

AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: A CASE FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AS A CRITICAL TOOL FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

by

BONOLO MOGOTSI

A mini dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

In the

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

SUPERVISOR: MR R. HENWOOD

PRETORIA

NOVEMBER 2021



DECLARATION

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters in Diplomacy (M-DIPS) in the University of Pretoria. It has not been submitted before any degree or examination in any other University.

Bonolo Mogotsi October 2021



ABSTRACT

The African continent has been plagued with armed conflicts, civil wars, and extended periods of regional instability right from the mid-20th century (Swart and Solomon, 2004:1). These conflicts are usually between sub-national centrifugal forces (like ethnic nationalism, religious intolerance, insurgencies, terrorism); and supranational centripetal forces (like regional integration or cooperation, free trade area, customs union, common market, single market, monetary union). This can be seen in the increase of illicit flow of weapons in exchange of resources, such as diamonds, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These have resulted in high death tolls, displacements, and the destruction of infrastructure. The African Union (AU) has adopted the mantra "prevent the crises of conflict before they arise". Hence, preventing these disputes before they escalate into armed conflict is paramount. However, the international community often takes time in responding to regional instability on the continent, due to the changing and unpredictable nature of conflicts.

There has been a growing debate and a great deal of work done in the field of conflict prevention. This is despite semantic differences over preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, norms, rules, and institutions related to preventive actions. The topic of conflict prevention has seen an increase in popularity among academics, diplomats, and policymakers. In addition, there has been an increase in the importance and relevance of adapting policy that can help prevent conflicts before they escalate. The aim of the study is to investigate the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) efforts pertaining preventive diplomacy, as a critical tool for conflict management. The APSA document represents key mechanisms with the promotion of peace, security, and stability for the AU.

Drawing on other region's success, there is evidence of how preventive diplomacy can bear fruit to prevent regional conflict, nonetheless the AU has little to no success in applying preventive diplomacy in a timely manner. There is a vacuum that exists between the promise of conflict prevention and its more deliberate pursuit (Lund, 2009:288). This can be seen in the lack of understanding and improving the contribution of the APSA document to the management of conflict in Africa. Rather, the continent is still riddles with conflict and the AU often reacts to ongoing conflicts rather than acting in a timely manner before then arise. This research will analyse and explore this challenge. It is within this background that the aim of this research is focused on contributing to preventive diplomacy as a critical tool in conflict management in the region. One of the core arguments that this research paper seeks to answer is that by drawing on the successes from other regions, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region can offer lessons for Africa. The paper focuses on three case studies namely, Burundi (2015-2016) and Kenya (2017). The two case studies represent internal conflicts while the third case study, the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand (2008-2011) represents regional disputes. The aim of investigating two case studies in Africa, and one in the Southeast Asian Region is to focus on improving the AU's ability to apply the APSA document in a timely manner before conflicts arise.

The significance of this research is that its results seek to deepen the AU and APSA conflict management on the continent. Importantly, the findings of this study aim to assist the AU in its attempt to effectively manage and prevent conflict on the continent. Moreover, the research supports the growing literature, such as the International Peace Institute, Crises Group, Institute for Strategic Studies, and the United Nations` (UN) Policy papers, that preventive diplomacy must be used as a critical tool on the African continent in conflict management to resolve intrastate and interstate conflicts.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout this journey, I have received a great deal of support both academically and personally.

I would firstly like to thank Ambassador Lembede for igniting this topic and being a sounding board in trying to establish the parameters of this study. My heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Mr Roland Henwood, whose invaluable expertise assisted me in sharpening my ideas and truly brought light to my work. Thank you for always availing yourself and making me feel I can accomplish this task. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues who pushed through even when we had no appetite to continue due to the COVID pandemic. 2020-2021 was a tough year for everyone, the virus stole so much from us, but we all managed to continue what we had started.

I would like to thank my parents, John Mogotsi and Tebogo Mogotsi, who continue to be a wise counsel for me. Your unwavering love and support know no ends and I did this for you. To my brother, Reabetswe Mogotsi, thank you for always believing in me. You encouraged me to continue and thank you for reminding me that I can.

To my supportive and loving family, thank you for being patient with me. Thank you for allowing me the time and space to thrive in this endeavour. To my beautiful daughter, Derileine Simao, this is for you. Always dream big and aim for the stars. And finally, to my husband, Dereck Simao, thank you for embarking with me on this journey, your love, support, and understanding didn't go unnoticed.

"Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding". Albert Einstein



TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAP	TER 1: INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY			
1.1.	Introduction	1		
1.2.	Problem statement	1		
1.3.	Purpose statement	3		
1.3.1.	Aim of the study	3		
1.3.2.	Objectives of the study	4		
1.3.3.	Research questions	4		
1.3.4.	Demarcation and orientation of study	4		
1.4.	Significance of the study	6		
1.5.	Literature review	6		
1.5.1.	Introduction	6		
1.5.2.	Definition of APSA, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention	7		
1.5.3.	An overview of the APSA	8		
1.5.4.	Understanding preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention	9		
1.6.	Research methodology	10		
1.6.1.	Qualitative method	11		
1.6.2.	Data collection and analysis	12		
1.7.	Structure of the research	12		
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY				
2.1.	Introduction	14		
2.2.	Conflict, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy	14		

2.2.1	. Conflict	14		
2.2.2	. Conflict prevention	15		
2.2.3	. Preventive diplomacy	16		
2.3.	Attainment of preventive diplomacy	18		
2.3.1	. Evaluation of short-term and long-term success	18		
2.4.	A focus on African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)	19		
2.4.1	. Formation of APSA	20		
2.4.2	. The Panel of the Wise (POW)	23		
2.4.3	. Importance of POW Foundation	24		
2.5.	Continental early warning systems (CEWS)	24		
2.5.1	. Constraints affecting early warning systems	25		
2.6.	Examining Bruce Jentleson`s Conceptual and Analytical Framework	26		
2.6.1	. Case study structure	27		
	2.6.1.1. Case summaries	27		
	2.6.1.2. Early warning	28		
	2.6.1.3. Key decisions on early action	28		
	2.6.1.4. Strategies of action	29		
2.6.2	. Importance of Jentleson's and the UNU-CPR approaches	30		
2.7.	Developing an assessment framework	30		
2.8.	Conclusion	31		
СНА	CHAPTER 3: THE AFRICAN UNION EFFORTS IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY			
3.1.	Overview	33		
3.2.	Analysis of the AU preventive diplomacy	35		
3.2.1	. The case of Burundi (2015-2016)	36		
	3.2.1.1. Resistance by the opposition	37		

	3.2.1.2. AU failure to neutralize Burundi conflict	37		
	3.2.1.3. Impact analysis	39		
	3.2.1.4. Sustainability of intervention	40		
3.2.2	3.2.2. The Case of Kenya (2017)			
	3.2.2.1. Kenyatta and Odinga as rivals	42		
	3.2.2.2. Resistance by the opposition	43		
	3.2.2.3. Failure of the AU to defuse political conflicts Kenya	44		
	3.2.2.4. Impact analysis	45		
	3.2.2.5. Sustainability of intervention	46		
3.3.	Conclusion	46		
CHAPTER 4: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE ASEAN REGION				
4.1.	Introduction	49		
4.2.	Formation of the ARF	51		
4.3.	The ASEAN region success in preventive diplomacy	52		
4.4.	Case study: Dispute settlement of the Thailand-Cambodia Border and Preah Vihear Temple	53		
4.4.1	Case study analysis	54		
4.4.2	Impact analysis	55		
4.4.3	Sustainability and lessons learnt	55		
4.5.	Conclusion	56		
CHA	CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION			
6. Bil	6. Bibliography			

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) is a data analyses project that not only offers real-time data but observers' conflict globally. The ACLED established that there were over 21000 incidents of armed conflict on the continent in 2019. Furthermore, by comparing that with 2018, it found that conflicts on the continent had increased by 36%. In 2018, the number was just under (Muradzada, 2020). According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), there are approximately 32 million refugees and internally displaced persons, compounded by the loss of lives, with three-quarters of the world's war-related deaths, occurring in Africa.

The African Union (AU) has adopted the mantra "prevent the crises of conflict before they arise". Hence, preventing these disputes before they escalate into armed conflict is paramount. However, the international community often takes time in responding to regional instability on the continent, due to the changing and unpredictable nature of conflicts. Therefore, the AU, in collaboration with other external actors such as the European Union (EU), which offered administrative and financial support, established the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2004. For the AU, APSA not only represents a paradigm shift from the principles of non-interference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to that of non-indifference of member states in the AU. However, it is a key AU mechanism for the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent. This is a parallel to that of the United Nations (UN) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Aniche & Egbuchulam, 2016: 6). It is therefore for these reasons that this paper seeks to explore the APSA efforts pertaining to preventive diplomacy, as a critical tool for conflict management. The paper seeks to determine why APSA fails to prevent conflict before conflict breaks out.

1.2. Problem statement

There has been a growing debate and substantive research done in the field of conflict prevention. This is despite semantic differences over preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, and what constitutes preventive actions and efforts. The topic of conflict prevention has seen an increase in popularity among academics, diplomats, and policymakers. In addition, there has been an increase in the importance and relevance of adapting policy that can help prevent conflicts before they escalate. With the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Mediation Support Unit (Zyck & Muggah, 2012:70). Nevertheless, there has been a reluctance by African Leaders experiencing armed conflicts to prevent conflict with policy implementation, sound monitoring, and evaluation processes.

Furthermore, statistical research by Berkovitch, (1993) offers relevant insight in conflict resolution today because it supports the growing literature of acting before conflicts intensifies in trying to halt tensions. That is, by adding lengthy, protracted conflicts and high fatalities appear to be incompatible with successful mediation (Berkovitch, 1993: 688-689). Lund (2009:287) adds that by applying third-party diplomacy before conflicts intensify, parties involved, can negotiate and able to stop ongoing tensions. Consequently, prevention is not an alternative standard, nonetheless a "practical option that sometimes works" (Jentelson, 1996; Zartman, 2001: 7-16). It is however disappointing that, on the African continent, the most common approach is not prevention but rather reactive. International and domestic actors often react late to conflicts, rather than reacting when there is imminent conflict predominately "engage themselves in the uphill task of managing crises instead of the relatively easier job of anticipating and preventing these crises" (Draman, 2003:234).

Given the evidence of how preventive diplomacy can bear fruit to prevent regional conflict, the AU has little to no success in applying preventive diplomacy in a timely manner. The inclusion of preventive diplomacy on the efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the umbrella of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) highlights two major issues which relate to preventive diplomacy in Africa. Firstly, there is a vacuum that "exists between the promise of conflict prevention and its more deliberate pursuit" (Lund, 2009:288) and secondly, the AU's tradition to react to the outbreak of violent conflict rather than to act pro-actively. With the aim to focus on improving APSA's ability to use preventive diplomacy as a tool for conflict management, the research paper explores three case studies to demonstrate the abilities of the two organisations to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict. The two case studies, Burundi (2015-2016) and Kenya (2017) represent internal conflicts while the third case study, the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand (2008-2011)

represents regional disputes. The comparison between the AU's inability to prevent conflict and the ASEAN Way of solving disputes offers lessons on improving the AU's ability to apply the APSA document in a timely manner before conflicts arise. The principles guiding the AU (which will be expanded in Chapter 2) such as principles of the sovereignty of African states and the importance placed on African solutions to African problems illustrate the significant impact on the organizations approach, ability, and success on effectively implementing APSA. Subsequently, the ASEAN Way contributed to the success of ASEAN preventive diplomacy. The dominant role of principles guiding the region in preventive diplomacy include sovereignty, but cohesion is often applied, peaceful cooperation and the importance placed on the non-involvement of external actors attributed to the region's success. The similarities between the AU and ASEAN principles in preventive diplomacy supports the argument that successful preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN region can present lessons for Africa.

It is important to note that the AU is a continental organization while ASEAN, a regional organization. In addition, the African continent is further divided in regions, each with its own regional economic community (REC) that play prominent roles in the advancement of APSA's preventive diplomacy endeavours. Furthermore, the distinctions between *internal* disputes, which involve factions within a state and *regional* dispute, where sovereign states are involved should be noted with the case studies. The AU, as a continental organization, aims to prevent intrastate conflicts, whereas, the ASEAN, which is guided by principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, predominantly focuses on conflicts between states.

This research will analyse and explore this challenge. It is within this background that the aim of this research is focused on contributing to preventive diplomacy as a critical tool in conflict management in the region.

1.3. Purpose statement

1.3.1. Aim of the study

The aim of the study is to investigate the APSA efforts pertaining preventive diplomacy as a critical tool for conflict management.

1.3.2. Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study are as follows:

- Objective no 1) To examine the conceptual frameworks for conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy
- Objective no 2) To investigate the AU efforts regarding the achievement of preventive diplomacy
- Objective no 3) To explore the lessons from ASEAN towards preventive diplomacy
- Objective no 4) To provide an overview of the development and status of the APSA document
- Objective no 5) To provide recommendations on how the APSA can effectively manage and prevent conflicts on the continent.

1.3.3. Research questions

This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

- Why has the AU's ambition to prevent conflict on the African continent been reactive rather than proactive?
- What is the development and status of the APSA regarding preventive diplomacy?
- What are the principles guiding the ASEANs efforts in the preventive diplomacy?
- What recommendations can be made on how the AU can effectively manage and prevent conflicts on the continent?

1.3.4. Demarcation and orientation of the Study

The concepts discussed within the study include `conflict`, `conflict prevention`, `preventive diplomacy`, operational prevention` and `structural prevention`. These concepts need to be carefully studied as they help guide the study in analysing and evaluating the successes and failures of the strategies of preventive diplomacy within the APSA document. In particular, the AU's effectiveness and credibility in responding to conflict on the continent. The AU's principles of sovereignty do have a significant impact on the preventive diplomacy approach and success of APSA.

The number and frequency of the AU-led mediation and the use of preventive diplomacy interventions have grown significantly since the adoption of APSA in 2002. As a result of the failures for intervention in the Genocide in Rwanda and internal disputes in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the adoption of APSA was because of an increased call for African led interventions when conflict arises on the continent. The formation of the AU in July 2002 which aimed to finding "African solutions to African problems" was a central component from limitations under the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Apuuli, 2012). In analysing the AU's preventive diplomacy effectiveness on the continent the study will use two case studies, namely Burundi (2015-2016) and Kenya (2017). These case studies allow us to trace back how far the AU has come in conflict prevention and assists to analyse the AU's effectiveness and credibility. Burundi offers an interesting, yet complicated example for discussion. This is not only due to the AU's peace efforts but there is a trajectory of the AU becoming more forceful in applying the principles of non-interference to that of nonindifference. However, the principle of non-interference has showed to being one of the reasons for lack of implementation of preventive diplomacy. In addition, the case of Kenya offers an interesting discussion because, unlike the case of Burundi, the AU did respond early when violence was imminent, but election violence still occurred despite efforts from the AU. The failure of the AU to address various grievances renewed scrutiny of the role of the Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), which form part of APSA's preventive diplomacy. In investigating the two case studies and the peace efforts of the AU initiated, this study assesses the effectiveness of the AU's APSA in applying preventive diplomacy on the continent. While the aim of the study is to investigate the principles that guide the AU's preventive diplomacy approach, ability, and success of APSA. The study seeks to draw lessons on ASEAN's peace efforts in the Southeast Asian region. Part of this success is attributed to what is known as the ASEAN Way, which is dominated by principles of sovereignty, peaceful cooperation, and the non-involvement of external actors. The ASEAN Way in maintaining regional peace is seen as a viable conflict prevention approach, hence it is worthwhile to examine and review its efficacy. To achieve this end, the study evaluates the dispute settlement of the Thailand-Cambodia border. This case study offers a unique discussion because of the years of protracted low-level tension. The region places emphasis on the importance of amity and cooperation, therefore resolving the dispute is important.

1.4. Significance of the study

The study aims to deepen the AU and APSA conflict management on the continent. Importantly, the findings of this study aim to assist the AU in its attempt to effectively manage and prevent conflict on the continent. Moreover, the research seeks to better understand and improve the contribution of the APSA to the management of conflicts in Africa. The humanitarian: displacements, and economic impacts demonstrate that the AU must strengthen and prevent outbreak, escalation, and re-occurrence of conflicts. Greater emphasis should be placed on reacting to conflict early and effectively, through promoting the use of preventive diplomacy.

To this end, this research supports the growing literature, from the International Peace Institute, Crises Group, and UN's policy papers, that preventive diplomacy must be used as a critical tool on the African continent in conflict management in resolving intrastate and interstate conflicts. In essence, this study reflects on the role of preventative diplomacy, as the primary bilateral and multilateral tool for conflict prevention in Africa. The research theme has relevance for scholars, academics, and students of International Relations. The focus on preventive diplomacy through the APSA can assist AU's Peace and Security Council in better applying preventative measure in response to conflicts on the continent.

