

# **A social history of the Chinese in Lesotho to 2020**

**by**

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**List of Abbreviations:**

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ACEL    | Association of Chinese Enterprises in Lesotho         |
| AGOA    | African Growth and Opportunities Act                  |
| ANC     | African National Congress                             |
| BCP     | Basotho Congress Party                                |
| BNP     | Basutoland National Party                             |
| CBAL    | Chinese Business Association of Lesotho               |
| CCSCC   | Chinese Community and the Security Cooperation Centre |
| CLPPFAF | China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund |
| CMT     | Chinese Medical Team                                  |
| CNKI    | Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure             |
| CLC     | Consortium of Lesotho Contractors                     |
| DDPR    | Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution      |
| OSBF    | One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre                 |
| PRC     | People's Republic of China                            |
| ROC     | Republic of China                                     |
| USA     | United States of America                              |



**Abstract:**

The Chinese migrant community within the Kingdom of Lesotho represents one of the least explored groups of Chinese migrants within southern Africa. Analysis of the Chinese within Lesotho has mostly focused on their economic position within Lesotho. Furthermore, studies of the Chinese migrant population of Lesotho have tended to deal with them in a generalized or homogenized manner and neglected a nuanced examination. In light of the comparatively recent interest in the history of Chinese migrants within southern Africa, and the hostility such migrants have faced due to assumptions concerning them, it is pertinent to examine the Chinese migrant community of Lesotho in greater depth. This calls for a particular focus on the social history of the Chinese in Lesotho to reveal the multifarious nature of that community and, in addition, to challenge certain core assumptions concerning Chinese migrants the developing Chinese Lesotho community poses.

The presence of Chinese migrants within Lesotho dates back to the 1960s. Although it was political connections with Taiwan which preceded the arrival of the initial Taiwanese migrants to Lesotho, state-sponsored migration was never the primary vehicle for the community that formed within the Kingdom. Private interests, motivated by a range of factors, saw the establishment of an initial Chinese community formed from Taiwanese business interests and labour pools. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s this community would grow through the arrival of mainland Chinese, predominantly from Shanghai, brought over by Taiwanese companies. When Lesotho's political relationship with Taiwan broke down and it transferred its allegiance to the People's Republic of China in the late 1990s, a period of anti-Chinese hostility led to violence in the 1990s which saw a major exodus of Taiwanese and other mainland Chinese from Lesotho. Starting in the 2000s, however, a new Chinese community began to form in Lesotho the result of a large migration by Fujianese traders into Lesotho.

Examination of the history of the Chinese community in Lesotho has tended to proceed along the same assumptions made around numerous Chinese migrant communities within southern Africa: that they are a uniform and insular community with little integration in the surrounding society and predominantly only focused on economic activities. However, a closer analysis of the history of the Chinese within Lesotho reveals that this is an overly generalized statement. There is evidence of the development, among both Taiwanese and later Fujianese, of a Chinese Lesotho community which is multi-faceted, and which has begun to develop its own unique identity as the community actively pursues greater integration within Lesotho's civil society.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Overview

Scholarly interest in China, in virtually all fields, has noticeably increased over the course of the late twentieth century and well into the twenty-first century. Driven by a number of factors, some concerning China's own changing situation and circumstance vis-à-vis the rest of the world and others concerning the changing landscape of academic and scholarly pursuit globally, this has led to a situation where international interest in the study and analysis of China is possibly at the highest point it has ever been. It is also the case that the study of Africa in several fields has visibly and significantly increased in relatively recent history. Unsurprisingly, the study of relations between Africa and China has benefited from this and become a noticeably more developed area of research. From economic, political and even social dimensions, there is a great deal of attention paid in academia to China's relationship with the African continent in the contemporary era.<sup>1</sup> This includes the field of academic historical studies, which has seen a growing corpus of work concerning China's engagement historically with African states. This research is, in part, informed by the contemporary geopolitical significance placed upon Sino-Africa relations. It would be difficult not to see the consistent attention paid by news media and politicians to China's engagement with Africa as in part motivating the increased interest in the history of China and Africa's interactions. At this stage in time it seems as if this field of study will only continue to grow, as the relationship between China and the African continent continues to develop and deepen, and scholastic attention to both regions expands. That the surge of interest in Sino-African relations is, at least partly, derived from political motions does raise the concern that works relating to this field often labour under the shadow of being used to promote some or other reading of contemporary Chinese and African relations. Within the confines of this topic China's relations with southern Africa, and migrations towards that part of the world, have received significant attention. But, chiefly, it is South Africa's history with China and the Chinese that has received the most coverage, at least in part due to South Africa's important political and economic role in southern Africa.

Among the southern African states with large Chinese migratory populations Lesotho has remained relatively unexamined. Indeed, unlike the presence of the Chinese in South Africa,

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<sup>1</sup> I. Taylor: *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, p. 127.

the fact that Lesotho has, relative to its population size, a large Chinese immigrant population remains relatively unknown.<sup>2</sup> This is in spite of the Chinese having become, perhaps, the largest ethnic minority in Lesotho, and that their proliferation is so widespread in that Kingdom that even in remote hamlets it is not uncommon to find a Chinese store.<sup>3</sup> According to state census data the proportion of ethnic Chinese within Lesotho still comprises a miniscule percentage of the population, only around 0.3%.<sup>4</sup> However, there is a general consensus that this official data is inaccurate.<sup>5</sup> Contemporary estimates instead place the number of ethnic Chinese in Lesotho between 4 000 and 20 000, as high as 1% of the overall population.<sup>6</sup> This easily makes the ethnic Chinese one of, if not the, most prominent ethnic minority in Lesotho. Indeed, other than the Chinese, Lesotho has little in the way of racial diversity within its borders. The population largely comprises Basotho. Furthermore, the ethnic Chinese have grown to this size in a relatively small period of time, having only begun immigration into Lesotho from around the 1960s.<sup>7</sup> Effectively, the Chinese have become a central ‘other’ of a Basotho-majority country. This can be clearly seen in how, despite their small numbers, the Chinese in Lesotho have a very public profile and attract a great deal of media attention.<sup>8</sup> But this attention is mostly the result of economic tensions within Lesotho, as well as the fact that they are an identifiable

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<sup>2</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>3</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019; Y. Park: ‘Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,’ *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013.

<sup>4</sup> *Lesotho Demographics Profile 2018*, Index Mundi, Lesotho Population - Demographics (indexmundi.com), Accessed 29th May 2019.

<sup>5</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, p. 33; M. Turner: “Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho,” Unpublished Master’s Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011; Y. Park: ‘Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,’ *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133.

<sup>6</sup> Y. Park: ‘Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,’ *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133.

<sup>7</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Anon: Lesotho quiet after weeks long riot killing 19, *Daily Breeze*, 26 May 1991, p. A8; Anon: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; Anon: Lesotho victims ask: Why did the mobs hit us? *Sunday Times*, 2 June 1991, p. 20; S. L. Cas: Naked couple stoned in Lesotho race frenzy, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 7; G. Mahabeer: Aysha stays as others flee Lesotho, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 57; M. Schmidt: Ruined Asian traders vow not to return, *Sunday Times*, 27 September 1988, p. 77; Anon: Police patrol after Lesotho Riot kills 19, *Charlotte Observer*, 26 May 1991, p. 23A; Anon: ‘Refugees flee “anarchic” Lesotho capital to South Africa’, *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 22 Sep 1998; Anon: Race Riots kill 19 in Lesotho, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 26 May 1991, p. A7; Anon: Racial unrest in Lesotho kills 19, *Rocky Mountain News*, 26 May 1991, p. 90; Anon: Week of race riots leave 19 dead, 60 hurt in Lesotho, *Kansas City Star*, 26 May 1991, p. A20.

minority.<sup>9</sup> This attention also has a tendency to cast ethnic Chinese in monolithic terms, paying little or no attention to the distinct groups of Chinese within Lesotho and, instead, treating them as a homogenous entity, typically conflated with their respective government as well.<sup>10</sup> Studies regarding the Chinese migrant population of Lesotho also tend to operate under the assumption that little, to no, integration by the Chinese migrant population has occurred.

This is not to say that the Chinese in Lesotho have received no scholarly attention. There does exist a small, but growing, body of academic work concerning the situation and history of the Chinese in Lesotho. However, for the most part this body of work is not comprehensive and is constrained by a noticeable focus on the Chinese involvement with economics in Lesotho.<sup>11</sup> Without a doubt the Chinese have gained a prominent position in public debate within the Kingdom purely due to their, allegedly, outsized influence and dominance of Lesotho's economy.<sup>12</sup> This economic focus has coloured almost every single aspect of the Chinese experience in Lesotho. Overwhelmingly news media reports on the Chinese in Lesotho are concerned with their economic relations to the Kingdom.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, most academic work concerning the Chinese in Lesotho also is driven by a focus on their economic activities.<sup>14</sup> Where this is not the case the focus tends to be solely on the anti-Chinese resentment and prejudice that has developed in Lesotho, generally driven by economic fears and concerns, once more maintaining an underpinning thread of economics.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133.

<sup>10</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 139.

<sup>11</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

<sup>12</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, pp 85-97; T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011; *Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network*, <https://china-africa.ssrc.org/caac-research-network/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Anon: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; B. Mpaki: Meat Import Ban requires inclusivity, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; L. Ntsukuyane: The tangled web of the Lesotho Wool War, *The Daily Maverick*, 10 October 2018.

<sup>14</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

<sup>15</sup> Anon: Lesotho quiet after weeks long riot killing 19, *Daily Breeze*, 26 May 1991, p. A8; Anon: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; Anon: Lesotho victims ask: Why did the mobs hit us? *Sunday Times*, 2 June 1991, p. 20; S. L. Cas: Naked couple stoned in Lesotho race frenzy, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 7; G. Mahabeer: Aysha stays as others flee Lesotho, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 57; M. Schmidt: Ruined Asian traders vow not to return, *Sunday Times*, 27 September 1988, p. 77; Anon: Police patrol after Lesotho Riot kills 19, *Charlotte Observer*, 26 May 1991, p. 23A; Anon: 'Refugees flee "anarchic" Lesotho capital to South Africa', *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 22 Sep 1998; Anon: Race Riots kill 19 in Lesotho, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 26 May 1991, p. A7; Anon: Racial unrest in Lesotho kills 19,

This has created a very limited understanding of the Chinese in Lesotho, one which reduces them almost purely to their economic impact and little else. In addition to this, relatively little work has been done to differentiate between the different sectors of the economy the different groups of Chinese interact with. The older Taiwanese community are predominantly involved in Lesotho's textile industry, whilst the newer mainland Chinese community is mostly involved in retail.<sup>16</sup> Conflation of Lesotho's Chinese population is a consistent trend that has to some degree masked the extent of internal divergence among the ethnic Chinese within Lesotho. This, in itself, is far from unique or a new phenomenon. The history of Chinese immigrants in southern Africa largely only being approached from an economic angle is long, however, in Lesotho there has been little done to move beyond this. Whilst in the case of South Africa there has now been serious academic efforts to expand the history of the Chinese in the country beyond their economic role, Lesotho has seen little similar development. As a result, the history of the Chinese in Lesotho and their unique identity represents a distinct lacuna in academic literature on the topic of Sino-African relations, and Sino-southern African relations in particular.

This study deals directly with the aforementioned gap, seeking to broaden the body of work concerning the Chinese in Lesotho by analysing the history of Chinese migrants within Lesotho and granting them agency beyond their economic activity. In particular, the focus of this study is on breaking down the monolithic treatment of the Chinese in Lesotho as a homogenous group and demonstrating that the Chinese migrant population of Lesotho are a diverse and multifarious community who have developed aspects of their own local Lesotho Chinese identity. This identity finds expression within the oft ignored efforts by members of the Chinese community within Lesotho to integrate themselves into Lesotho's wider society. This study demonstrates that, despite general assumptions concerning Chinese insularity within southern Africa, and the continent for that matter, Chinese migrants in Lesotho have made efforts to integrate into the wider society of Lesotho and, through this process, a distinct historical identity has emerged.

It is necessary for the study to be appropriately contextualized before it can begin. With regards to the topic of the Chinese in Lesotho there are two broad contexts that must be established for,

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*Rocky Mountain News*, 26 May 1991, p. 90; Anon: Week of race riots leave 19 dead, 60 hurt in Lesotho, *Kansas City Star*, 26 May 1991, p. A20.

<sup>16</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013; T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

even when not directly related, they inform and influence the topic significantly. Firstly, as it forms part of the extant body of work concerning the history of Chinese migration to southern Africa, it is imperative to understand the context concerning this matter. From the mid-nineteenth century up to the early twentieth century there was a massive movement of peoples out of China and into other countries. This historical background must be explored before moving on to a closer examination of Chinese migration into Lesotho.<sup>17</sup> This large-scale migration was the result of the Qing Dynasty's (1636 – 1912) relaxation of their traditionally harsh anti-immigration legislation, itself inherited from the former Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644).<sup>18</sup> Although a general opposition to immigration had marked the policies of many historical Chinese dynasties, though not all, the Qing Dynasty did in some areas increase the severity of punishments concerning immigration.<sup>19</sup> However, foreign intervention would inevitably overthrow these policies. Following China's defeat in the Opium Wars (1<sup>st</sup> Opium War: 4 September 1839 – 29 August 1842; 2<sup>nd</sup> Opium War: 8 October 1856 – 24 October 1860) and the series of treaties which followed - most important of which was arguably the Sino-British Convention of Peking (24 October 1860) - permitted Chinese subjects to immigrate and move into other countries without fear of any consequence or persecution.<sup>20</sup> Impoverishment followed as a result of droughts and famine in China, exacerbated by civil unrest such as the Taiping Rebellion (December 1850 – August 1864) and Boxer Rebellion (2 November 1899 – 7 September 1901), which devastated southern China.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Western colonial powers sought access to a large and cheap labour force to replace that of slavery, with which to drive the further exploitation of recently discovered resources, in their colonies, and their own industrialization.<sup>22</sup> Due to a number of other factors, including the above mentioned internal conflict, the aforementioned military coercion by Western colonial powers and economic instability, by 1860 the Qing Dynasty had largely opened China to immigration. This allowed for a mass movement of Chinese out of China abroad.<sup>23</sup> The concatenation of these factors, working together, saw the massive migration of Chinese into overseas Western states and

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<sup>17</sup> H. K. Norton: *The Story of California from the Earliest Days to the Present*, pp 283–284.

<sup>18</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 87-88.

<sup>19</sup> I. Shen: *A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices*, p. 188.

<sup>20</sup> C. P. Fitzgerald: *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People*, p. 5.

<sup>21</sup> H. K. Norton: *The Story of California from the Earliest Days to the Present*, pp 283–284.

<sup>22</sup> R. Skeldon: "Migration from China," *Journal of International Affairs*, (49), 2, pp 434-444.

<sup>23</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 89-90.



colonies, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Although the first presence of Chinese in Lesotho only comes much later, during the 1960s and 1970s, it is necessary to understand the longer history of Chinese migration to southern Africa to contextualize the eventual arrival of the Chinese into Lesotho.

Linked to this is the matter of the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan's chequebook diplomacy, in the latter half of the twentieth century. Chequebook diplomacy referred to Taiwan's courting of smaller, often pariah or economically fragile, states by promising economic support and investment in return for international recognition.<sup>24</sup> Due to the role Taiwanese immigrants play in this study, being the very first Chinese group to enter into Lesotho, the logic and motivation behind Taiwanese relations with as small a state as Lesotho must be explored. To understand this it will be necessary to understand Taiwan's history with South Africa, particularly how it courted the apartheid regime due to the lack of close friends or allies that regime had by the 1960s.<sup>25</sup> Taiwan's relationship with Lesotho took on a similar form, to an extent, as Taiwan's relationship with South Africa and numerous other small, young, African states. For this reason, it is necessary to underpin the study by exploring the history of Taiwan's chequebook diplomacy.

The second primary context that must be explored is that of Lesotho's circumstances as a landlocked country, surrounded on all sides by South Africa.<sup>26</sup> The links which exist between the Chinese community in Lesotho and South Africa also makes pertinent an examination of Lesotho's situation in its context as a country surrounded on all sides by South Africa. The resultant dependant relationship Lesotho has with South Africa, plays a significant role in the country's history. It is not possible to ignore the serious repercussions of Lesotho's geographic location. Studies on landlocked countries throughout Africa have tended to analyse and provide data of how detrimental to economic development such a thing can be.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, Lesotho's dependence on South Africa is so severe that it hampers its own economy and independence as a state.<sup>28</sup> From their utilities to airspace control, Lesotho is subordinated to South Africa in a number of key political and economic areas, and has little ability to defy or

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<sup>24</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>25</sup> Anon: Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with Lesotho Sunday to protest..., *UPI NewsTrack*, 15 May 1983.

<sup>26</sup> M. Matsoso: *Landlocked Lesotho: South Africa's Tourism Stranglehold?* Master's Degree, University of Pretoria, 2019.

<sup>27</sup> A. Worgotter, J. Worz & L MacKellar: *Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries*, pp 5-8.

<sup>28</sup> H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economische sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141.

resist the whims of the South African government, being so utterly dependent on South Africa for economic support.<sup>29</sup> Lesotho's landlocked nature with a much more economically powerful neighbour has entailed that the Chinese in Lesotho are invariably involved in South Africa as well. From the very inception of relations between Lesotho and China this has been the case. As Taiwan's involvement with Lesotho was linked to its close involvement with South Africa at the time it will be necessary to examine Taiwanese programmes in both states.<sup>30</sup>

When the first Taiwanese came to the country during the 1960s, it was as part of a wider programme predominantly focused on building closer ties between Taiwan and apartheid South Africa.<sup>31</sup> Even once these programmes expired, many Taiwanese would stay on in Lesotho, finding success in the retail and textile industries.<sup>32</sup> Initially these industries had been dominated by local Indian traders in Lesotho but, due to mounting prejudice against these traders, by the turn of the twenty-first century most had vacated the country, allowing Taiwanese traders to fill the roles they once had.<sup>33</sup> Although many of these Taiwanese traders would return back to Taiwan, a not insubstantial number remained on in Lesotho, and continue to form part of the Chinese population there today.

The later mainland Chinese retailers which have become so ubiquitous in Lesotho also maintain strong connections to South Africa, sourcing many of their goods from there as well as often having familial connections inside the country.<sup>34</sup> An example of this connection extends to both product acquirement and ownership of fixed assets. Whilst in South Africa it is common for the Chinese to own their own fixed assets and import their own supplies, in Lesotho this is not the case. Very few of the business assets within the country are owned by the Chinese themselves but, instead, are rented from either locals or, often, from Indians, underscoring the way the Chinese in Lesotho came to take the role of foreign merchants from the Indians.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 286.

<sup>30</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>31</sup> T. Rich: "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies*, 45:4, p. 160.

<sup>32</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, p. 81.

<sup>33</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>34</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, p. 81.

<sup>35</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, p. 30.



Indeed, the lack of Chinese-owned small business assets in Lesotho is actually a result of Lesotho's legislation.<sup>36</sup> Legally, in Lesotho, small businesses are reserved only for the Basotho local population. It is illegal for non-Basotho to own small businesses privately. However, this problem has largely been circumvented by the Chinese traders and retailers in Lesotho through means as simple as bribing local officers or having a Basotho local have the business premise under their name, but leaving all operation of the business to the Chinese trader.<sup>37</sup> As a result of this strong connection, the study must be situated within this context. In particular, how this relationship has affected the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho and their relations with both states.

Situated firmly within these contexts the study itself is divided into two main sections. These largely follow the chronological history of the movement of the Chinese populations into Lesotho. Broadly speaking, Chinese migration into Lesotho can be divided into two 'waves', unfolding one after the other.<sup>38</sup> The first of these waves begins during the late 1960s, and lasted into the 1990s.<sup>39</sup> This hailed, initially, from Taiwan.<sup>40</sup> Generally speaking, this wave of Chinese immigrants were considered the most highly educated of the three waves, constituting medical and agricultural experts, as well as a number of business owners and investors.<sup>41</sup> This arrival was concurrent with a period of close relations between Taiwan and Lesotho.<sup>42</sup> Taiwan had at first turned its attention to South Africa, which under the apartheid regime had little choice of friends or allies, making it an ideal partner for Taiwan's quest for some form of international recognition separate from the People's Republic of China. Lesotho, largely forced by context and circumstance into similar situations as its neighbour, also found itself being courted by Taiwan and readily accepted the foreign investment and immigration that came with this.

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<sup>36</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 139.

<sup>37</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 139.

<sup>38</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>39</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>40</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 33.

<sup>41</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>42</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

Also of importance to the study is the 2000 US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which served as the catalyst for a major resurgence of investment in Lesotho's textile industry by Taiwanese business owners during the 2000s.<sup>43</sup> Ultimately the Taiwanese population of Lesotho would see a significant decline in numbers and were supplanted by the 1990s as the most populous Chinese group in Lesotho by mainland Chinese.<sup>44</sup> The termination of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Lesotho, coupled with the increasing inflow of mainland Chinese migrants to Lesotho, soon saw the Taiwanese population of Lesotho reduced to a distinct minority, potentially as few as 500 remaining by 2018.<sup>45</sup> However, in spite of this, the influence of these remaining Taiwanese on Lesotho's economy remains pronounced. Despite their small numbers, the largely Taiwanese owned textile industry in Lesotho is still the second largest employer of people in the entire country and perhaps the Kingdom's single most important industry.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, though only a small number of Taiwanese have remained in Lesotho they represent a distinct community of Lesotho Chinese, with most of the remaining Taiwanese firms registered in Lesotho owned and overseen by Taiwanese who have adopted Lesotho citizenship.<sup>47</sup>

As part of this first wave of Chinese immigration into Lesotho, between the 1980s and until the 1990s, the initial group of Taiwanese migrants attracted further Chinese migrants. This group of Chinese, however, hailed largely from Shanghai, on the mainland, coming from the PRC instead. The Shanghai Chinese arrived in part due to the emergence of anti-Chinese sentiment in Lesotho. By the 1980s this sentiment had already begun to develop among Lesotho's native population, who saw the Chinese influence in the country's economic sector as a particularly disagreeable matter.<sup>48</sup> At times this anti-Chinese sentiment could even turn into violent action, as happened in 1991 during a series of riots in Lesotho that targeted

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<sup>43</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, p. 33.

<sup>44</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 135.

<sup>46</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 135.

<sup>47</sup> *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>48</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015 University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 193.

Chinese-owned businesses.<sup>49</sup> The result of this anti-Sinitic atmosphere was the departure of numerous Taiwanese business owners from Lesotho, either returning home or, in some cases, simply moving their assets and businesses into South Africa.<sup>50</sup> This departure left the remaining Taiwanese in Lesotho often with a serious deficit of manpower for their industries. Relations between the Chinese and Basotho had also been significantly strained and this caused many Taiwanese to be reticent, or simply unwilling, to employ Basotho, particularly in skilled labour roles. Instead, they sought to find a way to bring more Chinese into Lesotho, ones they could employ. But, the financial incentive offered by these Taiwanese businessmen were not appealing to other Taiwanese who, due to the financial growth of their own country, had become more affluent, leaving small demand for unskilled, low wage, labour in a foreign country like Lesotho.<sup>51</sup> However, there existed a large number of impoverished Chinese in mainland China, particularly Shanghai, who became drawn by the financial incentives of working in Lesotho.<sup>52</sup> It was these Shanghai Chinese who filled the labour gap created by the departure of Taiwanese business owners from Lesotho, and who constituted the next wave of Chinese immigrants. Of course, also effecting the departure of Taiwanese immigrants from Lesotho, was the fact that by the late 1990s, Lesotho, after some prevarication, followed South Africa's lead in recognizing the PRC as the only legitimate Chinese government.<sup>53</sup> Even though official relationships between their government and that of the Kingdom's had largely been terminated by this point, many Taiwanese business owners who remained in Lesotho were still willing to use private labour agencies in order to recruit mainland Chinese to work for them.

The second and latest wave of Chinese immigration into Lesotho has been that of the Fujianese traders from mainland China. Despite only beginning to enter the country in the 2000s, the Fujianese traders have currently become the largest population group of Chinese in Lesotho and represent the largest group of Chinese migrants within Lesotho seeking to integrate

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<sup>49</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>50</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>51</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>52</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>53</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 135.

themselves deeper into the Kingdom's society.<sup>54</sup> Fujian has historically been a source of Chinese outmigration from mainland China, owing to numerous factors, such as its coastal position and relative impoverishment compared to other provinces within China. These internal factors, as well as an effort to develop Fujian's own economy by focusing on its migration, have led the province to be the source of a large number of Chinese migrants all over the world.<sup>55</sup> The arrival of the Fujianese into Lesotho mirrors that of the Shanghai Chinese in many ways. Just as Taiwanese business owners began to struggle to attract fellow Taiwanese as labourers to Lesotho in the 1990s, owing to Taiwan's economic development, so too did the development of Shanghai into a prominent commerce hub make it difficult to entice further Shanghai immigration to Lesotho.<sup>56</sup> As a result, the less affluent stream of immigrants from Fujian became the next labour group to be incentivised into Lesotho. Unlike the prior two waves of Chinese immigrants, who were to some extent educated and skilled labour, the Fujianese wave of immigration has predominantly been unskilled and less educated, coming from a very broad range of backgrounds, including former farmers, miners and even housewives.<sup>57</sup> Only a minority of the Fujianese Chinese who became traders in Lesotho were traders by profession in Fujian.<sup>58</sup>

They were mainly drawn to Lesotho due to the difficulty in establishing their own enterprises in Fujian, where fierce economic competition, and a handful of major businesses, made it difficult for individual entrepreneurs to establish themselves successfully in the market.<sup>59</sup> Lesotho, seen as relatively lax with regards to commercial regulations, had proven attractive in part due to the ease of establishing a commercial enterprise there. In addition, many of the Fujianese who came to Lesotho had prior family living there, giving them a leg up when arriving.<sup>60</sup> These family members often assisted in chain migration, where they helped their

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<sup>54</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>55</sup> Xiang, B. (2009). Outmigration and Human Trafficking. In D. Pong (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Modern China* (Vol. 2, pp 420-423). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 421.

<sup>56</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>57</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>58</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, p. 15.

<sup>59</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, p. 15.

<sup>60</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, p. 81.

relatives in coming over to Lesotho, getting established, and in that way made it easier for other relatives to come over as well.<sup>61</sup> Through this the Fujianese traders tended to have a well-developed understanding of the commercial layout of Lesotho, and funds which allowed them to establish themselves through loans provided by local Chinese trading agencies. An important difference between the Fujianese Chinese and the Taiwanese or Shanghai Chinese is that the majority of the Fujianese Chinese have become retail and small business owners.<sup>62</sup> This sets them distinctly apart from the other Chinese in the country, who predominantly focus on factory ownership and investment in large industries, predominantly the textile industry.

The presence of the Chinese population in Lesotho has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in the country. The primary three catalysts for this resentment are the belief by the Basotho population that the Chinese are dominating the economy to the detriment of the native population and that the Chinese population are largely unbound by the laws of Lesotho and are permitted, through the government's laxity, to largely get away with a broad range of illegality. Furthermore, there is the belief among part of the Basotho population that the Chinese in Lesotho have an outsized influence on Lesotho's domestic politics. A clear example of an incident which inflamed such belief and controversy concerns the Chinese businessman, and naturalized citizen of Lesotho, Yan Xie who served as a special advisor to the country's Prime Minister until allegations of corruption saw him forcibly removed from that position.<sup>63</sup>

It should be noted that, within Lesotho, the Basotho population makes little, if any, differentiation between the Taiwanese Chinese and the mainland Chinese, and there is a tendency to treat all the Chinese in Lesotho as part of some monolithic, homogenous, group with the same origins, motives and goals in Lesotho.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, this discrimination goes even further; it is not uncommon in Lesotho for all Asian peoples to be classified as Chinese and treated as such by the Basotho population.<sup>65</sup> A clear demonstration of this exists in the presence of a small number of Korean stores, retailers and car dealerships which are, nonetheless, treated

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<sup>61</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>62</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>63</sup> P. Kabi: *Lesotho Prime Minister Thabane disowns controversial trade advisor of Chinese origin*, Africa-China Reporting Project, December 2018.

<sup>64</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 153.

<sup>65</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper; Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 152.

and generally considered Chinese by the local population.<sup>66</sup> This resentment has, at times, peaked with violence directed against Chinese in Lesotho. Both 1991 and 2007 saw largescale riots in Lesotho's capital city of Maseru directed against "Chinese" traders.<sup>67</sup> Of note is the fact that it is the small-scale Chinese traders and retailers who attract the bulk of discriminatory violence. Though the larger Taiwanese and mainland Chinese owned factories are critiqued extensively in Lesotho's news media, violence against Chinese is almost always limited only to the Chinese traders and retailers.<sup>68</sup>

Currently the relationship between the government of Lesotho and the PRC is also a point of contention within Lesotho. A common sentiment exists among Lesotho's population that the influx of Chinese into the country is largely a state-sponsored or organized matter, that the government of mainland China is directly inducing it and overseeing it. This ties in, of course, to common fears that the Chinese government surreptitiously seeks to subvert or undermine foreign governments by flooding them with Chinese immigrants, a sentiment found in numerous countries all over the world, but particularly on the African continent.<sup>69</sup> However, evidence shows that, overwhelmingly, the Fujianese immigrants who make up the bulk of Lesotho's Chinese population arrive into the country not as a result of state-sponsored initiatives, but at their own discretion.<sup>70</sup> Predominantly they enter the country because of familial connections to Chinese already within Lesotho, and because they believe that the ability to earn money there is more favourable for them than in Fujian itself.<sup>71</sup> Although it is, indisputably, true that a significant proportion of the Fujianese within Lesotho have entered the country via illegal means, it is not at the discretion of mainland China's government.

The study also reflects on the current trend of Chinese immigration to Lesotho. Once again, as was the case in the nineties, the number of Fujianese immigrants into Lesotho is decreasing.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 152.

<sup>67</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 143.

<sup>68</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 152.

<sup>69</sup> T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

<sup>70</sup> S. van der Lugt: *South-South Cooperation through Investment – South African and Chinese Support to Development in Lesotho?* Centre for Chinese Studies policy briefing, p. 2.

<sup>71</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>72</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.



This phenomenon is driven by similar factors as the downturn in Taiwanese and Shanghai immigration before it: rising anti-Chinese sentiment and the improvement of economic opportunities in Fujian itself. However, whilst the immigration of Chinese into Lesotho seems to be slowing down two decades into the twenty-first century, the involvement of the PRC government in infrastructure and medical development within Lesotho has not. The study concludes by accounting for the possibility that the decline in Fujianese Chinese into Lesotho may, as the Taiwanese and Shanghai decline before it, open up the possibility of another wave of foreign traders from a more impoverished area within China.

Of great relevance to this study is the conception of a monolithic single group of Chinese in Lesotho that needs to be dismantled. Between Taiwanese and South African Chinese factory owners and investors in the textile industry, Fujianese traders and small business owners seeking to send remittances back to their homes and the major infrastructure and support projects enacted first by the government of Taiwan and now, on a grander scale by the PRC, there is a medley of different, disparate, at times even conflicting, Chinese interests and interactions within Lesotho. Furthermore, among these groups of Chinese a distinct community of Lesotho Chinese have formed. This group of Chinese, who have adopted Lesotho citizenship and sought actively to integrate themselves into Lesotho have not received any scholarly attention or acknowledgement of their role in combating common assumptions concerning the insularity of Chinese migrants in southern Africa. There is no way to characterize the history of the Chinese in Lesotho as either purely negative or positive, unsurprisingly, but it is important that this history is accorded the nuance it deserves as the history of living subjects and beings. The first step to achieving this is recognizing how diverse the history of the Chinese population of Lesotho is and doing away with the notion that they have come to Lesotho at the behest of the PRC government.

## 1.2 Terminology

Within the topic of Chinese migration there exists some terms that must be clarified. Although most of the terminology utilized in the study is self-evident, to an extent, in meaning, the matter of Chinese terminology concerning, and surrounding migration is not. It is important to note that the specific term, *huaqiao*, which is commonly used in Chinese to refer to Chinese people abroad in other countries, began to be used only around 1890.<sup>73</sup> This term is often translated

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<sup>73</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, p. 28.

simply as “overseas Chinese”, but the exact translation would be something more akin to a “Chinese sojourner”.<sup>74</sup> A key implication of this translation is that the Chinese person is expected to, eventually, return home to China, rather than living abroad permanently.<sup>75</sup> The word’s meaning differed from that of a word like immigrant, as *huaqiao* implied that the cultural ties and loyalty of the individual remained with China even when they stayed abroad in another country.<sup>76</sup> Of course, this assumption was incorrect, or at least a gross generalization, and a distinction between those Chinese who fell into the category of sojourners, that is to say worked abroad but ultimately intended to and did return to China, and those who were simply individuals of Chinese ethnicity who lived in other states is important to draw. Although the term sojourners is useful when discussing Chinese migratory labour of the early twentieth century, there is no commonly accepted term to refer to all individuals of Chinese ethnicity living abroad.<sup>77</sup> To follow the example of Professor Wang Gungwu, the simple term “Chinese overseas”, as opposed to the more loaded “overseas Chinese”, is used when referencing any and all Chinese outside of China itself.<sup>78</sup>

The use of the term Chinese in the title of the study is also intentional to make clear the scope of the study encompasses all ethnic Chinese regardless of background or origins. The study includes the history of ethnic Chinese who are citizens of Lesotho, ethnic Chinese who are simply temporary migrants and return to their countries of origins at a later point, as well as ethnic Chinese representatives of governments operating within Lesotho. Furthermore, it does not limit itself only to either Chinese people originating from Taiwan or the mainland, but rather focuses on the history of both groups of Chinese in Lesotho. The concept Chinese is therefore used in a more inclusive sense, encompassing all ethnic Chinese within Lesotho’s borders, or who have lived in Lesotho. This distinction is somewhat pertinent to note as there has been discussion before on the terms used when referring to Chinese living abroad. For the purpose of this study all Chinese abroad in Lesotho, regardless of their intention to remain there or not, would fall within the scope of the study. Moreover, the use of the term Chinese also includes both Chinese from mainland China (PRC) as well as Chinese from Taiwan.

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<sup>74</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, p. 28.

<sup>75</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, p. 28.

<sup>76</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, p. 28.

<sup>77</sup> W. Gungwu: “Greater China and the Chinese overseas,” *The China Quarterly*, 136, December 1993, pp 927-928.

<sup>78</sup> W. Gungwu: “Greater China and the Chinese overseas,” *The China Quarterly*, 136, December 1993, pp 927-928.



A further point regarding terminology that must be clarified is the importance of specifying the difference between Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho from the other groups of Chinese. Although it is common, and incorrect, to simply group all Chinese immigrants in Lesotho together into one homogenous group this significantly fails to address the nuances of the Chinese historical situation in Lesotho. The use of Fujianese must, in particular, be expanded upon due to the very important and unique role played by Fujianese in the history of Chinese immigration abroad and, further, internal discrimination by other Chinese groups against the Fujianese. Fujianese, within this study, refers to Chinese immigrants hailing from Fujian province. A coastal province in the south of China, situated just opposite Taiwan. Fujian remains the largest source of Chinese immigrants in the world.<sup>79</sup>

Accounting for approximately a quarter of all Chinese living abroad, Fujian has a long history of outmigration in search of better economic opportunities.<sup>80</sup> Prior to 1990 the restrictive regulations concerning migration out of China meant that the Fujianese who travelled abroad tended to be at least somewhat affluent and educated, as it would prove difficult and onerous for Chinese of lower-income brackets to successfully navigate the legal obstacles to immigrate at that time.<sup>81</sup> Following the lifting of most of these onerous restrictions, and the relaxing of the PRC's regulations concerning the movement of Chinese abroad, it became easier for lower-income Fujianese to immigrate in search of work. The resultant flood of Fujianese abroad was in part driven by this relaxation of regulations but, as mentioned, also by a loss of economic opportunities in their home province. The modernization and commercialization of China's economy and reforms in the agricultural industry had seen numerous low-income labourers bereft of employment and struggling to successfully obtain work in Fujian province.<sup>82</sup> This need for work and the sudden ease with which the Fujianese could move abroad to find work helped to serve as a catalyst for the explosion of Fujianese migration which followed. Important also in understanding the use of Fujianese within the study is the series of preconceptions and stereotypes that have become attached to it in China. Amongst the Chinese, the Fujianese have a distinct reputation and face no shortage of discrimination from fellow Chinese. This negative association largely stems from a belief that the Fujianese are prone to violence and

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<sup>79</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>80</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>81</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012, p. 16.

<sup>82</sup> G. Liu-Farrer, 'Debt, Networks and Reciprocity: Undocumented Migration from Fujian to Japan', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 28 June 2010.

criminality.<sup>83</sup> Though their success as traders and merchants is, usually, acknowledged by other Chinese, it is often accredited to their territoriality and use of violence of illegal means to secure for themselves advantages over their competitors.<sup>84</sup> A result of this is that many of the Chinese groups in Lesotho who are not Fujianese, predominantly a small group of Taiwanese and South African-born Chinese, believe that the anti-Chinese sentiment budding in Lesotho is solely the fault of the Fujianese creating a negative impression of all Chinese in the Kingdom. It should be noted, however, that although this view has been anecdotally noted it is at the same time true that there is clear documentary evidence of Fujianese Chinese cooperating extensively with the other groups of Chinese within Lesotho. So, it is unfair to characterize the relations between the differing groups of Chinese migrants as predominantly negative.<sup>85</sup>

### 1.3 Methodology and Sources

The primary research methodology employed within this study is a qualitative one. Through analytical examination of a certain period of time, and the collection of primary data relevant to the selected period, a more holistic account of the history of Lesotho's Chinese population is provided. The study also largely advances in a chronological fashion, detailing the sequence of events within the specified period from the earliest point to the latest. The period in question ranges from 1960 until 2020, representing a slice of near six decades which are under analysis. The motivation for this period in particular is rather obvious. The year 1960 is generally agreed, and evidence seems to indicate, the earliest date in which Chinese of any origin entered Lesotho. In Lesotho there is no end to the presence of ethnic Chinese within the state, not yet and not likely any time in the near future. The end point of 2020 was selected to accommodate for the impact of Covid-19, particularly on the Taiwanese community of Lesotho due to their involvement in the textile factories which were heavily affected by the pandemic, and also to

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<sup>83</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012, p. 18.

<sup>84</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012, p. 18.

<sup>85</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, The New Humanitarian, 24 Jan 2008; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Ambassador Hu Dingxian of Lesotho visited Taiwanese-funded enterprises in Lai*, 26 January 2013; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Embassy Staff in Lesotho spend the Mid-Autumn Festival with Taiwanese businessmen*, 26 September 2010.

allow for the incorporation of the most recent information concerning the criminal threats faced by the Chinese community within Lesotho.<sup>86</sup> As much as selecting an end point for the history of an extant group of people is always arbitrary, 2020 serves as the most prudent end point for the time period of this proposed study.

As with all such historical studies sources are the fundamental underpinning of this work. The acquisition of primary sources, in particular, is central to this qualitative methodology. Sources which can shed light on the lived experiences of the Chinese community in Lesotho, and their own account of their history, were of vital importance due to the social nature of this study. As a result, oral interviews with key individuals within the Chinese migrant community were conducted. Unfortunately, due to Covid-19 these were curtailed and as a result other forms of primary information were utilised. This included available sources in both Chinese and English, including prior first-hand accounts given by members of the Chinese Lesotho community.<sup>87</sup> These oral sources are particularly important as they provide insight into the social history of the Chinese migrant communities in their own words thus giving them voice. The primary material also included governmental documents, local newspapers, court cases, radio broadcasts which were all important for reconstructing an understanding of the history of the Chinese in Lesotho. The importance of these newspaper sources, particularly, is underscored and expanded upon in the literary review segment of the study, as they represent some of the most extensive coverage of the lived experiences of the Chinese migrant communities within Lesotho. To this end South African and Lesotho archival sources, as well as accounts from news media concerning the Chinese in Lesotho, were utilized in order to give an account of the lives of the Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>88</sup> Supplementing these, however, there does

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<sup>86</sup> M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020; Nien Hsing Textiles: *Nien Hsing Textile gives to the underprivileged in the Lesotho Region*, 19 September 2019.

<sup>87</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, The New Humanitarian, 24 Jan 2008; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn); "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>88</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, The New Humanitarian, 24 Jan 2008; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Ambassador Hu Dingxian of Lesotho visited Taiwanese-funded enterprises in Lai*, 26 January 2013; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Embassy Staff in Lesotho spend the*

also exist a small but rigorous body of secondary literature on the Chinese in Lesotho. The groundwork already laid out by academics such as Yoon Jung Park (2010, 2013), Mothusi Turner (2011), Terence McNamee (2012), Sarah Hanisch (2013), and Sean Morenakemang Maliehe (2015) is relevant to contextualise the argument within wider Lesotho-Chinese history.<sup>89</sup> Although at the same time much of this groundwork is limited to specifically analysing the Chinese-Lesotho situation in terms of economics and the more recent period, it remains of critical importance for context and insight. Particularly the matter of Chinese domination of Lesotho's textile and meat industries, the proliferation of Chinese traders in Lesotho, and the growing anti-Chinese resentment among the Basotho population have largely been the exclusive focus of much of the academic work on the Chinese in Lesotho. This is further expanded on in the next chapter concerned with the literature review.

The primary methodological challenges this study encountered can be divided into three broad segments. These segments are the issue of language translation; the lack of detailed archival sources concerning the Chinese in Lesotho; as well as the matter of inherent bias found in official documents or the news media. These all posed differing degrees of challenge, but are also aspects of the methodology that cannot be avoided or wholly mitigated. The issues of a lack of archival sources and the inherent bias evident in all sources, are not particularly unique to this study. Indeed, the matter of bias evident in a source such as news media or official sources is practically inescapable for most academic work. With regards to this study, the matter of bias must be kept in mind particularly when examining local news media surrounding the Chinese in Lesotho due to the often anti-Sinitic slant they have. But the importance of these sources cannot be ignored. Particularly in the case of the Chinese in Lesotho, the study of news media is a vital cornerstone of understanding the reaction and reception to their presence and actions in Lesotho. This is because there exists relatively little official documentation about the Chinese in Lesotho, and the group itself is relatively insular, meaning that their oft-reported on presence in the news media remains one of the most consistent sources of information,

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*Mid-Autumn Festival with Taiwanese businessmen*, 26 September 2010; *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics; *Kingdom of Lesotho 2006 Lesotho Population and Housing Census*, Administrative and methodology Report, Vol 1.

<sup>89</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, pp 85-97; Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*. Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-153; S. Maliehe: 'A History of the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1976-1993,' *South African Historical Journal*, Volume 70, (4), 2018, pp 674-688; T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper; M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

spanning the period from their arrival in the 1960s until the present day.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, official records and data about the largest Chinese group in Lesotho, that of the Fujianese, is complicated by the fact that so many Fujianese Chinese utilize illegal means to enter and exit the country, meaning that they often leave an incredibly light, if not invisible, footprint in the paperwork or records of the Kingdom or China.

The issue of language, particularly when dealing with Chinese language sources, is considerably more pertinent. This issue is, of course, nothing new or unexpected when focusing on a topic such as that of the Chinese in Lesotho. The problem of translating a language into another often means that intention, purpose, meaning and such can be lost. To be blunt, there exists no such thing as a wholly accurate direct translation of any language into another. This is simply an impossibility that must be accepted. Thus, when translating Chinese, particularly traditional Chinese as is used by Taiwanese migrants who formed the first wave of Chinese in Lesotho, there always exists the potential for mistranslation or incomplete translations to fail to convey reliably the actual intention of the speakers or writers. As this is primarily an English analysis and examination, English will be used as the language in which to translate and provide any information, including quotes by Chinese individuals. Even with relatively reliable Chinese translation, as was utilized within this study, the potential for translation issues can never be wholly ruled out or negated. A further complication with language rests on the fact that for many of the Chinese in Lesotho, even today, English is not necessarily a language they are highly adept in, creating a space for reasonable doubt that their actual intentions are not always accurately reflected in their writings. This is a problem for the Chinese in Lesotho in their own day-to-day lives and, thus, unsurprisingly also forms a problem to the methodology of this study. This issue of translation also serves as one of the methodological challenges to incorporating Chinese language sources. In this case, the predominant Chinese language sources used were the commentary of Chinese living in Lesotho through surveys such as the Brenthurst analysis, the use of the official Chinese Embassy in Lesotho and its publications and the use of the Chinese academic papers and journal articles from the Chinese National

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<sup>90</sup> Anon: Chinese will aid Lesotho, *Sunday Times*, 6 June 1976, p. 108; Anon: Lesotho victims ask: Why did the mobs hit us? *Sunday Times*, 2 June 1991, p. 20; Barkhuizen, D: Leaders implicated in Passport racket, *Sunday Times*, 18 October 1992, p. 10; C, Blanckenberg: Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water, *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75; Brittain, J: Massive 'passports' for cash offers, *Sunday Times*, 28 February 1993, p. 108; J, Rademeyer: G8 debt-relief plan leaves Lesotho out in the cold, *Sunday Times*, 10 July 2005, p. 40; J, Robinson: Chinese skill is passed to Swazis, *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58; Schmidt, M: Ruined Asian traders vow not to return, *Sunday Times*, 27 September 1988, p. 77; J, Reed: Taiwanese rag trade has Lesotho all up in stitches, *Business Day*, September 2004; C, Rolfes: The Fang family of Qwaqwa, *Sunday Times*, 1 September 1985, p. 147; South African Press Association: Light Industries for Lesotho, *Sunday Times*, 9 July 1967, p. 91.

Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) site database.<sup>91</sup> This problem was somewhat ameliorated by the use of the Chinese language, where possible, in analysis. However, even when utilizing Chinese, a distinction must be made. Traditional Chinese, most commonly used by Taiwanese Chinese and numerous Chinese expatriate groups, needed to be translated through the use of a translation service. Only when encountering *zhōngwén*, the more common, modern, Chinese language utilized throughout most of the PRC, and thus used predominantly by the Shanghai and Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho, was direct translation be done by the author with his own Chinese capabilities.

Equally important to the methodology of the study is what is meant by referring to a “social” history of the Chinese in Lesotho. Social history within this study is taken to mean the history of a large group of people in the past, as opposed to a focus on select important personages or a political history of government structures.<sup>92</sup> Similarly, social history is generally set apart from what is known as political history due to it focusing on large groups of ordinary people as opposed to individuals of influence or power within traditional political structures.<sup>93</sup> As a result, this study focuses on the past lived experiences of the ethnic Chinese within Lesotho and examines what agency they possess beyond their economic activities. As a study of social history, the thesis will attempt to analyse the social structures which the ethnic Chinese came to inhabit within Lesotho. This included their family units, employment and other social systems they may be a part of, such as their formation of associations such as the Chinese Businesses Association of Lesotho (CBAL) and China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund (CLPPFAF).

A range of sources touching upon the history of the Chinese in Lesotho and their lived experiences were consulted. No authoritative, or exhaustive, body of archived sources exists detailing the history of the Chinese in Lesotho. Instead, a range of diverse sources were examined. Of particular use in this regard was the resource *Newsbank*, which aggregated an enormous content of news articles, which could be accessed under Covid-19 restrictions and used to gather much of the journalistic content surrounding the Chinese in Lesotho. The use of such sources was pivotal in order to gain a greater insight into the lives of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. In order to fulfil this study’s goal of attempting to broaden the understanding of

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<sup>91</sup> CNKI Journal Database, <http://new.oversea.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CJFQ>, Accessed 13<sup>th</sup> February 2020; T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012.

<sup>92</sup> C. Wright & W. Conze: “Social History,” *Journal of Social History*, Volume 1, (1), 1967, pp 7-16.

<sup>93</sup> C. Wright & W. Conze: “Social History,” *Journal of Social History*, Volume 1, (1), 1967, pp 7-16.



Lesotho's Chinese history beyond simply economic analysis, social sources such as the film *Laisuotuo* as well as the recent documentary *The Days of Cannibalism* were used in order to give some social context and understanding to the history of the Chinese in Lesotho. Furthermore, Chinese language sources, such as academic articles and first-hand accounts from Chinese migrants in Lesotho were utilized to provide some insight from a distinctly Chinese perspective on this situation as well, in addition to official statistical information from the Kingdom of Lesotho and Fujian provincial government, and the usage of Lesotho court records dealing with the Chinese.

The literature review and the outline of the overall study will be covered in the following chapter, providing for a comprehensive review of the sources that informed this study.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### 2.1 Overview:

Before proceeding with an account of the history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho it is necessary to review the secondary material which was used for this study. This literature is divided between material necessary for establishing the context of the study and material directly relating to the experience of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. To this end the literature review has essentially three categories. The first of these categories is the broadest context within which this study is set, that is the developing field of the history of Chinese in Africa and southern Africa and, also, the history of Chinese migration into southern Africa. The second category focuses more specifically on contexts specific to Lesotho. The most important of these is the fact that Lesotho is a landlocked country with an economic and political dependence upon South Africa. The final category concerns the detailed works and literature relating to the experience and to some extent history of Chinese migrants within Lesotho.

As already pointed out previously, the topic of the Chinese population in Lesotho has not been wholly unexplored. A body of academic work does exist. But due to the context of this study, literature concerning Chinese populations in broader southern Africa must also be noted. To further contextualize the thesis's core argument, it was also important to look at works concerning Chinese migration into southern Africa since the forcible opening of the Qing Dynasty at the end of the Second Opium War (1860). Although not specific to Lesotho, these two matters, Chinese in Africa and Chinese migration to southern Africa, lay the groundwork for the context in which the Chinese in Lesotho need to be positioned.

Related to the issue of contexts, a study of this nature has to take cognisance of the reality of Lesotho's status as a land-locked nation. It is difficult to possibly overstate the degree to which this land-locked state influences and effects Lesotho and its history, and the Chinese in Lesotho are no exception. There does, fortunately, exist a significant enough body of work which deals with the nature of land-locked countries in general, and specifically with the circumstances within Lesotho. Due to the strong links between the Lesotho and South Africa Chinese communities, and the economic links between the two countries, it was also necessary to examine, at least partially, the body of work concerning Chinese history in South Africa. This is a considerably more detailed body of scholarship than that concerning the Chinese in Lesotho.



To understand this history journalistic sources in both Chinese and English were consulted, as well as court records. In the following sections the details concerning all these groups of sources is expanded upon and their relevance to the thesis are made apparent.

## **2.2 The Chinese in Africa and southern Africa**

This study falls within the broader context of historical work surrounding the relationship of African states and agents with China. Traditionally this relationship has not received extensive academic scrutiny, when compared to the relationship of China with Western states or even other Asian states such as Japan or Korea. However, of late there has been a significant and considerable emergence of work on this topic, forming a large body of sources which are utilized to frame the context of this study within its regional environment.<sup>94</sup> Africa is, of course, a massive continent of numerous states, actors and players, traditions and variables and thus discussing the history of African and Chinese relations will always be an act of generalization. The context of this study is more limited, focused specifically on the historical relations between China and the southern African region, as it is within the context and framework of the southern African region that Lesotho is situated. This, at least somewhat, alleviates the inevitable problems of discussing relations between states in such broad terms.

A caveat must also be attached to the recognition of recent developments concerning the study of the Chinese in southern Africa. Much of the research on China's relation with Africa focuses purely on their economic involvement or focuses on the idea of China asserting dominance in Africa as a political competitor to the United States of America or certain European states and interests.<sup>95</sup> This is a limiting factor in gaining a broader understanding of the history of the Chinese in southern Africa, as there is a tendency to reduce them to their economic role, or prioritize their economic actions beyond any other. When pursuing to understand something of a social history of the Chinese in southern Africa, there is the further issue of a tendency for the Chinese state, the PRC usually, to be treated as a monolithic and homogenous organization behind the migration of Chinese into southern Africa, often ignoring the individual agency of the Chinese in Africa. However, accompanying the increase in interest in Chinese and African

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<sup>94</sup> A. Ado, Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-41.

<sup>95</sup> A. Ado & Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-42; Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-132.

studies, is a deviation from focusing strictly on geopolitical or economic points of view, and a more nuanced, more varied, analysis of the Chinese in southern Africa, their history and role, has begun to emerge.

When delving into a discussion on Chinese migration and Chinese in Africa the works of Wang Gungwu and Yen-ching Hwang form a crucial underpinning.<sup>96</sup> Both esteemed scholars have extensively dealt with China's history of migration and the history of Chinese migrants. As mentioned earlier, Wang Gungwu has, in particular, done extensive work on the classification of Chinese living outside of China and his work plays a fundamental role in the study's understanding of the early history of Chinese migration.<sup>97</sup> Gungwu is rightly acknowledged as one of the preeminent scholars in the field of overseas Chinese and thus any discussion of Chinese migration abroad would be incomplete without reference to his primary works concerning the topic.<sup>98</sup> His work, along with Hwang has focused on the changing relationship between China and her subjects overseas. In general Hwang's work provides a strong additional supplement to Gungwu's own, as it delves deeply into the history of the overseas Chinese and the history of the Qing Dynasty's behaviour with regards to the overseas Chinese.<sup>99</sup>

Studies of African migration have also tended to focus on migrant relationships between Africa and former colonizing states.<sup>100</sup> Whilst studies of Chinese migration often focus on the movement of Chinese into Western states, with the recent large waves of Chinese from Fujian moving into Africa receiving considerably less attention. This detail is pertinent as it is these Fujianese Chinese who form one of the largest current groups of ethnic Chinese in Lesotho. Studies of the Chinese migrants in Africa have been on the rise in the twenty-first century, often depending heavily on fieldwork and personal interchanges with the Chinese communities

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<sup>96</sup> W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993, pp 927-928; Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's protection of Overseas Chinese during the late Ching period (1851-1911)*.

<sup>97</sup> W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993; G. Wang, "The status of overseas Chinese studies", Luodi-Shenggen Conference, University of Berkeley, November 1992, p. 3.

<sup>98</sup> W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993; G. Wang, "The status of overseas Chinese studies", Luodi-Shenggen Conference, University of Berkeley, November 1992; W. Gungwu: *The Rising China and its Immigrant*, 2005; W. Gungwu: G. Benton & H. Liu (ed.): *Diasporic Chinese Ventures: The Life and Work of Wang Gungwu*, 2004.

<sup>99</sup> Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's protection of Overseas Chinese during the late Ching period (1851-1911)*; Y. Hwang: *The role of the Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*, 1978.

<sup>100</sup> A. Ado, Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-41.

within the respective African states.<sup>101</sup> The perception of the Chinese in Africa has also become a more substantive topic, with attention being paid to the feelings and attitudes possessed by local Africans to Chinese migrants. For the purposes of this study understanding southern Africa, and the sentiments of its inhabitants towards the migrant Chinese within it, forms part of the vital context to understanding the situation of the Chinese in Lesotho as well.

Important to understanding China's relationship with Africa overall are the works of Ian Taylor (2009), Uwe Wissenbach (2009) and Deborah Brautigam (2009), who have conducted a number of case studies on China's relationship with Africa.<sup>102</sup> Brautigam and Taylor have extensively covered the history of African – Chinese contemporary relations, providing a firm basis for any discussion of the historical context of this subject.<sup>103</sup>

Their work is further supplemented by authors I-yao Shen (2011) and Li Anshan (2012) who have documented in detail the more contemporary literature on the Chinese in southern Africa.<sup>104</sup> Anshan has, in particular, provided a robust body of work detailing a general history of Chinese migration into southern Africa.<sup>105</sup> His work has also provided considerable insights into the nature of Chinese state engagement with southern African countries, including Lesotho, and also the lived experiences of Chinese migrant communities within southern Africa.<sup>106</sup> Shen, meanwhile, provides a solid basis for discussion of legal facts surrounding the history of Chinese migration and his research provides a wealth of information concerning the treatment of the overseas Chinese throughout history.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> J. Maswana: 'Can China trigger economic growth in Africa?' *Chinese Economy*, Volume 42, (2), pp 91-105; G. Einhorn, M. Morris: 'Globalisation, welfare and competitiveness: the impacts of Chinese imports on the South African clothing and textile industry,' *Competition and Change*, Volume 12, (4), pp 355-376.

<sup>102</sup> I. Taylor: *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008; U. Wissenbach: 'The EU's response to China's Africa safari: can triangular co-operation match needs?' *European Journal of Development Research*, Volume 21, (4), August 2009, pp 662-674; D. Brautigam: *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, 2009.

<sup>103</sup> I. Taylor: *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008; D. Brautigam: *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, 2009.

<sup>104</sup> I. Shen: *History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practises*, 2011; L. Anshan: *A history of overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*.

<sup>105</sup> L. Anshan: *A history of overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*.

<sup>106</sup> L. Anshan: *A history of overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*; L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitute, Discussion Paper 52, 2011; L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017.

<sup>107</sup> I. Shen: *History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practises*, 2011.

Turning to southern Africa specifically, some other pertinent names must also be considered: Karen Harris, Yoon Park and Melanie Yap are all names in this field whose works have contributed to this study.

Professor Karen Harris has done extensive work regarding the Chinese in South Africa through a series of articles and chapter publications and her thesis and dissertation.<sup>108</sup> Her work predominantly focuses on the history of the Chinese in South Africa, from among the earliest recorded contacts, and provides a very comprehensive understanding of the history of the Chinese in South Africa.<sup>109</sup> From more general overviews of history, she has also provided work which focuses on specific aspects of the Chinese in South Africa, ranging from their involvement in the illegal trade of abalone to the involvement of well-known figures such as Mahatma Gandhi with the struggle of Chinese in South Africa against discrimination.<sup>110</sup> The combined body of her work provides an insightful and comprehensive understanding of the history of the Chinese in South Africa. This proves relevant to the study due to links which exist between the ethnic Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho, most specifically the government-dispatched teams of Taiwanese both countries received during the 1960s and 1970s, but also due to her work on the matter of Chinese migration into southern Africa and the experiences of Chinese migrants in southern Africa.<sup>111</sup> As a result, though the specific focus of this work is not on Lesotho, they provides context for the circumstances of the Chinese in southern Africa, of which Lesotho is part. Furthermore, as is elaborated on below, due to the strong family links supply chains that connect Chinese migrants in Lesotho to South Africa, an understanding of the situation of Chinese in South Africa is necessary to fully comprehend the picture of Chinese in Lesotho as well.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> K. Harris: *A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, PhD dissertation, University of South Africa, 1998; K. Harris: *BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa: a legal historic perspective*, University of Pretoria, 2017; K. Harris: 'Paper trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),' *Kronos*, Volume 40, 2014, pp 133-153.

<sup>109</sup> K. Harris: *A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, PhD dissertation, University of South Africa, 1998; K. Harris: *The Chinese in the early Cape Colony: A significant cultural minority*, University of Pretoria, 2009.

<sup>110</sup> K. Harris: 'Untangling Centuries of South African Chinese Diasporas: Molluscs/Abalone, Ungulates/Rhinos and Equidae/Donkeys,' *South African Historical Journal*, 71, (2), 2019, pp 263-281; K. Harris: "'Strange Bedfellows': Gandhi and the Chinese passive resistance 1906-11,' *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, Volume 31, 2013, pp 14-38.

<sup>111</sup> K. Harris: *A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, PhD dissertation, University of South Africa, 1998.

<sup>112</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 33.

Yoon Jung Park has done extensive sociological work concerning the situation of the Chinese in southern Africa.<sup>113</sup> Although her focus has also predominantly been on the Chinese in southern Africa, she has also worked extensively on the topic of how local Africans throughout southern Africa respond to, and regard, the Chinese populations now existing among them. Along with Pragna Rugunanan, Tu Huynh and Anna Ying Chen she has provided valuable commentaries on Asian migrant communities throughout South Africa, with a specific focus on Chinese communities.<sup>114</sup> These works help to dispel the image that the arrival of Chinese migrants into southern Africa is the result of some purposeful directive from the PRC government, and reasserts the agency of Chinese, and other Asian, migrants entering southern Africa of their own volition, often motivated by economic concerns. Park has also provided broader analysis at times, stepping back purely from a focus on South Africa and examining the southern African region's relation to Chinese migrants as a whole.<sup>115</sup> These works paint a picture of, in general, resentment on behalf of local Africans about Chinese migrants, and also a tendency for Chinese migrants to struggle to move out of self-isolated spaces within Africa.<sup>116</sup>

These sentiments are then further corroborated by an extensive investigation of Chinese and African sentiments undertaken by the Brenthurst Foundation.<sup>117</sup> Compiling responses from Chinese migrants and African locals throughout most of the southern African region, the Foundation's findings similarly paint a bleak picture of local African sentiment towards Chinese, and the struggle of Chinese migrants to be accepted within southern Africa.<sup>118</sup> The findings of the Brenthurst Foundation, along with the work of Park, provide a starting point for any commentary on the discriminatory sentiments faced by migrant Chinese in both southern Africa as a whole and Lesotho specifically. Hu Tuynh also comments on Chinese migration to

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<sup>113</sup> Y. Park: Boundaries, 'Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region,' *African Studies*, Volume 69 (3), November 2010, pp 457-479; Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133; Y. Park: *A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa*, Lexington Books, 2009.

