



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

‘US Hegemony and Latin American Regional Security’:

The United States’ hegemony in the Organisation of American States (OAS): Implications for Latin American Regional Security

Bridget Blanckenberg

16121857

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University of Pretoria
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Political Sciences

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Supervisor: Prof C. Isike

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Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this study has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the study contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made.

Signed: 

Date: 07 October 2021

Key Acronyms

ALBA:	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Spanish: <i>Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América</i>)
CELAC:	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
EU:	European Union
OAS:	Organisation of American States
PROSUR:	Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (FPDSA; Spanish: Foro para el Progreso y Desarrollo de América del Sur)
UNASUR:	Union of South American Nations
US:	United States of America

Abstract

United States of America (US) hegemony has been a topic of scholarly discussion for long. Regarding US hegemony within the Organisation of American States (OAS), and Latin America by extension, the OAS institutional and budgetary reforms submitted with the Revitalisation and Reform Act of 2013 had signified a trajectory towards a declining hegemony. This study explores the implications of OAS budgetary reforms on inter-American security architecture. This research uses theoretical assumptions of regime and hegemonic theory to construct hypotheses assessing the changes that could happen with a potential declining influence of the US. Findings showed that the OAS member states have been free riding on the US's funds to operate the region's security agenda and strategy. This must change. Increased autonomy, cooperation, and financial contribution from the Latin American member states would decrease the efficacy of the US conditionality—a tool the hegemon currently uses to shape inter-American security and peace policies to US interests. The US should change its strategy in Latin America going forward.

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Table of Corrections

Original Content	Examiner's Comments	Candidate Corrections and/or Motivation
Chapter 3 (3,2); pg. 25 – paragraph 2; line 10 reads “However, note that having an existing regional structure alone is not a solution to peace and security.”	Suggests that the sentence should read as follows “debatably, having an existing regional structure alone is not a solution to peace and security”	Amended verbatim.
Discusses the intertwined notions of security and insecurity.	“Insecurity not adequately defined”	Provided definition of ‘insecurity’ for the purposes of this study. See: Chapter 1.1; pg. 3 – paragraph 7; Line 1.
Introduces two 8-year periods for comparing the relationship of the US and OAS in the study.	“Further explanation of the significance of the two 8-year periods selected for review in the study”.	Further explanation given. See: Chapter 1.4; pg. 6 – paragraph 1; Line 6.
Discusses the OAS, as well as it’s organisational structure.	“A graphical representation of the OAS would have been a helpful tool”.	Inserted organogram of the OAS. See: pg. 28.
	“Size and shape of the OAS not discussed in sufficient detail”.	Additional information added regarding OAS. See: pg. 27
Typing error of “Congressional” on pgs. 31 & 35.	“Congressional (the candidate wrote “congregation”.	Amended “congregation” to “congressional”. See: pgs. 31 & 35.
Chapter 5: Conclusion	“Point out future threads for research”.	Threads for future research proposed.
		Removed sources not quoted in script from reference list.

CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Globalisation is an increasing and persistent move towards an interconnected global environment and has created conditions of interdependence within which new challenges and threats to security are experienced. Hence, pursuing security involves many uncertainties for countries. Most countries find it challenging to advance their national security by acting alone (Booth, 1987); thus, they often work together towards enhancing their security. Consequently, national security is better understood regionally.

Regional security is a relational phenomenon where local conflicts have regional ramifications (Söderbaum & Tavares, 2009). For example, the “insurgent groups vying for territorial control in Colombia, cartel violence fuelling the rise of vigilantes in Mexico, to the suppression of dissent in Nicaragua and Venezuela” (Kishi, Pfadt, Castro & Jones, 2020: 2) directly affect Latin American regional stability and security. Therefore, many Latin American states subscribe to regional organisations (ROs), such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), for security assurance.

The lack of regional security and stability in contemporary Latin America is attributable to the general asymmetry between the United States of America (US) and Latin American states. In pursuing regional security, “Americans consider themselves to be in control and have an ingrained preference for unilateral responses to regional problems” (Hurrell, 1998: 546). However, Latin American states “tend to be reflexively wary about proposals to improve hemispheric security because they think it will increase their vulnerability to American domination” (*ibid*). The Latin American security system results from the often-contradictory security policies pursued by the hemispheric hegemon, the US, against Latin American governments’ policies to guarantee their national security while enhancing their collective security (Mares & Kacowicz, 2016).

The US and 20 other governments in the Western hemisphere established the OAS as a multilateral regional body in 1948 to “increase regional security and commercial cooperation” (Labrador & Cheatham, 2020). However, as the organisation’s largest financial contributor and the hemisphere’s most powerful country, the US is disproportionately influential within the OAS (Meyer, 2018). The organisation’s regional objectives frequently appear consistent with the US’s national interests and objectives. Additionally, the organisation’s activities frequently coincide and complement the US’s activities and efforts (Slater, 1967; Meek, 1975; Tulchin, 2017; Boniface, 2020).

Former Guatemalan President Arévalo claimed that “the US always wins in the OAS” (1961: 126). Similarly, Carrión (1965: 29) argued that the “OAS receives orders and complies with them, with the appearance of discussion, and the appearance of votes that satisfy *pro-forma* the hypocritical *Quakerism* of the masters”. However, it is agreed that the US government’s ability to advance its policy initiatives in the organisation has declined recently (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012; Nolte, 2018; Biegon, 2017; O’Keefe, 2020; Milani, 2021).

This study contributes to the discourse on the US instrumentalising the OAS for advancing its interests in the Western hemisphere. The probable decline of US hegemony in the OAS by reducing its financial contributions and implications for Latin American regional security are explored. The disproportionate influence of the US as a regional hegemon has impacted inter-organisational aspects of the Latin American peace and security regime. By security regime, the researcher refers to Jervis’s concept addressing the “norms and expectations that facilitate co-operation, as well as the form of co-operation that is more than following short-term self-interest” (Jervis, 1982:357). This study explores the case of US hegemony in the OAS to illustrate how this asymmetric dynamic has caused the inability of Latin American states to function independently and respond adequately to peace and security conflicts in the region.

Barry Buzan (1991: 432-433) postulated that “security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile”. Stemming from this description, ‘insecurity’ in this study is hence understood to be the substantial range of concerns that potentially undermine the conditions (namely; state sovereignty, and with it, a sense of autonomy and agency) of states’ existence. If the OAS is to make progress in preventing insecurity escalation in its region, it must strengthen its internal capacity and resources to meet these challenges (Soto, 2016). Latin American states’ increased agency and financial contribution to the OAS would strengthen the institution, making it more resilient to Latin American crises. Furthermore, increasing the Latin American member states’ financial equity would decrease financial dependence on the US. Therefore, this research argues for a post-hegemonic cooperative strategy proposing “an active role in regional institutionalisation and the use of, for instance, power-sharing and differentiation” (Pedersen 2002: 677). This strategy would be underpinned by the values of effective multilateralism and a renewed commitment for peace, security, and operation modes by the US and the rest of OAS.

This chapter outlines the background (Section 1.2) and research purpose (Section 1.3). Section 1.4 describes the significance and scope of this research. Finally, section 1.5 includes an outline of the remaining chapters of this study.

1.2 Background

ROs, such as the OAS, are partly formed to “provide security and safeguard the territorial integrity of member states” (Gaudry & Abdul, 2017: 1450). ROs are not merely channels through which states might pursue their interests but are significant factors influencing peace and security policies. One or more states undertake regional security (Buzan & Wæver, 2004). However, the direct presence of outside (great) powers in a region can suppress the standard operation of security dynamics among the states in the region (Buzan, 1991:197-198).

Since its inception, the OAS has been financially dependent on the US, especially its peace and security policies. Despite the institutional, budgetary, and quota reforms initiated by the OAS’s 2013 *Revitalisation and Reform Act*, in 2017, the US remained “the largest financial contributor to the OAS, providing an estimated US\$68 million in FY2017 – equivalent to 44% of the organisation’s total budget” (Meyer, 2018: 1). The principal feature of these reforms was to ensure that no OAS member state would pay more than 50% of the organisation’s assessed contributions (Melito, 2018).

In 2019, the OAS allocated a budget of close to US\$83, of which the US had to provide around US\$51 million (~60% of the total contribution). From January to September of 2019, the US also “voluntarily gave more than US\$18 million to the specific fund, accounting for about 40% of contributions in that period” (Labrador & Cheatham, 2020: np). The US contributed almost 60% (about US\$55 million) to the organisation’s approved budget of US\$85 million for 2020, yet again. The US’s financial contributions appear to be increasing, or at least not declining at all.

This continued pattern of the US’s high financial contribution further entrenches an unequal power distribution and asymmetrical organisational intra-play within the OAS. Moreover, hegemonic/donor-type actors, such as the US, are more inclined to respond to immediate security crises instead of implementing long-term measures (Scott, 2014). Overall, this power distribution affects the interaction between the US and other OAS member states, and thus, the security policies in Latin America. The implication is that the US owns and imposes policies in Latin America.

The OAS’s 2013 *Revitalisation and Reform Act* had signalled a future towards financial equity in the OAS. Given that this must still be achieved, merits research into the probable outcomes of a

smaller financial role of the US in the OAS. To overcome the structural flaw that this dependency on the US presents for the OAS, the implications of changing this dynamic (declining US hegemony) should be discussed.

The Latin American states' lack of financial agency questions their commitment to the OAS, and by extension, regional security. Latin American states' ability and capacity to respond to peace and security conflicts in the region hinge on whether they can be persuaded to devote greater resources to it. This study examines the probable trajectory changes of the Latin American peace and security regime flowing from a speculative decline in US funding and influence in the OAS. These changes would involve more states, instead of one, to accept the responsibility of security. This study proposes that the organisational dynamics between the US and Latin America in the OAS should be redefined to enhance cooperation instead of dominance. In other words, "the other member states, primarily those in Latin America, must aim to pick up the slack" (Raderstorf & Shifter, 2018: 17).

