and its objectives took on a pro-African outlook, for instance in the Preamble of the Immigration Act (13 of 2002), it states

> "*Immigration control is performed within the highest applicable standards of human rights protection and xenophobia is prevented and countered both within Government and Civil Society*".

Therefore, it states that it is important for government and civil society to work in accordance with one another in order to minimise the high levels of xenophobia and to further make sure that there are correct implementation and immigration procedures taking place (Chaone et al. 2011:137). However, this contradicts the ongoing rise of xenophobia in the country since 2008, and how it has not been prevented nor deterred by the South African government, police officials as well as civil society, and as a result, this has led to the lack of protection of African immigrants in South Africa.

After the 2008 xenophobic attacks in various townships, where over 62 people were killed, and nearly 150 000 individuals were displaced, there was an expectation for the Immigration Act (13 of 2011) to address the difficulty of social cohesion and to enact a better regional strategy to migration with a comprehensible link to development, however, the amended act toughened demands of control and entry into South Africa for immigrants but more specifically, African immigrants (Lennep 2019).

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The Immigration Act (2002) sought to alleviate unfavourable perceptions of immigrants while also promoting a somewhat rights-based approach and less regulated approach to policymaking (Breckenridge, 2005). The Act replaced the term "alien" for "foreigner," signalling a significant departure from previous law (Rutherford, 2011). Internal monitoring procedures were established to prevent corruption and xenophobia and a whole chapter was dedicated to asylum permits (Boynton, 2015:42). Additionally, the Immigration Act was "less nationalistic" (Boynton 2015, 42), asking for collaboration with other nations to combat the "push causes" of unauthorised migration and to ease the mobility of SADC scholars as well as academic personnel (Rasool & Botha, 2011).

Despite these significant advancements, the Immigration Act of 2002 remained very protectionist, limiting legal labor immigration (Ellis & Segatti, 2011). The proliferation of temporary permits only served to strengthen the Department of Home Affair's jurisdiction over the application process and eroded foreigners' labor market freedom (SAHRC, 2003). Employers struggled to recruit foreign workers on work permits due to burdensome and long procedures and certificates (Ellis & Segatti, 2011). Additionally, fewer than half of non-permanent permits permitted foreigners to work, including others applying as family members of South African residents (Boynton, 2015:43), were denied employment (SAHRC, 2003).

South Africa's Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 came under fire for its lack of consultation during its development (Isike & Isike, 2012). As a result, consultation with government and non-government organisations, including the public and the Immigration Advisory Board, occurred throughout the development and passage of the Immigration Amendment Act No. 19 of 2004 and the Immigration Regulations of June 2005. (Willand 2005, 3). There is absence of connection between the Department of Labour's and Department of Home Affairs' lists of scarce skills which highlight inefficiencies in the implementation of policies (Kunene, 2009).

Deporting irregular migrants as prescribed by the Immigration Act is ineffective (Johnson, 2015). The majority of deportees return to South Africa via a variety of unlawful routes and re-enter the nation shortly after exiting the country and this is referred to as the revolving door syndrome (Allais, 2013). The Amendment of the Act focused on control and protectionist measures (Allais, 2013). The amended Act kept the Department of Home Affairs power to "identify", "detain", and "deport" illegal

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immigrants intact. Section 69 of the Amended Act was modified, giving the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs new powers, including the authority to initiate procedures, facilitating the tracking down and verification of illegal foreigners in the country and their expulsion from the country, as well as conducting inquiries into others who are "suspected of being prohibited persons" (Ellis & Segatti, 2011).

Section 23 of the asylum transit permit law was changed to limit asylum applicants' access to 1 of 5 refugee receiving offices to 14 days before their permits were terminated (Boynton, 2015: 45); Given time limitations, migrants' limited access to travel expenses, and Home Affairs' lacklustre bureaucratic processes, this is a difficult situation (Zihihundula et al., 2020).

4.2.3. Inconsistencies and lack of protection of African Immigrants

The 1999 White Paper's primary objective was to fight illegal immigration. The paper's section 6.3.1 emphasised the detrimental effect unauthorised immigrants have on the country, particularly how they rob natives of employment, exploit limited resources, and engage in criminal activity. The word "alien" continues to be used to refer to someone who is not a South African citizen (Boynton, 2015: 38), according to the ACA's antiquated practice. The 2017 White Paper on International Migration aims to guarantee security and public safety while effectively and strategically enabling the movement of lawful people, conveyances, and commodities in support of national objectives (Mbiyozo, 2018). Therefore the 2017 White paper seek to facilitate lawful movement of people whilst maintaining safety and security in the nation.