1.5. Literature review

1.5.1. Introduction

This research is situated within the field of international relations, as it wishes to analyse why the AU's aim to prevent and solve Africa's conflicts. Research into this topic requires an extensive literature as literature is covered under themes, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-making. The analysis will only be on conflict prevention, as this is the impetus of APSA. In this section definitions of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention will be followed by an analysis of the attainment of both preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention.

1.5.2. Definition of APSA, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention

APSA has been described as "the umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security, and stability on the African continent" (African Union, 2014b). More formally, it is "an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations, and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction" (African Union, 2002). The institutions that aim to respond to conflict prevention and support the PSC, which will be the focus of this research, is identified as a strategic theme in the APSA Road Map 2016-2020 Document (ibid). These are the Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Therefore, APSA remains an important instrument in the early-warning and conflict prevention stages.

Firstly, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention run the risk of conceptual ambiguity. These two concepts have been referred to as efforts to stop violent conflict before it occurs or escalates. In addition, they can also mean the "application of nonconstraining measures (those that are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved), primarily diplomatic in nature" (Munuera, 1994: 3). Carment & Schnabel (2001: 11) define preventive diplomacy as "a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment".

Preventive actions may also mean where conflict has already reached widespread proportions. In this instance, it indicates that similar methods may apply but "they may also be accompanied by more forceful methods" (Talentino, 2003:70). The above definition suggest actions must be taken prior to any outbreak of violence, even though this definition clouds and limits our abilities to evaluate success, for the purpose of this study, it is important not to expand and broaden the definition as it will be harder to evaluate success.

1.5.3. An overview of the APSA

In respect of APSA, the literature sources that provide a comprehensive overview include APSA assessment study (2010). This source serves as a reference for AU and PSC to better understand the structure of APSA, it also serves to "provide a clear and comprehensive overview of the current qualitative status of the establishment of the different APSA components and their interdependence as well as the quantitative and qualitative state of play of the support structures in the AUC and in the RECs/RMs" (APSA Assessment, 2010). Moreover, the assessment provides guidance on the way ahead for the full operationalization of APSA, leading to the 2016-2020 roadmaps. The APSA 2016-2020 roadmap consists of the strategic direction to operationalize APSA. According to the PSC Protocol, APSA is responsible for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts on the continent (African Union, 2002). Early warning systems within the APSA document continue to face challenges. Violence continues to be prevalent on the continent, and the early warning systems fail to act in a timely manner.

In addition, sources such as Gänzle & Franke (2010), Benzigui (2018), Evans (2013), Lins de Albuquerque (2016) provide a good and critical analysis of the APSA document and further offer challenges faced by the AU. While Paterson (2012) provides a good paper that assesses the constraints and challenges of APSA, he concludes with ten key recommendations on steps the AU needs to take to successfully implement its working policies. Lastly, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) provides extensive PSC analytical papers with a focus on APSA document. In an ISS document, de Carvalho (2017: 6) discusses opportunities for the AU to improve conflict prevention. The author states that there needs to be better coordination among departments and divisions, by connecting early warning approaches to longer-term responses. Lastly, he discusses the importance of having "stronger mechanisms for identifying and monitoring success in the short and long term".

Aniche & Egbuchulam (2016), Engel & Porto (2010), Desmidt & Hauck (2017), Wallesteen & Moller (2003), and de Carvalho (2017) provide an in-depth assessment of operational and structural prevention. The primary sources used include official policy documents from AU within the PSC, namely, the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 (APSA, 2019), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the AU. de Carvalho (2017: 2) discusses AU's approach to conflict prevention which he lists can be categorised into operational and structural. He further adds that operational "prevention aims to reduce the likelihood of conflict and violence with positive incentives for societies that strengthen their resilience and provide access to political, economic, and social and cultural opportunities". The development of a range of policy documents, frameworks and roadmap shows AU's support to prioritize conflict prevention. The development of Agenda 2063, shows the connection between conflict and violence that are hinderances to achieving development (AU Agenda 2063, 2014), thus showing that development isn't separate from conflict prevention.

1.5.4. Understanding preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention

The literature sources with adequate theoretical philosophies relate to preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention include Boutros-Ghali (1992), Carnegie Commission (1997), Lund (1996, 2006), Leatherman, et al. (1991, 2000, 2001), du Plessis (2003), Aggestam (2003), & Engel (2005). The concept of preventive diplomacy suggests proactive rather than reactive responses to international crises (Acharya, 1999:16). While the UN, as declared in its Charter (Article 1), had the goal of taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace", further, the organization "has undertaken various actions that can be considered as constituting preventive diplomacy, it was only in the 1960s that the first and consistent usage of the term arose" (Acharya, 1999:16). Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, introduced the concept in his 1960 annual report titled "Preventive Diplomacy *in* his *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*", he referred "to actions that prevent dispute from arising between parties and prevent existing disputes from escalating into armed conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Furthermore, Hammarskjöld's definition reflected the Cold War context, necessitating the importance to contain disputes within the region in aggravating the superpowers, USA and USSR, to an even larger confrontation (Lund, 1996: 33). Lund (1996: 33) notes Hammarskjöld's definition as being important because it not only serves as a good foundation for its historical precedent but because it states mechanisms which warrant preventive action, such as peaceful actions (mediation, good offices and fact-

finding) or even military force or other peacekeeping operations. Subsequently, Hammarskjöld considered the role of the UN and the Security Council as the only agents to use preventive diplomacy tools because "he sought to strengthen their role during the cold war" (ibid).

On balance, enhancing preventive diplomacy within the AU has become even more important, but while the AU's roadmaps provide clarity on the legal frameworks when dealing with operational approaches, they fail to provide a "guide on practical directions for effective structural conflict prevention on the continent" (de Carvalho, 2017:5). Further, the dependency and interference by external donors on the continent makes it challenging for effective intervention. (ibid).

1.6. Research methodology

Leedy & Ormrod (2010) define a research methodology as an organized investigating of a problem and how the research is to be done. They further define research methodology "as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained and its aim is to give the work plan of the research". Parker (2004) states that, the research methodology involves various steps by which the researchers go about explaining, describing, and predicting phenomena. The three methods of "conducting research include: qualitative methods, quantitative methods, and mixed methods" (Creswell, 2013). These are: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods.

Qualitative method best "provides the researcher a means of understanding a phenomenon by observing or interacting with the participants of the study" (Neuman, 2011). Maree (2010) "describes quantitative study as a research approach explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analysed using statistical approaches". Finally, Babbie & Mouton (2005) see it as a "mixed method study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the research process" (Babbie & Mouton, 2005). The study relies on theoretical contributions produced on the topic of `conflict`, `conflict prevention`, `preventive diplomacy`, operational prevention` and `structural prevention`. In examining conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, this will be adopted from insights by Jentleson (1996) and Lund (1996) and other contributors within the field of conflict prevention. This will allow the study to evaluate and scrutinize the concept of preventive diplomacy.

The conceptual and analytical frameworks of the study will be based on Jentleson's (2000a) work *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*. His work offers a comparative case study analytical framework with ten case studies where he assesses why some post-cold war conflicts were averted with the use of preventive measures but others not. The aim for using his analytical framework is to better understand where policy failed and how these policy failures can better assist in understanding which work and which do not work (Jentleson, 200:15). In addition, Jentleson's (2000b) analytical framework is in line with the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) report titled *Assessment Framework for UN Preventive Diplomacy: An Approach for UN Mediators and International Policymakers*, which was developed to explain how and why UN preventive diplomacy succeeds (UNU-CPR, 2018).

Although both Jentleson and the UNU-CPR assessments are useful by providing practical examples of how to apply and evaluate preventive diplomacy success, but the study will therefore develop an additional assessment that includes both Jentleson and UNU-CPR work. The reasons for this will be explained in Chapter 2.

1.6.1. Qualitative method

This research report will adopt a qualitative research methodology to investigate the APSA efforts pertaining preventive diplomacy as a critical tool for conflict management. Qualitative research seeks to answer questions by using the process of collecting data from credible sources analysing that data and producing findings. Therefore, this research will use a variety of sources, to examine the research topic. This will assist in extracting in-depth information from the targeted primary and secondary sources. The research paper intends to perform an in-depth analysis evolving the AU and ARF efforts regarding the preventive diplomacy and conflict management in Africa.

In essence, the qualitative method provides an opportunity to establish possible lessons on how the APSA can effectively manage and prevent conflicts on the continent.

1.6.2. Data collection and analysis

The research will rely on primary and secondary data collection methods. Therefore, the researcher will collect primary documents using UN archival research while secondary data collection will involve the usage of internet-based inquiry where scholarly and media articles will be consulted. The data necessary for the research will include documents and reports from the AU, the UN, speeches and seminars from PSC and international bodies and academic papers providing much needed information for the study.

The suitable form of qualitative analysis for this study is content analysis. The aim of content analysis is to determine major factors that contributed to violence and its deescalation, if any (Jentleson,2000b). This will help to provide a critical examination of the data collected from the documents. Documents are said to "furnish background on history, information about rules, policies, and basic facts" (Patton, 2002). Importantly, the articles and documents to be used for this study will act as a foundation to build the arguments and provide insights to the research questions. In addition, the researcher will identify and describe both implicit and explicit ideas within the data, that is, themes. Finally, the researcher will follow a systematic review of the documents where the content will be coded under each theme or pattern that will give an understanding of the evolving shift during peacekeeping operations.

1.7. Structure of the research

Chapter 1 will contain the introduction, purpose statement which includes the aim and objectives of the study, the research questions the study aims to answer is addressed in this chapter. The chapter also includes the brief literature review and the research methodology. Chapter 2 will form the basis of conceptual framework and will also provide an in-dept review on conflict, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. This chapter will in addition, analyse the formation of APSA and make a case for the importance of preventive diplomacy in resolving conflicts on the region.

Chapter 3 focuses on the AU efforts to apply preventive diplomacy on the continent. The focus will be on two study cases: Burundi (2015-2016) and Kenya (2017). The aim of Chapter 4 will be to draw lessons from other regional organizations, namely the ASEAN region. Equally, Chapter 4 will delve deep into efforts by the region is preventing conflicts, namely in the Thailand-Cambodia boarders.

Finally, the conclusion draws on lessons from other regions on how preventive diplomacy can be strengthened and improved in conflict prevention.

CHAPTER 2: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

2.1. Introduction

This section provides an outline on the literature on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy with a focus on the AU regional approaches, particularly to preventive diplomacy. The literature concludes that the AU has made considerable strides in playing an increasing role in preventing conflicts on the continent with the use of practices and applications, however, these approaches have shown little to no significant change in what the AU envisioned in its APSA document. The study aims to analyse the concepts. Further, the conceptual and analytical frameworks of the study with be based on Jentleson's (2000a) book entitled Opportunities missed, opportunities seized, and the second is a report of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research entitled Assessment Framework for UN Preventive Diplomacy: An Approach for UN Mediators and International Policymakers. The chapter will conclude by formulating an additional assessment that is used as a research tool for the critical examination of the three case studies in the proceeding chapters.

2.2. Conflict, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy

2.2.1. Conflict

A conflict is a situation where at least two actors (parties) are competing for the same set of scarce resources at the same time (Wallensteen, 2002:16). In contrast, the definition of conflict given by Czempiel is defined by what he calls "positiondifferenzen", which means that it is not enough to define conflict by hostility; it must also include differences in issue positions (Czempiel, 1981198). Unlike, Wallensteen (2002,16) where only violence and hostile behavior constitute a conflict. The scope of this traditional definition extends beyond to include attitudes and behaviors (Swanstroom & Weissmann, 2005:7). Ramsbotham et al. (2011) define conflict to include various groups pursuing incompatible goals, as well as political conflicts whether they're conducted peacefully or are violent.

According to Mitchell (1981: 55), a conflict structure consists of three components: attitudes, behaviors, and situations that interact to cause conflicts between actors. His model simplifies the structure of international conflict. This shows how the three parts are interlinked. However, Mitchell's structure fails to address the competitive component that creates conflicts, the model also does not address the cooperative element, which creates negotiating incentives (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962: 6). Lastly, by defining conflict comprehensively, Swanstrom & Weissmann (2005: 9) that it refers to "the perceived differences in issue positions between two or more parties at the same time".

There is a popular saying that goes: "prevention is better than cure." This phrase indicates the need for the international community to prevent crises before it turns violent, rather than dealing with the high costs involved in peacekeeping and nation-building. Preventing conflict can take place in different phases, such as "efforts to stop violence from breaking out, avoiding escalation of violence when it does occur, and lastly avert its deterioration after a settlement" (European Institute of Peace, 2016). It is important to note that not only are lives saved but avoiding the financial burden associated with war can be incredibly cost-effective in economic terms. Hence, when there is an insight of threat, or when conflict actually occurs, it is necessary to introduce measures of either preventing the conflict or managing the outbreak. With this in mind, it is imperative to explore the concept of conflict before exploring ways in which one can prevent and manage such occurrences.

2.2.2. Conflict prevention

Conflict prevention is defined by Bondoc (2018: 14) as "set of instruments used to avoid or to find a solution before a dispute or conflict progressed into active conflicts". Bondoc's definition of conflict prevention is closely linked with that of Jentleson's (1996) definition of preventive diplomacy. Jentleson (1996: 7) defines preventive diplomacy in which the "likelihood of violent mass conflict is imminent, or not yet existing but also not low or just potential; the objectives are to take the necessary diplomatic action, within the limited time frame to prevent wars which seem imminent" (Jentleson, 1996: 7). Both definitions are operational prevention, which calls for actions to be taken in a timely manner and often "time-sensitive" (Lund, 2009:290), while tensions are still low. This type of prevention is "actor-or-event focused" (ibid), with the use of mediation

and negotiation or other diplomatic mechanisms. Moreover, failure to prevent the escalation of minimal conflict prevention calls for a more comprehensive approach which include addressing the structural causes of the conflict, which Lund (2009: 290) refers to as "deep" prevention. This, he argues, structural actions should address deeper societal conditions that generate conflicts (ibid).

In terms of the connection between preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, scholars such as Lund (1996), Carment & Schnabel (2003), and Muggah & White (2013) contend that "preventive diplomacy is a component of broader conflict prevention". These scholars take a much broader view in defining the two concepts. While Munuera (1994) & Jentleson (1996) state that the two concepts are autonomous and to effectively evaluate success a much narrow approach is needed (Strachan, 2013: 2). On the contrary, the absence of a common definition of both concepts among policymakers and practitioners continues to generate confusion (Muggah & White, 2013:1) as it is hard to evaluate success or failures. Aggestam (2003:31), studies into the topic do not include detailed theoretical frameworks and operational guidelines. Nonetheless, for Swart (2008:31), he does agree that there hasn't been much attention to operational aspects of conflict prevention, however, he disagrees stating that research into the field has provided clear theoretical frameworks that discuss the "mo-dalities of preventing conflict".

2.2.3. Preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy appears to have a definition dilemma. The lack of a common and agreed on definition within the study of conflict prevention has prevented effective policy implementation and practice, leading to conflicts of interest between stakeholders. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, preventive diplomacy represents "consensual resolution of disputes", yet in Northern Africa, it represents aggressive appeasement allowing causes of "conflict to prevail under a veneer of stability" (Zyck & Muggah, 2012: 3). The 2008 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework established legal and normative principles to guide preventive diplomacy. The adoption of two key protocols: include nonaggression and the continued respect to the integrity and independence of its members (ECOWAS Commission,2018:11). For the AU, preventive diplomacy represents "principles of non-indifference that is mediation efforts no longer consider the sovereignty of individual member states as an absolute bar to intervention" (Hara 2011:5). For ASEAN countries, emphasis is placed on consent of all parties and limits the actions of non-state actors. These different definitions to preventive diplomacy affect the timing of intervention and what actions are perceived relevant. Lund (1996: 34) argues that for the AU and the UN, preventive diplomacy "seeks to contain the expansion of escalated violence".

Notably, it was former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali who popularized the term when he presented the paper on *The Agenda for Peace in 1992*. He describes preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 5). Swart (2008: 36) states that Boutros-Ghali's definition is a tripartite definition as it sees "diplomacy as acting at several levels of a conflict". Unlike Hammarskjöld, Boutros-Ghali (1992) includes regional agents and the UN (in cooperation) as agents of preventive diplomacy. Boutros-Ghali's (1992) approach includes entry in any cycle of conflict, even after conflict has escalated. For him preventive action not only meant looking at the main sources of the dispute, but also meant preventing these disputes from spreading into extreme violence (Boutros-Ghali,1992:11).

Nevertheless, this definition by Boutros-Ghali (1992) incorporates three areas of crises management (peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding) under the rubric of preventive diplomacy which can be problematic in conceptual development. Because not only does it "strain the bounds of meaningful terminology, but to collapse all stages of intervention together abandons distinctions that might have crucial implications for policy and operations" (ibid: 36). A more narrow approach is required for conceptualization purposes. Therefore, it is important to distinguish a precise periphery for preventive diplomacy, or by either adapting a broad definition as it takes away from the core conceptual distinction of preventive diplomacy as opposed to other conflict management. This was the problem with Boutros-Ghali's (1992) definition which stated that "preventing existing conflict" which can be classified within prevention stage "to limit the spread" would be classified more into conflict management (ibid).