<sup>114</sup> P. Rugunanan & Y. Park: *Visible and Vulnerable: Asian Migrant communities in South Africa*, University of Johannesburg, 2009; A. Chen, T. Huynh & Y. Park: 'Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980's to Present,' *African and Asian Studies*, Volume 9, 2010, pp 286-306.

<sup>115</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, pp 131-153; Y. Park: Boundaries, 'Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region,' *African Studies*, Volume 69 (3), November 2010, pp 457-479.

<sup>116</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, pp 131-153.

<sup>117</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

<sup>118</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper.

southern Africa, and their reception there, but illustrates the oft-missed point that the flow of migration is not only in one direction, that increasing numbers of Africans now also migrate into China.<sup>119</sup> Together these works set out the circumstances of the Chinese in southern African and a broad sense of how they have arrived in these circumstances.

As stated, a considerable amount of the work concerning Chinese communities in southern African focuses heavily on economic aspects of their existence or their relationships with Africa. Although the goal of this study is to provide an understanding that goes beyond a purely economic one, the economic dimension and aspect cannot be ignored wholesale and must also be incorporated into any history of the Chinese in Lesotho. To that end, several works which deal with the economic impact of migrant Chinese in the southern Africa region are also utilized in this study. Chris Alden and Martyn Davies provide a general overview of Chinese multinational operations in southern Africa, and this is further supplemented by an analysis of the effects of Chinese exports on African markets by Giorgio Giovannetti and Marco Sanfilippo.<sup>120</sup>

The abovementioned work of Taylor also forms a particularly important component of this study as he extensively worked on the dependent relationship of states such as Botswana and Lesotho with South Africa.<sup>121</sup> This information was particularly relevant within the context of Lesotho's political relations with Taiwan during the latter half of the twentieth century, as these relations were deeply shaped by the Kingdom's dependence on South Africa.<sup>122</sup>

When discussing the lived experiences of the contemporary Chinese migrant communities of southern Africa a scholar whose works are indispensable are those of Yanyin Zi's. Yanyin has completed considerable research on the lives of Chinese migrants living in southern Africa, particularly Botswana and South Africa, and their engagement and interactions with the local populations of those states.<sup>123</sup> Although her works have not specifically focused on Lesotho

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<sup>119</sup> T. Huynh: 'What people, what Cultural Exchange? A reflection on China-Africa,' *Africa-East Asian Affairs, The China Monitor*, 2, November 2012, pp 3-16.

<sup>120</sup> C. Alden & M. Davies: 'A Profile of the operations of Chinese multinationals in Africa,' *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 13 (1), 2010, pp 83-96; G. Giovannetti & M. Sanfilippo: 'Do Chinese exports crowd-out African Goods? An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector,' *European Journal of Development and Research*, Volume 21 (4), 2009, pp 506-530.

<sup>121</sup> I. Taylor: "The 'Captive States' of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008.

<sup>122</sup> I. Taylor: "The 'Captive States' of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008.

<sup>123</sup> Y. Zi: "Unravelling the 'Fongkong' Phenomenon in Botswana through Analysing the Relationship among Mass Media, Governmental Activities and Local Voices," *Psychologica*, 57, 2014; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.



the interconnected nature of the Chinese migrant communities in southern Africa, and the parallels which exist between their experiences, mean that her research was of great import to this study.

There is no single, simple, consensus on the nature of China's relationship with Africa.<sup>124</sup> Although there is no dispute that it is an intense relationship and a growing relationship, there is a distinct divide as to whether the relationship is largely exploitative, largely beneficial or otherwise. Similarly, on the matter of migration much of the work has focused on a broad scale patterns of migration, leading to a tendency to generalize.<sup>125</sup> There have been, however, works which focus more specifically on different groups of Chinese migrants, detailing their specific circumstances and history, but this is a newly emergent trend which does not as of yet have an enormously established base of work.<sup>126</sup>

As emphasized, though these works are pivotal for fleshing out the context of Lesotho's own Chinese migrant population, most academic material on the topic only tangentially, if at all, addresses Lesotho's Chinese migrants. When attempting to deal with the specific matter of the Chinese in Lesotho it is necessary to look through a more limited and specific body of work for some vital content on this matter. Furthermore, before the matter of the Chinese migrants in Lesotho can be directly commented on, it is necessary to discuss Lesotho's geographic position, as this has an effect on the Chinese migrant communities as well.

### 2.3 Land-Locked Lesotho

When doing any sort of analysis of Lesotho's history it is also necessary to take into account the Kingdom's context as both a landlocked country and a dependant country.<sup>127</sup> Lesotho is one of only three states recognized by the United Nations (UN) to be completely surrounded on all sides by another, single country. The other, similar, states are the states of San Marino and Vatican City, both found within Italy.<sup>128</sup> There is a large and impressive body of work

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<sup>124</sup> I. Taylor: *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*; G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*.

<sup>125</sup> A. Ado, Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-41.

<sup>126</sup> A. Ado, Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-41.

<sup>127</sup> H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economie sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141.

<sup>128</sup> E. Fanou & X. Wang: 'Assessment of transit transport corridor efficiency of landlocked African countries using data envelopment analysis,' *South African Journal of Science*, Volume 114 (1/2), 2018, pp 1-7; K. Uprety (ed.): *The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law and Development Perspectives*, 2005, p. 5; Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia*

which already addresses the matter of how being landlocked effects the economic prospects of states.<sup>129</sup> Simple analysis of growth rates and economic success indicate a clear connection between being landlocked and struggling to develop robust economies.<sup>130</sup> In their article on the economic challenges of being landlocked, Worgotter, Worz and MacKellar note that on average, landlocked states develop up to 1.5 times slower than non-landlocked states.<sup>131</sup> This view is corroborated by other studies such as the World Bank and other academics including Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats.<sup>132</sup> As a result of the relationship Lesotho has with South Africa it is necessary to evaluate it within this context, as a landlocked, dependent, country and what this entails. There exists already an extensive body of work covering the nature of landlocked states with the works of Cervenka, Moeletsi, Thabane and Reitsma being particularly pertinent to this study.<sup>133</sup>

Reitsma points out that Lesotho has been forced into a dependency relationship with the state surrounding it.<sup>134</sup> Reitsma's works on landlocked states within Africa, and particularly his commentary on economic dependence, are the starting point of discussing how Lesotho's

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*and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), pp 299-310; T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), pp 279-290.

<sup>129</sup> K. Uprety (ed.): *The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law and Development Perspectives*, 2005, p. 5.

<sup>130</sup> A. Worgotter, J. Worz & L. MacKellar: 'Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries,' *Transition Economic Series*, Volume 14, February 200, pp 1-14; E. Fanou & X. Wang: 'Assessment of transit transport corridor efficiency of landlocked African countries using data envelopment analysis,' *South African Journal of Science*, Volume 114 (1/2), 2018, pp 1-7; K. Uprety (ed.): *The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law and Development Perspectives*, 2005, p. 5; Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), pp 299-310; T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), pp 279-290.

<sup>131</sup> A. Worgotter, J. Worz & L. MacKellar: 'Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries,' *Transition Economic Series*, Volume 14, February 200, p. 9.

<sup>132</sup> A. Yeats & F. Ng: *Export Profiles of small Landlocked Countries: A Case Study Focusing on Their Implications for Lesotho*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3085, June 2003; A. Worgotter, J. Worz & L. MacKellar: 'Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries,' *Transition Economic Series*, Volume 14, February 200, pp 1-14; E. Fanou & X. Wang: 'Assessment of transit transport corridor efficiency of landlocked African countries using data envelopment analysis,' *South African Journal of Science*, Volume 114 (1/2), 2018, pp 1-7; K. Uprety (ed.): *The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law and Development Perspectives*, 2005, p. 5; Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), pp 299-310; T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), pp 279-290.

<sup>133</sup> Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), pp 299-310; T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), pp 279-290; H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economische sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141; M. G. Moeletsi: *Grassroots Diplomacy Between Lesotho and South Africa: The District Liaison Committees*, Master's Dissertations, 2000, Rhodes University, p. 26; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015.

<sup>134</sup> H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economische sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141.



geography defines its economic circumstances.<sup>135</sup> The state surrounding Lesotho is, of course, the Republic of South Africa. The primary reasons for this dependence on South Africa emerges from the inability of Lesotho to access the sea or engage in international trade without utilizing South Africa as a medium and making use of its facilities. Furthermore, historical circumstances surrounding the foundation of Lesotho distinctly disadvantaged its capacity for economic self-sufficiency. The very formation of Lesotho as a state saw it suffer significant loss of land to European settlers. According to the works of Moeletsi, who provides an indepth perspective on Lesotho's landlocked circumstances, the consistent conflicts of the late nineteenth century between the Basotho Kingdom (1871), the predecessor to the state of Lesotho (1966), and the Boer Republics resulted in Lesotho being reduced to a country which is two-thirds mountainous terrain.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, Lesotho is the only independent state in the world which exists completely at one-thousand meters elevation.<sup>137</sup> Even more significantly, in the conflicts preceding its formations Lesotho lost the vast majority of its arable land, reduced to having only 9% of its total territory being arable.<sup>138</sup> For a country in which much of the population maintain subsistence livelihoods this loss is dramatic and forces much of its population to seek work in South Africa. These already onerous economic conditions are exacerbated by Lesotho's reliance on migrant work. As part of this, a large portion of the Basotho population traditionally worked on South Africa mines as migrant labourers, but the twenty-first century recession of gold prices led to the retrenchment of large swathes of these labourers with serious economic consequences for the Kingdom.<sup>139</sup>

The deleterious effects of being landlocked can have on a country are well documented, particularly with many landlocked African countries currently constituting some of the poorest and least developed nation states.<sup>140</sup> It is pointed out by Thabane that as a small landlocked state, Lesotho suffers from a dependence on South Africa for the transit of goods and employment opportunities for its population.<sup>141</sup> Lesotho has struggled to develop a diverse or

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<sup>135</sup> H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economie sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141.

<sup>136</sup> M. G. Moeletsi: *Grassroots Diplomacy Between Lesotho and South Africa: The District Liaison Committees*, Master's Dissertations, 2000, Rhodes University, p. 26.

<sup>137</sup> Anon: Lesotho, CIA World Factbook, 11 June 2020.

<sup>138</sup> M. Letsie: *Spatial Data Sharing for sustainable development in landlocked countries: The case of Lesotho*, National University of Lesotho, p. 1.

<sup>139</sup> M. G. Moeletsi: *Grassroots Diplomacy Between Lesotho and South Africa: The District Liaison Committees*, Master's Dissertations, 2000, Rhodes University, pp 25-26.

<sup>140</sup> Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), p. 299.

<sup>141</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 281.

large internal economy, which has resulted in its continuing dependence on South Africa economically and politically.<sup>142</sup> Further illustrating this economic challenge is the inefficiency of Lesotho's transport transit corridor as detailed in Enagon and Xuping's study of transport transit corridors throughout southern African states.<sup>143</sup> Although far from the only state that performed poorly in terms of efficiency within the study, it still stands as clear evidence of the degree of economic challenge Lesotho faces simply by merit of its geographical position.

In matters of infrastructure, Lesotho also remains dependent on South Africa. Within Thabane's work it is pointed out that the majority of its energy needs are supplied by South Africa, with the small state only beginning efforts to diversify its power sources in late 1972.<sup>144</sup> In addition to this, as discussed by Reitsma, South Africa also exerts control over Lesotho's telephone, postal and air traffic services in addition to this wide range of political and economic dependencies.<sup>145</sup> The result of this is that almost every aspect of Lesotho's economic, social and political circumstance is influenced by South Africa. Dependant on its neighbour for all transit and relying upon it for much of its infrastructure needs has led to Lesotho being integrated into the South Africa economy but, also stunted its own internal development. In the field of tourism, as well, Lesotho's landlocked situation has resulted in a dependence on South Africa. According to the research of R. Saner and L. Saner-Yiu, the overwhelming majority, ninety-seven percent, of all tourists who enter Lesotho do so by road.<sup>146</sup> A far more pronounced issue, though, is the matter of tour operators. The majority of tour groups which enter Lesotho originate from South Africa, are organized by South African companies, guided by South African tour guides and often have no interaction with any local Lesotho enterprises at all.<sup>147</sup> As a result, a significant portion of the economic development and investment tourism could generate for Lesotho is, instead, lost to South African companies. As Thabane points out, further compounding all these troubles is Lesotho's capability to take protective measures is

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<sup>142</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 286.

<sup>143</sup> E. Fanou & X. Wang: 'Assessment of transit transport corridor efficiency of landlocked African countries using data envelopment analysis,' *South African Journal of Science*, Volume 114 (1/2), 2018, pp 1-7.

<sup>144</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 288.

<sup>145</sup> H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economische scheen sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141; Z. Cervenka: 'The right of access to the sea of African land-locked countries,' *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Volume 6, (3), p. 299.

<sup>146</sup> R. Saner & L. Saner-Yiu: 'Lesotho, a Tourism Destination: An Analysis of Lesotho's current tourism products and potential for growth,' *Handbook of Research on Global Hospitality and Tourism Management*, p. 321.

<sup>147</sup> R. Saner & L. Saner-Yiu: 'Lesotho, a Tourism Destination: An Analysis of Lesotho's current tourism products and potential for growth,' *Handbook of Research on Global Hospitality and Tourism Management*, pp 330-331.

curtailed as it is simply too dependent on South Africa to risk entering into a protracted economic conflict or dispute with it.<sup>148</sup> The small, mountainous, enclave within South Africa, is dramatically affected in every conceivable sphere by its surrounding neighbour.

However, it must also be acknowledged that more recently Lesotho has made significant efforts towards economic development, and the construction of new infrastructure, despite these challenges. In their research paper for the World Bank, Ian Gillson and Nicholas Strychaez provide further details on Lesotho's economic challenges, but also illustrate methods and steps it has taken to alleviate the pressure of these onerous conditions.<sup>149</sup> Beyond providing information on how Lesotho has benefited from cultivating a closer relation with South Africa, and seeking to attract foreign investment, the research also indicates the significance of the textile industry to Lesotho, how it exports from this industry in particular which have helped fuel some of the growth Lesotho has seen.<sup>150</sup> There is a developing body of scholarly work surrounding Lesotho's relationship with South Africa within this context. This work, including the research done by McNamee, Moeletsi, Reitsma and the UN, has elucidated the depth of Lesotho's dependence on South Africa, but has never dealt with what the implications of this are for the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>151</sup> This is particularly pertinent as the current majority population of Chinese in Lesotho, immigrants from Fujian province, make significant use of South Africa for their own economic purposes.

Continuing to reduce the scope of our context, it becomes necessary to next examine the extant works surrounding the Chinese in Lesotho, few and far between as they are, and to also examine the substantiable body of news articles and reports which help to provide substance to the lives of the Chinese in Lesotho outside their economic activity.

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<sup>148</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 281.

<sup>149</sup> I. Gillson & N. Strychaez: *Addressing the trade challenges facing Landlocked LDCs: The Experience of Lesotho*, World Bank Africa Trade Policy Notes, Note 8, October 2010.

<sup>150</sup> I. Gillson & N. Strychaez: *Addressing the trade challenges facing Landlocked LDCs: The Experience of Lesotho*, World Bank Africa Trade Policy Notes, Note 8, October 2010.

<sup>151</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*. Brenthurst Discussion Paper; M. G. Moeletsi: *Grassroots Diplomacy Between Lesotho and South Africa: The District Liaison Committees*, Master's Dissertations, 2000, Rhodes University, p. 26; H. J. A. Reitsma: 'Africa's Land-locked Countries: A Study of Dependency Relations,' *Tijdschrift voor economische sociale geografie*, Volume 3, 1980, pp 130-141; UN-OHRLS: *The development of Economic of Land-locked: Understanding the Development Cost of Being Land-Locked*, 2013, <http://www.lldc2conference.org>, Accessed 29 June 2019.

## 2.4 The Chinese in Lesotho

Moving from the broader historical context of China-Africa dynamics the body of work on Lesotho itself is smaller. As stated numerous times above, the bulk of analysis of ethnic Chinese within Lesotho has often focused almost exclusively on the contemporary period and on their economic role, predominantly within the framework of discussing how influential they are within Lesotho's textile industry and the feelings of resentment among the local Basotho population towards them. Mothusi Turner and Terence McNamee have both contributed a great deal of work to studying the presence of the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho, specifically their relation and role within the businesses in Lesotho.<sup>152</sup> These studies include relevant information pertaining to the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>153</sup> Turner has provided some of the most extensive work concerning the Chinese within Lesotho. Although they are not his main focus, his works are critical to establishing the basic context of the Chinese migrant community within Lesotho.<sup>154</sup>

Along with Turner, Sarah Hanisch has done a considerable amount of research on the current migrant community of Chinese within Lesotho.<sup>155</sup> She is responsible for an argument that the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho do not inhabit the periphery of the economy but, instead, are a central part of it.<sup>156</sup> Hanisch's works have also included some detailed engagement with the local Fujianese population of Lesotho.<sup>157</sup> Hanisch's works have also included a relevant and noteworthy examination of the lives of Chinese migrant women, in particular, which is incorporated into this study due to the vital insights it grants on aspects of the lived experiences of the Chinese migrant community within Lesotho.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper; M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>153</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper; M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>154</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>155</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, pp 85-97.

<sup>156</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, pp 85-97.

<sup>157</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012

<sup>158</sup> S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women's Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021.

Heidi Haugen, Deborah Brautigam also examine the economic links between China and African states.<sup>159</sup> Sanjaya Lall provides specific work, like Sarah Hanisch, regarding the economic impact of Chinese trade on Lesotho.<sup>160</sup> Similarly, author of a PhD thesis and book, Sean Morenakemang Maliehe, has detailed research discussing the Basotho's relation to businesses within their country, in which he comments specifically on the role played by the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho's business sector.<sup>161</sup> Although, like Turner, the Chinese migrant community do not form the focus of Maliehe's work, he does contribute greatly to any understanding of them due to the relevant information contained within his thorough and extensive work.<sup>162</sup> As mentioned, Park has also conducted a sociological investigation into the perception of the Chinese migrants in Southern Africa, including those held by the native Basotho of Lesotho.<sup>163</sup> The matter of the strong anti-Chinese sentiments in Lesotho has also been analysed in some works, such as that by McNamee and Turner.<sup>164</sup> Although a plurality of comments on this view can be found in Lesotho and South Africa's media, in academic work there are a few pieces concerning it. Sebatatso Manoeli does touch upon the circumstances and cause of this sentiment in her work.<sup>165</sup> Roger Tangri also comments at length on unrest as connected to foreign business interests in Lesotho, underpinning the core fact that within Lesotho a great deal of societal discontent among the Basotho people is directed towards Chinese migrants.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> D. Brautigam: 'Close Encounters: Chinese business networks as Industrial Catalysts in Sub-Saharan Africa,' *African Affairs*, Volume 102, pp 447-467; H. Haugen: 'Chinese Exports to Africa: Competition, Complementarity and Cooperation between Micro-Level Actors,' *Forum for Development Studies*, Volume 38 (2), June 2011, pp 157-176.

<sup>160</sup> S. Lall: *FDI, AGOA and Manufactured Exports from a Land-Locked, Least-Developed African Economy: Lesotho*, QEH Working Paper 109, 2003.

<sup>161</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*

<sup>162</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*

<sup>163</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133.

<sup>164</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>165</sup> S. Manoeli: *Of Culture and Cash: Asian big business in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/04/24/of-culture-and-cash-asian-big-business-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>166</sup> R. Tangri: 'Foreign Business and Political Unrest in Lesotho,' *African Affairs*, Volume 92 (367), 1993, pp 223-238.

Although, as indicated, there is an extant body of work concerning the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho, and it would be unfair to dismiss it, the subject has not yet been exhausted.<sup>167</sup> Aside from the aforementioned limitations of a focus on economics, the subject of the Chinese in Lesotho remains a very noticeable lacuna. It is an unfortunate fact that a great deal of information which does exist concerning the Chinese in Lesotho is connected to the negative image they have within the country among the Basotho population.<sup>168</sup> Much of the Chinese presence in Lesotho's media and news is purely a result of this negative view and much of the worldwide attention the Chinese in Lesotho have received, is connected to violence directed against them.<sup>169</sup>

Furthermore, some of the existing body of work concerning the Chinese in Lesotho has only focused on analysing Lesotho's migrant Chinese population in terms of the wider question of Chinese migrant labour to Southern Africa. This issue of Chinese migration to Lesotho is currently a contentious and politicized issue within the state. Economic concerns drive a popular discontent with Chinese migrants in Lesotho which is clarified below. On the matter of immigration of Chinese into Lesotho, the works of John Akokpari forms the underpinning, providing an overview of immigration into Lesotho in general, but simply by necessity also focusing on Chinese migrants into Lesotho.<sup>170</sup> In this context accusations of economic exploitation of Lesotho by China, typically meaning the PRC, are not uncommon. In a literature review by Ado and Su it becomes apparent that there has been considerable attention given to the question of how the PRC's governmental relationship with Lesotho fits into questions

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<sup>167</sup> S. Hanisch: 'At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail sectors,' *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 48, (3), March 2013, pp 85-97; T. McNamee (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper; M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>168</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019; Y. Zi: "Unravelling the 'Fongkong' Phenomenon in Botswana through Analysing the Relationship among Mass Media, Governmental Activities and Local Voices," *Psychologica*, 57, 2014, p. 273.

<sup>169</sup> Anon: Lesotho quiet after weeks long riot killing 19, *Daily Breeze*, 26 May 1991, p. A8; Anon: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; Anon: Lesotho victims ask: Why did the mobs hit us? *Sunday Times*, 2 June 1991, p. 20; S. L. Cas: Naked couple stoned in Lesotho race frenzy, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 7; G. Mahabeer: Aysha stays as others flee Lesotho, *Sunday Times*, 26 May 1991, p. 57; M. Schmidt: Ruined Asian traders vow not to return, *Sunday Times*, 27 September 1988, p. 77; Anon: Police patrol after Lesotho Riot kills 19, *Charlotte Observer*, 26 May 1991, p. 23A; Anon: 'Refugees flee "anarchic" Lesotho capital to South Africa', *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 22 Sep 1998; Anon: Race Riots kill 19 in Lesotho, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 26 May 1991, p. A7; Anon: Racial unrest in Lesotho kills 19, *Rocky Mountain News*, 26 May 1991, p. 90; Anon: Week of race riots leave 19 dead, 60 hurt in Lesotho, *Kansas City Star*, 26 May 1991, p. A20.

<sup>170</sup> J. Akokpari: 'Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration question of Lesotho,' *Development Southern Africa*, Volume 22 (1), 12 April 2011, pp 87-102.



concerning their broader role on the African continent and concerns of neo-colonialism.<sup>171</sup> As a result, a focus on Lesotho's own specific context and circumstances is warranted.

Although the most important context to the study is that of Lesotho's situation within southern Africa, with regards to South Africa in particular, it is necessary to also examine literature dealing with China's engagement on a state-level with Lesotho. Turner agrees that the presence of ethnic Chinese within Lesotho must be understood in terms of the initial attempt by Taiwan to cement closer ties with both Lesotho and South Africa and then, later, understood in terms of the PRC's ongoing efforts to entrench itself within numerous African states.<sup>172</sup> To this end it is necessary to understand how the PRC's role in Lesotho's infrastructure and textile industry form part of China's larger efforts to both finance development within African states whilst, simultaneously, seeking to also find economic enrichment from their relationship. Along with the works of Turner and Maliehe, in this aspect, the analysis of Kaplinsky and Morris help to show the effect of China's domination of Lesotho's textile market on a more social level.<sup>173</sup>

Carolyn Baylies and Caroline Wright further provide detail on the matter of Lesotho's textile industry in their article concerning female labourers in the predominantly Chinese owned factories.<sup>174</sup> A further important aspect of China's state-level engagement with Lesotho is that of medical aide, a venture the PRC has increasingly been engaged in throughout Africa. Although it is a broad overview of China's medical cooperation across the entire continent, Li Anshan's work does touch upon the matter of Chinese medical assistance to Lesotho.<sup>175</sup> Although economic concerns are involved in medical cooperation such as this, it also does possess a social aspect to it, which is invaluable for this study. In addition to contributing to this broad international context it is also necessary to situate the work within Lesotho's specific national context.

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<sup>171</sup> A. Ado & Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-44.

<sup>172</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>173</sup> M. Morris & R. Kaplinsky: *Dangling by a thread: how sharp are the Chinese scissors?* Institute of Development Studies, 2006; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>174</sup> C. Baylies & C. Wright: 'Female Labour in the Textile and Clothing Industry of Lesotho,' *African Affairs*, Volyme 92 (369), October 1993, pp 577-591.

<sup>175</sup> L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitute, Discussion Paper 52, 2011.

There is a relatively small pool of available Chinese academic literature concerning the Chinese in Lesotho as well. However, what does exist is useful for its tendency to focus on engagement with Chinese living in Lesotho, as opposed to observations of their economic role predominantly.<sup>176</sup> These works have also shed light on the role played by Overseas Associations, a generic term for the tendency for migrant Chinese populations to form organizations to allow them to better collectively defend their interests, in southern Africa, including Lesotho.<sup>177</sup>

These Chinese language sources are then further complemented by the more prolific access to Chinese language news sources regarding China's migrant population.<sup>178</sup> Fujian has a rather active news environment already, with multiple differing news portals which largely focus on Fujianese migrants. These are particularly useful as they contain numerous interviews with Fujianese living in Lesotho, including multiple high-profile former, and current, Lesotho Chinese such as Chen Kehui, Fang Zejiang and He Qiang.<sup>179</sup>

Whilst discussing the matter of Chinese state involvement, news sources also play a role in helping to provide context and data. Lesotho's tempestuous relationship with Taiwan, post-1994, was detailed in a number of news reports as the small African state briefly vacillated

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<sup>176</sup> H. Liu: "Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications," *The China Quarterly*, 155; Anon: Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>177</sup> H. Liu: "Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications," *The China Quarterly*, 155; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>178</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon:

*Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉: 白手起家! 这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhouese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>179</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon:

*Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉: 白手起家! 这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

between following in South Africa's footsteps to largely turn away from Taiwan in favour of the PRC, before finally settling on an official relationship in favour of the PRC in 1994.<sup>180</sup>

However, the context of Chinese state-level relationships with African states is not the only one of importance. There is no doubt that currently research concerning the engagement of China on a state-level with African countries has gained enormous attention, nor is there a doubt that these relationships are worthwhile topics of study and discussion, but it would be a crucial mistake to view the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho through this lens alone.<sup>181</sup> As indicated by Park, the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho, most of them, as migrants should not be viewed as official actors of any Chinese state, Taiwan or the People's Republic, or only understood in terms of their function in state-level relationships.<sup>182</sup> A vital additional context that must also then be kept in mind is how the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho fit into the broader context of Chinese migration into Africa. According to the work by Ado and Su this topic has itself also received noticeable attention of late, similarly to the attention given to state-level relations between China and African states. However, even within this existing body of work there exists a common trend for discussion on Chinese migration to focus primarily on some or other economic aspect. This ranges from discussions concerning their threat to local employees, their threat to established, usually Western, financial interests or their perceived role as being a form of neo-colonial economic domination of Africa by the PRC.<sup>183</sup> Along with this trend there is a further tendency alluded to by Park and others within studies on Chinese migration to Africa to conflate all Chinese in Africa into one singular group.<sup>184</sup> This allusion is borne out in the statistics gathered in Kelly Pike's interviews with Lesotho factory workers, most of whom did not understand the difference between the PRC state and the Taiwanese managers they worked under, perceiving them as one single group of Chinese.<sup>185</sup> Unsurprisingly this is a gross generalization and to attempt to lump all of the approximately one million or so Chinese residing on the African continent into a single group is reductive.

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<sup>180</sup> Anon: Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with Lesotho, *UPI NewsTrack*, 15 May 1983; D. Jenkins: Before the Red Dawn Taiwan has its days of gold, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 October 1992, p. 13.

<sup>181</sup> I. Taylor: *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*.

<sup>182</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 131-133.

<sup>183</sup> A. Ado & Z. Su: 'China in Africa: a critical literature review,' *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, Volume 12, (1), March 2016, pp 40-44.

<sup>184</sup> Y. Park: 'Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory,' *African Studies Review*, Volume 56, (1), April 2013, pp 132-133.

<sup>185</sup> K. Pike: *Made in Lesotho: Examining Variation in Workers' Perceptions of Compliance with Labour Standards in Lesotho's Clothing Industry*, Cornell University, 2014.

As a result, keeping in mind these trends, it is crucial when pursuing a study of this nature to make clear that even among the ethnic Chinese in Lesotho there is a diversity of groups, rather than one uniform Chinese body. When examining the Chinese migrants in Lesotho it is also necessary to adequately differentiate between the different groups of Chinese within the Kingdom. The works of Turner, Maliehe, Hanisch and Edkins all help to highlight and explain the different contexts and lived experiences between these groups of Chinese.<sup>186</sup> As Turner states the ethnic Chinese are divided between the descendants of the original Taiwanese migrants from the 1960s, groups of Chinese professionals from Shanghai and, more lately, temporary migrants entering the country in large numbers from the southern Chinese province of Fujian.<sup>187</sup> Although the aforementioned works do shed some light on the different waves of Chinese migrants to Lesotho, a reality of the existing data is that most evidence and information which has been gathered concerning Chinese migrants in Lesotho focuses on the Fujianese Chinese currently making up the majority of the Chinese community in Lesotho. This is simply a result of the fact that this topic has only garnered increasing attention as of late, when the Taiwanese, Shanghai and Beijing Chinese have mostly receded from the Kingdom, meaning that most engagement or efforts to collect information on the Chinese in Lesotho has to go through the Fujianese Chinese.

Although the body is small, some works which feature more social information on the Chinese in Lesotho do exist. Christian Boehm discusses the lives of Lesotho's working-class women in his article. The predominance of the Chinese migrants within Lesotho's industries means that this discussion inevitably also touches somewhat on how the Chinese migrants interact with Basotho working women.<sup>188</sup> Furthermore, within China itself some academic papers exist on the topic of how Chinese migrants in Lesotho interact with the Basotho people. For example, He Ning has written an article in the context of China's construction enterprise and management sector about how best for Chinese migrants to engage with local employees within

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<sup>186</sup> E. Teboho: *Days of Cannibalism*, Kinoelektron, 23 April 2020; S S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>187</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>188</sup> C. Boehm: *Industrial Labour, Marital Strategy and Changing Livelihood Trajectories among Young Women in Lesotho*, Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: Social Becoming in an African Context, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006.

Lesotho.<sup>189</sup> Although it does contain some commentary on more social engagements between Chinese migrants and the local population of Basotho, (and it is invaluable to include some perspective from Chinese-language sources as well,) these studies do still suffer from being predominantly framed from an economic point of view.

As can be seen in many other African states, the Chinese community in Lesotho can seem relatively insular and reticent to engage with non-Chinese beyond an economic function. There are, of course, many pertinent reasons for this, from matters of language to the avoidance of being captured for undocumented entry into the state. This is not a new phenomenon and, to understand it, the works of Hairong Yan on so-called “self-segregation” by Chinese in Africa is of relevance.<sup>190</sup> As will be evident, when considering the news coverage of community-led efforts by Chinese migrants in Lesotho, this picture is not wholly accurate, or, at the very least, is changing. There is an apparent increased presence and proactive effort to engage with others in Lesotho by the Chinese community.

One of the largest bodies of relevant sources concerning the lives of the migrant Chinese in Lesotho are newspapers, particularly local ones. Coverage on the lives of migrant Chinese by local news sources help to flesh out aspects of the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho. Due to the paucity of primary documentation left behind by Taiwanese migrants within Lesotho newspapers played a particularly important role in researching this group of Chinese. In both Lesotho and South African newspapers the active efforts by Taiwan to support or render aide to Lesotho received attention, particularly in agricultural and industrial affairs.<sup>191</sup> This is further examined and supported in the context of a number of news stories surrounding Chinese medical workers in Lesotho, and reactions to them.<sup>192</sup> The *Sunday Times*, a South African newspaper, did extensive work covering the 1991 and 1998 Lesotho riots, both their inciting factors and their aftermath for the Chinese migrant community.<sup>193</sup> Particular insights can be gleaned by the close coverage, and interview, with Kiki Koo, a Taiwanese woman who established the first Chinese distillery in Lesotho.<sup>194</sup> In addition, the profile and interview with

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<sup>189</sup> H. Ning: ‘调动属地员工积极性,’ *施工企业管理*, Volume 5, 2016.

<sup>190</sup> H. Yan: ‘Chinese and ‘self-segregation’ in Africa,’ *Asian Ethnicity*, Volume 20, 27 September 2018, pp 44-60.

<sup>191</sup> J. Robinson: Chinese skill is passed to Swazis, *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, pp 58-59.

<sup>192</sup> Anon: First Children’s HIV/AIDS Medical Center Opens in Lesotho, *PR Newswire*, 1 December 2005; Anon: China, Lesotho cooperate in combating HIV/AIDS, *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 23 January 2008; Anon: China equips Lesotho Government Officials, *Lesotho Times*, 25 August 2017.

<sup>193</sup> M. Schmidt: *Ruined Asian Traders vow not to Return: Multi-million Rand investments go up in flames in Lesotho upheaval*, *Sunday Times*.

<sup>194</sup> C. Blanckenberg: Kiki’s a firebrand when it comes to fire-water, *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75.



the Taiwanese Fang family in the *Sunday Times* also help to shed light on the lives of the Taiwanese in Lesotho, as well as providing further evidence of the strong links that exist between Lesotho's Chinese migrants, who often have family or friends in South Africa as well.<sup>195</sup> Among Lesotho's own domestic news services the publication the *Lesotho Times* has covered the widest gamut and range of content concerning the Chinese in Lesotho. It contains multiple sources on both allegations of corruption or business domination by Chinese within Lesotho as well as information regarding Chinese involvement with social projects in Lesotho, contributions towards charity and their own personal lives within the Kingdom.<sup>196</sup> These news sources also cover broader aspects of Chinese social engagement in Lesotho's history, including their role in development of Lesotho's medical industry and the construction of dams, as well as private insights into the lives of some Chinese migrants living in Lesotho.<sup>197</sup>

A number of news sources also detail the active efforts of the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho to engage with the Basotho locals. This is a relatively new development, spearheaded by private Chinese community figures in Lesotho, who have attempted to provide support, economically and through development, to Lesotho. This has been done via methods such as the donation of food to impoverished townships, supplying funding for medical development and providing funding for the tuition of orphaned children.<sup>198</sup>

These news sources also reveal that the contemporary population of migrant Chinese in Lesotho have established internal organizations. Further local news sources reveal a telling picture of the degree to which the figures within these organizations are attempting to integrate into Lesotho. Between local news sources, comments by writers such as Turner, and documentaries such as *The Days of Cannibalism*, it also becomes clear that many of the

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<sup>195</sup> C. Rolfes: The Fang family of Qwaqwa, *Sunday Times*, 1 September 1985, p. 147.

<sup>196</sup> Anon: "26 Chinese deported," *Lesotho Times*, 21 July 2011; "Chinese community lends a helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016; L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; P. Kabi: "Chinese community lends a helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016, p. 10; N. Koeshe: "Chinese Community lends helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 27 July 2017.

<sup>197</sup> Anon: China to aid Lesotho with Eye Clinic, *Informative*, 2018; Anon: Lesotho dams bring investment, at a cost, *Agence France-Presse*, 2012; Anon: "Setting up Shop in Lesotho – How the Chinese Succeeded," *allAfrica.com*, Accessed November 2020; MB 201746 Maseru Domestic Service in English, 1983.

<sup>198</sup> Anon: *Chinese Ambassador Sun Xianghua attended agricultural donation Ceremony by Chinese community in Maseru*, ReliefWeb, Chinese Ambassador Sun Xianghua Attended Agricultural Donation Ceremony by Chinese Community in Maseru - Lesotho | ReliefWeb, Accessed 17 June 2019; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund provided Donation to Maseru poverty-stricken students*, 17 February 2017; Anon: Chinese community donates food parcels in Mafeteng, *TheReporter*, 2020; H. Moyo & N. Muzofa: 'Paying it Forward: Chinese associations in Lesotho work on the ground to uplift the communities in which they operate,' *ChinAfrica*, 9, 2017, pp 36-37; W. Yu: Chinese medical team brings health to people in Lesotho, *En.People.Cn*, 2018.



Chinese migrants within Lesotho make a serious effort to learn the Sotho language so they can more easily communicate with the Basotho.<sup>199</sup> A further contribution to understanding the perspectives of a Chinese migrant in Lesotho comes from the memoirs of Le Hengxiu, a 48 year old gynaecologist who accompanied a Chinese medical team to Lesotho in 2011, recounting her experiences there of Chinese migrants within the Kingdom.<sup>200</sup>

Sources such as these, which rely on grassroots interactions with local Basotho and Chinese communities, help to provide a more social aspect to the history of the Chinese migrants in Lesotho. Though, regrettably, this aspect is often mediated through a third party, it is still invaluable for providing non-economic information about the lives of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. However, as is apparent much of the attention on the Chinese migrants in Lesotho is focused on the mainland Chinese exclusively. Furthermore, it is focused on the current wave of Fujianese Chinese who, as indicated, easily, make up the largest percentage of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. As a result, there is comparatively little to no research or primary documentation on the Taiwanese Chinese migrants to Lesotho, who were the first Chinese communities to be recorded in Lesotho. Their newspaper and other news sources helped to shed some light on this group.

An important primary source concerning the lives of the Chinese in Lesotho are the court records. Courts are one of the few public institutions in Lesotho that the Chinese, often by necessity, interact with, leaving a trail of documents concerning both their own lives in Lesotho and, often, public perceptions concerning them that are treated as having weight within the Kingdom. When analysing the court records concerning the Chinese in Lesotho, we can divide them into a few major categories. These categories include Lesotho's Court of Appeal and High Court, the highest courts of the Kingdom, which have both played a role in describing and setting out the institutional and systemic issues Chinese have faced due to concerns of translation and police intimidation within Lesotho, as well as resolving cases of business disputes between members of the Chinese migrant community.<sup>201</sup> Court records from the High

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<sup>199</sup> E. Teboho: *Days of Cannibalism*, Kinoelektron, 23 April 2020; G. Wilson: Anti-Chinese resentment flares up, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 January 2008; M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>200</sup> Anon: '全国援外医疗工作先进个人——乐衡秀', 政策, [the national list is announced! the winners of the award in puyang are... \(sohu.com\)](#), Accessed 18 August 2020.

<sup>201</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Association of Chinese Merchants and Manufacturers of Lesotho v Pen-He and Another*, CIV/A/3/99 CIV/A/3/99, 1999 LSCA 108, 04 November 1999; Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Hanyane v Jiang*, CIV/APN/29/98 CIV/APN/29/98, 1999, LSCA 91, 01 September 1999; Lesotho Court of Appeals:

Court also give an indication of how rarely enforced criminal charges against Chinese for operating without trading licenses are.<sup>202</sup> These courts have also dealt with some instances of significant violence against the Chinese community within Lesotho and opined about the reality of early Taiwanese importation of mainland Chinese to Lesotho.<sup>203</sup>

A significant majority of cases involving Chinese within Lesotho are resolved at the level of the Labour Court, generally due to them being brought to the court by another party, indicating the reticence the local Chinese population has to engage with Lesotho's courts on their own initiative.<sup>204</sup> Connected to the Labour Court and its numerous cases revolving around disputes between Chinese employers and their employees is Lesotho's Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DDPR), a tribunal established to handle cases involving employee-employer disputes without taking it to the level of the courts.<sup>205</sup> The DDPR is, without a doubt, the legal venue that the Chinese local population is most familiar with. Though the DDPR's own records are largely inaccessible the cases which have reached the Labour Court, due to being unresolved within the DDPR, gives more insight into the fraught relations between Chinese employers and their employees as well as the challenge still played by language barriers for the Chinese migrant community.<sup>206</sup>

In addition to court records one of the other official primary sources concerning the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho is the Bureau of Statistics which carries out population surveys.<sup>207</sup> Although, due to the large percentage of Chinese in Lesotho who attempt to avoid notice by the state due to their illegal means of entry, these surveys cannot be seen as fully

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Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001, p. 64; *R v Mosili and Others*, CRI/T/81/2000, 2001 LSCA 86, 23 August 2001.

<sup>202</sup> *Hanayne vs. Jiang and Others*, CIV/APN/29/98; *Dong Pinghua, Dong Jin Hua vs. Zhang Zhao Tai*, CIV/APN/189/99.

<sup>203</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997.

<sup>204</sup> Labour Court: *Hong Shun Import & Export (PTY) LTD and Lydia Lerotholi*, DDPR, LC/REV/81/08 A0297/08, 16 June 2010; Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014; Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8; Labour Court: *Labour Commissioner (OBO Deceased Motlalepula Charles Rakhoba's Family) and Leta Security Services (PTY) LTD*, LC/31/05 NULL, LSLC 12, 26 July 2006, p. 3; Lesotho High Court: *Lesotho High Court: 'Makeng Makhaila and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/475/06, LSHC 153, 9 February 2007, p. 8.

<sup>205</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

<sup>206</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014; Labour Court: *Lesotho Stone (PTY) LTD and Hololane Molefi, DDPR, Arbitrator (M. Keta)*, LC/REV/50/09, 21 October 2010.

<sup>207</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics; *Kingdom of Lesotho 2006 Lesotho Population and Housing Census*, Administrative and methodology Report, Vol 1.

indicative of the entire Chinese migrant community they do offer some insight into the Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>208</sup> This includes information pertaining to the percentage of Chinese intending to remain in Lesotho on a long term basis, their attitudes towards raising their children in Lesotho or sending them back to China for an education and also the way the initial gender disparity, with significantly more men than women, has rapidly begun to close in the migrant community as migrant labour becomes largely a family affair requiring the involvement of both parents.<sup>209</sup> Complementary to the Kingdom's own statistics are those of the Fujian Bureau of Statistics, which also compiles comprehensive information on the scale and occupations of Chinese migrants from Fujian moving abroad.<sup>210</sup> Seeing that the largest percentage of the Chinese population in Lesotho is now constituted by migrants from Fujian this data played an important role in understanding that the vast majority of Fujianese who enter Lesotho.

As the prevalence of anti-Chinese sentiment within Lesotho is hardly a contentious topic, any analysis of existing news media, online sources, or discussions with the local population within Lesotho will reveal a sentiment towards the Chinese migrants which can generally be described as “unfavourable”. These discriminatory sentiments usually manifest only in insulting terminology, prejudicial discussions, and accusations of numerous sorts against the migrant Chinese community in Lesotho. But, at times, these negative sentiments have also boiled over into widescale violence, directed at not only Chinese, but Asian migrants in general within Lesotho.<sup>211</sup> In addition these news sources also provide documentation of the anti-Chinese sentiment espoused by numerous media personalities and even opposition political figures within Lesotho.<sup>212</sup> These sources reveal that criticism of Chinese migrants within Lesotho, and negative statements towards them, are commonplace on radio stations such as Harvest FM and

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<sup>208</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics; *Kingdom of Lesotho 2006 Lesotho Population and Housing Census*, Administrative and methodology Report, Vol 1.

<sup>209</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics; *Kingdom of Lesotho 2006 Lesotho Population and Housing Census*, Administrative and methodology Report, Vol 1.

<sup>210</sup> Fujian Bureau of Statistics, *Fujian Annual Yearbook 2018*.

<sup>211</sup> Anon: Lesotho: More than 1300 refugees reportedly in South Africa, *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 24 September 1998; M. Schmidt: Ruined Asian Traders vow not to return: Multi-million rand investments go up in flames in Lesotho upheaval, *Sunday Times*, 27 September 1998, p. 77; G. Wilson: Anti-Chinese resentment flares up, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 January 2008; G. Wilson: Chinese businesses rile Lesotho Locals, *Marketplace*, 15 January 2008.

<sup>212</sup> G. Wilson: Anti-Chinese resentment flares up, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 January 2008; G. Wilson: Chinese businesses rile Lesotho Locals, *Marketplace*, 15 January 2008.

People's Choice FM, where there are not infrequent calls for Chinese to be forcibly returned to China.<sup>213</sup>

These news sources provide a clear account of some of the primary causes of discontent with Chinese migrants in Lesotho but, also, underscore the perception of the Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>214</sup> These news stories or reports on Chinese interests in Lesotho are responsible for framing them in terms of one monolithic 'Chinese', as opposed to acknowledging the existence of private Taiwanese interests, private mainland Chinese interests and state Chinese interests as well. Understanding the lack of nuance to how Chinese migrants are perceived in China is critical to understanding how even small Fujianese traders, not connected to any of the large Chinese industries entering Lesotho, still become targets of anti-Chinese sentiment due to the perception of the Chinese as one monolithic group.

As is evident from the review of the existing literature and primary sources above, a number of sources do already exist which pertain to the topic of the migrant Chinese. Although, within the specific case of Chinese migrants in Lesotho the amount of academic work which already exists is slim, and mainly focused on economic theory. Primary sources, and secondary sources, detailing the lives of the migrant Chinese within Lesotho do exist, and it is these sources which were utilized to give a fuller account of the history of the Chinese in Lesotho and to dispel any notion of the Chinese migrants in Lesotho as a singular block. Ultimately, the cause of this study is to begin the process of a more wholistic and nuanced understanding of the history of the Chinese in Lesotho by providing critical attention to the different experiences of the differing Chinese population groups. Thus, an examination of the relevant bodies of literature reveals that on the matter of the Chinese in Lesotho there is room for research. Although there exists a solid body of work on the context of this study the primary focus of it, the Chinese in Lesotho, remains comparatively limited. It is to this specific focus and subject that this study turns.

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<sup>213</sup> G. Wilson: Chinese businesses rile Lesotho Locals, *Marketplace*, 15 January 2008; Y. Zi: "Unravelling the 'Fongkong' Phenomenon in Botswana through Analysing the Relationship among Mass Media, Governmental Activities and Local Voices," *Psychologica*, 57, 2014, p. 273.

<sup>214</sup> L. Papachristou: Lesotho: Chinese businessman admits to funding top Politicians, *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, 6 November 2018; A. Sguazzin & M. Ralengau: Lesotho Government called on to quit over murder, corruption allegations, *Bloomberg*, 22 January 2020; Anon: Lesotho: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018.

## 2.5 Chapter Outline

As indicated, the study follows a predominantly chronological structure. This is done by examining the two consecutive waves of Chinese migration into Lesotho. The wider implications of the study for the Chinese in Lesotho is then considered at the end of the along with the a conclusion that then serves to collate and summarise the study's findings.

The previous chapter served as the Introduction to the study as a whole. It provided an overview of the aim of the study and the motivation behind its formulation. To this end it discussed the key topic, that of the history of the Chinese in Lesotho being cast in relatively simplistic terms needing to be exposed as a more nuanced affair, acknowledging the formation of a more integrated community of Lesotho Chinese who do partake in Lesotho's civil society. The issue of the economic focus of much of the research concerning the Chinese was made apparent and the aim of the study to provide a broader social historical sense of the Chinese in Lesotho was set out. The context and formulation of the study was also elaborated on. Specific to this is the need to place the study within the broader history of Chinese outmigration, and even more specifically than that, the topic of Chinese migration to southern Africa. Additionally, Lesotho's geographical position, surrounded on all sides by South Africa, is a further context that is explored and acknowledged as relevant to this study. The relevant terminology for the study was also elucidated. The methodology of the study was provided and a discussion on the variety of sources utilized was included. The issue of translation, particularly when working with Chinese language academic articles and journals, and the problem of the lack of Chinese sources attesting their own experiences in Lesotho was acknowledged. Furthermore, the difficulty inherent in studying or tracing the current Fujianese population in Lesotho, due to the frequently illegal methods of entry utilized to get into Lesotho, was also mentioned, and the reticence this creates to discuss topics concerning migration into or out of the country. Methods to mitigate, but not conclusively solve, these methodological issues were explored.

This second chapter is a select literature review of the existing body of work that is relevant to this study. This work is drawn from a wide range of secondary material including academic monographs, journal articles and academic literature as well as primary material including archival sources, news media sources, court records and online sources. The literature review also touches upon the sparsity of primary sources concerning the Chinese in Lesotho held within the Maseru National Archives and Lesotho National Library, as well as use of Lesotho's court records and Bureau of Statistics. Official sources of both the government of Lesotho, and that of Taiwan and the PRC, were considered in terms of their presentation of facts and data

concerning the Chinese population in Lesotho.<sup>215</sup> Finally the literature review discussed the broad scope of news media, from newspapers to radio stations, which contain useful information concerning the Chinese in Lesotho, due to the topical, controversial, nature of the Chinese role in Lesotho's economy. Finally, chapter two includes the outline of the remaining chapters.

Chapter three concerns itself with providing necessary historical context and background to the study. It is divided into two segments: the first of deals with the matter of the history of Chinese outmigration, from the early Ming Dynasty period, and how the matter of migration by Chinese out of their homeland has changed over time.<sup>216</sup> From this broad analysis the context narrows to focus more specifically on Chinese migration into southern Africa. The second segment of the chapter consists of an analysis of Lesotho's landlocked nature and the implications this has had for the state. These two contextual points form an essential platform for the study of the history of the Chinese population in Lesotho.

The fourth chapter focuses on the relationships of the respective Chinese governments with Lesotho, with particular concern for their interactions regarding immigrant Chinese in Lesotho. It focuses on the engagement which existed between the Taiwanese and Lesotho governments from the 1960s until the 1990s.<sup>217</sup> The cessation of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Lesotho in 1994, and the effect of this on the Taiwanese community, are considered.<sup>218</sup> Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that the Taiwanese population living in Lesotho do so largely due to their own vested economic interests and have little involvement with the Taiwanese state.

Focus is then given to the extent of involvement the PRC government has had with the government of Lesotho in this chapter. The specific role of medical assistance the PRC has provided, is accounted for.<sup>219</sup> In addition, the heavy involvement the PRC government has had

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<sup>215</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Lesotho Prime Minister Witnessed Hand-over of China-Lesotho Friendship Middle School, Chinese Embassy in Lesotho*, January 2017.

<sup>216</sup> W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993, pp 927-928; Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's protection of Overseas Chinese during the late Ching period (1851-1911)*.

<sup>217</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

<sup>218</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 143.

<sup>219</sup> Anon: China, Lesotho cooperate in combating HIV/AIDS, *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 23 January 2008; Anon: China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic, *Informative*, 16 January 2018; Anon: First Children's HIV/AIDS Medical Center Opens in-, *PR Newswire*, 1 December 2005; L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa. With special emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper 52.



in launching infrastructure and construction projects in the country is examined along with the economic friction this generated.<sup>220</sup>

The chapter also provides clear evidence that the relatively popular sentiment that the PRC government officially organizes or enables the migration of the Fujianese Chinese into Lesotho is largely false, with numerous sources indicating that the predominant driving cause for these immigrations is personal economic incentive, not government-sanctioned or driven incentive.<sup>221</sup> However, in the context of the Chinese in Lesotho the PRC's relative neglect of this group is analysed and shown. The PRC government has done little to ever engage with, or assist, the Chinese in Lesotho, and has at times even actively neglected them in times of distress.<sup>222</sup> Along with this the resultant distrust and resentment the Lesotho Chinese feel and express for their government's role in Lesotho, and its failure to assist them, is explored.

The fifth chapter focuses on both components of the first wave of Chinese immigrants into Lesotho. It presents this analysis in a chronological fashion, first beginning with the Taiwanese immigrants of the 1970s before continuing to discuss the mainland Chinese, predominantly from Shanghai, who arrived in great numbers in the late 1980s to early 1990s. The connection of the first group immigrants to Taiwan's strategy of courting African states for political recognition is analysed.<sup>223</sup> Although the focus remains on Lesotho, as already indicated, it is impossible to discuss this matter fully without also referring to the fact that Taiwan practised a similar policy in South Africa concurrently. Thus, an examination of the connection between these two programs is included. The chapter then analyses existing information on the social history of the Taiwanese migrants within Lesotho to provide insight into the lived experiences of this community.

Following on the first wave of immigrants, the chapter will then describe how two factors largely curtailed further Taiwanese immigration into Lesotho from the 1980s onwards. The first of these factors was the rising anti-Chinese sentiment that began to emerge in response to

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<sup>220</sup> Anon: Local contractors cry foul over Chinese dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; Anon: Lesotho dam brings investment, at a cost, *Agence France-Presse*, 5 June 2012.

<sup>221</sup> S. van der Lugt: *South-South Cooperation through Investment – South African and Chinese Support to Development in Lesotho?* Centre for Chinese Studies policy briefing, pp 4-5.

<sup>222</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>223</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," Unpublished Master's Dissertation, Oxford University, 2011.

perceived Chinese economic dominance.<sup>224</sup> The second of these factors was the economic growth of Taiwan itself made cheap labour in Lesotho a less attractive option for impoverished Taiwanese citizens, curtailing the number willing to immigrate to Lesotho.<sup>225</sup> The role this played in a labour shortage for the Taiwanese businesses leads to the history of the Shanghai Chinese who constituted the second wave of Chinese migration to Lesotho.

The sixth chapter focuses on the second wave of Chinese immigrants into Lesotho. This wave consists almost exclusively of Chinese from the Fujian province of mainland China, who immigrated into Lesotho in large numbers between the years 1998 and 2000. The history of these Fujianese immigrants is provided within this chapter.<sup>226</sup> The impetus that drove this third wave of Chinese immigration is analysed within chapter six. The way in which this second wave of Chinese migration shares characteristics with the earlier mainland Chinese is examined but, importantly, the chapter also delineates how the current Fujianese population differs substantially from the Shanghai Chinese. How the Fujianese Chinese succeeded in spreading extensively throughout Lesotho is analysed. The economic conflict between the early Fujianese traders and the established Indian and Taiwanese retailers is accounted for and the role this played in motivating a greater degree of organization and cooperation between the Fujianese newcomers is provided. The role played by Chinese business associations in facilitating the arrival and establishment of the Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho is analysed, particularly with reference to the specific business model many small Fujianese traders establish in conjunction with these associations.<sup>227</sup> In addition the strong internal connections between the Fujianese Chinese and the Taiwanese Chinese are examined. This is presented in the context of the study's goal of deepening a nuanced understanding of the Chinese in Lesotho by presenting the way the differing groups of Chinese within Lesotho have begun to interact more openly with each other.

The Fujianese Chinese also have a distinct culture and social system commonly shared between them. This differs from what is typically seen among the Taiwanese and the Shanghai Chinese,

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<sup>224</sup> Y. J. Park: *Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory*, p. 139.

<sup>225</sup> M. Turner: *How did they get there? A history of Chinese migrants in Lesotho*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/02/14/how-did-they-get-there-a-history-of-chinese-migrants-in-lesotho/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

<sup>226</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012.

<sup>227</sup> M. Turner: *Wherever the sun shines, Fujianese can be found*, The East is Read, <https://eastisread.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/wherever-the-sun-shines-fujianese-can-be-found/>, Accessed 15 June 2019.

in part because the matter of overseas migration and migratory labour has become something of a cultural phenomenon and tradition among Fujian's population.<sup>228</sup> As part of a broadening understanding of Chinese history in Lesotho it is necessary to examine the strong role played by Fujian family units in the lives of Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho. Remittance of money back from Lesotho to Fujian forms part of this, an economic incentive, but at the same time cultural and social pressures exist as well. The social attitude towards migration and migratory labour among Fujianese in Lesotho is examined in the sixth chapter, revealing how this pressure forms part of the Fujianese drive to succeed in Lesotho.<sup>229</sup>

Vitality, the growing presence of something akin to a Fujianese civil society in Lesotho is presented. Analysis of the growing Fujianese business community revealed evidence for the emergence of a segment of the Fujianese within Lesotho who made active efforts to integrate into Lesotho's wider society.<sup>230</sup> Their involvement in numerous social functions, as well as active charity efforts and gestures such as the adoption of Lesotho citizenship, demonstrates that, whilst still small, this group of Fujianese defy efforts to dismiss all Fujianese in Lesotho as insular and unconcerned with the country they are living in. Just as in the case of the initial waves of migration, the matter of anti-Chinese sentiment and how this has affected the history of the Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho will be considered.

Furthermore, the formation of social organizations by the Fujianese Chinese are examined, as well as the history of these organizations, as some of the clearest examples of the social agency of the ethnic Chinese within Lesotho. At the same time the political involvement of ethnic Chinese in Lesotho's government is analysed and accounted for with specific reference to the relationship of prominent Chinese businessman, and naturalized citizen of Lesotho, Yan Xie and the local Chinese owned Maseru Dawning company.<sup>231</sup> The influence of the ethnic Chinese

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<sup>228</sup> T. McNamee, (ed.): *Africa in their words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, 2012, pp 17-18.

<sup>229</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 40.

<sup>230</sup> CNKI Journal Database, <http://new.oversea.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CJFQ>, Accessed 13<sup>th</sup> February 2020; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉: 白手起家! 这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>231</sup> P. Kabi: *Lesotho Prime Minister Thabane disowns controversial trade advisor of Chinese origin*, Africa-China Reporting Project, December 2018.

in Lesotho's textile, wholesale, retail and meat industries will also be focused on. As part of this, the complaints brought by numerous local Basotho construction firms concerning alleged corruption on behalf of the Lesotho government are examined.<sup>232</sup>

The conclusion consists of a summarization of the foregoing data and then provides two overarching arguments based on the preceding content. The first of these is that a closer analysis of the history of the Chinese in Lesotho has demonstrated both that they are, overall, driven by private interests as opposed to common accusations of being agents of their respective governments. In providing for the overwhelming majority of Chinese in Lesotho's sentiments that they receive no assistance from their home governments, and their pursuit predominantly of private economic enterprises rather than state projects, this is established as a strong case for rejecting perception of the presence of the Chinese in Lesotho as proxies for the PRC or Taiwanese government. This is expressly important since, as the economic relations between Lesotho and both Taiwanese businesses and the PRC grow and become more complicated, for good and ill, the local Chinese population in Lesotho become an easy and vulnerable scapegoat for frustrations with governments that they should not fairly be held culpable for. The overall case of this first point being that the Chinese in Lesotho must be accounted for individually, rather than as a homogenous block that can be dismissed simply as 'Chinese'. The second argument to be made, stemming from the first, is that common assumptions about Chinese migrants within southern Africa, and Africa in general, are challenged in Lesotho by an emerging class of affluent traders. Here a distinction is made between the older class of wealthy Taiwanese industrialists, largely involved with Taiwan's textile industry, as few of them live in Lesotho for any period of time, usually staying in South Africa and simply visiting their factories and assets in Lesotho occasionally. By contrast, the emergent Fujianese class are characterized by living in Lesotho, with a small number of them intending to do so permanently. This particular class of Fujianese are used as indicative of the way homogenous assumptions about Chinese migrants in Africa, that they are insular, exclusively interested in their own economic enrichment before returning to China, must be challenged. Like almost all things involving large groups of humans there is no single, conclusive, description for the Chinese in Lesotho, and this socially active, involved, Fujianese middle class are a clear example of how conventional wisdom around Chinese migrants in

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<sup>232</sup> Anon: Local Contractors cry foul over Chinese Dominance, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; B. Mpaki: Meat Import Ban requires Inclusivity, *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018.

Africa should not be accepted as universal and an effort should be made to utilize a more nuanced analysis of the developing Chinese community in Lesotho.

## Chapter 3: A Brief History of Chinese Migration

### 3.1 Introduction

Chapter three provides an overview of the history of Chinese migration into Africa, with a specific focus on southern Africa. This informs the historical context of the Lesotho Chinese communities. Although it refers to some of the contact which existed between China and Africa prior to the Qing Dynasty (1636 – 1912), but the focus is predominantly on immigration and, therefore, the bulk of the chapter concerns itself with Chinese immigration during the Qing Dynasty. For this reason, the policies, and attitudes of the Qing Dynasty towards migration, as well as the historical factors which served as a catalyst for an explosion of Chinese migration in the latter half of the nineteenth century, are examined. The Qing Dynasty inherited a strictly anti-immigration policy and sentiment from its predecessor, the Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644). However, rather than simply maintain the Ming Dynasty's existing policies against migration the new Dynasty would also actively increase criminalization of migratory efforts and display, creating an altogether harsher approach towards migration than even the Ming Dynasty had displayed. The role Western powers and their interventions within the Qing Dynasty, as well as ensuing internal conflicts and disasters, played in facilitating change towards this policy is explored. Then the ensuing period of Chinese mass migration is examined, with specific focus towards the migration of Chinese into southern Africa.