While South Africa was drafting its new laws, the country's entry and exit points were controlled by a two-gate system (Matsinhe, 2016). The front gate accepted a select group of "desirable" white migrants who posed no danger to European culture (Moagi et al., 2018). The back gate allowed undesirable and often clandestine African migrants in order to meet labour needs in mining and agriculture and policing, imprisonment, and deportation were the main tools used to manage back gate immigration (Moagi et al., 2018).

Immigration was also considered an obstacle to the GEAR's development goals, which might be best accomplished by imposing the strictest conceivable restrictions on the entrance of any migrant (White Paper, 1999: 9). As a result, the White Paper

acknowledged the responsibility of deportation and imprisonment in the migratory structure (Mambi, 2018). Additionally, it called for a "community-based enforcement strategy" with the assistance of a "designated Immigration Service" (Boynton, 2015:39) for the purpose of detecting unauthorized foreign people (Klotz, 2012).

Additionally, the Immigration Act of 2002 preamble emphasized South Africa's sovereignty over migration (Pokroy, 2012). The Immigration Act of 2002's Preamble stated that the state's aim is to maintain hold over foreign immigration, decrease pull reasons for illegal immigration, improve border monitoring and to guarantee the borders do not remain porous" in order to effectively discourage illegal immigration (Pokroy, 2012).

The Act of 2002 authorized immigration officials to enter a property without a warrant if they had reasonable grounds to believe an undocumented migrant was there and then take them into custody on the spot (Section 34.1) (SAHRC, 2003). However, the Act did not define "reasonable reasons," which made room for the continuation of biased behaviour by law authorities (SAHRC, 2003).

The problems highlighted were a lack of debate about unaccompanied children (who wanted to immigrate or seek asylum), an inability to supervise the Lindela Centre, and a non-performative action to give duties and responsibilities to the anti-corruption body created in Section 47 of the Immigration Act of 2002 (Ueda, 2020). The SAHRC (2003) noted that:

> *"Bill promotes and institutionalizes xenophobia and racism by paying lip service to these issues"* (SAHRC, 2003: 6).

After carefully analysing the 1999 White Paper on International Migration for South Africa and the Immigration Act (13 of 2002), it is evident that there are inconsistencies in each policy document, as they fail to address and tackle the rising problem of xenophobia and by protecting African immigrants. According to Misago (2017:8), despite the fact there are countless instances where South Africans are continuously defending for the rights and freedoms of foreign nationals, there are however compelling evidence showing how there are a number of citizens who are widely apprehensive by the occupancy of African and in some instances Asian foreigners in the country.

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Despite the fact that the Amendment Act stressed the significance of foreign talents more explicitly, the Immigration Act of 1994 perpetuated the perception that immigrants are displacing South Africans from employment (Klotz, 2012). The new preamble retained protectionist measures, to a degree that foreign workers must not jeopardise South Africans' existing labour rights. Companies were still obligated to perform "diligent searches" of the domestic labour market in order to hire domestic employees rather than foreigners under common labour permits (Immigration Amendment Act, 2004: 32).

Immigration authorities as well as law enforcement officers implemented the ACA with the "same zeal and disdain for fundamental human rights as they did with the pass laws," discriminating against migrants based on their complexion, physical trait, and the languages they spoke (Crush, 1999). According to Ueda (2020:1) from the Human Rights Watch Report on the 'Xenophobic Violence Against Non-Nationals in South Africa:

> *"They Have Robbed Me of My Life' "Another man in Johannesburg, "Syed," a Bangladeshi shop owner, pointed at a row of shops ransacked by mobs during the same violence in September 2019. Over 1,000 Bangladeshi shops were looted, he said, by mobs estimated to be 300-500 people. Syed called the South African Police Service (SAPS), but he said they did not show up until the third day, forcing him and other shop owners to stand guard over the shops, without sleep, day and night, for three days, as the mob threw stones and other objects at them" (Ueda 2020:1).*

The report has further highlighted on stories on how young African immigrants (minors in particular) are subjected to xenophobic attacks, for example,

> *"Nathalie', a grade-10 student at a public school in Cape Town, who came to South Africa in 2009 with her family from the Democratic Republic of Congo paid a heavy price for being elected class monitor. She was severely beaten on August 27, 2019 by fellow students who thought a non-national was undeserving of being elected to such a position. She spent nine days in the hospital because of her injuries. Education authorities took no action because,*

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according to them, the offending students expressed remorse and taking further action would, in their view, inflame tensions" (Ueda 2020:1).

