A Global South reading of security and governance: traditional rulership in northern Nigeria

By

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MAPS

List of abbreviations

Acronym	Explanation
Ardos	Herder leaders who are a part of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria
CSS	Critical security studies
Dogarai	The Emirs personal bodyguards
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
Miyetti Allah	The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria are an advocacy group made up of Fulani pastoralists
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist States / the Soviet Union

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This research interrogates the nexus between security and governance through a study of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria. It uses a critical security studies (CSS) and Third World Security School approach to interrogate security and governance. It is specifically interested in how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined in the formal[1] practice of security and governance in northern Nigeria. Considering how traditional rulers have long provided security and stability to the Nigerian state, one would imagine that this question is unnecessary. However, it is an important question because, while traditional rulers are important and critical players on the ground, they have not been adequately acknowledged within the formal practices around security and governance.

Another reason why this is an important question is that, over the course of Nigerian history, the role and influence of traditional rulers has been formally and significantly reduced within the constitution and in practice. These limitations have constrained the work, impact and mandate of traditional rulers within the communities they serve. So, while they occupy a position of power and authority on the ground, this has not translated to increased awareness and visibility, as well as literature and discourse on traditional rulership to reflect this reality. The focus of the research is the exploration of how and why traditional rulers in northern Nigeria have been side-lined and not adequately studied or acknowledged, given their importance and prominence. This study is important and critical because it adds an additional voice to the growing and nuanced debates on the practice of security and governance. The research approach is Global South[2] focused, qualitative and interpretive study, making use of

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[1] 'Formal' in this thesis is used as an adjective and refers to an actor or institution that is officially sanctioned or recognised. I am aware of the debates and discussions around what is considered formal and have chosen this definition to encapsulate how I have understood the term.

[2] The Global South is an ambiguous term with multiple definitions. Traditionally, it has three distinct definitions: as 'intergovernmental development organisations', a 'deterritorialised geography' and 'resistant imagery of a transnational political subject'. Typically, the Global South refers to umbrella terminology that 'denotes regions outside Europe and North America', specifically those found in 'Africa, Central and Latin America, and most of Asia'. The Global South also 'references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standard, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained'. It refers to the challenge towards 'the insularity of Western political science by emphasising and shifting towards understanding the 'geopolitical relations of power', all 'while also providing space for scholars and activists to examine the specificities of issues, processes, and struggles at a national, regional or transnational level'. This research focused on understanding the Global South as a 'deterritorialised geography', specifically the 'collective block' of states from Africa, specifically northern Nigeria.

a single case study design with evaluative and exploratory properties. The study employs semi-structured interviews to analyse the side-lined[3] role of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria.

1.2 <u>JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE</u>

The side-lined role of traditional rulers in the formal practice of security and governance is an under-researched field of inquiry. There is an abundance of literature that focuses on investigating state capacity, state failure, international actor interventions and foreign aid. While this literature is important, it is incomplete and does not account for local realities and local actors who contribute to and/or diminish security and governance within a state. There is a gap in knowledge when it comes to understanding alternative actors, ones smaller and less in the public eye than the state or prominent international actors. The way in which the literature is compiled, produced, and studied side-lines the significant role and work of other actors, like traditional rulers, in formal security and governance practice.

It is for these reasons that this study focused on an exploration of one such set of actors: northern Nigerian traditional rulers. They hold a unique and significant role within their communities and within Nigerian society. This research contributed to an exploration and understanding of the role of these types of rulers and decision-makers within the West African and broader African context. This research can be beneficial not only within Africa, but also in other regions of the Global South that share similar beliefs, attitudes and values about these types of rulers.

Another reason why this research is important is that there is not enough literature and discourse that fully explores and focuses on Global South concerns through a Global South lens. Mainstream security and governance are primarily written for a Global North sensibility and are focused on understanding Global South concerns and problems through a Global North lens. While there is nothing wrong with this, it is important to remember that the context and history of the Global South differs considerably from that of the Global North.

In many instances, large parts of the Global South were colonised by states from the Global North, so while there is some sense of shared histories – for example, colonial and post-colonial

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[3] For this thesis, 'side-lined' was primarily used to refer to the fact that traditional rulers are unable to influence or participate in events because people have deliberately not involved them.

– these spheres are fundamentally different in demography, culture and the ways they behave and operate. Attempts to mimic or reproduce Global North understandings and strategies in a Global South context may be more harmful than beneficial to the multiplicity of contexts in the Global South. While Global North lenses are important, these perspectives are not specific or relevant to the needs of the Global South. This study sought to expand on the growing literature that is Global South focused and written from a Global South perspective.

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS

In order to fulfil the goal of writing from a Global South perspective, the research problem and sub-questions challenge the dominant understandings of formal security and governance. Mainstream discourses and literature are primarily state-centric, focusing on how the state is the sole and legitimate provider of security and governance. This literature is inherently exclusionary, not accounting for different methods and other actors who can provide security and governance within the state.

This research sought to determine how and why traditional rulers have been left out and, oftentimes, side-lined from formal security and governance practices despite the fact that they are important actors in northern Nigeria. More specifically, the study sought to explore the following questions:

    a)   Who are the actors and institutions that promote security and governance, and what is their relationship to each other?

    b)   How and in what ways have traditional rulers been side-lined in the formal practice of security and governance?

    c)   How and in what ways can traditional rulers be included more within the formal practice of security and governance?

These questions serve to tease out how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined. It is through this kind of exploration that one begins to see the ways in which these actors contribute and/or undermine security and governance in northern Nigeria.

1.4 UNDERSTANDING INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is a state that faces a host of drivers of insecurity that have fuelled instability within its borders. These drivers include a violent history and imperfect governance systems that have created pockets for corruption, inequality, exclusionary politics, lack of diversity,

marginalisation, poverty, poor social cohesion, and religious and ethnic tensions to flourish (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 77). The outflow of these drivers has taken the form of disgruntlement, unrest, protest action, domestic conflict, the formation of radical religious groupings, terrorism, insurgency, and secessionist claims over the course of Nigeria's troubled history, including the Kano revolt (1980), Bulunktu Bisarre (1982), Kastina crises (1999), Samfara conflict, Kaduna revolt, Bauchi crises and Sokoto (1999), Kaduna Riots (2000), and Jos Riots (2001) (Akinwale 2011: 124; Çancı & Odukoya 2016).

These drivers have been particularly strenuous for the north, where they have created high tension and often been the central point where these conflicts have started. They have also had a spill-over effect, negatively impacting the stability of the West African region. These drivers have contributed to Nigeria being considered a state plagued by serious internal security threats like 'sectarian violence, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, socio-economic inequality, exclusionary politics, intolerance of diversity and corruption' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 77; Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 296).

1.4.1 Violent history

Nigeria has had a long and contentious history of violence that has contributed to growing instability within its borders (Adesoji 2010: 96; Danjibo 2009: 16). It is a state synonymous with military rule and systemic violence (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 44). The period between the 1960s and 1990s was particularly volatile, with Nigeria experiencing six military coups (Aghedo & Osumah 2012: 856; Arowosegbe 2009: 576; BBC News 1999). There have also been waves of discontent from the citizens due to police torture, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and detention by the state and affiliated agencies (Alemika & Chukwuma 2000: 21; Human Rights Watch 2005; Nolte 2004: 61). Instead of protecting the citizens, security arms of the state have been used to create more insecurity within Nigeria. This is due to many factors including being ill trained, ill equipped or incapable of dealing with traditional security threats, as well as emerging ones like complex crimes, public corruption and economic crimes (Aghogho 2015: 66; Amnesty International 2011: 8). These instances of violence are a reoccurring feature of Nigerian society.

1.4.2 Religion

Religion is a contentious driver of instability in Nigeria. It has been used as a tool and source of friction, division and conflict in Nigeria. Various actors like politicians, religious leaders

and even the military have often, and actively, used religion as a political tool to incite, exacerbate and divide the state (Agbiboa 2013: 7). It has polarised the state between the north and south and between the two dominant religions: Islam and Christianity (Ruby & Shah 2007). Religious tensions between these two groups have been fierce and divisive, with both harbouring fierce suspicions of the other (Campbell 2013; Ruby & Shah 2007; Sampson 2012).

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was fierce sectarian violence between the two groups that led to destruction of property, thousands being displaced and 14 000 deaths (Akinwale 2011: 124; Campbell 2013; Ruby & Shah 2007; Sampson 2012). In northern Nigeria, there have been several inter-religious breakouts, most notably the Kano revolt (1980), Bulunktu Bisarre (1982), Kastina crises (1999), Samfara conflict, Kaduna revolt, Bauchi crises and Sokoto (1999), Kaduna Riots (2000), and Jos Riots (2001) (Akinwale 2011: 124; Çancı & Odukoya 2016). Efforts to reconcile the differing religious interests have proven to be unsuccessful.

1.4.3 The threat of transnational and violent actors

The violent nature of Nigeria's history and agents of the state has led to an 'emergence and ascendancy of militia organisations, struggles and movements' in Nigeria, particularly in the north (Aghedo & Osumah 2012: 857). These groups have sought to alleviate the 'political and economic inequities' and prevent exploitative and violent practices caused by the state (Alemika & Chukwuma 2000: 19; Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 42). It is no wonder that these different actors have resorted to the use of violence to communicate and engage with the state and achieve their aims.

Transnational, radical, and religious actors have become important players in the socio-economic arena in northern Nigeria. Actors like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Maitatsine, the Yan Izala, Tariqah, and more recently, Boko Haram have sought to establish a counter narrative to the Nigerian state. Often, the alternative narratives they offer are linked to self-determination, secession, and even a militarised attempt at statehood.

More often than not, these actors have tended to be religious in nature and Muslim in identity. They have often used religion to challenge the authority, legitimacy, and hegemony of the secular Nigerian state. This has been done to establish an alternative social, cultural, and political system – an Islamic caliphate not only in Nigeria, but also in the West African region

(Osaghae 2001: 21). They pose a challenge to traditional and new understandings of security, as they question the primacy and legitimacy of the state and the 'international order' (Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 287). These attempts and violent acts have weakened security and governance within Nigeria and have de-legitimised and questioned the very nature of statehood.

1.4.4 Marginalisation and inequality

The discontent and emergence of transnational actors have also been fuelled by how unequal and divided Nigeria is. Nigeria is considered to be a 'deeply divided' state within Africa, especially in terms of socio-economic and political matters (Persson 2014: 15; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 4). With over 350 ethnic groups, Nigeria has a 'complex history' of perennial ethnic tensions (Adebanwi 2005: 342; Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 63; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 4; Sergie & Johnson 2015). Between 1989 and 1992, there were over 250 ethnic-related conflicts recorded (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 77). Additionally, between 1999 and 2002, a further 42 ethno-religious and communal conflicts were recorded (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 77). These tensions have effectively divided Nigeria into two: the north and the south. The north has been under-resourced and underdeveloped while the south has had more access to resources and more development.

One of the biggest inequalities in Nigeria has been in education, specifically in terms of literacy and attendance rates. The percentage of females in northern Nigeria unable to gain an education is much higher (between 61% and 62%) than southern Nigeria (between 17% and 18%) (Akanbi et al. 2013; Omoju & Abraham 2014). 'Lack of financial' and emotional support for education have prevented young women and girls in northern Nigeria from attending school (Ahmed 2013). In addition, for northern Nigeria, school-going children between the ages of 6 and 11 do not attend school (Quranic or otherwise) (Hoffmann 2014: 6). This translates to only 40% of northern Nigerian children attending school, which is significantly lower than the 92% of southern Nigerian children who attend school (Hoffmann 2014: 6). The low literacy rates have been attributed to a number of factors such as inadequate funding, inadequate curricula, inadequate teacher training, poor infrastructure, and poor leadership and management in education in northern Nigeria (Abdulqadir 2016; Akanbi et al. 2013; Akande 2014; Hoffmann 2014: 5).

Political insecurity is a major cause of low school attendance in northern Nigeria (Global

Partnership for Education N.D.). Schools are frequently under threat of attack by armed and insurgent actors like Boko Haram (Global Partnership for Education N.D.). These attacks have forced an estimated one million school children out of school due to kidnapping, threats, killings of students and teachers, and destroyed infrastructure in the north-east (Kermeliotis 2015; Sheppard 2015; Winsor 2015). These acts have effectively discouraged teaching and greatly undermined the 'educational process' in the north (Premium Times N.D.). All these factors have contributed to the failure of educational institutions to provide students with adequate education to make them employable.

1.4.5 Legacy of corruption

Nigeria is commonly thought of in terms of corruption. This has created a negative perception of Nigeria, being associated with the '419 scams' (Aghogho 2015: 66). Historic and systemic corruption is one of the leading causes of the economic disparity and inequality in Nigeria. It has infiltrated all levels: political, bureaucratic, military and institutional (Folarin 2020). Despite having an abundance of natural resources – 37.2 billion barrels' worth of oil reserves and 184 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves – Nigeria is considered a highly corrupt state (Agbiboa 2014: 390; Salinas 2012). Nigeria has ranked highly on the Corruption Perception Index, ranking 135 and 136 out of 175 countries in 2014 and 2016 respectively (Transparency International N.D.).

Various spheres of government have been implicated in corrupt practices – US$400 billion was reported stolen by government and military leaders, and in 2012, an estimated N14 million was uncovered stashed away in personal accounts of top officials (Ikita 2014; Omotose 2013: 125; UNODC N.D.). In the north, there were high levels of theft, bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and embezzlement between 1999 and 2003 (The New Humanitarian 2010). This systemic corruption has negatively affected Nigeria, increasing poverty levels and inequality due to less funds being available to ensure effective implementation of policy and basic service delivery (Persson 2014: 16–18). While this is true, it is also important to note corruption has 'a long history of politics' and was partly a product of the colonial legacy (Pierce 2006: 888).

1.4.6 Poverty

The corrupt practices, unemployment and inequality in Nigeria have had the unintended consequences of fuelling high poverty rates in Nigeria (Panchal 2020). While poverty is a global security challenge, its effects are felt harshly in Nigeria. There are about 83 million poor

Nigerians who live below the poverty line (Al Jazeera 2020; The World Bank 2020). This roughly translates to 40% of the total Nigerian population (Al Jazeera 2020; The World Bank 2020). In 2020, the northern states like Sokoto, Taraba and Jigawa reported 87.7% of their population living below the poverty line as compared to the southern states of Lagos, Delta and Osun reporting 4.5%, 6% and 8.5% respectively (Al Jazeera 2020; Varrella 2020). These poverty levels have fuelled feelings of disgruntlement and dissatisfaction, especially in the north, and created an opportunity for radical actors like Boko Haram to prey upon these negative sentiments.

1.4.7 Unemployment and economic production

Coupled with the growing poverty rate, Nigeria also suffers from high unemployment. Between 2015 and 2016, unemployment in Nigeria grew from 9% to 12.1% (Akande 2014; Knoema N.D; Statista N.D.; Udo 2016). In 2021, this increased to 32.5% (Nwokoma 2021; Olurounbi 2021; Varrella 2021).

Map 1: Economic production rates in Nigeria

http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/insurgencies/poverty-root-cause-boko-haram-violence

There is a wide disparity in economic production between northern and southern Nigeria. One would assume that, due to low economic production and development in northern Nigeria, this

would translate to the high unemployment rates in the north. However, the opposite is true. Northern states are faring comparatively better, with unemployment rates ranging between 1% and 30%, while in southern Nigeria, it ranges between 30% and 40% (Giles 2019). The 10% difference between these regions translates to millions of Nigerians living in abject poverty. In fact, there has been an increase in unemployment, compounded by the devastating effects of COVID-19 which plunged Nigeria into its worst economic recession in four decades between 2020 and 2021 (Nwokoma 2021).

These drivers form the backdrop for this research. They have a strong hold and big impact on Nigeria. Transnational actors, religion, poverty, marginalisation, and corruption are more prevalent in the north. The north has been a theatre and focal area for much of the insecurity and instability being experienced in Nigeria. There has also been a rise in tension and instability from the north that has spread throughout the state.

While much has been written on socio-economic and political factors and their effects on northern Nigeria, there has been very little that looks at the interaction of these factors with security and governance or how other actors have impacted on these drivers. This research is distinctive because it examines the significance of one such set of actors in the north – traditional rulers. It examines their role and impact on security and governance as well as how and why their voices and their work are not always foregrounded or included in security and governance practice.

1.5 <u>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</u>

The theoretical framework for this study is based on two theories within security thinking: CSS and the Third World Security School. These two theories are the tools of analysis and lenses of inquiry that guided this study and problematised the Nigerian security and governance framework. They will be discussed in detail in chapter two but are briefly introduced here.

CSS is a sub-field of security studies that re-thinks and de-centres scholarly security and policy work, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of security that accounts for differing contexts and circumstances (Bilgin 2008a: 93; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 93; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4). It is an urgent and multi-layered challenge of orthodox security, specifically the one that has given rise to an oppressive and increasingly insecure world (Booth 1997: 106; Booth 2011: 1–2, 4; Bilgin 2008b: 5, 11; Hudson 2005: 160). By de-centring and

rethinking security, CSS has a broadened and inclusive agenda that identifies 'multiple types of threat, and multiple levels of analysis' (Bilgin 2008a: 93; Booth 2011: 4; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23).

CSS is drawn from the ideas of Gramsci, the Frankfurt school of critical theory and Ken Booth's writings on security and emancipation (Bilgin 2008a: 92; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 50). The strength and core of CSS lies in its emancipatory agenda (Peoples 2010: 1116). It espouses freedom, allowing people to 'deal with threats' and calls for a holistic approach to life rather than a focus on the 'material well-being' of the state and the individual (Booth 1997: 110; Bilgin 2008a: 91; Tarry 1999: 7–8; Wyn Jones 1999: 103, 118). Emancipation meant 'freeing people, as individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do' (Booth 1997: 110). CSS focuses on human agency as a means to develop 'structural and contingent' measures that meet and address the specific historical, geo-political and socio-political needs of differing security contexts (Bilgin 2008a: 93; Booth 2011: 4).

The heart and spirit of CSS manifests through the provision, inclusion and promotion of previously side-lined understandings of security, namely 'the disadvantaged, the voiceless' and the powerless from a Global South perspective (Ayoob 1997: 121; Bilgin 2008b: 5, 89; Bilgin 2008a: 92; Bilgin 2012: 165). This provides an added layer of understanding to security practice by bringing previously marginalised and side-lined voices to the forefront of security thinking. CSS offers a perspective of security that classifies Global South insecurities as a newly emerged set of concerns (Ayoob 1991: 258; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23). However, this is also a weakness. The security environment of the Global South is not newly emerged (Ayoob 1991: 258; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23). It has always been there. Instead, we should rather think of it as a side-lined and ignored aspect that has been largely left out of formal practice.

Another weakness of the CSS tradition is around who writes for the school and who the audience and reach of CSS is. Prominent CSS scholars like Keith Krause, Michael Williams, Ken Booth, Christopher Browning, Matt McDonald, who built and curated CSS literature, are predominantly Global North writers and thinkers. Their sensibilities and writings are based on and written for those contexts. Even the concept of emancipation is steeped in Eurocentricity, making it unsuitable for audiences and contexts outside of the West (Bilgin 2012: 161). These

ideological leanings neglect the contexts and experiences of other regions like the Global South (Bilgin 2012: 163). While there is nothing inherently wrong with this, their lens of inquiry is not always Global South oriented or may unconsciously lean towards Global North sensibilities. Inherently, some of the cognitive biases of Global North thinking and upbringing may creep into their analyses. This skews the analyses and leaves it as an inaccurate and incomplete representation of Global South contexts and concerns. While it is difficult to come to a true representation of the Global South experience, one way of coming to a closer representation is by incorporating the tradition with scholars based in the Global South region. Also, if Global North writers add to the debates and discussions, they should acknowledge their internal and unconscious biases that may cloud their analyses.

1.5.1 Third World Security School

There are many strands and perspectives under the CSS umbrella, and this research is focused on the Third World Security School as a means to understand and problematise security and governance dynamics in northern Nigeria.

Like the CSS tradition, the Third World Security School challenges the Euro-centricity of security discourses by centring and analysing security from the distinct and legitimate experience, 'intellectual concerns' and 'local and regional realities' of the Global South (Ayoob 1983: 43). The Third World Security School emerged during the Cold War era and focused on the socio-economic, ecological, historical, and geo-political changes of the Global South within the international arena (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31–32).

Scholars within the Third World Security School posit that the status quo attitude and polarisation of security along two poles during this Cold War period constituted a 'major source of insecurity' in the international arena (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31; Thomas 1992: 103). This was true for many regions in the Global South where many conflicts were waged. However, because these conflicts were 'intrastate in nature', they did not receive as much attention (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31; Tarry 1999: 4; Thomas 1992: 103). The end of the Cold War presented a major shift in security thinking from a polarised, interstate warfare mindset to a multi-polar, post-Cold War world. While there is rich and abundant literature on security, this

literature is primarily derived from a Western[4] and Euro-centred historical foundation (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31). This Euro-centring and framing of security, history and international relations fails to identify, analyse and address the growing and evolved nature of security concerns from the largely side-lined and neglected Global South (Thomas 1992: 109).

The side-lined nature of security discourse from the Global South region is one of the primary reasons why the Third World Security School emerged. There was a realisation that Global South concerns were primarily left out of security discourses. This school seeks to understand security from a Global South context and perspective that accounts for increased regional conflicts due to the outward spill-over effects of internal conflicts in the Global South (Bilgin 2008b: 5; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31). The core and heart of the Third World Security School was one in which security embodied a more inclusive and deliberative 'broadening and deepening' of the discipline and discourse of security, going beyond 'war and arms conflict' (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31). It envisioned security as a crucial means of viewing insecurities from a predominantly Global South perspective (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31).

1.5.2 Major proponents of the Third World Security School

Major proponents of the Third World Security School include scholars like Caroline Thomas, Mohammed Ayoob and Amitav Acharya. They agree that the school provides a reconfiguration of security based on the unique insecurities, challenges, and 'historical, political, social and cultural contexts' of the Global South (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31–32).

Like the CSS tradition, Acharya noted how and acknowledged that security has been predominantly understood as a Eurocentric endeavour, which did not fully integrate other segments, issues, and experiences (Ayoob 1983: 44; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31). For Ayoob, subaltern security and the Third World Security School widens the scope of security by acknowledging the 'wide variety of crises' that 'threaten the state' (Tarry 1999: 4). These threats often include non-military issues, which, Thomas (1992) concludes, the Global South is particularly vulnerable to. Thomas went on to state that non-military issues stemming from 'economic weakness' as well as other systemic issues and the legacies of colonialism have a significant bearing on how security is seen and carried out in the Global South (Caballero-

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[4] Western is used as an adjective in this thesis and is used to describe and refer to 'things, people, ideas, ways of life, civilization, thinking that is and is associated with states from the United States of America, Canada, Western, Northern and Southern Europe'.

Anthony 2016: 32; Thomas 1992: 94–95). These analyses are crucial because they redefine what security is and who participates in it, as well as allowing for nuances and duality within security literature and discourse. By bringing to fore the voices of previously side-lined actors like traditional rulers, the tradition and practice of security and governance gains depth and nuance.

While the Third World Security School is the chosen frame of reference in this thesis, there are criticisms of this school. A difficulty of the Third World Security School is the multiplicity of different referent objects that can be used in security. This is not necessarily a bad thing; it just means that there are multiple actors that can be used to analyse security. Unfortunately, for this study, there was not enough scope, time, and resources to explore all these different actors. This study specifically used traditional rulers as the referent object because they are side-lined in formal security practices and are important actors in northern Nigeria.

Much of the analysis around the Third World Security School is preoccupied with a critique against the state-centricity of traditional security thinking. While this is important, there needs to be a conscious effort to move beyond this critique. There needs to be more concentration in fleshing out what security is, outside of the state. While the Third World School broadens security thinking, there is not enough literature that is context- and geography-specific. It is too generalised to account for the complexities of different regions within the Global South. Like the Global North, the Global South is not a monolith and is comprised of different cultures, contexts, and backgrounds. In addition, while it is commendable that this body of work was pioneered by a woman, Caroline Thomas, the Third World Security School draws its roots from a largely Eurocentric framing and foundation. Thomas was born in Europe, and this upbringing may impact on the way the theory is understood and used. To counter this, insights and analyses from Ayoob and Acharya were used to bolster the analysis of the Third World Security School. It also reflects the serious need to include more analysis from women and gendered analyses to security that counter the highly masculinised security framing and thinking.

Despite these critiques, the Third World Security School is a useful paradigm as it allows for the most comprehensive and widest dispersal of the ideal and value of emancipation to the most vulnerable and under-represented geographical area: the Global South. It lies at the heart of new security thinking in which people are also seen as a means to security, and security is a vehicle through which people have the agency to free themselves from 'physical and human

constraints' (Booth 1991: 321–322; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 46; Wyn Jones 1999: 118). The Third World Security School allows for a bottom-up interpretation of security that is non-Eurocentric and accounts for Global South security needs (Bilgin 2008b: 5; Booth 1991: 322; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 31).

As expressed above, security is an important element within this thesis. It is an essentially contested concept because of its ambiguous, intersubjective and 'value-laden nature' (Acharya 2001: 442; Baldwin 1997: 10; Walker 1997: 61). Security is 'what people make it' and is often determined by ideology, timeframe and geographical area (Booth 1997: 106; Brauch 2005: 7; Thomas 1992: 93). There are two broad movements within security – traditional and non-traditional security – and these will be briefly outlined here and expanded on in chapter two.

National security is the traditional and most narrow conceptualisation of security. It is classified as a state-centric and military endeavour (Booth 1991: 318; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 1998: 3; Dalby 1997: 10; Wyn Jones 1999: 102). This preoccupation primarily stems from a Western and Cold War mind-set which fostered a highly masculinised world of security based on the ideas of high politics concerns and national interests (Ayoob 1997: 121; Goldman 2001: 43; Leffler 1990: 129). This specific and narrow focus excludes any other actors that are not the state from security thinking, and as such disqualifies this approach as a frame of reference for this study.

The end of the Cold War brought a realisation that conflicts were not only based on interstate warfare, but also include 'multifaceted and multidimensional' forms of warfare and 'drivers of disorder' (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 5; Newman 2010: 78–79, 83; Tarry 1999: 3). This new form of security, human security, prompted an enquiry into how to account for the forgotten and 'legitimate concerns' of ordinary individuals (Acharya 2001: 444; Ayoob 1997: 121; Paris 2011: 89). Based on these premises, human security may seem to be a closer fit to apply to this study because of its focus on individuals, as well as its counter to the state-centricity of national security. However, its focus does not allow for an analysis of other peripheral actors that also have an impact on security.

These shifts in security were not enough to fully encompass the full breath of security concerns. The turn to non-traditional security represented a further dissatisfaction with the practice and discourse of traditional security thinking. Non-traditional security represents an additional lens

to achieve an accessible understanding of security from a Global South perspective. It focuses on more normative, value-oriented and holistic understandings of security (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 5, 15; Tarry 1999: 1, 4–5). Non-traditional security expands and departs from human security concerns by providing a persuasive account of and focus on people in general, not just those from a particular state (Walker 1997: 65). It accepts the existence of 'old-fashioned territorial threats', at the same time acknowledging new and different threats which have an equally 'profound significance' and 'grave consequences' on the Global South and international arena (Booth 1991: 318; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14).

While there are various types of non-traditional security, the theoretical focus of this research, as explained in the previous section, is on CSS. CSS is a post-positivist turn of security which questions and challenges the 'predetermined understanding' of security (Booth 2011: 3–4). It highlights the 'political power and symbolism' of traditional security, while consciously being sensitive to the use of security language (Booth 2011: 3–4). Drawing its roots from the Frankfurt school of critical theory, a core preoccupation of CSS is its emancipatory value to security (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 50; Newman 2010: 86; Van Munster 2007: 235–237). Within this thesis, the research also focused on the Third World Security School. This strand of CSS is particularly useful to the analysis because of its specific focus on Global South security concerns and the multitude of referent objects that can be used to understand and analyse security.

This study is by no means exhaustively representative of this work but offers one way of viewing and understanding the world and is a comprehensive overview of the expanded literature within security thinking. What makes critical security studies discourses different is their acknowledgement that the focus of security needs to change. Critical security studies posit that security needs to reflect the realities and contexts of other geographical regions and spaces, specifically the Global South region. Critical discourses open the debate for more critical voices from the Global South and other side-lined actors experiences to enter, engage in and lead practice from Global South contexts. Additionally, like security, governance practice predominantly draws from Western/European understandings, something at odds with the Global South and African experience/s. Critical security studies discourses expands the literature and discourse and allows alternative, side-lined, forgotten, and marginalised voices to be foregrounded within governance thinking.

1.5.3 Governance

Governance is another important concept in this thesis. Like security, there is no universally understood or 'precise definition' of the term (Lutz & Linder 2004: 16). Governance is derived from Greek, Latin, and French origins, being traditionally used to describe the steering or regulation of an entity (Fukuyama 2016: 90). In the international arena, governance is usually linked with 'international development or philanthropic agencies'; while in the political arena, it refers to a diffusion of authority and decision-making between several levels of government (Bratton & Rothchild 1992: 265, 269; Hooghe & Marks 2003: 234).

The literature on governance provides different and emerging modes of governance, for example, multi-level governance, polycentric governance, multi-perspectival governance, condominio, fragmentation, and hybrid political orders (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4; Hooghe & Marks 2003: 234; Peters & Pierre 2001: 132). In this thesis, governance was used as a concept and was defined and operationalised as the processes and actions through which decisions are made and implemented (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145; Lutz & Linder 2004: 16). It also refers to the roles and influence of governing actors and how they exercise power (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1; Lutz & Linder 2004: 16). In Africa, these governing actors consisted of chiefs, tribal leaders, traditional rulers, and other indigenous names that denoted cultural and customary institutions and actors (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1). It is a 'useful analytical lens' for this research because it is broad enough to allow for an expanded reading of governance (Clarke 1999: 5; Tait & Euston-Brown 2017: 44). The idea, history and context of governance will be explored further in chapter three of this research.

1.5.4 Traditional rulers as a form of governance in Nigeria

The referent object and focus of analysis for this thesis are traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. This study focused on providing an understanding of how and why they are a side-lined actor within the formal practice of security and governance despite their being an important actor within northern Nigeria.

Traditional rulers form part of customary and traditional institutions in Nigeria (Abubakar 2015: 185; Mabunda 2017: 10; Vaughan 1995: 511–512). They make up the 'nucleus of governance' and are comprised of traditional heads of ethnic groups or clans, among other bodies (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128, 130). They are 'indigenous arrangements' where the 'highest primary executive authority' is vested in leaders who are 'nominated, appointed and

installed' (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 130).

Traditional rulers are the custodians and preservers of the customs, values, heritage, norms, and traditions within Nigeria (Akinwale 2010: 137; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 72; Mabunda 2017: 66). They are 'relied upon for the promotion of ethical values', governance, and security (Abubakar 2015: 185; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128). They play various roles and fulfil various functions in religious, legislative, executive and judicial spheres. These roles include mediators, advisors, ceremonial heads, negotiators, managers, peace builders, Fathers, interlocutors, 'shock absorbers', unifiers and stabilisers (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 122; Mefor 2012; Sklar 2003: 6; Vaughan 1995: 512).

British colonial rule begun the process of the 'decline of the influence' and legitimacy of traditional rulership in Nigeria (Suleiman 2012). In the post-independent era, traditional rulers were heavily criticised as hindering development and being responsible for stagnation within communities (Mabunda 2017: 66). Traditional rulers were considered irrelevant and unable to adapt to the changing times (Ajayi 1992: 124; Ohiole & Ojo 2015: 37). As such, there has been a steady 'diminishing' respect and 'subtle distain' for traditional rulers, with a mix of 'new boldness' to challenge them (Suleiman 2012).

Another reason for their diminishing respect and general distain is that there was a proliferation of infighting between traditional rulers and other actors who contested the legitimacy and authority in northern Nigeria (Ohiole & Ojo 2015: 37). Despite this, traditional rulers were able to remain influential in the north, especially at the grassroots level (Abdulqadir 2016: 7; Mefor 2012, Ojo 1976: 122; Suleiman 2012; Zeb-Obipi 2013: 100). Traditional rulers hold tremendous power, influence, and authority over society, even more so than the national and federal government (Ojo 1976: 122; Suleiman 2012; Zeb-Obipi 2013: 100). Given these two contrasting opinions, it is no wonder that traditional rulers are considered to be a 'key to success or failure' of security and governance in northern Nigeria (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 78; Vaughan 1995: 512).

While traditional rulers have long provided security and stability to the Nigerian state, they have not been adequately acknowledged within the formal practice of security and governance. By locating this study within CSS and the Third World Security School, this research is grounded in a Global South thinking. It allows us to problematise the side-lined role of

traditional rulers in the formal practices of security and governance, from the context and experience of the Global South. It allows us to question this framework, given that under a Global South reading of security and governance, many more actors besides the state would be at the fore of analysis. Under the CSS and Third World Security School framework, actors like traditional rulers occupy a more significant role within practice.

This study critiques the primarily Western and Westphalian conception of security and governance. It questions 'the pattern of security from top–bottom to bottom-up approach' (Mefor 2012). By centring traditional rulers as a referent object, this research shifts the security and governance debate, shedding light on the 'critical role' that these types of actors play in society (Mefor 2012). This perspective challenges the idea, role, and function of the state as the sole and ultimate provider of goods, services, order, governance and security within a state. From the data that emerged, we see how see the importance and centrality of traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers', as critical stakeholders, and as intelligence and information gatherers on the ground in northern Nigeria. Additionally, we see the relationships that traditional rulers have with other actors i.e., the state and vigilantes. This thesis focused on highlighting and illustrating the ways in which the lens of inquiry and traditional/mainstream ways of knowing have essentially hidden certain actors from our field of focus and analysis. Traditional security and governance thinking, analysis, and its referent object overshadows other ways of knowing and alternative actors. In the face of powerful actors, like the state, traditional rulers are relegated to a side-lined and peripheral role in formal security and governance practice. A focus on traditional security and governance thinking would not prioritise or acknowledge traditional rulers as an equal and important referent object. By changing the lens of enquiry to a CSS and Third World School perspective, we see more clearly the position and role of actors outside the state, such as traditional rulers.

For the purposes of this thesis, I chose to keep the concepts security and governance as two separate concepts. A concept that could have used within this thesis, and was considered, was security-governance. Security-governance is usually equated with the governance of security in which 'public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests' to cope with and mitigate contemporary security risks (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 1; Krahmann 2005: 20). and this is not how I wished to operationalise the terms within this thesis. Additionally, security-governance has underlying European foundations that do not allow for a full understanding of the contexts and issues within a Global South context. This is not to say

that the terms are not intertwined, interlinked to or relate to each other. Rather, there are linkages between security and governance, but that they are differently linked than what is understood within the security-governance literature. For the purposes of this thesis, security and governance are kept as two separate and interdependent concepts that feed on and intersect with each other.

1.6 <u>CHAPTER DEMARCATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH</u>

Chapter one served as the contextual chapter for this research. It presented the basic overview and scope for this thesis. The chapter established the rationale and justification for the study, offering the general background and reasons for undertaking this research. It also outlined the theoretical framework used in the study and provided a basic overview of the methods for data collection. This chapter also presents a demarcation of all the chapters in this thesis.