### 3.2 Early contact between Africa and China

Contact between China and Africa has existed apparently as far back as the sixth century BCE.<sup>233</sup> Predominantly, this contact was through the economic exchange of goods, which linked China, of the time, to Egypt through trade and commerce.<sup>234</sup> This contact was, for the most part, believed to be indirect, with products and commerce from either polity only finding their way to the other through various other nations and peoples which lay between the two, serving as proxies. However, regardless of the degrees of separation, it did represent tangible evidence of some form of engagement between China and Africa long before the modern Qing Dynasty period (1636 – 1912). If one was interested in determining a more direct moment of engagement between China and Africa, then the first direct political contact between a Chinese

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<sup>233</sup> K. L. Harris: "Early Encounters between China and Africa: myth or moment?" *South African Journal of Cultural History*, 17, (1), 1 June 2003.

<sup>234</sup>Z. Xiang: "Four climaxes of Ancient Sino-African interaction," *Nan Kai Histiography*, 2, 1987.



polity and an African polity could serve as a useful starting point. In the first century CE diplomatic representatives of the Kingdom of Aksum, in present day Ethiopia, entered the capital of the reigning Dynasty at the time, establishing the first official political contact at a governmental level between China and Africa.<sup>235</sup>

It can then be said that China had been in some form of contact, mostly limited, with Africa from as early as the Han Dynasty in the second century. During the following Sui (581 – 618), Jin (266 – 420) and Wei Dynasties (386 – 535) little evidence of further interaction between China or Africa exists, but in the Tang Dynasty of the sixth century a further expansion of Sino-Africa relations occurred. This contact was still mostly one of indirect trade, but the discovery of Tang Dynasty porcelain in Egypt and Tanzania, did indicate that Chinese commerce was able to penetrate Africa.<sup>236</sup> In this trade it was likely that Arabian merchants facilitated a deeper exchange of goods between Africa and China, with Egypt serving largely as a hub from which Chinese goods spread further out across the African continent.

During the following Song (960 – 1279) and Yuan (1271 – 1368) Dynasties Sino-African relations increased remarkably, and their contact ceased being predominantly one of indirect mercantile exchange. Multiple literary sources from this time indicated direct maritime travel by Chinese individuals to Africa.<sup>237</sup> Furthermore, the scholar Zhou Qufei wrote official documents concerning African states such as Morocco and Egypt in the twelfth century.<sup>238</sup> The Song Dynasty also deepened official contacts with polities in Africa. By the eleventh century the Song Dynasty had established firm relations with the Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa, with both states exchanging diplomatic representatives.<sup>239</sup> In the same century the Song Dynasty established relationships with the East African port of Gede.<sup>240</sup> By the Yuan Dynasty direct trade routes had come into existence between China and Africa, no longer forcing their commercial contact to be done nearly exclusively through varying middlemen. Chinese merchants sailed to Aden, the Maldives and even as far as Madagascar during the Yuan Dynasty.<sup>241</sup> In 1346 one of the most well-known early cases of contact between Africa and

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<sup>235</sup> S. Fuwei: *China and Africa – Two Thousand Years of Sino-African Relations*, Beijing, Zhonghua Press, 1990, pp 11-12.

<sup>236</sup> S. Fuwei: *China and Africa – Two Thousand Years of Sino-African Relations*, Beijing, Zhonghua Press, 1990, pp 11-12.

<sup>237</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 18-20.

<sup>238</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 21.

<sup>239</sup> S. Fuwei: *Sino-African Relations*, pp 252-258.

<sup>240</sup> Z. Junyan: *Contact with Central Asia*, p. 118.

<sup>241</sup> Z. Junyan: *Contact with Central Asia*, pp 24-25.

China occurred when the Moroccan traveller and explorer Ibn Battuta visited China directly.<sup>242</sup> By this time maps of Africa had begun to emerge within the Yuan Dynasty as well, evidencing a greater degree of direct knowledge of Africa within China. The Yuan Dynasty also, like the Song before it, further expanded its diplomatic relationships with African polities. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it established relations with the Mamluk Caliphate of Egypt, the Ethiopian city of Gondar and Madagascar.<sup>243</sup>

During the period of the Ming Dynasty, in the fifteenth century, contact between Africa and China extended still further, with the Eunuch Zheng He's visit to the eastern coast of Africa leading to numerous, detailed, publications concerning states and polities within Africa.<sup>244</sup> Although the early Ming Dynasty seemed set to continue to enhance diplomatic and trade relationships between China and Africa like the Song and Yuan Dynasties before it, the conservative turn the Dynasty took later on, under Emperor Min Ren Zong, saw a general scuppering of much of China's efforts to project or engage with the polities and states beyond its borders, and its relationship with Africa would suffer from this.<sup>245</sup>

What should be clear is that African-Chinese relations are far from some modern or recent occurrence. Interaction, even through proxies, between Africans and Chinese has been occurring for centuries, through both official and private contacts. It has spanned cultural, economic, and political spheres. However, though contact and relations between the two regions is centuries old, immigration is a decidedly newer phenomenon between them. Immigration of Africans to China, and of Chinese into Africa, can only be reliably traced to around the beginning of the seventeenth century.<sup>246</sup> Initial immigration of Chinese into Africa was also relatively small scale and almost exclusively the result of European powers. The very first Chinese in Africa who remained there for any length of time were mostly an assortment of prisoners and labourers shipped by the Dutch from their holdings in Southeast Asia to their holdings in Africa.<sup>247</sup> Until the nineteenth century small communities of Chinese did begin to emerge, predominantly Dutch prisoners within its southern African holdings, or labourers who

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<sup>242</sup> M. Jinping: *Translation of the Journey by Ibn Battuta*, pp 545-549.

<sup>243</sup> R. Coupland: *East Africa and its Invaders*, Book 3, p. 26.

<sup>244</sup> J. J. L. Duyvendak: "The True Dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the Early Fifteenth Century," *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, 34, (5), 1939; L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 30-32.

<sup>245</sup> J. J. L. Duyvendak: "The True Dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the Early Fifteenth Century," *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, 34, (5), 1939; L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 34.

<sup>246</sup> Anon: *Overseas Chinese Economic Yearbook*, National Bureau of Statistics of China, Taipei, p. 922.

<sup>247</sup> J. Armstrong: "The Chinese in the Cape in the Dutch East India Company period, 1652 – 1795," *Slave Route Project Conference*, 1997, pp 3-4.

chose to remain in Africa rather than return home at the end of their contracts. And, while these communities cannot be dismissed, their history is as important as any other, but for the purposes of determining systemic, large scale, Chinese immigration into Africa, that would not be achieved until the 1800s. It would only be in the latter half of the nineteenth century that large scale immigration of Chinese into Africa would begin under the Qing Dynasty.

### 3.3 The Qing Dynasty

The Qing Dynasty represented the final dynastic empire and power of China thus far. The Empire spanned a diverse number of cultures and faiths, lasting some three centuries from its foundation in 1644 to its dismantling by the Xinhai Revolution in 1912. It represented the final conquest dynasty of Chinese history as well. Conquest dynasties were, simply, dynasties established by groups seen as typically foreign to China, such as when the Yuan Dynasty was established by the conquests of the Mongolian Empire.<sup>248</sup> The Qing Dynasty was founded by the Jurchen, an ethnic group within the Ming Dynasty who were able to take advantage of a period of chaos and instability within the Dynasty to assert their own rule.<sup>249</sup> The Jurchen created Qing Dynasty would then proceed to expand the boundaries of the old Ming Dynasty, in many ways creating the borders that are now largely recognized as modern day China. That is the boundaries inherited by the Republic of China (1912-1949) and the PRC (1949 to the present).

Like most of the conquest dynasties before them, the Jurchen rulers of the Qing Dynasty actively sought to maintain the Chinese and Confucian character and traditions of their new empire, despite being a nominally separate ethnic group from the dominant Han Chinese population they now ruled over.<sup>250</sup> Immigration was one such area where the Qing Dynasty largely maintained the position of the Ming Dynasty uninterrupted, save for a somewhat tightening of penalties and restrictions over time. It goes without saying that even though both the Ming and Qing Dynasties displayed apathy, or outright hostility, to the notion of their subjects immigrating abroad at different periods in time, Chinese immigration has always continued and was never fully halted.<sup>251</sup> Like all states the borders of the Ming and Qing

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<sup>248</sup> W. Gungwu: *China and the world since 1949: The impact of independence, modernity and revolution*, pp 3-4.

<sup>249</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 64.

<sup>250</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 87-88.

<sup>251</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 73.

Dynasties were created through generations of conquests, explorations and migrations and though the Ming and Qing attempted to prevent and deter immigration as best they could they were never able to put a permanent or wholistic stop to Chinese outmigration.

Though never fully successful it remained true that the Qing introduced laws and policies to curtail immigration of their subjects outside of China as best they could.<sup>252</sup> Part of this policy was specifically attempting to prevent travel by sea, in order to discourage Chinese from travelling to other lands via boat or ship. Other than the fact that travel by sea was always an obvious route for migration, the Qing Dynasty's specific targeting of sea travel was due to concerns the Dynasty held that open travel for its subjects over the waters would lead to the increasing formation of pirates and other groups involved in banditry of some sort or another.<sup>253</sup> In this the Qing once more emulated their predecessors, as the Ming Dynasty had been motivated by similar fears.<sup>254</sup> At the core of the issue was the wrongful presumption by the rulers of both the Ming and Qing Dynasties that their subjects would never, truly, wish to immigrate from China, at least never for anything more than a brief sojourn. Indeed, the term utilized for Chinese who went abroad during the Qing Dynasty period was *huaqiao*, which was best translated as sojourners, the implicit meaning in the term coming from how it was often used, referencing Chinese who travelled abroad but were assumed to, one day in the future, return to China.<sup>255</sup> This sentiment was popular throughout the Qing Dynasty, the concept given rather florid meaning in a popular poem of the time:

A tree may grow to a thousand feet, but its leaves fall back to its roots.<sup>256</sup>

When discussing *huaqiao* and what the term means within the wider context of Chinese migration we can begin with the fact that it is, itself, *as indicated earlier*, a relatively modern term, first becoming popularized in 1890. The translation of the term, and its implicit, loaded, meaning has led to some confusion. For a long time, translations of the term simply rendered it as 'Overseas Chinese', the meaning seeming to simply suggest any Chinese who lived outside of China. But, as mentioned, the intention and commonly understood meaning of the term makes it closer to 'overseas sojourners', the term usually being used in a context of Chinese

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<sup>252</sup> Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Chinese overseas During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)*, p. xiv.

<sup>253</sup> Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Chinese overseas During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)*, p. xiv.

<sup>254</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 65.

<sup>255</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 98.

<sup>256</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 98.

who travel abroad to work but, ultimately, return to China.<sup>257</sup> We can see a difference then in meaning to a term like immigrant, *huaqiao* carried with it the context that even though the Chinese in question now lived outside of China they remained culturally part of it and would return to China in the future.<sup>258</sup> As a result the term can be misleading, and a distinction must be made between those Chinese who did travel abroad with the specific intent to return to China after a period, the sojourners in question, and those who truly were immigrants, moving to live in their new homes, without any intent or plan to return to China.

The Dynasty's attitude and position vis-à-vis the Chinese living abroad altered in response to its own political fortunes and stability, a common enough trend in most states. When the Qing Dynasty felt secure in its hegemonic status it evidenced little care for the fate of its subjects abroad and actively hindered those who sought to travel.<sup>259</sup> When faced with a declining status as a hegemonic force, on the other hand, the Dynasty changed its position and not only sought to cultivate better ties with the Chinese living abroad but, also, sought to support more Chinese travelling abroad, typically in its own interests.<sup>260</sup>

### 3.4 Opening the Qing Dynasty

When examining the Qing Dynasty's immigration policies and positions we are able to discern two broad periods with distinct characteristics. The initial period encompasses the Qing Dynasty's reign until 1860 and can be fairly described as restrictive in their attitude towards migrants travelling abroad and apathetic to those Chinese who did live abroad already. In this period the Qing Dynasty perceived the question of Chinese immigration largely as a danger to their control and the stability of the state, suspecting any large groups of Chinese outside the borders of the Dynasty to be prone to forming criminal groups which preyed upon the Empire.<sup>261</sup> This fear was one inherited from the Ming Dynasty, and the two differing Dynasties shared the same outlook that Chinese subjects outside of their direct control would always pose

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<sup>257</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, p. 28; W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993, pp 927-928.

<sup>258</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, p. 28; W. Gungwu: 'Greater China and the Chinese overseas,' *The China Quarterly*, 136, 1993, pp 927-928.

<sup>259</sup> S. V. Conradie: "*A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation*," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>260</sup> S. K. Ong: "'Chinese, but not quite Chinese': *Huaqiao* and the marginalization of the Overseas Chinese," *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 9, (2013), p. 5.

<sup>261</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 81.

a challenge to their rule.<sup>262</sup> As a result, in response to these fears, the Qing Dynasty would seek to impose even harsher penalties on those seeking to immigrate than the Ming Dynasty had, effectively sentencing any Chinese immigrants, who lacked express official permission, to death.<sup>263</sup> The Qing's commitment to this position even saw it at one point issue an official edict to their surrounding states, demanding the return of all Chinese subjects within them to be duly executed.<sup>264</sup>

In addition to the belief that any Chinese outside their direct borders were a challenge to their authority the Qing Dynasty also internalized the belief that Chinese subjects abroad were guilty of moral failings, perceiving travel outside of the empire as a violation of moral notions such as fidelity and loyalty they were expected to keep.<sup>265</sup> A clear example of this attitude is evidenced by a Qing Dynasty Emperor in his official response to the 1740 Batavia massacre in Indonesia. This massacre saw approximately 10 000 Chinese living in Indonesia massacred by the Dutch colonial troops in conjunction with native collaborators. Despite the numerous deaths the Emperor of the time expressed the notion that the Chinese victims were themselves to blame for their own fate:

They disgracefully abandoned their ancestors to gain fortune in an alien country, so they would be abandoned and would receive no sympathy or support from the government.<sup>266</sup>

Despite the Qing Dynasty's efforts, however, migration continued apace, with larger and larger groups of Chinese moving abroad and overseas in violation of the Dynasty's policies.<sup>267</sup>

The Qing Dynasty was forced, however, to adjust these policies and positions it held in response to the realities of the nineteenth century. The stagnation of the Dynasty's economy, plunging its citizenry into poverty, and the arrival of the Western colonial powers would see the opposition to immigration forcibly altered. The pivotal moment in this change occurred

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<sup>262</sup> Y. Hwang: *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Chinese overseas During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)*, p. xiv.

<sup>263</sup> M. R. Coolidge: *Chinese Immigration*, p. 16.

<sup>264</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 87-88.

<sup>265</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 87-88.

<sup>266</sup> I. Shen: *A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices*, p. 70.

<sup>267</sup> R. L. Irick: *Ch'ing policy towards the coolie trade, 1874-1878*, p. 390.



between 1840 and 1860, as the two Opium Wars the Dynasty fought, and lost, to the British Empire would formally reverse its opposition to Chinese immigration.<sup>268</sup> For their part, the European powers intervened militarily in China with an express desire to force the Qing Dynasty to permit migration, as they desired access to the labour force they perceived the Chinese populace as representing.<sup>269</sup> Thus, the first Opium War forced the Dynasty to expand the number of ports open to commerce with Western powers.<sup>270</sup> In response these same Western powers continued to exert pressure on the Dynasty to allow for its subjects to move abroad, predominantly so that they could make use of them for their own economic aims.<sup>271</sup> Irrevocable change to the Dynasty's policies came about in 1860, following the British victory over the Qing in the Second Opium War.<sup>272</sup> The Peking Convention which ended the war was largely a matter of European dictate, with the Dynasty lacking almost any capacity to resist the demands of the Western powers.<sup>273</sup> The Convention abolished the existing restrictions and punishments the Dynasty had levied against Chinese immigration, opening up China as a whole to immigration.<sup>274</sup> Article five of the Convention specifically permitted Chinese subjects freedom from all legal restrictions if they travelled on British ships.<sup>275</sup> The Convention also established for the Qing Dynasty the right to 'oversight' of any and all Chinese living in British colonies. However, a combination of the Qing Dynasty's apathy for its overseas subjects, as well as a lack of political clout, meant that initially this "oversight" was rarely utilized.<sup>276</sup> Although forced to allow for Chinese subjects to travel abroad by the Convention it should be noted that the Dynasty maintained the prohibition on any Chinese overseas returning to China until 1893.<sup>277</sup>

Thus, from 1860 onwards, we see the development of the next phase of the Qing Dynasty's approach to migration, a phase in which immigration outside of China became vastly easier

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<sup>268</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, p. 123.

<sup>269</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 70.

<sup>270</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, p. 123.

<sup>271</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 70.

<sup>272</sup> I. Shen: *A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices*, p. 60.

<sup>273</sup> I. Shen: *A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices*, p. 60.

<sup>274</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 81.

<sup>275</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 81.

<sup>276</sup> S. V. Conradie: "A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>277</sup> I. Shen: *A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices*, p. 60.

than it had ever been during the Qing Dynasty's preceding rule, and this was followed by one of the largest mass migrations of Chinese abroad in history. Much of this migration was driven by the needs of Western colonial powers for cheap, inexpensive, labour in their colonies.<sup>278</sup> Western states regularly engaged in contractual relations with the Dynasty or provincial level governments within the Dynasty to allow them to move large groups of Chinese abroad to serve as indentured labour.<sup>279</sup> Although nominally a contractual system it should be unsurprising to learn that this system itself was regularly exploitative of the Chinese migrants.<sup>280</sup>

As in the case of all states it would be wrong to ascribe the change in the Dynasty's attitude to some moral epiphany or desire to behave altruistically. There were of course individuals within the Dynasty motivated by such concerns, and had been even during the more repressive periods, but the impetus for the state as a whole to change its approach was motivated by rational self-interest. Faced with its fading hegemonic status, and the recent defeats against European states and Japan, the Dynasty now became aware of the urgent need to modernize if they wished to maintain a position of power and influence, or to prevent their own sovereignty being eroded by foreign interests.<sup>281</sup> Partly this meant finding a solution to the Dynasty's economic woes and the wealth possessed by Chinese overseas represented an incentive for the Dynasty to become more involved with their overseas subjects. This was clearly seen in an 1877 policy enacted by the Dynasty that allowed it to solicit any Chinese overseas for money, effectively granting the Dynasty the ability to ask for money from Chinese abroad.<sup>282</sup> In exchange for providing their wealth the Chinese overseas were offered noble titles and other honours, as well as prestige in exchange for monetary compensation.<sup>283</sup> Attempting to have the Chinese overseas provide financial support for the Dynasty formed part of a range of actions the Dynasty took to attempt to overcome the financial dependency it had developed on Western powers.<sup>284</sup> As the degree of financial support from Chinese overseas grew so too did the

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<sup>278</sup> K. L. Harris: A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 70.

<sup>279</sup> S. V. Conradie: "A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>280</sup> S. V. Conradie: "A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>281</sup> D. P. Chen & P. Lien: *The evolution of Taiwan's policies toward the political participation of citizens abroad in homeland governance*, p. 47.

<sup>282</sup> E. Barabantseva: *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism*, p. 24.

<sup>283</sup> S. K. Ong: "'Chinese, but not quite Chinese': *Huaqiao* and the marginalization of the Overseas Chinese,' *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, (9), 2013, p. 5.

<sup>284</sup> E. Barabantseva: *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism*, p. 24.

Dynasty's official messaging concerning them, beginning to speak positively of the overseas Chinese, officials even referring to them as: "the goose that lays the golden egg."<sup>285</sup>

Beyond the need for financial support closer relations with the Chinese Overseas also played a role in the Dynasty's political aims. By the mid nineteenth century fears of an internal revolution in China dethroning the Qing Dynasty were very concrete, with unrest growing, oftentimes supported by Chinese intellectuals abroad. Fostering closer ties to these communities and developing an international image as a protector of the Chinese abroad, was seen as a step towards placating some of the more revolutionarily inclined groups of Chinese. Through this the Dynasty hoped to both subdue some of their internal opposition and, furthermore, to secure assistance from Chinese abroad in the event of a revolution.

The Chinese Overseas also represented to the Qing Dynasty an important vehicle for their project of modernisation.<sup>286</sup> The lessons of the Opium Wars (1839 – 1842 & 1856 – 1860) and Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895) taught the Qing that they would be unable to compete with more technologically advanced powers on an even playing field. Thus, to reclaim hegemonic status, they needed to modernize their own technological base, and Chinese abroad were seen as critical to this endeavour. Qing Dynasty officials were instructed to specifically find Chinese Overseas educated in certain skillsets – such as the use or creation of European firearms, machinery and such – and then persuade them to return to China, to spread this knowledge within the Dynasty.<sup>287</sup> In pursuit of fostering this goal the Dynasty began to sponsor the creation of schools specifically for Chinese Overseas, now promoting their travel in exchange for the eventual return of the knowledge they acquired abroad. Perhaps the most dramatic step in this phase of the Dynasty's migration policies was the passing of the Qing Nationality Law in 1909.<sup>288</sup> The law effectively claimed Qing authority over any individual born to a Chinese father, regardless of where they were born, proclaiming them to be subjects of the Qing Dynasty.<sup>289</sup> This led to no small amount of bureaucratic confusion for Chinese living abroad at the time, many of whom wound up with dual citizenship, both citizens of their new homes,

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<sup>285</sup> S. K. Ong: "'Chinese, but not quite Chinese': *Huaqiao* and the marginalization of the Overseas Chinese,' *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, (9), 2013, p. 9.

<sup>286</sup> M. R. Godley: *The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernisation of China 1893-1911*, pp 60-61.

<sup>287</sup> M. R. Godley: *The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernisation of China 1893-1911*, p. 61.

<sup>288</sup> S. V. Conradie: "*A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation*," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018, p 29.

<sup>289</sup> S. V. Conradie: "*A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation*," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018, p 29.

but also legally recognized as subjects of the Qing Dynasty. Ultimately, the Dynasty changed its approach towards Chinese Overseas both because it had little choice, being coerced into it by foreign powers, and most importantly because it realized that it could no longer continue as it had been if it intended to develop itself into a state capable of competing and safeguarding its interests against European states and Japan.

The change in policy resonated within the very language used by the Dynasty when discussing Chinese Overseas. Following 1860 the Dynasty adopted more precise, less pejorative, terminology for referring to Chinese living outside of China. The term *huárén* began to be used, translating simply as “Chinese people”. This was in contrast to the previously more popular, and more discriminatory, term of *yu-min*, which translated to “unproductive people”, reflecting the prior bias within the Dynasty which perceived Chinese abroad as traitors to their state.<sup>290</sup>

This change in policy, along with the legal changes brought about by the Peking Convention (1860), engendered a mass migration of Chinese overseas during the last half of the nineteenth century. It would be this mass migration which saw the first large scale movement of Chinese into Africa.

### 3.5 The Nineteenth Century Chinese migrations

The massive migration of Chinese which ensued during the nineteenth century was to have a dramatic effect on numerous regions. Although Chinese migration to surrounding parts of Asia had been ongoing on a large scale since the eighteenth century, the massive movement of Chinese outside of Asia was to be a new development following the Peking Convention of 1860.<sup>291</sup> Large Chinese Overseas communities began to form in Asian regions surrounding China, within European colonies and the Americas.<sup>292</sup> Between 1869 and 1911 more than 6 000 000 Chinese would emigrate out of the Qing Dynasty abroad.<sup>293</sup>

This mass migration itself built upon the smaller migrations which had preceded it, prior to the Qing Dynasty’s change in policy.<sup>294</sup> Most of the Chinese who moved abroad in this time came from southern China, specifically from what are the modern-day provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.<sup>295</sup> Migratory labour within these regions became an integral part of the economic

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<sup>290</sup> G. Petersen: *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, p. 29.

<sup>291</sup> Y. C. Hoe: *Guangdong and the Chinese Diaspora: the changing landscape of Qiaoxiang*, p. 70.

<sup>292</sup> Y. C. Hoe: *Guangdong and the Chinese Diaspora: the changing landscape of Qiaoxiang*, p. 70.

<sup>293</sup> K. Sugihara: *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949*, p. 245.

<sup>294</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 92.

<sup>295</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 72.

system for numerous families, who depended on the remittances of relatives working overseas to survive. It became expected, during this period, for male members of a family to spend at least some time abroad doing work.<sup>296</sup> Guangdong in particular served as a massive source of Chinese outmigration, with almost half of all Chinese traveling abroad in this period hailing from that region.<sup>297</sup> Southern China had historically proven to be a source of Chinese outmigration and their ability to do so in the new climate was enhanced by their coastal nature and the fact that most of the European treaty ports, from which Chinese indentured labourers were taken abroad, were within southern China.<sup>298</sup>

These Chinese migrants also began a system of what is referred to as ‘chain migration’, in which the initial Chinese who travelled abroad facilitated the arrival of later migrants, typically members of their extended family. In this way it increased the ease with which new Chinese migrants could enter an area.<sup>299</sup> Philip Kuhn has argued that this phenomena of Chinese migration is best understood within the context of China’s historical expansion, that its migratory patterns overseas have some resemblance to its centuries long expansion via migration over land.<sup>300</sup> Although Chinese communities within neighbouring Asia were longstanding, this period saw the emergence of distinct Chinese communities within European colonial states.<sup>301</sup> This was due to the demand for labour within these colonial holdings, demand which created opportunities for employment for the Chinese migrants.<sup>302</sup> Of importance to this study’s ultimate purpose is the fact that migration during this period was rarely a private endeavour undertaken by individual Chinese. Rather, it was usually the result of contractual agreements between state or provincial-level governments within the Qing Dynasty with representatives of European governments or corporate interests. The result of this was that mineral-rich colonial holdings, such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa saw an influx of Chinese migrants to serve as labour.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 93.

<sup>297</sup> L. Pan: *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, p. 36.

<sup>298</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 73.

<sup>299</sup> Y. Zi: “China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>300</sup> P. Kuhn: “The Ancestral Land: Thinking about the History of the Chinese Overseas,” *The Morrison Lecture*, Australian National University, pp 3-6.

<sup>301</sup> P. Richardson: “The recruiting of Chinese indentured labour for the South African gold mines, 1903-1908,” *The Journal of African History*, 18, (1), 1977, p. 1.

<sup>302</sup> P. Richardson: “The recruiting of Chinese indentured labour for the South African gold mines, 1903-1908,” *The Journal of African History*, 18, (1), 1977, p. 1.

<sup>303</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 73.

Four crucial factors can be identified as helping to drive this period of Chinese mass migration. The first factor is the most obvious one, the Peking Convention of 1860, and the Dynasty's own softening stance following it. This removed the legal barriers and threats to migration making it easier for Chinese to move abroad. The remaining three factors were: the demand for unskilled labour by Western colonial powers; the revolution in world transportation technology; and the increasing economic and social difficulties which were afflicting the Dynasty at the time, incentivising many Chinese to seek better opportunities, and stability, abroad.<sup>304</sup>

The Western demand for large numbers of unskilled labourers, who would typically be paid very little, was a result of the changing economic realities of the nineteenth century. By this point slavery had, largely, been abolished by all the major colonial empires, removing easy access to cheap, unskilled, labour for exploitation.<sup>305</sup> However, demand for such labour was increasing, with Western colonial powers having uncovered untapped mineral resources in multiple colonies. For example, and states such as Canada and the United States discovered mineral reserves they sought to exploit and not long after so did Australia and South Africa. Successful, or perhaps one should rather say profitable, extraction and exploitation of these mineral reserves would require masses of unskilled cheaply labourers.<sup>306</sup> The use of Chinese indentured labour was one solution to this problem colonial states sought to exploit.

The nineteenth century also saw the emergence of new transportation networks, most critically railways, and construction programs for plantations and telegrams, all of which once again required a large body of labour.<sup>307</sup> As states are always prone to do, they sought to achieve this necessary labour demand with as little cost to themselves as they could. Thus, Western states turned to the prospect of making use of Chinese labour. The population of China was more than large enough to suit their demands, and, at the time, most Western states had a pervasive perception of Chinese as individuals who would work very hard for relatively little remuneration in turn. It was a common belief, at the time, that Chinese made for the most

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<sup>304</sup> P. Richardson: "Coolies, Peasants and Proletarians: The origins of Chinese labourers in the South African gold mines, 1904-1907", *Southern African research in progress, Collected papers*, (3), 1978, p. 82.

<sup>305</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 88-89.

<sup>306</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 88-89.

<sup>307</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 93.



effective, or at least most controllable, labour force.<sup>308</sup> To not leave any ambiguity concerning the reality, though not technically slavery in name, many of the Chinese migrants in this period were treated effectively as slave labour.<sup>309</sup> They were typically indentured labourers, restricted from moving freely, restricted from seeking employment elsewhere and often only received payment at the end of their entire contractual period. It was not uncommon for said payments to never arrive, as costs for things like gambling and transportation were deducted and often left the Chinese migrants with no remuneration or forced them to remain trapped in their contracts for longer periods of time.<sup>310</sup>

It should not come as a surprise to anyone that these Chinese migrants were, in general, treated poorly, exploited and victims of discrimination and repression. A clear example of the way the Chinese labourers were simply used in lieu of old slave labour can be found in Peru, where the industry of guano farming had previously been primarily a slave industry, but now was supplanted by a Chinese migrant workforce. The harvesting of this guano was an exceedingly dangerous activity, involving dangling precipitously over cliffsides to collect the product. When slavery was abolished within Peru in 1854 the harvesting of this guano fell largely onto the shoulders of incoming Chinese migrant labourers, with all the dangers that entailed, as they largely took the place, and role, of the slaves in this enterprise.<sup>311</sup>

Due to these reasons Chinese immigration represented a distinct economic asset from the perspective of the European colonial states.<sup>312</sup> Considering that the treaties regulating the outcome of the two Opium Wars specifically established systems for permitting European powers to import Chinese labour in mass it is a rather clear observation that the European powers were motivated, at least in part, by this desire for access to Chinese labour.<sup>313</sup> The 1839 Indian Act, which curtailed recruitment from the Indian subcontinent, as well as the stereotype among Westerners that Chinese were an effective workforce, also contributed to this.<sup>314</sup> The use of Chinese labour in South East Asian colonies had left a lasting impression on the Western

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<sup>308</sup> L. Pan: *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora*, p. 26.

<sup>309</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 93.

<sup>310</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 93.

<sup>311</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 93.

<sup>312</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 88-89.

<sup>313</sup> K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): "Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese," *Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 88-89.

<sup>314</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, p. 137.

powers, who considered the Chinese to be an effective and cheap workforce.<sup>315</sup> Hence other Western powers were quick to swoop in and follow in Britain's wake, formalizing their own arrangements with the Dynasty to allow for the importation of Chinese labour.<sup>316</sup> Ultimately, to the Western powers the population of China was an economic asset, a labour force for a series of states searching for cheap exploitable labour. The Western states thus contributed to this mass migration, both through coercion and treaties applying pressure to the Dynasty, and also through the direct offer of financial incentives to Chinese migrants to motivate them to travel abroad.<sup>317</sup>

However, had transportation technology not rapidly advanced in the nineteenth century the degree of mass migration which China witnessed would still not have been possible. Railways, steamships and other similar, dependable, methods for large groups to travel great distances in good time were crucial to enabling the Chinese mass migration to travel as far as it did around the world.<sup>318</sup> Railways played a particularly important role due to their ability to provide infrastructure support and connect urban areas. The construction of more railways also required a similarly unskilled, cheap, labour force and, once again, many Western states turned to Chinese migrants to fulfil this function for them.<sup>319</sup> Across European and other Western states, from North America to the Trans-Siberian railway and the Panama Canal, Chinese migrant labour played an important role in the construction of Western infrastructure.<sup>320</sup>

But the role played by Western coercion and technological development was not the only cause of Chinese mass migration. As indicated already, internal economic and social difficulties within China also played a role in this period of mass migration. The nineteenth century saw the Qing Dynasty facing both external challenges to its power and internal ones as well. Following integration into the Western global economic system, somewhat forcibly, the Dynasty's economy suffered greatly and, soon, was dependent upon Western states for its own finances.<sup>321</sup> This left the Dynasty unable to maintain or improve infrastructure internally, and the Chinese citizenry suffered due to this economic decline.<sup>322</sup> Northern China in particular

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<sup>315</sup> K. L. Harris: *A history of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, p. 69.

<sup>316</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, p. 127.

<sup>317</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, pp 137-138.

<sup>318</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 98.

<sup>319</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 98.

<sup>320</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 98.

<sup>321</sup> E. X. Li & P. S. Li: *From Cold War to Open Door: The making of the Chinese community in Canada, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 59-60.

<sup>322</sup> P. Richardson: *Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal*, pp 109-110.

saw difficulties as measures previously used to deal with flooding and droughts fell into disrepair and numerous northern Chinese peasants fell victim to increasingly severe famines.<sup>323</sup> Between 1876 and 1879 these famines killed more than 9 000 000 Chinese.<sup>324</sup> The fact that the Dynasty had experienced a relative population spike early in the nineteenth century, growing from about 150 000 000 in the seventeenth century to over 400 000 000 by the mid-eighteenth century, only worsened the consequences of these famines.<sup>325</sup>

In addition, as should already be clear, the nineteenth century saw the Dynasty fall victim to multiple military invasions. In addition, their military defeats against both the European powers and Japan, the Qing Dynasty was forced to cede increasing amounts of territory to foreign powers.<sup>326</sup> Taiwan, Macau, Stonecutter's Isle, Hong Kong, Kowloon and Inner Manchuria were all ceded to European powers throughout the nineteenth century, and China's role as the dominant power within Korea was usurped following their defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895).<sup>327</sup> The Dynasty was forced to cede Kowloon to the British and, at the same time, the Russian Empire took advantage of the Qing Dynasty's weakness to negotiate control of much of Manchuria for itself.<sup>328</sup> Qing hegemonic dominance came to a definitive end with the Dynasty's defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.<sup>329</sup> The war, and the Qing's defeat, was the first time in history that regional predominance within South East Asia moved from China to another state.<sup>330</sup>

Further disruptions plagued the Qing as the increasingly dire economic situation, coupled with the Qing's loss of authority, saw numerous uprisings, such as the Boxer Rebellion of 1899, which continued to degrade the stability and power of the Dynasty's government.<sup>331</sup> This disintegrating political control and stability saw certain of the outlying regions of the Dynasty's empire effectively become independent from its control, as it lacked the means by which to compel them anymore.<sup>332</sup> As more and more differing power groups emerged within the disintegrating political cohesion of the Dynasty, forming distinct fiefdoms for themselves,

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<sup>323</sup> P. Richardson: *Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal*, pp 110-111.

<sup>324</sup> P. Richardson: *Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal*, p. 111.

<sup>325</sup> J.D. Spence: *The Chinese roundabout: Essays in history and culture*, p. 168

<sup>326</sup> E. X. Li & P. S. Li: *From Cold War to Open Door: The making of the Chinese community in Canada, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 58-59.

<sup>327</sup> E. X. Li & P. S. Li: *From Cold War to Open Door: The making of the Chinese community in Canada, China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, pp 58-59.

<sup>328</sup> R. Nield: "Treaty Ports and other Foreign Stations in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 50, 2010, p. 126.

<sup>329</sup> S.C.M Paine: *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*, p. 3.

<sup>330</sup> S.C.M Paine: *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*, p. 3.

<sup>331</sup> P. Richardson: *Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal*, p. 110.

<sup>332</sup> D. Lary: *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia*, p. 94.

conflict increased as disparate factions sought to gain control. This cauldron of conflict certainly would be a powerful motivating factor as to why Chinese would have sought to travel abroad in this chaotic period.<sup>333</sup>

Thus, during the nineteenth century, migration represented for many Chinese a way to escape both chaos and crushing poverty. It was therefore not difficult for the numerous agencies canvassing to take Chinese labourers abroad to find the labourers they were searching for. In total, between 1850 and 1875, over 1 280 000 Chinese travelled abroad to become indentured labourers, with a further 750 000 following them between 1876 and 1900.<sup>334</sup> By the late nineteenth century popular destinations for these migrants were the United States of America, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. A commonality in all these states was the discovery of large reserves of mineral resources, with gold being the most prominent.<sup>335</sup>

### 3.6 Mass Migration of Chinese into Africa

The years 1904-1910 saw the peak of the mass migration of Chinese to Africa. The vast majority of these Chinese were labourers, of some sort or other, either independently seeking work in Africa or, far more commonly, contracted on behalf of European companies and nations.<sup>336</sup>

Due to their proximity to Southeast Asia the islands around Madagascar, in the West Indian Ocean, were some of the first parts of Africa to see immigration from China. In Mauritius, throughout the mid-nineteenth century, the British authorities made multiple attempts to employ Chinese indentured labour on the islands, sourcing over eight thousand Chinese labourers from locations such as Singapore and the Straits Settlements.<sup>337</sup> In addition to this, once free emigration became easier, numerous Chinese traders began to arrive in Mauritius seeking economic opportunities.<sup>338</sup> Similar to Mauritius Réunion was an island off the coast of Madagascar, and was occupied and controlled by French authorities. By 1829 the colonial authorities on the island made the decision to begin the importation of Asian immigrants, primarily for labour. Although most of the immigrants who would arrive on Réunion were

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<sup>333</sup> S. V. Conradie: "A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018, p 36.

<sup>334</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 49.

<sup>335</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, p. 49.

<sup>336</sup> P. Snow: *The Star Raft*, p. 55.

<sup>337</sup> P. C. Campbell: *Chinese coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire*, p. 338.

<sup>338</sup> H. Ly-Tio-Fane-Pineo: *Chinese Diaspora in Western Indian Ocean*, pp 61-62.

Indian, there were some Chinese among them as well. The Chinese were expressly identified along with Indians in a government order issued in 1831, regulating their contracts on the island.<sup>339</sup> By 1843 the French government of Réunion decided to bring in a further thousand indentured Chinese labourers, but a mere three years later they also abandoned this program.<sup>340</sup> The extensive efforts by the officials of Réunion to employ Chinese labourers, specifically from the Xiamen region of China, represented one of the earliest efforts by European powers to employ large bodies of Chinese labourers to meet their labour needs in their colonies.<sup>341</sup> On Madagascar itself, between 1901 and 1903, over three thousand Chinese were contracted by the French authorities to labour upon the island colony on infrastructure projects for them.<sup>342</sup>

In East Africa, in the German Tanganyika colony, some two-thousand Chinese were employed in 1898 to assist with the construction of the Tanga-Moshi railroad.<sup>343</sup> Of these several Chinese would remain behind, marrying local women. In French-West Africa Chinese labourers were employed in large numbers in both 1885 and 1899, to work on the Dakar-Saint Louis railroad and Kankan-Conakry railroad.<sup>344</sup> The high fatality rate among the Chinese labourers during both of these experiments, however, motivated the French authorities in Senegal to abandon further use of Chinese labour.<sup>345</sup> Chinese miners would be recruited to work in the Belgian Congo Free State between 1901 and 1906, the result of an official governmental agreement between the Qing Dynasty and Belgian government signed in 1898.<sup>346</sup> However, as mentioned, it was South Africa which would see the largest influx of Chinese migrants at the turn of the nineteenth century into the twentieth.

At the beginning of the twentieth century British South Africa would stand to become the part of Africa with the largest Chinese population. Within the Cape since the late seventeenth century, a very small community of free Chinese already existed, but between 1901 and 1910 the largest importation of Chinese indentured labour to Africa was undertaken by South Africa at the behest of British authorities.<sup>347</sup> Over the course of this labour experiment over 64 000

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<sup>339</sup> H. Ly-Tio-Fane-Pineo: *Chinese Diaspora in Western Indian Ocean*, pp 171-172; L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 56-59.

<sup>340</sup> E. Wong-Hee-Kam: *La Diaspora Chinoise aux Mascareignes: Le Cas de Réunion*, p. 8; H. Ly-Tio-Fane-Pineo: *Chinese Diaspora in Western Indian Ocean*, pp 129-139.

<sup>341</sup> C. Hansheng: "History of Chinese Labour recruitment in Africa by British, French, Belgium, Portuguese, Spanish and German colonies," *A Compilation of Historical Documents*, Vol 9, p. 263.

<sup>342</sup> C. Hansheng: "History of Chinese Labour recruitment in Africa by British, French, Belgium, Portuguese, Spanish and German colonies," *A Compilation of Historical Documents*, Vol 9, pp 174-177.

<sup>343</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 50-54.

<sup>344</sup> *Wai Jiao Bao*, 173, 27 April 1907.

<sup>345</sup> *Wai Jiao Bao*, 173, 27 April 1907.

<sup>346</sup> D. Leong Man & M. Yap: *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 194.

<sup>347</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 94-95.

Chinese indentured labourers were imported to, and employed, in the gold mines in the Witwatersrand area.<sup>348</sup>

The trend demonstrated above would hold true for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Chinese migration into Africa was, largely, the result of colonial powers seeking to employ large bodies of cheap, disposable, labour, and after the Opium War opened China up it became the prime candidate for these practises. It is important to note that despite the large numbers involved in these indentured labour experiments, very few remained in Africa. At the end of their contracts these labourers were almost always forcibly, if they did not willingly, sent back to China. Thus, the overseas Chinese communities which emerged in Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth century do not largely descend from these indentured labourers. Rather, more commonly, they were descended from the far smaller groups of Chinese traders who independently immigrated into Africa during this mass migration period.<sup>349</sup> As a result, even though during the nineteenth and twentieth century it is clear that migration began to occur between China and Africa, noticeable and large overseas communities of Chinese within Africa have their roots in a more modern period of migration.

### **3.7 Modern Chinese Migration into Africa**

Modern Chinese migration to Africa largely commences midway through the twentieth century, at the initiative of the People's Republic of China and, to a lesser extent, the Republic of China on Taiwan.<sup>350</sup> By the 1950s, both were involved in fostering closer ties with different African states (often undergoing independence struggles) in pursuit of both economic and political goals. The pursuit of these goals saw large numbers of Chinese once more entering Africa, typically as labour forces, such as in the case of the 50 000 Chinese workers who assisted in the construction of the TAZARA railway, linking landlocked Zambia to the coast of Tanzania. This allowed Zambia to trade without dependence on neighbouring South Africa or Rhodesia, both at the time ruled by minority European governments.<sup>351</sup> Similarly, Taiwan courted apartheid South Africa, a fellow pariah state, during the 1970s with a series of trade relations and the establishment of businesses.<sup>352</sup> Taiwan would also be one of the primary

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<sup>348</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 94-95.

<sup>349</sup> L. Anshan: *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911*, pp 30-34.

<sup>350</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," *China in Africa Project*, 24, January 2009, p. 2.

<sup>351</sup> J. Monson: "Africa's Freedom Railway: how a Chinese development project changed lives and livelihoods in Tanzania," *Boston Review*, December 2004.

<sup>352</sup> J. Pickles & J. Woods: "Taiwanese Investment in South Africa," *African Affairs*, 88, (353), October 1989, p. 115.



investors in the internationally unrecognized South African homelands, or Bantustans.<sup>353</sup> However, much like the indentured Chinese labourers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, most of these Chinese labourers would return home when their contracts expired, and did not become permanent migrant communities in Africa.

The origins of the contemporary Chinese migrant communities in Africa are instead more accurately traced to the liberalization of emigration policy, and economic policy, undertaken by the PRC between the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>354</sup> Following this period, Africa saw an increased flow of Chinese to the continent. Part of this was due to the wide range of projects instituted by the governments of both the PRC and Taiwan within Africa, but there was also an increasing number of Chinese private citizens moving abroad to Africa as well, typically in pursuit of work.<sup>355</sup> The modern day migrant communities of Chinese within much of Africa, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and more, can largely be traced to the Chinese migrants stemming from this period onwards. They were drawn to Africa primarily in search of economic opportunity.<sup>356</sup> Between 1970 and 1990 Taiwanese migrants played a large role in much of the migrant Chinese communities of southern Africa, particularly establishing factories and businesses in South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini.<sup>357</sup> The descendants of these Taiwanese communities still form part of the Chinese migrant communities in southern Africa today. But, from 1990 onwards, as the PRC changed its economic and political policy to the outside world considerably, southern African would see an influx of Chinese migrants from the mainland beginning to supplant the Taiwanese migrant communities as the most populous communities of Chinese in Africa.<sup>358</sup>

Unlike the large migrant indentured labourer communities of before, who predominantly were employed by third parties to operate on specific infrastructure, agricultural or industrial projects within African states, modern Chinese migrant communities frequently established their own

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<sup>353</sup> J. Pickles & J. Woods: "Taiwanese Investment in South Africa," *African Affairs*, 88, (353), October 1989, p. 115.

<sup>354</sup> B. Xiang: "Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective," *International Migration*, 41, (3), 2003, pp 21-48.

<sup>355</sup> B. Sautman: "Friends and Interests: China's distinctive links with Africa," *Centre on China's Transnational relations*, Working Paper no. 12, 2006, pp 21-22.

<sup>356</sup> B. Sautman: "Friends and Interests: China's distinctive links with Africa," *Centre on China's Transnational relations*, Working Paper no. 12, 2006, pp 21-22.

<sup>357</sup> M. Politzer: "China and Africa: Stronger economic ties means more migration," *Migration Policy Institute*, 6 August 2008, p. 4.

<sup>358</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," China in Africa Project, 24, January 2009, pp 6-7.

businesses, entering into retail or wholesale of Chinese goods, traditional medicine and restaurants.<sup>359</sup>

The contemporary Chinese period of migration to Africa has seen more Chinese arrive in, and remain in, Africa than ever before in history. Though it is difficult to construct an accurate picture for the exact numbers of Chinese living in Africa, a rough estimate lies anywhere between 580 000 to 800 000, with the majority focused in South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola and Madagascar.<sup>360</sup> Traditionally the vast majority of Chinese migrants came from three specific regions of China: Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian. All three regions continue to play an important role in Chinese migration, with Fujian particularly being well-known for its overseas trader communities.<sup>361</sup> But, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, due to internal economic factors, more and more Chinese migrants have been originating from established urban centres such as Beijing and Shanghai.<sup>362</sup>

As more and more Chinese have immigrated to African states to establish their own businesses there has been an increase in the use of informal social networks of friends and families to facilitate movement (chain migration).<sup>363</sup> Because an increasing amount of the Chinese migrants in Africa are not government employees, or operating on contracts arranged by their government, they cannot rely as heavily as earlier Chinese migrants did on the Chinese government to arrange their transportation or lodging with the host governments. This has increased the importance of networking between the Chinese already established in African polities with Chinese from the mainland, or Taiwan, seeking to enter Africa.<sup>364</sup>

The modern Chinese migrant communities in Africa can then be divided into two broad categories. The first of these categories is a familiar one, a continuation of the Chinese migrant labour brought to Africa by Western powers in the nineteenth century. These are large bodies of Chinese labourers and workers who typically only reside in Africa until their work contracts expire.<sup>365</sup> Contrary to the mass migration during the Qing Dynasty, these Chinese labourers are

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<sup>359</sup> H. Haugen & J. Carling: "How an African outpost is filled with Chinese shops," *Unpublished paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas*, Denmark, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>360</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," *China in Africa Project*, 24, January 2009, pp 4-5.

<sup>361</sup> H. Haugen & J. Carling: "How an African outpost is filled with Chinese shops," *Unpublished paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas*, Denmark, 2004, p. 14.

<sup>362</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," *China in Africa Project*, 24, January 2009, pp 6-7.

<sup>363</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," *China in Africa Project*, 24, January 2009, pp 6-7.

<sup>364</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," *China in Africa Project*, 24, January 2009, pp 6-7.

<sup>365</sup> M. Politzer: "China and Africa: Stronger economic ties means more migration," *Migration Policy Institute*, 6 August 2008, p. 4.

now mostly employed in Africa by Chinese firms and companies, both from Taiwan and from mainland China, as opposed to European ones. It should be noted that though most of these migrant labourers do return to China, increasingly the managerial and professional class of migrants employed in China's numerous infrastructure projects in Africa, often remain behind even once their contracts expire, establishing themselves as independent migrants within Africa.<sup>366</sup>

The second category of Chinese migrants are independent migrants, entering not due to government projects, but at their own behest. These, often, are Chinese who have struggled to find employment in China or believe they can make more profit in Africa.<sup>367</sup> This belief is not without reason. Wages or income in Africa can be anywhere from 30 to 400 times higher than in China, representing a clear financial incentive.<sup>368</sup> These traders typically establish their own private small businesses, often joining the retail or wholesale industry. These private businesses often generate a demand for further labour, as they grow and expand. For a number of reasons Chinese retailers will tend to then recruit other Chinese as employees, and this in turn brings more Chinese migrants into Africa, as friends and family will often move overseas to gain employment in a relative's store in Africa.<sup>369</sup> These then forms what is referred to as "kinship networks", as related groups of Chinese create migration chains, bringing more Chinese migrants to parts of Africa they are already settled in.<sup>370</sup> These kinship networks also entrench the manner by which Chinese migrant communities are often distinctly associated with specific Chinese regions or subgroups, because often the Chinese migrants of a particular part of Africa will have largely arrived from the same province, moving over due to family connections. A clear example of this will be explored later in the way the contemporary Chinese migrant population of Lesotho is almost exclusively now composed of Chinese from the Fujian region.

Although the greater majority of the Chinese population in Africa consists of individuals who will, at a point, return to China, the fact remains that from the 1990s onwards the community of permanent Chinese migrants in Africa has grown considerably. The clearest case of this

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<sup>366</sup> Y.J. Park: "Chinese Migration in Africa," China in Africa Project, 24, January 2009, p. 8.

<sup>367</sup> H. Haugen & J. Carling: "How an African outpost is filled with Chinese shops," *Unpublished paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas*, Denmark, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>368</sup> C. Burke & L. Corkin: *China's interest and activity in Africa's construction and infrastructure sectors*, Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese studies, p. 81.

<sup>369</sup> M. Mung: "Chinese Migration and China's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 4, (1), 2008, p. 101.

<sup>370</sup> A.Y. Chen & Y.J. Park: "Race, Class and Power: Chinese in the Free State," unpublished paper presented at the South African Sociological Association conference, Stellenbosch, June 2008.

remains South Africa, the African state with the largest Chinese migrant population. South Africa now has a community of approximately 20 000 Chinese who are citizens of South Africa, and can be explicitly described as South African, not simply Chinese migrants in South Africa. In other parts of Africa, such as Madagascar, Nigeria, Lesotho, Ghana and more, Chinese who can be classified as settling into Africa as their new home are beginning to be documented in larger numbers. The migration of Chinese in Africa seems, at present, set to only increase in the near future. Currently, however, the majority of Chinese migrants in Africa are confined largely to southern Africa, with their numbers throughout the rest of the continent being marginal at best.

## Chapter 4: A Political Background of Lesotho – Chinese Relations

### 4.1 Introduction

The history of the Chinese in southern Africa begins relatively contemporaneously with the arrival of the initial European settlers to the region.<sup>371</sup> The Dutch who first established a post on the Cape brought with them Chinese, usually prisoners or debtors, to work as labourers and slaves at the fledgling colony.<sup>372</sup> For much of southern Africa, Chinese individuals were present in the region long before any contact was established or made with a Chinese government or regime. This stemmed from the fact that the initial presence of Chinese in southern Africa was almost always the result of European powers importing the Chinese as some form of labour. The Chinese government of the time, the Qing Dynasty, would only begin any sort of interaction with the polities in southern Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. As a result, it can be comfortably stated that in most of southern Africa the history of Chinese predates any history of Chinese governmental relations.

However, this is not the case with Lesotho. There is no evidence which exists of any Chinese presence in Lesotho prior to the establishment of relations between the Mountain Kingdom and the ROC.<sup>373</sup> The establishment of relations with Taiwan in the 1960s directly led to the arrival of the first known group of Chinese to ever enter Lesotho.<sup>374</sup> It becomes evident that though some small initial group came over as part of government initiatives, the vast majority moved to Lesotho seeking out their own, private, opportunities to enrich themselves.<sup>375</sup>

An examination of the history of the official relations between Lesotho and the respective governments does yield important context for the migration of Chinese into Lesotho. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the history of governmental relations between Lesotho and China, particularly focusing on how these relations affected Chinese migration into Lesotho.

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<sup>371</sup> K. L. Harris: *A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*, University of South Africa, p. 82.

<sup>372</sup> K. L. Harris: *The Chinese in the early Cape Colony: A significant cultural minority*, University of Pretoria, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>373</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012.

<sup>374</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008.

<sup>375</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*.

The first section of the chapter focuses on the context in which Lesotho made its initial decision to recognize Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. To this end the section focuses on Lesotho's status as a newly independent country, its desperate economic situation as well as the general situation between Taiwan and the PRC during the 1960s, when the two states competed for recognition among newly independent African states. This chapter also focuses on the history of Taiwan's governmental relations with Lesotho. It details the transactional nature of the initial Taiwanese support for Lesotho as well as its financial support. It also places Lesotho's relationship with Taiwan within the context of Lesotho's existing relationship with the apartheid government in South Africa at the time.

The second sub-section of the chapter then focuses on the deteriorating relationship between Lesotho and Taiwan from the 1980s onwards. It focuses on the growing public discontent which formed against Lesotho's government. It shows how this played a role in shifting Lesotho's previously firm support for Taiwan. This section details how Lesotho began to reach out to the PRC, initially attempting to deal with both Taiwan and the PRC simultaneously, before following the lead of most other states in the 1980s and swapping their recognition of Taiwan to the PRC instead. This section also deals with the 1986 military coup in Lesotho and the period when the military government chose to reinstate relations with Taiwan.

The third sub-section of the chapter deals with the restoration of relations between Lesotho and the PRC and the history of their engagement until 2020. This chapter focuses on the PRC's economic support, and involvement, with the government of Lesotho. It also deals with the increasing medical and policing cooperation between the two states, as well as the emergence of a popular backlash among the local population against the perceived influence of the PRC government in Lesotho. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection.

## **4.2 Lesotho-Taiwan Relations**

The earliest point of state-level contacts between Lesotho and Taiwan date to the 1960s, making it the obvious genesis for any discussions of Lesotho's governmental relations with Taiwan. As a protectorate (1884 – 1966), and then later mandate under the authority of the British Empire, Lesotho had been known for much of its existence as Basutoland. It only adopted the name Lesotho upon achieving its independence in 1966, following a general



election in 1965.<sup>376</sup> The Basutoland National Party (BNP) won a marginal victory in these elections, although it would largely side-line the other involved parties in the formation of the 1966 government, initially effectively governing as a one-party state.<sup>377</sup>

At the time, both the PRC and Taiwan claimed the position of sole legitimate representative of a single, unitary, country of China. As a result, most countries were largely forced to support one over the other, as recognition of either the PRC or Taiwan generally meant that the other party was unwilling to continue to do official business. The PRC and Taiwan had been involved in a conflict of sorts largely since the inception of their respective governments, in 1949. Though the actual military aspect of this conflict is long ended, with the decisive victory of the communist government on mainland China, political tension and struggle continued between the two states throughout the Cold War and into the present. Jockeying for recognition internationally, both states have sought to appeal to other countries and state actors and utilized differing means at their disposal to advance their respective interests. For Taiwan, a particular tool in their geopolitical arsenal was their own developed economy and general affluence, which they leveraged in diplomatic relations when seeking to secure friends against the PRC. Lesotho, following its independence, would be counted among those friends for almost thirty years.

For Lesotho, the choice of which of these two governments to align itself with was heavily weighted in favour of Taiwan from the very start. This primarily stemmed from the fact that, although it was now a sovereign nation, recognized as such by the world at large, Lesotho was still almost completely dependent economically on South Africa. The small, land-locked, state relied on South Africa to provide a great deal of its goods as well as providing critical employment opportunities for its population.<sup>378</sup> This economic dependence inevitably grew a political dependence, of sorts as well, in which Lesotho was curtailed in choice of its political options by those which would not disrupt its vital economic relations with South Africa.<sup>379</sup>

One key example of this was Lesotho's 1966 decision to recognize Taiwan in favour of the PRC, following the example of South Africa.<sup>380</sup> The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs for

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<sup>376</sup> F. K. Makoa: "Lesotho," *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 12 (1), p. 62.

<sup>377</sup> F. K. Makoa: "Lesotho," *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 12 (1), p. 62.

<sup>378</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 84.

<sup>379</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 286.

<sup>380</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 84.

Taiwan was present at Lesotho's independence ceremony and Lesotho's first Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan, made a visit to Taiwan exceedingly early on into his career.<sup>381</sup> Of course, Taiwan's own active efforts to court international recognition among newly independent states also played a role in this. The ROC was active in the use of financial aid and development programs to try to court friends among newly independent states, Lesotho being one such example.<sup>382</sup>

Despite the fact that Lesotho had recognized Taiwan as the 'official' China, at the time the PRC maintained a relatively muted reaction. In part this was almost certainly due to the fact that Lesotho was considered of little geopolitical significance and, also, most likely reflected an awareness within the PRC's government that Lesotho had little realistic option, at the time, to differ from South Africa on this issue. With the Cold War in full swing during the 1960s apartheid South Africa still received a great deal of support from Western states, making any decision to dramatically diverge from South Africa's foreign policy by Lesotho likely to incur disastrous economic and political repercussions.<sup>383</sup> Instead, the PRC restricted itself mostly to just issuing critiques of the state-to-state relationship between South Africa and Lesotho, whilst maintaining cordial official relations with Lesotho, rarely critiquing the small country.<sup>384</sup>

The core context of Taiwan's diplomatic relations with Lesotho during the 1970s, 80s and 90s lies in the question of state recognition. For most of the Cold War both Taiwan and the PRC each claimed a status as the sole, legitimate, representative government of a unitary China, effectively each claiming to also actually be the representative of the other on the global stage.<sup>385</sup> As a result, other countries were largely forced to choose between one or the other in terms of official diplomatic and political relations. Generally recognizing the one would mean the other automatically terminated any official relationships with the offending state. Initially Taiwan's government, the Republic of China or ROC, was recognized as the sole government of a unitary China by a significant number of states. However, by the 1990s, and in the present, this position was largely reversed, with the PRC being far more widely recognized than

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<sup>381</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Twenty-First Year Meeting*, 1966, p. 8.

<sup>382</sup> F. K. Makoa: "Lesotho," *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 12 (1), p. 62.

<sup>383</sup> T. Thabane: 'Lesotho, an island country: the problems of being land-locked,' *African Review*, Volume 4, (2), p. 286.

<sup>384</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

<sup>385</sup> T. Rich: "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies*, 45:4, p. 160.

Taiwan's own government.<sup>386</sup> Back in the 1970s, however, Taiwan competed fiercely for recognition with the PRC. In particular, it sought to hold onto its one clear advantage over the PRC: holding the permanent UN Security Council Seat for China rather than the PRC.<sup>387</sup> But Taiwan was at a natural disadvantage considering its small size relative to the PRC, which clearly possessed the majority of the Chinese population by a vast margin. In the context of this, Taiwan employed a form of diplomacy which has gone under multiple different names, from: "cheque book diplomacy" to "dollar diplomacy", as well as "aid diplomacy". The underlying conceit of this was a form of diplomacy fundamentally connected to economic or developmental assistance.<sup>388</sup>

The concept of such cheque book diplomacy is, at its core, a simple one.<sup>389</sup> Taiwan sought recognition on the international stage as the legitimate government of China, or, at the very least, for states to adhere to a concept of there being one hypothetical unitary China, but tolerating two different governmental systems within it, that of the PRC and Taiwan.<sup>390</sup> Taiwan leveraged its relative affluence and economic success to, effectively, offer financial incentive for states to recognize it.<sup>391</sup> This form of diplomacy was also commonly called aid diplomacy, often operating as Taiwan sending direct foreign aid, or specialist teams to assist in different programmes.<sup>392</sup> In many ways, this diplomacy took the form of Taiwanese aid to impoverished or small states in exchange for their commitment to recognizing and supporting Taiwan politically on the international stage. This was particularly appealing and successful when dealing with underdeveloped, recently independent, states in Africa and also when dealing with isolated micro-island states like Tuvalu.<sup>393</sup> It is worth bearing in mind that this concept is in no way something unique to Taiwan, or new to global politics - the core concept is an incredibly obvious one which goes back as far as diplomacy itself. When used in reference to Taiwan the primary function is drawing attention to the fact that Taiwan, during the Cold War, actively

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<sup>386</sup> T. Rich: "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies*, 45:4, p. 160.

<sup>387</sup> J. Pickles & J. Woods: "Taiwanese Investment in South Africa," *African Affairs*, 88:353, 1989, p. 511.