1.3 Purpose, Objectives and Questions

1.3.1 Purpose

This study explores the potential decline in US hegemony (by decreased financial contributions) in the OAS and its implications for Latin American regional security.

1.3.2 Objectives

The study's objectives are as follows.

- Objective 1: Examine the dynamics between the states comprising the Latin American region and the US within the OAS, specifically its peace and security regime and the potential outcomes of a change in this dynamic.
- Objective 2: Analyse the implications of budgetary reforms that would be necessary to level the financial contribution of states within the OAS.
- Objective 3: Evaluate the effect of donor-like dependence on the effectiveness of the OAS's collective provision of security.

1.3.3 Questions

The principal question this study sought to answer is how increased OAS independence from US funding can change Latin America's capacity to maintain peace and security in the region.

To answer this question, three sub-questions have been outlined.

- (1) What are the dynamics between the states comprising the Latin American region and the US within the OAS, its peace, and security regime?
- (2) What are the implications of budgetary reforms that would be necessary to level the financial contribution of states within the OAS?
- (3) What is the effect of donor-like dependence on US funding on the effectiveness of OAS's collective provision of security?

1.4 Significance and Scope

This research focuses on two eight-year periods. The first period examines the dynamics of the US in the OAS during the Latin American security crises between 2005 and 2013 (before announcing the organisational reforms in 2013). The second period examines the changes in intra-organisational dynamics from announcing the OAS reforms onwards (2013–2021). These two time periods are significant as they represent the most 'recent history' for reviewing the relationship of the US and the OAS. Arguably, 8 years is enough time to allow for the dynamics of these actors to play out so that a comprehensive review can then take place as this study attempts to do so. These two time periods have been selected to illustrate the extent of US influence on the OAS's security agenda when it has relative bargaining or purchasing power in the organisation compared to when it does not. In exploring the period before announcing the institutional reforms and the period after, the aim is to shed light on current OAS developments and how these might affect how peace and security are maintained in the Latin American region.

The implications of the organisation's budgetary and quota reforms should be more conducive to promoting multilateral perspectives on the Latin American peace and security regime. By using hypotheses derived from theoretical assumptions, this research explores the present day to the future development of the OAS.

This study is relevant for academic discourse and society. For academia, this study will fill the research gap created by the relatively recent declaration of the OAS's institutional reforms and so, their subsequent implications for regional security. Before the 2013 Revitalisation and Reform Act, scholars (Kraft, 2010) argued that the rest of the Latin American states have neither the capabilities nor resources to match the region's peace and security needs and that this situation is unlikely to change in the future. Yet, by simply proposing the Act, the OAS has indicated that it is committed to achieving (increased) financial autonomy in the short term, or at least "attempting

to obtain more equitable treatment” (Narich 2016: 17). This will significantly affect the Latin American peace and security regime’s structure.

Societally, this study displays that the OAS, and by extension, the Latin American region in relation to the US, should not only be viewed in a saviour and dependent context. If the OAS manages to become financially autonomous while retaining its capacities to resolve local peace and security conflicts, it will demonstrate the Latin American region as a dynamic force globally; thus, refuting Malamud and Schenoni’s (2020) notion of the region’s declining strategic relevance in global affairs.

1.5 Structure of Research

The next chapter sets out the theoretical framework of this study. To examine the implications of institutional reforms on the contemporary Latin American security regime, and by extension, the relations between the active actors, this study draws upon various theories to assess the implications of a hegemonic force declining. The study uses the notion of cooperative hegemony to illustrate some consequences of a single hegemonic-type actor losing its influence in Latin American security affairs. This paper argues that the US can be treated as a hegemon-like actor to assess its influence against this hegemonic theoretical background and the implications of hegemonic decline on regional cooperation. In the third chapter, an overview will be provided of the current Latin American peace and security regime. The roles of different actors and their intra-organisational and inter-governmental relations will be examined. The sub-question, ‘*What is the effect of donor-like dependence on US funding on the effectiveness of OAS’s collective provision of security?*’ will be answered in this chapter.

Since a lot of academic research has already been done on the OAS’s peace and security policies before the 2013 reforms were announced, the study draws mostly from academic debates regarding the Latin American peace and security realm. This is necessary to compare the pre-institutional reforms more accurately to the Latin American peace and security regime and the regime that can be established if OAS reaches financial autonomy because of the reforms.

The fourth chapter analyses the changes proposed in the Revitalisation and Reform Act by answering the question, ‘*What is nature of the dynamics between the states comprising the Latin American region and the US within the OAS, its peace and security regime?*’ Next, the implications of these changes on the Latin American security regime and their consequent influence on the relationship between the US and Latin American states regarding peace and security policies are

assessed. *'What are the implications of budgetary reforms that would be necessary to level out the financial contribution of states within the OAS?'* is the sub-question designed to do so.

The fifth and final chapter presents a conclusion based on the findings of this study. The main question, *'How can increased independence from partner funding change the OAS's capacity to maintain peace and security on the continent?'* will be addressed while reiterating the most important arguments of this research.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Literature Review

Much research exists on ROs as security actors for collective efforts in reducing security challenges. The available literature underpins the overall importance of international and or regional regimes (Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; Buzan, 1981, 2004, 2007; Buzan & Hansen, 2007 Buzan & Wæver, 1998). However, due to geographical and language limitations, only a few works are accessible to African scholars on Latin American ROs and their collective efforts in reducing security challenges. In security studies, Africa and the Middle East are the most studied regions; hence, little attention is paid to Latin America or the Western hemisphere in general when thinking about international security.

Mares and Kacowicz (2016) studied the contemporary challenges and failures of ROs and the decreased use of force in Latin America. They noted that “academics who study Latin America focus most of their attention on what is happening inside particular states, rather than at the international relations within the region. Furthermore, those who look at the interactions – pay little attention to security issues and are rather focused on the international political economy”. Thus, the security outcomes driving many empirical puzzles of contemporary research are underexplored.

Mares and Kacowicz (2016) explored the position of Latin America in international security, but it does not focus on how organisational dynamics shape Latin American regional security. Rodrigo Tavares’ (2014) concentrated on the contributions of South American states’ dynamics and their ROs to traditional and human security. While Tavares (2014) offered a useful inventory of South American states and active non-state actors in the South American continent, he does not systematically analyse the driving forces influencing these states and actors in the broader, hemispheric sense.

Several books offering broader, comparative perspectives on regional security and regional security organisations globally contain individual chapters with brief overviews of Latin America’s security challenges (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2011), security governance, and security organisations (Tavares 2010; Kirchner & Domínguez, 2011; Breslin & Croft, 2012; Aris & Wenger, 2014; Winther, 2014). However, these studies are insufficiently concerned with power shifts or politics and their influence on Latin American regional security.

Weiffen and Villa (2017) discussed regional security issues and actors against the background of an international order in transformation. They analysed regional security challenges and the

specific policies adopted in reaction to such challenges to broader regional and global political developments, such as the rise of emerging powers, the changing role of the US globally and in the Western hemisphere specifically, power dynamics between regional and secondary regional powers, and the proliferation of ROs in Latin America. Weiffen and Villa's (2017) proposal of the US's changing role in the Western hemisphere is significant in this study for considering the dynamics between the states comprising the Latin American region and the US within the OAS.

Most literature on Latin American regional security was published in the late 1990s (Hurrell, 1998; Domínguez, 1998; Mares, 1998) and was strongly influenced by the regional wave of democratisation and the extensive reorganisation of civil-military relations after periods of military dictatorship at the time. Subsequently, other works have focused on specific security problems, such as border conflicts (Domínguez, 2003; Mares, 2001; 2012) or US security policy towards Latin America (Loveman, 2006).

An increasing number of studies address the new, non-traditional security challenges posed by violent non-state actors and illicit activities such as drug-trafficking (Koonings & Kruijt, 2004; Sanchez, 2006; Bruneau, Dammert, & Skinner, 2012; Maihold & Córdova, 2014; Maihold & Jost, 2014; Bagley, Rosen, & Kassab, 2015). Other available research is mostly in Spanish; thus, inaccessible to the wider audience (Grabendorff, 2003; Tulchin, Manaut & Diamint, 2005). The available literature sets an ominous tone of chronic patterns of insecurity in most Latin American states, and edited collections offering a panacea for the region's security challenges are scarce.

When exploring the dynamics shaping the Latin American security architecture, scholars fall into two schools of thought, Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism. Latin Americanism and Pan-Americanism are two opposing ideologies representing the prism of US–Latin American relations. Latin Americanism iterates Latin Americanisation and Latin American ownership, whereas US involvement in Latin American affairs characterises the Pan-American movement.

Much has been written about US involvement and its associated hegemony in various regions. Destradi (2010) and Weiffen (2017) discussed the US's emergent role in the organisations to which it subscribes in respective global regions. Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno discussed the impact of the US in international organisations and concluded that "America's decisions to cooperate in multilateral forums [are] determined predominantly by the extent to which any specific organization is perceived by important US domestic actors to be an effective and congenial vehicle for the promotion of America's objectives. As for multilateral institutions themselves, they operate within the direct and indirect constraints that US instrumentalism imposes" (2003: 14-15).

Considering the US's inclination to impose itself, the persistent US military interference in Latin America has sparked scholars to claim that the US, and not the rest of the Latin American states, decides when, where, and how security in Latin America is pursued (Carrión, 1965; Arévalo, 1961; Meek, 1975; Weyland, 2018). In contrast to the literature concerning the US's monocratic influence on international affairs, Ashraf (2020) evaluated the causal mechanisms behind the US's declining global hegemony.

