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SOCIAL NETWORKS AND NEGOTIATION OF BORDERS

UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE INFORMAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE ACROSS SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE BORDERS

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DECLARATION

I, **Thelma Chimimba (19308206),** hereby declare that this research for **MSoSci in Development Studies** submitted to the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology of the University of Pretoria has not been submitted previously for any degree at this or another university. It is original in design and execution, and all reference material contained therein has been duly acknowledged.

Signature……. Date……

DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis to my parents.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I begin by thanking the almighty God for everything that he does in my life. He is always holding me up and has raised me to see more than I could have ever imagined. He has ordered my steps and put me in a position that I had never dreamt of. I shall forever be grateful for his grace towards me.

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GLORY BE TO THE ALMIGHTY GOD!

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the role of social networks in the clandestine cross-border movement of cargo (goods and people) through the South African and Zimbabwean border posts. It is an analysis of the complex human interactions involved in facilitating informal movements between the two countries. While the clandestine movements across the two borders have been acknowledged and are well documented, these have been defined in terms of corruption within the border system and porous borders where migrants utilize undesignated entry and exit points. While this is certainly part of the story, such descriptions have missed the broader picture in these movements, particularly the social dynamics inherent in the movement of cargo between the two countries. Using an ethnographic approach, which took the researcher closer to the action, the study finds the process as rather complex and requiring a much broader understanding of the subject. It emphasizes the significance of understanding the social network system inherent in these cross-border movements.

The movement of cargo involves complex networks spread through the entire route through which cargo moves along. These networks involve different actors that perform different roles and are involved in complex interactions, which result in successful cross-border movements. The study argues that the process should not be confined to border dynamics only but be understood as a process that is closely tied to the Zimbabwean crisis. The crisis in Zimbabwe has made social networking a critical part of survival, and the cross-border movement of goods and people has certainly been caught up in this complex social process.

The study emphasizes the complexity of the process and argues that there is need to understand the social networking aspects of these cross-border movements. The actors who initiate the process and the process of initiation are as equally important as that of allowing the goods to pass through, which has been the focus. This does not happen in a social vacuum, but within a social space where relationships are developed, nurtured, and used for the success of the process. These complexities are best captured by Maombera and Thebe's (2019) deployment of the concept of 'negotiation'. These social actors are involved in a process of complex negotiations, with policy implications for

both Zimbabwe and South Africa as they battle with the challenges of porous borders and economic crisis respectively.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC - African National Congress

DHA - Department of Home Affairs

ESAP - Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

FMSP – Forced Migration Studies Programme

HRW – Human Rights Watch

IOM- International Organisation for Migration

ILO - International Labour Organisation

MDC - Movement for Democratic Change

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SAMP – Southern African Migration Project

SARS - South African Revenue Services

UN - United Nations

ZANLA - Zimbabwe National Liberation Army

ZANU (PF) - Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)

ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZCTU - Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

ZDP - Zimbabwe Documentation Project

ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION: NEGOTIATING THE BORDER

1.1. Introduction

This dissertation is about social networks, migrants, and borders as institutions and instruments of control for the entry and exit of cargo and people, and the significance of social networking in negotiating constraints imposed by the institution of the border. It is an analysis of the dynamics of social networking underway in facilitating the illicit movement of both cargo and people across the Messina (South Africa) and Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) Border posts. It explains the context of clandestine cross-border movements and porous borders and improves our understanding of a process that is complex and often misunderstood in South Africa, with serious implications for border management.

In this respect, it carries significant lessons for South Africa in its attempt to manage its porous borders with its neighbours, and for Zimbabwe in its attempt to prevent rampant smuggling activities into and out of the country. Without devaluing the attention paid to immigration in post-apartheid South Africa, the country is often seen as having weak border controls, which has generated narratives of porous borders (Muleya, 2009). The lessons are greater for South Africa and the region in a global context where human trafficking is increasingly becoming a reality facing many states. South Africa is a major migration destination and there are fears that its borders and ports of entry have been used as transit points for human smugglers.

For Zimbabwe, which is facing an economic crisis, and the development of what Jones (2010) referred to as the *kukiyakiya* economy, the lessons are significant. While he defines *kukiyakiya* as a 'new economy of "getting by"', he also describes it as suggesting 'cleverness, dodging, and the exploitation of whatever resources are at hand, all with an eye to self-sustenance (ibid: 286). He further observes:

> *Crucial in that regard is the emergence of a generalized culture of evasion: evasion of social institutions like the state, the bureaucracy, and the law; and evasion of cultural norms and hierarchies (French, 1984).*

The study begins by understanding relationships developed in the process of negotiating the border by migrants, and the parties involved in these relationships. Second, the study discusses the dynamics of interaction that happen in the process of negotiating the bureaucratic processes and the implications of these dynamics for border management and Zimbabwe's economic recovery. The study focuses on a micro picture of interaction dynamics in and around the border, but also understands that these social interactions are a chain and begin at the point of departure to the destination.

1.2. Research Problem

The debate on the clandestine movements of people and goods between Zimbabwe and South Africa focuses on two aspects, the corruption inherent in the border management system (Mills, 2012) and the porous borders (Chauke, 2020, Dodson, 2000; Irish, 2005; Mamokhere and Solomon, 2005). It is casually observed that the corruption inherent within the border system is responsible for illegal cross-border movements of goods and people including the trafficking of humans (Visvanathan, 2008). The smuggling activities currently at play are attributed to the propensity of border officials, including security agents, to accepting bribes, and there is evidence of such behaviour as some officials have been caught on the act and charged with corruption (Visvanathan, 2008). The phenomenon of cross-border smuggling is treated as a simple issue of morality, but some scholars have pointed to the bribery and demand for bribes by border officials as a condition for illegal access to the borders (Klotz, 2016).

Others have pointed to the payment of what they call a 'cold drink fee' to security agents at the border post in order to circumvent border processes as a part of the complex informal border crossing system (Maombera and Thebe, 2019, Thebe 2011,2015; Thebe and Mutyatyu 2017). In his study of *Omalayisha*, Thebe (2011) observed that these cross-border couriers could move anything across the two borders, at a price. He pointed to their ability to move goods, people (with or without travel documents), and the dead across the border with ease, while in his study with Maombera, they showed how *Omalayisha* continued to move unaccompanied children between

the two countries, despite the restrictive regulations on the cross-border movements of children under the age of 18.

Some scholars are of the perspective that, the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa is porous (Dodson, 2000; Popescu, 2012; Solomon, 2005). The porous borders allow the movement of people and goods through undesignated entry points (Tati, 2008, Thebe, 2011). People risk their lives wading through a crocodile-infested Limpopo River, the electric fence, and the dense forest, or vice versa (Rutherford and Addison 2007). The porous borders have particularly made immigration management difficult, since even if the government deports illegal migrants back to Zimbabwe, they simply cross back into South Africa, in what is called the revolving door syndrome (Crush and MacDonald, DA, 2001; Tati 2008).

Missing in this discourse of cross-border dynamics is the social element guiding such processes. Few studies have factored the significance of social networking, and how the corruption and porous borders are all entangled in a web where social networking is a central element in negotiating the border (Thebe and Maombera 2019). This study argues that both bribing and access to undesignated entry points entails a network of individuals, where the officials and smuggler or migrants are only a part of a broader system.

Bribery, as an act of negotiation of the border, is significant, but not solely an independent phenomenon as it is mediated by several social processes, which tend to operate in a social chain (Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Novak, 2011; Thebe, 2011). Understanding these social dynamics is key to understanding porous borders and the persistence of clandestine cross-border movements. By neglecting the social aspects of cross-border smuggling, particularly, the role of social networks, the debates on cross-border controls in South Africa are deprived of an important viewpoint.

This dissertation examines the nature of social networking involved in the clandestine cross-border movements of goods and people between Zimbabwe and South Africa, including the role played by social network systems in negotiating the bureaucratic border processes. It is guided by the understanding that informal cross-border actors are human beings who establish beneficial

relationships that are nurtured and protected. The border becomes a social space and not merely an institution of control. The control element leads to actions by those that are affected to negotiate these hurdles and social networks are central to these negotiations.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

This thesis seeks to understand the social networks and dynamics of interaction inherent in the clandestine cross-border movements of goods and people between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Such movements cannot be looked at simply in terms of corruption among officials and smuggling syndicates operating between the two countries, which is reductive and renders the process to the geographical confines of the border environment. Rather, they must be understood in terms of the complex processes of negotiating the constraints imposed by the border and involving social networks spread across geographical regions. The dissertation explores how this system of social networking takes place, together with the actors involved and their different roles in the process.

This study explores these issues by investigating the following specific aspects of the process:

- The popular channels that are used to facilitate clandestine movements of both goods and people across the border.
- The main role players who are involved in the clandestine cross-border movements of goods and people between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
- The role and significance of these actors in the clandestine cross-border movement of goods and people.
- The nature of interaction and interaction dynamics among different actors within the social network chain.

1.4. Research questions

The principal question that this study seeks to answer is: what role do social networks play in negotiating the border to facilitate unauthorized cross-border movement of goods and people at the South African/Zimbabwe port of entry? This is explored with a focus on the personal relationships developed between different actors involved in cross-border processes. This broad

question is addressed by attempting to answer a subset of more specific questions, in order to provide a detailed understanding of the interaction processes and their implications for our understanding of humans and their agency when faced with obstacles.

The specific research questions that will guide this study include the following:

- What are the popular channels for moving people and goods between Zimbabwe and South Africa?
- Who are the main actors involved in the cross-border movement of goods and people at the South Africa/Zimbabwe port of entry?
- What is their role in the unauthorized cross-border processes including the smuggling of goods and people?
- What are the interaction dynamics between different actors and what is the nature of the interaction between different actors?

1.5. Literature Contributions

The movement of Zimbabweans in and out of South Africa has received increased scholarly attention during the last three decades or so (Crush et al., 2015; Makina, 2013; Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Maphosa, 2010; McDonald et al., 2000; Morreira, 2015; Thebe, 2011, 2015; Zinyama, 2000, 2002). This scholarship provides significant insight into these movements and their characteristics. While this scholarship has analysed the movement of remittances and informal migration, there remains a literature gap on the role and value of social networks in facilitating these movements. A few studies have focused on the illegality, smuggling, and use of informal channels (Arango, 2000).

The existing literature has paid minimum attention to the complexity of the process, choosing to focus on corruption and smuggling syndicates as being behind these illicit movements. Studies by Thebe (see Thebe, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017; Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Thebe and Mutyatyu, 2017), have looked at the social process of these movements, but none of these studies has looked at these social processes in terms of social networks, despite the complex social networking

involved. Octavia Sibanda (2010) has also looked at the social aspects of Zimbabwean migration, but she has not looked at these in the context of the cross-border movement of cargo.

Given the general agreement that Zimbabweans in South Africa are economic migrants who have strong links with Zimbabwe and maintain contacts through remittances and visitation, how this is achieved becomes significant. (Siziba, 2014). Of course, Thebe's works have analysed these in his focus on the social agents but have not focused on social networks and the complex role of social networking. This study builds on Thebe and Sibanda's works and focuses specifically on cross-border movements and the role and value of social networks. It explores the complex system of social networks in facilitating the clandestine cross-border flows and the significance of these networks in the migration process.

1.6. Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into logically aligned and contextually synchronized chapters, designed to capture and focus on a specific aspect. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, the research objectives, and questions. It also provides a brief discussion of the literary contributions of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature in the field of border and migration studies and social networks. It is an attempt to develop a framework of understanding. Chapter 3 is a discussion of the research methodology adopted by the study. It discusses the research approach and design, research techniques, data analysis approach, fieldwork challenges, and ethical issues pertinent to the study. Chapter 4 provides a background and context. It is designed to lay the background. Chapter 5 discusses the empirical findings. It focuses on providing answers to the research question. Finally, chapter 6 is the discussions, conclusions, and policy implications chapter. It pulls and discusses the main themes in the data chapter and draws conclusions and implications for policy.

CHAPTER TWO -LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews key literature and studies relevant to this study on social networks and the negotiation of the border. This study straggles three main areas of study and literature: borders, migration, and social migration, which are critical areas of concern in Southern Africa, particularly when it comes to the two neighbours, South Africa and Zimbabwe that share an unfortunate, but similar history (Moyo, 2007, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). The literature is reviewed to develop a framework of understanding. The chapter first discusses the literature on the contentious subject of the border, before discussing the concept of migration and South Africa's migration problem. Last, the chapter discusses the concept of social networks and considers social network theory. The chapter then concludes with a discussion linking the three concepts. This is done with the consideration of the Zimbabwean / South African border and the challenge of illicit flows of goods and people.

2.2. The Concept of the Border

In its simplest sense, a border is a dividing line or a narrow strip along a steep edge. Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them (Anzaldua,1987). Borders are complex phenomena, multifaceted, multilevel, and interdisciplinary institutions and processes transecting spaces in not only administrative and geopolitical but also cultural, economic, and social terms (Donnan and Wilson 1999). A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition (Anzaldua, 1999).

According to Perkamann and Sunn (2002), borders can either confirm differences or disrupt units that belong together by defining, classifying, communicating, and controlling geopolitical, sociocultural, economic, and biophysical aspects, processes, and power relations. Recent tendencies in various parts of the world towards increased interdependence and integration among nations have greatly enhanced interaction among borderlands populations. Trans

boundary trade, tourism, migration, and attendant social and cultural relationships have linked regions of adjoining countries ever closer to one another (Anzaldua, 1999).

The role of the border is the clearance of travellers, trade facilitation, regulation, or limitation of movement of people and goods into and out of a country. In this case, borders can either facilitate or act as barriers to movement. The debates surrounding the roles of borders as barriers or bridges for movements of goods and people is another issue, which makes borderlands interesting. Several border studies take on the early concept of borders, seeing borders as obstructing and controlling cross-border activities and contacts (Wastl-Walter, 2009). This is because borders may be selectively opened for specific transactions while at the same time maintaining or even increasing barriers to other transactions (Perkmann and Sum, 2002).

In essence, a border post is a build-up facility that enables/facilitates the movement of desirable persons and goods whilst it prevents/blocks the movement of unwanted persons and goods by monitoring devices and control facilities. The role of borders and bordering processes are central to understanding how contemporary migrations and the mobilities they create are affecting our societies. Borders are controlled by nation-states, but they are ceaselessly both contested and maintained by diverse processes and practices (Laine, 2016). They are "enacted, materialized and performed in a variety of ways" and these "performativity aspects of borders" are carried out by a multiplicity of actors (Johnson et al., 2011), at different scales and locales (Laine, 2016; Moyo, 2010; Nshimbi, 2019).

According to Adebajo (2010), borders within the African continent were arbitrarily drawn because of European colonial expansion into Africa. The structural configuration of border posts, some dating back as far as the 18th century, continues to affect the flow of cross-border movements of people and goods across border posts (Saad Allah, 2007). In Africa, national borders came into existence during the colonial period, and after independence, they were accepted and remained largely in place despite decolonization after the Organisation for African Unity (now the African Union) resolved in 1963 to maintain the territorial boundaries of the new states of Africa (Adonis and Abbey, 2013).

As multi-faceted institutions, borders have a bearing on continental integration by influencing who and what moves from one country to another (Peberdy, 2000; Thuen, 1999). In this sense, any discussion of continental integration in Africa brings borders to the centre stage, because, while integration assumes the free flow of the factors of production, including people, borders refine and select who or what has the freedom of passage and which goods and quantity enter or exit (Independent Newspaper,16 May 2008). Whatever way one looks at borders, they tend to restrict movements and create barriers to free movement especially in this rapidly globalizing world where the movement of goods and capital.

While border systems provide barriers to cross-border movement, these barriers are overcome as people constantly negotiate these border systems to facilitate cross-border movements (Thebe and Maombera, 2019). Thus, the obstructive nature of the border can be considered as also open for negotiation. Thebe (2011) has particularly shown how human beings can compromise the border system as an administrative function. In his study of *Omalayisha*, he showed how the South African and Zimbabwe border posts have been used as access points for the movement of people and goods by these agents called *Omalayisha*. Since borders provide a barrier to movements, it provides room and incentive for negotiation by those whose movements would be impeded by the border system (Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Thebe, 2011, 2015).

These negotiations are at work every day at the South African and Zimbabwean border posts as human agents seek to overcome barriers imposed by the bureaucratic processes (Maombera, 2018; Maombera and Thebe, 2019). This has led to the narrative of porous borders (Dodson, 2000; Park, 2010; Solomon, 2005). While the issue of porous borders mainly relates to problems of enforcement, it is also closely linked to the problem of colonial borders and the separation of tribal groups into different nationalities; the drawing of the South African and Zimbabwean border left the Venda ethnic tribe divided between South African Venda and Zimbabwean Venda (Mlambo, 2010). These groups interact and in the context of a border that divides them and provides a barrier to legal interaction to attend social, cultural events, and other occasions, including funerals, they are forced to ignore the border (Rutherford and Addison, 2007).

In the case of the Zimbabwean and South African border, the issue of smuggling has featured prominently in the discussions on porous borders and immigration. While smuggling relates to both goods and people (see Thebe, 2011), the focus has been on human smuggling. Literature has documented the rampant smuggling of humans between South Africa and its neighbours (Iroanya, 2018; van der Watt, 2018). The government has often blamed the phenomena on human smuggling syndicates, who often utilize undesignated entry points along South Africa's long border, but it is the argument of this study that we cannot rule out the human element in cross-border smuggling. This would take us back to the process of negotiating the border, described by Maombera and Thebe in their study of Zimbabwean migrant mothers and changing immigration regulations in South Africa (Maombera and Thebe, 2019).

2.3. Social Networks

A network consists of a set of actors or nodes along with a set of ties of a specified type (such as friendship) that link them (Nystrom, 2012). The ties interconnect through shared endpoints to form paths that indirectly link nodes that are not directly tied (Massey, 1990). A social network then can be illustrated as a network of ties connected by individuals or nodes (Choldin, 1973). Networks are typically complex, that is, actors share more than one type of tie. Granovetter (1973) proposes a classification of the strength of ties as being either weak or strong according to the time invested in reciprocity and maintaining these ties, as well as intimacy and emotional attachment.

Some regard open, diverse, and weak global networks as the best ones (Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1973) for social capital, while others prefer strong ties in closely-knit local groups (Coleman, 1990). It is argued that weak ties are better to obtain more information at lower costs with few redundant ties (Burt, 1992), as well as access to resources beyond the scope of one's direct reach through friends of friends (Lin and Dumin, 1986). Strong ties, on the other hand, are suggested to restrict outsiders and require a long time to build (Portes, 1998; Stahl et al., 2013), even though they grant group members a sense of mutual obligation and considerable warmth (Granovetter, 1973).

Tie building can be viewed as a two-phase process (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Li, 1998) comprising, first, the weak-tie phase from strangers with no ties to acquaintances and, second, the strong-tie phase from acquaintances with weak ties to friends with strong ties. There are two essential sources, as well; one is achieved ties including direct non-kinship contact and third-party transfer, and the other is ascribed ties including kinship and relational demographics (Li, 1998, Lin, 2001).

Social networks researchers have examined a broad range of types of ties. These include communication ties (such as who talks to whom, or who gives information or advice to whom); formal ties (such as who reports to whom); affective ties (such as who likes whom, or who trusts whom), material or workflow ties (such as who gives money or other resources to whom), proximity ties (who is spatially or electronically close to whom); and cognitive ties (such as who knows whom) (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Simon, 1957, 1959).

Social networks can be viewed from a perspective, which integrates the internal workings of the group and the group's external environment. Studies have generally focused either on the relationships between group members (e.g., cohesiveness, coordination, etc.) or on the group's relationship with outsiders, but network methods can help researchers to examine how the two interact (Coleman, 1990). In line with the literature, this study is guided by an understanding of the social network as a network of ties connected by individual nodes (Newman 2003).

In migration studies, social networks have been discussed widely in relation to their effects on the migration of people, and the integration of migrants into host countries (see, for example, Chelpi-den Hamer and Mazzucato, 2009; Dolfin and Genicot, 2006; Klanova, 2009; Nystrom, 2012; Pereira and Van Meeteren, 2013; Ryan, 2011). However, a few of these studies have focused on the role of social migrant's networks in residential choice and integration into the neighbourhoods they reside in, in the host country (Johnson and Schultz, 2011; Ghosh, 2007; Katende, 2006). There is a need to explore social networks in relation to residential choice and integration. The same sentiments are shared by Ager and Strang (2008) who suggest a need to explore social capital as a basis for understanding the dynamics of integration. This study took note of these

recommendations by Ager and Strang and the focus was, therefore, on social networks, a form of social capital for migrants (Putman, 2007; Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu, 1986).

2.3.1. Social network theory

The social exchange theory suggests that people must act on the principle of reciprocity to build a social network (Blau, 1964). Affective ties at Beitbridge Border Post have somewhat simultaneously and complementary characteristics. In other words, such ties are sentimental in principle but are used quite intensively for instrumental purposes such as informally accessing the border. Affective ties are informal by nature; however, they also extend far into the formal domain fulfilling its functional roles. This understanding helps to explain human interaction dynamics in the process of cross-border movement at one of the busiest border posts in Southern Africa, the Beitbridge/Musina Border post.