As a result, this report provides a glimpse on how the South African law enforcement officers and government departments like the Department of Education and the Department of Home Affairs, are lacking in numerous ways on protecting African immigrants, especially young children who are exposed to xenophobic attacks at schools. Thus, such xenophobic attacks against African immigrants have negatively impacted on their safety and security, particularly with regards to their human security, thus affecting their wellbeing in South Africa (Cinini & Shanta 2019:53).

Assaulting foreign nationals may be perceived as a gainful set-up and a beneficial scheme. For example, when South African citizens assault foreign owned stores, the perpetrators gain from looting such shops. Furthermore, it seems as though the South African government responds to community rallies and protests quicker, once foreign nationals are physically assaulted. Therefore, from this analysis, it seems as though attacking foreign nationals is a way of getting attention from the government (Kreifels & Warton 2018).

Furthermore, the view and misconception that African immigrants only move to South Africa in order to "take jobs", in either the formal or informal business sectors, has been a lingering thought in the minds of many South Africans particularly those from underprivileged and poor communities (Choane et al. 2011). This is because poor black South Africans who are riddled by poverty, have adopted this mindset based on the fact that they have in the past been denied access to productive resources. Therefore xenophobic attacks continue to increase because of the frustrations of those living in abject poverty and feel that their livelihoods are at risk, however this should not be an excuse for the way African immigrants are treated and not protected (Choane *et al.* 2011:134).

Therefore, this misconception that those who migrate from different parts of Africa, particularly black foreign nationals, who are unskilled and poor and compete with black South African nationals who fall under the same vulnerable and poor class, is what continues to fuel xenophobia across many communities, particularly townships and informal settlements. Thus, top-ranking politicians, and government officials have

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often times fuelled xenophobic ideas which portray African foreign nationals as a burden to the state (Crush, Tawodzera, Chikanda, Ramachandran & Tevera 2017:69).

For example, former South African president, Jacob Zuma, was silent during the periods of xenophobic attacks during his presidency from 2009 to 2018. However, because of the build-up of pressures and tension from the public, Zuma acknowledged the matter in a brief and subdued manner to the violent attacks that were ongoing (Surujpal, 2015). Other traditional leaders like the late King Goodwill Zwelithini from the Zulu nation, overtly stated his views of African immigrants and cited South Africans to believe that foreign nationals are a threat to security (Kreifels & Warton 2018).

Furthermore, in connection to this, a dubious law enforcement campaign was established after the 2015 violent xenophobic attacks in Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal provinces during the Zuma Administration. This police campaign conveyed a message which to a large extent, justified xenophobia. In 2015, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration (IMC) facilitated the South African Police Service (SAPS) with a shared campaign labelled as 'Operation Fiela-Reclaim'. According to the Department of Government Communications and Information System (2015), the aim of establishing 'Operation Fiela-Reclaim' was to eradicate the high levels of crime and "lawlessness" from various societies in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal provinces. However, this was not the case. For instance, the campaign authorised various divisions of the police force, South African military and immigration administrators to raid the homes of undocumented immigrants in the same fashion they would raid the homes of drug dealers and other groups of criminals, and further failed to present search warrants (Maromo, 2015).

Although there were numerous human rights activists and Non-profit Organisations who demonstrated their apprehensions on the mistreatment and lack of protection of African immigrants by the police and other government officials (Maromo, 2015), the national authorities pursued to set in motion the second phase of the campaign "Operation Fiela-Reclaim" in 2018.

Several statements that were announced by national authorities, have presumed that 'illegal" migrants, asylum seekers and refugees must be classified as criminals, without the requirement to examine each case individually and thoroughly (Kreifels & Warton 2018).

As a result, this type of approach breaks down the level of trust and transparency in those who must by law and authority, protect individuals, whether they are citizens of the country or foreign-nationals because at the end of the day, their wellbeing is threatened and it created human insecurity. According to Misago *et al.* (2015:30), there is currently a lack of political will and stability to make government account for its non-fulfilments to protect the basic human security rights of foreign nationals or to promote secure and steady formal responses to xenophobia and other related violent acts.

Although the South African Department of Home Affairs has over the years amended their security and immigration policy documents since post-apartheid and have taken pro-African and holistic approaches to security and migration, there is a great inadequacy of government and police officials who have to a large extent contributed to the breakout of xenophobic acts which fundamentally become violent attacks, and this creates inconsistencies and contradictions to the existing security and immigration policy documents (Kreifels & Warton 2018). The police made a few arrests of instigators of xenophobia and this gave an image that foreigners are easy target (Kreifels & Warton, 2018). There has been a tendency to view the Department of Home Affairs as the only department responsible for the management of international migration (Department of Home Affairs, 2017). Internationally, there is a significant tendency toward nations adopting an integrated strategy, with departments cooperating and collaborating with civil society partners to accomplish shared security and development goals (Department of Home Affairs, 2017). There is poor coordination between the Department of Home Affairs and South African Police Service (SAPS) in enforcing the legislations and the South African Defence Forces in securing the border (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017).