2.3. Attainment of preventive diplomacy

Since its inception in the 1960's (Hammarskjöld), to its evolution in the early 1990's (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), there has been some significant key developments within the field of preventive diplomacy. *The United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR)* discusses the need for a more effective way to assess the impact of interventions, or how then can we measure a successful intervention? The report states that the lack of a shared consensus on what activities constitute preventive diplomacy poses a "challenge for those seeking to evaluate whether preventive diplomacy is accomplishing its tasks" or not (UNU-CPR, 2018: 3). As the terms, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention suggest different things to different academics and practitioners, success or failures thereof would depend on how they are defined. So, how then can we define success? How can success be operationalized?

The growing debate in the literature regarding what constitutes success varies greatly. Väyrynen (2003: 48) argues that success depends, to a larger extent, on the ability to analyse the political environment and being able to read it precisely. Furthermore, he argues that the "outcome varies between the stages of the conflict cycle, i.e., pre-war, escalation and post-war prevention". Sriram & Wermester (2003: 29) agrees and has a case-by-case approach. Certain factors such as "context-sensitivity, history, risks and goals" need to be considered when evaluating success. For Rothchild (2003: 36) success prevention debates that view as "either... or need to also consider partial success". In general, considering partial success means that practitioners are able to understand what is achieved. Talentino (2003:72) notes that not only should success be viewed as "either...or", but rather any methods used to prevent and address the core reasons of conflicts should also be considered. The above definitions illustrate that measuring success is process and cannot only be fixed by one criteria.

2.3.1. Evaluation of short-term and long-term success

As noted above, the inability to determine what is successful or unsuccessful preventive diplomacy has partially to do with the conceptual vagueness. As a result, Talentino (2003: 73) attempts to refine the "evaluation of preventive success and failure by posing four questions" under short-term and long-term success.

Short-term success:

- "Have the adversaries engaged in negotiations, truce talks, or any head-tohead meetings?"
- "Has an effort been made to reduce violence and prevent its re-escalation?"

Long-term success:

- "Have conflict-generating structures been identified and is there a plan to alter conflict dynamics?"
- "Has the salience of group identity been decreased in the political and economic realms?"

The above outlined structure shows that most literature on preventive diplomacy consists of case studies and often focuses on successful cases, with all case studies showing different results. Consequently, there needs to be a specific criterion in evaluating the successes and failures within preventive attempts even when steps have been taken prior to escalation. Furthermore, a crucial issue is what constitutes success? This stands to be a crucial point when evaluating success. Other questions we should pose are as follows: Do we consider success based on the fulfilment of goals/mandate set prior? Or perhaps is it the de-escalation of disputes only? Do we consider long-term goals? Or of those cases considered successful? The following section attempts to focus on AU's security architecture and the development of APSA pertaining preventive diplomacy.

2.4. A Focus on African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

A report released by *Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)* in 2020 shows that political violence decreased globally except in Africa. The report recorded that political violence events increased from 13,018 to 17,348 (ACLED, 2021:12).

The increased statistics on the continent illustrate the current state of affairs. The prolonged intrastate conflicts on the continent call for the continent to pursue the AU's mantra of "finding African solutions to African problems". With the 2020 global pandemic which further pushed countries to closing borders and looking more inward,

the slow progress in AU's vision of "silencing the guns by 2020" has not only moved further away from its vision but calls for greater cohesion within AU's mechanisms aimed at conflict prevention. It is within this background that this chapter will aim to strengthen the AU's security architecture by illustrating the critical role APSA can play in preventing conflicts on the continent. There needs to be better coordination and cohesion within APSA departments which will encourage efficiency and greater information sharing, in addition, other AU institutions, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) need to be strengthened and work in cohesion with APSA to encourage good governance and respect for human rights.

2.4.1. Formation of the APSA

The emergence of APSA is one of the most important developments on the continent in dealing with conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. The formation of APSA took place when the AU rejected the principles of the OAU from non-interference to non-indifference. The emergence of the APSA sought to represent Africa looking inward in dealing with conflict on the continent.

According to the AU's Peace and Security Protocol states that "APSA is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent" (African Union, PSC). Through the AU's Constitutive Act and the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the AU* (hereafter The Protocol) member states have mandated the AU and its PSC to fulfil a more robust role in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The Protocol was adopted in Durban, 2002, and details a comprehensive component within the APSA (African Union, 2002).


According to the Protocol, apart from establishing the PSC, the Protocol further added pillars to APSA and its preventive processes. Hence, the chief objective of APSA revolves around the goal of African solutions to African problems. To achieve its objectives, the PSC has the following mechanism: The Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning Systems, and the African Standby Force (ASF) (African Union Commission, 2015). The protocol collaborates with the UN and the UNSC in managing


African conflicts. But it "can deploy peace support missions with express authority from the UNSC which has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security" (Gänzle & Franke, 2010).

APSA is built around the PSC, "which is modelled along the lines of the UN Security Council, and is the AU's backbone as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention" (Gänzle & Franke, 2010), management and resolution of conflicts through implementation of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Therefore, this helps to develop a common defence policy for the AU; "encouraging democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law; and protection of human rights" (Touray, 2005).

More documents were adopted such as the *APSA Roadmap: 2016-2020* assisted in facilitating and helped to operationalize the AU's strategies (African Union Commission, 2015). Apart from the five main organs within APSA include PSC, African Peace Fund (APF), POW, CEWS, and African Standby Force (ASF). In addition, "eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and ten sub-regional organizations (SRO's) play a vital role within the APSA" (European Court of Auditors, 2018:4).

A new principle within the document is the ability "of the AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision from the AU Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (Constitutive Act Article 4 (h). There is a new layer that serves as a legal framework that supports the AU's pursuit of solving continental conflicts themselves that has been added to the APSA. This now gives the organization the "legal basis of intervention, but also imposes an obligation for the AU to intervene to prevent or stop crimes anywhere on the continent" (Dersso, 2013: 54).





Based on the illustrated PSC (Figure 1), the Constitutive Act of the AU empowers PSC to ensure preventive deployment in order to prevent;

- (i) "A dispute or a conflict from escalating",
- (ii) "An on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or States, and"
- (iii) "The resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict has reached an agreement" (Aniche & Egbuchulam, 2016).

For these reasons, the PSC's focus should be on conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution. In the field of conflict prevention, the PSC protocol (Africa Union

2002) also states that the PSC should work in coordination with the UN and Regional Economic Communities (RECs): "Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of Central African States" (ECCAS), East African Community (EAC), and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in their respective region (Engel and Porto 2010).

2.4.2. The Panel of the Wise (POW)

The POW is an "advisory mechanism with the aim of forging a culture of mediation. "It is composed of five highly respected African personalities, representing the five regions, which have made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent" (African Union, 2002: 16). According to Ganzle & Franke (2010), the POW is "meant to operate through personal mediation, discreet diplomacy and good offices with a view of de-escalating conflicts and facilitating the conclusion of viable peace agreements". "Nevertheless, rather than forecasting future problems that could emerge, as originally intended, the Panel would release publications in response to already ongoing crises" (Institute for Security Studies, 2014). Evans (2013:4), high-level panels should not only find innovative ways of addressing and solving issues that arise, but they must also be able to "raise the global profile of the issues".

The formation of high-level panels isn't exclusive to Africa, as similar panels can be seen with the appointment by "individual states and multilateral organizations such as the "UN, World Bank and the EU" (van Wyk, 2016: 58). However, the African Panels are unique compared to those within the UN and EU. For example, these panels contain "normative and operational elements of traditional governance; and diplomacy on the continent" (ibid). The scholarship for a Pan-African approach to peace and security has become popular within the AU. During his address, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail (2014:2) described how the panel was influenced by the centuries-old tradition of African leaders being at the forefront of conflict resolution in their communities. Therefore, in creating this Panel, the AU has in many ways recognized "the importance of customary, traditional conflict resolution

mechanism and roles and the continuing relevance of these mechanisms in contemporary Africa".

2.4.3. Importance of the POW foundation

The creation of the POW re-engineers the traditional concept of "wisdom" playing a more prominent role in conflict prevention on the continent (Sithole, 2013: 121). Usually, the elder members of the community were considered to be mature and wise. Traditionally, they could intervene to prevent tensions from arising within the community (ibid). However, modern-day POW plays a limited role in intervention, whereas their role could go beyond what they do. The Panel is qualified to undertake a more prominent role in preventive diplomacy, yet the panel still faces several challenges. Firstly, the panel is unable to play a more autonomous role in mediating or undertaking any missions, this is due to the institutional structure of the body. The panel is unable to keep up with the demanding conflicts of the continent. Secondly, because the members of the panel are old and high profiled, the panel only meets twice a year, and the members of the panel usually have commitments and other responsibilities (Institute for Security Studies, 2014) the panel is not readily available to take on more tasks. Hence, there is a need to increase the membership of the panel to include not only more people to better tackle conflict prevention but also include different expertise to effectively deal with issue-specific problems on the continent. The role of the panel is critical as more conflict arises on the continent.

2.5. The Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS)

The purpose of the CEWS is to "collect information on a multitude of variables related to conflict outbreak in AU member states, analyse this information and bring it to the attention of the chairperson of the AU Commission" (African Union, 2008). The aim "of CEWS is providing early warnings about situations that could escalate into armed conflict" (Noyes & Yarwood, 2013: 250). Nathan et al (2015: 12) discusses the core issues limiting CEWS effectiveness, stating that there is disconnect between early warnings and early responses. Moreover, only the "western REC ECOWAS, the REC the EAC and southern REC SADC are currently connected to CEWS". This means that the CEWS objective of providing early warnings cannot be fulfilled because the early information warnings is still not accessible, in a timely manner, by all RECs.

Besides POWS and CEWS being operational, these institutions do not fulfil the conflict prevention role as the continent still faces conflicts.

On the other hand, "the CEWS collects information on a multitude of variables related to conflict outbreak in AU member states, analyses this information" (African Union, 2008) and brings it to the attention of the AU Commission. "The overall goal of CEWS reporting is providing early warnings about situations that could escalate into armed conflict" (Noyes & Yarwood, 2013: 250). Equally, the information provided could be used to act preventatively. Significantly, "CEWS comprises an observation and monitoring centre (the situation room) located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and the observation and monitoring units of the REC early warnings, which are to be directly linked to the situation room" (International Peace Institute, 2012: 3). For instance, in 2006, the AU released a framework for operationalisation, the aim was not only to collect and analyse data in a timely manner, but to coordinate and collaborate with regional economic communities (African Union, 2006: 5). The AU currently uses a data collecting system called Africa Media Monitor (AMM); this system, automatically generates every ten minutes, searches and collects news stories, in all four working AU languages, from around the world as they appear in the media in real time (Johais, 2017). All this done without any human intervention. In addition, the AU has other information gathering tools such as Africa Reporter (an analytical tool to facilitate incidents reported by field mission officers), Africa Prospectus (is a forecast risk propensity) and Live-Mon (geo-localization of news items to be displayed on a map) (The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, 2015).

2.5.1. Constraints affecting early warning systems

Nathan et al (2015: 12) discusses two core issues limiting the effectiveness of the early warning systems. Firstly, a report by the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* argued that there is a contrast between early warnings and early responses, and this usually leads to the existing warning-response gap. What this means is that "the design and management of early warning systems is not connected with the task of responding to that warning" (George & Holl, 1997: 9). Wulf & Debiel (2010: 533) posits that these structural deficiencies have not essentially changed today, (which is not because of a lack of information) but due to other multiple reasons such as, issues

around "political will, member states' hesitations to interfere in domestic matters of the other country and financial and capacity shortage". One example of this was the military coup in Mali in 2012, "this was only two days after a ministerial meeting of the PSC which was held in the capital city Bamako to consider the situation in the Sahel region" (International Peace Institute, 2012: 1). Early warnings and the ability to respond could have put measures to try advert the coup in Mali, further, the lack of political will to interfere in the domestic affairs of its member states continues to be a hinderance.

As explained, not all REC's are connected to the early warning systems. Only the "ECOWAS, the EAC and the SADC are currently connected to CEWS" (de Albuquerque, 2016). This disconnect limits the system's ability to obtain information related to key conflicts or imminent disputes across the continent. In addition, the situation room operates on thirteen staff members who try to work twenty-four hours, the limited capacity in terms of staff expertise, material and technical equipment continues to be a hinderance in effectively analysing data that is collected (International Peace Institute, 2012: 4). Despite noticeable progress in the operationalization of the CEWS and POWs, there is still a sense of disconnect in these mechanisms working effectively to perform their mandate of preventive diplomacy as the continent is still riddled with conflict. It is for these reasons that the following section examines Jentleson's conceptual and analytical framework which he argues can be applied in the processes of preventing war conflicts but importantly achieving preventive diplomacy.

2.6. Examining Bruce Jentleson's Conceptual and Analytical Framework

In his work *Opportunities missed, Opportunities seized*, Bruce Jentleson (2000b:15) offers a comparative case study analytical framework. Jentleson (2000b:15) provides ten case studies where he assesses why some post-cold war conflicts were adverted with the use of preventive measures but others not. His central objective is to assess what he terms "missed opportunities" which means the international community had opportunities where they could've intervened but missed those opportunities (Jentleson, 2000b:15). The aim of the comparative case study analysis is to better

understand where policy failed, and how these policy failures can better assist in understanding which work and which don't work.

Jentleson (1996: 6) defines preventive diplomacy using two aspects; a conceptual framework for a working definition and further finding methodological considerations in which he can measure success or failure. He defines preventive diplomacy "in which the likelihood of violent mass conflict is imminent- not yet existing but also not low or just potential (Jentleson, 1996: 6). The objectives are to take the necessary diplomatic action within the limited time frame to prevent those crises or wars which seem imminent" (ibid: 7). So, this definition can be classified as "operational prevention", which is undertaken when violence becomes imminent (Carnegie Commission, 1997: 37). With this in mind, studying the prevention of conflicts or disputes presents logical and empirical challenges (Morini, 2014: 14). Jentleson (2000b: 8) points out that in order to prove that preventive diplomacy succeeded is a logical problem which calls for counter-factual solutions. He equally adds that this method of analysis and counter-factual is best suited when studying cases of preventive diplomacy (ibid: 18).

2.6.1. Case study structure

By identifying patterns, in a comparative case study, rather than single cases, Jentleson (2000b:16) says we are able to develop policy lessons, determine why preventive diplomacy worked in some cases while not in others. Jentleson (ibid: 16), develops a case study structure which can also be used to determine success of intervention. The structure consists of five parts namely;" case summary, early warning, key decisions on early action", strategies of action and conclusions which include implications for theory, and policy lessons learned (ibid).

2.6.1.1. Case summaries

The aim of case summaries is to detail a short description of the violent conflicts amongst countries. Jentleson (2000b: 16-18) details these with key points to be addressed when applying preventive diplomacy.

1. *"Nature of the opportunity*: Missed or Seized"? Here, Jentleson (2000b) is trying to determine whether the case was a failure or a success. Regarding the

former, he asks if the failure was inevitable, or could preventive diplomacy work. While regarding the latter, if success was this an opportunity seized?

- 2. *"Anatomy of the conflict":* In finding out what the anatomy of the conflict, Jentleson (2000b) tries to pin down the key causes of the conflict and the central issues thereof. This is done by determining who the principal parties were.
- 3. *"Key international actors":* This key point tries to understand who were there key international actors and determining what their policies were and why"?

2.6.1.2. Early warning

Early warnings are important in terms of establishing what was known or at least knowable at the time. Jentleson (2000b:16) establishes 3 key points in trying to determine if there were early warnings.

- *"Early warning availability*: Was there timely and reliable information available to policymakers"?
- Assessment: Here, Jentleson (2000b), tries to establish to what extent were these early warnings available? Conversely, to what extent were they not available?
- Lessons: what lessons can be learned?

2.6.1.3. Key decisions on early action

A failure to take action in in responding to warnings as an imminent crisis is often referred to as "missed opportunities". The assumption here is that had actors reacted to these early warnings then it would be possible to avoid or limit a major dispute. This assertion of "missed opportunity" is an "example of counterfactual reasoning, a practice that is very frequently resorted to in everyday life as well as in analysis of historical outcomes" (George & Holl, 1997). Jentleson (2000b) states that counterfactual analysis is best suited to studying cases of preventive diplomacy (Jentleson, 2000:18). In the case of failed preventive diplomacy, Jentleson (ibid, 19-20) states that "we need to distinguish between situations that were due to failures of actions that were taken and those that were failures to act".

- 1. *Missed opportunity*: Here, Jentleson (2000b) assesses why early action wasn't taken. In so doing he tries to understand if there were any political will or bureaucratic factors.
- 2. *Seized opportunity*: If an early action was taken, how were bureaucratic barriers overcome and issues such as political will?