2.3.2 Social networks and Zimbabwean migration

Social networks are a critical part of Zimbabwean migration, and migration cannot be looked at independent of these relations. As other authors have shown, social networks are well established in Zimbabwean migration and migrants depend on these networks to facilitate their movements into and out of South Africa (Massey and Fussell, 2004; Pereira and Van Meeteren, 2013). These networks have resulted in chain Zimbabwean migration and allow for the continuation of increased migration processes (Elrick, 2005).

Other studies have shown that would-be migrants knew someone in South Africa (Sibanda, 2010; Thebe, 2011). In some cases, social networks in South Africa initiated the migration of people back to Zimbabwe by entering a contract with *Omalayisha* in what Thebe (2011) divides into pay upon delivery or advance payment. These social networks became significant with the declining economic situation in Zimbabwe as would-be migrants always had people in South Africa, who would host them. As Sibanda (2010) has shown, social networks also play a vital role in South Africa as new migrant arrives and must familiarise with the environment.

However, besides migrants' networks in the form of relatives, friends, or family social networking has become a central component of Zimbabwean migration? In their study, Maombera and Thebe (2019 showed how migrants drew on social networks to facilitate the cross-border migration of children. They use their networks of the migrant to identify the best *umalayisha,* who has a good reputation (Stephen Mago, 2020).

Migrants also make use of information from *Omalayisha* and regular border users such as bus and truck drivers to assist them when traveling to and out of South Africa (Adam and Gelderblom, 2006; Landau and Duponchel, 2011). The importance of these networks is illustrated when these actors provide migrants with tangible resources such as clean routes, the money needed, information on work, housing, and moral support (Chelpi-den Hamer and Mazzucato, 2009; Hofmann, 2014; Klanova, 2009; Ghosh, 2007). On the significance of social networks, Landau and Duponchel (2011) argue that migrants who move to South Africa with connections on how to access the border are more successful than those who migrate without any assistance as they are bound to be deported.

2.4. Migration

Literature acknowledges that migration is a highly controversial and hugely contested terrain and that there is currently no single universally accepted definition of migration (Kok et al., 2003). The term migration, according to Kainth (2009), is so broad that it lends itself to different interpretations and connotations, which are due to the differences in nature, scope, and purpose of discussion. On the one hand, Kainth (2009) notes that sociologists emphasize the social and cultural consequences of migration. On the other hand, Kainth (2009) further notes that geographers put emphasis on time and distance, while economists give importance to the economic aspect of migration.

Considering these inconsistencies, it is thus difficult to ascertain what triggers migration. Consequently, in defining migration, there are main components that ought to be discernible. In essence, migration can be defined as a process of movement across a border - an international border, or within a state (International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS), 2012). According to the Human Migration Guide (2005), migration is typically the

movement of people from one place in the world to another to take up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary.

Further, Skeldon (2002) regards migration as the spatial movement of people at various times of their lives for various reasons. Even though the phenomenon of migration might appear to be outlandish, migration is not a new phenomenon as in reality, it has been a part of human history (IFRC and RCS, 2012). A remarkable rise in migration in the global context is consistent with the recognition of the right to move. According to the International Migration Report of 2002, "The right to move was recognized globally over a half-century ago with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". In this context, the declaration states in Article 13 that everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state (International Migration Report, 2002).

Historically, consideration of global migration provides insight not only into the global reaches of an expanding industrial economy but into how an integrative economy grew concurrently with political and cultural forces that favoured fragmentation into nations, races, and perceptions of distinct cultural regions (McEvedy and Jones, 1978). Excessive growth rates in migration trends have been witnessed around the world and have presented new challenges for receiving countries. Immigration rates tend to be uneven within regions, with some countries sending numerous migrants while others send hardly any at all.

According to McKeown (2004), 19 million overseas migrants from China and 29 million from India seem like a drop in the ocean compared to the several millions from much smaller countries like Italy, Ireland, and England. Massive internal migration also took place within major long-distance sending regions. In Europe, migrants from Ireland travelled to England for work and from Eastern and Southern Europe to industrial areas in Northern Europe, especially France and Germany (McKeown, 2004).

The number of international migrants worldwide reached an estimated 272 million in 2019. Nearly 56 per cent of them lived in countries in more developed regions, while countries in less developed regions hosted 44 per cent. As many as 65 per cent of all international migrants resided in high-income countries, 30 per cent lived in middle-income countries, and 5 per cent settled in low-income countries. In the period between 1990 and 2019, the number of international migrants worldwide grew by around 119 million. (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2018).

According to Glossary on Migration, International Migration Law, No. 34, this growth had accelerated since 2005. While the number of international migrants increased by around 39 million, between 1990 and 2005, from 153 million to 192 million, it increased by around 80 million between 2005 and 2019. This corresponds to an average annual rate of change of 1.5 per cent between 1990 and 2005, compared to 2.5 per cent from 2005 to 2019. Between 1990 and 2019, the more developed regions gained 69 million international migrants whereas the less developed regions added 50 million. Most of the increase in the number of international migrants occurred in high-income countries (98 million), whereas the middle-income and low-income countries only added about 20 million to their migrant stock (17 million and 3 million, respectively).

Glossary on Migration, International Migration Law, and No. 25 asserts that the average annual rate of change in the international migrant stock varied across development and income groups. While the average annual rate of change decreased from 2.3 per cent between 1990 and 2005 to 1.9 percent between 2005 and 2019 in the more developed regions, it increased from 0.4 per cent to 3.3 per cent during the same times in the less developed regions. Likewise, the average annual rate of change decreased from 2.9 per cent between 1990 and 2005 to 2.7 percent between 2005 and 2019 in high-income countries. During the same times, the rate of change increased from -0.4 per cent to 2.1 per cent in middle-income countries and from -0.6 per cent to 2.7 per cent in low-income countries (ILO, 2018).

While international migration is a global phenomenon, most movements involve a limited number of countries. In 2019, just 20 countries hosted two thirds of all international migrants and about half of all international migrants were living in just ten countries. The largest number of migrants

resided in the United States of America, which hosted 51 million migrants in 2019, or around 19 per cent of the world's total (International Migrant Stock, 2019). The second and third largest countries of destination were Germany and Saudi Arabia, hosting around 13 million migrants each, followed by the Russian Federation (12 million), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (10 million). Of the 20 main destination countries of international migrants worldwide, seven were in Europe, four in Northern Africa and Western Asia, three in Central and Southern Asia, two each in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia and in Northern America, and one each in Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1990 and 2019, the number of international migrants increased in 169 countries or areas, while it decreased in 60 (World Population Prospects, 2019).

The United States of America recorded the largest absolute increase of the international migrant stock, adding 27.4 million international migrants between 1990 and 2019. Saudi Arabia experienced the second largest gain (8.1 million), followed by the United Arab Emirates (7.3 million), Germany (7.2 million), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5.9 million). By contrast, the international migrant stock decreased in Pakistan by around 3.0 million between 1990 and 2019 (IOM, 2019).

In Russia, migrants moved into the growing cities and Southern agricultural areas. In Africa, labour migration to plantations and mines in Southern and Central Africa increased throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as did movement to agricultural areas and coastal cities in Western and Eastern Africa. Millions of people took part in these movements, some of whom were coerced and many of whom went to work for European enterprises, but many of whom also found independent occupations (McKeown, 2004).

The issue of migration is not new to South Africa; it dates back to the 1860s with the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State and gold in the Witwatersrand (Crush, 2011). The discovery of these minerals led to the high demand and recruitment of cheap labour from countries like Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland (McDonald, 2000; Simelane, 1999; IOM, 2005). With the demise of apartheid in 1994, South Africa became a focal point for trade and travel (Landau, 2007). This led to a rapid increase of immigrants into South Africa (McDonald, 2000).

The cross-border movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa has always been male-dominated with labour contracts in the mining industry. The end of apartheid and positive changes in the South African economy led to the high migration of foreigners into the country. Others have pointed to changes in migration patterns to South Africa in the past two decades following the end of apartheid in terms of the integration of South Africa within the SADC region and the reconnection of the region with the global economy (Zinyama, 2002).

The growing rural and urban poverty and unemployment have led to the growing number of illegal cross-border flows (Crush et al., 2005; ILO, 1998). As compared to other African countries, post-apartheid South Africa is seen to have increased economic opportunities for both legal and illegal migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Maharaj, 2004; PHAMSA, 2005; Solomon, 2003; Tsheola, 2008). Wide differences in income levels and economic conditions lead to irregular migration, as people will take risks to explore economic conditions to improve their lives (Maharaj, 2004).

According to the International Labour Organisation (1998), people migrate to South Africa for various reasons including the perception that South Africa's employment rate is low, which means it is easy for migrants to get jobs; South Africa has varied opportunities since its GDP is ten times than that of all SADC countries combined, and the income level in South Africa is above the US$500 mark when compared to that of SADC countries, which acts as an incentive (Todaro, 2012). In addition, the South African economy is seen to have the capacity to absorb its population and labour migrants in the region (Standing and Weeks, 1996). Moreover, population growth, coupled with a decline in the economy, induces people to cross borders to search for a better life. Environmental factors like drought and famine; and politically induced ethnic strife and socioeconomic disparities also promote migration (Murray, 1981).

2.4.1. Migration and borders

Some analysts have suggested that we should abandon the term migration, because it is said to imply long-term movement from one nation-state to another, following the patterns of labour and settlement migration seen as typical of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The twenty-first

century, by contrast, is regarded as an era of fluidity and openness, in which changes in transportation; technology and culture (Castles, 2010).

This makes it normal for people to think beyond borders and to cross them frequently. Movements for purposes of study, professional advancement, marriage, retirement or lifestyle are assuming greater significance, so that older ideas on migration are said to be no longer relevant. However, this picture seems overdrawn: indeed, as Bauman (1998) had pointed out, the right to be mobile is more class-specific and selective than ever. National border controls and international cooperation on migration management have become highly restrictive.

Most people have neither the economic resources nor the political rights needed free movement. Only 3 per cent of the world's population are international migrants (UNDESA. 2005). The postmodern utopia of a borderless world of mobility has not yet dawned, so that it still seems appropriate to focus on migration as a process based on inequality and discrimination, and controlled and limited by states. The migration mobility debate can be located in a political discourse. In the years leading up to the financial crash of 2008, demographic, economic and social factors combined to make highly developed economies increasingly reliant on immigrant labour (Castles, 2006; CEC, 2005a).

International recruitment of highly skilled personnel was considered valuable, while lower-skilled migrant workers were seen as out-of-place in shiny new post-industrial economies. Movements of the highly skilled were celebrated as professional mobility, while those of the lower skilled were condemned as unwanted migration. Mobility equalled well, because it was the badge of a modern open society; migration equalled badly because it re-awakened archaic memories of invasion and displacement. However, it seems to me that a focus on migration, rather than mobility, better reflects real power relations (Castles, 2006).

There is good reason to believe that the structural factors driving labour migration particularly from low- and middle-income countries to richer countries will quickly reassert themselves after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007. A further point is relevant here: a dominant political discourse sees migration as a problem that needs to be 'fixed' by appropriate policies. The repressive variant is tight border control, the more liberal one is addressing the 'root causes' of migration especially poverty and violence in origin countries so that people do not have to migrate. Either way, migration

is seen as harmful and dysfunctional. Bakewell (2007), has shown how this discourse, which he calls the sedentary bias, continues a long tradition, which started with colonial policies and is continued by most contemporary development agencies: the poor constitute a threat to prosperity and public order if they move, and should therefore stay at home.

However, since rich countries need migrant workers, the current expression of the sedentary bias is not a prohibition of South North movements of the lower-skilled, but rather the idea that circular migration is a 'win-win-win situation' for labour-importing countries, origin countries and the migrants themselves (CEC, 2005b). Yet historical perspectives show that migration has been a normal aspect of social life and especially of social change throughout history. The reason for the expansion of migration especially over long distances since the sixteenth century Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1567 was the accelerated pace of change connected with the development of the capitalist world market. Nation-state formation, colonial expansion and imperialism involved conflict, violence, development-induced displacement and the growth of forced migration. Migration in the colonial period took both the form of movement of administrators, traders and military personnel (in modern terms, professional mobility), and migration based on inequality and coercion: slaves, indentured workers etc. (Cohen, 1995).

However, migration also often has positive consequences for migrants and their communities of origin. People may move from areas where there are low incomes and few opportunities to places where economic growth and innovation present them with new opportunities. Return flows of remittances, technology and ideas may, under certain circumstances, lead to positive changes in areas of origin. The UN Development Programme's 2009 Human Development Report draws attention to the potential of migration to enhance human capabilities and well-being (UNDP, 2009). The great wave of industrialisation from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century led to what Hatton and Williamson call the first 'age of mass migration' (Hatton and Williamson 1998, 2005), while the accelerated globalisation of the post1945 period led to a second 'age of migration'.
This current wave has gone much further than the first, because it has drawn in virtually all regions of the world, while the first focused mainly on the 'Atlantic economy' (Castles and Miller 2009). Migration has grown more than ever in the last 30 years because of the accelerated pace of globalisation.

Moreover, far more people move within their own countries than internationally (King and Skeldon 2010,) although they, too, may encounter legal, economic, cultural and social obstacles. The problem is not migration itself, but rather the conditions of inequality under which most South North migration takes place. These lead to marginalisation and exploitation for many migrants. Development will not reduce migration (de Haas 2006). If there were less inequality (and therefore less poverty and human insecurity) there would not be less migration, but it would take place under very different circumstance.

As multi-faceted institutions, borders have a bearing on continental integration in Africa. This is because they influence who and what moves from one country to another. In this sense, any discussion of continental integration in Africa brings borders to the centre stage, because, while integration assumes the free flow of the factors of production, including people, borders sift and select who or what has the freedom of passage or not. The same is true for Agenda 2063, the African Union's (AU) strategic framework designed to socio-economically transform Africa over the next half-century. The state actors and formal institutions and enterprises, which assume legal personhood are direct beneficiaries of the border system; while their counterparts, the informal actors including informal cross-border traders must always negotiate the border (Donna, 1997).

This brings to the fore the nature, logic, and operationalization of regional and continental integration in Africa. In this context, we are led to ask whether the informal actors and people at the grassroots, such as cross-border traders, are an objective reality at African borders, as well as to reflect on their role and actual or potential efficacy in the continental integration project. Borders are not just lines at the margins of nation-states, but also social and political institutions (Kiek, 2010). This means that, beyond playing the ordinary role of managing migration and immigration, borders perform social and political functions that may not always.

2.4.2. Migration and South African border management

Border management is defined as the administration of borders that usually relates to the procedures regulating activities and the rules that guide cross-border activities (MacKay, 2008). Border management refers to a coordinated approach by border control agencies, both international and

domestic, in the context of seeking greater efficiencies over managing travel and trade flows while maintaining a balance with compliance requirements (Aniszewski, 2009). Furthermore, border control means measures adopted by a country to regulate and monitor its borders. It regulates the entry and exit of people, animals, and goods across a country's border. It aims at fighting terrorism and detecting the movement of criminals across the borders (US Legal, 2018). Border management is often defined as the administration of borders by a "professionally trained security apparatus with responsibilities, powers, functional mandates and a professional identity separate and distinct from other security providing structures" (Marenin, 2006).

According to (Dodson, 2002), there is a need for better border management at the Beitbridge Border Post to facilitate the smooth and faster flow of cargo across borders because better management promotes trade among countries by enhancing the free circulation of goods, improving predictability and reliability of shipments and reducing transaction costs at the border estimate Customs delays and border delays encourage illicit trading and corruption in order to bypass delays at customs and border posts. The mission of coordinated border management is to encourage border agencies to coordinate their activities in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of border procedures and counter the illegal movement of goods and people (Khumalo and Chibira, 2015).

The fact that effective coordination allows people to work across portfolio boundaries provides a cohesive Government response to the challenges of border management. Border management efforts are being made to speed up the customs clearance processes by pre-inspecting goods in the exporter's country rather than at the port of entry in the importer's country, and that pre-inspection drastically cuts inspection time down to 2 or 3 days instead of weeks (Mthembu-Salter, 2008).

While border control typically refers to the control of goods, people, and means of transport that legally enters or exits a country, the security and law enforcement aspects of border control give it a much broader scope by including what is sometimes called border "lines" (Tshuma,2016).

Various government departments are involved with the Beitbridge border post-management and deal with people, goods, and means of conveyance and the regulation of commercial activity, and the prevention /combating of illegal activities. The key ones are SA Revenue Service, SA Police

Service, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Transport, Department of Health, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Department of Agriculture, Department of Intelligence, SA National Defence Force, and the Department of Public Works. This poses a significant challenge for effective coordination of the key border control and security functions at the shared borders and ports of entry, as envisioned by Section 41 (1) (h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa that states, "All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith (South Africa Police Service, 2017).

The Beitbridge border management erected a fence to avoid the border being penetrated illegally. However, some migrants resort to dirty entry popularly known as border jumping which involves swimming across the Limpopo River and vandalizing the electric fence to illegally enter South Africa (Takabvirwa, 2010). The SANDF acknowledged that "…. we know a new border fence they are busy erecting closer to the Beitbridge has been vandalized and that is creating gaps in the illegal border activities. They increased patrols in that area utilizing several of our forces' resources such as horses and motorcycles" (Tshivhase, 2020).

The present immigration policy places emphasis on the broadening of the economic base of South Africa by concentrating on the obtaining of those immigrants who can render a meaningful contribution regarding economic gains (Daily Maverick, 19 April 2018). The South African immigration policy is embodied in the Immigration Act (No 13 of 2002) which prescribes certain requirements which are to be met by an applicant who wishes to immigrate permanently to South Africa. Those eligible to apply for permanent residence must fall into one of the categories listed in the Immigration Act. The South African Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No 13 of 2002) makes provision for various categories of Permanent Residence (Segatti, 2011).

Therefore, migration policy has been restrictive since 1994, positioning migrants as one of the sources of crime in the country and therefore undesirable. Similar sentiments are echoed by Mbiyozo (2013) of the Institute of Security Studies, who notes that migrants are seen as security threats and participants in violent crimes by host communities. Thus, leading to the negotiation of the border by migrants that do not qualify to be in South Africa based on the migration policy.

2.5. Borders, Migration, and Social Networking

The framework of analysis guiding this study is derived from the three major concepts discussed in this chapter. It brings together borders, their role, and the barrier they provide, together with migration and social networks to understand how flows of goods and people are managed and negotiated. In the case of the study, these broad concepts are discussed in relation to the cross-border movement of goods and people at Beitbridge Border Post. The analysis pulled these together to develop a framework of analysis. The framework presents the border not only as a management institution but as an obstacle that must be constantly negotiated (Maombera and Thebe, 2019). Negotiation of the border can be done through smuggling activities on undesignated entry points, or clandestine dealings through the formal border post (Thebe, 2011, 2015). Migrants often deploy social networks in the process of negotiating the constraints imposed by the border on their migration motives.

2.6. Chapter Summary

The role of the border is the clearance of travellers, trade facilitation, regulation, or limitation of movement of people and goods into and out of a country. The role of the border is compromised when it becomes restrictive of goods and people leading to the issue of who do you know? How can they assist to access the border without barriers? In migration processes, social networks play an important role in facilitating the journey, supporting newcomers in their first steps towards integration, and influencing the way migrants' residence strategies evolve (Chelpi-den Hamer and Mazzucato, 2009). Migrants rely on neighbours from the same racial or ethnic background to create social networks which assist them in reaching the proposed destination country (Engebrigtsen, 2007; Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). Therefore, human interactions play a vital role in overcoming border barriers to smooth migration (Siziba, 2014).

CHAPTER THREE-METHODOLOGY APPROACH

3.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the research approach and research design adopted by the study, the research techniques employed to gather data, the data analysis approach, the limitations of the study and the challenges encountered, and finally the ethical issues relating to the study. The chapter discusses the strength of a long-term ethnographic approach, which was the main approach of this study, and the challenges imposed by the outbreak of the Covid 19 pandemic in 2020 before the study could be completed on the research environment, and the methods used for data collection during the fieldwork period. It also illustrates the challenges of carrying out an ethnography at a time when interactions were curtailed, and the risks associated with such interactions.

The study was conducted between September 2020 and February 2021, when both South Africa and Zimbabwe were facing challenges of containing the spread of the novel coronavirus. The South African and Zimbabwean Border Post was closed to human traffic during different periods. I had timed the fieldwork to coincide with the time when I was traveling to Zimbabwe in order to capture dynamics in cross-border movements. I had already conducted the first phase of fieldwork on Zimbabwean migrants, cross-border transporters comprising of *Omalayisha* and the cross-border bus service, and long-distance haulage trucks, which had become a major means of transport during the pandemic. The journeys to Zimbabwe and South Africa were part of the ethnographic study that I had planned. I conducted the other part on *Omalayisha*, the cross-border bus service and long-distance trucks, where I sent several cargo consignments from Pretoria to Harare, through these modes of transport.