De Santibañes (2009) explored the end to US hegemony in Latin America and the strategic implications of China's increasing presence in Latin America because of the imminent power vacuum. Other opponents that argue that US influence is diminishing are Sabatini (2013) and Coatsworth (2017). Some scholars have argued that the disharmonious US–Latin American relations are due to the US's efforts being perpetually undermined by insecurity caused by regional transnational criminal organisations. The scholars in this argument highlighted a “number of regional political actors embracing ideological positions opposed to open political systems and free markets, which undermine progress (proliferated by the US), toward democratic governance and stability” (Deare, 2020: 1) in Latin America.

From these conflicting bodies of literature, the US's pursuit of security in Latin America is a case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. In other words, scholars cannot agree whether the regional hegemon has undue influence on Latin American security affairs and peace regime or whether it is an altruistic actor promoting security in an otherwise hostile, volatile strategic environment.

However, this paper argues that while the democracy proliferated and protected by the US through the OAS has helped Latin American states improve their economies, the US's involvement in Latin America has also hurt the region. In a 2008 report, O’Neil shared the same sentiment and concluded that “US–Latin America[n] relations should pursue a new direction for a new reality” (2009: 75). The US's approach to Latin American peace and security suffers from a series of contradictions. For one, the OAS's financial dependence on the US challenges the rhetoric of equal partnership. Former President Barack Obama also perpetuated this sentiment when he told Latin American leaders that he wanted to begin “a new chapter of engagement” and an “equal partnership, based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values” (Obama, 2009).

The US unashamedly pursuing its security and economic interests first has defined the rhetoric of solidarity towards the region. Legler (2015: 13) argued that the US has “often used the OAS to engage in defensive multilateralism designed to constrain unilateral US action”. Moreover, the

US's projection of normative power and the exclusive promotion of strategies that work for US citizens within US state territory has questioned the rhetoric of dialogue because these strategies are not necessarily sustainable in the Latin American strategic and security environment.

Various scholars highlighted the increasing resistance of Latin American governments to tenets of US-led approaches to alleviating the Latin American illicit drug crisis. These scholars elaborated on the extent of the breakdown between the US and Latin American states. The radical opposition of Latin American states to traditional US strategies, such as prohibition, eradicating crops, and a militarised stance to battling drug growers implies that the traditional US strategies might no longer be (if they ever were) viable in the wider Latin American region. Most importantly, there is little to no discourse or consideration by the US regarding whether their imposed security policies and strategies are contextually relevant and sustainable.

Moreover, contemporary scholarly discourse on Latin American peace and security architecture lacks a thorough investigation regarding the conceptual basis of the OAS as a security actor. This follows from the recurrent characterisation of the OAS as a “rather weak institution” in which member states see limited value (Valdivieso, 2015: np). Furthermore, global partners find little credibility and “citizens have no trust” in the institution (Güemes, 2019: 1068). In addressing the OAS's reputation, scholars have stressed the importance of effective multilateralism and the OAS and its complacent member states' renewed commitment to peace, security, and cooperation (Jácome, 2015). However, there is little mention of how such effective multilateralism can be achieved and by what standard such cooperation can be measured.

Regarding the OAS's capacity as a security actor in Latin America, the efficacy of the RO in addressing Latin American security policies and problems has also been underexplored and the predominant literature emphasises the perception of the US as a donor actor and the rest of the OAS member states as recipient actors (Buelvas, 2013; Quiliconi & Espinoza, 2017; Tavares, 2014; Weiffen, 2017). A blatant academic vacuum exists concerning the literature available on the US–OAS peace and security relations and the OAS institutional intra-play due to the external projection of US rules. Meyer (2018) briefly discussed the financial and practical value of the US–OAS peace and security policies. However, the lack of focus on the implications of OAS's financial dependence on the US has justified the need for researching the implications of OAS financial independence that is inextricably linked to the institutional intra-play.

A major gap in the discourse has been the appropriateness of the OAS's quota system's design for states' financial contributions to its operational fund. Rather than being examined, the financial contribution of states has been taken for granted. Yet, an effective quota structure is crucial if the

OAS is to play a significant role and make a difference in Latin American peace and security. There must be a broader understanding of the basis, roles of the member states, and amendments of their membership, scope, and norms in the OAS to understand how the organisation is structured to address regional security crises.

The extent to which the US influences Latin American strategic and security policies are nestled in numerous literature offering opposing perspectives without recourse to the US's funding of the OAS and the power it gives the US. However, empirical evidence cannot be disputed. Mattheis and Engel (2020) addressed a gap in the research on ROs where they 'followed the money'. They explored how the ROs' finances in Latin America, Africa, and Asia work and what they reveal about the region-building process. Their analysis on ROs' processes of budgeting and resourcing shed light on ROs around security in the Global South. This type of insight is significant, as it provides much information about power and priorities in ROs. Viable solutions to the unequal financial contribution and power distribution of the US within the OAS are minimally discussed in the literature. Therefore, this paper adds to the discourse of ROs' finances in the Global South. Many scholars take the financial dependency of the OAS on the US for granted. However, progress that could increase Latin American states' agency and financial autonomy should be considered.

2.2 Research Problem

Achieving an equitable and sustainable financial structure in the OAS has been slow. Thus, the ultimate effects of decreased US contributions to the organisation as a security actor for collective security on Latin American regional security remain a hypothetical academic vacuum to be studied. A gap in academic discourse has become obvious with the ongoing reformations of the OAS's institutional structure. Many scholars take the financial dependence of the OAS on the US for granted, claiming that this dynamic is unlikely to change in the future and that "any form of autonomy from the US would be totally unrealistic" (Narich, 2016: 16).

However, the threats made by US President Donald Trump in 2016 that the US would pull back general funding in Latin America illustrate that progress must be made to increase the OAS's financial autonomy (Oppenheimer, 2017). This is significant for guarding organisations' susceptibility to a hegemon's conditionality, disinterest, and threats. This way, the OAS's security actions and policies are more likely to be strategically relevant and free of undue exploits. It is time to research the possibility of decreased US funding, the OAS's subsequent financial

autonomy, and what the potential implications of such autonomy would be on comprehensive responses to regional insecurities.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The underlying framework of analysis for this research is inspired by Thomas Pedersen's (2002) theory of cooperative hegemony. Pedersen (2002) maintained that major states could pursue their interests without coercion using a cooperative hegemon strategy. This theory is pertinent to the case of the OAS, as realistically, the smaller Latin American states cannot effectively supplant the US's role in the organisation. However, a power-sharing solution is entirely viable.

Schimmelfenning's (2004; 2017) external incentives model (EIM) is used to show how the US tries influencing the OAS's peace and security policies to shape the Latin American neighbourhood. Although Schimmelfenning's EIM was developed for assessing the European Union's (EU's) power in shaping the public policies of those European countries seeking EU membership, it can also be applied to this research.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has enjoyed a long-standing status of power and prestige in international relations. Hence, the ultimate reward the US sets out is clear—the simple privilege of being associated with such great power. Given the connotation of being a global superpower, the US can affect the effectiveness of the EIM. Because this study researches the US's power to shape its backyard neighbours to its political preferences, it focuses on the intra-organisational interplay within the OAS considering the external projection of US rules.

The US's foreign policy towards the Caribbean, Central and South America is a policy of conditionality. The US exercises conditionality in Latin America similar to Schimmelfenning's EIM. In this model, the US's conditionality follows a strategy of reinforcement by reward. Under this strategy, the US rewards Latin American states who comply with its political preferences and conditions. However, it withholds reward if a state's stance is contrary to its own. Consequently, Latin American member states of the OAS are incentivised to yield to US influence.

Krasner and Keohane are significant scholars in explaining the behaviour of states based on states being inherently self-interested, rational actors. By using their state-centred approaches, this study superimposes the implications of hegemonic states interacting in ROs.

ROs should not be channels through which states pursue their fundamental interests. Rather, ROs should exemplify effective multilateralism and collective security where member states are motivated by the "development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international

institutions and a rules-based international order” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 1). ROs are an amalgamation of a common vision and strategy. Therefore, the notion of multilateralism was constructed to explain “how international action is achieved, and to some extent, by whom” (Montobbio, 2013).

An important consideration is that ROs are structures and instruments of power that reflect power balances in their configuration and intra-organisational operations. Therefore, the study reverts to the state-centric perspective on international relations, as states remain essential in the international system. Regarding multilateral organisations, the issues this cause is to find other actors who determine the system (often free riders taking benefits) so that they can assume their responsibility and contribute effectively (Montobbio, 2013).

An effective multilateral strategy emphasises “long-term stabilisation and a gradual approach towards emerging crises while addressing the long-term underlying factors determining peace and security” (Biscop & Drieskens, 2005: 2). The extent to which this occurs in the OAS will be examined in the coming chapters of this study. First, an overview will be provided on multilateral approaches and how they relate to the OAS as a security actor and the Latin American security regime. The EIM will be operationalised to show how and why the US influences Latin American peace and security institutions.

An explanation will be provided on how intra-organisational interplay, specifically budget quota, and financial contribution, shape the processes of fostering peace and security in Latin America. Given the developments in the OAS to revitalise and reform the organisation, the organisational intra-play between the US and other member states will change, and with it, the Latin American security regime. Considering a possible post-US hegemony era in the OAS, this research also draws some parallels between the shifting power balance in the Latin American peace and security regime to Pedersen’s (2002) cooperative hegemony introduced in a paper on the power, ideas, and institutions in regional integration.

2.3.1 Assumptions: Hegemonic actors and the external incentives model

For this study, two fundamental theoretical assumptions about international politics are acknowledged. (1) States are the most important actors in the context of international anarchy. States seek to achieve their preferred outcomes primarily through negotiation and bargaining processes. Since governments know their national interests, they pursue these in bargaining with other states. In the bargaining process, state actors might exchange information, threats, and promises and the outcome depends on the actors’ relative bargaining power (Moravcsik &

Schimmelfennig, 2009: 66-67). National governments are thus key actors in ROs, as they enjoy political legitimacy and decision-making power. (2) States are rational, and collective outcomes are the result of interaction between states that aligns with their individual preferences. Individual actor preferences are applied through rational choice because state leaders follow cost-benefit analyses to structure the institutional design of ROs. Moreover, national governments are aware of their preferences and pursue these in bargaining with other member states. Therefore, some states view ROs not as independent entities but as an opportunity or channel to pursue their interests.