<sup>388</sup> T. Rich: "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies*, 45:4, p. 160.

<sup>389</sup> Qingmin, Z: "Foreign Aid Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 16, (2-3), 29 Mar 2021, p 18.

<sup>390</sup> Qingmin, Z: "Foreign Aid Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 16, (2-3), 29 Mar 2021, p 18.

<sup>391</sup> Qingmin, Z: "Foreign Aid Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 16, (2-3), 29 Mar 2021, p 21.

<sup>392</sup> Qingmin, Z: "Foreign Aid Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 16, (2-3), 29 Mar 2021, p 21.

<sup>393</sup> T. Rich: "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies*, 45:4, p. 172.

pursued this program of diplomacy on a global scale. It consistently sought out countries, generally impoverished and underdeveloped, or politically isolated, it could offer its wealth to in exchange for support in its political conflict with the PRC. For a time, this programme did pay dividends for Taiwan's prestige, but it was ultimately to be short-lived. Particularly following 1979, after the USA's own recognition of the PRC, it became increasingly difficult for Taiwan to find allies.

However, during the Cold War, Taiwan found one particularly staunch ally on the African continent: The South African apartheid government.<sup>394</sup> Even well after Taiwan lost its seat at the UN and lost the unequivocal backing of many of its most powerful allies, the apartheid government in South Africa continued to recognize Taiwan over the PRC well into the 1990s. Both states were, to differing extents and for different reasons, engaged in a clash on the global stage for recognition and support from other governments in this period of time. By 1967 South Africa had established a consulate in Taipei and by 1975 a trade agreement between the two countries accorded Taiwan a "most favoured nation status".<sup>395</sup> In Taiwan's case, this was motivated by their dwindling influence next to the PRC, and for South Africa it was their increasing isolation on the international stage due to apartheid's own racist policies. Both South Africa and Taiwan, however, were staunchly anti-communist and, semi-pariahs, so they found common accord with each other through much of the latter half of the twentieth century. Indeed, during much of the Cold War period there was a strong understanding and diplomatic relationship between the three states of South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan.<sup>396</sup> All three states found themselves as allies of convenience and circumstance due to their differing degrees of isolation on the international stage and sharing a staunchly anti-communist stance. This alliance motivated Taiwan to invest rather heavily in South Africa's economy. With that investment, came migration, with up to 40 000 Taiwanese living in South Africa at the peak of their close relations.<sup>397</sup> This migration would be pertinent as, in time, a number of these Taiwanese migrants would relocate to Lesotho.

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<sup>394</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 29.

<sup>395</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 71.

<sup>396</sup> J. Morris: "Israel boosts its links with South Africa," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 Dec 1980.

<sup>397</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 29.

In addition, by 1988, there were over 120 Taiwanese owned factories in South Africa, and Taiwan had invested over 1.2 billion US dollars into trade relations with South Africa.<sup>398</sup> Many of these factories would, also, in time move to Lesotho when sanctions against the apartheid government made it economically unwise to continue to operate within their borders.<sup>399</sup> Initially these investments mostly took the form of wealthy Taiwanese opening businesses in South Africa, predominantly in the textile industry, taking advantage of generous incentives the apartheid government offered those willing to invest in the country.<sup>400</sup> The apartheid government also strongly supported Taiwan's investment, specifically, in township areas and homelands, outside the major urban European centres.<sup>401</sup> The warm relationships between Taiwan and South Africa prior to 1994 were also evident from the high level government meetings held between the two states throughout the 1980s.<sup>402</sup> As these Taiwanese became settled in South Africa, many becoming citizens of South Africa due to Taiwan's lax laws on dual citizenship, they were followed by further waves of independent, small-scale, Taiwanese migrants who would seek to establish a foothold as small retailers and traders in South Africa.<sup>403</sup> This support mostly stemmed from a desire to reduce the amount of Africans moving to, or around, predominantly European populated cities.<sup>404</sup> By opening factories nearer to African townships or rural settlements the Taiwanese investments helped to provide work in those areas, reducing the need for Africans to look for work elsewhere.<sup>405</sup> This strong connection with South Africa would help pave the way for similarly strong relations with Lesotho in the 1970s.

Having already established a close relation with South Africa, Taiwan's attention would then also follow to the so-called 'captive states' of South Africa, seeing a chance to gain further allies on the African continent by extending diplomatic relations to these states. Among these 'captive states' Taiwan would enter into negotiations with, and begin a close relationship with, was Lesotho, which as mentioned was nominally independent from South Africa, but

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<sup>398</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 71.

<sup>399</sup> Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 14.

<sup>400</sup> Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 14.

<sup>401</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 30.

<sup>402</sup> Anon: "Premier Sun, Botha speak of strengthening cooperation," *Taipei CNA in English*, 17 October 1980; Anon: "Taiwanese foreign minister arrives in South Africa," *Taipei CNA in English*, 28 May 1981.

<sup>403</sup> Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 14.

<sup>404</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 30.

<sup>405</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 30.

compelled by geopolitical realities to largely follow along with the foreign policy of its much, much, more powerful neighbour.

As indicated, Lesotho had only fully gained true independence for itself as a sovereign state in 1966. It was never colonised in the sense that its lands were occupied by European settlers, or at least the lands that it had remaining by the time it became a Protectorate of the British Empire in 1884 were never actively settled by Europeans. In 1868 King Moshoeshoe I of the Basotho Kingdom negotiated an annexation into the British Empire as a means to defend against the aggression of the nearby Republic under the Boers.<sup>406</sup> Successive conflicts and aggression by these neighbours had seen the Basotho consistently losing ground and arable land, forcing them into mountains and highlands. It was in an effort to secure protection from any further Boer encroachment on their remaining territory that King Moshoeshoe sought and agreed to British annexation.<sup>407</sup> In 1966 what had been Basutoland within the British Empire gained independence on the 4th of October as the newly independent, constitutional monarchy, of Lesotho. Almost immediately the small state faced enormous economic hardships. British rulership had done little for the country's economic development, turning it into a reservoir of cheap labour for neighbouring, larger, South Africa. These endemic economic issues saw Lesotho plagued with poverty.<sup>408</sup> More than almost any other state in southern Africa, Lesotho was dependent upon South Africa and, as a result, beholden to it politically to a certain extent.<sup>409</sup> The fact that during post-independence even as its role as a labour reserve for South African mines began to steeply decline - from 130 000 Basotho on the mines in 1970 to a mere 50 000 ten years later in 1980 - did not help matters at all.<sup>410</sup> As a result of these factors, foreign investment, and foreign aid, was actively pursued by Lesotho's post-independence government as a pillar or scaffold of the country's economy. This led, in turn, to Lesotho's openness to Taiwanese aid.

Thus, by 1968 a confluence of realpolitik would see Lesotho following South Africa in forging diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The factors influencing this decision can be divided into two broad categories. First, like Botswana and Swaziland (now Eswatini), Lesotho was effectively

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<sup>406</sup> K. Roberts-Wray: *Commonwealth and Colonial Law*, 1966, p. 830.

<sup>407</sup> K. Roberts-Wray: *Commonwealth and Colonial Law*, 1966, p. 830.

<sup>408</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 10.

<sup>409</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 83.

<sup>410</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, Ph.D. Dissertation, p. 10.



a “captive state” to the apartheid government in South Africa at the time.<sup>411</sup> “Captive state”, in this context, effectively meant that the military, political and economic predominance of apartheid South Africa forced the hands of these countries on matters of both external and internal politics and decision-making.<sup>412</sup> Even if, many of them, actually opposed on numerous levels the policies of the apartheid government, for the sake of their own sovereignty and survival they were forced, to an extent to accede to the demands and wishes of South Africa.<sup>413</sup> As is also always the case in such relations between powers the relationship was also not purely coercive. For some in power there were also economic advantages gained from supporting the most powerful regional player, even if that meant ignoring the rather obvious atrocities they were committing. But crucially, the coercive element should not be overlooked, which is why they came to be known as “captive states”.

The second factor in this confluence was Taiwan’s so-called “cheque book diplomacy” and Lesotho’s own need for economic development. Throughout the 1960s Taiwan courted African states through financial and developmental aid. Initially this proved successful, by 1969 22 of 53 separate African states recognized Taiwan, rather than the PRC, as the legitimate China.<sup>414</sup> This courting took the form of generous financial support, and Taiwan typically targeted newly independent and developing countries, such as those in Africa, or island nations within the South Pacific.<sup>415</sup> Indeed, island states like Tuvalu remain among the largest recipients of Taiwanese aid to date, and the relationship between this aid and their political support for Taiwan is not a contentions matter.<sup>416</sup> Taiwan was active in courting Lesotho early on, congratulating the country in 1966 on their declaration of independence officially, and as indicated, in a reciprocal gesture that same year Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho, visited Taiwan.<sup>417</sup> The purpose of this meeting was largely for Chief Jonathan to study Taiwanese proposals concerning technical development missions and projects they hoped to

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<sup>411</sup> I, Taylor: “The ‘captive states’ of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35:2, 2008, p. 75.

<sup>412</sup> I, Taylor: “The ‘captive states’ of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35:2, 2008, p. 75.

<sup>413</sup> I, Taylor: “The ‘captive states’ of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35:2, 2008, pp 75-76.

<sup>414</sup> S. Tseng: *The Republic of China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, pp 4-5.

<sup>415</sup> J. Marinaccio: “Rearticulating Diplomatic Relationships: Contextualizing Tuvalu – Taiwan Relations,” *The Contemporary Pacific*, 31, (2), pp 448-449.

<sup>416</sup> J. Marinaccio: “Rearticulating Diplomatic Relationships: Contextualizing Tuvalu – Taiwan Relations,” *The Contemporary Pacific*, 31, (2), pp 448-449; S. Salem: “Sino-Taiwan Chequebook Diplomacy in the Pacific,” *E-International Relations*, Sino-Taiwan Chequebook Diplomacy in the Pacific (e-ir.info), Accessed 22 June 2020.

<sup>417</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 39.

launch in Lesotho. In exchange for this assistance, Lesotho remained committed to politically supporting Taiwan over the PRC. In 1971, when the UN voted on whether or not to replace Taiwan with the PRC as the legitimate representative of China on the UN's Permanent Security Council, Lesotho was one of among sixteen African countries which voted in support of Taiwan.<sup>418</sup> Although the vote ended up going the PRC's way regardless, with some twenty-two African countries voting in support of them, it served as an indication of Lesotho's loyalty to Taiwan at the time.<sup>419</sup> In addition, for their loyalty, Taiwan signed a visa fees waiver agreement with Lesotho in 1974, continuing to demonstrate to Lesotho that so long as it could count on the Mountain Kingdom's support against the PRC in the political arena, Lesotho would receive financial aid and beneficial agreements.<sup>420</sup>

All this was a classic example of Taiwan's aid diplomacy with less affluent African states. Taiwan offered Lesotho financial and developmental aid in exchange for Lesotho's commitment to recognizing and supporting Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China. Between these two considerations, Lesotho went ahead and opted to forge a stronger relationship with Taiwan. Thus, we can conclude that for obvious pragmatic reasons, the initial policy of the BNP was relatively cooperative towards the apartheid government in South Africa, as well as Taiwan.<sup>421</sup> For the next two decades, from the 1960s until the 1980s, Taiwan would be one of Lesotho's most important political and economic partners. Up until 1974 Taiwan consistently provided financial aid and relief to Lesotho.<sup>422</sup> In addition, Taiwan also dispatched numerous infrastructure and agricultural development teams to Lesotho, intended to assist with the Mountain Kingdom's own efforts to strengthen their agriculture and infrastructure.<sup>423</sup>

Throughout Africa, during the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan's aid diplomacy saw teams of Taiwanese dispatched abroad, often forming migrant communities in the countries they were dispatched too. A particular focus of this form of diplomacy was on agricultural development.

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<sup>418</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 39.

<sup>419</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 39.

<sup>420</sup> L. Andor: *Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997*, p. 128.

<sup>421</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 84.

<sup>422</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 31.

<sup>423</sup> Anon: *Helping Lesotho's Agriculture*, Taiwan Panorama, Helping Lesotho's Agriculture - 台灣光華雜誌 (taiwanpanorama.com.tw), Accessed 4 October 2021.

Taiwan often sought to provide expert knowledge, and skilled workers, to establish projects in African states designed to provide better agricultural support to them.<sup>424</sup> These programs ranged from educating local African farmers on more sustainable agricultural practise, attempting to establish Taiwanese-style rice farms as a way to provide a stable source of food and also seeking to introduce into these African states different technologies and techniques to improve their agricultural sectors.<sup>425</sup> The focus of these projects were also wide, extending to forestry, fishery and even veterinary sciences.<sup>426</sup>

By 1974, however, most of these efforts began to wind down, and although Taiwan continued to be a strong provider of investment in Lesotho's economy, this now took the form of private investment. The 1980s would see a sudden influx of Taiwanese firms and companies, privately owned, without state involvement, relocating into Taiwan. By far the most prominent grouping of this wave of private investors were the Taiwanese textile companies, such as Nien Hsing, which still maintains an important role in Lesotho's economic sector.<sup>427</sup> For the most part, these firms were distinctly privately owned.<sup>428</sup> By the end of the official government-to-government relations between Taiwan and Lesotho, in the 1990s, these textile firms represented by far the largest investment and involvement of any Taiwanese in Lesotho. As a result, the lasting relationship between Taiwan and Lesotho was not a relationship built on state involvement or enterprises but, instead, built upon private investment and private involvement of Taiwanese citizens in Lesotho. As these are not state-level interactions they will be examined when dealing with the experiences of the Taiwanese in Lesotho in Chapter 5.

With regards to state interaction between Lesotho and Taiwan it can be asserted that there are no meaningful official-level contacts anymore. The large presence of Taiwanese in Lesotho's economic sectors requires the government's express involvement with Taiwanese individuals in Lesotho, but this does not involve any governmental interactions between Lesotho and Taiwan. On that matter, the history of Taiwanese-Lesotho governmental reactions has had few developments since Lesotho's 1994 decision to recognize and instate official government

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<sup>424</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 31.

<sup>425</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 31.

<sup>426</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 31.

<sup>427</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012.

<sup>428</sup> K. I. Pike & S. Godfrey: *Better Work Discussion Paper Series: No. 7, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Worker Stakeholder: Lesotho's Clothing Workers' Perceptions of What Makes Better Work*, p. 2.

relations with the PRC in favour of Taiwan. The cause and consequence of the collapse of Taiwanese and Lesotho state relations will be explained in the following section.

### 4.3 Deteriorating and Changing Relations

Political upheaval in Lesotho during the 1970s would presage the shift in attitude the Mountain Kingdom had towards the question of recognizing the Chinese states. In 1970, following a general election which saw the BNP's opposition, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), achieve a clear victory, the BNP responded by annulling the results of the election, clamping down on dissidence, and largely enacting one-party rule.<sup>429</sup> A large part of the dissatisfaction with the BNP was a result of its collaborative position regarding South Africa, something which was deeply unpopular with Lesotho's population. The recognition of Taiwan over the PRC was, in part, a result of this position and, thus, any dramatic reorientation away from South Africa would also entail a reevaluation of the choice between relations with Taiwan or the PRC. Early on after its unilateral annulment of the prior election The BNP faced numerous challenges. The internal discontent against the party continued to grow. This was fuelled by the perception that the party had done little meaningfully to improve the lives of its citizens, its ruthless crackdown on the BCP and its conciliatory behaviour towards the South African government.<sup>430</sup>

The economic situation for Lesotho deteriorated significantly as well. Between 1971 and 1975 the country saw low wage growth and an overall drop in its GDP.<sup>431</sup> In response to these factors, the BNP sought to find ways to shore up support for itself. One such method involved granting certain members of the previously denied opposition, the BCP, political positions, thus hoping to ameliorate the discontent of the populace over their refusal to accept the BCP electoral victory in 1970.<sup>432</sup> As part of this broader effort to stabilize their position, the BNP would also seek to break away from the image that the party was subservient, to some extent, to the apartheid government in South Africa. This effort would play a role in a temporary, but prescient, realignment of Lesotho's loyalties with regards to the PRC and Taiwan.

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<sup>429</sup> L. Andor: *Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997*, p. 117.

<sup>430</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 40.

<sup>431</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 40.

<sup>432</sup> W. J. A. Macartney: "The Lesotho General Election of 1970," *Government and Opposition*, 8, (4), 1973, p. 473.

During the 1980s Lesotho's exclusive commitment to Taiwan temporarily came to an end on the back of the BNP's efforts to win influence within Lesotho. These efforts had already begun as far back as 1975, a result of the BNP's efforts to gain popularity by distancing itself from the popular perception that it was beholden to the apartheid government in South Africa.<sup>433</sup> This took the form of a visit by Lesotho's foreign minister to Beijing, at the time prompting speculation that Lesotho would follow other southern African states, such as Botswana, in shifting their allegiances from Taiwan towards the PRC, in defiance of the expectations of South Africa.<sup>434</sup> In 1983 the government of Lesotho initiated political contact with the PRC and, throughout much of the 1980s, began to engage in official-level dialogue and communication with mainland China, including receiving some limited aid from the PRC.<sup>435</sup> This was done even though, in that same year, merely five months before establishing relations with the PRC, Lesotho's Prime Minister had also visited Taiwan, seemingly attempting to maintain some form of relationship with both Chinas.<sup>436</sup> This was not to be. In 1983 Taiwan expectedly broke off their own official relations with Lesotho in protest at this, as was the norm of either of the two Chinese states to do when a country recognized their rival.<sup>437</sup> In response to their decision to recognize the PRC the Taiwanese foreign ministry said:

The Government of the Republic of China considers the decision made by the government of Lesotho has seriously damaged the traditional friendly relations between the two countries.<sup>438</sup>

As shown, the BNP sought to shore up support for itself by becoming increasingly less cooperative with the apartheid regime in South Africa but, ultimately, this would fail to secure the party's continued dominance. Instead, it incited the displeasure of the apartheid regime, which engaged in an increasing number of coercive tactics against the Lesotho government. This included establishing an economic blockade of its much smaller, landlocked, and poorer,

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<sup>433</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

<sup>434</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

<sup>435</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 84.

<sup>436</sup> Anon: "Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with Lesotho Sunday to protest..." *UPI Newstrack*, 15 May 1983.

<sup>437</sup> Anon: "Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with Lesotho Sunday to protest..." *UPI Newstrack*, 15 May 1983.

<sup>438</sup> Anon: "Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with Lesotho Sunday to protest..." *UPI Newstrack*, 15 May 1983.

neighbour in 1986.<sup>439</sup> Lesotho's refusal to accede to a military pact with South Africa, and the government's refusal to deport ANC members from Lesotho to South Africa continued to stoke South Africa's ire as well.<sup>440</sup> This all resulted in an escalation of violence, with South African military forces entering the country in late 1985 and establishing a blockade of Lesotho's borders which only ended with a military coup in January 1986.<sup>441</sup> The coup, led by Justin Lekhanya, established a military government in Lesotho which proved far more amenable to the apartheid regime, largely submitting to their larger neighbour on a number of important topics, such as expulsion of ANC members and the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty.<sup>442</sup> Although Lekhanya initially assured the PRC that there would be no disruption of relations just because of the country's new position towards South Africa, this would prove to be false.

In 1990, still under the auspices of the military government's rule, Lesotho retracted from its prior warming of relations with the PRC, once more transitioning to an exclusive relationship with Taiwan.<sup>443</sup> Considering the influx of financial aid from Taiwan that followed this decision immediately, it is not too unlikely to imagine that the decision of the military government was predicated on the two-fold goal of appeasing South Africa's apartheid government, whom the military was far more amenable to, and also seeking immediate financial support from Taiwan in exchange for the recognition.<sup>444</sup>

However, by 1997, with the collapse of military government rule in Lesotho, the newly incumbent BCP, made Lesotho's final transition from recognizing Taiwan to again recognizing the PRC. This effectively ended official government relations with Taiwan in favour of the

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<sup>439</sup> Anon: "Lesotho seeks to end blockade," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 1986; A. Cowell: "Lesotho expels 60 South African insurgents," *New York Times*, 16 January 1986; E. Van Ees: "South Africa lifts blockade of Lesotho," *UPI Newstrack*, 25 January 1986.

<sup>440</sup> Anon: "Lesotho seeks to end blockade," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 1986; A. Cowell: "Lesotho expels 60 South African insurgents," *New York Times*, 16 January 1986; E. Van Ees: "South Africa lifts blockade of Lesotho," *UPI Newstrack*, 25 January 1986; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 86.

<sup>441</sup> Anon: "Lesotho seeks to end blockade," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 1986; A. Cowell: "Lesotho expels 60 South African insurgents," *New York Times*, 16 January 1986; E. Van Ees: "South Africa lifts blockade of Lesotho," *UPI Newstrack*, 25 January 1986.

<sup>442</sup> Anon: "Lesotho seeks to end blockade," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 1986; A. Cowell: "Lesotho expels 60 South African insurgents," *New York Times*, 16 January 1986; E. Van Ees: "South Africa lifts blockade of Lesotho," *UPI Newstrack*, 25 January 1986; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 86.

<sup>443</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 89.

<sup>444</sup> C. Collins: *Lesotho: Living in the Lion's Mouth*, American Friends Service Committee, 1989, p. 1, 15; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 89.



PRC.<sup>445</sup> In April of that year Kelebone Maope, Foreign Minister of Lesotho, journeyed to the PRC to once more commence official relations with mainland China in preference of Taiwan.<sup>446</sup> The PRC government was predictably enthused at the change in direction, welcoming Lesotho's decision.<sup>447</sup> This decision would then initiate the beginning of a robust set of interactions, Lesotho's most important foreign relations outside of South Africa, which has persisted into the present day.

#### 4.4 Lesotho-PRC Relations

Even whilst Lesotho had remained staunchly pro-Taiwan, the PRC had never been particularly antagonistic towards the small African state.<sup>448</sup> Indeed, despite Lesotho's ongoing support for the PRC's regional rival, mainland China remained remarkably uncritical of Lesotho, as opposed to other states which recognized Taiwan. The PRC even oft expressed sympathy for Lesotho's political situation, accusing South Africa of coercing Lesotho's politics unfairly.<sup>449</sup> This can almost certainly be put down to the simple fact that the PRC did not attach great value to Lesotho, geopolitically. In its relationship with Lesotho, the PRC has almost always played a more reactive role, rarely spearheading efforts for deeper relations itself, and instead reacting to overtures from Lesotho's government.<sup>450</sup> As a result, the PRC largely limited itself to critiques of South Africa's relations with Lesotho and displayed some degree of approval for Lesotho's Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan, particularly during his last few years in office, when he actively courted the PRC.<sup>451</sup>

However, since the early 2000s, and the stabilization of Lesotho's relations with the PRC, there has been a dramatic growth in the two states' official engagement with each other. One of the simplest manners to gauge the level of relations between Lesotho and the PRC is to examine

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<sup>445</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 89.

<sup>446</sup> Anon: "Chinese foreign minister happy at resumed links with Lesotho," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 11 April 1997.

<sup>447</sup> Anon: "Chinese foreign minister happy at resumed links with Lesotho," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 11 April 1997.

<sup>448</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

<sup>449</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

<sup>450</sup> I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 90.

<sup>451</sup> A. Cowell: "Lesotho expels 60 South African insurgents," *New York Times*, 16 January 1986; I. Taylor: "The "Captive States" of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35, (2), 2008, p. 85.

the level of the PRC's diplomatic representation within Lesotho. The small Mountain Kingdom is host to very few full embassies of other countries. In total there are only five that have full embassies: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Libya, and the PRC.<sup>452</sup> As a result, we can see that the PRC is among a very small group who have extensive enough of an interest in diplomatic relations with Lesotho, and the capacity for them, who opt to maintain a full embassy in the Kingdom. This is, of course, very much only a surface analysis of the situation as it signals intent and capacity far more than actual depth of relationship. It is, however, a good initial indicator of the extent of Lesotho and the PRC's official involvement with one another.

It should come as no surprise that a great deal of Lesotho and the PRC's governmental relations are built upon a bedrock of economic gain. Official relations between Lesotho and the PRC remain highly robust in large part due to the economic importance of this relationship to the government of Lesotho. Both states are explicitly and expressly committed to an ongoing, deepening, engagement with each other. Particularly in the sphere of economics, Lesotho has actively sought to court Chinese state investment and corporate involvement.<sup>453</sup> This, again, is in of itself not surprising. Since independence in 1966 the primary approach of Lesotho's government towards its economy has consisted, in part, of courting foreign investment into the country. Just as it did with Taiwan previously, Lesotho continues to actively court the PRC's economic investments into the country, hoping to uplift the small Mountain Kingdom's economy through this process. The result of this has been the involvement of numerous state-owned Chinese corporations in construction projects throughout Lesotho.<sup>454</sup> The extent of this cooperation is also visible in the some fourteen different construction projects initiated between the two countries from 1983 until 2005.<sup>455</sup> Through these agreements, Chinese state-owned firms have been responsible for the construction of several notable structures within Lesotho, including the national convention centre, Buthe Botha Industrial Park, the National Library and Archives building and an expansion of the Radio and Television Networks in Lesotho.<sup>456</sup> The PRC has initiated several more state projects in Lesotho since 2016 as well, typically intended

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<sup>452</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>453</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 110.

<sup>454</sup> M. Phakela: "Local Contractors Cry Foul Over Chinese Dominance," *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018.

<sup>455</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>456</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

to build infrastructure within the Mountain Kingdom. These include projects such as China-Lesotho Friendship School in Berea, the Lesotho State Library, a new parliament building, mushroom farm production centre as well as agricultural warehouses.<sup>457</sup>

The PRC's infrastructure projects in Lesotho are also an ongoing chapter of state interactions between Lesotho and China, with several more projects having begun in 2019 and continuing on into the present, as reported on by Lesotho's local media.<sup>458</sup> These include a road project to connect the Sehlabathebe National Park, Lesotho's sole World Heritage Site, with the national roadway in Lesotho, in order to boost ease of access.<sup>459</sup> The intended goal of the project through this is to increase tourism into the area by making it more accessible. In addition to the benefits to the area's potential for tourism-based revenue, the project also employed some five hundred Basotho labourers.<sup>460</sup> Additional projects which had already begun by 2019 include the construction of a Solar Power Plant in Mafeteng, a Fire Station in Maseru and an Agricultural Products Trade and Logistics Centre.<sup>461</sup> Further evidence of the PRC's ongoing interest in Lesotho-based projects can also be gleaned from the invitation the PRC extended to Lesotho to participate in the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2018, in Beijing.<sup>462</sup> The Belt and Road initiative currently represents one of the PRC's top priorities on the international stage and its involvement of Lesotho within that process indicates its desire for longstanding and continuing chances to economically involve itself in the Mountain Kingdom.<sup>463</sup>

The PRC involvement in Lesotho's infrastructure programs is likely to continue to accelerate in the short term. In 2016 the two governments reached an accord to open up a number of other projects, as well as studies for other feasible future projects, within the context of the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in Johannesburg.<sup>464</sup> Under the auspices of this agreement, the PRC dispatched further teams of experts to determine a range of possible future

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<sup>457</sup> Anon: "China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic," *Informative*, 16 January 2018.

<sup>458</sup> S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>459</sup> S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>460</sup> B. Mpaki: "China Cancels Lesotho Debts, Gives More Aid," *Lesotho Times*, 15 September 2018.

<sup>461</sup> S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>462</sup> S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>463</sup> S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>464</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Hon. Metsing Met with the Chinese Experts Team*, 19 December 2016.

infrastructure projects it could invest in, some of which have already materialized and been initiated as of 2018.<sup>465</sup> Under the framework of this agreement, the PRC's Development Bank also became more active in seeking to offer loans to local companies and businesses in Lesotho.<sup>466</sup> As part of this initiative, the Development Bank held a seminar in November 2016, attended by Lesotho government representatives, to make available grants and loans from the bank to small and medium Lesotho businesses.<sup>467</sup>

These construction projects have, however, also proved to be the greatest cause of direct consternation between Lesotho and the PRC. As will be seen in the following two chapters, the predominant criticism and hostility towards Chinese in Lesotho is largely directed at, and in response to, the actions of Chinese small traders and retailers, private enterprises, as opposed to state efforts or enterprises. However, an exception to this is the role played by Chinese state-owned enterprises such as the China Geo-Engineering Corporation. Local Basotho contractors have protested the awarding of lucrative construction tenders to these Chinese firms.<sup>468</sup> The Consortium of Lesotho Contractors (CLC), an association representing the interests of thirty-two different Basotho owned construction companies, alleged in 2018, in a letter to the Lesotho government, that the awarding of tenders to Chinese construction companies had become systematic to the point of excluding Basotho-owned enterprises:

I write to draw your attention Mr Chairman [Mochoboroane] and members of your [PAC] committee to an emergent practice whereby, consistently, a certain category of foreign construction companies, (sic) of common nationality are awarded construction projects to what has now progressively become the exclusion of Basotho companies and indeed also other companies falling outside of that seemingly select group.<sup>469</sup>

As a result, these infrastructure projects, whilst generally well-received by Lesotho's government, have begun to become controversial in Lesotho of late.

In addition to infrastructure projects, the PRC has been involved in investing in Lesotho's agricultural sector as well.<sup>470</sup> Unlike Taiwan, the PRC never dispatched any significant

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<sup>465</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Hon. Metsing Met with the Chinese Experts Team*, 19 December 2016.

<sup>466</sup> Anon: *China Development Bank Working Group Held a Briefing on Special Loan for Development of Africann SMEs in Lesotho*, 21 November 2016.

<sup>467</sup> Anon: *China Development Bank Working Group Held a Briefing on Special Loan for Development of Africann SMEs in Lesotho*, 21 November 2016.

<sup>468</sup> M. Phakela: "Local Contractors Cry Foul Over Chinese Dominance," *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018.

<sup>469</sup> M. Phakela: "Local Contractors Cry Foul Over Chinese Dominance," *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018.

<sup>470</sup> C. Song: "Move Forward China-Lesotho Cooperation," *The Nation*, 28 September 2018, p. 10.

contingent of agricultural experts to try to implement rice or other farming in Lesotho. Rather, its involvement in agriculture has usually taken the form of infrastructure projects or the provision of food aid, as will be discussed later. One exception to this, however, is the PRC's efforts to sponsor technology in Lesotho.<sup>471</sup> China-aid Juncao Cultivation Technical Cooperation Project in Lesotho is the result of an official ten-year agreement by the governments of Lesotho and the PRC to produce certain varieties of mushrooms in Masianokeng in Lesotho.<sup>472</sup> By 2018, over 100 Basotho had been trained in the cultivation of mushrooms and some 50 smaller mushroom projects had been established throughout Lesotho.<sup>473</sup> 菌草, Juncao, is mushroom grass in Chinese, a cornerstone of the China-UN Fund and actively being exported through much of Africa due to the perceived benefits of the mushrooms in both combatting soil erosion and providing alternative sources of sustenance and wealth.<sup>474</sup> The project has, so far, enjoyed strong support from both Lesotho's Ministry of Trade and the villages surrounding the Technical centre, many of whom have formed cooperative mushroom farms to take advantage of this opportunity.<sup>475</sup>

One of the strongest areas of state involvement by the PRC in Lesotho comes in the form of Chinese Medical Teams (CMTs). From the 1960s, during the Algerian conflict, the PRC already initiated the policy of dispatching CMTs to African states that were willing to accept them.<sup>476</sup> In 1997 the first of these CMTs would be dispatched to Lesotho, mostly hailing from China's Hubei Province.<sup>477</sup> In 1999 a further team of fifteen doctors arrived and, since then, an increasing number of CMTs have been dispatched to Lesotho.<sup>478</sup> Crucially these CMTs often can provide specialist services which are scantily available, if at all, within Lesotho. This includes gynaecologists, orthopaedists, obstetricians and radiologists.<sup>479</sup> The CMTs often are also able to provide healthcare services away from Lesotho's more urban areas.<sup>480</sup> These areas often struggle to gain access to healthcare of any sort, so the presence of the CMTs here helps

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<sup>471</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *H. E. Ambassador Sun Xianghua Inspected Demonstration Base of Mushroom Cultivation*, 30 January 2018.

<sup>472</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>473</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>474</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>475</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>476</sup> L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 52, p. 9.

<sup>477</sup> L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 52, p. 9.

<sup>478</sup> Anon: "China, Lesotho cooperate in combating HIV/AIDS," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 23 Jan 2008.

<sup>479</sup> Anon: "Chinese medical team treats hundreds," *Lesotho Times*, 6 July 2017, p. 30.

<sup>480</sup> Anon: "Chinese medical team treats hundreds," *Lesotho Times*, 6 July 2017, p. 30.

to somewhat alleviate the situation, at least temporarily. By 2017, some 130 Chinese doctors had been to Lesotho as part of these CMTs and treated some estimated 500 000 people in Lesotho as part of eleven different medical teams.<sup>481</sup>

These CMTs have been particularly involved with assisting Lesotho's healthcare system handle the country's high number of HIV/AIDS patients. In 2008 the government of Lesotho directly appealed to China for more medical assistance specifically with regards to HIV/AIDS.<sup>482</sup> The PRC Embassy in Lesotho has also become directly involved in the provision of medical supplies to Lesotho.<sup>483</sup> In 2017, the Embassy directly donated 100 000 maloti, approximately equivalent to R100 000, worth of medical supplies and equipment to the Motebang Hospital in Leribe district, including gowns, heaters and scrubs.<sup>484</sup> Motebang Hospital, at the time, also faced a critical shortage of qualified doctors, the district Health Manager having at times to assign some 100 patients to a single doctor in the Outpatient Ward.<sup>485</sup> In response, the PRC Embassy organized for the arrival of one of the CMTs in Lesotho, providing crucial specialists such as gynaecologists as well as providing more doctors to help ease the burden on the hospital.<sup>486</sup>

Chinese medical assistance in Lesotho is also very much an ongoing practise, with the PRC continuing to actively dispatch and support medical teams as well as medical infrastructure projects inside Lesotho. A rather recent example of this is the Maseru District Hospital and Eye Clinic, a project initiated in 2018, and funded by the PRC, to establish Lesotho's first eye clinic and provide a broader range of equipment for the hospital.<sup>487</sup> As Maseru lacks a district hospital, despite being Lesotho's capital, the project was intended to provide an important medical service to the country's largest city.<sup>488</sup> The creation of the District Hospital also reduced the need for Basotho to seek medical treatment outside Lesotho's borders, typically in South Africa, by providing a facility which can provide certain specialist procedures and treatments within the country's own borders.<sup>489</sup> The District Hospital is also intended to serve

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<sup>481</sup> M. Letuka: "Chinese come to Hospital's aid," *Sunday Express*, 20 August 2017, p. 7.

<sup>482</sup> Anon: "China, Lesotho cooperate in combating HIV/AIDS," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 23 Jan 2008.

<sup>483</sup> M. Letuka: "Chinese come to Hospital's aid," *Sunday Express*, 20 August 2017, p. 7.

<sup>484</sup> M. Letuka: "Chinese come to Hospital's aid," *Sunday Express*, 20 August 2017, p. 7.

<sup>485</sup> M. Letuka: "Chinese come to Hospital's aid," *Sunday Express*, 20 August 2017, p. 7.

<sup>486</sup> M. Letuka: "Chinese come to Hospital's aid," *Sunday Express*, 20 August 2017, p. 7.

<sup>487</sup> Anon: "China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic," *Informative*, 16 January 2018.

<sup>488</sup> Anon: "China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic," *Informative*, 16 January 2018.

<sup>489</sup> Anon: "China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic," *Informative*, 16 January 2018.



as a training base for Basotho doctors and nurses as well, providing them with a place to learn.<sup>490</sup>

Similarly, during the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic, the Embassy once more provided medical supplies to Lesotho on behalf of the state.<sup>491</sup> This included: 50 000 surgical masks; 10 000 respirators; 50 ventilators; 200 thermometers; and 40 oxygen machines to Lesotho as part of the consignments.<sup>492</sup> The assistance was greatly welcomed, unsurprisingly, within the context of the pandemic and serves to underline the continuing popularity and importance of the PRC's medical assistance to Lesotho.

As a result of this work, the CMTs and medical cooperation in general, remains one of the strongest areas of cooperation between the PRC and Lesotho governments. In addition to this, it remains one of the most uncontroversial areas of their cooperation among Lesotho's citizenry, with support of the CMTs and Chinese medical assistance in general being warmly received in Lesotho.<sup>493</sup> The CMTs have provided surgeries, CT Scans and X-Rays throughout Lesotho in addition to their other medical work, and have typically received praise in Lesotho's media and from their patients.<sup>494</sup> The CMTs have also organized sporting events, such as tennis and basketball, to try to further connect with the local Basotho population.<sup>495</sup> The fact that the CMTs have also donated food aid to some of the more vulnerable communities in Lesotho also plays a role in their popularity. Considering how controversial the Lesotho government's close economic association with the PRC government is, among the Basotho the CMTs and medical cooperation perhaps represents a rare example of completely uncontroversial cooperation between both states.

State-level contacts have also included training seminars and the likes held for Lesotho government employees.<sup>496</sup> In the year of 2017 alone, the PRC hosted over ten different training programs specifically for Lesotho government employees, ranging from the fields of trade facilitation to cotton processing and medical training.<sup>497</sup> The PRC government has also funded the establishment of a Chinese language instruction class at the Machabeng College in

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<sup>490</sup> Anon: "China to aid Lesotho with eye clinic," *Informative*, 16 January 2018.

<sup>491</sup> K. Molefi: "China gives PPE Consignment to Lesotho," *Public Eye*, 2020.

<sup>492</sup> K. Molefi: "China gives PPE Consignment to Lesotho," *Public Eye*, 2020.

<sup>493</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese medical assistance benefits 500k," *Sunday Express*, 16 October 2016, p. 5.

<sup>494</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese medical assistance benefits 500k," *Sunday Express*, 16 October 2016, p. 5.

<sup>495</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese medical assistance benefits 500k," *Sunday Express*, 16 October 2016, p. 5.

<sup>496</sup> L. Sello: "China equips Lesotho Govt Officials," *Times Maseru*, 25 Aug 2017.

<sup>497</sup> L. Sello: "China equips Lesotho Govt Officials," *Times Maseru*, 25 Aug 2017.

Maseru.<sup>498</sup> This class has also, since 2017, specifically provided training and educational courses to Lesotho government employees.<sup>499</sup> In addition to these training programs for government employees, the PRC has also been involved in awarding government scholarships to Lesotho students.<sup>500</sup> These scholarships have provided for Lesotho students to spend two to five years completing their higher education studies in China.<sup>501</sup> Critically these scholarships have focused on subjects such as Engineering and Sciences, which do not have a strong base in Lesotho, even at the Lesotho National University.<sup>502</sup> Thus, the scholarships provide an opportunity for students from Lesotho to receive more adequate instruction on these fields which they might otherwise be excluded from.<sup>503</sup> In addition to these scholarships, the PRC has also provided training programs for Lesotho's Defence Forces (LDF), with officers of the LDF being hosted in China as they undergo military training.<sup>504</sup>

The PRC has also invested in the construction of a middle school in Lesotho, the China-Lesotho Friendship School, which was handed over to the Lesotho government in 2017.<sup>505</sup> The school cost some 110 million maloti, roughly equal to 110 million rand, to build and was constructed by Chinese state firms in Berea district.<sup>506</sup> According to Lesotho's Minister of Education, the purpose of the school is to provide a higher quality level of education for local students, particularly those wishing to go on to tertiary education.<sup>507</sup> For this reason it offered an advanced curriculum in Lesotho (an A level) as opposed to the regular local curriculum.<sup>508</sup>

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<sup>498</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *First Chinese Language Course for Lesotho Government Officials Opened*, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 7 November 2017.

<sup>499</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *First Chinese Language Course for Lesotho Government Officials Opened*, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 7 November 2017.

<sup>500</sup> Anon: "Remarks by H. E. Ambassador Hu Dingxian at the Pre-Departure Reception in Honour of Basotho Students Awarded with the 2014/5 Chinese Government Scholarship and LDF Officers to Be Trained in China," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 24 Aug 2014.

<sup>501</sup> Anon: "Remarks by H. E. Ambassador Hu Dingxian at the Pre-Departure Reception in Honour of Basotho Students Awarded with the 2014/5 Chinese Government Scholarship and LDF Officers to Be Trained in China," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 24 Aug 2014.

<sup>502</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>503</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>504</sup> Anon: "Remarks by H. E. Ambassador Hu Dingxian at the Pre-Departure Reception in Honour of Basotho Students Awarded with the 2014/5 Chinese Government Scholarship and LDF Officers to Be Trained in China," *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 24 Aug 2014.

<sup>505</sup> L. Sello: "Sino-Lesotho cooperation hailed," *Sunday Express*, 22 January 2017, p. 7.

<sup>506</sup> L. Sello: "Sino-Lesotho cooperation hailed," *Sunday Express*, 22 January 2017, p. 7.

<sup>507</sup> Anon: "Lesotho-China school to advance A Level," *Public Eye*, 17 February 2017, p. 3.

<sup>508</sup> Anon: "Lesotho-China school to advance A Level," *Public Eye*, 17 February 2017, p. 3.

In addition to this, the PRC has been involved in providing and funding training and material support for Lesotho's police services.<sup>509</sup> As part of these training programs they have provided training language courses to police and migration officers in Lesotho.<sup>510</sup> In addition, in 2018, they sponsored a contingent of Lesotho's police officers to attend forensic science training in China.<sup>511</sup> Besides providing training courses, the PRC government has also been involved in providing funds and material support to the police in Lesotho, handing over 100 000 maloti, equivalent to around the same value in rand, worth of police community kits, including things like blankets, torches and such, to the government of Lesotho in 2018.<sup>512</sup> Along with these donations the PRC state also donated its first fingerprint examination lab to Lesotho in 2018.<sup>513</sup>

One important detail to note of these projects is that they are, almost exclusively, not long-term sources of Chinese presence in Lesotho. Typically, after their completion they see no Chinese presence stay on to manage the completed structures or infrastructures handing them over to the Lesotho government instead. Most of these projects demand a large body of Chinese labour, typically of a skilled or semi-skilled kind, meaning that for the duration of the project a significant number of Chinese tend to remain within Lesotho.<sup>514</sup> However, once the work is completed, the majority of them return back to China, as opposed to remaining in Lesotho.<sup>515</sup> This can pose problems for the sustainability of these projects, particularly those that are not permanent structures. A clear example of this can be found in the above mentioned Juncao mushroom farming project. At the end of their contractual period, the Chinese experts invariably returned back to China, rather than remaining at the Centre in Lesotho.<sup>516</sup> The loss of these experts often sees the productivity of the mushroom farms drop drastically. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture in Lesotho, Doctor Nthabsieng Makoae, noted, for example, that upon the completion of the third phase of the project in 2015, when most of the Chinese experts

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<sup>509</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Embassy holds Reception for Lesotho Police and Immigration Officers to Conclude Chinese Language Training and for Seeing off Officers to Attend Forensic Science Training in China*, 21 June 2018.

<sup>510</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Embassy holds Reception for Lesotho Police and Immigration Officers to Conclude Chinese Language Training and for Seeing off Officers to Attend Forensic Science Training in China*, 21 June 2018.

<sup>511</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Embassy holds Reception for Lesotho Police and Immigration Officers to Conclude Chinese Language Training and for Seeing off Officers to Attend Forensic Science Training in China*, 21 June 2018.

<sup>512</sup> Government of Lesotho: *China hands Community Policing Kit to Lesotho*, 28 November 2018.

<sup>513</sup> Government of Lesotho: *China hands Community Policing Kit to Lesotho*, 28 November 2018.

<sup>514</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 26.

<sup>515</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 26.

<sup>516</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

returned to China, the numbers of mushrooms being produced and cultivated simply plummeted as Lesotho struggled to create further mushroom spawns on their own.<sup>517</sup> The Chinese Embassy in Lesotho did respond, and stated that it would endeavour to get more Chinese experts to assist Lesotho, but the underlying issue remains. Projects built on specific, technical, knowledge by Chinese experts struggle to become sustainable because most state Chinese employees do not remain in Lesotho once their contracts have expired.<sup>518</sup> This problem is also pronounced with regards to the CMTs. Although, without a doubt, the CMTs provide a crucial service and their presence is beneficial, they do not make a sustained impact because they simply leave when their terms have expired. For Lesotho's healthcare system to be systematically improved, and remain so, requires further development than simply periodic arrivals of CMTs.

In addition to these the PRC has, like Taiwan before it, been actively involved in providing aid and disaster relief to Lesotho.<sup>519</sup> During the drought period between 2002 and 2004 the PRC provided two-thousand tons of maize to Lesotho, to try to alleviate the severity of the situation.<sup>520</sup> In the period between 2014 and 2017, the PRC had supplied some thirteen thousand metric tons of food aid to Lesotho.<sup>521</sup> In 2018, during a state visit by Lesotho's Prime Minister to Beijing, the PRC extended a further package of 50 million maloti's worth of food aid to Lesotho.<sup>522</sup> This food aid package came on simultaneously with a further grant of some 300 million maloti for the government of Lesotho.<sup>523</sup> The granting of this loan also falls into a now familiar pattern. In addition to aid and relief, the PRC has regularly loaned money to Lesotho, providing several interest-free loans with regards to agricultural projects and providing Lesotho with money through which to purchase medical equipment.<sup>524</sup> In 2017 the PRC also cancelled any debts owed to it by Lesotho for the construction of both the country's new parliament building and the National Convention Centre at Manthabiseng.<sup>525</sup> In this regard, the PRC has simply continued in a similar vein to Taiwan before it.

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<sup>517</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>518</sup> Anon: "The good old mushroom," *The Post*, 2 March 2018.

<sup>519</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>520</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>521</sup> C. Song: "Move Forward China-Lesotho Cooperation," *The Nation*, 28 September 2018, p. 10.

<sup>522</sup> C. Song: "Move Forward China-Lesotho Cooperation," *The Nation*, 28 September 2018, p. 10.

<sup>523</sup> C. Song: "Move Forward China-Lesotho Cooperation," *The Nation*, 28 September 2018, p. 10.

<sup>524</sup> R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>525</sup> B. Mpaki: "China Cancels Lesotho Debts, Gives More Aid," *Lesotho Times*, 15 September 2018.

The observation of official interactions between Lesotho and the PRC governments also indicates a strong intent from both sides to be perceived as “friendly” towards each other. From this it can safely be concluded that, due to both government’s mutual interests, the official relations between the two states remain strong. Indication of this can be found in the PRC’s high-level involvement in official celebrations within Lesotho. One of the clearest and most pertinent examples of this was the 2016 celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lesotho’s independence.<sup>526</sup> Along with representatives of the local Chinese community in Lesotho, the PRC was the only national government represented at the celebration and used the celebration as a reason to officially announce a further loan of money to Lesotho.<sup>527</sup>

It is clear that the PRC provides a significant amount of Lesotho’s infrastructure development.<sup>528</sup> This is beyond any credible doubt. There seems to also be no signs of the cooperation between the two states coming to an end anytime soon. Recently both states have made mention that they still are regularly discussing, and arranging, for future cooperative projects together.<sup>529</sup> On the state level, for now at least, there is little room for doubt that the government of Lesotho and the government of the PRC are in close concert and cooperation with each other. This is most likely driven by mutual economic desires by both countries, each seeking to gain wealth from their relationship. However, this must not be mistaken for the primary driver of Chinese migration to Lesotho. As indicated, in almost all the cases mentioned above, the construction projects, medical teams and such, the vast majority of all Chinese who come to Lesotho via these programs, are temporary and do not stay for any meaningfully long, extensive, period of time.<sup>530</sup> As will be discussed in the following two chapters, though state relations between the PRC and Lesotho remain close, the primary engine for Chinese migration into Lesotho is not state orientated but, instead, the result of private volition.

When it comes to the matter of Chinese migrants in Lesotho, the PRC has kept a relatively clear and consistent approach. This approach is that Chinese migrants in Lesotho are an internal matter for Lesotho’s government to handle, and not a matter the PRC government itself wishes

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<sup>526</sup> Anon: “The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China and Chinese Community in Lesotho Holds a Handover Ceremony of Donations Celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Independence of the Kingdom of Lesotho,” *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 26 August 2016.

<sup>527</sup> Anon: “The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China and Chinese Community in Lesotho Holds a Handover Ceremony of Donations Celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Independence of the Kingdom of Lesotho,” *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 26 August 2016.

<sup>528</sup> R. T. Tanga: “The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho,” *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

<sup>529</sup> L. Sello: “China equips Lesotho Govt Officials,” *Times Maseru*, 25 Aug 2017.

<sup>530</sup> R. T. Tanga: “The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho,” *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112.

to get involved in at all.<sup>531</sup> The strongest actions it has taken, to date, were in response to the 1998 Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention into Lesotho.<sup>532</sup> During the period of the intervention, which was nominally conducted in order to restore stability after protests against the contested 1998 Lesotho election, some 400 Chinese nationals were displaced from Lesotho, fleeing to South Africa, due to concerns around violence.<sup>533</sup> In response to this, the PRC only officially indicated that it had been in contact with the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, and organized some diplomatic representatives to visit Chinese refugees from Lesotho in South Africa.<sup>534</sup> Beyond this event, in almost all cases, the PRC has abstained from providing protection to Chinese nationals in Lesotho. In a sense this is not dissimilar to the position of the Qing Dynasty in earlier history. As recounted in chapter 3, the Dynasty largely neglected to engage with or render assistance to subjects overseas for much of its history.<sup>535</sup> Though some surface level similarities certainly exist, the comparison is not quite fair. At the height of its disconnection from Chinese overseas the Qing Dynasty actively desired the execution of said Chinese, whilst the PRC has still rendered more support for Chinese migrants than the Qing Dynasty did for most of its history.<sup>536</sup>

This PRC abstention of involvement has, at times, even extended to refusing to assist local Chinese businesses in Lesotho with the simple matter of providing translators for a contract bid a company wished to undertake.<sup>537</sup> It is, overall, very clear that the PRC Embassy in Lesotho does not see its job as being to individually support the efforts of local Chinese businessmen, particularly those who are not already affluent themselves. As will be discussed in chapters six and seven the Embassy has maintained a supportive stance towards a certain affluent segment of the Fujianese population. In particular, they have broadcast their efforts to support Lesotho civil society, but have stopped short of rendering aide or support to the numerous small Chinese businesses in Lesotho.

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<sup>531</sup> Anon: "Chinese spokesman on protecting nationals in Lesotho 'War'," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 29 Sep 1998.

<sup>532</sup> Anon: "Chinese spokesman on protecting nationals in Lesotho 'War'," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 29 Sep 1998.

<sup>533</sup> Anon: "Chinese spokesman on protecting nationals in Lesotho 'War'," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 29 Sep 1998.

<sup>534</sup> Anon: "Chinese spokesman on protecting nationals in Lesotho 'War'," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 29 Sep 1998.

<sup>535</sup> S. V. Conradie: "*A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation*," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>536</sup> S. V. Conradie: "*A Grievous Injustice to the Chinese Nation*," *The Role of the Qing Dynasty in supporting the South African Chinese*, Master's Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, October 2018.

<sup>537</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001, p. 64.



A pertinent example of this can be found in their approach to legal challenges faced by Chinese in Lesotho. Due to the strong question of illegality surrounding mainland Chinese traders in Lesotho, most specifically the consistent issues pertaining to whether or not the smaller Chinese retailers are legal, the Chinese government has shown a marked refusal to become involved.<sup>538</sup> As will be discussed in chapter six, following the Lesotho government's passing of the 1999 Trading Regulations Act, a piece of legislation specifically designed to curtail Chinese involvement in certain smaller sectors of the economy, questions of legality over the numerous Fujianese small stores that persisted have been a frequent issue.<sup>539</sup> Legally speaking many of these stores would be illegal for Fujianese Chinese to operate. However, they continue to do so in large numbers either through practising bribery of officials; through having a Basotho partner who formally owns the property for them or; at times, simply the complicity of local officials who weigh the costs of evicting the small retailers as more harmful than simply allowing them to continue their operations but fining them periodically.<sup>540</sup> As will be discussed in detail in chapter 6 the PRC has shown a marked refusal to support or become involved in legal cases brought against the Fujianese small traders, or really any Chinese business or citizen in Lesotho.<sup>541</sup> As a result of their unwillingness to lend any aid, the attitude of the Fujianese towards their government has largely soured, with them actively expressing the belief that the PRC government will not do anything to help Chinese in Lesotho at all. This is a far cry from accusations that Chinese migrants in Lesotho are government agents or, as well, that the PRC government is actively using Chinese migration as a tool to usurp power and influence within Lesotho.<sup>542</sup>

As was the case with the Taiwanese migrants, state relations did not play the primary role in Chinese migration to Lesotho from the mainland. Although, as shown, the PRC has funded several state initiatives in Lesotho, it is important to note that for the most part the Chinese involved in these do not remain in Lesotho past the remit of their activities, and almost invariably return home to mainland China once finished. The primary cause of Chinese migration into Lesotho remains, definitively, private in nature. Chinese, often in family units,

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<sup>538</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, pp 26-27.

<sup>539</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>540</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, pp 26-27.

<sup>541</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, pp 26-27.

<sup>542</sup> G. Wilson: Chinese businesses rile Lesotho Locals, *Marketplace*, 15 January 2008.

migrate to Lesotho not at the behest of the PRC government, but of their own initiative in order to pursue possible avenues for wealth accumulation.<sup>543</sup> In his thorough research on the topic McNamee puts it emphatically in these words:

What ‘pulled’ the new traders to Africa were not...state-led initiatives such as the provision of trade zones on the continent, or Small-Medium Enterprises International Market Development Fund (which ostensibly is geared to helping SMEs explore overseas markets) ...although Beijing’s loosening of its once-prohibitive emigration policies beginning in the 1990s did enable millions to leave China for the first time. Instead, it was the ineluctable lure of an immense market for low-cost Chinese goods. Unlike markets in Europe or North America, in Africa there were few constraining regulations and minimal entry requirements, so entrepreneurs with limited capital and low levels of skill and education could compete.<sup>544</sup>

#### 4.5 Conclusion

Cooperation between the governments of Lesotho and the PRC remains strong, both sides expressing explicit commitment to the relationship and continuing to undertake and develop new joint initiatives.<sup>545</sup> By contrast, cooperation between the governments of Lesotho and Taiwan have ceased completely, with neither side remaining in contact and with Taiwan no longer providing aid through developmental programs or financial transactions to the Mountain Kingdom. Even though the PRC enjoys robust relations with Lesotho, it has displayed a marked unwillingness to intervene in the affairs of its citizenry living inside of Lesotho, to the point that the Chinese largely express the sentiment that their own government has no interest in assisting them, or protecting them, whatsoever.<sup>546</sup> All evidence also indicates that the PRC government does, indeed, have relatively little interest in rendering aid towards Chinese living in Lesotho, and largely leaves Lesotho to handle the Chinese as their own internal affair. The following three chapters will demonstrate that we can safely conclude that the notion that Chinese migrants in Lesotho are the result of intentional efforts by the Chinese government, or are agents of a Chinese government influence operation, are categorically false. At best the

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<sup>543</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 15.

<sup>544</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 15.

<sup>545</sup> C. Song: “Move Forward China-Lesotho Cooperation,” *The Nation*, 28 September 2018, p. 10.

<sup>546</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, pp 26-27.

Chinese government serves as an accidental facilitator of some small portion of Chinese who arrive in Lesotho as part of state contracts and enterprises, and then choose to remain within Lesotho once this period of work ends.

This same conclusion holds true for the older Chinese migrants from Taiwan. As discussed above and will be shown in more detail in the following chapter, Taiwanese government engagement with Lesotho was never the primary driver of Taiwanese migration into Lesotho. Private business ventures, of which the numerous Taiwanese textile factories that still play a pivotal role in Lesotho's economy are the most visible example and served as the engine for Taiwanese migration into Lesotho.<sup>547</sup> The same holds true for the mainland Chinese, predominantly Fujianese, who migrated into Lesotho from the 1990s onwards, and who now represent the vast majority of Lesotho's migrant population.<sup>548</sup>

The Chinese population of Lesotho, grouped as a collective which rarely distinguishes between Taiwanese or mainland migrants, has been, and still is, treated in monolithic terms. Even when discussing their economic impact on Lesotho, the most common sense in which they are discussed, they tend to be grouped and collated into a generalized collective. This approach fails to account for the differences between the Taiwanese and Fujianese migrants, as well as failing to give sufficient agency to the Chinese migrants as individual actors in their own history. This is a critical failing that this study focuses on and should be readdressed by examining the experiences of the Chinese in Lesotho.

The following three chapters provide an analysis and discussion of the evidence surrounding Chinese migration into Lesotho. From the evidence gathered and presented in these chapters it shall become clear that the Chinese have arrived in Lesotho predominantly of their own volition and, crucially, should be engaged with as individual actors when trying to understand them, rather than engaging with them as a single homogenous block.

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<sup>547</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, pp 26-27.

<sup>548</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, pp 163-164.

## Chapter 5: The First Wave of Chinese Migration, 1966-1998

### 5.1 Introduction

As the title of the chapter indicates this section is concerned with the last quarter of the twentieth century and the prevalence of Chinese within the boundaries of Lesotho. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the paths that led Taiwanese into Lesotho during the 1960s and 1980s. It explains the important divergence between the initial Taiwanese migrants who stayed behind in Lesotho after completing state-sanctioned work and then, the later 1980s Taiwanese wave of migrants who primarily came to Lesotho from both South Africa and Taiwan in order to set-up their own private business ventures. Along with this, the chapter also analyses the personal experiences of the Taiwanese people in Lesotho, the reaction of the Basotho to the arrival of the Taiwanese and the role Taiwanese business owners played in stimulating further Chinese migration from the mainland to Lesotho. Finally, the chapter analyses the cooling of Lesotho and Taiwan's relations once Lesotho aligned itself with the PRC. It considers how this ended most migration from Taiwan to Lesotho and concludes by reflecting on the lasting impact and legacy that both the Taiwanese and initial mainland Chinese left in Lesotho.

Whilst the surrounding territories that would become South Africa had a Chinese presence from about as early as the latter half of the seventeenth century, Lesotho itself would only see any recorded instance of Chinese with the arrival of Taiwanese migrants somewhere between 1966 and 1969.<sup>549</sup> This is, of course, the first recorded instance. The possibility of some Chinese being in Lesotho before this time, however, is rather slim. For that reason, the Taiwanese who arrived in the context of Taiwanese aide to Lesotho are a suitable starting point when discussing the history of the Chinese in Lesotho.

As the first wave of Chinese migrants to Lesotho the Taiwanese are, unfortunately, often neglected in any discussion or analysis of the Chinese presence in Lesotho, which tends to focus only on the contemporary Fujianese population.<sup>550</sup> This neglect is, in part, the result of the fact that very little documentation, by either Lesotho or the Taiwanese themselves, of this

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<sup>549</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>550</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*.

period exists. As opposed to the later Fujianese, who have left a considerable footprint in local media, academic works and even established their own forums, the Taiwanese left far less evidence behind of their experiences in Lesotho. It is this lacuna that this chapter addresses.

Although it is true that Lesotho, like most of the world, has definitively in its foreign policy aligned itself with the PRC over Taiwan, the influence of the Taiwanese in Lesotho is still significant and their impact and influence on Lesotho is still relevant and persistent even in the present.

## 5.2 Taiwanese Migration to Lesotho

Taiwanese migration to Africa largely played out in two waves throughout the twentieth century. The first of these waves occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, as part of Taiwan's previously mentioned cheque book diplomacy, largely consisting of either Taiwanese experts dispatched to African states as part of joint development projects, or Taiwanese businessmen who were encouraged to invest in African states.<sup>551</sup> Some of these Taiwanese opted not to return home, but instead to live in the African states they had come to, forming the first serious overseas Taiwanese communities in Africa. By 1974, however, Taiwan's dedicated efforts at establishing agricultural and developmental programs on a wide scale in Africa had ended, largely bringing to a halt this first wave of Taiwanese migration.<sup>552</sup> Following this, in the 1980s, a second wave of Taiwanese immigration played out, this time private individuals usually taking advantage of the networks established by the first wave to find a place as retailers, traders and wholesalers in African states.<sup>553</sup> The pattern of Taiwanese migration to Lesotho very much followed this dynamic, with an initial migration as part of government projects in the 1960s and 70s, followed by more private migration in the 1980s. However, in Lesotho, the second period of Taiwanese migration, during the 1980s and 1990s, brought with it also a significant number of mainland Chinese, predominantly from Shanghai, setting it apart from the solely Taiwanese migration of the 1970s. We can therefore divide the first wave of Chinese migration into Lesotho, lasting from the 1960s until the 1990s, into two different periods. The first period, from 1969 until 1974 saw largely only Taiwanese migrating into the country

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<sup>551</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 31.