As a Zimbabwean citizen, who was a legal student in South Africa, the travel restrictions were not applicable, and I was able to make several trips to Zimbabwe during the period. The last trip was on my return to South Africa in February 2021 to resume my studies after the end of the year break. I travelled mostly with the bus service, where I was able to interact freely with other Zimbabwean travellers. I was also able to observe dynamics at the border because of the long clearance times

experienced because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The stay at the border was longer and the processes were very slow. However, these delays often provided the opportunity I wanted, and I benefited a lot from these long stays. In a way, the outbreak of the coronavirus did very little to compromise the study.

3.2. Research Approach and Design

While the fieldwork for this study began after getting ethical approval from the Faculty of Humanities' Ethics Committee, I also drew on my earlier experiences in cross-border movements since my years as a student, traveling either home or back to the university through various modes of cross-border transportation, and in sending goods home. The fieldwork then served to validate my experiences and the understanding I had built of cross-border dynamics at the South African and Zimbabwe border posts. This experience provided a starting point in designing my questions and methodology. Thus, the methodology adopted was guided by my understanding that a complex chain of human interactions characterizes cross-border processes, and that the chain of human interaction was complex and required an in-depth inquiry.

Such an inquiry required one to understand human interaction dynamics, and how these interactions related to cross-border movements. This required that I adopt an ethnographic study. According to Worby (2001), an ethnographic study is grounded on long-term research that normally involves sustained engagement in the daily lives of those about whom we want to write about, and in the effort to understand the latter on their terms.

This approach was appropriate in studying complex dynamics, which required one to be closer to the process and to understand actions and behaviour from the people's point of view. With the outbreak of the coronavirus, there was a threat to this approach, but declines in infections in South Africa and the fact that returning Zimbabweans were allowed to travel home and return to South Africa, allowed for some ethnographic study to take place. This happened mainly during my travel to and from Zimbabwe.

In design, the research was qualitative and designed to dig deeper into these human interaction processes. De Vos (2005) suggests that a qualitative research design is a multi-method focus and

involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach. By its nature, the qualitative research design is more suited to conducting social networks research because its goal is to understand those being studied from their perspectives rather than from an outsider's perspective (Gormon and Clayton, 2006).

The qualitative design allowed the researcher the opportunity to study situations as they unfolded naturally. By adopting a qualitative design, this study aimed to understand the relationships among actors from the perspectives of those involved in the interaction processes. Such a study, which was ethnographic in nature involved a range of techniques within the ethnographic approach, which allowed the researcher the opportunity to get first-hand experiences of actors through their narrations and in their natural environment as they performed various roles.

Through the personal stories of these actors, I was able to capture and understand their world and realities in the process of negotiating border access for goods and people. Through the qualitative method, I was able to explore some actors' experiences at the Beitbridge Border Post in greater depth, without having to predict or determine the flow of the narratives.

3.3. Research Techniques

While the ethnographic study on transport actors and other human agents involved in the moving of people and goods within the Beitbridge border area and Harare took place between September 2020 and February 2021, the study started much earlier in July when I interacted with migrants and transport operators in Pretoria. This earlier period involved interviews with Zimbabwean migrants, *Omalayisha*, and the cross-border bus crews. While the interviews were straightforward and involved referrals, which was important in understanding the process of networking, it was the process of sending goods and negotiating for visitations into South Africa during a lockdown period, which was intriguing. I had to rely on my network of migrants, who had goods to send home or had people to receive from Zimbabwe.

I accompanied these migrants to the Bosman Long Distance Station to send goods, and on a few occasions had goods to send home myself. While the process is complex, such negotiations are

not. Migrants approached bus crews that they knew through prior interaction or referrals and sent goods at a fee. In some cases, as migrants, we did not engage directly with the traveling bus crew, but those that operate in the offices at the bus terminus. These mostly receive goods and issue tickets.

This may appear as a formal process, but it is not, since these goods do not pay duty. I also accompanied friends and other migrants who sent goods through *Omalayisha*, who had adapted their operations at the time by using cargo trucks. The process was the same. Either you knew *Omalayisha*, or you were referred. You contact them and they come and pick your goods, and charge a fee, which at the time was relatively steep. A detailed discussion of the research techniques is discussed below.

3.3.1. Open-ended interviews

This study employed the qualitative methodology, in order to obtain empirical data. In particular, the study utilized in-depth interviews with key role players involved. My focus was on 5 groups of people: the transporters (cross-border bus crews, *Omalayisha*, and long-distance haulage track drivers), *Izimpisi* (the cross-border human smugglers), people who used to travel or send goods to Zimbabwe, clearing agents, and touts in Beitbridge and the border post, and officials at the border post.

While it was always going to be difficult to interview officials in their official capacity, interviews were conducted with officials in their informal capacity. These officials often talked from an observer perspective and were never interviewed as people who were part of the whole complex system. Such an approach made it easy to access officials, who were mostly off-duty and could share what they have observed and how they understand the process. For these interviews to happen, networks were very critical, and I had to rely on my relationships at the border post, mainly in Zimbabwe.

With the other groups of actors, the interviews focused on a range of issues concerning the cross-border movements of people and goods. These issues included the process itself, what is involved, who initiates what, who does what, where, what is the nature of the relationships, and more importantly, the value of each actor in the whole process. Despite the process being illegal, these

actors saw nothing wrong with their roles and were free to share their experiences and their roles. There was nothing to hide, and they talked of the process as if it was a normal day-to-day process.

For transporters, this was their job, and they were open to what they do and tried to assure me, as they often assured their clients, that goods would indeed cross and reach their destinations. They had done this for many years, and they were skilled operators. As for truck drivers, theirs was much easier, since their cargo is often sealed from the depot, and they often submit papers at the border. However, *Omalayisha* and the bus crews had to pay to avoid unnecessary searches. At the time of the lockdown, they were also the main agents moving people into South Africa, and they were relatively free in talking about this role.

The other group including *Izimpisi*, who are well-known Beitbridge residents, and often advertise their services, were equally forthcoming. They were prepared to share their experiences in cross-border facilitation and even identified their main clients, who were usually *Omalayisha*. They boasted about their skills and how they often outwit security personnel patrolling the fence. They also highlighted the dangers involved, but also the benefits they have derived. This was the same issue with the touts at the border post, who often approached people and were often prepared to talk about their other duties and relationships, besides assisting people to complete complex official immigration forms.

Given the information that the study sought, I adopted open-ended interviews that were designed to allow participants to share as much information as they could. This also contributed to the wealth of data derived from interviews. Each group of actors had information to share, and open-ended interviews allowed a flow of information, without disturbance. For the process to be controlled, I used an interview schedule. This allowed me to focus on aspects that answered the research questions without restricting them from sharing information that was valuable to the study but may not have been asked. Interviews were long and sometimes took an hour. Sometimes, they were extended, like in the case with migrants in Pretoria, where the interactions were continuous.

Given the complexity of the study and the complex situation caused by the coronavirus, I adopted a snowball sampling technique, where participating individuals were identified through referrals from other people. In a situation where there were many Zimbabweans in Pretoria and I knew

some people that would have travelled and sent goods home, access to ordinary migrants was not difficult. This was also the same with transporters and truck drivers, whom I was referred to by migrants who utilized their services. Migrants who had used *Omalayisha*, bus crews, and trucks to move or send goods across the border before, knew *Omalayisha*, bus crews, and truck drivers who were traveling home and had space to carry goods. These were the people the researcher approached and interviewed during the study.

In the case of *Izimpisi* and clearing agents, I was referred by my contacts in Beitbridge. Initially, I was approached by a tout who was seeking business at the border post, and he later referred me to others who were doing the same business after I had identified myself. Identifying and selecting border officials was complex and difficult, and I had to rely on my social networks in Beitbridge, who were able to identify people they were closer to and could share their experiences with. In total, I interviewed 30 people in Pretoria, Beitbridge, and Harare. These included 10 migrants, 3 *Omalayisha*, 3 bus crew members, 3 truck drivers, 3 *Izimpisi*, 3 touts, 2 clearing agents, and 3 officials.

3.3.2. Participant observations

This has been explained in the introduction, but I will provide a few highlights here. The study required that I get closer to the process. I had to get closer to the migrants, who were critical contacts to transporters. After identifying these migrants, I became their companion as they sent goods home, and arranged for the visitation of people from Zimbabwe. Through these migrant contacts, I was also able to make a few cross-border transactions through the various modes of cross-border transportation.

However, participant observation became a critical tool in capturing and recording the dynamics of negotiating the border more formally. As indicated, I had come to understand and experience these processes earlier before my study. However, this experience did not constitute a formal process although they were critical in forming my initial understanding. When I finally began the study, I had developed an understanding of what I was looking for and where I could capture it.

I made several bus journeys during the study, from Pretoria to Harare and from Harare to Pretoria. I made a total of 6 bus journeys during the start period, which were insightful. The observations started at the Long-Distance Bus Station in Pretoria, where I focused on goods that were transported, and who were accompanying them. On the journey, I interacted with some travellers, but it was at the border post that these dynamics unfolded. I observed the interaction process, which mostly involved the bus conductors and travellers, and how money formed a central part of the process.

At the border post, I also observed people returning to Zimbabwe without proper documentation and processing their goods. These complex processes required proximity. During these bus journeys, I also held discussions with travellers and sought insight on how the crossing and smuggling of goods and people took place. These bus journeys were valuable as I was able to record events, actions, and behaviour of the actors of the cross-border networks. While I was able to relate these to earlier experiences, I also had the opportunity to compare with studies like Thebe (2011, 2015) and Maombera and Thebe (2019), which captured these dynamics.

3.3.3. Non-participant observations

These took place at the Pretoria Long Distance Bus Station, border post, and Beitbridge Town. These focused on capturing dynamics that I was not involved in. I would spend time in Pretoria Long Distance Bus Station observing transactions between migrants and bus crews. I would capture exchanges that took place amongst the bus crew members, travellers, and grocery senders. At the border post, I spent time observing activities and interactions that took place around me, but that did not involve me. I observed the processing of goods, interaction among different actors, and how goods and people finally passed through the border through this complex web of social interactions.

In Beitbridge town, my interest was on *izimpisi* and their activities, their interaction with *omalayisha*, and how the facilitation process starts. Through observation, I came to realize that the facilitation of clandestine cross-border activities started in Beitbridge and that there were other

actors besides *omalayisha* and *izimpisi* that were involved. These included local transport owners, who transported *izimpisi* and would-be migrants to the places where they would cross the border.

3.3.4 Review of key literature

As alluded to earlier, South African borders have attracted a lot of academic attention, not only because of the country's immigration policy and migrant-receiving status, but also, the 'porous' borders, corruption, and illegal migration. The study drew selectively on this literature on South Africa's immigration policy on Zimbabweans, migration trends from Zimbabwe, human smuggling amongst others. These sources are available as academic books and journal articles. These were sourced from the library and online. Besides academic articles, numerous articles on Zimbabwean migration and dynamics on the South African /Zimbabwean border. These articles are mostly available online and are freely accessible.

3.4. Data Analysis

The design of the study dictated that the data analysis process follows a structured approach. The study adopted a qualitative design, which necessitated the use of qualitative data analysis approaches. For this study, a thematic data analysis approach was used to analyse data. Thematic analysis is a flexible method that allows the researcher to focus on the data in different ways (Patton, 2002). The first step in data analysis was to read through all the transcripts of the interviews and notes from observations and literature to develop a general understanding of the data. This was followed by a coding process where similar data was grouped and allocated codes. The next step involved comparing the different groups of data and again grouping them and allocating them codes. These groups represented minor themes. The process continued until only broad groups, representing major themes were created.

These emerging themes were used to develop the argument of this dissertation. At the end of the process, two emerging themes were identified: first, popular channels of moving goods and people across the border, and second, the main actors, their roles, and interaction dynamics. These themes provided the direction for this dissertation, but some data was used in its raw state and used as quotations and case scenarios to support the argument.

3.5. Challenges Encountered During Fieldwork

Planning and carrying out an ethnographic study at a time of a pandemic and restrictions on interaction and movement posed serious logistical challenges. The lockdown measures meant that the study could not be carried out as planned since it would be difficult to get closer to the action. However, there were relaxations in the regulations in South Africa, which allowed for cautious interaction. More importantly, the study involved migrants and some of these migrants were people I was familiar with and interacted with regularly. Also, the continuation of cross-border transportation of cargo allowed access and interaction with transporters, who were important actors in the cross-border movement of goods and people. This also meant that meeting these people was made easy, as they were contacted and met during the process of sending goods.

Lastly, the permission of returning citizens to return home and the opening of the border by South Africa enabled the study to take place without restrictions. It is also important to note the difficulties in gaining access to border officials. The subject was very sensitive, and the evidence could be incriminating. Getting officials to participate in the study was always difficult. However, I found ways of gaining access to these officials by approaching them in their personal capacity and using close contacts that referred me to them. Also, the focus had to change from them and their roles to their experiences, understandings, and observations. This helped as I was able to interview 3 officials. The identified constraints, however, did not compromise the study as there were no major changes to the planned research.

3.6. Ethical Considerations

Ethics are meant to protect the welfare of the participants and social research should not harm or injure the people being studied. Researchers, therefore, take all necessary precautions to ensure that the respondents are neither emotionally nor physically harmed throughout the research process (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). To protect the participants, the research was carried out independently and impartially following the rules and regulations set by the University of Pretoria. In engaging study participants voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, prevention of harm, and debriefing of respondents were some of the ethical considerations observed.

3.6.1. Voluntary participation

Voluntary participation is one of the basic principles of research and that prescribes that people should not be coerced into participation (Bryman, 2001). All participants were thoroughly made aware of the entire research process, and they were informed of their rights not to participate if they were not comfortable. They were also made aware of their rights to withdraw at any time if they were not comfortable with continuing with the interview. The participants were also made aware that withdrawal of consent will neither result in any penalties nor loss of benefits in any way.

3.6.2. Informed consent

Signed informed consent was sought from every participant. The researcher provided all participants with full disclosure of all information necessary for making an informed decision of whether to participate or not in the research. Information on the consent form included a statement of the research purpose, the identity of the researcher, the identity of the institution from which the researcher is from, an invitation to participate, the expected duration and nature of participation, a description of research procedures, and an explanation of the responsibilities of the participant. Assurance was also given to prospective participants that they would not be under any obligation to participate and can freely withdraw at any time without prejudice to pre-existing entitlements. Before commencement of each interview, the researcher ensured that each respondent gave consent by signing the consent form.

3.6.3. Anonymity and confidentiality

The issue of anonymity and confidentiality concerns protecting participants' interests and identity (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Confidentiality refers to the researcher safeguarding the respondents 'answers within the interviews and anonymity refers to withholding the respondents' names and identity (De Vos et al., 2005). Considering the sensitive nature of this research, in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality, the researcher adopted a pseudonyms approach to identify participants, and participants were informed accordingly. These pseudonyms were used to identify participants in the dissertation. Regarding confidentiality, the participants were informed that, besides the researcher, Prof. Vusi Thebe, who is the supervisor of the student would also have access to the data. Participants were also informed of the storage of the data. Data was stored in a

password-protected computer during the study, and at the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology for 15 years after the study.

3.6.4. Data dissemination

Data attained from the interviews was used for three academic purposes. First, the data was used to produce a master's dissertation, which was the main purpose of the study. Second, the data was used to produce a scientific article, which was also a requirement for the fulfilment of the qualification. Lastly, the dissemination of the data as part of conference proceedings, which is a recommendation for students doing research studies.

3.6.5. Prevention of harm

Social research should never cause harm or discomfort to the people being studied (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Respondents should not be harmed emotionally, psychologically, or physically. The study conformed to this principle through precautions that sensitive issues were avoided, and that the interviews were comfortable for all involved. That was the reason why border officials were interviewed on their experiences, views, and understandings. In addition, before the commencement of each interview, the respondents were made aware of the nature and goals of the study as well as making participation voluntary and informing them that they could terminate the interview if they found it necessary.

3.6. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the research approach and design, the ethnographic research approach for collecting data, and the approach to analysing the data collected, were discussed. The chapter then discussed the challenges encountered during fieldwork and how they were addressed, before identifying and discussing the ethical issues pertinent to the study and how the study addressed them. The chapter highlighted the significance of social networks in both the identification and selection of participants and data collection.

The snowball sampling technique depended on initial networks, but also, it was going to be difficult to conduct the research without the assistance of the networks. The challenge arose from the sensitivity of the subject, which made interviewing certain groups difficult. The chapter also

showed how other actors share their experiences and involvement, which allowed the researcher to gain significant insights on the research topic. While the study was conducted at a time of the coronavirus outbreak, the chapter showed that this did not compromise the research as the approach adopted was appropriate to the situation.

CHAPTER FOUR-BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

4.1. Introduction

Contemporary migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has attracted scholarly attention, and as a result, it is well-documented (Crush et al. 2015; Crush and Tawodzera, 2015; Lincoln and Mararike. 2000; Makina 2013; Tevera and Zinyama, 2000, 2002. Thebe 2017; Maombera and Thebe 2019). Despite academic interest and coverage, there are certain complexities, stereotypes, and exaggerations, which have in turn complicated our understanding of a process that is significant in South Africa in terms of policy and Zimbabwe in terms of employment and livelihoods.

Despite these complexities, this chapter attempts to provide a rough sketch of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and analyses the process in relation to the historical dynamics, economic and social crisis in Zimbabwe, migration, and social networks. This is done to provide a context for our understanding of the social networks that are inherently part of the process of negotiating the border.

The first section is a discussion of the complexity of the Beitbridge border that separates South Africa and Zimbabwe. The second discusses the complexity of Zimbabwean migration and migrants. It highlights the difficulties in generalization. The third provides a broad analysis of the historical development of the migration of Zimbabweans into South Africa. This chapter articulates some of the factors influencing informal cross-border activities between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Among others, the restrictive mechanisms at the Beitbridge border have accelerated the increase of informal cross-border activities.

Delays associated with numerous bureaucratic procedures at the border have caused many frustrations for those who might use official border crossing, but then feel they have no choice but to circumvent the official routes. Moreover, a rising unemployment rate coupled with a decline in the standard of living in Zimbabwe, have left many people with limited options, other than to engage in informal cross-border trade to survive. Finally, the chapter discusses the various ways

cargo moves between the two countries. It identifies two popular methods of moving informal cargo, the smart entry method, and the dirty entry method, and further argues that the smart entry method, which involves social networking is by far the most popular.

4.2. Locating the Beitbridge Border

This study is centred on informal cross-border movement of people and goods through the Beitbridge border that is located on the small border town in the Matabeleland South Province of Zimbabwe. It is also the border, which forms the political boundaries between Zimbabwe and South Africa (Fitzmaurice, 2009). The Beitbridge border post is sub-Saharan Africa's busiest land port and is the gateway to the sea for most of the SADC region (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 2015).

The importance of the border post to the SADC area is underlined by the fact that it serves more than 3, 000 vehicles and 9, 000 passengers, daily, with estimates exceeding 20 000 passengers during national public holidays particularly Christmas (Kwanisai et al., 2014). The International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2019) observed that 5,368,783 movements comprising 2,790,051 entries and 2,578,732 exits were registered at Beitbridge Border Post in 2019. As a point of entry and exit, the border facilitates and prevents cross-border movements.

The border that divides the area into Messina in South Africa and Beitbridge in Zimbabwe can be divided into two entities, the border post as an institution and part of the broader state system and the physical. The physical includes the Limpopo River and its crocodiles, the electrified fence, and the Messina forest. In terms of migration, these geographical aspects of the border represent opportunities for clandestine cross-border activities, while the border post presents a barrier or impediment (Maombera and Thebe, 2019).

However, both these can be easily negotiated, and migrants can use both successfully (Tati, 2008; Thebe, 2011). The border that has been defined as porous can be entered or exited through numerous undesignated entries and exit points, but there are situations when informal cross-border activities take place through the formal border post. According to Williams (2010), this happens often than is acknowledged and many illegal migrants rarely used the dangerous route. Numerous

reasons have been proffered to explain why borders are prone to clandestine cross-border movements, and this section will discuss only a few.

Figure 1: Map showing Beitbridge Post

Source, Google Maps (2021)

4.2.1. Restrictive mechanisms at the Beitbridge Border Post

This section examines some of the restrictive mechanisms introduced at the Beitbridge border. In doing so, it considers some of the legal measures or other restrictions imposed directly or indirectly by the Zimbabwean and South African governments. Such structural limitations have intensified illicit trade for individual and corporate benefits along the frontier. Both governments have put in place strict measures calculated to limit border incursions and generate income for their respective countries (Muguti and Marongwe, 2017).

Such limitations, however, have done little to reduce these border transgressions, but have facilitated the proliferation of informal cross-border trade. The authorities' restrictive structures ostensibly propelled smuggling, corruption, and other illegal activities at the border as informal traders try to bypass them (Muguti and Marongwe, 2017). These restrictions included, among other

things, the South African government's visitor visa requirements and strict enforcement of work permit regimes for all Zimbabweans who needed to work in South Africa (Polzer, 2008).

It should be noted that owing to the large proportion of illegal Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, precise statistics are hard to obtain. However, Polzer (2008) posits that the strict visa requirements were meant to avoid the influx of an estimated 5 million Zimbabwean immigrants, who are the largest group of foreign migrants in South Africa. Cross-border traffic at the Beitbridge border grew significantly from approximately 600,000 in 2004 to over 1.6 million in 2010 (Crush and Tawodzera, 2016). However, transient tourists visiting to trade, see family, or finding medical attention constitute a large proportion of these figures (Crush and Tawodzera, 2016).