2.3.2 The external incentives model (EIM)

Schimmelfennig (2004; 2019) leaned on the same principles of rational choice and bargaining power, assuming that actors will always try to strategically maximise their utility. The EIM analyses how a hegemonic actor's (in the original use of the model, the EU) external governance is based on the conditionality principle. It entails the hegemonic actor's values, norms, and laws being used as a condition to which other actors should adhere if they wish to be eligible for the hegemon's rewards. According to Schimmelfennig, these rewards range from trade and cooperation to full membership of the respective RO. The rewards are offered to reinforce conditions set out by the hegemon. However, this also involves the hegemon withholding rewards if the conditions are not met but grants rewards when the targeted actor complies with the hegemon's conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 671).

Schimmelfennig (2004) further conceptualised a bargaining process where differences exist between the domestic status quo of a target actor and the hegemonic actor's norms and principles. The domestic status quo reflects the current distribution of preferences and bargaining power in the target actor's policies. The hegemonic actor then distorts this status quo by applying incentives to comply with its conditions. The model assumes that target actors will only comply with the hegemon's conditions if the rewards' sizes exceed the potential policy adoption costs.

Therefore, Schimmelfennig argued that this cost-benefit analysis depends on the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs. When examining these factors, one can determine why target actors opt to adhere to (or freeride) the hegemon's conditions and the hegemonic actors' capacity to transfer its norms and principles through external incentives.

For this study, a different understanding of Schimmelfennig's EIM will be applied. Because Schimmelfennig focuses on processes involving the EU's expansion, the model is inherently

constructed for analysing the relationship between the EU and potential member states. Yet, because the US applies a similar approach based on conditionality when dealing with the OAS states, the EIM can be adapted. This study provides a better understanding of US–OAS relations; therefore, the EIM will be operationalised to apply it to relationships between the US and other OAS member states to apply the model to a case study of the Latin American peace and security regime.

First, determinacy refers to the formality and precision of a condition. The more formal and precise a condition is, the more likely it will be adhered to. A condition has higher determinacy if the behavioural implications are clear and have a prominent level of legitimacy—the targeted ROs see them as inherently good or lawful. Furthermore, determinacy has an informational value because it creates clarity on to which conditions the targeted RO must adhere to receive the hegemon’s rewards. Similarly, it increases the credibility of conditionality by binding the hegemon. When conditions are well-defined, it becomes increasingly challenging for the hegemon to withhold the reward by claiming that they have not been met by the targeted RO. Consequently, Schimmelfennig’s EIM argues that the “probability of norm transfer increases if determinate rules are set as conditions for rewards” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004:672). For instance, “these rules may be related to rules of democracy or human rights” (2004: 678).

Second, the size and speed of rewards influence the cost-benefit analyses of the targeted RO. If the hegemon can show that the rewards for adhering to the conditions it sets out are substantially larger than the policy adoption costs, the targeted RO is more likely to adhere to the hegemon’s conditions. If the involved parties agree that these rewards will arrive soon, it is more likely that the targeted RO is willing to comply than if the rewards are only obtainable in the long run. Similarly, if the hegemon “continuously proves that it will deliver the promised rewards within the agreed-upon timeline, this will increase its credibility and thus, the likelihood of compliance” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 673).

Third, the credibility of threats and promises is critical in the cost-benefit analyses of targeted ROs. The key difference in applying the EIM for this research and its original conception is that the EIM primarily argues that the EU does not seek to change the behaviour of targeted actors by issuing threats and adopting measures of punishment. Hence, a threat does not refer to reinforcement by punishing the targeted actor. It refers to the hegemon’s possibility to withhold the agreed-upon rewards if the conditions are not met. Logically, a promise refers to the actual commitment of delivering the agreed-upon rewards. The more credible the hegemon’s threats and promises are deemed by the targeted actors, the more likely they will adhere to the

hegemon's conditions (*ibid*, 673-674). However, in applying the EIM in this study, the US, which is the hegemonic actor here, has used credible threats to change the behaviour of the targeted Latin American states within the OAS.

Following the most recent political crisis in Venezuela, some US Congress members argued that the OAS has been inactive in the crisis. This led to the contention that the OAS "is failing in its mission to support democracy and human rights in Latin America" (Piccone, 2019: 1). Consequently, "they have called on the US government to use its influence in the organization to compel stronger action on these issues and occasionally have sought to withhold funding from the organization" (Meyer, 2018: 1). Here, unlike the EU, the US seeks to change the behaviour of the targeted ROs (the OAS) by issuing threats and adopting measures of punishment. Hence, a threat refers to reinforcement by punishing the targeted RO. This manipulative behaviour of the US influences the OAS's adherence to US conditions, minimising adherence to issues that the organisation itself deems important.

Lastly, the size of policy adoption costs is critical for the success or failure of the hegemon's conditionality and influence. Schimmelfennig argued that certain costs always go hand in hand with policy changes. The targeted RO incurs power losses by the conditions demanded by the hegemon. For instance, the hegemon might demand a final say or veto power in the decision-making process of the RO as a condition for funding. If the targeted RO wants to receive the hegemon's funding, it must allow the hegemon to dominate at the decision-making table; thus, giving up part of its equal decision-making powers (*ibid*: 674-675). Although OAS's decision-making is said to be democratic, it is widely accepted that "there has always existed an imbalance within the OAS, with the US dominating the collective 35 member states" (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012: 5). This domination implies that the other 34 member states have given up part of their equal decision-making powers to serve as instruments of US foreign policy.

2.4 Cooperative Hegemony in Regional Security Regimes

This study emphasises the importance of intra-organisational cooperation in Latin American peace and security affairs in a potential post-US hegemony era. There is merit in regional institutions, as security alone is insufficient in explaining how US engagement in Latin American peace and security has developed. Instead, the regional security regime, which shows patterns of functional convergence, shapes the OAS formation and US engagement in Latin America. This regional security regime is centred around a flexible security architecture (Aravena, 2004). This flexible architecture adopted by OAS defence in 2002 emerged because "the region has gradually

shifted towards a complex system of security, constituted by a network of old and new institutions and mechanisms of security, both collective and cooperative, which is hemispherical, regional, sub-regional and bilateral in its reach” (Aravena, 2004: 7). Thus, the emergence of new flexible security architecture in the Americas was a substantial feature of bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and hemispherical agreements on cooperation elaborated to complement the security institutions forged by the inter-American system (*ibid*).

The flexibility of the Latin American security regime can make the actors within the regime susceptible to manipulation, as there is no blueprint of operations. In other words, the flexibility of the Latin American security architecture increases the Latin American actors’ dependency on actors who take it upon themselves to take the lead in constructing solutions to problems. This regime structure influences the OAS’s operation, functions, tasks, and general security priorities.

Campbell (2018) emphasised the need for security cooperation in Latin America and extended her analysis to the Caribbean states. Campbell (2018: 1) argued that shifting power relations in the global security architecture have sparked states’ “desire to exercise greater control over the direction of regional security policies and programmes”. Campbell further examined the measures taken by Latin America in increasing and decolonising cooperation and regional governance in security. Overall, Campbell examined old and new security discourses and threats that informed these measures and interrogated the degree to which regional security cooperation mechanisms respond to changes in regional security structures and the power relations underpinning them. Campbell noted the increased cooperation among Latin American states to balance the US’s power in the region. However, what is lacking in Campbell’s analysis is the argument of the interests of the US and OAS member states. How US engagement in Latin American peace and security operations has developed is insufficiently explained. Thus, to offer a comprehensive explanation of the US’s involvement in Latin America, it can be argued that the regional security regime shapes US engagement in Latin America, which shows patterns of functional convergence.

To understand how security regimes develop, certain basic causal variables have been distinguished. The most important are egoistic self-interest, political power, norms, and principles. Before assessing how OAS reforms could influence the Latin American security regime, these variables must be reviewed.

Egoistic self-interest refers to the desire to maximise one’s utility in areas where it excludes the utility of another actor. Sometimes, rational self-interested choice leads to abandoning independent decision-making processes, creating space for cooperation, and joint decision-

making. Individual choices can create an incentive for cooperation when such choices lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes and to outcomes mutually undesirable by all parties. In the case of the former, an example would be when multiple actors use the same collective goods. Each actor has an interest in using as much of it as possible, but if each actor does so, the collective goods might deplete (Krasner, 1983: 11-12). Cooperation and joint decision-making would make sense in this case, as it will sharply decrease the likelihood of depleting the collective goods. In the latter case, note that in these situations the choice of one actor depends on the choice made by the other, most famously exemplified in the 'chicken game'. Krasner argued that cooperation is a way to resolve this 'dilemma of aversions'.

Secondly, norms and principles are critical characteristics defining any given regime. All rules, procedures, and decision-making processes of regimes are shaped along the lines of their norms and principles. Yet, norms and principles that influence the regime in specific issue areas but unrelated to that issue area can be seen as explanations for creating, transforming, persistence, and dissipating regimes (Krasner, 1983: 16-18). Norms and principles distinguish regime-governed behaviour in the international system from conventional behaviour, which are frequently guided exclusively by narrow calculations of self-interest.

Lastly, political power refers to power as an instrument that can be used to increase the influence of certain actors (*ibid*, 13-16). For this study, power is assumed to be used to alter the outcome of rational choice matrices and influence an actor's strategy. When researching the effects of power, the role of hegemony is often discussed. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, hegemony is the prevalence of material resources, enabling a state to single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements of international political and economic relations. More specifically, before a state can be considered hegemonic, it must have access to crucial raw materials, maintain a large market for imports, control major capital sources, and hold comparative advantages in goods with high value-added. Moreover, the state must be stronger in all these dimensions than its competitors to be considered a hegemonic actor (Keohane, 1984: 31-33). The role of hegemony is exclusively allocated to states.