<sup>552</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11; T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>553</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

whilst, during the latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s a second period of Taiwanese migration also included a substantial portion of mainland Chinese migration. This means that the first wave of Chinese migration into Lesotho contains two subgroups: the Taiwanese, who were substantially larger in number, and the mainland Chinese who were relatively smaller in number and came in during the 1980s and 1990s.

As mentioned, the 1960s thus saw the first influx of Taiwanese to Lesotho which, also, was the first recorded entry of any Chinese into the Mountain Kingdom.<sup>554</sup> These Taiwanese migrants formed part of a pioneer movement of Chinese to Lesotho.<sup>555</sup> Lesotho received its own Taiwanese agricultural mission on the 24<sup>th</sup> of January 1969, the first of many, but Taiwanese migrants had already entered the country before then as part of medical teams sent to aide in Lesotho's development in 1967.<sup>556</sup> This assistance extended to joint developmental projects and the dispatching of teams of skilled workers from Taiwan to Lesotho.<sup>557</sup> Most of these personnel focused in two areas, medical and agricultural assistance.<sup>558</sup>

The first initial project of the agricultural mission in Lesotho focused on attempting to develop small scale, Chinese-style, rice paddy farms in Lesotho.<sup>559</sup> Similar projects had been begun by Taiwan when providing aid to Malawi and, during the time they rendered this support to Lesotho a similar project was also pursued in Eswatini. These projects consisted both of physical labour by the Chinese experts, supported by local labourers, to attempt to create favourable conditions, as well as education seminars and lectures which were meant to teach local Basotho farmers about the proper use of rice and other vegetables the Taiwanese Chinese brought with them.<sup>560</sup> Like in Eswatini, the overall goal of the project was to determine if it would be viable to introduce large scale rice farming into Lesotho, with the initial project being

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<sup>554</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163; T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>555</sup> Anon: *Helping Lesotho's Agriculture*, Taiwan Panorama, Helping Lesotho's Agriculture - 台灣光華雜誌 (taiwanpanorama.com.tw), Accessed 4 October 2021; L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

<sup>556</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 32.

Anon: *Helping Lesotho's Agriculture*, Taiwan Panorama, Helping Lesotho's Agriculture - 台灣光華雜誌 (taiwanpanorama.com.tw), Accessed 4 October 2021; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>558</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>559</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58.

<sup>560</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58.



too small scale for meaningful impact. Ultimately, the rice farm would have little effect beyond a visible gesture of goodwill by the Taiwanese government during a period of warm relations with Lesotho.<sup>561</sup>

In addition to the rice farm, the Taiwanese provided assistance with regards to the development of irrigation in Lesotho. Throughout the late 1970s until 1983, when formal relations were severed between Taiwan and Lesotho, Taiwanese specialists oversaw the Thaba-Phatsoa irrigation project.<sup>562</sup> This project had already begun as a joint venture between the United Kingdom and Lesotho but, by 1976, British support for it had largely dried up, leaving Taiwan to step in and take over development. Taiwanese involvement in the project was briefly resumed in the 1990s, during the small window when Lesotho reversed its orientation from the PRC back to Taiwan, and by 1991 the project was finished, and the control handed over to local commercial interests.<sup>563</sup>

Taiwan's support for different irrigation related projects in Lesotho branched out simply from funding the Thaba-Phatsoa project. Over the course of their involvement in Lesotho, which lasted from 1969 until 1974, Taiwanese experts assisted in the creation of numerous irrigation-related programmes. This included 26 803 metres of irrigation canal which were dug by Taiwanese technical teams in Lesotho, along with a further 11 907 drainage canals.<sup>564</sup> In addition to this, they built 7 dams and 8 pumping stations in Lesotho, ultimately assisting in the creation of over 133 hectares of irrigated land during their operations in Lesotho.<sup>565</sup>

During the 1960s and 70s, the initial Taiwanese migration period, it seemed the Taiwanese experts who arrived in Lesotho were generally well received and without hostility. There was to be no serious or even reported cases of prejudice or violence during the 1960s and 1970s. By the testament of Lesotho's Prime Minister Jonathan, the Taiwanese agricultural team had:

...had done an excellent job and won the respect of the people of Lesotho.<sup>566</sup>

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<sup>561</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), p. 50.

<sup>562</sup> P. J. Ntai: *Critical Factors determining successful irrigation farming in Lesotho*, M. A. dissertation, p. 11.

<sup>563</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58; P. J. Ntai: *Critical Factors determining successful irrigation farming in Lesotho*, M. A. dissertation, p. 11.

<sup>564</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), p. 51.

<sup>565</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), pp 33-35.

<sup>566</sup> S. Tseng: *The Republic of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, p. 167.

Many of the agricultural programs Taiwan sponsored in this time had limited long term impacts on the African states they were intended to develop. This was the case in Lesotho as well where the most prominent agricultural project undertaken by the Taiwanese was an attempt to create the above mentioned rice farming.<sup>567</sup> The project, which was small scale, was simply poorly suited to Lesotho's climate and had little lasting effect.<sup>568</sup> Although it is indisputable that the agricultural project was small-scale in nature, it would be unfair to characterize it as lacking in any positive impact. Though efforts to stimulate rice cultivation in Lesotho proved fruitless, the work provided regarding irrigation, even if only a small part of a larger problem, did provide tangible and concrete benefits to Lesotho. However, overall, the efforts of the agricultural mission never became a largescale success sufficient to affect or change the entire agricultural sector in Lesotho. By the end of its tenure in 1974 it had effectively helped to establish just over 180 hectares of cultivated land in Lesotho for fresh use by farmers.<sup>569</sup> In addition to this, the project had trained approximately 3 314 local farmers in Lesotho in the use of modern technologies and agricultural practises.<sup>570</sup>

Further support from Taiwan also took the form of funding for existing government projects. In 1980 the Lesotho government launched the Food Self-Sufficiency Programme, or FSSP, a project created to replace a previously, largely failed, effort to address shortages of crops in Lesotho.<sup>571</sup> Most of the funding for this programme would come from Taiwan and met with mixed success. Although not a complete failure by any standard, it relied heavily on capital-intensive and expensive pieces of equipment and technology which were essentially not sustainable.<sup>572</sup> The programme, is however, still active in Lesotho to this day, via the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank, but with no involvement from Taiwan anymore.

When the projects mostly ended in 1974 many of the Taiwanese returned home. However, some of these same Taiwanese experts would ultimately decide to remain in Lesotho even once the remit of their projects ended, forming the initial migrant class of Taiwanese in Lesotho.<sup>573</sup>

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<sup>567</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58.

<sup>568</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), p. 50.

<sup>569</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), p. 50.

<sup>570</sup> S. Hsieh: "Agricultural reform in Africa – With special focus on Taiwan assisted rice production in Africa, past, present and future perspectives," *Tropics*, 11, (1), p. 50.

<sup>571</sup> N. R. Mokitimi: *Economic Analysis of Crop Production in Lesotho: A Household-based Programming Approach*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 18.

<sup>572</sup> N. R. Mokitimi: *Economic Analysis of Crop Production in Lesotho: A Household-based Programming Approach*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 18.

<sup>573</sup> N. R. Mokitimi: *Economic Analysis of Crop Production in Lesotho: A Household-based Programming Approach*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 18.

Those that stayed did not continue to work in agriculture or on the projects they had been previously associated with. Instead, most of them would enter into retail and wholesale businesses in Lesotho.<sup>574</sup>

Although the very earliest Chinese in Lesotho were these Taiwanese migrants who opted to remain in the country after the programmes, they had been part of ended, the true surge in migration, which brought the largest numbers of Taiwanese to Lesotho, and represented the majority of the remaining migrant population in Lesotho, would only come after 1974. Whilst the migrants before them had largely been specialists dispatched by their government, this next period of Taiwanese migration brought with it private Taiwanese migration, entrepreneurs and labourers seeking to find economic success in Lesotho.

Part of the wave of investors and entrepreneurs that arrived after 1974 had been swayed by the economic prospects in Lesotho, and the Mountain Kingdom's government's efforts to woo them. The Taiwanese investors and business owners who entered into Lesotho similarly seemed to have had a warm reception initially, buoyed by a general optimism from the post-independence Lesotho government's commitment to development as well as their specific catering to foreign investors.<sup>575</sup> In 1976, as a sign of the number of Taiwanese business owners now operating in Lesotho, a group of these Taiwanese collaborated together to found a Chinese Chamber of Commerce, under the leadership of Wu Songbai, the chairman of an automobile company in Lesotho.<sup>576</sup> It was also from these investors that the large Taiwanese textile firms, which in the present day are generally the most visible and prominent remnant of the Taiwanese migration period, were established in Lesotho. These Taiwanese migrants formed part of a general second wave of Taiwanese migration to Africa which played out over the 1980s.<sup>577</sup> For them, the networks and support already established by the first wave of Taiwanese migration into Africa proved an attractive option, making establishing themselves within those states easier.<sup>578</sup>

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<sup>574</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 193.

<sup>575</sup> L. Anshan: *Inheritance and Evolution of Chinese Associations in Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>576</sup> L. Anshan: *Inheritance and Evolution of Chinese Associations in Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>577</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

<sup>578</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

These migrants were thus not skilled experts or labourers arriving at the behest of government-to-government accords but, rather, private businessmen and investors seeking a profitable arrangement in Lesotho.<sup>579</sup> This migrant community would be further reinforced during the 1990s by an exodus of Taiwanese business interests from South Africa into Lesotho. Though many Taiwanese had initially established firms and factories for themselves, particularly in South Africa's homeland and township areas, during the 1970s, as economic sanctions on South Africa intensified, they began to reconsider their situations.<sup>580</sup> They felt it increasingly difficult to do business in South Africa. Many of them complained of inflexible labour laws, rigid visa requirements and higher taxes in particular.<sup>581</sup> This motivated many of them to relocate to Lesotho which was seen as both easier to work in and also did not suffer from concerted international sanctions being pressed against it. Of specific note, many textile factories established in South Africa by Taiwanese investors spent the late 1980s and early 1990s moving their operations to Lesotho, whilst still maintaining some assets in South Africa to create a supply chain between the two different sectors of their activities. In this manner, the powerful supply network these Taiwanese migrants benefited from, as well as the strong ties between the South African Taiwanese migrant community and Lesotho-based Taiwanese migrant community were strengthened further.

Many of these Taiwanese migrants would also end up as traders and retailers in Lesotho, like the initial migrant group. In this they were not particularly unique as following independence Lesotho's retail sector was almost always dominated by foreigners as opposed to local Basotho traders.<sup>582</sup> Part of this stemmed from the practises of the initial post-independence government which did not go to great lengths to actively promote, or incentivise, participation in the retail and wholesale sectors of Lesotho's economy, or protect and assist those Basotho who did enter into these sectors.<sup>583</sup> This not only meant that these sectors remained obvious economic lacunas to fill but, in addition, the post-independence government initially focused on attempting to attract foreign investment and making Lesotho an attractive business climate for foreign

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<sup>579</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>580</sup> S. Radebe: "Foreign Investments – Lesotho's Material gain," *The Financial Mail*, 2003.

<sup>581</sup> S. Radebe: "Foreign Investments – Lesotho's Material gain," *The Financial Mail*, 2003.

<sup>582</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 136.

<sup>583</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 136.

investors.<sup>584</sup> As a result, when the Taiwanese migrants began to enter the retail sector they were mostly following the example set by European and, later, Indian traders before them.<sup>585</sup>

Initially, as a British Protectorate (1884 – 1966), Lesotho’s retail and wholesale sectors had largely existed under a European-dominated quasi-monopoly, with little room for the Basotho themselves to take part in it.<sup>586</sup> Following independence and the slight economic boom Lesotho’s population experienced from work on mines in neighbouring South Africa, throughout the 1970s, this quasi-monopoly by European traders began to end. However, lacking dedicated support from the post-independence Lesotho government, as well as a decline in opportunities for labour on the South African mines, saw these fortunes reverse and in the 1980s many Basotho who had established stores, sold these off to Indian and Taiwanese migrants.<sup>587</sup>

As indicated already primary motivation shared by most Taiwanese migrants to remain in Lesotho was an economic one. By the 1970s Taiwan had already begun to experience a marked economic boom, the country was considerably more affluent than any of the African states it courted, but this did not immediately translate into a general affluence for the population of Taiwan.<sup>588</sup> The economic growth was mostly export-focused, and Taiwan saw a rapid industrialization due to this. Conversely this success saw a rise in wages which was not able to remain steady with the similar increase in rent which took place.<sup>589</sup> Compounded by an unfavourable exchange rate, for much of the 1970s many Taiwanese struggled with the high costs of living in Taiwan, which made the comparably cheaper circumstances of Lesotho an attractive option. In addition, the rapid industrialization in Taiwan saw many lose jobs and saw established entrepreneurs struggle to maintain their positions in the markets if they could not keep pace with the advent of new technologies being introduced.<sup>590</sup> This was true both of those governmentally dispatched Taiwanese and the later migrants who came privately on their own initiative.

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<sup>584</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 136.

<sup>585</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 29.

<sup>586</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 135.

<sup>587</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 135.

<sup>588</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 30.

<sup>589</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 30.

<sup>590</sup> S. Manoeli: “Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development,” *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 6.

These same economic motivations were particularly important for the major exodus of Taiwanese textile industrialists to Lesotho throughout the 1970s and 80s. Within Taiwan itself the production of textiles had become inefficient for business owners seeking to maximize profit.<sup>591</sup> In addition to this, the markets in small African states such as Lesotho often had easier access to lucrative Western markets than Taiwan itself had at the time, making them an appealing alternative to Taiwanese business owners. These factors led to a largescale development of Taiwanese textile factories throughout southern Africa. As a result, Taiwanese-owned textile factories soon became a common sight in Lesotho and, further, a vital component of Lesotho's economy, serving as a significant employer of local Basotho labour in unskilled positions in time.

The fact of the matter was that the government of Lesotho actively courted foreign investment as part of its post-independence plan.<sup>592</sup> Throughout the 1960s and 70s the government of Lesotho hoped to stimulate development within its economy through foreign investment. To this end it actively courted potential investors from outside the country and purposefully created conditions to be appealing to them. A major step in this process was the earlier mentioned 1974 mutual visa fees wavier agreement between Taiwan and Lesotho.<sup>593</sup> The relationship between this influx of Taiwanese investors must not be seen as simply going one way. To the government of Lesotho the presence of the Taiwanese textile factories, and to a lesser extent other businesses, were seen as advantageous and useful in particular because they had established access to massive markets such as those in the United States.<sup>594</sup> This was particularly the case in the 1980s, when the government of Lesotho began to actively establish industrial zones and parks, particularly around the capital of Maseru, with the intention to draw Taiwanese factories and investment to these zones.<sup>595</sup> Lesotho went so far, during the 1980s, to send multiple government delegations to Taiwan, to entice investors to setup shop in Lesotho. For both the Taiwanese investors and the Lesotho government a goal of these zones was to increase Taiwanese access to textile markets in the US. These were particularly lucrative and, thus, it was hoped that by becoming a provider for them both groups would benefit. The Lesotho government's interest in this was not purely one of profit though. Beyond expecting

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<sup>591</sup> S. Manoeli: "Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development," *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 6.

<sup>592</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 226.

<sup>593</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 44.

<sup>594</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 226.

<sup>595</sup> D. Brautigam: "Close Encounters: Chinese business networks as industrial catalysts in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Africa Affairs*, 102:408, pp 448-449.



foreign direct investment that would help to stimulate and develop their own economy, they were also hoping that the presence of Taiwanese factories would provide both employment for local Basotho and also serve to teach them skills that they could then employ themselves to help further develop the country's economic sectors.

Another factor which helped to draw these Taiwanese investors to Lesotho was the country's proximity to South African infrastructure. At the time upon the African continent, South Africa's infrastructure was considered particularly advanced and, thus, would help in the necessary supply chains to support a largescale textile industry.<sup>596</sup> Jennifer Chen, the current president of the Lesotho Taiwanese Exporters Association and one of the most important owners of textile factories in the country, stated the following:

Our wave of investors specifically sought out the countries bordering South Africa. Although we couldn't invest directly in South Africa, due to its apartheid policies at the time, we knew that if we were close by, we could take advantage of the stellar transport infrastructure, logistics and shipping services, and road network in South Africa.<sup>597</sup>

The success of these textile companies was clear from the stake they would soon gain as Lesotho's biggest private employers and one of the largest sectors in the country's economy.<sup>598</sup> Around the capital of Maseru, in the primary industrial zones, a majority of the factories established there would end up under Taiwanese ownership.<sup>599</sup> A clear example of the success of the Taiwanese textile companies in Lesotho can also be seen in the Nien Hsing textile company. In the 1980s seen as an ailing firm, it established the largest presence of any of the Taiwanese textile companies in Lesotho and is today one of the largest suppliers of denim products in the entire world, providing names like Levi's and Gap with jeans and more.<sup>600</sup>

Most of these Taiwanese textile companies were smaller offshoots of transnational ones based in Taiwan proper.<sup>601</sup> As a result they were local chapters of transnational companies, and often dealt with their clients in markets overseas, particularly affluent markets such as those of Europe or the US, through their headquarters in Taiwan, as opposed to in Lesotho. This did

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<sup>596</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, pp 25-26.

<sup>597</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, pp 25-26.

<sup>598</sup> K. I. Pike: *Made in Lesotho: Examining variations in workers' perceptions of compliance with labour standards in Lesotho's clothing industry*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 69.

<sup>599</sup> K. I. Pike: *Made in Lesotho: Examining variations in workers' perceptions of compliance with labour standards in Lesotho's clothing industry*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 69.

<sup>600</sup> T. Gibbs: *The Politics of Worker Rights in the Lesotho Textile Industry*, M. A. dissertation, p. 19.

<sup>601</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, International Centre for Trade and Development, p. 4.

have the effect of few linkages being built between the active economic actors in Lesotho and the markets they were selling to, as almost everything was mediated through Taiwanese interests located in Taiwan.<sup>602</sup> This meant that the engagement Lesotho itself gained with the commercial entities these textile firms had as clients was limited, as almost everything was done in Taiwan other than the actual assembly of the goods.

However, the Taiwanese textile businesses also served as a catalyst for their own growth, and the growth of the Chinese population in Lesotho. Taiwanese in Lesotho, already involved in textiles and apparel, would bring with them more Taiwanese looking to invest in the same market, setting off a rapid growth in the Taiwanese stake of Lesotho's burgeoning textile market.<sup>603</sup> With the diverse, international, supply chains these Taiwanese businesses also helped to make Lesotho's position in the global textile market comparatively robust and secure for a country of its developmental status.<sup>604</sup> Part of this was the tendency of Taiwanese business owners to employ and attract more of their family to their businesses. It was common practise for the business and its management and ownership to remain in the hands of a kin group, related family, and for them to provide employment for other family, luring more Taiwanese from Taiwan to Lesotho with these prospects of work.<sup>605</sup> These powerful kinship groups, yet another case of Chinese chain migration, helped to establish effective transnational migration support networks, which only increased the appeal of Lesotho as a destination for Taiwanese migrant workers.

Compared to the Fujianese group there is comparatively less evidence surrounding the experiences of the Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho. Much of what is known about them is limited to economic information, particularly in light of their still dominant role in Lesotho's critical textile industry. A further complication with piecing together the lives of the Taiwanese migrants is their subdued presence in Lesotho's media. Moreover, their visibility is masked by the difference in scope and size of Lesotho's media, from the late twentieth century as compared to the early twenty-first century. Whilst the Fujianese migrants have been a dominating topic in Lesotho's media the Taiwanese migrants, by contrast, rarely appeared in any form of media in Lesotho. However, some evidence does remain, particularly in the form

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<sup>602</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, International Centre for Trade and Development, p. 4.

<sup>603</sup> S. Manoeli: "Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development," *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 9.

<sup>604</sup> S. Manoeli: "Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development," *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 9.

<sup>605</sup> T. Gibbs: *The Politics of Worker Rights in the Lesotho Textile Industry*, M. A. dissertation, p. 21.

of personal stories as well as interviews by Taiwanese Chinese who lived in Lesotho during this period and, further, by Fujianese migrants who interacted with these Taiwanese migrants during the 1980s and 1990s. From this we can piece together some of the social history of the Taiwanese in Lesotho.

### 5.3 The Taiwanese Experience

Living and working in Lesotho was, often, a family affair for the Taiwanese.<sup>606</sup> In most anecdotes shared, and most known cases, Taiwanese migrants working in Lesotho were accompanied by family members and shared the business internally among the family unit. It was common for the businesses within Taiwanese families to swap ownership from parents to children or spouse-to-spouse.<sup>607</sup> This even involved distant travel from one country to another, as in the case of Kiki Koo, who moved to Lesotho from Taiwan after her husband, who had been operating the business there, died.<sup>608</sup> In addition to the family-based nature of these business ventures, an additional point of interest was the comparatively prominent role of women among the Taiwanese migrant population in Lesotho. The earlier mentioned Jennifer Chen, a Taiwanese migrant, is one of the most prominent voices in Taiwan's Textile Association in Lesotho, and prominent Taiwanese businesswomen such as Wen Yu-hsia and Chen Shou-yin indicate that multiple Taiwanese women have been successful as private entrepreneurs in Lesotho. Though it is true that the majority of the textile factories and other firms in Lesotho are still owned by men, the presence of Jennifer Chen and other high-profile Taiwanese women as entrepreneurs in Lesotho's economy is indicative of the success of Taiwanese women as migrant businesswomen abroad. This is similar to a phenomenon later witnessed among the Fujianese Chinese migrants. The business environment in Lesotho typically means that any traditional expectation that only men be involved in the running of businesses cannot last. Simply the demands of successfully operating the companies requires that female family members also become involved in the day-to-day affairs and running of the enterprises. Similarly, the family-orientated nature of the companies in Lesotho is very similar

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<sup>606</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75; Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

<sup>607</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75; Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

<sup>608</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75.

to that of the Fujianese Chinese, pointing to several commonalities on how these two groups of migrants lived in Lesotho.

Taiwanese small traders and retailers were also involved in a relatively diverse set of practises. Standard retail, grocery stores, cardboard production, bricks, motor vehicle parts and more were all operated by the Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho.<sup>609</sup> Of particular note was a distillery opened by Kiki Koo in Maseru.<sup>610</sup> At the time, in 1977, it was one of the only Chinese-style distilleries operating outside of China in the entire world, specializing in a number of traditional drinks such as 白酒 or ‘fire-water’.<sup>611</sup> Although exact information on this group of migrants is somewhat scarce, we can deduce some information from the Fujianese migrants who, in the 1980s and 1990s, came overseas often to work under these Taiwanese businessmen and women, typically in managerial positions.<sup>612</sup>

From the accounts of their mainland employees, the Taiwanese migrant community in Lesotho established themselves as key players in the country’s retail industry, particularly running a significant proportion of grocery chains within Lesotho.<sup>613</sup> Our clearest indication of the success of these migrants was that when the Fujianese migrants, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, began to enter into Lesotho’s retail and wholesale industry themselves they, overwhelmingly, identified other Taiwanese companies as their fiercest competition within Lesotho.<sup>614</sup> This was even though during the 1960s and 1990s Lesotho’s retail and wholesale sector played host to a number of different East Asian migrant groups, such as Koreans and Indians, the Fujianese businessmen invariably singled out Taiwanese merchants as their most important competition.<sup>615</sup>

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<sup>609</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>610</sup> C. Blanckenberg: “Kiki’s a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water,” *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75.

<sup>611</sup> C. Blanckenberg: “Kiki’s a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water,” *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75.

<sup>612</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>613</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>614</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>615</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

For the most part, Taiwanese migrants seem to have largely restricted themselves to Lesotho's cities and industrial zones. This is a point of clear contrast between them and the Fujianese Chinese who would come after them. Most known Taiwanese businesses and individuals all operated, typically, around Maseru or in the textile factories dotting the country.<sup>616</sup>

The overall mood of the Taiwanese migrants in the 1980s seemed optimistic. They were receptive to the Lesotho government's efforts to create spaces for them, purposefully appealing to them in order to secure foreign investment.<sup>617</sup> The initial reaction of the Basotho populace seemed positive as well.<sup>618</sup> The Lesotho government of this time invested in creating new spaces of development, roads, bus stops, transportation infrastructure, focused initially on the capital of Maseru. All these newly created areas proved attractive to business owners of both Taiwanese and Basotho origin.<sup>619</sup> This also included new companies, such as the Lesotho National Development Corporation, and industrial parks around Maseru and Mafeteng, all intended to attract foreign investors. Although some had the intention of opening spaces for local Basotho entrepreneurs to also attempt their own businesses, the overarching and clear goal of these initiatives, beginning in 1976, was always to attract foreign, private, investment.<sup>620</sup> Continuing the obvious pattern of the post-independence Lesotho government, the activities of local Basotho were simply relegated to lesser status than the importance of attracting foreign firms and investments.<sup>621</sup>

Outside these developmental spaces, throughout wider Lesotho, it remained similarly true that the Taiwanese found for themselves a largely welcoming place as they began to become part of Lesotho's retail industry. Bao-San Fang was a Taiwanese citizen skilled in traditional Chinese painting and other arts. In the 1980s he made the decision to move to Lesotho and like many Taiwanese migrants after 1974 this decision was motivated because a prior migrant already living in Lesotho, a friend of his invited him over.<sup>622</sup> In Lesotho he, and his family,

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<sup>616</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75; C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>617</sup> D. Ambrose: "Picture of a City – Maseru: An illustrated History," *The Journal of African History*, 35, (2), p. 240.

<sup>618</sup> D. Ambrose: "Picture of a City – Maseru: An illustrated History," *The Journal of African History*, 35, (2), p. 240.

<sup>619</sup> D. Ambrose: "Picture of a City – Maseru: An illustrated History," *The Journal of African History*, 35, (2), p. 240.

<sup>620</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>621</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>622</sup> C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147.

established themselves in a small town, filling a niche as they sold ornaments, carpets and vases decorated in traditional Chinese styles.<sup>623</sup> They remained in Lesotho up until 1983, when the government of Lesotho switched its recognition of Taiwan in favour of the PRC.<sup>624</sup> Although they had usually come as part of projects with very specific targets and time frames, many of these Taiwanese experts chose to remain behind in Lesotho even after the remit of their projects ended.<sup>625</sup> Jolene Chang and her family, who had come to assist in the rice farm project, opted to remain in Lesotho once the project was complete, purchasing a store from Indian traders to operate for themselves.<sup>626</sup> This was a common story among the Taiwanese migrants who opted to remain in Lesotho. Most of them would eventually become retailers and wholesalers within the country, joining the already influential community of Indian traders in largely dominating Lesotho's retail market until the 1990s.<sup>627</sup>

As indicated in chapter 4, the newly independent Lesotho government did not go to great lengths to attempt to promote or support Basotho taking up an economic role in retail or wholesale.<sup>628</sup> As has been extensively documented by Maliehe, between independence and the brief overthrow of civilian government in the 1980s, the Lesotho government, as part of pursuing predominantly neoliberal economic policies, in many ways acted directly to harm Basotho stakes in numerous economic sectors, showing a marked preference for foreign investors from abroad.<sup>629</sup> It continued to encourage foreign investors and traders, hoping to attract them to the country. Although on the surface this was motivated by a consistent belief of the initial post-independence government in the importance of attracting foreign capital and foreign direct investment, a result of this practise was that, even as European traders lost their colonial-era quasi-monopoly in the trading sector, most of it was taken up by other foreigners, drawn to Lesotho's business climate.<sup>630</sup> At first, and most prominently, these were Indian

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<sup>623</sup> C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147.

<sup>624</sup> C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147.

<sup>625</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 40.

<sup>626</sup> L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 126.

<sup>627</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 40.

<sup>628</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 22.

<sup>629</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 22.

<sup>630</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 193.



traders, who had already been competing with European traders during Lesotho's time as a protectorate of the British Empire. Following a law in 1973 which removed colonial-era restrictions on Indian traders, they were able to flourish and spread through much of Lesotho and definitively replace their old European competition as the primary merchant class in Lesotho.<sup>631</sup> They would not stay long, most having departed after the 1991 and 1998 riots which targeted Asian expatriates in general throughout Lesotho. When Taiwanese entered into the retail and wholesale sector, they did so alongside an already substantial population of Indian traders. Ultimately, this left little space for the Basotho to establish their own presence in retail or wholesale. This should not, however, be understood as meaning they did not attempt to do so. Many Basotho sought to open their own stores but, by the 1980s and 1990s, most of these were forced to close and sell, often to other Asian traders.<sup>632</sup>

It is worth noting that, in coming to take a prominent place as traders in Lesotho, the Taiwanese were very much taking up the place previously inhabited by other foreigners. First British and other European traders and then, after them, Indian traders.<sup>633</sup> Taiwanese migrants were definitively not the first group of foreigners in Lesotho to come to play such a pivotal economic role. However, the role of Taiwanese, and later Fujianese, retailers and traders as very much inheriting a position once held by these Indian traders is evident in how many of the Chinese stores currently rented from Indian owners no longer living in Lesotho. It is estimated that as much as 60% of all the stores operated by Chinese retailers in Lesotho are rented from Indian owners.<sup>634</sup> These initial Taiwanese migrants thus formed the first group of Chinese traders and storeowners, a role which later waves of Chinese, including the contemporary Fujianese migrants, would continue to occupy.<sup>635</sup>

Many of the Taiwanese who opened up their own stores and small businesses spoke positively of their experiences in the 1970s and 1980s. They found the overall atmosphere welcoming and were able to carve out for themselves profitable niches. Wen Yu-hsia is, currently, the owner of Lesotho's largest cardboard producer, and she remembered her initial experiences in

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<sup>631</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 193.

<sup>632</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 193.

<sup>633</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 40.

<sup>634</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 193.

<sup>635</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 40.

Lesotho positively overall, describing her relationship with the local Basotho as a respectful one:

Africans are very easy to get along with. First, if your skilled they will respect you. Second, if you pay their salaries, they will also respect you.<sup>636</sup>

Despite the protests of her family she had come to Lesotho in the 1980s, at 26 years old, to work in one of the Taiwanese firms setting up shop in Lesotho. There she would meet her husband, a fellow Taiwanese entrepreneur, and the two would open their own business together after she had completed her initial contract.<sup>637</sup> For many of the Taiwanese who came after 1974, not connected to the initial governmental aid programmes, this was a familiar story. They would usually initially come over to work in the firms and businesses of already established Taiwanese investors. But, when their contracts expired, rather than returning to Taiwan, many of them opted instead to remain in Lesotho, establishing their own businesses and lives there. Other Taiwanese who managed to open up stores in the 1980s and remained in Lesotho through the 1990 riots usually reveal a similar sentiment. Both Wu Song-bai, who operates a transportation company moving goods between South Africa and Lesotho, and Chen Shou-yin, who runs a textile company employing 1 000 local women, reveal that they were mostly optimistic when entering Lesotho.<sup>638</sup> They saw opportunities for themselves and have continued to thrive in Lesotho even as the sentiment against Chinese in general has soured in the country. A consistent image that appears is that those Taiwanese migrants who have elected to remain in Lesotho, rather than taking part in the large exodus of Taiwanese following the 1990s, are mostly positive about their experiences and their interactions with the Basotho. When asked many of them also seem to believe they have an overall positive impact on the country, particularly as job creators. Chen Shou-yin referenced her employment of Basotho locals, and that her reason for staying in Lesotho was to try to help a country she saw as being particularly impoverished:

The reason I chose Lesotho is that it was one of the 10 poorest countries. So, their government hopes people come here and establish factories to provide job opportunities. They encourage us to set up factories by saying that the U.S. doesn't tax

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<sup>636</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>637</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>638</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

or place quotas on exports from here. There are plenty of orders, and you can't complete them all. I have continually expanded the textile factory from 200 people in the beginning to 1,000 by 1999.<sup>639</sup>

Chen even specifically made mention that her first attempt to establish her own firm in Lesotho, at 31 years of age, failed. However, she did not allow that to deter her, returning to Lesotho alone to try again a few years on, and eventually succeeding in establishing herself.<sup>640</sup> In addition to this, many of the remaining Taiwanese in Lesotho have adopted Lesotho citizenship as well.<sup>641</sup> Partly this is simply due to the above mentioned lenient immigration laws concerning dual citizenship, making it far easier for them, but at the same time it is also a reflection of how the remaining migrant Taiwanese population feel and shows how committed they are to their new home. The current Taiwanese community within Lesotho, though considerably smaller now, represent in large part those Taiwanese who have most integrated with the wider civil society within Lesotho.<sup>642</sup> Beyond adopting Lesotho citizenship many of them have raised their families in Lesotho, as opposed to Taiwan, and had their children educated within Lesotho as well.<sup>643</sup> In the case of several prominent members of the remaining Taiwanese population in Lesotho, such as Jennifer Chen, adopting Lesotho citizenship is not a performative gesture, as she insists that she intends to stay in the African country she has now called "home" for over two decades.<sup>644</sup> Similarly David Chen, when asked about his own Lesotho citizenship, emphasised:

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<sup>639</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>640</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>641</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

<sup>642</sup> *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>643</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>644</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

We aren't foreigners. My children were born here. We are Basotho.<sup>645</sup>

Despite the hardships they have faced, and increasing prejudice they suffer, these Taiwanese still seemed committed and optimistic about their futures in Lesotho. A clear conclusion which can be drawn from this is that those Taiwanese who have stayed in Lesotho, have become citizens there, are those that found economic success already, whilst those who did not and would, most likely, have more negative opinions of their time there have by now all migrated either back to Taiwan and mainland China or to other prospects. It is therefore unsurprising that, though small, the Taiwanese community still in Lesotho now are largely committed to their position and stake in the country, having found success and stability for themselves there and often also having established families there who have only ever known Lesotho as a home.

During their time in Lesotho a persistent point of concern for the Taiwanese migrants, and a point of concern that would be shared by every successive group of Chinese migrants who entered Lesotho, was their perception of crime and corruption in the country. When asked, almost universally, Chinese migrants of in Lesotho affirmed that they feared becoming targets of criminal actions by local Basotho.<sup>646</sup> Furthermore, many of them complained about their stores being broken into and a lack of action from the Lesotho government in delivering any form of restitution for losses they suffered due to criminal acts.<sup>647</sup> Corruption, too, was a consistent point of contention for the Taiwanese from the beginning, particularly among those who operated in the retail and wholesale sectors.<sup>648</sup> Compared to the later Fujianese Chinese, the initial period of the Taiwanese migrant community's existence in Lesotho was very well-received and seemed, by their own account, to be overall positive.

However, the mood against the Chinese within Lesotho began to worsen rapidly during the 1980s. In contemporary Lesotho, the prejudice and hostility faced by Chinese in Lesotho is evident and relatively well-known, driven predominantly by a perception that the Chinese have an outsized and undeserved stake in Lesotho's economy. Through most of the 1970s and 1980s, as shown above, the Taiwanese did not endure this same level of resentment as now exists towards Chinese. Indeed, at least for the first two decades the Taiwanese migrants mostly found

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<sup>645</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>646</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>647</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>648</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

themselves welcomed, and report as much themselves.<sup>649</sup> The mood was beginning to sour, already, in the 1980s though, with 1987 seeing the first public outcry concerning the presence of Chinese in the country. At the time the Taiwanese and other mainland Chinese were largely conflated as one single group.<sup>650</sup> However, by the 1980s this mood had begun to turn, caused by the decline in mine remittances and a spate of economic and political difficulties within Lesotho. Of note, as well, was the change in the government's policies towards small businesses following the 1998 election. Following the chaotic civil strife, and the South African and Botswanan intervention, many of the small businesses, including those owned by Basotho, were in need of financial aid. The aid provided by the government was usually insufficient to keep these small businesses afloat and, as a result, many of them were forced to sell their stores.<sup>651</sup> As it so happened the largest group looking to buy these stores were freshly arrived Chinese migrants, mostly from the mainland, drawn initially by the Taiwanese need for cheap labour in their own businesses.<sup>652</sup> By the 1990s already within Lesotho a particular idea and image of the Chinese in Lesotho had crystallised among much of the population. This image was of foreigners who “exploited” or “stole” business opportunities from local Basotho, who enriched themselves at the expense of the country and who wielded control of the country's economy and government to some extent.<sup>653</sup> Within this context it bears mentioning that to many of the Basotho the distinction between Taiwanese, Shanghai or Fujianese Chinese was irrelevant and immaterial. All of them were simply considered “Chinese” as a general class.

When analysing why a particular group of individuals, or segment of a population, excel or seem to perform better by certain measurements it is always possible of ascribing too narrow causes as the explanation. Often factors of a multifarious nature - economic, social, cultural, political and more - all combine to create the circumstances that see certain groups excel pronouncedly in certain endeavours.<sup>654</sup> The same is, of course, true of the success of the Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho with regards to their success as retailers and wholesalers.

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<sup>649</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 45.

<sup>650</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 139; T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>651</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 8.

<sup>652</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 136.

<sup>653</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 136.

<sup>654</sup> E. Rodrigue, N. Joo & R. Reeves: *Asian-American success and the pitfalls of generalizations*, The Brookings Institutions, Report, 20 April 2016.

Political considerations cannot be ignored on this matter, particularly because of how important diplomatic relations with Taiwan were as a donor nation were to Lesotho. Yet, at the same time, it would be an oversimplification to put down the success of Taiwanese storeowners purely to something like “political favouritism”. Clear material factors, including things like their specific business practices or work ethics, do also play a role in this. Another, prominent, material factor which aided many of these retailers and wholesalers was their ability to source goods they sold cheaply, and easily, from their homes in Taiwan or from sources on mainland China.<sup>655</sup> In addition to these sources, the Taiwanese also frequently had pre-existing relationships with businesses in South Africa, seeing as it too had been the recipient of a wave of Taiwanese aid and investment during the 1970s.<sup>656</sup> As mentioned before, Lesotho was only the recipient of investment and developmental aid from Taiwan after South Africa, and the degree of investment and aid received by South Africa was greater.<sup>657</sup> This meant that many Taiwanese had already established businesses and factories in South Africa for themselves. These remained largely in close contact and communication with their countrymen operating in Lesotho and there was a consistent and mutual flow of both supplies and labour as well as know-how between these groups.<sup>658</sup> As a result, many of the Taiwanese business owners were able to supplement their supplies not only with goods from China but, in addition, from nearby South Africa as well. The Taiwanese migrants simply had access to larger, more diverse, and well-stocked, supply chains than their local competition in Lesotho did, and this naturally gave them an advantage in terms of commercial competition.<sup>659</sup>

As a result, in the final decade of their heavy involvement within Lesotho, discrimination against the Taiwanese saw expression in violent riots in both 1991 and 1998.<sup>660</sup> The 1991 riot would claim over 34 lives, injure some 65 others, and marked the most intense violence yet directed at the Chinese trader community inside Lesotho. In addition to loss of life and injury, there was also substantial damage done to stores. At least 77 businesses found their offices and properties damaged, with 16 of them being burned down completely.<sup>661</sup> Overwhelmingly it

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<sup>655</sup> M. Turner: “Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho,” M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 40.

<sup>656</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>657</sup> L. Xu: *On the Edge of Capitalism: Africa local States, Chinese Family Firms, and the Transformations of Industrial Labour*, M. A. dissertation, p. 195.

<sup>658</sup> L. Xu: *On the Edge of Capitalism: Africa local States, Chinese Family Firms, and the Transformations of Industrial Labour*, M. A. dissertation, p. 195.

<sup>659</sup> Y. Zi: “China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 33.

<sup>660</sup> M. Clement: “34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil,” *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92.

<sup>661</sup> R. Tangri: “Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho,” *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.



was Chinese and Indian businesses targeted and damaged in these riots.<sup>662</sup> It is worth noting, here, that for the most part the Basotho did not differentiate between Taiwanese, mainland Chinese or even other South-East Asian peoples such as Koreans who, also, found themselves targeted in these riots.

Occurring on May 20 of 1991, the riot was sparked by the death of a local Basotho woman over shoplifting. The woman, who had her baby with her, had stolen a shirt from a Taiwanese owned store.<sup>663</sup> She was caught by a security guard before she was able to escape, however, and beaten outside the store by the security guard. This beating, unsurprisingly, attracted attention. The woman herself would tragically die from the beating, and this death would serve as the primary inciting incident for the riots.<sup>664</sup> With frustration and resentment already simmering, the riot would indiscriminately target stores and shops throughout Maseru, with the Asian expatriate communities, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and even some Koreans, being targeted.<sup>665</sup> The turmoil was only halted after a strict curfew was enforced by heavily armed paramilitary groups throughout the city.<sup>666</sup> Even so, in response to the riot many Taiwanese families had fled into neighbouring South Africa. In Ladybrand, near Lesotho's border with the Free State, the municipal government even established a temporary refugee camp for these Taiwanese refugees from Lesotho.<sup>667</sup> Rather than return to Lesotho, many of the Taiwanese opted instead to remain in South Africa. As many as 70 families chose to settle in Ladybrand, and several others relocated to Bloemfontein rather than go back to Lesotho.<sup>668</sup>

In 1998 further riots would break out, and would send yet another exodus of Taiwanese, along with other targeted Asian expatriates, fleeing to South Africa from Lesotho.<sup>669</sup> The riots in 1998 were not, predominantly, sparked by racial tensions as those in 1991. They were largely in response to the volatile political situation in the country at the time.<sup>670</sup> However, as often

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<sup>662</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>663</sup> M. Clement: "34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil," *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92.

<sup>664</sup> M. Clement: "34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil," *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92.

<sup>665</sup> M. Clement: "34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil," *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92.

<sup>666</sup> C. Baylies & C. Wright: "Female labour in the textile and clothing industry of Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92, p. 577.

<sup>667</sup> L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 127.

<sup>668</sup> L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 127.

<sup>669</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 143.

<sup>670</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 143.

happens in such chaotic periods, the targets of the rioters were, very frequently, Asian store owners, including Taiwanese ones.<sup>671</sup> These riots would do much to drive away Taiwanese Chinese from Lesotho, many seeking out South Africa instead, and contributed to the decline of Taiwanese migration to Lesotho which, by the twenty-first century, had largely halted. The only substantive group of Taiwanese who were to remain in Lesotho after this were the owners and managers of the textile factories and a few large supply companies which still operate under Taiwanese ownership today. Wu Songbai, as late as 2011, still lived in Lesotho along with his wife.<sup>672</sup> However, though some few do remain, by the end of the 1990s most Taiwanese migrants had exited Lesotho.

#### 5.4 The Mainland Chinese

As the 1980s approached, the Taiwanese factory owners, retailers and wholesalers operating in Lesotho faced a labour shortage in their managerial sectors.<sup>673</sup> In addition, the Taiwanese owned retail and wholesale companies similarly lacked middle management staff in their shops. Initially they had largely employed fellow migrants from Taiwan, but the economic successes of Taiwan had made migration to Lesotho no longer an attractive option for many Taiwanese.<sup>674</sup> As a result, where they could previously count on luring their countrymen to Lesotho with promises of work and profit, now most of those same countrymen saw prospects in Taiwan and on the mainland more lucrative and as being vastly more attractive than anything being offered in Lesotho. Faced with this problem there were, of course, several possible solutions to pursue. One option would simply have been to turn to employing more Basotho labour from the local population in Lesotho itself. This option was, pointedly, not pursued at the time.<sup>675</sup> It should be noted that the Taiwanese had always employed large numbers of Basotho for unskilled or menial work, and still do today. However, when it came to managerial positions and supervisory rolls, they had opted historically in favour of other Chinese. Although, to an extent, the reasoning behind this choice was the lack of skilled or qualified

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<sup>671</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 143.

<sup>672</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>673</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>674</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, 164.

<sup>675</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 43.

Basotho labour, but in the case of the Taiwanese owned factories, the role trust played cannot be completely ignored. By the 1980s relationships between the Basotho and Taiwanese were more fraught with tension, on both sides. The 1991 outbreak of violence in Maseru was indicative of clear tensions, and distrust between both Taiwanese and Basotho peoples.<sup>676</sup>

Instead, the solution pursued by the Taiwanese migrants was to entice mainland Chinese to Lesotho.<sup>677</sup> Whilst for Taiwanese economic prospects outside of Taiwan had become less appealing, this was not the case for many mainland Chinese. Now that the PRC had entered a period of openness, economic opportunities outside the mainland not only appeared enticing but were more feasible to pursue than they had previously been.<sup>678</sup> This policy succeeded in dealing with the labour shortage the Taiwanese business owners had been facing, with a fresh wave of Chinese migrants now arriving in Lesotho, this time from the mainland as opposed to from Taiwan. Predominantly, these new migrants came from Shanghai, or the areas surrounding the city.<sup>679</sup> A significant portion of them were employed specifically at the Taiwanese owned textile and garment factories, but many found employment also in retail stores and wholesale centres.<sup>680</sup>

Many of these Shanghai Chinese would follow in the footsteps of the Taiwanese migrants before them. They would purchase retail stores, wholesalers, often from the Taiwanese migrants who had preceded them, continuing to ensure that Chinese migrants in Lesotho were a common fixture of the countries retail and wholesale sectors.<sup>681</sup> This would be the case for Doctor Huang, a medical practitioner from Shanghai employed to work at one of the Taiwanese textile factories in Lesotho in 1988.<sup>682</sup> After his work with the factory expired, rather than returning home to Shanghai, Doctor Huang elected to remain in Lesotho, purchasing a retail store from a Taiwanese migrant now seeking to return home, and becoming a retailer

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<sup>676</sup> M. Clement: "34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil," *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92.

<sup>677</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>678</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>679</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>680</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>681</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>682</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

himself.<sup>683</sup> A similar story was true of Mister Ong Guoliang, a mainland Chinese man who came to Lesotho in 1993.<sup>684</sup> Like many of the initial mainland Chinese coming to Lesotho, he found employ with Taiwanese migrants already settled in Lesotho. In his case, rather than working in a managerial or supervisory capacity in a textile factory, he instead was hired to work in a Taiwanese-owned supermarket.<sup>685</sup> In his own words, in the early 1990s, Ong Guoliang described the Chinese communities of Lesotho to mostly be a “Taiwanese or Hong Kong affair”, owning a number of factories and smaller stores, providing employment to mainland Chinese such as himself. This was the case throughout the 1990s and, as the Taiwanese migrants had done when Indian traders pulled out before, as more and more Taiwanese migrated out of Lesotho these mainland Chinese took the opportunity to often purchase the stores they left behind.<sup>686</sup> These mainland Chinese often had little contact beyond work with the local population of Lesotho. Persistently fearing crime, they spent most of their time in dorms or built-on accommodations to their workplaces, often socializing only with fellow Chinese.<sup>687</sup> It was not uncommon for even their transportation between work and where they slept to be arranged by their Taiwanese employers, further limiting any contact they had with any non-Chinese in the country.<sup>688</sup>

The relationship between the mainland Chinese employees and the Taiwanese migrants cannot be described uniformly. Many mainland Chinese who came to be retailers and wholesalers after the departure of the Taiwanese migrants at the end of the 1990s did so by inheriting control of Taiwanese stores from their former employers.<sup>689</sup> Additionally, many of those mainland Chinese who would go on to run these stores received their training and experience from the

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<sup>683</sup> M. Turner: “Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho,” M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>684</sup> X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](http://ifeng.com), Accessed 2 June 2020.

<sup>685</sup> X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](http://ifeng.com), Accessed 2 June 2020.

<sup>686</sup> X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](http://ifeng.com), Accessed 2 June 2020.

<sup>687</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 65.

<sup>688</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>689</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

years they spent serving as managers and middle-men for their Taiwanese employers in Lesotho.<sup>690</sup> Several prominent mainland Chinese businessmen, even whilst describing the fierce competition they initially faced from Taiwanese in retail and wholesale, still described personally warm, friendly, relations with their Taiwanese employers, at times even crediting them with their success due to the start-up capital they received from them.<sup>691</sup> A consistent pattern in the development of the affluent Fujianese merchant class was that they initially worked directly under Taiwanese employers, typically within supermarkets.<sup>692</sup> As a result, it is clear that some Taiwanese migrants had positive relationship with the mainland migrants.

However, there were also numerous incidents of Taiwanese employers misusing and abusing their mainland employees.<sup>693</sup> In particular the process of recruiting mainland Chinese to work in Lesotho during the 1980s was often rife with deception and highly opaque.<sup>694</sup> Many were cheated out of work they had been promised in China upon arrival in Lesotho or were lured to Lesotho on false promises that they would be transferred to South Africa in the future. This problem was commonplace enough that even the court system in Lesotho commented on what they saw as a “consistent and common problem” with regards to the deception by Taiwanese employers of their mainland Chinese employees.<sup>695</sup> As a result, the relationship between the Taiwanese and mainland Chinese can, at best, be described as a complex one during the period between 1960 and the end of the 1990s. Though several mainland Chinese evidenced warm, personal, relations with Taiwanese, a notable commonality is that those with positive experiences with the Taiwanese are those who had become affluent themselves already, often with support from their Taiwanese employers. This, perhaps, indicates that this positive relationship was genuine, as they had the fortune to be employed by the most supportive of the

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L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>691</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>692</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>693</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>694</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>695</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho. But, for many other mainland Chinese, they were not so fortunate, and systematic problems in the recruitment of mainland Chinese to Lesotho seem clear and will be considered in the next chapter. Perhaps the best way to view the relationship between the migrant mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in this period is to simply keep in mind that the Taiwanese migrants are not monolithic themselves. Though many, clearly, had little care for the conditions of their mainland Chinese employees, it is clear that some did.

This practise, of the Shanghai and other mainland Chinese often taking over small retailers and wholesalers from Taiwanese migrants, fits into an established practise documented among other Chinese communities in Africa. It is quite common for mainland Chinese arriving in African states to purchase or take over the industries and businesses of Taiwanese migrants who had arrived before them in the 1970s.<sup>696</sup> Whatever conflicts exist at the governmental level, when coming to Africa private Chinese, from the mainland and Taiwan, tended to build and benefit from the same supply chains and networks. As a result, usually the arrival of a migrant could build easier inroads by relying on those who came before them, regardless of whether they came from the mainland or Taiwan.<sup>697</sup> Like the Taiwanese retailers and wholesalers before them, the Shanghai Chinese had the economic advantage of more easily accessing supply networks and chains from both China and neighbouring South Africa.<sup>698</sup> This allowed them to very easily step into that same niche that the Taiwanese migrants had. An important distinction, however, which did exist between the Shanghai Chinese and the Taiwanese was that the Shanghai Chinese did not successfully entrench themselves in vital industries such as textiles or garments. For this reason, their impact in Lesotho was felt little outside retail and wholesale in the country.<sup>699</sup>

Without a doubt, the predominantly Shanghai mainland Chinese who entered Lesotho in significant numbers in the 1990s left the smallest footprint of the Chinese migrant communities in the Mountain Kingdom. When we analyse the legacies and lasting impact of these two migrant groups of Chinese in Lesotho, it becomes clear that while the Taiwanese migrant community continues to have an active connection to Lesotho, the mainland Chinese of the

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<sup>696</sup> Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 7.

<sup>697</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 33.

<sup>698</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015. 164.

<sup>699</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.



1990s have largely all drifted and moved away from there and have been replaced almost completely by the next wave of Chinese immigrants to come to Lesotho: the Fujianese Chinese.

However, the withdrawal of Taiwanese and Shanghai migrants was not immediately followed by an influx of Fujianese. For most of the late 1990s Lesotho saw no considerable increase in Chinese migration. Instead, the trend was rather one of seeing large communities of, particularly, mainland Chinese returning to their homes, as opposed to remaining in Lesotho.<sup>700</sup>

The anti-Chinese violence, as well as Lesotho's unstable political situation, saw Chinese migration only seriously begin to increase in the 2000s.<sup>701</sup> This time, however, it was not from Taiwan that the Chinese migrants came but, instead, from Fujian in mainland China. It is these Fujianese Chinese who today comprise the vast majority of all Chinese in Lesotho and, to date, are the last wave of Chinese migrants to enter the Mountain Kingdom.

## 5.5 Conclusion

Although Taiwanese migration to Lesotho may largely be a thing of the past, Taiwanese influence in the country is still deeply rooted and ongoing. The migrant Taiwanese community in Lesotho is currently the second largest Chinese community in the Mountain Kingdom. Though they are dwarfed in numbers by the recently arrived Fujianese Chinese, they hold some of the most visible and prestigious positions of any Chinese within Lesotho, owning a majority of all the Asian-owned factories and major firms in Lesotho. When speaking of the divide between the Chinese communities in Lesotho today, a simplistic understanding is that the Fujianese Chinese largely control matters of retail and wholesale, whilst the remaining Taiwanese continue to dominate the lucrative textile industry.

However, that is not to say that the Taiwanese community no longer is involved in the retail and wholesale sector at all, or that their influence there is not still felt. Even in the case of retail, though it is undoubtedly true that the stake of Taiwanese migrants in this sector is greatly diminished from what it once was, and never reached as prolific heights as the contemporary Fujianese migrants have managed, the legacy of the Taiwanese migrants is still visible throughout Lesotho. It is true that few stores remain in the hands of Taiwanese migrants, but those few that have survived are often major wholesalers, operating chains of stores in Lesotho,

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<sup>700</sup> S. Hanisch: "At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail Sector," *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 48, (3), 2013, pp 87-88.

<sup>701</sup> S. Hanisch: "At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho's Wholesale and Retail Sector," *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 48, (3), 2013, pp 87-88.

selling building materials, vehicle parts sourced from Taiwan and the mainland.<sup>702</sup> Similarly, as discussed above, Taiwanese investors still are involved in the production of other goods, such as cardboard boxes, and although their stake in retail is reduced many Taiwanese shop owners can still be found throughout Lesotho.

However, perhaps the clearest evidence of the ongoing Taiwanese legacy in Lesotho is found in the textile factories which still play such a pivotal role in Lesotho's economy and still, to this day, are largely owned and in the hands of Taiwanese businesses.<sup>703</sup> The role of these textile factories in Lesotho's economy is difficult to overstate. Even in the present day they represent one of the largest employers in the entire country and, within the manufacturing sector, they are quite possibly the single largest employer.<sup>704</sup> It is believed that at present Taiwan's private textile industries in Lesotho represent an investment of some 600 million US dollars in the country and employ around 50 000 Basotho, almost a fifth of the entire country's labour force.<sup>705</sup> The only other body in the country, for whom reliable data exists, who can definitively claim to employ more people throughout Lesotho is the government itself.<sup>706</sup> As a result, this textile industry represents a crucial part of Lesotho's economy not only for the Taiwanese but, also, for the mainland Chinese and the numerous Basotho they employ as well. It is also a fact that, with regards to the textile industry, Taiwanese individuals have remained firmly in control of this sector of the economy. In 2012, of the 21 Asian-owned factories around the capital only 4 were owned by interests from the PRC, the remaining 17 all being owned by Taiwanese companies.<sup>707</sup> The Taiwanese owned Nien Hsing textile company remains, most likely, the largest in the country, outstripping even the other Taiwanese firms present, and it has made a considerable investment in Lesotho. Running one of its only three worldwide denim mills, the Formosa mill, employing some 1 200 Basotho with a market capitalisation of some 300 million US dollars, Nien Hsing remains committed to its activities in Lesotho even to the present day.<sup>708</sup>

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<sup>702</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 43.

<sup>703</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>704</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 135.

<sup>705</sup> S. Radebe: "Foreign Investment – Lesotho's Material gain," *The Financial Times*, 2003.

<sup>706</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 135.

<sup>707</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, p. 2.

<sup>708</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 58.

It is a truism that, unfortunately, due to the pervasiveness of stereotypes many Basotho have come to see the textile industry as so thoroughly ‘Chinese’ that they do not express an interest in it.<sup>709</sup> This is made clear in the sentiments expressed by a Basotho manager of one of the regional firms in Lesotho who asserted that many Basotho reacted to his high position within one of these textile firms by referring to him as a ‘Chinese-Basotho’ and implying that employment at one of the textile factories was work fit only for women.<sup>710</sup> Similarly, Thabiso Mothabeng, a Basotho manager of the Mountain Textile Screening Company, spoke of his own isolated experiences as a Basotho owner of a textile company, finding himself in meetings with investors and clients who spoke either Chinese or English, and rarely meeting any other Basotho in the field.<sup>711</sup>

The textile factories also have become a significant point of contention within the country. There are two predominant complaints common in Lesotho in connection with the Taiwanese textile companies. The first common complaint is that these textile factories and businesses largely funnel their wealth only to their Taiwanese owners, and that this wealth does not benefit Lesotho, or the Basotho, and instead is simply being used to enrich foreigners and give them influence within Lesotho’s politics.<sup>712</sup> Commonly, in conjunction with this complaint, accusations are also made that the Lesotho government is too quiescent or submissive with regards to Chinese interests. They are said to allow the Taiwanese businesses to conduct themselves as they do because they are being personally enriched by them.<sup>713</sup> The second complaint commonly levelled by the Basotho are allegations of poor working conditions and even workplace abuses by Taiwanese and other mainland Chinese managers and supervisors of their predominantly Basotho workforce.<sup>714</sup> Cases such as a 2004 incident in which a Taiwanese manager disciplined, or attempted to discipline, their employees by hurling Fire Fighting Powder at them contributed to the tensions within the textile industry.<sup>715</sup> These complaints are particularly sensitive, and pertinent, in light of the fact that a significant portion of the Basotho workforce employed in these factories tend to be young or ailing Basotho

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<sup>709</sup> S. Manoeli: “Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development,” *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 15.

<sup>710</sup> S. Manoeli: “Lesotho after AGOA: From textile booms to sustainable development,” *Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper*, 2012, p. 15.

<sup>711</sup> I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, pp 116-117.

<sup>712</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 139.

<sup>713</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 139.

<sup>714</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 139.

<sup>715</sup> *Factory Workers Union and TZICC Clothing Manufacturers (PTY) LTD*, LC/20/2004, 13 May 2008.

women. Furthermore, currently these textile factories and companies remain mostly small offshoots of their larger parent companies in Taiwan.<sup>716</sup> This contributes to a persistent belief that these factories and the textile sector in general is not doing enough to help integrate Lesotho into wider international markets. This is because most of the interaction and mediation is performed by Taiwanese individuals operating out of larger companies based in Taiwan, simply using the institutions established in Lesotho to provide the materials they need. The only exception to this is the Formosa mill, which does directly negotiate with its US clients.<sup>717</sup>

As a general rule, however, the Taiwanese community remaining in Lesotho seems to have marginally warmer relationships with the Basotho than do the Fujianese Chinese. In an interview in 2010, speaking anonymously, a prominent female Taiwanese in the textile garment industry mostly emphasized that the Taiwanese were positive about their relations with the Basotho.<sup>718</sup> It is also true that many of the Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho hold dual citizenship, rather than being only Taiwanese citizens abroad. The Taiwanese community in Lesotho also often tends to express a similar dissatisfaction with the Fujian Chinese as the Basotho do. Indeed, a relatively widespread sentiment among Lesotho's remaining Taiwanese community is that the Fujianese Chinese effectively "ruin" the reputation of Chinese, as a wider group, in Lesotho.<sup>719</sup>

It is important, when discussing the impact of Taiwanese textile companies in Lesotho, to stress that these are not only the legacy of vestiges of a prior period but, in reality, a growing industry inside the country. Although Taiwanese migration has largely halted the same is not true of Taiwanese investment in Lesotho, which continues to expand and be drawn towards the Mountain Kingdom.<sup>720</sup> In the 2000s despite Lesotho now firmly being aligned towards the PRC politically, fresh Taiwanese funding came in, helping to stimulate an explosive growth in Lesotho's textile sectors.<sup>721</sup> This was largely due to a wave of Taiwanese investors seeking to capitalize on the advantage of Lesotho's exception from the American African Growth and

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<sup>716</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, p. 4.

<sup>717</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, p. vi.

<sup>718</sup> Y. J. Park: *Liminal Spaces: Ethnic Chinese in the Borderlands of Southern Africa*, Migration and Agency in a Globalizing World: Afro-Asian Encounters, p. 105.

<sup>719</sup> Y. J. Park: *Liminal Spaces: Ethnic Chinese in the Borderlands of Southern Africa*, Migration and Agency in a Globalizing World: Afro-Asian Encounters, p. 106.

<sup>720</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, p. vi.

<sup>721</sup> J. Barnes, M. Kao & M. Morris: *Global Value Chains, Sustainable Development, and the Apparel Industry in Lesotho*, p. vi.