Chapter two expands on the theoretical foundations of this study. The study focuses on a CSS approach to understanding security and governance in northern Nigeria. By using the Third World Security School strand, this thesis puts forward an alternative way of studying and conceptualising security and governance architecture from a Global South and African perspective. This allows for an alternative reading of security and governance, one that accounts for, explains, and critically engages with a non-state-centred and non-Western perception of actors within security and governance.

Chapter three presents a brief overview of the Nigerian context. It provides a summary of the geo-political and historical background of Nigeria, focusing on northern Nigeria. The chapter also explores the concept of governance as a tool for understanding the work and behaviour of the main referent object: traditional rulers. By reflecting on the background of Nigeria, this puts into perspective the impact of traditional rulers within northern Nigeria.

Chapter four serves as the methodology chapter for this study. It provides, explains, and justifies the methods used to conduct this study and collect data for it. Using a single case study, with exploratory and evaluative features, this research is able to access a rich amount of detail and nuance about the side-lined nature of traditional rulers. Using interviews, this study elicits rich data for analysis and enables participants to contribute to the research in a meaningful manner.

Chapter five provides the first half of the summary and analysis of the findings made in the field. It uses three data analysis methods: reflective, interpretive, and theoretical thematic analyses to investigate and interrogate the initial claims made in the justification and rationale of this study. This chapter looks at the depth of the governance, the endurance of the governance system and the centrality of the role of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria.

Chapter six provides the second half of the summary and analysis of the findings made in the field. This chapter builds on chapter five by expanding the analysis further, exploring the different aspects of traditional rulership. This chapter specifically examines the different actors and their relationships with each other, as well as the reality of traditional rulership in modern Nigeria.

Chapter seven provides the conclusion for this study. It summarises the research covered and the data collected in the field. It further synthesises the scope and impact of the research. It collates and assesses the validity of the claim that traditional rulers are a side-lined actor and how this was perpetuated within the formal practice of security and governance. To close, this chapter considers and outlines possible areas for further research.

1.7 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter served as the introduction to the thesis. It began by clearly stating the driving question for this thesis: how and why have traditional rulers been left of the formal practice of security and governance in northern Nigeria? The chapter explained the rationale and justification for this thesis, as well as the reasons for this academic undertaking. It provided a backdrop for the history and context of the Nigerian socio-economic and geo-political arena, as well as a brief overview of the theoretical framework and concepts employed in this study. This was followed by an overview of the research methods and methodology used to gather and analyse data in this thesis. Finally, the chapter provided a chapter demarcation of the issues and topics explored within this study.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

The turn to critical security represented a dissatisfaction with the practice and discourse of security thinking. National security and human security represent the hegemonic and traditional understandings of security, ones which privileged referent objects, historical, ideological, and geographical underpinnings that side-lined other forms of security discourse and understandings. The precursor to the weakening of these approaches to security came in the form of non-traditional human security. The Cold War and decolonisation eras challenged orthodox understandings of security by bringing relevance and representation to the 'contemporary challenges' of the modern era (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 5). It pitted orthodox security against non-traditional security as new sources of security discourse, primarily from the Global South (Ayoob 1997: 121; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 5; Tarry 1999: 1).

This chapter will provide a brief outline of the history and evolution of security, mapping out important and significant time periods as well as the changes in thinking about and doing security. It will lay the foundation and justify the use of CSS and the Third World Security School as the basis for analysing and conceptualising security and governance in northern Nigeria. It will provide a historical overview and the 'turns' in security from the traditional to the non-traditional, providing insight into why specific eras and turns in security would not align with understanding security from a Global South perspective. The chapter will pay close attention to the CSS tradition, providing a detailed rationale as to why it was the theory of choice for this study, as a discourse and literature that uplifts previously side-lined, neglected, ignored, and marginalised voices.

Finally, the chapter will focus on explaining governance in Nigeria through the lens of traditional rulers. Traditional rulers serve as the study's referent object, outlining their role, influence and impact over different time periods and what this has meant for governance and security within northern Nigeria. While traditional rulers remain significant, their role and relevance has been 'periodically renegotiated' to reflect the changing authority, geography, and political landscape (Kraxberger 2009: 450). This forms an important basis for understanding the history and scope under which traditional rulers fall. It is important to note that, while the process of limiting the role and function of traditional rulers was happening in the rest of Nigeria, this did not gain much traction in the north. Traditional rulers have had a strong

influence, significance, and legacy in the north, despite the changes in administration and the course of Nigerian history. While traditional actors remain significant, it is also important to point out that there are other actors that serve the society from outside the ambit of the state, like civil society, religious groups, and criminal elements (Cilliers & Sisk 2013: 20). These actors, with their wealth of knowledge and expertise, are in direct contact with the communities as first responders and boots on the ground.

2.2 <u>WHAT IS SECURITY?</u>

Security is more than a concept or definitional tool. It is comprised of theories, lenses, and conceptions of security based on philosophical and geographical underpinnings. Like many political concepts, security is an 'essentially contested', ambiguous, inter-subjective, and value-laden term (Acharya 2001: 442; Baldwin 1997: 10; Newman 2010: 84; Walker 1997: 61). Security can be determined by ideology, time frame, and geographical period and so has a long and rich history over the course of international relations (Baldwin 1997: 10; Leffler 1990: 144). This adds to and accounts for the lack of consensus on the definition of security. Despite these critiques and concerns, the presence – and more commonly, the absence – of security has always been a significant concern and pursuit within the international arena. As a result, security is 'what people make it' (Booth 1997: 106; Williams 1999: 1022). It is based on background, context, location, and circumstance and has been an enduring pursuit for individuals and states alike over the course of academic discourse and international relations.

Security can be traced back to antiquity, as far back as the writings of Cicero and Lucretius, where it was referred to a 'philosophical and psychological state of being', where one was free from sorrow (Brauch 2005: 7; Thomas 1992: 93). In its more modern iteration, security is the preoccupation with the 'absence of threats' and insecurities from entities which seek to challenge, threaten, or take away 'acquired values' (Hough & Du Plessis 2000: 43; Ullman 1983: 133). While there are many definitions for security, scholars have tentatively agreed on three pillars to identify and express what security refers to:

a) the existence of a referent object, i.e., the entity being threatened

b) the presence of an impending or actual danger

c) a need to prevent or escape from the impending threat/danger

(Booth 2007: 100)

As expressed in the three pillars above, a central and reoccurring theme within security is the idea of threat (Baldwin 1997: 15). While security thinking is a 'neutral exercise', it does involve a 'deeper and ideologically driven process where real or perceived threats are not only identified but deliberately constructed to suit one's interests' (Ratuva 2016: 212). A classical definition of security, the 'pursuit of freedom' from that which causes anxiety, underscores this central theme of threat (Brauch 2005: 9; Buzan 1991: 432). However, security is about more than just survival or even escape from things which are threatening (Buzan 1991: 433; Ullman 1983: 133). In the modern political arena, security refers to the capability of 'states and societies to maintain' their independence and integrity in the face of hostile forces (Leffler 1990: 144). Security is therefore a valued endeavour which encompasses a 'substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence' for 'individuals, families, states and other actors' (Baldwin 1997: 18; Buzan 1991: 433).

2.2.1 Turns in security

Security can be divided into different time periods and preoccupations within the field of security studies. This section provides a brief background of three of the major contributions to security: national security, human security, and non-traditional security. This is a holistic framing of what security is and how it has evolved over time. The following sections provide background and context for the different turns in security, as well as the rationale and justification for the choice of CSS and the Third World Security School as a theoretical framework within this study.

2.2.1.1 National security

The more traditional and narrow understanding of security is national security. At its core, national security is a state-centric, military endeavour that has dominated the international security discourse (Booth 1991: 318; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 1998: 3; Louw 1978: 10; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 4). Security is both a process and an objective for the protection of the 'core national interests' of a state from external and hostile threats (Deibert 1998: 376; Tarry 1999: 3; Goldman 2001: 43; Walker 1997: 61). This definition belies not only the narrow and specific focus of national security; it also portrays a one-sided reality of security thinking (Ullman 1983: 129).

The basis for national security thinking is modelled on realism, while its militaristic preoccupation stems from a largely American, Cold War mind-set (Ayoob 1997: 121; Booth

2011: 1; Booth 1991: 318). This preoccupation fostered a security worldview that focused primarily on high politics concerns, maintaining the status quo, as well as the state-centric nature of the international system (Booth 1991: 318; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Leffler 1990: 129; Walker 1997: 62).

Much of this national security scholarship is based on the United States' engagements 'with the rest of the world' during the Cold War, and more significantly on its engagement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Ayoob 1997: 121; Booth 2011: 1; Leffler 1990: 129). This entailed safeguarding the state from any 'external, physical', 'military and political' threats to its existence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 492; Goldman 2001: 43; Louw 1978: 10; Hough & Du Plessis 2000: 43; Walker 1997: 62). This also resulted in states arming themselves in an effort to protect themselves, which in turn led to a security dilemma and an arms race that drove up global insecurity and instability (Leffler 1990: 129).

As a process, national security is the 'pursuit of the core values' of the state (Leffler 1990: 146). These core values are determined by the policy makers and state craftsmen. In this pursuit, the objective of the state is to protect itself from hostile and external threats. The state employs several methods, for example, economic and military capabilities (Leffler 1990: 146). As a result, power and the use of force are important themes within security. They are used to safeguard the state from 'external aggression' through its various capabilities (Paris 2011: 89).

National security reflected one perception of reality governed by hostile and external threats. It highlighted a narrow, militaristic, Western, 'top-down, masculinised' and 'methodologically positivist' reading of security (Ayoob 1997: 121; Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 334; Booth 2011: 1; Deibert 1998: 375). This thesis questioned and challenged the understanding of security because the discourse around national security has excluded referent objects outside of the state as tools for understanding security. National security reflects a particular mindset, one which is anarchic and European in style (Acharya 1995: 2; Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 334; Ratuva 2016: 215). This thinking also prioritised the viewpoint of 'dominant powers', often creating a stratified and binary view of security, one which is exemplified by the 'good west and the bad rest' (Ratuva 2016: 213–214). This worldview neglects perspectives from other localities and philosophical underpinnings (Acharya 1995: 2). This thinking began to be challenged, as there was the realisation that insecurity within the international arena could also be caused by entities

other than states. During the 1990s, Mahbub ul Haq and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began to grapple with the implication of this and presented a challenge to this traditionally narrow understanding of security. This was based on the need for an approach of security that focused on addressing the concerns of citizens, as opposed to those of the state.

2.2.1.2 The turn to human security

While national security thinking has been a dominant feature in international relations, it came under criticism with the end of the Cold War era (Booth 1991: 318). The narrow definition of security – national security – was considered inadequate, 'empirically unhelpful' and incapable of explaining 'the multifaceted and multidimensional nature' of the evolving security realities after the Cold War (Ayoob 1997: 121; Bilgin 2008a: 95; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23).

Human security emerged as a counter to national security and its limited scope and range of issues. It represented a destruction of the 'intellectual coherence' of national security (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 1998: 3). It also placed 'limitations on warfare' and the pursuit of 'military objectives' as espoused by national security (Oberleitner 2005: 191). This heralded a change in the nature and scope of the threats to security in the international arena (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 1998: 3; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23). The end of the Cold War brought about the realisation that conflicts were not only based on interstate warfare, but also included 'multifaceted and multidimensional' forms of warfare and 'drivers of disorder', particularly from the Global South (Baldwin 1997: 23; Deibert 1998: 378; Newman 2010: 78, 79, 83; Tarry 1999: 3). It prompted an enquiry into the idea of how to account for the forgotten and 'legitimate concerns' of ordinary individuals (Ayoob 1997: 121; Paris 2011: 89; Newman 2010: 78).

The height of this shift in security thinking began at the end of the Cold War with the introduction of security concerns from other regions (Ayoob 1997: 121; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 5, 23). More and more, security was broadened and re-defined to include low politics concerns and the importance of 'non-military threats' (Acharya 2001: 444; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 4, 23, 14; Newman 2010: 81; Walker 1997: 64–65). This culminated in a 'people oriented' approach to the study of security (Acharya 2001: 444; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23).

Human security represented a critique against national security. This critique is that security should be viewed as multidimensional in nature, especially after the Cold War era (Baldwin

1997: 23). The end of the Cold War helped to increase the awareness of the fact that security could refer to more than just physical and state-centric threats. It marked a changing 'international climate', where inherent 'state sovereignty' was no longer the dominant preoccupation (Acharya 2001: 445). Security thinking evolved vastly to include additional parameters, rekindling the 'debate over what security means' (Acharya 2001: 442; Baldwin 1997: 23).

The newly emerged debate about security revolved around discussions over the 'disarmament–development nexus' (Acharya 2001: 444). This not only broadened the scholarship; it also questioned the prioritisation within security thinking, placing a heavy emphasis on state expenditure towards military endeavours, rather than towards development issues (Acharya 2001: 444). These debates culminated in an authoritative framework for human security thinking – the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations. The Report provides seven additional areas of concern for security (economic security, environmental security, political security, health security, food security, personal security, and community security) (Acharya 2001: 444; Paris 2011: 89). These concerns showed the more human-based approach to security that had begun to take root and shape after the Cold War (Acharya 2001: 445).

This broadened nature and scope of human security can be attributed to two factors. The first is the dissatisfaction with the orthodox and narrow military focus of security. National security thinking prioritised defence and military expenditure over development issues, and scholars noted the needed to take greater cognisance of new pressures arising from complex interdependency, as well as increased global instability within the international arena (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 493; Booth 1991: 318; Snyder 2012: 1–2). Secondly, human security emphasised the need to account for and explain the prevalence of new, non-military realities (Snyder 2012: 1–2). New and prevailing issues and threats gained strategic traction on the security agenda (Booth 1991: 318). These new issues, including economic meltdown, repression and suppression of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalry, among others, have had a 'profound significance' in the international arena (Acharya 2001: 449; Booth 1991: 318). In addition to these issues, the daily threats to ordinary individuals and communities became a wide-ranging concern and reality within security thinking (Acharya 2001: 449; Booth 1991: 318).

The significance of human security had a twofold impact on the international arena. Firstly, it vertically expanded the number of new actors in the international arena. New states gained political independence from the USSR. The inclusion of more states within the international arena also increased the number of non-state actors active within the same arena. Terrorist groups, insurgent groups, criminal organisations, and multilateral corporations began to have more of a political role. Secondly, there was a horizontal increase in the plurality of issues and concerns on the international agenda. The 1970s and 1980s heralded a host of new development realities, especially those arising from the Global South region (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 492; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 22; Snyder 2012: 1). Issues like poverty, inequality, disease, violent conflict, and restriction of political freedom emerged leaving tangible effects and insecurity within states, regions and the international environment (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 492; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 22; Snyder 2012: 1).

The immediate consequence of these changes was that the state was no longer the primary referent object of security. These changes challenged the principle of state-centricity and allowed for the introduction of a new referent object: the individual (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 492). The security of citizens and people grew in salience, showcasing the limitations of national security and its incapacity in explaining and accounting for the numerous dangers that not only threaten states but also societies, citizens, and the international community (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 494). This re-definition also created 'dangerous instability' within the international arena (Booth 1991: 318). At the domestic level, the end of the Cold War led to increased violence, refugees, and incidents of intra-state conflict, all of which have regional and international implications (Booth 1991: 318). At the international level, there was a rise in incidents of armed conflict and civil wars around issues of race, culture, religion, and ethnicity, especially from newly independent states in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Central Asia (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2015: 493).

While these changes to security thinking are important, they are limited for the research question of this study. The type of security espoused by national security and human security represent the dominant and orthodox versions of security. They reveal a form of security that is predominantly of Western and European vested interests. Human security comes closer to removing itself from these origins, but it does not go far enough to really incorporate all the actors and interests, especially from the Global South region. While human security is a small step towards broadening security discourse, it is not enough of a shift in security thinking to

employ in this study on how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined in the formal practice of security and governance in northern Nigeria. This research seeks to underscore and operationalise traditional rulers as one form of frame of reference in security thinking. The human security framework is only a step towards studying security from outside the perspective of territorial integrity and the protection of the state. It is important to note that though human security is a more broadly focused sub-discipline of security, it cannot replace national security, as there are still 'threats that fall within the scope and mandate of national security' (Oberleitner 2005: 191).

Human security is different from national security, as it prioritises 'common values' as opposed to national interest (Oberleitner 2005: 190). Like other sub-disciplines of security, human security should be used as a tool to complement and bolster other disciplines of security. Its focus on human well-being is just as important a goal as the protection of territorial integrity and state sovereignty (Oberleitner 2005: 191).

2.2.1.3 Non-traditional security: the critical turn

The focus of non-traditional security is a re-orientation of security to include its more normative and 'value-oriented' concerns (Ayoob 1997: 121; Tarry 1999: 1, 4–5). It is an inclusive discourse that includes multiple, equal referent objects in security, namely, the state, the individual, and other actors (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14). It acknowledges that while 'old-fashioned territorial threats' still exist, there are new threats that have an equally 'profound significance' in the international arena (Booth 1991: 318). Non-traditional security additionally acknowledges that there are different levels of threats which are of grave consequence to those living in the Global South (Booth 1991: 318; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14).

Non-traditional security represents a more holistic engagement with expanded understandings of security by including questions about what it means to be secure (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 15; Walker 1997: 65). However, while it brings into focus the intertwined nature of threats, scholars of this branch of security wanted more than just the idea of security as understood as the 'mere physical survival' or the aged 'bread and butter' debate (Walker 1997: 65). There are various major branches of non-traditional security, including the constructivist security studies, CSS, feminist security studies, and poststructuralist security studies (Booth 2011: 2). These are important additions to security thinking, as they all have a specific scope and particular referent object perspective that they focus on. The form of non-traditional security that this research

focused on is CSS, as it facilitates the broadest interpretation of referent object focus within security thinking.

2.2.1.4 Critical security studies (CSS)

This study focuses on CSS as a tool of analysis and a lens of enquiry to understand and problematise the Nigerian security and governance framework. CSS is a sub-field of security studies that provides new and critical analyses, questioning and rejecting the prioritisation of orthodox security thinking that have given rise to an oppressive and less secure world (Booth 1997: 106; Booth 2011: 1–2, 4; Bilgin 2008b: 5, 11; Hudson 2005: 160). CSS is based on a different set of questions and assumptions than traditional security, one in which there are 'different kinds of threats', that do not conform to the narrow, military scope of national security (Buzan 1983: 255; Buzan, Waver and De Wilde 1998: 4). It is based on the changing international arena (Fierke 2010: 9). Critical security emphasises 'that threats are a product of a politics of representation' (Fierke 2010: 9). CSS focuses on how threats are constructed and are not entirely external but emanate from historical, cultural, ideological, social, and political processes (Buzan 1983: 245; Buzan, Waver and De Wilde 1998: 4; Fierke 2010: 9–10; Krause 1998: 306, 309). This means that security does not have a 'single geo-cultural setting' (Bilgin 2012: 162).

The CSS tradition draws on three central points: epistemological, ontological, and normative challenges to traditional security discourses (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236). This manifests in the need to either reformulate security or 'escape the language and logic of security altogether' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236). CSS provides four dominant challenges to orthodox security (Bilgin 2008a: 92; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 50):

a) a realisation of the need to re-interrogate and re-conceptualise security to account for the newly emerged security environment, especially from the Global South (Ayoob 1991: 258; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23);

b) the rejection of the 'reification of ideas into institutions' by national security and the interrogation of how the state is a means and 'ends of security policy' (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23, 93; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4; Van Munster 2007: 235);

c) questioning the idea of military spending and warfare as ways to secure the world and interrogating the idea of the state as a source of insecurity rather than a key guardian and producer of security (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4); and;

d) the concern with the derivative nature of orthodox security, based on a particular political, historical, and philosophical outlook, namely, the Global North / the West (Ayoob 1991: 258; Bilgin 2008a: 90).

Like its human security counterpart, CSS sought to broaden the field of security by explicitly refusing to accept the 'face value' interpretation of security, one that was 'largely state-ist and military-oriented' (Booth 2011: 2; CASE Collective 2006: 448; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 47; Newman 2010: 83 – 84; Van Munster 2007: 235). This refusal was based on the recognition that national security 'masked the socially produced' divisions that have divided the international arena along particular dichotomies – 'inside and outside, self and other, domination and oppression, or termed directly inclusion and exclusion' (Mutimer 2009: 9; Williams 1999: 342).

CSS has no single viewpoint or referent point and is an anti-hegemonial thought on security (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236; Newman 2010: 83–84; Van Munster 2007: 235). It emerged as a serious analytical, political, and ethical debate about security and not just a temporary 'vague orientation' about security (Mutimer 2009: 9–10; Williams 1999: 341–342). It critiqued the idea of the state as the sole referent object for security, calling for security thinking to shift its focus to include multiple referents (Bilgin 2008a: 93; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Booth 2011: 4). This allows for the broadest understanding of security through an inclusive agenda that identifies 'multiple types of threat, and multiple levels of analysis' (Bilgin 2008a: 93; Booth 2011: 4; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23). The strength of CSS lies in its emancipatory agenda, providing freedom and allowing people to 'deal with threats' and have a holistic approach to the 'material well-being' of the state and the individual (Bilgin 2008a: 91; Tarry 1999: 7–8; Wyn Jones 1999: 103, 118). The CSS tradition transformed the concept of security into an 'object of reflection' (Van Munster 2007: 235). It brought to the fore the social exclusions inherent within security, focusing on questions around 'who was secured, from what and by which means' (Mutimer 2009: 10).

CSS is a 'pluralistic debate', seeking to provide a deeper understanding of security in a 'traditionally narrow field' (Williams 1999: 341–342). It echoes the same sentiments of human security, underlying the 'unrealistic' and insufficient analysis of national security (Williams 1999: 341). CSS 'encourages a focus on the socially constructed nature of security' (Browning

& McDonald 2011: 238; Williams 1999: 341). The core underpinnings of CSS include questions around:

- 'whose security is (or should be) prioritised'
- what the key threats are to security
- the philosophical and geographical location of security discourses and whose interests they serve

(Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238)

CSS is a reflective approach that tries to understand 'the role of representation' within security discourse (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238). Its focus on both the 'winners and losers of particular understanding and practices of security' provides a nuanced dynamic to security, one that has not been factored in by traditional security thinking (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238).

2.2.1.4.1 Main proponents of CSS and their philosophies

CSS emerged as a critical 'anti-Cold War' sensibility in the 1980s and 1990s (Booth 2011: 2; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 47; Van Munster 2007: 235). It draws its roots from the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Gramsci, and the turn to post-positivism within international relations (Bilgin 2008a: 92; Booth 2011: 2; CASE Collective 2006: 448). The CSS tradition has many famous proponents including Robert Cox, Kenneth Booth, Ole Wæver, Richard Wyn Jones, Keith Krause, and Michael Williams. Many of the core tenets of CSS are largely based on the work of Booth and his writings on security and emancipation (Bilgin 2008a: 92; Bilgin 2012: 159). A deeper examination of the link between security and emancipation will be discussed in the following section.

As mentioned above, Booth was a leading theorist of CSS. His work on CSS focused on exposing how traditional security 'wrongly privileged' the preservation of the state above the individual and/or the society (Browning & McDonald 2011: 244; Mutimer 2009: 11). According to Booth, this privileging has a cost – the failure of the state to provide security for its citizens and in some cases, the state actively undermining the welfare of its citizens (Browning & McDonald 2011: 244).

By pointing out the flaws within traditional security thinking, one is freed from limiting narratives and can then fully embrace the alternative actors who have a hand in security within

the state. Another prominent scholar, Cox, noted that, like other critical theories, CSS is 'concerned with pointing to the constitution of world orders' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 238). This is an additional critique of traditional narratives of security which prioritise the state over any other actors. CSS is distinctive from the traditional 'problem-solving theories', in that they do not focus on 'the world as it is as the starting point for analysis' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 238). Scholars like Krause and Williams contend that CSS is a way of moving the discipline of security towards a more 'precise theoretical label' (Mutimer 2009: 10). For them, the broadened approach of CSS allows for a 'a range of critical constructivism and post-structuralism' to be incorporated within security discourses (Browning & McDonald 2011: 238). Similar to Booth, the expansion of security discourses allows for a deepening of the field to include different actors, issues, and threats. This is especially true for CSS, which encompasses Global South security concerns, which are different from traditional security concerns.

2.2.1.4.2 Emancipation

The emancipatory agenda is not only specific to CSS but to the entire critical turn within international relations and security studies (Booth 1991: 321; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 46). Critical scholars sought to bring up more conversations that challenge and disrupt the status quo and hold of traditional security (Mireanu 2010). It also represented a way to offset the 'Western/Enlightenment origins of the term' and include 'non-Western perspectives on the meanings of freedom' (Peoples 2010: 1114; Fierke 2010: 17). Critical theory, and in turn CSS, is an ongoing process of rethinking and questioning social reality (Mireanu 2010). Emancipation became the 'ultimate goal' for this type of inquiry, and security represented a means by which entities could achieve freedom and liberation from oppressive structures and barriers (Mireanu 2010).

However, critical theorists understood the fact that emancipation could not be a universally understood concept and that it would look, be understood, and be carried out in different ways depending on the context (Mireanu 2010). Critical theorists understood that emancipation could never be generalised and transplanted into all contexts, and this has translated into the cornerstone feature of CSS (Mireanu 2010). This is unlike orthodox security, which considers social reality to be fixed across time and space.

'Scholars and practitioners of security' were often thinking around what emancipation meant as well as how 'to advocate or promote' it (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). For Booth, emancipation and security are theoretically closely related (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245; Mutimer 2009: 10). There are two ways to understanding emancipation: the theoretical and the material. Theoretical emancipation, as explained by Booth and Max Horkheimer, is 'a normative imperative' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). For Jürgen Habermas, emancipation was about thinking around developing 'criteria for progressive (emancipatory) change', primarily through communication (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). Wyn Jones and Andrew Linklater echoed Habermas's ideas on pursuing emancipation through 'progress and dialogue' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). Linklater is specifically rooted in Karl-Otto Apel's 'more deliberative strand of Critical Theory' in which emancipation is a 'non-repressive deliberation' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). He believed that emancipation has the 'potential normative grounding for a sociology of global morals' (Peoples 2010: 1114).

Scholars also deliberated on the material and physical manifestation of these arguments. Prominent scholars like Booth, Horkheimer, Wyn Jones and Linklater wrote extensively on the link between security and emancipation (Peoples 2010: 1116). For Horkheimer, emancipation is 'tied to material conditions' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). Material emancipation is the physical manifestation of its theoretical counterpart. For Wyn Jones, in particular, emancipation was more than a 'need to orient' security (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245); it represented the Habermasian principles of 'realisable visions for progressive change rather than abstract visions of future world' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). This is echoed by Booth and Horkheimer, who underscored the need to pursue promising ways of emancipating society from the oppressive, 'structural and contingent human wrongs' (Mutimer 2009: 10). In addition, for Booth, emancipation was a way of replacing and loosening the stranglehold of the main themes of orthodox security: power and order (Booth 1991: 319, 321). Booth also felt that security and emancipation were two halves of the same coin, with emancipation being a way to bring about 'true security' (Booth 1991: 319). This was the point of CSS thinking – for emancipation to happen, there needs to be 'the freeing of people' from 'physical and human' threats (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245).

The emancipatory agenda found its full expression within CSS. CSS moved away from the narrow conceptualisation of 'statecraft and force' within security to embrace a 'breaking down of barriers' and 'oppressive structures' (Booth 1991: 322; Fierke 2010: 17; Van Munster 2007:

241). It represented a way of freeing 'blind scholars' and opening up the security discourse to alternative viewpoints (Fierke 2010: 17; Nunes 2012: 354). It represented an urgent 'recovery of voice for the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless' from the Global South (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245). The focus of CSS revolved around questions of inclusion and exclusion within security discourse (Mutimer 2009: 9–10). Security became a primary way to achieve freedom and liberation, especially from the 'oppressive attitudes and behaviour' of traditional security practice (Booth 1991: 322; Mutimer 2009: 10; Van Munster 2007: 241). CSS hopes to develop and engage in 'promising ideas' that overcome 'structural and contingent human wrongs' within our society (Mutimer 2009: 10). This study focused on the theoretical manifestation of emancipation within security. This is the one that critiques narratives of security that are not aimed at liberating people from the various threats that afflict them.

From the CSS perspective, we see how traditional rulers can have the potential to be one of the drivers of emancipation. At their best, traditional rulers in northern Nigeria would assist their communities by freeing them from violence and harm and by being the 'the nucleus of governance', administering justice, and local administration within society (Mutimer 2009: 10, Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 144). In this ideal picture, traditional rulers would loosen the stranglehold of power and order by delivering the goods and services that the state is meant to, according to traditional security discourses (Booth 1991: 319, 321). By focusing on traditional rulers, as the unrepresented referent object, the discourse is enriched by alternative actors who deliver and enforce security and governance within the Global South region (Browning & McDonald 2011: 245; Fierke 2010: 17; Nunes 2012: 354). As has been reiterated in this thesis, traditional rulers are an important and influential actor in the north, as critical stakeholders, gatekeepers, intelligence and information gatherers and much more. These roles allow them to administer justice, security and governance within the north, and would potentially allow them to emancipate and liberate their communities from threats and oppressive structures that undermine the security of their territories.

2.2.1.4.3 CSS schools

There are three schools within the CSS tradition: the Aberystwyth, the Copenhagen and the Paris schools. These schools denote the range of distinct approaches dissatisfied with the orthodox tradition of security studies (Van Munster 2007: 235). They also represent an institutionalised engagement along specific philosophical thought lines (Van Munster 2007: 235).

2.2.1.4.3.1 The Aberystwyth school

The Aberystwyth, also known as the Welsh School, is the narrowest of the three schools (Van Munster 2007: 235). It is a post-positivist approach that rejects the traditional security approach which promotes a particular and exclusionary 'vision of progress' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 242, 244; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Mustapha 2019: 76). It is focused on individuals and communities, thereby expanding the understanding of security (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 50; Newman 2010: 85–86).

It draws its roots from the Frankfurt school of critical theory and is an attempt to transcend and challenge national security by focusing on individual security (Booth 2011: 2; Van Munster 2007: 235; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 9). The Aberystwyth school is a normative approach, specifically targeted at ensuring the 'instrumental value' of human emancipation (Booth 2011: 2; CASE Collective 2006: 448; Van Munster 2007: 237; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 9–10). Scholars like Booth, Wyn Jones, and Linklater drew their inspiration from the writings of philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, Theodor Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas (Burke 2007: 6).

The Welsh school also has normative underpinnings focused on the emancipatory value of security (Browning & McDonald 2011: 239, 244; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Hynek & Chandler 2013: 50; Newman 2010: 86). Scholars like Wyn Jones and Booth, sought to understand emancipation as a tool for social transformation and addressing the 'questions of struggle, resistance and violence' (CASE Collective 2006: 448; Mustapha 2019: 76; Van Munster 2007: 237). It is concerned with placing humans at the centre of collaborative projects around emancipation (CASE Collective 2006: 448). Security was therefore a tool to re-orient and mobilise the emancipatory agenda, i.e., the 'emancipation of individuals and communities from structural constraint' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 239; Burke 2007: 6). In Booth's seminal text, *Security and Emancipation*, he argues for a 'holistic and non-statist' approach to security, one in which the focus of security is freeing people from external threats (Burke 2007: 6). This endorses a 'set of logic of security' which ignores the 'possibility of negative implications flowing from an association of a particular issue with the language and logic of security' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 242). However, in its attempt to 'advance emancipatory ends', there is not much focus placed on how this can be better achieved through 'the language of justice, human rights or even economics' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 242).

2.2.1.4.3.2 The Copenhagen school

The Copenhagen school is an analytical idea of security, best known for its work on the theory of securitisation by Ole Wæver (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 26; Hudson 2005: 160; Van Munster 2007: 235 & 238; Watson 2012: 281). The Copenhagen school was founded in 1985, along with the creation of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, and was a by-product of discussions in the 1980s between the peace studies and strategic studies scholars (Filimon 2016: 49; Oliveira 2020; Waever 1995: 1). The school sought to usher in new ways of thinking about security that were not based on traditional security paradigms (Oliveira 2020). It was also pioneered by thinkers like Jaap de Wilde and Barry Buzan (Burke 2007: 10). It is 'descriptive and explanatory', and security is seen as an act of invocation (Booth 2011: 2–3; Newman 2010: 86; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 9). The Copenhagen school is particularly focused on 'framing theory on linguistic-grammatical composition' in which 'security belongs to actors, not observers' (Filimon 2016: 51; Watson 2012: 281).

Securitisation was based on the works of Wæver and his article on the *'Securitization and Desecuritisation' (1995),* as well as the work by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde's *'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' (1998)* (Filimon 2016: 50; Watson 2012: 282).Wæver's work on securitisation focuses on the 'political construction of insecurity and danger', and more specifically, drawing on the 'Austis speech act theory' and 'Schmitts notions of exceptionalism' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241; Stritzel 2007: 360; Van Munster 2007: 236; Waever 1995: 6). For Wæver, security constituted a 'performative' annunciation of 'existential threats' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241; Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998: 24). Issues that are securitised, by an act of invocation – for example, a speech act – represent 'an existential threat' to a political actor (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241). This is based on their 'significance and urgency', which is determined by the political actors (Booth 2011: 2–3; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 26; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 9; Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998: 24). Issues that are securitised are elevated to high or 'panic politics' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241; Waever 1995: 7). For Buzan, an issue was only securitised 'when audience accepts it as such' (Watson 2012: 284). In other words, 'securitisation is not decided by the securitiser, but by the audience' (Watson 2012: 284).

One of the effects of securitisation is the successful elevation of previously side-lined academic debates and subject matters like disease, the environment, and immigration (Browning &

McDonald 2011: 241). At the same time, this form of security is problematic (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241). It suggests that security is inherently universal and is only relevant when 'associated with urgency' (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241). The Copenhagen school does not account for the multitude of ways that 'security is understood and practised', much like the criticism of traditional security (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241).

2.2.1.4.3.3 The Paris school

The Paris school represents a sociological approach to security (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 10; Van Munster 2007: 236). It was pioneered by Didier Bigo and inspired by the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault (Langewald 2021; Mustapha 2019: 95). The Paris school analyses security through the 'conceptual and operational tools from the realm of IR, sociology and criminology' (C.A.S.E Collective 2006: 449; Langewald 2021).

The Paris School is focused on the 'conduct of everyday security practices', as well as the 'construction of insecurity' (Mustapha 2019: 96; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 10; Van Munster 2007: 236). It claims that the 'bureaucratic routines and everyday practices of security professionals institutionalise the field of security, therefore giving the governments and bureaucracies control over the political processes' (Mustapha 2019: 96). Unlike the Copenhagen school, the Paris school does not make use of an 'exceptional speech act' to broaden and bring security matters to the forefront of the security agenda (Van Munster 2007: 236). Instead, it analyses how 'bureaucratic actors construct security', as well as the impact they have on constructing security (Van Munster 2007: 236, 238–239).

2.2.1.5 Strands of CSS

There are several different strands of CSS. The strands represent the post-positivist turn in international relations (Booth 2011: 3). They provide an overview of the shared ideals of CSS, as well as the focus and fault lines of the different approaches (Booth 2011: 3). These strands include feminist security studies, constructivist security studies, poststructuralist security, and the Third World Security School.

The strands question and challenge the 'predetermined understanding' of orthodox security and represent a shift in the 'political power and symbolism' of security (Booth 2011: 3–4). They are an intersubjective understanding of security that is reliant on the historicising influence of 'concepts and politics' (Booth 2011: 3–4). This opens up the discourse to broader and

previously marginalised understandings of security, with particular sensitivity to the use of security language, which informs on the way security is viewed and understood (Booth 2011: 3–4).