2.6.1.4. Strategies of action

In this type of case structure, Jentleson (2000b) tries to determine which strategic actions were taken and why? He further asks what the key preventive diplomatic strategies that were pursued were. Jentleson's (2000b) analytical framework is in line with the report by UNU-CPR entitled "*Assessment Framework for UN Preventive Diplomacy: An Approach for UN Mediators and International policymakers*", the report developed a conceptual framework to explain how and why UN preventive diplomacy succeeds. This framework also identifies the critical reasons for success by presenting case studies in "Guinea (2008-2010), Lebanon (2011-17), Malawi (2011-2012) Nigeria (2015) and Yemen" (2011) (UNU-CPR, 2018). The assessment framework (UNU-CPR, 2018:8-15) is organized by six core questions:

- *"Context Analysis*: What were the major factors contributing to an imminent risk of violent conflict and its de-escalation?"
- "Casual Analysis. What influenced the decision-making of the key conflict actors at the crises moment?"
- *"Counter-factual Analysis*: what are the most likely scenarios that could have taken place absent external intervention, including the UN?"
- "UN's Role: To what extent can the outcome can be attributed to the UN's engagement?"
- *"Enabling/Inhibiting Factors:* What factors enabled and/or inhibited the UN's capacity to contribute to preventing violence?"
- "Sustainability: To what extent was the intervention linked to long-term structural causes of violence?"

2.6.2. Importance of Jentleson's and the UNU-CPR approaches

Both Jentleson (2000a) and UNU-CPR assessments are useful for this research study as they take an adaptive approach. These two approaches assist us to determine whether we are either able to, focus on the impact (either successful or unsuccessful) of intervention (preventive diplomacy) or we are able to assess policy failures and where actors are able to adjust and adapt to different cases. While both provide an example of how to practically apply and evaluate preventive diplomacy success, another conceptual aspect, which will infuse both Jentleson (2000a) and UNU-CPR assessments, should be considered for the purpose of the research paper. The reason for this is because Jentleson (2000a) and the UNU-CPR takes into account both operational and structural intervention. Based on our definition of preventive diplomacy, in order to evaluate success, the paper will not broaden the scope in which we assess success, but rather focus exactly where violence is imminent but mass destruction hasn't broken out. Therefore, when we assess structural prevention then it no longer falls within the scope of preventive diplomacy, but rather conflict management.

Secondly, even though counterfactual analysis offers us a chance to assess possible outcomes of what results would've occurred had there not been intervention, thus being able to improve on policy. Nevertheless, counterfactual analysis is recognized to be very weak and a problematic method (George & Holl, 1997: 14). George & Holl (1997:13-14) state that caution needs to be placed on "missed opportunity" as "it implies that the "misses" constitute important policy failures of various kinds". The assumption that a "crises is the measure against which policy decisions and their aftermath are judged", "may contribute to analytical clarity, but it fails to represent adequately all the factors that constrain policy decisions, such as domestic elections, credibility and other international problems" (George & Holl, 1997: 13-14).

2.7. Developing an assessment framework

In developing an assessment framework to assess the AU's preventive diplomacy (which is included in its APSA document), the assessment framework to evaluate success is based on the following:

- Case study analysis: Here it is important to understand the nature of the conflict. What were the major factors of conflict? Were there any factors that contributed to escalation? What were the core issues? And who were the core parties. In better understanding the context of the conflict we are able to better understand the social, economic and political drivers.
- Impact analysis: Has any effort been made by the AU to reduce escalation? Were there any early warnings? And was action taken in a timely manner? To what extend can impact be attributed to the AU? In addition, in answering the above, "we are able to capture where imminent violence was averted" (UNU-CPR, 2018: 9) or could have been averted.
- *Sustainability:* Did de-escalation last? Here we are trying to determine if interventionist methods lasted and resulted in any agreements being reached.

2.8. Conclusion

The uncertainties related to the specific roles of the AU and sub-regional organizations have raised debates on how to effectively delimit the responsibilities of APSA institutions in the context of the on-going AU Reform. For instance, in peace and security contexts, an emerging dynamic within APSA is the decline in the direct interventions of the AU in crisis situations in the past five years compared to its roles in the first decade of its establishment. New trends show that sub-regional organizations and coalitions are increasingly relying on their capacities to lead peace initiatives in their respective regions. The AU and RECs/RMs lay competing claims to primary roles in peace processes. This is compounded by the limitations of coordination platforms to maximize capacities for peace. Additionally, this review has found that there is no clear policy direction on how to address situations where sub-regions face bottlenecks including how to ensure inbuilt checks and balances within APSA.

In trying to determine whether the AU has used preventive diplomacy successfully or not, Chapter 3 will assess two case studies, namely, Burundi and Kenya, by applying the assessment framework developed above. By applying the assessment framework, the research paper will illustrate that the AU has been unsuccessful in applying preventive diplomacy mainly due to the timing of interventions, lack of harmonization and communication among APSA departments and the AU's inability to effectively respond to the early warnings which include financial and human strain. In addition, the ASEAN region serves as a useful background against which we can review the AU's efficacy in applying preventive diplomacy. The reason for this case study is because the region's "inter-state preventive diplomacy has been regarded as successful as evidenced by the absence of inter-state armed conflict" (Huan & Emmers, 2017:77).

CHAPTER 3: THE AFRICAN UNION EFFORTS IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

3.1. Overview

The number and frequency of the AU-led mediation and the use of preventive diplomacy interventions has grown significantly since the adoption of APSA. In addition, there has been a growing call for the importance of African led intervention when conflict arises on the continent. This is based on the common understanding that continental and regional organizations are most likely to succeed in mediating or brokering peace agreements than other external actors from other continents. This is because continental and regional organizations have context-specific knowledge and understanding about the conflict. In order to practice conflict prevention in the AU, the council has to work closely with the UNSC, CEWS, the POW and RECs which have Regional Mechanisms (REMs) for continental early warning. The AU has a comprehensive framework of agreements and an elaborate organizational structure to deal with preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In addition, the AU's organizational and institutional transformation have been due to the organizations commitment to the maintenance of peace in the region. Nowrojee (2004:37) affirms the shift of the AU's commitment from the principles that guided the previously OAU, set the precedence to openly discuss threats to achieving peace and respecting the rule of law. A distinctive feature of the Constitutive Act, was the AU's ability to integrate in its new institutional framework a regional standard to respecting the rule of law and the importance placed on members to condemn those not abiding by the guiding principles (Kioko, 2003:807).

The AU has managed to formalise and operationalize early-warning systems and mediation mechanism within their APSA document; hence "Africa is arguably leading in terms of regional preventive initiatives" (Strachan, 2013:2). The regional body has become increasingly interventionist in intrastate affairs. This can be seen in the suspension of "Mauritania (2005, 2008), Eritrea (2009), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2001, 2009), Niger (2010), & Cote d'Ivoire (2011), each by a PSC decision and mainly as a result of unconstitutional attempts to seize power" (Hara, 2011:8).

The "sovereignty of individual member states is no longer considered an absolute bar to intervention within the region; in several cases, the AU has already implemented the "principle of non-indifference" as listed in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU Charter" (Ibid: 5). This means that the AU can interfere in the domestic affairs of a member state in the event of an imminent threat to peace and security (Mwanasali, 2005).

Currently, APSA has "had great potential to help articulate the vision of the AU for a continent that is peaceful and well developed" (Mutisi & Khamis, 2012: 12). There is a need to prevent conflict to ensure sustainable peace. There have been several politically motivated wars on the continent however with the use of mediation, violence has been de-escalated. For example, this can be seen in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Burundi, and Sudan. Mediation as an effective approach to resolve conflict has played a vital role on the continent, but in most cases, mediation was applied only when violence had already escalated. The above interventions resulted in peace agreements being signed, but the peace and security environment on the continent is still threatened. Often, the AU intervenes when conflict has occurred and de-escalation is only short-term. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, evaluating and assessing preventive diplomacy success is harder than it seems.

It is important at this juncture to mention a variety of challenges to preventive diplomacy in Africa. Firstly, the involvement of external, both regional and international actors has played a role in the AU's ability to prevent disputes from escalating. The APSA incorporates both continental, regional, and sub-regional actors to play a role in preventive diplomacy. This may hinder difficulties as to which actor is meant to respond first. Secondly, there has been an increase in the availability of small arms weapons due to the illicit weapons trade in Africa, which has contributed to the persistence of internal conflicts. The study by Small Arms Survey in collaboration with the African Union Commission, entitled *weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa*, highlights the extent of the problem. Approximately 11 million licit and illicit firearms are held by civilians in Western Africa, followed by 10.2 million in Northern Africa, and 7.8 million in Eastern Africa (Small Arms Survey, 2019:31). This is concerning especially in the wake of the AU's Silence the Guns initiative. And lastly, another issue encountered by the APSA in implementing preventive diplomacy is the competition over natural resources and the dominance of autocratic rulers. In retaining control autocratic rulers maintain patronage and clientelism strategies. This is often done through the distribution of state resources, often natural resources. Conflict often occurs either when those outside the leader's patronage-based coalition seek resources that have been denied, or when some elites desire a greater share of the spoils the leader controls (Arriola, 2009:1339). The nuances that exist in the variety of challenges Africa faces are significantly different from the ASEAN.

3.2. Analysis of AU preventive diplomacy

This section aims to examine the following questions: Has the AU been successful in applying preventive diplomacy in resolving conflicts in Africa? Was preventive diplomacy applied in a timely method in resolving conflict? Has the organization placed more focus on operational prevention rather than structural prevention? Could preventive diplomacy have been applied throughout the conflict to avoid relapses? In trying to determine whether the AU has used preventive diplomacy successfully or not the paper will use two case studies, namely Burundi and Kenya.

The AU's coercive diplomacy attempt in intervening in Burundi in 2015 after President Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term, offers a particularly interesting case for analysis. There is a trajectory of the AU becoming more forceful in its pursuit to protect civilians from mass atrocities. The AU threatened the Burundian government with the use military force in order to protect civilians (Wilen & Williams, 2018:32). Additionally, the AU has previously intervened in Burundi during the civil war (1993-2005). This period was when the organization was transitioning from the OAU to the AU. This case study allows us to trace back how far the union has come in conflict prevention and analyse the union's effectiveness and credibility.

Furthermore, Kenya has a history of election violence with the 2007 and 2013 disputed national elections that turned violent, killing over one thousand people (Campbell, 2017). In this case, the AU started engaging the government when violence was still imminent but all their efforts did not work as violence did break out. This failure to act from the AU renewed scrutiny in its ability to prevent violence on the continent and the role of the POW and CEWS, which forms part of APSA's preventive diplomacy.

3.2.1. The Case of Burundi (2015-2016)

Since the civil war, the small nation of Burundi experienced political crises in 2015 (International Crises Group, 2016:1). This crisis was sparked by President Nkurunziza to seek an additional term in office, "this triggered mass protests, an attempted coup, armed opposition attacks and a brutal crackdown that has fuelled a cycle of violence with over 1000 dead" (International Crises Group, 2016: 1). The anti-Nkurunziza's protests were ignited by Nkurunziza's violation of the 2000 Arusha Peace and reconciliation agreement (Arusha Accords, 2000). Nantulya (2015), notes that at the core of the Burundi's political crises is the need to protect the Arusha Accords which attributed to having brought Burundi out of its 1993-2005 civil war. This comprehensive peace agreement "served the country well through the transitional period that ended in 2005" (Apuuli, 2017:54) and included an inclusive power-sharing formula; this agreement ended a twelve years of civil war and cycles of massacres (Nantulya, 2015).

The source of the 1993-2015 civil war was not only ethnic exclusion, which was used as a tool but rather mainly due the nature of the state, regional and urban-rural divisions and a politicized military (Curtis, 2012: 79). Therefore, the root cause of the conflict was political in nature and rather than ethnic (International Crises Group, 2016). When the Arusha Accords were signed in 2000, Pierre Nkurunziza's National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) rejected the peace agreement and "continued to fight for another three years before signing the agreements" (ibid). Nkurunziza's party continued to challenge the peace agreement and started undermining political pluralism and basic freedoms enshrined in the agreement (Nantulya, 2015). Within the broad principles of the agreement, there are two major elements, which both intended to balance the interest of the parties and reduce future conflicts. Firstly, a system of quotas and power sharing guaranteed the minority Tutsi group representation in the armed forces, parliament and other national institutions. Secondly, the constitution limits the president to two terms in office (ibid). Nkurunziza's unwillingness to step down has reversed the optimistic path that was envisioned in the Arusha Accords.

3.2.1.1. Resistance by opposition

The endless political in-fighting escalated in a series of intensified demonstrations around the area of Bujumbura. The abuse by security forces lead to the arrests of hundreds of people including suspected opponents and many were detained for prolonged periods without trial (Human Rights Watch, 2015). In an effort to silence any critics and the voice of the media, high-profiled people were killed including, Adolphe Nshimiriman, former head of the intelligence services as well as opposition party leader, Zedi Feruzi, a civil society activists and several other politicians were accused of "insurrectional movement" (ibid). The Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi on 30 September 2016 (OHCHR). The commission documented violations that were of a cruel nature, particularly extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, acts of torture and sexual violence (UN Human Rights Council, 2017: 4).

The findings of the commission continued to detail the atrocities that were committed in near-total concealment. These atrocities involved the killing of victims usually occurred in one location and the dumping of bodies in mass graves was in another location (ibid). The commission concluded with recommending that the AU and the East African Community (EAC) take an active role in seeking a lasting solution by deploying human rights observers and military experts to calm the situation. Nonetheless, the AU's failure to act and deploy the troops after giving the Burundian government 96 hours to approve the deployment just shows the political will by Member States to interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign country. This was after the AU expressed its determination to invoke "Article 4(h), which stipulates "the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (ibid), which did not materialize either.

3.2.1.2. AU failure to neutralize Burundi conflicts

Even though the AU acted early in trying to prevent what was a foreseeable conflict, all their efforts were ineffective as conflict broke out. For example, MAPROBU was never deployed dialogue remained stalled as members of the CNDD-FDD refused to attend talks; sanctions did not materialize and most AU observers and military experts were never allowed access and those who were deployed faced a hostile environment and many constrains on the ground (Wilén & Williams, 2018: 691). Furthermore, the decision to withdraw the deployment of MAPROBU shows the lack of political will of African states to sanction their peers. This political unwillingness, continues to be the greatest barrier to tackle the instability that arises on the continent (Bedzigui & Alusala, 2016: 1). In the same way, the Burundian case also presents interesting challenges for the AU's principles. In particular the promotion of constitutional democracy as enshrined in its Constitutive Act, which is moving away from principles of noninterference, to that of non-indifference (International Crises Group, 2016: 4).

The first challenge is the AU's "prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government" as listed in Article 4(p). This radical move from principles that guided the OAU illustrates the AU's commitment to upholding the rule of law. Article 4(p) states that any government coming to power through unconstitutional methods will be suspended from participating in AU activities (African Union, 2000:7). This is the only article that has a penalty. Even so, the definition of what is unconstitutional change is not clear, in addition, the legal frameworks of the Constitutive Act is unclear if it extends to the Burundian case, where President Nkurunziza tried to change and manipulate the constitution in seeking a longer-term. This position illustrates the AU's vague stance and the legalities of on heads of states amending constitutions in an effort to stay in office. Perhaps we can look at another AU legal document that can assist in clearing the legal loopholes. The Constitutive Act on the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), redefines the whole concept and it includes Article 23.5 which prohibits "any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government" (Donnenfeld, et al, 2018:9). On the other hand Burundi is a signatory but has not ratified of ACDEG and is not legally bound by the document. For the most part, the political unwillingness of member states and the AU's inability to implement preventive diplomacy were effectively compounded by the ambiguity in translating the legalities if he was eligible to stand for a third-term. The uncertainty rose after the constitutional court ruled on the basis because he was appointed in his first term in office, and not elected, there it made him eligible to seek another term (International Crises Group, 2016:4). This ruling offered no legal basis for the AU intervention because it supports the Union's position to respect the status quo and the sovereignty of member states.

The second challenge it presents is the guiding principles of the continental organization. The promise of intervention when mass violations occur in member states, and the commitment to protect citizens as listed in Article 4(h). These principles are reflected in the APSA framework, in Article 6 of the PSC Protocol and further Article 7 supports intervention where citizens are affected by natural disaster (African Union 2002). However, this has not been the case as member states political will surpasses its guiding principles. The reluctance for military intervention without the consent of host governments proves their inaction in implementation. This can be seen in "Darfur (2004-2005) and South Sudan (2013-2014)" (International Crises Group, 2016: 4). Even though the AU's legal and institutional framework supports non-indifference, actions taken linked to invoking Article 4 (h) are yet to be seen in reality. If the deployment was successful, this would be a major test for APSA, as its mechanisms such as CEWS and POW, specifically, the data and analysis would need to be presented so that member states could see that military intervention was necessary and is unavoidable (Dersso, 2016:4).