According to Misago *et al.* (2015:25), it is frequently said that the South African governments general response to violent xenophobic acts, has been categorised by denialism. Thus, often times, such denialism from the government and law authorities, is embedded in a discussion which marks nearly every xenophobic violent crimes as just ordinary crime and not xenophobia (Crush, 2014). Therefore, this type of denialism indicates the need for policy changes and interventions in order to protect African immigrants from any further xenophobic attacks.

In addition to the above mentioned, it should be noted that South Africa's borders are quite porous and not policed nor controlled properly, which then makes it easy for African immigrants to enter the country illegally (Malatji, 2020). As a result, this form of neglect, further causes violence and attacks by many poor South Africans who are aggravated by the uncontrolled immigration of equally poor and desperate African immigrants in search of a better life (Choane et al. 2011: 137).

The government claims that the collapse of South Africa's refugee protection system and the subsequent need for change are the result of the system being overwhelmed by economic migrants (Makina, 2013). For a while, the DHA claimed that the country was home to a million asylum seekers, a number that was blindly repeated by the UNHCR and the media and translated into false assertions that South Africa was the world's top refugee destination (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021).

The White Paper on International Migration acknowledges that this number is inaccurate, stating that only 78,339 asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits remained valid in 2015 (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021). According to the White Paper, detention centres are designed to house all asylum applicants throughout the process of determining their status and it negates the right on freedom to movement (Carciotto, 2020). The White Paper argues that stopping or slowing migration is neither desired nor feasible, but that it may be beneficial if handled effectively, safely, and in accordance with human rights (Eisenberg & Associates, 2021).

The frequent usage of the word misperception is intended to imply that a foreigner's legal claim to citizenship is untrue or begs some mistaken notion (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021). The Citizenship Act has developed to ensure that citizenship is granted without regard for race, gender, or ethnic origin, based on birth, descent, or naturalisation (Eisenberg & Associates, 2021). Denial of the rights to citizenships is a form of economic and social deprivation and puts them at risk of being targeted by xenophobic attacks (Eisenberg & Associates, 2021).

There are currently substantial progress initiatives towards an African Continental Free Trade Area AfCFTA) and a range of associated efforts that require decreasing state borders to promote closer interactions and collaboration with African neighbours. The

African Union is behind and in charge of most of these programs. One of these initiatives, as reflected in the African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons (FMP Protocol), is to reduce and eventually eliminate constraints to Africans travelling across African borders to visit, trade, reside, work, and start businesses in other African countries (Hirsch 2021:2). Furthermore, in 1995, the then South African Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi stated that another challenge that confronts South Africa is the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) concept of free movement of people, free commerce, and the right to choose where you work and live. He further stated that in South Africa, free mobility of people signifies calamity (Hirsch 2021:21). Thus, South African immigration policies as well as the hostilities and xenophobic attitudes that exist within society, in essence deviate from the free movement policies of the African Union as well as the Southern African Development Community for which South Africa is a signatory.

4.3. Conclusion

There are inconsistencies and contradictions that have been identified in South Africa's immigration and security policy documents, particularly in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration for South Africa and the Immigration Act such as taking a pro-African stance whilst having protectionist policies such as the Immigration Act of 2002 which advocated for deportation. Both of these policy documents failed to address the rising problem of xenophobia and the lack of protection by the South African government, law enforcement officials as well as civil society, when it comes to African immigrants who have now become vulnerable. The Act advocate for the attraction of skilled personnel but there are still bureaucracy involved delays the hiring of foreign skilled labour. Thus, South African immigration policies deviate from free movement policies of the African Union and the Southern African Development Community for which South Africa is a signatory.

Furthermore, this chapter has looked at how the concept of "new nationalism" has paved the way for the spread of xenophobia in African countries like South Africa and how it is important for the South African government and immigration policies to move away from new nationalism as it often stimulates xenophobia. This chapter has further looked at how xenophobia and violence is continuously rising each year in the country because of the failure of policy responses to immigration and security, hence African immigrants are not being adequately protected by the government, civil society, as well as law enforcement officers and there is a need for them to practice what has been stipulated in the policy documents.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

The study aimed at examining South Africa's immigration and security policy, and to examine the inconsistency of measures that the government has put in place to combat the perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The Chapter presents the conclusion of the research study and proffers the policy recommendations. In addition, the summary of the study findings is given in this Chapter. The study aimed at examining South Africa's immigration and security policy, and the inconsistency of measures that the government has put in place to combat the perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The study analysed the concept of immigration and highlighted the migration trends in South Africa. Furthermore, the study analysed immigration in relation to national policies as well as how it is related to xenophobia, nationalism and national security. The qualitative desk research approach was taken into effect by the research study which included the descriptive research design and content analysis in achieving the study objectives. The specific study objectives were:

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- To determine the measures implemented by the South African government for the protection of immigrants against xenophobia.
- To determine the effect of the existing policies, to ensure the protection of African migrants.
- To understand how nationalism has created threats to the protection of immigrants in South Africa.
- To understand why the South African government is not adequately protecting immigrants against xenophobia.