Feminist security studies represents a radical and 'biologically essentialist' view of security rooted in feminist theories (Booth 2011: 2). Gender is seen as an important dimension to consider when analysing 'war, conflict and global security' (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 25). It also is a way of addressing the invisibility of women and the marginalised within security discourses (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 25). Constructivist security studies views security as an intersubjective construction of the referent object (Booth 2011: 2). Poststructuralist security studies focuses on the 'discourse, identity and narrative' of security, in which security is conceptualised as a 'regime of ideas' (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 26). The final strand, the Third World Security School, is the focal point of this study and will be covered extensively in the section below.

2.2.1.6 Third World Security School
This study is based on the Third World Security School, a strand of CSS, because of the lack of critical security voices that speak to and encompass the concerns and needs of the Global South (Krickovic 2015: 3). While there are scholars that write on the Global South, the number of scholars who are African and write on Africa from an African perspective are not usually at the forefront of security and governance practice. There is an even smaller number who write on previously marginalised voices like traditional rulers and their link to security and governance. As covered by the above sections on the critical turn and CSS, security from dominant and traditional perspectives is an inadequate fit to 'address the security problems' from the Global South (Krickovic 2015: 3). As a frame of reference, traditional security cannot 'adequately account' for the local realities of the Global South, 'where military conflicts are exceedingly rare' and predominantly internal, for example, civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Acharya 1995: 2; Krickovic 2015: 3; Sandano 2012).

The end of the Cold War expanded the nature and scope of security and threats within the international arena. For the first time, insecurity and instability from the Global South had as much impact and relevance as the bipolarity that dominated the Cold War era (Acharya 1995: 4). Scholars like Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones took note of the fact that security issues from contexts aside from Western Europe did not receive adequate coverage (Acharya 1995:

3). Security during this time was focused on the bipolarity of the Cold War, one that emphasised the 'East-West divide' (Acharya 1995: 3). Security from other contexts was studied from the perspective of how it could potentially 'affect the superpower relationship' (Acharya 1995: 3).

With the advent of the Third World Security School, 'the issues and experiences' of the Global South were prioritised in the same fashion as other mainstream insecurities and threats (Acharya 1995: 2). It challenged the 'dominant understanding of security' (Acharya 1995: 2 & 4). Security scholars recognised that non-military threats had gained more relevance in the ever-globalising environment (Acharya 1995: 4, 6). New and evolved security issues like 'resource scarcity, overpopulation, underdevelopment and environment degradation' became common insecurities within the security discourse and literature (Acharya 1995: 6). Prior to this, the Global South was a segment of international relations that was never 'fully incorporated' or was mentioned in passing within 'the discourse of security studies' (Acharya 1995: 2).

The Third World Security School challenges traditional security along three lines:
   a) a focus on the inter-state level security threats
   b) its exclusion of non-military phenomena from the security studies agenda
   c) its belief in the global balance of power as a legitimate and effective instrument of international order'

(Acharya 1995: 4)

The leading mind on the Third World Security School, Caroline Thomas, echoes general sentiments that Third World security goes beyond the narrow 'military dimension' (Acharya 1995: 6–7). She also agrees with the broad CSS sentiment that the Global South region has remained irrelevant and marginal to discourses and conceptualisations of security. This is surprising considering that the nature and scope of threats and violence have largely taken place within the Global South. Mohammed Ayoob has used the Third World Security School to underscore the importance of how the 'vulnerabilities' and realities of the Global South have impacts on security (Krickovic 2015: 4). While his thinking does draw from national security, he shifts away from primary national security concerns by focusing on how the national values and interests of states in the Global South should be inclusive of the concerns, safety, and welfare of individual citizens (Krickovic 2015: 4). This should be coupled with a 'maintenance of cultural values such as tolerance and democracy' (Krickovic 2015: 4). Mohammed Ayoob

also acknowledges the fact that 'domestic instability poses' as big a threat to security as threats emanating from beyond a state's borders (Krickovic 2015: 4).

2.3 <u>GOVERNANCE</u>

Security and governance are the two important pillars of this study. The sections above provided an extensive overview of security, paying close attention to the role of CSS and the Third World Security School within this research. The following sections will provide a comprehensive overview of commonly held understandings and definitions of governance, as well as the role of governance within Nigeria.

Governance 'is probably as old as human civilization', deriving from Greek, Latin, and French origins (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145; Fukuyama 2016: 90). While governance is not a 'new' phenomenon, it is a difficult concept to pin down (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145). Scholars have struggled to drill down to a universal understanding because there are different perspectives and disciplines on what governance consists of and how it can be understood. With no real and tangible universal definition, governance broadly boils down to characteristics, attributes, institutions, and qualities. Often, discussions on governance revolve around institutions and actors.

As pointed out above, there are many different conceptualisations, disciplines, and approaches to governance, for example, a normative/philosophical approach, a material/consumerist approach, and even an analytical framework (Bratton & Rothchild 1992: 269; Hyden & Bratton 1992: 8; De Sardan 2011: 22). Most understandings of governance are focused on the narrow ideal of good governance. The focus of good governance literature includes the pursuit of attributes like 'transparency, organisational effectiveness, accountability, predictability, legitimacy, popular participation and plurality of policy choices' (Booth 2011: 1; Bratton & Rothchild 1992: 265; Oluwo 2003: 502). These understandings are commonly associated with the more traditional consumerist and Western style of governance, which can be insensitive to the human condition and dealing with deeply human interactions (De Sardan 2011: 22). These understandings do not always translate well to the African context, and it was important for this study to avoid the pitfalls of using a Western lens to explain an African phenomenon. Admittedly, it was difficult to come to an easy answer of what type of governance to use within this study. While working on this thesis, I had to constantly rethink the governance angle

because there was not a single governance theory that neatly explained the type of governance taking place in northern Nigeria.

General definitions of governance can include: the regulation of an entity; the 'rule-ruler-ruled relationship'; 'a process of organizing and managing legitimate power structures' and 'delivering public or collective services and goods'; the regulation, enforcement, provision, effectiveness, and distribution of rules, goods, and resources; the maintenance and management of different relationships within the state; a structure, a value, and complex process (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145; Börzel & Risse 2010: 114; De Sardan 2011: 22; Brockhaus, Djoudi & Kambire 2012: 201; Farrington 2009: 249; Fukuyama 2016: 90; Krahmann 2003: 11).

Narrow definitions of governance are usually discipline-specific, normally associated with development studies and public policy, studies often rooted in Western and 'Weberian' principles and ideals (Bagayoko 2012: 2; Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1; Crook & Booth 2011: 98). Governance is also often linked to the political arena, where it focuses on and includes elements such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights (Gisselquist & Rotberg 2009). It is commonly referred to as a diffusion of authority and decision-making between several levels of government (Bratton & Rothchild 1992: 265, 269; Hooghe & Marks 2003: 234). Political governance is 'concerned' with how an actor 'exercises power, exerts influence and manages the country's social as well as economic resources leading to better development' (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145). More specifically, political governance focuses on who is in 'power' and how they use it (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145).

In the early 1950s, the definition of governance expanded with the creation, growth, and integration of subnational, transnational institutions that seemingly bypassed, worked alongside, and even superseded the state (Hooghe & Marks 2003: 233; Peters & Pierre 2001: 131–132). This era represented a growing awareness of the need to speak less of the 'sovereignty and autonomy' of the state and rather to acknowledge the well-being and needs of the citizens within the state (Hooghe & Marks 2003: 233; Peters & Pierre 2001: 131). Within academia and the international arena, definitions of governance also reflected this change, often being linked to 'international development' or philanthropy (Bratton & Rothchild 1992: 265, 269; Hooghe & Marks 2003: 234). Ultimately, this shift in governance thinking culminated in a turn from government to governance, signalling the rise of cooperative and participatory politics (Hooghe & Marks 2003: 233; Peters & Pierre 2001: 131). The idea of the dominant

and centralised state as the sole bearer of governance lost traction and monopoly, being replaced by 'multiple', alternative, and creative means of dividing and exercising authority and power within a state (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 14; Peters & Pierre 2001: 131). These shifts in governance thinking coincided with the turn to human security and its focus on the security of the people.

Governance literature also includes different models outside of the broad definitions explained above. Some of these models include multi-level governance, polycentric governance, multi-perspectival governance, condominio, fragmentation, hybrid political orders, and consolidationists (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 14; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4; Peters & Pierre 2001: 132). In addition, governance is comprised of different dimensions – for example, functional, structural, normative – as well as different attributes and characteristics like 'transparency, organisational effectiveness, accountability, predictability, legitimacy, popular participation and plurality of policy choices' (De Sardan 2011: 22; Peters & Pierre 2001: 132; Oluwo & Erero 1995: 3).

Key governance authors like Francis Fukuyama, as well as organisations like the World Bank Group, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and GIBS have worked extensively on measurements and indicators of governance. These include indices like the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index and the African Peer Review Mechanism. They broadly focus on three factors: quality of institutions, administrative capacity, and the relationship between the state and society. These definitional traits outline the different debates and forms of governance. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of African Governance categorises governance along four criteria: 'safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development' (Tikum & Matenga N.D.). International agencies like the World Bank lean on the 'neoliberal ideology' of good governance (De Sardan 2011: 22). In it, governance is depoliticised within the public affairs arena to make way for technocratic ideals.

Within business and administrative circles, governance focuses on the 'managerial as well as the political dimensions of public or collective actions' (De Sardan 2011: 22). While these measurements are useful in measuring and identifying areas of concern within a state, the inherent problem they share is that they try to espouse an idea of governance that is universal and replicable across different contexts without understanding or considering the different

contexts within the international arena (Fukuyama 2016: 97). They are based on more quantitative measurements that measure governance along indices. This research is qualitative in nature, and while indices are good, a qualitative analysis of these measurements is of importance to this study. For this reason, I used a broad and general definition of governance.

While there are many positive attributes to governance, critics like Fukuyama have lamented the vagueness of the term, which can be used to refer to any type of 'steering' or regulation (Fukuyama 2016: 90; De Sardan 2011: 22). Critics have also lamented the plurality in understandings of governance that have contributed to the overall pollution and dilution of the concept, especially from the neoliberal perspective (De Sardan 2011: 22). This has led to a general misunderstanding of what governance means, with many of the definitions based on a conventional state-centric model of governance as opposed to the inclusion of alternative forms of governance and non-state actors (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 14).

While elements of political governance are important, they leave out 'inalienable aspects of governance' (Gisselquist & Rotberg 2009). This is a narrow definition of governance which is linked with the 'popular liberal understanding of good governance' (Gisselquist & Rotberg 2009). There are many critiques of the good governance ideals. Aside from it being narrow and ill-suited to explaining governance frameworks in the Global South, good governance 'ignores the central responsibilities of the state to provide safety, security' and a 'basic level of well-being for their citizens' (Gisselquist & Rotberg 2009). Often, this type of governance is used explain governance in all sorts of contexts (Gisselquist & Rotberg 2009). However, this narrow good governance does not explain or contextualise the circumstances and history of the African context.

For this thesis, governance is defined as the processes and actions through which decisions are made and implemented (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145; Lutz & Linder 2004: 16). It also refers to the roles and influence that governing actors have, as well as how they exercise power (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1; Lutz & Linder 2004: 16).

2.3.1 Governance in Africa

Increasingly, discussions around governance have become more focused on the role of actors, and especially 'non-state actors' (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1). The general definitions above allude to actors present in the governance process who manage the 'economic, political' and 'social'

governance processes within their states (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145). These actors are a crucial part of the 'decision-making' processes, affecting whether or not decisions are 'implemented' (Afegbua & Adejuwon 2012: 145).

By defining governance as the actions and decisions that actors take, it places a tension on 'the distinction between state and non-state actors' (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1). In particular, governance is an attempt to understand the 'entanglement' of these different actors 'in governance processes' (Colona & Jaffe 2016: 1). This chapter looks at one such actor – traditional rulers – and how and why they have been side-lined within the formal practice of security and governance. While this study focuses on one alternative actor, it is important to note that there are other actors that serve the society from outside the ambit of the state.

As illustrated in the above sections, governance is primarily understood from a liberal and Western standpoint. It is predominantly focused on the state, its capabilities, and the institutions linked to it. However, there is very little focus on actors and institutions that serve the society from outside the ambit of the state, for example, civil society, religious groups, and traditional authorities (Cilliers & Sisk 2013: 20). These actors, with their wealth of knowledge and expertise, are in direct contact with the communities as first responders and boots on the ground (Cilliers & Sisk 2013: 20). In addition, there are disagreements over whether governance should be limited to the state or if it can be applied to the international arena (Fukuyama 2016: 98). One of the ways the definition of governance can be expanded and deepened is by recognising that there are multiple and alternative 'forms of authority other than from western-style democratic structures' (Lutz & Linder 2004: 29). This gives scholars, academics, and practitioners the 'opportunity to better adapt political structures to the socio-economic needs of local communities' (Lutz & Linder 2004: 29). This thesis specifically takes a non-Western view of governance by focusing on traditional rulers as an actor that is important to governance in northern Nigeria.

The thesis specifically focuses on traditional rulership within northern Nigeria. This is because traditional rulers are a cornerstone of rulership and governance within African society (Ayoob 1983: 1; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128; Ubink 2008: 7). Whether they are recognised, ignored, or in conflict with the state, traditional rulers are an old and 'extraordinarily flexible institution', commonly used in leadership and governance (Comaroff & Comaroff 2018: 2; Lutz & Linder 2004: 30). They are considered as the key 'indigenous political system or

arrangements' within a community because of how 'intimately linked' they are to them (Comaroff & Comaroff 2018: 2; Kraxberger 2009: 453; Ayoob 1983: 1; Iyeh 2014: 135; Nweke 2012: 206). Their mandate is to preserve the 'rights, privileges, laws, customs and traditions' of the indigenous populace by dispensing the 'legislative, executive and judicial' needs of their communities (Nweke 2012: 206).

It is important to remember that traditional rulers are 'never wholly of the state' but operate outside and alongside the state (Comaroff & Comaroff 2018: 2). This follows an era when 'the institution had been marginalised, contested, or even outlawed, because of its undemocratic or colonial entanglements' (Ferme 2018: 162). Traditional rulership 'has enjoyed a renaissance in much of Africa', starting at 'the turn of the second millennium' (Ferme 2018: 162). This form of rulership has taken on 'many guises', through chiefs, tribal leaders, traditional rulers, and various other names in indigenous languages across the continent (Comaroff & Comaroff 2018: 1). Traditional rulers are argued to be 'flexible and adaptive' in nature, having persisted through the millennia, often playing important roles in service delivery, as intermediaries, resource allocators, conflict resolvers, as well as religious, legislative, and political leaders (Kraxberger 2009: 453; Ubink 2008: 5–7).

2.4 <u>LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN GOVERNANCE</u>

Conversations around governance are normally focused on big actors and Western understandings. Actors like the state and big regional and international organisations are at the forefront of formal practices of governance. In addition, governance practice predominantly reflects a top-down approach and formal practice. There is little literature and discourse that is focused on approaches that are bottom-up. This study is one way to view governance from a bottom-up perspective. The focus of the study is examining and analysing governance through the lens of actors that are sometimes side-lined within certain spheres, i.e., in formal practice and academia – traditional rulers. This is not to say that traditional rulers are side-lined in their own contexts or by their own people. Traditional rulers are well known and revered; however, at a formal level, i.e., in practice, within discourse and in academia, they are often viewed as an informal[5] actor. At the same time, this study explores how traditional rulers have taken local ownership of security and governance, especially during times of instability and insecurity.

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[5] Informal, in thesis, is used as an adjective and refers to actors/institutions that are not official, publicly recognised and sanctioned. They are actors or institutions that operate outside the state and at the periphery. I am aware of the debates and discussions around what is considered informal and have chosen this definition to encapsulate how I have understood the term.

Traditionally, non-state actors like traditional rulers have exhibited more currency, relevancy, and longevity due to their precolonial influence. They have amassed this through the hereditary transfer of power and patronage (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009: 15). However, this hold on power has significantly shifted over the course of international history, and the state has superseded traditional institutions to become an important actor in international relations (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 15). Interestingly, though the tide of international power and authority has evolved and shifted in favour of state sovereignty, actors like traditional rulers have 'shown resilience and adaptive capacity' in maintaining their power and being a part of security and governance efforts (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 15). This is not to say that these actors have remained the same. Colonialism and the modern international era irreparably altered and changed traditional rulership on the African continent, with traditional rulers either being replaced or assimilated into new ways of functioning and governing (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 15–16).

2.5 <u>THE SECURITY-GOVERNANCE NEXUS</u>

Through a CSS and Third World Security School lens, we get a fuller understanding of the dynamics in northern Nigeria, the ways in which it operates, and the pivotal role that traditional rulers play in formal security and governance practice in the north. A CSS and Third World Security School analysis allows us to capture and understand non-military threats and issues that take place in northern Nigeria, such as perennial ethnic and religious violence, electoral disputes, religious tensions, and conflicts over resources (Ayoob 1991: 258; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23). These threats and issues, while not within the ambit of traditional security, exemplify the kinds of challenges that traditional rulers in northern Nigeria face, and often address, daily.

Critical discourses also allow us to view the Nigerian state as an insecure and instable actor in the north. The state has committed violent acts such as police torture, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and detention by the state and affiliated agencies (Alemika & Chukwuma 2000: 21; Human Rights Watch 2005; Nolte 2004: 61). Instead of being the key guardian of security as espoused by traditional discourses on security and governance, the state has failed in its mandate, allowing traditional rulers to step into this gap by providing leadership and crucial decision-making for northern Nigerian communities (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 23; Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003: 4).

For security thinking, the end of the Cold war presented an international environment in which states still held their role 'pivotal actors, but their ability to ensure the provision of security unilaterally' had become increasingly 'more limited' (Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl 2013: 119; Hänggi 2005: 5). The new security and international environment meant that state had 'to coordinate their' security and governance efforts with more actors, and 'using a more diverse set of modes of coordination' (Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl 2013: 119). This new security environment created a space for the sub-discipline known as security-governance. Security-governance requires the 'organisation and management' of security within the state by multiple actors: formal and informal, all shaping and informing on security and governance in different but pivotal ways (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 1; Hänggi 2005: 9). It offers 'new modes of security policy that differ from traditional approaches to national and international security' (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 1). This not only exemplifies the broadening and deepening of security and governance practice along variables like 'actors, mechanisms, and issues', but it also adds nuance and complexity in this newly emerged environment (Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl 2013: 119). While security-governance is interesting, it will not be focused on in this thesis. I decided to keep the terms security and governance separate, because I conceptualise and understand these terms as two separate entities. Their meaning and usage is slightly different from the meaning and usage of security-governance as a singular term. I also chose not to use this term because security-governance is an emerging concept, primarily linked to European statecraft and the state of international affairs after the Cold War. I felt that it would be too far removed to operationalise within the context of Global South issues.

Traditional rulers, whilst on the periphery of socio-economics and geo-politics in Nigeria, are in fact at the crux of the security-governance nexus in northern Nigeria. They hold a different kind of legitimacy, one that is informal. This is important to note as it means that even where the state has not failed, traditional leaders may still play a prominent role in the communities. By shifting the focus of security and governance thinking, we expand the focus, scope and understanding of security to account for the political, historical, and philosophical outlook and experience of the Global South region (Ayoob 1991: 258; Bilgin 2008a: 90).

2.6 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter provided a brief outline of the history of security, mapping distinct time periods for crucial turns within the discourse of security studies. This provided a background and

context, laying the foundation for the choice of CSS as the theoretical framework of choice for the examination and analysis of this thesis.

National security is the dominant security thinking within the international arena. Its focus on the state, as well as national interests, made it relevant prior to the Cold War era. However, following the end of the Cold War, national security lost much of its traction because it does little to address concerns outside the ambit of the state. Human security emerged as a small step towards broadening security discourse. While human security expanded the nature and scope of security to include other threats and actors, it was not enough of a shift in security thinking to include all other different referent objects, particularly those from the Global South.

The turn to critical security thinking offers a lens through which to understand how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined in formal practice of security and governance. The value of the CSS tradition, and particularly the Third World Security School, is that they provide a critique of orthodox security thinking. As outlined in the sections above, mainstream, traditional security puts forward a version of security which is specific and relevant to a Westphalian and Eurocentric audience. While this may be of benefit to a largely Western context, but it does not provide adequate tools of engagement and analysis for scholars from the Global South or those undertaking studies based in the Global South. CSS and the Third World Security School provided a broadened and emancipatory security agenda that prioritised voices of previously marginalised groups such as traditional rulers, who will be the main focus of this study.

Finally, the chapter provided an explanation of governance. The chapter provided a historical overview of traditional rulership in Nigeria and how they form an important bulwark within governance and security. It traced the history and mandate of traditional rulers and reviewed the general state of security and governance within Nigeria. It looked at commonly understood definitions and understandings of governance, tracing its history through different approaches and disciplines. The chapter then specifically focused on understanding governance through an African lens, and specifically through the lens of traditional rulership. The chapter outlined the role and significance of traditional rulers in Africa and their impact within northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER 3: GOVERNANCE AND TRADITIONAL RULERSHIP IN NIGERIA

3.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This study seeks to explore and interrogate how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined in the formal practice of security and governance. It takes a critical, Global South reading to analyse the role and influence of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria, questioning how these factors do not translate to growing literature on these types of actors. Chapters one and two provided the conceptual and theoretical justifications for this study, providing the context and parameters which guided the research. They also justified the reasons for conducting the study, as well as outlined the theoretical framework that shaped and framed it.

This chapter continues the justification of the study, providing a brief historical overview of the Nigerian context. It is divided into three sections: an historical overview, an explanation of socio-economic challenges, and a discussion about the position of traditional rulers in governance. The first section provides an exploration and historical overview of Nigeria, explaining the state's history with violence, religious unrest, and socio-economic challenges. This is followed by a further explanation of the major socio-economic challenges – poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, ethnicity, corruption, and transnational religious groupings, all of which have been particularly prevalent in the north.

Finally, the chapter focuses on explaining governance in Nigeria through the lens of traditional rulers. Traditional rulership serves as the study's referent object, and the chapter outlines their role, influence, and impact over different time periods and what this has meant for governance and security within northern Nigeria. While traditional rulers remain significant, their role and relevance has been 'periodically renegotiated' to reflect the changing authority, geography, and political landscape in Nigeria (Kraxberger 2009: 450). This forms an important basis for understanding the history and scope under which traditional rulers fall.

It is important to note that, while the process of limiting the role and function of traditional rulers was happening in the rest of Nigeria, this did not gain much traction in the north. Traditional rulers have had a strong influence, significance and legacy in the north, despite the changes in administration and the course of Nigerian history. While traditional rulers remain significant, it is important to point out that there are other actors that serve the society from outside the ambit of the state, like civil society, religious groups, criminal elements, and so on

(Cilliers & Sisk 2013: 20). These actors, with their wealth of knowledge and expertise, are in direct contact with the communities as first responders.

3.2 <u>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON NIGERIA</u>

Map 1: Geographical map of Nigeria

http://doctorpence.blogspot.com/2015/08/map-on-monday-nigeria.html

Nigeria is a West African state located on the west coast of the continent, just off the Gulf of Guinea, in the Atlantic Ocean. It is the most populated African state, home to a sixth of the continent (Agbiboa 2014: 390; BBC News 2017; Idahosa 2015: 19; Salinas 2012). Nigeria is well endowed with natural resources, estimated at 37.2 billion barrels' worth of oil reserves and 184 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves (Aghogho 2015: 17; Agbiboa 2014: 390; BBC News 2017; Salinas 2012). This makes Nigeria the 'biggest oil producer' in Africa and the '5th largest exporter of oil' in the world (Agbiboa 2014: 390–391; Salinas 2012).

In addition, Nigeria has held several prominent leadership positions (Aghogho 2015: 71). Nigeria was a part of the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Aghogho 2015: 71). It has made considerable contributions to ECOWAS, being the biggest donor and having contributed an estimated $1.17 billion in 16 years, about 40% of the total contribution from West African states (Premium

Times 2020a). Nigeria is also a host to three ECOWAS institutions, the Commission, the Community Court of Justice, and the Parliament (Udo & Ekott 2013). All these aspects make Nigeria a formidable African state, especially within West Africa. Nigeria is so significant that changes and circumstances within the state have serious implications within the region and the continent (Premium Times 2017). Nigeria's leadership expands beyond the political and socio-economic realm. It is home to the continent's 'first authentic cinema' – Nollywood – and is prolific in the film industry (Aghogho 2015: 71). Along with this, Nigeria is known for its prolific and award-winning authors and writers, for example, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Chinua Achebe, and Tope Folarin (Aghogho 2015: 71). It is also well known for its music artists, like D'Banj, PSquare, Wizkid, Davido, and Burna Boy, who have dominated continental and global charts (Aghogho 2015: 71).

Despite its regional and financial prowess, Nigeria suffers from a myriad of socio-economic, political, and security challenges that have affected the stability of the state. The following sections provide a brief overview of these challenges, how they have affected the security and governance of the state, and their significance to northern Nigeria.

3.2.1 State violence

Nigeria has had a violent past, as well as a political and socio-economic environment that is in constant flux. It is a state with a long, contentious, repetitive, and violent history (Adesoji 2010: 96; Danjibo 2009: 16). It is a state synonymous with authoritarianism and military rule, stemming from colonial rule and continuing into the post-independent era (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 44). The Nigerian state has faced multiple, sustained violent episodes involving military and police forces. There were six military coups between 1960 and the 1990s, as well as reports of extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses between 1948 and 2008 (Aghedo & Osumah 2012: 857; BBC News 1999). These have become a style of engagement by the state, as well as a response and pushback by the citizens (Aghedo & Osumah 2012: 857; Amnesty International 2011: 30). This violent history has influenced and shaped the conduct and style of governance within the state to a point where the state is the main provider and antagonist of security and governance in Nigeria.

3.2.2 Religious unrest

Nigeria is host to a complex and volatile cocktail of unrest within its borders. In addition to the state violence, there has been a spate of religious tensions between Muslims and Christians

over the years. These tensions have been particularly fierce and divisive, with the groups harbouring a fierce, 'sustained culture' of suspicion and rivalry for each other (Campbell 2013; Ruby & Shah 2007; Sampson 2012). This has culminated in sectarian violence over the years. The 1980s and 1990s were particularly fraught with constant distrust, tension, and conflict between the two groups (Ruby & Shah 2007). These tensions finally came to a head in 1999 with sectarian violence which resulted in 14 000 deaths, property damage, and thousands of Nigerians being displaced (Akinwale 2011: 124; Campbell 2013). In northern Nigeria, there have been several inter-religious breakouts, most notably the Kano revolt (1980), Bulunktu Bisarre (1982), Kastina crises (1999), Samfara conflict, Kaduna revolt, Bauchi crises and Sokoto (1999), the Kaduna Riots (2000) and Jos Riots (2001) (Akinwale 2011: 124; Çancı & Odukoya 2016). Efforts to reconcile the differing religious interests have proven unsuccessful and have instead provided fertile ground for politicians, religious, and even military leaders to actively use religion as a political tool to incite, exacerbate, and further divide the state and its people (Agbiboa 2013: 7; Ruby & Shah 2007).

These religious tensions have also resulted in an increase in transnational radical groups seeking to redress the socio-economic, security, governance, and political environment within Nigeria. Transnational, radical groups, like MEND, the Maitatsine, the Yan Izala and Tariqah and Boko Haram have become important actors within the Nigerian political and security arena. Many of these groups originate from the north and pose a challenge to traditional understandings of security and governance. They challenge the primacy and legitimacy of the state and international order, having effectively weaponised religion to challenge the authority, legitimacy, and hegemony of the Nigerian state (Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 287). Their challenge is linked to alternative narratives of statehood, for example, the establishment of an alternative social, cultural, and political system. Many of these groups seek to achieve these goals through self-determination, secession, and even a militarised attempt at statehood.

3.2.3 Socio-economic challenges

Alongside religious tension and violence, Nigeria is crippled by a host of socio-economic and political challenges, such as corruption, systemic marginalisation, high poverty, ethnic tensions, and unemployment (Adesoji 2010: 96; Danjibo 2009: 16; Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 42; Shenhav 2007: 6). These socio-economic issues have effectively divided the state between the north and the south. Northern Nigeria is considerably under-resourced and underdeveloped as compared to the south, and this has effectively deepened divisions between the regions.

3.2.3.1 Marginalisation along ethnic and regional lines

Nigeria is considered one of the most 'deeply divided' states within Africa (Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 4). With over 350 ethnic groups within its borders, it is unsurprising that there is a long and 'complex history' of tensions around issues concerning poverty, unemployment, literacy, ethnicity, and religion (Adebanwi 2005: 342; Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 63; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 4; Sergie & Johnson 2015). These tensions are a result of inequalities in resource allocation and corrupt practices (Panchal 2020).

The tensions within Nigeria stem from exclusionary policies and the alienation of groups within the country (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 59; Solomon 2013: 30). After independence, Nigeria implemented exclusionary policies which conferred different rights to those living in specific states (Solomon 2013: 29). In some localities, there were 'marked distinctions' between those who are native born and those who are foreign born, which only served to accentuate the already simmering and fractious tensions (Solomon 2013: 29). This, combined with socio-economic and political mismanagement, led to divisions and 'uneasy relations' within Nigeria (Adebanwi 2005: 342; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 4).

The biggest marginalisation in Nigeria is around ethnicity (Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 9). From the 1960s till the 1990s, Nigeria was gripped by ethnic politics, particularly in northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 61; Akpan & Akpabio 2003: 42). Issues around access to power, opportunities, and resources have contributed to political power imbalances that affect marginalised minority groups (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 61; Akpan & Akpabio 2003: 42; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 9). They have left the north largely underdeveloped to the point where its socio-economic indicators were ranked very low on 'all measurements of development' (Akpan & Akpabio 2003: 49). The years of state neglect, deprivation and insensitivity have contributed to flashpoints of unrest, agitation, protests, and violence in northern Nigeria (Adebanwi 2005: 339; Akpan & Akpabio 2003: 45, 49).

In addition to this, regional divisions, as instituted and implemented by the federal system, laid the foundations for much of the tensions, marginalisation and conflict within Nigeria (Ibeanu & Luckham 2007: 60–61). In 1946, Nigeria was sub-divided into three regions: north, east, and west (Akpan & Akpabio 2003: 41; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 12). It reduced the state to 'North for Northerners, East for Easterners and West for Westerners' (Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 12).

The creation of the mid-west region in 1963 further frayed the 'regional structure', creating additional tensions between the different regions (Idahosa 2015: 11; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 12). These divisions contribute to disharmony within Nigeria, setting each region apart and against the others.

3.2.3.2 Corruption

Corruption is one of the leading causes of the economic disparity and inequality in Nigeria. Despite Nigeria's abundance of natural resources, high corruption rates have diverted national funds into the accounts of greedy individuals. This has also contributed to Nigeria's low ranking on the Corruption Perception Index, ranking at 135 in 2014 and 136 in 2016 (Transparency International N.D.).

Evidence of Nigerian corruption can be traced back in history. From 1960 to 1999, US$400 billion was stolen by government leaders and 'the military and other security agencies' (Ikita 2014; UNODC N.D.). In 2012, an estimated 'N14 billion' was uncovered, stashed away in the 'personal accounts' of top officials of the 'Pension Scheme' in Nigeria, while a further estimated 'US$11 billion' was reportedly stolen by 'prominent political figures' (Omotose 2013: 125). In the north, there were high levels of theft, bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and embezzlement between 1999 and 2003 (The New Humanitarian 2010). These are only some of the examples of the systemic corruption in Nigeria.

This systemic corruption has negatively affected the state, increasing the already high poverty levels and inequality (Persson 2014: 16). Corruption is one of the leading factors that has hindered the state from ensuring effective implementation of policy and delivery of basic services to its citizens, especially in the north (Persson 2014: 18). While this is true, it is also important to note corruption has 'a long history of politics' and was partly a product of the colonial legacy (Pierce 2006: 888). Corrupt practices have ultimately led to gross mismanagement of national funding, namely the military spending budget going to the personal accounts of 'top military officials' and 'defence and security contractors' (Hoffmann 2014: 15; Osaghae 2001: 28).

3.2.3.3 Poverty

The mismanagement of national resources has led to an increase in the poverty levels in Nigeria. Coupled with this, there has been a long-standing history of 'unequal distribution' of

resources which have exacerbated the 'persistent inequality' and poverty within Nigeria (Magnowski 2014). There are about 83 million Nigerians who live below the poverty line (Al Jazeera 2020; The World Bank 2020). This roughly translates to 40% of the total Nigerian population (Al Jazeera 2020; The World Bank 2020). In 2020, the northern states like Sokoto, Taraba, and Jigawa reported 87.7% of their population living below the poverty line as compared to the southern states of Lagos, Delta and Osun reporting 4.5%, 6% and 8.5% respectively (Al Jazeera 2020; Varrella 2020).

3.2.3.4 Unemployment

Nigeria is considered to be within the top 50 states with high unemployment. Between 2015 and 2016, unemployment in Nigeria grew from 9% to 12.1% (Akande 2014; Knoema N.D, Statista N.D.; Udo 2016). In 2021, this increased to 32.5% (Nwokoma 2021, Olurounbi 2021; Varrella 2021). These figures, along with the high poverty rate, have contributed to a loss of confidence in the state and its federal arms among the Nigerian populace. It has renewed an interest in alternatives sources of security and governance, outside the ambit of the state.

3.2.3.5 Literacy

Nigerian literacy is another area where there is uneven distribution of resources and inequality between the north and the south (Persson 2014: 15). Literacy rates in the north and in the east, i.e., Bauchi, are between 14.5% and 49.3%, while in the south, in states like Imo, it is recorded at 99% (Akanbi et al. 2013; Global Partnership for Education N.D.; Omoju & Abraham 2014). The low literacy rates in the north are due to several factors, including inadequate funding, curricula, 'teacher training', infrastructure, and poor leadership and management (Abdulqadir 2016; Ahmed 2013; Akanbi et al. 2013; Akande 2014; Hoffmann 2014: 5). This has contributed to the failure of educational institutions to provide their students with the appropriate skills to make them employable, adding even more tension to the high unemployment levels within Nigeria.

3.2.4 Modern security threats in northern Nigeria

Northern Nigeria has been plagued by a number of insecurities and threats (Duerksen 2021). These insecurities and threats stem from farmer/herdsmen clashes, bandits, transnational security threats like Boko Haram, threats of food scarcity, kidnapping, and so on.

Since 2011, over 8 000 people have been killed, while a further 200 000 have been displaced due to escalating violence in the northern states of Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara (International Crisis Group 2020; Samuel 2020). This violence has been attributed to resource scarcity and competition between the Fulani herders and the Hausa farmers over valuable resources like land and water (International Crisis Group 2020). The *Miyetti Allah* have been a major stakeholder in negotiations between the farmers and herdsmen (Egbuta 2018). Efforts to mitigate the tensions using traditional rulers have yielded some results. In the state of Katsina, traditional rulers were noted to have 'ranked highest in terms of influence and result' (Onah & Olajide 2020).

The conflict between the two groups has been particularly fierce, especially in Benue state, considering the climatic and environmental changes over the last decade (Egbuta 2018; International Crisis Group 2020; Tanko 2021). Diminishing water resources and the 'increase in desert or semi-desert' in the north have exacerbated the conflict over resources (Akinwotu 2021; Duerksen 2021; Egbuta 2018; International Crisis Group 2020; Samuel 2020). These environmental conditions have also prompted experts like the UNDP – Global Environment Facility and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, to project that there could be an 'acute food insecurity in the next few months' in northern Nigeria (Premium Times 2021). This would affect an estimated 13 million people (Premium Times 2021).