This study argues that the extent of hegemonic states includes powerful states within ROs dominating specific issue areas in entities otherwise not meant to have a hierarchical order. This research loosely uses a post-hegemonic cooperation model to investigate the potential consequences of a hegemonic-type actor losing its influence in Latin American security affairs. The essence of using a post-hegemonic cooperation conception is motivated by the thinking that if a change (reform) in OAS dynamics can be achieved through balancing funding obligations

between members, such that the US no longer pays the bulk, it will require some type of cooperative or group hegemony in place of the US dominant role in the OAS.

Within the Latin American peace and security regime, the US can be seen as a hegemonic actor. The US conforms to all four characteristics attached to hegemons in the theory of hegemonic stability (Keohane, 1984). The US is one of Latin America's most important trading partners. On average, the US has a comparative advantage in outputting goods with high value-added compared to the Latin American states. The US has access to vast quantities of raw materials, and most importantly, controls major sources of capital within the Latin American peace and security regime. The US is the largest contributor to Latin American peace and security missions through the OAS; therefore, economically, the US has played the leading role (*ibid*).

Especially during the pre-institutional reform period, the OAS has exclusively depended on the US for its peace and security budget. Even now, when the OAS voices the desire to move away from unequal funding, the US is still the major source of income for the organisation through the General Secretariat. This demonstrates that the US controls the major capital sources of the OAS's budget and can influence the OAS's decision-making processes regarding Latin American peace and security.

Most contemporary peacekeeping missions in Latin America are organised in partnerships between different ROs, most notably by the OAS, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Peacekeeping operations are thus not merely depending on the set-up and maintenance by leading Latin American states but are shaped by institutions that work together. Consequently, the US should not unilaterally decide on deploying troops or personnel in the Latin American region. Instead, reciprocity with other ROs, and at the very least, OAS member states, are needed to enable and initiate peacekeeping missions in the region. Cooperating ROs should coordinate with each other, consider each other's operational needs, institutional capabilities, and peacekeeping doctrines, and place them in relation to their capabilities and preferences.

When ROs plan their deployment of missions and other forms of security cooperation not according to their preferences but following other ROs through which systematic ways of cooperation based on reciprocity are produced, regional security regimes emerge. According to Krasner (1983: 11), "international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area". When states accept reciprocity, they are willing to sacrifice short-term interests in expectation of others to reciprocate in the future, even if they are not obligated to do so. This is in line with Axelrod's

arguments in *'The Evolution of Cooperation'*, particularly, his notion on *'Shadow of the Future'* which he argues that states will be held accountable for their decisions in future negotiations (Axelrod, 1984). For example, a state might benefit from being dishonest in the short run, but other states will consider this in future decision-making processes and might decide not to cooperate with the dishonest state anymore.

Given the numerous variables and nature of the Latin American peace and security regime, it is ambitious to claim that the US single-handedly dominates the rules and arrangements of Latin American peace and security affairs. However, the US uses the OAS to advance economic, political, and security objectives in the Western hemisphere; this is clear in that the OAS actions have historically reflected the US's policy (Meyer, 2018). The promotion of democracy is and has been central to US engagement in Latin America since the Cold War. Under the guise of the pursuit of democracy in the region, the US has "often used the OAS to engage in defensive multilateralism designed to constrain unilateral US action" (Legler, 2010: 13). However, if one looks at US engagement as inherently a foreign policy tool, it cannot overtly dominate the decision-making processes of the OAS because it would go against the idea of multilateralism, the foundation of the relationship between the US and OAS. In a situation where the US is dominating OAS operations, the OAS member states might no longer be willing to work closely with the US on Latin American peace and security affairs.

Still, the US can transfer norms and rules through conditionality and normative power. By setting up conditions to receive funding, the US can influence the OAS's decision-making processes while maintaining the rhetoric of Pan-Americanism and Latin American ownership. Moreover, many shared norms and principles shape the contemporary partnership between the US and OAS regarding peace and security, of which a key norm is the notion that each human has the right to live in peace. Therefore, it is logical that the US is committed to aiding the OAS in achieving peace in the Latin American region.

Yet, this does not mean the US is solely a benevolent actor that strives to achieve Latin American peace because of altruistic reasons. For example, it is in the US's interest to achieve peace in the Latin American continent as a continuation of its migration policies. If Latin Americans can live safely and peacefully in the Latin American continent south of the US (South America, Central America) continent, the incentive to migrate to the US will decrease. In short, the US's normative commitment to cooperation in Latin American peace and security matters with the OAS does not exclude US interests as a guiding force of US foreign policy.

The US has absolute supranational power over the OAS member states, which is a characteristic that makes the state much like a hegemonic actor, as hegemons are conventionally perceived to be states that can determine their policies to pursue their interests. In regime theory, the role of hegemons has often been a topic of discussion. Hegemons play a key role in supplying the collective goods necessary for regimes to operate. The hegemonic power does not supply these collective goods because they are interested in promoting and sustaining the system's well-being, but because regimes serve their own interests. Subsequently, Stein argued that as hegemonic powers decline, the incentives for cooperation rise because the hegemon no longer provides collective goods. More specifically, when smaller states notice that collective goods are no longer accounted for by the hegemon, they might be willing to start paying for these goods themselves. These states can then provide the collective goods themselves, without having to rely on any other incentives than the goods themselves. They have an interest in doing so because a regime contributes to facilitating mutually beneficial agreements between them. Consequently, "hegemonic decline can lead to stronger regimes and hegemony is not a necessary condition for the emergence – or the continuation of – cooperation in the global arena" (Krasner, 1983: 133).

Furthermore, if a hegemon persistently manipulates the norms and principles of other actors, the regime is held hostage by the existing distribution of power. Therefore, if the hegemon's political power decreases, the regime will gradually transform. For instance, the norms and principles of the colonial regime in Latin America collapsed when the political power of European states that governed it eroded in the early 18th century, as effected by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In short, a decline in power changes the regime as the hegemon can no longer influence the norms and principles of weaker states (Krasner, 1983: 16-18). Overall, regimes can make agreements between parties easier, as they frequently provide frameworks for legal liability, enhancing the quality and quantity of information available to all parties and reduce transaction costs (organisational costs). The benefits of regimes are therefore likely to outweigh the costs of constructing and maintaining a regime.

Without regimes, there is asymmetric information, potential dishonesty, and a higher chance of moral hazard. Additionally, the costs of establishing a regime are lower when a prominent level of formal and informal communication is in place between states and ROs. This condition could be present in open polities operating under conditions of interdependence, such as the Latin American regional peace regime. Most importantly, a change within a regime involves adjusting the rules and decision-making procedures, but not necessarily its norms and principles. A regime

has weakened if the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures become less coherent or if there is inconsistency between its behaviour and its norms and principles.

In the last section of this chapter, a framework will be constructed that will be applied to the two periods chosen for this study. This framework will enable assessing the potential implications of organisational reforms by comparing the period before the reforms were announced with the period that followed.

2.5 Constructing a Framework to Assess the Latin American Peace and Security Regime

Since this study assesses the implications of organisational reforms on the Latin American peace and security regime and how these reforms will impact the relationship between the US and the OAS within this regime, the theoretical framework that will be constructed combines elements from the EIM and theory of cooperative hegemony. Central to this theoretical framework is the notion that the US can be seen as a localised hegemon in Latin American peace and security affairs because it conforms to the definition of a hegemon, as set out by Keohane.

The framework comprises three sets of double-sided hypotheses centred around three principal factors that can change when the organisational financial reforms are implemented according to the theoretical assumptions from which they are derived. Each hypothesis is two-sided, comprising two claims to apply to the two periods chosen for this research. This first explanation (a) will be applied to the eight-year period before organisational reforms were announced (2005–2013), and the second explanation (b) will be applied to the period after announcing the Revitalisation and Reforms Act (2013 onwards), making theoretical predictions. The hypotheses have been formulated abstractly and will be applied to the case study to research the changes in the Latin American peace and security regime and the implications of these changes on the security cooperation between the US and the OAS.

The three sets of hypotheses that have been constructed for the analytical chapter of this study are as follows:

1. Collective Goods

- a. If a hegemon provides the collective goods necessary for a regime to operate, smaller states in that regime will free ride.
- b. When a hegemon is no longer providing the collective goods necessary for a regime to operate, smaller states can no longer free ride and will start paying for these collective goods themselves.

The hypotheses regarding collective goods were derived from Krasner's book on regime theory, in which it is argued that when a hegemon provides collective goods, smaller states will free ride. For hypothesis 1b, this theoretical assumption is then reversed. When smaller states perceive that a hegemon is no longer willing to offer a free ride, they might start paying for these goods themselves. Note that this will only happen in situations where the returns of collective goods exceed the costs for these goods. The states will make cost-benefit analyses to determine whether the collective goods are worth paying for if the hegemon no longer provides them. According to the theory, they have an incentive because the regime facilitates mutually beneficial agreements (Krasner, 1983: 15-16). Moreover, Keohane (1984: 50) posited that cooperation is possible after hegemony because the conditions for maintaining existing regimes are less demanding than conditions required for establishing them. The collective goods in question for this study are collective security.

2. *Conditionality*

- a. A hegemon will use conditionality to exert its influence on a regime's decision-making processes.
- b. When a hegemon's influence declines, its ability to use conditionality will also decline.

These hypotheses are based on Schimmelfennig's EIM, which brings forth four factors to analyse the impact of organisational reforms on US–OAS relations for Latin American peace and security. These factors are (1) the determinacy of conditions, (2) the size and speed of rewards, (3) the credibility of threats and promises, and (4) the size of policy adoption costs. When addressing conditionality, the EU, the environmental context from which the model is borrowed for this study, frequently phrases the term democratic conditionality. The US also uses democratic conditionality to influence Latin American OAS member states to comply with its principles of legitimate statehood—respect for human rights and adherence to democracy standards (Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003: 496-497). This model is in line with the theoretical assumptions of hegemonic regime theory, as it assumes the same rationale of egoistic self-interest. Consequently, these hypotheses will be used to examine how the US uses conditionality to pursue its self-interest in the Latin American peace and security regime.