The South African government has been determined to make it difficult for those seeking travel documents by increasing the fees needed to acquire visas and temporary permits to avoid the alleged disproportionate inflow of Zimbabweans (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002). The cost of processing a visa to South Africa was R2000 in 2000, according to Tevera and Zinyama (2002), and such a fee was too high for many Zimbabweans who were struggling financially. The visa programme was cancelled at a later stage.

On the Zimbabwean side, the government prolonged the waiting period to renew or acquire a new passport. This made it harder for ordinary traders to receive official travel documentation. According to Tapfumaneyi (2019), the government of Zimbabwe printed only 60 passports a day in July 2019 against a waiting list of more than 300,000 applications. The Zimbabwean Ministry of Home Affairs cited foreign currency shortages as reasons why they could not procure the necessary materials for producing passports, hence the backlogs (Tapfumaneyi, 2019).

Poor institutional changes, seen in this light, have proven to be restrictive, leading people to look for informal and illegal routes out of the country. These acts of border transgression are popularly known as "border jumping". Informal cross-border trade is motivated by import restrictions and export bans. Different restrictions on select imports were enforced by the Zimbabwean government, thus triggering their informal entry into the country (Munyanyi, 2015). In 2014, for example, the Government of Zimbabwe adopted Legislative Instrument No. 126 of 2014, which

allowed individual travellers and informal cross-border traders to obtain import permits for essential commodities, such as milk, cooking oil, detergents, and grain (Muleya, 2014).

Two years later, the government adopted the Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 (SI 64/2016), domestic legislation that restricted the importation of forty-three products and required traders to obtain an import permit from the government before importing certain essential commodities mainly from South Africa (Mabuwa, 2016).

4.2.2 Porous nature of the Beitbridge Border post

Insufficient border infrastructure and poor management, causing delays at formal borders in Southern Africa, have contributed tremendously to the rise of informal cross-border trade (Shayanowako, 2013). These setbacks are costly for perishable products such as meat and dairy. Considering this, some traders opt for informal trade routes, circumventing the regulatory procedure in a bid to save time and costs. The delays get longer during the festive season as Zimbabweans living in South Africa travel back home.

There are also numerous police roadblocks on both sides of the border that further worsen the delays, stimulating informal cross-border trade (Nshimbe and Moyo, 2017). It was noticed by Munyanyi (2015) that South African immigration officers were often unwilling to assist people coming to South Africa from Zimbabwe and they usually take labour actions, such as "go-slow", making travel difficult. In consequence, the traders establish informal trade routes that save them money and time thus promoting the growth of informal cross-border trade.

Figure 2: A general view of slow moving and volume of traffic at Beitbridge Border Post

Source: Gamuchirai Mutasa (Personal communication, 13 October 2017)

These institutional and regulatory barriers influence traders to engage in informal trade. Zimbabwean traders at the Beitbridge border are required to obtain import declaration forms, a process that involves numerous agencies to conduct the procedures for the inspection and certification of compliance (Munyanyi, 2015). In Zimbabwe, formal trade is subject to various regulations relating to the establishment and activity of a company. Compliance with these laws is expensive, time-consuming, and has numerous bureaucratic processes that typically go beyond the means of those participating in the informal sector (Jamela, 2013). These regulatory standards consequently increase the cost of trade transactions and encourage traders to circumvent formal trade (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman, 2009). This restriction of the entry or exit of certain goods also causes a deviation from the legal channels of trade.

Furthermore, corruption and lawlessness are on the rise due to the harsh economic conditions in Zimbabwe. To avoid delays, formal traders usually must bribe and pay off the border authorities to allow them to travel in possession of restricted goods such as meat, eggs, and milk (Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2017). Many informal cross-border traders bypass trade-related legislation

because of the high levels of import and export duties on selected goods (Lesser and MoiseLeeman, 2009). The failure of law enforcement, in the case of the Beitbridge border post, is a condition that is exacerbated by the low wages paid to border agents, prompting them to participate in corrupt practices to increase their income. Informal cross-border trade is thus, driven by several factors, both structural and poverty-related.

4.3. Migrants and the Complexity of Zimbabwean Migration

While migration trends have changed and are moving towards semi-permanence and permanence (Crush et al., 2015), however, it is difficult to generalize. Zimbabwean migration is complex, and this has been revealed over the years. Zinyama (2002) has shown how in the last decade there has been a qualitative shift in migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe, following changes in the political and economic conditions of both countries. While the migration of young single men for work has continued and even grown, growing numbers of women joined the migration stream. These women were mostly seeking to supplement the family income, dominated the informal cross-border trade (see also Muzvidziwa, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2015). The economic crisis and decline in Zimbabwe have prompted a diversification of household survival strategies. Cross-border migration became one in a basket of such strategies for many (Betts, 2010). The money obtained while in South Africa was used to purchase goods for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to be in short supply at home (Betts and Kaytaz, 2009).

Some migrants (mainly those captured in official entry statistics) have remained oscillatory, short-term, and purpose-driven, mainly to visit relatives, seek medical help, or commodities that are not available in Zimbabwe (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Evidence suggests that Zimbabweans were getting the bulk of essential requirements from Botswana and South Africa, which partly explains the increase in cross-border entrants after 2000 (ibid). Apart from those that entered the country illegally or on holiday, some migrants were professionals with work permits. Circular migration was also noted in studies on Zimbabwean migrants (Makina, 2013). As highlighted in Fig. 4.3, Zimbabweans who pass through the formal border processes often return to Zimbabwe with goods and groceries.

Figure 3: Travellers from Zimbabwe entering South Africa

Source: Daily Maverick.co.za article, 21 May 2020

Even contemporary migrants continue to maintain strong links with their families in Zimbabwe (Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Thebe, 2011). As others have shown, migrants return home regularly, even if they spend most of their time in South Africa. They return for funerals, other ceremonies, and social and holiday visits. When they return to Zimbabwe, the workers bring back a wide variety of items, including goods that were once commonly found in many Zimbabwean households such as maize meal, soap, and sugar, and cooking oil (Thebe, 2011). In the past, all these items were either impossible to find in Zimbabwe due to the economic meltdown or prices were too prohibitive for most people. It also emerged that,

> *Those with some money, particularly permanent workers, would bring back clothes, electronic equipment, bicycles, household items, automobile parts, and so forth. They would also bring the South African Rand to convert into Zimbabwean dollars at the black-market rate to give to dependants, buy food and clothes and pay school fees.*
>
> (Int., VaNyoka, Beitbridge, 2020).

In interviews, migrants indicated that they visit Zimbabwe at least once a year. This was captured in Mkoma Jairos' one sentence answer when asked about his relationship with Zimbabwe, he said,

Like every year, l was going home in December

(Int. Jairos Mashava, Pretoria, 2020).

These migrants even travelled to Zimbabwe during the period of the lockdown in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The majority of migrants jump the border to return to Zimbabwe because their travel documents would have been repatriated back home through various channels (see Maombera and Thebe, 2019). They would then return using the formal channels, which they would repatriate back to Zimbabwe and remain in South Africa as illegals. However, some travel because they have valid permits (see Thebe, 2017). For example, Tariro, a Professional Nurse with a valid permit, indicated that she travels home regularly. However, others would travel home without valid papers, hand themselves to the Zimbabwean authority, where they pay a fine for leaving the country illegally.

Some migrants maintain contact with family in Zimbabwe through remittances. They send remittance to Zimbabwe while they remain working in South Africa. This is usually done through families and friends returning home, or through *Omalayisha*, particularly for rural migrants (Thebe, 2011; Thebe and Matyatyu, 2017). The movements of migrants, who do not have requisite documents, and that of remittance, require the development of social networks to facilitate the movements.

In summation, migration to neighbouring South Africa from Zimbabwe has conventionally been typecast as a form of temporary or circular migration. Migrants temporarily move to South Africa in search of employment or other economic opportunities, return home regularly and send remittances while away (Crush and Tevera 2010; Rutherford 2011; Makina 2013). These migrants see Zimbabwe as a much more desirable place to live and do not wish or intend to settle in South Africa (Crush et al., 2015; Tevera and Zinyama, 2002). Rather, they have been forced into temporary circular migration by the crisis in Zimbabwe and will return for good once the crisis is resolved (Derman and Kaarhuis, 2013; Makina, 2012).

4.4. Root Causes of Zimbabwean Migration

Understanding the social dynamics at the Zimbabwean and South African border posts in the movement of people and goods, require that one understands the causes of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa. The causes are closely linked to both human traffic and the movement of goods seen and experienced over time. While the causes are well known and documented, there is little agreement on their contributory effects.

This section looks at the causes of migration and attempts to relate these to the general traffic at the border posts and why human interaction has become a central part of the process. Maombera and Thebe (2019) presented the South African border as a major obstacle to migrants through regulations, which govern cross-border movements and transactions. They specifically used the term 'negotiating the border' to highlight the importance of overcoming these border obstacles. This study takes the human interaction processes that occur at the border as part of the negotiation process and relate these to the situation and circumstances in Zimbabwe.

4.4.1 Political context of migration from Zimbabwe

This section gives an overview of the scope and nature of patterns of violence in Zimbabwe by paying special attention to such variables as party politics, race, and ethnicity. Critical events to be discussed include the 1983-87 Gukurahundi violence in Matabeleland and the Midlands province, the 1985 electoral violence targeting the opposition party, 1990 electoral violence targeting opposition party supporters, and the post-2000 increased militarization of the state and electoral violence.

The surge in migration into South Africa, which is part of what has been termed the 'exodus' by Crush and Tevera (2010), has been associated with the changing political context after 2000. For many, therefore, the fundamental cause of large-scale migration from Zimbabwe is often attributed to political instability, which spawned social and economic instability, creating a combination of factors that destroyed people's livelihoods. As one informant reasoned:

The crisis of migration in Zimbabwe has political roots. Political instability has a spiralling effect and can affect other aspects of life – from the economy to the social. In Zimbabwe, it all begins with the politics and then spills down to the social. Zimbabwe has been politically unstable since independence. While this also induced a migration crisis, it was less documented, because it only affected a section of the population, which were the minority. The political crisis of the late 1990s and 2000s is well known because it affected a broad section of society. Otherwise, the political crisis has a long history and political crisis-induced migration has a long history.

(Int. Mafufu Mafu, 2020).

From the interview, it becomes clear that while political violence is now endemic in Zimbabwe's political landscape, it has a long history. Some people associate the political crisis, which was often characterized by violence, to the desire for monopolistic political power by the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). For instance, Zimbabwe's transition into independence was characterized by ethnic tensions that culminated in the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s that saw the death of up to 20 000 people (CCJP and LRF, 1990). What has become known as the Matabeleland conflict has been equated by many, to a genocide (Mpofu, 2019; Rwafa, 2012; Sibanda, 2021; Vambe, 2012).

While the then President later referred to the atrocities as a moment of madness (Rwafa, 2012), the resultant consequences were telling for a region that housed a minority. While others identify mass displacement as one of the effects of the conflict, Thebe (2013) captured this in terms of disengagement, with people feeling alienated from the state and withdrawing from the state's confines. Such disengagement was prominent in regions most affected by the conflict, like Kezi, Plumtree, and Tsholotsho, where people sought belonging elsewhere (Thebe, 2013).

The conflict and its timing are important in understanding responses by certain sections of citizens in a country that was emerging from the protracted war of independence (Chitiyo, 2009). However, the disengagement was telling, for some of these regions also disengaged from the country's economy, becoming enclaves of economies within Zimbabwe, where goods consumed were all from South Africa or Botswana (Mlambo, 2010). Mlambo (2010) further talks of some communities using the Pula and Rand currencies as a means of exchange, well before Zimbabwe adopted the multi-currency system.

The disengagement of a minority from the state may seem unimportant, but it is significant for our understanding of the flow of goods and people. As more people from these regions left Zimbabwe for South Africa, it created opportunities for even more people to migrate since there were people to receive and host them in South Africa. However, more importantly, it also meant that the economy of the people was outside the country's borders. This was further exacerbated by drought in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which created pressure for migrants to provide for families back home. The pressure generated increased demand for moving remittances, leading to the development of *Omalayisha* as a channel for cross-border remittances (Thebe and Mutyatyu, 2017; Thebe, 2011, 2015).

While the political violence in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces was the precursor for cross-border flights, it was the subsequent retributions that followed that forced many to disengage from the state. People talked of perceived neglect of the region by the government as a form of punishment. In his study of the water crisis in Bulawayo, Musemwa (2006) captured the state's actions as 'disciplining a dissident city'. The discipline alienated people from the region, who sought belonging in South Africa, where early migrants acted as useful social contacts. Thebe (2013) talked of university students from the region, leaving the graduation podium with bags packed, for the journey south. These incidents certainly contributed to the increase in migration and increased migration contributed to the increase in the movement of remittances as the South African economy substituted the Zimbabwean economy.

One of the most publicized post-independence conduct of the government of Zimbabwe that also contributed to outmigration was the demolition of urban settlements in 2005 under an operation code-named Murambatsvina, which means 'drive out the rubbish or clean out the dirt' (Bracking 2005; Potts, 2006; Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Chari, 2008; Mlambo, 2008; Fontein, 2009). Murambatsvina can also be translated to mean, refusal (by the government) to tolerate dirty living conditions for the people. The major objective for the clean-up operation according to the government was to destroy illegal urban structures that foster criminal activities and stemming the black-market trade in foreign currency (Bracking 2005; Potts 2006; Masunungure 2007; Chari 2008).

In the July 2005 report produced by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, and other sources concurred that over 700 000 people were made homeless by the operation (Tibaijuka, 2005). It further spells that the operation took a heavy toll on vulnerable groups, such as widows, orphans, female and child-headed households, the elderly, and those people living with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (Ibid.). It is reported that the operation displaced more than 80 000 people infected with HIV/AIDS and many of these were left without access to antiretroviral (ARVs) pills (Poloch 2010). The operation, therefore, impacted negatively on the unemployed urban inhabitants who depended on the effective and efficient operation of the non-formal sector. This included the backyard industry workers in high-density suburbs like Glen View, Budiriro, Warren Park, Highfields, and Chitungwiza,) among other areas in the case of Harare (Tibaijuka 2005; Fontein 2009).

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) and Chandler (2004) broaden the definition of human security to include securing of people, their physical safety, their economic well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Hence, many Zimbabweans resorted to migrating to South Africa for safety, economic wellbeing, and to restore their dignity (Ndawana, 2020).

Despite the ethnic and political dimension of the Zimbabwean violence, there is also an electoral explanation to it. It was through the conduct of democratic elections that Zimbabwe attained the black majority rule, and this has been sustained from 1980 to the present. While elections are the pathway towards democratic consolidation, Matlosa (2011) posits that what matters most is integrity and credibility in the conduct of elections. Diamond (2008) further describes elections as a "double-edged sword" in the sense that they can be both a source of stability and instability. Democracy is indeed only possible through elections, but elections can be conducted in situations where democracy is highly constrained. Matlosa (2011) describes this as the "fallacy of electoralism." Diamond (2008) also argues that what matters is not the quantity of elections or the

number of times a country has held elections but the quality of those elections, that is, how free and fair those elections are.

A critical analysis of pre-and post-electoral violence in Zimbabwe augurs well with Matlosa's and Diamond's explanations. The regularity of elections in Zimbabwe has failed to translate into peace. A culture of violence has always been part of Zimbabwe's electoral politics. In order to understand the scope and nature of electoral violence in the post-2000 dispensation, it is vital to understand the agents, command structures, and the victims. What makes the post-2000 political violence unique is the expansive role of the military sector in matters of governance (Murithi and Mawadza 2011). As a result of the waning support, the Mugabe regime appointed former liberation war commanders into key security services positions. The military involvement in politics prevented ZANU-PF from acknowledging political diversity and from viewing the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as an equal player in politics.

This political-military nexus created some form of patronage where the state security services are at the service of the ZANU-PF party. (Bretton and Masunungure 2008; Chitiyo 2009). Masunungure (2011) adds that this has also led to party-state duality where there is a thin line between the state and political parties. Since the year 2000, state security forces have shaped the strategic direction of the country. That is why Masunungure (2011) euphemistically describes the military as "politicians in uniform."

The violent conduct in Zimbabwe's electoral system has seen the police, army, and intelligence taking the commanding political roles while the war veterans and the National Youth Services (NYS) have been co-opted as instruments of violence. State monopoly of violence through the security structures has been premised on the revival of the liberation war rhetoric, where ZANU-PF officials claim that their actions are informed by the need to preserve the values of the liberation struggle (Chitiyo, 2009). Violence has become an instrument for electioneering and people are coerced into voting for ZANU-PF for personal safety and security (Chitiyo, 2009).

Political repression took many forms, ranging from the murder of opponents to rape, mutilation, violence, repression, and intimidation (Bond & Manyanya, 2003). The early political violence is

captured in a report by the CCJP and LRF. All these tactics aimed to suppress opposing views (Maroleng, 2008). The breakdown in the rule of law means that there is no recourse to justice even when perpetrators are known (Hammar, 2008). Political oppression and intimidation are due to the ruling party's (ZANU PF) refusal to accept political pluralism. After decades of being the only dominant political party in the country, the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 was seen as a major challenge to the status quo (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010).

The tipping point was in 2000 when the MDC-led anti-constitution campaign caused the defeat of the ruling party in a national referendum on a new constitution. It was the first such political upset for the ruling party in twenty years. Inevitably, the party leadership was incensed by the opposition party. So, in order to prevent the opposition party from national victory evidenced by the MDC's strong showing in the June 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU PF resorted to intimidation and violence against political opponents and their supporters (Bond and Manyanya, 2003).

Since then, with each subsequent election (in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2008) political violence has become entrenched in the ruling party. When the urban electorate overwhelmingly rejected the draft constitution and subsequently voted out ZANU PF in urban local government elections in June 2002, the seeds of conflict between the ruling party and the opposition party were sown. Until 2002, the ruling party had commanded a majority in national and local government elections. The political elite refused to accept democratic political pluralism. The people were no longer perceived as a political asset but as an electoral risk (Kamete, 2002). Consequently, the government unleashed ZANU PF militia against them.

Predominantly the unstable political situation in Zimbabwe since 2000 caused people to migrate (Bloch, 2006). The largest number of migrants to date fled the country following the harmonized presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections in 2008. The election results were disputed. Although the president and his party lost the elections, he did not leave power, claiming that the opposition party had less than 51% of votes as required by the constitution. Consequently, a presidential run-off was undertaken as per the requirements of the constitution. ZANU PF ran a violent election campaign backed by the army, war veterans, and brutal youths that targeted

opposition supporters, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested, forced into hiding, maimed, or killed (Marowa, 2009).

Due to this, the opposition party was forced to pull out of the presidential runoff in June 2008, citing country-wide violence and intimidation of their supporters. The political polarisation and repression that followed caused many people to migrate to South Africa and other countries fleeing from the violence. Political motivations for the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa are popular as many migrants moved to South Africa to seek asylum and had political exile (Makumbe, 2009). An earlier study of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg found that political motivations peaked in the years from 2002 to 2008(Mazarire, 2013).

Zimbabwe's human rights situation continued to decline in 2020. Unidentified assailants, suspected to be state security agents, abducted and tortured more than 70 critics of the government during 2020 (U.S. Embassy Zimbabwe,2021) .Security forces also continued to commit arbitrary arrests, violent assaults, abductions, torture and other abuses against opposition politicians, dissidents and activists. In July 2020, police arrested prominent journalist Hopewell Chin'ono and Transform Zimbabwe Party leader Jacob Ngarivhume after they called for nationwide anti-corruption protests. The police violently dispersed protests in July, wherein 16 protesters were injured and a further 60 were arrested (World Report, 2020).

The current government's administration has so far failed to implement recommendations of the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry, established to investigate widespread violence in the aftermath of the August 2018 elections. The commission presented its report to President Mnangagwa in December 2018, and found that six people had died and 35 others were injured because of actions by state security forces. (Farley, 2019) It recommended that perpetrators be held accountable and that compensation be paid to families of the deceased and those who lost property. Therefore, political instability still plays a role in motivating migration.

4.4.2. Socio-economic context to migration from Zimbabwe.

For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline that has resulted in an inflation rate of about 231 million per cent and an unemployment rate of over 90 per cent (Parsons,

2007). Past research has concluded that the economic decline of Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and the failure of fiscal policies to control the budget deficit. High inflation in Zimbabwe has been fuelled by a rapidly growing money supply reflecting growing fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits. Quasi-fiscal losses have increased greatly since 2004, due to huge foreign exchange subsidies to public enterprises and government, price supports to exporters (to compensate them partially for the highly overvalued exchange rate), and interest payments on an open market operation (Robertson, 2008).

In August 2006, Zimbabwe's annual inflation rose above 1,000 per cent, dramatizing the severity of its economic crisis (Hanke, 2008). Redenominated notes were issued in August so that 1,000 old Zimbabwean dollars become one new dollar. The annual inflation rate, already the highest in the world, raced to 1,729.9 per cent in February 2007 from 1,593.6 per cent the previous month. The controls led to hoarding of goods, however, and even longer lines for basic goods. Manufacturers were forced to close businesses as they were incurring huge losses (Bond and Manyanya, 2009).