3.2.1.3. Impact analysis

In 2014, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, visited Burundi ahead of the countries upcoming elections (Institute for Security Studies, 2015a: 7). The AU supported the creation of a joint East African Community (EAC) - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the POW to help defuse tensions (Wilén & Williams, 2018:680). Following AU Commissioner, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's visit to Burundi in March 2015. This led to her authorizing to dispatch a team of high-level delegates that was chaired by Togolese Prime Minister, Edem Kodjo and former Senegalese foreign minister, Ibrahima Fall (Africa Union, 2015b). However, after the PSC held a meeting in Johannesburg in June 2015, they issued a communique stating the urgent deployment of human rights observers and military experts to Bujumbura (Wilén & Williams, 2018:681). Nonetheless, due to the delay by the Burundian authorities to issue the observers and experts with visas they were unable to be deployed. As a result, election observers were never deployed too before the election (African Union, 2015b). After pressure from the AU to postpone the elections, Burundi's government ignored calls and went ahead by holding them on 21 July 2015. This decision to ignore calls for the postponement of elections shifted the

AU's approach with the Burundi government from diplomacy to a trajectory of taking a harsh stance.

In October 2015, the AU PSC supported efforts to find early and consensual solutions by imposing targeted sanctions, including a travel ban and asset freeze, against the parties responsible for the political impasse and the continual deteriorating security (Institute for Security Studies, 2015b). In December 2015, with the threat to use military action, the AU PSC incited the government of Burundi to take action, thus backing them into a corner (Wilén & Williams,2018:680). This led to the approval to deploy over 5000 troops called the African Prevention and Protection Mission to Burundi (MAPROBU); "the African mission was mandated to prevent any deteriorating of the current security situation, the protection of civilians who are under threat and foster success in dialogue" (African Union, 2015c). This was indeed a pioneering "move for the AU, as it was the first time the organization authorized the deployment of a force against the wishes of a host country" (Connolly, 2016). This move was seen as a massive move by the AU as the legitimacy of the intervention could be challenged and possibly be seen as an invasion rather than humanitarian assistance.

3.2.1.4. Sustainability of intervention

Regardless of the difficulties in defusing the Burundi case, APSA's different components have been fully operationalized, including early warnings, the deployment of human rights observers and military specialists, and the imposition of sanctions (Institute for Security Studies, 2017). The AU did intervene promptly, even though unsuccessful, and did apply measures necessary to avert foreseeable conflict, but it bared no fruit as violence continued. After the 26th Summit of the AU, The PSC stated on October 6, 2016, that the situation in the capital city and neighboring districts had improved, noting that international monitoring had played a significant role in this recovery, particularly following the prospect of military intervention (Institute for Security Studies, 2017). However, this statement contradicted the UN Commission of Inquiry's statement on Burundi. The press release stated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was called to investigate possible crimes against humanity (UN Human Rights Council, 2017). The commission showed that extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, sexual violence, cruel, humiliating or degrading treatment, and enforced disappearances were all examples of significant

human rights breaches occurring in the country (UN Human Rights Council, 2017). The commission statement concluded that the presentation resulted from several months of investigations with over 500 witnesses (ibid).

Despite widespread international coverage and pressure, the Burundi government has shown it can withstand and resist that pressure. By mid-2016, there had been dialogue which EAC led under Ugandan President Museveni, which has shown little progress due to limited and inadequate logistical, political and financial support (International Crisis Group, 2019:17). In addition, the international community missed opportunities for better coordination and collaboration. The PSC, AU Commission Chair, and UN, could have assumed collaborations in advancing high-level Panel and expert deployments. Moreover, the AU had leverage on using its intended targeted sanctions as proposed in October 2015. This move will not only put pressure on the government but will set a strong tone in the region about restoring the unions' credibility. Just as the EU and United States of America (USA) sanctioned specific government members (ibid), the AU needs to take a firm decision to put pressure and adhere to mediation processes.

In conclusion, with the COVID-19 backdrop and the death of Pierre Nkurunziza, interest and attention on the ongoing conflict in Burundi have shifted. Newly appointed president Evariste Ndayishimiye, who won 68% of the votes, inherits a host of problems, including; party politics, migration, and rising poverty levels. To make things worse, on the one hand, Burundi is currently listed as the poorest country in the world with a GDP per capita of \$264 (Oluwole, 2021). While on the other hand, the CNDD-FDD youth militia continues to threaten violent reprisals against anyone who speaks out or criticizes the current government (ibid).

3.2.2. The Case of Kenya (2017)

There has been an increase in electoral-related conflicts on the African continent. These electoral conflicts have "made the quest for "peace" predominate electoral processes, especially in situations that hold substantial threats to peace and stability" (Gerenge, 2015: 1). Africa's elections are arguably one of the most contentious aspects of political life (Sisk & Reynolds, 1998: 1). Africa "was slated to hold 13

national elections in 2021, with roughly half situated in the Horn and the central Sahel" region (Siegle & Cook, 2021). Additionally, other leaders are attempting to circumvent term limits and others are Africa's longest serving heads of state (ibid). Generally, elections can serve to either help reduce growing tensions by upholding the constitution and rebuilding legitimate governments, or they can further intensify growing tensions in highly volatile societies.

Kenyans went to the polls on August 8, 2017, in what was Kenya's widely contested elections in the country's history. In 2017, Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner, after a controversial running, for presidential elections in Kenya. Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee party faced Raila Odinga of the opposition party National Super Alliance (NASA), with stakes high as "winner takes all" in true Kenyan politics nature (BBC, 2017). When Uhuru was declared as the winner, the elections were watched closely by regional organizations including the AU due to Kenya's new devolved constitution which was expected to be felt in its politics (ibid).

In the decade leading to the elections, the country was on a positive democratic trajectory with the government fighting "against international terrorism, providing significant military assets for the struggle against al-Shabab in Somalia and hosting a huge number of Somali and South Sudanese refugees" (Campbell, 2017). However, all that had set the country back when the opposition leader, Odinga, refused to accept the legitimacy of the elections. This refusal led to the Supreme Court's unprecedented decision to cancel the results of the election and annul them due to irregularities (Leithead, 2017).

3.2.2.1. Kenyatta and Odinga as rivals

The Kenyatta-Odinga family rivalry dates back years ago. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first democratically elected president is "Uhuru Kenyatta's father; and Odinga Odinga, who was Kenya's first vice president, is Raila's father" (Campbell, 2017). This rivalry has been classified as a tribal one, with the Kenyatta belonging to the Kikuyu tribe and the Odinga's Luo tribe. Conversely, tribal identity runs deep in most African countries, and Kenya isn't different. Often, people vote according to tribal loyalty, especially in rural areas, villages, and slums. This can still be seen with how Kenyan's had voted in the cities versus the slum areas. The core issues in the Kenyan elections apart from

strong tribalism are the continual poverty unequal distribution of resources and a continual patronage system used by the Kenyatta regime. After the Supreme Court ordered fresh elections which were held on October 26, 2017, the elections saw an unpredicted turn when Odinga withdrew from the October election after his demands of changing the electoral commission were not met (ibid). Furthermore, he called for his supporters to boycott the elections and not show up. This was after Kenyatta "won the rerun by 98%" with the lowest voter turnout of "just under 39%- less than half that recorded in the August election" (BBC, 2017). Low voter turnout indicates that people are not exercising their political rights, but there is indifference and the belief that their votes will be in vain.

3.2.2.2. Resistance by the opposition

Violence across the capital city and throughout the country erupted after Kenyatta won the re-election, with CNN reporting at least 24 deaths (Duggan et al, 2017). Areas such as Mathere, were classified by the police as areas with a high likelihood of having election-related violence. The police would target these areas by their classifications and use tear gas and other methods of intimidation to disperse the crowds (Amnesty International, 2018:223). It was reported by the Kenya Red Cross Society and Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) that a total of 150 people were wounded after the police opened live ammunition as opposition party supporters protested peacefully (Dixon, 2017). There was clear discrimination in how the police were deployed throughout the country, which was mostly in Odinga strongholds. This can also be seen with the police and paramilitary presence at the entrances of slums, which appeared to be designed to stop protests (Amnesty International, 2018:).

A joint report titled *Kill Those Criminals: Security Forces*` *Violations in Kenya*'s *Augusts 2017 Elections* by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported a total of "23 people who were shot dead; three beaten to death and three died of asphyxiation from tear gas and pepper spray; two trampled to death and two from physical and psychological trauma" (Gondi, 2018). Many witnesses spoke to Human Rights Watch stating at least four bodies were removed by police in Kibera slum (ibid). Throughout the violence that broke out in Kenya, the police were blamed for using heavy and excessive force to disperse protestors, as opposed to using excessive force

only as a last resort. This also shows irresponsible and reckless use of weapons as indicated in the human rights watch and amnesty international reports.

3.2.2.3. Failure of the AU to defuse political conflicts Kenya

This failure to act from the AU renewed scrutiny of its ability to prevent violence on the continent and the role of POWs and CEWS which form part of APSA's preventive diplomacy. Given the history of Kenya's election violence, there were early warning signs which indicated a possibility of violence erupting. The AU had stated controversy if the elections would either use electronic or manual registration, furthermore, there were reports on the IEBC opening the voter registration late, and lastly, issues surrounding who will get the tender for printing out ballots were also contested (Nginya, 2018;62). In all these reports there was a sense of lack of trust from the people for a free and fair election and further, there was a lack of preparedness. In addition, the IEBC official, "Chris Msando, was murdered and his body was found in the outskirts of Nairobi" a few days after he was reported missing (Baraka, 2020). Opposition party believes he was murdered because he refused to "hand over a password which was later used to rig the elections", in a press statement, the IEBC had later acknowledged hacking attempts but disputed the attempt had failed (Baraka, 2020).

Following the election, violence in Kenya was a surprise to the AU. A steady increase of tensions was compounded by ethnic, political, and structural weaknesses, making the conflict seem likely to occur (World Peace Foundation, 2017:5). This clear oversight by the AU showed weaknesses in their early warning systems and the political will needed to take firm action in preventing mass atrocities in the country. Looking at the APSA document, the initial purpose of electoral observation is not listed as a conflict prevention method, but the tense contexts in which election observation operates has led this instrument to serve for this purpose; conflict prevention (Bedzigui, 2018: 19). Even though no other action was taken by the AU besides the deployment of AUEOM, within the field of preventive diplomacy, AUEOM (or election observation) has an important part to play and can serve as a handmaiden for the POW (Gerenge, 2015: 3). The POW remains a key pillar in the APSA document in preventing conflict. With the deployment of the long-term observers in Kenya, they

were meant to play a critical role in detecting conflict drivers or detect core issues before they escalated into severe violence.

3.2.2.4. Impact analysis

Elections in Kenya were commonly associated with violence among the international community and as a result, the international community kept a close eye on the 2017 general elections. Since the country had shifted from a one-party system to multiparty democracy in 1991, high violence and political campaigns have been constant (Claes & Borzyskowski, 2018: 13). The 2017 elections attracted over 10 000 observers (Oruko & Kimanthi, 2017). To defuse the political violence and conflicts, the AU approved an AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to observe the 8 August 2017 elections, which was led by former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. The team consisted of 90 short-term observers (STO's) and 14 long-term observers (LTO's) from 31 African countries (AU, 2017). Since the 1990s, election observers have become an important tool whereby the international community determines if a country adheres to its obligations and commitments (Nginya, 2018: 50). The aim of the mission, as stated in the AU report for Kenya, was to provide independent, objective and impartial assessment for the preparations and conduct of the elections (ibid: 5).

The preliminary statement issued by the AU on August 10, stated that the AUEOM was very pleased and stated how peaceful elections were. The AU also noted that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) met standards set by Kenya and the AU for the conduct of democratic elections (AU, 2017). Although the verdict by the Supreme Court nullified the presidential elections after citing illegalities; this did not correlate with the preliminary statement issued by the AU which did not highlight any violence, irregularities and malpractices within the electoral commission. The AU described the polls using terms such as "free and fair", "peaceful", "credible" and "up to standards set by both organizations (Nginya, 2018: 57). However, incidents leading to violence went unnoticed. Even with a large number of international observers and their presence, the AU was unable to foresee imminent violence and the country still experienced heightened irregularities, police brutality, intimidation, and violence.

3.2.2.5. Sustainability of intervention

The AU's response to the violence in Kenya has been disappointing and indicates the inability of operationalizing APSA mechanisms to anticipate violence. The CEWS and POWs were established to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts by gathering and analyzing information so that the PSC and AU Chairperson can act promptly (Engel & Porto, 2010: 9). Although immediate violence caused by the elections subsided, Kenya is still marked by increased tensions between ethnic groups which is how the leading political party was formed (Kimani, 2018: 1). Kenya has experienced election violence over the years, and the worst was the 2007 election which left over 1,500 dead, over 3000 women raped and 300 000 internally displaced (ibid). With clear pre-election early warning signs of an imminent violence, there needs to be better correlation between CEWS and POW's.

Likewise, with the upcoming general elections in 2022, there are still signs of tribal, poverty, and continued unequal distribution of wealth that persist at the centre of political discourse as underlying issues. There are growing fears that if the root causes are not addressed, then there might be a repeat of violence in the near future. In addition, COVID-19 has also exposed Kenya's socio-economic ills that the country is still rattled with. This has also aggravated a range of other sources of insecurity and violence. The continued mistrusts with the law enforcement officers will further reinforce the view that the Kenyan police are instruments of political actors as opposed to an impartial body that protects the rights of the citizens (Auma & Campbell,2021). Taken together, these political drivers and dynamics highlight that Kenya once again faces the prospect of violence in the run-up to elections. It is important for POWS and CEW's work in between collaboration to enhance its own diplomatic actions at preventing electoral-related violence.

3.3. Conclusion

In summary, the findings show that the AU's early intervention in Burundi and firm position from the outset, with the AU Commissioner Chairperson Dlamini-Zuma setting the tone and direction really, helped neutralize the violent conflict. There was constant communication from the AU Peace and Security Commission with issuing communiques and trying to put pressure on the government. The AU's bold move in

trying to invoke Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act with the hope it would pressurize the government to continue negotiating and halting violence was praised. However, it failed as talks between Burundi and the Ugandan President continued to stall. In addition, the AU's coercive diplomacy was not favored. Military intervention is often viewed as less effective by member states. This clear divide within the AU resulted in the mission being declined. The organization lost any authority and a much-needed voice of warning it had in Burundi and damaged its credibility in its ambition to prevent conflicts and solve the conflict.

The case study of Kenya established that the Kenyan elections are commonly associated with violence among observers. Kenya's post-colonial state is characterized by conflict caused by the monopoly of politics in the country's political system (Sithole & Asuelime, 2017:98). The divide and rule practice dominated the country's political system, with one side benefiting more than the other (Oyugi, 1997:2). However, the case study highlighted that elections in Kenya continue to be a source of conflict. Furthermore, In reducing violence, preventing it, and responding to it, systematic monitoring systems are vital. The clear oversight by CEWS ability to provide early warnings is a call for concern. By this clear oversight by the AU, it became evident that the early warning systems were lacking and that the political will in preventing mass atrocities in this country lacked. The PSC's ability to act timely was compromised by this failure. In addition, the low voter turnout reveals citizens' feelings of futility, unwillingness, and indifference. Odinga's withdrawal, as the main opposition, should have served as an early warning for the AU to seek an election delay (violence escalated during the rerun of elections). Kenya will hold elections in 2022, but the unresolved killings, police brutality, and violence suggest the country has not addressed the underlying causes of the election conflict. The reflected distrust that citizens have in the police is also reflected in the distrust in the state. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed many countries' socio-economic divides, and Kenya is no exception. In light of these dynamics, Kenya may face tensions during the upcoming elections in 2022, with inequality contributing to the conflict. The AU needs to work closely with leaders in Kenya to ensure free and fair elections. The monitoring and analyzing of information needs to be timely so to ensure the PSC is able to intervene in a timely manner.

Both the continental organization, the AU, and the regional group, ASEAN, place importance on the role of principles that help guide the implementation of preventive diplomacy. The following chapter will draw on lessons from the ASEAN region in their ability to maintain peace and stability in the region. The chapter seeks to analyse the principles that guide the ASEAN region in implementing preventive diplomacy. While sovereignty and cohesion are dominant principles guiding the regional organization's preventive diplomacy, peaceful cooperation and the prevention of external involvement also play an important role. There is a strong emphasis on equality between the members and the importance of cooperation despite the considerable length of time necessary to reach an agreement.