Opportunity Act (AGOA).<sup>722</sup> AGOA, a piece of legislation passed in the United States of America in 2000, existed to assist certain designated African economies with access to US markets and exempt them from the Multi-Fibre Agreement. The Multi-Fibre Agreement was a piece of legislation which had enforced onerous conditions on certain developing countries' exports of textiles and fabrics to Europe and the United States of America, but from which Lesotho itself was exempt due to AGOA.<sup>723</sup> Passed in 2000 this exemption was a key factor attracting Taiwanese textile companies to Lesotho, seeing a chance to avoid the prior mentioned export quotas. AGOA helped maintain Lesotho's appeal to Taiwanese investors, and thus was seen as advantageous by Lesotho's government. However, under AGOA it is necessary for the state to not control or regulate foreign investment, as a result the state does not own most of the textile factories in Lesotho and, instead, it is left largely to private investors who tend to be Taiwanese.<sup>724</sup>

As late as 2012, Taiwanese textile firms still comprise the majority of textile firms throughout the country and have expanded in size since the 1990s.<sup>725</sup> Many of these textile firms continue to attempt to integrate themselves more deeply within Lesotho society. In 2019, Nien Hsing textiles took part in the "Meals for Hope" programme in Lesotho, donating both money and thermos to NGOs who would distribute them to those in need throughout the country.<sup>726</sup> Textile firms like Nien Hsing also have continued to host social events for their employees, such as the Formosa Choir, showing a clear attempt to ingratiate themselves among the local population of Lesotho.<sup>727</sup>

The importance these textile firms have to Lesotho's economy was highlighted again in 2020, with the outbreak of the novel Coronavirus. In response to the initial outbreak on March 29<sup>th</sup> the government of Lesotho had instituted a national lockdown on most factories and areas of employment, halting work in these locations in order to prevent further spread or transmission of the virus.<sup>728</sup> By the 5<sup>th</sup> of May of the same year when the government began to allow for the

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<sup>722</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>723</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>724</sup> K. Matlosa & C Sello: *Political Parties and Democratisation in Lesotho*, Eisa Research Report no. 23, p. 8.

<sup>725</sup> K. I. Pike: *Made in Lesotho: Examining variations in workers' perceptions of compliance with labour standards in Lesotho's clothing industry*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 67.

<sup>726</sup> Nien Hsing Textiles: *Nien Hsing Textile gives to the underprivileged in the Lesotho Region*, 19 September 2019.

<sup>727</sup> Nien Hsing Textiles: *Formosa Choir Finalists*, 5 June 2020.

<sup>728</sup> Nien Hsing Textiles: *Nien Hsing Textile to be the first company re-opened in Lesotho, after inspection by the Minister of Labour and Employment*, 5 June 2020.

reopening of work places the very first would be the Nien Hsing textile factory, personally inspected by the Minister of Labour and Employment.<sup>729</sup>

Connected to the Taiwanese textile factories are the Chinese migrant labour they helped stimulate. In a sense the arrival of additional Chinese migrants following the Taiwanese, first from Shanghai and then later, more significantly, from Fujian, is at least partly another legacy of the Taiwanese migrants. When Taiwanese migrants sought cheap labour for their industries they turned first, as discussed above, to poorer Chinese from the mainland, predominantly Shanghai.<sup>730</sup> When this ceased to be possible, however, as mainland China, and Shanghai in particular, experienced their own economic boom reducing the interest in seeking opportunities abroad, these same Taiwanese business owners turned to another form of cheap Chinese labour - Chinese from Fujian.<sup>731</sup> However, this connection must not be overstated. In particular, with regards to the arrival of the Fujianese Chinese, it would not be fair to say that Taiwanese textile factories are the sole, let alone primary, cause of the recent surge in Fujianese Chinese entering Lesotho. What can be stated is that the connections which the Taiwanese migrants laid down, through activities such as the establishment of this Chinese-dominated textile industry, did partially assist the Fujianese Chinese in finding an easier time in Lesotho.<sup>732</sup> These kinship and economic networks would endure after the Taiwanese migrants had ceased to need them, serving now also to assist the next waves of Chinese migrants into Lesotho. In this way, as Maliehe has eloquently argued, the different waves of Chinese migrations have built upon one another.<sup>733</sup> The different groups of Chinese migrants in Lesotho all do share certain linkages with each other, despite the fact that their homelands are politically highly opposed to one another.

A legacy that had been hoped would be left behind by Taiwanese involvement in Lesotho, but which ultimately did not manifest, was that of skills imparted to Basotho employed at Taiwanese firms. During the periods of Taiwanese investment in Lesotho, from 1974 until 1983, it had been hoped that the Basotho would be trained and learn several machine and

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<sup>729</sup> Nien Hsing Textiles: *Nien Hsing Textile to be the first company re-opened in Lesotho, after inspection by the Minister of Labour and Employment*, 5 June 2020.

<sup>730</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>731</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>732</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>733</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.



technological skills important to the modern textile industry. It was hoped that they could eventually harness and channel them into privately developing Lesotho's own indigenous textile firms. This, unfortunately, did not occur. For the most part, due to how Basotho labourers were expected to work in the Taiwanese firms, they rarely learned more than how to operate a single machine. They did not gain a broad-based understanding of the different modern technologies and organizational techniques which were pivotal to the modern factory.

When taken together it becomes clear that the termination of Lesotho's political relationship with Taiwan, in favour of the PRC, has not ended the strong economic ties between the citizens of the two countries. It would be generally accurate, to say that though Taiwanese migration to Lesotho after the 1990s diminished, the flow of Taiwanese investment and capital into Lesotho did not. Whilst the Taiwanese migrants still maintain a legacy in Lesotho, and are still deeply connected to it economically, the same cannot be said of the Shanghai Chinese and other initial mainland Chinese lured by employment in Taiwanese businesses in the 1990s. These Chinese have largely all migrated out of Lesotho and returned to the mainland, with very few remaining in Lesotho itself.<sup>734</sup> This has been the result of several factors. Foremost, like Taiwan before it, Shanghai experienced a significant economic boom of its own following China's opening up and entering into the twenty-first century. This resulted, once again, in the economic prospects of a distant place like Lesotho looking less appealing to the Shanghai Chinese, with more lucrative and appealing options now existing closer to home.<sup>735</sup> At the same time, other external factors also influenced these decisions: many Shanghai Chinese felt they could not compete with the influx of Fujianese Chinese in the retail industry in Lesotho and, thus, opted to seek opportunities elsewhere rather than compete.<sup>736</sup>

For many of the Shanghai Chinese, Lesotho was also not a final destination. Many of the mainland Chinese who entered Lesotho during the 1990s used it as a means to enter South Africa and bypass visa requirements, seeking richer economic prospects in Lesotho's larger neighbour and simply using the small country as a transit point. This was true of Ong Guoliang who only entered Lesotho due to the difficulty of acquiring a South African visa.<sup>737</sup> Once he

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<sup>734</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>735</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 45.

<sup>736</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 45.

<sup>737</sup> X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](http://ifeng.com), Accessed 2 June 2020.

had worked off his initial debts, spending three years in a Taiwanese-owned supermarket, he crossed over into South Africa, like many other Shanghai and mainland Chinese, in pursuit of better economic opportunities.<sup>738</sup> This combination, conjoined with the fact that the majority of these mainland Chinese sought in the end to return to their homes for economic opportunities, has resulted in few remaining Shanghai Chinese in Lesotho. This also explains why within Lesotho there is little distinction made between the period of Taiwanese-dominated migration before the twenty-first century, and the mainland Chinese entering as part of this migration at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s.

South Africa would remain an appealing location for these mainland Chinese. Beginning in the 1980s, and rapidly growing after events such as the 1991 Maseru riots, more and more of these Shanghai and other mainland Chinese immigrated out of Lesotho. However, rather than head back to their places of origins, many of them moved into South Africa instead.<sup>739</sup>

Although the Taiwanese initiated the period of Chinese migration to Lesotho, and still form an important part of that population in Lesotho to this day, the group who, by far, are most commonly being referred to in discussions of Chinese in Lesotho are the Fujianese Chinese who began to migrate in larger numbers to Lesotho during the 2000's. These Chinese form the focus of the next chapter.

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<sup>738</sup> X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](#), Accessed 2 June 2020.

<sup>739</sup> E. K. Lin: *Small Pond Migration: Chinese Migrant shopkeepers in South Africa*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 31.

## Chapter 6: The Second Wave of Chinese Migration

### 6.1 Introduction

As should be clear by now the history of Chinese migration into Lesotho cannot be divided into distinct waves. The arrival of different groups of Chinese into Lesotho overlaps and so they cannot be rigidly compartmentalized from each other.

From the 1990s onwards, we can now discern a new paradigm of Chinese migration into Lesotho supplanting the earlier Taiwanese and Shanghai-dominated waves. This wave of Chinese migration largely consists of Chinese migrants from Fujian province and, more specifically, a substantial number from Fuqing county-level city in Fujian.<sup>740</sup> Over the 1990s and into the present the influx of Fujianese migrants led to a sharp increase in the Chinese population of Lesotho and, further, led to the Fujianese becoming the most numerous and dominant group of Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>741</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the experiences of these Fujianese migrants in Lesotho. Although works exist which have dealt with the economic impact of the Fujianese migrants, little has been done concerning their lifestyles and their own experiences.<sup>742</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into this neglected aspect.

The context of Fujian will firstly be outlined as a source of Chinese outmigration along with its ongoing importance as one of the single largest contributors to the present overseas Chinese diaspora. Beyond providing necessary context, this chapter also considers why Lesotho proved so attractive to large quantities of Fujianese. The first step of discussing the lived experiences of the Fujianese in Lesotho is to discuss the processes by which they arrived in Lesotho. The arduous experiences of the initial Fujianese migrants, the deceptive nature of the labour agencies which contracted them are presented. In addition to this, the matter of kinship networks and of exhaustive loans and the personal effect this has had on the Fujianese migrants are explained. This section also provides an overview of the success Fujianese migrants found in Lesotho including the challenges of their isolated residences, the importance of their family

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<sup>740</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 7.

<sup>741</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03. Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>742</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015; M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University.

networks, and interaction with other local Chinese, the role of children as well as the growing agency of women in the labour force, along with the difficulty in bridging cultural gaps with the local Basotho population. This chapter also explores one of the most pertinent and under-examined aspects of Fujianese life in Lesotho, the growing importance of local Chinese associations. Section 5 of the chapter deals with the universal challenges which Fujianese have faced including the issue of the language barrier and the pressing threat of crime. The section also asserts that an underlying issue impacting relations between the Fujianese, and more broadly all Chinese, and Basotho is the lack of trust between the two groups. The penultimate section considers efforts by individuals to attempt to create a more harmonious interaction. The chapter concludes by examining the current feelings and expressions of Fujianese towards Lesotho, as well as the factors underlying the declining migration of new Fujianese to Lesotho.

## 6.2 Fujianese Context

The study of Fujianese migration is not a new topic by any measure.<sup>743</sup> Within China and abroad, Fujian province is relatively well known for being a source of international Chinese migrants.<sup>744</sup> Along with fellow coastal regions Guangdong and Zhejiang, Fujian provides the bulk of Chinese migrants who travel abroad.<sup>745</sup> In this regard the migration of Fujianese Chinese to Lesotho fits within a pattern of what was seen as expected behaviour from the region. Fujianese went abroad, to Lesotho and other foreign destinations, typically to seek better opportunities for their families.<sup>746</sup> For the most part, these would take the form of jobs and the chance to earn higher wages than they could earn back in Fujian. This chapter will not exhaustively dwell on this topic, but a short summary of the conventional prevailing wisdom surrounding Fujianese migration, and how it pertains to Lesotho, is presented below.

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<sup>743</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>744</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>745</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 5.

<sup>746</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 49.

Fujian is a coastal province in the PRC. It is home to some 35-million people, representing just short of 3% of China's overall population.<sup>747</sup> Despite this, the Fujianese disproportionately contribute to the Chinese overseas migrant population. By some measures they are estimated to account for almost a quarter of all current Chinese residing outside of the mainland.<sup>748</sup> Regardless of the exact percentage they constitute, it is without a doubt true that the Fujianese comprise a significant portion of the Chinese migrant population.<sup>749</sup> In southern Africa, Fujianese now constitute the majority of Chinese present.<sup>750</sup> This development in southern Africa has come in the wake of a new development in Fujianese, and more broadly Chinese, outmigration.<sup>751</sup> The turn of the millennium saw a new dynamic in Chinese outmigration develop, a dynamic which has led to a significant surge in Fujianese to the regions of Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa in particular.<sup>752</sup> As it has only been ongoing for some two decades now, this development is a relatively recent one, though it has already had a significant impact on the affected areas. The arrival of such large numbers of Fujianese of course raises the question of what, in particular, has facilitated the Fujianese to move in such large numbers, and what has drawn them towards southern Africa of all places?

To answer the first question, why such large numbers of Fujianese have been able to migrate, it is first necessary to understand the new migration development mentioned above. Prior to 1990, the movement of Fujianese as far abroad as Africa was restricted to very low numbers, and outmigration in general was a rare occurrence in China overall.<sup>753</sup> It was also, predominantly the purview only of educated and somewhat affluent Fujianese.<sup>754</sup> Since the 1990s, however, immigration from mainland China became easier for the vast majority of the

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<sup>747</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 16.

<sup>748</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 16.

<sup>749</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>750</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03. Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>751</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>752</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 16.

<sup>753</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>754</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 17.

population.<sup>755</sup> This development was driven by China's rapidly growing economic affluence and its increasing integration with the global economy.<sup>756</sup> As restrictions and separations from other markets diminished, and the need for a more open economy became pressing to fuel further development, the previously restrictive measures the PRC government employed around migration were relaxed, allowing a vast increase in the number of Chinese who could move abroad from the mainland.<sup>757</sup>

Though this explains why larger numbers of Chinese, including Fujianese, could now move abroad, it still leaves the question of why so many came to southern Africa. With the vast majority of Chinese in Lesotho now hailing from Fujian it is worth examining why Fujian is such an important source of outmigration to southern Africa as a whole. Lesotho far from represents a unique case and in much of southern Africa, including Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, Fujianese have quickly risen to become a noticeable part of the local Chinese population.<sup>758</sup> In most of these countries small populations of Chinese already existed before the twenty-first century, but they swiftly became outnumbered by the Fujianese migrants seeking economic opportunities in Africa.<sup>759</sup> Although the increased ease of migration had a role to play in this migration that was only part of the story, as there also existed specific reasons why southern Africa became appealing to the Fujianese. This opening of migration also coincided with the post-1994 intensification of relations between South Africa and the PRC, bringing with it a general intensification of Chinese movement to southern Africa as a whole.<sup>760</sup> Now, in the twenty-first century, the Fujianese who continue to migrate to southern Africa are driven predominantly by economic prospects, hoping to find profit.<sup>761</sup> Southern Africa has become attractive to Fujianese migrants due to the perception that it represents untapped potential, and that the wages there are considerably higher than what the Fujianese

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<sup>755</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 50.

<sup>756</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>757</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>758</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>759</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱素托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>760</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 17.

<sup>761</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 17.



are offered in their homeland.<sup>762</sup> To this end a powerful engine driving Fujianese outmigration is the commercialization and modernisation of Fujian's agricultural and fishing industries.<sup>763</sup> Increased urbanisation and competition for work within Fujian has created a situation where many Fujianese would rather seek better paying jobs abroad in southern Africa than remain in China.<sup>764</sup> As a result migration abroad is now no longer a purview limited to affluent or well-educated Fujianese but, instead, the bulk of Fujianese migrants tend to be of a less-affluent and educated profile. This is what has driven such large numbers to move into southern Africa.

In summation, this increase in migration in the 1990s was a new dynamic of Chinese migration which persists to the present, largely ushering in a period of extensive overseas migration by Chinese from the mainland.<sup>765</sup> This growth was driven by the PRC's increasing integration with the global economy as well as its increasing importance to it. It was characterized by the commercialization of Chinese migration to some extent, the relatively new practise of local governments often encouraging migration and a strong transnational aspect to the migrant groups who moved abroad.<sup>766</sup>

Broadly speaking, Fujianese migrants are motivated by a desire to accumulate wealth for their families.<sup>767</sup> Migrants tend to come from less affluent backgrounds and seek to use work abroad as a means to facilitate providing better material circumstances and prospects for their children.<sup>768</sup> As a result an important feature of Fujianese migratory work is the fact that it often serves the purpose of building up wealth across multiple generations. What is meant by this is that the initial Fujianese migrant labourers going abroad may not, in their own lifetime, see

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<sup>762</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>763</sup> G. Liu-Farrer: "Debt, Networks and Reciprocity: Undocumented Migration from Fujian to Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 28 June 2010.

<sup>764</sup> G. Liu-Farrer: "Debt, Networks and Reciprocity: Undocumented Migration from Fujian to Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 28 June 2010.

<sup>765</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004, p. 85.

<sup>766</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004, p. 85.

<sup>767</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>768</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

significant change in their fortunes or living conditions. However, they do often enable their children to benefit from better educations and better chances of securing higher paying employment and higher standards of living. This is done via remittances which are paid back to their families in China, whilst they remain abroad overseeing their business ventures in foreign countries.<sup>769</sup> These remittances pay for tuition for their children, allowing them to secure higher education degrees than their parents, and also enable them to consume more material goods in China than their parents were able to.<sup>770</sup> The importance of family as a motivation in the context of Fujian's pronounced outmigration is clear from most variables. In Lesotho, and elsewhere, when asked about their motivation for moving overseas to earn more money, invariably the most common responses are always that they seek wealth to either support a currently existing family or, otherwise, that they seek wealth in order to create the conditions for themselves to have a family.<sup>771</sup> Family, as a core concept, continues to lie close to the heart of the Fujianese migrant population and strongly informs their decisions and values. This also contributes to the phenomenon of "left behind children" referring mostly to the fact that the children of these migrant labourers often have relatively little contact in their childhoods with their parents, regularly raised instead by grandparents whilst the parents are away earning wages to pay for their children's tuitions.<sup>772</sup> For many Fujianese migrants to Lesotho, this exact situation unfolded. They would tend to leave their children behind in China, to receive an education, whilst sending remittances of income back from their work in Lesotho.<sup>773</sup> Among the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho we can see this pattern of behaviour is still dominant. A demographic survey undertaken in 2011 found that whilst there was a presence of Chinese children aged 0-4, there were slim to none between 5 and 19, indicating

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<sup>769</sup> J. Crush: *Migration Remittances and 'Development' in Lesotho*, Migration Policy Series, 52, p. 47; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 40.

<sup>770</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>771</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 19.

<sup>772</sup> H. Morooka & Z. Liang: "International Migration and Education of Left Behind Children in Fujian, China," *Asian Pacific Migration Journal*, 18, (3), pp 345-346.

<sup>773</sup> H. Morooka & Z. Liang: "International Migration and Education of Left Behind Children in Fujian, China," *Asian Pacific Migration Journal*, 18, (3), pp 345-346; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 40.

that shortly after their birth these children are predominantly sent back to China to be reared and educated there.<sup>774</sup>

This then leads to the concept of “kinship networks” an idea commonly discussed in light of the way Fujianese migrants travel abroad.<sup>775</sup> Kinship networks are the primary means by which the previously discussed phenomenon of chain migration is facilitated among the Fujianese. The concept of kinship networks largely focuses on the idea that Fujianese, through familial connections, create transnational links that facilitate the movement of other Fujianese more easily, and more rapidly, to countries outside of China. These kinship networks also facilitate easier access to loans, properties and premises, as well as coordinating between different Fujianese to disincentivise intra-Fujianese competition and conflict.<sup>776</sup> The Fujianese kinship networks provide their members access to transnational supply chains, with many Fujianese sourcing their goods from China rather than locally, and has often been credited as one of the strengths which enables the Fujianese population to so effectively migrate and work abroad compared to most other regions of China.<sup>777</sup>

This context informs the path of the Fujianese migrants who came to Lesotho. However, as will be shown below certain presuppositions about Fujianese migrants in Africa are simply not true with regards to the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho.

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<sup>774</sup> 2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 259.

<sup>775</sup> F. Pieke: “Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe,” *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>776</sup> F. Pieke: “Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe,” *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>777</sup> F. Pieke: “Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe,” *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

### 6.3 The Migrants

Fujianese migration to Lesotho began with two important events: the earlier discussed Taiwanese need for labour and, in addition, the normalization of relations between the PRC and the Kingdom of Lesotho. The road to the normalizing of Lesotho and the PRC's relationship was neither a straight nor simple one. Although it had been staunchly dedicated to supporting Taiwan since their official relations commenced in the 1960s, by the 1980s Lesotho had begun to drift more and more into the sphere of influence of the PRC.<sup>778</sup> Government-level contacts between the two states continued to increase until, in 1983, the government of Lesotho chose to recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate entity representing China, thus severing their official relations with Taiwan.<sup>779</sup> This pattern was a familiar one around the world. By the 1980s numerous countries which had once recognized and supported Taiwan had switched to pursuing closer relations with the PRC and supporting it in favour of Taiwan. However, Lesotho's own situation would prove to be somewhat more complex. Regardless of any complexity, since 1994 Lesotho has continued to maintain official relations with the PRC in favour of Taiwan, with no indication this position would change in the future. As has been observed on numerous occasions, the relationship between the PRC and Lesotho has deepened considerably with the PRC being one of the only countries to maintain full embassy and diplomatic relations with Lesotho.<sup>780</sup>

When discussing the arrival of the Fujianese migrants into Lesotho it is worth making a broad distinction between the period of the 1990s, when Fujianese largely arrived in Lesotho as prospective employees of Taiwanese businesses, and the period from the 2000s onwards, when Fujianese began to arrive in greater numbers seeking their own businesses opportunities and no longer connected to the Taiwanese commercial interests.<sup>781</sup> During the 1990s, when Fujianese migration into Lesotho largely began, Fujian province had a largely rural population.<sup>782</sup> Although increased urbanization was a phenomenon playing out across the PRC, large swathes of the population remained largely rural in nature and focused on agriculture. This was definitively the case in Fujian where, in addition, wages and the opportunities for

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<sup>778</sup> H. Minbo: "Analysis of New Chinese migrants in Africa," *Bagui Overseas Chinese Journal*, 3, (3), 2009, p. 51.

<sup>779</sup> H. Minbo: "Analysis of New Chinese migrants in Africa," *Bagui Overseas Chinese Journal*, 3, (3), 2009, p. 51.

<sup>780</sup> S. Tseng: *The Republic of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, p. 168.

<sup>781</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 163.

<sup>782</sup> S. Hanisch: "Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants' Children," *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 49.

income earnings fell considerably below that of urban Chinese citizens.<sup>783</sup> As a result Fujian possessed a large, poor, population of Chinese who struggled to find employment with wages which could allow them to better their circumstances. This would end up playing a crucial role in why Taiwanese business interests in Lesotho took to canvassing Fujian for employees.<sup>784</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, as mainland regions like Shanghai saw an overall increase in their affluence the Taiwanese business owners found it more difficult to recruit there, just as it had previously become more difficult for them to recruit Taiwanese workers to Lesotho when the island saw its own rise in living standards and overall affluence. In response to this, the Taiwanese turned to Fujian as a new source of labour. There were several factors motivating in favour of the Fujianese Chinese as a source of labour for Taiwanese firms. Fujian had, as indicated, a large, rural, impoverished, population who as a result could be more easily incentivised to move abroad if they felt it would improve their economic prospects was of course a central factor.<sup>785</sup> In addition to this, however, Taiwan and Taiwanese people had a longstanding connection to Fujian Province. Not only was it a coastal province which had already begun to develop strong economic ties with Taiwan, but many Taiwanese also hailed from Fujian ancestrally, and still had family or friends they remained in contact with to some extent in the province.<sup>786</sup> As a result of these previously existing linkages to Fujian it made a logical location to scout for employees. An advantage of the Fujianese migrants, and of recruiting Chinese from the mainland in general, was that they often had similar qualifications to the cheap labour Taiwanese firms had previously employed from Taiwan. But importantly, they tended to work for considerably lower prices, making them advantageous options to any firm seeking to maximize their profits. Unsurprisingly, then, the initial common profile of the Fujianese Chinese was one of less affluent individuals seeking a chance to make more money abroad.<sup>787</sup> Like the Shanghai and other groups of mainland Chinese whose place they began to occupy, they were recruited and drawn to Lesotho under the belief that they would be able to make more money for themselves there than in their own homeland.<sup>788</sup>

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<sup>783</sup> Fujian Bureau of Statistics, Fujian Annual Yearbook 2018.

<sup>784</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>785</sup> H. Liu: "Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications," *The China Quarterly*, 155, p. 587.

<sup>786</sup> H. Liu: "Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications," *The China Quarterly*, 155, p. 587.

<sup>787</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 11.

<sup>788</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political Unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, Vol 92, 367, p. 230.

Similar to the Taiwanese and Shanghai Chinese before them, these Fujianese migrants were predominantly brought over to Lesotho to serve in managerial positions in Taiwanese firms and factories.<sup>789</sup> Unfortunately the process of these recruitments is largely undocumented and there is little exact or specific record or data left behind which can be used to determine how this recruitment drive was conducted. However, certain assumptions can safely be made about why Fujianese began to represent such a significant majority of Chinese being brought in to work at Taiwanese firms. The arrival of the Fujianese Chinese was in part the result of already established Chinese business owners in Lesotho once more looking for a cheap source of Chinese labour to serve their interests, as has been established. The swap from first Taiwanese, then Shanghai, and finally Fujianese logically corresponds to the need for an available source of cheap labour with sufficient incentive to move from their home region in China to Lesotho. The existence of this financial incentive is clear. Beyond the testimony, anecdotal in nature, of multiple Fujianese themselves, available data suggests clearly that the Fujianese could earn more money in Lesotho than they could in Fujian. In Lesotho, a monthly rural household income worth 300\$, equivalent to some R4 882, constituted the average whilst, by comparison, in Fujian most rural households only had an average monthly income of some 30\$.<sup>790</sup>

We can track the initial Fujianese movement into Lesotho through Taiwan. Many of the Fujianese business owners who had now achieved considerable prosperity and economic success in Lesotho began their lives as manual labourers brought over to Lesotho to work in Taiwanese textile factories.<sup>791</sup> Due to the proximity of coastal Fujian to Taiwan, along with the large population of willing migrant workers generally served as a labour base for the island to recruit from.<sup>792</sup> Labour agencies between Fujian and Taiwan regularly recruited large numbers of Fujianese and then simply provided them to Taiwanese firms.<sup>793</sup> As a result of this, the Fujianese migrants of the 1980s and 1990s often might not even have known their ultimate destination until quite late into the process. It was at the behest of the firms they were assigned to where they would go, quite literally a supply and demand. For those attached to Taiwanese firms operating in Lesotho, they often had little to no preparation whatsoever for the country they would be entering.<sup>794</sup>

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<sup>789</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political Unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, Vol 92, 367, p. 230.

<sup>790</sup> Fujian Bureau of Statistics, *Fujian Annual Yearbook* 2018.

<sup>791</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24.

<sup>792</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>793</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24.

<sup>794</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24.



Chen Kehui, Fang Zejiang and He Qiang, all three Fujianese migrants who now are generally considered among the most affluent of Lesotho's Chinese, began their careers in Lesotho as employees of Taiwanese companies.<sup>795</sup> All three also personally attested to being motivated to move abroad to Lesotho due to the difficulties they had supporting their families (push factor) and the offers made by Taiwanese companies (pull factor).<sup>796</sup> Like many of the Fujianese migrants to Lesotho, Chen Kehui was born into a poor, rural, family in Fujian province.<sup>797</sup> In a family with five brothers and a sister there were always difficulties securing sufficient food and when he was just 22 years old, having finished his education and just married, he took an offer from a Taiwanese businessman to come over with several others and work in Lesotho.<sup>798</sup> Another one of the earliest migrants to Lesotho was Fang Zejiang. This Fujianese national moved over to Lesotho in 1995, after learning from his brother of opportunities there.<sup>799</sup> Along with him, in the 1990s, also came He Qiang.<sup>800</sup> The three men's lives provide insight into the course of the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho. Coming over first as employees to another group, Taiwanese in their case, all three were able to save up sufficient money from their employment, typically through very frugal lifestyles, to eventually pay off the expensive loans they took to migrate and establish their own retail or wholesale stores.<sup>801</sup>

Overall, however, the experience of the Fujianese when coming to Lesotho through work in Taiwanese companies is mixed. Although many of the currently established and affluent Fujianese traders in Lesotho, only entered the country thanks to working in a Taiwanese firm, the personal experiences of several other Chinese indicate that they were rarely treated well or in a fair manner by the labour agencies and Taiwanese companies who brought them over to Lesotho.<sup>802</sup> Because so many of them arrived in Lesotho at the behest of third parties, labour

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<sup>795</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>796</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>797</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>798</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>799</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>800</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>801</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>802</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

brokers, agencies, and such, contracted to work with Taiwanese firms, many of the initial Fujianese migrants of the 1980s and 1990s had little to no control of where they would actually end up in Lesotho.<sup>803</sup> With their contracts established, the firms they were now contracted to would determine where to send them. Often, they would only find out where they would be staying in Lesotho upon arrival.<sup>804</sup> Combined with their frequent lack of knowledge of the country they were entering, and lack of communication skills in English or Sesotho, the ordeal could be disorientating for many.<sup>805</sup> It should be noted that this was consistent with the reality for Fujianese migrants throughout southern Africa. From Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa the Fujianese migrants who arrived in the 2000s throughout southern Africa typically had only some knowledge of English and next to no knowledge of any other local languages.<sup>806</sup>

One of the most prevalent challenges that faced the initial Fujianese migrants was their complete lack of control over where they would be dispatched in Lesotho. For those who wound up working in and around Maseru it remained at least somewhat possible to continue to contact their families on a somewhat regular basis, and they had at least some access to Chinese or, in some cases, English-speaking locales and eateries. For those Fujianese dispatched to more remote locations, however, their lives often became ones of intense isolation and little to no contact with anyone outside of their work. A sadly reoccurring story is that of labour agencies or Taiwanese businesses offering work to groups of Fujianese only to inform them on arrival that only a select few would actually be getting work, the rest left to fend for themselves.<sup>807</sup> Even those who were fortunate enough to get the jobs they had been promised, they often found themselves cheated, the salaries they were lured by never materializing as they were paid considerably less than they were initially promised. This situation happened to Chen Kehui in 1992 when he landed in Lesotho with some 23 other Fujianese nationals.<sup>808</sup> Waiting for them at the airport were two Taiwanese men who, between them, only took five of

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<sup>803</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 25.

<sup>804</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 25.

<sup>805</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>806</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>807</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>808</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

the Fujianese, telling the rest they simply had no work for them.<sup>809</sup> Additionally, Chen Kehui's contract had initially stipulated he would be paid some M1000 but, in fact, the salary only amounted to M800.<sup>810</sup> Another sad reality of the first group of Fujianese migrants was that they were often taken advantage of. Unlike the kinship networks of the 1990s and twenty-first century, many of the labour agencies and brokerages which brought over Fujianese labourers, explicitly deceived them concerning wages and work contracts.<sup>811</sup>

An illustrative example of the extent of deception which many of these migrants underwent can be found in the case of Shao Ming Sheng, a Chinese national brought over by the Ta Hua/Hwa Company to Lesotho in the early 1990s.<sup>812</sup> Shao Ming Sheng was recruited along with numerous other Chinese from the mainland.<sup>813</sup> By their own attestation, and most research into the matter, movements such as these were not cheap, and the impoverished Chinese migrants being moved around often utilized all their initial savings to purchase these one-way air tickets under the belief that they would be provided with good work once they reached their destination.<sup>814</sup> Unfortunately, like many of these labour brokerages, Ta Hua Company often simply deceived or misled the migrants. In the case of Shao Ming and many others, they were informed they would be taken to South Africa, seen as a location ripe with economic opportunities. Instead, they were brought over to Lesotho in spite of assurances otherwise.<sup>815</sup> Even then, in Lesotho, they were informed they would be given stipends and work which would allow them to earn their own passage into South Africa.<sup>816</sup> However, after five years of waiting, this never materialized and in 1995 Shao Ming Sheng murdered an employee of Ta Hua Company and her family.<sup>817</sup> Although this was a capital offence and, under standard circumstances, would warrant a death sentence in Lesotho, the judge presiding over the case found the abominable treatment of the Chinese migrants by Ta Hua Company constituted an extenuating circumstance and, thus, Shao Ming was instead sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison.<sup>818</sup>

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<sup>809</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>810</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>811</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>812</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>813</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 6.

<sup>814</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 6.

<sup>815</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>816</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>817</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 8.

<sup>818</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

Despite these onerous conditions, for the most part, the Fujianese had no option but to accept or find alternative work. Few could afford to go back to China since many of them had staked their, and their families', livelihoods on being able to make a profit in Lesotho. As a result, many were forced to find alternative work, which fed into a growing phenomenon of Fujianese becoming independent traders and small businessmen.

As indicated, a significant proportion of Fujianese labourers wound up in Lesotho's retail and wholesale industries during this period. Typically, during the 1990s, this occurred following one of two routes. In the first case were those Fujianese who, when their contracts with the Taiwanese firms they were employed by expired, opted not to return to their homes but, instead, to find employment elsewhere in Lesotho. In the second case, this was the result of the Fujianese labour often not being sufficiently skilled for the needs of the Taiwanese firms and, so, being released from their contracts and being forced to find employment elsewhere in Lesotho.<sup>819</sup> Regardless of the reasons why, the end result was the burgeoning development of Fujianese merchants in Lesotho. Eventually this group of Fujianese retailers and wholesalers would be further reinforced by the wave of independent Fujianese migrants entering the country during the 2000s.<sup>820</sup>

The 1990s was a period in which Taiwanese and Indian businesses still largely dominated the local retail and wholesale industry in Lesotho.<sup>821</sup> Only in the aftermath of the 1998 riots did a mass exodus of Taiwanese and Indian traders begin to occur, simultaneously with the upturn in Fujianese migrants entering Lesotho.<sup>822</sup> In addition to extensive migration, the trend of European and other Asian traders leaving Lesotho left a distinct vacuum which the Fujianese were able to occupy.<sup>823</sup> Lesotho had, prior to the twenty-first century, a relatively diverse combination of Asian traders within the country, most of whom were replacing the position of the colonial-era European traders.<sup>824</sup> Violence against foreign traders, but typically focused

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<sup>819</sup> S. S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>820</sup> S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p. 164.

<sup>821</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>822</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>823</sup> S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women's Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021.

<sup>824</sup> M. Schmidt: *Ruined Asian Traders vow not to Return: Multi-million Rand investments go up in flames in Lesotho upheaval*, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998.

against those perceived as Asian, largely drove out most of these non-Chinese traders during the 1990s. Many of the estimated 6 000 Asians living in Lesotho at the time fled the looting or rioting into South Africa.<sup>825</sup> At the time of the 1992 riots in Lesotho interviewed traders expressed the position that most of Lesotho's Asian population were Muslim, hailing from Pakistan or Sri Lanka.<sup>826</sup> This is, now, definitively no longer the case. In this sense, the Fujianese entry into Lesotho was also facilitated by the rapid exit of a previous foreign trading class. Although Taiwanese Chinese maintain an important, influential, role in terms of the economy of Lesotho, due to their majority ownership of Lesotho's lucrative textile industry, they are a minority within the country. Many Taiwanese who operate factories or firms in Lesotho do not stay within the country but, rather, live in South Africa, often in nearby locations like Ladybrand, and only visit Lesotho on an occasional basis.<sup>827</sup>

We can see then the common profile of Fujianese traders, initially, was one of generally impoverished rural Chinese nationals who moved abroad in order to find better work opportunities.<sup>828</sup> Although as a general rule the motivation of Fujianese migrants to Lesotho remained consistent, the division between rural and urban migrants did break down over time. Initially, in the 1990s, the majority of Fujian migrants entering Lesotho were from a rural background, typically coming from Fujian province's countryside.<sup>829</sup> In the present day, however, surveys taken among Fujianese in Lesotho indicate that an increasing amount of them now come from Fuqing city, an urban area.<sup>830</sup> Developmental trends in China have, however, made it that even such qualifications are often not sufficient to secure the level of wages these Fujianese seek. However, in most cases, the Fujianese migrants drawn towards Lesotho continue to represent unskilled or lower skilled labour. Typically, they are Chinese who have not attained more than a high school equivalent education and seek money and employment as opposed to a higher education degree or, of course, were simply unable due to external social

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<sup>825</sup> M. Schmidt: *Ruined Asian Traders vow not to Return: Multi-million Rand investments go up in flames in Lesotho upheaval*, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998.

<sup>826</sup> M. Schmidt: *Ruined Asian Traders vow not to Return: Multi-million Rand investments go up in flames in Lesotho upheaval*, Sunday Times, 27 September 1998.

<sup>827</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24.

<sup>828</sup> M. Nowicka: "Positioning Strategies of Polish Entrepreneurs in Germany: Transnationalizing Bordieu's notion of Capital," *International Sociology*, 28, (1), pp 29-47.

<sup>829</sup> M. Nowicka: "Positioning Strategies of Polish Entrepreneurs in Germany: Transnationalizing Bordieu's notion of Capital," *International Sociology*, 28, (1), pp 29-47.

<sup>830</sup> M. Nowicka: "Positioning Strategies of Polish Entrepreneurs in Germany: Transnationalizing Bordieu's notion of Capital," *International Sociology*, 28, (1), pp 29-47.



or economic factors to pursue any higher education.<sup>831</sup> A demographic survey conducted in 2011, the most comprehensive official statistics on the Chinese population the government of Lesotho has compiled as of yet, found that absolutely none of the Chinese respondents had a post-graduate level of education.<sup>832</sup> As a result, they continue to be drawn towards Lesotho due to perceived financial gain.

The previously mentioned kinship networks played an important role in this chain migration. Specifically, with regards to the Fujianese, these kinship networks helped to facilitate the finances required for migration. Migration abroad was not cheap and setting up shop was equally expensive. Despite this, and the fact that most of these Fujianese migrants were relatively poor, they were able to fund themselves through the cooperative work of family groups, taking out loans which are paid off together or, in other cases, accessing cheap loans from family members who they then worked under to pay off the loans.<sup>833</sup> The prices of these loans could be steep, one of the reasons so many Fujianese lived on such meagre terms was simply because they could not afford to spend more if they hoped to ever pay off the loans they had taken out.<sup>834</sup> In 1992, when Chen Kehui came over, his family pooled together to take out a 40 000 yuan loan, some \$6 250 or R101 922, for him, at 3 cents interest, and it took him three years of work before he was able to pay off this initial loan.<sup>835</sup> A very good illustration of how effective, in terms of sheer numbers, these kinship networks were is the case of Chen Kehui. Chen explicitly claimed to have helped over one hundred of his own relatives relocate to Lesotho.<sup>836</sup>

However, this financial kinship dimension is only part of the story. Although the initial introduction of Fujianese into Lesotho was significantly facilitated by Taiwanese and mainland labour agencies, as the twenty-first century arrived, and Lesotho and the PRC's relationships

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<sup>831</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 277; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>832</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 277.

<sup>833</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>834</sup> Y. Zi: "Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone," *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 178.

<sup>835</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>836</sup> *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 Jan 2008.



stabilized, there would be a massive growth in the migration of Fujianese to Lesotho which had nothing to do with local Taiwanese businesses in Lesotho.

This additional influx of Fujianese migration to Lesotho was mostly the result of the general increase in Chinese outmigration of the 1990s, caused by an easing of legislation surrounding travel abroad for Chinese citizens, and the initiation of several government development projects by the PRC in Lesotho.<sup>837</sup> In addition, the twenty-first century saw a general and dramatic increase in Chinese migration to southern Africa as a whole.<sup>838</sup> The majority of this migration entered South Africa, following the normalization of relations between South Africa and the PRC, with Fujianese once more making up a large percentage of the Chinese migrants.<sup>839</sup> As a result, Chinese migration to Lesotho should not be seen as unique simply on the basis of large numbers of Chinese entering a southern African state, in fact there are more Chinese in South Africa than in Lesotho, but seen as part of the wider context of the twenty-first century's migration of Chinese into southern Africa seeking economic prosperity.<sup>840</sup>

Like with those Fujianese who had come initially as employees of Taiwanese firms in Lesotho, once the projects were finished many of them opted to remain in Lesotho, rather than returning home to China, due to the perception that there were better economic opportunities for them in Lesotho.<sup>841</sup> This is a phenomenon which is not unique, in anyway, to the Chinese migrants in Lesotho. Chinese migrant labour to Africa regularly consists of distinct groups with varying skill levels.<sup>842</sup> Typically there is a large semi-skilled group employed for manual labour but, along with that, a managerial and oversight body as well. This is the same level that most of the Fujianese brought over by Taiwanese firms occupied. A common pattern in Chinese migrants settling throughout southern Africa has been that the members of this second, generally more educated, class are the ones who opt to remain inside the African countries they work in, usually taking up some niche in the local economy.<sup>843</sup> This is what occurred in general

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<sup>837</sup> S S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 47.

<sup>838</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>839</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

<sup>840</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

<sup>841</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 47.

<sup>842</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

<sup>843</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

with the Fujianese migrants who came as part of projects initiated by the PRC, or who were brought over by labour brokers in the 1990s.<sup>844</sup>

We can see some indication of this increase in the twenty-first century when examining the official statistics for work permits issued to foreigners entering Lesotho in the 2001 and 2002 period. Between these years, Lesotho's National Employment Service registered a total of 2 743 permits allowing for work by foreign nationals in Lesotho.<sup>845</sup> Of these permits 1 228, a clear majority, were issued to Chinese.<sup>846</sup> This trend continued into the following year as well, with Chinese comprising 1 146 of a total 2 351 work permits awarded by the National Employment Service.<sup>847</sup>

When discussing the wave of Fujianese migrants entering Lesotho from the twenty-first century onwards it must also be acknowledged that a certain portion of them entered via illegal methods.<sup>848</sup> Lesotho has seen a considerable rise in the influx of Chinese who illegally enter the country, often with the intention of crossing the border from Lesotho into South Africa.<sup>849</sup> The use of illegal means to enter Lesotho began to accelerate from 1998 onwards, with a class of smugglers often referred to as 'snakeheads' organizing visas and other arrangements to allow them easy entry into the country.<sup>850</sup>

The fact that some Fujianese did, certainly, enter Lesotho through illegal means has also led to a common stereotyping of all Fujianese as having been 'smuggled' into the country. Furthermore, due to the aforementioned lack of distinction made between different groups of Chinese in the country, this often then becomes an assumption that all Chinese, or the vast majority at least, have entered Lesotho through illegal means. The increase in smuggling is a direct result of the commercialization of emigration.<sup>851</sup> Previously migration abroad was limited to a slightly more affluent class of Chinese, for the most part, but following the 1990s

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<sup>844</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

<sup>845</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 92.

<sup>846</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 92.

<sup>847</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 92.

<sup>848</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 15.

<sup>849</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 15.

<sup>850</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 163; Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>851</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

boom in migration numerous less wealthy Chinese have also undertaken migration to foreign countries.<sup>852</sup> This has led to a sharp increase in demand for migration which has also raised the costs of such migration.<sup>853</sup>

The exact extent of smuggling operations into Lesotho is, for obvious reasons, difficult to ascertain. Fujianese are often assumed to have been smuggled in regardless of the reality, and those who did enter Lesotho through illegal means would be understandably hesitant to divulge this information. However, high profile incidents of smuggling have occurred, and been captured, and the existing body of work concerning shady labour brokerages operating from Fujian attest that it can be reasonably assumed that smuggling is occurring to some extent.<sup>854</sup> One of the most high-profile cases of this in Lesotho occurred in 2011, when 26 Chinese citizens were arrested at Maseru airport on suspicion of illegally entering the country.<sup>855</sup> Further investigation into this case eventually exposed a ring of corruption involving officials at Lesotho's embassy in the PRC and Chinese nationals living in Lesotho.<sup>856</sup>

This should not be understood to imply that even most Fujianese who have entered Lesotho, and currently reside there, did so illegally. Smuggling is unlikely to constitute the majority of the Fujianese migrants due to the inherent dangers it poses and, more importantly, the prohibitive cost. Interviews with Chinese nationals responsible for assisting illegal entry of Chinese into Lesotho revealed that the average cost of such a venture was considerably higher than the average income of Fujianese migrants.<sup>857</sup> This is another factor substantiating why the kinship networks played the most crucial role in facilitating Fujianese growth in Lesotho. Many prospective Fujianese migrants would be unable to afford the cost of being smuggled in, or the cost of establishing themselves in Lesotho, but are able to do so because they receive initial support in some way, generally materially through loans or lodging, from established members of their family who had already managed to carve out a niche for themselves in Lesotho.

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<sup>852</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

<sup>853</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

<sup>854</sup> Anon: "26 Chinese deported," *Lesotho Times*, 21 July 2011.

<sup>855</sup> Anon: "26 Chinese deported," *Lesotho Times*, 21 July 2011; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

<sup>856</sup> Anon: "26 Chinese deported," *Lesotho Times*, 21 July 2011; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

<sup>857</sup> Anon: "26 Chinese deported," *Lesotho Times*, 21 July 2011; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 25.

Although the initial Fujianese migrants faced an often difficult starting position, and almost all had to work intensively to pay off loans they took out to come to Lesotho, their success was tangible in the inroads they made in Lesotho's retail, wholesale and other trade industries.<sup>858</sup> Within five years Fujianese migrants such as Fang Zejiang, He Qiang and Chen Kehui were all able to open their own supermarkets, as independent, self-employed businessmen.<sup>859</sup> Building on the connections and economic niche carved out by the initial Taiwanese, this first wave of Fujianese then served as a catalyst for a further influx of new Fujianese migrants in the twenty-first century, facilitating their arrival and providing to them a similar starting base as the Taiwanese had provided to the initial Fujianese migrants. In this way the two groups of Chinese both built upon each other's successes, coming to fill the same gap in Lesotho's small business sector, rather than diversify apart from each other. The most visible portion of Fujianese in Lesotho thus represent a collection of traders and store owners. The majority of these are small business owners, small retail stores or Chinese wholesalers, whilst a small handful have gone on to find significant success.<sup>860</sup>

#### 6.4 Life in Lesotho

It is thus apparent that by most estimates, and several different surveys, it is clear that the majority of the Chinese in Lesotho are Fujianese.<sup>861</sup> Yet, in general, as in most destinations the world over Lesotho's local population does not draw a distinction between Fujianese or other kinds of Chinese. In general, they are all simply lumped together as "Chinese" and are perceived in somewhat monolithic terms

For most Fujianese in Lesotho their place of business and their residence are one and the same.<sup>862</sup> Typically speaking a back or upper room, if the premises have multiple floors, are

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<sup>858</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>859</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>860</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>861</sup> Y. Huang: *Fuzhouese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>862</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women's Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak,

converted to serve as a bedroom for the Fujianese owners.<sup>863</sup> The conditions of these personal rooms are often relatively poor. They are cramped, “frequently messy”, largely indicating a survivalist lifestyle in which the occupants spend almost all their wealth on the business side of their operations and rarely on personal luxuries.<sup>864</sup> It is not uncommon for Fujianese to lack access to televisions or computers, a phenomenon which astonishes Chinese reports on their living conditions.<sup>865</sup> Conditions in their homes are often cramped, with families of up to six sharing a single room together.<sup>866</sup> This is not an altogether unexpected phenomenon. In studies concerning the Fujianese migrants elsewhere, it has often been noted that they display a capacity for enduring relatively low living standards in order to maximize their capacity for making profits.<sup>867</sup>

Furthermore, even for the more affluent Fujianese, who could afford to rent a separate, larger, space for themselves outside of their businesses, there is often still an incentive not to do so. This incentive is mostly the result of the frequency with which Fujianese have been targeted for theft and murder when closing up their business or being in transit between their place of work and a separate sleeping area.<sup>868</sup> The multiple incidents of Fujianese retailers targeted by criminals when they are closing their stores, intending to return home late in the evening, has made the community wary of having to move around, particularly after dark. In this situation maintaining a single location is seen as being safer. With that said, as the community of Fujianese in Lesotho became more organized, through the associations which are discussed

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24 February 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhounese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>863</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; 4 June 2020; S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women’s Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhounese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>864</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women’s Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhounese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>865</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>866</sup> T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>867</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>868</sup> L. Sello: “LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy,” *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: “The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed,” *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

below, the concerns for safety and security have abated somewhat. As a result, and their growing prosperity, there is an increasing number of Fujianese who no longer sleep at their business properties.

Most of the Fujianese retailers and small shop owners do not own these premises themselves.<sup>869</sup> This is due to Lesotho's legislation promulgated to protect the small business sector from foreign participation. This legislation limits certain sizes of properties and premises to only local Basotho.<sup>870</sup> As a result, most Fujianese small shop owners rent their premises from either Basotho, Indian or Taiwanese owners, and pay stipends to them.<sup>871</sup> The need for this arrangement if a Fujianese wishes to enter the retail market is also a cause of why so many of the Fujianese opt to, instead, go into wholesale, which is less restricted and thus does not require exploiting loopholes in this manner.<sup>872</sup> For the most part, authorities seem to accept this status quo. Although they will often badger a Chinese small store owner about the legality of their operation, this rarely results in anything more than fines. There are only a handful of examples of actual prosecutions of Chinese businesses concerning their trading licenses.<sup>873</sup> It appears that, although there are frequent complaints about this practise, for most in Lesotho the service these small retailers offer, selling goods cheap for the more impoverished sector of the population, are considered too vital to simply evict them. Thus, for now this practise appears to be at the very least tolerated at the official level.

The trend of sleeping where they worked was also the result of how hard Fujianese worked. Within Lesotho it is seen quite visibly that Chinese supermarkets tend to remain open late into the evening, and rarely close at any point in the week.<sup>874</sup> For most Fujianese migrants, work dominates the majority of their time. They spend up to ten hours a day working, be it retail, wholesale or in textile factories, and rarely have days where they take off from work at all. This intense focus on work is driven by a need to both pay off loans taken in order to migrate to

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<sup>869</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 196.

<sup>870</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 196.

<sup>871</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>872</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>873</sup> *Hanayne vs. Jiang and Others*, CIV/APN/29/98. *Dong Pinghua, Dong Jin Hua vs. Zhang Zhao Tai*, CIV/APN/189/99.

<sup>874</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.



Lesotho and as part of the wider goal to secure sufficient wealth to support their existing family or a desired future family.<sup>875</sup> This strong focus on work is anecdotally supported in the comments by Fujianese luminaries such as He Qiang or Fang Zeijiang, who all described their initial stays in Lesotho as largely being ones of near constant work and toil to assist their employers to become more profitable.<sup>876</sup> For the most part, the Fujianese seem to not take much issue with this intensive work lifestyle. Part of this seems to be a cultural value shared by most of the Fujianese that “hard work”, and “suffering” in particular, are necessary and worthwhile components in building better futures for themselves. This is most clearly demonstrated in Chen Kehui’s conversation with his father regarding his migration to Lesotho in 1992:

You have to learn to suffer, I don’t want to see you back in three days.<sup>877</sup>

As is clear from almost all studies concerning the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho that family remains a paramount aspect of their lives. This is exemplified in a few clear ways. Firstly, is the fact that for most Fujianese migrants their family are both the facilitators of their presence in Lesotho and, in addition, the primary social circle they move in.<sup>878</sup> Prominent businessmen, like Zang Feijiang and Chen Kehui, employ multiple members of their family in Lesotho, and often interact most closely with them.<sup>879</sup> Whilst even in more remote areas, it is typical for the owners of Fujianese companies to always be familial relatives of each other.<sup>880</sup> By both securing their access to Lesotho through family and then typically inviting more family over from Fujian, the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho form close knit family-owned enterprises and

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<sup>875</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>876</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>877</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>878</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>879</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>880</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

initiatives. Often these family members also double as the only friends the Fujianese migrants have, due to a division between the Fujianese and Basotho. In recent years the increasing organization of the Lesotho Chinese community, mostly spearheaded by Fujianese, has seen greater intra-Chinese socializing than before.<sup>881</sup> However, the greater integration has often been a luxury which only a smaller, already affluent, segment of the Fujianese population can afford, as seen by the fact that its main proponents, the likes of Chen Kehui and Fang Zejiang, are already all prominent figures and leaders of the Fujianese community.

For many of the smaller Fujianese traders who comprise the bulk of Fujianese migrants to Lesotho social life is still largely limited only to their immediate family who stay with them at their place of business.<sup>882</sup> As a result, the life of many Fujianese in Lesotho remains a fairly insular and isolated one, described as difficult and disheartening by a researcher for the China-Africa Trade Center whilst he conducted extensive interviews with Fujianese traders in remote parts of Lesotho.<sup>883</sup> Fujianese migrants in Lesotho are often seen as making little effort to engage with other Basotho outside of what is expedient for their business interests. They are not seen as engaging in efforts to join, in some sense, with the Basotho society. Similarly, their living conditions typically look more impoverished than those of a middle-class Basotho family. As many Fujianese migrants live in their stores their “homes” often look like storerooms and warehouses, which often conjures up the idea that they are living in poverty of some sort.<sup>884</sup> The oft-noted work ethic of the Fujianese also leaves them little time for recreation or social interaction. Due to Fujianese migrant laborers working long hours and rarely closing shop there is little opportunity for them to partake in social events.

The Fujianese frequently migrate as a family unit as well.<sup>885</sup> Compared to non-Fujianese migrants in Lesotho, there is a higher proportion of married Fujianese migrants.<sup>886</sup> Most

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<sup>881</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>882</sup> Y. Zi: “Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone,” *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 178.

<sup>883</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>884</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 57.

<sup>885</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>886</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 79.

Fujianese come over as couples and this contributes to the strong family connections that binds the Fujianese community in Lesotho tightly together. Though by numerous accounts the Fujianese, in particular among the Chinese, have succeeded in spreading and settling down throughout Lesotho, they are still mostly focused in the Maseru area.<sup>887</sup> Most, if not all, of the associations are headquartered around Maseru as well.

Another indication of the extent to which the Fujianese migrant community has established themselves in Lesotho is the growing presence of infants and toddlers living in Lesotho. As mentioned, above the typical model of the Fujianese transnational family is one in which the children are reared at home and only brought over to the foreign country their parents live in upon completion of their education in China. As teenagers it is not uncommon for them to be brought over to Lesotho, generally to work in the stores and businesses that their families began.<sup>888</sup> This, of course, plays a role in strengthening the familial aspect of the “transnational kinship network,” but it also means that there is a distinct group of young Chinese in Lesotho who struggle to adapt to their new surroundings. In China, these teenagers are accustomed to a higher level of access to commodities, goods, and technologies than what they encounter in Lesotho.<sup>889</sup> They are uprooted from established social circles and friendship groups and moved to a remote location they know little or nothing about. Due to the consistent fears surrounding crime, these teenagers are often not allowed to move about without supervision, and many of them spend their teenage years confined to working in their parents’ stores without any other outside contact or input.<sup>890</sup> However, increasingly Fujianese migrants are having children in Lesotho.<sup>891</sup>

A clear division exists between those children born in Lesotho, who represent a distinct minority, and those who had been brought there by their parents after spending most of their childhoods in China. Those who hailed from China were, in general, unhappy with their

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<sup>887</sup> 2011 *Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 275.

<sup>888</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>889</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 48.

<sup>890</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>891</sup> 2011 *Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 259.

circumstances and almost universally desired to return to China.<sup>892</sup> Virtually none of these children had plans, or intentions, to remain in Lesotho or to take over the businesses of their families.<sup>893</sup> Their goals and desires were focused upon returning to China, where they would rather be. The problem of poverty, of needing to find some way to sustain and support themselves, continued to be the most pressing concern.

A prominent feature of the Fujianese businesses in Lesotho is their tendency to be owned, or managed, by husband-and-wife pairs.<sup>894</sup> An interesting development among Fujianese migrant families living in Lesotho is growing agency and influence of the female members of the family, mothers, and wives. Traditional gender norms are a prevalent matter throughout the world and the traditionally less affluent population of Fujian typically evidences traditional expectations concerning gender behaviour.<sup>895</sup> This, of course, entails a history of complex interactions. Most readers will, however, be familiar with the broad expectations that “work” is the domain of the male members of the family, whilst female members are expected instead to find themselves suitable spouses, bear children and tend to the home. In Lesotho, however, among the many stores and businesses opened by Fujianese migrants it is not uncommon to find women also taking part in management of the enterprises.<sup>896</sup> Multiple instances also exist where husband and wife pairs operate their businesses together.<sup>897</sup> In addition, within the

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<sup>892</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 48.

<sup>893</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 48.

<sup>894</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家

！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center; T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; *Chen Lin (PTY) LTD (2013/0567)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 27 March 2013; *Chen Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (2013/0239)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 6 February 2013; *Chen Qing Supermarket (PTY) LTD (2012/1540)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 30 October 2012; *Qian Sheng Enterprises PTY LTD (50047)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 December 2014; *Shouhua Chen Enterprises(PTY) LTD (55887)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 2 September 2016; *Qing Qing Import & Export (PTY) LTD (12004/267)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 14 May 2004; *You Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (68496)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 August 2019.

<sup>895</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4.

<sup>896</sup> S. Hanisch: “Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants’ Children,” *Africa Today*, Vol 66, pp 47-48.

<sup>897</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱素托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello: “LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy,” *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: “The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed,” *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon:

framework of Lesotho's reporting on Chinese businesses within the country, the wives are typically referred to on an equal footing with their husbands in terms of ownership.<sup>898</sup> Initially, most Fujianese migrants were men, who only brought their wives over later, once they were financially established.<sup>899</sup> However, even these older group of Fujianese, to survive, typically saw the women also enter the workforce in some capacity when they arrived.<sup>900</sup> For instance, when Chen Kehui's wife moved over to stay with him in Lesotho, in 1995, she too had to secure work for herself in order to help provide for the couple's children.<sup>901</sup>

Furthermore, though most reporting indicates that the initial Fujianese labourers brought over to work for Taiwanese companies were predominantly male, the current demographic make-up of Chinese in Lesotho seems to indicate that just under half the population is female.<sup>902</sup> This shift almost certainly is the result of the later waves of Fujianese migrants seeking opportunity on their own terms, with a marked tendency towards married couples to move over together.<sup>903</sup> Another distinct difference between the Fujianese migrants of the 1990s and the later migrants of the twenty-first century can be found in their marital positions. Many of those Fujianese who first came to Lesotho, via Taiwanese and Fujianese labour agencies and brokers searching for cheap labour for Taiwanese firms, came individually, overwhelmingly male, and were only

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*Interview with Fang Zejiang, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.*

<sup>898</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello:*

"LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon:

*Interview with Fang Zejiang, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.*

<sup>899</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.*

<sup>900</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.*

<sup>901</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello:*

"LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon:

*Interview with Fang Zejiang, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.*

<sup>902</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 281.*

<sup>903</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 281.*



joined by spouses or family later.<sup>904</sup> By contrast, as more and more Fujianese began to migrate separate to finding work in Taiwanese firms, they often did so as already married couples, with both the man and wife entering Lesotho together.<sup>905</sup>

Finances are an important aspect of life for Fujianese in Lesotho and, the vast majority, tend to operate on a cash only basis, not trusting banks at all.<sup>906</sup> This has developed into a tendency to only deal in cash and to keep large sums of cash on their person.<sup>907</sup> Distrust informs part of this practise but, once again, another part is informed by the survivalist lifestyle of the small Fujianese traders, who need to scrape by any excess profit they can to pay off their debts and maintain their business. Maintaining cash-only exchanges and avoiding investment in local banks, helps these traders to avoid having to pay interest or taxes, with many of them reporting no taxes at all.<sup>908</sup> This is a response to a necessity of their circumstances. Most Fujianese traders struggle to support themselves, and their families, on what profits they already make, so they are reticent to lose any more. For most Fujianese their largest expenditure comes from the stock they must purchase.

Despite the conventional wisdom that Fujianese largely always source their stock directly from China, the Fujianese community in Lesotho actually stands out as an exception as they have begun making use of local products.<sup>909</sup> Conventional wisdom, and research, has generally identified that an advantage of Fujianese retailers and wholesalers, wherever they go, is access to cheap sources of goods directly from mainland China.<sup>910</sup> Most academic works on Lesotho and the Fujianese tend to cite this same logic, that the Fujianese overwhelmingly purchase their

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<sup>904</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>905</sup> S. Hanisch: "Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants' Children," *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 50.

<sup>906</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 164.

<sup>907</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 164.

<sup>908</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 164.

<sup>909</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.