Inability to access money in the banks due to hyperinflation and shortage of banknotes made life difficult for ordinary people. Such hyperinflation reduced economic competitiveness, forcing traders to demand payment for goods and services in foreign currency. Poverty and deprivation caused families to adopt migration as a survival strategy. During the economic crisis, remittances became the primary source of income for most households (Tevera and Zinyama 2002; Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006).

At independence in 1980, the incoming government under Robert Mugabe inherited a thriving and diversified economy underpinned by three key economic pillars of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Zimbabwe was the most industrialized country in sub-Saharan Africa except for South Africa and was a major exporter of manufactured products to its neighbours (World Bank, 2002). By 2015, however, the country's industrial sector had all collapsed following years of economic problems that resulted in serious deindustrialization as factories closed and relocated to neighbouring countries and thousands of workers were thrown out of employment. By the middle of 2015, Zimbabwe had become a nation of vendors, with an estimated 90 per cent of its population

unemployed and struggling to make out a living in the mushrooming informal economy (Zimbabwe Independent, 19 October 2015).

Therefore, due to retrenchments caused by the closure of industries many Zimbabweans lost their jobs, the hyper-inflation resulted in the shortage of basic goods as shop owners could not afford to restock because of the price control initiative brought by the government. There was a decline in living conditions and many citizens could not afford even to buy bread. Therefore, resorted to migrating to South Africa illegally or legally to find employment and better living conditions. Due to limited resources, the government reduced expenditure on health, education, housing, and other public services. Thus, after 2000 service delivery systems became completely dysfunctional or collapsed. Hospitals closed due to a lack of drugs, medical, and support staff (Tralac, 2014).

Before the COVID–19 pandemic, Zimbabwe's economy was already in recession, contracting by 6.0% in 2019. Output fell because of economic instability and the removal of subsidies on maize meal, fuel, and electricity prices; suppressed foreign exchange earnings; and excessive money creation. The onset of the COVID–19 pandemic and continued drought led to 10% contraction in real GDP in 2020. Inflation soared, averaging 622.8% in 2020, up from 226.9% in 2019 (African Development Bank, 2020).

Foreign exchange reforms were done in June 2020, which dampened an inflation that raged an annual rate of 838% in July. Fiscal and current account deficits also recovered after July, but both deteriorated for the year as a whole. The budget deficit rose from 2.7% in 2019 to 2.9% in 2020, while the current account went from a surplus of 1.1% of GDP in 2019 to a deficit of 1.9% in 2020. (African development bank, 2020). According to African development bank, (2020).The exchange rate depreciated ZWL2.5 in February 2019 and stabilizing around ZWL82 to the US dollar in December 2020. Poverty stood at 70.5% in 2019 while unemployment remained high at over 21%. The banking system is stable. Banks have some room to increase credit. The loan-to-deposit ratio was 38.8% in 2020 against a benchmark of 70%. Non-performing loans are at 3.23%, well under the regulatory benchmark of 5%. The capital adequacy ratio is more than three times the regulatory requirement of 12%. (World Bank, 2020)

The lack of basic services in urban areas caused a serious cholera epidemic in 2008 which killed 4 000 people out of the 100 000 infected with the disease (United Nations, 2009). Urban local authorities attributed the cholera outbreak to the inability to purchase water treatment chemicals due to a lack of foreign currency. The problem was compounded by power shortages, which reduced water-pumping capacity (Makina, 2010). There were also severe food shortages throughout the country (Simpson, 2008). Altogether 7.5 million people were food insecure and depended on donor aid (Zimbabwe Red Cross, 2009). This made Zimbabwe the only country in the world with over half of the country's population reliant on food aid. A combination of a worthless currency, lack of foreign currency, and food shortages pushed people to migrate (IOM, 2008).

On account of HIV/AIDS and poor standards of living of the people, life expectancy fell from 61 years in 1992 to 43 years after 2000 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos,2010). The proportion of the population living below the poverty line rose from 57% in 1995 to 69% in 2002 and 80% in 2005. Thus, rising poverty levels and limited livelihood opportunities pressured many people to migrate (Betts and Kaytaz, 2009). High levels of unemployment and low wages left people with limited options for survival, hence the adoption of migration to diversify survival strategies. By 2000 Zimbabweans had become the largest group of people seeking asylum in foreign countries (Bloch, 2005). The number of asylum applications rose from 230 in 1999 to 7 655 in 2002 (IOM, 2005).
Following a decade of positive progress in human capital indicators, the Covid pandemic has led to some deterioration in outcomes. Immediately after the onset of the pandemic, less than 30% of school-going children in rural areas engaged in education and learning compared with 70% for urban children. With the easing of lockdown and reopening of schools, most children are attending school. However, the pandemic continued to keep some children out of school, with teacher absenteeism being the primary reason (Zimstat, Rapid PICES phone surveys July 2020 and December 2020-March 2021). Issues including doctor strikes, staff attrition particularly nurses, and inadequate quantities and slow access to personal protective equipment challenge the health system. Reduced frequency and timing of antenatal care visits may cause further deterioration in maternal and infant mortality. Households' loss of access to basic social services and deepening of negative coping strategies risks undermining Zimbabwe's relatively high human capital and the pace and inclusivity of economic growth (Tswanya, 2020).

The decision to engage in illicit cross-border trading has, therefore, become a sensible one for the poor in search of better livelihood opportunities. It became increasingly apparent that a lot of people were engaging in informal trade as they sought an alternative means of attaining a livelihood. Thus, migration and a host of informal activities offered a potential escape route from poverty. Migration to neighbouring countries, especially South Africa, meant that the nation's borders became hives of activity as goods were smuggled goods for either household consumption or resale (Duri and Marongwe, 2017). Zimbabweans migrated to search for greener pastures. Johannesburg (Sibanda and Sibanda, 2014).

4.5. Movement of Goods and People between South Africa and Zimbabwe

The economic hardships that prevail on the Zimbabwean side of the border have pushed many into moving goods across the border to find alternative sources of income. When they return to Zimbabwe, these migrants bring back a wide variety of items, including goods that were once commonly found in many Zimbabwean households such as maize meal, soap, and sugar, and cooking oil. All these items were either impossible to find in Zimbabwe due to the economic meltdown or prices were too prohibitive for many people. Those with some money, particularly permanent workers, would bring back clothes, electronic equipment, bicycles, household items, automobile parts, and so forth. They would also bring the South African Rand currency to convert into Zimbabwean dollars at the black-market rate to give to dependants, buy food and clothes and pay school fees.

4.5.1 Methods of movements of goods and people into South Africa

The movement of people into South Africa, cross-border trading, and the crisis in Zimbabwe have led to a seamless flow of people and goods into and out of South Africa. As literature has shown, this is not new and has a long pedigree. Zinyama (2002) amply captured the situation in his argument that early migration from Zimbabwe was time-specific and most migrants often returned home. Muzvidziwa (1998, 2003) also captured this trend of cross-border migrants that used cross-

border migration as a survival strategy. What was not discussed by these studies was the methods these migrants used to move between borders. Thebe (2011, 2015, 2017), Thebe and Mutyatyu (2017), Maombera and Thebe (2019) have paid particular attention to the process of movements between borders and the channels utilized by migrants.

Figure 4: Omalayisha truck en -route to Beitbridge Border Post

Source: https://www.thestandard.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Omalayitsha.jpg

Omalayisha and the cross-border bus crew have provided the channel for moving remittances and people (Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Thebe, 2011). While *Omalayisha* have provided an informal service, the cross-border bus service provides both a formal and semi-formal service (Maombera and Thebe, 2019). These have increased with the increases in migration and now provide services across the country. The *Omalayisha* system has also grown from an informal erratic service to a business (Thebe and Mutyatyu, 2017; Thebe, 2015). *Omalayisha* operate a unique system that is driven by demand and has no set timetables and schedules. There are also no set prices for the goods, which are charged by determining the weight through weighing by hand; in Maphosa (2005)'s words '*bayayizwa*' meaning they lift the goods to feel its weight.

They are also recognizable by overloading and characteristic huge trailers that they pull, where they derived their name – always seen with a cargo (Muzondidya, 2010). These became central to the movement of goods at a time when the Zimbabwean economy was characterized by a severe shortage of basic commodities (Thebe, 2011). The bus service, which can be divided into two, the formal bus service offered by companies like Grey Hound, InterCity, and Inter Cape, which operate a booking system and is more formalized, and the other Zimbabwean buses that do not operate a booking system.

These are also characterized by overloading and have been associated with people smuggling, like *Omalayisha* (Maombera and Thebe, 2019). While omalayisha have been associated with people smuggling, they often operate in cohort with expert people smugglers called *Izimpisi*. According to Irish (2008), the '*maguma-guma'* are of Zimbabwean origin and comprise mainly of young men who reside predominantly on the Zimbabwean side of the border but move easily between the two countries and are involved in a variety of clandestine and criminal activities ranging from petty theft to facilitating the illegal crossing of people and goods through the border post. Their targeted clientele are people intending to cross to the other side of the border without proper travelling documents (Maphosa, 2005).

These syndicates have large spheres of influence that stretch as far as the points of origin of the passengers in Harare, Bulawayo, or Johannesburg (Thebe 2011). It has become the norm to find smugglers overtly operating at Harare's Road Port Bus Terminus or Johannesburg's Park Station uttering the following statement, "Those without requisite travel documents do not worry; we are here to serve you" (Muzondidya, 2008). By expanding the smuggling syndicates' influence, the Zimbabwe-South Africa borderland has become highly elastic or fluid as it shifts its margins or spheres of influence to points of departure in the capitals of Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The discussion above alludes to the channels of moving goods and people. While both *Omalayisha* and the cross-border bus service use both formal and informal options, this study focuses on the clandestine ways of moving goods and people across the border. These channels will be discussed in terms of smart and dirty entry methods.

4.5.1.1. Smart entry method

Other forms of border jumping illegal immigrants, cross-border traders, dealers, or criminals also independently gain entry to and from South Africa, especially through smart entry techniques. One of the most common methods involves using fake, forged, stolen, expired, or deceased persons' travel documents or passports. In most cases, they slip some cash in-between the passport's pages to bribe the border authorities (Klotz, 2013). This is what Thebe (2011) terms the payment of a 'cool drink fee'. However, this is not only confined to the border post but is a general language of securing one's freedom from law enforcement officials. This fee is paid throughout the journey, and as Maombera and Thebe (2019) noted, the fee paid for transportation by migrants is inclusive of this fee. The ability to pay this fee also determines the use of this method, and migrants prefer this method because it is relatively safe (Maombera and Thebe, 2019; Thebe, 2011).

Other popular conduits of smart entry used by border jumpers are bus and haulage truck drivers, many of whom have efficient and blossoming relationships with customs and immigration officials at both sides border post. The study learned that drivers would notify the authorities in advance of their illegal clients or passengers some of whom may be hiding under seats or containers in the buses or trucks whilst the border checks or scans occur. The authorities then pay a blind eye and allow the cargo to pass. According to one of the truck drivers:

> *This is very expensive because there are many people involved. Virtually every department at the border post is represented and has a share of the rewards. These networks range from the entry gate to the exit gate. In Zimbabwe, it also involves the CIDs and the military personnel, now stationed at the border post.*

(Int., Mkoma Tadiwa, Pretoria, 2010).

Figure 5: Illegal Zimbabwean migrants being deported

Source:https://www.thesouthafrican.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/482f2c24-zimbabweans.jpg

In addition, the Zimbabwe-South Africa borderland is so expansive that many Zimbabwean ethnic communities who live along the border engage in what Lubkeman (2006) terms commuter migration as farmworkers engage in daily commute across the Limpopo River for work in South African farms found along the river (see also Rutherford and Addison, 2007). The South African Limpopo Province is an agricultural province full of farms that grow tomatoes, fruits, flowers, and tobacco. These farms heavily rely on the cheap labour from illegal migrant Zimbabweans many of whom live within the borderland.

The borderland comprises of the Venda ethnic tribe, which has close ties with the Venda of South Africa. Many of these cannot use the official Beitbridge Border Post for entry due to the long distance. They also treat the borderland as what Tornimbeni (2001) terms as a transnational environment without borders where interconnections and labour movements can be made without restrictions. As such, the border is non-existent and they, thus, simply commute on foot to the farms using illegal crossing points scattered along the Limpopo River. This is a complex process for South African authorities because of the cultural relationships between the two communities. Some have close familial ties and must travel for cultural and other ceremonies. Zimbabweans that

are not Venda often exploit this situation to also move between the two borders without the risk of being apprehended (Rutherford and Addison, 2007).

4.5.1.2. The use of dirty entry methods

As Thebe (2011), Maombera, and Thebe (2019) have argued, while the narrative on cross-border movements has centred on informal entry points, the smart entry methods appear to be popular among migrants. They are often prepared to pay and often pay for this 'executive' way of immigrating or emigrating. However, for many migrants, the smart methods are not accessible, mainly due to lack of money (Solomon, 2000). They most use undesignated entry points, wadding through the river and the fence as seen in Fig. 4.6.

Figure 6: Illegal migrant entering South Africa through a fence

Source: https://c8.alamy.com/comp/2D1T5AR/refugees-illegally-cross-the-beit-bridge-border-from-zimbabwe-into-south-africa-july-21-2007-reuterssiphiwe-sibeko-south-africa-2D1T5AR.jpg

While some illegal migrants return to Zimbabwe through 'dirty entry' methods, others prefer getting deported back into Zimbabwe as shown in Fig. 4.4. Many have exploited South Africa's deportation policies for an easy return to Zimbabwe, especially in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic violence and the growing fear of its renewal in the aftermath of the 2010 FIFA World Cup

(Steenkamp, 2009). Therefore, those without travel documents simply hand themselves to immigration officials at the border and get deported. Hence, deportation ensures a hustle-free and formalized crossing of the border (Netsianda, 2008). This is opposed to the expensive and risky of illegal border jumping across the Limpopo River. Consequently, many illegal Zimbabwean migrants are deported every year (Landau, Ramjathan and Singh, 2005).

For example, the principal immigration officer at Beitbridge Border Post, Dennis Chitsaka, reported that in 2008, more than 200 000 illegal Zimbabwean migrants were deported from South Africa through the Beitbridge Border Post. Muleya (2002) concurred with Chitsaka in his observation that South Africa deports an average of about 500 illegal immigrants daily through Beitbridge Border Post with the figure increasing to more than 2000 on Thursdays and Fridays when the biggest holding camp, Lindela Repatriation Centre, outside Johannesburg in Gauteng, would have been cleared for new arrivals.

4.5.2. Migration and Social Networks

Zimbabwean migrants perceived social networks as playing an extremely important role in assisting them to settle in South Africa and to find work there. However, social networks may also discourage migration if negative information about the possible destination is communicated to prospective migrants by migrants already working away from home. Cross et al., (2009) indicate that different occupational classes tend to use different types of networks, for example, high occupational groups relying more on colleagues and organizations, while unskilled workers rely more on kin-based networks. These networks are said to have functions such as stimulating migration, facilitating migration, discouraging migration, and channelling migration. The above analysis can be elucidated by the forms of migration mentioned below:

4.5.2.1. Stimulating migration

The fact that one migrant seems successful when returning home stimulates the desire for non-migrants to migrate (Crush, Chikanda, and Tawodzera, 2012). At the end of the year or during the Christmas period, Zimbabweans cross the border with vehicles full of goods bought in South Africa, and that gives the impression that those in South Africa are successful (Maphosa, 2010).

These movements took place amid the tightening of restrictions on Zimbabwean movements. Some people who remained in Zimbabwe became the backbone, of social networks within the country, and there can be little doubt that the availability of these intensified migrant inflows in the 1990s (Crush andTevera, 2010).

4.5.2.2. Facilitating migration

Networks provide information about accommodation and job opportunities in destination areas (Sibanda, 2010). Networks make it easy for poor people to migrate because they offer cash, loans, and gifts to enable migrants to pay for traveling to destination areas. Those who have been in the country before, provide money to bribe officials and for agents to smuggle illegal immigrants across borders. Social networks also provide emotional support, friendship, and opportunities to help reduce the psychological impact of migration (Sibanda, 2010). If they are concentrated in one area, they create a cultural milieu like that they have at the place of origin.

Other migrants also entered the country illegally but had relatives in South Africa, and these relatives facilitated the migration process by entering either one of the two types of contracts advance- payment or pay upon delivery (pay forward) with cross-border smugglers (*Omalayisha*) who in turn bribed state officials to enter the country (Solomon,2003). Other migrants, also those with networks in South Africa, entered the country legally but over-stayed (Zinyama, 2002).

4.5.2.3. Channelling migration

The flow of migration can be directed to certain destination areas; hence, migrants from a particular area of origin tend to cluster in specific neighbourhoods. Networks also help in channelling migrants into occupations or companies in the area of destination. According to McDonald et al. (1999) and Solomon (1996), shared history, culture, and kinship ties are responsible for tying people across borders. They share social identities, language, and even political solidarity despite the borders. Most undocumented migrants have contacts in the destination area (Cross et al., 2006; Harris, 2001; Maharaj, 2004; Solomon, 1996; McDonald et al., 2000; McDonald et al., 1998). This was confirmed by a study undertaken by Klopper (2006) on the Southern Mozambique and South

African borders where social networks were seen to play a role in the migration of illegal immigrants.

4.6. Chapter Summary

The complexity of Zimbabwean migration is less acknowledged, and this has, in turn, contributed to the lack of appreciation of the complexity of clandestine cross-border dynamics. Clandestine cross-border dynamics are mediated by a range of issues including the situation in Zimbabwe that contributed to migration, complex migration trends, and the routes through which cross-border movements take place. This chapter provides a context for our understanding of these clandestine cross-border dynamics, particularly the significance of social networks.

It provided an analysis of the complexity of migration trends, arguing that contrary to popular narratives of permanence, Zimbabwean migrants have always maintained strong contacts and relationships with people in Zimbabwe. They have, thus, travelled regularly to Zimbabwe and sent remittances. These cross-border dynamics require strong social networking. It also discussed the root causes of migration, emphasizing the resultant disengagement from the state by regions that were neglected and seeming punished for being dissident, which led to the development of foreign economic enclaves, where goods consumed came across the border. It also emphasized the deteriorating economic and political situation, which forced people to rely on foreign markets. Last, it discussed the various channels of cross-border movement. It highlighted the significance of smart and dirty entry methods, which demand a system of networking. The chapter, thus, identified social networking as a central aspect of Zimbabwean migration.

CHAPTER FIVE - COMPLEX INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

5.1. Introduction

In Chapter Four, the historical development of the migration of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa was discussed. The chapter attempted to situate the Zimbabwean migration crisis to the Zimbabwean economic crisis of the 1990s and 2000s. By so doing, the chapter identified Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa as economic migrants, a position that South Africa has long maintained. This then will mean that these migrants need to utilize the border, either to move remittances or for their movements. As highlighted in Chapter Four, Zimbabwean migrants have maintained relationships with kin in Zimbabwe through visits and remittances. To do this, they utilize the South Africa/Zimbabwe, Beitbridge Border Post. These cross-border movements do not need to be legal, and therefore negotiations become necessary to access the border.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this complex process of negotiating the border, one that was vividly covered by Maombera and Thebe in their 2019 study and. As highlighted in Chapter Four, Zimbabwean migrants have maintained relationships with kin in Zimbabwe through visits and remittances which is also supported by Sibanda (2014) and to do this, they utilize the border.

As shown, these cross-border movements do not need to be legal, and negotiations become necessary to access the border. It is a discussion of dynamics in human interaction in the informal movement of goods and people across the South Africa/Zimbabwe Border Post. The chapter focuses on the social networks involved in the process and the role that they play in facilitating smooth cross-border movements, despite the barriers imposed by the regulations. The section after this is a discussion of these networks as groups of actors that play different roles. This is followed by a section that shows how social networks work to access the border even during lockdown when all land borders are closed.

5.2. Social Networks Involved in Informal Cross-Border Movements of Goods and People

The informal cross-border movement of goods and people either from South Africa and Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe to South Africa involves a complex network of actors that perform different responsibilities and are geographically dispersed. Some of these are in Zimbabwe, others at the border post, while others are in South Africa. Some of these actors operate within the border and have official positions in the South African and Zimbabwean civil service. While there are many groups or individuals involved, in this section I only attempt a brief caricature of a few that play prominent roles in what Maombera and Thebe (2019) define as negotiating the border. These social actors will include migrants themselves, transporters (as part of the smuggling syndicate), facilitators (*Izimpisi* of the Limpopo Valley), and border officials.

5.2.1. Migrants or people at home in Zimbabwe

The first category in the cross-border movement of people and goods between South Africa and Zimbabwe is made up of the migrants in South Africa who want to travel back to Zimbabwe or to send remittances, and people back home, seeking to travel to South Africa or to be brought goods from South Africa. As studies have shown, most Zimbabweans in South Africa are economic migrants and came to South Africa to work for themselves and their families. While some brought their immediate families, they still have close ties in Zimbabwe and support extended families back home in Zimbabwe. Some indicated that they have their own homes, and have employed people to look after them, while they seek better livelihoods in South Africa. In line with the findings by Maombera and Thebe (2019), some migrants have left children at home, which they support and sometimes visit, and at times these children visit South Africa.