CHAPTER 4: ASEAN REGIONS EFFORTS IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

4.1. Introduction

This section will detail a case study in which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region used preventive diplomacy to settle disputes. The aim of this chapter is to detail measures in place to maintain peace and stability in the region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) comprises 25 states, provides measures that could be taken before conflict arises. Therefore, this provides a useful background against which we can review and measure the AU's conflict prevention when preventive diplomacy is applied. Diplomats, politicians, and policymakers have all recognized and applauded ASEAN's contribution to the regional bloc's contribution towards fostering cooperation, peace, and prosperity in Southeast Asia. Former UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan stated that "ASEAN's contribution towards peace and prosperity in the region is felt and has impacted millions of people's lives". Furthermore, Amitav Acharya, a Professor at American University said that "ASEAN is a reminder of how developing countries irrespective of size can lead the way in building peace and progress" (Mahkubani & Sng, 2017:5-6). There is therefore a widespread belief that the ASEAN Way of maintaining regional peace and stability is a valuable approach to study conflict prevention; therefore, a study of its efficacy is profitable (Huan & Emmers, 2017: 77).

ASEAN was established in 1967 in Bangkok. A regional grouping in southeast Asia that promotes economic, political, and security cooperation among its ten members. To achieve this objective, ASEAN has three main pillars: ASEAN's Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (Sokla, 2019). The group has a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$2.8 trillion (Maizland & Albert, 2020). It has acted as a catalyst for Asian economic integration, driving negotiations between countries in the Asia-Pacific region to establish one of the largest free trade blocs in the world and signing six free trade agreements with other economies in the region (ibid). Despite this, critics say the group is lacking in leadership and strategic vision. In response to Beijing's claims in the South China Sea, ASEAN is not able to develop a unified approach to dealing with China.

As a result of their cynicism of the diplomatic norms shared by the countries of Southeast Asia, some policymakers and political analysts have criticized the ASEAN Way. Rather than claiming that the diplomatic style of the region is unique, critics claim that their rational response to political and security issues reflects the way they respond to any issue. (Which can be alluded to their culture and traditions) (Katsumata, 2003:108). Analysts such as Nischalke (2000: 90) argue that the ASEAN Way is a myth. He further adds that the regional body has "constituted a community of convenience based on functional considerations rather than a community". Nischalke (2000) acknowledges that this sense of community has assisted the region in taking a common position and presenting a cohesive front towards external powers even when the face internal disagreements. This sense of unity amongst the regional group best describes the style of diplomacy. While others say that ASEAN has been instrumental in maintaining regional stability and fostering good relations among member states. Several important diplomatic events have taken place in the region, including the ending of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Della-Giacoma, 2011). While many border disputes exist in the region, ASEAN has been able to maintain peace in the region

In a book titled *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace*, Mahbubani and Sng document ASEAN's success and state that part of the reasons to this success has to do with regions commitment to regional peace, the importance placed on mediation and continual diplomacy (Makhubani & Sng, 2017). Southeast Asia offers an interesting case because of its diversity, the regions ability to balance and coexist with so many different religions, ethnicities and languages. According to Kumar & Siddique (2008), this balance allows the region to operate and prosper. The region is home to over 600 million people, who are diverse in linguistics and religion. Other regions can't compare to the diversity of cultures, religions, languages, and ethnicities in South Asia. The region is home to over 240 million Muslims, 130 million Christians, 140 million Buddhists, and 7 million Hindus (Makhubani & Sng, 2017: 5). Even so, the region has sustained long and lasting wars which were fought in the region, mainly the Korean and Vietnam war which put "East Asian states at the frontline of the Cold War" (Stubbs, 2002:444). However, this key actor has made remarkable strides in maintaining peace, harmony, prosperity, and security (Kishore and Jeffery, 2017:1). This has often been

achieved with the use of preventive measures to avoid disputes or conflict in the region.

4.2. Formation of the ARF

ASEAN established the ARF with the aim of fostering peace and security in the region (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2019: 1). The aim of ARF is to provide measures that could be taken before conflict arises. The forum is unique because it details a "comprehensive security mechanism arrangement in the Asia-Pacific. This is due to the fact that it continues to provide a diplomatic avenue to hold multilateral discussions on regional problems, to share information, promote confidence-building measures, and enhance the practice of transparency" (Emmers, 2007: 1). The growing popularity and attention preventive diplomacy has received amongst scholars and policymakers have also found considerable attention within the ARF. Since its inception in 1994, the forum declared its intention to play a critical role within conflict prevention (Yuzawa, 2006: 785), this measure can be seen when the consortium issued a concept paper on its plan to establish mechanisms for conducting preventive diplomacy as a follow-up to confidence-building measures (ibid).

By implementing preventive diplomacy, ASEAN leaders have consistently pursued the ASEAN way, which emphasizes values such as mutual trust, quiet diplomacy, non-violence, and consensus-based decision making (Strachman, 2013:15). According to the ASEAN Regional Forum (2001:4-5), the eight key principles guiding the region in achieving preventive are;

- Diplomacy, inquiry, mediation, and conciliation serve as diplomatic and peaceful methods;
- (ii) Neither military action nor preventive diplomacy is coercive;
- (iii) The timing is right;
- (iv) Trust and confidence are important;
- (v) Consultation and consensus are necessary for preventive diplomacy;
- (vi) Consent is required for it to take place;
- (vii) Only applicable to inter-state disputes;
- (viii) "and adherence to international law is important. (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2001:4-5).

Based on the above definition and key principles of guiding the ASEAN region, we can deduce that the description and the role of preventive diplomacy have been narrowed down. This has been done by emphasizing the consent of all parties and limiting the actions of non-state actors. Della-Giacoma (2011: 29) argues that the exclusion of non-state actors such as NGO's or bilateral actors is problematic as it illustrates ASEAN's non-interference principles being the much-praised ASEAN Way. Furthermore, Della-Giacoma asserts that the common definition of preventive diplomacy does not include words such as voluntary and consent. Cossa (2002: 2) argues that this should be cautioned, as it would hinder the discussion of implementing preventive diplomacy to a significant number of potentially destructive conflicts in Southeast Asia, and it is an essential precondition. Consent and voluntary are guiding principles of the region.

4.3. The ASEAN region success in preventive diplomacy

Huan & Emmers (2017:86-91) argue that the success of preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN region has been due to three reasons. Firstly, the UN Security Council permanent members did not interfere or show interest in the regional dispute, they argue that without interference from great powers, the region can focus solely on the dispute at hand, rather than the focus shifting to power politics. Secondly, they argue that when the actor is perceived as legitimate, then the likelihood of success. By legitimate, we use Ian Hurd's (1999:381) definition of legitimacy: the "normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. That is, it increases the compliances of actors involved. This means that organizations such as the UN are not only credible but are respected as international actors. Lastly, Huan & Emmers (2017) assert that the more complex the agreement the likelihood to preventive diplomacy being unsuccessful.

The following section will review the dispute settlements of the Thailand-Cambodia border. The border dispute between Thailand-Cambodia offers a great example of preventive diplomacy being applied in the region. This dispute has been simmering since 2008, after years of low-level tension, the regional bloc only took notice and acted of the situation when it had escalated (Della-Giacoma, 2011:31). Several mechanisms from bilateral, regional to multilateral were chosen to help settle the dispute. The region

places emphasis on the importance of amity and cooperation, therefore solving this dispute this case has become a priority on the ASEAN agenda.

For this study, it is important to consider the differences between the case studies chosen. In contrast to the case study below, Burundi (2015-2016) and Kenya (2017) offer a different perspective, Kenya and Burundi were both internal disputes. However, the following case study involves a dispute between two countries (interstate conflict). There are conflicting beliefs about whether internal conflicts have a higher probability of ending in peace than are interstate conflicts. Since both hypotheses have some support, we chose two different types of conflicts. Authors such as Licklider (1995) and Miall (1992) agree that, unlike interstate conflicts, internal conflicts are much more difficult to resolve because the former involves subjective and sensitive factors that are nearly impossible to resolve, while the latter involves politico-economic issues that can be resolved reasonably. Licklider (1995:681) questions the difficulty of forming a government and working together with people you have been fighting with and have a strong opposing view. Burton (1987) disagrees with those who argue that identity and sensitive issues are particularly difficult to resolve. He states that such disputes are quite easy to resolve since they are frequently based on symbolic issues that can be handled quickly and cheaply. Based on the above, it is important to assess both hypotheses to determine the success of preventive diplomacy.

4.4. Case study: Dispute settlement of the Thailand-Cambodia Border and Preah Vihear Temple

Land and sea boundaries tend to be uncertain and open to interpretation, resulting in border disputes, which are frequently a cause of interstate conflict around the world. (Putra, et al, 2013:2). The best example of preventive diplomacy being used in the region was the territorial conflict between Cambodia-Thailand. Cambodia and Thailand share a land boarder of 803 Kilometres; the border was demarcated in the early 20th century when Cambodia was under a French Protectorate. Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding areas were the contentious border dispute between the two countries. After many failed negotiations and talks, Cambodia decided to bring the border dispute case to the attention of the International Criminal Court (ICJ) (International Court of Justice, 2015).

4.4.1. Case study analysis

In a report issued by the UN Security Council in 2011, a joint border commission had prepared maps in 1907 showing that the area surrounding Preah Vihear was part of Cambodian territory, and the ICJ ruled in 1962 that it was. Although the ICJ judgment determined that the temple complex was in Cambodian territory, the map of the location shows that the most easily accessible entrance to the complex is in Thailand territory. As a result, Thailand accepted Cambodian sovereignty over the temple, but still disputed about the surrounding land (Security Council Report, 2011: 1). Cambodia applied to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2007 to include the temple as a World Heritage Site but Thailand objected to the application (Sokla, 2019: 440). The initiative received a negative reaction from Thailand because the application and registration process happened without announcement and agreement from Thailand's government.

Generally, these events worsened the relations between the two countries. Additionally, this already strained relationship was exacerbated when UNESCO agreed to consider Cambodia's request to register the temple as a world heritage site. Conversely, the Thai government argued that the proposal would be disadvantageous to Thailand, because it would violate Thailand's sovereignty that referred to the land around the temple (Dewi, 2013: 6). The 1962 decision by the ICJ to grant Cambodia possession over the Preah Vihear, did not cover the 4,6 km2 area surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple that is still under contestation even today (ibid).

On a positive note, the two countries reached an agreement with Thailand agreeing to support Cambodia's proposal to list the temple as a world heritage site only if they did not interfere with the unresolved area near the Prech Vihear (the disputed area). However, the Thai opposition party (PAD) rejected the registration and demonstrated near the temple which lead to a chaotic situation in the boarder (ibid). For that reason, Cambodia's government closed the border around the temple for people from Thailand (International Crises Group, 2011: 7).

4.4.2. Impact analysis

The early warnings of the dispute was when the temple was used as a political battleground for Thailand, which was fuelled by the Thai opposition party since they used the temple "as a political tool against governments allied with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Huan & Emmers, 2017: 83). Between 2008 and 2011, there were numerous attempts in engaging preventive diplomacy. Singapore, ASEAN chair in 2008, encouraged continual negotiations through bilateral processes. This act of peace encouraged continual negotiations between the two countries, but when Thailand chaired ASEAN in 2009, it then stalled the dispute as Bangkok was party to the dispute (Huan & Emmers, 2017: 83). In fact, when negotiations between the two countries stalled for years, the UN Security Council called for a ceasefire by making an unprecedented move and referred the conflict back to ASEAN. This led to both countries agreeing to a ceasefire and resuming negotiations with Indonesia monitoring the process (Amador & Tedro, 2016:13). Cambodia's internal conflict also stalled the peace processes between the two countries. The call for preventive diplomacy was a success as the ceasefire de-escalated the tension and established a good foundation for continued negotiations between the two countries. The two countries had taken a step back in their stances as previously been confrontational. As argued by Huan & Emmers (2017: 84), the case of the "Preah Vihear temple was characterized by the lack of interferences from great powers the involvement of the UN bodies" as a legitimate organ pushed both sides to adhere to recommendations. Lastly, the nature of the agreement which sought a ceasefire was straightforward and did not impede either side's sovereignty (Huan & Emmers, 2017: 84).

4.4.3. Sustainability and lessons learnt

It is important to note that the successful preventive diplomacy between Thailand and Cambodia managed to decrease escalation and resulted in a successful ceasefire. Importantly, the approach the region applied relied on continual negotiations and consultations, it also practiced self-reliant and consensus building. Moreover, the application of the principles of the ASEAN Way and calling for continual mediation and negotiations assisted in achieving peace and security in the two countries. In essence, both countries acted in a timely manner in dealing with the dispute. As indicative of the ARF, at the centre of preventive diplomacy is the regions use of soft power. For instance,

the use of soft power has been a popular concept and has presented a key feature in the "ÀSEAN Way" $^{\rm 1}$

Even though the region has been unable to resolve or address long-standing territorial disputes, such as those on the Korean peninsula and between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, there have been quite successful mediations in containing violence and preventing tensions from worsening (Peace Science Digest, 2017). One of the guiding principles mentioned previously that guide ASEAN preventive diplomacy is the principle of trust and confidence. Building confidence is a fundamental part of the ASEAN Regional Forum which lays the foundation for preventive diplomacy.

The use of dialogue among member states, and consultation show the core objective of ARF, which places emphasis on confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. Consequently, the ASEAN region has managed to minimize interstate conflict because of the trust-building mechanisms in place (Thompson & Chong, 2020: 23). Furthermore, applying pressure behind closed doors with the use of peer pressure has placed a role in averting conflict. The importance of ASEAN providing a platform affords an opportunity by allowing member countries to socialize and build rapport at ASEAN counter-less meetings and retreats. These interpersonal meetings foster and enable frank discussions or disagreements, and further creating the potential for mutually acceptable outcomes to be explored privately (ibid, 8).

4.5. Conclusion

ASEAN has been successful in achieving the basic goal of maintaining regional peace. Part of this success is attributed to what is known as the ASEAN Way, a decisionmaking process, which emphasizes discussion and consensus (Tekunan, 2014: 144). ASEAN has established itself as a substantial force as a regional group, although continued dialogue and mediation had not removed all inter-state territorial disputes, but it should be commended on its achievement of regional peace and security.

The distinctive feature that separates ASEAN from other regional organizations is "its unique diplomatic engagement with its member states" (Tekunan,2014:142) through

¹ The classification of soft power means the persuasive approach of obtaining control and influence over others without the use of force, coercion, or violence. This form of power can be perceived in different settings and with different degrees of intensity (Pallaver, 2011:92).

the ASEAN Way, emphasizing the importance on discussion and consensus. This stance has helped preserve regional peace as it allows member states to express grievances without judgement as all members are considered equal and important.

The main elements on principles of non-interference, non-use of force, quiet diplomacy, and consensus approach (Katsumata, 2003: 108). The ASEAN region understands that to be able to preserve regional peace, its member states must ensure domestic peace within their own boarders. The declared aim is "the collective will of the nations of the region to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation, and through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings for peace, freedom and prosperity" (ASEAN). This implicit collective understanding helps maintain regional peace and stability, the "self-preservation and, consequently, regional preservation are ingrained in the norms accepted by ASEAN member states" (Amador & Teodoro, 2016: 9). As stated above, not all scholars believe in ASEAN success, alluding to the organization lacking "teeth, efficiency and had not produced significant achievements in binding members to regional policies" (Tekunan, 2014:144). However, we cannot ignore the continual important role it plays and continues to play within peace and security. Going back to the objectives of the region, "maintaining peace and stability, and working against communist infiltration" (ibid), the organization has been success in that regard.

Furthermore, the ASEAN style in reaching decisions and the extensive dialogues and consultations could be a lesson for the AU as their principles has assisted in resolving regional tensions. But can this style of promoting regional peace be implemented in other regional blocs, specifically Africa? can ASEAN's decision making, and extensive consultation be the single component or feature contributing to peace? Simply put, yes indeed this can be implemented, and lessons can be drawn from ASEAN in maintaining regional peace because; when you have a community of equal power (or equally spread) and seen as equal actors then it creates an environment where members are able to address grievances and other members are able to freely engage each other through consultations and dialogue. In addition, the sense of solidarity and community has been a lesson other regions can draw. When regional blocs are united and unified it is easy to take a strong, united stance when dealing with external actors. The responsibility of preventive diplomacy in Africa is primarily on the AU and the regional

blocs, whereas for Southeast Asia, the ASEAN regional bloc is more inclusive and less diversified. As mentioned before, ASEAN places emphasis on the non-involvement of external actors, and perhaps this has been a contributing factor in implementing preventive diplomacy. These characteristics are important for the AU to implement in strengthening the APSA document as there is a lack of unity within the organizations, lack of coordination within departments, and the organization lacks the sense of community where grievances can be discussed openly and frankly.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This study is about the African Peace and Security Architecture, a case for preventive diplomacy as a critical tool. The aim was to investigate the AU's APSA document pertaining to the effectiveness of applying preventive diplomacy in solving regional conflicts. Chapter 1 outlined the objectives and the aim of the study. It also explained the methodology and introduced the focus of the study. Chapter 2 developed conceptual frameworks for conflict, conflict prevention, and preventive diplomacy. By diving deep into the APSA document, the research found that APSA stands to become an effective framework, but it lacks cohesive coordination between the relevant preventive diplomacy departments to effectively intervene in conflicts. By drawing on Bruce Jentleson's analytical framework, the research developed an assessment framework that was applied to evaluating preventive diplomacy success and/or failures. Chapter 3 applied the assessment framework using Burundi and Kenya as a case study. The chapter proved that the AU did not effectively apply preventive diplomacy in a timely manner, as ineffective consultation and negotiations halted peace talks indicated the AU's inability to take up a more credible role in preventing conflicts with mechanisms adopted. Using lessons learned from the ASEAN region, chapter 4 finds that the ASEAN Way has helped to create a strong sense of community and to maintain a dynamic process of mediating and consulting to maintain peace and security.