5.2. Summary of Findings

The protectionist migration practises such as the two gate system are in conflict with the commitment by South Africa to *SADC Protocol on Facilitating Persons Movement* (2005) and the African Union's *Common Position on Migration and Development* (2006) which emphasises the importance of migration as an instrument for development, increased regional collaboration, and the protection of migrants' rights. Both of the Immigration Act and the White Paper on Immigration failed to address the rising problem of xenophobia and there is lack of protection by the South African government, law enforcement officers and civil society, when it comes to African immigrants who have now become vulnerable. The summary of findings is given based on the study objectives as follows:

Measures implemented by the SA government for the protection of immigrants against xenophobia.

Arrests were made by the South African police and there was prosecution of the accused involved in these violent attacks. The police were tasked with the responsibility of transporting foreign people to police stations and other secure locations. After first denying the xenophobic situation and making futile pleas for calm, the administration sent military in June 2008 to quell the unrest. However Human Rights Watch (2019) noted that the rate of arrest and conviction of xenophobic criminals has been appalling throughout the years.

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Additionally, Home Affairs arranged ''voluntary deportation'' vehicles (Misago, 2016a: 94) for those who wanted to head back to their homelands. Scholars such as Monson and Misago (2009), Crush (2014) and Gordon (2015) argued that the government did little to protect the immigrants against xenophobia. There has been a habit to view the Department of Home Affairs as the only department accountable for the administration and management of international migration.

Why the South African government is not adequately protecting immigrants against xenophobia

The government is not adequately protecting immigrants due to denialism. The denialists dismiss the idea that xenophobia influences violence against migrants and refugees, and xenophobia denial has influenced official South African reactions to foreign criticism.. In addition, South African government is not adequately protecting immigrants due to incapacitation. The persistence of violence over many years in the majority of impacted regions demonstrated the police and other relevant local officials' incapacity to put an end to the violence and/or prevent it from expanding to other places.

The effect of the existing policies, to ensure the protection of African migrants

The two main current policies that are in place to ensure the protection of the African migrants are the Immigration White Paper and the Immigration Act of 2002 which informs other policies on immigration. According to the 2017 White Paper, detention centres are designed to house all asylum applicants throughout the process of determining their status and it negates the right on freedom to movement. The Citizenship Act has developed to ensure that citizenship is granted without regard for race, gender, or ethnic origin, based on birth, descent, or naturalisation. Denial of the rights to citizenships is a form of economic and social deprivation and puts them at risk of being targeted by xenophobic attacks.

While South Africa was drafting its new laws, the country's entry and exit points were controlled by a two-gate system. The front gate accepted a select group of "desirable" white migrants who posed no danger to European culture (Moagi et al., 2018). Patrolling, imprisonment, and repatriation were the major tactics used to regulate

"back-gate" immigration, which permitted unwanted and frequently undocumented African migrants to satisfy labour demands in farming and mining.

The two gate system promoted the encouraged movement of European nationals whilst restricting African migrants exposing them to discrimination and xenophobia. Additionally, the 1999 White Paper on International migration called for a "community-based enforcement strategy" with the assistance of a "designated Immigration Service" (Boynton, 2015:39) for the purpose of detecting unauthorized foreign people exposing the foreign nationals to violence than protecting them.

How nationalism has created threats to the protection of immigrants in South Africa.

Anti-immigration sentiments are not just a reaction to rising immigration, but rather reflect governments' nationalistic and anti-immigrant stances. The South African exceptionalism perspective continues to inform widespread antagonism and unfavourable sentiments towards foreign nationals, primarily those from neighbouring African countries. Politics significantly influences attitudes and institutional actions toward immigration. The dehumanisation of a number of national, ethnic and racial communities and the idea that separation and exclusion are permissible and necessary for the state's functioning and the welfare of its citizens are products of South Africa's past apartheid life, which rejected and dehumanised non-whites especially black Africans, and fortified the idea that alienation and marginalisation are both plausible and necessary for the state's development and the security of its citizens.