These migrants, therefore, utilize the border regularly to achieve these responsibilities to the people at home. Several migrants indicated that they send remittances home once a month and travel back home once yearly. As indicated by Muzondidya (2008) most of these migrants are in South Africa illegally and cannot travel freely into and out of South Africa. To do this, they have a range of intermediaries, which require strong relationships. In his studies in 2011 and 2015, Thebe indicated that migrants sending remittances home or going for a visit utilize the services of *Omalayisha*, a cross-border transport system that provides door-to-door convenience (Thebe,

2011, 2015). In their study Maombera and Thebe (2011), brought in a second channel that women used to transport goods and children, the cross-border bus service. These have increased with the increase in migration and the economic crisis in Zimbabwe.

> *Migrants in need of services approach these cross-border transportation services for a fee. However, besides the fee paid, interpersonal relations are involved since the sending of goods, unlike the transportation of passengers, has been an informal arrangement (even in the bus service). This has changed with increased demand for transportation. However, one needs to know a member of the bus crew to be able to send unaccompanied goods, and as the study came to know 'the fee included the bribe paid to customs officials at the border post.*

(Int. Ncube, 2020).

To send goods through *Omalayisha*, migrants needed strong relationships with cross-border transporters, for *Omalayisha* were not a published transport service. As Thebe (2011) argued, they started as an informal service where people going home will take goods for neighbours and friends, and even as they developed, the service was mainly confined to people known to the *Omalayisha*, including friends, neighbours, family, and referrals. The process of referrals cannot be overemphasized since the whole relationship is based on trust, and migrants only utilize the services of *Omalayisha* that they know and trust. These, according to one of the migrants are:

> *People that do deliveries are key social contacts. Delivery is important in the context of economic crisis and the need for goods. We send goods that people need and sometimes they cannot do without them, and you expect Omalayisha to deliver them without delay. Some fail to deliver. In some cases, they misplace deliveries, sometimes they lose them, or they simply give them to their relatives. To avoid this from happening, you chose your Omalayisha with great care. Some come with good reputations, some are known for bad habits. You do not go for any Omalayisha you come across. Colleagues, relatives, and other migrants know people, and some use Omalayisha, so they know the most reliable ones. So, before you send goods, you ask around.*

(Int. Marvis, 2020).

Maphosa (2010), also emphasized the issue of trust in the process of moving goods to migrant-sending communities, arguing that "Not surprising, therefore, conflicts were slighter in rural communities, where transporters were members of the community and members of a wider kin system". For migrants, networks within the migrant community and *Omalayisha* become even more important because of the issue of pricing. There is always a search for the most affordable *Omalayisha*. *Omalayisha* tend to charge higher fares because they pay a lot of bribes along the way. So, migrants that need to send goods and do not have their own regular *Omalayisha,* often do their homework before opting for an *Omalayisha*. This is particularly important when they are sending money, or they are traveling. They need *Omalayisha*, who would negotiate a safe passage of the goods at the border.

Traveling migrants prefer to utilize the services of *Omalayisha* who are considered experts at negotiating the border and do not risk passengers' safety by using informal points. Thebe (2011) also emphasized the ability to negotiate the border as key in safe border passage. On the other hand, people at home utilize the services of *Omalayisha* and bus service. Would-be migrants often seek the services of *Omalayisha* to facilitate their movements to South Africa. This also requires certain relationships between the migrant and *Omalayisha*, and someone in Johannesburg. As Thebe (2011) noted that there is a close networking system between *Omalayisha*, people in rural areas, and migrants in South Africa.

Due to the complexity of the kinship system in rural communities, the transporter, the clients, and the households usually have a close relationship (Menjivar, 1995). It was in the context of these complex relationships that out-migration increased with the in-flow of goods. On their outward journey from Zimbabwe, transporters would assist kin into South Africa, and such assistance was also extended to relatives of colleagues in South Africa at a nominal fee. Such assistance was confined to kin and relatives of acquaintances, and at their request. Towards the turn of the millennium, there was increased demand for assistance into South Africa by relatives, and transporters were overwhelmed by requests for human exportation from clients and kin (Masengwe and Machingura, 2012).

People prefer *Omalayisha* that have a reputation for safe delivery of their cargo. More importantly, some of these transactions are pay-forward arrangements, and these can only be made if they would-be migrant and *Omalayisha* know each other and there is trust.

5.2.2. Cross-border transporters

Key players in the process of negotiation of the border for the safe passage of goods and people are cross-border transporters. These have been playing a crucial role in cross-border movements since the 1990s. The number of actors has increased in recent times and new entrants including the daily cross-border passenger service and long-distance haulage tracks have been added to the network. These have become agents of smuggling goods and people between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The movement of cargo is made simple if migrants are prepared to pay, as these would move anything across the border at a price (Thebe, 2011). The entry of haulage trucks has further complicated an already complicated interpersonal process, where successful cross-border movements are highly subordinated to a network of relationships along the route from Johannesburg or Zimbabwe.

5.2.3. *Omalayisha*

By far, the most prominent of cross-border transporters that are part of the social network in the cross-border movement of goods and people are *Omalayisha.* These are transporters that emerged as a response by migrants to the demand for the transportation of remittances in the 1980s, derive their name from the Ndebele term '*ukulayisha',* which refers to 'transporting' (Source). However, there is more to the name than just transportation as Thebe (2011) highlighted:

> *In everyday usage, it has been used in different contexts to refer to different entities, including the channel of remittances, the operator(s), and the vehicle(s). However, the label needs to be understood within the broader operational framework of the channel - overloading, human smuggling, and always with some form of cargo.*

These are informal South African-based cross-border transport operators that transport goods and people on behalf of migrants to all parts of Zimbabwe, including remote regions of the country. They are popular for illegal cross-border activities including people smuggling, which is by far the most lucrative of their business, and other contrabands on behalf of their clients. These are known for their social networks, which consist of many people who mastermind the cross-border smuggling of cargo, bribing, and transportation of the clients. These networks are spread throughout the N1 Motorway route and range from traffic officials, police officers to ordinary cross-border facilitators (Izimpisi) at the border post and Beitbridge Town. The study heard how:

> *They are well networked and very knowledgeable of the routes, timing, and corrupt state authorities within the borderlands. They also work in cahoots with bus and haulage truck drivers as well as customs and immigration officials. More importantly, they are highly cunning and tactful, and able to negotiate themselves out of trouble.*

(Int. Marake, 2021).

This allows them to transport anything across the border with minimum challenges, even where official regulations are tightened. They operate outside the regulations and because of their social networks within the border system, they can circumvent official processes. In an interview with one of the transporters, he revealed:

> *Through my connections at the border post crossing over to Zimbabwe without paying duty is made easier. I have known several police officers and immigration officials from both sides whom l give money for lunch in return for crossing while I skip procedures.*

(Int. Marvellous Shoko 2020).

For *Omalayisha* social networks in official positions are significant since they mainly transport *amalahle* (people with no official documents), who are their main clientele. They also do not make

it a secret that this has become their main business. They openly advertise this part of their business:

> *Those without requisite travel documents do not worry; we are here to serve you. You pay and we will pay our way to your destination. This is the purpose of the relationships that we establish. We help each other. You may think that you are paying me a lot of money, but most of this money is not mine. Sometimes, I get home without anything from what you people pay. But I am always happy to pay, keep people happy, and remain in business. This business is about people and the relationships you have with them. We try to always maintain cordial relationships with many people in different positions along the way.*

(Int. Sokhela 2020).

> *I meet most of our clients at Park Station where most border traders take their buses to Zimbabwe. We negotiate to carry their goods and get them cleared at a lower fee than the actual declaring fee. Some are referred to us by people we have served before. The most important thing is that they pay so that I can negotiate their safe passage. The good thing is that our clients know that we have friends that we need to keep happy for their goods to arrive safely at home. Some can even help us if the need arises.*
>
> (Int. Mkhululi Moyo 2020).

Omalayisha indicated the importance of making sure that client expectations and interests are prioritized as this becomes a key factor in ensuring that clients remain doing business with them. As such, they find it more convenient to deal with people from surrounding and close areas in Zimbabwe for ease of delivery and efficiency. This means that they rarely service persons from far areas although they may have one or two such cases. This even puts more pressure on them to ensure that they provide an efficient service, and in their business, efficient service is determined by the networks they develop and how happy they keep them.

As noted by Maombera and Thebe (2019) *Omalayisha* have been key agents in the movement of children without parents and affidavits to and from South Africa, by using social networks at the border posts. Most Zimbabweans who informally work in South Africa usually send back their young children, in particular babies, home for easy upkeep by their grandmothers and grandfathers.

According to Nde Ndifonka, the Southern African spokesman for the IOM, "Parents living in South Africa often pay *Omalayisha* to bring children across the border and this is a 'small step' to becoming a human trafficker" (Irin, 2009). However, Maombera and Thebe (2019) distinguish this form of people smuggling from trafficking in that this is an agreement between two parties, and no duress is involved. As indicated, there is an element of choice and parents always choose *Omalayisha* that they know and trust, and more importantly, these children are often delivered to their destination.

An immigration official agreed that this happens and has been happening even before the changes to immigration regulations in South Africa. *Omalayisha* simply continued as if there were no changes, and migrant's parents continued getting visits from their children and these children would return to Zimbabwe to attend school after holidays, without the requisite documents. He remembered:

> *I once saw Omalayisha traveling with 5 children to Bulawayo; they were all below the age of 12 and their parents were not among the traveling party. I cannot say they passed through immigration, although the other passengers did. There are many points of interaction here at the border. If they passed through the final checkpoint, we must assume that they had satisfied all requirements. These people, Omalayisha, make it their responsibility that requirements are satisfied. I do not want to say how, but in the end, they proceed, and they come back again.*

(Int. Tlou 2020).

Moving goods, moving people, and even moving the dead, without proper papers, has been a major business for *Omalayisha*. A variety of goods, people including children have been smuggled out of and into South Africa through human relations. In these relationships, money often changes hands: *Omalayisha* would charge R2000 to smuggle adults and children and charge goods per weight and pay a 'cool drink' fee at the border for the safe passage of their cargo (Netsianda, 2007).

5.2.4. The cross-border bus service

Compared to *Omalayisha*, the cross-border passenger bus service is a relatively new entrant in the cross-border movement of cargo to Zimbabwe, but in its short time, it has occupied an important role by providing an alternative to *Omalayisha*. While the operations of *Omalayisha* are clandestine and with no fixed timetables or days of operation, these operate in a more organized manner, with fixed timetables and bus terminus. Compared to *Omalayisha*, they cannot offer door-to-door convenience and because of their schedules, they are not suited to informal cross-border migrants that use undesignated entry points and travel long distances in the bush. Cross-border bus crews, therefore, do not have any relationship with *Izimpisi* and mostly work with the touts at the border post.

The cross-border bus service can be divided into two: the luxury coach services that include Greyhound, Citi Liner, InterCity, Inter Cape and Trans-lux, and City to City (which have since withdrawn from the route; and the standard buses, which include mainly Zimbabwean operated fleets. While the luxury buses are more formal and use a booking system, standard buses are very informal and operate on a walk-in system. This creates opportunities for the transportation of undocumented migrants and unaccompanied goods. Smuggling of undocumented migrants has become a central activity of these buses, which have also adopted tactics and strategies like those of *Omalayisha*. These, however, mostly use formal entry points, which makes social networks a central part of the cross-border process.

As we will see from the case below, the process involves a number of actors. Tapuwa was invited for an interview in Johannesburg, which was supposed to take place within 5 days, but he did not have a passport although he had made an application. He spent three days camped at the passport

office hoping that the passport would be issued with no success. Desperate and dejected, he approached his aunt who was involved in cross-border trading for advice. He narrated his story:

> *The journey was normal until we got closer to the Zimbabwean border, when people without passports were taken off the bus and loaded into a cargo minibus without seats, and driven to an area in Beitbridge called Dulivadzimu, where we parked for some time. I assumed the bus proceeded to the border post. After the driver had received a call, we started again, into the Zimbabwean border post, where the driver was allowed through without being searched or processing his passport. He drove into the South African border post, where the same thing happened, and we were dropped at the Shell Garage, just after the border, where we reconnected with the bus we had boarded in Harare and continued with our journey.*

(Int. Tapuwa, 2020).

These buses also are involved in the smuggling of goods, and they allow people to send unaccompanied goods, just like the rural bus service in Zimbabwe. Migrants can send goods by paying a fee to the bus crew, which then takes the responsibility to pass the goods through customs. These buses have become popular with traders, who buy goods in South Africa and want to avoid paying duty tax at the border. To achieve this, they depend on the bus crews to ensure the safe passage of the goods. According to one of the bus crews:

> *Traders buy goods in South Africa and pay a fee for us to transport the goods to Zimbabwe. They do not declare the goods at the border post. Instead, we take over the responsibility of the goods, pay a blanket sum to our man at the border post and we are allowed to proceed with the goods.*

(Int. Marowa, 2020).

To avoid these goods being confiscated at road checkpoints in Zimbabwe, the bus crews meticulously time their journeys/trips. As a result, most trips are conducted during the night from 6 pm to 6 am when the roads are free of police. Another one concurred:

A typical night journey of about 600km from Harare to Beitbridge takes close to 12 hours. The buses usually arrive at Beitbridge Border Post at dawn when the border is less busy. Such timing is essential in the business, and it works well for those with intentions to jump the border and smuggle goods.

(Int. Chirau, 2021).

For these traders, choosing the right bus is paramount. Referrals are very important in deciding which bus to use. The study discovered that some bus crews had better connections at the border post than others. Certain buses were cited as better options because they were not searched at the border post. In the words of one migrant:

The bus crew has long paved the way

(Int. Mai Farai, 2020).

During one bus journey to Harare, I met Tatenda, who was referred to the bus crew by her aunt, who used the bus regularly. She said:

I have a lot of goods and I do not want to pay duty at the Zimbabwean border my aunt recommended this bus. I know that the border is the most difficult place and goods must be unloaded for declaration and reloaded again. I wanted to avoid that. As you saw, our bus did not off-load luggage. The crew used its connections at the border, listed items on the declaration form, submitted it with a small amount called 'cheroad' (for the road), and got it stamped. I realized that the whole process is difficult and depends on who you know. While this was happening, some buses were forced to off-load their luggage and every passenger was asked to declare their goods.

(Int. Tatenda 2020)

However, these human interactions that are so key for the safe passage of goods and human cargo are not only necessary to avoid duty or to facilitate the movement of people without documents,

but they also happen even when no illegal transaction takes place. Bus crews may use their relationships at the border post to jump long queues and therefore buy time. This is particularly important in the context of congestion at the border post. Bus crews can either communicate directly with officials or with touts who act as go-betweens. In such situations, a chain of relationships is initiated since the process involves the bulk of the bureaucratic process – immigration, customs, CID section, and even those at the exit gates. It was because of this that some passengers preferred using luxury buses because they were not delayed at the border post. One passenger captured these interaction dynamics:

> *We left Johannesburg on Friday evening. The bus had been delayed due to a trailer problem, and we were among the last buses to depart. Everyone was worried about the journey taking too long, but the driver assured us that we were going to recover the time lost. On the way, he made a few telephone calls, which proved to be time serving. When we arrived at the South African border post, there were about 10 buses ahead of us. The conductor collected our passports and asked us to stay seated. After about 20 minutes he returned with all the passports and the journey resumed. The same thing happened at the Zimbabwean border post, where our passports were given to one of the touts, who disappeared into the building. In the meantime, we were asked to submit our declaration forms, which the conductor took with him, before re-emerging with a Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) official, who handed back the stamped declaration forms, and the bus was cleared to proceed. The whole process at the two-border post took about an hour and we left buses that had arrived earlier behind.*

(Int. Amai Dambura, 2020).

However, not all buses are well connected at the border post. There are buses that passengers said they avoid because the crew often fail to assist their passengers, who end up paying more or losing goods. It also emerged that some bus crews do not want to pay, which in turn disadvantages passengers. Others, simply have bad relationships with the touts, who are very influential actors at the border post. As such, they find it difficult to assist their passengers. In an interview, one woman told a sad story. She was travelling from Masvingo to Johannesburg. She boarded a bus at Masvingo bus terminus around 7pm and upon arrival at the border the drivers asked her if she had an affidavit since she was travelling with a minor without the presence of the father. She

indicated that she had stored the affidavit was in her phone, but she needed printing facility at the border to print out the affidavit. The driver informed her that he cannot help her since he had no connections at the border.

While she managed to go through the processes on the Zimbabwean side, she was denied entry at the South African side because they needed a printout. She reported her problem to the bus crew, but they said they cannot help her. Once the bus had cleared they left her and her daughter at the border. She finally got help from another bus, which arrived at the border at 4.00am. She paid R500 and the crew assisted her through immigration processes.

She regretted:

> *It was when I realized that the first bus was not well connected at the border while my last bus had so many connections even with the police*.

(Int. Amai Chipo, 2020).

Some cross-border buses, like the luxury coaches, operate a strictly professional service and are mostly not involved in illicit dealings as passengers are booked at the central offices. These bus crews may not necessarily need to be connected to facilitate cross-border movements. However, as alluded to earlier, human connections become necessary for negotiating time, and they seemed to be the most connected when it comes to time efficiency. In cross-border transportation, even for a professional service, you cannot avoid buying time. This may not necessarily mean paying bribes, but occasional recognition including transporting some goods for officials from Johannesburg, paying a cool drink fee, and sometimes sharing lunch.

In summary, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, whether cross-border movements are legal or illegal, actors that have strong networks can circumvent challenges associated with the Beitbridge Border Post, which is by far the busiest border in Southern Africa. With regards to informal movements, using buses has become a popular conduit of ‘smart entry’ used by irregular travellers and

transporters, who exploit social networks developed between the transporters and officials at the border post. These buses, like *Omalayisha*, now can move anything across the border if the right networks are established and rewards are realized, it is also important to note that other transporters also use the same networks to negotiate cumbersome border processes. The next section discusses the new entrants in the clandestine movement of goods and people, the long-distance haulage trucks.

5.2.5. Long-distance haulage trucks

Haulage truck drivers have been key smuggling agents, carrying migrant goods and people, even during the lockdown period. Beitbridge Border Post is also the exit point for countries like Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. So, they are many trucks passing through migrant-sending areas in Zimbabwe. Some of these trucks are driven by Zimbabwean drivers. The system is also dependent on referrals as truck drivers refer people to other drivers who have loaded and are leaving if they are not available. So, there is this constant web of relationships that even if the driver and the migrant do not know each other, they are connected through referrals.

Trucks that provide essential services are allowed to operate using the border for them to trade during the period of the lockdown and to keep the economy open. These trucks are not only carrying goods but also assisting in the illicit movement of migrants with no papers into and out of South Africa. Truck drivers are regular users of the border, and are familiar with border officers and police because they spent days at the border awaiting clearance.

A Malawian truck driver explained how his fellow Zimbabwean drivers contact him to make ferry people into and out of South Africa when he is traveling:

> *Most of these people l carry l does not know them l just get calls from my friends and location to pick them up. Some l drop them off in towns in Zimbabwe on my way to Nyamapanda Border Post. I have dropped off people in Murehwa, Harare, and Zaka.*

(Int M'bale Chihuli, 2020)

5.2.6. Informal and formal border agencies

In the cross-border movement of goods, two types of facilitators can be identified at the border posts. These have become key agents in the illicit movement of people and goods, particularly through *Omalayisha* and long-distance haulage trucks. Some of these agents have relationships with border officials and have used these relationships to the benefit of their clients. Informal agents include what has become known as *Izimpisi* (hyenas) (in cross-border language), mainly because of their knowledge of the local terrain, particularly the forest, and their ability to navigate through the forest to facilitate informal cross-border movements for *Omalayisha.* There are, however, some of them who are stationed at the border post and act as touts and provide assistance to drivers and other travellers. These have a strong relationship with border officials, and some are on the payroll of some border officials, who use them as middlemen between them and their clients who require illicit services. Formal agents, on the other hand, are clearance agencies, which mainly work with long-distance haulage trucks.

5.2.7. *Izimpisi* (The Hyenas of Limpopo)

As indicated earlier in this section, *Izimpisi* will be divided into two, the touts at the border posts and informal cross-border facilitators for ease of analysis. The touts are mostly Zimbabweans, who now make a living through hustling at the border post. They perform many things, including assisting travellers with language, assisting travellers with completing complex immigration forms amongst others.

However, their most important job is liaising with immigration and customs officials on clients that require favours. They know almost every official, and know officials that are corruptible or corrupt, and would often facilitate the border processes for *Omalayisha* and other travellers in need of assistance. They act as marketers and are always on the lookout for people that may require favours. They are also well known to *Omalayisha* and bus crews who would approach them for quick services. They are also well-connected to security agencies and often act as their eyes, informing them of suspect movements around the border, if such movements have not passed through and been facilitated through them. In interviews, one confessed to assisting *Omalayisha:*

I work here every day. I have very good relationships with people that work here – immigration officials, customs, you name them. My job is to assist people without or with expired passports through immigration and to assist people to go through customs. I talk to officials and of course, there is a price for everything. Through my services, Omalayisha can clear their vehicles without paying much. I negotiate the prices with ZIMRA officials and get the clearance. They pay me, I help them. I have their numbers and they have my numbers. They phone me before they get here, and I organize everything. They do not waste time in queues. I do the running for them

. (Int. Mkoma Chaumba, 2020).