The aims of this study were to examine the conceptual frameworks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. in addition, using the assessment framework developed by the study, the study investigated the AU and ASEAN's implementation of preventive diplomacy using three case studies namely, Burundi (2015-2016), Kenya (2017), and the Cambodia-Thai border dispute. And lastly, drawing lessons from the ASEAN principles guiding preventive diplomacy, the study concluded with outcomes.

The findings showed that the AU's early intervention in Burundi and firm position from the outset, with the AU Commissioner Chairperson Dlamini-Zuma setting the tone and direction really, helped neutralize the violent conflict. However, the AU's coercive diplomacy was not favored. Military intervention is often viewed as less effective by member states. The clear oversight by CEWS ability to provide early warnings is a call for concern in Kenya. By this clear oversight by the AU, it became evident that the early warning systems were lacking and that the political will in preventing mass atrocities in this country lacked. The PSC's ability to act timely was compromised by this failure. While the Cambodia-Thailand case proved ASEAN success in solving interstate disputes. There is still concern in Myanmar and south China Sea.

Outcomes of the study

APSA stands to become an effective framework for promoting peace and security in Africa, only if the mechanisms engage more proactively in preventive diplomacy and their roles expand to keep up with the ever-changing conflict environment. The core APSA mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, POWS, and CEWS remain understaffed and lack the capacity to effectively pre-empt conflicts. Therefore, based on the detailed review of various sources and articles on APSA and its efforts to achieve peace and security in the African continent, the study found the following findings.

- 1. There is a need for APSA to renew its strategic ambition and relevance
- 2. Amendment on the legal instruments and structure
- 3. AU should encourage greater information sharing and peer pressure (improvement of other institutions such as APRM that encourage good governance and respect for human rights).
- 4. Improve coordination among departments and divisions (POWS, CEWS, AU Commission chair & PSC).
- 5. Incorporate ICT & social media to develop early warnings.

The AU places importance on the principles of sovereignty, finding solutions to African problems, and principles on non-indifference. The AU has a good security architecture, but it is not being used effectively in addressing conflicts on the continent. The organization continues to face structural and organizational issues such as lack of capacity, willingness from other member states and finances which limits the AU's capacity to engage in preventive diplomacy.

The "efforts of the past two decades to respond effectively to challenges to peace and security in Africa have produced various new programmes and institutions, funds, and budgets and led to revisions of previous programmes and financing mechanisms" (Jentzsch,2014: 2). The PSC has made greater strides in engaging in preventive diplomacy. This can be seen with the greater role RECs have played, the increase of membership within the POW from five to ten, giving the added members a name "friends of the POW (Sithole, 2013: 127). APSA reflects a growing realisation of the importance of maintaining peace and security on the continent for the promotion of development and improvement of Africans livelihood.

Ladder (2003) indicates that "conflicts move into phases of different hostility" and these needs to be organized to make a comparison between different situations. Wallensteen (2001) "mentions three phases: emergence, dynamics, and peace building". According to Rothchild (2003), the "focus on phases should be useful as it makes it possible to analyse what resources are necessary and when they need to be employed. Low-risk situations need fewer resources than high-risk ones that may require greater levels of commitment". Therefore, it can be noted that there needs to be a criterion on ways to evaluate preventive diplomacy. In addition, the cases studied above have provided a clear blueprint in guiding the preventive diplomacy processes. These cases also help in determining a specific criterion in evaluating the successes and failures in preventive diplomacy.

6. **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Acharya, A (1999). Preventive Diplomacy: Background and Application to the Asia-Pacific Region. Cited in Ball, D & Acharya, A (Edits). The Next Stage. Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. https://openresearch-

repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/216581/1/131 The Next Stage Preventativ e Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia. Desmond & ACHARYA, A mitav eds. BALL 335p 0731527550.pdf

Africa Brief, Africa Media Monitor, African Union, <u>https://cews.africa-union.org/AfricaBrief/help/index.html</u>

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021). 32 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced by Conflict and Repression. Infographic. <u>https://africacenter.org/spotlight/32-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-by-conflict-and-repression/</u>

African Commission on Nuclear Energy (2015). African Union. https://afcone.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning-system-cews

APSA Assessment (2010) Report of APSA Assessment Study. AU Peace and Security. <u>https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-apsa-assessment-study-</u> <u>conducted-july-october-2010</u>

African Union (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union. Constitutif Act of African Union. <u>https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf</u>

African Union (2002). Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted 9 July 2002, entered into force 26 December 2003, (PSC Protocol) <u>http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-relating-establishment-peace-and-security-council-african-union</u>

African Union Commission (2015). African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, December 2015, <u>www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf</u>

African Union (2006). Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning Systems as Adopted by Governmental Experts Meeting on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention. Kempton Park, South Africa. <u>https://www.peaceau.org/up-loads/early-warning-system-1.pdf</u>

African Union (2008). Continental Early Warning System. The CEWS Handbook http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cews-handook-en.pdf

African Union (2014a). Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (Second Edition), August 2014, http://archive.au.int/ assets/images/agenda2063.pdf

African Union (2014b). African Union Handbook: A Guide for those Working with and within the African Union.

African Union (2015a). The African Union Reiterates its Concern about the Situation in Burundi. Press Release. <u>https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-press-release-bu-rundi-4-11-2015.pdf</u>

African Union (2015b). The African Union Dispatches a High-Level Delegation to Burundi. Press Release. <u>https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-dis-</u> patches-a-high-level-delegation-to-burundi

African Union (2015c). Communique of the 565th meeting of the PSC on the Situation in Burundi. Press Release. <u>https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-565th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-burundi</u>

African Union, Peace and Security. African Peace and Security (APSA). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsafinal.pdf

Aggestam, K. (2003). Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottles?. In: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 10, No 1. pp 12-23. DOI: 10.1080/714002395

Allison, S. (2020). Conflict is still Africa's Biggest Challenge in 2020. Institute for Security Studies. <u>https://issafrica.org/iss-today/conflict-is-still-africas-biggest-challenge-</u> in-2020?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=ISS_Today&utm_medium=email

Amador, J.S & Tedro, J.A (2016) The Role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Democracy Support. *International Institute for Democracy and electoral assistance*. <u>https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publi-</u> cations/the-role-of-asean-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-democracy-support.pdf

Amnesty International (2018). Amnesty International Report 2017/2018. The State of the Worlds Human Rights. <u>https://slidelegend.com/amnesty-international-report-2017-18_5a99c1101723ddb8cf9ab756.html</u>

Aniche, E & Egbuchulam, M. (2016). Is African Peace and Security Architecture the Solution? Analysing the Implications of Escalating Conflicts and Security Challenges for African Integration and Development. A Paper Delivered at the 30th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association Southeast Chapter on the theme: Elections, Security Challenges, and African Development at University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State on June 26-28. https://www.researchgate.net/publica-tion/305774693 Is African Peace and Security Architecture the Solution Analysing the Implications of Escalating Conflicts and Security Challenges for African Integration and Development/link/57a0d89308aeb1604832b4ec/download

Apuuli, K. P (2012). The African Union's notion of 'African solutions to African problems' and the crises in Côte d'Ivoire (2010–2011) and Libya (2011). ACCORD. AJCR <u>https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-african-unions-notion-of-african-solutions-to-african-problems-and-the-crises-in-cote-divoire-2010-2011-and-libya-2011/</u>

Apuuli, K. P (2017). The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000) and the Current Political Crisis in Burundi. Insight on Africa. Vol 10, No 1, pp 54-72. DOI: 10.1177/0975087817738659

Arriola, L.R. (2009). Patronage and Political Stability in Africa. In: *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol, 42, No, 10, pp 1339-1362. DOI:<u>10.1177/0010414009332126</u>

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000). Peacemaker United Nations.<u>https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-</u> maker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (2001) Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy. <u>https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ARF-Con-</u> <u>cept-Paper-of-Preventive-Diplomacy.pdf</u>

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), (2019). 26th ASEAN Regional Forum https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKE wjBt7Xil-fwAhUBXc0KHX85CgcQFjA-GegQIERAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mofa.go.kr%2Fwww%2Fbrd%2Fm_3914% 2Fdown.do%3Fbrd_id%3D7602%26seq%3D313225%26data_tp%3DA%26file_seq %3D1&usg=AOvVaw0D8DqShiw5FFcZFqdQsC3G

ASEAN, The Founding of ASEAN. History. <u>https://asean.org/about-asean/the-founding-of-</u> <u>asean/#:~:text=History%20%2D%20ASEAN&text=The%20Association%20of%20So</u> <u>utheast%20Asian,%2C%20Philippines%2C%20Singapore%20and%20Thailand</u>

Atuobi, S. (2020) Implementing the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: Prospects and Challenges. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Policy Brief 3/2020.

https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/31912/448494/policy_brief_2010_no_3.pdf

Auma, E. and Campbell, I. (2021). Why Peace Remains elusive as Kenya Prepares for the 2022 General Elections. Saferworld. Article. <u>https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/why-peace-remains-elusive-as-kenya-prepares-for-the-</u> <u>2022-general-elections</u>

Babbie, E., Mouton, J., (2005), *The Practice of Social Research*. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press.

Baraka, C (2020). Kenya's 2022 Elections have already Begun. Foreign Policy. <u>https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/02/kenya-2022-elections-already-begun-cycle-vio-</u> <u>lence-chris-msando/</u>

BBC, (2017). Kenya Election: Kenyatta re-election in Disputed Poll. World News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41807317

Bedzigui, Y. and Alusala, N., (2016). The AU and the ICGLR in Burundi. Africa Portal. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Central Africa Report. Issue 9. <u>https://www.africaportal.org/publications/the-au-and-the-icglr-in-burundi/</u>

Bedzigui, Y (2018). Enhancing AU responses to instability: Linking AGA and APSA. Institute for Security Studies. Policy Brief.

https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief-113.pdf

Bedzigui, Y., (2018). Preventing Conflict: How to make the AU's Policy Work. Institute for Security Studies. Africa Report 11.

https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/africa-report-11.pdf

Bercovitch, J. (1986) International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies, and Conditions of Successful Outcomes. Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, pp.155-68.

Bercovitch, J. (1991). International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful Mediation. *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.17-30,

Bercovitch, J. (1992). The Structures and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations." In: Bercovitch, J. & Rubin, J. Z (eds). Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management. Martin's Press. pp. 6-29,

Bercovitch, J & Houston, A. (1993). Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behaviour on the Success of Mediation in International Relations. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, Vol. 4 No.4. <u>https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022730</u>

Bondoc, N.T (2018). The Efficacy of ASEAN Way of Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Management in the South China Sea Conflict. Social Sciences, Business, Economics, and Management Studies (SBEM). Vol.3 Issue. 30 <u>http://www.pbic.tu.ac.th/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2018-North-proceedings.pdf</u>

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277-S/24111, UN Publications, 17 June 1992.

Burton, J.W. (1987). Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Campbell, J (2017). What Went Wrong with Kenya's Elections? Council on Foreign Relations. Africa Program. <u>https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/what-went-wrong-kenyas-elections</u>

Carment, D & Schnabel, A (2001) Introduction – Conflict Prevention: A concept in search of a policy in Carment, David & Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.) Conflict Prevention. Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? *The United Nations University Press*.

Carnegie Commission (1997). Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Carnegie Corporation of New York. <u>https://www.carnegie.org/publications/preventing-deadly-conflict-final-report/</u>

Charter of the United Nations. Legal United Nations. Codification Division Publications. <u>https://legal.un.org/repertory/art1.shtml</u>

Chekol, Y.G. (2019). Major Success and Challenges of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). *International Journal of Political Science* (IJPS). Vol 4, Issue 2. Pp1-8 <u>https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijps/v5-i2/1.pdf</u>

Chergui, S (2014). Opening Address by Ambassador Smail Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security. 14th Meeting of the African Union Panel of the Wise, 16-17 September.<u>http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/opening-address-by-ambassador-</u>

smail-chergui-commisionner-for-peace-and-security-to-the-14th-meeting-of-theafrican-union-panel-of-the-wise

Claes, J. & von Borzyskowski, I. (2018). What Works in Preventing Election Violence. Evidence from Liberia and Kenya. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Peaceworks Report. <u>https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/10/what-works-preventing-election-violence</u>

Connolly, L (2016). Politics in Place of Peace: The AU's Role in Burundi. Global Peace Operations.<u>https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/politics-in-place-of-peace-the-aus-role-in-burundi/</u>

Cossa, R. A (2002). Promoting Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region 1. In: Preventive Diplomacy: Charting a Course for the Asia Region Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM). International Working Group Report. Issues & Insights no 3-02.

Cossa, R. A (2010). The ASEAN Regional Forum, Moving Towards Preventive Diplomacy. In: Ball, D & Guan, K.C (eds). CSCAP, A. Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region.

http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf

Creswell, J.W. (2013). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed approaches. 4th Ed. Sage, Thousand Oaks

Curtis, D. (2012). The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Postconflict Governance in Burundi. *African Affairs*. Vol, 112, No, 446, pp 72–91. DOI: <u>10.1093/afraf/ads080</u>

Czempiel, E.O (1981). Internationale Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 1981. Pp. 268. DM19.80.

de Albuquerque, A. L. (2016). The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Discussing the Remaining Challenges. Report no FOI-R-4301-SE https://observatoire-boutros-ghali.org/sites/default/files/APSA.pdf de Carvalho, G (2017). Conflict Prevention. What's in it for the AU? Policy Brief, ISS. <u>https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-</u>studies/resources/docs/ISS Africa-policybrief103.pdf

Della-Giacoma, J.D (2011). Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Redefining the ASEAN Way. In: Mancini, F, (ed), Preventive Diplomacy: Region in Focus. New York: International Peace Institute. pp 28-34 <u>https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_preventive_diplomacy.pdf</u>

Dersso, S. (2013). The African Peace and Security Architecture, in Murithi, T. (Edit). 2013. Handbook of Africa's International Relations. London: Routledge

Dersso, S.(2016). To intervene or not to intervene. An inside view of the AU's decisionmaking on Article, 4(h) and Burundi. Occasional Paper. World Peace Foundation.

Desmidt, S & Hauck, V (2017). Conflict management under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Analysis of conflict prevention and conflict resolution interventions by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in violent conflicts in Africa for the years 2013-2015. Discussion Paper. No. 211. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). <u>https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/up-loads/DP211-Conflict-Management-APSA-Desmidt-Hauck-April-2017.pdf</u>

Deutsch, M & Krauss, M (1962). Studies in interpersonal Bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.*

Dewi, R (2013). Territorial Issues in Asia. Drivers, Instruments, Ways Forward. Konrad Adenauer Stifung. Berlin. 7th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS). Discussion Paper.

https://www.swp-

berlin.org/publications/products/projekt papiere/BCAS2013 Rosita Dewi.pdf

Donnenfeld, Z., Bedzigui, Y., Ani, N.C., Louw-Vaudran, L., & Akum, F. (2018) The AU and the Constitutional Review Process in Burundi. ISS Peace and Security Council Report, no 100. <u>https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC-148bc5a624</u>

Dixon, R (2017) 24 killed in Kenyan election violence, many after police open fire on opposition protesters, rights group says. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-kenya-election-killing-20170812-story.html

Draman, R. (2003). Conflict Prevention in Africa: Establishing conditions and institutions conducive to durable peace in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? In: Carment, D & Schnabel, A (Edits). *United Nations University Press*.

Du Plessis, A. (2003). Preventive Diplomacy: Origins and Theory. In: Solomon, H (edit) Towards Sustainable Peace: Reflection on Preventive Diplomacy in Africa. No 13. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Duggan, B., Karimi, F., & Narayan, C. (2017). 24 Killed in Post-Election violence in Kenya. CCN World. <u>https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/12/africa/kenya-elections-protests/index.html</u>

ECOWAS Commission (2018). ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines. ECOWAS Commission and Crises Management Initiative (CMI). ISBN:978-978-965-229-0 https://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ECOWAS-ENGLISH-230518.pdf

Emmers, R (2007). ASEAN Regional Forum: Time to move towards Preventive diplomacy. RSIS Commentaires.

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO07112.pdf

Engel, U. (2005). Violent Conflict and Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Alternative Research Agenda in Is Violence Inevitable in Africa?. In: Engel, U., Chabal, P., & Gentili, A (Edits). Theories of Conflict and Approaches to Conflict Prevention. Leiden & Boston: Brill.