The farmer/herdsmen conflict has also exacerbated organised crime, 'including cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and village raids' and has also encouraged the illicit 'increasing proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria' (Duerksen 2021; Egbuta 2018; International Crisis Group 2020). This has also encouraged transnational terror groups like Boko Haram, and its offshoots, the Islamic State in West Africa, to take route in the north (Duerksen 2021; International Crisis Group 2020). Boko Haram have been in operation since 2009, with their violent activities doubling from 2015 (Duerksen 2021). By the end of 2020, the group had been designated as the cause of 350 000 deaths and millions being displaced (Tanko 2021).

There have been a number of kidnappings of school children by groups like Boko Haram, most notably, the 300 Chibok girls (2014), Dapchi girls (2018) and recently, schoolboys from Kankara (2021), which forced the state to close schools in the northern state of Kaduna (Akinwotu 2021; Duerksen 2021; Ojewale 2021; Muhammed 2021; Tanko 2021). Organised

and armed groups have also taken root in the north-west, mainly in the form of bandits and vigilantes (Akinwotu 2021; Duerksen 2021; International Crisis Group 2020; Onapajo 2021; Samuel 2020).

3.3 <u>**TRADITIONAL RULERSHIP IN AFRICA**</u>

The previous sections of this chapter serve to illustrate the background and history of Nigeria. The sections provided an overview of the socio-economic and geo-political challenges that have plagued the state through history. They also discussed modern threats and challenges that the state has had to face, especially in northern Nigeria. The following sections explore traditional rulership, providing a brief background of the concept across Africa. The sections focus particularly on traditional rulership in Nigeria through different time periods: precolonial, colonial, postcolonial, and contemporary.

There are three distinct schools of thoughts on traditional rulership in Africa: the traditionalists, the abolitionists, and the 'midway arrangement' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82; Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 148). The traditionalists believe that traditional rulers are the 'true representatives of their people, accessible, respected, and legitimate, and therefore still essential to politics on the continent' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82; Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 147). Traditionalists believe that traditional rulers are important and relevant to African society and advocate for the 'upward revision of the role which the institution plays in the political scheme of things, to a level comparable to what it was in the pre-colonial period' (Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 147). Abolitionists believe that traditional rulers are 'gerontocratic, chauvinistic, authoritarian and increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82; Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe. 2019: 147).

Those who believe in the 'midway arrangement' are of the opinion that traditional rulers are an unutilized tool. This perspective contends that traditional rulers are a 'vital institution which serves as custodian of our cultures' and should not be 'completely ignored' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82; Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 148). Advocates for this perspective have called for 'a midway arrangement' for traditional rulers, one in which traditional rulers start off with an advisory role as a point of reintegration into modern African society (Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 148). At the same

time, advocates for the midway arrangement accept 'the position of the abolitionists', that traditional rulers are 'anachronistic', but that they are beneficial 'in specific aspects of our development process' (Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 148). Advocates for the midway arrangements are aware that the exclusion of traditional rulers from the constitutions has left the state out of touch with vital segments of society (Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe. 2019: 147). They understand that traditional rulers are an essential way to bridge the gap between the communities and the state (Ezema 2020: 38–39; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 147).

3.4 <u>**TRADITIONAL RULERS AS A FORM OF GOVERNANCE**</u>

Traditional rulership has a 'rich heritage', and a 'complex and highly sophisticated' history (Gusau, Abdulkadir and Musa 2020: 22; Omitola, Akinrinde and Omitola 2021: 543). Traditional rulers are the custodians of the beliefs, customs, values, norms and traditions of their communities and are heavily relied upon for leadership, governance and security (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Abubakar 2015: 185; Ajayi 1992: 125). They form a vital part of the governance and security structure, occupying this position with other actors like the state, civil society and more. While traditional rulers remain significant, their role and relevance has been 'periodically renegotiated' to reflect the changing authority, geography, and political landscape (Kraxberger 2009: 450). This forms an important basis for understanding the history and scope under which traditional rulers fall.

Traditional rulers are comprised of traditional heads of ethnic groups or clans, imbued with the 'highest primary executive authority' and power based on the heredity, nomination, appointment or instalment as enshrined in the laws and the provisions of African constitutions (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Iyeh 2014: 135; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128, 130). They serve multiple roles as administrative, 'religious, legislative, executive and judicial' leaders, preservers of 'tradition, customs, cultural heritage', managers and resolvers of disputes, and disseminators and lobbyists of 'projects and patronage' and the promotion of 'communal solidarity' (Ali and Bukar 2019: 6; Akinwale 2010: 137; Kraxberger 2009: 454; Osemwota 1989: 79; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128).

In Nigeria, traditional rulers are a diverse and age-old institution (Fatile, Majekdunmi and Adejuwon 2013: 72; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 130). They are the 'the nucleus of governance' (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 144). 'Traditional rulers' is an overarching term

that refers to religious leaders, councillors, Emirs, Obas, elders, heads (family, district, ward, and village) or even oracles (Ajayi 1992: 125; Ayoob 1983: 1; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 122–123; Uwalaka 2014: 22). This study focused on the Emirs, elders, and heads present in northern Nigeria.

In northern Nigeria, traditional rulership is divided broadly between the farming and non-farming communities. In the farming community, there is a hierarchy comprised of elders and councils (Olusola & Aisha 2013: 122–123). In the non-farming community, traditional rulership is conducted through Emirs, trained judges known as Alkali, heads of villages, as well as ward and district heads, and the Miyetti Allah, who help with conflict resolution (Adewusi 2018: 6; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131; Uwalaka 2014: 22). The Emir is the principal executive among the Hausa-Fulani, performing an ambivalent role of being a political and religious leader in their communities (Adewusi 2018: 6; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131; Uwalaka 2014: 22).

In southern Nigeria, specifically in the south-west and among the Yorubas, the principal traditional ruler is known as an Oba (or King) (Osemwota 1989: 78; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131; Uwalaka 2014: 22). There are other power centres who act as checks and balances to the Oba like 'the body of king makers, the town council and powerful secret societies' (Osemwota 1989: 78; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131). Unlike the Emirs in the north, the Obas are generally considered the weaker executives in Nigeria (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131). In the 'south-east', traditional rulership is 'decentralised and fragmented' and exercised at various levels, from household to village level (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131). While in eastern Nigeria, there are different levels of traditional rulers. Among the Igbo, traditional rulers are comprised of 'the Family Head, the Umuada, the Village Tribunal (Amala), Age Grades, Titled men (Chiefs), Oracles' (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131).

For the purposes of this study, the focus will be on traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. This is because these actors are the stronger of the traditional rulers within Nigeria. Northern Nigerian traditional rulers wield influence, authority, and power, more so than in other parts of Nigeria. This study seeks to understand how and why traditional rulers in northern Nigeria have been left out of formal security and governance practice, despite the fact that they are an influential actor in Nigeria.

3.4.2 Historical overview of traditional rulers in Nigeria

3.4.2.1 Precolonial traditional rulers

Before colonial rule, governance was 'synonymous with traditional institutions and their rulers' (Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 52; Sokoh 2018: 51). In precolonial Africa, traditional rulers were categorised on a spectrum (Ubink 2008: 7). At the one end, some were 'extremely hierarchical, militarised', while at the other end, some areas where there were no traditional rulers and territories 'were loosely linked segmentary lineage systems' (Ubink 2008: 7).

Precolonial Nigeria was the 'golden age' for governance, with traditional rulers enjoying much respect and reverence in their communities (Ajayi 1992: 125–126; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 73; Ojo 1976: 117, 122). Traditional rulers were crucial to security and governance, exercising absolute authority as heads of the 'political, social, legal and military' heads of their communities (Blench, Longtau, Hassan & Walsh 2006: i; Nweke 2012: 211; Orji 2013: 40; Sokoh 2018: 51; Udegha 1972: 2; Vaughan 1995: 511–512). Traditional rulers administered and governed Nigeria as 'mini-states' (Ali and Bukar 2019: 6; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 120; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128; Udegha 1972: 2). Traditional rulers were in charge of governance, shaping policies, and generating revenue (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 148). They were the sole form of rulership, holding strong allegiance with and kingship over their communities (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 408; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 73; Ojo 1976: 122; Vaughan 1995: 511–512).

In northern and eastern Nigeria, especially amongst the Hausa, Kanuri, and other ethnic groups, the Emir and Shehu were the 'locus of power, holding supreme control and authority' (Ajayi 1992: 126; Iyeh 2014: 136). The Emirs and Shehu were assisted by executive councils which were comprised of nobility, who consulted and advised the Emirs and Shehu (Ajayi 1992: 126; Ayoob 1983: 5; Udegha 1972: 1). The Emirs were considered to be a 'strong executive participator in local governance' (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 148). In South-West, the Oba carried out similar functions to their northern counterparts, but in a limited capacity (Ajayi 1992: 127). Like Emirs, the Oba ruled with the assistance of a council of chiefs and other 'power blocks' and bodies like the 'Oro, Egungun and Ogboni' (Ajayi 1992: 127; Ayoob 1983: 5; Udegha 1972: 1; Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 148). These bodies, while they assisted the Obas, also took away and undermined their power (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 148). In the South-East, 'there was an absence of centralised executive authority' (Tonwe and Osemwota

2013a: 148).

Precolonial traditional rulers held a wide variety of roles. They were the political, social, legal, cultural, spiritual, economic and military heads of their territories (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Omitola, Akinrinde and Omitola 2021: 543; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131; Udegha 1972: 2). As mediators, traditional rulers served as managers of conflict, final 'arbiters of peace', spiritual leaders, and peace brokers in their communities (Ali and Bukar 2019: 7; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Ojo 1976: 122; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 120). As judicial heads, traditional rulers were customary judges in disputes and preserved customs, values, and law in their communities (Abubakar 2015: 193; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 120; Ojo 1976: 122).

All traditional rulers had political and administrative duties, including enacting and collecting taxes, tributes, and fines, shaping policy, exacting market tolls, enforcing contracts, and conscripting citizens for labour (Ali and Bukar 2019: 7; Abubakar 2015: 193; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Udegha 1972: 1). As guardians of security, traditional rulers were tasked with securing and maintaining their communities through conscription and organising of troops (Abubakar 2015: 185, 193; Ayoob 1983: 1, 5). All these roles afforded traditional rulers much power, autonomy, and influence, rendering them as absolute powers within their communities (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Iyeh 2014: 136; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 120).

3.4.2.2 Colonial traditional rulers

Until colonial rule, traditional rulership was a commonly practised means of leadership, governance and security in Africa. However, colonialism changed the landscape of traditional rulership, not only in Nigeria, but throughout Africa (Iyeh 2014: 135, 137; Kraxberger 2009: 452). In colonial Africa, traditional rulers were either recognised by the colonial administrations or removed and replaced with ones that were more sympathetic, aligned and willing to further the colonial project (Ubink 2008: 7). Different colonial empires had different styles, approaches, and methods in interacting with and working alongside traditional rulers (Ubink 2008: 8). For example, in West Africa, the British tried to work with the traditional rulers, integrating pre-existing traditional rulers to work on their behalf (Ubink 2008: 8). The French found it more pragmatic to appoint and install traditional rulers who were more favourable and more inclined to work with them (Ubink 2008: 8).

While, at first, traditional rulers in Nigeria held the same power and authority as other monarchs in the world, their role, power and influence were significantly reduced, stripped and eroded away by the indirect imperial British rule (Abubakar 2015: 185, 195; Iyeh 2014: 135, 137; Miles 1993: 34, 38; Ojo 1976: 116–117; Sokoh 2018: 53). Colonialism effectively disrupted the natural flow of traditional rulership, which would gradually continue into post-independent Nigeria (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Iyeh 2014: 140; Orji 2013: 39–41; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 129; Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 149 - 150).

British colonial rule brought many changes to the political and governing landscape of Nigeria. Traditional rulers were 'relegated to the background' in terms of function and duty (Ojo 1976: 117; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 123). This fundamentally disrupted the traditional customs and practices of rulership and governance (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 80; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74; Olusola & Aisha 2013: 123). Instead of ruling their territories as executive authorities, traditional rulers were used as a tool for indirect colonial rule throughout Nigeria (Ali and Bukar 2019: 7; Chieza & Osumah 2015: 80; Omitola, Akinrinde and Omitola 2021: 544; Osemwota 1989: 78; Kraxberger 2009: 452). British rule only reinforced traditional rulers as a bedrock for their colonial conquest (Iyeh 2014: 137; Kraxberger 2009: 452).

British colonial rule set into motion the systematic disenfranchisement of the power and prestige of traditional rulers. It created a large disconnect between traditional rulers and their constituents. Colonial rule began the process of formalising and constraining the power and authority of traditional rulers (Iyeh 2014: 137). It created new institutions and new roles in the form of the state and the legislative council (Iyeh 2014: 137; Kraxberger 2009: 452; Osemwota 1989: 78). The formation of the state transferred much of the role and duties of traditional rulers to state agencies like police and other departments, while the creation of the legislative council relegated traditional rulers to consulting on 'major domestic policy issues' (Iyeh 2014: 137; Kraxberger 2009: 452; Osemwota 1989: 78). In northern Nigeria, indirect rule was able to take root by using the 'enduring structure of central administration under the sultanate and emirate councils' (Orji 2013: 41). While this was the case, there was no real evidence that these laws took away the executive powers of the traditional rulers, as they 'still performed executive functions at the local government level' (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013a: 149 - 150). In the west, indirect rule had some success by using the 'practiced centralised administration' of the Alafin and Obas (Orji 2013: 41). In the east, the British had to create artificial institutions to buttress

their colonial ambitions (Orji 2013: 41).

Even the constitutions stripped and delineated the role of traditional rulers. In 1914, the constitution instituted a legislative council consisting of six traditional rulers, 'two emirs from the north, the Alaafin of Oyo from the South, as well as one member each from Lagos, Calabar and the Benin-Warri area' (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 137). It is interesting that only six traditional rulers were incorporated to voice and represent the different ethnic and tribal concerns for the whole of Nigeria. In the 1922 Clifford constitution, the role of traditional rulers was expanded, giving them a chance to actively and directly 'participate in elective policies' between 1923 and 1938 (Iyeh 2014: 138; Sokoh 2018). This contrasted with their limited and consultative role at the beginning of colonial rule. The 1946 Richard constitution established a House of Chiefs in northern Nigeria and a House of Assembly within the three regions (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 138; Sokoh 2018). This was marginally better than the provisions of the 1914 constitution, which only allowed for six traditional rulers for the whole of Nigeria.

In 1951, the MacPherson constitution 'established regional House of Chiefs' in northern and western Nigeria and expanded on the provisions of the Clifford constitution. The MacPherson constitution allowed northern and western traditional rulers to 'make direct input in the selection of members of their regional Houses of Assembly' (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 138; Sokoh 2018). This gave northern and western traditional rulers autonomy over who became a part of these councils. However, despite all the strides to give back some of the power and authority that traditional rulers lost, the Lyttleton constitution of 1954 effectively reduced the 'constitutional powers' of traditional rulers at the 'centre and in the regions' (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 138). The Lyttleton constitution limited the selection power of traditional rulers in the 'House of Representatives', putting traditional rulers back in the position they were in at the start of colonial rule (Iyeh 2014: 138).

These changes were a deliberate strategy by the British to side-line traditional rulers from governing their territories. This effectively stopped traditional rulers from exercising absolute rule and autonomy within Nigeria (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 74). Without their wide-ranging power and authority, traditional rulers became mere 'intermediaries' for the new

colonial administration (Olusola & Aisha 2013: 123; Reed 1982: 3 & 7; Udegha 1972: 8). Traditional rulers were now largely ceremonial in nature, a position drastically different from their role during the precolonial era (Olusola & Aisha 2013: 123).

While this is all true, there is another side to traditional rulership during colonial rule. Before traditional rulers were used as intermediaries and became ceremonial in nature, they were the earliest opposition to indirect rule (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 409). Traditional rulers saw and recognised the 'desire of the Europeans to take over the control of the commerce' and how these ambitions were an 'affront against traditions' and customs (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 409). However, traditional rulers were unable to do much because of the superior firepower that the British had (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 409). This allowed the British to depose traditional rulers who did not want to align with their ambitions and replace them with ones who were more inclined to do so (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 409).

3.4.2.3 Post-colonial traditional rulers

After independence, African governments were mostly suspicious of traditional rulers (Ubink 2008: 10). Traditional rulers were viewed as 'impediments to modernisation and nation-building' (Ubink 2008: 11). In states like Guinea, Uganda, and Tanzania, traditional rulers were formally abolished (Ubink 2008: 10). In Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana, and Togo, the powers of traditional rulers were curtailed and their roles were downsized (Ubink 2008: 10). Additionally, elected officials became a part of installing and selecting members of the traditionally hereditary institution (Ubink 2008: 10, 29).

However, in the 1990s, in states like Mozambique and South Africa, traditional rulers were given formal recognition and 'enhanced' roles (Ubink 2008: 11). This recognition continued into the early 2000s, with international institutions like the World Bank, expressing 'renewed interest' in traditional rulers, as exemplified by the 'Promoting Partnerships with Traditional Authorities Project' in Ghana (2003-2006)' (Ubink 2008: 11).

The colonial era effectively curtailed the role and power of traditional rulers in Nigeria. While the different iterations of the Nigerian constitution sought to give back some part of the power and influence, this was nothing compared to their prestige during the precolonial era. The periods after colonialism and independence in Nigeria were met with fraught misgivings and distrust of traditional rulers. Traditional rulers were often criticised for what looked to be their

'accommodationist' and 'collaborationist' stance towards British colonial rule (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 75; Miles 1993: 34). This distrust deepened with reports that some traditional rulers governed in a 'despotic and authoritarian' manner (Orji 2013: 39; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 131). Traditional rulers were also considered to be 'anachronistic, retrograde', 'reactionary', 'parasitic' and 'corrupted' to the new African vision after colonialism (Abubakar 2015: 195; Chieza & Osumah 2015: 76, Iyeh 2014: 140; Lutz & Linder 2004: 15; Miles 1993: 34).

This new African vision was one in which the continent was democratic, had 'new institutions, new leaders, a new mentality' (Kraxberger 2009: 451; Miles 1993: 34; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133; Ubink 2008: 5). Traditional rulers were seen as a hinderance to this vision. These sentiments cast traditional rulers in a negative light, more as folk-like than a 'serious instrument for progress, development or national unity' (Miles 1993: 34). Additionally, there were tussles for power and personal gain by traditional rulers in the Council of Traditional Rulers (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 412). This also manifested in the creation of bestowed titles of traditional rulers, which were given to the wealthy and influential, people who had not made contributions to the communities (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 412).

The process of curtailing the role and impact of traditional rulers continued into the post-independence era (Miles 1993: 28, 38–39; Nweke 2012: 212; Vaughan 1995: 513). The changing nature of administrations in Nigeria cemented the advisory role traditional rulers had in federal and national government (Ali and Bukar 2019: 7; Miles 1993: 39; Reed 1982: 21–22; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 129, 133). During the military coups (1960–1966), the decision-making powers of traditional rulers were further reduced (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133; Reed 1982: 21–22). The 1960 constitution further eroded the role of traditional rulers to 'minority councils' in western and eastern Nigeria, leaving them largely advisory in nature (Iyeh 2014: 139). The one exception to this was the council of chiefs in northern Nigeria. This council was created as a binding policy-making body (Iyeh 2014: 139). This afforded traditional rulers greater power and influence within their communities, something that has not changed in contemporary Nigeria (Iyeh 2014: 139).

In 1963, the republican constitution established the Houses of Chiefs with limited power and authority (Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Miles 1993: 38). The 1966 military coup effectively suspended the constitutional provisions, further eroding the ceremonial role

of traditional rulers (Miles 1993: 38; Reed 1982: 21–23; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133). By the implementation of the 1979 constitution, this advisory role was deeply entrenched, with traditional rulers relegated to presiding over matters involving 'customary law, inter-communal relations, chieftaincy, peace and tranquillity' (Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 140; Miles 1993: 39). The slow phasing out of traditional rulers from colonisation to the post-independence era largely contributed to the invisibility and side-lined nature of traditional rulers within formal security and governance practice.

While there was a concerted effort to limit the role of traditional rulers, several constitutional amendments halted some of these efforts. The Local Government Reform briefly afforded traditional rulers the opportunity to formulate policies and advise provincial government (Iyeh 2014: 140; Reed 1982: 33; Udegha 1972: 18). The 1989 and 1999 constitutions expanded and improved upon the functions of traditional rulers (Blench, Longtau, Hassan & Walsh 2006: iv; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 134). In addition to these, there was periodical lobbying by traditional rulers for more authority and scope over their communities and within the federal and regional governments (Abubakar 2015: 196–197; Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 411; Miles 1993: 39). There have also been calls to increase the constitutional role of traditional rulers, from governors like Dr Ifeanyi Okowa of Delta state (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82). Traditional rulers are dissatisfied and 'disenchanted with being relegated to performing nominal, ceremonial and advisory roles' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82). They have sought 'more visibility and social relevance' and a 'space of power in the constitution' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 82). This is also due to the fact that traditional rulers have more mobilisation power and the recognition that they should form a part of peacebuilding and are a 'bridge between the government and the people' (Lutz & Linder 2004: 19).

While these efforts were welcome, they did not change the status of traditional rulers. Traditional rulers still occupied a periphery role within the state. It is important to note that, while the process of limiting the role and function of traditional rulers was happening in the rest of Nigeria, this did not have much traction in the north. In particular, the Emirs in the north retained their influence and authority in their communities (Iyeh 2014: 139; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133). In fact, several Emirs 'were able to extend their colonial-accrued powers into the first phase of Nigerian independence', with the council of chiefs (Iyeh 2014: 139; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133). Not only that, but traditional rulers in the north were the strongest opposition' to the new advisory roles (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013b: 151). This

highlights the strong influence, significance and legacy of traditional rulers in the north, despite the changes in administration and the course of history (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 133).

3.4.2.4 Modern traditional rulers

The renewed interest in traditional rulers can be linked to a number of factors. These include the 'widespread criticism of the state administration', internal conflict, failed nation-building, civil wars, and the influx of traditional rulers filling in the gap of the state (Ubink 2008: 13). This resurgence is also due to the recognition that these kinds of rulers still 'remain very important in organising the lives of the people at the local level despite modern state structures' (Gusau, Abdulkadir and Musa 2020: 23; Ubink 2008: 13; Sokoh 2018: 58). In states like South Africa, Uganda, Malawi, and Ghana, the communities rely on traditional rulers to deliver on services that the state cannot (Ubink 2008: 13–14). These states have functional state apparatus and competent institutions (Ubink 2008: 13). The state also recognises that by legitimising traditional rulers, they too are legitimised in the eyes of the communities, and this grants them access to the communities (Ubink 2008: 14).

At the same time, the state was still wary of traditional rulers (Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 154). This sentiment carried over from the post-colonial period. Traditional rulers were seen as threats and rivals to the state, an actor that would undermine their power (Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 154; Ubink 2008: 16). This sentiment dictated their behaviour towards traditional rulers. There is a 'continuous rejection of a constitutional role for them by politicians' (Gusau, Abdulkadir and Musa 2020: 23; Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 154; Sokoh 2018: 58). The state saw traditional rulers as 'mere agents of the state' and as a 'manifestation of the state intervention in the localities', rather than as 'independent actors' (Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 154; Ubink 2008: 16). This co-opted traditional rulers into state infrastructure and worked as a way for the state to benefit from traditional rulers (Ubink 2008: 16). The state exploited their influence and profited from the close association they had with traditional rulers (Ubink 2008: 16). This co-opted and marginalised traditional rulers, as they had no real role or real power (Ubink 2008: 16). It has also fostered a relationship of 'competition and mutual dependence' between traditional rulers and the state (Ray & Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 28).

Traditional rulers have thrived and persist into modern-day Nigerian society (Boege, Brown & Clements 2009: 14; Iyeh 2014: 140; Kraxberger 2009: 452). While they remain an important

actor and institution in security and governance, traditional rulers do not have an official role in contemporary governance in Nigeria (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 407; Gusau, Abdulkadir and Musa 2020: 23; Lutz & Linder 2004: 2; Sokoh 2018: 58). While the colonial and post-independence eras actively side-lined traditional rulers, in northern Nigeria, traditional rulers were able to retain significant power, influence, and authority over society, even more so than the national and federal actors (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 136; Ojo 1976: 122; Vaughan 1995: 513). During elections, traditional rulers are sources for grassroot endorsements and mobilisation (Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 407; Sokoh 2018: 58). Traditional rulers have continued to provide stability, service delivery, 'civic engagement and grassroots development', often where the state has been unable to do so (Kraxberger 2009: 449; Ubink 2008: 5, 13–14; Vaughan 1995: 512). They have been called upon in various instances to assist the state with clashes between the farmers and herdsmen, 'with the rising cases of kidnapping, armed robbery, and vandalism of strategic infrastructure' (Chieza & Osumah 2015: 76, 85). Though limited and largely in the periphery, traditional rulers are custodians of indigenous African 'history, culture and political governance systems' (Akinwale 2010: 137; Iyeh 2014: 140–141; Sklar 2003: 14).

3.4.3 The role of traditional rulership

Traditional rulers occupy a space of duality within security and governance in Africa (Kraxberger 2009: 453). They are a 'complex and multifaceted' institution (Danso 2020: 60). They command respect, 'power and influence' (Anamzoya 2013: 128). They are revered and important actors who have been able to endure and 'adapt to changing political order of the postcolonial period' (Anamzoya 2013: 127; Ray & Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 23). In South Africa, traditional rulers are well respected, but at the same time, they are under much scrutiny (Englebert 2002: 52; Ray & Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 23). In Ghana and Uganda, traditional rulers are recognised and their constitutions have been revised to 'increase the political weight of traditional institutions and their leaders' (Englebert 2002: 52). However, there are those who question 'the desirability and legitimacy of traditional authority in modern forms of governance' (Ubink 2008: 29). They question how compatible these kinds of systems and rulers are with modern, 'democratic rule of law' (Ubink 2008: 29). So, on the surface, traditional rulership is at odds with democratisation based on 'elective representation' (Ubink 2008: 29). Even deeper than that, there are questions of how traditional forms of governance, i.e., traditional rulership, can exist and work alongside modern and largely European ideas of statehood.

Even for Nigeria, traditional rulers are both revered and reviled and can mean the success or failure of security and governance (Abdulqadir 2016: 2; Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 78; Ayoob 1983: 11). According to some legal experts in Nigeria, the importance of traditional rulers cannot be understated or disregarded (Daily Trust 2013). At the same time, there is a recognition that traditional rulers have been 'fanning the embers of hatred, disunity' within Nigerian society (Daily Trust 2013). While traditional rulers hold these dual roles, it makes one question how and why there are not more efforts within the formal practice of security and governance to incorporate and capture the breadth and scope of the work of traditional rulers. It is not to say that the formal practice does not capture this, but that a lot of what traditional rulers do goes unnoticed or is understated, when they have a big role to play. The formal practice of security and governance does not adequately capture or highlight how pivotal and/or detrimental traditional rulers are to Nigerian society.

In addition, there is not as much depth in trying to understand the regional differences between traditional rulers, or between the different levels of traditional rulers. There is literature that does cover the range and scope of the duties of these actors, as well as the different kinds of traditional rulers in Nigeria. Maybe this is not something that we should be worried about. On the ground, and amongst the communities, traditional rulers are significant and important. They are at the heart of their communities, and while this not covered substantially in formal practice and even in discourse, their importance cannot be downplayed. The state and international organisations are intimately aware of how powerful traditional rulers are and what they mean for society and Nigeria. Perhaps these sentiments can be carried on by word of mouth and deed, passed on through the generations, as they have always done. Perhaps having these attributes, actions, and behaviours codified, written down, and acknowledged is an entirely Western concept. Maybe it is enough that there is oral tradition that has long alluded to the power and significance of traditional rulers.

3.5 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter provided a brief overview of the historical, socio-economic and political underpinnings within Nigeria. The chapter provided a brief historical overview of the Nigerian context, explaining and situating Nigeria within the past, the present, and even provided some insight into the future of Nigerian society. This provided context and evidence for the ways in which traditional rulers are an important actor within northern Nigeria.

The chapter described the socio-economic challenges that Nigeria faces currently, focusing on poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, ethnicity, corruption, and transnational religious groupings, all of which have been particularly prevalent in the north. These challenges are key issues that have sparked and driven insecurity within northern Nigeria. They also served as background information on the drivers, threats, and insecurities that are important to the socio-economic and geo-political landscape in Nigerian society.

Finally, the chapter provided an explanation of traditional rulership as a form of governance in Africa. It provided a historical overview of traditional rulership in Africa and, more specifically, in Nigeria. It traced the history and mandate of traditional rulers and explained and how traditional rulers form an important bulwark of governance and security in Africa. The chapter outlined the role and significance of traditional rulers in Africa and their impact within northern Nigeria.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This study engages in a critical Global South reading of how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined in the formal practices of security and governance. The chapter will explain and justify the methodology and research design used in this study. The study will employ a qualitative and interpretive research design which makes use of a single, exploratory, and evaluative case study design. It will also make use of semi-structured interviews to elicit deep and rich data and a nuanced reading of the side-lined nature of traditional rulers within formal security and governance practice.

This study will expand on and provide a holistic and inclusive Global South reading of security and governance, shedding new light on how side-lined actors can influence the political, security, and governance arena within a state. It will build on the literature on security and governance, focusing on a different actor, influence, and theoretical and geographical locality in the form of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. The reason for the focus on northern Nigeria is that traditional rulers are central and powerful figures in the security and governance arena in Nigeria. Despite this, they are not adequately represented and acknowledged within formal security and governance practice. This study seeks to understand why this is the case, especially for an actor with such an impact and footprint in northern Nigeria.

Chapter one began the study by providing its context, background, and justifications. The chapter summarised the literature and theoretical framework used within the thesis and provided an overview of the chapter demarcations. Chapter two expanded on the literature and theoretical framework used within the study. It focused on providing an overview of the turns in security, culminating in an in-depth explanation of the CSS and Third World Security School traditions, both key theories used within the research. The chapter also provided an overview of governance understandings, tracing the origins and history of governance through theory and different disciplines. In chapter three, the study provided an overview of the historical, socio-economic, and geo-political challenges that Nigeria faces. The chapter also gave insight on the implications of these issues to the northern Nigerian context. The chapter also traced the history of traditional rulership within Africa, and specifically focused on traditional rulership within Nigerian society.

This chapter provides the methodology and methods used within this thesis. The chapter starts off by providing the research paradigms that governed this study. Using a constructivist and interpretivist worldview, this study grounded itself in critical literature and discourses. This was an ideal combination, considering that the theoretical framework was also critical in nature. The chapter then provides an in-depth investigation of single, exploratory, and evaluative case studies which form the basis of the study. This is followed by an explanation of the use of semi-structured interviews used to collect the data from the field. The chapter then explains the analysis types employed in this study – reflective, interpretive, and theoretical thematic – which were used to analyse the data from the field. The chapter concludes by presenting the ethical considerations adhered to in this study.

4.2 <u>RESEARCH WORLDVIEW</u>

This section justifies and outlines the methodology and methods used in this study; providing the paradigm applied to understand and make sense of the side-lined nature of traditional rulers in formal security and governance practices in northern Nigeria.

The study used a combination of constructivist and interpretivist worldviews. The premises of both worldviews are also interrelated, adding an additional reason as to why they were employed within this study. Both approaches contend that, as subjective humans, we construct the world we live in (Creswell 2014: 8; Kivunja & Kuyini 2017: 33; Schwandt 1994: 223). This means that reality is unique and dependant on the actor creating it (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 111; Patel 2015; Schwandt 1994: 221–223). This reality is influenced by the actors' context and background for its 'form and content' (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 111; Mackenzie & Knipe 2006: 3; Schwandt 1994: 221–223). Reality is constructed and 'created' by local and 'social actors' and is therefore unique (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 111; Patel 2015; Schwandt 1994: 221, 236). This means that reality is 'pluralistic', diverse, and nuanced (Schwandt 1994: 236). No one reality is replicable or exactly the same, and all realities are equal, important, and worth studying.

The constructivist and interpretivist worldviews believe that reality is relative, subjective, and contested (Heron & Reason 1997: 278; Patel 2015; Wahyuni 2012: 71). This means that there are 'multiple perspectives', 'varied backgrounds, assumptions, and experiencings' of reality (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 111; Wahyuni 2012: 71). All these 'contribute to the on-going construction of reality' (Wahyuni 2012: 71). Like those who use the critical lens, the

constructivists and interpretivists reject the 'objectivism and a single truth' and prefer to 'interact and have a dialogue with the studied participants' (Heron & Reason 1997: 278; Schwandt 1994: 243; Wahyuni 2012: 71). The 'single truth' narrative is reminiscent of traditional security thinking. While this is useful, it discounts the fact that there are many different realities at play within society.

These worldviews seek to uncover the 'inside perspectives or the real meanings of social phenomena', and that requires tapping into multiple sources of 'social knowledge' (Wahyuni 2012: 71). The version of the world and reality that scholars and others are frequently exposed to is traditional perspectives. For security, this means western and traditional security discourses are favoured above others. Similarly, discourses around good governance are favoured ahead of other narratives of governance. This does not mean that they are the absolute versions of reality, but rather they are a part of the many different versions of reality that are equally 'meaningful' (Schwandt 1994: 243).

While there are good reasons for employing a constructivist and interpretivist worldview to this study, there are also criticisms to these approaches. The biggest challenge is thinking around what counts as a 'subjectively mediated account of intersubjective meaning' (Schwandt 1994: 246). Without criteria, critics state that these accounts fall into the trap of solipsism, 'descriptivism' and relativism (Schwandt 1994: 246). There are also those who state that these approaches are not being fully critical 'on the very accounts they produce' and that they privilege 'the views of actors' (Schwandt 1994: 247). This falls into the same trap that traditional security perpetuates within the literature, namely privileging one specific actor.

Despite these critiques, I have chosen to adopt these worldviews because, as with the decision to use critical approaches, other discourses have left out 'intersubjective' methods of 'experiencing action in society' (Schwandt 1994: 225). By adopting a more subjective approach, the discipline and discourse around security and governance is opened up to new actors who create, negotiate, sustain, and modify social reality (Schwandt 1994: 225). These approaches are also eye-opening as they allow us to see the 'blockages and repressions' within traditional discourses, as well as begin the process of thinking around what the appropriate actions are to overcome them (Deetz 1982: 140).

The constructivist and interpretivist worldviews allowed me to choose qualitative and interpretive research design, methods, and techniques to obtain and analyse the data and answer the research question. The value of qualitative research is that it prioritises the complex and intangible human element that is at the core of the constructivist and interpretivist worldviews (Creswell 2014: 4, 8; Mack et al. 2005: 1; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 3). The basis and foundation for qualitative research can be found in anthropology and sociology, where social reality is observed and interpreted (Creswell 2014: 4, 8, 13, 19; Mack et al. 2005: 1; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 3, 9).

Qualitative research seeks to develop a theory to explain, describe, make sense of, create meaning from, and reference the experiences of social reality (Hancock 1998: 2; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 3, 9). While there are many qualitative research designs available, namely, ethnographic studies, 'case studies, field studies, grounded theory, document studies, naturalistic inquiry, observational studies, interview studies', descriptive studies, concept analysis, focus groups, etc., this research used a single case study (Collier & Elman 2008: 780; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 9). This choice was based on the fact that case studies allow for in-depth explaining, description, and meaning-making of a single case – traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. In addition, by using a case study, this research was able to focus on the perspective of traditional rulers and how they engage in and form a part of social reality for communities in northern Nigeria.