3. *Policy Influence*

- a. Security policy will reflect the hegemon's priorities in a regime.

- b. When a hegemon's influence declines, security policy will reflect the priorities of the next most powerful state in a regime.

The final set of hypotheses will analyse the consequences of the empirical outcomes of the previous two sets of hypotheses. According to the theory, a relative decline in power changes the system because the hegemon can no longer control the pay-off matrix or influence the strategies of economically weaker states, not because there is no longer any actor providing the collective goods needed for the regime to operate (Krasner, 1983: 16). Especially, hypothesis 3b will explore the realm of predictions because it will predict the potential implications of the OAS Revitalisation and Reform Act of 2013.

2.6 Cooperative Hegemony and Regionalism

In a post-hegemonic environment, Pedersen (2002: 697) proposed that states might fulfil certain conditions for cooperative hegemony to be feasible and regional institutionalisation to come about. These conditions include "(1) power aggregation capacity, (2) power-sharing capacity and the (3) commitment capacity of major states". These concepts can be used to predict global and regional power and stability. The essence of Pedersen's work centres around the proposition that states that are militarily weak or weakened might seek to maximise or stabilise their influence through non-coercive means by pursuing a strategy of cooperative hegemony within a multilateral structure. His article argues that states concerned with security and relative gains might rely on international institutions. Pedersen's (2002) power sharing proposition could simultaneously stabilise the US's influence and decrease US coercive means (conditionality) in the OAS. Thereby, allowing the pursuit of co-operative hegemony strategy within a multilateral structure.

In conclusion, this chapter set out the theoretical framework of this study. Two theories were converged to construct a theoretical framework for understanding OAS behaviour in a probable post-US hegemony era. Both theories are based on realist principles of rational choice and egoistic self-interest. By drawing on theories of cooperative hegemonic and regime theory, and the EIM, three hypotheses are proposed that will be applied to the two periods that were determined for this study, namely, the pre-OAS Revitalisation and Reform Act (2005–2013) period and the post-OAS Revitalisation and Reform Act (2013 onwards). In applying the hypotheses to these periods, the study makes a calculated claim regarding the future of the Latin American peace and security regime.

CHAPTER 3

3.1 “The US Always Wins in the OAS”: Examining US and OAS Dynamics

This chapter analyses the Latin American peace and security regime by applying the hypotheses derived from theory to the case study. The first hypothesis (a) from each set will be applied. To properly examine the implications of the proposed OAS reforms, the dynamics informing the Latin American peace and security regime before the reforms were instigated must be assessed. An overview of the OAS dynamics pertaining to its pursuit of security and various actors must be provided. These variables influence, as the OAS is the core institution around which the Latin American peace and security regime has been built.

3.2 The Organisation of American States (OAS)

The OAS is a multilateral regional body established in 1948 by the US and 20 other governments in the Western hemisphere to “increase regional security and commercial co-operation” (Labrador & Cheatham, 2020). In their pledge to bolster peace and security, propel democracy, and advance socioeconomic cooperation, the original OAS member states signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty). Since its inception, 15 more states have joined the organisation.




Fig. 1 - Organisational overview of the OAS.

Source: <https://guides.library.upenn.edu/OAS>

As illustrated above, the OAS is evidently structurally intricate and immense. Additionally, the organisation comprises 1.02 billion people and has an annual economic output of US\$ 27 trillion (<https://www.worlddata.info/alliances/organization-of-american-sattes.php>.) The organisation's continental and regional significance is tremendous. The General Secretariat is the "central and permanent organ" of the OAS based in Washington DC (OAS, 2021). A further seven secretariats conduct the work of the General Secretariat in various areas. The OAS's three main bodies are the General Assembly, the primary decision-making instrument. The Permanent Council oversees day-to-day affairs. The General Secretariat implements policies made by the other two organs. The OAS's regular funds sustain the General Secretariat, and a *Specific Fund* is geared towards specific programmes and initiatives. The OAS is a complex of structures, norms, and capacities established to enable it to pursue its peace and security policies. Establishing the OAS was a milestone in developing regional capacity and capabilities for enhanced security. Debatably, having an existing regional structure alone is not a solution to peace and security. Rather, the dynamics of the structure should be seen to influence how these solutions are found. This speaks to the efficacy of the organisation. The real challenge for Latin American peace and security, therefore, does not lie in the lack of structures to address issues, it is found in the operationalisation of such structures and translating the intentions embedded in them into practical realities.

3.3 The OAS's Declaration of Security in the Americas

In 2003, the organisation made a renewed declaration of security in the Americas. The declaration introduced a new notion of hemispheric security that broadened the securitisation of traditional security to include the view of political, economic, social, health, and environmental concerns as new threats (OAS – Declaration on Security, 2003). The declaration reaffirmed a commitment to "cooperation, shared values and common approaches" in its pursuit of multimineral peace and security (2003: 2).

3.4 The Big Cat and its Mice – the Latin American Peace and Security Regime (2005–2013)

In the following sections, analyses are made against the backdrop of that between 2005 and 2013, the US averaged a US\$49–US\$51 million contribution to the OAS's Regular Fund. This average contribution accounted for ~60% of the fund's total budget. The OAS's significant dependency on US financial contributions and funding influences the securitisation of the region's

threats and responses to those perceived threats. While the Declaration of Security in the Americas introduced the prioritisation of new threats, Chillier and Freeman (2005) identified the potential threats of the 2003 Declaration. They argued that the broadened definition of security in Latin America would exacerbate the “risk of military responses to problems that are not military in nature and in circumstances where military action is ill-suited or could cause more harm than good, a tendency that is already well under way in Latin America” (2005: 1). Regarding the US’s influence, Chillier & Freeman further identified four main factors informing the Latin American peace and security architecture (2005: 1-2). First, “the historic tendency of the region’s armed forces to intervene politically under authoritarian regimes or during periods of armed conflict or social instability”. Then, the US’s war on drugs “encourages a greater role for the region’s militaries in domestic law enforcement”. Third, is “the inability of most of the region’s police forces to respond effectively to growing crime and violence”. Lastly, the US’s War on Terror, “particularly its expansive and nebulous definition of terrorism, which in turn encourages the armed forces to combat terrorism in whatever form it is expressed”.

3.5 The Cost of Freedom in the OAS – the US’s Purchasing Power in Latin American Security

In this section, the first set of hypotheses derived from theory will be applied to 2005 to 2013. The three principal factors that will be assessed are providing collective goods, how the US uses conditionality to influence OAS security policies, and whose priorities are reflected in OAS security policies.

3.5.1 Collective Goods

As established in the theoretical framework chapter, collective goods are understood as stability and peace. Effectively, the US provides the funds needed for the OAS to conduct their peace and security mandate through the General Secretariat’s Regular Fund to establish this collective good. By applying the hypotheses, ‘If a hegemon is providing the collective goods necessary for a regime to operate, smaller states in that regime will free ride’ to this case study, it can be understood as ‘if the US is providing the funding necessary for the OAS to fulfil its peace and security mandate through the General Secretariat, the Latin American states will not pay for it’.

The principal policy instrument that the US uses to support Latin American peace and security is the General Secretariat and occasionally, its voluntary contributions to specific OAS funds. The US is the largest contributor to the OAS. Between 2009 and 2013, the US contributed US\$250 million (calculated from Meyer, 2012) to the OAS to support the OAS-led peace operations, the

operationalisation of the OAS, and initiatives under the organisations' mandates and priorities. Because a substantial proportion of Latin American states are among the poorest countries globally, it poses a challenge in reaching the objective to build up collective efforts for peace and security in Latin America.

The political, financial, and socioeconomic challenges of the Latin American OAS member states impact the structural resource deficiencies regarding staffing, logistics, and most importantly, funding. The overall lack of funding stemming from Latin American sources resulted in the OAS's high donor dependency and the positioning of the US as a hegemon-like actor providing the collective goods to enable the OAS to function. When examining the history of funding of the OAS, it becomes clearer that Latin American member states have insufficiently self-financed the operationalisation of the OAS.

The OAS's underfunding by its member states exemplifies a dimension of free riding within the organisation. Notably, in FY2011, there was a significant drop in the US's contribution to the Regular Fund. The US contributed 36% of the total budget. Yet, the budget allocation of US\$85.3 million was still met (OAS Approved Program-Budget, 2013). According to further calculations, the largest member state donors after the US in 2011 were Canada (US\$22.1 million), Brazil (US\$7.9 million), Mexico (US\$7.5 million), Argentina (US\$3.1 million), and Colombia (US\$1.5 million). The largest donors outside the OAS membership include Spain (US\$6.1 million), the Netherlands (US\$3.5 million), and Sweden (US\$1.5 million). Save for the fact that outside donors also contributed to the budget, there was an increased contribution from Latin American states. This demonstrates Latin American states can contribute more than what has previously been perceived. This ability to increase contributions to the organisation when there is pressure to do so feeds the notion that the OAS's member states might free ride in the institution. It is, therefore, likely that with decreased funding of the US, the OAS might still be able to sustain its security priorities and mandates. In short, by providing funds that the OAS needed to operate, the US allowed many OAS member states to free ride in the period before institutional, budgetary, and quota reforms initiated by the OAS's 2013 Revitalisation and Reform Act.