Several statements that were announced by national authorities, have presumed that 'illegal" asylum seekers and refugees as well as migrants, must be classified as "criminals", with no requirement to examine each situation individually and thoroughly (Kreifels & Warton 2018). As a result, this type of approach breaks down the level of trust and transparency in those who must by law and authority, protect individuals, whether they are citizens of the country or foreign-nationals because at the end of the day, their wellbeing is threatened and it created human insecurity.

5.3. Recommendations

Notwithstanding the outcomes of the study, the recommendations which seek to amend the protection of migrants are applicable. The study proffers the following recommendations:

Collaboration: There is a need for effective collaboration of government departments particularly Department of Home Affairs and South African Police Service (SAPS) in enforcing immigration laws and the SANDF in protecting the country`s borders from illegal migration.

Adopting realism towards xenophobia: There is need for paradigm shift in the government so that it acknowledged the existence of xenophobia. The study shows that the government of South Africa adopted the denialism or minimalism stance. Thus the study recommends the government of South Africa to take a realist view to xenophobia.

Education and awareness campaigns: In recent years, there has been an alarming rise in hate speech among South Africans, with many blaming immigrants and minority groups for their own nations' problems. Prejudice and hatred are not inherent characteristics. They are acquired habits – and acquired behaviours may be unlearned. The study recommends that massive awareness campaigns be conducted to sensitise politicians and citizens about the xenophobia even in schools.

Capacitation: The study results show that the inadequacy of government response to protect migrants is due to incapacitation. The study recommends that various forms of capacitation of government departments responsible for the protect the migrants

5.4. Conclusion

The study aimed at examining South Africa's immigration and security policy, and to examine the inconsistency of measures that the government has put in place to combat the perpetual security threats against African immigrants. The study analysed immigration in relation to xenophobia, nationalism and national security. Xenophobia is hatred towards immigrants and it has been evident in South Africa through xenophobic violence since its democratic transition. The two gate system supported

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by government, contradicts the Conventions of the Africa Union and SADC on the integration of migrants. The study showed that the migrants are not adequately protected by the government and are vulnerable to xenophobia. The government denies the phenomenon and is incapacitated to deal with the issue.

5.5. Recommendations for Future Studies

Although the study was thorough, it did not cover all the aspects around the concept of immigration. The study suggests the following areas for further research in the future:

- A comparative approach which highlights the response of provincial governments in protecting migrants
- A study that analyses the capacitation and collaboration issues in the Department of Home Affairs, SAPS and SANDF in the implementation of migration laws.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Ethical Clearance Letter

Faculty of Humanities

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Humanities 100.
Since 1919

1 July 2021

Dear Miss K Kganticoe

Project Title:	Immigration and Security: An examination of South African government measures to combat perpetual security threats against African migrants
Researcher:	Miss K Kganticoe
Supervisor(s):	Dr CC Nshimbi
Department:	Political Sciences
Reference number:	16173156 (HUM009/0421)
Degree:	Masters

Thank you for the application that was submitted for ethical consideration.

The Research Ethics Committee notes that this is a literature-based study and no human subjects are involved.

The application has been **approved** on 1 July 2021 with the assumption that the document(s) are in the public domain. Data collection may therefore commence, along these guidelines.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. However, should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, a new research proposal and application for ethical clearance will have to be submitted for approval.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

Prof Innocent Pikirayi
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail:PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Research Ethics Committee Members: Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Mr A Bizos; Dr A-M de Beer; Dr A dos Santos; Ms KT Govinder Andrew; Dr P Gutura; Dr E Johnson; Prof D Maree; Mr A Mohamed; Dr I Noomé; Dr C Puttergill; Prof D Reyburn; Prof M Soer; Prof E Taljard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa

Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

ACADEMIC SUPERVISION

REGISTERED POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS[1]

The role and responsibilities of both a candidate and a supervisor

CANDIDATE INFORMATION

STUDENT NUMBER:................16173156..

NAME OF CANDIDATE:................KEABETSWE KGANTICOE..........................

CELLPHONE NUMBER:................0834192933..

EMAIL ADDRESS:................KKGANTICOE@GMAIL.COM................................

PROGRAMME FOR WHICH CANDIDATE IS REGISTERED:

MA SECURITY STUDIES
....

SUPERVISOR INFORMATION

NAME OF SUPERVISOR: ....Dr C C Nshimbi..............................

EMAIL ADDRESS: ....christopher.nshimbi@up.ac.za......................

DEPARTMENT:................Political Sciences...

CO-SUPERVISOR INFORMATION (if applicable)

NAME OF CO-SUPERVISOR: ....

EMAIL ADDRESS: ....

UNIVERSITY: ....