4.3 <u>RESEARCH DESIGN</u>

This study makes use of qualitative research design, methods, and techniques to obtain and analyse the data. Qualitative research is a form of scientific research that provides the complex and intangible human element whereby I observed and interpreted the participants' social reality (Creswell 2014: 4, 8; Hancock 1998: 2; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 3). This research provided a deeper understanding of the side-lined role traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. By using a qualitative research design, this study was able to delve deeply into understanding the phenomenon of traditional rulership, particularly how they are side-lined within formal practice even though they are impactful on security and governance in northern Nigeria. Through the use of a case study and interviews, this study was able to critically engage with the uniquely 'human experiences and social contexts' of northern Nigerian traditional rulers (Bhattacherjee 2012: 103; Creswell 2014: 8; Denzin & Lincoln 1994: 119).

Qualitative research can be divided into two 'major types' and 'five features' (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1). The two types include participant observation and interviewing, of which I used interviewing as the primary source of data collection. An in-depth discussion of this data collection tool is explained later in this section (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1). There are also five features of data in qualitative research: data should be natural, descriptive, concerned with process, inductive, and meaningful (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1). These features were incorporated throughout this study. This research used natural data through the use of audio recordings, transcripts, fieldnotes, and photographs to provide descriptive detail about the role and influence of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1). This provided a rich and detailed data set to analyse and draw conclusions from and established a complex and nuanced analysis from the data collected (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1).

The study also undertook not to selectively find data to prove or disprove the initial premises (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 2; Creswell 2014: 8). This would have limited the analysis and fed into confirmation bias (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 2; Creswell 2014: 8). Inductive data allows for the research to speak for itself as it is constructed and driven through objective analysis and conclusions. In addition, because this study used a constructivist worldview, the conclusions and research analyses come from the bottom up – i.e., the participants, actors, referent object – and this ensured that the research was grounded within the data (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 2; Creswell 2014: 8). This strategy also allowed for me to make meaning of the data by comparing it to the theory of CSS and the Third World Security School used in this study. By double-checking and verifying the recorded data frequently, I was able to have a more accurate reflection and representation of what the participants shared, contributing to meaning-making (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 2).

This study was shaped by unique 'human experiences and social contexts', rather than a 'singular or objective' reality (Bhattacherjee 2012: 103; Denzin & Lincoln 1994: 119; Van Wynsberghe & Khan 2007: 89). The research focused on constructing and creating in-depth understandings of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria by focusing on them from an 'insider view' rather than an 'outsider view' (Mason 2002: 56; Van Wynsberghe & Khan 2007: 89). This study used interviews as a primary way of collecting data for the interpretive research framework. Interviews were used to elicit the 'human experiences' and 'insider view' of the side-lined role of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria (Mason 2002: 56; Van Wynsberghe &

Khan 2007: 89). This allowed me to understand how and why these actors were side-lined in the formal practices of security and governance.

Interpretive research, like the critical approach, foregrounds previously side-lined and marginalised voices. The research focused on narratives and discourse that centred around traditional rulers, providing greater clarity and in-depth understanding of their role. Adding an interpretive research design to this study not only situated the research within the broader interpretive worldview; it also served as a support for the qualitative research design and constructivist worldview used in this research (Mason 2002: 56).

4.4 <u>RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</u>

The data collection for this research was conducted in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory and Zazzau, Kaduna state. The choice of Abuja was based on preliminary field research conducted in March 2018. From these discussions, a few participants suggested that I conduct further interviews in Abuja because it is the federal capital of Nigeria and because key participants, actors, and institutions, particularly those with links to northern Nigeria, were usually located in the capital. This was a useful trip that afforded me a chance to test the feasibility of the study. It also provided an opportunity to have conversations with academics, consultants, policy makers and researchers who had intimate and expert knowledge on traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. These contacts were also able to provide me with additional contacts to interview. In the follow-up field research in September 2019 and September 2020, I engaged with some of the same contacts previously made, as well as interviewing new participants through snowball sampling.

The choice of Zazzau was based on advice that emerged from several conversations that took place in Abuja. These conversations revealed that Zazzau would be a good location to secure access to traditional rulers, as it was close enough to the north to allow for meaningful engagement. Zazzau, also known as Zaria, is an Emirate located in Kaduna state in northern Nigeria. It is currently ruled by the Emir of Zazzau, His Royal Highness Ahmad Bamalli, who succeeded from the late Emir Alhaji Shehu Idris, who passed away in 2020 (Lere 2021; The Guardian 2020). Zazzau is important for various reasons: the most famous early ruler, Queen Amina resided in the city. The city was also a collection point for slave who were to be delivered to Kano and Katsina. Zazzau was a safer option because I was guided through the territory by a second-class traditional ruler. In 2018, I interviewed ten participants, while in

2019, I was able to interview an additional eight. In 2020, I realised that the study was still incomplete and a further two participants were interviewed through the online platform, Zoom. These interviews provided the primary data collection that elicited in-depth views and perspectives on traditional rulership. Given the time, nature, scope, and financial limitations of the study, I was only able to interview 20 participants in total. Given more time, I would have wanted to secure more interviews with first- and second-tier traditional rulers, as they work on the ground and with their communities. Interviews with government officials would also have given a different perspective on the position of traditional leaders in the governance-security nexus.

4.4.1 Case study

As mentioned in the above section, this research focused on a case study design (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1; Collier & Elman 2008: 780; Newman & Ridenour 1998: 9). The following section expands on these methods, explaining and justifying their use within the study. This research used a single, exploratory and evaluative case study. This kind of case study elicited a holistic and in-depth investigation and evaluation of the side-lined role of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria (Baxter & Jack 2008: 538, 549; Yin 1995: 5; Zainal 2007: 1–2, 4). It provided an in-depth overview of the Nigerian socio-economic, political, and historical background, which served to foreground the issues and challenges within the state.

Case studies are a robust and commonly used research tool, strategy, method, and approach (Dooley 2002: 335; Hancock 1998: 6). They offer a rich understanding of complex and contemporary social 'conditions and problems' (Dooley 2002: 335; Hancock 1998: 6). Case studies are comprised of a number of factors including the use of 'observation, reconstruction', organisation, collection, reporting, and analysis (Stake 1994: 238; Zainal 2007: 1–2). These elements were used to provide fresh insights into the under-researched area of traditional rulers in the Global South. The study foregrounded the side-lined voices of traditional rulers and offered a small step towards generalising these kinds of actors in other Global South contexts (Stake 1994: 238; Zainal 2007: 1–2).

A case study investigates 'an event, an entity, an individual or even a unit of analysis' 'within its real-life context' (Noor 2008: 1602; Vennesson 2008: 226). Due to their in-depth nature, case studies can be considered as a form of longitudinal study, concerned with 'how and why things happen', providing a 'detailed contextual analysis' of a given phenomenon (Baxter &

Jack 2008: 544; Noor 2008: 1602; Zainal 2007: 1–2). Case studies fall under the constructivist approach because they investigate the subjectivity and constructed nature of reality (Baxter & Jack 2008: 545).

Case studies have different features and characteristics. They make use of a diverse range of sources like 'documents, artefacts, interviews and observation' which provide strong and useful tools for understanding and examining data in its natural context (Bhattacherjee 2012: 93; Rowley 2002: 17; Zainal 2007: 4). There are a multitude of case study types, for example, single, multiple, exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, interpretive, evaluative, intrinsic, instrumental, collective, holistic, and embedded. This study focused on a single case as it would give me a fuller and richer 'understanding' of the side-lined nature of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria (Baxter & Jack 2008: 549; Yin 1993: 5). The single case study also allowed for a deep dive into the Nigerian context and literature of security and governance, fulfilling the need to analyse distinctly from a Global South perspective.

The other types of case study used in this study were exploratory and evaluative. The exploratory case study afforded me the chance to deeply explore the under-researched field of traditional rulers in security and governance (Baxter & Jack 2008: 548; Zainal 2007: 4). These two case study types also define the parameters of subsequent research and determine the 'feasibility of the desired research procedures', both of which were part of this study (Yin 1993: 4–5). The final component of this study is its evaluative case study. The evaluative case study seeks to discern and judge whether or not traditional rulers in northern Nigeria are a side-lined actor in the formal practices of security and governance in northern Nigeria (Zainal 2007: 4).

While there are strong reasons for the use of case studies as a design approach within research, there are also weaknesses and limitations of this method. Scholars have questioned the scientific rigour and reliability of case studies, as they lack measures to address issues of generalisability and replication (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008: 1465; Noor 2008: 1603; Zainal 2007: 2). It is important to note that these limitations are qualities of the quantitative approach. This study was interested in eliciting deep and rich data from a single case. This study is very specific to the context and complexity of northern Nigeria and so cannot be easily replicated in other contexts. However, the findings of this study can potentially provide useful insights, methodologies, and strategies that can be used to investigate other traditional rulers within the Global South.

Case studies are often limited in that they are reliant on theories to drive the research capabilities, 'the case selection, the comparison, the within-case analysis and the empirical investigation' (Vennesson 2008: 236). This often means that the incorrect theory used leads to case studies that are lacking or that the theory is ill-suited or forced to conform to the case under study (Vennesson 2008: 236). To counter this limitation, the research theories and concepts specifically match well with and are interlinked with the research question, methodology and case study. Using the CSS tradition and Third World Security School theories provided an anchor to unpack Global South actors like traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. These theories also allowed for these side-lined and vulnerable actors to be placed at the forefront of the formal practice of security and governance. Equally, by using interpretive and constructive worldviews, I was able to draw out a nuanced understanding of traditional rulers from a critical and Global South lens.

Finally, while case studies provide a holistic view of phenomena, this is limited to the specific focal interest and time period under study (Noor 2008: 1603). As such, some case studies are unable to provide broad generalisations for other time periods and contexts and are only useful for 'capturing the emergent and immanent properties' of a phenomenon (Noor 2008: 1603). While this limitation is true, given the time constraints and cost implications involved in conducting multiple cases, I decided it would be better to focus on providing a rich and in-depth analysis of one type of traditional ruler in northern Nigeria. This is also an under-researched area and will only add to the growing literature around traditional rulership within security and governance.

4.4.2 Interviews

There are three types of interview approaches: highly structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Hancock 1998: 9). For this study, I made use of semi-structured interviews because they are comprised of focused interviews with a 'series of open-ended questions', based on a loose structure (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1; Seidman 2006: 9–10). This format allowed for in-depth discussions, understandings and elaborations of the research questions posed to the participants (Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1; Seidman 2006: 9–10).

Interviews are often compared to everyday conversations because they illicit a great deal of information from participants from their 'own frame of reference' (Bricki & Green 2007: 11;

Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 1; Mack et al. 2005: 1). It is an interesting way of understanding human nature, behaviour and contexts, as well as hearing 'people's stories' and experiences (Mack et al. 2005: 1; Seidman 2006: 7–8; Wahyuni 2012: 73).

It is important for an interviewer to remember that an 'interview is not an interrogation' (Nunkoosing 2005: 702). It is a conversation where participants can freely and comfortably share their thoughts and sentiments on the subject matter being investigated. By having a conversation, it puts the interviewees at ease, and they are easily able to give their opinions. If the interview is conducted like an interrogation, it will limit how the participants respond to the questions. It may also make them skew their responses to please the interviewer. But it is important to remember that 'the research interview is not a neutral product of the academy' (Nunkoosing 2005: 704). It is based on human subjects who hold their own understandings and views on things. They are subjective, and as a result, while interviews can be considered 'authentic' portrayals of information, it does not always mean that they are 'true' (Nunkoosing 2005: 701).

Interviews serve a dual purpose, one where the interviewer and the interviewee find 'mutual benefit' (Nunkoosing 2005: 703). The interviewer gets intimate information that they would otherwise not have been able to get. For the interviewee, the interview is a way of expressing themselves. It is also a way to put forward their opinions on the subject matter in question. In a sense, the interviewee is not only a passive participant but is also actively participating in growing knowledge.

4.4.2.1 Power dynamics within interviews

It is important for the interviewer to be aware of the power dynamics inherently present in interviews (Nunkoosing 2005: 699). These dynamics take 'many forms and degrees' and are related to the identities of the actors involved (Nunkoosing 2005: 699, 704). For the interviewer, power 'rests in his or her authority as a seeker of knowledge and methodological expertise', while for the interviewee, their power rests in the fact that they are a 'more or less privileged knower' (Nunkoosing 2005: 699). Power is 'constantly shifting back and forth between the interviewer to the interviewee' (Nunkoosing 2005: 699). It is therefore important that the interviewer is aware of these dynamics and is able to delicately balance them in their quest for knowledge.

4.4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews have a 'relatively detailed interview guide' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 1). The one used in this study is attached as Appendix 1. Semi-structured interviews are 'used when there is sufficient objective knowledge about an experience or phenomenon, but the subjective knowledge is lacking' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 1). So, while there is information on traditional rulers in different literature, there is not a lot of literature that focuses on their link to security and governance. In addition, their voices and the opinions of those on the ground who work with these types of actors has not been fully explored within the literature and discourse. I chose to use semi-structured interviews because they are considered a 'more ethical way to conduct the research' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7). It allowed me to have 'verbal and non-verbal communication' with the participants (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7). I was able to discern 'any discomfort or unease' or lack of knowledge that the interviewees had (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7).

The disadvantages of semi-structured interviews are that participants may 'feel inhibited when asked to respond to sensitive questions' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7). This may lead to them not answering the question or providing 'more socially desirable' and 'conventional answers' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7). This may be problematic for a researcher as they may never know what answers are true. To mitigate this for this study, the same questions were asked to all participants and their responses were triangulated to see which answers reoccurred and which did not. Another disadvantage is that interviews are 'costly in terms of time and money' (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 7). The study was only able to conduct 20 interviews because of the time frame to complete the research. I was also unable to make an additional trip to Nigeria to interview more people because of the costs required for travelling.

4.5 <u>SAMPLING</u>

For this study, I used non-probability sampling, and more specifically, purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was used to pre-select participants based on four categories: traditional rulers, academics, civil society organisations and the government (Bhattacherjee 2012: 69; Bogdan & Biklen 2005: 5–6; Bricki & Green 2007: 9–10; Mack et al. 2005: 5–6). This enabled me to interview participants who were working in the field of security and governance, and who were intimately familiar with traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. For each category, five participants were interviewed. I found that with 20 participants, data

saturation was reached, and this meant that there was no need to interview more participants for specific questions.

Snowball sampling was also used in this research. It is also referred to as 'chain referral sampling', in which the 'social networks' of participants already interviewed were used to get access to other potential participants who could be included in the study (Bhattacherjee 2012: 69; Mack et al. 2005: 5–6). By using this method, I tapped into 'hidden populations' who were previously inaccessible and unknown during the pre-selection portion of purposive sampling (Bhattacherjee 2012: 69–70; Mack et al. 2005: 5–6; Bricki & Green 2007: 10).

4.6 <u>ANALYSIS OF DATA</u>

Qualitative data analysis methods were used in this study for meaning-making and facilitating detailed analysis, description, and interpretation of the data collected (Flick 2013: 5–6, 11). Qualitative data analysis is all about 'expanding the material' to elicit more interpretations (Flick 2013: 11). This falls in line with the methodology, worldviews and data collection type chosen for this study.

Data is the medium through which we gain and interpret knowledge to make sense of our reality. For this study, I used three analysis types: reflective, interpretive, and thematic. These analysis types allowed for 'pattern matching, linking data' and 'explanation building' between the theory explored and the data collected from the field (Baxter & Jack 2008: 554). By using reflective analysis, I was able to critically reflect on the nature of traditional rulership (Dooley 2002: 343; Mitchell 2017: 167). The study examined their role and impact and reflexively thought about the premise of this thesis: how and why traditional rulers could be considered a side-lined actor in security and governance in northern Nigeria (Dooley 2002: 343; Mitchell 2017: 167). On the ground, traditional rulers are important actors, so why did this importance not reflect in the same way within the formal practice of security and governance? In several discussions with experts, participants wondered why this type of research was being conducted, considering that traditional rulers have long played a vital role in northern Nigerian communities.

It was only when the data had been collected and reflected on that I realised the study was more theoretical in nature, i.e., how and why the formal practice of security and governance does not reflect the reality of relations and dynamics of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria. For

this, I used interpretive analysis to infer and interpret the opinions and experiences of the participants, and this is reflected in the research question posed (Pietkiewicz & Smith 2014: 362; Creswell, Shope, Plano Clark & Green 2006: 5). Like reflective analysis, interpretive analysis is based on 'critical reflection' to make sense of social reality (Dooley 2002: 343; Mitchell 2017: 167). For this study, the interpretive analysis explored the interpreted social reality surrounding traditional rulers, trying to make sense of why they were a side-lined actor within northern Nigeria despite having a prominent role in security and governance (Pietkiewicz & Smith 2014: 362; Creswell, Shope, Plano Clark & Green 2006: 5).

I also spent time 'self-interpreting' and self-reflecting on the research question and why participants wondered about this research area (Creswell, Shope, Plano Clark & Green 2006: 5). For the most part, participants were convinced that traditional rulers were a big part of security and governance practice, at least on the ground. They did not think of their importance and impact within the formal practice of security and governance. The respondents, and at times myself, were either unaware or kept forgetting that there is not always a clear link or distinction between theory and practice. They were unable to see how traditional rulers were 'silenced voices' within formal security and governance practice – especially because of their prominent role on the ground and within the communities (Pietkiewicz & Smith 2014: 362). The logical assumption was that this practical importance would also translate into the written discourses and literature. However, when studying literature and discourse through a Western lens, this same assumption did not hold true. One of the objectives of this study was to highlight and honour the subtleties and 'individual differences' between Global North and Global South interpretations of the world (Pietkiewicz & Smith 2014: 362). By changing the focus of analysis and referent object, I was able to fully grasp these subtleties and complexities.

The final pillar of data analysis in this study was theoretical thematic analysis. It allowed for the explicit and systematic identification, summary, and extraction of common patterns and themes 'in the form' of a 'specific theory' (Clarke & Braun 2013: 120; Joffe 2012: 210–211; Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas 2013: 400). Thematic analysis is rooted in 'content analysis' because it offers a systematic identification of themes within the data (Joffe 2012: 209, 211). It is a useful tool for 'social construction' and so links well with the constructivist worldview used in this study (Joffe 2012: 212).

Thematic analysis consists of six phases:

a) Familiarity with data – this required that I be intimately familiar with the data.

b) Coding – in which I developed labels about important features within the data.

c) Identification of themes – this is an active process in which I search for themes within the data.

d) Review of the themes – this consists of an analysis of whether the themes correlate and match the 'coded extracts and the full data set'. It also reviews whether the themes are coherent and relevant to the full study, as well as whether some of the themes should be broken up or collapsed in on themselves.

e) Naming and defining themes – this involves the write-up and 'detailed analysis of each theme', capturing the essence of each theme in a 'concise, punchy and informative name'.

f) Writing up – this is where I wove together a vivid narrative that presents the data in a 'coherent and persuasive' manner. It also allowed me to contextualise the data in 'relation to the existing literature'.

<div style="text-align: right">(Clarke & Braun 2013: 121–122)</div>

There are two types of thematic analysis: inductive and theoretical (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). Inductive thematic analysis recognises strong themes related to the 'specific data subject' while the theoretical thematic analysis is reliant on latent themes (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). This study specifically focused on the theoretical thematic analysis because it goes beyond mere description and surface meaning. I also explicitly extract analysis in the form of a 'specific theory' (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). However, theoretical thematic analysis is considered 'less rich', as it is focused on analysing data from a specific theory (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). While this is a general criticism for this analysis type, it was a useful tool that allowed me to be fully immersed in and engaged with the theories of the CSS and Third World Security School for this study.

A further subdivision within thematic analysis lies in the use of sematic or latent themes. Sematic themes involved only considering the surface themes that emerge from 'what the participant has said or what is written' (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). It does not go into depth or beyond the descriptive approach, unlike latent themes (Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). This study used latent themes, which are analytical and involve 'detecting and testing beliefs, presumptions and conceptualisation' and assigning them to 'classified patterns' that emerge

from the data (Aronson 1995: 1–2; Javadi & Zarea 2016: 35). The themes are then combined and catalogued according to patterns and sub-themes (Aronson 1995: 1–2).

In order to have a clearer argument and to provide coherence between the different themes and data collected, this study used triangulation to tie everything together and make a concise analysis. Triangulation is a part of mixed-methods research in which 'several methodological', or 'theoretical perspectives', methods, sources, or investigators are used to analyse data (Bekhet & Zausniewski 2012: 2; Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl 1993: 238; Flick 2013: 11–12). The use of triangulation cancels out 'intrinsic bias' associated with the use of 'single-method, single-observer, single-theory studies' (Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl 1993: 238). The main reason triangulation was used in this study was to increase the validity of the research by comparing data and evidence through multiple analysis techniques (Hussein 2009: 5; Bricki & Green 2007: 26; Turner & Turner 2009: 1). This approach provided a varied and diverse analysis from the data (Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl 1993: 238; Hussein 2009: 3; Olsen 2004: 3). Each research analysis technique used in this study presented a unique perspective, and by using triangulation, these perspectives added nuance, depth, and unique detail to provide a holistic, richer and more 'complete understanding' of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria (Hussein 2009: 3, 8; Turner & Turner 2009: 1). While there are various types of triangulation: methodological, investigator, theoretical, analysis and data, this study focused on the use of analysis triangulation, in which two or more methods are used for data validation, accuracy and limiting 'false conclusions' (Hammersley 2008; Hussein 2009: 3; Turner & Turner 2009: 1).

There are also two forms of triangulation: across and within methods (Bekhet & Zausniewski 2012: 2; Hussein 2009: 3). Across-method triangulation is the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques and is used for external consistency (Bekhet & Zausniewski 2012: 2; Hussein 2009: 3). For this study, I used within-method triangulation, in which 'two or more data collection procedures' are used to achieve validation, 'internal consistency' and accuracy (Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl 1993: 238; Bricki & Green 2007: 26; Flick 2013: 11–12). This form of triangulation, combined with the analysis triangulation increased the validity of the research by comparing diverse data analysis types: reflective, thematic, and interpretive analysis (Bricki & Green 2007: 26; Olsen 2004: 3; Turner & Turner 2009: 1).

4.7 <u>ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS</u>

Throughout this study, I wanted to ensure that the autonomy and dignity of the participants, as well as their communities, were respected. The participants had so graciously allowed me to interview them, so I made sure to meet all the participants in a location of their choice to facilitate a safe and enabling environment for them to freely express themselves (Farrimond 2012: 26–27, 30; Mack et al. 2005: 9; Punch 1994: 92). The areas where the interviews took place were quiet environments that minimised distractions and loud noises.

I also made sure to minimise the 'risks associated with research' like physical, psychological, and social risks (Farrimond 2012: 26–27, 30; Mack et al. 2005: 9; Punch 1994: 92). I made sure that the questions asked were not of a personal nature and did not touch on sensitive subject areas. I was also open and honest with the participants, ensuring that they were well informed of the goals, outcomes, and implications of the study through written and oral consent (Bricki & Green 2007: 5; Mack et al. 2005: 9, 11; Farrimond 2012: 26–27, 30; Punch 1994: 90, 92). I undertook to protect their confidentiality through written and verbal consent and by using pseudonyms, thereby protecting their identities (Mack et al. 2005: 11; Farrimond 2012: 133; Bricki & Green 2007: 5; Punch 1994: 92).

Another part of the ethical considerations made within this study was the storage of the data. During fieldwork, I made audio recordings of the interviews with the participants, as well as fieldnotes. These notes and audio recordings helped with the analysis and were saved and backed up on Google Drive. Only I had access to these password-protected files, which prevented the data from being accessed by outside parties. This data storage format also helped to keep the data safe from corruption or hard drive failure. In addition, the data was saved on a password-protected computer (Wahyuni 2012: 75).

Whilst meaning is derived and constructed from the subjects and phenomena under investigation, I made a conscious effort to acknowledge my own internal biases (Creswell 2014: 8). These biases are based on my own background, social context, history, and heritage (Creswell 2014: 8). As a young, black, female Zimbabwean, I had my own internal prejudices which may have obscured and influenced the research into traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. I had my own perceptions of these kinds of actors. And while others may see this as a hinderance, I viewed it as an opportunity to be objective to the culture, context, and data. As

an outsider, I was a little more sceptical and objective of the data. I was sufficiently distant from the culture and the background not to be swayed by cultural or national pride.

While this is true, as a foreigner, my otherness would be an obstacle to really understanding the Nigerian context or the institution of traditional rulership. I was unfamiliar with the cultural dynamics attached to traditional rulership in Nigeria. However, as a Zimbabwean, I was familiar with the institution of traditional rulership, as it is something that is present in the Zimbabwean context. I also mitigated these biases by spending months familiarising myself (reading and engaging with Nigerians and scholars) with the practices and customs of Nigeria. At the onset of this study, I fully acknowledged my internal and cultural biases and shortcomings and believed that the data analysis methods chosen (triangulation of reflective, interpretive, and thematic analysis) provided a degree of reliability and validity to the data analysis.

While these attributes may disqualify me from conducting this type of research, they also uniquely qualify me to conduct this research objectively. As a foreigner, I have a unique outlook and perspective on traditional rulership in northern Nigeria. The very same biases of background, social context, history, and heritage allow me to be even more objective with the analysis of the data collected in the field. The analysis was not tainted or clouded by feelings of patriotism and national pride. In addition, the constructivist worldview that was used subscribes to the notion that meaning is derived from the data and not from the collector of the data (Creswell 2014: 8). Meaning emerged from the data, as well as the constructed views and beliefs of the participants involved in this research, and not from any of my preconceived beliefs (Creswell 2014: 8).

4.8 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter provided the methodology used for this research. It outlined the data analysis methods to construct and analyse the data collected. It provided definitional parameters for the choice of the research design and methods: a case study and interviews. This design and methods allowed for the collection of rich, in-depth data from the field. The interviews were useful as they elicited perspectives from diverse areas and people, all of whom were based within the Global South and sub-Saharan Africa region.

This chapter also explained and justified the data collection methods, providing a rationale for the use of these methods within the study. By focusing on a single case study, I was able to provide an in-depth exploration of the context of Nigeria, as well as the system of security and governance within northern Nigeria. Through interviews, I gathered detailed data on traditional rulership in northern Nigeria from participants who worked alongside and had knowledge about these actors. This added their voices to the literature on traditional rulers, shedding light on their role and behaviour within security and governance literature. In chapters five and six, I analyse the findings I gathered during the fieldwork in 2018, 2019 and 2020. These chapters provide an analysis of the initial claims made in the justification and rationale of the study (see chapter one) by triangulating reflective, interpretive, and theoretical thematic analysis.

CHAPTER 5: THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL RULERS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

5.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This research provides a Global South reading of security and governance through the exploration of the side-lined role of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. It uses a CSS and Third World Security School approach to reflect on and discuss 'the role of representation', decision-making and provision of security in northern Nigeria (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238). It explores how and why traditional rulers have been side-lined from formal practices of security and governance, especially considering how much power, authority and influence they wield in decision-making in the north.

Traditional rulers are afforded some space within practices of security and governance; however, they are often perceived to be peripheral actors or a single, homogenous unit. More often than not, the focus of traditional forms of security and governance privilege the state as the 'winners' of security (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238). The 'losers' of security, such as alternative actors like traditional rulers, are often side-lined or ignored, as they do not conform to the scope, narrative, and epistemology of traditional security and governance. By adopting a CSS and Third World Security School lens, the focus is shifted to both the 'winners and losers of particular understandings and practices of security', highlighting the nuanced nature of Nigerian security and governance architecture (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238). It is important to include these alternative actors, as they contribute to the functioning of a state.

In northern Nigeria, the security and governance architecture is mainly protected and maintained through traditional rulership. Traditional rulers are important figures in Nigeria, but they do not appear as often in discussions around security and governance. By adopting a CSS and Third World Security School lens, this study reveals the 'socially produced' security reality within Nigeria and also reflects on how this has created the social, geo-political, and economic exclusions that side-line alternative actors like traditional rulers (Mutimer 2009: 9–10; Van Munster 2007: 235).

Chapters one and two provided the conceptual and theoretical justifications for this thesis, outlining the context and parameters that guided the study. Chapter three provided a brief

historical overview of the Nigerian context. This served as the background to the socio-economic and geo-political arena that is an undercurrent to the issues and challenges at play in Nigeria. In chapter four, the methodology and research design for the study was explored and justified and used to explain the study.

This chapter delves into the analysis of the thesis. The analysis is drawn from the interviews that I conducted in Abuja and Zazzau in Nigeria, as well as electronic interviews between 2018 and 2020. The analysis introduces traditional rulers, focusing on who they are within Nigeria and what their different roles encompass. This provides background to understanding what they do and establishes them as active actors within security and governance in the north. This chapter is divided into three sections, each describing an element of what traditional rulers are and what role they play in northern Nigeria, based on the data collected through interviews undertaken during the fieldwork described in chapter four. As was described in chapter four, thematic analysis was used to identify themes, and three of these themes form the subsections of this chapter. A further three themes will be discussed in chapter six.

The three themes or subsections discussed in this chapter are: the depth of the governance system, the endurance of the governance system, and the centrality of the roles of traditional rulers. These themes were further sub-divided into three sub-themes, namely, traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers', critical stakeholders, and intelligence and information gatherers. These sub-themes provide an insight into the different ways that traditional rulers are important actors in northern Nigeria. They highlight the ways traditional rulers operate and behave and are crucial to the functioning of northern Nigeria. They inform the discourse and debate on traditional rulership by showing the importance of the work that they do on the ground.

5.2 <u>THE DEPTH OF THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM</u>

In this section, the depth of the governance system of traditional leaders is revealed in relation to what interviewees said during the fieldwork undertaken between 2018 and 2020.

The multiplicity of cultures, religions, and ethnicities makes Nigeria a rich and complex context to analyse. This kind of complexity and diversity is important within disciplines of security and governance, as it shows the multitude of ways to understand security and governance, especially from a state as rich and diverse as Nigeria (Williams 1999: 341–342). This rich

multiplicity and diversity is especially true for northern Nigeria, which has a particularly strong and traditional governance landscape, something that the locals have termed as unique.

Northern Nigeria's uniqueness reveals the impact of history on crafting and changing the socio-political landscape within the region. This was pointed out in an interview with a second-class traditional ruler:

'As you rightly said, Nigeria, or the northern region, is unique. What you can get here, you can't get anywhere. Our system has been perfect' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Second-Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019).

He added:

'Something that is inherent, something in our blood. We are different from whatever is happening all over the world' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Second-Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019).

It is interesting how he describes Nigeria's uniqueness as 'something that is inherent, something in our blood' that cannot be found or replicated 'anywhere'. This frames traditional rulership as something instinctual and deep-seated within the psyche of northern Nigerians. This could allude to the fact that northern Nigeria sees itself as being set apart from the rest of Nigeria, whether by design or coincidence. The fact that the traditional ruler equates this system to being 'perfect' reinforces the idea that the north is unique and special as compared to other parts of Nigeria.

As pointed out by a civil society official who works at an organisation that operates in the north, traditional rulers in the north have more 'pronounced' roles and influence (NGO 3, 18/09/2019):

'Now, specifically in northern Nigeria, what I can tell you is that the peculiarity of traditional rulers is even more pronounced, because traditional rulers in northern Nigeria are usually both faith leaders and traditional leaders, as compared to the southern part of Nigeria where you can have faith actors separately and honestly see them honestly. They are not necessarily traditional leaders' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

He added:

'So, I think that's the major difference when it comes to northern Nigeria and the south in terms of the faith perspective added to it. And the other thing is that in northern Nigeria, when it comes to faith and culture – not just in northern Nigeria, across Nigeria – its interwoven' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

The 'pronounced' nature of traditional rulers in the north is based on the fact that they often occupy the role of 'faith leaders and traditional leaders'. The intertwined nature of culture and tradition in the north makes traditional rulers a potent and important actor. 'Faith and culture' in northern Nigeria give traditional rulers additional leverage, power, contacts, and links to the community that their southern counterparts lack. This dynamic is unique to the north and entrenches its set-apart nature. While religion, faith, and culture are important to understanding northern Nigeria, this was not the focus of this thesis.

During an interview with a titled traditional ruler, the uniqueness of northern Nigeria is further explained by how it is 'organised' in a different manner to the other regions (Titled Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019):

'Yes, in the south, you see the, the challenge they had in the south was that such institution never existed in the south. You see, the people in the south are organised and families or clans more than an organised institution. Nobody is in control at the top to say, uh, this man is instructing that this should be done in all the, in my territory or my land. No, there is nothing like that. Rather, the clan head, the eldest person in the community now is the leader of that immediate community. If there are disputes, if there are issues, they are the people they approach' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019).

The north is unique in that it has preserved the timeless institution of traditional rulership. The titled traditional ruler alluded to the fact that traditional rulership in the south 'never existed', but perhaps it did, only under a different name or title/s. What is important to note is that these other structures and actors functioned in a similar manner to traditional rulers, solving disputes and being the point of contact for the communities.

In an interview with a member of an organisation that works in the north-east, it was pointed out that northern Nigeria has a multiplicity of actors who are significant and powerful, thereby adding to the uniqueness of the north:

'Because northern Nigeria is totally different from the southern part of Nigeria. The simple thing I can say is that when it comes to elite in northern Nigeria, their thinking and their ways of working and the patronage, so to speak, is totally different from. It is only in northern Nigeria, for instance, that you would see an elite that has consistent followership. People with the listings and believers see them see him as their – they don't work for him, but as their model or figure that they look up to, and they even go to on a regular basis when he is in town and will do anything for, including dying for. It is only in northern Nigeria that you would see that kind of followership to people, whether the person is a business tycoon or he is a, is a religious leader, or is a philanthropist' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

Again, we see how the north is portrayed as being 'totally different from the southern part of Nigeria'. The north is different because 'it is only in northern Nigeria' where there is leadership of all kinds and that they are revered leaders. Through 'consistent followership', elite actors enjoy notoriety and influence which keeps them relevant and important in the north.

Even historically, northern Nigeria has always been unique. Its 'set-apart' nature, is not just cultural heritage, pride or self-interest; it also stems from the fact that there is a sense of 'otherness' that other regions attribute to northern Nigerians. According to interviews with a former director-general and a member of an NGO that works in the north-east, this 'othering' has caused tensions and divisions which have fragmented Nigeria along religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and geographic lines:

'But the local communities are absolutely not engaged. And the other issue I observed is when you, for example, if you take Red Cross work in the north-east. Red Cross has lots of Nigerians working with them, but most of the Nigerians are not from the north-east. They are from the south; they are from the west. They are either Igbos or Yorubas. They don't speak the language of the north-east. They don't understand the cultural context. They don't understand the history of that place. And they may not even, in most times, respect the values. And already you know that the Boko Haram conflict, the southerners are this is northern problem – deal with it. The Niger Delta militancy, the northerners are this is a waste, a southern problem – deal with it. The IPO, the indigenous people asking for independence. Northerners are this is eastern problem – deal with it. So, there is no collective ownership of conflict. It is not seen as a Nigerian conflict…It's factionalised' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

This was corroborated by a member from an NGO:

> 'The stories about the north, it seems to, for most Nigerians, seems to be about the north-east. They don't see it as a national problem. And if it's not a national problem, then how do we manage it?' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 1, 21/03/2018).