Some Latin American states have limited financial capabilities, making it challenging to meet assessed contributions to the OAS. However, the OAS must re-assess the contributions of its member states based on their ability to pay, equal burden sharing, and solidarity so that OAS member states can reasonably be expected to pay more than a bare minimum contribution. For example, Brazil and Mexico are two OAS member states with the strongest economies, but they each contributed less than 10% of the total OAS 2013 budget. Therefore, despite the region's

“3.2% growth in GDP in the previous year, which was above the global average of 2.2%” (ECLAC, 2012: 9), these states could have afforded to contribute relatively more. The GDP figure in 2013 for Brazil was “US\$2.25 trillion, and Mexico’s GDP in 2013 was US\$1.18 trillion”. Yet, the contributions of US\$8 109 400 by Brazil and Mexico’s US\$ 6 755 200 (Congressional Budget Office, 2013) are barely noticeable relative to the countries’ GDP. Comparatively, the US GDP growth in the same year was between “1.8% and 2.1% “(*ibid*). This demonstrates that there are OAS member states that do have the financial capacity to pay more than their assessed contribution to the OAS but have failed to do so and have opted to free ride the US’s bankrolling instead.

3.5.2 Conditionality

Providing collective goods does not, however, come without conditions. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, a hegemon does not supply collective goods for altruistic motivations or an interest in promoting and sustaining the system’s well-being, but because it uses the regime to enhance its interests. Consequently, the US uses conditionality as a tool to shape the priorities of the Latin American peace and security regime. According to Schimmelfennig’s EIM, four factors influence the probability of the effectiveness of using conditionality to shape the policies of targeted actors, namely, (1) the determinacy of conditions, (2) the size and speed of rewards, (3) the credibility of threats and promises, and (4) the size of (policy) adoption costs. This next section will assess the hypothesis, ‘A hegemon will use conditionality to influence a regime’s decision-making processes’. In this case study, it can be understood as ‘the US will use conditionality to influence the decision-making processes of the Latin American peace and security regime.’

The conditions of US funding might be determinate or at times, subliminal. For instance, The Trump administration notoriously threatened to sever global strategic partnerships in its ruling years from 2016 to 2020. The Trump administration brought with it significant budget cuts. Consequently, “OAS officials feared that deep budget cuts at the US State Department proposed by Trump could affect funding for the bloc” (Labrador & Cheatham, 2020). In March 2019, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, declared “that the Trump administration would cut funding to the OAS due to the organization’s support for legalizing abortion” (*ibid*). This manipulative behaviour by the US influences the OAS’s adherence to US conditions, minimising adherence to issues that the organisation itself deems important. The further flexibility of the Latin American security regime increases the Latin American states to US conditionality. The lack of a decisive action plan regarding the ends and means with which the institution aims to provide regional

security means that the US can choose to take measures against states that are noncompliant to the ends and means it deems suitable.

Second, the size and speed of rewards is a critical factor enhancing the effectiveness of US conditionality. US funding is central to desires for a regional security regime. This can be traced directly to the simple proportion of net spending and the lack of liquidity to the OAS. The first point considers that the US is the single contributor to security obligations, and the second considers the structural deficiencies of the Latin American security regime that have left it disproportionately exposed to US policy realisation. The central tenet of this relationship revolves around the axis of power discrepancy, otherwise understood as the relative dependence the security policy of the OAS has regarding its regional hegemon. Understandably, the US's conditionality's efficiency was enhanced in the pre-Revitalisation Act period, as the US was the largest provider of funds for the Latin American security regime. Because the operation of the OAS's security policies largely depended on US funding, the size of rewards can be perceived as substantial, thus increasing the likelihood of OAS adherence.

Third, threats and promises have been credible in the pre-reform period. Considering that the AU has been struggling with a declining budget (Meyer, 2014; 2018) and limited financial resources, the OAS has remained influenced by the US. The US can determine the missions, locations, terms, and conditions on the continuation of funding or by cancelling funding of certain security undertakings if they no longer agree with its scope. In short, actively promoting peace and security is the confutation and in the interest of the US's Good Neighbour Policy in Latin America. Overall, the relation between the OAS as a donor recipient and the US as a donor provider has enhanced the efficacy of US conditionality in the pre-reforms period.

3.5.3 Security Policy

It has now been established that the US provides the collective goods for operating the Latin American peace and security regime, enabling them to use conditionality to influence the regime's decision-making processes, and by extension, the outcome of policy realisations within the Latin America peace and security regime. This is in line with what was discussed in the theoretical chapter of this study that the US's engagement in the OAS for Latin American peace and security matters should not exclusively be seen as an act of a benevolent RO aiming to achieve peace solely because of altruistic reasons.

The following section explores the effects of this influence on the security priorities of the Latin peace and security regime. The hypothesis, 'in the presence of a hegemon, security policy will

reflect the priorities of the hegemon in a regime', can be read as the 'security policies of the OAS will reflect the priorities of the US.' The presence of the US entails that the hegemon is in control of major capital sources needed for the regime to operate. How the US has approached OAS capacity building has been reflective of US interests, rather than Latin American interests.

For example, the US's *War on Drugs* "has consisted of enhancing the ability of Latin American armed forces to carry out counter-narcotics initiatives" (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 2). In Bolivia, the US funded Bolivian air force and naval units to execute drug interdiction practices. In Mexico, US policy has encouraged a trend of militarising public security. Moreover, "Brazil's counter-narcotics policies have been influenced by the militarized US counter-drug strategy" (Transnational Institute 2005: np) where the government frequently engages the army to control and conduct counter-narcotics operations. The pressure exerted by the US in the framework of its anti-drug policy in Latin America is one of the main factors that prompted military intervention in domestic security matters.

Moreover, the *War on Terror* emerged as the US's foreign policy priority following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. The design and application of the Latin American state's national policies to respond to these perceived threats have manifested in various states. The "US-led campaign against terrorism has, unfortunately, become a cover for governments who want to deflect attention away from their heavy-handed treatment of internal dissidents" (Human Rights Watch, 2004: np). The Latin American region was affected by new security facilitated by US policy from 2005 to 2013. The respective, US-waged wars on drugs and terror signify a broadened conceptualisation of security threats. The scramble for Latin American states to include these broadened notions in the national security policy demonstrate an extent of US submission. Additionally, George W. Bush's rhetoric of "you are either with us, or with the terrorists" also strongly influenced the submission of the Latin American states to the US (Bush, 2001). Hence, the OAS's new multidimensional concept fits the US's regional security agenda. The Quito Declaration (Conference of Ministers of Defence of the Americas, 2004), an OAS conference, described the new notion of multidimensional security, where it emphasised the threat of terrorism. However, in Latin America, except Colombia, terrorism occupies a disproportionately large position in the 2003 Declaration compared to other threats and concerns in the hemisphere without serious terrorist activity.

3.6 The Dynamic of the US's Engagement in the OAS

To conclude, because of the US's financial power in the OAS, it has been easy for the regional hegemon to continue manipulate and appropriate the RO to conduct its foreign policy objectives in its backyard. The OAS should be for member states to coordinate, for example, anti-narcotics efforts together. However, "several regional leaders expressed frustration with the results of US-backed counter-narcotics policies" (Meyer, 2018: 11). The heads of Latin American governments even called for the OAS to review these policies' results and explore more effective alternatives. The US and Latin American member states have diverging visions on the regional threat of drug-trafficking. How is it that the US's anti-drug strategy prevailed? As the organisation's largest financial contributor and the hemisphere's most powerful nation, the US remained influential within the OAS. Hence, the organisation's objectives in the region are consistent with those of the US, and many of its activities complement US efforts. The extent of the US's influence on Latin American peace and security architecture is evident in the above examples of Latin American states' responses to the US wars on drugs and terror. What is also shown in these examples is the asymmetrical power relations and a continuous case of US intervention in the hemisphere. The US has often used the OAS to "engage in defensive multilateralism designed to constrain unilateral US action" (Legler, 2010: 13). Consequently, Latin American member states have grown averse to foreign involvement in internal affairs. Given this aversion to intervention, member states are unlikely to invoke the collective action mechanisms of the OAS. Although, this might change with the decline in US hegemony.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 Towards the Potential Decline of US Hegemony in Latin America

The partnership between the US and OAS regarding the Latin American peace and security regime has been challenging. The US's rhetoric of equal partnership has continuously been challenged by the OAS's insufficient capabilities and their constant need for funding, enabling the US to dominate the Latin American peace and security regime. Moreover, it appears the US has used this position to promote its democratic values and agenda by attaching conditionality to funding, enabling it to influence the OAS's security policies. Since the proposed reforms in the OAS's 2013 Revitalisation and Reform Act have specifically been constructed to reduce the financial dependence of the OAS on the US, the progress of these reforms is explored in the following section. After assessing the progress of the reforms, their impact on the effectiveness of US conditionality will be analysed before studying the potential implications of the reforms on Latin American peace and security matters.

In this chapter, the second set of hypotheses will be assessed to analyse the implications of the organisational reforms on the Latin American peace and security regime. Note that it is not proposed that the US will lose its economic powers in the future. The first hypothesis 1b, 'When a hegemon is no longer providing the collective goods necessary for a regime to operate, smaller states will no longer be able to free ride and will start paying for these collective goods themselves' will be evaluated by analysing empirical data. The additional two hypotheses, 2b 'When a hegemon's influence declines, its ability to use conditionality will decline too' and 3b 'When hegemony declines, security policy will reflect the priorities of the next most powerful state in a regime' will also be discussed.

4.2 The OAS Revitalisation and Reform Act of 2013

The Congressional Budget Office (2013) report encapsulated the purpose of the proposed reforms. In sum, the Act required the organisation to develop a multi-year strategy to strengthen and enhance its process for budget and staffing. The Act was accompanied by "an annual discretionary cost of less than US\$ 500,000 to implement it between 2014 and 2018" (CBO S.793, 2013: 1). The principal feature of these reforms was to ensure that no OAS member state would pay more than 50% of the organisation's assessed contributions (Melito, 2018). The reforms of the Revitalisation and Reform Act aim to restructure the way towards a more equitable and financially autonomous OAS. However, if the US is no longer the dominant funder to the OAS, it

might lose its influence and leverage; not because it has become economically weaker, but because it would be expected to. According to Nolte (2018: 13), the “subsiding influence of the US within the OAS was best symbolized by the 2010 re-election of the Chilean, José Miguel Insulza as secretary general despite the opposition of the US government, which supported another candidate”. Nevertheless, South American governments had begun to question the role of the OAS in the region.