<sup>910</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.



goods and stock from mainland China in bulk, and cheaply.<sup>911</sup> There is, of course, validity to this claim, the majority of stock purchased by the Fujianese traders does originate from China.<sup>912</sup> However, what is interesting is the findings of the Brenthurst Foundation's paper on Chinese traders in southern Africa which conducted interviews and surveys among Chinese traders in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zambia. One of their findings was related to where Chinese traders in these countries source their goods from: in the case of all countries, but one, the vast majority of goods, over 80%, were sourced directly from China.<sup>913</sup> The sole exception was Lesotho which sourced just over 40% of its goods directly from China.<sup>914</sup> More interesting than this steep difference, however, was that Fujianese in Lesotho sourced by far the largest amount of their supplies locally, just under 40%, actually very close to the amount they sourced from China.<sup>915</sup> The exact reason for why Fujianese in Lesotho source so much more locally than other Fujianese migrants in southern Africa is not clear. The Brenthurst Paper theorised that perhaps the landlocked nature of Lesotho made it too expensive to source more from China. This created a dependency on local sources to financially survive, but as of yet no clear and conclusive evidence exists to determine the cause of this unique behaviour.

As seen with the increased local sourcing of goods, even with the insularity of the Fujianese community in Lesotho, a degree of cultural exchange has occurred. For the Fujianese themselves this has been most prevalent in the adoption of the Sesotho language and the frequency of Fujianese traders sporting local nicknames. Particularly those who become prominent within the communities are often gifted a local Basotho name by their clientele.<sup>916</sup> On the other hand, certain Chinese delicacies and food products have taken off quite

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<sup>911</sup> Anon: "Local Contractors Cry Foul over Chinese Dominance," *Lesotho Times*, 16 June 2018; Anon: "Setting up Shop in Lesotho – How the Chinese Succeeded," *allAfrica.com*, Accessed November 2020; G. Mohan & M. Tan-Mullins: "Chinese Migration in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework," *European Journal of Research Development*, 21, 2009, p. 589, 595; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 162; Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, pp 132, 137, 145.

<sup>912</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.

<sup>913</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.

<sup>914</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.

<sup>915</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 25.

<sup>916</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

successfully in Lesotho. Since around half of the retail and wholesale stores managed by the Fujianese are supplied from China, it is little surprise that they end up stocking products and foods from the mainland. These then, in turn, become staples in Lesotho, where Chinese biscuits have become a popular and common snack. One particularly successful Chinese delicacy is punani fruit, effectively a form of dried sugar plum, which has also become a popular product sold by Chinese migrants in African states.<sup>917</sup> Indeed, the punani fruit currently selling rapidly in Lesotho are mostly imported from South Africa where, in the Free State and Eastern Cape particularly, they are also popular with the local population.<sup>918</sup> At least in part the popularity of the fruit, commonly consumed as a snack in China and used to alleviate motion sickness, is driven by a belief that it enhances sexual enjoyment for women if ingested.<sup>919</sup>

The importance of networking and connection between the Fujianese within Lesotho is a pivotal part of the migrants' experience. This is particularly true for the majority of the current Fujian migrants, those who have entered Lesotho after the phase driven largely by Taiwanese recruitment. For these Fujianese, their journey to Lesotho was facilitated by their families and often involved working for family members. Within Lesotho the Fujianese population remains relatively well-connected. Contrary to their general isolation from the rest of the population, driven by a combination of exhaustive work hours, slim profit margins and a perception of criminality that makes them afraid to leave their homes, the Fujianese coordinate and communicate among each other extensively. An increasing trend seen within the broader Chinese community in Lesotho is their integration and cooperation with each other. This is most clearly visible in the degree to which they all participate in the associations which have come to represent them in Lesotho. Yet even aside from this, evidence gathered from individual responses seems to indicate that, overall, the Fujianese and other groups of Chinese in Lesotho largely cooperate and support each other.<sup>920</sup> In general, the Chinese community in Lesotho seems well-integrated together, regardless of their originating region.<sup>921</sup>

Although some degree of market competition can be expected, little evidence of intense conflict or strife exists other than some anecdotal expressions that Fujianese have in some way

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<sup>917</sup> P. Kabi: "'Punani Fruit' takes Lesotho by storm," *Sunday Express*, 30 August 2016.

<sup>918</sup> P. Kabi: "'Punani Fruit' takes Lesotho by storm," *Sunday Express*, 30 August 2016.

<sup>919</sup> P. Kabi: "'Punani Fruit' takes Lesotho by storm," *Sunday Express*, 30 August 2016.

<sup>920</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 78.

<sup>921</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 78.

tarnished the reputation of Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>922</sup> Considering the most violent episode of anti-Chinese sentiment in Lesotho, the 1992 riots, largely preceded Fujianese domination of Lesotho's Chinese population, it is perhaps difficult to take seriously the notion that Fujianese have somehow worsened relations between local Basotho and Chinese of all types.<sup>923</sup> Furthermore, Fujianese express an openness to cooperation with other Chinese, a survey finding that when queried as to who they would turn to for assistance, most answered more generally local Chinese as opposed to exclusively familiar family or friends.<sup>924</sup> This perhaps also, again, indicates the extent to which Fujianese have internalized the need for cooperation and organization between Chinese in Lesotho to survive against what they see as a hostile environment. This cooperation has, in the past two decades, also led to a distinct new development in the way Fujianese, and Chinese, in Lesotho organize themselves.

A key feature of the Fujianese experience, and another indication of their capability for cooperation, is the importance of Chinese associations in Lesotho.<sup>925</sup> The phenomenon of a Chinese association is nothing new, most countries with a substantial population of Chinese usually have multiple such associations. These often are the only significant advocacy organizations for Chinese. In Lesotho, however, the existing associations have become active participants, both economically and socially, within the country. The associations are another window into the organizational framework that allows the Fujianese to remain so competitive.

These associations were specifically the concept of a group of Fujianese businessmen in the late 1990s.<sup>926</sup> In the aftermath of a series of riots in 1998, which targeted many Chinese stores, a number of the Fujianese migrants suffered significant losses.<sup>927</sup> By this stage already, most Chinese operating in Lesotho were Fujianese so, unlike in prior violent incidents, they bore the

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<sup>922</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 163.

<sup>923</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 196.

<sup>924</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 78.

<sup>925</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; S. Maliehe: *A History of Indigenously-owned Business in Post-colonial Lesotho: Politics, Constraints, Marginalisation and Survival, 1966-2012*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2015, p 197.

<sup>926</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>927</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

brunt of the attacks rather than Taiwanese business interests.<sup>928</sup> Fang Zejiang's own supermarket was burned down during these 1998 riots, and this would serve to motivate him to form the first of the Fujianese-based associations in Lesotho.<sup>929</sup> In an attempt to provide an organized network which would help all Fujianese migrants in Lesotho, Fang Zejiang, his brother Fang Zeji, Chen Kehui and He Qiang organized and discussed the need for Fujianese in Lesotho to assist each other and remain in contact.<sup>930</sup> Security, also, formed an important part of this discussion, as it was very much held in direct response to the violence of 1998. From this event, ultimately, would be borne the different Chinese associations now dominated by the Fujianese. The first of these was the Lesotho Fuqing Township Association, established in 2000 and lead by Fang Zejiang personally.<sup>931</sup> Along with this, in 2005, Chen Kehui would establish the CLPPFAF. It would take the lead on most matters, spearheading efforts by the associations to engage with Lesotho civil society.<sup>932</sup>

An important aspect of these associations was their role in reducing internal conflict among the Fujianese, and wider Chinese, community within Lesotho. It has been noted that, throughout southern Africa, conflict between Chinese retailers and wholesalers are not uncommon.<sup>933</sup> As many of the Chinese migrants operate under taxing loans they must pay back, and very slim profit margins, competition is often fierce and, in particular, the recent wave of Fujianese migrants to Lesotho have earned a reputation even among other Chinese migrants as resorting to violent conflicts due to this.<sup>934</sup> In Lesotho, however, the development of the associations specifically sought to decrease internal conflict between Chinese retailers and wholesalers.<sup>935</sup>

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<sup>928</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>929</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>930</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>931</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>932</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>933</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, pp 37-38.

<sup>934</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 167; Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, pp 37-38.

<sup>935</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

To this end the associations introduced a series of universal guidelines and prescriptions for new Fujianese entering the country.<sup>936</sup> The goal of this was to create a system by which all Fujianese would have enhanced security and stability but, also, to prevent any of them from encroaching on each other's customer bases.<sup>937</sup> To this end they promoted provisions such as requiring any Fujianese opening their own store to do so at least 50 to 100 meters away from any existing Fujianese business.<sup>938</sup> These associations also worked hard to lobby Fujianese migrants to institute independent accounting and unified management as well as expanded communication between different Fujianese enterprises so that they could assist each other rather than compete with each other.<sup>939</sup>

These associations have generally become what is perceived as the leadership of the Fujianese migrants, often described as such in news media and reports.<sup>940</sup> This is somewhat of an oversimplification. Although these associations boast high membership and, almost always, include some of the most successful Fujianese migrants, they can far from claim to represent the Fujianese population in Lesotho wholistically. As will be detailed later in the section concerning anti-Chinese sentiment in Lesotho, a common accusation made against Chinese in Lesotho is that they do little, or nothing, to speak out against the allegations or stereotypes they face within the country.<sup>941</sup> To an extent this also fits into the common narrative of Chinese communities within Africa being “insular”, “secretive”, and “unengaged” with the country they are in. However, the creation of these associations, and their ongoing efforts, dispel any notion that the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho are not at least making an effort to take part in the society of Lesotho.

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<sup>936</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>937</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>938</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>939</sup> Anon: “莱索托陈克辉,莱索托长春,” *Sinoenergy*, 莱索托陈克辉,莱索托长春 (sinoergy.com), Accessed 14 August 2021.

<sup>940</sup> L. Sello: “LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy,” *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; M. Phakela: “Chinese bring relief to Thabong,” *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; N. Koeshe: “Red Cross Honours Chinese Businessman,” *Sunday Express*, 7 August 2018; P. Kabi: “Chinese community lends a helping hand,” *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016, p. 10.

<sup>941</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 163.



The associations seem to have also become responsible for galvanizing the Chinese community into engaging more with Lesotho civil society and the Basotho population at large. Prior to the intensification of the associations' charitable efforts from 2015 there was little documentation or reporting on anything resembling aid or support from the Chinese community, whether Taiwanese, Shanghai or Fujianese, in Lesotho. What aid was received from a Chinese source was, invariably, received at the official level: state support from first Taiwan and then, after 1994, from the PRC.<sup>942</sup> However, with the formation of the associations, and in particular the CLPPFAF, or Fund, there appears to now be a conscious effort among some portions of the predominantly Fujianese community who actively engage in Lesotho's civil society.<sup>943</sup>

Chen Kehui's efforts reflect a clear attempt by a certain segment of the Fujianese population to ingratiate themselves with the population of Lesotho.<sup>944</sup> He has even adopted the common Basotho nickname, "Thabiso", as his new official name as a citizen of Lesotho.<sup>945</sup>

The year 2016 saw the intensification of aid rendered by members of the Chinese community in Lesotho. Most of this support came through associations, largely comprised of Fujianese Chinese.<sup>946</sup> Over the course of 2016 the Fund, Chinese Community and Security Cooperation Centre Lesotho, Chinese Enterprises Association, Association of Chinese Merchants and Manufacturers in Lesotho, Fujian Compatriot's Association and Fuqing Association contributed some M600 000 to varying aid projects throughout Lesotho.<sup>947</sup> In addition to this financial contribution the associations also spent 2016 donating agricultural products to nine different districts throughout Lesotho.<sup>948</sup> Once again, Chen Kehui was at the forefront of these

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<sup>942</sup> F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012.

<sup>943</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>944</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>945</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>946</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>947</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016.

<sup>948</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016.



charitable efforts and, again in 2016, he organized with other members of the Chinese business community to donate parcels of groceries and other necessary goods to some 500 residents of Mafeteng.<sup>949</sup>

However, of the associations the Fund clearly has taken the lead in terms of aid projects and involvement with Basotho civil society. In September of 2016, it partnered with the Chinese Community and Security Centre Lesotho to provide drought relief to over 250 vulnerable families in Quthing.<sup>950</sup> The Fund further provided drought relief to the Qacha's Nek district in that same year, as part of a dedicated program of helping households affected by the drought.<sup>951</sup> These efforts eventually provided aid to some 2 237 households throughout the Berea, Leribe, Butha-Buthe, Mokhotlong, Thaba-Tseka, Qacha's Nek, Mohale's Hook and Mafeteng regions of Lesotho.<sup>952</sup>

In 2014 the Fund began one of its longest running projects, a program aimed at supplying financial support to students in Lesotho who face financial difficulties in paying for their own tuition.<sup>953</sup> By 2017 this project was estimated to have supplied somewhere to the tune of M100 000 worth of support to different schools and high schools throughout Lesotho.<sup>954</sup> Although their project began in 2014, it reached a considerable high point in its efforts in 2017. Some of these efforts were focused on infrastructure and sanitation related projects. In October of 2017, the Fund paid for the construction of water conservation facilities in two villages in Thaba-Tseka.<sup>955</sup> That same year the Fund also paid for the construction of a borehole to help St Boniface High School in Maputsoe overcome a water shortage it was facing.<sup>956</sup> Similarly, the efforts of the associations seem to be promoting a wider interest in providing aid by the Chinese business community in Lesotho. In 2017, a group of local Chinese businessmen in Thabong noticed that the local community struggled with access to water. To rectify this situation one of them, Xue Feng, spearheaded a collective effort to finance and build a new borehole and water source which could be used by local residents more easily.<sup>957</sup> Xue Feng, nicknamed by the local Basotho "Mokhoenyane", which means grandfather, stated that he and his fellow

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<sup>949</sup> P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>950</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Quthing Community's aid," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2016, p. 6.

<sup>951</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Quthing Community's aid," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2016, p. 6.

<sup>952</sup> P. Kabi: "Chinese community lends a helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016, p. 10.

<sup>953</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Learners' aid," *Sunday Express*, 19 February 2017, p. 6.

<sup>954</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Learners' aid," *Sunday Express*, 19 February 2017, p. 6.

<sup>955</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Hand-over Ceremony of Water Supply Projects Held by China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund in Thaba-Tseka*, 23 October 2017.

<sup>956</sup> L. Ranooe: "Chinese continue donations drive," *Sunday Express*, 24 September 2017.

<sup>957</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017.

Chinese were motivated by what they saw as unnecessary suffering, particularly for older locals, who sometimes resorted to using the well which was intended for animal consumption.<sup>958</sup> Even earlier than that, in 2016, Lesotho Stone Enterprises, one of the largest Chinese owned firms in the country, constructed a borehole to the tune of M150 000 to assist villagers in Ha Ralisieng with access to water.<sup>959</sup>

The Fund has also begun providing financial assistance to underprivileged families with regards to their tuition fees.<sup>960</sup> This has taken the form of scholarships amounting to a total of M75 000.<sup>961</sup> Some of this assistance was awarded on the basis of performance in studies, but the rest of it was simply provided to assist families that could not pay their tuition otherwise.<sup>962</sup> By 2017 the Fund was supporting about 50 different students in this manner.<sup>963</sup> Beyond the opportunities this provides the children themselves, the families of the children expressed gratitude towards the Chinese community as this lifted a burden from the otherwise impoverished families, allowing them to make use of their funds in different ways.<sup>964</sup> In addition to this, the Fund also provided material support to high schools in the Mokhotlong area in 2017.<sup>965</sup> The Fund provided a number of sporting equipment supplies as well as sanitary supplies for female students, who can often not afford their own.<sup>966</sup> In the same year the Fund also provided up to M40 000 to support 40 orphaned and vulnerable students at the Masowe and Lesia High Schools.<sup>967</sup>

The Fund has most extensively also been involved in supplying support of an agricultural nature to rural communities in Lesotho.<sup>968</sup> Overall a sensible choice in a country where a significant portion of the population do still subsist off their agricultural activities. In October 2017 the Fund, along with local Chinese businessmen in the Butha-Buthe area, supplied seeds and fertilizer to 350 families from seven different villages around Butha-Buthe.<sup>969</sup> In November of 2017, the Fund also responded to pleas for assistance from a local Basotho woman,

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<sup>958</sup> M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016.

<sup>959</sup> M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016.

<sup>960</sup> N. Koeshe: "Chinese Community lends helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 27 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>961</sup> M. Maeka: "Fifty learners benefit from Chinese Grant," *Public Eye*, 28 July 2017, p. 2.

<sup>962</sup> N. Koeshe: "Chinese Community lends helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 27 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>963</sup> N. Koeshe: "Chinese Community lends helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 27 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>964</sup> N. Koeshe: "Chinese Community lends helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 27 July 2017, p. 9.

<sup>965</sup> M. Maeka: "Fifty learners benefit from Chinese Grant," *Public Eye*, 28 July 2017, p. 2.

<sup>966</sup> M. Maeka: "Fifty learners benefit from Chinese Grant," *Public Eye*, 28 July 2017, p. 2.

<sup>967</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Learners' aid," *Sunday Express*, 19 February 2017, p. 6.

<sup>968</sup> L. Sello: "Chinese come to Learners' aid," *Sunday Express*, 19 February 2017, p. 6.

<sup>969</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Charge d'affaires a.i. of Chinese Embassy Mr. Song Changqing Attended Agricultural Donation Ceremony Held by China-Lesotho People-to-People Friendship Action Fund in Butha-Buthe*, 30 October 2017.

Mamotena Thibili, by suppling M40 000 to farmers in the Ha Selonyane region of rural Maseru and providing some 106 bags of fertilizer, 50 bags of maize seeds and 50 bags of bean seeds as well.<sup>970</sup> In 2017 the Fund financed and provided 18 new water tanks for Motebang hospital and donated around M400 000 to local communities in Leribe as part of an active effort to involve themselves in supporting Lesotho's healthcare system.<sup>971</sup> The Fund has been involved in a number of aid projects. In 2018 they canvassed their membership, predominantly Fujianese businessman, to provide disaster-relief aid to the community in Quthing in the wake of damage done by a severe hailstorm.<sup>972</sup> By 2017 the Fund's Vice President claimed that the Fund had injected some M600 000 into local projects within Lesotho, including the provision of borehole water, scholarship programs and food assistance programs.<sup>973</sup>

Since the associations have begun to intensify their efforts to appeal to the people of Lesotho, they have also begun to definitively distinguish themselves from those Chinese nationals they see as giving them a bad name.<sup>974</sup> At an event Chen Kehui emphasised that though it was important to provide protection and safety for Chinese nationals living in Lesotho it was, equally, necessary to ensure all Chinese in Lesotho abided by the appropriate laws.<sup>975</sup> The Fund even signalled relatively clear, explicit, support for a harder government stance against offenders when, in 2018, it hosted Minister of Trade and Industry Tefo Maphela and concurred with his decision to deport Chinese national Chen Jin Song for selling expired meat products.<sup>976</sup> Just as there has been a call in some quarters for the Chinese in Lesotho to 'do more' for their own reputation, it seems the associations, spearheaded predominantly by Fujianese Chinese, are making a serious effort to do just that.

Individual contributions outside the associations have also begun to increase. In general, since 2015 there seems to have been an increase in efforts by the Chinese business community, mostly comprised of Fujianese migrants, to in some visible way be seen as contributing to society in Lesotho outside of their work. In 2018 Lesotho's Red Cross Society designated a local Chinese businessman, Chan Lee, as their corporate supporter of the year.<sup>977</sup> Chan Lee

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<sup>970</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese continue with charity initiatives," *Sunday Express*, 19 November 2017, p. 5.

<sup>971</sup> M. Phakela: "Major Equipment boost for Motabang Hospital," *Sunday Express*, 17 December 2017.

<sup>972</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Ambassador Sun Xianghua Attended Disaster-Relief Assistance Hand-over Ceremony in Quthing*, 26 March 2018.

<sup>973</sup> M. Phakela: "Chinese continue with charity initiatives," *Sunday Express*, 19 November 2017, p. 5.

<sup>974</sup> L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017.

<sup>975</sup> L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017.

<sup>976</sup> L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018.

<sup>977</sup> N. Koeshe: "Red Cross Honours Chinese Businessman," *Sunday Express*, 7 August 2018.

took the opportunity to appeal to his fellow Chinese businessmen throughout Lesotho for their assistance:

We invest in the country and create job opportunities for Basotho and giving back to the community should be one of our strongest areas of focus.<sup>978</sup>

Aside from their work concerning charity, the more affluent Fujianese merchants have also begun courting a closer relation with Basotho hawkers and vendors.<sup>979</sup> Although relations between most Fujianese small owners and Basotho small owners tends towards a degree of tension, with Fujianese shop owners often not permitting Basotho hawkers and vendors to work near their premises, the more established Fujianese traders have begun to not only permit Basotho hawkers and vendors to operate outside their premises, but even support them.<sup>980</sup> The logic underlying this is that the larger supermarkets and enterprises, owned by the more affluent Fujianese, do not see the small scale efforts of the hawkers or vendors as a threat to their business model and, thus, do not see an inherent risk in permitting them to sell their wares nearby.<sup>981</sup> Instead, by permitting this, these Fujianese have been able to integrate themselves better with their local communities, earning respect for these actions from local Basotho.<sup>982</sup>

While these may appear an anecdotal series of examples, they dispel the notion that the Fujianese community in Lesotho is completely unwilling to interact or engage with Lesotho's civil society. This is further supported by evidence that an increasing number of Fujianese traders adopted Lesotho citizenship.<sup>983</sup> Although this group still represents the distinct minority of the Fujianese community within Lesotho, they are an increasingly present and visible group, with many of the prominent leadership figures within the Fujianese associations counted among their number.<sup>984</sup>

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<sup>978</sup> N. Koeshe: "Red Cross Honours Chinese Businessman," *Sunday Express*, 7 August 2018.

<sup>979</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄 · 阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>980</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄 · 阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>981</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄 · 阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>982</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄 · 阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>983</sup> *Chen Lin (PTY) LTD (2013/0567)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 27 March 2013; *Chen Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (2013/0239)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 6 February 2013; *Chen Qing Supermarket (PTY) LTD (2012/1540)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 30 October 2012; *Qian Sheng Enterprises PTY LTD (50047)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 December 2014; *Shouhua Chen Enterprises (PTY) LTD (55887)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 2 September 2016; *Qing Qing Import & Export (PTY) LTD (12004/267)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 14 May 2004; *You Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (68496)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 August 2019.

<sup>984</sup> *Chen Lin (PTY) LTD (2013/0567)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 27 March 2013; *Chen Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (2013/0239)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 6 February 2013;

Although it is impossible to rule out the obvious selfish motives involved in this, that is a consequence of almost all efforts by any organization, the rise of the associations and their active charitable efforts, indicate a growing interconnectivity among the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho and also efforts to attempt to channel their presence in Lesotho to achieve common aims. The most important of which, at the moment, appears to be creating a more positive opinion of Fujianese in Lesotho. What these associations have most clearly allowed for is collective effort and work by the Fujianese. Pooling together their resources the associations have served as a vehicle for numerous efforts to support and engage the Basotho population in a constructive manner.<sup>985</sup> In particular, from 2015 onwards, there is a marked and pronounced campaign by the CLPPFAF to provide support for charitable projects throughout Lesotho.<sup>986</sup>

When examining these efforts, the role of an economic divide becomes clear. Chen Kehui and most of the leaders of these associations represent those Fujianese who have already established themselves successfully in Lesotho's economic sectors. They often own multiple businesses and as a result do not live mostly on a bare minimum of funds as the bulk of Fujianese migrants in Lesotho do. I would argue that it is this ability to not consistently worry, day to day, about their own safety and capacity to support themselves which enables them to focus on charitable efforts. In that way it is the more affluent Fujianese who seem to have decided to make a push for greater recognition in Lesotho and to convince the Basotho population of their good intentions. Here we again see the divergence which exists between the majority of Fujianese traders and merchants, and the smaller group of Fujianese who have managed to find financial success and create successful franchises for themselves within the country. Typically, these evidence a more optimistic position, both concerning crime in Lesotho and the capabilities of the police, and their relationship with the PRC Embassy in Lesotho.<sup>987</sup> Although in these cases

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*Chen Qing Supermarket (PTY) LTD (2012/1540)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 30 October 2012; *Qian Sheng Enterprises PTY LTD (50047)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 December 2014; *Shouhua Chen Enterprises(PTY) LTD (55887)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 2 September 2016; *Qing Qing Import & Export (PTY) LTD (12004/267)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 14 May 2004; *You Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (68496)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 August 2019.

<sup>985</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru*, 7 October 2016, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>986</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru*, 7 October 2016, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>987</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru*, 7 October 2016, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues



there are still no examples documented of the PRC Embassy providing assistance to them in disputes, the PRC Embassy has worked closely with them on the charitable endeavours they undertake, with almost all these endeavours receiving publicity on the Embassy's official website.

## 6.5 Challenges

It is apparent that there are a series of challenges and struggles which are common to the Fujianese experience in Lesotho as well. In general, most Fujianese, like most Chinese, who live in Lesotho express concerns and worries about their lives in Lesotho.<sup>988</sup> These concerns can predominantly be divided into the difficulties Fujianese feel they encounter due to cultural or language-based barriers, and then, most pertinently, the difficulties arising from criminality.<sup>989</sup>

Cultural and language barriers continue to be a serious impediment to better engagement and interaction between Fujianese and Basotho. As detailed above, almost no Fujianese had a grasp of Sesotho before coming to Lesotho and few among their number knew more than a passable amount of English.<sup>990</sup> As a result of coming from, generally, relatively low educational backgrounds most Fujianese are only fluent in their native language.<sup>991</sup> As a result, interaction with the state apparatus in Lesotho, with law enforcement and with their own customers all pose potential challenges. Establishing themselves as retailers and small businesses owners proved to have many complications too. Depending on the sort of business an individual wished to operate, Lesotho law required specific types of trading licenses.<sup>992</sup> With a poor grasp of English or Sesotho many Chinese traders did not know how to apply for these licenses or

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Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016. M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>988</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>989</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>990</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>991</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>992</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.



accidentally applied for the wrong sort of license.<sup>993</sup> This lack of communication also informs the experience of the Fujianese in Lesotho when attempting to make use of the local court system. Documentary evidence indicates that local Chinese migrants tend to avoid making use of the local courts. The majority of legal cases that deal with Chinese are those that have been brought to court by other respondents, as opposed to initiating proceedings themselves.<sup>994</sup> Where the Chinese do become involved in court proceedings, communication often forms a barrier. This, of course, presents a particularly problematic situation to a court which wishes to treat the Chinese fairly. Fortunately, in the case of Lesotho, consistently the courts have operated under the rationale that only with the presence of a qualified translator is it fair to proceed against Chinese individuals brought to the court.<sup>995</sup> There have been multiple instances already of higher courts reviewing and dismissing the decisions of lower courts against Chinese where they deem that, due to a lack of translator or a communication barrier, the Chinese individual was not allowed to fairly express their own case.<sup>996</sup>

With regards to courts in Lesotho, Fujianese most commonly are involved in disputes within Lesotho's labour court.<sup>997</sup> The majority of recorded cases involving Fujianese Chinese in Lesotho consist of appeals for the review of decisions by Lesotho's DDP. <sup>998</sup> For the most part these cases all focus on wrongful dismissal. Multiple Basotho employees dismissed by Fujianese employers have taken their cases to the DDP who have generally supported the case of the employee.<sup>999</sup> On a number of occasions, Chinese business owners have sought to

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<sup>993</sup> F. Pieke: "Chinese Globalisation and Migration to Europe," *Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies*, Working paper 2004; F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, Stanford University, 2004; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>994</sup> Labour Court: *Hong Shun Import & Export (PTY) LTD and Lydia Lerotholi, DDP*, LC/REV/81/08 A0297/08, 16 June 2010; Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDP*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014; Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions, CRI/APN/129/12*, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8; Labour Court: *Labour Commissioner (OBO Deceased Motlalepula Charles Rakhoba's Family) and Leta Security Services (PTY) LTD*, LC/31/05 NULL, LSLC 12, 26 July 2006, p. 3; Lesotho High Court: *'Makeng Makhaila and Director of Public Prosecutions, CRI/APN/475/06*, LSHC 153, 9 February 2007, p. 8.

<sup>995</sup> Labour Court: *Hong Shun Import & Export (PTY) LTD and Lydia Lerotholi, DDP*, LC/REV/81/08 A0297/08, 16 June 2010, p. 4.

<sup>996</sup> Labour Court: *Hong Shun Import & Export (PTY) LTD and Lydia Lerotholi, DDP*, LC/REV/81/08 A0297/08, 16 June 2010, p. 4; Labour Court: *Lesotho Stone (PTY) LTD and Hololane Molefi, DDP, Arbitrator (M. Keta)*, LC/REV/50/09, 21 October 2010.

<sup>997</sup> *Mabokang Mohafa and Good Trading Supermarket and DDP*, LC36/2013; Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDP*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014; *Atlantic Enterprises (PTY) LTD and Makatleho Letlaol and DDP*, LC/REV/101/13.

<sup>998</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDP*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

<sup>999</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDP*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

have these resolutions reviewed in Lesotho's labour court.<sup>1000</sup> The DDPR has become a fixture of life for many Fujianese traders. The vast majority of incidents and conflicts between Chinese employers and their employees do not go as far as Lesotho's courts but, instead, are dealt with via the DDPR.<sup>1001</sup> The DDPR also has a more negative image among the Fujianese traders. On one level this is unsurprising as it is the main tool their Basotho employees have with which to defend themselves, but it is also motivated by the matter of corruption.<sup>1002</sup> This corruption mostly stems from occasional collusion between the DDPR-assigned arbitrator and the employee bringing a case against their Fujianese employer.<sup>1003</sup> We can infer this practise is not altogether rare within Lesotho as, in the case of Lesotho Stone and Hololane Molefi, the judge of the Labour Court did opine:

What is apparent to this court is that there is a dirty game of bogus employers' organizations/associations which collude with individual employees and some trade unions to trick employers using the DDPR and this Court to extort money from such employers and employees as well.<sup>1004</sup>

Importantly, in their reviews of some of these arbitrations, the Labour Court of Lesotho has held that the DDPR represents a tribunal, as opposed to a court of law, and thus have held that the same requirements regarding the presence of an interpreter or translator do not hold for arbitrations held by the DDPR.<sup>1005</sup> From this can be seen cases where the language barrier between Chinese and Basotho plays a role:

#### DDPR Case, 15 September 2014

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<sup>1000</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

<sup>1001</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

<sup>1002</sup> Labour Court: *Lesotho Stone (PTY) LTD and Hololane Molefi, DDPR, Arbitrator (M. Keta)*, LC/REV/50/09, 21 October 2010; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1003</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1004</sup> Labour Court: *Lesotho Stone (PTY) LTD and Hololane Molefi, DDPR, Arbitrator (M. Keta)*, LC/REV/50/09, 21 October 2010.

<sup>1005</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermarkt (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014.

Arbitrator: I will allow you to speak here if you say something which I will be able to hear, because here we only allow Sesotho and English. If you speak Sesotho you should speak Sesotho and if you speak English you should only speak English on the issues which the lady said.

Mr. Chen: Yes

Arbitrator: Yes, the lady indicates that she has been unfairly dismissed, she wants notice, she wants the severance pay and she wants twelve months salary.

Mr. Chen: Listen to me, is never office...

Arbitrator: Are you going to speak English or are you going to speak Sesotho?

Mr. Chen: Ke bua Sesotho

Arbitrator: Okay

Mr. Chen: Yes, only banyane, katseba banyane Sesotho. Never office is talk, salary is one month.

Arbitrator: Sir

Mr. Chen: Yes

Arbitrator: I request that you should excuse me, really we shall carry on with this case and you will remain silent I will not allow you to speak.<sup>1006</sup>

In this case the court held that, as a tribunal, the DDPR was not required to provide a translator.<sup>1007</sup> As a result the respondent, Mr Chen, had his request for the DDPR's decision to be set aside refused.<sup>1008</sup>

However, the Labour Court has not been consistent with this ruling regarding the DDPR. In other cases, brought before the Labour Court it has ruled that the DDPR has erred by not ensuring an appropriate interpreter for a Chinese respondent.<sup>1009</sup> As a result the situation is,

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<sup>1006</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermark (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014, p. 5.

<sup>1007</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermark (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014, p. 5.

<sup>1008</sup> Labour Court: *Nazareth Supermark (PTY) LTD and Mita Lesaona and DDPR*, LC/REV/44/2012, LSLC 42, 15 September 2014, p. 5.

<sup>1009</sup> Labour Court: *Hong Shun Import & Export (PTY) LTD and Lydia Lerotholi, DDPR*, LC/REV/81/08 A0297/08, 16 June 2010, p. 4.

unfortunately, somewhat muddled. Unlike within the Court system itself, where there has been consistency regarding the necessity of an interpreter, the DDPR has been a more mixed affair. From this can be seen that the language barrier remains a key issue, one which many Fujianese themselves cite as a critical problem and common cause of disputes with the local Basotho.<sup>1010</sup>

At the same time several reports have noted the surprising adaptability of the Fujianese to the language divide.<sup>1011</sup> Many have begun to learn, even if only rudimentary, Sesotho as a means to communicate with their customers. Chen Kehui recalled, whilst working in a Taiwanese supermarket, noting down the tone, language and wording used by other Basotho employees, over a course of three months picking up some rudimentary Sesotho via observation he could use to communicate with them.<sup>1012</sup> This example proves to underscore a growing trend of adapting to the local circumstances that have defined the Fujianese experience in Lesotho. Although initially many Fujianese migrants were ill-equipped to handle the language barrier of moving to a country where the dominant languages were English and Sesotho, they have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for adapting to this obstacle. Fujianese migrants seem to have embraced learning Sesotho quite enthusiastically, to the point now where casual engagement with the many Fujianese migrants in Lesotho's more rural areas reveals that they regularly have a surprisingly good grasp of the local language.<sup>1013</sup> Considering their success even in remote locations within Lesotho, it is not surprising that they have come to utilize the language better, it would be hard for the Fujianese migrants to establish themselves as profitable small traders and merchants if they could not even communicate passably with their clientele. Many of the highly successful Fujianese migrants have even become more fluent in Sesotho than they are in English, showing clear signs of attempting to adapt to their adopted home country.<sup>1014</sup> This remarkable development has been achieved by conscious effort on behalf of the Fujianese migrants.

Once again, to an extent, the kinship networks do play a role here. Whilst the initial group of Fujianese migrants who entered Lesotho had to do so without any prior warning, experience or

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<sup>1010</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1011</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1012</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1013</sup> P. T. Tanga: *The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho*, Department of Social Anthropology/Sociology/Social Work, National University of Lesotho, p. 113.

<sup>1014</sup> *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 Jan 2008.

assistance, those who come now are often prepared for what they will find by relatives. More than that, they often have laid out in advance for them a path to follow which will assist them acclimatising to Lesotho. An example of this is the fact that numerous Fujianese migrants now, upon entering Lesotho, even before attempting to start their own businesses, take time out to learn aspects of Sesotho at the Lesotho Distance Education Centre.<sup>1015</sup> In the present Sesotho has become even more commonly spoken among the Fujianese than English, generally a preferred secondary language for Chinese migrants, due to its importance in Lesotho.<sup>1016</sup> Some academics in Lesotho have even remarked that the Fujianese tend to speak better Sesotho than they do English.<sup>1017</sup> This is another indication of the extent to which a certain, affluent, minority of Chinese merchants within Lesotho are actively becoming more integrated into the local society. As noted, language barriers and difficulties in communication have been noted as a consistent difficulty faced by Chinese migrants within southern Africa, and the developing of a strong, local, group of Chinese with understanding of Sesotho stands as an exception to the normal pattern of behaviour in these circumstances.<sup>1018</sup>

Perhaps more critically than the language barrier, however, the most pressing issue for the Fujianese in Lesotho is the matter of crime. Crime is an unavoidable part of life for the Fujianese migrants in Lesotho. If there is one topic, they almost are always willing to discuss at length, it is their feelings concerning crime in the country. In general, most Fujianese feel unsafe outside the confines of their homes and stores, which are often one-and-the-same.<sup>1019</sup> They are generally wary of going anywhere without some form of protection. Typically, they will only move if doing so in groups, and avoid having to walk outside their residences/places of business on their own.<sup>1020</sup> There exists a wealth of anecdotal evidence concerning their experiences with crime. Few, if any, do not tell of some encounter with crime during their stay

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<sup>1015</sup> P. T. Tanga: *The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho*, Department of Social Anthropology/Sociology/Social Work, National University of Lesotho, p. 116.

<sup>1016</sup> P. T. Tanga: *The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho*, Department of Social Anthropology/Sociology/Social Work, National University of Lesotho, p. 116.

<sup>1017</sup> P. T. Tanga: *The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho*, Department of Social Anthropology/Sociology/Social Work, National University of Lesotho, p. 116.

<sup>1018</sup> Y. Zi: "China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community," *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 35.

<sup>1019</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1020</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012.

in Lesotho.<sup>1021</sup> There also exists extensive documentation of court cases in Lesotho concerning Chinese victims of crime as well.<sup>1022</sup>

Specific data and records about Chinese victims of crime in Lesotho are hard to come by, making it impossible to ascertain for sure if they experience any higher frequency of crime than the rest of the country. However, it is generally acknowledged by multiple researchers, and the Fujianese themselves, that they are appealing targets for criminal activity in Lesotho.<sup>1023</sup> There also exist numerous documented cases of murdered Chinese migrants in Lesotho, generally as a result of robberies gone wrong.<sup>1024</sup> In 1995 Chen Kehui was held at gunpoint by robbers breaking into the supermarket he worked at.<sup>1025</sup> In July of 2006 robbers killed Huang Qihua when she and her husband were closing their stores late one evening.<sup>1026</sup> It was, at the time, the third murder of Chinese nationals in Lesotho in that month alone.<sup>1027</sup>

There are a number of factors which contribute to why Fujianese small traders present a more attractive target for criminals than many Basotho do. The clearest factor is, as mentioned before, that Fujianese tend to keep their money in the form of cash, often on their premises, rather than storing them in banks within Lesotho.<sup>1028</sup> For obvious reasons this makes them attractive targets for theft and there are multiple examples of murders resulting from attempted thefts of Fujianese properties. As a result, fear is, unfortunately, a large part of life for Fujianese

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<sup>1021</sup> Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020.

<sup>1022</sup> Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 4 June 2020; L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020.

<sup>1023</sup> M. Turner: *Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, p. 67.

<sup>1024</sup> Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020.

<sup>1025</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1026</sup> Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006.

<sup>1027</sup> Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006.

<sup>1028</sup> M. Turner: *Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, p. 67.



within Lesotho. Particularly among the less affluent Fujianese there is a constant expression of insecurity and a lack of confidence in their own safety in Lesotho. Many Fujianese feel as if they are ostracised to such an extent by the country that they live in, that they no longer have rights within that country.<sup>1029</sup> In this regard the Fujianese close ranks and deepen their existing bonds within the community as a reaction against what they see as an uncaring state that will not defend them and a populace they believe are actively interested in doing them harm.

Hijacking is also a problem Chinese migrants in Lesotho must contend with. As shown in the case of Makheng Makhaila, it is generally known that because the Chinese have a propensity for carrying cash on them, they make attractive targets, particularly in transit.<sup>1030</sup> Even when in vehicles they are often accosted at stop streets or robots. Since those who move between a place of work and domicile tend to do so only late in the evening, after the close of the working day, this further contributes to their vulnerable status.<sup>1031</sup> In general it can be concluded that, as a whole, transit represents a credible danger for Fujianese living in Lesotho, and one they have become conditioned to fear.

Furthermore, it is not only Chinese migrants who are the victims when targeted. As a court case in 2006 demonstrated, the Chinese owner of a local supermarket in Motimposo, Maseru, was robbed whilst on his way home after closing his store for the evening.<sup>1032</sup> Evidence of the seriousness with which the Chinese locals take their safety can be seen in the fact that the Chinese owner was being escorted home by one of his security guards, being afraid to make the journey from the supermarket to his residence alone.<sup>1033</sup> Whilst the two were still in route they were robbed and in the ensuing scuffle the security guard, a local Basotho man, was shot and died.<sup>1034</sup> The degree to which Fujianese feel their lives are threatened in Lesotho cannot be purely dismissed as paranoia or discrimination on their behalf. It is clear that there is a credible threat to their livelihoods, one which even widespread employment of armed security to

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<sup>1029</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 24.

<sup>1030</sup> Lesotho High Court: *'Makeng Makhaila and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/475/06, LSHC 153, 9 February 2007, p. 8.

<sup>1031</sup> Lesotho High Court: *'Makeng Makhaila and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/475/06, LSHC 153, 9 February 2007, p. 8.

<sup>1032</sup> Labour Court: *Labour Commissioner (OBO Deceased Motlalepula Charles Rakhoba's Family) and Leta Security Services (PTY) LTD*, LC/31/05 NULL, LSLC 12, 26 July 2006, p. 3.

<sup>1033</sup> Labour Court: *Labour Commissioner (OBO Deceased Motlalepula Charles Rakhoba's Family) and Leta Security Services (PTY) LTD*, LC/31/05 NULL, LSLC 12, 26 July 2006, p. 3.

<sup>1034</sup> Labour Court: *Labour Commissioner (OBO Deceased Motlalepula Charles Rakhoba's Family) and Leta Security Services (PTY) LTD*, LC/31/05 NULL, LSLC 12, 26 July 2006, p. 3.

provide protection has failed to ameliorate. Furthermore, this results in the unfortunate death of many Basotho employed by Fujianese migrants.

Again, a clear divergence here emerges between the majority of Fujianese, small retailers, wholesalers and business owners, and the minority who have managed to establish themselves as financially successful. Predominantly it is the small traders who are targets of crime and it is them who specifically allege that there is an overwhelming feeling of criminality in their surroundings within Lesotho.<sup>1035</sup> Similarly to their feelings towards the PRC governmental representation within the country, most of these Fujianese evidence little to no trust for Lesotho's police system, and some do not even report being victims of crime because they expect nothing to be done about it.<sup>1036</sup> The distrust the Fujianese population has towards the police force also extends to a fear of them. As part of the general perception most Fujianese have, that they are almost universally unwelcome or unappreciated in Lesotho, many are under the assumption that the same holds true for the police force. There is also some evidence to indicate that Fujianese wariness of contacting the local police emerges from some credible fears of police treatment of Fujianese migrants.<sup>1037</sup> Multiple Fujianese have alleged suffering abuse or intimidation at the hands of Lesotho police. For the most part this evidence is anecdotal, however, the court case of one Zheng Shu Xhian does evidence some credibility to this concern.<sup>1038</sup>

In 2011 Zheng Shu Xhian was initially found guilty by a lower court in Maseru for utilizing the services of a sex worker.<sup>1039</sup> The exact circumstances of his arrest and allegation are unclear because the charge sheet used initially was ultimately deemed defective, as the wording seemed to imply Zheng Shu Xhian was the victim of sex trafficking, rather than the most likely intended charge which was that he was making use of the services of a victim of human trafficking.<sup>1040</sup> However, Zheng alleged to have made a guilty plea only under torture and duress. He alleged

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<sup>1035</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1036</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1037</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1038</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1039</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1040</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

that he had been intimidated into a plea bargain he did not fully understand out of fear of further police torture and, in addition, that during his initial trial the charges against him were altered without him being made aware of said changes.<sup>1041</sup> In 2012 the High Court of Lesotho would side with Zheng Shu Xhian in setting aside his original conviction on the grounds that the case had been riddled with irregularities.<sup>1042</sup> Pertinently, the court accepted his allegations of torture as credible and also noted that the police force itself did not gainsay or deny said allegations.<sup>1043</sup> Behaviour such as this is partly responsible for the assumption amongst Fujianese migrants that they can rely little on support or protection from the police in Lesotho.

These fears and feelings of distrust are also magnified by the way the police force has handled prosecution of Chinese culprits in the past. In one pertinent case a Chinese national, Jian Zin Yan was accused, along with two other men, of murdering an Indian businessman in 1999.<sup>1044</sup> However, it came out during the court case that the manner by which Jian Zin Yan, the Chinese in question, had become implicated was highly dubious.<sup>1045</sup> One of the accused had alleged that the murder was performed at the behest of a Chinese man he simply identified as “Jimmy”.<sup>1046</sup> The accused only implicated Jian after seeing him in a police parade of suspects organized more than a year after the killing and in which Jian was the only Chinese person present.<sup>1047</sup> The court ultimately ruled that such a proceeding could not be used as evidence against Jian due to the way it had been structured to purposefully implicate him. Also due to a lack of any other evidence connecting him to the case he was completely acquitted and found not guilty.<sup>1048</sup>

Distrust from the police also stems from credible reports that they specifically target Chinese nationals for higher fines under the assumption that they are wealthier than Basotho. Traffic

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<sup>1041</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1042</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1043</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Zheng Shu Xhian and Chief Magistrate, Senior Clerk of Court and Director of Public Prosecutions*, CRI/APN/129/12, LSHC 13, 19 March 2012, p. 8.

<sup>1044</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001, p. 64.

<sup>1045</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001p. 64.

<sup>1046</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001p. 64.

<sup>1047</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001p. 64.

<sup>1048</sup> Lesotho Court of Appeals: *Rex v Lefu Ntobo, Jian Zin Yan and Afzal Abubaker*, CRI/T/68/2000, LSCA 137, 16 November 2001, p. 64.

Police in Lesotho will particularly target Chinese motorists to extort money from them.<sup>1049</sup> They mostly take advantage of the fact that even if the Chinese national suspects they are being extorted they are unwilling to take the risk of spending a day in prison due to the financial losses that will result for their business if they are not present to run it.<sup>1050</sup> Li Huang, a local Fujianese businesswoman, was accosted for a M500 fine and, in a hurry to deliver goods, simply paid it rather than challenge the fine.<sup>1051</sup> Whilst a fine such as this would, typically, be in the range of M20 to M50, when Chinese nationals are concerned it often jumps to M200 or M500 for the Chinese.<sup>1052</sup> If the Chinese fail to comply they usually only face a single day in jail, released by nightfall and with no case prosecuted against them, but due to how intense their work hours usually are, and the slim profit margins they operate off of, most cannot afford to lose that much time.<sup>1053</sup>

Distrust in public officials also emanates from the belief many Fujianese have that local officials tend to extort or blackmail them.<sup>1054</sup> They frequently allege that local officials use work permits and trading licenses, in conjunction with local Fujianese's difficulties with the local languages, to demand bribes from Fujianese store owners.<sup>1055</sup> Further complicating this issue is the fact that criminals have begun to imitate local officials seeking to confirm trading licenses as a method to gain access to Fujianese stores.<sup>1056</sup>

Tied into this is the fact that, along with crime, corruption is an enormous part of the experience for Fujianese migrants who live in Lesotho. Almost all of them claim to regularly engage with corrupt officials, be the targets of corrupt police, or in some or other way have to put up with corruption in Lesotho.<sup>1057</sup> There is, perhaps, some irony in the fact that both Basotho and Chinese complain about corruption in the Mountain Kingdom. It is maybe one of the few points of near universal agreement between the two groups. However, tellingly, both groups suspect

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<sup>1049</sup> Anon: "Chinese get a Raw Deal from Traffic Cops," *Lesotho Times*, 16 December 2010.

<sup>1050</sup> Anon: "Chinese get a Raw Deal from Traffic Cops," *Lesotho Times*, 16 December 2010.

<sup>1051</sup> Anon: "Chinese get a Raw Deal from Traffic Cops," *Lesotho Times*, 16 December 2010.

<sup>1052</sup> Anon: "Chinese get a Raw Deal from Traffic Cops," *Lesotho Times*, 16 December 2010.

<sup>1053</sup> Anon: "Chinese get a Raw Deal from Traffic Cops," *Lesotho Times*, 16 December 2010; Y. Zi: "Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone," *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 178.

<sup>1054</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 20.

<sup>1055</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1056</sup> Anon: "Businesswoman robbed," *Lesotho Times*, 17 June 2016.

<sup>1057</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

the other more of corruption. It is a prevalent belief among Basotho that the Chinese community in Lesotho largely benefits from corruption in the Lesotho state, indeed they are often accused of being the primary cause of corruption within the state. Whilst Chinese, particularly traders and retailers, feel they are unfairly targeted and marked out for extortion by police and officials because they are foreign.<sup>1058</sup>

The language barrier forms an important part of this corruption as well. Often Fujianese are not confident enough in their mastery of English or Sesotho to dare to try to challenge an official or policeman attempting to fine them, even if they do suspect the fine is illegitimate.<sup>1059</sup> Because they can rarely afford to lose any time away from their work, and because they often lack the funds to challenge extortion or corruption in courts, most Chinese simply pay the bribes demanded of them as a means of escaping further complications.<sup>1060</sup> This does, unfortunately, contribute to the stereotype around Chinese that they will solve conflicts with money, which makes them more attractive to corrupt individuals. This is yet another factor in creating, and driving, an insular community who are distrustful of their surroundings.

As with efforts to improve their reputation, and engage in civil society, the Fujianese have through their associations also attempted to organize a response to the high level of crime targeting the Chinese in Lesotho. This took the form of the Chinese Community and the Security Cooperation Centre (CCSCC) in Maseru.<sup>1061</sup> Formed in 2016, in response to the death of some seven Chinese nationals due to crime in Maseru, Chen Kehui once more played a founding role in the association.<sup>1062</sup> The primary purpose of the CCSCC was to liaise more effectively with the Lesotho police, in order to create a safer security environment for Chinese migrants in Lesotho.<sup>1063</sup> The Centre appoints Chinese representatives to assist the police force

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<sup>1058</sup> Y. Zi: "Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone," *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 172.

<sup>1059</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their Own Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 21.

<sup>1060</sup> Y. Zi: "Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone," *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 178.

<sup>1061</sup> L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017.

<sup>1062</sup> L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017.

<sup>1063</sup> L. Sello: "Moleleki condemns killing of Foreigners," *Lesotho Express*, 4 August 2017.

when they are called to Chinese stores or businesses.<sup>1064</sup> They provide translators, interpreters and are also present to comfort Chinese victims of crimes.<sup>1065</sup>

Though the creation of the Centre is believed, at least officially, to have resulted in a decrease in the level of danger faced by Chinese in Lesotho, it is still an ongoing issue. In 2018 there was an incident of Chinese businessman Cho Yang Lin being murdered by his driver in conjunction with several others.<sup>1066</sup> The murder was only among a number that year which prompted the PRC Embassy to officially note to the Lesotho Police Force its concern for the safety and security of Chinese nationals staying in Lesotho.<sup>1067</sup> Most recently, in 2020, Chinese doctor Tianshan Chen was murdered during a robbery of his premises for some M5 400.<sup>1068</sup> The case drew more attention than most due to the involvement of two officers of Lesotho's Defence Force and the fact that the criminals were largely able to execute the robbery due to being provided inside information concerning the Chinese doctor by one of his employees.<sup>1069</sup> Incidents such as these not only indicate that there is still a real and credible threat to the livelihood of Chinese migrants in Lesotho but, further, contribute to the continuing distrust between Chinese migrants and the Basotho community, which reinforces negative stereotypes the two groups hold of each other.

Linked to the matter of crime is the general opinion that the Fujianese are unwanted and disliked by the local Basotho population. Much of the dislike of Fujianese within Lesotho stems from their perceived domination of the retail and wholesale sector in Lesotho.<sup>1070</sup> Fujianese penetration of Lesotho's retail and wholesale industries is apparent at almost every level. The popular sentiment within the country contends that the Fujianese migrants have managed to establish themselves as traders, merchants, and business owners in even relatively remote parts of the country. This sentiment is borne out by evidence which supports the widespread dispersion of Fujianese businesses.<sup>1071</sup> In truth, most stores are still owned by non-Chinese

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<sup>1064</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1065</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1066</sup> L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018.

<sup>1067</sup> L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018.

<sup>1068</sup> M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020.

<sup>1069</sup> M. Mohloboli: "Soldiers nabbed over Chinese Doctor's murder," *Sunday Express*, 2 October 2020.

<sup>1070</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 167.

<sup>1071</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, p. 139.



within Lesotho, but the Fujianese prevalence at the level of small shops makes them a particularly visible component for the large rural population of Lesotho.<sup>1072</sup>

While the Fujianese were not present in particularly large numbers during the riots in 1992, they were present for the riots which occurred in both 1998 and 2007.<sup>1073</sup> Unlike the 1992 riots, both of these were not directly incited by conflict with Chinese in Lesotho. The 1998 riots were a response to allegations of fraud in the election of that year, and the 2007 one was instigated by a government effort to relocate stalls.<sup>1074</sup> However, despite this, both riots did see widespread looting and targeting of Chinese-owned businesses, or businesses perceived as Chinese owned.<sup>1075</sup> However, an indication of the success of Chen Kehui's rapport building with the local community could be found in 1998.<sup>1076</sup> When his own supermarket came in danger of being targeted it was a group of locals who convinced the crowds not to, defending Chen and his work.<sup>1077</sup> It is clear then that the Fujianese migrants have already experienced anti-Chinese violence in Lesotho, albeit the more recent wave, coming in after the millennium. They have so far not seen an explosion of violence on that same scale.

Perhaps the primary cause of hostility towards Chinese, of all origins, in Lesotho is economic in nature. As discussed above, Fujianese retailers and wholesalers have managed to establish themselves throughout Lesotho and even foreign reporting notes the presence of some or other form of Chinese mercantile enterprise or trader in virtually every settlement in the country.<sup>1078</sup> This makes the Chinese domination of local trading highly visible as, for many Basotho, it is literally impossible for them to avoid facing it in their day-to-day lives. As much as they resent the dominance of Chinese retail in the country, they also have no option but to make use of it owing to the fact that the Fujianese stores typically sell at the most affordable prices.<sup>1079</sup> A

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<sup>1072</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1073</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, p. 143.

<sup>1074</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, p. 143.

<sup>1075</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, p. 143.

<sup>1076</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>1077</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>1078</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1079</sup> Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009, p. 8.

general perception of the Chinese as “stealing” work and wealth from the Basotho has crystallised into a common sentiment, seen in both the country’s local media and at official levels.<sup>1080</sup> Although the highly visible presence of the Fujianese is a significant part of this, the role of Taiwanese textile factories cannot be ignored. Much of the resentment towards Chinese, as a group, in Lesotho has also been stoked by the working conditions local Basotho women endure in some of these textile plants.

The animosity felt towards the Fujianese presence in Lesotho’s retail and wholesale sector is also a result of the importance of that sector within the country. Retail and wholesale typically constitute the third largest contributor to Lesotho’s national GDP, coming in behind only manufacturing and real estate.<sup>1081</sup> As a result, this sector of the economy is one of relative importance to the country and, additionally, one which Basotho commonly attempt to enter as well. Unsurprisingly this then forces conflict and competition between Basotho retailers and wholesalers and Fujianese ones. This conflict then takes on a racialized context and becomes a larger conflict between Basotho and Chinese migrants within Lesotho in general.

It should be noted that the sentiment of hostility towards Chinese within Lesotho is a relatively public and open matter. Resentment towards the Chinese is a frequent topic of discussion among Basotho but, more than that, is also a topic which has been picked up in the country’s media. Both radio shows and newspapers have taken up discussion of the topic and, more than a few, have framed their discussions as largely anti-Chinese.<sup>1082</sup> It is not uncommon to have expressions of strong derision or hostility be expressed over the radio or in print media within Lesotho. Some publications, such as *Moafrika*, have even earned censure from media freedom organizations for what is seen as overtly hateful commentary on the Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>1083</sup> However, even those stations which avoid playing into overly odious sentiments, or currying hostility on purpose, still see widespread expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment regardless of the actual topics they engage with.<sup>1084</sup>

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<sup>1080</sup> T. McNamee: “Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola,” *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1081</sup> M. Makhetha: “Central Bank of Lesotho’s Economic and Financial Review,” *Economic Stakeholders’ Briefing Session*, p. 5.

<sup>1082</sup> J. K. Akokpari: “Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho,” *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 93.

<sup>1083</sup> J. K. Akokpari: “Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho,” *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 8.

<sup>1084</sup> Y. J. Park: “Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the “Other” and the Role of Memory,” *African Studies Review*, p. 140.

Sentiments of resentment towards the Fujianese, or Chinese in general, have also now become a politicised issue within Lesotho. The question of Chinese involvement in Lesotho, their influence, has become a hot topic within the country, and a matter often brought up in relation to the government.<sup>1085</sup> Resembling discussions which have been seen before throughout history, these tend to circle around complaints that the incumbent government is too light, too soft, in its treatment of the Chinese population. That it is enabling them, through corruption it is alleged, to exploit Lesotho to their own advantage.<sup>1086</sup> The All Basotho Convention (ABC) party spent much of the time between 2007 and 2017, when it came to power as part of a coalition government, building a populist anti-Chinese platform.<sup>1087</sup> Whilst in the opposition ABC largely campaigned on allegations that the government of the time was corrupt in its dealings with Chinese in Lesotho.<sup>1088</sup> Multiple politicians have made statements accusing Chinese of fraudulent and corrupt practises as well, making it impossible to ignore the political dimension of this hostility. One of the clearest examples were the statements of M. Tsuluba in 2002:

Basotho businesses ... are now facing serious problems which are caused amongst others, by unfair competition from foreigners (the Fujianese) engaged in small businesses who use fraudulent methods to account for their tax obligations, a practice which makes them pay no taxes and empowers them to under-sell Basotho businesses.<sup>1089</sup>

Among middle-class Basotho much the same opinion was prevalent, particularly in their avoidance of the Chinese retail and wholesale stores. Whilst low-income Basotho might often reveal expressions of discrimination and hostility towards Chinese, predominantly Fujianese, migrants in Lesotho, they are still largely, by necessity, forced to deal with them as they offer more affordable prices than South African and other retailers.<sup>1090</sup> As a result many of them do still concede, or acknowledge, that there is a vital, useful, function being played by Chinese retailers and wholesalers in Lesotho, namely providing access to necessary goods for lower income families. By contrast, middle class Basotho have the financial means to purchase solely

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<sup>1085</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 167.

<sup>1086</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 167.

<sup>1087</sup> Anon: Anti-Chinese resentment flares, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 Jan 2008.

<sup>1088</sup> Anon: Anti-Chinese resentment flares, *The New Humanitarian*, 24 Jan 2008.

<sup>1089</sup> Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, First Meeting, Sixth Session, 12 August 2002, 4.

<sup>1090</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 164.

from upmarket and South African stores, as a result often consciously avoiding engagement with Chinese retailers who are typically seen by the Basotho middle class as being uneducated and untrustworthy.<sup>1091</sup> Ironically, in terms of income a Fujianese migrant might often be comparable to the income of a Basotho middle class family, but despite this they are typically viewed as being part of a less affluent class.<sup>1092</sup> To a large extent this middle class disdain for the Chinese migrants is entangled with the perception of how Fujianese live in Lesotho.

However, it is an unfair perception which has taken root despite evidence to the contrary. The reality is that, particularly now among the Fujianese, there has been a considerable, dramatic, increase in active efforts by Fujianese to make themselves seen as useful and amenable to Lesotho society. To an extent, of course, this is a purposeful effort to rehabilitate the negative stereotypes which have developed around the Fujianese in Lesotho, but that cannot wholly disqualify these efforts. The fact simply is that there is considerable effort of the Fujianese striving to take part in Lesotho's civil society, and to provide assistance to Lesotho as a whole, which is often ignored or overshadowed by the accusations of their unfair business practises.

The perception of Chinese migrants possessing an outsized influence in Lesotho's government are perpetuated also by the scandal surrounding one particular individual: Yan Xie. Commonly known in Lesotho as John Xie, Yan Xie arrived in Lesotho from Shanghai during the beginning of the 1990s migration period.<sup>1093</sup> More than any other example his activities in Lesotho are relevant for demonstrating the source of the growing resentment Chinese face in Lesotho.

The evidence regarding Yan Xie's involvement in corruption connected to Lesotho's business and political worlds at this stage is definitive. In 2018, during an interview, he openly admitted to paying for the wedding of a prominent Lesotho politician, and his daughter's wedding as well, in addition to admitting to allowing said politician to rent his luxurious home at a considerably reduced cost.<sup>1094</sup> Members of the Basotho National Party admitted to receiving funding from him and it has been alleged that he provided funding for the birthday of a former Prime Minister as well.<sup>1095</sup> His appointment in 2017 as a special trade envoy of the Prime

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<sup>1091</sup> S. Hanisch: "Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants' Children," *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 57.

<sup>1092</sup> S. Hanisch: "Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants' Children," *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 57.

<sup>1093</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *Chinese business tycoon reveals how he helped fund politicians in Lesotho – but denies claim of state capture*, Daily Maverick, 31 October 2018, p. 1.

<sup>1094</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *Chinese business tycoon reveals how he helped fund politicians in Lesotho – but denies claim of state capture*, Daily Maverick, 31 October 2018, p. 1.

<sup>1095</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *Chinese business tycoon reveals how he helped fund politicians in Lesotho – but denies claim of state capture*, Daily Maverick, 31 October 2018, p. 1.