This friction and tension have led to fragmentation and disharmony in Nigeria to the point where regional issues cannot be considered as a 'national problem' (NGO 1, 21/03/2018). This fragmentation has seemingly caused a disconnect and discord where no one is willing to take 'collective ownership' of any problems that arise, especially for issues related to northern Nigeria (Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

By describing northern Nigeria as 'unique', the second-class traditional ruler's words echo a core value of the CSS school: that there can be multiple referent objects within security and governance discourses, all of them important, equal and offering expanded, interesting analyses of the daily existence of traditional rulers (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14; Second-Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019). While this thesis is focused on traditional rulers as the unit of analysis, this is not to say that there are not any other actors like vigilantes, transnational groups, religious groups, businessmen, and even philanthropists etc., who have a role in security and governance in northern Nigeria (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). In chapter six (section 6.2.1), the role of vigilantes in the security and governance nexus will be discussed. This demonstrates that by shifting the focus of security and governance discourse away from the state, the CSS school allows for an opening and broadening of the debates and discourses on security and governance.

With the state no longer being the sole referent object in security and governance practice, invisible, marginalised, and side-lined actors are identified, incorporated, and prioritised equally within formal practice (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14). Northern Nigeria's uniqueness stems from the plethora of diverse actors involved in security and governance, for example, traditional rulers, vigilantes, and transnational terror groups. This is not to say that other actors in other regions are not as important or interesting to study. It is just the roles of traditional rulers are more 'pronounced' in the north due in part to the centrality of their role, how they have endured as a system of rule, and how they have stood in the gap and absence of the state, providing for their communities (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). Mainstream security lenses are often

either too narrow to pick up these types of actors or they relegate these actors to more peripheral roles (Ayoob 1997: 121; Bilgin 2008b: 5, 89; Bilgin 2008a: 92). This kind of non-traditional analysis opens up the practice for analysis from different geographical locales, actors, viewpoints, etc. It questions and unmasks the mainstream and 'socially produced' exclusions that have side-lined these kinds of voices and shows how these voices are equally important and relevant to decision-making within Global South contexts (Mutimer 2009: 9–10; Williams 1999: 342).

An important component of the uniqueness of northern Nigeria is the centrality of traditional rulership. Traditional rulers in the north play a significant role in maintaining governance, gathering intelligence, holding and convening meetings, making rulings and judgements, and being faith and traditional rulers for the people (Akinwale 2010: 137; Kraxberger 2009: 454; Osemwota 1989: 79; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013b: 128). The focus on traditional rulers in this thesis deepens the level of analysis in security and governance, all while highlighting an equally important actor in northern Nigeria (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14; Mutimer 2009: 9–10). This highlights the type of 'low politics' and non-military security concerns that are important to the Third World Security School and Global South approaches (Acharya 2001: 444; Caballero-Anthony 2016: 4, 14, 23; Newman 2010: 81; Walker 1997: 64–65). It is just as important to focus on the 'pronounced' role of traditional rulers in the north as it explains how and why they have endured and remained important actors in the social fabric of Nigeria (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). This type of analysis also elevates the marginalised and side-lined realities, struggles, and actors based in northern Nigeria.

An interesting and unique feature of northern Nigeria is its fragmented nature. The north is fractured internally and 'othered[6]' by other regions. The north's internal fractured nature comes from non-military issues like religion, culture, tradition, and ethnicity, which are sources of insecurity in the north. The north is also 'othered' by other regions in Nigeria. There is 'no collective ownership' of how to deal with all these difficulties and tensions (Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018). Instead, each state finds a way to 'deal with' problems by themselves, reminiscent of the idea of the 'North for Northerners, East for Easterners and West for Westerners' (Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018; Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 12).

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[6] To be othered is an expression of 'prejudice on the basis of group identities'. It is a 'set of common processes and conditions that propagate group-based inequality and marginality'. The 'dimensions of othering include, but are not limited to, religion, sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (class), disability, sexual orientation, and skin tone'.

A Global South reading of the north would allow for a different interpretation of events and things as well as a prioritisation and centring of previously marginalised and side-lined actors like traditional rulers within formal security and governance practices. It would also recognise the work that these alternative actors are already doing in northern Nigeria. However, at this stage, regions and actors are more self-interested and distrustful than they are cooperative. It would make sense that actors like traditional rulers would have a more centralised and pivotal role at the centre of practice, given how integral they are. They are at the heart of decision-making within northern Nigeria.

5.3 THE ENDURANCE OF THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

The previous section served to illustration depth of the governance system in Nigeria. It looked at how unique northern Nigeria is. In this section, the endurance of the governance system of traditional leaders is examined in relation to what interviewees said during the fieldwork undertaken between 2018 and 2020.

Indirect rule is an important consideration when analysing and understanding Global South realities and the northern Nigerian context. It is an intrinsic reality for this region and has profound effects that have spilled over into the post-independence era. British colonial rule is a significant factor in the history of Nigeria. It played a significant role, cementing British colonial rule, preserving traditional rulership to further British rule, and signalling the steady decline of the influence of traditional rulership in modern Nigeria.

According to a traditional ruler and a government official, while traditional rulership has been hailed as a 'complete' and 'functional' system, it is also the main reason and vehicle through which indirect rule was able to take root and thrive strongly in the north (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019; Second-Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019). The government official stated:

> 'At the same time, you kn/ow, when the British came, in 1902, there about, they found the system, a functional system whereby the Emir or Amir, translated to English, it means the leader' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

He elaborated by stating:

'So, even when the British were there, when they came in 1902, they found a, well, like I said before, a functional system, so that is why they did what you call indirect rule. You know, indirect rule is more or less the British, you know, transferred information to the Emir because they found out that the Emir is highly respected within the whole community' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

This was reiterated by a traditional ruler:

'That's why when British came, instead of meeting us without any system, everything complete. Rather they said, you have a system, we will only use their system. So, they introduced indirect rule' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Second Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019).

He additionally stated:

'We have justice, security, health issue, we have agriculture, we have everything you think about. Everything of ours is complete and unique' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Second Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019).

Indirect rule allowed the British to rule Nigeria through the veneer of traditional rulership. The British were able to understand the value and power that traditional rulers had over their communities, as they were 'fully in charge of the whole community' and were 'highly respected' (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). Traditional rulers were used to strengthen and drive the British colonial project.

Indirect rule significantly influenced the way in which traditional rulers are viewed in Nigeria. The British saw the value of using a system that was already there (Second Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019). Colonial rule also preceded the separation and isolation of the power and influence of traditional rulers. While it provided traditional rulers with colonial legitimacy to rule, it also isolated and singled them out. By Nigerian independence, the role and mandate of traditional rulers had significantly diminished to the point where they were feared and distrusted due to their perceived collaboration with British rule (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 75; Miles 1993: 34). Interestingly, in northern Nigeria, the power, authority, and influence of traditional rulers endured even after independence. Traditional rulers remain an integral and crucial actor in the north, involved in the day-to-day activities and decision-making within the communities.

5.4 <u>THE CENTRALITY OF THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS</u>

The two previous sections serve as an illustration of the importance of traditional rulers in Nigeria, expanding on the depth of their role and their endurance over the years. The following sections examine their centrality and importance in northern Nigeria along the following three sub-themes: traditional rulers as gatekeepers, traditional rulers as critical stakeholders and traditional rulers as intelligence and information gatherers.

5.4.1 Traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers'

The influence of traditional rulers can be most felt and understood by viewing their relationship with other actors. It has been pointed out on numerous occasions that actors need to go through traditional rulers to gain access to the communities. As pointed out by an official from an NGO that works in the north-east, traditional rulers are the first point of access to communities:

> 'To always see the traditional rulers first…that's the entry point' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

This shows how important it is to 'always see the traditional rulers first' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This first encounter is important for success and continued access in the communities because traditional rulers are the gateway to the communities.

Officials from NGOs that operate in the north-east confirmed that traditional rulers are a gateway to the communities, especially if they seek to gain electoral success and traction within the communities:

> 'For rural setting, it is more evident because it is them, the politicians, will go to when it comes to what to do XYZ or seeking for electoral votes or we are seeking to mobilise the community to do certain XYZ projects. They are usually the gatekeepers, right. So, politicians, investors, they always bring them to the table because they recognise the power and authority, they will, in terms of to mobilise local people' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

This sentiment was echoed by a member of a different NGO:

> 'The traditional rulers hold more power because, for political office holders, they need their support to get what they want in government politics and so on and so forth' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

Politicians regularly go into the communities to broker favour with traditional rulers because they 'recognise the power and authority' that traditional rulers have to 'mobilise local people' (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). 'Politicians and investors' are careful and deliberate with courting traditional rulers because they 'hold more power' in the communities and their 'support' is necessary to do well and get electoral votes (NGO 2, 22/03/2018; NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

Traditional rulers have a valuable contribution to make. According to a member of an NGO working in the north-east, traditional rulers are the heart of the community, with the ability to 'bring people together' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This was reiterated four times:

> 'The traditional rulers are helping to bring people together. They identify those that should be at the table for this conversations' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

He further added:

> 'When we were having a conversation, we want you people to bring them. Which is good. They said no, they said without these people on the table, we can't meaningful conversations' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

In addition to this, the member of the NGO added:

> 'If, for instance, in one local government, there are, lets says, eight ethnic groups, they have what they call development associations. So, we bring all of these. The chief gets all these people together' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

These sentiments were further echoed in the following statement:

> 'It doesn't mean life is any less because he is a chief or not a chief. But we have seen that they hold a very significant position in helping to resolve this matter. Because people listen to them. If they say, look, lets maintain peace, let's sit and resolve these issues on the table, people listen, and they do that. And that's how we've been able to get people on the negotiating table' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2 22/03/2018).

According to these interviewees, traditional rulers are essential in bringing people together. They 'identify' and know exactly who needs to be at meetings and the 'negotiating table' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). They are extremely important actors within the socio-political environment,

with an intimate knowledge of who should or should not be included. They are able to bring marginalised and side-lined groups because without them, conversations are meaningless. Given their intimate knowledge, it makes sense that traditional rulers know the key players and who should be included in these types of conversations.

While the power and influence of traditional rulers is seen in a positive light, it can also have negative implications. Gatekeeping can also be a limitation and a restriction. A government official pointed out how the intimate knowledge that traditional rulers have regarding the various actors could potentially be dangerous:

> 'They know, traditional rulers know the people within their domain. If a strange person comes, they know. They even know the criminal' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

From this, we can see that traditional rulers 'even know the criminal' (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). This can have negative implications in the sense that traditional rulers potentially know criminal elements but could be withholding information or providing sanctuary for these types of actors, either to protect them or use them for illegal purposes.

According to a government official, traditional rulers can not only grant access, they can also block or deny access to the communities:

> 'They must consult traditional rulers. If the traditional rulers say, no, this is not good for my people, they can't move forward with it' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

This was echoed by a member of an NGO:

> 'In the farmer/herder conflict, a lot is resting on the chief to help to restore some normalcy and to bring the conversation to the table. When you meet with them, they will tell you that my people say let's talk with them, we'll talk with them. My people say let's not talk, we will not talk' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The member of the NGO further added:

> 'Traditional rulers are very powerful because they are the ones who connect with the bottom level of people in the community. So, whatever you are going to do, without

them involved, you are sure to have failure' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The gatekeeping role that traditional rulers play is very powerful, enough to deny access to anything they deem to be 'not good' for their communities (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). Without the buy-in or blessing of traditional rulers, any attempts to engage with communities invariably end in 'failure' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). Traditional rulers can 'say no' or not allow things to 'move forward' (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This shows how integral it is to include and engage with traditional rulers.

An important aspect of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria is that they are 'gatekeepers' and the 'entry point' to the communities (NGO 3, 18/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018). They 'wield' much power and authority and are key to the success or 'failure' of elections, projects, and initiatives within the community (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 78; NGO 2, 22/03/2018; NGO 3, 18/09/2019; Vaughan 1995: 512). This section highlights how Global South, CSS and Third World Security School readings foreground actors that are silenced, side-lined, marginalised, and on the periphery of formal security and governance practice. They hold incredible power and authority. This contrasts with mainstream security and governance literature and its hyper-fixation with formalised and international institutions and actors. Local actors, like traditional rulers, have more currency within the community, which is why it is important that other actors engage with and go through traditional rulers. This non-traditional analysis directly questions the prioritisation of mainstream discourses to keep up the dichotomies of inclusion and exclusion (Mutimer 2009: 9; NGO 2, 22/03/2018; Williams 1999: 342). Traditional rulers, while on the periphery of formal security and governance practice, have more power and currency than other formal actors like the state. It is strange that they are kept out of the spotlight, given their power and influence.

On the one hand, traditional rulers are gatekeepers and protectors of their communities. As 'Fathers of their people', traditional rulers safeguard the community from ill intent and bad actors (Abdulqadir 2016: 2, 7; Blench, Longtau, Hassan & Walsh 2006: I; Ojo 1976: 122; Vaughan 1995: 512). They supervise and oversee those who want to access the communities. From a Global South reading, this highlights how traditional rulers are protective in nature and serve as a counterbalance to the exploitative and unequal power relations of outside actors who try to access their communities. From a governance perspective, these specific actions and

decisions directly keep their communities safe from bad influences. They also showcase where power and influence lie, and without the blessing of the traditional rulers, other actors cannot successfully access or work in the communities.

On the other hand, traditional rulers can also be gatekeepers in a negative sense. They can inadvertently keep the communities isolated from outside influences and actors. This leaves communities reliant on traditional rulers. From a CSS perspective, this evokes questions on who is being 'secured, from what and by which means' (Mutimer 2009: 10). In some respects, this infringement can be seen as a good thing, as it shelters the communities from corruption and anything foreign. At the same time, it leaves the communities vulnerable and alienated from the wider world that they are a part of. It deprives communities of aid, resources, information, development, etc. This stance can also be detrimental because it limits access to other marginalised and vulnerable actors (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14). This contradicts the general non-traditional security narrative of opening up the discourse (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14).

In its more extreme form, it can be seen as a ploy by traditional rulers to consolidate and centralise power around themselves. By centring access in one referent object – traditional rulers – they are committing the same sins as state-centric and mainstream security thinking. It also inadvertently overburdens them because 'a lot is resting on the chief' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). So, instead of shouldering this burden with other actors, traditional rulers are acting alone. This pressure is a lot to bear, especially in a modern society which is different in make-up and configuration from pre-colonial Nigeria. By broadening the scope of security and governance thinking, the CSS and non-traditional security perspectives can alleviate these burdens by appointing multiple actors to decision-making positions.

This narrative of traditional rulers being the gatekeepers of society also shows how the vulnerable and marginalised actors are, in fact, the wellsprings of information, power, and authority. It also vests control of power and authority in the institution of traditional rulership. Actors outside the ambit of traditional rulership, or who are not vouched for by traditional rulers, are viewed with distrust, suspicion, and even hostility, which could be detrimental to the growth and development of the communities. It also means that the burden of responsibility for communities' rests squarely in the hands of traditional rulers. For better or worse, traditional rulers are the central point for the communities.

5.4.2 Traditional rulers as critical stakeholders

What is clearly emerging from the data and from the field is that traditional rulers are significant and critical stakeholders in northern Nigeria. There is critical work that traditional rulers do on the ground. There is also recognition by other actors that traditional rulers play an important role in providing security and governance, services, mentorship, and leadership to the communities.

According to personal interviews with two NGOs, traditional rulers in the north are important and 'significant' role players (NGO 2, 22/03/2018):

> 'Place of traditional rulers in everyday life especially in the north. Traditional rulers are very significant' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The importance of traditional rulers was further explained by a member of another NGO:

> 'We are making recommendation the involvement of stakeholders, because in the community, there are people called influencers. Without them, any project will never start' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

This statement was echoed by a member of the previous NGO:

> 'Traditional rulers are very powerful because they are the ones who connect with the bottom level of people in the community. So, whatever you are going to do, without them involved, you are sure to have failure' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

This solidifies the fact that traditional rulers have a significant impact on, and relevance to, 'everyday life especially in the north' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). Traditional rulers are 'significant' because they are 'influencers', able to influence the success or 'failure' of any initiatives and 'connect with the bottom level of people in the community' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018; Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018). This facilitates trust and builds relationships within the communities.

According to some university lecturers, the influence that traditional rulers hold is rooted in reverence, cultural norms, and practices. They hold sway and authority over their subjects:

'The northern part of Nigeria, the Emirs are well respected, ok, and they are obeyed. If they say stop, they will stop. If they say go, they will go – yes!' (Personal Interview, Abuja, University Lecturers, 21/03/2018).

Any decision or pronouncement made by traditional rulers in the north is 'obeyed' because the Emirs are 'well respected' (University Lecturers, 21/03/2018). It is significant to note that any commands issued by traditional rulers carry unquestioned weight and authority, i.e., 'they will stop', 'they will go' (University Lecturers, 21/03/2018).

Traditional rulers are also critical stakeholders because of the ways they are able to support the state in dispensing governance in the north. As pointed out by a number of NGOs that work in the north-east, not only does the state look to traditional rulers for support, they also 'recognise' the power and prestige that this position holds (NGO 2, 22/03/2018; NGO 3, 18/09/2019):

> 'Now, they are not necessarily recognised in the constitution as a governance structure, but they are recognised more as a supportive structure for governance because of the kind of power and voice they wield' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

This was also pointed out by a former director-general:

> 'So, it made it easy for the traditional institutions to have a role to play, because if you have a government that is using traditional rulers to take decisions and tried the government with decisions. And government found those useful, even to become policy issues. Then you can see they were being carried along and they were also critical stakeholders who gave ideas that were useful' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

This was echoed by a member of an NGO:

> 'The traditional rulers hold more power, because for political office holders, they need their support to get what they want in government politics and so on and so forth' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

This was corroborated by another member of an NGO:

> 'So, government recognises the importance of traditional rulers, right, they understand, they recognise the power they wield. They recognise the how instrumental could be for, for governance. But I guess what I'm saying is that they can be recognised but they

don't. The power is not solely with them, so to speak, right, and it's not limited to them' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

Even though the state only views traditional rulers as a 'supportive structure', there is a recognition that traditional rulers are important for governance in the north. Their value, 'power and voice' make it difficult to entirely dismiss or leave them out of the discourse on security and governance (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). Traditional rulers seem to be essential actors, and the state is aware of how 'useful' they are (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). The fact that traditional rulers 'hold more power' and 'importance' is significant as it boosts their prestige and legitimacy. Political office bearers often court the favour of traditional rulers to 'get what they want in government politics' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The critical role of traditional rulers in governance involves multiple spheres, like administration, security, and justice. According to several sources, a titled traditional ruler, a government official, and officials from an NGO and an INGO, traditional rulers are the first line of defence when it comes to security issues within their communities:

> 'Primary focus the role they can play in addressing security challenges as a nation' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

A traditional ruler echoed this sentiment:

> 'Now, well, you see, these traditional institutions have a lot to offer when it comes to security. So, the only way to make them to maximise the potentials of they providing security services, both to the people and to the state government, is to properly position them' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

He followed this up by stating how traditional rulers provide security:

> 'Now, but besides that, you know, okay, traditional rulers, can they have control over their subjects. And these subjects are such that they can convey messages to them as he can call them for meetings. They can assign, they can send messages to contain any security threats in those areas' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

The communities seem to have 'more confidence in' traditional rulers, and the people 'listen to' and trust them (INGO 1, 19/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018; Titled Traditional Ruler,

22/09/2019). Traditional rulers are said to wield more influence and 'have a lot to offer' in terms of security because they are 'closer to the people' (INGO 1, 19/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018). As confirmed by officials from an NGO and a government department, the state often uses traditional rulers to relay and demystify programmes and initiatives because of their close proximity to the people. It is interesting to note that the state knows how invaluable it is 'to find a way to work with traditional rulers' (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). This can have a negative implication, that without traditional rulers, the communities would not listen to the state or take their programmes and initiatives seriously. It leaves the state at the mercy of the traditional rulers.

Traditional rulers not only have a connection with the people, but they are also 'strategic' and necessary players in terms of conflict resolution and other security services (INGO 1, 19/09/2019). As a titled traditional ruler stated:

> 'It doesn't mean life is any less because he is a chief or not a chief. But we have seen that they hold a very significant position in helping to resolve this matter. Because people listen to them. If they say, look, lets maintain peace, let's sit and resolve these issues on the table, people listen, and they do that. And that's how we've been able to get people on the negotiating table' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

Similarly, someone from an INGO said:

> 'One of the things we wanted to see is where do people run to first when they face conflicts. We thought they would say the police, the security agents, but in the three states, majority of the respondents said they would run to the traditional institutions. And we tried to find out why, and they said they have more confidence in them than the security forces. And the reason for this is because the traditional institutions is closer to people than the security agents' (Personal Interview, Abuja, INGO 1, 19/09/2019).

This person also said:

> 'So, there is this connection between people and traditional rulers. And they're able to work as strategic level of conflict resolution because anything that affects their community, they are affected. They have that responsibility, even though it's not a very formal structure, but is considered to be very effective. And that is why, if you want to resolve conflict in a very strategic and sustainable way, you cannot do without the traditional institutions' (Personal Interview, Abuja, INGO 1, 19/09/2019).

The titled traditional ruler affirms this:

> 'In fact, sometime, before they engage in what we call conflicts, either communal conflicts or border conflicts or intertribal conflicts, you discover that, excuse me, nobody goes out to fight without the traditional rulers knowing about it. And that is when they now can contain them. Or, I mean, if they dare go on their own, they will find a way of punishing them, you know. So, they are very, very relevant when it comes to security and insecurity, but it's just that they have no defined role' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

These exchanges show the currency that traditional rulers have. They have 'control over their subjects' and hold a 'significant position' in terms of the containment and resolution of conflicts that arise within the community (NGO 2, 22/03/2018; Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). Traditional rulers also appear to be a deterrent to intertribal conflicts with the community not daring to 'go on their own' (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). This may be out of respect or even fear, but it is enough to make the community wary of going against their traditional rulers.

Traditional rulers also have a judicial role, contributing to justice, as pointed out by a former director-general:

> 'Whenever the traditional institutions have made a pronouncement on a case in a community, if does very good judgement because if it not based on justice and truth, the traditional ruler himself will have his own stool placed in jeopardy. And if they pronounce justice based on truth and factual issues, if you don't obey, the gods will also deal with you. So, it was highly respected, and the society was much better in terms of obeying the traditional institutions. The gods will not sanction someone based on injustice. And so, the traditional institutions were seen as the final court of arbiter for the common man. And people were happier' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

The former director-general then added:

> 'So, with that basis and basic understanding, then, you know that traditional rulers even the way were supported by culture and tradition at local areas. They easily could sit down and talk over traditional institutions without resorting to the courts because cases

that go to court took long a time to get resolved, and with the court system, they will always be a winner or loser of the case. And animosity might still continue even after the court ruling. And that's why sometimes we are not satisfied. We go and kill and appeal to supreme court' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

A member of an INGO corroborated this by stating:

'They have their limitations but are considered to be very effective in dealing with these issues, i.e., Mango local government area, Plateau – cases of wife battery and gender-based violence was so high in the community. Then the community leader met with members of traditional leader's council, and they came up with a policy that any man who beats his wife would be brought to the traditional rulers' council. The public would be there, and he would be given 100 strokes of canes. Since they started that, the cases of wife battery stopped. Every man who wants to do it wouldn't do it because he doesn't want to be embarrassed. It's not the pain of the cane, it's the embarrassment, the public disgrace and all that. They said, for them, it is their traditional way of dealing with issues' (Personal Interview, Abuja, INGO, 19/09/2019).

From this, we see that culture and tradition are important considerations for justice proceedings within the communities. They are more open, 'satisfied' and more than likely to adhere to judgements from their traditional rulers as final arbiters (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). These judgments and pronouncements are expedient, do not take 'too long a time', as we can see from the above interview excerpt, unlike the formal court system (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). The people are more willing to listen to these judgments because they believe that they are based on 'justice and truth' and therefore more 'effective' (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). The pronouncements made by traditional rulers are also enough of a deterrent – through 'embarrassment, the public disgrace' – to dissuade people from doing things that threaten the overall safety and stability of the community (INGO, 19/09/2019). This kind of justice is atypical to mainstream security and governance; however, to the communities, this type of justice seems to be respected and adhered to.

Another critical role traditional rulers play is going above and beyond the prescripts of their role and duties and engaging in issues like health, education, and general welfare. This

sentiment was reiterated numerous times by participants in interviews held in 2018 and 2019. For example, in a personal interview with a local government official, it was said that:

> 'People look up to him because of certain traits that God gave him and that he has a listening ear. And whenever he can, he assists the people or he can send delegates to assist if there is any crisis' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

Similarly, another local government official stated:

> 'But this, this one, the present Emir Sanusi, he reviewed the salaries of the *Dogarai*, because they have what you call the Emirate Council. The federal government of Nigeria helped the Emirate Council with funds to run its affairs, because this is a traditional institution, and they are keeping the peace. They help them in governance, so they create the Emirate Council. The Emirate Council have funds from the state, and federal government funds are given, given to the Emirate Council to carry out its functions. That is maintaining the district heads. Giving assistance in terms of health, education, and, you know, the general welfare to all the citizens, so money is created for the Emirate Council from the federal government. So, Sanusi, when he took over, he used part of this money and demolish a large part of the old houses within the Emir palace and built new ones for those who inherited those houses. And he reviewed their salaries at the same time' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

The local government official stated:

> 'I think he had a foundation to assist and give out scholarship to those who are less privileged to obtain education and the second one doesn't like it. You know the politicians are at loggerheads with him because he believes that, if you empower the people and encourage the people, you don't have any problem. But they are spending the money on infrastructure, building bridges, making Kano modern. He said no. That is not the priority. The priority is to give quality. He even said there is no need to be building mosques. Build schools. Where are you going to build mosques? Don't do it, build schools' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

In addition to this, the local government official added:

'He still gets the people. He used to go personally to the hospital and assist the needy, like the last one did. I, myself, was very touched. He paid some money to one young man who was sick, about 6 million to 7 million. The young man was taking a lot of things, you something small, small things that people cannot pay – 5 000, 10 000. He will go ask you, what is wrong with you? His bodyguards are following him. Personally, he will ask how much the beer is, and then he will direct that the bill should be paid' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

A member of an NGO also confirmed these statements:

'They encourage especially the youth. You know, young people are very unpredictable, and they are also the worst hit because they are largely unemployed when this conflict start, they ones whose educational pursuits are disrupted. And they are the ones who run farms, get their farms destroyed. Traditional rulers help to see that they are empowered, especially with farming. To provide them with the seedling. To provide alternative skills for them to be engaged. Also, they promote human capital development in their own way. They don't need use they monies per se, but they put pressure, they serve as a pressure group for certain things to be done and provided to people within their communities or their domains' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

It is interesting how traditional rulers are equated to divinity, appointed and sanctioned by the 'gods' (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). They are seemingly endowed with 'certain traits' like a 'listening ear' (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). These traits have allowed traditional rulers to become closer to their communities, particularly the Emir of Kano. The Emir seems to be very interested in the betterment of his community and frequently provides opportunities for his citizens to flourish and thrive, going as far as to 'pay' for them if they are struggling financially, prioritising educating the youth of the community and even reviewing the salaries of the *Dogarai* and building housing for them (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). It appears that it is not only the Emir of Kano, but other traditional rulers who appear to have gone above and beyond to help the people by providing encouragement, empowerment, human development, and capital to start projects and other things (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The Fulani traditional rulership – *Miyetti Allah* – form a part of traditional rulership in the north

and are a significant pillar. As pointed out by a government official, the *Miyetti Allah* deal with the challenges that the roaming Fulani face:

> 'Then the Fulani accused, they have a committee, *Miyetti Allah*, they have learned people within the *Miyetti Allah*. That's what they call themselves, that, the Association of the Fulani: *Miyetti Allah*. So, they came up with a solution to have those grazing reserves or the routes that were created even during the colonial times up to now, when the founding fathers enshrined it into the constitution, that they can move their cattle to so, so, so place' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

A traditional ruler confirmed this statement:

> 'Yes, they have their own association. They call it, they call it the *Miyetti Allah*. That the, that, the body. They are a national body, the umbrella under which they all come together. And it's because of the series of challenges they have to face along the line. And they try to find a protection for themselves. They try to find a legal basis for the existence as a group. If they are under any threat, anywhere, they have a platform now that they can now challenge the court any issue, you know. Sometimes they are made to pay heavily for security breach, and they lose their cows. They something in the process, and therefore, felt there should be a way of protecting themselves, under the law. That is why they have a platform like that' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

This was also confirmed by a member of an NGO:

> 'Those *Ardos* too are very powerful. They are very, very powerful, but what is more powerful now is the socio-cultural associations, that is the *Miyetti Allah*, under which all of them operate, and they listen to their leadership a lot, in that whatever they say here is done' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

Because the Fulani are roamers, it is not possible to have sitting traditional rulers who protect and serve them over a specific territory. They needed a 'platform' as a means of 'protecting themselves' (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). The *Miyetti Allah* are that platform, doing the same work as other traditional rulers in the north, like looking after their subjects, finding solutions to threats and 'challenges they have to face along the way' (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019; Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). According to an official from an NGO that

operates in the north, they seem to be just as 'powerful' as their Emir counterparts and appear to command a lot of respect (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

Like other traditional rulers, the *Ardos* and *Miyetti Allah* are relied upon by the Fulani herdsmen in various capacities. The most important are during conflict resolution and disputes with farmers:

> 'They have a very beautiful tracking system. For instance, a particular farmer/herder destroys a farm and takes off. Because how they are able to track whose cattle for miles when incident happens is really baffling. They can eat your crops and then in two hours they would have walked to Nasarawa state. So, beginning to wonder how did this happen. But once you report to the *Ardos* that this has happened, they are able to track which herder did it. So, they get compensation and make sure whoever farm was destroyed is compensated' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

He also added:

> 'This is arranged by the traditional rulers of villages and the *Ardos*' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

In addition, he stated:

> 'That why they keep the police out and so shorten the process and get justice done as quickly as possible' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

A former director-general also corroborated this information:

> 'The farmers would report to the traditional ruler, and the traditional ruler would inform, and inform and also invite the head of Fulani, in this case the herders we have are Fulanis' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

A member of an NGO confirmed the statement by the former director-general:

> 'In the past, the law of the herders is that if you are going a particular community, you must send word that you are coming. More so, like over a month or so. You will tell the local, you know, what they call *Ardos*. They are the leaders of the Fulani communities' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The people appear 'listen to their leadership', respect their council and any judgement or pronouncements they may make (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). The *Ardos* deliver justice for the benefit of their communities. Given that they are roaming herdsmen, this form of justice seems to work for them. The communities also seem happy with this as it causes less stress and frustration, and they 'get justice done as quickly as possible' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This would imply that the formal system is longer and more tedious, and they do not get justice as fast. In particular, the *Miyetti Allah* have been instrumental voices in the perennial farmer/herdsmen altercations. According to a former director-general and an official from an NGO, the *Ardos* and *Miyetti Allah* play a judicial and mediating role, often working in consultation with other traditional rulers to find solutions to crises that may arise between the two groups. The *Ardos* and *Miyetti Allah* are an essential go-between in the communities. They appear to be necessary for the resolution of conflicts (Former Director-General, 23/092019).

Despite the positive contribution of traditional rulership, there are negative implications for their communities. After Nigeria's independence in 1960, the reverence and respect for traditional rulers began to wane. There were those who viewed them with distrust and suspicion (Fatile, Majekdunmi & Adejuwon 2013: 75; Miles 1993: 34). Others did not see the need for traditional rulers, and some communities no longer put much faith in them.

With the changing times, the good relations between different traditional rulers in the north began to wane and erode. According to an official from an NGO that operates in the north, the modern era has 'changed' the way in which people perceived and understood traditional rulers (NGO 2, 22/03/2018):

> 'Over time, that changed. People felt: "I don't need to really take permission from anybody". Others became a bit stubborn. And so, these permissions were not set over time, and people just move freely' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

This contrasts with the notion expressed in the previous sections that pronouncements made by traditional rulers are absolute and upheld by all. It also seems to contrast sharply with the 'law of the herders' and the practice of the roaming Fulani in obtaining permissions to cross land (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). It creates opportunities for conflict to arise and adds to the already simmering tensions in the north. This may be one of the reasons why there have been perennial flair ups between the herders/farmers over the years. It may also explain why traditional rulers are side-lined due to their inability to effectively mediate in these kinds of conflicts.

While traditional rulers are considered powerful and respected, there are concerns about their rule. According to an official from an NGO who works in the north-east, traditional rulers are influential enough to sway and convince their communities to do or accept things that may not otherwise benefit them:

> 'Farmer/herder conflict, a lot is resting on the chief to help to restore some normalcy and to bring the conversation to the table. When you meet with them, they will tell you that my people say, let's talk with them, we'll talk with them. My people say, let's not talk, we will not talk. But they are significant because they are respected. A lot of them are elderly, so they are either able to convince their people to accept or reject depending on how everybody feels' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

From the above statement, traditional rulers have the potential to weaponise their influence and respect to 'convince' their communities 'to accept or reject' things (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). In a sense, their word is absolute but can also be used to the detriment of their communities. This can be viewed as manipulative and would account for their waning influence over the years, as people are more wary of their strategies.

Traditional rulers can also be seen as a threat to the very communities they seek to serve and protect. They can exploit their close relationship and proximity to their communities, something corroborated by a traditional ruler:

> 'Yeah, because there are some there are occasions when traditional rulers are been accused of being part of the security problem in other region. Now, it's a very complex system, very complex. I see, I've seen situations where, you know, they, they actually in control of the territory, their territory. They know a lot of things that happen there and sometimes you find that those that you call those that are security threats to an environment, have a way of linking up with institutions in those areas' (Personal Interview, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

This was confirmed by a local government official:

> 'They know, traditional rulers know the people within their domain. If a strange person comes, they know. They even know the criminal' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

According to some interviewees, traditional rulers have contributed to 'the security problem in other region' as primary threats and as enablers of threats that arise within the communities (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). Traditional rulers 'know the criminal' within their communities, and it has been speculated that they even know the members of violent groups like Boko Haram (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). This raises the question as to why traditional rulers have not mitigated the violence perpetuated by these kinds of actors or turned them over to law enforcement. It could be that they withheld this information because they wished to protect these actors from the state or even that they wished to use them for their own agendas.

The title of traditional ruler is highly sought after. It is the highest form of prestige in Nigeria and has led to some seeking out the position because of the influence and authority it holds. Traditional rulership is a means to secure themselves and their legacy. According to a government official, for some, traditional rulership is about personal gain and security:

> 'Emirs have great influence. You wonder how, in this country, people have attained the height careers. Some of them were even serving as ministers in the centre. They abandoned it to pick up the traditional title because it holds so much. Every traditional title holds, retired minister, retired permanent secretary, retired governors are now traditional title holders. Because you have control of an institution, you have your community under you. It's a permanent structure – until you die, you are on that seat. And there is continuity. You can hand over to son, grandson, great grandchildren. A succession plan is there. So, you notice that it's attractive, and at the end of the day, they would have made all the money. They would have gotten all that they want in life, so the best they can do is settle at that level and remain relevant' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

This is an interesting statement, as it shows the self-interest involved in the position of traditional rulership. There is safety in the knowledge that traditional rulership is a 'permanent structure' and there is the guarantee of succession for your offspring (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). Despite this, it is worrying that there are some individuals who seek out these positions just for the access and 'control' this position affords. It could also be a means for 'retired minister, retired permanent secretary, retired governors' to stay current and relevant within Nigerian society, thereby prolonging their access and proximity to power (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

Traditional rulers are viewed by some (the state, community members, local NGOs etc.) with distrust and suspicion because there have been instances where they have neglected their duties and mandate. This was explained by an official from an NGO that works in the north-east:

> 'And in some communities, they will say that some traditional rulers fled. Yes, they fled their palaces in the course of this fight, more in the Boko Haram case than the herders' case. But in some of the communities, they say: if you leave, never come back' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 20/09/2019).