The world of border jumping is a treacherous and dark terrain that exposes the borderland communities, especially the smugglers and the smuggled, to life-threatening risks and challenges. This is the world of *Izimpisi* (people smugglers) they are experts of human smuggling, whose work involves the most dangerous and arduous tasks of taking people across the crocodile-infested Limpopo River and over the Nabob fence, along hidden routes and dodging the heavily armed border patrols. *Izimpisi* operate differently because they rarely interact with border officials. Their terrain is the river and the Musina forest where they smuggle people and goods. These are mainly people from Beitbridge, with relations and knowledge of neighbouring South African communities, and they have used these relationships to develop a complex system of people smuggling that officials have failed to stop. One of the officials reasoned:

These are of Zimbabwean origin and comprise mainly of young men who reside predominantly on the Zimbabwean side of the border but move easily between the two countries and are familiar with the territory. They are part of the border jumping syndicates that usually operate at night to avoid detection and through their navigational skills honed through long years of practice and familiarity with the environment, the Izimpisi usually get from one side of the border to the other safely without maps, compasses or GPRS devices.

(Int. Ndaramu, 2021).

While the South African government has deployed soldiers to patrol the fence and the forest, *Izimpisi* have developed complex coping strategies and developed relations with some of these soldiers. Through their networks within the soldiers, they know where the patrols are for the day, which allows them to perform their job successfully without interference from the soldiers. Their

skills and knowledge of the forest made to be them trusted by *Omalayisha* to facilitate the informal movements of people smuggled into South Africa.

Thabo Kunene, a freelance undercover journalist, who undertook the journey with these human expert smugglers, vividly explains the responsibilities and tasks of *izimpisi* in a documentary entitled 'Smuggling migrants through the Limpopo River and Musina Forest'.

I have an appointment with a smuggler called Ndlovu. His job is to guide the smugglers and their clients through the thick forest, help them avoid the guards, and cross the border safely. I am very nervous. Crossing the border into South Africa is not only illegal but also highly dangerous. Many 'border jumpers' die trying to reach the 'promised land'. Ndlovu is wearing a T-shirt with a picture of Jacob Zuma on his large belly, an indication that things are going well for him. The Izimpisi and Omalayisha' are said to be very rich. Ndlovu claims to make more than US$300 per day. With the money, Ndlovu says he has bought a five-bedroom house in Bulawayo, which most professional Zimbabweans cannot afford. We wait in silence for a phone call from the drivers who will collect us in three vehicles. Then he breaks the silence. "Are you sure you want to take the risk and join the smugglers?" Then his phone rings. Ndlovu orders me to join the traffickers for a briefing. When I arrive, a trafficker demands payment from everyone in the group. Those with no money are asked to provide contact details of their relatives who must pay for them on arrival in Johannesburg. I paid 1,500 South African rands in cash.

The briefing follows. We are given 6 short and simple rules:

- *When you come across soldiers, don't run away or you will get killed.*
- *If they stop us, don't say anything, the traffickers will do the talking.*
- *When crossing the river, hold each other's hands in a single file.*
- *If a crocodile approaches, attacks or kills one of you, the others must carry on with the journey.*
- *If you stumble on human remains in the bush don't panic, continue walking.*
- *And most importantly: don't talk, just whisper.*

We are told that there is no going back once the group is in the bush. We are also told to eat before we leave. Women in the group are told to change into jeans or tights. Our dangerous journey begins in the evening. It's very dark. We are dropped near the river, about 10 km from the immigration checkpoint. The drivers will meet us on the other side. We wade slowly in single file across the knee-deep river and walk through the thick forest. I notice human remains under a bush. Pieces of clothing are scattered around the bones. We are told they belonged to border jumpers who did not make it. The sight does not appear to deter the group. After three hours of walking through dense forest, we approach the border. There is only one major obstacle to go, a three-meter-high barbed wire fence. It used to be electric, but the fence was switched off when apartheid was abolished. The guides spot a patrol. We have to wait half an hour until we are given an all-clear signal. We clamber over the razor wire fence, ripping our clothes and suffering serious cuts and bruises. On the other side, the border jumpers smile and pat each other on the back, but the traffickers warn us it is not time to celebrate yet. The traffickers are anxious about the roadblocks. Some border jumpers and traffickers have been arrested there by immigration officers in the past. Not all of them are easy to bribe. We are picked up in the vehicles and race to the border because of the danger of traveling at night. When we get there, a police officer demands our passports. The traffickers negotiate with him. We are told we have to contribute money to pay the officer, or they will have us arrested. We pay 600 rands and are let through. I feel a huge sense of relief. We arrive in Johannesburg in the morning. For some, it is time to celebrate. But others are held in houses until their relatives pay the R1500 for their journey. For them, the journey has not ended. It has only just begun.

(Kunene, 2020)

The *izimpisi* are part of the *Omalayisha* smuggling social network and they maintain close relationships with *Omalayisha* who pay their cheque. They are given clients and goods by Omalayisha to cross through the forest. *Omalayisha* uses their relationship with *izimpisi* to move goods and people and in exchange, they share the profits with them. The importance of these relationships to *Omalayisha* should not be underestimated because they allow them to move anything across the border.

5.2.8. Clearing agents

The Beitbridge Border Post is also well-known for vehicle smuggling. Vehicles of all types illegally pass through the entry point from South Africa into Zimbabwe through expansive and highly sophisticated networks comprising of clearing agents, the police, and immigration officers. Most clearing agents at Beitbridge are residents of Beitbridge town. They get most of their customers through motor sales companies who refer their clients to clearing agents. The clients are mostly people that need assistance with the clearing of vehicles. The agents explained:

Our customers are usually those who need help with clearing their motor.

(Int. Mkoma Vengai, 2020).

> *The border is a busy place and long queues slow down the clearing process, therefore, clearing agents become handy to customers who require our services because our service is time efficient and reliable. This is because we have good relations with immigration officers from ZIMRA and South African Revenue Services (SARS) who assist with the clearing of vehicles without any hindrances.*

(Int. Clearing agent Y, 2020)

Chidochashe a former student at the University of Venda said when she finished her bachelor's degree, she bought a car with her returning resident permit that meant duty-free importation of goods, which meant she could access the border legally and import her car legally. However, she encountered difficulties:

> *Buying the car was simple but getting to the border anticipating a smooth process to clear my car was no child's play. It came to my knowledge that return residents are supposed to purchase a car less than USD 3000. This changed my situation and meant l was meant to pay duty since my car had cost USD 3500. The ZIMRA official who served me offered to help me and connected me to a clearing agent who was at the border. He said, "talk to this guy he will assist you". After getting in touch with the guy he charged me a fee of USD 500 which he refused to negotiate because he had to share with the ZIMRA officer who referred me to him. He took my car papers and told me to wait for him*

within 30 minutes l was called in for an interview which is part of the process when one has a returning resident permit. From the interview, my car had been cleared. I was set to drive to Harare.

(Int. Chido Gowera, 2020).

One agent explained:

Most of us have good relations with SARS and ZIMRA officials, which is reciprocal meaning they get him, clients; they help him to fast track and jump procedures and at the end share profits.

(Int. Mkoma Ziso, 2020).

If one cannot afford the use of clearing agents, the experience can be very frustrating as highlighted by the excerpt from an interview with Sekuru Jeffy from Bulawayo, who had to spend days at the border:

I stood in the queue to clear my car at the border for hours, which turned into days. While in the queue we were being approached by people who offered to help us clear our cars fast. I did not have extra cash besides my full tank of petrol and duty money, so l knew l was not going to afford these guys my only option was to do everything by the book. Day 6,l cleared my car and took off to Bulawayo. These past 6 days l was sleeping at the border in my car without eating proper food.

(Int. Sekuru Jeffy, 2020).

The clearing agents are key actors if importers want to circumvent official processes. They can use their connections with Zimra officials to the benefit of the importer. Car dealers in Zimbabwe often utilize their services to maximize profits. Mr Vee, a car dealer from Harare, indicated how an agent assisted him undervalue his car to pay less duty:

Honestly speaking if l pay the full duty fee, it means my cars will be expensive when l resell them. Looking at a country like Zimbabwe with the current situation most people opt for cheap vehicles. Therefore, my guys at the border help me skip duty and some undervalue my cars off course for a fee (he refused to identify them or mention even their professions).

(Int. Mr Vee 2020).

4.2.9. Border immigration officials

The interactions process is not confined to actors outside the border institutions. Officials at the border post at both the South African and Zimbabwean border post are a central component of this complex web. The interactions at the border are bureaucratic and are done for mutual benefits amongst bus drivers, clearing agents, truck drivers, and *omalayisha*. However, officials also emerged as major beneficiaries as they are paid for their part. Immigration and customs officials are actively involved in the system of moving illegal goods and people. They take bribes from regular border users, and they create a web of relations. The exchange of money is key in the process as explained by one bus driver:

> *As a bus driver sometimes if l am not carrying hot staff (people with no papers) when l am passing the border l just leave a cold drink fee to the officials and police. This will help me one of those days when days are dark, and my bus is burning.*

(Int. Driver Moyo 2020).

Advance payments, as explained by Thebe (2011), help create relationships and connections for future use. Through these advance payments, connections are developed and border officials may not be paid direct bribes to assist, by regular kickbacks that cement the relationship. While no border official indicated that they had received bribes, they agreed that they know *omalayisha*, bus crews and truck drivers. Some of these official have used the services of these actors to bring goods from Johannesburg or Pretoria. As one explained:

> *Relationships with drivers are important. Sometime you need thin g to be bought from South Africa, and you cannot go there physically. You can ask them to bring these items for you…..and they have always done. Some of these people are even relatives. Relationships do not cease because you work in different jobs. Our jobs can be complementary and mutually beneficiary. I have benefited a lot from drivers in the past and I will continue asking them for favours.*

[Int. Officer Mudiwa, 2020).

The relationships developed may compromise the professional integrity of officials, but the officials maintained that they are necessary. They also agreed that there are times when they have to return the favour. However, they did not see this as corruption as they indicated that they did nothing underhand. The assistance may include assisting the bus to jump the queue, fast tracking the processing process, etc. However, official also indicated that they have heard of cases where the relationships involved money and where goods and people pass clandestinely, but have never experienced it first-hand. This was understandable, given the sensitivity of the topic. No official was going to be open like *omalayisha* about what the exchange involved. However, they agreed that clandestine dealings are prominent in these relationships and that good and people move across without going through the formal process. It was a case of, "'not me, but I have heard". No one had seen these transactions taking place, but they happen on a daily basis and in front of their eyes.

Border officials, particularly those immigration and customs officials (both SARS and ZIMRA) also have a complex relationship with touts that hang around the border post, masquerading as porters and people that assist travellers in completing documentation. These touts identify people who do not have proper documentation and refer them to these officials for assistance. Some of these touts have access to offices and often take people behind to the officials. They officials often assist people brought or referred by these touts, or deal directly with *omalayisha* and the bus crew. They do not interact direct with the public, except in exceptional circumstances.

5.3. Accessing the Border during Lockdown

Migrant social network to access the border became even more important during the period of the lockdown, when both countries put in place measures to contain the spread of the COVID 19 virus. The containment measure led to changes in the movement of goods and people across the

border. Initially, no movements were allowed except the movement of essential goods and supplies.

> *Cross-border road transport passenger services are not permitted to operate with effect from the date of publication of these directions, except when transporting passengers in line with the provisions of the regulations (returning residents with permits and passports). Cross-border trips are prohibited during this period, apart from the transportation of essential goods and cargo. For one to access the border a covid testing certificate valid 72hrs before traveling time is needed for clearance.*

(Daily Marverick, 16 June 2020).

Later, South Africa allowed for the repatriation of Zimbabwean citizens. However, the containment measure impacted negatively on the movement of remittances as *omalayisha* were not included in the category of people moving essential cargo, while the bus service ceased operations, except for repatriation purpose. This section provides an overview of the social networks involved in the process and the role that they played in facilitating smooth cross-border movements, despite the barriers imposed by the regulations put in place following the Corona Virus outbreak in March 2020.

As we have seen throughout the discussion, social networks works to upset official protocols and systems that are put in place to ensure control. It is therefore not surprising that they found a place and a role in a context of containment, which provided barriers to everyday activities. Migrant social networks strive under these circumstances, and over the years, they have been successful in outwitting the law. COVID 19 provided a platform for these social networks to operate in order to circumvent the negative effects on migrants and their homes in Zimbabwe. The ZimSN chairperson in South Africa in an interview captured the challenges posed by COVID 19 restriction on Zimbabwean migrants:

Border restrictions that have been imposed or increased as part of measures to respond to Covid-19 are affecting heavily on Zimbabweans in and outside South Africa. Hundreds of Zimbabwean nationals with medical conditions were refused treatment by local hospitals and clinics because they do not have proper documents as their permits expired during the lockdown.

The situation of the migrant population, including Zimbabweans, was different from that of South Africans. Migrants were likely to be discriminated from food parcel provisions, and yet, most had been made redundant and were out of work and without incomes. As reported in the Daily Maverick, 16 September 2020:

Furthermore, most of the Zimbabwean undocumented migrants in SA work in the food and beverage industry, therefore, they lost their jobs as many restaurants, shops and taverns closed due to the outbreak. Hitting hard times, the remaining option was to go back home.

(Daily Maverick, 16 September 2020).

While the border was later opened for returning residents, due to their undocumented status, some were denied access to the border, as they were not regarded as returning residents, thus restricting their movement to their homes and to ways to send food parcels became difficult subjecting their families to hunger who were also in a lockdown.

In their study on migrant mothers and the challenges posed by immigration policy changes on the cross-border movement of children under the age of 18, Maombera and Thebe (2019) showed how migrant mothers fell back on their social networks and relationships with cross-border transporters to facilitate the movement of children across the border. It was expected that migrants would use their web of connections to buses (used for repatriation of returning residents) and truck drivers to access the border since it was the only permitted transport to use the Beitbridge border.

Meanwhile, those in Zimbabwe who wanted to travel to South Africa were also restricted. The Zimbabwean government kept the border closed to non-essential travellers to limit the transmission of Covid-19 variants. Zimbabwe's economy is mostly informal and depends on cross-border trading, street vending, and small enterprises. Rugube and Matshe (2011) argue that informal cross-border trading has become a lucrative sector for people who fail to meet the pre-requisites for formal employment in those countries perceived as better in terms of economic opportunities.

According to Sunday Times (6 January 2021), "not only are these migrants coming to seek out a better life for themselves, but many are running away from a lockdown after Zimbabwe's acting president, Kembo Mohadi announced new Covid restrictions". The continued lockdown had destroyed the livelihoods as illustrated by the case of Hellen Mherekumombe, a cross-border trader who was taking care of her family by selling handbags in South Africa and could not continue with her business due to the continued closure of land borders. This was echoed by the story of another Zimbabwean woman who said, "I am only able to feed my family by going to South Africa through the Beitbridge, but the border is closed," She further said, "And I can do something illegal like jumping the border, by talking to a truck driver to cross me over to Messina. I am the one who is responsible for my kids' welfare, I am the mother and the father."(eNCA News, 2020). This reveals how the lockdown measures perpetuated illicit border crossing and illegal migration.

The implementation of border closure and the Covid test certificate requirements became a barrier to the movement of people and goods across Beitbridge Border Post, which forced migrants to resort to connections from haulage trucks and repatriation buses that had access to the border during lockdown to assist them to move back home and send goods through the border. The Covid-19 restrictions resulted in increased traveling costs due to limited transport between Harare and Pretoria. Furthermore, migrants exploited their networks to find a place on the limited buses and for fraudulent Covid 19 certificates in order to circumvent lockdown restrictions at the border. This is affirmed in a number of interviews:

I boarded a bus to Zimbabwe at Bosman station in Pretoria. I paid my bus fare, gave them a copy of my study permit and copy of the Covid-19testing certificate as per standard procedure, and got on the bus. As the bus started off the conductor announced that those who did not have permits to take out R2000 as per agreement. Shockingly l was the only person with a valid permit the rest paid that extra amount. After that, the conductor requested people to take out their Covid-19 test certificates and three-quarters of the bus did not have the certificates and were told to pay R500. When we arrived at the border the driver and the conductor went off the bus and told everyone to remain seated. Later, they requested me to go stamp my passport when l got to the counter the official who served me was the one who was clearing our bus. Before he stamped my passport the driver requested it, and he put some money inside then stamped and went back to the bus. In less than 30 minutes, our bus was cleared to proceed no searching.

(Int. Student Tari, 2020).

This has increased the incidents of corruption at the border posts. The border officials are actively involved in the illicit movement of people with no permits during lockdown because they have a working relationship with bus drivers, which stretches from the time before the outbreak of Covid-19.

(Int. Shamiso, 2020).

Following the lockdown business became slow or shifts were limited so as our salaries hence transporting desperate Zimbabweans back home became a side hustle. Many Zimbabweans who work in South Africa fell on hard times during the lockdown and they needed to go home and accessing the border was difficult. Therefore, our services came in handy. We used our connections at the border to bypass some clearance stages and share the money with border officials. Most of these officials charge per head meaning that we had to t overcharge the service to maybe R6000 per person.

(Int Driver Moyo, 2020).

Zimbabwean migrants also had to find alternative ways of moving remittances, which were needed in Zimbabwe. Some used haulage trucks, which were increasingly becoming a major player in the movement of remittances. Others, however were located in areas where trucks do not pass through.

These fell back on *omalayisha*, who had found new ways of moving goods. Omalayisha would combine their cargo and a truck to move goods to Zimbabwe. This too needed social networking since such cargo did not have proper documentation. They relied on social networks along the journey, particularly relationships with traffic officers and border officials. Other resorted to smuggling goods through unofficial entry points. These transporters drew on their relationships with *izimpisi,* who would hire women from Beitbridge to ferry goods across the Limpopo River.

Since these activities happened during day, and law enforcement officers knew these routes, networking with law enforcement officers at both sides of the border was significant in the successful movement of goods. While there were incidents of goods that were intercepted and confiscated, such incidents were few and did not reflect the extent of cross-border smuggling that was taking place. Through these social networks, migrants were able to maintain a flow of remittances to their homes, while *omalayisha* remained in business. *Izimpisi* were kept busy organizing the movement of goods across, while locals gained employment. As one *omalayisha* put it:

> *Moving goods became expensive. Migrants paid high prices, but they understood the situation. We also had to pay our way to Bulawayo. At the end of the day, everyone was happy. The migrant was happy, I was happy, the police were happy and izimpisi and locals were happy. We generated employment, but they also assisted us to get goods across so that they can get to their destination.*

[Int. Nkosana Moyo 2020].

Outside the informal entry points, *omalayisha* had to enter into new relationships with clearing agents. These agents that mainly assist with the clearance of long distance haulage trucks became appropriate partners since the cargo ferried by *omalayisha* through hired trucks has no receipts. *Omalayisha* mainly transport goods from different migrants and receipts do not accompany most of the goods. The significance of clearing agents in facilitating the cross-border movement of goods cannot be ignored. These understand the system and know the loopholes, and their

relationships with other border officials, particularly in the customs departs, become a key asset. During the various phases of the Covid 19 lockdown, *omalayisha*, truck drivers and bus crews drew on their social networks of border officials to ensure that they overcome the restrictions in cross-border movements that are associated with the containment of the spread of the virus. The degree of network ties has resulted in interconnections that broke the barriers posed by Covid -19 restrictions on cross-border movement.

5.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the micro-level analysis of the study that explored interaction dynamics between and within main actors at the cross-border value chain. These main actors facilitated the movement of goods and people illegally at the border through their relationships with relevant people who are catalysts to these cross-border movements. Discussed also are the resultant smuggling networks/rackets comprising of the *izimpisi*, *omalayisha*, informal cross-border traders, bus crews, and migrants who employ various techniques in illegally crossing the border as well as in smuggling goods. Furthermore, social networks have proven to be effective as the border could be accessed even during a strict lockdown when it was closed.

The discussion has shown that African borderlands in general and the Zimbabwe-South Africa borderland in particular, are like texts full of rich, intriguing but complex narratives to tell. These environments are tangled in interactions where both sides are fighting to carve their respective niches in an ever-evolving marginal landscape. Most importantly, due to its porosity, the borderland opens opportunities for illicit trade involving a plethora of actors or players. Amongst these operations are the smuggling of humans (border jumping) and the smuggling of goods or vehicles. The borderland is typical of such smuggling activities where the smugglers and the smuggled have become part of the order of the borderland even during a serious lockdown.

CHAPTER SIX – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Introduction

This study was motivated by the increase in the informal movement of goods and people through the Beitbridge Border Post. This had led to narratives of a porous border and human smuggling. While these have dominated public, academic, and public debates, the question of the movement of both people and good is more complex than simplistic explanations of corrupt officials and operations of human smuggling syndicates operating between the two countries' shared border. While porous borders and human smuggling are certainly part of the story, the movement of goods and people is part of a broader human system that spread from Johannesburg to Zimbabwe. This is a complex system that cannot be confined to the geographical confines of the border. This requires an understanding of the complex web of social networks that operate at different geographical zones.