DEPARTMENT: ....

DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE RESEARCH COMPONENT OF THE PROGRAMME:

01 FEBRUARY 2020
....

This document must be signed by both the candidate and the supervisor and be submitted to the office of the Head: Student Administration within two months after the date of registration for the research component of the programme.

[1] Acknowledgement: Documents from the faculties of Natural and Agricultural Sciences and Economic and Management Sciences, as well as a document from the University of Cape Town were used in compiling this document.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

Candidate supplied with the Code of Research Ethics of the University of Pretoria and agrees to abide by this code.
The Code of Research Ethics is available at www.up.ac.za/intranet/registrar/index.html#R.
Go to *Research Ethics* and then to *Code of conduct for responsible research practices*.
Please attach the letter of the Research Ethics Committee to this document if applicable.

Yes		No		Signature	

Candidate supplied with the Plagiarism Policy of the University of Pretoria and agrees to abide by this policy. The Plagiarism Policy Agreement is attached to this document and must be signed and submitted with this document to the office of the Head: Student Administration within two months after registering for the research component of the programme. Also attached to this document is the Declaration of Originality which must be submitted with every essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation and/or thesis.
The Plagiarism Policy is available at www.up.ac.za/intranet/registrar/index.html#R.
Go to *Plagiarism*.

Yes		No		Signature	

Candidate supplied with the contact details of the Library's relevant information specialist.

Yes		No		Information specialist:

Candidate referred to General Regulations G.16 to G.61 of the University of Pretoria pertaining to postgraduate matters and agrees to abide by these regulations.

Yes		No		Signature	

Specific regulations that must be noted:

G.61.

....
....

Any other administrative matters:

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EXPECTATIONS

Supervisor's expectations:

1. Regular scheduled meetings (at least once every three months) punctually attended by the candidate. Meetings to be scheduled in advance by the candidate. More frequent meetings may be arranged.
2. Candidate to make contact via email (at least once a month).
3. Candidate to provide an indication of the time to be spent on each phase of the research project (time chart). The project should be completed as soon as possible within the minimum time period as allowed by the University. The University's General Regulations regarding the renewal of registration per degree should be consulted in this regard. The time chart could be drawn up with reference to the following:
   - literature review (critical evaluation of existing knowledge)
   - drafting of the research proposal (what the research is intended to accomplish, including a protocol on how the research will be undertaken, ie research design and methods)
     The suggested outline for a research proposal is as follows:
     - Title/Area
     - Abstract
     - Introduction/Background
     - Research problem
     - Research objective(s)
     - Conceptual framework
     - Previous work – comprehensive and critical appraisal of literature
     - Proposal of new model/technique/idea/approach
     - Suitability of the approach for the level
     - Hypothesis and anticipated results
     - Milestones and timelines for completion
     - Conclusion
     - References
   - the actual research, and
   - recording research findings.
4. Quarterly written reports from the candidate on his/her progress in terms of the indicated time frame/time chart.
5. Candidate to ensure that all submitted work is written in an acceptable standard of English or Afrikaans. It is not the supervisor's duty to do "*rough editing*" and (s)he will merely concentrate on contents and structure.
6. Any revisions suggested by the supervisor to be resubmitted by the candidate within one calendar month (along with the copy of the previous manuscript where comments were made by the supervisor).
7. Any class, workshop or course that the candidate **must attend as a prerequisite**:
   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………… As shall be determined by the supervisor …………………………………………
8. Candidate has to demonstrate his/her research competence in order to be awarded a degree.
9. Other expectations:
   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
   Collaborate/undertake tasks/assignments/work that may be (in)directly related to and relevant/important
   for the candidate's research.
   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
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10. Comments by candidate on the abovementioned:
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Candidate's expectations:
1. Supervisor to be easily accessible.
2. Clear mediation mechanisms (refer to the General Regulations and Information of the University of Pretoria pertaining to the Student Communication Channel, Section B.15.) to deal with any grievances, personal problems or disagreements that may arise between the candidate and the supervisor.
3. All work submitted to the supervisor to be returned within a reasonable time (maximum turnover of one month), accompanied by written comments on the manuscript as well as separate general comments.
4. Other expectations:
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5. Comments by supervisor on the abovementioned:
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Supervisor's plans and commitments:
1. The supervisor must set out, where applicable, his/her plans for providing supervision in terms of the time chart. The supervisor must indicate any expected absence, such as leave/sabbaticals (providing alternative arrangements for supervision if away for more than two months in any one year).
   ....
   ....