This sentiment was also stated by a former director-general:

> 'Traditional rulers, now, because they are not having many of them have been ineffective. Not able to play that role. So, it is government that is doing it. They don't come and tell you that they are coming from outside the country. They don't. It is where there is been serious altercations and some serious conflict and police and the military getting involved and arresting some of them that we got the confession that they are nomads of stocks that are outside Nigeria' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

From the above statements, it is apparent that traditional rulers can be viewed by some as being cowardly and ineffective. As is described in the interview excerpt, they fled their 'palaces' when crises arose and have been unable to play their role as mediators. It is then understandable and unsurprising that some communities have told traditional rulers, 'if you leave, never come back'. These sentiments express the dissatisfaction that some communities have. They also seem to serve as a threat and warning of what may happen if the traditional rulers do not fulfil their mandate.

According to those I interviewed, another source of dissatisfaction stems from the fact that the 'police and military' have been fulfilling the work and mandate of traditional rulers, as was described by the former director-general. It gives the impression that, in certain instances, either traditional rulers may not be as effective as they are made out to be or they are not close enough to the community members to be able to get a 'confession', in the words of the former director-general. It could also mean that, in some instances, they are deliberately not doing their jobs, which would be just as bad as fleeing their palaces.

As explained in this section, the critical role of traditional rulers is a double-edged sword. In some of the interviews, traditional rulers have been lauded for their ability to connect with the people and bring them together. They have been described as providing for their communities above and beyond the scope and provisions set out for them in the constitution, even going as far as to pay from their own pockets. At the same time, some of the interviewees expressed how traditional rulers have been known to be the be a very real threat to their communities, pursue positions as traditional rulers just to secure themselves and even flee from their duties. This shows the work that traditional rulers do and showcases their importance. It also illustrates the different perceptions that people have of traditional rulers.

The value of a non-traditional security lens is that it is inclusive of a multiplicity of actors. This section highlights how the inclusion of multiple and equal referent objects and 'influencers', like traditional rulers, is a crucial factor to security and governance (Caballero-Anthony 2016: 14; Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018; Mutimer 2009: 9–10). Traditional rulers in northern Nigeria are a pillar of the security and governance framework that cannot be discounted, set aside, or forgotten. They are important actors, and as such, their contribution and voices should have equal significance within the practice and literature of security and governance. Broadly, this provides an interesting look into the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion of actors in northern Nigeria: how traditional rulers, while central to the workings of the communities, are excluded from formal and legal interpretations of security and governance – for example, the constitution (Mutimer 2009: 9–10; Williams 1999: 342). Similarly, the state is largely excluded from the informal workings of the communities, a domain in which traditional rulers are included.

Within the academic literature as well as in the Nigerian Constitution, traditional rulers seem to be a side-lined actor, left to the periphery of the formal discussion on security and governance. However, in the informal discussion of security and governance, those on the ground and within practice and the communities, traditional rulers are very important actors, as gatekeepers, critical stakeholders and information gatherers. From a CSS perspective, traditional rulers are among the actors who define what security is, what constitutes a threat and what measures to take against them (Mutimer 2009: 10). In northern Nigeria, traditional rulers 'are very significant' in 'addressing security challenges', as was made apparent in the interviews. They are the custodians and guardians of security (Blench, Longtau, Hassan & Walsh 2006: i; Udegha 1972: 2; Vaughan 1995: 511–512). Through their close proximity to

their communities, traditional rulers have 'control over their subjects' and are able to gain valuable information on security issues that threaten the community (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

A non-traditional security approach and CSS perspective brings actors like traditional rulers into focus. As was made clear in the interviews, they still have a role to play in promoting unity and peace within their domain. While the interviews revealed these kinds of positive perceptions of traditional rulers, more problematic perceptions were also expressed. To say, as a local government official did, that 'if we want peace in any community, first we need to re-orientate the leaders' would place traditional rulers in the same single-actor trap that is characteristic of mainstream security thinking. This statement implies that peace in the community is tied to the re-orientation of traditional rulers. It makes it seem like traditional rulers are the only ones who can bring about peace. Instead, security and governance practice needs to be re-invigorated and opened up to allow for multiple types of actors to add value and nuance to security and governance practices. Among those actors would be traditional rulers. Instead, there should be efforts to re-position traditional rulers to embrace their role as 'agents of conflict resolution but also as security managers which they were before' (Okonkwo, Onuigbo, Eme & Ekwekwe 2019: 154). This is already being done by actors like traditional rulers, business, civil society, religious groups and even violent actors. Traditional rulers are at the centre of efforts mobilising the community in health matters like polio and COVID-19 (Reliefweb 2021; Premium Times 2020b). Traditional rulers have also mediated between the farmers and herdsmen in their perennial conflict (Wodu 2021). By focusing on these side-lined voices and actors, we see how different actors within northern Nigeria are important and influential. This is not to say that these actors are side-lined in their own contexts. Traditional rulers in northern Nigeria are central and pivotal actors. By changing the lens of enquiry, we further see the ways in which traditional rulers work on their own and for the benefit of their communities.

By adopting a CSS approach, we begin to understand the 'constitution of world orders', the one that silences and side-lines actors like traditional rulers (Browning & McDonald 2011: 238). Traditional security and governance discourses and literature privilege and prioritise actors like the state, and subsequently, the work that they do is also focused on more. This inadvertently side-lines the work of other actors, who are equally as important as the state. We also begin to see how and why, despite the fact that traditional rulers are 'obeyed' and

'respected', they are a mere 'supportive structure for governance', as described by the university lecturers in the interviews (University Lecturers, Personal Interview, 21/03/2018; NGO 3, Personal Interview, 18/09/2019).

It is more than just their role being curtailed. Traditional rulers are not considered priority referent objects and actors in formal security and governance practice despite how influential they are. There is much within the literature and on the ground that says that traditional rulership is important and effective. However, there are questions about the true efficacy of traditional rulership as an institution. Traditional rulers have not been able to successfully mitigate the conflicts despite their extensive proximity to the communities, for example, with Boko Haram and the farmer/herdsmen conflict. Instead, traditional rulers have been accused of 'being part of the security problem' because 'they know a lot of things that happen there' and even know the criminal elements within their domains (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). This could contribute to the side-lined nature of traditional rulers, as they are not trusted enough to be fully in charge of protecting their communities. Traditional rulers are hamstrung and unable to fully realise their power and worth in the eyes of the law and other actors.

As 'the final arbiter' in cases and the community, traditional rulers are crucial to 'justice and truth' in the north (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019). This speaks to the Third World School perspective which prioritises 'the issues and experiences' of the Global South (Acharya 1995: 2). It also adds nuanced insights about how reality and justice are done effectively on the ground. A Third World Security and Global South focus would pay particular attention to justice mechanisms and processes in northern Nigeria. The way in which justice is done dispels the idea of a 'transplantation of the European territorial state' and its ideals (Acharya 1995: 2). It recognises, acknowledges, and prioritises the ability of traditional rulers and their processes to administer justice and make decisions on security and governance. At the same time, these traditional justice mechanisms challenge and question the universality of human rights. By mapping out the culture and history of a specific region in the Global South, we see how traditional practices are often left out of the universal discourse. Things like '100 strokes of canes' are perfectly normal and appropriate methods of justice and restitution in northern Nigeria (INGO, 19/09/2019). They are the historical and cultural ways in which justice is administered in one Global South context. However, if viewed from a mainstream Western/universal perspective, they would be labelled as wrong or evil. There is often no effort

made to understand these customs and practices because they do not fit into the mould of universally understood practices.

5.4.3 Traditional rulers as intelligence and information gatherers

As a part of the security and governance framework in Nigeria, traditional rulers fulfil the roles of being a part of the intelligence network and being information gatherers. It was suggested in multiple interviews that traditional rulers should form a part of the formal intelligence gathering network because of their close proximity to their communities and because they are already doing this.

The interviews suggest that traditional rulers have been gathering information and intelligence for a long time. Some of those interviewed described how they know who is within their domains, from residents to strangers, as evidenced by the following two statements from an official from a government department:

> 'If you are a stranger and you come, let me give you an example of a crisis, I think in 1950, thereabout. Somebody came from Cameroon. He is a learned Islamic man. You know he is a stranger. And that time, it was in 1950, the Emir of Kano, at that time, then is the grandfather of the present Emir of Kano. So, news went to him that an Islamic malaam is around. So, they made investigation about the man, and he found out that the man came with a certain doctrine which is not in tandem with Islam. So, he asked that the man be brought before him, and he questioned him. So, he realised that man is going to be a threat within the society and he's from Cameroon. So, he called on his bodyguards, that's the *Dogarai*, to escort that man back to Cameroon' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

He also added:

> 'So, if a stranger comes, the Emir must know. He must be aware that a stranger is within the community. That's why even when the Igbos and the other Nigerians and the Yorubas, and the migrants who came from outside, the Emir said no. They should not be within the wall which surrounded Kano city. So, that's why you have the stranger quarters till up to now' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

The interviewees suggest that traditional rulers have intimate knowledge of their domains. They know who the strangers are through 'news', research and 'investigation'. This is

important as it protects their communities from the encroachment of anything that is 'not in tandem with Islam' or is a 'threat within society' (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). The Emir goes as far to have strangers housed in 'stranger quarters' to protect the communities (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). Not only this, but Emirs in the north also have the power and authority to 'escort' these strangers out of their domains, as evidenced by the actions of the Emir of Kano. This escorting and confining of strangers makes sense considering that no one ever knows the true intentions of a person unless they know them well or are privy to their character.

According to a titled traditional ruler, traditional rulers are able to gain valuable information on security issues that threaten the community:

> 'Now, but besides that, you know, okay, traditional rulers, can they have control over their subjects. And these subjects are such that they can convey messages to them as he can call them for meetings. They can assign, they can send messages to contain any security threats in those areas' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

Through their close proximity to the community, traditional rulers have been noted by interviewees to collect intelligence and information through 'messages'. By controlling the flow of information inside and outside the communities, traditional rulers are seemingly able to exert their power and influence. In a sense, this can be interpreted as a form of manipulation. Information gives traditional rulers power and influence to 'control' their communities and get them to do what they want. At the same time, without this information, traditional rulers can be left paralysed and unable to protect their communities from 'security threats in those areas' (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

Considering their historical significance and how closely traditional rulers work with their communities, it makes sense for other actors to want to court and utilise traditional rulers for their valuable intelligence networks. This was alluded to by an official from a government department based in Abuja:

> 'You know, you cannot promote peace and security when you don't have good intelligence. So, we are thinking that they should be empowered to be a part of intelligence gathering process. In that case, you find, within traditional institution, they can gather info and pass this information to the commissioner of security agents where

it is beyond what they can handle. Because no security organisation can fight criminality without intelligence' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

In addition, the local government official stated:

'Traditional rulers can be a vital information gathering mechanism' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

There is a realisation that 'traditional rulers can be a vital information gathering mechanism' (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). There is also a realisation that with this type of intelligence, state actors can 'fight criminality' more efficiently (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019) and that traditional rulers should be incorporated and 'empowered to be a part of intelligence' (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). But perhaps it is rather a question of having other actors being incorporated into these networks. Traditional rulers are in a unique position because of their relationship with the communities. An additional option would be to empower traditional rulers to be better able to deal with 'criminality', like other actors such as the state and its security agents.

Intelligence and information are important components of fighting, countering, and dealing with threats. Traditional rulers are in a unique and privileged position, seemingly having the trust of the communities, which allows them to glean information that other actors cannot get. A Third World Security School and a Global South reading would welcome the inclusion of additional actors, like traditional rulers, in strategies like intelligence gathering because they can get information more quickly and easily than other actors. It then allows for security threats to be dealt with more quickly and for justice to be dispensed with earlier. In terms of governance, intelligence gatherers are a vital tool for actors to make decisions that benefit their communities. It also gives actors an edge over others because those in control of the information flow can have inherent power and authority over others.

Again, we see that even though traditional rulers are a vital part of the intelligence and information loop, they are at best an informal actor and at worst a seemingly side-lined and ignored actor. Mainstream security and governance discourses and practices do not account for and/or prioritise the work that actors like traditional rulers do. According to these discourses, actors like the state would be one of the few interstate actors who should be able to obtain

intelligence and gather information. This places traditional rulers in a precarious position because it can mean that the information they have, though important, can be deemed irrelevant, ignored, or even neglected. By tapping into the knowledge and leveraging the trust that traditional rulers have, security and governance efforts in northern Nigeria can be bolstered, and the hold of violent groups like Boko Haram can perhaps be lessened. By partnering and integrating the intelligence networks better across the different kinds of actors, criminality and violence could potentially be minimised and mitigated. Actors could also make better decisions by combining their intelligence streams and working together.

Intelligence and information gathering have positive and negative implications. In the section above, we explored the positive implications these types of networks can have on security, governance, and conflict prevention. However, the opposite is also true, particularly in northern Nigeria. These networks have not been fully utilised to quell the insecurity. This is surprising, considering how seemingly close traditional rulers are to their communities. It has been pointed out that traditional rulers have been linked with violent actors and vigilante groups like Boko Haram. This kind of association does not bode well for legitimacy and trust of traditional rulers. These links could mean that traditional rulers have used these intelligence networks to undermine security and stability in the north. It could also mean that the relationship between the state and traditional rulers has been so poor that neither has been able to effectively and meaningfully intervene, or that they both chose not to intervene because of their poor relationship. In one sense, this could point to the complicity of both traditional rulers and the state, in some way and shape, in being the driving forces of violence and insecurity in northern Nigeria. It could also mean that both the state and traditional rulers do not truly have the power and influence that they believe they do to engage and manage these violent actors. This, then, allows these groups to do what they want, terrorising the communities.

5.5 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter explored three broad areas of discussion: the depth of the governance system of traditional rulers, the endurance of that governance system and the centrality of the roles of traditional rulers. Within these broad areas, the chapter delved into the sub-themes of traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers'; traditional rulers as critical stakeholders and traditional rulers as intelligence and information gatherers, all of which were important in establishing the significance of traditional rulers and the roles they play within Nigerian society. They highlighted the ways traditional rulers operate, behave and are crucial to the functioning of

northern Nigeria. These sections inform the discourse and debate on traditional rulership, showing the importance of their work on the ground.

Northern Nigeria is complex, and traditional rulers are at the heart of security and governance in the north. Traditional rulers are powerful and influential as gatekeepers, providers, holders of information, etc. By using a Global South and a Third World Security School lens, the referent object of security and governance has shifted away from the state to peripheral actors like traditional rulers. This allows for other marginalised and side-lined actors to add their voices to the growing literature on security and governance. Creating a clearer picture of the socio-political, security, and governance of northern Nigeria requires the input of multiple sources of information. Other actors like religious institutions, business, and criminal elements equally have an influence on and role in security and governance, though their role is not explored or analysed within the parameters of this thesis. It is important to not only acknowledge their contribution, but also to seek their expertise and knowledge to gain a deeper understanding of northern Nigeria. The following chapter will continue with the analysis of the data, providing additional evidence of the side-lined role of traditional rulers.

CHAPTER 6: TRADITIONAL RULERS IN THE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE NEXUS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

6.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This research offers a Global South reading of security and governance, exploring the role and impact of traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. While powerful and influential, traditional rulers are afforded little space within formal practices on security and governance. They are often treated as peripheral actors or as a single, homogenous unit. Mainstream and formal practices on security and governance privilege the 'winners' of security like the state, while the 'losers' of security – namely, alternative actors, like traditional rulers – are often side-lined or ignored (Browning & McDonald 2011: 236, 238).

Chapters one and two provided the conceptual and theoretical justifications for this thesis, outlining the context and parameters that guided this study. These chapters explored and justified the value and objectives of the thesis. They were important to establishing the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings that guided this thesis. Chapter three provided a brief overview of the Nigerian historical, socio-political, economic, regional, and geographical landscape. This was invaluable background data which explained and justified the pursuit of this thesis. Chapter four explored and justified the methodology and research design for this thesis. This chapter outlined and explained the methods used to explore and question the research focus of this thesis.

Chapter five engaged with the data that emerged from the interviews and discussed who traditional rulers are and the roles they play within northern Nigeria. The chapter was divided into three sections, each describing an element of traditional rulership: the depth of the governance system of traditional rulers, the endurance of that governance system, and the centrality of traditional rulership. Within these sections an additional six sub-themes were covered: 'the northern region is unique', indirect rule, traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers', traditional rulers as critical stakeholders, and traditional rulers as intelligence and information gatherers. These sub-themes established the importance and significance of traditional rulership in northern Nigeria. They emphasised the need for more nuanced research that includes other perspectives, as one can easily dismiss the relevance and importance of traditional rulers.

This chapter builds on chapter five and discusses the broad topics of actors and relationships and the reality of traditional rulership. This chapter draws from the 20 interviews that took place between 2018 and 2020. Like chapter five, this chapter used three analysis types – reflective, interpretive, and thematic – to elicit the analysis within this chapter. The first three themes were discussed in chapter five, and a continuation of this analysis will be covered in this chapter. The three sub-themes included in this chapter are vigilantism, 'the institutions are weak', and the reality of traditional rulers. These sub-themes show the relationships that traditional rulers have with other actors within northern Nigeria and how they impact on security and governance in the north.

6.2 ACTORS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE MATRIX

The theme of actors and relationships ties in well with the previous themes discussed in chapter five because it situates traditional rulership within the security and governance matrix. We see how other actors are important within Nigeria and how they interact with traditional rulers. These actors also have an influence on the way traditional rulers govern in northern Nigeria. Of particular interest in this chapter is the relationships that traditional rulers have with the state and vigilantes. It is interesting to note how these relationships affect the maintenance of security and governance in the north. As stated in the previous chapter, multiple other actors have influence on and are important to the context of northern Nigeria. However, due to limited time and scope for this study, I was unable to further explore the relevance of other actors in-depth.

6.2.1 Vigilantism

The emergence of vigilantes is an interesting development in the socio-economic and geo-political landscape of northern Nigeria. Of note is the complex and symbiotic relationship that has evolved between the traditional rulers and vigilantes. The creation of vigilante groups can be attributed to high crime rates and the ineffectual police force that has not been able to mitigate these crimes (Spencer & Moraro 2017).

On the one hand, vigilantes are a perceived as useful and making a positive contribution in the communities. Some groups are sanctioned, funded, and even endorsed by traditional rulers because they are seen as promoting peace, law, and order in the communities, for example, the Borno vigilantes fighting Boko Haram (Asadu 2021; Cropley 2017; Spencer & Moraro 2017).

They seem to be an effective deterrent to external threats, while helping the communities to police and protect themselves. However, the opposite is also true. Vigilantes are also a force for harm in northern Nigeria. Even with powerful actors like the state, governors and traditional rulers regulating and monitoring them, vigilantes still operate outside of the law and according to their own understandings of justice, for example, being implicated in extrajudicial killings and abuses (Cropley 2017; Spencer & Moraro 2017). This has caused friction in communities because they have taken the law into their own hands, often going beyond the mandate they are tasked with.

According to an NGO, vigilante groups often emerge out of necessity, created for specific purposes and needs within the society:

'So, so, there are vigilante groups in the north. And I'll answer your question from, from the one that I know within the north-east, who were mostly hunters, right. When the whole Boko Haram issue started, there were a lot of issues and there were no police, enough army officers deployed to protect them. The hunters took up the responsibility and they formed themselves into factions to help with securing their different localities with the support of the traditional rulers and eventually their state government. Particularly, I've been engaged with them in state like Adamawa in north-eastern Nigeria, where they are all properly constituted by local government, and they have leadership. They have, they even have, not weapons, but local guns, and so on and so forth. And, and they, they are more aligned to the traditional rulers because in that, in those instances, the traditional rulers are more. They took ownership of the problem because people are coming to them first, based on the security challenges they're facing' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 3, 18/09/2019).

A local government official also added:

Yes, because the politicians use them extensively like the Boko Haram. It started from a vigilante. The governor of Borno state had some young boys, you know, under his care. You see they are jobless. Instead of giving to empower them with something useful, you know, he told them to be thugs and told them to follow him when he was moving apart from his security personnel' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

In the examples above, we see how vigilantes are seemingly formed under the direction of, and supported by, government officials and traditional rulers. They form as a result of 'a lot of issues' like not enough police or 'enough army officers deployed to protect' the communities (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). Vigilantes have been shown to have their own agency and 'ownership' of the 'challenges' that arise and have shown themselves capable of taking 'responsibility' for ensuring justice and security in their communities (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). This resulted in an alliance of sorts between traditional rulers and vigilantes, where some traditional rulers 'support' and align themselves with these groups (NGO 3, 18/09/2019). In exchange, this has granted vigilantes a form of legitimacy and credibility. At the same time, vigilantes have also been said to have been instrumentalised by other actors, for example, in the case of the governor of Borno and the creation of Boko Haram (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). One consequence of these actions is the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram not only to northern Nigeria, but to the whole West African region.

It has widely been speculated that state agents were involved in the creation and formation of Boko Haram. It is speculated that three governors from northern Nigeria, and specifically, the former governor of Borno, were behind the emergence of Boko Haram (Isawade 2020; Omonobi, Idonor, Marama, Onwuemenyie & Okopi 2011). It is said the Boko Haram was created as a 'clandestine plan' to 'build and unleash the militants on the country' (Isawade 2020). It is also speculated that Boko Haram emerged from the use of thugs by the governors and that this thuggery evolved into militancy (Omonobi, Idonor, Marama, Onwuemenyie & Okopi 2011). The governors contributed 'N100m each to buy working equipment, uniforms and so on for the militants' (Isawade 2020). This led to the group starting a religious crisis in Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa and Zamfara (Isawade 2020).

As remarked by a titled traditional ruler, vigilantes have become an invaluable resource to traditional rulers, especially in areas where the state is unable to fulfil its mandate:

> 'Who authorises the constitutional vigilante group? How is it operated? Who is funding it? Are you getting me? These are concerns they try to explain to, see, well, we cannot allow security issues to, we cannot leave it in the hands of the government. The government cannot be everywhere. The government cannot provide the kind of security we want. So, in that case, to secure ourselves, we have to put up a structure. Now the vigilante groups are some of these efforts by traditional rulers. They answerable to them' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

A local government official remarked on the type of work vigilantes do:

> 'The issue is not really, there is no legal backing. If there is legal backing and they are operating under framework of the law, and they are operating independently, there should be synergy. They handle minor matters' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 1, 20/09/2019).

Vigilantes are seemingly 'useful actually, to a large extent' because they are primarily drawn from the communities (NGO 3, 18/09/2019; Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). They usually handle 'minor matters' and their usefulness is drawn from the realisation that their services and expertise were needed (Government Department 1, 20/09/2019). They are there because the 'government cannot be everywhere' (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

However, while vigilantes are a force for good in society, they are also a security risk. This was a remark made by a government official based in Abuja:

> 'Well, you know, it's two ways. Most times, the vigilantes, those who are entrusted to be vigilantes, take the law into their hands before taking an accused or a suspect to a court. Or someone who is alleged to have done something wrong, and I think part of the problem is that they are not trained. They are not trained, you know you, you have riff raffs, vagabonds, some amongst the vigilantes. Those who are themselves criminals, most times, and a lot of victims, I mean were victimised. A lot of people were victimised under the vigilantes. It's a good thing, but if only they were trained how to handle cases. And I think we still have them in Kano. But it is like they are thugs' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Government Department 2, 17/09/2019).

A titled traditional ruler commented on the potential for vigilantes to be used as a weapon against the communities:

> 'Now, if there is no organised structure that allows for their existence, what if tomorrow the traditional ruler uses it as a terrorist group and throws it against the people?' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019).

Vigilantes can become a risk to security, partly because they lack training, which has led to cases of insecurity and victimisation in the communities (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). They are seen here as a source of insecurity because they have taken 'the law into their hands' and have gone beyond their prescribed mandate (Government Department 2,

17/09/2019). They are equated to 'thugs', 'riff raffs', and 'vagabonds', which gives them a bad reputation and creates an environment of fear and mistrust (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019). It is important to point out these terms are distinctly negative and create a very specific connotation for the people they are attached to. Vigilantes are also seen as a security risk because they could potentially be manipulated and used 'as a terrorist group' and thrown 'against the people', as with the case of Boko Haram (Titled Traditional Ruler, 22/09/2019). Not only do they pose a threat on their own, they are a threat when they are being used to fulfil other actors' agendas.

While traditional rulers are seen to be powerful entities that can potentially manipulate vigilante groups, they also find themselves in a 'helpless' position against these 'violent' groups (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This was pointed out by an official who works at an NGO that primarily operates in the north-east:

'We have seen in some communities where traditional rulers also become helpless because the state is not working. The justice system is not working, so they are left to administer justice. They are left to administer a group of people who are violent in nature, so how do they balance all of that? And they need to maintain positions and stay alive. So, some make compromises, some are able to have followers who are strong to help them stand strong and resist some of these pressures' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

It is interesting to note that even with the power and influence traditional rulers have, they seem to have had to choose 'followers who are strong' to assist them in securing the north and making the tough decisions (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This seems to have left traditional rulers vulnerable and 'helpless', especially to the nature of more 'violent' actors (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). They have seemingly had to 'make compromises' by aligning with these 'violent' and powerful vigilante groups in order to 'administer justice' (NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

Vigilantism has emerged as a result of many issues. For one, it is a symptom of high crime rates and the state's inadequacy and failure to ensure security and governance in the north (Spencer & Moraro 2017). According to an NGO representative based in the north-east, the Westphalian idea of the centralised state 'is not working' and has left a power vacuum for groups and 'followers who are strong' to step in (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). While traditional rulers are strong, they have seemingly had to align themselves with more violent actors to ensure

peace and stability in the north (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). The rise of vigilantism in northern Nigeria seems to illustrate how power vacuums create opportunities for alternative actors to emerge to fill in these vacancies. It has created opportunities for members of the community to come together and bridge the power vacuum, ensure safety and security, and govern territories in the place of actors who cannot. At the same time, it illustrates how, in some instances, actors responsible for governance have little power and authority. The interviews suggest that in some instances, the state and traditional rulers are forced to recognise that they cannot govern and ensure security alone. They need the help of 'followers who are strong' to manage northern Nigeria (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). This reveals that neither traditional rulers, nor the state, have absolute power and control within northern Nigeria.

From a Global South perspective, the emergence of vigilantism can be read as one local way of managing and preventing crime and providing security within communities where other actors have been unable to do so. Vigilantism also highlights the myriad of ways local actors have taken it upon themselves to secure and govern their communities. They cannot always rely on outside actors to provide these services. This may be due to outsiders being at odds and far removed from the community and its needs. It could also be due to the lack of faith and trust that the communities have in external actors.

Vigilantes, however, also seem to create new threats for their communities. Vigilantes have been shown to go against the prescripts of the law, leaving traditional rulers and the communities seemingly more 'helpless' and vulnerable in the face of their 'violent' tendencies (NGO 2, 22/03/2018). From a governance standpoint, the emergence of vigilantes adds to the already frayed tensions within northern Nigeria. While responsibility and decision-making can be delegated, it can also mean that there are too many actors involved in governance. This can have negative effects that hinder governance efforts because actors are working at cross purposes with one another. It can also dilute the influence of traditional rulers and leave communities confused as to who to turn to and trust.

6.2.2 'The state institutions are weak'
As explained in chapter three, northern Nigeria faces a number of insecurities that have disrupted the stability and security of the region. These insecurities are not limited to governance concerns, but also include the neglect of the north by the state. Actors like the state,

have been unable to maintain their mandate and have failed to deter groups and violent actors from committing acts of aggression towards the citizens.

An NGO that works on initiatives and projects in the north-east pointed out that state entities are 'weak' (NGO 1, 21/03/2018):

> 'Weak government institutions. The institutions are weak' (Personal Interview, Abuja, NGO 1, 21/03/2018).

In a number of conversations, this weakness has been re-iterated. The state and government institutions seemingly do not have much power, influence, and authority in the north. Instead, the work of security and governance is mainly done by and through traditional rulers. 'Weak' does not only refer to ineffectiveness; it can also refer to the fact that the state and its associated agencies are not trusted and do not have a prominent role and voice in northern Nigeria. 'Weak' could also be a reference to their incompetence and incapability in dealing with issues in the north.

As stated by an official from an INGO working in the north, the state is weak because it is not trusted by the communities:

> So, in the three states, from what we have gathered, the peace architecture has integrated traditional rulers because of their role. People have more confidence in them than security forces. People trust them more than the security forces because security and civil relations is very weak in Nigeria' (Personal Interview, Abuja, INGO 1 19/09/2019).

While traditional rulers are at the periphery of the formal governance and security framework, they are still 'integrated' into the 'peace architecture' (INGO 1, 19/09/2019). According to the interviewees, they are trusted more, and the communities seem to have 'more confidence in them' (INGO 1 19/09/2019). What is even more telling is the fact that not only are the institutions weak, but so are the very social fabric and 'civil relations' (INGO 1 19/09/2019).

It seems that the state input is scarce and often absent, leaving other actors to step into roles and duties like administration, security, and governance in the north. According to a personal interview with a religious NGO working primarily in the north-east, the state does not seem to know what is going on in the north:

'Government intervention has not engaged local communities' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

This was corroborated by the following statement:

> There are specific initiatives that locals' initiatives, women's groups, skills training in Yobe state. You have the 'Know your Neighbour' initiative in Borno state; you have *jama yalasaraf* – Islamic committee specifically to counter the ideology. But the government doesn't pay attention to these initiatives' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

The state is weak because it seems that it does not truly know what the communities' needs are. This is based on the views of some interviewees who said that the state pays little 'attention' to local contexts and activities and 'initiatives' and has not properly 'engaged' with the 'local communities' (Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018).

While there is a general cry that the state is inadequate, this is not the full story of the insecurity and instability being faced in northern Nigeria. The state is doing what it can to alleviate the insecurity, as explained by the statement below from a retired director-general:

> 'Traditional rulers now, because they are not having many of them, have been ineffective, not able to play that role. So, it is government that is doing it. They don't come and tell you that they are coming from outside the country. They don't. It is where there is been serious altercations and some serious conflict and police and the military getting involved and arresting some of them that we got the confession that they are nomads of stocks that are outside Nigeria' (Personal Interview, Abuja, Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

This section of the analysis began with the assumption that it is the state that is 'weak' and 'ineffective' (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019; NGO 1, 21/03/2018). However, actors like traditional rulers are also portrayed in the same light and thought of as being equally inefficient. This inefficiency can also be read in a different light. Perhaps it is a coping mechanism from the encroachment of the state. So instead of traditional rulers being weak and inefficient, perhaps they were disengaging as a form of protest. It would explain how, if traditional rulers were 'not able to play that role', other actors like the state would step in to fulfil this role (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019).

Different actors in northern Nigeria have failed to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in providing security and governance. This has led to them being labelled as 'weak' and 'ineffective' (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019; NGO 1, 21/03/2018). From one perspective, this may be true. If the lens of inquiry is mainstream and Western-centric, then these actors can be said to have been inadequate providers of security and governance. By using a mainstream lens, the threats and actors involved in security and governance are limited to a very specific set of behaviours and criteria. It is only the state that is capable of being the sole provider of security. The state has been unwilling and unable to provide solutions to curb the onslaught of asymmetric threats and challenges that have arisen. Perhaps the weakness of the state is that it is ill-equipped and has little understanding of the context in the north. However, if the lens of inquiry is non-traditional, CSS and Third World Security School focused, the analysis and viewpoint is broadened. Now there are multiple actors and threats that are involved in the insecurities and instabilities of northern Nigeria.

Actors and institutions, like the state, are perhaps not as weak and ineffective as portrayed (Former Director-General, 23/09/2019; Spiritual NGO 1, 20/03/2018). By moving beyond the stereotypical responses and understandings of how to practice and think about security and governance, we make space for complexity and nuance. While traditional rulers are important, they are not the only actors involved in security and governance in the north. Perhaps it is not that institutions and actors are not doing their part in ensuring security and governance in northern Nigeria. Perhaps it is rather that these actors fall short of their perceived responsibilities because the lens of analysis and focus is Western and state-centred. This framework does not allow for these actors to be fully expressed and to fully realise their potential as managers and mitigators of security and governance, and to work together to prevent conflict in the north. Traditional rulers and other actors are doing their part to ensure security and governance in the north.

6.3 <u>THE REALITY OF TRADITIONAL RULERSHIP</u>

The previous section examined the actors and relationships in the security and governance matrix in northern Nigeria. The following final section of this chapter explores the reality of traditional rulership, particularly their side-lined status, in relation to what interviewees said during the fieldwork undertaken between 2018 and 2020.

One of the concepts that was particularly difficult to grasp during this thesis was that of 'side-lined'. When grappling with the literature and discourse, as well as engaging with the data from the field, traditional rulers were shown to be an integral part of security and governance in northern Nigeria. There is no doubt about the ways in which traditional rulers promote and/or dimmish security and governance. Among the people and in the communities, traditional rulers are at the heart and centre of security and governance. Traditional rulers play active roles within the communities as gatekeepers, critical stakeholders, information gatherers, mediators, etc.

While this is all true, there is also the very real knowledge that power, influence, and authority are not codified and/or reflected clearly and strongly within the Nigerian constitution. Successive iterations and amendments of the Nigerian constitution, including the Lyttleton, the Republican and the 1979 constitutions, curtailed and reduced the powers and responsibilities of traditional rulers (Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 138; Miles 1993: 38). The consequence of this has been the limited visibility of traditional rulers within formal security and governance practice.

When speaking to participants and sources, it seemed they could not agree with the statement that traditional rulers were side-lined:

> 'But it will be right to note that part of the challenge is the absence of a formal/constitutional recognition of their role in security and governance' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 1, 10/12/2020).

There seems to be an acknowledgement and understanding that traditional rulers are absent from and not formally included in provisions of the Nigerian constitution. This fact has seemingly limited their engagement with security and governance and is a 'challenge' to solidifying their role in the north. From the examples cited in this chapter and chapter five, the importance of traditional rulership cannot be understated (Daily Trust 2013).

What is also interesting to note from discussions with academic scholars is that the lens of inquiry is important to understanding the side-lined nature and role of traditional rulers in formal security and governance practice:

'The government, conceptually, is part of the colonial paradigm. So, why would they respect or include or accommodate the position of the traditional rulers? Why would they?' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020).

He also added:

'Why would the colonial rulers include the traditional leadership unless it is profitable to their own interest?' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020).

He further stated:

'The problem is that when we use the word government, there is a conceptualisation of that term in our brain: government – social contract, you know, people, government, relations, you know…all that. In Nigeria, most of sub-Saharan Africa, that is not the case. The concept is different. So, the perception is different' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020).

He then stated:

'So, when the French or the British come to Nigeria, they talk to the government. They invest in the army. They invest in the police. They invest in the, what do you call, the, the potential for violence by government structures because, in their minds, the French and British minds, they think they talk to a government that it's as if it's a British government' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020).