Minister elicited further accusations that he had secured a position of influence for himself through financial support for incumbent politicians.<sup>1096</sup> Beyond numerous allegations of involvement in political corruption, to the point where Lesotho's press and tabloids regularly described him as having financed almost every politician in Lesotho's government, Yan Xie had a prior history of being suspected of intense corruption in his business-related activities in Lesotho.<sup>1097</sup>

Aside from the ongoing allegations and investigations into Yan Xie's relationship with Lesotho government officials, the other scandal which has highlighted the concerns about local Basotho over Chinese foreign investment is that of Guohui Shi and the Maseru Dawning company. In 2018 Lesotho's government mandated that the growers and suppliers of mohair and wool, a large industry for Lesotho's rural population, be forced to sell all their wool through a single company: Maseru Dawning.<sup>1098</sup> This company was established by a foreign Chinese businessman, Guohui 'Stone' Shi, and was intended to become a central facility through which all Lesotho mohair and wool would then be auctioned and sold abroad, replacing a South African-based firm, BKB, which had previously conducted largely the same operation.<sup>1099</sup> Although initial stages of this process seemed to be agreed upon by all parties involved, Maseru Dawning, Lesotho's government and the Association of Growers in Lesotho, representing most of the rural workers involved, trouble emerged when the government mandated that none of the growers could sell their products to any company outside Lesotho.<sup>1100</sup> They were also required to store all mohair and wool with Maseru Dawning, a matter which the Association took to court and won, preventing them from being forced to do so.<sup>1101</sup> Since then the dispute has spiralled into a multi-faceted conflict focused on accusations of state capture. Maseru Dawning and Guohui, have been accused of utilising their wealth to secure favourable deals for themselves and multiple government ministers have been accused of standing to privately benefit from this new law.<sup>1102</sup> Unsurprisingly, for their part, both Guohui and the ministers have denied any such allegations.

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<sup>1096</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *Chinese business tycoon reveals how he helped fund politicians in Lesotho – but denies claim of state capture*, Daily Maverick, 31 October 2018, p. 1.

<sup>1097</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *Chinese business tycoon reveals how he helped fund politicians in Lesotho – but denies claim of state capture*, Daily Maverick, 31 October 2018, p. 1.

<sup>1098</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *The Tangled Web of the Lesotho Wool War*, Daily Maverick, 10 October 2018.

<sup>1099</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *The Tangled Web of the Lesotho Wool War*, Daily Maverick, 10 October 2018.

<sup>1100</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *The Tangled Web of the Lesotho Wool War*, Daily Maverick, 10 October 2018.

<sup>1101</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *The Tangled Web of the Lesotho Wool War*, Daily Maverick, 10 October 2018.

<sup>1102</sup> L. Ntsukunyane: *The Tangled Web of the Lesotho Wool War*, Daily Maverick, 10 October 2018.

Both these two scandals highlight the most recent examples fuelling widespread anti-Chinese sentiment within Lesotho. Notably, however, neither of these individuals comprise part of the Fujianese migrant class comprising currently most Chinese in Lesotho. Yan Xie, as discussed, is part of the older Shanghai business clique within Lesotho, and no record of his involvement with any of the Fujianese associations exists, whilst Guohui Shi is a foreign businessman with seemingly no known connection to the established Chinese community in Lesotho.

The practical realities of hostility towards Chinese in Lesotho, regardless of point of origin, can also not be completely extricated from the credible fear many Chinese report feeling. Consistently, when polled, Chinese migrants in Lesotho report their greatest concern is being victims of crime and the concern about crime in Lesotho in general tends to preoccupy them.<sup>1103</sup> This concern is also not without merit. There have been multiple incidents of Chinese migrants in Lesotho being targets of crime and, in particular, being killed or assaulted.<sup>1104</sup> In general the Chinese migrants living in Lesotho are acutely aware of, and afraid of, becoming targets of crime. Security measures at the Chinese retail and wholesale stores throughout Lesotho are a common sight: alarms, bars and security guards. Because of the fact that their stores tend to have a high degree of security most Chinese who are victims of crime are targeted whilst outside the premises of their businesses or homes which, often for the Chinese in Lesotho, are one and the same thing.<sup>1105</sup> The fear of crime also plays a key role in limiting further integration by Chinese migrants with Basotho's wider society. Many Chinese are afraid to leave the premises of their stores or homes, thus the idea of moving freely about outside, or participating in societal events, is simply not something they entertain due to concerns for their safety.

The relationship between crime, Basotho hostility towards Chinese migrants and Chinese migrants' perception of crime in Lesotho, works together to largely sour relations on both sides. For Basotho there is an assumption of bad faith in the actions of Chinese migrants who come seeking work in Lesotho and are interpreted as stealing work instead. Whilst Chinese migrants assume that they can largely not trust or rely upon any non-Chinese in Lesotho due to a perception of criminality and corruption as being all-pervasive in the country.

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<sup>1103</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1104</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012, p. 13.

<sup>1105</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.



Nor is hostility towards Chinese in Lesotho universal. As displayed in the case of Chen Kehui's own supermarket, during the 1998 riot, Basotho would also come to the aide of Chinese locals under threat at times. This example was not an isolated one either. In 2010 a crowd of Basotho reacted to the robbing of a Chinese owned supermarket by apprehending and delivering the culprits to the police.<sup>1106</sup> A similar incident occurred in Leribe in 2012 as well, where local Basotho assisted in apprehending an individual who had stolen from a local Chinese store.<sup>1107</sup> As these incidents show Basotho sentiment towards Chinese is far from uniformly negative and at times Chinese locals have even received active aid and assistance from Basotho in their community.

## 6.6 An Uncertain Future

In the present day the appeal Lesotho once held to Fujianese migrants has diminished substantially. A number of factors have led to this outcome. Part of it is the result of the negative image many Chinese have of life in Lesotho. As has been detailed, the testimony of many Fujianese is that their time in Lesotho often saw them confronted with crime, corruption and hostility. However, considering that even in the face of this most Fujianese migrants in Lesotho opt to remain, it is unlikely the current level of criminality and hostility in Lesotho is behind the declining interest in migration towards Lesotho. Instead, the primary cause is most likely connected once again to affluence. In this case the growth in affluence the PRC has seen over the past decades has translated into a substantial increase in the average wages and wealth of rural families and households in Fujian.<sup>1108</sup> As a result, Lesotho no longer offers a distinct financial advantage for many Fujianese, who can now often make as much, and more, from work in Fujian. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a decrease in interest in immigrating to somewhere far off and remote, and often perceived in negative terms, like Lesotho, as opposed to remaining in their homes and simply working there. This, of course, is similar to the series of events which saw first Taiwanese, then Shanghai and other mainland Chinese, eventually cease their large-scale migration into Lesotho prior to the twenty-first century.

However, though numerous Fujianese have indicated their growing disillusionment with Lesotho, it is hard to make a definite assessment at this stage if the numbers of Fujianese in

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<sup>1106</sup> M. Maama: "Mob Justice for Robbery Suspects," *Lesotho Times*, 2012a:1.

<sup>1107</sup> Anon: "Detective Flees," *Lesotho Times*, 2012.

<sup>1108</sup> S. Hanisch: "Chinese Migration to Lesotho as a Springboard toward a Better Future? The Ambiguous Social Class Positions of Migrants' Children," *Africa Today*, Vol 66, 3-4, p. 61.

Lesotho will decrease substantially. It still remains the case that Fujianese are the most visible and present minority group within Lesotho, and that there is still a significant presence of Fujianese entering the country through air travel. Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether or not the Fujianese will in the near future begin to relocate from Lesotho the way the Taiwanese and Shanghai Chinese before them did. However, for now, the Fujianese community in Lesotho remains its largest minority, and one which is actively struggling with the extent to which it is caught between the efforts of an affluent minority to integrate themselves deeper into local society, and a less wealthy majority whose circumstances largely have driven them to become more internally interconnected with their fellow Chinese in Lesotho, but increasingly ostracized from the Basotho population.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

### 7.1 Overview

What emerges from the foregoing evidence and information is that the experience of different groups of Chinese migrants within Lesotho has been multifarious and nuanced, not monolithic, resulting in the emergence of a small community of Chinese, from both Taiwanese and Fujian origins, who have integrated themselves to some extent within Lesotho's wider society. Outside perceptions in news media, as well as commonly recorded popular sentiment, misses this fact by reducing the differing groups of Chinese into one 'Chinese' whose only noteworthy feature is their notable role in Lesotho's retail, wholesale, and textile sectors.<sup>1109</sup> There exists a clear connection between the grouping of all Chinese migrants together as a class and the increasing hostility they are subjected to within Lesotho.<sup>1110</sup> That they are commonly perceived as being in some way a proxy, or tool, for the PRC government also results in the conflation of issues directed towards the PRC state with the lives of private Chinese migrants within Lesotho.<sup>1111</sup> This is not unique to the Chinese migrants of Lesotho. In numerous locations Chinese migrants have, unfortunately, become targets of broader state-level conflicts and disputes.

Although not completely, this partly does emerge as a result of the refusal to accord Chinese migrants their own individual agency and history. For this reason, there exists a tangible reason to make analysis and discussion of Chinese migrants more nuanced. As part of beginning this process there are two important facts discussed within this chapter, building on the foregoing data. The first is the acknowledgement that migration from China to Lesotho is driven by private agency and initiative, not governmental directive.<sup>1112</sup> This being the case the discussion

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<sup>1109</sup> Anon: "Chinafrica: Quietly Conquering a Continent," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 19 March 2009, p. A6; J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, 22, (1), 1 March 2005, p. 94; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 168; Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56, (1), April 2013, p. 139.

<sup>1110</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, 22, (1), 1 March 2005, p. 94; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 168; Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56, (1), April 2013, p. 139.

<sup>1111</sup> G. Mohan & M. Tan-Mullins: "Chinese Migration in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework," *European Journal of Research Development*, 21, 2009, p. 589, 595; J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, 22, (1), 1 March 2005, p. 94.

<sup>1112</sup> G. Mohan & M. Tan-Mullins: "Chinese Migration in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework," *European Journal of Research Development*, 21, 2009, p. 589, 595; J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, 22, (1), 1

of the PRC's economic involvement with Lesotho must be decoupled from discussions of the private Chinese traders within Lesotho. Combining the two groups without distinction results in a tendency to view the economic relation of Lesotho with the PRC as being the cause of Chinese success within Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector, which drives hostility against the Chinese in Lesotho. An important part of this distinction is acceptance of the poor relationship which exists between the majority of Chinese migrants living in Lesotho with their home government.<sup>1113</sup>

A further distinction must be made between the differing groups of Chinese within Lesotho as well. The common conflation of all Chinese within Lesotho results in errors such as the assumption that the Chinese involved in Lesotho's textile industry are largely contiguous with those Chinese in the retail and wholesale sectors.<sup>1114</sup> However, as established in chapters five and six this is not the case. Even though Fujianese Chinese have become the most populous group of Chinese within Lesotho the Chinese involvement within Lesotho's textile sector is still mostly dominated by Taiwanese companies and individuals, not Fujianese or other mainland Chinese. Distinguishing between these differing groups of Chinese also demonstrates challenges to conventional assumptions about the relations between Chinese within Lesotho. Although there is a commonly repeated belief that older Taiwanese migrants are disapproving of the later Fujianese migrants, evidence suggests that any such resentment is not total as there is frequent, high level, contact and cooperation between groups of Fujianese and Taiwanese traders within Lesotho.<sup>1115</sup>

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March 2005, p. 94; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1113</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 196.

<sup>1113</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The Two Centuries of Struggle for Basotho Economic Independence*, p. 196; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1114</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a strange land: citizenship and the immigration debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, 22, (1), 1 March 2005, p. 94.

<sup>1115</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; *Anti-Chinese resentment flares*, The New Humanitarian, 24 Jan 2008; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Ambassador Hu Dingxian of Lesotho visited Taiwanese-funded enterprises in Lai*, 26 January 2013; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Embassy Staff in Lesotho spend the Mid-Autumn Festival with Taiwanese businessmen*, 26 September 2010.

Within the Fujianese migrants a more nuanced look also reveals a challenge to the common assumption that Chinese migrants within southern Africa are universally insular. The emergence of an affluent class of Fujianese businessmen who actively involve themselves within the civil society of Lesotho makes it impossible to categorically “accuse” the Chinese in Lesotho of not making efforts to engage, or integrate, with Lesotho society at large. This examination also, however, revealed the emergence of important class distinctions among the Fujianese within Lesotho. A clear difference has developed between affluent Fujianese and those who are still comparatively impoverished. Although outside the remit of this study the grounds exist for a class-based analysis of Chinese migrant communities within Lesotho.

The most important conclusion emerging from all of this is the urgent need to treat the Chinese migrants in Lesotho as individual actors and agents. This will only be achieved through acknowledging the internal divisions of the Chinese in Lesotho and reckoning with overly simplifying assumptions which still hold a great deal of sway in popular opinion concerning the Chinese.

## **7.2 Reflection**

The need to talk of people in wider classes and groups is an unavoidable hazard of historical studies. Though disciplines of history have emerged more recently which seek to individualize experiences and complicate generalized statements they must still, to an extent, rest upon imparting certain conclusions onto numerous individuals as a collective. Necessarily this will always result in a degree of generalization and obscure certain, individual, exceptions to said generalizations. Much like the issue of direct translation never fully managing to capture the intent of words so too is this simply a fact that we cannot avoid in the pursuit of historical knowledge. However, it is important that, with our increasing awareness of this fact, that efforts are made to provide as nuanced an analysis of groups or classes of people as reasonably possible. This necessitates and requires examinations which break down groups of people accorded shared history into smaller divisions to accord more individual agency to them and their history. From this nuanced approach comes the awareness that what can seem at first as a monolithic group with a shared history and identity are still, themselves, also a multivarious grouping of individuals with differing stakes in their own historical experiences. This process is what has been applied to the history of the Chinese migrants in Lesotho, providing a complication of the tendency to group Lesotho’s Chinese migrants as a single monolithic

group. Through this it has been demonstrated that certain assumptions which are commonly made about Chinese migrants in Lesotho, particularly a uniform insularity, do not fully accord with the reality as differing classes of Chinese migrants in Lesotho have emerged with different historical relations to Lesotho's civil society. This also serves as a microcosm, somewhat, for the assumptions made about Chinese migrants in southern Africa as a general class, painted as being a withdrawn, usually economically active, group with little connection to the society of the countries they are residing in.

Lesotho's Chinese population began with the development of political relations between the Kingdom and Taiwan in 1966.<sup>1116</sup> This relationship developed out of three key considerations: Taiwan's employment of 'cheque book diplomacy', of rendering aid and developmental support to states in exchange for political recognition and support in geopolitics against the PRC.<sup>1117</sup> Typically Taiwan focused on states which were newly independent and seeking to develop their economies. From this, unsurprisingly, from the 1950s through to the 1980s much of this diplomacy was focused on former colonial states in Africa.<sup>1118</sup> An additional factor in Lesotho and Taiwan's relationship was simply Lesotho's proximity to South Africa. As South Africa and Taiwan forged a close economic, political, and social relationship during the Cold War, Taiwan invested a great deal of money and time into apartheid ruled South Africa.<sup>1119</sup> Taiwan's attention and focus was thus drawn to the southern African region through its close cooperation with South Africa and numerous other states in the region, Lesotho being one such an example. Furthermore, when sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa began to increase to an extent where it disincentivised further Taiwanese investment there many of the Taiwanese businessmen, due to proximity, moved their assets and operations into Lesotho as a way to bypass the sanctions.<sup>1120</sup> The third factor stimulating Lesotho and Taiwan's relationship at the time was Lesotho's economic dependence upon South Africa, in large part arising from its landlocked status, which relegated it to the status of a so-called 'captive state'.<sup>1121</sup> Similarly to the other 'captive states' of South Africa; Botswana and Swaziland (now

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<sup>1116</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Twenty-First Year Meeting*, 1966, p. 8.

<sup>1117</sup> Z. Qingmin: "Aid diplomacy," *International Forum*, 9:6, 2007, pp 18, 21.

<sup>1118</sup> Z. Qingmin: "Aid diplomacy," *International Forum*, 9:6, 2007, pp 18, 21.

<sup>1119</sup> Anon: "Premier Sun, Botha speak of strengthening cooperation," *Taipei CNA in English*, 17 October 1980; Anon: "Taiwanese foreign minister arrives in South Africa," *Taipei CNA in English*, 28 May 1981; L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 71; Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 14.

<sup>1120</sup> Y.J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, p. 14.

<sup>1121</sup> I. Taylor: "The 'captive states' of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35:2, 2008, p. 75.



Eswatini), Lesotho remained diplomatically allied to Taiwan for most of the Cold War period as a necessity of both geography and geopolitics.<sup>1122</sup>

Taiwanese migration to Lesotho began in 1967, when the first team of Taiwanese specialists entered the country as part of medical mission.<sup>1123</sup> These specialists became the earliest, recorded, group of Chinese within the Mountain Kingdom.<sup>1124</sup> The vast majority of the Taiwanese experts returned home at the conclusion of the different programmes they had partaken in.<sup>1125</sup> It was those few Taiwanese experts who remained within Lesotho who formed the very first Chinese migrant community of Lesotho. The small size of this community seems to have allowed them to draw relatively little attention to themselves, as compared to the considerable attention contemporary Chinese migrant communities within Lesotho have received.<sup>1126</sup> These Taiwanese would become part of Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector, developing their own small businesses and shops during a time when this sector was largely dominated by a number of competing, predominantly Indian, interests.<sup>1127</sup>

The Taiwanese community within Lesotho grew following 1974 as a result of an influx of Taiwanese businesses seeking to establish their own private enterprises within Lesotho.<sup>1128</sup> These Taiwanese were drawn both by the economic opportunities the Lesotho government offered as part of their purposeful courting of foreign direct investment and as a result of the prior mentioned sanctions against the apartheid government in South Africa.<sup>1129</sup> In particular a large number of Taiwanese textile companies began to invest heavily in the development of

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<sup>1122</sup> I, Taylor: "The 'captive states' of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 35:2, 2008, p. 75.

<sup>1123</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 32.

<sup>1124</sup> Anon: *Helping Lesotho's Agriculture*, Taiwan Panorama, Helping Lesotho's Agriculture - 台灣光華雜誌 (taiwanpanorama.com.tw), Accessed 4 October 2021; P. J. Ntai: *Critical Factors determining successful irrigation farming in Lesotho*, M. A. dissertation, p. 11.

<sup>1125</sup> N. R. Mokitimi: *Economic Analysis of Crop Production in Lesotho: A Household-based Programming Approach*, Ph.D. dissertation, p. 18.

<sup>1126</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58; P. J. Ntai: *Critical Factors determining successful irrigation farming in Lesotho*, M. A. dissertation, p. 11; S. Tseng: *The Republic of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, p. 167.

<sup>1127</sup> J. Robinson: "Chinese Skills is passed on to Swaziland," *Sunday Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 58; P. J. Ntai: *Critical Factors determining successful irrigation farming in Lesotho*, M. A. dissertation, p. 11; S. Tseng: *The Republic of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, p. 167; Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56:1, 2013, p. 135.

<sup>1128</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; K. Matlosa & C Sello: *Political Parties and Democratisation in Lesotho*, Eisa Research Report no. 23, p. 8.

<sup>1129</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; K. Matlosa & C Sello: *Political Parties and Democratisation in Lesotho*, Eisa Research Report no. 23, p. 8; S. Radebe: "Foreign Investments – Lesotho's Material gain," *The Financial Mail*, 2003.

textile mills within Lesotho.<sup>1130</sup> In addition to the initial group of Taiwanese business owners further migration was stimulated by their enterprises, as these would typically recruit much of their middle management staff from Taiwan.<sup>1131</sup> In this way the Taiwanese migrants galvanized the arrival of further Taiwanese migrants, expanding the Taiwanese community within Lesotho drastically and also, often, causing the understanding of a difference between those Taiwanese involved in the retail and wholesale sector to be blurred with those Taiwanese who owned factories.<sup>1132</sup> This was, in part, because those same factories drew further Taiwanese migrants, seeking employment. However, not all were able to achieve this and, not infrequently, when Taiwanese in Lesotho were unable to secure work for themselves within Taiwanese-owned factories they tended to enter the retail and wholesale sector.<sup>1133</sup>

This new group of Taiwanese migrants soon became the most populous and visible group, although a clear distinction existed between the wealthier factory owners and the typically less affluent shop owners.<sup>1134</sup> These shop owners would begin to become an increasingly present and dominant force in Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector, joining other Asian expatriate groups in forming a profitable foreign trader class within the country throughout the 1980s and 90s.<sup>1135</sup>

Available evidence seemed to suggest that this new community of Taiwanese migrants were typically family units, as opposed to individual migrants, where ownership was often shared between spouses and children were expected to work within the businesses.<sup>1136</sup> Although it was standard for a husband to move over first, often setting up the initial shop, in time their family would move over to join them and then the entire enterprise became a family affair.<sup>1137</sup> The tight knit nature of these companies also contributed to the phenomenon of chain migration

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<sup>1130</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; K. Matlosa & C Sello: *Political Parties and Democratisation in Lesotho*, Eisa Research Report no. 23, p. 8; S. Radebe: "Foreign Investments – Lesotho's Material gain," *The Financial Mail*, 2003.

<sup>1131</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

<sup>1132</sup> L. Anshan: "Chinese immigrant population in Africa after the war – Dynamic analysis of the situation," *International Political Studies*, 6, 2017, p. 11.

<sup>1133</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 136.

<sup>1134</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 136.

<sup>1135</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 136.

<sup>1136</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75;

Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

<sup>1137</sup> C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75;

Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

through kinship networks, as Taiwanese businesses would typically serve as engines for facilitating the movement of more Taiwanese, typically relatives, to Lesotho to help with the businesses as they grew and expanded.<sup>1138</sup> As the number of Taiwanese businesses in Lesotho increased there was some organization among the Taiwanese in Lesotho. 1976 saw the establishment of the earliest organizations among the Taiwanese communities in Lesotho.<sup>1139</sup> These association represented the only major effort by this Taiwanese community to organize themselves in Lesotho, and largely existed to promote and defend the economic status of the Taiwanese community and help new Taiwanese migrants to establish themselves within Lesotho.<sup>1140</sup> As the Taiwanese community within Lesotho grew over the 1980s and 90s they also diversified the range of industries they took part in.<sup>1141</sup> This included the opening of the first traditional Chinese distillery outside of China, the establishment of stores dedicated to traditional Chinese ornamentation, cardboard companies, warehouses, and more.<sup>1142</sup> This diversification saw the economic and public profile of the Taiwanese community in Lesotho grow, although the largest economic impact was still restricted to the small group of Taiwanese business owners involved in Lesotho's textile industry.<sup>1143</sup> As the community grew their family orientated nature saw Taiwanese being born within Lesotho, slowly creating a small community of Taiwanese who permanently resided in Lesotho, rather than moving between Taiwan and Lesotho.<sup>1144</sup>

The growth of the community throughout the 1980s and 1990s saw a change in demographics of Lesotho's Chinese community. Whilst previously most migrants had come from Taiwan

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<sup>1138</sup> T. Gibbs: *The Politics of Worker Rights in the Lesotho Textile Industry*, M. A. dissertation, p. 21; Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; I. Y. Sun: *Next Factory of the World – How Chinese investment is reshaping Africa*, p. 115.

<sup>1139</sup> L. Anshan: *Inheritance and Evolution of Chinese Associations in Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>1140</sup> L. Anshan: *Inheritance and Evolution of Chinese Associations in Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>1141</sup> C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147; C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75. Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 126.

<sup>1142</sup> C. Rolfes: "The Fang Family of Qwaqwa," *Sunday Times*, 1985, p. 147; C. Blanckenberg: "Kiki's a fire-brand when it comes to fire-water," *Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977, p. 75; Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019; L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 126.

<sup>1143</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012.

<sup>1144</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

directly, during the latter half of the 1980s this began to change.<sup>1145</sup> Increasingly the migrants to Lesotho came from mainland China, Shanghai in particular.<sup>1146</sup> This was the result of Taiwan's growing affluence, which meant that the proportion of Taiwanese who were willing to move abroad to Lesotho for work had shrunk as the opportunities for work within Taiwan improved.<sup>1147</sup> Impoverished mainland Chinese, thus, became the new primary labour pool for Taiwanese firms seeking to employ Chinese managerial staff. Once again, as had happened to first the Taiwanese experts who stayed behind in the 1970s and the Taiwanese employees drawn to Lesotho in the first half of the 1980s, many of these mainland Chinese wound up entering into Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector.<sup>1148</sup> At times this was the result of them completing their contracts with their Taiwanese employers, but seeking still further work opportunities, and at other times it was a direct result of exploitative recruitment practises by Taiwanese labour agencies which lured over Chinese to Lesotho with promises of work which did not materialize.<sup>1149</sup>

Other than those mainland Chinese who entered into the retail and whole sector there was little contact between the wider society of Lesotho and this new influx of Chinese.<sup>1150</sup> These mainland Chinese were often shuttled from airports to their places of work, where they often resided in large complexes, interacting only with other Chinese and rarely leaving the premises.<sup>1151</sup> This has made tracking the history of this group of Chinese more difficult and they have left behind considerably less historical sources in Lesotho than either the Taiwanese migrant groups or Fujianese migrant groups. Though some of them did manage to establish themselves also as individual shop owners, it was never in as large numbers as the Taiwanese

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<sup>1145</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>1146</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44.

<sup>1147</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>1148</sup> T. McNamee: *Africa in their Words – A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, p. 33.

<sup>1149</sup> M. Turner: "Rethinking the Peripheral: Chinese Migrants in Lesotho," M.A. dissertation, Oxford University, p. 44; X. Yi: *Fuqing people in South Africa: Open a shop to hire Six Armed security guards*, Phoenix Finance, [fuqing people in south africa: open a shop to hire 6 armed security guard - phoenix financial special planning \(ifeng.com\)](http://www.ifeng.com), Accessed 2 June 2020.

<sup>1150</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1151</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

migrants were able too.<sup>1152</sup> Relations between the initial mainland Chinese migrants and their Taiwanese employers were not universally amicable either. Considerable evidence suggests that it was considered conventional wisdom within Lesotho throughout the 1980s and 1990s that the mainland Chinese recruited by the Taiwanese were subjected to highly exploitative circumstances.<sup>1153</sup> This was not universal, of course, but it was prolific enough to be notable.<sup>1154</sup>

The influx of Chinese migrants from both Taiwan and mainland China rapidly decreased as the 1990s went on. The increasingly public profile of Taiwanese migrants within shops and their labour practises within the textile and garment industry of Lesotho saw the development and eventual crystallization of a strong anti-Chinese sentiment among Lesotho's local population.<sup>1155</sup> As there was little distinction made between Taiwanese or mainland Chinese from Shanghai and other locations this resentment was directed against the entire class of 'Chinese looking' peoples, extending even towards traders from Korea.<sup>1156</sup> This hostility was driven primarily by the perception of the 'Chinese' as having too prominent a position within Lesotho's economy, particularly the retail sector, and poor treatment of Basotho labourers within the textile and garment industry.<sup>1157</sup> This growing anti-Chinese sentiment would see a strong expression in the riots of 1991 and 1998. Although broadly directed against all perceived foreign traders, these riots would particularly target businesses and stores owned by those considered 'Chinese'.<sup>1158</sup> The two riots resulted in a significant flight by the Chinese from both the Taiwanese and mainland communities from Lesotho.<sup>1159</sup> Even after the violence abated most Taiwanese and mainland migrants opted not to return to Lesotho, largely relocating to

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<sup>1152</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the 'Other' and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, 56, (1), April 2013, p. 143.

<sup>1153</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>1154</sup> Lesotho High Court: *Rex versus Shao Ming Sheng*, CRI/T/45/95, 1997 LSHC 68, 6 August 1997, p. 7.

<sup>1155</sup> M. Clement: "34 Slain in Racial Violence – Lesotho Turmoil," *The Toronto Sun*, p. 92; S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 136.

<sup>1156</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>1157</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>1158</sup> R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225.

<sup>1159</sup> L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa": A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 127.



South Africa, which they had fled to for safety during the riots, or returning to China.<sup>1160</sup> In the aftermath of this the Taiwanese and mainland Chinese role in Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector began a decline and the only significant industry the Taiwanese remained invested in was the textiles and garments sector.<sup>1161</sup> However, increasingly the Taiwanese owners and operators of the textile factories in Lesotho chose not to live in Lesotho. Instead, they relocated to neighbouring South Africa, particularly to Bloemfontein and Ladybrand, making occasional trips in Lesotho to monitor their assets.<sup>1162</sup>

Although the violence of 1991 and 1998 had largely stemmed any migration from Taiwan and mainland China to Lesotho, in conjunction with the growing economic opportunities within those locations as well, a small community of Taiwanese continued to remain in Lesotho.<sup>1163</sup> This small community of Taiwanese consisted primarily of those who had enjoyed economic success within Lesotho already, some of them even adopting Lesotho citizenship.<sup>1164</sup> This community of Taiwanese, estimated to be some 400 or 500 in total, continued to maintain a position in Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector.<sup>1165</sup> In addition, many of them had begun to identify more strongly with Lesotho than Taiwan, and represent the oldest extant community of Chinese migrants within Lesotho.<sup>1166</sup>

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<sup>1160</sup> Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019.

<sup>1161</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; L.

Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; R. Tangri: "Foreign Business and Political unrest in Lesotho," *African Affairs*, 92:367, 1193, p. 225; Anon: "Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Lesotho providing much needed jobs," *Form OSA News*, 2011, 民視英語新聞 (ftv.com.tw), Accessed 29 June 2019

<sup>1162</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24; L. M. van der Watt & W. P. Visser: "Made in South Africa': A Social History of the Chinese in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, South Africa, CA. 1980-2005," *Journal for Contemporary History*, 33, (1), 1 September 2008, p. 127.

<sup>1163</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>1164</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>1165</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>1166</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4.



As the 1990s saw the Taiwanese migrant community of Lesotho shrink it also saw Lesotho's political affiliations with Taiwan deteriorate in favour of relations with the PRC. By 1994 Lesotho reorientated its relations towards the PRC and away from Taiwan, establishing official relations with the PRC, and severing explicit government-to-government contacts with Taiwan.<sup>1167</sup> This improvement in relations would result in a more relaxed posture by the PRC towards the immigration of Chinese from the mainland into.<sup>1168</sup> The increased level of cooperation between the governments of Lesotho and the PRC soon began to take form in a number of infrastructure projects.<sup>1169</sup> Both private and state companies from the PRC became involved in the construction of roads, buildings, and dams within Lesotho.<sup>1170</sup> Like Taiwan before the PRC also dispatched multiple teams of specialists, predominantly medical, to provide technical assistance to Lesotho.<sup>1171</sup> Similarly, like the Taiwanese specialists saw some elect to remain in Lesotho.<sup>1172</sup> This group, however, remained very small, and the primary influx of new Chinese migrants to Lesotho would only begin in the 2000s, when a largescale migration of Chinese from the mainland province of Fujian occurred.

Fujianese migration to Lesotho formed part of a wider pattern of Fujianese migration to all of southern Africa, with the Fujianese soon coming to represent the single most numerous group of Chinese throughout the region.<sup>1173</sup> Fujianese migration accelerated during the 1990s, moving from something only an affluent, educated, class could engage in to something the larger, less affluent, classes could undertake as well.<sup>1174</sup> Overwhelming evidence indicated that the Fujianese wave of migration was largely the result of an increasingly challenging work environment within mainland China which saw Fujianese travel abroad in pursuit of

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<sup>1167</sup> S. Tseng: *The Republic of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations*, p. 168.

<sup>1168</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 163.

<sup>1169</sup> B. Mpaki: "China Cancels Lesotho Debts, Gives More Aid," *Lesotho Times*, 15 September 2018; R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112; S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>1170</sup> B. Mpaki: "China Cancels Lesotho Debts, Gives More Aid," *Lesotho Times*, 15 September 2018; R. T. Tanga: "The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho," *Journal of Social Sciences*, 19, (2), p. 112; S. Changqing: "Belt and Road Cooperation: Advancing China-Lesotho Cooperation with New Impetus," *Lesotho Times*, 18 April 2018.

<sup>1171</sup> L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 52, p. 9.

<sup>1172</sup> L. Anshan: *Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 52, p. 9.

<sup>1173</sup> S. Hanisch: *South-South Migration: The Case of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Masters Dissertation, University of Wien, 2012; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03; Y. J. Park: *Chinese Migration in Africa*, China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 24, January 2009.

<sup>1174</sup> T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03, p. 17.

enrichment for themselves and their families.<sup>1175</sup> Lesotho proved attractive to numerous of these Fujianese for two primary reasons: the existence of a Chinese community with links to Fujian and the potential to earn considerably higher wages within Lesotho as compared to Fujian.<sup>1176</sup>

Spurred on by these reasons the Fujianese soon began to enter Lesotho in large numbers, quickly establishing themselves as the most numerous group of Chinese within Lesotho, outnumbering the remaining Taiwanese and mainland Chinese from other regions.<sup>1177</sup> This new, emergent, class of Fujianese were typically from the less affluent and less educated sectors of Fujian.<sup>1178</sup> However, a commonality they did share with the Taiwanese migration group was that the Fujianese similarly tended to operate within family units.<sup>1179</sup> The majority of these families came over at their own, private, initiative, rather than as members of any state projects initiated by the PRC government within Lesotho.<sup>1180</sup>

By the early 2000s The Fujianese were able to become the dominant foreign trader class within Lesotho.<sup>1181</sup> This was made possible by the post 1990s exit of numerous migrant store owners from Lesotho, in response to the violence of 1991 and 1998, as well as their own concerted efforts to organize among themselves.<sup>1182</sup> This active organization by the Fujianese, cooperating in large numbers, has come to be a defining feature of the Fujianese migrants.<sup>1183</sup>

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<sup>1175</sup> G. Liu-Farrer: "Debt, Networks and Reciprocity: Undocumented Migration from Fujian to Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 28 June 2010.

<sup>1176</sup> G. Liu-Farrer: "Debt, Networks and Reciprocity: Undocumented Migration from Fujian to Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 28 June 2010; L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1177</sup> S. Maliehe: *Commerce as Politics: The two centuries of struggle for Basotho economic independence*, p. 164.

<sup>1178</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 277; M. Nowicka: "Positioning Strategies of Polish Entrepreneurs in Germany: Transnationalizing Bordieu's notion of Capital," *International Sociology*, 28, (1), pp 29-47.

<sup>1179</sup> F. Pieke, M. Thuno & P. Nyiri: *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe*, p. 96.

<sup>1180</sup> J. K. Akokpari: "Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho," *Development Southern Africa*, Vol 22, (1), p. 92.

<sup>1181</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>1182</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

<sup>1183</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; T. McNamee: "Africa in their own words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation*, Discussion Paper 2012/03.

Following 1998 an active effort was made by prominent Fujianese to coordinate with other Fujianese within Lesotho. Economic competition was instead transformed into cooperation which allowed the Fujianese to grow into a dominant force within Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector without competing against each other.<sup>1184</sup>

The new Fujianese community within Lesotho was itself divided into distinct economic classes with highly different experiences within Lesotho. The majority of Fujianese who entered Lesotho have remained trapped in relative poverty.<sup>1185</sup> Their places of business typically served as their homes as well and a perception of them as a "poor" class existed entrenched within Lesotho.<sup>1186</sup> The less affluent Fujianese traders also typically did not allow their children to remain with them in Lesotho, instead sending them back to mainland China to be educated and raised, often by other family members.<sup>1187</sup> This Fujianese community also was perceived as highly insular, isolated, from wider Lesotho society, rarely leaving their stores and typically not engaging or socializing outside of their own families or other Fujianese traders.<sup>1188</sup> A large driver of this isolation was the perception by the Fujianese that they faced imminent criminal threats when outside their homes.<sup>1189</sup>

Over the 2000s a new development occurred among the Fujianese community of Lesotho. This was the emergence of a number of associations, typically dominated and headed by Fujianese,

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<sup>1184</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021.

<sup>1185</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women's Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhounese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>1186</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020; S. Hanisch: *Searching for Sweetness: Women's Mobile lives in China and Lesotho*, Digital Guest Lecture, Fremmedsprak, 24 February 2021; Y. Huang: *Fuzhounese Overseas Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho*, Fuzhou Evening News, 23 July 2013.

<sup>1187</sup> *2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey*, Tables, Vol 3, Ministry of Development Planning, Bureau of Statistics, p. 259.

<sup>1188</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1189</sup> L. Sello: "LMPS Lack of Resources worries Chinese Embassy," *Lesotho Times*, 3 August 2018; Y. You: "The Chinese hostage in the southern African country of Lesotho was killed," *Sohu News*, 26 September 2006; Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

but also open to other mainland Chinese and Taiwanese members.<sup>1190</sup> These associations became more involved with Lesotho's civil society than any foregoing Chinese migrant group. They served as vehicles for cooperation between the Chinese in Lesotho with both local police forces and state officials and also embarked on a rather expansive programme of charity within Lesotho.<sup>1191</sup> These associations were created, initially, by prominent Fujianese businessmen as a reaction to the conditions Fujianese traders faced in Lesotho, including the riots of 1998, the threat of criminality, and competition against other traders in Lesotho's retail and wholesale sector.<sup>1192</sup> Having proved effective in improving the security and circumstances of the Fujianese within Lesotho these associations have now turned to active attempts to integrate the Fujianese community, and larger Chinese community as well, into Lesotho's society.<sup>1193</sup>

### 7.3 Final Analysis

As is now evident any suggestion that the arrival of the Chinese in Lesotho was predominantly due to a government sanctioned effort is tangibly false. It is an unfortunate, reoccurring narrative that when Chinese migrant population groups begin to emerge in foreign countries, the only explanation is that Chinese governments (whether the PRC's or Taiwan's) are purposefully engendering these migrations and secretly control or order the migrants inside these countries.<sup>1194</sup> Beyond the fact that this is an oversimplified stereotype, in the case of Lesotho's Chinese populations it is simply unfounded. Though the initial group of Taiwanese who entered Lesotho did do so as part of government projects, those who chose to remain and set-up shop, often literally, in Lesotho did so of their own, private, initiative. There was no involvement of the Taiwanese government in these decisions. The subsequent Taiwanese migrant population grew naturally from the private decisions of private Taiwanese citizens. Similarly, the post-1974 boom of Taiwanese business owners and investors in Lesotho were

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<sup>1190</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1191</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>1192</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记: 福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼, 成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020.

<sup>1193</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Chinese Community Donated Food and Daily Essentials in Maseru, 7 October 2016*, 29 September 2016; M. Phaleka: "Chinese Firm rescues Villagers," *Lesotho Times*, 10 December 2016; M. Phakela: "Chinese bring relief to Thabong," *Sunday Express*, 24 October 2017; P. Kabi: "Christmas comes early for Mafeteng Villagers," *Sunday Express*, 23 August 2016.

<sup>1194</sup> G. Mohan & M. Tan-Mullins: "Chinese Migration in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework," *European Journal of Research Development*, 21, 2009, p. 589, 595.

not driven by any government projects or orders. The lucrative economic opportunities they saw in Lesotho were what attracted their interest and drew them to Lesotho of their own volition. This was further driven by the movement of Taiwanese investors from South Africa to Lesotho as a means of avoiding the increasing sanctions applied to apartheid controlled South Africa.

Similarly, a study of the Fujianese migrants who came to Lesotho, and who remained there, reveals quite clearly that their presence in Lesotho is not part of a premediated or specific plan by any state initiative on behalf of the PRC. Indeed, in general, the government of the PRC seems to lack any particular approach towards Chinese migration into Lesotho, with most Fujianese in Lesotho commenting that they have little, to no, contact with any official representatives of their home country in Lesotho.<sup>1195</sup> For most Fujianese who have settled in Lesotho the decision was a personal one, not one taken at the behest of state instructions. They came seeking economic opportunities and potential self-enrichment.<sup>1196</sup> Interactions with Fujianese migrants provides evidence that the arrival of the Fujianese in such significant numbers in Lesotho is largely the result of private ventures by the Fujianese kinship networks, enabling a form of chain migration, and not the result of the intensification of the official relationship between the governments of the PRC and Lesotho.<sup>1197</sup>

A further stage of diversification of the Chinese in Lesotho is the differing groups of Chinese themselves. As established in chapters five and six, Lesotho has distinct groups of Chinese living within it. The Taiwanese migrants, the oldest Chinese in Lesotho, now represent a smaller portion of the total Chinese population of Lesotho. These Taiwanese occupy a dramatically different space to that of the Fujianese Chinese. Taiwanese migrants in Lesotho are largely involved within the textile industry.<sup>1198</sup> Many of these Taiwanese also differ from

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<sup>1195</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1196</sup> Anon: *Interview with Fang Zejiang*, Zhuanlan News, 非洲淘金记：福建海边的穷小子·通过20多年的打拼，成为亿万富豪|陈克辉|莱索托|南非|奥运会\_网易订阅 (163.com), Accessed 28 September 2020; L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1197</sup> Y. Zi: “China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 36.

<sup>1198</sup> Anon: “The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho’s economy,” *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-



their Fujianese compatriots in that they have homes and residences in South Africa and move between Lesotho and South Africa on a semi-regular basis, as opposed to remaining largely in Lesotho as the Fujianese do.<sup>1199</sup> Differentiated from these Taiwanese are a smaller migrant community of Taiwanese who have adopted Lesotho citizenship and expressed a strong connection to Lesotho as their home.<sup>1200</sup> This group of Taiwanese are not simply migrants, either, as some of them are now second generation Taiwanese born in Lesotho.<sup>1201</sup>

The now numerically superior Fujianese community within Lesotho is, also, an internally differentiated, rather than homogenous, community. The majority of Fujianese migrants living within Lesotho are small business and shop owners, mostly intending only to remain in Lesotho for as long as it takes them to secure the affluence necessary to return home to China. This group of traders typically has their children raised back in China by extended family and live insular lives mostly separated from the rest of Lesotho's society. However, evidence has revealed a separate class of more affluent Fujianese who have formed within Lesotho. This class is typically constituted from Fujianese traders who have already managed to establish themselves economically, often owning multiple businesses as opposed to one, and able to leave management to employees rather than remaining constantly within their own shops.<sup>1202</sup> From this development there is a clear emergence of a distinct class of affluence among the Fujianese living in Lesotho. Through means of organizing the Fujianese business community, charitable and outreach projects, and deepening communication with both Lesotho's government and police services, this class of Chinese migrants in Lesotho became more involved in the country's society, displaying clear efforts at integration.

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Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>1199</sup> I. Y. Sun: *The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment is Reshaping Africa*, p. 24.

<sup>1200</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>1201</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>1202</sup> L. Chuwen: "Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky," *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.



The different Chinese communities do interact with each other, although tensions are reported to exist among these disparate communities of Chinese within Lesotho, this evidence does not necessarily prove there is an overwhelming, or prevalent, negative attitude between the Chinese in Lesotho. That some resentment might exist is undeniable, but there exists also clear evidence that the different groups of Chinese in Lesotho have sought to coexist. The primary vehicle for this coexistence, and the primary vehicle driving increased intra-Chinese socialization within Lesotho in general, are the different associations discussed in chapter six. These associations tend not to be exclusively Fujianese in their membership, Chinese from Shanghai and elsewhere can also be found within them.<sup>1203</sup> There appears to also be very little animosity between Fujianese, and other mainland Chinese, and Taiwanese within Lesotho despite certain anecdotal reporting otherwise.<sup>1204</sup> Many of the oldest Fujianese migrants spoke warmly of their former Taiwanese employees, in addition they often gained their supermarkets and premises by inheriting them from Taiwanese who departed Lesotho in the 1990s.<sup>1205</sup> These Fujianese shopkeepers also, occasionally, remain in contact with their former Taiwanese employers, considering them to be friends or mentors.<sup>1206</sup> It has also become common for the differing groups of Chinese to collectively celebrate events such as the Mid-Autumn Festival.<sup>1207</sup> Taiwanese community leaders and businessmen are also regularly invited to meetings of the Fujian and other Chinese associations, seeming to indicate that the Chinese community at large in Lesotho are relatively well connected to each other.<sup>1208</sup>

None of this should be taken to mean that resentment does not exist among certain groups of Taiwanese regarding the Fujianese, but two important caveats must be added to such an

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<sup>1203</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1204</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>1205</sup> Anon: *Fuqing Character: Chen Kehui: Start from Scratch! Fuqingbang*, 【福清人物】陈克辉：白手起家！这位福清大佬传授你成功的秘诀 - 福清帮 (fuqingbang.com), Accessed 24 April 2021; Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>1206</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1207</sup> Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Embassy Staff in Lesotho spend the Mid-Autumn Festival with Taiwanese businessmen*, 26 September 2010.

<sup>1208</sup> Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho: *Ambassador Hu Dingxian of Lesotho visited Taiwanese-funded enterprises in Lai*, 26 January 2013.

assessment. Firstly, that this resentment is clearly not so entrenched or widespread as to discourage the above cooperation occurring between the two groups and, secondly, that this resentment finds much of its targeting against the less affluent Fujianese, those who are not capable of taking part in the social events organized by the largely Fujianese-dominated associations. This cooperation has served to build stronger internal connections between the Chinese migrant communities of Lesotho, despite their differences. Although it is true that efforts such as these are mostly initiated by the affluent class of Fujianese the widespread cooperation these efforts receive from both the Taiwanese communities and less affluent Fujianese groups indicates their effectiveness at building a platform for the diverse groups of Chinese within Lesotho to communicate in spite of their differences.

Although small in number, Lesotho has seen the development of a community of Chinese who are determined to integrate themselves into the country, rather than simply being temporary economic migrants. The earliest members of this community consist of those Taiwanese who remained in Lesotho post 1998. This group of Taiwanese have largely adopted Lesotho citizenship and have made explicit their belief that they have a national attachment to Lesotho.<sup>1209</sup> This group received little acknowledgement for their position, however, and only with the establishment of a larger Fujianese community of Chinese in Lesotho has the profile of this new community become more noticeable.

Although most Fujianese express no particularly strong attachment to Lesotho, and do intend to return to China, an affluent group has emerged within Lesotho over the 2000s who express a stronger attachment to the Mountain Kingdom.<sup>1210</sup> Like so many Fujianese, they started out by opening supermarkets, but have now diversified into running multiple businesses, including construction and liquid gas.<sup>1211</sup> At first glance it can seem that there is something of a contradiction, with so many Fujianese, in surveys, tending to evidence no desire for interaction with wider Lesotho society, and no intention to remain in Lesotho for any period of time, the efforts of the Fujianese associations seem out of sorts. Additionally, the ability to spend time

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<sup>1209</sup> Anon: "The textile industry needs to be sewn into the fabric of Lesotho's economy," *Mail & Guardian*, 2016, p. 4; *Chuang Yuan Trading (PTY) LTD (2014/1375)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Super Knitting (PTY) LTD (190/106)*; *Taipei Enterprises & Development Company (PTY) LTD (175/55)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *Tai-Yuan Garments (PTY) (198/358)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho; *TZICC Exporting & Importing (PTY) LTD (199/320)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho.

<sup>1210</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

<sup>1211</sup> Anon: *A special group of Chinese businessmen break into Africa: Fujian people*, China-Africa Trade Research Center.

on organizing charitable events and ceremonies would seem to clash with the gathered evidence that most Fujianese do not have time to engage in such activities, risking financial ruin if they do so. This is partly why generalizing assumptions are problematic. The Fujianese within Lesotho have been typically portrayed as an insular group who do not engage in any activities within the Kingdom outside of their economic role. However, this is an oversimplification of a more nuanced reality. Although the majority of Fujianese do remain economically unable to engage in wider society, and remain largely insular within Lesotho, an increasing number of Fujianese have also emerged who actively organize among each other in order to broaden their integration in Lesotho.

Along with these associations it is argued that in Lesotho a clear division exists between two broad classes of Fujianese migrants. The first of these classes represent the majority of Fujianese living in the country, relatively impoverished traders with no long-term plans to remain in Lesotho, whilst the second represents a growing class of affluent Fujianese who are attempting to integrate themselves into Lesotho's society, some through beneficial means and others through corrupt methods. Examination of this growing group of established Fujianese within Lesotho reveals a clear divergence between a mobile majority who intend to only remain briefly in Lesotho, using it as a springboard to better opportunities elsewhere, and a more settled minority of Fujianese who have long term intentions to remain within Lesotho. One of the clearest illustrations of this group of Fujianese is Chen Kehui, now Thabiso Chen since becoming a citizen of Lesotho. Commonly seen as the leader of the Fujianese community in Lesotho, by both the PRC representatives and the Lesotho government, his success financially, and from that his active efforts to partake in Lesotho society, put him at odds with the typical view of Chinese in Lesotho as being insular and withdrawn.

This more successful group of Fujianese businessmen also represent those Fujianese who most attempt to integrate themselves into Lesotho's society, becoming citizens or trying to engage with the local population. By contrast the majority of Fujianese, as discussed above, live insular lives in Lesotho, interact mostly only with fellow Chinese, and often have little time to do anything save work and then spend their evenings in their homes for fear of being targeted by criminal elements. Unlike them, the more affluent class of Fujianese have the time and ability to engage in social projects because they are not forced by economic considerations to spend all their time in their shops. They can hire subordinates who manage their enterprises for them, affording them time, a luxury which most Fujianese in Lesotho do not have. It is important to stress this point so as not to fall into the trap of thinking what sets these two groups of Fujianese

apart is some inherent difference. The larger portion of Fujianese, who cannot afford to take time off from their businesses, do not have the luxury of engaging in such social activities, making it impossible to determine if they would do so had they the means.<sup>1212</sup> A qualifying difference of importance, though of course not the only one, between these two groups of Fujianese is wealth and the luxury to engage in wider social activities which this wealth creates.

The matter of prejudicial sentiment against Chinese in Lesotho also raises the question of if the Fujianese have done anything to combat the ill-sentiments directed towards them. Although most of the discussion on the matter has simply concluded flatly that they have not made substantive efforts to rebut or dispute the common accusations targeted against them, this is yet another oversimplification of the real situation. It is true that, as discussed previously, for the most part the Fujianese remain an insular group within Lesotho who rarely engage or interact with the rest of the society. Although some established figures do purposefully cultivate a connection with Basotho civil society, the majority refrain from engaging outside of work relations and are mostly limited to interaction with fellow Fujianese and family members. In response to the frequent allegations against them in print media, in government forums or on the radio, there is rarely ever an expression of the opinion or perspective on the matter of any Chinese individuals. Their voices are, for the most part, excluded from this conversation. Based on this it is easy to see why so many outside observers conclude that the Chinese make no effort to rectify their image in Lesotho.<sup>1213</sup>

However, it is unfair to state that they categorically and uniformly make no effort. As discussed above there has been an active attempt, fostered directly through the Fujianese associations, to support charitable and civil missions throughout Lesotho, geared towards providing assistance towards the country as a whole. These efforts represent the most direct, tangible, ways in which Fujianese are, through actions, attempting to rebut accusations that they do not give back, or contribute, to Lesotho in some manner. That the efforts of the Fujianese associations do try to ingratiate themselves with their host country are at least partially connected to trying to reduce hostility against Chinese in Lesotho is clear. The Secretary General of the Chinese Merchants and Manufacturers Lesotho Association made clear such a connection when discussing aid given by his organization, stating:

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<sup>1212</sup> Y. Zi: "Decoding Relationships between Chinese Merchants and Botswana Shop Assistants: The Case of China Shops in Gaborone," *African Study Monographs*, 54, 2018, p. 178.

<sup>1213</sup> Y. J. Park: "Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Construction of the "Other" and the Role of Memory," *African Studies Review*, p. 140.

We need people to know we are part of them and have no intentions of harming them and they must reciprocate.<sup>1214</sup>

Such an explicit acknowledgement makes clear that, however slight they might be, there are active efforts by some in the Fujianese community of Lesotho to try to create a better, more positive, image of themselves among the population, in order to try to reduce the hostility they face.<sup>1215</sup> The fact that members of the associations directly connect resentment of Chinese presence in Lesotho with the high rate of crime Chinese in Lesotho are victim too, also indicates that the Fujianese do believe that the prevalent anti-Chinese mood within Lesotho is a significant contributing factor to the rate of robberies and murders which afflict Lesotho's Chinese population.

However, integration did not simply consist of charitable donations and social functions with Lesotho's established affluent class. This community of more affluent Fujianese have also become involved with street level vendors to a greater degree. Although it was common for the less affluent Fujianese shop owners to typically chase away Basotho hawkers or vendors, not wishing to deal with the competition, many of the more affluent Fujianese merchants purposefully allow hawkers and vendors to operate around their premises, forming friendly relations with them.<sup>1216</sup> This has served to improve the reputation of this group among many Basotho.<sup>1217</sup> However, as with their greater ability to partake in social functions, this capacity to ingratiate themselves with Basotho hawkers and vendors to a large extent arises from their affluence. Whilst the majority of, poorer, Fujianese traders are unwilling to risk any competition due to the slim profit margins they operate off of, for the larger, more established, Fujianese traders there is less inherent danger in permitting small scale competition. The increasing adoption of Lesotho citizenship among this class of Fujianese mirrors that of the small Taiwanese community that remained in Lesotho.<sup>1218</sup> As with those Taiwanese, this small

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<sup>1214</sup> P. Kabi: "Chinese community lends a helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016, p. 10.

<sup>1215</sup> P. Kabi: "Chinese community lends a helping hand," *Lesotho Times*, 29 September 2016, p. 10.

<sup>1216</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄·阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>1217</sup> Anon: "非洲莱索托的华人枭雄·阿辉在当地靠仁德起家," *Netease News Portal*, Accessed 16 July 2021.

<sup>1218</sup> *Chen Lin (PTY) LTD (2013/0567)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 27 March 2013; *Chen Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (2013/0239)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 6 February 2013; *Chen Qing Supermarket (PTY) LTD (2012/1540)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 30 October 2012; *Qian Sheng Enterprises PTY LTD (50047)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 December 2014; *Shouhua Chen Enterprises(PTY) LTD (55887)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 2 September 2016; *Qing Qing Import & Export (PTY) LTD (12004/267)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 14 May 2004; *You Qing Enterprises (PTY) LTD (68496)*, One-Stop Business Facilitation Centre, Lesotho, 22 August 2019.

class of Fujianese increasingly raise their families in Lesotho as well, integrating with the local society and populace.<sup>1219</sup>

The growing Chinese community in Lesotho are not alone in this increasing trend either. In Botswana, as well, it has been noted that there is an increasing effort made by the local Chinese community to integrate themselves with the wider society around them.<sup>1220</sup> Critical to this is that it appears this behaviour, as in Lesotho, is not prompted by any official intervention or pressure but, instead, motivated by the individual conscious and decisions of the local Chinese migrants.<sup>1221</sup> Although the community of Chinese in Lesotho stand as one of the most stark examples that assumptions of Chinese ‘insularity’ within southern Africa should not be universalized, they are not the only such example.<sup>1222</sup> There is a wider lesson to be drawn about assumptions made concerning the Chinese community within southern Africa from a more nuanced examination of the efforts made by the Chinese community within Lesotho to integrate itself with the society of its new home.

Ultimately, a closer, more nuanced, analysis of the social history of the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho reveals that assumptions typically held concerning Chinese migrants in Lesotho, and southern Africa at large, are not as universal as they are often reported as. Key to understanding the Chinese migrants within Lesotho is engaging with their social history not in a generalized manner and noting the distinctions among and within the Chinese in Lesotho. Through a nuanced analysis in this manner challenges to common assumptions concerning both homogeneity and the insularity of Chinese migrant communities in Africa begin to emerge. These challenges inform a more complicated and diverse series of interactions, and also shows that the Chinese migrants within Lesotho are neither monolithic nor purely passive economic agents.

This is exactly why it is impossible to make a single categorical statement concerning the Chinese migrant communities and their social history within Lesotho. There is no one, single, Chinese migrant community which can be utilized to describe the history of all Chinese

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<sup>1219</sup> L. Chuwen: “Lesotho Overseas Chen Kehui: Renyi broke out of the sky,” *Fujian Official News Portal*, 莱索托福清同乡会\_正文\_福清同乡会\_精彩福清\_福清新闻网 (fqxww.cn), Accessed 4 June 2020.

<sup>1220</sup> Y. Zi: “China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 44.

<sup>1221</sup> Y. Zi: “China Shop Business in Gaborone, Botswana: A Study of Interactions with the Local Community,” *PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 29, (1), 2015, p. 44.



migrants in Lesotho. At the most surface level a clear division like that between the Taiwanese and Fujianese migrant communities has been noted upon in some research, but often this division has been treated as the only notable division. Such treatment has also tended to associate the two groups as having poor relations with each other, in particular the assertion that the Taiwanese migrants disapprove of the Fujianese migrants. This is indicative of the sort of generalized conclusions surrounding the Chinese in Lesotho which necessitate a closer examination through their social history. From this perspective it is clear that, although tensions no doubt exist, there is a great deal of cooperation and socializing between both Fujianese and Taiwanese Chinese living in Lesotho as well.

Equally importantly, is that the evidence also shows that there is deeper diversification of the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho than just this binary. Some of the Taiwanese migrants who still reside in Lesotho only do so part time and have instead now become part of the community of Chinese living in South Africa. They maintain a connection to the Taiwanese in Lesotho, often through family connections, which creates a link between the Taiwanese migrant communities in both Lesotho and South Africa. Separate to these, however, there exists also the community of Taiwanese businessmen and women within Lesotho who express a strong connection to the Mountain Kingdom, some of them having already raised families there and adopted Lesotho citizenship. Unlike the more mobile Taiwanese who reside in South Africa this group has remained in Lesotho, involved in both the retail and textile sectors of the country's economy. This community is rarely acknowledged, as in most discussions of the extant Chinese business community living in Lesotho there is no distinction made between Fujianese or Taiwanese, denying this community any individual agency.

The Fujianese community are themselves not a uniform group, but exhibit increasing internal divisions and differentiations as more and more of them find success in Lesotho. A clear economic stratification or class difference has emerged among the Fujianese within Lesotho, creating a divide between the less affluent majority, who typically do not reside within Lesotho on a permanent basis, and the developing community of affluent Fujianese who have visibly begun to engage with Lesotho's civil society. In discussions concerning the Chinese in Lesotho the role of this developing community of Fujianese, and their efforts to build a rapport with the local population of Lesotho, is often unacknowledged, again a victim of a tendency to cast all the Chinese groups within Lesotho in a single mould, ignoring the individual, differing, aspirations and historical trends they evidence individually. It has become clear that for a small minority of affluent Fujianese, Lesotho is becoming more than just a temporary location before

returning to China. They have begun serious investments in the country, some even going so far as to abandon their Chinese citizenship. It is clear also they are making a concerted effort to appeal to the local Basotho, to try to repair and build relations between the groups. Whether or not they have been successful in this endeavour is a debateable point. In addition, they seem to be relatively detached from the more negative, pessimistic, view of the majority of Fujianese traders in Lesotho, but their active efforts do represent a contradiction to the common assumption that all Fujianese within Lesotho do not engage with the country's society.

As increasing numbers of Fujianese traders adopt Lesotho citizenship they follow in the same pattern as the remaining members of Lesotho's Taiwanese community. Although it is true that these represent the distinct minority of Chinese migrants within Lesotho, they are the most enduring group, as they remain within the Kingdom rather than returning to China or moving abroad elsewhere. It is therefore possible to discuss a distinct community of Lesotho Chinese, with their own identity, connected to the Mountain Kingdom and making an effort to integrate themselves into the society of their new home. This small community of both Fujianese and Taiwanese to some extent perceive themselves as being not simply migrants to Lesotho but also now inhabitants of it, adopting Lesotho citizenship and attempting to integrate into the society of their new home. These efforts have found expression most commonly in attempts to play positive roles in local communities, through financial support, and attempting to take part in social activities with the Basotho population of Lesotho.

Despite this these groups have not been widely acknowledged or recognized and tend to still be painted with the same homogenous assumptions that all 'Chinese' migrants can be classed together uniformly. This characterization is both objectively false, as these Lesotho Chinese demonstrate, but also creates persistent negative stereotypes about all Chinese migrants in Lesotho which can engender violence and ignores the efforts by parts of the Chinese migrant community in Lesotho to actively integrate themselves within their new homes. Whether this community of Chinese will be able to successfully integrate themselves as part of Lesotho's society is yet to be determined. However, any analysis of this group must acknowledge the existence of a diversity among the Lesotho Chinese and cannot generalize the Chinese community of Lesotho as being universally detached or insulated from the wider country. By utilizing a social historical lens, as opposed to an economic or political one, a more nuanced analysis is achieved of both the Chinese migrant community within Lesotho, and elsewhere as well.

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