4.3 When the Cat Is Away, the Mice Will Play: The Latin American Peace and Security Regime (2013 Onwards)

In this section, the hypotheses that have been established for the post-organisational reforms from 2013 onwards will be assessed. The structure is similar to the one used to examine the pre-organisational reforms period (2008–2013). Since the reforms of the Act aim to reduce the institution’s dependence on the US by enhancing the financial autonomy, this section investigates the implications for Latin American security should the OAS manage to achieve this enhanced financial autonomy. This would impact US relations with its Latin American counterparts and the output of peace and security policies because the interests of other actors might start having an increased influence on them.

4.3.1 Collective Goods

This section reviews the hypotheses, ‘When a hegemon is no longer providing the collective goods necessary for a regime to operate, smaller states will no longer be able to free ride and will start paying for these collective goods themselves’. In this case study, it can be understood as ‘when the US is no longer providing the majority funds necessary for the OAS to operate its peace and security policies through the OAS, Latin American member states will start paying for these operation costs themselves’. Note that the transparency of the budget has increased since 2013. This shows a commitment of the OAS to move towards becoming a financially autonomous organisation. While slow, the developments regarding the OAS’s budgetary reforms and the shown willingness from important economies of the region, such as Brazil and Mexico, to commit to the OAS’s reforms signifies that the economic leverage that the US has exercised for many years might decline if these countries step up. Without this leverage, it is questionable whether the US will still be able to maintain its influence on the Latin American peace and security regime.

4.3.2 Conditionality

Schimmelfenning's EIM asserts that the necessity of the US is declining because of the OAS's growing self-sufficiency. Hence, this will limit the US's ability to use conditionality as a tool to shape OAS security policy outcomes. The hypothesis, 'When a hegemon declines, its ability to use conditionality will decline too' can be understood as 'When the US's financial leverage is decreasing, its ability to use conditionality will also decline'. First, the determinacy of the conditions could become less clear. Second, the size and speed of rewards could decrease due to developments within the US. The Trump administration's implemented Congressional budget cuts resulted in the US short-changing its contribution to the organisations by ~US\$8 million (Miami Herald, 2017). The Trump administration's budget cut resulted in a substantial decrease in funds that it had to its disposal. Therefore, the US could also have a tighter budget in the future, depending on what the ruling administration deems appropriate. Simultaneously, the nationalist rhetoric of America First, characterising President Trump's administration, led to an increased emphasis on internal reforms, rather than focusing on its external policies in Latin America. A phenomenon coined as hegemonic disinterest by Zwingina (1987) is the combination of a disinterested hegemon and decreased US budget having the potential to reduce the size of the rewards of US conditionality or even the will to impose any sort of conditions.

However, if the OAS manages to maintain its trajectory towards financial autonomy, the necessity for US funding will keep decreasing. Logically, a cut in US funding will no longer decapacitate the OAS's peacekeeping operations. The threat of this budget cut will no longer have as much of an impact.

Lastly, the size of policy adoption costs might increase. Some missions conducted by Latin American states were carried by US funding and were predetermined, informed by the US's articulation. However, in a scenario where the OAS manages to achieve financial autonomy, most OAS Latin American states will have to increase their capacity and agency to recognise, articulate, and securitise their security priorities. Even when the OAS has not yet achieved full financial autonomy, the more financially autonomous the organisation will become, the larger the size of the adoption costs and responsibility of the Latin American states will be. However, note that policy adoption costs will only be high if the OAS does not want to pursue the same strategies put in place by the US.

For the case of declining US hegemony in Latin America, the EIM indicates that the effectiveness of US conditionality will decline in the future if the OAS successfully implements organisational reforms that aim to enable member states to sustainably finance the OAS themselves. Indeed,

the US's resolve might fade, the size of rewards might decrease, the impact of threats and promises might decrease, and the costs of adopting policies might increase. Consequently, there will be a loss of US influence on the Latin American peace and security regime because it will no longer be able to dominate the outcome of OAS security policies from its hegemonic position.

It has now been established that the responsibility for providing collective goods might shift to Latin American member states. Even if this process will take long, the steps that have been taken by the OAS indicate that the OAS will increase its financial autonomy in the coming years. Because of budgetary and quota reforms, the US will lose its leverage as a dominant funder and its use of conditionality as a tool to shape OAS security policies will decline in effectiveness. This raises questions of how the Latin American peace and security will develop in the absence of a dominant US as the provider of collective goods.

4.3.3 Security Policy

According to hegemonic stability theory, security policy will reflect the priorities of the most powerful state within a regime. As the US's position as hegemon declines when the institutional reforms are successful, security policy will no longer be based on US interests. Rather, the hypothesis reads, 'When hegemony declines, security policy will reflect the priorities of the next most powerful state within a regime', which, in this case, can be understood as 'when the US's influence on the Latin American peace and security regime declines, security policy will reflect the priorities of the next most powerful state within this regime'. This hypothesis correlates with Keohane's observations, positing that "in the international system choices will be constrained in ways that give greater weight to the preferences of more powerful actors" (Keohane, 1983: 16).

4.4 The Dynamic of US's Disengagement in the OAS

The first question to answer to predict the potential implications of the OAS reforms is; who is the next most powerful state within the Latin American peace and security regime? Based on their relative GDPs, Brazil and Mexico have the potential of forming a substantial proportion of the OAS's future assessed budgets. The two states are the most significant Latin American players in the international arena based on their power capabilities and influence, derived from hard and soft power dimensions. Furthermore, Brazil can be regarded as a hegemon in its respective South America sub-region. Even though Brazil and Mexico regard multilateralism as one of their core principles of foreign policy, this has not led to the equal recognition of the national interests of all countries on the continent. However, both countries could cooperate to serve their national interests while simultaneously advancing their shared international goals. If they do so, they will

function as driving forces of the Latin American peace and security regime. They are already Latin America's largest sources of funding in the OAS. As US funding will decline, the relative size of their funding (and influence) should increase for their cooperative dominance to take root.

Regionally, the Latin American ownership of policies or Latin Americanisation process is moving towards its realisation. These processes should be characterised by a lessened emphasis on US–OAS institutional isomorphism. Latin American norms and principles should become increasingly institutionalised, leading to a changed regional organisation. A stronger OAS will move away from normative congruence between the US and other Latin American states. As the US has been considered a hegemon in the Latin American peace and security regime, Latin Americanisation could be seen as a tool to delegitimise the US's hegemonic position.

In conclusion, the OAS is moving towards financial autonomy. Multiple steps have been taken, signalling that OAS member states are willing to start paying for the OAS budget themselves. Because of this process, when it materialises, the US's influence on the Latin American peace and security regime will decline. Brazil and Mexico have the two strongest economies in the region. Hence, their respective influence in their sub-regions could make it that they become the driving forces within the OAS. To do so, they should increase their cooperation and push the Latin American agenda, as opposed to the inter-American ideology forward. This will be in their best interest and the interest of other OAS member states if they lead the continent on a decolonial course, enabling it to find contextually relevant solutions to pertinent threats.

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Conclusion

It should be noted that the unprecedented threats to security experienced in our interconnected global environment require collaborative strategies. Arguably, there is no longer place for a single monopoly of power and hegemony in any context. This much has been made clear by the case of US hegemony in Latin American security affairs. The persistent threats and instability in contemporary Latin America indicate that US hegemony in Latin America has become unsustainable and divergent to the peace and security requirements of the region. Theoretically, the regional Organisation of American States is a suitable security actor for responding to Latin American crises. However, the donor-like dependence of the OAS on the US has significantly undermined the organisation's collective provision of security. In the OAS, the unbalanced influence of the US has allowed the other (Latin American) member states to free ride off the US's funding of the region's security agenda and strategy. This has also enabled the US to impose its national interests in this region through conditionality. Therefore, to maximise its efficacy as a security actor, the OAS must aim produce security policies that reflect the threats of the region rather than the interests of a particular country within the region.

Notably, the proposition of the OAS Revitalisation and Reform Act (2013) signalled that equity in the OAS is desired. The goals of the Act can be easily met through an organisational strategy that emphasises power sharing and co-operative hegemony. For one, the US can show a commitment to collaboration and changing the asymmetrical organisational intra-play by decreasing its significant voluntary contributions to the OAS' funds. This could propel other member states to increase their own additional, voluntary contributions to the budget. The size of voluntary contributions, arguably can be telling of the member states' perception of the OAS as a security actor. It is up to each member state to illustrate their commitment to regional security by an appropriate financial contribution. Additionally, hegemonic decline should increase regional co-operation. Increased financial agency of the Latin American states would alter the existing hegemonic dynamic by increasing their "ownership" of policies and security strategies. The resultant co-operative and power sharing dynamic would broaden the perspectives in the peace and security regime, which could produce novel responses to threats. This could only enhance the OAS's capacity to maintain peace and security in the region.

The implementation of the 2013 Revitalisation and Reform Act has been slow. Few academic sources on the outcomes of these reforms exist. Even though the progress indications are positive for now, it remains to be seen whether the Latin American member states are truly willing to invest in the OAS and make the reforms happen. Should the Latin American states now fail to implement the reforms for financial independence, it would undermine the OAS's credibility and question the commitment of Latin American states to the organisation. The future of the OAS depends on whether OAS member states can be persuaded to devote the necessary resources to it. The study suggested Brazil and Mexico as principal actors in cooperative hegemony. Admittedly, this is not as simple as it sounds. These states are competitors, and this competition could itself, undercut the effectivity of a post hegemonic OAS. Hence, future research should focus on addressing this dilemma. More research must be done when the OAS reforms are in a further stage of implementation.

Words: [16000]

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