Through our lens of inquiry, the concepts we use determine what can be included or excluded in analysis. It also determines how we conceptualise the world we live in and the key concepts that shape the way we imagine the state, governance, and actors, etc. This could be one reason why the voices of traditional rulers have been side-lined and not heard as much in formal practice. The way in which we conceptualise, view, and frame security and governance does not allow for the space to acknowledge and recognise traditional rulers as legitimate and equal actors. This might also explain why there has not been much engagement with traditional rulers, because actors usually only interact with other actors that are perceived as government, like a 'British government' (Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020).

The primary reason traditional rulers are side-lined is that they are 'not recognised in law' (Academic Scholar 3, 10/09/2020). This barrier does not allow for narratives from traditional rulers to be as exposed as for other actors:

> 'They don't play any role in the policy making whatsoever. They are acknowledged as a legitimate partner in the, in the national action plan of 2016. But they are not, um, recognised in law in the 2011 Act nor the 2013 Act. We'll see if the 2019 Act says differently. But I doubt it. But they are not recognised in law. They are recognised as a partner, but not in the eyes of the law' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 3, 10/09/2020).

Another academic stated:

> 'At the formal level, traditional rulers do not play a direct role in security and governance, which are the exclusive preserve of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government at the state and federal levels. All traditional leaders are appointed by state governors, and although they wield a lot of influence in traditional and customary/chieftaincy affairs, their role in the formal security and governance spheres are mainly symbolic and advisory' (Electronic Interview, Academic Scholar 1, 10/12/2020).

While traditional rulers are seemingly important and 'wield a lot of influence', their power and authority is limited to a largely 'symbolic and advisory' capacity (Academic Scholar 1, 10/12/2020). The constitutional provisions in place mainly direct the power and authority of traditional rulers towards 'traditional and customary/chieftaincy affairs', despite the fact that they have other roles and responsibilities within society (Academic Scholar 1, 10/12/2020). Traditional rulers are recognised as a 'partner', but not as a major and legitimate player (Academic Scholar 3, 10/09/2020).

This section examined the different ways that the side-lined role of traditional rulers manifests. From a mainstream and traditional security and governance perspective, traditional rulers do not have a real role in northern Nigeria. Their role and influence is handicapped. They are not 'recognised in law' (Academic Scholar 3, 10/09/2020). They have no legal standing to effectively influence policy and 'do not play a direct role in security and governance' (Academic Scholar 1, 10/12/2020). From the responses of these interviewees, this sentiment is corroborated. Colonialism seems to play a role in the way in which traditional rulers are side-

lined and 'hidden' from discourses of security and governance. This links back to how the formation of the Nigerian state during colonial rule reinforced the diminished role of traditional rulers in post-independence Nigeria. British colonial rule seemingly co-opted traditional rulership because it was 'profitable' and necessary for them (Academic Scholar 2, 22/09/2020; Ubink 2008: 8). It effectively began the steady decline of traditional rulership, rendering them weaker and relegating them to a peripheral, informal and side-lined status after Nigerian independence (Abubakar 2015: 185, 195; Iyeh 2014: 135, 137; Miles 1993: 34, 38; Ojo 1976: 116–117).

However, at the same time, there is overwhelming evidence that traditional rulers are not a side-lined actor. Even without legal and extensive constitutional backing, traditional rulers are securing and governing their territories in northern Nigeria. They even go above and beyond for their communities. They provide health, education, general welfare, going as far as to 'pay' for community members who are struggling financially, prioritising educating the youth of the community and even reviewing the salaries of the *Dogarai* and building housing for them, providing encouragement, empowerment, human development, and capital to start projects and other things (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

By changing our lens of analysis to be more inclusive of critical approaches like CSS, the Third World Security School, and other non-traditional perspectives, we can see the how the notion that traditional rulers are a side-lined actor is challenged. Using these perspectives changes the narrative and broadens the discourse, discussion, and debates to include and accommodate alternative understandings and ways of viewing security and governance. Actors and institutions that are usually relegated to the periphery are brought to the fore and have more salience and importance. By changing our lens of inquiry, we begin to see the myriad of actors who are a part of security and governance, as well as the various ways they influence everyday life. We also see a proliferation of issues and problems that are brought to the front burner of politics, specifically those that are not state-centred, like vigilantism, the farmer/herdsmen conflict, poverty, ethnic tensions, etc. These actors and issues add value and nuance to the discourse and literature of security and governance.

6.4 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This chapter discussed the position of traditional rulers in the security and governance nexus in relation to other actors in northern Nigeria. The sub-themes included in this area of

discussion were vigilantism and the fact that the state institutions are weak. These sub-themes were important in showing the relationships in northern Nigeria, as well as the impact of different actors in security and governance in the north. In particular, these sub-themes acknowledged the fraught relationship between traditional rulers and vigilantes, as well as between traditional rulers and the state.

The chapter showed how vigilantism is a double-edged sword that can be used for the good and the detriment of the communities. Vigilantes have been known to be funded and supported by traditional rulers and have been said to have helped their communities. At the same time, some vigilante groups have been known to take the law into their own hands, rendering traditional rulers helpless against their violence and criminality. Similarly, the relationship between the state and traditional rulers has been characterised as 'weak'. It is a relationship fraught with tension as both traditional rulers and the state seemingly do not trust one another. The state is considered to be weak, not being able to fulfil its mandate and ensure service delivery, being implicated in acts of terror and aggression to the communities, as well as fleeing from their roles and responsibilities. The chapter illustrated how nuanced and complex these relationships are, as well as how they shape security and governance in the north.

It is also important to note that other actors like religious institutions, business leaders, criminal elements, etc., equally have an influence on and role in security and governance. While these actors are important players, they too face struggles and challenges to meeting the security and governance needs of the north. Due to the time and scope of this thesis, I was unable to fully explore all these other important actors. Future studies and research could benefit from exploring these potential gaps.

This chapter concluded by looking at the reality of traditional rulership, drawing two conclusions. On the one hand, yes – traditional rulers are a side-lined actor. Within the formal practice of security and governance, traditional rulers are a side-lined and peripheral actor. Specifically, within law and the Nigerian constitution, we see the way the role of traditional rulers has been limited and reduced. Particularly when viewing traditional rulership through the lens of traditional and orthodox security and governance thinking, we can see the subtle and nuanced ways that traditional rulers are not included in the formal practices of security and governance. Within law, traditional rulers only have symbolic and advisory capacities, and this

would explain how and why they have been side-lined within the formal practice of security and governance.

At the same time, we also see the myriad of ways traditional rulers are not a side-lined actor. There are countless pieces of evidence within literature, as well as in the data collected, that show the influence traditional rulers have in northern Nigeria. The majority of this thesis specifically looks at the ways in which traditional rulers are important and integral to security and governance. Chapter five captures the way in which traditional rulers contribute to security and governance by being gatekeepers, critical stakeholders, and information gatherers. In this chapter, we see how the relationship that traditional rulers have with other actors affects and influences the state of security and governance within northern Nigeria. These perspectives show the ways in which traditional rulers are integral to security and governance, despite the fact that they are not accounted for in formal discourse and practice.

While these two perspectives are not the main driving questions for this thesis, they highlight how a change in the lens of enquiry and analysis, from a mainstream and traditional perspectives to a non-traditional security, CSS and Third World Security School perspective, prompts shifts in perspective and understanding. For this thesis, these shifts demonstrate how a non-traditional security, CSS and Third World Security School perspective broadens and expands our understanding of security and governance to include previously side-lined and forgotten actors like traditional rulers.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This thesis focused on understanding how and why traditional rulers are a side-lined actor in formal practices of security and governance. It used a CSS and Third World Security School lens to shed light on how security and governance are experienced within a Global South context, specifically, northern Nigeria. By using this non-traditional, CSS and Third World Security lens, the thesis grappled with analysing and understanding northern Nigerian traditional rulers and the ways in which they promote and/or diminish security and governance. These approaches were specifically chosen because they put forward a version of reality that reflects the multitude of ways of viewing security and governance. These perspectives allow for alternative, side-lined, forgotten, and marginalised perspectives to be brought to the forefront of formal practices of security and governance.

This is the concluding chapter for this thesis. It is divided into four sections. Firstly, it summarises each chapter, reflecting on how each chapter contributes to the primary argument of the thesis. Following this, the chapter provides general reflections on the thesis as a whole. This section consists of problematising the research question and teasing out the ways in which traditional rulers have been side-lined within formal practices of security and governance. The chapter then looks at recommendations and provides possible areas for future research. Finally, this chapter provides the closing remarks for the study, concluding the thesis and providing some answers for its initial claims.

7.2 <u>GENERAL REMARKS</u>

In chapter one, the thesis provided a general overview of the study, citing the driving research question that motivated the thesis. The chapter included a demarcation of each chapter of this thesis, providing an overview of what was to be discussed in each chapter. This first chapter described what the research was about and listed the justifications that drove the research question. It described how the study has sought to provide a Global South reading of security and governance, specifically focusing on how and why traditional rulers were a side-lined actor in northern Nigeria, even though they hold power, authority, and influence in northern Nigeria. The chapter also provided a general overview of the theories and methodologies to be used, as well as how the research question would be addressed and answered throughout the thesis. This provided a general overview of the entire thesis, as well as its outcomes and general objectives.

Chapter two then introduced the security theories and a conceptualisation of governance that were used throughout the thesis. The chapter began by running through the different turns within security from the traditional conceptions to non-traditional security conceptions. It started with national security, which is the basis and foundation of security thinking. National security is one of the dominant theories of security, and it put forward a view of security and reality that was realist and state-centric in nature. Security concerns were preoccupied with statist and military concerns. This was contrasted to the first turn in security thinking – human security. The human security approach opposed the national security paradigm, focusing on people and institutions affected by security rather than the state being the main focus and preoccupation of security. While interesting and important, national security and human security represent the two forms of orthodox security thinking in the international arena. These theories are at odds with the decision to focus on a Global South reading of security and governance in this thesis.

The second turn within security thinking came in the form of non-traditional security thinking. Non-traditional security was derived from the dissatisfaction with orthodox security (national security and human security) because they excluded side-lined, marginalised, neglected, and vulnerable voices and actors from formal security practice. It is within this form of security thinking that this study is based. This study focused on a CSS and Third World Security School analysis that looked at security from a Global South and African context. These kinds of discourse allow for a further expansion and broadening of security, to encompass the multitude of actors and issues within security thinking and discourse. The critical discourses used in this thesis, CSS and the Third World Security School, are not new to security thinking, in fact, like traditional discourses, they are based on Western roots. What makes them different is the acknowledgement that the focus of security needs to change to reflect the realities and contexts of other geographical regions and spaces, specifically the Global South region. Critical discourses open the debate for more critical voices from the Global South and other side-lined experiences to enter, engage in and lead practice from Global South contexts. This study is by no means exhaustively representative of this work but offers one way of viewing and understanding the world and is a good overview of the expanded literature within security thinking.

The second part of this chapter included providing an overview of governance in general, tracing its origins through history. This chapter provided a comprehensive overview of the different understandings, definitions, and meanings of governance across geographical locations and disciplines. The chapter then focused on providing an overview of what governance means in Africa, tracing its roots, meanings and how it manifests on the African continent. One of the challenges in operationalising governance is the abundance of definitions and understandings of the concept. Additionally, like security, governance practice is predominantly focused on Western/European understandings, something at odds with the Global South and African experience/s. This is why studying governance in a Global South and African context is an important endeavour. It expands the literature and discourse and allows alternative, side-lined, forgotten, and marginalised voices to be foregrounded within governance thinking.

Chapter three was divided into two focal areas. In the first instance, it provided an overview of the historical background of northern Nigeria. Secondly, this chapter provided an overview of traditional rulership as a form of governance in Africa. This chapter began by providing an overview of the historical background of the Nigerian context, narrowing in on the northern Nigerian context. Chapter three specifically focused on summarising historical challenges and issues at play in northern Nigeria. This included socio-economic and geo-political drivers like poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, ethnicity, corruption, and transnational religious groupings. These drivers informed the way in which Nigeria is configured and showcased the main drivers of insecurity within northern Nigeria. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but provides poignant examples of the kinds of challenges the north is faced with.

The chapter then explored differences in traditional rulership over the course of Nigerian history. The chapter traced the schools of thought on traditional rulership: abolitionists, traditionalists and the midway arrangement. These perspectives served to highlight the three main ways that traditional rulership is conceived and understood within Africa and Nigeria. The chapter then traced traditional rulership through pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and modern eras. These were insightful, showing different kinds of traditional rulers in Africa and the impact of the different eras on the nature and scope of responsibilities.

Chapter four provided the methodological underpinnings for this study. It explained and justified the worldviews, methods and analysis types used throughout the study. This chapter

first outlined the worldviews that dictated and guided the study – constructivist and interpretivist. These worldviews tied in particularly well with the CSS and Third World Security School focus of this study. They highlighted the need to shift towards the inclusion of alternative perspectives and approaches because reality is contested, subjective, and constantly under construction.

This study used a single case study with exploratory and evaluative features. This streamlined and narrowed the focus to a single state, and more specifically to a single region and set of actors: traditional rulers in northern Nigeria. The study also made use of semi-structured interviews which served to elicit rich and nuanced data used to analyse the research question of this study. The interviews were conducted in three stages: preliminary, main and supplementary. The preliminary interviews, held in 2018, served to test the validity of the research question and mine for preliminary answers. The main interviews, held in 2019, served to further explore the main research question and the follow-up questions that emerged from the 2018 interviews. Finally, the 2020 interviews supplemented the interviews that took place in 2018 and 2019. With the collection of the data, the study used reflective, interpretive, and theoretical thematic analysis to analyse the findings. The approach to analysis reflected the theoretical views and worldviews of this study.

Chapter five introduced the first set of findings within this study. It focused on three areas of interest: the depth of the governance system, the endurance of the governance system, and the centrality of the roles of traditional rulers. These sections served to outline the importance and work of traditional rulers on the ground – things that are not often highlighted within practice but are known on the ground. Each section had sub-themes that were explored. These included: 'The northern region is unique'; Indirect rule; and Traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers', as critical stakeholders, and as intelligence and information gatherers.

Specifically, for this chapter, northern Nigeria's uniqueness was an interesting dynamic to analyse. As became apparent from the interviews, the north is very 'different' from other contexts, backgrounds, and religious and ethnic political diversities (Second-Class Traditional Ruler, 24/09/2019). While this study is focused on a Global South context, it would be difficult to make specific generalisations, not only about the whole of northern Nigeria, but also across the rest of Nigeria, Africa, or even the entirety of the Global South region. This study offered a small glimpse into these kinds of actors in northern Nigeria. This is broad and so cannot be

specific or specifically applied to whole areas within the north. While this can be a limitation, it also served as a way to gain a detailed glimpse into these kinds of actors in parts of Nigeria like Kano and Zazzau.

This chapter specifically focused on the centrality of the role of traditional rulers. It analysed three important sub-themes: traditional rulers as 'gatekeepers', as critical stakeholders, and as intelligence and information gatherers. These sub-themes showed just how important and influential traditional rulers are on the ground in northern Nigeria. In each sub-theme, we see how there are negative and positive implications of the centrality of the role of traditional rulership. This chapter shows that despite the fact that traditional rulers are not recognised by law, that they still have an important and integral role to play in security and governance in northern Nigeria.

Chapter six continued the analysis of this study by focusing on actors and their relationships with each other. The chapter additionally looked at the reality of traditional rulers and whether or not they could be considered to be side-lined. The first half of the chapter discussed the relationship traditional rulers have with the state and with vigilantes. This sub-theme also revealed negative and positive implications of these roles. Vigilantes can be a force for good and for harm within the communities. On the one hand, some groups are sanctioned and supported by traditional rulers. On the other, some vigilantes lean into their violent natures, terrorising the communities and leaving traditional rulers unable to deal with them. The state is characterised as being weak and unable to ensure security and governance in the north. The state seems unable to maintain good relations with traditional rulers, because traditional rulers are speculated to be a direct cause of the insecurity either by fleeing from their duties or by actively wielding their legitimate force against the communities.

The final section of this chapter focused on the side-lined nature of traditional rulers. It problematised whether or not traditional rulers could in fact be a side-lined actor in northern Nigeria and how this manifests on the ground. Throughout the study, I focused on highlighting and illustrating the ways in which the lens of inquiry and traditional ways of knowing have essentially hidden certain actors from our field of focus and analysis. Traditional security and governance thinking, analysis, and referent object focus overshadows other ways of knowing and alternative actors. In the face of powerful actors, like the state, traditional rulers are relegated to a side-lined and peripheral role in formal security and governance practice. A focus

on traditional security and governance thinking would not prioritise or acknowledge traditional rulers as an equal and important referent object. By changing the lens of enquiry to a CSS and Third World School perspective, we see how and acknowledge that the impact of actors outside the state, like traditional rulers, are just as important in security and governance practice.

7.3 TRADITIONAL RULERS IN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL NEXUS OF SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

While it was apparent in the interviews and scholarship that traditional rulers are essential to the running and governance of the northern Nigerian peninsula, what has been noteworthy is that they are not formally included in the practice of security and governance. Traditional rulers, while revered, appear to be on the periphery of security and governance discourses, literature, and practice. They are important on the ground and in the communities. They are gatekeepers, information gatherers, and critical stakeholders. Traditional rulers play a pivotal role in the communities, one that cannot be replaced or replicated. This influence and authority stems from the pre-colonial era and has evolved and endured through successive violent changes in Nigeria's history. This is especially true for traditional rulers in northern Nigeria, who hold considerable power and authority.

Through a traditional and mainstream security and governance lens, the state should be capable of looking after Nigerian society. This lens of enquiry does not account for actors like traditional rulers or allow them to exist, to be acknowledged, and to be considered as important actors within formal security and governance discourse. However, the reality on the ground does not reflect these dynamics, especially in northern Nigeria. Nigeria is a state plagued by a myriad of drivers of insecurity, threats, and challenges. The state has not been able to secure its borders efficiently, evidenced by issues like the farmer/herdsmen clashes, ethno-religious tensions, vigilantism, banditry, the threats of Boko Haram, etc. These issues have unveiled a security and governance gap that actors like traditional rulers have stepped up to fill. Traditional rulers seem to be doing the work that the state should be doing. By conceptualising the Nigerian problem through a CSS and Third World Security School lens, we begin to see how traditional rulers are important actors in northern Nigeria. In some instances, traditional rulers seemingly go above and beyond their mandate, providing for their communities in the absence of state capacity (Government Department 2, 17/09/2019; NGO 2, 22/03/2018).

The central problem of this thesis is understanding how and why traditional rulers are not a recognised, formal actor within the practices of security and governance. In the first instance, the way in which the state and its structures are set up, the security policies and the state apparatus do not take traditional rulers into account. This is a by-product of the mainstream security and governance thinking that prioritises a state-centred approach above other forms of referent object and analysis. This is also evident in the way/s in which policy frameworks, through their seeming lack of inclusion of traditional rulers in the Nigerian constitution, reinforce the prioritisation of the state and its agencies above other kinds of actors and narratives. Traditional security and governance thinking has prioritised and focused on inter-state rather than intra-state issues and challenges. For Nigeria, this has seemingly manifested in the state focusing more and pooling resources towards southern Nigerian development, not accounting for the large rural population that exists in northern Nigeria. Because of this neglect, there have been sparks of dissent and unrest in the north, for example, the Kano revolt (1980), Bulunktu Bisarre (1982), Kastina crises (1999), Samfara conflict, Kaduna revolt, Bauchi crises and Sokoto (1999), the Kaduna Riots (2000) and Jos Riots (2001) (Akinwale 2011: 124; Çancı & Odukoya 2016). This has allowed for the growth and emergence of transnational actors like MEND, the Maitatsine, the Yan Izala, Tariqah, and more recently, Boko Haram, that have tried to step in and establish a counter-narrative to the Nigerian state.

This demonstrates that there is a fundamental disconnect between what is formal and informal within Nigerian society. Under a traditional security and governance lens, northern Nigeria should be operating and functioning well. There should not be insecurities because the state, its machinery and infrastructure should be able to deal with the threats, challenges, and insecurities that have arisen within Nigeria. However, by using a purely traditional security lens, we leave out the very real problems in northern Nigeria. Drivers and threats like poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, corruption, etc., would not be easily identified under an orthodox security and governance lens. Similarly, actors such as traditional rulers would not be looked at as capable of alleviating these threats and insecurities. However, we see that traditional rulers are important to security and governance in northern Nigeria. By using a CSS and Third World Security lens, we begin to see how and why traditional rulers are important actors, especially considering the asymmetrical and unorthodox threats that emerged in a modern society.

Something that was touched on in this thesis is the relationship between the state and the traditional rulers. There seems to be tension between them. They both realise that they are needed for the continued and sustained security and governance of Nigeria. While they are still wary and distrustful of each other, both realise that they need each other to function. The state seems to have distrusted traditional rulers from the beginnings of Nigeria's independence. It has been argued that state actors perceive traditional rulers to have been accommodationist to British imperial rule. They are also wary of traditional rulers because they believe them to be trying to usurp their power. There have also been instances where some traditional rulers have been self-serving and were not working for the benefit of the communities. At the same time, the state understands that it needs traditional rulers for their power, authority, and influence. The state realises that traditional rulers are the backbone of the community. They are also the community mobilisers and a gateway to getting anything done. The state uses traditional rulers during election times and also during health emergences, for example, polio and COVID-19 (Reliefweb 2021; Premium Times 2020b).

Traditional rulers also seem to distrust the state. They appear to be wary of the state because it has limited its powers throughout several iterations of the Nigerian constitution, i.e., the Lyttleton, Republican and 1979 constitutions (Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Amusa & Ofuafor 2012: 410; Garba, Jurgi, Mamman & Abdullahi 2018: 54; Iyeh 2014: 138; Miles 1993: 38). Constitutional provisions appear to be at the heart of why some traditional rulers are said to distrust the state. There have been several calls for the state to expand the role and function of traditional rulers. Traditional rulers are also argued to be wary of the state's influence in their communities, and that is why they gatekeep access to the communities. Despite this, traditional rulers seem to be aware that they need the state to function and carry out its work. They are seemingly dependent on it for funding. While this was not explored in this thesis, it would make an interesting field of enquiry.

All of this is indicative of the fact that there is a problem regarding how security and governance functions in northern Nigeria. The frameworks in place seem not to be working well and neither are the actors, and this affects the way in which security and governance is perceived and meted out. Additionally, formal security and governance thinking cannot account for and support the work of traditional rulers. The seeming lack of policy frameworks and provisions within the Nigerian constitution make it difficult to put in place checks and balances to inhibit the greed of certain traditional rulers. They also leave traditional rulers

unable to stand up to the state and its ambitions. The consequence of these socio-economic and geo-political threats and challenges is a breakdown in security and governance in northern Nigeria. It has resulted in a myriad of crises over the course of northern Nigerian history including, but not limited to, religious and sectarian violence in northern states like Kano, Kastina, Kaduna, Bauchi, Sokoto, and Jos, as well as the emergence of Boko Haram and the perennial farmer/herdsmen conflict (Akinwale 2011: 124; Çancı & Odukoya 2016).

7.4 <u>RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH</u>

The general recommendations, observations and areas for further research are based on the analyses made in chapters five and six. They are also based on areas that could not be fully covered within this specific research. While these areas and observations were outside of the scope of this study, it does not mean that they are not important or relevant. As the critical school posits, there is no one, singular view on reality. Reality is constructed and constituted of different points and perspectives, each equal and important in terms of being studied and understood. Subsequent studies would benefit from delving deeper into these areas and observations. They would add to the growing literature on security and governance and add nuance to traditional rulership and the dynamics within northern Nigeria.

The critical approach, and specifically the CSS and Third World Security School, lie within the broader discourses surrounding the debates on universalism versus cultural relativism. The CSS and Third World Security School, while not a specific look into cultural relativism, do promote the idea that discourses and narratives should reflect the context and culturally important aspects of geographical and historical places. Traditional and mainstream discourses on security and governance usually prioritise more universal themes, transplanting Western and European concepts of security and governance to all contexts and arenas. They do not account for the fact that contexts are different, histories are divergent, and the Western and European ideals were built on colonial precepts, ones that unfairly stripped and suppressed cultural norms and values. Further discussions on this debate, as well as looking at how cultural relativism underpins critical schools and discourses, would be relevant and add nuance to the growing debates and discourse.

The critical approach and schools posit the idea that discourse and literature need to go beyond the binaries of good vs bad, actors doing something vs actors doing nothing. The idea that actors and institutions are inherently bad or good is a false narrative and too simplistic. More

nuanced discourses would move beyond these kinds of stereotypical responses and understandings. The state is not as weak and ineffectual as described in literature and discourse. The state is burdened by colonial precepts that dictate how they should behave. They are acting in the way they are meant to because of the way the systems are structured. Traditional rulers are not as benevolent as the literature and data suggest. They have their own weaknesses and agendas, not having adjusted well to the modern eras and operating on largely precolonial precepts. They, like other actors, are doing the best they can with what they have. This does not negate the fact that they also contribute to insecurity by their actions, decisions, and behaviours. Further studies could potentially look at these binaries and dichotomies and problematise them from a political linguistic approach.

More importantly, while this study only focused on one alternative actor, there are a myriad of other key stakeholders who are equally important within security and governance practice. So, while traditional rulers are important, they are not the only other actor/s involved in security and governance in northern Nigeria. As pointed out in chapters five and six, actors like businessmen, religious groups, the state, NGOs, and other civil society groups hold equal sway in the communities in northern Nigeria. The literature and discourse on NGOs and civil society are rich and plentiful; however, the lens of inquiry is distinctly Western and European focused. By changing the lens of inquiry to more critical, postcolonial, feminist, and decolonial approaches, even more nuance in the discussion would emerge. Further research could also benefit from doing comparative studies on these alternative actors.

7.5 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

This research conducted an exploratory and evaluative study probing how and why traditional rulers are a side-lined actor in formal security and governance practices in northern Nigeria. Sub-questions asks who the actors and institutions are that promote security and governance and what is their relationship to each other, how and in what ways traditional rulers have been side-lined in formal practice, and how and in what ways traditional rulers can be included in the formal practice of security and governance.

To a large extent, these questions were answered during the thesis and by the findings made in the field. The thesis was able to identify a myriad of actors and institutions who work in security and governance in northern Nigeria. These include, but are not limited to, the state, traditional

rulers, vigilantes, religious groups, and even businessmen. In chapter six, the study specifically focused on the relationships between the traditional rulers, vigilantes, and the state.

The answers to the second and third sub-questions can be summarised as follows: This study established that the main way in which traditional rulers are side-lined is through the lens of focus and inquiry used in formal security and governance practice. If the lens is mainstream, Western and European in orientation, then the voices of alternative actors such as traditional rulers occupy the background and periphery. It is only by actively changing and deliberately focusing on these actors that their value, significance, and worth is foregrounded within formal security and governance practice. This is not to say that they are invisible and do not do the work. On the contrary, traditional rulers are there, and they do the work. They are just not acknowledged and recognised in a way that allows their contribution to be made to security and governance crisis in Nigeria.

Finally, this study explored whether or not traditional rulers are a side-lined actor. On the one hand, and most strongly implied by the data collected, traditional rulers are not a side-lined actor. By focusing on a CSS and Third World Security School lens, we see how traditional rulers are an important and critical stakeholder in northern Nigeria. From the data, we identified how significant traditional rulers are to most communities. Within oral discourse, traditional rulers are respected, placed at the centre of communities and at the forefront of security and governance. In the north, especially, traditional rulers wield the main sources of power, influence, and authority within the communities. By this logic, traditional rulers cannot be considered to be side-lined. The strength and importance of traditional rulers has not really diminished, especially in the north. This is evidenced by how they are gatekeepers, access points to the communities, how they bring the people together, and how other actors defer to traditional rulers.

While this is true, traditional rulers are a side-lined actor in the formal sphere. By maintaining and focusing on a mainstream and traditional perspective, traditional rulers are squarely in the periphery, subservient to the state. If one changes the lens of inquiry to more critical discourses, as shown in this study, this assertion does not hold true. By placing traditional rulers at the centre of our analysis, we see their importance more clearly. Traditional rulers are important on the ground but marginalised within formal practice. They are not acknowledged well within the Nigerian constitution and their roles and duties have been curtailed and limited to an

advisory role. This is to the detriment of security and governance in northern Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole.

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The role and influence of traditional rulers in governance and security in northern Nigeria

Time of interview: _____ Duration: _____
Date: _____
Place: _____
Interviewer: _____
Interviewee: _____ Pseudonym: _____
Male / Female: _____

Developing a clear and comprehensive understanding about the peoples' lived experience of the role and influence of traditional rulers in governance and security in northern Nigeria.

Pseudonyms will be utilised in the interviews, data analysis and the findings. The data collected in this study will serve for research purposes only and treated as confidential. Access to the data will be granted to the researcher and the supervisor only. Please sign the consent form at the back of this document.

Thank you for your participation.
…………………………………………………………………………………………
1. Interview questions for traditional rulers:

a) How and why has Nigerian state has failed in its mandate to provide governance and security?

b) Aside from the Nigerian national and federal government, what other mechanisms and institutions promote governance and security in Nigeria?

c) Are there any institutions or mechanisms that stand out in the provision of governance and security? If so, please name them.

d) What is the relationship between the Nigerian state and the other mechanisms and institutions that provide governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

e) What are the opportunities and limitations of the different mechanisms and institutions that provide governance and security?

f) What role do traditional rulers play in governance and security, if any?

g) Do you think traditional rulers have been included in the governance and security interventions in Nigeria?

h) Do you think that traditional rulers play can a greater role in governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

i) In your opinion, can traditional rulers and the Nigerian state can work together to provide governance and security? Do you think this would be fruitful partnership? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

j) Is there anything you would like to add?

………………………………………………………………………………………

2. Interview questions for academics and researchers:

a) How and why has Nigerian state has failed in its mandate to provide governance and security?

b) Aside from the Nigerian national and federal government, what other mechanisms and institutions provide governance and security in Nigeria?

c) Are there any institutions or mechanisms that stand out in the provision of governance and security? If so, please name them.

d) What is the relationship between the Nigerian state and the other mechanisms and institutions that promote governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

e) What are the opportunities and limitations of the different mechanisms and institutions that promote governance and security?

f) Do traditional rulers play any role in governance and security?

g) Do you think traditional rulers have been included in the governance and security interventions in Nigeria?

h) Do you think traditional rulers can play a greater role in governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

i) In your opinion, can traditional rulers and the Nigerian state can work together to provide governance and security? Do you think this would be fruitful partnership? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

j) Aside from the above listed mechanisms and institutions, how else can governance and security be achieved in Nigeria?

k) Is there anything you would like to add?

………………………………………………………………………………………

3. Interview questions for government officials:

a) Aside from the Nigerian national and federal government, what other mechanisms and institutions promote governance and security in Nigeria?

b) Are there any institutions or mechanisms that stand out in the provision of governance and security? If so, please name them.

c) What is the relationship between the Nigerian state and the other mechanisms and institutions that promote governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

d) What are the opportunities and limitations of the different mechanisms and institutions that promote governance and security?

e) What role do traditional rulers play in governance and security?

f) Do you think traditional rulers have been included in the governance and security interventions in Nigeria?

g) Do you think traditional rulers can play a greater role in governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

h) In your opinion, can traditional rulers and the Nigerian state can work together to provide governance and security? Do you think this would be fruitful partnership? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

i) Is there anyone else that you can recommend me to speak to?

j) Is there anything you would like to add?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

4. Interview questions for staff at civil society organisations:

a) How and why has Nigerian state has failed in its mandate to provide governance and security?

b) Aside from the Nigerian national and federal government, what other mechanisms and institutions provide governance and security in Nigeria?

c) Are there any institutions or mechanisms that stand out in the provision of governance and security? If so, please name them.

d) What is the relationship between the Nigerian state and the other mechanisms and institutions that provide governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

e) What are the opportunities and limitations of the different mechanisms and institutions that provide governance and security?

f) What role do traditional rulers play in governance and security?

g) Do you think traditional rulers have been included in the governance and security interventions in Nigeria?

h) Do you think traditional rulers can play a greater role in governance and security? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

i) In your opinion, can traditional rulers and the Nigerian state can work together to provide governance and security? Do you think this would be fruitful partnership? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)

j) Aside from the above listed mechanisms and institutions, how else can governance and security be achieved in Nigeria?

k) Is there anything you would like to add?

APPENDIX 2: Letter of permission

Faculty of Humanities
Department of Political Sciences

27 June 2018

To whom it may concern

RE: Letter Of Permission To Conduct Interviews For PhD Research

I am a student at the University of Pretoria, currently enrolled for my PhD, in the Department of Political Sciences. As part of the requirements for the fulfilment of my study, I am conducting a research on the role and influence of traditional rulers in governance and security in northern Nigeria, and I would therefore like to invite you to participate in this research.

If you agree to participate, you will be interviewed about this topic. The interview will take place at a venue and time that will suit you, so as not interfere with your personal, social, religious or administrative activities and time; also, it will not take longer than an hour. I will take notes and use a voice recorder as well. You do not have to participate in this research if you do not want to, and you will not be affected in any way if you decide not to take part. If you decide to participate, but you change your mind later, you can withdraw your participation at any time. Your identity will be protected. Only my supervisor (as signed below) and I will know your real name, as a pseudonym will be used during data collection and analysis.

In my research report and in any other academic communication, your pseudonym will be used and no other identifying information will be given, unless you prefer otherwise. Collected data will be in my possession or my supervisor's and will be locked up for safety and confidentiality purposes. After completion of the study, the material will be stored in University Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences according to the policy requirements.

If you agree to take part in this research, please fill in the consent form provided below. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me on Phone or Email.

Kind Regards,

Mellissa Simbisai Mlambo   Dr. Cori Wielenga

…………………………   ……………………
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Department of Political Sciences   *Department of Political Sciences*
University of Pretoria   University of Pretoria
+27 67 047 6345   *+27 12 420 4486*
simbisai.mlambo@gmail.com   *cori.wielenga@up.ac.za*

APPENDIX 3: Consent form

Faculty of Humanities
Department of Political Sciences

27 June 2018

I, _____ (your name), agree / do not agree (delete what is not applicable) to take part in the research project titled: The role and influence of traditional rulers in governance and security in northern Nigeria. I understand that I will be interviewed about this topic for approximately one hour at a venue and time that will suit me, but that will not interfere with my personal and official activities. The interview will be audio taped.

I understand that the researcher subscribes to the principles of:

- Voluntary participation in research, implying that the participants might withdraw from the research at any time.
- Informed consent, meaning that research participants must at all times be fully informed about the research process and purposes, and must give consent to their participation in the research.
- Safety in participation; put differently, that the human respondents should not be placed at risk or harm of any kind e.g., research with young children.
- Privacy, meaning that the confidentiality and anonymity of human respondents should be protected at all times.
- Trust, which implies that human respondents will not be responding to any acts of deception or betrayal in the research process or its published outcomes.

I, the Undersigned, have read the above and I understand the nature and objectives of the research project as well as my potential role in it and I understand that the research findings will eventually be placed in the public domain. I voluntarily consent to participate in all discussions, to give my expert opinion and to provide details and to provide details about my life history, keeping in mind that I have a right to withdraw from the project at any stage. I also grant the researcher the right to use my contribution to the research project in completing this project as well as other projects that may emerge in the future.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX 4: Photographs

His Royal Highness, the former Emir of Zazzau Alhaji Shehu Idris C.F.R., the Second-Class Traditional Ruler, His Royal Highness, Alhaji Wakili Aminu, and myself

The Second-Class Traditional ruler, His Royal Highness, Alhaji Wakili Aminu surrounded by the *Dogarai*, and myself