This study, thus, set out to investigate this complex web of social networks involved in cross-border movements between Johannesburg and Zimbabwe and to understand their complexity and implications for such complexity for the prevention of such illicit movements. Using an ethnographic approach that brought the researcher closer to the process, it sought answers to one principal question: what role do social networks play in negotiating the border to facilitate unauthorised cross-border movement of goods and people at the South African/Zimbabwe post of entry? This was explored with a focus on the personal relationships developed between different actors involved in cross-border processes.

The central objective of this study was to examine the nature of social networking involved in the illegal cross-border movements of goods and people between Zimbabwe and South Africa, including the role played by social network systems in negotiating bureaucratic border processes. It particularly explored the dynamics of interaction that happen in the process of negotiating what Maombera and Thebe (2019) have termed 'negotiating the border'.

To achieve this, it explored two main thematic areas: first, the different channels available for the movement of people and goods between South Africa and Zimbabwe, and second, the main actors involved in negotiating the border, their roles, and interaction dynamics. This conclusion aims to pull these themes together in a discussion of our understanding of this complex social process and to discuss their policy implications. After this introduction, this concluding chapter discusses the complex process of negotiating the border, focusing on the themes that emerged in the study. This is followed by the conclusions of the study. The purpose of conducting a study is to reach conclusion informed by the discussion of the findings. Finally, the chapter identifies some policy gaps and discusses the policy implications.

6.2. Discussions

Over the years, South Africa has grown to be a major migrant-receiving country in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Its migrant-receiving status derives in part from its relatively developed status and the challenge of poverty by its neighbours. Zimbabweans have formed the main migrant population in South Africa over the years. While migration from Zimbabwe has a long pedigree, it increased after the turn of the century (Crush et al., 2015). The complexity of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa is as complex as the migration process itself. While some migrants may have migrated for political reasons, it is agreed that the majority are economic migrants that have come to work for themselves and their families (Maombera and Thebe, 2019).

As such, these migrants have maintained strong ties with people in Zimbabwe, mainly through visitation and remittances. Added to that, some Zimbabwean migrants keep crossing the border into South Africa, making the process more complex. This section focuses on this complex process of movements and discusses the basic aspects of a process that Maombera and Thebe (2019) vividly captured as the negotiation of the border. Such a conception of the border recognizes the border as a barrier to movements, but also that, cross-border dynamics relate to human actions and should be understood as a social process involving social actors that interact in a social space.

6.2.1. Popular channels of movement of goods and people

If there is one thing that is difficult to ignore in any subject involving Zimbabwean migration, it is that of channels of moving people and goods. A host of literature has looked at this subject from different perspectives (Bloch, 2010; Crush et al., 2015; Tati, 2008; Thebe, 2011; Zinyama, 2002). Understandings of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa have often come to define the process as either formal or informal, suggesting aspects of legality and illegality. Within this context, narratives of cross-border movements between the two countries have revolved around corruption, porous borders, the revolving door syndrome, and smuggling syndicates. These seem to allude to channels of movement.

The study looked at these issues focusing, specifically on how goods and people move across the border. Two channels were identified in the literature and the study focused on these. It is accepted that the formal channel is open to migrants with proper documentation. Migrants that use these channels are captured in the system and their numbers are known. These do not present challenges to officials, except when they decide to overstay their visas. However, the most popular channel and one that poses challenges to officials is informal or clandestine movements that cannot be captured and are often complex.

Of course, the focus has often been on the use of unauthorized entry points, but the study following Thebe (2011) and Maombera and Thebe (2019) has shown that illegal goods and people also move through the formal border post. The study identifies entry methods that are presented as smart entry methods and dirty entry methods. The smart entry method, as the term suggests, involves the use of the formal border to move goods and people across illegally. As the term suggests, goods and people are smartly moved through the border by agents, including the bus crews, the Omalayisha, truck drivers, and clearing agents.

These movements involve a web of social networks including border officials and involve what Thebe (2011) has called paying a cold drink fee. The movement involves corrupt dealings with key role players at the border post. Movements involve networking, with the right networks the formal border that regulates movements of goods and people can successfully be negotiated, and anything can be moved across.

Dirty entry methods, on the other hand, involve using the informal channel which is popularly known as border jumping. In most cases, this involves the use of expert cross-border smugglers called *Izimpisi*, who are skilled in negotiating the physical and human obstacles of the border. They are mostly locals who understand the terrain and make a living out of the process of smuggling. Even within this process, social networking is at play, and these smugglers use their relationships with security agents to successfully execute smuggling activities. As Thebe (2011) noted, the use of a channel is determined by one's ability to pay, and dirty methods are popular among those that cannot pay large amounts of money. Migrants pay higher fees to go through the safer and smart entry method, lower fees, and, in some cases, pay-forward arrangements necessitate the use of informal entry points.

6.2.2. Main actors in the cross-border movements

Negotiating the border is a socially complex process, involving the contract parties and networks of other actors located in different geographical settings and play different, but significant roles in the process. As shown in the discussion, these actors can be grouped into distinct groups and play different roles in the process. Among these actors' networks, the client cannot be ignored and the significance of their role and interaction dynamics should not be ignored. They initiate the process, and have their financial resources are key in negotiating the border. They are therefore the starting point in any process of negotiating the border. However, the interaction does not begin with their contact with the other contracting party, the transporter, but way before that when the search for a suitable transporter begins.

Thebe (2011) and Maombera and Thebe (2019) talk of referrals by other migrants. This is where the complex web begins, either in Johannesburg or in Zimbabwe, depending on where the process begins. The client requires service and is willing to pay for it, but he/she also wants the best and most reliable service. He/she may know the transporter or may be referred, but he/she initiates the process and expects the successful execution of the task. The client enters into a contract, which determines the quality of the service he/she receives from the transporter, who is also dependent on other actors for the successful execution of the task contracted.

The transporters, therefore, form the second group in this web of social interaction. They include *Omalayisha*, the bus crews, and long-distance haulage truck drivers. They offer a service to clients they know or referrals. Sometimes, they provide a service to people they do not know and have never interacted with. However, these people (the clients) have paid based on the negotiated contract. They, therefore, have a mandate to execute the contract, which they would have been paid for. The payment often includes amounts that would be paid to other actors within the network system.

While they are the intermediary between the client and the recipient, they do not perform the task alone. They often connect to other actors, either within the border or outside it. The study showed how they could either make transactions directly with border officials or use others within the cross-border network system. These may include touts at the border post, clearing agents or *izimpisi*, if the smuggling involves moving people into South Africa. They pay for these services and have expectations of their networks. In cases of direct contact with officials, these relationships are often not new, and the border official and the transporter may have had prior interaction.

From the study, agents emerged as significant actors, who are very close to the process, and that without them this final stage will not materialize. It is often through their actions that goods and people move across the border. These agents, who include the formal clearing agents at the border post, who assist with the former clearance of goods, and informal agents involving touts and cross-border smugglers (izimpisi), found on the other side of the Zimbabwe border post, perform different duties, which are significant to be ignored. For example, it is often through their relationships with the gatekeepers and the officials that illicit goods can finally, and people can finally be moved across. Thus, their strategic location at the border post and their familiarity with the environment and the border terrain give them a key role.

Among these, are many touts and fake clearing agents who collaborate with immigration and customs officials on the one hand, and clients on the other, to facilitate the smuggling of goods and people, and mostly throng the Beitbridge Border Post These bogus clearing agents target travellers that may need assistance under the pretext of assisting them in completing the formalities

for a fee (Muzvidziwa, 2005; Munyanyi, 2015; Moyo, 2015). These are well connected to border officials, and some perform these duties on behalf of the border officials.

They are also appropriately placed within the border system and the disguised duties they perform allow them to easily identify potential clients, whom they would forward to the officials for assistance. Transporters have a long relationship with these touts, and they are their first port of call if they cannot facilitate the process directly. It does not end there, as Cabot (2012, 2019) noted, "Documents are bureaucratic artefacts that also find themselves at the centre of a complex network of relationships that at Beitbridge, partly rest on the manipulation of their perceived importance". Marongwe and Moyo (2015) disclose that some touts operate outside the customs checkpoints at the Beitbridge Border Post bearing goods on their heads.

In addition to these, the study identified the popular people smugglers, *izimpisi*, mainly situated on the Zimbabwean side of the border. They are every transporter's executioner and have been doing the job for *Omalayisha* for a long time. Cross-border facilitation has become a profession, and they make a living out of it. They are experts at negotiating both physical and human obstacles, and do this with great ease, despite the dangers involved. They mostly assist in illegal cross-border movements of people into South Africa, although with the outbreak of the Corona Virus, they were also involved in the cross-border movement of goods.

They are paid a fee to move people into South Africa and goods into Zimbabwe through undesignated entry points. Once they have been contracted by *omalayisha* to facilitate the movements, they will move people across the river, the electric fence, and along the forest. As others have observed, the *izimpisi* are notorious for evading the soldiers that patrol the border, and they have damaged the security fence to make it penetrable for their clients, the illegal travellers (Davies, 2008; Munyanyi, 2015; Duri, 2017). They often try to evade patrols, but they also have developed relationships with the security forces and know when there are no patrols. If they meet patrols, they negotiate on behalf of the clients and often succeed.

6.3. Conclusions

Does the analysis of the cross-border movement of goods and the actors involved tell us anything about the process? The dissertation has shown that goods and people move through the border post but argues that this cannot be explained through the deployment of narratives such as corruption and smuggling only. This is highly reductive, reducing a complex process that spans different geographical zones and includes a range of actors, who engage in a complex web of networking to a single geographical point, the border post. This analysis suggests a much more complex process of social networking that begins with the migrant-to be, or migrant, ends at the border post, and at times extends until the intended destination

With so much focus on stamping out corruption and preventing smuggling, it is easy to end up neglecting the social dynamics in the cross-border movement of goods and people. This cannot be reduced to a bureaucratic process, where the solution is seen as simply getting rid of the corrupt officials and tightening border controls. Negotiation of the border is about social networking, which makes it a social process. For example, the chain of relationships is too long and complicated by the spread through which the interactions take place. It also involves the human element. These are all complex dynamics that are difficult to understand by focusing on border officials and the smugglers. Furthermore, even if officials were to be removed from the equation, there are no guarantees that negotiations will not occur.

The complexity of the issue stems in part, from the Zimbabwean crisis and the need for survival. The movement of remittances is certainly a central part of the crisis. If Zimbabweans in South Africa are economic migrants, who came to work for themselves and their families, they would want to maximize the benefits of migration without incurring leakages. They will, therefore, seek strategies that best transfer the proceeds of their labour without incurring losses, and the cross-border transport system offers that. However, the border not only provides an obstacle that has to be overcome, but it also presents a social space. To achieve the objectives of migration, negotiation of the social space and social networks have been key in this regard. It is important, therefore, to focus on the social aspects of the migration and movement process, rather than the bureaucratic.
The movement of remittances has always been a social issue and not a commercial transaction. It has involved networks and the development of relationships that allow these to reach their destination. However, focusing on only the corruption and the smuggling aspect misses this critical

social element and risks oversimplifying a very complex process. The crisis in Zimbabwe has made social networking a critical part of survival, and the cross-border movement of goods and people has certainly been caught up in this complex social process.

The study emphasizes on the complexity of the process and argues that there is need to understand the social networking aspects of these cross-border movements. Who initiates the process, and the process of initiation are as equally important as that of allowing the goods to pass, which has been the focus. This does not happen in a social vacuum, but within a social space where relationships are developed, nurtured, and used for the success of the process. There is certainly no better way of capturing the complexity than Maombera and Thebe's (2019) deployment of the concept of 'negotiation'. These social actors are involved in a process of complex negotiations, with policy implications.

6.4. Policy Implications

This study has raised crucial questions on our understanding of cross-border movements, with some policy implications, and whether anything can be learned in the future. Zimbabwean migration to South Africa is going to be with us for a much longer time and with it too, are cross-border movements. Migration scholarship has often pointed to South Africa's porous borders and the challenges these pose on immigration policy. Without paying attention to the porous borders, any immigration policy will fail to achieve its objectives.

The study has shown how Zimbabwean migrants, *omalayisha, izimpisi,* and clearing agents are able to exploit the porous borders in order to continue clandestine activities in the movement of goods and people. The study also showed that migrants have always succeeded in negotiating the border when they travelled or were sending remittances to Zimbabwe. The chief agents in negotiating the border were *omalayisha, izimpisi,* and clearing agents who used their networks at the border or outside to overcome border obstacles. Without addressing the issue of porous borders, people will always exploit this loophole, and any provided policy will be ineffective.

So, what have we learned from this analysis of social networks and cross-border movements? This section looks at the specific policy lessons arising from the study and considers what may be done

differently and ways to improve. It divides these into two: one regarding the broader implications, and another, regarding specific implications to Zimbabwe.

6.4.1 Broad implications

6.4.1.1. Efficiency through pre-clearance

The Beitbridge border needs to be better managed to facilitate a smooth and faster flow of people and goods because better management promotes trade among countries by enhancing the free circulation of goods, improving predictability and reliability of shipments, and reducing transaction costs at the border. According to the research, border delays encouraged illicit trading and corruption as people attempt to bypass delays at customs and border posts officials. Therefore, border management efforts should be made to speed up the customs clearance processes by pre-inspecting goods and buses for proper documentation in the exporter's country rather than at the port of entry in the importer's country, and that pre-inspection drastically cuts inspection time down to 2 or 3 days instead of weeks within and along the borders. This will also minimize the illegal movement of people with no proper documents.

6.4.1.2. Make Beitbridge a One-Stop Border Post (OSBP)

The OSBP concept refers to the legal and institutional framework, facilities, and associated procedures that enable goods, people, and vehicles to stop in a single facility in which they undergo necessary controls following applicable regional and national laws to exit one state and enter the adjoining state. Currently, more than 80 OSBPs have been implemented in various parts of Africa as a means of reducing the time and costs of delays at border crossings along major corridors. The Chirundu OSBP, serving Zambia and Zimbabwe, is considered the first fully functional OSBP in Africa. One of the modern approaches for improving Beitbridge border operations is the establishment of OSBPs.

The OSBP concept promotes a coordinated and integrated approach to facilitating trade, the movement of people, and improving security. The concept eliminates the need for travellers and goods to stop twice to undertake border-crossing formalities. The OSBP concept calls for the application of joint controls to reduce routine activities and duplications. The OSBP concept

reduces the journey time for transporters and travellers and shortens the clearance time at border crossing points.

6.4.1.3. Regional collaboration

Improved regional collaboration between South Africa and Zimbabwe and within the SADC region can lead to the efficient movement of goods and people across borders. The fact that current staff and infrastructure were overwhelmed by demand requires the two governments to involve international financiers to facilitate the development of this important intra-Africa trade route. Roads into and out of the border from either end require duplex to create more lanes that could accommodate more traffic.

Related to this thinking are ZIMRA and SARS systems that need to be integrated and their procedures need to be harmonized to reduce duplicity of work and improve efficiency. All this can only happen when both governments have the political will and commitment to see this regional border post being turned around. The Beitbridge Border Post project has the potential to be a billion-dollar project therefore a strong team of qualified and experienced professionals must be assembled to manage the project professionally. Since the two countries may not have the capacity to finance, the project on their own they can consider the following funding options.

6.4.1.4. Physical and cyber-infrastructural changes

In addition, to resolving the long queues and corruption at the border, physical and cyberinfrastructure changes are required. This includes a concerted focus on the implementation of Information and Operations Technology. Efficient monitoring systems such as aerospace warning systems, which warn both South African and Zimbabwean authorities of any border movements, and unmanned aerial drones should be deployed over the areas mostly used as undesignated entry points that are used by *Izimpisi* to conduct smuggling activities. Technology such as infrared sensors and cameras also help track illegal border crossings (Military and Aerospace Electronics, Laser technology). This can mitigate the crimes that occur in the most remote places in the Limpopo forests.

6.4.2. Specific implications to Zimbabwe

6.4.2.1. Develop a bilateral agreement on customs

The key challenge emanating from this analysis, which has led to the deployment of social networks is the processing of goods moving across. The process emerged as cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive for migrants. Social networking became a strategy to negate costs and navigate through the process. A system similar to that, which is at play among Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, where goods bought from South Africa are exempt from customs duty, but government collects their share of the Value Added Tax (V.A.T).

People importing goods may submit receipts or invoices to customs, and the government claims its share based on the receipts received from the South African government. This will give people the incentive to keep invoices that will accompany goods. From a government point, it will allow the government to account for what was brought from South Africa at any particular time and how much it was worth. This can reduce the smuggling and illicit flow of goods that are not processed at the border as there would be no incentive for smuggling goods. Without such a system in place, smuggling of goods will continue through the process of networking. Social networking has strengthened because of the need to avoid official channels of moving goods.

6.4.2.2. Exempting goods that cannot be manufactured in Zimbabwe from excess duty

The study has shown that goods that flow across the border are mostly capital goods that are difficult to source in Zimbabwe. These include electronic goods and some consumer goods, which are not freely available in the country. Zimbabwean migrants travel to South Africa, mainly by bus to buy these goods and utilize the bus to transport these goods back to Zimbabwe. This affords people to draw on social networks in order to move these across the border without incurring additional costs. Emptying these goods from duty will allow people to move these goods through formal channels.

It has been noted that the illicit movement of these, whether through informal or formal entry points, is motivated by the need to pay duty. Migrants opt to utilize *Omalayisha* to move goods across because of their ability, as Thebe (2011) would put it, “to move anything across the border

at a price". In doing this, they rely on their relationships with border officials, which has made them popular among migrants. Truck drivers and the cross-border bus crew have also joined in this regard, and form part of the migrant's extensive social networks. It should also be noted that due to this complex social network system, the cross-border flows of these goods have been difficult to control. This has been particularly so, with the entry of the haulage trucks into the network system.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Informed Consent Form

You are hereby invited to participate in a research study by Thelma Chimimba, an MSocSci in Development Studies student in the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology at the University of Pretoria. The study seeks to investigate how the border Beitbridge border post is negotiated to allow the smuggling of goods and people between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The study seeks to understand more on how goods and human beings are smuggled through the border which is the watchdog of illegal goods trading, limit the number of goods and people travelling, and people with no irrelevant documents. Please take time to read through this letter as it gives information on the study and your rights as a participant. If you would prefer me to read the letter, I will read it in a language that you prefer.

Title of the study

'Social networks and negotiation of borders: understanding the social dynamics in the informal movement of goods and people across South Africa and Zimbabwe borders'

What will happen in the study?

The study will involve interviews with you on information and views on aspects that the study is interested in understanding. The interview will take about 30 minutes of your time and with your permission, maybe voice recorded so that I do not miss any important information that you share. You can choose to have the interview session in English or Shona.

Risks and discomforts

There will be no danger to you or your household or your institution. It may however be difficult for you to share some information, and you will be free not to answer any questions that may make you feel uncomfortable. If you experience some level of discomfort after joining the study, and you would like to

stop participation, please be free to let me know. You will be allowed to stop participation without any prejudice and the data already collected will be discarded.

Are there any benefits for joining the study?

You will not receive any money or gifts for your participation. Your contributions will assist me in developing a dissertation for my qualification, but it may also benefit the community and organization indirectly through findings that may assist in finding better ways of doing things.

Confidentiality

Apart from me as the researcher, the data will be shared with my supervisor, Prof. Vusi Thebe of the University of Pretoria. Every effort will be made to ensure that the information you share is not linked to you or your household. Your identity and that of your household will not be revealed and you will be identified through pseudonyms. The data will be stored in a password-protected computer during fieldwork, and in the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, for a period of 15 years for archiving purposes. If the data is used during this period, it will only be for research purposes.

The results will be produced in the form of a dissertation or scientific paper or may be presented at both local and international forums like workshops and conferences. The voice recordings of the interviews will not be broadcasted on radio, television, and internet or social media but will be utilised to make findings for the study.

Any questions?

If you have any questions or would want me to explain anything further, you are welcome to phone or text me on +27817263636. You can also send me an email at the following address thelmachimimba@gmail.com

CONSENT DECLARATION

I_____ (write your name) hereby agree to participate in this study.

Appendix 2: Interview Schedule

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

FOR

'SOCIAL NETWORKS AND NEGOTIATION OF BORDERS: UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE INFORMAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE ACROSS SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE BORDERS'

1. Who are they? (Profile)
2. Where are they located in the interaction process?
3. What is their role in the interaction process?
4. Where does the interaction start?
5. How do they use informal channels?

6 What are the challenges of using informal channels?

7. How do they use formal channels?
8. What are the challenges of using formal channels?
9. How is the process of negotiating border barriers?
10. What are the importance of networks at the border and outside?

Appendix 3: Plagiarism Declaration

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another person's work and pretend that it is one 's own.

2. I have used the …… convention for citation and referencing. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this essay/report/project/…… from the work(s) of other people has been attributed and has been cited and referenced.

3. This essay/report/project/……... is my own work.

4. I have not allowed and will not allow anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own work.

Signature _____