   Supervision arrangements: Hold contact sessions as per department/faculty stipulation (see EXPECTATIONS on page 3)
   Provide feedback on submitted work within at least ten (10) working days of receipt thereof, unless otherwise stated.
   Collaborate/undertake tasks/work/assignments that may be (in)directly to and important for candidate's research.
   Communicate on agreed on/about mutually agreed meetings and dates.

Candidate's plans and commitments:
1. The candidate must indicate any matter(s) that may have an impact on the time chart he/she provided (eg work pressure).
   ....
   ....
   ....
   ....

   Candidate's undertakings:
   ....
   ....
   ....

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
(Refer to the General Regulations and Information of the University, Regulation G.57.6)

Authorship: Authorship should be discussed and agreed upon by all parties concerned. Any additional remarks regarding authorship must be noted by the supervisor*:

....

The intellectual property rights of the outcome of the research will be determined by the agreement that the candidate has with the University of Pretoria and which is in line with the policy of the University of Pretoria.

....

*in the case that the candidate is employed by an institution other than the University of Pretoria an agreement as to which address is used on the publication needs to be signed. If such an agreement does not exist, the candidate must publish under the name of the University of Pretoria in line with the General Regulations of the University of Pretoria.

TERMINATION OF REGISTRATION
Should a candidate fail to maintain satisfactory academic progress at any phase of his/her period of study, the supervisor may, after consultation with the candidate, send the candidate a warning letter indicating the seriousness of the matter. This letter should also include written instructions on the conditions that need to be met in order to achieve/accomplish satisfactory progress/performance. The candidate will then be placed on probation and be monitored for a period of three months. Should the candidate fail to rectify his/her progress and/or improve his/her performance, he or she will have his/her registration terminated by the Dean on the recommendation of the Postgraduate Committee (General Regulation G.4).

A candidate can appeal the decision to terminate his/her registration. An Appeals Committee would be formed consisting of the Vice-Principal responsible for Research and Postgraduate Studies and two members of the Senate Committee for Research. The two members of the Senate Committee for Research are appointed by the Vice-Principal. The candidate must state his/her case in writing and a written response should be solicited from the supervisor. The Appeals Committee will base its judgement on the written submissions. The decision of the Appeals Committee is final.

Candidate's comments:
....
....
....

SIGNATURE OF THE CANDIDATE

Name	Signed	Date
KEABETSWE KGANTICOE		16 OCTOBER 2020

SIGNATURE OF THE SUPERVISOR

Name	Signed	Date
Dr C C Nshimbi		15 October, 2020

COMMENTS BY THE HOD

I have reviewed this completed Memorandum of Understanding and I am satisfied that it reflects the shared understanding of the supervisor and the candidate and that the Department is able to meet the obligations to the candidate set out in this Memorandum of Understanding:

Name	Signed	Date

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Appendix 3: Plagiarism Policy

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

PLAGIARISM POLICY AGREEMENT

The University of Pretoria places great emphasis upon integrity and ethical conduct in the preparation of all written work submitted for academic evaluation.

While academic staff teaches you about referencing techniques and how to avoid plagiarism, you too have a responsibility in this regard. If you are at any stage uncertain as to what is required, you should speak to your lecturer before any written work is submitted.

You are guilty of plagiarism if you copy something from another author's work (eg a book, an article or a website) without acknowledging the source and pass it off as your own. In effect you are stealing something that belongs to someone else. This is not only the case when you copy work word-for-word (verbatim), but also when you submit someone else's work in a slightly altered form (paraphrase) or use a line of argument without acknowledging it. You are not allowed to use work previously produced by another student. You are also not allowed to let anybody copy your work with the intention of passing if off as his/her work.

Students who commit plagiarism will not be given any credit for plagiarised work. The matter may also be referred to the Disciplinary Committee (Students) for a ruling. Plagiarism is regarded as a serious contravention of the University's rules and can lead to expulsion from the University.

The declaration which follows must accompany all written work submitted while you are a student of the University of Pretoria. No written work will be accepted unless the declaration has been completed and attached.

KEABETSWE KGANTICOE
Full names of candidate:...

16173156
Student number:...

16 OCTOBER 2020
Date:..

Declaration

1.   I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

SIGNATURE OF CANDIDATE: ....

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: ....

This document must be signed and submitted to the Head: Student Administration within two months of registering for the research component of the programme.

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Appendix 4: Declaration of Originality

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This document must be signed and submitted with every
essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation and/or thesis.

Full names of student:......KEABETSWE KGANTICOE..

Student number:......16173156..

Declaration

1. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

2. I declare that this ......PROPOSAL... (eg essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation, thesis, etc) is my own original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, Internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.

3. I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in as my own.

4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own work.

SIGNATURE OF STUDENT:..

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR:..

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