Engel, U., & Porto, J. (2010). Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms Institutionalising Solutions, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

European Court of Auditors (2018). The African Peace and Security Architecture. Special Report no 20.

https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_20/SR_APSA_EN.pdf

European Institute of Peace (2016). Making Preventive Diplomacy work. Belgium, <u>https://www.eip.org/making-preventive-diplomacy-work/</u>

Evans, G (2013). Commission diplomacy. In: AF Cooper, G Heine & R Thakur (eds), The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy. *Oxford University Press*, pp. 278-302.

Frost, F. (2008). ASEAN's Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Relations: Recent Developments and Australia's Interests. Research Paper No. 12 2008-09. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. Parliament of Australia.

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_ y_Library/pubs/rp/rp0809/09rp12

Gänzle, S. & Franke, B. (2010). African Developments: Continental Conflict Management - a glass half-full or half-empty? German Development Institute (DIE) Briefing Paper, July. <u>https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_7.2010.pdf</u>

George, A.L & Holl, J.E (1997). The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy. Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Carnegie Corporation of New York. <u>https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/33/6e/336e40fd-5176-42c2-bb9d-afd7b3b6550a/ccny_report_1997_warning.pdf</u>

Gerenge, R. (2015). Preventive Diplomacy and the AU Panel of the Wise in Africa's Electoral-related Conflicts. SAIIA Policy Briefing 136. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_spb_136_gerenge_20150522.pdf

Gondi, J. (2018). Reflections on the 2017 Elections in Kenya. https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/10/25/october-26th-election-can-thesovereign-will-of-the-people-prevail-in-an-environment-of-state-terror-andintimidation/?cv=1&session-id=e28ac94a1650450489d26b89156e8ff5&print=pdf

Guéhenno, J. M (2016). 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2016, Foreign Policy, Feature. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/03/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2016/ Hara, F (2011). Preventive Diplomacy in Africa: Adapting to New Realities. In: Mancini, F (edit). Preventive Diplomacy: Regions in Focus. International Peace Institute.

Huan, A & Emmers, R. (2017) What explains the success of preventive diplomacy in Southeast Asia?, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol, 29, No 1, pp 77-93, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2016.1259214

Hurd, I. (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. *International Organization*, Vol, *53, No* 2, pp 379–408. <u>http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601393</u>

Hyde, S & Marinov, N (2012). Which Elections Can Be Lost? *Political Analysis*. Vol 20, no.2. pp 191-210. DOI:10.1093/pan/mpr040

Institute for Security Studies, (2014). The AU could Benefit from the Expertise of its Panel of the Wise if it were organized Differently. Peace and Security Council Report. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/new-panel-of-the-wise-has-a-lot-on-its-plate

Institute for Security Studies, (2015a). Peace and Security Council Report. No. 70. June. Institute of Security Studies, 2017. The PSC in Burundi: One Year on. PSC Report. <u>https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-psc-in-burundi-one-year-on</u>

Institute for Security Studies, (2015b). Highlights of Decisions of the PSC in October 2015. PSC Report. <u>https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/highlights-of-decisions-of-the-psc-in-october-2015</u>

International Court of Justice (2015) Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Judgement of 15 v 62 <u>https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/045-19620615-JUD-01-01-EN.pdf</u>

International Crises Group (2011). Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?, Crises Group Asia Briefing, No. 121. <u>https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thai-land/thailand-calm-another-storm</u>

International Crises Group (2016). The African Union and the Burundi Crises: Ambition versus Reality. Crises Group Africa Briefing, No 122. <u>https://d2071andvip0wj.cloud-front.net/b122-the-african-union-and-the-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality.pdf</u>

International Crises Group (2019). Running Out of Options in Burundi. Crises Group Africa, Report No 278. <u>https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/278-running-out-of-op-tions-in-burundi.pdf</u>

International Peace Institute (2012). Preventing Conflicts in Africa: The Role of Early Warning and Response. Permanent Missions of South Africa and Azerbaijan to United Nations. Meeting Notes.

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_preventing_conflicts.pdf

Jentleson, B. W (1996). Preventive Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible, Difficult, Necessary, Policy Paper 27. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Jentleson, B. W. (2000a). Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. <u>https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/9e/43/9e435fc8-f8fd-4764-aabd-2c8eba103b38/ccny_book_1999_opportunities.pdf</u>

Jentleson, B. W. (2000b). Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytic Framework. In: Jentleson, B.W. (edit). Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. <u>https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/9e/43/9e435fc8-f8fd-4764-aabd-2c8eba103b38/ccny_book_1999_opportunities.pdf</u>

Jentzsch, C. (2014). The financing of international peace operations in Africa: A review of recent research and analyses. African Peacebuilding Network (APN). Working Papers No, 1.

https://webarchive.ssrc.org/working-papers/APN_WorkingPapers01_Jentzsch.pdf

Johais, E. (2019). The Role of Technology for Risk Management in Africa. News Article. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. <u>https://www.idea.int/es/news-media/news/role-technology-risk-management-africa</u>

Kaldor, M. (1999). New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Polity.

Katsumata, H. (2003). Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the "ASEAN Way." Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vol. 25. No1. pp104-121.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25798630.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A99e3a040f3284 6c6cf20d75b478e0eb1

Kimani, J (2018) Election Violence in Kenya. *The Siegel Institute Journal of Applied Ethics*: Vol. 7: No. 1, Article 1. DOI: 10.32727/21.2018.7

Kioko, B (2003). The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-interference to non-intervention. *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge*. No 852. Pp 807-825. <u>https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_852_kioko.pdf</u>

Kishore, M., & Jeffery, S. (2017). The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace. Ridge Books, The National University of Singapore.

Kumar, S., & Siddique, S. (2008). Southeast Asia: the diversity dilemma. How Intra-Regional Contradictions and External Forces are Shaping Southeast Asia today. Select Publishing. ISBN-13:978-981-4022-38-5.

Leatherman, J, DeMars, W, Gaffney, P.D., & Väyrynen, R, (1999), Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises, *Kumarian Press*.

Leedy, P.D., & Ormrod, J.E, (2010), Practical research: Planning and designing. 9th edition. Pearson.

Leithead, A (2017). Kenya Presidential Elections canceled by Supreme Court. BBC News. <u>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41123329</u>

Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993. In: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol 89, No 3, pp 681–690. <u>https://doi.org/10.2307/2082982</u>

Lund, M.S. (1996). Early warning and preventive diplomacy. In: Crocker, C., Hampson, F., & Aall, P.(Eds.), Managing global chaos (pp. 379-402). U.S. Institute of Peace.

Lund, M.S (2009). Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice. In: Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V., & Zartman, I.W (Edits), The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. SAGE, pp. 287-308

Mahbubani, K., & Sng, J. (2017). The ASEAN Miracle: A catalyst for peace. NUS Press. <u>https://za1lib.org/book/3671227/d33817?dsource=recommend</u>

Maizland, L. & Albert, E. (2020). What is ASEAN?. Council on Foreign Relations. Article. <u>https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean</u>

Maree, K., (2010), Ethical Considerations In Research, Pretoria. University of Pretoria

Miall, H (1992). The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlements of Disputes Since 1945. Macmillan.

Mitchell, C.R (1981). The Structure of International Conflict. Macmillan.

Morini, D. H (2014). Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the Individual in Attempts to Prevent War. School of Political Science and International Studies. The University of Queensland.

Muggah, R & White, N (2013). Is there a Preventive Action Renaissance? The Policy and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. Report.

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160999/00175abccdb1df5f006c8e40da206643.pdf

Munuera, G. (1994). Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons learned from recent experience. Chaillot Paper 15/16. Institute for Security Studies.

Muradzada, N (2020). Africa: A Rising Star in the New Economic Order. Modern Diplomacy. <u>https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/12/03/africa-a-rising-star-in-the-new-eco-nomic-order/</u>

Mwanasali, M (2005). The Era of Non-Indifference. Mail & Guardian. https://mg.co.za/article/2005-09-13-the-era-of-nonindifference/

Nantulya, P (2015). Burundi: Why the Arusha Accords are Central. African Center for Strategic Studies. <u>https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/</u>

Nathan, L., Kibochi, R, Mainge, C, Ndiaye, M, & Zoubir, Y (2015). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 2014 Assessment Study. Final Report. African Union.

Neuman, W.L. (2011). Social Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. 7th edition. Allyn and Bacon.

Nginya, M.N. (2018). International Election Observers in Kenya's 2017 Elections: impartial or partisan?. In: Kadima, D (eds) *Journal of African Elections*, Vol 17, No,1, pp.49-71. <u>https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE17.1.pdf</u>

Nischalke, T. I. (2000). Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-operation: The ASEAN Way, a Real Spirit or a Phantom?. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, pp 89-112.

Nowrojee, B (2004). Africa on its Own: Regional Intervention and Human Rights. In: Human Rights Watch World Report. Human Rights and Armed Conflict. Human Rights Watch. <u>https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf</u>

Noyes, A & Yarwood, J (2013) The AU Continental Early Warning System: From Conceptual to Operational, International Peacekeeping, Vol 20, No 3, pp 249-262. DOI: <u>10.1080/13533312.2013.838393</u>

OECD (2016), States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence, OECD Publishing, Paris, <u>https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267213-en</u>.

Oluwole, V. (2021). Mapped: The 25 Poorest Countries in the World. Business Insider Africa. <u>https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/mapped-the-25-poorest-countries-in-the-world/f2tg0wr</u>

Oruko, I & Kimanthi K (2017).5000-Strong World Team Keeps an Eye on Critical Kenyan Polls', Daily Nation. <u>https://nation.africa/kenya/news/5000-strong-world-team-keeps-an-eye-on-critical-kenyan-polls-433430?view=htmlamp</u>

OSCE & UN (2011). Perspectives of the UN & regional organizations on preventable and quiet diplomacy, dialogue facilitation, and mediation: Common challenges and good practices. <u>https://www.osce.org/cpc/76015</u>

Oyugi, W. O. (1997). Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Election in Kenya. African Journal of Political Science, Vol 2, No,1, pp 41–69

Pallaver, M. (2011). Power and its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart. The London School of Economics and Political Science. Dissertation. <u>http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/Palla-ver Power and Its Forms.pdf</u>

Parker, I., (2004), Qualitative data and the subjectivity of 'objective' facts. Arnold Paterson, M (2012). The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects. Centre for Conflict Resolution. Africa Portal. <u>https://www.africaportal.org/documents/17855/ccr_seminar_report_41.pdf</u>

Patton, M.Q., (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. Thousand Oaks. Sage Publications.

Peace Science Digest (2017). Successful Diplomacy in Southeast Asia. In: Hiller, P., Prater, D., & Wallace, M. Peace Science Digest. Vol 2, Issue 2. <u>https://peacesciencedigest.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Volume-2-Issue-2.pdf</u>

Pruitt, D.G (1981). Negotiation Behaviour. New York: Academic Press

Putra, T., Utomo, T. C., & Windiani, R. (2013). Strategic Indonesia Dalam Kepemimpinan ASEAN 2011 (Analisis Peranan Indonesia Sebagai Penengah Konflik Thailand-Kamboja Tahun 2008-2011). *Journal of Politic and Government Studies*, Vol.0, pp 1-9. <u>https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jpgs/article/view/2138</u>

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2011) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 3rd Edition, Polity Press, London. 2011

Rothchild. D (2003). Third-Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention. In Sriram. C & Wermester. K. (2003). From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Final Report. International Peace Academy, New York.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/248C5FC30593863B85257424006ED502-IPA_UN_Capacities_Conflict_May03.pdf

Siegle, J & Cook, C (2021). Taking Stock of Africa`s 2021 Elections. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <u>https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2021-elections/#list</u>

Sisk, T.D. & Reynolds, A. (1998). Elections and Conflict Management in Africa. US *Institute of Peace Press*. ISBN: 9781878379795

Sithole, A (2013). The Hatchling Institutions of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture: The Panel of the Wise. In: Liebenberg, I & Very, F. *Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS).* Vol 2, Issue 1 & 2, pp 117-136. <u>https://hdl-handle-net.uplib.idm.oclc.org/10520/EJC149533</u>

Sithole, T. & Asuelime, L.E (2017). The Role of the African Union in Post-Election Violence in Kenya. In Mubangizi, B.C (2020). *African Journal of Governance and Development.* Vol 6 No 2. Pp 98-122. <u>https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC-e5aca3f5e</u>

Small Arms Survey (2019). Weapons Compass. Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa. Report. In collaboration with African Union Commission.

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-AU-Weapons-Compass.pdf

Sokla, C. (2019) ASEAN's Preventive Diplomacy: What Roles for ASEAN in the South China Sea and the Rakhine State Issues?. *Open Journal of Political Science*, Vol 9, pp 434-457. DOI: <u>10.4236/ojps.2019.92024</u>.

Sriram. C & Wermester. K. (2003). From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. International Peace Academy. <u>https://re-</u> <u>liefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/re-</u>

sources/248C5FC30593863B85257424006ED502-IPA_UN_Capacities_Conflict_May03.pdf

Strachan, A. L (2013). Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention. GSDRC, Helpdesk research report. <u>http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1047.pdf</u>

Stubbs, R. (2002). ASEAN plus three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?. *Asian Survey*, Vol *42*, *No* 3, pp 440-455.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2002.42.3.440

Swanstrom, N & Wiessmann (2005). Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration. Concept Paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program.

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/113660/2005_swanstrom-weissman_conceptpaper_conflict-prevention-management-and-beyond.pdf

Swart, G.S (2008). The Role of Preventive Diplomacy in African Conflicts: A Case Study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:1998-2004. The Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria. Dissertation. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/24113/dissertation.pdf?sequence= Swart, G. S & Solomon, H (2004). Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, SAIIA Report, No 40. The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Talentino, A.K (2003). Evaluating Success and Failure: Conflict Prevention in Cambodia and Bosnia. In Carment, D & Schnabel, A (Eds). Conflict Prevention. Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?. The United Nations University Press.

Tekunan, S (2014). The ASEAN Way: The Way to Regional Peace? *Journal Hubungan International.* Vol.3. No.2. DOI: <u>10.18196/hi.2014.0056.142-147</u>

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project ACLED (2021). ACLED 2020: TheYearinReview.AnnualReport.ACLEDData.https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ACLED_Annual-Report-2020_Upd2021.pdf

Thompson, D & Chong, B (2020). Built for Trust, Not for Conflict: ASEAN Faces the Future. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report. No.477 <u>https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/built-trust-not-conflict-asean-faces-future</u>

Touray, O.A. (2005). Common African Defence and Security Policy. Oxford University Press (OUP). *African Affairs*, Vol. 104, No 417. Pp 635-656. <u>https://library.au.int/common-african-defence-and-security-policy-3</u>

United Nations (2011). Thailand/Cambodia. Security Council Report. Update Report. Report no 1. <u>https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%209%20Febru-ary%202011%20Thailand_Cambodia.pdf</u>

UN Human Rights Council (2017). Commission of Inquiry on Burundi. Report on the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi. United Nations Digital Library. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1304085?In=en

United Nations University (2018). Assessment Framework for UN Preventive Diplomacy: An Approach for UN Mediators and International Policymakers. United Nations Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR). Van Wyk, J (2016). High-Level Panels as Diplomatic Instruments: The African Union Panel of the Wise and the Emergence of an African Peace Diplomacy Architecture. *Journal for Contemporary History*. Vol 4, No.1, pp 57-79. http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/24150509/jch.v41i1.4

Väyrynen, R (2003) Challenges to preventive action: the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia. In: Carment & Schnabel (eds.) Conflict prevention: path to peace or grand illusion?, United Nations University Press.

Wallensteen, P (2002). Understanding Conflict Resolution War, Peace, and the Global System. 3rd Edition. *Sage Publications*.

Wallensteen, P. & Moller, F (2003). Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown. Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 7 Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University.

Wilén, N. & Williams, P.D. (2018), The African Union and coercive diplomacy: the case of Burundi. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 673-696.

World Peace Foundation (2017). Kenya Short Mission Brief, Kenya. *African Politics*, African Peace. <u>https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Kenya-brief.pdf</u>

Wulf, H. & Debiel, T. (2010). Why Regional Organizations Fail to use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms. *Global Governance*. Vol. 16. No 4. pp. 525-547. *Brill* <u>https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29764965.pdf?refreqid=excel-sior%3A1ae4cc2908e2d5c18a19437d89832159</u>

Yuzawa, T. (2006). The evolution of preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and prospects. *Asian Survey*, Vol, 46, No 5, pp 785-804.

Zartman, I.W. (2000). Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In: Stern, P & Druckman, D., (eds). *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*. National Academies Press. DOI: 10.17226/9897

Zartman, I.W. (2001). The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. In: *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, no 1, pp.8-18. <u>https://peace-maker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TimingofPeaceInitiatives_Zart-man2001.pdf</u>

Zyck, S. A & Muggah, R (2012) Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development.* Vol 1, No 1, pp 68-75. DOI: <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ac</u>.